TEN

Trauma, resilience and utopianism in Second World War Hull

David Atkinson

When the fury of an enemy’s assault was loosed upon our city and we saw our heritage shattered under the weight of air attack, the spirit of the people of Kingston upon Hull was unbroken …. We resolved then that the only fitting tribute that could be paid to the devotion and courage of the brave people was to rebuild our city in a manner worthy of its citizens. Out of the ashes of the old would arise Phoenix-like a fairer and nobler city than we had ever known.1

The city of Hull suffered grievously in the Second World War. Its core maritime trades and routes were suspended, its trawling fleet was largely requisitioned or dock-bound and, as elsewhere around the UK, many citizens were enlisted, then served and sometimes died in the various theatres of this global war. But Hull also suffered more direct and lasting trauma. By most estimates, Hull was the second most blitzed British city of the war and the casualties were considerable. The figures vary between different sources, but around 1200 people were killed between 1940 and 1945; 20 per cent of them were children and 3000 more people were injured.2 In addition, many who escaped harm were still affected profoundly. Of Hull’s 92,660 inhabitable houses in 1939, only 5938 escaped damage, leaving 152,000 people (around half the population) homeless at some point during the war.3 Three million square feet of industrial space was lost and, by extension, the associated employment and economic sectors disappeared too. In the spring and summer of 1941 Hull suffered enormous destruction from ferocious bombing. Although there were lulls in the blitz before and after this period, and no bombs fell in 1944, Hull also suffered aerial attacks into 1945. Hull lived with the threat and fear of bombing longer than other British cities. Virtually no-one would have been touched by the trauma and the devastation.

The theories of aerial warfare that developed in the interwar period argued that bombing cities would lead to the disintegration of civilian morale and the consequent defeat of enemy states. The sustained bombing and damage in Hull was so marked that it prompted government fears that this might be the first British city to experience ‘civilian collapse’. When the phenomenon of trekking accelerated in the summer of 1941 whereby locals left the vulnerable city centre nightly for the relative safety of surrounding suburbs and countryside, this was seen as a sign of this imminent breakdown. In November 1941, Winston Churchill and the Royal Family visited Hull to boost the citizens’ spirits. That same month, but in a more secretive
move, the Ministry of Home Security also sent a team of psychologists northwards to assess this same morale and the likelihood of ‘civilian collapse’. The London team evaluated over 700 people ranging from dockworkers to school children. They found evidence of clear trauma, but decided that collective psychological collapse remained unlikely. The findings of the Hull survey would have significant repercussions for later British bombing strategy, but meanwhile the population of Hull was deemed sufficiently resilient and the city was left to carry on beneath the bombs.

Hull’s civic leaders responded to this same traumatic episode in a more proactive and positive manner. In 1941 the city council commissioned Patrick Abercrombie and Edwin Lutyens, the leading planner and architect of the day, to draw-up proposals to re-build the city using modern, rational planning. The resultant ‘Plan for the City and County of Kingston-upon-Hull’ (1945) envisaged a new, utopian city emerging from the fractured fabric of the earlier city. This example of the best contemporary planning practice would, it was hoped, repair the trauma of the blitz and, in response, engineer a radical new urban structure to restore the city’s pride, rebuild its communities, and generate better lives for post-war generations. Rather than plan for collapse and defeat, the City Council, Abercrombie and Lutyens demonstrated sufficient optimism and fortitude to envision a bold, modern city that would forge a productive future from amid the bombsites and devastation. The political contingencies and economic budgets of post-war reconstruction meant that most aspects of the ambitious plan were never realised, but these proposals offered a confident, utopian response to the trauma of the war that reflected Hull’s broader resilience to its wartime blitz.

**The rise of aerial warfare**

Hull was one of the earliest cities to experience the aerial bombing of civilians when subject to attacks by German Zeppelin airships in the First World War. While we are now familiar with the idea and practice of aerial bombing, these attacks were entirely new and terrifying for early twentieth-century civilians. For generations, Britain had waged war overseas and military reports filtered home slowly. In 1915, however, the spaces of warfare constricted dramatically as enemy airships arrived overhead without warning to change the public’s experience of warfare.

By dint of its geography, moreover, Hull and East Yorkshire became a focus for several aerial attacks because England’s east coast was the safest and most accessible target for the Zeppelins. The first raid on Hull of 6 June 1915 left 25 dead and around 100 wounded, while further raids between March 1916 and March 1918 killed 51 more. The city centre and the docks to the east of the River Hull suffered the worst destruction, and the damage was clearly visible. The new aerial threat brought the war to local doorsteps. Some people were traumatised and others began ‘trekking’ from the central districts each night to safer, rural spaces at the city’s edge.
Given all this, Hull had recent experience of the new and unpredictable threat of aerial bombing.

Advances in technology shifted the scope and nature of aerial warfare further in the interwar years, and its military potential was debated extensively in political, military and public circles. In particular, the idea of winning wars by targeting and traumatising civilians was developed by theorists of airpower. These theories were tested to murderous effect during the later 1930s in the Spanish Civil War and the Sino-Japanese war. Despite the casualties, cataclysmic civilian defeat did not materialise, although evidence of the destruction circulated globally through newsreels and newspapers. These accounts of this new form of warfare reinforced publics and politicians alike in the belief that cities and civilians were now inevitable targets for aerial bombing and, because civilian morale would likely be fragile, at some stage cities would break.

**Bombing Hull, 1940-1945**

Hull was bombed in the Second World war partly because of its strategic importance as a major port, transport hub and industrial centre, and partly due to accidents of geography. Alongside the emerging theories about destroying civilian bodies and spirits, interwar military strategy also argued that blitzing key industrial and transport infrastructure would cripple an enemy’s war effort. In this respect, Hull was a military target and it suffered accordingly. Hull’s docks, railway junctions and yards, and other industrial districts were targeted by German aeroplanes, and the pattern of bomb damage across the city (Figure 10.1) shows some clustering around the docks and industrial districts alongside the River Hull.

**Figure 10.1**

The German airmen knew where to locate these sites because they carried maps of their targets and guides that illustrated what they looked like from the air. The Luftwaffe bombing map of Hull (Figure 10.2) detailed 30 key targets: primary red targets (docks, railway junctions and barracks) and secondary purple targets (industrial sites, gasometers, wood yards, factories and mills). The pilots’ guide included an image of the River Hull to help pilots find and identify their targets (figure 10.3).

**Figure 10.2**

**Figure 10.3**

Bomb-aiming technology in the 1940s was imprecise and unreliable, however, and wind, anti-aircraft fire and decoy systems on the ground also meant that bombs
rarely hit their intended targets and often damaged adjacent areas. The development of Hull’s industrial districts and their surrounding working-class residential streets meant that housing was often hit by bombs aimed at industrial and transport sites. That said, several raids by isolated aircraft attacked civilian targets to fuel terror. The mass bombing raids of spring and summer 1941 also hit residential districts, with the destruction of civilians and their morale as a key objective.

In addition, there were also geographical reasons for Hull’s suffering. German aircraft flying across the North Sea towards northern and central England could navigate inland more easily once they identified the broad Humber estuary. Moreover, as the largest city on its banks and with the confluence of the River Hull and the extensive docks and railway yards reflecting any moonlight, Hull was often visible at night (despite ‘Blackout’ and decoy measures to protect the city). In addition, when poor visibility, the weather or failed navigation prevented the completion of raids on Manchester, Liverpool, Leeds or Sheffield, these spare bombs were sometimes dropped on Hull as the Germans returned home.

The bombing of Hull was sporadic, but stretched from 1940 to 1945. It was also shaped by the shifting rhythm and progress of the wider war. In 1940, German bombing prepared for potential invasion by attacking airfields and defences. After a seaborne invasion of Britain was abandoned in September 1940, the Luftwaffe switched to civilian and industrial targets to shatter fighting capacity and the population’s resistance. Consequently, February to September 1941 saw the most lethal bombing of Hull. With the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, however, aircraft were increasingly diverted to the new eastern front and the intensity of the blitz in Britain faded. Given these shifting priorities in the wider war, Hull occasionally went months without an attack (such as early 1942, the spring of 1943 and the whole of 1944). Nevertheless, Hull’s relative accessibility on England’s east coast meant that attacks continued after raids had virtually ceased elsewhere in Britain; isolated raids even lasted into the final months of the war. Hull therefore experienced years of actual attacks, plus years of perpetual alert with the constant fear of raids. This situation posed a clear threat to civilian morale.

The sporadic but deadly nature of the Hull blitz:

- The first bomb was dropped on Hull by an isolated aeroplane on 20 June 1940. It slightly damaged a railway bridge. A second raid, over a month later on 30 July, damaged some flats in the city centre.
- The third raid, almost another month later on 25 August, was far worse as six people died in Rustenburg Street, East Hull. The city suffered eight further
small raids through August and September 1940, with virtually no damage aside from property.

- Two people were killed in a raid on the 13 October, however, and one person died on 1 November. Otherwise, 1940 ended with five minor raids across 7 and 8 November, and 11, 12 and 17 December: two caused slight damage to houses, but there were no deaths.

These 1940 attacks hit all areas of the city: from the docks and the centre, along the River Hull corridor, and from the Avenues and Newland Avenue to the residential streets of East Hull. There were nine casualties, but it was the blitz of 1941 that generated the later infamy. In early 1941, the Germans tried to break the British population by bombing cities across the country. Hull was targeted for the reasons outlined above, and civilian casualties increased sharply.

- February 1941 saw eight raids that killed 19 people across industrial, transportation and residential targets. The number of aircraft involved also rose markedly: 49 bombers attacked Victoria Dock and Albert Dock on 23-24 February, and 25 more struck on 25 and 26 February.  
- The situation deteriorated further. March 1941 saw five deadly raids that killed 5, 38 and 16 people, with a 'heavy raid' on 18-19 March when 378 aircraft dropped 316 tonnes of High Explosive (to shatter buildings) and 77,000 incendiary bombs (to set fire to these properties): 91 people were killed, 79 were seriously injured and 116 had lesser injuries. A journalist reported that 12000 people were left homeless by what the Germans called a 'sharp attack'.
- Another 47 aircraft attacked on 31 March, taking 52 lives; this raid was intended for Liverpool, but it was redirected due to bad weather. The 182 fatalities of March 1941, plus the other casualties and the material damage, were spread right across the city: nowhere was left untouched.
- April 1941 brought seven more raids. Two were fatal: one killing 57 when the Ellis Terrace shelter was hit by a parachute mine, and nine died when incendiary bombs fell across East Hull. Eight people died when a mine fell on Council Avenue and Rokeby Avenue.
- May 1941 saw the worst of the Hull blitz as seven attacks cost 422 lives. Most fatalities occurred on the nights of 7-8 and 8-9 May when two 'heavy raids' of high explosives, parachute mines and incendiary bombs hit East and North Hull, the docks and the city centre, causing huge damage and subsequent fires. Aside from the human toll, iconic city centre structures were destroyed, including the Prudential Building, with its unsafe tower demolished soon after.
- By the end of May 40,000 people were homeless. As the same journalist noted: 'They must have got close to the appalling limit in Hull'. This was the
most lethal and devastating period of the Hull blitz; it remains the focus of commemoration today.

- There was a lull in attacks in June 1941 as the Germans invaded the Soviet Union, although a notorious incident on 2 June 1941 - the 50th raid on the city - saw 27 killed around the Avenues district after the ‘all clear’ was sounded erroneously and people returned to the streets.
- July 1941 saw mass casualties again as raids on 11 and 15 of the month killed 21 and 25 people, and a heavy raid on East Hull and Victoria Dock killed 140 on the 18 July.
- Two further raids on central and East Hull on 18 August and 3 September cost 20 and 44 lives.
- After this, the intensity of raids finally slowed, with just one raid in each in October and November – none causing fatalities. By then the longstanding industrial districts around the River Hull (Figure 10.4) were in ruins, however, and the nearby working-class residential areas to the North-East and East were particularly badly hit.

**Figure 10.4**

- There was a longer respite from the bombs until 13 April 1942 when one raid killed four people; two more attacks, on 1 and 19 May, cost seven and ten lives.
- 1942 saw just three more raids (1 August, 24 October, and 20 December – when three people died).
- Apart from two raids on 4 and 16 January 1943, a hiatus lasted until 24 June and 14 July 1943, when two isolated raids targeted districts across the city – the latter killing 26 citizens.
- 1944 saw no bombing at all.
- The final two raids arrived on 4 and 17 March, 1945 – this final raid, as the war neared conclusion, took twelve lives on Holderness road.

In total Hull suffered 82 raids between 1940 and 1945, with other attacks on adjacent towns and villages too. These raids were staggered in their intensity and there were periods with no attacks at all. While fear might ease during these respites, it would not disappear entirely – especially as occasional raids, or clusters of raids, still materialised after periods of enemy inaction. Neither did location offer residents much protection.Raids hit all areas of the city: the docks and major railway infrastructure (and the residential streets surrounding them) were particularly vulnerable, but housing well away from these prime targets were also bombed. Everyone in Hull was a potential victim, and everyone would know the chill-fear of another air-raid siren.
Finally, and according to local lore, Hull’s suffering was largely unacknowledged beyond the city at the time or subsequently. Some politicians in London, with access to more accurate reports, appreciated the devastation: Herbert Morrison commented that Hull was the town that ‘suffered most’. The wider public were denied this news, however. The official censors decided that reporting the damage would help the enemy, so most reports referred only to attacks on a ‘North East coast town’. Eight decades later, this partial silence about Hull’s ordeal still rankles with locals.

Living beneath the bombs

British civilians proved more robust under aerial attack than gloomy pre-war government predictions had forecast. While post-war narratives of the ‘Blitz Spirit’ suggested that the nation pulled together stoically to survive the bombing, subsequent research suggests it was never this straightforward. Nevertheless, collective panic was rare:

In general, the British people responded with fortitude to the aerial assaults of the Second World War, resigning themselves to the dangers while engaging in the war effort. Morale fluctuated, but never broke. Although some individuals lost control during the raids, large scale panic was a rare event.

At the scale of the individual, however, the emotional weight of living with this constant threat often had less visible consequences. Hull’s city archives contain several first-hand accounts of life in the bombed city. Most vivid, perhaps, are the voices of children (rarely recorded in more formal histories of the war) that are preserved in a series of essays on the topic: ‘What happened to me and what I did in the air raids’. They were written by the 10-11 year old girls of Springburn Street School, near Hessle Road, in February 1942. Their words demonstrate how advancing aircraft technologies posed an immediate, deadly threat and that, for children, air raids had become a regular, but no less terrifying, part of their lives.

Fear and uncertainty were constant themes of the girls’ writing. Edna Fewster wrote: ‘... everytime a bomb came down I screamed and cried. I was very frightened’. Evelyn Canvass had similar experiences: ‘We had just got to sleep [when] we heard incendiaries coming down and one went into [our house] and [burnt] my father’s feet, and we felt frightened’. Likewise, Winifred Stubbins wrote about going to an air-raid shelter: ‘We all got on[to] the floor, and a lot of people were [fainting], and we heard screaming and crying. When I was [lying] on the floor I prayed to God to help us’. She concluded her essay with the line: ‘And every time the sirens go I am frightened’.
These essays, ranging from half a side of paper to four sheets, and marked for grammar and phrasing by the teacher, Peggy Warren, also hint at individual trauma. Eileen Moote, whose house was bombed, admitted that ‘It has made some difference to me because my nerves are [not] so good [as] they [were] before’.26 Her classmate Nancy Nunn wrote plaintively of the night when:

We went down to the underground shelter... the people were very frightened indeed. I was terrified... I thought my time had come, and so did the other people ... it made my nerves terrible and it [has] made a lot of difference to me.27

Audrey Ingram recounted another night in a shelter when:

...the [people] in the other part of the shelter woke me up screaming. I thought it was awful. Then all of a sudden [there was] a terrific crash. I thought it was coming for us. I was so frightened I could not keep still.28

At the same time, other girls interspersed their accounts with mention of the increasingly routine nature of the raids and the responses of the local people. Sylvia Palmer recounted an episode when: ‘My brother was just coming out of the door [when] an incendiary bomb fell right in front of him, [so] he got a bag of sand and [put it out]. We all went to bed’.29 Others commented on the familiar patterns of inspecting damage, clearing debris, gathering shrapnel pieces and making cups of tea in the aftermath of raids.

Greenhough notes how the girls adopted typical gender roles in response to these dangerous episodes. They wrote about their fathers’ duties on fire-watch and air raid precaution work outside the house, and of their mothers’ roles in maintaining the home as safe and secure (although 20 per cent of air raid wardens in Hull were women).30 For some children, enacting these expected gender roles lessened their fear. Florence Atkinson wrote about how:

I was glad that I could do something to help, for there was a lady who came into our shelter who was very frightened. She had a little child of one and a half years. The lady was trembling. I took the little baby, and every time a bomb came down I threw a pillow over myself and the little girl, who was called Sheila. She kept crying but at last I hushed her to sleep. I hope we don't have such terrifying nights again.31

Several essays also included mention of defiance, collective spirit and the need to ‘keep smiling’. Enid Billany wrote:
It’s when I hear the aeroplanes that I am most frightened because we cannot do anything but just sit and wait, even if we sing ... I hope we [do not] have any-more nights like those but if we do we are [keeping] and we will keep up our spirits up [until] we hear the last all clear and our friends and relatives come home again.32

A few essays included anti-German sentiments. Edna Fewster wrote: ‘I thought about everything we had been through that night. I felt as though I could just go across to Germany and punch Hitler and his Nazi gang in the jaw’.33 Meanwhile, Mary Oxley earned a comment of ‘v. g. indeed’ from her teacher for her defiant essay.34 Other girls made special mention of the particular resilience of Hull. Vera Stephens concluded her essay: ‘Hull will never lose her spirit whether there are raids or not’35 and Sheila Stothard declared: ‘...although Hull [has] gone through some awful, terrifying raids, we will always keep our spirits up and keep smiling’.36

We do not know how far the pupils were steered towards these conclusions by their teacher Peggy Warren as an exercise in sustaining morale, or how far they were repeating society’s wider expectations of fortitude. Nevertheless, their essays offer acute insight into the fear of everyday life in the bombed city, and of the resilience of Hull people in the blitz.

Not everyone found the strength to articulate this kind of resistance. After the first heavy bombing of March and May 1941, a committee of local citizens surveyed the resilience of locals. They were particularly worried about the St. Paul’s district of Sculcoates where they perceived morale to be worse than elsewhere, and where people displayed: ‘...complete helplessness and resignation [which was] the most disquieting feature. It was not a healthy willingness to accept misfortune without grumbling, but hopeless and indeed helpless incapacity to appreciate the significance of their plight’.37

This local committee initially found other districts in Hull to be more stoical, but the heavy raid of 7-8 May 1941 prompted wider anxiety and thousands started to leave the city every night over the following weeks. As noted above, the ‘trekking’ phenomenon emerged during the Zeppelin raids of the Great War, but during the spring 1941 blitz 7000-9000 people evacuated the city nightly - walking or cycling to relative safety in the city’s parks or, better, to village halls, barns or other shelter beyond the city.38 Hull is a relatively concentrated city, with easy access across flat landscape to surrounding countryside, yet this nightly migration concerned the authorities. Although the safety of rural areas underpinned the evacuation policy for urban children, when adults trekked from the city it was seen as a threat to industrial productivity, civil order and the collective mood. Over time Hull’s authorities realised that most workers who trekked were disciplined enough to return to work each
morning (as many merely sought a decent sleep with a working day to follow). The city council therefore made provisions to help the trekkers. Yet from afar such actions fuelled a ‘popular view in Whitehall ... that the people of Hull exhibited less moral fibre than other city populations’. These government suspicions helped to prompt a more rigorous survey of local resilience and an attempt to measure trauma to establish just how close Hull was to psychological collapse.

**Measuring the fear of bombing and the resilience of Hull**

Civilian morale, and its assumed fragility, was a key concern for interwar governments facing aerial warfare. Throughout the 1930s governments and their militaries tried to estimate this breaking point. In 1937, British modelling of wartime scenarios predicted that a 60-day bombing campaign might kill 600,000 and wound 1,200,000 civilians. Given the additional psychological devastation for those who survived such attacks, the British theorised that this might signal the point of civilian collapse. When the actual war started, the British government maintained a bomb survey to record precisely how many enemy bombs fell. Morale, by contrast, was recorded in a more haphazard manner. Through 1940 to early 1941 the Government relied on various sources for information on civilian resilience. The Ministry of Home Security gathered reports from the police, civil defence and intelligence officers. The Ministry of Information likewise generated daily reports. At their behest, the ‘Mass Observation’ initiative (a project that surveyed ordinary, working-class opinions and lifestyles) addressed morale across Britain in December 1940 and January 1941. Later in 1941, ‘Mass observation’ would visit and report on Hull (we encountered a section of their report above), but in early 1941 the government’s array of sources on public sentiments were still deemed to be insufficiently systematic. The Ministry of Home Security therefore enlisted more demonstrably robust science by requiring their ‘Security Research and Experiments Branch’ to establish the exact impact of bombing on British cities.

This new survey sought to apply neutral, dispassionate scientific rigour to quantify the nature and extent of ‘fear’ in bombed cities. It was run by two leading scientists: Solly Zuckerman, a biologist, and J D Bernal, a physicist who had been studying the effects of bomb blasts on humans. It aimed to determine the impact of the blitz on ‘productivity, absenteeism, evacuation and even “morale”’. They were also charged with establishing how many bombs, and at what frequency, might ‘break a town’. The survey used two cities as case-studies: Birmingham (to represent industrial cities) and Hull (to represent port cities). The government response to German bombing, and the British bombing of Germany would rest, in part, on the survey of these two cities.

The business of measuring fear and identifying a city’s breaking point scientifically was neither simple nor cheap. Some 40 psychologists travelled to Hull aiming to
interview 900 people about their experiences.\textsuperscript{45} The survey also demanded essays from all Hull schoolchildren aged 10-14 on the theme of ‘what happened to me in an air-raid’: we have encountered a few of these essays already. Defining and assessing fear and moods is notoriously difficult.\textsuperscript{46} Further, the scale of this project and the short time horizons of warfare meant that some of the data remained unprocessed. Zuckerman regretted that many of the children’s essays were not unexamined, especially as he had developed a complex coding mechanism to assess their fear via their choice of words.\textsuperscript{47} The survey nevertheless generated results that illuminated Hull’s wartime experience.

The research found Hull to be largely resilient with ‘no evidence of a breakdown in morale’.\textsuperscript{48} Here, as elsewhere, bombed-out families could be rehoused relatively easily: even with significant damage in the city there were usually places for temporary shelter. Transport systems, dock business and industrial productivity were rarely waylaid for long by enemy action. Neither did the survey uncover the mass-panic that Zuckerman had initially anticipated (due to the prevalence of trekking in Hull). His ‘outline conclusions’ found no evidence that trekking undermined production or morale. Instead, he saw it as a ‘considered response’ to danger, especially when so many had seen family, friends and neighbours killed.\textsuperscript{49} We cannot read the official, definitive report until it is released from embargo in 2020, but Zuckerman’s autobiography claimed that trekking was also driven by the visible proportion of local buildings damaged (and in Hull this figure was high).\textsuperscript{50} Another 1940s study showed that those living in smaller cities, where loss was more concentrated and visible, were more likely to suffer anxiety.\textsuperscript{51} Similarly, more recent research suggests that the destruction of familiar landmarks, shops and entertainment venues also fractured spirits by undermining the continuities of working-class lives.\textsuperscript{52} Therefore, Hull’s scale affected the experience of the blitz. Encounters with bomb damage and death were inevitable within its tight boundaries; equally, mass bicycle ownership made nightly escape feasible. On all three counts therefore, Hull people were more likely to be traumatised by bombing than compatriots elsewhere, and more likely to evacuate the city each night. Indeed, after the worst of the raids were over in 1943, over 1600 people still left every evening.\textsuperscript{53} Collectively, however, this government-commissioned survey reported that Hull remained resilient and did not have a problem of morale.

Beyond the collective scale, however, the impact of bombing was often more marked on individuals. Imagine the incremental strain of preparing to sleep each night while knowing that an air raid siren might sound. Or, of waiting in a shelter (or taking a chance at home), smelling fires burning, and hearing enemy aircraft and the different types of bombs falling (which people could identify with experience), and wondering if you might feel the blast this time. After the war, nationwide medical surveys concluded that although acute fear, anxiety and confusion were immediate responses to bombing, with sufficient rest, most people recovered and the number
of psychiatric casualties was surprisingly low. Zuckerman and Bernal produced parallel results from their 706 interviewees in Hull. These people were not unduly weak or hysterical collectively, they argued, but some individuals were suffering various nervous conditions from witnessing so much destruction - with moderate neurosis in 53 per cent of women and 20 per cent of men. As Overy points out, the narrative of Hull’s collective survival tends to mask the profound trauma of individuals. For example, Hull Survey Case 1, a male worker, lost two members of his family when their house took a direct hit. Case 37, a housewife, was bombed-out three times and, having lost her sister with five children, could not sleep and was terrified of the air-raid siren. At this individual, embodied scale, the blitz was horrific for many, despite the resilience of the majority.

The Hull research also had further, and more deadly, consequences elsewhere in the war. The survey had quantified the lethal impacts of the bombing and determined that each ton of bombs dropped on Hull killed four people and left 140 homeless. Moreover, although the intensity of the raids had little impact on collective spirits, those people ‘de-housed’ were more likely to suffer poor morale subsequently. In March 1942, these figures were used by Frederick Lindemann, the government’s Chief Scientific Advisor throughout the war, to persuade Churchill to support the mass ‘area bombing’ of German cities to ‘dehouse’ civilians and shatter their morale. Subsequent studies have argued that Lindemann misrepresented the Hull data to support destructive area-bombing. And as Churchill wanted a reason to carpet-bomb German cities, Lindemann’s intervention reinforced saturation bombing as British strategy. The theory behind the thousand bomber raids and firestorms that would so devastate Germany, with death-tolls far higher than those in Britain, were prompted in part by the surveys of Hull. In addition, some of the aeroplanes that formed these raids flew from East Yorkshire – joining formation above the Humber before departing across the North Sea. Such were the geographies of connection between wartime enemies and their modern cities.

Resilience via utopian planning
The severity of the bombing and its impact on Hull’s communities inspired a debate about how best to restore the city. These sentiments were aired at the height of the blitz when the Hull Daily Mail carried an article by Max Lock, a prominent planner and Hull resident, who noted that ‘There is not a citizen in Hull who is not deeply affected by the devastation of familiar streets and the destruction of well-known buildings ... what sort of city are we going to build up after the war?’ In 1943 the same newspaper claimed that ‘The conflict has made Hull perhaps one of the gloomiest big cities in the country. Because of what we have borne with resignation and courage our reward should [be] generous’. This same connection between destruction and re-planning was articulated directly on the first page of the 1945 plan to rebuild the shattered city. As Leo Schultz, Lord Mayor in 1943 and Chair of
the Hull Reconstruction Committee, explained in the quotation at the head of this chapter, resilience meant rebuilding a better Hull.62

To this end, in November 1942 the city engaged Edwin Lutyens and Patrick Abercrombie to redesign Hull.63 These appointments were confident and ambitious. Lutyens was perhaps Britain’s leading architect: famous for his design of the Cenotaph in Whitehall, London, to commemorate the Great War dead, and subsequently, for planning Imperial New Delhi with its neo-classicism, triumphant avenues and vistas. Abercrombie was Britain’s leading academic practitioner of the new ‘science’ of planning: the attempt to improve communities by improving their towns and cities. He had been influenced by Ebenezer Howard’s Garden City philosophies, plus the international Modern movement that aimed to produce better urbanism through rational planning. Abercrombie responded to interwar city sprawl with the idea of green belts, later enshrined in the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act. But his reputation also rested on re-planning blitzed cities where he demonstrated his patrician belief that the expert planner knew best how to engineer a better society.64

Lutyens and Abercrombie had worked on a series of plans to remake the blitzed cities of interwar Britain as modern, cleaner places for the future. Previous commissions included the plans for London (1943 and 1944) and for other bombed cities, including Plymouth, Southampton, Coventry and Bristol. Abercrombie claimed that their interest in Hull arose when he and Lutyens visited in 1936 and saw the possibilities for re-working the city.65 When commissioned, they asked for a ‘perfectly free hand’.66 This was granted and they were asked to: ‘Plan for us a city [as if] you were designing a city for yourselves.’67 Lutyens would not see the project to completion as he died on 1 January 1944, but Abercrombie finished the plan and released it to the city council in 1944 and to the public in 1945. He considered it ‘the best report he had been connected with’.68

**Justifying ‘The Abercrombie Plan’:**
The published report and proposals, commonly called ‘The Abercrombie Plan’, ran to 92 pages and included extensive full-colour maps and illustrations. Like Leo Schultz, Abercrombie explicitly connected his vision for a new, modern Hull to its wartime suffering. For these planners, bomb-sites also offered opportunities. In a chapter entitled ‘Bomb Damage’ Abercrombie outlined Hull’s devastation, then asked rhetorically ‘What, then, is the scope of the Reconstruction. The resurgence from the destruction of war which should be proposed for Hull?’69 He had an answer ready. Noting that bombed plots were scattered across the city rather than focused in one or two districts, he admitted that it would be simplest to infill these empty plots and maintain the extant street patterns if ‘rebuilding were to be limited to one short term scheme’.70 But Abercrombie argued for a longer-term regeneration process lasting
up to 20 years. This more radical scheme would remove surviving districts that were ‘ripe for redevelopment’ and instead deliver a ‘comprehensive scheme of reconstruction’ which meant ‘a real improvement to the whole, or parts, of the city’. Only this kind of overhaul, Abercrombie continued, was a suitable response to the devastation and suffering of the city:

> It would be the height of folly to miss this opportunity for re-planning in accordance with modern standards of transport, industry and health … The future of Hull demands these improved conditions: they are the compensation which may go some way to make up for the suffering, loss of trade, inconvenience and squalor of these [war] years; a patched and botched up war-scarred Hull would be a poor object to offer to posterity.\(^{72}\)

The plan was a remarkable statement of vision and ambition, but it was not a quick solution. Rather, it resonated with the measured and sober rhetoric of the best possible modern planning practice. It also offered a utopian vision of improved urban lives.

**Outlining ‘The Abercrombie Plan’:**
The plan opened with extensive discussion of the problems facing Hull. Following contemporary planning theory, it focussed heavily upon improving the quality of life in the city centre and redistributing the population to new, healthier suburbs. It prioritised simplified, unified and segregated land-uses for different functions. This would produce a dedicated city centre and shopping zone, and discrete industrial and residential zones separated by green space and connected by a transport infrastructure allowing easy circulation. It also aimed to curtail the suburban sprawl of interwar Hull, and to separate town and country with a green belt, beyond which would be a new satellite town at Burton Constable to the north-east of the city. This kind of coherent, comprehensive planning of a city-region was the state of the art.\(^{73}\)

**Figure 10.6**
The plan centred upon ambitious schemes for a largely new city centre laid out on modernist lines with axial routes and vistas. When Lutyens and Abercrombie visited Hull in 1936 they were impressed by Queen’s Gardens (the former Queen’s Dock that was reclaimed in the 1930s). Their plan made Queen’s Gardens the central axis of their ‘Civic centre’ which would be flanked by civic buildings and museums. There would be some preservation of the ‘Old Town’, but much of High Street, the area around Holy Trinity Church and Prince Street would be lost.\(^{74}\)

**Figure 10.7**
To the north of this central axis would be a new, relocated railway terminus, adjacent to entertainment and leisure facilities including hotels, theatres and cinemas. To the south-west of the axis would be the Osborne street quarter: a new pedestrianised shopping centre (Figure 10.8) drawing together Hull’s central retail functions and finding sufficient space by demolishing the Dock Offices (now the Maritime Museum) and the City Hall. This new city centre would be contained within a ring road that removed non-essential traffic from the area, although as Figure 10.9 shows, this aspect of the plan impacted on the historic fabric of the Old Town, including Wilberforce House, which we would now protect from such interventions.

**Figure 10.8**

**Figure 10.9**

The ring road would connect to key routes to the suburbs and to other cities and regions. Elsewhere the plan featured high-level railways (to avoid delays at level-crossings), landscaped routes into the city and the separation of traffic and pedestrians. Such ideas are familiar today, but in 1945 they were innovative.

Remaking the city centre meant demolishing its slums. According to Abercrombie’s figures, the dense terraced housing that enfolded the city centre and adjacent industrial sites and docklands often saw population densities of 100-300 people per acre. Many houses were squeezed around narrow, dark, airless ‘courts’, and 39.3 per cent of houses lacked bathrooms and hot water in 1939. Intermixed industry and housing was a particular problem in the planner’s imagination: such functions were to be separated into industrial zones and distinct residential neighbourhoods, each with healthcare, education and leisure provision, and sufficient open space for ‘proper, healthy living’. Hull would have seventeen of these self-contained neighbourhoods, with 5,000-10,000 people in each at a density of no more than 50-75 per acre. Each neighbourhood would be separated from others by transport arteries and swathes of greenery. The new housing would be mainly low-rise flats and terraced, family houses with space around them for light, air and recreation. Approximately 54,000 people would be displaced from the central districts to these new neighbourhoods. For Abercrombie, this improved housing, better environment and ease of circulation around the city meant that lives in these model suburbs would be improved.

Finally, this ambitious structure extended beyond the city into the wider region. At the edge of the city Abercrombie proposed a green belt to stop Hull’s urban sprawl. Although only one or two miles wide, this buffer would separate city and countryside and direct any future growth beyond this protected land. The proposed satellite town at Burton Constable, for example, would house 60,000 people eight miles beyond Hull, and would be connected to the city by the former Hull-Hornsea railway.
Here again, ‘town and country planning’ was deemed to improve the urban condition, and residential, retail and industrial functions were separated from each other.

This was an encompassing, comprehensive vision to remake blitzed Hull and its region for the late twentieth century. If implemented it would have destroyed some aspects of the city that we celebrate today, but Abercrombie also anticipated several problems that Hull has been wrestling with ever since, including traffic circulation, a coherent shopping core, a green belt and the creation of functioning communities beyond the city periphery. Despite its visionary promise, however, the plan was not realised in practice.

**Implementing ‘The Abercrombie Plan’:**

The plan was released to the council and public in 1944-45. For Jones, the plan was ‘at the forefront of contemporary planning thinking’ and ‘...was strong, coherent and intelligible to the ordinary person’.82 In 1945, Leo Schultz was more equivocal:

>This is the plan. It is put forward as a guide for the citizens for the future development of our great city. It is theirs to discuss, to consider, to criticise. To amend and to adopt such of it as they consider to be proper.83

Unfortunately for Abercrombie’s vision, many citizens did criticise. Some had grumbled all along about the transparency of the planning: seeking updates and information from the outside ‘experts’ who were assessing their city.84 Others complained about the late delivery of the plan, and the Chair of the City Reconstruction Committee made this point publically.85 Abercrombie acknowledged some of these anxieties, and admitted that the shopping district was a ‘controversial’ idea.86

There’s no clear point at which the plan was abandoned, but over the next few years it slipped out of focus steadily due to various intersecting reasons. For one commentator, the opposition of city-centre businesses and traders was a key reason.87 They resented the prospect of moving from their established locations to the proposed new shopping quarter. Local newspapers printed regular letters complaining about the potential impacts of the plan, and shopkeepers even organised an alternative plan and exhibition in 1949 that celebrated the existing shopping streets. For other commentators, the failure of central government to provide sufficient funding for longer term reconstruction was the primary reason for the plan’s failure.88 Perhaps inevitably, when post-war austerity failed to generate adequate resources for the major rebuilding envisaged, shorter term contingencies resulted. City centre shops and offices were repaired or rebuilt on their old sites, which re-enshrined the old street pattern. Every business that reopened on its
original footprint made the plan’s implementation less likely. When large, new, iconic developments like the Hammonds Department Store of 1950 were constructed, this cemented the old street structure still further and made Abercrombie’s wide scale rebuilding still more untenable. Abercrombie had foreseen and warned against this scenario in his plan.\textsuperscript{89} Yet the urban fabric that survived the bombs, and the short-term pressure to reconstruct the city quickly, overwhelmed this longer-term vision.

I have interpreted the plan as a utopian response to the trauma of the blitz and a reward for the citizens’ resilience. As Abercrombie feared, events, schedules and a lack of resource prevented its realisation, even though several elements of his vision crept into Hull’s post-war planning. In the end, the centre of the city retained much of the street structure of the interwar years, although many of the slums were cleared and their populations were encouraged to move to new, peripheral housing estates such as Bransholme and Orchard Park. That said, these issues do not detract from the overall aspiration and optimism of the plan: this was a proposal to soothe the trauma of the war for a city that suffered more than most.

**Bringing trauma, resilience and utopianism together in Second World War Hull**

The destruction of the Hull blitz was appalling and the deaths were numerous. Despite the severity of the bombing in certain periods, and the longevity of the threat of attack, the people of Hull proved to be resilient. Inevitably the citizens suffered some collective trauma, and many individuals were impacted significantly by these events, but despite the severity of Hull’s blitz, and despite government concerns about its impact, this key wartime city withstood the bombing and emerged battered, but undefeated.

Additional evidence of the city’s resilience was the plan that the city council commissioned which was a conscious attempt to rebuild Hull as a quintessentially modern city. The Abecrombie plan was undermined by post-war austerity, economic realities and local contingencies, but the ambition to forge a state of the art city from the ruins of the blitz likewise demonstrated Hull’s resilience. The devastation, re-planning and reconstruction of Hull since 1940 impacted upon the city, its cultures and its identities for decades afterwards. If the bombs had not fallen, or if the re-planning had been completed to Abercrombie’s vision, we might have interpreted Hull in very different ways in recent years, and we might be thinking of it as a different kind of city of culture.

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2 T. Geraghty, ‘A North-East Coast Town’: Ordeal and Triumph – the story of Kingston-upon-Hull in the 1939-1945 Great War (Howden, 1951 [2002]). I have used Geraghty for details of the air raids and casualties because this source is used by most other commentators (although some more recent authors have slightly different figures). On Hull’s blitz, see also: Philip Graystone, The Blitz on Hull (1940-45), (York, 1991); James Greenhalgh, “Till We Hear the Last All Clear”: Gender and the Presentation of Self in Young Girls’ Writing about the Bombing of Hull during the Second World War’, Gender & History, 26, 1 (2014), pp.167-183; Derry Jones, ‘Hull Blitz, Scientific Surveys and City Bombing Campaigns: 1941-42 Surveys of morale in much-bombed Hull’, The East Yorkshire Historian, 9 (2008), pp. 27-36.

3 Geraghty, North-East Coast Town.


6 Credland, Hull Zeppelin Raids.


12 The dates and details of the bombing of Hull is taken from Geraghty, North-East Coast Town, pp. 109-12.

13 Jones, Hull Blitz, p.32.

14 Geraghty, North-East Coast Town.

15 Gardiner, The Blitz, 318.

16 Powolny’s restaurant, a luxury venue in King Edward Street and noted in Figure 9.9, was destroyed on the night of 9 May 1941.

17 Gardiner, The Blitz, 319.

18 Geraghty, North-East Coast Town.


22 Greenhalgh, ‘Till We Hear the Last All Clear’.

23 Edna Fewster, ‘What happened to me and what I did in the air raids’, Hull History Centre, HHC DEX24/12.

24 Evelyn Canvess, ‘What happened to me and what I did in the air raids’, Hull History Centre, HHC DEX24/5.


26 Eileen Moote, ‘What happened to me and what I did in the air raids’ Hull History Centre, HHC DEX24/19.

27 Nancy Nunn, ‘What happened to me and what I did in the air raids’ Hull History Centre, HHC DEX24/20.

28 Audrey Ingram, ‘What happened to me and what I did in the air raids’ Hull History Centre, HHC DEX24/16.

29 Sylvia Palmer, ‘What happened to me and what I did in the air raids’ Hull History Centre, HHC DEX24/22.

30 Greenhalgh, ‘Till We Hear the Last All Clear’; Overy, The Bombing War.

31 Florence Atkinson, in Greenhalgh, ‘Till We Hear the Last All Clear’, p. 178.

32 Enid Billany, ‘What happened to me and what I did in the air raids’ Hull History Centre, HHC DEX24/3 (see also: Greenhalgh, ‘Till We Hear the Last All Clear’, p. 172.

33 Edna Fewster, ‘What happened to me and what I did in the air raids’ Hull History Centre, HHC DEX24/12.

34 Mary Oxley, ‘What happened to me and what I did in the air raids’ Hull History Centre, HHC DEX24/21.

35 Vera Stephens, ‘What happened to me and what I did in the air raids’ Hull History Centre, HHC DEX24/25.

36 Sheila Stothard, ‘What happened to me and what I did in the air raids’ Hull History Centre, HHC DEX24/27.

37 Harrisson, Living through the Blitz, p. 264.

38 Overy, The Bombing War.
41 Jones et al., ‘Civilian Morale’, p. 478.
45 Crook, ‘Science and War’.
46 Beaven and Griffiths, ‘The blitz’.
47 Zuckerman, *From Apes to Warlords*, Burney, ‘War on Fear’.
48 Zuckerman, *From Apes to Warlords*, 405.
49 Zuckerman, *From Apes to Warlords*.
50 Zuckerman, *From Apes to Warlords*; Crook, *Science and War*.
51 Jones et al., ‘Civilian Morale’.
52 Beaven and Griffiths, ‘The blitz’.
53 Overy, *The Bombing War*.
54 Jones et al., ‘Civilian Morale’.
55 Overy, *The Bombing War*.
56 Overy, *The Bombing War*.
57 Zuckerman, *From Apes to Warlords*, 405.
58 Burney, ‘War on fear’; Crook, ‘Science and War’; Zuckerman, *From Apes to Warlords*.
59 Jones, ‘Hull Blitz’.
60 Max Lock and D. A La Mare, What sort if Hull after the War: proper re-planning can build a city beautiful, *Hull Daily Mail*, 18 July 1941.
62 Schultz, ‘Foreword’.
77 Lutyens and Abercrombie, *Plan for Hull*, p. 50: an area near Hessle Road had the highest population density in Hull with over 300 persons per acre.
81 Lutyens and Abercrombie, *Plan for Hull*, p. 3.
82 Jones, ‘fairer and nobler city’, p. 313 and 314.
83 Schultz, ‘Foreword’, v.
87 Jones, ‘fairer and nobler city’.
89 Lutyens and Abercrombie, Plan for Hull, p. 3.