

THE UNIVERSITY OF HULL

**British Policy and Chinese Politics in Malaya
1942-1955**

being a Thesis submitted for the Degree of

PhD

in the University of Hull

by

**Hak Ching Oong B.A. (Hons), M.A. National
University of Malaysia (UKM)**

October 1993

Summary of Thesis submitted for Ph. D degree
by Hak Ching Oong
on
British Policy and Chinese Politics
in Malaya, 1942-1955.

This study attempts to assess the dynamics of British policy towards the Chinese community in Malaya during a period of thirteen years which witnessed the Japanese Occupation of Malaya, the reestablishment of British colonial rule, and the efforts towards self-government. A key factor in the British policy towards the Chinese community is based on an awareness of the community's potentiality to become a "Fifth Column", threatening the security of British Malaya. The problem facing the colonial authorities, therefore, was how to neutralize this potential "Fifth Column". Influenced by the contemporary situation, the British eventually adopted a policy of socio-political reorganization of the Chinese community as a means of solving the problem. During the period of this study British policy towards the Chinese political role covers four stages: first, the pre-war period with the so-called "pro-Malay policy"; second, the 1942-1947 period with the new Chinese policy and the Malayan Union scheme; third, the period of Federation and the revival of a pro-Malay policy; and finally, the Malayanization of the Chinese aiming at

building a united Malayan nation. Simultaneously with this stage, was the British undertaking of decolonization.

In retrospect, the study in the main confirms the success of British policy towards the Malayan Chinese particularly in cultivating a sense of Malayan national consciousness. At least the majority of the Chinese in Malaya willingly chose this land as their home.

Acknowledgements

I would like to record my thanks and appreciations to all who have assisted and inspired me throughout these past few years. Very special acknowledgement and gratitude are due to Dr. C.J. Christie of the Centre of the South-East Asian Studies for his painstaking supervision of the thesis. His careful comments, criticisms and suggestions were of great value to me. I am indebted to the late Dr. D. K. Bassett, the former Director of the Centre for South-East Asian Studies from whom I received much encouragement, assistance and sympathy. I would like also to record my thanks to Professor Dr. Victor King and all the staff of the Centre for South-East Asian Studies for their help and encouragement.

My special thanks are due to my former supervisor, Associate Professor Dr. Khasnor Johan, who introduced me to the subject of Chinese community in Malaya. I am obliged to Mr. Humphrey Ball, the former Legal Advisor of the MCA, who allowed me to examine certain documents on Chinese political activity. I would also like to express my indebtedness to the following persons for their advice and encouragement: Associate Professor Dr. Sabihah Osman, the Head of the History

Department, Professor Dr. Ahmat Adam, Professor Dr. Nik Hassan Shuhaimi Nik Abdul Rahman and Associate Professor Dr. Sarim Hj. Mustajab. My thanks are due to Associate Professor Dr. Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian and Associate Professor Dr. Pamela Sodhy for their comments on certain parts of the thesis. My thanks are also due to my colleagues and fellow-students, Mr. Nabir Abdullah and Associate Professor Dr. Nik Anuar Nik Mahmud for drawing my attention to certain documents in their collections.

I am indebted to various institutions for allowing me to conduct research in preparation for the thesis. I wish to acknowledge the help from the National University of Malaysia in the form of a study award and leave. The University also provided me with a financial aid which enable me to do further research in Singapore and Penang. I would like to extend my thanks to the staff of the following institutions: Public Record Office (London), the National Army Meseum (London), the Rhodes House Library (Oxford), the University of Durham, the Arkib Negara (Kuala Lumpur), The National Archives (Singapore), The Central Library of the National University of Singapore, The Library of the Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, the Library of the Universiti Malaya, the Library of the Universiti Sains Malaysia , the Institute Of Southeast Asian Studies Library

(Singapore) and the Brynmor Jones Library, University of Hull.

Finally, to my wife, Thank Sow Eng, and my son, Ong Swee Pie, my loving thanks for their unfailing support, encouragement, and affection throughout this academic trial.

OONG HAK CHING
National University of Malaysia

Contents

Summary	ii
Acknowledgement	iv
Contents	vii
Abbreviations	viii
Introduction	1
I The Emergence of Political Consciousness and Nationalism Amongst the Chinese during the period of 1894-1941	17
II The Malayan Chinese Politics during the War, 1942-1945	57
III The Problems of the War and the Formulation of Britain's New Chinese Policy, 1942-1945	87
IV The British Military Administration and the Malayan Union Experiment, 1945-1947	129
V The Chinese Political Agitation Against the Federation Proposals and the Emergency, 1948-1951	182
VI The Malayanization of Chinese Policy, 1948-1951	248
VII Building a United Malayan Nation, 1952-1954	310
VIII The Road to Independence, 1955	368
Conclusion	421
Appendix A	426
Bibliography	450

Abbreviations

ACCC	Associated Chinese Chambers Of Commerce
ACAO	Assistant Chinese Affairs Officer
AEBUS	Anti-Enemy Backing Up Society
AJA	Anti-Japanese Army
AJUF	Anti-Japanese Union and Forces
AMCJA	All Malaya Council of Joint Action
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BMA	British Military Administration
CAB	Cabinet, London
CAO	Chinese Affairs Officers
CCAO	Chief Civil Affairs Officer
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CCC	Chinese Chamber of Commerce
CDL	Chinese Democratic Party
CJA	Council of Joint Action
CLC	Communities Liaison Committee
Cmd.	Command Paper
CNEVC	Chinese National Emancipation Vanguard Corps
CO	Colonial Office, London
Cominform	Communist Information (Bureau)
Commintern	Communist International
CWC	Constitutional Working Committee
DCCAO	Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer
DO	Dominion Office, London
FARELF	Far East Land Forces
FIR	Fortnightly Intelligence Review
FMS	Federated Malay States
FO	Foreign Office, London
GHQ	General Headquarters
GLU	General Labour Union
GOC	General Officer Commanding
HMG	His/Her Majesty Government
HMSO	His/Her Majesty Stationery Office
IMP	Independence of Malaya Party
JMBRAS	Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society
JSEAH	Journal of Southeast Asian History
JSEAS	Journal of Southeast Asian studies
JSSS	Journal of South Seas Society
KMM	Kesatuan Melayu Muda
KMT	Kuomintang
MCA	Malayan Chinese Association
MCACECC	MCA Chinese Education Central Committee
MCP	Malayan Communist Party
MOCNSM	Malayan Overseas Chinese National Salvation Movement
MCS	Malayan Civil Service
MDU	Malayan Democratic Union

MIC	Malayan Indian Congress
MRLA	Malayan Races Liberation Army
MNC	Malayan National Congress
MNP	Malay Nationalist Party
MPABA	Malayan People's Anti-British Army
MPAJA	Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army
MPAJU	Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Union
MPU	Malayan Planning Unit
MSS	Malayan Security Service
NCP	Nanyang Communist Party
NDYL	New Democratic Youth League
NEI	Netherlands East Indies
OAG	Officer Administrating Government
OCA	Overseas Chinese Association
OCAJA	Overseas Chinese Anti-Japanese Association
PIJ	Political Intellengence Journal
PMCJA	Pan-Malayan Council of Joint Action
PMFTU	Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions
PMU	Paninsular Malays Union
PSSLC	Proceeding of the Straits Settlements Legislative Council
PUTERA	Pusat Tenaga Ra'ayat
RIDA	Rural and Industrial Development Authority
SAC	Supreme Allied Commander
SACSEA	Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia
SCA	Secretary for Chinese Affairs
SCAO	Senior Civil Affairs Officer
SCBA	Straits Chines British association
SCCC	Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce
SCRFC	Singapore Chinese Relief Council
SCRFU	Singapore Chinese Relief Fund Union
SEAC	South-East Asia Command (The Allied Forces)
SEA	Southern Expeditionary Army (Japanese Forces)
SMCIYC	San Min Chu I Youth Corps
SOE	Special Operations Executive
STS	Special Training School
TCL	Tan Cheng Lock (Papers)
UMNO	United Malays National Organization
UMS	Unfederated Malays States
UCSTA	United Chinese School Teacher's Association
WO	War Office, London

Introduction

This work is an attempt to assess the dynamics of British policy towards Chinese politics in Malaya. It focuses on the period from 1942-1955 which witnessed the Japanese occupation of Malaya, the re-establishment of British colonial rule, and the moves towards self-government. British policy towards the Chinese community changed dramatically at the outbreak of the Second World War with the introduction of the document entitled, "Malaya, Long Term Policy Directives-- Chinese Policy" and the Malayan Union proposals which replaced the British so-called pro-Malay and anti-Chinese policy of the pre-war period. However, this new policy was suddenly changed in 1948 with the introduction of the Federal policy which almost revived the pre-war policy towards the Chinese community. At the end of 1948 the British started to rethink their position and developed a "Malayanisation of the Chinese" policy. This was re-emphasized in 1952 with the development of the theme of building a united Malayan nation. 1955 was the critical year in the evolution of British policy, since this was the year that they decided to end their rule in Malaya.

Many books have been written which are indirectly related to British policy and Chinese politics in Malaya. In 1967 James Allen wrote his pioneering monograph, The

Malayan Union.¹ It is a study of the rise and the fall of the Malayan Union. The author sets himself to answer two principal questions: "Why was it attempted and why did it fail so quickly?" Even though the book "presented the lengthiest and most sophisticated analysis of the Malayan Union," it suffered from a deficiency of data.² Allen's work was mainly based on interviews and published materials including journals and books. He was not able to investigate the relevant official records such as CO 273/667, CO 825/42, CO 865/14, CO 717/152, FO 371/41625 and BMA/ADM/239 which were then not yet open for public scrutiny. Therefore, it was not possible for the author to present an entirely satisfactory explanation as to what led the Colonial Office to introduce and then to drop the Union policy. Some of his arguments are not convincing as he was not able to support them with sufficient data. For instance, he points out that one of the reasons which induced the Colonial Office to introduce the Malayan Union policy was the "anti-Malay atmosphere" prevailing at the time, along with the growth of "a more genuine admiration for the Chinese," who bore the brunt of the Japanese occupation.³ He added that Whitehall felt that the predominantly Chinese Malayan Peoples Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) and its civilian supporters deserved some recognition and some share of the political cake after the re-establishment of colonial rule in Malaya. However, Allen fails to provide any data or specific sources to support this hypothesis.

Allen's arguments were disputed by Mohamed Noordin Sopiee, who published From Malayan Union to Singapore Separation in 1974. According to Mohamed Noordin, there is little in the Colonial Office records "to indicate that there was a significant desire to punish the Malays or that strong anti-Malay feelings significantly affected political decision-making."⁴ Mohamed Noordin was of the opinion that the indirect role of the United States played an important part in the formulation of the Malayan Union policy.⁵ He added that the British commitment to the ideal of decolonization also contributed to the formulation of the Union policy.

Unlike Allen, Mohamed Noordin was able to rely on a wider variety of sources-- including some confidential files, particularly Cabinet papers-- in the Public Record Office in London, and others in the National Archives in Kuala Lumpur. However, the work also faced a deficiency of data, as some of the relevant confidential files on this subject were opened one year after it was published. Thus, according to Albert Lau, Noordin failed "to offer a satisfactory account of official decisions at the departmental level from which the Malayan Union originated."⁶

Mohamed Noordin's work, which is an overall study of political unification in the Malaysia region, gives some coverage of Chinese political activities such as the

Penang Secession Movement of 1948-1949, but fails to assess the impact of the Penang Secession Movement on the constitutional development of Malaya. Judging from the available information, this event in fact induced the British government to bring Singapore closer to Malaya, which in the long term contributed to the formation of Malaysia. Mohamed Noordins's coverage of British policy towards Chinese politics in the period 1948 to 1955 does not fulfill all our expectations, particularly since more and more confidential files have become available.

Another major study on the same ground is British policy and Malay politics during the Malayan Union Experiment 1942-1948 by A. J. Stockwell.⁷ As the title suggests it focuses on the development of Malay politics, and has limited coverage of Chinese politics. In chapter II, the author traces and discusses the emergence of a new British policy from 1942 to 1945. According to Albert Lau, Stockwell was "able to document, with greater precision, the key stages in the evolution of the Union scheme as well as presenting the first documented study of the MacMichael mission."⁸ Like Mohamed Noordin, Stockwell found little evidence which indicated that Chinese politics had played a key role in inducing the Colonial Office to introduce the Union policy. However, he does mention that the Malayan Planning Unit appointed Victor Purcell to deal with Chinese matters.⁹ Indirectly he opened new ground for further research.

Stockwell's work, which was published in 1979, "was understandably more extensively researched than either" James Allen or Mohamed Noordin Sopiee.¹⁰ The book is heavily footnoted and makes use of almost every source available-- including CO 825, CO 273, CO 717, CO 865, Cab 65/41, 49 and 53, Cab 66/60 and 65, Cab 96/5, Cab 98/41, the Malayan Security Service Files, Political Intelligence Journals, British Military Administration Files and some private papers. As his focus of research was on Malay politics, Stockwell did not investigate the work of Victor Purcell and the inter-departmental committee which was formed in December 1943, to formulate a key directive on Chinese policy. As a consequence A. J. Stockwell did not pursue James Allen's speculations on this subject.

Nine years after the publication of Stockwell's book many more writers started to undertake research in this field, on the basis of tackling a wider scope and more diverse literature. In 1988 Heng Pek Koon published Chinese Politics in Malaysia, followed by Richard Stubbs, Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960, in 1989.¹² The following year C.F. Yong & R.B. McKenna published The Kuomintang Movement in British Malaya 1912-1949¹³ and then, Albert Lau's The Malayan Union Controversy, 1942-1948, was published in 1991.¹⁴

Heng Pek Koon's work is the first book-length study of the Malayan (later Malaysian) Chinese Association (MCA) in the period 1945-1955, which according to the author "witnessed the emergence of the Chinese as an integral component within the political community of Malaya."¹⁵ Heng's study reveals that the MCA brokered the growth of a Malayan-centered conservative Chinese political culture and, "in its finest hours," "played an innovative and pivotal role in the independence movement, galvanizing and articulating the aspirations of the Chinese community, as well as effectively representing Chinese concerns vis-a-vis the British Administration and Malay powers that be."¹⁶

The real strength, which is also the real weakness of the author, is her sources. On the one hand she was very lucky to be allowed to investigate MCA records from 1949-1986 at the MCA Headquarters in Kuala Lumpur and was also able to interview some prominent leaders of the party. However, on the other hand, she was unable to investigate a variety of other sources, including certain files in the Public Record Office and the Malaysian National Archives, and private papers such as the Gerald Templer, H.B. Ball (the Legal Advisor of the MCA) and H.S. Lee Papers. As a result the author emphasises and discusses at great length the role of MCA in the process of the "indigenization" of Chinese politics and gives only small coverage to the role of the colonial government, which in

actual fact forced the Chinese to turn inward or to "Malayanize", in order to be able to enjoy citizenship and other political rights in Malaya. There are also some gaps in her arguments relating to the origins of the MCA and the UMNO-MCA Alliance. Heng Pek Koon was not aware that Tan Cheng Lock had already made a proposal to form the MCA in December 1948, as she was unable to investigate the Malcolm MacDonald Papers. Her explanations of the origins of the UMNO-MCA Alliance were based mainly on logic, speculation and assumption.¹⁷ She also did not interview H.B. Ball, former Legal Adviser of the MCA, who could have provided some vital information regarding the origins of the Alliance. Some of her statements such as: "Rejecting Tan Cheng Lock's decision to support the IMP in the election, the Selangor MCA leadership searched for an alternative strategy which would enable the MCA to field its candidate on a communal ticket but within an inter-ethnic framework," are not supported by any specific source.¹⁸ Likewise the author is unable to explain certain events, such as "why Tan Cheng Lock continued to support the IMP after he made his commitment to UMNO", which indicates a deficiency in documentation.¹⁹ Therefore further research needed to be done or more documentation was necessary to clarify the origins of the UMNO-MCA Alliance and the attitude of Tan Cheng Lock towards the IMP and UMNO.

Richard Stubb's book aimed "to place the 'shooting war' between the Malayan Government and the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) within the broader context of social, political and economic aspects of life in Malaya."²⁰ It made a survey of the full scope of the Government's "hearts and minds" strategy and the impact of both Government and MCP strategies on administration, security, and political, economic and social policies.²² His findings and analyses confirm the contribution made by his predecessors such as Anthony Short in The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960,²³ complement Cheah Boon Kheng's Red Star Over Malaya: Resistance and Social Conflict During and After the Japanese Occupation 1941-1946.²⁴

To cover such "a wide-ranging review of the events of the Emergency," Richard Stubbs mainly used a wide variety of confidential files in the Public Record Office and the Malaysian National Archives, mainly CO537, CO717 and CO1022 files. He missed some important files in the series CO273, CO865, WO203, CO1030 and also the older file FO371/116941 which could have provided some additional data on this subject. The author also failed to consult certain BMA files in the Malaysian National Archives and some private papers such as the Malcolm MacDonald and General Gerald Templer Papers.

Even though Richard Stubb's book offers a comprehensive explanation of various aspects of the Emergency, it also has some shortcomings. Chapter 8, "The Final Year",²⁷ was somewhat of a disappointment as there is in it hardly any new information about the Baling talks of 1955. 1955 was in fact a crucial year in the development of British policy and the process of the decolonisation of Malaya. He missed a chance to investigate certain files particularly F0371/116941 and CO1030/31, which could have provided useful information, adding to our understanding of the British response to the Communists' peace offensive.

Richard Stubbs also gives little coverage of some of the Government's efforts to win the "hearts and minds" of the people such as the development of a Malayan-centered Chinese political party and the Community Liaison Committee or the movement for inter-communal co-operation. Like Heng Pek Koon, he was unable to provide enough data to clarify the origins of the UMNO-MCA Alliance.²⁷ He suggests that UMNO and the MCA joined forces to counter the electoral threat of Onn's IMP, and because of personal animosity towards Onn.²⁸ But he is unable to provide any evidence to support this statement.

C.F. Yong & R. B. McKenna's work focuses on a different angle of Chinese politics and in a different period. It is concerned with the Chinese-based political

movement-- the Kuomintang-- in the period 1912 to 1949. According to the authors it is a study set "against the background of British Colonial rule, the changing political circumstances and fortunes in China and the rising and waning of Malayan nationalism from 1894."²⁹ Six of the eight chapters focus on the leadership, organisation and ideology of the Kuomintang in the pre-World War Two period.

Generally this book is well researched and well written and is heavily noted. The authors made use of a wider variety of sources such as official records in the CO, WO and FO series in the Public Record Office, and also materials in the National Library of Singapore, private papers and other unpublished and published material both in English and Chinese. However, the authors missed a chance to investigate certain files which are relevant to the subject, such as FO371/41625 and CAB101 in the Public Record Office, and the BMA files in the Malaysian National Archives. As a consequence the authors did not attempt to study the evolution of British policy towards the Kuomintang during the period 1942 to 1945. The authors seem not to have been aware of the existence of the document entitled "Malaya, Long Term Policy Directives-- Chinese Policy" which was formulated by the British as a result of British (through Force 136) cooperation with the

Kuomintang and the MCP during the war. Therefore these matters remain to be redressed.

The arrival of Albert Lau's book is a most welcome addition to the study of British policy and Chinese politics. The author presented a more comprehensive study of British constitutional policy towards both Malaya and Singapore in the period 1942 to 1948. He emphasized two fundamental aspects of British policy: the "Union" and "citizenship" issues.³⁰ This book definitely provides us with a more comprehensive analysis and is enlightening on the Malayan Union and the development of British policy until 1948.

The author had a great advantage compared with his predecessors in this field, since almost all the relevant confidential files had been opened in the Public Record Office and the Malaysian National Archives. Albert Lau also was able to investigate almost all MBA files and certain private papers such as the Nik Mohammed Kamil Papers which are no longer available for public scrutiny because of the implementation of the Malaysian Official Secrets Act at the end of the 1980's.

Albert Lau made some fascinating discoveries relating to British policy towards the Chinese community during the Japanese occupation of Malaya.³¹ He also discusses the probable influence of political, moral and military

factors on the Colonial Office's thinking about its post-war Chinese policy.³² He made use of CAB101 files as his main source to support and justify his hypothesis and interpretation. However, without further research in this area scholars may not be entirely convinced by his conclusions as the author has failed to indicate whether the Colonial Officers had any knowledge of the work of British Force 136 and its relationship with the MCP in Malaya before they formulated their policy towards the Chinese community.

Documents of particular significance for the subject of British policy towards the Chinese polity have not been given sufficient emphasis, such as the private papers of people such as Malcolm MacDonald, General Templer, H.S. Lee and H.B. Ball. There is also some old material which has still been left uninvestigated, such as FO371/41625, and there are new files to be investigated such CO1030 and FO371/116941. Because of these documents, new information has been obtained, and a different perspective on British policy towards the Chinese has been gained, particularly the fact that previous books have under-emphasised the influence on British policy of the development of a Chinese polity in Malaya.

This thesis seeks to assess the dynamics of British policy towards the Chinese community between 1942 and

1955. A key factor in British policy towards the Chinese community was their belief that this community had the potential to become a "Fifth Column", to serve their motherland, China, or another foreign power, notably Communist Russia. Thus the Chinese created the so-called "Chinese problem" for the British in Malaya, including Singapore. The strength of this community lay not only in its size but in its economic power vis-a-vis the Malays or bumiputra. The problem for the Colonial or local authorities was how to deal with and render this potential "Fifth Column" innocuous.

British policy towards the Chinese community changed dramatically between 1942 and 1955. The change took place in four phases: first, the pre-war period with the so-called "pro-Malay policy"; second, the 1942-1947 period with the new liberal Chinese policy and the Malayan Union scheme; third, the period of early Federal policy which reflected almost a revival of the pre-war policy; and finally the "Malayanization of the Chinese" policy aiming at building a united Malayan nation. Simultaneously with this stage, Britain finally committed itself to early decolonisation.

The study is also intended to complement the earlier works covering the same ground and to fill the documentary gaps in this period's history, and thereby gain a new and

fresh perspective on the complex relationship between British policy and Chinese Politics in Malaya.

It is the writer's contention that the relations between British policy and Chinese politics were shaped by the actions and responses of both sides. Between 1942 and 1946 the initiative towards a more liberal attitude towards Chinese politics was largely taken by the British without any prompting or much pressure from the Chinese. The abandonment of the Chinese policy based on the long term policy directives and the Malayan Union proposals and the implementation of the federal policy, while largely a response to strong Malay opposition, was made easier by a lack of reaction from the majority of the Chinese and the increased radicalism of the MCP. The British could still initiate a policy which affected the Chinese without giving weight to Chinese opinion. However, the introduction of the Malayanization of the Chinese policy was undoubtedly a British response to the political activities of the Chinese which went beyond an act of accommodation. It was a policy adopted to safeguard the security of the British position in Malaya and to enable the transfer of sovereignty to take place peacefully.

NOTES

1. James de Allen, The Malayan Union, Yale University Southeast Asian Studies, Yale, 1967, p. vi.
2. Mohamed Noordin Sopiee, From Malayan Union to Singapore Separation, Penerbit Universiti Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1974, p. 16.
3. James de Allen, op.cit., p.9.
4. Mohamed Noordin Sopiee, op.cit., p.18
5. Ibid., pp. 18-19.
6. Albert Lau, The Malayan Union Controversy, 1942-1948, Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1991, p.2.
7. A. J. Stockwell, British Policy and Malay Politics during the Malayan Union Experiment, 1942-1948, Malaysian Branch of Royal Asiatic society, Monograph no. 8, Kuala Lumpur.
8. Albert Lau, op.cit., p.2.
9. A.J. Stockwell, op.cit., p.24.
10. Albert Lau, op.cit., p.2.
11. Heng Pek Koon, Chinese Politics in Malaysia, A History of the Malaysian Chinese Association, Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1988.
12. Richard Stubbs, Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960, Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1989.
13. C.F. Yong & R.B. McKenna, The Kuomintang Movement in British Malaya 1912-1949, Singapore University Press, Singapore, 1987.
14. Albert Lau, op.cit.
15. Heng Pek Koon, op.cit., p.1.
16. Ibid., p.2.
17. See ibid., pp. 159-163.
18. Ibid., p. 159.
19. Ibid., p. 168.
20. Richard Stubbs, op.cit., p. vii (preface).

21. Ibid.
22. Anthony Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960, Frederick Muller Ltd., London, 1975.
23. Cheah Boon Kheng, Red Star Over Malaya: Resistance and Social Conflict during and after the Japanese Occupation, 1941-1946, Singapore University Press, Singapore, first editon, 1983.
24. Richard Stubbs, op.cit., p.vii.
25. Ibid., pp. 225-245.
26. See ibid., p. 209.
27. Ibid.
28. C.F. Yong & R.B. McKenna, op.cit., p.xi.
29. Albert Lau, op.cit., p.5.
30. See ibid., pp.74-75.
31. Ibid., p. 75.

CHAPTER 1

The Emergence of Political Consciousness and Nationalism Among the Chinese, 1894-1941

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the development of Chinese political consciousness and activities in Malaya by focussing on three main tendencies: firstly, "Overseas Chinese" nationalism which was wedded to the Kuomintang and China; secondly, the Communist movement, which was dominated by Chinese, and whose activities included the promotion of Chinese nationalism, in addition to anti-imperialist and anti-British movements; and thirdly, the Straits Chinese, as represented by the Straits Chinese British Association and the Straits Chinese newspapers which were written in the Baba Peranakan-Malay language and were locally oriented.¹

Chinese political activities created the so-called "Chinese problem" for the colonial government. The Kuomintang's activities were considered a foreign interference in Chinese affairs in Malaya; there was also the fact that the Communist movements, which were the most radical groups in the Chinese community, promoted and incited social unrest and discontent among the workers.² Also there were the Straits Chinese demands for participation in the administration and government of

Malaya, which had given rise to great concern among the Malay Sultans and the traditional Malay community. Generally the colonial government held the view that the Chinese community had the potential to be a "Fifth Column" which would serve the motherland, China, or other foreign powers and destroy British supremacy in Malaya.

In these circumstances, the aims of British policy were to suppress the Kuomintang and the Communists, except for those who showed themselves to be moderates; and to ignore the demands of the Straits Chinese and take a strong and inflexible pro-Malay line, such as a decentralization policy, prolonging the exclusion of non-Malays from administration and any areas of policy-making. In other words the British wanted the Chinese community to be loyal and apolitical.

Part I

Overseas Chinese Nationalism and the Development of the Kuomintang

The origin of Overseas Chinese nationalism can be traced to the political development of China at the end of the nineteenth century. In the first Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), China was defeated and was forced to sign the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895 which ceded the island of Formosa to Japan. These events caused

bitterness and a sense of humiliation among the Overseas Chinese, who had always regarded Japan as a wo-jen (dwarf).³ In 1897, eighteen patriotic Chinese from Malacca set up a group called "The Eighteen Saviours" whose objective was to save China from destruction.⁴

After the emergence of the Reform Movement led by Kang Yu Wei (1856-1927) the Overseas Chinese were introduced to the idea of reform. Some educated Chinese in Singapore such as Khoo Seok Wan set up a Chinese newspaper, Thien Nan Shin Pau to spread reformist principles among Overseas Chinese.⁵ Dr. Lim Boon Keng, an English educated Straits Chinese, was also attracted to the idea of reform. He, and other Straits Chinese, set up the Straits Chinese Magazine to spread reformist ideas to the Straits Chinese community. He also revived the Chinese newspaper, Sing Po under the new name of Jin Shin Pau, which became an organ for reformist groups.⁶ For the same purpose, he formed the Chinese Philanthropic Society.

On 2 February 1900 Kang Yu Wei visited Singapore and set up a branch of the Emperor Protection Party with Khoo Seok Wan as its Chairman. The Reform Movement and their leader promoted political consciousness among the Overseas Chinese in Malaya through Chinese education. With their encouragement,

eight Chinese modern schools were established in Malaya from 1904-1907. The Reform Movement took steps to raise funds from the Overseas Chinese in order to prepare for revolt in China against the dowager Empress. The purpose of the revolt was to restore Emperor Kuang-hsu to the Chinese throne. However, the revolt, which was launched in August 1900, failed, and the local reformist supporters began to disassociate themselves from the Reform Movement. Subsequently the Reform Movement lost its main purpose when Emperor Kuang-hsu died in 1908.

The revolutionary movement, under the leadership of Sun Yat Sen, saw the Overseas Chinese as a potential force for nationalist revolution in China. In order to get support from the Overseas Chinese, Sun Yat Sen visited Singapore in July 1900. He did not get a good response from the Overseas Chinese for the revolutionaries' cause. However, his colleague, Yu Lieh, who visited Malaya in the following year, was able to gain some support. He laid the foundations for the revolutionary movement by setting up the social-educational "Central Harmony Club" or Chung Ho-tang in Kuala Lumpur, with branches in Singapore, Ipoh and Penang⁷. These branches, together with clubs and reading rooms became a propaganda machine to fan anti-Manchu sentiment among the Overseas Chinese. The revolutionary movement also used various secret societies in Malaya to

instil propaganda among the lower classes of the Overseas Chinese.

A branch of the Tung Meng Hui, or Alliance League, were formed in Singapore in April 1906, and it became the headquarters for the Southeast Asian branch of Tung Meng Hui. But in 1910 it was moved to Penang and also reorganised under the new name, Chung hua Ko-min-tang or "Chinese Revolutionary Party." Sun Yat Sen planned a series of revolts against the Manchu Government in China. The Overseas Chinese played their role as fund raisers for the revolutionary cause and some of them even returned to participate in the revolt.

The Manchus were overthrown after the Wuchang uprising in October 1911. China became a republic on the 1 January 1912, and Sun Yat Sen was inaugurated as provisional president in Nanking, the new capital. However, four months later he yielded the presidency to Yuan Shih K'ai, with the hope of maintaining peace and unity in China.⁸

After the national revolution, the Tung Meng Hui was merged with other smaller parties and reorganized as the Kuomintang or Nationalist Party. Unlike the Tung Meng Hui, the Kuomintang was not a revolutionary organization, but a parliamentary political party. Various branches of the Kuomintang were formed, including

some abroad. A branch was formed in Singapore under the name of "The Singapore Communication Lodge of the KMT" and was registered under the Societies Ordinance in 1913.⁹ Among the founding members were Straits Chinese such as Dr. Lim Boon Keng and Tan Chay Yan from Malacca. This lodge was closed in 1914 when to the Registrar of Societies pressurized the Lodge to disclose the names and addresses of members.¹⁰ However, other branches in Malaya continued to operate. Later, all the branches went underground and were declared non-existent by a Gazette Notification of 1922.

In 1913, the Kuomintang in China was banned by Yuan Shih K'ai's government. Sun Yat Sen and a group of Chinese leaders, who were opposed to Yuan Shih K'ai fled to Japan. In Japan he decided to found a new party, the Chinese Revolutionary Party (CRP), to replace the Kuomintang. He directed the branches of the Kuomintang abroad, including those in Malaya, to be redesigned and reorganized as the branch offices of the CRP in order to prepare for the "Third Revolution."

In Malaya some branches of the KMT were dissolved to form branches of CRP and were operated secretly, as in China. But some other branches of the KMT refused to be dissolved and carried out operations under the banner of the old KMT.¹¹ As in China, the KMT

branches were under pressure from the authorities. The colonial government attempted to maintain good relations with Yuan Shih K'ai's government, which was recognized by the British government in London. The British were in favour of a unified and centralized China which could protect British interests in that country. Thus, the local government in Malaya took steps to suppress the local branches of KMT. Between 1913 and 1919, the KMT and CRP suffered a decline in China and in Malaya as well.¹²

The death of Yuan Shih K'ai in 1916 and the development of Chinese nationalism as a consequence of the May Fourth Incident provided the opportunity for Sun Yat Sen to build his power base in China.¹³ He with the aid of southern military governors set up a "rump parliament" in late July 1917.¹⁴ On 2 September the Military Government was inaugurated and Sun Yat Sen was elected as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. On 10 October 1919, he reorganized the CRP and converted it into the Chung-hua Kuomintang (in a shortened form it was called the Kuomintang(KMT), same as former Kuomintang), in preparation for final struggle against the Northern warlords.¹⁵

The May Fourth Incident intensified nationalism among Overseas Chinese in Malaya.¹⁶ The Chinese in Singapore and Penang were furious with the Paris Peace


Conference decisions concerning China and the attitudes of the Peking government. An organization called the Patriotic League (Ai-kuo t'ung-meng) urged Overseas Chinese to boycott Japanese goods. On 19 June, 1919, anti-Japanese activities in Singapore caused a major disturbance. In one incident police and anti-Japanese demonstrators clashed: two people were killed and three wounded. The government declared Martial Law the following day. Subsequently 131 arrests were made by the police and three people were killed and eight injured. In Penang, anti-Japanese activities also created a disturbance: three people were killed and three injured. Towards July, anti-Japanese activities had declined but the Overseas Chinese continued to harbour a strong resentment towards the Japanese.¹⁷ This marked the beginning of Chinese radical nationalism in Malaya.

KMT activities took a new turn in 1924, after the KMT in China cooperated with the CCP under a United Front (1924-1927).¹⁸ In China, the United Front promoted anti-warlordism and anti-imperialism for the unification of China. In Malaya, Communists were allowed to join the KMT. This turned the organization into a radical movement with the adoption of anti-imperialist nationalism. The colonial government feared the radical groups would infiltrate Chinese trade unions and

encourage subversive activities.¹⁹ The government was also taking steps to stop the influx of anti-British, anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist literature. The police raided Chinese night schools to suppress Communist activities.

Overseas Chinese nationalism reached its peak during the Second Sino-Japanese War. They formed the Malayan Overseas Chinese National Salvation Movement (MOCNSM) for the purpose of collecting funds for Chinese relief. According to Stephen Leong, "so intense and widespread were the nationalist activities of the Malayan Chinese, the achievement of the Malayan Overseas Chinese Nationalist Salvation Movement (MOCNSM) as the Nationalist Movement of 1937-1941 far exceeded those of earlier periods of nationalist activities."²⁰ Not only the Overseas Chinese in Malaya, but Chinese communities throughout Southeast Asia, united to promote support for China. The Federation of China Relief Funds of the South East was formed under Malayan Chinese leadership with the objective of giving maximum support to the motherland. By December 1941, the MOCNSM came to an end as Japanese forces invaded and occupied Malaya.

Before World War Two (1941-1945), it was apparent that the Kuomintang was playing a significant role, both in the promotion of Chinese political consciousness and the activities of the Overseas Chinese



in Malaya. It nurtured and developed patriotism and nationalism among the Overseas Chinese and it served as an important coordination and propaganda agent in allying the Overseas Chinese to the motherland's cause.

Part II

The Emergence of the Communist Movement

According to Gene Z. Hanrahan, the first actual Communist activities in Malaya were carried out by Alimin, an Indonesian revolutionary.²¹ Alimin stopped by in Singapore in early spring 1924 while en route to the Pan-Pacific Conference which was taking place in Canton. Tan Malaka, chief Comintern representative for all southeast Asia held the view that the Malays were not interested in any political work and that, "...the only hope lay with the Chinese."²² He persuaded Chinese Communists to undertake the infiltration of left-wing groups in Singapore. The CCP did send an agent Fu Tu-ching, to liaise with the Chinese in Malaya, and with Indonesian revolutionaries.

It is most probable that Communism had been introduced into Singapore or Malaya long before Alimin arrived. The Overseas Chinese anti-Japanese activities after the 4 May Incident of 1919, probably had links

with the activities of Bolshevik agitators. According to C. J. Christie, it is likely that Bolshevik agitators had infiltrated the student and labour organizations in China and caused the demonstrations and riots during the 4 May Incident of 1919.²³ It was followed by demonstrations and disturbances in Malaya in June 1919.

The first Communist organization which promoted Communist ideology and anti-imperialist nationalism in Malaya was known as the "main school." Its activities centred on the Hailam community (the immigrant Chinese from Hainan Island) which formed the lowest class in Overseas Chinese society in Malaya. According to Victor Purcell, "they were the first to take a left line in politics, partly, perhaps, to increase their prestige with other Chinese by drawing attention to themselves."²⁴ The "main school", under the direction of the Chinese Communist Party, operated through various night schools, labour unions and the left wing of KMT.²⁵

In March 1927 the "main school" was responsible for causing a civil disturbance which was known as the "K'reta Ayer Incident" in Singapore.²⁶ This incident happened when the Chinese community staged a mammoth memorial service to mark the second anniversary of the death of Sun Yat Sen, the founder of the Chinese Republic. In order to enhance anti-British sentiment

among the Chinese, the Communists organized a demonstration in front of the police station at K'reta Ayer. Police who attempted to quieten the crowd were attacked. According to Stephen Leong, "the K'reta Ayer Incident, and its aftermath, represented the most active and fruitful phase of Communist mobilization of Overseas Chinese nationalism in Malaya during the period 1922-1937."²⁷

The British government took stern measures to curb the activities of the Communist movement, by the enactment of the Immigration Restriction Ordinance in the Straits Settlements in 1928. The law empowered the governor to regulate or prohibit immigration for the purpose of performing domestic or manual labour.²⁸ The primary object of the ordinance was to regulate Chinese immigration as the result of K'reta Ayer Incident.

In 1927, following the split between the Kuomintang and the Communists in China, the left-wing of the KMT broke away from the Kuomintang in Malaya. Several Chinese Communist agents arrived in Malaya under the instruction of the Comintern to form a regular Communist organization in Malaya.²⁹ The "main school" was replaced by the Nanyang Communist Party in March 1928. In August 1928, the Nanyang Communist Party, together with the General Labour Union, the Communist Youth and the Nanyang anti-Imperialist League, attempted to organise a mass

rally in Singapore to commemorate the Tsinan Affair and encourage the Chinese to fight against Japanese imperialism in China.³⁰ But the majority of the Chinese did not respond to the Communist call for anti-Japanese nationalism. The Chinese community was afraid that they would face consequences similar to those the K'reta Ayer incident caused. As a result they preferred a peaceful approach.

After 1929, the Communist movement in Malaya did not play any active role in promoting Overseas Chinese nationalism.³¹ The Communists made an attempt to change the direction of their struggle and to expand their base to include Malays and Indians in the country and therefore become a non-communal organization. A Malayan Communist Party (MCP) was formed in Kuala Pilah, Negeri Sembilan in April 1930. The MCP adopted a twelve-point programme in September 1932; this included the aim of overthrowing the Colonial government and the setting up of a Malayan Workers' and Peasants' Soviet Republic.³²

The Far Eastern Bureau of the Comintern in Shanghai gave a new directive to the MCP to concentrate its efforts on fomenting labour strikes, mass demonstrations, sabotage of transportation and the British naval installations at Singapore, boycotts against taxation and so forth. In September 1936, the

Communists influenced the pineapple workers in Singapore to strike.³³

In early 1937, a series of strikes occurred in rubber estates, including Bolton and Wardiburn, near Kuala Lumpur. The most significant strike instigated by the MCP was in the Malayan Collieries at Batu Arang, Selangor between 23-27 March, 1937. The Communist-led miners took full possession of the mine and attempted to set up a Soviet Government.³⁴ The British authorities needed to use the police to break up the strike which resulted in armed clashes. One worker was killed, two others were wounded and 116 strikers were detained by the police.³⁵

With the outbreak of war in 1939, the MCP brought itself into line with the policy of the Chinese Communist Party which co-operated with the National Government of China in fighting against the Japanese forces.³⁶ In the middle of September 1940, the MCP received orders from the Hong Kong Branch of the Chinese Communist Party to cease all anti-British activity and to offer no opposition "...to any campaign initiated by the Chinese community in Malaya to aid the British war effort...."³⁷ It should be noted that the Nazis launched their attacks against the Soviet Union in June 1941. Consequently, the Soviet Union or Communist international movement also ordered the MCP to cease any act of

hostility and to aid Great Britain in their efforts to the fight Japanese forces. Russia itself received aid from Britain in the war against the Nazis. This external situation influenced the MCP to reaffirm its moderate line and avoid causing any friction with the colonial government in Malaya.

As early as the summer of 1941, six months before the Japanese attack on Malaya, the MCP made a series of exploratory proposals to the British, offering cooperation and assistance in the event of the war. The British at this early date, however, refused to compromise with illegal parties. But as the battle front moved nearer to Singapore, the hard-pressed British had to modify their attitude towards the Communists and other Chinese bodies. Governor Shenton Thomas invited the Chinese leaders to have a meeting with him at Government House to mobilize Chinese resources in helping to defend Singapore.³⁸ On 15 December, the British confirmed their good intentions by releasing all leftist political persons from confinement.

On 30 December 1941, the Singapore Chinese Mobilisation Council was founded, with Tan Kah Kee as chairman.³⁹ Twenty-one officers were elected, including representatives from the Kuomintang, Communist and Straits Chinese born leaders. They formed the Chinese volunteers known as DALFORCE to fight against the

invading forces of the Japanese army.⁴⁰

The British government also created a Special Training School (101STS), a guerrilla and sabotage school, with Major Chapman as Deputy Commander. The MCP agreed to supply a number of young Chinese as trainees for this school.⁴¹ Later, the graduates of 101STS formed the hard core of the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) during the Japanese occupation in Malaya.

Part III

The Growth of the Straits Chinese Political Consciousness

At the end of the nineteenth century, a group of English educated Straits Chinese emerged from local and overseas educational institutions. Among them were Dr. Lim Boon Keng, Song Ong Siang and Dr. Wu Lian Teh. They were educated in British universities and when they returned to Malaya, they published various newspapers and magazines and formed various social and cultural organizations which reflected their intention of spreading reformist ideas in educational, social and cultural fields. Their activities reflected the growth of social and political consciousness among the Straits Chinese.⁴²

It was apparent that the political thinking of the Straits Chinese was divided into two main strands during this period. The first strand of thinking was to strengthen the community by reorientation towards China and the introduction of pure Chinese cultural elements into this society. But at the same time these people maintained the status of the Straits Chinese as British subjects and continued to show loyalty to the colonial government. In other words, they advocated a dual role and the maintaining of dual loyalties and therefore developed an identity full of ambiguity.

The second strand of thinking which the majority of the Straits Chinese society held, was the promotion of Straits Chinese status and identity as British subjects through English education and westernization. As far as they were concerned, they belonged to Malaya and vice-versa. This attitude was manifested strongly in Straits Chinese newspapers such as the Bintang Timor (3 July 1834- 2 July 1895) Kabar Slalu (5 January- 6 May 1924), Kabar Uchapan Baru (4 February 1926- 15 January 1931), Bintang Pranakan (December 1930- April 1931) and Sri Pranakan (April 1932- June 1932).⁴³

Song Ong Siang published the first Straits Chinese newspaper, Bintang Timor, which means "Eastern Star" with the objective of promoting social and

political awareness among the Straits Chinese. Song, unlike Lim Boon Keng, never took a part in any activities which concerned the Chinese motherland. Bintang Timor always tried to appeal to the Straits Chinese and other local-born peoples to wake up and enlighten themselves. This intention was reflected in two verses of poetry which urged:

Matahari chondong zohrah beridar
 Cahyanya lempah sluroh bandar
 Merika yang lalai dibri sedar
 Menegar berbagai warta dan kabar.⁴⁴

[The sun is setting,
 Venus ascends and her
 light spreads over every city.
 The sleeper must awaken,
 and listen to all that is happening.]

To promote their interests in various fields, the Straits Chinese organized an association which served as a pressure group. The Straits Chinese British Association (SCBA) was formed by Song Ong Siang, Lim Boon Keng and others on 17 August 1900 in Singapore. Some of the objectives of this organization were:

- (a) To promote among the members an intelligent interest in the affairs of the British Empire and to encourage and maintain their loyalty as subjects of the Queen;
- (b) To offer facilities for the discussion of all questions relating to the social, intellectual and moral welfare of the Chinese British subjects in the Colony; and
- (c) To take any requisite lawful step for the defence of the rights and privileges of British Subjects.⁴⁵

The Singapore SCBA initially attracted 800 members. Tan Jiak Kim was appointed as President and Song Ong Siang as Honorary Secretary-General. The British government chose SCBA leaders to serve as Chinese unofficial members in the legislative body of the Straits Settlements, but they served in the capacity of general Chinese spokesmen, not as representatives of the Straits Chinese.

After the formation of the Singapore SCBA, another branch was set up in Malacca in October 1900. The SCBA (Malacca) succeeded in enrolling 200 members, but this branch was closed in 1904 because of a lack of interest among members. In Penang, according to Diana Ooi, "The Northern Colony remained obdurate and it was not until twenty years later that an SCBA was eventually founded there."⁴⁶

The SCBA liked to give the impression that they were loyal subjects of the Government and Britain. Their pro-British outlook met with a good response from the British government. The British authorities were clearly and positively in favour of it and also strongly supported the Malayan-born Chinese who were English-educated and who had become professionals. These were groomed and nurtured to serve as spokesmen for the whole Chinese community.⁴⁷ Unofficial Chinese members in the

Straits Settlement Legislative Council and the Federal Council in the Federal Malay States were Straits Chinese or Malayan born Chinese. Many SCBA leaders, such as Tan Jiak Kim, served as unofficial members in the Straits Settlements Legislative Council: he served between 1889-1891 and 1902-1915. Also in the Council were Seah Liang Seah, (1883-1890 and 1894-1895), Dr. Lim Boon Keng (1898-1901 and 1915-1920) and Song Ong Siang (1925-1927).

During the 1920s, the acting Colonial Secretary introduced a proposal in the Legislative Council to appoint a select committee to study the need for council reform. This event led to a great increase in the level of political activity among the Straits Chinese. Lim Boon Keng, unofficial Chinese member in the Legislative Council welcomed the government proposal for council reform. He said:

The question of reform is in the air and the Government may be heartily congratulated that it has not waited for the public to clamour for it. The people of this colony are well known for being very long suffering and patient, and (it is) just as well that the Government has come forward to offer them the reform, which in other colonies has already been initiated.⁴⁸

The Government appointed a Select Committee whose members were chosen from the Legislative Council, including Lim Boon Keng. This committee invited the public to submit to it any proposals or opinions on

council reform. Malacca had set up its SCBA again in 1916. In the Straits Settlements, only Penang did not have any association to represent the Straits Chinese.

On 16 November 1920, 25 Straits Chinese in Penang organized a meeting in the Chinese Town hall to discuss forming an SCBA for Penang.⁴⁹ At last, the SCBA(Penang) was set up in that month. Lim Eow Thoon, a former Municipal Commissioner was elected as President and Lim Seng Hooi as Honorary Secretary, but it was too late for the SCBA to submit a memorandum for the Select Committee. Instead, as individuals the Straits Chinese leaders from Penang, including Lim Ching Ean and Heah Joo Seng, submitted their own memoranda to the Select Committee. Further memoranda were sent from the Singapore SCBA and Malacca SCBA and others.

The Select Committee made a report in early 1921 which recognized that:

...the instinct of loyalty to a motherland (the Straits Settlements) has been confined to the Malays, the Eurasians and a growing body of Straits-born Chinese. But in numbers and in wealth these classes represent at present but a small proportion of the population.⁵⁰

This report also proposed the enlargement of the Legislative Council of the Straits Settlements by

increasing the number of unofficial members until they formed a majority. It proposed that the number of official members including the Governor, should increase to thirteen, and unofficial members to fourteen, as a first step towards extending the representative character of the council. The colonial government did not implement fully these recommendations. The numbers of the Legislative Council were increased to twenty-seven: thirteen unofficial and fourteen official members, including the Governor himself.

The majority of the members, official or unofficial, were European. It meant that the Asian contingent, including the Chinese, were unable to determine the Council's decisions. Thus, the Straits Chinese would not be able to play an important role in this body.

With the enlargement of the Straits Settlements Legislative Council, new members, including Tan Cheng Lock from Malacca, were appointed.⁵¹ Tan Cheng Lock was the most outspoken critic of British policies and played a crucial role in promoting Malayan national consciousness among the Straits Chinese and the Chinese community in general.

Tan Cheng Lock, like other Straits Chinese leaders, was frustrated by the attitudes and policies of

the British, which excluded this community from responsible posts in the the civil service⁵². After he joined the Straits Settlements Legislative Council, he continued the battle for better treatment of the Straits Chinese and other British subjects. He asked the government to open up the civil service to Asiatic communities. Song Ong Siang, who replaced Lee Chuan Guan in representing the Chinese community in Singapore in the Straits Settlements Legislative Council, shared the same view regarding Council reform and the issue of the civil service. But Tan was a more outspoken critic of government policies. According to K. G. Tregonning, Tan's criticism of the government in his first speech was "unprecedented in the annals of the Legislative Council."⁵³ Tan Cheng Lock's viewpoint was also far in advance of other Straits Chinese leaders. For instance, he raised the "Colour Bar" issue, whereby Asians were discriminated against and Europeans favoured, in government services. Tan Cheng Lock also proposed in the Legislative Council on 1 November 1926, that the ultimate political goal should be a united self-governing British Malaya with a Federal Government and Parliament for the whole country.⁵⁴ He said, "...I [Tan Cheng Lock] think it is high time that we commenced to take action towards forging the surest and strongest link of that united Malaya by fostering and creating a true Malayan spirit and consciousness amongst its people to the complete

elimination of racial or communal feeling."⁵⁵ He added that they should aim at building up a Malayan community with a Malayan consciousness closely united with the British Empire.

In the early 1930s, Straits Chinese political consciousness intensified due to certain factors, such as the Depression and the revival of political issues which threatened the future of this community. On 11 October 1930 Wan Boon Seng and other Straits Chinese set up Bintang Pranakan to serve the interests of their community. This newspaper claimed it was "the only Straits born Chinese Romanised Malay Weekly Journal in British Malaya."⁵⁶ The objectives of Bintang Pranakan were to promote a sense of unity among the Peranakan (Straits Chinese) and to show and maintain their loyalty to the Government and to work for the advancement of the Straits Chinese community.

In an editorial dated 20 December 1930, Bintang Pranakan explained the aim of its publisher in setting up this newspaper. It wrote:

Sbab ini Bintang Pranakan punya publisher Baba-Baba Peranakan jadi itu sebab dengan sbrapa boleh kita mau majukan pasal Pranakan Tionghua.⁵⁷

[Because this Bintang Pranakan belongs to a Straits Chinese publisher, it should promote the Straits Chinese cause.]

and urged:

Disini tempulah yang lain-lain Pranakan Tionghua mesti kluarkan plohnya dan kasi tau sama orang-orang dunia yang Pranakan Tionghua juga tau pasal council Reform and voting....⁵⁸

[At this moment the Straits Chinese must work hard to inform the people of the world that they also understand the subject of council reform and voting.]

In its editorial, dated 14 March 1931, it continued to express its loyalty to the government. According to the editorial:

Kita kluarkan ini surat kabar sa'minggu satu kali maksud kita yang pertama-tamanya mau hormatkan, dirikan dan membalaskan trima kaseh kepada Bendera Inggeris yang sudah amat banyak kepenatan dan kasi chukup perlaajaran, kesenangan dan keuntongan kepada sklian Pranakan di [seluruh] British Malaya... [Jika kita rakyat British yang sejati]... kita mesti unjokkan kita punya hati chinta kepada ka-Raja-an Inggeris.⁵⁹

[We publish this newspaper once a week (with) our objective being to respect, to uphold, and to say thank you to the English flag which works really hard and gives protection, education and prosperity to all Straits Chinese in the whole of British Malaya. As we are really British subjects ,... we must show our love to the English [sic] government.]

In 1931 the SCBAs of Penang, Singapore and Malacca cooperated and submitted a joint memorandum to the colonial government on the question of council reform. This memorandum declared:

The political consciousness of the Straits-born Chinese is a sign of healthy growth and their aspiration ought to be guided along constitutional lines for the promotion of the community. Your petitioners humbly pray that your excellency may be moved by a feeling of magnanimity to concede to the Straits born Chinese a greater measure through their respective Associations in each of the settlements, the privilege to elect their own representatives on the Legislative Council in addition to the three nominated Chinese members nominated by Government at present.⁶⁰

This memorandum was signed by the presidents of the SCBAs; Lim Han Hoe (Singapore), Heah Joo Seang (Penang) and Tan Cheng Lock (Malacca). They demanded an increase in the numbers of the Straits Settlements Legislative Council to six members from each settlement. They hoped the government would allow them to choose their own representatives in the council. They also appealed to the government both to increase the number of unofficial members until they formed a majority in the council, and to nominate a Chinese member to the Executive Council.

Instead of yielding to the demands of the Straits Chinese community, the colonial government reemphasized a strong "pro-Malay policy" which was reflected in the decentralization policy carried out under Clementi during the 1930s. Under the decentralization scheme, the powers of the Malay Sultans, Residents and State Councils were increased by the loosening of the Federation structure. The Straits Chinese leaders were convinced that this policy itself was the product of a pro-Malay attitude and that it very definitely served the Malay cause.⁶¹ However, the Straits Chinese conflict with the British authorities regarding the decentralization policy did not go further than words. The most obvious reason was because it was almost exclusively the business class of the Straits Chinese who opposed government policies. They could not fail to recognize that any radical overturn in the country would hurt their interests.⁶² Disillusioned with British policy, the Straits Chinese became politically inactive in the middle of 1930s.

During the second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1941), the Straits Chinese emerged from isolation to take part in fund-raising activities for the China Relief Fund. Some Straits Chinese made it clear that their activities were not politically motivated. Chu Kei Hai, the Vice President of the SCBA of Singapore said that:

Some people have tried to make it an excuse that because they are British citizens they are not allowed to contribute to the China Relief Fund... this is a mistake which requires correction. After all, anybody who contributes to a fund like this is only performing an act of humanity.⁶³

Dr. Lim Boon Keng, former president of the Singapore SCBA, formed the Straits Chinese China Relief Fund Committee of Singapore which affiliated with the SCRFC.⁶⁴ Lim Boon Keng became its chairman, Mrs. Lee Choon Guan became vice-chairman and other Straits Chinese leaders such as Tay Lian Teck, the president of the Singapore SCBA and T. W. Ong (who after World War II became president of the Singapore SCBA) were appointed as committee members. This was the first purely Straits Chinese organization to take part in activities concerning China. Some writers consider the involvement of the Straits Chinese organization in SCRFC activities as a mark of solidarity between China-born and the Straits-born communities in Singapore between 1938 and 1941.⁶⁵ During the Japanese invasion of Malaya, the Straits Chinese collaborated with and supported the British government in fighting against the invaders.

Part IV

British Policy and Reaction to Chinese Politics

The aim of the British in establishing political control in Malaya was to create political stability and form a western type of administration in order to promote economic development. This could be achieved by encouraging investment from British or foreign capital, and using foreign labour and exploiting local natural resources. The Chinese were not only tolerated but encouraged by the British colonial government to participate in the economic development of Malaya. But the British were not willing to share their power with the Chinese or any other immigrant communities.⁶⁶ Naturally, its policy was aimed at protecting its power from any ideological or political "subversion" from the Chinese community,⁶⁷ some of suspected of creating disorder and intending to overthrow the government.

Before the Second World War, Malaya was not a homogeneous political entity. British Malaya, which emerged after 1914, was separated into three categories of political units.⁶⁸ First, there were the Straits Settlements of Malacca, Singapore and Penang which comprised a Crown Colony and were ruled directly by the British government. In the second category, were the

Federated Malay States of Perak, Pahang, Selangor and Negeri Sembilan which were ruled as a unity. The third category, the Unfederated Malay States of Kelantan, Trengganu, Kedah, Johore and Perlis were states which were ruled and administered separately with varying degrees of indirectness.

British control over the Malay states was based on treaties with the Malay Sultans who were recognized as independent sovereigns. British officials who governed the Malay States in the name of the Malay Sultans were obliged to protect those states and preserve them primarily as states for the Malays. The Chinese were considered as foreigners although some of them were locally born or had become permanently domiciled in these regions. As foreigners, the Chinese did not have any political rights whatsoever and were excluded from public service. According to W.R. Roff, this policy gave some advantage to the British; first, the Malay states remained constitutionally and juridically autonomous "Malay Monarchies."⁶⁹ Any attempt to change the status of Chinese or Indians by granting citizenship or other rights in these states would arouse considerable Malay opposition. Secondly, "the British role in Malaya as arbitrator and adjudicator within the plural society was to a large extent dependent upon preserving the distinctions between separate communities."⁷⁰ These distinctions were based on criteria

of economic function, ethnic origin, and cultural similarity or dissimilarity. Thirdly, "the series of popular stereotypes of 'unassimilable' Chinese which portrayed them as irrevocably wedded to homeland, uninterested in government provided they were able to make money, and preferring to educate themselves in their own fashion, made it possible to avoid expensive and troublesome responsibility for integrating even the locally born and domiciled Asians with a larger Malayan society."⁷¹

In the Straits Settlements, which constituted a Crown colony, the status of the Chinese had two divisions. Those locally born or naturalized were recognized as British subjects. The immigrant Chinese were considered aliens. As the Straits Chinese were locally born in the Settlements, they enjoyed certain rights. These included being able to hold positions in the administration and the political organizations of the Straits Settlements.

Any demands from the Chinese to increase the number of their representatives in the Legislative Council of Straits settlements were rejected by the British government. Any demands for the inclusion of other races, except the Malays, into the public services of the FMS and UFMS were not only ignored, but

actually caused annoyance to British officials. For instance, in 1937, the High Commissioner, Sir Shenton Thomas, rejected a request for the non-Malays to be included in the public services with the remark:

This is the sixth country in which I have served, and I do not know of any country in which what I might call a foreigner-that is to say, a native not a native of the country or an English Englishman-has ever been appointed to an administrative post and I consider that I shall be right in saying now that I would support no such proposal here.⁷²

Yeo Kim Wah, in his study on the Decentralization controversy under Guillemard, suggested that this policy was pursued as a response to the growth of political activities among the Chinese in Malaya.⁷³ According to him, in his work on "Guillemard's planning for the Decentralization of the FMS", Guillemard, the High Commissioner, declined to consult the two Chinese unofficial members, Choo Kia Peng and Wong Yick Thong, "largely out of personal distrust and partly because he felt that political issues concerned only the British and the Malays."⁷⁴ However, when the Chinese unofficial members protested at not being consulted, Guillemard gave as his excuse, "that his failure to consult them was due to a mere oversight on his part."⁷⁵ Actually he resented "the growing political ambition of the Malayan Chinese to run the country themselves,"⁷⁶ and in his view, "this was something to be strongly resisted." Some

members of the Colonial Office shared this view. One of them said, "... political questions such as decentralization only concerned the British and the Malays and that any Chinese attempt to exert control over Malaya should be nipped in the bud at once."⁷⁷

The British officers on the spot abhorred the political activities carried out by the KMT branches under orders from a "foreign country." The colonial government feared the creation of a highly organized imperium in imperio by China in Malaya, especially as the Kuomintang was suspected of regarding Indo-China, Hong Kong and even Malaya itself as terra irredenta of China.⁷⁸ The KMT government in China always considered the Chinese in Malaya or other regions as their subjects, based on the principle of jus sanguinis which implied that they had a right to interfere in local Chinese affairs in Malaya.

After the Japanese attacked Malaya and the battle front moved nearer to Singapore at the end of 1941, the British government needed the support of the Chinese community. As has been shown above the Governor of the Straits Settlements and High Commissioner of the FMS had appealed to the Chinese community Chinese to cooperate and assist the government in its war effort.⁷⁹ This was the first time in the history of British Malaya

that the colonial government had both dealt and cooperated with the illegal KMT and MCP. These actions indicated the dramatic shift in the British government's attitude towards the Chinese community. The British government continued to deal with, and almost totally depend upon, the active support of the Chinese community in military operations during the Japanese occupation of Malaya.

Conclusion

The British government disliked any form of Chinese political activity in Malaya, except the expression of loyalty to the British crown. The colonial government was untouched by the moderate demands of the Straits Chinese and continued to pursue its so-called "pro-Malay" policy. They regarded KMT and Communist activities as a serious threat to their position in Malaya. They feared that the Chinese government or other powers intended to destroy British supremacy in this region by using the Chinese community as a "Fifth Column." Therefore, the British suppressed the Kuomintang and the Communists.

Developments during the end of 1941 brought together the Straits Chinese, the Kuomintang and the Communists to support and collaborate with the British

government in fighting against the Japanese forces. It was illogical to ignore the claims of the Straits Chinese or to curb the Kuomintang and the Communists, who were collaborating with them but who still might pose a threat for future British administrations. In the new circumstances the British government needed to rethink its policy towards the Chinese community.

Notes:

1. On Baba Peranakan identity, see Chee-Beng Tan, "Baba and Nyonya: A study of Ethnic Identity of The Chinese Peranakan in Malacca," Ph.D. thesis, Cornell University, 1979. Some other sources on Straits Chinese are, Rosie Tan Kim Neo, "The Straits Chinese Way of Life," A Research Paper for The Department of Social Studies, University of Malaya (Singapore) 1958; Diana Ooi, "A Study of Chinese Speaking English in Penang ,1900-1940", M.A. thesis, University of Malaya, 1967; P'ng Poh Seng, "The Straits Chinese in Singapore: A Case Study of Local Identity and Social Cultural Accomodation," in Journal of Southeast Asian History, Vol.2, No. 1, 1961; and J.R. Clammer, The Ambiquity of Identity Ethnicity Maintenance and Change Among the Straits Chinese Community of Malaysia and Singapore, Occasional Paper no.54, 1979, Institute of Southeast Asia Studies, Singapore.
2. Many writers including Brian Crozier, C.B. McLane and Wang Gungwu regarded the Malayan Communist Party as a Chinese-oriented or China centred party and as a part of the Chinese nationalist movement in Malaya. According to Sue Yew Ng, MCP, adherence "to the Communist ideology was nominal, it originated from the nationalist movement in China, in its infancy, it was nurtured by the Chinese Communist Party and even its activities came overwhelmingly from Hainan (Hailam)." See Sue Yew Ng, "The Malayan Communist Party and Overseas Chinese Nationalism in Malaya, 1937-1941," M.A. thesis, The University of Hull, 1981, p.51 and passim.
3. Yen Ching Hwang, The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1976, pp. 49-50.
4. Ibid., p. 50.
5. P'ng Poh Seng, "The Kuomintang in Malaya, 1912-1941", in Journal of Southeast Asian History, Vol.2, No. 1, March 1961, p.2.
6. Stephen Leong, "Sources, Agencies and Manifestations of Overseas Chinese Nationalism in Malaya, 1937-1941," Ph.D. thesis, University of California, 1976, p.98.
7. P'ng Poh Seng, op.cit., p.3.

8. Milton J. T. Shieh, The Kuomintang: Selected Historical Documents, 1894-1969, Asia in the Modern World, No.7, Center of Asian Studies, St. John's University, p.vii. See also, C. F. Yong and R.B.McKenna, The Kuomintang Movement in British Malaya 1912-1949, Singapore University Press, Singapore, 1990.
9. C. F. Yong and R. B. McKenna, The Kuomintang..., p.20.
10. Victor Purcell, The Chinese in Malaya, Oxford University Press, London, 1948, p.120.
11. C.F. Yong and R.B. McKenna, op.cit., p. 30.
12. Ibid., pp. 30-37.
13. For details of the May Fourth Incident, see C. J. Christie, "The Problem of China in British Foreign Policy, 1917-1921," Ph.D. thesis, University of Cambridge, 1971; Madeleine Chi, China Diplomacy 1914-1918, East Asian Research Center, Harvard University, Cambridge (Mass.), 1970, pp. 21-27, 85-93, and 136-137; and Stephen Leong, op.cit., passim.
14. C. J. Christie, op.cit., p.46. See also J. Jordan (British Legation, Peking) to Earl Curzon, 17 January 1920, in FO 371/3702/ File No. 182048.
15. P'ng Poh Seng, op.cit., p.15.
16. Stephen Leong, op.cit., pp-63-72. See also telegram from A. Young, the Governor of the Straits Settlements to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 21 June 1919; the General Officer Commanding the Troops, Straits Settlements, to War Office, desp. 25-6-1919, in FO 371/3695/16000/File No.93374; Jordan to Earl Curzon, 26 July 1919 and Arthur Young to the Colonial Office, 26 July 1919, in FO 371/3695/16000/File No. 128746.
17. Stephen Leong, op.cit., p.70. According to Arthur Young, the disturbances in Singapore and Penang were caused by the increase of the price of rice and serious hardships faced by the people in these Settlements during the middle of 1919. See, Arthur Young to the Colonial Office, 26 July 1919, in FO 371/3695/16000/File No. 128746.
18. For a detailed study of the Kuomintang-Communist united front in China, see Chung-Gi Kwei, The Kuomintang-Communist Struggle in China, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970.

19. C.F. Yong and R.B. McKenna, op.cit., p. 75.
20. Stephen Leong, op.cit., p. 808.
21. Gene Z. Hanrahan, The Communist Struggle in Malaya, University of Malaya Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1971, p.28
22. Cited ibid.
23. C. J. Christie, op.cit., p. 108.
24. Victor Purcell, The Chinese in Malaya, Oxford University Press, London, 1948, p.215
25. Cited Stephen Leong, op.cit., p.223.
26. Ibid., pp. 224-232.
27. Ibid., p.224.
28. J. Norman Parmer, Colonial Labour Policy and Administration: A History of Labour in the Rubber Plantation Industry in Malaya, c.1910-1941, New York, 1960, p.92.
29. Gene Z. Hanrahan, op.cit., p.31.
30. Stephen Leong, op.cit., pp. 231-233.
31. Ibid., p.230.
32. Ibid., p.238.
33. Gene Z. Hanrahan, op.cit., p.45.
34. Ibid., p.52.
35. Stephen Leong, op.cit., p.240.
36. Ibid., p.448.
37. Hanrahan, op.cit., p.56.
38. C.F. Yong, Tan Kah Kee, The Making of an Overseas Chinese Legend, Oxford University Press, Singapore, p. 284.
39. Ibid.
40. Hanrahan, op.cit., p. 62.
41. Ibid., pp. 64-67.

42. For detailed study of Straits Chinese politics, see Oong Hak Ching, "Pengkajian Beberapa Aspek Masyarakat China Peranakan di Negeri-Negeri Selat, 1900-1940" (A Study of Straits Chinese Society), M.A. thesis, National University of Malaysia, 1981, pp. 184-185.
43. Ibid., pp.157-70.
44. Cited ibid., p.57.
45. Cited Song Ong Siang, op.cit., p.319.
46. Diana Ooi, op.cit., p.94.
47. C.F. Yong, Tan Kah Kee ...op.cit., p. 6.
48. The Straits Settlements, Proceeding of the Legislative Council of The Straits Settlements (PLCSS), Government Printing Office, Singapore 1922, p. B. 139.
49. Diana Ooi, op.cit., p. 95.
50. The Straits Settlements ,PLCSS for The Year 1921, Government printing office, Singapore 1922, Appendix A. P. C30.
51. For a detailed study of Tan Cheng Lock's biography, see, Soh Eng Lim, "Tan Cheng Lock: His leadership of the Malayan Chinese", in JSEAH, Vol.1, 1960; K. G Tregonning, "Tan Cheng Lock: A Malayan Nationalist", JSEAS, Vol.10, No. 1, March ,1979
52. K.G. Tregonning, ibid., p. 26.
53. Ibid., p. 29.
54. Cited ibid., p. 30.
55. Cited ibid.
56. Bintang Pranakan, 20 December 1930, p.1
57. Ibid., p.3
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid., 14 March 1931, p.3.
60. Cited Oong Hak Ching, op.cit., p.220.
61. Rupert Emerson, Malaysia, A Study in Direct and Indirect Rule , University of Malaya Press, Singapore (3rd imp),1969, p.182.

62. Ibid., pp.320-321.
63. The Straits Times ,16 November 1937.
64. C.F. Yong, Tan Kah Kee...op.cit., p.211.
65. Ibid.
66. See Norman Parmer, op.cit., pp.92-98, William R. Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism, New Haven and London Yale, University Press, 1967, pp. 208-211, V. Purcell, op.cit., p.215-217; Stephen Leong, op.cit., p.177-220; Gene Z. Hanrahan, op.cit., p.57-58; C.F. Yong, op.cit., pp.7-8, 155-156, 179,193 and Rupert Emerson, op.cit., p.174-175, 182-185, 320-323, and Khasnor Johan, op.cit. passim.
67. C.F. Yong, Tan Kah Kee....op.cit., p.6.
68. James de V. Allen, The Malayan Union, Southeast Asia Studies, New Haven 1967, p.4
69. W.R. Roff, op.cit., p.111.
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid.
72. Cited Khasnor Johan, op.cit., p.112.
73. See Yeo Kim Wah, The Politics of Decentralization, 1920-1929, Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1973.
74. Ibid. p.237.
75. Ibid. p.244.
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid., p. 245.
78. Victor Purcell, op.cit., p. 216.
79. C.F. Yong, Tan Kah Kee...op.cit., p.282.

CHAPTER II

Malayan Chinese Politics During the War, 1942-1945

This chapter focusses on the Japanese Military Administration's policy towards the Chinese community and Chinese political activities during the War. Under the repressive policy of the Military Administration, Chinese political activities based on Chinese nationalism ceased almost completely and the link with the motherland, China, was broken.

The Straits Chinese and the Overseas Chinese co-operated with the Japanese Administration after the Japanese launched a brutal purge against anti-Japanese elements or "hostile Chinese." They were forced to form a single Chinese organization, known as the Overseas Chinese Association. The OCAs carried out activities in line with the Japanese Military Administration's directions, as raising \$50,000,000 from the Chinese community for the Japanese as a gift of atonement. As the Japanese treated the Chinese as a single community, the split between the Straits Chinese and the Overseas Chinese, or the various Chinese communities, was almost submerged during the war. The

pre-war Chinese organizations such as the Chinese Chambers of Commerce, regional associations and trade guilds ceased to exist. However, the Malayan Communist Party continued to exist by going underground. The MCP launched the Resistance Movement to continue the fighting against the Japanese. This organization became popular as a result of Japanese cruelty to the Malayan Chinese. During the war, the Communist or Chinese-led Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army was the only viable and effective resistance movement. The MCP and the MPAJA worked closely with the British Force 136 in order to fight against the Japanese forces.

Some prominent Chinese fled to India before the Japanese occupied Malaya. Under the leadership of Tan Cheng Lock, they formed the Overseas Chinese Association. Their activities were mainly concerned with constitutional matters for the future of Malaya. Tan Cheng Lock made a demand to the British government for a greater role for the Chinese in the proposed constitutional development of post-war Malaya.

Part I

Japanese Policy and Chinese Response

On 8 December 1941 the Japanese forces began their attack on Malaya. One division of the 25th Army landed at Kota Bharu in the Malay State of Kelantan and

another division landed at Songkhla in southeast Thailand. After sixty-nine days, the British troops were defeated. The initial response among the Malayan people was divided. According to Yoji Akashi:

Stunned but cheerful Malays and Indians greeted General Yamashita's conquering army as it entered the city [of Singapore]. For a great majority of the Chinese, however, an air of uncertainty hung heavily upon them because they had been active, voluntarily or involuntarily in the anti-Japanese movement for many years and a good number of them even fought with the British in the last ditch battle that ended in their defeat.¹

Under the Japanese Occupation, the name of Malaya was changed to Malai and Singapore to Syonan-to. Initially Malaya and Sumatra were ruled by the military government department (gunseibu) of the Twenty-fifth Army of the Japanese forces which invaded these regions. According to Yoji Akashi, gunseibu was reorganised by Watanabe Wature and called a "Malay Military Administration" or Gunsei Kanbu or "Watanabe Gunsei"² (April 1942 to March 1943). For the Chinese community the establishment of the "Watanabe Gunsei " marked the beginning of the most traumatic period in their history in Malaya, because the Japanese military had a previously formulated policy of severe punishment for them as a consequence of their anti-Japanese activities in the past.³

Soon after the occupation of Singapore, the Kempetai or military police went into the Chinese communities. They rounded up and sometimes killed dissidents. Some people were picked up simply for being Chinese.⁴ At first Major General Manaki, the head of the Military Government (gunsei) intervened to stop indiscriminate mass arrests of the Chinese. However, he was informed that the military police were acting on General Yamashita's directive. General Yamashita actually gave the order via Lt. General Suzuki Sosaku to Kawamura Saburo, commander of the Syonan garrison army, to wipe out the Overseas Chinese anti-Japanese elements in Singapore over three days, from 21 to 23 February 1942. Kawamura subsequently relayed the order to Oishi, Ichigawa and Miyamoto who were heads of the three Military Police Corps. According to Yoji Akashi, his decision was made purely on military grounds, and not out of hatred.⁵ He ordered the mopping-up operation of Sook Ching or purification by elimination. This was based on three considerations: first, the Japanese military faced the problem of maintaining security with an under-resourced army; second, they wanted to establish security as quickly as possible, and third, they feared the resistance would annihilate the small Japanese garrison as had happened in China.⁶ Yamashita's order was given with this instruction to carry it out in accordance with his letter. To the soldiers this meant

"summary execution" and they proceeded to carry out the massacre of the Chinese by rounding them up "for inspection and identification"⁷. The primary targets of this operation were: persons who had been active in the China Relief Fund or who had given most generously to this fund, adherents of Tan Kah Kee, the leader of the Nanyang National Salvation Movement, school masters, teachers, and lawyers, Hainanese who, according to the Japanese, were Communists, China-born Chinese who came to Malaya after the Sino-Japanese wars, men with tattoo marks, who, according to the Japanese, were all members of secret societies, persons who fought for the British as volunteers against the Japanese, government servants and men who were likely to have pro-British sympathies, such as Justices of the Peace, members of the Legislative Council, and persons who possessed arms and tried to disturb public safety.⁸

This process began on 21 February 1942. Under the mopping-up operation, the Japanese military police set up five large "concentration camps" in the city of Singapore.⁹ The Chinese were forced to assemble at these camps. On 3 March, 1942, 70,699 Chinese were detained, including such prominent Chinese leaders such as Lim Boon Keng, Lim Chong Pang, the head of the Singapore Kuomintang, and Wong Gim Geok, alias Loi Tek, the Secretary General of the MCP. The Japanese also carried out the same operation on the mainland. Many Chinese

were detained and killed indiscriminately. The most often quoted figures vary from 6,000 to 40,000 Chinese.¹⁰ The Sook Ching massacres created terror in the Chinese community throughout Malaya. According to the former General Manaki, " Sook Ching was the biggest blot in the Japanese Administration in Malaya."¹¹

Collaborators

Some of the Chinese leaders were used as tools for social control by the Military Administration. Forty of the most prominent Chinese in Singapore were instructed to form an Overseas Chinese Association for the purpose of cooperating with the authority.¹² A first meeting was held on 2 March 1942 in Singapore and the various Chinese communities elected their own representatives to this body. Dr. Lim Boon Keng was elected as chairman. During the meeting, representatives of various Chinese communities were elected. Among them were : Dr. Lim Boon Keng and Tan Hoon Siang of the Straits Chinese, Lim Seow Cheong of the Hainanese community, Yeo Chang Boon of the Teochew community, S. Q. Wong and Dr. Loh Seng Tak of the Cantonese community, and Yang Sing Hua of the San Kiang community. They were required to be present at the Association every day and carry out any order by the Japanese Military Administration. It should be noted that Dr. Lim Boon Keng who was a Straits Chinese

assumed the presidency of the Overseas Chinese Association (OCA).¹³ Thus, it seemed that the OCA was under the leadership of the Straits Chinese. The Japanese Military Administration had assumed that this community possessed much wealth and property and could become the prime object of extortion.¹⁴ But in fact this community owned less than the Japanese expected. Thus, at a later stage the leaders of other Chinese communities were forced to assume the leadership of the OCA. Ng Twee Kim, a Formosan and a supernumerary officer of the Japanese army was stationed at the Association to instruct and liaise with the immigrant Chinese.

At first the Association was instructed to advise the Chinese community to give up any tools or weapons to the Association headquarters and also to destroy anything that was detrimental to the Japanese Military Administration. The leaders of the Association were harrassed and intimidated by the Japanese officials on many occasions. In an attempt to please the Japanese authorities, Loo Tien Poh as the chief spokesman of the Association expressed their desire to give cash contributions.¹⁵ Takase, the Japanese officer in charge of Chinese affairs, took this opportunity to make an exorbitant demand for \$50,000,000 to \$60,000,000. He said that, as the Chinese contributed millions of dollars to Chiang Kai-Shek, rendered services to the British and threatened the lives of loyal Japanese, they

should contribute that amount in penance for their crime. Actually the idea of raising \$50,000,000 came from Watanabe himself because the Southern Expeditionary Army (SEA) Command had ordered him to raise money locally to pay for military administrative expenses. As a result of fear and intimidation, the Chinese proceeded to raise the sum of \$50,000,000 "in very short order."¹⁶

Shortly afterward the Japanese ordered the Chinese community to form an Overseas Chinese association in "Syonan-to" (Singapore) which adopted the official name of "Syonan-to Overseas Chinese General Union"¹⁷ (SOCGU). The 21 representatives from various communities such as the Straits born Chinese, Cantonese, Hokkien, Teochew and other communities were elected to the Council of Management.¹⁸ Dr. Lim Boon Keng was elected as the president and S.Q. Wong, a Cantonese, as the vice-president. State Overseas Chinese Associations were formed in mainland Malaya as ordered by Takase. Later, on 6 June, the Malayan Overseas Chinese General Association was established as a central organisation for the various States Associations. Dr. Lim Boon Keng was elected as the president of the Malayan Overseas Chinese Association and Heah Joo Siang, another Straits Chinese, the president of the Penang State Association, and Wong Thit San, the president of the Selangor State Association, were vice-presidents. Every state branch,

including Syonan-to, was responsible for the collection of a certain amount, which was set for every state. The states with the greatest and wealthiest Chinese populations were given the largest targets. The target for every state was as follows:

"Singapore (Syonan-to)	\$10,000,000	
Selangor	\$10,000,000	
Perak	\$ 8,500,000	
Penang	\$ 7,000,000	
Malacca	\$ 5,500,000	
Negeri Sembilan	\$ 2,000,000	
Kedah	\$ 800,000	
Pahang	\$ 500,000	
Kelantan	\$ 300,000	
Terangganu	\$ 200,000	
Perlis	\$ 200,000.	"19

The Chinese community faced great difficulty in raising the amount which was demanded by the Military Administration. When the deadline passed, the Chinese Association had just been able to collect \$28,000,000, a shortfall of \$22,000,000. When the Japanese realized that it was impossible for the Chinese to raise \$50,000,000, they were forced to take a loan from the Yokohama Specie Bank. The Chinese leaders presented a letter to General Yamashita on 25 June 1942, along with the gift of \$50,000,000. The letter, to His Majesty, the Emperor of Japan was full of praise, obeisance and repentance for past crimes against the Japanese.²⁰ Part of its content was as follows:

Your Excellency,

During the last few hundred years, the evil and vicious policies adopted by Britain and America towards the various races in East Asia were aimed only at bringing prosperity to their own [countries]. Being unaware of their true intentions we have long become their tools and had frequently brought harm to the Great Japanese Empire... During these few years of the Holy War, we have been frequently instigated by the evil British and Americans to harm and impair the Great Japanese Empire. Although we know now that we have done wrong, we do not know how to pay for our crime. Considering our actions against the Imperial Army, we do rightly deserve the same punishment as meted out to the British and the American²¹

However, the \$50,000,000 gift of atonement failed to change the anti-Chinese policy of the Japanese Military Administration. General Yamashita warned the Chinese community that the gift had "in no way redeemed the previous act of the Malayan Chinese in having supported Britain and Chungking."²² Japan continued to pursue its policy of treating the Chinese as "milk cows" throughout the period of their rule in Malaya.

During this most turbulent period, the Chinese accommodated Japanese wishes in order to survive. The main activities of the Overseas Chinese Associations were in line with the Japanese needs or directives as follows: to collect and present "gifts" or "donations", to the Japanese Military Administration; to obtain

necessary labour for the reconstruction of Singapore; to register all Chinese working people; to open a home for the unemployable or disabled; to organise agricultural settlements; to encourage factories to provide substitute commodities for daily use; and to foster the spirit of thrift among the Chinese which contributed towards a savings drive.²³

The OCA also carried out assignments such as leading the people in the celebration of the birthday of the Japanese Emperor, conducting Japanese language classes, and selling Syonan lottery tickets. The Overseas Chinese Associations were also instructed to launch the "aircraft offering movement" to collect funds from the Chinese community for the purchase of war planes for the Japanese Imperial forces.²⁴ This instruction was meant as a form of punishment, as the Chinese had donated an aircraft to China in the past.²⁵

The Japanese ordered the OCAs to raise a sum of \$100,000 as a donation to purchase an aircraft. The OCAs asked every major Chinese group to raise the above sum. Each community was set to raise certain amounts as follows:

Hokkien community	: \$40,800
Cantonese community	: \$15,300
Teochew community	: \$17,850
Straits-born Chinese community	: \$ 8,500
Hakka community	: \$ 7,650
Sam Kiang community	: \$ 5,100
Hainanese community	: \$ 5,100 ²⁶

On the 31 May 1943 the Japanese government decided to give the indigenous people of the southern region, including Malaya, the right to participate in local political affairs.²⁷ At first the hard line group opposed any suggestion of giving the Chinese opportunities to participate in local politics. However, on 26 June, it was decided that Chinese political participation would be determined by the speed of progress of the political participation of the indigenous peoples, including Malays, and other races such as Indians and Eurasians.

On 2 October 1943 the Military Administration announced that advisory councils would be established in each province, state or municipality which would enable the people of Malaya to participate in the administration of their country.²⁸ The mayor or governor of the states would select the representatives for the States or Regional Advisory Councils. But the Military Administration would approve and appoint them. The mayor or governor would call a meeting whenever necessary. The Council could raise any subject for discussion without restriction.

When the Councils and the Singapore Special Municipality Consultative Board were established, prominent Chinese were appointed as members. Among them were Lim Chong Pang for the Singapore Special Municipality Consultative Board, Choo Kia Peng, former member of Federal Council (1923-26), Yong Shook Lin, member of the Federal Council in 1941, and Wong Tat San and Goh Hock Huat for the Selangor Advisory Council. The Chinese members' role in the councils was limited to the praising of the Japanese Authorities. In one article in the Shonan-Shimbun, Lim Chong Pang said that the Chinese were proud that they had contributed in no small part to the attainment of normal conditions in Malaya "by giving all-out cooperation to the Military Administration."²⁹ It should be noted that, it was impossible for the Chinese to be critical when the Sook Ching Operation was still lingering in their mind. According to Cheah Boon Kheng, Chinese cooperation with the Japanese acted as a "shield" for the protection of the prewar leaders and their supporters.³⁰ However, the Malayan Chinese resistance movements regarded those Chinese leaders of the Overseas Chinese Association merely as collaborators and enemies.

Part II

Malayan Chinese Resistance to Japanese Military Rule,
1942-1945

The Japanese policy of repression, such as the mopping up operation and the extortion of \$50,000,000, turned some of the Chinese towards the Anti-Japanese resistance movements. The Chinese-led resistance movements centred on two groups of guerrilla forces: the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) which was dominated by the Malayan Communist Party and the Overseas Chinese Anti-Japanese Army (OCAJA), which was organized by the members of Kuomintang. The British Force 136, which also organised the Malay guerrillas or Wataniah, provided arms, money, supplies and training facilities for the Chinese resistance movements during the early months of 1944, when the Allied powers began to act upon their plan to re-occupy Malaya.³¹

The MPAJA was organised from the remnants of the communist graduates of 101 Special Training School (STS) and other local recruits in Selangor, Negeri Sembilan and Johore. In the initial stages it was made up of four independent regiments. From 1 December 1942 to early August 1945, four more regiments were added to enable this movement to operate throughout Malaya. The Central Military Committee of the MCP, which was formed in June or July 1942, acted as Supreme Command of the MPAJA.

The MPAJA was the strongest and most effective guerrilla force during the period of Japanese occupation. Its most active regiment was the Fourth Independent Regiment, which took part in more than 20 skirmishes, killing some 600 Japanese military personnel.³² Throughout this period, the MPAJA claimed to have eliminated 5,500 Japanese officers and men and about 2,500 "traitors" which included the leaders and members of the Overseas Chinese Associations. The MPAJA itself suffered a total loss of 1,000 personnel who died in action, fell sick or were missing. However, Japanese records indicate that they themselves lost 600 and the local police 2,000, while inflicting 2,900 casualties on the MPAJA. A senior Force 136 officer regarded the Japanese figures as fairly accurate.³³

The MPAJA also formed the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Union (MPAJU) to provide the guerrillas with food, clothing, fighting material and information. The MPAJU launched their recruiting drive among all people, regardless of race, class, or religion, who opposed the Japanese Military Administration. However, their efforts gained limited success among the Malays and this organization was dominated by the Chinese.³⁴ The Malays, who were treated more favourably than the Chinese, did not really oppose the Japanese Military Administration. Meanwhile the Malays disliked the MPAJA and the MPAJU,

which were dominated by the Chinese Communists, and the membership of both organizations was overwhelmingly Chinese.

Force 136

Force 136 was an Allied organization which had been formed in July 1942 to contact, supply and direct guerrilla activities in an attempt to cripple the Japanese in certain parts of Southeast Asia. A section was formed to deal with Malaya through cooperation between British officials in India and China. The Chinese government agreed to provide agents who were sent to India to be trained as military intelligence and telecommunications personnel.³⁵ Britain was responsible for providing the cost of the project and the training facilities. The British party was led by Colonel Basil Goodfellow, Capt. John Davis and Capt. R. N. Broome, all from the Malayan Branch of the British Ministry of Economic Warfare. Colonel Lim Boon Seng, a KMT member who fled from Malaya was assigned as the Regional Chief (Chinese) of Force 136 which was based in India. The recruits mostly came from the 2,000 Chinese seamen who were stranded in India after the outbreak of the war.³⁶ They were trained in certain centres in India and Ceylon.

The first batch of the Force 136 led by Lt. Colonel J .L. Davis, with some Chinese agents or

guerrilla fighters, left Ceylon by submarine and landed in Perak on May 1943.³⁷ The second batch of the Force 136 personnel, led by Lt. Colonel R. N. Broome (S.O.E. Chinese affairs), left Ceylon in 24 July 1943 and landed in Perak. The Chinese agents followed later and landed in November 1943. Other batches of Forces 136 personnel were also sent to Malaya by submarine. However, a few of them were sent by plane and parachute into the jungle of Malaya.

The Force 136 personnel, or KMT agents, made contact with Chin Peng, representative of the Perak MPAJA headquarters in 30 September 1943. On 1 January 1944, the MCP, MPAJU, and MPAJA, represented by Chang Hung @ Loi Tek (who went under eight other names including Mr. Wright) and Chin Peng, met the three British officers of Force 136, the representatives of Lord Louis Mountbatten, Supreme Allied Commander, South-East Asia.³⁸ They were Davis, Broome and Major Spencer Chapman who had been left in Malaya after the fall of Singapore.

The MPAJA agreed to cooperate with, and accept orders from the British Army during the War with Japan, and during the British Military Administration of Malaya. In return, the British would provide money for the MPAJA and arm the guerrillas. On 31 December 1943 the Anglo-

MCP Agreement was signed on papers from an exercise book.³⁹ According to Spencer Chapman both side agreed not to discuss any matter regarding Britain's post war policy.⁴⁰ Many writers have accepted this view.⁴¹ According to C. Cruickshank , for example, at "no point did the guerrilla leaders suggest they expected political concessions in return for their co-operation."⁴² However, it is now evident that this is not an accurate statement of what happened in the years 1944 - 1945. The present writer has indicated elsewhere that the MCP expected political concessions -particularly for the Chinese community. Force 136 was allowed to inform the guerrilla leaders about Britain's future plans for Malaya-particularly in connection with the position of the Chinese. J. J. Paskin of the Eastern Department of the Colonial Office admitted in 1946, that the formulation of Britian's Chinese (post war) policy took into consideration the agreement between the Communists and the representatives of Supreme Allied Commander of Southeast Asia.⁴³ Communist documents also indicate that the British made a "promise" related to the post-war policy of Great Britain.⁴⁴

Based on this agreement, the MCP placed the MPAJA under the supervision of the Supreme Allied Commander, South-East Asia or its representative, Force 136. The Communists made an arrangement to let Force 136 staff into the MPAJA camps except at the MPAJA Central

Headquarters in Perak. The MCP were determined to preserve some secrecy with regard to hiding places and composition of its staff, as a guard against any retaliation by the British in the event of an outbreak of hostilities with the British after the War. Up to 13 August 1945, there were at least 80 senior and subordinate officers of Force 136 liaising and working with the MPAJA and other resistance movements.⁴⁵ Force 136 intended to supply between 3,500 to 4,765 arms, e.g. bombs, grenades, carbines, stenguns, and brenguns to the guerrilla movements.⁴⁶ However, as the Japanese surrender was unexpected, the British just supplied 2,000 weapons.

The other resistance movement which was led by the Chinese was the KMT guerrillas under the command of Lee Fong Thai. Their total strength was 400 personnel and their operations were limited to the Malayan-Thai border. At first it was active in Perak around February 1942. Then its headquarters moved to Gua Musang in Kelantan. It should be noted that the village of Pulai in Gua Musang is a major Chinese settlement in Kelantan. The Overseas Chinese Anti-Japanese Army did not make any attempt to contact the KMT Government; however they were loyal to Chungking. On 8 February 1942, they joined forces with the Hung-men Guerrilla Force which consisted of elements of the Tien-ti Huay, or secret societies. Lt. Colonel

Dobree, a British army officer who was parachuted into Perak, made contact with the 17th Platoon of the OCAJA in Grik in 16 December 1944. Force 136 did not provide any weapons for these guerrillas. However, it did receive \$20,000 (in Japanese military currency) for buying provisions.⁴⁷

In late April 1944 the Japanese force discovered the existence of a Malay guerrilla force, which was formed by Lieut. Colonel Dobree. They attacked and destroyed this guerilla group. At the same time they also attacked and destroyed the OCAJA. As a result the OCAJA failed to remain a viable and effective force.

Tan Cheng Lock and the Malayan Chinese in India

Some of the Chinese community leaders, mostly from Malacca and Singapore, fled to India before the Japanese occupied the whole country. Among them were Tan Cheng Lock and his son, a company director. They continued to participate in political activities which concerned Malaya. Tan Cheng Lock presided over a meeting of prominent Chinese there and launched the Overseas Chinese Association. The members were mostly from Malaya, Burma and the other east Asia territories under Japanese occupation.⁴⁸

The objects of the Overseas Chinese Association in India were to promote and to protect the economic and political interests of the Overseas Chinese in India, and also to assist the efforts of the United Nations in regaining lost territories in Asia and to cooperate in the war effort of China.⁴⁹ The Association appointed 26 Chinese, mostly merchants and professionals, as officers and committee members. Tan Cheng Lock was elected as president with Tan Chin Tuan, a rich Singaporean banker as vice-president. Tan Siew Sin held the post of Honorary Secretary and Treasurer of the Association. Dr. K. W. Tan, Barrister-at-law, Foo Meow Chin, proprietary tin-miner and landowner, Ng Sen Choy, merchant, C. H. Koh, Barrister-at-law, Loke Wan Tho, land proprietor and capitalist, and others were committee members. According to Tan Cheng Lock, when they returned to Malaya after the war, they would form the "Malayan Chinese Association" devoted to Malayan interests.⁵⁰ He himself devoted his time to preparing a memorandum connected with certain matters on the future of Malaya.

Tan Cheng Lock also worked closely with the Colonial Office, or other British who had a keen interest in Malayan Affairs. For instance, he met N. J. B. Sabine, the Public Relations Officer of the Colonial Office at the end of September 1943, and he provided some information on Malaya under Japanese rule to the Colonial Office through J. L. Milne. Tan Cheng Lock also

wrote to Col. Oliver Stanley, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, to inform him about the activities of the Chinese and the OCA.⁵¹ W. B. L. Monson, on behalf of Oliver Stanley, informed Tan Cheng Lock that the Secretary of State hoped that at a later stage it would be possible to establish some closer liaison between Malayan residents living overseas (India) and those responsible for the formulation of future policy for Malaya.⁵² He informed Tan Cheng Lock that the memorandum on the future of Malaya (which was written by Tan Cheng Lock), had been read with very great interest, and "the views expressed therein will be of great assistance to all concerned in the consideration of future policy."⁵³

In his memorandum, Tan Cheng Lock demanded that, "the people of Malaya should, after the War, be given a measure of self-government, which they are capable of exercising, and in the shortest possible time be granted, by planned and regular stages, full responsible government under the Crown and as a unit of the British Commonwealth and Empire in all matters of internal and civil administration, and then march on progressively towards full freedom...." ⁵⁴

He made a proposal that British Malaya should be united under one government. He preferred a centralized government of United Malaya, and considered, that "the

postwar period should provide a golden opportunity to bring [this] about."⁵⁵

Tan Cheng Lock also gave a suggestion to the British government to solve the difficult and complex problem created by the Chinese community in Malaya. In his view, if the China-born were given a fair deal in the future of Malaya they would regard themselves "... in course of time as Malaysians first and Chinese secondly, as long as they make Malaya their home...."⁵⁶ According to him, one of the best ways of treating the Chinese, was to give them an opportunity to acquire the right of Malayan citizenship in order to enable them to identify themselves completely with the interests of the land of their adoption.

Tan Cheng Lock wrote this memorandum on behalf on the Overseas Chinese Association. However, the idea reflected the Malayan Chinese view. From this memorandum it appeared that the "China-born Chinese" as well as the Straits Chinese had started to regard themselves as Malayan Chinese, having a permanent interest in that country. However, the OCA did not represent all the Chinese from Malaya who fled to India. The Association just attracted around 300 Chinese who became its members. The activities of this organization were limited.

There were some Chinese leaders who fled to India but did not join the OCA or put themselves under the leadership of Tan Cheng Lock. One of them was Lim Bo Seng, Straits-born Chinese, educated in the English medium. He led a group of seventeen survivors of DALFORCE to India. He worked closely with British Force 136.⁵⁷ His first assignment with Force 136 was to recruit Straits-born Chinese as radio operators and interpreters. Force 136 used them as key liaison personnel between the British Officers and the Communists in Malaya. As the present writer has indicated elsewhere, Colonel Lim Bo Seng was appointed as the Regional Chief of the (Chinese) Force 136. He was sent to Malaya and was killed by Japanese forces, while he carried out his duty as a member of Force 136. He was considered by the British, as well as, the Chinese, as a patriot.⁵⁸

Conclusion

War had broken the links between the Chinese in Malaya and mainland China. According to Stephen Leong, the Japanese occupation (1942-1945), "...abruptly transferred national sentiments for China into an urgent quest for self-survival"⁵⁹ and loyalty to China as a nation was superseded by loyalty to the basic unit, the family.

The Japanese Military Administration launched a brutal purge against anti-Japanese elements, and caused the death of several thousand Chinese. The extortion of a "gift" of antonement of \$50,000,000 caused great hardship to the community, particularly the Straits Chinese. Almost all Chinese organizations such as the SCBAs, the Chinese Chambers of Commerce, regional associations and trade guilds ceased to exist. The split among the Overseas Chinese and the Straits Chinese was almost submerged as the Japanese forced them to organize a single Chinese organization, the OCAs.

The Japanese also unified the Overseas Chinese and the Straits Chinese in other ways. China-oriented education was not allowed and Chinese education in the Chinese language was limited. The Japanese did not allow the use of English as a medium of instruction in any schools. Thus the Straits Chinese and Overseas Chinese sent their children to the same type of schools which promoted loyalty to the Japanese Emperor and the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity sphere. The Chinese were forced to express loyalty to Japan. Thus it was absurd to expect them to express loyalty to Britain or China after an end of the War.

Those Chinese who were not willing to co-operate with the Japanese Military Administration, joined the Anti-Japanese resistance movements, such as the MPAJA and

OCAJA. These organizations, especially the Communist-dominated MPAJA, worked closely with Force 136, in preparation for the Allied troops to re-occupy Malaya. The prominent Chinese who fled to India also worked closely with the British government, such as providing information regarding Malaya under the Japanese occupation. As the present writer has indicated Tan Cheng Lock the President of the OCA in India submitted a memorandum to the Colonial Office regarding the constitutional issues pertaining to Chinese interests in post-war Malaya. These developments would change Britain's attitude towards the Chinese community.

Notes

1. Yoji Akashi, "Japanese Policy Towards the Malayan Chinese 1941-1945," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies (JSEAS), Vol.1, No. 2, Sept. 1970, p. 61.
2. For a fairly detailed study of the Japanese Military Administration in Malaya during the Japanese occupation, see Yoji Akashi, "Bureaucracy and the Japanese Military Administration, with Specific Reference to Malaya", in W. H. Newell (ed.), Japan in Asia, Singapore University Press, Singapore, 1981, pp. 46- 82.
3. Yoji Akashi, "Japanese Policy Towards the Malayan Chinese 1941-1945,"...op.cit., p. 66.
4. Ibid., p. 66.
5. Ibid., p. 67.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., p. 68.
9. Cheah Boon Kheng, "The Social Impact of the Japanese Occupation of Malaya (1942-1945)", in Alfred Mc Coy (ed.) Southeast Asia Under Japanese Occupation, Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1980, p. 96.
10. Ibid., p. 97.
11. Ibid.
12. Shu Yun-t'siao and Chua Ser-koon, eds., Malayan Chinese Resistance to Japan 1932-1945- Selected Source Materials, Cultural and Historical Publishing House Pte Ltd., Singapore, 1984, p. 36.
13. Ibid., p. 36-37.
14. Ibid., p. 37.
15. Yoji Akashi, "Japanese Policy Towards the Malayan Chinese 1941-1945,"...op.cit., p. 70.
16. Ibid., p. 72.
17. Ibid.

18. Shu Yun-t'siao and Chua Ser-koon, op.cit., p. 37-38.
19. Ibid., p. 39.
20. Ibid., pp. 40-41.
21. Cited ibid., p. 41.
22. Yoji Akashi, "Japanese Policy Towards the Malayan Chinese 1941-1945,"...op.cit., p. 75.
23. "Fortnightly Intelligence Report No.6", 16 to 31 March 1944, in CO 273/673/ 50744/7, p. 37.
24. Ibid., passim. •
25. Shu Yun-t'siao and Chua Ser-koon, op.cit., p. 43.
26. Ibid.
27. Yoji Akashi, "Japanese Policy Towards the Malayan Chinese 1941-1945,"...op.cit., p. 80.
28. "Fortnightly Intelligence Report No.20", 18 December 1943, in CO 273/673/ 50744/7, p. 109.
29. "Fortnightly Intelligence Report No.15", 9 October 1943, in CO 273/673 file no. 50744/7, p. 109.
30. Cheah Boon Kheng, "The Social Impact of the Japanese Occupation of Malaya (1942-1945)"...op.cit., p. 111.
31. See, Cheah Boon Kheng, Red Star Over Malaya, Resistance and Social Conflict during and After the Japanese Occupation, 1941-1946, Singapore University Press, Singapore, first ed., pp. 79-80.
32. Shu Yun-t'siao and Chua Ser-koon, op.cit., p. 71.
33. Cheah Boon Kheng, Red Star Over Malaya, ...op.cit., p. 64.
34. Ibid., p. 65-66.
35. Shu Yun-t'siao and Chua Ser-koon, op.cit., p. 72.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid., pp. 72-73.
38. F. Spencer Chapman, The Jungle is Neutral, Chatto & Windus, London, 1953; Cheah Boon Kheng, Red Star Over Malaya ...op.cit., p. 73; and Gene Z. Hanrahan, op.cit., p.80. See also, Leo Tin Boon, "Force

- 136 the Malayan Episode" B.A. academic exercise, National University of Singapore, 1986, p.33, and C. Cruickshank, SOE in the Far East, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1983, p. 196.
39. Ibid.
 40. F. Spencer Chapman, op.cit., p. 234.
 41. See, Cheah Boon Kheng, Red Star Over Malaya, ...op.cit., p. 74. See also Gene Z. Hanrahan, op.cit., p. 81.
 42. C. Cruickshank, op.cit., p. 196.
 43. "Minute by J.J.Paskin", in CO 273/675. See also, "Report on The British Military Administration of Malaya by H.R.Hone , 1947 in CO 717/152/52152.
 44. C. B. McLane, Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia: An Exploration of Eastern Policy under Lenin and Stalin, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1966, p. 306, see note no. 138 and 139.
 45. Cheah Boon Kheng, Red Star Over Malaya, ...op.cit., p. 159.
 46. Ibid., p. 75 and 159.
 47. Shu Yun-t'siao and Chua Ser-koon, op.cit., p. 74.
 48. According to the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, there were some 10,000 Chinese connected with this Association. However, the Colonial Office pointed out that the Overseas Chinese Association in India consisted of not more than 200 people, all of them reputable and propertied Chinese who had left Malaya, in CAB 98/41.
 49. Tan Cheng Lock to J.L. Milne, 5 November 1943, in CO 273/673/50744/41.
 50. Ibid.
 51. Tan Cheng Lock , Malayan Problems From A Chinese Point of View, Tannso, 1947, pp. 8-9.
 52. W. B. L. Monson to Tan Cheng Lock, 16 February 1944, in ibid., pp. 8-9.
 53. Ibid.
 54. Ibid., p. 18.

55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57. Gene Z. Hanrahan, op.cit., p. 80.
58. Ibid.
59. Stephen Leong, op.cit., p. 810-811.

CHAPTER 111

The Problems of the War and the Formulation of Britain's New Chinese Policy, 1942- 1945

As a consequence of the war, the relationship between the British and the Chinese community had changed dramatically. Throughout the period of the Japanese occupation, Britain worked closely with the illegal Chinese political organisations in its preparation to fight against the Japanese forces and reoccupy Malaya. During this period, the British government began to rethink and formulate a new policy towards Malaya and the Chinese community. For Malaya in general, a Malayan Union was formulated and for the Chinese community, a document entitle "Malaya, Long Term policy Directives-- Chinese Policy" was drafted which reflected a change of policy and attitude towards them.¹

The new policy proposed the creation of a constitutional union of Malaya and a common Malayan citizenship. According to A.J. Stockwell, the "Malayan Union was a response to following circumstances: (i) the administrative problems of the peninsula which before the war had been divided into the Straits Settlements, and the Federated and Unfederated Malay States, (ii) the

prospect of economic rehabilitation after the war when Britain would depend more than ever before upon the dollar-earning tin mines and rubber estates, (iii) the need to assure the world, or at the USA, of British progressivism by laying the foundations for a future self-governing nation."² In addition to Stockwell's three points, there might be two more reasons or circumstances which influenced the British government in formulating its post-war policy towards Malaya: first, the question of the London funds of the Malay Sultans and second, the Chinese factor.³

British Attitudes Towards Chinese Problem.

During the Second World War, British planners in London who played an important role in formulation of Britain's new policy towards Malaya were not pro-Malay and had little affection for the Malay Sultans. Gent, the Head of the Eastern Department of the Colonial Office, had noticed with dismay the difficulties faced by British officials in Malaya in their dealings with the Malay Sultans during the pre-war years.⁴ For instance, Sir Shenton Thomas, the Governor of the Straits Settlements and High Commissioner of the Malay States tried to persuade the Malay Sultans to be flexible on the question of opening the civil service to the non-Malay communities.⁵ However, it was to no avail. Gent was

irritated with the pre-war policy which "represents the traditional apprehensions of the Malay Sultans."⁶ To him the policy of ignoring the claims and demands of the Chinese and Indians in Malaya was a "barren policy."⁷

British officials, including the military, were disillusioned with the Malay Sultans who continued to collaborate with the Japanese administration. P. A. B. McKerron, Political Secretary to the Civil and Military Governor in the Council of the British Dominion of Ceylon, and E. V. G. Day, the Deputy Political Secretary, labelled the Malay Sultans as "Japanese puppets." In their memorandum on 'A Note on Some of The Matters To Be Considered Before Our Return To Malaya,'⁸ they asked the British government "to indicate for the Military Commander, the policy and attitude which he is to adopt towards the Rulers on the immediate reoccupation of their States and towards persons who have allowed themselves to be used as Japanese puppets."⁹ Both of them later joined the Colonial Office, and Mackerron played an active role in the formulation of the Malayan Union scheme and the Chinese policy. The military view on the Malay Sultans, as represented by Louis Mountbatten, was hostile. In his letter to Major General Ralph Hone, dated 14 February 1944, he wrote:

I am not in favour of reinstating the Sultans even as constitutional rulers, and certainly not as autocratic rulers

The Japanese have kept them in position, and it is inconceivable that most of them have not been actively collaborating with the Japanese, even though the clever ones, like Johore, may when the time comes embarrass us by turning round and siding actively with the victorious British armies. In any case, their prestige cannot fail to have been seriously impaired by the Japanese occupation.¹⁰

Some of the planners were not only disillusioned with the Sultans and the Malay community but also with the former British officials who were pro-Malay. Among them was Victor Purcell, the Director of Information and the Chief Adviser for Chinese Affairs for the proposed government in Malaya. He criticised the old Malayan civil servants "for being largely out of touch and sympathy with the Chinese."¹¹ He made the remark:

The 'Old Stagers' [Old M.C.S.] might glory in their 'pro-Malay' bias, but the Malay Cadets [Malayan Civil Services] of the M[alayan] P[lanning] U[nit] deplore this over-weighting on the Malay side.¹²

Along with the growing disillusionment over the Malays, new circumstances arose which changed British attitudes and policy towards the Chinese community in Malaya.¹³ In January 1942, the Chinese community-- the Straits Chinese, the Communists and the Kuomintang-- fully gave their support and cooperation to the British government in fighting against the Japanese forces which

had already invaded the Northern part of the Malayan peninsula. This new situation fostered the growth of admiration among the British officials for the Chinese.

At first, the Malayan Communist Party's offer of cooperation was rejected by the British government because they did not recognize this organisation. It was not only illegal but had also given much trouble in the past. But when the Japanese forces began to invade Malaya in December 1941, the British changed their mind and agreed to accept the Communist offer of cooperation. On 3 January 1942, the Governor of the Straits Settlements and High Commissioner of the FMS, Sir Shenton Thomas, reported to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Moyne, about these new developments. Sir Shenton Thomas said:

...for the first time in history the Chinese representatives of all parties, including Straits born, Kuo Min Tang, Communist, etc., came to me to say that the defeat of Japan is now their only interest, and placed themselves unreservedly at my disposal.¹⁴

On 14 January, the Secretary of State gave orders to the Governor as follows:

In the present situation particular importance must be attached to the fullest use being made of services of the Chinese community in Malaya to defeat the Japanese invasion...the toughest Chinese elements which have given us so much trouble in the past in

Malaya are likely to be amongst the most useful for the immediate purpose. I appreciate that this change of attitude may present difficulties for your officers in many directions and particularly to the Secretary of Chinese Affairs, whose duties hitherto must necessarily have brought him and his Department into conflict with those elements....¹⁵

The Secretary of State had assumed that the Governor had given clear and definite instructions to all concerned in order that the requirements of the new situation could be fully understood and acted upon. He also emphatically agreed with the Governor's view that, "post war repercussions do not concern us [British] in this emergency."¹⁶

The British released the Communists who had been jailed, and trained the local people to fight against the Japanese in Singapore. The Communists and the Kuomintang worked together and formed the Chinese Mobilization Council which consisted of twenty members, ten from each of the two parties. This was presided over by Tan Kah Kee. A sub-committee was formed called the Defence Corps Committee or Volunteer Corps (DALFORCE), to defend Singapore from Japanese invaders. They put up a strong resistance against the Japanese forces and fought on until capitulation.

During the Japanese occupation of Malaya, once again the British considered the Chinese community as their friends and supporters willing and capable of opposing Japanese forces and helping to prepare for their return. The British gave full support to the formation of the guerilla forces of the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army which operated in occupied territory. For the Communists, support for the British came not so much from a love of the British as from extreme hatred of the Japanese. The British, however, assumed the Communists had changed.¹⁷ They hoped the Communists had become their true supporters.

They hoped to utilise these resistance forces. The present writer will indicate elsewhere that the the considered them as part of their troops. As the resistance forces consisted of mainly Chinese, the British government needed to change its policy towards the Chinese community in Malaya. According to Victor Purcell as the Adviser on Chinese Affairs:

In the past it was possible to say that a large proportion of the Chinese in Malaya were not political minded--that they 'did not mind who held the cow so long as they milked it'. We shall not be able to say this in the future. There is evidence that the anti-Japanese guer[r]illa army in Malaya, mostly Chinese, is nearly 40,000 strong, and largely communist in outlook.... Will it not be remembered that the recognition of the Chinese

Mobilisation Committee during the invasion was the virtual recognition of the Kuomintang and the Chinese [Malayan] Communist Party?....During the progress of the [British] Military operations for the reconquest of Malaya it is likely that large areas of the country will be controlled by the guer[r]illa forces. Are we to expect that we can establish an administration or a Chinese Affairs organization unrelated to the existence of this [guerrilla] army and without recognition of any claims it will have to make?¹⁸

During World War II, British military officials worked closely with the Chinese resistance forces. Major Chapman was left with the resistance forces when British troops withdrew from Malaya.¹⁹ Then, at the end of 1943, John Davis, ex-Malayan Police and Richard Broome of the Chinese Secretariat entered Malaya by submarine, to negotiate with the resistance forces for their cooperation and to coordinate guerrilla activities with the secret British guerrilla unit otherwise known as Force 136.

In January 1944, Col. J. Davis, as the Supreme Allied Commander's chief representative in Malaya, made an agreement with Loi Tek and Chin Peng, representatives of the Joint Committee of the Anti-Japanese Forces and the Anti Japanese Union, to co-operate fully for purposes of defeating the Japanese. The present writer has indicated elsewhere that the British representatives

agreed to supply arms, finance, training and medical facilities.

According to Chapman, they agreed at the beginning that no questions of post-war policy were to be discussed and that their (British) whole mission was military.²⁰ But Communist records which were revealed in November 1945, indicated that the British government had given some promises to them. The MCP proclaimed on the anniversary of the Russian Revolution that, "we still believe in the good things which the British government has promised us."²¹

Whether they had made a promise or not, Britain's post-war policy was guided by a number of considerations. The achievements of the Resistance Forces during the period of Japanese occupation and the agreement made by the Supreme Allied Commander with the Anti-Japanese Army which was under the control of the Communist Anti-Japanese Union were factors which the British took into account in their planning for the constitutional development of Malaya.²²

Later, when R.H. de S. Onreat, a police adviser under the British Military Administration in Malaya, complained about British policy towards the Chinese, J.J. Paskin explained to him that it had been felt in the Colonial Office that when their Chinese directives were

being formulated, it was absolutely impossible for them to ignore:

- (a) the change of attitude towards the Chinese Communists which took place in Singapore in the days before the [British] surrender.
- (b) the fact that not only then, but later throughout the period of the Japanese occupation, the Chinese communists were virtually the only elements in the local population which had actively resisted the Japanese....²³

Some previous writers believed that it was impossible for the agreement (between the British government and the Communists) to have influenced its policy for the future of Malaya. According to F.S.V. Donnison, "in point of fact, the British government's proposals for the constitutional future of Malaya were conceived long before the conclusion of this agreement and were in no sense caused by undertakings entered into with the Chinese Communists."²⁴ Also according to Donnison, it was not possible to get any news of the signing of this agreement out of Malaya until more than a year later. He added, that 1944 had passed without contact between the British Force 136 officials in Malaya and the British government.²⁵

But the accuracy of the facts mentioned above can be doubted. Firstly, the British government or the Colonial Office had just begun to formulate their Chinese

policy and citizenship proposals in early 1944. The Colonial Office made its final revision of, "Long Term Policy Directives-- Chinese Policy" on 5 May 1944.²⁶ This meant there was enough time for the Colonial Office to consider the agreement when they formulated their Chinese Policy. Secondly, it was not true that news of the signing of that agreement could not have reached beyond Malaya. Major F.Spencer Chapman said that these messages (about the agreement) reached Colombo (British Military Headquarters) in January 1944.²⁷ A conference of British officials which was held in New Delhi on 11 January 1944 was told about "certain Allied work which was already being undertaken within Malaya largely through the instrumentality of the Chinese in that country."²⁸

In fact a directive on Chinese policy was formulated for Force 136 as guidance. With this, Force 136 would be able to reassure the "...Chinese as to their future position in Malaya in order to retain their co-operation and encourage them to further activities."²⁹ During the British Military Administration the substance of this directive was communicated to the MPAJA leaders in the course of the negotiations for the disbanding of this organization. According to Ralph Hone, "The undertaking given to the M.P.A.J.A. was based on the directive (and not vice-versa) and was, of course, given by the G.O.C. under S.A.C's authority without any further

reference back to London."³⁰ Based on this evidence it was probable that British policy, particularly towards Chinese community was formulated, partly in response to the agreement between Forces 136 and the Communist dominated MPAJA.

Besides the Communists, there were some other groups such as the Straits Chinese and the Kuomintang, which influenced the Colonial Office's policy towards the Chinese in Malaya. Prominent Straits Chinese such as Tan Cheng Lock always made demands for a stronger Chinese role in the future constitutional set-up of Malaya than was provided for in the Malay States of the past. Tan Cheng Lock, as President of the Overseas Chinese Association, (a small group of Malayan Chinese in India), submitted the "Memorandum on the Future of Malaya" to the Colonial Office at the end of 1943.³¹ In his letter of 16 February 1944, to Tan Cheng Lock, W.B.L. Monson, on behalf of the Colonial Office, said, that the memorandum "had been read with very great interest."³² According to Ralph Hone "the Colonial Office was leaning towards some change of policy in regard to ..."the Straits Chinese and local born Chinese."³³ He himself agreed with this view and considered that there was "no justification for any specially favoured treatment..." for the "birds of passage" or Overseas Chinese.³⁴ However, after consideration of other factors, the alien Chinese also were to be given an opportunity to acquire the rights of

Malayan citizenship by naturalisation and would enjoy equal rights under Malayan Union citizenship.

Among all Chinese political organisations or groups, the Kuomintang was the strongest element which induced the British government to change its policy towards the Chinese community.³⁵ This was because the Kuomintang was the party that controlled the government in China. As a consequence of the war, the British government wanted to maintain good relations with China. The British had assumed that after the war, China would emerge with a strong government under the Kuomintang and would be one of major powers of the Allied nations and have a close relationship with Britain. It could be assumed that the Kuomintang would pressurize the British government to lift the ban on Kuomintang branches in Malaya. According to J. J. Paskin: "It was therefore considered that, as a matter of policy, it would be better to forestall demands (which in the circumstances envisaged in the post war world would be irresistible) for the repeal of the Malayan Legislation, by ourselves taking the initiative and replacing that legislation by enactments on the lines of the one which was then in operation in Hong Kong."³⁶ However, if the Kuomintang was legalized, the Chinese government would have ample opportunities for interference in the country's internal affairs.

The Colonial Office needed to find a formula which on one hand would legalize the Kuomintang and on the other hand discourage the Chinese in Malaya from being involved with this organization. One way was to offer local citizenship to this community in the hope that they would transfer their loyalty to Malaya and cut their ties with their motherland.³⁷

The hostile Japanese policy towards the Chinese, along with their "pro-Malay policy", directly or indirectly changed the British attitude and perception towards both communities. It was pointed out to Whitehall that the Chinese were bearing the brunt of the Japanese occupation and had been executed en masse after the fall of Singapore. The officials who read the accounts of Japanese atrocities toward the Chinese "were in almost stunned silence."³⁸ It was the Chinese who were more friendly to the British and the Chinese attitude towards the Japanese was very hostile. It was pointed out that one reason why the British defence collapsed rapidly was because a Malay "Fifth Column" was active in collaborating with the Japanese forces as guides and interpreters.³⁹ The Malays of the Kesatuan Melayu Muda had actually been working for Fujiwara Kikan the Japanese Military intelligence agency under Maj. Fujiwara Iwaichi which was based in Bangkok.⁴⁰ As a result of these events the British officials became

more sympathetic to and worked largely with, the Chinese in their war effort to reclaim Malaya from enemy occupation.

Part III

The Formulation of Chinese Policy

The Colonial Office began to formulate a general policy directive for the Civil Affairs Administration under the British Military Administration in mid 1943. At the same time they also began to study Chinese problems. A meeting was held in Gent's room on 17 June 1943, and the Colonial Office staff including Gent, Paskin and McKerron decided to take steps to collect a number of suitable Malayan officers to study the future from the Chinese angle. They would also act as advisors on all matters pertaining to the Chinese to the planning staff, and eventually to military and civil affairs officers when the British eventually re-occupied Malaya.⁴¹ They also agreed that it would also be the duty of this special unit to keep in close touch with the Foreign Office about the development of the Chinese government's policy towards the Chinese in the South Seas.

On the question of Chinese problems, McKerron suggested to the Colonial Office that they secure the services of, Victor W. Purcell, H. G. Moles, and J. Barry, a former member of the Malayan Police Service. In

his opinion, Purcell's services would be particularly useful to advise on the very important matter of publicity for the Malayan Chinese because he was engaged at that time on duties of that nature in Australia. He also suggested that those officers would have to be attached to the Colonial Office and paid from the Malayan fund because the War Office would never agree at that stage to provide posts on the civil affairs establishment for them.

McKerron raised the question of Chinese labour, and in his view, the Chinese Protectorate would cease to exist after the British returned to Malaya and its function would be taken over by the police and a new Labour Department which would deal with labour of all kinds and for all races. Gent agreed with McKerron's view that the Chinese and Indian labour issue would be one of the most tricky for Malayan policy in future years. In his opinion, both communities "will probably have at their beck and call the services and the support of their respective ebullient nationalist governments."⁴² But he felt it was premature to decide to deal with labour problems before they had competent officers on Chinese and Indian affairs. He agreed with McKerron's suggestion of getting the services of Victor Purcell, H. G. Moles and J. Barry. On 26 June 1943 he ordered Paskin to try to bring back those officers to London.⁴³ In August 1943, Gent and other colonial officials also decided to

bring back other officers such as Day, Newbould, Hay, Lowinger and William to join the Malayan Planning Unit which was attached to the War Office.⁴⁴

On 27 and 28 September 1943 Colonial officials, including Gent, Paskin and Monson held a discussion regarding the relationship between the future government of Malaya with China and the Chinese problem as a consequence of the war.⁴⁵ They felt it was necessary to send an officer to make personal contacts with Chungking as they needed to know Chinese government policy towards the Overseas Chinese community. The pre-war government in Malaya was not able to maintain a closer relationship with the government in China, as the Kuomintang always interfered in the affairs of Chinese in Malaya, which was not in the interest of local government. It feared the government in China would use the Chinese in Malaya as a "Fifth Column." Thus, the pre-War government adopted a policy of repression of Kuomintang activities. But the Kuomintang government protested to Britain and as a consequence both Britain and the Kuomintang government solved the conflict based on the 1931 Lampson-Wang Agreement. The Chinese authorities pledged not to establish an official party in Malaya and also not to allow the activities of its members to interfere with the domestic affairs of the Chinese community in the country. The local government would not object to any Chinese in

this country being a direct member of the Kuomintang of China but they were not allowed to form a branch in Malaya. However the Lampson-Wang Agreement did not satisfy the Kuomintang of China and this party made an attempt to form illegal branches in Malaya and continued to interfere in the domestic affairs of the Chinese community in the country. At the outbreak of the war the Kuomintang of China asked the British government to allow this organization to form branches in Malaya. But Sir Shenton Thomas, the Governor of the Straits Settlements strongly opposed any attempt to change policy towards the Kuomintang. In his despatch of 19 June 1941 to the Colonial Office, he said as follows:

To enable an alien government to gain control of the preponderant element of the population would be to subject this government to an external pressure which might have most unhappy political and social consequences, expose it to sharp criticism by the Rulers as an unfaithful trustee, and open a door to indiscipline and disloyalty on the part of large sections of the [Chinese] community, who are taught by these organisations to owe their allegiance elsewhere....⁴⁶

Colonial Officials found out that the British were no longer able to follow the pre-war policy regarding the relationship with the Kuomintang government in China as a consequence of the war. It had been argued that, "further stages of the war against Japan may well be influenced by the maintenance of good relations with the

Chinese in respect of Malayan affairs."⁴⁷ Furthermore the Kuomintang and Communists were likely to play a prominent part in helping the British in any campaign to drive the Japanese out from Malaya. The Colonial officials felt that, "in these circumstances, it seems impossible to revive, immediately, on return to Malaya the pre-war embargoes on the parties, even if that course were thought to be desirable."⁴⁸ The colonial officials could not find the best method to deal with the Chinese problem. They decided to consult with the Foreign Office and other British officers.

On 29 September Paskin told Ashley Clarke of the F.O. that the Colonial Office would like to arrange an informal discussion between various departments of the MPU and among those who would attend was Purcell.⁴⁹ They also hoped Esler Dening (a Foreign Office official and the Chief Political Adviser to South-East Asian Command), who was still in Britain, would attend. The subject of discussion was about Chinese matters and the attitude to be adopted regarding Chinese political organisations in post-war Malaya. The need for such a discussion became more urgent, as at the end of October 1943, the Malayan Planning Unit informed the Colonial Office that they had already felt the need for policy directives, including one on the Chinese. Ralph Hone, informed Gent that it would be primarily for the Colonial Office to decide what

directives should be prepared. He assumed that Gent would also be agreeable to receive opinions from the Malayan Planning Unit officials on certain subjects, both during the planning stage and after they reached Malaya.⁵⁰ He added, though the formulation of policy directives was the responsibility of the Colonial Office, he had no doubt that Gent would be willing to allow members of his staff to consult with the Colonial Office while the directives were being actually formulated. It was obviously an advantage to allow the people who would have to carry out the approved policy to have some hand in defining it. He urged Gent to set up an inter-departmental committee to study some of the political questions, for example, the Chinese matter.⁵¹

On 1 November 1943, a meeting was held and attended by Colonial Office and Foreign Office officials including as A. Blackburn, Ashley Clarke, Gent, Paskin, Purcell and Monson to discuss the Chinese problem and the question of the relationship between Britain and the future government in Malaya with the Kuomintang government in China.⁵² Blackburn of the Foreign Office held the view that the Chinese government should be treated as "on a basis of full equality."⁵³ He recognized that, politically, relations between Britain and the Chinese government were bound to be a matter of considerable difficulty for the future government in Malaya. But he said it was desirable that "the

reestablishment of British authority in Malaya should be accompanied by, at any rate, a show of treatment of the Chinese government... [as equal] with other powers" and by making it clear to the Chinese government that the British government would be prepared to consider their legitimate interests in Malaya but "without admitting any right by them to interfere with the internal administration of the country."⁵⁴ The Foreign Office and the Colonial Office shared the same view regarding the attitude to be adopted to the Kuomintang in Malaya. It had been argued that, it "would be desirable to treat the party in Malaya on a basis of legality."⁵⁵ Therefore they strongly supported "...the suggestion that any future Malayan legislation should follow the lines of the Hong Kong Society's Ordinance which placed on the local government the onus of declaring a society unlawful." Victor Purcell also supported this proposal. He pointed out that "the proposed change might not mean very much but it would have a definite psychological value in regard to our relations with the Chinese Government."⁵⁶

In December 1943, the Colonial Office sought an opinion from Sir Horace Seymour, the British ambassador in Chungking and also Netherlands diplomats in London regarding the Chinese government's intention towards the Overseas Chinese. Horace Seymour told the Colonial Office that he was not aware of any particular view held

by Chinese authorities towards Malaya, but he had the definite impression that Chungking control of Overseas Chinese would be intensified after the war and that the Chinese would look to have freer opportunities for immigration into Malaya than they had had before the war.⁵⁷ Teixeira de Mattos, the Minister of Netherland's embassy in London, told the Foreign Office that, based on a report received from the Netherlands ambassador in Chungking, the Chinese government would mount claims "...to economic freedom and privileges almost giving the Chinese an ex-territorial position in the territories..."⁵⁸ that were occupied by the Japanese. He pointed out that the overseas Chinese would, "through their affiliation with the Kuomintang be made an instrument for Chinese penetration."⁵⁹ Teixeira pointed out that Chinese secret agents had been sent to the Japanese occupied territories to form "a nucleus for future operation."⁶⁰ He suggested that there was one way "to counter the dangers in question, a clear prohibition of political organisations in foreign territory might be inserted in the Peace treaties concluded with Germany and with Japan."⁶¹ He added that "most countries would regard such conditions as natural and necessary, and a precedent would be set up by which Chinese designs could possibly be countered."⁶² The British government also recognized "Chinese imperialistic designs" and "the dangers and the difficulty which [they] might have in keeping these designs in check in Burma and Malaya" after

they returned to both territories.⁶³

From June to December 1943, the Colonial Office still could not find a formula to deal with the Chinese problem in the future Malaya. It faced a great dilemma. On one hand it had been argued that Britain and the future government in Malaya needed to maintain a good relationship and cooperation with China and the Chinese, the Kuomintang and the Communists in Malaya, to drive the Japanese out of these territories. On the other hand the Chinese community had the potential to become a "Fifth Column" in Chinese imperialistic designs on Malaya. In pre-war days, this could be dealt with by a policy of repression. But in these new circumstances repression was not the answer. In January 1944 Ralph Hone went to New Delhi to look for a possible solution to the Chinese problem.⁶⁴

On 11 January 1944, a conference was held in New Delhi to discuss the subject of Chinese affairs in Malaya. It was attended by Ralph Hone, the C.C.A.O. (Malaya), M. E. Dening, the Chief Political Adviser to S.A.C., Sir Horace Seymour, Air Marshall Sir Philip Joubert, the Deputy Chief of Staff (in charge of information and civil affairs), Colonel E. J. Gibbons, the Chief Civil Affairs Security Officer, and John Keswik, Political Liaison Officer, S.E.A. Ralph Hone told the meeting about a discussion held at the Colonial

Office on 1 November 1943 at which a suggestion was made on the possibility of sending a Malayan government officer to Chungking to explore the trend of Chinese opinion regarding the overseas Chinese in Malaya.⁶⁵ Seymour agreed to the suggestion of sending V. Purcell to China for this purpose. Hone asked the conference what the Chinese wanted in Malaya. Seymour's reply was that he did not think that "opinion in China was very crystallized on this subject but the general trend was that Overseas Chinese should not be subject to disabilities in trade and politics from which other races did not suffer."⁶⁶ Hone told the meeting that, in the past, all Chinese in the Federated Malay States and Unfederated Malay States had been treated as foreigners. He mentioned that there were two categories of Chinese in Malaya: those bred and born in the country who adopted Malaya as their home, and "birds of passage" who departed with their gains and contributed very little to the well-being of the country.⁶⁷ Hone told the meeting that the Colonial Office "was leaning towards some change of policy in regard" to the Chinese who were born and bred in Malaya.⁶⁸ Seymour pointed out that "a change of policy with regard to Malayan born Chinese would go some way to meet Chinese ambitions but would not fully satisfy them", as "the Chinese claim an interest in all Chinese, whether Malayan born or not."⁶⁹ He pointed out that the Chinese "were trying to have the best of both worlds."

Dening told the meeting that he, as a political adviser to SEAC, needed to have a directive on Chinese policy at an early date. He explained to the meeting that "certain Allied work was already being undertaken within Malaya, largely through the instrumentality of the Chinese [the Communist dominated Malayan People Anti-Japanese Army] in the country."⁷⁰ He added that, "there might well soon be a request from the Officer in charge of these operations [Force 136] for permission to say something to Chinese [Communists] as to their future position in Malaya in order to retain their co-operation and encourage them to further activities."⁷¹ Thus Dening felt that some directive, if only of an interim nature, should be issued as early as possible. He also told the meeting that "the necessity for guidance will continue equally after military operations have taken place." It should be noted that evidence from this conference indicates the formulation of a Chinese directive which had a direct connection with the works that had been carried out by Force 136.⁷² It should be noted also that the officers of the Malayan section of Force 136 had made direct contact with Gent and other colonial officials regarding British post-war policy in Malaya.

In the meantime an inter-departmental or working committee convened its first meeting on 17 December 1943 to prepare a directive on Chinese policy.⁷³ This

committee consisted of J. J. Paskin and W. L. Monson from the Colonial Office and Victor Purcell, E. V. Day and A. T. Newbould from the MPU branch of the War Office. The subject discussed at the meeting was to what extent the Chinese community, and other communities as well could be associated with the machinery of government. The meeting decided to open a new file dealing with "Malayan citizenship" and recognized the need for a series of directives including a discussion on Chinese policy. In January 1944 the working committee was able to submit a draft directive on Malayan policy and a general view of its policy towards the Chinese to the Foreign Office.⁷⁴ One of the comments made by the Foreign Office on Colonial Office Malayan policy was that it was "to satisfy the Chinese."⁷⁵ J. J. Paskin denied this. According to Paskin, the idea which concerned the Colonial Office was that of absorbing the Chinese, who had roots in the country into a common citizenship, for the benefit of Malaya as a whole.⁷⁶

Paskin told Gater that he was present at a meeting between Sir Alexander Cadogan, the Permanent Under Secretary at the Foreign Office and Netherlands' minister at Chungking. The latter urged that they (the British and Dutch) should coordinate a policy against the plan of the government in China to strengthen the position of the Overseas Chinese in Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies.⁷⁷ They believed the Chinese

government had an ultimate long-range objective in acquiring a substantial measure of control in the affairs of all countries in Southeast Asia through the Overseas Chinese.

Paskin suggested to them that one possible means to counter these designs would be to win local Chinese loyalty from China to their country of domicile.⁷⁸ Paskin mentioned that the ambassador had little faith in the effectiveness of that, on the grounds that the "Chinese will always be Chinese" but he agreed that it was worth trying.⁷⁹

V. Purcell was given the task of reviewing "Long Term Policy Directives: Chinese Policy" (first draft), before it was submitted to the Chief Planner of Civil Affairs of the Malayan Planning Unit and to the British Cabinet.⁸⁰ He gave his comments in March 1944. He and the interdepartmental committee drew up a several drafts of a directive on Chinese policy before it could reach a final conclusion. The main difference between the first and the second draft was regarding the Chinese participation in political parties. Part 3 of the first draft stated:

Chinese persons whether citizens of the Malayan Union or not will be free to be members of the Kuomintang in Malaya provided that the society is a lawful

society in Malaya, and provided that it does not signify in the case of citizens of the Malayan Union, any political allegiance to any Government other than the Malayan Union.⁸¹

In the second draft this reference to the Kuomintang was dropped. It was replaced by the reference that, "Chinese citizens of the Malayan Union will be free to be members of any society in China provided that such society is not an unlawful society according to Malayan law."⁸² In the third draft the reference to "politics" and "in China" was dropped as it would appear that Malayan citizens of other races would not be free to be a member of any society. It should be pointed out that the MCP could not be regarded as a Chinese society in legal terms as its constitution allowed people from non-Chinese races to become a member of this organization.

There was certainly a specific incident that influenced the Colonial Office to leave out any reference to the Kuomintang. The Supreme Allied Commander for south-east Asia made an agreement with the resistance groups which mainly contained Communists elements in Malaya. As the present writer has indicated, the conference in New Delhi was told about the Allied work with the Chinese resistance forces in Malaya. It was not possible for the Colonial Office to favour the Kuomintang and ignore the other Chinese organizations which also cooperated with the British government

during the war. By dropping the reference to the Kuomintang, it was possible for the Chinese in Malaya to become members of other organizations. This was also modified to make it easier for the Malayan Communist Party to become a legal organization. Under the final revised Chinese policy, "the legislation in the Malayan Union governing the registration of societies should be amended so as to remove the requirement that a society must apply to be accepted for registration before it could be a lawful society, and the responsibility instead should be placed on the governor in Council for declaring any existing society to be an unlawful one."⁸³ This meant the British government recognized the Malayan Communist Party and Kuomintang which in the past were considered as illegal organisations, so a legal problem would not arise if the British government were to make a deal with the Communists and the Kuomintang when they returned to Malaya later. Although the final draft of the directive on Chinese policy was not explicit on this matter, examination of the discussions between officials of the C.O., F.O. and the staff of SEAC suggest beyond doubt that Chinese policy was formulated by British in order to deal with the MCP and the Kuomintang and the Chinese community in general.

In the history of the Chinese in Malaya, the new Chinese policy and citizenship proposals under the Malayan Union scheme were the best offer they ever had

from the British government. The Chinese community would be allowed two choices. They could become Malayan citizens or remain as aliens with the freedom to participate in any kind of political party, either foreign or China-based or local based political party. The pre-war policy which subjected Chinese to various disabilities and prosecution would be lifted. In other words there would be no more cases of repression. The first part of the Chinese Policy stated:

Persons of Chinese race in the Malayan Union will either be possessed of Malayan Union citizenship as defined in the directive on the creation of the such citizenship or will be aliens in the country.⁸⁴

The citizenship directive made it much easier for the Chinese in Malaya or Singapore to become Malayan Union citizens. As Malayan Union citizens, they would be, in all respects, possessed of rights and privileges of any other section, save only that concerned with the policy of Malay land reservation. To prevent the Chinese from being discriminated against on racial grounds, Victor Purcell suggested "that all newly appointed cadets [in Malayan Civil Services] should be required to learn both Chinese and Malay".⁸⁵ According to Purcell, the Malayan Civil Services was largely out of touch and sympathy with the Chinese.⁸⁶

For the first time, the new British policy would offer the Chinese, and Indians as well, an opportunity to enter the public services of a future Malaya. In the pre-war Malay States, not even one Chinese or Indian ever had a hope of becoming a Malayan Civil Service officer. Furthermore there would be no discrimination of race in the salary scheme of the future public services of the Malayan Union. Officers whose permanent homes were not in Malaya would receive pensionable expatriation allowances at rates approved by the Secretary of State, in addition to the basic Malayan scale.

In the commercial and economic field, the Chinese were already in a dominant position. To be fair, the Colonial Office therefore needed to consider the interests and position of the Malay Community. So in the directives to the Chief Planners of Civil Affairs, the instruction was

that the participation in the government by all the communities in future Malaya is to promote... subject to a special recognition of the political economic and social interests of the Malay race.⁸⁷

Towards the middle of August 1944, it became clear that the immediate aims of Malayan Union policy and the Directive on Chinese Policy were to induce the Chinese community, particularly the Communist-dominated

resistance forces to co-operate and work closely with Force 136. S.E. Taylor wrote to Gent, that SOE or Force 136 had already been in touch with resistance groups in Malaya.⁸⁸ They asked about certain questions regarding the British post-war policy which they should know in order to give reasonably concrete answers to the resistance forces. According to him the questions which the SOE would like to be able to answer were:

- (1) What form of citizenship if any will be available
 - a. To those born in Malaya, and
 - b. Those who have been domiciled there for a given period?
- (2) Will organisations and societies which were considered to be illegal before the war continue to be so considered?
- (3) From the point of view of civil rights and opportunities will such Chinese as may qualify for citizenship under 1 above be subject to discrimination?⁸⁹

According to Gent the best answers that they could give about the future of the Malayan Chinese were as follows:

- (1) ...it is the intention of His Majesty's Government to promote a greater degree of unification of all Malaya and its peoples, and equality of those who have made Malaya their home. Whatever any person's racial extraction may be one of the processes by which it is hoped to achieve this purpose is by creating Malaya Citizenship. It is proposed that such citizenship should be acquired by persons in Malaya and by persons who have been ordinarily resident there for very many years.
- (2) On the question of societies and organisations which were considered illegal before the war, ... it is our intention to change the emphasis in

future by fresh legislation so that a society or organisation will not be considered illegal unless declared so to be.

- (3) Chinese who possess Malayan Citizenship referred to (1) above will have the right and privileges of any other Malayan citizens. There will be no discrimination on racial grounds except that of the policy of Malay land reservations....⁹⁰

According to J. J. Paskin, although SOE was authorised to give assurances to the resistance forces they (the officers of the Colonial Office) "... have no knowledge ...that any of these assurances were in fact ever given to the M.P.A.J.A."⁹¹ He pointed out that, in a memorandum dated 15 August 1945, "On the Resistance Forces in Malaya on the eve of Japanese capitulation", Innes Tremlett, the SOE officer, had explained that, "the M.P.A.J.A. leaders were reluctant to come out into the open, in association with the Force agents, because of the possible desire of their leaders to retain their anonymity for subversive action after the reoccupation."⁹² Tremlett added that this was because of the general policy of the Colonial Office to make no statements: they had never been able to tell its leaders that they would not be treated as outlaws. According to Paskin, from this writing it would "appear that little was said to the leaders of the guerrilla forces in Malaya during the war as to ... [Britain's] post-war policy."⁹³ However, after the war, the British Military Administration used the Directive on Chinese Policy as a

bargaining counter during the negotiation with the MPAJA leaders for the disbandment of this organization.⁹⁴ After more than one year of keeping their Malayan policy secret the Colonial Office decided to publicize it in September 1945. It appeared that the immediate purpose of the Malayan policy was to extract support and cooperation from the resistance movements, including the Communist and Kuomintang for the British forces in Malaya. Admiral Mountbatten had long pressed for a measure of publicity of the Malayan policy so that his power to utilise resistance forces thereby would be greatly increased.⁹⁵ It is possible that the policy-makers in the Colonial Office knew something of the aims and aspirations of the resistance forces. The Colonial Office received two telegrams from Denning pointing out that the MCP have set before themselves a goal which in many respects was consistent with the directive on Chinese policy. One of the officers of the Colonial Office wrote:

There was the extreme relevance of our [the British Government's] future Malayan policy to the aim and aspirations of the most politically difficult body of Chinese [the Communists] in Malaya, and the great advantages which we will secure in dealing with that body if our policy can be made known to them.⁹⁶

But the Communist "stole their thunder" by publicizing their policy before the British government

was able to act. This policy was far more radical than the British government's offers. One of the aims of the MCP was to "establish a democratic Government in Malaya with an electorate drawn from races of each State and the anti-Japanese army."⁹⁷ Thus compared to Communist policy, the proposed Malayan policy lacked any real progressive and democratic elements. Instead of being a preparation for self-government, the Malayan Union became a crown colony.

Conclusion

It is apparent that Britain's Chinese policy was not only intended to secure the immediate aim of extracting the support and cooperation of the resistance movements, but also to solve Chinese problems in the long term. The long term aim of the Chinese policy was to promote the process of the Malayanisation of the Chinese community. This aim was in line with the general policy of the British government within the British Commonwealth of Nations. It has been argued that to achieve these objectives, it was deemed necessary for the British government to deprive the Malay Sultans of sovereignty.

The Colonial Office had the impression that the Sultans would not agree to the implementation of the Chinese policy or the creation of a common citizenship

for all people in Malaya regardless of race and the formation of a unified Malaya. According to Gent, "...we cannot expect the Malay rulers to be other than reluctant to give an inch to any future constitutional arrangement which will be intended to absorb locally domiciled Chinese or Indians on a political and economic level in the country with the Malays."⁹⁸ He added, "Nor can they be expected to be attracted by our idea of a greater unification of Malaya." The rulers, in Gent's view, "are very state-minded and not only the Unfederated States rulers but also the F.M.S rulers consistently favour political decentralization."⁹⁹ As the present writer has indicated in the Appendix A, it was also necessary for the British government to deprive the the Malay Sultans of their sovereignty, in order to solve the question of the various Malayan funds and other problems.¹⁰⁰

Notes

1. See, Malayan Union and Singapore, Summary of Proposed Constitutional Arrangements, His Majesty Stationery Office London, 1946. See also, "Malaya, Long Term Policy Directives-- Chinese Policy", in CO 865/18.
2. A. J. Stockwell, "British Imperial policy and Decolonization in Malaya, 1942-52", in The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. XIII, No.1, October 1984. See also, A. J. Stockwell "British Imperial Strategy and Decolonization in Malaya", ASEAS UK/SEALG Conference, Hull, 24-26 March 1986, and A. J. Stockwell, British Policy and Malay Politics during the Malayan Union Experiment, 1942-1948, Malaysian Branch of Royal Asiatic Society, Monograph No.8, Kuala Lumpur, 1979.
3. For a fairly detail^l account of the problems of the London funds of the Malay Sultans, see Appendix A, pp. ~~426 - 449~~.
4. Minutes by Gent, 23. 9. 1941, CO 273/667/50429.
5. Sir Shenton Thomas to Lord Moyne, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in ibid.
6. Minutes by Gent, 23. 9. 1941, in ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. "A Note on Some of the Matters to be Considered Before Our Return to Malaya "by P.A.B. McKerron and E. V. G. Day, in CO 865/14.
9. Ibid.
10. Lord Louis Mountbatten to Ralph Hone , the Chief Civil Affairs Officer of the Malayan Planning Unit, 14 February 1944. in CO 825/42/55104/i.
11. Victor Purcell notes on "Long Term Policy Directives-Chinese Policy", in CO 865/18.
12. Ibid.
13. J. de V. Allen, op.cit., p. 9.
14. See CO 273/669.

15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Minutes by J. J. Paskin, in CO 273/675/50823/3/2.
18. Notes on "Organisation of Chinese Affairs during the Period of Military Administration" by V. Purcell, in BMA/ADM/239, Arkib Negara Malaysia.
19. B. B. C. 2, SOE-Arms and the Dragon, examines the special Executives's oriental mission to arm the Communist guerillas in Malaya during World War Two, 31 August 1987, 7.35 p.m. See F. Spencer Chapman, The Jungle is Neutral, Chatto & Windus, London, 1954, p. 226; Leo Tin Boon, "Force 136 The Malayan Episode", B.A. Honour academic exercise, National University of Singapore, 1986; C. Cruickshank, SOE in the Far East, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1983, p.191-210. See also, " Project no.13. Richard Broome", in Singapore Under the Japanese A Catalogue of Oral History Interviews, Oral History Department, Singapore, 1986.
20. F. Spencer Chapman, op.cit., p. 226.
21. C. B. McLane, Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia, Princeton, N. J., 1966, p. 306.
22. Minutes by J. J. Paskin, in CO 273/675 /50823/3/22. See also, "Report on the British Military Administration of Malaya by H. Ralph Hone", in CO 717/152/52152, 1947.
23. Minutes by J. J. Paskin in CO 273/675/50823/3/22.
24. F.S. V .Donnison, British Military Administration in the Far East, 1943- 46, HMSO, London, 1956, p. 380.
25. Ibid.
26. Malaya, "Long Term Policy Directives-Chinese Policy", in CO 865/18
27. "Note of Conference held in [New] Delhi on the 11th January 1944 regarding Chinese Affairs in Malaya", in FO 371/41625.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Ralph Hone to F.S. Donnison, 5 May 1949, in CAB 101/66.

31. Tan Cheng Lock, Malayan Problems...op.cit., pp. 10-42.
32. W. L. Monson to Tan Cheng Lock, 16 February 1944, in Tan Cheng Lock, Malayan Problems..., pp. 8-9.
33. "Note of Conference held in [New] Delhi on the 11th January 1944 regarding Chinese Affairs in Malaya", in FO 371/41625.
34. Ibid.
35. Ralph Hone to F.S. Donnison, 5 May 1949, in CAB 101/66.
36. Paskin to Hone, 16 June 1949, in CAB 101/66.
37. J. J. Paskin to C. Jeffries, 4 Jan. 1944, in CO 825/42/55104 /1.
38. Albert Lau, op.cit., p. 92.
39. Cheah Boon Kheng, Red Star Over Malaya, op.cit., p. 20.
40. Ibid.
41. Notes on " Malayan Recontruction-Chinese Problem," 18 June 1943, in CO 865/47.
42. Ibid.
43. Gent to Paskin, 22 June 1943, in CO 865/47.
44. S. Robinson to W. B. Monson, 19 August 1943, in CO 865/47.
45. Minutes by W. B. Monson, in CO 825/35/55109/6.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. J. J. Paskin to Ashley Clarke, 29 September 1943, in CO 825/35 55109/6.
50. Ralph Hone to Gent 29 October 1943, in CO865/18.
51. Ibid.
52. "Note of a discussion at the Colonial Office on 1 November, 1943, in CO 825/35/55104/6.

53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57. Minutes by J.J. Paskin on 4 December 1943, in CO 825/35/55104/6.
58. Ashley Clarke to Gent, 18 December 1943, in CO 825/35/55104/6.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. "Note of Conference held in [New] Delhi on the 11 January 1944 regarding Chinese Affairs in Malaya", in FO 371/41625.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid.
72. See, S. E. Taylor to Gent, 12 August 1944, in CAB 101/66.
73. Minutes by W.B.Monson, 17 December 1943, in CO 825/35/ 55109/6.
74. J. Paskin to C. Jeffries. 14 January 1944, in CO 825/42 /55104/1.
75. Ibid.
76. Ibid.

77. Ibid.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid.
80. "Malaya, Long Term Policy Directives-Chinese Policy", in CO 865/18. See also "Malaya, Long Term Policy Directives-Chinese policy," Second Draft, in FO 371/41625.
81. Ibid. (CO 865/18 and FO 371/41625).
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid.
84. Ibid. See also, "Malaya, Long Term Policy Directives-Creation of Malayan Union Citizenship", in CO 865/18
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid.
87. War Cabinet, Committee on Malaya and Borneo, "Draft of A Directive on Policy in Malaya", 5 April 1944, C.M.B. (44) 8, CAB 98/41.
88. S. E. Taylor to Gent, 12 August, 1944, in CAB 101/66.
89. Ibid.
90. Gent to Taylor, 29 August 1944, in CAB 101/66.
91. J. J. Paskin to H. Gurney, 6 June 1949, in CAB 101/66.
92. Ibid.
93. Ibid.
94. Ralph Hone to F.S. Donnison, 5 May 1949, in CAB 101/66.
95. Minutes by H. T. Bourdillon, 6.9.1945, in CO 273/675 .
96. Ibid.
97. Telegram from Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia to [the] Foreign Office, in CO 273/675.
98. Gent to Gater, 9. 10. 1944, in CO 825/42/55104/i.

99. Ibid.
100. For an account of how British Government resolved the question of the problems of the London funds of the Malay Sultans, see Appendix A, pp.426-449.

CHAPTER 1V

British Military Administration and the Malayan Union Experiment, 1945-1947

From the end of the war to the establishment of civil government in Malaya (August 1945-April 1946), political activity among the Chinese community was dominated by the MCP and radical movements. The leaders of the pre-war Chinese community, which consisted mainly of merchants or business leaders and English-educated professionals, almost entirely lost their leadership in the Chinese community. They, as the leaders of the Chinese community which had carried out an appeasement policy with regard to the Japanese Military Administration through participation in the Overseas Chinese Associations and in the advisory councils, were regarded as collaborators or traitors. Their financial position had also been crippled by the Japanese. For a temporary period, these groups no longer held high social status and influence among the Chinese. Their political role in the Chinese community was taken over by a group of Chinese leaders who belonged to the resistance movements, such as the MPAJA and MPAJU. These groups were controlled by the MCP. As the War came to an

end these groups acquired high social prestige and had great influence among the Chinese community as liberators. Their prestige was enhanced by the Allied powers, who recognized them as part of Southeast Asian Command's troops.

Part I

Lord Louis Mountbatten and the Chinese Resistance Movements

The unexpected surrender of the Japanese on 14 August 1945 left a political vacuum in Malaya for a few weeks. Some factions of the MPAJA attempted to take over power in certain areas vacated by the Japanese forces. However the MPAJA and the MCP leaders decided to cooperate with the returning British and adopt a constitutional line of struggle. The MCP drew up an eight point programme and adopted the slogans: to "uphold the democratic league of China, the Soviet Union, Britain, and America", to welcome "Great Britain to administer Malaya", and all races should unite" to establish a democratic Malaya."¹ The MCP and the MPAJU made a joint statement that:

...we trust that a righteous and just policy will be executed by the British Military Administration in future in order to bestow on us happiness and freedom. As Great Britain is a

righteous nation we believe we shall be granted proper rights and given the opportunity to offer our cooperation to the British Government. Simultaneously, we expect all races and political parties to join with us in the task of establishing a New Malaya under the democratic flag....²

It was apparent that the MCP adopted a cooperative policy towards the British, as a tactic, and also in the hope that they would be allowed to play a political role in postwar Malaya. For the British, cooperation with the MCP or the resistance movements was necessary in their plan to fight and reoccupy Malaya under Operation Zipper. However, with the sudden surrender of the Japanese forces, the role of the resistance movements in the military operation was no longer necessary. In these new circumstances, the resistance movements posed a political problem to the British planning to reoccupy Malaya. According to Lord Louis Mountbatten, the Allied Commander of the Southeast Asian Command:

In the case of Malaya, there is of course the difficulty that the resistance movements are largely composed of Chinese elements and that the Chinese in the greater part of Malaya did not in the past enjoy equality of status. If we back them to any appreciable extent, and accept their cooperation, we shall owe them a special debt and this will give them a strong case if they choose to ask for special privileges.³

Oliver Stanley, the Secretary of State for the Colonies did not need to be reminded by Mountbatten, as he himself realized they would face delicate political issues when they began to set up a military administration in Malaya. He had already informed Lord Louis Mountbatten that:

You will realise that the presence in substantial numbers in Malaya of Chinese and Indians makes the future constitutional development a matter of some delicacy, particularly as these communities are likely to demand a more intimate [sic] place in the constitutional set up in the future than they have been given in the Malay States in the past, while at the same time the great economic power which they have already secured has led to antagonism between themselves and the Malays. We must be prepared to face a risk of sectional antagonisms showing themselves more definitely in the settlement of a new constitution.⁴

Mountbatten agreed with the directives on Policy in Malaya which pointed to the prospect of forming a single Malayan Union embracing all the States and the Settlements of the peninsula, and of constitutional progress directed towards the development of democratic self-government. He insisted Singapore be included in the proposed Union. He also emphasized some of the points in the directives, which said that participation in the government by all the communities in Malaya was to be promoted, subject to a special recognition of the

political, economic and social interests of the Malay race. He added that he felt that the British objective should be to break down racial sectionalism in every way open to them, politically, economically and socially, and to endeavour to substitute the idea of Malayan citizenship.⁵

Louis Mountbatten made a suggestion that the military administration should set up an elected advisory council and on further consideration their efforts should be directed toward promoting responsible democratic institutions at the bottom by beginning with the village and ward. He added that with such modest beginnings might lie the key not only to future self-government, but to the difficulties inherent in a pluralistic society. He stressed that:

*If we can make a start in this way by getting people, whether Malays, Chinese or Indians, to combine together to deal as citizens (and not as racial communities) with the local problems of their village or ward we may hope that one day they will come to look at the wider problems of Malaya in the same light, and that at least Malayan-born and Malayan-domiciled Chinese will begin to identify themselves with Malaya instead of seeking political guidance and interference from China*⁶

However, the Colonial Office considered it premature to introduce an election in Malaya during that time. One reason was the administrative difficulty in deciding

who had the right to belong to Malaya, thus enabling them to participate in the election.⁷ In their view, the creation of Malayan Union citizenship would form the basis for a franchise and therefore they needed to determine which persons belonged to Malaya by being born there or by having another claim to naturalisation. They were doubtful that it would be feasible to complete the sifting of the population into the category of belonging to Malaya during the military administration.⁸

Lord Louis Mountbatten had received the final draft on Chinese policy and the creation of Malayan Union citizenship in early September 1944. He told Oliver Stanley that they were *substantially in agreement* on certain matters. He wrote, "I am sure you share my wish to see the country politically unified and racially united, since these are indispensable prerequisites to the building of a free and happy country there."⁹ He agreed that, "it is essential that the Chinese and Indian elements should be legally assimilated, and should be made to feel committed, to local responsibility." Towards the Malay, he said he felt sorry to see that they should, by general consent, be found incapable of competing on equal terms, "economically and educationally," with the Chinese and Indians. He urged Stanley to announce His Majesty's Government's policy

immediately, as the "Japanese war may be over by the end of 1945" and he hoped they would be back in Malaya before that. He said:

I consider that the time to announce our policy, and to give it full publicity, is NOW, and that there is no time to be lost, if I am not to be asked to undertake a campaign against a part of the world which should have been prepared by suitable Political Warfare, but where on the contrary we will have again missed the bus.¹⁰

Lord Louis Mountbatten considered British post-war policy to be a "weapon" and "putting it at its very lowest, if we can expect but little help and sympathy from the Malayan [Chinese] populations (which I personally do not believe) we should at least be able to ensure their benevolent neutrality in our invasion of the country."¹¹ He was very concerned that the Chinese dominated resistance movements might attempt to fight against the British troops during their invasion of Malaya. Ralph Hone, the Chief of Civil Affairs of the Malayan Planning Unit, and other senior officers were also worried that "the communists in the jungle at the time of the Japanese surrender had every intention of taking over control in Malaya."¹² Mountbatten pointed out that the potential danger would be minimised by disclosing the post-war policy which offered political concessions to the Communist dominated resistance forces in particular, and "to the Chinese community in

general."¹³ According to Louis Mountbatten, announcement of the British post-war policy was important. In his view: "...something (must be) done about this very vital matter before it is too late."¹⁴

Southeast Asian Command of the Allied powers was unable to send its troops into Malaya immediately after the unconditional surrender of Japanese on 14 August 1945. Louis Mountbatten was instructed to delay the landing until 31 August by General MacArthur, the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces. General Terauchi, the Supreme Commander of the Japanese forces in the south region, also made it clear that he would not obey Mountbatten's order until he had been ordered by the Japanese emperor. During this time, SEAC decided to increase the strength of Force 136 personnel in order to control the resistance forces in Malaya. Meanwhile, Colin MacKenzie the Commander of Force 136, reported that they faced difficulties in connection with Anti-Japanese Union Forces and asked SEA headquarters to disclose the relevant details of British post-war policy. He pointed out two important grievances coming from the AJUF: firstly, they consisted entirely of domiciled Chinese whose citizenship status was inferior to the Malays, and secondly, their organisations were treated as illegal.¹⁵

A few days later, the SEAC's broadcasting stations were instructed to disseminate propaganda about; (1) The maintenance of law and order, (2) Britain's strength and its confident determination to carry out its mission to Malaya, (3) Britain's approach being likely to be sympathetic to 'progressive elements' in Malaya, and (4) an avoidance of over-optimism about returning to peace-time conditions.¹⁶ On a radio broadcast from SEAC headquarters on 25 August, the guerrillas were told to move into the vacated area left by the Japanese forces and maintain peace and order. They were urged to put themselves under the command of British troops and follow orders from the local British commanders as soon as possible. The guerrillas were also told that the British Military Administration, which would take over from the Japanese forces, would help them to take their rightful place in Malaya. After the radio broadcast, Davis from Force 136 headquarters in Malaya urged SEAC to recognize and treat the guerrilla forces as part of the Allied forces. The SEAC conceded this recognition of the guerilla forces on 4 September 1945.¹⁷

Before British troops landed in Malaya, the MPAJA and other guerilla forces had already taken over control of a vast section of Malaya. In some areas such as Alor Star in Kedah, the Malays prevented the MPAJA or the

Communists from taking control. In some areas, the MPAJA carried out summary executions against policemen, detectives, Kempetai informers, and others whom they considered traitors or collaborators with the Japanese Military Administration. As the Malays were not particularly hostile to the Japanese occupation and the Japanese had been using the police forces which mainly consisted of Malays to suppress the Chinese resistance movements, the MPAJA's actions caused racial riots in many parts of the Malayan peninsula.¹⁸

British troops landed in Penang on 2 September 1945 and more troops were landed in Singapore on 5 September. They found out that the MPAJA was in de facto control of the greater part of Malaya. A British Military Administration was formed to govern Malaya before the setting up of a future civilian government.

The Malayan Communist Party and the MPAJA continued to cooperate with British troops and the British Military Administration in Malaya. They let their aims be known to the British authority. They were as follows:

1. To support [the] United Nations of Russia, China, Britain, Greece, America and the new organisation for world security;
2. To establish a democratic Government in Malaya with electorate drawn from all races of each State and [the] anti-Japanese army;

3. To abolish Fascism and Japanese political structural laws in Malaya;
4. To enforce free speech, publications and societies, and obtain legal status for [the] anti-Japanese army;
5. To reform [the] educational system and improvement of social conditions of the people;
6. To improve living conditions, development of industry, commerce and agriculture, provide relief for unemployed and the poor, increase wages to standard minimum and establish eight-hour working day;
7. To punish traitors, corrupt officials, hoarding and profiteers and stabilisation of prices;

and
8. To ensure good treatment for members of anti-Japanese army and provide compensation for families of those who died for the Allied cause.¹⁹

The British directives on Chinese policy, the creation of Malayan Union Citizenship, and the Malayan Union scheme in general, were compatible with the aims and aspirations of the MCP and MPAJA. Under the "Malaya, Long Term Policy Directives- Chinese Policy" the MCP and the KMT and other illegal organisations were recognized as legal or lawful associations, unless the governor of the proposed Malayan Union declared them illegal.

The BMA also carried out the Chinese policy by granting freedom of speech and publication to the Malayan people. The prewar Registration of Societies

Ordinance was not reimposed. Cheah Boon Kheng has the impression that this policy was the result of the favourable attitude of Mountbatten towards the Chinese and the MCP.²⁰ However, as the present writer has indicated elsewhere, this policy was deliberately formulated by the inter-departmental Committee of the Colonial Office, the Foreign Office and the Malayan Planning Unit of War Office in London. The BMA carried out the Chinese policy as directed by H.M.G. as it found out the conditions were favourable. It was possible that, with this policy, the British could induce the MCP not to seize power immediately after the war or during the BMA period in Malaya.²¹ Elsewhere, in Indo-China, for example, Communists had moved to seize power by force at the end of the war.

The MCP carried out a moderate policy and let the opportunity of seizing power slip away. Not only that, they continued to cooperate with the BMA, to disband the MPAJA and surrender some of their weapons. This cooperation was possible as the British adopted a liberal policy towards the MCP and other Chinese political movements.

Part II

British Policy Towards the Chinese Community During
the British Military Administration,
September 1945-March 1946. .

During the British Military Administration, Colonel Victor Purcell became the Principal Chinese Adviser to Ralph Hone, the Chief Civil Affairs Officer. He was responsible for the implementation of the policy directives on Chinese affairs. Among British official circles, he was known as the most pro-Chinese officer and the most outspoken critic of British "pro-Malay policy." As the principal Chinese adviser, he adopted a more liberal policy towards the Chinese community in line with the Colonial Office's "Long Term Policy Directives: Chinese Policy." According to Ralph Hone, "freedom of speech, press and association was allowed in full degree and very generous treatment was accorded to the members of the Chinese Resistance Forces."²²

In line with this liberal policy, the Secretary of Chinese Affairs, did not continue his pre-war role of controlling the Chinese press. The pre-war Societies Ordinance was not re-imposed, and societies or associations were not required to be registered. Other enactments or ordinances which were used in the past to

control Chinese political activities were retained, but not put into practice. The British adopted this policy in consideration of such factors as follows:

- (a) The recognition extended by the Governor, shortly before the fall of Singapore, to the existence of Chinese parties, included the Kuomintang and the Malayan Communist Party, which were not registered according to law.
- (b) The achievements of the Resistance Forces during the period of the Japanese occupation, and the agreement made by the Supreme Allied Commander with the Anti-Japanese Army which was under the control of the Communist Anti-Japanese Union.
- (c) The intention of the Colonial Office to amend the Societies law to provide that a society was legal until declared otherwise by the Governor-in-Council.²³

As a consequence of this liberal British policy and developments during the war, the pattern of Chinese politics changed. The division between the politics of the Straits Chinese, or moderates, and the Kuomintang and the MCP or radical groups was obscured. The most noticeable features of the Chinese political scene during the BMA period were the almost complete absence of the Straits Chinese as a political body, the decline of the Kuomintang, and the emergence of the MCP as the major force in the Chinese community.

The politics of the Straits Chinese, as a group, were moribund during the BMA period. This community had

been in decline. As a result of extortion by the Japanese Military Administration, the Straits Chinese financial position had been crippled. Furthermore the professional class of this community, such as lawyers and teachers lost their sources of income as a consequence of Japanese occupation. Victor Purcell, who left Singapore via Malacca for Kuala Lumpur, on 10 October 1945 noted that "...when I [V. Purcell] talked with them [the Babas] I found their minds still obsessed with bitterness of the Japanese Terror."²⁴ According to Purcell, "a good deal of their wealth, I believe, has passed to an alien Chinese element attracted to Malacca by the gambling farms and the lures of the Black Market."²⁵ As a consequence of the Japanese occupation, the Straits Chinese no longer had strong feelings that they were a distinct Chinese group. During the "Double Tenth" celebration, Victor Purcell noted that there was "a great procession in which Babas, Kuomintang members, and [the Communist dominated] A.J.U. became for a moment, simply Chinese."²⁶

They were without political leadership. As the writer has mentioned, some of the most prominent leaders of this community such as Dr. Lim Boon Keng and Heah Joo Seng carried out an appeasement policy towards the Japanese Military Administration, and became the most important figures in the Overseas Chinese Association. They were labelled as collaborators. Others, like Lim Cheng Yan, who had served as a judge, or who had

taken posts in the Japanese Military Administration faced the same consequences. After the Japanese were defeated in the war, the OCAs collapsed and their leaders and others who served in the Japanese Military Administration went on the run to avoid the wrath of the Anti-Japanese resistance movements. Some of the Straits Chinese leaders who took refuge in India, such as Tan Cheng Lock, still had not returned to Malaya. Others, such as Lay Lian Teck, the president of the Singapore SCBA had died, and some had been rounded up and executed by the Japanese. Under these circumstances, the social and political organisation of the Straits Chinese became dormant. The Straits Chinese also were without their own press to voice their views. On top of this, the BMA was not in favour of the Straits Chinese serving as Chinese representatives in the advisory councils, as in the pre-War period. During the BMA the Straits Chinese were almost totally isolated. Their former leaders only made a comeback to the Malayan political scene after the establishment of civilian government.

During the war, the Kuomintang as a body was almost defunct. The members went into hiding from the Japanese forces. Many of their leaders and supporters were rounded up and executed by the Japanese. Some, like the Straits Chinese leaders, were forced to cooperate with the Japanese Military Administration. As a

consequence they lost their high social status and political influence among the Chinese community. During the BMA the Kuomintang and its youth wing, the San Min Chu II Youth Corps, were recognised and had representatives on the Advisory Council of Singapore. After the Chinese Consul General arrived in Singapore, the Kuomintang carried out small political activities such as staging some memorial ceremonies for the victims of the Japanese. The Chinese Chambers of Commerce were still associated with the Kuomintang and some of their leaders were also leaders of the Kuomintang. The orientation of the Kuomintang was still towards the motherland. However, R. N. Broome noted that the Kuomintang did not pose any threat to the British position in Malaya.²⁷ According to him "... the danger which led to our opposing the K.M.T. in the past has largely disappeared, and I myself see little chance of a Chinese Imperialist party gaining ascendancy in Malaya, at least for a long time."²⁸ He added that, there "may well be imperialist designs on Malaya from China itself, though I can see no danger...there until China settles her own internal troubles, which looks like being a long business."²⁹ One of the activities which connected Malaya to China, was a fund raising campaign for the reconstruction of the motherland after the war. However, according to Stephen Leong, the response from the Overseas Chinese was not comparable to the contribution collected during the national salvation period of 1937-

1941.³⁰ Some of the Kuomintang leaders were moderate, and cooperated with the BMA on certain occasions. When the GLU launched a general strike on 29 January 1946 some of the Kuomintang and Chinese Chambers of Commerce supported the government and declared that there was "no sympathy for the strike amongst business men and that shopkeepers would open their shops if they could be given protection." Consequently the GLU and the Communist activists called off the strike.³¹

The MCP emerged as a real force when Japanese rule came to an end in August 1945. It controlled the guerrillas of the MPAJA and the MPAJU which was later replaced by the New Democratic Youth League (NDYL). According to R. N. Broome, the leaders and members of these Communist organizations were young men, most of them under twenty.³² The MCP adopted a policy of cooperation with the British government at this stage as the result of the agreement signed in January 1944 between the MCP's representatives and Force 136 officers. The MCP and its youth wing, the NDYL, were recognized by the BMA and both had representatives on the Advisory Council of Singapore. Among them was Wu Tian Wang, the Singapore MCP official.

Under the liberal British policy, the MCP was able to carry out their political activities unchecked

by that authority or the Malayan police. During the post-war period, towards early 1946, the MCP was more concerned with the reorganisation of the party and continued to cooperate with the BMA. The MCP played an important role in the disbanding of the MPAJA's guerillas and avoided an armed clash with the BMA. The MCP apparently adopted a moderate policy or approach to achieve its political ends during the BMA. One of the obvious reasons for this was that the MCP was under moderate leadership. The Secretary-General himself, Loi Tek, was a British secret agent. He asserted a great influence on the MCP's Central Executive Committee and was hailed as saviour and preserver of the MCP.³³ He was one of the MCP leaders who negotiated and signed the agreement of cooperation between the MCP-SEAC in January 1944. During that time, he was called "Chang Hung." British Intelligence only realized he was Loi Tek at the end of December 1945. Loi Tek commanded great influence in the MCP. Some of the MCP's members knew Loi Tek was a traitor and the Kempetai's agent during the Japanese occupation. However, their attempts to expose the real identity of Loi Tek in September failed, as the Central Executive Committee of the MCP considered the allegation incredible. During the end of 1945 Loi Tek continued to play a role as the supreme leader of the MCP.³⁴

Loi Tek's influence within the MCP was obvious when the MCP decided to cooperate with Force 136 to

disband the MPAJA in December 1945. According to Cheah Boon Kheng, Loi Tek was in favour of the proposed disbandment of the MPAJA guerrillas but the rest of the members of the Standing Executive Committee strongly opposed it.³⁵ After holding a long negotiation with the General Officer Commanding(GOC), Malaya Command, the MPAJA leaders presented "... eight points on which they required assurances, before they were prepared to be demobilized, and among these points were the question of freedom of association and the operation of the pre-war Societies Ordinance."³⁶ To reciprocate, the GOC under SAC's authority, mentioned the substance of paragraph one, two, three, and seven of the "Malaya, Long Term Policy Directives-- Chinese Policy." It should be noted that the present writer has discussed about this in fairly precise detail elsewhere. The decision was taken based on a memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies on 9 December 1944.³⁷ The Secretary of State told the War Cabinet Committee on Malaya and Borneo that "...the organisation in question [Force 136] has had to be given certain guidance on the subject [British future plans] for the use of its agents."³⁸ It was authorised to communicate these to the MPAJA. Therefore, according to Ralph Hone, the undertaking given to the MPAJA was made without any further reference to London.³⁹

The MCP cooperated with Force 136 by disbanding the MPAJA in December 1945. However, it was discovered

that it had not cooperated fully with the British. The MCP had hidden some of its weapons. While the MPAJA was dissolved, ex-MPAJA comrades formed the Federation of Anti-Japanese Army Ex-Servicemen's Associations, with Kuala Lumpur as its headquarters. Various branches were established in Negeri Sembilan, Johore, Perak and other states. The Associations' aims were to cultivate ties of friendship among the ex-guerrillas and to help members in various fields. This organisation sponsored a newspaper, the Charn Yew Pau (Combatant's Friend) which was pro-Communist, anti-Kuomintang and anti-imperialist.⁴⁰ This organisation provided a well organized military arm for the MCP during the Communist revolt in 1948.

The MCP used the opportunity provided by liberal British policy to spread its influence into every section of the population in Malaya. It formed or led various associations, social, cultural, political, and trade unions. On 25 September 1945, the Selangor State Committee of the MCP, the MPAJU, and the MPAJA organized a Selangor State Congress of the People's Representatives. They invited all racial communities to send delegates but only the Chinese responded with enthusiasm. The Congress proposed the formation of the Selangor People's State Committee as "... a public body to express public views represented by peoples of all

nationalities"⁴¹ An Executive Committee was formed, consisting of ninety-one members. Forty five of them became members of the Working Committee. The Selangor Congress passed twenty-three resolutions which demanded that the BMA should: (1) put into effect the Atlantic Charter with regard to self government and democracy, (2) support the programme of the Malayan Communist Party, (3) realize self-government...and (4) guarantee absolute freedom of speech, press and publication.⁴²

The MCP carried out political activity by participating in the advisory councils which were set up through out the country by the BMA. The BMA gave equal treatment to the MCP and its youth wing, along with the Kuomintang and its youth wing, to avoid the appearance of taking sides with any party. Both the MCP and its youth wing had two representatives. As the MCP also controlled, directly or indirectly, the General Labour Union and the Malay Nationalist Party, which had their representatives in the Advisory Councils, the Communists dominated the councils. The Singapore Advisory Council convened a first meeting on the 14 November 1945. As the Communist or radical groups were overwhelmingly represented in the Advisory Council, V. Purcell considered it "marked an epoch in the history of Singapore."⁴³ He also noted that the Communist representatives took part during discussion on almost every topic such as on supply, trade and

industry and industry and social problems.⁴⁴ Wu Tian Wang, a Communist representative, was very critical of the status of the Council, which was not a democratically-elected legislative council, as the MCP were demanding.⁴⁵

Towards the end of 1945, the MCP carried out political activities to influence the English educated professional class and the masses. A moderate political organisation, the Malayan Democratic Union, was formed in December 1945. According to Gerald de Cruz, one of the founding members of the MDU, "the idea of the MDU was conceived by Lim Hong Bee and the MCP during the Japanese occupation."⁴⁶ Lim Hong Bee contacted Philip Hoa Lim, Lim Kean Chye and DeCruz to organize the MDU. Later John Eber was recruited to become one of the Executive Members. According to Yeo Kim Wah, the announcement of the Malayan Union scheme in October 1945, encouraged their leaders to form this organisation in the hope that a new democratic order would soon be introduced into Malaya.⁴⁷ However, de Cruz has denied the Malayan Union Scheme played any role in the formation of the MDU.⁴⁸ The political manifesto of the MDU was: self-government for Malaya within the British Commonwealth of Nations, a legislative Assembly for Malaya composed of freely elected representatives, votes for all Malayan citizens above the age of 21 years irrespective of race, sex,

religion, or property; complete freedom of person, speech and meeting; educational reform including free elementary, secondary, and technical education for all, a social security scheme including free medical services throughout Malaya; improved standard of life for all, and complete equality in the employment of Malaysians and removal of colour restrictions.⁴⁹

The MCP also made an attempt to influence the Malay community by sponsoring a radical Malay Nationalist Party . An inaugural congress was held in Ipoh between the late December 1945 and early January 1946 to form this party. According to Victor Purcell, many "shades of Malay opinion were represented,"⁵⁰ including Raja Kamaralzaman Setia Usaha Sultan Perak and Tengku Mahmud Mahayuddin (Pegawai Perkerja Pereman of Kelantan). According to Victor Purcell, the main points stressed by speakers at the congress were: the necessity of mutual respect between the Malay Nationalist Party and the Sultans, the continuing idea that Malaya belongs to the Malays but that a greater racial front incorporating other races should be created, the Malay struggle for the basic rights of the people and the realisation of their national independence, and the friendship between the Malays and Chinese which should be strengthened as the Chinese occupied a very important position in the commercial and industrial fields.⁵¹

The Malay Nationalist Party was formed with Mokhtaruddin Lasso as its first president.⁵² According to Purcell, the MCP "was taking a leading hand in the formation of the M.N.P."⁵³ Chen Tien Hua, the Head of the Perak Peoples' Association attended the congress. Other leftist leaders, including Miss Lee Kiu, were also invited to the congress. This close cooperation between the MNP and the MCP was opposed by some of the branches of the MNP, such as the Klang branch.⁵⁴ Under the MCP's policy of cooperation with the British, it avoided direct confrontation with the BMA. It let the NDYL, trade unions and other organizations challenge the Government. The major clash between the Communist-dominated organizations and the British happened on 15 February 1946. The Communists decided to call a strike, and celebrate the anniversary of the defeat of the British and the loss of Singapore.

The main reasons for the MCP's strike seem to have arisen from two factors. The first involved the long term accumulation of discontent and dissatisfaction of the the MCP members concerning hardships caused by shortages of foodstuffs, gross inflation and low wages.⁵⁵ The second was the immediate cause of the strike. Apparently the MCP decided to make use of the anniversary of the British capitulation of Singapore to the Japanese, namely 15 February as the date to register

their protest against the BMA. It also seemed the intention of the Communists was to hold mass meetings and processions for "self-humiliation", with the intent to bring the British into disrepute.

The BMA decided to ban the celebration and the strikes. A statement from the Chief of the SEAC was issued. It declared that:

Since it was established in Malaya more than five months ago, the British Military Administration has not only allowed but encouraged full freedom of speech and the Press....however [the BMA] has no intention of allowing advantage to be taken of this, nor that civil disturbances should be fomented, hatred of the Administration aroused, or the just process of the law impeded in anyway.⁵⁶

The BMA gave a warning that it intended to use its full power to suppress actions of that kind from whatever quarter they might come. However, the MCP and the trade unions, undeterred by the warning, continued to make preparations for a stoppage of work and the holding of a procession. Police took action to disperse a procession in Singapore on 15 February. They were attacked by the crowd and were forced to open fire; two people were killed.⁵⁷ In Labis, Johore, police were also attacked by the crowd and forced to open fire; fifteen people were killed. The clash with the police continued when a demonstration was held at Mersing to express

sympathy with the victims of the Labis incident. The Police also took action by arresting ten Chinese agitators who were ordered to be deported to China under the Banishment Ordinance. However, this order was not carried out during the BMA.

The BMA-MCP relationship seemed to deteriorate rapidly when the Military Administration approached its end. The liberal BMA policy towards the MCP was replaced by more repressive measures to control Communist militancy. The Malayan Police had begun to press the British government and the BMA for more power to suppress or control Communist political activity after the general strike.

R. Onraet, the police adviser to the BMA urged the Colonial Office and the Secretary of State for the Colonies to change the liberal policy. First, he opposed the proposed policy which would allow "societies and counter societies to exist without registration."⁵⁸ According to Onraet, there were grave dangers in the growth of all such societies "...as their growth can only be checked after the society proves itself to have dangerous or unlawful objects."⁵⁹ Second, he opposed the Banishment Enactment, which was retained in theory, but was not being put into practice. Onraet commented adversely on the appointment of the MCP or other

extremist organizations' representatives on the Advisory Councils. He also opposed the freedom of the press; according to him, the Chinese press "is more afraid of the extremists than it is of the government..." and as a result the Chinese press had become "the mouth-piece of the extremist."⁶⁰

The Colonial Office defended its Chinese policy as being a result of the British-Chinese resistance forces cooperation during the Japanese occupation. It seemed that the British government had made a promise to give political concessions as a reward for the MCP cooperation in fighting against the Japanese forces. R. Onraet, who later resigned and returned to London, criticized the government's action.⁶¹ He said, it "was perhaps of military advantage to back the [Communists] Guerrillas, but need...[sic] we make them promises for the future?"⁶² He added, and "if we did should we not analyse the spirit of the promise-maker and the twisted interpretation made of it by the elements to whom the promise was made?"⁶³ He accused Victor Purcell "of giving wrong advice" on a new policy which "favoured the return in strength of old subversive forces that had once caused bloodshed in Malaya."⁶⁴

As a consequence of the conflict between the Chinese radical movements and the BMA, the British began to distrust and become disillusioned with the Chinese

community in general. However, British policy changed gradually until the civilian government replaced the BMA. The British government faced strong opposition to the Malayan Union policy, along with a lack of interest among the Chinese community towards the scheme, so the British abandoned their Chinese policy and the Union scheme and started to become more pro-Malay.

After the establishment of the Malayan Union, the British government began to ignore the radical groups in their planning for future constitutional development in Malaya. The MCP also had begun to dissociate themselves by not taking part in the government bodies as the BMA came to an end.

Part III

Malayan Union Policy and the Chinese Reaction

On 10 October 1945 G. H. Hall, who replaced Oliver Stanley as the Secretary of State for the Colonies, mentioned the Malayan Union scheme in a brief announcement in the House of Commons. On the following day, Sir Harold MacMichael as a Special Representative of His Majesty's Government, arrived in Malaya to conclude a new treaty with every ruler, or Malay Sultan, in the Malay States. Under the new treaty each Sultan would

cede full jurisdiction to H.M.G. A few days after he arrived, Harold MacMichael visited them to explain the new constitution and to secure their agreement to this. His mission was completed on 25 December 1945, and he returned to Britain a few days later.

After the acquisition of full sovereignty by the Crown, the Colonial Office issued the first White Paper on 22 January 1946 which described in more detail the Malayan Union scheme. On the same day the Straits Settlements (Repeal) Bill was introduced in Parliament to pass the legislation necessary for the new constitutional proposal. On 30 March, the British government announced that the implementation of the Malayan Union citizenship had been delayed, but proceeded to promulgate the other constitutional proposals. On 1 April Gent was installed as a Governor of the Malayan Union and a civil government replaced the BMA. As planned, Singapore formed a separate entity with its own Governor. Thus Malaya came under direct control of the Secretary of State for the Colonies. As the Crown had direct jurisdiction under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1890, the Crown could legislate by the means of Orders in Council. The first legislation was to give legal protection to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, members of the Colonial Office, the War Office and the staff of the Crown Agents, for their actions when they used the various trust funds belonging to various Malay States and the other

governmental and non-governmental bodies.⁶⁵ As the present writer has indicated elsewhere this action solved the problem of the London funds of the Malay sultans.

After the solution of the Malayan fund problem Gent apparently was more flexible on Chinese policy and the constitutional arrangements for Malaya. After just one month, Gent decided to modify the Union policy and planned a federal policy which reflected almost a revival of the so-called pro-Malay policy of prewar years. According to Cheah Boon Kheng, one of the considerations which led to this development was British disillusionment with the MCP during the BMA and "the less than total enthusiasm of the Chinese for the Malayan Union policy."⁶⁶ After the announcement of the Malayan Union in London on 22 January 1946, the Chinese did not come forward to support the scheme, as had been expected by the government. Not a single Chinese newspaper published the whole text of the White Paper.⁶⁷ The Chinese press did not comment on the Malayan Union proposal until 31 January 1946. According to the SEAC Director of Intelligence reports, the initial Chinese attitude was, "completely apathetic."⁶⁸ The Chinese were more preoccupied with economic problems and civil disturbances during that time. To the majority of the Chinese the new constitutional proposals "meant little or nothing to them, except where they affect their own personal

affairs."⁶⁹ Among the politically conscious Chinese, opinions were divided. The Kuomintang and China-born Chinese remained generally unenthusiastic about the White Paper.⁷⁰ Their political loyalty was still to China. To them acceptance of Malayan Union citizenship raised a problem of nationality status as they were Chinese nationals. According to Chung Hwa, the Chinese newspaper, "...If we [the Chinese] want to have rights of citizenship in Malaya, we must either openly declare or quietly consent that we are separated from our mother country."⁷¹ It seemed ridiculous for the Chinese to accept Malayan Union citizenship if they needed to renounce their Chinese nationality. Some of the Chinese newspapers such as the Modern Daily, also opposed the retention of the Malay Sultans as "traditional and spiritual leaders under the Union."⁷² The Chung Hwa also commented that the Sultans of the Malay States only represented their own individual interests. This newspaper added that the future of democracy would be greatly affected by the retention of the Malay Sultans. The Sin Min Chu on 24 January 1946 strongly criticized the Union scheme as it far from enhanced the political status of the Malayan people: it only "consolidated Britain's hold on Malaya and Singapore."⁷³ However, the Hua Ch'iao welcomed the citizenship proposals.⁷⁴

The proposed Malayan Union scheme almost fulfilled the demands and aspirations of the Straits

Chinese or moderate Chinese groups. However, leaders like Lim Cheng Yan, Heah Joo Seng and Tan Cheng Lock did not come forward to fully support this policy. As the writer has mentioned, the Straits Chinese leaders seemed to have gone into hiding, or were not in Malaya during that time. This was the most obvious reason for Chinese lack of support for the Union policy.

The Straits Chinese came to defend the Union policy a bit too late. On 2 April 1946, Tan Cheng Lock wholeheartedly welcomed the Malaya Union policy. He said that the Chinese, "...who intend to settle permanently in this country welcome the opportunity to acquire the rights of citizenship, so that they may completely identify themselves with Malaya and be loyal and faithful to the land of their adoption, to which they are prepared to give their undivided allegiance."⁷⁵ He really hoped that HMG "...being convinced of the rightness and justice of its Malayan policy [and] will not beat a retreat in the teeth of the opposition of the old-fashioned and ultra conservative diehards, who desire to sabotage the Union plan."⁷⁶ However, Gent, in his reply to Tan Cheng Lock mentioned that a change in the Union policy was desirable.⁷⁷

The MCP and radical movements felt there was lack of progressive proposals. Instead of giving self-

government to the Malayan people, Malaya was being reduced to being a Crown colony. To support the Union meant supporting the revival of British imperialism. The Communists also opposed the separation of Singapore from mainland Malaya, and the citizenship proposals, which did not, according to them correspond with legitimate rights.⁷⁸ The MCP demanded the adoption of "Democratic Principles" for the establishment of a Pan-Malaya Unified Self-Government, with Singapore as the centre of control administratively and commercially, the formulation of a democratic constitution, the conferring of citizenship rights to all domiciled persons above eighteen years of age, and the granting of equal rights to vote, equality in administration, and equal opportunity to participate in social and economic reconstruction.⁷⁹

The MDU which was sponsored by the MCP, considered the White Paper a "progressive document."⁸⁰ But this body also demanded self-government within the Commonwealth, a freely-elected legislative assembly, voting rights for all Malayan citizens above twenty-one years of age, and complete equality in the employment of Malaysians.⁸¹ The MDU adopted a moderate line towards the Malayan Union scheme, as this organization consisted mainly of English educated and professional classes.

While Chinese reactions were divided, the majority of Malays were united in opposition to the scheme. To them, as J. Allen put it, the Malayan Union scheme was "an earthquake."⁸² The Malays who faced an uncertain future during the MCP-BMA period cooperation felt even more vulnerable with the introduction of the Malayan Union policy. Their fears focussed on two issues: the transfer of full power and jurisdiction to the Crown and the creation of Malayan Union citizenship which offered equal status to Chinese and other non-Malays. After the announcement of the White Paper, the Malay press strongly criticized the Malayan Union scheme. The Utusan Melayu, on 24 January described the White Paper as "a blow for the Malay Rulers and their subjects."⁸³ According to this newspaper, the Rulers had descended from the throne to the pulpit. Another newspaper, the Majlis bitterly commented on the citizenship proposal which seriously compromised the rights of the Malays and reduced their status, more or less to "...the Red Indians in North America and the aborigines in Australia."⁸⁴ The Seruan Ra'ayat, on 25 January described the citizenship proposals as "an act of injustice to the Malays, the native inhabitants of Malaya."⁸⁵ In response to the Malayan Union scheme, the Malays revived such pre-war states associations as Persatuan Melayu Johore and Persatuan Melayu Selangor. On 3 January 1946 Dato Onn Jaafar formed the Pergerakan Melayu Semanjung Johore with the aim of uniting the Malays, and defending their

rights and privileges through cooperation with the Government and among the Malays themselves.⁸⁶ At first the Malays also criticized their own Rulers, for example in Johore, where the Sultan voluntarily signed the MacMicheal Agreement. However, the Sultans and their subjects closed ranks at a later period to protest against the British government. The Kedah ruler revealed that he was forced to sign the agreement by Harold MacMichael. Thus the validity of the Agreement could be disputed or was in doubt, at least.

The Malays' opposition to the Union was later coordinated in the Pan-Malayan Congress on 1 March 1946. The Congress later formed the United Malay National Organization with Dato Onn Jaafar as the President. Almost all the Malay associations came under UMNO, except the Malay Nationalist Party which supported the union government.

The British ex-Malayan Civil Services Officials Opposition to the Union Policy

The Malayan Union policy was not only opposed by the Malays but by their supporters in London as well. They were former British officials who had served in Malaya. Some of them were known as the 'Old Stagers' who were biased towards the Malays. After the announcement of

the Union policy, they turned up to fight for the Malay cause, and, indirectly, for British interests in the Far East. Among them were Richard Winstedt, Frank Swettenham, George Maxwell and Sir Cecil Clementi. On 13 and 14 February 1946 Maxwell criticized the White Paper and the planners who, in his view, had little knowledge of Malaya and its people.⁸⁷ He also criticized the planners for ignoring the treaties and other obligations that the British government had to the Malay Rulers and their subjects. His criticism focussed the attack mainly on the citizenship proposals and the Union.

Sir R. Winstedt was violently opposed to the Union policy, after the scheme was announced by the Secretary of State in October 1945.⁸⁸ In his article which was published in The Straits Times on 15 November 1945, he attacked both the policy and the means of bringing it into effect. He regarded the method used as brutal and dictatorial and said that the policy meant "the extinction of the Malay in political life."⁸⁹ He believed that Chinese would swamp the Malay. Sir Cecil Clementi, whom the Chinese found to be the most unsympathetic Governor, adopted a similar view. He was very concerned for the Malays. He feared that any admission of Chinese and Indians to political rights in Malaya would destroy British-Malay friendship and drive the Malays into violent opposition which would probably link with the uprisings in Indonesia.⁹⁰

In response to the initial opposition to the Union policy, the Secretary of State for the Colonies decided to call a meeting with former British officials, and others who were concerned with the affairs of Malaya. The Colonial Office noted that the opposition to the scheme was flawed.⁹¹ Some of the ex-MCS did not offer any alternatives to the Union policy, other than a return to the old system. "This", according to Bourdillon, "amounts to standing still."⁹² He added "events will not [stand still]." He proposed that the Secretary of State defend the Union policy by pointing out that "the claims of Chinese and Indians, support[ed] by the Chinese Nationalist government and the Indian nationalists, will become increasingly strong and increasingly impossible to resist."⁹³ On the other hand he said, "the Malay will become increasingly dependent on the continuence of British protection." He added, this "position would inevitably lead to an upheaval, and in the upheaval it would be the Malays who would go under."⁹⁴

A meeting was held at the Colonial Office on 26 February 1946, and Creech Jones acted as chairman. It was attended by Sir George Gater, and colonial officials including Gent, Paskin and Lloyd. Among the ex-MCS who were present were F. Swettenham, Cecil Clementi and R. Winstedt, others included A. S. Haynes, E. Hake and also,

Capt. L. Gammans, a Labour M.P. According to Creech Jones, the Malayan Union policy was one to commend itself to the people of Malaya ; it satisfied the aspirations of all involved and won the favourable comment of world opinion.⁹⁵ He said that modifications to the Union policy were being made and he wanted to find out the feelings of people interested in Malayan affairs.

Many of the ex-MCS were not to be swayed, and were critical of the Citizenship schemes and the transfer of the jurisdiction of the Malay Rulers to the Crown. Their attitude towards the Chinese in Malaya was hostile. Cecil Clementi said that the Chinese-born were a menace, hostile to the Malays and not good citizens.⁹⁶ He also distrusted the Kuomintang, which in his opinion had the intention of ousting the Europeans in Asia. Capt. Gammans shared the same views. He said citizenship was "far too easy" and "there were no safeguards for the Malay Rulers."⁹⁷ He added that "the White Paper will hand over Malaya to China."⁹⁸

Faced with opposition to the Union, the Colonial Office delayed implementing the Malayan Union citizenship scheme. However, as has been mentioned, the Malayan Union was established by the British government on 1 April 1946. The Malay Rulers and the followers of UMNO

boycotted the installation of the Governor and the Governor General for British Southeast Asia.

As anti-Malayan Union agitation became intense and widespread, Gent changed his mind and urged the Secretary of State to modify the Union policy. In his letter on 4 May Gent pointed out that the value of the policy depended on the cooperation with the Malays and urged HMG to be prepared to accept federal proposals.⁹⁹ His recommendation was based on his discussion with the Malayan Security Services which considered that the "very serious likelihood of organised and widespread non-cooperation and disorder on the part of the Malay people" would assist the Malayan Communist Party and Indonesian political organizations.¹⁰⁰ The Acting Director of the Malayan Security Service, in his report for the month of April, warned that the passive resistance of the Malays would turn into violence and bloodshed if their demands were ignored. The MNP had already urged the Malays to denounce the policy of moderation advocated by Dato Onn and the Sultans and to join the Pan-Indonesian campaign to oust the British. Gent also pointed out that the MCP would take any opportunity to disturb the peace to forward its aim of overthrowing the British Malayan government.¹⁰¹

It seems that the British government not only feared a direct threat from Dato Onn and his Malay

followers and the ex-MCS "but there was also the indirect threat of what might happen if these leaders lost the battle they were fighting along purely constitutional lines which [would] decide the final issue."¹⁰² The Malays might turn to Indonesia for leadership. The British would not be able to win the support of the Chinese who had shown a lack of interest in the Union policy, and the MCP had already begun to confront the British. It seemed there was only one choice for the British and that was to win over the moderate Malays and revive the so-called pro-Malay policy of the pre-war period. According to MacDonald, the Governor-General of British Southeast Asia, Britain needed to reach an agreement with the Malays in order to maintain their leadership in the Far East.¹⁰³ In his view, if the Britain failed to reach an agreement:

...we shall begin to lose acceptance of our leadership by local peoples, and a process of our being at each stage [a] bit behind local political opinions (such as has been so unfortunate in the history of the Indian problem) will start. We must, of course, keep in mind that there are powerful political groupings in Asia which are ready to exploit any weakening of our position i. e. Indian nationalists and Imperialism, Chinese Imperialism and especially Pan Malayan Movement led by Indonesians.¹⁰⁴

On 2 June, Gent and MacDonald began to hold an informal meeting with the Malay Sultans to discuss new

constitutional proposals for Malaya. They also held discussions with Dato Onn on 19 June 1946. An Anglo-Malay Working Committee was formed on 25 July, consisting of representatives of the British government, of the Malay Rulers, and of UMNO, to negotiate and formulate a new constitutional proposal.

The Working Committee adopted the following principles as the basis of its discussion:

- (a) that there should be a strong central government to ensure the economical and effective administration of all matters of importance to the welfare and progress of the country as a whole;
- (b) that the individuality of each of the Malay States and of the Settlements should be clearly expressed and maintained;
- (c) that the new arrangements should, on a long view, offer the means and prospects of development in the direction of ultimate self-government;
- (d) that, with a view to the establishment of broad-based institutions necessary for principle (c) to become effective, a common form of citizenship should be introduced which would enable political rights to be extended to all those who regard Malaya as their real home and as the object of their loyalty;
- (e) that, as these States are Malay States ruled by Your Highnesses, the subjects of Your Highnesses have no alternative allegiance, or other country which they can regard as their homeland, and they occupy a special position and possess rights which must be safeguarded.¹⁰⁵

The Constitutional negotiations between the British and the Malays, formally began in the early August and continued until November 1946.¹⁰⁶ The Working Committee Reports, which contained the drafts of the proposed Federation Agreements, received the conditional approval of HMG on 11 December. It did not receive full approval until it was examined by the Consultative Committee, which was appointed by the Governor and contained representatives of the non-Malays. However, the final draft of the Federation Agreement, which in effect became the Constitution of the Federation of Malaya, was mainly based on the original Report of the Working Committee.

The British government conceded to Malay demands by returning the internal sovereignty of the Malay Sultans, and they recognized the special position of the Malay and modified the unpopular Citizenship scheme. The Malays in return agreed to British demands for a strong central government and external sovereignty on external affairs and defence. The new constitution adopted a new name, the Federation of Malaya, with a High Commissioner as the head of government.

With the introduction of the Federal policy came a change in British policy towards the Chinese community. The most important part of the previously formulated, "Long Term Policy Directives-Chinese Policy."

(the Malayan citizenship proposals) was not implemented. However, Edward Gent implemented another part of the policy regarding the proposals on the Societies Ordinance. He did this by publishing a Bill on 27 July 1947 which gave an option for societies to register and put themselves under the control of the Registrar of Societies. Those Societies which chose not to register would not be under the control of the Registrar. According to W. Blythe, despite strong opposition from the Malayan Union Advisory Council and the Singapore government, Gent was not prepared to abandon it.¹⁰⁷ Thus Gent maintained one of the commitments of the British government to the MCP and Kuomintang. This meant that under the Federation policy the Chinese community would be encouraged to return to foreign or China-based politics, and maintain their status as aliens.

Conclusion

The postwar period, up until the establishment of the civil government of the Malayan Union, marked the beginning and end of British liberal policy towards the Chinese community in Malaya. The BMA adopted a liberal policy based on the Colonial Office's "Long Term Policy Directives: Chinese Policy" and also the intentions of creating of the Malayan Union citizenship. Under the liberal policy, control over Chinese political activities

was not imposed. The Registration of Societies Ordinance, the Banishment Ordinance, and other means to curb Chinese political activities in the pre-war period, were not put into practice during the BMA. The Chinese Secretariat relaxed their control on the Chinese press. In theory the BMA allowed the fullest freedom of speech, publication and association, in contrast to pre-war times. Based on the "Long Term Policy Directives: Chinese Policy", the Kuomintang and the MCP and other illegal organizations were treated as legal. As a result, the power of the Malayan police to check and control Chinese political activities was restricted or curbed.

Apparently in response to this liberal British policy, or for other reasons, the MCP continued to cooperate with the BMA and adopted constitutional means in their political struggle during this period. However, BMA-Communist relations deteriorated rapidly in the middle of February 1946, as a consequence of a general strike launched by pro-Communist organizations. 15 February marked the beginning of a British distrust of the MCP and the reintroduction of the pre-war measures to curb radical political or labour movements. These events also changed the attitude of Victor Purcell, the planner and the Principal Adviser for Chinese Affairs towards the MCP. He was convinced that no compromise could be made with the MCP and suggested that the BMA adopt a tough policy.¹⁰⁸

British liberal policy indirectly encouraged the growth of the political activities of radical movements, such the MCP, MDU and MNP and China oriented movements, such as the Kuomintang. The Straits Chinese and other moderate Chinese leaders failed to respond to the new developments during the BMA. The Malayan Union proposals which were announced during the BMA were favourable to and would benefit, many of the Chinese. However, the proposals had not aroused sufficient interest among the Chinese. Some supported the principle of equality for all citizens but were sceptical about choosing to become Malayan Union Citizens as they were still proud of maintaining their status as Chinese nationals. Others, such as the MCP, regarded the Malayan Union policy as promoting British imperialism in Malaya.

Unlike the Chinese, most Malays were united in opposing the Malayan Union scheme. Under the leadership of the Sultans, Dato Onn and UMNO, the Malays pressed the British government to return the sovereignty, and their rights as sons of the soil to them. The former British MCS also strongly supported the Malay and opposed the Union policy. As the Malayan Union policy failed to win support and cooperation from the Chinese and was opposed by the Malays, Edward Gent submitted his recommendations to modify the plan in May 1946. The British decided to work closely with the moderate Malays

under the Sultans and UMNO. The radical Chinese whose aims were to overthrow the British government in Malaya and other Chinese who were China-oriented, were not consulted during the formulation of the new constitution. The final result was a Federation scheme which reflected almost a revival of the pro-Malay policy of the pre-war period.

Notes

1. Cheah Boon Kheng, Red Star Over Malaya, Singapore University Press, Singapore, Second Edition 1987, p. 149.
2. Cited ibid.
3. Cited ibid., p. 155.
4. Oliver Stanley to Lord Louis Mountbatten, 13 June 1944, in CO 825/42/ 55104/i.
5. Lois Mountbatten to Oliver Stanley, 29 July 1944, in CO 825/42/ 55104/i.
6. Ibid.
7. Minutes by Monson and edited by J.J.Paskin 18 February 1944, in CO 825/42/ 55104/i.
8. Ibid.
9. Louis Mountbatten to Oliver Stanley, 6 September 1944. in CO 825/42/55104/1
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Cited Cheah Boon Kheng, Red Star Over Malaya, op.cit., p. 163.
13. Ibid., p. 154.
14. Louis Mountbatten to Oliver Stanley, 6 September 1944, in CO 825/42/55104/1.
15. Cheah Boon Kheng, Red Star Over Malaya...op.cit., p. 155.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., p. 161.
18. A fairly detailed description of Sino-Malay conflict is to be found in ibid., pp. 195- 240.
19. From Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia To Foreign Office (3 September 1945), "Aims of [the] Communist Party in Malaya", in CO 273/675.

20. Cheah Boon Kheng, Red Star Over Malaya, ..op.cit., p. 242.
21. An explanation on the MCP's policy during this period is found in, C. B. McLane, op.cit., pp. 303-335.
22. "Report on The British Military Administration of Malaya by H. R. Hone", 1947, in CO 717/152/52152, p.38.
23. Ibid.
24. "Malaya's Political Climate II, Further Barometer Readings Periods", 1-19 October 1945. in WO 203/5302.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. "Chinese Political Parties in Malaya by Col. R.N.Broome, 1.12.45, in WO 203/5302.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Stephen Leong, op.cit., p. 814.
31. V. Purcell, The Chinese in Malaya, ...op.cit., p. 272.
32. "Chinese Political Parties in Malaya " by R.N. Broome, 1 December 1945, in WO 203/5302
33. Cheah Boon Kheng, Red Star Over Malaya...op.cit., p. 244.
34. Anthony Short, op.cit., p. 39.
35. Cheah Boon Kheng, Red Star Over Malaya... op.cit., p.258.
36. Ralph Hone to F. Donnison, 5 May 1949, in CAB 101/66.
37. War Cabinet Committee On Malaya And Borneo, "Constitutional Policy in Malaya", C.M.B. (44)12, December 1944, in CAB 98/41.
38. Ibid.

39. Ralph Hone to F. Donnision, 5 May 1954, in CAB 101/66.
40. Cheah Boon Kheng, Red Star Over Malaya... op.cit., p. 260.
41. Ibid., p. 251.
42. Ibid.
43. Cited Cheah Boon Kheng, Red Star ... op.cit., p. 257.
44. Ibid., p.258.
45. Ibid.
46. G.de Cruz to the Editor of the Journal of Southeast Asian Studies , in JSAS, Vol.1, No.1, March 1970, p.123.
47. Cited ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Gordon P. Means, Malaysian Politics, University of London Press, 1970, pp. 82-83.
50. "Malaya's political Climate VI, Period 21 December to 7 January 1946, in WO 203/5302.
51. Ibid.
52. Moktaruddin Lasso was a Moscow-trained Communist, the leader of the Malay section of the MPAJA, and a member of the MCP. See Cheah Boon Kheng, Red Star Over Malaya... op.cit., second edition, p. 281.
53. "Malaya's political Climate VI, period December 21st to January 7th, 1946, in WO 203/5302.
54. Ibid.
55. Cheah Boon Kheng, Red Star Over Malaya... op.cit., p. 244.
56. "Report on The British Military Administration of Malaya by H. R. Hone", 1947, in CO 717/152/52152
57. Ibid.
58. R. Onraet to Chief Civil Affairs Officer of the BMA (R. Hone), 25 February 1946, in CO 273/675.
59. Ibid.

60. Ibid.
61. R. Onraet to Thomas Lloyd, undated, (received by the Colonial Office on 3 March, 1947), in CO 273/675.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. R. Onraet to Thomas Lloyd, 19 August 1946, in CO 273/675.
65. See Chapter three. See also, Malayan Union Ordinance No. 1 of 1946, in Malayan Union, Ordinances Passed During The Year 1946, Published by Authority.
66. Cheah Boon Kheng, Red Star Over Malaya... op.cit., p. 290.
67. Albert Lau Khong Hwa, "The Politics of Union and Citizenship: The Evolution of British Constitutional Policy Towards Malaya and Singapore, 1942-1948", Ph.D. Thesis, SOAS, University of London, 1986, p. 149.
68. Cited ibid., p. 150.
69. Ibid., p. 151.
70. Ibid.
71. Cited ibid.
72. Cited ibid.
73. Cited Cheah Boon Kheng, op.cit., p. 288.
74. Ibid.
75. Tan Cheng Lock, Malayan Problems...op.cit., p. 118.
76. Ibid. p. 120.
77. Ibid., p. 113.
78. Albert Lau, " The Politics of Union...", Ph.D. thesis, p. 154.
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid., p. 155.
81. Ibid.

82. J. de Allen, op.cit., p.vi (preface).
83. Cited Albert Lau Khong Hwa, "The Politics of Union...", Ph.D. Thesis, p. 156.
84. Cited ibid.
85. Cited Cheah Boon Kheng, Red Star Over Malaya... op.cit., p. 283.
86. Ibid., p. 284.
87. Albert Lau Khong Hwa, "The Politics of Union...", Ph.D. Thesis, pp. 163-164. See also, George Maxwell to L. Gammans, 18 February, 1946, and "Some General Notes For the Secretary of State's Talk\$ [sic] with Prominent Ex-Malayans," 22 February 1946, in CO 273/676/50823/35.
88. "Some General Notes For the Secretary of State..." in CO 273/676/50823/35.
89. Ibid.
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid.
93. Ibid.
94. Ibid.
95. "Notes of a Discussion at the Colonial Office on 26th February, 1946, on the White Paper on Malayan Union" ,in CO 273/676/50823/35.
96. Ibid. See also, "Statement Made By Sir Cecil Clementi at a Colonial Office Conference concerning Parliamentary Command Paper No.6724...in CO 273/676/50823/35.
97. "Notes of a Discussion at the Colonial Office on 26 February" 1946",in CO 273/676/50823/35.
98. Ibid.
99. Albert Lau Khong Hwa, "The Politics of Union...", Ph.D. Thesis, p. 182.
100. Ibid.
101. Ibid., p. 185.

102. J. de Allen, op.cit., p. 57.
103. Albert Lau Khong Hwa, "The Politics of Union...",
Ph.D. Thesis, p.188.
104. Cited ibid.
105. Federation of Malaya, Summary of Revised
Constitutional Proposals, CMD. 7171, HMSO, 1947, p.
3.
106. Albert Lau Khong Hwa, "The Politics of Union...",
Ph.D. Thesis, pp. 176-241.
107. Wilfred Blythe, op.cit., p. 355-356.
108. Cheah Boon Kheng, Red Star Over Malaya... op.cit.,
p. 265.

CHAPTER V

Chinese Political Agitation against the Federal Proposals and the Emergency, 1947-1948

The response of the Chinese community to the Federal policy was predictably hostile. Apprehensive about their political future, they began a vigorous campaign and agitated against this policy. Consequently the Malayan Communist Party launched an armed revolt, officially known as the "Emergency." A few months later the Chinese and other non-Malays in Penang formed a movement for the secession of Penang from the Federation of Malaya. Faced with these unprecedented demands and opposition, the British made another attempt for speeding up the solution of the Chinese problem.

Part I

The Malayan Chinese Anti-Federation Agitation

In the first three months of civil Government in Malaya, the Chinese community generally appeared to be indifferent to the constitutional developments under the Malayan Union scheme. The MCP continued to follow its moderate line in the struggle against the colonial power. According to the Malayan Security Services, Political

Intelligence Journal (PIJ), the MCP's political activities up to 30 April 1946 had been "confined to reorganization, to the mobilisation of Civic Rights associations and to protests against the enforcement of the Sedition and Banishment Ordinance and in particular against the conviction of Chu Kau, a Johore Anti-Japanese Army leader sentenced to death for murder."¹ However, the MCP also made an attempt to be reconciled to the government by replacing convicted leaders, such as those in Singapore, with new men of local birth. The MCP actually expected to be recognised officially and given representation.² The only gain it got from the government was an invitation for several ex-members of the anti-Japanese army, including Chin Ping and Lau Ma, to attend the London Victory Parade in June. The British government later awarded Chin Peng, the MCP leader, an Order of the British Empire (OBE) for his distinguished record with the Anti-Japanese Forces (AJF).

On 1 May 1946 the MCP and the Malayan General Labour Union organized the Labour Day celebrations, which were described by the PIJ as a "a failure to an extent but a success in discipline."³ The organisers made an attempt to "make the best possible propaganda use of the celebrations in order to regain the prestige which they had lost after the repressive action been taken against them during the last few months."⁴ Some of their

speeches and pamphlets criticized the British imperialists, while others mentioned the fact that the Labour government used the most fearful methods to suppress the people, like those used by the Conservative Party, and that the racial emancipation movement and the proletarian revolution were inseparable. They also mentioned maladministration of the BMA and the reimposition of the reactionary policy of colonial rule, which had brought about the bankruptcy of the propertied class and unemployment among the workers as well as widespread famine.⁵ However, the MCP and GLU avoided clashes with authorities and according to PIJ, reports "of real intimidation were, however, negligible, both before the celebration and on the actual day."⁶

In the meantime the arrival of Chinese consular officials in Singapore, Kuala Lumpur and Penang had stimulated the Kuomintang to revive activity and recover its lost prestige and popularity among the Chinese community. It ran a newspaper, the Min Pao, and also attempted to develop its youth wing, the San Min Chu I Youth Corps throughout the country. The Kuomintang and Chinese consular officials seemed to carry out a policy of cooperation with the local government but the PIJ warned the government that "their motives must be viewed with a certain amount of scepticism."⁷ During the May Day celebrations the Kuomintang and its youth wing and Chinese Chamber of Commerce (under the leadership of Tan

Kah Kee) were invited to participate, but decided not to take part.

In April 1946 a branch of a new Chinese party, the Chinese Democratic League, was opened in Singapore by Hu Siu Yue. The CDL had its Headquarters in Hong Kong. According to PIJ, the importance of this new political party in Malaya would lie in its appeal to the centre and to the moderate wings of both the Malayan Communist Party and the Kuomintang and in particular in its strong antipathy towards extremists of the latter.⁸ The general policy of this party was "democracy and Unity for China," and "regarding Malaya, its policy [was] to consolidate democratic unity in China to propagate democratic development of the people of the Southern Regions and to fight for the early realisation of democratic policies."⁹

Hu Yit Tse, the leader of the CDL in Singapore, mentioned that there would be "no interference with Malayan politics."¹⁰ However, PIJ suspected the real intention of this organization in Malaya. According to the PIJ in "actual fact the C.D.L. will almost certainly align itself with the M.D.U. and the M.C.P. against the so-called 'Fascist Remnants' among the British and K.M.T."¹¹ Up to 15 May 1946, the CDL had set up 3 branches in Singapore, Penang and Kuala Lumpur. According to the PIJ the CDL in Malaya would, "probably

receive the backing of Tan Kah Kee and perhaps of Au Boon How, and other business magnets."¹² One of the organisers in Singapore was Li Tiet Min, who was a secretary to Tan Kah Kee. The Penang sub-branch of the CDL was also formed after a visit coinciding with that of Tan Kah Kee.

Towards June 1946, the colonial government was under strong pressure to change its Malayan Union policy. The British government began to hold discussions with the Malay Sultans and the representatives of UMNO regarding constitutional matters. The Malayan public was kept in the dark, as the discussion was held in the utmost secrecy. However, the Chinese envisaged that there would be no changes in the Malayan Union policy and came out in support of Malayan Union citizenship proposals in a mass meeting which was held in Kuala Lumpur by the representatives of forty-two Chinese associations and guilds.¹³ As soon as the Colonial Office made known its intention to replace the Malayan Union with a new constitution for Malaya, the Chinese community in Malacca under both Tan Cheng Lock and Goh Chee Yan, the president of the Malacca Chamber of Commerce, made an appeal to the British government to consult all sections of Malayan opinion before arriving at a final decision on this vital matter "affecting the welfare and interests of all and everyone of different communities in this country."¹⁴

The MCP, according to Yeo Kim Wah, apparently realized that the convening of the Anglo-Malay Working Committee was likely to lead to a British volte-face on the constitutional question.¹⁵ The British government might be forced to change the Malayan Union scheme and adopt a constitution which would be likely to be more restrictive for the non-Malays. The MCP organized a 20,000 strong rally at Farrer Park in Singapore in late September to demand a self-governing Malaya in which all communities would enjoy equal rights.¹⁶ Meanwhile Tan Cheng Lock warned that if they were presented with a fait accompli, they would mount "...a campaign of passive resistance and non-cooperation with the government, which would be unfortunate and disastrous to the country as a whole."¹⁷

It took almost six months for the Anglo-Malay Working Committee to produce their report. In November 1946, MacDonald brought the report to London for Whitehall's approval. About this time, the MCP, the MDU, the MNP and Tan Cheng Lock had decided to form a united front to oppose the constitutional proposals. According to Yeo Kim Wah there were several opinions on the initiative to form a united front.¹⁸ A leader of the MDU attributed it to John Eber and Lim Kean Chye, but Gerald de Cruz, who was also one of the MDU leaders, was of the opinion that it was an MCP initiative.

Initially, a meeting was held on 17 November to discuss the formation of a united front. It was attended by two MCP representatives, (Liew Yit Fun and Chai Pek Siang), two representatives of the MNP (Ahmad Boesteman and Musa Ahmad), one representative of the Communist controlled newspaper, Democrat, (Gerald de Cruz), and two non-Malay leaders (H.B. Talalla and Khoo Teik Ee). The meeting adopted three principles which were suggested by Tan Cheng Lock as basic to the coalition's programme.¹⁹

After the meeting reached an agreement to form the Pan-Malayan Council of Joint Action, de Cruz, as a representative, went to see Tan Cheng Lock and invite him to lead this coalition. On 14 December, Tan Cheng Lock and John Eber jointly sponsored the Council of Joint Action (CJA) in Singapore. It consisted of various organizations from right to left wing but mostly of Communist-led organizations. Among others, there were the MDU, MNP, MIC, SCBA, the General Labour Union (which later became the Singapore Federation of Trade Unions and the Pan Malayan Federation of Trade Unions), the Singapore Womens' Federation and the Peasants' Union. The SCBA withdrew from the coalition as it realized it was dominated by the left wing.

The CJA made it known that its intention was to negotiate with the government in order to formulate a constitution which was based on the three principles:

- (a) A united Malaya inclusive of Singapore,
- (b) Responsible self-government through a fully central legislature for the whole of Malaya.
- (c) Equal citizenship rights for all making Malaya their permanent home and object of their undivided loyalty.²⁰

The MCP did not join the CJA; however, its youth-wing, the Malayan New Democratic Youth League became a member of the coalition on 22 December. Other Communist dominated organizations, such as the ex-MPAJA Comrades Association, also joined this coalition which was later renamed the Pan Malayan Council of Joint Action (PMCJA). Although the MCP was not a member, it could control the MPAJA through its contact organizations. Tan Cheng Lock was even elected as a chairman of the PMCJA based on the advice of the MCP. According to Yeo Kim Wah, the MCP favoured Tan Cheng Lock, as it realized that the PMCJA had to rely overwhelmingly on Chinese support. Another reason was that the PMCJA hoped Tan Cheng Lock could get support from Chinese business community leaders such as Tan Kah Kee, Lee Kong Chian and Yong Shook Lin.²¹ Meanwhile the MCP itself provided the mass base for the PMCJA such as the members of the General Labour Union. Eber reminded Tan Cheng Lock of this fact and said that:

The speakers of GLU, whose voice, though not very loud is very important, are listened to with respect and attention. They have only one vote, in spite of the fact that their membership is certainly at least half of the total membership of all the Joint Council associations. They are very co-operative on this question of having only one, and it is up to us to see that their voice carries great weight. Their membership is about 300,000, you see.²²

The left-wing character of the PMCJA was one of the reasons it failed to attract the Chinese Chambers of Commerce or Chinese commercial interests. At first, Tan Kah Kee was expected to become an honorary member of the council. However, he decided not to join. According to Yeo Kim Wah, "it is necessary only to note that the Chinese business interest could not be expected to enrol in a coalition in which the voting procedure would force them to play a subordinate role to the communist-controlled organizations."²³

The PMCJA also failed to get support from the Malay community which considered it as a Chinese controlled organization. UMNO and the Malays regarded the MNP as betraying Malay interests to a predominantly Chinese coalition. To counter such allegations, the MNP decided to form its own united front of Malay organizations which included Pembela Tanah Air (PETA), Angkatan Wanita Sedar (AWAS), Angkatan Pemuda Insaf (API) and others, under the name of Pusat Tenaga Ra'ayat

(PUTERA). Later PMCJA-PUTERA was formed as an inter-racial alliance. In order to attract support from the Malays, or as a concession to PUTERA, the alliance PMCJA-PUTERA agreed to add some principles as follows:

- (a) Malay should be the official language of the country,
- (b) Melayu should be the title of any proposed citizenship and any national status in Malaya.
- (c) foreign affairs and defence should be the joint responsibility of the government of Malaya and the British crown; and
- (d) the national flag should have the Indonesian, red and white colours.²⁴

The main task of PMCJA-PUTERA was to put strong pressure on the government to negotiate with them on constitutional matters and to drop their previous discussions and agreement with the Malay Sultans and UMNO. After the Working Committee's constitutional proposals were officially published and with the formation of the Consultative Committee, the PMCJA decided not to submit any proposals or enter into any negotiation as the Consultative Committee was regarded as not representative of the people in Malaya. In December 1946, Tan Cheng Lock urged the Secretary of State, Arthur Creech, to open direct negotiations with the PMCJA which, he claimed, was the sole body representing the domiciled Malay and non-Malays.²⁵ He criticized the Committee Report which did not foreshadow the future development of Malaya along democratic lines.

British officials did not consider the PMCJA to be a significant political body and did not pay much attention to its demands.²⁶ Gent considered this organizations as left wing, as it consisted of some radical groups such as the GLU, and that it did not represent any major Chinese organizations such as the CCC or SCBA. Gent was also of the opinion that the PMCJA would not receive wide-spread support from the people of Malaya. According to Gent, "its claim to represent even the non-Malay Asiatic-domiciled communities had little basis."²⁷

In the eyes of local officials the PMCJA was not a strong body as it represented "very divergent views and aims."²⁸ However, the Colonial Office considered that the PMCJA had the potential to become a source of trouble and asked the Governor of the Malayan Union to see if there was any possibility of discussing constitutional matters with this organization. However, Gent felt it was not necessary, as it would discourage other bodies or individuals from expressing their opinions through the Consultative Committee. Gent was also of the opinion that discussion with the PMCJA would result in increasing its influence and ability for pressure.

MacDonald, the Governor-General, had a different view regarding the PMCJA. He considered it was necessary

for the Governor to hold a meeting with the PMCJA so as not to alienate this body.²⁹ He also feared that the swing of popular opinion to the PMCJA posed a threat to the British government, though Gent said it was not really united and strong. The action of the MNP of pulling out of the PMCJA and forming the Pusat Tenaga Raayat (PUTERA) had shown it was not credible. Gent also regarded Tan Cheng Lock's association with the PMCJA as deplorable. According to Gent, his action was the result of his bitterness towards the British government as he was not given a Knighthood by the British government.³⁰

Meanwhile the PMCJA organized public rallies to appeal to the Malayan people to unite and protest against the Federal proposals. In a public meeting on 26 January 1947, Tan Cheng Lock criticized the British government and Federal proposals. He said:

The constitutional proposals constitute a breach of the pledge of His Majesty's Government to ensure and facilitate the progress of the people of this country towards unity and ultimate self-government within the British commonwealth and empire, and promote a broadbased citizenship which will include without discrimination of race or creed, all who can establish a claim to belong to this country.³¹

Towards mid-April the PMCJA stepped up their campaign against the Federal proposals. Together with PUTERA it held a public meeting in Taiping, Perak on 13

April 1947. Both groups declared their opposition to the Federal policy. They also proposed to convene a "People Conference" to formulate a "democratic constitution" as an alternative to the Federal policy.³²

The Chinese Chambers of Commerce, who had decided not to join the PMCJA, now directed their attention to the Federal policy and the Malayan political scene. The Chinese business community felt their economic and commercial interests threatened by Malay nationalism, which had succeeded in compelling the British to formulate a Federal policy as an alternative to the Malayan union. It seemed to them from now on the Malays would become the dominant political force in Malaya. On 23 February, the ACCC held a conference to protest against the Federal proposals. In its despatch to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the ACCC made strong criticisms that the Federal proposals were "prepared without consulting the feelings, wishes and aspirations of its inhabitants as a whole" and were "undemocratic and retrograde in structure and conception."³³ The ACCC also claimed that the citizenship proposals "were discriminatory in character and designed to exclude the vast majority of the Malayan Chinese from a legitimate share in the public life of this country..."³⁴ On 25 March 1947 the ACCC sent another despatch to the Colonial Office. As advised by Gent, the

British ignored the ACCC demands. The British government was undeterred by the anti-Federation movements. In July 1947, it published a summary of its constitutional proposals and was determined to impose the new policy. This policy reflected a revival of Britain's so-called "pro-Malay policy" of the pre-war period. The previously formulated "Chinese Policy" and the Malayan Union citizenship scheme were abandoned. Under the Federal policy, the British government again established Malaya as the land of the Malays or Tanah Melayu with the adoption of more favourable citizenship proposals for the Malay, recognition of the special position of the Malays and return of internal sovereignty to the Malay Sultans.³⁵

The Federal policy for the first time made a distinction between Malays and non-Malays. The word "Malay" was defined as a person who habitually speaks the Malay language, professes the Muslim religion, and conforms to Malay custom. The Federation also indirectly divided the Chinese Community into the Straits Chinese (British subjects) and other Malayan born who were westernized or half-assimilated, and the more numerous alien Chinese. The Straits Chinese or other British subjects in Malacca and Penang still enjoyed their previous position or status in addition to their rights as Federal citizens. The Malayan born Chinese in the Malay States, whose parents were also locally born were

qualified to become Federal citizens by 'operation of law'. The vast majority of the alien Chinese could of course acquire citizenship by application, but this required an adequate knowledge of Malay and English and hence automatically debarred many from becoming Federal citizens. As a result, large numbers of the Chinese would remain aliens in Malaya. However, Indonesian immigrants who were recognized by the Malay Sultans as Malay subjects, together with the Malays, were granted citizenship by operation of law under the Federal policy.

The Federal proposals were the product of the negotiations between the British government, the Malay Sultans and UMNO which were carried out from August to December 1946. The British government did give all interested non-Malay communities an opportunity to express their views on the proposals before they were fully approved. However, the final proposals were almost the same as the Report of the Anglo-Malay Working Committee. This pro-Malay policy was justified on the grounds that the Malay, "needed protection from the encroachment of the economically and politically sophisticated Chinese."³⁶ Without such protection, the Malays felt their political life in their own country was in doubt.

As might be expected, the Federal policy provoked an outcry from the Chinese and other non-Malays. In their view, Federal policy was the ultimate application of the principle of "divide and rule."³⁷ It brought the ACCC or the Chinese business community closer to the PMCJA-PUTERA. In order to accommodate ACCC wishes, the PMCJA was renamed as All Malaya Council of Joint Action (AMCJA), as the term "Pan-Malayan" denoted a communist-influenced body.³⁸

The coalition of AMCJA-PUTERA adopted Indian tactics in fighting against the constitution. According to Albert Lau, the first suggestion to adopt these tactics came on 19 July 1947.³⁹ However, as the present writer has indicated, Tan Cheng Lock had warned the British government in October 1946 about the possibility of resorting to a campaign of passive resistance and non-cooperation against the government. However, during this time, Tan Cheng Lock showed a greater effort to use the Indian nationalist tactics by openly calling for a civil disobedience campaign and a determination to fight the implementation of Federal policy. Both Tan Cheng Lock, and DeCruz, another AMCJA leader, were prepared to face the consequences of being jailed by the British authorities.⁴⁰

On 17 August various Chinese organizations, guilds, and the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Malacca,

decided to launch a hartal as a method of protest against the Federal policy and "HMG's 'breach of faith' in breaking its pledge of full consultation."⁴¹ The ACCC itself sent a dispatch to the Colonial Office to express their anger and disappointment with the British decision to impose a "retrogressive" constitution, despite its being opposed strongly by the people of Malaya. This organization also demanded the appointment of a royal commission to make a study on the constitutional issues.

A hartal was launched in Malacca on 9 September 1949 followed by another in Perak on 25 September. The AMCJA-PUTERA and the ACCC launched a widespread hartal on 20 October which "paralysed nearly all the main towns in Malaya."⁴² Lee Kong Chian, the president of the ACCC explained to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 'that their actions were based on popular demand and demonstrate a feeling of bitterness among a large number of responsible people towards the Federal policy.'⁴³ However, the British government adopted an uncompromising position towards the anti-Federation movements.⁴⁴

Towards October 1947, the AMCJA-PUTERA drew up and published their own constitutional proposals for Malaya which was called "The People's Constitution." "The People's Constitution" was based on the ten principles of AMCJA-PUTERA. According to Yeo Kim Wah, it was a largely

MDU-MCP contribution to political thinking in Malaya.⁴⁵ It proposed "the establishment of an elected sovereign Federal Legislative Assembly, ... and the life of the Assembly to be three years."⁴⁶ It stressed that "there shall be no communal electorates, candidatures, representatives or allocation of seats whatever."⁴⁷ However "the Malays are given the privilege of having 55% of the seats in the first-three Assemblies."⁴⁸ The framers of this constitution also proposed the creation of a council of races to prevent discriminatory legislation based on religion or race.

The People's Constitution proposed the creation of a common citizenship which it called "Melayu nationality."⁴⁹ The locally born in Malaya would be given Melayu citizenship or nationality automatically based on the principle of jus soli. Citizenship by naturalisation would be offered to those who had resided for eight out of the preceding ten years in Malaya. They would need to pass a simple test of competency in the Malay language.⁵⁰

According to Yeo Kim Wah, the People's Constitution embodied a delicate balance of interests between the non-Malay left wing parties and the MCP on one hand, and the Malay left wing parties on the other.⁵¹ The guarantee to the Malays of 55% of the seats in the first three Assemblies or over a period of nine years, the establishment of a "Council of Races" and the

creation of Melayu citizenship were major concessions from the left-wing Chinese dominated political organizations to the Malays under PUTERA. However, according to W. Linehan, these measures in the long run, after the abolition of the Council of Races and the withdrawal of the 55% guaranteed seats in the Assembly, would make the Malays like that "unfortunate king, so well known in their history, whose bottom was being stuck with thorns at the same time that his mouth was being fed with bananas...."⁵²

The People's Constitution was rejected by colonial officials who did not in any respect alter Federal policy.⁵³ The government was also unmoved by the October hartal. Meanwhile the AMCJA-PUTERA was in "dire financial difficulties"⁵⁴ which hindered the aims of sustaining a strong campaign against the government. After October, it concentrated its activities on fund raising to finance the "agitation" campaign. Meanwhile, Lim Hong Bee, its representative in London, urged that a British parliamentary fact-finding group should tour in Malaya. Lim also set up a News and Information Bureau and published a newsletter, The Malayan Monitor, to enlighten British public opinion on the Malayan situation.⁵⁵

In the meantime, seven Chinese Chambers of Commerce held a conference in Singapore against the Federal Policy in early December to discuss their future method of struggle. It decided to send a delegation to discuss the matter with Malcolm McDonald. On 8 December 1947, McDonald informed Gent that ten Chinese, including Lee Kong Chian, Tan Cheng Lock and H. S. Lee had discussions with him regarding the Federation constitution. They were informed that "...no section of opinion in the House of Commons felt that the Constitution should be altered in any respect."⁵⁶ The leaders of the CCC were "undecided what to do". According to MacDonald, "they will regard the sending of a further letter to the Secretary of State and my promise to speak personally to the Secretary of State on the matter as the utmost that they can achieve, and they will present these actions as a sufficient development to save face."⁵⁷

The anti-Federation movements in Malaya collapsed after the implementation of the Federation scheme in February 1948. It did not win any concessions from the British government who adopted the "pro-Malay policy." However, this movement had caused a growing awareness and interest among the Chinese community on political and constitutional issues of a local nature. It brought together the Straits Chinese, the Kuomintang dominated ACCC, and MCP-led organizations to fight for

the Chinese and other non-Malays' political rights. As a result, it reduced the flavour of a Chinese nationalism which was oriented towards the motherland. However, the failure of the anti-Federation movements indicated the failure of the MCP's struggle by constitutional means. As a consequence the MCP dropped its moderate line and resorted to armed revolt against British rule in Malaya.

Part II

The Communist Insurrection and The Emergency

The anti-Federation movements disintegrated after the inauguration of the Federation of Malaya. The Straits Chinese and Kuomintang leaders, such as those in the Singapore Chinese Chambers of Commerce and others, called off their boycott of the Federal Legislative Council and accepted seats on it. They were concerned that opposition to the Federation would hurt their economic and commercial interests. Meanwhile the MCP dismantled the AMCJA-PUTERA, as it had lost faith in the constitutional struggle. Two months after the AMPCJA-PUTERA collapsed, the Communist launched an armed revolt, officially known as the "Emergency."

According to R. B. Smith, controversy "still surrounds the question whether the Communist-led

uprisings which developed across Southeast Asia during the months from March to September 1948 were the outcome of a deliberate international communist strategy or merely the product of coincidental decisions by individual communist parties."⁵⁸

According to official records, there are indications that the change from the constitutional policy of the Communist Party in Malaya to a policy of violence was directed from outside sources.⁵⁹ Gerald de Cruz, a former member of the MCP, also held the same opinion, that the MCP launched an armed revolt as a result of Stalin's orders.⁶⁰ However, we can conclude with certainty that there is not enough evidence to support this. It can be said that the MCP decided to drop their moderate line and resort to armed struggle as a result of developments within Malaya. Perhaps one of the reasons was that the colonial government had broken its "promise" to the Communists. As the present writer has indicated elsewhere, the colonial government had formulated the "Long Term Policy Directives: Chinese Policy" which it later incorporated into the Malayan Union scheme. British officers used the directive to induce the Communists to continue to cooperate with them during and after the war. One reason the MCP agreed to disband the MPAJA was because the General Officer Commanding(GOC), Malaya Command, pointed out to them that British policy was based on this policy directives.

According to Ralph Hone, during the negotiations which took place in the early part of 1946 with the leaders of the MPAJA, the leaders of the MPAJA presented to the GOC, Malaya Command, "eight points" on which they required assurances, before they were prepared to be demobilized.⁶¹ Reciprocally, "the substance of paragraphs 1,2,3, and 7 [of the directive on Chinese Policy] was communicated to the M.P.A.J.A. leaders in the course of negotiation."⁶² Ralph Hone added: "the undertaking given to the M.P.A.J.A. was based on the directive and not vice-versa and was, of course, given by the G.O.C. under S.A.C's authority without any further reference back to London."⁶³

Based on this evidence, the colonial government was bound to implement their Chinese policy under the Malayan Union scheme. However, the civil government seemed to ignore the undertaking between the BMA and MPAJA except on the question of the Societies Ordinance. During the constitutional negotiations between the Malay Sultans and the UMNO leaders with the colonial government, the Communist-sponsored AMCJA-PUTERA was ignored. Not only that, Malcolm MacDonald, Governor-General of British Southeast Asia regarded Communism as "Enemy No.1 in these territories and in South East Asia."⁶⁴ In his opinion "Communism was capable of becoming quite a formidable one" and any accommodation

to the AMCJA- PUTERA's demands would "strengthen the MCP and weaken the Government."⁶⁵ MacDonald declared "Communism would have to be dealt with in a pretty big and effective way in the Malayan Union and Singapore."⁶⁶ Therefore the colonial government took strong measures and actions to suppress Communist activity.

M. Stenson held the opinion that the Communist rebellion was caused by the employers' efforts to reduce wages and obtain stricter control over their labour forces, while at the same time undermining the newly-formed unions.⁶⁷ The colonial government aided the employers by controlling trade union activities. The government's restrictions on Communist activity increased throughout the spring of 1947, especially on the labour front. On 31 May, the government banned any federation of labour unions, and decreed that all trade union officials would be required to have a minimum of three years experience in the trade or industry which the union was concerned with. According to Stenson, the new laws or measures effectively crippled overt Communist influences in the labour movement and destroyed the Pan Malayan Federation of Trade Unions which was declared illegal.⁶⁸

The MCP itself was faced with internal conflict during early 1947. Loi Tek, the Secretary General of the MCP was under investigation over his past

activities.⁶⁹ He was an Annamite who arrived in Singapore, brought in by the Singapore Special Branch.⁷⁰ He managed to infiltrate into the MCP top hierarchy and assumed the leadership of the MCP after the crisis of 1936. During the Japanese occupation, he became a Japanese Kempeitai agent and helped the Japanese to liquidate the senior party members at Batu Caves in September 1942. However, he was cautious "...not to throw in his lot altogether with the Japanese."⁷¹ Being the Secretary General of the MCP, he also cooperated with officers of Force 136 during the Japanese occupation. After the war, Loi Tek (alias Mr. Wright) resumed his contacts with the Special Branch in Singapore.

Immediately after the war, an attempt was made to unmask the real identity of Loi Tek. An allegation that Loi Tak was a traitor to the party appeared in a Penang newspaper in September 1945.⁷² However, this charge was regarded as incredible, as it has been made by MCP members who had themselves collaborated with the Japanese. However, criticism of Loi Tek's leadership and his irregular behaviour was to persist in early 1947. This matter was brought to the attention of the Singapore Police Special Branch. Major R. J. Isaacs of the Field Security Section made an investigation to discover Loi Tek's true identity.⁷³ The process of investigation was known as "The Wright (alias Loi Tek) Case." As a result

of the investigation, it was revealed that Mr. Wright or Loi Tek was an agent of the British police. The case was closed and Loi Tek was advised not to contact the police and he totally disappeared from the political scene. On the other hand, Chin Peng, Loi Tek's chief aide during the war carried out an investigation on Loi Tek's (alias Mr. Wright) past activity. Loi Tek was absent during the 6 March 1947 Central Committee meeting and since then the MCP never saw him again. In May 1947 he was formally expelled from the party and Chin Peng became Secretary-General. It took more than a year for Chin Peng or the Central Executive Committee (CEC) to make a full report on Loi Tek or "The Wright Case."

On 28 May 1948 the CEC issued the report entitled "Statement of the Incident of Wright", which described Loi Tek as an "internal traitor" and the greatest culprit in the history of the MCP.⁷⁴ He was charged with "pressing for policies which could not be carried out," thereby serving as "a running dog and traitor of the revolution."⁷⁵ As a consequence of the "Wright Case," the MCP needed something to restore confidence among its members. The CEC had admitted that it had committed very serious mistakes in their course of struggles.⁷⁶ Accordingly the CEC pointed out that the "comrades" of the CEC "have endeavoured their utmost in getting the Party to turn away from a blind alley to a new path as evidenced by the recent fixing of a new policy which has

gained the full and unanimous support of comrades of the entire Party."⁷⁷ According to Anthony Short, by the time (28 May 1948) the Loi Tek report was issued "the Party had already changed course and the Emergency was no more than three weeks away."⁷⁸

According to C. B. Mclane, the Fourth Plenum of the Malayan Communist Party which met in Singapore from 17 to 21 March 1948, marked a turning point in the strategies of Malayan Communism comparable with the adoption of the Ghoshal Line in Burma six weeks earlier.⁷⁹ During this Plenum of the MCP's Central Committee, three resolutions were adopted. Firstly, they gave a political analysis of the current situation in Malaya, which concluded that the Labour Government in Britain was irredeemably imperialist. In this situation, the struggle for independence must ultimately take the form of "people's revolutionary war" and the MCP would provide leadership in "this most glorious task." Secondly, with regard of political strategies, it set two tasks before the party: the reversal of the former "ostrich policy" of "surrenderism" and the preparation of the masses for an uncompromising struggle for independence. Thirdly, it stressed the need to restore party discipline after the laxness of the Loi Tek period.⁸⁰ However, "the Fourth Plenum did not

specifically call for an uprising but stressed the urgency of preparing for it."⁸¹

The first action in the implementation of this new line of struggle was focused on an urban area. The Singapore Harbour Board Employees Union (SHBEU), an unfederated union dominated by Communists, launched a strike on 23 March to 4 April 1948 demanding better wages and conditions of work for the workers. The SHBEU urged the workers to "rely on (their) forces to solve all difficulties" and to "launch gigantic bloodshed against the imperialists should the employers continue to belittle (the labourers') forces."⁸² The police took action to break the strike by raiding the premises of the SHBEU and SFTU. They arrested and jailed nine labour leaders on charges of sedition and intimidation.

After the general strike, the SFTU made a plan to hold a mass demonstration of 100,000 people on May Day. The Malayan Security Service was suspicious of the SFTU's real intention. According to the PIJ:

There have been indications recently that the communists, working through labour unions, have been preparing for some important event. Whether they were merely preparing for May Day or whether they were working to fit in with a wider world pattern (the Italian Elections, events in Berlin, events in Burma) is not yet known, but there are indications from many sources that major events are being prepared for,

and although the recent events [the General strike] in Singapore resulted in the defeat of their immediate plans, it is unlikely that the communists will accept it as a total defeat.⁸³

The SFTU asked permission to hold a May Day rally and a procession. The government only allowed them to hold the rally and put a ban on the procession on grounds of interference with traffic.⁸⁴ The SFTU announced that they would defy the government ban and continue to hold both the rally and the procession. Later the government decided to ban both the rally and procession which forced the SFTU to call off the mass demonstrations. However, the SFTU organized a closed day meeting which was attended by the MCP's representatives. In this meeting, the MCP'S representatives continued to press for a militant line and called upon the people to "take part in a mass struggle to hold back the attacks of the reactionaries by using their strength."⁸⁵

On 10 May 1948, as a result of growing government suppression of legal Communist activities, the MCP held the Fifth Plenum of the Central Committee. The MCP adopted a twelve-point "plan of struggle" to counter the government's programme. According to Anthony Short, "the decision taken at the Fifth Plenum in one sense was a declaration of defensive war, an unmistakable call to clear the decks for action, a confession of constitutional failure, in that the political struggle

was now taken on to another level but, at the sametime, it was to be a graduated political struggle rather than a coup d'etat or recognisable revolution."⁸⁶

The Fifth Plenum decided to attack the British imperialists through the workers and to use trade unions as its main weapon in the struggle. The "plan of struggle" also emphasized the primary use henceforth of "illegal action"; it "called for strikes specifically aimed at the disruption of the Malayan economy, demanded a more vigorous assault on the democratic parties and on the national bourgeoisie (including Chinese elements sympathetic to the Kuomintang), and proposed measures to attract intellectuals and peasants to the Communist cause."⁸⁷

In preparation for carrying out this new policy the MCP had instructed the state committees to form mobilisation sections to deal with all problems connected with the armed struggle and agreed that violence could be used against the opposition from mid-May onwards. The MPAJA Executive Council held a meeting on 5 May and District MPAJA ex-Service Comrades' Associations were told to compile fresh records of all members including those who had left the associations.⁸⁸ Large scale mobilisation was carried out in Perak, Johore and Selangor. The MPAJA ex-Service Comrades's Association,

trade unions and organisations affiliated to the MCP had been instructed to remove all photographs, list of names and other documents which might be of use to the police.⁸⁹ On 30 May an MCP mobile corps was formed in Perak with selected ex-MPAJA members led by Yong Lam. The members selected for the corps were instructed to report to an unknown camp on 2 June for three days training. The corps, which would be armed was ready to move into town areas on 8 June 1948.⁹⁰

In the meantime, reorganization within the MCP itself had been carried out. The members of the Central Executive Committee had been increased to fifteen.⁹¹ In February 1948, there were just eleven members and during normal periods, it was around nine. Among the new CEC members was Lau Ma, one of the Malaysians who had participated in the Victory Parade in London. Lau Ma later became the highest military commander of the MCP in Perak. At the state level of the MCP, reorganization also had been carried out. For instance, the whole MCP Perak set-up was reorganized at the beginning of May 1948. Two sections were formed, the political and the military section. The political section function was to mobilise the people, organize the members, and gather food supplies for the armed forces and carry out other important directing work. The function of the military section was to mobilise all the armed forces and carry

out executive orders' from its military council regarding the use of arms.

During the reorganization of the MCP, the Indian Section, under Balan was separated.⁹² It was put under the direction of the Communist Party of India but operated in conjunction with the MCP. The Malay Section was abandoned as unprofitable. The MCP spent about \$50,000 on the formation of the MNP. However, the results of the Malay movement were disappointing for the MCP. On the labour front, the MCP continued to support the trade union struggle which caused industrial unrest throughout Malaya from May 1948 onward. For instance, the Harbour Workers Union staged a major strike at Port Swettenham on 18 and 19 May. During the strike it was reported that there were two cases of suspected arson in the railway sidings and an attack on an European manager employed by Tan Teck Bee, the contractor. Twelve Indian workers were arrested, according to the union, "without reason."⁹³ Up to 4 June, the High Commissioner informed the Colonial Office that there were twelve serious incidents, including nine murders and three attacks on European estate managers, involving serious injuries. The incidents occurred in Penang, Perak, Selangor, Negeri Sembilan and Johore. At this stage the government still put the blame on the Pan-Malayan Federation of

Trade Unions.⁹⁴ The MCP campaign still put the government in the dark. According to the PIJ:

The long-term objective of their [the MCP] campaign is still obscure. It may not have a specific object. It may be defensive action to bolster morale against improving conditions, cheaper labour, lower prices, a tightening of the Trade Union Enactment and the fear of co-operation among employers.⁹⁵

The government's attitude towards the MCP's campaign up to 31 May 1948 was still uncertain. According to the PIJ, if this campaign was a local tactical plan the government could expect the MCP to cease their attacks and keep them in abeyance until another opportunity arose.⁹⁶ In the opinion of the PIJ, if the MCP continued their attacks, whatever the costs, then it was clear their plan was part of a world-wide plan of aggression by Russia, which was intended to lead to war.⁹⁷ Later it was clear that the MCP would continue their attack on all fronts. On 16 June 1948, three European planters were murdered in Sungai Siput, Perak. Then the government declared a state of emergency which continued for twelve years.

The MCP's Politics of Terrorism

According to Anthony Short, the mobilisation of the MCP for the armed struggle was carried out in three

phases.⁹⁸ The first phase involved the disappearing of the hard core of the MCP assault forces which were unknown by the general public into the jungle. The forces consisted of some professional revolutionaries who formed the mobile units, Lau Tong Tui or the "Killer Squads." They normally operated in a small group of four or five for the purpose of eliminating their selected targets. The second phase required open members of the MCP and its affiliates-- particularly the MPAJA Ex-Comrades Association--to retire to the hills and await further instructions. The final phase witnessed the armed struggle of the MCP once the Emergency was declared.

Lucian W. Pye makes a remark that the MCP had "an extraordinary faith in the benefit of guerrilla warfare"⁹⁹ which was based on Mao Tse-tung doctrine's and the practices of the Communists in China. For the purpose of launching a guerrilla war, the MCP formed the so-called Malayan People Anti-British Army (MPABA) shortly before the Emergency. Ironically, the MPABA was not sufficiently strong to fight the security forces in Malaya in a total "guerrilla" situation. This failure led to the MCP's adoption of the politics of terrorism.

The primary objective of the MCP terrorism was to cause unrest and chaos in the countryside.¹⁰⁰ Managers and contractors in the rubber estates and tin mines became logical targets of their attacks. With the

disappearance of the managerial personnel in the estates and tin mines, the MCP hoped to establish its control over the labour force and, through their control, obtain food, intelligence and local support. In addition, the MCP planned to transform the labour force into guerrilla fighters. The Kuomintang leaders and their supporters became likewise the targets of Communist attacks. If successful, the attacks would provide Communists with a political vacuum in the Chinese community, making them ready to accept the latter's leadership. Other targets of the Communist attacks were the police and government officials, and the security and administrative machinery of the government, without which the economic and administrative structure would collapse.

The second objective of the MCP campaign was the establishment of Communist governments in various liberated areas in the country, which ultimately would join together and form a government of the entire liberated zone. The final objective of the MCP was to launch a general revolution and achieve final victory by defeating the British and local armed forces, and by forming a Communist regime or the Republic of Malaya. In actual fact, however, the Communist campaign did not advance further than the primary phase.¹⁰¹

The Communists started the campaign of violence with the killings in Sungai Siput. On 27 June 1948 the guerillas launched a large scale attack on the Kuala Krau police station in central Pahang.¹⁰² After the attacks, the guerilla army moved back to their camps in the jungle. Most of the guerrilla camps were former MPAJA camps which were unknown to Force 136 liaison officers.

On 1 July 1948 the Communist guerrillas launched another major attack in Gua Musang, A force of about a hundred guerrillas attacked and captured the police post. There is evidence that the Communists were supported by a large number of Chinese in Pulai.¹⁰³ Government forces managed to retake the post after five days of Communist occupation. After fighting with the security forces, the guerrillas again withdrew to the jungle. The attack in Gua Musang was the first attempt by the guerrillas to establish a liberated area. Though they failed, the Communists were able to raise great concern among top government officials. MacDonald, the Commissioner-General wrote:

Events like the Kelantan police capture will stimulate recruitment... to the guerrillas, and will thus increase the armed strength of the total [Communist] forces which we must eventually destroy.¹⁰⁴

After the Kelantan event, MacDonald pressed the British Government for the early arrival of the Inniskillings or other troops to Malaya.¹⁰⁵ With the arrival of the Inniskillings the Communist attacks were disrupted. It was reported that the morale of the Communist guerrillas -- particularly among the new recruits-- was low.¹⁰⁶ A comparative lull from Communist attacks followed, namely between early 1949 and the middle of the year. It was during this period that the Communists began to recruit on a large scale for the Min Yuen or Mass Organisation, which was similiar to the Malayan People Anti-Japanese Union (MPAJU) of the Japanese occupation time. However, the Min Yuen represented the civilian wing of the guerrillas and served as an auxiliary fighting unit. Also during this period, the guerrilla forces were increased from 8 to 10 regiments. The MPABA was replaced by the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA), an attempt to present the Communist guerrillas as a multi-racial force. For example, the 10th Regiment, consisting of Malay guerrillas, operated in Pahang. This "Malay Regiment", harried by the Gurkhas and other security forces, finally disintegrated by the end of 1949.¹⁰⁷ The MCP's attempt to present a multiracial "People's War" facade met with failure.

Towards the middle of the 1949, the guerillas increased their attacks on the police, army and planters.¹⁰⁸ It was not unusual for the guerrillas to make an attack on ordinary civilians. One of those attacks was carried out in Kampar, Perak which killed four and wounded forty-five civilians. On 11 September 1949, the guerrillas under Chin Nam, launched a large scale attack on the small town of Kuala Krau in Pahang. The guerrillas tried to capture the police station and form a liberated area. This attempt was crushed by the security forces.

After the Kuala Krau event, the Central Committee of the MCP cautioned the party not to isolate itself from the masses but to continue building a Min Yuen infrastructure.¹⁰⁹ The Central Committee directive of December 1949 stated the following:

Temporary bases should first be set up among the Min Yuen territories; Min Yuen work would be expanded with increased activities, radiating spearheads into enemy-held territories, so that an intermeshing of territories would be the result,...[This tactic is expected to result in] entanglement and encirclement of the enemy and their bases of communication and centres. This sort of tactic could lead to extremely fluid situations in a difficult period for the MRLA, but it could be done.¹¹⁰

By early 1950, the main force of the guerrillas was retrained, regrouped and revitalised. The non-combat unit of the guerrillas had also been reorganised and was "...probably equal to that of government in the matter of supplies and superior in the matter of intelligence."¹¹¹ The guerrillas increased their attacks throughout the whole year with the peak during the first week of September. During the period, there were 4,739 incidents involving Communist attacks. The security forces suffered 889 casualties, with 393 deaths and 496 wounded. The terrorists suffered 942 casualties with 648 deaths, 147 captured, and 147 surrendered.¹¹² There were also a large number of civilian casualties: 646 deaths, 409 wounded, and 106 missing.

In October 1950, the Joint Intelligence Advisory Committee reported to the Federal War Council that, "there had been gradual improvement in MCP organisation, leadership and military tactics and the existing MCP policy of extended activity, unless checked, was likely to cause a serious breakdown in civilian morale."¹¹³ The strength of the MRLA at this time was between 3,000 to 3,500 ,excluding unidentified units or guerrillas in Southern Thailand. In addition there were about 1,200 armed ancillaries. The Communist insurrection reached its peak in 1951. According to government sources, it was probable that over one million of the Chinese population were at least potential supporters at the height of the

Emergency.¹¹⁴ The Communist insurrection declined rapidly after 1952. According to government sources, the estimated strength of the terrorists was:

Average for 1951...	7292
" " 1952...	5765
" " 1953...	4373
" " 1954...	3402
" " 1955...	2798
" " 1956...	2231
" " 1957...	1830 ¹¹⁵

The Emergency was the colonial government's response to the Communist insurrection, seen as imported "alien" politics from China. It was largely a "Chinese affair." The Chinese community was an accessible target for penetration by the MCP, upon whom they could rely for money, supplies, recruits and information.¹¹⁶ The solution to end the Emergency was to be found not only in military but also in political strategy. However, the dominating position of the Malay community within the framework of the Federal policy of 1948 had discouraged the Chinese from active cooperation with the government.¹¹⁷

Part III

The Penang Secession Movement, 1948-49

The inclusion of Penang with the Federation of Malaya had aroused dissatisfaction among some sections of the non-Malay communities.¹¹⁸ They were the Straits-born Chinese and the business communities. They resented the Federal constitution which gave the Sultans and the Malay representatives controlling powers over legislation and restricted citizenship rights for non-Malays. The constitution divided the people in Malaya (including Penang) into Malay, non-Malay or immigrant. As indigenous peoples, the Malays or subjects of the Sultans were accorded a "special position." Thus the non-Malays or British subjects felt their status or rights had "been assailed and almost taken away" as they were regarded as immigrants.¹¹⁹ From their point of view, a large proportion of the Malayan Malays were themselves comparatively recent "immigrants." Furthermore, the non-Malays pointed out that under Federal citizenship, British subjects, born in the Settlements, who did not habitually speak the Malay language, and did not conform to Malay custom, had a lower political status than Indonesian immigrants as the Indonesian was the subject of the Sultan and considered as Malay.¹²⁰

The Straits Chinese, who were proud of their British identity and connection with the British Empire, also feared that the creation of Federal citizenship would impair their legal status as British subjects. Heah Joo Seang, a former president of the Penang SCBA, wrote to The Straits Budget in March 1948:

The Straits Chinese of Malacca and Penang enjoyed a status as British subjects and I cannot understand the desirability of donning the mantle of Malayan citizenship unless I am forced to.¹²¹

He opposed the inclusion of the Penang and Malacca settlements into the Federation which, according to him, was unfair, unforgivable and came very much at the wrong time. Another Straits Chinese leader, Dr. Lee Tiang Keng feared that the Straits Chinese community would not get the same or equal treatment with the Malays in the Federation although they could maintain their status as British subjects.¹²²

The business communities' opposition to the inclusion of Penang into the Federation scheme was largely out of fear that the rights of Penang to free port trade would be withdrawn in the future. Previously the Penang traders had faced some restrictions on the entrepot trade after Penang had been included in a political and customs and excise union with mainland Malaya; this was under the BMA and Malayan Union.¹²³ For

instance the copra traders needed to weigh and check the quantities of copra they brought from other countries such as Burma, Thailand and Sumatra in order for it to be re-exported duty free. These measures were necessary as the copra from mainland Malaya was not exempted from export tax. The copra traders preferred to trade with Singapore as there were no restrictions and they got better prices. As a result Penang's traders strongly protested against the new restrictions which they had never experienced before Penang was included within Malaya. Dr.F.C. Benham, economic adviser to the Governor-General, who made an inquiry about these problems, agreed that some of the entreport trade "may be driven away from Penang by unnecessary restrictions and formalities which cause delay, expense, and inconvenience."¹²⁴

Dr. Benham made a report and recommended the restoration of Penang to a genuine free port, enjoying the same privileges as Singapore. His report was tabled at the Federal Legislative Council in May 1948. By that time Penang had already been included in the Federation. Thus Benham's report reminded them of the difficulties of their struggle to maintain the free port status of Penang.¹²⁵

The non-Malays of Penang held the view that the inclusion of Penang into the Federation was not in the interests of its people. They pointed out that Penang as the highest developed settlement had been reduced to the status of a junior partner, as a former Crown Colony had been relegated to a Protectorate. As a member of the Federation, it was not given full rights but on the other hand it contributed a large income to the Federation from the collection of taxes. The income derived from Penang was being used for the benefit of the "backward" Malay states.¹²⁶

The non-Malays, particularly the Chinese community in Penang, were also dissatisfied at the ways and means which brought Penang into the Federation.¹²⁷ As the present writer has indicated the colonial government excluded the non-Malays from preliminary discussions on Federal policy. The Chinese community in Penang resented this action. Under the banner of the Penang Chamber of Commerce, the Chinese Town Hall and the Penang SCBA, they sent a petition to Creech Jones, Secretary of State for the Colonies, in March 1947 on the "constitutional proposals for Malaya." They opposed the Federal citizenship proposals, which according to their interpretation "would whittle down the prescriptive rights of British subjects" and would "lead to great injustice."¹²⁸ They made a request to the British government to appoint a royal commission to examine

local conditions and formulate a constitution for Malaya. However, the colonial government ignored their demands. The colonial government also ignored the demands of the ACMJA-PUTERA and the ACCC. Thus, the decision to include Penang and Malacca in the Federation and the exclusion of Singapore was made without taking into account the wishes of the people in the former Straits Settlements.¹²⁹

The first movement for the secession of Penang from the Federation of Malaya was largely a Straits Chinese affair. In November 1948, T.W. Ong (Singapore SCBA) informed Lim Huck Aik (Penang SCBA) and Ee Yew Kim (Malacca SCBA) that he would propose the restoration of the Straits Settlements at the Singapore SCBA's impending annual general meeting.¹³⁰ This initiative was leaked and published by the Straits Echo on 22 November 1948. The president of Penang's Indian Chamber of Commerce and J. P. Souter, the president of the Settlement of Penang Association came out in support of secession. On 4 December the Penang SCBA formally supported secession. The Penang Chinese Chamber of Commerce at first resolved that it would be more advantageous for Singapore to join the Federation. Later it decided to support Penang secession. The Penang Eurasian Association also came to support it.

An interim Secession Committee was formed in the first week of December with D.A. Mackay, the chairman of the Penang Chamber of Commerce, as the chairman and Ponnudurai, the president of the Penang Clerical and Administrative Union as secretary. This committee decided to hold a public meeting on 13 December 1948 to debate the issue of Penang's secession from the Federation. At the public meeting, which was held at the Chinese Town Hall, the Penang and Province Wellesley Secession Committee was formally created. It made a resolution that the Settlement of Penang would adopt all constitutional means for obtaining its secession from the Federation of Malaya and the reversion of the Colony to the Straits Settlements which according to them, "would be in the best interests of Penang and Province Wellesley."¹³¹

The Penang secession movement was purely a non-Malay affair. Not even one Malay attended the public meeting or became a member of the committee for secession. The Malays-- particularly in Penang-- came out in strong opposition to the secession movement. An UMNO official considered that such a move during the early stages of the Emergency was bound to have a serious effect on the feelings of the Malays. The Malay press, such as Utusan Melayu, described it as a destructive step, fraught with evil consequences for the people of Malaya.¹³² The paper feared such action would lead to inter-racial tension between the Malays and the

immigrant races and it urged the return of Penang and Province Wellesley to Kedah. Warta Negara, another Malay newspaper regarded the separation of Penang from the Federation as another "threat by 'foreigners' and 'aliens' to the existence of the Malays in their own land."¹³³

As a response to the Penang secession movement, an official of the Penang UMNO proposed that Malay associations including the MNP should form a committee to resist the movement.¹³⁴ However, it failed to materialize, as the MNP feared the colonial government might take action against it. Instead the Malays in Penang held a mammoth public meeting on 8 January 1949. It was attended by 2,000 Malays and their purpose was to show they were united in opposition against secession.

The secession movement came at a most unfortunate time for the colonial government in Malaya. During this time, Britain was planning to carry out a special policy towards the Chinese community in order to get their cooperation in the war against the Communist guerrillas. It was the intention of the colonial government to confer political rights on the Chinese community, or other non-Malays through consultation and consent between the Chinese and Malay leaders. However, the secession movement increased the tension between both

communities and made it more difficult for Britain to bring Malay and Chinese leaders to the conference table.

MacDonald, the Commissioner-General, did not want to hurt the feelings of the community leaders in Penang, although he opposed the secessionist movement. Thus he wrote to D.A.Mackay, one of the leaders of the secessionist movement, to show his sympathy to the Penang grievances. He wrote:

Penang has grievances regarding its treatment within the Federation and these must of course be dealt with fairly by the authorities. I am certain that the new High Commissioner will consider them with a sympathetic mind. In my opinion he should be given time to consider the problem fully.¹³⁵

Regarding Penang's economic complaints, MacDonald pointed out that Dr.Benham would arrive in Malaya before the end of December and would discuss with Henry Gurney, his report and views on the economic problems faced by Penang. He urged the secessionist leaders not to press their claim until he could have an opportunity to discuss with them the various moves by the government on certain issues which were larger than those concerning the constitutional position of Penang alone. He mentioned some of the important plans being made by the government for the security and well-being of the

citizens of Penang, the Federation and also Singapore.

The plans were:

1. Diplomatic action is being sought to strengthen co-operation between friendly Governments against the Communist menace in South-East Asia.
2. Conversations are pending which may lead to agreement between the Malay leaders and Chinese leaders on political relations between the Malays and Chinese throughout Malaya.
3. Plans are being prepared for the closer economic and political association of the Federation and Singapore.¹³⁶

MacDonald feared that the publicity connected with the movement for secession in Penang might bring a setback to government plans, but he did not suggest to Mackay to abandon the plan for secession. He met the Secession Committee members on 2 January 1949. Once again he promised to deal with Penang's grievances, "but was unprepared to concede secession."¹³⁷ He pointed out that:

1. The Penang secession agitation, if continued, would cause a deplorable split in the Chinese community in the Federation and Singapore, since just as many good Chinese leaders were opposed to secession as favoured it. This would have deplorable effects on the influence of the Chinese in Malayan affairs.
2. It would exacerbate interracial hostility between the Malay and the Chinese....
3. The agitation would divide Penang from Province Wellesley, for the Malays in the Province would undoubtedly vote in favour of continued adherence to the Federation.
4. The agitation would also divide Penang from Malacca for it appeared that opinion in Malacca would also favour continuation in the Federation.

5. It would postpone the day when a closer association between the Federation and Singapore became practical politics. The Government's firm objective is to join the Federation and Singapore more closely together economically, administratively and politically.¹³⁸

MacDonald agreed with Henry Gurney's view, that the agitation "would not become a serious issue unless the secessionists continued their campaign."¹³⁹ He believed that the secession movement leaders seemed to be in a mood to use the upheavals as a stick to beat and pressure the government with the intention of getting certain objectives other than just the declared objective of secession which was impracticable. The best solution for the government was to persuade the secessionists to keep quiet.

As a consequence of his meeting with the secession committee in Penang, MacDonald explored some of the Straits Chinese leaders' views on this matter. T.W. Ong told him that the British Straits-born Chinese Association intended to hold a meeting in support of the Penang secession movement. MacDonald argued that the question of Penang's secession was primarily an internal matter for the various members of the Federation¹⁴⁰ and people "in Singapore, as residents of a separate territory, should not interfere." He pointed out that "a campaign in favour of ...[secession] would do terrible damage to relations between the Chinese (including the

Straits-born Chinese) and the Malays."¹⁴¹ This would prejudice the chances of much of the constructive work for good relations between all communities in Malaya, and for cooperative relations between the Federation and Singapore.

On 20 January 1949 the Secession Committee decided to move a resolution in favour of secession in the Settlement Council which was due to meet on 10 February. Dr. Lee Tiang Keng decided to resign from the Communities Liaison Committee (CLC) and second the Resolution.¹⁴² His action nearly wrecked the CLC, as the Malay members considered that his attitude seemed "to indicate insincerity on the part of a Chinese member of the CLC itself."¹⁴³ The CLC decided to persuade the Secession Committee against moving a debate on Penang's secession by sending three of its members, Thuraisingham, Khoo Teik Ee and C.C.Tan, to Penang. They held discussions with eight of the members of the committee and persuaded them to postpone the motion in the Settlement Council. However, a slight majority of the Committee were in favour of proceeding with the motion.

The Secession Movement Committee at the Settlement Council moved a Resolution in favour of the secession of Penang, an important step in their plans. The Resident Commissioner of Penang gave an official

reply that it was a proposition which the Federation Government could not accept.¹⁴⁴ Furthermore, according to him, the government was already taking steps to solve the economic and administrative difficulties which were faced by Penang. He also allayed the fears of British subjects regarding their rights. The motion was defeated by a vote of ten in favour and fifteen, mostly official members, against. However, according to The Straits Times, "...had a free vote been allowed, the motion would have been carried by a convincing majority."¹⁴⁵

After the defeat, the secessionists decided to appeal to Arthur Creech Jones, the Secretary of State for the Colonies through the government of Malaya. On 22 July 1949, a petition was presented to the Resident Commissioner and in mid November 1949 it was despatched to London. In January 1950, Henry Gurney made detailed comments on the various points raised by the petitioners for the attention of the Secretary of State for the Colonies.¹⁴⁶ He pointed out that the large majority of the population of Penang did not appreciate the issues raised by the petitioners. In his opinion, "...Penang could never succeed in establishing a claim to separate status as a Crown Colony..."¹⁴⁷ He advised the Secretary of State to highlight the consequences of granting the petitioners' request which in his opinion would deprive the people of the Settlement of the local autonomy which they possessed at that time. He also pointed out that

there were some flaws in the petitioners' argument. There was, for example, a contradiction in D.A. Mackay's statement with regard to the status of Province Wellesley. According to Gurney, Mackay previously made a statement that "Malacca and Province Wellesley whose interests are similiar to the mainland [peninsular Malaya], should be incorporated in the Federation."¹⁴⁸ However, in his speech in the Settlement Council on 10 February 1949, Mackay stated that Province Wellesley "must remain part of the settlement [of Penang]."¹⁴⁹ These two statements contradicted each other. Mackay also refused to explain the question of returning Penang to its former status "...in association with Singapore."¹⁵⁰ According to Gurney, Mackay was afraid to expound on this subject as it would expose "...the weakness and loose thinking of the ...[petitioners'] case."¹⁵¹ However, Gurney accepted the petitioners's argument regarding "the limitations on the eligibility of the British subjects of Penang for Federal citizenship under clauses 124 and 125 of the Federal Agreement."¹⁵² He pointed out it was possible to remove these disabilities. It was under the consideration of the local goverment and the CLC. He hoped the outcome of the discussions and the proposals to revise the whole of the provisions of the Federal Agreement relating to citizenship could adequately meet the requests of the *petitioners*. Thus he advised the Secretary of State "that

the reply [for the Petitioners] should wait until the citizenship proposals had been agreed...."¹⁵³

One of the colonial officials felt it was unusual at that time to receive a petition such as this from Penang, "a dependant territory praying for the continuance of Crown Colony status and for the abolition of constitutional arrangements which might lead ... to their severance from British Colonial rule."¹⁵⁴ However, he also realized that the petition was not motivated solely by affection for British rule. In his opinion the underlying motive was undoubtedly a real fear among the non-Malay community that their incorporation in the Federation might in the long run mean that they would be irrevocably part of a state in which Malay interests and influence would predominate and British traditions and interests might be submerged.¹⁵⁵

In the meantime the Secretary of State travelled out to Malaya to assess its problems. He arrived and met the Penang Secession Committee at the end of May 1950. He rejected the secession of Penang from Malaya and pointed out in the meeting that "...the complete unity of all the people of Malaya was needed to win the battle against the terrorists."¹⁵⁶ However, he agreed that their rights could not be sufficiently protected within the framework of the Federal Agreement of 1948. He hoped that these

problems would be solved by the CLC and the local government.

In September 1951, the secessionists received a full reply from the Secretary of State for the Colonies which among other things mentioned that "...the apprehensions of the petitioners were not well founded and that a case has not been established either for initiating action to change the status of Penang or for the appointment of a Royal Commission to investigate the question further."¹⁵⁷ By this time the secessionist movement was long dead.¹⁵⁸

The secession movement failed to remove Penang from the Federation of Malaya or reconstitute the Straits Settlements. However, the government did remove some of the grievances of the Straits Chinese and business communities.¹⁵⁹ The Bill for the Banishment of British Subjects, which had been opposed by the Straits Chinese, was abandoned in 1949. The Custom Duties (Penang) Bill, (1949) and the Rubber Excise (Penang) Bill (1949) were presented and passed by the Federal Legislative Council. Thus, the status of Penang as a free port was maintained. The Federation of Malaya Agreement (Amendment) Ordinance (1952) was introduced which made it easier for the Chinese to become Federal citizens in comparison with previous citizenship clauses in the Federal Agreement. The Straits Chinese were confirmed in their right to

enjoy their status as citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies, in addition to Federal citizenship. One of the important leaders of the secession movement, Dr. Lee Tiang Keng, was appointed as a "Member" for Health in the Federal Government. This reduced the fear of the Straits Chinese in Penang that they were given inadequate representation in the Federal Government. In fact, the Straits Chinese community was favoured and over-represented on government bodies such as the Settlement Councils of Malacca and Penang, and the Federal Council in relation to the numbers of this community. The British government also made an attempt to merge Singapore with the Federation by forming a Joint Co-ordination Committee in 1953. This Committee made a serious attempt to persuade Malay leaders to discuss some kind of union or partnership between Singapore and Malaya.¹⁶⁰ It took ten years before Singapore merged with Malaya, together with Sabah and Sarawak under the Federation of Malaysia. But in 1965 Singapore was separated from the Federation.

Conclusion

The colonial government, which was confronted by Chinese political agitation against the Federation policy of 1948, Communist terrorism-- a manifestation of politics from China-- and the Penang secession movements,

needed to change its policy towards the Chinese in Malaya. The new policy to be introduced at the close of 1948 focussed on the process of Malayanization of the Chinese community through the cultivation of Malayan Chinese awareness and denial of foreign (mainland China) influence.

Notes:

1. The Malayan Security Service, Political Intelligence Journal (PIJ), 30 April, 1946, p.1.
2. Ibid.
3. The Malayan Security Service, PIJ, 15 May 1946, p.4.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., p. 6.
8. Ibid., p. 8.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. The Malayan Security Service, PIJ, 30 April 1946, p. 2.
13. Yeo Kim Wah, Political Development in Singapore, 1945-55, Singapore University Press, Singapore, 1973, p. 20.
14. Tan Cheng Lock, Malayan Problems From a Chinese Point of View, Tannisco, Singapore 1947, p. 163. See, telegram to G. Hall, the Secretary of State for the Colonies dated 8 July 1946, in Ibid.
15. Yeo Kim Wah, op.cit., p. 22.
16. Ibid.
17. Tan Cheng Lock, op.cit., p. 127.
18. Yeo Kim Wah, op.cit., p. 22.
19. Ibid., p.23.
20. Ibid.

21. Ibid. p.25. It should be noted that the MCP also hoped Tan Cheng Lock would be able to provide money for the PMCJA. In October 1947, Gerald de Cruz asked Tan to make a monthly contribution of \$200 to the PUTERA-AMCJA. Previously he received \$1200.00 from Tan Cheng Lock. See Letter from Tan Cheng Lock to Eu Chooi Yip, Secretary, MDU, 10 October 1947 in Tan Cheng Lock Papers ,TCL.1.18 ISAS Singapore. See also List of MDU bills from de Cruz, in Tan Cheng Lock Papers, TCL/1/14, ISAS, Singapore.
22. Cited, Yeo Kim Wah, op.cit., p.25.
23. Ibid., p. 26.
24. Cited ibid., p.27.
25. Cited ibid., p.30.
26. Albert Lau Khong Hwa, "The Politics of Union and Citizenship: The Evolution of British Constitutional Policy Towards Malaya and Singapore, 1942-1948," Ph.D. Thesis, SOAS, University of London, 1986, p. 243, see also C0537/1567/50823/52.
27. Cited Albert Lau Khong Hwa, "The Politics of Union...", p. 244.
28. Cited ibid.
29. Ibid., p.245.
30. Ibid., p.248
31. Cited, Tan Cheng Lock, op.cit., p.137.
32. Albert Lau Khong Hwa, "The Politics of Union...", Ph.D. Thesis, p.277.
33. Cited, Tan Cheng Lock, op.cit., p.153.
34. Cited ibid.
35. Federation of Malaya: Summary of Revised Constitutional Proposals accepted by His Majesty's Government, Command Paper 7171, Kuala Lumpur, 1947.
36. R. Kennedy, "Malaya: Colony Without Plan", Far Eastern Survey, 15 August 1945, p. 225.
37. Tan Cheng Lock, op.cit., passim.
38. Yeo Kim Wah, op.cit., p. 35; and Albert Lau, op.cit., p.278.

39. Ibid. p.278.
40. Ibid.
41. Cited, ibid., p.287. See also MSS ,PIJ, 30 October 1947 and CO537/2146/52243/2, p.11.
42. Albert Lau Khong Hwa, "The Politics of Union...", Ph.D. Thesis, p.278.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid., p.280.
45. Yeo Kim Wah, op.cit., p.37.
46. "Comments on The Proposals of the AMCJA-PUTERA...on Citizenship" by W.Linehan, in, Malcolm MacDonald Papers, no.16/10/18-20. see also, Gent to H.T. Bourdillon, 4 October 1949, in Malcolm MacDonald Papers, no. 16/10/17
47. Cited, W. Linehan, "Comments...", op.cit.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. Yeo Kim Wah, op.cit., p.37.
51. Ibid., pp.37-38.
52. "Comments on the Proposals of The AMCJA-PUTERA...On Citizenship" by W.Linehan, in Malcolm MacDonald Papers no.16/10/18-20.
53. Yeo Kim Wah,op.cit., p. 39. The AMCJA-PUTERA did not send the People's Constitution to the local government, but the organising Secretary of the Singapore Eurasian Communists sent the People's Constitution, stage 2 scheme to the Public Relations Offices in Singapore. The local Government got their copies from confidential sources. A copy of the People's Constitution with comments by Linehan had been sent to the Colonial Office. See Malcolm MacDonald Papers, no. 16/10/17.
54. Yeo Kim Wah, op.cit., p. 41.
55. Ibid.
56. MacDonald to Gent, 8 December 1947, in Malcolm MacDonald Papers, no. 16/10/54.

57. Ibid.
58. R. B. Smith, "China and Southeast Asia: The Revolutionary Perspective, 1951", in Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. XIX, No.1, March 1988, p.97. See also, Frank N. Trager, Marxism in Southeast Asia, Stanford University Press, London, 1960; H. Brimmell, Communism in South East Asia, A Political Analysis, Oxford University Press, London, 1959;
59. See for instance, The Malayan Security Service, PIJ, No.14/48, 31 July 1948.
60. J. de Cruz to the editor of the Journal of Southeast Asia Studies, see JSAS. Vol.1, No.1, March, 1970, p.125. See also Cecil H. Sharpley, Great Delusion, The Autobiography of an ex-Communist Leader, William Heinemann Ltd. London, 1952, p. 111.
61. Ralph Hone to F.S.Donnison, 5 May 1949, in CAB 101/66.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. Minutes of a "Conference held under the Chairmanship of H.E. the Governor-General..." on 26 June 1947, John D. Dalley Papers, MSS. Ind. Ocn. s. 254(11), Rhodes House Library, Oxford.
65. Albert Lau Khong Hwa, "The Politics of Union..." Ph.D. Thesis, p.284.
66. Minutes of a "Conference held under the Chairmanship of H.E. the Governor-General..." on 26 June 1947, John D. Dalley Papers, MSS. Ind. Ocn. s. 254(11), Rhodes House Library, Oxford.
67. See preface by Norman Parmer in, M. Stenson, Repression and Revolt: The Origins of the 1948 Communist Insurrection in Malaya and Singapore, Ohio University Centre for International Studies, Southeast Asia Program, 1969, Athens, Ohio. p.v-vii.
68. Ibid., passim.
69. Anthony Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960, Frederick Muller Ltd., London, 1975, pp38-43.
70. Yoji Akashi, "Loi Teck Secretary General of Malayan Communist Party: Potrait of A Professional Double Agent", Paper no.62, The Eight Conference

- International Association of Historians of Asia
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 25th-29th August 1980, pp.1-4.
71. Anthony Short, *op.cit.*, p.40. See also, Yoji Akashi, "Loi Teck Secretary General of Malayan Communist Party...",
 72. Yoji Akashi, "Loi Teck...", pp.20-22. See also, Cheah Boon Kheng, Red Star Over Malaya, Singapore University press, Singapore, 1983, second edition, note no. 63, p.323.
 73. Yoji Akashi, "Loi Teck...", p.21.
 74. Anthony Short, op.cit., p. 41.
 75. McLane, Clarks, B., Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1966, p.136, The Malayan Security Services, PIJ, No.14/48, 31 July 1948, p.20.
 76. The Malayan Security Service, Supplement No.9, issued with The Malayan security Services, PIJ, No.14/48, 31 July 1948, p.18.
 77. Ibid., p. 20.
 78. Anthony Short, op.cit., p. 43.
 79. C. B. McLane, op.cit., p.385.
 80. Ibid.
 81. Ibid.
 82. Cited, Khong Kim Hoong, Merdeka! British Rule and The Struggle for Independence in Malaya, 1945-57, INSAN, Kuala Lumpur, 1984, p. 148.
 83. The Malayan Security Service, PIJ, 31 May 1948, p.354.
 84. Richard Clutterbuck, Riot and Revolution in Singapore and Malaya, 1945-1963, Faber and Faber Limited, London, 1973.
 85. Cited, Khong Kim Hoong, op.cit., p.148.
 86. Anthony Short, op.cit., p.56.
 87. C. B. McLane, op.cit., p. 56.
 88. Anthony Short, op.cit., p. 59.

89. The Malayan Security Service, PIJ., 31 May 1948, p.385.
90. Ibid.
91. The Malayan Security Service, PIJ., 15 July 1948, pp. 506-508.
92. See, The Malayan Security Service, Supplement No.9 of 1948 issued with The Malayan Security Service, PIJ., No. 14/48 on 31 July 1948.
93. Ibid. p.402.
94. Anthony Short, op.cit., pp. 59-60.
95. The Malayan Security Service, PIJ., 31 May 1948, p.356.
96. Ibid.
97. Ibid. .
98. Anthony Short, op.cit., p. 45. See also, "Review of the Emergency in Malaya From June 1948 to August 1957 by the Director of Operations, Malaya", in WO 106/5990.
99. Lucian W. Pye, Guerrilla Communism in Malaya, Princeton, U.S.A., 1956. See also, R.L. Clutterbuck, The Long long War; the Emergency in Malaya, 1948-1960, Cassell, London, 2nd Edition, 1967.
100. Anthony Short, op.cit., p.45.
101. Ibid., passim.
102. Ibid., p. 96.
103. Ibid. pp.102-104.
104. MacDonald to Neil, 19 July 1948, in Malcolm MacDonald Papers, no.22/3/5.
105. Ibid.
106. Anthony Short, op.cit., p.111.
107. Ibid., p.209-210.
108. Ibid., p. 206-230.
109. Ibid., p.207.
110. Cited ibid.

111. Ibid., p.211.
112. Ibid., p.507-508 (appendix)
113. Ibid., p. 212.
114. "Review of the Emergency in Malaya from June 1948 to August 1957 by the Director of Operations, Malaya", p.4, in WO 106/5990.
115. Ibid.
116. See ibid.
117. See ibid.
118. See, "The Humble Petition of the majority of the informed People of Penang and Province Wellesley, to the Right Hon'ble' Arthur Creech Jones, ..Secretary of State for the Colonies, [13 December 1948], in Lim Phaik See, Gerakan Pemisahan Di Pulau Pinang Tahun 1948-51 [Penang Secession Movement in the Years;1948-51]", academic excise for B.A.(Hons), The National University of Malaysia, 1983/84.
119. Cited ibid., p. 183.
120. Cited ibid., p.184.
121. The Straits Budget, March 1948, p.7.
122. The Straits Budget, 17 February 1948, p.10.
123. B. Simandjuntak, Malayan Federalism, Oxford University Press, 1969, pp. 79-81.
124. Ibid., p. 81.
125. See, Lim Phaik See, op.cit., p. 188.
126. Ibid., pp.111-115.
127. See, Mohd Noordin Sopiae, "The Penang Secession Movement, 1948-51", in JSEAS, Vol.1V, N.1, March , 1973, p.55.
128. Cited, Lim Phaik See, op.cit., p.178.
129. Ibid., pp.116-117.
130. Mohd. Noordin Sopiae, From Malayan Union to Singapore Separation, ...op.cit., p. 60.
131. Cited , Lim Phaik See, op.cit., p. 181.

132. "Press Reactions To Penang Secession Movement, (for the period of 21 November- 22 December) 1948, in CO 537/3761.
133. Ibid.
134. Md. Salleh bin Md. Gaus, Politik Melayu Pulau Pinang, (Malay Politics in Penang), Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, Kuala Lumpur, p.71.
135. MacDonald to D.A.Mackay, 14 December 1948, in Malcolm MacDonald Papers no.22/4/43
136. Ibid, no.22/4/44.
137. Mohd Noordin Sopiee, From Malayan Union to Singapore Separation, ...op.cit., p. 66.
138. See MacDonald Papers , no. 22/5/18.
139. MacDonald to Gurney, 17 January 1949, in MacDonald Papers, no. 22/5/50.
140. MacDonald to Sir Franklin Gimson, the Governor of Singapore 4 February 1949, MacDonald Papers no. 22/5/86.
141. Ibid.
142. A fairly detailed background of the CLC is found in chapter six.
143. MacDonald to the Colonial Office, Savingram, No.14, 15 February 1949, MacDonald Papers, N.22/6/45.
144. Mohd. Noordin Sopiee, From Malayan Union to Singapore Separation... op.cit.,p.66.
145. Cited ibid.
146. Henry Gurney to Arthur Creech Jones, 12 January 1950, in CO 717/204/52928/50.
147. Ibid.
148. Ibid.
149. Ibid.
140. Ibid.
151. Ibid.
152. Ibid.

153. "Schedules of Memorials Etc, Presented to the Secretary of State in Malaya", in CO 537/5983.
154. J.H [igham] to Watson (The Colonial Office), 19 May 1950, in CO 717/204/52928/15/50.
155. Ibid.
156. "Record of Meeting Between the Secretary of State and the Penang Secession Committee-Penang- " 31 May 1950, CO 717/204/52928/15/5983.
157. Cited in Md. Salleh bin Gaus, op.cit., p. 176.
158. Mohd Noordin Sopiae, op.cit., p.67.
159. Ibid., passim.
160. See, CO 1030/161.

CHAPTER VI

The Malayanization of Chinese Policy, 1948-1951

In response to the Communist insurrection, the Chinese political agitation against Federal policy, the Penang Secession Movement and developments in China, the British government reemphasized the Malayanization of their Chinese policy. The main aims were to defeat the Communists and win support from the Chinese community. The effort to achieve these goals had several facets:

1. The development of a Malayan-centred Chinese political party.
2. The movement for inter-communal co-operation, particularly on the issues of citizenship, education, Malay economic problems, and the future development of Malaya towards responsible self-government.
3. The fusion of Malay and Chinese nationalism into a Malayan nationalism which had as its object the building of a Malayan nation of different races.

Part 1

A Revival of a Chinese Policy

According to the Annual Report for 1948 of the Department of Chinese Affairs, "1948 was a difficult year for the Chinese community in the Federation."¹ First,

they faced the future with uncertainty as a result of the Federal policy which gave the Sultans and the Malay representatives controlling powers over legislation and also restrictions over citizenship rights for this community. Second, they faced various problems after the MCP launched an armed revolt against the Malayan government. The problems arose from the fact that the Emergency was largely a Chinese affair.

The MCP, the guerrillas, and the Min Yuen (the civilian arm of the MCP) were maintained and supported by the Chinese community. The Chinese squatters, particularly in the remote settlements, provided food and intelligence for these organizations. Thus government operations to wipe out the Communist guerrillas in one way or other affected the Chinese community. Some of the measures to defeat the Communists involved large-scale arrests and detentions of Chinese, the evacuation of Chinese squatters and also the destruction of Chinese settlements such as Kachau Village in Selangor.² In certain circumstances, Chinese who were innocent but suspected as Communists were shot on the spot by government forces.³ The Chinese themselves in fact became the target of Communist attacks because they were members or supporters of the Kuomintang or because of their failure to support and cooperate with the guerillas.

The Emergency also created interracial conflict between the Chinese community and the Malays. The conflict was aggravated by the fact that the local forces used by the colonial government were mostly Malays, against Communist guerrillas which were in effect created and maintained by the Chinese community. Meanwhile the Chinese public at large displayed a "fence-straddling" attitude towards the government's efforts to defeat the Communists.⁴

According to the Annual Report there were three reasons why the Chinese community did not come to support and cooperate with the government in its effort to suppress the Communists.⁵ First, they did not have much confidence in the power of the government to maintain law and order in the remote settlements, villages and small towns. In fact, the power of the government in these areas was never properly re-established since the end of the Second World War. Second, the Chinese squatters were *too frightened of reprisals* to give any information regarding terrorist activities or movements. Third, the Chinese had the least to lose from a Communist victory. In fact, it should be noted that they would probably gain something better if the Chinese dominated MCP took over power, rather than remain in their present position under the Federal policy. Furthermore, they were unwilling to express public approval of a government campaign which involved Chinese who were the victims of

circumstances. These groups were those who were neither guilty nor innocent but had been associated with the Communists either on account of the patriotic common front during the Japanese occupation or because they were exposed by terrorist pressure and without protection of the security forces.

With this background, the Department of Chinese Affairs felt it was necessary to evolve a new or special Chinese policy. This department admitted past policy on the Chinese had been a mistake. According to the Annual Report on Chinese affairs:

No attempt was made [after the War] to curtail the freedom of association, though for Chinese this had the particular consequence of producing a variety of organisations, some of which were not consistent with the policy of Malayanisation on account of their China bias or of the civil unrest which they were trying to bring about. ⁶

The Department of Chinese Affairs pointed out the need for a special policy for the Chinese community which it described as "one of bringing the maximum pressure on all persons whose behaviour was prolonging the emergency while, at the same time, encouraging the Chinese to believe that the Federal government was fundamentally concerned for their well-being in the country and wishes as a first step to increase the liaison between

government and the Chinese community which had been interrupted after the return of the Civil government in 1946."⁷ This department also stressed that the Federal government had the responsibility "not to allow the Chinese to imagine that their position was deteriorating so rapidly as to make it likely that their morale and loyalties would disappear completely."⁸

Henry Gurney, who replaced Gent as a High Commissioner of Malaya, shared the same view as the Department of Chinese Affairs on policy towards the Chinese community. He wrote to Creech Jones, Secretary of States for the Colonies, that it was necessary to have a special policy regarding the Chinese. In his view, "the Malayanisation of the Chinese will be a long and difficult process in which wise guidance and help will be required at every step."⁹ He also pointed out that there was a comparative lack among the Chinese of the kind of public spirit which was the essential basis of true democracy."¹⁰ These facts, he argued, would impair Britain's "well-intentioned attempts to lay the foundations of Malayan democratic government."¹¹

Henry Gurney also agreed with the Department of Chinese Affairs' view that past policy on the Chinese had been a mistake. In his opinion, as a result of the previous policy, "on the one hand, there was an enormous expansion of the Kuomintang, whose interests and outlook

were completely bound up with Nationalist China and on the other hand, the attempted regimentation of Malayan labour by the Malayan Communist Party, who were undoubtedly acting under orders from Moscow."¹² The final result of the previous policy was the emergency, "which has compelled the Malayan government to interfere with the freedom of the individual in a way unknown in Malaya since the British have been associated with its government."¹³

The developments in China also induced the local government to reemphasize the need for a policy for "Malayanising the Chinese."¹⁴ At the end of 1948, it seemed that events in China were more dangerous for the Malayan government than the Communist revolt in Malaya itself. The Communists in China looked certain to defeat the Kuomintang and take over a large part of that country. The Malayan government feared the "excitement about the news from China would affect the Chinese community in Malaya's attitude towards the government and towards other communities in this country."¹⁵ Henry Gurney was of the opinion that it was clearly in the interests of the Chinese "to cut themselves adrift from China especially now that the Communists seem likely to secure control of the whole country."¹⁶ "If possible" said Gurney, "the prospect of becoming Malayan must be made more attractive to them."

The colonial government began to evolve a new Chinese policy at the end of 1948. Among the steps that were taken, was holding of a discussion on the liaison aspect of the new policy. According to the Annual Report on Chinese Affairs, "the revival of the Chinese Advisory Boards and support for the proposed Malayan Chinese Association were undoubtedly the most important features of this part of the policy."¹⁷ Another part of the new policy "was the establishment of a Government Committee to investigate the squatter problems and make recommendations and proposal to appoint two Chinese speaking 'squatter officers', in order to encourage the Chinese to look for understanding and confidence from the Government."¹⁸

The Department of Chinese Affairs pointed out that "...the special problems connected with the Chinese community, problems which impinged on internal security, tenure of land... and on the political question of the prospects of the Chinese in the Federation, were not easy to solve."¹⁹ It stressed that the role of the government should be like the Chinese community's doctor;" giving it unpleasant medicine now in order to bring it back to health and ensuring it a place under the Malayan sun."²⁰

The British government realized that in order to win support of and Malayanize the Chinese community it needed to amend the Federal citizenship clause which

restricted citizenship rights for this community. It also realized that any steps taken towards this direction would antagonize the Malays. Thus it needed to encourage the Malays to adopt an accommodating attitude towards Chinese demands. On the other hand, the government also realized the fear among the Malay leaders of Chinese economic power. Thus the local government encouraged the Chinese and the Malay leaders to solve their problems through "consultation and consent" between both communities' leaders. At the same time it needed to encourage the formation of a Chinese association, equivalent to UMNO, to represent this community.

Part 11

The Development of Malayan-Centred Chinese Politics: The Malayan Chinese Association

As a result of the Communist insurrection, the British attitude towards "foreign Chinese political parties" changed. The liberal policy which had been introduced after the Second World War was replaced by the policy of the Malayanization of Chinese politics. In July 1948 the MCP, its youth wing and Ex-Comrades Association and other Communist-led organizations had been declared illegal. On 25 February 1949, just two days before the inauguration of the Malayan Chinese

Association, British officials in Malaya and Singapore took steps to ban other "foreign Chinese political parties" including the China Democratic League and China Democracy Promotion Society.²¹ The British considered the existence of foreign-centred political parties as a risk to internal security in the Federation and in Singapore, particularly after the establishment of Communist government in China. The local government feared these political parties might easily become instruments of the Communists or other active forms of support for Communist "bandits" in Malaya. At this stage, the government felt it unnecessary to take action against the Kuomintang "which in any case ...[during that time] appears to be dying naturally."²² Thus British officials created a political vacuum in the Chinese community and prepared the ground for the building of a locally-centred Malayan Chinese Association as a new force in Malayan Chinese politics.

There was no doubt that the local government played an important role in the formation of the MCA. However the idea for the formation of this organization was conceived by Tan Cheng Lock during the war. As the present writer has indicated, Tan Cheng Lock informed the Secretary of State for the Colonies in September 1943 of the intention of the Malayan Chinese to form this association. However "the formation of the MCA did not materialise when Cheng Lock first proposed it, as no

support for the idea was forthcoming from the colonial authorities"²³ or the Chinese community. According to Heng Pek Koon, "Cheng lock himself did not possess the organisational resources and support base to successfully launch a pan-Malayan political party."²⁴

At first, Tan Cheng Lock made an attempt to form a Malayan Chinese League in early May 1948. Its main aim was:

To wean the China-born Chinese from China and Chinese politics and encourage them to transfer their love, for the good of all concerned including themselves, to Malaya which should aim at attaining to full dominion status within the British Commonwealth and Empire, through the organization of the Malayan Chinese League ... with a view ultimately to merging it in or affiliating it with a Malayan National Unity League... to embrace all races.²⁵

According to a Political Intelligence Report of 15 January 1949, Tan Cheng Lock's attempt fell flat, but he was "still active in urging unity among the Chinese who are prepared to make Malaya their home."²⁶ On 5 December 1948, once again Tan Cheng Lock mentioned his intention of forming a Malayan Chinese Association in his speech to the Malacca Chinese Chamber of Commerce.²⁷ The moderate Chinese leaders who were also members of the Federal Council came to support this proposal. The Department of Chinese Affairs also supported it. In its

Annual Report for 1948, it mentioned that the "... support for the proposed Malayan Chinese Association was undoubtedly the most important feature ... [of Britain's new]... policy."²⁸ MacDonald, Commissioner General, welcomed this idea for the formation of a Chinese "Association" but considered the timing to announce the proposals of its formation was unsuitable. He wrote to Tan Cheng Lock on 15 December 1948:

"...[I]...am personally averse to steps being taken in this direction at the moment. I think it would be wise to have the proposed talks with some of our Malay friends in the first instance. Propaganda in favour of the formation of the [Malayan Chinese] Association before that might be misunderstood and arouse suspicions amongst the Malays. After preliminary talks have taken place, there could be no such misunderstanding."²⁹

However, before Malay opinion was sought, Tan Cheng Lock and the Chinese members of the Federal Council began to organize the MCA. On 19 December, Gurney send a telegram to the Colonial Office informing them that the step was being under-taken by the leading Chinese to form an association which would be open to all who regard Malaya as their home.³⁰ The object of this association was to co-operate with the government and other communities in restoring peace and good order in the country. According to Anthony Short, "Rules were being drafted and were to be discussed with Gurney."³¹

On 29 December 1948, the first Sino-Malay talks were held in Johore Bharu, attended by Tan Cheng Lock, Dato Onn and other Malay and Chinese leaders. According to Thio Chan Bee who also attended this meeting, Tan Cheng Lock sought the approval of the Malay leaders for his proposals to form the Malayan Chinese Association.³² He mentioned that the objective of the proposed MCA was "to co-operate with the Malays to build a new nation."³³ Thus there was no reason for the Malays to oppose this proposal.

In the meantime, Gurney also held a discussion with MacDonald on Chinese proposals to form the MCA, and interracial problems. On 6 January 1949, he wrote to MacDonald:

Malay feeling against the Chinese is building up rapidly. This is only to be expected when the fight with the bandits is largely between Malay Police and Chinese and I should be grateful for anything you can do to bring home to the Chinese the grave danger in which, in my view, their good name in Malaya now stands. As I said to you [MacDonald] I do not think there is any time to lose in getting the Malayan Chinese Association formed and into active operation. Responsible Chinese are wasting their time talking about the secession of Penang while their Rome is burning.³⁴

From this time onwards, Gurney and MacDonald continued to put pressure on the moderate Chinese leaders to organize the proposed MCA. On 25 January 1949 Gurney

held a meeting with Chinese leaders including H.S. Lee, Yong Shook Lin and Khoo Teck Ee.³⁵ He tried to persuade them to accept the restoration of peace and order as a prominent objective of the association. On 15 February MacDonald held discussions with some Singapore Chinese leaders such as Lee Kong Chian and Thio Chan Bee regarding the proposed talks of the CLC and also regarding squatter problems. He informed them that Gurney would hold a discussion with the proposed MCA members in order to inform them about government policy on squatter problems and also to seek their opinion on that matter.³⁶ It was no doubt the government's intention to pressurize the proposed MCA to support government policy and get their cooperation regarding the Chinese squatters. It was made known to the Chinese leaders that the government would take strong action against the squatters including the repatriation of large numbers of squatters from particular areas where the record of support for the terrorists and murders was bad. Tan Cheng Lock, however, was in favour of resettlement of the squatters rather than repatriation. According to the Annual Report of Chinese Affairs:

This dawning realisation prepared the ground for the remarkable response to the Malayan Chinese Association—a response born almost of despair—and a willingness to speak up on behalf of the squatters not merely as unfortunate individuals deserving pity but as the

primary obstacle to the restoration of peace in Malaya and therefore a responsibility for the Chinese community.³⁷

In the meantime, according to Heng Pek Koon, the representatives of the Kuomintang (Nationalist) government in China, knowing the fall of Peking was imminent, used their remaining time to mobilise support for the proposed MCA which they hoped would take the place of the Kuomintang as instruments of propagation of the Nationalist cause to the Chinese in Malaya.³⁸ This role was obvious in the formation of the proposed MCA branches at the state level. For instance, a few weeks before the inaugural meeting of the MCA, Haji Ibrahim Ma, the Kuomintang consul in Ipoh, took steps to prepare the groundwork for the formation of a society to become the Perak Branch of the MCA. The proposed society was not formed, but the Chinese consul was able to spread pro-MCA feelings among the most prominent Chinese leaders in Perak. He also appealed to them to attend the inaugural meeting of the proposed MCA in Kuala Lumpur. He also directed the local Chinese guilds and associations in various states to help organize the setting up of MCA branches.

Towards the end of February the colonial government took steps to ban China-oriented Chinese political parties such as CLD and paved the way for the

emergence of the MCA. The British also, through diplomatic channels, took steps not to let the proposed MCA be used by Communist China as its instrument to support the Communist terrorists. During this time it was urgent to launch the MCA as a counterbalance to what in Britain's view was "Tan Kah Kee's recent ill-judged telegram of congratulation to the Communist leaders in China which had created some dismay and uncertainty in Chinese circles in the Federation."³⁹ The government also took steps to ban or prohibit the organization of Kuomintang branches by repealing the Societies Ordinance (Amendment) of 1947. In actual fact this was done in 1950. By this time the Kuomintang government had been defeated by the Communist Party and withdrew to the island of Taiwan.

After nearly three months of discussion and preparation, an inaugural meeting of the MCA was held on 27 February 1949 in Kuala Lumpur.⁴⁰ It was sponsored by the sixteen Chinese members of the Federal Council. The majority of them were prominent Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Chinese guilds and associations (huay kuan) leaders. Among them were H. S. Lee, Leong Yew Koh and Khoo Teik Ee. The Straits Chinese leaders who sponsored this meeting were Tan Cheng Lock, Tan Siew Sin, Ee Yew Kim, Dr. Lee Tiang Keng and Mrs. B. H. Oon, Tan Cheng Lock was appointed as a chairman of the Protem Committee

and the first president, Yong Shook Lin was the Secretary General and Khoo Tek Ee was treasurer.

The appointment of Tan Cheng Lock received the clear endorsement of the Commissioner-General and the High Commissioner of Malaya. At first it was MacDonald who convinced Gurney that Tan Cheng Lock was the most suitable choice for the President of the MCA. He wrote to Gurney as follows:

...[Tan Cheng Lock] commands high respect amongst many of the Chinese, leaders and others, in ...[many] parts of the Federation and in Singapore....they [the Chinese leaders] recognise his power as a public figure amongst the politically minded Chinese...he was almost wholly responsible for the famous Hartal, by which the Chinese sought to express their dissatisfaction with the Federal Constitution. In other ways and on other occasions then, he was the most influential voice in the Chinese circles.... Even the Chinese in Penang-- though they were then more or less led by a man of real wisdom, Ong Chong Keng-- submitted to his influence.⁴¹

He added that:

[The moderate Chinese leaders were afraid] that if ...[Tan Cheng Lock] was not the President of MCA he might, go off at a wild tangent [mix with the radical elements]... and would drag a lot of other Chinese with him. Elevating him to the official leadership is partly an insurance policy against this.⁴²

MacDonald himself admitted Tan Cheng Lock had his own merits for assumption of the leadership of the Chinese community. According to MacDonald, Tan Cheng Lock "had a longer experience of politics, a greater and more courageous outspokenness on public platforms than most of the other Chinese leaders."⁴³ Gurney agreed with MacDonald's view on the quality of Tan Cheng Lock as a leader of the MCA. He wrote to J.J. Paskin, the head of the Eastern Department of the Colonial Office as follows:

He commands considerable respect among the Chinese. He is 66 years old; he has had experience in Malayan policies, he is sincere; and he is able to rise above the arguments of the different dialect groups in Chinese society. He is sincere in his efforts to do the best for the Chinese. He has, therefore a strong influence with moderate Chinese opinion here. He is still independent and will support the government if he is convinced that the Government desires to treat the Chinese fairly.⁴⁴

Although the government gave full backing to the formation of the MCA, it failed to influence this body to make a public declaration that it was on the government's side in restoring peace and order in the country. The president of the MCA only highlighted the desire of this organization for "attaining inter-communal understanding and friendship, particularly, between the Malay and Chinese...."⁴⁵ He also pointed out the desire of the Chinese to unite amongst themselves and with other

communities to "make this land, which feeds, nourishes, and sustains ... [them], [as] one country and one nation and the object of their loyalty, love and devotion."⁴⁶

Towards June 1949 some more points were added to the MCA's objectives. Among others were : "To safeguard the interests and welfare of the Chinese socially, economically and politically through legal and constitutional means; and to maintain law and order so that Malaya will achieve peaceful and orderly progress."⁴⁷ The addition of the last point reflected the MCA's willingness to compromise with the government. The latter wished this body to declare its support for the government side in maintaining law and order in the country. The MCA maintained the link with the government in other ways. The MCA's constitution stated explicitly that the "Chinese members of the Legislative and Executive Councils would automatically become officers of the Association."⁴⁸ Thus according to Khong Kim Hoong, "... the Government would have a direct influence in the decision-making bodies of the Association" as some of its officials were nominated indirectly by the government.⁴⁹

The MCA, as the handmaiden of the government, was asked to perform a special role or "duties" in government efforts to defeat the Communist insurgency.

According to Anthony Short, from the beginning "it was asked to assist the police in the penetration of the MCP, to comment on CID classification of detainees; to arrange sureties ; and to promote incidents of surrender."⁵⁰ The most well-known MCA role in counter-insurgency was in relation to the squatter problem. In order to deny the Communists any support from the squatters, they were resettled in "New villages" which were completely fenced-in with barbed wire and guarded by the local police forces.⁵¹ The resettlement scheme was implemented by Lt. General Harold Briggs, Director of Operations, in the middle of 1950. By the end of 1952, 470,509 had been settled in 440 New Villages throughout Malaya. The MCA was asked to provide social services for the Chinese community in the 'New Villages'. It was allowed by the government to conduct public lotteries in order to obtain money for the purpose of funding social service for the benefit of the 'New Villages'. The MCA itself gained some benefit from conducting public lotteries. At first only MCA members were allowed to take part in these gambling activities. Thus the people who wanted to take part in these lotteries would join the organization. The MCA also was able to spread its influence among the Chinese in the 'New Villages' as it was the only Chinese organization to help them. However, as a consequence its leaders and supporters were labelled as "running dogs" of the government and became targets for terrorist attacks.

Part 111

The Communities Liaison Committee

The Communities Liaison Committee was an unofficial body but in fact it was a policy making avenue for the colonial government in Malaya. Ideas, originating from the government, were put forward by MacDonald, (either directly or through the Chinese leaders) for discussion by this body. Later it adopted them as its own and forwarded them back to the government. The government then took steps to make a further study on the CLC's proposals and adopted them as government policy. The members of the CLC were prominent leaders of the UMNO, MCA and others. The meetings of this body "were held in sanctum sanctorum such as the ...[Commissioner]-General's house at Johore Bahru, King's House in Kuala Lumpur (the residence of the British High Commissioner) and ... Government House in Penang."⁵² The colonial government played an important role in guiding and giving ideas on the subjects to be discussed and the timing of the meetings. MacDonald, Commissioner-General told the Colonial Office that;

Our (the government) tactics are to complete discussion of these economic problems before we consider the political aspects of relations between the communities. If the Malays feel assured, as a result of these discussions, that the Chinese and other communities are in earnest in their desire to improve the economic position of the Malays, and that practical results are likely to follow the Committee's deliberations in this field, then I [MacDonald] think the Malays will be ready to be fairly forthcoming in political discussion. They realise that it will then be for them to make some concessions to the non-Malay communities.⁵³

Malcolm MacDonald was the architect of the Communities Liaison Committee which was formed to solve interracial conflict in the face of the MCP insurrection. In early November 1948, MacDonald held a series of personal discussions with Malay and Chinese leaders in the hope of getting them to meet each other and make a serious attempt to reach agreement on inter-communal co-operation and aims in the Federation and Singapore. He was able to persuade Dato Onn and won over Tan Cheng Lock, who had led the critics of government policy under the Federal constitution to work together in the formation of the Sino-Malay Goodwill Committee.⁵⁴ Henry Gurney, the High Commissioner of the Federation and Gimson, the Governor of Singapore also played an important part. Gurney and Gimson worked closely together to avoid taking action that might discourage the Chinese leaders from attending the proposed Malay Goodwill

Committee. For instance Gurney asked Gimson to defer the introduction of the bill dealing with the banishment of the British subjects from the Settlements of Penang and Malacca. Gimson informed Gurney that:

I understand that considerable progress is being made with arrangements for full discussions between Dato Onn and leading representatives of the Chinese Community in Malaya...to reconcile differences in view point between Malays and Chinese. Meeting has been arranged for 29th December [1948]. Malcolm MacDonald is to be present. Cancellation of meeting might easily result if you proceed with legislation which will make Straits born Chinese subject to banishment....⁵⁵

The first meeting between the Malay and Chinese leaders was held at Dato Onn's house in Johore on 29 December 1948. The Chinese leaders who were invited to attend the meeting, or in fact "dinner" were C.C.Tan, S.Q. Wong, Lim Han Hoe, Thio Chan Bee, Lee Kong Chian, Tan Chin Tuan, Tan Cheng Lock, Yong Shook Lin, and Khoo Teik Ee. Most of them were from Singapore except the last three. The second meeting was held in a club in Penang where the Penang Chinese Councillors acted as hosts. At the second meeting, five Malays and five Chinese leaders were selected to continue discussions and try to work out details of an agreement for interacial cooperation. The five Malays were led by Dato Onn. The Chinese group consisted of the leading Federal Councillors such as Yong

Shook Lin from Kuala Lumpur, Dr. Lee Tiang Keng of Penang and also Tan Cheng Lock and C. C. Tan, a member of the Singapore Legislative Council.⁵⁶ Malcolm MacDonald considered the selection and participation of members from Singapore important, as he and Gurney and Gimson hoped "at a later stage these talks may help them to bring the Federation and Singapore closer together in some form."⁵⁷

The Sino-Malay Goodwill Committee faced its first snag as there was no suitable member to serve as chairman. The Malay and Chinese leaders asked MacDonald to become chairman of the Committee. However, he refused this suggestion, on the grounds that he was not a member of the Committee and he attended the meeting as an observer. In his opinion, the discussions of the Committee should be wholly the responsibility of the unofficial committee leaders. As an observer he had the right to take part in the discussions but without making any commitment. The members agreed with his view, and one of them proposed that Dato Onn should be their chairman. Dato Onn also refused on the ground that "he wished to be free to take a full part in the discussions without the possible inhibitions of a chairman who has to seek to reconcile divergent partizan points of view."⁵⁸ In this situation he suggested Thuraisingham, the Ceylonese Federal Legislative Councillor as a chairman whom he hoped to be a more 'neutral' individual. MacDonald also

gave a suggestion to the Chinese and Malay leaders to add members from other communities to the Committee, including members from the Indian, Eurasian and European communities.⁵⁹ Thus the Sino-Malay Goodwill Committee was renamed as the Communities Liaison Committee or CLC. According to MacDonald, the first and second meetings of the CLC, "...revealed a possible basis for agreement between the Malays and Chinese on both economic and political questions."⁶⁰ He told the Colonial Office that "it would be foolish to over estimate their importance at this stage, for the discussions were concerned mostly with general principles."⁶¹ "Nevertheless," he added, "Some of the most controversial questions, e g. the conditions applying to Federal citizenship, were probed, and a goodly measure of agreement appeared possible."⁶² "Moreover," he continued, "the meetings have engendered quite a lot of sincere goodwill between the two communities, and a resolve to continue the discussions in the hope of achieving practical results over a wide area of subjects."⁶³

The CLC held its third meeting in Johore Bahru on 9 and 10 February 1949.⁶⁴ The meeting proceeded to discuss the economic position of the Malays, with a view to seeing what help the Chinese might give towards (a) the greater employment of Malays in industry, etc. and (b) the taking up by Malays of positions of

responsibility in business affairs. Later they discussed political relations between the Malays and the non-Malays, ie. the introduction of non-Malays into administrative services and the qualifications for Federal citizenship. The Committee also discussed education, particularly with a view to bringing up children in Malaya as Malayan with a sense of Malayan citizenship, patriotism and outlook.⁶⁵

During the third meeting, the members of the CLC's attention also focussed on another problem faced by Malaya. The people in Penang had announced their intention to move a resolution in favour of secession on 10 February 1949 at the meeting of the Penang Settlement Council.⁶⁶ One of the CLC members from Penang, Dr. Lee Tiang Keng did not attend the CLC in Johore Bahru as he had been invited to second the resolution in the Settlement Council Debate. Dato Gantang raised the matter at the CLC meeting and said that Dr. Lee Tiang Keng's attitude seemed to indicate insincerity on the part of Chinese members of the Committee. The Malays strongly opposed the secession of Penang from the Federation of Malaya, which was likely to raise intercommunal quarrels on a grave scale. In the Malays' opinion Dr. Lee's action was a challenge to the very purposes for which the CLC had been formed. Thus they wondered whether there was any point in the CLC proceeding with its work.

Other CLC members including the Chairman, Thuraisingham and the Chinese members also strongly disapproved of Dr. Lee's action. The Committee decided that three of its members Thuraisingham, Khoo Teik Ee and C.C. Tan-- should fly to Penang and persuade the members of the Secession Committee to postpone the proposed debate on the secession of Penang. The CLC made a resolution urging this, on the grounds that a debate at this time would prejudice the prospect of closer inter-communal understanding and cooperation which at that time appeared quite bright. However, one of the Secession Committee members strongly opposed any postponement of the debate on Penang secession.⁶⁷

The Malays felt very hurt by the action of the Penang secession movement. In their view, there was little goodwill on the part of individuals in other communities towards a movement for intercommunal co-operation. Thus they decided to postpone any further discussion by the CLC. However, MacDonald persuaded them and pointed out that this action was unreasonable and unfair, and he urged the CLC to carry on its meetings regardless of the Penang 'incident'. At last, the Committee agreed and they decided to hold a meeting in Kuala Lumpur on 18,19, and 20 February 1949.

The fourth meeting of the CLC was held in Kuala Lumpur on 18 and 19 February. According to MacDonald, the Malays had somewhat recovered from their anger at the Penang secessionists' conduct at the previous meeting.⁶⁸ The agenda for this meeting and also for the next meeting in Ipoh was based on the economic problems of the Malays.

The discussion of the economic problems of the Malays was carried out in four Sessions of the Committee. It began with the examination of the problem of 'economic adjustment' between the various communities in Malaya. The members of the Committee agreed on a resolution that it was of great importance for the non-Malays themselves and the Malays to cooperate in every possible way to improve the economic position of the Malays. Therefore the Malays should take a full share in the economic life of the country. The Malays pointed out that they could not compete with the Chinese, who they alleged used bribery to enable them to get licences for business, trade and other things. As a result, they said, the Malays were at a disadvantage and would never have an equal chance against the Chinese in establishing themselves in small businesses and trades. The members decided to draft a resolution for the government to tighten up legislation, in order to eliminate bribery and corruption. The Malays also pointed out that the Chinese had a virtual monopoly on major economic activities such as transport and others. The Committee made a formula to

ensure the Malays achieved economic parity with the non-Malays. It was suggested that the Malays' share in business should be increased, and that a partnership should be created between this community and the Chinese.

At the Kuala Lumpur meeting, the British plan to promote interracial cooperation had achieved some encouraging results. According to MacDonald:

- a. members of each community spoke quite frankly about the other communities, and no-one took offence at this;
- b. The Chinese and other non-Malays showed great readiness to make concessions to the Malays in the economic field;
- c. The Malays were impressed with this and lost something at least of their suspicions of the bona fides of the non-Malays on the Committee....⁶⁹

The discussion of the economic problems of the Malays was continued in other CLC meetings until May 1949. The CLC found a formula to help improve the economic position of the Malays as follows:

1. The government should subsidise Malay business ventures and set up trade schools to train the Malays, in order to enable them to participate in the modern economic sector.
2. Certain industries should be opened to the Malays, such as the transport sector.
3. Preferential treatment should be given to the Malays in the allocation of educational and employment opportunities.
4. Non-Malay businessmen and employers should increase the proportion of Malay participation in all economic sectors, such as tin-mining, rubber industries and retail trades.⁷⁰

After an interval of three months the CLC resumed its meetings in August 1949.⁷¹ The most controversial subjects were the 'special position' of the Malays and the Federal citizenship clause in the Federal Constitution. As the present writer has indicated elsewhere, the Chinese leaders strongly opposed the Federal citizenship clause which denied the majority of Chinese Malayan citizenship, either by automatic operation of the law or through application and naturalization. It took the CLC quite a long time to come to terms on this matter. Actually MacDonald himself realized that discussion on "the political aspects of relations between the various communities was the most difficult part of the CLC's task" and "might end in wide disagreement between the members of the committee."⁷²

However, at least the CLC was able to reach a tentative agreement on some political matters. On the question of qualifications for federal citizenship, it was agreed to accept the principle that only those who owed Malaya their loyalty and regarded Malaya as their permanent home should qualify for citizenship. The Committee stressed that the loyalty must be an 'undivided loyalty' which rejected dual citizenship or nationality. The Chinese members made a suggestion that all non-Malays born in the Federation and permanently domiciled there should become citizens automatically by process of law.

These suggestions were similiar to the suggestion by H. S. Lee and Leong Yew Koh, the Chinese representatives in the Consultative Committee who published a minority report. Braddell, the UMNO Legal Adviser, who was also a member of the CLC, supported the Chinese proposals. The Malays, particularly Dato Onn did not flatly oppose them. The attitude of the Malays seemed to have changed very much following the Malayan Union regarding the question of citizenship for the non-Malays. Dato Onn himself admitted that they would not have considered for a moment any such suggestion three years ago. He said that the Malays accepted the idea that everyone, irrespective of race, who really owed undivided loyalty to Malaya and regarded the country as his permanent home, where he would live and die, should be admitted to Federal citizenship. According to MacDonald, however, Dato Onn still "expressed scepticism about the strength of the loyalty of some of the people involved, and indicated that the Malays must have time to consider the proposals very carefully."⁷³

On some other political matters, the CLC unanimously agreed that "the aim of the Federation of Malaya is the establishment of self-government with sovereign status, and that a nationality should be created for all qualifield citizens irrespective of races".⁷⁴

On some matters, such as the relationship between the Federation and Singapore and the possibility of the amalgamation of both, the Committee could not decide, while on the subject of education it was agreed that:

1. the teaching of the Malay language should be compulsory in all Government and state-aided primary schools.
2. Every facility should be given for the progressive elimination of communal schools, and the establishment of central schools to be attended by children of all races together, the medium of instruction in these schools being Malay or English.⁷⁵

As part of the British policy of the Malayanization of the Chinese, MacDonald suggested that the display of pictures of Sun Yat Sen, Chiang Kai Shek and Mao Tse Tung in Chinese Schools be prohibited, and that the Chinese should be discouraged from hanging up the Chinese flag.

The next meeting was held at the residence of the Commissioner-General at Bukit Serene on 14 to 16 September 1949. After this meeting the CLC released its major statement, which among other things proposed:

1. There should be a thorough reconsideration of the citizenship provisions of the Federal Constitution.
2. That as soon as circumstances permit, legislation should be introduced for the election of members to the several legislatures within the Federation of Malaya.

3. That elections should be introduced for municipalities and states that were ready.
4. That the government should begin preparations on an electoral law.
5. That the franchise should be based on Federal citizenship.
6. That the teaching of Malay and English languages should be compulsory in all government and government-aided schools.⁷⁶

In early 1950, the CLC was able to reach unanimous agreement on the citizenship issue. It resolved "that the jus soli should be introduced forthwith in each of the Malay states, so that all persons of Asiatic or Eurasian parentage who are born in that state, are thereby entitled ...[to them to become] Federal Citizens under the terms of the present Federal constitution...."⁷⁷ This was a major concession made by Dato Onn to Tan Cheng Lock's demands. It was made after the Chinese leaders agreed on the "implementation of a Malay special rights policy" and "economic privileges."⁷⁸

The Government Response to the CLC's Proposals--

The Citizenship Issue

As a consequence of the CLC discussion, the British government began to draft a new bill in the middle of 1951 to amend the Federation Agreement with a view of relaxing the citizenship provisions in favour of non-Malays. On 23 August 1951, the Attorney-General forwarded the new bill for a discussion in a conference between the High Commissioner, the Resident Commissioner,

and British Advisers, held at King's House, Kuala Lumpur.⁷⁹ However, the British government did not fully adopt the CLC suggestion on the qualifications for citizenship--including the principle of the jus soli. According to Heng Pek Khon, the reason for the colonial government's withdrawal of complete support for this principle was based on "its concern that the sudden granting of citizenship to large numbers of non-Malays, potentially more than 50% of the voting population, would be both destabilizing and politically unacceptable to the Malays."⁸⁰ The purpose of the bill was to provide citizenship for the non-Malays who demonstrated their assimilation "to this country's way of life"⁸¹ but it stressed the need to safeguard the Malays against "submergence by alien ways of life." According to L. Finkelstein, the chief advantage of the provisions under this bill over the earlier terms of the Federal Agreement was that naturalization no longer required a demonstration of literacy, but merely ability "to speak the Malay or English language with reasonable proficiency."⁸²

As the government itself could not accept all the recommendations of the CLC on the subject of Federal citizenship, Chinese leaders such as H.S. Lee, the president of the ACCC considered that the CLC's efforts had proven fruitless and asked the British government for

the appointment of an independent body or a royal commission to make a report on the constitution of the Federation of Malaya. They also wished recommendations to be made on the removal of the grievances of a very large section of the Malayan population.⁸³ The ACCC argued, how "will the Federation of Malaya become a self-governing country if these hundreds of thousands of Chinese were not granted the rights to which they are entitled by their birth?"⁸⁴ The MCA reaction to the bill was reported to be divided. Tan Cheng Lock opposed the bill strongly and demanded that the government appoint a royal commission. According to him, a proper process of Malayanization of the Chinese could not be achieved without the extension of jus soli to the non-Malays and a generous offer to the China-born Chinese.⁸⁵ According to him, the "only effective way of weaning the China-born Chinese from being obsessed with Chinese national politics is to make a generous offer of Malayan citizenship, as, -for instance, that enunciated in the original Malayan Union scheme of 1945."⁸⁶

The Federation of Malaya Agreement (Amendment) Ordinance (1951) did not satisfy either the Malays or the non-Malays. However, this amendment was actually more liberal than the original Federal Citizenship. It enabled nearly half of the Chinese population in Malaya to become Malayan citizens. The Federal of Malaya Agreement (Amendment Ordinance (1951) was referred to a select

committee for further examination and become Law in 1952.

Education Issue

As a result of the CLC's proposals on the need to change the education system, the government appointed a committee in 1951, under the chairmanship of L. J. Barnes, Director of Social Training, Oxford University. This committee consisted of nine Malays and five European members. The aims of the Barnes Committee were "to enquire into the adequacy or otherwise of the educational facilities available for the Malays."⁸⁷ However, it also had a hidden motive which, according to J. E. Jayasuria was, "to strike a death blow to Chinese schools with their persistent communist threat."⁸⁸ The Committee released a report which was known as the Report of the Committee on Malay Education or Barnes Report in June 1951. The Barnes Report reflected the government's intention to encourage the Malayization of the Chinese and other non-Malays through the education system. The report made a recommendation for the termination of government aid to vernacular schools and the formation of an interracial National School at primary level. This National School would be open to all pupils regardless of race and staffed by teachers who were Federal citizens and possessed the proper qualifications. The mediums of instruction were to be only in Malay and English. The

Report demanded that non-Malay communities make some sacrifices. It said:

When all this has been said, the fact remains, that Chinese and Indians are being asked to give up gradually their own vernacular schools, and to send their children... to schools where Malay is the only oriental language taught.

We repeat here that our proposed new school is conceived as a school of citizenship, a nation-building school. We have set up bilingualism in Malay and English as its objective because we believe that all parents who regard Malaya as their permanent home and the object of their undivided loyalty will be happy to have their children educated in those languages. If any parents were unhappy about this, their unhappiness would properly be taken as an indication that they did not so regard Malaya. On the other hand, all non-Malay parents who avail themselves of the new facilities, and who set aside their vernacular attachments in the interests of a new social unity, have a right to be welcomed without reserve by the Malay people as fellow-builders and fellow-citizens.⁸⁹

The Barnes Report "sparked off a storm of protests from Chinese social organizations from all over Malaya."⁹⁰ Tan Siew Sin, son of Tan Cheng Lock, described the Barnes Report as "embodying the maximum of racial bigotry, racial intolerance and a deep-seated ignorance of fundamental political principles."⁹¹ The government was forced to take action by appointing another committee. The committee contained two Chinese members; W.P. Fenn and Wu Teh-yao, both of whom were non-

Malayans. The committee was called to study the problems of Chinese schools with particular reference to:

(i) bridging the gap between the present communal system of school and the time when education will be on a non-communal basis with English and Malay as the medium of instruction and another language as an optional subject, and advising on (ii) preparation of text-books for present use with a Malayan as distinct from a Chinese background and content. ⁹²

The Fenn-Wu Committee produced a report which was to strike a major blow to the Malayanization policy. This report reached a different conclusion from the Barnes Report. In contrast to the Barnes Report, it concluded that Chinese schools should be preserved and strengthened. It stressed that the Chinese language should continue as the first language of instruction for Chinese pupils. The report pointed out that "to most Chinese in Malaya, 'Malayanization' is anathema."⁹³ Accordingly it said that "Malayanization can only be the result of give and take which is based on an increasing awareness of a community of interest and the need for mutual tolerance and co-operation." The Report rejected any attempt to force an unwilling fusion as it would almost certainly aggravate animosity among the Malayan people.

The government itself could not make a decision on the Barnes and Fenn-Wu Reports. Later the Central Advisory Committee whose members included the leaders of the MCA, was requested to study and make recommendations on both reports. The Central Advisory Committee made a compromise and mentioned that:

We recognize, however, that in the present-day circumstances and conditions in Malaya it may be necessary to take into consideration other factors additional to educational principles when framing [a policy] that all pupils should learn Malay and English throughout the six years of their primary course and that, in addition, provision should be made for Chinese and Indian pupils to receive instruction in Kuo-Yu and Tamil respectively.⁹⁴

The Central Advisory Committee recommended the establishment of two types of national schools, English and Malay medium schools. Chinese and Tamil medium schools were to continue but English and Malay languages would be taught as other subjects at a later period. The Central Advisory Committee's recommendations formed the basis for the Education Ordinance of 1952.⁹⁵

The Economic Problems of the Malays

One of the most controversial subjects which was raised during the discussions of the CLC was the question of the proper share that the Malays would have

in the economic life of Malaya. The Malay leaders in the CLC considered this as a priority to any consideration of the citizenship question and other political matters.⁹⁶ They hoped that the Chinese and other non-Malays would make some concessions to the Malays in this field as an exchange for their greater citizenship rights. Consequently the CLC resolved to recommend to the government to form a body for an improvement of the economic condition of the Malays. Thus the Rural and Industrial Development Authority (RIDA) was formed in 1950 with Dato Onn, the "Member" of Home Affairs as the first chairman.⁹⁷

The functions of RIDA were twofold: to plan and carry out specific schemes for rural economic development, in particular to enable the Malay smallholders to participate in processing and marketing their crops, and to organize the rural population to improve their standard of living themselves.⁹⁸ RIDA implemented its first plan by establishing a rubber processing factory in Johore. The rubber smallholders were consequently able to process and increase the quality of their products at the factory. They could both sell their products at good prices and increase their income. RIDA also encouraged Malay smallholders to improve their methods of production by introducing suitable fertilizers and heavy machinery. It also made

some plans to set up cooperatives and credits consumer's shops for the rural population.⁹⁹

Part IV

The Creation of a Non-communal Movement:

The Independence of Malaya Party

The most significant part of the Malayanization of Chinese policy was "the fusion of the Malay and Chinese nationalism into a Malayan nationalism which ...[had] as its object the building of a Malayan nation of different races."¹⁰⁰ The CLC had already made an attempt to soften the interracial conflict through the following proposals: to give increased political and civil rights to the Chinese and other non-Malay communities; to induce the Chinese to renounce their political ties with their motherland and accept an undivided loyalty to Malaya; and to help the Malays to take a fuller part in the economic life of the country. Another step towards the realization of the Malayanization of the Chinese was the creation of a non-communal movement to generate the necessary momentum to overcome communal barriers and promote the growth of Malayan nationalism. Thus the colonial government gave their backing to the formation of the Independence of Malaya Party (IMP) which made a clean break with the tradition of communalism in Malayan politics.

According to R. Vasil, "the real origins of the Independence of Malaya Party lie in the period between late 1947, when the Malayan Union plan was already in the process of being scrapped, and the middle of 1948, a period during which Dato Onn bin Jaafar envisaged a new and wider role for UMNO."¹⁰¹ He adds that this took shape as "early as 27 April 1948, long before the Communities Liaison Committee was suggesting mixed marriages among the different communities ... as a way of integrating the different people and creating of a new Malayan nation."¹⁰² There is no doubt these statements are not in dispute. However, to say that there was no "necessary link between the IMP and the Communities Liaison Committee" is not quite right.¹⁰³

The CLC played an important role in modifying Dato Onn's attitudes and policies towards the non-Malay communities. Furthermore it was through the committee that Dato Onn was able to win the friendship and trust of the Chinese leaders, particularly Tan Cheng Lock. It was a fact that some of the IMP's principles such as "Equality for All" were part of the CLC's proposals, and almost all of the Chinese leaders who supported the formation of IMP were former members of the CLC.¹⁰⁴ Furthermore Tan Cheng Lock also provided the idea for the formation of a new non-communal party.

Tan Cheng Lock made a proposal on the need of a non-communal party during a meeting of the working committee of the MCA on 21 April 1951. This party might be superimposed upon, and co-exist with UMNO, MCA and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC). According to him:

Perhaps what is needed, and the first and most practical step to be taken under existing development of Malayan consciousness among the people of this land would be to create a new United Malayan National Organization or Party with a new constitution in which members of all the races are assembled and meet on a common ground and an equal footing to discuss the affairs of the country purely as Malaysians and which may be superimposed on or superadded to and co-exist with the existing communal bodies such as the United National Malay National organisation, Malayan Indian Congress and Malayan Chinese Association which are to be retained to care only for the special and peculiar interests of the various communities. ¹⁰⁵

He added:

Thus the ground could be prepared for the possible eventual merging of the existing communal Associations into the proposed non-communal and national organization when the time is ripe for and the circumstances should indicate such a course....¹⁰⁶

The Malayan Political Intelligence reported that, reaction "to Cheng Lock's proposal to amalgamate the three main communal organisations has been varied."¹⁰⁷

The Report added that the Seberang Prai Branch of the MCA warmly endorsed the idea, and suggested the title of Malayan Congress for the proposed body. Certain officials of the MIC also welcomed the proposal to amalgamate the MCA, MIC and UMNO.

In the meantime, Dato Onn made an attempt to transform UMNO to a non-racial basis at the end of 1950. He proposed to widen the basis of the membership of UMNO by granting associate membership to non-Malays who were federal citizens and desired to join this body.¹⁰⁸ He also made a proposal to change the name of UMNO from the "United Malay National Organisation" to "United Malayan National Organisation." He made an announcement in early June that he would form a new party with the objective of achieving independence for Malaya within seven years, if the members of UMNO rejected his proposals.¹⁰⁹

Dato Onn had a discussion with Tan Cheng Lock before he announced his intention of forming a non-communal body in early June. It seemed that they both shared the same view on the need to form the United Malayan National Organization. But as the present writer has indicated, Dato Onn failed to influence UMNO into transforming itself into the United Malaya National Organisation or to change to a non-racial identity. Thus

he and Tan Cheng Lock decided to form a new non-communal body. However, their ideas and approach to the proposed party were different. As the writer has mentioned Tan Cheng Lock proposed a new "Party" with its own "Constitution," but it should not make a total break with the communal parties. Not only that, the new party should be placed above non-communal parties-- UMNO, MCA and MIC. In other words, the relationship of the non-communal and communal parties would resemble a pyramid-shaped political organization or "pyramidal system."¹¹⁰ The non-communal party would form the peak and the three communal parties of the UMNO, MCA and MIC would form the base. Thus the members of the communal parties could join or support the new party and could maintain their relationship with their own communal parties. Henry Gurney, the High Commissioner also preferred this way when he suggested to Dato Onn to lead both the proposed new party and UMNO.¹¹¹ However, as the present writer will indicate later, Dato Onn decided to make a total break with UMNO.

When Dato Onn decided to announce his intention to form a new party, there was no clear indication as to whether the colonial government had anything to do with it. However, after the announcement, Henry Gurney, the High Commissioner of Malaya, "had a long and frank talk" with Dato Onn on 13 June 1951.¹¹² According to Gurney, Dato Onn explained that his intention in forming an

Independence of Malaya Party was to free himself from "the inactive and purely conservative elements in UMNO who have been obstructing his efforts to admit non-Malays into UMNO" and who were in his view, "merely a dead weight in any political party."¹¹³ He also mentioned that as the leader of a new non-communal party he would be able to take "with him the live and active elements of UMNO and also the kampong Malays."¹¹⁴

Gurney gave his advice to Dato Onn to continue to lead UMNO as well as the IMP. But Dato Onn had already decided to resign from UMNO as "he was utterly tired of the sabotaging of his efforts by diehards in UMNO."¹¹⁵ Actually, at first Dato Onn did not intend to be the leader of the proposed IMP and had offered the leadership to Tan Cheng Lock, but, according to Dato Onn, Tan Cheng Lock, "was becoming more and more nervous and would not take it on."¹¹⁶ Thus, Dato Onn had no choice other than to assume the leadership of the proposed IMP.

As a matter of tactics, at first Henry Gurney did not give any support to Dato Onn's intention of forming a new party. The reason was obvious; he could not support a political party which had the intention of getting rid of British rule in Malaya within seven years. It seems that Dato Onn was able to read Gurney's mind. He told Gurney that the press reports of

his statement referring to independence in seven years were incorrect. He added that in fact, "independence was not the [main] object [of the proposed IMP]."117 He explained further that the object of the IMP was to work for the good of people, and that independence was only a means. With this assurance, Gurney indicated his willingness to support the proposed IMP and continued to discuss "how the IMP might secure seats in the Legislative Council."118 But he stressed that Dato Onn's decision to break with UMNO was "a major one which may have far-reaching consequences, such as a building up of a strong ... party from the middle elements of UMNO who are largely government officers and may thus come into conflict with the I.M.P."119

In early July Gurney gave a speech at a Press Club dinner, in which he publicly declared support for inter-communalism. According to L. Finkelstein, although the High Commissioner's speech was in general terms, its timing was a significant indication of where the government stood on the IMP issue.120

On 26 August 1951 Dato Onn formally tendered his resignation to the UMNO General Assembly. His place was taken by Tunku (Tengku) Abdul Rahman, half brother of the Sultan of Kedah and a deputy public prosecutor. Meanwhile Dato Onn held an inaugural meeting for the formation of the IMP at the Majestic Hotel, in Kuala Lumpur on 17

September 1951. It was presided over by Tan Cheng Lock. A resolution was adopted by one thousand people--representatives of each community. It was as follows:

We, the people, here assembled, do hereby affirm the unalterable and inalienable right of the people of this country to determine the future political, social, and economic destiny of Malaya. Fully conscious of the grave problems of the present and the future, we solemnly pledge ourselves to the task of uniting the people in common loyalty, irrespective of creed, class, or race, and to work together towards the goal of an independent State of Malaya.¹²¹

An organising committee of the IMP was formed consisting of the leaders of the Malays including Dato Onn himself and Chinese, Indians, Ceylonese and others. The MCA's leaders who became members of this committee were, Tan Cheng Lock, Yong Shook Lin, the secretary-general of the MCA, and Khoo Teik Ee, the treasurer of the MCA. All were former members of the CLC. The stated objectives of the IMP were as follows: (1) self-government within ten years, (2) democratic elections to local government by 1953 and to the central Legislature, based on adult suffrage, by 1955, (3) Malayanization of the civil service and the creation of a Malayan service as opposed to a colonial service, (4) free and compulsory elementary education for all children between the age of six and twelve by 1955, (5) improved social services, especially in the rural areas, (6) subsidies and

guaranteed prices for cultivators, and (7) reform of the feudal system in the Malay States.¹²²

As expected, the Malay reactions to the formation of the IMP were very bitter. As soon as Dato Onn announced his intention of forming a new party, the Malays began to criticize it. In a letter to the press, a Malay from Kedah wrote that the IMP would "be a prelude to the disappearance of the Malay race"¹²³ and the Malay would be "reduced to the status of the Red Indians striving to live in the waste lands of America."¹²⁴ After the IMP was organized, the UMNO Executive Committee decided that the policy of the IMP was not compatible with UMNO and asked any members who joined the IMP to resign from the former or be expelled. Tunku Abdul Rahman strongly criticized the IMP which opened its membership to all persons who were resident in Malaya regardless of any qualification as to their allegiance, loyalty or birthright.¹²⁵ In face of such strong Malay opposition, the prospects of the IMP looked dim. However, Dato Onn still believed that Malay support would be forthcoming. "In six or twelve months", according to Dato Onn, "the Malays would have got used to the idea of this party."¹²⁶

The Chinese community-- particularly the MCA-- were more cautious in their support of the IMP. In

public, Tan Cheng Lock personally made an appeal to the Chinese community to support this non-communal organization. Privately, however, Tan Cheng Lock expressed reservations concerning the IMP. He still held fast to the idea of an amalgamation of the MCA, MIC, and UMNO. As the present writer has indicated elsewhere, the MCA leaders realistically continued to cooperate with UMNO as well as the IMP.¹²⁷

Tan Cheng Lock also attempted to play the role of a "matchmaker" between Dato Onn and Tunku Abdul Rahman. He set up a Sino-Malay Friendship and Economic Cooperation Fund.¹²⁸ He also proposed to form a committee comprising of Dato Onn, Tunku Abdul Rahman, the president of UMNO, he himself and two others-- including a part-time paid Malay secretary. Initially the MCA allocated \$100,000.00 for this fund which aimed for the economic betterment of the Malays.¹²⁹ This generous contribution appeared more a political bribe to induce the president of UMNO and Dato Onn to participate in the proposed committee than an altruistic move to help the Malays' economic lot. Tan Cheng Lock discussed this move with Md. Soviee who was prepared to sound out UMNO leaders on the proposed plan and on the question of UMNO participation in it.¹³⁰ According to Md. Soviee, Tunku Abdul Rahman would be willing to participate in such a plan, if he was invited. There was a possibility that Dato Onn might

however, refuse to work with UMNO and counter-propose that the fund be handled by RIDA.¹³¹

Dato Onn was, in fact, suspicious of Tan Cheng Lock's intentions. On 30 November 1951 he urged Tan Cheng Lock to commit himself to the IMP cause by setting up an IMP branch in Malacca.¹³² Tan Cheng Lock agreed to Dato Onn's suggestion and informed him (Dato Onn) that he had written to Humphrey Ball, the MCA's legal adviser on this matter.¹³³ Tan Cheng Lock gave the impression that Ball had been extremely useful to their cause.

On 19 December 1951 the Malacca branch of the MCA held an informal meeting in Malacca for the purpose of forming a Malacca Branch of the IMP. Humphrey Ball suggested that "... a reconciliation between [the] I.M.P and U.M.N.O should be attempted before the creation of a Branch in Malacca."¹³⁴ "Otherwise," he added, "there was a risk of creating a racial division." Nonetheless, the meeting decided to form a Malacca Branch of the IMP on 31 January 1952, on condition that there should be at least 250 people registering with the proposed branch. The formation of the proposed branch was as it turned out delayed until May 1952.¹³⁵ In the meantime H.S. Lee, the chairman of the Selangor branch of the MCA had formed an alliance with the local UMNO branch to contest the February 1952 election of the Municipal Council of Kuala Lumpur. This action was not incompatible with Tan Cheng

Lock's policies. As the present writer has indicated elsewhere, Tan Cheng Lock's plan was to bring together all communal parties such as UMNO, MCA and MIC under an umbrella of a non-communal party or the IMP. Because of this he logically supported the principle of the IMP and also UMNO-MCA cooperation and Sino-Malay cooperation.¹³⁶

Conclusion

The Malayanization policy in essence was not a new policy. Its aims were the same as the previous Chinese policy which was formulated during the Second World War. The aims were to solve the "Chinese problem" and integrate the Chinese into Malayan society. However the methods and approaches to the achieving of these goals were different. The previous policy was a liberal policy. The Chinese could maintain their status as aliens and were able to participate in China-based political parties such as the Kuomintang and the MCP without hindrance from the government. As the present writer has indicated elsewhere the previous policy legalised Chinese foreign political parties. On the other hand, the Chinese were able to become Malayan citizens and integrate themselves into Malayan society. For these reasons the citizenship proposals of the previous policy bodies made it very easy for Chinese to acquire Malayan citizenship.

It was based on a principle of charity. The policy did not demand loyalty first, but anticipated that the Chinese would become loyal to the government after they became Malayan citizens.

The Malayanization of Chinese policy, which evolved after the Emergency, adopted different methods to solve the "Chinese problem." The Chinese were pressured not to give support or participate in Chinese-based political parties, including the Kuomintang, and were induced to form a Malayan-centred Chinese association or the MCA. As the present writer has indicated, the government punished severely those Chinese who directly or indirectly supported the MCP or the guerrillas by actions such as burning Chinese villages and resettling them in concentration-camp style "New Villages." But under their stick-and-carrot-policy, the government took steps to amend the Citizenship clause of the Federation Agreement of 1948, in order to make it easier for nearly half of the Chinese in Malaya to become Malayan citizens. But this was not as generous as the Malayan Union citizenship proposals. The other half of the Chinese still had to hope they could become Malayan citizens after they had made a clear choice between their homeland and their adopted country and also indicated their loyalty to it. The colonial government recognized that the process of the Malayanization of the Chinese should be carried out

gradually and through interracial cooperation between the Malays and the Chinese and other non-Malays.

The process of the Malayanization of the Chinese from the end of 1948 to the end of 1951 was developed and carried out by Henry Gurney with the assistance of Malcolm MacDonald, with the intention of crushing the Communist insurrection. Gurney not only failed to defeat the Communists but became one of their victims. He was assassinated by guerrillas on 6 October 1951 at Fraser's Hill in Pahang. M.V. del Tufo became the Officer Administering the Government before the appointment of a new High Commissioner. In the meantime a new government in London was in the process of formulating new directives and new orders for the government of Malaya. We will examine this in the next chapter.

Notes

1. Department of Chinese Affairs, "Annual Report for 1948", in CO 717/157.
2. Kachau village was burned down by the police under the direction of the OCPD Kajang. According to the OCPD after the guerrilla attack on Dominion Estate, "it was decided to burn down the village and verbal approval was given by the CPO Selangor." It was burned down approximately two and half hours after the inhabitants had been warned to evacuate. See Anthony Short, op.cit., pp. 163-165.
3. For instance two young Chinese carrying padi were shot on the spot in Batang Kali, in December 1948. A Scots Guardsman who had been member of the patrol, involved in the shooting, swore that twenty-five Chinese had been massacred in Batang Kali in that month. See Anthony Short, op.cit., pp. 166 -169.
4. Department of Chinese Affairs, "Annual Report for 1948", in CO 717/157.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Henry Gurney to Creech Jones, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 5 July 1949, despatch no.7, in CO 717/157.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.

17. Department of Chinese Affairs, "Annual Report for 1948," in CO717/157.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Commissioner-General to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 25 February 1949, in MacDonald Papers, no.22/7/24 and MacDonald Papers, no.22 /7/25.
22. Ibid.
23. Heng Pek Koon, "The Development of The Malayan Chinese Association," Ph.D. Thesis, SOAS, University of London, 1984, p.69.
24. Ibid.
25. B. Simandjuntak, op.cit., p.61.
26. "Monthly Political Intelligence Journal, Federation of Malaya and Singapore, month ending of the 15th January, 1949 ", in CO 967/84, p.27.
27. Tan Cheng Lock gave a copy of his speech at the Malacca Chinese Chamber of Commerce on 5 December 1948. See MacDonald letter to Tan Cheng Lock, dated 15 December 1948, in MacDonald Papers, no.22/4/47. (University of Durham, Department of Palaeography and Diplomatic).
28. Department of Chinese Affairs, Annual Report for 1948, p. 10.
29. MacDonald to Tan Cheng Lock, 15 December 1948, in MacDonald Papers, no.22/4/47. (University of Durham, Department of Palaeography and Diplomatic).
30. Anthony Short, op.cit., p. 265.
31. Ibid.
32. Thio Chan Bee, Extraordinary Adventure of an Ordinary Man, Governor Books, London, 1977, p. 86.
33. Gurney to MacDonald, 6 January 1949, in MacDonald Papers, no.22/5/4 and MacDonald Papers, no. 22/5/5, (University of Durham).
34. Anthony Short,op.cit., p. 265.

35. See MacDonald to Gurney, 16 February 1949, in MacDonald Papers, no.22/6/52, (University of Durham).
36. MacDonald to Gurney, 16 February, 1949, in MacDonald Papers, no.22/6/52, (University of Durham). See also , Thio Chan Bee, op.cit., pp. 89-93.
37. Department of Chinese Affairs, "Annual Report for 1948", in CO 717/157, p.10.
38. Heng Pek Koon, "The Development of The Malayan Chinese Association, Ph.D Thesis, pp. 121-122.
39. Commissioner-General to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 25 February 1949, in MacDonald Papers, no.22/7/24. See also, Commissioner-General to the Secretary State for the Colonies, 21 March, 1949, in MacDonald Papers, no.22/7/23 and MacDonald Papers no.22/7/24.
40. Heng Pek Koon, "The Development of The Malayan Chinese Association", Ph.D. Thesis, p. 67.
41. MacDonald to Gurney, 21 March 1949, in MacDonald Papers, no.22/7/25 and MacDonald Papers, no.22/7/26.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Cited Heng Pek Koon, "The Development of The Malayan Chinese Association," Ph.D. Thesis, p. 67.
45. Cited James P. Ongkili, op.cit., p.93.
46. Cited ibid.
47. Cited Khong Kim Hoong, op.cit, p. 155.
48. Cited ibid.
49. Ibid., p. 156.
50. Anthony Short,op.cit., p. 265.
51. Heng Pek Koon, "The Development of The Malayan Chinese Association," Ph.D. Thesis, p. 139. Pek Koon made a comprehensive survey of the development of the MCA and also its role during the Emergency. See ibid., particularly pp.132- 183. Other studies include Anthony Short, op.cit.
52. Khong Kim Hoong, op.cit., p. 158.

53. MacDonald to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 25 February, 1949, in MacDonald Papers, no.22/6/69.
54. MacDonald used the word "captured" about Tan Cheng Lock to imply the difficulties of persuading him to cooperate with the government. He informed the Colonial Office that, "You will note that we have captured Mr. Tan Cheng Lock, who hitherto has led the critics of the Government" Commissioner-General to Colonial Office, 12 January 1949, despatch no.122300, in MacDonald Papers, no.22/5/30 and MacDonald Papers, no.22/5/31 and also in, CO 717/183/52928/17.
55. Gimson to Gurney, 14 December 1948, in MacDonald Papers, no.22/4/39.
56. The Chinese members of the CLC excluding C. C. Tan were the leaders of the MCA.
57. MacDonald to the Colonial Office, 12 January 1949, dispatch no.12230, in MacDonald Papers, no.22/5/30.
58. Ibid.
59. MacDonald to Yong Shook Lin, 19 January 1949, in MacDonald Papers, no.22/5/54.
60. MacDonald to the Colonial Office, 12 January 1949, in MacDonald Papers, no.22/5/30
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. MacDonald to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 15 February 1949, in CO 717/183/52928/17.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid.
67. MacDonald to Dato Douglas of Kampong Jawa, Klang, 26 February 1949, in MacDonald Papers, no.22/6/82.
68. MacDonald to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 25 February 1949, in MacDonald Papers, no.22/6/69 and also in CO 717/183/52928/17.
69. Ibid.
70. Heng Pek Koon, "The Development of The Malayan Chinese Association," Ph.D. Thesis, p. 220.

71. Commissioner-General to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 19 August 1949, in MacDonald Papers, no. 22/8/21 and also in CO 717/183/52928/17.
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid.
76. Commissioner General to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 17 September 1949, in CO 717/183/52928/17
See also. Khong Kim Hoong, op.cit., p.157.
77. Cited Heng Pek Koon, "The Development of The Malayan Chinese Association," Ph.D. Thesis, p. 225.
78. Cited ibid., p. 218.
79. "Note of A Conference Between His Excellency The High Commissioner, Resident Commissioners and British Advisors at King's House on 22 and 23 August 1951", in C0537/7254.
80. Heng Pek Koon, "The Development of The Malayan Chinese Association," Ph.D. Thesis, p. 226.
81. Lawrence S. Finkelstein, "Prospects for self-Government in Malaya," in Far Eastern Survey, Vol.XX1 No.2, January 30, 1952, American Institute of Pacific Relations, p.16.
82. Ibid. See also "A Bill intituled An Ordinance to re-enact with amendments Part XII of the Federation of Malaya Agreement, 1948", in CO 717/188/52276/91.
83. The Associated Chinese Chamber of Commerce of Malaya to the Chief Secretary of the Federation of Malaya, 16 January, 1951, in CO 537/7296. See also, "Memorandum on The Request For A Royal Commission on The Constitution of The Federation of Malaya by The ACCC," in C0537/7296.
84. Ibid.
85. Dato Sir Cheng-lock Tan, "The Chinese-and Malayan Unity," in The Straits Times Annual for 1953, Singapore, p. 75.
86. Ibid.

87. Cited J. E. Jayasuria, Dynamics of nation-building in Malaysia, Associated Educational Publishers, Colombo, 1983, p.60.
88. Ibid.
89. Cited Federation of Malaya, Report of the Committee on Malay Education (Barnes Report), Kuala Lumpur, 1951, pp.23-24.
90. Tan Liok Ee, "Tan Cheng Lock and The Chinese Education Issue in Malaya", in Journal of Southeast Asian Studies (JSEAS), Vol.XIX, No.1, March 1988, Singapore University Press, p.50.
91. Cited ibid., p. 53.
92. Chinese Schools and the Education of Chinese Malaysians , The Report of a Mission invited by the Federation Government to study the problem of the Education of Chinese in Malaya (Fenn-Wu Report), June 1951, Kuala Lumpur. See also, J.E. Jayasuria, op.cit., p. 62.
93. Chinese Schools and the Education of Chinese Malaysians... op.cit. See also, Lawrence S. Finkelstein, op.cit., pp.14 and 15.
94. Cited J.E.Jayasuria, op.cit., p. 63.
95. Ibid.
96. Tan Cheng Lock to Yong Shook Lin, 19 January 1950, in H.S. Lee Papers (private collections)
97. Charles Gamba and Ungku A. Aziz, "RIDA and Malayan Economic Development", in Far Eastern Survey, 10 October 1951, p.174.
98. Ibid.
99. Ibid.
100. "Federation of Malaya, Political Background To Situation in Malaya" (1951), in CO 1022/81.
101. See R. K. Vasil, Politics in a Plural Society, Oxford University Press, 1971.
102. Ibid., p. 41.
103. Ibid., p.42.

104. "Monthly Political Intelligence Report (MPIR), April to May 1951, in CO 537/7343, and Tan Cheng Lock, "Presidential Address at the Annual Meeting of the Central General Committee of the M.C.A. at Kuala Lumpur," in Tan Cheng Lock Papers: A Descriptive List, compiled by the Library Staff, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, p. 6-7.
105. Ibid.
106. Ibid.
107. "Political Intelligence Report, Political Summary-May 1951" in CO537/7346.
108. R. K. Vasil, op.cit., p.46.
109. Ibid.
110. In February 1953, Tan Cheng Lock still advocated the formation of a "pyramidal [sic] system of Sino-Malay liaison committees starting from the top right down to the masses," cited Tjoa Hock Guan, "The Social and Political Ideas of Tun Datuk Sir Tan Cheng Lock", in K.S.Sandhu and P.Wheatley, Melaka: The Transformation of A Malay Capital c.1400-1980, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, p.318. See also, Thio Chan Bee to Tan Cheng Lock, 12 March 1953, in Tan Cheng Lock Papers SP 13/A/16, Arkib Negara Malaysia. It should be noted that the word "pyramidal" cited here does not exist in the English vocabulary. It was likely that it was invented by Tan Cheng Lock as an adjective derived from the word "pyramid." It was used to describe the relationship between a non-communal party or movement with the communal parties. One of the MCA members said that Tan Cheng Lock's approach was "idealistic and unreal." On this matter, he (Yong Shook Lin) faced great difficulties and decided to resign as Secretary-General of the MCA. See, The Straits Budget, 22 May 1952.
111. Gurney to Higham, 13 June 1951, in CO 537/7303.
112. Ibid.
113. Ibid.
114. Ibid.
115. Ibid.
116. Ibid.
117. Ibid.

118. Ibid.
119. Ibid.
120. Lawrence S. Finkelstein, op.cit., p. 12.
121. "Draft Intelligence no.52928/51 on Political Developments in Malaya, Inaugural Meeting of Dato Onn's Independence of Malaya Party," in CO 537/7303, This draft was prepared by the Colonial Office for the Foreign Office. The opinion expressed in the draft reflected British policy and attitudes towards the IMP. Privately it supported the formation of IMP but in public the draft instructed that it should deny any support for it. See also, Lawrence S. Finkelstein, op.cit., p. 12.
122. Khong Kim Hoong, op.cit., p.162.
123. Cited Lawrence S. Finkelstein, op.cit.,p.12.
124. Cited ibid.
125. R. K. Vasil, op.cit., p.52.
126. Federation of Malaya, "Report on Recent Political Developments by The Officer Administrating The Government," in CO 1022/81.
127. See, Thio Chan Bee to Tan Cheng Lock, 12 March 1953, in Tan Cheng Lock Papers SP 13/A/16, Arkib Negara Malaysia.
128. "Sino-Malay Friendship And Economic Cooperation", Tan Cheng Lock's Speech in Pahang on 20 and 21 August 1951, in Tan Cheng Lock Papers, TCL/4/2-2a, ISEAS, Singapore.
129. Ibid.
130. Md. Sopiie (Social Welfare Department) to Tan Cheng Lock, 12 November 1951, in Tan Cheng Lock Papers, TCL/4/7b, ISEAS, Singapore.
131. Ibid.
132. Tan Cheng Lock to Dato Onn, 15 December 1951, in Tan Cheng Lock Papers, TCL /4/7, ISEAS, Singapore.
133. See "p.s." [sic] in Tan Cheng Lock to Dato Onn, 15 December 1951, in Tan Cheng Lock Papers, TCL/4/7.

134. "Minutes of An Informal Meeting held at no.96, First Cross St., Malacca, 19 December 1951," in H. B. Ball Papers, (private collections). See also, Chandran Jeshurun, "Post-war Politics in Melaka" in K. S. Sandhu and P. Wheatley, Melaka, the Transformation of a Malay Capital c. 1400-1980, Oxford University Press, 1983, pp.421-436.
135. R. K. Vasil, op.cit., pp. 66-68.
136. Ibid., p. 64.

CHAPTER VII

Building a United Malayan Nation, 1952-1954

This chapter discusses the development of British policy and political strategy in Malaya after the assassination of Henry Gurney and Winston Churchill's election victory-- both in October 1951. These two factors set the stage for major political changes: namely the decline of militant Communism, and the rise of a moderate interracial political organization-- the UMNO-MCA alliance.

Part 1

The Formulation of a New Policy Directive

At the beginning of 1951, the Communist insurrection continued and moved rapidly towards its peak. This situation sparked off a major crisis amongst British officials in Malaya and Southeast Asia. The officials blamed each other for the slow progress of the Malayan campaign. In early March 1951, MacDonald, the Commissioner-General and General John Harding, Commander-in-Chief of the Far East Land Forces (FARELF) went to London to hold talks with the Secretary of State for the

Colonies. After the meeting, MacDonald brought back the message to Gurney, the High Commissioner, "of the impatience and dissatisfaction felt and expressed...by certain Ministers" on his "conduct of affairs" in Malaya.¹

Henry Gurney was saddened by the fact that he had not been informed or invited to the Ministerial talks concerning his conduct of affairs. He was convinced that the Secretary of State no longer had confidence in his administration. He wrote to Thomas Lloyd, the permanent head department of the Colonial Office,

I agree that if there is not a marked improvement in the operational field in say, six months' time, it will be very advisable to have a change of High Commissioner.²

Gurney himself had not had much confidence in achieving any progress in the campaign against the Communist guerillas. Thus he said that, it was advisable that he should be permitted to relinquish office towards the end of the year, after Lt. General Harold Briggs left. According to him, this "would provide the opportunity for the appointment as High Commissioner of a suitable services candidate. He suggested that the candidate should be a person who possessed "some unusual qualities if he is going to hold together the Malay and

Chinese... [and] Indian politicians, the Rulers, planters without repatriation to China."³

Griffiths, the Secretary of State for the Colonies accepted the offer from Gurney, and said that it made it "much... easier for him should he at any time come to the conclusion that there ought to be a change of High Commissioner."⁴ At the same time he wished "that during the next [six] months...[Gurney's] work will receive its due reward in an ever increasing measure of success in the anti-banditry campaign and in a realization of the Briggs plan."⁵

From May to October 1951 the Malayan government counter offensive against the Communist guerillas began to gain some momentum. But the efforts to win over the support and cooperation from the Chinese community as a whole did not achieve significant success. There was, for example, the case of conscription measures to direct all males, particularly Chinese, between 17 to 45 to perform paramilitary or police service. Gurney announced the conscription measures in December 1950. At the end of 1951 only 1,800 Chinese had been conscripted, and most were English-educated. Thousands of Chinese who were eligible fled from Malaya to Singapore, then to Hongkong or China. The Chinese newspapers such as the Nanyang Siang Pao and the China Press opposed the conscription

measures and appealed to the government to exempt certain Chinese. Tan Cheng Lock defended the Chinese attitude towards compulsory military or police services. He said that "the loyalty of the Chinese was to the family and locality rather than to the nation."⁶ Accordingly he pleaded for leniency and asked the government to give citizenship rights to the Chinese. This would encourage Chinese youth to join the Malayan forces. The Chinese attitude gave the Malays the impression that they were not loyal and did not belong to Malaya and did not deserve to get citizenship rights in the country. Gurney himself felt dismay at the Chinese community as a whole. This was reflected in a memorandum he wrote in October 1951. He wrote as follows:

The attack of the MCP was always directed at the Chinese, to obtain their support through racial sympathy and intimidation. Three years ago it was made clear to the MCA leaders that unless they provided an alternative standard to which local Chinese could rally, the Communists would win. The answer was that the rural Chinese, the peasants, who are the real target, must first be protected. With the help of the MCA the whole vast scheme of resettlement has now been almost finished and labour forces regrouped. Into these settlements and into trade unions and into schools the MCP are trying hard to penetrate and are succeeding. If they are allowed to continue this unopposed by any Chinese effort whatever, the whole of the Chinese rural population will soon come under Communist domination. These people are looking for leaders to help them to resist. But what has happened ?

- (a) the government wished to recruit up to 10,000 Chinese for service in the police. There was full prior consultation with leading Chinese, but as soon as the men were called up, the cry was all for exemptions, 6,000 decamped to Singapore and several thousands to China.
- (b) Everyone knows that the MRLA and Min Yuen are today being financed and supplied by Chinese. Everyone knows that with a few notable exceptions the Chinese themselves have done absolutely nothing to help their own people resist Communism, which is today rampant in schools and among the young uneducated generation. How many Chinese schools fly the Federation flag ?
- (c) The wealth amassed by the Chinese in Malaya is enormous, and all of it will be lost unless something is done by the Chinese themselves and quickly. The British Government will not be prepared to go on protecting people who are completely unwilling to do anything to help themselves.
- (d) A feeling of resentment is growing up among all other communities at the apparent reluctance of the Chinese to help. These people live comfortably and devote themselves wholly to making money. They can spend \$4 million on celebrations in Singapore but can spare nothing for the MCA anti-Communist efforts.
- (e) Chinese labour forces lie wide open to Communism. There is no encouragement to them to join Trade Unions, which are mainly Indian-led. Leading Chinese have contented themselves with living in Singapore etc. and criticising the police and security forces for causing injustices. These injustices are deplorable but are the fault not of the police but these Chinese who know the truth and will not tell it. The longer this goes on, the more injustices there will be and the greater the opening to Communist propaganda.⁷

On 6 October 1951, just two days after he wrote this memorandum, Gurney was assassinated by the communist

guerrillas in Fraser's Hill. With his assassination, the first stage of government's efforts to defeat the communists came to an end.

In the meantime, the Labour government in London had been replaced by the Conservatives on 25 October 1951. Oliver Lyttelton replaced James Griffiths as Secretary of State for the Colonies. The Communist insurrection was the most urgent and worrying problem for him. He has written that:

It was evident that we were on the way to losing control of the country, and soon. The repercussions of such a loss on South-east Asia, one of the most troubled and tender parts of the world, would have been incalculable. Moreover, rubber and tin were amongst the most important exports and dollar earners of the Commonwealth.

My predecessor...James Griffiths, in a short talk when he handed over to me, confessed that the previous Government was baffled by Malaya. Sadly he said, "At this stage it has become a military problem to which we have not been able to find the answer"...I saw quite clearly that I must go to Malaya at once. The Department applauded the idea: the Prime Minister because of our precarious majority, agreed with a little reluctance: the King granted me leave. With greater difficulty I persuaded the Whips to let my Parliamentary Private Secretary, Hugh Fraser, come with me.⁸

On 29 November 1951, Oliver Lyttelton, together with J. J. Paskin, the Under Secretary of State in charge

of the Far East, and A. Mackintosh, his private Secretary, set off to Malaya. He arrived in Singapore and declared that his first job in Malaya was "to restore law and order as a prelude to political development."⁹ He made a big blunder by saying to the press that "there is no point in giving political progress to people if they get their throats cut."¹⁰ His statements could have been interpreted that the new Conservative government in London was considering changing British policy towards Malaya. It also implied that constitutional progress would be delayed. Before his statement created an uproar among the Malayan political leaders he corrected his earlier announcement by saying that restoring law and order was the first priority but that does not mean that "the wider horizons of political development are narrowed."¹¹

On 2 December Lyttelton arrived in Kuala Lumpur and met separately representatives of various organizations including the IMP, UMNO and MCA. Tunku Abdul Rahman, president of UMNO urged Lyttelton to introduce political reforms as part of the struggle against militant Communism and demanded that " 'an interim independence government' should be formed immediately with a British High Commissioner, and that Malaya should be formally admitted to the British Commonwealth."¹² The MCA also shared his views. In addition, Tan Cheng Lock urged the government to modify

the Federal Citizenship Act and withdraw the State nationality bill. He said that equal "rights and responsibilities... must be shared by all loyal Malaysians."¹³ According to him it was "useless to complain that the Chinese were neutral in a war against Communism when the government officials followed an anti-Chinese policy"¹⁴ He assured the government that the Chinese community would cooperate with the administration "to end the Emergency if distrust and suspicions of Chinese intentions were removed."¹⁵

Lyttelton travelled widely in Malaya and his strenuous fact-finding tour lasted more than a week. Before leaving Malaya on 11 December he released a major statement on British policy towards Malaya.¹⁶ Part of it mentioned that:

The ideal for which all communities in the Federation of Malaya must strive is a United Malayan nation. That nation will carry responsibilities and enjoy advantages of self-government within the frame-work of the British Commonwealth.... Political advancement, economic development, social services and amenities are rungs in the ladder. To-day, however, we have to place emphasis on the immediate menace. We must ask who are the enemies of political advancement? What is delaying the progress towards it? The answer is Communism. The answer is the terrorist. The answer is Min Yuen and those who, partly from sympathy, create a passive but not less serious obstacle to victory.... The British believe they have a mission and they will not lay it

aside until they are convinced that ...[terrorism] has been killed and buried and that a true fusion of all communities can lead to true and stable self-government.¹⁷

On the same day, MacDonald re-emphasized the aim of Britain's policy of bringing Malaya towards self-government, which according to him was an unalterable aim, transcending party politics in Britain.¹⁸ But he stressed that it would take a long time to complete the task of forming a united, self-reliant Malayan nation. He added that the pace at which the work would advance and the date at which the ultimate aim could be reached depended on the Malayan people.

Regarding the racial problem in Malaya, MacDonald pointed out that it could be solved by friendly discussions between the representatives of the various communities, assisted by the government.¹⁹ He agreed to the extension of citizenship and other rights to non-Malays but according to him, it must not be so sweeping as to threaten the security of the Malays.

After completing his fact-finding tour, Lyttelton found that the situation in Malaya was far worse than he had thought. He has written as follows:

... it was appallingI have never seen such a tangle as that presented by the Government of Malaya... There was

divided and often opposed control at the top.... The two authorities (civil and military) were apparently co-equal, neither could overrule the other outside his own sphere. But what was each sphere? The frontiers between their responsibilities had not been clearly defined, indeed they were indefinable, because no line could be drawn to show where politics, civil administration, police action, administration of justice and the like end, and where paramilitary or military operations begin. The civil administration moved at a leisurely, peace-time paceThe police itself was divided by a great schism between the Commissioner of Police and the Head of the Special Branch. Intelligence was scanty and uncoordinated between the military and the civil authorities.... Morale amongst planters, tin miners, and amongst Chinese loyalists and Malays, was at its lowest. The grip of the terrorists was tightening, and the feelings of the loyalists could be summed up in one word, despair.²⁰

In his assessment of the situation in Malaya, Lyttelton came to the conclusion that it needed a strong military man or a general to be put in charge of both military and civil affairs. he also concluded that the British "...could not win the war without the help of the population, and of the Chinese population in particular" and in order to get the support from them, the government must show that it was "beginning to win the war."²¹

Lyttelton flew back to Britain on 21 December 1951. He asked Anthony Head, the Secretary of State for War, to provide a list of potential candidates for the

post of High Commissioner of Malaya. Although MacDonald disagreed with a military man as candidate for this post, Lyttelton picked General Gerald Templer as the new High Commissioner. Templer agreed to accept this post. He was confident that he would be to solve many of the Malayan problems. According to him : "the military problem is nothing, the police question can be set right, and the civil service difficulty can be solved."²² The main problem in his opinion was to get the Malays and the Chinese to say, "This is our country." He agreed to accept a new appointment as the High Commissioner of the Federation of Malaya and asked that the government be given clear policy directives which could also be used "publicly to impress HMG's purpose."²³

In January 1952, General Templer held a discussion with the Colonial Office on the "Draft directives to the High Commissioner for the Federation of Malaya. The draft directives re-emphasised that, this "should be a Federation with a strong central government" based on the Federation of Malaya Agreement of 21 January 1948.²⁴ It also stressed that "there should be a common form of citizenship...to be extended to all those who regard the Federation or any part of it as their real home and the object of their loyalty..."

The draft directives reminded the future High Commissioner of Malaya that, "...the Malays have had no alternative allegiance or other country...[and]... owed an undivided loyalty to their homeland and consequently, it has been recognised that they occupy a special position."²⁵ Regarding British policy to the Chinese and other non-Malays, it pointed out that "The legitimate interests of [these]...communities in Malaya must ultimately be judged in the light of the allegiance such communities give to Malaya." It emphasized "...a full and equal right in the Malayan community should in due time be accorded to all those who, irrespective of race, demonstrate that they owe their whole-hearted allegiance to Malaya and take an active part in the work of building a Malayan nation."²⁶ In pursuance of these objectives, the future High Commissioner was directed to "...encourage and assist the development of a closer association and cooperation between the different races of Malaya."²⁷

The draft directives reminded the High Commissioner that his "immediate task ... will be the restoration of law and order in the Federation by defeating the communist terrorists in their efforts to disrupt the life of the country and interfere with its healthy political advance."²⁸ For this purpose, he would also assume the role of Director of Operations and would

exercise direct operational command over all armed forces within the Federation.

The draft directives also emphasized the building of the united Malayan nation with the further prospect of self-government. The High Commissioner was instructed to "...make clear to the people of Malaya the [British] government's belief that the building of such a nation is in their own hands and must inevitably depend mainly on their efforts both as individuals who owe a true allegiance to Malaya and as members together of the Malayan community."²⁹ The draft Directive gave almost absolute power to the High Commissioner. The specific directions and the suggestions which were set out in the directives were not intended to limit the exercise of his discretion.

In the middle of January 1952, Lyttelton, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, announced the underlying policies of the British government, as expressed in the new Directive for the High Commissioner. According to him, the new High Commissioner would direct the battle of ideas and concern himself with broad measures of social, economic and political progress. He did not mention a specific policy towards the Chinese community, but said the new High Commissioner would seek to reassure and enlist this community without sacrificing in any way the interest of the Malays. He stressed that

the Malayan problem could not be solved without the help and support of Chinese community. According to him, the "Chinese terrorists can never be brought to book unless Chinese policemen, Chinese administrators and Chinese citizens take part in the struggle."³⁰

Part II

The Battle For The Hearts And Minds

The British government was aware that in order to win over the support from the Chinese community it was necessary to make a promise of a brighter future for them. Thus Lyttelton declared that "...means have to be found of giving the [moderate] Chinese a greater political stake in Malaya"³¹ and for the Malays a more important share in local economic life. It has been argued that this policy aimed to achieve a united Malayan nation with the prospect of increased self-government.

General Templer arrived with his directives in Malaya in February 1952. He was installed to the post of High Commissioner and assumed the role of Director of Operations. Thus he himself was responsible for planning, co-ordinating and generally directing the anti-terrorist operations of the Police and fighting forces. As he was

in charge of both the civil and military administration he might be able to secure full and effective coordination in the war against the Communist guerrillas.

The first major change Templer instituted was administrative. The Federal War Council which had been started by Briggs in 1950, was abolished and merged its responsibilities with the Executive Council. Thus there was one policy making body. Some members of the FWC were absorbed into the enlarged Executive Council. He also took action to improve and reorganize the police and military apparatus of the Emergency. Templer realized the shooting war only formed 25 percent of Emergency business and 75 percent was political. Thus he concentrated also on the efforts to win over the people's "hearts, and minds", particularly those of the Chinese community. ³²

In pursuance of the directives, Templer and his deputy, D.C. MacGillivray, made some efforts to make the Chinese community feel that they were part and parcel of the country. Templer persuaded the Malay rulers to open the Malayan Civil Service to Chinese and other non-Malays. In the past "the MCS was entirely Malay and expatriate in composition."³³ As the present writer has indicated elsewhere the Chinese had always demanded the opening of MCS to them and the Malays strongly opposed this. On 1 January 1953 two Chinese were admitted into the MCS. It seems that the recruitment of Chinese into

the scheme was deliberately slow so as not to arouse opposition from the Malays. By 1957 there were only nine Chinese in a total number of 360 in the MCS.³⁴ Nevertheless this small concession was important in the sense that the Chinese were accepted as part of the prestigious Civil Service of the country.

One of the main problems facing the British government was the lack of Chinese personnel in the police force and the army. From a political point of view, the war against the Communists could be portrayed as the war between Chinese and the Malays as the Malayan forces were almost entirely Malay in composition and the Communist guerrillas Chinese. To the Malays, the Communist insurrection was an alien Chinese insurrection and "something to be resisted on racial as well as on political grounds."³⁵ Gurney's attempts to persuade the Chinese to join the uniformed service ended with failure. Templer made a greater effort to improve recruitment of Chinese into the Malayan forces particularly the Special Branch.

In March 1952, he launched a campaign to persuade members of Chinese community to come to the government side in the war against the Communists. For instance on 27 March he appealed to Chinese youth to join the Federation Police Force. he said,

...I am calling on the Chinese community, to show their loyalty to the country in which they live and to the cause of freedom. This call is particularly to the young men...to express their loyalty by volunteering to join the Federation Police Force. I ask parents to put aside prejudice and fear and to co-operate to this end. I am asking for 2,000 young Chinese volunteers to come forward... 2,000 is a small number to ask from among three million Chinese living in this country....³⁶

Templer pointed out that the government could not reward their loyalty in a form of more pay , but in giving them political rights. He said, "that the Select Committee which has been considering the Federal Citizenship Bill, has now recommended to the Legislative Council, that all those who serve in the Defence Forces of the Federation shall, after completion of three years services automatically be granted Federal Citizenship."³⁷

In order to encourage Chinese to join the Malayan Forces Templer announced the creation of a new unit, the Federation Regiment which was also open to other races including the Malays. In May the first company of the Federal Regiment had been formed, based at Taiping, Perak.³⁸ Templer also made a plan to set up a Military Academy which was open to all races. Under Templer, all units of the Malayan Army , except the Malay Regiment, became multi-racial in composition. However, only a handful of Chinese served in the Malayan forces.

Templer also took other measures to encourage the Chinese to participate in the defence of the country against the Communists. One of them was the formation of a Chinese Home Guard. A large and fully armed Chinese home guard was created, known as the Kinta Valley Home Guard in Perak. Its purpose was to defend the tin mines against attacks from the guerillas. At first Templer regarded the arming of the Chinese Home Guard as his "biggest gamble" as there was a possibility the Chinese might pass their arms to the Communists forces or might mutiny.³⁹ But this fear was unfounded. Instead the Kinta Valley proved they were loyal by getting involved in two "Chinese battles" against the guerillas which ended with their victory.⁴⁰ As a result miners were able to open up new mines or reopen those which had been closed down because of the Emergency. Encouraged by this initial success, Templer increased the number of Home Guard to protect the rubber estates, new villages and others. Meanwhile the regular forces were used for operations against the guerrillas in the jungle. As a result the government forces were able to kill 1,097 of the members of the MRLA or 40 percent more than the previous year.⁴¹

In the meantime, Templer also turned his battle for the "hearts and minds" to the Chinese in the resettlement areas. As the present writer has indicated elsewhere, under the Briggs Plan, a large section of the

Chinese squatters from the forest had been removed and resettled in new areas, beyond the reach of the guerrillas. Templer solved one of the main problems of the resettled squatters by giving them security of land tenure. Another problem was the lack of public spirit amongst the Chinese community which was the essential basis of democracy. As the British government intended to lay the foundations of Malayan democratic government, it was important to teach, in association with other communities, the art of self-government. For this purpose the previous High Commissioner had prepared the Village Council Bill and it was up to Templer to move it on the Legislative Council. He did this in May 1952, and this gave a Village Charter to the resettlement areas. It officially renamed those settlements as "New Villages." The Charter gave enfranchisement to some 400,000 Chinese in some 410 New Villages.⁴²

The Village Charter gave the first form of self-government to the Chinese in New Villages. Under this the people in New Villages would elect Village Councils which could administer the villages directly. They would collect their own rates and taxes and employ their own staff and be completely responsible for their own budgets and education. But the response from the villagers was lukewarm. According to Ray Nyce, in some New Villages, there was often no contest at all for the councils as it was difficult to find villagers who were willing to fill

offices.⁴³ However, this situation changed with the progression from Village Council to Local council. The posts to the local councils were more prestigious than the village councils as they controlled larger areas. The elected local council's duties were: the imposition of taxes and fees, and issuing receipts, preparation of annual estimates of revenue and expenditure, construction and management of schools and public works, in particular those involving communications, sanitation, market facilities and recreation grounds, and others. The council was also responsible for preserving peace in its area.

The government, as expressed by Templer, firmly believed that it was important to enlist the support of the Chinese in order to defeat Communism. Templer said this "would solve not one sixth of the Chinese problem" in Malaya, but "would solve at least half of it."⁴⁴ Thus, the government made much greater efforts to improve the social and welfare services in these new villages. Roads and often railways were built to link the Chinese New Villages to other population centres. This enabled the government to extend social amenities and welfare to these villages. With these efforts it was hoped that the New Villages "would change from reservoirs of resentment into bastions of loyal Malayan citizenry."⁴⁵ In fact these measures made possible the crushing of the

Communist rebellion and the defeat of the MRLA. But it also caused increasing friction between Malays and Chinese as these amenities and other social services were rarely extended to the Malay villages. Furthermore the promise to improve the economic position of the Malays was not put into effect as the financial position of the government would not permit it. For instance the government could provide only just over \$2 million for RIDA to improve the economic position of the Malays during 1952.⁴⁶ The British government was unable to fulfill its promise to the Malays. This could be explained by the fact that the solution to the Chinese problem was more urgent for the government and it would also work indirectly for the interest of the Malay's political future in the country. Failure to solve the Chinese problem would result in the take over of power in Malaya by the Chinese-dominated MCP with links to China.

Part III

Education and the Malayisation of the Chinese.

Apart from the campaign to win the hearts and minds of the Chinese community, the government also introduced some measures which the Chinese resented such as collective punishments for any community involved in terrorist activity. But most unpopular was Britain's

political policy on Chinese education, which was considered by this community as an attack on their language and culture. It was the intention of the government to Malayanise the Chinese community through education. A first attempt was made by Gurney but it ended in failure as a result of strong opposition from the Chinese community. The Barnes Report and the Fen-Wu Committee reflected different views on the education issue. As a result both reports were submitted to the Central Education Committee and then to the Select Committee for their consideration. The Committee's recommendations which were embodied in the Education Ordinance of 1952 were pushed through the Legislative Council by Templer. This ordinance pointed out that:

The aim and purpose of the national education policy of the Federation is to achieve the sound education of all children in the Federation using in the main medium, for this purpose, the official languages of the Federation and bringing together pupils of all races in a national type of school with a Malayan orientation.⁴⁷

A new "National School" was defined as "...any school providing for children of all races a six-year course of free primary education with a Malayan orientation and appropriate for children between the ages of six and twelve and using as the main medium for this purpose the official languages of the Federation."⁴⁸ The national

school could use either Malay or English as the main medium of instruction. Chinese or Tamil would be taught as a third language in the national schools where the number of children wanting to receive it justified its inclusion in the curriculum. It should be noted that Tamil and Chinese vernacular schools would not be accepted as part of national schools or national system.

The Education Ordinance of 1952 aroused amongst the Chinese community a greater interest in the issue of Chinese education. The MCA, whose councillors did not speak or vote against the Education Ordinance, realized it was important for its survival as a Chinese party to get involved in this issue.⁴⁹ Only then would it get support from the Chinese educated Chinese particularly Chinese teachers. Therefore the MCA joined the United Chinese School Teachers' Association (UCSTA) and the United Chinese Schools' Committees' Association to organize a meeting on Chinese Education on 9 November 1952. The MCA leadership supported the three resolutions adopted at the meeting and expressed unanimous Chinese opposition to the Education Ordinance, called for the establishment of a national body to defend the future of Chinese education, and decided to form a committee to negotiate with the government for better terms of official aid to Chinese primary schools.⁵⁰ As a consequence of this meeting the MCA Chinese Education Central Committee (MCACECC) was formed, headed by Tan

Cheng Lock. He became the main spokesman on the Chinese education issue.

According to Tan Liok Ee "the activities of the MCACECC did not have an impact on official policy."⁵¹ The government also did not respond to a Memorandum on Chinese Education which was sent to Templer. He even refused to see MCACECC officials to discuss the Education Ordinance of 1952. Templer told them, it was "pointless to go over old ground."⁵² He also criticized the Chinese for pursuing a "separatist and exclusivist position for their language and culture."⁵³ On the other hand, Templer urged Chinese school teachers to assist the government in bringing the Emergency to an end. He pointed out to them that, "there is hardly a Chinese middle school in the country today where the evil doctrine of Marxist Communism is not being preached in secret and the minds of youth are being perverted by creed which knows no human kindness or decency and rests on a standard of values that is absolutely false."⁵⁴

Templer firmly believed that the Education Ordinance and the establishment of national schools were vital for the formation of a united Malayan nation which was capable of democratic self-government. He said that it was government policy "to see ...[Chinese] boys and girls being conscious of the fact that Malaya is their

home and that they are its future citizens...with responsibilities and rights as such."⁵⁵ However, it was unlikely that the government could implement the education policy as the financial position of the country would not permit it.⁵⁶ Up to March 1954, it was reported that "no new national schools have yet been built, nor have any vernacular schools been converted into National schools, but existing government and government-aided schools...are being progressively converted to National school type as the trained staff required become available."⁵⁷ In the meantime Templer had appointed a Special Committee:

to consider ways and means of implementing the policy outlined in the 1952 Education Ordinance, in the context of diminishing financial resources of the Federation.⁵⁸

It was appointed in November 1953 and consisted of ten members including three Chinese.

The Special Committee produced its first draft report in July 1954. During this time D.C. MacGillivray had taken over the post of High Commissioner from Templer. The Committee expressed their conviction "...that education must be one of the highest priorities in the national budget..."⁵⁹ and re-affirmed their belief in three principles as follows: that multi-racial schools are essential for the education of the future

citizens of a united Malayan nation, that there are two official languages, English and Malay, and both must be taught, and that there must be a single system of education and a common content in teaching in all schools."⁶⁰

The Special Committee also made an examination of Chinese education and produced a memorandum on "Chinese Schools in Malaya." Among others its made the following conclusions:

1. Chinese schools are providing an education which fits their pupils to be good Chinese, but not good Malaysians.
2. The Chinese schools are meeting a demand for education in Malaya which cannot at present be met by other types of Government or Government-aided schools.
3. Politics and political influence form part of the tradition of Chinese schools, and will remain so as long as these schools cater exclusively for pupils of Chinese race.
4. The principal danger of Chinese schools lies in the Middle Schools, and urgent action must be taken to transform these schools so that the students they produce are fitted for life in Malaya.
5. Communism, as a force in open and armed conflict with the Government of this country, is at present a most dangerous political influence in these schools, and negative control by close liaison between the Special Branch and the Education Department and by the strict enforcement of legislation regarding registration... must continue. At the same time positive efforts must be made to eradicate the causes of Communism in these schools.⁶¹

The memorandum suggested that the government adopt a positive policy on Chinese schools and Chinese education in general.⁶² It pointed out that the essential elements

of Chinese culture contained in Chinese schools should be preserved, but at the same time that the nature of Chinese schools should be changed to fit the needs of Malayan society. Amongst other things it suggested: the teaching of Kuo Yu in newly-established National Schools and in existing English primary schools, the encouragement of Chinese primary schools to transform themselves voluntarily into National Schools, and assistance to the Chinese Primary Schools which remained as vernacular schools to improve their teaching standards. According to this memorandum the government needed to increase funding for Chinese schools and this could be justified as it was accompanied by a certain degree of "Malayanisation" of these schools. It was confident that this process would continue and the exclusively communal nature of these schools could be changed.

Based on the Select Committee proposals, *MacGillivray made a modest programme of educational expansion*. According to his plans Malaya would need to create 300 new English medium National schools over the next 13 years. The cost for the proposed schools, together with two Teacher Training Colleges, was estimated at the sum of £27 million or very much higher than that. MacGillivray informed the Colonial Office that there was no way to get that money for the National School scheme.⁶³ Therefore, according to him, "Her

Majesty's Government must bless it and underwrite it financially."⁶⁴ He added:

The process of nation-building, although recognised as essential by the authorities... has so far made slow progress. The situation can radically change by one means only, reforms in the educational system which will make it an effective stimulant to national consciousness. The need is for schools, dedicated to promoting Malayan unity, in which children of all races may grow up together, learning each his mother tongue as a subject of study but being taught through the medium of a common language. The common language must be the lingua franca of the country, English. Only thus can racial exclusiveness, at present fostered by the vernacular system of education which predominates in Malaya, be broken down.⁶⁵

The Colonial Office strongly supported the D. MacGillivray's proposals National Schools in Malaya. Colonial officials agreed that the role of education was important if the British hoped to attain their declared and essential aim of building a united Malayan nation. J. Martin pointed out that the "shooting war" was only one side of a two-pronged policy.⁶⁶ The other was to win or in other word to control, the hearts and minds of the people, especially young Chinese, through education. He added that even though the Emergency would come to an end, the struggle against Communism would continue. He appealed to the HMG Treasury to make available some #27 million to provide for it. Martin wrote:

The case for this [National School scheme] is political. Unless, in the few years of control that still remain to us, we act with much greater vigour and on the basis of a far more ambitious plan than has yet been attempted... there is no hope of creating a united Malayan... nation attached to the British connection and firmly aligned with the anti-Communist world....it is suggested that approximately £ 2 million a year for 14 years is not an excessive premium to pay if, as we believe, it may be decisive⁶⁷ in safeguarding our investment.

The Colonial Office hoped the Treasury would approve the proposals for National Schools before Malaya achieved its semi self-government on 31 August 1955. It was argued that the Secretary of State for the Colonies could present this as a contribution from HMG to Malaya. Martin pointed out that this proposed contribution for English-medium National schools would be accepted if it was presented before the formation of a new government under the Alliance. Otherwise the future government might reject this scheme. Up to 20 August 1955 Colonial officials were still holding discussions regarding the proposals for National Schools and failed to reach any conclusion.⁶⁸ In these circumstances, the Secretary of State, who visited Malaya in late August, felt that "there could be no point in his saying more to the Alliance leaders than to exhort them in very general terms to accept a really forward policy of National Schools."⁶⁹

In the meantime the UMNO-MCA-MIC Alliance was eager to review the education policy in order to give greater satisfaction to those who wanted Malay to be the national language.⁷⁰ At the same time the Alliance also needed to accommodate the wishes of the MCA regarding Chinese education. In these circumstances, the Malayan government did not press the British government to approve and underwrite the proposed National English Schools for Malaya. Instead it would hold a discussion with the International Bank with a view to drafting a new "Development Plan" for education in the country.⁷¹

Part IV

Political Reforms--

Citizenship Changes

As the present writer has indicated elsewhere, Gurney was unable to push the 1951 Bill on citizenship through the Federal Legislative Council as it was strongly opposed by the Malays. This Bill was referred to the Select Committee for further examination. Its recommendations were embodied in the Federation of Malaya Agreement (Amendment) Ordinance of 1952 Bill. Templer moved this Bill in the Legislative Council on 7 May 1952. Together with this, nine State Nationality Enactments were moved in each State and Settlement Council. The

Ordinance and Enactments introduced two avenues for conferring citizenship: state nationality for those in the Malay States and citizenship of the United Kingdom and Colonies for Malacca and Penang inhabitants.⁷² The people of Malaya would be able to acquire Federal citizenship by being subjects of Malay Rulers or through state nationality and citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies. Thus the new citizenship scheme created one citizenship in addition to nine nationalities.

The new Citizenship scheme was introduced in order to confer upon a large majority of Chinese a Federal citizenship. The new rules for becoming a citizen were less restrictive for non-Malays than the previous Federal Citizenship rules. But the new rules imposed obligations as well as rights. For instance the applicant should indicate loyalty by taking an oath of allegiance to the relevant ruler and renounce any other citizenship or nationality. However the language requirement was relaxed for a period of five years from the date the new regulation came into effect. With this new scheme 1,157,000 Chinese and 255,000 other non-Malays would become citizens/state nationals by operation of the law on 30 June 1953.⁷³ One Malay member of the legislative council regarded the acceptance of the new scheme as a tremendous sacrifice by the Malays in allowing the members of other races to share the rights

of the Malays.⁷⁴ However, Chinese were not happy to abandon the principle of Jus Soli and were unhappy about the failure to create a Federal nationality.⁷⁵

The "Member" System And The Introduction Of Elections

The colonial government introduced some political reforms, in order to "woo the masses away from the Communists",⁷⁶ and to groom and nurture the leadership of the moderate Chinese and other communities and to lay the foundations of Malayan democratic government. The most important political reforms, apart from changes in the citizenship law, were the introduction of the "Member (ministerial)" system and elections. The idea for the introduction of the "ministerial" or "Member" system came from Henry Gurney. He made an announcement in March 1950 that certain non-government members of the Federal Legislative Council would be appointed as head of various government departments in order to gain administrative experience.⁷⁷ The government considered this move as an important step towards self-government and democracy. The "Member" system was introduced in April 1951 with the appointments of five Malaysians as "Members" or the heads of Home Affairs, Agriculture and Forestry, Lands, Mines and Communications, Education, and Health portfolios. Among them were Dato Onn, the president of UMNO and also a CLC member as the Member Of Home Affairs, Dr. Lee Tiang King, one of the leaders of

the Penang Secession Movement as the Member of Health, and E.E. Thuraisingham, the chairman of the CLC as the Member for Education. In October 1953 two more Malayans were appointed as "Members." They were Dr. Ismail (UMNO) and H. S. Lee (the chairman of the Selangor branch of the MCA).⁷⁸

In 1951 the colonial government introduced another major political change : elections at the local and municipal level, and subsequently at the state level. The first election to be held was for the Malacca Municipality Election in November 1951. However, the response from the people to this election was poor. All nine candidates to the new Municipal Council were returned unopposed. There were four candidates from the Progressive Party, three from the Labour Party, one from UMNO and the other was an Independent candidate.⁷⁹ According to Tan Cheng Lock "Chinese did not come forward to stand for election...due to the fact the government policy had been to discriminate against non-Malays in the matter of citizenship."⁸⁰ The Penang Chinese also showed a lack of enthusiasm to stand for Georgetown Municipal Council Election scheduled in December 1951. According to Rajeswary Ampalavanar, most of the candidates who stood for this election were Indians.⁸¹ It should be noted that the Chinese formed the largest ethnic group in both the Malacca and Georgetown

Municipalities. The general apathy of the Chinese community reflected their resentments towards the government policies-- particularly on citizenship-- and the government operations against the guerrillas which affected their community. Tan Cheng Lock as the president of the MCA criticized this attitude which he said "might perhaps be detrimental to the future success of Malaya as an independent state."⁸² He added that, people "must take a more active part in the affairs of the country or good government will be impossible."⁸³ In response to these criticisms, the Chinese in Kuala Lumpur decided to participate in the forthcoming election for the municipal council.

The Rise of The UMNO-MCA Alliance

The Kuala Lumpur Municipal Election of February 1952 represented a turning point in the political development of Malaya. On 8 January 1952, the Kuala Lumpur division of UMNO and the Selangor branch of the MCA, in a joint declaration, announced that they would contest the Kuala Lumpur Municipal Election on 16 February "on a common non-communal, non-party basis."⁸⁴ Thus the UMNO-MCA Alliance was formed at a local level. Many writers, for example Gordon P. Means have explained the formation of the UMNO-MCA as a reaction to the IMP. He wrote:

The most adequate explanation of the sudden turn-about of the MCA must take into account the personalities of Dato Onn and Tan Cheng Lock. Both men were very dynamic, and both possessed too much of the quality of a prima donna on the political stage to be able to work together very well. Furthermore, personal animosities had developed between them during the extended political controversies over the Malayan Union and the federation Agreement. Although Tan Cheng-lock could have supported a "non-communal" political party he could never been an enthusiastic supporter of such a party if it also would have given Dato Onn an unassailable position of political supremacy in Malaya.⁸⁵

However, Gordon G. Means was unable to provide any evidence to support his view. There is conversely evidence which indicates Tan Cheng Lock's continued support for the political activity of Dato Onn during the 1952-3 period. It is more likely that the alliance was formed in preparation for the possible eventual merging of UMNO, MIC and MCA as proposed by Tan Cheng Lock in April 1951. It is here argued that it was not the intention of the MCA, by forming the alliance with the UMNO to destroy the IMP, but to "co-exist" with this non-communal party which, according to Tan Cheng Lock's anticipation, might become an umbrella for the communal bodies. This was more likely the reason why he continued to support the IMP after he had made his commitment to UMNO.

For many contemporary political observers, the forming of the UMNO- MCA Alliance was a most unexpected

event, as Tan Cheng Lock, apart from holding the presidency of the MCA, was the chairman of the founding Committee of the IMP. He actively involved himself with the setting up of the IMP branches throughout Malaya. As the present writer has indicated elsewhere, it was Tan Cheng Lock's intention to form a "pyramidal" type of political organisation with the non-communal party superimposed upon the communal bodies. This proposal was not secret. It was in fact discussed at the meetings of the MCA Central Committee. It was also reported by the Malayan Intelligence.⁸⁶ Afterwards this issue was raised during an informal meeting of the MCA in Malacca in 1951. Humphrey Ball, the MCA's legal adviser suggested that an attempt should be made to reconcile the IMP with UMNO before the formation of a Malacca branch of the IMP.⁸⁷ It had been pointed out that his idea was to avoid the risk of creating racial conflict as the Malays strongly supported UMNO.

Consequently, at the end of January 1952 a secret meeting was held in Kuala Lumpur and was attended by Dato Onn, Rasmani R. Ramani, a prominent Indian lawyer, Tunku Abdul Rahman, the president of UMNO, Thuraisingham, and one or two Chinese Councillors and Tan Cheng Lock.⁸⁸ Thuraisingham asserted that "the reason for the meeting as being the altruistic one of saving Malaya from bloodshed"⁸⁹ or in other words to avoid racial conflict.

Thuraisingham suggested a formation of an interracial movement on the lines of the Communities Liaison Committee with perhaps independence as the objective. However, the meeting failed to achieve any positive results as "T[unku] A[bdul Rahman] took the stand that all must help him drive out the British before he would discuss terms of granting rights to non-Malays."⁹⁰ On the other hand Tan Cheng Lock refused to make any commitment on this matter and "excused himself to attend a dinner with Sir J. Hay."⁹⁰

There is no doubt that the Selangor MCA chairman, H. S. Lee and the working Committee members Ong Yoke Lin and S. M. Yong played important role in taking the initiative to form a coalition with the UMNO Kuala Lumpur branch to compete in the election. According to Heng Pek Koon, it was Ong Yoke Lin who arranged the meeting between H. S. Lee and Datuk Yahaya bin Abdul Razak, chairman of the Kuala Lumpur UMNO's Election Committee, and, between them, they decided to form an Alliance to compete in the election.⁹² The present writer found no evidence which indicates Tan Cheng Lock had instructed H. S. Lee to approach the UMNO leadership. There is however, evidence confirming that Tan Cheng Lock did inform other MCA leaders of the informal meeting of the MCA Malacca branch and of the suggestion put forward by Ball. Tan Siew Sin, son of Tan Cheng Lock, wrote to Dato Onn on 18 January 1952 to say that:

My father [Tan Cheng Lock] informs (me) that Shook Lin (Yong Shook Lin, the Secretary General of the MCA) is under the impression that we in Malacca are afraid of forming a branch of the IMP just because two lawyers [S.Shammugam and Humphrey Ball] are against it.⁹³

During the Kuala Lumpur Municipal Elections, the leaders and members of the MCA seemed divided. Some of the MCA leaders such as Tan Siew Sin and Yong Shook Lin vigorously supported the IMP. Thus the MCA avoided a break up of their relationship with the IMP. At the same time the Selangor branch of the MCA fostered close relations with UMNO. It seemed that the main MCA personalities were caught in a real dilemma. While the Kuala Lumpur voters clearly supported the UMNO-MCA Alliance by giving them nine of the twelve seats, the IMP managed to secure two seats, while another seat was won by an independent candidate.⁹⁴

According to R. Vasil, Tan Cheng Lock delayed sending a message of congratulations on the success of the UMNO-MCA alliance.⁹⁵ In actual fact however, H.S. Lee received the telegram of congratulation from Tan Cheng Lock in the morning of 18 February 1952. In his message Tan Cheng Lock stated that he wished "that the cause of Sino-Malay co-operation and the MCA political activities should triumph throughout the country..."⁹⁶ On the same day H.S. Lee also received the message from

Tunku Abdul Rahman, in which the Tunku said that the "Alliance great achievement profit[s] Malaya."⁹⁷ The Tunku hoped it might be everlasting and spread. H. S. Lee wrote to Tan Cheng Lock,

I have no doubt in my own mind that no self-government for Malaya would be successful unless we have a united Malaya, but to obtain a united Malaya it is in the first instance necessary to obtain the mutual understanding and co-operation between the Malays and the Chinese, the biggest racial groups in the country.... If the UMNO-MCA alliance could be established in the other parts of the country, it would go a long way to achieve a united Malaya.⁹⁸

H. S. Lee pointed out that:

The result of the Kuala Lumpur Municipal Election unmistakably shows that the public has no confidence in the IMP, at least in the capital of Federation. When the founder of the IMP together with other leading IMP members could not get more than two seat out of twelve in the Kuala Lumpur Municipal Election after making ever effort to get the vote, it seems unlikely that the IMP will be able to achieve any success elsewhere.⁹⁹

In his reply, Tan Cheng Lock said that H. S. Lee's views on the question of Sino-Malay co-operation were very sound.¹⁰⁰ However, he informed H. S. Lee that the influential members of the MCA wanted co-operation with the IMP.¹⁰¹ According to him, it was likely the MCA was divided on the question. He was in favour of

leaving it to the individual branches of the MCA to decide whether they would cooperate with the IMP or the UMNO. But he stressed that : "Principles are more important than people. I support the principles of the IMP, UMNO-MCA co-operation and Sino-Malay cooperation."¹⁰² Thio Chan Bee, a close friend of Tan Cheng Lock held the same views. He told Tan Cheng Lock: "Your conciliatory attitude is right ...[as]...at the moment there is nothing very definite--all in a state of flap."¹⁰³ He suggested that "UMNO-MCA [would] have to be linked up on the basis of common aims and common programme of change re the constitution, etc..". According to him, their friend, Dato Onn "stands for change but went too fast for the rank and file of the Malays so that they have turned to communal leadership again."¹⁰⁴ He added that: "What is now needed is a rallying together of UMNO-MCA-IMP, but it will need god's guidance and help to be successful."¹⁰⁵ He advised Tan Cheng Lock to "show goodwill to rival units and hold up the ideal of all-Malayan unity and Co-operation for the good of all and for the country."¹⁰⁶

Meanwhile the MCA leaders of the Selangor branch continued to foster a closer relationship with the UMNO leaders. It was, for instance, reported that Tunku Abdul Rahman, the president of UMNO "had a very useful meeting with local MCA leaders" in Kuala Lumpur at the end of February 1952.¹⁰⁷ On 22 February H. S. Lee was reported

to have sent a "highly confidential" letter to Tan Cheng Lock, proposing an ultimate Federation-wide Sino-Malay alliance.¹⁰⁸ But H. S. Lee refused to disclose its contents as he considered "it would be harmful" to the interests of the MCA.¹⁰⁹ In actual fact, H.S. Lee only informed Tan Cheng Lock that he had had several discussions with Tunku Abdul Rahman.¹¹⁰ According to H.S. Lee he had found the Tunku "to be very sincere and reasonable."¹¹¹ He added that the Tunku would send a letter to the leaders of UMNO in various States and Settlements--suggesting they to contact the leaders of the various MCA branches. In his opinion it was necessary for the Chinese to show their response in order to obtain whole-hearted co-operation from the Malays.¹¹² He suggested to Tan Cheng Lock to meet the Tunku at an early date.

In his reply on 29 February 1952, Tan Cheng Lock sought H. S. Lee's views on certain matters to be discussed in the proposed meeting.¹¹³ Tan Cheng Lock told him, he needed to clear up certain points of policy in the relationship between the UMNO and MCA, such as whether the Tunku personally was in favour of the principle of jus soli and whether he advocated the policy of "Malaya for the Malayan."¹¹⁴ Tan Cheng Lock also asked Lee to discover whether the Tunku was in a position to work to get UMNO to agree on those principles. H. S. Lee

wrote to Tan Cheng Lock to say that the Tunku's personal views were as follows

If everybody born in the country is allowed to vote, the principle of Jus Soli is therefore, established.¹¹⁵

The Tunku added that, in "order to get his view agreed to by his U.M.N.O. Branches ...there should be liaison meetings between the leaders of the U.M.N.O. and the leaders of the M.C.A. in the various States and Settlements to discuss confidentially and in a friendly manner these various points."¹¹⁶

The first meeting of UMNO and MCA leaders was held on 3 January 1953. Both Tan Cheng Lock and Tunku Abdul Rahman, the president of UMNO, were eager to consolidate the alliance of both parties. They agreed to "set up the the Alliance Roundtable as a vehicle to institutionalize the UMNO-MCA Alliance on a pan-Malayan basis."¹¹⁷ Until early 1955, the Alliance Roundtable acted as the supreme decision-making body of the alliance.¹¹⁸ This body directed the states' branches of UMNO and MCA to form states liaison committees and work at a low level to run the affairs of both parties. The Alliance Roundtable was changed into the Alliance National Council in early 1955. This body became the umbrella for the UMNO and MCA and also the MIC when this body joined the Alliance.

Tan Cheng Lock and The IMP

After the Kuala Lumpur election Tan Cheng Lock did not appear to abandon his idea of forming the "pyramidal" system of political organisation. Thio Chan Bee, his friend, told him that he must "remain loyal to Dato Onn... out of gratitude and from a long term view."¹¹⁹ He stressed that Dato Onn stood "for more change in the Malay policy so as to accept Malayan Chinese as equal fellow citizens."¹²⁰ Thus Tan Cheng Lock continued to help Dato Onn in forming branches of the IMP such as the one in Malacca. When the Malacca branch of IMP was formally formed on 10 August 1952, Tan Cheng Lock and his son, Tan Siew Sin, accepted membership of the executive committee of this branch.¹²¹ However Tan Cheng Lock declined nomination as chairman on the grounds that his "hands are full."¹²²

Towards September 1952 the relationship between MCA leaders and Dato Onn deteriorated as Dato Onn was infuriated with what he saw as the case of double-dealing on the part of Tan Cheng Lock. He launched a campaign to criticize MCA's activities such as the running of lotteries.¹²³ He said the MCA had been able to amass large sums of money through the running of lotteries and part of the money was used for political work. In September 1952 the IMP's central national council passed a resolution, calling for the prohibition

of lotteries run by political parties. As a result, Tan Siew Sin, the head of the publicity section of the MCA was furious. According to him, by passing these resolutions the party (IMP) had thrown a direct and hostile challenge to the MCA.¹²⁴ Consequently Tan Siew Sin resigned from the IMP on 18 September 1952. However, Tan Cheng Lock said nothing about this. He continued to support Dato Onn and the IMP for another year.

By the end of 1952 it was clear that the IMP failed to attract support from the Malay or the Chinese communities. One of the leaders of the IMP, Dato Panglima Bukit Gantang, made a suggestion to Thuraisingham to hold a series of meetings to study the "political scene against the Malayan national background."¹²⁵ The first meeting was held in Ipoh on 29 and 30 January 1953 and was attended by Dato Panglima Gantang himself, Dato Onn bin Jaafar, Heah Joo Seong, Yong Shook Lin, former MCA Secretary-General and others including MacDonald, the Commissioner-General. After the meeting discussed the political situation in Malaya, Dato Penglima Bukit Gantang suggested the formation of "a central political body."¹²⁶ MacDonald agreed with this suggestion and pointed out that in India, the Indian problem was solved through the Round Table Conference. In another meeting held in Kuala Lumpur on 12 February 1953, MacDonald suggested that a central political body should work

through the existing political organizations rather than promote a new political party as being suggested by Yong Shook Lin and Dato Onn.¹²⁷

As a result of those meetings, the Malayan National Conference was held on 27 April 1953. This was attended by various social and political organizations including the IMP. However, the UMNO and MCA boycotted the conference.¹²⁸ The Conference failed to form a national coalition of all parties. As a consequence of this Dato Onn felt he was betrayed by Tan Cheng Lock and the MCA leaders as it was they who induced him towards non-communalism. He carried a campaign to discredit the MCA. For instance, in March 1953 he alleged that the MCA and the Chinese Chambers of Commerce cooperated to carry out a plan to make Malaya the twentieth province of China. He also said the MCA was controlled by the Chinese Chambers of Commerce which according to him, had "become the underground Kuomintang Party."¹²⁹ These charges were strongly condemned by the MCA leadership. Tan Cheng Lock's son, Tan Siew Sin, moved a motion of censure on Dato Onn in the Federal Legislative Council on 7 May 1953. But the motion was defeated with only nine in favour and forty against it. In the meantime, Tan Cheng Lock, who was still involved with IMP attempts to hold a protest meeting against Dato Onn, called it off after the defeat of a motion of censure in the Council.¹³⁰

After this incident, the political alliance between Tan Cheng Lock and Dato Onn came to an end. In a sad statement Dato Onn described how he had attempted to promote inter-racial harmony and cooperation and the sacrifices that he had made. He said, "having left UMNO, the present president of the MCA and I agreed to form a non-communal party which would take into its fold members of all races and of all communities."¹³¹ He added, "I have kept my part of the bargain."

In early 1954, Dato Onn dismantled the IMP and formed a new political party, the Party Negara (National Party) which was of a more pro-Malay orientation but its membership was open to all races who were subjects of the Ruler, or Federal citizens or British Subjects.¹³² The formation of this party reflected Dato Onn's intention to return to the old ground of getting Malay support and competing with UMNO. With the failure of the IMP, Tan Cheng Lock's proposals to "superimpose" a non-communal policy failed to become reality.

The Decline of The Militant Communism

Towards the end of 1951, the effects of the Government counter-insurgency and the military and police offensive were felt by the Communist guerrillas. The MCP was alarmed by the high casualties suffered by the guerrillas in fighting against the government forces. At

the same time its popularity and influence amongst the people was in decline. On 1 October the MCP Central Committee issued a new directive which reflected a rethinking of its policy.¹³³ The directive admitted mistakes in the past and the need to change the focus of its campaign. It reminded members that their primary duty was to expand and consolidate the organization of the masses, which was to take precedence over the purely military objective of destroying the enemy.¹³⁴ They realized that indiscriminate acts of destruction and sabotage were alienating the people who had before been prepared to support them. The new Directive instructed members to win over the masses by: ending the seizing of identity and ration cards; ending the burning of new villages and coolie lines; ending attacks on public utilities; refraining from derailing civilian trains; and ending the throwing of grenades or hurting the masses during the shooting of "running dogs." The directives reminded them that acts of sabotage and destruction in the rubber estates, tin mines, and factories should be stopped. These acts in the past caused resentment against the guerrillas as the workers lost their employment. But certain people, considered as reactionaries and traitors (such as the Kuomintang and the MCA members), and also government forces, were still targets for Communist attacks. But it reminded members not to kill members of the Malay political parties such

as UMNO and the IMP. This was because the MCP wanted to avoid resentment from the Malay community.

At the time Templer took over the post of High Commissioner and Director of Operations, the Communists had already begun to retreat into the deep jungle, partly as a result of the efforts of his predecessor. However, Templer made greater efforts and achieved a greater success in the campaign against the Communists. During his two years rule, two-thirds of the guerrilla forces were eliminated. Later on, MacGillivray and Bourne, continued to attack and curb the guerrillas. From 1951 to 1955, the strength of the guerrillas was reduced dramatically from 8,000 to less than 5,000.¹³⁵ Chin Peng and the MCP were forced to retreat, and found a new base in Southern Thailand. Terrorist activity was reduced until the government forces had difficulty in finding them.¹³⁶ At certain times the High Commissioner was worried that "...Communist terrorism should cease altogether in Malaya"¹³⁷ and this situation was more dangerous to the British position. In these circumstances, in the opinion of the High Commissioner, "it would be difficult if not impossible to resist, the establishment of Chinese Consuls and for the recognition of a lawful Communist Party, through which agencies Communist penetration of the political life of the country would be stepped up."¹³⁸

Towards the end of 1954, it appeared that the Communists' armed struggle against the British government would end in failure. As a consequence the MCP began to consider adopting a moderate line in its struggle against the colonial government. In August 1954, a Malayan delegate to the Council of World Democratic Youth in Peking gave a hint that the Campaigners for Malayan liberation were willing to undertake peace talks to bring the Malayan war to an end if the basic rights of national independence and self-determination of the Malayan people were maintained.¹³⁹ The MCP looked to the Geneva Conference on Indo-China as an example that "disputes can be solved justly by peaceful means"¹⁴⁰ and a colonial war could also be solved successfully by the same means if there was "respect for national independence, and the democratic and territorial integrity of the oppressed nations." The MCP argued that the British should follow the steps taken by France for the solution of the Indo-China problem.¹⁴¹

Conclusion

The government's vigorous campaign to build a united Malayan nation and the introduction of elections had achieved considerable success in the political life of Malaya. It changed the attitude of the Malays towards the non-Malays--particularly the Chinese-- and encouraged

the development and the growth of a moderate interracial political movement such as the UMNO-MCA Alliance. It also brought about the decline of militant Communism. In these circumstance, moderate political leaders were confident and expected that the ultimate aim of self-government and independence could be reached at a faster pace.

Notes

1. Henry Gurney to Thomas Lloyd, 19 March 1951, in CO 967/145.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Thomas Lloyd to Gurney, 5 April 1951, in CO 967/145.
5. Ibid.
6. Cited Anthony Short, op.cit., p. 301.
7. Cited in ibid., p.302-303.
8. Viscount Chandos (O. Lyttelton), Memoirs of Lord Chandos, Bodley Head, London, 1962, p.362.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. A press statement issued by Lyttelton, in CO 1022/81, File No.SEA 31/1/01.
12. The Times, 3 December 1951, in CO 1022/81/31/1/01.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. See , "Part of a Statement Which Mr. Lyttelton proposes to make before leaving Malaya", in CO 1022/81/31/1/01.
17. Cited , "Part of a Statement Which Mr. Lyttelton proposes to make before leaving Malaya", in CO 1022/81/31/1/01, see also O. Lyttelton to Richard Wevell, Labour M.P.(Wells Constituency), 15 January 1952, in CO 1022/81/31/1/01.
18. "Extract from The Straits Budget, 17 January 1951, in CO 1022/81/31/1/01.
19. Ibid.

20. Viscount Chandos, op.cit., p. 366.
21. Cited John Cloarke, Templer Tiger of Malaya: The Life of Field Marshall Sir Gerald Templer, Harrap, London, 1985, p. 201.
22. Cited ibid., p. 205.
23. Ibid.
24. "Draft Directive to the High Commissioner for the Federation the Federation of Malaya " (prepared by Jerrom and Higham) in CO 1022/102.File No. SEA 34/252/02.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. The Times, 16 January 1952, (Newspapers Cuttings) in The Templer Papers, Acc.N. 7410-29-7, in National Army Museum, London.
31. Ibid.
32. See Richard Stubbs, Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare, Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1989, pp. 156-191.
33. R. O. Tilman, "Policy Formulation, in Wang Gungwu (ed.), Malaysia, A Survey, Donald Moore Books, 1964, Singapore, p.352.
34. Ibid.
35. Anthony Short, op.cit., p.271.
36. "Message from H.E. The High Commissioner To The Chinese Community", in The Templer Papers, Acc.N. 7410-29.
37. Ibid.
38. J. Cloarke, op.cit., p.246.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid., p. 249.

41. Edgar O'Ballance, op.cit., p.126.
42. Anthony Short, op.cit., p.342.
43. Ray Nyce, Chinese New Village in Malaya, A Community Study, Malaysian Sociological Research Institute, Singapore, 1973, p. xi (introduction).
44. Cited J. Cloake, op.cit., p.264.
45. Ray Nyce, op.cit., p.xi.
46. Victor Purcell, Malaya, Communists or Free?, Victor Gollancz Ltd, London, 1954, p.246.
47. Cited J.E. Jayasuria,op.cit., p. 63.
48. Ibid.
49. See, Tan Liok Ee, "Tan Cheng Lock and the Chinese Education Issue in Malaya",in JSEAS, Vol. XIX, No. 1 March 1988, pp. 48-61. The question of Chinese education also has received considerable attention from Heng Pek Koon. As far as the Chinese community was concerned, Heng Pek Koon is generally accurate in her interpretation of the Chinese response to the government educational policy. Nevertheless, the interpretation only emphasize a one-dimension picture of the whole episode. In accessing the educational policy of the government concerning the Chinese community, one should, in fact, must take into consideration all factors involved, namely not only the Chinese response but also the overall effect of the policy to the well-being of the Malayan community as a whole. See, Heng Pek Koon, "The Development of the Malayan Chinese Association". Ph.D. Thesis, SOAS, 1984, pp.286-302.
50. Tan Liok Ee, op.cit., pp. 48-61.
51. Ibid., p.55.
52. Cited ibid.
53. Cited ibid.
54. "His Excellency's Address To Chinese Middle School Teachers At Carcosa", 9 March 1953, in The Templer Papers, Acc. N. 7410-29-1-46, in National Army Museum.
55. Ibid.

56. Dr. J. Falk, the chairman of the International Bank Mission on Education in Malaya, estimated that the Malayan government needed at least M\$200 millions for the implementation of the National School programme based on the 1952 Education Ordinance. The government also needed \$70 millions for secondary education. The overall cost for education would be M\$300 millions a year. However, the actual total public expenditure on education in 1952 was only M\$64 millions. The government revenue for that year was about M\$800 millions with total expenditure on all public services, exclusive of the Emergency, was M\$600. For the Emergency it needed more than £20 million annually excluding £65 millions per annum from the H.M.G Treasury for the cost of the British Army and other units. See, "The Report of the International Bank Mission on Education", in CO 1030/52, File No. FED 23/246/01.
57. Templer to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 10 March 1952, in CO 1030/49, File No. FED 23/246/01, Part A.
58. "The Draft Report by The Special Select Committee...", in CO 1030/51, File No. FED 23/246/01, Part C.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
61. Memo. on "Chinese Schools in Malaya", in CO 1030/51/23/246/01. see also, High Commissioner to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 23 March 1955, in CO 1030/51/23/246/01.
62. Memo. on "Chinese Schools...op.cit.
63. "Memorandum explanatory of Sir D. MacGillivray's proposals for National Schools in Malaya", 1955, in CO 1030/51/23/246/01.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
66. "Draft letter for signature by Sir J. Martin for A. E. Drake, the Treasury, 5 July 1955", in CO 1030/51/23/246/01.
67. Ibid.

68. The Treasury faced various problems to approve such funds for education in Malaya such. See, minute by M.A. MacKintosh, 4 July, 1955, in CO 1030/51/23/246/01.
69. MacGillivray to Sir Hilton Poynton, the Colonial Office, 11 September 1955, in CO 1030/51/23/246/01.
70. Ibid.
71. See, " A Brief Report on the Development of Education in the Federation of Malaya for the year 1956, in CO 1030/51/23/246/01.
72. K .J. Ratnam, Communalism and the Political Process in Malaya, University of Malaya Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1967, reprinted, p.86-87.
73. Ibid.
74. Anthony Short, op.cit., p.341.
75. K.J. Ratnam, op.cit., p. 90.
76. Rajeswary Ampalavanar, The Indian Minority And Political Change in Malaya, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1981, p.112.
77. Ibid.
78. Ibid.
79. The Straits Budget, 8 November 1951, p.5.
80. Ibid.
81. Rajeswary Ampalavanar, op.cit., p. 116.
82. The Straits Budget, 8 November 1951.
83. Ibid.
84. Anthony Short, op.cit., p.345.
85. Gordon P. Means, Malaysian Politics, University of London Press, London, 1970, p. 133-134.
86. "Political Intelligence Report, Political Summary-May 1951", in CO 537/7346.
87. "Minutes of an INFORMAL MEETING held at No.96 First Cross St., Malacca" (on Wednesday), 19 December 1951," in Humphrey Ball's Paper (private collections).

88. B. H. Oon to J. J. Paskin, 5 February 1952, in CO 1022/85.
89. Ibid.
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid.
92. Heng Pek Koon, " The Development of the Malayan Chinese Association", Ph.D. Thesis, SOAS, 1984, p.234.
93. Cited R. Vasil, op.cit., p.65. See also Oong Hak Ching, Sejarah Perjuangan Partai Malaya, ...op.cit., p. 48.
94. The Straits Budget, 24 January 1952.
95. R. Vasil, op.cit., p.65.
96. H. S. Lee to Tan Cheng Lock, 18 February 1952, in H.S. Lee Papers (private collections). This letter also is found in Tan Cheng Lock Papers, TCL /9/33, ISEAS, Singapore.
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid.
99. Ibid., p.2.
100. Tan Cheng Lock to H. S. Lee, 22 February 1952, in H. S. Lee Papers (private collections). This letter also is found in Tan Cheng Lock Papers, TCL/24/4c, ISEAS, Singapore.
101. Ibid.
102. Cited R. Vasil, op.cit., p.65.
103. Thio Chan Bee to Tan Cheng Lock, 12 March 1952, in Tan Cheng Lock Papers SP13/A/16, Arkib Negara Malaysia.
104. Ibid.
105. Ibid.
106. Notes enclosed in ibid.
107. The Straits Budget, 28 February , 1952, p.14.
108. Ibid.

109. Ibid.
110. H.S. Lee to Tan Cheng Lock, 22 February 1952, in Tan Cheng Lock Papers, TCL /24/4c, ISEAS, Singapore.
111. Ibid.
112. Ibid.
113. Tan Cheng Lock to H. S.Lee, 29 February 1952, in H.S. Lee Papers (private collections)
114. Ibid.
115. H. S. Lee to Tan Cheng Lock, I March 1952, in H.S.Lee Papers (private collections)
116. Ibid.
117. Heng Pek Khoon, op.cit., p.183.
118. See ibid., pp. 179-216.
119. Thio Chan Bee to Tan Cheng Lock, 12 March 1952, in Tan Cheng Lock Papers SP13/A/16, Arkib Negara Malaysia.
120. Ibid.
121. R. Vasil, op.cit., p.66.
122. Cited ibid.
123. Ibid., p.72.
124. Ibid., p.73.
125. Cited ibid.
126. Ibid.
127. Ibid., p. 75.
128. Ibid.
129. Ibid., p.78.
130. Ibid.
131. Cited ibid., p. 79.
132. Ibid., p. 82-92.
133. Anthony Short, op.cit., pp. 310-321.

134. Victor Purcell, Malaya, Communist or Free, op.cit.?
p. 69.
135. It could be said that the forces of the terrorists were very small compared with government forces during this time. In 1952, there was a regular Police Force of 23,500, a Special Constabulary of 25,000, and a Home Guard of 170,000. There were also 23 battalions of troops; eight were in the Federation Army, seven British, six Gurkha, one Fijian, and one Rhodesian. See "Federation of Malaya: The Emergency," Copy No.78, from the High Commissioner to the Secretary of the State for the Colonies, 26 January 1955, in CO 1030/403.
136. See Appendix in ibid.
137. MacGillivray raised a question "...whether it would be in the ultimate interest of the British position in Malaya for militant communism to be called off completely and whether it would not be better for it to continue yet awhile at a level reduced to the point where it would be no more than a nuisance value". See, "Federation of Malaya: The Chinese Community and the Malayan Communist Party"(memo. from the High Commissioner for the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 28 January 1955), in CO 1030/403.
138. Ibid .
139. Anthony Short, op.cit., p. 460.
140. Cited in ibid.
141. Ibid.

CHAPTER VIII

The Road To Independence 1955

By 1955 it was evident that Britain and the colonial government in Malaya were facing a delicate situation. Both the UMNO-MCA-MIC Alliance and the MCP had one goal in common to obtain independence for Malaya as soon as possible. Because of this the Alliance appeared willing to negotiate with the MCP in order to bring the Emergency to an end. There was, therefore, the probability of a merger between the moderate and militant political movements in order to achieve independence. The British finally chose to withdraw and transfer the power to the moderate UMNO-MCA-MIC Alliance.

Part I

The Constitutional Crisis And The British-Alliance Confrontation

By early 1953 it became clear that the fight against the Communists had improved and Tempier, the High Commissioner, decided to initiate steps towards Malayan self-government. A committee was set up to prepare ways and means for Federal elections. This

Election Committee consisted of 46 members, most of whom were supporters of Dato Onn and the National Conference group.¹ There were only seven UMNO-MCA representatives.

In the meantime the Alliance mounted a campaign to draw support from the people for their cause of getting independence for the country.² The Alliance made an attempt to bring together all political organizations and interest groups to discuss future constitutional developments in Malaya. For these purposes the Alliance organized a Malayan National Convention and invited fifteen organizations to attend. It held three meetings of the National Convention, on 23 August and 11 October of 1953 and 14 February, 1954. Only four organizations, other than the Alliance, participated in the National Convention: the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP or PAS), Peninsular Malays Union (PMU), the Kelantan Malay Union (KMU) and the Pan-Malayan Labour Party (PMLP). The Convention, which was largely dominated by the Alliance, passed a number of resolutions which amongst other things called for an elected majority in the Federal Legislative Council and an election for Federal Council not later than November 1954.

In January 1954, the Election Committee produced its findings which showed that there were some disagreements among its members. The vital questions were whether

there should be or should not be an elected majority and also on the number of elected majority component. The Majority report recommended that there should be 48 nominated and 44 elected members for the re-constituted Council. This meant a majority of the members of this committee favoured a delay in political progress towards an independent Malaya. The majority report also recommended that civil servants should not be allowed to stand for election. The minority report, which reflected the Alliance view recommended 60 elected and 40 nominated members for the Federal Council. The Alliance proposed a large majority of elected members as it expected to win in the forthcoming election and form the first elected government. The minority report also recommended that civil servants should be allowed to stand in the election; large members of UMNO were, in fact, government servants.

The report was submitted to the High Commissioner and the Conference of Malay Rulers which had the right of veto on any change in constitutional matters. The Conference made an attempt to bridge the gap between the majority and minority recommendations. Later a White Paper was published proposing a small elected majority for the Federal Council. It proposed a Council of 98 with 46 nominated and 52 elected members. The Alliance refused to accept such a small elected majority. Instead it demanded a three-fifths elected majority. It decided to

send a delegation of its three representatives--Tunku Abdul Rahman, Dato Razak and T.H. Tan-- to discuss the matter with the Secretary of State for the Colonies in London. The Alliance also petitioned the Sultans, but for the time being did not seek an interview with them.

MacGillivray, the Deputy High Commissioner sent two telegrams to the Secretary of State on 2 April regarding the Alliance request to send a delegation to see him.³ The colonial officials felt that it would be a mistake to accede to the Alliance request as the High Commissioner had already reached full agreement on all constitutional proposals except minor ones. According to MacKintosh, he did not think that "the Alliance could fail to recognise that the Secretary of State was being disingenuous if he were to receive a delegation in circumstances in which it was obvious that nothing that they had to say would have any effect."⁴ But afterwards the colonial officials changed their mind after Lord Ogmores, who was sympathetic to the Alliance's cause, persuaded the Secretary of State to receive the Alliance delegation. Newsam suggested to Martin that the Secretary of State might agree to see them as a matter of courtesy.⁵ But he should not discuss constitutional matters. Martin agreed and told Sir Thomas Lloyd, that he thought it would " be a mistake for the Secretary of State not to 'show willing' to the extent of receiving

the leading visitors on a purely personal and informal basis."⁶

In the end Tunku Abdul Rahman and his colleagues were received by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and they also met Lord Ogmores and other Labour members of Parliament who had a particular interest in Malayan problems. In the meantime Templer informed the Secretary of State that it seemed that the Alliance was intent on resigning from the Federal and States Executive councils, also from all local government councils.⁷ In his opinion, this would undoubtedly be a dangerous move and would have a most unsettling effect on the political situation and might even give rise to disturbances. He gave a suggestion to the Secretary of State that he should tell the Alliance "that resignation from a council at this stage would be an irresponsible act which might even have an unfavourable effect on the conduct of the Emergency."⁸ He also informed the Secretary of State that H. S. Lee suggested that a "royal commission" should be appointed and Tunku Abdul Rahman might accept this even if it meant a delay of elections for six months. Lee also told Templer that the Alliance felt that they might lose the elections unless they fulfilled their promise to resign.

During the meeting between the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Alliance leaders, the main arguments of the Alliance were as follows:

- a. That so small a elected majority was unacceptable to the mass of the people, who demanded at least three-fifths. Alliance leaders could not resist them on this because if they did they would be thrown over and replaced by extremists. For so few seats the people would not think it worth-while supporting elections, and the vast expense of fighting them would be a waste of money for political parties.
- b. No party could hope to win more than seventy per cent. of seats. On present figures that would mean an unworkably small majority and the winning party could therefore have no hope of governing with confidence. They would be in an impossible position if they always had to rely for a majority upon substantial help from non-elected elements in Council.
- c. Moreover, the Opposition would have too few seats to function effectively and debates would thus lack reality....⁹

The Secretary of State was not impressed and was not prepared to vary the constitutional proposals agreed between the High Commissioner and the Rulers. He pointed out to the Alliance that "it was no sort of leadership tamely to obey all the demands of your followers."¹⁰ He assured the Alliance that the majority party which would form the government would automatically enjoy the additional support of the three 'ex-officio' and two other official members of Council and also would be likely to get the support from among the other non-elected members. He rejected the demands for increasing

size of the elected majority as it would throw back the whole agreement which had so far been reached into "the melting pot." He persuaded the Alliance to accept the proposals, and take part in the elections, and discover whether the fears they expressed about the agreement were sound or not.

The Secretary of State told Templer that the Alliance delegation had not made any suggestions on the appointment of a royal commission and also did not mention their threats of mass resignation. He had the impression of the Alliance delegation, that they were as "three worried little men and on the evidence of their attitude when with me I should doubt whether they will in fact press their opposition to the present proposals by the extreme measures which they have threatened."¹¹ He added that, "I am quite determined not to budge at all from our position but I think that it might ease the situation greatly if we could open to the alliance some emergency exit from the position in which they have put themselves, and I am anxious if possible to find some such expedient."¹²

The Alliance mission to London was an almost total failure. After the delegation returned to Malaya, they again renewed their criticism of the constitutional proposals and demanded the following:

- a. That Government servants should be eligible for election to Council....
- b. That there should be a simple majority vote in all constituencies....
- c. That franchise should be granted to certain other groups beside federal citizens....
- d. That Nominated Members of the Legislative Council should be eligible for Ministerial Office.
- e. That the elections should be held this year [in 1954]....
- f. That at least three-fifths of the Members of the Legislative Council should be elected....¹³

Templer agreed to meet certain demands in full as in (a), (b) and (d).¹⁴ He rejected (c) as he was convinced that in order to build a united Malayan nation it was essential to confine the privilege of voting to its citizens. On (e) he pointed out it was not possible to hold the election in 1954 as it needed time to prepare it. He rejected (f) but added that Nominated Members might be expected to include some who were members of the victorious party. Thus the winning party could form the effective government by the support from its own nominated members together with the elected members.

Tunku Abdul Rahman was still not satisfied with the assurances of support from the High Commissioner and the Secretary of State for the Colonies . On 25 May 1954, he said that the small majority of six was insufficient to enable the victorious party to have a working majority in the Council to form a stable government.¹⁵ The party

in power would be subject to the whims and fancies of nominated members and amongst them there were those who were opposed to real democratic progress. According to the Tunku no responsible party could willingly form a government in these circumstances.

On 25 May 1954, the Tunku, H. S. Lee, Ismail and Leong Yew Koh presented a resolution adopted by the Alliance to General Templer. They read as follows:

That the White Paper to introduce national elections in the Federation of Malaya is not acceptable to the Alliance and, therefore, the Alliance strongly opposes its implementation by the Federation Government. In order to get an unbiased assessment of the country's progress towards self-Government, the Alliance requests that a special independent commission, consisting entirely of members from outside Malaya, be sent immediately to the Federation with the concurrence of Her Majesty and Their Highnesses to report on constitutional reforms in the Federation. The Alliance believes the appointment of such a commission will have the support of all who believe in democracy. Fully realising its responsibilities towards the people and the country, the Alliance will continue to give its fullest co-operation to the Government in all respects, particularly with a view to bringing the emergency to an early end, if this request is acceded to. On the other hand, if the authorities insist on implementation of the White Paper, the Alliance with great regret will have no choice but to withdraw all its members from participation in the Government.¹⁶

Templer told the Alliance members that it was his firm intention to go ahead with consideration of the bill in the Executive Council and to publish it at once so as to make it possible to introduce it to the Legislative Council on 23 June. However, he agreed to the Alliance's proposal for the appointment of a commission. He told the Secretary of State that "the request for a commission to undertake a complete review of the Federation Agreement would appear a reasonable one to many people as there were unacceptable parts in the Agreement which are clearly in need of change."¹⁷ In his opinion, the rejection of this request would therefore be ill-received by many and would strengthen the position of the Alliance. But it was likely that the Malay Rulers and the Negara Party (or Party Negara) would bitterly oppose this proposal. However, Templer felt this proposal should be put before the Rulers.

On 2 June 1954, MacGillivray, who had taken over from Gerald Templer as the High Commissioner of Malaya, told the Secretary of State that they should go ahead with the elections on the basis already agreed.¹⁸ In his opinion, not "to do so would be interpreted to mean that we accepted that there was substance in the Alliance's contention that the arrangements proposed are unworkable and would encourage the Alliance in their present intransigent attitude and lead them on to demand

further concessions; and we would undoubtedly run into difficulties at the same time with the Rulers and the Party Negara."19

MacGillivray anticipated that the Alliance members would carry out their plan of resignation and boycott, as without this it was difficult for them to maintain face. But in doing so they risked dissension in their ranks, both in UMNO and the MCA, and possibly even a break-up of the Alliance. In his opinion, it might be best if the Alliance were to break-up and later reform without the extreme UMNO. MacGillivray pointed out that the three UMNO Menteri Besar might not be prepared to resign. As the presidents of their State councils, they must support the bill so as not to be regarded as disloyal to the Rulers' Conference. He hoped the Alliance would recognise the weakness in their position once they realized the government proposed to stand firm and pursue its plan.²⁰

The Secretary of State agreed with MacGillivray and told Tunku Abdul Rahman that he saw no reason to postpone the programme designed to give effect to the proposals already decided upon for the introduction of elections to the Federal Legislative Council. He considered that those proposals seem to be in themselves thoroughly sound. In his opinion, any attempt to go back

upon them would cause confusion .Thus, he hoped the Tunku would co-operate in making a success of them.²¹ However this persuasion had no effect with the Tunku and other Alliance leaders. The MCA General Committee decided to support the earlier decision of UMNO to withdraw its representatives from participation in councils of the government at various levels.²² At a joint meeting of UMNO and MCA officials on 13 June 1954, they released a statement to the press as follows

As a result of the refusal of the Secretary of State for the Colonies to accede to an Alliance request for the White Paper on Federal Elections to be set aside and for the appointment immediately of a Special Independent Commission to inquire into Constitutional Reforms in the Federation, the UMNO-MCA Alliance, ... announces with regret its decision to withdraw all unofficial members of UMNO and MCA from active participation in the government in the Federation.

The decision entails the resignation of the two Members ("ministers") of the Federation, unofficial members of UMNO or MCA from the Federal Executive and Legislative Councils and other government bodies. In the Alliance view, the White Paper proposals are unsatisfactory and cannot be accepted in spite of the assurance of the Secretary of State for the Colonies that if these proposals cannot work satisfactorily, immediate remedial steps will be taken.

The Alliance did not ask for a Royal Commission. The Alliance asked for a Special Independent Commission. The Alliance is prepared to agree to postponing the election while a Special Independent Commission is appointed to go into constitutional reforms. The White Paper proposals are not democratic enough.²³

As a consequence, on 18 June three Alliance Members of the Executive Council, H.S. Lee (Transport) Ismail (Natural Resources) and Rahman resigned. Twelve of the nineteen members of the Alliance in the Federal Council also resigned not including the Mentri Besar. H. S. Lee issued a strong warning to other MCA members to do likewise.²⁴ On the 21 June H. S. Lee told the representatives of Chinese public organisations and guilds in the States of Selangor as follows:

Any M.C.A. members who disagrees with the General Committee but insists on remaining as members of the Government Councils should first of all resign as members of the M.C.A. A person serving in the Government Councils must in honour bound, consider how he became a member of such Councils. Any person who professes to be member of the M.C.A. and yet does not accept the unanimous decision of the General Committee of the M.C.A., the highest body in the organisation, deserves treatment of public contempt because it is always open to him to tender his resignation to the M.C.A. if he should prefer to be a stooge.²⁵

Lee also warned those who might fill the vacancies in the various councils as replacements for Alliance members. He said that in a democratic state persons responsible for misdeeds would have to answer to the people eventually.²⁶

However, the Alliance's action was not effective as their representatives in various Federal, States and Settlements and other government bodies were outnumbered by the supporters of Dato Onn and other official members. MacGillivray told the Secretary of State that the "great majority of councils will have no difficulty in assembling a quorum to hold meeting and carry on with transaction of business."²⁷ But in some councils such as Kuala Lumpur, where Alliance elected Members had an outright majority, some change had to be made. However, he felt at that moment, that there was no necessity to take immediate action. According to him, the Alliance's actions would harm more the interest of the Chinese, as Chinese members were almost without exception members of the MCA and it would be left "virtually without representation in constitutional bodies in the country at large."²⁸

MacGillivray pointed out that it seemed the Alliance was in favour of contesting the elections, in order to demonstrate popular support in the country for their party and those associated with them. Accordingly, the government probably would have faced great difficulty as the successful Alliance candidates would have absented themselves from the councils to which they had been elected. Thus the Alliance might obstruct the transaction of business in the councils.²⁹

Towards the end of June 1954 the Alliance struggle appeared almost certain to end in failure. On 23 June 1954 MacGillivray told the Secretary of State that "the rulers and Party Negara and their supporters are strongly of the opinion that a firm stand is necessary if the Alliance is to be made to see reason, and that any further concessions can only lead to further demands."³⁰ He also informed him that only eight of the seventeen Chinese in the Legislative Council had resigned, some of them most reluctantly. According to him, they took this action as a result of a "deplorable" campaign amounting to intimidation by H.S.Lee with all the power of the Guilds and Associated Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Chinese Chamber of Mines behind him. The other nine Chinese, most of them members of the MCA, remained in their seats in the Council. But all of them were not in the Council as nominees of the MCA.³¹

On 24 June 1954, the Federation of Malaya Agreement (Amendment) Bill was passed in the Legislative Council without division.³² 59 members (excluding the speaker) were present. But the sixteen Alliance Members who had resigned, were as expected, absent. This amendment provided for a Legislature in which 52 out of 98 members would be elected. Thus, the elected members would be in the majority. It was decided that the first Federal Election would take place in July 1955. For the

Alliance this was their first major defeat in the struggle with Dato Onn and his supporters and the British government. At this stage the Alliance did not realize that they had made a big mistake in not seeking support from the Malay Rulers whose consent was necessary for any change to the constitution. Instead of persuading the Malay Rulers, the Alliance irritated them by asking the British government to use "formal advice" to force them to give consent to any change to the constitution.³³

The Alliance seemed to realize their mistake and adopted a new strategy to win the support from the Malay rulers. On 2 July 1954, they held a procession of 2000 people in Johore Baharu to publicise their demands and present a petition to the Sultan.³⁴ They made a request for the appointment of a special independent commission "to inquire into, and make recommendations for, constitutional reforms in the Federation of Malaya."³⁵ In their opinion, a commission with members from outside Malaya would be "free from prejudices and other local influence."³⁶ The Alliance pointed out the majority report of the Election Commission recommended an elected minority in the future Federal Legislative Council. They hoped the Sultans would prevent "this ridiculous recommendation in the Report from being adopted."³⁷

Initially the Sultans and their advisers strongly resisted the Alliance proposal for a commission from

outside Malaya to examine the constitution for the future of Malaya.³⁸ The reason was that the advisers for the Sultans were associated with Dato Onn of the MNC, which was an opponent of the Alliance. The High Commissioner himself was in difficulties as the Sultans' attitude was one of 'no concessions' to the Alliance. He feared that if he applied strong pressure he might prejudice his own position with the Sultans and their supporters, and "certainly would not get anywhere." The Sultans themselves argued that they would be on dangerous ground to depart from the advice tendered by their advisers, many of whom were among those who had signed the majority report of the Election Committee. Likewise Dato Onn pressed the High Commissioner not to suggest any other amendments to the Bill which gave an advantage to the Alliance.³⁹ However, the High Commissioner himself favoured an early agreement on the constitutional issue. In his opinion:

There were dangers in a continuation of the present impasse. Disorders might arise from it and clearly the position gave all sorts of opportunities for skulduggery and for penetration on the part of the Communists.⁴⁰

As the present writer has indicated elsewhere the former High Commissioner agreed with the Alliance's view regarding the need for a commission to review the constitution. But the Colonial Office was not in favour

of a commission from outside Malaya which was being suggested by the Alliance "... if it is possible to reach agreement on an appointment of an entirely local commission... to form a suitable body for this purpose."⁴¹

On 15 July 1954 , MacGillivray was able to persuade the Conference of Rulers that some parts of the Federation Agreement should be reviewed at an early date, particularly having regard to the introduction of elections to the various legislatures.⁴² But the Rulers were not satisfied that a commission drawn from outside Malaya would provide the most satisfactory body for conducting such a review. But the Alliance leaders still strongly pressed for a commission from outside Malaya, as they feared a local body might be controlled by the 'reactionaries' of the Party Negara and they would be in a minority.⁴³ However, MacGillivray opined that the Alliance might agree if he proposed " that a fundamental review of the Federation Agreement should be conducted in such a manner that it enjoyed popular support and therefore the Legislative Council should have a say in the manner and composition of the body but only when the elected element had been added to it."⁴⁴ To persuade the Alliance to accept this, the High Commissioner also planned to propose to the Rulers the appointment of a Working Party which would comprise half Federal and half

State representatives with a strong Alliance element. This body's "main task would be to consider the financial relationship between the Federal government and the States and other matters including an amendment to regularize the position of the Mentri Besar and State Secretaries."⁴⁵ These actions would help to the moderate UMNO leader who" appeared to be trying to get out of the boycott but was under pressure from his left wing."⁴⁶ According to MacGillivray, "UMNO was seeking a possible excuse to go back on the agreement" and he " had had to urge the Rulers and others to re-appoint all those who had resigned their position."⁴⁷

In early August, the Alliance strategy of persuading the Malay rulers to support their demands started to have an effect. The Sultan of Johore invited the Sultans for a meeting in Johore Baharu on 22 and 23 August to discuss the Alliance demand for an outside commission.⁴⁸ It was reported that he might have come out in support of UMNO "with the idea of capturing a prominent position for Johore vis-a-vis other States" and also that he was very pleased "by the general behaviour towards him of members of UMNO during procession last month."⁴⁹ This change of attitude of the Sultans was apparent at the Conference of the Rulers on 21 October 1954. The Rulers and Menteri Besar most closely in touch with UMNO reached an agreement on certain constitutional matters.⁵⁰ It was agreed that a purely exploratory

committee should be appointed "to examine the provisions of the Federation of Malaya Agreement 1948, other than Part XI," which "... required amendment for the purpose of ensuring that they meet with the needs and aspirations of the people..."⁵¹ The proposed committee would be comprised of one representative for each State and Settlement, and eleven Federal representatives appointed by the High Commissioner. Dato Abdul Razak, the vice chairman of the UMNO and the Secretary of Pahang would sit on the committee. The High Commissioner hoped "...the presence of Dato Abdul Razak on the Committee should satisfy U.M.N.O."⁵²

This concession, together with the assurance of the High Commissioner that he would consult the victorious party regarding the filling of the five of the seven reserved Nominated Members seats for the Federal Council, was a good excuse for the Alliance to call off the boycott. This could be seen by the people as a victory for the Alliance and enhanced its image as a strong force in the battle for self-government and independence for Malaya. Accordingly the boycott was called off in early July.

After the end of the boycott the UMNO-MCA Alliance concentrated their efforts on winning the forthcoming States and Federal elections with the final

objective of getting immediate independence. British officials were still undecided when the process of decolonization should reached its final stage. In March 1955 Sir Anthony Eden, the Foreign Secretary, made it clear to the Malayan people that there were obstacles that stood in the way along the road to self-government.⁵³ The main obstacle was the Emergency. He pointed out to the people what they should do in order to achieve self-government. He said:

First suppress terrorism, next put the people on their guard against Communist infiltration and subversion then help to secure them against these dangers, develop a stable economy and administration, establish a durable accord between the races and provide a secure system of defence. These are the hard necessities regulating the pace at which we can go forward to realise ...our hope of a happy prosperous self-governing united Malayan nation within the Commonwealth.⁵⁴

In the Federal Elections in July 1955, the Alliance put up candidates for all seats with 35 from UMNO, 15 MCA and two from MIC. The main issues in the Alliance manifesto were to achieve independence within four years and to bring the Emergency to an end by offering a general amnesty. The main contender was the Party Negara which contested 33 seats. This party also aimed to get independence but a year later than the Alliance target. Unlike the Alliance the Party Negara under the leadership of Dato Onn adopted a strong pro-

Malay stance as an attempt to win the support of the Malays which formed 85 per cent of the electorate in this election. However, the Alliance achieved a landslide victory by capturing 51 of the 52 seats. Another one was won by the Islamic Party (PMIP). The Alliance's great victory had proved the gap between Chinese and Malays already had closed to a very great extent. According to K. J. Ratnam, "...there was little definite evidence to suggest communal voting ..." at this election. He added that, if "communal voting had in fact been widespread, Party Negara might have stood some chance of beating the Alliance since U.M.N.O.'s communal appeal might very well have been diminished as a result of its partnership with the M.C.A and M.I.C."⁵⁵ Thus the Alliance was able to clear one of the obstacles on the road to full self-government and independence as this election had indicated the various races were united.

But one obstacle remained; the Emergency or the shooting war against the Communist guerrillas. The British had always argued this as a reason to delay the granting of independence for Malaya. Thus the Alliance government, under Tunku Abdul Rahman and other MCA leaders were eager to bring the Emergency to an end. One of their efforts was to "negotiate" with the MCP, which led to the meeting of Baling, in Kedah.

Part II

Baling Talks

When the MCP launched a peace offensive, the Alliance was preparing to contest the first Federal Election which was to be held in July. The Alliance leaders, including Tunku Abdul Rahman, felt that the terrorists should be offered an amnesty with view to encourage them to surrender. On 21 January, Tan Cheng Lock announced that he was willing to go into the jungle and discuss a general amnesty with the terrorists with a view to ending the Emergency. The Alliance renewed its proposals for amnesty in the Election manifesto which was published in May.⁵⁶

In June the Alliance leaders received a letter, dated 1 May from the MCP, announcing that the aim of the MRLA was to achieve a peaceful, democratic and independent Malaya.⁵⁷ According to the MCP, to achieve this it was necessary to bring the war to an end, "abolish the Emergency Regulations, hold national elections in a peaceful and democratic atmosphere so that all political parties, organisations, and individuals who genuinely strove for peace could hold a round table conference to reach a unanimous agreement in conformity with actual conditions in Malaya."⁵⁸ The MCP pointed out that that they were willing to meet the government's

representatives to negotiate for peace. But the government rejected the offer for negotiation. It was pointed out that if the MCP wished to end the Emergency they could take advantage of the generous terms of amnesty. The Alliance leadership, while expressing their willingness to meet with Chin Peng , did not take the matter seriously.

In letters dated 12 and 29 September, the MCP continued to offer to negotiate with the government. In a letter, received by Tunku Abdul Rahman, the Chief Minister of the Federal government, from the MCP Central Committee, negotiations were proposed to "achieve a cease fire and to solve the questions of repealing the Emergency regulations and of achieving independence by peaceful means."⁵⁹ The MCP considered the measures proposed in the "General Amnesty" Proclamation were not reasonable and practical. It proposed that "immediate negotiations be conducted directly between the two parties engaged in the fighting, in order that a total cease fire can be achieved as soon as possible and that the questions of repealing the emergency regulations, the achievement of independence by peaceful means and other problems relating to this can be satisfactorily solved."⁶⁰ The MCP appreciated the peace efforts taken by Tunku Abdul Rahman and Tan Cheng Lock and their desire to meet Chin Peng, the Secretary General of the MCP. Thus

the MCP agreed to send its representatives to the UMNO-MCA-MIC Alliance headquarters "... to discuss with the representatives of the Alliance constructive and practical details for a meeting to be held between Tunku Abdul Rahman and Sir Tan Cheng Lock with Comrade Chin Peng."⁶¹

In response to the MCP's new approach Tunku Abdul Rahman and also the prominent members of the MCA had begun to support the idea of negotiations in order to end the Emergency. But the High Commissioner and other British officials agreed only to allow the Tunku to meet the MCP's leaders to clarify the terms of the amnesty. Thus on 30 September the government released a statement saying:

The Chief Minister is ready to meet Chin Peng to clarify to him the recent declaration of amnesty. Sir Cheng Lock Tan will be with him at the meeting. There will be no preliminary meeting with any representatives or anybody else.⁶²

On 1 October, at the meeting of the Federation and Singapore ministers held in Singapore, the Tunku said he would like David Marshall to come with him. But Marshall said the MCP had invited Malayan ministers only. He agreed to accompany Tunku if the Communists invited him to attend, and in view of Singapore's common interest in the problem.⁶³ On 17 October 1955 a meeting was held

at government House in Singapore House, attended by the Tunku, Marshall, MacGillivray, and R. H. Scott, the British Commissioner-General, to discuss the issue of the amnesty.⁶⁴ Marshall expressed the gravest possible concern about the outcome of a meeting with Chin Peng. He considered that it would develop into negotiations, during which demands would be made by Chin Peng and concessions in some form would be inevitable. He was certain that the MCP would ask the Tunku to release all persons who surrendered after the briefest possible screenings, to release all detainees, and to repeal the Emergency Regulations. He pressed for a clarification of policy in the face of these grave possibilities if there were any negotiations with the MCP. The Tunku regarded negotiations with the MCP as inevitable as this was his political commitment. During the meeting on the following day, the Tunku expressed his opinion that Chin Peng would be likely to ask for:

1. Recognition of the Malayan Communist Party.
2. An assurance that those surrendering will not be deported.
3. An assurance that those surrenderring will be allowed to play a part in the political life of the country and will not be detained for more than a short period.
4. The release of present detainees, and
5. The repeal of the Emergency Regulations.⁶⁶

Tunku Abdul Rahman said he would reject straightway any recognition of the MCP but he must be able to discuss

other matters raised by Chin Peng.⁶⁷ But he pointed out that he recognised that he would not have the authority to agree to anything at the meeting. He would refer any points raised in the discussion with Chin Peng to the High Commissioner. MacGillivray pointed out to the Tunku that the proposed "meeting with Chin Peng was agreed on the understanding that it was for the purpose of clarification of the terms of the amnesty and that there would be no negotiation."⁶⁸ But the Tunku strongly opposed this condition as there was growing public opinion in favour of negotiation and that he could not "go to the meeting if he were authorised merely to explain the terms of the amnesty."⁶⁹ Furthermore the MCP would be able to brand him as a "Colonial stooge" if it appeared that he was acting entirely on the instructions of the British government during the forthcoming meeting.

The Tunku's terms for the meeting really put the High Commissioner in a great dilemma.⁷⁰ If he disagreed there was a real danger that the Alliance would use their "secret weapon" of resignation from the Councils at all levels and represent to the public that the British refused to allow the Tunku to meet and talk with Chin Peng. The Alliance then could suggest that the British did not want to bring the Emergency to an end and deliberately wished to keep it alive in order to deny independence to Malaya. If this was to happen, there

would be a strong anti-British campaign by UMNO and the prosecution of the Emergency would be made more difficult and there would be a possibility that morale among the police and in the Malay Regiment would be lost. On the other hand if he allowed the Tunku to talk with the MCP on his terms and bring back a report, he might not be able to agree to the points raised in the proposed meeting. Then the Tunku would resign and suggest to the public that he could have brought the Emergency to an end on terms acceptable to the public but that the British had frustrated a reasonable solution. The greater risk for the British lay in the possibility that Chin Peng would ask for an assurance that independence would be granted to Malaya by a stipulated date. In the High Commissioner's opinion, the Tunku would certainly support this demand.

The High Commissioner also pointed out that the Alliance and the Communists were both striving for the independence of Malaya. It was likely that this would become one of the subjects for discussion, and "if discussed, the Chief Minister may emerge from the meeting feeling that he has a closer identity of view with the Communists...than he has with the British"⁷¹ on this particular issue. The status of Chin Peng would inevitably be enhanced, and in fact his position was already improved by the publicity of the proposed talks.

On the other hand the status of British officials in the government would be reduced.

The Colonial Policy Committee took an enormous interest in the proposed talks between the Tunku and Chin Peng. One of its leading members, Lord Reading, came to Malaya and Singapore and held a series of meetings with top government officials, including MacDonald (whose post was change to High Commissioner for the United Kingdom in India in 1955).⁷² They made attempts to dissuade the Tunku from his intention of having discussions with Chin Peng at his forthcoming meeting. The reason was that the Tunku had insisted that he would not go to meet Chin Peng merely to clarify the terms of the amnesty. He might make concessions to the MCP which were not in the interests of the British. According to Lord Reading, the Tunku made it quite plain that he had every intention of using every means in his power to bring the Emergency to an end as he had pledged himself in the election campaign to do so.⁷³ In his opinion, if he failed, he would at once become discredited. On the other hand, success would have a chance of creating a united nation. The Tunku also pointed out that a military solution was no longer possible as the Communists had established themselves on the Siamese border. According to him the only way was to negotiate with Chin Peng. But it was useless for the Tunku to meet Chin Peng if he was not in a position to make reasonable concessions. According to the Tunku he

must have the discretion to make a more favourable offer, if the course of negotiations required it. Thus he must have a reasonably free hand in order to gain his objective. It was pointed out to him that if the Communist forces were set free, they could turn to covert subversion. But the Tunku held the belief that once the Communists accepted terms, they would be anxious to re-establish themselves and show themselves as good citizens for some years to come.

Lord Reading thought that it was useless to argue with the Tunku as he was evidently "a very vain man and it might be that personal vanity was an element in the policy that he was pursuing."⁷⁴ But he also realized that the Tunku's attitudes could be explained by his desire to clear the ground of obstacles to the achievement of independence in the very near future. According to Lord Reading, the British government should consider two courses of action. First to "refuse authority to go beyond the published terms of the amnesty and thereby risk the prospect of the talks never taking place or breaking down at a very early stage, with all the consequences of a charge of imperialistic motives, or failure to move with the spirit of the times into a world of coexistence..."⁷⁵ Another course of action was to allow "some further measure of latitude in spite of all the difficulties of specifying the nature and extent

of the concessions which may be offered and all the dangers of the Tunku deliberately exceeding his authority and coming to terms which, however, acceptable to large sections of local opinion, Her Majesty's Government could not possibly ratify."⁷⁶

On 25 October, MacGillivray suggested another course of action: to strengthen "Rahman for this meeting is not ...now regarded as a necessary condition precedent to grant of self-government to the Federation."⁷⁷ Tunku Abdul Rahman and other Alliance leaders were determined to achieve very early self-government as they believed that if they would not be able to deliver it they would be submerged by extremists, such as the Youth wing of the UMNO. In MacGillivray's opinion, an insistence "upon ending the shooting war as a prior condition to the granting of self-government has ceased to pay dividends and if it is maintained it will prove a positive incitement to irresponsibility on the part of Rahman when he meets Chin Peng."⁷⁸ Thus he advised the Secretary of State to make a statement that "the shooting war need no longer be regarded as an obstacle on the road to self-government, although H.M.G. intend to go on providing military assistance until militant Communism in Malaya has been defeated."⁷⁹ He also needed to point out that he had been able to agree with the Rulers and Alliance Ministers that talks should be held in London early next

year, to discuss the future of Malaya. MacGillivray hoped this statement might "have the greatest possible effect upon Rahman before he meets Chin Peng."⁸⁰

The Secretary of State for the Colonies instructed the High Commissioner to make every effort to persuade the Tunku to confine himself at the proposed meeting to clarification of the terms of the amnesty.⁸¹ He asked him to make it clear to the Tunku that he was not allowed to go to the meeting as "a plenipotentiary with power to agree to anything on behalf of the Government."⁸² HMG fully reserved the right to reject proposals going beyond the amnesty terms and in any case were not prepared to agree to concessions, particularly ones that would involve recognition of the MCP or that would result in the release of hard core Communists.

The Secretary of State agreed with MacGillivray's proposals to strengthen Tunku Abdul Rahman by explaining the HMG's attitude towards self-government, the proposed January talks, and the establishment of a commission to review the constitution. The government would consider the recommendations of such a commission, except in the case of anything that would affect the ability of the Federation government to keep the internal security position under control. He also agreed with the suggestion that British government "...no longer regard

further progress on the road to self-government."⁸³

The Secretary of State asked MacGillivray to inform the Tunku about this in his briefing for the proposed meeting with Chin Peng. He pointed out that he was not ready to make a public statement in Parliament on the terms that were being suggested by MacGillivray.⁸⁴ He feared the proposed statement, made in Parliament, would be misunderstood in Britain.⁸⁵ On the other hand he agreed to send a personal message that might help strengthen the Tunku before the meeting.

As instructed by the Secretary of State, MacGillivray and other British officials made efforts to persuade the Tunku to confine himself to clarification of the terms of amnesty.⁸⁶ It was pointed out that discussions on matters such as the repeal of the Emergency Regulations, would amount to an acknowledgment that Chin Peng had a strong voice in policy making, and would raise the meeting to the level of negotiations on equal terms. But these reasons did not change Tunku Abdul Rahman's attitudes. During the meeting of the Executive Council the Malayan ministers were not impressed by the letter from the Secretary of State for the Colonies regarding the proposed London talks and self-government. Dr. Ismail pointed out that the Alliance and the people generally attached a great deal of

importance to ending the Emergency at the earliest possible moment.⁸⁷ This sense of urgency was increased by the fact that the British government had made the ending of the Emergency a condition of granting of self-government. MacGillivray held the view that Tunku Abdul Rahman planned "to use the fact that ... [he] could reach a settlement with Chin Peng on terms which had a large measure of public support here, although unacceptable to Her Majesty's Government, in order to advance his demands for early self-government",⁸⁸ in the proposed London talks. Thus, MacGillivray renewed his suggestion to the Secretary of State on 15 November 1955, to provide a clear statement by HMG that the Emergency at this present level "did not stand in the way of self-government."⁸⁹ In his opinion this kind of statement would have a very good political effect and would certainly weaken public support for negotiations. He suggested the wording as follows:

H.M.G. join with all in this country in the hope that the Emergency will now be brought to a speedy end in such a way that it will be clear to all that the Communists have completely failed in their declared aim of overthrowing the Government. If, however, the Malayan Communist Party continue to reject the generous amnesty terms declared nearly three months ago and the Emergency should therefore continue, H.M.G. will not regard the Emergency as an obstacle to the Federation's advance towards self-government and independence. H.M.G. will, however, wish to be assured at the forthcoming talks in

London that adequate arrangements will be made and maintained by the Federation Government with assistance from H.M.G. as may be needed to keep the internal security position under control and to meet the threat of Communist aggression and subversion.⁹⁰

MacGillivray himself made this statement at the Legislative Council meeting just before the Baling talks.

On the eve of the talks the MCP issued a statement and manifesto for the press for propaganda purposes. In one of the texts of the statement, the MCP pointed out that:

There are some people who do not like peace talks and who are unwilling to reach a reasonable agreement. There are a few influential warmongers and militant people who are unwilling to accept the lessons brought by eight years of war. They dream of using military force and food restriction measures to force members of the liberation army to go down on their knees. There also believe in spreading rumours but they cannot shake the firm determination of the liberation army. Their words and deeds are obstacles in the way of achieving peace and reaching a reasonable agreement. With the unflinching and unfailing efforts of all patriotic parties and the masses victory will go to the Malayan people who are fighting for peace, democracy and independence.⁹¹

On 19 November 1955 Tunku Abdul Rahman came under pressure from the High Commissioner to take

advantage of the MCP's action to modify his terms on the proposed talks from "negotiation" to a discussion of amnesty.⁹² MacGillivray pointed out to the Tunku that the Chin Peng statement "...amounted to an outright rejection of the amnesty terms and the renewal of a proposal to negotiate as equals..."⁹³ The Tunku, who seemed in a state of confusion, issued a statement to the press.⁹⁴ He said that he had instructed Too Joo Hing, the Alliance representative, to tell Chen Tian, the MCP's representative, that the MCP had indulged in propaganda tactics by issuing statements to the press.⁹⁵ For this reason he was not going to negotiate, but to clarify the terms of amnesty to the Communists. He said that:

I will not meet Chin Peng or anyone else. I am not going to negotiate with or treat Chin Peng as my equal, I am going to explain the amnesty. I will consider it. I represent the Malayan Government and we have all the resources to fight and beat the Communists. I want peace and I want to end this emergency. I will end the emergency in any case, but I don't want any more bloodshed if I can help it.⁹⁶

Tan Cheng Lock also supported the decision of the government not to recognise the MCP.⁹⁷ He added that it "... would be difficult for the Government to alter the terms of amnesty, and that Government must retain the right to detain elements which might constitute a danger to the country."⁹⁸ Any further assurance from the British

that the Emergency was no longer considered as an obstacle for granting self-government and independence for Malaya would stiffen the Tunku's resolve not to negotiate with the MCP. In actual fact this measure induced the Tunku to confine his discussion to the terms of amnesty.

In the meantime, on 17 October 1955, a preliminary meeting was held at Klian Intan, North Perak, between I. Wylie, Deputy Commissioner of Police and Too Joo Hing, Assistant Minister of Education, as the representatives of the Malayan Government, with a representative of the MCP to make arrangements for the proposed meeting between the Tunku and Chin Peng. It was followed by another meeting on 19 November where three points were raised by Chen Tian, the MCP's representative: a guarantee from General Bourne, the Director of Operations and the Tunku concerning the security of Chin Peng and his men, the supply of food, and the place of the meeting between the Tunku and Chin Peng.⁹⁹ The Tunku agreed to these demands and gave the option to Chin Peng of fixing a meeting place.

The meeting began on 28 December at Baling, a small town in Kedah. On the government side were Tunku Abdul Rahman, the Chief Minister and the President of the UMNO, Tan Cheng Lock, the President of the MCA and David Marshall, the Chief Minister of Singapore. The MCP were

represented by Chin Peng, the General Secretary of the MCP, Chen Tian, the head of the MCP's Central Propaganda Department and Abdul Rashid Maidin, a Malay Communist. The Tunku opened the meeting by thanking the MCP for coming.¹⁰⁰ He said he came to explain the amnesty terms and these were for the discussions and consideration of the MCP. The Tunku also explained the political changes that had taken place in Malaya and the role of the Alliance in ending colonialism. It was pointed out that the UMNO Assembly had passed a very clear resolution to the effect that independence should be given by 31 August 1957. He also mentioned the High Commissioner's announcement in the Legislative Council that self-government would be given to Malaya despite the Emergency. He looked forward to the forthcoming talks on 1 January with the British government in London on this matter. He was confident the proposed talks would produce results and would be successful.

The Tunku pointed out that if the Communists accepted the amnesty, everyone would be pardoned. David Marshall said that he realized there were some genuine nationalists in the MCP, and asked them to come "back to the healthy stream of constitutional progress" with their fellow citizens.¹⁰¹ He added that both the Federation and Singapore had suffered as a result of the campaign of hate and violence. He said this should be ended and all

the good men should join together in the formation of a democratic nation.

As expected Chin Peng raised the question of recognition of the MCP and the attitudes of the government representatives towards this issue. According to Chin Peng, if the MCP was recognised and its members were not subject to detention and investigation, they could throw down their arms at once. As the present writer has indicated elsewhere, the Tunku would not accept any proposals for the recognition of the MCP. His position was unchanged. According to Anthony Short, for the Tunku, "recognising the strength and support of Communism in Malaya, it would be impossible to control the MCP if it were to come out of the jungle and be allowed to organise as a bona fide political party."¹⁰² The Tunku made it plain to Chin Peng that: "to ask us to recognise you as a Party, so that you can disperse throughout the country to organise your communist activities, naturally you must understand that the people of this country would not accept that."¹⁰³ He pointed out that the people in this country regarded Communist activities as something entirely foreign to the Malayan way of life and the MCP belonged to an outside power and owed allegiance to China. But when Chin Peng asked whether, if the MCP were confined to Federal citizens, it could be recognised, The Tunku did not give a clear answer. He said the point was that they had to prove

their loyalty to the country first. However, during the fourth or the last session held on 29 December, he said, we "told you in no uncertain terms that we would not agree to recognition of the Communist Party."¹⁰⁴

Chin Peng told the meeting that the members of the MCP would not like to be detained or investigated when they came out from the jungle.¹⁰⁵ He argued that if they were subject to detention and investigation, this would imply that they had surrendered. The Tunku explained that the period of detention would be only as long as it was necessary to hold investigations. He stressed that: "correctly speaking, it is not detention at all."¹⁰⁶ According to the Tunku, an investigation should be held to ascertain whether the members of the MCP were loyal or not. If the MCP did not like the term "investigation", according to the Tunku, than they could refer to it as an "inquiry." On the question of the MCP's members who wish to go to China or an other country, the Tunku said they would be pleased to help them go. In his opinion, it would not be necessary to hold an investigation about those people. But he needed to know the total number of those who wished to go. Chin Peng was reluctant to give an answer to this. But he could not accept the terms of the amnesty as proposed by the government.

It appeared that the only issue that had been agreed by both sides during the meeting was on independence. Chin Peng said :

The present government, although it is popularly elected, still is not an independent government.... Under such circumstances, therefore, when we bring out our suggestions we have got to have regard to this situation. If these popularly elected governments of the Federation...and...Singapore have self-determination in matters concerning security and national defence, then all problems could be solved easily. As soon as these two governments have self-determination in internal security and national defence matters, then we can stop the war immediately.¹⁰⁷

Both the Tunku and David Marshall grabbed at this proposition from the MCP. The Tunku asked:"Is that a promise?"¹⁰⁸ He added that when he came back from England (after the forthcoming London talks) that would be the thing that he would bring back with him. Chin Peng replied, if that were to be the case, "we can stop our hostilities and disband our armed units."¹⁰⁹ Meanwhile David Marshall made a note as follow:

As soon as the Federation obtains control of internal security and local armed forces we [the MCP] will end hostilities, lay down our arms and disband our forces¹¹⁰

He gave the note to Chen Tian and asked: "Would you initial that because I want to issue it to the press."¹¹¹ Chen Tian accepted it with an amendment: "that is not equal to the fact that we accept the terms of the Amnesty."¹¹²

As the present writer has indicated elsewhere, the British government feared that both the Alliance leaders and the MCP leaders would come to agree on the question of independence for Malaya. This in fact actually happened. But the impact was not that great, as the British government had already decided to discuss that matter at the forthcoming London talks in January. Nevertheless, it strengthened the hand of Tunku at the proposed talks. Thus the Baling meeting which came to an end on 29 December can be considered as a success for the Alliance in the struggle for independence. It had enhanced the status and improved the position of its leadership amongst the people in this country and in Asia.

After the Baling Talks, Tunku Abdul Rahman, headed the "rombongan merdeka" or Independence delegation to hold talks with the Secretary of State for the Colonies on Malaya's future constitution as an independent country. An agreement was reached on 8 February, which granted Malaya full self-government preparatory to independence within the Commonwealth.¹¹³

But during the interim period Britain would retain final control on external defence and foreign relation. British Government had appointed a Commonwealth Commission, which also known as the Reid Commission to make recommendations on the future constitution of an independent Malaya.¹¹⁴ This Commission consisted of Lord Reid as the Chairman, Sir Ivor Jennings from the united Kingdom, Sir William McKell from Australia, Mr. Justice Abdul Hamid from Pakistan, and Chief Justice B. Malik from India.

The Commission began its work by visiting Malaya in May 1956. It invited the people in this country to submit their views on constitutional issues. The arrival of Lord Reid had aroused public interest and sharpened the racial feelings as Malays and Chinese and other communities fight for constitutional advantages in the forthcoming sovereign nation.¹¹⁵

The Alliance which intended to submit a united memorandum to the Commission was under pressure from its component: The UMNO which represented the Malay, the MCA which represented the Chinese and the MIC, which represented the Indian community. The Chinese Chambers of Commerce, various Chinese guilds and associations strongly demanded citizenship based on the principle of jus soli and equal rights of all the people in Malaya. On the other side the Malays strongly opposed it. ¹¹⁶

However, the component parties in the Alliance decided to reconcile and compromise on these issues. On the citizenship issue, the Alliance accepted the delayed jus soli principle. This meant that everyone born on or after the independence day would be a Malayan citizen. According to Heng Pek Koon, the acceptance of jus soli principle "mark a momentous watershed in the history of Chinese political development in Malaya".¹¹⁷ Shed added that: "It gave citizenship and franchise to nearly half the Chinese population, thus enabling the community as a whole to play an effective role in the political life of the country."¹¹⁸

The Alliance recognised and proposed that the Malay special privileges should be continued for a substantial period. The Alliance suggested Islam as the official religion and Malay as national and official language.

The Reid Commission received 131 memoranda from various organisations and individuals. The Commission adopted almost all the Alliance proposals and published its Report in February, 1957. The Report was submitted to a local Working Committee which consisted the High Commissioner as the Chairman, four representatives of the Alliance, four representatives of the Malay Sultans and two British officials. After the Working Committee had

agreed upon its recommendations a delegation from Malaya went to London to hold talks with the Secretary of state for the Colonies on the final details of the draft which was adopted as the Constitution for an independent Malaya. On 31 August 1957 the process of decolonization reached its final stage and Malaya was born as a nation.

Conclusion

The British government handed over its power in Malaya to the moderate Malay-Chinese Alliance government, in response to the development of Malay and Malayan nationalism. The British did not wish to curb the aspirations of moderate groups as it might turn them to the fold of the militants and communists. The combined force of these might became too formidable or too great for the colonial power to resist. Events in Indonesia and Indo-China provided some good examples of this. Before nationalism reached to a climax, the British government decided to end its rule in Malaya. According to A.J. Stockwell, constitutional "concessions in Malaya would... bring two benefits: they would not only keep the moderate Malayan leaders in the forefront of local events but also win Britain friends and credibility in independent Asia...thereby doing something to counter the lure of China."¹¹⁹ This made it possible for Britain to maintain a good relationship with its former colony and "ensure

Britain's strategic interests."¹²⁰ In fact it was possible for Britain to make a defence agreement with the Malayan government and tie this country to the anti-Communist Western block. Thus Britain was able to safeguard its investments and commercial interests in this region.

Granting independence would also solve the Chinese problem in the long term. With the previous and continuing efforts of British government and changing circumstances, the Chinese political outlook and orientation had changed. Malayan-centred Chinese politics had replaced China-flavoured Chinese nationalism and Communism as a stronger force in Chinese politics in Malaya. Under the new Constitution almost all the Chinese would become Malayan citizens or Ma Hua and would be integrated into the political life of this new independent country. It has been argued that they still had the potential to become a "Fifth Column." But they also could become good and loyal citizens.

Notes

1. Heng Pek Koon, "The Development of the Malayan Chinese Association", Ph.D. Thesis, SOAS, University of London, 1984, p. 268.
2. See, ibid., pp. 269-285.
3. See CO 1030/309/ FED 175/3/03, Part A.
4. MacKintosh to J. Martin, minutes of 3.4.1954, in CO 1030/309.FED 175/3/03, Part A.
5. MacKintosh to Martin, minutes of 9.4.1954. in CO 1030/309.FED 175/3/03 Part A.
6. J. Martin to Thomas Lloyd, minutes of 9.4.1954 in CO 1030/309.FED 175/3/03, Part A.
7. Templer to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, inward telegram, 13 May 1954, in CO 1030/309/FED 175/3/03. Part A.
8. The Secretary of State for the Colonies to General Templer, outward telegram, 15 May 1954, in CO 1030/309/FED 175/3/03
9. The Secretary of State for the Colonies to General Templer outward telegram, 15 May 1954, in CO 1030/309/FED 175/3/03, Part A.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid .
12. Ibid .
13. Templer to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 20 May 1954, in CO 1030/310/FED 175/3/03 ,Part B.
14. Ibid.
15. Telegram sent to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, from Tunku Abdul Rahman, the President of the UMNO, 25 May, 1954, in CO 1030/310/FED 175/3/03, Part B.
16. Cited, Templer to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, inward telegram, 26 May 1954, in CO 1030/310 FED 175/3/03, Part B.
17. Ibid.
18. MacGillivray to the Secretary of State for the

- Colonies, inward telegram, 2 June 1954, in CO 1030/310/FED 175/3/03, Part B.
19. Ibid .
 20. Ibid .
 21. The Secretary of State's Reply to Alliance Request for Independent Commission, 10 June 1954, in CO 1030/310 FED 175/3/03 , Part B.
 22. MacGillivray to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, inward telegram, 14 June 1954, in CO 1030/310 FED 175/3/03 Part B.
 23. UMNO-MCA Alliance Headquarters, Press Release, in CO 1030/310, FED 175/3/03, Part B.
 24. MacGillivray to the Secretary of State, inward telegram, 25 June 1954, in CO 1030/310 FED 175/3/03, Part B.
 25. Cited in ibid.
 26. Ibid .
 27. MacGillivray to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, inward telegram, 18 and 20 June 1954, in CO 1030/310 FED 175/3/03, Part B.
 28. Ibid .
 29. Ibid .
 30. MacGillivray to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, inward telegram, 23 June 1954, in CO 1030/310 FED 175/3/03, Part B.
 31. Ibid .
 32. MacGillivray to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, inward telegram, 24 June 1954, in CO 1030/310 FED 175/3/03, Part B.
 33. See, the Secretary of State for the Colonies to General Templer, inward telegram, 15 May 1954, in CO 1030/309 FED 175/3/03, Part A.
 34. The Alliance UMNO-MCA Petition to Their Highness The Rulers in CO 1030/65 FED 36/1/01 .
 35. Ibid .
 36. Ibid .

37. Ibid .
38. MacGillivray to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 15 July 1954, in CO 1030/65 FED 36/1/01 .
39. "Note of Record of Meeting with Asian Executive Councillors on 29 June 1954, in CO 1030/65 FED 36/1/01 .
40. Ibid .
41. J. Martin to MacGillivray, 7 July 1954, in CO 1030/65 FED 36/1/01.
42. The High Commissioner to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, inward telegram, 15 July 1954, in CO 1030/65 FED 36/1/01.
43. Note of A Meeting Held in Sir J. Martin's Room on 26 July 1954 in CO 1030/65 FED 36/6/01 .
44. High Commissioner to J. Martin, 17 September 1954, in CO 1030/65 FED 36/1/01 .
45. Ibid .
46. Note of A Meeting Held in Sir J. Martin's Room on 26 July 1954, in CO 1030/65 FED 36/1/01 .
47. Ibid .
48. Watherson, the O.A.G. to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, inward telegram, 7 August 1954, in CO 1030/65 FED 36/1/01.
49. Ibid .
50. MacGillivray to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, inward telegram, 21 October 1954, in CO 1030/65 FED 36/1/01
51. Ibid .
52. Ibid .
53. "Extract from a statement by Anthony Eden, at Kuala Lumpur, on 2 March 1955", in FO 371/116915.
54. Ibid
55. K. J. Ratnam, op.cit., p. 191.
56. Anthony Short, op.cit., p. 460.

57. Ibid .
58. Ibid .
59. MacGillivray to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, inward telegram, 29 September 1955, in FO 371/116941.
60. Cited ibid.
61. Cited ibid.
62. MacGillivray to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, inward telegram, 30 September 1955, in FO 371/116941.
63. Outward Telegram from the Commonwealth Relation Office to various U.K. High Commissioners, 5 October, 1955, in FO 371/116941.
64. Sir R. Black to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 17 October 1955, in FO 371/116941.
65. Ibid .
66. MacGillivray to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, inward telegram, 17 October 1955, in FO 371/116941.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid.
70. See, MacGillivray to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, telegrams no.654,655 and 656, 24 October 1955, in FO 371/116941.
71. MacGillivray to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, inward telegram no.655, 24 October 1955, in FO 371/116941.
72. A Report by Lord Reading to the Colonial Policy Committee, 24 October 1955, in FO 371/116941.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid.
76. Ibid.
77. MacGillivray to the Secretary of State for the

- Colonies, inward telegram, 25 October 1955, in FO 371/116941.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid.
81. The Secretary of State for the Colonies to MacGillivray, outward telegram of 29 October and 1 November 1955, in FO 371/116941. See also, "Copy of Telegram to High Commissioner, Federation of Malaya, in FO 371/116971.
82. The Secretary of State for the Colonies to MacGillivray, outward telegram, 29 October 1955, in FO 371/116971.
83. "Copy of Telegram to the High Commissioner, Federation of Malaya, in FO 371/116941.
84. The Secretary of State for the Colonies to MacGillivray, inward telegram, no.145, 29 October 1955, in FO 371/116941.
85. Ibid.
86. Outward Telegram from Commonwealth Relations Office to U.K. High Commissioner in Australia..., 2nd November, 1955, in FO 371/116941. see also, MacGillivray to the secretary of State for the Colonies, 8 November 1955, in FO 371/116941.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid.
89. MacGillivray to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, inward telegram, 15 November 1955, in FO 371/116941.
90. Ibid.
91. Cited MacGillivray to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, inward telegram, no.719, 18 November 1955, in FO 371/116941.
92. MacGillivray to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, inward telegram, no.718, 18 November 1955, in FO 371/116941.
93. Ibid.
94. Ibid.

95. MacGillivray to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, inward telegram, no.725, 19 November 1955, in FO 371/116941.
96. Cited ibid.
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid.
99. MacGillivray to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, inward telegram , no.725, 19 November 1955, in FO 371/116941.
100. See, "Draft Report By The Chief Minister of the Federation of Malaya on the Baling Talks",in CO 1030/29 FED 12 /360/07.
101. Ibid.
102. Anthony Short, op.cit., p. 467.
103. Cited in "Draft Report By The Chief Minister of the Federation of Malaya on Baling Talks, in CO 1030/29 FED 12/360/07.
104. "Verbatim Record of the Baling Talks",in CO 1030/31 FED 12/360/07.
105. Ibid.
106. Ibid.
107. Cited Anthony Short, op.cit., p. 465.
108. Cited ibid.
109. Cited ibid.
110. "Verbatim report of the Baling Talks",in CO 1030/29 FED 12/360/07.
111. Ibid.
112. Ibid.
113. The elected government has full responsibility for finance, economic affairs and internal security. See, G.P. Means, op.cit., p. 172.
114. Ibid., pp. 172-173.
115. Heng Pek Koon, "The Development of the Malayan Chinese Association", Ph.D Thesis, SOAS, University

of London, 1984, pp. 330-343.

116. Ibid., p.333.
117. Ibid., p.338.
118. Ibid., p.339.
119. A. J. Stockwell, "British Imperial Strategy and Decolonization in Malaysia", ASEAUK/SEALG, Hull, 24-26 March 1986, p. 8.
120. A. J. Stockwell, "The Approach to A Possible Transfer of Powers' Series on Malaysia and Singapore", in R. B. Smith and A.J. Stockwell, British Policy and the Transfer of Power in Asia, Documentary Perspectives, School of Oriental and African studies, University of London, 1988, p. 90.

Conclusion

Between 1942 and 1955 British policy towards the Chinese community changed dramatically. It represented a shift from the negative and antagonistic attitude towards Chinese politics as seen before the Second World War to one of recognition that they had to adopt a more positive, accommodating and, when necessary, conciliatory approach to Chinese political activities. The change took place in four phases: first, the pre-war period with the so-called "pro-Malaya policy;" second, the 1942 -1947 period with the new liberal Chinese policy and the Malayan Union scheme; third, the period of early Federal policy which reflected almost a revival of pre-war policy and finally, the "Malayanization of the Chinese" policy aiming at building a united Malayan nation. Simultaneously with this stage, British finally committed itself to early decolonisation.

Previously Chinese political activities were looked upon as a threat that had to be drastically curbed. However, after 1942, the altered relationship between the British and the Chinese, brought about by their close co-operation during the war, together with the threat of renewed Fifth Column infiltration among the Chinese, forced Britain to review its relations with the Chinese in Malaya. The result was a liberalisation of attitudes,

beginning in 1942, which involved the granting of greater political freedom by lifting the ban on the Kuomintang and the MCP and the guarantee of a political stake in the country through the Malayan Union proposals.

Ideological differences which prevented the MCP and the British working in harmony, and the opposition of the Malays to the Malayan Union plan, ushered in the second phase of British- Chinese relations in 1946. Ignoring the Chinese by treating most of them as aliens and denying them adequate political rights in Malaya on the one hand, and fearing that the Malays would be alienated and driven to take a more radical stance politically on the other, the British reverted to the relatively more safe pre-war pro-Malay policy. Thus the Federation of Malaya proposals were adopted.

However, the British soon realised that a policy which did not adequately cater to the Chinese was no longer possible. Neither was it good policy, in view of the increase in Chinese political consciousness, and the communist offensive which led to the declaration of a state of Emergency. Consequently, steps were taken which collectively worked towards the "Malayanisation" of the Chinese-- an important ingredient in the formula for a peaceful transfer of power from the British to the people of Malaya.

From the perspective of the Chinese, the years between 1942 and 1955 brought momentous changes in Chinese political outlooks and activities. The pre-war years had seen two directions in Chinese politics: namely, that which was focused on China, which was regarded by the British as dangerous and destabilising; and the conservative minority Peranakan Chinese politics which was locally oriented and unthreatening, but which was seen as peripheral in the political scheme of things in that period.

The outbreak of the Second World War for the first time not only placed Chinese politics at centre stage through the resistance movement, but also concentrated them locally. The policy change initiated by the British after 1942 of giving political freedom to the Chinese as a reward for their co-operation against the Japanese gave more scope for action to the radical elements within the Chinese community. This contrasted sharply with majority of the Chinese community which appeared to be politically quiescent.

The Malayan Union plan was announced against the background of the increasingly bold actions and excesses of the MCP and the seeming inaction of the rest of the Chinese on the one hand, and the strong opposition of the Malays on the other. This forced the British to rethink

their strategy for Malaya's political development. The result was the Federation of Malaya plan which, as in the pre-war days, once again favoured the Malays and disadvantaged the Chinese.

The Federation of Malaya proposal galvanised the non-communist Chinese into action, but also provided the MCP with an excuse to take the offensive. It was a new phase in Chinese political development and one that demanded a response from the British. The result was the Malayanisation of the Chinese, a strategy of winning their hearts and minds away from the possible allure of the MCP, and directing their political energies towards achieving aspirations which were more Malaya-centered, by the promise of citizenship and a political stake in the country after independence.

Thus it may be seen that the relations between British policy and Chinese politics were shaped by the actions and responses of both sides. Between 1942 and 1946 the initiative towards a more liberal attitude towards Chinese politics was largely taken by the British without any prompting or much pressure from the Chinese. The abandonment of the Malayan Union proposal and the implementation of the Federation of Malaya Constitution, while largely a response to strong Malay reactions, was made much easier by the lack of reaction from the majority of the Chinese and the increased radicalism of the MCP.

The British could still initiate a policy which affected the Chinese without giving weight to Chinese opinion. However, the introduction of the Malayanisation of the Chinese policy was undoubtedly a British response to the political activities of the Chinese which went beyond an act of temporary accomodation. It was a policy adopted to safeguard the security of the British position in Malaya and to enable the transfer of sovereignty to take place peacefully.

APPENDIX A

The Problems of the London Funds of the Malay Sultans

War created new demands and new problems which were unprecedented in the history of colonial Malaya. After the Japanese invaded Malaya, the British government and the Colonial Office faced a new problem of indirect rule in which they would not be able to advise the Malay Sultans with regard to matters relating to Malaya. During the Japanese occupation, it was inevitable for the British government to resort to unconstitutional practices in dealing with Malayan problems. This showed itself, for instance, in the dealings with the various funds of the four Federated Malay States, the five Unfederated Malay states, the Straits Settlements and other non-government bodies which were held in trust under the control of the Crown Agents in London.¹

These funds, excluding those which belonged to the government of the Straits Settlements, did not belong to the British government. H.M.G. did not possess any authority (except for local government in Malaya) to dispose of or use the funds. However, the British government, at first by mistake, and then deliberately, continued to use the funds; they in so doing committed an

action that was illegal, irregular and unconstitutional according to the constitution of the Malay States and the Straits Settlements.

By using the funds the British government realized that they could be faced with legal proceedings being taken against them. In this event, great embarrassment would be caused to certain members of the British cabinet, the Colonial Office staff and especially the staff of the Crown Agents. To enable them to solve this problem without much publicity, or being exposed to the public, or facing a big claim of compensation in the courts, the British government needed to secure sovereignty over the Malay States by depriving the Malay Sultans of their sovereignty. Other steps to be taken were the formulation of a new financial policy and legislation by an Order in Council.

The Colonial Office faced the Malayan fund problem immediately after Viscount Cranborne replaced Lord Moyne as Secretary of State for the Colonies and Harold Macmillan became the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies.² Both of them had to face the immediate task of mobilizing all resources of the Colonial Empire, manpower and materials, for the purposes of war. One of the most important sources was from various funds from Malaya which were held under trust in the hand of the Crown Agents in London.

The Crown Agents held cash and securities belonging to various governments, government bodies and also non-government bodies. The amount was between £ 50,000,000 and £ 60,000,000. A sum of £ 30,000,000 was earmarked for a particular purpose, e.g. Sinking Funds, Post Office Saving Accounts, etc. The remainder consisted of surplus funds, and other accounts such as Railway Renewal Funds which did not belong to the government. The nature of the funds was as complex as the political system of pre-war Malaya which was divided into the Straits Settlements, the four FMS and the five UFMS. As the Straits Settlements was a Crown Colony the funds belonged to the H. M. G. However, the Secretary of State for the Colonies or H. M. G did not possess any authority regarding these funds, except through the Governor of the Straits Settlements, or the local government. The funds of the Malay States did not belong to H.M.G. Neither the Secretary of State for the Colonies nor the Governor of the Straits Settlements possessed any authority to release or to dispose these funds. It should be noted that the Malay States were administered by the British government based on treaties with the Malay Sultans. However, the Malay Sultans were recognized as independent sovereigns.

The Colonial Office considered it necessary to draw money from those trust funds to meet the residual

obligations of the Malay States and the Straits Settlements for payment of salaries and pensions to serving and retired government servants, debts outstanding, the payment of interest on loans, the payment of salaries to the credit of government officers in Malaya, including any necessary allotments to the dependants of men who served in the local military forces and had been reported as casualties or presumed to be prisoners of war and others. The Colonial Office also felt obliged to make payments, on humanitarian grounds, for the maintenance of persons evacuated from Malaya, where they themselves were without other means of support. As the present writer will indicate, the Colonial Office also used the funds for the payment of salaries to the staff of the Civil Affairs of the Malayan Planning Unit and for the rehabilitation of Malaya. The present writer also will indicate that the Colonial Office intended to use all the funds.

Macmillan, under the directive of Viscount Cranborne, asked the Crown Agents to make certain payments, from the Malay State funds, which were under trust. Both of them were lacking in knowledge of Malayan affairs, and did not realise that they were forcing the Crown Agents to commit a "criminal" breach of trust by making payments from the funds. Edward Gent, the head of the Eastern Department of the Colonial Office and Sir Sidney Abrahams, the assistant Legal Adviser of the

Colonial Office, also pressured the Crown Agents to make payments based on this directive. The Crown Agents were perturbed by their actions and one of them, H.C. Thornton, wrote a letter to Harold Macmillan on March 1942. According to him:

It appears that we may, for an indefinite period, be asked to make certain payments on authority which may, strictly speaking, have no legal force; and we feel doubt as to the propriety of dealing in this manner with funds which were lodged with us as agents holding a position of trust.³

From the Crown Agents' point of view, their legal position was that they were responsible in law to their principals (the Malay rulers) for the funds which they held on their behalf. Payments made by the Crown Agents, solely on the authority of the Secretary of State, might lay them open to the possibility of legal proceedings, not only from Malaya but from any holder of Federated Malay States stock. In their opinion, it seemed possible that a holder of the stock might hear that grants of a nature not permissible in normal conditions had been made from Malayan funds, and that he might take legal action to prevent such payments on the ground that they endangered the security of his holding. In addition, there may be a valid claim against the assets of the Federated Malay States wherever these assets may be held; a claim could be made, and such a claim might amount to a

very large sum. In that event, in the opinion of the Crown Agents, there could be legal proceedings against them, and the Secretary of State's directive of 7 March 1942 would not be admissible in defence.⁴

The Crown Agents appreciated the difficulties of the present situation, involving legal and constitutional questions on which they were not qualified to express an expert opinion. They had not wanted to emphasise, unduly, legal points arising from their position as agents and trustees. They agreed that existing conditions might well justify, even in the eyes of the law, actions which in normal times would be irregular. However they felt the Secretary of State's directive would put them in a position of uncertainty. As they were asked to apply the funds in their hands for purposes which it could not safely be assumed would be approved by the Rulers of the Malay States, their legal position should first be carefully examined by the Secretary of State and his legal advisers, and possibly also the law officers of the Crown.⁵

Gent and other Colonial officers agreed that the legal position of the Crown Agents was not in doubt, but the nature of problem facing the Colonial Office at that stage was not legal but political, and the protection to be given, if necessary, to the Crown Agents, could only

be secured by political measures.⁶ In the case of the colonial government (Straits Settlements) where His Majesty had jurisdiction, the Colonial Office was preparing to regularize the Secretary of State's authority regarding the using of Straits Settlements funds by Order in Council.⁷ In his reply to Thornton's letter, Gent informed him that arrangements were in hand for validating the authority of powers of the Governor of the Straits Settlements to dispose, at his discretion, of the funds of the Colonial Government which were held in London.⁸

In the case of the Malayan funds, a similar course of action could not be taken during that time. This was because the Malay States possessed sovereign status, and so it was not possible for the British government to legislate for them. The British regarded their treaties with the Malay States as being 'still in force', and hoped to rely on them when they were again in contact with the Governments concerned, to secure ex-post-facto approval of any payment which they may have authorised the Crown Agents to make from State funds in their hands.⁹

Meanwhile the Secretary of State himself, held the opinion that it would probably be better to show Mr. Thornton's letter and possibly the Colonial Office draft reply to the law officers, before replying to the Crown

Agent. He also asked Harold Macmillan to give his own view of the Malayan fund problem. Macmillan agreed that it would be wise to refer the matter to the law officers and also to consult the Treasury, which was also agreed by the Secretary of State.¹⁰ But Gent and Sir Kenneth Poyser, the Legal Adviser of the Colonial Office and former Chief Justice of F.M.S., did not wish to have the law officers' view on the Malayan fund question at this stage because, they argued, no legal point arose.¹¹ In their view, the law officer would merely say that, as lawyers, they had no advice to give. They, including Harold Macmillan, agreed that they must make a decision on policy, and they told the Secretary of State that his action in asking the Crown Agents to make payment under the Secretary of State's direction was "an act of tyranny of your [Secretary of State's] part, but it is one with which the Treasury concur."¹² He urged the Secretary of State to take action because:

"If we win the war you will put it right by F.M.S. legislation. If we lose the war, neither you nor I care."¹³

Then on 23 April 1942, Viscount Cranborne directed the Colonial Office's staff, among them, Gent, Sir Sidney Abrahams, Sir K. Poyser and Harold Macmillan, to make a decision or plan in order to protect the Crown

Agents against any possible legal proceeding being threatened against them.¹⁴ They all agreed that :

- (a) ...it is the intention that the actions of the Secretary of State in approving the use of these funds for purposes which he may decide to be necessary should be validated by indemnification enactments by the legislatures of the [Malay] States concerned as soon as this course becomes practicable.
- (b) The position of the Crown Agents as ... trustees of certain Malayan funds and subject in normal circumstances to the instruction of the Malayan Governments has been carefully considered and is fully appreciated. They will however, recognise that the Secretary of State has a responsibility to discharge to Parliament and he would not conceive it to be politically practicable, [even if it were on any grounds justifiable], to refrain from taking decisions regarding the use of Malay States funds in this country in satisfaction of what he may judge to ...accord ...with the obligations and interests of the State Governments.
- (c) The Constitutional distinction between the Colony of the Straits Settlements and the Malay States under His Majesty's Protection would not in the Secretary of State's view justify a difference being made in practice in the employment of their respective funds in the discharge of similiar obligations, and he is fully prepared to exercise his responsibility in the present abnormal situation no less in the one case than in the other.
- (d) ...In the event of legal proceedings being threatened from whatever source to challenge the propriety of any decisions of the Secretary of State or of any action which the Crown Agents may have taken in compliance with those decisions, the Secretary of State would of course adopt every means, political

and other, whether in Malaya or this country, to protect the Crown Agents [and also Secretary of State and Colonial officers themselves] and if necessary to indemnify them... [from any penal consequence?]. . . [which they may have incurred...].¹⁵

This draft letter concerning the decision to be taken by the Colonial Office to protect the Crown Agents regarding the use of Malay States funds in their hands was sent to the Treasury (G. L. Syers) on 23 April 1943. Sir K. Poyser also sent a letter of 29 April 1943 under cover of a personal letter to Donald Somervell, the Attorney General, in order to seek his personal view regarding the course of action to be taken by the Colonial Office regarding the use of Malayan funds in the Crown Agents' hand.¹⁶ In his opinion, K. Poyser said:

[that]...in the case of Malay States, however where His Majesty has no jurisdiction a similar course [to transfer to the power Malay Sultans to the Secretary of State] is not practicable. It is the view of the State that these treaties still remain in force and he relies on them to secure any action which he may take to authorize, the disposal be validated by indemnification which the Governments concerned will be advised to enact as soon as their territories are freed enemy occupation and he has therefore conveyed these views to the Crown Agents for the Colonies in the attached letter. ¹⁷

From the Attorney General's point of view, the Malayan funds issue raised some rather difficult legal

questions which needed to be considered further.¹⁸ He asked Sir K. Poyser to seek (Board of Trade)'s view, whether responsibility for the Malayan funds fell under the "Trading With the Enemy" Act, by reason of the Japanese occupation of the territory. The Attorney himself was not clear as to the exact position of the Crown Agents or the funds, but he agreed that from the political and common sense point of view there seemed to him to be strong grounds for the procedure suggested by the Colonial Office, that the Crown Agents should seek and act on instructions from the Crown, the Crown taking full responsibility for those instructions and undertaking if necessary to indemnify the Agents. But he could not decide whether, if some question was raised in the courts, this procedure would be legally in order, and he thought this was not altogether an easy question to answer.¹⁹

On the Attorney General's suggestion, K. Poyser wrote a letter to Sir Thomas Barnes of the Board of Trade to refer to the Malayan fund problem in connection with the Trading with the Enemy Act.²⁰ In his letter, Poyser stated the Colonial Office decision not to refer the matters formally to the law officers but to the Attorney General personally, and at the Attorney General's suggestion he was writing to Thomas Barnes himself. He asked Barnes' opinion regarding the problems faced by the Colonial Office and the Crown Agents. In his own opinion,

Poyser said that they could not invoke the doctrine of "agent of necessity" with regard to the actions that had been already taken by the Colonial Office and the Crown Agents to make payments, e.g. to the dependents of the men in the local military forces who had been taken prisoner, and allowances to relatives of the Rulers who left Malaya before the Japanese occupation.²¹ According to Barnes, the states or sovereigns were not at war with His Majesty and were not to be regarded as enemies, although the sovereigns considered as individuals were resident in territory occupied by the enemy.²² That meant that neither the Malay States nor the Sultans were enemies under the meaning of the Enemy Act. In Barnes's opinion, "the funds held on behalf of the Government of the Malay States would therefore only be attracted by these provisions [in the Enemy Act] if they were properly belonging to or held or managed on behalf of enemy subjects."²³

In another letter of 22 May 1942, in reply to Sir K. Poyser, the Attorney General did not object to the Secretary of State's action in dealing with the Malayan funds in a manner which, in his view, accorded with the obligations and interests of the state governments.²⁴ In his opinion, so far as any subsequent validation by a legal enactment was required, the Secretary of State was satisfied that this would be forthcoming and, indeed,

over a large part of the area he would probably be in a position to secure this result as they would be matters on which the ruler agreed to accept the advice of His Majesty's Government. In regard to the Crown Agents, he agreed that if any ruler desired to complain about any action they had taken, his complaint in law would be against the Crown and not against them. And he also agreed with the steps taken by the Colonial Office to give assurance to the Crown Agents that they would be protected and, if necessary, indemnified. On the questions of legal proceedings by a bondholder or some other person, he agreed that those would be most unlikely, provided that any funds earmarked for the services of the loans were kept intact for that purpose. In conclusion, he saw no objection to the course which was being taken by the Colonial Office, and in his opinion, though there may be certain obscurities in the legal position, no difficulty was likely to arise: "if it does arise it would be much better to wait and consider it when, if ever, it discloses itself."²⁵

Meanwhile, Sir K. Poyser himself, with the assistance of Gent and Robert Wray, drafted the Straits Settlements (Temporary Provision) Order in Council for 1943 in March 1942.²⁶ This draft Order in Council could be seen as a precedent for the future draft Order in Council for Malayan Union which would protect the Crown

Agent, the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Colonial Office staff, from any legal proceedings regarding the payments made from the Malay States funds. In order to validate the Secretary of State's authority, he was made the principal of the funds which were in the hand of Crown and was able to exercise the function of governor. Phrase 3, article 1 of the draft Order in Council stated that:

Without prejudice to anything done thereunder by, or in relation to, the Governor (or) the Governor in Council (or any other officer) or authority or otherwise, all the functions of the Governor in Council (or any officer or the the Government of the colony) under the enactments mentioned in the second schedule to this order shall, save as otherwise expressly provided in this order, be exercisable by the Secretary of State and all references to the Governor (or) the Governor in Council (or such other officer or authority as aforesaid) shall, save as aforesaid, be construed as including reference to the Secretary of State. ²⁷

And phrase 3 article 2 stated:

Where such functions include to make, amend and revoke any legislative instrument, and any such instrument is amended by this order, it shall be lawful for the Secretary of State:

- a) to amend or revoke such instrument as amended by this order;
- b) to provide that any legislative instrument made by him shall be deemed to have had effect as from a date not earlier than the 16th day of February, 1942.²⁸

The draft Order in Council, transferring powers possessed by the governor of the Straits Settlements to the Secretary of State, was sent to the Crown Agents and seemed to satisfy them.²⁹ On the question of the Malay States fund problem, Gent told the Crown Agents on the telephone that he proposed to secure validating authority for operating the various funds, and that this would have to take the form of legislation.³⁰

There was not much choice left for the Colonial Office other than to introduce such legislation for the Malay States, taking or transferring the power of the Malay Sultans and putting the Malay States under the jurisdiction of His Majesty's Government. It was not possible to introduce such legislation in the Legislative Council which would then be open to discussion, because it involved 'gentlemen's honour' and would invite various claims from as far away as India and Australia.

In November 1942, Viscount Cranborne left the Colonial Office in Downing Street to take a new appointment as Lord Privy Seal. It was an awkward coincidence that the Straits Settlements (Temporary Provision) Order in Council was due to be passed in 1943. As the Lord Privy Seal, he continued to play an important role in the formulation of British colonial policy.

Harold Macmillan also left the Colonial Office after Colonel Stanley took over the post of Secretary of State for the Colonies at Westminster. Hence the Malayan fund problem became a burden for the new Secretary of State for the Colonies. But it was reasonable to expect that he could be sure of getting support from the Secretary of State for the Dominions when Viscount Cranborne took over that post and joined Col. Stanley at Downing Street. Both of them could also rely on another Cabinet member, Attorney General Somervell, who had given his support in regard to the Malayan fund problem.

The Colonial Office had begun to formulate a new constitution for post-war Malaya in March 1943. At the same time they continued to take steps to solve the Malayan fund problem. On 4 March, Gent, J. J. Paskin and W. L. Monson held a discussion with Sir K. Poyser regarding the future constitution for Malaya. According to Sir K. Poyser, it would be possible for the HMG to "enter into some ...form of Agreement which would give [HMG] some jurisdiction" in the Malay States after HMG reconquered and occupied all those states.³¹

The Colonial Office also began to discuss financial matters with the Treasury and the War Office. They seemed to agree with the Colonial Office, to cover-up the Malayan fund problem. For instance, on the 11 May

1943, the representatives of the Treasury, the War Office and the Colonial Office reached an agreement that "...for the purpose of expenditure upon Malayan needs it would be unnecessary to preserve any precise' distinction between Malayan Fund as represented by current information collected under the Military Administration and Malayan Funds as represented by Malayan balances in London."³² The War Office was not willing to provide any expenditure necessary for the rehabilitation of Malaya and the Treasury was empty. The money that was available was from the Malayan fund. So in a meeting at the Colonial Office on 18 December 1943, the Colonial Office decided that: "in the case of expenditure necessary for rehabilitation, where it was clear that the War Office intended to take no action, action could be taken by the Colonial Office pledging if necessary, funds at their disposal."³³

The meeting also agreed that the reference to the funds should be given in the name of His Majesty's Government. By this action, the Colonial Office could cover up any evidence from the records that referred to the using of the Malayan funds. It would be difficult for anyone to detect any irregularities.

Another step was taken to solve the Malayan fund problem, when the Colonial Office began to formulate their financial policy towards Malaya on 11 November

1943. The Colonial Office decided that the assets and liabilities of the Federated Malay States and other Malay States and non-government bodies were to be transferred to the central government. This decision was taken when Turnbull, the Financial Adviser for the future Civil government of Malaya, was absent from the meeting on 23 March 1944 and 5 June 1944. Turnbull was puzzled by this action. He said that:

I do not understand why ... it should be necessary [for the Central Government] to absorb the assets and liabilities of State Authorities other than the Governments or of other local authorities.³⁴

The logical reason was that not all the funds from Malaya which were held in trust by the Crown Agents belonged to the government. To solve this problem, it would be necessary for the future central government of Malaya to absorb the assets and liabilities of non-government bodies.

With the elimination of the sovereignty of the Malay Sultans and the transfer of all the assets and liabilities of Malaya to His Majesty's Government under the Malayan Union³⁵ Scheme, Britain became the principal of the various Malayan funds in London. Finally, the Colonial Office solved the problem by introducing legislation under the Malayan Union Ordinance No.1/46 -

The Indemnity and Validating Ordinance, 1946, by Order in Council.³⁶

The object of the Indemnity and Validating Ordinance which came into force on the 1 April 1946, "was... to bar legal proceedings in respect of certain payments made and acts, done or under authority of the Secretary of State for the Colonies or the Crown Agents, during the war period...." ³⁷

After these steps were taken, a legal opinion was sought from Cyril Radcliffe and John Foster to assess whether the question of the London funds of the Malay Sultans, particularly those which belonged to Johore, had been solved. Both solicitors gave their opinion on 14 May 1946.³⁸ According to them, "it seems clear that under...[section 92(1) of the Malayan Union Order in Council 1946 S. R. & O. No.463]...the funds held by Crown Agents in London have become His Majesty's property."³⁹ They added that, "if the validity of the purported transfer of the Funds in London of the Government of Johore were to be tested in the English courts, the main question for decision, would be the validity or otherwise of the Order in Council No.463, in so far as it affected the Malay States, and in this case the State of Johore." They pointed out that regarding this matter, the Government of Johore could raise two questions as follows:

"Firstly, does His Majesty have the necessary jurisdiction in the State of Johore? The second question is or is not valid, but as a practical matter, since the Secretary of State's decision is conclusive, the answer depends on whether the the Secretary of State is willing to give the court a decision that His Majesty does in fact have such jurisdiction.⁴⁰

It had been argued that if the agreement between and His Majesty's Government and the State of Johore was valid the steps that had been taken by the Colonial Office solved the problem of the fund. Both of them came to the conclusion that, "there is no form of proceeding in the English courts by which the Malay States could test the agreements with Sir Harold Macmichael", as, the "agreements are State documents between two sovereign entities quasi international in character, not intended to create legal relationships, and could not be the subject of direct litigation in the English courts."⁴¹

It appears that one of the reasons why the British Government introduced the Malayan Union was to cover up and solve the question of the London funds of the Malay Sultans. J. Allen who raised the question, "why did...[the Malayan union] fail (and fail so quickly)?"⁴² failed himself to see that the Malayan Union actually achieved one of its immediate aims.

It should be noted that it was extremely probable that the decision taken by the Colonial Office to eliminate the sovereignty of the Malay sultans was partly the result of the question of the London funds of the Malay Sultans. Only after the decision had been taken did the Colonial Office start to formulate a directive on Chinese policy. During the formulation of Chinese policy, the Colonial Office no longer needed to consider the attitude of the Malay Sultans and the Malays towards the Chinese community. In other words the Colonial Office was in a more flexible position to decide on a new policy towards the Chinese community.

Notes

1. H. C .Thornton to Harold MacMillan, the Under Secretary of State of the Colonies, 16 March 1942, in CO 273/670/50763.
2. The executives at the Colonial Office did not always follow their legal advisers' advice. In 1949, Sir Sidney Abrahams commenting on some executives, said, " It was difficult to convince or persuade eager and energetic executive that a policy they believe to be wise and just is the reverse, since it is the business of executives to execute..." He added, to some "enthusiastic executives, it is easier to get into a mess than to get out of it." Sir S. Abrahams was an assistant legal adviser at the Colonial Office when Macmillan joined the Colonial Office as the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies. "Macmillan" according to Nigel Fisher, "knew nothing about the colonies or how they were governed...." See Sidney Abrahams, "The Role of the Attorney General" in Corona, No.5, June 1949, HMSO, p. 21. See also, Nigel Fisher, Harold Macmillan, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1982, p. 83 and Harold Macmillan, The Blast of War, Macmillan & Co Ltd., 1967, p. 163.
3. Thornton to the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies 16 March 1942, in CO 273/670/50763.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Minutes by Gent, 7 March 1942, in CO 273/670/50763.
7. Gent to Thornton ,7 March 1942 in CO 273/670/50763.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Harold MacMilan to the Secretary of State for the Colonies 17 April 1942, in CO 273/670/50763.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.

14. Minutes by K. W. Blaxter, 23 April 1942, in CO 273/670/50763.
15. Ibid.
16. Sir K. Poyser wrote to Donald Somervell, the Attorney General, 29 April 1942, in CO 273/670/50763.
17. Ibid.
18. Donald Somervell reply to K. Poyser, 1 May 1942 in CO 273/670/50763.
19. Ibid.
20. K. Poyser to Sir Thomas Barnes, 7 May 1942, in CO 273/670/50763.
21. Ibid.
22. Sir Thomas Barnes reply to K. Poyser, 13 May 1942, in CO 273/670/50763.
23. Ibid.
24. Donald Somervell to K. Poyser, 22 May 1942, in CO 273/670/50763.
25. Ibid.
26. Draft of the proposed Straits Settlements (Temporary Provision) Order in Council, 1943, in CO 273/670/50760.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Thornton to Gent, 6 May 1942, in CO 273/670/50763.
30. Ibid.
31. Albert Lau Khong Hwa, "The Politics of Union and Citizenship: The Evolution of British Constitutional Policy Towards Malaya and Singapore, 1942-1948", Ph.D. Thesis, SOAS, University of London, 1986, p. 63. See also, CO 825/35 /55104/1.
32. "Rehabilitation of Industry, Malaya." Record of meeting at the Colonial Office, 8 December, 1943, in CO 865/25
33. Ibid., see also CO 865/25/55104/6(c).

34. R .E. Turnbull was the former Colonial Secretary of British Honduras. He was appointed as the Financial Adviser for the future government of Malaya. However, he did not play any important role in the formulation of financial policy for the proposed government of Malaya. R. E. Turnbull to Wodeman, 24 July 1944, see CO 865/24.
35. All assets (except the personal residences or estates of any Sultan, or any building or lands which are used for the purpose of Islamic religion or properties pertaining to the endowment of Islamic religious institutions) of the Government of the Federated Malay States and of any Malay State be transferred to the Government of the Malayan Union. See, Great Britain, Malayan Union and Singapore, Summary of Proposed Constitutional Arrangements, London, 1946, p. 7.
36. Malayan Union, Annual Report on the Malayan Union for 1946, April to December, Government Printer, Kuala Lumpur, 1947, pp.90-91.
37. Ibid.
38. See, "Joint opinion regarding whether there is power to vest in His Majesty the funds of the Government of Johore which were held by the Crown Agents for the Colonies in London" (by C. Radcliffe and J. Foster), 14 May 1946, in "Joint Opinion" MSS.Ind. Ocn. S.105, (Rhodes House Library, Oxford).
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. James de V. Allen, The Malayan Union, Yale University Southeast Asian studies, Yale, 1967, p.vi.

Bibliography

UNPUBLISHED OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS AND PRIVATE PAPERS

The Public Record Office, Kew (England)

Colonial Office

- CO 273 Straits Settlements, Original Correspondence, 1836- 1946.
- CO 275 Straits Settlements, Sessional Papers.
- CO 537 Eastern Colonies, Original Correspondence (Straits Settlements and Malay States).
- CO 717 Federated Malay States, Original Correspondence, 1920-1951.
- CO 825 Eastern, Original Correspondence.
- CO 875 Public Relation and Information, Original Correspondence.
- CO 865 Far Eastern Reconstruction, Original Correspondence.
- CO 1022 South East Asian Department, Original Correspondence 1950-1956.
- CO 1030 Eastern, Original Correspondence, 1950-1956.

Foreign Office

- FO 371 General Correspondence (Malaya)

Cabinet Office

- CAB 98 War Cabinet Miscellaneous Committees.
- CAB 101 Cabinet Historical Section, Official War Histories.

War Office

- WO 172 Lord Louis Mountbatten's Diary.
 WO 203 Civil Affairs, SEAC Headquarters.
 WO 220 Civil Affairs.

Rhodes House, Oxford (England)

Blythe, W.L., "Papers as Colonial Secretary, Singapore, including Reports on Chinese Affairs, 1946 by Victor Purcell", MSS. Ind. Ocn. S. 116.

Dalley, J.D., "Malayan Security Service, Political Intelligence Journal, MSS. Ind. Ocn. S. 25.

Humphrey, A.H., "Communism and Chinese Schools", MSS. Pac. S. 115.

Radcliffe, C., and Foster, John, "Joint Opinion of Counsel[sic]", MSS. Ind. Ocn. S.105.

"Ralph Hone Papers", MSS. Brit. Emp. S. 407 (1).

Webb, G.W., "The Chinese in Malaya, memorandum as Acting Secretary for Chinese Affairs, Singapore, 1948", MSS. Ind. Ocn. S.255.

The National Army Museum (London)

"Major Lloyd Owen Papers", Ac. N. 8301.

"General Gerald Templer Papers", Acc. N. 7410.

Department of Palaeography and Diplomatic, University of Durham (England)

"Malcolm MacDonald Papers"

Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Library (Singapore)

"Tan Cheng Lock Papers"

The National Archives and Department of Oral History
(Singapore)

BMA/CA British Military Administration/Chinese
 Affairs, Headquarters, Singapore Division.

CSO Ministry of Social Affairs Files.

Arkib Negara (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia)

BMA/ADM British Military Administration Files

MU Malayan Union Files .

PR Information Department Files.

JPM/SCA Secretariat of Chinese Affairs Files.

UMNO/SG UMNO Files.

"Tan Cheng Lock Papers" ,SP13.

"Hugh Pagden's Papers", SP7.

The University of Malaya Library (Malaysia)

"Koleksi Ibrahim Yakob" [Ibrahim Yakob Collections] File
No. MSS 176 (8)

Private Collections (Malaysia)

"Humphrey Ball's Papers"

"H. S. Lee Papers"

PUBLISHED SOURCES

Official Record

Colonial Office (London), British Dependencies in the Far East, 11945-1949, Cmd.7709, HMSO, 1949.

_____, The Colonial Empire 1939-1947, Cmd. 7167, HMSO, 1947.

_____, Malayan Union and Singapore, Summary of Proposed Constitutional Arrangements, His Majesty Stationery Office London, 1946.

_____, Federation of Malaya, Summary of Revised Constitutional Proposals, CMD. 7171, HMSO, 1947.

Federation of Malaya, Societies in the Federation of Malaya, Government Printer, Kuala Lumpur, 1949.

_____, Address By His Excellency the High Commissioner, Department of Public Relations, Kuala Lumpur, 1949.

_____, Annual Report (1948-1954), Kuala Lumpur.

_____, Annual Report of the Labour Department (for 1947- 1949), by R.G.D. Houghton, Government Printer, Kuala Lumpur.

_____, Annual Report on the Trade Unions Registry (for the 1948-1949), by J.B. Prentis, Government Printer, Kuala Lumpur.

_____, Chinese Schools and the Education of Chinese Malayans, The Report of a mission invited by the Federation Government to Study the Problem of the Education of Chinese in Malaya (Fenn-wu Report), Government Printer, Kuala Lumpur, 1951.

_____, Minutes of the Meetings of the Legislative Council, 1948-1956.

_____, Report of the Committee on Malay Education (Barnes Report), Kuala Lumpur, 1951.

_____, Report of the Education Committee 1956 (Razak Report), Government Printer, Kuala Lumpur, 1956.

_____, Report of the Education Review Committee 1960 (Rahman Talib Report), Government Printer, Kuala Lumpur 1960.

_____, Report of the Malaya Census 1921, Kuala Lumpur.

_____, Special Committee on the Implementation of the Educational policy; Statement on the Report of the Special Committee, Government printers, Kuala Lumpur, 1954.

_____, Ordinances and Acts, 1950-1951.

Great Britain, Hansard, 391 HC Deb 5, Column 48, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons.

_____, Statutory Rules and Orders 1946, Halsbury's Statutes of England, Second Edition, Vol.6., Butterworth & Co.(Publishers) Ltd, London, 1948, p.543-71.

Report on the British Military Administration of Malaya, September 1945 to March 1946 by Major-General Ralph Hone, Kuala Lumpur, 1947.

Report on a Mission to Malaya, October 1945-January 1946, by Sir Harold MacMichael, HMSO, London, 1946.

Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff By Supreme Allied Commander South-East Asia 1943-1945, HMSO, London, 1951.

Singapore Advisory Council Proceedings, 1946.

Straits Settlements, Proceedings of the Legislative Council of the Straits Settlements (PLCSS), 1920, Government Printing Office, Singapore, 1922.

Malayan Union, Annual Report on the Malayan Union for 1946, April to December, Government Printer, Kuala Lumpur, 1947.

_____, Proceeding of the Advisory Council of the Malayan Union, 1946-1948, Kuala Lumpur, 1948.

_____, Federal Ordinances and State and Settlement Enactments Passed During the Year 1948.

Straits Settlements, Straits Settlements Blue Book for the 1881[1891 and 1991], Government Printing Office, Singapore, 1882-1911.

Newspapers

The Malaysian Message, 1894-1895.

Kabar Uchapan Baru, 1926-1931.

Kabar Slalu, January- May 1924.

Bintang Pranakan, 1930-1931.

Bintang Timor, July 1894- July 1895.

The Malacca Guardian, 1930-1940.

The Straits Echo, 1932.

The Straits Budget, 1950- 1953.

The Straits Times, 1930- 1950.

The Straits Chinese Herald, January - May 1894.

BOOKS

Abdullah, Firdaus, Radical Malay Politics: Its Origins and Early Development, Pelanduk Publications, Kuala Lumpur, 1985.

Adam, Ramlah, Dato' Onn Ja'afar, Gateway Publishing House, Kuala Lumpur, 1987.

Akash, Yoji, The Nanyang Chinese National Salvation Movement, 1937-1941, Lawrence University of Kansas, 1970.

Ampalavanar, Rajeswary, The Indian Minority And Political Change in Malaya, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1981.

Amyot, J., The Chinese and National Integration in Southeast Asia, Institute of Asian Studies, Faculty of social science, Bangkok, 1972.

Alexander, G., Invincible China: The Overseas Chinese and the Politics of Southeast Asia, Macmillan, New York, 1974.

Allen, James de V., The Malayan Union, Southeast Asia

- Studies, New Haven 1967.
- Asmad (Ab. Samad bin Ahmad), Dokumentasi Seminar Sejarah Melaka, Malacca State Government, 1983.
- Bastin, J. and R.W. Winks (ed.), Malaysia: Selected Historical Reading, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1966.
- Brimmell, H., Communism in South East Asia, A Political Analysis, Oxford University Press, London, 1959.
- _____, A Short History of Malayan communist Party, Singapore, 1956.
- Blythe, Winfred, The Impact of Chinese Secret Societies: A Historical Study, Oxford University Press, 1969.
- Carlson, Sevine, Malaysia: Search for National Unity and Economic Growth, Sage Publications, Beverly Hill, California, 1973.
- Chan, Heng Chee and Hans-Dieter Evers, Nation Building and National Identity in Southeast Asia, University of Singapore Press, Singapore, 1972.
- Chang, Queeny, Memoirs of a Nonya, Eastern Universities Press Sdn. Bhd., Singapore, 1981.
- Chapman, F. Spence, The Jungle is Neutral, Chatto & Windus, London, 1954.
- Chandos, Viscount (O. Lyttelton), Memoirs of Lord Chandos, Bodley Head, London, 1962.
- Carino, Theresa Chong, China and the Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, New Day Publishers, Quezon City, 1985.
- Cheah Boon Kheng, Red Star Over Malaya: Resistance and Social Conflict during and After the Japanese Occupation, 1941-1946, Singapore University Press, Singapore, first ed. 1983.
- _____, The Masked Comrades: A Study of the Communist United Front in Malaya, 1945-1948, Times Books International, Singapore, 1979.
- Chelliah, D.D., A History of the Education Policy of the Straits Settlements with Recommendation for A New System Based on Vernaculars, The Government Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1960.
- Ch'en, J. & N. J. Tarling (ed.), Studies in the Social

History of China and South-East Asia, Cambridge Universities Press, Cambridge, 1970.

Chen, Ta, Emigrant Communities in South China, Institute of Pacific relations, New York, 1940.

Chew, Daniel, Chinese Pioners on the Sarawak Frontier 1841-1941, Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1990.

Chi, Madeleine, China Diplomacy 1914-1918, East Asian Research Center, Harvard University, Cambridge (Mass.), 1970.

Chia, Felix, Ala Sayang! A Social History of Babas and Nyonyas, Eastern University Press Sdn. Bhd., Kuala Lumpur, 1983.

_____, The Babas, Times Books International, Singapore, 1980.

Chung-Gi Kwei, The Kuomintang-Communist Struggle in China, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970.

Chin, John M., The Sarawak Chinese, Oxford University Press, Petaling Jaya, 1981.

Clammer, J. R., Maintenance and Change Among the Straits Chinese Community of Malaysia and Singapore, Occasional Paper no.54, 1979, Institute of Southeast Asia Studies, Singapore.

_____, Straits Chinese Society, University Singapore Press, Singapore, 1980.

Cloake, John, Templer Tiger of Malaya: The Life of Field Marshall Sir Gerald Templer, Harrap, London, 1985.

Clutterbuck, R., Riot and Revolution in Singapore and Malaya, 1945-1963, Faber and Faber Limited, London, 1973.

_____, The Long Long War; the Emergency in Malaya, 1948-1960, Cassell, London, 2nd Edition, 1967.

Coppel, A. Charles, Indonesian Chinese in Crisis, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1983.

Cruickshank, C., SOE in the Far East, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1983.

Dawson, Thomas, R.P., Tan Siew Sin, the Man From Malacca, Donald Moore, Singapore, 1969.

Donnison, F.S.V., British Military Administration in the

- Far East, HMSO, London, 1956.
- Emerson, Rupert, Malaysia, A Study in Direct and Indirect Rule, University of Malaya Press, Singapore (3rd imp), 1969.
- Evers, Hans-Dieter (ed.), Modernization in South-East Asia, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, reprinted 1975,
- Fairbank, J.K., (ed.), The Cambridge History of China, vol. 12, (Republican China 1912-1949, p.1), Cambridge University Press, New York, 1983.
- Fifield, Russell, The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia: 1945-1958, Archon Books, 1968.
- Fisher, Nigel, Harold Macmillan, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1982.
- Fried, Morton H. (ed.), Colloquium on Overseas Chinese, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1958.
- Funston, Neil J., Malay Politics in Malaysia: A Study of United Malay National Organization and Party Islam, Heinemann, Kuala Lumpur, 1980.
- Gopalan, P.V., Coronation Souvenir of the Settlement of Malacca, Commercial Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1937.
- Gordon, K. Benard, The Dimensions of Conflict in Southeast Asia, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New JERSEY, 1966.
- Gosling, L. A. Peter & Linda Y. C. Lim, The Chinese in Southeast Asia, (Volume 2 Identity, Culture & Politics), Maruzen Asia, Singapore, 1983.
- Hanrahan, Gene Z., The Communist Struggle in Malaya. University of Malaya Press, Kuala Lumpur 1971.
- Hassan, M.A., and Rahman, N. Hassan Shuhaimi Nik Abdul Rahman (ed.) The Eight Conference International Association of Historians of Asia, Selected Papers, Department of History, National University of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, 1988.
- Hassan, Riaz, Interethnic Marriage in Singapore: A Study in Interethnic Relations, Occasional Paper No. 21, May 1974, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.
- Heng, Pek Khoo, Chinese Politics in Malaysia A History

- of the Malaysian Chinese Association, Oxford University Press, 1988.
- Ho, Ruth, Rainbow Round My Shoulder, Eastern Universities Press Sdn. Bhd., Singapore, 1975.
- Hua, Wu Yin, Class and Communalism in Malaysia, Politics in a Dependent Capitalist State, Zed Books Ltd, London, 1983.
- Hubbard, G.E., British Far Eastern Policy, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1943.
- Jayasuria, J.E., Dynamics of Nation-building in Malaysia, Associated Educational Publishers, Colombo, 1983.
- Johan, Khasnor, The Emergence of the Modern Malay Administrative Elite, Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1984.
- Khong, Kim Hoong, Merdeka! British Rule and the Struggle for Independence in Malaya, 1945-57, INSAN, Kuala Lumpur, 1984.
- Khoo, Kay Kim et al. (ed.), Kenegaraan 25 Tahun, Satu Perspektif Sejarah (25 Years of Nationhood, A Historical Perspective) Persatuan Muzium Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, 1982.
- Komer, R. W., The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of a Successful Counter-insurgency Effort, A Report Prepared for Advanced Research Projects Agency, The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, 1972.
- Lau, Albert, The Malayan Union Controversy 1942-1948, Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1991.
- Lee, Poh Ping, Chinese Society in Nineteenth Century Singapore, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1978.
- Leo, Suryadinata, China and the ASEAN States: The Ethnic Chinese Dimension, Singapore University Press, Singapore, 1985.
- Lim, Joo-Hock and S. Vani (ed.), Armed Communist Movements in Southeast Asia, Gomer Publishing Company Limited, Hampshire, 1984.
- Lim, Pui Huen, P., Tan Cheng Lock Papers A Descriptive List, A New and Enlarged Edition, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1989.
- Lim, Victor, Biographies of Prominent Chinese in

- Singapore, Nan Kok Publication Co., Singapore, 1983.
- Macmillan, Harold, The Blast of War, Macmillan & Co Ltd., 1967.
- Mahmood, Ibrahim, Sejarah Perjuangan Bangsa Melayu (History of The Struggle of The Malay Race), Penerbitan Pustaka Antara, Kuala Lumpur, 1981.
- Masrom, Baharudin Ali, Politik Melayu Abad 21 (Malay Politics in The 21st Century), 'D' Enterprise, Kuala Lumpur, 1989.
- Mauzy, D.K., Barisan Nasional: Coalition Government in Malaysia, Marican & Sons (M) Sdn. Bhd., Kuala Lumpur, 1983.
- Means, Gordon P., Malaysian Politics, University of London Press, London, 1970.
- McKie, Ronald, Malaysia in Focus, Angus and Robertson Ltd., Sydney, 1963.
- McLane, C.B., Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia: An Exploration of Eastern Policy under Lenin and Stalin, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1966.
- McVey, Ruth T., The Rise of Indonesian Communism, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1965.
- Middlebrook, S.M., Yap Ah Loy, 1837-1885, M.B.R.A.S. Reprints, Kuala Lumpur, Republished in June 1983.
- Miller, H., Menace in Malaya, Harrap, London, 1955.
- Mustajab, Mohd Sarim(ed.), Akhbar Dan Majalah: Sejarah Dan Perkembangan (Newspapers and Magazines: Its Development and History), The Department of History, National University, 1985.
- Newell, W.H. (ed.), Japan in Asia, Singapore University Press, Singapore, 1981.
- Nyce, Ray, Chinese New Villages in Malaya, A Community Study, Malaysian Sociological Research Institute, Singapore, 1973. qi
- O'Ballance, Edgar., Malaya: The Communist Insurgent War, 1948-60, Archon Books, Hamdan, Connecticut, 1956.
- Onghokham, Rakyat Dan Negara (Peoples and Nation), Penerbit Sinar Harapan, Jakarta, 1983.
- Ongkili, James, P., Nation-building in Malaysia 1946-

- 1974, Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1985.
- Onraet, R., Singapore- A Police Background, Dorothy Crisp, London, 1947.
- Oo, Yu Hock, Ethnic Chameleon: Multiracial Politics in Malaysia, Pelanduk Publications(Malaysia) Sdn Bhd, Petaling Jaya, 1990.
- Osborne, Milton, Region of Revolt; Focus on Southeast Asia, Pergamon Press (Australia), Adelaide, 1970.
- Parmer, J. Norman, Colonial Labour Policy and Administration in Malaya. A History of Labour in the Rubber Plantation Industry in Malaya, c.1910-1941, New York, 1960.
- Purcell, Victor, Malaya, Communist or Free?, Victor Gollancz Ltd, London, 1954.
- _____, The Chinese in Malaya, Oxford University Press, London, 1948.
- _____, The Revolution in Southeast Asia, Thames and Hudson, London, 1962.
- Pye, Lucian W., Guerrilla Communism in Malaya, Princeton, U.S.A., 1956.
- Rahman, Tunku Abdul (Putra al-Haj), Looking Back, Pustaka Antara, Kuala Lumpur, 1977.
- _____, Political Awakening, Pelanduk Publications, Petaling Jaya, 1987.
- Ratnam, K. J., Communalism and the Political Process in Malaya, University of Malaya Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1967, reprinted.
- Roff, W.R., The Origins of Malay Nationalism, University of Malaya Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1967.
- Rose, Saul, Britain and South-East Asia, Chatto & Windus, London, 1962.
- Ross, John D.D., The Origin of The Chinese People, Pelanduk Publications, Petaling Jaya, reprinted in 1990.
- Ryan, N.J., The Making of Modern Malaysia and Singapore, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, eighth impression, 1978.
- Sandhu, K. Singh, and Wheatly, P. (ed.), Melaka: The

- Transformation of a Malayan Capital c.1400-1980, 2 Vols., Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1983.
- Sarasin, Viraphol, The Role of China in Southeast Asia in Regional Security Developments and Stability in Southeast Asia, Papers presented at International Conference, organized by The Institute of Southeast Asia Studies (Singapore) and International Institute for Strategic Studies (U.K.), Singapore, 1980.
- Scott-Ross, Alice, Tun Dato Sir Cheng Lock Tan, a Personal Profile by His Daughter, Published by Alice Scott-Ross, Singapore, 1990.
- Sharpley, Cecil H., Great Delusion, the Autobiography of an ex-Communist Leader, William Heinemann Ltd. London, 1952.
- Shieh, Milton J.T., The Kuomintang: Selected Historical Documents, 1894-1969, Asia in the Modern World, No.7, Center of Asian Studies, St. John's University.
- Short, Anthony, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960, Frederick Muller Ltd., London, 1975.
- Shu, Yun-t'siao and Chua Ser-koon, eds., Malayan Chinese Resistance to Japan 1932-1945- Selected Source Materials, Cultural and Historical Publishing House Pte Ltd., Singapore, 1984.
- Sidhu, M.S., & G.W.Jones, Population Dynamics in a Plural Society: Peninsula Malaysia, UMCB Publication, Kuala Lumpur, 1981.
- Sidhu, Jagjit Singh, Administration in the Federated Malay States 1896-1920, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1980.
- Simandjuntak, B., Malayan Federalism, Oxford University Press, 1969.
- Singko, Ly, Hanoi, Peking and the Overseas Chinese, Asian Writers Publishing House, Singapore, 1978.
- Skinner, G. William, Chinese Society in Thailand: An Analytical History, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1957.
- Smith R.B. and A.J. Stockwell, British Policy and The Transfer of Power in Asia, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 1988.

- Song, Ong Siang, One Hundred Years of the Chinese in Singapore, University of Malaya Press, 1967, (reprinted).
- Sopiee, Mohamed Noordin, From Malayan Union to Singapore Separation, Penerbit Universiti Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1974.
- Stenson, M., Repression and Revolt: The Origins of the 1948 Communist Insurrection in Malaya and Singapore, Ohio University Centre for International Studies, Southeast Asia Program, 1969, Athens, Ohio.
- _____, The 1948 Communist Revolt in Malaya: A Note on Historical sources and Interpretation Occasional Paper No.9, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1971.
- Stockwell, A.J., British Policy and Malay Politics during the Malayan Union Experiment, 1942-1948, Malaysian Branch of Royal Asiatic Society, Monograph No.8, Kuala Lumpur, 1979.
- Strauch, Judith, Chinese Village Politics in the Malaysian State, Havard University Press, Cambrigde, Massachusetts, 1981.
- Stubbs, Richard, Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960, Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1989.
- Tan, Chee Beng, The Baba of Melaka, Culture and Identity of a Chinese Peranakan Community in Malaysia, Pelanduk Publications, Kuala Lumpur, 1988.
- Tan, Cheng Lock, Malayan Problems From A Chinese Point of View, Tannco, 1947.
- Tan Cheng Lock Papers: A Desriptive List, compiled by the Library Staff, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.
- Thayer, Philip W., Southeast Asia in the Coming World, The John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1953.
- Thio, Chan Bee, Extraordinary Adventure of an Ordinary Man, Governor Books, London, 1977.
- Thio, Eunice, British Policy in the Malay Peninsula 1880-1910, University of Malaya Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1969.
- Thomson, V. And Richard Adloff, Minority Problems in

- Southeast Asia, Russell & Russell, New York, reissued 1970.
- Thornton, Richard C., China, the Struggle for Power, 1917-1972, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1973.
- Tilman, R.O., Bureaucratic Transition in Malaya, Cambridge University Press, London, 1964.
- Trager, Frank N., Marxism in Southeast Asia, Stamford University Press, London, 1960.
- Tregonning, K.G., A History of Modern Malaya, Eastern University Press Ltd., Singapore, 1964.
- Vasil, R.K., Politics in a Plural Society, Oxford University Press, 1971.
- Wang, Gungwu(ed.), Malaysia A Survey, Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, New York, 1964.
- _____, A Short History of the Nanyang Chinese, Donald Moore, Singapore, 1959.
- Wu, Teh Yao, Roots of Chinese Culture, Federal Publications, Singapore, 1980.
- Yeap, Joo-Kim, The Patriach, Times Printers, Singapore, 1975.
- Yen, Ching Hwang, The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1976.
- Yen, Ching-hwang (Dr.), The Role of the Overseas Chinese in The 1911 Revolution, Southeast Asian Studies Programme, Nanyang University, Singapore, 1978.
- Yeo, Kim Wah, The Politics of Decentralization, 1920-1929 Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1973.
- _____, Political Development in Singapore, 1945-55, Singapore University Press, Singapore, 1973.
- Yeo, Siew Siang, Tan Cheng Lock, the Straits Legislator and Chinese Leader, Pelanduk Publications, Kuala Lumpur, 1990.
- Yong, C.F., Tan Kah Kee, the Making of an Overseas Chinese Legend, Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1987.
- _____ & R.B. McKenna., The Kuomintang

Movement in British Malaya 1912-1949, Singapore University Press, Singapore, 1990.

Zacher, Mark W., and R. Stephen Milne, Conflict and Stability in Southeast Asia, Anchor Books, New York, 1974.

ARTICLES IN JOURNALS AND CHAPTERS IN BOOKS

Abrahams, Sidney, "The Role of The Attorney General" Corona, no.5, June 1949, HMSO.

Akashi, Yoji, "Japanese Policy Towards the Malayan Chinese 1941-1945," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies (JSEAS), Vol.1, No.2, Sept 1970.

_____, "Bureaucracy and the Japanese Military Administration, With Specific Reference to Malaya" in Newell, W.H.(ed.), Japan in Asia, Singapore University Press, Singapore, 1981.

Anuar, Nik Mahmud Nik, "Tunku Abdul Rahman-Chin Peng Amnesty Talks and British Response", in JEBAT, No. 18, 1990, Journal of the Department of History, National University of Malaysia.

_____, "Malayan -Thai Police Border Agreement, September 1, 1949", in SARJANA, Jilid(Vol.) 5, 1989, Journal of the Faculty of Art and Social Science, University of Malaya.

Beaglehole, J.H., "Malay Participation in Commerce and Industry: the Role of RIDA and MARA", Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, Vol. VII, 1969, Leicester University Press.

Cheah, Boon Kheng, "The Social Impact of the Japanese Occupation of Malaya (1942-1945)", Alfred Mc Coy (ed.) Southeast Asia Under Japanese Occupation, Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1980.

_____, "Malayan Chinese and the Citizenship Issue", Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs, Vol. 12, No.2, December 1978.

Clammer, John, "Chinese Ethnicity and Political Culture in Singapore" in Gosling, L.A. Peter & Linda Y.C. Lim, The Chinese in Southeast Asia, (Volume 2 Identity, Culture & Politics), Maruzen Asia, Singapore, 1983.

Finkelstein, Lawrence S., "Prospects for Self-Government

- in Malaya", Far Eastern Survey, Vol.XX1, No.2, January 30, 1952, American Institute of Pacific Relations.
- Freedman, M., "The Growth of a Plural Society in Malaya", in Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXXIII, No.2, June 1960.
- Gamba, Charles, and Aziz, Ungku A., "RIDA and Malayan Economic Development", Far Eastern Survey, 10 October 1951.
- Gamba, Charles, "Chinese Associations in Singapore", JMBRAS, Vol. XXXIX, December 1966.
- Haron, Nadzan, "Early Chinese in California: Some Aspects of Their Immigration and Settlement, 1847-1860", in JEBAT, Bil(Vol.) 11, 1981/82, the Department of History, National University of Malaysia.
- Ja'afar, Kamaruddin, "The Politics of Merdeka", in Malaysia in History, Vol.XX, No.11, December 1977.
- Jeshurun, Chandran, "Post-war Politics in Melaka", K.S.Sandhu and Wheatley P., Melaka, the Transformation of a Malay Capital c.1400-1980, Oxford University Press, 1983.
- Kennedy, R., "Malaya: Colony Without Plan", Far Eastern Survey, 15 August 1945.
- Lim, San Kok, "Some Aspects of the Malayan Chinese Association 1949-1969", Journal of the South Seas Society, Vol.26, No.2, 1971.
- McGee, T.G., "The Malayan Election of 1959: A Study in Electoral Geography", in Journal of Tropical Geography, Vol. XVI, October 1962.
- Morrison, Ian, "Aspects of the Racial Problem in Malaya", Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXII, No.3, September 1949.
- Parmer, Norman J., "Constitutional Change in Malaya's Plural Society", Far Eastern Survey, Vo. XXVI, No. 1, October 1957, American Institute of Pacific Relations.
- P'ng, Poh Seng, "The Straits Chinese in Singapore: A Case Study of Local Identity and Social Cultural Accomodation", Journal of Southeast Asian History, Vol.2, No. 1, 1961.
- _____, "The Kuomintang in Malaya, 1912-1941", Journal of Southeast Asian History, vol.2, No.1, March, 1961,

Purcell, Victor, "A Malayan Union: The Proposed New Constitution", in Pacific Affairs, Vol.19, No.1, March 1946.

_____, "Britain's Future in South East Asian", in Malaya, Vol.1, No.2, February 1952.

Smith, R.B., "China and Southeast Asia: The Revolutionary Perspective", 1951, in Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol.XIX, No.1, March 1988.

Sopiee, M.N., "The Penang Secession Movement, 1948-51", in Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol.1V, No.1, March 1973.

Soh, Eng Lim, "Tan Cheng Lock: His Leadership of the Malayan Chinese", Journal of Southeast Asian History, Vol.I, No.I, March 1960.

Stockwell, A.J., "British Imperial Policy and Decolonization in Malaya, 1942-52", The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. XIII, No. 1, October, 1984.

_____, "The Approach to a Possible Transfer of Powers' Series on Malaysia and Singapore", in R. B. Smith and A. J. Stockwell, British Policy and the Transfer of Power in Asia, Documentary Perspectives School of Oriental and African studies, University of London, 1988.

Stubbs, Richard, "The United Malays National Organization, the Malayan Chinese Association, and the Early Years of the Malayan Emergency, 1948-1955", in JSEAS, Vol.X, No.1, March 1979.

Tadin, Ishak, "Dato Onn and the Malay Nationalism, 1946-1951," Journal of Southeast Asian History, Vol.1, No.1, 1960.

Tan Chee-Beng, "Acculturation and the Chinese in Melaka: The Expression of Baba Identity Today", in Gosling, L. A. Peter & Linda Y. C. Lim, The Chinese in Southeast Asia, (Volume 2 Identity, Culture & Politics), Maruzen Asia, Singapore, 1983.

Tan, Cheng Lock (Dato), "The Chinese and Malayan Unity" The Straits Times Annual for 1953, Singapore.

Tan, Liok Ee, "Tan Cheng Lock and the Chinese Education Issue in Malaya", in Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. XIX, No. 1, March 1988.

Tjoa, Hock Guan, "The Social and Political Ideas of Tun

- Datuk Sir Tan Cheng Lock", in Sandhu K.S., and Wheatley, P., Melaka: The Transformation of A Malay Capital c.1400-1980, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1983.
- Tilman, R.O., "Policy Formulation, in Wang Gungwu (ed.), Malaysia, A Survey, Donald Moore Books, 1964, Singapore.
- Tinker, Irene, "Malayan Election", Western Political Quarterly, Vol.9, 1954.
- Tregonning, K.G., "Tan Cheng Lock: A Malayan Nationalist", Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 10, No. 1, March, 1979
- Turnbull, C.M., "British Planning for Post-war Malaya", Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol.V, No. 2, September 1974.
- _____, "The Impact of Events in China in The 1920s on British Policy in Malaya and The Straits Settlements", in Hassan, M.A. and Rahman, N. H. S. N. A.(ed.), The Eight Conference: International Association of Historians of Asia, Selected Papers, The Department of History, National University of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, 1988.
- Wahid, Zainal Abidin Abdul, "Semangat Perjuangan Melayu" (The Spirit of Malay Struggles), in JEBAT, Vol.7/8, 1978/79.
- Yen, Chin Hwang, "Confucian Revival Movement in Singapore and Malaya". in Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. VII, No.1 March 1976, F.E.B. International, Ltd.
- Yong, C.F., and McKenna, R.B., "The Kuomintang Movement in Malaya and Singapore", Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. XII, No.1, March 1981.

UNPUBLISHED THESES, SEMINAR PAPERS, RESEARCH PAPERS
AND OTHERS

Ahmad, Siti Hajar, Isu Hak kerakyatan Atau Kewarnegaraan Dalam Politik Tanah Melayu, 1946-1957, (Citizenship Issues in Malayan Politics), B.A. academic exercise, National University of Malaysia, 1989/90.

Akashi Yoji (Prof.), "Loi Teck Secretary General of the

- Malayan Communist Party: Portrait of a Professional Double Agent", The Eighth Conference International Association of Historians Kuala Lumpur, 25th-29th August 1980.
- B.B.C.2, "SOE-Arms and the Dragon : Examines the Special Executives's Oriental Mission to Arm the Communist Guerillas in Malaya during World War Two, 31 August 1987, 7.35p.m.
- Chan, Heng Chee, "The Malayan Chinese Association, M.A. Thesis, University of Singapore, 1965.
- Cheah, Boon Kheng, "The Malayan Democratic Union, 1945-1948, M.A. Thesis, University of Malaya, 1974.
- Christie, C.J., "The Problem of China in British Foreign Policy, 1917-1921", Ph.D. Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1971.
- Gaus, Md. Salleh bin Md., Politik Melayu Pulau Pinang (Malay Politics in Penang), Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, Kuala Lumpur.
- Haas, R.H., "The Malayan Chinese Association 1958-1959, Analysis of Differing Conceptions of the Malayan Chinese Role In Independent Malaya", M.A. Thesis, Northern Illinois University, 1967.
- Heng, Pek Khoon, "The Development of the Malayan Chinese Association", Ph.D. Thesis, LSOAS, 1984.
- Ismail, Mohamed, Keaadan Social Orang-orang Melayu Sebelum Perang Di Melaka (Social Conditions of the Malays Before the War), B.A. academic exercise, National University of Malaysia, 1973.
- Khoo, Kay Kim, "The Beginning of Political Extremism in Malaya, 1915-1935", Ph.D. Thesis, University of Malaya, 1973.
- Khor, Eng Hee, "The Public Life of Dr.Lim Boon Keng," B.A. Academic Exercise, University of Malaya, Singapore, 1958.
- Lau, Khong Hwa Albert, "The Politics of Union and Citizenship: The Evolution of British Constitutional Policy Towards Malaya and Singapore, 1942-1948," Ph.D. Thesis, SOAS, University of London, 1986.
- Lee, Ting Hui, "The Communist Open United Front in Singapore, 1954- 1966", Ph.D. Thesis, National University of Singapore, 1983.
- Leo, Tin Boon, "Force 136: The Malayan Episode" B.A.

- academic exercise, National University of Singapore, 1986.
- Leong, Stephen, "Sources, Agencies and Manifestation of Overseas Chinese Nationalism in Malaya, 1937-1941", Ph.D. Thesis, University of California, 1976.
- Lim, Phaik See, Gerakan Pemisahan Di Pulau Pinang Tahun 1948-51 (Penang Secession Movement in the Years;1948-51), B.A.academic exercise, National University of Malaysia, 1983/84.
- Ooi, Diana, "Chinese Speaking English in Penang ,1900-1940",M.A. Thesis, University of Malaya, 1967.
- Oong, Hak Ching, Pengkajian beberapa Aspek Masyarakat China Peranakan di Negeri-negeri Selat, 1900-1940 (A Study Of Straits Chinese Society in the Straits settlements, 1900-1940), M.A. Thesis, National University of Malaysia, 1981.
- "Project no.13 Richard Broome", Oral History Interviews, The Oral History Department, Singapore, 1986
- Sopiee, N. M.(ed.),"The Battle for Malayan Union, a Historical Sourcebook", Kuala Lumpur, 1970. (microfilm).
- _____, (ed.), "The Communities Liaison Committee and Communal Relations in Malaya, A Historical Sourcebook", Kuala Lumpur, 1970 (microfilm).
- Stockwell, A.J., "British Imperial Strategy and Decolonization in Malaya", ASEAS UK/SEALG Conference, Hull, 24-26 March 1986.
- Sue, Yer Ng, "The Malayan Communist Party and Overseas Chinese Nationalism in Malaya, 1937-1941", M.A. Thesis, The University of Hull,1981.
- Tan, Chee Beng, "Baba and Nyonya: A study of Ethnic Identity of the Chinese Peranakan in Malacca," Ph.D. Thesis, Cornell University, 1979
- Tan, Kim Neo (Rosie)," The Straits Chinese Way of life", A Research Paper for the Department of Social Studies, University of Malaya (Singapore), 1958.
- Tan, T.H.(ed.), "Merdeka Convention": Papers and Documents, London, 1957.
- Ting, Chew Peh, "The Chinese In Peninsular Malaysia: A Study of Race Relations in a Plural Society Country", Ph.D. Thesis, University of Warwick, 1976.