THE UNIVERSITY OF HULL

THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES AND ITS EDUCATION: SELECTED
THEMES AND ISSUES WITH REFERENCE TO THE
'SMALL COUNTRY' CONTEXT

being a Thesis submitted for the Degree of

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Michael Ivor Biggs, MEd (Hull)

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ABBREVIATIONS AND USE OF WORDS

BD	Bahrani Dinar
Dh.	UAE Dirham
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GCS	Gulf City States
GNP	Gross National Product
HCT	Higher College of Technology
HCTs	Higher Colleges of Technology
R&D	Research and Development
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UPE	Universal Primary Education

The following words are used regularly throughout this thesis and are interchangeable:

National, local: refers to the indigenous people.

State, emirate: refers to the individual emirate. Collectively they make up the UAE.

United Arab Emirates, UAE, the Emirates, the Federation, the country: all refer to the present day UAE.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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PART ONE
A CONTEXTUAL AND CONCEPTUAL OVERVIEW

PART ONE A:

A CONCEPTUAL OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

The United Arab Emirates

In less than two decades the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has evolved from abject poverty and a subsistence economy into a modern well serviced federation. The spectacular growth and impressive achievement in the UAE's development have passed relatively unnoticed by the rest of the world. The commercial world, understandably, has seen it as a market place for their products and services in the last ten years but only recently has any academic interest started to stir. On the whole this is a result of entrepreneurial institutions searching for new markets to expand into as their own area suffers recession. But generally, although the UAE can influence the world economy through its tremendous oil reserves and wealth, it has only gained international recognition through its own active self-promotion.

The UAE, a federation of seven small sheikhdoms/emirates[1], was inaugurated on December 2, 1971 as the British government terminated its treaties with the Trucial States [2]. Original discussions on the formation of the federation included the small neighbouring emirates of Bahrain and Qatar, however, they decided to pursue their own autonomous destinies rather than join the federal experiment.

Surrounded by large, powerful and influential countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq, the oil producing UAE is strategically located at the entrance to the Arabian Gulf at the Strait of Hormuz. It is, therefore, of important to the industrialised West and this guarantees certain attention and support from the oil dependent industrial superpowers as was witnessed in the recent invasion of its small neighbour Kuwait by Iraq and the consequent Gulf War [3].

The rapid process of modernisation in the UAE was fuelled by the discovery of

oil and its attendant wealth. However, the wealth has been centred around the major oil producing emirate of Abu Dhabi, the federal capital, and its neighbouring emirate of Dubai. The other emirates have enjoyed a benevolent 'trickle down' effect of the wealth through the mechanisms of the federation and, to some extent, through servicing the needs of their developing neighbours. Importantly, not all of the emirates are oil producers and internal dominance by certain emirates can be noted.

The importance of education in the United Arab Emirates

On the inauguration of the United Arab Emirates and throughout the process of development the federal government has afforded education an important role. It was perceived as one of the building blocks which would help to forge a national unity within the disparate tribal populace. It was also important in creating an educated and trained workforce so that the indigenous population could make a positive contribution to the Federation's future.

Educational provision in the UAE, therefore, developed alongside the process of modernisation and industrialisation and did not preempt it or result from it. Accordingly, education in the UAE is the product of a variety of influences that direct it and shape it. These influences exist both within and outside of the provision itself and have a reflexive quality: that is to say that each influence responds to change in another influence. They are not constant and as educational provision itself evolves and develops these inputs and influences will change and create a further dynamic for change. Education generally and in the UAE is, therefore, the product of geographical, historical, demographic, political, economic, cultural and pedagogical influences. It is necessary to recognise these inputs and be informed by them if an understanding of educational provision and its development in a country is to be fully appreciated.

The United Arab Emirates offer an interesting and, perhaps, unique opportunity to the researcher and comparative educationalist.

The United Arab Emirates is a group of small sheikhdoms of similar geographical, historical and cultural backgrounds with each having risen from obscurity and extreme poverty to a group that can now claim one of the highest per capita incomes in the world. Each emirate has retained its own identity within the federation with each having developed differently as a direct result of internal and external influences. Knowledge of these important non-educational influences is crucial in any understanding of the resulting pattern of educational provision. Furthermore, by comparison across the emirates and with the neighbouring small states of Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait, which enjoyed earlier development, some important characteristics and trends can be identified. Interestingly, some of these characteristics and trends also correspond to those found in other developing educational systems in small countries which do not enjoy the wealth factor of high per capita income: others may be unique [4].

To the comparativist, and to the study of international education, this thesis does not attempt to break new philosophical ground by introducing a new theory. Neither does it base itself on an established methodology suggested by past academics and comparativists [5].

This thesis does, however, draw from the post 1977 mode of thought in comparative education which generally adopts "new approaches [that] reflect eclectic and creative ways of dealing with the broad spectrum of issues"[6]. Comparative education is now, therefore, viewed as "a multidisciplinary field that looks at education (not necessarily limited to schools or formal educational institutions) in a cross-cultural context"[7]. Importantly, in recent years, no single method has developed as the canon because, as Altbach pointed out in 1991, "a formal methodology for such a hybrid field is impossible"[8]. This is, therefore, a move away from the limited research of the 1960s which was, in part, driven

by the then popular human capital theory [9] and its concerns, particularly in the developing world. That approach tended to devalue other important outcomes such as social, political and cognitive factors and "denied complex social relations and the obvious effect of class, race, gender, ethnicity on who got and who could use education in what context"[10].

The concerns expressed in the late 1970s regarding this limited approach were supported by arguments that "education had political and social outcomes [that] in many instances [were] in contradiction to economic ones"[11]. It was further argued that schools had educational outcomes which were of central concern to policymakers and educators and that they had been generally ignored by the field [12].

This move away from a concern with national education policies and more towards "intranational comparisons as well as analysis of transnational trends"[13], and arguments that education had political and social outcomes, has opened new areas of interest with new research foci such as "gender, in-school variables, the dysfunctional aspects of schooling, the role of the state, curriculum and text books, and a variety of others"[14]. This may have removed the dominant intellectual centre that the field had in the 1960s but does now allow for significantly more diversity in research and analysis[15]. It is this trend towards an eclectic, creative and holistic approach that this thesis will adopt because educational provision in a small developing country does not operate in a vacuum and should not be viewed merely as a miniature version of what already exists in a larger country; it, too, has its own unique qualities which a contemporary, multidisciplinary, discursive comparative approach will highlight.

Comment on the sources used in this thesis

As mentioned above, a wide approach has been adopted to gather the information and data which has formed the basis of this thesis from which the

discussion and analysis has emanated. It is, therefore, important to draw the reader's attention to the following points.

Primary sources

There is an absolute dearth of written material and data on the United Arab Emirates prior to their independence in 1971. This is mainly the result of the following important factors/influences.

The small population of the area was of a nomadic tribal nature spending time between the desert interior and the coast depending on whether it was the winter or the summer season. And, although there was some coastal settlement and development in the more recent years the traditional modes of education and information transfer prevailed. The schools were *kuttabs* which offered an Islamic education that was based on the recital of the Qur'an[16] from memory. Consequently, very few learnt to read other than those destined to the position of mullah[17]. A fundamental tenet of Islam is that one accepts one's position and the authority of the Qur'an; there was, therefore, little need in developing records that would further hamper the nomadic way of life. Important information for survival and/or culture was passed down through the generations by word of mouth. Literacy, therefore, was not important as communication took place as it always had.

Even under the more recent period of British tutelage that situation prevailed as there was a conscious effort by the British not to interfere with or educate the indigenous population. This policy of non-interference extended to complete non-development of the Trucial States[18] and, unlike other 'protectorates,' no infrastructures or systems were established. In fact, the area stagnated under the British until just before independence. Illiteracy continued to prevail and the traditional modes of information exchange led to very little, if any, information being stored for future reference.

Record keeping did start to take place just prior to independence in 1971 but understandably the initial attempts were basic and far from rigorous. Unlike many areas of the world there was no major academic institution in the vicinity that would assume this responsibility through their research programmes. Even the large neighbouring Saudi Arabia was undeveloped until late in this century. In fact, any development in the area was only nurtured on the discovery of oil. Moreover, the individual country's oil production was only then developed as it suited the interests of the West who, at the time, held the technology. Independence offered a certain stimulus to record keeping as it could be used as a vehicle to show development particularly when attracting aid.

Most information about the UAE is found in government produced literature and, is therefore, 'official' accounting of the situation or of what took place. However, these accounts demonstrate little sensitivity to the complex nature of the educational change and could even exaggerate the contrasts between one situation or event and the next, particularly in the early stages of development. These official reports also make no comparisons with other countries. It could be argued that if they did it would 'soften' some of their accomplishments as they were also being achieved elsewhere especially in terms of Universal Primary Education; school building programmes; enrolment and so forth.

The information that has been taken from a variety of official sources has been enhanced in two ways. Firstly, by the writer's twelve years of contact and experience of living and teaching in the private education sector of two emirates of the UAE, and, secondly, by personal contact with those involved in various aspects of education in the UAE. This contact has been via informal interviews. The interviews have had an important outcome in that they have offered an insight into certain aspects of educational thought, event and practice both past and present which would not necessarily have been put into print. Accordingly, these two aspects have been most valuable in adding subjective orientations to the research and have thrown up potentially important ideas which may not have

been anticipated or pursued through a questionnaire approach or entirely book based research.

Literature review

There is a limited pool of published research and writing from which to draw for the Trucial States/UAE and its education. This appears also to be the case in Arabic. It is only now that the UAE is starting to attract scholarly attention and this is the first major work that focuses on education *per se*. A literature review regarding the Trucial States/UAE's educational provision is limited for these reasons and those already outlined. The literature review will, therefore, be more confined to that pertaining to small country issues which is an important thread running through this research and can be found in Chapter Two: a framework of national smallness.

This situation regarding the UAE will change in the future as the country produces its 'homegrown' academics. Understandably, with a country as young as the UAE, nationals researching at higher levels are only just appearing. Unfortunately, however, because of the perceived low status by male nationals of working in education, educational research will continue to take a back seat to the other professions. Social mores compound this situation because the majority of beneficiaries of overseas higher education are males and, although this is changing, it is likely to continue for some time. Moreover, the majority of the teaching force in the UAE is imported, contract, expatriate expertise which is unlikely to include research interest other than in a specific expertise that comes in the form of short term commercially driven consultancy. One of the advantages of wealth is that the UAE can buy in what it needs but often the expertise is of a transient nature with research interests generally focused elsewhere.

Accordingly there is also a dearth of unpublished research materials pertaining to educational provision in the UAE. The exception to this is a 1989 MEd dissertation by the writer which addressed *The Development of Educational*

Provision in the Arabian Gulf City States of Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates [19] of which a small section was devoted to the UAE. In the neighbouring and earlier developed emirates of Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar a certain amount of research by nationals at masters and doctoral level is starting to appear. Although this is specific to their own educational provision it does, to a certain degree, prove the above comment about future research emanating from 'homegrown' sources. References to these dissertations will be made later and can also be found in the Bibliography. Any other works pertinent to this area of study will be referred to in the relevant sections of this thesis.

A major source of information about educational provision in the UAE is the local press which is regularly presented with press releases from the various ministries of the federal government. Perhaps this is an advantage of the press in a small country where even basic government comment may be reported on. This is a situation that is unlikely to arise in a large country where there is more to choose from, resulting in the incidental or minor press releases being discarded in favour of news of a more substantial or sensationalist nature; or being left to the specialist press: a luxury that rarely exists in the small country. The UAE press releases are an essential propaganda tool in the nation building process and often promote policy and highlight positive achievement in the provision of education. In more recent years the newspapers have been allowed to become vehicles for critical comment. This was hitherto unknown because if a newspaper did not impose its own censorship on what it printed it did run the risk of limited or even permanent closure. This self-censorship [20] controls articles deemed unsuitable and offensive to Islam and criticism of the Rulers and their administration. Needless to say censorship is very much part of the way of life in this part of the world with the close bonding of state and Islam. However, the English language newspapers and magazines of Dubai and Abu Dhabi are increasingly reliable sources of up-to-date information. Furthermore, as indicated above, they are becoming an increasingly important mode of informal education.

Finally, information has also been gleaned from reliable publications that have been sourced even though mention of the UAE may only have been made in passing. Any pieces of information such as this can still help to build the total picture particularly as there is no one source to which one can turn for much of the specific or generalist information.

The limitations and bias of this research

It is important to note the subjectivity of any research that falls within the broader multi-disciplinary spectrum of comparative and international study such as this thesis. The research is naturally directed and informed by the interests of the researcher and the parameters given to the study. This, therefore, forms the first bias.

Secondly, although the collection and collation of information and data may be influenced by the subjectivity of the researcher, the data itself is subject to limitation and bias. This can be seen in the way that statistics are collected, selected and presented by the country's institutions themselves as they manage and manipulate to present information in a manner that best suits their purpose. Rigorous methodology and objectivity in statistics that is so necessary in many areas of research cannot be guaranteed in this study because of the occasional lack of rigour in the country's compiling procedure. This was particularly the case in this part of the world and the UAE prior to independence.

Finally, the reader also brings many influences to bear on the interpretation of this thesis such as his or her personal and cultural background. This in itself must be regarded as a positive outcome which further enriches the writing and findings of this style of thesis.

This thesis, therefore, aims to introduce an area of the world that although in recent years has attracted international attention because of its strategic importance to the West, has attracted little academic attention or recognition of

the tremendous changes and development of its society and educational provision. The thesis will bring together previously scattered and, at times, obscure information and data about the UAE, its surrounding area and its educational provision. It will identify influential factors that have helped to shape this educational provision such as Islam; gender; human resource, manpower requirement and the resulting multi-cultural nature of its population. The important fact that the UAE can be defined as a small country will lead to discussion and analysis within a framework of national 'smallness' highlighting how that has been advantageous or not in its educational development.

It is hoped, that this thesis will contribute to the existing body of research on the educational provision in small countries that has been produced over the last two decades. This will be achieved through introducing a new country/area and the influential wealth factor; an area and influence that has been generally ignored by the researchers who have focussed their work on the poorer less advantaged countries of the Commonwealth, Caribbean and the South Pacific [21]. Characteristics that are common to both rich and poor small countries will be highlighted and new ones exclusive to small countries that enjoy the wealth factor will be introduced.

There are three main threads running through this thesis with each being related and informed by the others:

i) the collection and collation of data on the UAE and its educational provision;
ii) identification, discussion and analysis of the trends and influences on the educational provision of the UAE;
iii) the above analysis within a framework of national smallness.

Part One of this thesis will offer a contextual and conceptual overview of the thesis. Section 'A' above outlines reasons for the study and limitations in research procedures. It further expands into establishing a 'small countries'

perspective below. The second section, 'B', brings together important general and specific information and data about the United Arab Emirates. This will help the reader by creating one source or point of reference where previously this information has been widely scattered. Moreover, this will form the basis to which further specific information will be added as **Part Two** develops an analytical approach to the trends, influences and attitudes that have shaped the educational provision such as gender, Islam, its manpower requirements and the resulting multi-cultural nature of the society. **Part Three**, the final section, identifies and restates characteristics and trends of the small country and applies them to the case of the UAE with some reference to the wealth factor. It is not exhaustive, however, it clearly places the UAE and also, by some comparative reference, the other small Gulf states into the developing field of research focussed on educational provision in small countries. It is also recognition of the importance of comparative education and how an awareness of developments elsewhere and, in particular small countries, can enhance an understanding of education in the United Arab Emirates.

NOTES AND REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER ONE

1. In the Islamic world the word sheikh is used to refer to the leader of an Arab tribe or village. Emir is also used in the same context.

2. The United Arab Emirates comprises the seven emirates of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al Qaiwain, Ras al Khaimah and Fujairah. Prior to independence and whilst under British tutelage the group was known as the Trucial States.

3. The Gulf War (1991) was the result of Iraq's president Sadam Hussain's expansionist plans and invasion and looting of Kuwait. Hussain justified the invasion within the context of Iraq's historical claim to the land of Kuwait. The invasion was condemned by the international community and through the aegis of the United Nations an international task force, headed by the United States of America and supported by many industrial nations including those of the Arab world, was dispatched to liberate Kuwait.

4. These characteristics and trends will be discussed in detail in the next chapter and comment regarding them will be made throughout the thesis. The final chapter will relate them specifically to the case of the UAE.

5. For further details and a brief overview of trends in Comparative Education see: ALTBACH, Philip and KELLY, Gail (Eds) (1986),
   New Approaches to Comparative Education,
   (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press).

   ALTBACH, Philip G (1991),
   "Trends in Comparative Education" in:
   Comparative Education Review, Vol. 35, No. 3, August 1991, pp. 491-507.

   WATSON, Keith and WILSON, Raymond (Eds) (1985),
   Contemporary Issues in Comparative Education,
   (London, Croom Helm).

6. ALTBACH, Philip G and KELLY, Gail P (1986),
   "Introduction: Perspectives on Comparative Education" in:
   ALTBACH, Philip and KELLY, Gail (Eds) (1986) op. cit., p.1.

7. ALTBACH, Philip G (1991), op. cit., p. 491.

8. Ibid.

9. See: COOMBS, Philip H. (1985),
   The World Crisis in Education,
   (Oxford, Oxford University Press), p. 67 onwards.

   WATSON, Keith (1988),
   "Forty Years of Education and Development: from optimism to uncertainty" in:
   Education Review, Vol. 40, No. 2, p. 148.
   Well worth reading for general background information and for the questions he raises regarding education and development.

10. ALTBACH, Philip G and KELLY, Gail P (1986), op. cit., pp. 5-6.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid., p. 2.

14. ALTBACH, Philip G (1991), op. cit., p. 506.

15. Ibid.

16. Qur'an (also Koran) is the sacred book of Islam, believed by Muslims to be the infallible word of God dictated to his prophet Mohammed. The *Collins Concise English Dictionary* states that it is derived from 17th Century Arabic word qur'an meaning reading book.

17. Mullah or mulla is a Muslim religious leader, scholar or teacher.

18. This will be discussed in Part I Section B.

19. BIGGS, Michael Ivor (1989),
The Development of Educational Provision in the Arabian Gulf City States of Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates,
unpublished MEd dissertation, University of Hull.

20. Self-censorship exists in the UAE press.

21. See the next chapter for further information.

PART ONE A:

CHAPTER TWO: A FRAMEWORK OF NATIONAL SMALLNESS

An important thread running through this thesis is that the United Arab Emirates can be classified as a 'small country' and as such exhibits characteristics that correspond to other 'small countries'. The fact that there is some correspondence in the characteristics associated with smallness and the consequent influences on a country and the education it provides is of importance to all small countries and comparative education in general.

Before comparison, discussion and analysis can take place in this thesis it is necessary to define the notion of smallness and set it into the context of the recognised international research already undertaken within this relatively new area of scholarly interest.

Accordingly, this chapter will initially outline previous interest and writing within the area of small country research and its relevance to the educational context. This will offer the reader an historical overview followed by definitions of smallness and a presentation of characteristics as identified in important contributions to the field by Bray, Brock, Smawfield et al [1].

Comment on small country characteristics and their consequent influences with reference to the United Arab Emirates and its educational provision will take place throughout the body of this thesis. Some reference to the neighbouring Gulf City States (GCS) of Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar will add a further comparative element and highlight the wealth factor. Salient points will be drawn together and presented in the final summative chapter.

Small sovereign states have been in existence for some time although the proliferation in their numbers did not really occur until the 1960s and 1970s when the old style empires, particularly the British, were dismantled. In terms of Britain

and its colonies these small states generally did not receive their independence until after the larger states. This was the result of both Labour and Conservative Party thinking in the 1950s which "believed that full sovereignty was not possible in the great majority of British colonies, and that even Sierra Leone was a borderline case" [2]. This must be recognition of the difficulties that they would face in establishing systems and sound political and economic bases rather than being concerns purely driven by the metropolitan centre's own commercial motives.

Initially, these new small sovereign states attracted little scholarly interest and when they did it was generally confined to non-educational matters. In part this may have been due to the popular theories of development at the time based firmly in the economic field stimulated to a certain extend by aid donor organisations such as UNESCO and the World Bank. However, in the last decade some attention has turned to educational issues which also corresponds to an international shift in emphasis from the quantitative to qualitative expansion of educational provision in developing countries [3]. This was also directed by fiscal motives as the ideals of Universal Primary Education became increasingly difficult to finance and implement and a sense of realism in the finite funding of development took effect.

Smawfield's unpublished PhD thesis *Education in the British Virgin Islands: a small country case study* [4] maps out the early research regarding educational provision and small countries. It is not the writer's intention to regurgitate this work but it is important to direct the reader to it.

Smawfield states that the idea of 'small countries' as a phenomenon meriting discrete academic attention is one which is at least thirty years old [5]. He ascribes the earliest reference to a seminar exploring the theme of national smallness to the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, between 1962

and 1964 which culminated in the 1967 publication of *Problems of Smaller Territories* under the editorship of Burton Benedict [6]. However, in terms of publication Demas predated this with *The Economics of Development in Small Countries* in 1965 [7].

Smawfield cites further a conference:

> The year 1972 saw the convening of a second important conference in Britain on the problems of "small" developing countries and this too produced a major work: *Development Policy in Small Countries,* edited by Selwyn and published in 1975. [8]

The aforementioned did not examine the educational context although Smawfield did discover a 1972 doctoral thesis by Harrigan [9] which, he believes, is the first significant contribution to the study of 'small countries' from an educational perspective. The writer has not uncovered any other major work of this period to disprove this. However, Harrigan's work was an unpublished piece which had a limited audience and this most probably accounts for the general consensus that the area of study did not emerge until the 1980s.

Brock suggests that the real "impetus for this developing field has come from the Commonwealth Secretariat" [10] with meetings in the mid to late 1970s on small member states resulting in the following Commonwealth Secretariat documentation: in 1975 *Pluralism and Development in Island Communities* [11] and in 1979 with *The Commonwealth: its special responsibilities to small states* [12]. Brock does state, however, that the "educational dimension" did not emerge as a priority until 1980 and the convening of the Eighth Commonwealth Education Conference in Sri Lanka. A conference which resulted in the commissioning of a monograph from Brock which he "presented to a Caribbean regional workshop in 1982 before it was further developed for publication in 1984" as the important *Scale Isolation and Dependence: educational development in island developing and other specially disadvantaged states* [13].

Brock also cites interest from the Commonwealth Foundation which produced a report in 1982 following a seminar in Barbados: *The Development of Appropriate Skills and Qualifications Required to Serve the Community in Small Island States: report of the Commonwealth Foundation Seminar, Barbados* [14].

December 1984 must be regarded as an important landmark as both Brock and Smawfield concur in their belief that the first general conference on the issues of education in small countries was held at the University of Hull under the guidance of Brock and Parker [15]. This was reported on in 1985 by Brock [16]. The focus on educational issues at the conference sets the scene for subsequent research and interest which has been generated by individuals and international institutions such as UNESCO and the Commonwealth Secretariat. This may have been given certain impetus by the shifting emphasis in educational thought for developing countries from quantitative to qualitative provision as mentioned earlier. However, of great relevance to this emerging area of study is the work of Brock. Not only for his focussing of interest on educational issues but particularly for his involvement with the Commonwealth Secretariat and his work at the University of Hull with the consequent research being undertaken by his students such as Smawfield.

A list of Brock's publications [17] can be found in the notes of this chapter as well as the Bibliography with important points that he and others raise being mooted later in this chapter.

November 1985 saw the convening of a Commonwealth Secretariat meeting in Mauritius which Brock records as being attended by some twenty small member states and resulted in both a report [18] in 1986 and the commissioning of Bacchus and Brock to edit and publish a series of essays in 1987: *The Challenge of Scale: educational development in the small states of the*

Commonwealth [19]. The same year Bray of the University of Hong Kong published a manual for educational administrators in small countries which was commissioned by UNESCO and signalled its interest in the developing field.

The field has, in recent years, attracted attention from individuals who have developed and presented their work in three forms. Firstly, the case study such as Bray and Fergus[20] and their consideration of the advantages of being small vis-à-vis Montserrat; and Smawfield [21] in his thesis on the British Virgin Islands. Secondly, as a theme specific to education in small countries such as Brock [22] in his discussion of the centre-periphery concept and Brock and Smawfield [23] in their article examining the "issues of scale, isolation and dependence in respect of small states and their educational provision", or, finally, a mixture of both as in Hindson [24] and his *Comparative Education* article on "Post-primary School Non-academic Alternatives: a South Pacific study".

A recent addition to this last category is the 1993 publication *Education in Small States: concepts, challenges and strategies* by Bray and Packer [24a]. This work is of significance because, apart from its case studies and their importance in a comparative sense, the penultimate chapter attempts to establish the emergence of a " small-state theory". However, the authors acknowledge that "conceptual definitions and empirical findings have until now not been sufficiently advanced to permit generation of hypotheses capable of testing" [24b]. Although their theoretical constructs are still at an emergent stage[24c] the work does impress that the ecology of small countries is evident in education just as in other sectors. This, therefore, justifies the legitimacy of placing education at the centre of a small country study while at the same time drawing on the conceptual frameworks of other fields [24d].

The recent and more relevant work of educational issues and small countries in

English has tended to emanate from Britain. A development that is not surprising when one considers that Britain is still, in many cases, maintaining its status as a metropolitan power in the Commonwealth through its various modes of support programmes; educational model; market place for products and defence agreements. This position is enhanced further by the siting of the Commonwealth Secretariat in London. An important factor also is the actual make-up of the Commonwealth with twenty-nine of its forty-nine independent member states being classified as small countries with populations of less than two million. Add to this group some sixteen associated states and dependent territories with populations of less than 100,000 and a need for addressing these issues can be seen. In time, as homegrown research interest develops the focus is likely to devolve to the states themselves. However, the benefit of a regular forum for the exchange of ideas and findings has obvious benefit. The Commonwealth Secretariat or a University may well be the best vehicle for this. The University of Hull has, in the past, offered this forum.

Over recent years an increasing number of researchers have pointed out that small countries have characteristics which are not merely miniature versions of larger countries. Consensus exists in that many of these characteristics seen in small countries are common and can be seen in their societies and systems. The fact that they also manifest themselves through their educational systems is also an important characteristic. Small countries share characteristics and, therefore, by virtue of their scale they share advantages, disadvantages and dilemmas that may not pose as concerns to larger countries. Economies of scale could be cited here as an obvious example where for small countries it could be read as diseconomies of scale.

In establishing a point of reference for smallness researchers have generally agreed on the need to fulfil some of the following criteria:

Population has, somewhat obviously, established itself as a major indicator of a

small country and in 1960 Kuznets defined a 'small nation' as "an independent sovereign state with a population of ten million or less" [25]. Demas's definition reduced this figure to five million and added the spatial element of 10,000 to 20,000 square miles of usable land[26]. Shand's definition refined the above even further by categorising certain Pacific and Indian Ocean states into 'small', 'very small' and 'micro' with the respective thresholds of greater than 250,000; 25,000 to 250,000 and less than 25,000 [27].

Smawfield incorporated an educational dimension in his definition of smallness with his 1986 typology examining the relationship between scale and university provision. In the typology he introduces elements of population and GNP and argues that significant thresholds do present themselves and, disregarding regional initiatives, those countries that do not have a national university should be regarded as small countries [28]. The writer cannot agree with this definition as it is far too restrictive in its attempt to create a finite distinction of where smallness ceases. Limited opportunity in tertiary education is a characteristic of smallness; but to limit the definition to the one criterion of university provision does preclude from the definition those small sovereign states that enjoy stronger financial resources yet share characteristics. The UAE, Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait can be cited as examples here. Furthermore, Smawfield does suggest later in his thesis that small countries should look very carefully at the appropriateness of the university model and suggests that these countries should find radical new models that are more appropriate to their needs [29]. This in itself will further fuel his arguments for the typology but without looking at the overall provision, if it is a radical departure, will introduce major anomalies. In 1988 Brock pointed out also that "for reasons of historical peculiarity there is not a complete correlation between national scale and a place on the typology - for example, until recently Malta, with 350,000 people, had two universities and Cyprus with over 600,000 still had no university" [30].

In broad terms Brock agrees with the pattern but the writer feels it worth noting that the typology has not stood the test of time as some countries listed in it with no national university do now possess one, such as Brunei.

Keeping within the educational context in terms of definition, Bacchus and Brock (1987) identified a hierarchy of educational provision in their indices of smallness of scale where:

> a) the provision of Universal Primary Education is still not a reality;
> b) primary education is universally provided, albeit in need of qualitative improvement, secondary facilities are limited and no tertiary education is available locally;
> c) both primary and secondary education is provided and some tertiary education facilities are available locally, possibly even at university level. [31]

The above two examples, although attempting to define smallness, are merely categorisations or descriptions that define small or limited education systems and for reasons mentioned above are not accepted by the writer as sufficient to describe small countries *per se*.

The population indicator of smallness is particularly relevant in terms of educational provision and in this the Commonwealth Secretariat uses an upper limit of two million people as its threshold [32]. Within the Commonwealth's membership alone some twenty-nine full members and sixteen dependent territories are below this threshold; with each operating educational systems that fall within the full range of educational smallness: Pitcairn with a population of 60 through to Lesotho with 1.35 million [33].

Geographical factors such as small land mass or larger land mass with little usable land and small populations also contribute to the general definition of smallness.

Finally, economic determinants such as GNP can make their contribution, and past research interest has given some prominence to these factors with the poorer developing countries more often attracting attention. However, the writer argues that the relative wealth of a country should not be considered grounds for inclusion or exclusion of that country into the classification. As indicated earlier, the wealth factor in rich developing countries does not change the general characteristics of the small country and although it may alleviate some disadvantages it does not negate them when the context is an educational one.

The above does highlight the difficulty of arriving at a firm definition of a small country and, accordingly, of where a small country ceases to be small. It is clear that a country such as Brunei is small both in terms of land mass and population but with the development of its oil reserves it now also enjoys tremendous wealth, a factor previously not attributed to a small country. Hong Kong is small in terms of land mass but demographically it has a population in excess of five million which is more than New Zealand. On the other hand Botswana has a large land mass but small population and it could be said that it suffers similar spatial disadvantages to the archipelago islands of the Maldives. There is an obvious problem in defining a threshold to the state of smallness and it is therefore by necessity an arbitrary one. General consensus in the literature shows that territorial, demographic and economic factors do contribute to defining the notion of smallness and this gives it some form. Brock suggests that any one of these factors "could render a political unit to be classified as small" and that "the coincidence of two or three indices of smallness in respect of any one example leaves no doubt as to a country's eligibility to the epithet" [34].

The notion of smallness is a relative concept which is informed by some or all of the above indicators and it is the relationship between these indicators that sets the context of scale for a particular country and perception of it.

It is clear that small countries do not fall into a distinct and tidy category. In fact, it could be argued that a prime characteristic of small countries is their disparity when viewed *en masse* in terms of topography, culture and economy. However, this characteristic does not invalidate the aforementioned nor, indeed, this thesis as when this smallness is considered more carefully, groupings can be found. Moreover, when viewed in the contexts of communication, administration, demography, development and particularly education it is surprising what common ground there is. It is important, therefore, at this juncture to consider small countries in a more general sense as these generalisations will help to inform the educational analysis later.

Small country characteristics

In terms of land mass, countries can be grouped into those that are landlocked, littoral or islands states. Although examples of small countries can be identified for each of these categories it is interesting to note that out of the 49 country membership of the Commonwealth 22 of the 29 countries with populations of less than two million are islands [35]. When extended beyond the Commonwealth it can be found that islands form a large proportion of those countries that could be classified as small. Many of these islands are located in tropical regions such as the South Pacific and Caribbean although not all fall within regional groupings and some suffer a high degree of remoteness; in both cases there are implications for educational provision.

Consideration of the topographical features of a country will lead to descriptors regarding land use and introduce spatial factors that throw-up characteristics. For example, islands can be further classified as single island states or archipelagos; with volcanic and mountainous terrain or flat coral terrain both of which affect land use. This also introduces spatial factors of isolation and insulation/constriction which further affect communications and consequently educational provision. There is also some correspondence of spatial factors in certain landlocked, littoral and island states and, by way of example, it can be seen that in purely physical

terms it may be difficult to communicate or commute from one part of a country to the next if it is, say, an archipelago; has a sparsely scattered population in a large land mass such as Botswana or has mountainous terrain. This would make demands on the limited fiscal budgets stretching and focussing facilities and could further isolate areas and populations. This would create inequalities of opportunity and benefits adding to the migration of population from rural to urban environments. In small countries the focussing of the limited resources and opportunities leads to a focussing of the population around the urban centres and a dichotomy of population. This would correlate with the situation in larger developed countries although in the small state it can be found that the percentage of the population based in and around the capital city would be greater.

Economic considerations, perhaps, more than most highlight the disparities that exist and small countries can be placed at any point of a continuum from the poorest in terms of per capita income to the wealthiest with the UAE being afforded the accolade of one of the highest per capita incomes in the world [36]. This thesis sets out, in part, to show that even the wealth factor does not set a small country apart from the rest of the group.

Economic considerations do bring into sharp focus certain important characteristics of small countries. Often they share the characteristics of a common colonial heritage and although the colonial masters may have been different the legacies do, nevertheless, bear a striking similarity. The differences in the French, Spanish and British colonial attitudes towards education may be different although the setting up of attitudinal factors that perpetuates the educational superiority and desirability of the colonial and metropolitan centre is the same for all. At this point, however, it is the more general economic legacy or, in fact, the general economic situation of small countries *per se* that is of interest. Examination of the economic base of small countries will show that the majority of them have mono-economies: that is to say economies that are dependent on

one main source of income such as oil, bananas, sugar cane or tourism. This may be the result of historical factors such as colonial interference or because of limited resources due to their geographic and climatic conditions. Unfortunately, a mono-economy is also very vulnerable to change in demand, over production, attitude, natural disaster and currency fluctuation. The advantages of an oil based mono-economy may, on first sight, appear tremendous, however, the fluctuating price of a barrel of oil means fluctuating income. Petrol prices may have appeared to rise in the West but, in recent years, that has generally been the result of taxation policies and does not represent increased income to the oil producers. The argument can be easily extended although there is little need as the point has been made. Consider also the situation of a 'banana economy' if there was a drop in demand or crop failure; unlike oil bananas cannot be kept stored for prosperity. A mono-economy can also lead to strong dependency on a metropolitan centre be it the ex colonial power or a new one and as such can be seen as another influential factor on small countries increasing aspects of vulnerability [37].

Tourism is an increasing feature of small countries which has been enhanced by their favourable climatic conditions as many are situated in the tropical and sub-tropical regions of the world. With their exotic palm fringed beaches they possess the 'paradise environments' that the advertisers have actively promoted since the 1960s. The advances in communications and the reduced costs of air travel, exotic destinations in the Caribbean, South Pacific, Middle East and Far East have become major destinations for both the individual traveller and the package tour operator and are no longer the preserve of the affluent. Tourism is not without its vulnerability factor and it is important to consider the present Western trend away from just a beach holiday as concerns over skin cancer increase. How that will affect the industry in the future must already be of concern to some countries that are heavily dependent on tourism. Moreover, increasing concerns about terrorism and civil unrest, and the media's reporting of it, continue to shape demand and consequent choice of destination. An

unfavourable press comment and the foreign earnings from a season's tourism could be wiped out. But, at present, tourism is a major currency earner for many small countries further giving them the opportunity to start funding their development or to diversify from their mono-economies. However, it is not without its cost and some may view the tourist 'invasion' as cultural contamination bringing with it many negative factors. This will be discussed later as the UAE offers an excellent example in terms of their developing tourist industry. The promotion of tourism does have major implications for the development of a country's infrastructure and their manpower requirements which, in many cases, directs educational policy. One example is the importance of English as the language of the travel industry.

The English language has assumed great importance internationally and in many small countries has become the de facto language. The benefits derived from communication in English are clear when one considers that, amongst other things, it is the language of the airlines and tourism; it is the international language of commerce and banking and it is the operating language of many organisations such as OPEC (Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries). In fact, it is also estimated that 80% of the data stored on the world's computers is in English [38].

Many small countries have realised their independent status by actively promoting themselves as off-shore financial centres offering relaxed company rules and favourable taxation policies to the individual and corporation alike. The Caymen Islands, Jersey and Bahrain are just three examples. Again this has major implications in terms of manpower requirements and often leads to a large influx of high tech expatriate expertise.

Both the financial and the tourist industry require the development of a service industry, this also has implications for educational policy, provision and the language of instruction which can be exemplified in the case study of the UAE.

The lack of necessary expertise and manpower in developing countries is of major concern to both large and small countries alike. However, in the small country the situation is compounded by the small pool from which to draw and limited resources with which to train. A feature of developing countries is, therefore, its expatriate population and, as a percentile of the population in small countries this is an enhanced figure. This may be the result of colonial legacy as is the case in many Caribbean islands but, more recently, it is the result of active development policies and can include the whole spectrum of labour from manual to 'high tech' expertise. Whatever the cause, it is clear that small countries are not homogeneous units and that heterogeneity is yet another characteristic that can be highlighted. Benedict refers to this characteristic by stating that many small countries are "plural or multi-racial societies, composed of different ethnic origins, cultures, religions, languages and traditions" which, he goes on to say, "aggravate the problems of smallness" [39]. This is clearly the case in many Caribbean societies and the small Arabian Gulf City States. Moreover, in whatever form this multicultural state manifests itself it does have obvious implications for educational provision and often leads to educational dichotomy with the development of large private sectors being but one example.

Smawfield cites the case of multilingualism being a possible manifestation of a plural society which could "exacerbate problems of provision in a situation which might already be marginal on account of consideration of scale" he further draws attention to the possible implications this may have for the provision of educational materials and attempts to localise the curriculum [40].

Manpower requirement is part of the equation that contributes to educational planning in all countries and in a developing country this may lead the policy itself. Small countries are unlikely to produce all of the expertise that they require and with finite resources must, therefore, give careful consideration to the type of skills that they wish to develop in their population and find ways of maximising this production.

The government is a major employer and in small countries its pervasive nature is well documented. Benedict states "very few enterprises are possible without government support, and very few avenues of upward mobility fail to involve the government" [41]. A general examination of this large employer and its demands may well exemplify the skills requirement and the consequent implications for educational policy.

A high level of governmental involvement in a country that is developing its infrastructure and basic services is understandable, particularly when bearing in mind that initial funding for these projects will be generated by or directed through the government. Interesting, however, is that the initial skills requirement in initiating these projects is often different from those skills required for its later management, maintenance and development. In small countries to buy-in this initial expertise is not just the only option but, possibly, a preferable one as these very specialist skills may well become redundant within the country on the project's completion. Moreover, if training an individual in this expertise uses up precious resources and the only opportunities left on project completion for the individual are external ones then that investment is wasted. This may appear a harsh statement but in the reality of the small country with finite resources there is no room for wastage and this type of lost investment through the out flow of the expertise is a very real problem. It is not just confined to the trained individual whose skills may have become redundant but also to any trained individual who perceives a better opportunity or general improvement in status elsewhere. This could occur at any level of the work force but whereas the nature of the migrant manual worker tends toward a temporary outflow with an inflow of externalised foreign currency, such as in a country like Jordan in the Middle East, the higher the training the more likely the outflow is permanent with new homes and bases being set-up elsewhere. This is a particular problem with training that may have taken place in the metropolitan centre and is a dilemma that will haunt all countries with limited resources; but one that is particularly poignant in small

countries where there is a need for trained personnel but by training them they may also lose them. Furthermore, in small countries with a 'topless' education system or certainly limited higher education this training represents a substantial investment and does, therefore, pose the question of where and how do these countries target their resources.

The high cost of training is often borne by the government in small countries for, as indicated earlier, it is they who are the biggest employers and in the early days of development it is unlikely that there are large private ventures in the country which would be prepared to fund major training anyway. In fact, for profit orientated business there is little incentive to invest heavily in training programmes when they could introduce trained expatriates. Moreover, these essential personnel are unlikely to be refused admission and work permits by the host country which would welcome the enterprise; if for nothing more than the generation of cash; a required new production facility; use of local manual labour and the relieving of unemployment.

There is obvious concern in small countries about this inflow of expertise when it is, perhaps, at the expense of homegrown expertise. An increasing trend in many small countries is the promotion of labour policies of localisation or, in the Arabian Gulf, Arabization: that is to reduce dependence on expatriate expertise in the running of the country by introducing their own nationals into these positions. Miller points also to this trend in the Caribbean and states that it is of particular significance in the education field. He states:

> ....the region as a whole has moved away from a situation in which locals occupied subordinate positions while expatriates occupied the top positions. Over the last thirty years the Caribbean has developed a cadre of suitably trained nationals that currently man all levels of the education system. This is true of all the leadership positions, in schools, as well as in ministries of education. [42]

Obviously the process is much easier to implement in those departments that form part of the government, such as education, because fiscal motives do not always direct appointments. In the private and commercial sector localisation of the work force will be more difficult to encourage and may require legislation to be effective. However, because post secondary education in small countries is often in its infancy the introduction of local expertise is still only a trickle, but, as the developments take place the numbers, particularly as a percentage of population, will increase.

As indicated above, major routes for employment and opportunity exist through the government agencies, government controlled enterprises and projects. The government of any country is a major employer because of the need to administer the policies, dictates, projects and ministries. In a developing country there is a need to set into place a minimum level of structured government and supporting administration. In small countries the case is no different and although Bray and Fergus refer to it as a "Dominant Bureaucracy" [43] researchers have highlighted the characteristic in that there is less departmentalisation and much shorter chains of command [44]. This situation, often due to lack of financial resource and/or manpower leads to ministers themselves holding more than one portfolio reflecting the general administrative situation with umbrella ministries such as Education, Sports and Youth Affairs. A greater level of polyvalency is, therefore, more necessary than in larger countries, where specialisation tends to be the mode. Importantly, because small countries require small numbers of highly specialist personnel and have a strong need to respond quickly to changing external factors and technology a certain level of polyvalency would be a desired quality in their manpower and the population in general. This does, of course, have major implications for curriculum planning at all levels of education.

Smallness can often be associated with proximity and in a small country situation this can often mean close contact with the decision-makers leading to greater

accountability. In a small country, particularly a micro state, it is not uncommon for the decision-makers to be known to the majority of the indigenous population. Their decisions and the resulting consequences will be soon known to them and, unlike their counterparts in larger countries, there is little opportunity for escape and anonymity. This personalisation of politics with increased accountability for decisions and actions is a characteristic of small countries that has both positive and negative aspects for the individual. It could lead to more realism [45] in the decision-making because the consequences of the decision can be easily seen. But it can also lead to less risk taking and 'safe policies' by the individual due to the high visibility of failure. This could become a negative factor when the need for dynamic and innovative action may be more appropriate in a country's development.

Bray and Fergus point out that in Monserrat this personalised nature of society has also led to intense rivalry with consequent wastage of energy. They suggest that in a larger society this fierce competition and personal rivalry would be easier to absorb and redirect perhaps not resulting in the same potential damage to the education system as it did in Monserrat over a period of some ten years as the individuals rose through the system to the higher echelons [46].

Understandably, in small countries there is a high level of nepotism and favoured status that the power of government office can bring. However, as the case of the UAE will highlight later, this situation is likely to change as the level of education increases in a country's population and meritocracy surfaces. Unfortunately, when the country is a poor one the protection of the favoured status for leading families and their future generations can be a corruption that will continue to influence policy decisions, including those of education, as individuals, families and groups secure their own futures. In the small less wealthy country this could have devastating consequences as the limited funds are misdirected, misappropriated, squandered or merely directed to the benefit of the small number of the élite ruling class. This may be the result of colonial legacy or

merely the result of a 'power grab' on independence.

By furthering the arguments of close proximity it can also be seen that a positive benefit of smallness lies in the implementation of policy and change. A shorter chain of command can allow for quicker communications and the easier dissemination of information with an attendant quick response to its implementation. This would allow for quick responses to changes and demands which would be of particular benefit to education where policy can be implemented quickly with monitoring and modification arrived at in full consultation. The benefit to the in-service development of the education force can also be cited here as it is possible for groups to gather and be accessed with reasonable ease by their trainers and administrators. This does make the assumption that there is no major spatial isolation within the small country although, with the advances in technology and its reducing costs, this is becoming less of a problem.

Personalisation of internal politics has been cited above as a characteristic of small countries but politics in an international sense also has a bearing on the small country that has aspired to independent status. The state of nationhood brings with it certain advantages in that the small country will have the opportunity to join international organisations and forums thereby acquiring a voice on the international stage. It may bring with it voting status equal to many large countries and afford the small country's opinions a prominence that is out of proportion to its size of population or economic influence. This acknowledged status by organisations such as the United Nations is an important dimension for small countries as it certainly helps in the recognition and maintenance of territorial borders and rights. Nationhood also brings the opportunity to draw upon international aid organisations and it is documented that small countries do receive a greater proportion of the available funds on a per capita basis than larger countries [47].

Nationhood will involve the small countries in international and regional forums which are of positive benefit to the country through the exchange of ideas, information and initiatives. However, it also stretches the smaller country's expertise in that a regular commitment to such forums, apart from fiscal considerations, also takes that expertise out of the country for periods of time leaving a gap on the home front. As mentioned above, one of the problems in small countries is their limited requirement for, and availability of, specific expertise which leads to one person wearing several hats. If that person is constantly being called upon to represent the country it is unlikely that there is the luxury of a reserve in the country to cover. The forum and contact may bring positive benefits to the country by breaking its isolation or through the introduction of new ideas. Conversely it may overstretch an individual or resource with negative consequences. This has implications at all levels and highlights the marginal state within which most enterprises operate in the small country context. This is particularly so in education for it is from the education field that many people are drawn to hold higher office. In some cases the mere fact that the teacher has had some higher education is sufficient reason, especially in the early stages of development.

Therefore, on the one hand it can be seen that expertise is taken from where it may be most effective but on the other hand it is important to point out that the professional development of an individual can also be highly inhibited in the context of a small country. In this case the lack of promotional opportunity will affect all of the professions and, again, particularly the education force. This can easily be seen in the example of Headteachers in schools. A small number of schools in a country requires a small number of Heads. Likewise, a small number of schools also reduces the opportunity for sideways moves for those aspiring Heads waiting in the sidelines. This lack of opportunity and movement will have a demoralising effect on the work force at all levels. It will also lead to a certain amount of stagnation in ideas and curriculum innovation which cannot be good for the country as a whole. This problem has been highlighted by writers such as

Brock, Smawfield, Bray and Fergus [48]. But of major concern to the small countries themselves must be how they introduce incentives and prevent possible stagnation of not just the teaching profession but all professions. If the general perception in any one area is that of lack of opportunity to develop then the individual may well seek further opportunities or challenges out of the profession or away from the country. In either case it is a lost investment as well as a loss of greatly needed expertise.

Universities can sometimes provide leadership roles in these circumstances but unfortunately one of the characteristics of small countries, as identified by Brock, is their "topless education systems" [49]. In brief, this refers to the fact that few small countries have fully developed education systems and limited tertiary sectors do tend to be the hallmark. Smawfield has suggested that the lack of university provision be an indicator of smallness although the writer did disregard this indicator earlier. However, university provision, or lack of it, does lead to further identifiable characteristics and dilemmas for the small country.

It is not the brief of this research to develop arguments for and against the university model, however, the model itself is often the result of a colonial presence. That is, it may be a legacy that is already in place on independence; or is the result of pressures and attitudes from within the small country itself that look to the metropolitan centre, colonial or neo-colonial, as possessing the ideal system which the internal pressures demand. The university and the degree it confers is generally perceived with high status and is viewed often as a way out of the low status/poverty trap for some. This leads many parents to feel that it is worth the struggle and investment in pursuing this type of education for their children because, if successful, it can also be a hedge against poverty in their old age. Thus the model is perpetuated whether it is appropriate or not to that individual or the country's situation.

The university model is an expensive option that draws large amount of funding that could possibly be used to greater benefit elsewhere and lower down the system. However, it is a model that is unlikely to be superseded as an ideal in small countries because it confers status on a country. It also appears just as important to many a government as establishing the international airport as a way of promoting the country's success. Once in place, the university does influence the education system from the top downward [50] as the various levels of education direct their students through courses that involve selection. The university can also devalue the status of vocationally orientated education which is more likely to be of greater benefit to the developing small country.

However, if the university is not in place or if it offers limited courses the small country will find that it has to direct its education to the demands of external universities or colleges. In fact, this is more likely to be the case in most small countries irrespective of their own provision because of their topless or limited system. This consequently leads to an external dependence which is again directed towards the metropolitan centre: a centre that possibly offers scholarship or favourable fees; has a common language; is the destination for products; or is a major aid donor. This leads to the small country having to assume the Centre's examination models limiting the opportunity for localisation of curricula and educational materials and increasing the Centre's cultural influence on the small society itself. Educational dependency and cultural dependency are often the result.

Cultural dependency is most pervasive if the metropolitan centre is; a destination for produce; is the educational model and, importantly; the Centre chooses to make the small country a market place and destination for their own products. The example of television, video, radios and hi fi and its software can be cited here as obvious cultural contamination and dependency which affect attitudes in their presentations and introduce further expectations creating trends and fashions more often dependent on the originator.

The picture of influences on a small country becomes increasingly complex once the question of aid is brought to bear. For example, it is important for small countries to take advantage of the advances in technology. Communications and computerisation are but two examples of useful high technology that may help improve the situation for small countries with applications from air traffic control and telecommunications to education. But to fund these technologies is often expensive in the first instance and, therefore, a need to set up loan facilities is important. The financing organisation or aid package is often linked to a major industrial power. This results in a new dependency as the future maintenance and development of that technology will be linked to the country that holds the technological knowledge and spare parts. In the educational context there will be a direct link to the source/donor country of the technology through its use and training programmes. All developing countries have this problem and often due to the funding situation rarely have the opportunity for real diversity in technological source. In the small country there is little opportunity to diversify the source and, hence, the dependence because often only one system or small numbers of equipment are involved. However, if the small country has some strategic significance the situation may be different as one power can be played off against the next.

Regional cooperation could be cited here as a means of offsetting some of the dependencies already mentioned. The Caribbean's regional initiatives to localise their school curriculum and to introduce their own examinations in the form of the Caribbean Examinations Council can be given by way of example. There has also been a pooling of finance in the area in the setting-up of the regional University of the West Indies with its split sites on the islands of Trinidad, Barbados and Jamaica. A regional university may be seen as a viable alternative to external universities but it is not without its own reflection of what was in place before. The campus siting brings with it benefits and centre-peripheral influences with the larger 'campus' islands benefiting not just in the

proximity of provision but also in the obvious benefits to the local economy. These islands further become magnets and foci for the region in much the same way the metropolitan centre was as previously discussed. Brock refers to this as "regional metropolitanism" [51].

The establishment of regional initiatives and pooling of resources does, without doubt, help in the diseconomies of scale suffered by small countries. It does, however, require a political will to instigate and maintain especially when the draw of the larger and more powerful centres continues to attract. Pooling of resources and producing home grown media may be the only way to prevent the cultural influences and conditioning small countries are prone to from the major powers in the region. Cynical argument could, however, state that there is little point now in doing so as with the tremendous advances in technology a new international culture is being created by those who are in control of the technology with their satellite communications, TV, media transfer, tourism *inter alia*.

Diseconomies of scale must be viewed as a definite disadvantage of smallness and although regional initiatives may alleviate the situation to some extent it can be nothing more than the tip of the iceberg when looking at small countries as a whole. This has particular relevance in the provision of education in these small countries and although wealth may help it will not remove the problem which usually manifests itself in higher unit costs. In the extreme these unit costs can become prohibitive. In a small country, therefore, diseconomies of scale can have a bearing on every aspect at every level of the educational provision. The topless system has been cited earlier but also the lack of specialist provision such as educational psychologists or special education is also a characteristic of small countries, particularly, in the early stages of their development.

Noticeable trends in the educational provision of small countries identified by Packer and Baba are sufficiently important to list here as they will be further exemplified in the UAE's case. Packer [52] identifies five trends which can be

simplified as follows:

1. post-secondary institutional expansion;
2. rationalisation of technical and vocational education;
3. moves towards regional examinations;
4. growth of non-formal and continuing education initiatives;
5. increased attention to the possibilities of high technology
    and distance education.

The five trends that Baba [53] recognised in the South Pacific context are of interest generally:

1. the localisation of the curricula and examinations;
2. upgrading the quality of teachers;
3. providing greater access to basic education, especially at
    the primary level;
4. the provision of more appropriate agro-technical education;
5. development of tertiary education within the South Pacific.

These observable trends in the various regions go some way to support the premise that small countries do have common concerns. Taking it one stage further, it could be said that small countries go through similar stages of development and thereby have similar questions to answer in the process.

Small countries are inextricably linked to other countries both small and large that also fall on the continuum of strong and weak in a variety of frames of reference. It is clear that in some cases this interdependence can work to their advantage although equally it can turn into the disadvantage of dependence. All countries must learn to cooperate for mutual and not exclusive gain. Whereas the larger country could possibly function as a discrete entity this option is not available to the small ones as they do not possess the knowledge, technology or diversity

of resources to operate in an independent mode and still develop. Small countries do, therefore, have to find ways of reducing their dependence be it political, cultural or educational or resolve their isolation. This may not be possible for some who are vulnerable with their mono-economies and strong metropolitan dependencies. However, important decisions regarding national, regional and metropolitan initiatives and/or overtures are an increasing feature of small countries as they look to their futures. Nowhere is this more obvious than in the sphere of education and in particular, examinations, as a country makes decisions as to which direction to go with each decision having major implications for curricular planning and resourcing.

Packer suggests that small countries are involved in a fine balancing act as they search "for an acceptable balance between the development of a homegrown national education system, formal and non-formal, and some measure of dependence on financial support and services provided by other countries, bilaterally or through regional co-operation" [54]. It could be said, therefore, that small countries' education systems are a mirror of the fine balancing act that the countries are involved in as a whole reflecting those decisions and routes that have been taken.

One of the characteristics of small countries previously alluded to is their disparity. They fall on the wealth continuum from the highest to the lowest in terms of GNP and come in a range of shapes and sizes with each offering up their own unique pattern or background of both endogenous and exogenous influences that may fall anywhere on the positive to negative continuum. The above review and discussion of the small but developing body of literature on small countries has highlighted important characteristics and dilemmas, both positive and negative, that have ramifications for small countries and their educational provision. During the following parts of this thesis these points will be discussed more fully as the UAE is used to illustrate many of these characteristics. In turn, this will support the writer's case for the UAE's inclusion in,

and the contribution that it can make to, the growing body of research on education in small countries.

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PART ONE B:

CONTEXTUAL OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

CHAPTER THREE

THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: A GENERAL BACKGROUND

The Gulf States of Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates, have become familiar names in the West over the past two decades. This has, in part, been due to their oil production but is also the result of the attention given by the news media in their coverage of the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the region and of recent conflicts and events in the area generally. However, these states, and the Middle East of which they are a part, are often perceived as one and the same and distinction is rarely made even between the Arab and the Persian. This results in stereotyped images that have been given form by a range of influences such as: religious prejudice, perhaps dating as far back as the Crusades; sensationalist stories recited by returning expatriate workers; media images; or merely romantic and mysterious pictures conjured up from childhood tales such as those of the *Arabian Nights.*

Given the fact that the Middle East, due to its position at the centre of the clash of Eastern and Western civilisations, has had an enormous impact on the history and culture of Western Europe combined with the recent extensive media attention; it is surprising how little is known or understood of the region. Moreover, it is also surprising how little attention the area has received in the English-speaking schools and universities of the West. In fact, caricature has often passed for knowledge[1].

The United Arab Emirates is part of the Middle East and by virtue of this often suffers from the same lack of knowledge and understanding. Furthermore, because educational provision is organic and evolves as a result of many influences, it is important that any examination of the United Arab Emirates' educational provision is informed by those conditions that give it shape. It is,

therefore, imperative that the United Arab Emirates *per se* are considered in certain detail as this will give substance to the later analysis and discussion thereby placing the research into context.

There is no one source to direct the reader to for this information because, as indicated earlier, there has been a general lack of scholarly interest in the area both in English and Arabic. This section of the study, therefore, aims to address that situation by bringing together general and specific information that was previously scattered across a wide variety of sources. It is intended that this section informs not just the rest of this study but that it also acts as a more focussed point of reference for future study based on the United Arab Emirates.

The section will begin with a geographical overview of the region and the United Arab Emirates identifying immutable factors that have had a fundamental effect on shaping the pattern of human activity. A general historical overview is also important and will be given to help to explain, amongst other things, the general stagnation in the area and the lack of educational provision up until the early 1970s. However, historical perspective will only be included thereafter when it has a direct bearing on the situation being discussed. Political, social and economic factors are important contributors to the historical perspective and, where thought important, they will be given attention in this and later sections.

A GEOGRAPHICAL OVERVIEW OF THE AREA

The United Arab Emirates is found in the southeastern area of the Middle East. It is situated on the southern shores of the Arabian Gulf in the eastern tip of the Arabian Peninsula and is a member of the group of states more frequently referred to as the Gulf States. Collectively they are the oil producing states of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman.

The Middle East

The Middle East, as a term, is only valid when the region is viewed from a

MAP 3.1

THE MIDDLE EAST

Source: HEARD-BEY, F. (1982), *From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates*, op. cit.

Western perspective and does allude to its position midway between Europe and her past important colonial interests in India and the Far East. Beaumont et al [2] states that the term appeared to originate in the British India Office during the 1850s, in the early days of expansionist rivalry between Russia and Britain. They go on to state that the term became current in the English-speaking world around 1900 when the naval historian, A.T. Mahan, employed it [3]. Its first airing in Britain's House of Lords has been credited to Lord Curzon on 22 March, 1911 [4]. The term itself arose out of the inadequacy of the previous older terms of Near East and Far East in describing the area around the Persian Gulf. Strategic connotations of the term gained further in importance during the Second World War fostered by the establishment of the RAF 'GHQ Middle East' in Cairo [5].

In recent years the residents of the region itself often refer to themselves as from the Middle East with the term Near East having dropped out of normal usage. More recently American commentators have introduced a second and neutral term 'Southwest Asia' which covers that part of the region which lies east of the Isthmus of Suez and north of the eastern Mediterranean Sea, this excludes North Africa which came under the umbrella of Middle East during the Second World War [6]. Clearly the term Middle East is Eurocentric. However, with the region's important commodity of oil the strategic importance of the area to the industrialised West has in no way diminished and, if anything, has increased. The show of Western might in ousting Iraq from Kuwait in the recent Gulf War is testimony to that.

The region of the Middle East is characterised by a severe climate of hot arid summers with precipitation generally being confined to the winter-spring seasons. This precipitation can be so low that it has marked effects particularly in the interiors of the land masses. With water being a fundamental prerequisite of life, human settlements in the region have evolved around sources of it and nomadic existence based on oases are a hallmark of the early patterns of life.

MAP 3.2
THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

INTERNAL BOUNDARIES

Enclaves:
O – Oman
A – 'Ajmân
D – Dubai
AO – jointly administered by 'Ajmân and Oman
F – Fujairah
FS – jointly administered by Fujairah and Shârjah
S – Shârjah

Sultanate of Oman

IRAN

— Asphalted road
--- Main oil pipeline
● Airport
⊙ Oil export terminal
☐ Urban or industrial area
● Village
Coast line
producing oil field
— 1974 border as published by the Abu Dhabi Department of Petroleum

SAUDI ARABIA

OMAN

The United Arab Emirates

Source: HEARD-BEY, F. (1982), *From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates*, op. cit.

Further settlements sprung up at important points on the communication and trade routes. Generally, human activity and occupancy throughout the region was severely governed by topographical and climatic conditions to which the peoples of the region became closely adapted. This is particularly so in the early settlements of the Arabian Peninsula in which the United Arab Emirates and the Gulf States are situated.

Immutable factors such as those mentioned above have played such an important role in the UAE that it is necessary to give at least a brief outline of the major features of these fixed and dynamic elements and man's interaction with them over time. This will provide the necessary base for comment and analysis of socioeconomic activity later in this section.

Immutable factors: fixed and dynamic

The United Arab Emirates is situated along the lower shores of the Arabian Gulf [6a] with some 750 km of shoreline which amounts to more than one-third of the Arabian side of the coast. Occupying the majority of the easterly tip of the Arabian Peninsula the UAE also has the benefit of some 75 km of coastline on the eastern side of this peninsula giving it important access to the Indian Ocean via the Gulf of Oman. The total area of the littoral UAE excluding its small island areas is approximately 77,700 sq km [7].

The Desert

The United Arab Emirates shares with its neighbours of the Gulf States the desert characteristics of a severely arid climate. This includes vast tracts of barren land and sand desert. More than two thirds of the UAE's territory is sand desert with the more southerly areas forming part of the 800,000 sq km Rub'al Khali, the world's largest 'sand sea', a spectacular area described by Tomkinson as a:

> scenery that changes constantly in form but never in
> substance: sand that for over 250,000 square miles
> constitutes every physical feature whether on low flat
> plains, higher plateaux, steep scarps and slopes or

eight-hundred-foot peeks, its surface is incessantly
shaped and patterned by the wind. [8]

This formidable area more commonly referred to as The Empty Quarter was brought to public awareness by Wilfred Thesiger in his book *Arabian Sands* [9] in which he recounted his years living and travelling with the area's bedouin.

The sands generally begin between 5 and 15 kilometres from the Gulf shoreline and rise gently towards the foothills of the mountains to the east and south. The extent to which they are habitable depends on the availability of fresh or brackish water either in run-off from the mountains or, more importantly, the siting of the various oases and points where the water table/aquifer comes close to the surface. Generally the more easterly areas benefit from the rainwater run-off from the mountains. The rainfall in the desert regions and the UAE generally is very limited and can be quite erratic.

The mountains

The eastern side of the United Arab Emirates is dominated by the Hajar mountains ('The Rock') a range that extends along the peninsula to the south-east as far as Ra's al Hadd in Oman. At the tip of the peninsula the mountains rise from fjord-like inlets dramatically and almost vertically to some 2,000 metres in places forming an important promontory into the strategic Strait of Hormuz.

The Hajar range is composed of igneous and limestone rock and is generally devoid of topsoil except for the 3,000 metre high plateaux of Jebel al Akhdar ('Green Mountain') east of Al Ain in Oman.

These mountains effectively divide the United Arab Emirates into two. Locally this is referred to as the *Dhahira* and the *Batina*, the back and the belly [10]. The Hagar range is also responsible for the arid nature of the area. The area of South-eastern Arabia is touched by the fringes of the winter monsoon but the range generally prevents the rain clouds that have formed over the Indian Ocean

from entering the skies over the rest of the peninsula. This rain instead falls onto the range replenishing the underground water table that reaches almost as far as Dubai [11]. There are no perennial rivers that reach the sea from the centre of the range and flash floods are a characteristic of the area. However, these flash floods have, over time, deposited fertile sediments in some narrow tracts of land and valley areas on both sides of the mountains. When combined with a high water table limited agricultural activity can take place.

The coast and sea

With the exception of the mountainous coastline in the far northern reaches and the occasional outcrop of rock, the predominant feature of the coastal areas is that of *sabkhah*. *Sabkhah* is the local name for the salty mud-flats, formed from dried up lagoons and as such they are saturated with salt and generally devoid of vegetation. These flat areas, when combined with the shallowness of the sea, give the coastline a vague quality that reflects the nebulous fringes of the desert. Reefs, shoals and sandbanks are a feature of this coast which changes particularly with high tides which may submerge or surround them creating islands; or, when tides are low, expose connecting sand causeways creating spits and small peninsulas. With high spring tides in the Gulf averaging six to seven feet [12] or a rare heavy rainfall, coastal *sabkhahs* turn into inlets and lagoons or treacherous swamp that is unsafe for the traveller on either a camel or in a vehicle. Near the border with Saudi Arabia and Qatar these areas can stretch inland over 100 kilometres [13]. Understandably Tomkinson points out that: so elastic a coastline poses a problem to the cartographer [14]. Combine this to the general shallowness of the Arabian Gulf [15], coral reefs and low-lying islands it is easy to understand just how difficult and hazardous it would have been to navigate these waters and coastal areas in the past without local knowledge.

A positive benefit to the indigenous population of the shallowness of the Gulf waters is that, when combined with the light and local temperatures, ideal

conditions exist for the growth of the pearl oyster. Consequently pearl-fishing was one of the most important economic activities that took place on this coast up until the 1930s.

Due to the features of desert, mountain, hazardous coastline and lack of natural resources, water included, the area now known as the United Arab Emirates would have experienced a great deal of isolation from the rest of the world. Furthermore, although the Arabs dominated overseas trade at various stages in history, long distance shipping never became a feature of this area due to its inhospitable coastline and lack of deep natural harbours; this caused further isolation until comparatively recent times.

Of great importance to the UAE and this study is that the recent exploration of the geological conditions both on and off-shore has yielded vast deposits of oil and gas which the UAE is now exploiting.

The geographical characteristics of the individual emirates

The United Arab Emirates was not given form until 1971 and although this will be discussed in greater detail under the historical overview it is now important to identify the present political map of the different emirates of the UAE so that discussion of their particular geographical characteristics can take place. The federation of the United Arab Emirates is made up of seven individual emirates as can be seen in Map 2. They are Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al Qaiwain, Ras al Khaimah and Fujairah.

Abu Dhabi

The emirate of Abu Dhabi is the largest state occupying some 67,340 sq km (26,000 sq miles) and accounts for approximately 87 per cent of the total territory of the UAE. It is predominantly desert landscape and has a long Gulf shoreline of *sabkhah* which can extend inland some 100 km near its border with Saudi Arabia and Qatar. The territory includes twenty-four islands of significance

MAP 3.3
THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
INTERNAL BOUNDARIES

0 Ra's al Khaimah

O Shārjah

Sultanate
of Oman

Ra's al
Khaimah

S

Umm al
Qaiwain

Fujairah

'Ajmāh

A

S

O

Shārjah

F

Dubai

Ra's al
Khaimah

S

FS

S

F
S

A

D

F

AO

Sultanate of Oman

Abu Dhabi

Enclaves: O - Oman, A - Ajman, D - Dubai, F - Fujairah, S - Sharjah, AO - jointly administered by Ajman and Oman, FS - jointly administered by Fujairah and Sharjah.

Source: HEARD-BEY, F. (1982), *From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates*, op. cit.

TABLE 3.1
AREA AND POPULATION OF THE UAE BY EMIRATE
(excluding islands)

Emirate	Area			Population	
	sq. km.	sq. ml.	% of UAE	1991	% of UAE
Abu Dhabi	67,340	26,000	86.67	798,000	41.80
Dubai	3,885	1,500	5.00	501,000	26.24
Sharjah	2,590	1,000	3.33	314,000	16.45
Ras al Khaimah	1,683.5	650	2.17	130,000	6.81
Fujairah	1,165.5	450	1.50	63,000	3.30
Umm al Qaiwain	777	300	1.00	27,000	1.41
Ajman	259	100	0.33	76,000	3.98
Total	77,700	30,000	100.00	1,909,000	99.99

Source for area: MINISTRY OF PLANNING, CENTRAL STATISTICAL DEPARTMENT (1985), *Annual Statistical Abstract 1985*, (Abu Dhabi, Ministry of Planning), p. 8. Source for population figures: MINISTRY OF PLANNING, CENTRAL STATISTICAL DEPARTMENT(1991), *United Arab Emirates Statistical Review 1991*, (Abu Dhabi, Ministry of Planning). Percentages deduced from these figures.

TABLE 3.2
Dates of Discoveries and First Shipments of Oil in the Lower Gulf

	Discovery	First Shipment
Bahrain	1932	1934
Qatar	1939	1949
Abu Dhabi	1958	1962
Dubai	1966	1969
Sharjah		1974

Source: SADIK, M.T. & SNAVELY, W.P. (1972), *Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates*, (Lexington, Lexington Books), p. 8.

in the coastal waters and six islands further out in the Gulf which in recent times have assumed importance as oil terminals due to their close proximity to the oil fields. Das Island, located 170 km from the capital city of Abu Dhabi, is by far the most important of these off-shore islands and houses a refinery, oil storage, loading terminal and the associated services of a large resident work force. An oil tanker terminal to deal with onshore oil production was established on the rocky hills of Jabal al Dhannah which is situated opposite one of the largest islands, Sir Bani Yas. The importance of this siting is that the island is situated to the West of one of the few deep water channels which reach the coast [16]. Dalma Island is gaining increasing importance as one of the biggest farm producers in the area after the success of trial farms that were set-up in the early 1980s [17].

The capital city of the emirate, Abu Dhabi, is also located on an island. It is triangular in shape and extends some 16 kilometres towards the mainland between lagoons and other islands. It is connected to the mainland by road bridges. Abu Dhabi is also the federal capital of the UAE.

Due to the restricting nature of the predominant desert landscape and the difficulty in coastal approach the pattern of human settlement and activity can be seen in three main areas within the emirate of Abu Dhabi. They are understandably based on oases and a source of sweet-water. The capital, is where many of the emirate's 798,000 [18] inhabitants now live and total in excess of 400,000 [19]. Al Ain is the second largest centre of occupation with some 200,000 [20] inhabitants and is based in the Eastern Region of the emirate near the desert oasis of Buraimi. The town is situated some 200 metres above sea level at the foothills of the mountains.

Further small settlements have sprung-up around the emirate although only the Liwa oasis area is worthy of note at this time. The Liwa is an area where a string of approximately four dozen small oases nestle in the many hollows formed by

the huge 200m high interlocking sand dunes on the edge of the Rub'al Khali [21].

These oases gave the area major significance as a focal point for the migratory bedouin population of the area and although the area's water could not support major agricultural activity the small settlements could swell to several hundred [22] during the hot summer months. Sited some 100 kilometres inland, the Liwa oases were isolated from the rest of the world as their exact location was not discovered until 1906. Heard-Bey states: it [the Liwa] came by accident to the attention of the author of the *Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia*, who was compiling the information obtained by generations of officials in the British Government of India [23].

Of note, however, is that these and other centres in the emirate can be traced back several thousands of years with documented reports discussing settlement in Al Ain as far back as 3,000 BC [24]. The population of these centres has grown substantially in more recent years as the figures above allude. For example, the foundation of Abu Dhabi can be traced back to a group of hunters from the Liwa discovering sweet water on the island in 1761 with the ruling Al Nahyan family making it their capital in the 1790s [25]. However, until the early 1960s, and the export of oil from the emirate, it was little more than a village[26].

Dubai

Dubai is the second largest emirate and although its 3,885 sq km (1,500 sq miles) area is very small when compared to that of Abu Dhabi's 67,340 sq km (26,000 sq miles) it is large in comparison to the smallest emirate of Ajman with its land mass of a mere 259 sq km (100 sq miles). Dubai's predominance of desert and sea is much like Abu Dhabi yet the desert surrounding Dubai can be relatively green in comparison. Dubai's territory also includes the small enclave of Hatta in the Hajar mountains at the border with Oman. Of major significance in the emirate is that the city straddles one of the few natural harbours on the UAE's Gulf coast. However a prevailing south-north current along this coast does cause

a certain amount of sand drift across the mouth of this creek as it does also to similar creeks in Sharjah, Umm al Qaiwain and some coastal villages [27]. In Dubai and Sharjah this natural process is kept at bay by regular dredging and development along the shores which stabilises them.

The importance of the creek to Dubai can be seen in its development as one of the key trading and commercial centres in the Gulf area. From the mid 1950s it has often been referred to as the 'city of traders' [28] when it capitalised on the increasing economic prosperity of its neighbouring Gulf countries. Duties on the imports were, until oil revenues in 1969, the major source of income for the Ruler, Sheikh Rashid bin Said Al Maktoum, who wisely reinvested these limited revenues into urban infrastructural developments. Port development from the 1980s onward has resulted in a 35 berth deep water harbour close to the mouth of the creek and also the world's largest man-made harbour of 67 berths [29] at Jebel Ali where Dubai's Free Trade Zone is being developed, further establishing the city as the main entrepot centre in the Gulf.

Dubai's position relative to the other emirates makes it well placed to act as a commercial and service hub and some 75% [30] of all imports to the UAE enter through it.

Recent archaeological discoveries have shown that parts of the emirate sustained human activity and settlement that can be traced back some 4,000 years.[31] Much like Abu Dhabi, the area would have only sustained small populations and the emirate's present population of 501,000 [32] based around its capital city of Dubai has shown substantial growth in recent years on the discovery and export of oil which it too enjoys both on and off-shore.

Sharjah

Sharjah, the third largest emirate at 2,590 sq km (1,000 sq miles) has similar characteristics to its neighbour Dubai. However, its creek, around which Sharjah the capital city is based, has suffered from a far faster rate of silting up than in Dubai. Rectification of this did not take place until after Dubai's and this has, in part, resulted in its lesser standing in commercial terms.

Sharjah straddles the UAE and has the benefit of the eastern coast as well as the western one unlike the other emirates whose territories are confined to one coast. It has small enclaves in the mountainous areas and on the Gulf of Oman coast. The most important of which is the fishing harbour of Khor Fakkan which in the late 1970 underwent development to add a container terminal to its facilities. Sharjah also has a few small islands in the Gulf of which one, Abu Musa, is presently occupied by Iran in an ongoing territorial dispute. This island, close to Sharjah's Mubarak oil field, originally administered by both countries enjoys a strategic position close to the entrance of the Gulf which must be of importance in Iran's determination to claim it fully.

As with all of the Emirates, archaeological finds allow the emirate to trace its heritage back some 3,000 years, particularly the settlements in the eastern coastal areas and in the oasis area of Dhaid [33]. Dhaid situated in the centre of Sharjah's territory has become a major centre of agriculture in the emirate. In similarity to all of the emirates, with the exception of Abu Dhabi which now has two major population centres, the majority of Sharjah's 314,000 inhabitants are centred around the capital city. Sharjah also saw a rapid increase in population in recent times as it too has the benefit of oil and gas fields albeit a small and erratic production in comparison to Dubai and particularly Abu Dhabi. The position of Sharjah's territory also allows it greater access to the scarce water resources of the area with little of its water supplies having to be desalinated from the Gulf as in the case of Dubai and Abu Dhabi.

Ajman

Ajman, the smallest emirate (259 sq km, 100 sq miles), has a littoral situation on the Gulf coast and is surrounded by the emirate of Sharjah. It does, however, also possess a small number of enclaves in the Hajar Mountains, Masfut and Manama. The capital of Ajman has built up around lagoons which offer safe anchorage for small fishing and trading boats. However, although Ajman does not, so far, have the benefit of oil or other resources, in part due to its limited territory, its population has risen sharply from a sleepy backwater to some 76,000 [34]. This has mainly been the result of the development taking place in the surrounding emirates.

Umm al Qaiwain

Umm al Qaiwain has similar geographical features to Ajman and its main population centre, the capital of the same name, is situated on a peninsula parallel to the coast. The sheltered waters of the lagoons on the landward side offer safe anchorage to the local fishing vessels.

Like Ajman, its *sabkhah* and desert landscape of 777 sq km (300 sq ml) has not proved successful in the search for oil. Off-shore, however, a gas field was discovered in the late 1970s although, to date, this has not been developed [35].

Umm al Qaiwain's territory is limited to the confines of one area, unlike the other emirates, Abu Dhabi excluded, and stretches some 30 kilometres inland from the coast to a small oasis at Falaj al Mu'alla. The emirate is relatively undeveloped and has the smallest population of all the emirates totalling around 27,000 [36].

Ras al Khaimah

Ras al Khaimah is the most northerly emirate and borders the Omani enclave that occupies the tip of the Musandam Peninsula. Its territory of 1,683 sq km (650 sq ml) also includes the disputed Tunb islands at the entrance to the Gulf

which are presently occupied by Iran [37]. Ras al Khaimah has a much more rugged relief than the other emirates due to its territory extending across some of the most inaccessible parts of the Hajar Mountains with several small remote settlements in the steep-sided valleys. The main centre of activity and population is the capital town of Ras al Khaimah which surrounds an inlet and natural port. Historically, a significant area with a long sea going tradition and heritage dating back some 5,000 years [38]. Other patterns of settlement can be found on a narrow coastal strip and inland at the base of the mountains where, with the benefit of the water run-off from the mountains, agricultural activity has taken place.

In the early 1980s, after a great deal of exploration, the small off-shore Saleh oil field was discovered in Ras al Khaimah's territory and brought onstream in 1984 [39]. Ras al Khaimah's other limited natural resources are the mountains, which provide building stone, and the rich fisheries of the Gulf. Post 1980 Ras al Khaimah has experienced a sharp increase in population which is now in the region of 130,000 [40].

Fujairah

Fujairah, in many ways has a very different topography to the rest of the UAE. Its 1,165 sq km (450 sq ml) is confined wholly to the eastern coast and was isolated from the other emirates, apart from the enclaves of Sharjah, by the Hajar Mountain range until the recent construction of a road through these mountains. The territory lacks the vast barren tracts of sand desert or *sabkhah* and is generally made up of a gently sloping gravel coastal plain averaging some 7 kilometres wide. With the mountains in its hinterland it does benefit from the run-off of rainwater which seeps into its ground from the *wadi* [41] beds. The waters in the Gulf of Oman are cooler and less shallow than those of the western coasts and so Fujairah has never had the benefit of pearl beds in its waters.

A scattering of small settlements within the mountain areas and along the coastal plain centring on the port and capital town of Fujairah mark the pattern of human activity with fishing and agriculture being their major stimulus for settlement. Fujairah's present population is in the region of 63,000 [42].

Common geographical characteristics

All the emirates share a generally arid climate with consequently little cultivated land. A predominant feature is the barren land be it desert, mountainous or *sabkhah*.

Although all emirates have access to the sea the inhospitable climate and inaccessibility of much of the area either internally or from the Gulf waters has led to relative isolation in history until comparatively recent times.

The patterns of settlement were dictated by sources of water. This led to a nomadic and semi-nomadic lifestyle for many of the area's inhabitants. In more recent times settlement at the coastal inlets has led to a more settled urban lifestyle based on agriculture, fishing, pearl diving and some trade. In recent years the process of urbanisation has dramatically increased in line with the discovery and exploitation of oil and the associated benefits of trade, development and modernisation.

Interestingly, the territorial areas of each emirate have not been determined by geographical factors which may have provided natural boundaries but more by historical developments [43].

AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE AREA

A study of the educational provision within an area must be informed by the series of past events and developments that shaped the area and its attitudes and consequently the educational provision itself. In the UAE this is no different although the importance of the immutable geographical and climatic factors in

past events is, without a doubt, crucial to an understanding of the underlying poverty of the area and general stagnation in the progress of development up until recent times. These factors also account for the lack of interest in the area from foreign powers and, even during periods of colonial domination, because there was nothing to exploit, interest was minimal and development negligible. The geographical and climatic factors were, therefore, responsible for the UAE's relative isolation. Ironically it is also geographical/geological factors and the vast reservoirs of oil discovered in the area that has spring-boarded the country almost overnight onto the international stage and into the Twentieth Century. This has led to a speed of development and achievement that has been surpassed by few other countries this century.

This impressive period of time, less than two generations, is the main focal point of this study. Interestingly, it also corresponds to the short history of interest in small countries' educational systems. A brief chronological account of the main events and developments does, therefore, have relevance at this time as it will inform later discussion on the development of educational provision within the UAE.

A brief chronological account

As indicated earlier the area now known as the the United Arab Emirates can trace its history back some 5000 years although Kay [46] does note that this was not known until 1958 and the discovery of a 5200 year old grave beside Jebel Hafit in Al Ain containing pottery from Sumerai [47]. Following that discovery, and with the establishment of a permanent team of archeologists in the area, further finds in Al Ain and around the different emirates continue to unravel the ancient past. It appears relatively certain that there was some trade taking place between the people of the Arabian Peninsula and the ancient hub of the civilisation based in the Tigris-Euphrates valley in the region now known as Iraq. Kay maps the ancient history of the area in her book although it is not important to develop it here as it has little real bearing on the present.

For this study and points raised later it is important to draw the reader to the following: firstly, that the culture and religion of the United Arab Emirates and its neighbours is fundamentally Muslim; and, secondly, there was a period of history where there was limited Colonial interest from Europe.

The coming and accepting of Islam

According to Heard-Bey "there are no known records of exactly how and when Islam came to the tribes of the Trucial Oman[48], but [that] it was probably simultaneous with the well documented conversion of Oman and al Bahrayn (sic) to the faith" [49]. The spread of Islam into the area was most probably the direct result of what was happening in the surrounding region as the "religious, political, military and economic revolution of the early spread of Islam" affected the whole of the Arabic-speaking world. According to Fiey the conversion of Bahrain to Islam took place between AD 627 and 629 [50]. With the final conquest of Bahrain for the Islamic Empire, centred on Medina, being cited as 633 AD. Later recordings of a major quelling of rebellious tribes took place in the then thriving market town of Dibba on the east coast of the present UAE. It has been suggested by some historians that some 10,000 people lost their lives in that battle. However, it is worth noting the significant point that Islam's spread in this area was not perceived by external forces as political domination and in the early stages the customary tax was not remitted to Medina. According to Heard-Bey the Prophet Mohammed himself ordered that in the case of Oman the annually collected zakah was to be distributed among the poor of that country [51]. Initially, the accepting of Islam did not, therefore, disrupt the existing systems and after the battle at Dibba there were no further recordings of the need of force to impress the process of Islamisation on the region. In time, the process did effect fundamental changes on the people by affecting both their systems and their values. Today the culture of the area is fundamentally Islamic with Shari'a [52] principles forming the basis of law and therefore embracing all aspects of

Muslim life. The language of the area, Arabic, is also the language of God's revelation through the Qur'an and the language of the supplicant's prayers. Full submission to Islam therefore represents a striking contrast to the previous religions of the area where it has been suggested:

> the majority of the population were probably worshippers of the moon or the stars, others may have been under the influence of the beliefs of the frequent Persian invaders, while animistic religions were also widespread. As in Oman and al Bahrayn (sic), communities which had been converted to Christianity were among them. [53]

Although there is now a substantial expatriate population in the UAE, the past submission to Islamic values and laws by the indigenous people of the country has given it its present cultural identity. This identity permeates through all levels of society and is an inherent part of life influencing the decision-making and planning of all social services, including education.

A colonial legacy

As with many emerging countries, the UAE has in the past been the subject of colonial attention from the European powers. However, unlike many other countries, the colonial interest tended to involve less interference in the internal workings of the area and more intentional periods of non-interference. Nevertheless, a colonial legacy was left which explains the stagnation in the area's development in all aspects until independence and also the present attitudes towards the West. A brief history of the colonial interest is therefore worthy of mention.

The lack of natural resources, including water, and the inhospitable climate did leave the area relatively untouched for many years as generally there was nothing to exploit. Some pearl trading did take place but this was centred more around the oasis island of Bahrain. Any presence was, therefore, generally confined to a naval interest in the area particularly because of the Gulf's siting

between Europe and the important spice trading areas in India and the East.

The first European presence felt in the Gulf was that of the Portuguese around the Sixteenth Century. They controlled the Strait of Hormuz at the mouth of the Gulf and all trade that passed through it. During their presence of one hundred and fifty years or so, the Portuguese made little impression on the life-style and culture of the area as they did not venture far beyond the sea and their garrisons. Their rule was, however, uncompromising and commanded little respect from the indigenous population who came into contact with them. Understandably, they were ousted at the earliest opportunity; in 1602 from Bahrain and 1622 from Hormuz [54].

There was a Dutch trading presence in the area although this did tend to be more concentrated on the Persian side of the Gulf. However, this Dutch supremacy was soon to be eased aside by the increasing British political presence of the 'British East India Company'.

Increased activity in the area through trade, particularly en route from the European centres to the East, encouraged a certain amount of piracy which became a problem for shipping in the Eighteenth Century. The pirates based on both sides of the Gulf were not confined to Arab or Persian but included marauding European pirates based in Madagascar [55]. At one time the lower Gulf coast was more infamously known as 'The Pirate Coast'. Of interest at this point is a doctoral thesis [56] written by the present ruler of Sharjah, Dr. Sheikh Sultan bin al Qasimi. As a descendent of the Qasimi family which controlled the coastal area generally from Sharjah to Ras al Khaimah his thesis sets out to disprove the fact that the pirates were from local tribes.

However, British intervention and the suppression of piracy in 1820 resulted in a series of truces being signed by five local rulers with the British culminating in

1853 with the *Treaty of Peace in Perpetuity* [57]. As a result of these truces the lower Gulf became more popularly known as the 'Trucial Coast'. Britain continued to sign many treaties [58] with the individual ruling sheikhs in the Gulf area and Balfour-Paul makes two important observations:

> Firstly, by signing individual treaties with whatever shaykhly [sic] figures were dominant at the time along the route through the Gulf to the Indian Empire, Britain's policy had the effect, wittingly or not, of 'legitimising' and perpetuating the fragmental political system which happened to prevail. Secondly, the extraordinary nature of those treaties deliberately restricted the extent of Britain's interference in a colonial sense in the internal affairs of the Shaykhdoms (sic). [59]

He goes on to mention in his notes that:

> An unusual gloss was put to the writer by a prominent Gulf Arab in the mid-1960s. "Our great misfortune (he said) was that you people [the British] never colonised us. If you had, you would at least have spent some effort on our development and we would then have had the pleasure of finally throwing you out". [60]

A colonial relationship could have resulted in far greater development of the Trucial States, as it was, the active policy of non-interference in the local systems did establish the ruling families. The seven small emirates that now comprise the United Arab Emirates are, therefore, a good example of the British policy in the area of political fragmentation. That is, until the conscious efforts by the ruling families of the area to create a cohesive force in the formation of the Federation of the UAE in 1971 on the British exit.

Generally, under these formal agreements the British assumed responsibility for the administration of the foreign affairs of the Sheikhdoms and for their physical protection. The British did not interfere with the tribal workings and *Shari'a* imposed by the rulers on their people but did, at the request of the rulers', exercise their jurisdiction over all Christians and certain other nationalities [61].

Society continued, therefore, to be based on the basic social unit of the extended family with allegiances to the head of the family and to the tribe of which the family was part. Accordingly, this maintained the parochial interests of the tribe and did not encourage any formal organisation outside of it.

These agreements appeared to offer a mutually agreeable compromise and domination by an alien power was not an overwhelming experience for the indigenous people. In fact, it was most probably not perceived as domination as it proposed little change and certainly did not attempt to bring the disparate tribal groupings together under one administration, the thought of which would have been an anathema to the tribal people where inter-tribal rivalry was a hallmark of the area. Moreover, and importantly for the British, any resistance to the dominating power would have required a coordinated effort which was just not in the general nature of the tribes of the area. This allowed the British to control the area with the minimum of personnel and a *Political Residency* was established in Bahrain with small *Political Agencies* being set-up in Bahrain, Doha and Sharjah. Later the Sharjah agency was transferred to Dubai with a further one being eventually opened in Abu Dhabi. Isolation of the area from the rest of the world would have continued as these small agencies, run by just three or four civil servants, controlled, through the issue of visas, all who entered the area. This also included oil exploration concessions and thereby linked a sheikh's potential wealth to 'friendly interests', that is of the British. The sheikhs were, therefore, not allowed to grant exploration concessions without the approval of the Political Agent [62].

Unlike Britain's colonial interests elsewhere in the world Britain's presence in the Gulf did not fundamentally change the nature and culture of the area now known as the UAE. Even though the topography of the area included the natural boundaries of the sea, mountains and the Empty Quarter it did not amalgamate the various territories into one. The present day map of the different emirates with its fragmented territories is testament to that policy. It did not impose on the

Trucial States an alien administration, nor did it interfere with local custom or language, in fact, even the Political Agents communicated to the sheikhs in Arabic. The area continued much as it always had with each ruling sheikh exercising a comprehensive power which was, perhaps, tempered by the democracy of the *majlis*. The ruling sheikh's position would be maintained until death through the acquiescence of his relatives and his ability to maintain the loyalty of the tribal members, by whatever means. Thus the sheikh was born to rule just as the pearl diver, merchant, bedu and so on inherited their station in life from their fathers. The female's position was an even narrower perspective. These preordained roles were assumed and taken for granted without question, in part, influenced by historic lack of opportunity and an Islamic perspective on an individual's position in society. Accordingly, a relatively stable society continued with the individual's rights and duties reasonably well defined within the hierarchical structure of family and tribal loyalties. Under British tutelage, therefore, a period of stagnation existed with little or no increase in opportunity or expectation until well after the Second World War and the commercial production of oil in other parts of the Gulf.

The fact that the UAE did not suffer the full process of colonisation as did many other countries both small and large is of significance in understanding the more contemporary situation within sociopolitical contexts; the process of development and its educational provision. To view the small states in the Caribbean it is easy to highlight colonial legacies that have a tremendous influence on every aspect of society, development and education [63]. It would be fair to assume that a cursory appraisal of the UAE would not highlight these same legacies. However, the writer does contend that they do exist in subtle ways and have arrived in the UAE, not by way of the British presence in the area, but more through the introduction of expatriate expertise, particularly from the subcontinent of India and non-Gulf Arab countries such as Egypt and Jordan, who brought with them colonial legacies from their own countries. Expatriate personnel who, in the early days of development, were charged with the

responsibilities of advising and initiating administrations and systems; and, perhaps, just as influential, charged with educating the youth of the country. Importantly, the Arab world may be united by Islam and a common language but it is diverse and the culture, attitudes and beliefs of, let us say, the North African Arab Egyptian, can be quite different to those of the Gulf Arab. Colonial legacies and attitudes inherent in the minds and culture of these expatriates would not have been considered or questioned in the heady days of early oil revenues when the development of the UAE could not even keep up with itself. At that time, particularly, the colonial legacies of other countries would have been transferred both consciously and subconsciously to be manifested through attitudes and aspirations of both the indigenous and expatriate population. This would have resulted in a nurturing of metropolitan orientated ideals which, in the case of the UAE, were most positively directed toward Britain in the early days of independence. The writer will argue later that these ideals are still a major influence on educational aspiration within the contemporary situation of the UAE and are, perhaps, a characteristic of small wealthy countries which require the introduction of a large expatriate expertise to fuel their development.

Within the chronology of this section it is important to mention two events that have influenced the economic activity of the area with the second one, the commercial production of oil, being of profound importance to the present situation.

The introduction of the cultured pearl

As indicated earlier the one benefit of the shallow warm waters of the Gulf was the creation of ideal conditions for the growth of the pearl oyster. Exploitation of these pearl beds become a major trading vehicle for many of the coastal inhabitants particularly along the Abu Dhabi, Qatari and Bahrani coasts. In the 1930s Japan developed and introduced the cultured pearl and as a result, and in no time at all, more or less monopolised world trade. This had a devastating effect on the coastal settlements as their sole source of income dried up and

consequently they were thrown into abject poverty.

A turning point: the discovery of oil

In Bahrain and Qatar, to a certain extent, new opportunities were starting to develop through the discovery of oil in 1932 and 1939 respectively. In the Trucial States no such opportunity was on the horizon and a growth in poverty within the area must be noted. Bahrain's future was assured to a certain extent post 1932 with oil revenues starting to fuel the country's development programmes. Consequently Bahrain became an increasingly important trading centre within the region. Qatar's development was delayed because although the oil was discovered in 1939 its first shipment did not take place until after the Second World War in 1949. These two developments in neighbouring countries, as too the developments taking place in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, are worthy of mention because they did require a number of labourers which, to some extent, offered a form of paid employment that did not previously exist to migratory Arabs; this included some men from Abu Dhabi and the other emirates.

In 1958, oil was eventually discovered in the the emirate of Abu Dhabi and the first shipment took place in 1962. A timetable of first discovery and shipment can be seen in the table 3.2. 1962 was, without doubt, an important watershed for the Trucial States and although it was an Abu Dhabi revenue it did start an inflow of foreign currency which would eventually be of benefit to all of the emirates through the mechanisms of the soon to be formed federation. But as the table shows, the wealth in the area is a recent phenomenon and up until just before the 1960s Sadik and Snavely described Abu Dhabi as "an impoverished tribal community [that] lacked such things as water, electricity, health and educational facilities, streets, roads, etc." [64] For the present day visitor to the thriving modern city of Abu Dhabi it is hard to imagine that all of the impressive development and achievement has taken place in less than a generation: a mere thirty years. Similar comment could be made regarding the

other emirates, particularly Dubai.

Aid to the Trucial States

Whilst the neighbouring countries were enjoying the benefits of oil revenues the Trucial States continued to suffer. Britain initiated some development programmes: in 1949 a British doctor was engaged to organise and develop a new hospital being built in Dubai; in 1952 surveys of the creeks in Dubai and Sharjah, which were silting up, took place plus general water surveys and the drilling of wells [65]. In 1954-55 Britain involved itself on a larger scale with £25,300 paid out to continue water supply projects; extending and improving the hospital in Dubai and in building the first modern school of the Trucial States in Sharjah[66]. An important landmark was the establishment of the Trucial States Council in 1952. The Council was established on a British initiative to act as a forum in which the states could discuss and plan for the future. It had no funds of its own to promote economic development but did advise on the allocation of funds available through Britain's Trucial States Development Fund, see Table 3.3.

The Council acted as one of the first forums for the rulers of the different emirates and although initially chaired by the British Political Agent from Dubai any decision arrived at generally had to be implemented by the Rulers themselves within their own Sheikhdoms [67]. In 1965 the Trucial States Council was reorganised and the Political Agent handed over the chairmanship to, in the first instance, Sheikh Saqr bin Muhammad the ruler of Ras al Khaimah who was nominated by the other rulers. At the same time a Development Office was set up under the Council and a Secretariat with well-qualified staff was provided [68]. In the same year Britain increased its donation to the fund and Bahrain, Qatar and Abu Dhabi also contributed. The contribution for 1965 can be seen below:

Britain	£1,000,000
Ruler of Qatar	£ 250,000
Ruler of Abu Dhabi	£ 100,000
Ruler of Bahrain	£ 40,000 [69]

TABLE 3.3
Trucial States Development Office Income, 1965-1970

Contributions (Bahraini Dinars)	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	Total
The Ruler of Abu Dhabi	266,625	666,600	1,819,762	337,662	1,700,000	2,500,000	7,290,649
Ruler of Qatar	333,250	---	---	---	---	---	333,250
Ruler of Bahrain	53,298	---	---	---	---	---	53,298
Britain-Annual Grant	322,720	266,600	196,768	278,597	114,000	---	1,178,685
Initial Capital	399,900	533,199	85,725	257,175	171,000	---	1,446,999
Grant Total	1,375,793	1,466,399	2,102,255	873,434	1,985,000	2,500,000	10,302,881

Source: Unpublished Report, Development Office, Trucial States Council, not dated, p. 43; Development Office, Round-Up of News for 1969 and 1970: as cited in: SADIK, M.T. & SNAVELY, W.P. (1972), *Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates*, (Lexington, Lexington Books), p. 189.

TABLE 3.4
Trucial States Council Development Expenditure for Various Periods by Major Development Programmes

Major Programme Expenditure in Bahrani Dinars	Total to end of 1968	1969	1970	Total to end of 1970	% of Grand Total *
Trunk Roads	732,905	228,157	745,000	1,706,062	22.25
Health	192,829	348,919	588,500	1,130,248	17.74
Town & Village Water Supplies	636,660	137,751	422,000	1,196,411	15.60
Electricity	680,130	280,480	168,000	1,196,411	15.60
Agriculture	541,829	240,803	247,000	1,029,632	13.43
Technical Education	232,836	35,089	144,000	411,925	5.37
Harbours	229,055	3,270	96,200	328,525	4.28
Fisheries	---	142,515	119,000	261,515	3.41
Town Roads	145,308	2,876	30,000	178,184	2.32
Urban Development	93,333	35,424	12,000	140,757	1.84
Housing	62,600	13,436	23,000	99,036	1.29
Telecommunications	49,465	2,429	---	51,894	0.68
Miscellaneous	2,683	---	3,000	5,683	0.07
Grand Total	3,599,633	1,471,149	2,597,700	7,668,482	100.00

* percentage figures do not total 100 due to rounding of figures.
Source: Development Office, Trucial States Council, Round-Up News for the month ending 28 February, 1970 (unpublished material), as cited in: SADIK, M.T. & SNAVELY, W.P. (1972), *Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates*, (Lexington, Lexington Books), p. 188.

Abu Dhabi was now exporting oil, Dubai had increased revenues and it was felt that these two emirates could now start to support their own development programmes and the Development Fund was, therefore, directed to the five other emirates.

As stated elsewhere by the writer, it is fair to speculate that this was possibly the only time that Britain took an active interest in the development of the area and the welfare of the indigenous people. It is in keeping with a general change in attitude from the powerful countries of the world, in the post war decades, as they started to assume a much needed sense of responsibility towards their weaker protectorates.

In the Trucial States, Abu Dhabi was the first emirate to enjoy this new wealth and as can be seen from the table above, with Abu Dhabi's 70 per cent contribution to the fund from 1965 there was, from the earliest days of its oil shipment, a strong commitment to aid in the development of its poverty stricken neighbouring tribal territories. This must have laid the foundation for the later discussions that led to the formation of the Federation of UAE with Abu Dhabi, the dominant member both in terms of territory and wealth, and one that was based on a benevolent attitude and not one of expansionism and domination. Although this attitude may have been an extension of bedouin or Islamic ideals it was an important starting point in building a future for all seven emirates of the Trucial States. The development programme benefiting all was, as Table 3.4 shows, understandably directed towards infrastructure development within the states. Any investment in education from the Development Fund appears to have been in technical education which was more likely geared to servicing the infrastructure being developed. Interestingly, this was directed by the British to develop a certain amount of technical expertise and not administrative expertise. The generally illiterate and uneducated population did, however, receive some small benefit from educational aid offered by another oil rich emirate, Kuwait. This educational aid from as early as 1954 was later enhanced

by Qatar and Bahrain who contributed the services of expatriate teachers. This aid was the important foundation of educational provision in the Trucial States and later the United Arab Emirates which will be discussed in some detail in the next chapter.

The Development Office transferred its duties to the appropriate ministries of the Federation in 1972, but in its short life from 1965 to 1972 it distributed more than £13 million in aid to the five emirates [70]. As mentioned above some 70 per cent of this was contributed by Abu Dhabi.

The British withdrawal

The 1968 announcement of the British Government's decision to withdraw its forces from east of Suez by 1971 was the most important political decision of recent times by an external power for the area. Consequently it had a profound effect on the future of the small emirates of the southern shores of the Arabian Gulf. Unlike the northern Gulf emirate of Kuwait which actively sought and achieved its independence from the British in 1961 Bahrain, Qatar and the Trucial States had not pushed for it. In fact, Sadik and Snavely state that the rulers of these small Gulf City States (GCS) were anxious to have the British stay in the Gulf beyond the 1971 deadline. However, "Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAR, among others, openly rejected the idea of extending Britain's stay beyond 1971, whether on its own initiative or at the request of the GCS themselves" [71].

The withdrawal of British protection would leave a political vacuum within the Gulf area as a whole. The Gulf region had become politically important to superpowers of the industrial world because of its oil and also because the larger countries of the area such as Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq vied to increase their influence in the region. Old territorial disputes and expansionist intentions reappeared such as Iran's claim to islands that were sited in or near proven or potential oil fields. The island of Bahrain was also part of that claim and this left

the small emirates in no doubt as to their general vulnerability.

Ironically the Emirates' vast oil reserves and strategic importance were both their strength and their weakness depending on the intentions of those who viewed them: strength in negotiation with those who needed their oil and weakness in that they became very attractive propositions to the avaricious with expansionist tendencies. One would suspect that Iran's intention over the islands gave Bahrain the necessary momentum towards the ideal of a federation and, perhaps, the consequent increased strength to keep Iran at bay.

The question of national identity, sovereignty and security within these soon to be independent states was of paramount importance. The decision to set into motion pre-independence dialogue between the rulers of the emirates of Bahrain, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al Qaiwain, Ras al Khaimah and Fujairah was to be crucial to the independent survival of these small weak yet increasingly wealthy emirates.

The formation of a federation

The early forum of the Trucial States Council must have helped in the early stages of bringing the rulers together to discuss their future as dialogue between them had already commenced on matters of development. Furthermore, it would have been clear to the non-oil producing emirates of Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al Qaiwain, Ras al Khaimah and Fujairah that their future lay in some form of alliance with the wealthier emirates: they would have been unable to support any development and/or protect their sovereignty in the post 1971 period. A benevolent attitude towards these emirates from the oil producing emirates was also established through the auspices of the Development Office, particularly Abu Dhabi under the leadership of Sheikh Zayed bin Al Nahyan. It is interesting, but no coincidence, that Sheikh Zayed came to power in 1966 at around the same time as the Development Office really started to develop its brief and increase its funding. An air of mutual interest in a developed and stable

future must already have started to form amongst these rulers.

The rulers of Abu Dhabi and Dubai struck up certain accord on 18 February, 1968, through a bilateral agreement of union between the two emirates. In principle they had settled their boundary disputes and had agreed to share a common policy in the areas of foreign affairs, defence and citizenship with each emirate retaining control of their internal and judicial affairs [72]. These were the first steps in creating a political union of the nine states and the rulers of the other emirates were invited to join the discussions. Three years of discussion commenced on the proposed union to be known as the 'Federation of the Arab Emirates'. A federation that was perceived to ultimately increase their economic and social development potential [73].

However, as Anthony [74] reports when negotiations started in 1968 among all nine emirates disagreements over the form of the Federation and the allocation of its substantive powers impeded its creation. To quote:

> An important problem was the distribution of powers between the rulers and the Union government. Another was how the Union should operate. Would there be an elected or appointed assembly? Would the assembly have consultative or legislative powers? What would be the basis of representation: wealth? prestige? size of territory? proportional according to population? Other ancillary issues were: How would the Union be financed? Where would the permanent capital be located? How would defense and foreign affairs be controlled? What would be the division of the ministerial responsibilities among the amirates (sic)[75]

A full picture of the problems that beset the negotiations and the initial setting up of the Federation can be found in Anthony's 1972 article "The Union of Arab Amirates" and Heard-Bey (1982), op. cit.

Bahrain, which had enjoyed early oil revenues and a far greater level of

development than the other emirates was, understandably, looking to secure a strong position within the union for its relatively well educated population claiming "it should be the Federation's natural 'think-tank'" [76]. Qatar, Abu Dhabi and Dubai were also looking to a strong influential position. There were genuine differences of opinion amongst the rulers but the polarisation was, more likely, the result of the traditional rivalries of the tribes and the families involved in the negotiations with each seeking to dominate the competition for the prestige siting of the Federal Capital or seeking an equal voice and representation in the Federation's proposed highest office, the 'Supreme Council', irrespective of wealth or size of territory or population.

The Bahrain/Iran dispute was settled by Iran's acceptance of a UN survey which found in favour of the Bahraini citizens' desire to independence and self determination rather than some form of union with Iran [77]. This ruling in favour of Bahrain must have contributed to a greater level of confidence within Bahrain. Add to this the fact that Bahrain was more developed than the other negotiators by having established itself as the "communications and service centre of the Gulf states, accommodating foreign-based companies, banks, airlines, investors and private schools" [78.] Moreover, extensive administrative and political reforms were being effected in January 1970. Bahrain, therefore, had the base and, more importantly, the confidence to break away from the negotiations to pursue its own independent identity and declared its full independence on 14 August, 1971.

Qatar was, at the time, also a little more developed than the remaining emirates. It too, could not reach a successful outcome in its negotiations and broke away announcing a provisional constitution in April 1970 and declaring full independence on the 1 September, 1971.

The loss of Bahrain to the Federation with its educated population and reasonably well developed administrative systems must have been a blow

initially, but the remaining seven rulers continued their negotiations and, although the rivalries still prevailed, agreements were reached. It has been recorded [79] that a strong influence on this process was the natural leadership of the rulers of Abu Dhabi and Dubai, Sheikh Zayed bin Al Nahyan and Sheikh Rashid bin Said Al Maktoum, respectively.

On 2 December, 1971, the day after Britain's termination of existing treaties with the Trucial States, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) came into existence and a provisional constitution was announced. Initially Ras al Khaimah refrained from joining the UAE mainly in protest to its allocation of seats in the *al Majlis Watani al Ittihadi*, the National Assembly of the UAE [80]. However, it was admitted on 10 February, 1972 [81]. New treaties were entered into with Britain and shortly after independence the UAE was admitted into both the Arab League and the United Nations. Both were important memberships in establishing the UAE's sovereignty and accordingly in warding off any expansionist interest from other countries which both Sharjah and Ras al Khaimah were already suffering in Iran's occupation of three of their islands. On the day before the British withdrawal, 30 November, 1971, Iran occupied Ras al Khaimah's two small islands of Greater and Lesser Tunb and Sharjah's small Abu Musa island, [82] a dispute that continues to this day [83].

The transformation of the Emirates

The provisional constitution agreed by the six rulers at a meeting in Dubai in July of 1971 permitted a substantial concentration of authority in the presidency and between the two wealthiest emirates [84]. Instead of a rotating presidency, as was previously mooted, Sheikh Zayed, of Abu Dhabi, was installed as the first president of the United Arab Emirates, with Sheikh Rashid of Dubai as the first Vice-president. Although initially it was agreed that they would each serve a five year term a change did not take place until the death of Sheikh Rashid in 1990 when his eldest son Sheikh Maktoum bin Rashid al Maktoum inherited his

father's position. Effectively the power base is still the same and the provisional constitution is still in place after the first two decades of the United Arab Emirates. Anthony offers a fair account of the early make up of the Supreme Council in his 1972 article (op. cit.). Of importance is the fact that control of the decision-making process in the new Federation was basically a reflection of what was previously in existence. All the portfolios created and ministers controlling them were either from the ruling families of the various emirates or were people who represented important interest groups that were allied to those families.

Although the ideal of the Federation was universally felt to offer the way forward pessimism did abound for a variety of reasons not least the fact that previous attempts to create federations elsewhere in the world such as Central Africa, the West Indies and Malaysia, had been unsuccessful, as too, previous attempts at federations in the Arab world, with the exception of Libya. Moreover, because of the historical inter-tribal/family rivalries that were a hallmark of the area it was felt, in some quarters, that the rulers would not be able to concede the necessary power and control to a central body on which they would have a small contributing voice. Indeed, in the early days, before Ras al Khaimah (RAK) joined the Federation, there was an attempted coup in Sharjah where the ruler was killed. Anthony suggests that although the build up to this event was of a complex nature it did involve the ruler's handling of the Abu Musa agreement with Iran. He speculated that if it was not for the sensitive handling by the Federation, in allowing the issues to be treated separately to the federation issues, Sharjah could have withdrawn from the Federation to form an alliance with RAK; or, at worst, the Federation could have been drawn into a military confrontation with Iran [85]. In fact, instability was rife: five of the initial rulers in the Federation came to power as the result of a family coup [86] and all of the emirates were involved in border disputes internally and externally with countries such as Iran, Oman and Saudi Arabia.

It can therefore be seen that to gain consensus support within the Supreme

Council for matters such as foreign policy and a defence force would be easier than, for example, internal policy and policing. Foreign policy and defence had already been dealt with previously by the British whilst the Trucial States were a protectorate. Anything that could be perceived by the individual emirates as losing control of internal affairs would remain an area of sensitivity and would require confidence building and careful implementation. An important consideration would be, that even though the rulers may have an agreed policy, the relinquishing of certain emirate autonomy would not be popular and they would have to persuade their people of its acceptability. The persuasiveness of the financial handout or aid from the oil rich cannot be denied especially as the non-oil producers, particularly Ajman, Umm al Qaiwain and Fujairah, were not likely to be economically viable units and had previously relied on economic aid to survive. Buying support is a short term policy but the importance of creating a national identity and an air of mutual trust was perceived to be paramount in the long term success of the UAE and education was prescribed that role.

It was recognised that, apart from Abu Dhabi and Dubai, the social and economic structures of the other emirates were, at the time of independence, the least developed in the Arab world [87]. Education, again, was perceived to offer an important spring-board in turning the uneducated and generally untrained population into one which would be able to contribute to the future needs and development of the Federation. It would develop skills which were already desperately needed to take the country forward. Skills and expertise that, due to the wealth, were being bought-in with dramatic consequences for the demography of the UAE. This resulted in the indigenous Arabs becoming the minority in their own emirates and the UAE as a whole. A further important role for education was perceived in counteracting the effect of this massive influx of alien cultures and ideals on what was, up to now, fundamentally an isolated Muslim society.

The wise investment of the massive oil revenues that were pouring into Abu

Dhabi, Dubai and, later to some extent, Sharjah was important in maintaining stability in the Federation. The rulers were, and are, absolute monarchs in their own emirates and the idea of elected bodies or organisations that could articulate opposition was an anathema and not even a consideration. However, the importance of the benevolent nature within the culture should not be underestimated because this has helped to keep at bay any potentially damaging effects on these autocracies. In the twenty years since independence every member of the indigenous population would have experienced substantial benefit from the new wealth through the establishment of an impressive infrastructure, welfare and social programmes and, of course, the fiscal and material benefits associated with the tremendous development that has taken place. It is easy to see how the status quo has been maintained under these conditions. What will be more interesting is to see whether it can be maintained under the very different circumstances of the next twenty years as the younger generation rises through a 'taken for granted' affluence that may be difficult to maintain with the decreasing oil revenues being swallowed up in sustaining the existing development and structures. One also speculates what will happen when the present strong leadership gives way to a new generation of sheikhs who will have experienced a different pattern of education and alien cultural influences to their fathers. Already in Kuwait and Bahrain there is an undercurrent of activity that supports a far more democratic process of decision-making.

The role of education has been given increasing importance in helping the Emirates to maintain and sustain what they have achieved. However, as can be seen in the case of Kuwait, an unpredictable event such as the Gulf War can devastate those plans and ideas. It put the country almost back to 'square one' and a dependent mono-economy; it destroyed the diversifying economy and also public confidence in the Ruling Family.

Kuwait has also lost its status as a leader in the area, albeit an arrogant one, and

has become a nervous country desperately trying to rebuild. The results, however, will never be the same as before. Interestingly, it is perhaps through the education that the population received and the new horizons and opportunities that it opened that the expectations were raised and the absolute challenged. It will be interesting to see how the United Arab Emirates manipulates these forces and aspirations as it raises the level of achievement and expectation in its citizens.

These elements are often exaggerated, enhanced and all the more acute in the personalised politics and atmosphere of a small country.

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(London, David Fulton Publishers), p. 13.

2. See ibid., pp. 1-2 for fuller details.

3. KOPPES, C.R. (1976),
'Captain Mahan, General Gordon and the origin of the term "Middle East" ',
in: *Middle Eastern Studies*, 12, pp. 95-98 as quoted in ibid. p. 1 and p. 16.

4. As quoted in BEAUMONT, Peter, et al, (1988), op. cit., p. 1.

5. RAF 'GHQ Middle East' controlled British and Allied operations in the region between 1940 and 1943 and BEAUMONT, Peter et al (1988), op. cit., p. 1, suggest that the constant use of the term Middle East in military communiques from the GHQ based in Cairo and from military personnel generally brought the term to public awareness.

6. BEAUMONT, Peter, et al, (1988), op. cit., p. 3.

6a. The term Arabian Gulf will be used throughout this thesis in preference to the more familiar term Persian Gulf. This is based on the terms of reference for this particular study which takes in the states on the shores of the Lower Gulf, the Arabian Peninsular. The fact that the indigenous people of these states are Arab and not Persian, as in the case of Iran which occupies the northern and opposite shores of the Gulf, further supports the use of the term.

7. This figure is approximate as HEARD-BEY (ref. below) states that not all of the desert areas have been fully surveyed and figures of 83,660 sq km and above have also been given. However, her research and subsequent official figures appear to be based on area figures given by the statistician Dr. Fenlon (for ref. see below). For the purposes of this study those same 'official' figures will be used.

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12. TOMKINSON, Michael (1975), op. cit., p. 23.

13. HEARD-BEY, Frauke (1982), op. cit., p. 12.

14. TOMKINSON, Michael (1975), op. cit., p. 23.

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16. HEARD-BEY, Frauke (1982), op. cit., p. 12.

17. MINISTRY OF PLANNING, CENTRAL STATISTICAL DEPARTMENT (1991),
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21. HEARD-BEY, Frauke (1982), op. cit., p. 13.

22. Ibid., p. 14.

23. Ibid., p. 13 and p. 408n.

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41. *Wadi* is the local name given to the generally dry river bed that takes the flood water during the rains. They can range from deep sided valleys to what appears to be a wide and flat dried-up river bed. During the rains the *wadis* are prone to flash floods.

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48. HEARD-BEY, Frauke (1982), op. cit.

49. Ibid., p. 126.

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"....the al Majlis Watani al Ittihadi (The National Assembly of the UAE) which
is the legislative branch of the UAE and consists of forty representatives.
The allocation of seats is eight for Abu Dhabi and Dubai, six each for Ras al
Khaimah and Sharjah, and four for each of the other states."

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PART ONE B:

CHAPTER FOUR:

AN OVERVIEW OF THE EVOLUTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF EDUCATIONAL PROVISION IN THE TRUCIAL STATES/UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

To complete this contextual section it is important to include an overview of the development of educational provision itself. This overview and history of educational provision in the United Arab Emirates will be presented in chronological order. The information has been arrived at by scanning all available literature on the UAE and for reasons mentioned earlier, may be sketchy in parts due to lack of recorded data.

Educational provision does not operate within a vacuum. It is politicised in every sense of the word and is influenced, if not completely shaped, by decisions that benefit either the majority or, as is more often the case, a minority of the people who inhabit a sovereign territory. These decisions would have been made by internal or external powers and the influences will be discussed to some extent in this chapter. This section, however, is fundamentally a contextual one presenting the information in a more formal and matter of fact manner. Although this chapter could be viewed as a discrete section in its own right, it is hoped that it is considered more as one that builds on what has preceded and, accordingly, continues to present a fuller picture of the United Arab Emirates. A full understanding of the present situation and provision cannot be made without this knowledge and although some discussion will inevitably take place in the form of digression in this chapter the more detailed discussion, analysis and comment will be left to Part II of the thesis once a reasonably full contextual picture has been presented.

This chapter will, therefore, plot the development of formal educational provision in the United Arab Emirates and will identify major events that have taken place

in the different emirates both before and as a result of the independence process. Some comparative comment will be made with reference to the other small Gulf states of Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar all of whom contributed in some way to the present situation through their benevolent attitudes and funded by their earlier oil revenues.

Educational provision

It is important at this point to define the term educational provision as it will be used in this thesis. It will be all education that is formally organised and that is being provided for both the indigenous and non-indigenous people of the region. That will include education at all ages and levels including that provided by sources other than the Government of the United Arab Emirates. The informal channels of education that were important to these tribal people and are ever present in both subtle and overt forms nowadays will not be addressed in this section but will be discussed in subsequent chapters when important points such as attitudinal inertia, amongst other influences, are raised. This chapter will, however, address the importance of the *kuttab* and use it as the starting point.

Kuttab

The traditional form of education within the whole area of the Gulf states took the form of the Qur'anic school known more commonly as the *kuttab*. These schools predate all other forms of school in the region and Al-Hamer, from Bahrain, describes them as follows:

> These schools [*kuttab*] were run by local Mullas in their houses, in corners of shops, and, in the summer, in lanes in the bazaars. Most of the kuttab were co-educational. The program (sic) consisted mainly of memorizing the Qur'an and usually reading and writing plus the acquisition of a rudimentary knowledge of simple arithmetic. When a boy or girl finished reading the whole of the Qur'an, then parents and friends joined in the most popular celebration called *al-Khatmeh*, a celebration comparable to commencement in present day schools. [1]

Worth recording at this stage is also Heard-Bey's comment regarding the *kuttabs* in the Trucial States:

> In many *kuttabs* the emphasis was more on reading
> than on writing, for it was important to be able to
> read the Holy Book and other religious books; but
> some people regarded it as being undesirable for
> girls to be able to write and thereby to communicate
> with the outside world by letter. [2]

Her comment sums up, to a certain extent, something of the social mores of the time in the Trucial States; and, importantly, an attitudinal inertia that was ever present in the local culture's view of education for the female of the whole region generally. This attitude can still be found present in many families or parts of the Middle East and Islamic cultures.

The style of teaching was that of rote learning where the teacher read or recited from the Qur'an. This was, in part due, to the scarcity of copies of the Holy Book and the shortage of writing materials in the area [3]. The period of study at the *kuttab* was not clearly defined and generally depended upon the child's ability to memorise the Qur'an [4].

The above comment about the social mores of the time makes Al-Hamer's reference to the co-educational intake of the *kuttab* all the more interesting because generally there was segregation between the boys and girls as is the case in the present state provision. This was certainly the norm as of the onset of puberty for the girls and so from his comment it is fair to surmise that this basic provision only lasted for the early years. Moreover, in the culture of the region the girls enter into seclusion at the onset of puberty with it not being uncommon for an adolescent girl to then be betrothed and married in her early teens. The above is further supported by Soffan who states that she found several sources saying that girls were not allowed to attend the *kuttabs* but found, in her conversations with local women, that they did attend but only to the age of ten [5].

She also stated that occasionally boys and girls did attend together if there was only one instructor but, in that event, segregated seating was arranged [6].

It would not be unreasonable also to assume that there was a comprehensive pattern of intake into the *kuttabs* because the paramount function of the *kuttab* was to inculcate the young into the Islamic faith. Al-Hamer points out that, in the case of Bahrain, these *kuttabs* could be subdivided into those promoting the Sunni or Shiah [7] sects of Islam. This shows the various influences of the Arab and Persian cultures: the Sunni sect associated with Saudi Arabia and the Shiah sect with Iran. The writer has found no evidence to contradict that this was also the case in the emirates that are now the United Arab Emirates; thus reflecting the make-up of the nomadic and tribal people, although the percentage of each would change from emirate to emirate depending on their historical associations with the Arabs and Persians.

Some reference has been found to early schooling in Dubai where Heard-Bey comments on schools established in Bur Dubai and Deirah (the two sides of Dubai's creek) by the *Majlis* of the reform movement in 1938/9. These were closed again during the Second World War due to lack of funds. The Al Ahmadiyah was the exception: opened on the 10 Shawal, 3 December 1938, when 200 students were enrolled with three teachers. However, there is little information on these schools and from Heard-Bey's later comments regarding the start of modern schooling in 1953 in Sharjah it must be assumed that these were short lived Islamic schools following in the vein of the *kuttabs* [7a].

Colonial influences

As in all countries that had a period of colonial domination, it is important to look to see what influence that power had on the education of the region. In the Gulf states generally it would be fair to state that the British were a major colonial influence. However, because of their active policy of non-interference in the seven emirates under consideration no system of education or facilities for it

were imposed during their period of colonial influence. However, the ideals and educational goals of the colonial power did become a legacy which will be discussed in the next chapter. A second influence on an area whilst it is under some form of colonial dominance is the interference on the culture and education of the area by missionaries. Winder records that there was a presence in the late Nineteenth Century in Bahrain as his reference below supports:

> The first Western-style schools in the al-Bahrayn (sic) were founded by the Arabian mission an independent group which began its operations in al-Bahrayn in 1892 and which was adopted by the Reform Church of America in 1894. It was Mrs. Samuel M. Zwemer - who started the Mission's educational work and opened the first girls' school in the Gulf - in al-Bahrayn in 1892. [8]

Bahrain at that time was also the site of the British Agent for the region and this may well have given the stimulus for the Mission's interest. There appears to be no evidence of the Mission extending its arm into Qatar and the Trucial States and the small Arabian Mission school itself would have had little impact outside the island of Bahrain. What is of particular interest is Winder's claim that it was the first girls' school in the region. He later goes on to state that between 1901 and 1903 some twelve boys joined the school which offered a syllabus that consisted of English, Arithmetic and Arabic Grammar [9]. These are both important references for the region under study as they indicate the start of formal education of a kind in the area. However the writer has found no evidence to support the existence of a similar facility in the Trucial States although it should be noted that a group of missionaries did set up a small hospital in Sharjah. Although there was no school attached it must have had a limited influence in some way on those who attended it.

The dates above give some indication to the backward nature of the Trucial States vis-à-vis the other Gulf City States because the first school was not established in its territory until 1953, some fifty years after Bahrain's Mission

School. Furthermore, other than the Ahmadiyah School mentioned above, the writer has found no real evidence of early formal Islamic schools being established under the sponsorship of prominent merchants and dignitaries as was the case in the neighbouring Bahrain and Qatar. Until 1953, therefore, the only option open to the population of the area of the Trucial States appears to be that of the *kuttab*. Even with the opening of the first school in Sharjah in 1953 the limited nature of what was available must be emphasised. Moreover, what was on offer in Sharjah at that time would have been unlikely to be available to residents of Dubai and certainly not to the more distant and less accessible emirates such as Abu Dhabi and Fujairah.

The colonial presence did, however, stimulate the establishment of this first and later schools. In the early 1950s the Trucial States were very poor and although their neighbours were reaping the benefits of oil revenues they were not. Not only did they lack the funds to establish modern educational facilities, they also lacked the expertise. Kuwait, however, had enjoyed oil benefits for some twenty years and had already made substantial in-roads, like Bahrain, in establishing its own educational system. The early formal facilities in the Trucial States came as a direct result of British and Kuwaiti effort and aid.

The importance of Sharjah

Fenelon [10] records that the first formal school to be established in the Trucial States was sited in Sharjah in a building donated by the British Government. This school initially provided free education to 230 boys [11] between the ages of six and seventeen and was managed and staffed by the Kuwait Department of Education [12].

The British Government also built schools in Ras al Khaimah, Abu Dhabi and Khor Fakkan [13], which was an enclave of Sharjah on the eastern coast and the other side of the Hajar Mountains which divided the Trucial States and effectively

cut off the area from the main body of the other emirates except for the emirate of Fujairah. This school was the first school on that coast. In 1958 [14] further schools were built through the offices of Kuwait in Dubai, Fujairah, Ajman and Umm al Qaiwain [15].

Out of those schools built in the 1950s Fenelon makes the following comment on the one in Sharjah: "For a long time, this was the only school in Trucial Oman to provide advanced courses as all the others subsequently inaugurated in the fifties provided only elementary education" [16]. Sharjah was also the first emirate to establish a public girls' school and this was achieved in 1955 [17].

The importance of Sharjah in these early years of educational provision should, therefore, not be overlooked. This is something that would be easy to do if viewing the provision from a more recent perspective where the later contributions by Abu Dhabi and Dubai, once the oil revenues started to materialise, over shadow Sharjah's early significance. Also worth noting is that of the first schools established in the various emirates, Khor Fakkan was an enclave of Sharjah and that the rulers of Ras al Khaimah had very strong family ties with the rulers of Sharjah. In 1958 it can be stated that some 520 pupils were attending schools in Sharjah accounting for more than half of the total attendance in the seven Trucial States. Fenelon sums it up as:

> In 1958 there were 520 pupils attending school in Sharjah. This may not seem to be a very great number for a population of 25,000, as it then was, but it was somewhat more than half the total number of pupils at school in the seven states. Put in another way, Sharjah was educating somewhat more than 50 per cent of the children at school in the region, though she accounted for only about 12 per cent of the total population. Moreover, in those early days standards of education were higher in Sharjah than elsewhere in the area, as less reliance was placed on pure memory and on learning by rote. [18]

TABLE 4.1
Expansion of Educational Provision in the Northern Emirates
1953/54 to 1969/70

	Schools			Enrolment			Teachers		
Year	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
1953/54	1	0	1	230	0	230	6	0	6
1954/55	1	0	1	270	0	270	7	0	7
1955/56	2	1	3	440	30	470	11	1	12
1956/57	2	1	3	580	60	640	17	1	18
1957/58	5	1	6	639	119	758	23	2	25
1958/59	5	3	8	1,954	381	2,335	47	15	62
1959/60	8	6	14	2,491	620	3,111	84	18	102
1960/61	13	4	17	3,113	722	3,835	101	31	132
1961/62	16	8	22	3,752	1,142	4,894	119	39	158
1962/63	16	10	26	3,920	1,293	5,213	188	63	251
1963/64	16	11	27	4,102	1,639	5,741	185	70	255
1964/65	19	12	31	4,895	2,060	6,955	222	79	301
1965/66	21	13	34	5,624	2,685	8,309	241	108	349
1966/67	20	13	33	6,062	4,082	10,144	254	126	380
1967/68	20	15	35	6,754	3,795	10,549	267	145	412
1968/69	21	17	38	7,999*	4,958*	12,957	356	225	581
1969/70	21	18	39	9,131*	6,222*	15,353	408	290	698

Note:
This Table has been compiled from information extracted from various sources including information on all seven emirates. In 1968/69 Abu Dhabi introduced kindergarten schools. The schools appear to have been co-educational and the totals 578 and 788 for 1968/69 and 1969/70 respectively do not indicate gender breakdown. * Figures are therefore estimates that take into account the general gender enrolment breakdown in Abu Dhabi at the time.
1969/70 figures are based on Abu Dhabi Government Abstracts, however, SADIK, M.T. & SNAVELY, W.P. (1972), cite a 1970 interview with the Education Officer in the Kuwait Office in Dubai, which stated the following figures: 21; 18; 39; 8,389; 5,717; 14,106; 402; 281; 683. This is a good example of the discrepancy that can appear in the early statistics and although there is a small variation on the bulk of the information on the total enrolment figures there is approximately an 8% difference.

Sources:
UAE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, *Educational Abstract 1976/77*.
1969/70 Unpublished material and 1970 interview with the Education Officer in the Kuwait Office in Dubai, as cited in SADIK, M.T. & SNAVELY, W.P. (1972), *Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates*, (Lexington, Lexington Books), p. 90.

Statistics can be used to distort or support claims and to some extent Fenelon is playing with them above. The stimulus given to the siting of the first educational facilities in Sharjah was more likely to have been the result of the presence of the Trucial States' British Agent who was initially based there possibly because Sharjah was, at the time, a stopping off point for the seaplane route between the West and the East. However, for whatever reason, of importance is the fact that Sharjah did take the lead in establishing educational provision: in 1953 with the first boys' school; in 1958 with the first girls' school; also in 1958 with the establishment of the first trade school and a vocational school for the Trucial Oman Scouts.

The trade school was opened to boys and in November of 1958 started with one class of eighteen training to become skilled artisans [19]. The vocational school for the Trucial Oman Scouts was set up to place men into skilled employment after their discharge from the force [20]. Importantly for the Trucial States was that the ideal of more than just a basic education was established in the emirate and, with the initial help of Kuwait, educational opportunity at a basic level started to expand into all of the major population centres of the various emirates. Of significance was the recognition that this opportunity should also be available to girls and, although the numbers were minuscule in the early days, it did set a precedent which in less than twenty years was to be seen in apparent equal educational opportunity for both the male and the female.

Kuwait's commitment to education in the Trucial States was first seen in the building of schools and in the managing and staffing of them. Its full commitment could be further seen in the half a million pounds sterling special budget that it created to that end for the 1964-65 school year [21]. Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Republic (Egypt) also contributed to the efforts through the supply of male and female teachers free of charge to the various emirates. In the case of Bahrain and Qatar, due to their own shortage of trained nationals, the writer believes that the contribution was in the form of expatriate teachers who could

well have come from either Egypt or Jordan. In 1954, for example, out of a total of the 794 teachers employed in Kuwait only 127 were Kuwaiti [22].

Worthy of note at this point is the fact that although by the mid 1950s education at primary and secondary levels was free for all in Kuwait, it too, was a relatively recent phenomenon there. Public school facilities in Kuwait itself had only come into being since 1936 with UNESCO reporting in 1956 [23] that previous to that education for the 200,000 population [24] "had been provided only by a few Koranic schools, and two private schools which offered a more modern curriculum" [25]. The policy of education for all was still in its infancy in Kuwait as later in the report UNESCO produces figures that show that just over half of the 25,000 estimated primary school aged children (13,333) were enrolled for primary education in 1954 [26]. Of these 13,333 pupils approximately a third, 4,492, were girls [27]. Interestingly a similar situation prevailed in Bahrain at the same time with 7,751 of the estimated 16,500 primary aged children enrolled. In Saudi Arabia it was merely 76,070 out of their 900,000 primary aged children [28]. In some ways, when viewing the Saudi situation as a percentage, it could be said that the Trucial States were not that far behind. However, offering facilities for some 76,070 pupils is no mean feat when starting from nothing.

It must be stated, therefore, that the programme in the Trucial States could not have been started at this point in time without Kuwait's financial support and expertise which, similar to Bahrain and Qatar, included a high, if not total, expatriate teaching force.

The benevolent nature of these neighbouring states towards the Trucial States at a time when their own educational systems were still incomplete reflected Islamic principles rather than expansionist tendencies and is laudable. The same attitudes on aid can be seen in the present day UAE where, for the past twenty years, it has become one of the world's largest per capita aid donors.

Understandably Kuwait's influence was considerable as through the offices of the Kuwait Ministry of Education it undertook the supervision and inspection of its Kuwaiti curriculum in all of the emirates except that of Abu Dhabi.

It is also worth quoting the UNESCO report further to give an idea of the age range of the curriculum that was on offer in Kuwait in the mid 1950s as it would be fair to assume a similar one was introduced in the Trucial States under Kuwait's guidance. It states that:

> The primary course lasts for seven years and ends with a school-leaving examination. This can be followed by a five-year secondary course. Commercial education is given in a two-year course after completion of the first two years of secondary schooling. There are no facilities for higher education in Kuwait but fellowships are granted for study abroad.
>
> Women teachers for the primary schools are trained in a three-year course on completion of the primary school. At present, however, a large number of foreign teachers are employed. [29]

The Report later states that post 1954 and the December Cairo Conference, Kuwait adopted a ten-year plan to extend the primary course to eight years [30]. The report of the conference also notes that whereas Saudi Arabia's legislation was concerned with defining the school-ladder, age limits for admission and maximum class sizes of 40 pupils (preparatory) or 30 pupils (primary)[31]; the Kuwaiti legislation was concerned as follows:

> In Bahrein (sic) and Kuwait legislation is limited to a definition of the aims of education. These do not differ very greatly: both countries make a distinction between the education of boys and girls. Thus, in Bahrein (sic), 'The aim of education of girls is to produce educated women, equipped with an adequate knowledge of home management and child welfare', and in Kuwait 'The aim of education of girls is to equip them with education and culture necessary to enable them to assume the responsibilities of the home and to promote within them the best desired qualities'. [32]

An important deduction from this is that education for the female was considered worth while albeit directed quite clearly within the Islamic cultural view of the female's position in the family, home and as the child rearer. This was obviously a government point of view. However, in reality although the prevailing social mores may not have been offended many a father would not have approved of educating the female other than within the family and through the traditional mother to daughter routes. Furthermore, to allow the female outside of the family around and after puberty would have been unacceptable. However, education of the population at large would address these points, as will be seen later.

According to Fenelon, the actual curriculum followed in the Trucial States included taught subjects in the Qur'an, Arabic, arithmetic, history, geography, music, science, art and physical education with English being introduced at the intermediate level. Moreover, school uniforms, books, stationery, school meals and medical attention were provided for all children attending the schools by the Kuwaiti government [33].

Table 4.2 below shows the actual breakdown of the Kuwaiti curriculum as shown in the UNESCO Report and this corresponds fairly closely to that as indicated above further supporting the writer's argument of a complete transfer of the Kuwaiti model from Kuwait to the Trucial States. This may be a policy frowned upon by present day educators but it is important in this case to emphasise the apparent homogeneity of the Arab people of the Arabian Gulf states in terms of language, their tribal backgrounds and Islamic culture. Kuwait's culture was much closer to the Trucial States' culture than the British one and, perhaps, this was an important recognition by the colonial power when encouraging Bahraini, Qatari and particularly Kuwaiti involvement in starting formal education in the Trucial States. A more realistic, albeit a cynical comment, is that at the time there was also international pressure on the colonial powers to nurture positive development in their territories. This pressure combined with the metropolitan

TABLE 4.2
Weekly Scheme of Work, Kuwait, circa 1956

	'Preparatory'			Primary			
Year	1	2	3	1	2	3	4
Koran and Religion	4	4	4	3	3	3	3
Arabic	13	12	12	10	10	8	8
Second Language	-	-	-	7	7	8	8
Arithmetic	6	6	6	6	6	5	5
Elementary Geometry	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
History	-	1	1	1	2	2	2
Geography	-	1·	1	1	2	2	2
Science and Hygiene	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Drawing and Handicrafts	3	4	4	2	2	2	2
Physical Training	3	3	3	2	1	1	1
Singing	1	1	1	-	-	-	-
Total	32	34	34	34	34	34	34

Source: UNESCO (1956), *Compulsory Education in the Arab States*,
(Amsterdam, UNESCO), p. 52.

centre's fiscal pressure to cut back on spending would have created a situation where the other Gulf states were encouraged into involvement. Accordingly, this would have appeased all of the pressures that the colonial power was experiencing.

Because of the small nature of the system to which the aid was being extended it is fair to assume that it was felt best to operate a centralised system of administration as operated in the donor countries of Kuwait and Bahrain [34]. In 1963 [35] a Kuwait Office was opened in Dubai to facilitate this process in the Northern Emirates [36]. By this time Abu Dhabi was in receipt of oil revenues (1962 onwards) and was able to fund its own programme; Dubai, although having discovered oil within its territory in 1966, did not start to enjoy oil revenues until 1969 which accounts for it still being part of the Kuwaiti package at that time. Further to the building and managing of schools in the Northern Emirates by Kuwait, Soffan states, that Qatar built eight schools in these emirates and that Saudi Arabia provided Ras al Khaimah with a religious institute as well as teachers; Soffan is not precise in the dating of this but from her comments it can be assumed that it was either in 1963 or just before [37]. Further building projects were carried out during this early period with Britain contributing technical schools then known as Trade Schools to Sharjah (1958), Dubai (1964) and Ras al Khaimah (1969) which complemented the agricultural school opened in Ras al Khaimah in the late 1950s, also built by Britain [38].

The 1960s saw a period of expansion in the educational provision provided by Kuwait and consequently an increased enrolment. By 1971 there were 17,754 students enrolled in its schools [39]. This increase would also have been encouraged by the inducements offered for attendance at school such as a monthly stipend for each child, free meals, clothing, transportation, medical care and free school supplies [40]. Kuwait had financed the building and maintenance of 45 schools in the Northern Emirates, paid the salaries and allowances of some

700 teachers and covered the cost of transportation, books and food. Kuwait further supervised 200 teachers supplied by other Arab States: Egypt - 65, Qatar - 57, Saudi Arabia - 34, Abu Dhabi - 12,[41] Bahrain - 9 and 23 local teachers[42]. Interestingly, Abu Dhabi was starting to add to the pool but also worth noting is that by 1971 a small percentage of locals were becoming involved. Twenty three teachers from a pool of nine hundred is merely 3.3 per cent but this does characterise the make up of the teaching force in the small Gulf states that has changed little even to the present date, particularly in the United Arab Emirates.

Starting to address the manpower needs

The three Trade Schools mentioned above, established and run by the British Government through the aegis of the Trucial States Development Office, complemented the general education by offering the first vocational training in the Northern Emirates. The initial goal to train nationals as artisans, to a certain extent started to address the Trucial States' desperate need for trained manpower and offered courses in carpentry, vehicle maintenance, electrical installation and mechanical engineering. By 1971 the total enrolment had reached 330 students. Needless to say, this enrolment would have been male.

The first students, back in 1958, entered the schools without any formal education and part of the course would have been to teach them how to read and to write [42a]. However, as outside facilities improved and primary education became available in the urban centres the entry requirements were raised so that by 1964 all entrants were required to be literate in Arabic with a full four years of primary education behind them [42b]. In the same year the length of course was also extended from two to three years [42c].

In Dubai from 1966 a three year commercial course was opened with a curriculum covering Arabic and English typing; mathematics and accounting; office

practice and procedures; commercial law; commercial geography and business administration. However, the annual intake of fifteen were required to have completed eight years of general education before being accepted on to the course [42d].

Teacher training was also being addressed by 1971 and two programmes were set-up: one for girls in Sharjah and one for boys in Dubai. These courses were located at secondary schools and enjoyed a total enrolment of 159 students by 1971 [43]. It would also be fair to assume that in the teacher training, much like the earlier schooling, the Kuwaiti model would have prevailed. That the training would have started after the seven years of primary education and lasted for some three years. Again worthy of note is Sharjah's lead in offering teacher training to the female.

As indicated earlier the initial impetus to educational provision was centred around Sharjah and later Dubai. This was the result of direct involvement from Kuwait and the aid programmes set-up by the British and other Arab states, particularly Kuwait. During this early period, of less than two decades, a reasonable base of provision in primary and secondary education and associated medical attention for children was established. Whether this period of active Kuwaiti involvement should be deemed a period of Kuwaiti expansionism is not under review at this time. However, it is clear that by the imposition of a Kuwaiti curriculum and of Kuwaiti administration a certain level of subtle cultural interference would have resulted even though there appears similarity between the two cultures. Others would argue that Kuwait's involvement should be seen as nothing more than reflecting the Arab and Muslim philosophy of charity; and, because the curriculum was not secular, a reinforcing of Islamic values in the area would also take place. Important, however, is that this period prior to independence was crucial in setting a firm foundation in both a physical and intellectual sense on which the Federation was to build.

TABLE 4.3
Expansion of Educational Provision in Abu Dhabi
1960/61 to 1969/70

	Schools			Enrolment			Teachers		
Year	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
1960/61	3	0	3	81	0	81	6	0	6
1961/62	3	0	3	109	0	109	7	0	7
1962/63	3	0	3	281	0	281	19	0	19
1963/64	4	1	5	340	131	471	23	6	29
1964/65	4	1	5	349	138	487	23	6	29
1965/66	4	1	5	390	138	528	27	6	33
1966/67	4	1	5	579	223	802	36	10	46
1967/68	6	3	9	1,499	724	2,223	50	27	77
1968/69	11	7	19 + 2K	2,936	1,394	4,908*	143	105	248
1969/70	15	8	23 + 2K	4,104	2,080	6,972**	220	140	360

Source: Table compiled on the basis of data from the following sources:
Government of Abu Dhabi, Ministry of Education, *Yearly Report 1970-1971.*
This figure includes *578 infants and **788 infants, no available information as to the gender breakdown.
K - Kindergarten schools that appear to have been co-educational

Abu Dhabi: a separate case.

Abu Dhabi developed its early provision through a different route that was facilitated by the influx of oil revenues from the vast reserves that had been discovered in its territories and were now being developed by Western expertise and expatriate manpower. 1958 heralded both the discovery of oil in the emirate of Abu Dhabi (although the first shipment did not take place until 1962) and also the opening of the first school, the Falahiyah Boys' School, in the town of Abu Dhabi [44]. Unfortunately, however, the school was closed after just four months due to lack of facilities. It was reopened again in 1960 along with two other primary schools in the emirate: the Bateen Primary School in Bateen and the Al-Nahyanian Primary School in Al Ain [45]. The 81 boys [46] attending these schools were taught by six male teachers who were recruited from Jordan [47]. In 1963 the boys' provision was enhanced by the opening of the Sharkiyah Boys' Primary School [48].

In 1967 an intermediate stage of education was introduced for boys by the opening of three schools. In an official report [49] from the Government of Abu Dhabi in 1971 this stage was referred to as the Preparatory Stage. On viewing the Report it appears that one of the primary schools was upgraded to that of preparatory because the number of boys' primary schools dropped from four to three that year. The schools were sited in the two main population centres of the time with two in Al Ain and one in Abu Dhabi. One of the Al Ain schools was designated an Islamic Institute. The following year, 1968, saw the introduction of the boys' secondary stage of education with the opening of a further two schools.

Educational opportunity for the girls was not a reality until 1963 when the first school for girls was opened in Abu Dhabi. Interestingly a 1972 Government Report [50] makes reference to the actual names of the first few boys' schools that opened but does not refer to the name of the girls' school. The writer ascribes

this as a good example of the social mores of the time reflecting the attitude of the Report's author/editor and not that of the ruler of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Zayhed, who came to power in 1966 and was well documented on his support of education for the female. This example reflects the traditional prejudice in that of the author and not necessarily an implied indication of the lack of importance to the opening of this school and the inauguration of formal female education in the emirate of Abu Dhabi. Worth noting is the ten year gap between the earlier start of girls' education in the northern emirate of Sharjah and this one in Abu Dhabi.

In the 1967-68 academic year two further primary schools were opened for girls followed by a preparatory school in 1968-69 and a secondary school in 1969-70.

1968-69 also saw the inauguration of a coeducational [51] kindergarten stage of provision. There was a quick take up and enrolment rose from 578 to 1,114 by 1970-71 [52], just two years, although dropped to a mere 76 children in the 1971-72 academic year. Fenelon comments that: "... the kindergarten premises were temporarily transformed into elementary [primary] schools to cope with a rush of entrants into the first year elementary classes" [53]. This corresponds to the first year of the Federation and the writer suggests that it was the result of an active federal policy to increase education for all at the primary stage in an effort to start the nation-building process.

In Abu Dhabi, as in the other emirates, the state schools were soon to be complemented by a number of private schools although this does not appear to happen to a large degree until post independence and will be discussed later.

The importance of the administration of education in Abu Dhabi

The administration of education within Abu Dhabi is worthy of mention as on

TABLE 4.4
Teachers According to Donor Country, Northern Emirates 1970-71

Donor Country	
Locals	23
Abu Dhabi	12
Bahrain	9
Kuwait	500
Qatar	57
Saudi Arabia	34
U.A.R. (Egypt)	65
Grand Total	700

Source: K G FENELON (1976), *The United Arab Emirates*, p. 100.
Note; There are some inconsistencies between the figures that Fenelon quotes and those official figures of the Abu Dhabi and later UAE Government. This highlights the problem with the accuracy of the early data. Where an inconsistency exists a comparison has been made between all of the information available to the writer and a judgement made.

TABLE 4.5
Teachers According to Sex and Nationality, Abu Dhabi, 1970-71

National of	Male	Female	Total
Abu Dhabi	1	3	4
Sharjah	4	2	6
Ras al Khaimah	1	3	4
Umm al Qaiwain	1	0	1
Bahrain	70	15	85
Great Britain	1	2	3
Iraq	1	6	7
Jordan	109	85	194
Lebanon	11	7	18
Oman	5	1	6
Pakistan	1	0	1
Palestine	31	28	59
Qatar	1	0	1
Sudan	2	2	4
Syria	4	4	7
U.A.R.	21	18	39
Grand Total	263	176	439

Source:
GOVERNMENT OF ABU DHABI, Ministry of Education, *Yearly Report, 1970-1971.*

independence it was the only emirate that had set-up its own administration [54]. It was also to form the basis of the future UAE Ministry of Education which was to administer education in all of the emirates.

Initially, and from 1960 until 1964, the headmaster of the largest school, the Al Falahiyah School, acted as the unofficial Director of Education and reported directly to the Ruler's Court. However, in 1964 the first Director of Education was appointed and in the same year the Jordanian syllabus was officially adopted for the schools in the emirate of Abu Dhabi [55]. This also reflected, in part, the substantial number of Jordanian and Palestinian[56] teachers who were in the system and most probably accounts for the continued large numbers that were later recruited. Table 4.5 shows that in 1970-71 Jordanian and Palestinian teachers commanded some 58 per cent of the total number of teachers in the emirate of Abu Dhabi.

In 1967-68 the first educational mission arrived from Bahrain and it is recorded that they shared in the teaching alongside that of the Jordanian one, [57] although the writer suggests that a more accurate comment would be that they shared in the administration.

There would have been little fundamental difference between the Jordanian syllabus adopted by Abu Dhabi and that of the Kuwaiti model adopted in the Northern Emirates at the time. The subject breakdown would have been similar although minor differences of emphasis would have been placed on some of the subjects, for example, one more module of arithmetic may have been offered by the Kuwaiti syllabus in Year Two than the Jordanian syllabus [58].

In 1968-69 Abu Dhabi offered educational provision in some form from kindergarten through to secondary for both boys and girls. In the same year "Night Anti-illiteracy and Adult Education Centres were opened for those who

had earlier missed the chance of being educated" [59] and by the following year, 1969-70, fifteen "Anti-illiteracy Campaign and Adult Education Centres" were opened across the emirate: eight in Abu Dhabi: five for males and three for females; and seven in Al Ain: five for males and two for females. During that year 1,065 males and 80 females had registered for the Anti-illiteracy classes and a further 170 had registered for the adult education classes [60]. The number of adults registered is a firm indication of the growing perception of the importance of education and the increased opportunity and prosperity that it would bring to the individual. However, there was no further opportunity regarding education within the emirate as tertiary educational facilities did not exist at that time. The ruler of Abu Dhabi placed great emphasis on education and did perceive a need for training at a higher level; where necessary, students were sponsored and sent abroad for further study. In 1969-70 the government reported that "there were 303 scholars overseas comprising 288 male scholars and 15 female scholars. In addition there were 71 bursars comprising 57 males and 14 females" [61].

Some of these students attended the Bahrain based Gulf Technical College. The institution which was inaugurated in 1968 [62] was set up by the ruler of Bahrain, who donated the land, and the ruler of Abu Dhabi along with the British Government each of whom contributed fifty per cent of the capital costs and, initially, half of the recurrent costs [63]. The stated aim of the college was:

> ...the training of school leavers from any of the Gulf states in higher technical skills that cannot be provided within the scope of the educational systems in [the] individual states. Courses are given in technical and advanced trade subjects, in commercial and business studies, and in public administration. Students are prepared for external examinations such as those of the City and Guilds or the Royal society of Arts. In this way it is hoped to maintain a high standard by enabling students to qualify in objective tests held by impartial, outside bodies whose qualification awards are well known and trusted. [64]

The Gulf Technical College was, therefore, the apex of higher and technical education in the Gulf states at that time. This first regional college was, after independence, supported by Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and the United Arab Emirates and in 1981 renamed the Gulf Polytechnic.

Consideration was being given to the administration of the educational facilities and in 1968-69 the government of Abu Dhabi reported that the Department of Education was expanding to include "most Divisions necessary for administering the education activities effectively" [65]. By 1969-70 the government further reported that it had "completed its Divisions and Sections" [66].

This development of the Department of Education is important and it is not unreasonable to make two observations here. Firstly, that the emirate of Abu Dhabi had by 1970 taken full control of its education provision and had effectively centralised the administration of it. Secondly, that there was a planned coincidence between this and the imminent inception of the United Arab Emirates at the end of 1971.

Technical training such as that offered in the trade schools of Sharjah and Dubai did not commence in Abu Dhabi until 1972 as a state sponsored activity because, to a point, it was being dealt with by the training schools of the two oil companies in the rapidly developing oil industry. As far back as 1959 the Abu Dhabi Marine Areas Limited (ADMA) instigated an on-the-job training programme for nationals who were interested in a career in the industry. A training centre was officially opened on 22 March 1961 with eight nationals. Admissions gradually increased to thirty a year. The programme was a two year one followed by on-the-job training that included an element of regular day-release. The centre further developed links with the Gulf Technical College in Bahrain and in the United Kingdom with Swansea University, Neath Technical College and the BP Research Centre at Sunbury [67].

The Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company (ADPC) began its training programme for nationals once the oil started to flow. Initially based in Tarif the facility was soon moved and developed in Abu Dhabi.

By 1971 and at the point of independence the ADMA Training Centre and the ADPC Training Centres were training one hundred and three nationals between them. Seventy-four nationals between the ages of fifteen and thirty were on the ADMA company's payroll and being offered attractive rates of pay related to their progress. A further thirty-nine were with the ADPC [68].

Clearly this was a first step in the process of Arabisation: that is the replacing of expatriate employment positions with locals. Both these training centres and the Gulf Technical College were striving towards British recognised qualifications such as the City and Guilds and the Royal Society of Arts. There were obvious links with Britain through the oil companies' parent companies. However, the independence of these institutions may have been an important factor in their selection as the social system of the time was based on tribal loyalties with nepotism being a prevailing factor. These institutions therefore would have been above reproach. Perhaps a cynical comment but nevertheless relevant when the personalised nature of this part of the world, at that time, is taken into account.

To summarise at this point:

Prior to independence certain main points in the development of educational provision in the Trucial States come to light. Firstly, there was no formal education in any of the emirates before 1953 other than the traditional *kuttabs* whose main function was to inculcate into the Islamic faith. Further the provision started as a British and Kuwaiti initiative and because of the paucity of resources and expertise in the Emirates it was built on aid from the British and other Arab states. Kuwait's influence in the Northern Emirates regarding educational provision, curriculum and control of personnel was immense although the

introduction of a variety of expatriate Arab teachers and administrators would have had a subtle input and influence on the curriculum and culture. In the formative years Abu Dhabi developed its own provision and that on independence the strides forward in educational provision for all of the emirates was funded by oil revenues and was not the result of wealth creation through the process of industrialisation.

The transformation from the Trucial States into the United Arab Emirates and the importance of education.

2 December, 1971 was a major landmark in the history of the region in that it saw the inauguration of the United Arab Emirates, a federation comprising six of the emirates that made up the Trucial States. Ras al Khaimah initially stalled on its membership but was admitted to the Federation shortly afterwards on 10 February, 1972.

The creation of the Federation involved a transfer of the different local administrations, that already existed in basic form in some of the emirates, to a federal authority. The benefits of increased access to the wealth of Abu Dhabi and, to some extent, Dubai must have been a clear incentive to move in the federal direction for the poorer emirates. However, the process would not have been an immediately comprehensive one because mutual trust would have to be built between the various emirates first. After all, up to this point, and even under the British rule, they were autonomous territories. Each emirate comprised tribal people who were loyal to their leader and not to the leader of a neighbouring emirate whom they may still be in dispute with and/or hostile to. Disputes were, more often than not, over boundaries and oases: that is who controlled the water. Federal intrusion, albeit to a desirable end, would have been viewed with certain suspicion for it removed control from the traditional power bases in each of the emirates. Education was given a crucial role from the onset of the Federation as it was perceived as a way of nurturing a common identity and goal for the disparate people of the area. It was vital, therefore, for

the success of the federal experiment to instil federal ideals and goals in the people of the various emirates which would, in time, increase trust and allow for greater intrusion and the centralising of the power and decision-making processes.

Initially, the federal powers were far from comprehensive and each emirate was generally responsible for its own affairs. The need for basic infrastructures across the whole area was already being addressed to some extent through the Trucial States Development Office and the local governments of each emirate. This was to continue and to be given even more impetus through the offices of the Federation by redirecting even more of Abu Dhabi's wealth although all major projects were still conceived and developed through the governments of the individual emirates who slowly relinquished their existing departments.

In reality, Abu Dhabi and Dubai could have gone ahead alone. The other emirates generally needed access to Abu Dhabi's wealth through the vehicle of the Federation as they were unlikely to survive without it. Accordingly, they had no choice but to allow Abu Dhabi to take a strong lead. Fortunately the aspirations of the ruler of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Zayed, were benevolent towards the other emirates. A quote from a document issued by the Ministry of Information and Culture is relevant here:

> At the same time, reorganising the desire of the people for the consolidation of the new-born-federation, Sheikh Zayed took the lead in 1973 in the strengthening of the federal institutions, by dissolving the cabinet created in Abu Dhabi only in 1971, and by assigning to the federation a number of responsibilities that had previously been handled at the level of the Emirate, such as health and education. The move provided extra impetus for the federation and helped significantly in the creation of a sense of state-hood amongst the population of the seven individual Emirates. The initial steps in 1973 were followed in subsequent years by agreement to handle on a federal level such other key items as the police and state security, the armed forces, which were unified in

1976, and questions of nationality and immigration.
69

The crucial role of education in the development of the United Arab Emirates was therefore firmly stated. The above statement by the Ministry of Information and Culture clearly supports the importance ascribed to education in the nation building process. It also further highlights the diplomacy of the ruler of Abu Dhabi and first president of the UAE, Sheikh Zayed.

It was important for the success of the Federation that the responsibility for education was seen to be under the control of the Federation and not outside agencies. This would not necessarily affect the qualitative aspect of education *per se* but it would strengthen the perception of the Federation. This would not affect the funding of the educational provision greatly as already with increasing oil revenues and commercial activities, particularly in Dubai, this was generally being achieved internally with Abu Dhabi being the major donor to the Northern Emirates. Accordingly, education came under the aegis of one federal department to which both Kuwait and Abu Dhabi relinquished their responsibilities in 1973 [70].

A second and equally important role ascribed to education was in the necessary process of modernising the citizens of the United Arab Emirates so that they could take an active role in the UAE's future. They were soon to be thrown onto the world stage yet the people of the UAE were generally illiterate, poorly trained, and were still living at a basic level, particularly in the remoter desert and mountain areas and the poorer emirates. Poor health knowledge and high infant mortality rates amongst other indicators were a consequential characteristic of the low level of basic education that prevailed. Some of these indicators and the substantial improvements made in them through the impressive development of educational provision in the last two decades will be discussed in the next section. At this point it is merely sufficient to discuss the general details of the provision at the point of change over to central and federal control of education;

for the actual quantitative details of this progress see the self-explanatory statistical tables that are presented in this chapter.

At the inception of the Federation 27,745 children were attending some 66 schools [70a] across the various emirates of the United Arab Emirates. Of this number some 10,000 were enrolled in the Abu Dhabi government schools and 3,000 in Dubai. It must also be pointed out that there were several private schools also in operation in Dubai with the Iranian school being the largest with an enrolment of over 900 [71]. The expansion under the Federal Ministry of Education and Youth was to be substantial and within a decade the figure of 30,000 was to rise to 108,840 [72]. The most dramatic increases during this period, understandably, took place in the major population centres of Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah and this reflected the pace of development generally taking place in these towns. Interestingly, many of the children of the Arab expatriate communities enrolled in large numbers and accounted for some 80 per cent of the enrolment in some of the secondary schools' higher classes [73].

The above increase in enrolments was accompanied by an impressive building programme. A priority of that programme was to situate the primary schools as close to the community as possible [73a]. This was helped by an equally impressive road building programme that substantially improved communications around and between the various emirates. It must be remembered, however, that at the inception of the United Arab Emirates a characteristic of the communities was their insular nature due to spatial remoteness caused by the inhospitable terrain. Even Abu Dhabi and Dubai, now connected by the fast highway, were remote by land. Moreover, transit from the east to the west coast still required a four-wheel drive vehicle or, of course, a camel.

The road building programme contributed to vastly improved communications

and made inter-emirate access much faster and more accessible. The building programme that accompanied it included schools, health facilities and improved housing for the people. Accordingly, the general standard of living in all the Northern Emirates improved quickly and most spectacularly in the towns of Sharjah, Dubai and Abu Dhabi. The oil wealth of Abu Dhabi was beginning to benefit all the people of the Emirates as it was filtered through the offices of the Federation or more subtly through services that the neighbouring emirates could offer. These developments were a positive intrusion of the Federation and helped to strengthen more accepting attitudes towards it. Moreover, access to education not only improved the individual's standard of living but also increased his opportunity to take part and reap benefits from the tremendous and impressive growth that gripped the Emirates post independence. Many would comment on this being seen as taking an active part in the development of the Federation but the realist would comment that it was more motivated by financial gain and/or increasing future security.

Quantitative expansion of educational provision

The quantitative expansion of education became a priority after independence and although an increasingly desperate need for trained personnel in every field was apparent, energy and finances were poured into school expansion. Little real consideration was given to relevant training needs in this expansion because the oil wealth allowed expertise to be 'bought-in'. Moreover, unskilled labour was also 'bought-in' to service the ever increasing needs of the development. This is highlighted by the 1968 Census of the Trucial States[74] where only 43 per cent of the population were actually economically active. This figure would have been an enhanced one by the very nature of the influx of foreign labour. It would have been further distorted by the fact that 98 per cent of the indigenous female population would, through social mores, have been effectively inactive at the time. The figures do, however, support the fact that the local Arab was, through the discovery of oil and the subsequent development that took place, put in an interesting position. He was thrown into, not just a new

employment market, but one in which there was no cultural history of relevant or modern skills that could prepare him other than in the area of trading. In fact, in many cases, particularly in the wealthier emirates of Abu Dhabi and Dubai, there was little incentive to work as nepotism and increasing social benefits were nurturing a culture where the local was elevated to positions where he loosely supervised the expatriates who did the work. The reader may consider this a harsh statement but it does present an interesting picture of the time and one which is pertinent to small wealthy states that are about to embark upon a process of modernisation and development. This particular situation and the dilemma it creates will be discussed more fully in a later chapter under issues of manpower.

Educational provision developed quantitatively but qualitatively it was still quite basic in its philosophy drawing on traditional methods and rote learning techniques. It failed to address the crucial problem of change and, perhaps another important issue, that of developing work attitudes, ethics and skills in the nationals. However, this was not uncommon in the development thinking of the time and quantitative expansion of education, particularly at primary level, was, at the very least, an international goal sponsored by organisations such as the United Nations and the World Bank [75].

The increasing wealth of the United Arab Emirates also meant that it did not have to use the process of industrialisation or the development of education itself as a means of generating funds for future growth and/or of sustaining what was already in place. In fact, fuelled by the oil price increases in the wake of the Arab-Israeli War of 1973 the United Arab Emirates experienced a quantitative explosion in education and social provision in the decade post their independence.

The UAE was fortunate enough not to be caught up in the chicken and egg dilemma that most other developing countries were suffering, that is, the

dilemma of whether social developments such as education, health, housing and so forth were to come as a result of a process of wealth generation through industrialisation or whether the wealth would, in itself, be generated through the development of education and the consequent introduction of expertise and trained personnel into the economy. This dilemma is usually further compounded by the small country situation.

The wealth factor in the United Arab Emirates meant that the process of modernisation allowed social development and industrialisation to take place at the same time, as parallel activities; that is, that schools could be built, resourced and staffed as necessary and that the cost effectiveness of schools, particularly in the remoter areas or the costs of sustaining the provision, was not of major concern or an inhibiting factor as it would have been for the majority of developing countries. Admittedly the poorer emirates were not in a strong position vis-à-vis their own income generation but importantly this also was not a concern as through the aegis of the Federation they would too enjoy the benefits of the wealth factor. Therefore, the UAE forged ahead and at the time ceilings and limits to funding the development were never really perceived as a constraint.

Table 5.1 shows the development that took place and highlights the rapid expansion in these early years. During this time, as in the years preceding independence, certain inducements were offered to parents to encourage them to send their children to school. It is important to remember that there was not a tradition of formal education in the Emirates and for the peoples of the remoter desert and mountainous areas schooling may initially have been viewed as an intrusion into the family and their traditional ways. The inducements were also offered in the rapidly growing urban centres even though the benefits of schooling would have been more tangible. These stipends continued for several years and, in part, were the starting point of the forthcoming social benefits programme that was to benefit all of the indigenous people and, to a

certain extent, the expatriates.

In 1971 the following incentives were offered by the Ruler of Abu Dhabi to encourage the "expansion and growth of education in Abu Dhabi":

1. All books, stationery and the various necessary equipment and supplies.

2. Monthly allowances for every boy or girl student, starting with BD.[76] 4/ - monthly for each kindergarten child, BD. 5/ - for First Primary students, BD.6/ - for Secondary Primary students and so on with an increase of BD.1/ - for each new class until the individual student's monthly allowance reaches BD.15/ -.

3. A complete meal on each school day.

4. Two uniforms and one pair of shoes for each boy or girl student annually in addition to all supplies and uniforms necessary for physical and scout education.

5. Free, regular transportation daily for all students from home to school and vise versa under the direct control of the Department of Education and in collaboration with the schools so as to ensure the comfort and the safety of each student.

6. Free medical care through a special division (the Scholastic Health Division) which is staffed by physicians and nurses who dispense free medicines from the pharmacies of the Departments of Education and Health which have branches in most schools.

7. Boarding houses have been open for expatriate students from neighbouring sisterly Emirates and Arab countries so as to ensure that each student gets free lodging, food, care and the best educational guidance. [77]

Similar incentives were being offered in the Northern Emirates and on independence the above incentives were extended to all pupils in the schools under the control of the Ministry of Education and Youth Affairs. Alongside free education, these incentives would have initially made a valuable contribution to the family budget particularly in the poorer areas. They were further added to by

the introduction of boarding facilities that certainly would have benefited the people of the remoter regions where educational provision would have, if it existed, initially been limited to a basic level. The increased importance of the boarding facilities can be seen in the take-up figures where in 1970-71 the 661 students boarding represented a 263 per cent increase on the 1969-70 figure of 251 boarders [78]. Government sources do not indicate whether the boarding facilities were limited to boys. However, it would be fair to assume that the boarding would have been more used by the boys as within the interior and the remoter settlements the social mores would have prevented the young female from living outside of the family unit.

The monthly stipend has since been dropped although it was occasionally reintroduced to encourage take-up of certain vocational courses.

The formal schooling model in the United Arab Emirates

The school model and curriculum adopted throughout the Emirates post independence followed the one already in existence in Abu Dhabi and it comprised four stages: Kindergarten, Primary, Preparatory and Secondary and, as can be seen in Figure 5.1, these were further subdivided into academic, religious and technical at the preparatory stage with a further addition of agricultural and commercial at the secondary stage. In the secondary academic and secondary religious institutions students were directed into either a literary or a scientific route, which they still are today.

Ministry of Defence schools

A number of schools were also set-up and run by the Ministry of Defence in the remoter parts of the UAE. These complemented the Ministry of Education provision.

The role of the Trade and Technical Schools

Initially, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, the trade schools were established

and run by the British Government through the aegis of the Trucial States Development Office with the goal of training nationals of the Trucial States as artisans. Upon independence the Federal Government assumed responsibility for these schools and generally upgraded [79] them by requiring six years of primary education before admission to their six year course which had been extended from the previous four years. The six years was complementary to and reflected the general school pattern with a three year preparatory and three year secondary stage.

By independence there were three trade schools operating: Sharjah (1960), Dubai (1964) and Ras al Khaimah (1969). The need for state sponsored training in Abu Dhabi was not so pressing as facilities were being provided for by the two oil companies. Abu Dhabi's first technical school was started post independence in late 1972 [80]. The trade schools initially offered technical courses that allowed for specialism in one of four fields: general engineering; motor vehicle maintenance; carpentry and cabinet-making; electrical installation.

From 1966 a three year commercial course was being offered in Dubai. Initially with an annual intake of just fifteen nationals who were required to have completed eight years of general education before being accepted on to the course [81]. In recent years this has been raised to nine years: that is completion of the preparatory stage. The curriculum covered Arabic and English typing; mathematics and accounting; office practice and procedures; commercial law; commercial geography and business administration.

The Agricultural Secondary School set up in Ras al Khaimah in 1967 continued to prepare students as agricultural technicians so that they could "run or hold posts in agricultural guidance" [82].

These specialist school routes followed a pattern that was widely taken up by

the Gulf City States in their systems. It appears that these states did not question the general pattern of education in the early stages of their development. This may have been in part due to fiscal considerations and the routes did, to some extent, pay at the very least lip service to their own manpower needs. However, these needs would have not presented a major pressing concern because the increasing oil revenues would continue to soften the problem by offering the opportunity to buying-in needed expertise through the employment of expatriate labour. Another important point when viewing these schools is that they were never a significant contribution to offering an alternative route to the general education as can be seen in the enrolment figures. This is still an important factor today as their role continues to diminish in both take-up and particularly status with perhaps the exception of the religious schools in terms of status. Public perception of these institutions will be explored in more depth a little later in the next chapter under qualitative considerations.

Teacher Training

In government statistics for 1972-73 it can be noted that there was also a teacher training route although it is not clear at what stage or age the students entered this section. However, it is clear from an Abu Dhabi Government abstract that the course was instigated in 1966 and that the duration of the course was for four years [83]. Teacher training was later placed under the umbrella of the UAE University in 1977.

Tables 5.9, 5.10 and 5.11 show the weekly plan of the syllabus in operation in Abu Dhabi just around independence. It does not take into account the more specialist syllabuses that were operating in the religious, technical, commercial and agricultural sections, examples of which the writer has been unable to trace. Furthermore, when viewing the numbers of students enrolled within the different sections of the secondary stage of education it can be seen that there is a strong tendency away from the vocationally orientated education showing a real lack of

manpower planning at this stage in the country's development. Of greater importance and relevance within this chapter is the general content of the curriculum and the observation that it has changed little in structure and subject allocation over the past twenty years. Of importance also is the similarity of syllabus in a comparative sense between the UAE and its neighbouring Gulf City States. Yet, surprising for a group of small countries there has been little real movement in the direction of pooling their resources in curriculum development.

No doubt the wealth factor has inhibited this to a certain extent in that the diseconomies of small scale were perhaps not so harshly felt in the Gulf states as, for example, in the poorer Caribbean states where regional initiatives resulted in positive benefit. The Caribbean's regional CXC examinations can be cited here as an example of a concerted effort at localising and making the curriculum more relevant to their area.

However, the fact that each of these Gulf states are relatively new nations actively establishing their independence with much of their energy focused inwardly on setting-up their own systems would not have been conducive to major regional cooperation. Moreover, it is well documented that small countries do have a shortage of expertise in their manpower which puts particular strains on a government department when international representation and initiative is required [84]. The Gulf states were and are no exception in that their limited manpower resource would have initially been directed towards establishing contact with the major international agencies. The United Nations can be cited as one such example. Its acceptance of them as a sovereign state would have increased their own territorial stability and rights; particularly at a time when their larger neighbours were making historical claims to their territory and the very real threat of expansionism lay heavy in the air. One only needs to point to the early claims on Bahrain by Iran; the more recent territorial dispute between Saudi Arabia and Qatar; the present occupation of two of the UAE's islands by Iran

and, of course, the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. Needless to say, that when these concerns are put into context, territorial protection and defence take priority over educational initiatives. In the early days of independence this possibly used up the limited expertise that could, for example, have been directed towards regional educational cooperation in addressing the inefficiencies of scale. It could also be fair to assume that in the early days of independence any remaining 'international' expertise amongst the citizens would have been put into wealth creation projects in an attempt to break away from the mono-economy: yet another characteristic of the small country. All of these factors would have had an inhibiting effect on major regional educational cooperation and initiatives.

The above quantitative expansion continued throughout the first two decades of the newly formed federation with later years naturally seeing a greater improvement for the poorer emirates and remoter settlements as wealthier emirates and towns had achieved their targets. In terms of pupil enrolment for primary through to secondary the United Arab Emirates had by 1990s achieved their goal of full enrolment of the school age range of the population. However, these figures, as with all developing countries, tend to enhance the actual situation. Drop-out rates and those repeating a failed year should, at some stage, be taken into consideration. However, at this point it is more appropriate to complete the account of the quantitative and physical expansion that took place in educational provision.

Further and Higher Education

One of the characteristics of a small country's education system is what Brock refers to as a 'topless education system' [85]: that is, an incomplete system that can be quite limited in the tertiary sector for the obvious reason of financial constraint. This will often manifest itself in the very small countries as there being no university and, indeed, Smawfield [86] has argued that this should be one of the necessary characteristics in determining whether the small country title should be applied. The United Arab Emirates is no exception to this topless system.

As already discussed, its educational facilities in the early years were limited to formal schooling stopping at the end of the secondary phase. Post secondary and specialist training generally required periods of study abroad.

It is not within the brief of this thesis to discuss the appropriateness of the university model and academics such as Smawfield [87] have argued for more appropriate use of limited funds and for a radical rethinking to find an alternative to the traditional university model, particularly in small developing countries. But what is clear is that to have a university at the apex of an education system has become a matter of national pride for many developing countries, whether the model is relevant or not, and even if it does drain funds from more appropriate and cost effective use elsewhere in the system. Moreover, if the aspiration of a national university is an impossible task alone then a regional university would initially suffice. The United Arab Emirates and the other small Gulf states of the lower Arabian Gulf went along exactly this route.

Before independence Abu Dhabi contributed to the Gulf Technical College which was later upgraded in 1981 to the Gulf Polytechnic as mentioned earlier. Post independence in 1976 and with the benefit of the oil wealth of Abu Dhabi the UAE established its own university. The university although of limited faculties was an important step and established an acceptable and internationally recognised symbol of statehood as well as an apex to the education system, albeit a 'borrowed' model. An important development to a country that was desperate to establish itself as such and a country that, because of its newness and nervousness, was keen to use symbols and models taken from other developed countries. The university was one of many symbols of statehood that the United Arab Emirates was keen to adopt and establish post independence such as its own national airline, its own army and police-force, and so forth. Whether alternatives to the university model were actually considered the writer has not been able to discover. What is clear is the fact that because there were no major financial constraints the United Arab Emirates was not forced

to consider alternatives.

Another important consideration was that Sheikh Zayed, the president of the UAE and Ruler of Abu Dhabi, decided to establish the UAE University in the emirate's second town of Al Ain. Whether this was merely because of his affection for the area and his close connection to its people from his time as regional governor; or whether it was a conscious decision to place the university in an area that needed the developmental benefits that a university can bring to an area is not known. The writer suspects that it was a mixture of both. However, as the major source of finance would have come from Abu Dhabi it did keep not just the facility within the emirate but also the knock-on commercial benefits. Very much a similar case to the split campuses of the University of the West Indies with sites in the major contributor's territories of Jamaica and Barbados. Both would, therefore, gain the peripheral benefits of an academic centre which would further act as a magnet drawing important offices and businesses to the centres and ironically away from those islands/areas where the commercial need would have been greater. The irony being in the fact that these other small countries were also contributing to the university from their meagre resources but at one and the same time directing a focal point away from themselves in terms of much needed development. A parallel can be drawn in the case of the United Arab Emirates which is also a group of small states just as the states of the Caribbean. With hindsight it would have been better to have placed the university centre in one of the emirates that did not have the benefit of oil wealth enabling it, through the university, to generate its own wealth. After all, Al Ain would always have the benefit Abu Dhabi's wealth. Moreover the siting of the university in Ajman or Umm al Qaiwain would have brought it physically closer to more of the population and a similar distance away from the population of the city of Abu Dhabi. However, that is mere conjecture and the fact is that the university has been sited in-land in an oasis town that enjoys its own slightly more moderate micro-climate than the summer extremes experienced on the coast. Another possible consideration is that the site may have been chosen

with sensitivity to the social mores of the time. The university would allow the females to further their education within the Emirates in an area that was not dominated with foreigners. It would not, therefore, offer the Western and alien attractions and distractions of the urban centres such as Dubai and Abu Dhabi thereby making it and its boarding facilities more acceptable to the head of the girl's family.

United Arab Emirates University was inaugurated in 1977 with separate facilities for males and females. A luxury that a less wealthy developing country could ill afford. However, the importance of social mores would have had a major influence on the segregated route that the Federal Government had adopted. The university has, without doubt, increased educational opportunity for the indigenous female as can be seen by the early enrolment figures where some thirty per cent were females. The wider implications it had for the female will be discussed to some extent in the next section although this will be reasonably limited and clearly this is an area of study that could be effectively addressed by one of the university's own graduates. It would certainly be of interest to academics generally in the wider debate on the importance of education in developing equal opportunity across the genders.

The inauguration of the university saw the opening of four faculties in the first academic year covering what the 1979-1981 UAE Yearbook [88] states as: "the humanities and social sciences; natural sciences; education and public administration and political science". Two years later in 1978 a faculty of Islamic Law was opened, in 1980 the faculties of Agriculture and Engineering and in the late 1980s a faculty of Medicine and Health Sciences was added as part of a planned expansion programme. In 1981 the long term plan was to cater for some 10,000 students [89], a figure that has now been exceeded with some 10,922 undergraduates [90] registered for the 1993-94 academic year [91].

By 1993 [92] the university had produced some 12,000 graduates of which over half, some 7,000, were females, indicating again the importance of this institution for the female and the changing social attitudes in allowing the female to continue her education. Apart from the gender equality, an important stated aim of the University in the early days that also determined the choice of faculties, was to produce graduates "specialised in precisely the areas that the country most needs"[93]. Whether this important goal was actually thought through and implemented effectively will be raised in the next section when the important relationship between education and manpower requirement will be discussed. However, it is an area of significant importance in a small developing country of limited expertise in its indigenous population and in this the UAE is no exception.

Vocational education and the importance of the Higher Colleges of Technology

In terms of the continuing development of the educational provision for the citizens of the United Arab Emirates and an initiative of perhaps more immediate relevance than that of the University, was the inauguration in September 1988 of the first three Higher Colleges of Technology (HCT). An initiative that was the result of the Toronto based Canadian education consultancy (Educansult) being commissioned to help implement a programme to address the acute shortage of paraprofessional manpower that existed amongst the indigenous population of the UAE.

The Ontario pattern of education in this sphere was chosen by Sheikh Nahyan, the then Chancellor of the UAE University and acting Chancellor of the HCT, because:

> ....of the close proximity the college has with the community. Every college has a governing body which is selected from the particular area, also every programme has its advisory committee......Each college is flexible and versatile and responds to the needs of the area as soon as it is identified. It does not have to wait for approval from a centralised

controlling body and takes its own decision. [94]

Of greatest significance to the educational provision of the UAE was that these colleges marked a watershed in the realisation of the often verbalised goal of linking educational planning to actual manpower requirement. The rhetoric of previous years merely paid lip-service to the problem and goal of Emiratisation: the localising of the work force. The University at Al Ain clearly contributed to the goal of educational equality for the people of the UAE but did not directly concern itself sufficiently with the actual business of preparing a trained cadre of required expertise. There were gaps between the rhetoric and the reality. Clearly the HCTs were charged with the responsibility of addressing the actual situation and at the same time adding certain credibility to vocational training which traditionally in the eyes of the nationals was always given lower status than the academic route [95]. Certain status to the HCT qualification was also being offered by Sheikh Nahyan at the time in his comments:

> ...we are preparing legislation establishing the Colleges' graduation certification as higher educational degrees and specifying the expected pay scale and benefits for its holders. In this context, the higher diploma conferred by the Colleges will be equivalent in pay and benefit to a university degree. [96]

More recent comment in the press points to the strong moves being taken to give some of the qualifications offered by the HCTs first degree status. But, an even stronger indication of their need and success is that of high student placement within quasi government organisations and, perhaps more importantly, within the private sector. Also, in terms of public perception, there has been strong support which can be seen through the six-fold increase in take-up of places from the 240 enrolment in the first year to some 1,800 in 1993/4 across the 8 men's and women's colleges that are presently situated in the emirates of Abu Dhabi (4), Dubai (2) and Ras al Khaimah (2).

The Higher Colleges were clearly perceived as some form of responsive Community College similar to those found in North America and increasingly in the developed world. That is, they were from the outset to take up a developing and pivotal role in community education and manpower training. It is still early days and the Colleges are wisely developing and consolidating their first role as training institutions concentrating initially on specific areas and adding new areas only when they are ready to do so. Future financial constraints may ultimately inhibit their controlled development but the importance of these responsive institutions must not be underestimated in the development of educational provision. In future manpower planning, educational resources may well be better directed to the HCTs rather than the UAE University.

A knock-on benefit of the HCTs that has possibly not been considered in the UAE is the positive influence that they may well exert on the curriculum of the secondary schools. That is a natural downward pressure through their entrance demands on the students that they accept on to their courses. In the HCTs the medium of instruction is English, the de facto language of the Gulf, with a hands on problem-solving based style of teaching using leading edge technology where computer literacy is given a high priority. Ultimately the HCTs may well become the catalyst needed to change the traditional curriculum and rote style teaching methods of the formal schooling years to bring about necessary qualitative changes in the curriculum.

The intention of this chapter is to offer an overview of the development of educational provision in the UAE. Accordingly the HCTs mere five years of existence means that they command a small portion of this section. However, the importance of the HCTs is far too great a development in terms of the UAE and within the wider context of small countries research generally, for them to be dismissed as just another entry in this chapter's overview. Far greater attention will be paid to them in the next section where the relationship between educational provision and manpower requirement will be discussed in more

depth.

In more recent years although a great deal of training has continued through the oil companies for that particular field other paraprofessional training institutions are now being sponsored by the Federal government. This includes institutions that cater to banking, nursing and such like and although these institutions are relatively recent additions they are indicators of the ever expanding homegrown educational opportunities that are being created by the government for the indigenous population.

Adult Education and the eradication of illiteracy

Prior to the introduction of the first formal schooling in the Trucial States from 1953 onwards the majority of the indigenous population of the area were illiterate. Another important aspect of the educational provision on offer in the United Arab Emirates is, therefore, that of the Adult Education programme. In fact, in the 1968 census of the Trucial States just prior to independence of a total population of 122,245 some 96,698 were illiterate, that is 79 per cent of the population. This could be further broken down into 73 per cent of the male population (59,046) and a staggering 91 per cent (37,652) of the female population. Clearly these figures did not pertain to just the indigenous people and included the expatriates. However, as most of the expatriates, at the time, would have been male it could be argued that the 91 per cent for the females would have been a fair indication of illiteracy amongst the national females. It could also be argued that the introduction of male expatriates in the figures would have reduced the male percentage. Nevertheless, with such a high level of illiteracy it is easy to understand the importance to the area of the introduction of Adult Education and its continued development.

Clearly the expanding school provision catered to the younger population and in the early years the not so young with, on occasions, twenty year old and older students enrolled in the formal school system. The adult education classes for

cost effective reasons initially used the school facilities in the evenings although after independence several adult education centres were established. The figure now stands in the region of 136 centres running some 1020 classes [97]. In 1992 some 17,194 students were enrolled in a range of courses. By the very nature of what the courses entail this is a diminishing figure, however, bearing in mind the small nature of the population of the UAE it is a significant contribution to educational provision which should not be dismissed lightly. In fact, the writer argues that in terms of what is being achieved and because of the sheer numbers involved over the years that this area of educational provision in the UAE should be viewed as an integral part of the provision to date. Moreover, the present Ministry of Education target of eradicating illiteracy in the indigenous population by the year 2,000 [98] looks all the more achievable.

The above generally plots the development of state educational provision in the United Arab Emirates and outlines that on offer at this point in time. However, of significance is the development of private educational initiatives and institutions which have grown up alongside the state provision. They have developed with the blessing of both the various Emirates' governments and the Federal Ministry and have addressed the needs of the local and the expatriate alike. At this point it is merely sufficient to give a brief overview of their contribution as they will be discussed more fully in the next section.

In the region generally there has been a tradition of the more wealthy families and/or merchants establishing school facilities. This can be seen in the case of Bahrain which enjoyed an earlier development to the United Arab Emirates. Al Hamer [99] states that the Persian community, for example, established their own school, al-Ittihad, in Manama the capital of Bahrain as early as 1910. He also cites two other schools, al-Falah and Dar al-'ilm, as being established around the same time. These he ascribes as more of formalised *kuttab* and under the sponsorship of a wealthy patron such as the pearl merchant Mohammed Ali

Zainal as was the al-Falah school [100] The establishment of these schools amongst others actually predated the state initiative in Bahrain but are important in that they indicate two styles of private educational facility which can be used in reference to the UAE's private provision: the first one was established as a school with a nationality bias and the other was established by more of an entrepreneurial individual. Both of these types were to appear in the UAE but more prevalent would become the schools established by the entrepreneur with profit motives using the nationality basis to find various niches in the market place.

Dubai was an early centre for the establishment of private education and, in fact, the Ministry of Education with its Private Education wing is actually now sited in Dubai, perhaps a reflection of this fact. However, within the region generally Dubai is well known for its more liberal policies and Fenelon [101] does actually cite this as a reason for the early growth of private education in the city. Foreign residents, communities, companies and Consulates were, therefore, encouraged to build and run their own community schools. In the early days one of the largest established in 1976 was the Iranian School which catered to some 600 boys and 300 girls. It was actually financed by the government of Iran and inspected regularly by their Ministry of Education. At that time Fenelon states:

> There are also an English-speaking school, an American community School, and a Pakistani Middle School, which is Urdu-speaking and co-educational. There is an Indian primary school and the National Private School, which is fee-paying and run as a private enterprise, teaching Arabic, French and English to children whose parents intend that they should continue their education in the Lebanon. [102]

Two important points about the style of private education can be raised here. Firstly, the national and cultural bias of a school reflected a demand from the multi-cultural make up of the rapidly growing expatriate population of the Emirates. These demands due to the transitory nature of the expatriate population also

required that the children could easily transfer back into their own systems. This resulted in the schools' strong national bias rather than the development of a curriculum appropriate to the area. Secondly, and perhaps interestingly, as in the case of the Pakistani school, the private schools would develop, particularly in the early days, as coeducational schools: this was completely at odds with the social mores of the area and what was being offered by the Ministry of Education. The Ministry has, to some extent, continued to turn a blind eye to mixed schools as long as the number of Muslims in the school remains a small proportion of the total enrolment.

It is worth noting that the introduction of private education saw the enrolment of nationals in the schools. In fact, certain institutions such as the English curriculum school Dubai College would be an aspiration for many a parent as public perception affords an English schooling high status. Although the College's reputation in the Gulf region for a high standard of education is not doubted the public perception is more likely to be a colonial legacy which is self-fulfilling in terms of the College's enrolment demand. This is a legacy that is also often transferred from the expatriates' home countries such as India and Sri Lanka.

It would be a pointless exercise to list the 289 private schools [103] that were in operation within the Emirates during 1992. But it is significant that 33 per cent of the total school enrolment in the UAE during the academic year 1991-92 was catered for by these institutions, that is, 137,057 students out of a total of 419,891. A parallel expansion can also be seen taking place in the tertiary sector which will be discussed in the next chapter.

The stimulus for many of these schools would have come from interested business concerns such as a group of companies who would sponsor a non-profit making institution to cater for the children of their employees. For example the British company Tarmac sponsored the setting up of the Sharjah English School for its English employees' children amongst others. In time this school

was to run with a Board of Governors with much the same powers as its equivalent in the UK with the school paying its own way and effectively operating as a 'Charitable Trust' with profits being ploughed back into the school's own development. Similar was the case of Dubai College and many other reputable institutions. However, any discussion on the development of private education in the UAE must include the substantial contribution made by the Varkey Group. The group has funded and developed twelve schools across the Emirates catering mostly to the vast numbers of Indian nationals. It caters to some 20,000 students, offering an education which is very results orientated much like that on offer back in India. However, it must be said that education is the lion's share of the group's business and a major generator of company profits. The Varkey Group is a successful educational business which many other entrepreneurs have hoped to duplicate, albeit in a small way. It is, therefore, not uncommon in the Emirates at present for business conglomerates to look to education as a means of expansion and profit when their other markets have been exploited.

This chapter has plotted the development of educational provision in the United Arab Emirates and given some overview of the provision itself. However, although some figures have been quoted and references made to the impressive nature of this development much of the statistical input has been left to the next chapter. To group them will help to show the quantitative expansion and will also help in the comparative comment on qualitative aspects of this development. By the very nature of this style of thesis the writer's selection of points raised will have a subjective as well as objective bias. Importantly, the reader may, when viewing the grouped facts and figures draw further and different comparisons and points. In any comparative analysis this should be a welcomed by-product and is one of this thesis' stated aims.

NOTES AND REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER FOUR

1. AL-HAMER, Abdul Malik (1969),
   Development of Education in Bahrain: 1940-1965,
   (Bahrain, Oriental Press), p. 7.

2. HEARD-BEY, Frauke (1982),
   From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates,
   (London, Longman), p. 156.

3. Ibid, p. 156; Heard-Bey also points out that "in the more remote communities it was not uncommon to use the shoulder blade of dead domestic animals to write on", ibid., p. 436.

4. AL-MOSAWI, Nasser Hussain (1988),
   An Analytical Study of the Utilization of Classroom Verbal Interaction in Social Studies Teaching in the Secondary Schools of the State of Bahrain,
   unpublished PhD thesis, University of Hull, p. 46.

5. SOFFAN, Linda Usra (1980),
   The Women of the United Arab Emirates,
   (London, Croom Helm), p. 62.

6. Ibid, p. 50.

7. SUNNI: one of the two main branches of orthodox Islam, consisting of those who acknowledge the authority of the Sunna*. Sunni is the branch of Islam more commonly associated with Saudi Arabia.
   SHIAH: the other main branch of orthodox Islam which regards the Prophet Mohammed's cousin Ali and his successors as the true imams. This sect is mainly associated with Iran and the more recent wave of fundamentalism that has been affecting the Arab region.
   *SUNNA: the body of traditional Islamic law accepted by most orthodox Muslims as based on the words and acts of the Prophet Mohammed.

7a. HEARD-BEY, Frauke (1982), op cit., p. 453N also:
   MINISTRY OF EDUCATION,
   Education in the United Arab Emirates, circa 1975/76, p. 2:

   ....some private schools were built like the Ahmadiyah School, Saa'da, Falah in Dubai, Quasemeya in Sharjah....

   The information is vague but the Ahmadiyah school in Dubai does correspond to a conversation the writer had with a local who was aware of the school's existence in the 1930s.

8. WINDER, R.B. (1959),
   "Education in Al-Bahrayn - The World of Islam",
   p. 310, as reported in AL-HAMER, op. cit., p. 8.

9. Ibid, p. 311.

10. FENELON, K.G. (1976),
    The United Arab Emirates: An Economic and Social Survey,
    (London, Longman, second edition), p. 99.

11. UAE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND YOUTH (1976-1977),
    Educational Abstract 1976-1977,
    (Abu Dhabi, Department of Technical Affairs Section of Educational Statistics), p. 12; however, FENELON, K.G. (1976), op. cit., p. 99, states the enrolment figure as 450. This is obviously inconsistent with the government source and the writer tends to err on the side of the smaller figure as a more realistic one especially as this was the first formal school to be established. The figure of 230 is also supported by SOFFAN, Linda Usra (1980), op. cit., p. 51, who does not state her source.

12. FENELON, K.G. (1976), op. cit., p. 99.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. SOFFAN, Linda Usra (1980), op. cit., p. 51.

16. FENELON, K.G. (1976), op. cit., p. 99.

17. SOFFAN, Linda Usra (1980), op. cit., p. 52.

18. FENELON, K.G. (1976), op. cit., p. 99.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. UNESCO (1956),
    Compulsory Education in the Arab States,
    (Amsterdam, Holland N.V.), p. 61.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid, p. 16.

25. Ibid, p. 26.

26. Ibid, taken from Table 2, p. 28.

27. Ibid, taken from Table 9, p. 68.

28. Ibid, p. 28.

29. Ibid, p. 26.

30. Ibid, p. 53.

31. Ibid, pp. 32-3.

32. Ibid, p. 33.

33. FENELON, K.G. (1976), op. cit., p. 99.

34. UNESCO (1956), p. 38, there is some reference to a centralised system.

35. SOFFAN, Linda Usra (1980), op. cit., p. 51.

36. The six emirates excluding Abu Dhabi are often referred to locally as the Northern Emirates.

37. SOFFAN, Linda Usra (1980), op. cit., p. 51. This appears also to be the first reference to a religious institute in the Trucial States; a further one was found for Al Ain for 1967.

38. Ibid.

39. MERTZ, Robert A (1972),
    Education and Manpower in the Arabian Gulf,
    (Washington DC, Friends of the Middle East Gulf Study), pp. 150-1, as cited in SOFFAN, Linda Usra (1980), op. cit., p. 51 and p. 62.

40. SOFFAN, Linda Usra (1980), op. cit., p. 52, see also her note 15.

41. SOFFAN, Linda Usra (1980), op. cit., p. 51, reports the figure as 12 and cites her reference as MERTZ, Robert A (1972), op cit., p. 151.

    GOVERNMENT OF ABU DHABI (1970-1971),
    Yearly Report 1970-1971,
    (Abu Dhabi, Ministry of Education), p. 5.

The above Government Report actually states that:

> The number of Adu Dhabi Government teachers in the sisterly Trucial States in 1969-70 was 47 male and female teachers. The number has increased in the current scholastic year 1970-71 to well over one hundred male and female teachers.

These two references to Abu Dhabi's contribution are worthy of comment and the following observations can be made. Firstly both references are reputable but they do highlight the problems of these early statistics. The difference in number from 12 to over 100 is a substantial discrepancy. However this may be explained in that the Hertz figure dealt with the Northern Emirates and the Abu Dhabi Government may well have included Oman in arriving at its figure. The area including Oman was at times referred to as Trucial Oman. Important, however, is the fact that inconsistencies do exist in these early figures and that they cannot be accurately verified due to the general lack of information available at the time particularly regarding the criteria and definitions applied to the gathering and presentation of such information.

However, it is not clear whether the 700 is the grand total of teachers or the total of Kuwaiti teachers excluding those that it supervised. Fenelon (1976), op. cit., discusses a different national make-up of teachers and this clearly highlights the inconsistencies in the early data.

42. SOFFAN, Linda Usra (1980), op. cit., p. 51.

42a.FENELON, K.G. (1976), op. cit., p. 103.

42b.Ibid. However, there is some inconsistency here as Fenelon makes reference to 3 years in the Dubai school on p. 104.

42c. Ibid, p. 104.

42d. Ibid.

43. SOFFAN, Linda Usra (1980), op. cit., p. 51.

44. GOVERNMENT OF ABU DHABI (1970-1971), op. cit., p1.

45. Ibid.

46. FENELON, K.G. (1976), op. cit., p. 100.

47. GOVERNMENT OF ABU DHABI (1970-1971), op. cit., p1 and Table on p. 1.

48. Ibid, p. 1. The Sharkiyah Boys' Primary School was later renamed (date unknown) and in 1970-71 was known as the Mohamed Bin Al-Kassim School.

49. Ibid, p. 124.

50. Ibid.

51. FENELON, K.G. (1976), op. cit., p. 100.

52. GOVERNMENT OF ABU DHABI (1970-1971), op. cit., Table 5.

53. FENELON, K.G. (1976), op. cit., p. 101.

54. SADIK, Muhammad T. and SNAVELY, William P. (1972),
Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates,
(Lexington, Massachusetts, Lexington Books), p. 163 Table 5.5. Author's survey, July 1970, indicates that there was an education department in the governmental organisation of Sharjah although it is not clear what powers and controls were exercised by Kuwait who was administering education at the time.

55. GOVERNMENT OF ABU DHABI (1970-1971), op. cit., p. 1.

56. Due to the loss of the Palestinian homeland to Israel many of the Palestinians relocated to Jordan and in the early years of the United Arab Emirates Palestinians often referred to themselves as Jordanians. This blurring of nationality has started to change a little in recent years particularly post the September 1993 Israel Palestinian Peace Accord where Israel and the PLO are now recognising each other and negotiating territory

57. GOVERNMENT OF ABU DHABI (1970-1971), op. cit., p. 3.

58. See UNESCO (1956), op. cit., pp. 50-52, for examples of the Kuwaiti and other Arab syllabuses that were in operation and although the date of the publication was in the late 1950s it would be reasonable to assume that they changed little during the 1960s.

59. GOVERNMENT OF ABU DHABI (1970-1971), op. cit., p. 3.

60. Ibid, p. 4.

61. Ibid.

62. AL-MOSAWI, Nasser Hussain (1988), op. cit., p. 61.
FENELON, K.G. (1976), op. cit., p. 105, states that the date was 1969, however, other sources confirm that it opened in the academic year 1968-69.

63. FENELON, K.G. (1976), op. cit., p. 105.

64. Ibid.

65. GOVERNMENT OF ABU DHABI (1970-1971), op. cit., p. 3.

66. Ibid.

67. FENELON, K.G. (1976), op. cit., p. 106.

68. Ibid.

69. MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND CULTURE (undated),
United Arab Emirates 1971-1986: Fifteen Years of Progress,
(Abu Dhabi, Ministry of Information and Culture), p. 15.

70. HEARD-BEY, Frauke (1982), op. cit., p. 386; actually states that the government of Kuwait relinquished this responsibility in early 1972.

70a. MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND CULTURE (1991),
United Arab Emirates 1991,
(Abu Dhabi, Ministry of Information and Culture), p. 90;

also: MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND CULTURE (1993),
United Arab Emirates 1993,
(Abu Dhabi, Ministry of Information and Culture), p. 100;

see: 1991 Yearbook for pupil numbers and number of schools. However, the 1993 Yearbook states the number of schools as 60.

71. HEARD-BEY, Frauke (1982), op. cit., p. 386 and p. 483.

72. Ibid, p. 386.

73. Ibid.

73a. HEARD-BEY, Frauke (1982), op. cit., p. 386.

74. SADIK, Muhammad T. and SNAVELY, William P. (1972), op. cit., p. 32

Table 2.4.

75. See: THOMPSON, A.R. (1977),
"How Far Free?: international networks of constraint upon national education policy in the Third World" in:
Comparative Education, Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 157-68;

W ATSON, Keith (1988),
"Forty Years of Education and Development: from optimism to uncertainty" in:
Education Review, Vol. 40, No. 2, 1988, pp. 137-174;
for wider reading see articles such as:

FOSTER, P. (1965),
"The Vocational School Fallacy in Development Planning" in:
ANDERSON, C. A. and BOWMAN, M. (Eds),
Education and Economic Development,
(Chicago, Aldine Publishing Company) and its follow-up:
FOSTER, P. (1992),
"Vocational Education and Training: a major shift in World Bank policy" in:
Propects, Vol. XXII, No. 2, 1992, pp. 149-155.

76. BD refers to the Bahrain Dinar. The UAE has since established its own currency, the Dirham (Dh), which is linked to the US $. BD 1 is equivalent to Dh 10 at the present time.

77. GOVERNMENT OF ABU DHABI (1970-1971), op. cit., pp. 2-3.

78. Ibid, p. 5.

79. UAE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION (undated),
Education in the UAE,
(Abu Dhabi, Ministry of Education, circa 1975-76), p. 3.

80. FENELON, K.G. (1976), op. cit., p. 103.

81. Ibid., p. 104.

82. UAE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION (undated), p. 4.

83. UAE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND YOUTH (1976-1977),
Educational Abstract 1976 - 1977,
(Abu Dhabi, Department of Technical Affairs Section of Educational Statistics), deduced from Table found in the above abstract.

84. BROCK, COLIN et al, see Chapter Two.

85. BROCK, Colin (1984), op. cit., p. 45.

86. SMAWFIELD, David (1988), op. cit., see reference 28 in Chapter Two.

87. Ibid.

88. MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND CULTURE (undated c1981),
United Arab Emirates: a record of achievement 1979-1981,

(Abu Dhabi, Ministry of Information and Culture, circa 1981).

89. Ibid., p. 93. Quote refers to 1981.

90. MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND CULTURE (1993),
    United Arab Emirates 1993,
    (Abu Dhabi, Ministry of Information and Culture), p. 100.

91. The writer is not sure whether this is still part of the long term plan as since
    these comments the Higher Colleges of Technology (HCT) have opened.

92. MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND CULTURE (1993), op cit., p. 100.

93. MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND CULTURE (undated c1981), p. 93.

94. GHAZI, Arshad (1988),
    "The community connection" in: *Gulf Weekly,* 5 August, 1988, pp. 8, 9.

95. For more information regarding the low status of vocational courses see
    Chapter 7.

96. EMIRATES NEWS, 29 October, 1988, p. 2, "Sheikh Nahyan outlines
    College's role".

97. UAE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION (1992),
    Summary of Educational Statistics 1991-992,
    (Abu Dhabi, Ministry of Education Information and Documentation Section).

98. This has been well documented over the last decade as one of the main
    targets in the modernising of the UAE.

99. AL-HAMER, Abdul Malik (1969),
    Development of Education in Bahrain: 1940-1965,
    (Bahrain, Oriental Press), p.8.

100. Ibid.

101. FENELON, K.G. (1976), op. cit., p. 102.

102. Ibid.

103. UAE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION (1992).

PART TWO
INFLUENCES, ATTITUDES AND TRENDS THAT HAVE SHAPED
EDUCATION IN THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES:
A MALE ORIENTATED SOCIETY

PART TWO

CHAPTER FIVE

CHANGING EDUCATIONAL PRIORITIES:

QUANTITATIVE INDICATORS AND QUALITATIVE

CONSIDERATIONS

The previous chapter has given a reasonably comprehensive overview of the impressive expansion in educational provision that the Emirates has experienced over the last three decades. Indeed, as Table 5.1 shows, modern formal educational development has been a phenomenon of this period alone with previous provision being confined to a traditional *kuttab* facility available to a limited few.

There is no coincidence in the fact that this period of development has taken place as a result of changing international political attitudes which were stimulated by such declarations as the United Nation's Charter of Human Rights in which education became a basic human right. There is also no doubt that, as this period of time unfolded, the more developed countries started to assume a supportive and less exploitative attitude towards the less developed world through their aid programmes and organisations [1].

Because mass illiteracy was a characteristic of the majority of developing countries in the 1950s and 1960s the rapid expansion of education was generally perceived as a panacea. It would help to overcome the gross disparities that existed and that were rooted in prejudice and the socioeconomic injustices. Also of equal, if not greater importance, in the minds of the politicians and planners was an economic motive. That is, education would feed the manpower requirement that was necessary if development was to flow from the technological progress. It was, in fact, a period in time when the relatively new discipline of educational economics started to appear and gain credibility with its early thoughts shaping the foundation of human capital theory.

TABLE 5.1
The Expansion of State Educational Provision in the Trucial States/United Arab Emirates: Kindergarten, Primary, Preparatory and Secondary Stages, 1953 to 1992

Academic Year	Number of Schools				Number of Classrooms				Number of Pupils			Number of Teachers*		
	M	F	K	T	M	F	Co-ed	T	M	F	T	M	F	T
1953/54	1	0	0	1	6	0	0	6	230	0	230	6	0	6
1954/55	1	0	0	1	8	0	0	8	270	0	270	7	0	7
1955/56	2	1	0	3	11	1	0	12	440	30	470	11	1	12
1956/57	2	1	0	3	18	4	0	22	580	66	646	17	1	18
1957/58	5	1	0	6	15	5	0	20	639	119	758	23	2	25
1958/59	5	3	0	8	25	8	0	33	1.954	381	2,335	47	15	62
1959/60	8	6	0	14	52	15	0	67	2,491	620	3,111	84	18	102
1960/61	16	4	0	20	78	22	0	100	3,194	722	3,916	107	31	138
1961/62	19	8	0	27	91	29	0	120	3,861	1,142	5,003	126	39	165
1962/63	19	10	0	29	113	42	0	155	4,201	1,293	5,494	207	63	270
1963/64	20	12	0	32	123	58	0	181	4,442	1,770	6,212	208	76	284
1964/65	23	13	0	36	147	69	0	216	5,244	2,198	7,442	245	85	330
1965/66	25	14	0	39	171	81	0	252	6,014	2,823	8,837	268	114	382
1966/67	24	14	0	38	189	94	0	283	6,641	4,305	10,946	290	136	426
1967/68	26	18	0	44	213	117	0	330	8,253	4,519	12,772	317	172	489
1968/69	32	24	2	58	327	200	19	546	11,321	6,544	17,865	499	330	829
1969/70	35	26	2	63	417	252	20	689	13,761	8,564	22,325	628	430	1,058
1970/71	37	27	2	66	519	314	32	865	16,850	10,895	27,745	742	505	1,254
1971/72	42	31	1	74	669	333	22	1,024	21,770	11,092	32,862	955	630	1,585
1972/73	66	39	24	129	754	443	93	1,290	24,508	15,685	40,193	1,381	1,005	2,386
1973/74	77	49	22	148	866	575	63	1,504	26,154	18,118	44,272	1,678	1,279	2,957
1974/75	73	57	37	167	1,015	671	78	1,764	30,264	22,057	52,321	2,084	1,744	3,828
1975/76	82	67	36	185	1,074	809	199	2,082	34,782	27,021	61,803	2,542	2,314	4,856
1976/77	93	76	37	206	1,248	978	226	2,452	39,300	32,014	71,314	3,058	2,908	5,966
1977/78	104	88	36	228	1,440	1,177	218	2,835	43,085	35,896	78,981	3,170	3,177	6,347
1978/79	110	95	38	243	1,523	1,293	261	3,077	46,536	39,512	86,048	3,374	3,498	6,872
1979/80	118	98	39	255	1,718	1,454	288	3,460	51,631	44,446	96,077	3,789	4,025	7,814
1980/81	136	115	32	283	1,986	1,701	279	3,966	58,100	50,742	108,842	4,240	8,893	
1981/82	149	130	44	323	2,276	2,006	401	4,683	66,584	59,782	126,366	4,806	5,646	10,452
1982/83	163	144	40	347	2,533	2,273	418	5,224	73,194	66,646	139,840	5,315	6,436	11,751
1983/84	173	155	42	370	2,748	2,517	424	5,689	78,015	72,398	150,409	5,346	6,294	11,640
1984/85	179	161	43	383	2,946	2,737	459	6,142	84,400	79,596	163,996	4,462	5,513	12,492
1985/86				395				6,619			179,276			13,320
1986/87				415				7,241			194,433			14,815
1987/88				431				7,745	105,444	103,736	209,180	6,958	8,909	15,867
1988/89				457				8,403	113,201	112,190	225,391	7,428	9,648	17,076
1989/90				475				8,973	121,361	121,177	242,538	8,080	10,637	18,717
1990/91				499				9,441	128,303	129,470	257,773	8,577	11,497	20,074
1991/92				512				9,861	129,843	131,849	261,692	9,148	12,189	21,337

Note: * This figure also includes administrators in some of the statistical abstracts.
The accuracy of some of these figures cannot be fully guaranteed due to the shortage of sources although cross-referencing has taken place where possible.
M - Male, F - Female, K - Kindergarten, T - Total.
Sources:
UAE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION & YOUTH (1976), Educational Abstract 1975/76.
UAE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION & YOUTH (1977), Educational Abstract 1976/77.
UAE MINISTRY OF PLANNING (1985), Annual Statistical Abstract 1985,
MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, Development of Education 1988.
MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, Development of Education 1992.
1989/90 totals arrived at by totalling KG, Primary, Preparatory, Secondary, Religious Education, Technical Education, as deduced from the Ministry of Education, Development of Education 1992.

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TABLE 5.2
Development of Formal State Educational Provision in the
Trucial States/United Arab Emirates, 1950 - 1990

Year	No. of Schools Male	Female	KG *	Total	No. of Students Male	Female	Total
1950	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1960	16	4	0	20	3,194	722	3,916
1970	37	27	2	66	16,850	10,895	27,745
1980	136	115	32	283	58,100	50,742	108,842
1990	-	-	-	499	128,303	129,470	257,773

Notes: The above figures do not include the private educational provision.
KG*: Some of the kindergarten schools are coeducational, no breakdown of gender figures are available.
Sources: Compiled from information in Table 5.1

TABLE 5.3
Growth of Student Enrolment in the Trucial States/United Arab Emirates
as a Percentage of the Total Population,
1970 - 1991

Year	Enrolment	Total	% of Total Pop.
1970	27,745	225,000	12.33
1975	61,803	557,887	11.07
1980	108,842	1,042,720	10.43
1985	179,276	1,622,464	11.04
1990	257,773	1,844,000	13.97
1991	261,692	1,909,000	13.70

Notes: The above figures do not include the private educational provision.
KG*: Some of the kindergarten schools are coeducational, no breakdown of gender figures are available.
Sources: Compiled from information in Table 5.1 and Table 7.1.

TABLE 5.4
Growth of Male Student Enrolment in
the Trucial States/United Arab Emirates
as a Percentage of the Total Male Population, 1970 - 1991

Year	Enrolment	Total	% of Total Pop.
1970	16,850		
1975	34,782	386,427	9.00
1980	58,100	720,000	8.06
1985		1,052,577	
1990	128,303	1,115,000	11.50
1991	129,843	1,146,000	11.33

Notes: The above figures do not include the private educational provision.
Sources: Compiled from information in Table 5.1 and Table 7.1.

TABLE 5.5
Growth of Female Student Enrolment in
the Trucial States/United Arab Emirates
as a Percentage of the Total Female Population, 1970 - 1991

Year	Enrolment	Total	% of Total Pop.
1970	10,895		
1975	27,021	171,460	15.75
1980	50,742	322,000	15.75
1985		569,887	
1990	129,470	729,000	17.75
1991	131,849	736,000	17.91

Notes: The above figures do not include the private educational provision.
Sources: Compiled from information in Table 5.1 and Table 7.1.

Human Capital Theory influenced much of the thinking of the time and was based on the fact that formal education should be treated as an investment with economic returns that could be statistically measured by means of a cost-benefit analysis applied to the wage structures [2]. Accordingly, national growth could be seen in terms of flowing from technological progress and increased productivity which in turn flowed from progress in formal education [3]. It was, therefore, a theory that gave scientific credibility to the arguments of the politicians and educational planners as they sought larger budget allocation to fuel their education expansion.

The early 1960s saw a common approach and goal being adopted by much of the world which was supported by the education ministers of Asia, Africa and Latin America through regional UNESCO conferences and, in the Arab world, through a 1966 conference held in Tripoli. The general goal was to achieve Universal Primary Education (UPE) within twenty years, ten for Latin America, while at the same time setting up a core provision of secondary and higher educational structures which would be expanded upon at a later time. This was further enhanced by the objective of eradicating illiteracy amongst the non-schooled adults [4].

In idealistic terms the goal was to create a fully literate population in one generation with the idea that with a common primary schooling all citizens would have an equal start irrespective of sex, family background or geographical location. In retrospect it is easy to see the naivety in this, however, at the time the goal clearly had both acceptable humanistic and economic dimensions. This led to the unquestioned introduction of the developed world's pyramid model where the educational provision had been built from the ground up. There was no real alternative available and after all it had worked in those countries which were now reaping the economic rewards of industrialisation.

In reality the ideals were not fully realised and in many cases instead of building

from the bottom up countries started to build their systems from the top down. This was particularly the case when some countries started to realise the impossibility of achieving Universal Primary Education. Often the sheer financial burden of the ideal of UPE and its recurrent costs became prohibitive.

The above is mentioned to set the scene in terms of what was happening in the Trucial States/United Arab Emirates. It is not intended to devalue the impressive achievements of the area but more as a means of placing them into context. It will also reinforce a couple of points raised a little later in this chapter.

In the Trucial States/United Arab Emirates the instigation and development of the educational provision can be seen to clearly mirror and exemplify what was happening elsewhere; in fact, it will be shown that in the UAE the ideal was accepted and quantifiably achieved in a generation.

Changing international perspectives

The instigation of educational provision in the Trucial States was a direct result of two related factors which exemplify the pattern of changing attitudes. Firstly, Britain's changing position from a policy of non-interference with its protectorate, to one of supporting some development of the Emirates. Secondly, and, perhaps more important, was Britain's encouragement of Kuwait's involvement and aid in setting up and managing the first of the modern formal educational provision in the Northern Emirates.

The case of Abu Dhabi was different in that it developed its educational provision later as a result of its oil revenues. However, even here as Table 3.3 shows Abu Dhabi did show a benevolent attitude and supported, through financial aid, the developments in its neighbouring emirates even though there was a tradition of rivalry between Abu Dhabi and many of them.

These changing attitudes, combined with the leadership of certain sheikhs,

resulted in the formation of the United Arab Emirates. This was the real stimulus to the impressive quantitative development of educational provision which was made possible by its coincidence with the tremendous oil revenues that Abu Dhabi, and to some extent Dubai, were starting to enjoy.

Quantitative expansion

The expansion of educational provision in the UAE from nothing in the early 1950s to covering the whole population in effectively less than three decades is by any measure impressive. However, it must not be considered to be unique as it was generally reflected in all of the oil producing Gulf states during a similar period albeit slightly earlier for states such as Kuwait and Bahrain who enjoyed earlier oil revenues. As already mentioned, rapid expansion of educational provision was also a phenomenon of the period elsewhere in the developing world.

Another phenomenon of the time was the diminishing colonial dominance of large areas of the world and the emergence of new developing countries. The Arab oil producing states of the Arabian Gulf are a good example of this. However, it is important to be aware of this changing pattern as it explains the quantitative expansion as the newly established countries strove to modernise and pull their often disparate populations together into some form of cohesive group with a national identity and national goals. Educating and, perhaps, indoctrinating the population was quite naturally the route through which these new goals could be inculcated into the people and ultimately achieved. The United Arab Emirates, again, is a good example of this as it openly placed the responsibility of focussing, nationalising and modernising its disparate tribal groupings towards the goals of the Federation on to education.

The model that the UAE chose for this rapid expansion was that of the 1960s even though some of its failings were starting to become apparent. This also ties in comfortably with the 1966 Tripoli conference where the Arab education

ministers agreed on the pyramid model [5]. It would be these same countries who, through the expatriate advisers and educators in the UAE at the time, would accordingly shape and direct the expansion through the ministers and offices of the Federation.

The system was to be developed from the bottom up with the goal of Universal Primary Education, a core structure of secondary education and a basic structure of higher education. This was to be supported by an adult education programme designed to tackle the unschooled and illiterate adult population. Accordingly, this would address the absolute dearth of educated and trained personnel amongst the nationals and feed the Federation's desperate manpower requirement *inter alia*.

The United Arab Emirates was therefore consumed by the international thinking of the time and unquestioningly embarked on their expansion programmes. As the 1980s approached many developing countries had the facility of hindsight and questions about the success of the model in their development route were being raised. The UAE had, therefore, the opportunity to learn from these thoughts and the problems that materialised as it embarked on its own major period of expansion. But it is questionable whether it learnt from any of the concerns being mooted. The United Arab Emirates was in the enviable position of having a great fiscal resource as a result of the sharp rises in oil prices in 1973 and 1979. Effectively this turned the oil exporters into capital surplus countries and the UAE would have been in a confident position to embark on these ambitious social and economic developments. At the time oil revenues must have seemed a bottomless purse. Why then should it rethink the route and/or concern itself about funding the maintenance of what it set into place as there was no question about whether it could be afforded and built upon. Even as a small country, where education expansion is often constrained by high unit cost, for the UAE, and the Gulf oil producing states generally, this was not a concern at the time. Basically, if the UAE wanted something it could afford to buy it and

invariably it did.

Moreover, educational expansion was not a problem for the poorer non oil producing emirates in the federation as they too, through the offices of the Federation, enjoyed the benefits of Abu Dhabi's wealth. Education was one of the first federal ministries to be established and accordingly received full funding. Even the necessary building programme to accommodate the expansion was not inhibited by the small population as expatriate workers were brought in from the Indian subcontinent. The shortage of teachers due to the lack of an educational background in the local population represented no obstacle as they, too, were brought in from other Arab countries such as Egypt and Jordan: particularly from Jordan where a cadre of educated, well trained, stateless Palestinians welcomed the opportunity to establish themselves in the Gulf. This would be the case in all areas of development and expansion and not just that of education and has clearly become a phenomenon and characteristic of the area of the last three decades. The situation has only started to change in the last few years as an active programme of Arabisation and nationalisation of the work force has started to sweep the Gulf States. But, it must be said that this Arabisation would not have been possible without education and does support the theory of education being an investment.

Therefore, in all matters, the fact that the skills were rarely present in the small national population of the different emirates was no obstacle to the development of the area. The import of these skills and necessary labour has led to two more phenomena and characteristics of the area. Firstly, there exists a situation where the national is in the minority within the UAE. Secondly, there is an overall gender imbalance where the greater majority is male.

Furthermore, the massive influx of expatriate school age population was catered for by the introduction of private schooling and the development of privately run institutions as can be seen in Tables 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8. These institutions have

TABLE 5.6
Growth of Private Schools in the United Arab Emirates
as a Percentage of the Total Provision, 1975 to 1992

Year	MOE Schools	Private Schools	Total	Pr. Sch. as % of Total
1972/73	129			
1973/74	148			
1974/75	167			
1975/76	183	*36	214	14
1976/77	206	40	246	19
1977/78	228			
1978/79	243			
1979/80	255	*67	322	21
1980/81	283	*79	362	22
1981/82	323	*102	425	24
1982/83	347	*140	487	29
1983/84	370	147	517	28
1984/85	383	157	540	29
1985/86	395	164	559	29
1986/87	415	178	593	30
1987/88	431	198	629	31
1988/89	457	231	688	34
1989/90	457	240	715	34
1990/91	499	270	769	35
1991/92	512	289	801	36

Notes:
* figures deduced from information on MOE schools and total number of schools.
Percentage points have been rounded to the nearest whole.
Sources:
UAE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION & YOUTH (1976), *Educational Abstract 1975/76.*
UAE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION & YOUTH (1977), *Educational Abstract 1976/77.*
UAE MINISTRY OF PLANNING (1985), *Annual Statistical Abstract 1985,*
MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, *Development of Education 1988.*
MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, *Development of Education 1992.*

TABLE 5.7
Growth of Private Educational Provision in the United Arab Emirates
Shown as a Percentage of the Total Enrolment, 1985 to 1992

Year	MOE Schools' Enrolment	Private Schools' Enrolment	Total	Private Students as % of Total
1985/86	179,276	70,291	249,567	28
1986/87	194,433	76,372	270,805	28
1987/88	209,180	87,964	297,144	30
1988/89	225,391	102,619	328,010	31
1989/90	242,538	115,670	358,208	32
1990/91	257,773	126,137	383,910	33
1991/92	261,692	137,057	398,749	34

Notes:
Percentage points have been rounded to the nearest whole.
Sources:
UAE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION & YOUTH (1976), *Educational Abstract 1975/76.*
UAE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION & YOUTH (1977), *Educational Abstract 1976/77.*
UAE MINISTRY OF PLANNING (1985), *Annual Statistical Abstract 1985,*
MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, *Development of Education 1988.*
MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, *Development of Education 1992.*

TABLE 5.8
Growth of Private Educational Provision in the United Arab Emirates
Shown as a Percentage of the Total Provision in Terms of Teachers
and Administrators, 1985 to 1992

Year	MOE Schools	Private Schools	Total	Pr. Teach./Admin. as % of Total
1985/86	13,320	4,410	17,730	25
1986/87	14,996	4,816	19,812	24
1987/88	15,867	5,574	21,441	26
1988/89	17,076	6,580	23,656	28
1989/90	18,717	7,260	25,977	28
1990/91	20,074	8,076	28,150	29
1991/92	21,337	8,920	30,257	29

Notes:
Percentage points have been rounded to the nearest whole.
Sources:
UAE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION & YOUTH (1976), *Educational Abstract 1975/76.*
UAE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION & YOUTH (1977), *Educational Abstract 1976/77.*
UAE MINISTRY OF PLANNING (1985), *Annual Statistical Abstract 1985,*
MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, *Development of Education 1988.*
MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, *Development of Education 1992.*

become an important feature of the quantitative expansion and now account for some 33 per cent of the total provision.

Quantitatively the United Arab Emirates has achieved in one generation what many other developing countries can only dream of. Moreover, its goal of eradicating illiteracy by the year 2,000 also looks achievable. The UAE has, therefore, an increasingly educated population and in terms of Human Capital Theory economic growth should flow from it. However, the UAE cannot be deemed to offer an example of the theory in practice as it represents an atypical case. The UAE's development is the direct result of its oil wealth and not a result of investment into education. The process of modernisation, limited industrialisation, and economic generation is not a sole result of educating the national. Education and development have taken place in parallel and one has not led the other. Importantly, oil wealth has fed the process by buying in what has been necessary, be it labour, expertise or equipment. This is not unique to the UAE as the other Gulf oil producing states and countries such as Brunei show a similar pattern of development.

In terms of quantitative development of educational provision, the UAE assumed the goal embraced by one and all in the 1960s and 1970s. However, unlike many other developing countries, the UAE's vast financial resources allowed it to achieve what it set out to do. Can we learn from what has been achieved and inform the general arguments of 1960s? Perhaps not, other than to suggest that the wealth factor has allowed a country to aspire to the goal of Universal Primary Education and increased educational access for all at all levels. It has also allowed for the indigenous population to emerge from the most humble of origins into a population that can, as a result of education, embrace the modern world and its technologies. This now places it in a strong position to take advantage of the technology and to embark on a path of wealth creation for the future with a diminishing reliance on an expatriate work force.

Even though the UAE has followed the historical pattern of the already developed countries and has not been innovative in its course of quantitative educational development, it does not mean that poorer less developed countries cannot learn something from the process. In terms of quantitative development the recurrent cost of maintaining what has been put into place must offer some lessons on the model. Secondly, as a small country the extremely high unit cost of setting up the provision should cause some countries to rethink their strategy of blindly transposing the historical model to their own country without a great deal of modification. Finally, it must raise important questions on the actual model itself. Questions that are presently being asked such as: is Universal Primary Education achievable or even desirable for countries with limited budgets? Perhaps the same goals could be achieved through the less formal routes at reduced cost using traditional modes of communication, thereby releasing funds for a more targeted approach to the actual needs of a particular time. Surely, a characteristic of educational provision for the modern technological world is that it has the ability to respond quickly to change and has the facility to address these changes. Targeting is, therefore, clearly a way forward.

One of the problems of the goals that were set in the 1960s must be that in no way could their originators have even imagined the technological advances of the more recent decades and the way in which the manpower requirement would have changed. Watson states that "in the USA, for example, over 30% of all jobs in the mid-1980s were unheard of and unplanned for at the beginning of the 1970s" [6]. The most important consideration in educational planning now must not be to offer a basic inappropriate education for all; but more a relevant one for all, that furnishes the individual with the skills to be able to develop as an individual and contribute, through his or her own development, to the needs of the country. A targeted human resource development would minimise wastage in both financial and human terms. The trend of the late 1980s is towards a consideration of the qualitative rather than the pure quantitative expansion of

education. It is clearly here that lessons can be learnt from developing countries such as the UAE which have started to flesh out their basic provision to address their manpower needs.

As mentioned, a characteristic of the present world is the need to respond quickly to change in all areas. It is possible, that larger countries can learn from some of the smaller countries where the need to produce polyvalency in its work force, which allows them to cope with ever changing circumstances, is crucial to their survival if they wish to develop as viable autonomous units. It may be that the UAE can also offer an example in this area and inform the general debate as it starts to address the qualitative aspect of its provision.

Qualitative considerations

In recent years as the initial goals in the expansion of education were being realised the UAE has turned its attention to qualitative considerations of its provision. In part this has been brought on by financial reasons because the 'bubble did burst' with the drop in oil prices that the OPEC countries have been experiencing since 1985. The UAE, as with the other oil producing states of the Gulf, has recently moved into fiscal deficit in its national budget. This was initially offset by increasing production, though over-production resulted in further instability in the oil price. However, by drawing on their non oil investments in the rest of the world, particularly the industrial countries, the shortfall has been made up. The world recession of the early 1990s and the recent Gulf War has however severely strained these resources. The UAE is, perhaps for the first time, feeling the squeeze. A process of diversification has started, but, apart from Dubai, this has not had a tremendous influence on the present situation and consequently a rethink of spending policies has started to take place. In this present year, 1995, the GCC, of which the UAE is a member, has started to unify and implement import tariffs to increase state revenues. In the UAE this has been further enhanced by the raising of government administration fees, occasional taxes and introducing legislation to reduce the expatriate drain on

certain services such as the health service. Clearly a need for reducing the costs of maintaining the social service industry overall has become a recent characteristic. The area of education will be no exception in this and although fiscal budgets will continue to rise, the cost of maintaining the provision already in place will come under the microscope and will no doubt influence the implementation of future plans.

A forced period of review is now a characteristic of all of the oil producing states of the Gulf brought on by changing financial circumstances. This in itself should be considered healthy although this may not be the sentiment of the locals as they are forced to rethink the way that they actually address and solve their problems. No longer can the Gulf states and the UAE, in particular, throw money at a problem to solve it, although, it must be agreed, that there is still a tremendous amount of wealth in the Emirates and the area generally which will soften the transition.

The development of educational provision in the UAE can therefore be defined in terms of periods of quantitative expansion and qualitative development, with the major quantitative expansion taking place in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. Qualitative development appears to be an increasing consideration in the development of the provision from the 1980s. However, it is important to state that these are not discrete periods that are mutually exclusive. The provision is continuing to expand and there would always have been some review and qualitative improvement. Clearly the driving force was to put into place primary education followed by preparatory and secondary provision and that once the basic provision was in place then the emphasis of the development started to move towards more specific educational provision. This further fed the qualitative aspects of the provision itself such as teacher training and in-service education for the teachers and the inauguration of the UAE University.

It is appropriate at this juncture to consider the expansion and development of

education in a more specific manner. This will throw up some interesting points that are worthy of mention in a work such as this.

Segregated provision:

Throughout the development process and, at this point in time, the provision being offered is segregated. The few Ministry of Education coeducational institutions that existed are confined to the kindergarten stage and did not start to appear until 1968 as Table 5.1 shows. It is clear that the Islamic nature and traditional mores of the Trucial States/UAE would have influenced this route and continue to do so today.

Exceptions to this characteristic have been allowed in the private education sector although these coeducational schools are aware of the sensitive nature of their position and the need to keep the Muslim percentage of their enrolment to a minimum [7], particularly if they are secondary schools. If this figure should become too large then segregation could be forced upon them by the Ministry of Education. At present it tends to be the international style and British curriculum schools that have this privilege not just at the primary stage but also at the secondary stage. Dubai College and the English College, both in Dubai, are good examples of this where, apart from physical education, no segregation exists in the classes and all students follow a common curriculum. Similar examples can be readily found in the cities of Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah which are the main private education centres.

Segregation is, therefore, an important characteristic of the UAE's education system and is in keeping with the situation in the Arabian Gulf area generally. In fact, Saudi Arabia exemplifies this in the extreme and also the potentially high cost of the segregated route. In the Kingdom the female university students are segregated from the male teacher/lecturer who teach them indirectly through the medium of closed circuit television [8]. Recent reports from Kuwait also indicate that the Kuwaiti parliament is presently voting on a bill to phase in the

segregation of classes at its coeducational university [9] over the next five years. Those supporting the bill make accusations that "shameful things that contradict our traditions and Sharia (Islamic law) happen in classrooms and teachers' offices" [10]. The university naturally opposes the bill on the grounds that it is difficult to implement due to lack of funds. The university's board also issued a statement describing coeducation as a "characteristic of Kuwait's tolerant society..........Kuwaiti women, brought up in a healthy culture and social climate have succeeded with dignity in achieving high positions"[11]. Interestingly, the Rector of the university is a female.

However, it would be pertinent to speculate on the situation in the UAE should the oil wealth not have been present to allow this expensive style of development to take place. Three elements inform this speculation. Firstly, the social mores and the importance for many of segregating the female from the male once she has reached puberty. This situation tends thereafter to lead to general segregation of the sexes throughout the rest of their lives. Secondly, evidence in that the early development afforded priority to the male where the first educational provision and the early development concentrated quite clearly on male provision. Finally, that although the ideal of equal opportunities does exist in the UAE it is, in reality, a concept that means equal but different. This will be discussed more fully in the next chapter, however, in the context of this chapter this manifests itself through indicators such as the curriculum.

Tables 4.1 and 5.1 show that priority in schooling was given to the male in the Northern Emirates and that although females enjoyed some limited opportunity fairly early on it was not until 1963 that the females' situation was addressed in Abu Dhabi. The tables further show that a parity of male/female enrolment did not exist until around 1988/89. This clearly supports the argument regarding male priority but it is important to relate this point to the social mores and mention that family attitudes would have prevented some of the girls from

attending school particularly as they approached adolescence. It is also important to mention that in the process of modernisation there was an introduction of social workers whose brief was to address this attitudinal problem. This supports the idea of equal opportunity for the female but may also explain, to some extent, changing social attitudes that allowed the parity to exist. It is, however, unlikely that the expense of these social workers could have been supported if the wealth factor did not exist. One final point regarding this parity is that in terms of the national it could have taken place a little earlier. This is because, and particularly in the early years, expatriate children also enjoyed the benefit of the state education if they so wished and their enrolment would have distorted the figures. Closer analysis of these figures would prove this, however, the necessary breakdowns are not available to the writer for the earlier years, that is if they exist in the first place.

From these points it can be surmised that when the wealth factor was not present the early provision was segregated and priority was given to the male; and even though it was the least cost effective route the social mores would have further supported this situation. The male was seen as the family investment and not the female, where any investment in her would have transferred to the receiving family on marriage. These same attitudes clearly defined the role of the female within the family context. This will be explained and developed in the next chapter. This was also the situation in other Islamic countries, for example, Pakistan where, in 1980, it was documented that if a choice had to be made between segregated education at the expense of female education that choice would be made in favour of segregation[12].

However in the UAE, because it is a small country with a limited manpower pool, it would have had to have found a way of releasing the female into the labour pool if it was to modernise and survive without the benefits of oil wealth. It would then be fair to assume that a process of modernising the attitudes would have to have taken place and that this would have increased certain

expectations in terms of educational opportunity. Consequently increased demand for education for the female would have resulted. This idea can be seen as conceivable in the context of Dubai, in particular, with its commercial background. But, perhaps, not so in the poorer and more remote areas/emirates where even today the incongruity of a strong tie to traditional mores still exists alongside a demand for the consumer products of the present day. In the context of Saudi Arabia it would be fair to say even today that the decision would come down strong on the side of the male whereas on the small island of Bahrain one could speculate a pragmatic attitude similar to Dubai's. This is, in fact, increasingly the case as Bahrain itself has run out of oil and is now suffering certain financial constraints in its state budgeting.

However, if the decision is taken to segregate and not to introduce educational provision for the female then clearly there is not a cost effective factor to be considered. Also, as the enrolment increases this factor is not such an important consideration, as once the funding can be found it is unimportant whether the provision is for male or female. The cost factor would be reintroduced, however, should there be a requirement for the staff and teachers to be the same sex as the pupils. The writer, therefore, contends that with the vision of the early sheikhs, who were in power before the oil, and with the early setting up of some provision for both sexes that the UAE would have developed its provision in a segregated manner albeit at a much slower development rate. This would also have been the case in the other Gulf City States although not the case in Saudi Arabia, highly subjective, yet based on the writer's many years experience in the Gulf.

One influential situation that could have arisen if the UAE did not enjoy its oil wealth, and is to some extent now being felt by Bahrain, is the tremendous power that Saudi Arabia can and does wield within the region through its wealth and markets. The UAE without oil would have had to develop its educational provision through reliance on aid as it did in the Northern Emirates in the early

stages. It is in this area of aid that Saudi Arabia would have, no doubt, controlled the general development and continued to inhibit the unfettered progress of the females.

Qualitative indicators

Quantitative expansion of the UAE's educational provision is obvious and by its nature easy to define through statistics as the tables in this thesis show. Quite clearly they show an increase over a period of time. On the other hand it is very difficult to define the qualitative enhancements within the provision itself and this would require several longer in-depth studies addressing particular aspects. However, within the context of this research it is important to make some general comment on the qualitative aspect. To that end the writer believes that important indicators can be found in areas such as the teaching resource; the curriculum and its resourcing; enrolment analysis such as admission and drop-out figures and school accommodation. Brief comment will, therefore, be made under each of these headings to offer examples. No doubt, in the future some of these areas will attract more in-depth study by graduates of the UAE University as they start to move towards their post-graduate options.

Resourcing the development of education in the UAE

The teaching resource:

A characteristic of the teaching force in the UAE is its strong reliance on expatriate teachers. This has been the case in all of the emirates from the inauguration of the first schools. Table 4.4 shows that in the Northern Emirates in 1970-71, 23 national teachers accounted for a mere 3.3 per cent of the total 700 hundred teaching force. If the 12 nationals from Abu Dhabi are included the percentage would only be increased to 5 per cent. In Abu Dhabi at the same time it can be seen that of the 439 teaching force only 4 were Abu Dhabi nationals and that a further 11 were from the Northern Emirates, some 15 nationals and a similar 3.4 per cent of the total.

This strong reliance on expatriate teachers persists today across all of the emirates although the exact nationality breakdown in the published statistics, as appeared in earlier years, has given way to a different style of figures. The present day figures in English combine teachers and administrators with a breakdown in qualification being emphasised. From published statistics[13] it is clear that there are increased numbers of well qualified teachers within the system. In terms of percentile it could be expected that there would be some enhancement of the higher qualification figures in accordance with the development of educational opportunity for all in the area and Arab world generally. What is not clear is the relationship between a teacher's or administrator's qualification and the job that they are doing.

Another interesting fact that can be gleaned from these statistics relates to the situation regarding the inspection of the provision on offer. In Abu Dhabi in 1972-73 there was a total of 16 graduate non-national inspectors overseeing 780 teachers representing a 1: 48.75 ratio. In 1991-92 the ratio was 1: 42.73 [14]. Clearly a similar formula is being applied in the teacher inspector relationship. However, the writer is unaware of the quality of interaction and benefits of this relationship or the nationality breakdown and how many locals now command these positions.

Interesting is the fact that at the present time and although there is now parity in male/female enrolment there is a disparity in the make-up of teachers and inspectors. In 1991-92 of the 21,337 total teacher/administrator figure 12,189 were females, some 57 per cent. Amongst the inspectors only 25.8 per cent (106) were females. Compare the teacher figures to those of 1970-71 in Abu Dhabi and we can see that males commanded the greater share at 60 per cent and in the Northern Emirates for 1970 it was 58 per cent [15] in favour of males. Male/female comparisons for inspectors cannot be made as sexes have not been identified.

Certain observations can be made regarding these figures. The most obvious one is that the male/female teacher recruitment has changed in favour of the female who is now in the majority. Moreover, that in the early years of provision, when the male commanded the greater enrolment figure, it is likely that he would have been taught by a female teacher. This still is the case although from the data given an enhanced number of females must now be involved in the boys schools as it is unlikely that teacher pupil ratios are so disproportionate that all of the female teachers are in the girls' schools. Another observation is that this pattern of high numbers of female teachers follows a similar pattern to that of the West. To see more males in higher positions vis-à-vis the inspectors also supports that comparison. Compare this figure further with the gender imbalance in favour of the male found in the population of the UAE and it can be seen that the teaching profession is increasingly a female orientated one in the eyes of the recruiters and public themselves. This point does need some further qualification which can be seen from the information on the early teacher training of the UAE national. In 1968, of the first batch of students at the teacher training institutions, 68 per cent of the 57 were males and by 1976, just before the training came under the control of the university, the male percentage had dwindled to 18 per cent of the 89 trainees. Moreover in 1984 even with the teacher training receiving university status males only commanded 29 per cent (170 of the total 577). This is a clear indication of the local attitude towards teaching as a profession. It is increasingly female orientated mainly because of the social mores. Perhaps importantly, it does represent a popular opportunity and employment route for the local female that continues to 'protect' her generally from the adult male.

However, in terms of an improving qualitative situation in the UAE's educational provision the above does represent an increasing involvement in the teaching profession from the nationals themselves and a certain commitment to training when in actual fact the characteristic nepotism of the area at one time has not always required this commitment.

The fact still remains that the majority of the teachers in the education system both public and private are expatriates. In the public schools this would be Arab nationals who have received their training elsewhere. The quality of this training would be monitored locally to some extent nowadays and would be a factor in recruitment. Yet it is unlikely that that was the case in the early years when, particularly, in the Northern Emirates education was being provided and monitored by Kuwait as part of their aid programme. To gain local control of the recruitment is a qualitative indicator alone although this has been the case since the setting up of the federal ministry responsible for education in 1973 albeit under expatriate advisers.

Employing a foreign national, even from an Arab country, means the introduction of alien ideas and this leads to the question of: how has the UAE controlled and standardised its teaching force? In the early years this standardisation for the Northern Emirates would have been the responsibility of Kuwait via a Kuwaiti curriculum. In Abu Dhabi it would have been through the introduction of the Jordanian curriculum. In more recent years it is the contention of the writer that this standardisation continues to be achieved in the public schools though the curriculum taught which is monitored by the Ministry of Education. However, although there are increasing number of national graduates swelling the ranks of the Ministry of Education it does not alter the fact that the Ministers are still being advised by non-nationals and that the expatriate is still part of this monitoring. This should become a diminishing factor as the national experience and expertise grows.

The curriculum and its resourcing:

Bearing this in mind, monitoring of the curriculum is therefore an important job. This can be easily achieved at the Ministry through the centrally operated system. Monitoring the delivery of it is another matter and that is clearly the responsibility of the inspectors. The UAE system reflects very much the

pattern of those found in the developed countries and no doubt the Arab world. One qualitative indicator of whether the curriculum is being delivered effectively will be seen in the examination results and repeat figures. However, the nature of the examination itself would need careful review if this was to be followed up and greater study outside the brief of this thesis would be necessary.

One qualitative indicator can, however, be found in the area of localising the curriculum and making it relevant to the national in the UAE context. This tends to be a problem for many small countries because lack of expertise and diseconomy of scale often results in borrowed and irrelevant curriculum imposition. This is often controlled externally by institutions outside the country's control such as a traditional metropolitan centre linked through the colonial heritage. Regional cooperation in examinations such as the CXC in the Caribbean and the regional split campus University of the West Indies are examples of localising the curriculum and regaining some control through the university. In the Arabian Gulf this too has happened to some extent through the joint venture and establishment of the regional polytechnic/university in Bahrain. The establishment of the UAE University in Al Ain must have further enhanced the situation, as for the first time nationals had the opportunity to attend their own institution. The institution itself could also feed and influence the curriculum through the teachers it produced, the research it undertook and the entrance demands it made for its courses. This further supported by the production of localised curriculum materials by the Ministry of Education must be seen as a qualitative improvement. However, the reality is that many foreign influences still do affect the curriculum through the high number of expatriates needed to advise and deliver it. As a wealthy small country the UAE has been in the fortunate position of not being too constrained by the diseconomies of scale. Nevertheless, they do exist and it is during the present period of development with reduced fiscal resources that these diseconomies will need to be addressed.

FIGURE 5.1
Organisation of the Education System in the United Arab Emirates, 1995

Source: UAE Ministry of Education

Note: Secondary education may be: general (literary or science), religious (literary or science), technical, agricultural or commercial.

FIGURE 5.2
Organisation of the Ministry of Education
in the United Arab Emirates, 1988

H.E. MINISTER	High Committee for Educational Policies
	Committee for Administrative Organisation & Development
H.E. THE UNDERSECRETARY	Public Relations & Education Media

ASST. UNDERSECRETARY Planning & Evaluation
- Information & Research Department
- General Planning & Follow Up Department
- Curricula & Text Book Department
- Evaluation & Examinations Department

ASST. UNDERSECRETARY Educational Affairs
- Kindergarten & Primary Education Department
- Preparatory & Secondary Education Department
- Technical Education Department
- Adult Education Department
- Private Education Department

ASST. UNDERSECRETARY Educational & Central Activities
- Cultural Relations Department
- Libraries Department
- Pre & In-Service Teacher Training Department
- Social Service Department
- P.E.,Scouts & Art Educational Activities Department
- Educational Aids Department

ASST. UNDERSECRETARY Administrative Sector
- Legal Affairs Department
- Civil Service Department (Personnel)
- Financial Affairs Department
- General Services Department

EDUCATIONAL ZONES: Abu Dhabi | Al Ain | Western | Dubai | Sharjah | Ras al Khaimah | Eastern

EDUCATIONAL OFFICES: Ajman | Umm al Qaiwain

Note: ★ denotes Private Office
Source: MINISTRY OF EDUCATION (1988), Development of Education 1986 - 1988, p. 7. A report to the International Conference on Education 41st session, Geneva, 1988.

Curriculum development

In terms of the quality and the content of the actual curriculum being delivered, and not just the control of it as above, there are two indicators that may highlight a qualitative improvement. Is there any evolution in the curriculum on offer? Second, is there any change in the style of delivering the curriculum?

In an Islamic country there is no differentiation between state and religion and accordingly this has a major influence on the curriculum on offer and the way in which it is delivered in schools. In a traditional sense the Trucial States were no exception with their *kuttabs* although, as the United Arab Emirates, there has been a more modern approach to the curriculum which has tended to follow the pattern of the Arab world. This is hardly surprising bearing in mind that the UAE is part of the Arab world and the fact that the development has generally taken place under the guidance of Arab advisers and teachers.

The organisation of the school system in the UAE has changed little over the last three decades and Figure 5.1 shows that the system follows the pattern adopted in the region with kindergarten, primary, preparatory and secondary stages. At the preparatory stage the majority of students will travel through the main stream with small numbers being directed to a religious or a technical stream which continues into secondary. The technical stream has a strong vocational basis and in general will attract lower ability students for which the favoured academic route would not be suitable. Accordingly, even though this stream does, theoretically, offer a route to the Higher Colleges or university the local perception of it is low.

The favoured route is through the main stream and at secondary level this divides into either a literary or scientific section. The emphasis within these routes are obvious but can be clearly seen in the weekly lesson plans which will be discussed next. Generally, this main stream route is perceived as the desirable one as supported by very high enrolment. In comparison take-up in the

agricultural, commercial, religious and technical schools is low. It is sufficient to state that this is as a direct result of low status perception in the local community towards vocationally orientated courses, as highlighted above.

The most desired route in local perception is the literary route followed by an arts degree. This clearly has implications for the development of an educated and trained manpower pool that meets the actual needs of the modernising country. To some extent this was addressed in the late 1980s as the Federal Government looked into developing a provision to produce a body of paraprofessionals, something that was not being achieved through the university. Interestingly, the UAE looked outside the Arab world for this expertise and employed a Canadian consultancy to develop the Higher Colleges of Technology (HCT) that were, in part, to be based on similar institutions in Ontario. These institutions have been introduced into the UAE in recent years and continue to develop and increase their courses. The colleges *per se* will be discussed at some length in Chapter Seven, however, it is relevant to mention that in the last few years there has been a great deal of rhetoric from the relevant authorities about the status of the qualification being offered. There is no doubt in the writer's mind that these colleges are making a valuable contribution to the needs of the UAE and that their leaving qualifications are of value, allowing for the immediate placement of students in the commercial sector. However, the rhetoric about the status of this route and the fact that there should be parity in terms of qualification and salaries to that of the university degree and employment prospects continues. A further indication of the local perception towards the vocationally orientated route; and a perception that is diploma orientated to the point that many believe the higher your qualification the more capable you are of doing the job irrespective of ability and relevance of training and experience to do so. Imported values from those well represented nationalities in the UAE such as Egypt and the Indian subcontinent, that are something Ronald Dore (1976) describes as the *Diploma Disease*.

The Higher Colleges of Technology can be described as a developing qualitative improvement in the education and training on offer in the UAE. Their curriculum very much addresses the modern computer technologies which is an area that must be important to all small countries if they are to fulfil their development plans and reduce their reliance on expatriate labour. Moreover, the HCTs were designed to develop in much the same way as a community college and to respond quickly to the needs of the local communities that they serve. It is still early days for these colleges and at present they are quite rightly consolidating what they have presently achieved to date. Their development appears to be more measured rather than the past characteristic of a rushed provision. They are presently responding, through short courses, to the training needs of certain commercial enterprises and governmental organisations. Expansion into the community college direction is still to come but should remain a qualitative goal.

Clearly the HCTs are addressing and embracing the modern technologies. Also of note is that their medium of instruction is English. These two elements are of crucial importance to all small countries if they are to develop in an international context. But is the curriculum elsewhere responding to the rapidly changing situation not just of the UAE but the modern world generally? Answers to this can be found in two indicators. Firstly, is the content of the curriculum changing from the traditional and becoming more secular and secondly is it developing more of an inquiring mind in those that it is designed for? This is two major areas of research, but, in the context of this thesis comment can only be made based on general observation of the situation, particularly in the Northern Emirates. Interestingly, for a non-national this may be the only route to glean this information as the writer has not been allowed to formally visit local state schools. This does invite speculation as to why this should be the case. However, in a part of the world such as this, this decision could easily have been made by a high ranking individual with little regard to the possible benefits of an exchange of ideas.

TABLE 5.9
Comparison of Weekly Scheme of Work, circa 1971, 1976/77,1988/89
Primary Stage

Primary Stage (Age)	1 (6/7)			2 (7/8)			3 (8/9)			4 (9/10)			5 (10/11)			6 (11/12)		
Year	70	77	89	70	77	89	70	77	89	70	77	89	70	77	89	70	77	89
Islamic Education	3	4	5	2	4	5	3	4	5	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
Arabic Language	10	12	12	11	12	12	10	12	12	10	12	10	8	8	8	8	8	8
English Language	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	6	8	6	6	8	6
Mathematics	5	6	5	6	6	5	6	6	5	5	6	5	5	6	5	5	6	5
Science	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	2.	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Social Studies	2	-	-	2	-	-	2	-	-	3	2	2	3	2	2	3	2	2
Art Education	2	3	2	2	3	2	2	4/3	2	2	4/3	2	2	3/2	2	2	3/2	2
Music	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0/2	2	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	2
Physical Education	3	3	2	3	3	2	3	3	2	3/2	2	2	3/2	2	2	3/2	2	2
Home Economics	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0/2	-	0/2	0/2	0/2	0/2	0/2	0/2	0/2	0/2	0/2
General Activities	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	2/1	-	-	1/0	-	-	1/0	-	-
Preparation	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Totals (male)	29	32	30	30	32	30	36	34	30	35	34	34	36	37	34	36	37	34
Totals (female)	29	32	30	30	32	30	36	35	30	35	35	36	36	38	36	36	38	36

Notes: Information pertaining to 1971 is for the system operating in the emirate of Abu Dhabi at the time and not for the UAE as a whole. 1976/77 and 1988/89 is for the schemes operating across all emirates of the UAE. General Activities: no information available to determine exactly what is involved in this subject. Preparation: No information available to qualify this subject. However, the writer concludes that it is actually teacher time built into the original table.

Sources:

1970: SADIK, M.T. & SNAVELY, W.P. (1972), Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, (Lexington, Lexington Books), p. 81 who acknowledge their source as the Government of Abu Dhabi, Education Department (unpublished material).

1976/77: UAE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND YOUTH (1977), Educational Abstract, 1976-1977.

1988/89: MINISTRY OF EDUCATION (1988), Development of Education 1986-1988, p. 11. Scheme of work to be carried out from the academic year 1988/89.

TABLE 5.10
Comparison of Weekly Scheme of Work, circa 1971, 1976/77,1988/89
Preparatory Stage

Preparatory Stage (Age)	1 (12/13)			2 (13/14)			3 (14/15)		
Year	70	77	89	70	77	89	70	77	89
Islamic Education	3	3	4	3	3	4	3	3	4
Arabic Language	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	8	7
English Language	6	8	6	6	8	6	6	8	6
Mathematics	5	5	5	5	5	5	6	6	5
Science	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
Social Studies:	3			3			4		
History	-	2	2	-	2	2	-	2	2
Geography	-	2	2	-	2	2	-	2	2
Philosphy, Community, Economics, Civics	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	1	1*
Art Education	0/2	2	2	0/2	2	2	0/2	2	1
Music	1	1	-	1	1	-	1	1	-
Physical Education	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	1	2
Home Economics	0/3	0/3	0/2	0/3	0/3	0/2	0/3	0/2	0/2
Technical/Agricultural/Commercial	5/0	-	-	5/0	-	-	5/0	-	-
Vocational	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	2/0	-
Totals (male)	36	39	34	36	39	36	38	40	34
Totals (female)	36	39	36	36	39	36	38	40	36

Notes:

Information pertaining to 1971 is for the system operating in the emirate of Abu Dhabi at the time and not for the UAE as a whole. 1976/77 and 1988/89 is for the schemes operating across all emirates of the UAE.

Science: 1970 - General Science; 1988/89 - Science & Hygeine.

Art Education: 1976/77 - Fine Arts.

Social Studies: 1970 - Social Studies; 1976/77 - History, Geography and National Education; 1988/89 - as identified above, * indicates Civics.

Sources:

1970: SADIK, M.T. & SNAVELY, W.P. (1972), *Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates,* (Lexington, Lexington Books), p. 81 who acknowledge their source as the Government of Abu Dhabi, Education Department (unpublished material).

1976/77: UAE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND YOUTH (1977), *Educational Abstract, 1976-1977.*

1988/89: MINISTRY OF EDUCATION (1988), *Development of Education 1986-1988,* p. 11. Scheme of work to be carried out from the academic year 1988/89.

TABLE 5.11
Comparison of Weekly Scheme of Work, circa 1971, 1976/77,1988/89
Secondary Stage

Secondary Stage (Age)	1 (15/16)			2 (16/17)						3 (17/18)					
				Literary			Science			Literary			Science		
Year	70	77	89	70	77	89	70	77	89	70	77	89	70	77	89
Islamic Education	2	2	3	2	2	3	2	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3
Arabic Language	7	7	6	8	8	9	6	6	6	8	8	9	6	6	6
English Language	8	8	6	8	8	8	7	7	7	8	8	9	7	7	6
French Language	-	-	-	5	5	-	-	-	-	6	6	-	-	-	-
Mathematics	5	5	5	2	2	1	8	8	6	-	-	-	8	8	7
General Science	-	-	-	2	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Physics	2	2	2	-	-	-	4	4	4	-	-	-	4	4	5
Chemistry	2	2	2	-	-	-	4	4	3	-	-	-	4	4	4
Biology	2	2	2	-	-	-	3	3	3	-	-	-	4	4	3
Geology	1	1	1	-	-	-	1	1	1	-	2	-	1	1	1
Surveying and Geology	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-
Social Studies	1	-	-	2	2	-	1*	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-
History	2	2	2	3	3	4	-	-	-	4	3	5	-	-	-
Geography	2	2	2	3	3	4	-	-	-	3	3	5	-	-	-
Phil./Com./ Econ./Civics	-	1***	1(c)	1**	1	2+2	-	-	-	3*	4*	4	-	-	-
Art Education	2	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Music	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Physical Education	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	1	1	2	1	1
Home Economics	0/2	0/2	0/2	0/2	0/2	02	0/2	0/2	0/2	0/2	0/2	-	0/2	0/2	-
Total (male)	38	38	34	38	37	34	38	37	34	38	37	36	38	37	36
Total (female)	40	40	36	40	39	36	40	39	36	40	39	36	40	39	36

Notes: Information pertaining to 1971 is for the system operating in the emirate of Abu Dhabi at the time and not for the UAE as a whole. 1976/77 and 1988/89 is for the schemes operating across all emirates of the UAE.
Social Studies: 1970 - * Humanities,
Philosophy/Community/Economics/Civics: 1970 - ** Political Economy, * Philosphy; 1976/77 - *** Arab Society, * Philosophy; 1988/89 - (c) Civics, 2+2 indicates 2 Community and 2 Economics.
Sources:
1970: SADIK, M.T. & SNAVELY, W.P. (1972), *Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates*, (Lexington, Lexington Books), p. 81 who acknowledge their source as the Government of Abu Dhabi, Education Department (unpublished material).
1976/77: UAE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND YOUTH (1977), *Educational Abstract, 1976-1977*.
1988/89: MINISTRY OF EDUCATION (1988), *Development of Education 1986-1988*, p. 11. Scheme of work to be carried out from the academic year 1988/89.

In terms of the shape of the curriculum and the weekly lesson plans it can be noted from Tables 5.9, 5.10 and 5.11 that there is a strong comparability in curriculum time devoted to certain subject areas between the early 1970s and the present day. Furthermore, that there is also a strong comparability between the time allocation and that of the other Gulf City States of Bahrain and Qatar [16]. The actual time of each module has not been specified although that would not fundamentally affect the proportional breakdown.

Primary education

Generally the primary stage has seen little change in the subject breakdown of the curriculum. The introduction of English at Grade 4 rather than in Grade 5 is the only major change and this no doubt reflects its importance as the de facto language of business, commerce and tourism in the UAE. Science is present as a subject although afforded much less time than mathematics which reflects the Islamic traditions. Outside of the academic it is important to note that both the boys and the girls at this stage are receiving some education in art, music and physical education. As would be expected the introduction of home economics around Grade 4 is for the girls only.

Preparatory education

In the preparatory stage a slightly greater emphasis by one module has been placed on Islamic education which appears to be at the expense of English. However, six modules of English per week at all three grades does show a strong commitment to the subject and almost places it on a par with Arabic. There is slightly increased coverage of science at this stage although its four modules have remained constant since 1970. A general social studies approach has given way to more specific history, geography and civics delivery and would be in keeping with the localising of the curriculum and increased attention given post independence to developing a more nationalist identity.

Art education continues at this stage although it must be stated that this is more

of a craft education than art education in a Western sense. Interestingly, music has been dropped in recent years from this stage of the curriculum. Home economics continues to be offered to the girls.

Secondary education

Again, in a general sense, this section of education has seen little fundamental change to the timetable over the last twenty years. At this stage Islamic education loses some of its significance although, as with the other stages of education, recent years have seen an addition of one module per week. This appears in keeping with the more recent rhetoric of the president, Sheikh Zayed, in which he expresses general concerns about the local losing his or her Islamic values when overwhelmed by a cosmopolitan expatriate population and surrounded by the trappings of consumerism [17]. It may also have some reference to the wave of Islamic fundamentalism that is sweeping the area which would be of concern to the Federation. To educate and reestablish Islamic values in the up and coming generation may help to keep fundamentalism at bay.

The short introduction of French has been discontinued and English continues to operate on a parity with Arabic in both the literary and the scientific sections. Science is taught through the discrete areas of physics, chemistry, biology and geology in Grade 10 only and continues in just the scientific section for the last two years. In the final year greater emphasis has been placed on physics at the expense of one of the biology modules. This most probably reflects the need of the country to produce more practically minded engineers than biologists. The introduction of geology for all in Grade 10 and its continuance in the scientific section speaks for itself in an oil producing country. Likewise its appearance in the final grade of the literary section in the early years also indicates the need of the time. Future managers and administrators did need some grounding as many of the employment opportunities would have been oil related. The social studies, as with the science, have given way to being delivered through discrete

areas with some enhancement of history and geography teaching. Art education has been dropped at this stage, as too, has music. Home economics continues in the female domain but has now been dropped in the final year. The fact that until recently it figured in both the literary and the scientific sections is a clear indication of the important role that the female has been assigned in the home and in raising the family. This is a traditional situation that is unlikely to change in the near future although, interestingly, educating the female has brought about certain changes in this traditional role which will be discussed in the next chapter. A small reduction in physical education can be noted for the final two years. This is surprising bearing in mind the political rhetoric in the media and recent concerns regarding the health of the upcoming generation. Perhaps the government feels that this is offset by the impressive sporting facilities that have been established for the national over recent years.

Content and delivery of the curriculum

Since the inauguration of the UAE it appears that there has been little change in the structure of the curriculum as viewed via the weekly lesson plans. However, a qualitative indicator in educational provision can be found in the content and actual teaching methods used in the delivery of the curriculum. As mentioned above, for a non-national researcher such as the writer it is not possible to actually visit the state schools and witness the teaching methods employed. The following comments are, therefore, based on descriptive information produced in English by the Ministries of Education and Information, the writer's experience of living in the area complemented by informal contacts with individuals who have, in some way, been involved with the public schools.

It is clear that there is a certain discrepancy between the Ministry of Education's rhetoric of what it is trying to achieve and the reality of the situation. It is the writer's contention that this would not be unusual in a developing country and in a developing education system as there would be a natural time lag between an idea and its implementation as established working practice in the classroom.

This situation in a small country is not so marked as there is a much shorter route for the dissemination of ideas and new practice. However, in the UAE with the extremely high proportion of expatriate teachers and the consequent turnover rate due to their transient nature the small country advantage must , to some extent, be a diminished factor.

In the UAE with its vast numbers of expatriate teachers it cannot be assumed that the teachers come with the same expertise or experience. Although they would normally be Arab and of Islamic background they would come from a variety of training programmes and from a variety of countries over which the UAE would have little control other than the general suitability or unacceptability of certain courses or institutions. One only has to look into the private teaching sector to note the wide range of teachers and often the lack of suitability of their qualifications. From this it is important therefore to note that although the general standard of qualification of the teachers in the state sector has improved in recent years it cannot be automatically assumed that there is a consequent improvement in the standard of teaching and quality of the curriculum generally.

An important factor in this is that traditional Islamic cultures do not have a strong distinction between state and religion and that this is reflected in their education systems and its provision. The educational provision and curriculum offered is not secular and reflects the values and ideas of Islam. Segregation is an obvious manifestation of this. This situation can, therefore, have an inhibiting factor on curriculum development and teaching methods and has attracted academic discussion by educators in the Islamic world as they strive to address the needs of the modern secular technological world in their own developing contexts [18]. In the sense of this chapter there are two main inhibitors that can be discussed. Firstly, in the traditional sense the teacher was held in very high esteem often on a par with the father and religious leader. In this, what he said was to be accepted without question which is in keeping with the original ideas of Islam and an individual's submission to it. Consequently learning was by rote, a style in

variance to the role of the modern classroom with its resource based teaching methods designed to encourage a questioning and challenging approach to learning. Secondly, there is the traditional conflict between Islamic thinking and modern science and, on a lesser scale, conflict in areas such as economics where the idea of the international money markets are an anathema. Clearly, there has to be some form of secularising of the curriculum if a country is to modernise and prepare its people for a very different technological world to that which Islam was initially introduced. The way in which the Islamic world addresses this challenge remains to be seen although a severe swing back into fundamentalism must draw a parallel to the ostrich sticking its head in the sand: the problem will not go away.

In the UAE, a small country with limited resources and skills, the problem is being addressed quite squarely and a certain amount of secularisation has taken place. The legal system is an example of this where, at the present time, *sharia* law and thinking is complemented by a secular law such as in the business world. In education the introduction of modern resources and teaching methods are without doubt being taken advantage of.

The Ministry of Education reports to the International Conference on Education (ICE) and addresses recommendations made by it. It would, therefore, be fair to state that since the early 1980s certain qualitative recommendations by the ICE have been given consideration and certain measures have been taken with regard to their implementation. In acceptance of these recommendations and the setting up of action plans there is a tacit recognition of the previous inadequacy of certain elements of the system, curricula and teaching strategies. But, perhaps more importantly, is a recognition of the fact that the system needs to evolve and adapt to changing circumstances as both it and the country matures; a pragmatism on the part of the UAE which will help it to synchronise and synthesise its educational goals with those of its national ones.

Important recommendations that the Ministry of Education has started to address as they were adopted by the ICE are:

Recommendation No 73 adopted by the 38th session of ICE in 1981:
The interaction between education and productive work.

Recommendation No 74 adopted by the 39th session of ICE in 1984:
The universalisation and renewal of primary education in the perspective of an appropriate introduction to science and technology.

Recommendation No 75 adopted by the 40th session of ICE in 1986:
The improvement of secondary education: objectives, structures, content and methods.

Recommendation No 76 adopted by the 41st session of ICE in 1989:
The diversification of post-secondary education in relation to employment.

These recommendations have led to a variety of responses in recent years and it is interesting to note that among them is the introduction of a new national curriculum for primary education circa 1988 which included the renewal of text books and in-service for teachers [19]. This also included some consideration of scientific and technological primary education. In the same period the Ministry of Education also started to address Recommendation No. 75 by reorganising and stating its objectives for secondary education [20] with the following aims for the curriculum:

Objectives:

a - Stressing Islamic behaviour.
b - Realising belongingness (sic) of citizens to their country also protecting it and all Arab and Islamic nations.
c - Emphasising the scientific approach and inference to solve problems.
d - Developing ability to practice social activities and services.
e - Developing respect and esteem for manual, mental and social work.
f - Developing ability to predict future changes and laying plans to meet them.
g - Awareness of the values of time whether in work or leisure.

Methods:
Secondary education depends on the following factors:

a - Relationship with previous education.
b - Expansion and extension to a later stage of further education.
c - Adjustment to the State Development plans and tries to provide able staff to carry these out.
d - Dependence on new data to cope with curricula whose applicability it supports to link this with real life and offers the graduates the chance to participate in building their country.

Curricula:

a - Suited to learners' mentality and ability.
b - Modern, true and experienced.
c - Aims at development to raise the society's standard.
d - Subject to evaluation and measurement.
e - Graded according to learners' standards.
f - Open to scientific revolution and world changes. [21]

In its Report to the International Conference of Education, Forty Third Session, in September 1992 the UAE Ministry of Education reports that after a coordinated effort between the Ministry of Education and the UAE University:

A complete revision of the elements of the curricula included objectives, content, strategies, attitudes and methods of teaching. All this is based on Islam, the nature of society, students' characteristics and growth and contemporary educational trends.

Curriculums were prepared and text books were produced covering all stages including computer science, civics, English language, social studies, standardized (sic) curricula for Arab Gulf countries in science, mathematics, Arabic language, curriculums for non-Arab speakers in private schools, Islamic studies and local and national social studies. Development did not stop at that: it went further to the inspection process.

[22]

The Report goes on to state the following as the "most important achievements in the recent period":

1. Reshaping general educational technical objectives in order to encourage the use of advanced skills.

2. Modernizing (sic) the content of the curricula and making it more suitable and more responding to individuals' needs.

3. Modernizing (sic) text books to make them more in line with objectives and more effective.

4. Developing educational aids and modern educational technologies. Also providing schools with up-to-date devices and training teachers to make, produce and develop their own educational aids and also develop school libraries.

5. Developing means of measurement and evaluation and making them more functional to evaluate the real efficiency of students.

6. Developing other educational activities to enrich the educational process and to develop the personality of the students.

7. Linking the curricula of educational stages so as to complement each other.

   At the moment curriculums include educational topics dealing with misbehaviour and bad demeanour and how to avert and avoid them as well as develop the awareness of the student. [23]

It is worth including the above 'official comments' as this can inform the general discussion regarding qualitative development in the curriculum as well as lead to important digressions at this point.

From the Ministry references and the developments in the educational provision of the UAE, such as the HCTs, qualitative improvements have taken place. It is also clear, that in support of the writer's earlier argument, that this has gained its real impetus in the last decade. What is also interesting is that the Ministry of Education is not particularly rushing into any changes and that the UAE University is now playing an important leadership role in this development, not just in expertise and research but also in teacher provision and training which will be discussed later. It would be fair to comment that some of the qualitative development is as a result of the university's own development as it was not in a position to lead in the same way when it opened in the late 1970s.

In support of the above comment about the Ministry of Education not rushing into change it is worth noting that in the 1988 Report reference is made to the fact that "before introducing any innovations or reforms, the Ministry tries to make an intensive study plus experimentation and scientific research. This ensures that any innovation will serve the educational system and make it more adjusted to the country's needs and development plans."[24] This is further supported by the introduction of the Education Law in the period 1986 to 1988 which sets three important principles: the setting of general rules and precepts which do not change if authorised officials change; a need to ensure stability of educational guidelines and that a planning stage should precede the execution stage [25]. These are very important points particularly when bearing in mind the very personalised nature of the area's politics, senior appointments and decision-making mechanisms. To a certain extent it safeguards the education system in law by necessitating that all future innovations and changes are appropriate. This is an important development especially when looking at the UAE constitution which after over two decades is still a temporary one.

It can be noted that the recent qualitative developments in the curricula have taken a minimum of four years to effect. However, the 1992 report does not state whether they are still to be implemented although the inference is that they have been, as too, has the necessary in-service training of the teachers.

It is also interesting to note the reference made to "misbehaviour and bad demeanour" in the Report as this leads to another aspect of the system which rarely receives public comment but does ultimately affect the quality of what is offered: attitudes of the pupils towards their teachers. In the early years of the Federation little if any comment would have been made about poor attitudes and behaviour and indeed if some public comment was made it would be refocussed towards the expatriates who were the root of all evil with their alien ideals. It is only in the last couple of years that the writer has noted reported

critical comment about the national youth and their increasingly unacceptable behaviour and attitudes. On the whole this has been directed towards the males and has been supported by comments from, for example, the president Sheikh Zayed himself in a regular reminder of traditional and Islamic values and the need to uphold them in the modern, cosmopolitan and materialistic UAE. However, in the new wave of calculated and 'sensitive' media openness the English media press are starting to make comment. Clearly there is a behavioural problem in some of the boys' schools which can also be seen in some of the boys' sections of private schools that cater to the local.

It appears that a great deal of this problem is the result of two factors: firstly, prejudiced and arrogant attitudes on the part of some of the youth towards their expatriate teachers; secondly, the personalised nature of the ex-tribal and privileged society in which they have been born where, unlike their fathers, they have not experienced hardship. This manifests itself often as a disincentive to work. Why work in school when there is little need for qualifications as jobs in the family firm or one of the government departments is guaranteed? Moreover, once in these positions specific skills are not necessary as the expatriates often take on the workload. Perhaps a more invidious aspect is that of the arrogance in the knowledge that the expatriate teacher cannot really punish the local pupil. There is a prevalent notion that any problem can be overcome by knowing the 'right' person. An obvious example of this can be found in basic driving offences such as speeding, incorrect parking and so forth. Here, as a local with the right contacts, the offender will often find a great deal of leeway, and offences can be forgotten at the shake of a hand.

This personalised nature of society is not just restricted to the rich Gulf states but is a characteristic of small countries generally. However, when one adds the wealth factor and the consequent disincentive to work it is easy to see how positive attitudes can deteriorate.

In two informal conversations it became clear that the behaviour deterioration coupled with drug taking and smoking in some schools has caused concern to the point of possibly rethinking the actual design of multi court-yarded school buildings. In the second, poor behaviour towards the expatriate teachers inhibited the introduction of interactive science teaching in some schools to the point that the teachers reverted back to the 'safer' styles. Apparently, although the teachers were enthusiastic and receptive to the new teaching methods, the pupils were unreceptive with the result that they became disruptive [26].

The teaching resource

The aforementioned highlights the potential problems that an expatriate teacher may experience which can result in discipline problems. The mere fact that this is now being addressed by the Ministry of Education in their national curriculum is tacit agreement that it exists as a potential problem and in itself does indicate an improving situation in the preparation and support of the teacher. However, another qualitative indicator can be found in the improving standards of the teaching force generally and the support that they receive. In the situation of the UAE three main qualitative improvements can be seen. Ministry of Education data shows the teaching force is increasingly well qualified. There is an increasing number of nationals being trained and joining the teaching force albeit, in the main, the female national. The teacher training has improved substantially over and above the passing of a school certificate as was the case in the early years of the Federation and that there is now a commitment on the part of the Ministry of Education to ongoing training of the expatriate teachers in an effort for consistency of approach and a general raising of standards [27]. A further important factor in the overall raising of standards in the teaching force and their delivery of the new national curriculum is the recent introduction of senior teachers and coordinators to support the teachers at the various stages of schooling. This has also complemented the Ministry of Education's desire to reduce its bureaucracy and improve its support services to schools and consequently teachers [28]. The actual situation and improving standards in the training of national

teachers in particular will be discussed in greater depth in the chapter on manpower.

Accommodation:

The UAE's tremendous wealth in the early stages of setting up the educational provision allowed it to embark upon an ambitious school building programme. From the very early days the students living in the urban areas have had purpose built school buildings to be a focus for their formal education. These also doubled up as the adult training centres when they were initially established. In small countries generally the focus of the formal education provision would, due to the more acceptable unit costs, tend to be in urban centres. This naturally makes political sense as it allows the education umbrella to cover more at lower unit costs. In this the UAE was no exception in its early provision and as the majority of its population was and is focused on the main cities it made good sense to concentrate there. However, a qualitative indicator can be seen in the expansion of educational opportunity for both the male and the female in the rural and more isolated areas. It is these areas which traditionally suffer due to higher unit costs and lack of interest from the trained human resource which would have to resituate in these areas.

In a small country situation where the land mass is also small this does not represent such a problem as a certain amount of commuting to school is possible. In the case of a small country with sparse population scattered over a large surface area such as the Maldives archipelago or a large land mass such as Botswana this can and does present a very real problem. The geographical characteristics of the UAE places it in the latter category with focussed population centres and a sparsely scattered rural or nomadic population across either large desert land masses or inaccessible and remote areas such as the mountains. The emirate of Abu Dhabi would suffer this characteristic most acutely with its huge land mass of 67,340 square kilometres commanding some 87 per cent of the total UAE territory. However, the wealth factor did undoubtably help in this

situation as Abu Dhabi also commanded the lion's share of the oil revenues. This allowed the emirate, once it embarked on its path of providing educational provision, to quickly introduce infrastructures and roads to these remote areas and to start the school building programmes. Where it was not initially feasible to develop a school for the older children then it introduced boarding facilities in Abu Dhabi. Understandably due to the social mores of the time this was for the boys and the rural female continued to suffer a typical development inequality. In the cities and the smaller emirates this was not a major concern because as the general development continued the attractions of the urban centres exerted quite naturally a strong pull on many remote rural areas and continued to grow as a result. This in itself must have helped the expansion programme a little by reducing certain demand in the areas which would have been expensive to develop.

In terms of the teaching resource there would have been little problem in supplying teachers to these remote areas as expatriate teachers would have been recruited specifically to fill the positions. In reality any opposition to a remote placement would more likely have received a 'take it or leave it' response from the authorities. Accordingly, teachers would have accepted the situation as the relative rewards in terms of remitted funds to their home countries would have been substantial.

The UAE, therefore, suffered the same constraints as any small country in its introduction and initial expansion of its educational provision. However, the wealth factor would have offset the constraints placed on the expensive expansion of the provision in rural and remote areas. Moreover, it would not have suffered from the problems associated with staffing these remote areas as would, for example, a small country which is having to train and rely on its own nationals to fill the position. Certainly, the urban centres would have had an attraction but in terms of teaching expertise when the expertise is being bought in the problems of outflow of national expertise is relatively unimportant, clearly

an advantage of the wealth factor in the small country context.

The wealth factor would also have allowed the expansion to continue relatively unfettered with the recurrent costs also not becoming a constraint at the time. However, it is important to point out that the expansion parallelled the increase in oil prices and increase in oil production from the UAE. This allowed the Emirates to set into place an impressive programme of educational accommodation in the two decades post independence as Table 5.1 shows. Since that time, the oil prices have tumbled and the actual revenues of the Emirates have dropped quite substantially. There is still a great deal of wealth in the country and it is unlikely that the recurrent costs of maintaining the provision is likely to present too much of a problem. However, it is fair to speculate that future capital programmes will come under a more careful consideration. This would, perhaps represent the first major constraint on the expansion of the system although this should not present too great a concern as much of the necessary building programme is already in place. Future expansion in the national population will create the demand although the writer suggests that this should not be a problem as the modernising forces of education are changing the nature and the size of the family. This will be touched upon in the next chapter. A second important point is that although the population of the UAE is rapidly expanding the national is still in the minority, being some twenty per cent of the total. Any expansion in the school age population in the expatriate population will be catered for by the market forces of the private education industry. Therefore, apart from the government's monitoring expenses little demand will be made on the funds of the federal education budget.

Simple enrolment analysis:

Review of the enrolment can also throw up qualitative indicators and the initial starting point would be in the area of achieving full enrolment across both genders. But as statistics can be manipulated to support many arguments it is also important to look at the drop-out and repeater figures. Questions should

also be raised regarding special provision since a developing system recognising and catering to special learning needs is showing signs of qualitative improvement.

Education in the UAE is free to all of its citizens at all stages and, in keeping with the ideals of equal opportunities for all, it has made special efforts to keep a balance "of educational services between near and remote areas" [29]. Moreover, schools have been standardised in a bid to this end. Therefore, as the UAE is a wealthy country and rural opportunity for education does exist there is now little to constrain full take up of education by urban and rural males or females in the early stages. This can be seen in the impressive expansion in enrolment from zero in 1952 to 261,692 by 1992 and recently effectively achieving the goal of Universal Primary Education. Throughout this period and due to the social mores of the area the male enrolment led the female and it is only in the 1989/90 academic year that a statistical parity was reached with 121,361 males and 121,177 females enrolled in the kindergarten to secondary stages of the system. However, it is important to point out that this parity of numbers could well have occurred earlier for the national because there is a high proportion of Arab expatriate children enrolled in the system. In the same academic year (1989/90) the national accounted for 68.3 per cent of the total enrolment. The local male made up 63.7 per cent of all male enrolment the local female 66.8 per cent of female enrolment [30]. A closer examination of Table 5.1 shows that throughout the 1980s there was an almost equal number of schools, classrooms and females enrolled in the system.

The figures presented in this table have been deduced from various sources and in these sources there is no indication of drop-out after enrolment. This is something that must be considered because in the early stages of development, as indicated in the preceding chapter, the incidence of drop-out would have increased in the case of the female as she approached puberty and/or was betrothed. This would have affected rural and urban communities

TABLE 5.12

**Examination Failure or Pass (Promotion to the Next Level).
Shown as Total Failure Figures for all Levels of
Compulsory State Education in the United Arab Emirates,
1986/87 - 1990/91**

Year	Male	Female	Total	Failure as % of Enrol.
1986/87	12,330	8,043	20,373	11.4
1987/88	12,146	8,476	. 20,622	10.7
1988/89	12,770	9,244	22,014	10.6
1989/90	13,606	9,519	23,125	10.3
1990/91	14,193	8,682	22,875	9.6

Source: UNITED ARAB EMIRATES MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, *Summary of Educational Statistics 1987-1988; 1988-1989; 1989-1990; 1990-1991 and 1991-1992;* prepared by the Information and Documentation Section.

TABLE 5.13

**Examination Failure or Pass (Promotion to the Next Level).
Shown as a Percentage of Total Male or Female Enrolment,
Compulsory State Education in the United Arab Emirates,
1986/87 - 1990/91**

Year	Male %	Female %
1986/87	13.6	9.1
1987/88	12.5	8.8
1988/89	12.2	8.9
1989/90	12.1	8.5
1990/91	12.0	7.3

Source: UNITED ARAB EMIRATES MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, *Summary of Educational Statistics 1987-1988; 1988-1989; 1989-1990; 1990-1991 and 1991-1992;* prepared by the Information and Documentation Section.

alike due to the strong social mores of the time. It would also have affected the primary stages as this was the first educational opportunity and many overage pupils, by present stage/age criteria, would have been enrolled. The employment of social workers to combat this female drop-out was taken particularly seriously in Abu Dhabi [31] and the natural process of the modernising forces of education would have since contributed to easing the problem.

A further inducement to encourage general enrolment particularly in the poorer and remote communities came in the form of financial allowances, daily meals, uniforms, health care amongst other things [32.] It must not be forgotten that the people of the Trucial States and the UAE, in its early years, were very poor and often lived at the most basic of levels; these incentives would have made a valuable contribution to the family budget. At the time there would also have been some male drop-out due to seasonal work and family requirements.

The nature of pass and fail in the UAE education system is quite different to that of the British one in that in the British system there is no real concept of pass or fail within a year and automatic promotion to the next year is the norm. In the Gulf system and the UAE a finite concept of fail does exist and promotion to the next stage only takes place on successful completion of the present stage. This in itself would contribute greatly to student drop-out particularly in the case of males where to 'save face' is an important local characteristic. In the early stages of development of the system special needs education would not have existed to cater for those with learning difficulties and drop-out would also have been a natural response to constant failure. In recent years consideration has been given to special needs within the system and special units have been introduced [33]. It would, therefore, be reasonable to assume that this qualitative improvement would have resulted in a diminishing failure rate. Table 5.12 clearly shows this with the overall failure rate for both sexes dropping from 11.4 in 1986/87 to 9.6 in 1991/92. In the Table's breakdown it is also interesting to note the lower incidence for female failure generally which some may contend was sufficient

argument for single sexed schools. However, the high incidence of male failure traditionally started at the preparatory stage and continues to date. The boys at this stage would be starting adolescence and often moving within the family from the mother's to the father's control and social circle. Combine this fact with the important local characteristic of saving face and it can be seen how the two things could compound the situation for those either with learning difficulties or at a stage of disinterest. Reassuringly in terms of qualitative improvement the percentile has steadily reduced as the provision itself started to address qualitative and not just quantitative issues.

One important piece of information regarding this data that is not available to the writer is the breakdown per year and so it is not possible to determine just how many of the failure figures include repeaters who have already failed. Another interesting set of figures are those for the vocational orientated schools where failure appears extremely high. It is agreed that these schools do cater to the less academic individual and one would have expected quite tailored courses matching the more limited abilities. However, the writer contends that the failure figures are more likely drop-out figures where students opt out due to either family business opportunities and/or the low social status afforded this type of school and vocational education generally in this part of the world.

In terms of the questions being addressed in this chapter it is important in a qualitative sense to note that these figures have generally shown improvement rather than deterioration.

Quantitative vis-à-vis qualitative: concluding comments

As stated at the beginning of this chapter there have been distinct periods of development in the Trucial States' and the UAE's efforts to provide educational provision for its citizens which clearly follow the developmental patterns of the time. The 1950s, 60s and 70s witnessed unprecedented quantitative expansion with its goal of Universal Primary Education and generally education

for all. However, unlike many developing countries, educational expansion was not the result of industrialisation but was possible by increasing oil revenues which also made UPE possible.

Since that period a noticeable characteristic of the last decade is that of qualitative improvement. However, it is still early days and the UAE has a long way to go in the process of balancing national needs with those of the individual. If, as a small country, it is determined to pursue the necessary capital intensive manpower route it needs to prepare its citizens to take full advantage of the new technology. It must, therefore, be prepared to continue secularising its school curriculum.

Quantitative improvements will eventually lead to qualitative ones and the dilemma that most Islamic countries will have to address in their process of modernisation. This is, that the secularising of education and the consequent secularising of society is at odds with Islamic interpretation within the Arab world where state and religion are one and the same. In the larger country this secularising process will be a protracted one. In the small country, such as the UAE, which desperately needs to address: economic diversification; the overwhelming expatriate presence; the existence and need for open markets and; the existence of consumerism, if it is to survive post oil, the problem is immediate and could be politically destabilising. The rulers of the UAE have, nevertheless, taken the 'bit between their teeth' and, to give them credit, are allowing and encouraging the secularising qualitative improvements in their educational provision. Perhaps, they are relying on wealth creation and the 'old' Human Capital Theory to prevail and soften any destabilising influences on their society.

NOTES AND REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER FIVE

1. The fact that in many cases this aid may have had strings attached is outside the brief of this chapter and will not, therefore, be discussed.

2. COOMBS, Philip H. (1985),
   The World Crisis in Education,
   (Oxford, Oxford University Press), p. 67.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., pp. 69, 70.

5. For more information on this conference see ibid.

6. W ATSON, Keith (1988),
   "Forty Years of Education and Development: from optimism to uncertainty",
   in:
   Education Review, Vol. 40, No. 2, p. 148.
   Well worth reading for general background information and for the questions he raises regarding education and development.

7. At the present time the percentage is in the region of 20 per cent.

8. For more information re segregation and education in Saudi Arabia see:
   AL RAWAF, Haya Saad and SIMMONS, Cyril (1991),
   "The Education of Women in Saudi Arabia", in:
   Comparative Education, Vol. 27, No. 3 1991.

   Regarding CTV see ibid., p. 292.

9. Except for the Sharia College and the Girls College, Kuwait University has been coeducational since it was established in 1966.

10. KUWAIT (AGENCIES) (1994),
    "Kuwait University against segregation" in :
    Gulf News, 6 December, 1994.

11. Ibid.

12. When faced with the choice of building a school for boys or a school for girls Pakistan does tend to build them for boys. See:
    SMOCK, Audrey (1980),
    Women's Education in Developing Countries: opportunities and outcomes,
    (New York, Preagar).

13. The Ministry of Education now produces less comprehensive data in English which comes in form of an annual summary of educational statistics leaflet and a regular basic report to the International Conference on Education. However, in terms of qualifications the teachers and administrators are now grouped together.

14. This was some 410 inspectors overseeing 17,522 teachers. These figures also exclude administrators. Reference: Ministry of Education: Summary of educational statistics 1991-1992, leaflet also:

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION (1992),
National Report of United Arab Emirates on the Development of Education from 1989/1990 - 1991/1992 to the International Conference on Education Forty Third Session, Geneva, September 1992,
(Abu Dhabi, Department of Information and Research).

15. See Table 5.1.

15a.DORE, Ronald (1976),
The Diploma Disease: education, qualification and development,
(London, George Allen and Unwin).

16. See: BIGGS, Michael Ivor (1989), op. cit. for comparisons.

17. Comment is regularly being recorded in the local media reminding the citizens not to lose their Islamic principles and to be drawn without question into the trappings of consumerism with its consequence on family values etc.

18. See: HUSAIN, Syed Sajjad and ASHRAF, Syed Ali (1979),
Crisis in Muslim Education,
(Jeddah, King Abdulaziz University, Hodder and Stoughton);

ASHRAF, Syed Ali (1985),
New Horizons in Muslim Education,
(Cambridge, The Islamic Academy, Hodder and Stoughton);

HURST, Paul (1985),
"Critical Education and Islamic Culture" in:
BROCK, Colin and TULASIEWICZ, Witold (Eds),
Cultural Identity and Educational Policy,
(London, Croom Helm).

19. MINISTRY OF EDUCATION (1988),
Development of Education 1986-1988 National Report of United Arab Emirates,
(Abu Dhabi, Department of Information and Research), p. 21.

20. Ibid., p. 22.

21. Ibid.

22. MINISTRY OF EDUCATION (1992), op. cit., p. 21.

23. Ibid., p. 22.

24. MINISTRY OF EDUCATION (1988), op. cit., p. 17.

25. Ibid., p. 18.

26. These comments refer to two separate informal interviews in September 1993 with people involved in these areas.

27. See: MINISTRY OF EDUCATION (1988) and (1992), op. cit.; also:
MINISTRY OF EDUCATION (1990),

The Development of Education 1987-1990 National Report of United Arab Emirates,
(Abu Dhabi, Department of Information and Research).

28. Ibid.

29. MINISTRY OF EDUCATION (1990), op. cit., p. 3.

30. Ministry of Education: Summary of educational statistics 1989-90, leaflet.

31. See previous chapter.

32. See previous chapter.

33. See: MINISTRY OF EDUCATION (1988), (1990) and (1992), op. cit.

PART TWO

CHAPTER SIX

ATTITUDINAL INFLUENCES AND INERTIAS

It is a characteristic of all human societies, no matter how basic their culture or their technology, that they not only adapt to the world in which they live but that they also modify and change it; even create a new world using materials from the natural one or brought in from elsewhere. No where is this more evident than in the recent history of the Arabian Gulf which has seen the emergence of new modern oil states that have grown from the most humble of origins out of the desert sands. In less than two generations these states have transformed settlements into modern garden cities of high-rise airconditioned buildings and have, to some extent, tamed the inhospitable and arid climate and greened the desert.

Only thirty years ago the indigenous people of the United Arab Emirates eked out a meagre existence with the most basic of technologies in a constant struggle with their unremitting natural environment of desert, mountain and sea under quite oppressive climatic conditions. A source of water would determine settlement and limited agricultural activity. Because of the scarcity of water and arable land compounded by the limited nature of natural resources and materials a nomadic bedouin lifestyle prevailed with movement and settlement often dictated by the searing heat of the summer or the more temperate winter season.

Some more permanent settlements centred around the oases and along the coast did start to develop and offer an alternative pattern of lifestyle. These small communities survived on agriculture, fishing, pearl-diving and some consequent trade. But even the pearl industry was taken from them in the 1930s by the advent of Japan's cultured pearl and its almost instantaneous dominance of the world pearl trade. The area's early mono-economy was vulnerable and

consequently devastated leaving little alternative for the people of the area but to continue, as they always had, by living their lives in relative poverty in a subsistence economy: a hand to mouth existence.

Limited economic opportunity and scarcity of resources allowed for little economic activity and, out of necessity, the tribal people were versatile.[1] Accordingly they involved themselves in a diverse range of activity from camel, goat, sheep and cattle breeding; a little agricultural activity which was mostly dependent on artificial irrigation; fishing; trade by camel or ship and a limited range of crafts which were governed by the available resources. Trade was understandably limited and few could engage in it profitably. [2]

The discovery of oil in the more northern reaches of the Arabian Gulf did little to ease the situation other than to offer the opportunity of involvement for some in migratory work as labourers. For others, of trading background, the opportunity to reap the benefits of their neighbour's increased spending power through trade opened up. But even this was not until relatively recent times with the first development taking place in neighbouring Bahrain after its oil discovery in 1932 and Qatar's after the Second World War.

There was little of interest in the region to the outside world and through Britain's active control of those entering the area whilst under its 'protection' the Trucial States and its people remained isolated from the outside world. The population remained small at around 100,000 and the tribal heritage and systems remained intact. This status quo was to continue until the insatiable oil needs of the industrialised world and the huge profits to be made from the commodity directed attentions to the Lower Gulf and the Trucial States. Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah, to a certain extent, were to be beneficiaries when oil was discovered in their territories.

The exploitation of this oil was, in less than one generation, to change the face of

all of the seven emirates in an irreversible manner. At the centre of these changes were personalities of vision who were driven by ideals of modernisation based on social caring. A motivation to improve the conditions for all of the indigenous people of the area existed.

Initially, the process stemmed from profit driven motives of the entrepreneurial individual or company both local and foreign. The area was wide open for profiteering and massive profits were taken. However as the local people and their rulers matured and gained in experience and confidence in this new world a more sensitive philosophy prevailed and planning started to become an increasingly important element in the process of modernisation.

From 1971, just twenty-three years ago, the seven emirates brought together under the federation of the United Arab Emirates started, for the first time, to assume a common direction. This was to include some sharing of the oil revenue benefits particularly those of Abu Dhabi. Common infrastructures were developed and the foundations of a common system of social welfare and benefit were laid and built upon. Education for all became an important federal goal and it was assigned, not just the role of nurturing a literate and modernised society from a predominantly illiterate and basic one; but also the important role of nurturing a more cohesive forward looking people - young and old, male and female - so that they could contribute to the success of the federal experiment and consequently their own future: in short, to nurture nationalism.

As mentioned earlier it is a characteristic of humankind to adapt and change both in itself and in its environment. To improve an individual's standard of living must make change all the more acceptable but to do it almost overnight against a backdrop of traditional social mores and their natural resistance to immediate and comprehensive change creates an interesting situation in the society. Due to the pace of this change in the UAE it would be fair to state that the majority of the people were drawn into the wave and consumed by it not questioning or trying

to slow it down. After all, their standard of living was constantly improving as too was their spending power and the first opportunity to pamper themselves. It would be very difficult to forego the comforts of the rapidly approaching consumer society once they had been experienced.

The idea of a centralist force and policy of the newly formed federation was generally in contradiction to the normal modes of the parochial administration that existed in the area's sheikhdoms. However, its success, where other federations elsewhere had failed, lay in the fact that the perceived intrusions of the Federation were seen to be limited but of positive benefit. Moreover, the writer contends that, as these intrusions increased they were offset by the modernising forces of the process of education for all. In the early years this increased personal expectation by opening up new previously unseen achievable opportunities; and, interestingly, kept the power-base of each emirate reasonably stable and in place without challenge. Even though the local was to become a minority in his own country, certain safeguards were offered to the indigenous Arab so that the alien worker and his family were always to be considered as transitory with few rights, no matter how long they were in the area. This safeguarded the local, his nationality and also elevated him to even higher standards of status as the Emirates grew wealthier and more developed.

This chapter addresses this very situation and identifies certain influences that, although not appearing obvious to the visitor are, nevertheless, strong attitudinal pressures and inertias that were present in the UAE society at the point of independence and are still present in some form today. These are attitudes and influences that are a direct legacy of the traditional past experience of the indigenous people of the area and of the oil producing Gulf states generally. These influences are concerned, firstly, with the tribal heritage of the region; secondly, the Islamic identity that the indigenous population has submitted to and; finally, the combined influence on gender, particularly the female. To understand the people and the educational style and provision of the area it is

important to have knowledge of these three influences as they make-up the fundamental character of the indigenous minority group and the absolute controlling force in all of the seven emirates.

An insular tribal heritage

To understand some of the accepting attitudes of the Gulf Arabs to the oligarchic system and its control on the decision-making that prevails in the United Arab Emirates and the other Gulf states it is important to understand the basis of their tribal background. As mentioned earlier, the United Arab Emirates of less than forty years ago was a very different world. In fact, although Dubai was starting to develop in a basic way in gold trade and as an entrepot, the lives of the people had changed little through the centuries. Moreover, they were generally unaware of what was happening outside their own area let alone outside the region. Most were involved in a day to day existence accepting their position and role within the community. The dearth of economic opportunity meant that little could change. This situation was further compounded by the century long presence of the British who had little effect other than to enforce the Trucial States' isolation from the outside world by controlling those who entered the area.

There would have been some contact for those who were involved in trade, including the few *Dhow* [3] owners who moved about the Gulf and to the subcontinent of India. This would also have included inhabitants of Ras al Khaimah who were a little more outgoing in their past history due to the emirate's deep natural port and its proximity to the entrance to the Gulf waters. However, all in all, the characteristic of the Trucial States was that of isolation from the outside world and due to the difficulty of communication other than by sea an internal isolation also prevailed.

Small communities with strong tribal bonds inhabited the area and, as nomads, tended to move within certain territories. As settlers they either settled at the oases or a coastal area which had the benefit of sweet water. Some, due to the

climate spent their winters inland and their hot humid summers on the coast where they enjoyed the relative cooling benefit of sea breezes. The more settled lived in basic homes built of coral and mud, others in tents or *barrasti* constructions made from the fronds of the indigenous date palm.

Communications were, therefore, limited to travel by foot, camel or boat and the exchange of ideas and news was by verbal interaction. The people of the region were, in the majority, illiterate and knowledge was passed on by word of mouth from father to son or from mother to daughter. The technology of the area was very limited and often confined to that which was easily transported due to the nomadic nature of many of the people. Homes would often be left and returned to depending on the season and so possessions were also minimal.

Interestingly, Heard-Bey contends that the lack of real economic opportunity and the need for a diversification in their limited economic activities rendered the tribal basis of society indispensable. This is because the population of the area generally could not afford to segregate as settled inhabitants with single occupations such as merchants, fishermen and pearlers on the coast; as farmers in the oases and *wadis* or as herdsmen tending animals. She argues, that throughout the ages specialisation would have been impractical for most families and accordingly, due to lack of economic opportunity, social separation into occupational groups did not take place.[4]

Understandably in such an inhospitable area strong family and tribal bonds existed. There was no outside influence to change the system and during the period of British rule there was an active policy of non-interference within the local systems on the part of the British. Moreover, by not encouraging cooperation amongst the often feuding tribes a divide and rule policy prevailed that allowed the British to control the area with minimal personnel. Because, at the time, there was nothing to exploit and the fact the British were in the area more to protect their large merchant fleet from marauding pirates as well as to keep other foreign

powers out, there was also very limited need for the introduction of British personnel. This further isolated the people from alien cultural contamination and reinforced the tribal society and its hierarchy. In fact, there was also little language contamination as the British Political Agent would deal with the rulers of the various sheikhdoms, in the language of the sheikh, Arabic [5].

Initially, the Political Agent controlling the area was based away from the Trucial States on the island of Bahrain further highlighting Britain's disinterest in the area. Eventually an agent for the Trucial States was established in the emirate of Sharjah which had become a staging post (1932)[6] for the British Imperial Airways service from England to India and eventually to Australia (1938)[7]. Even in this case although there was some contact with the immediate locals there was not in the wider Trucial States because the travellers were put-up in the controlled and enclosed compound of Sharjah Fort on their stopovers.

1951 and 1953 [8] saw Political Agents established in the emirates of Sharjah and Dubai respectively. In Abu Dhabi the 1957 establishment of a Political Officer was not upgraded to that of Political Agent until 1961[9], this coincided with the start of oil revenues in the emirate. These late dates do however reinforce the lack of British interest in the area until it was of benefit to them. Importantly, the indigenous population remained in relative isolation from the outside world until the discovery of oil in the 1960s.

So far, two important points have been established: firstly, that up until very recently the inhabitants of the area under study were generally isolated from the outside world and; secondly, the limited resources and nature of the climate and environment combined with lack of real economic opportunity encouraged a tribal society.

Internal isolation and tribal rivalry

The area was not a homogeneous unit operating to a common goal in a cooperative manner until the inauguration of the Federation in 1971. The imposition on the inhabitants of the area of a common identity with mutual goals under the federal experiment, was an alien concept. It is, therefore, important to establish that a certain amount of internal isolation and tribal rivalry[10] was a characteristic of the tribes inhabiting the area which consequently inhibited regional cooperation. It could be argued that Islam was the common goal but it is necessary, at this point, to put this aside temporarily because although it united the people of the region in a spiritual sense and instilled certain values and order it did not unite the tribes in a cooperative sense. They still feuded and fought tribe to tribe over past, not forgotten, rivalries[11] or borders which invariably established ownership of a fertile oasis *inter alia*. Tribes generally looked after their own important needs and although through the spirit of Islam may have cooperated and helped each other this would not have been across the whole area and would have often been limited to family ties or mutually beneficial trade of sorts.

Bearing this in mind, it makes the recent achievements, of creating an increasingly cohesive country from a disparate collection of previously autonomous groupings, all the more impressive: a powerful testimony to the the importance that the education process has had on this.

As established already, the region as a whole was made up of tribal groupings, sheikhdoms. These tribal groupings may have been nomadic Bedouin or led a more settled lifestyle, and because of the limited nature of economic activity and the need for diversity, social separation into occupational groups did not take place: the tribal structure was reinforced. Each tribe was, therefore, self-sufficient albeit often in a subsistence mode.

Because of the inhospitable climate and general environment the travelling

TABLE 6.1
Tribal Population of the Trucial States by Emirate and Tribe, 1968

Tribe	Abu Dhabi	Dubai 1968	Sharjah 1968	Ajman	Umm al Qaiwain	Ras al Khaimah	Fujairah	Total
Ahbab	319	1	25	-	7	-	-	347
Al-ali	60	155	508	85	2,862	1,445	3	5,118
Al Awamir	1,721	69	37	7	19	34	5	1,892
Biduwat	42	450	-	1	-	-	6	499
Dahanimah	9	59	13	7	-	551	94	7,333
Dahababiha	3	-	2	6	-	-	8	19
Dhawahir	2,844	42	109	41	-	9	57	3,102
Ghafalah	96	6	34	5	127	25	-	293
Habus-Shihuh-Dhahuriyin	147	74	74	13	-	5,845	244	6,177
Bani Jabir	49	8	4	-	5	15	-	81
Bani Kaab (inc.Shwaihiyin)	217	16	197	39	-	189	59	717
Muhariza	17	-	12	-	-	312	10	351
Manasir	3,224	275	49	21	-	38	-	3,607
Masafarah	6	-	39	-	7	19	1	72
Mazari	1,287	271	293	17	38	1,062	76	3,044
Naaim (inc. Khuwatir)	325	171	219	616	25	968	10	2,334
Najadat	662	29	5	1	-	11	85	793
Nagbiyan	16	-	1,345	-	-	541	3	1,905
Qawasim	101	108	3,592	8	3	1,055	14	4,881
Bani Qitab	617	156	1,458	21	6	112	-	2,370
Quwaid	3	1	162	-	4	19	6	195
Shahairah	-	3	1	11	-	69	-	84
Al bu Shamis	370	769	689	190	12	408	-	2,438
Sharqiyin	80	65	116	69	25	82	8,372	8,809
Tunaij	13	2	372	7	-	21	22	437
Bani Yas	4,597	3,913	1,424	213	1	290	27	10,465
Zaab	22	27	710	7	4	2,455	-	3,225
Other	903	1,194	1,280	226	69	2,366	256	6,294
Total	17,750	7,864	12,769	1,611	3,209	17,941	9,138	70,282

Source: 1968 Trucial States Census (unpublished) as cited in SADIK, M.T. & SNAVELY, W.P. (1972), *Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates,* (Lexington, Lexington Books), p. 125.

patterns of the tribes would have tended to be within certain constraints. The most severe of these constraints would understandably be that of the sources of sweet water, the oases. As trade was not an economically viable option for many there was little need to travel beyond the general area in which they had always moved. Furthermore, any such travel would have been a slow and difficult task bearing in mind the nature of the sand deserts and terrain of the mountainous regions. With the 800,000 square kilometres of the Rub'al Khali forming part of the Trucial States it is easy to understand how spatial isolation in the past was a characteristic; even as it is, in part, today despite the facility of four-wheel drive vehicles. Journeys on fast modern highways connecting some of the old settlements that take a mere two hours by car now, would have taken a week or more in the past. Therefore, with such a small population scattered across such a vast area, restricted by mountain or sand, movement for families and tribes would have naturally been limited for most. Furthermore, because there would have been no need to establish strong trading links in the interior there would have been little point in the extra effort of making unnecessary contact with other tribes. This contact would have taken place, if necessary, at the coastal settlements where some trading was undertaken and made easier by sea communications, and also at some of the major oasis settlements which enjoyed a certain amount of agricultural activity.

Table 6.1 and Table 6.2 give some idea of the tribal situation, the details of which have been extrapolated from the unpublished figures and information of the 1968 Trucial States Census. The Tables do offer a point of reference that helps to compose a picture of an earlier time when statistics were not compiled. It is important to note that by 1968 a certain amount of development had already started particularly in the sheikhdoms of Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah due to oil revenues and Dubai's growing entrepot trade. The totals, therefore, include the increasing numbers of expatriate workers who had entered the area due to the oil boom. But if we extract the expatriates and concentrate on the indigenous Arabs a more interesting picture develops showing the local

TABLE 6.2
Relationship Between Land Mass and Population, 1968

Emirate	Land Mass sq km	Tribal Population	Tribal Pop. per sq km	Total Population	Total Pop. per sq km
Abu Dhabi	67,340	17,750	0.3	46,500	0.7
Dubai	3,885	7,864	2	59,000	15
Sharjah	2,590	12,769	5	31,500	12
Ras al Khaimah	1,683	17,941	11	24,500	15
Fujairah	1,165	9,138	8	9,700	8
Umm al Qaiwain	777	3,209	4	3,700	5
Ajman	259	1,611	6	4,200	16
Total	77,700	70,282	1	179,100	2

Notes:
Compiled and deduced from information in Tables 3.1, 6.1 and 7.1.
The percentages have been rounded.

TABLE 6.3
Indigenous (Tribal) Population as a Percentage of Total Population, 1968

Emirate	Indigenous Population	Expatriate Population	Total Population	Indigenous % of Total Pop.
Abu Dhabi	17,750	28,750	46,500	38%
Dubai	7,864	51,136	59,000	13%
Sharjah	12,769	18,731	31,500	41%
Ras al Khaimah	17,941	6,559	24,500	73%
Fujairah	9,138	562	9,700	94%
Umm al Qaiwain	3,209	491	3,700	87%
Ajman	1,611	2,589	4,200	38%
Total	70,282	108,818	179,100	39%

Notes:
Compiled and deduced from information in Tables 6.1 and 7.1.
The percentages have been rounded.

inhabitants as 70,282 people. Relate this figure to land mass and it would be fair to surmise that before the oil boom there was a ratio of one person per square kilometre and even with the total mixed population in 1968 it was not much more at two people.

The mountainous terrain would have certainly inhibited contact between the inhabitants of the East Coast and those elsewhere.

The Tables also give a breakdown of the various tribes. It can be seen that by 1968, and the increased economic opportunities of the oil boom, a social breakdown had started to take effect and groups were establishing more settled existence in various emirates creating more of a confederation of tribes in some. However, it does show the main concentration of the larger tribal groupings in the various sheikhdoms and therefore helps to show their allegiances.

Tribal groupings and allegiances generally moved within an area and in time established settlement centres which formed the basis of the sheikhdoms, and the present day emirates. These areas would have been ruled by a sheikh and the structure and established rules of the tribe would form the basis of authority within the prescribed area. The occasional inter-tribal marriage would bring groupings closer together but the authority of the ruling sheikh was paramount in establishing the order of things within his area and this was not interfered with by the British. At the request of the various sheikhs the British did have jurisdiction over the Christians and the aliens in the area.

Interesting at this point is a quote from Heard-Bey because although it deals with tribal jurisdiction it further supports the tribal isolation to a certain extent by stating that the customary law, 'urf, was exclusive to the tribal grouping.

> The legal principles which guided this process of arriving at a judgment were first of all the customary law, 'urf, which developed within a particular group of tribes, was known and recognised by its members, and was peculiar to that group. [12]

This was the first and traditional stage in the process, however, it is important to point out that once the tribe submitted to Islam there was a second and final stage governed by Islamic principles which were common to all in the region. However, as Heard-Bey implies, this could have had a very local interpretation unless a *mutawwa* was present within the tribe and consulted.

> Because all the people concerned were Muslim, their personal lives and social behaviour, and therefore these legal principles too, including *'urf*, were moulded by Islam. Yet such verdicts were not founded on specific precepts of *shari'ah*, the Muslim code of law, unless the parties turned to a *mutawwa*, a man who had studied the Quran, was known to be religious, and was often even called *qadi*. [13]

The head of a tribe was chosen for his personal qualities. Wisdom, bravery, honesty, generosity and justice were among the basic characteristics which qualified the individual to steer the fortunes of his tribe. [14] The sheikh's authority was, tempered by the *majlis*, a meeting place where interested parties could present their point of view. The *majlis* would have offered a pseudo democracy to tribal members and that would have been important because the sheikh's position only remained in tact through the acquiescence of his family and his tribal subjects. This is an important point that is still relevant today because although the present day rulers may surround themselves with the Palace Guard it is still important for them to come up with the goods, as it were, to maintain support. It must be remembered that five of the present seven rulers came to power themselves through deposing their previous ruler. The President of the UAE, Sheikh Zayed, deposed his father Sheikh Shakhbut to take the leadership of Abu Dhabi in 1966. It could be argued that in doing so he started the great leap forward for Abu Dhabi and later the UAE in a way that his father, who lacked the vision, never could have: Sheikh Zayed was the major driving force in the creation of the Federal UAE. A parallel can also be drawn in recent times with the UAE's neighbour and another 'small country', the Sultanate of Oman, which only recently has emerged from an almost medieval self-imposed isolation into the

Twentieth Century through the present Sultan Qaboos seizing power from his father.

However, increasingly the present sheikhs are strengthening their positions and are keeping a tight grip on power. In this process their benevolence has been felt by many often through nepotistic attitudes particularly in the employment arena. One only has to look at the names of the federal ministers to note that the legacy continues today. Nepotism will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

The above has generally established that until the changed economic circumstances of the 1950s and particularly the 1960s and the opportunities it offered families to establish a livelihood entirely from one economic activity, the society of the area was tribal. It should also be noted that a characteristic of these tribes was their self-sufficiency and that there was a certain amount of internal and external spatial isolation.

Moreover, although the inhabitants of the region did suffer periods of colonial control they did not suffer from the imposition or contamination of an alien culture. World events, such as periods of conquests and colonisation, also tended to by-pass them, leaving them with little knowledge, experience or awareness of the industrialised world and its values and achievements, be they considered positive or negative. There was therefore, little to prepare them for the onslaught of modernisation that was about to change their material existence. Even the young Sheikh Zayed's opportunity to travel abroad to broaden his horizons and receive an education was curtailed by his father Sheikh Shakhbut. A quote from Tomkinson is relevant here:

> The present generation of shaikhs (sic), ministers and merchants, however, solid and unified their 'national front' now, grew up in a world of sharp tribal rivalries. In the early 1960s Sir Hugh Boustead, as British Political Agent, tried to stimulate interest in

schooling overseas. A programme of courses was
planned by a British consultant, but Shakhbut, with
his singular notions of progress, then refused
permission for shaikhs sons to take part. Only the
Otaiba [family] accepted the proposal, claiming that
they were not shaikhs. Seven Otaiba boys left for
London and today one is Minister of Petroleum and
Industry, another Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs
- and both in positions where illiterate figureheads
would clearly not suffice. [15]

Islamic values

It would, however, be wrong to suggest that the inhabitants of the Arabian

Peninsula existed in loose groupings with little organisation and few values. In

fact, over the centuries they had developed into a very clearly structured society

based on concepts of life that were meticulously defined in every detail and

upheld by most of the inhabitants.[16] Much of this code was reinforced by the

peoples' submission to Islam around 630 A.D. which reinforced the family

structure and responsibilities within it and also an individual's standing within the

hierarchy of the tribe.

In 1968 the fundamental make-up of the region was that of Muslim and in the

Trucial States more than 95 per cent of the total population was Muslim. Islam is

part of the heritage of the region as a whole and is a fundamental shaper of the

area's attitudes and the decisions that are taken. Islam, for example, is the

reason why the schools are segregated. It is also an influential factor in the

apparent suppression of the female until recent times, although a Muslim would

argue against this by saying that their position was equal but different. These

accepting attitudes that are a characteristic of the region will be discussed in the

next part of this chapter under gender issues.

In order to explain, in part, some of these accepting values and to familiarise the

unfamiliar it is important to refer to some of the beliefs of Islam because these

beliefs have a comprehensive effect on every aspect of a Muslim's life and,

consequently, their attitudes towards education and its provision, an important

element of this study.

A fundamental and often misunderstood difference between Christianity and Islam is that Christianity is a system of morality whereas Islam is a complete social, political and economic order. Christianity was born at a time when the Roman Empire was politically at its zenith and required moral reform and hence the ethical thrust of Christianity. Islam, however, emerged out of a backward bedouin setting within the Arabian region creating, from scratch, an entire social order in which separation between secular and religious realms made no sense at all.[17] The spirit of Islam was therefore totally intertwined into the traditions of the Trucial States tribal society. Everything concerning the family's domestic structure, its functions within the community and all of its daily routine were part of man's very existence as a Muslim.[18]

It is important to understand this and to expel Western ethnocentrism because this is very different when compared to the Western way of separating the religious from the secular and making the religious a subject of specialisation. It could be argued that this is essential in the present multicultural societies of the West. Moreover, it is legislatively imposed in the United States of America where, for example, public education is definitely secular. Others may argue that the present UAE is a multicultural society now and therefore its public education should be secular and designed to prepare its citizens for life in a mixed society. However, in reality the state education system is most definitely driven by Islamic views and, because the majority of its recipients are nationals and Muslims, there is little need for change. It does, therefore, reinforce the Islamic values that could easily be lost to the younger generation that is brought up in a multi-racial consumer society in which the national is in the minority. Herein lies one of the major dilemmas that faces the modern day UAE, not just in education but in all aspects of its public administration and planning for the future. Just how far can it secularise its decision-making and its forward planning? A cursory glance at the present UAE would point to differences of opinion that are already

assigning an emirate's characteristic on this front. For example, Abu Dhabi has the wealth and is in the privileged position of being dictatorial in its imposition of Islam if it so wishes with a take it or leave it attitude towards its residents. The holy month of Ramadan, an important period in the Islamic calendar, is a period of fasting where no water, food or cigarettes are to be taken during the hours of daylight. Up until now Abu Dhabi has generally reinforced this situation legislatively on all of its residents by closing down cafes, restaurants, bars and so forth during daylight hours and banning entertainment in the evenings. A similar situation also exists in all of the emirates although Dubai, perhaps the most liberal emirate, which is desperately trying to diversify its economy into trade and tourism has adopted a slightly more lenient approach and, although not visible to the public, many tourist facilities including all bars remain open in the evenings. This pragmatic approach continued this year as Ramadan fell at the height of Dubai's tourist season.

The availability of alcohol is also another strong indicator. It is available to non-Muslims who hold a special police licence from discretely placed shops not open to the public at large. In most of the emirates there are bars attached to private clubs which cater to non-Muslims and public bars attached to hotels. In Sharjah there are no public outlets at all as the emirate effectively went 'dry' in October, 1985[19]. Dubai, on the other hand, is most definitely 'wet' with an increasing number of outlets catering to expatriate and tourist alike. Bacon (pork) is available in Sharjah but not in Ras al Khaimah and so it goes on. Interestingly, many of the long-term expatriates cringe at the changes, particularly in Dubai as it is felt their liberal policies are opening the door to a fundamentalist reaction from the more conservative Islamic states such as Saudi Arabia and Iran. However, every indication is that Dubai is determined to diversify and to remove its vulnerability to the UAE's mono oil economy. Dubai is acutely aware that its oil reserves are finite and it appears that it is prepared to liberalise, even at the threat of the wrath of its conservative neighbours, to attract and fuel the much needed diversification. Interestingly, this is also a characteristic of Bahrain which

was forced into diversification earlier as its oil reserves were very limited. This is not the case for the conservative Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar who have vast reserves of oil or natural gas or the less conservative Abu Dhabi. However, by looking at Sharjah (which is often dependent on aid for its major projects from either the Federation, Abu Dhabi, or Saudi Arabia) it is easy to see why the emirate is taking a more conservative stance even though, as neighbours, Sharjah is visibly aware of the rewards of Dubai's liberalising process. The reality, however, is a mixture of many elements and Sharjah is moving towards a strong Islamic cultural identity which leads one to suspect that it is part of a wider plan since the mid eighties to turn it into an Islamic city of culture attracting an academic interest and a different type of tourism. However, they can also maintain their idealism because the cities of Dubai and Sharjah almost meet physically. Accordingly, due to their proximity Sharjah is reaping knock-on benefits in the light of cheaper rents and services vis-à-vis Dubai.

The above may appear to be a digression, but it is a necessary one by way of example of the writer's own experience of living in the area since 1982. Importantly it offers some insight into the crossroads that all of the emirates, and for that matter the Gulf states, have reached in their process of development and modernisation. The process of modernisation is, to some extent, at odds with the traditional and Islamic beliefs and ideals of the area. Perhaps the process of modernisation, urbanisation and material rewards from the technological advances in the Emirates over the past thirty years have taken the rulers by surprise. It is likely that in the early years with their traditional values the rulers would not have fully appreciated the secularising effect that these advances would have on their own Muslim societies. Clearly emirates such as Sharjah are starting to pull in the reign a little but then the ruler's reasons may be more academic as he is the most highly qualified in academic terms having gained his doctorate from Exeter University in England. In Dubai, the rulers come from a firmly established trading family and their approach is different as they are much further down the road of modernisation than Sharjah. Whereas

Sharjah can draw in its reigns, it is possible that Dubai has passed the point of no return with the process drawing energy and feeding upon itself. Each emirate has a different leadership and government, and accordingly a different identity. This may be construed as a strength of the Federation which allows it to continue without challenge. However, the apparent toleration of each emirate to the next is important because each emirate may rely on the next or receive benefit from its neighbour's success whether it agrees with their route or not. Like it or not their economies are now interconnected. The Federation certainly has not dampened the 'higher' beliefs of one emirate or the entrepreneurial spirits of the next. Tribal experiences and ideals have perhaps shaped each emirate and been developed through the benefits of the Federation and its oil wealth. It is possible that without the oil a similar route would have been taken within each of the emirates albeit not with such impressive development.

An important point has been raised and that is, that although the majority of the United Arab Emirates' nationals are practising Muslims, the multi-cultural society that they have created is becoming increasingly secularised. There are now spheres where Islamic thinking is a diminishing element of the decision-making process, particularly in commerce and trade. Moreover, even areas such as that of censorship of alien cultural media are showing signs of changing as the locally censored television programmes are vying with the readily available uncensored satellite transmissions from Hong Kong. Saudi Arabia and Iran [20] have counteracted this problem by trying to ban all satellite receiving dishes across their territories, a sledgehammer to crack a nut as the saying goes. However, it has been effective and an indication of how determined both Saudi Arabia and Iran are to maintain their own severe and fundamental interpretations of Islam. An important consideration in this is that both Saudi Arabia and Iran initially opened their doors and accepted the modern advances. The resulting secularisation of their societies must have come as somewhat of a shock and, as recent events have shown, this precipitated the reactionary responses and rise of fundamentalism; Iran's response was and is severe and attacks the very

process of modernisation because it considers it to be a catalyst to the introduction in their society of unacceptable Western values and behaviour. Importantly, in this situation Saudi Arabia can afford to go along this path, Iran would anyway, but the Emirates, other than Abu Dhabi, will, out of necessity, have to find their own balance. As indicated above this balance will naturally be different in the various emirates, but a question that needs to be considered is: how will the changing attitudes and processes of secularisation away from Islamic values and the family affect the basic fabric of this society and its public services. Some discussion on the changing role of the female in the United Arab Emirates may throw some light on this, particularly when considering the popular notion that the degree of social change and development of a society can be measured by the degree of women's emancipation in that society.[21] It will also help to move away from the temptation of pure speculation.

The changing role of the female

The position of the female in the Arab world has often been misunderstood and more often images far from reality are presented in the world's non-Muslim and sensationalist press. On first sight, and often a reason for the media's close attention, is the fact that feminist movement of the 1960s and the 1970s appears to have bypassed the Arab world. The fact that countries such as the United Arab Emirates were in their infancy and only just moving out of a very traditional mode of life has been lost in the sheer speed of the physical processes of modernisation. In fact, some might contend, given the short time that has elapsed, that the process of emancipation of the female has happened surprisingly quickly, in some cases in just one generation. Although these achievements can be belittled by comment such as, they have not yet aspired to the vote as in many of the industrialised countries, they only focus on the ethnocentricity of the comment: in the UAE the men don't have the vote *per se* either! Others may argue, as was common development thinking in the 1960s and early 1970s that in order to upgrade and improve a female's position it was sufficient to raise the family's income thereby creating a 'trickle down' effect of

benefits from the head of the family. This theory was, however, discredited in favour of more focused education and aid to the female herself as the female was the educator of change within the family and that the trickle down theory did not work. However, in the case of the United Arab Emirates there has been a substantial raising of the family income since the mid 1960s but, as will be pointed out, it did little to change the status of the female other than to release some of her time through the introduction of servants: housegirls and houseboys. Moreover this section will go on to show that targeted education was a major agent of change in the UAE and, it can be said, for the other Gulf City States also.

To understand the attitudes and influences on gender and how the process of modernisation, particularly that of education, has affected the situation it is necessary to be aware of the traditional attitudes and Islamic influences that have shaped the position in the first instance. An excellent source giving an insight into these attitudes can be found in Soffan's 1980 published doctoral thesis: *The Women of the United Arab Emirates* [22]. It is one of the few pieces of research within the sociological sphere available that focuses on the UAE and although some fourteen years old still gives a good description of the foundation of the attitudes. Also, from her research with national women, it offers a fair account of the changing attitudes in the 1970s just after independence. There would be little point in repeating her comments in this thesis verbatim but it is important to direct the reader to her work. Moreover, it is also important to highlight some of the points raised and make further comment about them to aid in the understanding of the forces that have to be overcome if equality of the sexes, in a Western sense, is to be achieved. In fact, it is the writer's firm contention that equality of the sexes is a situation that is unlikely to happen in the near future although further arguments will be made stating that the apparent suppression of the female is not quite as severe as the observer first believes. The UAE is not Saudi Arabia or Iran where their severe forms of fundamentalism manifest themselves quite specifically through the controls that they place on their

females. This section will point out that, although their arguments are based on Islam, in fact, they are their own interpretation of Islam geared more to the protection of their traditions and their concern of cultural contamination by Western ideals of morality.

Initially, it must be argued that the coming of Islam to the tribes of the Arabian Peninsula did actually improve the situation for the female and, in fact, some of the present social mores inhibiting female freedom within the UAE are more tribal legacies than that of Islamic origin; this could be applied to most of the region. Heard-Bey states that Islam has changed the status of women, who in pre-Islamic times were often considered merely as objects of possession [23]. She further comments that the institution of the *harem* itself was largely a symbol of the position of women within the society in that they were not members of the community and that they belonged to the private lives of the men on whom they depended at particular points in their lives [24]. For example, the father until marriage; the husband and then on divorce or as a widow, the brother.

The female in pre-Islamic tribal times

To understand these comments it is necessary to briefly outline the pattern of the female life during the tribal times. As already stated, tribal existence within the area was either nomadic or more settled, in both cases the life was difficult and basic. Society was patrilineal and the female was subordinate to the male with no rights *per se*. Marriage would be arranged for her around the age of puberty, 13/14 years. On marriage, responsibility for her would be passed on to the husband and his family. She had no right of divorce although he did, particularly, if she was infertile, as may often have been the case in the early years of marriage as her body developed. Her situation was quite unstable, vis-à-vis divorce, until she produced her first son [25]. In traditional society the choice of husband was important and although no limit was placed on his age it was necessary that he was of equal or higher station than the girl. To marry below her

would have brought dishonour to the bride's family [26]. This meant that a common choice in the arrangement would be that of a first cousin because no question of marrying beneath her could be raised. This has important implications for the UAE in the present day and, although marriage of first cousins is not encouraged in the Qur'an, it is a good example of a tribal legacy. There is increasingly strong discouragement in the present day UAE for such an arrangement, due to the high incidence of hereditary disabilities being passed on in the local population [27].

The wearing of the veil and seclusion of the female

Interestingly, if the woman was a *bedu* she would have enjoyed a certain amount of freedom to move amongst the menfolk of the tribe mainly due to the amount and type of work necessary from her for their survival [28]. It does not appear, therefore, that seclusion was part of the pattern of her life at that time. Soffan states [29] that seclusion came about in the Arabian world by the end of the Eighteenth Century and that it was at that time more a way of differentiating the slaves from the free women. Certain status was therefore attached to seclusion and consequently two societies developed: a female society and a male society.

The Prophet Muhammad did advise women to cover themselves modestly but it was later that the ideas of what constituted modesty were greatly exaggerated. It could be said, however, that at the time segregation was not just a Muslim characteristic because Christians and Jews also veiled and secluded their women in the Middle East up until the Twentieth Century [30]. To a certain extent this supports the earlier comment about it initially being a sign of status. The tribal society in the UAE did not, it appears, practice seclusion until after their submission to Islam but it was not necessarily the result of Islamic thinking.

A very important factor in seclusion is that of family honour. Seclusion was,

therefore, introduced as a means of safeguarding the female's virtue and consequently the family's honour. This is a point of paramount importance because in the case of the United Arab Emirates it does go some way to explain much of the present attitude towards the segregation of the sexes which is more tribal and family orientated rather than Islamic although it must be impressed that the importance of virtue was reinforced by Islam.

The tribal female and Islam

Islam was introduced to the area in the first instance because of the lack of religious and ethical order in the region. It has been suggested that at that time there was a need for a comprehensive code to cover particularly the position of women, family life, retaliation, wine drinking, usury and gambling [31]. Prior to the introduction of Islam the position of the female was subservient to the male, she was his property, and furthermore, she had no right of inheritance or property ownership, even her *mahr*, dowry, was given to the bride's father or guardian leaving her completely dependent and subject to the menfolk [32].

Islam assigned the female certain status and a role. The Qur'an Sura XLIX verse 13 implies their status was not unequal to men:

> O mankind, we created you all from a male and female, and made you into races and tribes, that you may know one another. Surely the noblest among you in the sight of God is the most God fearing of you. [33]

Soffan further cites the Qur'an: "men are in charge of women, because Allah hath made the one to excel the other, and because they spend of their property (for the support of women)" [34]. She states this as the argument often cited to challenge the equal status of the two sexes. However, she goes on to defend it and argues their complementary existence; with men being head of the household, the breadwinner and responsible for what happens outside of the house with the women being responsible for the raising of the children and for all

else within the confines of the home. Traditional Islam, therefore, envisaged the man's and the woman's roles as complementary and not as competing.

Islamic or not, women are assigned the primary responsibility for family and child care in all societies of the world, therefore, this does tend to be the pattern of traditional family responsibilities. The difference that Islam had to bear on the situation in the region was that the female was afforded status in this pivotal role in the early education and development of the young child. She was also afforded the right to inherit and, because it is the husband's responsibility to support his wife and family, she had no financial duties within the marriage. Therefore, any property and such like that she acquired was hers to manage and dispose of as she wished. Under Islam she also has the right to divorce her husband and thus return to her family. Furthermore, the *mahr* was to be paid by the husband to the bride and she was free to use this as she pleased [35].

A fusing of tribal and Islamic values

In reality the tribal people of the area adopted what was relevant or acceptable and lacked real conviction to the religious tenets. Consequently, the social mores in the pre-oil days were strongly based on tribal attitudes tempered by Islam. An important and overriding value of the tribe and family was that of honour. With the honour of the family held above that of the tribe and of Islam. This honour was bestowed on and conveyed through the female line of the family. That is, a loss of her honour, virtue, would have brought dishonour and shame upon the family. The female's honour would have been protected vehemently by the menfolk. This honour often affords the mother in the family special status in the minds of her sons. In the case of the young girls, particularly around the time of puberty, there would have been great concern and nervousness about her position. She would not be placed at risk and until she was married the family would not lessen their concern. Seclusion, purdah, and the wearing of the veil at the onset of puberty was, therefore, a satisfactory way of controlling the situation. The young man's position was the antithesis of this and on

adolescence he was considered independent to act as he pleased [36].

This raises, perhaps, the most fundamental point in the relationship of the genders in the present UAE. That is, that the family's protection of their honour has reinforced attitudes towards segregation and that this has been a major inhibiting factor in the wider educational and employment opportunities of the female. This will be discussed later under issues of education and the female joining the work force.

A point of constant interest and controversy regarding Islam is in the case of polygamy and the taking of up to four wives. However, it is not to be pursued at this time as Soffan[37] has found in her research that the men of the area under study have long leant towards monogamy. That is not to say that it does not exist in the UAE but that it is minimally exercised and therefore of insignificant consideration in this discussion on social mores. In fact, generally, the attitude in the UAE now is still towards monogamy even though the present citizens could well afford to run more than one household. Monogamy, however, tends to be viewed as a characteristic of 'modern' countries and one that the people of the UAE wish to emulate in being considered a modern people [38].

The more general attitude that marriage and raising a family have been and continues to be prime goals for every girl in the UAE [39] is both traditional and in full conformity with Islam.

The above offers an insight into tribal and Islamic social mores that are fundamental in the make-up of the character of the indigenous people of the Arabian Peninsula region as a whole, not just the UAE. But it would not be fair to submit that the modernising forces and the increased opportunities brought on by the oil revenues have had the same effect throughout the region. By way of example, Saudi Arabia can present itself as having a quite different outcome

where the female's freedom is very much suppressed by the Kingdom's legislature which reinforces traditional social mores. They will, in time, find themselves in an interesting position because they encourage the female to take advantage of education in the Kingdom's well resourced and segregated facilities yet impose severe and comprehensive restrictions on her freedom thereafter. There is no doubt that education has been a major agent of change in the modernising of traditional attitudes in the UAE and particularly in releasing the female, to some extent, from the shackles of traditionalism. There is still much to do but a start has been made and actively encouraged by the rulers and their wives of the various emirates. The next part of this section will, therefore, discuss the impact of these modernising forces on the position of the female.

The effect on the female of the modernising forces in the United Arab Emirates

One of the driving forces in the effort to change traditional attitudes towards the female in the UAE has been the President himself, Sheikh Zayed, and his wife Sheikha Fatima both of whom have been well documented in their ceaseless efforts to upgrade the social position of the female. He has put on record his view on the question of equal opportunities, for example, in the following statement which will be used as a starting point:

> Women have the right to work everywhere as long as they are given the appropriate respect.....Their basic role is that of bringing up children but, over and above that, we have to support a woman who chooses to perform other functions. [40]

Clearly this statement has three main strands. Firstly, and in keeping with Islamic tradition and beliefs, he cites the female's main position as being in the area of child-rearing. This has not changed over the years and is a fundamental belief in the society of the UAE to the point that at times he has expressed concern regarding the introduction of houseboys and housegirls who are increasingly involved with, and take responsibility for, the upbringing of some children. This is a direct result of the new found wealth of the country and his concerns express a

need to return to traditional values on that front. However, he is strongly committed to the ideal that the female can contribute to the future success of the UAE and its society outside of the family unit. Furthermore, he suggests that to suppress the female is un-Islamic and often cites the views of the Prophet in his arguments [41] and; that the female should be helped in every way to contribute to the future of her country and not be tied to the legacy of out dated tribal mores. Here he has publicly challenged the traditional suppression of the female and used the powerful arguments of religion to present his case. This supports the writer's earlier contention that the social mores of the UAE are a fusion of tribal and Islamic values. Another important aspect of Sheikh Zayed's comment is his recognition of the vast reserve of untapped manpower (womanpower) [42] that lays dormant in the female population particularly in a country that has to import hundreds of thousands of people to fill its work force.

The importance of Sheikh Zayed's and Sheikha Fatma's support in this matter has been crucial. Sheikh Zayed has been seen to be a driving force behind the development and modernisation of the Emirates and in the eyes of the indigenous people he is unquestioningly afforded the traditional respect and honour given to their leaders [43]. In other words his style of leadership has been perceived to be wise, fair and generous, it has not been publicly challenged and along with the other ruling sheikhs, who are also documented in their support of the female, his views would form the basis of cabinet directives that further form the basis of public policy-making in the Emirates.

It was recognised early on, and in keeping with the thinking of many aid agencies, that illiteracy was the scourge of female emancipation and that until this was addressed little change would take place. If the female was unaware of her rights and of opportunities it would be easy to maintain the tribal condition. Illiteracy was the hallmark of the area and although educational equality was an increasing opportunity for the young female it was not addressing the older women at large. Adult education centres were set up and Sheikha Fatima

became heavily involved in the programme for women not just through the centres but also through the efforts of the UAE Women's Federation that she headed. She would involve herself physically in the programme exerting serious efforts to serve the women's cause to enable them to play a greater role in the society of which they were a part. Understandably, there was no desire to breakdown the barriers of segregation as that would have been an impossible task and, the writer suspects, not necessarily a desirable one. However, few men could ultimately find objection, even in the remoter and naturally more traditional areas, to these things happening in a segregated setting.

The success of a two pronged educational programme addressing the adult as well as the young has already been presented in Chapter Five. The adult programme made a slow start although once resources were poured into the education of the female, the take-up was impressive. Adult Education for both the male and the female has been a tremendous success with many completing not just a literacy stage but also progressing through to receive the full range of formal schooling to include secondary level. Sheikha Fatma's declaration that the year 2,000 "is our final rendezvous with the liberation of women all over the UAE from the confines of illiteracy" [44] and her passionate goal of eradicating female illiteracy does appear achievable.

In the early days of offering a formal schooling to the young female the stipends and benefits initially given would have been an attraction to the more traditional and poorer family, who unlike many of their urban counterparts, would not have perceived the benefit of education. In later years, educating the mother in a family would have contributed to the releasing of the daughter to go to take advantage of formal schooling. In the case of the young female being denied her right to schooling, and to address the situation to drop-out from school due to family or social pressures, the UAE Government introduced female social workers whose responsibility was to visit the family, particularly the father/head of household, to encourage a review of their attitude and the situation [45].

The introduction of formal schooling for the young female was soon taken up and as the enrolments show in Table 5.1 the numbers of girls soon matched those of the boys. By 1977 and with the opening of the UAE University the previous confinement of educational opportunity for most females to the end of the secondary level, due to social mores not allowing them to take up Higher Education outside of the country, was opened up. More recent development of the Women's Higher Colleges of Technology has also increased the female's opportunity in a more vocational sense. The female now has equal educational opportunity to that of the male within the state provision and it is clear from enrolments, which are equal or greater for the females at all of the stages she is taking advantage of that on offer. If allowed to travel abroad for her studies she has an exactly equal opportunity to the male in education. However, it must be pointed out that the opportunity within the country is equal but different. With the exception of the kindergarten stage of schooling, all of the state educational facilities are segregated and although the financing and resourcing may be equal the curriculum within the schools and the courses on offer are not. Therefore, in the society at large, we are again presented with the equal but different situation that is a characteristic of each of the emirates.

Tradition has clearly been a powerful influence in shaping women's lives in the Middle East, not least in their access to, or exclusion from, education. Once access to education has been gained many of the problems that were initially presented by traditional attitudes are surmounted; attitudes such as those that forbade a female an education as a wasted investment as her purpose in life was to get married. Unlike any investment in the son, which was an investment for the future of the family and remained within the family, investment in the daughter would be transferred out of the family as soon as she was married. However, changing attitudes means that nowadays education is perceived more positively and an educated daughter may even allow for a higher status of match in the marriage arrangement. Furthermore, the traditional attitudes that feared that

educated women were prone to illicit affairs [46] and consequently a loss of family honour which encouraged the veil and seclusion are slowly being broken down although family honour is still of paramount importance. The positive effect of education of the female at all levels has, as is the case in many developing countries, manifest itself through reduced infant mortality, better health through improved nutrition and longer life spans. Education in general has caused the family to reappraise its values in the case of the daughter and she is now more actively encouraged to seek it. Consequently this has affected two societal characteristics. Firstly, it has been found that because formal schooling continues well into adolescence and up to eighteen that the age at which the girls are getting married is actually advancing and moving away from the traditional 13/14 years of age [47]. Along with this trend is a reduction in the number of children the mothers are having with the educated female opting for less, even though there are governmental incentives to have large families. These incentives appear at odds with the general attitudes of improving the females condition but are clearly motivated by active manpower policies to increase the indigenous population and reduce the UAE's reliance on expatriate labour. However, as in other developing countries there is a direct correlation in the UAE between increased education and later marriage with reduced family size. The increased opportunities that have arrived since the discovery of oil have also led to a reduction in the size of the extended family and a gradual breaking down of it into the nuclear family. This is most definitely a recent phenomenon in the UAE brought about by the opportunity to establish and live well from one occupational base unlike the past when everyone in the tribe and family were less specialised and needed to support each other. This situation, interestingly, has led to the UAE having to consider responsibility for the elderly which due to improved conditions is an increasing percentage of the population [48]. A transfer of responsibility from family to state now appears to be taking place where previously the elderly, handicapped and infirmed were taken care of within the structure of the family. This structure also, to some extent, supported the large

number of children the females were producing with all the different generations of female within the family lending a helping hand. With the nuclear family this benefit has been lost to the mother. However, the increasing role that the houseboy or housegirl plays has offset the loss of this support. One important aspect that has come out of the reduced size of the family is that, in her research, Soffan has found that increasingly the husband and wife are spending more time together and, to some extent, there has been increased closeness in the relationship and a sharing of responsibility within the home [49]. On the whole and from observations made by the writer from living within the country the family ties are still very strong and they still generally supersede that of the state.

The local society does still operate in two spheres, that of the male and that of the female. This situation may not be apparent in the city, due to the local being in the minority, but it is fairly obvious in the villages and remoter areas. The female has increased opportunities but marriage and raising a family are still a very important part of their culture. She may 'rule the roost at home' and in public appear to command great respect being sent to the front of queues and so forth, but, perhaps, this stems more from traditional attitudes of imposed segregation.

It is clear that in the UAE the female's contribution to society is still generally confined to that of daughter and mother and that she still has not aspired to positions that really challenge the male dominance of the decision-making process in this patrilineal society. It is unlikely that planners in the UAE will come to terms with the concept of interchangeability in the genders as opposed the mutually exclusive sex-roles that presently exists. There is a danger of making the assumption that education is the panacea that will change these attitudes from equivalent to those of equal opportunities. However, it must be remembered that, much as in educational provision itself, equal opportunity is a concept that has educational, social, religious, political and economic aspects, all of which must be moving in the same direction because any one of them

working in a contrary direction will inhibit the process. Full equality of the sexes, in a Western sense, is an alien concept in the UAE with much working against it. Education has eroded some of the traditional prejudices and most definitely increased personal motivation and aspiration, the importance of which cannot be denied in the processes of change and modernisation. It is early days and much of what has changed has been impressively achieved in less than a generation. Naturally there are exceptions to the local norm and these exceptions are women of vision and determination, they may also be part of a new phenomenon in the United Arab Emirates, the single and/or career orientated woman.

There is a political will to modernise the UAE in terms of its societal attitudes towards women. A catalyst for this change in attitudes can also be found in the UAE's dearth of manpower where there is a very real need to release the female resource. Education is changing traditional attitudes and the oil era has offered new opportunities to the female. The promises of education and training and the promises of political rhetoric are not, therefore, hollow ones.

Clearly, in the UAE, the wealth factor has enabled and fed the processes of emancipation for the female at all levels. It has, to some extent, released her from the traditional sex-roles of labour and alleviated her from the traditional burdens of the household and family economy of a subsistence lifestyle. The new wealth has allowed the introduction of a different and less labour intensive lifestyle which has also witnessed the introduction of further help in the form of houseboys and housegirls. This, in turn, has released her to attend schools and adult centres which has helped her to speed up the process itself. In a poorer developing country, education and emancipation is often the result of a process of wealth creation such as industrialisation. The process itself would, therefore, be much slower than in the UAE as it likely that the female would, as cheap labour, be an integral part of the of wealth creation. Fortunately, in the case of the UAE, the female was not drawn into the same trap of false freedom because

wealth was the result of oil revenues and did not require a process of industrialisation.

In the UAE the move is in a positive direction and, although still early days, the female is enjoying new freedoms. This may have introduced new dilemmas and concerns but, unlike neighbouring Saudi Arabia and Iran with their fundamentalism, there is a political will to change the female's position in society and to surmount obstacles. It will be interesting to see whether this momentum will continue on the demise of the present leaders as their sons take control; sons that have led a rather privileged lifestyle and who have never experienced the hardships that were the hallmark of their father's earlier lives. It would be very easy in this patriarchal society for a shift to fundamental idealism because effectively it would not affect the lifestyle of the male decision-makers in a particularly adverse manner. This move may be forced by threats to their own power base from either internal or external forces which they may not be politically astute enough to counter or foresee. It is important for the female in the UAE not to lose the momentum and, in fact, drive it and use their education and the present opportunities available to position themselves in a non-threatening but more influential manner within both the public and private spheres of the country. This would surely help them in maintaining their present advances.

Education and Islam itself has helped to raise the value and importance of the female in her role and activities within the family: visible and invisible roles such as educators, nurses, producers and distributors of food and other goods and also, perhaps, the importance of their emotional and psychological roles. Recognition of this in itself raises their status in society. Previously the functions of reproduction was relegated to the private and non-economic sphere unlike that of production. But it is important for a society to realise that the two human-fields of reproduction and production are inseparable and that the economy cannot exist without reproduction. In the UAE in the past thirty years the economy has existed and grown on the strength of imported personnel

because it had the wealth to allow this. The national is now in the minority due to the runaway development of the UAE and this fact alone is now a catalyst to new social planning which is raising the status of both activities of reproduction and production within the indigenous population, and consequently the increasing importance of the female in this process.

Cultural contamination

Education has helped to breakdown and temper some of the traditional mores that were, in part, an obstacle to modernisation. It could be argued that cultural contamination has also had a positive effect on this process. Along with the impressive development there has been a massive influx of expatriate manpower into the area bringing alien cultural ideals and values. This has to some extent been contained because there is not a real mix between these cultures and often a ghetto mentality has existed in terms of social contact and accommodation habits. Some of this has been forced through the introduction of cost effective company work-camps which have been sited on the peripheries of the population centres. At other times, through elements of choice where often there have been sufficiently large numbers of nationality groups and of venues to allow mixing with ones 'own kind'. However, with the boom years of development a commercialism has prevailed in the UAE and to a certain extent it has become the market place for the industrial societies of the world. The oil wealth has allowed this commercial situation to exist without a large element of production and protectionism. It is a completely open market, apart from the boycott of products connected with the occasional country such as the state of Israel, which is not recognised by the Gulf Arabs. However, even this is likely to change in the near future as bilateral ties are established. For example, this past year has seen the door to South Africa open and it is, now, only a matter of time before Israel is recognised. This will be helped by the signing of the peace accord between Israel and the Palestinians in September 1993 and the recent treaty (4 May 1994) granting the Palestinians certain rights and self-rule within some of the occupied territories.

The UAE is an open market and as such is seen as a natural target market place for many a manufacturer or service agency. This has brought with it not just a bounty of products and luxuries undreamt of some forty years ago by the local population but also the new technological boom. This is particularly so in the area of media. Everyone from the lowest paid expatriate worker has the opportunity to purchase a radio, hi-fi, television and a video recorder. Indeed, they are now considered essentials. The luxuries and labour saving devices may make life easier and more pleasurable, but, the aforementioned media receivers and deliverers have introduced and exposed the population to new cultures and values. This cultural contamination is not confined to just the locals who previously lived a cocooned and insular existence until the discovery of oil, but also affects the many more lowly paid unskilled workers that have arrived often from subsistence economies themselves such as remote areas of Pakistan and India. Moreover, because no copyright laws existed in the area bootleg products prevailed and access to cheap videos, cassettes and such like were therefore available to all. The copyright situation has changed with the recent introduction of intellectual property, patents and copyright laws in the UAE. However, for several years to come the cost of the media and cultural vehicles will have to remain low and accessible if they are to effectively combat and ease out the copies. The long term profits to be made are enormous and so the originators will, no doubt, be driven by these motives. Television and radio have been an important element of life in the UAE for many years now and this has included English speaking channels. Accordingly, programming for television has been bought in from countries such as Britain, the USA, Canada and Australia. These programmes have been censored although clearly their cultural impact has nevertheless remained through the alien values and ideals that they present. In recent years the UAE has allowed the satellite television revolution to come in without restriction. Star Channel, transmitting free to some forty countries Asia-wide, is now readily available and free to all and sundry. All that is required is a receiving dish. In fact, in-house satellite TV has become a

major marketing factor in promoting apartment and villa rentals in the UAE. As mentioned earlier Saudi Arabia and Iran have recognised the potential secularising influence of these uncensored transmissions on their inhabitants and have banned them across their territories. The UAE has not to date and has actually jumped on the bandwagon itself producing an internationally transmitted Arab channel, EDTV, Emirates, Dubai Television. The 25 May 1994 saw the commencement of transmissions in the area of the Orbit Satellite Television and Radio Network introducing a further twenty "unedited and impartial" [50] channels.

There is little point in an in-depth discussion on the actual impact of the media revolution on the UAE as that is a research project in itself. However, it is clear that different cultures have been introduced to the people of the UAE, nationals and expatriates alike, through expatriates and the media. It is also clear from pure observation in the urban centres, particularly Dubai, that many of the new cultural icons have been taken from the West. That increasingly there is a strong desire amongst the younger generation to assume the Western identity and values that they see around them and through the media. The advent of tourism and its promotion has also led to Western styles of entertainment. The short term introduction of foreign non-Arab and non-Muslim tourists who have a lesser respect and understanding of the social mores, which to a certain extent, the expatriate has conformed. The area of dress is one example where reasonable modesty in the outfits worn by the females has increasingly given way to the more revealing fashions of the West particularly aided by the warm climate. This is certainly the case in parts of Dubai to the point that topless bathing on the beaches has been occasionally witnessed. This tends to be confined to the tourists from the Eastern Block countries who have been arriving in increasing numbers since the collapse of the USSR and the relaxing of their travel restrictions.

The above is merely an example of the way in which alien cultural influences are affecting the everyday situation in the UAE. There must be a certain irony in the

fact that under the colonial rule of the British there was no imposition of an alien culture, administration, education or language and that post that period the de facto language is now English and that the trappings of the West are shaping both the culture of the local inhabitants and the appearance of their world.

It is clear in the case of the UAE that in the process of accepting the material and technological advances of the modern world through their own process of modernisation that the traditional cultural base of the area has changed in an irreversible manner. An obvious change can be seen in the new lifestyle that the national leads with all the trappings of a modern world. A more subtle change can be found in the changing family from an extended one to a nuclear one and the consequent shift of responsibility for traditional areas of caring and welfare to the state. There has also been a shift in responsibility for educating the youth, from family and the local *mulla*, to the state with its more secular approach and predominantly expatriate work force with their own differing cultural values. It has been recognised all along by the rulers that education is important in helping to prepare the indigenous inhabitants for the differences and changes. Moreover, education will continue to be used to help them cope with change and to use it effectively. Secularisation of the society is an increasing feature of this process and the UAE has reached an important crossroads on how to manage this process in the future, it cannot turn back. It may have caught the planners and decision-makers by surprise initially, but by looking to their neighbours the UAE can see that the question has to be addressed now. However, although a characteristic of the Gulf states is their high percentage of aliens in the population it is only in the UAE where the national will remain in the minority for many years to come. Technology, education and reduced mortality within the local population may increase numbers and reduce reliance on foreign manpower, but, it is the writer's contention that the citizens of the UAE will always remain in the minority because the maintenance of the modern base that they have created and continue to develop will require, for the foreseeable future, a work force that is greater than the indigenous population itself. This would still be the case even if

the society secularised and traditional values regarding the female's position changed and the female manpower resource potential was fully realised. The dilemma for the UAE is how it will manage this future because, increasingly, it is allowing the expatriate's time in the UAE to become more stable and long term.

The traditional tribal background of the local population was non-assimilative due to their history of isolation and rivalry. It is surprising how quickly these same people have learnt, understood and absorbed the modern ways and adapted to the new UAE. Perhaps this has been helped by their traditional polyvalency. They cannot turn back but as a minority in their own country it may well be that they need to identify strongly with the past to keep a grip on the very different world that they now live in. In many ways, when viewing the large urban centres, there appears little of the past tradition and culture in them. They are cosmopolitan modern cities and the locals appear to have assimilated this international culture into their own. However, the ghetto mentality still persists with the locals and each of the major nationality groups still retaining many of the trappings of their own culture. The area is multicultural but with many national groups absorbing not the local or Islamic culture but that of the modern secular world, particularly that of the West. Education has enabled the locals to learn English and has accordingly given them access to the various people living in the region through this de facto language. It has also given access to the Western media and its secularising effect. This has helped the process of assimilating the characteristics and materiality of the modern world as they aspire to new ideals and new goals that were previously unthought of or unachievable.

It must not be forgotten that all of this has happened in a mere thirty years or less and that the continued need for a life-long education is important. In fact, it is important that all of the locals develop new skills as the traditional mode of accepting that which they were told by their elders and the rote style of learning, where they could easily be the repositories of the necessary knowledge to survive, is no longer applicable. Further cultural changes and evolution of the

education system itself to modern methods will be necessary to prepare them for what is to come. They can no longer expect to hold sufficient knowledge to deal with their future world. They will need to become more specialist, as has started to happen, but will also need to develop those questioning and problem-solving skills that will help to direct them to the source of information and enable them to use it, if they are to effectively deal with their future. Islamic values may suffer in this process and so it is important within this country that these traditional values also evolve. There is no longer the need for a full social order as was the case when Islam was conceived. The systems have now been established and a more tolerant order will need to continue to prevail to allow the UAE to take full advantage of international opportunity to their own end. A more tolerant order but one that continues to offer a moral directive, such as is the case in Christianity. After all, many of the driving forces of fundamentalism are trying to halt the assimilation of the more relaxed Western morals. The challenge to education in particular is how can this be achieved in the UAE without running the risk of a fundamentalist backlash as is the case elsewhere in the Arab and Islamic world. The UAE cannot return to inappropriate ways that would ultimately lead to a decline in what has been achieved by rejecting everything 'Western'.

It is clear that the discovery of oil has made a substantial difference to the appearance of the UAE and that it has had an effect on its culture. Oil revenues have fuelled the modernising processes that have shaped the area and have catapulted the poverty stricken indigenous population from relative obscurity onto the world stage where they now enjoy one of the highest per capita incomes. The UAE, as a small country, is now, by its own making, dependent on the industrialised world and its future lies in its interrelationship with it and the rest of the world whether it be in politics, commerce, technology or knowledge. Its survival will depend upon this relationship which it must learn to manage and manipulate.

Education can be seen as a common strand running through all of the above and importantly it has endowed and will continue to endow the indigenous people with the ever evolving skills and knowledge necessary to enable them to reflect on the past and address the future. It will allow them to find the right pragmatic balance between their traditional social mores and the demands of their modern multicultural society.

NOTES AND REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER SIX

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HEARD-BEY, Frauke (1982),
From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates,
(London, Longman).

2. Ibid, pp. 24-25.

3. *Dhow:* wooden Arab sailing ship much used in the Arabian Gulf and also in the trade between the Gulf and the Indian subcontinent. Still in use today.

4. HEARD-BEY, Frauke (1982), op. cit., p. 26.
For an analysis and breakdown of the various tribes, their distribution and dominance around the time of the Second World War see ibid. pp. 27 onwards.

5. SADIK, Muhammad T. and SNAVELY, William P. (1972),
Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates,
(Lexington, Massachusetts, Lexington Books).

6. TOMKINSON, Michael (1975),
The United Arab Emirates,
(Hammamet, Tunisia and London, Michael Tomkinson Publishing), p. 130.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid., Sharjah on p. 130: Dubai on p. 131.

9. Ibid., p. 100 also see HEARD-BEY, Frauke (1982).

10. SADIK, Muhammad T. and SNAVELY, William P. (1972), op. cit., p. 119.

11. Ibid.

12. HEARD-BEY, Frauke (1982), op. cit., p. 122.

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14. SADIK, Muhammad T. and SNAVELY, William P. (1972), op. cit., p. 152.

15. TOMKINSON, Michael (1975), op. cit., p. 58.

16. HEARD-BEY, Frauke (1982), op. cit., p. 19.

17. These comments developed from those first seen in:
AJAMI, Fouad (1981),
The Arab Predicament: Arab Political Thought and Practice Since 1967,
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), pp. 64-65.

18. HEARD-BEY, Frauke (1982), op. cit., p. 154.

19. Ruthven states that the imposition of a ban on alcoholic drink in Sharjah in

October, 1985 was two days after a visit by the Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Muhammad Ali Besharati. The writer is unaware of pressure from Iran and suspects that the timing was coincidental. See:
RUTHVEN, Malise, "Islamic Politics in the Middle East" in:
The Middle East and North Africa: 1987,
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20. GULF NEWS, 11 March, 1994, p. 5, "Saudi Arabia bans satellite TV dishes", citing Reuter as the source. The reason given was that Saudi Arabia "was seeking to defend its religious and social mores".

GULF NEWS, 10 April, 1994, p. 8, "Ban on satellite TV dishes faces criticism".
Reported from Teheran (AFP) citing the *Jahan-e-Eslam* daily newspaper. The report also goes on to comment that some 50,000 satellite dishes had been installed in Teheran and other major cities since "the fashion took off last autumn" (1993). *Salam,* another daily newspaper said some 400 dishes were being installed in Teheran daily.

21. SOFFAN, Linda Usra (1980),
The Women of the United Arab Emirates,
(London, Croom Helm), p. 9.

22. Ibid.

23. HEARD-BEY, Frauke (1982), op. cit., p. 163.

24. Ibid., p. 144.

25. SOFFAN, Linda Usra (1980), p. 19.

26. Ibid., p. 14 who cites:
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ANSHEN, Ruth N (1949) (Ed),
The Family: Its Function and Destiny,
(New York, Harper and Brothers), pp. 45-7.

27. ABDULLAH, Eman; AL BAIK, Duraid and KEGAHATIAN, Fe, "Marriages of 'inconvenience'" in: GULF NEWS, 18 September, 1993, p. 3, a special report on inter-marriages between cousins in the UAE.

28. SOFFAN, Linda Usra (1980), p. 13.

29. Ibid., p. 16.

30. Ibid., p. 15.

31. Ibid., p. 14, who cites:
SCHACHT, Joseph (1955), "Pre-Islamic Background and Early Development of Jurisprudence" in:
KHADDURI, Maid and LIEBESNY, Herbert (Eds),
Law in the Middle East,
(Washington, DC, The Middle East Institute), pp. 28-33.

32. SOFFAN, Linda Usra (1980), p. 14.

33. Ibid., p. 15.

34. Sura IV verse 34, cited in ibid., p. 15.

35. Ibid., p. 29.

36. This was particularly the case in determining the custody of the children in divorce. See ibid., p. 30.

37. Ibid., p. 30.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid.

40. MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND CULTURE (1993),
    United Arab Emirates 1993,
    (Abu Dhabi, Ministry of Information and Culture), pp. 106-7.

41. SOFFAN, Linda Usra (1980), p. 53; also widely recorded in the local press.

42. Manpower, mankind are typical sexist words that are generally applied to include both male and female in their meaning. However, in the case of manpower there is possibly a strong indication in the popular use of the word of the situation where the female's contribution to the home and family business was rarely given its full status in past active 'manpower' policies and that it has grown out of the policies that were initially directed to the male. Where possible in this thesis the writer has tried not to use sexist terminology.

43. See comment earlier in this chapter under tribal heritage.

44. MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND CULTURE (1993), op. cit., p. 107.

45. See previous chapters.

46. SOFFAN, Linda Usra (1980), p. 50.

47. SOFFAN, Linda Usra (1980), p. 19.

48. Homes for the elderly are now beginning to appear across the Emirates. also see 'Special Reports' in:
    GULF NEWS, 26 September, 1992, p. 3;
    GULF NEWS, 8 October, 1994, p. 3.

49. SOFFAN, Linda Usra (1980), p. 35.

50. Orbit Satellite Television and Radio Network advertisement placed in GULF NEWS, 27 April, 1994, p. 13.

PART TWO

CHAPTER SEVEN

DEMOGRAPHIC IMBALANCE AND MANPOWER ISSUES: HUMAN RESOURCES

It is a characteristic of all countries that their developmental plans and demands often exceed their finite resources. The management of these resources, therefore, becomes an important issue. The United Arab Emirates is no exception and although it enjoys an apparent wealth beyond the dreams of many developing nations it does, nevertheless, have finite resources and, in fact, is presently experiencing diminishing revenues from its oil.

These resources should also include those human resources that are within the country. The UAE embarked on its process of development on the discovery of oil in the 1960s and, in common with most developing countries, suffered, at the time, from a dearth of expertise and trained manpower. As a small country with no history of state education or past development to draw from or to build on this shortage was extreme and resulted in a massive influx of expatriate labour. This was necessary to man all areas of the development from specialist expertise to manual labour.

This influx of expatriates has continued unabated for the past three decades with the increasing numbers actually fuelling demands for more expatriates in terms of the service industry. Within no time at all the indigenous population soon found itself in the minority. At present with a population approaching two million the national make-up is a mere twenty per cent. It has only been in recent years that the federal authorities have seriously reviewed this situation. In the last few years the rhetoric of the federal ministers has started to turn into some form of action to slow the process down and to start to reduce the UAE's reliance on expatriate manpower through the process of nationalising the work force: Emiratisation.

It would be unfair on the federal authorities to say that this was not considered previously. Actually it was, but it is only now that the management of the situation is beginning to be realised in a tangible form. Clearly, with no history of schooling other than the *kuttab* it takes time to introduce and establish modern educational provision. It also takes several years before the benefits of schooling and vocational training are felt in a country's work force. Fortunately in the UAE's case, and as a result of the oil revenues, it did not have to embark on a process of industrialisation to generate the wealth to develop the education system. It had the luxury, in a period of increasing oil prices, production and revenues, of developing its educational provision at the same time as starting its physical development and modernisation. The process of developing educational provision was given particular momentum by the Emirate's independence in 1972.

Therefore, given the fact that schooling and training is a relatively new phenomenon for the UAE national of only twenty years, it is quite natural that they are only now starting to feel the benefits of the provision within their work force. However, the writer contends that only in the last decade has there been a conscious effort to address the UAE's specific manpower requirements through educational means. Previously, as the provision was initiated in the various emirates the aims were more in keeping with the popular international notion of the time: Universal Primary Education. This was followed up with the introduction of limited university education that was, perhaps, initially more about developing a symbol of national success than addressing the manpower requirement. This may be a cynical point of view, but when money appears to be no obstacle and there is a strong desire to be recognised as a modern state many things are quickly assumed without question. The UAE, therefore, did not possess a cadre of experienced indigenous administrators in its run-up to independence mainly due to the fact that each emirate operated in an autonomous and traditional mode with little need for an overall structure. This was a situation encouraged by the British presence of the time. It could be argued that the inauguration of the

TABLE 7.1
Population Growth in the Trucial States/United Arab Emirates
1965 - 1991

Population	1965	1968	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1991
Male		110,806		386,427	720,000	1,052,577	1,115,000	1,146,000
Female		68,320		171,460	322,000	569,887	729,000	736,000
Total	**121,000**	**179,126**	**225,000**	**557,887**	**1,042,720**	**1,622,464**	**1,844,000**	**1,909,000**
Abu Dhabi	25,000	46,500	60,000	211,812	449,000	670,125	772,000	798,000
Dubai	60,000	59,000	75,000	183,187	278,000	419,104	484,000	501,000
Sharjah	15,000	31,500	40,000	78,790	159,000	268,723	302,000	314,000
Ajman	2,500	4,200	5,500	16,690	36,100	64,318	74,000	76,000
Umm al Qaiwain	3,000	3,700	4,500	6,908	12,300	29,229	26,000	27,000
Ras Al Khaimah	12,000	24,500	30,000	43,845	73,700	116,470	125,000	130,000
Fujairah	3,500	9,700	10,000	16,655	32,200	54,425	61,000	63,000

TABLE 7.2
Population Growth in the Trucial States/United Arab Emirates.
Females as a Percentage of the Total Population,
1968 - 1991

Year	Male	Female	Total	Female as % of Pop.
1968	110,806	68,320	179,126	38.14
1975	386,427	171,460	557,887	30.73
1980	720,000	322,000	1,042,720	30.88
1985	1,052,577	569,887	1,622,464	35.12
1990	1,115,000	729,000	1,844,000	39.53
1991	1,146,000	736,000	1,909,000	38.55

Notes: perctages deduced from figures given in Table 7.1.

Sources for Table 7.1 and 7.2:
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1968 and 1970: SADIK, M.T. & SNAVELY, W.P. (1972), Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, (Lexington, Lexington Books), p. 15 and p. 65.
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university was a major watershed in the production of the first group of personnel where a certain level of education was important. However, specific training of the individual would have taken place after leaving the university and once in the employment position.

A manpower driven demographic imbalance

More specific comment on the relationship between manpower and training will be made a little later. It is important at this point to address the demography of the UAE as this does have tremendous bearing on the present situation in the Emirates.

As mentioned, the benefit of oil revenues allowed the establishment and development of infrastructures, administrations, security forces and education and so forth to take place in parallel. In the early 1970s the massive price rises in oil imposed on the industrial world by the Arab oil producers offered the UAE increasing revenues which were further enhanced by increased production. Of particular importance is the fact that this gave the UAE the opportunity to buy-in any of the expertise and labour that it required. This facilitated a massive influx of expatriates who were needed in all aspects of the development from consultants and administrators through to labourers and the associated services necessary to keep the whole thing afloat. The substantial growth in population can be seen in Table 7.1. This growth has effectively continued unabated even though, in real terms, the oil revenues have declined. In fact, the Emirates, as with its neighbouring Gulf states, have now moved into deficit public spending budgets. However, development in the Emirates has continued and in Dubai it appears in almost frenzied proportions as the emirate desperately tries to diversify its economy before its oil runs out. On top of that the sheer maintenance of what each emirate has created requires a continued expatriate presence although the initial skills to set-up the various projects and developments have now been replaced by different ones needed to maintain them.

The vast majority of the imported labour was male on bachelor contracts. This very quickly led to an imbalance in the gender make-up of the population with males commanding some 60 to 70 per cent as can be seen in Table 7.2. This imbalance is a characteristic of each of the emirates and the Gulf states generally although it does tend to be a particularly enhanced figure in the United Arab Emirates. It is also, possibly, a general characteristic of wealthy small states, whereas, the poorer small states often suffer a converse situation as the men folk are required to leave the country to work elsewhere.

The above does raise two points that are worthy of mention. Firstly, in the case of the UAE and the wealthy small Gulf States, this imbalance does lead to an outflow of financial resources as all the states allow uninhibited remittance of earnings. In the poorer small states of the world an opposite situation often exists with an outflow of labour but an inflow of funds highlighting a differing small country characteristic. Secondly, this outflow of personnel from the poorer countries does have educational and training implications which need to be addressed. For example, it is clear, in the Middle East, that Jordan is an exporting country in terms of an educated and trained labour. This, has become a valuable currency earner through remitted funds which are now an integral element of the Jordanian economy. This would hold true also for countries such as Egypt, Yemen, Lebanon, Pakistan, India and the Philippines all of whom are major contributors to the Gulf states' manpower. Where families and countries alike grow to rely on these funds the larger ones can recover should they be lost through changes in political attitude or policy. The small country or a regional area of a large country is, however, unlikely to recover easily. This was particularly the case after the Gulf War once Iraq was ousted from Kuwait and it started to rebuild. Palestinians and Yemenis who were seen to sympathise with the Iraqi occupation were excluded from the new work force in Kuwait. Moreover, this had a major knock-on effect throughout the Gulf states generally which resulted in certain rejection unless these people were well established in the country. In fact,

it also resulted in the governments of the Gulf states withdrawing their generous funding for the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO)[1]. Ironically, this may well have forced the PLO into dialogue with Israel and the subsequent peace declaration which, perhaps, adds a little more stability to the region.

However, of importance is the fact that many poor and developing countries do depend on remittances to support their economies. This in itself has implications for their educational and training provisions, particularly as the Gulf states move towards Arabisation and localising their work force.

It has now been established that there is a gender imbalance in the demography of the Gulf states and that this figure is particularly enhanced in the Emirates. Furthermore, it is worth noting that there is also the characteristic of a relatively young population in the same states as the majority of the expatriates fall into the twenty to fifty age range. In the UAE an employment visa is rarely extended beyond sixty years of age and as there is no right of abode other than through being a national the older make-up of the population reverts to that more in favour of the local. In recent years due to education, a higher standard of living and health care this figure within the local population is also an increasing figure, as too, is the birth and infant figure with the UAE's reduced infant mortality. The national, nevertheless, remains in the minority and even though their numbers are actually increasing, as yet, this is not at a rate that is surpassing the overall rate of population growth of the expatriates.

Another important characteristic of the population growth is that it has been at its highest around the urban centres and accordingly the majority of the UAE's population is based in the capitals of each emirate. This focus, which is not uncommon in the process of development, does, however, manifest itself in a City State phenomenon which is echoed in Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait. It could be said that Abu Dhabi is an exception with its second significant population centre of Al Ain although it must be pointed out that the majority of the emirate's

population is still based around the capital city. Initially this phenomenon was the result of geographical conditions. However, as these centres have grown their attraction in terms of employment, improved and modern standards of living and increasing facilities would have been difficult for the indigenous rural population to resist.

How does this affect formal schooling?

Now that the country has completed its programme of formal schooling for provision from kindergarten through to secondary it can be seen that no major or disturbing imbalances at a local or regional level exists. At this level the goal of urban/rural equality has been achieved. As Table 5.1 shows there is also equality for male and female as can be seen by the number of institutions, classes and enrolment. By reviewing the Table and allowing for the expatriate enrolment in the system it can be seen that there is still no noticeable discrepancy. Interestingly, at the tertiary level of educational provision, and in particular the UAE University, it can be seen that there is an increasing and greater female enrolment. This is more likely the result of social mores. The modernising forces of education have allowed for a certain amount of emancipation of the female and the UAE University, as opposed to an external institution, is a 'safe' option for the female in the eyes of the family, particularly the father. Traditional attitudes cannot be changed overnight but clearly the university enrolment is a strong indication that these attitudes have changed significantly in the last two decades. It is also an indication of the changing roles of the UAE female and the increasing opportunities available to her.

The UAE: a multicultural society

The manpower and rapid development in the UAE has, therefore, created a gender imbalance and placed the indigenous population in the minority. It has also created a noticeably cosmopolitan population drawing people from most parts of the world. This is true for all of the emirates as can be seen by any visitor to the cities. At the same time, due to their striking national dress, it is also

obvious that the national is in the minority. However, perhaps the most noticeable characteristic is that the majority of the population make-up is afforded to Asians, particularly those from the subcontinent: Indians, Pakistanis, Sri Lankans and so forth. This highlights the strong historic trading links between the two areas. In recent years many of the lower paid, yet higher profile employment positions such as in shops and food outlets, have been filled by Filipinos. This has resulted in the UAE becoming second only to Saudi Arabia in terms of employment opportunity for Filipinos [2]. This noticeable influx appears to have taken place post the USA's military withdrawal from the Philippines and the subsequent loss of associated revenues and job creation there. A reminder for those small countries which court the superpowers to establish strategic military bases on their territory of the need to consider the consequences to the economy when they withdraw.

Another important factor in the influx of contract labour is that workers are often overqualified for the lowly position that they take up. Many may have degrees from their home country. However, it is important to note that although the positions in the UAE are low paid when viewed in a UAE/home country context the rewards are significant. It is, therefore, regarded as a preferable choice compared to staying in their homeland and experiencing unemployment and even poverty. For example, in the case of the European the differentials in earnings have diminished to the point of near parity [3] yet for the Asian worker earnings can be ten times better.

Interestingly, the multi-cultural make-up of the UAE has little adverse effect on the UAE and rarely affects state educational provision. The common language amongst the races is English, albeit pigeon English that many of these people communicate in. On the surface there appears to be little conflict between the different groups. Every indication is that, through commonality of purpose of ultimately improving their personal conditions and lifestyle, a certain amount of pseudo homogeneity exists. In reality they pull together in different groups

often based on national and regional origin. This results in a ghetto mentality and clearly manifests itself as defined areas in which certain nationalities tend to live, although in recent years this has started to breakdown as all nationalities are aspiring to a cosmopolitan middle class. The converse of this, and a less savoury aspect, is the characteristic of work camps based on the outskirts of the cities where the factory workers, construction workers and the manual labourers live. In the Sonapur area of Dubai it is reported that some 100,000 construction workers live in the most basic of conditions [4]. The conditions of these camps can be appalling by Western standards yet the potential externalised rewards for the workers must be an overwhelming factor in them tolerating the situation and not returning home at the end of their contract. Needless to say, obvious inequalities in the expatriate work force are not addressed by the UAE where Trade Unions and the such like are not allowed. In fact, strong public dissent from any element of the expatriate population would certainly result in an almost immediate repatriation for the vocal. This allows the employers to adopt a take it or leave it attitude which appears to continue generally unabated in most employment sectors and does tend to be a characteristic of employment in this part of the world. It would be unfair not to point out that as the UAE's federal institutions mature those who have the wherewithal and the financial resources can take an employer to court. This is, however, an unlikely situation as the employee's visa would have been cancelled and an illegal residence status would have prevailed thereby forcing the individual to leave the country.

Profit motives are often the driving force which result in the aforementioned situation and are responsible for the major discrepancies in salaries and conditions between the various employment sectors; and levels within the same sector which can be extreme between worker and manager. This is a consequence of allowing market forces policy in the employment market where the work force is drawn from the international arena and local legislation is still in its infancy.

This does have some implications in educational terms, for example, consistency of approach to a particular task from the cosmopolitan work force, particularly in terms of quality control and health and safety issues. This on the whole, as in many countries, would fall into the employer's sphere. However, monitoring of these areas would need to be instigated by the federal ministries and become their responsibility. This requires training in its inspection force and the establishment of standards and codes of practice. In this the Higher Colleges of Technology (HCT) have already started to become active albeit in only a modest way [5]. Although this must be seen as a qualitative improvement it is still important to ask who trains and monitors the inspectors especially bearing in mind their diverse national backgrounds and their transient situations. Early Emiratisation of these areas may, at the very least, offer some form of consistency in this important area of government responsibility if international standards are to be aspired to.

Educationally, the training of the national, not the expatriate, is a characteristic of the education system. Its relationship to the manpower requirement is, therefore, important and will be discussed later in this chapter.

The domestic help phenomenon

One result that the influx of manpower has had on the region is the phenomenon of maids and houseboys in the home. This is a characteristic of the Gulf area generally and not just the Emirates. It could be argued that this phenomenon is enhanced as a result of increased wealth but in its basic form it is merely an extension of the system of slaves which existed within the wealthier families of Arabia even before Islam. Interestingly, the Qur'an neither advocates nor outlaws the institution of slavery [6]. Domestic slaves became part of certain family structures and they were cared for and provided for by the family and as such they were also part of the same tribal affiliation. The difference in status usually only mattered when it came to marriage where the tribal Arab would not normally marry a slave girl [7]. The situation did start to change post 1930s when

the pearl industry, which had a large number of slaves, began to wane and due to the ensuing poverty many slaves were liberated. However, a general lack of opportunity resulted in many slaves opting to continue their role within the family where, at least, their daily needs were still catered for. Heard-Bey states that in most cases the families with slaves only had one or two domestic servants.

Slave trading was a characteristic of the area and although the British thought that they had suppressed it by the 1930s there are reports of it continuing in the 1940s and early 1950s [8]. Apparently the trading was being fuelled by demand in the increasing wealthy and developing Saudi Arabia.

The houseboy/girl phenomenon of the Gulf area could be viewed, therefore, as an extension of the domestic servant practice with the only difference being that these workers now choose to come; albeit often forced into the position by poverty and lack of opportunity in their home country. A recent report by the Ministry of Labour and Social affairs stated that 146,000 domestic workers were employed in the 80,000 local families in the Emirates accounting for 1.83 domestics per family. It continued to state that 45.5 per cent of the local families employed more than one domestic worker with 19.1 per cent employing three or more and of that figure, some families employed ten or more [9]; a clear expansion on the previous situation and a strong indicator of the extreme affluence that the local family in the UAE now enjoys.

This characteristic of life in the UAE and the Gulf generally does throw up some interesting thoughts and concerns. Of particular interest educationally is the influence that the domestic worker phenomenon has on the early development of the young child. The contemporary trend in the local family is that they rely heavily on the housemaid in the rearing of the children. This also appears to be a developing rather than declining situation as the traditional extended family gives way, through the modernising forces of development, to a smaller nuclear family where both parents can lead busy lives away from the children. The implications

for the development of the child that is basically being reared by someone who is not of their own culture and is not a native speaker are obvious. In the case of the formative years prior to the introduction of formal schooling the implications must be profound particularly in the area of language development where the intense contact is with someone who may speak nothing more than pigeon Arabic or English. In 1992 Laila Helmi, a psychologist working for the Ministry of Education, stated that "it is my experience that a lot of students who are thought to be mentally retarded are actually suffering from environmental linguistic confusion" going on to say that "it was particularly true of the student who was under the influence of an outsider like a maid, at the time he was beginning to talk and learn his mother tongue"[10].

A 1984 thesis by the psychologist Sultana Othman Yousef did raise some other interesting information. Her Masters thesis which involved a random survey of 118 families revealed that of the 258 domestic servants (2.2 per family); 23 per cent of the housemaids were illiterate; 24 per cent held preparatory certificates and that 11 per cent had primary certificates. Forty-two per cent could read and write compared to only 13.8 per cent of the housewives/mothers with similar abilities. The average age of the housemaid was 28 years and only 28 per cent of those in the study had remained with their sponsor for more than two years. Of the sample a mere 11 per cent had what Yousef considered good command of Arabic; 48 per cent with medium knowledge and 41 per cent with very weak knowledge of the language [11]. This supports the writer's argument and concern about language development in the young national; it also raises a second concern, that of the duration of the house maid. 28 per cent had been with their sponsor for more than two years but put another way a large 72 per cent were with them for less than three years and some 37.5 per cent stayed in the position for just one year. This raises the problem of continuity and stability in the early years for the young child which has attracted little attention in the rhetoric, perhaps because admittance of the concern would also imply that the mother was not fulfilling her Islamic duty to the full with

regards to child rearing. This is a subject that is perhaps worthy of a future study.

Clearly there is a comprehensive reliance on maids amongst the local population and due to the busy modern lifestyles of some families the maids can become the substitute mothers [12]. This new phenomenon has caused some concern amongst the country's leaders to the point of the President raising the possible adverse effects of it in his own rhetoric. Sheikh Zayed has also impressed the need to return to Islamic family values in this matter and has appealed to nationals to reduce their reliance on domestic help. However, this has seen little change in the writer's years in the UAE and it is clear that this is concomitant with the process of modernisation itself and will require severe legislation to change it. Such legislation that has started to appear is only effective for the expatriate, where a similar situation exists. The expatriate must now prove that they earn above a certain salary before employing a housemaid/boy and must also pay a tax equivalent to the domestic help's annual salary before sponsoring them. Introducing the same legislation for the local would be politically inexpedient.

Poor behaviour is a further observable trait of the young which possibly is a result of the housemaid/boy phenomenon; children do play up their housemaids/boys who are often powerless to control them. In the eyes of the children, domestic staff lack the authority of the parents which is then further reinforced by the attitudes of the parents themselves to the housemaid/boy. This manifests itself in unacceptable attitudes in, what many believe to be, a pampered youth and young adult. This is of concern to certain locals and is attracting some rhetoric from prominent leaders in the UAE [13] and is worthy of further study. The question of increasingly unacceptable attitudes from some nationals towards their expatriate teachers has already been raised in a preceding chapter. It would be interesting to study the relationship between the two.

Changing employment pattern for the traditional local

The influx of very cheap manual labour combined with the modernisation of the traditional employment areas such as fishing and agriculture would have also accelerated an unemployment problem; particularly in the poorer non-oil producing emirates in the early years of independence. This would have had implications for the older nationals without education whose employment prospects would have diminished considerably. At the time they were illiterate, untrained and extremely traditional and therefore surplus to requirements. The establishment of the adult education centres would have addressed the situation to a certain extent. However, there appears no data to prove that in the case of the older menfolk that the situation did improve and the writer would suggest that these older people would have withdrawn into patterns of family and state-sponsored unemployment. The tribal nature of the society would have facilitated this and offered certain social support to the unemployed. This can often be witnessed in the federal or quasi governmental organisations where friends often visit and socialise with the national employees during the working hours. Because the expatriate underling often does much of the work this situation is, therefore, tolerable and not a problem. In fact, a whole new industry has arisen out of this very personalised bureaucracy. Employment opportunities have arisen for the company Public Relations Officer (PRO), the 'Mr Fix-its', where personal contacts allow for ways around the apparently never ending bureaucracy, particularly, for shorter routes to the necessary official rubber stamps which are so often a characteristic of these types of developing societies. However, the modernising effect of education will change these attitudes as the national assumes a more productive position in the employment arena.

A personalised employment market

A characteristic of small countries is the personalised nature of the decision making and employment areas [14] which can also be a characteristic of developing countries. However, nepotism can only be changed on the part of

FIGURE 7.1
Governmental Organisation in Abu Dhabi as of July 1970

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                          ┌──────────────┐
                          │  The Ruler   │
                          └──────┬───────┘
              ┌──────────────────┴──────────────────┐
       ┌─────────────┐                        ┌─────────────┐
       │  Planning   │                        │ The Emiri   │
       │   Board     │                        │   Diwan     │
       └─────────────┘                        └─────────────┘
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Electricity *	Water *	Health *	Education *	Foreign Affairs *
Labour & Social Affairs *	Information & Tourism *	Police & Public Security *	Finance *	Public Works *
Agriculture & Animal Resources *	Petroleum & Industry *	Ports *	Post *	Personnel *
Municipality Abu Dhabi *	Municipality Al Ain *	Defence *	Development	Justice *
Nationality Passports & Residence	Labour Dept. Al Ain *	Courts, Eastern Province	Customs *	Telecommuni- cations

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                          ┌──────────────┐
                          │    Civil     │
                          │  Aviation  * │
                          └──────────────┘
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Note * Starred units are those headed by members of the Royal Family

Source: Figure as found in SADIK, M.T. & SNAVELY, W.P. (1972), *Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates*, (Lexington, Lexington Books), p. 161 which was compiled from the authors' survey.

261

FIGURE 7.2
Governmental Organisation in Dubai as of July 1970

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                    ┌──────────────┐
                    │  The Ruler   │
                    └──────┬───────┘
                           │      ┌──────────────┐
                           │      │  The Emiri   │
                           │      │    Diwan     │
                           │      └──────────────┘
        ┌──────────┬───────┼──────────┬──────────┐
   ┌─────────┐ ┌─────────┐ ┌─────────┐ ┌─────────┐
   │ Lands & │ │Municipa-│ │ Customs │ │Oil Affairs│
   │Property │ │ lity    │ │    *    │ │          │
   │    *    │ │    *    │ │         │ │          │
   └─────────┘ └─────────┘ └─────────┘ └─────────┘
        ┌──────────┬──────────┐
   ┌─────────┐ ┌─────────┐ ┌─────────┐
   │Accounts │ │Passports│ │ Police  │
   │         │ │& Immigra│ │    *    │
   │         │ │  tion   │ │         │
   └─────────┘ └─────────┘ └─────────┘
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Note * Starred units are those headed by members of the Royal Family
Source: Figure as found in SADIK, M.T. & SNAVELY, W.P. (1972), *Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates*, (Lexington, Lexington Books), p. 163 which was compiled from the authors' survey.

FIGURE 7.3
Governmental Organisation in Sharjah as of July 1970

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                          ┌──────────────┐
                          │  The Ruler   │
                          └──────┬───────┘
┌────────┬────────┬────────┬─────┼────────┬────────┐
│Air&Sea │Electri-│Labour& │Educa-  │Finance │Customs │
│Ports   │city&   │Soc.Aff.│tion    │Dept    │Dept    │
│Dept    │Water   │Dept    │Dept    │        │        │
└────────┴────────┴────────┴────────┴────────┴────────┘
┌────────┬────────┬────────┬────────┬────────┐
│Petroeum│Police  │Post    │Justice │Sharjah │Lands&  │
│&Min.Aff│Dept    │Dept    │Dept    │Municip.│Surveyng│
│Dept    │        │        │        │        │Dept    │
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Source: Figure as found in SADIK, M.T. & SNAVELY, W.P. (1972), *Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates*, (Lexington, Lexington Books), p. 163 which was compiled from the authors' survey.

the national in these small countries through educating and modernising the indigenous population itself. The UAE is a good example of this and over the last decade there has been a noticeable shift from nepotism and very personalised appointments towards some semblance of meritocracy which can, to some extent, be seen in the government appointments. Figures 7.1 and 7.2 shows the situation regarding the personalised nature of appointments in Sharjah and Abu Dhabi just before independence. The figures allude to the heads of each department although by the very nature of the tribal society reward for loyalty would have been bestowed on all of those in favour or on whom favour would have been courted at all levels of the government sectors. As can be seen in the Abu Dhabi example twenty-three of the twenty-six departments/ministries were headed by members of the royal family. At such an early time in the emirate's development, where schooling had just started and where members of the royal family were discouraged from taking their schooling overseas by the late ruler Sheikh Shatibut [15], it is unlikely that the appointees would have had relevant education and experience in their areas of responsibility. A review of the appointments would highlight fewer sheikhs in these present positions as they are slowly being filled by educated and trained nationals.

To help to explain the traditional situation it is important to note that the tribal systems in the various emirates and the region were such that the ruler's position and security was as a result of the acquiescence of the tribal members. Although the leader may have been born into the ruling family, nevertheless, as the leader/ruler he still had to prove himself to the tribe to command their respect. He was expected, in return for support, to be benevolent and afford favours to his tribal members. Tribal society was, therefore, status-orientated rather than function-orientated [16]. Accordingly, administrative appointments in the governmental departments of the various emirates were more usually afforded on the grounds of loyalty rather than competence. The result of this was that many key positions in the formative period of the UAE were filled with

individuals who often lacked training and experience. It was not for their function that their salary was paid but more as their share of the oil revenues [17]. As mentioned above, this filtered down from the top through the various levels. The personalised nature of the appointments allowed further personalising of the decision-making process to the point that apart from personal and family considerations entering the process, it was not unusual to establish a new department simply to justify the appointment of a favoured person [18].

Understandably this system led to overmanning and administrative gaps which widened as development took place and the functions of the departments became more sophisticated. This resulted in a style of administration that can lead to over staffing to the point of empire-building with unclear definitions of aims and objectives; an inadequate and inefficient organisation in extreme cases. Through the ethnocentric eyes of a Westerner the system would appear corrupt, inefficient and rife with nepotism. Fortunately the wealth factor in the UAE allowed the import of expatriate expertise to compensate for this characteristic and consequently this would have not just papered over the cracks but also contributed to the impressive and continued development of the Emirates. However, one other contributing inhibitor was that a great deal of the imported expertise would have come from countries with a similar pattern and/or a long period of all pervasive colonialism with the consequent adoption of a traditional labour intensive style of bureaucracy.

A move from status to function orientation in the public sector

The public sector is still the major source of employment opportunity for the national be it government ministries, the security forces, education and so on. In this the UAE is no different to other small and developing countries. However, within this area it is important to note that the national will often start at an elevated position assuming a managerial role without previous experience. Anything less, unless it offers an accelerated promotion route, would be frowned upon. This is in keeping with the social pressures created by the public's perception

and the low status afforded to manual work and vocational courses[19]. It is clear that the status orientated society still exists in the UAE. However, it would be wrong to suggest that the UAE is not now reaping some of the benefits of the education process. It is moving more towards function orientated public employment appointments and is creating a more productive national employee. A turning point in this appears to be around 1988 when the Chancellor of the UAE University, Sheikh Nahyan bin Mubark, spoke of the situation in the UAE where there were a considerable number of poorly qualified nationals "relatively high up the chain of command"[20].

> The question of revamping the structure of the civil service is currently under consideration by the National Committee on Manpower Planning. Various proposals are being evaluated and appropriate actions will be taken.[21]

A process of rationalisation was taking place that would certainly push the system towards a more function orientated one as well as make it more efficient. This is a trend that had previously taken place elsewhere in the small Gulf states.

The Higher Colleges of Technology: a turning point

This change in attitude and development was enhanced in 1988 by Sheikh Nahyan's inauguration of the first of the Higher Colleges of Technology for which he was the Acting Vice Chancellor. These are important institutions which were designed to produce a much needed cadre of local paraprofessionals who were not automatically being placed into high government office.

The Higher Colleges of Technology (HCT) are an obvious indication of the growing importance that the Federal government was starting to place on manpower planning and the need for educational institutions to be an integral part of the process. With the establishment of the HCTs the government also assumed the responsibility, in principle, for the necessary training programmes

in certain sectors. By wishing to work in partnership with the business world it removed, to some extent, the previous unstated onus that was placed on the private sector for training. In reality, perhaps it was the only way to introduce the national to the paraprofessional levels of the private sector where cheap trained labour could be easily imported. With an open economy and market forces principles prevailing, there was little incentive for companies to turn their profits over to employing and training a more expensive national. Legislation is the only way to combat these market forces and this is something that all of the Gulf states have realised as they consider employment opportunities and targets for their nationals.

The HCTs are also a good institutional example that could be held up to other small and developing countries as a way forward. To some extent they offer an alternative model to the expensive traditional university. The HCTs have been designed much on the North American community college model albeit they are still at a basic stage in their development. However, the introduction of these colleges is given prominence in this section of the thesis for two reasons. Firstly, that they are an example of a major shift in terms of state educational provision for the national. Secondly, that, not only do they herald a change in educational policy, but they are directly involved in social engineering aimed at changing traditional attitudes towards a national vis-à-vis employment and productivity.

Interestingly the UAE looked outside the Arab world when it sought to establish this level of education and training facility.

> It would obviously have been foolish to have ignored the experiences of other countries during the 1960s and 1970s, when hundreds of new colleges were being established all over the world. Representatives of the UAE examined college systems in several countries and assessed their relevance to the special case of the UAE. [22]

Educansult, the Canadian Education Consultancy Organisation, based in Toronto

was commissioned to help in the implementation of the HCT programme. Sheikh Nahyan is reported to have chosen the Ontario pattern of education because:

> .....of the close proximity the college has with the community. Every college has a governing body which is selected from the particular area, also every programme has its advisory committee......each college is flexible and versatile and responds to the needs of the area as soon as it is identified. It does not have to wait for approval from a centralised controlling body and takes its own decisions. [23]

Sheikh Nahyan also stated that the colleges:

> Will be offering continuing education programmes as part of their community service activities. Such programmes aim at the development and upgrading of skills in local national institutions....

> ....programmes are being developed to meet the urgent demands thrust upon us by the rapid changes in advanced technology and will enhance our abilities to face the challenge of the future, stressing the expeditious Emiratisation of the work force and providing varied educational opportunities that will satisfy the needs and aspirations of the individuals and maximising their contribution to society....

> ....the major fields of technical and technological education are: engineering technologies, business and data processing technologies, health and natural science technologies, and communication and public service technologies. We will have programmes in all of these areas in the Colleges.

> The engineering technologies include the options of civil, mechanical, chemical, electrical, electronic, microcomputer, aircraft, surveying and building and construction engineering technologies.

> The business technologies include the options of office systems and procedures, business administration, travel-tourism, hotel management, accounting, data processing, information system, and international trade and banking.

> The health science programmes aim at graduating skilled national paraprofessionals in the disciplines of nursing, medical laboratory technology,

physiotherapy, imaging technology, health records,
dental hygiene, respiratory technology and
pharmacy.

The communication studies division will offer
programmes in electronic media, including radio and
TV broadcasting and advertising, interior design and
graphic arts, graphics and offset printing, public
relations, the library technician field and technical
writing.

Due to technical limitations, only a small number of
these programmes are offered by the Colleges this
year. We plan to have all of these programmes
operational within the next two years....

....we are preparing legislation establishing the
Colleges' graduation certification as higher
educational degrees and specifying the expected
pay scale and benefits for the holders. In this
context, the higher diploma conferred by the
Colleges will be equivalent in pay and benefit to a
university degree. [24]

In the last six years the HCTs have certainly established themselves as an
integral part of the tertiary stage of UAE educational opportunity.
Understandably, some of the original aspirations of Sheikh Nahyan have still to
be realised. The HCTs are not yet community colleges in a true educational
sense offering a diverse range of courses that respond to local needs.
However, they have achieved a growing reputation within the UAE and have
worked hard to dispel the traditional perception of low status afforded vocational
courses. Importantly, the UAE has not just thrown money at the situation. The
institutions have started with a manageable base of courses and training
expertise which they have added to in a planned and controlled manner. This
past September (1994), for example, the communications programmes were
introduced and in the last couple of years the HCTs have produced their first
graduates who were placed into many private sector enterprises. However, the
term private sector is used reasonably loosely in this instance as to place a
graduate in Emirates airline is actually to place a graduate into a state owned
enterprise run on private lines: Emirates is fully owned and controlled by the
government of Dubai. It is too early to comment on the medium term outcome

of these graduates, however, the rhetoric is that they are motivated and well trained for their new positions [25].

Certain points should be raised regarding the HCTs. First, and of importance, is that they are segregated colleges that operate on different sites, although the policy does not extend to the teaching faculty. For example, the director of the women's college in Dubai is a non-national male. Furthermore the women's colleges do not offer the same courses as the men's colleges. Societal attitudes clearly shape and limit that on offer to the female. However, this should not be considered as a failure in the Western sense as the colleges do offer a major opportunity to the young females which was not offered by the state prior to 1988. As commented on earlier, although technologies can change overnight social mores take generations to change. In the case of the UAE a tremendous stride forward for the female has taken place in less than one generation which should not be underestimated.

The HCT's *Annual Report 1988-89* states that the colleges are:

> ... designed to address three fundamental issues affecting the economic and social development of the country:
>
> 1. The need to increase the supply of people with professional and technological skills to support the expansion and diversification of the economy.
>
> 2. The need to prepare nationals to assume positions of significance in the operation of the country.
>
> 3. The need to provide post-secondary education for the rapidly growing number of young nationals completing their secondary education. [26]

From this statement alone we can see, for the first time, the manpower issue being squarely confronted. It would be fair to assume that the process of developing the idea of the HCT took place from the mid 1980s. Formal schooling was in place, the university was maturing and for the first time, apart

from the few technical schools for the less able, education was being assigned
the responsibility to produce well trained nationals to join the national work force.
Some may argue that the UAE University was already fulfilling this function, but,
the writer contends that it was not because the graduates rarely, if at all, gained
any work experience and would have had to have been trained once they
joined the work force. In the case of the HCTs the graduating students would
have already had some work experience and could generally be expected to fit
comfortably into the role that they were specifically trained to fill.

This would be guaranteed to a certain extent by two factors. Firstly, that the
courses were relevant because they were developed in full consultation with
employers' requirements. Secondly, that the courses were to be of international
standard and rigorously controlled to maintain such. This can be seen in the
following comment:

> They also travelled the country, discussing training
> and manpower needs with employers, government
> departments, professional associations, Chambers
> of Commerce, the University and schools..... 27

A closer look at the fundamental and founding principles will reveal some very
important changes in the governmental policy which will, in the long run, affect
social attitudes. In fact, these principles are a clear indication of government
interference to change traditional attitudes.

> Obviously, as the Colleges develop in the future
> they will change in response to emerging needs,
> and already we are having to modify some of our
> initial assumptions. However, there are certain basic
> characteristics which are not likely to change
> because they reflect the role which the Colleges
> are designed to play in the development of the
> nation.

> They can be summarized as follows:

> 1. Admission to regular programs (sic) is confined, for
>   the present, to nationals because the colleges are

intended to prepare nationals to assume key roles in the running of their country.

2. We are committed to excellence through the careful selection of students, through strict promotion policies and a requirement for students to satisfy very stringent performance standards before they receive a diploma.

3. We demand hard work and long hours of attendance (thirty-four a week) with a requirement for students to assume considerable responsibility for their own studies.

4. The Colleges have close links with employers through advisory committees, which review the suitability of program (sic) content and standards, and through a requirement for students to obtain practical training and experience with employers before they can qualify for their diploma.

5. We are preparing students to be competent in both English and Arabic as well as in the vocational subjects. The main language of instruction is English and considerable time is devoted to English language studies in the first year.

6. The Colleges have first class facilities and equipment with a particular emphasis on computer literacy. We probably have one of the largest concentrations of computer equipment in the Middle East.

7. We intend to be models of the managerial effectiveness which we are trying to inculcate in the students. Compared with traditional government operations, we have relatively few detailed procedures and regulations. We expect a high level of commitment and accountability from our staff. We stress team work, consultation, performance and effectiveness. [28]

Point one recognises the need to prepare and train nationals for the leadership positions of the future. When viewed with the other points it can be clearly seen that not only is there a need to train but that there is a need to insist on the highest standards. This is a direct shift from the traditional status orientation of appointments to functional considerations: in its simplest form from a nepotistic and personalised system towards one of meritocracy. This is further

emphasised in the final point, 7, where comment is made about the colleges being 'models of managerial effectiveness which we are trying to inculcate into our students'. A clear recognition of the traditional and non productive position of the national in the work force which is reinforced by the comment expecting 'commitment and accountability'.

Even in terms of the students' working week and study style there is a very strong need for commitment. The colleges demand long hours compared to a government appointment which expects a commitment of approximately twenty-nine hours a week over six days [29]. Early days yet but it is likely that this insistence is a precursor to eventual changes in government hours. The thirty-four hours also reflect the longer hours of the private sector and therefore send out a strong signal that nationals are to start entering this employment sector and are not to expect, as a right, opportunities in the traditional 'safe' government and public sector areas.

The young nationals are, therefore, being directed to join and survive in the far more competitive employment areas. However, it is important to note that they are being fully prepared for these areas and little expense has been spared in setting this up. It has been reported that some of the first students through the Dubai Colleges were actually better trained than their expatriate colleagues in the private sector [30]. Moreover, these graduates also exposed the lack of up-to-date technology in some of these businesses.

This recognition by the government of the need to change traditional attitudes to employment is not just borne of a desire to reduce reliance on the expatriate work force but is also a recognition that the good times will come to an end; that the oil revenues are finite; that public spending budgets have moved into deficit and that the mono-economy is vulnerable and that diversification must take place.

Bahrain offers a cautionary example in that the small island state has effectively run out of oil and is now experiencing some fairly severe financial constraints. In Bahrain there has been recent rioting [31] which is generally believed to have been brought about by an extreme divide in the island's wealth where many of the indigenous people still live in relative poverty with little opportunity for work. Over the years to ease the situation legislation has been introduced to open up employment opportunities for the national in the private sector. However, this has highlighted the need for relevant training programmes to prepare the Bahraini.

Bahrain is not the UAE and the national has a majority position in the population make-up yet the state is further down the line, having experienced oil revenues from the 1930s. However, the cautionary lesson must be that as the UAE's population grows, with the highest growth rate in the Gulf countries [32], a point may well come in the not too distant future when the wealth divide is of contention to those citizens who no longer appear to be sharing the country's riches. Educating the UAE national will also speed up this process in that it will continue to increase the national's expectations and aspirations thus further highlighting the situation. Specific training to create a productive national who takes control of his own destiny without too much reliance on the state must be the only political option if the present style of non-democratic leadership is to continue. An interesting digression and an indication of the important need for the government, through its education and training programmes, to create opportunities to fulfil citizens' aspirations.

The medium of instruction in the HCTs is English and this is an important recognition of the widespread use of it in every sphere of the UAE's business and commercial activities. It also allows the colleges to recruit their faculty from a wider field of expertise. In fact, the first intake of 100 staff in 1988 were selected from 3,000 worldwide applications [33] and in 1989 the colleges recruited 103

new staff from a pool of over 8,000 applications [34]; a choice of expertise that would not have been available to them had they restricted applicants to Arabic speaking which can often be the result of nationalist policies.

The medium of instruction being English is also a further recognition and acceptance of the fact that most modern technological advances have taken place in the Western world and that the language of these technologies is generally English [35], an important point in terms of future manpower requirement in the UAE. The importance of English to the UAE, therefore, becomes obvious, particularly, if the country is to reduce its reliance on expatriate manpower. It will need to embrace all of the modern technologies and develop capital intensive industries and businesses as opposed to the present labour intensive ones. However, it is important to note that unless the UAE is prepared to damage its economic base it will never reach a point when it does not rely to some extent on an expatriate work force. A comparison of a UAE building site to one in Britain offers a good example of the way forward. In the UAE, building sites seem to be swarming with workers at all stages yet in a British site there is a noticeable absence of labourers these days, their jobs have been replaced by machines and modern technologies. The pure devastation of the Western work force generally and the consequent unemployment in the last decade is testimony to that. Due to historical reasons in terms of the import of ideas and an uncontrolled cheap labour force the UAE is still burdened with labour intensive bureaucracies, systems and attitudes in the decision-makers.

This situation must change and the Higher Colleges of Technology are spearheading that changing pattern from labour to capital intensive policies. The fact that they have introduced and are using 'leading edge' technology [36] in the colleges is evidence of that shift. Furthermore, as of the 1 September, 1994 the UAE introduced legislation to protect intellectual property, copyright and patent laws which has been systematically followed up by the authorities to rid the country of pirated copies of computer software, musical recordings, trade

marked goods *inter alia.* The Federal authorities are determined to see this through even though it has inflationary implications for the economy. Once there is international confidence that intellectual property laws, patents and copyrights are being seriously enforced in the UAE the much needed new technologies should flow into the area. These laws are being looked at elsewhere in the Gulf states and will consequently change the nature of the manpower requirement. This has implications, in terms of unemployment, not so much for the Gulf nationals but more for the donor countries who contribute to the Gulf work force. If these countries are also embracing more capital intensive approaches a severe unemployment crisis could result when the expatriates return home and this could have potentially negative political ramifications for these countries.

The HCTs are, therefore, at the watershed of change in the UAE; in fact, it could be said that they are leading the change. However, in this, the government's change, delivered in part through the HCTs, will initially only have a limited effect on public perception. It may take many years to effect change in this traditional culture. It must be emphasised again that there is a strong negative perception in the local towards menial or manual work and, due to misconception on the part of the local, towards vocationally orientated courses. The government will have to attack this particular attitudinal inertia from all directions and although it may not be successful with the present older generation it must influence the up and coming generation if it is to achieve its goal of a more productive national. A quick glance at the high and increasing enrolment figures for the UAE University vis-à-vis the HCTs is a strong indication of the desire for an arts based education that will lead to white collar opportunities. It will, therefore, be necessary for the Federal authorities to be bold and introduce measures in the University curricula that relate these courses more to the workplace. The government may even have to rethink its policy of open access to courses at the University and restrict certain courses and encourage take-up of others more compatible to the nation's manpower requirements and longer term plans.

Importantly, it will also have to consider the problem at the most basic level and develop the formal schooling curricula at all levels so that it addresses both the technological and the vocational aspects and engender positive attitudes towards them. This may have already started in a basic way as the Ministry of Education has recently reported that it is looking into introducing technology into its national curriculum [37]. This has not been effected as yet but will not be sufficient in itself to achieve the desired outcome. It is perhaps time for the UAE to look outside the Arab world for the stimulus for innovation in its curriculum development even though this may have an increasingly secularising effect on the formal education as a whole.

The HCTs may have a greater role in this process than given credit for. It is well documented that universities exert an influence on the school curriculum through their entrance requirements. This same influence will now be exerted by the HCTs assuming that their graduating diploma and initial salary packages and conditions of employment are similar to those of the university graduate [38]. Furthermore, if it is seen that there is more likelihood of employment at the end of a HCT course than for a university graduate the HCT would ultimately become a more attractive proposition. Within the next decade, as the public and government employment opportunities start to diminish due to more capital intensive approaches and as these processes coincide with declining revenues and reduced welfare packages, the HCT route may become an attractive option. Already the HCTs have made certain admission demands, such as at least a 60 per cent pass rate in the General Secondary Educational Certificate (GSEC) which places them on a par with the university [39]. Yet, even in this it has been necessary to introduce a foundation course to bring basic skills up to standard including English skills [40].

From the inauguration of the first HCTs the rhetoric has been about the parity of the higher leaving diplomas and that of the UAE University degrees with parity

also in initial salaries and employment packages [41]. In recent years, as the colleges have started to mature, the HCTs have opened up channels with external colleges and universities around the world and started to align their courses with them offering wider educational opportunities for those with the inclination and intellectual capacity [42]. These are important moves to give their vocationally orientated courses greater status which, in time, will reap benefits when combined with the changing pattern of the UAE's future manpower requirement as outlined above.

At present the HCTs are sited in four major population centres: Abu Dhabi, Al Ain, Dubai and Ras al Khaimah [43], a total of eight colleges to date. It is the writer's view that the UAE must now invest more heavily in developing the HCTs by introducing them into all emirates and importantly develop the original community college philosophy so that they become responsive to national manpower planning and local business requirements. Furthermore and as important, make the HCTs responsive to the demands of the wider community itself so that the idea of an ongoing lifelong education is nurtured in the UAE national allowing for a fuller post secondary educational experience. A characteristic of small countries is their limited tertiary educational facilities and opportunities and the UAE is an example of this. However, unlike many developing small countries the UAE is not too constricted by severe fiscal constraints. Of even greater significance in this is the fact that any precious investment in the national is unlikely to turn into an outflow of that investment where greater rewards are sought externally by the trained individual such as in many of the poorer nations. In the UAE with its high standard of living and a seemingly endless range of employment opportunities, as a result of the ongoing process of Emiratisation of the work force, most of the targeted investment in the tertiary sector is more than likely to remain in the country. Generally, the individual is unlikely to aspire to a more affluent and comfortable lifestyle elsewhere. Therefore, major investment in this sector would not be wasted and is of vital importance to the future of the UAE. It can afford to invest

in it at present and it should endeavour to so.

The developing tertiary sector

The tertiary sector continues to grow in the Emirates and home grown opportunities for the national at all levels are appearing. The inauguration in 1983 of the Emirates Banking Training Institute (EBTI) sited in Sharjah is a good example of this where nationals are trained to enter an increasingly large employment sector. Interestingly, the Institute is actually funded by an employment levy where the various banks in the Emirates contribute one per cent of the total basic salary bill of their employees [44]. This sort of levy would be received reasonably well by the banks as, in a country where there is no company taxation as such, it would be viewed as a form of taxation and one that they would derive some benefit from. This is a concept that the government could develop in other areas to fund its tertiary programme. In certain sectors which could embrace training aspects for all that, this would create a common standard amongst its cosmopolitan work force's varying experience and background. Others may argue that this should remain in the domain of the company where traditionally they set their own standards. However, the profit motives of many companies and, in some cases, their transient nature and temptation for a quick profit must further support the argument for government control/monitoring of the workmanship as well as health and safety issues [45].

Of note over the last five years, is the development and expansion of the private tertiary sector of education in the UAE. This is based in the cities and has taken place in recent years around Dubai, Sharjah and Ajman. Dubai Aviation College, Ajman University College of Science and Technology, The Centre for American Education, Institute for Australian Studies, The Emirates Indian College, Sharjah College, Skyline Institute, Dubai Pharmacy College are but a few of the institutions that have appeared in the last few years. The reason for the expansion in this particular part of the UAE must be influenced by the size of the population concentration and ease of access to it. This privately funded and

profit orientated expansion of the service sector is targeted to tap two sectors of the population: the increasing numbers of expatriate children that are growing up in the area and the increased spending power of the expatriate worker.

The private sector educational facilities previously on offer to the expatriates reflected the topless characteristic of small countries educational systems. The sector was, therefore, ripe for local entrepreneurial activity once other traditional business and commercial sectors started to dry up. Combine this factor with the changing international pattern of tertiary education, where courses were becoming more modularised and where split campus opportunities were opening up, and it can be easily seen why the UAE was an attractive proposition for external institutions. For these entrepreneurially minded institutions the UAE was clearly seen as a means of expanding their own educational businesses. For the UAE based educational businesses these external institutions had well established expertise and, more importantly, any affiliation would give their own enterprise more validity, kudos and credibility in the UAE market place.

The institutions that have opened come in all shapes and forms and cover the full spectrum from highly creditable with a growing reputation to those of dubious ethics solely in the market place to make a 'fast buck'. All of these institutions would require Ministry approval and a licence before opening. However, the nature of that approval in a personalised administration such as the UAEs would allow for a broad range of styles and ethics to exist. There is little point in listing the vast range of institutions and the courses that they offer other than to say that the affiliations with external agencies are wide ranging and represent the cosmopolitan nature of the UAE's population. Having stated that, those affiliations with British institutions do carry a great deal of status for reasons as stated previously.

The proliferation of courses on offer do reflect the market forces policies of these

institutions. This can be easily exemplified in the sheer number of part time MBA degree courses on offer with the writer's own university, Hull, contributing. This simply reflects a demand from those who have the spending power to join these courses and represents an opportunity, for some nationalities, to obtain a degree which they would normally not have had access to. Such a degree would carry high status on their return to their home country or enable a move elsewhere. The range of opportunities is wide within areas such as business and commercial activity and reflects a need. However, in recent years further opportunities of a vocational and non-university degree nature have started to open up. The Dubai Aviation College is a good example of this where an increasingly wide range of certificates from the British-based Business and Technology Education Council (BTEC) courses are presently being offered. Not only does this address a desperate need for this style of education for the non academically minded it is, for the first time, offering this style of education to the expatriate in the area. Students who in the past have been forced to return to their home countries on completion of their secondary courses around the age of sixteen now have some opportunity to continue their education in the UAE and stay with their family. The actual name, Dubai Aviation College, is a little misleading in that the courses are not solely geared towards aviation, however, the College does also offer an alternative route to nationals as well as expatriates which was not in place prior to its inauguration.

As mentioned, the courses on offer do reflect market forces, but importantly, as a new middle class evolves amongst the expatriate population and they opt to stay in the area long term, employment allowing, there is a growing need for these institutions. Each year as the institutions mature in their affiliations with external colleges and universities their courses expand and the range increases. At the seven year old Dubai Medical College for Girls which is affiliated to a British university it is now possible for a female to take the whole of her medical course and graduate as a doctor without involving overseas study. These new private institutions are now forming a solid foundation to the development of

tertiary education in the area.

The population imbalance in favour of expatriates has in its way enhanced the tertiary education situation in the UAE by giving these institutions a large enough market to make them viable options. In doing so they have enhanced the situation for the national without cost to the Federal government. This may well be a beneficial characteristic of the wealth factor in a small country context where the administration is reasonably liberal in its educational policies. The situation is unlikely to be repeated in a small country without the large influx of reasonably affluent expatriate workers.

The issues of manpower training and education vis-à-vis the UAE is a subject that could attract endless academic interest. Within the parameters of this study it is sufficient to highlight salient features of the situation. However, it is important within this context to note comment regarding the World Bank's recent review of vocational and technical education and training (VET) literature [46]. In it it drew the conclusion that:

> most modes of training prior to entry to the labour force can yield good returns when there are jobs for graduates and the training is closely linked to effective employment demand, that is, when training is demand-driven.
>
> ....VET has been most effective where its objective is to fill an existing or anticipated need for skilled workers. [47]

This is the developing situation in the UAE as it progresses towards a more planned development of manpower where the HCTs are responding and will continue to be responsive to demand. However, the UAE does not represent a typical case because, to a certain extent, any specific training that it offers its nationals will result in employment opportunities for the foreseeable future which will be at the expense of an expatriate in the natural process of Emiratisation.

However, the private sector is clearly demand driven and for the expatriate and national alike represents not just an opportunity for self improvement but also one that will result in better employment opportunities. In the UAE most expatriates are locked into a particular job by its description on their employment visa with little opportunity for natural promotion or change. These private vocationally orientated courses offer that opportunity; if they did not, then the courses would not have the take-up and consequently would not exist. An argument that is not backed by rigorous research method but one that shows when market forces are involved. An outcome of this situation is that those less popular employment routes are unlikely to be accommodated by the private sector and it is in these areas that the government sponsored courses will need to address the demand. When the demand is limited it would most probably be better house-keeping if those requirements were bought in as and when necessary either by the import of the manpower or through state sponsorship of overseas study and training. Private VET facilities in the UAE are of benefit to the UAE and, therefore, at this stage of the country's development it is important for the government not to replace the viable private initiatives but to complement them in their own provision to maximise the overall benefit to the country.

To a certain extent the success of tertiary education, be it vocationally orientated or not, does rely on the groundwork already done in the formal schooling in the UAE. The secondary education tends to have an academic bias as already discussed in a previous chapter. This follows the pattern of the Gulf states and the Arab world generally and the little attention given to vocational education is misguidedly directed to a few through the limited technical and agricultural school route. Clearly here is a great misunderstanding of the whole nature of vocational training which can only reinforce attitudes that link vocational education and training with manual and menial work. This further reinforces social attitudes which are more in tune with ideas of education allowing their children to achieve more desirable white collar and managerial opportunities. The HCTs have, to some

extent, got around this particular problem by offering vocationally orientated courses that appear more 'glamorous' and that relate to clean or hi-tech industries.

The teaching force

However, a clear example of these negative social attitudes can be found in the education sphere where teachers are afforded lesser status than administrators in the minds of the local. This is in contradiction to the belief in Islam that more normally affords teachers an extremely high status as was evident in the *kuttabs*. An examination of the teacher recruitment of the last two decades reveals a significant shift from an initial high proportion of males to a dominance of females. Furthermore, a visit to the Ministry of Education will also highlight the number of local males who are employed as administrators vis-à-vis females. Although we are talking small numbers in terms of the local in the total teaching force there is a clear trend of feminisation of the local teaching force. Much of this is more likely the result of far greater opportunity for the male in the developing UAE where rewards in trading and speculative activity such as property have been substantial for the local. The bottom line, therefore, is that the teaching profession has not attracted the local male and that this is most probably because he has had no financial incentive to join it; whereas for the female it represents, along with nursing, a 'safe' and comfortable employment route to pursue as the traditional social mores against females in the work force have started to breakdown. Even increasing the status of teacher training by placing it in the UAE University in 1977 did little to change this situation. Sadly, the UAE will have to come to terms with the fact that although the national is an increasing proportion in the total teaching force, the profession will, as a whole, slowly become feminised.

Teachers are important, as the quality of what they deliver through the formal school curricula obviously creates the foundation for the next stage. Perhaps just as important, teachers can nurture positive attitudes towards the world of work

and to individuals becoming productive members of society. In the UAE it is important to establish positive attitudes towards all levels of employment because, by the very nature of the natural spread of ability and skills within a society, some citizens will not be able to aspire to the 'cleaner' white collar positions. Teachers and the curriculum must, therefore, foster positive attitudes within the context of the UAE towards vocational education in all of its aspects. In the UAE context this will also include addressing the change of attitude from status to function orientation in the workplace and the need for the UAE to move towards capital, as opposed to labour intensive routes. This last point will require very different skills to be developed in the young who will certainly have to become far more technically literate than they are at present. Filling the schools with technology, as appears to have been the case in certain areas, will not reap rewards unless the nature of how the pupils are taught starts to change. This situation is evident when considering the low number of individuals who can transfer directly from secondary school, without remedial work, to an HCT course even though they have achieved the minimum entry requirements [48]. Increasing the acceptable pass level on the GSEC will not change the situation as it is basic skills such as Arabic, English, computer literacy and mathematics that students need support in; support also in being able to deal with the HCTs modern style of learning [49]. This has resulted in the HCTs introducing a foundation course of study as this allows them to increase the students' basic skills before introducing them to the actual courses. This is a firm commitment on the part of the HCTs to maintaining quality, in a strongly personalised society, and is most laudable.

A national curriculum setting out certain targets and modes of delivery may go some way to standardising and raising school standards. However, the importance of teachers being in tune with the requirements of this curriculum and the UAE's culture and aspirations is obvious. In a small country where the teaching force is drawn from the national population it may be possible to find this in the teaching force. In a country where a high percentage of the teaching

force is expatriate Arab and where locals are shying away from the profession it looks an impossibility. The Arab teachers that make up the teaching force are not from the Gulf states where a limited amount of homogeneity exists but from various Northern Arab states where the characteristic of the Arab is, in reality, heterogeneity. Since the recent crises in the Middle East it may even be clear now to a Westerner that an Iraqi is very different to an Egyptian in terms of culture and national and personal aspirations. There would also be a very different attitude from the poor Iraqi national towards wealthy Kuwait and the Gulf Arab states which would be transferred into the receiving education system. Therefore, in a heterogeneous teaching force from a variety of Arab training grounds how can the three fundamental teacher qualities of knowledge of subject-matter; pedagogical practice; and beliefs about teaching be standardised and refocussed to take into account the UAE's culture and national goals? Unless this can be achieved in a significant way, shaping of attitudes and developing of inquiring minds in the UAE national to readily accept the new technologies, may not be possible. If this balance is not achieved there could be political ramifications as the process of education itself will raise expectations in the national without raising awareness and a sense of nationalism and realism. This is of importance in the area as the Gulf states work hard to halt the spread of Islamic Fundamentalism which appears to find its support in the minds of those that feel a sense of injustice in the states' fiscal and political inequalities.

The UAE has gone some way to addressing the overall problem by the introduction of a carefully reviewed national curriculum which has been discussed in a previous chapter. As a small country the UAE also has the benefit of short lines of communication for the dissemination of important information or ideas. In terms of the personalised nature of a small country this too can work to the country's advantage as people are known which can result in far more informal communication channels that allow for a real exchange of ideas and less opportunity for misunderstanding and misdirection. Furthermore, in a country where a centralised education policy exists there is not the same need for rigid

rules and regulations to implement and manage the system and the curriculum as in a large country. These points facilitate and allow for the sharing of responsibilities particularly in curriculum development and staff development. This would result in more of a democratising of the ownership of the curriculum and it would not tend to suffer from core/periphery problems as in a large system. Curriculum specialists would enjoy immediate feedback along with ease in the exchange of ideas that would allow for a certain amount of responsive flexibility in the school curriculum. Importantly, therefore, the personalised nature of the small country culture, in which the UAE is no exception, should allow for greater involvement of the teacher in the process of curriculum development, help to standardise and focus the teaching force, and have the added benefit of professional growth of the teacher through this process.

The UAE is in an extremely strong position to take advantage of this situation in the qualitative development of their formal schooling. To a certain extent some of this has already been achieved through various recent improvements as outlined in the Ministry of Education's national reports to the International Conference on Education. How much of this rhetoric has actually been achieved is a matter for speculation by this researcher because not being a national involved in research and/or a member of the Ministry access to the state schools for observation or even a visit is not allowed. However, these reports [50] state that a national curriculum has been developed by the Ministry of Education in consultation with the UAE University. This has involved "a complete revision of the elements of the curricula [and] included objectives, content, strategies, attitudes and methods of teaching. All this is based on Islam, the nature of society, students' characteristics and growth and contemporary educational trends." [51] The salient points in the Ministry's recorded achievements have been outlined in Chapter Five. They appear to be addressing the future needs of the UAE and introducing a modern style of methodology. In terms of addressing the world of work the Ministry has implied that it has included in its school syllabus

"...behaviour concepts that glorify work and esteem productive workers" [52].

However, it goes on to say that " this is illustrated most in the technical education

syllabus (technical and vocational) [53] which is attached to the labour market in the

UAE and is the practical training which goes side by side with the learning

process". The five technical schools, shown in data as vocational education,

accounted for 893 students out of a total of 261,698 pupils in the state system

in 1992[54]. Clearly this is a continued and fundamental misunderstanding of

vocational education and its importance in the general curriculum.

This situation may change in the future as a result of the establishment on the 4th

September, 1994 of a "national research project for manpower planning and

educational planning" [55] which "seeks to make the best use of human and

financial resources by suggesting action plans that make training and education

systems better suited to achieve national goals". Professor Saad Gadalla of the

UAE University cites the project as having three main aims:

> First, improving the efficiency and effectiveness of
> the education and training systems; increasing the
> participation of nationals in education and labour
> force and ensuring education provided and
> occupations sought are in keeping with the
> economic and cultural needs of society.

> The project also includes developing definite
> recommendations supported detailed action
> programmes to improve the efficiency of the
> education and training sector; occupational structures
> of the productive and service sectors and
> employment incentives of the public and private
> sectors.

> The third objective is to develop research skills and
> data management and analysis capacities at the
> UAE University, ministries and government
> agencies concerned with educational planning and
> national manpower development. [56]

The research team included ten international consultants from US universities.

From the report, and following the nature of those involved in the research and

workshops, it appears the UAE is tackling the problem at the post secondary stage without fully reviewing the situation within the schools. However, one benefit of this may be found in the downward pressure exerted by the changing institutions on the school system. Further benefit for the schools may also be found in the general development of research skills, data management and analysis by the planning departments, which from the third aim, is clearly an area of concern and highlights the general immaturity of the UAE systems.

The importance of training the expatriate teacher is rarely commented on in the rhetoric or the reports that appear but at all levels this must be achieved if a common frame of reference for them is to be aspired to. A programme of in-service education is referred to in the Ministry of Education reports which have the aims of:

1. Enriching and renewal of teachers' capabilities.

2. Offering remedial courses to inefficient teachers.

3. Developing nationals' efficiency in both professional
   and administrative fields. [57]

Unfortunately, the Report does not indicate whether this programme is directed to all teachers as clearly point 3 is restricted to nationals. Moreover, it does not give reference to the style of the in-service on offer. The transient nature of expatriate teachers working to limited contracts may also negate any long term benefit to this style of programme and until the national occupies a significant proportion of the teaching force in-service of the transient element will result, to some extent, in a lost investment. The Ministry of Education may rely on the teachers passing their recruitment examinations as sufficient evidence of standard and continue to avoid addressing the need for common points of reference.

Decentralising the curriculum and involving teachers in the process of its development may result in more benefit overall. This does not appear to be a characteristic of the system where the Ministry of Education has created three tiers of administration: central, regional (zones) and schools. This in part will create more discrete areas which will reinforce the centralist style of curriculum planning that exists in the UAE. However, the creation of seven zones across the UAE may encourage closer communication and cross-fertilisation of ideals and methodology amongst teachers in those zones. The Ministry does not indicate, however, whether the in-service is school based or zone based. One area that the Ministry could derive some benefit from is that of the large numbers of UAE University graduates that it is employing as administrators. These are status orientated appointments as opposed to functional ones where the nationals feel that they are above teaching. It would surely be a short-sighted move if these inexperienced nationals are being brought in to replace experienced expatriate planners and administrators even if they are of a different culture. It is still early days but surely these nationals could be trained to offer the necessary support to the schools and teachers to help create a common framework for all.

Encouragement can be drawn from the increasing numbers of national teachers in the system as clearly the Ministry of Education will invest heavily in developing their professionalism. However, some loss of investment may well be found as the female leaves the profession to start a family and perhaps further investment in restart courses for females could be introduced here where, at present, there appears to be none.

In the three years from 1989 to 1992 the Faculty of Education at the UAE University produced some 1,460 graduate teachers [58]. In 1994, Hamad Abdul Rahman Al Madfa, Minister for Education, reported that 457 newly graduated national teachers were appointed to state schools and that "the rate of female national teachers in the Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman and Umm al Quwain educational zones was 100 per cent in kindergarten and in subjects including Islamic studies,

biology, geology, geography, social studies, science and philosophy" [59]. This is a starting point from which to build and one which, for the female element of the population, will continue to increase as teaching has become a socially acceptable gender-typical occupation in the UAE for the female.

Interestingly, a *National Report of the UAE* to be presented to the 4th International Women's Conference in Beijing in September 1995 [60] states that 326 of the 793 female graduates from the UAE University in 1991 had studied teaching with a further 139 opting for literature. The report also states that the male/female ratio at the university has changed from 42.3 to 57.7 per cent in favour of males in 1981 to a 32.6 to 67.4 per cent in favour of females in 1991. However, to take this one stage further and bearing in mind the high ratio of female graduates to males, only 40 per cent of administrative and technical positions in the UAE's federal ministries were occupied by females in 1992. This is a very strong indicator of gender-typical roles that the UAE society's mores are encouraging. In terms of investment in education, whilst the national is in the minority, all investment will reap returns in the future as the national replaces the expatriate. It is unlikely, in the near future, that much more can be expected as even this gender stereotyping and feminising of certain employment areas is deemed worthwhile in the process of Emiratisation.

NOTES AND REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER SEVEN

1. The Gulf states were the PLO's main financial backers contributing some $3 billion a year which was stopped out of anger over Yasser Arafat's support of Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War. See:
   COLVIN, M (1990),
   "Arafat's austerity budget cramps cushy lifestyle of the PLO" in:
   THE SUNDAY TIMES, 30 December, 1990, p.15.

   also see the following report regarding the situation of the Yemenis whose country also supported Saddam Hussein:
   COCKBURN, P (1990),
   "Immigrant Yemenis incur Saudi's wrath" in:
   THE INDEPENDENT, 24 November, 1990, p. 10.

2. KAGAHASTIAN. F (1993),
   "Gulf biggest absorber of OCWs" in:
   GULF NEWS, 22 December, 1992.

3. This was conveyed to the writer in conversation with someone working for an international group of accountants based in Dubai.

4. See the following article for fuller details:
   "Special report on labour camps" in:
   GULF NEWS, 20 February, 1993, pp. 3 and 4.

5. The HCT's Director of Planning, Peter Williams, mooted this as a way forward for the HCTs and one area in which they had started limited activity regarding building standards when in conversation with the writer. 13 February, 1993.

6. HEARD-BEY, Frauke (1982),
   From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates,
   (London, Longman), p.152 and p. 289.

7. Ibid., p.153.

8. HEARD-BEY, Frauke (1982),
   op. cit., pp. 231/2, where she makes reference to observations by
   THESIGER, Wilfred (1959), op. cit.
   Also see: HEARD-BEY, Frauke (1982), pp. 151/2, 231, 251, 288 and:
   PRIDAM, B.R. (Ed.) (1985),
   The Arab Gulf and the West,
   (London, Croom Helm and Centre for Arab Studies, University of Exeter),
   p. 25 for comments about the suppression of slavery.

9. As cited in MIDDLE EAST EXPATRIATE,
   Vol. XI, No. 9, December 1994/January 1995, p.1.

10. See the following article for fuller details:
    "Special report on housemaids - third and final part" in:
    GULF NEWS, 28 November, 1992, p. 3.

11. See the following article for fuller details:
    "Special report on housemaids - 1" in:

GULF NEWS, 14 November, 1992, p. 3.

12. See KAGAHASTIAN. F (1992),
"Psychological perspective behind it all" in:
"Special report on housemaids - third and final part" in:
GULF NEWS, 28 November, 1992, p. 3.

13. The writer is referring to conversations that he has had with various locals during his time living and working in the UAE.

14. See: Chapter Two.

15. TOMKINSON, Michael (1975),
The United Arab Emirates,
(Hammamet, Tunisia and London, Michael Tomkinson Publishing), p. 58.

16. SADIK, Muhammad T. and SNAVELY, William P. (1972),
Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates,
(Lexington, Massachusetts, Lexington Books), p.154.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid., p.158.

19. AL-HAMER, Abdul Malik (1969),
Development of Education Bahrain: 1940-1965,
(Bahrain, Oriental Press), p. 13.
This may refer to Bahrain but the island state is culturally very similar to the UAE.

20. *EMIRATES NEWS*, 29 October, 1988, p. 3.

21. Ibid.

22. HIGHER COLLEGES OF TECHNOLOGY (1989),
Annual Report 1988-89, p. 4.

23. GHAZI, Arshad (1988),
"The Community Connection" in:
GULF WEEKLY, 5 August, 1988, pp. 8, 9.

24. *EMIRATES NEWS*, 29 OCTOBER, 1988,
"Sheikh Nahyan Outlines College's Role", pp. 2, 3.

25. See FRANCHI Valerie (1993),
"College graduates prove their worth" in:
GULF NEWS, 24 May,1993, p. 3.

26. HIGHER COLLEGES OF TECHNOLOGY (1989),
Annual Report 1988-89, pp. 3, 4.

27. Ibid., p. 4.

28. Ibid., pp. 4, 5.

29. Hours at federal/government and quasi federal/governmental offices are 8 am to 1pm Saturday to Wednesday and 8 am to 12 noon on Thursdays. In the private sector the hours can be much longer often with a split shift and extra hours between 4 pm and 6 or 7pm particularly for offices. They also have less time off for Public Holidays.

30. *GULF NEWS*, June, 1993.

31. For further comment regarding the unrest, which coincided with the meeting on the island of the GCC rulers, see:

REUTER (1994),
"Cop killed in Bahrain" in:
GULF NEWS, 18 December, 1994, p. 1.

AVEBURY, Eric (1994),
"Human rights abuses in Bahrain" in:
THE INDEPENDENT, 21 December, 1994.
A letter from Lord Avebury who is Chairman of the Parliamentary Human Rights Group in Britain in which he outlines reasons for the unrest and mentions a petition signed by more than 25,000 people calling for the restoration of the 1973 constitution, under which the state had an elected Parliament. The Parliament was dismissed by the Emir in 1975 who has ruled by decree since.

32. "High rates of immigration into the oil-producing Gulf states have resulted in rates of population growth ranging from 3.8 per cent in Saudi Arabia to 7.6 per cent in the UAE."

MOSTYN Trevor (Ed) (1988),
The Cambridge Encyclopaedia of the Middle East and North Africa,
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), p. 115.

33. HIGHER COLLEGES OF TECHNOLOGY (1989),
Annual Report 1988-89, p. 7.

34. HIGHER COLLEGES OF TECHNOLOGY (1990),
Annual Report 1989-90, p. 5.

35. "About 80 per cent of the data stored on the world's computers is believed to be in English"
THE GUARDIAN, 5 February, 1992, p. 5 of the education section.

36. Reference to an advertisement that the HCTs placed in the
TIMES EDUCATIONAL SUPPLEMENT, 30 October, 1992.

37. Dr. Hussain Al Muttawa, Head of the Books and Curricula Department of the Ministry of Education is reported as making the following comments:

> The present curriculum has not stressed the teaching of technology....

> ....it has become urgent to complement the curriculum with technological and vocational courses

....it will help students to apply the scientific principles they have learned

Technology experts will be brought to the country to prepare the proposed curriculum and the needed text books.

The project will cost an estimated Dh 2 million during an experimental phase beginning in September next year plus Dh 1.5 million for the construction of 10 laboratories.

As reported in: *GULF NEWS*, 8 October, 1992. p. 2.

38. In 1993 the UAE government ruled that the HCT diplomas were to be treated as the equivalent of UAE University degrees. However, in reality this is still to be achieved. See:
MAKLAD, Jasmine (1994),
"Double standards irk HCT graduates" in:
GULF NEWS, 25 August, 1994, p. 4.

39. Sheikh Nahyan announced in August 1993 that the HCTs and the University were to introduce a new admissions policy for the academic year 1994-95 with both institutions admitting students with 60 per cent or over in the GSEC.
As reported in: *GULF NEWS*, 29 August, 1993, p. 2.

40. There tends to be a lack of preparedness in mathematics, science and English which was attributed to the nature and style of the secondary education and the general lack of problem-solving in it. This comment was made to the writer in conversation with several people who have been or are involved in the HCTs. It is further supported by comments made in the first *Annual Report 1988-89*.

41. See reference 38 above.

42. This has been recorded regularly in the local media over the last three years. For examples see:
SRINIVASAN, N (1993),
"HCT, US aeronautical varsity sign agreement" in:
GULF NEWS, 14 December, 1993, p. 3 and;
FRANCHI, Valerie (1994),
"HCT move to upgrade status" in:
GULF NEWS, 6 February, 1994, p. 4.

43. The two colleges at Ras Al Khaimah are the most recent additions.

44. Up until 1988 each bank in the UAE contributed a sum equivalent to two per cent of the total basic salary of their employees to the EBTI. This was then reduced to one per cent. For fuller details of the EBTI see:

AL BAIK, Duraid (1992),
"EBTI is not out to make money" in a special report on training in banking in:
GULF NEWS, 7 November, 1992, p. 3.

GULF NEWS (1993),
Emirates Banking Training Institute,
Gulf News Supplement, 6 January, 1993.

45. The establishment of the "Emirates College for Construction Safety Training Project Management" is being considered by the UAE Contractors' Association and Cleveland College. Linking this further to the HCTs is also under consideration. See:
"College to train industry personnel on safety at construction sites" in: *Gulf News*, 2 March, 1993; and " 'Safety college' to take shape soon" in:
GULF NEWS, 8 April, 1993.

46. ADAMS, Arvil V, MIDDLETON, John and ZIDERMAN, Adrian (1992) "The World bank's policy paper on vocational and technical education and training" in:
Propects, Vol. XXII, No. 2, 1992 (82), p. 128.

47. Ibid., p. 129.

48. It would be fair to assume that this is also the case in transfer to the UAE University because as of September 1994 their admission requirements have been equalised, see reference 39 above.

49. See HCT's Foundations Programme prospectus and HCT's *Annual Reports* for 1988-89 and 1989-90.

50. MINISTRY OF EDUCATION (1988),
Development of Education 1986-1988 - National Report of United Arab Emirates
(Abu Dhabi, Department of Information and Research);

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION (1990),
The Development of Education 1987-1990 - National Report of United Arab Emirates,
(Abu Dhabi, Department of Information and Research);

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION (1992),
The Development of Education from 1989-1992,
(Abu Dhabi, Department of Information and Research).

51. MINISTRY OF EDUCATION (1992), op. cit., p. 21.

52. Ibid., p. 22.

53. The writer has added this bracket which was missing in the original.

54. Leaflet produced by the MINISTRY OF EDUCATION (1992 b) , "Summary of Educational Statistics 1991-1992.

55. See the following article for fuller details:
FAROOK, Latheef (1994),
"Better education, better work force", in:
GULF NEWS, 21 December, 1994, p. 3.

56. Ibid.

57. MINISTRY OF EDUCATION (1992), op. cit., p. 28.

58. Ibid.

59. For further information see:
"National students prefer literature to science" in:
GULF NEWS, 4 June, 1993, p. 3.

60. As reported by:
SHOULY, Ehab S (1994),
"Where are the women?" in: *Gulf News*, 24 May, 1994, p. 2.

PART THREE
APPLYING A SMALL COUNTRY PERSPECTIVE TO
THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

PART THREE

CHAPTER EIGHT

APPLYING A SMALL COUNTRY PERSPECTIVE TO THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

In recent years researchers have pointed out that small countries have characteristics which are not merely miniature versions of larger countries. Consensus exists that many of the characteristics evident in small countries are common and can be seen in their societies and their systems. The fact that these characteristics manifest themselves through the educational systems is also an important characteristic.

One of the threads running through this thesis is that the United Arab Emirates can be classified as a 'small country' and, as such, it shares characteristics with other small countries. The fact that the United Arab Emirates has not already received attention in previous research is likely to be the result of the following points. Firstly, the majority of the research undertaken so far has often been the result of initiatives by the Commonwealth Secretariat where a high number of its members are small states. The UAE, as the Trucial States, did share with the Commonwealth countries a period of British Colonial domination. However, it did not suffer from exploitation and the imposition of British systems as many of these countries did because, at the time, there was nothing to exploit. Because the UAE is not part of the present Commonwealth group it did not, therefore, receive automatic attention. The same can also be said for the other small Gulf states of Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and Oman who were also under British rule but have been omitted from the research that has been conducted over the last two decades. The fact that there is limited data and information on these Gulf states and that this would have made book research difficult has possibly also had some bearing on the situation. However, an overriding factor explaining their omission from the body of research must be their wealth. A great deal of the small country research focussed on educational issues has tended to

concentrate on the poorer states. This was often with the motive of finding ways to alleviate problems that they experience as a direct result of their scale, such as the more obvious diseconomies of small scale.

Since the small states research has taken on an educational dimension these Gulf states have, in fact, enjoyed high per capita incomes, with the UAE being accredited one of the world's highest in recent years. Important, in an educational context, is that the educational development has been a direct result of the change in economic fortune and the wealth generated by oil revenues in all of these states. In the UAE this wealth and development has been confined to the last thirty years where previously there was no doubt as to the poverty of the area. It is, therefore, worth noting that wealth in the form of a high GNP as well as a high per capita GNP and the provision of education are recent phenomena in the emirates of the UAE.

The small states of the Arabian Gulf have, therefore, been omitted from the general body of research done to date. This research goes some way to address that situation by focussing on the small emirates of the UAE. Through occasional comparison it also acknowledges that Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and Oman are worthy of future interest as they too conform to the same criteria that will be used to establish the UAE's inclusion in small country research. Indeed much may be learnt from comparative research based on this group of similar emirates which have all developed during a similar period of history in an autonomous manner.

Why should the UAE be included? For the basic reason that the inclusion of the UAE and its wealth factor can, in fact, inform the general research already undertaken because correspondence can be found between the characteristics already identified in poorer countries and the wealthy UAE. Small countries share characteristics and, therefore, by virtue of their scale they share advantages, disadvantages and dilemmas that may not pose as concerns to

larger countries. The wealth factor does not fundamentally change these characteristics although there are occasions where it may alleviate a particular problem. There are also occasions when it can aggravate a situation or concern and even throw up a new characteristic. This final part of the thesis will, therefore, relate the federation of the United Arab Emirates and its individual sovereign states to the general body of findings to date and thereby offer some comparison.

Criteria used for the classification of small countries

As discussed in Chapter Two, there is an obvious problem in defining a threshold to the state of smallness and to a certain extent it is an arbitrary one. This is not helped when one of the characteristics of small countries is their apparent disparity when viewed en masse in terms of topography, culture and economy. However, general consensus in the literature shows that territorial, demographic and economic factors do contribute to defining the notion of smallness. Brock suggests that any one of these factors "could render a political unit to be classified as small" and that "the coincidence of two or three indices of smallness in respect of any one example leaves no doubt as to a country's eligibility to the epithet"[1].

The population indicator of smallness is particularly relevant when considering educational provision and the Commonwealth Secretariat uses the upper limit of two million people as its threshold [2]. Other factors such as small land mass or larger land mass with little usable land and small population also contribute to the general notion of smallness. The writer's disregard of the economic determinant has already been stated. The wealth factor or high per capita GNP does not fundamentally change the general characteristics of a small country and particularly does not negate them when the context is an educational one. The question now is does the UAE and/or its emirates fulfil the other two criteria?

Clearly on grounds of total population the UAE with its population of just under

two million falls under the Commonwealth Secretariat's threshold. Of interest, however, is the fact that the majority of this total population is of a transient nature with no permanent right of abode in the UAE. The indigenous population makes up a mere twenty per cent of the total. Moreover, if the individual emirates are considered their total population figures are all low as can be seen in Table 3.1.

The UAE falls comfortably within the territorial determinant as seen in terms of land mass because the majority of the UAE is desert, arid mountain or *sabkhah* salt flats, with little of the land mass cultivatable and capable of sustaining agriculture. Some 87 per cent of the UAE's territory of 77,700 sq km falls within the emirate of Abu Dhabi which leaves the remaining emirates with quite small territories. In fact, if a combination of the territorial, demographic and economic determinants were considered the emirate of Ajman could be clearly viewed as a poor small state with its 260 sq km, although in recent years its population has soured to some 74,000 inhabitants. Under Shand's definition Ajman would be classified as very small as would Ras al Khaimah and Fujairah. Umm al Qaiwain with a population of merely 26,000 would only just miss Shand's definition of Micro State.

Therefore, viewed either *en masse* as the United Arab Emirates or as individual emirates the area under study does fall comfortably within the small country classification. With this established it is now important to identify the more general characteristics of a small country exhibited by the UAE which will lead into specific comment and help to inform the general debate.

Spatial isolation [3] : remoteness

All of the individual emirates, as with the vast majority of small countries, have access to the sea, and, the sea, until recent years, was an important means of communication. This combined with the desert interior and mountainous regions also created a certain amount of spatial isolation, remoteness, from their

neighbours. Similarities can be drawn here with island groupings or small countries such as Botswana that have a large land mass with small scattered populations. The people of the area suffered a great deal of internal isolation prior to the oil boom due to their tribal nature and the difficulty of travel. Overall, the area suffered a high degree of remoteness from the rest of the world whilst it was under British 'protection'. This is in keeping with many small territories particularly those found in the remoter regions such as the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. These characteristics of isolation and remoteness do have implications for educational provision in all small countries. Within the Emirates this did not present itself as a major problem because the late introduction of educational provision parallelled the infrastructural development across all of the emirates. A consequence of this was the opening of good communication routes between the majority of the settlements except for the extremely remote ones in the mountain and interior areas. This was a clear example of how the wealth factor, prompted by the political will, alleviated a problem although the characteristic did exist initially and the early educational development did take place in the more accessible and cost effective urban centres.

Spatial isolation creates a lack of opportunity for remoter communities to enjoy the same more specialist educational facilities which in the early stages of development, particularly in small countries, is limited to the urban centres. The wealth factor temporarily eased this inequality in the emirate of Abu Dhabi by allowing the introduction of boarding facilities for the boys where the educational provision did not exist in their remote communities. However, this was limited to the wealthy emirate of Abu Dhabi in the early stages of development where it could be argued that its communities did suffer a far greater level of spatial isolation due to the vastness of its desert areas.

There would have been educational inequalities between the sexes at this time but this was a result of social mores rather than a small country characteristic. Segregation of the adolescent female would, nevertheless, reduce the

effectiveness of the finite funding to address equality of educational opportunity for the female. In the UAE the male was initially given priority.

Inequalities due to remoteness from the centre were, however, fairly limited within the UAE because the majority of each emirate's population was already concentrated on the capital centres where, in keeping with many developing countries, the limited resources and opportunities were focussed. This concentration of the limited resources to maximise their benefit to the country is a feature of small countries whether they are rich or poor. In wealthy countries and in the wealthier emirates of the UAE these resources would have been slightly greater and would have developed at a faster rate. However, in terms of the early stages of development, the limited introduction of basic facilities such as printing, copying and a library would be the same for all small countries.

Urban settlement

The population of each emirate, as mentioned, was, and is, focussed around the capital centres, as too, were the early developments in educational facilities, employment opportunity and training. This in itself acted as a further magnet drawing greater numbers of nomadic and rural people to settle in the centres. This is a characteristic of small countries with limited resources and the UAE and its individual emirates are no exception to the rule.

Colonial legacies and economic considerations

Often small countries share a common colonial heritage and, although the colonial masters may have been different, the legacies are strikingly similar. These legacies often have an economic element which brings into sharp focus important characteristics of small countries.

Mono-economy

A characteristic of small countries due to their topography and small scale is their limited natural resources which result in mono-economies. In countries with a

colonial background, as most small countries have, this mono-economy is a direct result of policies of exploitation where the market place was also the metropolitan centre. The 'banana economies' of the Caribbean are classic examples of this characteristic which also exhibit a high degree of vulnerability through crop failure, currency fluctuation and/or the target market place changing its supplier. Ironically, the UAE although not having natural resources to exploit during its period of colonial domination, nevertheless, clearly exhibits the characteristic of a mono-economy and the resulting vulnerability to this condition with its past reliance on the pearl and more recent one on oil.

The majority of the impressive development of the last three decades in the UAE has been funded by its oil revenues. This source of income has been generated mostly by Abu Dhabi and distributed to the poorer emirates through the offices of the Federation. In the longer term, Abu Dhabi's vast reserves will assure it a healthy future of income generation although the situation in the other emirates is very different and Dubai and Sharjah are acutely aware of their finite reserves of oil. Already they have felt their vulnerability in terms of oil price fluctuation and reduced demand. The heady days of the 1970s when the Arab oil producers held the industrialised world to ransom and dramatically hiked the price of crude oil are now a distant memory.

Declining revenues

Two adverse conditions resulted for the oil producers and the small Gulf states from the Arab oil embargo. Firstly, the industrial world realised their own vulnerability in relying on the Arabs and effectively one general source for the majority of their oil. This was soon countered by frenzied exploration elsewhere in the world to find new sources of crude, which they did, consequently offsetting the Arab advantage. Secondly, the new discoveries brought new wealth to non-Arab countries in various parts of the world which fuelled their own development programmes. The high recurrent costs of this development in these countries was supported by increased production of oil. This led to over

production and a glut of oil which caused the dramatic drop in prices in real terms that the international market has witnessed over the last decade. This situation has been compounded further by reduced demand for oil as a more conservation minded world sought for greater efficiency in the use of energy .

The UAE and the Arab oil producers generally are now feeling the results of vastly reduced oil revenues, ironically a consequence of their own actions. A characteristic of the UAE and the small states of the Gulf is that they have now moved into deficit budgets in their state finances and, perhaps for the first time, a realisation that all developing countries have plans that exceed their finite fiscal resources. The UAE and the Gulf states can no longer throw money at a problem as was the trend in the past. This has implications for all sectors and not just education, as targeted development becomes the trend.

Some of this reduced revenue has been made up by diversification into oil refining and oil related production but overall their income has reduced substantially in real terms. The financial reserves that these countries had accumulated during the period of high prices and high production have also dwindled due to the need to fund the recurrent cost of what they have already established. This situation was not helped by the recent invasion of Kuwait in which the war costs are still being felt in the Gulf states. Also felt in more subtle ways where a state of shock and surprise that the invasion did happen from a brother Arab has resulted in a nervousness which has manifested itself through greater military spending and a further drain of the financial reserves.

Where has this left the Emirates? Emirates such as Ajman, Umm al Qaiwain and Fujairah which were never oil producers have carried on, much as they always did, relying on their neighbours' development and the offices of the Federation for their future development. They have continued to develop albeit at a slower pace than the oil producing emirates. They are, therefore, less vulnerable as they do not have the same development demands/plans and recurrent costs.

In fact, Ajman, much like Sharjah, will continue to thrive on offering cheaper accommodation costs than neighbouring Dubai and the consequent trade that it will bring in as people seek cheaper accommodation alternatives to maximise their spending and saving power.

However, remove Abu Dhabi's wealth from the equation and a totally different picture would result because traditional aid donors such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait can no longer be drawn in to fill the shortfall. In a sense, the various emirates are much like a group of islands within the Caribbean with each relying on each other's success, and where a collapse of the most successful mono-economy could have devastating consequences for its neighbours. In the case of the UAE, this does place Abu Dhabi in a powerful and influential position.

Diversification

Diversification in the small country economy is the noted trend with the obvious benefit of reducing a certain amount of vulnerability due to the limited nature of the economy. Already, in the poorer emirates of the UAE a wide range of income generating activity can be seen: agriculture, fishing, quarrying of stone and basic manufacturing industry *inter alia*.

However, it must be noted, that in the UAE apart from a minimal import tax, various charges for public services such as visa renewal and a municipal tax, the individual emirates do not have the benefit of local purchase tax or income tax to fill their coffers and support their programmes. For the poorer emirates reliance on the Federal funds is still a major source of income. However, favourable taxation policies nationwide do encourage a certain amount of business and commercial activity. One area that all the emirates have naturally expanded into is that of banking and each now possess at least one 'national bank'. Because of the tremendous wealth in the region certain emirates have started to take advantage of the tax situation by developing 'offshore' banking facilities as is the trend in many small stable countries such as the Channel

Islands, Bermuda, and the Cayman Islands. However, it is only early days and many lessons are still to be learnt.

Bahrain saw this as a way forward once its oil revenues expired and was determined to become the banking centre of the Gulf, if not the Middle East. To some extent it has been successful, but there needs to be an international confidence in the stability of the country and in the rigours of its systems if it is to be really successful. This confidence is still developing in the case of Bahrain and most major banks do now have a presence on the island; as they do elsewhere in the states of the Gulf where they cannot afford to miss out on controlling some of the region's wealth. In the UAE, particularly Abu Dhabi and Dubai, banking is a natural development of their commercial activities. However, the recent intervention by Britain's Bank of England and its closure of the London branch of the Abu Dhabi owned BCCI bank resulted in the spectacular worldwide collapse of the banking group. This has done little to develop international confidence in the banks of the area. As a result it will certainly encourage greater rigour and control of the region's banking and may, in future, lead to greater expansion in this area of commerce. The UAE has recognised banking as a desirable route for local employment and has already addressed it in educational and training terms by establishing the Banking Institute in Sharjah. This institute for training nationals is funded by a two per cent levy on staff salaries for all banks in the UAE. The funding is not a new idea but is, nevertheless, a successful formula that is working and could be repeated in other 'desirable' areas of training, as too, elsewhere in the world.

Dubai, as mentioned earlier, is acutely aware of its vulnerability and, since the introduction of oil revenues, has been working hard to diversify. Already it has developed itself as a major entrepot. This has further been supported by the development of the world's largest manmade container port and the adjacent establishment of the tax advantageous Jebel Ali Free Zone which is attracting warehouse and service industries and further creating a small manufacturing

base. Dubai has become the commercial and business centre within the UAE and the Gulf area generally and already business people are talking about it becoming the Hong Kong of the Middle East; perhaps mere rhetoric but the Dubai government is investing as much as it can back into the emirate's development and clearly there is a growing business confidence in the idea which in itself could become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Therefore, with international business looking at Dubai in terms of more than just a market place, the emirate could develop and grow to enjoy a success story similar to that of Singapore. Take away the business confidence and the bubble could burst leaving Dubai with insufficient income generation to maintain what it has already achieved and put into place. This is a very real dilemma for all small countries as they embark on their own development programmes.

Tourism

The UAE and the small Gulf states, although arid, share a similar sub tropical climate to many other small countries which makes them well suited to follow the characteristic diversification into tourism.

Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Bahrain are widely regarded as the most relaxed centres within the Gulf with alcohol readily available. They are commercial and administrative hubs in the area and are well serviced with established luxury hotels catering to the business traveller. This base is being built upon and new hotels are opening almost weekly as they encourage tourism. Dubai, in particular, has recently enjoyed a busy tourist season with new interest being shown by the residents of the ex Soviet Union who have been visiting in their droves further taking advantage of Dubai's position as a tax-free market place for the world's electrical goods. This has fuelled a mini boom for the local traders where the 'Russians' have, on occasions, cleared a shop with their bulk buying. However, although the Emirates has turned to tourism in its bid to diversify it has not opted for the introduction of mass package tourism and, like many other

small countries, has encouraged the upper end of the market. It offers, not just, guaranteed sunshine and unspoilt beaches but also multi-centre opportunities with sporting activities, ventures into the desert and mountain regions topped by a varied night life.

Dubai itself has actively developed a wide range of top class sporting facilities making it the sporting centre of the Gulf. It now boasts world class facilities and in the last couple of years has sponsored international events in tennis, golf, snooker, horse racing, rallying and F1 offshore powerboat racing which have become annual events further putting Dubai and the UAE on the international circuit. These events must be costing Dubai government a great deal to sponsor but are, without doubt, another example of the farsightedness of the emirate. The wealth factor aids in this as the poorer emirates cannot obviously take the same risks with their more limited resources. Parallells can be drawn elsewhere in the small country world but personalities of vision must make the difference. In Dubai they presently have the resources, a commercial background and realise that they are in a make or break situation with regards to their future. Take away the financial resources and introduce the personalised nature of politics in a small country and it would be interesting to speculate whether the Ruler of Dubai would have taken the same risks in terms of development and diversification.

The other emirates have also started to expand into tourism although Sharjah has had its ups and downs. Sharjah going 'dry' and closing its bars suffered a short term adverse effect on its industry. In the past season, because of concerns over the introduction of prostitution by the ex Eastern Block tourists, it further hampered its tourist development by overnight introducing a royal decree refusing visas to single females. Understandably, the expansion into tourism and the introduction of alien cultures is to be controlled where possible. However, most emirates have experienced expansion in the industry although mostly through the knock-on effects of the Dubai and Sharjah expansion. This

has introduced certain financial gain for the poorer emirates who are desperate to increase their revenues. All emirates enjoy the commercial activity brought about by their relatively tax-free status. Sharjah, Dubai and Abu Dhabi actively promote their duty free airport facilities to transit passengers and have turned the 'stop-over' business into a busy and profitable industry.

As mentioned, the diversification of small countries' economies into tourism is a well documented characteristic brought about by their geographical position resulting in warm sunny climates. However, another characteristic is that some small countries have moved from one mono-economy to another. This can make them just as vulnerable especially when the mere hint of adverse media coverage can destroy a season's earnings. Dubai has countered this particular problem by setting up its own tourist promotion board which proactively promotes both commercial and recreational aspects of Dubai throughout the world. Important in this promotion is the fact that Dubai and the Emirates generally, are a safe place with very low crime. However, there only needs to be one event such as the recent Gulf War to colour public opinion and send the industry into decline. Even though this conflict was hundreds of kilometres away and had little effect on the UAE *per se*, international perception of the UAE did change. Potential tourists generally had little awareness of the geographical aspects of the Arabian Gulf and tourism plummeted. In recent years it has started to boom again and Dubai's proactive promotion has benefited all of the emirates.

Tourism has not had the cultural impact on the individual emirates as it may well have had in other small countries mainly for three reasons. Firstly, due to the extremely high percentage of expatriates in the Emirates the indigenous population has already been exposed to alien cultures. The local culture has already adapted and assimilated many of the icons of the developed world. Secondly, because of the existing wealth in the local population, their standard of living has not particularly improved as a result of the introduction of the tourist

trade and its foreign currency. In fact, tourism has, in one sense, merely expanded the facilities available to the national and expatriate alike by increasing the element of choice in their spending power. Thirdly, and of equal importance, is the fact that the general language of tourism in the Gulf is English. As it is already the de facto language in the UAE amongst the various nationalities and businesses there has been little need to effect major change to promote the industry.

Tourism in the Emirates has, therefore, not led the development process as has been the case in a small country such as the British Virgin Islands [4] in the Caribbean. It has merely enhanced what was already in place. However, that is not to say that tourism does not have educational implications. It may not have stimulated educational development but it does have implications in that it will need to be addressed by the educational institutions in the area if they are to develop the necessary service industry skills in the local population. Unlike other small countries where the situation needs an immediate response, in the UAE, because of the high percentage of expatriates, the skills needed to develop the industry can be bought-in as is the case with most of their development and diversification programmes.

Private educational institutions: a diversification and business activity

The large numbers of expatriates in the Emirates form some eighty per cent of the UAE population. This has been the case since its inception and has lead to a massive commercial development in the field of education at all levels catering to all nationalities. For the UAE this has effectively addressed the educational needs of the multi-cultural population without drawing on federal funding other than the associated costs of supervision, administration and inspection by the Ministry of Education. It could be stated that this is a strong characteristic of education in the UAE and that on the whole the majority of expatriate formal schooling needs are catered for in this way. In fact, because of the apparent high

standard of the school facilities and education on offer, an increasing number of expatriates are taking advantage of local private schooling opportunities and keeping their family together rather than send their children to boarding school in their home countries. In many situations the expatriate is able to upgrade the educational opportunity that they offer their children, particularly if they can afford the fees of one of the British curriculum schools which lead to British qualifications. This is also the case in post secondary courses and training that is available in the UAE where Dubai has become a major centre. Understandably because of the commercial nature of these institutions a limited range of post secondary opportunity exists and is often centred on business and service industry courses. Nevertheless, as the market demand grows so too does the range of courses on offer and the range of overseas institutions that are validating them.

What is happening in the UAE is a clear trend showing the increasingly entrepreneurial nature of educational institutions throughout the world looking for ways of developing their own businesses outside of their home market. Modular degrees, split campus courses, distance learning are all delivery styles that are being employed and aided by advances in electronic technology and reducing costs in communication. The language of instruction is generally in English and British, North American and Australian universities are leading the development through links with local private institutions. For reasons that will become apparent British vocational or academic qualifications are actively sought and leading the demand. Because of the large numbers of Indian subcontinent nationals in the Emirates, Indian universities have now started to take a share of the market. Preparatory courses for their highly competitive entrance examinations are increasingly available.

Education in the UAE is, therefore, big business and an attractive market place for the foreign institutions due to a reasonably open policy within the country; lack of competition from state sponsored institutions and a high spending power

in the residents. For some of these foreign institutions the thought of attracting even a few transferring students at overseas fee rates must also be a driving force.

The commercial aspects of education in the UAE are also being realised now by the bigger UAE based businesses which are, as their traditional markets mature, starting to enter the field of education as a way of expanding and increasing profits. An example of this can be seen in two recent ventures in Dubai which have resulted in the opening of an international/British and a British curriculum secondary school in 1992, The Emirates International School and The English College. Both have profit making motives and are early ventures into this type of business activity for their parent companies. The English College has further seen the potential profit in offering boarding facilities and presently has a small number of students not just from other emirates but also neighbouring Gulf states.

Private education could, therefore, be classed as part of the process of diversification taking place in the UAE. At primary, preparatory and secondary levels it now accounts for one third of all education on offer. At the tertiary level it is further driven by market forces and is a growing sector of business. In economic terms it addresses the needs of much of the expatriate population without making fiscal demands on the Federal budget. Importantly, it also encourages the containment of money within the Emirates' economy rather than leading to an outflow to pay for education elsewhere, which can be a problem for small countries and was the case in the UAE until recently.

The expatriate population's perception of a good, if not better, education being available in the UAE is feeding this major development. The fact that the different nationality groups, whilst in the emirates, have the resources to pay for 'private education' whilst in the Emirates, whereas they would probably not be able to afford it back home, must also support the positive perception. Private

education is, therefore, a strong characteristic of educational provision in all of the emirates which caters to the different national groups in the expatriate population but also supports the education of the national at all levels. A further knock-on benefit is that the availability of the education facilities adds to a greater stability in the transitory nature of the expatriate population where they are now staying for longer terms to enjoy the education benefits.

Colonial legacies: metropolitan orientated ideals and values

The above discusses the general economic condition relative to small countries and their propensity to vulnerable mono-economies. It is clear that there are similar characteristics and trends which the UAE shares. More specific economic considerations pertaining to administration and educational provision will be reviewed later. At this time further comment regarding small countries colonial heritage is worthy of comment.

The UAE, as the Trucial States, shares with the majority of other small countries a period of colonial domination. In the case of the Trucial States it was by the British for a period of some one hundred years until the early 1970s. Although during that time it did not suffer the imposition of an alien language, culture, administration or education system there are surprising similarities in the present day attitudes to the attitudinal legacies left elsewhere in the world where the colonial presence was pervasive. A good example of this can be found in the general attitudes of the people in the area, indigenous and expatriate alike, which afford high status to British education often making it more desirable than their own.

Dubai offers an excellent example of this where in the late 1980s Sheikh Maktoum, the Ruler of Dubai, established two 'Royal Schools' to cater for the educational needs of the Royal Family and other selected pupils. Latifa School for the girls and Rashid School for the boys are show piece schools that in the early stages of development appeared to have unlimited funding. These

English/Arabic medium schools cover the full formal schooling age range and operate an English curriculum to English external examinations taught by well qualified British teachers. Therefore, in educational terms the past metropolitan centre of Britain still commands a strong pull and attraction for the Royal Family in Dubai.

This positive attitude may be the result of the fact that the British were never ousted from the area and initially independence was not actively sought. Independence was more thrust upon the UAE and its neighbouring states of Bahrain and Qatar as the British withdrew east of Suez. There was no direct introduction of educational facility or examination into the area by the British and positive attitudes towards British education and qualification have more likely come about because of two factors:

First: because the British exercised complete control on those who entered the area and also over the exploration rights within the area during the early oil development. The oil companies and the training that they offered would have been influenced and directed towards Britain, the metropolitan centre. Further early development in the country, again, would have had British orientation and, in part, this eventually resulted, in English becoming the language of communication and, accordingly, the language of opportunity. These apparent advances introduced new and substantial revenues for the sheikhs and it is, therefore, unlikely that the British motives were ever questioned.

Second: attitudes would have been further reinforced by the introduction of the vast numbers of expatriates to the UAE, the majority of whom came from countries where the history of British colonial domination was particularly strong such as the Indian subcontinent and the northern Arab countries of Egypt, Palestine and Jordan. This was the case throughout the work force at all levels and particularly found in the managers and advisers to the sheikhs. This would have been further reinforced by the UAE's expatriate teaching force where the

transfer of colonial legacies in terms of metropolitan orientated ideals and curriculum would have been unwittingly transferred. In recent years there has been a more conscious effort to widen horizons and take advantage of new international centres by diversifying their educational dependence. But for the national, particularly in the further education sphere, there is still a strong leaning towards the superior nature of the British system and its qualifications.

Considering the fact that education is a recent phenomenon for the local it is also surprising to observe their obsession with paper qualification [5]. It is often local perception that a doctoral qualification would render the holder far more suitable for a job than an individual with greater relevant experience. The writer contends that this local attitude is the result of a transferring of attitudes brought in by the expatriates from places such as the Indian subcontinent where qualifications have, as Ronald Dore puts it, become a 'diploma disease' [6]. These same people have for many years been advising and running the administrations in the UAE.

It may also be the result of a characteristic that can be found in small and developing countries where educational opportunity is a relatively new phenomenon. That is, obtaining one of the limited educational qualifications available offers upward and outward mobility from the poverty trap. In the poorer countries the high public perception afforded academic qualification, because of the opportunity it offers the few, also stimulates a strong public desire for the traditional university model in education. To perpetuate this model in the public's aspiration can maintain the ruling elite's control. The importance, of course, is to allow a few to succeed. In a developing country it can be seen how colonial legacies support this ideal because, on a country's independence, a ruling elite would have been created and often trained through the active policies of the colonial presence where opportunity was afforded to a few. Moreover, a limited higher educational opportunity within the country and the need to travel to the metropolitan centre would have nurtured the ideal further.

These ideals would still be very strong for many of the expatriates who have come from such a system. They themselves now reap the benefits and the financial rewards in the UAE; or hope to offer the 'educational opportunity' to their children whilst in the UAE and can afford to do so. For the locals this 'contest mobility' within education is not so important. It is unimportant whether they succeed or not as they are, nevertheless, assured a safe and comfortable future supported by the social benefits of an extremely wealthy country. For the expatriates there are no such guarantees as they have no right of abode and, therefore, no right to the wealth. The expatriate's transient position, even after being in the country for ten or twenty years, must go some way to reinforce the above attitudes towards the importance of education.

Incomplete education system

In a small country one characteristic documented by Brock [7] is their "incomplete" and "topless" education system and accordingly where funds are limited the few opportunities available would perpetuate the aforementioned attitudes towards the system. However, in the UAE although the incomplete system is a hallmark, unlike other small countries, it did not, and does not, restrict the national from equal educational opportunity. The opportunity to extend study overseas was, and is, offered by scholarship to all with an appropriate level of education and aspiration to it. However, in the past because of the social mores of the country, this opportunity was rarely taken up by the females although, if desired, it was available.

In the early days of the UAE the incomplete and, at the time, topless education system without a university or college drew the small Gulf states into a regional cooperation that led to the funding of a regional college and later university on the island of Bahrain. The university was supported by funds from Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and Abu Dhabi (the UAE) with each country sending students to it. This satisfied certain needs and demands in the early stages of development

of the contributing countries' limited educational systems. The choice of Bahrain as the centre was more than likely due to the fact that Bahrain had enjoyed earlier development than the other small countries in the region and, therefore, already had a strong base upon which to build. Unlike the Caribbean and Pacific areas with their regional universities, the siting of the university in Bahrain did not act as a magnet. That is, it did not draw associated benefits and consequently important development to the core (Bahrain) and away from the contributing but remoter islands, in this case, the Gulf states. The main reason for this was that the vast oil wealth made it possible for each Gulf state to quickly establish their own university. These may have had limited faculty structures in the earlier years but they developed into major providers within a short time. Again expertise could be bought-in and because of the ever increasing wealth at the time the expensive university provision in the UAE, for example, did not draw important funding away from other state sponsored schooling projects and developments. However, the UAE and the other small Gulf states do still exhibit the characteristic of an incomplete education system in that their universities are still developing and there is limited provision between the formal schooling and this higher level. This is, however, being addressed and paraprofessional training institutions are continuing to be developed.

The fact that this provision is being developed after, rather than before, the university provision can be attributed to two points. Firstly, the public perception and demand for the model and the importance that this demand has on the decision-makers who, in a small country, are quite accessible. The UAE is no exception and in the early days of independence the rulers still needed the support of their family and tribal members to maintain their position. Secondly, the establishment of the university was also a matter of national pride. It would be regarded as one of the important symbols of statehood along with an international airport and airline: symbols that many small countries wish to acquire as soon as possible.

In a small country these important symbols of sovereignty and the establishment of them, sometimes at the expense of other areas of development, is often a priority. In the Emirates an international airport was established in each emirate very soon after independence followed by a regional airline to service them and highlights the importance of this symbol of sovereignty. In wealthy small countries they are clearly important priorities, but are achievable quickly and without obviously drawing the limited funding to the detriment of other areas such as education.

A positive outcome of the wealth factor in the UAE and its open market policy in education, is that the private sector is addressing the incomplete tertiary sector. Market forces, international trends and a high spending power in the large numbers of expatriates all contribute to this trend. Profit motives understandably offer the stimulus to the initial development of the sector and will make it responsive to demand and changing circumstances. However, of importance is that it is developing at no cost to the Federal Government and is, at the same time, opening up and expanding tertiary education and training opportunities for the national. The UAE should recognise this positive outcome and not make the mistake of duplicating the provision but concentrate on developing the 'less profitable' areas of provision. This is but one positive example of the wealth factor, yet, the presence of the expatriate community has resulted in the growth of a substantial service industry catering to their needs. This has developed at little expense to the UAE and offers increased choice and opportunity for the national. In a small less wealthy country, the expatriate population will still exist as a result of aid programmes and although the community may be smaller some benefit to the country can be gleaned from the expatriate's support and service industry. The small country should be careful not to waste funds by duplicating certain private provision that is already in place.

Dependency

A characteristic of newly independent countries is their dependency, in some form, on their past rulers and the metropolitan centre from which the colonial power emanated. This situation can be an exaggerated one in small countries when the centre is the market place for their limited exports and/or also a source of the much needed aid for development. In educational terms, this centre often directed the local curriculum through the imposition of externally managed examinations which bore little relevance to the local situation but did offer the necessary qualifications for those few who were to take advantage of the metropolitan centre's tertiary education system. Due to limited resources and the incomplete and topless educational system that small countries suffered, educational dependence became an inevitable characteristic for most small countries. Apart from education, it also perpetuated the ideas of contest mobility in the general attitudes and aspirations of the indigenous population of a small country. The resulting demands that this would bring to bear on the decision-makers of the small country inextricably linked it to the ex colonial centre.

A desirable trend for all developing countries, therefore, is to localise their curriculum and make it all the more relevant. However, this can only be achieved through political will, the necessary funding and a pool of expertise to implement the changes. In a small developing country where most of its enterprises operate in a marginal mode it is easy to understand how educational and, to some extent, culture dependency are difficult situations to escape. Add to this the further element of aid, which is rarely offered unconditionally, and it can be seen how the dependency increases not decreases. This is particularly the situation when the aid comes in a technological form which involves the introduction of expatriate expertise and/or training from the aid donor. Ongoing maintenance and upgrading is also controlled by those who also holds the technology and further increases the dependence.

For small countries there are two elements of concern to this dependency. First,

because of their limited manpower resource, small countries need to embrace these new technologies. This will enable them to operate more efficiently and effectively particularly in those sectors that operate with little leeway due to a lack of expertise. The second major concern is about how they can control the technological dependency when often they only require one system or limited numbers of the equipment. Unlike a large country where there is a need for more equipment/systems the small country does not have the luxury of being able to diversify its sources, even when they are paying themselves and not relying on aid. Examples of this type of dependency can be found to illustrate the point. However, it is merely sufficient to draw the reader's attention to it and to the technological and micro-chip revolution of the last decade which has changed the way in which the world operates. It is important for small countries to take advantage of the revolution yet the resulting dependency can adversely effect both the wealthy and poor small country in similar measure.

The majority of small countries have been born during this technological revolution and it would follow that as they have developed, so too, has their capacity to take advantage of the ever improving technology. However, link technological advances to education and certain dilemmas can be found. Firstly, the technology can only be fully embraced if education within the developing country has addressed it. Secondly, to address it educationally and to introduce the relevant skills into the work force requires an ongoing process throughout the whole education programme from an early age. Although unit costs would have come down in recent years this would still require the introduction of expensive technology. Another important dimension of this technology, such as computers, is that the software is controlled by those countries with the relevant knowledge and again will be developed for their usage and not necessarily for that of the small country. Some software, in a teaching sense, would be suitable but a great deal would not be relevant to the curriculum demands and needs of a small country. This could represent a whole area of research and as small countries, such as the UAE, start to produce their first batches of graduates,

perhaps, it is on these areas that these graduates should be focussed rather than be absorbed as yet more administrators in the Ministry of Education [8].

The UAE is in the enviable position of being able to afford this new technology. In recent years it has started to computerise certain government sectors such as immigration, traffic police and so forth. Initially, these capital intensive devices were often being used alongside traditional labour intensive methods and did little to alleviate the reliance on expatriate labour. However, of note is that they are now coming into full use and that the Higher Colleges of Technology (HCTs) are developing the necessary skills within their students. The rhetoric also suggests that the modern technologies are being introduced to the state schools. The question does however remain, do the teachers have the knowledge and training to deliver and develop the necessary skills in the classroom?

In terms of dependency, the UAE's advantage of wealth allows it to buy in the technology that it requires from whom it wishes. This is a useful advantage as it also encourages a healthy level of competition amongst the sources. However a dependency still exists linking the UAE via the technology to the source. Until the UAE starts to develop its own research and development (R&D) programmes it will continue to rely on other's technology. The R&D would give it the opportunity to adapt the technology to its own circumstances, particularly in terms of software. However, as in the case with many small countries, R&D is a sector that attracts little attention. This is hardly surprising when most areas including the university, if it exists, operate in a marginal mode.

Interestingly, the UAE has recognised the importance of the modern technology and knowledge and has recently introduced patent, copyright and intellectual protection laws which are actively being enforced. This should give the holders of the technology and the knowledge, confidence to introduce their products and such like into the UAE knowing that they are protected under these new laws.

This will not remove the dependency but it will introduce the necessary capital intensive technology and the development that the UAE so desperately needs if it is to reduce its reliance on the expatriates. The UAE will not have to rely on aid for this, and through its open market policy, will be able to reduce its reliance on one source for it; an option not open to those small countries who do not enjoy the wealth factor.

A second important point helped by the wealth factor is that the UAE can buy-in the necessary expertise to operate this technology without the need to train up its own nationals and consequently can take immediate advantage of it. Less wealthy small countries will find themselves in a 'chicken and egg' dilemma. Do they get the technology and then train their nationals or vice versa? Either way it inhibits the introduction of the technology. In the UAE, the wealth factor allows the luxury of training the national in a more measured manner and the 'release' of the expatriate when the local is ready to assume that position.

Cooperation

A noted trend in the small countries' world is that there is movement towards regional cooperation in areas such as these above where meagre resources can be more productively extended through the vehicle of pooled resources. Cooperation does make sense but it does require a political will. This will, however, be inhibited by the personalised nature of politics in a small country where people are held more accountable for their actions and decisions. In the small country there may be times when much of the innovation is stifled by an individual's own nervousness about reaction from those whose support he requires to maintain his position. In a large country it is easy to see how unpopular and radical decisions can be easily made by individuals who can usually lose themselves in anonymity.

Cooperation, therefore, has a local/national, regional and international dimension and it is somewhere along this continuum that the various balances for the

different projects must be found. In a small country, where umbrella ministries and organisations tend to be the hallmark, it may be easier to manage local cooperative ventures as, often, they already share the same expertise and management. However, even in this situation personal rivalries can inhibit the process.

One advantage of statehood for small countries is the fact that they are offered an international voice which allows them the opportunity for a disproportionate level of influence in these forums compared to a much larger country with the same representation. At the regional level this may also be the case. However, it is worth noting that, in terms of pooling manpower expertise, this may actually adversely affect the small country as it releases this expertise from the home situation. Apart from the apparent high cost of sending the delegate, it actually takes away the much needed expertise from within its own pool of limited resources. This is a particular problem if the country is a micro-state.

Regional cooperation has been cited as a trend and the value of it can be seen in areas such as the Caribbean where regional cooperation has enabled the easing of the educational dependence on a metropolitan centre. To a certain extent, this can be seen through initiatives such as the developing of the University of the West Indies and the setting up of regional examinations in the form of the Caribbean Examinations Council (CXC) both of which allow a degree of localisation of the curriculum. A positive outcome of the establishment of the university is that they now have an institution that can lead and monitor future curriculum development and regional initiatives. A possible negative outcome of this, for the smaller or less wealthy states, is that this sort of institution is likely to create a new centre leading to adverse core periphery relationships and, perhaps, for those peripheral or poor states a new dependence.

Conflicting and competitive interests can present a problem for successful

regional cooperation and, although national interests bring the group together, it is a careful juggling act to move forward in a coordinated regional sense and, at the same time, to also address the more specific national interests. Clearly a strategic approach must prevail, particularly regarding human resource development, as developmental plans and targets arrived at through these forums must be of benefit to the whole region and not just to the louder national voice. The federation of the UAE itself is a good example of this cooperation yet, within the wider Gulf Arab context of the Gulf Cooperation Council, nationalism from all quarters is still an inhibiting factor as the following will identify.

Clearly the setting up of the Federation in itself is an example where regional cooperation has worked and, against all predictions, the federation of the United Arab Emirates is a continuing success unlike other post colonial attempts elsewhere. In fact, without this cooperation it is fair to speculate that the smaller non-oil producing emirates would not have survived. They would likely have been absorbed into the territories of their neighbouring emirates or even drawn into the expansionist aspirations of Iran. It is important to remind the reader that Iran laid claim to Bahrain on its independence and the UAE is at present in dispute with Iran over three strategic islands that Iran has recently occupied after over twenty years of joint administration of them with Sharjah and Ras al Khaimah. It is also worth pointing out that the Federation works because the individual sovereign emirates are gaining benefit from Abu Dhabi's benevolence and generosity with its oil wealth.

One of the first federal agencies established on independence was that of the Ministry of Education and Youth Affairs. This allowed the fusing of the Northern Emirates' Kuwaiti sponsored education system with Abu Dhabi's Jordanian system. It also allowed the Northern Emirates access to major investment in education through the federal offices which they would never have been able to fund from their own meagre resources. The high standard of educational provision in the UAE is, therefore, a direct result of regional cooperation. The oil

wealth also enabled the poorer emirates to enjoy the benefits of curriculum developments and the localising of this curriculum which, prior to independence, was dominated by two external education systems. The pooling of resources also allowed for the smaller less wealthy emirates to gain the knock-on benefits of cheaper unit costs. Even with the oil wealth the unit costs, particularly in the early stages of development, can be exorbitant and prohibitive. The wealth factor did allow for the earlier decentralising of resources to each emirate, but also the establishment of central departments such as the Ministry of Public Works. Its responsibility for building schools and their maintenance *inter alia*, is a positive example of centralising and reducing overall costs and wastage of the limited expertise.

In terms of regional cooperation it is interesting to note the rhetoric of cooperative ideas of the last decade although little has been achieved in real terms educationally. The ideal of the Gulf states working together and creating common policies and goals is starting to come together through the aegis of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) which is supported by Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Oman. However, their present direction is driven more by ideas of free movement for its nationals, open market policies in trade amongst its membership, common tax policies and, due to recent events vis-`a-vis the Gulf War, the interrelationship of its defence forces. Each contributing unit is still very much a sovereign state looking to its own interests, but, it may well be that, due to declining oil revenues and each of the countries moving into budget deficits, the GCC is drawn together and the rhetoric turned into proactive and positive action.

In the meantime, the GCC appears to have had little effect on the educational systems and examinations of the region although, it must be said, that there is a high degree of correspondence already existing between them. There has been some common curriculum planning and implementation in terms of Mathematics [9] and talk of looking at the region's examination systems.

However, it appears clear that, if anything, the wealth factor that all of the Gulf states have enjoyed has inhibited the process of regional cooperation, particularly in education, apart from the early establishment of the college/university in Bahrain. Although the area's bedouin have a tradition of hospitality to the visitor it is rarely extended to that of cooperation outside the tribe. The area was made up of traditional tribal groupings which lived in poverty and were, quite rightly, protective and suspicious of external influence and interference. The change in this situation in the Gulf has only taken place in the last sixty years and a mere thirty years in the case of the UAE. Understandably, as the new nations of the Gulf were given the opportunity to develop into modern states, one of the priorities of each territory was to bring its disparate populations together to operate cooperatively as one and to identify with national goals. To have achieved this with reasonable success across a region noted for its past and present ethnic rivalries and demands for self determination, is an achievement. Against that backdrop it is easy to understand why the energy has gone into nationalistic as opposed to regional enterprise. The wealth has meant that, generally, they have been able to fund their insular policies unlike a less wealthy country which would have found the costs prohibitive. Furthermore, even though the Gulf states are now earnestly addressing their incomplete education systems, the lack of comprehensive facility in the tertiary sector was never, and will never be a major problem. As mentioned earlier, the wealth factor does allow the buying-in of the expertise that they need. Where else, for example, could a small country, or any country for that matter, fund from scratch and provide a completely segregated set of facilities as has been achieved by the Islamic oil producing states? Elsewhere, rich or poor, small or large countries would have to be far more selective and possibly discriminate against one group or the next.

However, segregation is a strong characteristic of the small states in the Arabian Gulf which they are, at present, determined to maintain. The writer speculates that, as these states move into a future of declining revenues and budgetary

deficits, they are more likely to move towards the fiscal benefits of regional cooperation than to desegregate their educational facilities.

Arabisation: localisation of the work force

A characteristic of the Arabian Gulf states is their extremely high level of expatriates as a percentage of the population. Because of the nature of the expatriate work force there is also a strong bias in favour of males within these populations with two thirds males often being recorded. This is particularly the case in the UAE where the national is a mere twenty per cent of the total population and males dominate two to one. This also leads to another characteristic of a predominantly young population across the region.

Each of the states is now addressing the expatriate situation which leads to the noticeably strong trend in the region of Arabisation: the localising of the work force in an attempt to reduce reliance on expatriate labour. This is in keeping with small countries generally and is presently driving educational planning in all of the small Gulf states, although, on a national level and not as a cooperative regional venture. The result of this, in the last decade, is that each of the countries is reviewing its employment situation and making targets regarding their national work force. These targets are being addressed through the inauguration of paraprofessional institutions for the post secondary national, male and female alike, albeit gender specific courses that go against Western ideas of equal opportunity.

The past trend was that the national was offered 'safe' employment opportunities in the public sector. This is changing and the programmes are now backed by a strong desire in the governments of each country to introduce their nationals into the private sector work force. In the UAE, females are also actively encouraged to join the work force. As these points have already been discussed in length it is not necessary to develop the discussion further other than to highlight the trend. As mentioned, these are trends that are noted for

small countries generally although in the UAE they have only been actively pursued in the last decade by linking manpower planning to education. A major reason for this fact is that previously certain training was carried out by the companies whilst the government's energy was put into developing schooling provision and the university. The belief was that the university would supply the cadre of nationals needed to fill the newly created public administration positions necessary to run the Federation. The take-up at the university has been good and it is producing graduates who are being offered positions in the public sector. However, there has been a strong take-up of arts courses at the university over the years which is mainly due to the public's low perception of vocationally orientated schooling and courses, as discussed in previous chapters. This misguided local perception often associates vocational training with menial and manual labour. However, the university graduates were generally not trained individuals and it would be fair to say that their guaranteed employment in the public sector initially did little to improve the situation. As nationals, many of these people were elevated to 'protected' managerial positions commanding greater salaries than the expatriate who would often be there to support them.

By way of example, many individuals in the administration of private schools have, over the years, referred to the increased paperwork that is demanded from the Ministry of Education's private education department. This obliquely refers to the increased numbers of Al Ain graduates who are added each year to the Ministry and who need something to do. The reason that they are in the Ministry is often due to the public's perception of teaching and the low salaries afforded to teachers when, in actual fact, they would be of far greater benefit to the country in the classroom.

Another important contributor to the employment situation in the public sector is that nepotism or personalised appointments were a hallmark of the UAE and the region generally. This did little to develop a work ethic in the national who in

some situations had to do little more than turn up; after all, the expatriates were employed to do the work. This characteristic of the Gulf states can be clearly seen in the appointment of high ranking government officials in the early days of independence. All but a few were members of the various ruling families and/or the families' important supporters. Importantly, the trend in the UAE is now away from that situation. An examination of the same positions would show that more experienced individuals have been appointed and clearly a meritocracy is replacing the nepotism born out of the tribal culture where reward was expected for an individual's support for the ruler. The very nature of small countries is that people are close to the decision-makers and to those people running the administrations and departments which support this system. It would be unfair to suggest that this was peculiar to the UAE and no doubt it is a characteristic of all developing and some developed societies. In the early stages of development of a country, where unlike the UAE, it does not have the benefit of expensive expatriate advisers, it can be clearly seen how maladministration and wastage in every sense could inhibit the development of a country, particularly when resources are limited and the country is small.

A clear trend for the UAE national in the work place is, therefore, a move from status orientation to function orientation. This can, to some extent, be attributed to the process of education where previously the experience did not exist. Now that it does it can more readily be insisted upon.

Importantly, the UAE is addressing this general situation through its training programmes. Understandably, there is a certain amount of resistance from the nationals in some areas where they are encouraged to leave the easier and well paid public sector for the less well paid performance related private sector. In the less secure private sector, even though the ultimate rewards may be higher, the nationals will have to prove themselves through hard work. This has already been discussed and referenced in the chapter on manpower, but it is worth bringing to the attention of the reader at this point. It is a characteristic of the UAE

and the small Gulf states, therefore, that they are now seriously addressing the need for relevant training in their national work force and linking national manpower targets to the education system. Also, increasingly in the public sector, trained nationals are taking over positions of importance and this is leading to more decision-making on their part and less reliance on expatriates.

Small countries need to release all of their citizens into the work force. This is particularly so if they are wealthy countries and wish to reduce their tremendous reliance on expatriates. The UAE is following this trend and an increasing number of females are joining the work force. However, as expected in a Muslim society, these females are opting for gender specific employment routes, such as offices, nursing and teaching.

A characteristic of the UAE teaching force is that it is made up of transient expatriate Arabs. The recent influx of nationals is a welcomed development; however, it does lead to a second trend, that is, the noticeable feminisation of the teaching force. Ultimately, this may have a negative effect but until the status of teachers and the profession is raised in the eyes of the local, it will be a continuing trend. Interestingly, in the early days of independence there was a higher percentage of males entering the profession. This did drop off as entrepreneurial and commercial opportunities were afforded the local during the years of rapid development. A fifty-one per cent local partnership in any business venture is a UAE requirement and, naturally, due to the nature of society these opportunities were taken up by the males.

The subject of the teaching force also raises other important points that may highlight advantages and disadvantages that are a result of the wealth factor. Advantages are reasonably obvious. In a period of just thirty years, the UAE has achieved Universal Primary Education. It has developed, resourced and staffed modern schools for the four to eighteen age range of the population. This has taken place despite the lack of necessary expertise within its own

population. A less wealthy small country would generally have had to train up teachers and introduce them to the schools, often with minimal training and qualifications. In the UAE buying-in the expertise has made the process immediate and also allowed for the trend of increasingly well qualified teachers delivering the curriculum. However, an adverse consequence of the high number of expatriate teachers, no matter how good they are as teachers, is the introduction of an alien culture to the classroom and to the impressionable minds of the young national. These teachers are Arabs but they are not from the same culture. Their Arabic would be different as too could be their interpretation of Islam. These teachers would have different points of reference to the locals and different aspirations which may be at a variance with the needs, goals and aspirations of the young and developing UAE. There is a need to develop a common goal and a sense of national pride in the young where previously existed a tradition of disparate tribal groups with loyalty to the tribe. How can, therefore, an Egyptian brought up on the ideals of Arab Nationalism and Pan Arabism with, perhaps, a fundamentalist background prevent some transfer of his/her ideas?

Cultural contamination may be too harsh a phrase, although it is an outcome of the situation. Some may argue that exposure of the young locals to other Arab cultures and ideas is a positive outcome. However, in the UAE where the national is in the minority and is being bombarded by a multicultural experience he or she is in very real danger of losing his or her Gulf cultural identity. This should be viewed as a negative outcome of the wealth factor and no amount of localising the curriculum or investing money in it will change the fact that the local in many cases is being taught by an alien.

Another characteristic of the UAE and the Gulf states generally is the phenomenon of domestic help. This is clearly, an indication of the wealth and high spending power of the local. The houseboy/girl's increasing importance within the family, and particularly his/her role in raising the children, is causing

some concern. The linguistic development of the child brought up by or in regular contact with a non-Arab speaker who may only communicate in pigeon Arabic or English was discussed earlier. It could be argued that this is not a characteristic of small wealthy countries and is one of wealthy countries generally. However, the writer contends that in the small country the situation is an enhanced one if the context is: a small local population with high spending power combined with a high presence of expatriates. In the UAE most locals enjoy a high standard of living if they wish and, at present, also enjoy a high spending power further supported by the state welfare system. Combine this with the introduction of cheap foreign labour and it can be easily seen how the situation becomes a characteristic of the small country. It certainly is a characteristic of the small Gulf states and it is also likely in other small wealthy countries which offer employment routes to their neighbours where little, if any, training is needed to secure a job.

Linguistic and cultural contamination is an outcome and could be considered a negative outcome of the wealth factor when the context is a small country. There must be some irony in the fact that, although the UAE did not experience a pervasive colonial presence, it is now suffering similar 'contaminations' and legacies to those small countries that were dominated by one.

Small country education systems often suffer from a lack of specialist support such as educational psychologists and special needs education. These areas require trained specialists who have, perhaps, spent many years acquiring their skills. In a small country, such as the UAE with no tradition of education other than the last thirty years, it is easy to understand the dearth of these professionals. This situation could cover all sectors where only one or a small number of professionals are required.

In the UAE it is fair to state that special needs and specialists in education are more recent additions. This would be in keeping with the general process of

development where qualitative issues are tackled after quantitative development has taken place. Arguments against the ideals and validity of Universal Primary Education could develop at this point, although, it is sufficient to say that the idealism of UPE being the panacea leading to increasing democracy and equality for all is now being challenged in favour of more targeted approaches. UPE, therefore, has much to answer for in the absorbing of funds and energy in poorer developing countries, particularly small ones. However, it is easy to understand the political prudence of offering it in a personalised society such as that of the small country world. Returning to the issue of specialists, the social mores in the UAE, and of the area generally, have also played an important role in the later development of special needs education in the country. The tribal background and the extended family have, until recently, contained the problem. Handicapped children, for example, would have been looked after and cared for within the home. Delinquency is yet another problem and, if the 'official' comment in the press a mere ten years ago is anything to go by, it has only just appeared and is a result of the expatriate presence. Perhaps it is more the result of the process of modernisation and the rapid change from poverty to extreme wealth in less than a generation and the associated pressures of consumerism. This is not the place to argue this point. However, the comment does exemplify the 'closed' nature of the area's traditional society and family and it is only in recent years that an 'openness' has started to appear. The UAE does have handicapped children with special needs. In fact, there is a high incidence of it due to the tradition of inter-marriage to cousins, something that has already been discussed and is now being discouraged to some extent. The UAE is also recognising delinquency amongst its citizens, as too drug abuse *inter alia*. Accordingly, as it recognises a problem it is also starting to address it. In part, it is being forced into this action by a gradual break-up of the extended family and an increasing transfer of responsibility for care, education and correction from the family to the state. The authorities are assuming their responsibility and, as a wealthy country, can afford to. It must be noted that this is a characteristic of recent years only.

Specialists and specialist facilities are being introduced to the schools. However, the expatriate service sector does also have an important part to play by making available, for consultation, specialist professionals who are here, perhaps as wives, and have set up as consultants or opened facilities. For example, the writer is aware of the existence in the Dubai expatriate community of a dyslexia specialist, a few educational psychologists, a careers consultant, etcetera. These people are unlikely to be present in a less wealthy small country which does not enjoy a high number of expatriates. In the UAE they do exist and there is sufficient demand amongst the expatriates for them to practice. This allows them to complement the developing provision in the state sector and is another example of how the small wealthy country can benefit from the dormant expertise among its expatriates.

The development of special provision such as this in the state sector has come as a matter of course in the development process as a whole. The wealth factor has not changed the situation other than to speed-up the process. The process of education itself for the national has also fed the dearth of expertise but more importantly the shift to qualitative considerations and a more targeted approach has enabled its implementation. The wealth factor has also enabled the UAE to buy-in expertise if it is not present in its manpower pool. The diseconomy of small scale requirement of these specialists/facilities and the fact that they may be underutilised is not of concern nor is the cost of sending its citizens for external training.

An outcome of the UAE's wealth is that it has not, as yet, been forced to focus on maximising its spending power. It could be argued that it cannot see 'the wood for the trees' as there is a tremendous wealth of untapped expertise in its own country. It is the writer's contention that the imported expatriate expertise, in the form of wives and family members, is not being effectively utilised. All too often, the expertise is recruited to do a specific job and the wider use of this

and/or the latent expertise present is not being tapped. A transfer and dissemination of this expertise and knowledge, if language allows, to the locals and, for that matter, the expatriate could be achieved via short term training, seminars, the occasional introduction to established courses and so forth. This is an area worthy of recognition and consideration by all countries but particularly small countries that have a high incidence of trained expatriates as it could work to their advantage in a cost effective manner.

Training raises another important point which is often a major dilemma for the small country: wasted investment in education, that is, investing some of the limited financial resources in the high cost of educating and training a citizen in a specialist field. This often involves sending the person to an external institution where they could be seduced by the better lifestyle. On their return it could also involve them in a specialist field which has limited demand within the country and thus force them to seek professional development and opportunity elsewhere which results in a lost investment to the country.

The UAE does not suffer this particular problem at present because any investment will result in an expatriate position being filled by a local which will be viewed as a benefit. Moreover, the standard of living in the UAE is so high and the family ties so strong that the majority of locals prefer to stay or return after their overseas study and training. The high level of expatriates staying long term in the UAE is testimony to the high standard of living and has resulted in a certain 'brain drain' from elsewhere in the world. In fact, the UAE has aspired to what is widely considered a desirable posting as opposed to the hardship one of a mere thirty years ago.

Another interesting characteristic of small less wealthy countries is that the lack of employment opportunity does force, particularly the menfolk, into seeking employment in a neighbouring country. This is often of a manual type which requires little training and results in a temporary outflow of men and an inflow of

remitted funds. The converse of this tends to exist for the educated/trained individual who can aspire to a better standard of living in a different country and the permanent setting up of residence there.

In the UAE the wealth factor has shown itself as the opposite characteristic. That is, it is a 'receiving country' and the inflow of foreign labour results in an outflow of remitted funds. Within the educated/trained sector there is a strong desire to 'stay put' as conditions are unlikely to improve by moving to another country. This also results in an inflow of expatriates who would welcome the opportunity to establish themselves in the Emirates due to the better standard of living on offer. Interestingly, although this is the case and many people have effectively established themselves in the Emirates for a decade or two, the UAE does not entertain offering nationality to them, not even if they are born in the country. It protects its nationality very carefully even though it cannot, as a country, exist without these expatriates. Understandably this reduces the states's responsibility to and for the resident expatriate, and for any potential financial liabilities, which could be regarded by some as a prudent move for a small country. It also reduces the risk of losing political control to the 'non-local' segment of society at a future stage. Such as has been the case in other small countries which have evolved into plural states where, in time, the foreign presence naturalises and takes control. The vehement protection of nationality is a characteristic of all of the Gulf states which guarantees them continued and ultimate political control. However, the process of educating the local could, to some extent, destabilise the political oligarchies that exist. Education will raise standards and expectations. It will also nurture questioning attitudes and the ability to respond and be proactive in political aspirations.

A noticeable trend in the small countries of the Gulf is that education has had a democratising effect on these societies, certainly in terms of expectation. It has started and encouraged the emancipation of the female and has started to secularise certain sectors of the Gulf societies. In Kuwait and Bahrain this trend

has also led to demands for a greater say in the affairs of state and the decision-making in Kuwait and Bahrain. In Bahrain this has been brought on by a widening gap between the rich and the poor and a lack of opportunity for the poor. In the UAE reducing oil revenues and wealth or even a static standard of living could, in time, precipitate the demands for political democracy. At present, it appears that everyone is sufficiently wealthy, comfortable and still holding on to traditional ideals of loyalty, albeit, they are now directed more to the rulers of the UAE as opposed to the tribal sheikhs of the past. Education is modernising the citizens of the UAE and increasing their aspirations and it is therefore all the more important for a continued distribution of the wealth to all citizens if the elitist power base is to remain unchallenged.

The aforementioned has attempted to place the UAE into the small country context. However, pertinent comment throughout the body of this thesis has already been made by way of the small country thread running through this work. This chapter is not, therefore, exhaustive but it does report and comment on the situation and gives a summary outlining certain characteristics and trends that can be offered for comparison. Hopefully this thesis will inform the wider debate by introducing the United Arab Emirates to the world of educational research on small countries and international and comparative research more generally.

NOTES AND REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER EIGHT

1. BROCK, Colin (1988), op. cit., p. 167.

2. COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT (1987), op. cit., p. v.

3. See: BROCK, Colin (1984), op. cit., Chapter Three "Education and Isolation" in which Brock refers to spatial isolation and remoteness.

4. See SMAWFIELD, David (1988), op. cit.

5. As observed by the writer.

6. DORE, Ronald (1976), op. cit.

7. BROCK, Colin (1984), op. cit., p. 45.

8. This refers to 'safe' employment opportunities offered to nationals in the government or quasi government offices.

9. See HUSSEIN. Mansour G. (1992),
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