THE UNIVERSITY OF HULL

FROM MARKETING SYSTEMS TO SYSTEMS MARKETING

being a Thesis submitted for the Degree of PhD

in the University of Hull

by

Zhichang ZHU, MSc

September 1995

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would first like to thank Professor Flood for his supervision, which has provided me with motivation, encouragement and challenges.

I also wish to thank the Department of Management Systems and Sciences and the Centre for Systems Studies in the University of Hull, for their academic, administrative and financial support during the whole period of my study.

Finally, I must thank my wife Xiaoping and son Riping, whose love, patience and sacrifice have made all this possible.

ABSTRACT

This thesis attempts to explore an alternative taking us beyond the paradigmatic tension which currently dominates and stagnates the discipline of marketing study.

This is done in the light of Habermas's critical theory and contemporary critical systems thinking (CST). It is argued that there is an urgent need to bring together the strengths of 'critical' and 'systems' so as to facilitate collective complementarity while at the same time preserving opportunity for pursuing individual development among heterogeneous approaches.

Based upon an investigation of how systems approaches have been employed as analytical techniques for improving marketing efficiency, as conceptual models facilitating comprehensive understanding of marketing activities, and as a guide to theoretical development to co-ordinate divergence and convergence in research, the thesis contends that systems approaches can be employed in a perhaps more rewarding way to investigate, address and tackle the present paradigmatic tension.

The thesis proposes a critical systems reconstruction of marketing study: first reorienting marketing as a communicative action system driven and constituted by rationally contesting human technical, practical and emancipatory interests in consumption needs, then suggesting a conceptual typology for categorising marketing approaches into technical, practical and normative marketing which systematically nurtures technical enhancement, subjective experience and social norm formation in marketing activities.

It is asserted that under such reconstruction, mutual understanding and support among heterogeneous approaches is not arbitrary, but is an inherent feature of marketing knowledge inquiry. The thesis urges marketing researchers to enter into a critical dialogue to establish plurality in the long term, to promote mutual learning through fusion of horizons, and to pursue complementarity in practical problem-solving intervention.

In the effort to revitalise systems approach as a facilitating model, the thesis concludes that given the stagnating paradigmatic unease currently prevailing in marketing study, the future for competitive marketing systems lies in systems marketing - serving human contestable interests in consumption needs through communicative reasoning among various marketing systems.

CONTENTS OVERVIEW

CONTENTS

APPENDICES

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

In this introductory chapter, firstly the background of the research is briefly presented. Next, the aim of the research is declared and its main arguments put forward. Then, major theoretical resources are introduced. Lastly, the structure of the thesis is outlined.

The main message is that a possible way out of the current 'paradigmatic stagnation' in marketing study is to carry on a critical reconstruction and to adopt a critical systems pluralist perspective in the discipline through a move from marketing systems to systems marketing in the light of critical systems thinking. To be reconstructed as a facilitating inquiry system assisting understanding, formulation and satisfaction of contestable and balanced human interests in consumption needs, marketing study must be at once both critical and systemic.

1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE RESEARCH

The intention of this research is to explore, in the light of Habermas's critical theory and contemporary critical systems thinking, a possible alternative for reconstructing marketing study. This project is undertaken in the recognition that in the discipline of marketing, we are confronted with a challenging diversity and in the need of an adequate response to it.

Since the early 1970's, the Kuhnian idea of paradigm (Kuhn, 1962) has spread into the field of marketing study (Carman, 1980; Dawson, 1971). When marketing theorists were still struggling to read and interpret Kuhn, similar concepts soon emerged under such names as 'research programs' (Lakatos, 1974), 'research traditions' (Laudan, 1977) and 'research areas' (Feyerabend, 1978a, b), etc. From then on, the prevailing micro/logical-empirical wisdom in marketing study has been seriously questioned (Anderson, 1983; Dholakia and Arndt, 1985; Firat *et al.*; 1987), and more 'socially relevant' and 'diverse' alternatives for marketing inquiry have been argued for (Arndt, 1985a, b; Deshpande, 1984; Hirschman, 1985, 1986a; Hudson and Ozanne, 1988). Ideologies in marketing are becoming a heatedly debated subject (Dholakia e*t al.*, 1980; Firat, 1985a, b; Heede, 1985; Hirschman, 1983, 1993). All this has contributed to the emergence of a diversity in the discipline. So much so that, in 1985, Arndt found in marketing study a range of research approaches and metaphors allied to each of the four quarters of Burrell and Morgan's (1979) macro paradigmatic scheme; in 1992, Hirschman and Holbrook were able to identify in marketing a whole continuum of philosophical positions (with 'material determinism' at the one end and 'mental determinism' at the other) and corresponding research methods, as well as application projects. Nowadays, the question is not whether there is a diversity, but rather how to see and respond to the diversity. The diversity manifests itself so fragmentarily that marketers even describe their discipline as experiencing 'disarray' (Benton, 1985:198), 'turmoil' (Dholakia and Arndt, 1985:xi), 'intellectual warfare' (Hirschman and Holbrook, 1992:114) and 'stagnation' (Heede, 1992:1), or, as being 'at a crossroad' (Firat *et al.*, 1987:xvi).

Responses to the diversity have also been diverse, and can be briefly classified into three groups. On the one side, there are 'scientific realists' and 'modern empiricists', who argue that science can be distinguished from non-science by *the* criteria of *scientific* method. They reject interpretive/hermeneutic and other accounts as science (Calder and Tybout, 1987, Tybout and Calder, 1989). They see the diversity as symptomatic of a dangerous wave of 'scientific anarchy' (Hunt, 1990a, 1991, 1992a). Their response is to re-establish 'the meta physical belief in one world with one truth about one reality' (cf.: Hirschman and Holbrook, 1992:2). On the other side, there are 'critical relativists' and 'relativist constructionists', who delight in the present disorder, arguing for different forms of relativism based on the argument of paradigmatic incommensurability. They do not admit of any possibility or condition for mutual listening and conversation between research approaches. In the final analysis, their response is to argue for paradigmatic closure (Anderson, 1986, 1988a, b; Peter, 1991). There are also those who just list and present various competing approaches, then 'pray[ing] for peace and respect to one another'; or those who seek a 'middle of the road' reconciliation so as to synthesise rival research paradigms (for example Hirschman and Holbrook, 1992; Leong, 1985).

However, peace does not come. Instead we have been falling into a war with ourselves, since each side tries to convince the others that it 'provides the best account of science', tries to prove itself as the 'most useful philosophical foundation' (Peter, 1991:534), and hence tries to capture a superior position in the diversity. Communications between paradigms become more and more unproductive, if not impossible, because each main approach regards itself as the 'best way' and hence defines all issues in its own terms (see for example Calder and Tybout, 1987 and Hunt, 1991, 1992a). Two professors of marketing have recently painted such a portrait for us:

> However regrettable it may seem to those with tender hearts, warfare rages to day among scholars and scientists in the field ... The battle lines for this war among consumer researchers resemble the swamped boundaries, blurred identities, and fuzzy loyalties that characterise a guerrilla warfare that grinds on endlessly without hope of termination, much less resolution. In this the conflict recalls Vietnam more than World War II. It threatens to sap the strength of its participants without offering any possibility of victory. It promises only waste with no chance of success for the self proclaimed righteous on various sides of the struggle (Hirschman and Holbrook, 1992:113-4).

It appears that none of the above mentioned propositions have properly responded to the diversity since, although pointing in dramatically different directions, they all failed to address and answer two basic questions: firstly, why and how it is that we have this diversity of different rationalities/approaches in marketing study, and secondly, why and how competing approaches can be employed in a meaningful and productive way.

1.2 AIM OF THE RESEARCH

The aim of this research is thus to probe the necessity of differentiated research approaches in marketing study, and to explore an alternative for encouraging mutual listening and possible complementarity among these approaches, in the hope that this will accommodate rival paradigms[1] in marketing study, and will suggest a pluralist atmosphere conducive to both individual enhancement and collective complementation.

The basic argument of the thesis is that for this purpose, a critical systems pluralist perspective must be adopted, which should be in turn built upon the grounds of systemicity and criticality.

Pluralism, in my view, in the marketing study context suggests that on the one hand human interests in consumption needs are so complex, and the marketplace, marketing activities, and marketing tasks are so heterogeneous, that no single research approach or paradigm on its own is sufficient to address and tackle them all properly. On the other hand, no human knowledge or inquiry approach can escape from partiality, incompleteness and prejudice, and each possesses its own strengths and weaknesses. For this reason, individually, various approaches/paradigms may be good at dealing with some human congnitive interests and marketing situations, but not with others. Therefore to handle heterogeneity in the marketplace and diversity in consumption needs, various approaches/paradigms need to be employed in such a way to complement one another. For this to be possible, researchers have a universal responsibility to reflect on their boundary judgements made on marketing actions, to reflect on the Self, to listen to the Other, as well as to pursue any possibility for conversation and understanding with each other through critical dialogical reasoning. It is this pluralist proposition that underlies the whole argument of the present research.

The above understanding of pluralism highlights such a line of thinking, that is: the necessity of different research approaches depends on the diversity and heterogeneity of issues derived by contestable human interests in consumption needs. A question which arises here is: but what about this latter kind of diversity and heterogeneity?, i.e., how is it possible to justify and ground rationally the contestability of human needs and interests in marketing?

I will argue that the answer to this question lies in how we perceive and define marketing. If marketing is narrowly, that is, one-sidedly, defined as merely management techniques for business activities, obviously only those approaches addressing instrumental or technical issues are legitimised; all other kinds of approaches are at best superfluous and at worst dangerous, since they violate *the* once clearly defined scientific criteria for marketing knowledge inquiry. If, however, we look beyond the prevailing 'mainstream' wisdom and critically reconstruct marketing as also a human-action/social-mechanism, which simultaneously involve human beings' technical, practical and normative interests, then various approaches/paradigms are logically necessary, because no incomplete construct on its own is able adequately to support marketing as such. Plurality and complementarity among alien and rival approaches is therefore indispensable under a critical definition of marketing.

Throughout the above elaboration, I have highlighted the current lack and the vital importance of systemicity and criticality in marketing study, both of which need some introduction here.

The notion of 'system' nowadays covers a huge variety of meanings, which increase in number and complexity with ever-greater rapidity. Seen from this standpoint, at least three kinds of reasoning can be supported by the 'system' idea.

Firstly, the notion of system can be employed as a conceptual model to describe, subject to our cognitive purpose, a crucial ontological property: the holistic structural relations among concrete and/or abstract entities as well as different kinds of relationships; for example in the marketing context, the complexity in exchange relations, marketing mix, marketing programs, marketplace, micro and macro consumption patterns, as well as the dynamics in which all these phenomena are interwoven and interacting with each other, etc. Here, systemicity is conceived as contained in the systemic world.

Secondly, system can be seen as an organising device of human knowledge inquiry, i.e., a systemic process generating and facilitating open debates towards mutual understanding and agreed changes, which transfers systemicity 'from the world to the process of inquiry into the world' (Checkland, 1983). This line of thinking, for example the reflective work of Churchman (1968, 1979), has been introduced into the field of marketing study, and the term 'system' has been used to denote the systemic inquiry process of seeking and appreciating marketing knowledge (Mokwa and Evans, 1982).

A more fruitful and rewarding usage of 'system', relevant to this project which focuses on the current paradigmatic tension in marketing study, may lie on its original intent of holism, with which ideally we could be able to overcome the tendency of reducing contestable human interests into a one-dimensional interest, to reject the tendency of reducing differentiable human knowledge into a one-dimensional 'science', and thus be able to search for both singularity and commonality among different inquiry modes and research approaches. In this sense the intention of systems thinking and the idea of pluralism are closely related and point in the same direction.

It is mainly this last kind of systems reasoning that I will employ to argue for critical systems plurality of research approaches in marketing study. It is also in this sense that I title this thesis: *From marketing systems to systems marketing*. 'Marketing systems' in this research are defined as conceptual models of marketing activities/phenomena created by various schools of marketing thought, e.g., mechanical models, organismic models, cultural models and emancipatory models (see Chapter 2 and Part II). The term 'marketing systems' in this research also denotes the tendency or mode that concentrates on using a particular marketing approach and constructs to model marketing situations as a particular kind of system, to present such models as *the* marketing whole, and then to manipulate these systems based on a particular rationality, usually in an isolationist and exclusive manner.

In contrast, *systems marketing* is proposed in this thesis as an attitude and style of practice that intends to juxtapose discordant marketing systems, to encourage complementation through communicative reasoning so that collectively marketing systems can tackle the wide range of heterogeneous issues involved in understanding, formulating and satisfying consumption needs. As such, systems marketing intends rather to simultaneously address contesting human interests (in Habermas's sense) and human spheres (in terms of Heeds, 1980) in marketing than to reduce them to a single dimension. Systems marketing also postulates critical reflection on individual research approaches, on boundary judgements each makes, and encourages approach enhancement through mutual listening, challenging, and learning among rival paradigms, rather than pursuing isolationist closure.

On the one hand, unlike 'scientific realism' in marketing study which believes that 'only scientific knowledge rests on a methodology that offers the possibility of scientific progress' (see for example Calder and Tybout, 1987) and therefore denigrates all other kinds of knowledge, systems marketing suggests learning to live with instability, granting respect to diverse research approaches, pursuing rich understanding of diverse marketing activities, and engaging in a collective effort for complementarity among the whole range of contesting marketing systems.

On the other hand, unlike the kind of 'relativism' in marketing study which denies the possibility of inter-approach listening, dialogue and learning, systems marketing encourages and tries to facilitate better understanding of both the Self and the Other through the dynamic process of inter-challenging. Systems marketing also encourages competing approaches to pursue mutual appreciation through critical reflection and fusion of horizons based on a longer and wider socio-historical scope.

Thus, systems marketing is a 'better' and more viable alternative for responding to the diversity in marketing study since it provides more flexibility for various approaches to pursue differences as well as commonality. It is also more systemic in the sense that it tries to avoid the tendency of reduction or isolation, postulates and emphasises systemic inquiry and systemic employment of various marketing systems, and tries to embrace and juxtapose them for a richer understanding and competence in marketing study.

It is a basic theme throughout this thesis that a crucial prerequisite for adopting the systems marketing strategy, given the current situation, is to reconstruct marketing along the line of critical theory. On the one hand, without a critical reorientation, without a critique of the dominant exclusive ideology of 'marketing as managerial technology only', without reviewing the broader societal mission of marketing, we will not be able to derive the recognition of the necessity of embracing technical, practical, and emancipatory interests, and therefore will lose the exact reason for giving respect to diverse marketing constructs, let alone encouraging meaningful interaction among them. On the other hand, without properly embracing and employing the whole range of available differentiated approaches, there is no hope of addressing, in an undistortive and unconstricting manner, the whole range of heterogeneous issues involved in satisfying the plurality of human interests in consumption needs. Criticality and Systemicity are therefore two faces of the same systems marketing coin.

To sum up, the main aim of my thesis is to explore an alternative response to the diversity in marketing study. For this, it is necessary to answer two basic questions: why and how such diversity comes to us, and how we can facilitate meaningful interaction within this diversity. Answering these questions, I will argue for a pluralist perspective which is built upon criticality and systemicity .

1.3 THEORETICAL RESOURCES

To realise the above aim I will draw mainly upon Habermas's critical theory and contemporary critical systems thinking (CST) as an intellectual resource (In the following, only a brief outline of these resources is presented; a more detailed introduction can be found in the appendices of the thesis: for the development of CST see Appendix I; for Habermas's theories see Appendix II; for critical systems commitments see Appendix III).

Habermas's theses of knowledge and human interests, of communication, and of lifeworld/systems, are most relevant to this project.

In *Knowledge and Human Interests* (Habermas, 1966, 1968), Habermas attempts to establish that knowledge is always historically and socially rooted and interest-bound, and therefore should be conceived, sought, and granted validity accordingly. For Habermas, human cognitive interest is three-fold, namely: technical interest towards success in the material surrounding, practical interest in mutual understanding among human fellows, and emancipatory interest towards autonomy and responsibility. Accordingly, human knowledge is manifested respectively in empirical-analytic, historical-hermeneutic, and critical sciences. Although differentiated, Habermas maintains, the three kinds of human cognitive interests are inherently related. 'It is only in the modern period that they have been isolated from one another to the extent that cultural traditions can be dealt with under any given one of these aspects' (Habermas, 1982:235). The purpose of Habermas's constitutional interest thesis is to restore the differentiation and proper relations among propositional truth, subjective truthfulness, and normative rightness. On the one hand, Habermas persistently criticises the domination in late capitalism, of one particular form of the three types of interests and knowledge, namely, technical-instrumental, at the expense of others. On the other hand, he does not degrade technical and/or practical interests in favour of emancipatory interest. Rather, he argues that emancipatory interest cannot be realised if isolated from other kinds of human interests, but can only emerge from the critical usage of both empirical-analytical and historical-hermeneutic approaches. Habermas actually argues for the use of both empirical-analytic and historical-hermeneutic approaches in bringing about the realisation of human emancipatory interest.

The purpose of Habermas's *theory of communication* is to recast the study of society in a paradigm of communication, to develop a model that will show how rationality (and irrationality) are manifested in ordinary socially communicative interaction (Habermas, 1979, 1981/1984, 1981/1987). In his 'scientific reconstruction' of historical materialism, Habermas is concerned to demonstrate the *always already* embodiment of human emancipatory interest in autonomy through his 'universal pragmatics'. He attempts to break with the legacy of pure *a priori* transcendental philosophy, and establishes a clarification and justification of the normative foundation for his socio-epistemology as such: cognitive interests, especially emancipatory interest, are not contingent or accidental; rather, 'they are basic and unavoidable, rooted in what we are as human beings' (cf.: Bernstein, 1985:13). Perhaps the most important achievement of Habermas's theory of communication is his distinction of two kinds of rationality: an instrumental one oriented to success and a communicative one oriented towards inter-subjective assessment. According to Habermas, communicative action can be viewed and claimed as rational only when a consensus-of-belief is formed through nonmanipulative and noncoercive argumentation which is itself 'built into' our everyday pretheoretical life. The 'truth' of Habermas's notion of communicative action and argumentation can therefore be seen as to urge us to distinguish and then to assure communicative rationality and instrumental rationality in social affairs and to rebuild proper relations between these two dimensions.

By the *lifeworld/systems* thesis, Habermas invites us to see the evolution of society as the rationalisation of the lifeworld, and especially to study the modernisation of society as the tug-of-war between the lifeworld and systems (Habermas, 1975, 1981/1984, 1981/1987). Lifeworld is defined by Habermas to contain the background of shared meaning that makes ordinary symbolic interaction possible. In other words, lifeworld is the substratum of our conscious *Weltanschauungen* and of all social actions. Lifeworld stands behind each participant in communication, comprising our vast stock of taken-for-granted definitions and unquestioned understanding of the world that give meaning and direction to human everyday actions and interactions. 'Systems', according to Habermas, now refers to those vast tracts of modern society that are 'uncoupled' from communicatively shared experience in ordinary language and co-ordinated through the steering media of money and power. It should be the lifeworld, Habermas maintains, that gives form and content to systems for development, rather than the reverse. 'New levels of system differentiation can establish themselves only if the rationalisation of the lifeworld has reached a corresponding level' (Habermas, 1981/1987:179). Unlike Weber and some Frankfurt theorists, Habermas argues that the differentiation of systems as a process of the rationalisation of the lifeworld is *not necessarily* one-sided or inherently distorting. A possible way out of the 'Iron Cage', Habermas points out, is to restore a balanced social reproduction through a balanced process of differentiation and development of systems under the symbolic guidance from lifeworld, and this possibility is still open.

From Habermas we can gain a platform for a critical systems pluralist perspective capable of embracing different paradigms and research approaches, however alien and competing they might be. Read both historically and systemically, in *Knowledge and Human Interests*, Habermas argues that any scientific research in social affairs involves all three cognitive interests, yet there is always a danger that only one interest will come to dominate. This means that in selective practice the genuine interests of humankind are either not expressed, or, alternatively they are subjugated in an unequal play-off between competing and conflicting modes of reason. In *Theory of Communication,* Habermas articulates that communication can be distorted when human beings do not give sufficient attention to all subjective, intersubjective, and objective orders of reality. In his *Lifeworld/systems* thesis, Habermas claims that humankind can transcend the 'dark side' of modern rationalisation only when we consciously undertake balanced inquiry and practice across all technical, practical and emancipatory modes. Thus, the whole enterprise of Habermas can be understood, for our purpose here, as a project for openness and plurality, i.e., critically open to differentiated human interests, open to heterogeneous inquiry modes, open to different validity claims, and open to the pursuit of proper balanced practice, against any kind of isolation, reduction, or final reconciliation in favour of any single interest, knowledge, or approach.

Habermas's critical theory and the underlying socio-epistemological theorising play a central and fundamental role in the development of CST.

Up to the beginning of 1980s', very much like the situation confronting marketing study today, there became apparent two urgent needs in the systems community. Firstly, although the human dimension had been addressed to some extent by systems approaches, for example some formulated human behaviour into their modelling, while others developed to help surfacing and understanding of world-views or value systems, yet little attention had been invested to tackle issues such as how human behaviours and world-views are sociohistorically guided and shaped and why some guides or world-views come to be dominant, hence preventing open debate. Therefore, there was a need for a critical approach in relation to critical social theory to reveal and address such deep-seated issues. Secondly, at that time, within the diversity of systems approaches, advocates of different approaches tended to spend their energy in a campaign for a superior position, arguing for 'best method(s)' rather than searching for 'best usage' of methods, which resulted in a so-called 'Kuhnian crisis'. Thus there was a need for a pluralist strategy capable of theoretically informing appropriate employment of systems methods and preserving the potential for each to enhance itself. It was to explore critical systems responses to these urgent needs that CST emerged during the 1980s and has continued, since then, to learn and refine itself, by remaining open to the views of others.

CST can be viewed as a research perspective which embraces three themes, or commitments. These themes in their simplest expression, according to my reading, can be described as below[2].

We can begin by arguing that all human actions, say, research and problem-solving, constitute intervention - even seeing and knowing are not exceptional (Romm, 1995). While all actions as interventions inevitably produce differences in human situations (both *us* and the *environment*), what such differences are, or should be, involves an act of judgement; and it is the three themes for informing acts of judgement, namely, improvement (emancipation)[3], critical awareness (reflection and critique)[4], and methodological pluralism (complementarism)[5], that signify the criticality and systemicity of CST.

Firstly, improvement in its simplest sense indicates 'a change for the better'. Although improvement can be defined and have meaning only in relation to local and temporary contexts, it is at the same time universal in the sense that we as actors expect, consciously or otherwise, intended or desired consequences from intervention, e.g., higher efficiency, deeper understanding, better relations, more autonomy, and so on. Therefore CST contends that improvement lies at the starting point and destination of our systems research and practice, since the commitment to improvement preserves the hope and possibility of enabling positive intervention in the complexity confronting us.

Next, CST asserts that all understanding of improvement is bounded, in the sense that a limited set of actors are considering a limited set of variables, a situation from which no intervention can escape. Therefore, awareness of the partiality embodied in boundary judgements is vital (Chuchman, 1979; Ulrich, 1983, 1993). Since we cannot avoid making boundary judgements underlain by partial knowledge, the best we can do is to seek critical reflection and critique of the limitations they impose, i.e., *what* is taken into account and *who* is involved in the process of defining improvement.

Then, due to the complexity of the situational contexts into which we intervene, the ability of participants adequately to make and criticise boundary judgements and the underlying partial knowledge depends on the possibility of drawing upon a variety of different methods, some for revealing or creating perspectives, some for supporting mutual understanding, and others for facilitating decision-making based on that mutual understanding of perspectives. Such usage of a multiplicity of methods in a complementary manner points to a methodological pluralist perspective which should in turn be supported by an adequate pluralist perspective at the theoretical level.

Therefore, the central assertion of CST suggests that: an intervention towards improvement can be said to be critical only in that no assumption should be beyond question; and it can be said to be systemic only in that no rationality should be excluded from discourse.

Read as such, CST provides insights to tackle the urgent needs in the systems community: by explicit critique of partiality in boundary judgements, on the one hand, any domination and/or distortion of man, machine, mind-traps, or whatever, can be put into question, while on the other hand, critical appreciation of the Self and the Other can be made, which opens the possibility of collective complementation, as well as of individual enhancement.

The basic themes of CST and associated arguments arising from the continuous discourse around it - for example, an ontological vision of a three-world complexity, undertaking simultaneously critique of both mind-traps and conditioning social-material relations, openness and critical reconciliation towards irreducible rationalities, a dialectical view on pluralism and paradigmatic (in)commensurability, searching for complementarist methodological guidelines for here-and-now problem-solving - are highly relevant to the proposed reconstruction. Therefore, together with Habermas's critical theory, CST provides significant theoretical resources to assist addressing urgent issues in the current intellectual tension and stagnation in marketing study (those themes and arguments will be discussed in the course of the thesis, either in the main body or in the appendices).

1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

The thesis will be organised into three parts, namely, Systems Approaches in Marketing, Marketing Systems, and Systems Marketing.

First, Part I (Systems Approaches in Marketing) investigates how systems approaches have been used in marketing study and how they as a whole can be used more critically and fruitfully. It shows that systems approaches have been used in the marketing context as analytical tools to improve efficiency, as conceptual models for coherent understanding of marketing phenomena, and as a theoretical framework for perceiving and guiding the process of divergence and convergence in marketing theory development. It will be suggested that to tackle the current uneasy situation in marketing study, and to explore an adequate alternative for responding to the challenging diversity, systems approach could also be employed as a communicative dialogical grounding for a search for differences and commonality. It is also argued that for this to be possible, it is vital to question the exclusive wisdom in marketing study which presents systems approaches as merely an instrumental device, and to recognise the necessity of establishing 'true' systemicity and criticality.

Then, Part II (Marketing Systems) presents an appreciation of some of the diverse marketing systems. Marketing systems are considered as founded on different basic perspectives and assumptions, as well as driven by different cognitive/practical purposes such as efficiency, understanding, or enlightenment. The backgrounds, intellectual origins, promises and rationale, principles and methods of those marketing systems will be highlighted in the light of embracing differences together with complementarity. Such an appreciation reveals and brings to the fore irreducible differences and singularity: individual strengths, weaknesses, domains of application, and partiality of various marketing systems.

Then, Part III (Systems Marketing) juxtaposes and brings the 'best' of marketing systems together for collective complementation as well as individual enhancement through a reconstruction of marketing study. In Part III, firstly a Habermasian critique of marketing colonisation on the lifeworld is undertaken. Through this critique, an attempt is made to reconstruct marketing as a facilitating communicative action system in modern society thus oriented to addressing and serving differentiated and contestable human interests in consumption needs. This redefinition of marketing is hoped to support a recognition of the necessity of plurality in research approaches. With such reorientation of marketing, it will be possible to tackle the relations among diverse marketing systems. Subsequently, the controversies and evolutionary thread underlying the present 'paradigmatic stagnation' are analysed, and the Either/Or rationale behind both the 'scientific realist'-'modern empiricist' and 'critical relativist'-'relativist constructionist' propositions is revealed. Then, in the light of critical systems pluralism, marketing systems are linked to interrelated yet differentiable domains of the reoriented marketing study, and a typology suggested to conceptualise marketing approaches into technical, practical, and normative marketing. It is argued that such a reconstruction of marketing can be operationalised at three levels: to establish pluralism for the long term, to facilitate mutual listening and understanding through dynamic interaction, and to promote possible complementation in problem-solving.

Finally, a review is presented, which summarises basic arguments and major contributions, as well as addresses, preliminarily, possible postmodernist challenges.

The appendices of the thesis include a reading of Habermas's critical theory and of the development and commitments of CST, as well as two cases in marketing study which show the conceptual competence of the reconstruction of marketing.

The structure of the thesis is also illustrated in Figure 1.1.



Figure 1.1 Structure of the thesis

CONCLUSION

In this introductory chapter, the background of the project has been outlined, its aims declared, arguments put forward, theoretical resources introduced, and the research agenda formulated. The main message of this chapter is that a possible way out of the current paradigmatic tension in marketing study is to carry on a reconstruction grounded on a critical pluralist perspective, which is built upon criticality and systemicity.

Notes

1. I will follow Ritzer (1975) to clarify the notion of paradigm as below:

> A paradigm is a fundamental image of the subject matter within a science. It serves to define what should be studied, what questions should be asked, how they should be asked, and what rules would be followed in interpreting the answers obtained. The paradigm is the broadest unit of consensus within a science and serves to differentiate one scientific community (or sub-community) from other [sic] (Ritzer, 1975:7).

A paradigm can therefore be seen as a world-view that constitutes a particular 'reality' around us and derives consistent theories, principles, rules, standards, norms and methods to address and tackle that 'reality'. Defined as such, paradigms can be used broadly to depict differentiated kinds of knowledge in Habermas' human cognitive interests thesis, hard and soft systems thinking in systems/management science, different traditions in sociological and organisational studies, and alternative and rival schools of thought in marketing study. Many marketing theorists have chosen to perceive and use the term in this way (see for example the whole 1983 Fall issue of *Journal of Marketing*; Bristor, 1984, 1985; Dholakia and Arndt, 1985; Firat *et al.*, 1987; Leong, 1985, etc.).

2. Since CST is continually refining its tenets through dialogues within itself and with *others*, it is not surprising that there is no consensus on the definition of these themes (or commitments). Sometimes critical systems thinkers use different words to describe the same concern. While being aware that differences among those descriptions should not be downplayed or ignored, I suggest that these differences *can* be historically and systemically *read* as supporting and strengthening each other towards more critical and systemic, and I will treat them as such. While in this introductionary section I present a vision of CST mainly based upon Midgley (1995a) for convenience, in the rest of the thesis I may draw more upon associated and supplemental arguments.

3. This theme in its original form is called *emancipation*, which is adopted in the rest of this thesis to support an ideal oriented towards freeing human beings from material, social, or ideological domination and distortion. For reasons for using *improvement* to describe the same theme, see Midgley (1995b).

4. The theme of critical awareness can also be described, as it is during the CST discourse, as an interactive process of undertaking critical self-reflection and ideology critique, which is originated by Habermas (see previous introduction in this section) and substantially developed by Flood (1991a), Flood and Jackson (1991a) and Gregory (1992) (also see Appendix III).

5. Gregory (1992) presents an insightful analysis of the differences between the 'two versions' of pluralism: Flood and Jackson's *complementarism* and her *discordant pluralism.* She also provides a historical explanation of why some critical systems thinkers (for example Flood and Jackson (1991a, b), Jackson (1991a); Jackson and Keys (1984)) in the early stage of inquiry chose the term *complementarism.* In my thesis, I will use *complementarism*

mainly to denote an attitude at the *methodological* level: i.e., a strategy arguing for theoretically informed usage of the wide range of approaches in situated here-and-now problem-solving contexts towards complementation, while using (critical systems) *pluralism* mainly to describe in more general terms a *theoretical* perspective (including ontology, epistemology, and ideology levels) for supporting the proposed complementarism.

PART I

SYSTEMS APPROACHES TO MARKETING

Part I will focus on investigating how systems approaches have been used in marketing study and how they can be used more critically and fruitfully.

A careful study of the marketing literature shows that systems approaches have been used in the marketing context for different cognitive as well as practical purposes, in different application domains, on different levels of reasoning, and through different inquiry modes. Rich as is the notion of 'system' itself, the intervention of systems approaches in marketing has also been rich and diverse. It will be shown that systems approaches have been used to improve efficiency in marketing activities, to enrich understanding of marketing phenomena, and to co-ordinate convergence and divergence in marketing theory development. It will also be proposed that it is desirable and feasible to employ systems approaches in a more challenging and rewarding way: as a critical and systemic vehicle to reconstruct marketing study so that a realistic and viable alternative can be found to move beyond the current paradigmatic tension.

However, it is equally apparent that in marketing study the diverse intervention of systems approaches has been mispresented. The rich competence and practice styles of systems approaches in marketing have, in the received wisdom, been reduced to a single dimension, such as instrumental rationality or technical power only. Constrained by such a narrowly one-sided and exclusive perception, it is impossible to incorporate the latest achievements of contemporary systems thinking to tackle the challenging situation confronting marketing.

Therefore in Part I an attempt will be made to show firstly that 'system' is a promising approach to marketing study, especially for the purpose of addressing the current 'paradigmatic disarray', and secondly that this promise can be realised only when we are willing and able to undertake a critical and systemic reconstruction of the one-sided and exclusive perceptions of both 'systems' and 'marketing'. My conclusion will be that proper usage of systems approaches will not only facilitate disciplinary study of 'marketing systems', but also enable us to succeed in proper 'systems marketing'.

Chapter 2
SYSTEMS APPROACHES TO MARKETING

INTRODUCTION

This chapter will begin by comparing optimistic and pessimistic attitudes towards employing systems approaches to marketing, pointing out that in their recent form these two opposite attitudes are based on the same reductionist perception of the 'systems approach'. Next, a discussion will be presented of how systems approaches have been used as analytical techniques, as conceptualisation models, and as theory development guidance. This presentation will help us to establish a pluralist perspective towards the employment of systems approaches, and to penetrate the received one-sided formalisation of '*the* systems approach to marketing'. It will then be argued that given the challenging diversity in marketing study, it is desirable and feasible to incorporate and employ the latest achievements of contemporary systems science as a communicative dialogical vehicle to promote informed and complementary employment, as well as individual enhancement, of rich and pluralist research approaches in marketing.

2.1 A FADED FAD OR A PROMISING APPROACH?

Marketing as a discipline has a long tradition of adopting an interdisciplinary approach, that is, of developing itself by incorporating valuable concepts, principles, and models from various natural as well as social sciences, including systems thinking (see for example Bartels, 1970; Kelley and Lazer, 1967). Especially since the 1950s, due to the war-time achievements of systems approaches and the popularity of von Bertalanffy's General Systems Theory, systems thinking has been frequently recommended for, and in fact incorporated into, marketing study and practice. A few examples are: the 20's, Clark (1922); the 30's, Steward and Dewhurst (1939); the 40's, Breyer (1949); the 50's, Alderson (1957); the 60's, Fisk (1967); the 70's, Bell (1972); the 80's, Reidenbach and Oliva (1981); the 90's, Meade and Nason (1991). Some scholars suggest that the systems approach provides marketing with urgently needed orderly scientific methodologies (Alder, 1967). Others declare that it is one of the few candidates potentially capable of integrating and consolidating theories in marketing toward a general marketing theory (Carman, 1980; Sheth, Gardner and Garrett, 1988). It is further claimed that marketing theory has evolved into the development stage of 'systems age' from the previous market place, selling, and buying ages (Webster, cf.: Heede, 1980:9). Following are just some examples among this optimistic viewpoint:

> 'Marketing is, by definition, a system' and the systems approach is basic to an understanding of the discipline (Bell, 1972:35).

> The systems perspective has had a profound influence on marketing. It is reflected in both the marketing concept and the marketing mix. Systems ... has resulted in a managerial breakthrough (Lazer, 1971:20).

> If the present study will serve in some way to make the students of marketing properly aware of this need for the 'systemic approach' to the practical and theoretical

study of marketing, it will have fully served its purpose ... (Breyer, 1949; cf.: Schwartz, 1963:122).

On the other hand, however, the 'systems approach' is not always convincing or beyond challenge. In 1968, Banks speculated that the systems concept as applied to marketing might be just another fad that would eventually fade away. He claimed that 'it is clear there are vast areas of lack of understanding or rejection of the systems concept' (Banks, 1968:24). More recently, Sheth and Garrett (1986:723) argued that 'unless there is strong empirical testing and validation, it [the systems school] is not likely to become popular'.

It would be argued that, both these optimistic and pessimistic views are derived from a similar misperception of systems approaches. Proponents of both views are still constrained in the rationale of Hard Systems Thinking and mechanical/biological analogy (for such rationale see Appendix I).

On the optimistic side, when appraising '*the* systems approach', what scholars emphasise is merely its methodological power or instrumental strengths. For these advocators, 'The systems approach is thus an orderly, "architectural" discipline for dealing with complex problems of choice under uncertainty. ... The systems approach attempts to apply the "scientific method" to complex marketing problems. ... The ultimate application of the systems concept is to attempt to make mathematical models of the entire marketing process' (Adler, 1967:167). As recently as 1992, a paper in the *Harvard Business Review* reminds managers to 'master systems thinking', which was said to mean 'to begin viewing it [organisation] as a kind of living organism' (Freedman, 1992:36).

On the pessimistic side, theorists criticise systems approach mainly based on whether it fits the criteria of 'empirical testing and validation' (e.g., Sheth and Garrett, 1986:723). They censure systems approach because they believe that it 'makes no attempt to predict or understand human behaviour. It focuses on the components of the marketing systems in terms of performance rather than understanding' (Kelly and Lazer, 1967:21-2).

It can be agreed that, viewed as such, 'systems approach' can have little to do with the full complexity of marketing study, let alone attempt to address or overcome the current 'paradigmatic stagnation'.

However, it is reasonable to argue that both the optimistic and the pessimistic cognitions of systems approaches are dated and one-sidedly constrained. They do not reflect either the latest achievements in systems science, or the actual intervention of systems approaches in the marketing discipline. It is this distortive image of systems approaches that has blocked the full possibility and potential of systems science in marketing from being properly promoted and practised.

Having said this, given the challenging problematic situation confronting the marketing discipline, in contrast to the opposing viewpoints reported above, it is contended here firstly that 'system' is still a promising approach to marketing study, especially for addressing and tackling the paradigmatic tension, and secondly that to realise its full potential, we must update and reconstruct our perception of 'systems approach' in general and its practice in marketing study in particular. It will be shown in the rest of this chapter, that the intervention of systems approaches in marketing study has *actually* been rich and diverse. Given the uneasy and challenging situation in the marketing discipline, so long as we are willing and able to undertake critical and systemic reorientation and reconstruction of marketing study, there is no reason why contemporary systems approaches, especially their latest achievements, cannot be purposefully employed as a paradigm communicative dialogue vehicle to explore viable alternative responses to the 'paradigmatic disarray'. After tracing different application domains and modes of systems approaches to marketing, I will pick up this promise again in the last section.

2.2 SYSTEMS AS ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUES

2.2.1 Overview

This category denotes the kind of application that perceives and employs systems approaches as analytical/technical tools to tackle marketing systems for the purpose of technical efficiency.

There has been a consistent tradition of employing 'scientific method' in marketing problem-solving since the emergence of the marketing discipline at the beginning of the 20th century. 'For the most part "scientific marketing literature" related to the application to marketing of methods and analytical tools used successfully by F. W. Taylor in increasing the efficiency of production' (Schwartz, 1963:3-4). Explicit attempts within this tradition of employing systems approaches in marketing problem-solving can be found in the early works of Duddy and Revzan (1947), Breyer (1949), etc. However, it was in the 1960's that systems methodologies were widely adopted under the formal title of 'systems approach to marketing'.

In the 1960's, both the supply side and the demand side of systems methodologies to marketing were ready. On the supply side, systems approach by that time had proved its competence in dealing with natural/engineering problem situations. On the demand side, marketing was under pressures to adopt (1) a customer orientation thus a system/environment *perspective* rather than navel-gazing in the factory , (2) an organisational revision to implement the marketing concept, thus a holistic and integrative corporate *strategy* rather than piece-meal policy, and (3) a more orderly *methodology* to problem-solving to overcome the *ad hoc* management style. It is reasonable to claim that all these three urgent requirements led to 'the systems approach', which was said to be a 'rational, fact-based methods for solving marketing problems' (Adler, 1967:105).

Since then, the marketing discipline had witnessed great enthusiasm and effort in applying systems techniques and the like to tackle marketing problems: e.g., Operations Research (Doherty, 1963; Kotler, 1967b; Lazer, 1965), Systems Analysis (Fisk and Dixon, 1967; King, 1969; Stasch, 1969, 1972;), Management Information Systems (Berenson, 1969; Brien, 1968; Cox and Good, 1967; Jobber, 1977; McNiven, 1968;), Management Science (Charnes *et al*, 1985; Olsen, 1968; McMains, 1968; Montgomery and Urban, 1969, 1970), Systems Dynamics (Forrester, 1958, 1959), Computer Simulation and Mathematical Modelling (Amstutz, 1967, 1969; Kotler, 1971), etc. We can even find in the marketing literature Marketing Operations Research (Kotler, 1967b), Marketing Systems Analysis (Fisk and Dixon, 1967), Marketing Information System (Cox and Good, 1967), and so on.

The nature of 'systems as analytical techniques' in marketing can be investigated through the following aspects: its definition, rationale, procedure, and problems-in-focus.

2.2.2 Characteristics

2.2.2.1 Definition

The definition of systems approaches from an analytical techniques viewpoint is perfectly identified with those in the management/systems science at that time. For example,

> The definition of the systems approach ... is perfectly apt for marketers: 'An inquiry to aid a decision-maker choose a course of action by systematically investigating his proper objectives, comparing quantitatively where possible the costs, effectiveness, and risks associated with the alternative policies or strategies for achieving them, and formulating additional alternatives if those examined are found wanting' (Adler, 1967:112).

2.2.2.2 Rationale

From the above definition and documented applications in the marketing literature, it is easy to identify the rationale behind this kind of employment of systems approaches in marketing study. What it emphasises is the goal-seeking firm, optimisation strategy, and the end-means scheme. Marketing phenomena are complex since 'interactions within the marketing mix make it difficult to uncouple the elements in the marketing mix so that they may be analysed independently' (Montgomery and Urban, 1969:4). Thus, a systems approach is required since it 'attempts to apply the "scientific method" to complex marketing problems studied *as a whole*' (Adler, 1967:112). According to Kotler, when systems tools are employed, the firm is 'conceived to be a complex goal seeking entity that continuously adjusts variable under its control in the interest of maximal achievement of its objectives' (Kotler, 1971:17).

2.2.2.3 Procedure

It is suggested that 'there is a system for applying the systems approach' which can be outlined as a sequence of steps, for example:

1. Define the problem and clarify objectives;
2. Test the definition of the problem;
3. Build a model;
4. Set concrete objectives;
5. Develop alternative solutions;
6. Set up criteria or tests of relative value;
7. Quantify factors or 'variables';
8. Manipulate the model;
9. Interpret the result and choose one or more courses of action;

10. Verify the result.

(Adler, 1967:116-7; similar methodologies can be found also in Fisk and Dixon, 1967; Kotler, 1971; Montgomery and Urban, 1969; and many others).

2.2.2.4 Problems-In-Focus

Areas concerning 'systems approaches as analytical techniques' include market response, advertising, pricing, distribution, personal selling, new product (Montgomery and Urban, 1969); products and services, profitable innovation, marketing intelligence, physical distribution (Adler, 1967); new products, pricing, physical distribution, advertising, sales force management (Kotler, 1967b), and so on, covering all the 'how to do' issues in marketing operation.

2.2.3 Appreciation

The most valuable achievements in this first kind of employment of systems approaches in marketing seem to be that it introduces an integrative and holistic *perspective* into marketing and that it provides formal and systematic *methodologies* for marketing problem solving. As Kelley and Lazer put it,

> Systems thinking - the integration and co-ordination of marketing activities - is providing a new perspective for solving marketing problems. Systems have become powerful interpretative marketing tools (Kelley and Lazer, 1967:21).

It requires a recognition of the interrelations and interconnections within and between marketing function and other organisational elements. It involves the integration of all the components of the marketing programme into a co-ordinated marketing mix. It demands the establishment of a communication network and linkages between the various functionaries and activities necessary for the accomplishment of marketing objectives. And it converts *ad hoc* experience-based 'management' to orderly working plan and procedures.

Arguably, 'systems as analytical techniques' can be conceived as identical with hard systems approaches in management/systems science (for the latter see Appendix I). Therefore analysis and appreciation on HST appears perfectly valid and suitable to this kind of use of systems approaches to marketing; e.g., it is underpinned by goal-seeking rationale, it is based on end-means scheme, it is derived from 'scientific method', it is managerial oriented, it emphasises optimisation, it focuses on prediction and control, and so forth. It can also be related to the economic/mechanical schools of thought in marketing, which can be derived by macro as well as micro orientation (see Part III). As such, this kind of application of systems approaches in marketing could be considered as a manifestation of empirical-analytic science serving human's technical/instrumental interest in consumption needs (for the thesis of constitutional cognitive interest see Appendix II).

It is also clear that this kind of use of 'systems approach in marketing' has its partiality and selectivity in terms of focus, emphasis and hence competence. Lazer, an advocator of a systems approach in marketing study, is quite aware of such partiality and selectivity. As early as 1965, he presented a 'critical assessment' of marketing operations research.

According to Lazer, first, 'operations research [in marketing] is concerned with investigating 'goal-directing' 'purposeful marketing systems in which specific objectives are pursued and in which choices from among alternative courses of action are presented'. However, such objectives are 'predetermined' and therefore out of the question. 'Critical marketing factors are usually assumed away. For instance, demand is assumed; consumer behaviour is taken as given', etc.

Secondly, operations research does 'not seem to study interactions of people', and hence tends to 'neglect human factors' which are 'focal points of marketing'. Operations research does not 'account for human behaviour', tends 'to consider human beings as "black boxes"'. 'Most operations research models are developed, analysed, and interpreted as though the interaction of people is of little consequence', thus 'those factors that are most significant are whisked away'.

Thirdly, as a direct result of the second point, operations research tends 'to tackle the least crucial problems. The types of marketing problem that have been handled reflect an un-balanced problem-solving emphasis'. 'There seems to be a tendency' 'to ignore and sometimes even degrade other types of marketing problems that are more significant than those that have been handled'.

Fourth, we must be aware that 'operations research models are not ends in themselves. They are the means to an end'. 'Yet, in model building, operations researchers seem to get lost in heroic mathematical abstractions. They appear to develop preference for rigor over realism, for manipulative potentiality over practicality, and for mathematical sophistication over immediate problem-solving capability in marketing. Marketing models, like other kinds of models, seem to result in "the unlimited postulation of irrelevant truths"'. 'As a result, to a large extent, solutions reached are relatively impotent'. Even worse, there exists a tendency 'to change a problem to fit some general solution method'.

Finally, Lazer concluded, as an overall result of the above factors, the contribution of operations research to marketing has been 'quite limited'. 'In fact, it is the promise of *potential application* in marketing, rather than *actual application* to which operations researchers refer fondly' (Lazer, 1965:440-2).

To sum up, the employment of systems approaches as analytical techniques is an important domain in marketing activity and study and will certainly remain so. However, it should be related, more explicitly and consciously, to a specific kind of issues in marketing activities, i.e., to serve human technical interest in consumption needs. It is only a particular domain of 'systems approaches in marketing', rather than the whole. If marketers and consumers were properly and critically to recognise, practise and enhance this area of use of systems approaches, the benefits of the endeavour can be reaped and human technical consumption needs properly served.

2.3 SYSTEMS AS CONCEPTUAL MODELS

2.3.1 Overview

Systems approaches have also been employed to model marketing structures and behaviours in order to seek more meaningful understanding of marketing phenomena. As Mackenzie and Nicosia (1968:16) put it, 'For a period ranging from 1920 to the late fifties, major efforts were given to the problem of obtaining a picture of the whole marketing system'. Actually, such effort continues today, far beyond 'the fifties' (for example Meade and Nason, 1991).

Viewing marketing phenomena from a systems perspective is a long tradition in marketing study. Since the very beginning of the emergence of the discipline, because of the complicated nature and diverse manifestation of the relationships among components, processes, and functions of marketing, a framework capable of analysing their interactions became and remained imperative. It was contended that the holistic approach of systems was most appropriate for this purpose (Reidenbach and Oliva, 1982a, b). This explains why enthusiasm in attempting to obtain a comprehensive picture of marketing through the systems perspective has been prolonged, in spite of occasional criticism.

A systems perspective provides conceptual models for both marketing theorists and practitioners. For the former, systems thinking can be employed to integrate the demand and the supply sides together in the marketplace, thereby laying the foundation for the whole conventional marketing thought. Previous to the systems approach, the two sides tended to be discussed separately, up to the 1930's. On the demand side, Robinson established that a market might be able to be divided into separate parts because of 'a difference between the elasticity of the demands'

(Robinson, 1933:185). From Robinson stemmed today's central concept of 'market segmentation'. In contrast to Robinson, Chamberlin centred his attention on supply considerations, studying how marketers can manipulate marketing variables so as to maximise profit by satisfying demands in segmented markets. Facing differences in markets, Chamberlin suggested that marketers differentiate and position their products and selling efforts. Seen by Chamberlin, product 'variation may refer to an alteration in the quality of the product itself - technical changes, a new design, or better materials; it may mean a new package or container; it may mean more prompt or courteous service, a different way of doing business, or perhaps a different location' (Chamberlin, 1933:71). Chamberlin's idea laid down the theoretical basis for the elements of today's marketing mix programming. Through the systems perspective the two sides can now be better conceived as distinguishable yet interdependent aspects of the marketing whole: the curve of demand and the curve of supply will meet at a certain point; therefore 'a balance between the supply and the demand functions' can be sought (Sheth and Gardner, 1982). As to marketing practice, at the micro level, 'the systems approach provides a good basis for a logical, coherent, and orderly analysis of marketing activity. ... Systems ... add greatly to the formulation of overall corporate and marketing strategy and objectives' (Lazer, 1971:13), and hence assist marketers to co-ordinate activities in organisations in an integrated and holistic fashion 'over sub-optimisation of sub-functions.' Meanwhile, at the macro level, 'Through systems perspective, the often bewildering and confusing relationships between production, marketing, and consumption can be organised into a coherent and unified whole' (Boulding, 1956, cf.: Sheth *et al*, 1986:186; also Meade and Nason, 1991).

Due to this advantage, the conceptualisation of marketing as a certain kind of 'system' has been long adopted in marketing study. 'Even before the more formal statement of systems' (Sheth *et al.*, 1986:164), marketers had made great efforts along this conceptualisation line: Clark (1922) acknowledged the interdependencies of structure and functions which exist within and between marketing organisations; Stewart and Dewhust (1939) treated distribution as systems for investigating and reducing the cost involved; Duddy and Revzan (1947) conceived marketing as an 'organic' whole that bringing the 'what', 'who' and 'how' of marketing together; Breyer (1949) embedded the then newly introduced concepts of 'groups' and 'networks' into the study of marketing channels; Alderson (1957, 1965) established a formal functionalist school in the marketing discipline, etc.

The conceptualisation of marketing in systems terms is considered so basic that nowadays few schools of marketing thought, if any, do not claim explicitly or imply implicitly that they are employing 'systems' as a conceptualisation device. Generally, 'systems' are employed to model marketing structures and/or behaviours. Then, based on this as a starting point, various schools continue their inquiry to develop their own principles and methods to manipulate respective 'systems'. As a result, we have various 'systems' in marketing, e.g., complex transactional system, organised behaviour system and ecological system (Alderson, 1957, 1965); a system of social roles and norms (Fisk, 1980); macromarketing system (Bell, 1972); complex networks of exchange (Bagozzi, 1979); interaction network (IMP Group, 1982); etc. Indeed, Kelly and Lazer claim that 'system is the master model for marketing activity' (Kelly and Lazer, 1967:21).

Systems as conceptual models for marketing study can be categorised into studies of 'marketing as systems hierarchy' and 'marketing as systems jungle' (these two focus on relatively static structural marketing phenomena), 'marketing as systems behaviour' and 'marketing as systems evolution' (these two emphasise dynamic aspects), each of which are briefly presented in the following.

2.3.2 Marketing As Systems Hierarchy

2.3.2.1 Overview

It is claimed that 'A system is a collection of entities that can be understood as forming a coherent group'; therefore, 'any group of marketing elements and activities that can be physically or conceptually delineated as a marketing system' (Kelly and Lazer, 1967:19). Based on this conception, concern and attention have been directed to such subjects as components, relationships, boundaries, environment, flows of products, services, money, equipment, information, etc. Emphasis has been placed on the analysis of functions and relationships within systems and between system/environment, with a focus on individual contributions to 'the total system'.

Systems conceptualisation in marketing study began with the effort to create hierarchical systems models to comprehend various levels of marketing entities/activities; e.g., Alderson (1957, 1965) introduced his thesis on 'organised behaviour system' of individuals, households and business enterprises; Fisk (1967) introduced the 'systems hierarchy' concept and identified seven levels of systems from the individual to the whole world economy; Bell (1966) consolidated marketing systems into three levels, namely, the management or micro marketing system, the intermediate or channel system, and the aggregate or macro marketing system; etc. Overall, it can reasonably be summarised that marketing systems are generally modelled at the levels of the whole economy, industry/channel, firms, social groups and households, and individual consumers.

2.3.2.2 Macromarketing system

At the most aggregate level, marketing is conceived as the whole economic system. For example, Bell's (1972) macromarketing system is generally the same as the whole economic system which embraces all types of entities engaged directly or indirectly in the production and distribution of goods and services. Components in such a marketing system include customer components (agricultural customers, industrial customers, commercial customers, institutional customers, government as a customer, and resale customers), selling components (extractors, agriculture sellers, manufacturers, resellers, agents and brokers), facilitating components (marketing research firms, financing firms, promotional agencies, transportation firms, storage firms, insurance firms, security and commodity exchanges, communications firms), and supervising components (associations or co-operative agencies, private agencies, public agencies). As White puts it, 'in this use, "the marketing system" will be defined as including *all marketing related actions and transactions*. This approach sees the marketing system as a part of the broader social system with which the marketing system interacts' 'for satisfying consumption wants and needs' (White, 1981:11).

2.3.2.3 Industry/channel system

Moving attention downward to the next level, industries/channels within the whole economy are conceptualised as 'vertical marketing systems', for example the food retailing system. At this level, marketing is described as comprising professionally managed and centrally programmed networks, pre-engineered to achieve operating economies and maximum marketing impact. This usage of 'systems' emphasises vertical integration for high internal efficiency in industry by reducing uncertainties, increasing control, and by replacing time-consuming market transactions and negotiation with administrative procedures. The conception of industries/channels as vertical marketing systems is usually based in the rationale that converting competing marketing into 'domestic' marketing will help to reduce the cost of competition and achieve optimisation and efficiency (Arndt, 1979b, 1981; Arndt and Reve, 1980; Breyer, 1949; McCommon and Little, 1965).

2.3.2.4 The firm as system

Then, as a most common usage, 'system' is used to model the firm at a micro level conceptualisation (e.g., Bell, 1972; Howard, 1983; Lazer and Kelley, 1962; Reidenbach and Oliva, 1981). The two most distinct thrusts of the conceptualisation of 'the firm as a marketing system' are the internal integration perspective and the emphasis on external interactions between the firm and environment. The first involves the integration of all company components and efforts involved into an overall corporate strategy for providing customer satisfactions. It is not enough simply to integrate the internal functions of the marketing division itself. Co-ordination among marketing and other functional areas of business, such as finance, production, personnel, administration, accountancy and statistical control must be pursued (Bell, 1972; Howard, 1983; Lazer, 1971; Stanton, 1975). The second thrust emphasises firm/environment interaction which forces management to widen its conceptualisation and consideration horizon so as to ensure that the firm's strategy as well as operation are 'fitted' to the changing requirements and constraints from the environment, which is fundamentally vital for the firm's survival and growth (e.g., Hollaway and Hancock, 1964, 1968, 1974).

2.3.2.5 Social group as system

On the demand side (that is, marketees), social groups and households are also conceptualised as systems (Dixon and Wilkinson, 1989; Kassarjian and Robertson, 1968; Komarovsky, 1961). In the marketing context, social groups - formal or informal collections of people - are said to possess three basic features: (1) members in a group have common needs and goals; (2) members of a group interact over time; and (3) members in a group hold a shared ideology, that is, a set of beliefs, values, attitudes, and norms (Kassarjian and Robertson, 1968:272). Groups have functions such as influencing purchase decision making. As such, in terms of marketing management, 'grouping allows a market to be segmented into meaningful units, permitting differential product, pricing, channel, and promotional appeals in line with the specific characteristics, need-value systems' and so forth (*ibid.*:374). In the same way, the household as a special type of social group is also conceptualised as a subsystem, is considered as the ultimate source of demand for goods and services in a society (Dixon and Wilkinson, 1989). Following the same rationale, the husband-wife relationship is considered as forming another important subsystem (Komarovsky, 1961). Social groups and households as systems have played a crucial role in the prevailing 'consumer research', or more precisely, buyer behaviour theories.

2.3.2.6 Buyer behaviour as system

Finally, at the last level, the behaviour of individual consumers is also modelled as 'systems'. For example, in Howard and Sheth's (1968, 1969) theory of buyer behaviour, it is firstly assumed that 'brand choice is not random but systematic; and the task ... is to formulate a structure that enables us to view it as a system' (Howard and Sheth's 1968:467). Secondly, analogised with the black-box in cybernetics, a 'stimulus-process-purchase behaviour' model is created. It is claimed that 'if behaviour is systematic, it is caused by some event - a stimulus - either in the buyer or in the buyer's environment. This event or stimulus is the input to the system, and purchase behaviour is the output. What we must describe then, is what goes on between the input and the output' (*ibid.*:467).

2.3.3 Marketing As Systems Jungle

2.3.3.1 Overview

Marketing is complicated, not only in that it is a vertically multi-level phenomenon, but also in that it is a horizontally multi-faceted activity. Actually, it was once a central consideration whether marketing as a discipline should develop a general theory *of* marketing or many theories *in* marketing - each theory studies a particular sub-field of marketing (see for example Bartels, 1968; El-Ansary, 1979; Solomon, 1979). The rationale underpinning the latter idea is that a marketing system can be viewed as having many sub-structures which individually describe particular activities (e.g., financing, R&D, promotion, advertising, distribution, selling, risk-taking, etc.), and collectively these sub-fields describe higher level activities (e.g., providing consumer goods at low price and in large variety) (MacKenzie and Nicosia, 1968). Historically, this rationale has led to specialisation of research focusing on individual sub-structures decomposed from the whole marketing system. In this way, 'system' has been employed as a conceptualisation perspective, not only to model vertically marketing hierarchy, but also to model horizontally heterogeneous activities in marketing sub-fields, such as marketing channel systems (Breyer, 1949; Cox and Goodman, 1954), organisational buyer behaviour systems (Qualls and Michaels, 1984), consumer logistics systems (Granzin, 1984), consumer behaviour systems (Adler, 1982), retailing systems (Goldstucker, 1966), manufacturer-dealer systems (Ridgeway, 1957), selling systems (Clabaugh *et al.*, 1982), etc., resulting in a 'marketing systems jungle' (the term 'jungle' is borrowed from Koontz (1961), who used it originally to describe the diversity of management theories. Here it is borrowed to denote the diverse studies in marketing sub-fields). Kelley and Lazer, quoting Henderson, described such usage of systems approaches in marketing study thus: 'It is in systems that all forms of activity manifest themselves. Therefore, any form of activity may be produced by a suitable system' (Henderson, 1917:172; cf.: Kelley and Lazer, 1967:21). Following are just two examples within the diverse marketing jungle that individually address particular sub-fields of the marketing whole.

2.3.3.2 Marketing channel system

Breyer (1949) emphasised that a channel, or group of channels, constitute marketing systems because an interdependence exists among the business units which comprise them in order to perform the marketing work necessary to move goods from producer to customer. Hence, the aim of his study - Quantitative Systemic Analysis and Control - was to develop appropriate method to measure, analyse and improve the overall performance of marketing systems, to uncover points of weakness and strength.

Since most marketing channels consist of multiple ownership, Breyer particularly concentrated on effective systemic analysis and control, which in turn requires the establishing of authority with at least limited power to manage the channel or channel group for overall optimisation. Such authority should 'ideally' perform, contended Breyer, the following functions: (1) Establish the basic objectives for the channel system; (2) Determine the activities required to accomplish these goals; (3) Allocate these activities among the enterprises composing the system; (4) Establish a system for controlling the channel's operation. Similar effort can also be found in MacCammon and Little (1965) who developed a systems model for conceptualising and analysing channel phenomena.

2.3.3.3 Marketing logistics system

Christopher (1971a, b) presented the whole logistics operation as one system, composed of a group of sub-systems that are interrelated and undertake processes of input, output, feedback and constraints. Based on this conceptualisation, he developed a systems approach for dealing with marketing logistics systems: Logistics Systems Engineering, which is mainly concerned with and systematically identify the components involved in logistics and their interrelationships. Logistics Systems Engineering is concerned with the totality of the company logistics systems and its awareness of interactions between the various parts of the whole. The performance of a logistics system can be measured by two standards: (a) the level of customer service, and (b) the total cost required to attain that level. Generally, it is believed that customer service and cost are opposed to each other. The optimum or balance of service and cost can be calculated and achieved through a total logistics cost-effectiveness analysis. Similar conceptualisation of logistics systems, also based upon a GST perspective but focusing on the consumers' side, is addressed by Granzin (1984).

2.3.4 Marketing As Systems Behaviour

2.3.4.1 Overview

While 'systems hierarchy' and 'systems jungle' emphasise the structural aspects of marketing, 'marketing as systems behaviour' models processual/dynamic interactions between marketing and the environment.

The central model of marketing behaviour rests on the contingency approach. As Zeithaml *et al.* (1988:38) wrote, 'The contingency approach to management has its roots in general systems theory and open systems perspective' which 'views the complex organisation as a set of interdependent parts that, together, constitute a whole which, in turn, is interdependent with some larger environment'. Thus, the main thrust of such approach contends that marketing should be adapted to environment contingencies. In marketing literature, contingency models cover such areas as advertising (Ray, 1978), consumer behaviour (Bettman, 1979; Engel *et al.*, 1973; Howard and Sheth, 1969), personal selling (Friedman and Churchill, 1987; Weitz, 1981), marketing organisation and the sales organisation (Mahajan and Churchill, 1986), structure and performance (Ruekert *et al.*, 1985), selling (Clabangh *et al.*, 1982), etc. By 1988, Zeithaml *et al.* have identified twenty five studies in marketing adopting the contingency approach.

Generally, conceptualising marketing as systems behaviour emphasises interactions between marketing systems and their environment: how marketing systems survive and grow by adjusting and adapting themselves to the environment. As Nicosia (1962:90) wrote, 'behaviour ... qualifies the dynamics of the bonds among the system's parts. These bonds allow a system to be open: that is, to react to changes in the environment'.

Through the perspective of open systems theory, 'major emphasis is given to the environment of marketing and the way in which the environment influences the behaviour of marketing' since 'whatever the nature of marketing in a society, it will be influenced by the environment in which it is carried on' (Holloway and Hancock, 1968:1). 'When marketing is cast in this framework, the marketing activities of the firm should ideally correspond to its environment' through carefully scanning and analysing the environment and systematic marketing strategies 'designed to adjust to and meet an ever changing environment' (Holloway and Hancock, 1968:2).

The conceptualisation of dynamic marketing behaviours can be conceived as having evolved through three stages, namely, the environmental approach, the environmental management approach, and the interaction/network approach.

2.3.4.2 The environmental approach

Along with the marketing concept shifting the orientation of marketing from the firm/product/production toward the market/customer/competitor, how to adjust or adapt marketing activity/function to the environment became the main concern of marketing modelling. Advocates of this 'environmental approach' include Holloway and Hancock (1964, 1968, 1974), Scott and Marks (1968), Achrol *et al.* (1983), Glaser (1985), Elliott (1990), and many others.

Clearly, the conceptualisation and understanding of 'environment' lies at the heart of the approach. In fact, four conceptual dimensions have been generated.

The most popular dimension, which can be found in any classic introductory marketing textbooks such as those of McCarthy (1960) and Kotler (1967), classifies factors which are outside the firm's control but affect its performance into demographic, economic, technological, ecological, political, cultural, legal, ethical forces and so on. This dimension validates the idea of marketing as a multi-disciplinary field and the demand that marketing be treated holistically. Obviously, this dimension reflects the *exogenous* nature of separate environmental contexts.

The second dimension, formulated by Dill (1958) and Thompson (1967), tackles the *functional* aspect of the environmental context, segmenting the environment into sectors: input, output, competitive and regulatory. For Dill and Thompson, the input sector of the environment of a firm consists of all direct and indirect suppliers; the output sector consists of all direct and indirect customers, both distributors and end users; the competitive sector captures actual and potential competitors; while the regulatory sector consists of regulatory groups such as governmental agencies, trade associations, interest organisations, and ad hoc groups.

The third dimension, provided by Achrol, Reve and Stern (1983), first chooses a dyad as the unit of analysis and then sections the environment of the 'focal dyad' into primary and secondary task environments and a macro environment. The premise of such a sectioning is the belief that 'it is reasonable to assume that there are important clusters of forces which seem to affect channel dyads differentially' and 'the environmental pluralism ... can be handled by distinguishing the forces creating direct and indirect external dependencies ... ' (Achrol *et al.*, 1983:56). Along this dimension, the primary task environment is comprised of immediate suppliers and customers of the dyad; the secondary task environment is comprised of suppliers to the immediate suppliers, customers to the immediate customers, regulatory agents and interest aggregators who influence them, and direct and potential competitors to the channel dyad; while the macro environment is comprised of general social, economic, political, and technological forces which impinge on the activities in the primary and secondary task environments. It can be perceived that this dimension emphasises the 'layer' or '*extended*' nature of the environmental contexts, which reflects degrees of the 'closeness' of the relationships between the firm and its environmental contexts as well as the 'strength' of the impacts to the firm from these three 'layers' of environmental contexts.

The fourth scheme can be found in Emery and Trist (1965) and Emery *et al.* (1974). Basically, Emery and Trist point to a two-dimensional taxonomy in terms that environment may be characterised by (1) extents to which environment can be said to be organised and structured in terms of goals and noxiants of environment objects, and (2) rates or degrees of change of that organisation and structure over time. According to the organisation and rate of change, four ideal environment 'types' can be identified as illustrated in Figure 2.1. Corporate strategies for handling different types of environment are also suggested (see for example Trist, 1965; Emery *et al.*, 1974; Glaser, 1985).



Figure 2.1 'Ideal' type of environment

Table 2.1 sums up various dimensions provided by the environmental approach for conceptualising the marketing environment, each of which emphasises a particular aspect of the nature of the environment. It is likely that all dimensions are reasonable and meaningful to some extent in some circumstances. Which of them should be employed depends on the nature of a particular marketing activity or management task, as well as on the particular environmental situation.

The environmental approach essentially implies that environmental factors are given as constraints and that the only responsibility of marketing organisation and management is to identify, define, analyse, forecast and sort out these constraints, and to adapt to them by allocating internal resources as well as arranging internal activities. The external environment is out there, and cannot be influenced, but only be adapted to. Bartels (1970) coined a word for such approach: Environmentalism.

Table 2.1 Dimensions for conceptualising marketing environment

Emphasis of dimension	*Environment force/layer/type*	*Advocates*
Exogenous	Demographic Economic Technological Ecological Political Cultural Legal Ethical etc.	Holloway Hancock etc.
Functional	Input Output Competitive Regulatory	Dill Thompson
Extensible	First task Secondary task Macro	Achrol Reve Stern
Clustered in goals and noxiants	Placid random Placid clustered Disturbed reactive Turbulent	Emery Trist *et al.*

2.3.4.3 The environmental management approach

The environmental approach is challenged basically for its essentially passive and reactive adaptation stance. Scholars such as Aldrich (1979), Aldrich and Whetten (1981), Bourgiois (1980), Child (1972), Galbraith (1977), Kotter (1979), Miles and Snow (1978), Zeithaml and Zeithaml (1984) have reconceptualised the relationship between organisations and the environment in a more active or proactive framework, resulting in an alternative, the environmental management approach (the title from Zeithaml and Zeithaml (1984)).

It is argued that the reactive perspective has been dominating the popular marketing concept which starts at a point where a system of environmental constraints has already been defined for a marketing mix programme, in that the internal aspects of the organisation can be managed but the external environment is established and must be accepted as it is. It is also argued that the typical marketing manager's reliance on marketing intelligence, forecasting and market research was based on the reactive belief in which marketing strategies were viewed as a set of adaptive responses (*ibid.*).

In contrast, seen from the proactive point of view, 'marketing is a significant force which the organisation can call upon to create change and extend its influence over the environment' (*ibid.*:52). 'Rather than designing the organisation to "fit" the environment (the position of the contingency theory), it is more likely that first the organisation will attempt to design its environment to fit its present structural arrangements' (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978:141-2). In other words, rather than merely passively reacting to the external environment, organisations can implement a variety of strategies designed to modify existing environmental conditions. It is believed that in practice the essence of this perspective has been reflected in the current movement toward innovative, entrepreneurial management, and therefore that marketing theory should explicitly adopt a proactive and entrepreneurial orientation to the management of the external environment (Savitt, 1987).

In fact, scholars such as Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) and Galbraith (1977) have developed specific sets of strategies for managing the external environment and discussed conditions under which those strategies are appropriate. While the former provides methods for accomplishing tasks of managing competition, promoting regulation to reduce competition, managing symbiotic interdependence, as well as managing uncertainty, organisational legitimacy, and political actions the latter classifies proactive strategies into three categories: (1) independent strategies such as public relations and competitive aggression by which the organisation can reduce environmental uncertainty and dependence by drawing on its own resources and ingenuity; (2) co-operative strategies such as contracting and coalition by which the organisation co-operates with other elements in the environment; and (3) strategic manoeuvring such as diversification as well as merger and acquisition by which the organisation can change or alter its task environment.

In summary, the environmental management approach encourages marketers to tackle the issues confronting their organisations with an increasing level of proactivity and influence, as well as enabling marketing scholars to direct marketing toward a more comprehensive partnership in the management of organisation-environment relationships.

2.3.4.4 The interaction/network approach

It can be argued that both the environmental approach and the environmental management approaches imply that a dividing-line exists between the organisation and its environment and that the environment exists even without the organisation.

Opposite to this static and positive perspective, the interaction/network approach (IMP Group, 1982, 1990) does not consider environment as a meaningful concept. Instead, the concept of a 'context' is adopted as follows.

An organisation is embedded in relationships with identifiable counterparts. Within this web of relations, the operations and performance of an organisation become dependent not only on how well the organisation itself performs in interaction with its counterparts, but also on how these counterparts in turn manage their relationships with third parties (Hakansson and Johanson, 1988). Without relationships or outside networks, the necessity or validity of organisational existence is lost. It is through mutual interdependency, that an organisation is given its identity, that performance of the organisation is evaluated, and that a 'context' referring to entities which interact with the organisation is enacted. Thus, a picture of the organisation's surrounding is presented as continuous interaction with other parties constituting the context within which the organisation interacts, and which endows the organisation with meaning and role.

Hall and Fagen (1968:83) noted that when applied to social systems, 'Subdivision of this universe into two sets, system and environment, can be done in many ways which are in fact quite arbitrary. Ultimately it depends on the intentions of the one who is studying the particular universe as to which of the possible configurations of objects is to be taken as the system' (also sée Flood, 1990a:91). This is exactly the case of the conventional marketing view on environment, whose 'intention is to embrace within the boundaries of the organisation those resources and activities that can be controlled and influenced by the organisation, and to leave outside those that cannot be influenced' (cf.: Hakansson and Snehota, 1989:531). However, in social or human activity systems, according to the interactive approach, neither 'control' nor 'influence' can have an absolute meaning, nor can they be 'judged' or 'measured' in a positivist manner.

The network view of the organisational context perceives the issue in a different way. Operations, performance and identities of actors in a network context depend on mutuality among actors, or in other words, *my* resources must be managed not only for my own desire, but also in accordance with *your* expectations of me, therefore *I* lose some control of *my* resources and vice versa. In this situation, the meaning of 'internal' and 'external' becomes no longer absolutely clear-cut or valid, even if it might still be clear from the legal point of view. As Hakansson and Snehota put it:

> [S]ome of the resources and activities traditionally considered as 'internal' can hardly be controlled and influenced by the organisation, while a number of what have been considered 'external' resources and activities do actually constitute an integral part of the organisation itself and are subject to its influence and control (Hakansson and Snehota, 1989:532).

Furthermore, relationships constitute in themselves one of the most, if not the most, valuable resources for organisations (Fiocca and Snehota, 1986; cf.: Hakanson and Johanson, 1988). Obviously a relationship is meaningless if related to only one entity. Thus such resource must be co-possessed and co-managed, or co-controlled and co-influenced. Thus, one comes the conclusion that

> [I]t becomes meaningless and conceptually impossible to disconnect the organisation from its context. The organisation appears without boundaries in as much as it is to a certain degree constituted by resources and activities controlled by other parties forming the network, and exist only in the perceptions of other parties (*ibid.*:532).

Generally speaking, in conceptualising marketing behaviour as systems, marketers arrive at a recognition that

> [Definitions of environment] do not specifically state when an object belongs to the environment and when it belongs to the system, for the answer to this question is by no means definite. Subdivision of a universe into two sets, system and environment, can be done in many ways, the appropriate one depending on the intentions of the person observing that particular universe (Ackoff, 1971) (Dowling, 1983:23).

2.3.5 Marketing As Systems Evolution

2.3.5.1 Overview

Also concerning with marketing dynamic behaviour, but from a more long-term historical viewpoint, systems approaches are employed as a conceptualisation model to investigate how marketing evolves in social-historical process, at both micro and macro levels. In the following, two models based on such perspective are presented. The first model, drawing upon open systems theory, focuses on how marketing as a management philosophy and social mechanism adjusts and adapts itself to the socio-economic dynamics, while the second, analogised to closed systems, analyses the impact of marketing to our wider 'ecological total system'.

2.3.5.2 Marketing and socio-economic evolution

The conventional wisdom holds that it is a breakthrough in marketing philosophy that the orientation of the firm moves from profit to customer (Drucker, 1954; Borch, 1957). More generally, it is claimed in textbooks that marketing has evolved from production, selling, customer, to marketing orientation (e.g., Kotler, 1980). However, no reasoning is given on what force underpins such continuous re-orientation during the evolution of marketing.

Based on open systems and contingency theory, Walters and Taylor propose a systems model of marketing evolution. They argue that 'both a profit and a customer orientation are myopic in that one factor has preferential status in an interaction where each is indispensable. Furthermore, neither orientation gives adequate attention to other environmental factors involved in the interaction' (Walters and Taylor, 1979:517). For the authors, 'there has never been any real change in attitude of business. That is to say, businesses have never been either profit or customer oriented *per se*' (*ibid.*). As Walters and Taylor see it, the shift in emphasis in the 50's from a profit to a customer orientation in marketing was just a part of the firm's continuing response to the changing situation. In a seller's market where products sold on their own, businesses naturally tended to emphasise profit. In the contrast, in a predominantly buyer's market where the consumer has more choices, businesses have to become more customer conscious. 'Should the situation revert back to a seller's market, and it could, business will make another adjustment' (*ibid.*:517). The conventional wisdom misreads marketing evolution, and thus fails to seize the fundamental reason, because it has taken a static view of the environment.

As an advancement, Walters and Taylor propose a model of marketing evolution: Contingency Marketing. Their hypothesis is that 'Business firms are situationally oriented rather than either profit or customer oriented, and that a situation orientation stands the best of both logic and practical application' (*ibid.*). Contingency Marketing is therefore defined as 'a flexible, integrated plan developed in response to the total internal and external situation, either existing or anticipated, that guides marketing activity' (*ibid.*:519).

Holding a more societal perspective, Dowling (1983) also models the evolution of marketing within the 'paradigm' of GST. Changes relevant to the evolution of marketing, in Dowling's thesis, are assumed to originate in the external as well as the internal environment. According to the concept of GST, systems evolution can occur from (1) self-induced changes, and/or (2) environment-induced changes, which occur either by chance or because the system senses that by changing it will function more efficiently. Then, the basic argument is that as economies develop and become more complex, so does the environment of marketing systems; accordingly, marketing has to change its orientation in order to fulfil its homeostatic role in society. For example, the 'product concept' of marketing is analogous to a relatively simple and closed system. On the other hand, changing economic, social, legal and political conditions have forced a more open systems approach to be adopted in marketing. Adopting Emery and Trist's analytical scheme to perceive the environment, Dowling models the linkage between the changing environment, relevant uncertainty, marketing philosophies and organisational goals as follows.

Table 2.2 Marketing evolution along with environment changes

Changing environment	*Relevant uncertainty*	*Marketing philosophy*	*Marketing goal*
I. Placid random	Low	Product concept	Quality products
II. Placid clustered	Low/medium	Selling concept	Sales volume
III. Disturbed reactive	Medium/high	Marketing concept	Long-run customer satisfaction
IV. Turbulent	High	Societal marketing concept	Long-run customer satisfaction/ Public welfare

(based on Dowling, 1983)

2.3.5.3 Marketing and entropic catalyst

While Walters and Taylor's and Dowling's open systems model focuses on the long-run adjustment and adaptation of marketing to socio-economic dynamics, Reidenbach and Oliva (1983), conversely, propose a closed systems model to analyse the impact of marketing to the socio-economic contexts with a macro perspective.

Their model is based on the second law of thermodynamics which states that the entropy of a closed system increases with time. In order to maintain systemic order in closed systems, energy must be transformed. If there is no external source, it must come from within; hence, the system becomes less organised. Ultimately, this process leads to system dissolution.

Reidenbach and Oliva consider our planet as a relatively closed system with respect to matter/energy transfers. According to Reidenbach and Oliva, within this relatively closed system, marketing is a facilitator directed at satisfying certain human wants and needs by providing products and services in order to generate and deliver the standard of living.

However, not all products or services are used to maintain or enhance our standard of living. Therefore some energy and material could be misused through marketing. Through the consumption process, such products and services are transformed into high entropy waste, exhausted of their utilities. It is this very aspect of marketing that acts as an entropic catalyst, and speeds up the entropy of our macro system. The negentropy for the set of individuals is offset by positive entropy in the environment. Through this process, marketing reduces the entropy of individual human systems at the expense of increasing the entropy of our wider total (ecological) system.

To maintain the order of our total system, Reidenbach and Oliva claim, marketing must be more long-run oriented and socially responsible. The task of marketing must shift from creating, developing and revitalising demand toward synchronising, formulating and controlling demands. As members of the wider system we have to work out the trade-off between our wants, needs and the limited energy and material in the wider ecological system, and such trade-off between order and disorder must be consciously and substantially managed. The model is then used to demonstrate that this trade-off can be worked out and managed.

2.3.6 Appreciation

Together, conceptualising marketing as systems hierarchy, as systems jungle, as systems behaviour and as systems evolution present a conscious and fruitful effort to employ the notion of holism into the inquiry of marketing knowledge. Rather than focusing on manipulating marketing elements, the purpose of this second kind of use of systems approaches is to model marketing phenomena into understandable and hence manageable systems, static (structural) or dynamic (behavioural and evolutionist). Overall efforts in this application domain consciously base their work upon the open systems concepts of survival and growth, justification and adaptation, etc. (if necessary, a closed systems model will be used as well, for example Dowling's (1983) entropic model). Such models encourage marketers to hold an interactive and dynamic viewpoint which begins by identifying a system of marketing actions, and of related marketing parts, stresses the operation of the whole and the dynamic relations among the component parts, attempts to explain the component parts in terms of the contribution they make to the operations of the marketing whole, and emphasises the interaction between marketing systems and the environment (for example Alderson, 1957). Here, we witness a reflection in marketing study of the systems movement from reductionism to systemisationism, or in Ackoff's terms from the 'machine age' to the 'systems age'. This can be viewed as the first systems struggle in the systems movement spreading into marketing study (for systems struggles see Appendix I). Its achievement is so prevailing that system has become a prerequisite and a 'master model' for studying marketing activities (Carman, 1980; Kelly and Lazer, 1967). In this sense, this kind of employment of systems approaches remains most popular in marketing study today.

Nevertheless, it is equally apparent that the selectivity in focus and emphasis which characterised the first systems struggle in the systems movement has been transferred into marketing study as well.

First, systemic marketing models are derived from realistic ontology and positivistic epistemology. The question of concern is usually expressed as: how to model marketing? Actually, reading between the lines, this question implies that marketing is something objective, already 'out there' to be modelled. Answering this question, 'systems as conceptualisation models' generally comes up with the assertion that marketing is a complex of open systems; e.g., marketing systems hierarchy, marketing systems jungle, etc. It is also partial and selective in the sense that when mapping marketing phenomena, the model has not embraced the richness of relevant viewpoints. Actually, issues concerning viewpoints, world-views or perspectives have no place in the model's horizon. Without questioning and inquiring into their own hidden assumptions, models of marketing systems are generally based on a particular rationale. As such, 'system approaches as conceptual models' is systemic in terms of *the* objective phenomena, not in terms of subjective viewpoints or rationalities about phenomena. The focus is on ontological mapping, while epistemological and ideological issues are ignored.

Second, the achievement of systematisation in marketing has been undermined by the heroic yet sometimes mis-led employment of systems approaches, resulting in over specialisation under the title of 'systems'. For example, in the study of marketing systems jungle, we see a tendency to investigate various sub-level marketing phenomena in isolation. We can focus on 'small' systems but ignoring 'bigger' ones. We may be focusing on trees, but forgetting the forest. Usually, under the title of 'systems', the overall purpose/performance of the larger system is quickly relegated to a backseat after a lip-service, whilst local optimisation of marketing sub-fields is pushed forward as a main concern, e.g., optimisation of distribution systems, selling systems, pricing systems, etc. von Bertalanffy spoke of being disillusioned with this kind of 'systems approach'. He stated that 'the student in systems science receives a technical training which makes systems theory - originally intended to overcome current over specialisation - into another of hundreds of academic specialities' (von Bertalanffy, 1968:vii-viii). In marketing study, similarly, we have 'hundreds of academic specialities' for marketing sub-fields, but few systemists for marketing system as a whole. As a result, marketing study has shrunk its focus from macro to micro (Sheth, 1979), and from bigger systems to smaller ones (Dixon and Wilkinson, 1989:61). Sheth *et al.* express their concern for this danger thus:

> [M]ost writers seem to associate systems with each function of marketing such as product, communication, marketing research, and distribution. It seems apparent that we need to devote considerable conceptual research to marketing as a system versus marketing systems (Sheth *et al.*, 1988:171).

Thirdly, 'systems as conceptualisation models' so far appears to be ideologically conservative. Related to the first point, the conceptualisation of marketing structure/behaviour as systems is such as to emphasise control, regulation, stabilisation, equilibrium, homeostasis, steady-state maintenance, co-ordinating mechanisms, authority, interdependence, integration, unity, etc. For most works under this category, 'to conceptualise a phenomenon as a system implies an operationalisation in terms of the phenomenon's structure' (MacKenzie and Nicosia, 1968:23) that is determined by the system's functions, which in turn are determined by the system's prior needs (Alderson, 1957). Obviously this view is rooted firmly in the functionalist tradition which is basically concerned with maintenance of current systems structures, and hence regulation of existing social orders and relations. Through this kind of systems perspective, marketing remains as a set of management techniques only for *the* non-problematic goal(s), rather than practised as a social process/mechanism for satisfying the collective yet contestable consumption needs of members as autonomous individuals in society (Bartels, 1970; Fisk, 1986; Reidenbach and Oliva, 1983; and also Habermas's work). Although marketing scholars call for the development of a new (normative) thesis which incorporates moral and ethical considerations (Dowling, 1983; Fisk, 1980; White, 1981), their calls quickly sink into the marketing systems 'mainstream' literature.

To sum up, being a valuable device to perceive marketing in terms of understandable and manageable systems, 'systems as conceptual models' in marketing study has greatly influenced the discipline, has drawn great attention and efforts from marketing researchers and theorists, has improved our understanding of the complex marketing phenomena, and will certainly continue to make a contribution in this important domain. It also provides the first kind of employment (i.e., systems as analytical techniques) with sound conceptual justifications. Of course, it still has a long way to go to overcome its constricting selectivity, its realist ontology and positivist epistemology bias, its ignorance of human autonomy, world-view and creativity, its sub-optimisation tendency, and its managerial/conservative orientation.

2.4 SYSTEMS AS THEORY DEVELOPMENT GUIDANCE

2.4.1 Overview

In the foregoing sections it was illustrated how systems approaches have been employed as a conceptual device to model marketing structure/behaviour and as analytical techniques to deal with marketing systems for the purpose of instrumental efficiency. In this section, it will be presented that systems approaches have also been used at a higher abstract level of reasoning to direct and organise marketing theory development. The main concern of such effort is to adopt a systems perspective in order to develop a framework that is sufficiently broad and flexible to accommodate the growing collection of marketing knowledge generated and borrowed from a broad range of disciplines (Reidenbach and Oliva, 1982a, b).

A starting point to investigate this domain of employment lies on the recognition that marketing is a multidimensional field within which the boundaries and content of the class of events which make up the field are uncertain and vary a great deal. Hence, it is natural that in earlier stages of the development of marketing thought, some individual marketing scholars focused on, and researched in depth into, one dimension/facet of the marketing whole, generally adopting a particular method, and borrowing constructs from a specific discipline, while others stressed another dimension/facet, and so forth. This process in the development history of marketing theory has produced a situation where 'the most peculiar feature of this discipline is its variety of approaches to, and thus meanings of, marketing' (MacKenzie and Nicosia, 1968:14). MacKenzie and Nicosia call this way of study 'decomposition' in marketing.

On the one hand, such decomposition can be seen as historically necessary and useful because specialised empirical studies in decomposition have produced a variety of useful specialised knowledge in depth regarding diverse 'systems' in the marketing jungle. On the other, however, each study concentrates on a particular sub-field, and therefore tends to isolate it from the marketing whole, and fails to expose the systemic nature of marketing (Nicosia, 1962). 'What has happened in the past is the development of a number of disciplines [in marketing], each of which yields a single view' (Reidenbach and Oliva, 1982a:61).

Furthermore, decomposition studies in marketing have not always been conducted in a harmonious atmosphere - 'My theory's better than yours' (cf.: Kernan and Sommers, 1968:vii). 'Basic agreement on the nature of, and the relations among, these approaches was hard-won achievement' (Nicosia, 1962:86). There has been a lack of recognition that while an individual approach to marketing may be relevant for a given class of problem, yet it inevitably lacks the necessary generality for studying other classes of problems, and thus is selective and incomplete.

Facing this situation, self reflective marketing scholars have tried to combine various pieces of marketing knowledge into a coherent image, 'moving from traditional marketing to the systemic and integrated approach needed to develop a theory of marketing', in the hope of a single discipline of marketing study with a multiplicity of views (Reidenbach and Oliva, 1982a:61).

For this purpose, most marketing scholars turn to the systems approach for a coherent multidisciplinary framework. Among others MacKenzie and Nicosia's (1968), Granzin's (1982), and Dowling's (1983) work seem most significant. While the first investigates the *possibility* of bringing pieces of marketing knowledge into a multidimensional whole, the second proposes a *path* to realise such possibility through multidisciplinary synthesis, and the third presents the *process* of marketing knowledge evolution as systemic progress in segregation and systematisation; all based on GST and Miller's (1965, 1978) work.

2.4.2 A Systemic Recomposition

Mackenzie and Nicosia's (1968) work can be seen as an attempt to recompose, after the previous 'decomposition', the various views of marketing into a 'more complete and general image'.

As Mackenzie and Nicosia perceived, the rich and amenable knowledge of marketing by that time could be summarised in three separated but conceptually related groups of ideas. The first group of ideas addresses marketing activities, which include 'elements' for a marketing system to exist, namely, the objectives (user's needs), the objects (goods and services), the subjects (agencies), the marketing activities themselves, and all other relevant entities such as laws, regulatory agencies, customers, social institutions, human and other resources, etc. The second group investigates how the morphology of the marketing system leads to marketing behaviour through interactions. At least three mechanisms that attendant upon a marketing system can be identified. These are: (1) price; (2) devices to collect and disperse information; and (3) goals of individual agencies or groups of agencies. The final group of ideas stresses the dynamism underlying marketing events; i.e., it addresses the relationships that may exist within and/or across the elementary dimensions mentioned in the first group. In short, according to Mackenzie and Nicosia, marketing knowledge can be classified into three categories: elementary dimensions, the behaviour of these dimensions, and relationships between dimensions during marketing systems' behaviour.

Mackenzie and Nicosia then advance a 'formal systems description' of the marketing behaviour space as the following vector:

S = (G, Q, P, ...)

in which S stands for marketing system behaviour space, G the agency dimension, Q the activity dimension, P the product dimension, and '...' stands for other possible relevant dimensions indicated by study purposes. The behaviour space of marketing systems can also be depicted as Figure 2.2.



Figure 2.2 A system description of behaviour space of marketing systems
(Adopted from MacKenzie and Nicosia, 1968:21)

It is claimed that the above 'formal description' of marketing system provides a systemic framework to accommodate and organise the whole range of marketing knowledge, within which the commodity school addresses the product dimension, the institutional approach concentrates on the agency dimension, the functional studies investigate the activity dimension, and so forth (for these schools see Part II).

Thus, it is clear that Mackenzie and Nicosia's work is an effort, based on the GST perspective, to advance a basic reference framework for marketing study to embrace the wide range of constructs from various disciplines into a multidimensional formal description that might be able to (1) describe the structural arrangements of any marketing system; (2) compare structure within and across different systems and across time; (3) understand the variety of organisational designs that make up the overall marketing systems and its subsystems; all of which are pre-requisites for organised engineering knowledge of marketing (Mackenzie and Nicosia, 1962:23).

2.4.3 A Multidisciplinary Synthesis

While Mackenzie and Nicosia were concerned to organise marketing knowledge into a coherent whole through a formal systems description of marketing, Granzin (1982a, b) has concentrated on a distinct aspect: how to obtain a systemic synthesis of the borrowed contributions from other disciplines towards a theory of marketing.

The basic argument of Granzin's thesis is that the development of marketing thought can benefit from synthesis of the contributions from other academic disciplines, and that sub-theories from those disciplines can be integrated into a comprehensive theory of marketing based on GST and Miller's (1978) theory.

Granzin firstly argued that previous research efforts have sought to develop lower-range and middle-range theories that dealing with sub-structures and sub-processes of marketing. In particular, many attempts to develop marketing thought have taken the orientation of a particular discipline, applying the concepts of that discipline to the problem of marketing. Such borrowing of concepts and orientations from other disciplines has proved fruitful for enriching the understanding of marketing structures and processes since marketing is a 'hybrid field' of study related to an enormous variety of social functions and activities. However, when marketing scholars seek knowledge compiled by a variety of academic disciplines to explain marketing process, they have often retained the frame of reference appropriated to the discipline that provided the borrowed bit of knowledge. Such knowledge may 'fit' well a particular sub-field *in* marketing but not provide a theory generally applicable to the entire field *of* marketing. Granzin argued that 'such piecemeal borrowing has resulted in a body of marketing thought that currently reflects a potpourri of incompletely adapted constructs taken from other disciplines. Without a unifying, integrating theory of marketing, there appears little hope that future researchers will be any more successful in adapting contributions of other disciplines to an evolving common body of marketing thought' (Granzin, 1982a:63).

To overcome the above mentioned drawback in marketing study, Granzin turned to GST, to 'adapt[s] basic value concepts to a systems framework to indicate how relations in general, and the value relation in particular, can be used as synthesising devices for the development of marketing theory' (*ibid.*:64).

Viewing system as a set of objects with relationships between the objects and between their attributes, Granzin argued that relations among objects of concern to scholars in marketing can provide the integrating device necessary for linking the contributions of various disciplines into sub-theories, and ultimately into a single theory of marketing. The point which then arises is which relation should be investigated. Granzin's view was that the value relation among system objects holds importance, in one form or another, to the organised development of marketing thought.

Value in Granzin has a specific meaning. It does not refer to characteristics of the subject or object in isolation, but to a context, a situation, an interrelated subject-object system. Therefore, value is an affectivity that exists in the relationship between stimulator (the object) and respondent (the subject) - a systemic tie that connects object and subject in such a way that the object provides benefits to satisfy the purposive element established by the subject. As such, any object that permits attaining the subject's desired state is acceptable. The subject not only reflects her/his personal and social characteristics by erecting standards to be met by a given object for establishing a value relation, but also establishes relations to other objects with which s/he is concerned. In this way the subject joins the purposive elements of the value relation to objects of interests, and establishes the tie as a multidimensional relation net of other relations inherent in her/his state.

Thus, the systems approach to the theoretical development of marketing, suggests Granzin, can follow three major steps: (1) specifying the objects relevant to the process under examination; (2) crossing inter-disciplinary boundaries to determine the attributes of importance to the process; and (3) characterising the value relations among the objects that are essential to understanding the process in question. It is believed that this systems approach can facilitate marketing theory to be constructed through proper integration of the wide range of sub-theories, each based on treatment of one of the systemic relations of importance to processes carried out by marketing systems, and hence supports the synthesis of contributions of the various academic disciplines whose knowledge relates to marketing process.

2.4.4 A Systemic Dynamics

Dowling's (1983) work presents the systems approach as a guide for marketers to pursue the development of a unique 'paradigm' (the term here is used *not* as defined in the last chapter) for marketing study, contending that the dynamics of marketing thought can be conceptualised and guided as the process of segregation and systematisation.

The underlying rationale of Dowling's thesis is Hall and Fagen's (1968) and Braham's (1973) theory of systems evolution. For Braham (1973:13), the general principle of systems evolution can be stated as 'the continual emergence and elaboration of successively more complex and flexible forms over time'. Hall and Fagen contend that progressive segregation and progressive systematisation occur over time during systems evolution. 'Most ... systems change with time. If these changes lead to a graduate transition from wholeness to summativity, the system is said to undergo progressive segregation', while progressive systematisation is simply the opposite of segregation, that is, 'a process in which there is change toward wholeness' (Hall and Fagen, 1968:85-6). Furthermore, progressive segregation and systematisation can occur simultaneously within the same system during its evolution. Braham (1973) holds the same idea, although he prefers the terms 'divergence' and 'convergence' to describe similar processes. While segregation (divergence) produces more flexibility, systematisation (convergence) enhances coherency, during systems change.

Seen by Dowling, the evolution of marketing thought represents an example of such evolution involving both systems progressive segregation and systematisation. While the efforts to develop sub-theories in marketing, tackling individual aspects, can be conceived as the former, interest in attempting to formulate 'a general theory of marketing' acts as the latter. During the history of the development of marketing thought, the domain of marketing study has expanded into a wider range of sub-theories flexible enough to deal more competently with increasingly diverse marketing phenomena. During this process, marketing knowledge has been continuously enriched through in-depth study of marketing sub-fields. Such growth is a typical characteristic of progressive segregation. During the same period, there have been persistent attempts to embrace various sub-fields of knowledge towards a general marketing image. Recent contributions along this second line can be found, according to Dowling, in for example Fisk's (1967) work on marketing systems and Holloway and Hancock's (1968) work on the environment of marketing (other works within the systematisation of marketing study include Bartels (1968); Hunt (1976); Bagozzi (1979); Zaltman, Pinson, and Angelmar (1973), etc.). In terms of systematisation, these contributions have displayed all three manifestations suggested by Hall and Fagen (1968): (1) pre-existing relations among parts of the marketing knowledge whole are strengthened; e.g., Bagozzi's (1978, 1979) formulation of a formal theory on marketing exchange; (2) there is a gradual addition of parts which were previously unrelated to marketing knowledge; e.g., emerging researches in relationship marketing, hi-tech marketing, etc.; and (3) there is a development of relations among parts previously unrelated; e.g., Carman's (1977) use of industrial organisation theory to describe competitive conditions in the environment of marketing systems.

2.4.5 Appreciation

'Systems as theory development guidance' opens another promising domain for employing systems approaches in marketing study. Its purpose is to bring isolated pieces of disciplinary knowledge into a coherent and general marketing image. Granzin believes that this approach 'allows a more manageable division of research labour' within which 'Some researchers can work on sub-theories in their areas of speciality and interest. Others can work on the integration of these sub-theories into a continually growing and more comprehensive theory of marketing' (Granzin, 1982:63). It is claimed that systems approach, among a few other schools of thought, is the most appropriate and promising 'paradigm' for dealing with the specialisation-generalisation issue in marketing theory development. (Carman, 1980; Dowling, 1983; MacKenzie and Nicosia, 1968; Granzin, 1982a, b; Meade and Nason, 1991; Sheth *et al.*, 1988).

Unlike the first two application domains, which focus on techniques and models addressing and tackling phenomena in the marketplace, i.e., in 'the outside world', this kind of application places attention on employing the notion of system to organise the process and/or outcomes of marketing knowledge inquiry. In this sense 'systemicity' has been extended from 'the world' to the way in which we probe the world. This is not to suggest that this development is exactly parallel to the hard/soft shift in the systems movement (which is presented in Appendix I). The aim here is to show that systems approaches have been used in the marketing discipline for different cognitive purposes and in different modes of inquiry, not necessarily related to or constrained by a single mode or style, be it 'scientific method' or 'strong empirical testing and validation'. This development in marketing study can be considered as compatible with Jain's (1981) assertion about systems science/philosophy that 'The promise of a general systems paradigm seems greatest in its capacity for organising knowledge rather than in operational applications'. All schemes presented in this section reflect such a possibility and significance.

Yet a more careful investigation of 'employing systems as theory development guidance' reveals that, in order to realise the full promise of this guidance, more fundamental issues have to be addressed. Since marketing study evolved from 'theoretical jungle' to 'paradigmatic disarray' during the last couple of decades, any attempt to tackle meta-discipline or meta-theory issues, or to bring piecemeal borrowed multidisciplinary constructs into a unified image, cannot simply avoid the challenges arising from the controversy of paradigmatic issues.

This line of thinking, i.e., employing a systems approach to probe fundamental meta-theoretical issues that concern contemporary marketing knowledge inquiry, can be found in marketing literature, although it may not use the exact term 'paradigm', and remains undeveloped. A good example is Mokwa and Evans' (1982, revised in 1984) effort to incorporate Churchman's (1971, 1979) reflective general systems inquiry. Drawing upon Bagozzi (1976), Carman (1980), Sweeney (1972) and

Zaltman *et al.* (1982), Mokwa and Evans assert that 'a conventional philosophy of science perspective is neither a complete nor comprehensive framework for grounding and guiding marketing inquiry' (p.170), and that 'Greater awareness, appreciation, and co-operation among diverse styles of inquiry is necessary' (p.174). To shift towards a more 'vital and critical' inquiry of marketing knowledge, Mokwa and Evans urge us to adopt Churchman's systems approach which they claim to be 'much different than the rudimentary connotative representations of the systems approach to which most of us have been exposed'. They suggest that 'Churchman's logic accentuates an imminent dialectic dimension and a reflective perspective of design and development in which orientation, construction, action, and evaluation meld into meaning and significance' (p.177). Without using the word 'paradigm', they in their conclusion certainly express their concern for paradigmatic issues confronting marketing study today:

> In marketing, we need to encourage articulation of the nature, scope, and characteristics of both our methods and our phenomena, from different ontological orientations. We need to accept and encourage the active development of diverse inquiring personalities, respecting personal capabilities, preferences, and contributions. We should continue to probe the role of conventional science in marketing, but we need to adopt a much broader and deeper philosophy of inquiry to realise all that *is* and *can be* marketing. A better understanding of the archetype inquiring methods, the conscious dimensions and enactments of each, and the unconscious unfolding of each into the others appears to be a serious direction for marketing inquiry' (p.178).

As I read it, Mokwa and Evans' work provides significant instruction to enhance 'systems as theory development guidance'. And the present project can be considered as an attempt along this line of thinking drawing on the latest development in systems science/philosophy.

2.5 SYSTEMS AS PARADIGM COMMUNICATION VEHICLE

It is suggested with this project that systems approach be employed as paradigm communicative dialogue vehicle to explore alternative responses to the challenging diversity in marketing study. This can be considered as a logical development and extension of the existing modes of application of systems approaches in marketing presented in the foregoing sections, especially of 'systems as theory development guidance'. The rest of this section will probe the necessity of such an approach, while more discussion on 'marketing as communicative action system' and its implication will be presented in Part III.

2.5.1 The Changing Situation And Challenge

Let me begin by addressing a specific aspect of marketing study - cross disciplinary borrowing. Murray and Evers (1989) argue that successful borrowing can be accomplished only if marketers understand the important philosophical issues at stake, and if the borrowing process becomes explicit, purposive and conscious.

First, Murray and Evers define theory borrowing as a social process, performed by researchers, in which: a theory constructed in a particular social context to explain a social or natural phenomenon at a specific level of abstraction, is taken out of this original context and used in another to explain a different social or natural phenomenon at the same or a different level of abstraction.

Next, theories in Murray and Evers are conceived as consisting of a superstructure and a substructure. The superstructure of theory includes the empirical or intuitive propositions that exist on the phenomenal level. These propositions are then evaluated in terms of their usefulness, applicability, relevance, truth, etc. The substructure of theory includes the types of science, e.g., technical-analytic, historical-hermeneutic, and critical-emancipatroy, in terms of ontology, axiology, and epistemology, which justifies the theory and its social context (interests, values, sentiments and significant events).

Then, Murray and Evers argue that 'appropriate borrowing' results from a harmony or consonance of all the three aspects: first, theory superstructure, next, type of science, and lastly, social context. Inconsistencies among these elements may result in substantial problems for the research programme. For example, the motivation research era in marketing failed due to a disharmony or inconsistency among the three aspects mentioned above. When Freud's theories were borrowed to explain consumer behaviour, all three elements of the original theory structure changed. First, the superstructure changed in that only a small portion of the propositions comprising Freudian psychoanalysis were borrowed. Assuming that the original propositions worked together in an organic manner, the borrowing effort lost the synergy derived from their interdependence by selecting only a few. Next, the type of science changed from historical-hermeneutic to fit an empirical-analytic type. Then, the social context transformed from the nineteenth century Vienna to the post-war America-West Europe. While the three elements in the original Freudian theory formed a coherent whole, the changed version 'imported' into marketing study became inconsistent.

Following the same argument but concerned with a wider scope which covers marketing study as a whole, Anderson (1982:24) in a similar way asserts that marketing theory has borrowed much of its ontology from economics and finance, but its epistemology from sociology and psychology, which has resulted in larger inconsistencies within aims, methods, theories, and philosophies in the field.

Such inconsistency became more apparent and introduced more fundamental challenges and abnormalities when marketing study, along with other social practical disciplines, evolved during the last couple of decades from the 'theoretical jungle' into the 'paradigmatic disarray'. Since it is assumed that aims, methods, theories, and assumptions are inevitably interwoven in relations of mutual adjustment and justification (see the elaboration on this topic of Laudan (1984) in the research tradition in general and Anderson (1983), Arndt (1985a, b), Bristor (1984, 1985), Deshpande (1983), Hirschman and Holbrook (1992), Hudson and Ozanne (1987, 1989), Leong (1985) and many others in marketing study in particular), each piece of marketing knowledge holds a particular kind of view-point and assumptions for conceptualisation and investigation, employs a particular method for inquiry, and follows a particular logic to interpret and justify itself. In short, each theory belongs to, and brings into marketing, a particular paradigm (as defined in Chapter 1). Thus, to integrate various sub-field, disciplinary or dimensional theories, which hold rival visions, into a general and coherent image of marketing, one simply cannot avoid addressing the deep seated paradigmatic issues. More precisely, we cannot simply bypass the why (necessity) and how (communication) questions in marketing study: Why did various elements of knowledge come to us? How are they to listen and talk to each other?

Using a different line of argument, Dascal (1989) and van Gigch (1990) arrive at a similar recognition. According to Dascal, the justification of knowledge cannot be based on a system of causal reasons which is self-serving (cf.: van Gigch, 1990). Following Dascal's argument, van Gigch contends that paradigmatic issues cannot be properly addressed and justified at the same paradigmatic level of reasoning, and hence that a higher level of reasoning must be in order. 'It is not sufficient to just model, we must meta-model, i.e., we must complement the formulation of models with an inquiry which raises its level of logic and of abstraction'. 'A discipline stagnates when it ignores its own epistemology and denies that it even exists' (van Gigch, 1993:253, 257).

As such, 'systems as theory development guidance' without concerns about paradigmatic issues or without addressing the current paradigmatic diversity has only very limited relevance in marketing study today. The changed and increasingly changing situation challenges us as system scientists and marketing theorists to change and to enhance our approaches. Responding to this challenge, my assertion is that 'systems' is still a promising approach but this can be realised only when we are willing and able to do two things: first we have to re-establish a proper conception of 'systems approach', and secondly we have to look beyond the exclusive one-sided definition of marketing. In the following I will tackle the first issue, while the second issue is the subject of Chapter 7.

2.5.2 Breaking With The Dominant Formalisation

It has been presented in foregoing sections that systems approaches in marketing have been employed as analytical techniques, as conceptualisation models, and as theory development guidance. It is also suggested that it is desirable and appropriate, given the changing and challenging situation in the discipline, to extend the application of systems approaches to a more urgent inquiry domain as a paradigm communication vehicle. However, this can certainly *not* be undertaken under the received formalisation of the perception of the 'systems approach' in marketing.

Now what kind of perception or definition of 'systems approach' has been normalised in the 'mainstream' of marketing study? What kind of impact has this normalisation produced?

Defining '*the* systems approach', Adler claims that

> The systems approach is thus an orderly, 'architectural' discipline for dealing with complex problems of choice under uncertainty. ... The systems approach attempts to apply the 'scientific method' to complex marketing problems. ... The ultimate application of the systems concept is to attempt to make mathematical models of the entire marketing process (Adler, 1967:167).

More recently, Sheth and Gardner also write that

> The contribution of the systems approach toward marketing theory is largely methodological. It has enabled scholars to think of quantification of marketing process for simulation or optimisation purposes. In the process, marketing has become more rigorous and more of a science. ... It has neither tried to broaden the horizons of marketing to non-economic areas of behaviour nor has it questioned the legitimacy of more traditional corporate objectives of profitability and market share (Sheth and Gardner, 1982:82).

I will argue that '*the* systems approach' defined as such is distortive, constraining and dated - in short, exclusive, and is therefore not able to support the use of systems approaches to address the recent paradigmatic tension in the field.

First, '*the* systems approach' defined as such is narrowly one-sided, since it is not able to reflect the actual intervention of systems approaches in marketing. It can at best give us a partial picture of a particular domain of application of systems approaches in marketing - 'systems as analytical techniques' only. It conceals and excludes other application modes of systems approaches, such as conceptual models or guides to theory development, and hence seriously restricts and depresses the possible applicability of systems science to marketing. Indeed, that particular kind of use of systems approaches has itself been seriously mispresented. For example, OR originally called for employment of multidisciplinary teams and synthesis of various disciplines, thus definitely going beyond the horizon of the 'economic area', and appreciating as many systems methodologies as possible, rather than just 'mathematical models'. '*The* systems approach', narrowly defined, presents in a misleading way only a seriously limited picture of the rich and diverse whole; therefore it is a distortive description of actual applications.

Secondly, '*the* systems approach' exclusively defined has constrained and blocked, rather than encouraged and facilitated, other kinds of systems intervention to marketing. The impact of the one-sided definition is so prevailing and penetrating that even some self-reflective marketing scholars, who call for the incorporation of long-run societal and ethical normative consideration dimensions into the conceptualisation of marketing system (e.g., Dowling, 1983; Fisk, 1980; White, 1981), have not been able to avoid the trap of the misleading conception. For example, they claim that to realise their desire, 'the main handicap is the almost universal lack of mathematical training and systems and computer skills within the present generation marketing theorists, a lack we plan to rectify in training the next generation' (Fisk, 1980:148). But how about *this* generation of us, here and now? If systems approach 'has neither tried to broaden the horizons of marketing to non-economic areas of behaviour nor has it questioned the legitimacy of more traditional corporate objectives of profitability and market share', how can societal and ethical normative considerations be compatible with, or tackled by, systems approach? Again, if 'the ultimate application of the systems concept is attempts to make mathematical models of the *entire* marketing process', how can the recent generation of marketers dare to address the impact of marketing systems on society/members before they become experts at mastering mathematical models and computer skills to model those impacts? Just sit back, relax, and wait. Other possibilities and responsibilities are for the next generation only. It is hardly difficult to imagine what '*the* systems approach' will say if we try to employ the notion of holism at a higher level of reasoning in order to tackle the tension in marketing study. It is therefore reasonable to argue that the one-sided definition of '*the* systems approach' is subjugating and suppressing, rather than encouraging and supporting.

Thirdly, the one-sided perception of '*the* systems approach' in marketing study is dated because it is not informed with substantial developments in its origin - contemporary systems science. As introduced in appendices, systems science has advanced to develop and accommodate a wide range of approaches to tackle multifaceted ontological complexity and conflictual epistemological/ideological propositions. Together, in the light of the critical pluralist perspective, conducted in a reflective and holistic manner, these rich and diverse approaches have greatly enlarged the competence in assisting problem-solving, social systems conceptualisation and design, and social meta-physical reasoning activities. '*The* systems approach' one-sidedly defined has not been able to reflect this development. What it presents is not the richness and increasing criticality of systems approaches as a developing and dynamic whole, but only one of the most traditional application domains of systems approaches to marketing, isolated from a much bigger whole. And, as we have indicated, even that particular kind of application has been mis-presented.

To sum up, systems approach*es* in marketing have been mis-presented in an isolationist, reductionist, and suppressing way.

Then comes a critical question. Given the variety in systems approaches, given the richness of actual practice of 'systems' in marketing, given more promising styles of employing systems approaches in the discipline, given substantial developments in systems science, why is it that a particular *part* of systems approaches, i.e., systems techniques, is presented exclusively as '*the* systems approach to the marketing' *whole*?

The answer in short is because such a narrowly defined 'systems approach' is perfectly compatible with the current ideology, with the 'methods bias', with the particular interest of current 'scientific establishments', in the discipline, and with the unreflected epistemological partiality.

First, '*the* systems approach' one-sidedly defined is a derivative of a particular kind of ideology - scientism, or technocratic consciousness, through which a particular kind of human interest eclipses and exhausts other kinds of human interests. As Habermas writes, 'The ideological nucleus of this consciousness is the elimination of the distinction between the practical and the technical. ... Technocratic consciousness makes this practical interest disappear behind the interest in the expansion of our power of technical control' (Habermas, 1971:112-3). It is through the narrow training of systems techniques that marketers and other citizens as well are constrained within the process of selecting optimal means rather than probing ends. For this purpose, '*the* systems approach' one-sidedly defined is perfectly 'fitted'. Other modes of applying systems approaches to marketing will challenge the received marketing wisdom, sooner or later. For example: employing systems approach to model marketing structure/behaviour will inevitably raise questions as to what factors ought to be modelled into systems, what others not, and in what order, and thus will ultimately lead to more deep seated questions such as who has the final say in such decisions, for what purpose, in whose terms, etc. Another example: employing systems approaches to organise marketing theory development will confront marketers with considerations such as whether we should, and how to, incorporate societal/moral dimensions into marketing study, or should/can marketing serve as social process/mechanism. Obviously, most systems approaches/practice, except the filtered systems techniques, will sooner or later ultimately go beyond the prevailing one-sided marketing ideology. And this is why other kinds of systems approaches must be concealed and repressed.

Secondly, there exists a 'methods bias' (see Chapters 5 and 7) behind the misperception and mispresentation of systems approaches to marketing. Except for 'systems approach as analytical technique', other modes of applying systems approaches will inevitably require more diverse inquiry devices beyond those 'scientific methods'. Take the above two examples again. If marketers take the 'ought to' and 'for whose interest' questions into consideration, how can 'scientific' methods 'predict' and 'determine' such issues? To allow the domination of a particular type of methods, the possibility of other forms of applying systems approaches to marketing must be frozen.

Thirdly, '*the* systems approach' one-sidedly defined has strong implications for the sociology of knowledge and social psychology. Our whole generation of marketers is trained by the marketing ideology and 'scientific method' to become silent, 'fitted' and loyal to marketing techniques (Heede, 1992; Peter and Olson, 1983). Other research purposes, study domains and inquiry approaches, will require new perspectives, research styles and methods, which will in turn reveal the limitation of the received one; therefore require new intellectual investments, and hence inevitably 'devalue' our proud profession, challenge our comfortable position, shake our worry-free career, disturb the current order and peace in the 'well-formed' scientific establishment in the discipline (Arndt, 1985a, b).

Last but not the least, there exists a more deep-seated epistemological reason. So far, 'systems approach as technical tools' has been presented as 'total', 'comprehensive', 'completed', or as least progressing towards so. It has not been recognised in the discipline that any approach, however sophisticated or 'scientific' it might be, cannot escape from partiality. We are still in the partiality trap.

To sum up, the conventional received formalisation of systems approaches to marketing is distortive, constraining and dated, and therefore can no longer hold. To reflect the actual systems applications in the discipline, to fulfil the greater potential of systems approaches, the received normalisation of '*the* systems approach to marketing' must be penetrated and discarded. What we need in the discipline, given the actual practice and challenging situation, is a critically reflective and prompt perception of the 'truth' of systems approaches, as well as theories and guidelines capable of supporting critical reflection and communication among researchers.

A vision of the rich application of systems approaches to marketing study can be summarised by Table 2.3 on the next page.

2.5.3 Supporting Signals

To employ contemporary systems approaches as a paradigm communicative vehicle to explore alternative responses to the challenging diversity in marketing study, we have to satisfy a certain precondition - to undertake a critical reflection and critique on the prevailing, distortive and constraining perceptions of both systems approaches and marketing. In the 'mainstream' of marketing study, such precondition has not been substantially established. However, we can find in the marketing literature growing signals of a tendency among self-reflective theorists which supports the proposed project. These supporting signals can be roughly summarised into three categories.

Table 2.3 Application modes/domains of systems approaches to marketing

Systems as	*Level of reasoning*	*Application purpose*	*Exemplar*
Analytical techniques	Method	Manipulating marketing systems for technical efficiency	Marketing OR Marketing SA Marketing Inf. Sys. etc.
Conceptualisation models	Theory	Conceiving marketing structure/behaviour into understandable/ manageable systems	Marketing as: systems hierarchy systems jungle systems behaviour systems evolution
Theory development guidance	Meta-discipline	Bringing piecemeal theories from multiple disciplines into an integrated and manageable image	A systemic recomposition A multidisciplinary synthesis A systemic dynamics
Paradigm communicative vehicle	Meta-paradigm	Promoting pluralism and encouraging collective complementation together with individual enhancement	Marketing study reorientation Marketing study reconstruction

First, becoming aware of balanced development. The received marketing ideology (detailed in Chapter 7) - 'marketing as management technique for business activity only' and 'positive-empirical approach as "scientific method"' - is still the prevailing belief in the 'mainstream' marketing study, while human practical and emancipatory interests in consumption needs basically remain under-addressed in most of the recent marketing education programmes, research projects and 'formal' activities. In other words, marketing is currently instrumental/technical interest oriented at the expense of other equally legitimate human interests. For evidence, one has only to have a brief look at our 'mainstream' textbooks, conference proceedings, 'professional' journals, and marketing modules for MBA courses. Yet it is becoming noticeable that a substantial trend is gradually developing, which points to a balance in marketing inquiry and practice. It has been argued that societal/humanistic aspects and purposes should be incorporated into marketing systems (Bartels, 1983, 1986; Dawson, 1969, 1971, 1980; Dowling, 1983; Fisk 1967, 1974a, b; Lazer and Kelly, 1973; Spratlen, 1974; Sweeney, 1972; Tuker, 1974; White, 1981). It has been postulated that our perception of marketing be deepened and broadened from the 'dog-food level' research towards more 'socially relevant' perspective (Belk, 1987; Dholakia and Arndt, 1985; Bagozzi, 1976; Dawson, 1980; Hollander, 1980; Firat *et al.*, 1987). It has also been suggested that for a balanced marketing activity, humanistic, interpretive, and critical/radical inquiries should be undertaken (Deshpande, 1983; Heede, 1980, 1992; Hirschman, 1986; Holbrook *et al.*, 1989; Murray and Ozanne, 1991; Poster and Venkatesh, 1987; Rogers, 1982, 1986; Sherry, 1991; Unstitalo, 1989).

Secondly, becoming aware of a reflective-pluralist perspective. During the development of marketing thought, marketing knowledge has been probed generally by different approaches in an isolationist or imperialist manner - 'My theory's is better than yours!' (cf.: Kerman and Sommers, 1968:vii; see the foregoing sections). Especially since the discipline evolved into 'paradigmatic disarray', marketing schools of thought, approaches and paradigms, have been stagnating within a 'Vietnam War' for superior positions (Hirschman and Holbrook, 1992:113-4; also recall Chapter 1 and see Chapter 8). Nevertheless, the recent years have witnessed within marketing study a continuous and conscious struggle for reflexivity and plurality. More and more scholars have become concerned with an organised discipline of marketing, capable of accommodating the whole range of theories in marketing (Bagozzi, 1979;

Bartels, 1968, 1970; Bristor, 1984, 1985; Carman, 1980; Dowling, 1983; Hudson and Ozanne, 1987, 1989; Zaltmal *et al.*, 1982). The reflective ideal has gained an initial foothold in marketing study, reaching the proposition that 'every research programme has its limitation when it comes to achieving its putative aims' (Anderson, 1986:168) and thus marketers must question 'a theory's mode of production, criteria by which it is judged, the ideological and value commitment that inform its construction, and the metaphysical beliefs that underwrite its research program', as well as its 'realisable cognitive and practical aims' (*ibid.*:156). It has been openly questioned what value and whose interest our marketing tools, techniques and methods serve (Hampton and Fleenor, 1979) and what social consequences marketing techniques will produce (Moorman, 1987). It has also been argued that 'Marketing scholars need to be reflective and critical of *what* they do, *how* they do it, and *why* they do it' (Dholakia and Arndt, 1985:xi). A pluralistic-oriented framework has become a significant pursuit (e.g., Bristor, 1984, 1985; Leong, 1985) although adequate philosophical and sociological justifications have not yet been put forward.

Thirdly, becoming concerned with meta-level reasoning. The 'mainstream' marketing study so far has been dominated by the seriously constrained focus of 'how to do' manipulation. Meta-reasoning has been only an exceptional concern of marketing theorists (for these exceptional examples see Bartels, 1970; Howard, 1965; Halbert, 1964; Hunt, 1983; Kelley, 1965; Mahajan and Friedman, 1987; Solomon, 1979; Zaltman *et al.*, 1982). However these exceptional concerns provide a critical kernel. Originally, meta-reasoning in marketing study focused on two aspects. The first concerned 'meta-theory'; i.e., the properties of theories, their forms, structures, generalisation-specialisation process, etc. (see for example Bartels, 1970). The second original aspect of meta-reasoning concerned 'meta-marketing'; that is, a 'societal concept' of marketing which is 'beyond', 'after', and 'higher' than traditional profit-driven marketing concepts (see for example Kelley, 1965). When marketing study evolved into the 'paradigmatic disarray', meta-reasoning also became increasingly concerned with the investigation of the philosophical/sociological underpinning of marketing paradigms (see for example Arndt, 1985a, b; Hirschman and Holbrook, 1992; Murray and Evers, 1989; Leong, 1985; etc.). With the various concerns of systems approaches to marketing study, we witness a gradual yet substantial movement from lower towards higher levels of reasoning (i.e., from manipulating tools, to conceptual model, then on to theory development guidance). The question in meta-reasoning has also shifted from 'What do we know? How do we know?' to 'What *can* we know? How *can* we know?' (Mokwa and Evans, 1982). Thus we see an increasing conscious move towards reflective meta-reasoning in marketing study.

To sum up, we can find signals of a growing tendency to support the proposed reconstruction of marketing study along the lines of pursuing balanced development, reflective/pluralist perspective, and meta-reasoning. However, compared with the prevailing marketing wisdom, these vital and much needed properties remain undeveloped. More crucial, these tendencies lack a critical and systemic vehicle to embrace and encourage existing/further contributions and efforts. And it is exactly for the purpose of proposing such a critical systems vehicle to reconstruct marketing study that this research is undertaken.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, diverse modes/domains of employing systems approaches in marketing study have been traced and presented. It has been shown that systems approaches have been used as analytical tools, as conceptual models, and as theory development guidance. It has also been argued that given the changed and challenging problematic situation, systems approaches can also be used as a paradigm communicative dialogue vehicle for the purpose of embracing various available marketing systems towards collective complementation and individual enhancement. The necessity of such a proposal have been explored. The main message is that to realise the full potential of systems approach, we must question and move beyond the distortive and constraining misconception/mispresentation of both systems approaches and marketing. If we are willing and able to do this, 'systems' is still a promising approach, since it enables not only disciplinary study of 'marketing systems' but also proper 'systems marketing'.

PART II

MARKETING SYSTEMS

Part II of the thesis undertakes an investigation on marketing systems, i.e., research approaches or schools of thought in marketing study.

The diverse marketing systems are conceptualised into four groups, namely, economic-mechanical, behaviour-biological, interactive-cultural, and historical-emancipatory models. This conceptualisation captures basic perspectives through which marketing phenomena are conceived, e.g., which metaphoric vision is employed to model marketing complexity. It also focuses on basic orientations indicating research traditions, e.g., whether the focal approach is derived from the purpose of efficiency, understanding, or autonomy. Such classification and investigation will hopefully uncover and push forward the basic assumptions, strengths and weaknesses, as well as most likely domains of application, of various marketing approaches, in terms of serving differentiable interests and purposes in understanding, formulating, and satisfying human consumption needs.

There are four chapters in Part II, each of which studies a particular kind of marketing systems. In each chapter, firstly an overview of the focal model will be presented, in terms of its emergence, intellectual origins, perspective, and deriving orientation. Next, representative approaches in the concerned model will be outlined, with emphasises on their premises, rationality, principles and methodological features. Then an appreciation will be presented, addressing the model's current position and possible future in the discipline.

Part II therefore constitutes necessary preparation for Part III in which various marketing systems (research approaches) are typologically categorised and hence conceptually juxtaposed, according to their respective 'personalities', into a reoriented marketing study, which is believed to be able to facilitate individual enhancement and at the same time to promote collective complementation in the dynamic process of addressing and tackling the whole range of issues relevant to differentiable and contestable human interests in consumption needs.

Chapter 3

ECONOMIC-MECHANICAL SYSTEMS

3.1 OVERVIEW

Approaches treating marketing as economic-mechanical (EM) systems include the commodity, the functional, the institutional, and the regional schools of thought. The commodity school focuses on the *objects* of marketing transactions as the central subject matter of study, and attempts to differentiate various products and goods on the basis of their physical characters and associated consumer buying habits. The functional school promotes an emphasis on the *activities* which repeatedly occur in different marketing situations, describing various functions that must be performed during marketing process. The institutional school concentrates on the study of *agents* of marketing transaction, and analyses organisations that perform marketing functions. Then the regional school researches the *locations* of marketing transactions, and probes how to bridge geographic or spatial gaps between buyers and sellers. Thus, the EM model studies the *what, how, who* and *where* questions of marketing.

The EM model appeared at the turn of this century when marketing emerged and was formalised as an independent discipline (Bartels, 1962; Sheth and Gross, 1988). Dholakia *et al.* (1980) give a historical-materialist account of the background of its birth, arguing that it was by no means accidental but related to a particular social-economic situation. Up to the late nineteenth century, industrialisation was well under way in the western world and the capitalist system retained the broad character of classic atomistic competition. However, due to the development of mass-production and automation techniques, productive capability grew immensely, resulting in a critical need for adequate distributive systems for a widely dispersed market. It was the interest in such a distributive system, capable of effectively and efficiently moving commodities from producer to consumer, that led to the beginning of the commodity and the regional approaches. Later, as the commodity movement grew in quantity and size, different functions for optimising and smoothing the distribution process were recognised. The apparent need for differentiation and organisation of such functions brought the birth of the functional and the institutional approaches.

As the first model of the marketing discipline, newly separated from its parent, economics (Jones and Monieson, 1990; Sheth and Gross, 1988), it is natural that EM systems adopted a strong economic perspective, in which efficiency and maximisation were a major focus, and in which actors in marketing actions were assumed to be driven mainly by economic values and to act predictably. The emphasis on physical handling of commodities also lends itself to a mechanical approach. In Bell's words, 'There is a temptation to view the marketing system, or some part of it, in purely mechanical terms. Although this view is not necessarily static, the parts are seen to more in a predetermined and predictable fashion. ... In this view the entire marketing systems might be regarded as a giant vending machine'

(Bell, 1972:44-5). The four marketing systems that share the economic orientation and mechanical perspective are outlined as follows.

3.2 THE COMMODITY APPROACH

The commodity school is defined as an approach to marketing phenomena where a product or class of products is the major focus of the analysis (Zinn and Johnson, 1987).

The rationale behind the commodity approach was simple. Given that marketing was concerned with the movement of goods from producer to consumer, if goods exchanged in the marketing process could be classified based on some criteria into some sort of rational system, then the analysis of commodities could be employed as a means to explain and then to organise the marketing process (Rhoades, 1927). Commodity theorists believed that many goods are really very closely related to each other so that they might be combined into one relatively homogeneous category, and which the same marketing procedures and techniques could be utilised for all products in that particular category. 'This notion of a fairly limited number of categories that are internally homogeneous and externally heterogeneous created a great deal of excitement among the commodity school scholars, because they began to have visions of a grand "marketing cookbook" (Sheth *et al.*, 1988:36). They believed that, when a marketing practitioner was in need of advice regarding the marketing of a specific product, he could simply find which category his product was in and then follow the prescribed marketing recipe for that category' (*ibid.*; also see Copeland, 1925:14). Duddy and Revzen found that 'In its extreme form, the view is held that differences in commodity characteristics alone explain the different kinds of organisation and operation presented in the marketing, attributing to these characteristics a determinative effect', and thus 'the commodity serves as a focus around which to organise the details of the institutional and management aspects of marketing' (Duddy and Revzen, 1947:12-3). The commodity approach was believed as fundamental to the development of marketing theory. As Mount saw it, the consumer relates his differential advantage to the individual commodity and not the institution which provides it or the function which creates it. Therefore, the commodity should be the subject matter of marketing and marketers should make greater use of the commodity as the basic building block for better theory in marketing (Mount, 1969).

Commodity theorists have dedicated great effort in the classification of commodities. Firstly, Parlin (1912) proposed a threefold classification of goods in 'women's purchases' as convenience, shopping, and emergency goods (Gardner, 1945). Copeland (1923) offered an improvement of Parlin's work, basing his method of classifying on consumer needs and actions. He labelled commodities as either convenience, shopping, or speciality goods. Other improvement and redefinitions along this line of classification can also be found in Bucklin (1963), Holton (1958), Kaish (1967), and Luck (1959). Another independent classification was provided by Aspinwall (1958) and later refined by Miracle (1965). Aspinwall specified his classification in terms of replacement rate, gross margin, degree of adjustment, time of consumption, and searching time, then categories commodities as red, orange and yellow goods, by analogy with the length of light rays. His classification is as follows:

Table 3.1 Aspinwall's classification of commodity

Characteristics	*Red Goods*	*Orange Goods*	*Yellow Goods*
Replacement rate	High	Medium	Low
Gross margin	Low	Medium	High
Adjustment	Low	Medium	High
Time of consumption	Low	Medium	High
Searching time	Low	Medium	High

Later, Holbrook and Howard (1977) expanded the Copeland classification, proposing a fourth category, preference goods, in the addition to the traditional convenience, shopping and speciality goods. More recently, Enis and Roering (1980) and Murphy and Enis (1986) adopted and refined this categorisation, presenting its relevance to new types of 'goods': services and ideas.

The commodity approach has encouraged and facilitated in-depth and fruitful researches. For example, Breyer applied principles derived from commodity approach to the marketing of bituminous and anthracite coal, crude petroleum, iron ore, rolled steel, Portland cement, cotton textiles, passenger automobiles, electricity and telephone service. For each of these 'goods', Breyer outlined the conditions of demand and supply, major characteristics of the product, channels of distribution, agencies engaged, functions performed, pricing, distribution costs, trade practices, and associated activities. Thus Breyer actually studied the whole marketing process around its subject: the commodities processed (Breyer, 1931). Other applications can be found also in Duncan (1920), Macklin (1921), Brown (1925), and Comish (1935), etc.

3.3 THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH

The functional approach is as old as the formal study of marketing, and has been described as 'most contributing to the development of a science of marketing' (Converse *et al.* 1952:62). Its importance has been compared with that of the discovery of atomic theory (Converse, 1945:19). It is said that 'the analysis of functions in marketing formed the foundation of the field and dominated it from 1900 to 1945' (Faria, 1984:138-9). This pre-eminent position of the functional approach stemmed from the common belief that the study of functions was somehow more fundamental than that of the institutions that carried out those functions. Cherington stressed that marketing should focus on functions rather than institutions because 'functionaries are constantly changing, whereas functions are not' (Cherington, 1921:50).

Hunt and Goolsby identify four reasons for the emergence of the functional approach. They state, 'The originators of the functional approach ... did so because economists had ignored the topic of distribution, because distribution problems were deemed to be important, because there were changes developing in distribution institutions, and because of a desire to point out the usefulness of marketing institutions in distributing goods and services' (Hunt and Goolsby, 1988:37). Hunt and Goolsby also present a historical account of the acceptance and favouring of the functional approach, which they attribute to the onset of the Great Depression in the 1930s. On the one hand, 'The problems of excess supply in the production area in ... economy prompted academicians and business people alike to focus increasing attention on problems in the marketing of goods and services, rather than their production', while on the other 'the functional approach was thought highly useful in analysing problems of efficiency, competition, and government regulation in those years of economic distress' (*ibid*:39).

Then what is the functional approach to marketing? As Duddy and Revzen defined it:

> Marketing functions are homogeneous groups of activities which are necessary to the performance of the general function of distribution. Thus marketing comes to be defined as a process of exchange involving a series of activities necessary to the movement of goods or services into consumption. Functional analysis calls attention to the basic nature of these operations (Duddy and Revzan, 1953:20-1)

Or in Jones's terms, 'functional analysis was simply that [analysis] of the marketing functions or activities performed by middlemen or participants in the marketing process' (Jones, 1988:166).

There is some consensus that Shaw originated the functional approach (Convers, 1945:18; Faria, 1983:162; Hunt and Goolsby, 1988:36; Jones and Monieson, 1990:109; Sheth and Gross, 1988:12). Shaw asserted, 'to understand what seems to be a present tendency to go around the middleman as well as to consider the problem of the merchant-producer with reference to the use of middlemen in distribution, it is necessary to analyse the functions performed by the middleman' (Shaw, 1912:731). Through the functional perspective, Shaw suggested that the rise of banks as 'functional middleman' could be explained by noting that they had assumed the traditional middleman's function of 'financing the operations', and the rise of insurance companies assumed the function of 'sharing the risks'. Weld, following Shaw's lead, defined 'functions' as 'the services that must be performed in getting commodities from producer to consumer' (Weld, 1916:3). Weld also pointed out that marketing functions are not necessarily performed only by middlemen but are often performed to a greater or lesser extent by producers and consumers. Other contributions adopting and promoting the functional approach can also be found in the following: Cherington (1921) proposed that the elementary activity of marketing is to bring buyer and seller together in a trading mood through the functions of merchandise, auxiliary, and sales; Vanderblue (1921) pointed out a potential risk of isolating each functional component and claimed that functions are often interdependent; Ivey (1923) used functional analysis to explain the rise of specialised 'functional middlemen'; Converse (1930) indicated that not all functions are always necessary and suggested focusing on the performance of functions to the best advantage; Ryan (1935) argued that emphasis should be put on organising rather than on merely summarising functions so that a comprehensive picture of the distributive process could be sought; Fullbrook (1940) argued for the recognition of the distinction between a functional requirement and the actual performance of that function; McGarry (1950) attempted to evaluate functions in terms of ultimate objectives and to ascertain those that are necessary and those that are not; Bucklin (1966) suggested deriving functions from the required market services and minimising the total cost for any given set of services; Baligh and Richartz (1967) extended the mathematical development of the functional approach; and Lewis and Erickson

(1969) attempted to link together the functional approach and the systems perspective.

Alongside with the theoretical development, at least eighteen classification lists of marketing functions have been proposed (see Hunt and Goolsby, 1988). It is not surprising, therefore, that 'these numerous studies, however, have given rise to a good deal of confusion' (Schwartz, 1963:86). Hence, efforts have also been invested in justifying such variation in classifications. Bartels (1941:160) considered that the variety stems from fundamentally different assumptions and methodologies; Schwartz (1963:86-7) asserted that it is due to differences in the explicit or implicit research purposes; while Hunt and Goolsby (1988:37) added differences in experiences and backgrounds of researchers as another reason.

The functional approach is generally regarded as a resource from which the marketing mix programming is derived, which in turn constitutes the core of the methodology for the succeeding managerial marketing approach.

3.4 THE INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH

It is believed that 'the institutional school of marketing thought holds a central position in the development and growth of the marketing discipline' (Sheth *et al.* 1988:73). It is further claimed that 'the three traditional forms of marketing analysis: functional, institutional and commodity, could benefit from the institutional approach' (Jones and Monieson, 1987:105).

Like that of the commodity and the functional approaches, the emergence of the institutional approach can also be mapped to a historical background. At the beginning of this century, there were rapid sociological transitions in the western world, especially in the United States. As industrialisation advanced and spread furiously, people were moving away from the rural areas, taking jobs and establishing residences in the booming urban areas. For this reason, most consumers in cities were not accustomed to the intermediaries who distributed required goods, and were unprepared for the price paid to the middlemen. As a result, there emerged among citizens the argument that middlemen added excessive costs to products without a concomitant addition of value. A question frequently asked was: *Does Distribution Cost Too Much?* (Stewart and Dewhurst, 1939). Therefore, it was natural for the newly formalised marketing discipline to evaluate the functions and efficiency of the agencies involved in transforming and transporting goods, to investigate the roles and performance of intermediaries, and to determine whether the economic contributions of these organisations could justify their existence (Sheth and Gross, 1988).

From a wider historical-intellectual development perspective, the institutional approach can also be linked to a more general approach: institutionalism, which generally refers to a method of studying social, political and economic phenomena. The approach integrated Veblen's (1898, 1899a, b) anthropological and evolutionary perspective, Mitchell's (1913) statistical method, and Commons's (1924, 1934) sociological-legal approach (Revzan, 1968). What these pioneers pursued was a new kind of economics more applicable for solving social and economic problems (Dorfman, 1955; Jones and Monieson, 1987) (see supplementary discussion in Section 6 of this chapter). Nevertheless, the term 'institution' in the early marketing writings has referred mainly to marketing actors that moved goods from points of production to points of use, with particular emphasis on visible marketing institutions such as wholesalers and retailers (Arndt, 1981; Bartels, 1962; McCammon and Little, 1965; for a more comprehensive introduction to 'institutionalism' consult Revzan, 1968).

Often regarded as the founder of the institutional approach, Weld (1916) demonstrated that specialised agencies such as middlemen were desirable. He pointed out that the problem was to find the most economical combination of agencies. Weld wrote that:

> ... whether there are too many successive steps, and ... there are too many middlemen. ... [S]uch subdivision is merely an example of the well-known doctrine of division of labour, and that economies result from specialisation by functions. Although it is perhaps impossible to say definitely whether there are too many middlemen in this sense, it is at least true that there is ample economic justification for a subdivision of the marketing process among specialised classes of dealers; that in some cases lower cost and greater specialised efficiency may be gained by further specialisation; and that in other cases it may be possible to reduce the cost by combining the functions of two or more middlemen into the hands of one single middleman. The functions of marketing have to be performed, however many separate middlemen there are; the problem is to find the most economical combination of functions (Weld, 1916:21-2).

Butler (1923), too, justified the role of middlemen with an emphasis on the utilities that middlemen provide for both producer and consumer. Furthering Weld's lead, Breyer (1934) argued that the task of marketing was to get from production to consumption and hence that marketing was the price customers pay for the advantages of social specialisation, the benefits of which they enjoy. Breyer also emphasised the role of middlemen in overcoming the various obstacles and resistance to the exchange of goods (Bartels, 1962:184-5; Sheth and Gross, 1988:13).

When consumers gradually accepted the role and cost of the intermediaries, the institutional approach moved its focus to the structure and evolution of distribution channel systems. Converse and Juegy, among others, were the first to investigate the potential benefits and possible risks of vertical integration in marketing channels:

> Vertical integration means the joint operation of two or more stages in production or distribution by one company. It has two advantages: a reduction in marketing expanses and the assurance of a supply of materials or an outlet for the goods. Marketing expenses may be reduced by the elimination of successive buying and selling

> operations between what otherwise would be separate companies ... Integration offers one of the most hopeful and most successful methods of reducing marketing costs, but it introduces serious problems of management and co-ordination (Converse and Juegy, 1940:800-1).

Numerous researchers have pursued along this line of thinking, resulting in a boom in the study of marketing channels: Duddy and Revzan (1947) contended that the institutional approach pays attention to other influencing forces as well as that of economics; Breyer (1949) emphasised quantitative systemic analysis and control of channels; Balderston (1964) sought to provide a normative approach to optimal channel design; McCammon (1965) identified various types of centrally co-ordinated channel systems and suggested reasons for their emergence; McCammon and Little (1965) attempted to develop a comprehensive notation system to describe and simulate the behaviour of complete channel systems; Bucklin (1965) introduced the principles of postponement and speculation to explain the creation of intermediate inventories between producers and consumer; Mallen (1973) proposed the concept of functional spin-off and the hypothesis that marketers would choose between performing functions themselves and subcontracting to functional specialists so as to minimise the overall cost of performing marketing functions, etc.

Together, researches in the institutional approach have made contributions in defining the institutions, articulating their value-adding roles, and demonstrating their interrelationships between producers and consumers. They have come up with an institutional framework for explaining the emergence, behaviour, evolution of channels, and for the design of effective and efficient channels. Furthermore, like the functional approach which provided intellectual origins for the development of the succeeding managerial school, the institutional approach contributed great intellectual resources for the coming functionalist and political economy approaches.

3.5 THE REGIONAL APPROACH

The regional approach conceives marketing as a form of economic activity designed to bridge the geographic, or spatial, gaps between buyers and sellers. Vaile *et al.* expressed the rationale behind the regional approach as such:

> Space, like time, is omnipresent. Its impact upon buyers and sellers and commodities is not uniform, however, for the amount occupied by a firm or by a process varies enormously. Space provides opportunities for production, marketing, or other activities at various sites and locations. It also erects obstacles in the form of costs of movement that must be bound by buyers and sellers (Vaile *et al.*, 1952:487).

The regional approach was basically quantitatively driven, with extensive utilisation of mathematical models such as regression analysis. It was based on economic characteristics, and was influenced by geography in terms of the interplay between economic activity and physical space.

The most influential projects adopting and promoting the regional approach are said to be Reilly's (1931) and Converse's (1949) work in delineating trade areas and analysing the movement of retail trade (Goldstucker, 1965; Grether, 1983; Schwartz, 1963; Sheth *et al.* 1988). The objective of their projects was to discover some method for measuring the retail trade influence of economic regions, resulting in the 'Law of Retail Gravitation'. Reilly (1931) attempted to formulate a principle, which was presented as a formula, that would explain how boundaries of trading areas are determined and where buyers would shop. Similarly, Converse (1943, 1949), verifying Reilly's work, developed his own formula known as the 'Breaking Point Formula'. The 'Social Physics Approach' to marketing proposed by Stewart and his associates (Stewart, 1950, 1952; Stewart and Warntz, 1958) was another project consistent with Reilly and Converse's work, with its particular emphasis on the clusters of people, distances between population concentrations and demographic energy. Revzan (1961), reporting his regional study focusing on wholesaling, formulated eight factors affecting the size of a wholesale market area.

Vaile *et al.* (1952) presented a distinct account of the classic regional approach. They regarded their approach as an alternative to the Marshallian perfect competitive market which implied that the geographic area of a market depended merely on the price of the goods plus the cost of transporting them (see Marshall, 1890:270-1). For Vaile *et al.*, such Marshallian market does not exist in the real world. Instead, the determinants of the dimensions of trading areas are conceived by Vaile *et al.* to be (1) the extent of product differentiation and the relative effectiveness of brand promotion, (2) the range of choice in administered pricing made possible by product differentiation, oligopoly, and other influences, (3) the ratio of fixed to total costs, (4) the burden of transfer costs in total delivered prices to customers, and (5) the availability of adequate markets within a radius of economical outreach (Vaile *et al.*, 1952:525-6). Based on this conception of economic trading area, Vaile *et al.* proposed two sets of hypotheses, the first of which was to explain why some goods are produced and consumed within the same economic region whereas other goods are consumed outside, while the second was to explain the volume of commodities flowing in interregional marketing.

Grether has made a distinct contribution to the regional approach. In his work, firstly the regional approach was expanded to analyse interregional and intraregional trade, focusing on the flows of materials and goods among regions and even import and export trade among countries (Grether, 1950, 1983). Second, the theory of interregional marketing was applied in the study and formulation of public policy. Through the interregional approach, Grether analysed the trade barriers such as cost and price structure that inhibit regional competition, stressed issues of maintaining and promoting competition in marketing decision and government policy (Grether, 1966). Finally the approach was employed to generate a fairly broad theory of marketing. Grether argued that 'The behaviour of the firm should be investigated not only in a price and marketing sense, but, under the conditions of its physical and social environment, in its determination of its location, its spatial outreach in selling and in buying and its relationships in the marketing channel with suppliers on the one hand and the buyers on the other' (Grether, 1950:117).

Although the regional approach is one of the oldest approaches in marketing study, and although great changes have occurred in technology, competition and marketplace since its emergence, it is commonly believed that the approach will not only remain extremely critical for physical distribution and logistics functions (Sheth and Garrett, 1986:405), but will also become important to marketing even in new guises in the high technology and service industries of the emerging post industrial society (Grether, 1983:36).

3.6 APPRECIATION

When marketing emerged as a separated discipline in the early 1900s, the focal question was moving commodities from producer to consumer effectively and efficiently. Focusing on this question, EM systems addressed the what, how, who and where aspects respectively. In this section, it will be asserted that EM systems shared a macro perspective, an economic orientation, a mechanical world-view, and that their perspective, orientation, and philosophy were fairly consistent.

3.6.1 The Macro Perspective

The EM model basically held a macro perspective which viewed marketing systems from the vantage point of the society rather than from the viewpoint of the firm executives (McCammon and Little, 1965:324). It conceived that the whole of marketing is greater than the sum of its parts, that marketing system is the product of society which it in turn influences, and that marketing is basically what *people* do rather than merely business processes (Bartels, 1965:69). Essentially, EM systems studied marketing from a societal viewpoint (Hunt, 1976; Schwartz, 1963), defining marketing as both an applied managerial technology *and* a social process (Fisk, 1986). During their initiation, EM systems pursued efficiency for society to meet its collective consumption needs, rather than merely for businesses to capture profit (Bartels, 1983, 1986; Cox, 1962).

Actually, the macro-societal perspective underwrites all the pioneering projects of EM systems. For example: McGarry considered marketing as a social mechanism that develops along with the growth of an economy in order to facilitate the adjustment of man and his environment. The social role of marketing is therefore to 'reconcile the notions of potential users as to what they desire with the products that businessmen find it practical to provide' (McGarry, 1950:273). What McGarry attempted to do was to explain marketing functions in terms of the role of marketing in an economy. Vaile *et al.* (1952) stated that the basic tasks of marketing are (1) to direct the use of resources and allocate scarce supplies in conformity with existing demand and (2) to aid in making consumption dynamic in conformity with changes in an economy's ability to cater to human wants. Grether (1966, 1983) analysed marketing from a social policy point of view. His work focused attention on such questions as (1) the circumstances which may give rise to interregional marketing; (2) the effect of interregional marketing on regional prices and the products offered for sale by regions; (3) the effect of sales promotion on traded between regions; and (4) the economic consequences to society and specific regions of interregional marketing.

Bartels has given a historical explanation for this original societal perspective in early marketing approaches. Bartels writes:

> The new expectations and the emergence of marketing, however, were not merely the outgrowth of nineteenth-century economic conditions and thought. They stemmed from an intellectual and spiritual renaissance occurring throughout society and throughout the century, which gave people vision of a better society and hope of achieving it. ... This flowered in confidence that the scientific method was a means of solving all

> problems. Marketing was such an intellectual approach to problems of supply and distribution. ... The beginning of the twentieth century was a turning point in economic history, a point at which the distribution of consumption products was expected to conform to higher spiritual values, while at the same time catering to the satisfaction of material needs. ... [F]or benefits to consumers were tantamount to benefits to society, so urgent was the need for better product distribution. ... [I]n the eyes of early researchers, the ultimate interests of producers and consumers were the same. ... Until midcentury, marketing academics generally accepted the coincidence of social and economic, consumer and producer, interests (Bartels, 1986:31-2).

Obviously, in EM systems, marketing institution and society, consumer and producer, material and spiritual needs, management techniques and social process, economic value and humanistic norms, were all conceived as compatible and coincident. It is therefore clear that although EM systems were driven by technical concerns and economic criteria, they were yet dedicated to describing marketing as a social institution of society, and to investigating how the institution functions for the improvement of the human situation as a whole. This rediscovery strongly supports an argument of this thesis that in a longer-run and wider socio-historical perspective, marketing is first and foremost a social mechanism geared to satisfy the collective consumption needs of members of a society, not merely a group of management techniques driven by business profit targets.

Of course, from a critical point of view, the original macro perspective in EM systems is by no means complete or satisfactory. To gear marketing towards society's collective needs is correct and necessary, yet not sufficient. What marketers need to recognise and practise is that consumption need is a culture (Hibshoosh and Nicosia, 1987) and social formulation (Dholakia *et al.* 1980), that is, social-historically shaped (Benton, 1987). When it comes to public judgement, consumption need cannot be accepted as given - even based on a majority rule; rather, it should be the prior issue of inquiry. At least one can ask, in defining consumption needs, who are involved, what are modelled in, in what terms, for what purpose, in what circumstance, and why? It is argued, particularly, in current marketing literature that 'many segments and individuals in society cannot effectively participate in the market because they lack the buying power and the required organisation'; therefore, the efficiency and success of marketing is judged actually in terms of only those who pay the most (Firat *et al.* 1987:xiii). Without consciously questioning its own boundary judgements and underlying philosophical-sociological assumptions, ignoring historical and ideological issues, EM systems in marketing cannot root out the danger of seeing consumption needs and hence marketing *per se* 'through the eyes of the channel captain' (terms from Tucker, 1974). In fact, like the sad experience of OR (Mingers, 1992a), when industry and the private sector picked up marketing for their narrowly defined needs, they confined it to management techniques for instrumental efficiency only; the macro perspective and humanistic side of marketing have gradually faded away (Bartels, 1986; Firat *et al.* 1987; Sheth, 1979), resulting into a one-sided imbalanced pursuing in the discipline.

3.6.2 The Economic Orientation

Economics was the fundamental orientation of the early marketing thought and hence EM systems (Arndt, 1981; Bartels, 1962; Dholakia *et at.* 1985; Firat *et al.* 1987; Howard, 1965; Katona, 1953; Mallen, 1963; Schwartz, 1963; Sheth *et al.* 1988). In fact, all the projects outlined in this chapter were attempts to utilise economic theory in the conceptualisation, analysis, justification, and control of marketing process. Converse (1951:2) made the rationale of EM systems most clear and simple: 'economic theories gave us a starting point - or a series of hypotheses'.

It is popular nowadays in social/management sciences in general and in marketing study in particular to criticise the economic orientation in research approaches. However, few criticisms have recognised the difference(s) between the economic school of thought that EM systems adopt and that underwriting the later approaches such as managerial systems. As a result, to some extent, the EM model is, to some, identical with the recently received marketing wisdom. It therefore seems necessary to clarify the distinction: that is, while the recently-received marketing wisdom relies mainly on the price theory of neo-classical economics, EM systems consciously oriented themselves to a more societal and practical ideal, i.e., the historical school of economics. Supporting materials for this argument can be found from Jones and Monieson's historical study in early marketing thoughts (Jones, 1988; Jones and Monieson, 1987, 1990).

In the latter part of the nineteenth century, a scientific model of historism, which became identified with the historical school, began to influence the social sciences in Germany (Herbst, 1965). The historical school of economics emerged as a reaction at that time to the classical economic thinking and later to the neo-classical economic theories such as Marshall's *Principles of Economics* (1890) and *Industry and Trade* (1919) (Myles, 1956; Jones and Monieson, 1990). The founders of the historical school were dissatisfied with the inability of classical/neo-classical economics to resolve urgent problems associated with the rapid growth in the Western world as it then was. Thus, the historical school was developed as a new approach to economy, distinctive by its practical focus on real world problem-solving, its historical, statistical methodology, and its social ideal concerned with application of knowledge and skills to social ends (Jones and Monieson, 1990).

Given that the discipline of marketing emerged around the beginning of this century, and given that most of the early marketing academicians got their training in Germany (Bartels, 1962), it is not surprising that EM systems adopted the tradition of historical school of economics, and that the philosophy of early marketing thought may well have been quite different from what the received wisdom currently understands it to be (Jones and Monieson, 1987). It can be argued that the economic orientation of EM systems was socially concerned, problem-solving derived, and inductive in methodology.

Firstly, concerned with the social role of marketing, Ely proclaimed the succession of the 'new school' over the old one of orthodox, classical economics. Ely asserted that ethics and economics were inseparable, and stressed the general welfare over individual gain. Ely believed in a strong role for the state in certain spheres of industrial activity such as natural monopolies where great saving and convenience resulted from 'compulsory corporative methods' (Ely, 1886). Accordingly, Ely wanted marketing and its students to have a broad and practical approach which would contribute directly to human progress. Here we see the intellectual origin that influenced EM systems such as those of Shaw, Weld, Grether, Vaile, Breyer, Cox, and McGarry, in which a distinctive ethical normative concern often led to a thinking on general welfare distribution and to a concern for whether the entire system was working 'properly' (Jones and Monieson, 1987:163, 1990:109).

Second, EM systems were more concerned with real world problem-solving than with 'pure' theoretical or conceptual ideas (Jones and Monieson, 1990:103). Most projects in EM systems were attempts to respond to urgent public concerns. For example, the functional and institutional models focused on the justification of middlemen and optimisation of distribution channels, both were urgent concerns of the then public. Therefore we have projects from Shaw (1912), Macklin (1921), to Vaile *et al.* (1952) and Grether (1983).

Finally, distinctive from the deductive positivism of classical/neo-classical economics, EM systems adopted an inductive method that emphasised observation, collecting facts, comparison, statistics, description, summarisation and synthesis. For example, Gay (1927) believed that the scientific principles and generalisations of marketing business should be 'built up by observation and induction from widely gathered and carefully sifted facts'; Shaw (1912) advocated what he called the 'laboratory method', which included the use of observation, statistics, comparison, and a historical perspective. So much so that Sheth *et al.* (1988) came to the conclusion that the commodity, functional, and institutional models all adopted inductive methodologies.

3.6.3 The Mechanical World-View

While EM systems were geared to the ideal of social effectiveness and efficiency, the predominant concept of effectiveness and efficiency was fundamentally mechanistic (Bartels, 1965:69); for example Breyer's (1934:24) treating marketing as 'a working machine'. This mechanical world-view has been manifested in the assumptions about Man, the technical-rational view of science, and the emphasis of empiricism and operationalism.

First, in dealing with the movement of goods from producer to consumer, EM systems based their forecasting of aggregate consumer spending/demand on a preassumption that consumers behave in a predictable, stable and knowable way. This assumption stemmed from the Keynesian model of 'economic man' whose wants exceeded his ability to buy (Pratt, 1965). In this model, households were considered to maximise utility while firms maximise profits. As such, the behaviour to be expected from an individual household or an individual firm under specified circumstances could be deduced, and the resulting aggregate behaviour for all households and/or firms could be estimated. It was this assumption that enabled Keynes to be assured that consumption would be a stable function of income (Keynes, 1935:96). Thus we are told that between consumer spending and personal income exists a fixed relationship, in which if one value is known, the other can be accurately estimated. In this way, human motives, attitudes, emotions, expectations were generally ignored, the human element was eventually absent. This positivistic world-view in EM systems enabled people to be treated as 'things', and social relations fixed and constrained (Morgan, 1992:141).

Second, EM systems held a technical-rational view of science. They believed in a parallelism between the natural and social science in the way Durkheim saw 'social facts'. The purpose of marketing approaches was to generalise 'scientific laws' that are said to predict and control marketing process. Schwartz expressed such ideal like this:

> A marketing theory should be such as to yield accurate probability predictions about variation in the dependent variable on which it focuses. ... A marketing theory would become a law if it were improved to the point where its predictions were perfectly accurate over time' (Schwartz, 1963: 134).

Thirdly, the EM model tended to concentrate on empirically operationable aspects of marketing. What it pursued were 'scientific measurement', 'accurate prediction', 'effective control', 'quantitative standards', 'analytical techniques', and 'empirical methods' (*ibid*). Such emphasis on technical interest is understandable in the sense that as a newly emerged discipline, marketing had to attain academic legitimacy by demonstrating its practical applicability which was in turn defined by the *then* recognition of 'science'. However, this selectivity in research philosophy is very dangerous for a social practical discipline such as marketing, if EM systems are not aware of its own partiality and proper position within the overall pursuit of human genuine emancipatory interest (see Appendix II). By reducing marketing approaches into a one dimensional science, marketing study became incomplete at best and distortive at worst. Actually, as we will see in later chapters, the selectivity and partiality in EM systems were developed into a one-sided ideology legitimating imbalanced marketing when marketing was picked up by the managerial model and buyer behaviour theories.

3.7 A POSSIBLE FUTURE

The EM model in marketing study is a line of thinking that pursues effective and efficient economic solutions to macro marketing problems. It holds a societal perspective and a mechanical world-view, and is economic value derived. As demonstrated earlier, when the model emerged, to meet society's consumption needs was the principal objective of marketing. It was considered that social and economic, consumer and producer, material and spiritual, technical and humanistic interests, were coincident; therefore management techniques and social mechanism were conceived as the dual nature of marketing. From this point of view, relations between aims, philosophy, theories and methods of this model were fairly consistent. The model provided the marketing as it then was, with a relatively unified picture as well as satisfactory techniques.

However, a careful reading of the model reveals the seeds of potential inconsistency in addition to the lack of conscious reflection of its own partiality and philosophical and sociological assumptions; for example, conflicts between the inductive approach in its historical stance and the deductive rationale adopted in its mechanical world-view, and its emphasis on operability.

After the 50's, when management behaviour became the primary object of marketing interest, when consumers were studied more to understand their buying habit than their consumption needs (Bartels, 1986:32-3), when marketing began to be geared for corporative profit rather than socially collective interest, the EM model was first distorted then subjugated. Its societal perspective has been concealed for the purpose of establishing the marketing ideology (marketing as merely management techniques for business activity). Its socially-historically concern and inductive stance of economics have been undermined by the unquestioning adoption of neo-classical or micro economics; its technical interest has been enlarged and presented as the model *per se*. Hunt and Goolsby (1988:40-2) have described how the functional approach 'fell' when the managerial approach progressed in the name of needs for corporative strategic planning and more sufficiently analytical theories and hence for adopting a more 'professional/managerial orientation'.

So what will be the future of EM systems? Will they, like the phoenix, rise from their own ashes? I believe they will. If marketing is to assume a larger responsibility to society by meeting its collective consumption needs (Bartels, 1983, 1986; Dawson, 1980), if marketing is to provide management techniques for improving human situations (Firat *et al.* 1987), if its technical strength is to employed consciously and explicitly to deal with the technical aspect of balanced marketing activities (see Chapter 9), there seems to be no reason why EM systems cannot have a proper position in the reoriented marketing (see Chapter 7). That is, to conceive, formulate and satisfy human differentiable and contestable consumption needs, EM systems as management techniques realising and improving effective and efficient distribution of consumer goods/services constitute an indispensable part of the marketing institution. The prerequisites for turning this possibility to reality are that the EM model resumes its societal perspective, enhances its technology by incorporating behavioural as well as ethical normative considerations, becomes concerned with philosophical-sociological considerations, reflects on its own partiality, recognises that its serving subject - human beings - have other equally legitimated interests, and, most crucial, positions itself within the systems marketing project for the overall human genuine interests. By doing so, EM systems can have a much brighter future than that conceived for them by the 'mainstream' in the discipline.

Chapter 4

BEHAVIOURAL-BIOLOGICAL SYSTEMS

7.1 OVERVIEW

Approaches treating marketing as behavioural-biological (BB) systems can be represented by the functionalist, the managerial, and the buyer behaviour schools. Emerging after the World War II, although these approaches have different research focuses (the functionalist approach describes aggregated marketing mechanism, the managerial school studies behaviour of the firm, while the buyer behaviour research focuses on individual consumers), they hold a similar behavioural viewpoint and adopt a biological metaphor.

BB systems recognise that marketing activities cannot be adequately explained by economic analysis alone (Cyert and March, 1963; Dichter, 1964; Howard, 1963; Katona, 1953; Mallen, 1963). Rather, they emphasise the social and psychological factors that may influence the behaviour of actors in the marketplace.

In economic models, marketing behaviour is explained by relative price and income distribution. A central belief is that competition brings about allocative efficiency and that supply and demand curves can be derived by means of marginal analysis. Economic models also rest on assumptions about utility maximisation, utility and cost functions, rationality, and perfect information (see for example Henderson and Quandt, 1971). In contrast, the behavioural viewpoint suggests that the crux of marketing is a behavioural orientation (Law and Wensley, 1979:17), which tends to interpret marketing behaviour through human motives, bounded rationality, imperfect information, coalition of objectives, and interplay of power. Along with the behavioural shift, the BB model conceives marketing entities/phenomena as open systems, usually with a biological analogy. Every marketing system operates under significant yet uncertain impact from the environment and is driven by its implicit goal of survival and growth. Hence, the ongoing operation of marketing systems is interpreted through continuous dysfunction, adjustment, regulation, and dynamic equilibrium. The behavioural orientation and the biological metaphor go hand in hand in that the dominant goal unifying marketing systems is survival through exchange with environment and that conflict goals arise mainly over various means to achieve survival (Neergaard and Venkatesh, 1987).

This behavioural-biological turn in marketing study was not accidental. Firstly, just before and after the World War II, when the Keynesian policies were widely implemented to increase demand and consumption to the level of supply and production, there was an urgent need for a better explanation of marketing operating mechanisms than the conventional economic one (Dholakia *et al.*, 1980). Second, during the post-war years, developed countries began to face dramatically increased competition within the global economic system and in home markets, which highlighted the importance of studying competitive rather than domestic, adjustic rather than routine, marketing behaviour (Hunt and Goolsby, 1988). Thirdly, the development of functionalism in sociology, the managerial school in economics, and behaviour theories in social sciences in general, provided the necessary intellectual resources and a suitable atmosphere for such a turn (Sheth and Gross, 1988; Walle, 1984). Finally, the turn was precipitated and boosted by the two studies of American business education sponsored by the Carnegie Corporation and the Ford Foundation (Gordon and Howell, 1959; Pierson, 1959), and the subsequent specific programmes of the Ford Foundation, supporting research in behavioural sciences and quantitative analysis (Grether, 1983). The three most representative marketing systems manifesting the behavioural-biological turn are hereby outlined.

4.2 THE FUNCTIONALIST APPROACH

The functionalist approach in marketing is defined by its founder, Alderson, thus:

> Functionalism is that approach to science which begins by identifying some systems of action, and then tries to determine how and why it works as it does, ... stresses the whole system and undertakes to interpret the parts in terms of how they serve the system (Alderson, 1957:16).

The most distinct feature of the functionalist approach in marketing is said to be its employment of a total systems perspective as an all-encompassing integrating frame of reference. Alderson explicitly recognised the relationship between his work and the general systems theory. He told us that 'Functionalism implies a commitment to what is coming to be known as the total systems approach' (Alderson, 1965:24). Actually, Alderson used the systems concepts of variety, survival and plasticity as the basic theme to cast his core concepts and his whole functionalist enterprise (Glaser and Halliday, 1987). This approach enabled him not only to conceive marketing as a system of structural and dynamic relationships, but also to organise various schools in marketing study into an organised multidimensional scheme (Nicosia, 1968; also recall Chapter 2). Through Alderson's work, the holistic approach has become a fundamental approach in marketing study, which has produced numerous influential projects such as those of Fisk (1976) and Revzan (1968).

Following the tradition from Comte, Spencer, Durkheim, Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown to Parsons and Berton (see Appendix I), Alderson drew upon analogies between marketing systems and biological organisms. He tried first to explain how different parts of marketing systems are related to the whole and to each other; next, to demonstrate that functions performed by marketing structures were essential to the needs of the system, and then, to investigate how systems as a whole could work better (Monieson and Shapiro, 1980). For Alderson, functions determine and modify structures, although structures might, conversely, limit the performance of functions to some extent (Revzan, 1968). The focus of the Aldersonian functionalism is therefore on the system's needs, functions, structures, operations, control, and performance in a marketing context (Dixon and Wilkinson, 1989). The emphasis is placed on the central issue of system survival through adjustment to its environment (Barksdale, 1980). These core tenets have been incorporated into the three fundamental component premises of Alderson's enterprise; i.e., organised behaviour system, heterogeneous market, and the sorting function, which are briefly presented below.

Organised behaviour system (OBS)

Alderson defined an OBS as an ecological system composed of a group taken in conjunction with the environment in which it functions and has meaning. Members of an OBS are not rigidly connected as parts in a machine, neither are they randomly associated as molecules in a gas chamber. Behaviour systems are organised because of the expected benefits, and members cooperate to increase the output of their relationship through serving the overall needs of the system. The expectations of participants are interrelated but not identical, and members may compete with one another for control of the system, or to increase their share of the output. In particular, Alderson postulated that systems do not have goals separate from those of individual members. Rather, systems are considered as the means of expressing and realising the aims of members who make up the association. On the other hand systems performance depends upon co-ordination of participants. Even simple OBSs exhibit some structural organisation to facilitate the direction of effort. The most significant OBSs for Alderson are households and firms, which engage in marketing activities in order to sustain expected patterns of behaviour and/or to search for survival/growth by pursuing differential advantage.

Heterogeneous market (HM)

In contrast to economic models of perfect competition, which assume homogeneous markets, Alderson postulated heterogeneity in both the supply and the demand sides of markets. On the demand side, the OBS (household) is considered to accumulate goods to sustain anticipated patterns of behaviour. It is assumed that the product requirements of each household are different. Therefore, each family enters into the market as a problem-solver, seeking a unique assortment of goods needed to support expected behaviour patterns. On the supply side, the behaviour of the OBS (the firm) is interpreted as efforts to adjust to the differences in product requirements from the demand side. To the extent that they are successful in terms of survival, each business occupies a position (ecological niche), which is in some respects unique, and satisfies some particular segments of demand. In ideal HMs, 'each market segment of demand can be satisfied by just one unique segment of supply' (Alderson, 1965:29). Then logically, the function of the market is to match up the differentiated products of firms with the diverse requirements of households. The market is cleared when each segment of demand has been satisfied, but this never happens in the real world; thus, the market is an ongoing phenomenon (*ibid*:207). The reason for this is that information is the means of clearing HMs and that information is never perfect (*ibid*:30). Price is here treated as just one part of the information flow needed to clear HMs. Households require information about goods available, while firms require information about consumer desires. Since transmission of information is costly, neither needs nor products can be completely identified. Thus, the flow of information determines the efficiency with which the unique segments of demand and supply are matched in HMs.

Sorting

Given HMs, the unique segments of supply and demand are matched by successive sorting transformations. Therefore, the basic function of marketing is the sorting transformation which creates meaningful assortments of goods from random mixtures between demand and supply. Sorting includes both the decisions that firms make in assembling products for the market and the choices that buyers make in selecting goods to satisfy their wants. Alderson refers to the process as 'double sorting' in the sense that seller and customer are searching for each other. Alderson identified four stages in sorting functions. First, *sorting out* represents the breaking down of heterogeneous collections into homogeneous sub-lots to take advantage of economies of production or handling. This is followed by the *accumulation* of homogeneous sets in economically viable marketing units. Third, *allocation* represents the breaking down of the homogeneous collections to meet heterogeneous requirements. *Assorting*, the final stage, is the building up of a heterogeneous supply which matches as closely as possible the heterogeneity of demand. During such process, marketing institutions serve as specialists, performing the sorting functions and contribution to the matching of heterogeneous segments of demand with appropriate segments of supply.

In summary, all aspects of marketing in Alderson were explained in terms of these three basic concepts. Marketing is considered an organised behaviour system, operating in heterogeneous markets, and adapting to diverse market conditions by successive sorting functions. While earlier approaches studied the what, how, who and where aspects, Alderson contributed an explanation of the *why* aspect of marketing mechanism, presenting an alternative way of describing marketing reality. Furthermore, Alderson was conscious of where he was departing from, and where he was going. In his words, 'Marketing as a field of study does not rest comfortably under the label of applied economics. ... Economics as the mathematical logic of scarcity is invaluable for marketers but not sufficient' (*ibid*:302-3). His functionalism has been commonly considered as a substantial behavioural and biological turn in marketing study (Dawson and Wales, 1979; Glaser and Halliday, 1987).

4.3 THE MANAGERIAL APPROACH

While the Aldersonian functionalism followed the tradition of the classical schools, with a common emphasis on describing aggregated market behaviour, the managerial approach shifted the research interest dramatically towards management techniques, individual behaviour, and empirical research (Bartels, 1983).

Taking the firm as the point of reference in its presentation, this approach focuses on the theory of the firm, rather than on demand theory (Anderson, 1982; Kotler, 1967a; McCarthy, 1968). In Kotler's terms, 'theory of the firm provides the starting point for theory construction in the area of marketing programming. The theory shows how a firm oriented toward profit maximisation and characterised by efficient cost management and full information would set its prices (or output) under different conditions of demand and marketing structure' (Kotler, 1971:10). The core belief maintains that the market can be managed and the demand can be regulated for the benefit of the marketer (Sheth and Gross, 1988:14; also see Howard, 1957; Kelley and Lazer, 1958). This belief has been manifested through such influential concepts as the marketing concept, marketing mix, marketing segmentation, product life cycle, market niche, etc., which generally advocate firstly a close attention to customer or user desires, secondly an emphasis on integration or co-ordination of all the firm's marketing-related activities with appropriate planning, and finally a focus upon profit rather than on sales volume.

Firstly, based on the recognition that the supply of products exceeds the conceived demand in most markets and that most supply units are still constrained by the shortsight of production efficiency, the managerial approach proposes that marketers should pay greater attention to the ascertainment of customers' wants and desires before decisions are made regarding production and the whole business operation (Sheth *et al.*, 1988:97). What this assertion contends is a shift in focus from the firm towards the customer. As Mckitterick puts it,

> So the principal task of the marketing function in a management concept is not so much to be skilful in making the customer do what suits the interests of the business as to be skilful in conceiving and then making the business do what suits the interest of the customer (Mckitterick, 1957:78).

Keith names such a shift 'marketing revolution', and suggests that 'marketing begins and ends with the consumer'. He writes,

> No longer is the company at the centre of the business universe. Today the customer is at the centre. ... Our attention has shifted from problems of production to problems of marketing, from the product we can make to the product the customer wants us to make, from the company itself to the marketplace (Keith, 1960:35).

Then Levitt (1960), articulating his concept of 'marketing myopia', argues that every industry must warily scan the horizon for signs of corporate vulnerability, calls for increased sensitivity to the wants of customers as the basic motivation for business effort. Furthering this 'customer orientation', Smith (1956) asserts that marketers should segment the market and strive to develop several different marketing programs in order to more closely match the diverse desires of customer.

The second conceptual breakthrough produced by the managerial approach is the 'marketing mix', which focuses on integrating related functions/activities into well planned corporate strategies and programs. Borden describes the marketing mix philosophy as follows:

> [I]t is essential always to ask: what overall marketing strategy has been or might be employed to bring about a profitable operation in light of the circumstances faced by the management? What combination of marketing procedures and policies has been or might be adopted to bring about desired behaviour of trade and consumers at costs that will permit a profit? Specially, how can advertising and other elements of a marketing program be manipulated and fitted together in a way that will give a profitable operation (Borden, 1965:387)?

Such intention in integration and co-ordination of marketing activity can be seen as based on the holistic notion of systems thinking (Lazer, 1965, 1971). It emphasises continuous adaptation and adjustment to the changing environment (Holloway and Hancock, 1964, 1968). It employs systems techniques in marketing management, assisting decision-making in pursuing optimal combination and in programming of marketing functions/activities (Adler, 1967). It reveals the importance of overall corporate strategic planning and provides means to approach this target (Day and Wensley, 1983; Howard, 1983). Through a tremendous volume of empirical studies, the integration/co-ordination principle has produced fairly comprehensive management techniques to facilitate 'what marketing managers should or could do to run a business more efficiently' (McCarthy, 1968:654). Under the integration/co-ordination scheme, concepts, theories, and methods have also flourished in such specific areas as product decision, pricing, distribution, promotion, salesforce management, market research and planning (Sheth *et al.*, 1988); for example product portfolio (Boston Consulting Group, 1970; Cardozo and Wind, 1980), value chain (Porter, 1980, 1985), profit impact of marketing strategy (PIMS) (Buzzell and Gale, 1987), etc.

Finally, the managerial approach promises to make profit through customer orientation and integration of the marketing process. It is considered that survival as the fundamental objective of organisation is viewed as 'too vague to be of service in resolving difficult company decisions' (Kotler, 1967a). As a result, according to Kotler, profit maximisation is most often cited as the dominant business goal. Kotler provides his own reasoning as to why adoption of profit maximisation is favourable. First, 'profit maximisation is the formal purpose for which companies are established'. Second, 'The competitive pursuit of maximum profits creates the greatest economic welfare'. Finally, 'Profit maximisation provides management with a relatively unambiguous criterion for business decision making in contrast to approaches calling for the simultaneous satisfaction of multiple company goals. Management has only to estimate the expected profitability of alternative courses of action and adopt the course which appears superior in profit terms' (*ibid.*:130). Kotler continues to argue that 'Profits continue to provide the most widely shared and best single criterion for the analysis of decision alternatives' (*ibid.*:132). Following this, Kotler states that 'Profit maximisation shall be used in this book as the major criterion for decision making' (*ibid.*:130). McCarthy also contends that the role of marketing management is to attain maximum profits by finding the optimum combination of decision variables - the '4Ps' (product, place, promotion, and price) (McCarthy, 1960). Actually it is now held in the managerial school that profit maximisation is the central logic driving marketing activities (Powers and Martin, 1987).

To repeat, the emergence, development, acceptance, prevalence and domination of the managerial approach rests on the belief of a customer orientation, an emphasis on co-ordination of company efforts, and a promise of making profit through integrating marketing process. Sheth *et al.* have summarised the contribution of this school in marketing study as: (1) It has identified the key policy issues of marketing practice; (2) It has produced influential management concepts and integrated them into one theory of marketing management; (3) It has provided operational definitions and criteria to examine and pursue marketing function efficiency; (4) It has generated an enormous amount of empirical support in the world of marketing practice; and (5) It is rich because it encompasses all areas of marketing. Based on this, it is further suggested that 'the reputation of the marketing discipline is likely to be enhanced more by the managerial school' than by 'classical' marketing thought (Sheth *et al.*, 1988:105-7; also see King, 1965).

4.4 THE BUYER BEHAVIOUR APPROACH

Along with the booming of the managerial school, the micro managerial interest in regulating the buyer's market through controlling individual behaviour in the marketplace has given birth and popularity to the buyer behaviour approach (Sheth and Gross, 1988:14-5). Besides its micro/individual focus, this school distinguishes itself from economic/mechanical systems in two ways, regarding study of the consumer. Firstly, it consciously incorporates constructs from behavioural and social sciences, and actually builds itself upon the logic of these sciences rather than following the economic discipline only. Secondly, it embraces 'scientific methods' and dedicates itself to logical-empirical research rather than inductive description.

As illustrated in the last chapter, the basic assumption of consumer behaviour in the EM model is that the consumer derives satisfaction from consumption, and that s/he seeks to maximise her/his overall satisfaction within the limitations of her/his income level in relation to a given set of prices. It is further assumed that s/he acts rationally and that s/he is able to judge her/his tastes and preferences for all products under consideration. Recognising the limitation of this maximisation and optimisation rationale, consumer behaviour scholars such as Katona and Duesenberry turn to behavioural sciences, more consciously to understand, predict and influence buyer behaviour (terms from Gardner *et al.*, 1980:253). Katona's (1953) 'economic psychology' approach first takes into account psychological factors that affect buyer decisions, such as personal motives, attitudes, and expectations. Duesenberry (1949) then takes an 'economic sociology' approach, arguing that buyer behaviour theory must recognise the social character of consumption patterns since many consumer decisions are based upon a desire for esteem in the eyes of others. Following this lead, the buyer behaviour approach insistently borrows and incorporates concepts, theories, and methods from the behavioural sciences, especially from psychology, sociology and anthropology (Gardner *et al.*, 1980; Sheth *et al.*, 1988).

In this context, the main hypothesis of the buyer behaviour school is that the consumer can be conceived as a psychological entity, acting within social and sociocultural conditions. Firstly, potential response from the consumer to the stimulus in the marketplace is considered to be governed not only by utility features of the products (what they do) but also by their total symbolic meanings (what they mean) (Gardner and Levy, 1955; Levy, 1959). Then, the purchase decision is viewed as determined by the consumer's wants or desires which are in turn derived in part by her/his cognition, motivations, and personality (Bauer, 1960; Dichter, 1964; Howard and Sheth, 1969). Furthermore, an individual's personal characteristics are considered to be shaped largely by social groups such as family and friends (Arndt, 1967; Bourne, 1957; Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1955). Finally, behind these forces lie other causal influences which involve long-standing social-structure and cultural traditions (Levy, 1966; Linton, 1973). Thus, the influencing factors in buyer behaviour are studied first from a psychological perspective (focusing on individual factors) such as cognition (perception, learning, attitude, cognitive dissonance, risk taking, etc.), motivation and personality theories (e.g., Cox and Rich, 1964; Engel, 1963; Evans, 1959), secondly from a sociological perspective (focusing on social factors) which includes group influencing, family decision making, opinion leadership, and diffusion of innovation models (e.g., Kassarjian, 1965; Rogers, 1962), and finally from a sociocultural perspective (focusing on sociocultural factors) that covers social class, culture and sub-culture viewpoints (e.g., Carman, 1965; Levy, 1978).

As such the buyer behaviour approach has generated flourishing specific constructs such as brand loyalty, attitudes, involvement, perceived risk, joint decision making, buying centres, etc. Out of concern that the school remained fragmented and unorganised, attempts have also been made to derive a comprehensive model from the above-mentioned wide range of 'middle-range' theories. The most widely quoted models include Andreasen (1965), Ncosia (1966), Engel, Kollat and Blackwell (1968), Howard and Sheth (1969), Hansen (1972), Markin (1974), and Bettman (1979). Although these models hold their respective emphases (Andreasen on attitude formation and change, Nicosia on decision-making process, Engel *et al.* on the black box model, Bettman on cognition, etc.), together they present information processing as the most salient feature of buyer behaviour - the purchasing decision-making.

Take the Howard and Sheth (HS) model as an example. Basically, the HS model concentrates on a particular field of consumer behaviour - the brand choice decision-making in repetitive purchase. It is based on several assumptions. Firstly, buying behaviour is rational within the limits of the buyer's cognitive, learning capability and limited information. Secondly, brand choice behaviour can be observed in certain standard ways; that is, a given stimulus may result in a given response. Thirdly, the event or stimulus can be seen as the input to the 'brand choice behaviour system' and the purchase/not-purchase behaviour as the output. Next, based on learning theory, the HS model suggests that given a drive (such as hunger) and the perception of a cue (such as an advertisement of food), the individual may make a response (purchase), which if reinforced or rewarded, may lead to learning (repeat purchase). Once the buyer is motivated to buy a product class he is faced with a brand choice decision. The elements of his decision therefore include (1) a set of motives, (2) several courses of action, and (3) decision mediators, by which the motives are matched with the alternatives. Over time, in the face of repetitive brand choice decisions, the buyer simplifies his decision process by storing relevant information and routinising his decision process. Numerous empirical projects have been carried out to test and verify these comprehensive models which are considered as forming the 'backbone' of the school (terms from Foxall, 1986:9).

In addition to theory borrowing and model building, the buyer behaviour approach also builds up its method/technique armoury. The first category of its research methods were borrowed from behavioural sciences, such as focus groups, depth interviewing, thematic apperception tests and other projective techniques (used in motivation research), as well as cross-sectional mail and telephone survey techniques (used in attitude and psychographic research) (Ferber and Wales, 1958; Ferber, 1974; Holloway, 1967). The second category includes traditional operations research and management techniques, mathematical models, such as stochastic process, liner programming, and optimising theory (Bass, 1969; Bass *et al.*, 1961; Blattberg and Sen, 1976; Kotler, 1971; Massy *et al.*, 1970; Peterson and Mahajan, 1978). The third category focuses on computer simulation in buying decision process and choice mode (Bettman, 1979; Nicosia, 1966).

To sum up, the buyer behaviour approach has produced a wide range of concepts, hypotheses and research techniques. It has also generated the largest amount of empirical research in marketing study. Given this rapid growth and progressive expansion, some marketing theorist are optimistic for the future of this approach. They claim that 'the behavioural marketing schools have been largely responsible for increasing the scientific sophistication of the marketing discipline, with the buyer behaviour school in particular deserving much of the credit' (Sheth and Gross, 1988:18).

4.5 APPRECIATION

It is now possible to conclude that BB systems outlined in this chapter generally share a behavioural perspective and a biological systems metaphor. Specifically speaking, the Aldersonian functionalist approach adopts the tradition from Spencer to Parsons, analogising marketing with biological/ecological systems (Monieson and Shapiro, 1980:7), and drawing heavily on the behavioural sciences for many of its conceptualisation (Sheth *et al,* 1988:88). In the case of the managerial school, it stands mainly upon behavioural theories of the firm (Anderson, 1982), emphasises adaptation and adjustment of the firm to the 'uncontrollable' environment (Howard, 1957; Kotler, 1967a; McCarthy, 1960). As to the buyer behaviour approach, it adopts the behavioural stance at the very beginning (Katona, 1953), and places its whole enterprise upon a 'stimulus-organism-response' analogy (Foxall, 1986). While the functionalist doctrine provides a frame of reference for marketers to explain and justify their marketing activities (Dixon and Wilkinson, 1989), the managerial school translates the framework into an operational and implementable 'paradigm' (Neergaard and Venkatesh, 1987), and the buyer behaviour approach responds to a vital need to understand and manipulate 'the characteristics and buying habits of target customers' (terms from McCarthy, 1968:vi). Through such mutual reinforcing among framework, strategies and methods, the BB model has been constituted and presented as the 'mainstream' or marketing study *per se* (Dholakia and Arndt, 1985; Firat *et al.*, 1987).

The intention of this section is to analyse the ideology of BB systems in their recent form, and to assess the impact of their current practice on society in general and on the discipline in particular. This will be undertaken in terms of three aspects; i.e., their regulative orientation, their managerial perspective, and their methods bias.

4.5.1 The Regulative Orientation

It is reasonable to argue that the Aldersonian functionalism and hence BB systems firmly based their doctrine upon the structural functionalist tradition of from Comte to Parsons. From its beginning, this tradition has been dominated by the use of biological analogy for the study of social situations. Radcliffe-Brown himself noted that a limitation inherent in the use of organismic analogy is the imposed conservatism (cf.: Burrell and Morgan, 1979:56), in the sense that building upon the concepts of structure, function, system needs and homeostasis, the biological analogy lends itself to social regulation and to reaffirm existing orders. Similarly, in the field of marketing, although BB systems recognise and admit that conflict and change exist (through their concepts of coalition of goals and adaptation/adjustment), they strategically define such phenomena as abnormal and hence to be smoothed off. Therefore, BB systems implicitly adopt a perspective which emphasises stability and cohesion, not evolution and emancipation (Bagozzi, 1976). Walle has revealed the intellectual relationship between the functionalist doctrine in marketing and the structural functionalist tradition in social studies, revealed their regulative nature. He writes,

> Alderson's model was homeostatic (static, self-regulating) and was developed from models which emphasised how the *status quo* was maintained, not how social and institutional change occurred. ... [I]n sociology theorists such as Talcott Parsons represented these orientations while in anthropology such ideas were explored by A. R. Radcliffe-Brown and his students. Both emphasised certain functionalist ideas of social solidarity which can be traced to Herbert Spencer and, later, to Emile Durkheim. ... Stemming from Spencer, such models tried to explain social structure in terms of the functions they perform and how they maintained social systems. ... The fact that Alderson always strove to help marketing institutions change for the better does not totally cancel out the hidden agendas implicit in Alderson's functionalism (Walle, 1984:78).

The regulative and conservative orientation in BB systems can be most easily traced in Alderson's perception of systems structure and function, and his viewpoint on change and disequilibrium.

Structure and function

Alderson claimed that his approach looks at a systemic structure to determine the *present* relationship among parts, then lays the groundwork for bringing about an improvement in these relationships (Alderson, 1965:11). Obviously, systems structures and functions in Alderson were taken as given (Sheth *et al.*, 1988:88), while the issue of historical origin and evolution received limited attention (Abraham, 1973:403; cf.: Monieson and Shapiro, 1980:7). Reflected in the buyer behaviour approach, the structure of consumer needs are conceived and actually concealed as given without prior inquiry (Firat, 1987); while in the managerial school, it is argued that the needs and wants of consumers 'should be served, rather than shaped' (Pratt, 1965:98). Alderson also contended that an organised element in a marketing systems will survive if only it fulfils the functional expectations of the larger system of which it is a part. Here, Alderson firmly committed his ideal to Parsons's 'imperative systems needs'. Even though Alderson explicitly rejected the system's overall objective separated from individual goals of its members (see Section 7.2), he actually implicitly downplayed individual goals for the interest of superior system's need of survival. This is why in Alderson (1957, 1965) individuals were studied in terms of their behaviour rather than their needs. As to the whole BB model, marketing theory has been unduly restricted by a narrow and coincident view that the ultimate objective of a theory is to understand how firms and households attempt to solve problems in the marketplace, i.e., 'viewing marketing as a how-to-do-it area of study' (Dixon, 1964:28).

Alderson asserted that systems structures are determined by systems functions. Yet, what Alderson ignored is that if an observer interprets structure and behaviour simply as part of an on-going homeostatic system, criticising that structure and behaviour is extremely difficult (Walle, 1984:79). From a critical point of view, 'By studying an institution only in terms of its function within its own society the social scientists intended to avoid unscientific value judgement. ... "The function is" was often translated [into] "the function should be"' (Friedman, 1964; cf.: *ibid.*:79). This 'translation' from *is* to *should be* is distorting because at best it confuses the distinction between human technical interest with other (practical and emancipatory) interests, and at worst exhausts and subjugates the legitimacy of other interests. By doing so, BB systems in the recent form constitute themselves as the should-be marketing study whole, and identify other possible models/approaches as redundant or heterodox. Ultimately, most of us in the discipline have accepted by default that the managerial school should be taught as the introduction course for students and hence granted it the 'mainstream' position (Bartels, 1983).

Change and disequilibrium

As friends, both Parsons and Alderson viewed behavioural systems as being in equilibrium and functioning properly when the elements of the system were in perfect adjustment with one another and to the environment. Behaviour systems, however, could become dysfunctional (in terms of Parsons) or in disequilibrium (in terms of Alderson). Following Parsons, Alderson invoked a pathology rather than morphogenesis of systems, and emphasised the system's tendency toward stability or 'pattern-maintenance'. Disequilibrium could become chronic, forcing the system into fundamental changes including dissolution (Parsons, 1960:327), or 'toward final extinction in the manner of a human being with a terminal illness' (Alderson, 1965:308). To Alderson, change is immanent, resulting from the inherent dynamic of the marketing behaviour systems. However, this dynamism, according to Alderson, has to be accompanied by a derive toward systemic equilibrium if the system's survival is to be assured. A system without equilibrium could not operate or even survive. For Alderson, disequilibrium is essentially pathological. He stated,

> [T]he several basic elements [of a structure] will be in precise adjustment if the systems is in equilibrium. There are several ways in which such systems can go into a state of disequilibrium. The pathology is somewhat analogous to the pathology of the human body. ... [When it is in a state of disequilibrium] a system is running out of

control, and unless control can be established, it will eventually disintegrated as a system (Alderson, 1964:97).

To sum up, the current orientation of BB systems is essentially conservative, geared to a reaffirmation of *status quo* and unable to deal with change, geared to the imperative system's needs which are usually defined by the powerful and those who pay most, rather to facilitate individual needs and autonomy (see also Mokwa *et al.*, 1980; Matsusaki, 1980). To society, it reaffirms the given structure of consumption needs and hence social relations (Morgan, 1992); to marketing study, it legitimates the 'tyranny' of the dominating paradigm (terms from Arndt, 1985a).

4.5.2 The Managerial Perspective

Both the classical approaches (see the last chapter) and BB systems focus on the technical interest of marketing. However, their orientations towards technical interest are dramatically different. In the classical approaches, the commitment is geared to collective social needs, concerned with the aggregated mechanism facilitating effective and efficient movement of goods from the point of production to the point of consumption, pursuing optimal allocation of the nation's resources according to the nation's appropriate consumption needs. In contrast, in BB systems, the technical interest is geared to the profitability of the firm, reflecting a preoccupation with the actions of managers (Holbrook, 1985b:145.5). The efficiency ideal is no longer committed to the well-being of the society, but to 'a business' (McCarthy, 1968:654). In the managerial school, 'marketing management's essential question is: what should we do to ensure that our brand is selected over the competition?' (cf.: Fennell, 1982:8). McCarthy openly declares that the managerial school sees marketing situation and buying habits of target customers 'through the manager's eyes' (McCarthy, 1968:vi). In the buyer behaviour theories, the research focus is, too, dictated by things that matter to managers - such as purchasing decisions, buying commitments, and brand choices (Holbrook, 1985b:145.5). Kassarjian and

Robertson, in their influential book, *Perspectives in Consumer Behaviour*, describe the typical concern in buyer behaviour research as this:

> Let us consider, for example, a housewife walking down the aisle of a supermarket. Suddenly remembering she is out of soap, she places three bars of facial soup in her shopping basket. This apparently simple event involved her in several decisions. Why did she decide to act? Why did she choose a soap rather than a detergent, or cleansing cream - or even Kerosene? Why did she select a facial soap? European women often cleanse their faces with eau de Cologne. Why did she select a perfumed and artificially coloured soap rather than a pure soap product? Why was one particular brand purchased instead of a similar 'beauty soap'? And why did she purchase three bars rather than one bar, a dozen bars - or a gross? (Kassarjian and Robertson, 1968:2).

Clearly, the focus of research on consumers is on their behaviour, more precisely their purchasing habits to be manipulated, rather than their needs to be satisfied (Bartels, 1983, 1986). Tucker reveals the fundamental nature of the BB model in these words:

> The consumer was always considered as a consumer at the micro level. That is, he was always studied in the ways that fishermen study fish rather than as marine biologists study them (Tucker, 1974:31).

Belk reaches the same conclusion. He writes that

> Attention has been focused on how to 'hook' buyers rather than on understanding consumer behaviour, since how and why people buy has more immediate and concrete implications for marketing management than do the questions of how and why people consume as they do (Belk, 1984:163).

Although the BB model claims that it can be used by all business, social policy maker, and consumer (Kassarjian and Robertson, 1981:xix-xx), it has recently been recognised that the discipline has become extremely unbalanced in favour of the interest of business and marketer, and has constrained the research focus to the 'dog food level' issues (Bartels, 1983; Belk, 1987b; Holbrook, 1985b; Karlinsky, 1987). As a result, the harmony between macro and micro interests, between social mechanism and management techniques, has gone. The original societal concern of marketing has been distorted and eclipsed. In Stidsen's words, 'the modern version of the societal orientation to the study of marketing has become a variant of the managerial orientation' (Stidsen, 1979:384).

Furthermore, within the managerial perspective, efficiency is no longer concerned with the operation of societal mechanism for moving goods from production to consumption. Rather, efficiency is defined and practised exclusively in terms of the firm's profitability (or sometimes expressed in related jargons such as market share, market leading position, return on investment, etc.). It is not intended here to deny that businesses in modern society (no matter whether in the capitalist Britain or in the Marxist China) may make profit through instrumentally using marketing management techniques. What is criticised and rejected here is the assertion that in business decision making, 'management has *only* to estimate the expected profitability of alternative courses of action and adopt the course which appears superior in profit terms' (terms from Kotler, emphasis added, see Section 3.3), because such a narrow managerial assertion has eclipsed and subjugated other accountabilities of marketing which inherently originated in the classical marketing approaches and have frequently been insisted on by Arndt (1978a, b), Bartels (1983), Dawson (1980), Fisk (1974a), Stidsen (1979), and many others.

It should be noted that the predomination of profit maximisation in marketing is both distorted and distorting. Powers and Martin have revealed, based on historical events and relevant literature, that the early ideal of the marketing concept contrasts sharply with the current prevailing simpler notion of profit as the measure of success of the marketing concept. They point out:

> Based on the current perception of the marketing concept, many would assume that profit, especially in the short term, is the primary goal. ... [T]he early marketing concept literature does not support such a view. A longer term perspective aimed at both consumer benefit and firm viability was considered by the early writers (Powers and Martin, 1987:177; also Hollander, 1986).

It is only when marketing was picked up by business for its own narrow interests (Holbrook, 1985) that marketing became 'completely manager oriented', became 'operationalised [in] the marketing effort through manipulation of the marketing mix' (Neergaard and Venkatesh, 1987:174), and became closed. Being distorted, on the other hand, the BB model distorts social life by defining marketing in merely economic terms. Gorz (1989) called this 'economicisation'. The resulted predomination of 'profit maximisation' in marketing provides a good illustration of the Habermasian colonisation thesis (see Chapter 7). Power and Laughlin have summarised the colonisation process as follows (their argument can be translated to describe the same process in marketing by simply replacing the words 'economic system' with 'marketing'):

> In this sense the process of the colonisation of the lifeworld by narrowly instrumental system imperatives is also a process of 'systematically distorted' communication. The lifeworld is a primary communicative resource which has become colonised by the functional dictates of system and subsystem. An example might be an economic system in which profitability, not necessarily maximised, is the predominant goal. Such a goal tends to negate and inhibit institutional possibilities for questioning and justifying itself. This means that the lifeworld is no longer capable of communicatively steering a complex economic systems which has generated its own functional goals. ... Such complex systems advance their own limited operational imperatives at the expense of others, with urgent consequences for social and global welfare (Power and Laughlin, 1992:124).

4.5.3 The Methods Bias

'Methods bias' here denotes the operation and tendency in current BB systems in two senses. First, BB systems have led the discipline to focus exclusively on developing empirical methods at the expense of other broader and important *aspects* of inquiry. Secondly, BB systems reject and imprison alternative research *approaches* for the domination of the 'single scientific method'.

Since the death of Alderson in the mid-60's, and especially since the interest of marketing shifted to micro managerial orientation and individual buyer focus, the emphasis of marketing study has been directed from theoretical to empirical research, from basic to applied thought development, and from its broader to a narrower commitment (Bartels, 1983, 1986). It is not the intention here to deny the necessity of technical methods in social practical disciplines. The point is, in BB systems, especially in the managerial school and buyer behaviour approach, the one-sided pursuit of applicable instrumental methods has concealed the importance of theory construction and the search for a broader perception of the marketing mechanism. Eventually, this process has reduced the whole inquiry of marketing knowledge to the inquiry of methods only. 'It involves a reduction of the whole to one of its parts - a reduction which, in the case of marketing, turns out to be convenient from the standpoint of available and popular research methodology' (Stidsen, 1979:388).

In the managerial school, 'we have been experiencing a technological revolution of sorts, with most of our energies being devoted to the discovery and application of increasingly sophisticated mathematical and statistical procedures. This revolution has been a necessary step forward for the discipline, but it has perhaps directed our attention away from similarly important inquiry into the conceptional foundations of marketing' (Lutz, 1979:3). In the buyer behaviour approach, it has been revealed that two dimensions have underwritten the discipline. 'The first is the dominance of satisfying the managerial as opposed to the disciplinary (meta-theory) needs. The second is the dominance of acquiring empirical knowledge (facts and figures) about the consumer as opposed to the theoretical foundations of consumer behaviour' (Sheth, 1979:421). A leading scholar in the field claimed that

> Despite the availability of consumer behaviour theories and models, the impetus and rationale underlying most consumer behaviour research seems to rest on little more than the availability of easy-to-use measuring instruments, the existence of more or less willing subject populations, the convenience of the computer, and/or the almost toy-like nature of sophisticated quantitative techniques. Little reliance is placed on theory, either to suggest which variables and aspects of consumer behaviour are of greatest importance and in need of research or as a foundation around which to organise and integrate findings. It is still true that nothing is so practical as a good theory (Jacoby, 1978:88).

The second aspect of the methods bias is the view that there is a single scientific method, the logical-empirical (LE) method (Calder and Tybout, 1987, 1989; Hunt 1976a, 1983, 1989b; Muncy and Fisk, 1987). Much criticism has been levelled at this domination of the LE philosophy in social sciences in general and in marketing in particular (see for example Kuhn, 1972; Burrell and Morgan, 1979; also Arndt, 1983b and Peter, 1991). It is argued here that at this moment in the discipline, such domination is most obviously embedded in BB systems. In the functionalist school, Alderson believed that the most important goal of science is increasing the empirical accuracy of 'laws or principles', and asserted that functionalism uses a combination of empirical research techniques and deductive reasoning (Schwartz, 1963:101 and 105). In the managerial school, the LE paradigm 'assumes that marketing relations have a concrete, real existence independent of the observer and a systemic character producing regularities in marketing behaviour. Marketing systems are viewed as being equilibrium-seeking', which is driven by 'the marketing management tradition centring on the profitable manipulations of the 4 Ps in the marketing mix (Kotler, 1976a, 1980; McCarthy, 1960)' (Arndt, 1983a:46). As to the buyer behaviour approach, it has been found to be micro/positive (Hunt, 1976b; Sheth *et al*, 1988:109), in that it relies on 'standardised and well-tested instruments based on empirical research' (Sheth *et al.*, 1988). It concentrates on seeking to generate predictive and explanatory models of the sorts of people who will buy particular products or service and how they can be persuaded to do so (Morgan, 1992). Together, BB systems have shifted the focus of the discipline from explanation and understanding to prediction and control (Firat, 1985b:317). They have been using methods of theory verification almost exclusively, even in situations where theory discovery was more appropriate (Desphpande, 1983:106). They have rejected the legitimacy of any other approaches but 'the scientific method' borrowed from natural sciences (Arndt, 1985a, b). In short, they became closed.

The impact of the methods bias in the discipline is fourfold. Firstly, it has imprisoned other possible research styles, and blocked more socially concerned perspectives. This point is fairly straightforward and has come in for strong criticism in the marketing literature (see for example Anderson, 1983, 1986; Dholakia and Arndt, 1985; Firat *et al.*, 1987; and Peter, 1991).

Secondly, the methods bias has not gained and increased the reputation and competence of marketing; rather, it has produced severe damage to the discipline. Heede (1980) found that most research in marketing study is constricted by a kind of standard 'style sheet', producing only papers published in 'professional journals' but which have never been and will never be applied in practice. In the case of the buyer behaviour approach, it has been asserted that too large a proportion of the consumer research literature is not worth the paper it is printed on or the time it takes to read (Kollat *et al.*, 1972; Jacoby, 1978; Sheth, 1979). The view, 'give me facts about the consumer and don't confuse me with *your* theories', has so far, the criticism holds, discovered only two laws; that is: (1) Those who don't need a product or information, consume or use it; and (2) Those who need a product or information, do not consume or use it (Sheth, 1979:422 and 424). In this situation, Heede concludes that marketing study is in stagnation (Heede, 1980).

Thirdly, the methods bias has produced and maintained great inconsistency and tension between the aims, methods, theories, and philosophies of BB systems. In the buyer behaviour school, on the one hand, it is claimed that the buyer as human being has free-will, his rationality is bounded, and his ability to acquire information is limited (Katona, 1953). On the other hand, the school builds its models about buyer behaviour upon the assumption of a rational and hence predictable buyer, and manipulates the model with LE methods (Howard and Sheth, 1979; Sheth, 1979:415). In the managerial approach, on the one hand it is claimed that the firm must adapt to 'uncontrollable' social, political, ecological forces for its imperative goal of survival, yet, on the other hand, profit maximisation is constituted as the formal, unambiguous, most widely shared and best single criterion for marketing decision-making. Anderson found that the received marketing wisdom maintains a great tension between its philosophical methodology and its ontology (Anderson, 1982).

Finally, together with the regulative orientation and managerial perspective, the methods bias in BB systems has reproduced and reinforced the marketing ideology. By gearing researchers towards the narrow inquiry for instrumental methodologies only, it limits the inquiry scope to certain selected phenomena in the marketplace while ignoring others. By expanding its 'professional' or 'functional' power, it constitutes managerial techniques as marketing *per se*. By their methods bias, BB systems do not undermine but reproduce a particular framework where social relations are ignored or treated as 'objective variables'. Through the practice as such, marketing as management techniques captures the position to reframe social issues and human affairs in terms of profit, efficiency, operationality and testability (Morgan, 1992; Power and Laughlin, 1992). The result is clear: 'Marketing has remained essentially a one-dimensional science concerned with technology and problem solving' (Arndt, 1985a:21).

4.6 A POSSIBLE FUTURE

Both the EM model and BB systems are derived by human technical interest, to satisfy consumer needs. In terms of measurement, prediction and control, BB systems have borrowed and developed more sophisticated techniques and hence hold more instrumental/manipulating power, compared with EM systems. However, while classic systems dedicated themselves to efficiency in satisfying the collective needs of society as a whole, BB systems have gradually shrunken the dual nature of marketing into narrowly-defined and pursued management techniques with a conservative orientation, a managerial perspective, and a methods bias, doing so in the name of professionalisation and discipline maturing. As a result, in the field of marketing study, (1) certain variables are taken as givens; (2) a managerial-technological orientation dominates; (3) the discipline develops only micro theories; and (4) not the consumer, but only the buyer, or more precisely only repetitive purchase decision-making in brand choice, is studied (Firat, 1984a).

It should be pointed out that the purpose of the assessment and critique in this section is not to condemn BB systems *per se*, but to draw attention to the limitations of the model in its recent form and the consequence of its pervasive and uncritical acceptance, as well as our selective practice of them. It is not intended here to reject micro level study *per se*, but to recall that without consciously locating themselves onto a macro framework, micro studies with an individual focus will not be able to deal with the many questions regarding assumptions, constraints and input variables, but will accept them as givens, without an understanding/recognition of their history, state, and other possibilities. It is not intended here to reject logical-empirical philosophy and methods *per se*, but to make it clear that such tradition is only one approach, though an important one, among many alternative research paradigms, and that it is good at dealing with some human situations but not adequate in others. It is not intended here to reject management techniques in marketing *per se*, but to assert that besides the firm's profitability, marketing techniques and marketing as a whole have other accountabilities, since if marketing is believed to have ability to influence the consumer (obviously BB systems hold this belief), it therefore unavoidably produces impacts on consumer and hence on society. It is not intended here to reject technical interest *per se*, but to contend that human beings have other equally important and legitimated interests, which marketing can either support or damage. And finally, it is not intended here to reject BB systems *per se*, but to suggest that BB systems should reflect on their partiality, their current self-imposed selectivity, and method-aim tensions. It is such critical reflectivity, in the view of this thesis, that will lay the future for BB systems and the discipline of marketing study as a whole. It is clear that since human beings have an interest in improving their consumption situation, they logically need marketing techniques to deliver the required goods and services effectively and efficiently. It is this kind of human interest which legitimates marketing techniques. However, it is equally clear that what is required is not just any kind of marketing technique, but a kind that is both willing to enhance itself through self-reflectivity and willing to admit and give respect to other equally legitimated marketing accountabilities.

Chapter 5

INTERACTIVE-CULTURAL SYSTEMS

5.1 OVERVIEW

Approaches conceiving marketing as interactive-cultural (IC) systems are presented in this chapter through the comparative, the interaction/network, and the interpretive consumer research schools. While these schools hold different focuses (the comparative school studies societal phenomena, the interaction/network approach concentrates on the organisation/inter-organisation level, and interpretive consumer research is involved with individual consumer experiences), they together share an interactive-culturological perspective in studying market/consumption phenomena, and thus present an 'interpretive turn' in the field (terms from Sherry, 1991).

The research domain of IC systems differs sharply from that of the EM and BB systems outlined in the last two chapters. EM and BB models are basically concerned with the *do* questions in their inquiry (what to market, who to market, where and how to market, etc.). In contrast, IC systems mainly investigate the *be* questions (what are the differences and similarities between marketings in different social-cultural settings, what position and linkage an entity has within a marketing network and how this is enacted and maintained, what is the meaning behind consumer actions and how it can be experienced and interpreted, etc.). Answering these questions, IC systems give attention to ontological and epistemological issues besides methodological ones, hence opening avenues for another level/aspect of reasoning in the marketing scholarship.

From a social-cultural perspective, the emergence of interpretive inquiry in marketing study is a reflection of the wider social-cultural turbulence and changes during the last couple of decades, which can be linked to the societal unrest and questioning of values (Mager and Helgeson, 1987), linked to a Kuhnian 'scientific revolution' in social sciences (for example the evolution of sociology into a multiple paradigm science (Ritzer, 1975)), and linked to the democracy and involvement movement in management science (e.g., Toffler, 1983). As a social institution, marketing cannot isolate itself from this 'mega trend' (term from Naisbitt, 1982) but must inquire into the values, feelings, meanings and ways of life of its serving subjects (term from Arndt, 1986b).

Even from a managerial point of view, the interactive-cultural perspective as a supplemental alternative in marketing study is inherently needed. The core notion of the marketing concept - 'make what the customer wants to buy' - entails that a goal of research is to stand in the customer's shoes and appreciate real-world influences from the customer's perspective, which is essentially an assignment that requires marketers to study need-occurrence and the satisfaction mechanism in their everyday contexts and manifestations (Fennell, 1985). For this purpose, the reductionistic S-R (stimulus-response) or S-O-R (stimulus-organism-response) models in EM and BB systems cannot help much (Ryan and Bristor, 1987; also see Chapters 3 and 4).

From a critical systems point of view, the interpretive turn is inherently necessary. Given that human beings hold an indispensable interest in mutual understanding and relationship maintenance, and given that the subject matter of marketing is to perceive, formulate and satisfy human collective yet differentiated consumption needs, it is natural for marketing to understand these needs by grasping the feeling and meaning of actors in the marketplace before goods and services are produced, organised, and delivered. For such purpose, the instrumental logic and reasoning of EM and BB systems is inadequate whilst interpretive/hermeneutic inquiry must be put on the agenda.

As usual, on the one hand assumptions and assertions among different approaches will overlap on some aspects, while on the other, theories based on the same set of basic assumptions will display variations to some extent. In the case of IC systems, the comparative school places more emphasis on cultural aspects; the interaction/network approach incorporates more from political science and concerns more consciously ontological matters; while interpretive consumer research concentrates more on exploring naturalist/hermeneutic ways of knowing. This said, the three representative marketing systems manifesting the interpretive turn are hereby outlined.

5.2 THE COMPARATIVE APPROACH

Comparative study has been a long tradition in social sciences since the time of Tocqueville, Durkheim and Weber (Smelser, 1976). A comparative analyst in sociology puts it like this:

> Thinking without comparisons is unthinkable. And, in the absence of comparisons, so is all scientific thought and all scientific research. No one should be surprised that comparisons, implicit and explicit, pervade the work of social scientists and

> have done so from the beginning: comparisons among roles, organisations, communities, institutions, societies, and cultures (Swanson, 1971:145).

The same thrust occurs in marketing study; for example Boddewyn states that 'the need for comparison in marketing rests primarily on the realisation that all research is comparative, explicitly or implicitly' (Boddewyn, 1966:149). Thus, 'comparative marketing was an early focus of theory development in marketing' (Tharp and Cundiff, 1989:369). More recently, it has been suggested that comparative study 'may become one of the discipline's most productive new avenues of inquiry' (Sherry, 1991:561).

This avenue of inquiry has been defined as follows:

> The comparative approach is [the study of marketing] concerned with the systematic detection, identification, classification, measurement and interpretation of similarities and differences among phenomena (Boddewyn, 1966:49; also 1969, 1981).

> ... comparative marketing is concerned with different marketing systems of mankind, with the interpretation of different yet comparable elements. ... Its inquiry may begin with the differences of marketing practice in various national settings (Bartels, 1964:197).

Since its popularity and booming in the 1960's, however, comparative marketing has not resulted into a unified tradition. This is compatible with Ritzer's (1975) argument that paradigms differentiate not only scientific communities but also sub-communities, and is parallel to the development of comparative study in the field of sociology in which exist at least the sharply different Durkheimian positivist and Weberian interpretative strands (Smelser, 1976). Actually, in a state-of-the-art review study, Tharp and Cundiff (1989) identified at least five strategies in employing the comparative approach in marketing.

The first is to build a conceptual understanding of general premises of marketing itself, concerned with such questions as what are marketing institutions, who participates in marketing activities, what are the tasks of marketers, etc., with a societal focus on the general structure of markets and their relationship to economic development (e.g., Bartels, 1977; Boddewyn, 1966; Cox, 1965; Dholakia, 1984; Mojer and Hollander, 1968; Shapiro, 1965). The second concentrates on identifying environmental factors as determinants of specific market structures, and investigates how economic or cultural environment might influence general market structures and their development (e.g., Arndt, 1972; Cundiff, 1965; Douglas, 1971). The third studies different national marketing systems in terms of effectiveness and efficiency, and tries to produce normative judgements about whether particular marketing systems do their jobs well and why they do or do not succeed in meeting their goals (e.g., Buonofina, 1987; Emery *et al.*, 1980; Harrison *et al.*, 1974; Kaynak, 1982; Moyer and Hollander, 1968; Slater, 1968, 1969; Slater *et al.*, 1969; Sorensen, 1980). The fourth sees comparative marketing to be useful as a basis for input into public policy, proposing recommendations for policy-makers to improve the effectiveness of marketing systems (e.g., Buonofina, 1987; Etgar, 1983; Galbraith and Holton, 1955). The last compares domestic-foreign marketing phenomena, describes parameters for managerial decision-making in different contexts, and serves the information needs of private business, typically multinational firms (e.g., Buzzell, 1968; El-Ansary and Liebrenz, 1980; Green and Langeard, 1975; Sekaran, 1981; Wind and Douglas, 1982).

Facing these diverse streams in comparative marketing, Tharp and Cundiff found a lack of clarity of purpose. They claim that

> What is needed is the move from an empirical basis to a conceptual one, without the necessary rigor that would be requisite in other types of non-comparative research and concept development. Such rigor in linking the deductive process of gathering empirical data and then forming generalisations based on such data, will always

> be hamstrung by the weaknesses of empirical comparative marketing data. Nevertheless the field cannot go forward without broader thinking reflected in comparative marketing concepts (Tharp and Cundiff, 1989:368).

It is therefore an argument of this chapter that such needed 'broader thinking' can be built upon three related recognitions, which are briefly outlined below.

First, various comparative strategies can be broadly classified into two categories: a technical one and a hermeneutic one. The first one employs the comparative approach for instrumental interest in designing and reforming the market/marketing-systems, such as the designing of effective and efficient food distribution channels for developing countries (now perhaps equally crucial for the ex-Eastern-block countries) (e.g., Galbraith and Holton, 1955; Slater, 1969), as well as in formulating corporate marketing programmes such as decision-making in standardisation/differentiation issues for international marketing activities. This usage concentrates on identification, classification, measurement, explanation and evaluation, with an emphasis on formulating generalisations, hypotheses and 'laws' through empirical data and testing (e.g., Boddewyn, 1966; Jaffe, 1976). Driven by either societal or corporate concerns, this kind of comparative marketing is aiming at, and characterised by, technical interest in manipulating marketing variables for agreed, or at least clearly defined, objectives, the ideal of which is effectiveness and efficiency. The second kind of comparative marketing follows the interpretive/hermeneutic turn in social sciences for the purpose of perceiving and understanding human differentiated needs in different contextual settings (places, times, sectors, cultures, etc.), to explore heterogeneous value systems and to analyse why they occur, thus moving towards a more comprehensive understanding of human consumption (Sherry, 1991).

Secondly, without denying the necessity and legitimacy of employing comparative marketing for technical purposes, it can be argued that the potential of the comparative approach in marketing lies *more* in its intention and capability to facilitate human communication and mutual understanding, and therefore to serve human hermeneutic interest. In other words, comparative marketing is primarily a cultural-interpretive enterprise. The reason for this is simple. First, criteria for comparison, even in terms of merely effectiveness and efficiency, cannot escape from but are linked to variations in values, goals, and expectations of marketing in heterogeneous cultural settings (Tharp and Cundiff, 1989:367). Secondly, the process of dealing with values, goals, and expectations itself is also cultural-interpretively bound. In the terms of Bartels, it 'not only appraises culture differences but interprets experience which are foreign personally, institutionally, linguistically, and nationally', thus 'more than the usual subjective factors influence it [comparative marketing]' (Bartels, 1964:383).

Finally, comparative marketing should go beyond the dimension of comparison between nations (Bartels, 1963; Bucklin, 1977; Fisk, 1981; Kaynak, 1986), sectors/industries (Green and Langeard, 1975; Moyer and Hollander, 1968; Wadinambiaraatchi, 1965), geography (Costa, 1989), behaviour (Dawson, Stern and Gillpatrick, 1989; Sommers and Kernan, 1968) and history (Dixon, 1980; Moyer, 1964; Zif, 1980). What is suggested here is that, if the comparative approach is primarily a cultural-interpretive enterprise, then not only culture/sub-culture (ethnomethodological) but also *heterogeneous perspectivism* (*Weltanschauugen*) comparison dimensions must be incorporated.

Ethnomethodology focuses on the culture dimension, dealing with the stock of commonsense knowledge (Schutz, 1964) which is (1) acquired through social interactions and (2) shared by interactors in the same culture (Berger and Luckman, 1966; Schurtz and Luckman, 1974). In marketing terms, consumption needs are originated, felt, perceived, shared and expressed through human day-to-day interaction. In ethnomethodology, similarities in value, meaning and need conception tend to outweigh differences within a culture or sub-culture (Hirschman and Holbrook, 1992).

On the other hand, perspectivism (Mannheim, 1936, 1952; cf.: Wolff, 1975:39) extends the concept of ideology to include alternative meaning systems within subcultural ideologies, going beyond the scope of merely nations or cultures (Williams, 1965, 1973, 1977, 1979). This line of thinking asserts that individual world-views or *Weltanschauungen* will vary systematically across genders, races, occupations and generations, thus knowledge structures differ across various social groupings in modern society. For such heterogeneous groupings, complex societies display many possible 'social realities'. Accordingly, their consumption needs to be satisfied are also heterogeneous, varying and differentiated. From such systematic variations in the points of interaction between people from different social groupings, each perspective will develop its own distinct ideology of consumption needs and its viewpoint on what is good or bad in marketing, what and how marketing should deliver, and so on. Both are concerned with value and meaning systems, and hence culturral matters; ethnomethodology emphasises similarity within specific culture/sub-culture context, while perspectivism focuses more on differences among heterogeneous social groupings and individual world-views.

To sum up, if the marketplace is believed to be heterogeneous and segmented (Alderson, 1957, 1965), if marketing is to 'make what the customer wants to buy' (the marketing concept), and if comparative marketing can harmonise differences and similarities in marketing practice *only* when differences are accorded more emphasis against prevailing ethnocentric ideologies (Bartels, 1963), then the prior intention of comparative marketing should be understanding and comparing meanings of actions in the marketplace and consumption in different social-cultural settings. The dimension of culture, and especially heterogeneous perspectives, in addition to the dimensions of nations and sectors, must be firmly put on the comparative agenda.

5.3 THE INTERACTION/NETWORK APPROACH

Conventional marketing theories, focusing on organisational/interorganisational levels (e.g., distribution channel research), perceive marketing organisation and activity as either economic or behavioural systems (see the last two chapters). The former viewpoint applies an economic foundation to analyse how distribution channels could be structured more efficiently, emphasising costs, functional differentiation and channel design (e.g., Bucklin, 1966; Cox, Goodman, and Fichandler, 1965); while the latter borrowing heavily from social psychology and conventional organisation theory, identifies and dimensionalises major variables influencing channel structure and behaviour, and seeks to understand how channel members can effectively adapt and adjust to competitive environments (Alderson, 1957, 1965; Arndt, 1983a; Stern and Reve, 1980). Common to both conventional approaches, organisations are seen as 'things' separable from the environment, whether machine- or organism-like; marketing activities are viewed as goal-seeking, whether those goals are efficiency and effectiveness or survival and growth; technical/instrumental interest is considered as the ultimate norm, whether in terms of optimisation or adaptation.

The interaction/network (IN) approach, emerging during the interpretive turn in marketing study and developed mainly in Europe, provides a sharply different perspective in marketing organisational/channel research. There are three main thrusts in the IN approach. First, the marketplace can be conceived as relational networks, within which flow power, information, money and utilities. Secondly, marketing entities have identity only when interacting with and interpreted by interaction counterparts. And finally, the subject matter of marketing management is understanding, learning, mutual adaptation, relationship maintenance and network dynamics, rather than the 4Ps programming and the like. These thrusts in turn stem from several distinct observations and assumptions: (1) Both buyer and seller are active participants in the marketplace (while the marketing mix approach implies an active seller and a passive buyer); (2) The relationship between buyer and seller is frequently long term, close and involving a complex pattern of interaction (while the received wisdom assumes discrete 'one shot operation' buying behaviour and unstable relations); (3) The links between buyer and seller, which can involve both conflict as well as co-operation, often become institutionalised into a set of roles that each party expects the other to perform, which requires significant adaptation between interacting counterparts (departing from the conventional idea of one-way adaptation to the environment); and (4) Instead of material or financial exchanges, mutual evaluation and the associated relationship underlying the exchanges are more fundamental (going beyond decision-making for optimisation or survival) (IMP Group, 1982, 1990).

The interpretive nature of the IN approach can then be grasped through its core concepts of network, interaction, position, and network dynamics.

Network

A network is viewed as consisting of positions occupied by marketing entities and links manifested by interaction between positions (Thorelli, 1986:444). Networks might be conceived by individual actors at a particular time point for a specific marketing task. Positions and relationships constituting a network may not exist in the 'real world' waiting to be identified or found. Instead, they might be created by actors through conception and interpretation. As such, a network has no absolute boundary or structure. 'An observer can identify a network of connected interaction relations between firms engaged in industrial activities - an industrial network. In principle, such industrial networks are unbounded, but the observer (or a specific actor) may, for analytical purpose, set suitable boundaries. ... All such boundaries are arbitrary. Different actors will draw different boundaries. They are a result of perspectives, intentions, and interpretations' (Hakansson and Johanson, 1988:459-60). Thus any perception of boundary and network itself cannot be judged by a unique universal standard. Rather, it is self-sufficient and can be evaluated only by its perceiver, by the underlying world-view, and by the marketing task it is supposed to fulfil.

In such networks, each transaction may be termed an *episode*. As transactions occur over time they form recurring patterns. These patterns then result in ties of dependency, forming the structure of the network (Hakansson, 1982; Mattsson, 1985).

Interaction

Interactions are streams of acts among network positions involving trusts, expectations and adaptations, which existing and undertaken within an overall 'atmosphere' (IMP Group, 1982). Within networks, firms interact with each other in order to influence and adapt counterparts. Since interactions are performed by human beings who have intentions when interacting, actors make subjective interpretations of the meaning of those interactions and relationships, as well as base their actions on this meaning (Giddens, 1975). The actor in an interactions needs not only to turn her/his intention into acts, but also to understand and interpret what intentions lie behind the acts of her/his counterparts. Thus, every interaction is based on intentions and is interpreted from both sides. Both sides have their own view of the same interaction, even if these views are not necessarily consistent (Hakanson and Johanson, 1988). What an actor sees as exchange of products may be viewed by another as communication or by a third as a demonstration of power (Klint, 1985, redescribed by Hakanson and Johanson, 1988).

From this point of view, interactions between actors are seen as a series of tests and learning experiences by two or more parties involved. During such testing and learning, actors gradually and continuously learn more and more about each others' ways of viewing and doing things as well as how to interpret each other's acts. Over time, parties come to trust in each other (Blau, 1964) and become mutually oriented (Ford *et al.*, 1986).

Position

A position constitutes a location of power to create and/or influence networks (Thorelli, 1984, 1986). At each point of time the firm has certain positions in networks which characterise its relations to other marketing entities (Johanson and Mattsson, 1988). The commitment, or the objective, of a marketing entity is thus to seek, occupy, and maintain, appropriate positions in networks. A position a firm occupies in a given network depends on three factors: the domain of the firm, the position of the firm in other networks, and the power of the firm relative to other participants in the focal network. Among these factors, power is the central focus in positioning analysis, which can be obtained from, or determined by, five aspects: economy, technology, expertise, trust, and legitimacy (Thorelli, 1986).

Network dynamics

Links, or interpositional relationships, constitute a reflection and recognition of interdependence, which in turn constitutes the essence of the culture of a given network. Thus, marketing management (or network management) can be considered for new entrants as entering and positioning in networks, while for those existing members as repositioning or leaving networks. Within networks, firms must continuously co-ordinate and adjust their links with other members. Since organisation in a network is enacted rather than given, existing only when being perceived and recognised by others, its performance is therefore interpreted and evaluated mainly in terms of understanding, meaning, trust, expectation and mutuality, by interacting counterparts, rather than merely on its own terms of profitability or market share and the like (which is sharply different from the managerial school). For the same reason, marketing effectiveness can be better understood and interpreted in mutualistic terms of participation and positioning in the network, rather than in economic terms of maximisation and optimisation, or in behavioural terms of survival and growth.

As a result, the focus and commitment of marketing strategy planning is to facilitate framing, establishing, developing and maintaining links with other positions in networks (IMP Group, 1982). Accordingly, investments might take forms of, and be target towards, continuous mutual adaptations in product, technology, knowledge and finance, resulting in increasing credibility and trust and a long-term comfortable atmosphere for interaction with other network members (Wilson and Mummalaneni, 1986).

To sum up, in the interaction/network approach, marketing activity and marketing organisations are no longer viewed as closed machines or open organisms, rather, as culture/politics interplayers within social networks. Marketing management focus has moved beyond the consideration of resource allocation or internal arrangements, towards establishing, maintaining and developing long-term mutual relationships with counterparts within dynamic network surroundings. With this commitment, marketing entities depart from the goal of profit and/or survival towards participation and positioning. Marketers have realised the importance of mutual understanding, expectation and mutuality. Marketing establishes its new dimensions of power, influence, and trust, besides the conventionally recognised dimensions of product, price, promotion, distribution and service (Thorelli, 1986).

5.4 THE INTERPRETIVE CONSUMER RESEARCH

Interpretive consumer research as an approach is a fruitful outcome from the self-reflection and critique on the prevailing positive tradition in the field.

During the 1980's, three crucial limitations of the positive tradition in consumer research were identified and criticised. First, it was found that consumer research has been narrowly defined and constricted. What has been labelled consumer theory and research is more accurately the study of buyer behaviour from a micromarketing perspective, even though buying is only a small fraction of consumption behaviour and consumption is in turn merely one small aspect of human life. 'We have been so concerned with consumer micro behaviours such as examining an advertisement or choosing a brand, that we have ignored whole categories of significant consumer macro behaviours such as exploring a lifestyle or choosing a consumption level' (Belk, 1987a:1).

Secondly, it is argued that consumer research has not been directed for its own sake towards the interest of consumers, but geared merely to the one-sided purpose of the firm's managerial manipulating interest in profit-seeking. Conventional consumer research had nothing to say in supporting the consumer to participate in the marketplace or to consume properly in her/his own right. Instead, consumer research has always focused on how to hook buyers (Arndt, 1976; Holbrook, Lehman and O'Shaughnessy, 1984; Olsen, 1982; Tucker, 1974).

Thirdly, the criticism has been raised that the methods bias in the field tends to treat consumers as 'micro chips' or 'things' rather than as human beings (Belk, 1987a, b; Morgan, 1992), and then to manipulate consumers using the 'scientific method' borrowed from the natural sciences. Therefore, it has blocked consumer research from becoming a 'science of human behaviour which is sensitive to the perspectival, reflective, negotiable, relational, and processual nature of group life' (Prus, 1987:66). In fact, some have argued that a discipline of consumer research does not yet exist (Belk, 1987b; Ryan, 1986).

Based on such critique, consumer researchers then consciously set off to broaden the research domain (focusing on ontology), explore alternative research methods (focusing on methodology), and probe the necessity for alternative ways of knowing (focusing on epistemology), bringing forth a completely new paradigm to the field of consumer research, and hence centrally reflecting the interpretive turn.

First, consumer researchers began dramatically to penetrate the limited scope of buyer behaviour, extend research attention and energy to cover a much wider range of consumption phenomena. The inquiry has intervened at least in such areas as: consumer mythology or mythology of consumer culture (Levy, 1981; Leymore, 1987, 1988), hedonic consumption behaviour (Hirschman and Holbrook, 1982; Holbrook and Hirschman, 1982), gift giving and exchange (Pandya, 1985; Sherry, 1983; Sherry and McCrath, 1989), comic consumption (Belk, 1987c), homeyness conditions (McGraken, 1989), consumption symbolism (Belk, Bahn and Mayer, 1982; Hirschman, 1986b; Hirschman and Holbrook, 1981; Holbrook, 1987b; Mick, 1986, 1987, 1988a, b), ideograph in art consumption (Holbrook, Belk and Grayson, 1989), Christmas consumption culture (Belk, 1989; Hirschman and LaBargera, 1989), values in advertising (Holbrook, 1987c; Pollay, 1986, 1987a; Sherry and Camargo, 1987), consumption codes in cinema and television programmes (Hirschman, 1987b, c, 1988), ritual consumption (Arnould and Wallendorf, 1988; Levy, 1978; Rook, 1984, 1985; Tetreault and Kleine III, 1990), power and gender in fashion codes (Solomon and Anand, 1985), popular culture (Belk, 1989), consumption vs. self-actualisation (Kilbourne, 1987; Moorman, 1987), etc. These researches usually address broader and more fundamental dimensions in consumption. Typical questions usually asked include: Is materialism healthy? How do consumers make trade-offs between money, durables, and discretionary nondurables? What roles do consumption objects play in interpersonal relationships? What roles does consumption play in self identity, self maintenance, and self enhancements? What is marketing's influence on materialism and satisfaction in life? (Belk, 1984a, b), etc. These research fields and focuses have definitely moved beyond the micro-managerial-instrumental scope, opening a wide avenue to search for a more basic and rich understanding of consumer behaviour for its own sake.

Secondly, consumer researchers are throwing out the methods bias, breaking the constriction of the information-processing or stimulus-organism-response model, going beyond the 'scientific method' of positivism, sophisticated falsificationism and the like, to explore alternative interpretivistic, humanistic, naturalistic methodologies.

A brief and certainly not exhaustive list of the alternative approaches can include anthropology (Belk, 1987c; Belk, Sherry and Wallendorf, 1988; Douglas, 1976; Heisley and Holmes, 1987; Sherry, 1983, 1988a, 1989), ethnography (Levy, 1981; McCranken, 1989; Sanders, 1987; Sherry, 1988b), phenomenology (Churchill and Wertz, 1985; Fennell, 1985; Mruk, 1985; Wertz and Greenhut, 1985), existential phenomenology (Thompson, Locander and Pollio, 1989), semiotics (Hirschman, 1989b; Holbrook, 1987a, 1988, 1989; Holbrook and Grayson, 1986; McQuarrie, 1989; Mick, 1986, 1988; Sherry and Camargo, 1987; Umiker-Sebeok, 1987), structural analysis (Hirschman, 1988), literary criticism (Stern, 1988a, b, c, 1989a, b), cultural criticism (Sherry, 1986, 1987b, c), historiography (Lavin and Archdeacon, 1989), sociology (Arndt and Uusitalo, 1980; Nicosia and Mayer, 1976; Wallendorf and Zaltman, 1984), etc. These alternative approaches generally hold a hermeneutic (Hudson and Ozanne, 1988; O'Shaughnessy, 1985; Ryan and Bristor, 1987; Thompson, 1991), culturological (McCracken, 1986, 1988; Sherry, 1986, 1989; Wallendorf and Arnould, 1988), and interpretive (Hirschman, 1986, 1987a, b, 1989a; Holbrook, 1988a, b) perspective, urging researchers to understand consumption meaning and consumer feeling through actual situationalised context experience together with consumers. For example Thompson contends that 'social scientists do not need to somehow become detached observers of the social world. Rather, social science is seen as a *human activity* for understanding other human activities' (Thompson, 1991:67).

At the same time, consumer researchers insist on demonstrating the legitimacy of their 'alternative ways of knowing'. It is firstly argued that consumer research as a study of human behaviour must employ methods different from the 'scientific method' in the natural sciences. Hirschman (1985, 1986a) names the necessary new ways of knowing 'humanistic inquiry'. Churchill and Wertz postulate that verifiability of consumer behaviour knowledge should depend on 'whether another researcher can assume the perspective of the present investigator, review the original protocol data, and see that the proposed insights are indeed possibilities of interpretation that illuminate the situation under study' (Churchill and Wertz, 1985:554). It is also contended that 'in the end, the value of findings depends on their ability to help others gain insight into what has been lived unreflectively' rather than on the production of 'objective truths' (*ibid*). As Thompson puts it,

> By fully embracing the interpretive nature of understanding, a hermeneutic orientation cannot promise to consumer researchers absolute certainty or an aperspectival 'truth'. It can provide, however, a means for understanding what is perhaps the most basic and intriguing of all human phenomena: how one human being can come to understand the world of another (Thompson, 1991:67-8).

Together, these messages from interpretive consumer researches argue for a broader based perspective of the scientific enterprise, and for mutual acceptance of different ways of conducting consumer research.

Interpretive consumer research has produced heated debates, empirical projects, and extensive documentation. Yet it is still developing rapidly and taking shape dramatically. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to summarise its diverse and multi-vocal images (Hirschman, 1991a:209). Nevertheless, its developmental direction is not impossible to identify: interpretive consumer research will stand on a hermeneutic-cultural perspective, compare research findings across social and historical boundaries, shift to discourse-centred investigation and hermeneutic approaches in understanding meaning, and therefore holds the potential 'to balance and integrate the discipline of consumer research, as well to balkanise it even further' (Sherry, 1991:572).

5.5 APPRECIATION

The interpretive turn in marketing study is too substantial and influential to be ignored. A critical marketing theorist describes this new development in the field thus:

> In marketing, the rise of the interpretive school has been highly significant. It has sought to place the issue of meaning and the constitution of meaning within marketing settings firmly on the research agenda. It has drawn inspiration from the hermeneutic tradition, particularly as developed in social anthropology. In its challenge to the predominant positivist paradigm the interpretive approach has also sought to distance itself from managerialism ... (Morgan, 1992:147).

In this section, our analysis and assessment of the IC model will focus on three aspects: its broader scope of study, its interpretivistic employment of culturological perspective, and its particular form of pluralistic attitude.

5.5.1 The Broader Scope

The research scope or domain of IC systems is broad in the sense that it extends the research focus to redeem macro-societal dimensions, transcends the managerial orientation, and breaks out from the technocratic ideology.

The macro perspective is inherently embedded into the comparative approach. Bartels (1963, 1964), Cox (1965), Boddewyn (1965), Douglas and Craig (1986), Dholakia and Dholakia (1984), Dholakia and Sherry (1987), Kumcu and Firat (1988) and Shapiro (1965) all assert that comparative study is essentially of societal significance. Bartels (1963:3) repeatedly argues that the justification for approaching a comparative marketing analysis can be founded only upon a social standpoint. Shapiro (1965:400) contends that the prior commitment of comparative research is to probe such topics as the role that marketing plays in a particular society, the present stage of marketing development, and the nation's principle marketing problems.

Douglas and Craig (1986:93-4) direct the comparative attention to examine how marketing theories and concepts vary or are expressed in different societal contexts. Dholakia and Sherry (1987:119) suggest comparative marketing to study the ways in which marketing catalyses development, affects the socio-political environment in which it is embedded, acts as an agent of acculturation, and evolves within the context of a world system. Kumcu and Firat (1988) also emphasise the role of marketing in societal development in different societal settings.

Even interpretive consumer research, the focus of which is generally grouped/ungrouped individuals, intends to study its subject matter from a macro-societal perspective. Belk (1987a) challenges consumer research so far as limiting the scope to the micro level, and advocates researching 'macro consumer behaviour'. He contends that 'macro consumer behaviour concerns aspects of consumer behaviour that are likely to have little interest to the decision making of a marketer or an advertiser, but have great interest to members of society and to their individual and collective well-being' (Belk, 1987a:1). Firat *et al.* (1987), Hirschman (1991) and Sherry (1991) also put forward such concern. Actually, consumer research has produced empirical projects with macro-societal orientation, for example Arndt and Uusitalo's (1980) 'Backward Segmentation by Consumption Style'. Sheth and Gross (1988) have concluded that most recently, marketing has begun to shift its emphasis and perspective back to aggregated market and consumer behaviour.

Much has been said on the managerial interest as a predominant orientation recently in the field. During the interpretive turn, IC systems consciously challenge this predomination and seek a new orientation. Firat *et al.* have evaluated such development as follows:

> [They] generate knowledge that pertains to the consumption experience of individuals, households, and communities, regardless of the direct consequences of such experiences for market exchange or buying-selling processes. ... They are questioning the

validity of research done solely for consulting purposes for the marketing organisations. They are further arguing that marketing management implications of their research should not be a criterion of evaluation of their work (Firat *et al.*, 1987:xv).

Anderson (1983), Arndt (1976), Belk (1987a), Cox (1965), Holbrook, Lehman and O'Shaughnessy (1984) also argue that for marketing to contribute to or be taken seriously as a science, research and theory must also focus on the non-managerial aspects of marketing phenomena.

IC systems in practice have developed along this direction. For example, Bartels's (1963) comparison of wholesale systems in various societal settings, Galbraith and Hulton's (1955) study of distribution systems in developing counties, and the consumer behaviour *Odyssey* documented by Belk (1991) and many others. The interaction/network approach, focusing on interorganisational relationships among marketing agents, may be considered as still corporate management oriented, yet it is definitely shifting away from the profit-seeking/market-share or survival-growth objectives towards meaning/value sharing and relationship maintenance.

The movement of IC systems away from instrumental interest and hence transcending the technocratic ideology in marketing study is also apparent. Bartels (1964:198-9) argues that 'until it is recognised, however, that the essential characteristics of any marketing systems are social rather than technical, the full significance of this new type of study may not be appreciated'. He thereby associates the comparative marketing approach firmly with a 'social standpoint'. The interaction-network approach throws out profit-optimisation or goal-seeking objectives, focusing rather on mutual expectation, meaning interpretation, value sharing, and relationship maintenance. Interpretive consumer research concentrates on understanding and interpreting consumption meaning and behaviour through naturalistic experience. It is worth noting that for IC systems, departing from instrumental interest does not mean discarding empirical research. In contrast, most interpretive marketing projects depend on empirical experience to obtain meaning. Essentially, interpretive approach is considered and conducted as empirical in the sense that 'it is empirical, assuming that by empirical one means studying some phenomenon in a manner that attempts to be true to its "essence"' (Prus, 1987:66), and that 'in the root sense of the term which refers to that kind of evidence that is given through experience' (Churchill and Wertz, 1985:550).

Together, the broadening of scope in IC systems has forced marketing study to concern itself with basic assumptions in terms of ontology, epistemology and methodology, the outcome of which has been outlined in previous sections. This process is crucial and significant for the future of marketing study. As demonstrated in previous chapters, for its own proper development and eventually for its legitimacy, any social practical science must undertake self-critique, address broader issues, and be concerned with meta-level reasoning. In this sense, the broadened scope of IC systems not only provides alternative ways of knowing and practice, but also contributes sounder legitimacy for the discipline.

5.5.2 The Cultural Perspective

The study of culture as a social phenomenon in marketing study did not begin with IC systems. More conventional marketing theories have placed cultural phenomena as one of their research domains (Arndt, 1986b; Levy, 1978; also see Table 5.1). However, IC systems are distinctive because firstly they treat culture not merely as research object but also as research perspective, and secondly they establish in marketing study that research approaches or researchers are not to escape or keep distance from particular cultural standpoints, but to reflect on and make explicit the existence and impact of such standpoints.

As indicated in Table 5.1, traditional marketing study treats culture as one of internal variables and/or environmental forces. In such studies, purposes are to assist marketers in re-allocating internal resources effectively and efficiently, and in reconstructing (if possible) organisational culture, in order to accomplish marketing programmes in the short term and/or to survive and grow in the long run. The interest is fundamentally technical/instrumental in the sense that the end of marketing is not problematic and hence 'culture' is employed as one of marketing means or mechanisms towards that end, or seen as constriction influencing the way in which marketing approaches its ends. In other words, culture is conceptualised as 'things' or 'objects' to be researched and manipulated (see for example in Holloway and Hancock, 1964, 1968, 1974; Howard and Sheth, 1969; Kotler, 1967a, 1980; McCarthy, 1962, 1968).

Table 5.1 'Culture' in marketing study with different perspectives

Perspective	*Positive functionalism*	*Structural functionalism*	*Hermeneutic interpretivism*
Denotation of culture	Environmental factors	Internal variables	Root of entity
Concept of culture	Culture as an instrument serving human biological and psychological needs	Culture as an adaptive/regulatory mechanism uniting individuals into social structures	Culture as a system of shared cognition and meanings
Example focus in research	Cross-cultural comparison for multinational strategy	Corporate culture for vitalising organisations	Cognition/ belief and symbolism/ meaning in marketplace/ consumption behaviour
Research commitment	Task accomplish-ment through resources allocation	Survival/growth through adaptation/ adjustment	Mutual understanding/ relationship maintenance through interaction/ learning

(Developed from Arndt, 1986b:128)

In contrast, in IC systems, culture as a research perspective is epistemologically related to the interpretive doctrine (Arndt, 1986b; Hirschman and Holbrook, 1992; Sherry, 1991). In IC systems, culture is not considered as a set of things, but as an ongoing interpretive process that is to provide a rich description of lived experience, free from natural science prejudices (Belk, Sherry and Wallendorf, 1988; Hirschman, 1986a; Hudson and Ozanne, 1988; Holbrook and O'Shaughnessy, 1988; Thompson, Locander and Pollio, 1989). As an interpretive research perspective, culture 'should question the taken-for-granted assumptions as well as raise havoc with the usual ways of "seeing" and understanding market phenomena' (Joy, 1988:389). Thus, culture is not merely an internal variable to manipulate or an environmental force to adapt to, but more significantly, a way of seeing which leads to understanding of assumptions and meaning among marketers and others. The purpose of probing such 'ways of seeing' is no longer to assist manipulation but to 'understand and interpret human actions as a function of feeling, purposes, intentions and goals, including those of which s/he is unaware' (Ryan and Bristor, 1987:191). This kind of interest in the cultural perspective has directed the comparative approach to seek understanding of goals and expectations of marketing in different societal setting and segments (e.g., Bartels, 1964), the interaction/network approach to assist value sharing and relationship maintenance among marketing participants (e.g., IMP Group, 1982, 1990), and interpretive consumer researchers to experience and interpret the meaning of consumption from the viewpoint of consumers (e.g., Belk, 1984a, 1987a). In short, the purpose of employing culture as a research perspective is to help marketers to 'gain insight into what has been lived unreflectively' (Churchill and Frederick, 1985:554).

Through the interpretive turn, marketers come to the recognition that understanding always depends on the cultural tradition or viewpoint of the person who understands (Bartels, 1964; Hirschman and Holbrook, 1992). Hence, 'researchers cannot step outside of their historical context to view the world from an unsituated perspective' (Thompson, 1991:66). Rather, 'one's own beliefs and world-view invariably and inevitably enter the hermeneutic act and contribute to the interpretation' therefore we have to accept 'the utility of preconceptions or prejudices' which is one of the necessary 'conditions of understanding' named by Gadamer (1975) (Hirschman and Holbrook, 1992:89). Therefore, the prerequisite of marketing study is not to require researchers to detach from their inescapable cultural perspective or world-view, or to keep distance to any standpoint so as to become 'neutral' or 'objective' , but to urge them to explicitly state their assumptions, cognitive aims, and also to provide appropriate evaluative criteria (Anderson, 1986, 1988a, b, 1989; Thompson, 1990).

5.5.3 The Pluralist Orientation

Taking up the interactive-cultural perspective will inevitably leads one to the recognition that world-views are socially-historically bound and hence could be different, because 'the study of alternative cultural ways raised havoc with our own ways of "seeing" and loosened some of our own taken-for-granted assumptions of human nature and social and cultural realities. ... Once we recognise that we live in as much of a culturally-constituted world as others, it is possible to begin to discuss substantive differences as well' (Joy, 1988:389; also Marcus and Fischer, 1986) (actually this is the exact original inspiration of the comparative marketing approach, see Bartels, 1963, 1964).

However, understanding 'different ways of seeing' can only be facilitated and supported by 'different ways of knowing' because 'the human realm was considered to be distorted rather than truthfully disclosed by exact mathematical language and naturalistic reductionism' (Churchill and Frederick, 1985:550). If we accept that purpose, perspective and methods in research should be consistent (see Chapter 2), if we are to break out from the methods bias (see Chapter 4), then it is not surprising that during the interpretive turn marketing researchers have directed great enthusiasm and energy towards reflecting on and exploring the discipline's ontological, epistemological and axiological stands. It has been illustrated in previous sections, and there is no need to repeat it here, that to demonstrate their own legitimacy, interpretive marketing researchers have challenged the orthodox tradition, questioning its positivistic assumptions and logic (also see Chapter 8). The result is that IC systems have actually broken the 'paradigmatic tyranny', welcoming to *any* kinds of marketing theories, and have therefore fostered a particular form of pluralism (e.g., Arndt, 1985a, b; Hirschman, 1985; Hirschman and Holbrook, 1991; Hudson and Ozanne, 1988; Sherry, 1991) (for analysis of this form of pluralism see Chapter 8).

In summary, IC systems have produced a broader study scope, incorporated an interpretive-cultural research perspective, and established their own form of pluralism, which has its own significance in marketing study, and thus greatly enriched the discipline.

5.6 A POSSIBLE FUTURE

The interpretive-hermeneutic turn in marketing study represented by IC systems is celebrated and welcome, because it provides marketers with necessary philosophical and methodological insights to seek a natural understanding of the market and consumption behaviour, and because it has broken down the domination of one-sided interests, methods, and ways of knowing. From a critical systems point of view, this development is highly significant and necessary. As human beings have a practical interest in communication and mutual understanding (Habermas), and as marketing is a human activity to satisfy human contestable consumption needs and desires (Bartels, 1983, 1986; Firat *et al.*, 1987; Fisk 1986), interpretive/hermeneutic approaches and hence IC systems are a necessary and indispensable part of marketing science. Therefore their significance and importance should not be a question.

What might be in question, also from a critical systems point of view, is, to what extent IC systems are sufficient. As illustrated previously, IC systems so far are relativistic in nature. They stop at granting equal weights to all research approaches, yet do not offer any light on how to appreciate and to choose between different research approaches for specific marketing situation and task at hand. IC systems lack an in-depth historical dimension in their inquiry. When pursuing natural understanding of consumption meanings, they see various consumption needs and desires as given and equally valid, but fail to address how these consumption needs and desires are constructed and shaped or how they might be different. IC systems also fail to incorporate adequate sociopolitical theoretical resources. Though they criticise alienated materialism trends such as conspicuousism and hedonism in consumption behaviour (for example Hirschman and Holbrook, 1982), they are unable to see how these consumption trends relate to power. IC systems are not systemically critical in the sense that though they criticise technocratic ideology they fail to unveil the broader economic-social relations that produce and reinforce such ideology. IC systems are not systemically self-reflective, because they do not go further to question their own partiality and possible limitations. All these weaknesses (and also the strengths outlined previously) remind us of the similar situation of soft systems thinking in the systems movement (see Appendixes I and III).

The limitations of IC systems have actually been manifested in, and have produced impact to, recent marketing study. In this regard, Morgan presents us an example: the current debate about advertising as a 'distorted mirror' in modern commercial society (Morgan, 1992; also see Holbrook, 1987 and Pollay 1986, 1987a). In the debate, Pollay found that advertising as a mirror of dominant ideology in society is both distorted and distorting. It is distorted since only certain values and lifestyles are attached to display. It is distorting because its effects are inescapable and profound, reinforcing unintended consequences. Pollay thus urges marketers to reflect on such unintended consequences. On the other side of the debate, Holbrook is uncomfortable with such a critical idea. Holbrook counterposes a 'pure' and 'comprehensive' hermeneutic view, which maintains that consumers as social actors are not merely passive recipients of manipulatory messages, since they can create and appreciate consciously and properly their own values from advertising. Obviously, Holbrook's hermeneutic stand prevents him from seeing the possibility that people can be misled through the manipulation of systematically distorted communication, for example the dark side of commercial advertising (which reminds us of the debate between Gadamer and Habermas).

From the above we can come to a statement that IC systems are significant and indispensable in conceiving various meanings of consumption needs and desires but are not sufficient on their own to seek systemic understanding of and to tackle the wide range of issues related to such needs and desires. As a valuable complemental alternative to conventional research approaches, IC systems should be encouraged and further developed. Yet it is equally important to be aware of their partiality and present limitations. Therefore, we conclude this chapter with a quotation from a critical marketing theorist:

> Hermeneutic analysis is certainly a progressive step in the analysis of marketing in sofar as it breaks with the problematic of positivism and the endorsement of materialism, but in itself it is not sufficient. It is necessary to foreground the way in which meanings are socially constituted, and this requires an appreciation of the transformation of social relations and the role of marketing in that process (Morgan, 1992:148-9).

Chapter 6

HISTORICAL-EMANCIPATORY SYSTEMS

6.1 OVERVIEW

There has recently emerged a developing line of thinking in the discipline of marketing that perceives marketing as historical-emancipatory (HE) systems. Both this line of thinking and the interpretive turn (outlined in the last chapter) are outcomes developing from the critique of the micro-managerial-positivist tyranny. Compared with the flourishing interactive-cultural systems, HE systems seem to be relatively slow comers (which again reminds us of the similar situation of SST and CST in the systems movement; see Appendix III). However, the development of HE systems is persistent and substantial.

This chapter will present HE systems through the historical, the radical, and the critical approaches. Together, HE systems provide marketers and citizens with a historical and sociological perspective to investigate marketing phenomena. Instead of taking market structure and consumption patterns as fixed or given (i.e., 'The phenomenon is because it is'), HE systems study marketing phenomena against a longer time span and a wider societal context, probing how those structures and patterns are sociohistorically shaped and reproduced and for whose interests. HE systems intend to develop capability for marketers and citizens to reflect on their situation as well as their hidden assumptions, and hence help marketing to resume its broader mission assigned by society and history, that is, to understand, formulate and satisfy differentiated and contestable consumption needs of members in society.

While economic-mechanical and behavioural-biological systems concentrate on the *do* questions (e.g., *how* to meet consumer needs), and interactive-cultural systems focus on the *be* questions (e.g., *what are* those needs), HE systems inquire into the *why* questions (e.g., *why* consumption needs are shaped and presented as such and what they *ought to* be). From this point of view HE systems can be seen as an indispensable part of a proper and adequate marketing science, in that they are enriching our understanding of marketing in a holistic rather than reductionalist sense; that is, towards a more rich and thorough understanding of marketing as such, rather than narrowing it within certain dimensions.

Again, while sharing a common historical-sociological perspective, different H/E systems hold different emphases to some extent. The historical approach focuses more on how market-structure/consumption-patterns are formed and transformed; the radical school tries more to probe the social-economic relations behind and producing market-structure/consumption-patterns; while the critical research concentrates on freeing marketers, consumers and citizens from manipulation, distortion, domination, and traps of whatever kind. HE systems are hereby outlined.

6.2 THE HISTORICAL APPROACH

It is increasingly realised that the received wisdom in marketing study is ahistorical since it simply lacks a well-developed ontological and epistemological awareness of time, change, and context (Firat, 1985a, b, 1987b, 1988a, b, 1989; Fullerton, 1987a, b, 1988). While the phenomena which it attempts to explain are dynamic and characterised by complex flux, orthodox marketing study presents and treats them as 'frozen'. Generally, the bulk of contemporary marketing thought takes for granted an essentially stable marketplace, fixed consumption needs and repetitive marketing activities (Stewart and Punji, 1982; Wind and Robertson, 1983). Along with the statistic perception of an unchanging reality, ways of knowing this reality - marketing models - are presented as if valid everywhere, at all times (Dholakia *et al.*, 1980). Furthermore, research results from varied dates are used and quoted, concepts and theories are borrowed and translated, without seriously considering how the time and context in which they were produced might affect their current applicability (Fullerton, 1987a). Even those most ambitious methods explicitly dealing with 'changes' in marketing, such as dynamic modelling and forecasting, as well as those process-oriented concepts such as 'product life cycle' and 'diffusion of innovations', are fundamentally ahistorical since they are all built on implicit assumptions that marketing phenomena follow some 'orderly and predictable' logic and/or some fixed and regular patterns (Huckfeldt *et al.*, 1982). Together, the perception of fixed marketing phenomena, the employment of static marketing modelling, and the timelessly-minded usage of research results, have presented a picture of marketing incomplete at best and distorted at worst, and have produced self-limitation to the discipline; otherwise marketing study might address more dynamic, urgent and hence significant issues.

The reasoning into the domination of ahistoricism in marketing study can be in terms of epistemology, history and sociopsychology. Firstly, ahistoricism in marketing is allied with the dominating logical positivist paradigm that pursues the goal of discovering timeless laws, or at least law-like generalisations, valid for all times and places thus transcending any time, change and context (see Schwartz, 1965). Then historically, ahistoricism in marketing has been actually advocated and encouraged by the two study reports on business education in north America (see Chapters 3 and 4) which suggested that 'description' be kept to 'some irreducible minimum' and that 'generalising' was preferable (Fullerton, 1987a). Ahistoricism has also been reinforced by the ahistorical philosophy in the then economics and social sciences from which marketing study borrowed heavily. Last but not the least, the prevalence of ahistoricism in marketing is also due to the sociopsychological pressures within 'scientific establishments'. To be 'professional', marketing researchers are pushed to produce and publish in quantity. As a result, researchers have adhered to easily measurable and operatable 'facts', and tended to avoid becoming involved into time-consuming research of long-run evolution and broader sociohistorical context within which those facts happen (Firat, 1985a).

Based on the above recognition and critique, historicism is proposed by marketing researchers as an indispensable research perspective/philosophy (Hollander and Savitt, 1983; Hollander and Nevett, 1985; Nevett and Hollander, 1987; Nevett and Fullerton, 1988; Nevett *et al.*, 1989). Compared with the received wisdom, the historical perspective holds four distinctive features:

> Firstly, it has a strong historical-dynamic orientation - Marx's 'dialectical materialism' and Schumpeter's 'creative destruction' are well-known examples of such an orientation. Second, it is strongly sceptical that empirical analysis can be the ultimate test of truth. Third, it emphasises the innate structure of the mind, which structures empirical data according to its own dynamic, and which is far more important than the data in and of themselves. Fourth, it explicitly and emphatically rejects the belief that social science should emulate the methods and assumptions of the natural sciences (Fullerton, 1987b:431).

Generally, historical approach is 'to make the past intelligible in terms that will allow people of the present to understand better what has shaped their world and their lives' (Lavin and Archeacon, 1989:62). However, as in the case of comparative marketing, historicism in marketing has produced not a single method, but a variety of traditions (Firat, 1987b), which can be categorised into (1) researches in history of marketing *thought*, (2) researches in history of marketing *content*, and (3) researches in historical *methodology* (Jones and Monieson, 1990b; Savitt 1980), or can be grouped by research *purpose* of (1) describing past events, (2) analysing continuity and trends, (3) explaining causes of changes, and (4) formulating historical methodologies (Smith and Lux, 1993).

For the purpose of this thesis, possible ways of employing historicism in marketing study can be classified into three broad traditions: empirical, hermeneutic, and critical. The empirical historicism approach collects and describes empirical data and repetition of common occurrences in history perceived as such (for example Savitt, 1980, 1982, 1984, 1988). The hermeneutic historicism approach interprets, explains and produces understanding of empirical events, repetitions and possible trends (for example Lavin and Archdeacon, 1989). The critical historicism approach then brings to light the basis of experience, interests, values an relations of human beings, which condition the collecting, recording, interpretation, explanation and perception processes (for example Firat, 1985a, b, 1987b, 1988a, b). According to the assertion that 'No method should be excluded *a priori* from seeking explanation. But in the last analysis, no method gives us a definite explanation' (Firat, 1987b:437), all three traditions seem to have their own place in marketing study.

Again, for the purpose of this thesis, and given the present unbalanced situation in the discipline, I will suggest that the greatest potential of the historical approach lies in the critical tradition. The reason for this is twofold. On the one hand, approaches in marketing study are urgently needed which can assist marketers and citizens to understand the *why* questions (as described at the beginning of this chapter); on the other hand historical approach is essentially aiming at, and has the distinct capability of, uncovering how phenomena interact historically to produce the present conditions that surround us. Therefore, the major strength of the historical approach is that it can be purposefully directed to facilitate understanding of the evolution and dynamics that construct and shape market structures and consumption relations.

This has been proved by significant and fruitful research outcomes of critical historical approach in the areas of both marketing *phenomena* and marketing *study*.

In the first area - the study of marketing phenomena, Fullerton (1988) elaborates that marketing development in the modern western world is the concrete manifestation of capitalist *ideals* or in Weber's terms 'purposeful rationality' (*Zweckrationalitaet*). As a historical phenomenon, the modern western version of marketing did not always exist, will not always exist, and undergoes change over the course of its existence. It will eventually come to an end, replaced by some other compelling structure of attitudes, beliefs, and rules of conduct. During this course, marketing has been, and remains, a powerful force which shapes the social, cultural, and economic conditions (the same finding is also provided by Pollay (1985, 1986, 1987b) with particular regard to advertising). With a similar historical perspective, Kumcu (1987b) focuses on understanding and explaining the *structural* change in marketing systems and in anchoring its *relations* with other institutions to their social and economic origins. Kumcu employs a historical approach to investigate three broad sets of issues. Those are: (1) the underlying social, cultural, political, and economic structures and their historical development; (2) the production relations; and (3) the marketing systems that enable allocation of goods and services in the society, plus the constitution of the market-consumer profiles as well as behaviour and consumption patterns. The research result of Kumcu can be illustrated as Figure 6.1.



Figure 6.1 Dialectics between marketing and broader sociohistorical context
(Adopted from: Kumcu, 1987:128)

Kumcu's model investigates the societal-macro context which historically formulates and limits the formation and transformation of marketing systems and consumption patterns, and illustrates production and power relations which shape and lie behind the present marketplace and consumption structures, neither of which have been addressed by previous research approaches.

In the second area - the study of marketing study, Firat (1985a, b) employs historical approach to probe the relationship between science and ideology, and to demonstrate that the recent 'mainstream' form of marketing is not scientific but ideological. Firat first proposes that 'the demarcation point between the ideological and the scientific is that science seeks to understand temporal and contextual truths (facts) within their history; while ideology generalises from temporal and contextual truths' (Firat, 1985a:138-9). Firat then argues that the foundation of ideologies is not *opposite* to but *in* the empirical truths and experiences. Empirical observation and description of facts are totally innocent. Only when we take temporal and contextual facts as granted and argue that they always were and will be the case, we fall into the ideological trap. Therefore, according to Firat, unscientific, ideological biases come into play in the interpretation of empirical findings when facts are taken for granted without cognition of the social, political, economic and cultural history underlying them. Thus Firat urges marketing researchers to fight the threat of the tendency of imposing universality on temporal and contextual facts and relationships found in empirical measurements, so that we are able to propose and follow a more scientific and socially relevant paradigm in marketing study.

To summarise, and to use Kumcu's (1987b) terms, the major strength and potential of historical approach is that it provides a powerful perspective with which marketers and citizens can depart from the present tradition which takes change, development, values, consumer choices and various guiding principles as given. The historical approach, if used properly, is able to aid marketers and citizens to understand and explain the historical formation and transformation of particular marketing systems, institutions, processes, and research traditions in various times, places, countries, as well as in various segments in society.

6.3 THE RADICAL APPROACH

The radical approach in this thesis denotes a research tradition in marketing that is built upon the radical line of thinking from Marx to Althusser (e.g., 1974) for example. It inherits the radical spirit of social critics such as Caplovitz (1963), Galbraith (1967) and Baran and Sweezy (1947), etc. It is also conscious of establishing sound philosophical and sociological guidance, and therefore is able to move beyond its predecessors' achievement, in the sense that it has made a contribution to nearly all current heatedly debated aspects of marketing study; that is, not only sociological issues, but also philosophical and ideological ones. This approach in marketing context is theorised mainly by Heede (1980, 1981a, b, 1985, 1992) and Firat (1985a, b, 1987a, b), and has been shared and employed in guiding such researches as macro consumption pattern and compensatory consumption behaviour.

The basic argument of the radical approach maintains that the present form of marketing has become one of the controlling sciences, which is aiming at enforcing given production, power and other socioeconomic relations in modern society, therefore must be firstly deconstructed and then reconstructed for the purpose of human autonomy and emancipation.

It is claimed, first of all, that marketing today possesses a common 'silent knowledge' that decides both what problems should be dealt with and the methods used. Even at this starting point, radical marketing does not simply repeat Kuhn's doctrine of 'paradigm' and 'scientific revolution'. To the radical approach, Kuhn's account is not sufficient for deconstructing the controlling marketing. Kuhn's enterprise is static because in it, only historical examples and descriptions are given, not normative ways of how to change paradigms. To overcome Kuhn's limitation, the critical approach in marketing study turns to Althusser.

According to Althusser, every research tradition and researcher holds its own inescapable particular 'spontaneous philosophy' which is based on two mutually reinforcing fundamentals: internal beliefs and external beliefs. In the field of marketing, the internal belief or the 'silent knowledge' holds that (1) the object of marketing science is the marketplace where sellers meet buyers, and (2) the method to study this object is logical positivism. It is crucial to note that this internal belief is not selected at random by marketers or whoever; rather, it is defined and justified, and hence constituted and legitimated, by two external beliefs (external, that is, these beliefs are come from the wider context which condition the discipline): (1) a belief in the Protestant model of Man and (2) a belief in the equilibrium-seeking model of society. The Protestant model of Man holds that in a capitalist society, Man is well educated, with unconstrained free-will, is able to critically use information, and thinks before s/he acts. Therefore, s/he has responsibility for her/himself when exposed to marketing (see also Arndt, 1976a, 1978, and Bartels, 1986). The equilibrium-seeking model of society defines society as an equilibrium-seeking body with fixed relations, within which there exist self-adjusting forces that brings the system back to equilibrium or stable states (see also Dixon, 1964, Matsusaki, 1980, and Mokwa *et al.*, 1980). It is these two models that imply and legitimate the internal beliefs that marketing has no responsibility to the consumer, that consumer and marketing phenomena are predictable, that market structures and consumption patterns are stable, defined and maintained by themselves, and that logical-positivist methods such as stochastic techniques are sufficient and favourable.

Since internal beliefs are defined and justified by external beliefs, for reconstructing the controlling marketing science, we have to first of all deconstruct the Protestant model of Man and the equilibrium-seeking model of society. For such purpose, the radical approach draws upon Marx's dialectic materialism.

First, the dialectic materialistic model of Man claims that the two dimensions of Man, i.e., the materialistic and the spiritual, mutually constitute and determine each other in an ever-conflicting way. The materialistic dimension of Man can be considered to be her/his participation in production, distribution and consumption processes and relations; this is called the economic sphere. The spiritual dimension describes how Man perceives her/himself, how his social life is organised, and how s/he interacts with sociopolitics; this is called the intimate, the social, or the political sphere. Now these two spheres or roles of Man are interacting in a dialectic way, producing conflicts between materialistic and spiritual dimensions of her/his life. It is such conflicts that prevent Man in modern society free from constraints. In this sense, Man in modern society cannot have free-will, cannot think properly before s/he acts, and therefore cannot be responsible for her/himself when exposed to marketing.

Secondly, the dialectic materialistic model of society proposes that relations in society are intertwining with each other in a conflicting way, and hence are by no means stable nor tending towards equilibrium. Rather, society is considered as a set of dynamic structures and relations. The mechanism of the dynamics is not recurrent. Therefore structures and relations will not come up again and again. Structures and relations in society are always in a flux of changes. Furthermore, changes in quantitative development will unavoidably produce changes in quality. Therefore, striving to maintain or bring back equilibrium or stable order to society is meaningless. Instead, our research energy should be directed to investigate how far a system is from changing to new relations, what these relations are likely to be, and how changes will take place and can be facilitated. Even if the research focus is on the present state, we should address the dialectics between economic, sociopolitical and power relations since they can by no means remain isolated from each other but interact in a dialectic way.

Adopting this reconstructed external belief, the internal belief of marketing study will accordingly have a completely new look. Firstly, since the spiritual and materialistic spheres, the economic, sociopolitical and power relations define and determine each other, the object of marketing study can no longer be 'the marketplace where sellers meet buyers'. Instead, marketing study should be dedicated to penetrating the economic blind, so as to probe deep-seated relations producing and reproducing market structures and consumption patterns. Secondly, since all relations as well as relations among relations are not fixed but in a flux of changes, marketing study should investigate how these relations develop and what may be their possible future. Thirdly, since consumers cannot have free-will, and cannot think properly before acting, marketing then cannot deny its responsibility for consumers and for society. Thus, marketing can no longer be perceived as a no-harm, neutral instrumental mechanism, but should be considered as a social institution through which particular social relations are seen and done. Finally, all these new insights indicate that conventional logical-positivist methods are by no means adequate, and there is a need to incorporate methods and theories able to explain interactions between spiritual and materialistic dimensions, between economic and sociopolitical spheres, and between power relation and knowledge, such as those of Marx.

The most fruitful and stimulating inquiry guided by the radical approach can be found in the macro consumption pattern theory and the compensatory consumption behaviour model. The macro consumption pattern (MCP) theory was proposed by Firat and Dholakia (Dholakia and Dholakia, 1985; Dholakia and Firat, 1986; Dholakia *et al.*, 1983; Firat 1977, 1986a, 1987a; Firat and Dholakia, 1982). Contemporary theories of marketing and consumer behaviour are based on the assumption that consumer choice exists and is effectively exercised. Questioning this assumption, Firat and Dholakia found, based on empirical research findings, that (1) extensive choice exists only at the brand level; (2) increased micro choice is usually accompanied by decreased macro choice; and (3) with increasing capitalist development, the degree of macro choice declines. As a result, the overall consumption pattern in advanced capitalist society is becoming increasingly passive-individual-private-alienated, as against active-collective-public-synergisis (Dholakia and Dholakia, 1985; Firat, 1987a), which can be illustrated by Figure 6.2.

This macro consumption pattern (MCP) is dominating because the costs of deviating from these patterns are far in excess of the costs of conforming to them since, in turn, the whole economics and politics of advanced capitalism tend continuously to enhance such concentrated pattern (Firat and Dholakia, 1982). However, despite the passive-individual-private-alienated nature, consumption patterns in capitalist society are presented, by and large, as unconstrained. The reasons for the formation and concealment of the dominating MCP are both socioeconomical and ideological. First, according to the capitalist economic logic, the dominating MCP helps expanding markets and increasing scales of selling and production therefore helps capital accumulation (Firat, 1987a). Second, along the ideological dimension, a belief in the existence of unconstrained consumer choice is crucial since consumer choice has been equated with freedom in social life and hence related to the legitimacy of capitalist development (Dholakia and Dholakia, 1985). Both reasons are aiming at reinforcing capitalist production relation. For this reason, Firat and Dholakia claim that the 'dialectical relationship between production and consumption provides the key to the understanding of consumption patterns' (Firat and Dholakia, 1982:10; also Firat 1986, 1988b, c; Kilbourne, 1987a, b, 1989).



Figure 6.2 Dominant macro consumption pattern

(Adopted from: Firat and Dholakia, 1982:11)

During the whole process of producing and reproducing the dominating MCP, marketing has been acting as a conforming social institution. Now, since it is realised that the dominating consumption patterns are the result of the complex, historical and dialectical social and political process, the commitment of marketing study must include probing the society's organisation of productive activity and its ideology, and studying how micro and macro choice patterns change as societies develop and transform (Firat, 1987a).

The compensatory consumption behaviour (CCB) model was developed by Gromo (1984) based on the work of Allardt (1975), Caplovitz (1963), Faichild (1968) and Lick (1978), etc. In this model, the mechanism of compensation refers to a process characterised by such phenomena that certain activities are consequences of a general lack of need-satisfaction. More precisely, 'the concept of compensatory consumption [is] to describe how poor lower class people engaged in excessive consumption in order to make up for their low status in the production process' (Gromo, 1984:184).

Gromo then probes CCB through the concepts of objective needs, subjective motives and manifest action. While needs are defined objectively, as basic and relatively stable requirements, motives are defined subjectively and related to perceptions or values which are adequate to induce conscious and purposeful action. Furthermore, it is not need in itself that motivates action. Instead, objective needs should be considered as basic sources for subjective motives, which lead to manifest action. The CCB in advanced capitalist society thus can be modelled as Figure 6.3.

On the left side of Figure 6.3, conventional consumer research (such as BB systems) assumes consistency between needs, motives, and actions, which leads to genuine need-satisfaction. Now the CCB model reveals that there are normally in capitalist society inconsistency among objective needs, subjective motives, and manifest actions. Inconsistency might be introduced by imposed/self-imposed consciousness or by certain socioeconomic structures; the end result of both will be CCB. Gromo provides a Marxist explanation in how socioeconomic development creates, maintains, and reinforces the conditions for CCB. He states:



Figure 6.3 A conceptual model of compensatory consumption behaviour
(Developed from Gromo, 1984:185)

Although the capitalist production does not always correspond to real human needs, the capitalists will have to sell their products, in order to increase and maximise their profit, which is their main interest. To avoid overproduction by increasing the sales of products that are not adapted to people's real objective needs, it may be necessary to develop and stimulate subjective motives or consumer demands that are not based on or consistent with real needs (Baran & Sweezy 1966; Sulkunen 1978). This might be done by means of excessive advertising and marketing activities (cf.: Gorz 1967; Haug 1971; Thyssen 1976; Mason 1981). Instead of developing products that are adapted to real needs, the capitalists will try to develop and stimulate artificial or false needs that are adapted to the products (cf.: Marcuse 1964) (Gromo, 1984:186).

Gromo then suggests that while micro level analyses may provide insight into the individual, psychological processes of compensatory behaviour, macro level analyses may show how the cultural, social and economic processes determine the extent and forms of this behaviour in the area of consumption. Thus, micro and macro studies should be combined and integrated (*ibid*).

To summarise, throughout its theorising and application, the radical approach has been developing as an alternative in marketing study to address the historical and dialectical processes between marketing and the broader socioeconomic-power-ideological contexts.

6.4 THE CRITICAL APPROACH

The critical approach in marketing study shares most of its basic assumptions and standpoints with the radical school. Both traditions in marketing aim to address the broader social-economic-power structural context in which marketing is embedded, shaped and diffused. Both schools are concerned with the issue of who controls marketing institutions and for what interests/purposes, for whose benefit, etc. Both approaches have had a central interest in social class structure as one of their main concepts, along with other concepts of conflict, inequality, domination and dialectic (Poster and Venkatesh, 1987; Rogers, 1982, 1986). The critical approach also allies with the historical approach in their perspective which sees marketing as formed and transformed within and by the development of capitalist society, as manifesting and realising the capitalist ideal and interest (Firat, 1988b, c; Fullerton, 1987a, 1988).

However the critical approach is distinguishable in that it drops the Marxist notion that class conflict is the motor of social development and human emancipation (Rogers, 1982); and in that it emphasises more, compared to the historical school, the dialectic interaction between marketing and other social institutions within advanced capitalist society; that is, marketing is not only shaped and produced by broad historical context, but has also been active in influencing and reproducing particular social-economic-power structures/relations in modern society (Morgan, 1992), and that critical approach emphasises more the dialectic between human subjective cognition and the surrounding objective conditions (Murray and Ozanne, 1991).

The distinct thrust of the critical approach lies in its theorising that the commodity form of social relation and class structure, and the cultural sphere manifested as such, have effectively defused the critical potential of the working class and citizens. The culture of capitalism has developed in such a way that it begins to undermine the autonomy of the individual, resulting in a dominating ideology (Poster and Venkatesh, 1987). In advanced capitalist society, compared with the time of Marx, the ideology of the dominating class/group has diffused across other classes/groups for economic interest and capitalist domination through the effect of marketing and other 'rationalised' and 'legitimated' instrumental mechanism (Firat, 1988b). This has been done because people are not in symmetrical relationships and therefore there cannot be the realisation of an ideal speech situation. However, it is possible to create a public world in which there would be such an ideal speech situation (Poster and Venkatesh, 1987). The emancipation of people and critique can mainly, if not only, arise in communication action to unmask social distortions (Murray and Ozanne, 1991). In these terms, the commitment of marketing study should be, therefore, to seek to reveal the conditions and possibility for marketing as a way of conceiving and conducting particular social-economic-power relations, and hence to unmask the ideological nature of prevailing marketing assumptions, processes and methods; in short, to facilitate the self-emancipation of people from domination.

Since the main emphasis of the critical approach is on revealing manipulation distortion, and domination in communication, it is understandable that the most concrete studies guided by the critical approach so far have been carried out in a major area of modern marketing: mass communication (see Fejes, 1984; Rogers, 1982, 1986; among many others). Such research focuses on the control and production of media messages and their content, in the context of examining how the media develop and operate a specific ideology that supports and maintains the class-stratified and class-dominated society and hence blocked people from their full freedom and potential. There have been developed three major research streams (Fejes, 1984).

The first, the structuralist approach to media analysis, draws upon ideas found in linguistics, anthropology, semiotics and psychoanalysis. The major goal has been the study of the system and processes of signification and representation in the media. Seeing ideology less as a simple reflection of the economic base but more as an optic through which one views the world, structuralist research seeks to examine the implicit categories of thought in media texts through which the individual experiences the world. As such, this kind of critical research has deep intellectual relation with IC systems.

The second, the political economy approach focuses upon the economic structure and processes of media production (Murdock and Golding, 1977). The major thrust of this research has been the study of the trend toward increasing monopolisation and concentration of control within the media industries. Relying on a more classic notion of ideology utilising a Marxist 'base-superstructure' model, the political economy approach sees the media producing and disseminating a false consciousness which legitimises the class interests of those who own and control the media. While this is seen as the media's ultimate effect, most of the research taking this approach concentrates on an investigation of the structures of control within the media.

The third, the cultural study, focuses also on the media message. However, in contrast to the autonomy that the structuralist approach ascribes to such messages, the cultural approach assumes that media content and impact are shaped by the societal environment in which media messages are produced and received (Hall, 1980). This approach also rejects the simple base-superstructure division by which political economy scholars explain cultural phenomena. It argues that culture is a far more complex dialectic between social being and social consciousness than the metaphor of base-superstructure would allow. In the media message one sees an important expression of this dialectics.

Critical researchers have systematically investigated the distorting effect of the distorted mass communication in advanced capitalist societies, in global relations, and even in developing countries.

As mentioned at the end of the last chapter, in the case of advanced capitalism, Pollay (1985, 1986, 1987a) has demonstrated with empirical research findings that advertising is a distorted and distorting 'mirror' which produces and reinforces, 'on a very selective basis', certain attitudes, behaviours, and values far more frequently then others, stimulating and reinforcing materialism, cynicism, irrationality, selfishness, anxiety, social competitiveness, sexual preoccupation, powerlessness, and/or a loss of self-respect. Belk and Pollay (1985) also found from empirical research that advertising has reinforced negative materialism, and has increasingly portrayed consumption as an end itself rather than as a means to consumers' well-being and self-actualisation.

Turning attention to global marketing, it is claimed that (1) a considerable imbalance exists in the flow of communication among countries, and (2) cultural biases exist in the news that does flow. Supporting empirical materials for such argument can be found in, for example, Dorfman and Mattelart's (1971) *To Read Donald Duck?*, which reveals that Walt Disney's *Donald Duck* comic strip as it published in Latin American newspapers contains subtle themes of U.S. imperialism-hegemonism toward developing countries (cf.: Rogers, 1982).

While focusing on marketing in developing countries, Belk and Zhou (1986) contend that the constraining consumer culture of materialism and individualism has been stimulated and growing in developing countries, for example the reforming China. With the same concern, Thorelli (1986) calls developing countries to consider consumer emancipation in their economic developing plan, while Firat (1986b) urges developing countries to note the impact of marketing in manipulating consumers, moulding life styles, reinforcing or modifying values, etc.

Three major distinct characteristics can be found in critical marketing study. Firstly, it is claimed that no researcher can avoid having an ideological identification, whether s/he realise it or not. Thus, the critical approach challenges marketing researchers to recognise, surface and declare, their particular ideology in research (Rogers, 1982). Secondly, it is realised that the concepts of ideology and hegemony, much like the Marxist notion of alienation, are structural concepts that cannot be easily translated into analytical notion. For this reason, they cannot be simply operationalised in terms of discrete variables open to conventional measurement and manipulation (Fejes, 1984). Finally, it urges marketers to incorporate critically supporting elements from empirical-behavioural methodologies in any possible ways so as to facilitate and empower critical research (Rogers, 1986). Actually, Fejes (1984) has demonstrated the possibility for critical mass communication research to employ recently developed behavioural models, such as the agenda-setting, the spiral of silence, the knowledge-gap, and the effect-dependency model.

It is claimed that critical marketing can be useful to academic, public, as well as private interests:

> For the academic constituency, critical theory provides a new approach that investigates those aspects of consumer behaviour that constrain some social groups or that generate conflict. ... For the public constituency, critical theory provides a systematic approach to revealing deception and its consequences. It also has potential to generate

> social change strategies that may prove useful to legislators and consumer-rights organisations. For the private constituency, critical theory may provide a way to achieve competitive advantage without contradicting the public interest (Murray and Ozanne, 1991:130).

To sum up, critical marketing has been developed as a complemental approach to seek knowledge about marketing and consumers. It holds that the distortion of marketing often results from classes/groups in society being constrained by social structures and processes that they themselves construct and maintain through imposed and/or self-imposed constraints of various kinds. Critical research involves grasping both the intersubjective understanding of the classes/groups involved and the historical-empirical understanding of the potentially constraining objective social conditions. Contradictions that are discovered through communication competence provide the stimuli for change. Through the process of critique and dialogue, the critical research tries to help citizens as marketers and consumers to imagine alternative marketing mechanisms in particular and social relations in general that enable the development of human potential free from constraints *(ibid)*.

6.5 APPRECIATION

In this section, the analysis and assessment of HE systems will focus on their liberating commitment, their empowering role and their holistic perspective.

6.5.1 The Liberating Commitment

The liberating commitment of HE systems in freeing people from structural and/or ideological constraints is apparent.

First, it is openly claimed by HE systems that '[the] need for critical marketing thought derives from the fact that many segments and individuals in society cannot effectively participate in the market because they lack the buying power and the required organisation' and therefore that 'success ... in a marketing system is judged in terms of who can pay for this utility the most' (Firat *et al.*, 1987:xiv). It is this belief that inspires marketing researchers to look beyond the empirical-interpretive logic in order to seek understanding on how marketing has been 'rationalised' and 'legitimated' as a controlling science that reproduces and reinforces the deep-seated economical-sociopolitical relations (Morgan, 1992). In this strand, the radical school is the most dedicated to probing issues such as the role of ownership and production relations in marketing strategies, programming, and communication (for example Firat and Dholakia, 1982).

At the same time, HE systems are dedicated to freeing people from another kind of constraints - ideological traps. They condemn the orthodox marketing strategies which often lead to distortive communication and the frustration of human potential (Murray and Ozanne, 1991). HE systems insist on revealing the ideological nature of the contemporary form of marketing studies and practice. HE systems also insist on demonstrating the potential for citizens as consumers to become 'a new type of individual whose character is based in freedom, autonomy and spontaneity'. They also theorise, especially through a critical point of view, that 'the only interest of the individual ... is true freedom which can, in a rationally ordered society, coexist with general freedom' (Kilbourne, 1989:175). In regarding individuals as marketers, Heede declares that his radical enterprise 'aims at freeing marketing scientists from the tyranny and illegitimate power exercised upon them by society' (Heede, 1980:a). Critical marketing methodology guide-lines have been proposed for the purpose of such freedom, and practice examples have been documented (Murray and Ozanne, 1991).

During this emancipation process, the historical approach in marketing also plays an important facilitating role. Morgan (1992) has demonstrated, following Foucault's doctrine, that 'history and genealogy are important in that they allow us to understand more clearly how particular institutional arrangements were set up and empowered such that they now appear "normal". A proper genealogy of marketing therefore holds out considerable potential as a tool of critique. Such an analysis also helps us to consider how marketing has become embedded in the construction of social subjects and thus in the transformation of capitalist societies as a whole' (Morgan, 1992:153; also Firat, 1989).

Thus, the liberating ideal of HE systems has greatly enriched marketing study ontologically, in the sense that it has brought completely new and significant research phenomena and issues into marketing study, which have so far been totally ignored or concealed by technical and/or interpretive marketing studies.

6.5.2 The Empowering Role

The empowering role of HE systems in this thesis denotes the intention, capability and functioning of HE systems in aiding consumers and marketers to reflect their epistemological assumptions and to increase their recognition ability. In this regard, HE systems have moved beyond the cognitive limitation of economic-mechanical, behavioural-biological, and interactive-cultural systems.

Traditionally, logical positivist EM systems and functionalist BB systems focus on revealing regularities. The marketplace and consumption structures are treated as given objects, independent of social actors who created them. In a similar way, interpretive IC systems generally stop at merely describing existing needs, market relations and consumption structures. They take a nonjudgemental stance, which assumes that all perceptions are equal, due to the belief that each perception has their own rationality and logic. Consequently, neither tradition could offer, or intended to offer, an image of a better marketing and society. Over time, both these traditions generate knowledge that becomes an integral part of the existing marketing institution no-harm to the *status quo*.

In contrast, HE systems realise that the 'rationality' underlying and justifying any cultural belief is conditioned by certain sociohistorical context. Critical researchers, drawing upon Elster (1983) for example, rejects the belief in the 'thin theory of the rational' which holds that merely acting consistently with one's beliefs and desires would be sufficient. HE systems argue that, the rationality of beliefs and preference can be evaluated by linking at the way in which they are shaped; for instance, whether beliefs are distorted by incorrect information and judgement, or whether they lack substantive rationality because of their non-autonomous character (cf.: Uusitalo, 1989:84). It is asserted that

> Culture beliefs do not just 'happen'; they are mediated through the social structure and are, to a large degree, the products of those groups which control the material resources of society, those who control the institutional and communicational systems and who enjoy special access to the symbolic environment and to mass communications (Parenti, 1978:43).

Following Habermas, Morgan (1992) argues that it is not sufficient simply to understand how people see the world and reach consensus. Since power in society is implicated in the process of constituting meanings, marketing should embed the critical epistemological stance so as to understand how certain forms of meaning have been generated through manipulation of power, how particular ways of seeing represent certain power and class interests. In a similar way, Firat, following Foucault, claims that

> Power differentials in society can create the illusion of common understanding through imposition of a certain powerful party's understanding upon others. This is what Foucault calls the "regimes of truth": truth that is at once reified through verification of the received realities of the regime (the reigning system), and created/recreated by the history of the regime itself. But, ... this is not true understanding, only an imposed education of minds into conformity (Firat, 1989:97).

Actually, all Fullerton, Firat, Dholakia, Kumcu, Gromo, and Heede's historical-dialectical models, as well as Rogers, Fejes, and Pollay's elaboration on mass communication, can be seen as significant attempts along this line of thinking, in that they moved beyond the empirical and interpretive understanding to free marketers as well as consumers from their own cognition limitation.

6.5.3 The Holistic Perspective

It is clear throughout this chapter that HE systems hold a holistic perspective in the sense that they have brought broader sociohistorical questions into 'the whole systems'.

As Fejes puts it, compared with conventional researches based on an analytical mode of argument in which a phenomenon is broken down into its components and each part studied as a separate entity, 'critical research is based on the holistic mode or argument which attempts to deal with a phenomenon such as the social role of the media as a complex integrated system of power relation. The goal is to understand the parts in relation to the whole' (Fejes, 1984:527). Rather than reducing, HE systems usually intend to expand their scope in seeking for marketing knowledge. Thus, arguments can be often heard from HE marketing theorists such as 'to understand consumer behaviour is to understand society' (Rogers, 1986:9), 'a critique of marketing is simultaneously a critique of a particular type of society' (Morgan, 1992:137), 'marketing at present seems to be losing the vision of the forest for the trees' (Firat *et al.*, 1987:378), etc.

More fruitfully, the holistic perspective of HE systems has been directed to embracing various, and even seemingly contradictionary, approaches. Instead of sticking to the methods bias (see Chapter 4), or to the belief that 'anything is equally good' (see Chapter 5), HE marketing theorists urge marketing researchers to 'treat the other with more respect', to reach 'a realisation that each may have much to learn from the other', and to establish 'pluralism (the position that all points of view deserve to be heard and considered' (Rogers, 1986:9). A concrete attempt of this can be found in Fejes's significant and detailed analysis on the advantages and disadvantages of the recently developed behavioural models in mass communication research, as well as on how these models could be critically employed by critical researches (Fejes, 1984; for those models see Ball-Rokeach and Defleuk, 1976, 1982; McCombs, 1981; McQuail and Windahl, 1981; Noellie-Neumann, 1980; Tichenor, 1982; Tichenor *et al.*, 1970). To sum up, compared with EM, BB, and IC systems, HE systems have most consciously embedded and hence manifested a holistic notion in marketing study so far.

6.6 A POSSIBLE FUTURE

Despite being slow comers in marketing study, and even still in their initial development stage, HE systems have substantially displayed the strength of their liberating commitment, an empowering role and a holistic perspective. Another equal distinction of HE systems is also apparent, that is, although all social theories in general and research approaches in marketing in particular are ideologically-bound, HE systems differ from others by explicitly acknowledging the emancipatory interest.

All these distinct characteristics, seen by this thesis, grant a legitimate position for HE systems in marketing study which may not be accepted by the conventional conception of marketing. Arguably, for the overall purpose of understanding, formulating and satisfying human consumption needs, due to its distinct ontology (marketing phenomena and issues addressed), epistemology (the way adopted to generate and validate marketing knowledge), and ideology (the presentation of interest and purpose in knowledge and practice), HE systems hold a indispensable and insubstitutable segment (to use a marketing jargon) in marketing knowledge systems.

However this legitimacy should be complemented with a critical self-reflection. Viewed from a critical systems perspective, HE systems so far are emancipatory and critical more in their critique of the dominating marketing and on the related particular type of society, and more in the effort to envision a better marketing and society for citizens, but less in a dialogical pluralist sense. While concentrating on the one hand on condemning the paradigmatic tyranny of positivism, and on the other hand on challenging the nonjudgemental stance of interpretivism, no critical attempt has been tried to probe its own strength/limitation and proper positions for various research traditions. Even when elaborating Habermas's human constitutional interests theory, the purpose was limited to legitimising the HE approach itself, rather than to promote reflection on inescapable partiality and systemic complementarity among various approaches (see for example Morgan, 1992).

In this sense, HE systems in their present form, along with other marketing systems outlined in previous chapters, face the same tendency of reductionism, in that they all favour their own tradition too much to hold a 'truly' open attitude towards both the Self and the Other (Fejes reveals that 'most critical researchers have rejected most if not all of the behavioural tradition of effects research as either inherently uninteresting and/or biased in terms of the liberal pluralist assumptions built into it' (Fejes, 1984:520)).

Unfortunately, and yet logically, the selective and reductionist tendency has actually limited the competence of the HE tradition itself. A concrete example is provided by Fejes and quoted at length here:

> [Critical researches] assume the media are powerful. Thus the focus is away from an analysis of the media effect and more toward an analysis of message content and ... message production. Yet there is a danger that for critical communications research, ... the audience will be regarded as passive. As more and more research is focused

towards message content and production, the audience will become more and more invisible in the theory and research of critical scholars. For critical communications research, there is a distinct danger of a disappearing audience. ... The style, manner and rules by which the audience incorporate, accommodate, alter or reject media reality as part of their own everyday reality are overlooked. If one goal of critical communications research is to develop a politics of the media where popular struggle over the production and character of media presentations is developed, it is quite odd that so little attention is paid to the audience and their relation to the media (Fejes, 1984:520).

It is clear that without being aware of inescapable partiality and the danger of selectiveness, without a proper recognition of the strength and weakness of its own, without a critical and open desire to listen and talk to the Other, enclosing within one's own scope will inevitably undermine the strength of the Self, however 'critical' and 'holistic' it might be. HE systems so far have been no exception. As argued throughout this thesis, emancipatory and pluralist ideals condition each other. They are just the two faces of the same coin for human's overall interest. Without one, the other cannot be complete.

To summarise, HE systems have a bright future in a proper marketing science. Yet to realise their potential, HE systems must be aware of the partiality of their description of situations in which they intervene, open to communicative dialogue with other approaches, rather than pretending to be 'total' or pursuing a 'superior' position over the Other.

PART III

SYSTEMS MARKETING

Part I of the thesis probed the disirability and necessity of employing systems approach as paradigmatic communicative dialogical vehicle in the marketing study context. Part II investigated the irreduciable singularities and personalities in marketing approaches. Now Part III, Systems Marketing, juxtaposes marketing systems for the purpose of moving beyond the present paradigmatic tension and stagnation through a critical systems reconstruction of marketing. Part III is divided into four chapters.

First, Chapter 7 reorients marketing as a communicative action system towards addressing and serving differentiated and contesting human interests in consumption needs, which inherently and logically indicates the necessity of collective complementation among, and individual enhancement of, the whole range of heterogeneous marketing systems.

Next, Chapter 8 analyses the evolutionary thread underlying the diversity in marketing approaches as well as responses to the diversity. It will be argued that neither the existing pluralistic-oriented responses nor the objetcivist/relativist 'alternatives' has provided a viable way out of the paradigmatic stagnation in marketing study, and therefore that a critical systems pluralist perspective must be adopted which is to pursue possible critical plurality and complementation while at the same time preserving irreducible differences and personalities.

Then, Chapter 9 proposes a conceptual typology which reconstructs marketing researches and practice into technical, practical, and normative marketing categories, which encourages theoretically informed development and usage of heterogeneous marketing approaches, so to facilitate technical enhancement, subjective understanding, and ethical normative conformation in marketing actions respectively. The proposed reconstruction will be further operationalised at three distinct yet related levels: to establish pluralism for the long-run prospect, to facilitate mutual listening during dynamic interaction processes, and to promote complementation in practical problem-solving.

Cases are presented in Appendix IV.

The major concern of Part III is therefore firstly to reorient marketing as a communicative action system which is constituted by differentiated and interacting marketing actions driven by rationally contesting interests in human consumption needs, and thus gives respect to heterogeneous research approaches; and secondly to reconstruct marketing study as a critical dialogic community of researchers within which diverse research approaches are employed to pursue simultaneously individual enhancement and collective complementation through rationally grounded conversation, learning, and appreciation.

Chapter 7

A REORIENTATION OF MARKETING

INTRODUCTION

This chapter aims to reorient marketing under a critical systems perspective. The main message of the chapter is that marketing can be re-established as a positive (that is, facilitating and supporting, rather than distorting or degenerating) system that indicates and requires a pluralist attitude and complementarist strategy towards alien and heterogeneous research approaches.

The chapter is divided into four sections. Section 7.1 undertakes a critique of the received conception of marketing. Firstly, the original concern and commitment of marketing is recalled, and the social-historical context within which marketing degenerated and constituted as it is today is outlined. Next, the prevailing one-dimensional conception of marketing is summarised and given a preliminary critique. Then, it is argued that the received conception is partly a product of reductionist thinking in the discipline. Section 7.2, drawing upon Habermas's thesis of lifeworld/systems, investigates and presents, from a social evolution viewpoint, why and how marketing is conceived and constituted as it is. It is argued in this section that the received one-dimensional conception is a product of marketingisation; that is, an institution and ideology developed from the colonisation of the instrumentalised marketing system over the lifeworld. Section 7.3, then, based on Habermas's thesis of communicative rationality, re-conceptualises marketing as a rationally interested communicative action system constituted of differentiable and interacting teleological, dramaturgical and normative regulated marketing actions. It is contended that to re-establish marketing as such, it is necessary to adopt a systems perspective and the Habermasian thesis of communication, both of which are indispensable to make rational the relation between contesting human interests and marketing actions. Finally, in Section 7.4, this communicative action systems conceptualisation is translated into an operational statement which defines marketing as simultaneously a management technology, a social process, and a social institution that embrace understanding, formulating and implementing activities towards systemically satisfying the sociohistorically shaped, differentiable yet collective human economic consumption needs. An attempt is also made to demonstrate that marketing, so defined, provides a 'truly' rational ground for the legitimacy and complementary usage of competing approaches.

7.1 ON THE RECEIVED CONCEPTION

What counts as marketing? In Part II, it was presented, basing on a reading of the early marketing literature, that when it emerged at the beginning of the century, although driven by technical concerns and economic criteria, marketing was originally established as a social mechanism and was initially described as a social institution for the collective benefit of members in society, rather than constituted as *merely* management techniques driven by business profit targets. This macro commitment underpinned and was manifested in the works of all early distinguished marketing gurus: Shaw, Weld, Duncan, McGarry, Stewart, Dewhurst, Vaile, Breyer, Cox, Duddy, Revzen, etc. To quote Breyer as an example,

> Marketing is not primarily a means for garnering profit for individuals. It is, in the larger, more vital sense, an economic instrument used to accomplish indispensable social ends. Under a system of division of labour there must be some vehicle to move the surplus production of specialists to deficit areas if society is to support itself. This is the social objective of marketing (Breyer, 1931:192; also Cox, 1962:18-23).

Therefore it is apparent that marketing was born with a dual nature: as a social mechanism (the normative aspect) *and* as a management technology (the implementing aspect), both of which were originally geared to satisfy collective needs of members in a society. Questions usually asked were: whether distribution costs too much (e.g., Stewart and Dewhurst, 1939), how to move goods from production to consumption in a society more efficiently (e.g., McGarry, 1950), how to locate the nation's resources effectively according to human purposes (e.g., Vaile, *et al.*, 1952). With its dual nature, marketing served fairly well both producer and consumer interests, both material and spiritual needs, both economic and humanistic norms (Bartels, 1986, also see Chapter 3).

However, as illustrated in Chapter 4, during around the mid-century, when 'it was taken up by large companies and nationalised industries and utilised in a tactical way to improve efficiency by analysing recurrent problems' (terms from Mingers, 1991:93, who originally described the degenerating process of OR), marketing began to lose the aspect of macro 'normative judgement', remaining 'primarily managerial' (Hollander, 1986:20-3), which left the discipline in an *imbalance* (Bartels, 1983:32; Hollander, 1986:23). As a result, the discipline of marketing today prefers empirical but ignores theoretical research, places heavy emphasis upon management strategies but ignores social mechanism, focuses on buyer behaviour in the marketplace but ignores consumer needs in social life, remains enclosed within 'the scientific method' but ignores the possibility and necessity of opening to other ways of seeing, knowing, and doing (Arndt and Dholakia, 1985; Bartels, 1983, 1986; Firat, *et al.*, 1987; Morgan, 1991). As Fisk puts it,

> Most marketing literature ... commonly treats marketing as a management technology. Problems of marketing operations managers dominate the journals devoted to marketing practice, policy, and science. ... The focus on marketing management in professional literature creates the illusion that marketing achievements result solely from applying technical skills to the marketing problems of firms (Fisk, 1986:ix-x).

Or, in Stidsen's words,

> Clearly the study of managerial marketing has captured the attention and imagination of far more students of marketing than has the study of marketing from a social standpoint. ... [T]he managerial and societal orientations exist in rather uneasy relation in most textbooks. ... In the hands of some marketing scholars that modern version of the societal orientation to the study of marketing has become a variant of the managerial orientation (Stidsen, 1979:383-4).

Indeed, the imbalanced conception has gradually won the most acceptance and inspired the most thinking (Arndt, 1976b:10); it has been constituted as the 'mainstream' in the discipline. In the bulk of textbooks, academic journals, MBA courses and business schools, marketing is defined, more often than not, merely as managerial technology for business activities (see the discussion of Bartels, 1965b; Luck, 1969, 1974; and Sweeney, 1972). It is believed and suggested that 'the future of marketing lies in providing private enterprise with an evermore effective technology for controlling the marketplace' (cf.: Dawson, 1987:81).

This perception is nowadays so exclusive that it is almost inconceivable that marketing could have any other role. It has actually spread to all levels of organised social life: organisational, societal, and global.

On the organisational level, marketing has taken over the pre-eminent position from the Taylorist production in management science. This seems to be a sensible result since our production capacity has dramatically developed and at last surpassed our commonly perceived demand. 'The key issue' for organisation 'became that of selling products in competition with other producers' (Morgan, 1992:142). To quote Drucker,

> Marketing is the distinguishing unique function of the business ... Marketing is so basic that it cannot be considered a separate function on a par with others such as manufacturing or personnel. It is first a central dimension of the entire business. It is the whole business seen from the point of view of its final result, ... Concern and responsibility for marketing must, therefore, permeate all areas of the enterprise' (cf.: Doyle, 1987:122).

Secondly, at the societal level, all subjects, concrete or abstract, natural or symbolic, can now be marketed; all relationships between people can now be defined in marketing terms. For an investigation of this let us have a brief look at Kotler's (1972) 'generic concept of marketing'. Kotler distinguishes three levels of marketing consciousness. The first level is concerned with the *market transactions* by which seller and buyer meet and exchange their goods. The second level is where *two parties* meet and exchange things that are of value to them; such 'things' can be household commodities in supermarkets, ideas from professors, courses from universities, services in churches, promises from political parties, health service from the NHS, gifts from lovers, rewards from parents, etc. Then at the third level, Kotler claims that marketing can be viewed as a 'category of human action *indistinguishable* from other categories of human action such as voting, loving, consuming' (Kotler, 1972:53, italics added). No doubt, in the whole society, marketing is every thing and everything is marketing. This is what we are told by the expansion of marketing from as market transactions, to two-party exchange, and then on to 'indistinguishable human actions'.

Finally, at the global level, marketing has won the final victory. The decades long cold war ended not because of weapons treaties; the Eastern European Block returned back to the democratic camp not because of the Western peace troops; the USSR collapsed not because of the greater superpower of the USA; the Chinese opened their door not because of political pressures from the West. Instead, all these happened in the name of market economy, and 'it seems to be the final victory to the marketing theory and practice of the West' (Heede, 1992:145). Who can argue with this global trend of marketisation? Now Poland and the whole of eastern Europe have invited Western businesses to develop a market economy. Russia has asked for market expertise from the West to transfer its once centrally-planned economy to a market one in spite of the latest bloodshed in Moscow and in Chechnya. Even in the Marxist socialist China, marketing prevails throughout the country: in addition to various corporate marketing programmes, the housing system has been handed over to the market; 'good' education for a child of six years onward can now be bought from the market, the health service system has also been pushed into the market, and all this has happened without the security of an established social insurance system.

It seems that marketing has gained marvellous victories at all organisational, societal, and global levels. Marketing in its current form has been accepted, along with market economy, as a panacea for all sectors and for all purposes, as if a neutral means without any prerequisite, implication, or consequences, by the West and the East, the North and the South, the liberal, the capitalist, the socialist, and the Marxist. With marketing and market economy, political and ideological boundaries in the traditional sense become less and less relevant. It is difficult to imagine a world where marketing does not exist. It is also difficult to imagine that marketing may cease to exist in the way it functions today.

In recent years, however, we have begun to see an increasing challenge to this narrow imbalanced conception and uncritical acceptance of marketing as such. The challenge has been focusing on (1) the impact of marketing to society, (2) the misperception of a nature-like market, (3) the asymmetry in business-consumer relations, (4) the instrumental view of consumer, and (5) the ignorance of more important issues in marketing.

First, it is criticised that the prevailing conception of marketing as a value-free no-harm technology is misleading and distorting. The received conception presents marketing as customer-oriented, or even sovereign, and environment-constrained (for example see Borden, 1964; Felton, 1959; Konopa and Calabro, 1971; Kotler and Zaltman, 1971; McCarthy and Perreault, 1984; McKitterick, 1957; also see the analysis on the 'consumer sovereignty' by Dickinson *et al.*, 1986). What is not told is the other side of the story, that marketing is at the same time influencing and constituting. Arndt argued that 'In discussions of the relationship between marketing and society, the *adaptive* aspects of marketing are often stressed. The *formative* role of marketing, on the other hand, is often conveniently swept under the rug. Hence, the impact of marketing on society through the interweaving of its specific ideology with current marketing practices is frequently overlooked' (Arndt, 1976b:13; also see Dholakia and Dholakia, 1986). Heede further argues that the mispresentation is not accidental but an attempt to deny the responsibility of marketing to society. However the one-sided conception is impoverished since, according to Heede, if marketing can influence consumers' decisions (which is obviously the fundamental pre-assumption of the prevailing marketing mix and 'consumer research', see for example Kassarjian and Robertson, 1968), then it shall be responsible for the impact on consumer and, further, if marketing can influence individual consumers then it can influence society as a whole, and then marketing can be held responsible for some of the problems in society (Heede, 1980). As a social practical science, marketing is by no means a neutral means. Instead, it is always functioning for certain purposes and can produce practical life consequences to society and its members; therefore marketers should always reflect on their ethical normative judgements besides technical norms in decisions. It is not intended here to deny the constraint and influence of social conditions and human wills to marketing. It is, however, to reject the reductionist thinking that ignores the consequence of applying marketing techniques to consumer and society, and to reject the thinking that reduces the dialectic interaction between society and marketing into a one-way image.

Secondly, the criticism is levelled that accompanying the conception of marketing as a neutral no-harm technology is the perception of a nature-like free market. The received perception claims that market is the place where prices and qualities are brought to an equilibrium (Alderson, 1957, 1965). Actually it has been a belief since Adam Smith that the market is an invisible hand, independent of human subjectivity or inter-subjectivity, which, arguably, implies that the market is somehow objectively nature-like. We are told that the market is there, the laws of market movement are there, and what we should do is to discover and then to follow such laws. If the British people are not satisfied with the market-reforming of NHS, if the Eastern block people are not happy with the unintended outcome generated by a market economy, if the Chinese people are not enjoying the expected advantages of the transformation in housing, education and health service systems, marketing as a technical mediator is not to blame, since the market is something nature-like and because marketing is just operationalising the market laws. As humankind we have no choice but to obey the law of nature (here the market). We cannot complain or escape from it but adapt ourselves to it. Thus, the blame lies on those who fail to adapt themselves to the market. Following this logic, it is not difficult to understand why the market has been presented as a mysterious metaphysical construct, why the market has become one of the most frequently used justifications for the decisions and actions of managers and politicians alike.

However, it is increasingly argued that a nature-like free market is a distorted picture. First, the market is not always free. According to Matzusaki (1979:681), a free market assumes a homogeneous world and an unhampered flow of resources to bring about equalisation of basic human values. Unfortunately such condition does not exist in our globe, which is evident when we look at the pattern of utilisation of natural and especially non-renewable resources world-wide or the pattern of world trades. Next, the market is not merely objective either. It can be ideology-generated and -generating. Based on empirical findings, Arndt (1979a, b) has demonstrated that markets can be manipulated for particular interests or purposes, and thus become *domesticated.* Therefore markets are not necessarily independent of human subjectivity and/or inter-subjectivity. Rather, markets can be constructed, formulated and controlled by human beings as a governing mechanism to transform particular interests, values and actions into social ones. The marketplace can then be an artifact which is manipulated for the purpose of sustaining or transforming certain man-nature and/or man-man relations. Further, the market is described as nature-like because it can 'tell'. That is, the convenient abstraction can become an ideological prescription for the way that the market *should* work (Hibshoosh and Nicosia, 1987). The market has always already been told to work in a certain way. From a critical systems point of view, what has been eclipsed and eventually exhausted in the received 'objective' wisdom is supplemental ways to conceive and manage the market. Like our social reality, markets can have objective, subjective and inter-subjective aspects (see Appendix II and Chapter 9). Therefore our conception of markets should not be reduced to their objective aspect only.

Thirdly, it is argued that the received conception is asymmetric (Anderson, 1983; Stidsen, 1979). Karlinsky (1987) criticises current marketing theory and research for focusing on (instrumental) rationally normative research for managers but only on positive research on consumers. That is, the discipline is *for* marketers *about* marketees (Belk, 1984b; Firat *et al.*, 1987; Hirschman, 1986a; Holbrook and Hirschman, 1982; Levy, 1981; Olson, 1981). Indeed it is claimed that 'My perspective is that of a marketing scientist. My goal is to study marketing phenomena and to develop theory and methodology which help managers better understand the environment in which they operate in order to use marketing strategies proactively to maximise profit' (cf.: Hauser, 1985; also see the discussion in Chapter 4 on the managerial school and buyer behaviour research). Obviously with this prevailing commitment, the viewpoint and interest of consumer simply disappear. Such asymmetry in marketing has led to distortion of resource allocation; that is, society's investments are distributed asymmetrically between consumers and marketers (for example the Ford and Carnegie reports on business education), in turn resulting into asymmetric distribution of benefits. 'Consumers become more predictable and firms become better in exploiting this predictability' (Karlinsky, 1987:47). It is possible to maintain that the asymmetry in marketing is due to three factors. First, it is attributable to the 'relevance' to practical marketers and the interests of firms (Belk, 1984b; Holbrook, 1985). Next, it is based on the 'Protestant model of man' which assumes that consumers are well educated and have free-will, as well as able to access and use full information, and always think before they act (recall section 6.3). Finally, it is also due to the uncritical acceptance of easily-reached 'scientific' research methodologies and teach ability (Stidsen, 1979). Nevertheless, as the outcome, what the marketing asymmetry produces in the marketplace are 'part-time amateur buyers' on the one side and 'full-time professional sellers' on the other (Holton, 1981). The whole enterprise of marketing has degenerated into a one-party game. Through this asymmetry the social mechanism aspect of marketing has eventually gone.

Fourth, it is argued that related to the asymmetry in marketing is an instrumental view of consumers. It is demonstrated that the received conception has looked at consumers in the same way that fisherman, rather than marine biologists, study fish (Holbrook, 1985; Tucker, 1974; recall Chapter 4). The focus of marketing research on consumers is their buying behaviour, or more precisely their brand-choice habits, in the marketplace, rather than needs in their whole social life (Bartels, 1983; Belk, 1984b; Dholakia *et al.*, 1980) . 'Such an instrumental view of the consumer treats the consumer not as the *subject* but as an *object* to be affected in order for marketers to realise their business goals' (Arndt, 1976b:14). Indeed Atac has suggested that the use of marketing techniques such as public relations and government lobbying 'may turn buyer's markets into seller's markets where consumers' needs lose priority' (Atac, 1985:2). Obviously, the goal of making profit through integrating marketing efforts to satisfy consumers in the marketing concept has eclipsed and exhausted the possibility of inquiring the needs of consumers. Moorman (1987) has demonstrated the relation between the instrumental view of consumer and the technique-oriented aspect of marketing. This technical dimension demands that tasks be accomplished in a way that will achieve results most efficiently. The reduction of marketing into merely management technology is indicated by the virtual absence of other important dimensions (for example social, moral, and ethical ones). As a cost, the absence of other dimensions in the original marketing mission has had the effect of replacing human values with exchange values and eventually with market prices (Fromm, 1955), and has moved human concern from Hamlet's dilemma, *To be, or not to be?* towards the corporate philosophy, *To buy, or not to buy?,* or simply towards the technical decision, *What to buy?* or *What brand to select?,* through which humankind is eventually reduced to a 'one-dimensional man' (Marcuse, 1964).

Finally, the received conception of marketing tends to restrict the discipline energy to 'dog food level' research (Belk, 1987; Bellow, 1957), to move away inquiry attention from more 'important aspects of total marketing' (terms from Bartels, 1983; also Arndt, 1976b, 1978; Hollander, 1986). In contrast with early research questions in the discipline, now typical questions asked have become: why was a particular brand purchased instead of a similar one?, why the housewife purchased three bars rather than one bar of soap? (Kassarjian and Robertson, 1968:2), what should we do to ensure that our brand is selected over the competition? (cf.: Funnell, 1982:8; Holbrook, 1985:2), rather than what kind of marketing system should be developed?, what consumer wants and needs should be satisfied, and in what order? (Nickels, 1979:619; Matsusaki, 1979:689), why do the seller's needs always come first? (Dickson, 1982; Houston, 1986), whose value should marketing technology serve? (Carman, 1979; Fisk, 1982; Robin, 1980; Spratlen, 1974). Again, there is no intention here to deny that the technology aspect is a necessary dimension of the marketing discipline, or to condemn the micro-managerial perspective *per se*, nor to object to making profit through integrating marketing efforts to satisfy consumer. There is some question, however, as to whether management technology for business activities is a sufficient statement of the domain and mission of marketing. 'In other words, is there something more fundamental, more pervasive, and more essential to marketing than solely the development and implementation of a management technology' (Sweeney, 1972:3)?

To sum up, the received conception embedded in the 'mainstream' image of marketing has defaulted the social provisioning mechanism aspect of marketing through which members of society receive their standard of living. The received perception has degenerated marketing into a one-dimensional instrumental science through which humankind are treated as things and only asymmetric interests are served.

Seen from a systems perspective, it may be argued, the degeneration and distortion in the received conception of marketing is a product of the reductionist thinking in the discipline. Reductionism refers to the 'idea that the principles explaining one range of phenomena are adequate for explaining a totally different range of phenomena - for example, the idea that social behaviour is ultimately psychological, or that human psychological behaviour is ultimately biological' (Hoult, 1972:267). In sociology study, Etzioni (1970) identifies two kinds of reductionism:

one reducing social or political analysis to the level of a universal theory of action or to psychology, the other reducing macro phenomena to micro behaviour. Bagozzi (1977) found the same kinds of reductionism existing in marketing study. He criticises the discipline as concentrating merely on recording observable events, which failing to analyse and represent the meaning of acts, events or objects. I would argue, further, that marketing also fails to analyse and address the sociohistorical context in which such events occur and meanings are attached. Heede (1976, 1980, 1991) stresses the reductionist danger in the discipline. He argues that the inadequacy and distortion of marketing may stem fundamentally from the lack of a holistic view toward differentiable yet interacting human spheres (for holistic perspective in a similar sense also see Firat *et al.*, 1987; Hollander, 1986; also recall Section 6.5).

Therefore, based on the critique presented in this section so far, it is possible to argue that the flaw in the received conception of marketing is a syndrome of reductionist thinking: it reduces the macro societal marketing phenomena into micro firm/buyer behaviour; it reduces the multi-faceted consumption and market structure into an objective nature-like one; it reduces the dialectic interaction between marketing and society, and between business and consumer, into a one-way manipulation; it reduces diverse human activities/relations into a one-sphere domain defined in solely marketing terms; it reduces the whole range of issues in human consumption into technical consideration only; it reduces values in human-social life into monetary prices in the marketplace; and finally it reduces the dual nature of marketing into a singular instrumental frame of reference. In short, it reduces the plurality in marketing into a singular standard therefore becomes closed.

All this reminds us that to re-establish marketing as a positive (that is, facilitating and supporting rather than distorting or degenerating) mechanism for the benefit of humankind, a 'true' systems pluralist perspective must be in order, while tendencies of reductionism or closure must be rejected.

As outlined above, in the marketing literature, there has been developed a substantial critique which challenges the one-sided reductionist manipulation and distortion in marketing. However it remains unexplored so far that for what reason, and in what way, this reductionist thinking has become so significant and dominant, and how it is that marketing is constituted as it is today. The next section will present a preliminary exploration of these questions.

7.2 ON MARKETINGISATION

This section will, drawing upon Habermas's theory of social evolution, i.e., his lifeworld/systems thesis (see Appendix II), inquire why and how it is that a particular form of marketing dominates our social life. It is argued that marketing in its current form is the outcome of the process of marketingisation, or in the Habermasian terminology, marketing can be seen as one of the colonising systems over our lifeworld. It will also be emphasised that to re-establish marketing as a positive facilitating system, it is necessary to be aware of the differentiation between the social and the technical spheres, and to maintain the proper order between the lifeworld and the technical elements in the marketing context.

According to Habermas, the evolution and modernisation of society can be traced to increasing levels of differentiation of and in the lifeworld (social sphere) and systems (technical sphere). Lifeworld, as the background of shared meaning that enables ordinary symbolic interaction, exists logically and historically prior to the processes of rationalisation which characterise modern societies, while systems and subsystems emerge as a consequence of these processes, forming as functionally definable area of actions, such as the modern states, economy, etc. As I read it, *system* in Habermas's sense can also denote, at the micro level, such constructs as accounting, information systems, marketing, and so on (for elaboration of Habermas's lifeworld/systems thesis on the micro organisational context which suggests that systems may develop their own differentiated social and technical elements, i.e., their own lifeworld and systems, see Laughlin, 1987).

Ideally, according to Habermas, systems receive symbolic guidance from the lifeworld for functioning and hence have dependence on the lifeworld. In other words, the lifeworld defines systems and subsystems, co-ordinates and facilitates a balanced process of rationalisation and differentiation. It is the lifeworld that gives meaning and guidelines to the establishment and operation for systems, rather than the other way around. To repeat Habermas:

> New levels of the system differentiation can establish themselves only if the rationalisation of the lifeworld has reached a corresponding level (Habermas, 1981/1987:179).

However, as Habermas maintains, in modern societies, it is possible and has actually happened that systems rapidly developed an autonomous development logic and functional dictates of their own. Our inability to differentiate and retain as separate the social and technical spheres has led to a process of 'inner-colonisation' of the social lifeworld by technical systems, through which the technical sphere overpowers the social, far exceeding its boundaries, capturing the most, if not the whole, human attention and consideration. As a result, the relation and order between lifeworld and systems has become 'systematically distorted' and effectively reversed. The lifeworld gradually loses its capability to steer systems, while systems, conversely, gradually define and dictate the lifeworld by the expansion of its functional domain and operational logic.

In the context of marketing, as it became more and more complex from the mid-century, the marketing system has developed its own technical logic and disciplinary power over social norms. As illustrated in the previous section, marketing has gradually suppressed its original commitment as a provisional mechanism assigned by the society (recall the criticism from Arndt, Bartels, Belk, Fisk, Fullerton, Funnell, Holbrook, Hollander, Stidsen, and Sweeney). It has gradually constituted itself as a dominant, if not the only, way and norm to see, to know, and to do social relations (recall the previous discussion on Kotler's 'generic concept of marketing', which expands the application domain of marketing power to cover firstly market transactions, then exchanges between two parties, and finally all human activities). Through this process of degeneration and distortion, marketing has been constituted as not a means but the end itself (Fisk, 1986). Marketing has become a new language and dominant culture, replacing the previous one (see the previous quotation from Drucker). Eventually, marketing today presents itself not as an implementing function steered by the lifeworld, but as *the* language defining our lifeworld (Morgan, 1991).

Along with the reversion and distortion of the proper relationship *between* systems and the lifeworld, degeneration and distortion has also occurred *within* marketing. The once balanced relation between possible ways of reasoning within marketing system has been broken down. Through the rise of the '*Expertenkultur*', instrumental reasoning for efficiency in merely economic norms provides a dominant representation of marketing, which eclipses and eventually exhausts other possible reasoning (Arndt, 1985a, b; Anderson, 1983; Bartels 1983, 1986; Dholakia *et al.*, 1985; Firat *et al.*, 1987). For evidence one needs only to have a look at the official definition and the prevailing concept of marketing.

In 1960, the *American Marketing Association* formulated such a definition of marketing:

> [Marketing is] the performance of business activities that direct the flow of goods and services from producer to consumer or user (AMA, 1960).

Twenty-five years later, again the *American Marketing Association* defines marketing thus:

> Marketing is the process of planning and executing the conception, pricing, promotion, and distribution of ideas, goods, and services to create exchanges that satisfy individual and organisational objectives (AMA, 1985).

Both of these 'authorised' definitions view marketing as merely technical activities and/or as an inquiry of 'how to do' instrumental knowledge. They speak in terms of the application of marketing techniques, while there is 'no indication of goals or consequences of marketing', nor consideration of 'what consumers would want marketing to be' (Gronroos, 1989; Kurzbard and Soldow, 1987).

The 'marketing concept', which underpins the bulk of 'mainstream' textbooks and academic publications, describes marketing in exactly the same way. It claims that

> A corporate state of mind that insists on the integration and co-ordination of all of the marketing *functions* which, in turn, are melded with other corporate functions, for the basic objective of producing maximum long-range corporate profits (Felton, 1959:55, italics added).

> The marketing concept ... calls for most of the effort to be spent on *discovering* the wants of a target audience and then creating the goods and services to satisfy them (Kotler and Zaltman, 1971:5, italics added).

Apparently, in such 'concept', marketing is viewed exclusively as a set, or sets, of techniques of observation, measurement, prediction and manipulation employed by organisations, most commonly by business organisations, to generate desired responses from the market.

Now marketing has been both *expanded externally* and *reduced internally.* On the one hand, it has expanded the functional domain of its instrumental logic and disciplinary power to intervene in other human-social spheres, thereby constituting itself as an autonomous institution over the lifeworld. All entities and relations, even the lifeworld, are now defined in marketing terms. On the other hand, marketing has been reduced into a one-dimensional science, knowing nothing but instrumental efficiency towards pre-determined ends (Arndt, 1985a, b; Firat *et al.*, 1987). Any other possible broader questions of accountability for society and consumers have been eclipsed (Fisk, 1986). I call this two-fold process *marketingisation.* By marketingisation, marketers have been trained into 'specialists without vision' (in terms of Weber), marketees have been transformed into clients and taught to be responsible for 'socially structured silences' (in terms of Habermas), humankind has been treated as 'things' or 'objects' like money or machines (in terms of Morgan, 1992). It is ourselves who undertake such marketingisation. We practise marketing under a one-sided perception, which reinforces itself through day-to-day functioning and operation. Through this process, we impose this distorted perception onto ourselves again and again until it becomes rational, neutral, ideal, and beyond-challenge belief, i.e., an ideology. As a result, any inquiry of marketing knowledge system is based on the one-sided logic, and therefore outcomes of all inquiries, however 'objective' and 'scientific', can be safely foreseen in advance.

To conclude, the current image of marketing in its current form as the sole language describing social life and as managerial technology geared for business profit is a distorted and distorting ideology imposed on people through marketingisation. It is an outcome developed from the colonisation of the instrumentalised marketing system over the social lifeworld.

We can find seeds of this line of reasoning in the work of self-reflective marketing theorists. For example, as early as 1972, without using the Habermasian terminology, Sweeney arrived at the same recognition about the imbalanced rationalisation-differentiation process during which the technical logic suppresses societal guidance in the marketing context, which is quoted at length as follows:

> Marketing is viewed as a social process in much the same way that education or government is viewed as a social process. These social processes exist because society has recognised the need for the performance of certain basic social functions such as the transmission and enhancement of knowledge, the establishment and enforcement of codes of behaviour, or the exchange of values for consumption. The specific institutional structure and technology which implement the process exist at the total discretion of society, and necessarily reflect society's current values, ideology, social structure, and technological-economic state.
>
> As a society grows and advances beyond its primitive state, these basic social processes eventually become formalised, specialised institutions evolve, and standard technologies are developed to implement the required processes more efficiently. As the society grows more complex and continues to become more sophisticated, its institutions become more complex and sophisticated technology required to manage its institutions assumes a role of progressively greater importance.
>
> As this technology is continually improved and refined, the institutions often begin to view the technology as being more important than the basic social function which the technology is supposed to implement. Eventually, the entire *social process is defined as being the technology*, rather than the *technology being defined merely as a means of implementing the basic social process* (Sweeney, 1972:7-8; emphasis original).

It should be noted that the critical theory of Habermas does not reject the legitimacy of technical systems, nor does it reject technical reasoning *per se*. Instead, for Habermas, the emergence of autonomous systems *can* be a potentially positive force which is not necessarily distorting, and meanwhile a proper order between systems and lifeworld, and a balance among various kinds of reasoning, *can* be pursued. This is the topic of the next section, in which it will be argued that marketing *can* possibly be established as a positive system steered by the lifeworld to tackle the full range of issues in human consumption needs through complementary practice of all technical, practical and ethical normative reasoning.

7.3 MARKETING AS COMMUNICATIVE ACTION SYSTEM

So far in this chapter, a critique has been presented of the received conception of marketing. It has also been argued that the one-sided conception is a product of the two-fold process of marketingisation; or in Habermas's terminology, an institution and ideology developed from the colonisation of the technical marketing system over the social lifeworld. In this section, based on the previous critique of the received, imbalanced, dominant, and distorting, an attempt will be made to outline a normative sketch of an ideal yet possible, critically rational and facilitating marketing. In other words, the question is what marketing *can be* or *'ought' to be*. The message is that marketing can be established as a human communicative action system that embraces and supports, on a criticisable rational ground, positive enhancement, subjective experience, and ethical normative formation, in addressing and tackling heterogeneous issues embedded in human economic consumption needs. This section draws upon Habermas's theses of communication , and has benefited from reading on critical inquiries in accounting, a sister discipline of marketing, including the work by Arrington and Puxty (1991), Laughlin (1987, 1988), Power (1988), Power and Laughlin (1991), Puxty and Chua (1989), and many others.

7.3.1 Marketing, Interest, Rationality

To begin with let me present marketing as a system of purposive human actions which are highly situated in the context of human interests. I suggest here that *purposive* and *interest* be understood and defined in their broadest sense. That is, human purpose and interest can be differentiated in many ways, and are always derived, influenced, and conditioned, by interweaving and contestable social, economical, legal, political, cultural, regional, national, religious, historical, psychological, cognitive, sexual and personal factors.

It is not new to perceive marketing actions as always aligned with certain interest. For example, marketing has been linked to the interest of matching supplies of a society to demands (see for example Grether, 1966, 1983; McGarry, 1950; Vaile *et al.*, 1952; Weld, 1916), related to the interest of making profit through integrating marketing efforts to satisfy customer wants (see for example Kotler, 1967a; McCarthy, 1968), directed to the interests of institutions/agencies constituting marketing systems (see from the institutional school of Breyer, 1934, 1949; Revzan, 1962, 1968 to the political economy school of Arndt, 1981, 1983; Stern and Reve, 1980), connected to the interest of making best use of limited resources global-wide (see for example Dholakia and Dholakia, 1986), etc. Obviously, these various interests underpinning marketing actions are not always compatible. Rather, they are generally conflictual and competing.

Nor is the recognition new that human interests in marketing actions are not objectively given, or merely subjectively originated and attached by particular individuals or groups in isolation, but are intersubjectively created, shaped and maintained within certain ever changing sociohistorical relations (see HE systems in Chapter 6 and the critique on the received perception).

What is new is the question of whether and how the relation between contesting interests and marketing actions can be grounded rationally. What I am trying to argue for is therefore a discursive arena, in which any conceivable claims about the shape and character of marketing can be brought to listen and talk to each other in a criticisable rational way. Rather than basing marketing on some singular interest to perceive, plan, and take action (this is what 'marketing systems' always tend to do), my central concern is: can marketing's relation to consumption interests be made *rational* while preserving sufficient spaces for those interests to be differentiated and contesting?

Following Habermas, I will suggest, that marketing can be conceptualised as a kind of communicative action. Let me begin by arguing that marketing is always *public* and hence should be *communicative.* Even from the narrowest perspective, marketing is a public communicative action: it involves transactions which are always intending, carrying, and exchanging, that is, communicating, meanings and messages between at least one seller and one buyer (see for example Brinberg and Lutz, 1986; Levy, 1959, 1980). Marketing action is firstly originated by perceived *public* needs through certain kinds of market research and survey; it is next trying to inform and deliver to the *public* through marketing programmes what is provided in the marketplace; it is then always producing impacts, intended or unintended to the *public*, in terms of material condition improvement/damage and/or value imposing-maintaining-transforming. If this statement of the public nature of marketing action is accepted then marketing can be, and had better be, defined as primarily one of human communicative actions.

In his thesis of communication, Habermas distinguishes communicative action from other types of social action/interaction that are oriented to 'success' (the efficient achievement of ends). He calls this latter type of action purposive-rational action. With Habermas we can distinguish broadly two types of rationality in social actions: instrumental rationality and communicative rationality. Thompson has expressed Habermas's notion of rationality thus:

> When we use the term 'rational', observes Habermas, we assume that there is a close connection between rationality and knowledge. We assume, it seems, that actions or symbolic expressions are 'rational' insofar as they are based on knowledge which can be criticised. In calling an action 'rational' we may presume that the actor knows, or has good reason to believe, that the means employed will lead to success; in calling an

expression 'rational' we may presume that it bears some relation to the world and hence is open to objective - that is, inter-subjective - assessment. The former case, by linking the term 'rational' to the notion of action oriented to success, offers an intuitive basis for what Habermas calls *'cognitive-instrumental rationality'.* The latter case links the term 'rational' to the notion of inter-subjective assessment and thereby points towards a broader concept of *communicative rationality* in which various participants overcome their merely subjective views and, by virtue of the mutuality of rationally motivated conviction, assure themselves of both the unity of the objective world and the inter-subjectivity of their life relations (Habermas, 1981/1984:28) (Thompson, 1983:282; emphasis added).

Thus, according to Habermas, communicative action, and in our case marketing, in its broad sense, can be viewed and claimed as rational only when a consensus-of-belief is formed through nonmanipulative and noncoercive argumentation which is itself in turn 'built into' our everyday pretheoretical life:

We use the term *argumentation* for that type of speech in which participants thematise contested validity claims and attempt to vindicate or criticise them through arguments. An *argument* contains reasons or grounds that are connected in a systematic way with the *validity claim* of problematic expression. The 'strength' of an argument is measured in a given context by the soundness of the reasons; that can be seen in, among other things, whether or not an argument is able to convince the participants in a discourse, that is, to motivate them to accept the validity claim in question (Habermas, 1981/1984:18).

Claiming that marketing should be viewed and practised as primarily communicative action does not deny technical, behavioural, and/or political considerations. The 'truth' of Habermas's notion of communicative action and argumentation is to urge us to distinguish and to assure communicative rationality and instrumental rationality in social affairs, and to rebuild proper relations between these two dimensions. Otherwise, as in the case of marketing so far, communicative rationality is, more often than not, reduced to instrumental rationality which is usually manifested in forms of the mainstream technical and behavioural approaches (recall Part II and previous sections).

Unlike the backward-looking romantics who downplay and reject positive technical rationality on the one hand, and unlike those 'experts without vision' who equate technical logic with rationality *per se* on the other, Habermas's model of communicative rationality preserves a pluralist space for seeking technical rational enhancements to marketing's ability to serve the needs and desires that it has opted for, and in the meanwhile for pursuing an emancipatory rational attitude concerned about how existing regimes of marketing create and sustain social pathologies that are injurious to other human interests besides the technical logic.

Therefore, as communicative actions, marketing must be based on a balanced pursuit of both cognitive instrumental rationality and communicative rationality, each of which implies the other yet cannot be reduced to the other.

From Habermas's model of communicative rationality we can reasonably surface one cognitive reason why marketing has been degenerated to management techniques only. That is, the one-sided perception of marketing has emerged and been sustained due to our inability in the discipline to differentiate, and to keep a proper balance between, instrumental rationality oriented to success and communicative rationality oriented to 'better ordered' life relations.

With Habermas, we come to the recognition that marketing as human interested communicative actions, like any other social actions, 'is not first "goal-directed" (teleological), nor is it first a place for solitary subjects to materialise the noetic (consciousness). That is because goals and consciousness are themselves constructed out of the dynamics of intersubjective assent to (or refusal of) them (terms from Arrington and Puxty, 1991:44). In Habermas's terms,

> This concept of *communicative rationality* carries with it connotations based ultimately on the central experience of the unconstrained, unifying, consensus-bringing force of argumentative speech, in which different participants overcome their merely subjective views and, owing to the mutuality of rationally motivated conviction, assure themselves of both the unity of the objective world and the inter-subjectivity of their lifeworld (Habermas, 1981/1984:10).

Based on Habermas's articulation, we can possibly contend that marketing as communicative action is not first teleological or epistemic but ethical in the broadest sense. We can claim a marketing action as 'teleology' only in the sense of the goal of arriving at a rationally motivated compromises and agreements with respect to the shape and rationality of that action; and we can speak of the validity of marketing knowledge (epistemology) only after conditioning that knowledge by the ethics that informed intersubjective adjudication of competing interests. In other words, to perform rational marketing action we first need knowledge of how a polity interacted to produce our marketing action, of the normative rightness of that action, and of the validity of that action's influence on the lives and beliefs of marketers and consumers, before we can make intelligible judgements about the objective success of that action.

For Habermas, communicative rationality can come to action only through democratic ethical-political discourse, where public argumentation (on marketing and any other social actions) is unconstrained. Habermas's critical discourse model demands, for the adjudication of contestable interests in public discourse, that (1) no one should be excluded, (2) all have the right to make claims and criticise others, and (3) the only norms valid are those regulating common interests.

Arrington and Puxty (1991) present a good summary of Habermas's ethical-political model of communicative rationality. They suggest that the model helps us to recognise that we as communicative human beings must trade-off competing interests since we must co-ordinate collective action and build institutions that are injurious to particular interests at particular times and places. Thus no one is going to 'have their way' all the time, and rational communication requires that each compromises his or her merely 'subjective' interests in favour of a responsible public agreement. It is such an agreement that recognises the pragmatics of conceding one's private needs and desires at times, and it is such an agreement that recognises the right to contest the shape of social action - to always be able to criticise the validity claims on which public action is seen to depend. What matters is not that we get our way but that we are able to accept dysfunction without compulsion:

> [T]he consequences and side-effects for the satisfaction of the interests of every individual, which are expected to result from a general conformance ... can be accepted without compulsion by all (Habermas, 1982:257).

Therefore what communicative humankind need is not any kind of pluralism (for example that of 'anything goes'), but a pragmatic pluralism that is both critically rationalised and normatively informing in the above Habermasian sense.

So far in this section I have suggested firstly that marketing can better be conceptualised as human interested communicative actions; secondly that those interests originating and attached to marketing actions are always differentiable and contestable; thirdly that an adequate way to make rational the relation of marketing actions to contestable interests is through public argumentation without compulsion.

7.3.2 Rationally Interested Marketing Actions

In the rest of this section, for the purpose of this thesis, i.e., to explore a critical pluralist avenue by which we are to overcome the paradigmatic uneasiness in the discipline, I will suggest a typology of human interests in consumption needs in terms of technical enhancement, of subjective expectations, and of social norm formation. These interests can be conceived as standing in a relation to, and having potential consequences for, three worlds: a natural (objective) world, an internal (subjective) world, and a social (intersubjective) world (for the three world complexity see Appendix II). Accordingly, in the marketing context, we can have three broad domains of accountability: the domains of technical enhancement, of private experiences, and of public norms. These accountabilities will be related to three broad kinds of interested marketing actions respectively.

First, technical interest toward the objective natural world will be manifested as *teleological action,* where:

> The actor attains an end or brings about the occurrence of a desired state by choosing means that have promise of being successful in the given situation and applying them in a suitable manner. The central concept is that of a *decision* among alternative courses of action, with a view to the realisation of an end, guided by maxims, and based on an interpretation of the situation (Habermas, 1981/1984:85).

Accordingly, teleological marketing actions tackle issues of control and prediction, effectively to realise agreed marketing ends; for example to design, produce, or organise, goods and services, to inform the public about the products, to deliver products to targeted consumers, and to do all these tasks in an optimising way in benefit/cost terms, which are generally manifested into economic norms/technical criteria. It is this kind of marketing action that directly satisfies consumers' consumption needs and hence improves their standard of living.

Then, hermeneutic interest toward the subjective internal world can invoke *dramaturgical action*, where:

> From the perspective of dramaturgical action we understand social action as an encounter in which participants from a visible public for each other and perform for one another. 'Encounter' and 'performance' are the key concepts. ... A performance enables the actor to present himself to his audience in a certain way; in bringing something of his

subjectivity to appearance, he would like to be seen by his public in a particular way (Habermas, 1981/1984:90).

In this domain, dramaturgical marketing action accounts for personal experiences, meaning, reading, and expectations, in the marketplace; for example: to address what consumers want from the marketplace, how individuals prefer the marketplace to look like, how the Self expects the Other to read her/his desires in purchasing/selling performance, etc. This is a domain of private preferences, beliefs, imaginations, wills, desires and motives alike, which is construed by individual experiences, and results in an increasing heterogeneity of desires and activities in the marketplace. It is this kind of marketing action that makes human consumption needs differentiated, market segmented, products heterogeneous, and marketing programmes diverse.

Finally, ethical normative interest toward the intersubjective social world can produce *normatively regulated action*, where:

> The concept of normatively regulated action does not refer to the behaviour of basically solitary actor who come upon other actors in their environment, but to members of a social group who orient their action to common values. The individual actor complies with (or violates) a norm when in a given situation the conditions are present to which the norm has application. Norms express an agreement that obtains in a social group. All members of a group for whom a given norm has validity may expect of one another that in certain situations they will carry out (or abstain from) the actions commanded (or proscribed). The central concept of complying with a norm means fulfilling a generalised expectation of behaviour. The latter does not have the cognitive sense of expecting a predicted event, but the normative sense that members are entitled to a certain behaviour. This normative model of action lies behind the role theory that is widespread in sociology (Habermas, 1981/1984:88).

Normatively regulated actions in the marketing context can take the form of normatively regulating action to tackle the issue of co-ordinating the relation between private needs of individuals and collective needs of a society, and even conflictual needs in a global situation if necessary. As game theories indicate, individually rational actions may have damaging consequences to collective interests (Hollis, 1987; cf.: Power and Laughlin, 1991). In a marketing context, dramaturgical marketing actions derived by private subjective interests of one or a group of marketers or consumers may produce negative or at least unintended impact to other marketers and consumers. On other occasions, teleological actions may get out of hand from social guidance (terms from Etzioni, 1970). Hence human beings as marketers and consumers in the marketplace have to make normative appreciation of the rightness of teleological and/or dramaturgical marketing actions. Holding a pluralist perspective, I (and we, I believe) cannot offer a singular substantive rightness sovereign over marketing, since any such 'rightness' is based only on private, therefore partial, experience and rationality (recall Flood and Ulrich, 1991). However, confronted with situated marketing issues at a specific point of time and place, it is necessary and possible for participants in marketing actions to formulate a situational rightness through norm-conformative action; that is, normatively regulated action without compulsion, working towards rational public judgement and possible responsible agreement on ends to be adopted and means selected. It is this kind of marketing action that sorts out differentiated needs into satisfiable demands so that meaningful and realistic teleological marketing actions are possible.

It is important to point out that marketing actions do not function or operate in isolation, nor can any marketing situation be purely teleological, dramaturgical, or normatively regulative in character. Rather, although differentiable and heterogeneous, various marketing actions and their underpinning interests always condition, imply, and interact with each other. In short, they should be viewed as constituting a system. As presented earlier, teleological action can produce desired outcomes only when agreed end(s) have been reached. This indicates the necessity of normative regulated action through which human fellows can participate without compulsion in discourse toward a situational compromise/agreement on end(s). Normative regulated action, in its fundamental sense, can only happen when related to dramaturgical action where as many as possible value systems and expectations can be brought about, which make normative regulated action truly public and democratic. Further, normative regulated action can have significance only when it is to be transformed into teleological action which directly improves human conditions. Then, dramaturgical action depends on teleological action to provide material conditions within which it becomes possible. Dramaturgical action also depends on normative regulated action through which a higher level of rational agreement on cognition takes place about situationally appropriate action to be taken. Therefore, the three kinds of marketing action and their underpinning interests always interact with one another. Any one, isolated from the other two, will lose meaning or become impossible in any proper sense. In short, they are related components of a larger whole, i.e., a contestable interested action system.

7.3.3 Implications

So far in this chapter I have been arguing, in the light of Habermas's critical theory, that marketing can be conceived primarily as a rationally interested communicative action system constituted of human teleological, dramaturgical, and normatively regulated actions. This conception of marketing has at least the following immediate implications.

First, since 'the whole is more than the sum of its parts', marketing as an action system holds new emergent properties which can identified only from the intertwining and interaction of constituting actions. That is, we are confronted with a higher level of complexity that cannot be found from merely teleological, dramaturgical, or normatively regulated actions. On the other hand, different research approaches, although each may be satisfactory in tackling particular constituting marketing actions, may not be individually able to deal with the higher level complexity. This indicates that to tackle the marketing whole, 'something' more than being devoted to individual approaches is required. I suggest that that 'something' could be a well 'theoretically constituted perspective' (terms from Habermas) which will be able firstly to get the 'best' out of individual differentiable approaches and then to facilitate collective synergism among those 'best's, while at the same time preserving places for competing approaches to pursue their individual potentials. It is this 'something' that this thesis is all about - I call it 'systems marketing'.

Secondly, since 'the whole will lose its essential properties when taken apart', marketing as a communicative action system requires us to treat it as a *holon* (in the sense of Checkland and Scholes, 1991) rather than to reduce it into one or some of its constituting component actions. According to the critique of the received perception in previous sections, the real danger in the marketplace so far has been the tendency of reducing marketing into teleological actions only, and the real danger in the marketing discipline has been the tendency to reduce marketing knowledge into instrumental reasoning alone. In other words, marketing has been taken apart and has been conceptualised in terms of teleological rationality only. In my view, this is partly because we marketing theorists usually tend to treat marketing by certain easily-reached methods. As demonstrated earlier, marketing as a whole cannot be studied by a single method in any proper sense, no matter how sophisticated or 'scientific' that method might be. Only variety can destroy variety. Differentiable and contestable interested marketing actions can be tackled properly only with appropriate differentiated methods. *Diversity in marketing situations requires plurality among approaches.* In tackling marketing system as a whole, rather than taking it apart, on the one hand no approach should be excluded from the very beginning, while on the other hand, no approach could claim at the end that it is alone adequate. Only collectively can they claim to be sufficient. Therefore a 'truly' pluralist attitude toward the diversity in differentiated inquiry modes and research approaches must be adopted.

Thirdly, since 'components of a system cannot be understood or tackled if isolated from the system whole', marketing actions, albeit differentiable, cannot be studied properly in an isolated manner. According to Ackoff (1981), component actions concerned should be conceptualised upward as a part of a larger whole and could be understood adequately only in terms of their role in the larger whole, and in terms of their relation to other actions. Parallel to this argument, various marketing approaches, which are 'specialised' for tackling particular kinds of marketing actions, cannot work well or realise their individual potentials in isolation. Rather, they have to seek proper recognition of their relation to the others, to reflect on their proper positions in the approach family, to appreciate what kind of marketing action they are 'the best' to support, and to find any possible way to listen to, to learn from, and ultimately to complement, each other. As articulated earlier, marketing actions, albeit differentiable, are always interweaving with each other, which leaves us no other choice, but to employ various methods in a complementary and informed manner. All these indicate the necessity of an open, reflective and communicative perspective towards the diversity of alien or even conflictual approaches.

To summarise, in this section I have tried to conceptualise marketing as primarily a communicative action system constituted of contestable interested actions, which could be made rational through criticisable reasoning and public argumentation without compulsion. One immediate advantage of this rationally-interested-communicative-action-systems conception is, based on the notion of systems, that the conceptualisation as such inherently indicates the necessity of contestable research approaches, and inherently requires an open, reflective and communicative attitude towards contesting approaches.

7.4 A CRITICAL SYSTEMS STATEMENT OF MARKETING

In the previous section, I have conceptualised marketing as a rationally interested communicative action system. While such conceptualisation can be seen as an attempt to reorient marketing critically and systemically, nevertheless it remains highly pedagogical and abstract. Therefore, in this section I try, based on the critique of marketingisation and the principles of the reconceptualisation, to formulate a relatively operational statement of marketing in which both criticality and systemicity are incorporated and integrated.

A critical systems statement of marketing is hereby worked out as follows:

Marketing is a *management technology, social process and institution* *for* *systemically* *understanding, formulating, and satisfying* *sociohistorically shaped* *human economic consumption needs*.

A systemic understanding of the implications of this statement can be achieved by investigating the meaning of the component words and by explaining how they should be read as a whole expression. The order in which these will be unfolded in the following will be: (1) management technology, social process and institution, (2) understanding, formulating, and satisfying, (3) systemically, (4) sociohistorically shaped, (5) human economic consumption needs.

(1) Defining marketing as simultaneously *management technology, social process and institution* manifests the pluralist 'systems marketing' perspective. Unlike various 'marketing systems' that generally define marketing respectively as merely management technology (see for example the 'marketing concept' and the managerial school), or social process (see for example the functionalist approach or the exchange model of marketing), or social institution (see for example the institutional and political economy models of marketing), which tend to emphasise a singular aspect of marketing at the expenses of ignoring, downplaying or at worst distorting the others,

the proposed statement attempts to embrace differentiable characters and dimensions of marketing into a critically pluralist image, stressing the interaction of those characters and dimensions. Together these three key words constitute marketing as an irreducible multifaceted whole (see also (3) later).

We know that it is not new in marketing literature to define marketing as technology, as social process, or as social institution. However not all meanings attached to these words are well questioned and developed. What is distinct in these key words that make the statement critical and systemic is hereby considered in the following paragraphs.

Firstly, 'marketing is a *management technology*' in the statement should be read in the Habermasian sense. It is important to recognise that an 'upward' trend toward greater emphasis on subjective and intersubjective aspects of marketing as presented in the last section does not intend or imply a lessening concern with technical enhancement and positive reasoning. Human destiny can become manifest only when humankind is released from the struggle for physical survival. In the marketing context, there is ample evidence that marketing techniques in market research, product and package design, physical distribution, retailing and wholesaling, advertising, promotion, public relations, etc., have greatly improved efficiency for adopted ends. In developed countries, marketing as management technology has begun to, for example, accelerate the transformation of the useless into the useful, recycling waste so it becomes raw material of value, while in developing countries, marketing as management technology, if used properly, can become multiplier of national economic growth as well as individual wealth. Ultimately, maximising the full potential of the world's limited material resources requires highly sophisticated techniques for answering the optimisational how, where, when questions, which is the natural province of marketing strategic planning and marketing programmes (Dawson, 1987; Kumcu *et al.*, 1986). Marketing techniques can work well when put in the hands of well-identified agencies with well-defined goals (Dholakia and Dholakia, 1986:67). Therefore management technology has been, still is, and will continue to be, an indispensable characteristic and aspect of marketing.

All this said, it is, however, more important to emphasise in our current marketing context the crucial necessity to address the colonising effect of instrumental reasoning, and to locate management technology at an appropriate position within the marketing whole. The real danger in the discipline, one which has already been realised, as illustrated earlier, is that the technical aspect is equated with the marketing whole and that instrumental reasoning advances its own operational imperatives at the expense of other rationalities. More and more evidence is reported that isolated from, and colonising over, other dimensions of marketing, management technology and instrumental reasoning have produced disastrous outcomes to both developed as well as developing countries, at individual, organisational and national levels of social life (Belk and Zhou, 1986; Firat, 1987a; Marcuse, 1964; Moorman, 1987). Therefore, marketing as management technology should not be uncritically accepted. Nor is it on its own an adequate statement of the marketing whole. It should be, instead, constituted as only a part of a larger whole. For this Habermas provides an exemplar. Habermas is for science rather than against it. However he always establishes legitimacy for science with a critical standard, locating it under the guidance of the lifeworld (see Appendix II).

Secondly, the reading of 'marketing is a *social process*' should go beyond the limitation of the functionalist approach (for example that of Alderson, 1957, 1965) and exchange theory of marketing (for example that of Kotler, 1972). Both these two schools of thought conceptualise marketing as social process; however, their notions of 'social process' are quite problematic. On the one hand, the functionalist perspective denotes social process as compulsive functions determined by a set of given system needs ('functional requisites'). As a result, marketing as social process in the functionalist perspective 'has been narrowly restricted to technological problems of the manager' (Bagozzi, 1976:586). On the other hand, the exchange model of marketing tends to universalise marketing into interactions '*indistinguishable* from other categories of human action' (Kotler, 1972, 1973, as quoted and analysed earlier). In both cases, in their final analysis, 'the social process is defined as being the technology, rather than the technology being defined merely as a means of implementing the basic social process' (Sweeney, 1972:8). In short, 'marketing as social process' might be, and has been, telescoped into, teleological actions alone.

We need to stress our critical insights embedded into our definition of marketing as social process. Here I am going to emphasise two crucial aspects. One is that as *process*, marketing must have a historical dimension (Firat, 1985b, 1987b; Fullerton, 1986, 1988; also see Chapter 6); or in a marketing jargon, it has a 'product life cycle'. A certain kind of marketing can emerge and mature; it can also decline and disappear, or be replaced by other kinds. The current form of marketing may be compatible with the current occurrence of western capitalist system. But it will change. According to Kumcu, 'social institutions are neither static nor given but rather change through time. Indeed, as a social institution, marketing is itself subject to historic change and evolution' (Kumcu, 1987:127). Therefore, our attention should be guided to 'understanding and explaining the structural change in marketing systems and in anchoring its relations with other institutions to their social and economic origins' (*ibid*). Thus, the mission of marketing theorists is more to study how and when marketing as it stands today and its wider conditions break down, and what kind of marketing will be more compatible with the desire of human beings, than to focus on how to sustain existing relations (Heede, 1980). The second aspect to be emphasised is that as *social* process marketing must always have a societal or macro dimension. Being pluralist, it is not intended here to reject the necessity of micro perspective and the interest of firms in marketing. They should have their place. Rather, what I am arguing is that micro analysis should be situated within a broader macro image, and that the interest of firms should always be made compatible with that of society, since 'without some linkage to a macro framework, micro theories will not be able to deal with many questions regarding constraints, assumptions and input variables, having to accept them as givens without an explanation and/or understanding of their state' (Firat, 1984a:5). In systems terms, we can only understand (micro) parts in terms of a larger (macro) whole within which the parts are embedded. Thus, if marketing is conceived as a social process, it must be at once conceived historically and societally.

Finally, defining marketing as a *social institution(s)* is not new either. Traditionally, there are three broad notions in viewing marketing as institution. Firstly the conventional institutional approach is concerned mainly with the value-adding role of various institution*s* *in* marketing based on the division of labour theory, usually focusing on the effectiveness and efficiency of distribution channels (see Chapter 3). Then there are a group of marketing theorists who view marketing as an organic whole, that is, as an institution *of* marketing, which is made up of a great variety of marketing structures, whose function is co-ordinated not merely by market prices and profit margins, but also by management using authoritarian and persuasive techniques (see for example Duddy, 1947; Revzan, 1961, 1968;). Finally, another group of scholars who define marketing as a social institution have put their emphasis on the ownership and mission of the marketing institution. It is claimed that 'marketing is a part of society' (Moorman, 1987:197). It is argued that 'society, not the business entrepreneur, is the basic undertaker of all activity. Marketing is that activity undertaken by society at large to meet its consumption needs - the producing, distribution and consuming of products needed for human existence' (Bartels, 1968:250). The standpoint of this last strand is usually at the side of the unfortunate or powerless in society since it is believed that in most current situations, 'many segments and individuals in society cannot effectively participate in the market because they lack the buying power and the required organisation' (Firat *et al.*, 1987:xiv).

Compared with these different notions of 'marketing as a social institution', I will emphasise the dialectics between the implementing and manipulating functions of the marketing institution. On the one hand, marketing is an implementing function or social mechanism through which members of society receive their standard of living. It is, or should be, conditioned, determined, and directed by the collective will of a society. This is why we humankind as marketers and consumers increasingly emphasise the importance of working out marketing strategies, plans, programs and co-ordinating regulations. We want to dictate and control the activities and performance of the marketing institution. In other words, the marketing institution is, or should be, a 'listening' and 'doing' instrument realising human wills. We believe in this, we emphasise this belief, and work under this belief. What we often neglect and downplay, however, is what happens the other way around, that is, the influencing and constituting function of social institutions. Hamilton, an institution economist, states: 'Institutions *fix* the confines of and *impose* form upon the activities of human beings' (cf.: Revzan, 1968:99, emphasis added). In other words, marketing as a social institution is at the same time always 'telling' and 'shaping'. Critical systems thinkers always remind us of the 'practical life consequence' of social practical sciences within which marketing stands (see Appendix III). In the marketing discipline, unfortunately, this issue has not been systematically addressed. If there is any recognition of the impact of the marketing institution, it usually focused on the individual level, i.e., how marketing influences the value systems and life style of consumers as individuals (for example Pollay, 1986); or it emphasise at an isolated (usually an economic) dimension, e.g., how the marketing institution can work as an economic growth amplifier (for example Drucker, 1958). No substantive attempt has been tried to investigate the overall impact of the constitutional functioning of marketing onto the wider multifaceted/multidimensional sociohistorical condition as a whole. Only recently have self-reflective marketing theorists begun to recognise that 'Marketing ... has distinctive power effects for organisations, managers, consumers and society as a whole. ... marketing [is] a way of thinking about and doing particular social relations. ... Marketing is best understood as a set of practices and discourses which help to constitute and shape social relations in modern Western societies. ... Marketing stands at the centre of these social processes.' (Morgan, 1992:136-7; also see Dawson, 1980:79). I consider this insight very important since it reminds us of the possibility of the constitutional function of marketing. When doing marketing, we are actually engaging in some kind of social relation, creating, retaining or transforming in a particular way the whole social situation where we have no escape. There are infinite possibilities of these doing, creating, sustaining, and transforming activities, which can be determined by humankind. The point is that we have to at least be aware of these functions and possibilities. This is why the dialectic functioning of marketing as a social institution must be stressed.

(2) *Understanding, formulating, and satisfying* are the domains of marketing activities derived from dramaturgical, norm-forming, and teleological marketing actions elaborated in the last section.

At the first glance, no one will argue with the logic here: firstly we have to understand and conceive in the marketplace what people need, then classify, compare, and sort out those needs, and finally satisfy those needs by effectively and efficiently delivering desired goods and services. Understanding, formulating and satisfying therefore constitute an operational mix of marketing activities. They are all indispensable operations of the marketing whole. A simple reading of these three phrases seems to provide a common-sense view of marketing, on which everyone (paradigms or theories) will agree. For example it is commonly agreed that before marketing sets out to produce and deliver products, we have to understand what are the needs and desires of consumers. As Fennell (1986) claims, the monumental question of marketing is: what do people want?. In terms of marketers, that is the question of what shall we produce? (for example the customer orientation in the marketing concept or the managerial school), while in terms of consumers that is the question of what can I get from the marketplace? (for example the questionnaire survey in the buyer behavioural approach). It is also easy to agree that conceived needs have to be formulated, that is, to be classified, compared and sorted out, so that appropriate products can be designed, produced, and then informed and delivered to customers in order to match their desires.

However, critical insights embedded within our statement will become apparent and significant when we address the following issues. First, *how* do we understand and conceive consumer needs? The answer for EM and BB systems is that this can be done through positive methods, for example random sampling, stochastic, statistic techniques, etc. However, substantial materials in the marketing literature have reported that 'hard' methods simply do not work in understanding or conceiving consumer needs (recall Chapter 5). If we accept that human needs are more than merely biological or economic, but also psychological, cultural, social and so on, underpinned by human private experience and changing free-wills, value systems, preference, motives, etc. (obviously this is commonly accepted; see for example Katona, 1953; Kassarjian and Robertson, 1968), then needs can be understood better through human dramaturgical actions rather than teleological ones. In turn, meanings in dramaturgical actions can be better read and interpreted through hermeneutic methods, which are variously referred to as qualitative, interpretive, ethnographic, phenomenological, subjective, and naturalistic methods (see the interpretive consumer research in Chapter 5).

Second, *what* are those needs to be understood? In other words, should needs be taken as given 'out there' to be scanned and grasped, or should they be subject to prior inquiry? The answer from EM and BB and even IC systems tends, explicitly or implicitly, to be that needs are already 'out there' to be 'discovered' (for example Kotler and Zaltman, 1971:5). The asked question is then usually converted into what method(s) should be employed to conceive and manipulate needs. As Heede (1980) and Dickinson *et al.* (1986) contend, this belief is built on the Protestant model of Man assuming that man always possesses sufficient ability and information, and therefore always knows what her/his real need is and what products are provided in the marketplace that best match her/his need. As self-reflective marketing theorists and consumer researchers criticise, this model and hence the belief that human needs can be taken as granted is flawed and impoverished (e.g., Firat, 1984a, 1988b, c). Due to the limitation in her/his cognitive competence and various constraints, man as an individual does not always know what her/his 'true' need is. Her/his expression of needs through dramaturgical actions may be compulsory (Galbreith, 1958), hedonic (Hirschman and Holbrook, 1984), commercialised (Moorman, 1987), conspicuous (Marson, 1984), dominated (Firat, 1987a), manipulated (Dickinson *et al.*, 1986), alienated (Marcuse, 1964), and so on. Therefore needs articulated in marketplace should not be taken as given, but be a topic for prior investigation and public argumentation.

Thirdly, *for whose interest*, or in whose terms, to understand and formulate consumption needs? Parallel to Kerlinsky's (1987) argument that marketing is by far an asymmetric game, Belk (1987b) has argued that the research agenda in the discipline thus far has been constrained within a narrow set of micro issues such as:

- How can we predict which brand a consumer will buy?
- How can a product or service be designed that consumers are especially likely to buy?
- How can we determine which market segments are most likely to buy a product or service?
- How can we measure the effects of advertising on consumer brand attitudes?

Belk argues that these issues have converted human consumption needs into buyer behaviour, based solely on the viewpoint of marketing managers, and geared merely for the interest of firms (also see Firat, 1984a; Hirschman, 1983; Holbrook, 1985a). As an alternative, Belk suggests considering the following macro consumer behaviour issues for the consumers' own sake:

- How do consumers make trade-offs between money, durables, and discretionary nondurables?
- Does the acquisition and consumption of money, durables, and discretionary nondurables contribute positively, negatively, or not at all to happiness and feelings of well-being?
- What roles do consumption objects play in interpersonal relations?
- How does the consumption of products and experiences affect consumer sense of self?
- Why and under what conditions do consumers share their goods, wealth, and services (and with whom)?
- What will Chinese (PRC) consumers first want as income and discretionary income increase? Will these consumers be better off for wanting and getting these things?
- What is the consumer culture and when did it originate?

Again, this is not to say that micro buyer behaviour issues and firm managers' terms are not a legitimate and useful part of the language in which to conceive and formulate consumption needs. Neither am I here trying to provide a ready answer as to whose terms should be adopted. What I read from Belk's message is that there should be involved many more terms and interests when defining what needs ought to be, and that no particular terms or interests can always hold sway, or be accepted by default.

Finally, holding a pluralist perspective toward needs does not deny the necessity and possibility of making judgement and agreement on consumption needs since needs are always already historically situated. Following the argument in the last section, judgements and agreements should be reached through normatively regulated actions. For operational purposes, on the way toward the ideal communicative conditions where normatively regulated actions are possible, the formulation of 'what needs ought to be satisfied' and 'in what order' can be undertaken through dialogical political action and enlightenment. Political actions have already been a substantial part of marketing practice (for example Kotler (1981) has added politics as the fifth P to the marketing mix). As to enlightenment, as argued earlier, marketing as a social institution is always educating members of society how to know, to see, and to perform social relations. Dawson considers that 'Marketing provides the only known means for redirecting the attitudes, perceptions, and values of a mass society' (Dawson, 1980:79). In short, politics and enlightenment in a certain form are always already existing and functioning in marketing. What we need to do is only a further step to release the political action and education function from the domination of particular interest(s) so that they become means for pluralist ends (needs).

(3) *'Systemically'* in the statement indicates and pushes forward the importance of the holistic perspective in marketing practice and inquiry. It emphasises that understanding, formulating, and satisfying imply and interact with one another. Therefore, marketing should not be reduced to only one category of activity. Satisfying, i.e., teleological actions derived by instrumental interest, in current situated context is the most common orientation and concern of marketing. However, as argued earlier, satisfying should be put on the agenda only when the question of 'what should we produce and deliver?' has been answered. Therefore, satisfying requires understanding and formulating as prerequisites. Understanding through dramaturgical actions underwritten by hermeneutic interest alone, on the other hand, is not a sufficient basis for selecting, deciding, or reaching compromise on, what needs should be satisfied and in what order, which indicates that formulating activity must be involved. Finally, as a distinctive marketing activity, i.e., proper normative regulated actions towards emancipatory interest, formulating can only happen within discourses which accommodate as many private experiences and interpretations as possible, and has meaning only when transformed into satisfying activities which directly implement what society wants marketing to do: that is, to deliver a desired standard of living to members of society by moving goods/services from the point of production to the

point of consumption, effectively and efficiently. To sum up, understanding, formulating, and satisfying activities always imply, condition, and interact with each other. Thus the marketing whole should not be reduced to any particular activity. Further, any particular constituting activity will lose meaning when isolated from the other two.

Systemically should also be read as a general perspective rejecting any tendency of reduction; for example, reducing pluralist interests into the firms' interest only, reducing the dialectic functioning of the marketing institution into a one-way operation, reducing macro marketing phenomena into a micro image, reducing the diversity and richness of available approaches into a singular 'scientific method', etc.

(4) *'Sociohistorically shaped'* in the statement emphasises the dynamic and situational characters of consumer needs, which is parallel to the previous argument that marketing as a social process must incorporate historical and societal dimensions. From a critical point of view, human needs are not something fixed or universal, but are 'the products of total historical human experience' (Firat *et al.*, 1987:xvi). As society advances, human experience and hence needs can change, and change at various rates, in various ways, for various reasons (Boddewyn, 1985; Fullerton, 1987; Kumcu, 1987). Further, human needs are not changing and evolving in a vacuum. Rather, as any other human value systems, they are conditioned by the wider context, which may take forms of materialistic situations, power/economic relations, and/or ideologies (Dholakia and Dholakia, 1985; Flood, 1990a; Flood and Ulrich, 1990; Gronmo, 1985; Heede, 1985; de Monthoux, 1985; Oliga, 1988, 1991). Thus, without a well-developed awareness of time, change, and social context, one cannot claim a comprehensive understanding of human needs. One of the major issues we must now address in comprehending human needs is, therefore, the formation and transformation of marketing structures, institutions, processes and their relation to the general socio-economic, cultural, political, and historic processes of the society. In sum, since needs, should they be 'real', alienated, hedonic, compensatory,

dominated, false, etc., are sociohistorically shaped, to understand, criticise, and formulate human needs must be at once to investigate, criticise and transform the society.

(5) On *human economic consumption needs.* Should marketing be an action distinguishable or indistinguishable from other human actions? Should marketing focus on tackling human economic consumption needs, or should marketing expand the functional domain of its disciplinary power to intervene in other, or ultimately all, kinds of human affairs such as voting, socialising, self-actualising, loving, sexing, caring, etc.?

A premise of my thesis is that marketing is a rich phenomenon; therefore it should not be reduced into any one or a set of its sub-dimension(s). Following the same logic, I would assert that human actions are so diverse, rich and heterogeneous that they should not be reduced or simplified to 'fit' into the realm of marketing. Reducing or assimilating various human actions into marketing, like reducing or simplifying the marketing whole into its sub-dimension(s), is distorting. It is not a proper way to treat anything which can be conceived as a 'system'. This is why I criticise the process of marketingisation, or the colonisation of marketing system over the lifeworld; that is, the attempt to define all social relations, from caring and loving to political voting/promising, in solely marketing (or exchange) terms.

Therefore, I agree with Arndt (1976, 1978a, b), Bartels (1974, 1983, 1986) and Tuck (1974) that:

> For marketing to become a ... science, it must be firmly based on ... theories providing a systematic explanation of the phenomenon of interest - in this case, the economic need satisfaction processes. ... Marketing should be positioned as what Fisk terms a provisioning mechanism, the social instruments through which members of society receive their standard of living. More specifically, the role of marketing in society is to match supply and demand, and to provide an informational basis for responsible decisions

by marketers, consumers, and government. ... While exchange may be a fruitful abstraction of the marketing function, not all exchanges are *marketing* exchanges. For the reasons suggested above, marketing will cover only the resolving of the *economic* needs and wants in society' (Arndt, 1978:101).

Defining marketing within the domain of tackling economic consumption needs rather than other human affairs does not deny the necessity of embracing other dimensions of psychological, social, political and historical considerations. The dialectics here is: on the one hand, we have to address psychological, social, political, historical (and other) issues for the purpose of holistic understanding and properly tackling human economic consumption needs, because those issues are all relevant to, and are always shaping, economic needs as well as marketing activities, thus marketing should not be isolated from questions of those issues. On the other hand, however, we must reject the attempt of expanding the functional domain of the marketing disciplinary power to intervene other human affairs, since such an attempt inherently (sometimes going beyond human awareness) implies the tendency of the inner-colonisation of marketing system over the lifeworld. In short, part(s) concerned (here economic consumption needs) should be tackled in terms of the containing whole (here the wider sociohistorical conditions/issues), while the logic of contained part(s) must *not* be generalised into that of the containing whole.

Now a critical articulation of the component phrases composing the proposed statement has been presented. Based on the thorough articulation, it is possible to say that the statement proposed is at once critical and systemic. It is critical because it tries to break down the current domination of a singular rationality, encourages reflection on the relations between differentiated marketing approaches, actions, and underlying interests. It is at the same time systemic, since it insists on bringing heterogeneous interests, rationalities and approaches, into a holistic marketing image, rejecting reductionist or isolationist tendencies in the discipline.

CONCLUSION

Now we are in a position to summarise what we have sought to achieve in this chapter. First, an attempt was made to deconstruct the exclusive one-sided conception of marketing, and to outline the sociohistorical condition where, and the cognitive reason why and how, the distorting and suppressing institution and ideology of marketing come to being. Then, marketing was reconstructed as a critical rationally grounded human communicative action system which embraces and supports positive enhancement, subjective experience and emancipatory attitude, interweaving and interacting in the process of understanding, formulating and satisfying sociohistorically situated human consumption needs. The aim of the deconstruction and reconstruction is to transform marketing as such that it inherently indicates the necessity of a pluralist perspective and a complementarist strategy toward the irreducible diversity of differentiable, alien, competing, or even conflicting, reasoning modes, inquiry paradigms and research approaches. Therefore, the whole chapter can be viewed as an attempt and step towards establishing a critical systems pluralist perspective in marketing study.

Pluralism as articulated in this chapter is not only indispensable for dealing with the recent unproductive and stagnating paradigmatic tension in the discipline, but also has significance for tackling urgent practical issues in real situations confronting marketing. Nowadays we are facing pollution and ecological imbalance in the environment, undernutrition and malnutrition in the third world, inequality and tensions in world trade, hardship and disappointment in economic transformation, etc., which are, partly or largely, produced by marketing activities. As Firat *et al.* (1987) point out, no major problem of this kind is just social, ecological, economic, political, cultural, or psychological, but rather 'total'. Solutions, or dissolutions, therefore, cannot be sought through merely management technology or any single method(s); rather, they require an inter-dimensional perspective to embrace and cut across methods. For this, we have no reason to exclude any possible ways of knowing and doing. Instead, all Others should be carefully heard, while all Selves should be critically reflected on.

Chapter 8

DIVERSITY AND RESPONSES IN MARKETING STUDY

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter a historical account is presented of the diversity of research approaches and inquiry domains, as well as recent responses to this diversity, in marketing study. Through the presentation, the aim is to demonstrate that a critical reconstruction, which simultaneously promotes collective complementarity and facilitates individual enhancement, is indispensable and urgently needed.

The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section investigates how the diversity in marketing study comes to us. It is shown that the diversity is a result of a kind of self-reflection in the discipline, as well as a manifestation of a much wider intellectual development throughout all branches of science. Through deimprisoning from *the* scientific method, marketing study has developed a significant diversity in research, which covers substantive, meta-theoretical and ideological inquiry domains, and in which exist a wide range of valuable research approaches.

Responses to the diversity, too, appear diverse. Thus in Section 8.2, some representative responses are outlined, and their basic attitudes, positive impacts and limitations analysed. It is shown that, due to their lack of an adequate ontological vision, due to their ignorance of the sociological dimension, and due to their inability in addressing the possibility of rationally grounded listening and speaking among rival approaches, these responses have left room for a new domination in the discipline, the domination of a misleading epistemic Either/Or debate.

In the final section, a brief account of this epistemic Either/Or debate will be given, revealing the difference, as well as the spoken or unspoken deep seated common foundations, of the conflicting rivals of the debate - the objectivist and the relativist stands. It is argued that this Either/Or has locked the discipline into an intellectual black hole, providing no hope to move beyond the paradigmatic stagnation.

Finally, in the conclusion to the chapter, the researcher's conception of the development thread underlying meta-theoretical inquiry in marketing is presented. It is argued that marketing study has moved from a pre-paradigmatic age into a paradigmatic age, and that it is necessary to advance to a post-paradigmatic age through a critical reconstruction.

8.1 THE DEVELOPMENT OF DIVERSITY

As presented to some extent in Chapter 2, the scientific status of marketing study has been always a concern of consciously self-reflective marketing academics, partly because marketing as a discipline, since its separation from its parent discipline economics, has been continuously borrowing concepts, theoretical constructs, and research methods, from a wide range of natural as well as social sciences. Marketing study has never built up for itself a central or concrete 'theoretical core', or, a master model. Can such kind of knowledge inquiry, based upon borrowing without a theoretical core, direct marketing study to be a science?

Since Converse (1945) formally posed this question, it has become 'the oldest controversy in the marketing literature' (Bush *et al.*, 1982:30). By the end of 1970s, there existed three 'schools of thought' in this regard (Solomon, 1979). There were those who claimed that marketing is already a science, for example Hunt (1976a, b), Kotler (1972), and Robin (1970). There were also those who believed that marketing has potential to be a science, for example Alderson and Cox (1948), Bartels (1951), Dawson (1971), Levy (1976), Mills (1961), and Taylor (1965). There were still also those who held that marketing can never hope to be a science, for example Brown (1948), Hutchinson (1952), Longman (1971), Oxenfeldt (1961), Sweesey (1972), and Vaile (1949).

Whatever positions these scholars held, the criterion against which they judged the scientific status of marketing was the same. That criterion, to quote Bush *et al.*, was built on the belief that

> ... the role of laws play a vital part in determining whether or not marketing is science. The development of laws in marketing is a requirement for explaining and ultimately predicting marketing phenomena. That is, laws or lawlike statements will provide predictive power which is necessary for the scientific understanding and control of marketing phenomena. However, is it possible to have statements of lawlike nature in marketing? Can lawlike statements in the social sciences satisfy the criterion of falsifiability? *If so, marketing is indeed a science* (Bush *et al.*, 1982:30; emphasis added).

Hunt formulates a more systematic statement as to what differentiates scientific theory from non-scientific. He claims that: (1) A theory is a systematically related set of statements; (2) A theory includes law-like generalisations specifying relationships among variables; and (3) These statements and law-like generalisations should be empirically testable (Hunt, 1971). Later, Hunt provides his conclusion to the 'Is marketing a science?' controversy thus: 'In summary, sciences (1) have a distinct subject matter drawn from the real world which is described and classified, (2) presume underlying uniformities and regularities interrelating the subject matter, and (3) adopt intersubjectively certifiable procedures for study the subject matter' (Hunt, 1976b). In his later debate with the relativist position, Hunt furthers his argument by stating that 'The open empirical testing process, therefore, provides a common methodological formulation for evaluation the knowledge-claims of *all sciences*' (Hunt, 1984:32, emphasis added).

Clearly, the scientific status of marketing is believed to depend on whether marketing adopts *the* scientific method, procedure, and criteria. By the 1980's, this belief was hidden, invisible, taken as granted and formalised. This paradigm not only restricted the 'Is marketing a science?' debate, but also shadowed other issues discussed at that time, such as 'A general theory *of* or theories *in* marketing?' (see Chapter 2) and 'The broadened concept of marketing' (see Appendix IV).

This period could be termed the pre-paradigmatic age in the sense, which might be different from that of Kuhn (1962) and Ritzer (1975), that although 'the method of science' did signify and constitute a paradigm, little, if any, questioning or critique challenged that paradigm.

Today, when we step back and look what went before us, it appears clear that in that 'scientific' line of thinking, marketing by no means stood alone. The prevailing attitude at that time among professional social scientists in various disciplines was that their discipline was now on the secure path of becoming a genuine science, a science differing in degree but not in kind from natural sciences. Progress in the social sciences, they argued, requires adoption of those methods, procedures, and criteria for testing hypotheses and theories that had proven so successful in the natural sciences (cf.: Bernstein, 1983:27; Bredo and Feinberg, 1982:3-4). Or, to borrow Nietzsche (1913:3), our century (and marketing study in particular, I suggest) is distinguished not by the triumph of science, but by the triumph of *the* scientific method of science (cf.: Sherry, 1991:550).

Between 1970's and 1980's, questions and changes emerged in marketing study, although all these came much later than they occurred in other social sciences (according to Bernstein (1983, 1985), similar challenges in the wider background were signified by the publication of Winch's *The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy* (1958), Gadamer's *Truth and Method* (1960/1975), and Kuhn's *Structure of Scientific Revolution* (1962)). What also distinguished marketing from other social sciences in this regard is that, in marketing the questioning was first posed, not regarding philosophical paradigm issues, but regarding the issue of the appropriate substantive domain of marketing inquiry.

In other words, change began when conscious self-reflective marketers challenged the taken-for-granted and limited scope of marketing. Theorists criticised marketing study for being blinded so long by the question of 'How to do?' that marketing had lost its sight of the question of 'What phenomena marketing as a social-practical discipline should tackle?'. In 1978, Jacoby undertook a review of the consumer research literature, arguing that the discipline was resting on 'easy-to-use measuring instruments' and 'the almost toy-like nature of sophisticated quantitative techniques', while 'little reliance is placed on theory, either to suggest which variables and aspects of consumer behaviour are of greatest importance and in need of research or as a foundation around which to organise and integrate findings' (Jacoby, 1978:88). Sheth (1979, 1982, 1985) also examined, analysing the dimensions of focus, process, and purpose, the 'surpluses and shortages' in consumer behaviour theory and research. Sheth found that our knowledge inquiry was too much dominated by empirical models, too much constrained by description and borrowing, as well as too much driven by managerial ends. Following this, Hirschman and Holbrook (1982) pointed out that consumer research has focused on just a limited portion of consumer behaviour but neglected other equally or more importance ones. Along this line of argument, a conscious concern for the proper nature, scope and subject matter of marketing began to grow rapidly (i.e., What substantive phenomena or issues marketing as a scientific discipline should study) (see for example Arndt, 1981; Belk 1984a, b, 1986, 1987; Benton, 1987; Dholakia and Arndt, 1985; Firat *et al.*, 1987; Holbrook, 1985a, b, 1987; Kilbourne, 1987; Moorman, 1987; Sherry, 1987; Uusitabo and Uusitabo, 1981; Zaltman and Wallendorf, 1977; Zielinski and Robertson, 1982, etc.).

The concern regarding the substantive domain of marketing study was not new. In the last chapter, some earlier critique of the limitation, distortion, and constriction of the one-sided inquiry has been summarised. What was new and distinct in this new wave of challenge of the focus and breath of marketing was that, this time the challenge was consciously related to the questioning of the dominant methodological-philosophical foundations which had constituted and constrained what marketing study should and can investigate. That is, through the reflection on the scope and subject matter of marketing, marketing scientists came to a critical recognition of the relation between the two domains of inquiry: substantive and methodological.

On the one hand, drawing upon the notion of paradigm, marketing theorists realised the necessity of a consistence between phenomena investigated, questions asked, methods used, and standards adopted (Anderson, 1981, 1982; Bristor, 1984, 1985; Deshpande, 1983, 1984; Hirschman, 1985, 1986a; Hudson and Ozanne, 1988, 1989; also see Chapter 2). On the other hand, marketers now found that their intellectual enterprise was exclusively limited to just a small portion of relevant phenomena. Related together, these two categories of reflection lead to a further self-reflection on the discipline: a reflection on the methodological paradigm bias. Marketing theorists began to challenge the dominant methodological paradigm that preassumes logical positivism/empiricism as *the* single, monolithic, all-encompassing model (e.g., Lutz, 1989:4). They claimed that 'it does not seem reasonable that we should embrace logical empiricism by default' (Peter, 1982:2). They urged marketing to break free from the conceptual colonisation of logical empiricism (Arndt, 1985a, b). International workshops, whole issues of leading marketing journals and a huge number of publications were devoted to the investigation of proper methodological-philosophical foundations (see for example Anderson, 1986:155; Arndt, 1985a:11; Belk, 1991:2; Belk, Sherry and Wallendorf, 1988:467; Bristor, 1985:301; Deshpande, 1983:101, 1984:18; Firat, 1989:93; Hirschman, 1986a:237; Holbrook and O'Shaughnessy, 1988:402; Hudson and Ozanne, 1988:508; Lavin and Archdeacon, 1989:1; Peter and Olson, 1983:118; Thompson *et al.*, 1989:134; Venkatesh, 1989:101; Sherry, 1987a:370; Sauer, Nighswonger, Zaltman, 1982:17, etc.).

Based on the recognition that any methodological paradigm or method is partial and hence that it is not reasonable to constrain marketing within a single method, marketers begin to call for exploring alternative methods to tackle heterogeneous marketing phenomena which were previously excluded from marketing study (see for example Anderson, 1981; Brinberg and Kuman, 1987; Dholakia and Arndt, 1985; Hirschman, 1985, 1986a; Holbrook and Hirschman, 1982; Holbrook and O'Shaughnessy, 1988; Lutz, 1989; Olson, 1981; Ozanne and Hudson, 1989; Peter, 1981, 1982, 1983; Ryan and Bristor, 1987; Wallendorf and Belk, 1989; Zaltman, LeMasters and Heffring, 1982, etc.).

As a result, the 1980s witnessed a rapidly growing diversity in methodologies in marketing-study/consumer-research, for example the application, incorporation or formulation of naturalistic inquiry (Belk, Sherry and Wallendorf, 1988), ethnographic methods (Sherry, 1983), historical methods (Fullerton, 1987), enchanted inquiry (Monieson, 1988), semiotics (Holbrook and Grayson, 1986; Mick, 1986), literary explication (Stern, 1989a, b), existential-phenomenological methods (Thompson, Locandr, Pollio, 1989), interpretive research (Hirschman, 1989a), humanistic inquiry (Hirschman, 1986a), structuralism (Levy, 1981), etc. (also see Section 5.3). Together with traditional approaches, these newly developing methods created a great diversity of approaches in marketing, which I have grouped in Part II as EM/BB, IC, and HE, marketing systems.

The inquiries in both substantial and methodological/philosophical domains, and the relation between the two, advanced the understanding of the 'Is marketing a science?' debate. It was recognised that 'the debate regarding whether or not marketing is a science has been largely unproductive' since it has been based on 'inappropriate standards'. Now, method(s), procedures, and criteria for research were no longer taken as given, but became the subject of prior questioning (Anderson, 1983; Deshpande, 1983; Peter and Olson, 1983). In this sense, the 'oldest controversy' was moved to a more meaningful level.

Along with the meta-theoretical debate, a relevant inquiry domain emerged and confronted marketing theorists. That is, the domain of ideology. As in other disciplines, conceptions of, and approaches to, ideology are dramatically diverse (for the case in systems movement see for example Gregory, 1992 and Oliga, 1989a, 1990, 1991). For the purpose of discussion, concerns and treatments in marketing study toward ideology can be classified into three categories.

First, there are those who by and large equate ideology with dominant research paradigms. They condemn the domination of positive empiricism as a manifestation of ideology which imprisons other possible research approaches. Thus, ideology in marketing, it is argued, should be criticised and thrown out. This conception and treatment of ideology is compatible with the notion of 'history of science' and 'sociology of science'. Marketers found that when they explore alternative approaches they are confronted with organised resistance and suppression from dominant traditions and well-capitalised 'scientific establishments'. They cried out that for the potential of alternative approaches and for the own sake of the discipline as a whole, ideology should be challenged, materialised establishments, such as editing boards of leading journals and PhD examination committees, should be reformed (Anderson, 1983, 1989; Firat, 1985a; Holbrook and O'Shaughnessy, 1988; Joy, 1991; Peter and Olson, 1983). Through this line of thinking, a political dimension in conducting knowledge inquiry has been established in marketing study. Sherry (1991) provides a vivid description of the process of the 'politicisation of pluralism' in consumer research as four-act social drama.

The second group of marketing theorists view ideology as a system of beliefs and values that emanate from and promulgate the world-view and interest of the dominant group in a society. Such ideology, it is argued, is to sustain and legitimise the power of the dominant group over perceptions of social reality and to legitimise the control of social relation and institutions in favour of the dominant and powerful. Marketers use this conception to analyse the imposed imagination and mis-understanding in consumption needs, e.g., consumerism, having vs. being, materialism, self-realisation, and the telling function of advertising as well as its affects in capitalist societies, etc. (Belk, 1986; Benton, 1987; Dholakia and Arndt, 1985; Faber, O'Guinn and Krych, 1987; Firat, 1987a; Heede, 1980, 1991; Hetrick, 1989; Holbrook, 1985b; Kilbourne, 1987; Polay, 1986, 1987; Zaltman and Wallendorf, 1977). Following Marx and the Frankfurt school, this group of marketers maintains that we human beings exposed to marketing might not be able to escape from the influence of ideology but we may be able to transcend it through critique.

There are also those who refer ideologies to the world-views and value or belief systems of any particular group or class of people. Therefore for these marketers ideologies can be either dominant, complementary, or oppositional. For example, Hirschman argues that in marketing, feminists have proposed feminism as either a complementary ideology or an oppositional ideology with premised feminine values which are to complement or replace the masculine world-view (Hirschman, 1993, also 1988, 1990). Other ideological themes that should be complemented or replaced may include, according to Hirschman, the quantitative models, people as machines, the economic man and utility maximisation, the 'detached' objective methods, the capitalist viewpoint in controlling consumers, views of conflict and competition, and sex roles in consumption.

No matter what strategies are selected to treat ideology, to throw out, to transcend, to change, to complement, or to replace, one argument is common. That is, there has been and is still an ideology dominating the discipline in the past and in the present, and this ideology must be challenged and criticised.

The awareness and critique of ideology brings about a differentiable and significant inquiry domain to marketing study. This domain complements the other two domains of inquiry, making marketing a truly multifaceted, multidimensional and interdisciplinary human knowledge inquiry which becomes more adequate in addressing and tackling the wide range issues relevant to human economic consumption needs.

Before turning to the next section, we may summarise the inter-domain relation in the diversity developed in marketing study (also see Figure 8.1). The oldest controversy 'Is marketing a science?' combined with the more contemporary notion of paradigm firstly led self-reflective marketers to question the substantive domain of marketing study: what phenomena and subject matter marketing should investigate. Through this reflection, it was recognised that marketing has neglected equally, if not more, important issues in human consumption needs, and that the reason for this exclusive imbalance is the uncritical acceptance of *the* single scientific method and its particular theoretical tradition. Based on this recognition, the discipline began to explore complemental research approaches, which signifies a movement into the methodological-philosophical domain of inquiry. However, the pursuit of complemental approaches met with obstacles, tangible or otherwise, such as scientific establishments and hegemonic traditions. This finding reveals that the political and philosophical aspects of paradigms go hand and hand, which ultimately



Figure 8.1 The developing diversity of inquiry domains in marketing study

points to another domain of inquiry: investigating ideologies in marketing research. Questions are asked why and how a particular paradigm or tradition gained such a dominant position and became so exclusive in practice, what consequences such domination produces, what values and whose interest are served by such marketing traditions and institutions, etc. The inquiry domain of ideology also has its root in the substantive domain: marketers begin to question why and how, and for what purpose, marketing is constituted in the way it is. Thus, the three domains of inquiry in the diversity are not isolated from, but imply, condition and support, each other. This can be viewed as a direct outcome of the questioning and reflection on the one-sided imbalanced marketing research. In this sense, marketing study has evolved from the pre-paradigmatic age into a paradigmatic age, in the latter a range of diverse research paradigms co-exist and compete with each other in the discipline.

8.2 PLURALISTIC-ORIENTED RESPONSES

In the last section it was illustrated how the diversity in research approaches and inquiry domains have come to being in marketing study. In doing so it was argued that the diversity can be seen as a significant outcome of the questioning and deconstructing of the once and perhaps still prevailing one-sided research tradition, and that it can be seen as a necessary step towards a facilitating and supporting discipline which was outlined in the last chapter.

Along with the development of the diversity, however a new form of unease has emerged and grown in the discipline. Advocates of different approaches jockey for a superior position, as if that position exists or should exist. Arguments about which approach is the best rather than how to best use approaches draw most intellectual enthusiasm and energy and become more and more fierce (to borrow Flood, 1993a). A new challenging question therefore confronts the discipline, that is, can we bring proper conversation among competing approaches, and if so, how? Can we find a way to accomodate competing approaches, which is to encourage collective complementarity and at the meantime to preserve opportunities for individual enhancement?

Responses to this question and hence to the diversity are also diverse. There are those who believe that the emergence of the diversity of '-isms', '-ologies' and '-ists' is just another fashionable fad which will sooner or later fade away. They fail to see any significant (positive or negative) impact from this 'fad'. They believe that the discipline will ultimately restore unity and harmony and return back to 'serious scientific research'. They choose to ignore or to depress the diversity, choose to bury their heads in their 'serious scientific tradition', and therefore have nothing to say and no contribution to make to marketing study in this regard.

Others realise that the diversity does have substantial impact on the present status and future potential of marketing, and therefore are concerned to give their responses. These responses can be considered as falling into three conceptions:

(1) Research approaches in the diversity might reach their ultimate potential, yet they must be subsumed to the tenets of scientific realism and modern empiricism.

(2) Research approaches in the diversity, if they want to escape from the domination of positive empiricism, should commit to the epistemic position of relativism .

(3) Research approaches in the diversity had better try to find reconciliation and resolution for the purpose of methodological pluralism.

An account of the first two, i.e., the realist-empiricist and the relativist stances, will be given in the next section. In the rest of this section, the focus will be on analysing the reconciling and resolving attempts of Hirschman, Leong, Bristor, and Hudson and Ozanne.

8.2.1 Hirschman's Prayer for Peace

Hirschman is one of the most articulate advocates for exploring alternative research approaches in marketing-study/consumer-research. She has also put her ideal into action by developing a humanistic inquiry tradition, or, interpretive approach (Hirschman, 1986a, 1989a). At the same time, Hirschman is very sensitive to the uneasy relation among competing paradigms. She consistently declares that her work only 'represents an important expansion of traditional consumer research and offers a complementary perspective for conceptualising many otherwise neglected consumption phenomena', and that her approach 'while certainly no complete solution, may take us further toward comprehending the multiple facets of the consumption experience' (Hirschman and Holbrook, 1982:100). Hirschman urgently 'argues for a broader based perspective of the scientific enterprise and for mutual acceptance of different ways of conducting research' (Hirschman, 1985:225). Although she believes that it 'is likely not a realistic or pragmatically accessible goal' for each researcher to practise in all scientific styles, she holds that 'to the extent that we can open up our perspective of what constitutes science, to the extent that we can appreciate conceptual theorism, conceptual humanism, and particular humanism in conjunction with analytical science, our own research and consumer research as a whole - will be substantially enriched' (Hirschman, 1985:238). Hirschman recognises that we are 'obligated to remain always aware that no one approach or paradigm is the "only" approach or paradigm' (Hirschman, 1986a:248), and therefore that 'marketing inquiry, as that in most social sciences, will be enhanced by the use of multiple ideological perspective' (Hirschman, 1987:107).

However, Hirschman has not tried to go a further step to justify her ideal of pluralism. Nor has she intended to address the issue of communication and mutual learning. Being anxious about the increasingly fierce 'intellectual Vietnam War', she states that 'much as we hate this intellectual warfare in consumer research, we make no claim that we know how to end it'. Rather, what she tries to do is just to firstly present a whole continuum of philosophical concepts and corresponding research methods, from the most material- to the most mental-determinist, and then 'only add a wish for mutual tolerance: "Be gentle with the text and be gentle with *each other*"' (Hirschman and Holbrook, 1992:112). She rests her honest and kind-hearted wish on prayer, prayer for peace (*ibid*:125-6).

Hirschman represents a modest position of a big number of marketers. They recognise the limitation of the positive empirical tradition from their own experience, therefore they welcome the diversity in approaches. They have a strong feeling that every perspective is just partial; therefore a pluralist attitude toward alternative approaches is necessary. However, as the epistemic debate grows ever more fierce and verbal nit-picking increases (see the next section), they become less and less confident about involvement in and/or finding a way out. Meanwhile, since they do not want to add fuel to the fire, they choose not to enter into direct confrontation with either side, realist/empiricist or relativist. Although understandable, their prayer has not in practice brought peace to the discipline.

8.2.2 Leong's Reconciliation and Resolution

Unlike Hirschman who rests her wish merely on prayer, Leong (1985) tries to incorporate a 'middle-of-the-road' framework in the hope of reconciling differences between empiricism and relativism and hence towards methodological pluralism.

Leong is clearly aware of the impact of the diversity and the debate on it, on the future of marketing. Rather than just present perspectives, he seeks resolution to the debate. He states, 'resolution of this debate is essential for future progress in marketing because the adoption of a particular philosophical perspective affects what facts, theories, and methodologies will subsequently be acceptable to the discipline'. For Leong, an ideal resolution is a 'Hegelian synthesis' as he understands that should incorporate the best while minimising the drawbacks of the 'apparently polar extremes' between logical empiricism and relativism (Leong, 1985:23).

For this, Leong turn to the Lakatosian sophisticated methodological falsification (SMF). In Leong's reading, 'the Lakatosian (SMF) perspective urges the existence and desirability of multiple theoretical foundations in a discipline, a formulation consist with Popperian and Feyerabendian (1980) tenets and the contemporary structure of marketing science' since 'the Lakatosian perspective blends together both traditional tenets of empiricism (i.e., falsification) as well as more contemporary relativist notions' (*ibid*:24).

Based on this reading of Lakatos, combining it with Merton's (1957) notion of middle-range theory, Leong 'reconstructs' marketing science as consisting of four layers of constructs. At the centre of the construct is his 'hard core' of marketing science. According to Leong, the hard core will determine guiding research questions, general propositions/assumption, integrated models, and classification schemes. The next layer is a 'protective belt' which contains research programmes. Leong's research programmes in the protective belt include the political economy, microeconomic, conflict resolution, general systems, functionalist, social exchange, behaviour modification, and information processing. Outside the protective belt is a layer of middle-range theories, and finally an outer periphery of working hypotheses (see the illustration in Figure 8.2).

For Leong, 'It is in the protective belt that some of the conflict between marketers has arisen' (*ibid*:30). As to the hard core, Leong seems quite confident in the premise that 'once a fact has achieved "textbook status" it tends to become part of a discipline's body of knowledge' which can serve as a foundation for the hard core (*ibid*:30). To delineate the hard core for marketing science, Leong directs us to Hunt's (1983a, b) conception which 'views marketing as the behavioural science seeking to explain exchange relationships between buyer and sellers', to Hunt's 'four fundamental explanada' and to Hunt's 'five criteria' for classification schemes, which, Leong believes, 'can serve as the central tenets of marketing science' (*ibid*:29-30).



A = hard core (guiding research questions, general propositions/assumptions, integrated models, and classification schemas)

B = protective belt (research programmes)

C = middle-range theories

D = working hypotheses

Figure 8.2 Leong's Lakatosian SFM reconstruction of marketing science (Source: Leong, 1985:29)

As I see it, Leong's hard core of marketing science is the most problematic in his reconstruction, whereby conflict in the protective belt is no more than a 'family quarrel' within the 'mainstream' managerial functionalist paradigm. According to the notion of 'paradigm', Hunt's tenets can by no means provide an agreed reconciling foundation for a hard core of a science. If that could be called a hard core, it is a hard core only for Leong or Hunt, but not for others. It appears surprising that in his attempt to formulate a 'middle-of-the-road' framework for 'reconciling the empiricism and relativism', Leong builds his hard core exclusively on Hunt's empiricism, even though he is clearly aware that a hard core 'determines guiding research questions, general propositions/assumption, integrated models, and classification schemes'. Leong believes that his SMF construction 'offers general standards for a maturing discipline' and that based on his reconstruction 'researchers in the discipline can now freely choose from a larger array of methodological perspectives' (*ibid*:37). Leong feels regret that the 'middle-of-the-road' characteristic might be seen as a possible limitation of his reconciliation. However, what we see behind the 'middle-of-the-road' limitation is actually a 'leaning-to-one-extreme' inadequacy. Leong's attempt indicates that a final reconciliation appealing to a 'middle-of-the-road' framework might not be a valuable ideal.

8.2.3 Bristor's Paradigmatic Organisational Framework

Bristor's (1984, 1985) response to the diversity and the debate on it is claimed to be distinct to those of Hirschman and Leong. On the one hand, unlike Hirschman who just highlight and present differences among approaches, Bristor tries to 'examine why these differences exist', and to formulate an organisational framework for diverse approaches by utilising Kuhn's (1962) notion of paradigm and Morgan (1980) and Zikmund's (1980) notion of metaphor, 'so that research efforts do not exist in isolation'. On the other hand, in contrast to Leong, Bristor believes that 'different paradigms are truly irreconcilable' so that integrating or reconciling the divergent fragments of the consumer behaviour field 'is neither appropriate nor desirable at this time'. Rather, Bristor contends that organising approaches should 'explicitly preserve and accentuate the distinct, yet rich and diverse body of literature in a manner that capitalises on this diversity' (Bristor, 1984:173-4).

Following Feyerabend (1975/1980), Kuhn (1962), Lakatos (1974) and Laudan (1977), Bristor contends that 'there are and should be multiple scientific methods and that there exist no universal or objective criteria by which to evaluate the knowledge that each produces' (Bristor, 1985:301). Bristor believes that differences in approaches underpinned by different philosophical and methodological assumptions are truly irreconcilable and irresolvable. To reorganise the diverse approaches, Bristor formulates a three-dimension framework. The first dimension to compare and distinguish is research perspectives (i.e., approaches' basic assumptions about the antecedents of consumer behaviour) which 'are not philosophically compatible' and 'are all necessary for the development of consumer behaviour knowledge' (*ibid*:301).

The second dimension is levels of analysis. Approaches can differ among research focuses on 'the individual, group and aggregate levels'. Finally, approaches can be organised according to a third, the empirical problem context dimension. Bristor identifies four such problem contexts in her framework: managerial problems, public-policy/consumer-welfare problems, consumer problems and theory qua theory problems.

A thorough reading of Bristor (1984, 1985) shows that her three-dimension framework focuses mainly on stressing differences and incommensurability among paradigms, although she realises that a framework should 'highlight [both] similarities and differences'. Further, although she holds that 'Kuhn (1970) suggests that overcoming communication breakdowns between scientific communities through translation efforts is both possible and potentially fruitful' (Bristor, 1984:173), Bristor has nothing to say about how such communication is possible. Finally, although she claims that comparing and contrasting approaches through her framework 'could play a major role in reducing the fragmentation and isolation' and in lending 'understanding as to why approaches are complementary to, or incommensurate with, each other' (*ibid*:173), Bristor tends to ignore the issue of mutual understanding, learning and communicative judgement. In this sense, Bristor has not moved much further beyond Hirschman.

It is reasonable to argue that the imbalance in Bristor's organisational framework is a manifestation of her deep-seated relativist philosophical assumption. To quote her 1985 paper:

> ... the framework extends well beyond dominant logical empiricist thought by rejecting the prevailing notion of the necessity and existence of the single scientific method. ... This position is consistent with a relativistic view of science which holds that different research groups will utilise different standards to judge the scientific adequacy of knowledge claim (Anderson 1983 and Peter and Olson 1983) (Bristor, 1985:301).

It is the 'relativistic view' that blinds Bristor's sight to other possibilities 'beyond dominant logical empiricist thought'. It seems apparent that while Leong unconsciously leans to realism/empiricism, Bristor has consciously placed herself in the relativist camp. The either-realism/empiricism-or-relativism anxiety seems to be a fundamental barrier blocking these two self-reflective scholars from reaching 'true' pluralism.

8.2.4 Hudson and Ozanne's Dialectic Analysis

Compared with the responses of Hirschman, Leong and Bristor, Hudson and Ozanne's dialectic analysis between polar positions provides extra insights in organising alternative approaches (Hudson and Ozanne, 1988; Ozanne and Hudson, 1989). It neither seeks a 'best' reconciliation or integration (while Leong does); nor does it stop at presenting difference (while Bristor does); of course neither does it build its responses by resting on kind-hearted desires or prayer (while Hirschman does). Rather, Hudson and Ozanne urge researchers to 'seek diversity by counterposing aspects of the different world views in the hope of resolving conflict and developing a completely new mode of understanding through the debate generated by this juxtaposing' (Hudson and Ozanne, 1988:519).

Hudson and Ozanne focus their attention on the conflict between positivist and interpretive approaches. They claim that each approach's assumptions and goals justify and are consistent with its chosen theories and methods. In many ways, the two world-views are incommensurate and generate very different outputs. These two positions represent two diametrically opposed ways of knowing. Hudson and Ozanne recognise that blinding conversion to interpretivism is just as dangerous as blinding adherence to positivism. Either action is dangerous because each action limits our horizon. Therefore, researchers need not take an advocacy position and argue for the supremacy of one approach over the other. 'Consumer research will benefit most from the acceptance and pursuit of a plurality of approaches to seeking knowledge' (Ozanne and Hudson, 1989:1).

Hudson and Ozanne suggest that dialectical analysis is a particularly appropriate method for dealing with the conflict of positivism and interpretivism. Drawing upon Churchman (1971) and Mitroff and Mason's (1983) Hegelian thesis-antithesis-synthesis dialectics, Hudson and Ozanne urge researchers to question and rethink their implicit assumptions by comparing them with those of the opposed approaches, by surfacing conflicts. Hudson and Ozanne argues that 'examination of these conflicts sometimes results in insights and a synthesis of the conflict that may offer ideas for creating new alternative approaches to research' (Ozanne and Hudson, 1989:6). As an example they claim that neither the positivist nor the interpretivist assumption about the nature of consumer is tenable since consumption actions of consumer do not appear to be totally determined nor to be chosen with total freedom. As a result, a resolution of this contradiction by asking when do consumers behave more voluntaristically and when do they behave more deterministically, would be more appropriate. Hudson and Ozanne suggest that such a synthesis 'may open our choice of research process as opposed to constraining choice' (*ibid*:7).

Overall, Hudson and Ozanne maintain that 'dialectic analysis explores the conflict between opposing views in order to find a synthesis. The goal here is not to find the best synthesis or integration of positivism and interpretivism - an ideal union of these two world view probably is impossible. Nevertheless, alternative positions do exist. As we question our assumption base and explore alternative assumptions (Laudan, 1984), we inject the potential for flexibility and change in our approaches' (*ibid*). 'It is hoped that the end result will extend beyond the original formulation of either world view. If synthesis occurs, it happens only at the final stage, following the debate of conflicts, and is in a form of understanding that goes beyond the original formulation' (Hudson and Ozanne, 1988:519).

However, as Hudson and Ozanne recognise, 'to construct a new research paradigm from a new assumption base represents a tremendous challenge' (Ozanne and Hudson, 1989:7). Three issues can be raised here.

First, 'some conflicts do not easily (if possibly) lead to a synthesis'. For example, regarding the nature of reality, 'it seems clear that the issue of one or many realities is not resolvable by taking a middle ground position .... Here, it seems likely researchers must take their own stand' (*ibid*:7). But to 'take their own stand' in ontological terms on the one hand while at the same time seeking synthesis of approaches on the other apparently violates Hudson and Ozanne' own position that ontological (and philosophical) assumptions justify and are consistent with chosen theories and methods. If views about reality (or realities) do not lead to a synthesis, how it is that methods can reach a synthesis with well theorised support?

Second, like soft systems thinking in the systems movement, Hudson and Ozanne's dialectic analysis tends to ignore the possible yet realistic impact on the antithesis and synthesis processes of inequality in power relation and resources for 'counterposing'. Without addressing this issue, dialectic analysis lends itself to the synthesis agenda set by the dominant and the most powerful.

Finally, the whole articulation of dialectic analysis merely claims that questioning, challenging, and counterposing between polar positions is necessary. It has nothing to say about how opposed approaches come to communicate with, and to seek mutual understanding between, each other. Be it in ignorance or by intention, *not* to address the issue of communication and mutual understanding greatly undermines the practicality of the proposed dialectic analysis.

8.2.5 Lessons From The Responses

In the above, four representative responses toward the diversity of approaches in marketing study have been outlined. All four responses try to promote and establish plurality among heterogeneous approaches. While each of them has provided valuable insights, and therefore should be highly appreciated accordingly, however none of them has realised their desire. The result is unfortunate: the whole discipline falls into an endless paradigmatic stagnation. For more than a decade, marketing study has been locked into debates on paradigm issues, while little substantial theoretical contribution towards more urgent problem-solving can be found. While other social sciences such as anthropology and communication have undergone a 'paradigm shift', 'marketing has not, yet' (Brownlie *et al.*, 1994; Buttle, 1994; Hunt, 1994).

To overcome the limitation of the four responses, it seems to be a necessary step to draw indicating lessons from their attempts. It may be argued that attention could be given to the following lessons.

(1) There is a lack of an adequate conception of what constitutes SCIENCE and what kinds of sciences marketing can possibly pursue. While the outlined responses correctly move the 'Is marketing a science?' controversy to a more meaningful 'What kind of science marketing should become?' dialogue, their conception of science is still misleading. Hirschman, for example, suggests that the debate should more 'accurately' focus on '*the* kind of science that marketing should become' (Hirschman, 1986a:237, emphasis added). Such conception apparently presumes that there can be a singular kind of science marketing should become. This Either/Or conception appears more clear in Hirschman's statement that 'it is perhaps more appropriate to view science as an inherently normative, person-centred enterprise of knowledge creation *than* as the phenomenon-centred, unbiased process of truth discovery it is generally purported to be' (Hirschman, 1985:225, emphasis added). Clearly, here we are urged to make an rather/than choice, either to adopt positive inquiry or to pursue interpretive science. As I see it, this Either/Or rationale has greatly undermined the efforts to promote plurality and complementarity.

(2) The Either/Or rationale has also shadowed their epistemological position. For example, Hirschman (1986a) and Bristor (1984:301) consciously line themselves up with the relativist. In Leong's case, although he tries to find a middle-of-the-road position between logical empiricism and relativism, yet practically when he 'reconstructs marketing science' he builds his hard core of science on the 'textbook status' empiricism without any hesitation. It seems that so far while scholars try to establish a pluralist position they at the same time lean to either the logical empirical or the relativist position.

(3) A further relevant Either/Or concerns treatments of the ontological issue. All responses stop at enumerating various conceptions of reality (realities). In doing so, an unspoken presumption seems to be that either we accept the realist position of a single, immutable reality, or we must embrace many purely mentally-created realities. No effort has be invested in sorting out this ontological Either/Or. It is rather believed that 'it seems likely researchers must take their own stand' (for example Ozanne and Hudson, 1989:7). It appears clear that without an adequate ontological vision at this time, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to drive out the objective/relative Either/Or anxiety. This may explain the phenomenon that while marketers recognise the necessity of consistence between meta-theoretical assumptions and methods, they still choose to selectively stress only methodological pluralism.

(4) The issue of communication, mutual listening or fusion of horizons, has not been touched at all. Although some call for 'reducing the fragmentation and isolation', call for 'opening lines of communication' and 'cross-fertilisation of ideas and efforts' (for example Bristor, 1984:173), no effort has been tried to practicalise such ideal. Others simply have said nothing in this regard. At this crucial time, confronted with the paradigmatic fragmentation in marketing study, what is ignored or avoided could be as revealing as what has been addressed. The silence on conversation issues seems to indicate that, for the sake of the diversity, closure among alien approaches,

even with regret, might be the best situation we can reach, while pluralism and complementation through dialogical evaluation and judgement, however attractive, may be not realistic. As I see it, without addressing the issue of listening and speaking among approaches, marketing study can unlikely escape from the isolationist and reductionist fragmentation.

(5) An immediate by-product of the ignorance of conversation issue is a lack of desire of rational theory appreciation and choice. The questions of 'which approach, when, and why' have hardly been raised. Indeed, if there could be only a singular science in marketing, if there could be no meaningful communication, appreciation and choice would hardly seem relevant. This leaves room for 'anything goes', which might be opposed to the initial desire of the above mentioned responses. A pluralist attitude is bound to be unrealistic if without appreciation and choice, although appreciation and choice should be continuously subject to critical adjustment in accordance with dynamic contingency.

(6) None of the outlined responses has built up or incorporated an adequate social theory to justify their pluralist ideal. As I see it, although the prior purpose of the responses is focusing on epistemic pluralism - legitimating diverse ways of knowing or diverse style in conducting research, there is no reason to root out the relevance of sociological issues. The substantial development of CST has shown that, for any social-practical discipline, it is important to reflect upon its underlying sociological assumptions, since any action guided by particular kinds of knowledge is bound by a particular interest, whether explicit or otherwise, and will unavoidably produce life-practical-consequences (see Appendix III). No way of knowing or style of conducting research can escape purposive sociological interests or influences. Without reflection on sociological assumptions, all responses remain restrictedly selective rather than pluralist. At least this can help us to explain such a phenomenon: all responses, without exception, exclude critical/emancipatory

approaches from their discussion, although these approaches experienced substantial development in the 1980s (see Chapter 6).

To summarise, responses toward the diversity of approaches in marketing study have so far not achieved 'true' plurality and complementarity. Major reasons for this seem to be: (1) the Either/Or conception of science, of epistemology, and of ontology; (2) the failure to address communication and mutual learning issues; and (3) the ignorance of reflection on sociological assumptions. At best, these responses move marketing study from 'object-centred' towards 'subject-centred', urging researchers to take their own stand. None of them, however, is able to take us beyond the Hegelian subject-centred consciousness towards the Habermasian intersubjectivistic communicative dialogical reasoning. As a result, reconstructing marketing study in the light of critical systems pluralism remains an urgent challenge. In the next chapter, an attempt will be made to propose such a reconstruction.

However, before turning to that proposal, let us undertake a critique of a new form of domination in marketing study - the endless misleading epistemic Either/Or debate between realism/empiricism and relativism, an intellectual black hole that wastes the discipline's energy and locks the discipline into a paradigmatic stagnation. This critique is relevant and necessary since a major purpose of the reconstruction of marketing study is to find a possible way out of the Either/Or black hole.

8.3 A MISLEADING EITHER/OR

For over one and a half decades, the discipline of marketing has witnessed an endless spirited debate on the appropriate epistemological foundation for marketing research. On the one side of the debate are the realists-empiricists, Hunt, Calder and Tybout, etc., while the other side is led by Anderson, Peter, Olson and some others. Though through the long heated debate, advocates on both sides have time and again changed or modified their contention (for example Hunt has replaced his previous logical empiricist position with his later so-called 'modern empiricism' and tried to distinguish his 'scientific realism' from other forms or realism, whereas until 1986, Anderson did not formally declare his original principles of 'critical relativism'), they have been insistently arguing that research approaches in marketing must commit to the tenets of either realism-empiricism or relativism (Hunt, 1989a; Anderson, 1983; Peter, 1991; Peter and Olson, 1989). Although its immediate focus is pointed to the growing diversity in marketing study, the debate is clearly just a particular episode of the long controversy between objectivism and relativism which can be traced at least as far back as the Sophist-Plato controversy, and is just a part of a much larger philosophical discussion throughout the social sciences (Kavanagh, 1994).

It is impossible to detail all the counter-arguments of the skilled protagonists of both sides, since the debate as it conducted today has developed into such a form that it contains not only counter-arguments but also anticipatory counter-argument to arguments (*ibid*; a preliminary list of the counter-argument papers is presented at the end of this chapter). However it is not impossible to summarise their basic assertions and intentions.

On the one end, as manifested in marketing, 'scientific realism proposes that (1) the world exists independently of its being perceived (classical realism), (2) the job of science is to develop genuine knowledge about that world, even though such knowledge will never be known with certainty (fallibilistic realism), and (3) all knowledge claimed must be critically evaluated and tested to determine the extent to which theory do, or do not, truly represent or correspond to that world (critical realism)' (Hunt, 1990a:9). Further, 'applying scientific realism to the social sciences and marketing differs *only* in that most of the entities postulated in physical and biological theories are, at least in principle, "tangible", whereas many, but not all, of the entities postulated by theories in marketing and the social sciences are "intangible" or "unobservable in principle"' (*ibid*:11; emphasis added).

Related to this 'scientific realist' ontological view, Hunt contends that truth and objectivity ought to be the goal for *science* (Hunt, 1990a, 1992a; Hunt and Speck, 1985). According to Hunt, 'Theories are systematically related sets of statements, including some lawlike generalisations, that are *empirically testable* ... lawlike denotes nothing more than the observed regularity in the occurrence of two or more phenomena' (Hunt, 1983b: 10; underlined original and italic added). Hunt also argues that the deductive-monological model and inductive-statistical model 'remain *the most* viable models for explaining phenomena' (Hunt, 1983a:99; emphasis added).

Similar to Hunt's modern empiricism, Calder and Tybout (1987) classify human knowledge into three categories: scientific knowledge, everyday knowledge, and interpretive knowledge. Although they agree that the later two kinds of knowledge might have different objectives, and require their own methodologies, Calder and Tybout argue that *only* the tenet of sophisticated methodological falsification provides methodology for scientific knowledge. Further, Calder and Tybout declare that

> only scientific knowledge rests on a methodology that offers the possibility of scientific progress. It is important to recognise that unless subjected to the rules of empirical science, everyday and interpretive knowledge must stand apart from science, each on its own merits (Calder and Tybout, 1987:140).

Therefore, in the Western culture within which 'science' holds such a superior position, knowledge not subjected to 'the tenet of sophisticated methodological falsification' or 'the rules of empirical science', according to Calder and Tybout's logic, should be commonly denigrated as second class knowledge (Thompson, 1990). In the final analysis by Hunt and Calder and Tybout, it seems that the core of realism/empiricism is that *science* must be subjected to and enclosed within a single scientific method, and that any contention of other criteria for scientific validity claim ('such as Kuhn's irrationalism') 'was nihilistic, historically inaccurate, and made nonsense of science' (Hunt, 1990a:2).

On the other end, in its most advanced and articulating from, relativism in marketing study contends that 'there exists no single "scientific method"'. 'Instead, disciplinary knowledge claims are viewed as contingent upon the particular beliefs, values, standards, methods, and cognitive aims of its practitioners. ... In short, science is a social and historical enterprise, and its knowledge-products can be affected as much by sociological factors as by purely "cognitive" or empirical considerations'. Further, 'the critical relativist demands to know a theory's mode of production, the criteria by which it is judged, the ideological and value commitments that inform its construction, and the metaphysical beliefs that underwrite its research program. Most importantly, the critical relativist wishes to know the realisable cognitive and practical aims of a theory so that its range of applicability can be assessed' (Anderson, 1986:156-7).

Meanwhile, although it is declared that 'critical relativists are actually more "hard-headed" than positivists in their analysis of scientific claims', the relativists hold the following beliefs of reality, truth, as well as theory evaluation and selection.

On reality. 'Reality is essentially mental and perceived [and is] also socially constructed' (Hudson and Ozanne, 1988:509), therefore 'science creates many realities' (Peter and Olson, 1983:119). As a result, because realities are socially and psychologically constructed, 'the same event may have multiple realities, *each of which is valid*' (Sauer, Nighswonger and Zaltman, 1982:18; emphasis added).

On truth. 'Truth is a subjective evaluation that cannot be properly inferred outside of the context provided by the theory' (Peter and Olson, 1983:119), therefore '"truth" plays no role in the ontology of critical relativism' (Anderson, 1988a:134). In short, '"truth" is an inappropriate objective for science' (Anderson, 1988b:405).

On theory evaluation and selection. 'Every research programme has its limitations when it comes to achieving its putative aims. ... [W]hether those aims are themselves worthy of pursuit will be *judged differently by various research programmes*' (Anderson, 1988a:134; emphasis added). Relativists in marketing eagerly distant themselves from any kind of 'transprogrammatic' theory selection: 'Some will object that the relativist's position implies that (for any given time period) there must exist some transprogrammatic standards for theory selection. However, this view ignores that fact that criteria are applied by human beings and, ... an important implication of the relativistic construct is that appraisal criteria in the social sciences are highly parochial' (Anderson, 1986:157). If I read correctly, the relativists in marketing contend in their final analysis that any theory can and should be evaluated and judged, only within that theory's own frame of assumptions.

From my point of view, underpinning both the realist/empiricist and the relative positions is the same deep-seated foundationalist thought that has been thoroughly criticised and abandoned by contemporary scientific communities.

The foundationalist view is characterised by a desire to ground human knowledge on a unique and indubitable Archimedian point (Rorty, 1979; cf.: Thompson, 1990). The foundationalist evaluation concern is primarily epistemological in seeking to identify methods, procedures, and criteria that can demarcate scientific from non-scientific knowledge. We have seen that both sides of the current debate essentially focuses on this concern.

The foundationalist characteristic of the realist/empiricist is fairly straightforward. From the above brief outline, it appears clear that for the realist/empiricist, scientific knowledge can and must be demarcated from non-scientific through empirical test by the method of falsification (Calder and Tybout, 1987), or 'intersubjectively certifiable procedures' (Hunt, 1983a). The realist-empiricist's foundationalist view is also manifested in their argument that social sciences are differing from natural sciences only in degree but not in kind, and hence that empirical tests should be extended to social sciences as *the most* viable criteria for demarcating *science* from non-science (see the previous quotation from Hunt (1990a) and Calder and Tybout (1987)).

The foundationalist view of the relativist in marketing is, however, not so straightforward, but appears more fashionable and therefore more seductive and misleading. The relativists firmly reject the assertion of a single universal scientific method that could be employed to demarcate science from non-science. They are right up to this point. The problem arises when they contend that the best (or the only?) alternative is to evaluate and judge theories on their own research programme's frame of reference. More precisely, what they are saying is that theories cannot be evaluated and judged from outside their own enclosures. Theory selection therefore seems actually irrelevant. As Thompson reveals, 'The critical relativist [in marketing] contends that research is evaluated on the basis of the researcher's guiding theoretical programme rather than on a "fusion of horizons"' therefore 'the relativist has not completely obviated some form of an epistemological foundation' (Thompson, 1990:27).

Through the above analysis, it appears clear that for both the realist-empiricist and the relativist (at least in marketing), there *must* be a single basis for evaluating and judging science: for the realist-empiricist that basis should be universal, whereas for the relativist that basis for a particular research programme must, also, be unique. Both the realist-empiricist and the relativist are therefore ethnocentric in the sense that every research programme should direct its theory evaluation and judgement on a unique fixed basis. While the realist-empiricist tries to imprison research programmes into *the* scientific method, the relativist tries to direct researchers to an 'alternative', with which 'we are enclosed within a wall of prejudices' (terms from Bernstein, 1983:129). As Habermas argues, both stands 'rest on the common assumption that the objective method of natural science is the only source of knowledge, and [or] that it is self-contained in the sense that there can ultimately be no critique of science that arises from outside its own framework' (cf.: Hesse, 1982:102).

In the above I have shown the foundationalist thought that underpins both the realist-empiricist and the relativist positions. Outside marketing, substantial progress has been achieved in critique of these two manifestations of foundationalism. For example, Bernstein (1983) has systematically presented us a growing convergence among contemporary philosophical stands (such as those of Gadamer, Kuhn, Rorty, Habermas, etc.), moving beyond the epistemic Either/Or of objectivism and relativism.

Bernstein's denotation and critique of objectivism and relativism are perfectly 'fitting' the realist-empiricist and the relativist stands in marketing. For Bernstein, on the one hand objectivism denotes 'the basic conviction that there is or must be some permanent, ahistorical matrix or framework to which we can ultimately appeal in determining the nature of rationality, knowledge, truth, reality, goodness, or rightness. ... The objectivist maintains that unless we can ground philosophy, knowledge, or language in a rigorous manner we cannot avoid radical scepticism' (Bernstein, 1983:8). Is this not 'the basic conviction' underlying the insistent arguments of the realist-empiricist in marketing? On the other hand, 'In its strongest form, relativism is the basic conviction that ... in the final analysis all such concepts [as rationality, truth, reality, right, the good, or norms] must be understood as relative to a specific conceptual scheme, theoretical framework, paradigm, form of life, society, or culture. ... For the relativist, there is no substantive overarching framework or single meta language by which we can rationally adjudicate or univocally evaluate competing claims of alternative paradigms' (*ibid*). Is this not 'the basic conviction' underlying the persistent arguments of the relativist in marketing?

For Bernstein, one reason why controversies between these two ends seem to generate more heat than light is that the entire discussion is still infected with the legacy of a Cartesian Anxiety. According to Bernstein, the Cartesian Anxiety waged by objectivism and relativism leads us with an apparent and ineluctable necessity to a grand and seductive Either/Or. In its present form, the Cartesian Anxiety leads us to an underlying belief that in the final analysis the only viable alternatives open to us are either some form of objectivism, ultimate grounding of truth or science, or that we are ineluctably led to relativism which, even with variation, eventually roots out any possibility for 'a type of rationality that is historically situated and practical, involving choice, deliberation, and judgement' (*ibid*:xiv). Are these not 'the only viable alternatives' with which the realist-empiricist and the relativist tend to constrict marketing?

In the above, it has been argued that both the realist-empiricist and the relativist in marketing are ethnocentric and hence foundationalist in characteristic, therefore both stands, and the heated debate between them, are misleading and distortive. This argument is compatible, from my point of view, with Bernstein's critique of the Cartesian Anxiety or the epistemic Either/Or. Bernstein forcefully argues that, at the heart of the objectivist's vision, and what makes sense of his or her vision, is the belief that there are or must be some fixed, permanent constraints to which we can appeal and which are secure and stable; whereas at its most profound level, the relativist's message is that there are no such basic constraints except those that we invent or temporally (and temporarily) accept. In this sense, relativist is self parasitic upon the objectivist ethnocentric position, and therefore both objectivism and relativism are themselves parasitic upon an acceptance of the Cartesian persuasion that needs to be questioned, exposed, and overcome. In short, to see other alternatives or possibilities, 'we need to exorcise the Cartesian Anxiety and liberate ourselves from its seductive appeal. Only if we implicitly accept some version of Cartesianism does the exclusive disjunction of objectivism or relativism become intelligible. But if we question, expose, and exorcise Cartesianism, then the very opposition of objectivism and relativism loses its plausibility' (*ibid*:19).

From my point of view , it is unfortunate that marketing study lacks a critical analysis on the Cartesian Anxiety and the epistemic Either/Or. As if totally uninformed by Bernstein, Gadamer, Rorty, and Habermas's work, for over a decade, leading marketing theorists and leading marketing and consumer research journals pour most of their best intellectual energy into the epistemic Either/Or debate (see the list at the end of this chapter). The debate, as currently constructed, has substantially set the context for knowledge inquiry in marketing, and began to impose on the discipline its particular definition of what kind of question should be asked (i.e., inquiring in epistemological domain only but not in substantive or ideological-sociological domains), what kind of method should be adopted (i.e., counter-arguing and even anticipating counter-arguments), and what kind of basis for interpretation and evaluation should be chosen (i.e., universal or isolatedly enclosed standards). The debate has orchestrated a basic tune in terms of the Either/Or for responses to the diversity of research approaches. We have seen in the last section how this basic tune shadows pluralistic-oriented responses. The debate has become another imprisoning 'iron cage' with no escape. In this sense, the debate between the realist-empiricist and the relativist has constituted a new form of domination that suppresses other alternatives and possibilities for marketing study.

Although both sides of the debate expressed their desire for 'critical pluralism', 'mutual acceptance', 'rapprochement' and 'tolerance' years ago, although the debate has become verbal nit-picking, repetitive, symbolic and virtually impenetrable to the majority of marketing academics (let alone practitioners), and although the debate has produced more confusion rather than productivity (for example Hunt presents five 'especially significant' forms of relativism (1994), six forms of realism (1991), and twenty-five distinct philosophical positions from academic scepticism to vulgar absolutism (1992a)), the debate seems to be set by the both sides to continue (for example Hunt, 1994). Marketers have accurately described this misleading and distortive Either/Or debate as an 'intellectual warfare' (Hirschman and Holbrook, 1992), an 'intellectual boxing match' (Kavanagh, 1994), or an 'intellectual black hole' (Buttle, 1994).

It is becoming increasingly clear that 'the debate, as currently constructed, is no longer making a contribution and should therefore be brought to a conclusion' (Kavanagh, 1994:27), for the discipline as a whole, and for the own sake of individual research approaches. It is also clear, from the lessons drawn up in the last section, that a way out of the black hole cannot rely on either side of the debate, nor on a middle-of-the-road between them. Rather, it should move beyond the Cartesian Anxiety and the Either/Or between objectivism and relativism. Marketing needs a 'truly' pluralist reconstruction which is grounded on an appropriate ontological vision and epistemological standard that is able to accommodate the diverse research approaches, that is compatible with a critical systemic reorientation as undertaken in the last chapter, that is able to nurture and facilitate differentiated yet interrelated substantive, methodological-philosophical, and ideological-sociological inquiry domains, that encourages openness rather than closure, isolation or reduction, and last but not least, that is able adequately to address the way in which alien approaches can pursue mutual communication and understanding.

CONCLUSION

Now it is possible to construct a developmental account of the meta-theoretical inquiry in marketing study and what is needed in the future (the account is also illustrated in Figure 8.3). By the end of the 1970s, meta-theoretical inquiry in marketing has underpinned by a taken-for-granted standard. Since the end of the 1970s, meta-theoretic inquiry in marketing began to be concerned about issues of paradigms, and has virtually developed a wide range of research paradigms for itself (Section 8.1). In this sense, marketing study has moved from a pre-paradigmatic age to a paradigmatic age of inquiry. As a significant outcome, this movement has deimprisoned marketing from the domination of one-sided orientation and *the* single



Figure 8.3 A vision of the development thread underlying meta-theoretical inquiry in marketing study

model, thereby enlarging the discipline's capacity to tackle a wider range of issues confronting marketing which otherwise would have been ignored. However the movement has also produced tension between diverse approaches (although this is not necessary). Marketers have tried to dissolve the paradigmatic 'disarray'. Yet their efforts have appeared to be unsuccessful. Rather, some responses have even produced a new form of domination that put the discipline into intellectual stagnation. What lies ahead, or, what can marketers choose to do for the future of marketing? My suggestion is that a possible way out of the present stagnation is to undertake a reconstruction of marketing study that at once promotes collective complementarity and facilitates individual enhancement among heterogeneous approaches, which is grounded on continuous criticisable communicative dialogical reasoning. Through such reconstruction, research approaches need not campaign for a superior position that subsumes the others. Instead, paradigms will be able to enhance the Self through complement with the Other. I call this ideal situation the post-paradigmatic age. Such reconstruction, referring to the lessons from previous responses, must be critically grounded on adequate ontological, cognitive and sociological reasoning in a systemic way. In the next chapter, such a reconstruction will be propsed.

Appendix to Section 8.3

A preliminary list of representative papers in the realist-empiricist/relativist debate

Year	Papers on the realist/empiricist side	Papers on the relativist side
1976	*Marketing theory* (Hunt) *The nature and scope of marketing* (Hunt)	
1981		*A review of some recent philosophy and sociology of science literature* (Anderson) *Presidential address: Toward a science of consumer behaviour* (Olson)

(to be continued)

1982	*Are the logical empirical models dead?* (Hunt)	*Current issues in the philosophy of science: Implications for marketing study* (Peter, Anderson, Olson, etc.)
1983	*Marketing theory: Conceptual foundations of research in marketing* (Hunt) *General theories and the fundamental explananda of marketing* (Hunt)	*Marketing, scientific progress, and scientific method* (Anderson) *Is science marketing?* (Peter & Olson) *Some philosophical and methodological issues in consumer research* (Peter)
1984	*Should marketing adopt relativism?* (Hunt)	*On ignoring a research education* (Peter) *External validity?* (Olson & Peter)
1985	*Does logical empiricism imprison marketing?* (Hunt & Speck)	
1986		*On method in consumer research: A critical relativist perspective* (Anderson)
1987	*Do we need critical relativism?* (Cooper) *What consumer research is ...* (Calder & Tybout)	*The construction of scientific meaning* (Olson) *Cognitive relativism and the practice of marketing science* (Muncy & Fisk)
1988	*Relativism for consumer research?* (Siegel)	*Relative to what?* (Anderson) *Relativism revisivus* (Anderson)
1989	*Naturalist-humanist-interpretive inquiry: Challenges and ultimate potentials* (Hunt) *Reification and realism in marketing: In defence of reason* (Hunt) *Interpretive-humanistic-phenomenonist research* (Tybout & Calder)	*On relativism to interpretivism* (Anderson) *The relativistic/constructionist perspective on scientific knowledge and consumer research* (Peter & Olson)
1990	*Truth in marketing theory and research* (Hunt)	
1991	*Modern marketing theory: Critical issues in the philosophy of marketing science* (Hunt) *Positivism and paradigm dominance* (Hunt)	*Philosophical tensions in consumer inquiry* (Peter)
1992	*For reason and realism in marketing* (Hunt)	*Realism or relativism for marketing theory and research?* (Peter)
1993	*Objectivity in marketing theory and research* (Hunt)	
1994	*On rethinking marketing: Our discipline, our practice, our method* (Hunt)	

Chapter 9

A RECONSTRUCTION OF MARKETING

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter a reconstruction is proposed in the hope of taking us beyond fragmentary stagnation in marketing study, under which researchers are encouraged to promote both collective complementation and individual enhancement among alien approaches, and therefore in a way out of the present intellectual tension.

The chapter is divided into five sections. In Section 9.1, based on the work of Part II and the last two chapters, a typology of marketing is proposed for further discussion. The typology reconstructs existing research approaches into technical, practical, and normative marketing. It is claimed that since knowledge concerned with heterogeneous marketing phenomena and actions hold different cognitive purposes and different validity claims, a single science might not be an appropriate or desirable end in marketing study. Rather, sciences serving contestable interests and differentiated knowledge in marketing actions can be rationally nurtured and established in the discipline. Under the typology, various approaches may find greater opportunity to pursue their individual potential while together they may be able to better serve human consumption needs, doing so in an informed and complementarist manner through communicative dialogical reasoning. The proposed typology should be viewed as representing conceptual categories for the purpose of articulating plurality, instead of 'natural' ones.

The rest of the chapter focuses on operationalising the proposed reconstruction. Section 9.2 explains the decision to address the operationalisation at three different yet related elaboration levels. Following this, Section 9.3 focuses on establishing critical systems pluralism for a promising long-run prospect; Section 9.4 emphasises the pursuit of mutual understanding and learning through dynamic interactive development; while Section 9.5 discusses promoting complementation in problem-solving. Overall, the aim is to demonstrate, drawing mainly upon Gadamer, Habermas, Bernstein and CST, that conversation, understanding, learning, appreciation, argumentation and complementation between alien approaches are not only necessary and desirable, but also possible. It is argued that to do so or not is primarily an ethical question, and an attempt is made to show that different modes of, and multiple views in, knowledge inquiry actually imply and condition one another. To this end, some informative metaphors are employed: force-field, constellation, fusion of horizons, fibre-cable, which are believed, holding different emphasises respectively, together to strengthen the open, communicative and reflective position.

The whole chapter (and the whole thesis) can therefore be seen as an effort to reconstruct marketing study as a critical dialogic research community towards openness, reflection, individual empowerment, and collective complementarity.

9.1 A TYPOLOGY OF MARKETING APPROACHES

Let me first reiterate what has been achieved so far. In part II of the thesis, some representative research approaches available in marketing study were outlined and briefly grouped into EM, BB, IC, and HE systems, according to their meta-theoretical characteristics. These characteristics are signified by phenomena of concern, questions asked, language used, models selected, methods chosen, and criteria employed for validity claim. It was shown that differences making these approaches different are too fundamental and irreducible to be given a final reconciliation. It was equally emphasised, that, bearing these dramatic differences and 'otherness', all approaches nevertheless dedicate themselves to a common commitment, a commitment to serve human consumption needs. It is this commitment that brings these diverse rival approaches together, although some approaches are concerned more with the *how*, some others emphasise more the *what*, while still others underscore more the *why* and *ought to* questions; moreover, some approaches are prevalent, others growing, and still others remain relatively underdeveloped. Investigation of these approaches led to a recognition, that neither personalities nor commonalities among approaches can be ignored, diminished, or reduced. To pursue their better contribution, to pursue complementation without suppress their personalities, we need to put this diversity in order, an order which is able to foster and encourage conversation and complementation among approaches without distortion, imposition, domination, restriction or reduction but subject to dynamic change, subject to critical scrutiny, and subject to continuous public argumentation without compulsion.

In Chapter 7, the prevailing one-sided unbalanced 'mainstream' conception of marketing was deconstructed and an attempt made to reorient marketing as primarily a human communicative action system. It is argued that since marketing is inherently a public enterprise, it is at once and always a listening and telling constitution. Being one of the most active technical systems in our modern civilisation and society, within itself marketing has differentiated and developed its own lifeworld and technical elements. Marketing has always been concerned with reasoning in efficiency, in understanding, and in public norms. To achieve 'good' marketing, we need once and forever to embrace the irreducible inquiry domains of instrument enhancement, of subjective experiences, and of emancipatory attitude. These differentiated concerns and contestable interests have given rise to and been manifested in teleological, dramaturgical, and normatively regulating marketing actions, which together constitute a system whose elements are ever changing and dynamically conditioning each other. There has always been a danger of the selective tendency of marketingisation, that is, an unbalanced practice to reduce the systemic whole into one of its part(s). However, the possibility of a balanced and facilitating marketing is still open. For this, that is, to make rational the relation between differentiable and contestable human interests and marketing actions, it has been argued that the Habermasian communicative action/rationality thesis must been adopted; and to translate properly contestable interests into rationally grounded marketing actions, a critical systems pluralist attitude toward the diversity of rival approaches must be established.

In the last chapter, it was shown that previous attempts to bring order to marketing study have not been successful. It was argued that to find a way out of the intellectual stagnation, the marketing discipline must penetrate the Either/Or anxiety. We marketing theorists cannot avoid addressing the issues of mutual understanding, learning, and argumentation. We have to learn to reflect on the Self and listen to the Other.

Based on the recognition and arguments in previous chapters, it is possible to formulate a typology that categorises marketing approaches into technical marketing, practical marketing, and normative marketing, which are in turn differentiated and signified by distinct inquiry focuses and underlying cognitive interests, producing heterogeneous scientific knowledge with corresponding standards of validity claims, while at the same time being dedicated to a common commitment - to tackling irreducible heterogeneous issues in human consumption needs (see Table 9.1).

Table 9.1 A typology of marketing approaches

Marketing categories	*Technical marketing*	*Practical marketing*	*Normative marketing*
Concerning reality	Natural world	Internal world	Social world
Inquiry domain	Objective relations	Subjective experience	Public norms
Underlying interest	Technical enhancement	Hermeneutic understanding	Emancipation/ autonomy
Focal issue(s)	Efficiency, optimisation, prediction/control	Mutual understanding in meaning, feeling, desires, wants, etc.	Critically grounding argumentation on marketing actions
Produced sciences	Natural sciences	Hermeneutic sciences	Critical sciences
Validity claim	Objective truth	Subjective sincerity	Normative rightness
Kinds of marketing actions	Teleological marketing actions	Dramaturgical marketing actions	Normatively regulating marketing actions
Major activities	Satisfying consumption needs through R&D, promotion, physical distribution, etc.	Understanding consumption needs through consumer experiences and concerned researches	Formulating consumption needs and corresponding marketing programmes/ regulations
Most likely contributing approaches	EM/BB systems: Commodity, Functional, Institutional, Regional, Functionalist, Managerial, Buyer behavioural researches, etc.	IC systems: Comparative, Interaction network, Interpretive consumer researches, etc.	HE systems: Historical, Radical, Critical approaches, etc.

The three-fold typology, which is presented as a possible conceptual model to move beyond intellectual unease and to embrace multiple rationality in the field, should be read as follows.

First, following Habermas (1981) and Midgley (1992) (see Appendix II), the typology conceptualises the ontological complexity which confronts marketing as consisting of a natural world, an internal world and a social world. This ontological statement does not pretend to describe reality in any ultimate sense. At this present time, confronted with the diversity and the debate on it in marketing, and for the purpose of seeking accommodation for heterogeneous approaches, attempts to identify, describe and prove a single realist reality or many relatively-created realities are neither necessary nor desirable.

It should be noted that both the realist and the relativist have *actually* softened their ontological visions. On the one side, 'Indeed, scientific realism ... claims that "the long term success of a scientific theory gives reason to *believe* that something like the entities and structures postulated by the theory actually exist"' (Hunt, 1990a:9; 1992a:95; emphasis added). Apparently, even for the realist, that 'the world exists independently of its being perceived' (Hunt, 1990a:9) is no more and no less than a 'belief', although with 'reason' (*ibid*), but without 'certainty' (Hunt, 1990a:9). On the other side, 'the relativist ... *believes* that while there may be (or may not be) a reality independent of the observer, there is no way to know such a reality' (Peter, 1991:540; emphasis added). It seems equally clear that if the relativists reject 'an independent objective reality', the reason for doing so is only because they are concerned with ways to know it rather than the nature of it. In short, for either the realist or the relativist, to or not to believe an independent reality, to or not to accept many mentally-created realities, makes no 'ultimate' accessible or provable sense. The choice as to how to describe reality(ies) depends ultimately on 'reason' or purpose.

This gives good reason to construct the existence which confronts marketing as an ontological complexity constituted by an objective world, a subjective world, and a social world. This three-world ontological vision makes it possible, as shown in Chapter 7, to accommodate research approaches in marketing according to their inquiry domains, cognitive interests, knowledge produced, validity claims, and personalities in methodologies. It can be argued that the three-world ontological vision provides more informative and useful insights than the realist belief of only an objective world, which unavoidably excludes many available approaches whose focuses are not objective aspects around us. It can also be argued that the proposed ontological vision provides greater conceptual competence than the relativist belief of many realities, which inherently lacks the ability to put approaches to 'good' order and unavoidably slips to 'anything goes'. In short, the three-world ontological vision gains its meaning and advantage from its facilitating and enabling constructive competence to accommodate and juxtapose available research approaches, rather than from any direct accessible 'ultimate' sense.

Secondly, the three-world vision of ontology enables us to conceive and to establish marketing inquiry domains of objective relations, of subjective experience, and of public norms. It was revealed in the previous chapter that the 'truth' of the diversity in approaches is a consistent reaction to the positivist-empirical domination that ignores and excludes many equally important phenomena in consumption needs, is a move beyond the narrow conception on easy-to-measure objective aspects in marketing. Advocates of newly developing research approaches are certainly aware, and have consistently declared, that the purpose of their exploration in methodology should be viewed as complementarist attempts to include those equally important marketing phenomena (for example Hirschman, 1985, 1986a; Hirschman and Holbrook, 1982, etc.). However, so far they have limited their discussion scope to methodological and epistemological dimensions. No attempt has been made to support their methodological or/and epistemological pluralism with a compatible ontological statement (except that of Mokwa and Evans, 1982, which is rarely referred to by marketers). This is unfortunate for marketing. As demonstrated in previous chapters, and as most, especially the self-reflective, marketers agree, there is and should be a consistence between methods, ways of knowing, and ontological assumptions. It has been argued that one of the most crucial reasons why marketing study currently stagnates in the epistemic Either/Or black hole is that the discipline lacks an adequate supporting ontological vision (Kavanagh (1994), with a similar concern, correctly points out that paradigmatic inquiry in marketing has by far mistakenly equated ontological question with epistemological one). Without an adequate ontological vision, pluralistic-oriented marketers have not been successful in supporting their attempts to embrace heterogeneous inquiry domains and hence their appreciable positions toward diverse research approaches. In the case of the systems movement (see Appendix II), the legitimacy of plurality of research approaches has been established based on an critical systems ontological vision able to embrace heterogeneous yet interrelated phenomena (Midgley, 1992). My incorporation of the ontological vision of a three-world complexity, and the conception of three-fold inquiry domains, can be seen as a similar effort in marketing study.

Thirdly, the proposed typology of marketing is compatible and mutual supporting with the reorientation of marketing undertaken in Chapter 7. In that reorientation, it is conceptualised that since marketing from its birth is a public mechanism for the purpose of distributing needed products and services from the point of production to that of consumption, marketing as a discipline inherently holds interests and responsibilities in technical enhancement (in terms of objective measurement, prediction, control, optimisation and efficiency), in hermeneutic understanding (in terms of subjective meaning, feeling, desires, and wants manifested in marketing actions), and in norm firmation (in terms of critical rationally grounded argumentation on social norms embedded into marketing activities). While in Chapter 7 this reorientation is established on the conceptional competence of the Habermasian social evolution theory, i.e., communicative action-rationality and lifeworld/systems theses, now the reorientation gains a 'double support' from the three-fold marketing typology which begins with an ontological consideration. The differentiated human cognitive interests and corresponding validity claims join here with the three-world complexity and three domains of inquiry. Overall, in the proposed typology, ontological, epistemological, methodological, as well as sociological and society-evolution dimensions are systemically inform one another.

Fourth, the proposed marketing typology appears to be a realistic avenue out of the Either/Or black hole, a viable alternative to either the realist-empiricist or the relativist options for responding to the challenging diversity in marketing. It provides us with a new possibility to gain alternative understanding on issues such as 'Is marketing a science?' or 'Should marketing science pursue or abandon truth and objectivity?'. In previous chapters, it has been shown that pluralistic-oriented marketers have revealed that the oldest controversy of 'Is marketing a science?' is misleading, since it was conducted based on a taken-for-granted criterion of a single method, procedure and standard. Pluralistic-oriented marketers have correctly replaced it with a more accurate question, 'What type of science should marketing become?'. However, they have so far not been successful in systematically answering this question. Most often, if not always, they are concerned about which type of *science* marketing should become, rather than what types of *sciences* marketing can embrace. It has been argued that this reductionist conception of SCIENCE has both left room for, and been constrained by, the epistemic Either/Or. It has also been revealed that the whole discipline is dominated by a counter-arguments between 'Truth ought to be the objective of marketing science' and 'Truth is an inappropriate objective of [marketing] science'.

Seen by the proposed marketing typology, those conceptions of SCIENCE and counter-arguments on TRUTH are misleading. When we step back to see the Either/Or debate on science and truth in marketing, it is now more clear that both the realist-empiricist and the relativist built their arguments on an indifferentiated-foundationalist rationale. When the relativists claim that truth or objective is over or should be abandoned, their image of truth and objective is still that of *the* Absolute System. Each, in its own way, wants to keep truth or objective pure - pure from any contamination by either non-empirical or empirical 'scientific' research, respectively.

Now we come to a new light of truth in marketing study. Truth need not be rejected, nor is it *the* only goal. Truth can, and should, be an objective of marketing, yet it is only *an* objective, no more and no less. Truth gains legitimacy and necessity in marketing study because marketing cannot deny the need and responsibility to deal with objective relations in the marketplace. This responsibility is relevant to what Hunt labels 'law-like generalisations/regularities' in natural sciences. In this sense, truth is *a* necessary objective and standard in marketing study. However, as demonstrated throughout the thesis, objective relations in the natural world are just a portion (albeit undeniable) of the phenomena confronting marketing. Marketing by its public and communicative nature is also concerned with subjective values and social norms. In these areas, the objective of truth derived from natural sciences is not much relevant, empirical-analytic sciences just cannot help. Rather, subjective sincerity and normative rightness as objectives must be incorporated and established, which are better addressed by hermeneutic and critical sciences respectively.

Thus, the proposed marketing typology provides new insights to bring conclusion to the misleading debate on 'truth' in marketing, and to answer the questions of 'Is marketing a science?' and 'What type of science should marketing become?'. As shown in Table 9.1, truth is one inquiry objective in marketing study, and marketing as a discipline can and should gain its scientific status by producing knowledge through all empirical-analytic sciences, hermeneutic sciences, and critical sciences. Marketing can become scientific in terms of a critical conception of SCIENCE.

Finally, according to the typology, available heterogeneous research approaches can be conducted in such a manner that each is purposefully and explicitly employed to tackle most relevant aspects of marketing situations and tasks so that each can give its most valuable contribution. Research approaches in marketing have, to different extents, intended so far to conceive, without reflection on the partiality in practice of each, *the* whole marketing system in their own terms. In contrast, the proposed typology encourages us to choose a different strategy. According to this strategy, available approaches are differentiated and developed such that they are directed by different purposes and assumptions, as well as pin-pointing different types of issues, phenomena, and marketing activities respectively. As outlined in Part II, while each of them can contribute its own merit to the common commitment of marketing in their differentiable ways with different emphases, none of them can individually encompass all issues in consumption needs, since none of them holds sufficient conceptual as well as methodological elements for tackling the multi-dimensional, multi-faceted marketing whole. At this point we come back to one of the most articulated contentions of CST: it is unproductive and meaningless to argue which approach is best in static universal terms; rather, what is most needed and more rewarding might be to reflect on inescapable partiality in intervention, and to study 'which approach - when and why'.

To summarise, in this section marketing study has been reconceptualised through a conceptual typology by which marketing is schematised into technical, practical, and normative marketing categories. Beginning with an articulation of a three-world ontological vision, the proposed typology is shown to be compatible and mutually supporting with the critical systems reorientation of marketing proposed in Chapter 7. The typology and hence the reconstruction as such are presented as a viable alternative to get out of the dominating Either/Or in the sense that it provides new insights to see the issue of truth and science. More significant, for the purpose of this research, the proposed typology enables us to differentiate, to accommodate, and to juxtapose heterogeneous approaches, promoting complementarism on the one hand, and directing differentiated individual approaches to their most likely contributing inquiry domains on the other.

Before leaving this section, it is crucial to point out that any typological categorisation consists not of 'true descriptions' of 'real things', but simply of handy and useful constructions for generating understanding about concerned situations of a discipline, or for providing a language we can adopt to conduct research in a 'better' ordered way. Nor can any typology be fixed or 'once and forever,' due to the dynamics and diversity a discipline confronts. Therefore, the proposed typology of approaches in marketing is simply a suggested way in a situated context to gain 'better' understanding and accommodation for heterogeneous approaches, and to take us beyond the current uneasy paradigmatic situation. It is not final nor fixed. Rather, it is proposed for further discussion. It should be continually subjected to rigorous dialogical scrutiny and adjusted in accordance with dynamic changes and continuous emergency in the discipline.

9.2 OPERATIONALISING THE RECONSTRUCTION

In the last section, a typology was proposed which schematises approaches in marketing study into technical, practical, and normative categories, each underwritten by particular philosophical assumptions, each producing differentiable scientific knowledge with different criteria for validity claims, therefore each competent for specific intervention purposes and interests respectively. Thereby, three different broad paradigms were presented for research and practice in marketing. Now we come to consider how this typology can be operationalised for the purpose of individual enhancement and collective complementation.

This issue can be addressed at three different yet related levels of reasoning, each of which focuses on a particular emphasis. At the first level, the emphasis is focused on the long-run development potentials for rival research paradigms. The central objective at this level of elaboration is to establish a critically grounded pluralist attitude toward both individual and collective enhancement. At the next level, major attention is given to how to make possible understanding and learning between alien research traditions, in the dynamic interactive development process of paradigms. At the last level, the concern is how to promote complementation among available approaches in practical problem-solving situations through appreciating and (if necessary) selecting approaches. In this endeavour, some facilitating metaphors will be incorporated and employed, and supporting methodological guide-lines will (if possible) be suggested (see Table 9.2).

Table 9.2 Operationalising the reconstruction in marketing

Emphasis in operationalisation	*Long-term development potential*	*Dynamic interactive process*	*Practical problem-solving intervention*
Central objective	Establishing pluralist perspective	Seeking self- and mutual-understanding	Promoting complementation
Facilitating metaphors	Force-field, constellation	Fusion of horizons, Hermeneutic circle	Fibre cable
Major task	Undertaking dynamic juxtaposition	Encouraging listening and learning	Facilitating appreciation/ argumentation
Supporting methodology guide-lines		Experience-near/ experience-distant, Stepping back from traditions	Total systems intervention, SAST, SSM, CSH, WSR, etc.

It seems here necessary to justify the decision to address the paradigmatic issue at the perceived differentiated levels. Addressing issues of paradigm/pluralism with different emphasises at differentiated elaboration levels may have some advantages. Many scholars appear to have difficulties when they try in an all-circumstances-encompassing manner to address paradigmatic issues. For example, Jackson and Carter (1991) persistently articulate paradigmatic incommensurability for the purpose of breaking down the tyranny of dominant paradigm(s) over incommensurate paradigms. In their elaboration, they have not provided any suggestion as to how colleagues in organisations or fellow citizens in societies communicate in their day-to-day problem-solving intervention. In their defence of paradigmatic incommensurability against scientistic authoritarianism, their conclusion leaves practitioners no other alternative possibility than either to be depressed by the domination of scientistic authoritarianism or to be enclosed within a particular prejudice. To such a fundamental issue, what is ignored is as telling as what is addressed. Do these writers actually believe that the Self and the Other are so incommensurable to listen and speak to each other in any practical problem-solving situation? Or will they argue that their intention is on the theoretical level therefore day-to-day problem-solving is not relevant to their argument? If so, then what is the purpose of stressing the incommensurability issue without proper concern for practical actions?

Back in 1972, Singelmann argued against the sanctity of paradigms: 'However, I am not very interested in paradigms beyond their utility in making sense out of the world. ... If we are interested in the world as it is, let us select our constructs according to whether they help us elucidate that world' (Singelmann, 1972:424). Ritzer, too, criticises the upside-down priority we usually grant to the world and our incommensurate (or commensurate) perspectives about it: 'Sociologists tend to forget the real world and focus instead on the perspective within which they work. The point is, however, to understand the world and not defend our vested interests in our "pet" paradigm' (Ritzer, 1975:223). As I read them, Singelmann's and Ritzer's comments can be, with equal validity, levelled at the ignorance of practice intention and relevance in the paradigmatic incommensurability-pluralism debate.

Here I am not saying that any argument of paradigmatic issues must or can be translated into day-to-day problem-solving instructions. Nor am I suggesting that we must be committed to 'the world' of Singelmann or Ritzer. What concerns me is that many scholars tend to ignore a point - that is, their stands toward paradigmatic incommensurability (or commensurability) and pluralism may hold different implications to different levels of reasoning; for example, implications for long-run development potentials, implications for dynamic development process, and implications for here-and-now problem-solving situations, which may in turn require different reflections. One of the difficulties is that, even though we may defend our abstract theoretical position articulately, we might fail to provide significant indications as to how to translate our theorising into guidance for practice in specific problem-solving circumstances, a failure which can ultimately undermine the significance of our arguments. It is to overcome such difficulty, that the operationalisation of the proposed reconstruction is here addressed with different emphases at three elaboration levels, rather than in an all-circumstance-encompassing, non-differentiating manner.

9.3 ESTABLISHING PLURALISM FOR THE LONG TERM

At the first level, concerning the long-run prospect for rival paradigms or approaches, it is suggested that operationalising the reconstruction can put emphasis on establishing critical systems pluralist attitude.

9.3.1 Pluralism and (In)commensurability

To repeat, critical systems pluralism is denoted an attitude toward the diverse research approaches, which contends that differences, otherness, discordance and conflicts can be embraced and accommodated together with searching for similarities, commonalities, mutual understanding and complementarity, and that alien, competing, conflicting paradigmatic claims can be rationally criticised and defended. This attitude emphasises undeniable commonalities as much as irreducible differences. It recognises that personalities among the Self and the Other may be too fundamental to be reduced, yet at the same time it also recognises that advocates of competing approaches can be capable of listening and speaking to one another in a critical, non-imperialistic manner. Obviously, this attitude implies that it is possible to accept both paradigmatic incommensurability and pluralism. In other words, paradigmatic incommensurability and pluralism are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

To establish such a position it is necessary to move our conceptualisation of both paradigmatic incommensurability and pluralism beyond the prevailing wisdom since in the marketing study context marketers tend to address this issue in an

Either/Or manner. For example, Hunt (1991:41, 1990a:4-5) argues that since 'no coherent, interesting, nontrivial version of "paradigmatic incommensurability" could be justified' therefore paradigmatic incommensurability is *not* a real issue, whereas Anderson (1986) and Peter (1992) insist that research approaches in marketing *are* incommensurate. As I read them, their Either/Or positions on paradigmatic incommensurability are adopted to reinforce their own realist-empiricist or relativist stands respectively. For the realist-empiricist, denying possible paradigmatic incommensurability is for the purpose of subsuming other research paradigms into the logical empiricist grip, whereas for the relativist, arguing for acceptance of paradigmatic incommensurability is for the purpose of justifying their intention of ruling out possible rational inter-theory discourse.

From a dialectic viewpoint, a simple Yes/No or Either/Or is not the only, nor a desirable or viable, alternative we can choose to tackle the paradigmatic incommensurability issue. Rather than being committed to a fixed and rigid Yes or No, we can perceive paradigmatic (in)commensurability as operating in a dynamic way: from certain perspectives, paradigms can be seen as incommensurate in some aspects, for a particular point of time and space, while from other points of view, paradigms may be viewed as commensurate in some aspects in other investigation periods (Gregory, 1992; also see Appendix III).

The dialectic view provides us with more flexibility to address the paradigmatic incommensurability issue. It is more flexible in the sense of being able to reflect dynamic changes of rival paradigms during their rich on-going evolution during which tendencies of both divergence and convergence can frequently rise and fall in many ways. The bottom line of the conception of the dynamics of paradigmatic (in)commensurability is that, we have no good reason to rule out possibilities in which differences and conflicts between rival paradigms are too fundamental to be reduced or assimilated since contingencies in all their evolution simply cannot be foreseen with certainty. Yet equally necessary and crucial to be made clear is that, neither have we good reason to rule out the openness of our linguistic horizons through which we may find possibilities of listening and speaking among alien languages or research programmes, so that we may be able to punch a hole in the 'incommensurate' wall which imprisons us within our own prejudice (even the most committed relativists in marketing have recently softened their position by saying that 'Social scientific research programs exhibit a "weak form" incommensurability ... [in which] scientists can understand each other perfectly well, yet disagree violently on the appropriate programme for researching a particular topic' (Anderson, 1986:158)). The closure or isolation implication of paradigmatic incommensurability is more artificially imposed than not. Paradigms, no matter how incommensurate they might be, are always having relations among one another. Even domination or suppression is a kind of relation. It may be argued that, if relations are manifested as domination or suppression, a possible, if not the only, way to break down such domination or suppression is to challenge them through more meaningful interaction, rather than to appeal to closure or isolation.

To embrace irreducible differences and conflicts and search for commonalities and complementarity among rival paradigms (let us assume for a moment that paradigms are not commensurable at all) implies that we have at once to give up the desire for any *final* reconciliation and in the meantime continuously to seek *critical* conciliation . To borrow Bernstein:

> ... although we cannot (and should not) give up the *promise* and demand for reconciliation - a reconciliation achieved by what Hegel calls 'determinate negation', I do not think we can any longer responsibly claim that there is or can be a final reconciliation - an *Aufhegung* in which all difference, otherness, opposition and contradiction are reconciled. There are always unexpected contingent rupture that disrupt the project of reconciliation (Bernstein, 1991:8).

> But the need for critical reconciliation is not therefore to be abandoned. For an uncritical celebration and valorisation of plurality, differences, and otherness harbours its own dangers. What is too frequently obscured is the need to make critical discriminations and judgements. Not all forms of otherness and difference are to be celebrated (*ibid*:313).

> [We] can neither give up the need and desire for reconciliation nor [our] openness to new, unexpected, contingent ruptures (*ibid*:319).

Thus the dialectic view of paradigmatic (in)commensurability points to a great possibility for rival research approaches to preserve and develop their distinct (commensurable and incommensurable) features through their dynamic interaction.

Not only the notion of paradigmatic (in)commensurability but also the notion of pluralism should be critically refined. Pluralism has become such an indefinite word that it has been employed without any hesitation by any paradigmatic and/or meta-paradigmatic positions. In marketing study, pluralism has been used as a fashionable banner by both sides of the epistemic Either/Or, and of course adopted in some form or the other by those marketers trying to embrace diverse approaches (for example Hunt, 1991; Anderson, 1988b; Hirschman, 1986a). For different stands, pluralism means different 'things'. But not all these uses or meanings are to be celebrated, especially in the present time. As Bernstein states:

> For pluralism itself is open to many interpretations and we need to make some important distinctions. For there is a danger of *fragmenting* pluralism where the centrifugal forces become so strong that we are only able to communicate with the small group that already shares our own biases, and no longer even experience the need to talk with others outside of this circle. There is a *flabby* pluralism where our borrowings from different orientations are little more than glib superficial poaching. There is *polemical* pluralism where the appeal to pluralism doesn't signify a genuine willingness to listen and learn from others, but becomes rather an ideological weapon to advance one's own orientation. There is *defensive* pluralism, a form of tokenism, where we pay lip service to

others 'doing their own thing' but are already convinced that there is nothing important to be learn from (Bernstein, 1991:335-6).

In marketing study, especially in the realist-empiricist/relativist Either/Or debate, we see all these forms of 'pluralism'. While Hunt grounds his 'critical pluralism' on his realist-empiricist belief, Anderson (1986, 1988a) equates pluralism with relativism. As to those pluralistic-oriented marketers, while their desire for plurality can be valuable, their arguments for pluralism are unfortunately not sound since they choose to either lean to the realist-empiricist position (e.g., Leong, 1985), or line themselves up with the relativist stand (e.g., Bristor, 1984, 1985), or just present competing paradigms without any attempt to encourage conversation (e.g., Hirschman, 1985, 1986a).

As Gregory (1992) puts it, although social scientists who support a pluralist perspective need to have both a rigorous philosophical justification for their position and a means for evaluating and choosing between competing paradigms, such a means should avoid the danger of any paradigm being evaluated simply in its own terms (extreme relativism, like that of Peter and Olson) or solely in terms of the evaluating paradigm (extreme imperialism, like that of Calder and Tybout). And this leads us back to the refined notion of paradigmatic (in)commensurability: on the one hand, to be 'truly' pluralist rather than some form of imperialist, we have to recognise that sometimes what is alien to us is not possible to be translated perfectly into our own vocabularies; on the other hand, to be 'truly' pluralist rather than some form of relativist, we have no reason to rule out the openness of our linguistic horizons, or to fall back to what Popper called 'the myth of framework' which tells us that we are so imprisoned into these frameworks that we cannot even communicate with those enclosed in 'radically' different frameworks or paradigms (Popper, 1972:56; cf.: Bernstein, 1983:84-5). In short, for 'true' pluralism, 'it is always a *task* to seek out commonalities and points of difference and conflict' (Bernstein, 1991:336).

9.3.2 'Constellation' in 'Force-Fields'

For the objective of establishing pluralism in the diversity in marketing study, the metaphors of force-field and constellation appear particularly helpful. These two metaphors are introduced by Adorno and Benjamin, then cited in Jay (1984), and then borrowed by Bernstein (1991) and Gregory (1992) (My perception and usage of these two metaphors differ from those of Gregory. In Gregory, force-field is related to imperialism therefore is 'bad', and constellation denotes 'discordant pluralism' therefore is 'good'. While in my analysis, force-fields and constellations always dynamically condition and constitute each other, from which no Self or personality can escape).

By force-field we can denote 'a relational interplay of attractions and aversions that constituted the dynamic transmutational structure of a complex phenomenon' (Jay, 1984:14-5). As I read it, for the purpose of this project, the diversity of approaches in marketing can be seen as such 'a complex phenomenon'. Each approach in this phenomenon holds a distinct position upon which it sees itself, sees the others, sees the whole diversity, and conducts marketing research and practice in its particular style. Such seeing and conducting is not in a vacuum. Instead, they always produce 'attractions and aversions' to others, to the whole structure, and vice versa. Such 'attractions and aversions' among approaches can be manifested directly through spoken assertions, arguments and counter-arguments, or can be produced by unspoken but telling research practices. The 'relational interplay' of these arguments and practices 'constitutes a force-field' within which varying approaches find their own distinct positions. This situation is very much like planets and stars in the Universe: at any moment, each planet or star contributes its own particular force to constitute the Universe gravitational force-field, while each is, at that same moment, located at a particular position, imposed by the others *and* itself.

Like stars in the Universe gravitational force-field, approaches in the paradigmatic diversity 'force-field' are always on-going attracting and repelling each other. That is, approaches are always interacting with one another in certain ways, distancing from each other, and reflecting on each other. One cannot be subsumed into others, yet at the same time none can isolate itself or escape from the mutual effect with others. The structure of such mutual effect manifests as a constellation which 'signify[ies] a juxtaposed rather than integrated cluster of changing elements that resist reduction to a common denominator, essential core, or generative first principle' (Jay, 1984:14-5).

Constellation in a force-field is an always on-going and dynamic process therefore we cannot expect a once-and-forever juxtaposition of approaches. The reason is simple: approaches themselves and their inter-relations are ever-changing - new approaches will come and rise, generating unexpected contingent forces that influence the force-field; existing approaches will fall and vanish, too, producing unforeseeable changes to the force-field; remaining approaches will gain enhancement through mutual reflection, thereby making the force-field ever unpredictably evolving. In this way, the distinctive identity of individual approaches may be held intact, while at the same time approaches continuously challenge and supplement one another. Conceived as such, the metaphors of force-field and constellation enable us to justify our argument for embracing differences together with searching for complementarity among approaches, which is exactly what critical systems pluralism wants to achieve. If we would like to say that juxtaposing approaches in constellation can be seen as seeking reconciliation or as establishing order in a discipline, then 'reconciliation' and 'order' should be read such that

> We need to maintain a vigilant double attitude where we are at once aware of the need for reconciliation and order and that any reconciliation and order cannot be seen as final or fixed but subjected and called into critical question (Bernstein, 1991:319).

9.4 SEEKING UNDERSTANDING THROUGH INTERACTION

At the next level of operationalising the reconstruction of marketing study, we can focus on the dynamic interactive development process of research approaches, with emphasis on encouraging learning through hermeneutic self- and mutual-understanding.

9.4.1 Mutual Supposing and Conditioning among Approaches

To begin with, I would like to claim that mutual listening and understanding among research approaches or rationality is not an arbitrary choice or imposed load. Rather, it seems to be an inherent feature of human cognitive inquiry as well as practical life. Different rationalities underlying different approaches actually imply and rely on each other. As Habermas states, 'in the communicative practice of everyday life, in which cognitive explanation, moral expectations, expressions and evaluations interpenetrate, this unity is in a certain way *always already* established' (Habermas, 1982:250). The separation and mutual exclusion among different kinds of rationality is just an illusion produced by the unbalanced and distortive process of one-sided rationalisation we selectively undertake. To quote, again, Habermas, 'it is only in the modern period that they have been isolated from one another, to the extent that cultural tradition can be dealt with under any given one of these aspects, and that traditional problems can be sorted out in terms of questions having to do with merely truth, justice, or taste' (Habermas, 1982:235).

To elaborate the mutual implying, presupposing, and conditioning relations among alternative approaches and their underlying rationality, I will focus on three different approaches, or different modes, of human knowledge inquiry, i.e., an empirical-analytic mode, a hermeneutic-interpretive mode, and a critical-emancipatory mode. This treatment is compatible with the proposed typology of marketing study that schematises marketing approaches into technical, practical, and normative categories (recall Table 9.1).

The mutual presupposing and conditioning relation among differentiable approaches or modes of human knowledge inquiry is illustrated in Figure 9.1 (on the following page), which should be read as the following.

Firstly, it can be argued that empirical-analytic and hermeneutic-interpretive approaches are presupposing and conditioning each other. The major concern of empirical-analytic inquiry is to observe phenomena, record data, and then analyse findings for the purpose of seeking regularities for prediction and control. Here, the words 'empirical' and 'analytic' are used in their most broad sense, as Habermas uses them. In such sense, even advocates of interpretive, naturalistic, and humanistic research approaches in marketing will accept that observing, recording and analysing are basic processes of scientific inquiry. In a book about the *Naturalist Consumer Research Odyssey*, for example, the authors claim without disagreement that 'The preliminary process of recording data is the earliest act of interpretation' (Belk, 1991:222). Now the point is that the empirical-analytic processes of observation, recording and analysis can only become possible when, explicitly or implicitly, guided by certain kind of theory because researchers have to make choices (even unconsciously) as to what to observe, record and analyse, how, when, and why to do so. At least, some (even implicit) theory is needed to create or to adopt a certain kind, rather than other kinds, of measurement, as well as to attach a certain kind, rather than other kinds, of meaning to data. An interpretation is necessary because what we see or choose to see imposes constraints on us (Polier and Roseberry, 1989). Such selection, creation, adoption, and attaching underlie the whole process of empirical-analytic research, and all obviously embed interpretation. Even the 'rigorous empirical test' so favoured by Hunt and other realist-empiricist is an interpretive act, according to Giorgi (1986), which uses a process resembling what phenomenologists refer to as 'imaginative variation' (cf.: Thompson, 1991). Through languages, rules and mechanisms of interpretation, values and attitudes, virtually determine what phenomena are to be observed as events, what data to be recorded as



Figure 9.1 Mutual-presupposing and -conditioning relations among human knowledge inquiry approaches

findings, what kind of 'law-like' regularities to be produced as empirical results. As such, empirical-analytic research becomes possible and has meaning only through the support and facilitation, rather than getting rid of the influence, of hermeneutics-interpretation. It is in such sense that Gadamer (1960/1975) claims that even empirical-analytic natural sciences rest on hermeneutic interpretation (cf.: Holbrook and O'Shaughnessy, 1988).

Conversely, hermeneutic-interpretive research seems always conditioned and supported by inquiry mode of continuous falsification. In marketing study, hermeneutic-interpretive research has been said to rest on a self-fulfilling prophecy in which 'the conceptual argument is used to give an account of data ... and ... there is no intention of comparing interpretation in order to choose among them' (Calder and Tybout, 1987:139). In Calder and Tybout's minds, hermeneutic-interpretive research always tries to fit data into pre-established conceptualisation somehow freely without, on the other hand, seeking falsification according to empirical findings. However, the notion of 'Hermeneutic Circle' has proved that such a description of hermeneutic-interpretive research is misleading. The Calder and Tybout description is misleading because it ignores the dialectical nature of the hermeneutic-interpretive process - that is, precursory interpretations are continually modified to accommodate the emergent characteristics of phenomena in the empirical sphere (Thompson, Locander and Pollio, 1989). According to Gadamer, the hermeneutic circle is an iterative spiral understanding process. The dialogue (interaction) between a reader and a text (researcher and phenomenon) proceeds through such iterations of circular process that, far from being vicious, tend toward self-correction in the direction of increasing validity. This process brings the researcher's interpretation into closer and closer alignment with the discerned through a series of close scrutiny and revision. Therefore 'interpretation always admits and generally requires an intrinsically empirical approach via ... the self-corrective circle of hermeneutics' (Holbrook and O'Shaughnessy, 1988:401).

Now I turn to focus on the mutual presupposing and conditioning relation between hermeneutic-interpretive and critical-emancipatory approaches. Most hermeneutic-interpretive researchers are becoming aware that hermeneutic-interpretive research cannot escape from political influences and constraints, and therefore needs to incorporate elements from the critical-emancipatory inquiry mode. It is stated that 'writing and reading a text is a political process - at both a macro and a micro level' (Joy, 1991:218). In reading a text, a person understands it not only in terms of her/his own individual concerns but also as a 'collective effort'. Reading is thus a learned and socially organised activity (Becker, 1986; Peterson, 1976). Therefore any discussion of interpretive textualisation cannot be understood out of the social context of knowledge production (Crick, 1982; Flacks and Turkel, 1979; cf.: Joy, 1991:218). Given that hermeneutic-interpretive understanding is always already conditioned by the social-political sphere, how can we conceive of 'true' reading and 'thick' description produced through 'purely' hermeneutic-interpretive approaches without facilitation of the critical-emancipatory mode? Habermas has forcefully argued that language, the vehicle of hermeneutic-interpretive research, is not only a medium for hermeneutic understanding but also a medium of possible domination since language itself is dependent upon social process which are not wholly linguistic in nature (Habermas, 1980; cf.: Thompson, 1982:117; also Arnold and Fischer, 1994). 'Pure' hermeneutic-interpretive research without facilitation from critical-emancipatory rationality may generate self-misunderstanding, rather than self-understanding. Therefore 'what was needed is a "depth hermeneutics" which would do justice to the role of work and power (not just language and communication) in the understanding of culture and society' (Bernstein, 1983:43). Thus for the 'own sake' of hermeneutic-interpretive research, that is, to achieve 'true' reading and 'thick' description, support from critical-emancipatory mode is not additionally imposed but indispensably needed. As Arnold and Fischer put it, 'Critiques of ideology are now part of our tradition and way well inform subsequent research. "We can no longer oppose hermeneutics and the critique of ideology. The critique of ideology is the necessary detour which self-understanding must take" (Ricoeur, 1981:144)' (Arnold and Fischer, 1994:65).

Conversely, if critical-emancipatory inquiry is to free people from domination of ideology or imposed image, it cannot afford to be separated from the process of hermeneutic understanding and interpretation. The most central notion of the critical-emancipatory approaches - critique - can only become possible through hermeneutic processes of conception, explanation, reading, deconstruction, and interpretive action. To self-reflect on one's own pre-assumed knowledge condition (in the sense of Kant), or to reflect on imposed 'ideological frozen forms of dependence' (in the sense of from Hegel to Marx), hermeneutic-interpretive process is indispensable. In modern societies, compared with the days of Marx, domination and alienation are exercised more and more through cultural medium and language. As such, proper critique about modern day domination and alienation cannot be realised or even begun without the process of language which is inherently laid on the core of modern hermeneutic-interpretive research approaches. For this, Habermas (1976) has argued that any adequate social and political theory must involve an interpretative or hermeneutic dimension.

The relation between empirical-analytic and critical-emancipatory approaches can also be considered as mutual presupposing and conditioning. On the one hand, as a marketing communication researcher claims, in the pursuit of valid and meaningful knowledge about marketing, 'we are all critical, with or without a capital "C"' (Lang, 1979). That is, researchers are always making 'ought to' decisions on what to do, with what standard, and for what purpose. Without such critical reasoning, empirical-analytic research loses proper direction and orientation for its own sake, although that 'properness' is always already historically situated. Since Weber, it has been insistently argued that researchers have been becoming 'experts without vision'. Habermas has pointed out that this is only an unfortunate result of the imbalanced rationalisation process we unconsciously selected to undertake. Habermas insists that this is not necessarily so and that other possibilities for a 'better' rationalisation (and hence also a 'better' empirical-analytic natural science) are still open. Marketers (especially consumer and marketing communication researcher such as Hirschman (1993), Roger (1986) and Murray and Ozanne (1991)) have recognised that to research consumer and medium is to research society. Like the institution of marketing, research, even empirical-analytic, is always telling. Bleier (1988:160) writes, 'Scientists believe the language they use is simply a vehicle for the transformission of information. ... They do not recognise or acknowledge the degree to which their scientific writing itself participates in *producing* the reality they wish to represent'. Without a critical vision, empirical observation will ignore significant marketing phenomena (Hirschman, 1985, 1986a). A marketer involved in empirical-analytic research needs to make explicit the questions and answers of how to conduct research, why, and for whose benefit (Rogers, 1987; Fejes, 1984), simply because 'there is no getting beyond ideology, there is only the possibility of becoming aware of its presence and consciously choosing the values we wish to affirm' (Hirschman, 1993:551), of which empirical-analytic research cannot be an exception.

On the other hand, critical-emancipatory inquiry relies on empirical-analytic findings to locate its focus and to test its critique. As Habermas argues, a critical theory without empirical content could too easily degenerate into an empty rhetorical gesture. There has always been a real danger that critical theory might 'regress' to the type of critical criticism Marx so ruthlessly attacked when he turned away from the young Hegelians to a more empirical account of political economy (Bernstein, 1985:8). From Habermas's perspective, the old generation of the Frankfurt school risked such a danger when they distanced themselves from developing a critical social science able to address real potentialities in real social conditions toward a 'negative dialectics' focusing on a generalised critique of instrumental rationality only. One of the purposes of Habermas's whole thesis is to rebuild critical inquiry with more immediate practical contents and concerning day-to-day communicative action. In marketing study, Hirschman provides a convincing example of how empirical findings supports and benefits critical research. In her critique of ideologies in marketing/consumer research, Hirschman selects, compares, and analyses various manifestations of ideologies from 37 articles in the 1980 volume and 41 articles in the 1990 volume of the *Journal of Consumer Research.* This empirical-analytic work (involving observation, recording, analysis, generalising, and interpretation) enables Hirschman to identify seven prevailing distortive ideological themes in marketing research/practice and to show that during a ten-year period some of the themes were becoming increasingly prevalent and dominant. Other examples can be found in Arndt (1979a, b), Arndt and Uusitalo (1980), Dholakia and Firat (1986), Rogers (1982), etc.

In the above I have presented a conceptual model illustrating how different research approaches can be viewed as not merely mutually conditioning but are also often presupposing and rely on one another. The model emphasises that mutual interaction and incorporation among heterogeneous rationality is not an arbitrary choice nor an imposed load, but an inherent necessity and feature of human knowledge inquiry. This model is compatible with the critical systems thinkers' argument that any individual rationality is partial; therefore no social reality can be adequately explained and tackled without drawing on insights from a wide range of paradigms. Naturally, research approaches need the infusion of any possible insights and supports from other paradigms.

9.4.2 Ritzer: Researchers as 'Paradigm Bridgers'

It can be further suggested, according to Ritzer (1975), that *a researcher* can not only infuse insights from others to her/his own paradigm, but can also 'shift' between or 'bridge' research paradigms. In his study of paradigms in sociology, Ritzer identifies three broad research paradigms, i.e., the social fact, the social definition, and the social behaviour paradigms. Ritzer argues that Parsons shifts from one paradigm to another. According to Ritzer, Parsons's stand in *The Structure of Social Action* (1937) is clearly of an action theorist which squares in the social definition camp, while by the 1950s Parsons had all but deserted the social definition paradigm for social factism where he put status-role as his basic unit of analysis. Ritzer feels regret that 'Parsons's work would have been far stronger had he truly integrated social factism and social definitionism instead of leaping from one to the other' (*ibid*:218).

For Ritzer, it is possible for *a researcher* to 'bridge' research paradigms so as to gain research advantage. Durkheim, Weber and Marx are regarded as such great 'paradigm bridgers'. While Durkheim certainly recognised that material social facts exist and are external to, as well as coercive on, individuals, he recognised that the most important social facts were nonmaterial 'social currents' that could only exist in intersubjective and in intrasubjective social phenomena. 'It was his ability to discuss both material and nonmaterial social facts that enabled Durkheim to bridge the social facts and social definition paradigms' (*ibid*:213). Similarly, although Weber defined social action as the subject matter of sociology, he studied substantially social facts. For example, in his cross-cultural studies of religion, Weber was clearly dealing with both social factism and social definitionism. Therefore Weber in his social research actually 'bridge' social definitions and social facts paradigms. As to Marx, Ritzer argues, he was also able to work with both the social facts and social definition paradigms. Even though Marx accorded coercive reality to various social facts, he fully recognised the creative, active aspect of Man. In fact, the two perspectives are interwoven because of the dialectical character of Marx's thinking. Ritzer states that among the three, Marx 'best integrated social factism and social definitionism' (*ibid*:216).

In his conclusion Ritzer maintains that:

> It is my thesis that virtually all of the great sociological theorists were able to bridge paradigms. They were capable of moving, more or less comfortably, between two,

> or more, of the paradigms. ... This was not an entirely conscious process, although I think that most theorists felt a need to deal with social reality in the diverse ways. Some tried to deal with multiple paradigms simultaneously, while others have shifted from paradigms to paradigms. Still others have shifted their theoretical perspectives or methodological techniques but remained within the same paradigms (*ibid*:213).

We may or may not accept Ritzer's paradigmatic categorisation in sociology; we may or may not agree with him on details of his discussion of Durkheim, Weber, Marx, and Parsons. Nevertheless we can hardly ignore his challenging analysis and description on the ways in which great sociology researchers deal with paradigms, because Ritzer's work might enable us to accommodate more 'abnormalities', if we see researchers' being enclosed within specific paradigms as 'normal'. In marketing research, such 'abnormalities' are apparent. For example, Hirschman is basically an advocate of humanistic/interpretive approaches (1986a, 1989a), yet she also undertakes critical-emancipatory research on the distortive effect of ideologies in marketing and urges marketers to be aware of the practical socio-political consequences produced by their research; Bagozzi originally focuses on studying casual regularities through empirical-analytic research (1980), but gradually becomes radically concerned with the hardship and tension marketing produces and eventually involves in radical marketing research (in Firat *et al.*, 1987); Rogers (1987) and Fejes (1984) incorporate positive achievements of advanced behaviourist researches into their critical study of marketing communication; Alderson (1957, 1965) is another well-known 'abnormality', researching marketing phenomena from both economic and behaviourist viewpoints, etc. These 'abnormalities' simply cannot 'fit' into either the realist-empiricist or the relativist moulds, but well into Ritzer's model.

In the above, while my model describes how research *approaches* can be viewed as mutually presuppose and condition each other, Ritzer's thesis describes how *researchers* practically incorporate and bring advantages of different paradigms together. Together these two pieces of work may provide marketers more flexibility to deal with diverse research paradigms and marketing phenomena than the realist-empiricist or the relativist does. Researchers need not necessarily limit their research in *the* scientific method, nor have they to enclose their research in their 'pet' paradigm. Other possibilities exist. Here I am not saying that all marketers must shift their paradigmatic perspectives or become 'paradigm bridgers'. What I am trying to show is that to do so or not is an open choice. After all, whatever paradigms we adopt, whatever ways we select to deal with paradigms, elements or insights of all three inquiry modes will unavoidably, acknowledged or not, come into play to different extents in different cases.

I would suggest that my model and Ritzer's work are compatible with the refined notion of paradigmatic (in)commensurability and pluralism. Paradigms are always both incommensurable and commensurable in a dynamic way. Differences and commonalities are always rising and falling. Attraction and aversion are always co-existing. It is therefore always a task for researchers to seek complementarity whilst embracing individuality. Researchers may, consciously or unconsciously, argue the incommensurability and difference of their paradigms for whatever reason, yet they will, consciously or unconsciously, for good or evil, infuse insights from other paradigms into their research practice. The question is how consciously and well they do this. A first step to encourage mutual understanding and learning requires researchers to become more conscious, to make it more explicit, and to always prepare to listen.

9.4.3 'Experience Near/Distant Concepts' and 'Fusion of Horizons'

To facilitate mutual understanding and learning, the notion of 'experience near/distant concepts' and the metaphor of 'fusion of horizons' appear informative and instructive.

The notion of experience-near and experience-distant concepts is introduced by Geertz in his study of anthropology. In its most advanced form, as I read it, anthropology reflects and constructs cultural variation in an otherwise homogenising world. It points to the multiplicity of being human. In the process, the anthropology study questions and challenges our existing knowledge by exploring and examining world-views of tribes which are most likely and most often alien to ours. Anthropological methods help construct the 'self' in the process of constructing 'otherness' (Marcus and Fischer, 1986). In a more general sense, this 'other' can refer to a society, tradition, form of life, and in our concern research approach or paradigm, unfamiliar and different from that of the researcher. Instead of studying the other(s) on an un-prejudiced basis (in terms of Gadamer, 1960/1975), or 'jumping out of our own skins (and language) and transforming ourselves' (in terms of Bernstein, 1983), the method of Geertz urges researchers to 'step back' time and again from their always already conditioning traditions. It is this insight that is most helpful for mutual understanding and learning since when we try to do so we are always already 'thrown' into a particular paradigm.

According to Geertz,

> An experience-near concept is roughly, one which an individual - a patient, a subject, in our case and informant - might himself naturally and effortlessly use to define what he or his fellows see, feel, think, imagine, and so on, and which he would readily understand when similarly applied by others. An experience-distant concept is one which various types of specialists - an analyst, an experimenter, an ethnographer, even a priest or an ideologist - employ to forward their scientific, philosophical, or practical aims (Geertz, 1979; cf.: Bernstein, 1983:90).

To translate Geertz's assertion to our discussion of mutual-paradigm understanding, the two kinds of concepts should be employed in a subtle dialectical way. On the one hand, to gain possible understanding of 'others' we have to pursue appreciation of those experience-near concepts of an alien and may-be-incommensurable paradigms through which they actually represent themselves to themselves and to their 'others'. However, the purpose of grasping experience-near concepts is not to 'jump' from one's 'self-containing' paradigm to another 'self-containing' one. Rather, we are to appreciate and highlight similarities as well as differences between our own and others' paradigms. Therefore on the other hand, to gain 'true' understanding, rather than enclose us to another 'self-containing' paradigm, we have to balance the experience-near concepts with appropriate experience-distant concepts, which may not necessarily hold the same meanings in the studied paradigm(s) but may enable us to understand the distinctive assumptions underlying 'other' paradigm(s). Through the dialectic interplay of experience-near and experience-distant concepts, 'incommensurability does not get in the way of understanding and comparing the concepts - it rather sets a challenge to us of finding out how to understand and compare them, a challenge that is met by the artful employment of hermeneutic skills' (Bernstein, 1983:96). It is through such dialectic process that Geertz comes to compare and understand the distinct senses of 'self' in the Javanese, the Balinese, and the Moroccans, and that Burrell and Morgan are able to show us what they consider as differences and similarities between paradigms in their two-dimension macro scheme (although Burrell and Morgan may not be aware of such dialectics).

Again, the purpose of interplaying the experience-near and experience-distant concepts is not merely to understand and appreciate other paradigms but also for a better and more critical understanding of one's own paradigm since 'we come to a deeper understanding of ourselves precisely in and through the study of others' (Bernstein, 1983:96). This is, too, the basic talent of Gadamer's hermeneutic thesis of 'fusion of horizons'.

'Fusion of horizons' is an appropriate metaphor for addressing and facilitating mutual understanding and learning. According to Gadamer,

> Every finite present has its limitations. We define the concept of 'situation' by saying that it represents a standpoint that limits the possibility of vision. Hence an

> essential part of the concept of situation is the concept of 'horizon'. The horizon is the range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point (Gadamer, 1975:269; cf.: Bernstein, 1983:143).

Both the interpreter and the text (in our case the researcher and the studied alien paradigm) have a horizon. The horizon of the interpreter (researcher) is his or her [pre]understanding, that is, his or her basic traditional or paradigmatic assumptions and attitudes. [Pre]understanding, or what Gadamer termed 'prejudice', is our window on the world, our base for recognition and comparison. Without [pre]understanding, it would simply not be possible to make sense of the events and objects we observe or to find meaning of the declaration and arguments of other paradigm(s). We could not put this [pre]understanding aside but instead use it to construct a coherent account. In this sense, [pre]understanding (in our case the researcher's own paradigm preassumptions) is not escapable. The horizon of the text (in our case the studied paradigm) is its sense discerned through semiotic-structural analysis and progressive iterations of the hermeneutic circle (Gadamer, 1960/1989; cf.: Arnold and Ficsher, 1994). Horizons are limited and finite (this is compatible with the insistent argument of this thesis that every knowledge and rationality of any marketing approach is partial and incomplete). However, horizons are not closed nor fixed but essentially open and changeable. What we are seeking to achieve is a 'fusion of horizons'. Fusion of horizons implies that the horizon of the interpreter (researcher) comes to encompass the discerned horizon of the text (the researched). In this process, the [pre]understanding of the researcher is changed until it is able to account for the sense of the text (researched). [Pre]understanding becomes understanding. It is through the fusion of horizons that the researcher and the researched dichotomy is transcended, resulted into a collective 'self' (Arnold and Fischer, 1994:63-4), and that 'our own horizon is enlarged and enriched' (Bernstein, 1983:143). 'In this sense, learning from other forms of life and horizons is at the very same time coming to an understanding of ourselves. "Only through other do we gain true knowledge of ourselves"' (*ibid*:144). As Ricoeur says, 'To understand is to *understand oneself in front of the text*' (1981:143, emphasis in the original; cf.: Arnold and Fischer, 1994). In this sense, hermeneutic understanding is in part self-understanding, self-reflection, and self-development, and hence the ontological existence of being. Without mutual understanding (and hence communication and learning), paradigms even lose their identity and reasons for being (here again we see the flaw of relativism, at least the kind of relativism prevalent in marketing study; that is, relativism tries to enclose paradigms within their individual horizons while denying any possibility of fusion of horizons).

Fischer (1990) (also Ryan and Bristor, 1987) provides a vivid case of 'fusion of horizons' in marketing study. Fischer's focus is to explore and examine the relationship in consumer research between the causal regularities sought in positivist approaches and the hermeneutic rules sought in interpretive approaches. Fischer claims that notwithstanding their incommensurability, greater comparability and 'points of tangencies' exist between these two paradigms.

According to Fischer, chief among the axiological commitments of positivism in the marketing study context is a determination to explain causal regularities which are believed to underlie consumer behaviour, whereas in contrast that of interpretivism is to understand settled social rules which are generally defined as amenable to verbal expressions containing a descriptive 'is' or a prescriptive 'ought' implication.

Although underwritten by different assumptions about consumer behaviour (and hence human beings), Fischer and Ryan and Bristor maintain that, these two approaches can learn from and support each other by encompassing the other's horizon.

In one direction, settled social rules are counterparts of causal regularities in that rules lead to regularities for which the rule itself can be counted as a 'cause'. So, for instance in research about choosing gifts for the spouse and for other people (Belk, 1979), the rule about purchasing a more expensive gift for a spouse than for any other person 'causes' such behaviour to be an observable regularity. This does not negate the fact that rules are brought into existence through the tacit understandings and interpretation of social actors, but merely asserts that while the rules exist, they act as causes of behavioural regularities. Conversely, some regularities in social phenomena imply the existence of settled social rules. A causal regularity is likely to have a counterpart interpretive rule when the causal regularity applies to behaviours which an individual may voluntarily perform or not perform. In the same case of gift choosing, the rules for choosing a gift for the spouse and for other people may or may not be initially known by social actors and hence by interpretive researchers. Then the relation in the gift choosing phenomenon may not be addressed as a social rule by interpretive approaches but left to be generalised as causal regularity by positivist approaches. When the relation is comprehended later by actors and tends to be confirmed or rejected for certain reasons, however, the voluntarist aspect seems to provide a more convincing explanation, then it begins to be considered as a social rule. In such a two-direction process, the positivist and interpretivist horizons are fused, encompassing and enlightening each other.

While facilitating mutual understanding and learning, the fusion of horizons between positive and interpretive approaches on causal regularities and settled social rules does not deny differences that make these two approaches distinct. Both horizons have their distinct value in their own. To quote Fischer at length:

> [On the one hand,] since interpretive inquiry is premised on the belief that individuals can modify their behaviour because they become aware of and choose to modify rules, this approach has the potential to focus on situations where rules are in flux or in conflict. For instance, at a time when tacit societal rules are increasingly being seen to operated to the seeming disadvantage of women, rules relating to appropriate behaviours for men and women are changing considerably .... Interpretive inquiry into the

emergence of new rules, then, is possible whereas positivist inquiry into the emergence of causes is less feasible.

On the other hand, positivist inquiry has considerably more to offer than interpretive inquiry when regularities occur which are the unintended consequences of human action or inaction. Consider, for instance, the regularity with which it happens that aggregate consumer demand for a product increases as the prices of that product decreases. While an interpretive rule may underlie the behaviour of independent actors who are separately seeking to make a 'wise' purchase decision, it is not an intended consequence of any individual's behaviour that the aggregated quantity of goods purchased should increase. In such situations, positivist science may offer more insight than interpretive inquiry (Fischer, 1990:22-3).

In his conclusion, Fischer maintains that it is most likely that both differences and tangencies will exist and that different approaches have potential to complement one another. In situations where rules are extremely settled, shared by groups of considerable size, and are not consciously being rejected by social agents, causal regularities are most likely to be associated with rules. In cases where regularities apply to behaviour under the voluntary control of actors to considerable extent, interpretive rules are likely to associated with causal regularities.

In summary, the interplay of experience-near and experience-distant concepts and the hermeneutic fusion of horizons enrich and hence enhance individual paradigms while at the same time harbouring pluralist complementation, rather than enclosing paradigms into isolation or seeking final reconciliation over differences that make approaches distinct. The purpose of such interplay and fusion, to quote Gergen (1992) and Flood and Romm (1995), is not to reinforce one's own view, or to subsume the Self and the Other under a general theoretical position, but to encourage 'mutual exploration', to expand our sensitivity towards irreducible diversity, and to reformulate the relationship between the Self and the Other.

9.5 PROMOTING COMPLEMENTATION IN PROBLEM-SOLVING

Lastly, at a more immediate here-and-now level, operationalising the reconstruction of marketing study must focus on searching for decisions and actions in practical problem-solving intervention. Here emphasis is put on appreciation and choice among research approaches through critical argumentation.

9.5.1 Forming Research Community as 'Fibre-Cable'

Marketing is first and forever a problem-solving oriented discipline with a major concern of serving (that is, understanding, formulating, and satisfying) real human consumption needs through practical intervention in the marketplace. Any pluralist and complementarist argument and inquiry is not very relevant if without intention toward pragmatic responsibility to immediate challenges emerging in dynamic human consumption needs. That is, any pluralist attitude or complementarist contention must hold potential to be translated into practical action decisions. It is not enough merely to address long-run development prospects or/and to stress an ever on-going interactive development process. It is an undeniable responsibility for a 'truly' critical and pluralist inquiry to tackle head-on the immediate practical issue: making decisions for responsible actions through argumentation among particpants by appropriate approaches in situated marketing context, here and now.

Decisions on choice and actions should not be made based on any isolated rationality. The reason for this is simply that no single kind of marketing actions and approaches can always prevail, nor is it held that 'anything goes'. On the one hand, since marketing is a multifaceted enterprise concerned with a whole complexity which consists of objective, subjective and intersubjective phenomena, no single approach can tackle adequately such complexity on its own (for this point recall the elaboration of marketing as a communicative action system in Chapter 7). On the other hand, although various rationalities will certainly contribute their individual valuable insights towards a rich understanding of the complexity, their contribution should not be seen as equally insightful in all possible cases since dynamic emergency in marketing phenomena will manifest at different time-points different characters which require differentiable approaches to tackle (for this point recall Fischer's discussion on the respective appropriateness of positive seeking of causal regularities and the interpretive seeking of settled social rules in consumer research context). Situations confronting our decision on choosing approach(s) may become more complicated when power relations stemming from materialised conditions are involved, which generally tend to present particular type(s) of approach(es) as always most relevant or superior (for this point recall Sherry's (1991) 'social drama' metaphor of the politicisation process of methodological domination/pluralisation.). All this points to the same conclusion: it is an inevitable necessity that appreciation and choice among research approaches be made through argumentation in accordance with the ever-changing challenges emerging in the dynamic marketing context.

According to Gadamer (1976), human understanding and inquiry is always already conditioned by our own traditions, i.e., our [pre]understanding. If we take Gadamer's assertion seriously, we can reasonably reach a recognition that, set by our [pre]understandings, we are always already making our own sense of, i.e., making some kind of appreciation and judgement on, what we read, see, and hear. In this sense, making appreciation and judgement is not an arbitrary choice but an inherent (conscious or otherwise) feature and process in any human understanding. We are always doing it. What is urged here is to do it more explicitly and reflectively, to do it through 'better' argumentation.

As Habermas, Bernstein and critical systems thinkers persistently argue, an appropriate way to ground rational appreciation and judgement (and to make choice accordingly) is through critical argumentation. For this purpose, what we need to establish in marketing study is a critical dialogic community of researchers, within which researchers communicate with each other in dialogical encounter, rather than adversarial confrontation. This requires researchers consciously to (1) treat rival approaches as constituting a fibre cable, and (2) make localised decisions through a much wider communicative scope under 'the principle of universalisation'.

First, it should be established that the purpose of appreciation and choice decision is to realise the 'best' of the Self *and* the Other, rather than to devalue the others. In this regard, the metaphor of a fibre-cable introduced by Peirce appears most educative. In characterising philosophic arguments, Peirce urges philosophers to 'trust rather to the multitude and variety of its arguments than to the conclusiveness of any one. Its reasoning should not form a chain which is no stronger than its weakest link, but a cable whose fibres may be ever so slender, provided they are sufficiently numerous and intimately connected' (Peirce, 1868, in Hartshorne and Weiss, 1931-1935:157). Bringing Peirce's light into our critical dialogic community, we researchers are to 'grasp the other's position in the strongest possible light', rather than to expose other's weaknesses in such a manner that 'we can be blind to what the other is saying and to the truth that the other is contributing to the discussion' (Bernstein, 1991:337). In this sense, different approaches are not adversaries but conversational partners. To create the strongest possible cable rather than a weak link, researchers of approaches as slender fibres must be always prepared to speak to the others and listen to the others with all possible imagination, sensitivity, and hermeneutic skills (*ibid*).

Next, although the suggested kind of approach appreciation and selection is continuously subjected to the ever-changing emergence in a dynamic marketing context, and therefore any produced agreement is always already locally determined and temporally conditioned, we must be aware that however locally determined and temporally conditioned our decisions might be, actions derived from such decisions can produce much wider-reaching and longer-lasting consequences. Fox example, when the American film makers decided to reinforce their effort to market their products in Europe and in other regions, the decision was locally plausible, since the proposal would provide more jobs without wasting more natural resources in the

United States; however when we analyse this decision from beyond, or from other than, the American viewpoint, we come to a recognition that the cultural commodity from Hollywood will, with its dominant power, virtually destroy the diversity in culture world-wide, and that diversity in world culture is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to re-develop. Within localised consideration, what is relevant to this case seems to be teleological marketing action and empirical-analytic approaches for improving efficiency and maximisation. But when we appeal to a wider research community, it becomes apparent that normatively regulating marketing actions and a critical-emancipatory approach might be more urgently needed. Thus, as Gregory puts it, in undertaking appreciation and choice decision,

> [T]he contingent nature of problems could appear to call for a discourse to be established with a wider community that is neither locally nor historically constrained. This is needed in order that we avoid the danger of making all decision purely contingent and therefore relativistic. There must be some means for asserting whether particular decisions may have wider consequences of an evil or repressive nature (Gregory, 1992:446).

In this regard, Habermas's 'principle of universalisation' provides supporting insights. In facilitating within- and between-community argumentation, Habermas's model contends that listening and responding to the Other, the Difference, and the Alternity within contestable interests and approaches is an ethical requirement for everyone (cf.: Bernstein, 1991). Further, like cognitive arguments, normative validity claims supposed by contestable interests can be open to empirical falsification and critical refutation, and can therefore be rationally defended and vindicated, as well as dialogically discussed and evaluated, among participants. For Habermas, ethical argumentation is essentially a cognitive task:

> The mere fact that a particular norm could be accepted by a community as valid does not establish its validity as such. Consequently, it is necessary to turn to the inner

logic of moral argumentation to determine the validity or the invalidity of a norm. ... In other words, normative validity is determined by acceptance of the principle of universalisation. Universalisation, the basic principle of a discourse ethics, implies a specific procedure whereby contested norms are accepted once their consequences are understood by all without coercion (cf.: Ramsmussen, 1990:60-1).

The principle of universalisation allows, first, that judgement and decision can be achieved in the context of a multitude of opinions which may conflict, and second that the interest of any individual can be accepted by all those involved. Accordingly, Habermas has provided a normative model of an ideal political-democratic condition for the adjudication of contestable interests in public discourse which demands (1) that no one should be excluded, (2) the right for all to make claims and criticise others, and (3) that the only norms valid are those regulating common interests.

9.5.2 Searching for Methodology Guidelines

Having established an objective of constituting a complementarist cable of researchers and an awareness of the need of communicating with wider research community under the 'principle of universalisation', we are in a 'better' position to critically employ research approaches in problem-solving situation. In the proposed typology, most likely contributing approaches have been linked respectively to differentiable aspects of marketing phenomena and marketing actions. To promote complementation in pragmatic intervention, we need the concrete help of methodological guidelines. To my knowledge, such guidelines can be purposively, and critically, incorporated from the systems community, for example contributions from TSI (Total Systems Intervention) (Flood, 1995a, b, c; Flood and Jackson, 1991b, c), SAST (Strategic Assumption Surfacing and Testing) (Mason and Mitroff, 1981), SSM (Soft Systems Methodology) (Checkland, 1981; Checkland and Scholes, 1991), CSH (Critical Systems Heuristics) (Ulrich, 1983), WSR (*Wu-li Shi-li Ren-li* Methodology) (Gu and

Zhu, 1995), etc. TSI is dedicated to assist practitioners to promote complementation through reflection and appreciation of approaches; SAST is helpful in surfacing and discriminating basic assumptions of competing action plans; SSM focuses on organising debates among world-views for the purpose of learning and (if possible) reaching agreed action decisions; CHS is particularly formulated for intervening in situations where the involvement of power and unequal relations is found or felt; WSR is a practical guideline for selecting methods to tackle differentiated situations based on the Oriental philosophy. Although these systems methodologies may vary in their basic assumptions about human beings and in their intentions toward social phenomena, yet critically and artfully employing valuable elements of these methodologies in a theoretically informed manner, grounding on continuous argumentation, moving back and forth, will certainly benefit our pursuit of possible agreed actions. Due to the limits of time and space, in the following only TSI is briefly outlined (wherever felt necessary, assertions of TSI will be translated into terms of marketing contexts).

TSI is presented as a meta-methodological guideline to appreciate and employ critically available approaches for the purpose of complementation. It translates the philosophy and commitments of CST (for both see Appendixes II and III) to the methodology level. The prerequistic argument of TSI is that the search for some super method that can address the whole range of interacting issues confronting marketing is mistaken and must quickly lead to disenchantment. It would be equally wrong, however, to revert to a heuristic, trial and error approach. Hence, the future prospect of problem-solving will be much enhanced if practitioners critically assess the strengths, weakness, partiality in each intervention of available approaches against specific problematic situations, be aware of social conditions in which those approaches operate and social consequences their use might produce, and then decide through argumentation which method(s) to use, which methodological elements to combine, when, how, and why.

There are seven major points of conception about social phenomena and approaches underpinning the logic and process of TSI: (1) Marketing phenomena are too complicated to understand using one 'model' or to tackle with the 'quick fit'; (2) Marketing phenomena, their interrelations and challenges, can be investigated using a range of creative tools, e.g., metaphors; (3) Metaphors, which seem appropriate for highlighting and organising our concern of issues, can be linked to appropriate approaches; (4) Different metaphors and approaches can be used in a complementarist manner to address heterogeneous aspects of the marketing whole and difficulties; (5) It is possible to appreciate the strengths and weaknesses of approaches and to link each to concerns in situated cases; (6) Such appreciation and linkage can be achieved through iteration back and forth with the assistance of hermeneutic and critical imaginations and skills; (7) Marketers and consumers as well as regulating agents are willing and able to engage at all stages of the TSI process. Based on the previous discussion, I consider it necessary to add two principles: the desire to constitute a research fibre-cable, and to make temporally localised decisions through conversation with wider community and debate(s).

The process of TSI consists of three phases. *Creativity* uses creative methods (e.g., metaphors) to help to surface, deconstruct and reconstruct concerned issues. *Choice* helps to choose or design a most possibly contributing approach(es) or combination of methodological elements. *Implementation* facilitates planning and realising appropriate actions. Each phase operates at the same time, but there will normally be an emphasis on one phase. It is also required, during each phase, that continual reference be made, back and forth, to the likely conclusion of other phases.

No methodology can guarantee consensus since, even we are willing to listen and speak to each other, 'we can never escape the real practical possibility that we may fail to understand "alien" traditions' (Bernstein, 1991:65). In this regard, TSI, and any other methodology guidelines, cannot be an exception. However 'open' and 'reflecitve' we might be, due to the huge complexity in marketing phenomena and the unavoidable limits of human cognitive competence, we participants may or may not be able to reach agreements on what is the most fundamental (issue), which is the most pin-pointing (metaphor), which is the most contributing (approach), what are the best (methodological-elements), what is the most appropriate (action), etc. For example, the decision of 'marketing U.S. films world-wide' may be seen in America as most appropriate but considered in other regions of the world as most distortive. Accordingly, empirical-analytic approaches might be selected as most contributing by some, but hermeneutic-interpretive or critical-emancipatory approaches might be viewed as most required by others. Should such a situation arise, the 'best' way to pursue possible agreement in the future is still through critical conversation among concerned parties. After all, through a critical dialogic process, participants and researchers will at least be able to listen to the assertions of others and to enhance their own conception and approach by possibly knowing and incorporating valuable insights from others, which will improve the situation within which participants continue their critical dialogue. It is not easy. There is no fixed or ready answer. But it is worth pursuing. In a certain sense, the ideal and concern of complementarism and the above mentioned methodology guidelines lies more in continuos learning and enhancement of participants than in one-shot operation of decisions or actions.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter a conceptual typology has been proposed to juxtapose marketing approaches for the purpose of establishing pluralist perspective, facilitating mutual listening, and promoting complementary intervention. It is stressed that the 'truth' of such reconstruction is not for closure or final reconciliation. Rather, it suggests that mutual respect, learning and inter-appreciation are not only necessary but also possible, in terms of long-run potential, in terms of dynamic interaction, and in terms of practical problem-solving. I would hereby like to point to a conclusion that pluralist perspective and complementarist strategy in marketing study is a viable choice. Marketing approaches need neither to campaign for a 'superior' position nor to isolate their Self from the Other, since in its essence, marketing study is a discipline that embeds a whole range of cognitive as well as practical interests which are inherently differentiable, contestable, mutually presupposive, and therefore preserve enough place for involvement of a wide range of available approaches. A 'better' way to pursue individual enhancement, as well as collective complementation, is therefore to nurture plurality and complementarity through intersubjective argumentation, critical reflection, continuous listening, and mutual learning.

Chapter 10
REVIEW

INTRODUCTION

Now it is possible to summarise what this project has tried to achieve. First, the basic arguments are reviewed; next, major contributions evaluated; and finally, the possibility of the proposed reconstruction becoming a new ideology is discussed.

10.1 ARGUMENTS REVISITED

The purpose of this project has been to explore a desirable and viable alternative to transcend the paradigmatic unease and stagnation in marketing study. Based on a reading of Habermas, CST and the marketing literature, it was asserted that what is lacking in the discipline is an adequate awareness and an explicit establishment of the integration of criticality and systemicity. It was shown that although these two elements were incorporated into marketing study long ago, yet such incorporation has so far been in an isolationist manner and based on a narrow conception of both 'critical' and 'system'. To bring the best of criticality and systemicity into the context of marketing study, Habermas's critical theory and the CST discourse were introduced, and an attempt was made to demonstrate that given the present distortive paradigmatic warfare, the greatest strength and competence of the systems approach to marketing lies in its ability to facilitate collective complementation within the diversity of marketing approaches while at the same time preserving the opportunity to pursue individual development and potential of heterogeneous approaches.

To realise such strength and competence, a critical systems reconstruction of marketing study was proposed: first reorienting marketing as a communicative action system then conceptualising the wide range of marketing approaches into technical, practical and normative marketing typological categories. Drawing upon Habermas's theses of knowledge and human cognitive interests, lifeworld/systems, and especially communicative action and rationality, it was postulated that marketing can be conceived as primarily a communicative action system through which consumers satisfy material/spiritual needs, companies gain survival and growth, and societies deliver and improve standards of living for citizens. Therefore, marketing has accountability *not* for any singular substantive interest, *but* for the whole complexity which is constituted by contestable interests in technical enhancement, in subjective experience, and in normative norm formation. It is such critical rationally grounded differentiable aspects in accountability that indicate the necessity and plurality of the wide range of heterogeneous marketing approaches.

Based on the achievements of Habermas, Gadamer, Ritzer, Bernstein and critical systems thinkers, it was argued that mutual understanding, learning and supporting among heterogeneous approaches are not merely necessary but also possible, are not arbitrary loads but a logical requirement and inherent feature of the human knowledge inquiry process. The issue of paradigmatic (in)commensurability, viewed in a critical systems dialectic way, appears not as a difficulty or barrier for mutual communication but can be seen as a supportive reasoning. Our linguistic horizons are always open. Personality and commonality, individuality and plurality, the Self and the Other, force-fields and constellations, are always presupposing and conditioning each other. Given locally and temporally situated contexts, even though we can never escape the real practical possibility of failing to understand others, it is always a universal responsibility of communicative participants to learn to live with instability and conflict, to listen and speak to the Difference, the Other, the Alterity, and to search for juxtaposition and synergism through continuous critical reflection and argumentation. Therefore, for marketing systems to campaign for a superior position, or to imprison ourselves within a 'myth of framework', is neither the only, nor a necessary or desirable, option. Instead, researchers can contribute their individual best for the purpose of complementation in serving human contestable consumption needs during their pursuit of individual potential. As marketing researchers and citizens, we can establish plurality for the long term through continuous constellation, we can seek mutual understanding and learning through fusing our horizons, we can also act as a communicative fibre-cable in problem-solving intervention. To do so is obviously not easy: it requires warm hearts and cool heads, it demands vision and skills, it produces disappointments and setbacks. Yet, after all, that is a realistic and viable alternative, a move beyond the stagnating tension. The possibility is open. The future of marketing systems and the discipline depends on our choice to act.

10.2 MAJOR CONTRIBUTIONS

The contributions of this project can be analysed from the viewpoint of both disciplines: marketing study and systems thinking.

In terms of marketing study, works have been done to (1) resume proper commitments and research domains; (2) promote an advanced form of pluralism; (3) enrich the employment of systems approaches.

First, through a reading of historical as well as contemporary marketing literature, the dual nature of marketing has been rediscovered, that is: since its becoming of an independent human knowledge inquiry, marketing has been defined as both management techniques and social mechanism, serving differentiated yet contestable human interests in consumption needs. However, in the current 'mainstream' marketing study the social mechanism dimension has been systematically distorted, suppressed and eventually rooted out. It has been suggested that this is a result of the two-fold process of *marketingisation*; that is, externally the technical power of marketing has been extended to manipulate and actually define the way in which we citizens seeing and doing *all* human-social affairs that are said to be no longer distinguishable, while internally within marketing, technical rationality and logical-empirical method have gradually been presented as *the* singular standard and even as marketing study *per se*. It is argued that this is also a product of reductionist thinking in the discipline. Through the proposed reconstruction of marketing, an attempt is made to re-establish marketing as management techniques, as social process, and as social institution, which is driven and constituted by rationally contestable technical, practical, and emancipatory interests.

Secondly, an advanced form of pluralism for marketing study has been promoted on a critical systems ground. In Part II, we have seen that due to the great variety and heterogeneity in marketing phenomena, even at the very beginning marketing as a discipline was shadowed by the threat of fragmentation and imperialism. For example the commodity, the functional, and the constitutional approaches in the early days argued each that their own focus *should be* the substantive subject matter of research around which the study of marketing can be properly organised. During later evolution, we witness a similar debate in forms of 'A general theory of marketing or theories in marketing?', 'Is marketing a science?', 'What kind of science should marketing become?', etc., which has developed into the present paradigmatic disarray and stagnation that traps the discipline into an energy-wasting and anti-productive intellectual black-hole. It has been argued that neither the realist-empiricist nor the relativist propositions based on foundationalism can provide a way out. The limitations of several pluralistic-oriented responses to the diversity have been analysed. And it has been suggested that for the fate of marketing study as a whole and for the own sake of individual approaches, to move beyond the current paradigmatic tension, critical systems pluralism could be a more promising and rewarding strategy we can adopt. It is to establish such a strategy that the reconstruction of marketing presented in Part III was proposed.

Finally, given the urgent situation in marketing study, an attempt has been made to move the perception of systems approaches to marketing to a level that is capable of catching up with and incorporating the latest developments in systems thinking, thereby enriching the way of employing systems approaches to marketing. It was summarised in Part I that the 'system' concept has been used in marketing study to provide analytical tools for pursuing technical efficiency, as conceptual models for generating comprehensive image of marketing activities, and as a guide to theory-development to co-ordinate divergence and convergence in research. Base on this investigation, it is argued that while these ways of employing systems approaches will no doubt remain with us, we can also employ systems approach in marketing in a more rewarding way, that is, to employ systems approach, especially in the form of CST, as a paradigm communicative vehicle to address and tackle the distortive and stagnating paradigmatic tention. Given the stagnating tension in marketing study on the one hand and the suffering and hardship of humankind produced by marketing on the other, this form of employment is becoming not only feasible but also urgently desirable and necessary.

In terms of the field of systems thinking, the project, among many others, contributes to enriching the way we employ systems thinking, especially CST, as a *Method.* Flood recently (1995a) adds a fourth principle to the CST's philosophy: committing to practice. Compatibly, in Chapter 9 it has been argued that any (meta) theoretical or (meta) paradigmatic thesis can hardly be relevant if without intention to address the issue of here-and-now problem-solving. It is suggested that practical interventions of CST can be classified into issue-centred (e.g., facilitating reflection, ideology and power, etc.) and field-centred (e.g., development, environment, total quality management, etc.) (see Appendix I). This project can be located within the 'field-centred' category: to investigate, address, and tackle urgent situation in a field of study. The project is undertaken in the hope that the proposed critical systems reconstruction of marketing will shed light on a viable way out of the present paradigmatic stagnation. Of course, problem-solving and theoretical development cannot be completely separated. In this sense, this project also makes a contribution to the theoretical development of CST. For example, the paradigmatic (in)commensurability issue has been addressed by bringing together the efforts of leading critical systems thinkers, the ideas of constellation, fusion of horizons, fibre-cable, and a dialectic view on paradigmatic incommensurability, in the hope that bringing together the best of these intellectual resources will strengthen the pluralist position.

10.3 A NEW IDEOLOGY?

Here, a self challenging question is raised: as the reorientation and the typology are presented in much more favourable terms than other meta-paradigmatic propositions, can the proposed reconstruction of marketing become a new ideology?

The first half of my answer to this question is: Yes, it is of course possible. As Bredo and Feinberg (1982:439) point out, 'Whether a theory becomes an ideology depends on how it is used'. If the proposed reconstruction is cut off from the historically situated social and disciplinary contexts, if it intends to be generalised and absolutised as adequate and comprehensive for all circumstances, it becomes an ideology. As social situations in general and meta-theoretical debates in particular change, the intention and assumptions of the reconstruction become dissonant with new conditions, therefore the proposed reconstruction must be called into question, examination, modification, and adjustment. If we fail to do so, our proposition becomes ideological, and we can no longer claim to be critical and systemic in any proper sense. We have witnessed many unfortunate examples of such; for example the empirical approach was deimprisoning and liberating when it freed people from the intellectual restriction of the middle-age, but when it is exclusively presented as Reason *per se* it becomes an ideology (also recall the debate between the interpretive and the critical positions about the impact of advertising upon society, which is presented at the end of Chapter 5).

The second half of my answer is, then, that so long as we reflect on the purpose and assumptions of our own proposition as much as we reflect on those of others, so long as we seek continuous judgements through discursive dialogue with wider research communities, so long as we consistently probe and adjust our proposal in accordance with the dynamics in marketing situations, it is equally possible that the reconstruction will avoid the fate of becoming an ideology. This is why in Chapter 9 when the proposed reorientation and typology of marketing study was presented, it was consistently declared that it is by no means a final reconciliation or dissolution but an alternative explored within a given historically situated condition, i.e., the urgent need for transcending the distortive and depressing paradigmatic Either/Or, and that the reconstruction must be continuously subjected to dynamic adjustment and dialogical scrutiny. To conclude, I will quote Bredo and Feinberg again (which is compatible with the argument of Flood and Ulrich (1991)):

> ... nothing would be less consistent with the spirit of critical theory than to adopt it blindly as another 'ism', another dogma; nothing would be more consistent with it than to subject it to the same sorts of criticism that it would direct against other approaches, for this would seem to be the best way of ensuring that its legitimate heirs do indeed constitute a more adequate theory of knowledge in society (Bredo and Feinberg, 1982:439).

A few words can be added here. Although I recognise that all situations involve all three aspects and therefore all three types of sciences/methods are necessary (in terms of technical, practical, and emancipatory), nevertheless I put more attention in this thesis to elaborate emancipatory interest and critical theory. I do this because I saw that since in theory *and* practice, especially in our case marketing study, technical knowledge and practical knowledge tend to be distorted because of the power field in which they are developed and employed, therefore a proper usage of empirical-analytic and interpretive-hermenutic methods requires a critical intent. To repeat, emancipation and pluralism conceived in this sense are the two faces of a same coin.

A more fundamental challenge to the proposed reconstruction may come from the 'post-modernist'. In using this term, I choose to grasp its meaning through Lyotard (1984) who 'define(s) postmodern as incredulity toward metanarratives'. Given that this project presents itself, along the line of Habermas and CST, as offering a holistic response to the challenging diversity as well as a possible way moving beyond fragmentation in marketing study, and given the present fashion in which 'Any attempt to gain a comprehensive understanding of modernity and its discontents is immediately condemned as a "metanarrative"' (Bernstein, 1985:25), it is unlikely that this project will not provoke attack from postmodernists.

My basic attitude toward the modern/postmodern discourse (and relevant issues of Enlightenment, Reason, rationality, etc.) is that: if defined in terms of instrumental rationality as Weber and Horkheimer and Adorno do, and if elaborated 'with the tools of social-scientific functionalism' (cf.: Habermas, 1985/1987:2), the premises of modernity are dead, only its consequences continue on; however 'if conceived as a project of emancipation, as liberation from oppression, as the means of overcoming hidden, latent forms of domination' (cf.: Rasmussen, 1990:96), the ideal and premises of modernity and Enlightenment are still alive and worth pursuing. Due to limited space, I will only summarise in the following three threads of intellectual resources which can be drawn upon for addressing the modern/postmodern discourse: those of Habermas, Bernstein, and Giddens.

Habermas (1981c, 1985/1987) is fully aware of the challenges to modernity posed by the radical critique of reason in contemporary postmodernist or poststructuralist thought. He agrees with many of their points: their critique on intellectual domination, their critique on singular standard, their critique on the negative 'dialectics' of Enlightenment, and their critique on the failure of 'the paradigm of consciousness' and 'the subject-centred reason'. However these agreements do not lead Habermas to the postmodernist conclusion. For Habermas, the defects of the Enlightenment can only be made good by further enlightenment; therefore the project of modernity is not to be abandoned, but to be redeemed on a more critical ground.

On the one hand, for Habermas, the Hegelian modernity fails because it reduces a plurality of interests to the monadic interest of an absolute self-consciousness. The philosophy of the isolated subject's consciousness, argues Habermas, leads us to understand knowledge exclusively as knowledge of something in the objective world. One must make the distinction between subject-centred reason and Reason itself. On the other hand, Habermas claims, the postmodernist who calls for abandoning modernity cannot quite abandon it (cf.: Rasmussen, 1990). In their attempt of abandoning modernity, postmodernists from Nietzsche onward (with the sole exception of Foucault) have sought to concentrate on the aesthetic to the exclusion of the moral and the scientific. For those postmodernists, beyond truth and falsity, beyond good and evil, lies only taste. Habermas tries to bring Nietzsche back into the fold, unmasking that the leap from reason to taste entails aesthetic judgement which in turn is based upon reason, although in the hand of postmodernists, reason is used to reduce a plurality of differentiated spheres of modern experience into 'aesthetic modernity' only. By giving up seeking moral standards, postmodernism 'stands ready for the simple seduction by any political systems that happens to come along' (cf.: *ibid*:109), which, as I see it, tends to line up with the *status quo* and to maintain any existing domination. In this sense, it is possible to argue that both Hegel and Nietzsche are reductionist, and that as one of the core ideas of Enlightenment the notion of 'system' is not dead.

Habermas's strategy in redeeming the unfinished project of modernity is to invite us to undertake a paradigm shift from 'the paradigm of consciousness', and from its associated 'philosophy of the subject', in favour of the through-and-through intersubjectivist paradigm of communicative dialogical reason. According to Habermas, we can revitalise modernity based on the argument that 'if situated reason is viewed as social interaction, the potential of reason has to be realised in the communicative practice of ordinary, everyday life' and that 'communication is not only always "immanent" - that is, situated, conditional - but also always "transcendent" - that is, geared to validity claims that are meant to hold beyond any local context and thus can be indefinitely criticised, defended, revised' (cf.: McCarthy, 1987). To overcome the pathologies of modernism (e.g., Hegel's subject-centred reason) and the misleading of postmodernism (e.g., Nietzsche's aesthetic reason seduction), to redeem rather than to abandon the project of modernity, Habermas points to a direction of 'universal pragmatics' which is drawn upon and developed from Peirce, Mead, and Dewey, suggesting that 'the paradigm of the knowledge of objects has to be replaced by the paradigm of mutual understanding between subjects capable of speech and action' (Habermas, 1985/1987:295-60).

A second line of reasoning on the modern/postmodern discourse can be drawn from Bernstein (1983, 1985, 1991). Bernstein invites us to see the logic of the modern/postmodern discourse as an unstable tensed Both/And rather than a determinate fixed Either/Or. In appreciating Habermas and Derrida as paradigmatic examples of the modern/postmodern discourse, Bernstein claims that 'I do *not* think that there is some theoretical perspective in which their crucial differences can be reconciled, *aufgehoben*. They cannot. But I want to show some of the ways in which they supplement each other, how we can view them as reflecting two intertwined strands of the "modern/postmodern" *Stimmung*' (1991:201).

Drawing upon the metaphors of a force-field and constellation, Bernstein does not treat the modern/postmodern discourse as a zero-sum win-or-lose game or an integrated cluster. Rather, he intends to juxtapose Habermas and Derrida as ever changing elements that resist reduction or final reconciliation. He sees the modern/postmodern discourse as providing us with a force-field which enables us to gain a deeper grasp of our present cultural and philosophical situation. On the one hand, Bernstein highly values Derrida's challenging arguments for differences and otherness which seem to be a central phenomenon of our present time; on the other he shares Habermas's worry that uncritical celebration of plurality and difference all too easily degenerates into a self-defeating relativism, presentism, contextualism and 'bad' historism. Bernstein invites us to investigate 'How can we hope to be open to, and respond responsibly to the terror of otherness and singularity of the Other' (*ibid*:219).

On the one hand, Bernstein demonstrates that we can no longer hold the hope of a final conciliation, while on the other he firmly rejects the assertion that there is never any way of sorting out better or worse arguments. Bernstein argues that 'we can and should debate about what constitutes an argument, how forceful it is, and how we are to evaluate competing arguments' even though 'there are rarely (if ever) any algorithms or clear criteria for determining this in non-trivial instances' (*ibid*:221). Bernstein invites us to fight against the playful 'performative contradictions' that destruct everything but reconstruct nothing. Bernstein is in line with Habermas in the critique on the 'groundless totalising critique' - the danger of the critical impulse consuming itself. Following Wittgenstein's argument that the very 'grammar' of critique requires some standard, some measure, some basis for critique, and drawing upon Derrida's idea that 'I cannot conceive of a radical critique which would not be ultimately motivated by some sort of affirmation, acknowledged or not' (cf.: *ibid*:6-7), Bernstein reminds us again and again of an unavoidable ethical question: Critique in the name of what? What is being affirmed and why?

A further provocative perspective through which we can grasp the 'true' logic of the modern/postmodern discourse is offered by Giddens (1990). For Giddens, the crucial crisis and challenge in our highly modern age is institutional rather then epistemological. In analysing the pathologies of modernity and Enlightenment, Giddens claims that

> Several factors suggest themselves, none of which, however, have anything to do with the idea that we no longer have any viable methods of sustaining knowledge claims in the sense of Lyotard and others (*ibid*:151).

> The disorientation which expresses itself in the feeling that systematic knowledge about social organisation cannot be obtained, I shall argue, results primarily from the sense many of us have of being caught up in a universe of events we do not fully understand, and which seems in large part of outside of our control (*ibid*:3).

Modernity, viewed by Giddens, refers to modes of social life or organisation. The development of modern social institutions has created vastly greater opportunities for human beings to enjoy a secure and rewarding existence than any type of pre-modern system. But modernity also has a sombre side that has become very important in the present time. However, looking into the future, 'rather than entering a period of postmodernity, we are moving into one in which the consequences of modernity are becoming more radicalised and universalised than before' (*ibid*:3).

What lies beyond our period of high modernity is not epistemological fragmentation, Giddens argues. Rather, we should establish a 'future-oriented project', which 'defines postmodernity as possible transformations moving "beyond" the institutions of modernity' (*ibid*:150), and which is 'connected to immanent trends of development, and therefore realistic' (*ibid*:163). For this, what we need is not fragmentation, pessimistic playfulness, or giving up thinking. Rather, we should create a 'critical theory without guarantees' - a model of *utopian realism.* Such a model must be *sociologically sensitive* - alert to the immanent institutional transformations which in constantly opens out to the future; it must be *geopolitical* in the sense of recognising that moral commitments and 'good faith' can themselves be potentially dangerous in a world of high-consequence risks; it must create *models of good societies* which are limited neither to the sphere of the nation-state nor to only one of the institutional dimensions of modernity; and it must recognise that *emancipatory politics* needs to be linked with *life politics*, or a *politics of self-actualisation* (*ibid*:155-6).

Obviously, in taking part in the modern/postmodern discourse, Habermas, Bernstein, and Giddens hold respectively their own distinguishable emphasis and line of thinking. Habermas dedicates himself to demonstrate the possibility of a systemic epistemology which is critically grounded on communicative dialogical reason; Bernstein juxtaposes the modernist paradigm and the postmodernist paradigm as a dynamic constellation which shows us the strengths and weakness of modernity and postmodernity; while Giddens invites us to undertake a paradigm shift from epistemological fragmentation to institutional transformation. Together, however, they all forcefully point to more promising alternatives, differing from that of postmodernism, to address and tackle the pathologies of modernity. All of them encourage us to confront honestly the challenges, critiques, the unmasking of illusions, and to responsibly reconstruct a 'theoretically constituted perspective' towards informed comprehensive understanding on modernity. Their work takes us beyond the postmodernist narrative.

In the field of marketing study, scholars have begun to consider seriously transcending postmodernism. It is cautioned that commodification-commercialisation appears as a new metanarrative. Marketing has become the new metaphor of life, and may already be a postmodern institution. If marketing is still considered as a conscious and planned practice, 'it is necessary to muster power to influence and control marketing institutions' in order to transcend the new metanarrative of 'the fragmented yet universalised (totalising) market(ing) culture' (Firat and Venkatesh, 1993:246).

Therefore after considering the postmodernist challenge, I still hold that the proposed reconstruction is defensible. I agree that the postmodernist challenge is too fundamental to be ignored or reduced. I agree that there can no longer be a fixed single all-encompassing narrative or final reconciliation over the ever-shifting irreducible plurality of horizons. In this sense, we have to learn to live with rival pluralistic traditions. We have to accept that there is no single fixed algorithm for grasping what is held in common and what is genuinely different (Bernstein, 1991:66). However this does not liquidate our responsibility in searching for systemic understanding and critical appreciation about commonalities and differences among narratives. While those commonalities and differences are always already historically and locally conditioned, the responsibility of communicative participants in any tradition towards mutual listening and understanding is universal, since what we see, what we say and what we do will unavoidably produce impact on the immediate and future situation for the Self and the Other. Confronted with any temporally localised context, we have a universal obligation to seek appreciation and judgement, and to take responsible action, if we do not want to align ourselves with what happens to be dominant. Of course in seeking understanding and judgement, in taking responsible action, we may make mistakes, we may experience setbacks, we may find what we consider to be responsible is not actually so. However, should this happen, the way to overcome it is, I believe, to seek more careful listening and better appreciation among reflective participants through continuous intersubjective argumentation.

With all this said, what I have presented in the thesis is only one of the directions worth exploring, and furthermore, this thesis does not completely answer the questions raised from addressing this one direction. I realise that my exploration of the direction proposed in this project has generated or brought forth new questions. For example:

I suggested differentiating research/practice purposes and interests into technical efficiency, subjective experience, and social norm formation, and accordingly saw marketing as technical, practical, and normative actions. But why *three,* and why *these* three, categories? Why can't we see marketing as a language game, and so on? Have I excluded something by being too partial to and hence closed within my own world-view?

I suggested pursuing 'better' self- and mutual-understanding through the 'artful employment of hermeneutic skills' in dealing with the paradigmatic tension in marketing study. But, with all these artful skills, with overlaps among languages, and with a will to listen, can't we still misunderstand our Self and the Other? Can't we still find it difficult to listen and talk to each other? Or can't we, with better understanding of the Self and the Other, still disagree with each other?

I suggested incorporating 'best elements' from TSI and other available systems methodologies to search for methodology guidelines for complementarist problem-solving. But, in so doing, don't we possibly fall into the same rationale I am so eager to criticise; a rationale which implies that in order to deal with new problems what we need to do is to search for some kind of new methods?

I suggested with the whole thesis to employ systems approach as a communicative argumentation platform to move beyond paradigmatic domination and closure. In doing so, have I generalised this kind of usage to such an extent to imply that the proposal itself can escape critique of its own boundary judgements in its action?

And so forth.

I admit that all these reveal possible as well as real dangers and pitfalls of 'closeness', 'finalness', 'comprehensiveness'. I admit that I face more deep-seated dilemmas when I approach to the 'end' of the thesis. To answer these questions will definitely require more effort and hard work beyond the scope of this project. Collective contributions from the whole community of researchers are needed. We might never be able to answer these and similar questions. To borrow a metaphor from Vickers (1970): While we try to escape from a current mind-trap we fall into another. Nevertheless, escaping from mind-traps is what research is about. Individually, by every effort, we try a step, however small, at a specific stage, and for a specific point of concern; while collectively with all our steps we can preserve the hope of learning from what we have escaped from. This project might be worth considering as just such a small step.

CONCLUSION

Even at a cursory glance one cannot miss the great similarity in the basic assertions between the concept of marketing and the notion of system: both are sensitive to the dynamics in the environment; both emphasise co-ordination of parts, functions and efforts; both are concerned with desirable and feasible purpose(s), etc. As such, systems thinking has unsurprisingly gained a sufficiently crucial role in marketing study to be appreciated as a 'master model'. Through this whole project of 'From marketing systems to systems marketing', I have tried to redefine and revitalise this promising model in the light of Habermas's critical theory and CST, and I would like to conclude my thesis with the following sentence:

Given the urgent uneasy paradigmatic situation in marketing study, a brighter future for differentiated marketing systems lies in systems marketing - that is, to serve human contestable interests in consumption needs through communicative dialogical reasoning among marketing systems. Although it is not a ready answer, it might be a direction worth exploring.

Appendix I

CONTEXT, EVOLUTION AND CONTENTS OF CST

INTRODUCTION

This appendix illustrates the development context, evolution and scope of CST, highlights the challenges confronting systems/management science during the last two decades, and summarises responses from different perspectives in systems thinking. It also tries to reveal the evolutionary thread underpinning the systems movement in terms of systems struggles and epistemological breaks.

A1.1 DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT

A1.1.1 Early Development Of Systems Thinking

A brief history of systems thinking up to the 1960's in the context of social and management sciences can be presented as following (this summary draws partly upon Burrell and Morgan (1979) and Jackson (1991a)).

Systems ideas such as 'the whole is more than the sum of its parts' or 'wholes exhibit properties that are not presented in any of their parts' can be traced back as early as the ancient Greek Aristotle (Aristotle, 1943:161-7; cf.: Fuenmayor, 1991:229). However, the effort to apply the notion of system in inquiries in the social context did not emerge until Pareto built his mechanical model of society upon the view that society is a system of interrelated parts which, though in a continual state of surface flux, are in a state of unchanging equilibrium, or in a tendency to establish, maintain and restore that equilibrium (Pareto, 1934). Following this lead, the mechanical-equilibrium model has also been extended to the study of organisation (see for example Henderson, 1917 (cf.: Kelley and Lazer, 1967) and Barnard, 1938) , and of individual behaviour (see for example the Hawthorné study documented by Roethilisbeger and Dickson, 1939). Burrell and Morgan summarised the mechanical equilibrium model in social/management sciences thus:

> Society is to be understood in terms of a system tending towards equilibrium; if this equilibrium is disturbed, forces are set in motion to restore it. The equilibrium of modern society has been upset by technological change prompted by the dictates of an economic logic; as a result social forces have been set in motion to restore the balance. This equilibrium model, as applied at the societal level, is transferred in more or less unchanged form to an analysis of the work situation. The individual now becomes an equilibrating system, influenced by the various elements which comprise the situation within and outside work. Behaviour at work is understood in terms of attempts to maintain or restore an equilibrium position. In the work place where the influence of technology and economics are paramount the social organisation acts as one of the principal forces for restoring equilibrium (Burrell and Morgan. 1979:139-40).

Comte (1853), Spencer (1873) and Durkheim (1938) also linked the notion of 'system' to social study, although they drew upon a biological rather than mechanical model, which conceives society/organisation as a living whole. Following this tradition, the notion of system has been extended to an influential school: functionalism. The functionalist model holds that social systems are made up of mutually dependent elements functioning such that elements contribute to the maintenance of the whole, serving the imperative needs of society/organisation for survival and growth. It is these system needs that determine the functions of elements, which in turn determine the structure of society/organisation (e.g., Parsons, 1949, 1951; Radcliffe-Brown, 1952).

Obviously the majority of systems models used in social/management sciences at this stage tended to be based upon an analogy, either mechanical or biological. Buckley (1967) argued that it was this kind of unnecessary allegiance to mechanical or biological analogies that led systems theory to get 'stuck' in the functionalist paradigm. Silverman (1970) also asserted that organisations may be systems but not necessarily natural systems. The main problem of these analogy-based views of 'systems', as Burrell and Morgan have argued, was that 'the automatic selection of a particular kind of analogy to represent a system pre-empts systems analysis, since each kind of analogy presumes a specific kind of structure and concomitant pattern of information process, exchange, behaviour and the like', (Burrell and Morgan, 1979:68). Theorists generally proposed, in advance of their study, some simple mechanical or biological analogy of the system to which it was applied. 'In doing so, they have meted out rough justice to the essential nature of the social phenomena which they are investigating' (*ibid*).

An improvement came from von Bertalanffy. Instead of basing his General Systems Theory (GST) on a particular kind of analogy, von Bertalanffy focused on the distinction between closed and open systems. Bertalanffy derived his insights from biology, but he believed that those insights could be transferred to other disciplines as well. The task of GST, according to Bertalanffy, is thus to discover the principles of organisation which underline open systems, irrespective of the nature of those systems. One of his general aims was to achieve a 'unity of science' based upon 'the isomorphy of laws in different fields' (von Bertalanffy, 1950:8). von Bertalanffy wrote,

> We postulate a new discipline called General System Theory. Its subject matter is the formulation and derivation of those principles which are valid for systems in general. ... We can ask for principles applying to systems in general, irrespective of whether they are physical, biological or sociological. ... A consequence of the existence of general system properties is the appearance of structural similarities or isomorplisms in different fields. ... This correspondence is due to the fact that the entities can be considered in certain respects, as 'system', i.e., complexes of elements standing in interaction (von Bertalanffy, 1968:32-3).

Since the mid-1950s, the open systems model of GST has exhibited itself as a popular means of studying society/organisations; for example the emergence and popularisation of the socio-technical and the contingency systems approaches in the study of social situation and organisations (e.g., Katz and Kahn, 1966; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1969; Miller and Rice, 1967; Rice, 1958, 1963).

The main contribution of GST, therefore, can be summarised as being that it opens up a new horizon for systems thinkers and practitioners to see social situations beyond the limitation of any single analogy, whether mechanical, biological, or other, and thereby enables human beings to obtain a more rich picture of our diverse situations. Thus from Pareto's mechanical-equilibrium approach, to Comte's biological model, then on to Bertalanffy's GST, we witness an ontological reconceptualisation, from analogising social context with concrete 'things', to the strength and richness of an abstract redefinition of 'system'. The basic achievement of this movement can be seen as increasing the human ability to conceive a social situation as an irreducible whole, rather than reducing the whole to a particular image.

A1.1.2 An Increasing Diversity

At about the same time as the shift in ontological perception from analogy to abstract redefinition, which focusing on how 'better' to model social systems, other groups of systems scientists were working on developing systems methodologies for problem-solving in real-world problem situations. This work is now called 'Hard Systems Thinking' (HST).

Briefly speaking, HST denotes such approaches as Operational Research, Systems Analysis, Systems Engineering, Systems Dynamics, Cybernetics, Information/Communication Theories, Game Theory, etc. All these approaches are concerned with engineering optimal goal-seeking strategies for manipulating complex systems through systems techniques. HST holds a positivistic view that the social world is systemic and therefore can be precisely measured, modelled, predicted, and controlled by sophisticated methods brought from natural sciences. The key feature of all hard approaches is the formulation of a clear definition of ends and the selection of optimal means to achieve those ends. As Checkland (1985) argues, hard approaches are all 'based on the assumption that the problem they tackle is to select an efficient means of achieving a known and defined end'. Ackoff (1957), too, claims that the assertion of hard approaches is that 'all problems ultimately reduce to the evaluation of the efficiency of alternative means for a designated set of objectives'. Overall, the hard approach rests on a preassumption that identifying *the* problem and *the* end is not problematic. HST seeks to make possible the efficient achievement of goals or objectives, takes goal-seeking to be *the* model of human behaviour, and assumes that the world contains systems which can be 'engineered' (Checkland, 1985:71).

Jackson (1991a:82) provides an account of the positive achievements and features of HST. Firstly, HST provides decision making and problem-solving with systematic procedures, which can be seen as an advance over *ad hoc* management. The careful setting of objectives, the defined measurements of performance, the search, evaluation and selection of alternative means, and the clearly designed step-by-step control procedures, make the management of complicated projects feasible. Secondly, HST has promoted and popularised the use of quantitative models to aid decision making. With the increasing power of computers, such models allow simulation and prediction to be made about the behaviour of real-world situations, hence reducing the risks and costs of intervening in the actual system of concern. Finally, HST reveals the interactive nature of system parts, making clear the need to draw the boundaries of any investigation so as to include all important influences on the system. Problems of suboptimisation and hence reduction tendency can be possibly identified and avoided.

While the ontological redefinition of system has enriched human understanding of the world, hard systems approaches have increased human ability in real world problem-solving. HST proved its capability and strength in war-time military planning ('win the war'), and peace-time projects such as the *Apollo* programme ('send Man to the moon').

During the late 70's and the early 80's, some 'soft' systems thinkers opened a new perspective and brought another kind of systems methodology into systems/management science. This approach is now called Soft Systems Thinking (SST). SST questions the goal-seeking model and end-means scheme in understanding social affairs. It focuses on perceiving and improving social situations through learning and relationship maintenance. It accepts multi-rationality as inevitable. It is characterised by subjectivity, qualitative approach and systemic methodologies. It seeks for accommodation and change in the face of contrasting world-views. Generally speaking, soft systems approaches include Social Systems Design (Churchman), Strategic Assumption Surfacing and Testing (Mason and Mitroff), Interactive Planning (Ackoff) and Soft Systems Methodology (Checkland), etc. All soft methodologies provide systemic procedures assisting learning and open debate among participants towards possible agreed change and action in social situation.

The most distinctive feature of SST is its interpretive orientation. SST does not seek to study objective 'social facts' or to search for regularities and causal relations in social reality. Social world is rather seen as being the creative construction of human beings. For Churchman (1970), social world is constructed by Man through the particular *Weltanschauungen* they hold. Ackoff argues (1979b) that there are no problems 'out there' to be solved. Instead, in any mess there can be many different definitions of what the problem is. Checkland (1981a) claims that the concern of his methodology 'is ... not on any external "reality" but on people's perceptions of reality, on their mental process rather [than] on the objects of those processes'.

Soft systems thinkers know very well the differences between their proposition and that of HST. Rather than modelling social situations as machines, organisms, or 'open systems', they see them as manifestations of the interaction of varying cultures/world-views. SST focuses on understanding subjectively the points of view and the intentions of human actors who construct social systems. Thus, for Churchman (1979a), knowledge in social systems science cannot be sought by constructing theories or verified/falsified by observation of the real world because no observation of the world can be free of metaphysical underpinning (Kant), nor can any data or observation ever destroy a *Weltanschauung* (Hegel). For Ackoff (1974), 'Objectivity is the social product of the open interaction of a wide variety of individual subjectivities'. Checkland is not interested at all in formulating systemic theories which can be used as cognitive systems to validate other hypotheses about the social world. Instead, he models a process of enquiry: learning. Learning, argues Checkland, is about perceiving and evaluating parts of the flux before deciding and taking action, which then becomes a part of the flux, subject to new perception. And since in social life there are multiple realities, models of human activity systems in Checkland's SSM 'do not pretend to be models *of* the world, only models which embody a particular stated way of viewing the world' (Checkland, 1985:69-70).

While *the* world is problematic, the process of enquiring in it, i.e., methodologies, can be systemic. This transfers the notion of systemicity from the world to the inquiry process. All methodologies in SST construct their procedure in a systemic way. Churchman's Hegelian three phases dialectical inquiry, Ackoff's idealised design, and Checkland's cyclic learning phases, are all formulated under the notion of system for seeking possible understanding through open debate in the hope that exposing *Weltanschauung* to counter-*Weltanschauung* will give rise to compromises and actions for agreed change.

In summary, SST is underpinned by interpretive theory which is oriented to learning by using systemic methodologies to explore problematic situations. Systems models are not considered to be of *the* world, but amount to systemic intellectual constructs which help to surface important issues arisen from problematic situations, in the hope of accommodation among world-views and maintenance of relationships through intersubjective debates.

From the above summary we see an apparent increasing variety of approaches in systems/management science: the use of analogy and the abstract redefinition of 'systems' lead to viewing the social world from different perspectives; the hard systems approaches focus on predicting and controlling ontological systemicity and perceive the social world in these terms; while the soft systems school postulates its own vision of social affairs and argues in favour of its own kind of methodologies; there are still other streams of holistic approaches driven by the notion of system, such as Viable Systems Modelling (Beer, 1979, 1981, 1985). The perspectives, focuses, methods, languages, standards and interpretations underpinning these approaches are tremendously and irreducibly different. As in the field of marketing study, it has become difficult during the last two decades to ignore or deny the increasing diversity in systems/management approaches. Such diversity has brought two urgent challenges to systems scientists.

A1.1.3 Contemporary Challenges

With the diverse approaches developed up to the beginning of the 1980s, there became apparent a crucial lack of two elements in systems/management science: a critical approach to deal with coercive human situations, and an adequate strategy for responding toward the increasing diversity.

It is argued, concerning the first lack, that both the hard and the soft systems approaches fail to recognise and address conflictual situations in social affairs and are therefore unable to facilitate radical change to improve human situations. HST takes existing structures of social reality as given 'in its unitary view of management' (Thomas and Lockett, 1979), and therefore tends to downplay issues of value, intention, power relation, social arrangement and distribution. Also, the end-means scheme embedded in HST requires the *a priori* prioritising of one objective (or set of objectives) over others, even if it does realise that different goals exist. At the same time, HST has nothing to say about how to reach such objective(s). In practice, objectives are, generally, defined in terms of the powerful and dominant. Thus, even though HST tries to grasp the holism of the social 'whole', actually it ignores and hence 'cuts off' a fundamentally important dimension of social affairs: the possibility of conflictual and coercive situations. This is a kind of reduction. As for SST, its proponents claim that their methodologies are available to any interest in society, and that the debates it supports will be able to bring different viewpoints together for agreement and compromise. However, the criticism is levelled that in practice the pre-assumption of an overall basis of consensus or of no fundamental conflicts is nothing more than a myth, which leads to the acceptance of existing structures of authority and power (Thomas and Lockett, 1979). Even when conflicts become apparent, the overriding concern of SST is on how they can be contained and regulated, not on why they occur (Oliga, 1990). SST has not incorporated a prior commitment to establishing conditions for unconstrained discussion. For this reason, interventions using soft systems methodologies tend to facilitate a social process in which essential elements of the status quo are reproduced (Jackson, 1985:131).

The above critique in the 'crisis' literature highlights a challenge to systems/management science, challenging it to address the issue of human situations that prevent open debates, and to incorporate critical approaches that capable to bring about radical changes in such situations.

The next challenge focuses on the relationship between competing approaches, and hence response strategies for dealing with the variety in systems/management science. Take HST and SST again as examples. Both propositions have addressed this issue; however, each of them tries to assert that the other could be subsumed under its own particular perspective. While M'Pherson (1974) argues that soft approaches are a subset of the hard, Checkland (1981) claims that SST is the general case of which HST is the occasional special case (cf.: Gregory, 1992). This campaign for a superior position has produced tensions and worries, leading to a conclusion that systems/management science is presently going through a period of 'Kuhnian crisis' (Dando and Bennett, 1981). Thus, as in the field of marketing study, systems/management science is in an urgent need of a pluralist perspective capable of properly converting the 'crisis' into complementarity.

It is in response to these two challenges that CST emerges and takes shape as a distinct body of thought which brings the ideals of criticality and pluralism together.

A1.2 EMERGENCE AND EVOLUTION

Both SST and CST are advances moving beyond the limitations of HST. However, CST tries further to go beyond the 'pure' interpretive/hermeneutic perspective of SST. For this reason, the major evolutionary trend of CST can be summarised by analysing its critique upon SST. This critique has focused on two related issues, discussed below.

A1.2.1 Establishing Emancipation Interest

Jackson (1982) first challenged the soft approach's incompetence in dealing with issues of power and social change. While SST is concerned to explore the world-views of different actors, it has little to say about how and under what conditions these world-views are formed and maintained, or why some dominate over others. Jackson (1985) continued that people's understandings, feelings, intentions, interests and aims can be linked to social arrangements such as inequality in power relation and in economic conditions. To tackle such issues, Jackson called for critical approaches in systems/management science, thereby highlighting a form of the contemporary emancipation interest.

Flood (1990a) and Flood and Ulrich (1990) argued that SST is impoverished because it freezes emancipation through non-transparent means. For Flood and Ulrich, mutual understanding is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for social improvement. Authentic understanding of each other's subjective intents is all right in that it allows rationally motivated discourse, but it does not answer the question of why particular *Weltanschauungen* are favoured or privileged. Through the soft systems approach, people are encouraged to work out ideal systems views that are relevant to participants, but there is no indication as to what might be chosen as appropriate and on what basis such choice should be made, even locally. Further, SST suggests that social tensions arise only because of misunderstanding and hence can be corrected through ideological interpretation alone. By doing so, SST creates another ideological trap instead of freeing people from perpetuation, because it actually conceals possibilities and conditions for addressing the social situations that produce and maintain those misunderstandings.

Aware of the above limitation of SST, CST dedicates itself to human autonomy and seeks to achieve for both involved and affected, the maximum development of their potential. Jackson (1985, 1987a) argued, in the Habermasian terminology, for a normative concern to identifying and transforming the conditions which impede or distort possible rational analysis and transformation in social situations. At about the same time, Ulrich (1983) was working out a systems approach, *Critical Systems Heuristics*, aiming at people's emancipatory interest. The approach suggests polemical employment of boundary judgement in social systems planning by means of asking and answering questions contrasting *ought* with *is* judgements so that both the involved and the affected can question a design's normative content and challenge its 'objective necessities', underlying interests and pre-assumptions.

More recently, Flood and Ulrich (1990) argue that systems thinking implies emancipation and critique when interpreted according to its original critical intent. Flood (1990a, b, c) also tries to incorporate Foucault's thesis of power and knowledge into systems study, aiming to assist human beings to liberate both themselves and their thinking from traps imposed by machine, man, or whatever.

A1.2.2 Promoting Pluralist Perspective

Pluralism generally suggests that since our knowledge about 'the' world and ourselves, no matter how sophisticated it might be, cannot escape partiality and selectivity, no single rationality is adequate to address the full range of problematic situations. Therefore we can pursue as meaningful an understanding as possible of 'the' world and ourselves only by embracing diverse and competing constructs, and learning from the diversity, the differences and otherness of competing constructs. SST is correct when it claims that the soft is not going to discard the hard (e.g., Ackoff, 1981). However the soft's position slips into imperialism since it fails to be aware of its own limitations and weaknesses when it claims that soft is the general case (e.g., Checkland, 1981a).

As Flood and Jackson point out, SST fails 'to question its own theoretical underpinning and to be reflective about the social context in which it is employed', 'accepting only the tenets of interpretivism and hence denaturing methodologies used from other theoretical bases' (Flood and Jackson, 1991a:2-4).

Leading critical systems thinkers, in the early stage of discussion, called their pluralist perspective complementarism. Complementarism first emerged at the methodological level when Jackson and Keys (1984) constructed their system of systems methodologies, asking the critical questions, 'Which methodology, when and why?'. They argued that various systems methodologies have their respective strengths and weaknesses, and therefore suggested informed employment of various systems approaches, as appropriate for intervention in different social situations.

Flood (1989b) expressed appreciation of Jackson and Keys's ideal, but suggested that complementarism at the methodological level should be supported by complementarism at the theoretical level, i.e., by meta-level reasoning, and that it was necessary to overcome the difficulty of paradigm incommensurability.

Following Flood's argument, Jackson, Oliga and Ulrich, drawing upon Habermas's constitutional human interests theory (detailed in the next chapter), developed a complementarist form of pluralism over the notion of 'paradigm incommensurability'. Jackson (1985, 1988b) linked systems methodologies to differentiated human interests; Oliga (1986, 1988) addressees the epistemological foundations of various approaches; Ulrich (1988) specified three complementary levels of systems practice; Flood (1991) criticised the underpinning of methodological and theoretical isolationism. These works suggest that paradigms could be rendered commensurate by making explicit their presuppositions and linkage to fundamental human cognitive interests.

A prerequisite of adopting a complementarist perspective is, it is said, to recognise the partiality and incompleteness of knowledge about social reality, to question our inevitable normative judgement flowing into social systems design (Flood and Ulrich, 1990). Equally important is to reflect on the strengths and limitations of various systems approaches (Jackson and Keys, 1984), on the 'life practical consequence' of employing these approaches (Ulrich, 1983; Flood and Ulrich, 1990), on epistemological foundations and ideologies underwriting various approaches (Oliga, 1988, 1990), and on application context (Jackson, 1988). Without such reflection, we lose the basis for justifying the complementarist perspective. Gregory (1992) continues to demonstrate that self-reflection cannot be separated from communicative dialogical critique. In Appendix III, we will see how this line of arguments has been developed into a systems commitment of CST.

A1.3 SCOPE AND CONTENT

As a result of the work referred above, criticality and systemicity have been brought together and refined into a substantial body of thought in systems/management science, which could be perceived as consisting of four classifiable yet interrelated domains (also see Figure A1.1 on the following page).

Firstly, there is the core of CST, which most clearly distinguishes CST from other versions of systems thinking, and qualifies its own identity. This core includes proposed yet still developing critical systems commitments, principles, and methodology (e.g., Flood and Jackson, 1991a, b; Midgley, 1995a, b).

To justify the enterprise of CST, sociological and philosophical inquiry has been undertaken, which can include Jackson's calling for critical approaches (Jackson, 1982, 1985), Flood and Ulrich's argument for an adequate epistemology in terms of both sociological awareness and systems rationality (Flood and Ulrich, 1989; Flood, 1990), Midgley's critical vision of ontological complexity (Midgley, 1992), and of course Flood (1989a, b), Flood and Romm (1995), Gregory (1992) and Jackson's (1987, 1991b) analysis of the pluralism/(in)commensurability issue.



Figure A1.1 Scope and current development of critical systems thinking

Then we have also CST's intervention into practical situations, which seek to demonstrate the competence of CST in social affairs and in the organisational-management domain. The former inquires into such issue-centred topics as unification of science (Flood, 1993a), ideology, power and control (Oliga, 1989a, b, 1990, 1991), critical appreciation (Gregory, 1992, 1994), critical facilitation process (Gregory and Romm, 1994), reflective practice (Vahl, 1994), etc. The latter denotes the intervention of CST into field-centred studies and projects, such as total quality management (Flood, 1993b), ecology and environment (Midgley, 1994), etc. (the present project can be classified as one of the efforts in this category).

It is apparent that the above categories are by no means clear-cut. This scheme is only a subjective structural construct as an aid to grasping the richness of CST. It is also obvious that the four parts form a dynamic and coherent whole. It is dynamic since it is still enjoying rapid development in all four categories. It is coherent because all developments in the four parts are based on both the critical spirit and the notion of system. The four parts of CST inform one another in terms of new development, challenge, and works done, currently undertaken, or yet to do.

A1.4 THE SYSTEMS MOVEMENT

Now we are in a position to summarise in overview the diachronical line of the historically discontinuous reconceptualisation of 'systems', i.e., the systems movement (the term is from Checkland, 1983) (this part draws upon Flood, 1991a).

The systems movement began, when Bertalanffy overcame the ontological inadequacy of the mechanical and biological analogical use of 'system' by proposing GST which sees the world as a complex interaction of open systems. This historical phase can be called 'the first systems struggle'. During this stage, 'systems' were still employed merely as devices to map the world (concrete or abstract), and the world was perceived as systemic. Parallel to this redefinition was the development of HST, an effort to employ systems techniques in the social/management domain for the purpose of prediction and control. Epistemological and ideological considerations were usually out of the systems horizon. For this reason, the first systems struggle was mainly ontological.

History continued with the second systems struggle in which ontological concern gave way to epistemology. As a result of this shift, the emphasis was no longer on what the world *is* but on how we perceive it. The notion of systemic world was given a backseat while world-views come to the fore. 'System' came to be used as a structure to promote understanding between people involved. What was seen as systemic was more our mind - the process of inquiry - than the world. This reconceptualisation therefore represents a move from positivistic thinking to interpretivistic proposition, and is therefore epistemological in characteristic. This is why the second systems struggle has been called, especially by Flood (1990a, b, c), the first epistemological break.

Continuing the systems movement we now come to the third systems struggle, or, the second epistemological break. The new reconceptualisation now moves from interpretivism to critique, which takes us beyond the understanding of world-views. CST suggests that we must reflect, through communicative dialogue, on our partiality in knowledge and selectivity in social systems design, and on our particular normative content in systems practice. 'System' in this stage is also employed to conceptualise the possibility of bringing theoretical, social, ethical, and normative inquiry dimensions as well as competing approaches together. The positivistic hard tends to ignore the issue of world-views; the interpretivistic soft takes world-views as given; the critical approach deals with the extent to which those world-views may be distorted and whose interest any distortion may serve; it aims at freeing human beings from any mental, social, or material distortion, which may block their full potential.

This is not to suggest that with each break, the latest version of systems thinking replace the earlier, or that the earlier became a subset of the latter. Rather, the aim here is to demonstrate that with each extension, systems/management science opens a new vision to enrich our understanding of social situations, increasing our competence to tackle the social 'whole' more properly, and therefore reaches a 'better' degree of holism. Each break brings an addition. This addition could be 'better', but only when employed to address a particular kind of issue based on critical argumentation, and only when reflected on inescapable incompleteness in practice.

I agree that each version of systems thinking not only provides methods for problem-solving, but also at the same time implies fundamental ontological, epistemological as well as hidden normative perceptions of all objective, subjective and power-material relations. However, I also believe that different visions each has its respectively different particular emphasis and focus. Although they embed, consciously or unconsciously, all considerations and perceptual dimensions, their ability and competence in dealing with different aspects of human affairs is not identical. Rather, these approaches can be considered as pin-pointing, respectively, heterogeneous aspects in terms of technical enhancement, hermeneutic understanding, or normative formation. As such, for each temporally localised case, it is necessary and possible to employ purposefully what appears to be the most relevant contributing vision, according to their particular focus and competence, and of course also subject to our perception at that particular point in time, which should be continuously reflected on, discussed, criticised and revised through communicative argumentation.

CONCLUSION

This appendix introduces the background and emergence of one of the theoretical resources for this project. It has been shown that by bringing criticality and systemicity together, systems thinking possesses the possibility to enrich human understanding and ability to tackle a broader range of issues interwoven and embedded in social affairs. It has also been suggested that each approach, however alien and competing it appears, if employed critically, may increase human competence in dealing with the complexity confronting.

Appendix II

SOCIOLOGICAL-PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS

INTRODUCTION

This appendix investigates the sociological-philosophical origins of CST. First, an outline is given of Habermas's sociological-epistemological theorising, which will cover his theses of knowledge and human cognitive interests, communicative action and competence, and lifeworld/systems. Then, a new vision of ontological complexity is presented.

A2.1 HABERMAS'S SOCIOLOGICAL-EPISTEMOLOGICAL THEORISING

Habermas's sociological-epistemological theorising plays a central and fundamental role in the theoretical foundation of CST. Habermas's work draws upon and goes beyond the achievements of Kant and Hegel's German philosophical tradition, Weber, Marx and the Frankfurt school's sociology, Durkheim, Mead and Parsons's systems science, Freud's psychology, and many others. Based on these intellectual achievements, Habermas demonstrates the legitimacy of differentiable human cognitive interests, redirecting human intellectual inquiry from a one-sided reductionist towards a balanced holistic approach. Habermas also offers a way to synthesise the creative residue of both liberal and Marxist theories of society into a new and critical social theory, in which society is geared through democracy, autonomy and Reason to rationally contestable public needs, rather than to arbitrary power. In the following three theses of Habermas's that are most relevant to the grounding of criticality and pluralism will be introduced: knowledge and human interests, communicative action and rationality, and lifeworld/systems.

A2.1.1 Knowledge and Human Cognitive Interests

In *Knowledge and Human Interests* (Habermas, 1966, 1968/1971, 1973/1974), Habermas tries to rework a comprehensive epistemology for critical theory that can rehabilitate the claims of reason in human affairs. As such, his whole thesis concentrates on addressing and deciding the simple yet most fundamental questions of how we know, and how we know that what we know is valid and reliable.

For this purpose, Habermas first at all elaborates three arguments from the German philosophical tradition (Pusey, 1987). Firstly, knowledge is defined not only by the objects of experience but also, at the same time, depends equally on the subjective and intersubjective, i.e., the *a priori*categories that the knowledge subject brings to every act of thought and perception. Thus, following Kant, Habermas puts reason and rationality back to the knowing subject. Secondly, drawing upon the power of Hegel and Marx's philosophy, Habermas breaks with Kant's timeless world outside history and social experience, to contend that knowledge and understanding are socially conditioned and mediated by human historical experience. For Habermas, there is no knowledge without culture. Thus, Habermas secures the social relevance for epistemology. Finally, Habermas, following the critical spirit of German philosophy, continues to argue that the power of knowledge and reason is grounded in the process of reflection. Reflection, for Habermas, is the social process through which human beings surface their*a priori* assumptions and judgement, and through which irrationally impaired or broken communication is restored and so rationality redeemed.

Base on these arguments, Habermas sets out to make one of his original contributions to epistemology. Habermas asserts that it is simply a myth that knowledge is conceived as a body of facts, or that truths exist apart from human purposes and are validated as a stand-alone body of information and theory. For Habermas, knowledge is always historically and socially rooted and interest-bound, and hence should be conceived, sought, and granted validity accordingly. In thought and action, inquiry and practice, Habermas insists, human beings simultaneously discover and create a world in accordance with our knowing purpose. Thus, knowledge must be viewed in terms of the problems humans encounter in producing and reproducing their social and material existence (cf.: Roderick, 1986:51).

Then, Habermas continues to push forward his threefold-structured interest theory: the three categories of knowledge, the human interest each serves, and the procedures and standards used in each to distinguish between valid and invalid modes of knowing.

Firstly, empirical-analytic science, as pursued in the natural sciences, serves human interest in technical control of material surroundings. It constitutes 'the meaning of possible statements and establishes rules both for the construction of theories and for their critical testing' (Habermas, 1971: 168). Habermas insists that what we know about nature is defined and validated by human cognitive attitudes that inform our scientific enquiry. Nature is conceived, even in theoretical and 'pure' science, in terms of our interest in controlling it. As such, this kind of purpose and its corresponding knowledge are instrumental in characteristic. On the one hand, Habermas strongly criticises the one-dimensional scientism and 'technocratic-consciousness', rejecting the inappropriate extension of instrumental reason beyond its proper sphere; on the other, Habermas rejects the equally one-sided critique of technical knowledge from the idealist romantic, arguing that technical reason, so long as it does not claim to embody reason *per se*, is legitimate (cf.: Jay, 1984b:467). For Habermas, knowledge produced by empirical-analytic science is useful and necessary to the development of modern society, since such science provides guide-lines for instrumental action through which humankind directly improve material conditions in which they survive and interact. Only when people intend to employ such science as *the* unique approach to tackle all kinds of human situations, does it become distortive. Habermas is *for* science rather than against it. Science could do better, if it were employed in a more philosophically knowing way, with tougher standards and in reflective consciousness of the purpose it serves. In this thesis, economic and behavioural marketing systems are linked to this category and it is argued that they can be purposefully employed to serve this first kind of human cognitive interest in consumption needs.

As a social species humankind live in and depend on communicative and social interactions. Thus, we have a second universal interest, i.e., 'practical interest', in communication and mutual understanding in the everyday conduct of life in which 'objectivity of experience consists precisely in its being inter-subjectively shared' (Habermas, 1973:168). By practical interest Habermas invites us to enhance human understanding and communication. It is only through speech and listening that we can make sense of what others mean. It is only through discussion and argument that we can obtain understanding and appreciation. This type of knowing targets on the insights into people's motives, character, values and world-views, which cannot be tested and validated by 'scientific' techniques. As Apel puts it, 'I cannot imagine that this function of the humanities could ever be replaced by reducing understanding and interpretation to the method of objectifying science' (Apel, 1977:308). Therefore human practical interest requires a second type of knowledge, historical-hermeneutic science, as Habermas calls it, which is associated with methods based on insightful interpretation of texts, narratives, myths, interviews, therapies, cultures, languages, conservation, observations and so on. In this thesis, interactive and cultural marketing systems are linked to this second kind of human cognitive interest, since these systems focus, through hermeneutic-interpretive approaches, on understanding meanings of actions in consumption and interactions in the marketplace.

While arguing for the legitimacy for practical interest, Habermas at the same time persistently rejects the universal claims of hermeneutics and the tendency to contrast scientific method with the hermeneutic phenomenon, articulating the necessity of a dialectical synthesis of empirical-analytical science and hermeneutics into a critical theory that has a practical intent and is governed by an emancipatory cognitive interest (cf.: Bernstein, 1983:42-3). Therefore our third type of knowledge is related to an emancipatory purpose, without which the interest-bound character of knowledge could not itself be understood. This interest is based in the human capacity to act rationally, to be self-reflective and self-determining, towards autonomy and responsibility. This kind of purpose is based firmly on the Hegel-Frankfurt tradition that critique should concern itself with a broader set of constraints than with those relating solely to knowledge as commonly conceived, and on Marx's ideal of unmasking the constraints imposed by the dominant and powerful. To serve this kind of purpose we need what Habermas calls emancipatory-critical science, that will enable human beings to reflect on their own situations and liberate themselves from domination blocking their full potential. In this thesis, historical and emancipatory marketing systems are linked to this form of human cognitive interest according to their focus and attempt to enable citizens as consumers and marketers to appreciate their consumption patterns and marketing activities over a longer historical span and in a wider sociological context, with a view to more responsible consumption and marketing.

Albeit differentiated, Habermas maintains that, the three kinds of human cognitive interests are inherently related. 'It is only in the modern period that they have been isolated from one another to the extent that cultural traditions can be dealt with under any given one of these aspects' (Habermas, 1982:235). The purpose of Habermas's constitutional human cognitive interest thesis is to restore the differences and proper relations among propositional truth, subjective truthfulness, and normative rightness, for the intellectual inquiry of humankind.

To sum up, with *Knowledge and Human Interests*, Habermas attempts to establish that knowledge is always linked to deep-rooted human purposes and interests, which are in turn historically and socially shaped and reproduced, and hence should be defined, conceived, sought, and granted legitimacy and validity as such (also see Table A2.1).

Table A2.1 Knowledge and human cognitive interests

Cognitive interest	*Instrumental*	*Practical*	*Emancipatory*
Purpose	Control/prediction	Understanding	Enlightenment
Knowledge	Technical	Practical	Emancipatory
Type of science	Empirical-analytic	Historical-hermeneutic	Critical

(Based on Habermas's thesis)

Habermas realises that his initial discrimination of technical, practical and emancipatory cognitive interests is 'quasi-transcendental' (Habermas, 1968/1971:194), and therefore can be accounted as only a partially successful attempt to legitimise different types of human knowledge and inquiry approaches (Bernstein, 1983:184-5; Roderick, 1986:52). To overcome this limitation, Habermas furthers his argument by formulating a non-transcendental scientific reconstructive theory of communicative action (the linguistic turn), and by developing a social systems theory of social rationalisation (the social turn) (Jay, 1984b).

A2.1.2 Communicative Action and Rationality

The purpose of Habermas's theory of communication is to recast the study of society in a paradigm of communication, to develop a model that will show how rationality (and irrationality) are manifested in ordinary socially communicative interaction (Habermas, 1979, 1981/1984, 1981/1987).

For Habermas, communication involves both contents and relationships, and thus it is much more than a purely linguistic process. Communication is social interaction among citizens through which society evolves and is reproduced. Only because human beings share the skill of communicative interaction can they make sense of each other and determine together, 'whether they then cooperate or fight with, care for or objectify, nurture or exploit one another' (terms from Forester, 1983:235). It is from the standpoint of such a long-term social-historical process that Habermas grants importance to human communicative action and competence.

In formulating his communication theory, Habermas leaves German hermeneutics for contemporary Anglo-American linguistic philosophy. Firstly, from Wittgenstein, Habermas draws the idea that claims of truth in language usage are inseparably bound up with 'forms of life', i.e., they have social context. Habermas quickly seizes this assertion, develops it, and then pushes forward his own understanding that the forms of life may be the other way round, as a reflection of a systematically distorted communication background that shapes its members' lives and their interactions.

Then, Habermas turns to the post-Wittgensteinian 'ordinary language philosophy', constructs his own presentation of pragmatic features of human speech-action. Every human speech-action, argues Habermas, consists of different types of validity claims. In the first place, speech-action typically proffers statements about an object of the world. This is the aspect in which inter-actors (speakers and hearers) use language cognitively and oriented to present external nature. Through this aspect in speaking and listening social actors make a truth claim. Then, speech-action is used to express the inner world of the speaker, his feelings, motives, and authenticity, which carries the voiced or silent guarantee of the speaker's claim to sincerity or truthfulness. Finally, speech-action has an inter-subjective aspect that establishes legitimising interpersonal relation in inter-subjectively shared world of society. Here, attention is directed to the normative rightness and social norms that the hearers may or may not accept. This kind of interactive use of language can be related to the third kind of orientation in validity claim, i.e., social world relations. Thus, for Habermas, the three types of validity claim of speech, i.e., truth, sincerity and normative rightness, complemented by a fourth claim, comprehensibility or clarity, are simultaneously involved and internally connected in the very constitution of ordinary language communication even if there is no explicit reference to them (also see Table A2.2).

Table A2.2 Universal pragmatic features of speech-action

Aspect of speech action	*Cognitive*	*Expressive*	*Interactive*
Domains of reality	'The' world of external nature	'My' world of internal nature	'Our' world of society
Basic attitude	Objectivating	Expressive	Norm-confirmative
General functions of speech	Representation of facts	Disclosure of speaker's subjectivity	Establishment of legitimate interpersonal relations
Validity claim	Truth	Sincerity	(Normative) rightness

(Based on Habermas's thesis)

The above ideal speech-actions can fully take place, Habermas continues to contend, only when people reach communicative competence, i.e., when all forms of domination, overt and hidden, have been removed. Habermas insists on alerting us that free speech-action in modern society can be undermined by the use of power, coercion or manipulation, resulting in 'systematically distorted communication'.

To find a way to reflect on systematically distorted communication and to restore communicative competence, Habermas looks to Freud's psychoanalytic relationship between analyst and patient. Habermas sees the Freudian therapeutic relationship as a specialised type of communication. In the security of the therapeutic relationship the patient learns to reflect on her/his own experience, to affirm a larger rational control over complexes of systematically distorted perceptions. Furthermore, systematically distorted perceptions are not like misunderstood or unrecognised meanings. They have to be explained and interpreted through public action (it is public, even if only between the psychologist and the patient) such as speech and symbolic interaction, so that the patient is able freely to associate conscious thoughts and dreams with repressed or forgotten experience.

Extending this model from the psychological to the social context, Habermas creates new insights and meanings. Firstly, communication can be systematically distorted when humankind do not properly differentiate between subjective, inter-subjective, and objective orders of reality, or between her/his own self *(I)*, another ego*(You)*, and the impersonal objective world*(It)*. In other words, social actors and communicative action may be misled or mystified by the violation of the ordinary claims of speech action. Second, systematically distorted communication can have social origins, thus pointing back to systematically distorted social structure. Communicative action taking place within structural settings of power, status, and possible domination, may result in reproduction of domination and distortion. And thirdly, human beings can transcend systematically distorted communication towards communicative competence only through consciously free communicative action in an ideal speech situation. For Habermas, communicative action should be oriented to reaching an understanding across all dimensions of speech-action, i.e., truth, sincerity and normative rightness. Now this ideal communicative action can only take place in an ideal speech situation where participants are willing and able to enter into discourse so that the outcome of discussion will reflect agreements, free from any constraints imposed by the participant her/himself or by others. As such, communicative competence specifies two basic requirements. Firstly, all participants should have the same chance and resources to initiate, present, reason, justify and defend their attitudes, feelings, intentions and interests; and secondly, participants should be aware of the possibility of systematically distorted perceptions that might be imposed on them by themselves or by others, and be consciously ready to reflect on such perceptions (in the next appendix it will be shown that this argument has been developed into one of CST's basic commitments: critique and reflection).

By the 'universal pragmatics' of communicative action, Habermas tries to break with the legacy of pure*a priori* transcendental philosophy, and establishes a clarification and justification of the normative foundation for his socio-epistermology: cognitive interests, especially emancipatory interest, are not contingent or accidental; rather, 'they are basic and unavoidable, rooted in what we are as human beings' (cf.: Bernstein, 1985:13).

To sum up, with the 'linguistic turn' of his theory of *Communicative Action,* Habermas has sought to articulate the ordinary claims of communication through which human beings acquire a capacity to achieve understanding and agreement in reproducing society. Yet the potential to achieve such communicative agreement can be blocked in the imbalanced process of rationalisation and differentiation at the social structural level by colonisation of the lifeworld by systems, which is the topic to be addressed in the following sub-section.

A2.1.3 Lifeworld and Systems

By the *lifeworld/system* thesis, Habermas invites us to see the evolution of society as the rationalisation of the lifeworld, and especially to study the modernisation of society as the tug-of-war between the lifeworld and systems (Habermas, 1981/1984, 1981/1987).

Lifeworld is defined by Habermas to contain the background of shared meaning that makes ordinary symbolic interaction possible. In other words, lifeworld is the substratum of our conscious *Weltanschauungen* and of all social actions. Lifeworld stands behind each participant in communication, comprising our vast stock of taken-for-granted definitions and unquestioned understanding of the world that give meaning and direction to human everyday actions and interactions. As such, lifeworld is 'so unproblematic that we are simply incapable of making ourselves conscious of this or that part of it at will' (Habermas, in Honneth *et al.*, 1981:49). We cannot step out of our lifeworld, nor can we find a vantage point to observe it. Habermas reminds us again and again that lifeworld sets the 'context-forming horizon' of social action and interaction, and therefore makes effective social rationalisation and modernisation possible.

On the other hand, lifeworld to Habermas also explicitly includes structural aspects such as institutions, normative structures and social practice, which can be outlined by Table A2.3.

By elaborating the concept of lifeworld, Habermas critically reconstructs both Weber and Marx's theses on social reproduction. Weber is correct when he contends that we must enter social reality 'from the above' through interpretation of people's *Weltanschauungen* to seek meaning and understanding. But for Habermas, the explanation 'from the above' should be complemented by an explanation 'from the below': i.e., it is necessary to go beyond pure interpretation and to explain how the objective and material components produce this or that change and influence in lifeworld. In short, all events in social evolution should be investigated through the two perspectives of lifeworld. In other words, the study of social evolution should be both 'adequate at the level of meaning' and 'adequate at the level of cause'. On the other hand, by seeing social evolution as the rationalisation of the lifeworld, the constitution and dynamic of society is no longer reduced to its social-structural and economic substratum only, as in the orthodox Marxist vision of historical materialism. Instead, social reproduction for Habermas is a result of dialectic interaction between the two dimensions - cultural and structural, an interaction in which each dimension conditions and sets limits on the other.

Table A2.3 Structural components of the lifeworld

Reproduction processes	*Structural components*		
Cultural reproduction	Interpretative schemata susceptible to consensus (valid knowledge)	Legitimating	Behavioural patterns influential in self-formation, educational goals
Social integration	Obligations	Legitimately ordered interpersonal relations	Social memberships
Socialisation	Interpretative accomplishments	Motivation for norm-confirmative actions	Capability for interaction (personal identity)

(Adopted from Pusey, 1987)

The 'system' concept of Habermas firstly draws upon the functionalist social systems theory of from Durkheim to Parsons (Pusey, 1987). But with his later developed concept of system, Habermas critically revises his own thesis, making radical concessions to Luhmann's functionalist paradigm, and reconstructing Weber and Marx's sociology (Habermas, 1981a/1984, 1981b/1987, 1985b/1987).

The basic tenet of Luhmann's functionalism, according to Habermas, is that social systems today have become extremely complex and uncertain. As a result, rationality in society is no longer a property of interacting subjects but of the system object. For Luhmann, facing the complexity and uncertainty of the social system, rationality no longer has anything to do with rational discourse or with practical decisions about what we should or should not do. Rather, rationality is possible and useful only when it is concerned with the system's adaptation and survival. The accelerated growth of complexity makes it necessary for society to convert to a form of reproduction that gives up the differentiation between power and truth in favour of a nature-like development withdrawn from reflection (Luhmann, cf.: Habermas, 1975:136). Administration and planning must confine decision choices in whatever measure necessary to reduce complexity and increase the steering capacity (adaptability) of the society in the face of its environment. In other words, system in modern society should follow its own logic and rationality instead of that of human subjects, or, in Habermas's terms, of the lifeworld.

Habermas firmly rejects Luhmann's 'reductionist functionalism'. In *Legitimation Crisis*, he distinguishes between two forms of integration, which he calls social and systems:

> We speak of social integration in relation to the systems of institutions in which speaking and acting subjects are socially related [vergesellschaftet]. Social systems are seen here as *life-worlds* that are symbolically structured. We speak of system integration with a view to the specific steering performances of a self-regulated *system*. Social systems are considered here from the point of view of their capacity to maintain their boundaries and their continued existence by mastering the complexity of an inconstant environment. Both paradigms, life-world and system, are important. The problem is to demonstrate their interconnection (Habermas, 1973:4).

That interconnection, for Habermas, should be that social integration is independently rooted in the development of lifeworld that does not reduce to the requirement of systems integration. It should be the lifeworld that gives form and content, according to its own logic, to systems for development, rather than the reverse. 'New levels of the system differentiation can establish themselves only if the rationalisation of the lifeworld has reached a corresponding level' (Habermas, 1981/1987:179). What Luhmann does not see, argues Habermas, is that legitimations, requirements and logics that are conceived by the functionalist as coming from systems are actually all loaded with validity claims that we accept more or less unthinkingly from the lifeworld. For Habermas, what originally distinguished Man from his animal ancestors was less his ability to work on the world, which the transitional hominids had been able to do, than his ability of communication and socialisation. 'It was incorrect, therefore, to see instrumental rationality, or in Luhmann's terms, the systemic reduction of environment complexity, as the sole determinant of the historical process' (cf.: Jay, 1984b:487). In Luhmann's thesis, the relation between the lifeworld and systems has become effectively reversed and systematically distorted. The issue of social adaptation and survival is not based on a quasi-biological logic, Habermas argues, but concerns the guiding symbolic structure of the lifeworld and its capacity to facilitate communicative action and socialisation.

It is through the *lifeworld/systems* thesis that Habermas brings Marx and Weber together and overcomes their limitations. In sociological terms, 'system' according to Habermas now refers to those vast tracts of modern society that are 'uncoupled' from communicatively shared experience in ordinary language and co-ordinated through the steering media of money and power. In Marx, money converts concrete labour into an abstract commodity; while in Weber, power converts value-rational and practical action into the nature-like imperatives of the Iron Cage. It is based on the lifeworld/systems scheme that Marx and Weber can be seen as complementing each other. For Habermas, through the steering media of money and power, social relations in the lifeworld are monetarised (Marx) and bureaucratised (Weber) in order to adapt to the functionalist requirement of systems. Habermas calls this process colonisation of the lifeworld. And it is this process of colonisation that has undermined the social reproduction of modern society.

Habermas's *lifeworld/systems* thesis is a conscious reconstruction of Weber's theory on rationalisation in modern society. According to Weber, during the process of differentiation of social systems in the late capitalist society, rationalisation has gone from a once positive stage to a completely negative stage. The process is no longer driven by the original ethical and cultural motivations, but by the pure utilitarianism of the economy and the state. In Weber's words,

> This [modern economic] order is now bound to the technical and economic conditions of machine production which to-day determine the lives of all the individuals who are born into this mechanism, not only those directly concerned with economic acquisition, with irresistible force (Weber, 1976:181).

> In a historical perspective too, the 'progress' towards the bureaucratic state, adjudication and administering according to rationally established laws and regulations, is very closely related to modern capitalist development. The modern capitalist enterprise rests (internally) primarily on calculation. It requires for its existence a legal and administrative system whose functioning can be rationally calculated, at least in principle, on the basis of fixed general norms, just like the expected performance of a machine (Weber, cf.: Habermas, 1981/1984:218).

Thus, the rationalisation of societies for Weber had become an inescapable Iron Cage in the late capitalism (later, the Frankfurt school, especially Heikorheimer and Adorno, developed Weber's thesis of 'the loss of meaning' and 'the loss of freedom' into the 'dialectic of Enlightenment').

While fully realising the 'dark side' of rationalisation, Habermas critically goes beyond Weber's (as well as Heikorheimer and Adorno's) narrow and one-sided horizon, and comes up with the possibility of penetrating the Iron Cage to pursue balanced differentiation between three basic orientations to the world. For Habermas, instrumental reason is just one possible sphere of development. As humankind we can have three spheres or worlds: the objective natural world, the intersubjective social world and the internal subjective world, which can be seen as corresponding broadly to human practice of science, politics and art. It is the differentiation of these three spheres in general, rather than instrumental reason alone in particular, Habermas argues, which should characterise modernity and the reproduction of society. In late capitalist system, one particular form of the three types of reasoning, namely, instrumental reason, has dominated at the expense of others. However, for Habermas, the differentiation of systems as a process of the rationalisation of the lifeworld is not necessarily one-sided or inherently distorting. A possible way out of the Iron Cage, Habermas points out, is to restore a balanced social reproduction through a balanced process of differentiation and development of systems under symbolic guidance from the lifeworld. And this possibility is still open.

Read both historically and systemically, the line of reasoning underlying Habermas's theses is clear. *Knowledge and Human Interests* argues for differentiation and co-ordination in human rationality; *Theory of Communication* lays down scientific reconstructive grounding; while*Lifeworld/systems* supplements his 'linguistic turn' with a normative 'social turn'. A reading of Habermas leads to the conclusion that since human beings as social actors have differentiable cognitive interests, different forms of knowledge and hence different approaches to seek such knowledge are therefore individually needed, and should be pursued in a balanced manner so that society can be reproduced for both individual autonomy and the collective needs of humankind. From Habermas we gain a platform for a critical pluralist perspective capable of embracing different paradigms and research approaches, however alien and competing they might be.

A2.2 A VISION OF ONTOLOGICAL COMPLEXITY

While Habermas articulately establishes a socio-epistemological perspective for critical theory, he has not come up with a formal statement of ontology. This left an unexpected philosophical tension when critical systems thinkers embarked on their intellectual inquiry. Fortunately, critical systems thinkers have made a significant advance by complementing Habermas's epistemological perspective with an ontological vision, and hence reach a sounder position to argue for pluralism. We see in Part III of this thesis that an adequate ontological vision is vital for marketing study to get out of the realist/relativist Either/Or black hole and to promote plurality.

A2.2.1 A Historical Tension

The core ideal of Habermas's whole project is to argue for critique, critique free from any singular substantive interests. Critique in Habermas has two distinguishable dimensions (Bernstein, 1985; Roderick, 1986). On the one hand, it has a Kantian critical ideal: to reflect on purposes, abilities and conditions of knowing subjects. On the other, critique also requires reflection on the constraints and forces that shape the formation and reproduction of interaction between knowing subjects (Habermas, 1981/1984:22-24). Thus, critical theory has both idealist and materialist dimensions. While contending that social world is created by people through interaction, critical theory at the same time argues that such interactions are shaped and situated by material conditions, even though these conditions may not be directly accessed. In other words, critical theory suggests an ontology of historically and socially shaped human beings whose organisational relations work in each instance, either to constrict or to emancipate human lives. It is in this sense that Forester (1983:235) claims that 'ontologically, it [critical theory] marries subjectivist and objectivist positions'.

This proposition raises issues of the relationship between idealism and materialism. As Burrell and Morgan put it, 'the materialist and idealist strands within

Habermas's work are always yoked in a relationship of great tension' (Burrell and Morgan, 1979:296).

Nevertheless, Habermas has introduced an idea of 'segments of reality'. In *Knowledge and Human Interests*, Habermas relates human cognitive interests and knowledge to the natural world, human subjectivity, and inter-subjective relation. In *The Theory of Communicative Action*, Habermas reveals validity claims oriented from *the* world of external nature,*my* world of internal nature, and*our* world of social relation. In the*Lifeworld/systems* theory, Habermas suggests we enter the social reality from both 'the above' and 'the below'. Doing so, through his demonstration of a critical epistemology, Habermas brings the essential ingredients of an ontology for critical theory. However, Habermas has not come up with a formalised statement of ontology. *Reality* is not his main concern. 'The three "worlds" he identifies are merely extrapolations from it [the*a priori* status of language and argumentation]' (Midgley, 1992:158).

This tension in the ontology of critical theory between idealist and materialist positions remained when critical systems thinkers began to forge their critical systems epistemology and ontology. This is most clearly reflected in Flood and Ulrich (1990) (also see the discussions in Jackson (1991b) and Mingers (1992b)).

Flood and Ulrich (1990) identify a crucial need of an adequate epistemology for CST in terms of both systems and sociological awareness. They also try to establish an epistemology as such by bringing the idealist and materialist propositions together.

The first proposition, contributed by Ulrich (1983), is a systems epistemological ideal. It attempts to return to the systems idea in its original Kantian critical sense. According to this sense, any social systems design is conditioned by the 'whole systems judgement', or in Ulrich's own words - 'social metaphysics', which has no reference to economic-material issues, and thus is basically idealist (Jackson, 1991b).

On the other hand, the second contribution to the proposed epistemology by Flood (1990a, b, c) is concerned mainly with structural conditions. To be sociologically aware, according to Flood, 'critical idealists distinguish themselves from subjectivist idealists by accepting that "out there" are some hard factual conditions that do not exist in the mind only' (Flood, 1990a:173). 'Liberating systems theory', for Flood, cannot sidestep from issues of power structure, economic relation, and material conditions.

The point is, Flood and Ulrich have not come up with a harmonised ontological vision to support their epistemological ideal. In Jackson' terms, 'what we have here is a contradiction between Kantian epistemology, fundamentally idealist in character, and a Marxist ontology, just as fundamentally materialist' (Jackson, 1991b:612). Furthermore, this contradiction between idealist and materialist philosophical standpoints did not maintain a simple 'dualist' proposition, but inevitably led to an idealist bias. 'It is the Kantian epistemology which wins out', 'the materialist side of the argument fails to develop' (Jackson, 1991b:613). Perhaps it is for this very reason that Mingers claims that ''an adequate philosophy for critical systems has not yet emerged' (Mingers, 1992b:173).

As I read them, Jackson and Mingers try to highlight the need for an ontological vision which is able to differentiate and address elements in human situations which shape and condition human cognition, feeling, work and life.

To serve this need, Midgley and Mingers have put forward insightful proposals. While Mingers (1992b) proposes his ontological understanding based on Bhaskar's (1978, 1919, 1986) critical realism, Midgley proposes a meta-level ontological complexity (Midgley, 1992). Since Midgley's work seems more useful to the present project, it is therefore presented in some detail below.

A2.2.2 A New Vision of Ontology

Based upon Habermas's ontological ingredients, Midgley formulates a tripartite vision of ontology. Midgley states that

> Reality is constituted by objective phenomena ('objects', 'systems' and 'relations'), many subjectivities, and power (expressed in the evolution and use of normative rules). All three (objective phenomena, power and subjectivity) are absolutely and inextricably interdependent (Midgley, 1992:160).

According to Midgley, firstly we can have a natural world complexity, which consists of 'objective phenomena', i.e., relationships between parts of our concern, that can be seen as simple or complex and had better be dealt with by empirical-analytical approaches. Then we can also have an internal world complexity, with which we try to make sense of the other's claim through her/his own perspective as well as ours. This complexity is indispensable since recognition of objective phenomena depends on the existence of multiple subjectivities. Accordingly, this complexity is better dealt with by interpretive-hermeneutic approaches. Finally we can have a social world complexity, which defines our understanding of the relationships of value judgements and how they can be normatively constructed. Understanding and tackling this third complexity is vital if we desire to achieve higher level of criticisable rational agreement on our subjective cognition about the natural world and appropriate action to be taken. This complexity is better dealt with by emancipatory approaches. Furthermore, these three worlds are not separate from each other, argues Midgley. Instead, they are related to and depend on each other, resulting in a higher level of complexity that is more than the sum of the three parts.

It is these three facets and the interdependency between them that constitute our 'reality', which can be called ontological complexity. To obtain as rich as possible a picture of it, we have to come up with statements on all the three 'worlds':

i.e., a statement of truth (about objective phenomena), a statement of rightness (about what should be normatively accepted), and a statement of subjective understanding (about the orientation of specific subjectivity).

It is conceivable that, this vision of ontology might seem unacceptable by other paradigms of ontological thought, since all traditional perspectives tend to reduce the rich and multi-faceted ontological complexity into a single dimension.

First, there has been a realist line, which claims that reality is 'out there', independent from the observer. This realist perspective contends that all human language, action and knowledge is directed toward and responding to something in that real world. Our subjective and social world complexity have no place at all in the realist picture unless they are reduced to some kind of second-level contingent parameters or emergent properties.

Secondly, we can find an idealist position, which asserts that reality is constituted by subjective knowledge only. For the idealists, were we not here, the exact notion of 'reality' would simply disappear, let alone the 'real world'. Of course, within the idealist horizon, objective phenomena and normative constructs do not exist in any 'real' sense. Should they exist, they exist only as a human image.

Then a third, the normative constructivist, perspective comes up to push forward the normative construction of 'external' reality and 'internal' understanding. For this paradigm, all knowledge is originated and reproduced by social rules and forces. Conversely, knowledge at the same time shapes the patterns of power. It is through the working of power that 'truths' and 'subjectivities' are constituted.

As the new vision of ontology sees it, all of the above paradigms tend to reduce the ontological complexity to*one* particular aspect, ignoring and denying the existence of other realms of reality, and therefore are reductionist in character.

By contrast, through the notion of ontological complexity, we can now conceive 'reality' as consisting of all the three worlds. Therefore 'we can now try to bring the best of *all three* paradigms into a new perspective to arrive at an adequate vision of ontology that will not exclude the most important insights of any other of them' (Midgley, 1992:156).

In order to preserve, incorporate and accommodate the 'best elements' of 'all three paradigms', Midgley suggests contextualising possible uses of those elements within a theory of process of thinking. Such theory holds that human thought has a time dimension. We are not able to address and tackle *all* issues related to all three complexity domains simultaneously at a specific moment, due to the limitation of human ability. Therefore, we have no choice but to address the ontological complexity in terms of a *series* of issues, moving from one related issue to another along a series of 'moments' in the time dimension, in a linear fashion.

From my point of view, this does not imply that we should or we could isolate a particular aspect from the complex whole. Even if we decide to tackle a particular aspect of the ontological complexity, we are at once and forever involved in all three aspects. For example, supposing we decide to take action in the sphere of power relation, we have to formulate our internal subjective meaning of 'power', 'relation', and 'action', we have to share with, or at least express to, others these meaning intersubjectively, and we can do this only within a particular material objective condition. It should not be forgotten that our action will, inevitably, produce impacts on subjective meanings, intersubjective relations, and also our surroundings. For this reason, we must not give up attempts to pursue the richest possible image related to all three ontological worlds.

The above elaboration has shown that reality can be conceptualised as consisting of three aspects of complexity. To address and deal with a reality as such, humans will conceptualise situations as a series of issues with different contexts, and tackle a particular issue(s) of concern at one moment using appropriate knowledge based on the background of the complex whole. Through the whole series of moments dealing with the three-world complexity, all rationalities are individually necessary. Following this line of thinking, a pluralist perspective aiming at improving human situations in all three worlds must be adopted. Like any other ontological claims, this critical vision of reality cannot be proved by 'direct access' or 'evidence' in any ultimate sense. It is appreciated and adopted because it is able to provide us with more flexibility to tackle our problem situation and to embrace available human knowledge constructs.

CONCLUSION

The developmental line of the socio-philosophy of CST has been outlined. Habermas tries to argue for a critical socio-epistemological ideal that differentiates and embraces all empirical-analytic, historical-hermeneutic and emancipatory knowledge according to human contestable interests and orientations towards the natural, the subjective, and the social world. Flood and Ulrich attempt to establish a critical systems epistemological ideal in terms of both the Kantian critical systems ideal and the Marxist historical materialism. Midgley complements and supports this epistemology ideal with a critical vision of ontology which is to accommodate the diversity of rationality in an open and holistic manner.

APPENDIX III
CRITICAL SYSTEMS COMMITMENTS

INTRODUCTION

This appendix presents a reading of critical systems commitments. First, it will be shown that CST distinguishes itself from other versions of systems thinking by establishing an openly declared human emancipatory interest, and that at the same time it differentiates itself from other critical theories by dedicating itself to formulating operational methodologies to translate the emancipatory interest into *Praxis*. Secondly, the critical reflection commitment will be outlined, emphasising the recognition that emancipatory interest can emerge only through a systemic approach which combines self-reflection and ideology-critique into an interactive process. The third section focuses on the complementarist perspective, arguing that the paradigm incommensurability issue need not be treated as a difficulty for pluralism, but can be reconstructed as a contribution to the articulation of openness and proper inter-paradigm dialogue in the absence of domination.

A3.1 HUMAN EMANCIPATION

Both proponents and critics of CST have pointed out that the key characteristic principally differentiating CST from other versions of systems thinking is its commitment to human emancipation (see for example Gregory, 1992; Tsoukas, 1992). It was to serve this very ideal of formally establishing human emancipatory interest for autonomy as a mission of systems/management science that CST emerged. It began when Jackson (1982), in the debate with soft systems thinkers, criticised SST's ignorance and inability in addressing social conditions that shape, reproduce and maintain imbalanced relations between world-views. Jackson challenged systems/management scientists to promote the ideal of emancipation in research and practice, whether at a societal or an organisational level.

As Gregory (1992) points out, all critical theories, whether social or systems, adopt some view of human situations as basically repressive or coercive, and are dedicated to freeing human beings from alienation and distortion which prevent individuals or groups from realising their genuine interest. This is exactly what CST tries to do in systems/management science (e.g., Jackson, 1986:158; Flood and Ulrich, 1990:186).

Following Fay, emancipation here can be defined as a 'state of reflective clarity in which people know which of their wants are genuine because they know finally who they really are, and a state of collective autonomy in which they have the power to determine rationally and freely the nature and direction of their collective existence' (Fay, 1987:205).

The emancipation commitment of CST consists of two dimensions. Firstly, 'emancipation from hidden presuppositions', i.e., to free people by critique on imposed ideological traps which prevent them from autonomy. Next, 'to emancipate the deprived majority' from various forms of domination that generate and maintain those hidden presuppositions (Flood, 1990a, b, c). In short, emancipation involves critique in both ideological and structural contexts.

Along the first dimension, the CST cognition of 'hidden presuppositions' comes from the Habermasian tradition. For Habermas, ideology can be defined as ideas or culture used either to hide or to legitimise power and to normalise the structure of social relation. Along this line, Oliga (1989a, b, 1990, 1991) sets out to study control, power and ideology in social systems. Oliga argues that power and ideology play important roles in maintaining stability and in making social change. He maintains that power and ideology interact and reinforce each other and together they condition the possibility for social stability or change. Oliga levels the criticism that most work in social systems theory, when addressing stability and change, takes existing social orders as given; thus, the problem addressed by such social systems theory is merely the problem of maintaining order. In so doing, the historical origin and nature of social order is masked. Thus, social systems science generally functions not to maintain systems as a whole, but to benefit a particular segment in society, not to promote social change towards collective autonomy, but to reinforce the *status quo*.

Flood elaborates another line of insight on 'hidden presupposition' (Flood, 1990a, b). For Flood, the ideology or the rationale at the basis of liberating systems thinking 'also concerns recognition of subjugation and the bringing about of emancipation and liberation' (Flood, 1990b:51). Flood tries to incorporate Foucault's 'archaeology of knowledge' (Foucault, 1974) as a methodological guide-line in order to inquire why some concepts and ideas have flourished but others have been suppressed. Foucault argues that there are forces holding together discursive formation, i.e., a situation of conflict leads to the rising of some, and the subjugation of other, knowledges, and thus leads to resistance and relations of power. To Foucault, 'centralising powers ... [are] linked to the institution and functioning of organised scientific discourse' (Foucault, 1980:84). Using Faucoult's 'archaeology of knowledge', Flood and Robinson (1989) try to explain why some knowledge in the systems movement, e.g., General Systems Theory, has lost favour in contemporary social systems science. Flood (1990a, b) continues to argue that emancipating suppressed knowledge can be achieved by oppositional thinking. Both dominance and subjugation of knowledge need and could have explanation. Critical analysis must focus as much on revealing lost or suppressed knowledges as on the examination of those that have survived and are dominant. Since the rise of some knowledges and the subjugation of others depend on localised context and struggles governed by the distribution and structure of power, the appropriate way to counter dominant knowledges and release the suppressed is through oppositional thinking which can develop as a way of liberating both knowledge and people from ideological traps. In this sense, liberating 'systems theory' aims at liberating systems theory, not only from self imposed ideology, but also from localised subjugation and suppression. It is in this sense that CST can be presented as a particular stage in the struggle and confrontation between 'forces'.

Turning to the second dimension of emancipation, CST can be understood as a 'liberating systems' theory, which is dedicated to liberation from repression, concerns about social equality and justice, individual fulfilment and autonomy. It is argued that emancipation from hidden presuppositions is not a smooth transition from an existing consciousness to a new one, but a deep break from the old one toward a new consciousness, and therefore refers to the overthrow of a system of beliefs and ideals (Tsivacou, 1992). To realise proper 'break' and 'overthrow', CST must surface and address the issue of how those hidden presuppositions are formed, maintained and reinforced in certain conditions, which directs attention to the structural social context (Flood and Ulrich, 1990).

Along this line, Flood openly declares that CST is aiming at 'emancipation and liberation in organisations, institutions, societies, and other social groupings, in response to dominance and subjugation by others for whatever means or purpose'

(Flood, 1990b:51). For Flood, without properly addressing and dealing with social arrangements within which hidden presuppositions emerge and are maintained, full and effective autonomy interest in the Habermasian sense cannot be realised. Through addressing issues such as power structure and economic relation, even though CST 'cannot force the powerful to take account of the less powerful', at least it can 'unveil this facade of rationality and objectivity which is so characteristic of the strategic action of powerful vested interests in (the) present day' (Flood, 1990a:179).

Recently, Tsivacou (1992) argues that the critical intention of CST should be extended from the analysis of problem-context to that of the social system itself. For Tsivacou, 'Without critically and systemically investigating real-world situations where the technical and practical interests are developed, the conditions through which the emancipatory interest could surfaced remain unexplored' (Tsivacou, 1992:184).

Critical systems thinkers have tried great effort to develop workable methodologies for translating the emancipatory ideal into *Praxis*, among which most significant words can be found from Ulrich (1983), Flood and Jackson (1991b), and Gregory (1992).

A3.2 REFLECTION AND CRITIQUE

Reflection in CST involves surfacing *a priori* judgements and normative content in social systems design, incompleteness and partiality in human knowledge, revealing the basic assumptions, strengths and weaknesses of various approaches, questioning social pressures leading to the favour of particular methodologies and the social consequences produced by employment of particular methodologies (Flood and Jackson, 1991). The development of this line of thinking can be traced as follows.

Ulrich (1983), following Kant, argues that since value judgements (normative premises) inevitably flow into practical propositions and social systems design therefore 'a system is "adequate" [only] if it makes explicit its own normative content' (Ulrich, 1983:229). Thus, for every social systems design, mere 'systems rationality' in the traditional functionalist sense, concerning instrumental reasoning only, is not sufficient; we must also bring into our horizon 'social metaphysics' which contains issues of the *a priori* normative value assumptions and judgements that enter into our design but cannot be validated either empirically or logically.

Ulrich (1983) and Flood and Ulrich (1990) articulate the need for reflection on incompleteness and partiality in human knowledge. Unlike the more traditional approaches that believe themselves to understand and be capable of explaining virtually everything and are sure their knowledge is valid, CST admits that our knowledge and understanding is incomplete and that we can never know 'the whole system'. Therefore, in any intervention, our perception and design are inevitably selective, driven by our particular incomplete knowledge. To recognise and overcome our partiality and selectivity, we must keep 'an explicit state of awareness which reminds us, in the face of incomplete knowledge, that we must never accept knowledge or methodological output as total or absolute' (Flood, 1990a:331). To pursue such an ideal, Flood (1990a, 1990b) argues, a switch in emphasis from (traditional) systems science to (critical) systems rationality must be called for. '[B]y systems science we mean any effort to employ a systemic outlook in doing basic or applied science according to the conventional ideals of non-reflective positivistic empirical-analytic rationality (objective data, testable hypotheses, valid modelling, and so on), whereas by systems rationality we mean an ideal that may orient applied inquiry toward a critically rational social practice in the face of incomplete knowledge and understanding' (Flood, 1990a:163). Since our knowledge is incomplete, we must seek therefore not to adopt any singular ontological, epistemological, theoretical, or ideological position, but rather to reflect on the partiality and selectivity of our position in every specific context of application, whatever that position may be. 'Being critical is not a quality of a certain position or approach; rather it is the quality of remaining self-reflective *with respect* to particular and all positions or approaches' (Flood and Ulrich, 1990:187).

Jackson (1982) and Jackson and Keys (1984) open the way for another related aspect of critical reflection: reflection on the strengths, weaknesses and hence proper application domain of various systems approaches. Jackson (1982) summarises the common character of Ackoff, Churchman and Checkland's work, reveals their interpretive and regulative nature, and points out that like hard systems thinking, the soft systems methodologies too are subject to a limited domain of application. A main message from Jackson can be read as rejecting the idea of any 'general' or 'superior' approach. Added to partiality and selectivity, Jackson tries to tell us, all approaches have their respective strengths and weaknesses. Jackson and Keys (1984) analyse the strengths and weaknesses of a range of systems approaches and suggest that each can be applied in its 'most appropriate' social context. Their basic suggestion is that various approaches hold different basic assumptions of social reality, address different aspects of reality as such, possess different competence in tackling those aspects respectively, and thus can be employed to serve different human interests.

Critical reflection should also be directed toward social pressures for the employment of particular approaches in relation to historical and social conditions (Jackson, 1991a). In this regard, traditional OR might be a telling example. Rosenhead and Thunhurst argue that the rapid growth of OR in Britain after World War II was the logical result of the demands of the post-war crisis of the capitalist system. OR was favour in that social situation, mainly because it can help more efficiently to extract surplus value from labour. OR was presented as the only source of rational answers to management/organisational problems, which, in turn, strengthened the dominant ideology.

The employment of a particular approach in social contexts can produce certain social consequence (Jackson, 1985, 1988, 1989), or 'life-practical consequences and side-effects' impacting on 'those who may be affected by their implementation' (Ulrich, 1983). Concerned with these social practical consequences, Ulrich argues that both the involved and the affected should have equal chance and resources to discuss and contrast the*is* and the *ought* boundary judgements in any social systems design. If systems/management science (and marketing study as well) are to be employed in any proper sense to improve human well-being, then we cannot ignore their impacts, especially those unexpected, on social systems as a whole.

Last but not the least, CST differs from hard and soft systems thinking in that 'with critical systems thinking, the ideology is necessarily declared at the outset' (Flood, 1990b:69). CST always challenges systems thinkers to consider an ideological statement of their thinking and practice. Oliga (1986, 1988, 1990, 1991) insists that adequate social inquiry must not forget to unmask the ideology issue. In his study, Oliga identifies the hard systems approach with the ideology of economic individualism or economic rationality. He argues that this ideology conceals unequal relations that often exist among so-called 'free individuals'. As to soft systems thinking, Oliga suggests that 'No doubt, the technical interest is neither intended nor acknowledged by soft systems thinkers. Nevertheless, it circumscribes their whole methodological enterprise. Just as the case of the hard systems approach, systems (social) control within the terms of present social arrangements is the ultimate goal. The only essential difference is the approach to such a goal. ... In ideological terms, the end result is essentially the same' (Oliga, 1991:123).

CST contends that self-reflection and critique of ideology cannot be separated from each other, but are inseparable aspects of any critical inquiry. Gregory (1992, 1994) provides an intensive argument on this recognition. She argues that either self-reflection or ideology-critique, if undertaken separately, have their specific problems. On the one hand, self-reflection alone without critique of ideology which is embedded in wider social settings and which defines basic social norms for individuals cannot challenge but simply supports the *status quo* of a dominant ideology. On the other, ideology-critique, even when linked with actions, may not bring about desired changes if carried out without individuals' collective judgement and decision through reflective dialogue, on competing visions of a 'better' society. Following Habermas, Gregory contends that emancipation is not an emerging product of the application of either approach, but only of a process in which both are used in an interactive manner. Reflection and critique, argues Gregory, should therefore be employed interactively through a process of 'critical appreciation'. We see here that in CST, systemicity and criticality are always proposing and implying each other, always against the tendency of isolation and reduction.

A3.3 COMPLEMENTARISM

Before introducing this commitment let us refresh our memory on Habermas's legacy. It is important since leading critical systems thinkers build this commitment mainly upon Habermas' thesis. In *Knowledge and Human Interests*, Habermas argues that any scientific research in social affairs involves all three interests, yet there is always a danger that only one interest well come to dominate. This means that in selective practice the genuine interests of humankind are either not expressed, or, alternatively they are subjugated in an unequal play-off between competing and conflicting modes of reason. In *Theory of Communication Action* Habermas articulates that communication can be distorted when human beings do not give sufficient attention to all subjective, intersubjective, and objective orders of reality. In his *Lifeworld/systems* thesis, Habermas claims that humankind can transcend the 'dark side' of modern rationalisation only when we consciously undertake balanced inquiry and practice across all technical, practical and emancipatory modes. Thus, the whole enterprise of Habermas can be understood, for our purpose here, as a project for openness, differentiation and complementation, i.e., critically open to differentiated human interests, open to heterogeneous inquiry modes, and the pursuit of proper balanced practice, against any kind of isolation or reduction in favour of any singular interest, knowledge, or approach. It is upon Habermas's theses that critical systems thinkers draw theoretical resources to support the commitment of complementarism, especially in the early development stage of CST.

The line of arguments in the CST discourse for complementarism can be described as follows: firstly Ulrich (1983) reveal partiality and selectivity in systems intervention; next Jackson and Keys (1984) suggest complementary use of methodologies according to their specific strengths and weaknesses; then Flood and Ulrich (1990) argue for an epistemology in both critical and systems terms; Flood (1989a, 1990b) also urges systems thinkers to overcome the paradigm (in)commensurability difficulty; at about the same time Jackson (1988), Oliga (1988), and Ulrich (1988) try to tackle the (in)commensurability issue in the light of constitutional human interests; following this Flood and Jackson (1991b) set out to develop a meta-methodology for guiding informed and complementary use of systems methodologies; recently Midgley (1992) proposes a vision of ontological complexity that supplementarily lays down an ontological grounding for the complementarist position.

Given the variety and diversity in systems/management approaches, Jackson (1987a) and Flood (1989a, b, 1990b) have explored and analysed possible strategies (Jackson) or inquiry methods (Flood) for response, demonstrating their belief in the advantage of complementarism for the future of the systems movement and systems 'problem-solving'. Their analysis can be summarised as below.

There are four possible ways of dealing with diversity; namely: isolationist, imperialist, pragmatist and pluralist strategies.

Isolationists see their own approach as basically self-sufficient; therefore, there is nothing to learn from other perspectives. Furthermore, since various approaches hold different basic assumptions, they cannot communicate with each other, due to paradigm incommensurability. Attempts to interact with alternative tendencies or to incorporate ideas from such tendencies will do no good; indeed, they might weaken and therefore threaten the preferred position. Thus, isolationists insist on going their own way, 'developing independently on the basis of their own presuppositions and with minimal contact between the [other] strands' (cf.: Jackson, 1987a:460). This position can be considered identical with Burrell and Morgan's (1979) 'paradigmatic closure'.

The imperialist strategy assumes a fundamentally superior approach, able to tackle the full range of problem contexts, 'but is willing to incorporate aspects of other strands if they seem to be useful and to add strength in terms of the favoured approach' on the condition that they do 'not threaten its central tenets' (Jackson, 1987a:461). This viewpoint will suggest evaluation of all other paradigms 'simply in the given terms of the evaluating paradigm' (Gregory, 1992:23). We can find this kind of treatment within the hard-soft debate on which is the 'general case' (see Appendix I).

The pragmatist strategy, according to Jackson and Flood's analysis, is to accept and bring together anything that 'works' in practice. No reference is made to inferable underlying theory or methodological rules. There are no explicit considerations of either theoretical or methodological commensurability. Nevertheless, superficially the pragmatist is assuming measures by the same standard.

The pluralist strategy (which in Flood and Jackson (1991a, b) takes the form of a complementarist perspective) is the response suggested and adopted in CST; thus, it is worth quoting at length from one of its advocators:

> Complementarism seeks to respect the different strengths of the various trends in management science, encouraging their theoretical development and suggesting ways in which they can be appropriately fitted to the variety of management problems that arise. The complementarist vision is, therefore, of the continued existence of a variety of strands within management science. Theoretical and practical developments will be mutually informing. Arguments stemming from the different assumptions employed by the various strands will continue but will be conducted with mutual respect, since it will be recognised that different approaches address different (if interrelated) aspects of the management task. The strengths and weaknesses of the different strands of management science will be more fully understood, and the domain of effective application of each approach will become established. A metatheory will develop that can guide theoretical endeavour and can advise analysts confronted with different problem situations as to which approach is most suitable. The diversity of theory and methodology available in management science will be seen to herald not a crisis in the discipline but increased competence and effectiveness in a variety of different problem situations (Jackson, 1991a:262-3).

Then, given the diversity of rationalities in social systems science and based on the above analysis, Flood and Jackson further analyse the future for different strategies.

Isolationist strategy is not able to provide an adequate way forward. Theoretically, it prevents necessary conversation, and therefore relinquishes the possibility for systems science (and other social sciences in general) to develop as a coherent discipline. Practically, it suggests using a single methodology in all circumstances or using methodologies through the vision of a single rationality, and therefore is unable to deal properly with the great variety of complexity textures, or even worse will distort textures for a single interest (for reported cases see for example Hoos, 1972, 1976).

The imperialist strategy is not promising either. In imperialist development, one approach holds a dominant position at the expense of the alternatives, squeezes the opportunities available to alternatives, and hence eclipses the possibility of balanced development for the full range of human knowledge. We have recognised the danger of such strategy through Habermas' critique of scientism/technocratic consciousness and systems' colonisation of the lifeworld.

The pragmatist strategy suffers from theoretical contradiction. It is easily reduced to the concern of technical interest alone ('getting things done by any means'), and cannot facilitate learning from or passing knowledge among disciplines. When employed in the social domain, the strategy will inevitably lend itself to misuse in serving of authoritarian interest (things done in the authority's will).

Only the pluralist strategy provides a realistic, viable possibility of embracing mutual complementarity among rival approaches. While taking seriously significant differences among alternative strands, it suggests that at the most fundamental level, all of the different strands are necessary as supports for the anthropologically based cognitive interests of the human species therefore allows competing approaches to complement each other on the one hand and to penetrate the premature theoretical and methodological closure on the other.

However, the pluralist premise needs further elaboration and justification since inter-paradigm conversation nowadays cannot avoid the challenge of paradigmatic (in)commensurability issues (Flood, 1989a, 1990b). Jackson expresses his concern for the issue thus:

> The difficulty remains for complementarism that once it accepts the existence of wholly different systems approaches resting upon apparently irreconcilable presuppositions (inhabiting different paradigms), how can the problem of paradigm incommensurability be overcome (Jackson, 1991a:268)?

We can identify in contemporary philosophy discources and systems thinking at least three lines of insights for takling this isses. First, we can appeal to 'the most fundamental human constitutive cognitive interest'. Second, we can probe and re-establish the 'truth' or paradigmatic (in)commensurability. Finally, we can perceive paradigmatic (in)commensurability from a dialectic dynamistic viewpoint. Although these three approaches focus on different emphases, and may have their respective limitations, together the 'best elements' of these three lines of reasoning support and strengthen each other in the process of promoting plurality.

Most leading critical systems thinkers have tackled the paradigmatic (in)commensurability issue through the first line, which is well documented, mainly in Flood (1990a, 1991b), Jackson (1988, 1991a), Oliga (1988) and Ulrich (1988). Their work is built basically on the thrust of the Habermasian thesis of human constitutive cognitive interest. As outlined in Appendix II, the thesis maintains that since different research approaches are developed for the purposes of tackling heterogeneous ontological aspects, they may hold tremendously different visions, procedures and standards, which might be incommensurate at the methodological level; yet at a higher theoretical level these different paradigms can find certain common language to communicate and give respect to each other, since at this fundamental level they are compatible in the sense that they are all dedicated to serving genuine human interests. In Flood's words,

> Knowledge interests are presuppositions that provide the possibility for a differentiated constitution of meaning of possible objects of experience; hence there is theoretical commensurability. Methodological rules have a logical relationship with knowledge-constitutive interests but have different claims of application; they are 'distinct', hence there is methodological incommensurability (Flood, 1991b:309).

To overcome the 'paradigmatic incommensurability difficulty' at the methodological level, a key point is for researchers to make explicit the relation between their research and the served human cognitive interest, and to become aware that humankind have other equally important kinds of interests that require different kinds of approaches (Jackson, 1991a).

Along the second line of reasoning, Bernstein (1983, 1991) focuses on re-establishing the 'truth' of paradigmatic (in)commensurability, which, as I read him, also supports and strengthens the pluralist/complementarist proposition.

Bernstein tries to demonstrate that it is an illusion that paradigmatic incommensurability entails relativism, isolation, or closure. Bernstein invites us again and again to read Kuhn's original intention that:

> In applying the term incommensurability to theories, I had intended *only* to insist that there was no common language within which both could be *fully* expressed and which could there be used in a *point-by-point* comparison between them (Kuhn, 1976; cf.: Bernstein, 1991:59; emphasis added).

and Kuhn's declaration that:

> If two men disagree, for example, about the relative fruitfulness of their theories, or if they agree about that but disagree about the relative importance of fruitfulness and, say, scope in reaching a choice, neither can be convicted of a mistake. Nor is either being unscientific. *There is no neutral algorithm for theory-choice, no systematic decision procedure which, properly applied, must lead each individual in the group to the same decision* (Kuhn, 1962; cf.: Bernstein, 1983:53; emphasis added in Bernstein).

Accordingly Bernstein argues that in his original intention, 'Kuhn never intended to deny that paradigm-theories can be compared - indeed rationally compared and evaluated. In insisting on incommensurability, his main point was to indicate the ways in which paradigm-theories *can* and *cannot* be compared' (Bernstein, 1983:59).

Paradigm-theories can be rationally compared and evaluated in multiple ways because exponents of rival paradigms share 'their everyday and most of their scientific world and language' (Kuhn, 1970:201). Therefore, most of them come to understand each other's concepts. Also, 'it is the incommensurability of scientific problems, data, and standards, not that of scientific meanings' that makes 'fully expressed' 'point-by-point' comparison difficult (Doppelt, 1978:39). Further, there is always 'a considerable overlap between the language, problems, data and standards of rival paradigms' (*ibid*). 'If there were not such overlap, rational debate and argumentation between proponents of rival paradigms would not be possible' although debate and argumentation may not lead to 'the same decision' (Bernstein, 1983:85).

Thus, what Kuhn tries to root out by paradigmatic incommensurability is not rational conversation, comparison, or appreciation among paradigms. What the issue of paradigmatic incommensurability rejects is the involvement and domination of a unquestioned singular rationality in scientific inquiry. Bernstein claims that

> ... what is sound in the incommensurability thesis*has nothing to do* with relativism, or at least that form of relativism which wants to claim that there can be no rational comparison among the plurality of theories paradigms, and language games - that we are prisoners locked in our own framework and cannot get out of it. What is sound in the incommensurability thesis is the clarification of just what we are doing when we do compare paradigms, theories, language games. We can compare them in multiple ways. We can recognise losses and gains. We can even see how some of our standards for comparing them conflict with each other. We can recognise - especially in cases of incommensurability in science - that our arguments and counter-arguments in support of rival paradigm theories may not be conclusive (Bernstein, 1983:92-3).

Actually, even Burrell and Morgan who argue for paradigm incommensurability and closure do not deny that we might gain understanding of other paradigms through some kind of appreciation. To quote their 1979 book,

> in order to understand alternative points of view it is important that a theorist be fully aware of the assumptions upon which his own perspective is based. Such an appreciation involves an intellectual journey which takes him outside the realm of his own familiar domain. It requires that he become aware of the boundaries which define his perspective. It requires that he journey into the unexplored. It requires that he become familiar with paradigms which are not his own. Only then can he look back and appreciate in full measure the precise nature of his starting point (Burrell and Morgan, 1979:xi).

The journey postulated by Burrell and Morgan implies that the 'paradigmatic closure' must be penetrated, and that there are at least some aspects in language or logic that both the Self paradigm and those of others can understand and grasp.

Thus from Bernstein's elaboration, we can conclude that the essence of paradigm (in)commensurability is not to urge scientists to enclose themselves within a unique theoretical stand, be it*the* universal one or that most familiar to her/him, but to be open to the Other, to the Difference, to the Alterity, and open to multiple ways of comparison through which we come to better understanding the Self and possibly the Other. Read as such, the paradigm (in)commensurability thesis is not for isolationism or relativism, but for openness and conversation. Read as such, the Kuhnian paradigm incommensurability issue is not a difficulty for the complementarist perspective, but can be seen as a contribution supporting 'mutually informing' communication, and hence complementation between heterogeneous approaches.

The third line of reasoning supporting the pluralist proposition contends that a simple and fixed Yes-or-No is not the only nor a desirable way we can choose to tackle the paradigmatic (in)commensurability issue. Rather, we can perceive paradigmatic (in)commensurability as operating in a dynamic process: from a certain perspective, paradigms can be seen as incommensurate in some aspects at a particular time-point, while from other viewpoints paradigms may be viewed, with equally good reason, as commensurate in some aspects in other investigation periods (Gregory, 1992). The dynamics of paradigmatic (in)commensurability perceived as such can be considered as more flexible in the sense of being able to reflect and embrace dynamic changes of rival paradigms emerging in their ever on-going evolution during which tendencies of both divergence and convergence can frequently rise and fall but are difficult, if not impossible, to foresee.

CONCLUSION

The three critical systems commitments presented in this appendix imply and support one another. As I read them, the emancipation commitment establishes an ideal worth pursuing for systems/management science towards human autonomy and potential; the critical reflection commitment translates the ideal to*Praxis* by presenting self-reflection and ideology-critique as an interactive process from which human emancipation can be brought about; while the complementarism commitment explores the possibility of embracing and informed usage of the whole range of available approaches to support that process. Among these commitments, none can be separated from the others. On the one hand, if we take the genuine human emancipatory interest seriously, we need proper process and we need approaches as rich as possible to secure autonomy from self-imposed constraints, hypostatised forces and conditions of distorted communication. On the other hand, various approaches can only gain their full legitimacy on the ground of critically appreciation of human genuine interests, and can only fulfil their own possible potentials respectively in most likely contributing situations through a process of reflection and critique. Together, these three commitments form a critical and systemic vehicle, which is, if employed properly, able to facilitate balanced inquiry and practice.

Appendix IV
CASES:
MACRO AND SOCIAL MARKETING

INTRODUCTION

In this appendix, two descriptive cases are presented to show the conceptual and instructive competence of the proposed reorientation and reconstruction.

The two cases are macromarketing and social marketing. They are two branches in the discipline with a similar initial ambition of bringing wider-socially aggregated phenomena into their research domains. Both research branches have long traditions in marketing, both experienced resurgence around the 1970s, and both have been formalised within just a couple of decades. However, while macromarketing is dedicated to reflecting on and bringing together ontological, epistemological, ideological and methodological considerations, and to embracing rival research paradigms in a theoretically informed way, social marketing tends to expand merely the technical power to intervene and manipulate a much wider range of human affairs, but doing so based on a particular narrowly defined paradigm. As a result, these two cases have dramatically different positions in marketing study:

while macromarketing is developing as a major influential branch in marketing study with scholarly achievements (see for example Dholakia and Arndt, 1985; Dholakia and Venkatesh, 1984; Dowling, 1983; Firat *et al*, 1987; Fisk, 1986; Fisk *et al.*, 1980; Fisk and White, 1981; Nason, 1986; Reidenbach and Oliva, 1983; Savitt, 1990; Sheth and Gardner, 1982; Sheth *et al.*, 1988; Slater, 1977, etc.), social marketing has quickly lost its influence and even its identity, producing little contribution to the discipline but an empty expansion of technocratism (Arndt, 1976; Bartels, 1983, 1986; Heede, 1980; Morgan, 1991; Stidsen, 1979; Sweeney, 1972; Spatle, 1974, etc.).

The appendix is divided into three sections. The first two sections will outline the contemporary evolution and research strategies of macromarketing and social marketing respectively, while the last section presents an analysis and assessment in the light of the proposed reorientation and reconstruction of marketing.

A4.1 MACROMARKETING AS A MULTIPARADIGM RESEARCH

The macro perspective in marketing can be traced back early to the emergence of the discipline (see Chapter 3). Through historical study, Savitt (1990) presents a picture of the historical development of macromarketing 'as an integrated body of theory' from Clark (1922, 1932, 1942), Breyer (1934, 1949), Duddy and Revzan (1947, 1953), to Vaile, Grether and Cox (1952), which was synthesised and referred by Alderson as 'macrofunctionalism' (Alderson, 1965:13-4). Although driven by an economic and positivistic view, 'each in their own way, the various ideas [of these antecedents] came together to provide the basis for a systemic approach to understanding marketing'; all discussed the need for a marketing system and an analysis of how such system operates; all recognised the mutual influencing impacts between marketing and society (Savitt, 1990:299; also Grether, 1988). Matsugaki, too, asserts that 'macro marketing as we know it today has always been an integral part of traditional marketing , that significant contributions have been made under the macro perspective, and that the current predominance of the micro aspects of marketing has not detracted from the inherent virtues of macro marketing' (Matsugaki, 1980:19).

The recent resurgence and contemporary development of macromarketing, however, is due to the social, economic and political turbulence and problems of the 60's ~ 70's and afterward which caused marketers and citizens to be concerned about the societal impacts of marketing (Heede, 1980:106; Mokwa *et al.*, 1980:41; Nason, 1986:281). The basic thrust of contemporary macromarketing is thus to 'systematically examine the role of marketing from a societal perspective rather than from the perspective of the profit oriented firm', and to probe 'how marketing can become a means to achieving the goals of society' (Sheth and Gardner, 1982:77-8; also Arndt, 1976a; Cox, 1962; Fisk, 1974a, b, 1982, 1986).

It is increasingly recognised today that 'micromarketing is merely a subset of macromarketing phenomena' (Mokwa *et al.*, 1980:51). A more convincing argument from macromarketing theorists is on the one hand that macro phenomena cannot be properly addressed when reduced to micro analysis, and on the other hand that micro analysis should be related to a broader macro context to gain dynamic and meaningful explanation (Firat, 1984a; Fisk, 1986; Matsusaki, 1980).

Based on this recognition, marketing scholars have been focusing on the issue of macromarketing/micromarketing dichotomy. Various taxonomic models have been proposed, such as Moyer (1972), Shapiro (1973), Grashof and Kelman (1973), Spratlen (1975), Hunt (1976), Bagozzi (1977), Bartels and Jenkin (1977), Hunt (1977), Nickels and Hill (1977), McCarthy (1978), Slater (1978), White and Emory (1978), Shawver and Nickels (1978), Fisk (1982), Hunt and Burnett (1982), etc. Now, a commonly held model contends that the distinction between macro and micro marketing lies in (1) the level of aggregation, (2) the focus of research, and (3) the perspective of study (see for example Fisk, 1982; Hunt and Burnett, 1982; White, 1981; Mokwa *et al.*, 1980).

First, macromarketing focuses on the *societal aggregation* level of marketing phenomena. This line of definition is articulated most clearly by Moyer, who contends that macromarketing 'studies marketing within the context of the entire economic systems, with special emphasis on its aggregate performance' (Moyer, 1972:viii; also Fisk, 1982, 1986; Shapiro, 1973).

Secondly, the focus of macromarketing is the*mutual influencing* relation between marketing and society. For example, Hunt insists that 'Macromarketing refers to the study of marketing systems, the impact and consequences of marketing systems on society, and the impact and consequences of society on marketing systems' (Hunt, 1977:56). This research focus has been embodied into the 'editor's working definition of macromarketing' by Fisk (1982:3).

Finally, macromarketing is directed and conducted from th*eperspective* of society. Dholakia and Nason contends that 'The focus of the macro systems view is on understanding the behaviour and structure of the marketing systems from a societal perspective' (Dholakia and Nason, 1984:43). Actually, the title of the proceedings of the First Annual Macromarketing Seminar is '*Macro marketing: Distributive Processes from a Societal Perspective*' (Slater, 1977) (see also Firat, 1988a; Shawver and Nickels, 1979; White and Emory, 1978).

It is worth noting that among the three dimensions, marketers come up with a recognition that, the most crucial distinction between macro and micro marketing is the research perspective or interest (Dholakia and Nason, 1984; Firat, 1988a). In Nason's words, 'The fundamental distinction between macro marketing and micromarketing is the level of interest upon which the analysis is focused. Macromarketing inquiry focuses in a general sense on the interests of society' (Nason, 1988:356). Dholakia and Nason further detail that:

> It should be noted that a marketing system can usually be studied from both a macro and a micro perspective. The distinction hinges on the objectives of the researcher rather than on the inherent characteristics of the system. If research is undertaken to aid managerial decisions of a specific marketplace actor, then it is micro in focus. If, however, the research is designed to study the same system for its inherent systemic characteristics (rather then for the purpose of advancing a firm's interests) then it is macro in focus. Thus, a channel of distribution could be viewed from micro and macro perspectives (Dholakia and Nason, 1984:43).

Heede also points out that research into aggregated marketing phenomena does not necessary aim at the benefit of society as a whole; rather, it can be driven by contesting orientation, purposes, interests, and ideologies:

> The purpose of macro marketing is a dynamic and system oriented science, trying to facilitate a specific economic and cultural development. But one has to be very careful to define macro-marketing as a sociological science. It depends upon the goals of society, and thereby the goals of a given structure. If, e.g., a developing country tries to create a structure where given minorities of the society can benefit upon the costs of the majority or other minorities, the role of macro-marketing will not be the social one, but the technological one. If on the other hand the primary goal of the construction of the systems is to create a decent and free living of the individual, trying to give maximum freedom to the individual, only restricted by the influence that given acts will have upon other individuals, it should be called a sociological science. ... This is the basic principle or question within the social science: who benefits from a given structure? (Heede, 1980:27).

Therefore, during the emergence and formalisation of contemporary macromarketing research (which was signified by firstly the *First Annual Macromarketing Theory Seminar* in 1976 (Slater, 1977) and later the publishing of the *Journal of Macromarketing* in 1981 (Nason, 1988; Sheth *et al.*, 1988)), self-reflective marketers have come up with a significant and critical recognition that while focusing on a particular portion of marketing phenomena, macromarketing can and should be studied and conducted as such for differentiable and contesting purposes and interests, therefore can and should be organised as a multiparadigm (branch of) science. Among many others, the most systemically articulated paradigm organisational scheme can be found from Bagozzi (1976, 1977) (other valuable contributions along this line include those works searching for adequate ontological, epistemological and methodological constructs for macromarketing, for example Dholakia and Venkatesh, 1984; Firat, 1988a; Heede, 1980; Matsusaki, 1980; Venkatesh and Dholakia, 1986; Shea and Punj, 1988, etc.).

Following Kuhn's (1962) paradigm thesis, Bagozzi maintains that macromarketing is a multiparadigm science which contains competing yet co-existing research paradigms. Drawing upon, and combining insights from, Ritzer (1975) and Etzioni (1970), Bagozzi contends that 'At present, at least three distinct paradigms may be identified in macromarketing: the social facts paradigm, the social definition paradigm, and ... the societal guidance paradigm' (Bagozzi, 1977:32).

The social facts paradigm closely parallels the natural science model of explanation in that variables are explicitly constructed from facts in the world and these, in turn, are interrelated through social laws frequently based on extensive observation of regularities in patterns of behaviour at the social level. Overall, the theoretical and methodological tradition of this paradigm owes its impetus to the early work of Durkheim (1938) in sociology (see Ritzer, 1975; Smelser, 1970). The subject matter of this school includes processes, relationships, patterns of behaviour, or structures among macromarketing phenomena, which can be objective or intersubjective entities, for example aggregations of sales, decisions, public policy, laws, or competition, power and influence, etc. Theories brought to bear in this paradigm attempt to explain social facts with other social facts, and usually do not address the act-meanings of social agents in a marketing context. An explanation of social facts might entail certain functions or components of a structure in relation to other functions or components of the structure through structural equations; for example conceptual analysis of consumption at societal level as affected by public policy and/or environmental/competitive factors; empirical associations of aggregated effects between advertising and demand and so on. Exemplars in the social facts paradigm can include the work of Bucklin (1970) in channels of distribution and marketing productivity, Stern*et al.* (1977, 1980) in channel conflict and market structure, Grether (1966) in public policy, Fisk (1974a, b, 1986) in social aspects of marketing, and numerous efforts in applying Parsons's structural functionalist social systems model to explain macro marketing phenomena, such as those of Alderson (1957, 1965), Dowling (1983), Fisk (1980), Helgeson and Mager (1988), Meade II and Nason (1991), Mokwa*et al.* (1980), Reidenbach and Oliva (1981, 1982, 1983a, b), etc. (also see Chapters 2 and 4). Methodologies used in this paradigm tend to be questionnaires or interviews that are usually employed in a survey sense. These procedures lend themselves to acquiring many individual and institutional facts necessary to obtain variability in constructs. Relationships among functions or structures are typically represented through regression, path analytic or causal models, or structural equations. It is believed that such methods will reveal laws or law-like regularities behind social facts.

In contrast with the social facts paradigm, the social definition paradigm examines the constructive, value-driven and interactive facet of behaviour, explicitly addressing the meaning of actions of the parties engaged in the marketplace. Following Weber, the social definition perspective strives for an 'interpretive understanding of social action' (Weber, 1964; cf.: Bagozzi, 1977:36; also Ritzer, 1975; Smelser, 1970). At the macromarketing level, social action finds expression as cognitive and symbolic processing by actors in the marketplace (for example social interaction among buyers and sellers) from a symbolic interactionist, phenomenological, ethomethodological, or cultural orientation. Significantly each of these lines of inquiry explicitly incorporates the individual actor's subjective interpretation of actions, symbols and events, as well as focusing on the actors' interpretive understanding of marketing situations in which they find themselves. Methodologies employed are typically participant observation, depth interviewing, case work, content analysis, document examination, literature analysis and so on. Although the range of phenomena covered by the social definition paradigm could be quite broad, at the time when he proposed his multiparadigm thesis, Bagozzi found that 'few marketers have utilised the approach, and as a result, it is difficult to identify exemplars' (*ibid*:37). Fortunately, during the last fifteen years or so, the situation concerning Bagozzi has changed dramatically. In Chapter 5, it was illustrated that an interpretive turn had occurred in marketing study. It was presented that, particularly in the field of consumer research, marketers (for example Belk, Holbrook and Hirschman) have clearly articulated and actually conducted interpretive, naturalist, and humanist consumer research at the societal (as well as micro) level. It was identified that the interpretive turn in marketing has actually established its own particular inquiry domain, criteria of validity claim, and research methodologies. Some influential projects and theories were also summarised as exemplars generated by the interpretive turn. Based on materials at hand, it is reasonable to claim that the situation concerning Bagozzi has been improved in that the social definition paradigm has achieved substantial development in macromarketing.

Instead of focusing on social facts or the meaning of action, the societal guidance paradigm explicitly probes the normative dimension of marketing behaviour. 'To be sure', argues Bagozzi, 'society is infused with consensus, planning, and harmony, but to ignore the role of conflict - from the intrapersonal to the systemic - is to define away an important force in social and marketing life. What is needed is a definition and theory of marketing that explains both the reality of conflict and consensus' (*ibid*:40). The premise of the social guidance paradigm is therefore based on the recognition of the occurrence of competing interests in society, the reality of trade-offs and scarcity, and the seemingly omnipresent discrepancies in status, power, and resources among various segments of society. It is believed that power and political manoeuvring within and between marketing systems and other social systems are pervasive. For this paradigm, marketing involves more than technological problems of storing and transporting goods and services for given needs. Significantly, marketing is both a cause and consequence of social change, functioning actively as a determinant and target of forces in the larger societal system. Then marketing cannot be a neutral social mechanism. Rather, it certainly produces impact on individuals and society, harmless to some groups' interests, but distortive to others. Hence, marketers need an explanatory theory of the discipline's subject matter that informs the normative questions raised by its practice. Bagozzi has therefore articulated a need in macromarketing to address the pressures of the powerful, the influence and constraints of marketing institutions, and the imbalance in information, income, and other resources. However, due to the time of his writing, Bagozzi was not able to present detailed theories, exemplars or methodologies for the societal guidance paradigm. Apart from arguing for the paradigm, what Bagozzi could provide was only Arndt's (1976a) and Fisk's (1974b) assertion that as a 'provisional mechanism', or a social instrument, marketing is to match supply and demand, and to provide an information basis for responsible decisions by marketers, consumers, and government (Bagozzi, 1977:39). Fortunately, again, marketing has witnessed a significant development since Bagozzi's writing in the line of critical-emancipatory approaches that consciously address normative issues which the societal guidance paradigm intends to probe. While critical-emancipatory approaches focus on the social producing, influencing, rationalising, and legitimising effects on marketing, they at the same time investigate and reveal the diffusing and reinforcing functioning of marketing as a way of viewing and performing certain social relations in a particular type of society. Such approaches obviously hold a societal perspective since they always analyse marketing phenomena against a broad sociohistorical context. All these have been presented in Chapter 6. All these achievements allow us to claim that the societal guidance paradigm has also achieved substantial and significant development.

Bagozzi's proposal for organising macromarketing as a multiparadigm research can be summarised in Table A4.1, which is apparently compatible with the proposed reconstruction of marketing presented in this thesis.

Table A4.1 Research paradigms in macromarketing

Research paradigm	*Social facts paradigm*	*Social definition paradigm*	*Societal guidance paradigm*
Research focus	Process and structure	Aggregated agent behaviours	Interest, power and resources control
Subject matter	Distribution productivity	Meaning of action	Conflict/ social norms
Produced knowledge	Law-like regularities	Interpretive understanding	Normative guidance
Exemplar research models	Structural functionalist social systems models	Symbolic, interactionist, phenomenological, and ethnomethodologic models, etc.	Compensatory consumption model, Dominant consumption pattern model, etc.
Methods	Questionnaires, Interviews, Regression analysis Path/causal analysis Structural equation, etc.	Participant observation, In-depth interview, Case work, Content analysis, Literature analysis, etc.	Critical research (see for example Murray and Ozanne, 1991)

(developed from Bagozzi, 1977)

Bagozzi (1976) also asserts that research paradigms are not clear-cut or isolated; rather, research in macromarketing (and marketing in general) is a process supported by multiple paradigms in a structure of dialectical relationships.

Thus, since its contemporary reassurance, macromarketing has moved beyond constraints or domination of any singular orientation/paradigm. Instead, explicitly integrating valuable elements from multiple paradigms enables macromarketing to produce rich research achievements. We can take Arndt's (1979a, b) research of 'domesticated markets' as an example. Before this research, the received traditional marketing theory presumed, based on the classical economics, an open, competitive market. It was assumed first that there are a large number of buyers and sellers in the market, next that the market rewards marketing actors on the basis of their contribution to the value added, then that the market would be seen as an incentive and information systems, and finally co-ordination and control followed from the myriad of decentralised, unconnected decisions. Any encounters in the marketplace were viewed as anonymous, transient and efficient. Arndt, based on empirical work and document analysis, revealed that the competitive open market is in the process of being tamed, regulated and closed, thus becoming domesticated. This market domestication is undertaken through selective government supports and subsidies, and through marketers' compromised arrangements such as conglomerates, franchising, vertical and horizontal integration, joint ventures, joint product development and marketing contracts, joint physical distribution plans and so on. For the 'mainstream' marketing research, the phenomenon of 'domesticated markets' is irrelevant since firstly the dominant orientation in capitalist society is based on open markets and secondly the then dominant research paradigm lacks the ability to tackle such abnormality. Arndt further argued that the implications of the notion of domesticated markets go beyond the marketing mix or the 4Ps programme, calling for adding a fifth P - politics into marketing. For Arndt, though market relations may be given an economic interpretation, they are not only, and perhaps not even primarily, economic phenomena. They are political creations which are formed in a compromise of a variety of competing principles and values. Arndt demonstrated, based on empirical findings, that such phenomena have occurred, and that the social and political aspect of modern marketing cannot be ignored. Arndt's contribution was built on the advantage of integrating empirical-analytic and other research paradigms (or in Bagozzi's words social facts, social definition, and societal guidance paradigms). Arndt's research has also gained numerous theoretical supports such as those of Abratt and Sacks (1988), as well as empirical confirmation such as that of Stidsen (1979b).

To sum up, contemporary macromarketing, resurrected around the 70's, has been consciously organised as a multiparadigm enterprise, within which different research purposes and interests contest and complement each other, which enables macromarketing to address the whole range of social facts, meaning of actions, and normative issues embedded in marketing phenomena at the societal level. The plurality in research has established macromarketing as a major influential branch in marketing study.

A4.2 THE RISE AND FALL OF SOCIAL MARKETING

At around the same time that macromarketing was resurrected, there emerged a concept and a kind of research in marketing called 'social marketing'. It was fully manifested and formalised during the 1970's. Its evolution and the debate upon it have been well documented, and its current position and most likely future in the discipline are not too difficult to identify.

It is commonly considered that the contemporary social marketing evolution was sparked by Kotler and Levy in their 1969 article, which called for the concept of marketing to be broadened to include nonbusiness organisations (Hunt, 1976b; Martin, 1985). Kotler and Levy suggested that marketing concepts and skills are used by politicians, fund raisers, churches, universities, and other non-business entities who routinely market themselves, their ideas, and their organisations. Kotler and Levy concluded that all organisations engage in and perform marketing. They said that

> [T]he choice facing those who manage non-business organisations is not whether to market or not to market, for no organisation can avoid marketing. The choice is whether

to do it well or poorly, and on this necessity the case for organisational marketing is basically founded (Kotler and Levy, 1969a:15)

At exactly the same time, along another line, Lazer attempted to articulate and infuse a normative dimension for social marketing. Lazer argued that

> What is required is a broader perception and definition of marketing than has hitherto been the case - one that recognises marketing's societal dimensions and perceives of marketing as more than just a technology of the firm (Lazer, 1969:9).

This normative concern in the early social marketing was also expressed by Lazer and Kelly. They wrote:

> Social marketing is concerned with the application of marketing knowledge, concepts, and techniques to enhance social as well as economic ends. It is also concerned with analysis of the social consequences of marketing policies, decisions, and activities (Lazer and Kelly, 1973:4).

Thus it is crucial to note that at the beginning social marketing possessed two investigating dimensions: the first, suggested by Kotler and Levy, was to broaden the application domain of marketing techniques so as to include not-for-profit organisations and activities; while the second, advocated by Lazer and Kelly, was to incorporate normative judgement in order to address and tackle the social consequences of marketing (Hunt, 1976:17). It is also clear that both aspects have an equally long tradition in marketing study (Hollander, 1986:20).

Now a critical point is, however, that during the later formalisation of social marketing, the technical dimension virtually 'won' out, while the normative dimension diminished (Hunt and Burnett, 1982:16). Or in Arndt's words, 'the narrower interpretation has won the most acceptance and inspired the most thinking' (Arndt, 1976:10). Let us see how this happened.

In 1971, Kotler and Zaltman further defined social marketing as 'the design, implementation and control of programmes calculated to influence the acceptability of social ideas and involving considerations of product planning, pricing, communication, distribution, and marketing research. ... It is the explicit use of marketing skills to help translate present social action efforts into more effectively designed and communicated programmes that elicit desired audience response' (Kotler and Zaltman, 1971:5). In 1972, Kotler articulated a 'generic' concept of marketing by stating that 'marketing is specially concerned with how transactions are created, stimulated, facilitated and valued. ... Marketing is a relevant subject for all organisations in their relations with all their publics, not only customers' (Kolter, 1972:49). More recently, Kotler formally defined social marketing as 'the design, implementation, and control of programmes seeking to increase the acceptability of a social idea or cause in a target group(s)' (Kotler, 1985:490). Meanwhile, projects applying marketing techniques for fund raising, health services, population problems and so on have been undertaken and documented (see for example the 1971 July issue of the *Journal of Marketing*). Consequently, the marketing discipline continues to embrace an ever growing number of issues, phenomena and applications beyond the domain of human economic consumption needs (Martin, 1985). Through its formalisation and practice, social marketing denotes solely to the extension of the application of marketing techniques to nonmarketing fields, while the societal perspective concerning normative judgements completely disappeared (Bartels, 1974; Spratlen, 1979).

It seems therefore that between the technical and normative, social marketing has eventually formalised into the technical aspect only. It becomes a vivid case of the process of marketingisation (see Chapter 7), the one-sided process of rationalisation (Weber), and the process of the colonisation of the lifeworld (Habermas). However, one may at least ask: formalised as such, what contribution has social marketing made to marketing theory development, what position has social marketing gained in marketing study, and what may be its future?

Over the last two decades, the research community in the discipline has reached a rough consensus that social marketing or the broadening effort has provided little, if any, alternative formulation or promise for marketing theory development (Arndt, 1976, 1978; Firat, 1985a; Heede, 1980; Hollander, 1986; Spratlen, 1979; Stidsen, 1979a; Sweeney, 1972; Tucker, 1974; etc.). Rather, what social marketing or the broadening effort has produced is an identity crisis in the discipline (Bartels, 1974; Laczniak and Michie, 1979; Luck, 1969, 1974).

Basically, it is increasingly considered in the discipline that

> Social marketing evolved as an important extension of the general field of marketing .... Generally, it refers to all non-commercial or not-for-profit applications of managerial marketing. ... Contributions to social marketing analysis to date imply that it differs in degree, not in kind, from commercial marketing. Reported applications relate primarily to micro-managerial questions and issues. ... [T]heory, research and management applications of social marketing differ only slightly from traditional practices in commercial or micro marketing. ... No really coherent focus or framework has yet emerged for social marketing analysis (Spratlen, 1979:166).

Unfortunately, this evaluation and analysis appears still valid today (Dholakia and Arndt, 1985; Firat*et al.*, 1987; Morgan, 1992). As such, social marketing is reasonably under criticism. The critique levelled at social marketing or the broadening effort can be roughly grouped into two main points.

First, broadening marketing to include activities of nonprofit organisations may turn the marketers' attention away from more critical issues facing the discipline and dilute the content and meaning of marketing. Arndt (1976a, 1978), Bartels (1974, 1983, 1986), Fisk (1974a, 1982, 1986) and Hollander (1986) insist that the role of marketing as a provisioning mechanism is to match supply and demand in society, to provide an information basis for responsible decisions by marketers, consumers, and government, and so to improve and deliver the standard of living, which requires marketers to be concerned with not merely technical but also sociological, political, historical and ethical normative dimensions. However, social marketing, on the other hand, tends to direct marketers to intervene in all kinds of human activities, yet restricts their inquiry to a single dimension - managerial techniques. Consequently, social marketing prevents marketers from being aware of and addressing essential and urgent issues in our turbulent time: the imbalance of welfare, poverty, energy, and environment crisis, and so on, which are by and large produced by marketing. Concerning such impact of social marketing, Stidsen concludes that

> Actually, social marketing involves, not a broadening of *marketing*, but a broadening of the *application* of certain marketing techniques which can be viewed as comprising the entire scope of marketing only if one radically *narrow* one's concept of marketing (Stidsen, 1979a:385; emphasis original; also Tucker, 1974).

Secondly, social marketing or the broadening effort was dedicated to expanding the power of marketing techniques and at the same time attempted to avoid related responsibility, thus producing a kind of 'social disorder'. Laczniak and Michie (1979) elaborate this point as follows. Laczniak and Michie argue that when the broadened concept of marketing is applied in various instances in human affairs, its power and responsibility are not in balance. On the one hand, according to Kotler, 'Marketing is a human activity directed at satisfying human needs and wants' (Kotler, 1972:49), which actually suggests that marketing is a universal concept. Following this logic, all that is required for marketing to occur are two parties able to deliver, each having something of value to exchange freely. So much so that Staudt *et al.* (1976:557) state in their textbook, '... there is a universality to the application of marketing functions wherever there is an interface'. On the other hand, no articulation of responsibility for such broadened power of marketing has been given. Any that ever has been given, e.g., that by Lazer and Kelly, has subsequently been depressed. As a result, the power of the discipline grows so great that it is tempting to avoid responsibility for some of the social changes and consequences it could cause. 'If society suffers because some members of the population accept a controversial and ultimately dysfunctional message, the marketer is not to blame since the only role served by marketing was to help the sender of a message exercise his right of free speech. Stated another way, marketing merely facilitated an intellectual exchange but in no way coerced the parties into a meeting of the minds'. However, as Laczniak and Michie (1979:224-5) argued, 'this defence is unsatisfactory because it can be logically argued that the application of marketing techniques to a controversial situation [should] provide the balance of communicative power to culminate a successful transaction. If no responsibility for subsequent events is accepted by the marketer in cases of broadened marketing, accountability breaks down and the power-responsibility equation is not in balance'. It is also argued that 'if the marketing function and ideology is allowed to expand freely into the other realms, this balance may be upset, with resulting political and spiritual pollution. Hence, to broaden the marketing thinking into areas where it is out of context may bring marketing on a collision course with our humanistic ideals' (Arndt, 1976a:15).

To sum up, what social marketing expended is the application domain of marketing techniques, what has been narrowed and reduced is research scope and perspective. During its formalisation, social marketing has evolved into a one-dimensional enterprise which is nothing more than the traditional micro-managerial school, philosophically, epistemologically, methodologically, and ideologically. In this sense, social marketing as a branch of research has eventually lost its identity.

However, the impact of social marketing remains, distortive and depressive. On the one hand, social marketing tends to define all human affairs in marketing terms, therefore to neutralise, legitimate and reinforce a particular type of social relation and a particular type of society. Arndt expressed his concern thus:

> Examples that make me uneasy are the not tongue-in-cheek proposal to save India by marketing birth control (Matlin, 1968) or the attempt to bring husband-and-wife marital relations under the marketing umbrella, with the label 'intimate marketing' (Levy and Zaltman, 1975:42). Such 'broadening' may accelerate the alienation of man in modern society by inducing individuals to view their relationships with one another as marketing relationships (Arndt, 1976a:15).

Morgan expresses a similar concern that:

> Kotler presents marketing discourse as an aid to more efficient organisations in the public and voluntary sectors. But what this means is the transformation of social relations in those locations. It means a progressive introduction of positivist ways of looking at people in these contexts. It means a continuous resort to market mechanisms in order to monitor and evaluate social relations. It means, in particular, a monetisation and commodification of social relations. In this world, marketing can tell us the 'price of everything, but the value of nothing'! Anything can be marketed. It does not have to be the more obvious goods and services; it can be 'good causes', 'political parties', 'ideas'. The whole world is a market and we are consumers in a gigantic candy-store. Just sit back and enjoy it! (Morgan, 1992:143-4).

Without being defined, Kotler and Levy's taken-as-given 'present social action efforts', or 'social idea or cause', might be anything that affects society, for good or evil. The 'goodness' in any case is actually seen through the eyes of the channel captain (Luck, 1974). Logically, it goes without saying, social marketing tends to serve the powerful and those who pay the most thus at the position to decide what 'social cause', 'social idea', or 'social action', to be marketed.

On the other hand, by extending the application of marketing technology, and by blocking other kinds of inquiry in marketing, social marketing tends to direct marketing activities (traditional as well as broadened) into a certain kind of 'normal science', which is devoted to confirmation of the dominating paradigm, not to questioning it. The normalisation of social marketing in merely technical terms is nothing more than to prove and to expand the professional power, which aims at expanding the area where a particular paradigm is relevant. In Heede's words,

> [T]he concerned activity called social marketing has nothing to do with a theoretical development, but is merely a different practice of a specific theory, based upon exactly the same paradigms. ... Social marketing, therefore, in my opinion contains no renewal in connection with marketing theory, and in the relevant case marketing theory has not been adapted to a new practice or new social relations. On the contrary, ... new social problems have been treated like traditional problems, thus being conservative in proportion to a given development (Heede, 1980:105).

To sum up, social marketing came to the fore at around the same time as macromarketing. During the consequent formalisation, the technical aspect of social marketing has become dominating and imposing, while the original societal normative dimension has been depressed and rooted out. While social marketing attempts to expand the application domain of its technical power, it reduces marketing to a one-dimensional science, effectively legitimising and reinforcing a particular kind of social relation, a particular kind of 'science', and a particular kind of ideology through which the technical element of marketing system colonises the lifeworld. However, the outcome of such normalisation is depressing even for social marketing itself: social marketing has been eventually shrunk into, and thus assimilated with, the micro-managerial tradition. Social marketing thus remains insubstantial, making no contribution to marketing study.

A4.3 ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT

The story of macro and social marketing has been told. Their traditions have been introduced, their evolution has been outlined, their current positions in marketing study have been identified. Both systems had as their starting points the desire to deal with social issues and problems, yet their interests and strategies are tremendously different. For macromarketing, broadening means to enrich consideration dimensions and, as a logical requirement, to embrace and organise differentiable and contesting purposes and interests as well as heterogeneous research approaches; while for social marketing, broadening means to extend the disciplinary power based on a singular orientation to intervene in an infinite range of human affairs. In this section, the differences between these two marketing systems are assessed and analysed in the light of the reconstruction of marketing. It is argued that their different positions and futures in the discipline are determined by the differences in their development perspectives and strategies. A key issue is how they define in their inquiry the notion of 'holism', even in a quite traditional sense of the word, horizontally and vertically.

By 'horizontally' is meant how macro and social marketing deal with the relation between technical-economic and other differentiable human spheres. Heede, drawing upon Habermas's thesis of public opinion, contends that human beings hold five fundamental spheres; i.e., the intimate, the economic, the social, the cultural, and the political spheres. Heede continues to assert that these spheres constitute a system in which differentiated spheres influence, define, and condition one another. Marketing as such a social system obviously contains economic elements, yet also has roots in other spheres. No research approach will deny this in general terms. But when it comes to the practical conduct of research, 'normal sciences' (in our case social marketing) tends, more often than not*not* to take account of other spheres. Rather, driven by a particular narrow orientation, for whatever reason, they usually limit themselves to the study of relations where both causes and effects are within the same sphere (Heede, 1980:84-6). In systems terms, these 'normal sciences' tend to reduce the diverse complexity and rich plurality into an one-dimensional (or in Heede's terms one-sphere) image. They tend to define and tackle the concerned sphere isolated from other spheres. Social marketing is exactly such a case. When it attempted to embrace a wide range of economic, social, cultural, religious and political 'ideas', 'actions', and 'causes' as given into its application territory, it restricted its perspective within a singular dimension: the technical one. This is how social marketing has shrunk itself into the traditional managerial school, even though it initially desired to enlarge its research scope.

In contrast, when focusing on a distinct kind of phenomenon (the influencing impacts between marketing and society) at a distinct aggregation level (the societal level), macromarketing consistently holds a holistic perspective; that is, macromarketing as a research community is aware that marketing, as an economic mechanism to match society consumption demand and supply, is inherently related not only to technical-economic but also to deep-seated social, cultural, and political dimensions (or in Heede's terms spheres). Due to this recognition, researchers in macromarketing consciously develop differentiable approaches to address differentiated yet related issues in a well informed and organised way. In short while social marketing tried to expand and impose its technical power based on a singular standard, macromarketing is dedicated to reflecting on and to enriching its research orientation and approaches for contestable interests. This difference in research orientation and strategy fundamentally determines their tremendously different current positions in marketing study.

By 'vertically' is denoted the simultaneous involvement in reasoning at the methodological, theoretical, and ideological levels. Kuhn (1962) and Althusser (1974), among many others, have revealed that there are certain relations between these reasoning levels (see Heede, 1980). In marketing study, this argument has been put forward by Bristor (1984, 1985), Hirschman (1985, 1986), Hudson and Ozzane (1988, 1989), Lutz (1989), Murray and Evers (1989) and many others (see Chapters 2 and 8). We see that in the evolution and formalisation of macromarketing, researchers critically reflect, refine, and juxtapose various strands of methodology, epistemology, ontology, and ideology. Even at the time when the micro-managerial-positive paradigm dominated the discipline, when interpretive and normative research was under-developed, researchers in macromarketing consciously sought to bring these latter dimensions together in an informed and organised way towards plurality in research (for example Bagozzi, 1976, 1977; Dholakia and Venkatesh, 1984; Shea and Punj, 1988). As a result, macromarketing has gained substantial and significant achievement at all reasoning levels, and thereby has greatly enriched and increased its ability to properly address its research objects.

In contrast, because social marketing restricted itself to the attempt to extend merely the application territory of managerial techniques, although it appeared once fashionable in the 1970s, it has not been able to provide any promise or contribution to theory or meta-theory development, and thus could not escape from the fate of decline and fall.

CONCLUSION

The message from the two cases is clear. Searching for technical enhancement and economic efficiency is generally innocent, as is the application of management techniques to assist handling other social issues. However, if such searching and application is carried out at the expense of ignoring and/or depressing other inquiry orientations and research approaches that are at least equally important, if it tends to be exclusive (to other approaches) and closed (within its partiality and selectivity), the outcome could be disastrous. From a critical systems point of view, for a social practical discipline such as marketing to reassume the proper mission assigned by society, it is always a task to be aware of the inescapability of partiality and selectivity, and to reject tendencies of reduction and isolation, in conducts of research and action. It is crucial to keep in mind that issues in human consumption needs are heterogeneous and differentiated; therefore, they inherently require heterogeneous research approaches to tackle them. And since those issues are dynamically contesting in unforeseeable ways, research approaches and paradigms, although pointing respectively at different aspects, have no other choice but to communicate, inform and support each other.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abratt, Russell and Diane Sacks (1988), Perceptions of the societal marketing concept, *European Journal of Marketing*, 23 (6), 25-33.

Achrol, R. S., T. Reve, and L. W. Stern (1983), The Environment of Marketing Channel Dyads: A Framework for Comparative Analysis, *Journal of Marketing*, 47 (Fall), 55-67.

Ackoff, R. L. (1957), Towards a behavioural theory of communication, in *Modern Systems Research for the Behavioural Scientist*, ed., W. Buckley, Chicago: Aldine, 209-18.

Ackoff, R. L. (1971), Towards a system of systems concept, *Management Science*, 17 (July), 661-71.

Ackoff, R. L. (1974), *Redesigning the Future*, New York: John Wiley.

Ackoff, R. L. (1979a), The future of operational research is past, *Journal of Operational Research Society*, 30, 93-104.

Ackoff, R. L. (1979b), Resurrecting the future of operational research, *Journal of Operational Research Society*, 30, 198-99.

Ackoff, R. L. (1981), *Creating the Corporate Future*, New York: Wiley.

Adler, Keith (1982), Potential 'control mechanisms' for theories of consumer behaviour, in *Marketing Theory: Philosophy of Science Perspectives*, eds., Ronald F. Bush and Shelby D. Hunt, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 181-4.

Adler, Lee (1967), Systems Approach to Marketing, *Harvard Business Review*, 45 (May/June), 105-118.

Alderson, Wroe (1950), Survival and adjustment in organised behaviour systems, in *Theory in Marketing*, eds., Reavis Cox and Wroe Alderson, Chicago: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 65-88.

Alderson, Wroe (1957), *Marketing Behaviour and Executive Action*, Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin, Inc.

Alderson, Wroe (1964), A normative theory of marketing systems, in Theory in Marketing, 2nd series, eds., Reavis Cox, Wroe Alderson, and Stanley J. Shapiro, Homewood, Ill.: Richard, D. Irwin, Inc., 82-108.

Alderson, Wroe (1965), Dynamic Marketing Behaviour, Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin, Inc.

Alderson, Wroe and R. Cox (1948), Towards a theory of marketing, Journal of Marketing, 13 (October), 137-42.

Aldrich, H. (1979), Organisations and Environments, Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice-Hall.

Aldrich, H. and D. Whetten (1981), Organisation-sets, action-sets and network: making the most of simplicity, in Handbook of Organisational Design, 1, eds., P. Nystrom and W. Strarbuck, New York: Oxford University Press, 385-408.

Allardt, Erik (1975), Att Ha, Att Alska, Att Vara, Lund: Argos; cf.: Gronmo, Sigmund (1984), Compensatory Consumer Behaviour: Theoretical Perspectives, Empirical Examples and Methodological Challenges, in 1984 AMA Winter Educators' Conference: Scientific Method in Marketing, eds. Paul F. Anderson and Michael J. Ryan, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 184-8.

Alston, William P. (1964), Philosophy of Language, Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice-Hall, Inc.

Althusser, Louis (1974), Philosophie et philosoplie spontanee des sabants, Paris, cf. Heede, 1980.

AMA-Committee on Terms (1960), Marketing Definitions: A Glossary of Marketing Terms, Chicago: American Marketing Association.

'AMA Board Approves New Marketing Definition', (1985), Marketing News, (February): 1.

Amstutz, Arnold E. (1967), Computer Simulation of Competitive Market Response, Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, The M.I.T. Press.

Amstutz, A. E. (1969), Market-Oriented Management Systems: The Current Status, Journal of Marketing Research, 6 (November), 481-96.

Anderson, Paul F. (1981), A review of some recent philosophy and sociology of science literature, working paper, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University.

Anderson, Paul F. (1982), Marketing, strategic planning and the theory of the firm, Journal of Marketing, 46 (Spring), 15-26.

Anderson, Paul F. (1983), Marketing, Scientific Progress, and Scientific Method, Journal of Marketing, 47 (Fall), 18-31.

Anderson, Paul F. (1986), On Method in Consumer Research: A Critical Relativist Perspective, Journal of Consumer Research, 13 (September), 155-73.

Anderson, Paul F. (1988a), Relative to What--That Is the Question: A Reply to Siegel, Journal of Consumer Research, 15 (June), 133-7.

Anderson, Paul F. (1988b), Relativism Revidivus: In Defence of Critical Relativism, *Journal of Consumer Research*, 15 (December), 403-6.

Anderson, Paul F. (1989), On Relativism and Interpretivism: With a Prolegomenon to the "Why Question", in *Interpretive Consumer Research*, ed., Elizabeth Hirschman, Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research, 10-23.

Andreasen, Alan R. (1965), Attitudes and consumer behaviour: A decision model, in *New Research in Marketing*, ed., L. Preston, Berkeley, CA.: Institute of Business and Economic Research, University of California, 1-16.

Apel, Karl-Otto (1977), The a priori of communication and the foundation of the humanities, in *Understanding and Social Inquiry*, eds., Fred R. Dallmayr and Thomas A. McCarthy, Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 292-315.

Aristotle (1943), *Metafisica*, Madrid: Espasa-Caple.

Arndt, Johan (1967), *Word of Mouth Advertising: A Review of the Literature*, New York: Advertising Research Foundation.

Arndt, Johan (1972), Temporal lags in consumer retailing, *Journal of Marketing*, 36 (October), 40-5.

Arndt, Johan (1976a), The Marketing Thinking of Tomorrow, in *Future Directions for Marketing*, 1978, ed., George Fisk, Cambridge, MA: Marketing Science Institute, 4-27.

Arndt, Johan (1976b), Reflections on research in consumer behaviour, in *Advances in Consumer Research*, 3, ed., B. B. Anderson, Ann Arbor: Association for Consumer Research, 213-21.

Arndt, Johan (1976c), 'The marketing thinking of tomorrow: Beyond the marketing concept toward new dignity and responsible freedom for managers and consumers', working paper, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, February.

Arndt, Johan (1978), How Broad Should the Marketing Concept Be?, *Journal of Marketing*, 42 (January), 101-3.

Arndt, Johan (1979a), The Market Is Dying: Long Live Marketing! *MSU Business Topics*, 27 (Winter), 5-13.

Arndt, Johan (1979b), Toward a Concept of Domesticated Markets, *Journal of Marketing*, 43 (Fall), 69-75.

Arndt, Johan (1981), The political economy of marketing systems: Reviving the institutional approach, *Journal of Macromarketing*, 1 (Fall), 36-47.

Arndt, Johan (1983a), The Political Economy Paradigm: Foundation for Theory Building in Marketing, *Journal of Marketing*, 47 (Fall), 44-54.

Arndt, Johan (1983b), Book review on Shelby D. Hunt's Marketing Theory: The Philosophy of Marketing Science, *Journal of Marketing*, 47 (Fall), 145-6.

Arndt, Johan (1984), Perspectives and Paradigms in Consumer Research, in *1984 AMA Winter Educators' Conference: Scientific Method in Marketing*, eds., Paul F. Anderson and Michael J. Ryan, Chicago: American Marketing Association , 159-62.

Arndt, Johan (1985a), The Tyranny of Paradigms: The Case for Paradigmatic Pluralism in Marketing, in *Changing the Course of Marketing: Alternative Paradigms for Widening Marketing Theory*, eds., Nikhilkesh Dholakia and Johan Arndt, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press Inc., 3-26.

Arndt, Johan (1985b), On Making Marketing Science More Scientific: Role of Orientations, Paradigms, Metaphors, and Puzzle Solving, *Journal of Marketing*, 49 (Summer), 11-23.

Arndt, Johan (1986a), Paradigms in Consumer Research: A Review of Perspectives and Approaches, *European Journal of Marketing*, 20 (8), 23-40.

Arndt, Johan (1986b), Shared symbols, meanings, and ways of life in interorganisational networks, in *Marketing Management Technology as Social Process*, ed., George Fisk, New York: Praeger, 121-38.

Arndt, Johan and Torger Reve (1980), Innovativeness in Vertical Marketing Systems, in *Macromarketing: Evolution of Thought*, eds., George Fisk *et al.*, Boulder: Graduate School of Business Administration, University of Colorado, 223-38.

Arndt, Johan and Liisa Uusitalo (1980), Backward segmentation by consumption style: A sociological approach, in *Marketing in the 80's*, ed., Richard Bagozzi, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 126-30.

Arnold, Stephen J. and Eileen Fischer (1994), Hermeneutics and consumer research, *Journal of Consumer Research*, 21 (June), 55-70.

Arnould, Eric and Melane Wallendorf (1988), Oh give thanks for we are one: A cross-cultural comparison of the meaning of participation in thanksgiving rituals, paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Association of Consumer Research, Honolulu, HI.

Arrington, C. Edward and Anthony G. Puxty (1991), Accounting, interests, and rationality: A communicative relation, *Critical Perspectives on Accounting*, 2, 31-58.

Ashby, W. R. (1956), *An Introduction to Cybernetics*, London: Methuen.

Aspinwall, Leo (1958), The characteristics of goods and parallel systems theories, in *Managerial Marketing: Perspectives and Viewpoints*, eds., Eugene J. Kelley and William Lazer, Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, 434-50.

Atac, Osman Ata (1985), Finding new product needs: A new job for researchers, *Marketing News*, (January):4.

Bagozzi, Richard P. (1974), Marketing as an Organised Behaviour System of Exchange, *Journal of Marketing*, 38 (October), 77-81.

Bagozzi, Richard P. (1975), Marketing as Exchange, *Journal of Marketing*, 39 (October), 32-9.

Bagozzi, Richard P. (1976), Science, politics, and the social construction of marketing, in *Marketing: 1776-1976 and Beyond*, ed., Kenneth L. Bernhardt, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 586-92.

Bagozzi, Richard P. (1977a), Marketing at the societal level: Theoretical issues and problems, in _Macromarketing: Distributive Processes from a Societal Perspective_, ed., Charles D. Slater, Boulder: University of Colorado, Business Research Division, 6-51.

Bagozzi, Richard P. (1977b), Is All Social Exchange Marketing? A Reply, _Journal of the Academy of marketing Science_, 5 (Fall), 315-26.

Bagozzi, Richard P. (1978), Marketing as exchange: A theory of transactions in the marketplace, _American Behavioural Scientist_, 21 (March/April), 535-56.

Bagozzi, Richard P. (1979), Toward a formal theory of marketing exchange, in _Conceptual and Theoretical Developments in Marketing_, eds., Ferrell *et al.*, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 431-41.

Bagozzi, Richard P. (1980), _Causal Models in Marketing_, New York: John Wiley & Sons.

Balderston, F. E. (1964), Design of marketing channels, in _Theory in Marketing_, eds., Reavis Cox, Wroe Alderson, and Stanley J. Shapiro, Homewood, Ill.: Richard Irwin, 176-87.

Baligh, Helmy H. and Leon E. Richartz (1967), _Vertical Marketing Structures_, Boston, Mass.: Allyn & Bacon.

Ball-Rokeach, S. J. and M. L. Defleur (1976), A dependency model of mass media effects, _Communication Research_, 3 (1).

Ball-Rokeach, S. J. and M. L. Defleur (1982), _Theories of Mass Communication_, 4th ed., New York: Longman.

Banks, Seymour (1968), A non-systematic look at systems: A triumph of optimism over experience, in _Marketing and the New Science_, ed., Robert L. King, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 24-8.

Baran, Parl A. and Paul W. Sweey (1966), _Monopoly Capital_, London: Penguin Books.

Barksdale, H. C. (1980), Wroe Alderson's Contribution to marketing theory, in _Theoretical Development in Marketing_, eds., Charles W. Lamb, Jr. and Patrick M. Dunne, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 1-4.

Barnard, C. (1938), _The Functions of the Executive_, Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press.

Bartels, Robert (1941), Marketing literature - Development and appraisal, Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University.

Bartels, Robert (1951), Can marketing be science? _Journal of Marketing_, 15 (January), 319-28.

Bartels, Robert (1961), Marketing as a Social and Political Tool, in _Marketing: A Maturing Discipline_, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 210-6.

Bartels, Robert (1962), _The Development of Marketing Thought_, Homewood, Ill.: Irwin Press.

Bartels, Robert (ed.) (1963), _Comparative Marketing: Wholesaling in Fifteen Countries_, Homewood, IL: Irwin.

Bartels, Robert (1964), A Methodological Framework for Comparative Marketing Study, in _Toward Scientific Marketing_, ed., S. A. Greyser, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 383-90.

Bartels, Robert (1965a), Development of marketing thought: A brief history, in _Science in Marketing_, ed., George Schwartz, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 47-69.

Bartels, Robert (1965b), Marketing Technology, Tasks, and Relationships, _Journal of Marketing_, 29 (January), 45-8.

Bartels, Robert (1968), The general theory of marketing, _Journal of Marketing_, 32 (January), 29-33.

Bartels, Robert (1970), _Marketing Theory and Metatheory_, Homewood, Ill: Richard D. Irwin, Inc.

Bartels, Robert (1974), The Identity Crisis in Marketing, _Journal of Marketing_, 38 (October), 75-76.

Bartels, Robert (1977), Marketing and economic development, in _Macromarketing: Distributive Processes from a Societal Perspective_, eds., P. D. White and C. C. Slater, Boulder: Business Research Division, University of Colorado, 211-7.

Bartels, Robert (1983), Is Marketing Defaulting Its Responsibilities? _Journal of Marketing_, 47 (Fall), 32-5.

Bartels, Robert (1986), Marketing: Management Technology or Social Process at the Twenty-first Century? in _Marketing Management Technology as a Social Process_, ed., George Fisk, New York: Praeger, 30-42.

Bartels, Robert and Roger L. Jenkins (1977), Macromarketing, _Journal of Marketing_, 41 (October), 17-20.

Bass, Frank M. (1969), A new product growth model for consumer durables, _Management Science_, 15 (January), 215-27.

Bass, Frank M. *et al.* (ed.) (1961), _Mathematical Models and Methods in Marketing_, Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc.

Bauer, Raymond A. (1960), Consumer behaviour as risk taking, in _Dynamic Marketing for a Changing World: Proceeding of the 43rd National Conference of the American Marketing Association_, ed., Robert S. Hancock, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 389-98.

Becker, Howard (1986), Telling about society, in _Doing Things Together_, Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

Beer, S. (1979), _The Heart of Enterprise_, Chichester: Wiley.

Beer, S. (1981), _Brain of the Firm_, Chichester: Wiley.

Beer, S. (1985), _Diagnosing the Systems for Organisations_, Chichester: Wiley.

Belk, Russell W. (1979), Gift-giving behaviour, _Research in Marketing_, 2, 95-126.

Belk, Russell W. (1984a), Manifesto for a Consumer Behaviour of Consumer Behaviour, in _1984 AMA Winter Educators' Conference: Scientific Method in_

Marketing, eds., Paul F. Anderson and Michael J. Ryan, Chicago: American Marketing Association , 163-7.

Belk, Russell W. (1984b), Against thinking, in 1984 AMA Winter Educators' Conference: Scientific Method in Marketing, eds., Paul F. Anderson and Michael J. Ryan, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 57-60.

Belk, Russell W. (1986), What should ACR want to be when it grows up, in Advances in Consumer Research, 13, ed., Richard J. Lutz, Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research, 423-4.

Belk, Russell W. (1987a), ACR Presidential Address: Happy Thought, in Advances in Consumer Research, 14, eds., Melanie Wallendorf and Paul Anderson, Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research, 1-4.

Belk, Russell W. (1987b), A modest proposal for creating verisimilitude in consumer-information-processing models and some suggestions for establishing a discipline to study consumer behaviour, in Philosophical and Radical Thought in Marketing, eds., A Fuat Firat *et al.*, Mass.: Lexington Books, 361-72.

Belk, Russell W. (1987c), The role of the Odyssey in consumer behaviour and in consumer research, in Advances in Consumer Research, 14, eds., Melanie Wallendorf and Paul Anderson, Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research, 357-61.

Belk, Russell W. (1988), Possessions and the Extended Self, Journal of Consumer Research, 15 (September), 139-68.

Belk, Russell W. (1989), Materialism and the modern U.S. Christmas, in Interpretive Consumer Research, ed., Elizabeth C. Hirschman, Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research, 115-35.

Belk, Russell W. (1991), Highways and Buyways: Naturalistic Research From the Consumer Behaviour Odyssey, Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research.

Belk, Russell W., Kenneth Bahn, and Robert Mayer (1982), Developmental recognition of consumption symbolism, Journal of Consumer Research, 9 (2), 4-17.

Belk, Russell W. and Richard W. Pollay (1985), Images of ourselves: The good life in twentieth century advertising, Journal of Consumer Research, 11 (March), 887-97.

Belk, Russell W., John F. Sherry, Jr., and Melanie Wallendorf (1988), A Naturalistic Inquiry into Buyer and Seller Behaviour at a Swap Meet, Journal of Consumer Research, 14 (March), 449-70.

Belk, Russell W., Melanie Wallendorf, and John F. Sherry (1989), The Sacred and the Profane in Consumer Research, Journal of Consumer Research, 16 (June), 1-38.

Belk, Russell W. and Nan Zhou (1986), Emerging consumer culture in the People's Republic of China, in The Role of Marketing in Development: Global, Consumer, and Managerial Issues, eds., Erdogan Kumcu, A. Fuat Firat, Mehmet Karafakioglu, Muhittin Karabullut and Mehmet Oluc, Muncie, IN.: Ball State University, 137-45.

Bell, Martin L. (1966), *Marketing: Concepts and Strategy*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.

Bell, Martin L. (1972), *Marketing: Concepts and Strategy*, 2nd ed., Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.

Bellow, Saul (1975), *Humbolt's Gift*, New York: The Viking Press.

Benton, R. Jr. (1985), Alternative Approaches to Consumer Behaviour, in *Changing the Course of Marketing: Alternative Paradigms for Widening Marketing Theory*, eds., Nikhilkesh Dholakia and Johan Arndt, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press Inc., 197-218.

Benton, R. Jr. (1987), Work, consumption, and the joyless consumer, in *Philosophical and Radical Thought in Marketing*, eds., A Fuat Firat *et al.*, Mass.: Lexington Books, 235-50.

Berenson, Conrad (1969), Marketing Information Systems, *Journal of Marketing*, 33 (October), 16-23.

Berger, P. L. and Luckmann, T. (1966), *The Social Construction of Reality*, New York: Doubleday.

Berkeley, G. (1710), *The Principles of Human Knowledge*, 1962 ed., ed., Warnock, G. J. , London: Fontana Press.

Bernal, J. (1939), *The Social Functioning of Science*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Bernstein, Richard J. (1983), *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis*, Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell.

Bernstein, Richard J. (1985), *Habermas and Modernity*, Cambridge: Polity Press and Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Bernstein, Richard J. (1986), *Philosophical Profiles: Essays in a Pragmatic Mode*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bernstein, Richard J. (1991), *The New Constellation: The Ethical-Political Horizon of Modernity/Postmodernity*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bettman, J. R. (1979), *An information processing theory of consumer choice*, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc.

Bhaskar, R. (1978), *A Realist Theory of Science*, 2nd ed., Brighton: Harvester Press.

Bhaskar, R. (1979), *The Possibility of Naturalism*, Brighton: Harvester Press.

Bhaskar, R. (1986), *Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation*, London: Verso.

Bhaskar, R. (1989), *Reclaiming Reality*, London: Verso.

Blackett (1939), in *The Social Functioning of Science*, Bernal, J., London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Blattgerg, Robert C. and Subrata K. Sen (1976), Marketing segments and stochastic brand choice models, *Journal of Marketing Research*, 13 (February), 34-45.

Blau, P. M. (1964), Exchange and Power in Social Life, New York: Wiley.

Bleier, Ruth (1988), Sex differences research: Science or belief? in Feminist Approaches to Science, ed., Ruth Bleier, New York: Pergamon, 147-64.

Boddeywn, J. J. (1966), A construct for comparative marketing research, Journal of Marketing Research, 3 (May), 149-53.

Boddeywn, J. J. (ed.) (1969), Comparative Management and Marketing, Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman and Company.

Boddeywn, J. J. (1981), Comparative marketing: The first twenty-five years, Journal of International Business Studies, 12 (Spring/Summer), 61-79.

Borch, Fred J. (1957), The marketing philosophy as a way of business life, Marketing Series, No. 99, American Management Association, Inc.

Borden, Neil H. (1965), The concept of the marketing mix, in Science in Marketing, ed., George Schwartz, New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 386-97.

Boston Consultting Group (1970), The Product Portfolio, Boston: The Boston Consulting Group.

Boulding, Kenneth (1965), General Systems Theory - The Skeleton of Science, Management Science, 2 (April), 197-208.

Bourgeois, L. J. (1980), Strategy and Environment: A Conceptual Integration, Academy of Management Review, 5 (January), 25-39.

Bourne, Francis S. (1957), Group influence in marketing and public relations, in Some Applications of Behavioural Research, eds., Rensis Likert and Samuel P. Hayes, Jr., Paris: Unesco, 207-57.

Braham, M. (1973), A general theory of organisation, General Systems, 18, 13-24.

Bredo, Eric and Walter Feinberg (eds.) (1982), Knowledge and Values in Social and Educational Research, Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Breyer, Ralph F. (1931), Commodity Marketing, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.

Breyer, Ralph F. (1934), The Marketing Institution, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co.

Breyer, Ralph F. (1949), Quantitative Systemic Analysis and Control: Study No. 1 - Channel and Channel Group Costing, Philadelphia: published by the author.

Brien, Richard H. (1968), Marketing information systems in practice: The user's view, in Marketing and the New Science of Planning, ed., Robert L. King, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 172-5.

Brinberg, David and Ajith Kumar (1987), Radical issues in experimental and naturalistic inquiry, working paper, State University of New York at Albany, New York.

Bristor, Julia (1984), Organising Consumer Behaviour: A Paradigmatic Perspective, in 1984 AMA Winter Educators' Conference: Scientific Method in Marketing, eds., Paul F. Anderson and Michael J. Ryan, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 173-6.

Bristor, Julia (1985), Consumer Behaviour form a Contemporary Philosophy of Science Perspective: An Organisational Framework, in Advances in Consumer Research, 12, eds., Elizabeth C. Hirschman and Morris B. Holbrook, Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research, 300-4.

Brown, Edmund, Jr. (1925), Marketing, New York: Harper & Bros.

Brown, Lindon O. (1948), Toward a profession of marketing, Journal of Marketing, 13 (July), 27-31.

Brown, Stephen (1994), Marketing as multiplex: Screening postmodernism, European Journal of Marketing, 28 (8/9), 27-51.

Brownlie, Douglas, Mike Saren, Richard Whittington and Robin Wensley (1994), The new marketing myopia: Critical perspectives on theory and research in marketing, European Journal of Marketing, 28 (3), 6-12.

Bryer, R. A. (1979), The status of the systems approach, Omega, 7, 219-31.

Buckley, W. (1967), Sociology and Modern Systems Theory, Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice-Hall.

Bucklin, Louis P. (1963), Retail strategy and the classification of consumer goods, Journal of Marketing, 27 (January), 50-5.

Bucklin, Louis P. (1965), Postponement, speculation and the structure of distribution channels, Journal of Marketing Research, 2 (February), 26-31.

Bucklin, Louis P. (1966), A Theory of Distribution Structure, Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Institute of Business and Economic Research.

Bucklin, Louis P. (1970), The channel system, in Managerial Analysis in Marketing, eds., Frederick D. Strudivant *et al.*, Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman and Co., 586-619.

Bucklin, Louis P. (1977), Improving food retailing in developing Asian countries, Food Policy, (May), 114-22.

Buonofina, Marta Ortiz (1987), The economic efficiency of channels in a developing sector, Journal of Macromarketing, 7 (Fall), 17-25.

Burrell, Gibson and Gareth Morgan (1979), Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis: Elements of the Sociology of Corporate Life, London: Heinemann.

Bush, Alan J., William C. Moncrief and Clifford D. Scott (1982), On the interpretation of nomic necessity: A requirement for a science of marketing, in Marketing Theory: Philosophy of Science Perspectives, eds., Ronald F. Bush and Shelby D. Hunt, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 30-3.

Butler, Ralph Starr (1923), Marketing and Merchandising, New York: Alexander Hamilton Institute.

Buttle, Francis A. (1994), Editorial: New paradigm research in marketing, European Journal of Marketing, 28 (8/9), 8-11.

Buzzell, Robert D. (1968), Can you standardise international marketing? Harvard Business Review, 46 (November/December), 102-13.

Buzzell, Robert D. and Bradley T. Gale (1987), The PIMS Principles - Linking Strategy to Performance, New York: The Free Press.

Calder, Bobby J. and Alice M. Tybout (1987), What Consumer Research Is ..., Journal of Consumer Research, 14 (June), 136-40.

Calder, Bobby J. and Alice M. Tybout (1989), Interpretive, qualitative, and traditional scientific empirical consumer behaviour research, in Interpretive Consumer Research, ed., E. C. Hirschman, Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research, 199-208.

Caplovitz, David (1963), The Poor Pay Moor, London: Free Press.

Cardozo, Richard and Yoram Wind (1980), Portfolio Analysis for Strategic Product - Marketing Planning, Working Paper, The Wharton School University of Pennsylvania.

Carman, James M. (1965), The Application of Social class in Market Segmentation, Berkeley, CA.: Graduate School of Business Administration, University of California.

Carman, James M. (1977), Theories to describe some competitive conditions in which the firm operates, in Behavioural Models for Marketing Analysis, eds., F. M. Nicosia and Y. Wind, Hinsdale, Ill.: Dryden, 147-62.

Carman, James M. (1978), Values and Consumption Patterns: A Close Loop, in Advances in Consumer Research, 5, 403-7.

Carman, James M. (1980), Paradigms for marketing theory, in Research in Marketing, ed., J. Sheth, Greenwich, CT.: JAI Press Inc., 1-36.

Chamberlin, E. H. (1933), The Theory of Monopolistic Competition, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Charnes, A., W. W. Cooper, D. B. Leavner, and F. Y. Philips (1985), Management science and marketing management, Journal of Marketing, 49 (Spring), 93-105.

Checkland, Peter B. (1981a), Systems Thinking, Systems Practice, Chichester: Wiley.

Checkland, Peter B. (1981b), Rethinking a systems approach, Journal of Applied Systems Analysis, 8, 3-14.

Checkland, Peter B. (1982), Soft systems methodology as process: A reply to M. C. Jackson, Journal of Applied Systems Analysis, 9, 37-9.

Checkland, Peter B. (1983), OR and the Systems Movement: Mappings and Conflicts, Journal of Operational Researches Society, 34, 611-75.

Checkland, Peter B. (1985), From optimising to learning: A development of systems thinking for the 1990s, Journal of Operational Researches Society, 36, 757-67.

Checkland, Peter B. and J. Scholes (1990), Soft Systems Methodology in Action, Chichester: Wiley.

Cherington, Paul (1921), The Elements of Marketing, New York: Macmillan.

Child, J. (1972), Organisational Structure, Environment, and Performance: The Role of Strategic Choice, *Sociology*, 63 (January), 2-22.

Christopher, M. (1971a), *Total Distribution*, London: Gower Press.

Christopher, M. (1971b), The new science of logistics systems engineering, *International Journal of Physical Distribution*, 2 (1).

Churchill, Scott D. and Frederic Wertz (1985), An Introduction to Phenomenological Psychology for Consumer Research: Historical, Conceptual, and Methodological Foundations, in *Advances in Consumer research*, 12, eds., Elizabeth C. Hirschman and Morris B. Holbrook, Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research, 550-5.

Churchman, C. W. (1970), Operations Research as a profession, *Management Science*, 17, B37-B53.

Churchman, C. W. (1971), *The Design of Inquiring Systems: Basic Concepts of Systems and Organisation*, New York: Basic Books.

Churchman, C. W. (1979a), *The Systems Approach*, 2nd ed., New York: Dell.

Churchman, C. W. (1979b), *The Systems Approach and Its Enemies*, New York: Basic Books.

Clabaugh, Maurice G., Jon M. Hawes and Joanna Wallace (1982), CASS: Contingency approach to selling as a system, in *Marketing Theory: Philosophy of Science Perspectives*, eds., Ronald F. Bush and Shelby D. Hunt, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 103-6.

Clark, Fred F. (1922), *Principles of Marketing*, New York: The Macmillan Company.

Clark, Fred F. (1932), *Principles of Marketing*, rev. ed., 1962 by R. D. Tousely, E. Clark and F. E. Clark, New York: The Macmillan Company.

Clark, Fred F. and C. P. Clark (1942), *Principles of Marketing*, New York: The Macmillan Company.

Comish, Newel H. (1935), *Marketing of Manufactured Goods*, Boston: Stratford Co.

Commons John R. (1924), *Legal Foundations of Capitalism*, New York: Macmillan.

Commons John R. (1934), *Institutional Economics*, New York: Macmillan.

Comte, Auguste (1853), *The Positivist Philosophy*, I, (freely trans., H. Martineau), London: Chapman.

Converse, Paul D. (1930), *The Elements of Marketing*, New York: Prentice-Hall.

Converse, Paul D. (1943), *A Study of Retail Trade Areas in East Central Illinois*, Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Converse, Paul D. (1945), The development of the science of marketing, *Journal of Marketing*, 10 (July), 14-23.

Converse, Paul D. (1949), New laws of retail gravitation, *Journal of Marketing*, 14 (October), 379-54.

Converse, Paul D. (1951), Development of marketing theory: Fifty years of progress, in *Changing Perspectives in Marketing*, ed., Hugh G. Wales, Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Converse, Paul D. and Harvey Huegy (1940), *The Elements of Marketing*, New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc.

Converse, Paul D., H. Huegy and Robert Mitchell (1952), *Elements of Marketing*, New York: Prentice-Hall.

Copeland, Melvin T. (1925), *Principles of Merchandising*, Chicago: A. W. Shaw Co.

Costa, Janeen Arnold (1989), Toward an understanding of social and world systems process in the spread of consumer culture: An anthropological case study, in *Advances in Consumer Research*, 16, ed., Thomas K. Srull, Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research.

Cox, D. F. and R. E. Good (1967), How to build a marketing information system, *Harvard Business Review*, 45 (May/June), 145-54.

Cox, D. F. and S. U. Rich (1964), Perceived risk and consumer decision-making - The case of telephone shopping, *Journal of Marketing Research*, 1 (November), 32-9.

Cox, Reavis (1962), Changing social objectives in marketing, in *Emerging Concepts in Marketing*, Proceedings of the Winter Conference of the American Marketing Association, ed., William S. Decker, Pittsburgh, 16-25.

Cox, Reavis (1965), The search for universals in comparative studies of domestic marketing systems, in *Marketing and Economic Development*, ed., Peter D. Bennett, Chicago: American Marketing Association, Richard D. Irwin, 143-62.

Cox, Reavis and Charles S. Goodman (1954), *Channels and Flows in the Marketing of House-Building Materials*, Philadelphia: Mimeographed and published by the authors.

Cox, Reavis, Charles S. Goodman and Thomas C. Fichandler (1965), *Distribution in a High-level Economy*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice-Hall, Inc.

Crick, Malcolm (1982), Anthropology of knowledge, *Annual Review of Anthropology*, Palo Alto, CA.: Annual Reviews Inc.

Cundiff, Edward W. (1965), Concepts of comparative retailing, *Journal of Marketing*, 29 (January), 59-63.

Cyert, Richard and March, James (1963), *A Behaviour Theory of the Firm*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Dando, L. J. and P. G. Bennett (1981), A Kuhnian crisis in management science?, *Journal of Operational Research Society*, 32, 91-103.

Dascal, M. (1989), Artificial intelligence and philosophy: The knowledge of representation, *Systems Research*, 6 (1), 39-52.

Dawson, Leslie M. (1969), The Human Concept: New Philosophy for Business, *Business Horizons*, 12 (December), 29-38.

Dawson, Leslie M. (1971), Marketing Science in the Age of Aquarius, Journal of Marketing, 35 (July), 66-72.

Dawson, Leslie M. (1980), Marketing for Human Needs in a Human Future, Business Horizons, 23 (June), 72-82.

Dawson, Lyndon E., Jr., and Hugh G. Wales (1979), Consumer motivation theory in historical perspective: An Aldersonian view, in Conceptual and Theoretical Developments in Marketing, eds., Ferrell *et al.*, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 210-21.

Dawson, Scott, Bruce Stern and Tom Gillpatrick (1989), An empirical update and extension of patronage behaviours across the social class hierarchy, in Advances in Consumer Research, 17, eds., Marvin E. Goldberg *et al.*, Provo, UT.: Association for Consumer Research.

Day, George S. and Robin Wensley (1983), Marketing theory with a strategic orientation, Journal of Marketing, 47 (Fall), 79-89.

Deshpande, Rohit (1983), "Paradigms Lost": On Theory and Method in Research in Marketing, Journal of Marketing, 47 (Fall), 101-10.

Deshpande, Rohit (1984), Theoretical Myopia: The Discipline of Marketing and the Hierarchy of the Sciences, in 1984 AMA Winter Educators' Conference: Scientific Method in Marketing, eds., Paul F. Anderson and Michael J. Ryan, Chicago: American Marketing Association , 18-21.

Dholakia, Nikhilesh and Johan Arndt (eds.) (1985), Changing the Course of Marketing: Alternative Paradigms for Widening Marketing Theory, Greenwich. CT: JAI Press Inc.

Dholakia, Nikhilesh and Ruby Roy Dholakia (1982), Colloquium: Comparative marketing: Marketing in the emerging world order, Journal of Macromarketing, 2 (Spring), 47-56.

Dholakia, Nikhilesh and Ruby Roy Dholakia (1985), Choice and Choicelessness in the Paradigm of Marketing, in Changing the Course of Marketing: Alternative Paradigms for Widening Marketing Theory, eds., Nikhilkesh Dholakia and Johan Arndt, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press Inc., 173-186.

Dholakia, Nikhilesh, Roy Dholakia and A. Fuat Firat (1983), From social psychology to political economy: A model of energy use behaviour, Journal of Economic Psychology, 3, 231-47.

Dholakia, Nikhilesh and A. Fuat Firat (1980), A Critical View of The Research Enterprise in Marketing, in Theoretical Developments in Marketing, eds., Charles W. Lamb, Jr. and Patrick M. Dunne, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 316-9.

Dholakia, Nikhilesh and A. Fuat Firat (1986), Globalisation of consumption patterns and markets, in The Role of Marketing in Development: Global, Consumer, and Managerial Issues, eds., Erdogan Kumcu, A. Fuat Firat, Mehmet Karafakioglu, Muhittin Karabullut and Mehmet Oluc, Muncie, IN.: Ball State University, 127-36.

Dholakia, Nikhilesh, A. Fuat Firat and Richard P. Bagozzi (1980), The De-Americanisation of Marketing Thought: In Search of A Universal Basis, in Theoretical Developments in Marketing, eds., Charles W. Lamb, Jr. and Patrick M. Dunne, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 25-9.

Dholakia, Nikhilesh and Robert W. Nason (1984), Research Issues in Macro-Marketing: A Blueprint for Progress, European Journal of Marketing, 18 (1), 41-55.

Dholakia, Nikhilesh and John F. Sherry, Jr. (1987), Marketing and development: A resynthesis of knowledge, in Research in Marketing, 9, ed., J. N. Sheth, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, Inc, 119-43.

Dholakia, Nikhilesh and Alladi Venkatesh (1984), Metascientific Issues in Macromarketing Managerial Research, in 1984 AMA Winter Educators' Conference: Scientific Method in Marketing, eds., Paul F. Anderson and Michael J. Ryan, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 247-51.

Dholakia, Ruby Roy (1984), A macromarketing perspective on social marketing: The case of family planning in India, Journal of Macromarketing, 4 (Spring), 53-61.

Dichter, Ernest (1964), Handbook of Consumer Motivation: The Psychology of the World of Objects, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.

Dickinson, Roger (1982), Consumer Behaviour: A Consumer Perspective, in Marketing Theory: Philosophy of Science Perspectives, eds., Ronald F. Bush and Shelby D. Hunt, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 202-5.

Dickinson, Roger, Anthony Herbst and John O'Shaughnessy (1986), Marketing concept and customer orientation, European Journal of Marketing, 20 (10), 18-23.

Dill, W. R. (1958), Environment as an Influence on Managerial Autonomy, Administrative Science Quarterly, 2 (March), 407-443.

Dixon, Donald F. (1964), Functionalism as an approach to marketing study, Economics and Business Bulletin, 22-9.

Dixon, Donald F. (1980), The role of marketing in early theories of economic development, paper presented at the Fifth Macromarketing Seminar, University of Rhode Island, (August).

Dixon, Donald F. and I. F. Wilkinson (1989), An Alternative Paradigm for Marketing Theory, European Journal of Marketing, 23 (8), 59-69.

Doherty, Philip A. (1963), A Closer Look at Operations Research, Journal of Marketing, 27 (April), 59-65.

Doppelt, Gerald (1978), Kuhn's epistemological relativism: An interpretation and defence, Inquiry, 21, 33-86.

Dorfman, A. and Mattelart (1971), A Para Leer al Pato Donald, Valparaisl, Chile, Edicones Universitariaeas de Valparaiso; reprinted by Siglo, XXI, Buenes Aires, 1972; cf.: Rogers, Everett M. (1982), The Empirical and The Critical Schools of Communication Research, in Communication Yearbook, 5, ed., Michael Burgoon, NJ: New Brunswick, 125-44.

Dorfman, Joseph (1955), The role of the German historical school in American economic growth, _American Economics Review_, 45 (May Supplement), 17-39.

Douglas, Mary (1976), Relative poverty - relative communication, in _Traditions of Social Policy: Essays in Honour of Violet Butter_, ed., A. H. Halsey, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 197-215.

Douglas, Susan P. (1971), Patterns and parallels of marketing structures in several countries, _MSU Business Topics_, 19 (Spring), 38-48.

Douglas, Susan P. and C. Samuel Craig (1986), Contributions of Comparative Research to the Study of Consumer Behaviour, in _Marketing Management Technology as a Social Process_, ed., George Fisk, New York: Praeger, 93-112.

Dowling, Grahame (1983), The application of general systems theory to an analysis of marketing systems, _Journal of Macromarketing_, 3 (Fall), 22-32.

Doyle, P. (1987), Marketing and the British Chief Executive, _Journal of Marketing Management_, 3 (2), 121-32.

Drucker, Peter (1954), _The Practice of Management_, New York: Harper and Row Publishers.

Duddy, Edward A. and David A. Revzan (1947), _Marketing: An Institutional Approach_, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company Inc.

Duddy, Edward A. and David A. Revzan (1953), _Marketing: An Institutional Approach_, 2nd. ed., New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company Inc.

Duesenberry, J. S. (1949), _Income, Saving and the Theory of Consumer Behaviour_, Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press.

Duncan, C. S. (1921), _Marketing_, New York: D. Appleton and Company.

Durkheim, E. (1938), _The Rules of Sociological Method_, New York: Free Press.

Dykman, Charlene, A. (1992), Refinery constructors in corporated: A case study in adaptation to advanced telecommunications technology, _Systems Practice_, 5(3), 251-62.

EJM (1993a), _European Journal of Marketing_ Calling for Papers: Rethinking Marketing.

EJM (1993b), _European Journal of Marketing_ Calling for Papers: New Paradigm Research in Marketing.

El-Ansary, Adel I. (1979), The general theory of Marketing: Revisited, in _Conceptual and Theoretical Developments in Marketing_, eds., Ferrell *et al.*, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 399-407.

El-Ansary, Adel I. and Marilyn Liebrenz (1980), Comparative marketing systems analysis revisited, paper presented at the Fifth Macromarketing Seminar, University of Rhods Island, (August).

Elias, Norbert (1982), Scientific Establishments, in _Scientific Establishments and Hierarchies. Sociology of the Sciences_, 6, 3-69.

Elliot, G. R. (1990), The Marketing Concept--Necessary, but not Sufficient? An Environmental View, European Journal of Marketing, 24 (6), 20-30.

Elster, Jon (1983), Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ely, Richard T. (1886), Ethics and economics, Science Economics Discussion, New York: The Science Company, 44-56.

Emery, Donald R., Dorothy Jenkins and Lee D. Dahringer (1980), The foundations for a positive theory of macromarketing, in Macromarketing Evolution of Thought, eds., George Fisk, R. W. Nason, and P. D. White, Boulder: Business Research Division, University of Colorado, 197-209.

Emery, F. E., M. Emery, G. Caldwell, and A. Crombie (1974), Futures We're In, ANU, Canberra: Centre for Continuing Education.

Emery, F. E. and E. L. Trist (1965), The Causal Texture of Organisational Environments, Human Relations, 18 (February), 21-32.

Engel, J. F. (1963), Are automobile purchasers dissonant consumers? Journal of Marketing, 27 (April), 55-8.

Engel, J. F., D. T. Kollat and R. D. Blackwell (1968), Consumer Behaviour, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Engel, J. F., D. T. Kollat and R. D. Blackwell (1973), Consumer Behaviour, (2nd ed.), New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Enis, Ben M. and Kenneth J. Roering (1980), Product classification taxonomies: Synthesis and consumer implications, in Theoretical Developments in Marketing, eds., Charles, W. Lamb, Jr. and Patrick M. Dunne, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 186-9.

Etgar, Michael (1983), A failure in marketing technology transfer: The case of Ivory Coast, Journal of Macromarketing, 3 (Spring), 59-68.

Etizioni, Amitai (1970), Toward a macrosociology, in Macrosociology: Research and Theory, James S. Coleman, Amitai Etzioni and John Porter, Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 103-44.

Evans, F. B. (1959), Psychological and objective factors in the prediction of brand choice: Ford vs. Chevrolet, Journal of Business, 32, 340-69.

Faber, Ronald, Thomas O'Guinn and Raymond Krych (1987), Compulsive consumption, in Advances in Consumer Research, 14, ed., Melanie Wallendorf and Paul Anderson, Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research, 132-5.

Faichild, Henry Pratt (eds.) (1968), Dictionary of Sociology, NJ.: Littlefield.

Falkenberg, Andreas W. and John R. Wish (1980), Efficiency, Equity and Freedom of Choice as Evaluative Criteria for Normative Marketing Management, in Theoretical Developments in Marketing, eds., Charles W. Lamb, Jr. and Patrick M. Dunne, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 138-41.

Faria, A. J. (1983), The development of the functional approach to the study of marketing to 1940, in First North American Workshop on Historical Research *in Marketing*, eds., Stanley Hollander and Ronald Savitt, East Lansing, MI: MSU, 160-9.

Fay, B. (1987), *Critical Social Science*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Fejes, Fred (1984), Critical Mass Communications Research and Media Effects: The Problem of the Disappearing Audience, *Media, Culture and Society*, 6 (3), 219-32; reprinted in *Mass Communication Review Yearbook*, eds., Gurevitch and Levy, Beverley Hills, CA: Sage, 517-30.

Fennell, Geraldine (1982), Terms v. concepts: marketing segmentation, brand positioning and other aspects of the academic-practitioner gap, working paper, Bridgeport, CT.

Fennell, Geraldine (1985), Things of Heaven and Earth: Phenomenology, Marketing, and Consumer Research, in *Advances in Consumer research*, 12, ed., Elizabeth C. Hirschman and Morris B. Holbrook, Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research, 544-9.

Fennell, Geraldine (1986), Extending the Thinkable: Consumer Research for Marketing Practice, in *Advances in Consumer Research*, 13, ed., Richard J. Lutz, Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research, 427-32.

Ferber, Robert (ed.) (1974), *Handbook of Marketing Research*, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company.

Ferber, Robert and H. G. Wales (eds.) (1958), *Motivation and Market Behaviour*, Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc.

Feyerabend, Paul (1975/1980), *Against Method*, London: Verso.

Feyerabend, Paul (1978a), From Incompetent Professionalism to Professionalised Incompetence: The Rise of a New Breed of Intellectuals, *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, 8 (March), 37-53.

Feyerabend, Paul (1978b), *Science in a Free Society*, London: Verso.

Feyerabend, Paul (1981), More Clothes from the Emperor's Basement, *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, 32, 57-94.

Fiocca, R. and I. Snehota (1986), Marketing e altl tecnologia, *Sviluppo e Organizzazione*, 98, 24-31.

Firat, A. Fuat (1977), Consumption Patterns and Macromarketing: A Radical Perspective, *European Journal of Marketing*, 11 (4), 291-8.

Firat, A. Fuat (1984a), A Critique of The Orientations in Theory Development in Consumer Behaviour: Suggestions for The Future, in *Advances in Consumer Research*, 12, eds., Elizabeth C. Hirschman and Morris B. Holbrook, Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research, 3-6.

Firat, A. Fuat (1984b), Marketing Science: Issues Concerning The Scientific Method and the Philosophy of Science, in *1984 AMA Winter Educators' Conference: Scientific Method in Marketing*, eds., Paul F. Anderson and Michael J. Ryan, Chicago: American Marketing Association , 22-5.

Firat, A. Fuat (1985a), Ideology vs. Science in Marketing, in Changing the Course of Marketing: Alternative Paradigms for Widening Marketing Theory, eds., Nikhilkesh Dholakia and Johan Arndt, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press Inc., 135-46.

Firat, A. Fuat (1985b), A New Approach to Science and Research in Marketing: An Historical Necessity, in Marketing in The Long Run, eds., Hollander and Nevett, East Lansing: Dept. of Marketing and Transportation, Michigan State University, 317-28.

Firat, A. Fuat (1986a), Towards a Deeper Understanding of Consumption Experiences: The Underlying Dimensions, in Advances in Consumer Research, 14, eds., Melanie Wallendorf and Paul Anderson, Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research, 342-6.

Firat, A. Fuat (1986b), Relevance of marketing to development, in The Role of Marketing in Development: Global, Consumer, and Managerial Issues, eds., Erdogan Kumcu, A. Fuat Firat, Mehmet Karafakioglu, Muhittin Karabullut and Mehmet Oluc, Muncie, IN.: Ball State University, 10-1.

Firat, A. Fuat (1987a), The Social Construction of Consumption Patterns: Understanding Macro Consumption Phenomena, in Philosophical and Radical Thought in Marketing, eds., A. Fuat. Firat *et al.*, Lexington, MA: Lexington, 251-67.

Firat, A. Fuat (1987b), Historiography, scientific method, and exceptional historical events, in Advances in Consumer Research, 14, eds., Melanie Wallendorf and Paul Anderson, Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research, 435-8.

Firat, A. Fuat (1988a), The inevitability of historical evidence in generating macromarketing knowledge, in Marketing: A Return to the Broader Dimensions, eds., Stanley Shapiro and A. H. Walle, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 98-104.

Firat, A. Fuat (1988b), A critical historical perspective on needs: The macro or the micro rationale? in Marketing: A Return to the Broader Dimensions, eds., Stanley Shapiro and A. H. Walle, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 289-95.

Firat, A. Fuat (1988c), Consumption as production: The end result of marketing practice, in Marketing: A Return to the Broader Dimensions, eds., Stanley Shapiro and A. H. Walle, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 395-9.

Firat, A. Fuat (1989), Science and human understanding, in Marketing Theory and Practice, eds., Terry L. Childers *et al.*, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 93-8.

Firat, A. Fuat (1991a), Postmodern culture, marketing, and the consumers, in Marketing Theory and Applications, eds., Terry L. Childers *et al.*, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 237-42.

Firat, A. Fuat (1991b), The consumer in postmodernity, in Advances in Consumer Research, 18, eds., Rebecca H. Holman and Michael R. Solomon, Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research, 70-6.

Firat, A. Fuat (1993), Postmodernity: The age of marketing, International Journal of Research in Marketing, 10 (3), 227-49.

Firat, A. Fuat and Nikhilesh Dholakia (1982), Consumption Choices at the Macro Level, _Journal of Macromarketing_, 2 (Fall), 6-15.

Firat, A. Fuat, Nikhilesh Dholakia and Richard P. Bagozzi (eds.) (1987), _Philosophical and Radical Thought in Marketing_, Lexington Books, MA: Lexington.

Firat, A. Fuat and Lladi Venkatesh (1993), Postmodernity: The age of marketing, _International Journal of Research in Marketing_, 10 (3), 227-49.

Fischer, Eileen (1990), Regularities, rules and consumer research: Tangencies between positivist and interpretive approaches to research, in _Advances in Consumer Research_, 17, eds., Marvin E. Goldberg *et al.*, Provo, UT.: Association for Consumer Research, 19-24.

Fisk, George (1967), _Marketing Systems: An Introductory Analysis_, New York: Harper and Row.

Fisk, George (ed.) (1974a), _Marketing and Social Priorities_, Chicago: American Marketing Association.

Fisk, George (ed.) (1974b), _Marketing and the Ecological Crisis_, New York: Harper and Row.

Fisk, George (1980), Taxonomic classification of macromarketing theory, in _Theoretical Developments in Marketing_, eds., Charles W. Lamb, Jr. and Patrick M. Dunne, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 146-9.

Fisk, George (1982), Editors' working definition of macromarketing, _Journal of Macromarketing_, 2 (Spring), 3-4.

Fisk, George (ed.) (1986), _Marketing Management Technology as a Social Process_, New York: Praeger.

Fisk, George and Donald F. Dixon (eds.) (1967), _Theories for Marketing Systems Analysis_, New York: Harper & Row.

Fisk, George and Donald F. Dixon (1981), Comparative analysis of macromarketing systems and distribution channels: Organisation, current status, and future prospects, paper presented at the Sixth Macromarketing Seminar, Emory University, (August).

Fisk, George and Patricia Meyers (1982), Macromarketers' guide to paradigm development, in _Marketing Theory: Philosophy of Science Perspectives_, eds., Ronald F. Bush and Shelby D. Hunt, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 281-5, reprinted in _Marketing Theory: Distinguished Contributions_, eds., Stephen W. Brown and Raymond P. Fisk, New York: John Wiley and Sons, 194-205.

Fisk, George, Robert W. Nason and Philip D. White (eds.) (1980), _Macromarketing: Evolution of Thought_, Boulder, Colorado: Business Research Division, Graduate School of Business Administration, University of Colorado.

Fisk, George and Philip D. White (1981), Macromarketing: A state of the art review, in _Review of Marketing 1981_, eds., Ben M. Enis and Kenneth J. Roeving, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 173-84.

Fisk, Raymond P. (1982), Toward a Theoretical Framework for Marketing Ethics, in Marketing Theory: Philosophy of Science Perspectives, eds., Ronald F. Bush and Shelby D. Hunt, Chicago, American Marketing Association, 255-9.

Flacks, Richard and Gerald Turkel (1978), Radical sociology, Annual Review of Sociology, 193-238.

Flood, Robert, L. (1989a), Six Scenarios for the Future of Systems "Problem Solving", Systems Practice, 2 (1), 75-99.

Flood, Robert, L. (1989b), Archaeology of (systems) inquiry, Systems Practice, 2(1), 117-24.

Flood, Robert, L. (1990a), Liberating Systems Theory, New York: Plenum.

Flood, Robert, L. (1990b), Liberating systems theory: Toward critical systems thinking, Human Relations, 43(1), 49-75.

Flood, Robert, L. (1990c), Towards an adequate epistemology for systems practice, England: Hull University Press.

Flood, Robert, L. (1991), Redefining management and systems sciences, in Critical Systems Thinking: Directed Readings, eds., R. L. Flood and M. C. Jackson, Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 303-20.

Flood, Robert, L. (1993a), DSc Thesis.

Flood, Robert, L. (1993b), Beyond TQM, Chichester: Wiley & Sons.

Flood, Robert, L. (1995a), Total systems intervention (TSI): A reconstitution, Journal of Operational Research Society, 46 (2), 174-91.

Flood, Robert, L. (1995b), An improved version of the process of Total Systems Intervention (TSI), Systems Practice, 8 (3), 329-33.

Flood, Robert, L. (1995c), Solving Problem Solving, Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.

Flood, Robert, L. and Michael C. Jackson (1991a), Critical Systems Thinking: Directed Readings, Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.

Flood, Robert, L. and Michael C. Jackson (1991b), Creative Problem Solving: Total Systems Intervention, Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.

Flood, Robert, L. and Michael C. Jackson (1991c), Total systems intervention: A practical face to critical systems thinking, Systems Practice, 4(3), 197-213.

Flood, Robert L. and S. A. Robinson (1989), Whatever happened to general systems theory? in Systems Prospective, eds., R. L. Flood, M. C. Jackson and Paul Keys, New York: Plenum, 61-6.

Flood, Robert L. and Norma R. A. Romm (1995), Diversity management: Theory in action, Systems Practice, 8 (4), 496-82.

Flood, Robert L. and Werner Ulrich (1990), Testament to Conversations on Critical Systems Thinking Between Two Systems Practitioners, Systems Practice, 3 (1), 7-30.

Ford, D., H. Hakansson and J. Johanson (1986), How do companies interact? Industrial Marketing and Purchasing, 1 (1), 26-41; reprinted in Understanding

Business Markets: Interactions, Relationships, Networks, The IMP Group, ed., David Ford, 1990, London: Academic Press, 381-92.

Forester, John (1983), Critical theory and organisational analysis, in Beyond Method, ed., Gareth Morgan, Beverley Hills: Sage Publications, 234-246.

Forrester, Jay W. (1958), Industrial dynamics: A major breakthrough for decision makers, Harvard Business Review, 36 (July/August), 37-66.

Forrester, Jay W. (1959), Advertising: A problem in industrial dynamics, Harvard Business Review, 37 (March/April), 100-10.

Foucault, M. (1972), The Archaeology of Knowledge, London: Tavistock.

Foucault, M. (1980), in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writing 1972-1977, ed., C. Gordon, Brighton: Harvester Press.

Foxall, Gordon (1986), Consumer choice in behavioural perspective, European Journal of Marketing, 20 (3/4), 7-18.

Freedman, David H. (1992), Is management still a science? Harvard Business Review, 70 (November/December), 26-38.

Friedan, Betty (1964), The Feminine Mystique, New York: Norton.

Frideman, M. L. and G. A. Churchill, Jr. (1987), Using consumer perceptions and a contingency approach to improve health care delivery, Journal of Consumer Research, 13 (March), 492-510.

Fuenmayor, Ramses (1991), Between systems thinking and systems practice, in Critical Systems Thinking: Directed Readings, eds., R. L. Flood and M. C. Jackson, Chichester: John Wiley & Sons., 225-44.

Fullbrook, Earl S. (1940), The functional concept in marketing, Journal of Marketing, 4 (January), 229-37.

Fullerton, Ronald (1986), The marketing concept: A Deja Vu, in Marketing Management Technology as a Social Process, ed., George Fisk, New York: Praeger.

Fullerton, Ronald (1987a), The Poverty of Ahistorical Analysis: Present Weakness and Future Cure in U.S. Marketing Thought, in Philosophical and Radical Thought in Marketing, eds., A. Fuat Firat *et al.*, Lexington, MA: Lexington.

Fullerton, Ronald (1987b), Historicism: What It Means for Consumer Research, in Advances in Consumer Research, 14, eds., Melanie Wallendorf and Paul Anderson, Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research, 431-4.

Fullerton, Ronald A. (1988), Modern Western Marketing as a Historical Phenomenon: Theory and Illustration, in Historical Perspectives in Marketing, eds., Terence Nevett and Ronald A. Fullerton, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.

Gadamer, Hans-Geoge (1960), Truth and Method, translated and edited by Garrett Barden and John Cumming (1975), New York: Seabury Press, also (1989), New York: Crossroad.

Galbraith, John Kenneth (1958), The Affluent Society, Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Galbraith, John Kenneth (1967), The New Industrial State, Boston: Houghton Mifflin..

Galbraith, John Kenneth (1977), Organisation Design, Boston: Addison-Wesley.

Galbraith, John Kenneth and Richard Hulton (1955), Marketing Efficiency in Puerto Rico, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.

Galtung, Johan (1972), Empiricism, Criticism, Constructivism: Three Approaches to Scientific Activity, paper presented at the Third World Future Research Conference, Bucharest, September 3-10.

Gardner, B. B. and S. J. Levy (1955), The product and the brand, Harvard Business Review, 33 (March/April), 33-9.

Gardner, David M., James F. Cox, Jr., and John K. Wong (1980), A general model of consumer behaviour for macromarketing analysis, in Macromarketing: Evolution of Thought, eds., Fisk *et al.*, Business Research Division, Graduate School of Business Administration, Boulder, Colorado: University of Colorado, 253-69.

Gardner, Edward H. (1945), Consumer goods classification, Journal of Marketing, 9 (January), 275-6.

Gay, Edwin Francis (1927), Social progress and business education, Gay's Addresses, Address delivered at the Dedication of Weiboldt Hall, Northwestern University, June 16, in Edwin Francis Gay Collection, ed., San Marino, CA: The Huntington Library.

Geertz, Clifford (1979), From the native's point of view: On the nature of anthropological understanding, in Interpretive Social Science: A Reader, eds., P. Rabinow and W. M. Sullivan, Berkeley, CA.: University of California Press.

Gergen, K. J. (1992), Organisation theory in the postmodern era, in Rethinking Organisation, eds., M. Reed and M. Hughes, London: Sage, 207-26.

Giddens, A. (1975), New Rules of Sociological Method, Essex: Anchor Press.

Giddens, A. (1990), The Consequences of Modernity, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Giorgi, Amedeo (1986), Theoretical justification for the use of descriptions in psychological research, in Qualitative Research in Psychology, eds., Peter Ashworth, Amedeo Giorgi, and Andre de Koning, Pittsburgh, PA.: Dusquesne University Press, 3-22.

Glaser, S. (1985), The Marketing System and the Environment, European Journal of Marketing, 19 (4), 54-72.

Glaser, S. and M. I. Halliday (1980), A systems foundation for Alderson's functionalism, in Macromarketing: Evolution of Thought, eds., Fisk *et al.*, Business Research Division, Graduate School of Business Administration, Boulder, Colorado: University of Colorado, 71-81.

Goldstucker, Jac L. (1965), Trading areas, in Science in Marketing, ed., George Schwartz, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 281-320.

Goldstucker, Jac L. (1966), A systems framework for retail location, in Science, Technology, and Marketing, ed., Raymond M. Hass, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 412-29.

Gordon, Robert and J. E. Howell (1959), *Higher Education for Business*, New York: Columbia University Press.

Gorz, A. (1967), *Nykapitalismen og arbeiderklassen*, Oslo: Tiden norsk forlag; cf.: Gronmo, Sigmund (1984), Compensatory Consumer Behaviour: Theoretical Perspectives, Empirical Examples and Methodological Challenges, in *1984 AMA Winter Educators' Conference: Scientific Method in Marketing*, eds., Paul F. Anderson and Michael J. Ryan, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 184-8.

Gorz, A. (1989), *Critique of Economic Reason*, London: Verso.

Granzin, Kent L. (1982a), A proposed path toward marketing theory: An illustration of multidisciplinary synthesis by means of the value relation, in *Marketing Theory: Philosophy of Science Perspectives*, eds., Ronald F. Bush and Shelby D. Hunt, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 63-66.

Granzin, Kent L. (1982b), A conceptual systems framework for marketing, in *Marketing Theory: Philosophy of Science Perspectives*, eds., Ronald F. Bush and Shelby D. Hunt, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 246-9.

Granzin, Kent L. (1984), Consumer Logistics: A characterisation of the field by means of general living systems theory, in *1984 AMA Winter Educators' Conference: Scientific Method in Marketing*, eds., Paul F. Anderson and Michael J. Ryan, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 168-72.

Grashof, John F. and Alan P. Kelman (1973), *Introduction to Macromarketing*, Columbus, OH: Grid, Inc.

Green, Robert T. and Eric Langeard (1975), A cross-national comparison of consumer habits and innovator characteristics, *Journal of Marketing*, 39 (July), 34-41.

Green, S. M. (1993), Total systems intervention: A trial by Jury, *Systems Practice*, 6(3), 295-9.

Gregory, W. J. (1992), Critical systems thinking and pluralism: A new constellation (PhD thesis), London: City University.

Gregory, W. J. (1994), Critical appreciation: Thinking, speaking and acting critically, in *New Systems Thinking and Action for a New Century*, Proceedings of the 38th Annual Meeting, International Society for the Systems Science, California, 1555-74.

Gregory, W. J. and Norma Romm (1994), Developing multi-agency dialogue: The role(s) of facilitation, working paper No. 6, Centre for Systems Studies, University of Hull, England.

Grether, E. T. (1950), A theoretical approach to the analysis of marketing, in *Theory in Marketing*, eds., Reavis Cox and Wroe Alderson, Chicago: Richard D. Irwin, 113-23.

Grether, E. T. (1966), *Marketing and Public Policy*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice-Hall.

Grether, E. T. (1983), Regional-spatial analysis in marketing, *Journal of Marketing*, 47 (Fall), 36-43.

Grether, E. T. (1988), Macro-micro marketing in perspective, in *Marketing: A Return to the Broader Dimensions*, eds., Stanley Shapiro and A. H. Walle, Chicago: American Marketing Association, iv-vi.

Gronmo, Sigmund (1984), Compensatory Consumer Behaviour: Theoretical Perspectives, Empirical Examples and Methodological Challenges, in *1984 AMA Winter Educators' Conference: Scientific Method in Marketing*, eds., Paul F. Anderson and Michael J. Ryan, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 184-8.

Gronhaug, Kjell and Nikhilesh Dholakia (1987), Consumer, Markets and Supply Systems: A Perspective on Marketisation and Its Effects, in *Philosophical and Radical Thought in Marketing*, eds., A. Fuat Firat, *et al.*, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.

Gronrros, Christian (1989), Defining marketing: A market-oriented approach, *European Journal of Marketing*, 23 (1), 52-60.

Gu, Jifa and Zhichang Zhu (1995), The *Wu-li Shi-li Ren-li* approach (WSR): An Oriental systems methodology, in *Systems Methodology: Possibilities for Cross-cultural Learning and Integration*, eds., Gerald Midgley and Jennifer Wilby, Centre for Systems Studies, University of Hull, England, 31-40.

Habermas, J. (1966), Knowledge and interest, *Inquiry*, 9 (4), 285-300.

Habermas, J. (1968), *Knowledge and Human Interests*, trans., Jeremy J. Shapiro, Boston: Beacon Press, 1971.

Habermas, J. (1970a), Systematically distorted communication, *Inquiry*, 13, 205-18.

Habermas, J. (1970b), Towards a theory of communicative competence, *Inquiry*, 13, 360-75

Habermas, J. (1971), *Towards a Rational Society*, trans., Jeremy J. Shapiro, London: Heinemann, 1971.

Habermas, J. (1973), *Theory and Practice*, trans. J. Viertel, Boston: Beacon Press, 1974.

Habermas, J. (1975), *Legitimation Crisis*, trans., Thomas MaCarthy, Boston: Beacon Press, 1975; and London: Heinemann, 1976.

Habermas, J. (1979), *Communication and the Evolution of Society*, trans., Thomas McCarthy, Boston: Beacon Press, 1979; London: Heinmann, 1979.

Habermas, J. (1981a), *The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. I: Reason and the Rationalisation of Society*, trans., Thomas McCarthy, Boston: Beacon Press, 1984; London: Heinmann, 1984.

Habermas, J. (1981b), *The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. II: A Critique of Functionalist Reason*, trans., Thomas McCarthy, Boston: Beacon Press, 1987.

Habermas, J. (1981c), Modernity versus Postmodernity, New German Critique, 22 (Winter).

Habermas, J. (1982), A reply to my critics, in Habermas: Critical Debates, eds., John B. Thompson and David Held, London: MacMillan, 219-83.

Habermas, J. (1985), The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag; trans., Frederick Lawrence, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987.

Hakansson, H. (ed.) (1982), International Marketing and Purchasing of Industrial Goods: An Interaction Approach, Chichester: Wiley.

Hakansson, H. and J. Johanson (1988), Formal and international industrial networks, in Co-operative Strategies in International Business, eds., F. J. Contractor and P. Lorange, Mass.: Lexington Books, 369-79; reprinted in Understanding Business Markets: Interactions, Relationships, Networks, The IMP Group, ed., David Ford, 1990, London: Academic Press, 459-67.

Hakansson, H. and I. Snehota (1989), No Business is an Island: The Network Concept of Business Strategy, Scandinavian Journal of Management, 4 (3), 187-200; reprinted in Understanding Business Markets: Interactions, Relationships, Networks, The IMP Group, ed., David Ford, 1990, London: Academic Press, 526-40.

Halbert, Michael H. (1964), The Requirements for Theory in Marketing, in Theory in Marketing, 2nd series, eds., Reavis Cox, Wore Alderson and Stanley J. Shapiro, Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin inc.

Hales, M. (1974), Management science and the 'second industrial revolution', Radical Science Journal, 1:5.

Hall, A., and F. Fagen (1968), Definition of a system, in Modern Systems Research for the Behavioural Scientist, ed., W. Buckley, Chicago: Aldine Publishing, 81-92.

Hall, S. (1980), Cultural studies: Two paradigms, Media, Culture and Society, 2 (1).

Hampton, Gerald M. and C. Patrick Fleenor (1979), The Need for Value-Based Marketing, in Conceptual And Theoretical Developments in Marketing, eds. Ferrell *et al.*, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 237-45.

Hansen, Flemming (1972), Consumer Choice Behaviour: A Cognitive Theory, New York: Free Press.

Harrison, K., D. Henley, H. Riley and J. Shaffer (1974), Improving Food Marketing Systems in Developing Countries: Experiences from Latin America, East Lansing, MI.: Latin American Studies Centre, Michigan State University.

Hass, Jack (1987), Prospects for Consumer Research, in Advances in Consumer Research, 14, eds., Melanie Wallendorf and Paul Anderson, Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research, 76-8.

Haug, Wolfgang F. (1971), Kritik der warenasthetik, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp; cf.: Gronmo, Sigmund (1984), Compensatory Consumer Behaviour: Theoretical Perspectives, Empirical Examples and Methodological Challenges, in 1984 AMA Winter Educators' Conference: Scientific Method in Marketing, eds., Paul F. Anderson and Michael J. Ryan, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 184-8.

Hauser, John R. (1985), The coming revolution in marketing theory, in Marketing in an Electronic Age, ed., R. D. Buzzel, Boston: Harvard Business School Press.

Heede, Soren (1980), Marx and Marketing: Essays on the Social Psychology of Marketing, Copenhagen: The Copenhagen School of Economics and Business Administration.

Heede, Soren (1981a), A Radical Theory of Marketing, Copenhagen: The Copenhagen School of Economics and Business Administration.

Heede, Soren (1981b), From micromarketing to macromarketing: Radical social systems paradigms, Journal of Macromarketing, 1 (Fall), 60-1.

Heede, Soren (1985), The Conflict Between Ideology and Science, in Changing the Course of Marketing: Alternative Paradigms for Widening Marketing Theory, eds. Nikhilkesh Dholakia and Johan Arndt, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press Inc., 147-57.

Heede, Soren (1992), Economics and Marketing, in Essays in Honour of Gosta Mickwitz, Swedish School of Economics and Business Administration, Finland, Helsingfors Multiprint, 145-58.

Heisley, Deborah D. and Paul S. Holmes (1987), A Review of Family Consumption Research: The Need for a More Anthropological Perspective, in Advances in Consumer Research, 14, eds., Melanie Wallendorf and Paul Anderson, Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research, 453-7.

Helgeson, James G. and John Mager (1988), A living systems perspective on the macromarketing system and how balance is attained in the system, in Marketing: A Return to the Broader Dimensions, eds., Stanley Shapiro and A. H. Walle, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 470-5.

Henderson, J. L. (1917), The Order of Nature, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Henderson, James and Richard E. Quandt (1971), Microeconomics Theory: A Mathematical Approach, 2nd ed., Englewood, Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice-Hall.

Herbst, Jurgen (1965), The German Historical School in American Scholarship, New York: Cornell University Press.

Hesse, Mary (1982), Science and objectivity, in Habermas: Critical Debates, eds., John B. Thompson and David Held, London: MacMillan, 98-115.

Hetrick, William (1989), The ideology of consumerism: A critique, in Marketing Theory and Practice, eds., Terry L. Childers *et al.*, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 40-3.

Hibshoosh, Aharon and Franco M. Nicosia (1987), The social consumer: Institutional aspects of consumer decision process, in Philosophical and Radical Thought in Marketing, eds., A. Fuat Firat *et al.*, Mass.: Lexington Books, 15-38.

Hirschman, Elizabeth C. (1983), Aesthetics, Ideologies and the Limits of the Marketing Concept, Journal of Marketing, 47 (Summer), 45-55.

Hirschman, Elizabeth C. (1985), Scientific Style and the Conduct of Consumer Research, Journal of Consumer Research, 12 (September), 225-39.

Hirschman, Elizabeth C. (1986a), Humanistic Inquiry in Marketing Research: Philosophy, Method, and Criteria, Journal of Marketing Research, 23 (August), 237-49.

Hirschman, Elizabeth C. (1986b), The creation of product symbolism, in Advances in Consumer Research, 13, ed., Richard J. Lutz, Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research, 327-31.

Hirschman, Elizabeth C. (1987a), People as Products: Analysis of a Complex Marketing Exchange, Journal of Marketing, 51 (January), 98-108.

Hirschman, Elizabeth C. (1987b), Movies as myths: An interpretation of motion picture mythology, in Marketing and Semiotics: New Directions in the Study of Signs for Sale, ed., Jean Umiker-Sebeok, Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 335-73.

Hirschman, Elizabeth C. (1987c), 'Beverley Hills Cop' and consumer behaviour, in Marketing Theory, eds., Russell W. Belk *et al.*, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 136-41.

Hirschman, Elizabeth C. (1987d), Marketing research: To serve what purposes? in Marketing Theory, eds., Russell W. Belk *et al.*, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 204-8.

Hirschman, Elizabeth C. (1988), The ideology of consumption: A structural-syntactic analysis of *Dallas* and *Dynasty*, Journal of Consumer Research, 15 (3), 344-59.

Hirschman, Elizabeth C. (ed.) (1989a), Interpretive Consumer Research, Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research.

Hirschman, Elizabeth C. (1989b), The semiotics of sacredness: Consumption imagery in *The Emerald Forest*, in Marketing Theory and Practice, eds., Terry L. Childers *et al.*, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 221-6.

Hirschman, Elizabeth C. (1990), Secular immortality and the American ideology of affluence, in Advances in Consumer Research, 17, eds., Marvin E. Goldberg *et al.*, Provo, UT.: Association for Consumer Research, 31-42.

Hirschman, Elizabeth C. (1991), Secular Mortality and the Dark Side of Consumer Behaviour: Or How Semiotics Saved My Life', in Advances in Consumer Research, 18, eds., Rebecca H. Holman and Michael R. Solomon, Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research, 1-4.

Hirschman, Elizabeth C. (1993), Ideology in Consumer Research, 1980 and 1990: A Marxist and Feminist Critique, Journal of Consumer Research, 19 (March), 537-55.

Hirschman, Elizabeth C. and Morris B. Holbrook (1981), Symbolic Consumer Behaviour, Ann Arbor, MI.: Association for Consumer Research.

Hirschman, Elizabeth C. and Morris B. Holbrook (1982), Hedonic Consumption: Emerging Concepts, Methods and Propositions, Journal of Marketing, 46 (Summer), 92-101.

Hirschman, Elizabeth C. and Morris B. Holbrook (1992), Postmodern Consumer Research: The Study of Consumption as Text, Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Hirschman, Elizabeth C. and Priscilla LaBarbera (1989), The meaning of Christmas, in Interpretive Consumer Research, ed., Elizabeth C. Hirschman, Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research, 136-47.

Holbrook, Morris B. (1985a), The consumer researcher visits radio city: Dancing in the dance, in Advances in Consumer research, 12, eds., Elizabeth C. Hirschman and Morris B. Holbrook, Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research, 28-31.

Holbrook, Morris B. (1985b), Why Business Is Bad for Consumer Research: The Three Bears Revisited, in Advances in Consumer research, 12, eds., Elizabeth C. Hirschman and Morris B. Holbrook, Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research, 145-56.

Holbrook, Morris B. (1987a), The Dramatic Side of Consumer Research: The Semiology of Consumption Symbolism in the Arts, in Advances in Consumer Research, 14, eds., Melanie Wallendorf and Paul Anderson, Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research, 237-40.

Holbrook, Morris B. (1987b), The study of signs in consumer aesthetics: An egocentric review, in Marketing and Semiotics: New Directions in the Study of Signs for Sale, ed., Jean Umiker-Sebeok, Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 73-121.

Holbrook, Morris B. (1987c), Mirror, mirror on the wall: What's unfair in the reflections on advertising, Journal of Marketing, 51 (July), 95-103.

Holbrook, Morris B. (1988a), Consumption Symbolism and Meaning in Works of Arts: A Paradigmatic Case, European Journal of Marketing, 22 (7), 19-36.

Holbrook, Morris B. (1988b), The psychoanalytic interpretation of consumer behaviour, in Research in Consumer Behaviour, 3, eds., J. N. Sheth and E. C. Hirschman, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 149-78.

Holbrook, Morris B. (1989), Seven Routes to Facilitating the Semiological Interpretation of Consumption Symbolism and Marketing Imagery in Works of Art: Some Tips for Wildcats, in Advances in Consumer Research, 16, ed., Thomas K. Srull, Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research, 420-25.

Holbrook, Morris B., Stephen Bell, and Mark W. Grayson (1989), The Role of Humanities in Consumer Research, in Interpretive Consumer Research, ed., Elizabeth Hirschman, Provo, UT: Association for consumer Research, 20-47.

Holbrook, Morris B. and Mark W. Grayson (1986), The Semiology of Cinematic Consumption: Symbolic Consumer Behaviour in *Out of Africa*, Journal of Consumer Research, 3 (December), 374-81.

Holbrook, Morris B. and Elizabeth Hirschman (1982), the experiential aspect of consumption: Consumer fantasies, feelings, and fun, Journal of Consumer Research, 9 (2), 132-40.

Holbrook, Morris B. and John A. Howard (1977), Frequently purchased nondurable goods and service, in Selected Aspects of Consumer Behaviour: A Summary *from the Perspective of Different Disciplines*, ed., Robert Ferber, Washington D. C.: National Foundation, Directorate for Research Applications, Research Application to National Needs.

Holbrook, Morris B. and O'Shaugnessy (1988), On the Scientific Status of Consumer Research and the Need for an Interpretive Approach to Studying Consumption Behaviour, *Journal of Consumer Research*, 15 (December), 398-402.

Hollander, Stanley C. (1980), Let Us Contemplate Our Navels: The Need for a Sociology of Marketers and Marketologists, in *Theoretical Developments in Marketing*, eds., Charles W. Lamb, Jr and Patrick M. Dunne, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 55-8.

Hollander, Stanley C. (1986), The Marketing Concept: A Deja Vu, in *Marketing Management Technology as a Social Process*, ed., George Fisk, New York: Praeger, 3-29.

Hollander, Stanley C. and Terence Nevett (eds.) (1985), *Marketing in the Long Run. Proceedings of the Second Marketing History Conference*, East Lansing: Michigan State University Press.

Hollander, Stanley C. and Ronald Savitt (eds.) (1983), *First North American Workshop on Historical Research in Marketing: A Proceedings*, East Lansing: Michigan State University Press.

Holloway, Robert J. (ed.) (1967), *A Basic Bibliography on Experiments in Marketing*, Chicago: American Marketing Association.

Holloway, Robert J. and Robert S. Hancock (1964), *The Environment of Marketing Behaviour*, New York: John Wiley & Sons.

Holloway, Robert J. and Robert S. Hancock (1968), *Marketing in A Changing Environment*, New York: John Wiley & Sons.

Holloway, Robert J. and Robert S. Hancock (1974), *The Environment of Marketing Management*, New York: John Wiley & Sons.

Holton, Richard H. (1958), The distinction between convenience goods, shopping goods, and speciality goods, *Journal of Marketing*, 23 (July), 53-6.

Holton, Richard H. (1981), Public regulation of consumer information: The life insurance industry case, in *Regulation of Marketing and The Public Interest*, eds., F. E. Balderston, J. M. Carman, and F. M. Nicosia, New York: Pergamon Press.

Honneth, Axel, Eberhard Knodler-Bunte and Arno Widman (1981), The dialectics of rationalisation: An interview with Jurgen Habermas, *Telos*, 49(Fall), 5-31.

Hoos, I. (1972), *Systems Analysis in Public Policy: A Critique*, Berkeley: University of California Press.

Hoos, I. (1976), Engineers as analysts of social systems: A critical inquiry, *Journal of Systems Engineering*, 4(2):81.

Hoult, Thomas Ford (1972), *Dictionary of Modern Sociology*, Totowa, NJ.: Littlefield, Adams & Co.

Houston, Franklin, S. (1986), The Marketing Concept: What It Is and What It Is Not, Journal of Marketing, 50 (April), 81-7.

Howard, John A. (1957), Marketing Management: Analysis and Decision, Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc.

Howard, John A. (1963), Marketing: Executive and Buyer Behaviour, New York: Colombia University Press.

Howard, John A. (1965), Marketing Theory, Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

Howard, John A. (1983), Marketing theory of the firm, Journal of Marketing, 47 (Fall), 90-100.

Howard, John A. and Jagdish N. Sheth (1968), A theory of buyer behaviour, in Perspectives in Consumer Behaviour, eds., Harold H. Kassarjian and Thomas S. Robertson, Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman and Company, 467-87.

Howard, John A. and Jagdish N. Sheth (1969), The Theory of Buyer Behaviour, New York: Wiley.

Huckdeldt, R. R.., C. W. Kohfeld, and T. W. Likens (1982), Dynamic Modelling, Beverley Hills: Sage.

Hudson, Laurel Anderson and Jeff B. Murray (1986), Methodological Limitations of the Hedonic Consumption Paradigm and a Possible Alternative: A Subjectivist Approach, in Advances in Consumer Research, 13, ed., Richard J. Lutz, Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research, 343-8.

Hudson, Laurel Anderson and Julie L. Ozanne (1988), Alternative Ways of Seeking Knowledge in Consumer Research, Journal of Consumer research, 14 (March), 508-21.

Hunt, Shelby D. (1971), The morphology of theory and the general theory of marketing, Journal of Marketing, 35 (April), 65-8.

Hunt, Shelby D. (1976a), Marketing Theory: Conceptual Foundations of Research in Marketing, Columbus, OH: Grid Inc.

Hunt, Shelby D. (1976b), The nature and scope of marketing, Journal of Marketing, 40 (July), 17-28.

Hunt, Shelby D. (1977), The three dichotomies model of marketing: An elaboration of issues, in Macromarketing: Distributive Processes from a Societal Perspective, ed., Charles D. Slater, Boulder: University of Colorado, Business Research Division.

Hunt, Shelby D. (1982), Are The Logical Empirical Models of Explanation Dead? in Marketing Theory: Philosophy of Science Perspectives, eds., Ronald F. Bush and Shelby D. Hunt, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 7-10.

Hunt, Shelby D. (1983a), Marketing Theory: Philosophy of Marketing Science, Homewood, IL: Irwin.

Hunt, Shelby D. (1983b), General theories and fundamental explananda of marketing, Journal of Marketing, 47 (Fall), 9-17.

Hunt, Shelby D. (1984), Should Marketing Adopt Relativism? in _Scientific Method of Marketing_, eds., Paul F. Anderson and Michael J. Ryan, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 30-4.

Hunt, Shelby D. (1988), The nature of social marketing and its interface with macromarketing, in _Marketing: A Return to the Broader Dimensions_, eds., Stanley Shapiro and A. H. Walle, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 357-8.

Hunt, Shelby D. (1989a), Naturalistic, Humanistic, and Interpretive Inquiry: Challenges and Ultimate Potential, in _Interpretive Consumer Research_, ed., Elizabeth Hirschman, Provo, UT: Association for consumer Research.

Hunt, Shelby D. (1989b), Reification and Realism in Marketing: In Defence of Reason, _Journal of Macromarketing_, 9 (Fall), 4-10.

Hunt, Shelby D. (1990a), Truth in Marketing Theory and Research, _Journal of Marketing_, 54 (July), 1-15.

Hunt, Shelby D. (1990b), _Modern Marketing Theory: Critical Issues in the Philosophy of Marketing Science._ Cincinnati, OH: South-western Publishing Company.

Hunt, Shelby D. (1991), Positivism and Paradigm Dominance in Consumer Research: Toward Critical Pluralism and Rapprochement, _Journal of Consumer Research_, 18 (June), 32-44.

Hunt, Shelby D. (1992a), For Reason and Realism in Marketing, _Journal of Marketing_, 56 (April), 89-102.

Hunt, Shelby D. (1992b). Marketing is ..., _Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science_, 20 (4), 301-11.

Hunt, Shelby D. (1993), Objectivity in Marketing Theory and Research, _Journal of Marketing_, 57 (April), 76-91.

Hunt, Shelby D. (1994), On rethinking marketing: our discipline, our practice, our method, _European Journal of Marketing_, 28 (3), 13-25.

Hunt, Shelby D. and J. Burnett (1982), The Macromarketing/Micromarketing Dichotomy: A Taxonomical Model, _Journal of marketing_, 46 (Summer), 11-26.

Hunt, Shelby D. and Jerry Goolsby (1988), The rise and fall of the functional approach to marketing: A paradigm displacement perspective, in _Historical Perspective in Marketing_, eds., Terence Nevett and Ronald A. Fullerton, MA: Lexington Books, 35-51.

Hunt, Shelby D. and Paul S. Speck (1985), Dose Logical Empiricism Imprison Marketing? in _Changing the Course of Marketing: Alternative Paradigms for Widening Marketing Theory_, eds., Nikhilkesh Dholakia and Johan Arndt, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press Inc., 27-35.

Hutchinson, Kenneth D. (1952), Marketing as a science: an appraisal, _Journal of Marketing_, 17 (January), 286-93.

IMP Group (1982), *International Marketing and Purchasing of Industrial Goods*, Chichester: Wiley.

IMP Group (1990), *Understanding Business Markets: Interactions, Relationships, Networks*, ed., David Ford, London: Academic Press.

Ivey, Paul Wasley (1923), *Principles of Marketing*, New York: Ronald Press Co.

Jackson, Michael C. (1982), The nature of soft systems thinking: The work of Churchman, Ackoff and Checkland, *Journal of Applied Systems Analysis*, 9, 17-29.

Jackson, Michael C. (1985), Social systems theory and practice: The need for a critical approach, *International Journal of General Systems*, 10:135.

Jackson, Michael C. (1987a), Present Positions and Future Prospects in Management Science, *Omega*, 15, 455-66.

Jackson, Michael C. (1987b), New directions in management science, in *New Directions in Management Sciences*, eds., M. C. Jackson and Paul Keys, Aldershot: Gower, 133-64.

Jackson, Michael C. (1988), Systems methods for organisational analysis and design, *Systems Research*, 5(3), 201-10.

Jackson, Michael C. (1989), Evaluating the managerial significance of the VSM, in *The Viable Systems Model*, eds., R. Espejo and R. J. Harnden, Chichester: Wiley, 407-39.

Jackson, Michael C. (1991a), *Systems Methodology for the Management Sciences*, New York: Plenum.

Jackson, Michael C. (1991b), Arguments between critical systems thinkers: A critical comment on Flood and Ulrich's 'Testament', *Systems Practice*, 4(6), 611-4.

Jackson, Michael C. (1993), Don't bite my finger: Haridmios Tsoukas' critical evaluation of total systems intervention, *Systems Practice*, 6(3), 289-94.

Jackson, Michael C. and Paul Keys (1984), Towards a systems of systems methodologies, *Journal of Operational Research Society*, 35, 437-86.

Jackson, Norman and Pippa Carter (1991), In defence of paradigm incommensurability, *Organisation Studies*, 12 (1), 109-27.

Jacoby, Jacob (1978), Consumer Research: A State of the Art Review, *Journal of Marketing*, 42 (April), 87-96.

Jaffe, Eugene D. (1976), Comparative marketing revisited, *Marquette Business Review*, (Winter), 143-53.

Jain, Virender (1981), Structural analysis of general systems theory, *Behavioural Science*, 26 (April), 51-62.

Jay, Martin (1984a), *Adorno*, Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press.

Jay, Martin (1984b), *Marxism and Totality: The Adventures of a Concept from Lukacs to Habermas*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Jenkins, G. M. (1972), The systems approach, in *Systems Behaviour*, eds., J. Beishon and G. Peters, London: Open University Press, 78-104.

Jobber, D. (1977), Marketing Information Systems in United States and British Industry, *Management Decisions*, 15 (2), 297-304.

Johanson, J. and L. G. Mattsson (1988), Internationalisation in industrial systems - a network approach, in *Strategies in Global Competition*, eds., N. Hood and J. E. Vahlne, New York: Vroom Helm, 287-314; reprinted in *Understanding Business Markets: Interactions, Relationships, Networks*, The IMP Group, ed., David Ford, 1990, London: Academic Press, 468-86.

Jones, D. G. Brian (1988), Origins of the functional approach in marketing, in *Marketing: A Return to the Broader Dimensions*, eds., Stanley Shapiro and A. H. Walle, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 166-70.

Jones, D. G. Brian and David D. Monieson (1987), Origins of the institutional approach in marketing, in *Marketing in Three Eras*, eds., Terence Nevett and Stanley C. Hollander, Department of Marketing and Transportation Administration, Graduate School of Business Administration, East Lansing: Michigan State University, 149-68.

Jones, D. G. Brian and David D. Monieson (1990a), Early development of the philosophy of marketing thought, *Journal of Marketing*, 54 (January), 102-13.

Jones, D. G. Brian and David D. Monieson (1990b), Historical research in marketing: Retrospect and prospect, *Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science*, 18 (4), 269-78.

Joy, Annamma (1988), Marketing and culture: An epistemological critique, in *Marketing: A Return to the Broader Dimensions*, eds., Stanley Shapiro and A. H. Walle, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 389-94.

Joy, Annamma (1991), Beyond the Odyssey: Interpretations of ethnographic writing in consumer behaviour, in *Highways and Buyways: Naturalistic Research From the Consumer Behaviour Odyssey*, ed., Russell W. Belk, Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research, 216-33.

Kaish, Stanley (1967), Cognitive dissonance and the classification of consumer goods, *Journal of Marketing*, 31 (October), 28-31.

Kant, I. (1787), *The Critique of Pure Reason*, (2nd ed.), trans. Smith, N. K., MacMillan, Basingstoke, 1933.

Karlinsky, Meir (1987), Changing Asymmetry in Marketing, in *Philosophical and Radical Thought in Marketing*, eds., A. Fuat Firat *et al.*, MA: Lexington, 39-56.

Kassarjian, Harold H. (1965), Riesman Revisited, *Journal of Marketing*, 30 (April), 54-6.

Kassarjian, Harold H. and Thomas S. Robertson (eds.) (1968), *Perspectives in Consumer Behaviour*, Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman and Company.

Kassarjian, Harold H. and Thomas S. Robertson (eds.) (1981), *Perspectives in Consumer Behaviour*, 3rd ed., Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman and Company.

Katona, George (1953), Rational behaviour and economic behaviour, *Psychological Review*, 60 (September), 307-18.

Katona, George (1960), The Powerful Consumer: Psychological Studies of the American Economy, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company.

Katz, D. and R. L. Kahn (1966), The Social Psychology of Organisations, New York: Wiley.

Katz, Elihu and Paul F. Lazarsfeld (1955), Personal Influence: The Part Played by People in the Flow of Mass Communications, Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press.

Kavanagh, Donncha (1994), Hunt versus Anderson: Round 16, European Journal of Marketing, 28 (3), 26-41.

Kaynak, Erder (1982), Marketing in the Third World, New York: Fraeger.

Kaynak, Erder (1986), World Food Marketing Systems, Butterworths.

Keat, R. N. (1981), The Politics of Social Theory: Häbermas, Freud and the Critique of Positivism, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Keith, Robert, J. (1960), The marketing revolution, Journal of Marketing, 24 (January), 35-8.

Kelley, Eugene J. (1965), Ethics and science in marketing, in Science in Marketing, ed., George Schwartz, New York: John Wiley and Sons, 465-83.

Kelley, E. J. and William Lazer (1958), Managerial Marketing: Perspectives and Viewpoints, Homewood, Ill: Richard D. Irwin, Inc.

Kelley, E. J. and William Lazer (1967), Managerial Marketing: Perspectives and Viewpoints, 3rd ed., Homewood, Ill: Richard D. Irwin, Inc.

Kelly, G. A. (1970), A Brief Introduction to Personal Construct Theory, in Perspectives in Personal Construct Theory, ed., D. Bannister, London: Academic Press.

Kernnan, Jerome B. and Montrose S. Sommers (1968), Perspectives in Marketing Theory, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.

Keynes, J. M. (1935), The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, New York: Brace, Harcont.

Kilbourne, William E. (1987a), Self-Actualisation and the Consumption Process: Can You Get There from Here? in Philosophical and Radical Thought in Marketing, eds., A. Fuat Firat *et al.*, Heath, MA: Lexington, 217-34.

Kilbourne, William E. (1987b), The self actualising consumer vs. the class cage, in Marketing Theory, eds., Russell W. Belk *et al.*, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 312-5.

Kilbourne, William E. (1989), The Critical Theory of Herbert Marcuse and Its Relationship to Consumption, in Marketing Theory and Practice, eds. Richard Bagozzi and J. Paul Peter, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 172-5.

King, Robert L. (1965), The marketing concept, in Science in Marketing, ed., George Schwartz, New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 70-97.

King, William R. (1969), Systems Analysis at the Public-Private Marketing Frontier, Journal of Marketing, 33 (Jan.), 84-9.

Kollat, David T., Roger D. Blackwell, and James F. Engle (1972), The current status of consumer research: Development during the 1968-1972 period, in *Proceeding of the Third Annual Conference of the Association for Consumer Research*, ed., M. Venkatesan, Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research, 576-85.

Komarovsky, Mirra (1961), Class differences in family decision making, in *Consumer Behaviour: Household Decision-making*, ed., Nelson N. Foote, New York University Press, 255-265, reprinted in *Perspectives in Consumer Behaviour*, eds., Harold H. Kassarjian and Thomas S. Robertson, Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman and Company, 323-9.

Koontz, Harold (1961), The management theory jungle, *Journal of the Academy of Management*, IV (3), 174.

Kotler, Philip (1963), The Use of Mathematical Models in Marketing, *Journal of Marketing*, 27 (4), 31-41.

Kotler, Philip (1967a), *Marketing Management: Analysis, Planning and Control*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Kotler, Philip (1967b), Operations research in marketing, *Harvard Business Review*, 45 (January/February), 31-44 and 187.

Kotler, Philip (1971). *Marketing Decision Making: A Modelling Building Approach*, Holt: Rinehart and Winston, Inc.

Kotler, Philip (1972), A Generic Concept of Marketing, *Journal of Marketing*, 36 (April), 46-54.

Kotler, Philip (1979), Strategies for Introducing Marketing into Non-profit Organisations, *Journal of Marketing*, 43 (January), 37-44.

Kotler, Philip (1980), *Marketing Management: Analysis, Planning and Control*, 4th ed., Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Kotler, Philip (1983), *Principles of Marketing*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Kotler, Philip (1985), *Marketing for Nonprofit Organisations*, 2nd. ed., Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice-Hall, Inc.

Kotler, Philip and Sidney J. Levy (1969a), Broadening the Concept of Marketing, *Journal of Marketing*, 33 (January), 10-5.

Kotler, Philip and Sidney J. Levy (1969b), A New Form of Marketing Myopia: Rejoinder to Professor Luck, *Journal of Marketing*, 33 (July), 57.

Kotler, Philip and Gerald Zaltman (1971), Social Marketing: An Approach to Planned Social Change, *Journal of Marketing*, 35 (July), 3-12.

Kotter, J. (1979), Managing External Dependence, *Academy of Management Review*, 4 (January), 87-92.

Kuhn, Thomas B. (1962), *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Kuhn, Thomas B. (1970), *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 2nd ed., Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Kumcu, Erdogan (1987a), An Historical Perspective Framework to Study Consumer Behaviour and Retailing Systems, in *Advances in Consumer Research*, 14, eds., Melanie Wallendorf and Paul Anderson, Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research, 439-41.

Kumcu, Erdogan (1987b), Historical Method: Toward a Relevant Analysis of Marketing Systems, in *Philosophical and Radical Thought in Marketing*, eds., A. Fuat Firat *et al.*, MA: Lexington, 115-33.

Kumcu, Erdogan and A. F. Firat (eds.) (1988), *Marketing and Development: Toward Broader Dimensions in Research in Marketing*, Supplement 4, ed., J. Sheth, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.

Kurzbard, Gary and Gary F. Soldow (1987), Towards a parametric definition of marketing, *European Journal of Marketing*, 21 (1), 37-47.

Laczniak, Gene R. and Donald A. Michie (1979), The social disorder of the broadened concept of marketing, *Journal of Academy of Marketing Science*, 7 (3), 214-32.

Lakatos, Imre (1974), Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programs, in *Criticism and The Growth of Knowledge*, eds. Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 91-195.

Lang, K. (1979), The critical functions of empirical communication research: Observations on German-American influence, *Media, Culture and Society*, 1, 83-96.

Laudan, Larry (1977), *Progress and Its Problems*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Laudan, Larry (1984), *Science and Values*, Berkeley, CA.: University of California Press.

Laughlin, R. (1987), Accounting systems in organisational contexts, *Accounting, Organisations and society*, 12 (5), 479-502.

Laughlin, R. (1988), Accounting in its social context: An analysis of the accounting systems of the Church of England, *Accounting, Auditing and Accountability*, 1, 19-42.

Lavin, Marilyn and Thomas Archdeacon (1989), The relevance of historical method for marketing research, in *Interpretive Consumer Research*, ed., Elizabeth C. Hirschman, Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research, 60-8.

Law, P. and R. Wensley (1979), Marketing teaching, *European Journal of Marketing*, 13 (1), 15-26.

Lawrence, P. R. and J. W. Lorsch (1969), *Developing Organisations: Diagnosis and Action*, Reading, MA.: Addison-Wesley.

Lazer, William (1965), Operations research and marketing science, in *Science in Marketing*, ed., George Schwartz, New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 430-45.

Lazer, William (1969), Marketing's Changing Social Relationships, *Journal of Marketing*, 33 (January), 3-9.

Lazer, William (1971), *Marketing Management: A Systems Perspective*, New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Lazer, William and Eugene J. Kelly (1967), The systems approach to marketing, in *Managerial Marketing: Perspectives and Viewpoints*, eds., William Lazer and Eugene J. Kelley, Homewood, Ill.: Irwin, Inc.

Lazer, William and Eugene J. Kelly (eds.) (1973), *Social Marketing: Perspectives and Viewpoints*, Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin.

Leong, Siew Meng (1985), Metatheory and Metamethodology in Marketing: A Lakatosian Reconstruction, *Journal of Marketing*, 49 (Fall), 23-40.

Levitt, Theodore, (1960), Marketing Myopia, *Harvard Business Review*, 38 (July-August), 45-56.

Levy, Sidney J. (1959), Symbols for sale, *Harvard Business Review*, 37 (July/August), 117-24.

Levy, Sidney J. (1964), Symbolism and Life Style, in *Toward scientific Marketing*, ed., Stephen A. Greyer, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 140-50.

Levy, Sidney J. (1966), Social class and consumer behaviour, in *On Knowing the Consumer*, ed., Joseph W. Newman, New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 146-60.

Levy, Sidney J. (1976), Macrology 101 or the domain of marketing, in *Marketing: 1776-1976 and Beyond*, ed., Bernhardt, Chicago: IL.: American Marketing Association.

Levy, Sidney J. (1978), Hunger and work in a civilised tribe: Or, the anthropology of market transactions, *American Behavioural Scientist*, 21 (March/April), 557-70.

Levy, Sidney J. (1981), Interpreting Consumer Mythology: A Structural Approach to Consumer Behaviour, *Journal of Marketing*, 45 (Summer), 49-61.

Levy, Sidney J. and Gerald Zaltman (1975), *Marketing, Society, and Conflict*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Lewis, Richard, Jr. and Leo Erickson (1969), Marketing functions and marketing systems: A synthesis, *Journal of Marketing*, 33 (July), 10-4.

Leymore, Varda (1987), The structure is the message: The case of advertising, in *Marketing and Semiotics: New Directions in the Study of Signs for Sale*, ed., Jean Umiker-Sebeok, Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 319-31.

Leymore, Varda (1988), Inside information: Structure and effectivity in advertising, *International Journal of Research in Marketing*, 4 (3), 217-32.

Lick, Jozsef (1978), Needs, interests, actions, in *Hungarian Society and Marxist Sociology in the Nineteen-Seventies*, eds., T. Huszar, K. Kulesar and S. Szalai, Budapest: Corvina Press, 39-54.

Linton, Ralph (1973), The concept of culture, in *The Culture Background of Personality*, ed., Ralph Linton, Englewood Cliffs: NJ.: Prentice-Hall, 30-6.

Longman, K. A. (1971), The management of challenge to marketing theory, in _New Essays in Marketing Theory_, ed., G. Fisk, Boston, MA.: Allyn and Bacon, 9-19.

Luck, David J. (1959), On the nature of speciality goods, _Journal of Marketing_, 24 (July), 61-4.

Luck, David J. (1969), Broadening the concept of marketing - Too far, _Journal of Marketing_, 33 (July), 53-4.

Luck, David J. (1974), Social marketing: Confusion compounded, _Journal of Marketing_, 38 (October), 70-2.

Lutz, Richard J. (1979), Opening statement, in _Conceptual and Theoretical Developments in Marketing_, eds., Ferrell *et al.*, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 3-6.

Lutz, Richard J. (1989), Presidential Address: Positivism, Naturalism and Pluralism in Consumer Research: Paradigms in Paradise, in _Advances in Consumer Research_, 16, ed., Thomas K. Srull, Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research, 1-8.

Lyotard, J-F (1984), _The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge_, Minneqpolis, MN.: University of Minnesota Press.

Mackenzie, Kenneth D. and Francesco M. Nicosia (1968), Marketing Systems: Toward Formal Descriptions and Structural Properties, in _Marketing and The New Science of Planning_, ed., Robert L. King, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 14-23.

Macklin, Theodore (1921), _Efficient Marketing for Agriculture_, New York: MacMillan Co.

Mager, John and James G. Helgeson (1987), The development of marketing thought: Culture changes and marketing evolution, in _Marketing Theory_, eds., Russell W. Belk *et al.*, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 326-31.

Mahajan, Jayashree and G. A. Churchill, Jr. (1986), Environmental influences on sales organisation and effectiveness: A structure contingency approach, working paper, University of Arizona.

Mahajan, Jayashree and Margaret L. Friedman (1987), A contingency approach as a meta theory: Major issues and considerations, in _1984 AMA Winter Educators' conference: Scientific Method in Marketing_, eds., Paul F. Anderson and Michael J. Ryan, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 401-5.

Mallen, Bruce (1963), A theory of retailer-supplier conflict, control, and corporation, _Journal of Retailing_, 39 (Summer), 24-33, 51.

Mallen, Bruce (1973), Functional spin-off: A key to anticipating change in distribution structure, _Journal of Marketing_, 37 (July), 18-25.

Mannheim, K. (1936), _Ideology and Utopia_, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Mannheim, K. (1952), _Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge_, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Marcus, George E. and Michael Fischer (1986), *Anthropology as Cultural Critique: An Experimental Moment in the Human Sciences*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Marcuse, Herbert (1964), *One Dimension Man*, Boston, MA: Beacon Press.

Markin, Rom J. (1974), *Consumer Behaviour: A Cognitive Orientation*, New York: MacMillan Publishing Co.

Marshall, A. (1890), *Principles of Economics*, reprinted 1956 by London: MacMillan & Co.

Marshall, A. (1919), *Industry and Trade*, London: MacMillan.

Martin, Charles L. (1985), Delineating the boundaries of marketing, *European Journal of Marketing*, 19 (4), 5-12.

Mason, Roger (1984), Conspicuous Consumption: A Literature Review, *European Journal of Marketing*, 18 (3), 26-39.

Mason, R. O. (1969), A dialectical approach to strategic planning, *Management Science*, 15:B403-14.

Mason, R. O. and I. I. Mitroff (1981), *Challenging Strategic Planning Assumptions*, New York: Wiley.

Mason, Roger S. (1981), *Conspicuous Consumption: A Study of Exceptional Behaviour*, Hampshire: Gower.

Massy, William F., David B. Montgomery, and Donald G. Morrison (1970), *Stochastic Models of Buying Behaviour*, Cambridge: MIT, The MIT Press.

Masterman, Margaret (1970), The nature of a paradigm, in *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*, eds., Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Matlin, Nathaniel (1968), The outlandish idea: How a marketing man would save India, *Marketing Communication*, (March), 54-60.

Matsusaki, Hiro (1979), Marketing, culture, and social framework: The need for theory development at the macro marketing level (From an international point of view, with Canadian perspective), in *Conceptual and Theoretical Developments in Marketing*, eds., Ferrell *et al.*, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 679-93.

Matsusaki, Hiro (1980), A conceptual framework for macro marketing: An academic postulate, in *Macromarketing: Evolution of Thought*, Proceedings of the Fourth Macromarketing Seminar, eds., George Fisk, Robert W. Nason and Philip D. White, Boulder, Colorado: University of Colorado, Business Research Division, 15-28.

Mattsson, Lars-Gunnar (1985), An application of a network approach to marketing: Defining and changing market positions, in *Alternative Paradigms for Widening Marketing Theory*, eds., J. Dholakia and J. Arndt, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 263-87.

McCammon, Bert C. Jr. (1965), The emergence and growth of contractually integrated channels in the American economy, in *Marketing and Economic*

Development: The 50th Anniversary International Symposium of Marketing and Allied Disciplines, ed., Peter D. Bennett, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 496-515.

McCammon, Bert C. Jr. and Robert W. Little (1965), Marketing channels: Analytical systems and approaches, in Science in Marketing, ed., George Schwartz, New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

McCarthy, E. J. (1960), Basic Marketing, Homewood, IL: Irwin.

McCarthy, E. J. (1968), Basic Marketing, 3rd ed., Homewood, IL: Irwin.

McCarthy, E. J. (1978), Basic Marketing, 6th ed., Homewood, IL: Irwin.

McCarthy, Thomas (1987), Introduction, in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, Habermas (1985/1987), Cambridge: Polity Press, vii-xvii.

McCombs, M. E. (1981), The agenda setting approach, in Handbook of Political Communication, eds., D. D. Nimmo and K. R. Sanders, Beverley Hills: Sage.

McCracken, Grant (1989), Homeyness: A cultural account of one constellation of consumer goods and meaning, in Interpretive Consumer Research, ed., Elizabeth C. Hirschman, Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research, 168-83.

McGarry, Edmund D. (1950), Some functions of marketing reconsidered, in Theory in Marketing, eds., Reavis Cox and Wroe Alderson, Chicago: Richard D. Irwin, 263-79.

Mckitterick, John B. (1957), What is the marketing management concept, in The Frontiers of Marketing Thought and Action, ed., Frank Bass, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 71-82.

McMains, H. J. (1968), Marketing with Management Science: 1980 Style, in Marketing and The New Science of Planning, ed., Robert L. King, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 10-3.

McNiven, Malcolm A. (1968), Marketing research and marketing information systems, in Marketing and The New Science of Planning, ed., Robert L. King, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 169-71.

McQuail, D. and S. Windahl (1981), Communication Models, London: Longman.

McQuarie, Edward (1989), Advertising resonance: A semiological perspective, in Interpretive Consumer Research, ed., Elizabeth C. Hirschman, Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research, 97-114.

Meade II, William K. and Robert W. Nason (1991), Toward a unified theory of macromarketing: A systems theoretic approach, Journal of Macromarketing, 11 (Fall), 72-82.

Merton, R. K. (1957), Social Theory and Social Structure, New York: Free Press.

Mick, David Glen (1986), Consumer Research and Semiotics: Exploring the Morphology of Signs, Symbols, and Significance, Journal of Consumer Research, 13 (September), 196-213.

Mick, David Glen (1987), Towards a semiotic of advertising story grammars, in *Marketing and Semiotics: New Directions in the Study of Signs for Sale*, ed., Jean Umiker-Sebeok, Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 249-78.

Mick, David Glen (1988a), Contributions to the semiotics of marketing and consumer behaviour, in *The Semiotic Web: A Yearbook of Semiotics*, eds., Thomas Sebeok and Jean Umiker-Sebeok, Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

Mick, David Glen (1988b), Schema-theoretics and semiotics: Toward more holistic, programmatic research on marketing communications, *Semiotics*, 70 (1-2), 1-26.

Midgley, G. R. (1990), Critical Systems and Methodological Pluralism, in *Toward a Just Society for Future Generations, Volume I: Systems Design, Proceedings of the 34th Annual Meeting of the International Society for the Systems Sciences*, Portland, Ore., July 3-13.

Midgley, G. R. (1992), Pluralism and the Legitimation of Systems Science, *Systems Practice*, 5 (2), 147-72.

Midgley, G. R. (1993), A reply to Haridimos Tsoukas, the radical critic of radical critique, *Systems Practice*, 6(3), 301-6.

Midgley, G. R. (1994), Ecology and the poverty of humanism: A critical systems perspective, *Systems Research*, 11 (4), 67-76.

Midgley, G. R. (1995a), Systems intervention: A critical system perspective, in *Systems Methodology: Possibilities for Cross-cultural Learning and Integration*, eds., Gerald Midgley and Jennifer Wilby, Centre for Systems Studies, University of Hull, England, 57-64.

Midgley, G. R. (1995b), What is this thing called critical systems thinking? , in *Critical Issues in Systems Theory and Practice*, eds., Keith Ellis *et al.*, New York: Plenum Press, 61-72.

Miles, R. and C. Snow (1978), *Organisational Strategy, Structure and Process*, New York: McGraw-Hill.

Miller, E. J. and Rice, A. K. (1967), *Systems of Organisation*, London: Tavistock Publications.

Miller, James G. (1965a), Living systems: Basic concepts, *Behavioural Science*, 10 (July), 193-237.

Miller, James G. (1965b), Living systems: structure and process, *Behavioural Science*, 10 (October), 337-79.

Miller, James G. (1965c), Living systems: cross-level hypothesis, *Behavioural Science*, 10 (October), 380-411.

Miller, James G. (1978), *Living systems*, New York: McGraw-Hill.

Mills, H. D. (1961), Marketing as a science, *Harvard Business Review*, (September-October), 137-42.

Mingers, John (1984), Subjectivism and Soft Systems Methodology: A Critique, *Journal of Applied Systems Analysis*, 11, 85-103.

Mingers, John (1992a), Technical, Practical and Critical OR: Past, Present and Future? in Critical Management Studies, eds., Mats Alvesson and Hugh Willmott, London: Sage, 90-112.

Mingers, John (1992b), Criticising the phenomenological critique - autopoiesis and critical realism, Systems Practice, 5(2), 173-80.

Miracle, Gordon E. (1965), Product characteristics and marketing strategy, Journal of Marketing, 29 (July), 18-24.

Mitchell, Wesley C. (1913), Business Cycles, Berkeley: University of California Press.

Mitroff, Ian I. and Richard O. Masson (1983), Creating A Dialectical Social Science, London: D. Reidel Publishing Company.

Mokwa, Michael P. (1987), Ethical Consciousness and the Competence of Product Management: Beyond Righteousness, Rituals, and Rules, in Philosophical and Radical Thought in Marketing, eds., A. Fuat Firat *et al.*, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 57-76.

Mokwa, Michael P., Ben M. Enis and Ricky N. Griffin (1980), Macromarketing and theory development: Perspective from Parsons' general theory of social systems, in Macromarketing: Evolution of Thought, Proceedings of the Fourth Macromarketing Seminar, eds., George Fisk, Robert W. Nason and Philip D. White, Boulder, Colorado: University of Colorado, Business Research Division, 41-58.

Mokwa, Michael P. and Kenneth R. Evans (1982), In Pursuit of Marketing Knowledge: An Exploration into Philosophies of Inquiry, in Marketing Theory: Philosophy of Science Perspectives, eds., Ronald F. Bush and Shelby D. Hunt, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 34-8.

Monieson, David D. (1988), Intellectualisation in macromarketing: A world disenchanted, Journal of Macromarketing, 8 (Fall), 4-10.

Monieson, David D. and Stanley J. Shapiro (1980), Biological and evolutionary dimensions of Aldersonian thought: What he borrowed then and what he might have borrowed now, in Theoretical Developments in Marketing, eds. Charles W. Lamb, Jr. and Patrick M. Dunne, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 7-11.

Montgomery, D. B. and G. L. Urban (1969), Management Science in Marketing, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Montgomery, D. B. and G. L. Urban (1970), Marketing Decision-Information Systems: An Emerging View, Journal of Marketing Research, 17 (May), 226-34.

Moorman, Christine (1987), Marketing as Technique: The Influence of Marketing on the Meaning of Consumption, in Philosophical and Radical Thought in Marketing, eds., A. Fuat Firat *et al.*, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 193-216.

Morgan, Gareth (1980), Paradigms, metaphors, and puzzle solving in organisation theory, Administration Science Quarterly, 25 (4), 605-22.

Morgan, Glenn (1992), Marketing Discourse and Practice: Towards a Critical Analysis, in Critical Management Studies, eds., Mats Alvesson and Hugh Willmott, London: Sage, 137-58.

Mount, Peter R. (1969), Exploring the commodity approach in developing marketing theory, Journal of Marketing, 33 (April), 62-4.

Moyer, Reed (1964), The structure of markets in developing countries, MSU Business Topics, 12 (Fall), 43-60.

Moyer, Reed (1972), Macromarketing: A Social Perspective, New York: John Wiley and Sons.

Moyer, Reed and Stanley C. Hollander (1968), Markets and Marketing in Developing Countries, Chicago: American Marketing Association.

M'Pherson, P. K. (1974), A perspective on systems science and systems philosophy, Futures, 6, 219-39.

Mruk, Christorpher (1985), Integrated Description: A phenomenologically oriented technique for researching large scale, emerging human experience and trends, in Advances in Consumer research, 12, eds., Elizabeth C. Hirschman and Morris B. Holbrook, Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research, 556-9.

Muncy, James A. and Raymond P. Fisk (1987), Cognitive Relativism and the Practice of Marketing Science, Journal of Marketing, 51 (January), 20-33.

Murdock, g. and P. Golding (1977), Capitalism, communication and class relations, in Mass Communication and Society, eds., J. Curvan, M. Gurevitch and J. Woollacott, London: Edward Arold.

Murphy, Patrick E. and Ben M. Enis (1986), Classifying products strategically, Journal of Marketing, 50 (July), 24-42.

Murray, Jeff B. and Deborah J. Evers (1989), Theory Borrowing and Reflectivity in Interdisciplinary Fields, in Advances in Consumer Research, 16, ed., Thomas K. Srull, Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research, 647-52.

Murray, Jeff B. and Julie L. Ozanne (1991), The Critical Imagination: Emancipatory Interests in Consumer Research, Journal of Consumer Research, 18 (September), 129-44.

Myles, Jack C. (1956), German historism and American economics - A study of the influence of the German historical school on American economic thought, Ph.D. dissertation, Princetion University.

Naisbitt, J. (1982), Megatrends: The New Directions Transforming Our Lives, New York: Warner Books, Inc.

Nason, Robert W. (1986), Externality focus of macromarketing theory, in Marketing Management Technology as a Social Process, ed., George Fisk, New York: Praeger, 280-93.

Nason, Robert W. (1988), Social marketing in a macromarketing context, in Marketing: A Return to the Broader Dimensions, eds., Stanley Shapiro and A. H. Walle, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 356.

Neergaard, Keith and Alladi Venkatesh (1987), A critique of Kotler's formulation of the theory of the firm and its implications, in *Marketing Theory*, eds., Russell W. Belk *et al.*, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 170-5.

Nevett, Terence (1991), Historical Investigation and the Practice of Marketing, *Journal of Marketing*, 55 (July), 13-23.

Nevett, Terence and Ronald Fullerton (eds.) (1988), *Historical Perspectives in Marketing: Essays in Honour of Stanley C. Hollander*, Lexington, MA.: Lexington Books.

Nevett, Terence and Stanley C. Hollander (eds.) (1987), *Marketing in Three Eras: Proceedings of the Third Conference on Marketing History*, East Lansing: Michigan University Press.

Nevett, Terence, Kathleen Whitney, and Stanley C. Hollander (eds.) (1989), *Marketing History: The Emerging Discipline, Proceedings of the Fourth Conference on Historical Research in Marketing*, East Lansing: Michigan University Press.

Nickels, W. (1979), Theory development and the broadened concept of marketing, in *Theoretical Developments in Marketing*, eds., Charles W. Lamb, Jr. and Patrick M. Dunne, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 615-23.

Nickels, W. and R. Hill (1977), Is marketing what the textbooks say? - New definition of macro and micro marketing, in *Macromarketing: Distributive Processes from a Societal Perspective*, ed., Charles D. Slater, Boulder: University of Colorado, Business Research Division.

Nicosia, Francesco M. (1962), Marketing and Alderson's functionalism, *Journal of Business*, 35 (October), 403-13, reprinted in *Perspectives in Marketing Theory*, eds., Jerome B. Kernan and Montrose S. Sommers, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1968, 83-96.

Nicosia, Francesco M. (1966), *Consumer Decision Processes: Marketing and Advertising Implications*, Englewood cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Nicosia, Francesco M. and Charles Y. Glock (1968), Marketing and Affluence: A Research Prospectus, in *Marketing and The New Science of Planning*, ed., Robert L. King, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 510-27.

Nicosia, Francesco M. and Robert N. Mayer (1976), Toward a Sociology of Consumption, *Journal of Consumer Research*, 3 (September), 65-75.

Nietzsche, Friedrich (1913), The will to power, in *The Complete Works of F. Nietzsche*, Vol. 15, ed., O. Levy, Edinburgh: Foulis.

Noelle-Neumann, E. (1974), The spiral of silence: A theory of public opinion, *Journal of Communication*, 24 (2).

Noelle-Neumann, E. (1980), Mass media and social change in developed societies, in *Mass Communication Review*, Vol. 1, eds., G. C. Wilhoit and H. de Bock, Beverley Hills: Sage.

Oliga, John C. (1986), Methodology in systems research: The need for a self-reflective commitment, in *Mental Images, Values, and Reality*, ed., J. A. Dillon, Jr., Louisville, KY.: Society for Beneral Systems Research.

Oliga, John C. (1988), Methodological foundations of systems methodologies, Systems Practice, 1(1), 87-112.

Oliga, John C. (1989a), Ideology and systems emancipation, paper presented at the 33rd Annual Meeting of the International Society for Systems Science, Edinburgh, Scotland.

Oliga, John C. (1989b), Power and interest in organisations: A contingent, relational view, Proceedings of the 33rd Annual Meeting of the International Society for Systems Science, Edinburgh, Scotland.

Oliga, John C. (1990), Power-ideology matrix in social systems control, Systems Practice, 3(1), 31-49.

Oliga, John C. (1991), Concepts of ideology: An exegesis and critique, Systems Practice, 4(2), 101-29.

Olsen, Robert M. (1968), Defining objectives in marketing management, in Marketing and The New Science of Planning, ed., Robert L. King, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 34-40.

Olson, Jerry C. (1981), Towards a Science of Consumer Behaviour, in Advances in Consumer Research, 9, ed., Andrew A. Mitchell, Ann Arbor, MI: Association of Consumer Research, v-x.

Olson, Jerry C. (1982), Current Issues in The Philosophy of Science: Implications for Marketing Theory: A Panel Discussion, in Marketing Theory: Philosophy of Science Perspectives, eds., Ronald F. Bush and Shelby D. Hunt, Chicago, Ill: American Marketing Association, 11-6; reprinted in Marketing Theory: Distinguished Contributions, eds., Stephen W. Brown and Raymond P. Fisk, New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 3-12.

Olson, Jerry C. (1987), The Construction of Scientific Meaning, in Marketing Theory, eds., R. W. Belk, *et al.*, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 384-8.

Olson, Jerry C. and J. Paul Peter (1984), External Validity, in Scientific Method in Marketing: Philosophy, Sociology, and History of Science Perspectives, eds., Paul Anderson and Mike Ryan, Chicago: American Marketing association, 81-4.

O'Shaughnessy, John (1985), A Return to Reason in Consumer Behaviour: An Hermeneutical Approach, in Advances in Consumer research, 12, eds., Elizabeth C. Hirschman and Morris B. Holbrook, Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research, 305-11.

Oxenfeldt, A. R. (1961), Scientific marketing: Ideal and ordeal, Harvard Business Review, (March-April), 51-64.

Ozanne, Julie L. and Laurel Anderson Hudson (1989), Exploring Diversity in Consumer Research, in Interpretive Consumer Research, ed., Elizabeth Hirschman, Provo, UT: Association for consumer Research, 1-9.

Pandya, Anil (1985), Symbolic communication among consumers, in Marketing Communications - Theory and Research, eds., Michael Houston and Richard Lutz, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 89-92.

Parenti, M. (1978), Power and the Powerless, New York: St. Martin's Press.

Pareto, V. (1934), An Introduction to Pareto: His Sociology, eds., G. C. Homans and C. P. Curtis, New York: Alfred Knopf.

Parlin, Charles Coolidge (1912), Merchandising and Textiles, 5-6.

Parry, R. and John Mingers (1990), Community Operational Research: Its Context and Its Future, OMEGA, 19 (6), 577-86.

Parsons, T. (1937/1949), The Structure of Social Action, Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press.

Parsons, T. (1951), The Social System, London: Tavistock; Blencoe, Ill.: Free Press.

Parsons, T. (1960), Structure and Process in Modern Society, New York: Free Press.

Peirce, Charles Sanders (1868), Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, eds., Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (1931-1935), Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 5.265.

Peter, J. Paul (1981), Some methodological issues in consumer research, paper presented at the Association for Consumer Research Annual Conference.

Peter, J. Paul (1983), Some philosophical and methodological issues in Consumer Research, in Marketing theory, Shelby D. Hunt, Homewood, IL.: Irwin, 382-94.

Peter, J. Paul (1984), On ignoring a research education, in Marketing Theory: Distinguished Contributions, eds., Stephen W. Brown and Raymond P. Fisk, New York: Wiley, 324-7.

Peter, J. Paul (1991), Philosophical Tensions in Consumer Inquiry, in Handbook of Consumer Behaviour, eds., Thomas S. Robertson and Harold H. Kassarjian, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 533-47.

Peter, J. Paul (1992), Realism or Relativism for Marketing Theory and Research: A Comment on Hunt's "Scientific Realism", Journal of Marketing, 56 (April), 72-9.

Peter, J. Paul and Jerry C. Olson (1983), Is Science Marketing? Journal of Marketing, 47 (Fall), 111-25.

Peter, J. Paul and Jerry C. Olson (1989), The Relativist/Constructionist Perspective on Scientific Knowledge and Consumer Research, in Interpretive Consumer Research, ed. Elizabeth Hirschman, Provo, UT: Association for consumer Research, 24-8.

Peter, P. *et al.*, (1982), Current Issues in the Philosophy of Science: Implications for Marketing Theory: A Panel Discussion, in Marketing Theory: Philosophy of Science Perspectives, eds., Ronald F. Bush and Shelby D. Hunt, Chicago: Ill.: American Marketing Association, 11-26; reprinted in Marketing Theory: Distinguished Contributions, eds., Stephen W. Brown and Raymond P. Fisk, New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 3-12.

Peterson, R. A. (1976), The Production of Culture, Beverley Hills: Sage.

Peterson, Robert A. and Vijay Mahajan (1978), Multi-product growth models, in Research in Marketing, 1, ed., Jagdish N. Sheth, Greenwich, Connecticut: JAI Press, Inc., 201-31.

Pfeffer, Jefferey and Gerald R. Salancik (1978), *The External Control of Organisations*, New York: Harper and Row.

Pierson, Frank C. (1959), *The Education of American Business*, New York: McGraw-Hill.

Polier, Nicole and William Roseberry (1989), Trists-tropes: Post-modern anthropologists encounter the other and discover themselves, *Economy and Society*, 18 (2), 245-64.

Pollay, Richard W. (1985), American advertising and societal values during the twentieth century, in *Historical Perspectives in Consumer Research: National and International Perspectives*, eds., Chin Tion Tan and Jagdish N. Sheth, Singapore: National University of Singapore, 60-71.

Pollay, Richard W. (1986), The distorted mirror: Reflections on the unintended consequences of advertising, *Journal of Marketing*, 50 (April), 18-36.

Pollay, Richard W. (1987a), On the wall of reflections on the values in the 'Distorted Mirror', *Journal of Marketing*, 51 (July), 104-9.

Pollay, Richard W. (1987b), Insights into Consumer Behaviour from Historical Studies of Advertising, in *Advances in Consumer Research*, 14, eds., Melanie Wallendorf and Paul Anderson, Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research, 447-50.

Popper, K. R. (1972), *Objective Knowledge*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Porter, Michael E. (1980), *Competitive Strategy*, New York: The Free Press.

Porter, Michael E. (1985), *Competitive Advantage*, New York: The Free Press.

Poster, Mark and Alladi Venkatesh (1987), From Marx to Foucault: An Intellectual Journey through Critical Theory, in *Marketing Theory*, eds., Russell W. Belk *et al.*, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 20-6.

Power, Michael (1988), Educating accountants: Toward a critical ethnography, paper presented at the Second interdisciplinary Perspectives on Accounting Conference, The University of Manchester.

Power, Michael and Richard Laughlin (1992), Critical Theory and Accounting, in *Critical Management Studies*, eds., Mats Alvesson and Hugh Willmott, London: Sage, 110-35.

Powers, Thomas L. and Warren S. Martin (1987), A historical examination of the marketing concept: Profit or progress? in *Marketing in the Three Eras*, eds., F. Nevett and S. C. Hollander, East Lansing, MI.: Michigan State University Press, 169-80.

Pratt, Robert W. Jr. (1965), consumer Behaviour: Some psychological aspects, in *Science in Marketing*, ed., George Schwartz, New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 98-136.

Prus, Robert (1987), Generic social processes: Implications of a processual theory of action for research on marketplace exchanges, in *Advances in Consumer Research*, 14, eds., Melanie Wallendorf and Paul Anderson, Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research, 66-70.

Pusey, Michael (1987), Jurgen Habermas, New York: Ellis Horwood Limited and Tavistock Publications.

Puxty, A. and W. F. Chua (1989), Ideology, rationality and management control process, in Critical Perspectives in Management Control, eds., W. F. Chua, T. Lowe and T. Puxty, London: MacMillan Press.

Qualls, William J. and Ronald E. Michaels (1984), Organisational buyer behaviour: a general system/role model, in 1984 AMA Winter Educators' Conference: Scientific Method in Marketing, eds., Paul F. Anderson and Michael J. Ryan, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 129-32.

Radicliffe-Brown, A. (1952), Structure and Function in Primitive Society, London: Cohen and West.

Rasmussen, David M. (1990), Reading Habermas, Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, Inc.

Ray, M. L. (1978), The present and potential linkages between the microtheoretical notions of behavioural science and the problem of advertising: a proposal for a research system, in Behavioural and Management Science in Marketing, eds., H. L. Davids and A. Silk, New York: Ronald Press, 99-141.

Reed, Michael (1985), Redirections in Organisational Analysis, London: Tavistock.

Reidenbach, R. Eric and Terence A. Oliva (1981), General Living Systems Theory and Marketing: A Framework for Analysis, Journal of Marketing 45 (Fall), 30-7.

Reidenbach, R. Eric and Terence A. Oliva (1982a), An extension of general living systems theory as a paradigm for analysing marketing behaviour, in Marketing Theory: Philosophy of Science Perspectives, eds., Ronald F. Bush and Shelby D. Hunt, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 59-62.

Reidenbach, R. Eric and Terence A. Oliva (1982b), A Preanalytic Approach to Modelling Macromarketing Behaviour, in Marketing Theory: Philosophy of Science Perspectives, eds., Ronald F. Bush and Shelby D. Hunt, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 242-5.

Reidenbach, R. Eric and Terence A. Oliva (1983), Toward a Theory of the Macro Systemic Effects of the Marketing Function, Journal of Macromarketing, 3 (Fall), 33-40.

Reilly, William J. (1931), The Law of Retail Gravitation, Austin: The University of Texas.

Revzan, David A. (1961), Whole Saling in Marketing Organisation, New York: John Wiley & Sons.

Revzan, David A. (1962), The holistic-institutional approach to marketing, in Perspectives for Research in Marketing: Seven Essays, ed., David A. Revzan, Institute of Business and Economic Research, University of California, Berkeley, 1-39, 152-5.

Revzan, David A. (1968), The holistic-institutional approach to marketing, in Perspectives in Marketing Theory, eds., Jevome B. Kernan and Montrose S. Sommers, New York: Appleto-Centry-Crofts, 97-136.

Rhoades, E. L. (1927), *Introductory Readings in Marketing*, Chicago: A. W. Shaw Company.

Rice, A. K. (1958), Productivity and Social Organisation, London: Tavistock.

Rice, A. K. (1963), *The Enterprise and Its Environment*, London: Tavistock.

Ricoeur, Paul (1981), *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences: Essays on Language, Action and Interpretation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ridgeway, Valentine F. (1957), Administration of manufacture-dealer systems, *Administration Science Quarterly*, 1 (March), 464-83.

Ritzer, George (1975), *Sociology: A Multiple Paradigm Science*, Boston: Allynand Bacon, Inc.

Roberts, J. and Scapens, R. (1970), Accounting as Discipline, in *Critical Accounts*, eds., D. Cooper and T. Hopper, London: MacMillan, 107-25.

Roberts, Wayne, A. (1984), A Kuhnian Perspective on Marketing Science and the "Scientific Method", in *1984 AMA Winter Educators' Conference: Scientific Method in Marketing*, eds., Paul F. Anderson and Michael J. Ryan, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 14-7.

Robin, Donald P. (1970), Toward a normative science in marketing, *Journal of Marketing*, 24 (October), 73-6.

Robin, Donald P. (1980), Value Issues in Marketing, in *Theoretical Developments in Marketing*, eds., Charles W. Lamb, Jr. and Patrick M. Dunne, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 142-5.

Robinson, J. (1933), *The Economic of Imperfect Competition*, London: MacMillan and Co. Ltd.

Roderick, Rick (1986), *Habermas and the Foundations of Critical theory*, London: Macmillan.

Roethlisberger, F. J. and W. J. Dickson (1939), *Management and the Worker*, Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press.

Rogers, Everett M. (1962), *Diffusion of Innovations*, New York: The Free Press.

Rogers, Everett M. (1982), The Empirical and The Critical Schools of Communication Research, in *Communication Yearbook*, 5, ed., Michael Burgoon, NJ: New Brunswick, 125-44.

Rogers, Everett M. (1986), The Critical School and Consumer Research, in *Advances in Consumer Research*, 14, eds., Melanie Wallendorf and Paul Anderson, Prove, UT: Association for Consumer Research, 7-11.

Romm, Norma (1995), Knowing as intervention: Reflections on the application of systems ideas, *Systems Practice*, 8 (2), 137-67.

Rook, Dennis (1984), Ritual behaviour and consumer behaviour, in *Advances in Consumer Research*, 11, ed., Thomas Kinnear, Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research, 279-84.

Rook, Dennis (1985), The ritual dimension of consumption, *Journal of Consumer Research*, 12 (3), 251-64.

Rorty, Richard (1979), Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Rosenhead, J. (1976), Some further comments of 'The Social Responsibility of OR', Organisation Research Quarterly, 17:265.

Rosenhead, J. (1984), Debating systems methodology: Conflicting ideas about conflict and ideas: Journal of Applied Systems Analysis, 11, 79-84.

Rosenhead, J. (1989), Introduction: Old and new paradigms of analysis, in Rational Analysis for a Problematic World, ed., J. Rosenhead, Chichester: Wiley, 1-20.

Rosenhead, J. and C. Thunhurst (1982), A materialist analysis of operational research, Journal of Operational Research Society, 33, 111-22.

Rossiter (1989), Consumer Research and Marketing Science, in Advances in Consumer Research, 16, ed., Thomas K. Srull, Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research, 407-13.

Rsoukas, Haridimos (1993a), The road to emancipation is through organisational development: A critical evaluation of total systems intervention, Systems Practice, 6(1), 53-69.

Rsoukas, Haridimos (1993b), 'By Their Fruits Ye Shall Know Them': A reply to Jackson, Green, and Midgley, Systems Practice, 6(3), 311-7.

Ruekert, R. W., O. C. Walker, Jr, and K. J. Roering (1985), An alternative view of the organisation of marketing activities: a contingency theory of structure and performance, Journal of Marketing, 49 (Winter), 13-25.

Ryan, F. W. (1935), Functional elements of market distribution, Harvard Business Review, 13 (October), 137-43.

Ryan, Michael (1986), Implications from the 'old' and the 'new' physics for studying buyer behaviour, in Perspectives on Methodology in Consumer Research, eds., David Brinberg and Richard Lutz, New York: Springer-Verlag, 37-63.

Ryan, Michael and Julia M. Bristor (1987), The symbiotic nature of hermeneutical vs. classically generated knowledge, in Marketing Theory, eds., Russell W. Belk *et al.*, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 191-4.

Sanders, Clinton R. (1987), Consuming as Social Action: Ethnographic Methods in Consumer Research, in Advances in Consumer Research, 14, eds., Melanie Wallendorf and Paul Anderson, Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research, 71-5.

Sauer, William J., Nancy Nighswonger and Gerald Zaltman (1982), Current issues in philosophy of science: Implication for the study of marketing, in Marketing Theory: Philosophy of Science Perspectives, eds., Ronald F. Bush and Shelby D. Hunt, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 17-21.

Savitt, Ronald (1980), Historical Research in Marketing, Journal of Marketing, 44 (Fall), 52-8.

Savitt, Ronald (1982), A historical approach to comparative retailing, Management Decision, 20 (4), 16-23.

Savitt, Ronald (1984), The wheel of retailing and retail product management, *European Journal of Marketing*, 18 (1), 43-54.

Savitt, Ronald (1986), A Personal View of Historical Explanation in Marketing and Economic Development, in *Marketing Management Technology as a Social Process*, ed., George Fisk, New York: Praeger, 113-31.

Savitt, Ronald (1987), Entrepreneurial behaviour and marketing strategy, in *Philosophical and Radical Thought in Marketing*, eds., A. Fuat Firat, *et al.*, Mass.: Lexington Books, 307-22.

Savitt, Ronald (1988), A personal view of historical explanation in marketing and economic development, in *Historical Perspectives in Marketing: Essays in Honour of Staley C. Hollander*, eds., T. Nevett and R. Fullerton, Lexington: Lexington Books, 113-32.

Savitt, Ronald (1990), Pre-Aldersonian antecedents to macromarketing: Insights from the textual literature, *Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science*, 18 (4), 293-301.

Schecter, David (1991), Critical systems thinking in the 1980s: A connective summary, in *Critical Systems Thinking: Directed Readings*, eds., R. L. Flood and M. C. Jackson, Chichester: John Wiley & Sons Ltd., 213-26.

Schutz, A. (1964), *Collected Papers*, 2, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff..

Schutz, A. and T. Luckman (1974), *The Structure of the Life World*, London: Heinmann.

Schwartz, G. (1963), *Development of Marketing Theory*, Cincinnati 27, Ohio: South-western Publishing Company.

Scott, Richard A. and Norton E. Marks (1968), *Marketing and Its Environment*, Belmont: Wadsworth.

Sekaran, Uma (1981), Methodological and theoretical issues and advancements in cross-cultural symposium, working paper, McCrill University.

Selznick, P. (1948), Foundations of the theory of organisation, *American Sociology Review*, 13, 25-35.

Shaw, Arch (1912), Some Problems in Market Distribution, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 26 (August), 706-65.

Shapiro, I. (1973), *Marketing Terms: Definitions, Explanations and/or Aspects*, West Long Branch, NJ: SMC Publishing Co.

Shapiro, Stanley J. (1965), Comparative marketing and economic development, in *Science in Marketing*, ed., George Schwartz, New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 398-429.

Shawver, Donald L. and William G. Nickels (1979), A rationalisation for macromarketing concepts and definitions, in *Macromarketing: New Steps on the Learning Curve*, eds., George Fisk and Robert W. Nason, Boulder: University of Colorado, Business Research Division.

Shea, Linda and Girish Punj (1988), Philosophical perspective in macromarketing, in Marketing: A Return to the Broader Dimensions, eds., Stanley Shapiro and A. H. Walle, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 447-51.

Sheparovych, Zenon B., Marcus Alexis, and Leonard S. Simon (eds.) (1968), A Selected Annotated Bibliography on Quantitative Methods in Marketing, Chicago: American Marketing Association.

Sherry, John F., Jr. (1983), Gift Giving in Anthropological Perspective, Journal of Consumer Research, 10 (September), 157-68.

Sherry, John F., Jr. (1986), The cultural perspective in consumer research, in Advances in Consumer Research, 13, ed., Richard J. Lutz, Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research, 573-75.

Sherry, John F., Jr. (1987a), Keeping the monkeys away from the typewriters: An anthropologist's view of the consumer behaviour Odyssey, in Advances in Consumer Research, 14, eds., Melanie Wallendorf and Paul Anderson, Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research, 370-73.

Sherry, John F., Jr. (1987b), Cultural propriety in a global marketplace, in Philosophical and Radical Thought in Marketing, eds., A. F. Firat, N. Dholakia, and R. Bagozzi, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 179-91.

Sherry, John F., Jr. (1987c), Advertising as a cultural system, in Marketing and Semiotics: New Directions in the Study of Signs for Sale, ed., Jean Umiker-Sebeok, Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 441-61.

Sherry, John F., Jr. (1988a), Marketing and consumer behaviour: Windows of opportunity for anthropology, Journal of the Steward Anthropological Society, 16 (1).

Sherry, John F., Jr. (1988b), Market pitching and the ethnography of speaking, in Advances in Consumer Research, 15, ed., Michael Houston, Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research, 543-7.

Sherry, John F. Jr. (1989), Observations on Marketing and Consumption: An Anthropological Note, in Advances in Consumer Research, 16, ed., Thomas K. Srull, Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research, 555-61.

Sherry, John F. Jr. (1991), Postmodern alternatives: The interpretive turn in consumer Research, in Handbook of Consumer Theory and Research, eds., Harold Kassarjian and Thomas Robertson, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 548-91.

Sherry, John F. Jr. and Eduardo Camargo (1987), 'May your life be marvellous': English language labelling and the semiotics of Japanese promotion, Journal of Consumer Research, 14 (2), 174-88.

Sherry, John F. Jr. and Mary Ann McGrath (1989), Unpacking the holiday presence: A comparative ethnography of two gift stores, in Interpretive Consumer Research, ed., Elizabeth C. Hirschman, Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research, 148-67.

Sheth, Jagdish N. (1972), The Future of Buyer Behaviour, in *Proceedings of the Third Annual Conference*, ed., M. Venkatensan, Association for Consumer Research, 562-75.

Sheth, Jagdish N. (1979), The Surpluses and Shortages in Consumer Behaviour Theory and Research, *Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science*, 7, 414-27.

Sheth, Jagdish N. (1982), Consumer behaviour: Shortages and surpluses, in *Advances in Consumer Research*, 19, ed., Andrew Mitchell, Ann Arbor, MI.: Association for Consumer Research, 13-6.

Sheth, Jagdish N. (1985), Presidential Address: Broadening the Horizons of ACR and Consumer Behaviour, in *Advances in Consumer research*, 12, eds., Elizabeth C. Hirschman and Morris B. Holbrook, Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research, 1-2.

Sheth, Jagdish N. and David M. Gardner (1982), History of marketing thought: an updated, in *Marketing Theory: Philosophy of Science Perspective*, eds., Ronald F. Bush and Shelby D. Hunt, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 52-58.

Sheth, Jagdish N., David M. Gardner and Dennis E. Garrett (1988), *Marketing Theory: Evolution and Evaluation*, New York: John Wiley and sons.

Sheth, Jagdish N. and Dennis E. Garrett (1986), *Marketing Theory: Classic and Contemporary Readings*, Cincinnati, Ohio: South-western Publishing Co.

Sheth, Jagdish N. and Barbara L. Gross (1988), Parallel development of marketing and consumer behaviour: A historical perspective, in *Historical Perspectives in Marketing*, eds., Terence Nevett and Ronald A. Fullerton, MA.: Lexington Books, 9-33.

Shiva, V. (1990), Cry Foul, Cry Freedom, *New Internationalist*, No. 206, 20-1.

Sica, A. (1981), Review of 'The Systems Approach and Its Enemies', *AJS*, 87:208.

Silverman, D. (1970), *The Theory of Organisations*, London: Heinemann.

Simon, H. A. (1947), *Administration Behaviour*, New York: MacMillan.

Singelmann, Peter (1972), Exchange as symbolic interaction, *American Sociological Review*, 38, 414-24.

Slater, Charles, C. (1968), Marketing processes in developing Latin American societies, *Journal of Marketing*, 32 (July), 50-5.

Slater, Charles, C. (1969), *Marketing Processes in the Recife Area of Northeast Brazil*, East Lansing, MI.: Latin American Studies Centre, Michigan State University.

Slater, Charles, C. (ed.) (1977), *Macromarketing: Distributive Processes from a Societal Perspective*, Boulder: University of Colorado, Business Research Division.

Slater, Charles, C. (1978), Macromarketing: Some speculation on directions and opportunities, in *Research Frontiers in marketing: Dialogues and Directions*, ed., Subhash C. Jain, Chicago: American Marketing Association.

Slater, Charles, C. *et al.* (1969), Market Processes in Lapaz, Bolivia, East Lansing, MI.: Latin American Studies Centre, Michigan State University.

Smelser, Neil J. (1976), Comparative Methods in the Social Sciences, Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice-Hall, Inc.

Smith, Ruth Ann and David S. Lux (1993), Historical method in consumer research: Developing causal explanations of change, Journal of Consumer Research, 19 (March), 595-610.

Smith, Wendell R. (1956), Product differentiation and market segmentation as alternative marketing strategies, Journal of Marketing, 21 (July), 3-8.

Solomon, Michael and Puman Anad (1985), Ritual costumes and status transition: The female business suit as totemic emblem, in Advances in Consumer Research, 13, ed., Richard J. Lutz, Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research, 315-8.

Solomon, Paul J. (1979), Marketing theory and metatheory, in Conceptual and Theoretical Developments in Marketing, eds., Ferrell *et al.*, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 375-82.

Sommer, Montrose S. and Jerome B. Kernan (1968), Comparative Marketing Systems, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.

Sorensen, Olav Jull (1980), Marketing and economic development: The entrepreneurial state, paper presented at the Fifth Macromarketing Seminar, University of Rhods Island, (August).

Spencer, H. (1873), The Study of Sociology, London: Kegan Paul and Tench.

Spratlen, Thaddeus H. (1974), The Challenge of a Humanistic Value Orientation in Marketing, in The Environment of Marketing Management, 3rd ed., eds., Robert J. Holloway and Robert S. Hancock, New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 473-9.

Spratlen, Thaddeus H. (1975), Macromarketing analysis of aggregated performance: Issues and insights, in 1975 Combined Proceedings, ed., E. Mazze, Chicago: American Marketing Association.

Spratlen, Thaddeus H. (1979), A Conceptual Analysis and Framework for Social Marketing Theory and Research, in Conceptual and Theoretical Developments in Marketing, eds., Ferrell *et al.*, Chicago, American Marketing Association, 166-83.

Stanton, William J. (1975), Fundamentals of Marketing, 5th ed., New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc.

Stasch, Stanley F. (1969), Systems Analysis for Controlling and Improving Marketing Performance, Journal of Marketing, 33 (April), 12-9.

Stasch, Stanley F. (1972), Systems Analysis for Marketing Planning and Control, Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman and company.

Stauat, Thomas A., Donald A. Taylor and Donal J. Bowersox (1976), A Managerial Introduction to Marketing, 3rd. ed., Englewood Cliffs: NJ.: Prentic-Hall, Inc.

Stern, Barbara B. (1988a), Medieval allegory: Roots of advertising strategy for the mass market, Journal of Marketing, 52 (3), 84-94.

Stern, Barbara B. (1988b), Figurative language in services advertising: The nature and uses of imagery, in Advances in Consumer Research, 15, ed., Michael Houston, Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research, 185-90.

Stern, Barbara B. (1988c), How dose an ad mean, Journal of Advertising, 17 (Summer), 3-14.

Stern, Barbara B. (1989a), Literary Explications: A Methodology for Consumer Research, in Interpretive Consumer Research, ed., Elizabeth Hirschman, Provo, UT: Association for consumer Research, 48-59.

Stern, Barbara B. (1989b), Literary Criticism and Consumer Research: Overview and Illustrative Analysis, Journal of Consumer Research, 16 (December), 322-34.

Stern, Louis W. and Adel I. El-Ansary (1977), Marketing Channels, Englewood cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.

Stern, Louis W. and Torger Reve (1980), Distribution Channels as Political Economy: A Framework for Comparative Analysis, Journal of Marketing, 44 (Summer), 52-64.

Stewart, David W. and G. Punji (1982), Factors associated with changes in evoked sets among purchase of new automobiles, in An Assessment of Marketing Thought and Practice, eds., B. J. Walker *et al.*, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 61-5.

Stewart, John Q. (1950), Potential of population and its relationship to marketing, in Theory in Marketing, eds., Reavis Cox and Wroe Alderson, Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin.

Stewart, John Q. (1952), A basis for social physics, Impact of Science on Society, (Summer), 122.

Stewart, John Q. and William Warntz (1958), Macrogeography and social science, Geographical Review, (April).

Stewart, Paul W. and J. Frederic Dewhurt (1939), Dose Distribution Cost Too Much? A review of the Costs Involved in Current Marketing Methods and a Program for Improvement, New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, Inc.

Stidsen, Bent (1979a), Directions in the Study of Marketing, in Conceptual and Theoretical Developments in Marketing, eds., Ferrell *et al.*, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 383-99.

Stidsen, Bent (1979b), Comment on Johan Arndt's 'Toward a concept of domesticated markets', Journal of Marketing, 43 (Fall), 76-8.

Sudman, Seymour (1992), Book Review of Coming to public Judgement by Danil Yankelovich, Journal of Marketing, 56 (July), 123-4.

Sulkunen, Pekka (1978), Individual consumption in capitalism: An exercise in the logic of capital, in Acta sociologica, 21, 35-46; cf.: Gronmo, Sigmund (1984), Compensatory Consumer Behaviour: Theoretical Perspectives, Empirical Examples and Methodological Challenges, in 1984 AMA Winter

Educators' Conference: Scientific Method in Marketing, eds., Paul F. Anderson and Michael J. Ryan, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 184-8.

Swanson, Guy E. (1971), Frameworks from comparative research: Structural anthropology and the theory of action, in Comparative Methods in Sociology: Essays on Trends and Applications, ed., Ivan Vallier, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Sweeney, D. H. (1972), Marketing: Management Technology or Social Process? Journal of Marketing, 36 (October), 3-10.

Taylor, W. J. (1965), Is marketing a science? Revisited, Journal of Marketing, 29 (July), 49-53.

Tetreault, Mary A. Stanfield and Robert E. Kleine III (1990), Ritual, ritualised behaviour, and habit: Refinement and extensions of the consumption ritual construct, in Advances in Consumer Research, 17, eds., Marvin E. Goldberg *et al.*, Provo, UT.: Association for Consumer Research, 31-8.

Tharp, Marye C. and Edward W. Cundiff (1989), Agenda for comparative marketing research and thought, in Marketing Theory and Practice, eds., Terry L. Childers *et al.*, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 365-71.

Thomas, A. and M. Lockett (1979), Marxism and systems research: Values in practical action, in Improving the Human Condition, ed., R. F. Ericson, Louisville: SGSR, 284-93.

Thompson, Craig J. (1990), Eureka! And other tests of significance: A new look at evaluating interpretive research, in Advances in Consumer Research, 17, eds., Marvin E. Goldberg *et al.*, Provo, UT.: Association for Consumer Research, 25-30.

Thompson, Craig J. (1991), May the circle be unbroken: A hermeneutic consideration of how interpretive approaches to consumer research are understood by consumer researchers, in Advances in Consumer Research, 18, eds., Rebecca H. Holman and Michael R. Solomon, Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research, 63-9.

Thompson, Craig J., William B. Locander, and Howard R. Pollio (1989), Putting consumer experience back into consumer research: The philosophy and methods of existential-phenomenology, Journal of Consumer Research, 16 (September), 133-46.

Thompson John B. (1982), Universal pragmatics, in Habermas: Critical Debates, eds., John B. Thompson and David Held, London: MacMillan, 116-33.

Thompson John B. (1983), Rationality and social rationalisation: An assessment of Habermas's theory of communicative action, Sociology, 17 (May), 278-95.

Thompson, J. D. (1967), Organisations in Action, New York: McGraw-Hill.

Thorelli, Hans B. (1984), Markets as Networks: Political Science Revisited, in 1984 AMA Winter Educators' Conference: Scientific Method in Marketing, eds., Paul F. Anderson and Michael J. Ryan, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 101-5.

Thorelli, Hans B. (1986a), Networks: Between markets and hierarchies, *Strategic Management Journal*, 7, 37-51; reprinted in *Understanding Business Markets: Interactions, Relationships, Networks*, The IMP Group, ed., David Ford, 1990, London: Academic Press, 443-58.

Thorelli, Hans B. (1986b), Consumer emancipation and economic development, in *The Role of Marketing in Development: Global, Consumer, and Managerial Issues*, eds., Erdogan Kumcu, A. Fuat Firat, Mehmet Karafakioglu, Muhittin Karabullut and Mehmet Oluc, Muncie, IN.: Ball State University, 21-8.

Thyssen, Ole (1976), Paykoanalyse og Marxisme, Kobenhavn: Berlingske Forlag; cf.: Gronmo, Sigmund (1984), Compensatory Consumer Behaviour: Theoretical Perspectives, Empirical Examples and Methodological Challenges, in *1984 AMA Winter Educators' Conference: Scientific Method in Marketing*, eds., Paul F. Anderson and Michael J. Ryan, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 184-8.

Tichenor, P. J. (1982), Status, Communication and social evolution: Evolution of the knowledge gap hypothesis, *Masscommunicatie*, 10 (3).

Tichenor, P. J., G. A. Dohnohue and C. N. Olien (1970), Mass media flow and differential growth in knowledge, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 34 (2).

Toffler (1983), *Preview and Premises*, New York: William Morrow.

Tomlinson, R. (1971), *OR Comes of Age*, London: Tavistock.

Trist, E. L. and K. W. Bamforth (1951), Some social and psychological consequences of the long wall method of coal-getting, *Human Relations*, 4, 3-38.

Tsivacou, Ioanna (1992), Emancipation and truth in critical systems methodologies, *Systems Practice*, 5(2), 181-91.

Tsoukas, Haridimos (1992), Panoptic reason and search for totality: A critical assessment of the critical systems perspective, *Human Relations*, 45(7), 637-57.

Tsoukas, Haridimos (1993a), The road to emancipation is through organisational development: A critical evaluation of total systems intervention, *Systems Practice*, 6(1), 53-70.

Tsoukas, Haridimos (1993b), 'By their fruits ye shall know them': A reply to Jackson, Green, and Midgley, *Systems Practice*, 6(3), 311-7.

Tucker, W. T. (1974), Future Directions in Marketing Theory, *Journal of Marketing*, 38 (April), 30-5.

Ulrich, W. (1983), *Critical Heuristics of Social Planning: A New Approach to Practical Philosophy*, Berne, Switzerland: Haupt.

Ulrich, W. (1988), Systems thinking, systems practice, and practical philosophy: A program of research, *Systems Practice*, 1(2), 137-64.

Ulrich, W. (1993), Some difficulties of ecological thinking, considered from a critical systems perspective: A plea for critical holism, *Systems Practice*, 6 (6), 583-612.

Umiker-Sebeok, Jean (ed.) (1987), _Marketing and Semiotics: New Directions in the Study of Signs of Sale_, Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

Uusitalo, Liisa (1989), A Rational Discourse and Co-operation: Two Requirements for a Rational Society, in _Marketing Theory and Practice_, eds., Richard Bagozzi and J. Paul Peter, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 83-6.

Uusitalo, Liisa and Jyrki Uusitalo (1981), Scientific Progress and Research Traditions in Consumer Research, in _Advances in Consumer Research_, 8, 559-63.

Uusitalo, Liisa and Jyrki Uusitalo (1985), Which makes Sense of Paradigms Makes Sense in Marketing? in _Changing the Course of Marketing: Alternative Paradigms for Widening Marketing Theory_, eds., Nikhilkesh Dholakia and Johan Arndt, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press Inc., 69-85.

Vahl, Martha (1994), Improving mental health service in Calderdale, working paper, Centre for Systems Studies, University of Hull, England.

Vaile, Roland S. (1949), Towards a theory of marketing: A comment, _Journal of Marketing_, 13 (April), 520-2.

Vaile, Roland S., E. T. Grether and Reavis Cox (1952), _Marketing in the American Economy_, New York: The Ronald Press Company.

van Gigch, John. P. (1990), Systems science, the discipline of epistemological domains, contributes to the design of the intelligent global web, _Behavioural Science_, 35, 122-37.

van Gigch, John. P. (1993), Metamodelling: The Epistemology of Systems Science, _Systems Practice_, 6 (3), 251-8.

Vanderblue, Homer B (1921), The functional approach to the study of marketing, _Journal of Political Economy_, 29 (October), 676-83.

Veblen, Thorstein (1898), Why is economics not an evolutionary science? _Quarterly Journal of Economics_, 373-97.

Veblen, Thorstein (1899a), _The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study of the Evolution of Institutions_, New York: MacMillan.

Veblen, Thorstein (1899b), The preconceptions of economic science, _Quarterly Journal of Economics_, (January), 121-50, (July), 396-426.

Venkatesh, Alladi (1989), Modernity and postmodernity, in _AMA Winter Educators' Conference_, eds., Terry L. Childers *et al.*, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 99-104.

Venkatesh, Alladi and Nikhilesh Dholakia (1986), Methodological issues in macromarketing, _Journal of Macromarketing_, 6 (Fall), 36-52.

Vickers, G. (1970), _Freedom in a Rocking Boat_, Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Vickers, G. (1983), _Human Systems Are Different_, London: Harper and Row.

Vittachi, A. (1990), The Denial Syndrome, _New Internationalist_, No. 206, 24-5.

von Bertalanffy, L. (1950), The theory of open systems in physics and biology, in _Systems Thinking_, ed., F. E. Emery, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 70-85.

von Bertalanffy, L. (1968), _General System Theory_, Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Wadinambiaratchi, George (1965), Channels of distribution in developing economics, Business Quarterly (Winter), 74-82.

Walle, A. H. (1984), Alderson's functionalism: A phoenix rising from its own ashes, in 1984 AMA Winter Educators' Conference: Scientific Method in Marketing, eds., Paul F. Anderson and Michael J. Ryan, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 78-80.

Wallendorf, Melanie and Eric Arnould (1988), 'My favourite things': A cross cultural inquiry into object attachment, possessiveness and social linkage, Journal of Consumer Research, 14 (4), 531-47.

Wallendorf, Melanie and Russell W. Belk (1989), Assessing Trustworthiness in Naturalistic Consumer Research, in Interpretive Consumer Research, ed., Elizabeth C. Hirschman, Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research, 69-84.

Wallendorf, Melanie and Gerald Zaltman (eds.) (1984), Readings in Consumer Behaviour: Individuals, Groups, and Organisations, New York: Wiley.

Waltors, C. Glenn and Ronald D. Taylor, (1979), Contingency marketing and contemporary marketing management: a comparison, in Conceptual and Theoretical Developments in Marketing, eds., Ferrell *et al.*, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 517-31.

Weber, Max (1964), The Theory of Social and Economic Organisations, New York: The Free Press.

Weber, Max (1976), The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism, London: Allen & Unwin.

Weld, L. D. H. (1916), The Marketing of Farm Products, New York: The MacMillan Company.

Weld, L. D. H. (1917), Marketing functions and mercantile organisation, American Economic Review, 2 (June), 306-18.

Wertz, B. A. (1981), Effectiveness in Sales Interactions: a contingency framework, Journal of Marketing, 45 (Winter), 85-103.

Wertz, Frederick and Joan Greenhut (1985), A psychology of buying: Demonstration of phenomenological approach in consumer research, in Advances in Consumer research, 12, eds., Elizabeth C. Hirschman and Morris B. Holbrook, Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research, 566-70.

White, Philip D. (1981), The systems dimension in the definition of macromarketing, Journal of Macromarketing, 1 (Spring), 11-3.

White, Philip D. and Donald R. Emery, Jr. (1978), Simplifying Macromarketing: The need for improved understanding and the implications for research planning and execution, in Research Frontiers in Marketing: Dialogues and Directions, ed., S. Jain, Chicago: American Marketing Association.

Williams, R. (1965), The Long Revolution, Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin.

Williams, R. (1973), Base and superstructure in Marxist cultural theory, New Left Review, 82, 3-16.

Williams, R. (1977), *Marxism and Literature*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Williams, R. (1979), *Politics and Letters*, London: New Left Books.

Wilson, D. T. and V. Mummalaneni (1986), Bonding and commitment in buyer-seller relationships: A preliminary conceptualisation, *Industrial Marketing and Purchasing*, 1 (3), 44-58.

Winch, Peter (59), *The Ideal of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Wind, Yoram and T. S. Robertson (1983), Marketing strategy: New directions for theory and research, *Journal of Marketing*, 47 (Spring), 12-25.

Wind, Yoram and Susan P. Douglas (1982), Comparative consumer research: The next frontier? *Management Decision*, 20 (4), 24-35.

Wolff, J. (1975), *Hermeneutic Philosophy and the Sociology of Art*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Zaltman, G., K. LeMasters, and M. Heffering (1982), *Theory Construction in Marketing: Some Thoughts on Thinking*, New York: Wiley.

Zaltman, G., C. R. Pinson, and R. Angelmar (1973), *Metatheory and Consumer Research*, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Zaltman, G. and Melanie Wallendorf (1977), The missing chunk or how we've missed the boat, in *Contemporary Marketing Thought*, eds., Barnett Greenberg and Danny Bellender, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 235-8.

Zeithaml, Valaria A., P. Rajan Varadarajan and Carl P. Zeithaml (1988), The contingency approach: its foundations and relevance to theory building and research in marketing, *European Journal of Marketing*, 22 (7), 37-64.

Zeithaml, Carl P. and Valaria A. Zeithaml (1984), Environmental management: revising the marketing perspective, *Journal of Marketing*, 48 (Spring), 46-53.

Zielinski, Joan and Thomas Robertson (1982), Consumer behaviour theory: Excesses and limitations, in *Advances in Consumer Research*, 9, ed., Andrew Mitchell, Ann Arbor, MI.: Association for Consumer Research, 8-12.

Zif, Jehiel (1980), A managerial approach to macromarketing, *Journal of Marketing*, 44 (Winter), 36-45.

Zikmund, William G. (1982), Metaphors as methodology, in *Marketing Theory: Philosophy of Science Perspectives*, eds., Ronald F. Bush and Shelby D. Hunt, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 75-7.

Zinkhan, George M. and Rudy Hirschheim (1992), Truth in Marketing Theory and Research: An Alternative Perspective, *Journal of Marketing*, 56 (April), 80-8.

Zinn, Walter, and Scott D. Johnson, (1987), The commodity approach in marketing research, in *Marketing in Three Eras*, eds., Terence Nevett and Stanley C. Hollander, Department of Marketing and Transportation Administration, Graduate School of Business Administration, East Lansing: Michigan State University, 135-48.