THE UNIVERSITY OF HULL

ANALOGICAL REASONING AND THE FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS: U.S. INTERVENTIONISM IN THE CARIBBEAN BASIN WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO GRENADA 1983

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
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AID	[U.S.] Agency for International Development
BDF	Barbados Defence Force
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CBI	Caribbean Basin Initiative
CC	Central Committee
CDB	Caribbean Development Bank
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CINCLANT	Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic
CPPG	Crisis Pre-Planning Group
DCM	Deputy Chief of Mission
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
EEC	European Economic Community
EFF	Extended Fund Facility
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FMS	Foreign Military Sales
GDMC	Grenada Documents Microfiche Collection
GMMWU	Grenada Manual and Mental Workers Union
GNP	Grenada National Party
GPP	Grenada People's Party
GULP	Grenada United Labour Party
IFI	International Financial Institution

IMET	International Military and Education Training
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JEWEL	Joint Endeavour for Welfare, Education and Liberation
LIAT	Leeward Islands Air Transport
MACE	Movement for the Advancement of Community Efforts
MAP	Movement for the Assemblies of People
MAU	Marine Amphibious Unit
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NEO	Non-Permissive Evacuation Operation
NJM	New Jewel Movement
NSA	National Security Advisor
NSAGC	National Security Archives Grenada Collection
NSC	National Security Council
NSDD	National Security Decision Directive
NSPG	National Security Planning Group
OAS	Organisation of American States
OECS	Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States
OREL	Organisation for Revolutionary Education and Liberation
PB	Political Bureau
PRA	People's Revolutionary Army
PSIA	Point Salines International Airport
PRG	People's Revolutionary Government
RFG	Radio Free Grenada

RIG	Restricted Inter-Agency Group
RMC	Revolutionary Military Council
RSS	Regional Security System
SDI	Strategic Defense Initiative
SGU	St. George's University Medical School
SLOC	Sea Lines of Communication
SSG	Special Situations Group
UN	United Nations
UPP	United People's Party
WIAS	West Indies Associated States
WINBAN	Windward Islands Banana Association


United States
Gulf of Mexico
Atlantic Ocean
The Bahamas
Cuba
Turks and Caicos (U.K.)
Cayman Is. (U.K.)
Guantanamo (U.S. Naval Base)
Jamaica
Haiti
Dominican Republic
British Virgin Is. (U.K.)
Anguilla (U.K.)
Virgin Is. (U.S.)
Puerto Rico (U.S.)
St. Christopher and Nevis
Antigua and Barbuda
Montserrat (U.K.)
Guadeloupe (Fr.)
Dominica
Martinique (Fr.)
St. Lucia
St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Barbados
Grenada
Trinidad and Tobago
Honduras
Nicaragua
Costa Rica
Panama
Caribbean Sea
Netherlands Antilles (Neth.)
Aruba
Curacao
Venezuela
Colombia
Pacific Ocean
Guyana
Suriname
French Guiana (Fr.)
Caribbean Sea
Pearls Airport
Grenville
Grenada
Saint George's
Atlantic Ocean
Point Salines Airfield
Point Salines

GRENADA

61°45'W
61°35'W
12°15'N
12°10'N
12°05'N
12°00'N

CARIBBEAN SEA

LEVERA I.
GREEN I.
Levera Bay
Sauteurs
Duquesne Bay
Grenada Bay
N
Victoria
ST MARK'S MTS
S T P A T R I C K
Lake Antoine
St Patrick R.
S T M A R K
Gouyave
(Charlotte Town)
Mt. St Catherine
840m (2757 ft)
PEARLS AIRPORT
S T J O H N
Great River Bay
Great Bay R.
Grand Roy
Mt. Granby
683m (2240 ft)
GRAND ETANG
Fedons Camp
765m (2509 ft)
Grenville
S T A N D R E W
MARQUIS I.
St Andrew's Bay
Grand Etang
Willis
FOREST
Mt. Lebanon
▲715m (2347 ft)
Sinai
▲703m (2306 ft)
S T
Gt. Bacolet Bay
Grand Mal Bay
RESERVE
G E O R G E
Crochu Harbour
La Tante R.
ST GEORGE'S
St David's
Martin's Bay
S T D A V I D
Grande Anse Bay
Morne Rouge Bay
Canoe Bay
Westerhall
Westerhall Bay
Lance aux Epines
HOG I.
Egmont Harbour
CALIVIGNY I.
GLOVER I.

CARIBBEAN SEA

Key

- Principal roads
- Parish boundaries
- Land 0 - 304m (1000 ft)
- Land over 304m (1000 ft)

0 1 2 3 Miles
0 1 2 3 4 Kilometres

INTRODUCTION

At 9:07 a.m. on October 25, 1983, President Reagan, accompanied by Prime Minister Eugenia Charles of Dominica, addressed journalists in the White House Briefing Room. Surprising the audience, Reagan announced that:

> on Sunday, October 23d, the United States received an urgent, formal request from the five member states of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States assist in a joint effort to restore order and democracy on the island of Grenada . . . Early this morning, forces from six Caribbean democracies and the United States began a landing or landings on the island.[1]

He gave three reasons for the U.S.' participation: "to protect innocent lives, including up to a thousand Americans, . . . to forestall further chaos. . . [and] to assist in the restoration of conditions of law and order and of governmental institutions."[2]

Grenada is the southern most island microstate in the Windward Islands chain in the Eastern Caribbean. It is 133 square miles in area, about twice the size of Washington D.C., and in 1983 had a population of approximately 85,000. In the U.S. Grenada was practically unheard of by most Americans outside of tourist circles.[3] In October 1983 this obscure island was thrust into the international limelight for its "fifteen minutes of fame."

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[1] "Remarks of the President and Prime Minister Eugenia Charles of Dominica Announcing the Deployment of United States Forces in Grenada, October 25, 1983," U.S. President, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States* (Washington D.C.: Office of the *Federal Register*, National Archives and Records Service, 1983), Ronald W. Reagan, 1983, p. 1505.

[2] Ibid., p. 1506.

[3] To be fair it was not just Americans who knew nothing of Grenada. At one stage there was uncertainty over exactly how "Grenada" should be pronounced. One anecdote relates how a Russian television station announced that the U.S. had invaded Granada in Southern Spain!

Although much has changed since 1983 and the days of President Reagan, the Soviet Union and the Cold War, the Grenada intervention raised many important issues that have been the subject of numerous studies in the last decade. What were the implications for international law and its role in decisionmaking? To what extent was the intervention an example of the U.S. reassertion of hegemony in the region? This question was related to speculation about the future role of Britain in the region. Several weeks after the intervention Barbadian Prime Minister Tom Adams stated that 1983 was "the watershed year in which the influence of the United States, willy-nilly, came observably to replace that of Great Britain."[4]

Grenada had been a close ally of Cuba and consequently the intervention had important implications for the nature of Cuba's future relations with her Caribbean neighbours as well as the U.S. The People's Revolutionary Government (PRG) had been the focus of much interest for radicals throughout the region and its dramatic implosion was a serious setback to socialism in the Caribbean.

It was probably in the Eastern Caribbean that the intervention had the most impact. The Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS)[5] had not agreed with the larger Caribbean Community's (CARICOM)[6] desire for a peaceful solution and deliberately kept CARICOM in the dark about their request to Washington for help. Regional integration suffered somewhat as relations between the OECS and

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[4] Anthony P. Maingot, "American foreign policy in the Caribbean: continuities, changes, and contingencies," *International Journal* XL (Spring 1985): 327.

[5] The OECS was established in 1981 and consists of Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Lucia and St. Vincent and the Grenadines.

[6] CARICOM was established in 1973 and consists of the OECS countries as well as the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago.

CARICOM were slow to heal after the intervention. Another issue bought to the fore was the military, political and economic dimensions of the security of microstates.[7]

The focus of this study will be the actual decisionmaking process that led the U.S. to intervene in Grenada. As such events go, the Grenada crisis has the advantage of a clearly definable duration; October 13 until October 25, 1983. With the passing of time more sources have become available which has facilitated a more complete reconstruction of the crucial period. A relatively large number of Reagan officials have published memoirs in recent years.[8] Interviews with participants and recently available declassified U.S. government documents have also been important sources.

In examining the Grenada crisis I have divided the study into seven chapters. Chapter one outlines the theoretical basis of the thesis; I discuss the psychological process of analogical reasoning and the positives and negatives commonly associated with the use of analogies by foreign policy decisionmakers. The chapter concludes that historical analogies can be misleading but that they are powerful cognitive tools that aid decisionmakers in defining a situation and selecting a policy option.

Chapters two and three examine U.S.-Grenadian relations during the Carter and Reagan administrations between March 1979 and Grenadian Prime Minister Maurice

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[7] Commonwealth Study Group, *Vulnerability: Small States in the Global Society* (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1985) was specially commissioned after the intervention to address such issues.

[8] Among the more useful ones are: Allan Gerson, *The Kirkpatrick Mission: Diplomacy Without Apology: America at the United Nations, 1981-1985* (New York: Free Press, 1991); Frank McNeil, *War and Peace in Central America: Peace and Illusion* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1988); Constantine Menges, *Inside the National Security Council: The True Story of the Making and Unmaking of Reagan's Foreign Policy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988); Ronald W. Reagan, *An American Life: The Autobiography* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990); George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993) and Caspar Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years at the Pentagon* (London: Michael Joseph, 1990). Also of use were memoirs by the former British Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe, *Conflict of Loyalty* (London: Macmillan, 1994) and former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years* (London: HarperCollins, 1993).

Bishop's visit to Washington in June 1983. The origins of the March 1979 revolution via the rise and fall of Grenada's Prime Minister Eric Gairy and the origins and triumph of the New Jewel[9] Movement (NJM) in deposing him are traced. Grenada's relations with the U.S. and her Eastern Caribbean neighbours are charted. An account of the steady deterioration in U.S.-Grenadian relations is provided; the PRG's alignment with the Soviet bloc, Cuba's involvement in the construction of an international airport, with potential military use, on Grenada, the failure to arrange elections, the suspension of the constitution, the large numbers of political prisoners, the suspension of *habeas corpus*, the closure of Grenada's only independent newspaper. Simultaneously the PRG maintained a constant flow of anti-U.S. rhetoric. In response the U.S. adopted a "distancing" policy: Washington employed a combination of economic, political and military pressure to isolate Grenada. Bishop's June 1983 trip to Washington D.C. was designed for public relations purposes and to take the heat off the PRG for a while rather than primarily as an effort to normalise relations.

Chapter four examines the demise of the PRG in the summer of 1983 and the events which climaxed in Bishop's death on Wednesday, October 19. After Bishop's arrest on Thursday, October 13, a train of events was set in motion that resulted in an overt military intervention only two weeks later. The decision to intervene was a result of events in three locations: Washington, Barbados and Grenada. Consequently, a day-by-day analysis reconstructs the flow of these events and interactions between the three venues for the crisis period. Several important events between Bishop's house arrest and his death effectively established the foundations

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[9] Jewel is an acronym for Joint Endeavour for Welfare, Education and Liberation.

for, and direction of, subsequent decisionmaking. In Washington the State Department's Restricted Inter-Agency Group (RIG) convened daily and advocated an evacuation of U.S. nationals to avoid a potential hostage situation; the Joint Chief of Staff's (JCS) reviewed evacuation procedures; a U.S.-Caribbean plan to rescue Bishop was discussed and on the morning of Wednesday, 19 October, Barbadian Prime Minister Tom Adams confirmed the Eastern Caribbean leaders' feelings by requesting U.S. participation in a military action.

The central period of the crisis, between Thursday, October 20 and Tuesday, October 25, is the focus of chapters five and six. Chapter five covers the period between Thursday, October 20 and Saturday, October 22. During this time several key developments occurred: the attention on Grenada was elevated to Cabinet-level in Washington; the OECS met in Bridgetown, Barbados, and issued an oral request to the U.S. inviting them to participate in a multinational military force; CARICOM met in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad, and proposed a non-military solution and at a Special Situations Group (SSG) meeting President Reagan made a "75 percent"[10] commitment to action.

Chapter six examines the period from early morning on Sunday 23 when President Reagan's party returned from Augusta, Georgia, to Washington, until the final order was given to launch operation Urgent Fury on Tuesday 25. The key events of this short period include: the impact of the Beirut bombing; U.S. diplomats' meetings with a member of the Revolutionary Military Council (RMC) on Grenada; the dispatch of Special Emissary ambassador Frank McNeil to meet the Caribbean leaders and assess their rationale for action; the issuing of a formal written request by the OECS; the

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[10] "Britain's Grenada Shut-Out," *The Economist*, March 10, 1984, p. 22.

request of Grenada's Governor-General Sir Paul Scoon for assistance and Reagan's ultimate decision to accede to the OECS request and intervene.

Chapter seven concludes this study by addressing the central question of this work: How did historical analogies influence the U.S. policymakers in deciding to use force in Grenada? Having established the influence of Munich and Vietnam on Reagan officials, the different options Washington had to chose between during the Grenada crisis are listed. The significant historical analogies used by decisionmakers, the Iran hostage crisis, Vietnam and Cuba, are identified and their impact assessed. Finally, the recommendations of each analogy are examined and how these factors not only promoted intervention but helped shape the form of Urgent Fury.

CHAPTER 1

ANALOGICAL REASONING

In the 1950's and 1960's a "cognitive revolution"[1] in the social sciences emphasised the centrality of human information processing in understanding behaviour. As Simon's "bounded rationality" theory posited: "limits on decision-makers time and information processing capabilities force them to take cognitive short-cuts that do not allow for maximizing decisions or full incorporation of new information."[2] The analogy is a central simplifying mechanism in this process. Accordingly, decisionmakers are "satisficers" whose search for decision options is sequential and the first option that meets minimum objectives is adjudged "good enough" and chosen.[3] Thus "bounded rationality" was at variance with the traditional rationality thesis that:

> decision-makers survey all possible courses of action, weight probable costs and benefits, and select a course of action that achieves a maximum value outcome in terms of the decision-makers' complete set of rank-order preferences.[4]

The cognitive psychology approach emphasised that the decisionmaker was:

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[1] Cognitive in this context refers to "all the information processing activities of the brain, ranging from the analysis of immediate stimuli to the organization of subjective experiences. . . [C]ognition includes such processes and phenomena as perception, memory, attention, problem-solving, language, thinking, and imagery." Martha L. Cottam, *Foreign Policy Decision Making: The Influence of Cognition* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986), p. 6.

[2] Andrew Owen Bennett, "Theories of Individual, Organizational and Governmental Learning and the Rise and Fall of Soviet Military Interventionism," (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1990), p. 92. For Simon's work see Herbert Simon, *Models of Bounded Rationality*, 2 vols. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1982).

[3] Bennett, "Theories of Individual," p. 93.

[4] Ibid., p. 92.

> in large part shaped by the manner in which he perceives, diagnoses, and evaluates his physical and social environment. . . it is recognized that in order to experience and cope with the complex, confusing reality of the environment, individuals have to form simplified, structured beliefs about the nature of their world.[5]

The decisionmaker was conceived of as a "naive scientist" who used "knowledge structures" such as analogies, belief systems, operational codes and schemas to process information, understand the environment and make decisions.

Analogies, schemata/operational codes and ideological beliefs, constitute the three main knowledge structures associated with learning: "a change of beliefs, skills, or procedures based on the observation and interpretation of experience."[6] The subject is traditionally divided into three levels: individual, organisational and governmental learning with individual learning being the most important as it is the basis for organisational and governmental learning.

The application of cognitive psychology to foreign policy decisionmaking has experienced theoretical, methodical and practical problems: disillusionment at previous results, skepticism about the relevance of cognitive psychology to foreign policy decisionmaking, establishing a link between beliefs and action, access to reliable data and the principle of parsimony.[7] Another problem was the fact that the

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[5] Cottam, *Foreign Policy Decision Making*, p. 19.

[6] Jack S. Levy, "Learning and foreign policy: sweeping a conceptual minefield," *International Organization* 48, no. 2 (Spring 1994): 296. Levy emphasises that learning does not automatically involve "policy change, an improved understanding of the world, or an increasingly complex cognitive structure." Ibid., p. 283.

[7] Ole Holsti, "Foreign Policy Formation Viewed Cognitively," in Robert Axelrod (ed.), *Structure of Decision: The Cognitive Maps of Political Elites* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 22. Reber defines parsimony as a "general heuristic which states that if. . . two theories are equally tenable the simpler one is to be preferred." Arthur S. Reber, *The Penguin Dictionary of Psychology* (London: Penguin, 1985), p. 519. Thus systemic, governmental and bureaucratic explanations of decisionmaking have traditionally predominated.

psychological theories employed had originated under laboratory conditions, a far cry from the world of political decisionmaking.

Although no one explanation or level of analysis can fully account for decisionmakers behaviour, the application of cognitive psychology to foreign policy decisionmaking has increased understanding of that process immensely although it is necessary to remember that:

> Both psychological and rational models are seriously underpredictive. In many circumstances either can be consistent with almost any outcome, making them nearly impossible to falsify. To make definite predictions about any particular actor's behavior, both models require standards of knowledge of actors' goals and information sets that can rarely be met outside a controlled experiment.[8]

Each theory has advantages and disadvantages in seeking to explain events but the adoption of one method has often excluded the explanations offered by the other.

Analogical Reasoning

Rather than employing every psychological concept to analyse the U.S. decision to intervene in Grenada, I will concentrate on the use of historical analogies by decisionmakers to learn from history. Some of the major questions associated with this aspect of learning theory are: when do certain actors learn, what types of lessons are learned, from what type of events, under what conditions and with what results.[9]

Learning from history is a ubiquitous concept that underlines the general belief that the past teaches lessons that can be applied to the present and the future. The principal device employed in this process is the analogy; "an inference that if two or more events separated in time agree in one respect, then they may also agree in

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[8] Chaim D. Kaufman, "Out of the Lab and into the Archives: A Method for Testing Psychological Explanations of Political Decision Making," *International Studies Quarterly* 38 (1994): 558.

[9] Levy, "Learning and Foreign Policy," p. 280.

another."[10] This may be represented by Fischer's statement, AX:BX::AY:BY. A resembles B in terms of X; A also possesses Y which therefore infers that B possesses Y too. Thus via analogical reasoning BY has been inferred from three "known" values.[11] The fundamental idea whenever an analogy is used is to clarify unfamiliar points in terms of the familiar.

The validity of studying the influence of analogies is reinforced by the belief among many cognitive psychologists that analogical reasoning is inherent to all human beings. As Holyoak and Thagard emphasize; "Comparing novel situations to familiar ones and finding correspondences between them, and then using these correspondences to generate inferences about the new cases, is integral to human thinking."[12] What makes analogies so alluring is that they are time-saving cognitive shortcuts. As previously mentioned, the human mind is incapable of processing the large amounts of information involved in foreign policy decisionmaking and utilizes analogies as "knowledge structures" which help order, structure, interpret, simplify and understand information. Conversely, when there is a lack of information, analogies allow decisionmakers to go beyond the information available by relying on the suggestions provided by the analogy.

The basic principles of analogical reasoning are clearly relevant to foreign policy decisionmaking as Gilovich points out:

> contexts that might be especially prone to this type of process are those in which the decision makers' training involves studying past decisions and their outcomes

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[10] Yuen Foong Khong, *Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 6.

[11] David Hackett Fischer, *Historians' Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), p. 243.

[12] Keith J. Holyoak and Paul Thagard, *Mental Leaps: Analogy in Creative Thought* (Cambridge: A Bradford Book, MIT Press, 1995), p. 262.

> or in which the nature of the decision making process largely involves a consideration of the success or failure of similar past decisions.[13]

Ernest May's 1973 book *"Lessons" of the Past* brought prominence to the subject and in the years since it has received increasing attention.[14] In the policymaking context analogies can be thought of as "diagnostic devices"; Khong has proposed six important functions: "(1) help define the nature of the situation confronting the policymaker, (2) help assess the stakes, and (3) provide prescriptions. They help evaluate alternative options by (4) predicting the chances of success, (5) evaluating their moral rightness, and (6) warning about the dangers associated with the options."[15] The first function, the definition of the situation, is the most important as it is the stage at which some options will be rejected and other options will be promoted.

<u>The Sceptics Viewpoint</u>

The relationship between the past, present and future and the role of history in providing "lessons"[16] which are used by decisionmakers is a contentious issue. Carr

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[13] Thomas Gilovich, "Seeing the Past in the Present: The Effect of Associations to Familiar Events on Judgments and Decisions," *Journal of Personality and Social Personality* 40 (1981): 802.

[14] The most extensive works on historical analogies are: Ernest May, *"Lessons" of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), Earl C. Ravenal, *Never Again: Learning From America's Foreign Policy Failures* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press), Goran Rystad, *Prisoners of the Past?: The Munich Syndrome and Makers of American Foreign Policy in the Cold War Era* (Lund, Sweden: CWK Gleerup, 1982), Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest May, *Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers* (New York: Free Press, 1986), Alex Hybel, *How Leaders Reason: U.S. Intervention in the Caribbean Basin and Latin America* (Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell, 1990), Yaacov Y.I. Vertzberger, *The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), George W. Breslauer and Philip E. Tetlock (eds.), *Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991) and Khong, *Analogies at War*.

[15] Khong, *Analogies at War*, p. 10.

[16] A lesson in this context is will be understood as "an explicit policy-relevant statement that is based on experience that has at least an implied application to later events." W. Zimmerman and

argued that "the function of history is to promote a profounder understanding of both past and present through the interrelations between them."[17] As we shall see, the difficulties and dangers involved in analogical reasoning are numerous. A large proportion of historians and political scientists argue that analogies are in fact used to justify/advocate a pre-determined policy rather than to analyze policy options. A.J.P. Taylor wrote that, "men use the past to prop up their own prejudices." Fairbank echoed this, describing history as "a grabbag from which each advocate pulls out a 'lesson' to prove his point."[18]

This use of historical analogies is defined by Melanson as "declaratory history":

> Decisionmakers use declaratory history not only to educate, justify, manipulate and mobilize the public, but also to illuminate the relationship between current declaratory policy and presumed historical experience. . . Declaratory history does not aim to be comprehensive, complex, or controversial. It usually repeats a limited number of themes, excluding others completely, and targets different audiences with somewhat different historical accounts.[19]

The Reagan administration's declaratory history was dominated by the portrayal of the Cold War as a period of "peace through strength" and comparisons of the 1970's with the 1930's and the dangers of appeasement; the most obvious result was the massive defence spending of the administration.[20]

Robert Axelrod, "The 'Lessons' of Vietnam and Soviet Foreign Policy," *World Politics* 34, no. 1 (1981): 6.

[17] Edward Carr, *What is History?* (London: Macmillan, 1962), p. 62.

[18] Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, p. 217.

[19] Richard Melanson, "Action History, Declaratory History, and the Reagan Years," *SAIS Review* 9, no. 2 (Summer-Fall 1989): 229.

[20] Ibid., p. 237.

The other point the critics make is that decisionmakers "misuse" history.[21] Critics point to decisionmakers' tendency to extract specific lessons from a past event and then apply them literally to the new situation without regard for the differences in time, space and history.[22] "Lessons" are frequently ambiguous and open to a variety of interpretations. They tend to be overgeneralised, oversimplified and overused. Once a past event is chosen as an analogy it can dominate the proceedings and there is a danger that policymakers will use it unquestioningly to define the situation and choose an option whilst disregarding other possible analogies and relevant information.

The concern of the critics is not unfounded to be sure. Analogies are obviously useful tools of advocacy but as Jervis counters:

> If history merely reinforced established beliefs, people with different outlooks would not draw the same lessons from events, people would not disproportionally use as analogies events they experienced firsthand, and historical experience would not alter decision-makers views.[23]

As Khong observes, "the fact that policymakers use the same analogies to *justify* their choices does not vitiate the diagnostic role of the analogies in helping policymakers *arrive* at these choices."[24] It is undeniable that policymakers have, on the whole, not

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[21] Misuse in this sense is defined as "a use of past events which is faulty in that it violates the rules of logical and/or stated judgment and inference." Yaacov Y.I. Vertzberger, "Foreign Policy Decisionmakers as Practical-intuitive Historians: Applied History and its Shortcomings," *International Studies Quarterly* 30 (1986): 225.

[22] George C. Herring, "Vietnam, El Salvador, and the Uses of History," in Kenneth M. Coleman and George C. Herring, *The Central American Crisis: Sources of Conflict and the Failure of U.S. Policy* (Wilmington, Va.: Scholarly Resources, 1985), p. 106.

[23] Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, p. 217.

[24] Khong, *Analogies at War*, p. 16. Emphasis in original. Indeed, as Anderson suggests, justification of a policy is constrained by what is acceptable and what is not. In this situation if policy is not consistent with a [historical] precedent it is often deemed unacceptable. Therefore, "actions which cannot be plausibly justified in terms of desired precedents are at a bargaining disadvantage, given the limits of legitimate advocacy." Paul A. Anderson, "Justifications and Precedents as Constraints in Foreign Policy Decision-Making," *American Journal of Political Science* 25 (November 1981): 748.

used history very well and this fact has been well documented. However, as Khong perceptively emphasizes:

> unless one first answers the question of whether and how the analogies in question affect the selection of policy, there is not much point in making the assessment that the analogies are used badly. That is, if analogies do not affect the decision outcome, it does not matter if they are used badly or wisely.[25]

The Use of Historical Analogies

Before proceeding further in discussing the use of historical analogies it would be advantageous to delineate exactly what is meant by analogy, to avoid semantic confusion with terms like metaphor, extrapolation, insight and precedent.

Metaphor, often used interchangeably with analogy, is a "figure of speech in which a word or phrase is applied to an object or action that it does not literally denote in order to imply a resemblance."[26] This identification and fusion of two objects creates a new one with the characteristics of both. Shakespeare's "All the world is a stage", is a prime example. The metaphor transfers the meaning of stage to the meaning of the world. Metaphor operates via what Zashin and Chapman term "the association of ideas":

> Metaphor is an art of speech and prose: it is a tactic of immediate expression. Through it, a speaker or writer attempts to shape and even manipulate the imagination of his audience. By combining certain words, he is able to induce an unusual picture of images in their minds.[27]

This involuntary process exploits feelings, emotions, images, connotations, words and so on that the individual has accumulated over time. The metaphor, like the

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[25] Khong, *Analogies at War*, p. 9.

[26] Patrick Hanks (ed.), *Collins Dictionary of the English Language* (London: Collins, 1983), p. 927.

[27] Elliot Zashin and Phillip Chapman, "The Use of Metaphor and Analogy: Toward a Renewal of Political Language," *Journal of Politics* 36 (1974): 310.

analogy, is central to communication, persuading and influencing people, helping them to interpret subjects. They are used to clarify, magnify, embellish and add concreteness to an idea, argument or event. For historians, Fischer described metaphors as "useful and ornamental in the articulation of ideas."[28]

There are two views on the function of metaphors: the substitution view argues that the metaphor does not add any meaning to a statement which could not have been expressed with other words and only implies similarities already existing. Alternatively, the interaction view argues that the metaphor actually creates the similarities and adds meaning to statements.[29] Metaphors have been crucial in the development of political theory; "political science has always resorted to metaphors, to the device of proceeding from the known to the unknown."[30]

Metaphors are often described as an abridged form of an analogy; both share many of the same mental processes. Metaphors and analogies are obviously not mutually exclusive; when a historian uses a metaphor he draws an analogy via "a multiple simultaneous mental perception or vision of two or more related things."[31] An example of the relationship between metaphor and analogy can clarify the situation: if a negotiator at a conference is described as having "played his hand well" a card game metaphor has been drawn. If the situation is now interpreted in terms of

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[28] Fischer, *Historians' Fallacies*, p. 224.

[29] Zashin and Chapman, "The Use of Metaphor and Analogy," p. 296.

[30] Martin Landau quoted in Eugene F. Miller, "Metaphor and Political Knowledge," *American Politcial Science Review* 73, no. 1 (March 1979): 155.

[31] Warren A. Shibles, *Metaphor: An Annotated Bibliography and History* (Whitewater, Ark.: Language Press, 1971), p. 24. As with analogies, "'a metaphor is understood by finding a mapping between the target domain. . . and the source domain. The degree to which the analogy is viewed as metaphorical will tend to increase the more remote the target and domains are from each other." Holyoak and Thagard, *Mental Leaps*, p. 220.

the basic abstract category and relationships of poker, an analogy is being used.[32] Using metaphor as analogy though, only implies that the two domains are alike in some respects. Many authors proffer that metaphors "may thus be viewed as expressing the vague and confused but primal perception of identification, which subsequent processes of discrimination transform into a conscious and expressed analogy between different things."[33] Metaphors and analogies operate in the same field of establishing relationships between two events via similar differences or carrying from one domain to another.

The most important difference between metaphor and analogy is the phase of thought process. The meaning of metaphor is grasped via the images it evokes; this process is performed by the brain quickly and often subconsciously. Metaphors are frequently used unintentionally, more through habit than any careful consideration. Analogies however, are more abstract and deliberate. Comparisons, implicit in metaphors, are explicit with analogies and too involved to be induced spontaneously; consequently, an analogy's purpose is often announced and the audience's conscious cooperation sought with such phrases as "Think of it this way. . ."[34] The analogy utilizes abstract categories and relationships and transfers them from one domain to another to organize the latter; the metaphor employs new images of one domain, evoked by juxtaposing it with another which is acknowledged to be similar and different simultaneously. Thus, "in the metaphor, the similar and different interact to

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[32] Zashin and Chapman, "The Use of Metaphor and Analogy," p. 312.

[33] Shibles, *Metaphor*, p. 75.

[34] Zashin and Chapman, "The Use of Metaphor and Analogy," p. 310.

produce a meaning that is not to be found in either subject alone. In the analogy, there is no tension or interaction."[35]

In conclusion, metaphors are generally considered to be useful devices to enliven prose, stimulate the use of analogies, convey effect and highlight features. It would seem to be taken less seriously. Winston Churchill believed politicians used them to speak strongly because they were unsure of what to say and critics argue that metaphors actually bypass logic. For example, one author concluded that "analogies belong to logic: metaphors belong to aesthetics."[36] Analogies lend force to an argument and are considered essential to thought, serving as hypotheses.

Extrapolation is another process used to compare the past and present. This involves "perceiving the present event as an organic extension of a past event whose causes are known. The assumed continuity is also applied to the causes of the present situation which, by definition, are then the same as those of the earlier event."[37] The primary difficulty of this process is that the "claim to forecast [the] likely future. . . ignores many key determinants of that future."[38] The use of this device differs essentially from analogy by assuming some continuity and association between the past and present or future. Analogical reasoning assumes discontinuity but some correspondence between two or more events separated in time.

Two further terms require attention: insight and precedents. When referring to a situational or contextually triggered insight it can be defined as "a novel, clear,

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[35] Ibid., p. 317.

[36] Joshua Gregory quoted in Shibles, *Metaphor*, p. 123.

[37] Vertzberger, "Foreign Policy Decisionmakers," p. 226.

[38] Solomon Encel, Pauline K. Marstrand and William Page, *The Art of Anticipation: Values and Methods in Forecasting* (London: M. Robertson, 1975), p. 76.

compelling apprehension of the truth of something occurring without overt recourse to memories of past experiences."[39] Whilst insight does clarify a situation and help decisionmakers understand events and create policy, it clearly differs from analogy in that it does not manifestly rely on previous experiences. Precedents create "a norm for the future and when analogous situations are observed. . . the precedent 'recommends' a certain pattern of behavior"; consequently analogies are a prerequisite for precedence.[40]

The Analogy

Analogical reasoning is the most pervasive mode of reasoning used in the everyday communication of unfamiliar ideas. It is the primary cognitive process employed in all decisionmaking operations:

> what analogies do, essentially, is offer those to whom they are proposed a ready-made conceptual organization for something unfamiliar or probabilistic. . . by suggesting that the object of concern is "isometric" or parallel with or similar in relevant respects to something else which is familiar, well understood, and uncontroversial.[41]

In terms of cognitive psychology, analogical reasoning occurs when individuals "abstract a solution strategy from a previous problem and relate that information to a new problem that. . . [they] are trying to solve."[42]

Cognitive psychology is a general approach to psychology which accentuates the internal mental processes by suggesting that "behaviour is not specifiable simply in

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[39] Reber, *The Penguin Dictionary of Psychology*, p. 360.

[40] Lars-Goran Stenelo, *Foreign Policy Predictions* (Lund, Sweden: Studentlitteratuer, 1980), p. 110.

[41] Zashin and Chapman, "The Use of Metaphor and Analogy," p. 312.

[42] Jerome S. Bruner, *A Study of Thinking* (London: Transaction, 1986), p. 220.

terms of its overt properties but requires explanations at the level of mental events, mental representation, beliefs, intentions and so on."[43] This approach criticizes the other psychological viewpoint of behaviourism which argues that the only valid subject matter for investigation is observable, quantifiable behaviour because it does not provide any coherent characterization of cognitive processes such as thinking and decisionmaking.[44] In practice these two camps are not mutually exclusive but interactive to varying degrees on various subjects.

For decisionmakers, "knowledge structures" such as analogies promise order and control. Man has a limited cognitive capacity and cannot cope with the vast amounts of information available and so employs analogies to order, structure, interpret, simplify and understand the information. They are fundamentally a "short-cut" mechanism that allow individuals to process information and solve problems; reasoning cannot proceed very far without them.[45] Mefford suggests that:

> reasoning by analogy probably exerts greatest impact in the initial steps of the overall process. It helps shape the decision makers initial orientation and posture. It is here that candidate interpretations are first marshaled, later to be scrutinized and reworked or rejected. Evaluation and calculation come later.[46]

Current situations frequently provide nebulous and incomplete information for the decisionmaker to construct a policy from. In this situation analogies are used to supply extra information to complete gaps in the knowledge of the present situation and to identify what the result of a particular option might be, or if a particular course

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[43] Reber, *The Penguin Dictionary*, p. 129.

[44] Ibid., p. 130.

[45] Dwain Mefford, "Analogical Reasoning and the Definition of the Situation: Back to Snyder for Concepts and Forward to Artificial Intelligence for Method," in Charles Hermann, Charles Kegley and James Rosenau (eds.), *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy* (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987), p. 223.

[46] Ibid., p. 223.

of action is prescribed. This is when analogies can become disingenuous; they are invoked on the basis of factors that were not causal and significant in the original situation and therefore inappropriate to the new situation but remain influential in decisionmakers' minds. Learning from history is obviously a potentially beneficial action but there are many pitfalls which need to be avoided. There are numerous examples of decisionmakers being misled by erroneous analogies, yet analogies still remain a present part of decisionmaking. To understand why this is so and how analogies are used in general, it is helpful to examine the psychological process of analogical reasoning.

Using past experiences to help solve a current problem is technically described as the analogical transfer of a problem-solving strategy. Naturally, solving one problem previously will not always help solve another problem on every occasion. There are three stages in analogical transfer. Firstly, recognition: this involves identifying, accessing and retrieving an analogy (the base)[47] from the memory with which to reason. Secondly, abstraction: the problem-solver abstracts a general structure, procedure or principles (lesson) from the base. Thirdly, mapping: the problem-solver applies this knowledge to the present problem (the target).[48] I will examine each of these stages in detail.

Recognition

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[47] A base is a person or situation from which knowledge is transferred so as to be able to make a prediction for the target. Stephen J. Read, "Similarity and Causality in the Use of Social Analogies," *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 23 (1987): 190.

[48] The target is the person or situation for which the prediction is to be made. Ibid., p. 190 and Bruner, *A Study of Thinking*, p. 227.

Knowing the solution for an analogous problem is not useful unless the decisionmaker realizes the problem is analogous to the current situation. How are analogies identified and retrieved from the memory and how are specific ones chosen? Retrieval in this sense is based on what Holyoak and Koh describe as "summation of activation."[49] Multiple shared features, particularly if they are causally related, trigger the memorized representation of a similar situation. These shared features result in the retrieval of an analogy. Such similarities are divided into "surface" and "structural."

It is acknowledged that retrieval is facilitated by surface cueing, superficial similarities between X and Y that are not necessary for problem-solving. Gentner and Landers presented a group of students with 32 short stories (14 were fillers), two acted as bases. The students received three target story variations - one was a true analogy, one an apparent analogy and one a false analogy to the base stories. Their results revealed that the apparent match target story triggered the retrieval of a base analogy more often that the true analogy target story did. This led them to conclude that whilst structural cueing is important, the retrieval of the apparent target story indicated that surface cueing was a dominant factor.[50] A ready example of this can be seen in U.S. decisionmakers' comparison of Korea and Vietnam: a land war in Asia, a divided nation, Northern communist-backed aggressors and so on. These surface similarities reinforced belief in the Korean analogy. Such surface similarities are ostensibly those that are most accessible and the quickest to be recalled, therefore

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[49] Keith J. Holyoak and Kyunghee Koh, "Surface and structural similarity in analogical transfer," *Memory and Cognition* 15, no. 4 (1987): 333.

[50] Mark T. Keane, *Analogical Problem-Solving* (Chichester, West Sussex: Ellis Horwood, 1988), p. 62.

having more impact on the selection of source analogies than the application of analogies.

The other main theory of retrieval is the structural-and-surface cueing thesis. Here, structural similarities are those that correspond relations of event X to relations of event Y. They are the causally relevant factors. Structural cues are the goal features (for example the containment of communism, removal of a government or rescue of nationals) which are matched with the potential analogy in the memory. The surface component of this theory is the object features which are matched with objects of a similar structure base in the memory.[51]

Although surface and structural similarities are influential, dissimilarities can be just as important. Surface dissimilarities can be structure-preserving (causally relevant factors) but structural dissimilarities are structure-violating, altering the causal relationship between the two situations, making the potential analogy less useful and less likely to be used. Unlike surface differences, structural differences between the base and the target impairs mapping and makes the analogical solution more difficult to derive since further transformation is required to generate a solution that is viable in the target situation.[52] In an ideal world, decisionmakers would only use structural similarities as retrieval cues but they cannot consistently distinguish between surface and structural features and therefore irrelevant surface features do affect the solution planned by influencing the selection of an analogy at the outset. Research conducted would indicate that once an analogy has been retrieved, surface features have less

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[51] Ibid., p. 63.

[52] Holyoak and Koh, "Surface and structural similarity," p. 338.

impact than structural ones. Simply put, recognizing structural similarities and ignoring surface ones is the key to successful analogical reasoning.

Retrieval of potential analogies is determined by what is called the "availability" and "representativeness" of the analogy to the target. Analogies are stored in the memory on an unequal standing; it is this that produces the idea of the availability of an analogy. Availability refers to the ease with which certain information can be retrieved from the memory. Recent events are more accessible as their impact has not been diminished by time to any great extent or overshadowed by subsequent events. For President Truman in 1950 the North Korean invasion of South Korea was interpreted as a classic case of aggression which had to be opposed; the capitulation at Munich and its results loomed large in his mind. "Big" events such as Munich and Korea are also likely to be prominent in the memory. Revolutions and wars influence entire generations. For U.S. administrations in general, Latin American revolutions are available as rejections of U.S. values and an opportunity for Soviet penetration of the U.S.' backyard. The 1979 Grenadian Revolution triggered memories of the 1959 Cuban Revolution. Such an analogy was highly accessible because it was a dramatic, relatively big event that has remained conspicuous in U.S. foreign policy towards Latin America ever since.

Wars are conceivably the most available events due to their severity and destructiveness which make them the most influential events for many decisionmakers. They are more likely to learn from an aggressive outcome than a negotiated solution to a problem simply because the former is more dramatic.[53] Memories of World War One reminded decisionmakers of the dangers of an

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[53] Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, p. 235.

uncontrolled arms race leading nations stumblingly into a war. World War Two revealed the dangers of appeasement, isolationism and punitive peace treaties and the "total" nature of war. Korea suggested that future wars in the nuclear age would be limited affairs and that a pattern had been set for the emergent Cold War. Vietnam led policymakers to conclude that fighting a land war in Asia against an indigenous guerrilla foe was futile, that incrementalism was ineffective and that domestic opposition undermined the war effort.

The availability of major events like wars and revolutions are juxtaposed with another measure of availability - success or failure. As Jervis points out, events in foreign policy are rigidly classified as a "success" or "failure." The obvious problem is how to define success and failure in terms of foreign policy; a simple definition may be the achievement of desired aims. Normally past successes will result in policy continuity and failure will produce policy change. However, in foreign policymaking nothing is clear-cut; desired results are compromised, changed, unclear and often unrealistic.

The perception of a past event as a success frequently means that it will be ignored as an analogy. The assumption is that because everything turned out favourably the policy was correct. Minimal attention is paid to the costs of the policy, other options that were available, the element of luck involved and the possibility of failure.[54] When a past success is used as an analogy it is often used too quickly and without careful comparison simply because it is perceived as a success and therefore relatively uneventful for policymakers when searching for an analogy. Successful event analogies are not always misused. The British management of the media during

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[54] Ibid., p. 232.

the Falklands conflict reinforced in the U.S.' mind the desirability of strict control of the media during wartime and hence they excluded the media entirely from Grenada.

Failures would appear to be more available in the memories of decisionmakers. Fischhoff describes this as the "focus on failure" and warns that:

> although it has legitimate goals, focus on failure is likely to mislead us by creating a distorted view of the prevalence of misfortune. The perceived likelihood of events is determined in part by the ease with which they are imagined and remembered. Belabouring failures should, therefore, disproportionally enhance their perceived frequency in the past (and perhaps in the future).[55]

For example, the predominant analogies used in U.S. politics in reference to President Reagan's Central America policy were Cuba and Vietnam, two strongly negative analogies.[56]

The central aims of decisionmakers in using the past is to avoid mistakes that were made previously and why they were made, believing that history shows what not to do rather than what to do. It is probable that previous failures are used as "additional demands" for the next time, incorporating the unsuccessful solution into the representation of the new problem as an additional problem constraint.[57]

In a similar way to successes, failures produce the assumption that other options would have been better and that the decisionmakers involved should have realized this. The idea that the policy followed was perhaps the best option available or that

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[55] Baruch Fischhoff, "For Those Condemned to Study the Past: Heuristics and Biases in Hindsight," in Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic and Amos Tversky (eds.), *Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 339.

[56] As Levy points out, "the most likely outcomes to trigger learning are failures that were either unexpected at the time or unpredictable in retrospect, though predictable failures are still more likely to lead to learning than are successes." Levy, "Learning and Foreign Policy," p. 305.

[57] Mary L. Gick and Susan J. McGarry, "Learning From Mistakes: Inducing Analogous Solution Failures to a Source Problem Produces Later Successes in Analogical Transfer," *Journal of Experimental Psychology* 18, no. 3 (1992): 624.

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even good decisionmaking using all the information available at the time still produce a bad result is less likely to be considered.

The context of the original policy is ignored or overlooked due to the bias of hindsight. Contextual differences can present difficulties when transferring lessons. As a consequence, either the past will be defined simplistically to make it more similar to the present than it is or the current situation is manipulated to resemble the past more than it does.[58] Using historical analogies to establish terms for examining the current situation that are out of historical context decrease the usefulness of the analogy. For example:

> The categories Leon Trotsky borrowed from the French Revolution - Jacobinism, Thermidor, and Bonapartism - were too much the product of one historical epoch and national history to be useful in explaining, or even in helping to explain, the evolution of another.[59]

There are also a number of individual-oriented factors that increase the availability of a memory. First hand experience of an event is very influential. Leng, in an article studying coercive bargaining in recurrent crises, argued that in this process "experience learning" focused on a previous crisis; its lessons were then interpreted in terms of realpolitik credibility and demonstrations of power. He concluded that: "the propensity to draw lessons from the outcome of one dispute to guide policy-making in the next is especially strong when statesmen find they are engaged in a second and third crisis with the same adversary."[60] President Kennedy's experience of the abortive Bay of Pigs fiasco undoubtedly affected his handling of the missile crisis the

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[58] Vertzberger, "Foreign Policy Decisionmakers," p. 237.

[59] Jay Bergman, "The Perils of Historical Analogy: Leon Trotsky on the French Revolution," *Journal of the History of Ideas* (1987): 73.

[60] Russell J. Leng, "When Will They Ever Learn? Coercive Barganing in Recurrent Crises," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 27, no. 3 (September 1983): 380.

next year. Actual participation in policymaking always has more impact on an individual and his memory of the event than secondary experiences. However, first-hand experience can have an overbearing influence later and produce lessons that are overgeneralized and overused.[61] Individuals use what they have learned, observed and experienced in analogical reasoning although it is uncertain which is most influential or effective. For example, countries rarely appear to learn lessons from other countries' experiences; the U.S. did not learn from France's in Vietnam. It would appear that countries tend to concentrate on what has happened to them relatively recently. However, "there is usually no reason why the recent past will be a better guide than the remote past or why what happened to one's own state will be more informative than what happened to others."[62] U.S. feelings of exceptionalism could perhaps help to explain this.

Decisionmakers early experiences are especially available for analogical use. The early years of political life are the most influential as individuals are at their most impressionable and receptive to new ideas and beliefs.[63] The political issues of this formative period, and the stand taken, often form a belief-system for an individual's subsequent career. Both Presidents Truman and Johnson, to use the example of

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[61] Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, p. 239. Conversely, personal experience can be suppressed and sometimes there is simply no precedent amongst personal experience. Michael Fry, "Introduction," in Michael Fry (ed.), *History, the White House and the Kremlin: Statesmen as Historians* (London: Pinter, 1991), p. 16.

[62] Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, p. 269.

[63] In a biography of Ronald Reagan, Cannon noted that "Reagan's enduring model for presidential performance in times of economic crisis was his first political hero, Franklin D. Roosevelt. The relief program of the New Deal had provided jobs for his father and brother in 1933, earning from Reagan an emotional loyalty that transcended all subsequent philosophical mutations." Lou Cannon, *President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), p. 108.

Korea and Vietnam, had been affected by Munich during their early careers and hence facing up to aggression was a feature of their presidencies.

What Jervis describes as the "generational effect" postulates that if an administration is of the same generation they are likely to be influenced by the same events when reasoning by analogy.[64] Mannheim argued that:

> The fact of belonging to the same class, and that of belonging to the same generation or age group, have this in common, that both endow the individual with a common location in the social and historical processes, and thereby limit them to a specific range of experiences, predisposing them to a certain characteristic mode of thought and experience and a characteristic type of historically relevant action.[65]

The Reagan administration were sentient of World War Two. Reagan, George Shultz and Caspar Weinberger, amongst others, were of that generation and remained aware of the Munich syndrome throughout their careers. For the postwar generation Vietnam is the most available analogy.[66] This theory does not automatically mean that the same generation will have the same interpretation of events or even invoke the same analogy.[67] Decisionmakers have a bank of analogies in their memory, some are common to a generation and others are more individual. However, "we can be

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[64] Such events are typically those that have a lasting impact and captivate public attention and establish a consensus on their meaning. Howard Schuman and Cheryl Rieger, "Historical Analogies, Generational Effects, and Attitudes Toward War," *American Sociological Review* 57 (June 1992): 316.

[65] Ole Holsti and James N. Rosenau, *American Leadership in World Affairs: Vietnam and the Breakdown of Consensus* (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1984), p. 1.

[66] The use of Vietnam as an analogy is complicated by the fact that there is a lack of consensus over what the lessons of Vietnam actually are to start with. See David Fromkin and James Chace, "What Are the Lessons of Vietnam?," *Foreign Affairs* 63 (1985): 594-612.

[67] In a recent study by Schuman and Rieger on the invocation of the Munich and Vietnam analogies in relation to the 1991 Gulf War they found that those participants born before 1945 favoured the Munich analogy 70/30 whereas the post-1945 generation demonstrated a 50/50 split. However, the study concluded that "rather than past experience controlling the present, the present controlled the past, as most of the Americans of all generations came to accept the analogy to World War Two - an analogy that justified massive military action." Schuman and Rieger, "Historical Analogies," p. 325. This is an indication of the influence of present policy preferences; the Bush administration repeatedly used the Munich analogy in public statements.

fairly confident that events exert an independent influence when large numbers of people with a range of characteristics and beliefs all learn the same lessons from an event."[68] Munich is the classic example of this and Vietnam is the very antithesis of it.

Representativeness

Analogies are also retrieved according to their "representativeness." The decisionmaker has to gauge the similarity of the current situation with a specific analogical situation in the memory. In doing this they "look for causes that resemble the explained effect when applying it in its primitive form to the search for causal explanation."[69] In general, decisions are based on beliefs concerning the probability of uncertain events and people rely on a limited number of heuristic[70] principles to reduce the complexity of assessing problems and predicting solutions to simple judgmental operations.[71] Heuristics do not guarantee the discovery of a solution to a problem.

Representativeness is one such heuristic whereby the probabilities are evaluated by the degree to which X represents Y or X resembles Y. Yet, "as the amount of detail in a scenario increases, its probability can only decrease steadily, but its

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[68] Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, p. 249.

[69] Vertzberger, *The World in Their Minds*, p. 144.

[70] Heuristics are "general principles for reducing complex judgment tasks to simpler mental operations by emphasizing some properties of the data and ignoring others. They are informal intuitive procedures that are applied both consciously and thoughtlessly. Heuristics are not necessarily applied consistently, even by the same person to the same type of problem and circumstances." Ibid., p. 144.

[71] Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, "Judgment Under Uncertainty," in Kahneman et al., *Judgment under Uncertainty*, p. 4.

representativeness and hence apparent likelihood may increase."[72] This process helps to explain the influence of surface similarities in the selection and retrieval of analogies. Problems can occur when high degree of representativeness is perceived; this reduces the close examination of the reliability and validity of evidence and increases the level of faith the decisionmaker has in the prediction.[73]

Abstraction

Once an analogy is recognized as possibly useful the next stage is to abstract the general characteristics from it to use in solving the target situation. Abstraction is "the cognitive process whereby an abstract idea or concept is isolated from a number of exemplars."[74] Abstraction can take place at multiple levels of differing generality.[75] Gick and Holyoak used the "radiation problem" and "The General" to demonstrate. The radiation problem presents a doctor with a stomach tumour. An operation is impossible but unless the tumour is removed the patient will die. There are rays that will kill the tumour but they are so intense they will also kill the surrounding tissue. Lower intensity rays will not kill the tissue or the tumour. How might the tumour be destroyed and the patient saved? The General scenario has a small country ruled by a dictator from a stronghold. A rebel leader promises to capture the fortress and assembles his forces along one of the approach roads. However, the road is mined and a large force could not use it simultaneously and a

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[72] Amos Tversky, "Judgments of and by Representativeness," in Kahneman et al., *Judgment Under Uncertainty*, p. 98.

[73] Vertzberger, *The World in Their Minds*, p. 148.

[74] Reber, *The Penguin Dictionary*, p. 3.

[75] Mary L. Gick and Keith J. Holyoak, "Analogical problem solving," *Cognitive Psychology* 12 (1980): 310.

small force would not be enough to overthrow the dictator. How was the dictator to be removed? The solution to both problems is convergence - the division of one force (rays/men) into smaller groups attacking the target simultaneously from different positions.

At a low level of abstraction both stories have a number of corresponding details (a small group of rebels, low intensity rays). At a more abstract level, corresponding details include the overpowering of an object in a region that must be preserved. It is assumed that the decisionmaker's requirement of an analogy determines the selection of the level of abstraction, specific or general. Analogical reasoning implies the comparison of two concepts at the same level of abstraction and Gick and Holyoak suggest that there is an optimal level where an analogy becomes a guide to a solution for a target situation.

The optimal level theory is problematic. Analogies can be complete at one level (general) but not at another (specific). Therefore:

> for use in solving a problem the optimal level of abstraction for representing an analogy may be that which maximizes the degree of correspondence between the two related systems. In many cases a very detailed representation will include dis-analogous relations, while a very abstract representation will omit information about important correspondences.[76]

Thus for the decisionmaker the greater the level of abstraction, the greater the completeness and apparent value of the analogy is. This does occur at the cost of deleting details which do not correspond though. In conclusion, "the optimal level of representation for successful analogical thinking may, typically, lie at an intermediate

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[76] Ibid., p. 314.

level of abstraction, and it may yield an analogy that is less than complete."[77] It seems that such a trade-off is unavoidable.

The concept of schema-induction also contributes to an explanation of how individuals abstract general characteristics from an analogy. Schemas are "a generic concept stored in memory, referring to objects, situations, events, or people. It is a collection of knowledge related to a concept" that "has default values. . . providing a prototype against which specific examples can be compared."[78] Thus the schema for a bird would contain "default values" about colour, size, beak shape and so on.[79] Schemas facilitate the storage and retrieval of information from the long-term memory. Like analogies, schemas "can reduce information processing requirements by focusing attention, economizing on memory storage, providing a basis for extrapolation beyond present information, and enabling decisionmakers to envision a sequence of outcomes to a desired goal."[80] The schema perspective contributes to an understanding of analogical reasoning by suggesting how decisionmakers match current events with past ones and infer that because two separate events are similar in one respect that they will be in another as well.

Schema-induction basically deletes the differences between the base and target situation while preserving similarities.[81] Each individual analogy represents a schema. In the previous example of the radiation problem and The General, the goal of

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[77] Mary L. Gick and Keith J. Holyoak, "Schema induction and analogical transfer," *Cognitive Psychology* 15 (1983): 9.

[78] Deborah Welch Larson, *The Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 44.

[79] Ibid., p. 51.

[80] Bennett, " Theories of Individual," p. 97.

[81] Gick and Holyoak, "Schema induction," p. 8.

overcoming a target is achieved via destroying a tumour and seizing a fortress. In using schemas to abstract similar features the representativeness heuristic of the analogy is crucial; "the similarity of the data at hand to some stored representation of objects and events always has been presumed to be the chief determinant of schema arousal and application."[82] As Khong points out though, schema theorists concede that individuals are tentative in applying a schema to a novel situation when the fit does not seem accurate.[83] Schema-induction increases the probability that a possible analogy will be recognized.

Mapping

Mapping, the final stage of analogical reasoning, aims to create a parallel solution to a new problem by constructing a set of solution propositions that correspond to solution propositions of the original story.[84] Hesse has defined two varieties: horizontal and vertical. Horizontal mapping concerns those aspects of both situations that are similar. Vertical mapping concerns the causal relations which connect elements within one situation.[85] The two forms are inextricably linked.

Due to the fact that analogical reasoning depends on correspondences between a base and target there is good reason to view mapping as the crucial stage. It is best when direct and obvious mapping is possible but this is infrequent; most mapping is incomplete. In such situations the "most useful analogy. . . is the one in which some of the overlapping features of target and base can be causally related to the outcome

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[82] Khong, *Analogies at War*, p. 216.

[83] Ibid., p. 222.

[84] Gick and Holyoak, "Schema induction," p. 314.

[85] Ibid., p. 5.

or behaviour of the base."[86] The analogy therefore provides plausible causal relationships between matched features and outcome. Of course, before any mapping can occur the original analogy must be seen in the same light as the target problem. It is not essential to map all aspects of the base to the target to generate a solution but the causal antecedents of the base outcome must be mappable; if they are not the analogy should be rejected as misleading.[87] This operation is where the bad use of history occurs. Decisionmakers repeatedly prove unable to identify these causal antecedents and hence subsequent mapping of misleading analogies results and the lessons of history that are applied are inappropriate.

The use of surface and structural similarities to identify potential analogies governs which ones are used. While structural features are influential in recognition, surface features are influential in mapping. In theory, decisionmakers should use both types of similarities to recognize analogies but only structural similarities to abstract solutions. It is important to remember that perhaps the central theoretical idea shared by all the major theories of analogical reasoning assume that people strive to achieve some sort of coherence in the mapping they establish between the elements of the source and target analysis.[88] Spellman and Holyoak proffer that this coherency is shaped by certain constraints; structural constraint implies that mappings should be one-to-one.[89] Decisionmakers thus favour unique one-to-one mappings although

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[86] Stephen J. Read, "Analogical Reasoning in Social Judgment: The Importance of Causal Theories," *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 46, no. 1 (1984): 15.

[87] Gick and Holyoak, "Schema induction," p. 6.

[88] Barbara Spellman and Keith J. Holyoak, "If Saddam was Hitler then who was George Bush? Analogical mapping between systems of social roles," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 62, no. 6 (1992): 914.

[89] Ibid., p. 914.

one-to-many are possible. In general, individuals generate mappings that conform with certain basic restraints of coherency.

Even if analogies are nearly complete, the mapping of irrelevant dissimilarities from the base to the target is probably unavoidable. There are three reasons for failing to map a solution with an analogy at hand: unable to apply the analogy even if the effort was made; unable to locate a potentially useful analogy in the memory or unable to notice an analogy relevant to the target problem.[90] It is extremely difficult for a decisionmaker not to map irrelevant features and if mapping from the base to the target is proving troublesome then it is unlikely to produce a target solution. Mapping, the stage where the lessons of the analogy hopefully provide help with the new problem, is far from straightforward and when the foreign policy making process is taken into consideration it is understandable that analogical transfer appears to produce misleading results.

The Problems of Analogies

Decisionmakers continue to [mis]use analogies not only because they are a fundamental cognitive processing method and instinctive, but because they are short-cuts which allow decisionmakers to go beyond the information available to them at any one time. Any mechanism that offers such advantages is almost irresistible; in a crisis situation where time is of the essence and the information available decisive, analogies promise speed and extra information.

Decisionmakers appear to act consistently in relying on the first analogy that comes to mind, often bearing only superficial similarity to the new situation, and fail

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[90] Gick and Holyoak, "Analogical problem solving," p. 316.

to search for other possible analogies. This focus on one analogy occurs possibly because of the complexity of remembering several multiple cause-effect situations. Read adds: "it is only when people do not perceive (or learn) the causal rule that they rely on a single, similar instance."[91] Analogising from one instance is weaker than from several but it seems to be the norm. One particular trap the decisionmaker can fall into in this situation is what Fischer terms the fallacy of the "perfect analogy": "reasoning from a partial resemblance between two entities to an entire and exact correspondence." The problem is that "an analogy, by its very nature, is a similarity between two or more things which are in other respects unlike. A 'perfect analogy' is a contradiction in terms, if perfection is understood. . . to imply identity."[92] Thus, reasoning from a partial resemblance has been transformed into deducing an exact correspondence between X and Y. If there are no dissimilarities then there is no analogy in the first place.[93]

The greater the number of analogies available the less likely it is that one will dominate decisionmakers minds; the range of alternatives are therefore important. Often individuals memory banks do not contain a relevant analogy and even if they do the analogy is not automatically recalled. The constraints of decisionmaking and the dangers of analogical reasoning mean that a detailed search for, and comparison of, other relevant analogies is not always done. As Holyoak and Thagard point out:

> A single analog can seldom provide a complete basis for a decision, but aspects of several analogs can often provide part of the basis for developing a coherent plan. Although analogy-based inferences never guarantee optimal decisions, they

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[91] Stephen J. Read, "Once is Enough: Causal Reasoning from a Single Instance," *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 45, no. 2 (1983): 333.

[92] Fischer, *Historians' Fallacies*, p. 247.

[93] As Stenelo concludes; "Analogy exists somewhere between the extremes of absolute identity and total difference." Stenelo, *Foreign Policy Predictions*, p. 110.

derive the strongest possible justification when multiple source analogs are mapped to the target.[94]

Decisionmakers rely on a small number of examples that are generally consistent and confirmatory rather than inconsistent ones.[95] Cognitive psychology describes this as cognitive dissonance. This theory contends that individuals' knowledge, beliefs, behaviour and so on, emphasize consistency; inconsistencies are therefore psychologically worrying and will motivate the individual to minimize dissonance and also to consciously avoid situations and information which is likely to increase dissonance.[96] An analogy may initially appear appropriate and decisionmakers feel it is authoritative and decrease their sensitivity to subsequent information that contradicts the analogy. A reservoir of analogies can be biased in such a way and therefore conclusions reached can lack validity and be misleading.

Retaining beliefs and the value of an analogy and ignoring contradictions produces faulty diagnoses and faulty policies. This phenomenon is "perseverance": incoming information is compared with/fitted into a schema and information that does not fit is ignored or not given the weight it merits.[97] Decisionmakers can rationalise away contradictions or dissimilarities:

> a poor fit between the past situation and the case in hand does not automatically lead to the analogy being dropped because the situation in hand can be manipulated until its structural features more closely resemble the past situation, thereby

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[94] Holyoak and Thagard, *Mental Leaps*, p. 146. On a similar theme, Houghton proffers that analogies are always used, even when there is no obvious analogy for the current situation. Policymakers "may use partial analogies, and may 'mix and match' these, drawing on different precedents at different stages as if each constituted a different piece in a jigsaw puzzle." David Patrick Houghton, "The Role of Analogical Reasoning in Novel Foreign Policy Situations," paper presented at the 1994 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, September 1-4, 1994, p. 4.

[95] Vertzberger, "Foreign Policy Decisionmakers, p. 240.

[96] Leon Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* (London: Tavistock, 1957), p. 3.

[97] Khong, *Analogies at War*, p. 37.

rendering the analogy 'operative.'[98]

The "false consensus" perseverance creates leads decisionmakers "to see their own behavioral choices and judgments as relatively common and appropriate to existing circumstances while viewing alternate responses as uncommon, deviant, and inappropriate."[99] Even when evidence totally discrediting a person's beliefs is presented, these beliefs may not change. Two groups of students were each given 30 suicide notes and asked to identify the genuine ones. One group were told they had done well and identified approximately 70 percent and the other group were told they had performed poorly and only identified 30 percent. The first group thus felt confident about their abilities and the second group did not. Before being handed a second series of notes both groups were told that the first set were all false. However, researchers found that when questioning the students they still felt either confident or not in their ability to distinguish between true and false, depending on which group they had been in. The basis for their beliefs had been completely discredited yet they still retained those beliefs to a surprising extent.

It is unsurprising that the use of analogies has been associated with below par policy decisions. The proclivity to see causes as dramatic as the outcomes leads decisionmakers to assume the most salient aspects of the results were caused by the most salient aspects of the preceding event. The apparently unimportant aspects are discarded without considering if they may be relevant to the current situation.

Analysis of a past event also encounters another problem:

> People pay more attention to *what* has happened than to *why* it has happened. Thus learning is superficial, overgeneralized, and based on post hoc ergo propter

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[98] Houghton, "The Role of Analogical Reasoning," p. 35.

[99] Lee Ross, "The Perseverance of Beliefs," in Kahneman et al., *Judgment Under Uncertainty*, p. 140.

> hoc reasoning. As a result the lessons learned will be applied to a wide variety of situations without a careful effort to determine whether the cases are similar on crucial dimensions.[100]

Even when notice is taken of why a particular event occurred, decisionmakers' explanations tend to be overly deterministic; Munich is the classic example. For the U.S., Munich demonstrated that appeasement led to war. As Kuklick comments, invoking Munich was almost a "sacred act" and "[t]hat Munich led to war was a dogma believed by all those who had been initiated in the practice of diplomacy and its explication was almost ritualistic in its defence of policy."[101] From this interpretation of Munich, reinforced by the experience of World War Two and Korea, the U.S. formed a set of general political assumptions: the world was bipolar, Communism was inherently aggressive and desired world domination, local conflicts were Soviet-inspired and appeasement and compromise were ineffective and invited disaster.[102] The obvious problem is that it is far from clear that had Hitler been stood up to at Munich that he would have been deterred and war avoided.[103]

Decisionmakers rarely examine closely the causes and do not search for other examples; analogies actually become a substitute for thorough analysis:

> the choice of historical analogy often occurs before rather than after the analysis that might reveal its validity and premature fixation on a particular historical precedent can attentuate, or even eliminate, the search and analysis activities that are necessary to determine which past episodes, if any, might be appropriate.[104]

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[100] Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, p. 228. Emphasis in original.

[101] Bruce Kuklick, "Tradition and Diplomatic Talent: The Case of the Cold Warriors," in Leila Zenderland (ed.), *Recycling the Past: Popular Uses of American History* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1978), p. 125.

[102] Rystad, *Prisoners of the Past*, p. 44.

[103] See Gerhard Weinberg, "Munich After Fifty Years," *Foreign Affairs* 67 (1988): 165-78 and Robert J. Beck, "Munich's Lessons Reconsidered," *International Security* 14 (1989): 161-91.

[104] Holsti and Rosenau, *American Leadership*, p. 9.

The cognitive allure of analogies would indicate that analogical reasoning will continue to be invoked in a plethora of situations without real consideration of their appropriateness. The use of analogies as self-evidence occurs because:

> the only way to prove the appropriateness of an analogy would be an exhaustive description of both objects being compared. But it is precisely to avoid this onerous task that the analogy is introduced in the first place. We compare something problematic with something familiar. . . this does not require exhaustive description. For this reason, an analogical argument cannot prove anything.[105]

Analogies can only act as a useful tool to understand history as an auxiliary. As Fischer warns, "so successful are analogies in creating the illusion of sense and certainty that they are widely used as a method of proof in their own right."[106] Analogies can suggest plenty but ultimately prove nothing.

Additionally, analogies are frequently used to predict and provide prescription for the future rather than analyze the present. When decisionmakers use analogies to predict, the process often conveys an unconscious hope of advancing the realization of the prediction.[107] The problem is that using analogies to devise a prediction presents a use for which the facts are not available, making the entire exercise untestable and inconclusive.

Individual Beliefs

Belief-systems are central in searching for, storing and interpreting information relevant to a particular situation. Alexander George's influential development of

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[105] Zashin and Chapman, "The Use of Metaphor and Analogy," p. 313.

[106] Fischer, *Historians' Fallacies*, p. 256.

[107] Carr, *What is History?* p. 65. For a detailed description of predictions see Stenelo, *Foriegn Policy Predictions.*

Leites' concept of an "operational code"[108] was based on the significance of decisionmakers beliefs. George argued that beliefs are:

> a prism that influences the actor's perceptions and diagnoses of the flow of political events, his definitions and estimates of particular situations. These beliefs also provide norms, standards, and guidelines that influence the actor's choice of strategy and tactics, his structuring and weighing of alternative courses of action.[109]

Cognitive constraints on information processing make it impossible for an individual to act with objective rationality and hence these belief-systems tend to shape incoming information into existing structures, making it harder to recognize and cope with change.[110]

With no prior knowledge or preconceptions, understanding events would require more time and effort and the outcome would be inaccurate. Prior beliefs are therefore central: "an inevitable consequence of our willingness to process evidence in light of our prior beliefs is the tendency to perceive more support for those beliefs than actually exists in the evidence at hand."[111] Ross et al. describe this as "confirmation biases."[112] They contest that confirmatory evidence is taken at face value but discrepant evidence is examined skeptically; processed evidence therefore sustains

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[108] George defined the Operational Code as: "a set of beliefs about fundamental issues of history and central questions of politics as these bear, in turn, on the problem of action." Alexander L. George, "The 'Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decison-Making," *International Studies Quarterly* 13 (1969): 191. George simplified and refined the "operational code" that had been pioneered by Nathan Leites in *A Study of Bolshevism* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1953) by formulating two sets of five questions and applying them to decisionmakers philosophical and instrumental beliefs to discover how individuals' belief systems are related to, and determine, policy choices.

[109] George, "The 'Operational Code'," p. 191.

[110] Holsti and Rosenau, *American Leadership*, p. 180.

[111] Ross, "The Perseverance of Beliefs," p. 149.

[112] Craig A. Anderson, M. Lepper and Lee Ross, "Perseverance and Social Theories: The Role of Explanation in the Persistence of Discredited Information," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 39 (1980): 1038.

prior beliefs. Biased searching, recalling and assimilation supports beliefs even when faced with contradictory new data.[113] This vicious circle helps to explain the repeated use of an analogy.

Values and beliefs formed by an earlier event are carried through into later situations. President Truman's memories of Munich and his firm belief that history teaches lessons demonstrated the phenomenon that "those who believe that history repeats itself will aim to repeat the past, by learning history's lessons and reliving them. This makes it look as though history, indeed does repeat itself, encouraging more people to act the same."[114] The Bolsheviks believed that history repeated itself and remembered that the French Revolution produced a Napoleon and therefore mistrusted Trotsky because he was the most similar to Napoleon and trusted Stalin because he was the least similar. However, as Carr points out, it is possible that historically conscious people involved in two similar situations remember the outcome of the first and their actions are affected by that knowledge, for better or worse.[115] This outlook leads perhaps to unconscious learning, pressure to apply lessons to every situation and an unawareness of this trend.

The Political Environment

The lack of historiographical consensus in U.S. foreign policy since 1945 and the present division over what the real lessons of Vietnam are, has not provided a firm basis from which to draw analogies: "the ambiguity of the policy environment can

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[113] Ross, "The Perseverance of Beliefs," p. 150. Confirmation bias theory is obviously interrelated with cognitive dissonance and cognitive consistency theory.

[114] Vertzberger, "Foreign Policy Decisionmakers," p. 243.

[115] Edward Carr, *What is History?* (London: Macmillan, 1962), p. 37.

erode the clarity of even the most precise historical analogy."[116] Decisionmakers often know and associate with others who share the same generation, background, experiences, interests, beliefs and so on. Ross et al. term this "selective-exposure" to like-minded people:

> such people do, in disproportionate numbers, respond as we would in a wide variety of circumstances. Indeed, our close association is determined, in part, by feelings of general consensus, and we may be inclined to avoid those whom we believe unlikely to share our judgments and responses.[117]

This situation does not make mistakes or bad policy inevitable but it underlines how certain analogies can dominate while others are ignored.

The typically small, hierarchical foreign policy decisionmaking group arrangement also influences analogical reasoning. Within this situation such factors as personal considerations, career prospects for example, domestic politics, bureaucratic interests and so on all have an influence.[118]

Another aspect linked to this is what Irving Janis identified as "groupthink." This is a "mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members' strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action."[119] History can produce a consensus among decisionmakers by activating the same historical memory and similar interpretations and therefore promote groupthink.

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[116] Richard Melanson, *Writing History and Making Policy: The Cold War, Vietnam, and Revisionism* (New York: University Press of America, 1983), p. 225.

[117] Ross, "The Perseverance of Beliefs," p. 143.

[118] As Houghton suggests, "the most persuasive analogies appear to be those which promise not only *policy* success, but *political* success as well." Emphasis in original. Houghton, "The Role of Analogical Reasoning," p. 38.

[119] Irving Janis, *Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign Policy Decisions and Fiascoes* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972), p. 9.

Not All Bad

Having examined the cognitive process of analogical reasoning and detailing the potential dangers of using analogies, it would be easy to conclude that the employment of historical analogies by foreign policy decisionmakers is an accident waiting to happen and should be avoided at all costs. Psychological theories propose that there are irresistible cognitive reasons for individuals to use analogies to process information and understand their environment that prevent this. Despite this, there are good reasons to use analogies.

The all-important definition of the situation stage marks the point at which competing options are selected or rejected. Analogies help eliminate options and narrow down the range of alternatives requiring further consideration, thus reducing the complexity of the situation for the decisionmaker. Simultaneously, analogies can promote a particular option. This is especially helpful in crisis situations where time is short and information ambiguous. As Vertzberger summarises, analogies:

> help in cognitive economization, provide illustrations and a sense of direction, structure argumentation, and help clarify ideas. However, their main contribution to decisionmaking tasks lies in their power to stimulate thought by pointing to potentially relevant factors, variables and causes for the diagnosis and prognosis of current events.'[120]

In their justificatory role, especially to the public, analogies are powerful tools; they "can brilliantly reinforce a reasoned argument. . . suggest and persuade, inform and illustrate, communicate and clarify."[121] Historical analogies also provide an important sense of perspective and proportion to current situations.

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[120] Vertzberger, "Foreign Policy Decisionmakers," p. 243.

[121] Fischer, *Historians' Fallacies*, p. 244.

Conclusion

As we have seen, analogical reasoning is a three stage process: recognition and retrieval from the memory of an analogy relevant to the current problem to act as a base; the abstraction of the relevant properties of the analogy to be used and, finally, the mapping of the solution structure to the target to construct inferences about that target. The difficulties of this process have given analogies a bad reputation as misleading rather than helpful.

Unsurprisingly, it is the negative aspects that have attracted attention. Most critics agree that Santyana's maxim that "those who forget history are condemned to repeat it," should be reversed to read "those who do not forget the past can be led to misapply it."[122] The fundamental assumption behind analogies is that history not only contains lessons but will readily reveal them. The compelling desire to use them can prove restrictive; "on occasion they may exert such control on imagination and debate that they effectively exclude all other possibilities."[123]

In conclusion, it is a catch-22 dilemma: analogies are difficult to use and frequently mislead so in theory better analogical reasoning would result in better policy. However, analogical reasoning is a psychological process and difficult to alter.[124] In this case it would seem that analogies will always be used as an inescapable feature of human decisionmaking.

This study will now progress to examine the influence of historical analogies upon U.S. foreign policymakers in terms of U.S.-Grenadian relations between 1979 and

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[122] Gilovich, "Seeing the Past in the Present," p. 808.

[123] Mefford, "Analogical Reasoning," p. 239.

[124] Khong, *Analogies at War*, p. 255.

1983, concentrating primarily on the decision to use military force by Washington in October 1983. Firstly, a brief account of the U.S.' history of interventionism in the Caribbean is provided to examine the important role of historical analogies in previous intervention decisions.

U.S. Interventionism in the Caribbean Basin

As early as 1823 the U.S. proclaimed the importance of Latin America to the U.S. President James Monroe announced that: "We should consider any attempt on their (Europe) part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and security."[125] As Maingot observes, this Monroe Doctrine marked the "earliest rumblings of incipient hegemony."[126] In 1904 President Theodore Roosevelt added a corollary to the Monroe Doctrine:

> Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power.[127]

Victory in the 1898 Spanish-American War had seen the U.S. acquire, almost overnight, a global empire stretching from Cuba to the Philippines. The U.S. was now an imperial power in the Caribbean although she preferred to think of it euphemistically as "beneficial imperialism" rather than the economic exploitationism of European imperialism.

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[125] Graham H. Stuart and James L. Tigner, *Latin America and the United States* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1975), p. 2.

[126] Anthony P. Maingot, *The United States and the Caribbean* (London: Macmillan, 1994), p. 15.

[127] Walter LaFeber, *The American Age: United States Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad since 1750* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1989), p. 232.

In 1898 the U.S. had no real historical memories on which to draw for the full-scale interventions she would undertake in the Caribbean. Between 1898 and 1933 intervention was the zeitgeist of the U.S.' Caribbean policy: interventions in Cuba (1906-09), Nicaragua (1912 and 1927-33), Mexico (1914), Haiti (1915-34) and the Dominican Republic (1916-24) totalled over 50 years of occupation. A variety of methods were employed: overt military intervention and occupation, gunboat diplomacy, surrogate troops, customs control, economic sanctions, treaties, supervised elections and so on. Justifications for these actions remained fairly consistent: humanitarianism, economic interests, the Monroe Doctrine, treaty obligations, the protection of nationals and property and the promotion of democracy.

The occupation governments in Cuba and the Philippines were the first appropriate analogies available. Throughout the succession of interventions, analogies advocated intervention and occupation as necessary to achieve the desired results. Instead of providing specific lessons analogies were used cumulatively to develop models for occupying countries. Experience led the U.S. to learn how run an occupationary government: seizing customhouses, running receiverships, promoting favoured election candidates, supervising elections with marines, fighting anti-guerrilla campaigns and so on. Fundamentally:

> the same purposes inspired the policy of successive administrations. . . The methods used in attempting to achieve them varied from one administration to another, but more because of accumulating experience and increasing involvement than because of any differences in the ultimate goals.[128]

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[128] Dana G. Munro, *Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900-1921* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1964), p. 531.

Ultimately, though, the U.S. failed to learn from their experiences that lasting solutions could not be imposed on Latin America. Interventions were unpopular and more often than not increased opposition to the U.S. Under President Franklin Roosevelt's Good Neighbour Policy unilateral intervention was eschewed in favour of collective security measures to exclude extra-hemispheric powers. The simultaneous resort to supporting National Guards and dictators, such as General Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua and General Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, can be seen either as a failure by the U.S. to learn from their experiences or as the learning of the wrong lessons.

The advent of the Cold War produced a sense of Soviet threat to the Hemisphere, reminiscent of the "Red-Scare" of the 1920s and Washington's apprehension about Soviet intentions in Mexico, and changed the U.S.' approach to Latin America from a regional perspective to a global one. Events in Europe and Southeast Asia convinced the U.S. that the Soviet Union was set on world domination; the Third World was incorporated into the bipolar power system and any unrest there must be Soviet-sponsored and had to opposed. The first example of this in the Caribbean was Guatemala in 1954.

Guatemala's President Jacobo Arbenz had pursued a progressive policy of modernisation. Washington came to the conclusion that Arbenz was a Communist based on his political connections to Communist leaders in labour organisations, the Communists in his government's bureaucracy, his reforms[129] and pro-Soviet line in the United Nations.

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[129] The most significant of these reform was the Agrarian Land Bill which expropriated land from the landowning oligarchy and foreign companies and redistributed it amongst the rural poor to promote their participation and organisation in the transfer of power. James Handy, "The Most Precious Fruit of the Revolution: The Guatemalan Agrarian Land Reform, 1952-54," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 68, no. 4 (November 1988): 705. In Guatemala the American United

The Munich and "loss of China" analogies advocated swift and decisive action. The form of action was influenced by the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) successful destabilisation of the Mossadeq regime in Iran in 1953. The Iran analogy was almost irresistible: it involved many of the same people, was recent, available and, most importantly, successful. The analogy suggested a covert operation and also predicted that success would produce a pro-U.S. regime.

The CIA designed an operation that relied on psychological demoralisation and political destabilisation. An exiled Guatemalan Colonel, Carlos Castillo Armas, was chosen to lead a "ragtag" force of about 150 exiles and mercenaries into Guatemala, stopping just inside the border.[130] The idea was:

> to create and maintain for a short time the impression of very substantial military strength. Through air support and massive use of radio broadcasting, the CIA was working to support the impression of Castillo Armas's strength as well as to spread the impression of the regime's weakness.[131]

The plan worked; Arbenz assumed that this was the vanguard of a full-scale intervention and resigned soon after.

The axiom that "nothing succeeds like success" is apposite. Both Iran and Guatemala were destined to be used as analogies. Both analogies increased

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Fruit Company (UFCO) owned 42 percent of the country's land, 80 percent of which was expropriated. When Arbenz offered two million dollars in compensation, based on the land's taxable value, UFCO refused and demanded 16 million dollars. Central America had long been considered by the U.S. as the preserve of U.S. companies and that the region should be kept safe for their business; "In the past UFCO and its sister companies had bribed politicians, pressured governments and intimidated opponents to gain extremely favorable concessions. To the Guatemalans it appeared that their country was being mercilessly exploited by foreign interests which took huge profits without making any significant contributions to the nation's welfare." Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala*, 1983 ed. (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1983), p. 73.

[130] Richard Immerman, "Guatemala as Cold War History," *Political Science Quarterly* 95, no. 4 (Winter 1980-81): 642.

[131] Stephen J. Rabe, "The Caribbean Triangle: Betancourt, Castro, and Trujillo and U.S. Foreign Policy," *Diplomatic History* 20, no. 1 (Winter 1996): 93.

policymakers complacency and ensured there would be no policy change or detailed analysis of either operation.

The Guatemala analogy was evident in the 1961 Bay of Pigs fiasco in Cuba. Washington approached Fidel Castro as they had Arbenz: initial recognition and willingness to support moderate reforms. When Castro also passed an Agrarian Reform Law, nationalised foreign property, expelled moderates from his government and developed popular support by identifying with the working-class and well-organised Communist party, Washington concluded that Castro was a Communist and compromise with Cuba useless.

The Guatemala analogy suggested that the gradual imposition of a trade embargo would be ineffective so President Eisenhower's first move was overt economic pressure.[132] Additionally, the analogy suggested that economic pressure alone was not necessarily enough to topple a regime. Military pressure was also needed. The analogy promoted a covert military solution.

By January 1960 President Eisenhower had decided that it was time to "really do something about Castro."[133] The CIA designed an operation whereby 1400 Cuban exiles would make a surprise amphibious landing at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba and establish a beachhead, the exiles' planes would destroy Castro's airforce and communications, CIA radio would create an atmosphere of uncertainty and confusion, Castro would panic, lose support and widespread unrest would produce a

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[132] Hybel, *How Leaders Reason*, p. 95.

[133] Lucien S. Vandenbroucke, Perilous Options: Special Operations As An Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 11.

coup.[134] The operation proved to be a "perfect failure" in practice; the exile force were captured within two days.[135]

The success in Guatemala was bound to influence the CIA. Once again, many of the same personnel were involved in the planning of both operations. Guatemala was often referred to as "the successful practice run."[136] Cuba was not Guatemala. In Guatemala the exile force was not designed to remove Arbenz but to convince the Guatemalan military that if Arbenz was defeated a U.S. intervention would follow. Thus a military coup removed Arbenz not the intervention. Castro had realised Arbenz's mistake and abolished the old Cuban army and established a new loyal one with some 40,000 members.[137] Castro had also fought a guerrilla war and was unlikely to flee like Arbenz had.

Guatemala had instilled a dangerous sense of overconfidence in the CIA, a "can do" feeling of omnipotence. As Gleijeses concludes, Guatemala:

> was a psychological operation that needed only a minimal paramilitary component - the "spark"; the Bay of Pigs was, or should have been a military operation If the CIA had paused to reflect on the former, they would have recoiled from the latter. Instead, the agency wallowed in euphoria.[138]

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[134] Lloyd S. Etheredge, *Can Governments Learn? American Foreign Policy and Central American Revolutions* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1985), p. 12.

[135] For more details on the Bay of Pigs see also: Peter Wyden, *Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1979), John Prados, *Presidents' Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations from World War Two Through Iranscam* (New York: Quill William Morrow, 1986) and Trumbull Higgins, *The Perfect Failure: Kennedy, Eisenhower, and the CIA at the Bay of Pigs* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co. 1987).

[136] Maingot, *The United States and the Caribbean*, p. 102.

[137] Lucien S. Vandenbroucke, "Anatomy of a Failure: The Decision to Land at the Bay of Pigs," *Political Science Quarterly* 99, no. 3 (Fall 1984): 473.

[138] Piero Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).

Consequently, the lessons of Guatemala, and Iran for that matter, were based on "perceptual distortions and misinterpretations."[139] The lack of intelligence on conditions in Cuba meant that Washington was unaware that an exile intervention was never likely to trigger an uprising and that there was no widespread opposition to Castro. Such a lack of information made analogies an irresistible method of reasoning.

The final use of force in the Caribbean prior to Grenada was in the Dominican Republic in 1965. Once again analogical reasoning was in evidence. Indeed, most studies of the intervention concur with Lowenthal's conclusion that "the aim of preventing 'another Cuba' shaped American policy toward the Dominican Republic at every stage after Trujillo's death in 1961."[140]

After the Cuban revolution the U.S. concluded that right-wing dictatorships conceivably stimulated revolution rather than precluding it. An analogy was with Cuba was apparent: "Batista is to Castro as Trujillo is to X. But who would X be?"[141] Fearing a "domino effect of Castro-like governments" in the region, the U.S. State Department advocated a military intervention to "prevent a Castro-type government or one sympathetic to Castro."[142] Action was rendered unnecessary when Dominican dissidents assassinated Trujillo in May 1960. The U.S. supported

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[139] Martha Cottam, *Images and Intervention: U.S. Policies in Latin America* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1994), p. 44.

[140] Abraham F. Lowenthal, *The Dominican Intervention*, Johns Hopkins ed. (Baltimore, N.J.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), p. 26.

[141] Piero Gleijeses, *The Dominican Crisis* (Baltimore, N.J.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), p. 34.

[142] Rabe, "The Caribbean Triangle," p. 64.

the seven man Council of State that came to power until elections could be held in December 1962.

The election was won by the lower-class Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD) candidate Juan Bosch. The U.S. soon became disenchanted with Bosch: land reforms and nationalisations harmful to U.S. business interests promoted obvious analogies with Guatemala and Cuba. Bosch's pro-civil liberties policies prompted Washington to conclude that Bosch tolerated Communists and was unwilling to suppress them. Bosch was unseated by a military coup in September 1963.

Washington decided that as Bosch had allowed Communism to return any government that removed him should be supported. However, the unelected junta, headed by Donald Reid Cabral, was deeply unpopular.[143] The Constitutionalists[144] launched a countercoup. The initial unrest was contained by Reid but when he failed to secure U.S. support he resigned. The Constitutionalists announced a provisional government until Bosch's return. Now the Loyalists'[145] forces hit back.

Washington had badly misjudged the situation and found it hard to tell which group had the upper hand; the basic fear was that the Communists within the Constitutionalists group would gain control. The U.S. embassy in the Dominican Republic reported that:

> All indications point to the fact that, if present efforts of forces loyal to the government fail, power will be assumed by groups clearly identified with the Communist party. If the situation described above comes to pass. . . we should intervene to prevent another Cuba from arising out of the ashes of this uncontrol-

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[143] The CIA estimated that only five percent of Dominicans supported the junta. Lester D. Langley, *The United States and the Caribbean in the Twentieth Century* (Athens, Ga.: University of Georgia Press, 1989), p. 237.

[144] This group was composed of a mixture of PRD and military officers.

[145] This group was composed of anti-Bosch military officers.

lable situation.[146]

On April 28, 1965, the first contingent of 23,000 U.S. troops arrived in Santo Domingo; President Johnson explained that this was necessary to "save the lives of our citizens, to save the lives of all our people. . . [and] to help prevent another Communist state in the hemisphere."[147]

The Communists were only ever a weak minority presence amongst the Constitutionalists but as the Secretary of State at the time, Dean Rusk, admitted, Washington had learnt from Cuba that: "a small but highly disciplined group could seize power in the midst of confusion and have a political influence far beyond their numbers."[148] Another lesson was that "the only way to prevent such an occurrence was for the U.S. to take swift unilateral action should a Communist takeover of another Latin American country seem likely."[149] Indeed, Washington perceived two simple options: "the choice is: Castro in the Dominican Republic or U.S. intervention."[150]

The Cuba analogy was dominant: it was a major, recent, negative event which was very available as a base. The Bay of Pigs episode had discredited the Guatemala analogy's recommendation of covert action but not the suggestion that the cause of the unrest was Communist subversion.

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[146] Daniel I. Papermaster, "A Case Study of the Effects of International Law on Foreign Policy Decisionmaking: The United States Intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965," *Texas International Law Journal* 24 (1989): 483.

[147] Jenny Pearce, *Under the Eagle: U.S. Interventionism in Central America and the Caribbean* (London: Latin America Bureau, 1982), p. 64.

[148] Dean Rusk, *As I Saw It* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1990), p. 372.

[149] Gordon Connell-Smith, *The United States and Latin America: An Historical Analysis of Inter-American Relations* (London: Heinemann Education Books, 1974), p. 241.

[150] Papermaster, "A Case Study," p. 482.

Analogies had defined and advocated firm action, the type of action, the result of inaction and the likely result of action in each case: Guatemala, the Bay of Pigs and the Dominican Republic. This study will now proceed to examine the influence of analogies in the case of Grenada.

CHAPTER 2

U.S.-GRENADIAN RELATIONS: THE CARTER YEARS (1979-1981)

In this chapter I will examine the development of U.S.-Grenadian relations from the March 13, 1979, Grenadian revolution until the end of the Carter administration in January 1981. The antecedents of the revolution in post World War Two Grenadian politics under the corrupt, repressive and autocratic regime of Eric Gairy are traced, along with the rise of the NJM who eventually overthrew Gairy. This chapter will study the U.S.' initial optimism about good relations and the subsequent deterioration of relations and the policy of "distancing" that Washington adopted. U.S.-Grenadian relations during this period set the pattern for future years.

The Rise and Fall of Eric Gairy

Between 1951 and 1979 Eric Gairy dominated Grenadian politics. He had become involved in trade unionism in Aruba whilst working as a clerk in the oilfields. At the time of his return to Grenada in 1950 the island consisted of a small, white upper-class, a small mulatto middle-class and the majority black working-class. Maldistribution of land was one of the main grievances of the majority of Grenadians: 98 percent of the farmers owned 53 percent of the land and 1.45 percent owned 44.68 percent of the land.[1] Gairy took up the cause of some evicted worker-tenants and won sizable compensation from the landowner.

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[1] Tony Thorndike, *Grenada: Politics, Economics and Society* (London: Frances Pinter, 1985), p. 30.

Realising that the support of a trade union expedited the route to power Gairy registered the Grenada Manual and Mental Workers Union (GMMWU) in July 1950. When negotiations over a 50 percent wage rise for sugar workers failed Gairy organized Grenada's first ever General Strike for February 19, 1951.[2] After leading a demonstration to Parliament to demand an audience with the Governor, Gairy was arrested and exiled to Carriacou.[3] Rioting ensued, only subsiding when Gairy was released two weeks later.

The unrest occurred just a few months before the introduction of universal suffrage. Gairy seized the opportunity to exploit his popularity and established the Grenada People's Party (GPP) and in the 1951 election won seven of the eight seats on the Legislative Council with 71 percent of the vote.[4] The GMMWU was Gairy's vehicle to power and once there his true colours began to show. In the 1954 elections Gairy's party, now changed to the Grenada United Labour Party (GULP), won six of the eight seats but received only 46 percent of the vote. His increasing divorce from the interests of the people was evident; of the 83 laws passed by the 1954 government only one really concerned working-class interests.[5] GULP subsequently lost the 1957 election, gaining only two seats and 44 percent of the vote. In October 1957 Gairy was disfranchised for five years for marching a steel band through an opponent's political meeting. Assuming the status of a martyr he remained popular

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[2] Approximately 5,000 agricultural workers and 1,500 public workers participated. Thorndike, *Grenada*, p. 33.

[3] Carriacou is the main island in the Grenadian-administered part of the neighbouring Grenadines chain.

[4] Brian Meeks, *Caribbean Revolutions and Revolutionary Theory: An Assessment of Cuba, Nicaragua and Grenada* (London: Macmillan Press, 1993), p. 137.

[5] David E. Lewis, *Reform and Revolution in Grenada: 1950 to 1981* (Havana, Cuba: Casa De Las Americas, 1983), p. 33.

with the working-class as a charismatic, messianic leader of the same colour and beliefs as them; a "People's Champion." Singham characterized Gairy as the "hero" amongst the "crowd" - "the hero does not have a genuine mass party; he has supporters who are personally committed to following him but who are not controlled by him."[6]

GULP won the 1961 elections but in 1962 a Commission of Inquiry into the Control of Public Expenditure dismissed the government for corruption and financial irregularities, an episode that became known as "squandermania."[7] The 1962 election was dominated by the demise of the West Indian Federation. The opposition advocated union with Trinidad and Tobago but Gairy remained equivocal on the subject. GULP subsequently lost the election gaining only four seats and 46 percent of the vote.[8] The opposition government did little to appease the Grenadians concerns and GULP won the 1967 election.

Between 1951-67 Gairy had become the most powerful trade union leader, fought the Colonial Office, businesses and the civil service and improved the position of the masses. However, he had simultaneously presided over violent strikes, been disfranchised and had his government dismissed. Consequently, "by 1967 when Gairy had returned to political office he was certainly the most controversial personality, positively the most loved and most hated individual on the island."[9]

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[6] Aaron Segal, "Background to Grenada: When the Social Scientists Invaded," *Caribbean Review* XII (December 1983): 42.

[7] Tony Thorndike, "Grenada: Maxi-Crisis for Mini-State," *The World Today* 30 (October 1974): 440.

[8] Thorndike, *Grenada*, p. 38.

[9] D. Sinclair Dabreo, *The Grenada Revolution* (Castries, St. Lucia: Management and Publicity Services Publication, 1979), p. 50.

In 1967 Grenada attained Associated Statehood status. Great Britain were now only responsible for Grenada's defence and foreign affairs. Working-class support for Gairy now began to wane as he sought to distance himself from the masses politically and socially, using Government as a tool of personal power for self-aggrandizement.

By 1970 the Black Power movement had become a visible force in several Caribbean nations politics. In early 1970 in Trinidad and Tobago, Black Power was evident in a series of nationwide protests which acted as a catalyst for an abortive coup by the army.[10] Concerned about the possibility of links to the Black Power movement from Grenada, there was a relatively large Grenadian emigrant community in Trinidad and Tobago, Gairy announced that:

> It is said that when your neighbour's house is on fire, keep on wetting your own house. We are now doubling the strength of our Police forces, we are getting in almost unlimited supplies of new and modern equipment.[11]

It was at this time that the "police aides" (the Mongoose Gang) were established. In November 1970 a nurses strike was forcibly broken up and Gairy announced the formation of a Night Ambush Squad and Special Secret Police Force. Other security measures included an Emergency Powers Act allowing the police to search opposition houses and the Public Order Amendment Act which restricted anti-government demonstrations.[12] Harassment, intimidation and terror were regularly employed to deter opposition to the government.

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[10] Paul Sutton, "Black Power in Trinidad and Tobago: The Crisis of 1970," *The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* XXI, no. 2 (July 1983): 115.

[11] Kai P. Schoenhals and Richard Melanson, *Revolution and Intervention in Grenada: The New Jewel Movement, the United States, and the Caribbean* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985), p. 24.

[12] Ewart Archer, "Gairyism, Revolution and Reorganization: Three Decades of Turbulence in Grenada," *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* XXIII, no. 2 (July 1985): 96.

The majority of Grenadians did not appear keen on Independence but Gairy was resolute.[13] The GNP opposed independence on the grounds of economic viability and the prospect of an even more powerful Gairy and his secret gangs.[14] Predictably GULP won the 1972 election and 13 of the 15 seats via "a combination of vote rigging, gerrymandering, the use of patronage and genuine support among the rural poor who were still identifying more with 'Uncle Gairy' than the elitist Grenada National Party."[15] Unrest pervaded 1973. On November 18 that year the six main figures in the NJM were badly beaten by police and arrested in what became known as "Bloody Sunday." Opposition to Gairy now traversed all sections of society; a nonpartisan Committee of 22 was formed which included the Church, businesses and trade unions, advocating strikes and demonstrations.[16] The Committee ended their action when Gairy agreed to establish a Commission of Inquiry under Sir Herbert Duffus and promised to disarm and disband his "aides." Gairy later suspended the commission until after independence.

By January 1974 Grenada was gripped by a General Strike; Gairy had run out of money to pay the civil service and police, taxes went uncollected and fuel and food ran low. He was only saved by Britain's decision to advance Grenada £100,000 on a

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[13] Usually if an Associated State wanted independence the government would have to gain a two-thirds majority in a referendum on the subject. However, in response to his inquiries, Britain informed Gairy that if he won the 1972 election on the issue Grenada's case would be considered understandingly. The GNP were informed rather than consulted about this arrangement two weeks before the election. Anthony Payne, Paul Sutton and Tony Thorndike, *Grenada : Revolution and Invasion* (London: St. Martin's Press, 1984), p. 11.

[14] Thorndike, "Maxi-Crisis," p. 440.

[15] Schoenhals and Melanson, *Revolution and Intervention*, p. 25.

[16] Ken I. Boodhoo, "Violence and Militarization in the Eastern Caribbean: Grenada," in Alma H. Young and Dion E. Phillips (eds.), *Militarization in the Non-Hispanic Caribbean* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1986), p. 71.

£2.25 million loan and $2 million (Eastern Caribbean dollars) from Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana and Jamaica.[17] On February 7, 1974, Grenada became independent and Gairy's power was absolute.

The 1973-4 unrest had reduced Gross National Product by 33 percent and the economy never recovered. Unemployment settled at 50 percent and the national debt reached $60 million (Eastern Caribbean dollars).[18] Money from the then European Economic Community (EEC), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and CARICOM soon dried up, affected by Gairy's corruption, repressive rule, advocation of a United Nations (UN) agency to study unidentified flying objects and his relations with countries like Chile. In the 1976 election GULP won 9 of the 15 seats with 52 percent of the vote but had relied on paternalism, coercion and ballot-rigging to do so.[19] Gairy's rule now grew only more dictatorial and self-serving, further alienating the populace.

Gairyism had come to represent "corruption, anti-democratic activity, arrogance, personalism, tyranny, violence, criminality and buffoonery."[20] As Thorndike says of Gairy:

> he had successfully exploited the grievances of the common people in 1951 and set Grenada upon a new course. Twenty years on, he had betrayed most of his promises and failed to realize that the world, including Grenada, had moved ahead.[21]

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[17] Schoenhals and Melanson, *Revolution and Intervention*, p. 29.

[18] Payne et al., *Grenada*, p. 14.

[19] Colin Henfrey, "Between Populism and Leninism: The Grenadian Experience," *Latin American Perspectives* 11, no. 3 (1984): 19.

[20] W. Richard Jacobs and Ian Jacobs, *Grenada: The Route to Revolution* (Havana, Cuba: Casa De Las Americas, 1979), p. 111.

[21] Thorndike, *Grenada*, p. 40.

The New Jewel Movement

The inspiration of the NJM was primarily the Black Power movement which swept the Caribbean, especially between 1968-70, reaching its zenith with the unrest in Trinidad and Tobago. The Black Power ideology exerted a significant influence on the future Grenadian Prime Minister, Maurice Bishop. Bishop had left Grenada in 1963 to study law in England and returned via Trinidad in 1970. That year he participated in a meeting of Caribbean radicals on Rat Island off St. Lucia. The tangible result in Grenada was the establishment of Forum, a political movement promoting change.[22] Forum was replaced by the Movement for the Advancement of Community Efforts (MACE) which was subsequently replaced by the Movement for the Assemblies of People (MAP) in 1972. MAP's ideology opposed one leader domination, was anti-elections, emphasized a decentralized state, opposed corruption and conspiratorial takeovers.[23] Bishop was influenced by the ideas of Tanzanian leader Julius Nyerere's Christian Socialism and the writings of Trinidadian Marxist C.L.R. James amongst others. Bishop aimed to replace Gairy's distortion of Parliamentary Democracy with a system of "participatory democracy" and "people's assemblies" throughout Grenada. MAP's ultimate political problem was that in a predominantly conservative and rural society it was a radical and urban entity and therefore lacked widespread support.

Coincidentally at the same time another group of educated and disaffected young men formed the Joint Endeavour for Welfare, Education and Liberation (JEWEL), led by an economist, Unison Whiteman. JEWEL was generally a less overtly political

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[22] Jacobs and Jacobs, *Grenada*, p. 76.

[23] Meeks, *Caribbean Revolutions*, p. 146.

movement than MAP, consisting mostly of self-educated farmers. It advocated social and political change and gained substantial support amongst rural Grenadians. As Hardt suggests, "JEWEL became a viable political organization because, unlike Bishop's MAP, the leaders were addressing their friends and neighbours, not the anonymous masses."[24]

A logical development occurred on March 11, 1973, when MAP and JEWEL merged to form the New Jewel Movement. They issued a Manifesto with the slogan: "We'll Be Free in 73." This document envisaged an intrinsic change in the island's economic and political structure, the establishment of a welfare state, people's participation in politics and an improvement in the standard of living amongst other things.[25] The Manifesto also pronounced that: "When a government ceases to serve the people and instead steals from and exploits the people at every turn, the people are entitled to dissolve it and replace it by any means necessary."[26] As Davidson concludes, the Manifesto was "short on political ideology and long on pragmatism aimed at social justice."[27] For now the main objective was the removal of Eric Gairy.

The NJM's cause was helped by Gairy's determination to achieve independence as it united the opposition to him:

> Apart from the reservations concerning Grenada's viability as a state, for the GNP and the oligarchy, independence meant the removal of the final constraint which would give Gairy a free hand to continue and consolidate his incursions against them. For the growing mass movement it meant unfettered "mongoose" power, further victimization and dictatorship.[28]

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[24] D. Brent Hardt, "Grenada Reconsidered," *Fletcher Forum: A Journal of Studies in International Affairs* 11, No. 2 (Summer 1987): 281.

[25] Thorndike, *Grenada*, p. 45.

[26] Payne et al., *Grenada*, p. 13.

[27] Scott Davidson, *Grenada: A Study in Politics and the Limits of International Law* (Aldershot, Surrey: Avebury, 1987), p. 9.

[28] Meeks, *Caribbean Revolutions*, p. 144.

The NJM organized rallies, demonstrations and protests. In May 1973 a People's Convention on Independence held at Seamoon attracted 10,000 people.

Gairy's only response to the nascent power of the NJM was intimidation and force. Of the NJM he blustered: "These irresponsible malcontents, these disgruntled political frustrates coming from abroad, . . .coming here, metaphorically and literally hot and sweaty, and shouting 'Power to the People'."[29] This was the first time he had faced non-middle-class GNP opposition and he realized that the NJM were eroding his traditional base of support amongst the rural working-class. Gairy only increased support for the NJM with episodes such as the previously mentioned "Bloody Sunday." Thus by January 1974 the lines had been drawn:

> No longer was it a fight for power, or a change in the present political system's antagonism between the GULP Government and the New Jewel Movement. From then on it was a struggle which involved all citizens against the abuses of the Government.[30]

For the NJM the rubicon had been crossed. Bishop later identified spring 1974 as the turning point when the decision was made to construct a Leninist Party. The NJM now focused on the urban working-class rather than the rural masses. Whilst appearing to remain a populist party to its supporters the NJM in reality was becoming a classic Marxist-Leninist vanguard organization with a conspiratorial and hierarchical command structure, restricted membership and clandestine ideology.[31] Links were established with communist groups in Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana and

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[29] Chris Searle, *Grenada: The Struggle Against Destabilization* (London: Writers & Readers Publishing Cooperative Society., 1983), p. 15.

[30] Lewis, *Reform and Revolution*, p. 95.

[31] Meeks, *Caribbean Revolutions*, p. 151.

Jamaica and in December 1975 a Grenada-Cuba Friendship Society was established.[32] During 1977 Bishop, Whiteman and Coard all visited Cuba. Indicative of the NJM's changing structure was the formation within the Party of the Organization for Research, Education and Liberation (OREL) in 1975. OREL consisted of young, privileged middle-class radicals who supported revolution.

The return to Grenada of Bernard Coard in 1976 is important in understanding the continued development of the NJM. Coard had been an international relations lecturer at University of the West Indies. He was a firm believer in Marxism and the "non-capitalist path of development." Coard was the intellectual ideologue of the Party and most identifiable with the further development of a vanguardist NJM.

In the 1976 elections the NJM allied with the GNP and United People's Party (UPP) to form a People's Alliance.[33] Although they lost, the People's Alliance won six seats (NJM three, GNP two and UPP one). This provided the NJM with several advantages: as part of the Alliance their radical image was moderated and the Party legitimated, widened the base of support beyond the urban working-class and youths, established the NJM as the official Opposition rather than the GNP and provided them with a domestic and international platform.[34] Gairy's victory caused the NJM to

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[32] During 1977 Bishop, Whiteman and Coard all visited Cuba. The society actually remained secret until 1978 because as Einstein Louison later explained: "the whole question was how to deal with Cuba in the context of our own political situation here. You had to be careful so that you didn't appear to be a communist in this country; that would have affected the struggle, that would have affected the alliances that were necessary to be formed." John Walton Cotman, *The Gorrion Tree: Cuba and the Grenada Revolution* (New York: Peter Lang, 1993), p. 49.

[33] The GNP represented mainly the middle-classes and businessmen and never had much support outside St. George's. The UPP represented the interests of the business community.

[34] Thorndike, *Grenada*, p. 51.

hasten their conversion to a vanguard party. Having seen "scientific socialism" in Cuba, the NJM now viewed socialism as "the only solution to our problems."[35]

Between 1976 and 1979 the NJM infiltrated the trade unions, organizing working-class support and even undermining Gairy's support in his GMMWU. The ever-growing violence and victimization expanded middle-class support for the NJM, as did Bishop's popularity and charismatic leadership. Simultaneously the NJM became more socialist and Marxist in tone; the People's Alliance folded when the NJM refused to say they were "not communists."[36] By 1978 they were the most influential force in Grenadian politics.

In February 1979 Gairy's popularity rose slightly in line with the fifth anniversary of independence and rumours of new elections circulated; the NJM feared they would be unable organize effective opposition. The tension in Grenada was increased when it was revealed that two Grenadian-born U.S. citizens, James Wardally and Chester Humprey, had been arrested on February 22, 1979, in Baltimore by U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms agents for crossing state lines with guns for transshipment to Grenada.[37] On March 10 a meeting of senior NJM leaders got wind of a major action against them by Gairy. Their houses had been searched that same day and one member, Vincent Noel, who had not been at the meeting, arrested. The other leaders decided to go into hiding. On March 12 Gairy left for New York to

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[35] "The Struggle for Democracy and Against Imperialism in Grenada, August 1977," Bruce Marcus and Michael Taber (eds.), *Maurice Bishop Speaks: The Grenada Revolution and Its Overthrow 1979-83* (New York: Pathfinder, 1983), p. 22.

[36] Denneth Modeste, "Grenada: Tumultuous Decades," *Freedom at Issue*, no. 8 (September-October 1984): 5.

[37] Robert Pastor, "The U.S. and the Grenada Revolution," in Jorge Heine (ed.) *A Revolution Aborted: The Lessons of Grenada* (Pittsburgh: The University of Pittsburgh Press, 1990), p. 186. The two jumped bail on October 2, 1979, and escaped back to Grenada.

meet with UN officials; NJM leaders learnt from sympathetic sources in the police and army that Gairy had allegedly left behind orders for the NJM leadership to be assassinated.[38]

The 1979 Revolution

At 4:00 p.m. on March 12 the NJM's Security and Defence Committee consisting of Bishop, Coard, Whiteman and Austin secretly met to discuss "Operation Apple," the contingency plan to topple Gairy that had been in preparation for four years.[39] The vote was split, with Bishop and Whiteman against action. Another NJM member, George Louison, was brought in to break the deadlock: he voted in favour of action.[40] There was a certain sense of "now or never" about the choice; Bishop later explained that it was a case of "them or us. . . and we didn't plan on it being us."[41] The main target was the Army barracks at True Blue. Apart from the advantage of surprise, the NJM was unsure of what the reaction would be, had to trust that the

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[38] The NJM claimed that Gairy had deliberately left Grenada to distance himself from the situation; a more likely scenario is that Gairy's absence was a coincidence. He had been present on the island for previous atrocities and it would probably have made more sense to remain to ensure that everything went smoothly. Additionally it is perhaps difficult to understand why Gairy would want to eliminate the entire NJM leadership at that particular time rather than any other; Gairy's popularity had risen slightly and the ATF investigation into arms smuggling which clearly implicated NJM leaders was progressing. Thus it is possible that the NJM leaders perceived an increasing threat to their future and this acted as the basis for the origin of the death threat claim.

[39] Most of the military training had taken place secretly in Grenada although six NJM leaders had traveled to Guyana for four weeks training in late 1978 with the support of Guyana's President Forbes Burnham. John Walton Cotman, "Cuba and the Grenada Revolution: The Impact and Limits of Cuban International Aid Programs," 2 vols. (Ph.D. diss., Boston University Graduate School, 1992), p. 195. The U.S. was aware of the NJM leaders' visits to Cuba, Guyana and Eastern Europe prior to 1979. Telephone interview with Frank Ortiz, August 10, 1994.

[40] Meeks, *Caribbean Revolutions*, p. 155.

[41] Manning Marable, *African and Caribbean Politics: From Kwame Nkrumah to the Grenada Revolution* (London: Verso, 1987), p. 221.

populace would support them, that Gairy's supporters would not fight and, most importantly, that the Police and Army would not provide any significant resistance.[42]

The coup began at 4:15 a.m. on March 13, 1979. Austin led the 46-man National Liberation Army armed with only 16 rifles, two shotguns, a few pistols and Molotov cocktails in the main attack on the Army barracks.[43] The surprise attack encountered minimal resistance with soldiers either surrendering or fleeing. A simultaneous attack on Pearls was also victorious and by 5:00 a.m. the radio station at Grand Anse was seized. By 6:00 a.m. the NJM was broadcasting, encouraging people to join the fight and telling the Police to surrender.[44] At 10:15 a.m. Bishop broadcast as Prime Minister, promising that:

> all democratic freedoms, including freedom of elections, religious and political opinion, will be fully restored to the people. . . [T]his revolution is for work, for food, for decent housing and health services, and for a bright future.[45]

Once the Army had been overcome and the radio station taken the people enthusiastically supported the NJM. By 4:00 p.m. all opposition had evaporated and a carnival atmosphere prevailed as the island celebrated Gairy's demise.

In view of the new government's near immediate extension of relations with Cuba there has been much speculation that Cuba was involved in the coup. Ashby

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[42] Lewis, *Reform and Revolution*, p.151.

[43] Meeks, *Caribbean Revolutions* p. 155.

[44] Jacobs and Jacobs, *Grenada*, p. 125.

[45] "A Bright New Dawn, March 13, 1979," Bruce Marcus and Michael Taber (eds.), *Maurice Bishop Speaks: The Grenada Revolution and Its Overthrow, 1979-83*, p. 25. Although the NJM referred to their victory as a "revolution" it is often referred to as a coup. Marable suggests that the action was "not a genuine social revolution, but a political insurrection against a despotic and corrupt regime. . . the NJM would gain a mandate to expel Gairy from power, but not a national consensus to implement socialism." Marable, *African and Caribbean Politics*, p. 220. Meeks suggests that the NJM's action was "a revolution from above, marginally distinguishable from a *coup d'etat* by its execution by armed irregulars and by the willingness of the leadership to mobilise popular support, though firmly under its command." Meeks, *Caribbean Revolutions*, p. 156.

unequivocally states that a team of Cuban commandos participated and that a Soviet ship harboured in Grenada at the time was present to observe this "national liberation" venture that had been orchestrated by Cuba.[46] In a CIA report to Congress a less fantastic conclusion was reached: "as far as we can tell, the coup occurred. . . from local circumstances. The Soviets had nothing to do with it, or the Cubans either."[47] In interviews with three of those who planned and led the coup Cotman confirms that only the 46 NJM members were involved, the Cubans had no foreknowledge of the coup and played no role, most of the modern weapons used were smuggled in from the U.S. and acquired by NJM members and that no Guyanese participated.[48]

The U.S. Response

As foreign policy does not exist in a vacuum it is essential to examine briefly President Carter's Latin American policy. Since 1945 Latin America had traditionally been subsumed as just another arena in the Cold War by successive administrations. Differentiating the Caribbean from Central America, although not from the perception of the region as the U.S.' "backyard," Carter emphasized economic development,[49] democratization, human rights, ideological pluralism, a respect for

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[46] Timothy Ashby, *The Bear in the Backyard: Moscow's Caribbean Strategy* (Lexington, Va.: Lexington Books, 1984), p. 84.

[47] U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs. *Economic and Political Future of the Caribbean* (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1979), p. 141.

[48] Cotman, "Cuba and the Grenada Revolution," p. 198.

[49] Carter founded the Caribbean Group for Cooperation in Economic Development: composed of thirty countries and fifteen international bodies. It quadrupled the aid given to the region in four years. Robert Pastor, "The U.S. and the Caribbean: the Power of the Whirlpool," *Annals of the American Academy* 533 (May 1994): 27.

national sovereignty and the encouragement of regional cooperation and a Caribbean role in world affairs.[50] Unfortunately, Carter's optimistic image of a world system composed of a variety of significant issues and actors forming a global community was increasingly challenged by world events.[51] By 1979 the Administration was divided, producing an incoherent and unstable image of the world on which to base policy.[52] Within a year of the NJM's coup the U.S. had reverted to the orthodox Cold War anti-Communism view of the region to combat the war, revolution, instability and Soviet and Cuban expansionism occurring.

The U.S. reaction to the coup was one of surprise. Prime Minister Bishop quickly contacted the neighbouring Caribbean governments to express his desire for continued relations and to promise early "free and fair" elections. Bishop phoned the U.S. ambassador Frank Ortiz,[53] on March 13 to assure him that U.S. citizens and property were safe, that good relations were desired, that the new government would be non-aligned and that elections would be held promptly. Deputy Prime Minister Coard also contacted Ortiz to inform him that Grenada wished to continue receiving aid from the U.S. and Britain.[54] From what was known about Bishop and his colleagues Ortiz's initial assessment was that they were:

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[50] Payne et al., *Grenada*, p. 46.

[51] 1979 also witnessed the Nicaraguan Revolution, the Iranian Revolution, the Iran hostage crisis, the Soviet-Cuban intervention in Ethiopia and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

[52] Jerel A. Rosati, *The Carter Administration's Quest for Global Community: Beliefs and Their Impact on Behavior* (South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1980), p. 113.

[53] Ambassador Ortiz was based in Barbados and accredited to the other Eastern Caribbean islands as well.

[54] In response the embassy dispatched Consul Richard La Roche to Grenada that day. He met with Coard on March 16; Coard indicated that Grenada would look to the U.S., U.K. and Canada for assistance. In a pattern that would become familiar no specific request was made. Frank Ortiz, confidential telegram to Secretary of State, "'Subject: USG and Assistance to Bishop Government in Grenada," 281729Z, April 1979, Bridgetown 01615, section 1, p. 2. U.S. government cables will be cited by author, recipient,, subject, time and date, telegram number and then section and/or page.

well-educated, young idealists and violence prone. They appear to be ideologically committed to Marxism but have not demonstrated particular hostility to the US. More than anything they are anti-Gairy. It is probable that the revolutionary group are still uncertain of success and are fearful that we, the British or others may take actions against them.[55]

In Washington the reaction to the revolution varied; the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) saw the NJM as Cuban Marxists pure and simple, whereas the State Department were less concerned. The National Security Council (NSC) took the middle line. NSC Latin American Senior Director Robert Pastor penned a memo to National Security Adviser Zbignew Brzezinski suggesting that the U.S. work through CARICOM and support their call for elections. Elections would ensure continuity, prevent Bishop from forming "revolutionary councils," test the extent of Bishop's following and establish a good precedent by demonstrating that forceable takeovers were illegitimate. Pastor proffered that "if CARICOM can put Grenada under its umbrella, Cuba will remain far outside."[56] Pastor warned cautiously that the situation "could go [in] either direction, and a fair amount depends on what we choose to do, with whom and when" and consequently he proposed a meeting of the subcommittee of the NSC's Special Coordination Committee (a mini-SCC) to "mesh different agencies perceptions of the problem into a single and common view,"

The time and date reference requires some explanation; in the above telegram (281729Z) "28" indicates the day of the month and "1729" indicates the time the telegram was sent. The "Z" refers to Zebra which means Greenwich Mean Time (GMT). A final note: the Eastern Caribbean is fours hours behind GMT and Washington D.C. five hours behind. A collection of declassified cables can be found at the National Security Archives in Washington D.C. A number of other cables were provided courtesy of Dr. Mitch Leventhal (see bibliography for details).

[55] Frank Ortiz, confidential telegram to Secretary of State, "Subject: Grenada: Situation Report Twelve Forty-Five Local," 131954Z, March 1979, Bridgetown 00869, p. 1.

[56] Robert Pastor, NSC secret memorandum to Zbigniew Brzezinski/David Aaron, "Subject: Next Steps in Grenada," March 14, 1979, no. 1603, p. 1.

especially encouraging the State Department to appreciate the political dimensions and urgency of dealing with the issue effectively and expediently.[57]

The mini-SCC convened on March 15 and included representatives from the State Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), CIA, DIA and the NSC. Pastor, for one, categorized the PRG as "reasonably idealistic socialist" in the style of Jamaican Prime Minister Michael Manley but also pragmatic. The replacement of the police and army by the People's Revolutionary Army (PRA) and the quasi-Communist propaganda emanating from Radio Free Grenada (RFG) did create some suspicion.[58] The Pentagon were characteristically apprehensive and the NSC staff allegedly considered imposing a naval blockade.[59] Despite the differing departmental opinions a consensus was reached, particularly on the subject of Cuba:

> Bishop and his group could probably be co-opted by the U.S. or perhaps by Cuba. They are sensitive to international reaction to their coup, and eager to obtain international legitimacy, but if we are not sensitive to their overtures, it is conceivable that they could turn to Cuba.[60]

It was agreed that supervised parliamentary elections were important and that Washington would wait for the outcome of the CARICOM meeting and get British and Canadian support to back CARICOM's call for elections. Pastor made the point that if Bishop won an election the U.S. should be willing to help him.[61]

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[57] Robert Pastor, NSC secret memorandum to Reg Bartholomew, "Subject: Mini-SCC Meeting on Grenada -- March 15 1979," March 15, 1979, unnumbered, p. 1

[58] Robert Pastor, "Does the United States Push Revolutions to Cuba? The Case of Grenada," *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs* 28, no. 1 (1986): 6.

[59] John M. Goshko, "Caribbean Ministates are a New Source of Concern for U.S.," *Washington Post*, July 6, 1979, p. A12.

[60] Zbigniew Brzezinski, NSC secret memorandum to the President, "Subject: Mini-SCC Meeting on Grenada," March 15, 1979, no. 1629, p. 1.

[61] Ibid., p. 1.

A furious Gairy requested U.S. help to restore him but the absence of any group supporting him and his universal unpopularity in the Caribbean (when consulted by Washington, Prime Minister Tom Adams of Barbados described Gairy as "indefensible") made his reinstatement insupportable.

The Eastern Caribbean Reaction

Grenada's neighbours were similarly surprised by the coup. The shared experience of colonialism had given the Eastern Caribbean a collective identity and fostered close social, economic and political links. The 1958 West Indies Federation had been an attempt to consolidate these ties but collapsed in 1962 amongst internecine squabbling. In 1968 the Caribbean Free Trade Association was formed, later becoming CARICOM, to promote economic integration, intra-regional cooperation and coordination in foreign affairs.[62] Therefore, the first undemocratic change of power in this close community was destined to have a profound impact.

The immediate response was a meeting of the Commonwealth Caribbean Ministers in Barbados on March 14-15.[63] The Ministers commented that events in Grenada were contrary to traditional methods of changing power but that it was an internal matter and that there should be no external interference. They also expressed their desire for a return to constitutionality as soon as possible to preserve the unity

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[62] Payne et al., *Grenada*, p. 89.

[63] The only CARICOM member not represented was Trinidad and Tobago whose initial reaction to the revolution was indifference. Relations were destined to remain "formal and cool" and as one Trinidad and Tobago government official explained in June 1980: "The official Trinidad and Tobago position on revolutionary Grenada is clear and uncompromising: so long as there is no properly elected government in St. George's, there is no possibility of cooperation. Officially, diplomatic relations continue: We recognize countries not governments. . . We are not telling Grenada what to do or what not to do. All we are saying is - don't come to us for loans or assistance until you clear up this situation." EPICA Task Force, *Grenada: The Peaceful Revolution* (Washington D.C.: EPICA Task Force, 1982), p. 57.

of the region and hoped that the election pledge would be honoured and offered help if it was requested.[64] On March 15 George Louison, the PRG's representative, reaffirmed to the Ministers Grenada's intention to hold elections soon and to remain within CARICOM. The meeting was divided along the question of recognition; Jamaica and Guyana favoured quick recognition to normalize relations, but the smaller states were more wary, fearing that this would encourage "more Grenadas." Knowing that Jamaica and Guyana would soon recognize Grenada, the Eastern Caribbean leaders attempted to obtain Gairy's resignation and his Deputy Prime Minister Herbert Preudhomme's support for a proposal to Grenadian Governor-General Sir Paul Scoon that Bishop be appointed Prime Minister. In theory this would provide a veneer of legitimacy to the PRG. Such legal maneuvering failed due to Preudhomme's intransigence. Subsequently, on March 20, Barbados, Guyana and Jamaica officially "recognized" Grenada.

More alarmist reactions were evident at an emergency meeting of the West Indies Associated States (WIAS) on March 20. The Prime Ministers of Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines and the Premier of Montserrat condemned the Revolution and refused to recognize Grenada until there was a return to constitutional rule. In reality only Dominica and St. Lucia were independent sovereign states and could withhold recognition.[65] Other suggestions made included excluding Grenada from the regional legal system, suspending Grenada from the Eastern Caribbean Currency Authority, ceasing

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[64] U.K. Parliament. House of Commons. Foreign Affairs Committee, Fifth Report. *Caribbean and Central America*. Session 1981-1982, p. 287.

[65] Davidson, *Grenada*, p. 42. WIAS finally granted de facto recognition to Grenada in May but only after the PRG had again promised to hold elections.

Leeward Islands Air Transport (LIAT) service and examining the feasibility of a regional defence force "empowered to intervene, under a mutual defence treaty, in the event of future rebellions by armed and trained revolutionaries" against any of the governments concerned.[66] St. Lucia's Prime Minister, John Compton, sent a request to Britain to send a military force to depose the PRG, believing that "nipping things in the bud" would be preferable to dealing with the situation once the PRG were established.[67] As Payne et al. conclude:

> they were terrified lest the Grenada "virus" began to spread, infecting next their islands and thus bringing about their downfall. It was a crude, gut reaction to an event which the Commonwealth Caribbean was unfamiliar.[68]

Despite these early doubts Grenada was accepted because Gairy had been a universally disliked character;[69] Bishop was well-known and liked and his friendship with Prime Ministers Forbes Burnham and Michael Manley helped the PRG's case in the regional bodies. Secondly, faced with a fait accompli there was a desire to maintain a sense of regional identity and solidarity. Thirdly, the PRG's promise of elections, desire for good relations and retention of the Governor-General and membership of the Commonwealth, CARICOM and the Organisation of American States (OAS) boded well. Finally, the Eastern Caribbean tradition of tolerance and non-interference was reinforced by President Carter's promotion of ideological

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[66] "Eastern Caribbean," *Keesings Contemporary Archives*, August 10, 1979, p. 29691.

[67] Interview with Joseph Edmunds, August 2, 1994, Washington D.C. Edmunds is the current St. Lucian ambassador to the U.S.

[68] Payne et al., *Grenada*, p. 91.

[69] Prime Minister Adams commented that: "many of us were so glad to be rid of Gairy. . . that we (the Eastern Caribbean) were prepared to overlook the means by which this regime was ended." Robert Pastor, "The Impact of Grenada on the Caribbean: Ripples from a Revolution," in Jack W. Hopkins (ed.), *Latin America and the Caribbean Record, Volume III, 1983-1984* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1985), p. 12.

pluralism. As one Caribbean diplomat noted, Bishop made "all the right moves."[70] Recognition gave the PRG some breathing space to honour its promises and more importantly, "despite the absence of specific reciprocal ties, processes of interaction. . . tend to create norms and mutual obligations."[71] Grenada's neighbours always remained apprehensive but were willing to give the PRG a chance.

Meeting the PRG

Despite expressing concern about the need for elections, Ortiz interpreted the unusual situation as an opportunity, believing that "the assumption of power might moderate some of the extremist ideas which the NJM had advocated."[72] On March 21 PRG representatives Kendrick Radix and Dessima Williams met with Ashley Hewitt, the State Department's Director of Caribbean Affairs, in Washington. Radix promised that elections were a priority and would be open to observers and that Grenada's foreign policy would be independent.[73] At this stage it was clear that the U.S.' aim was to seek ways to facilitate early democratic elections.

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[70] "Grenada Special: A Souvenir Edition covering the Grenada coup," *Grenada Documents Microfiche Collection* (GDMC), no. DSI-83-C 005533, p. 12. After the intervention a vast quantity of PRG documents were shipped to Washington. They are available for public inspection on about 12,000 microfiches at the National Archives. The "DSI-83-C" classification remains the same throughout and so I shall only refer to the documents using the final six digit number.

[71] Anthony P. Maingot, "The English-Speaking Caribbean and Hemispheric Security Policy: The Lessons of Grenada," in Georges Fauriol (ed.), *Security in the Americas* (Washington D.C.: National Defense University, 1989), p. 242.

[72] Lawrence Rossin, *U.S.-Grenada Relations Since the Coup: A Background Paper* (Bridgetown, Barbados: U.S. embassy, 1983), p. 1. This paper was written by a political officer at the Barbados embassy and is based on telegrams, airgrams, memoranda, interviews and other unspecified material.

[73] Ibid., p. 1.

Washington believed that "any sanctions at this stage could be counterproductive," only serving to push Grenada into Cuba's arms.[74] Ortiz reasoned that if the PRG did not feel threatened they would organize elections quicker. The U.S. officially "recognized" Grenada on March 22 whilst repeating the call for elections.[75] In Washington the prevailing mood was one of optimism as there was a sincere belief that here was a case where the U.S. could successfully influence a "socialist" group to democratize for the first time.[76]

Ambassador Ortiz met with Bishop and Whiteman on March 23 to convey the U.S.' official recognition of Grenada and to express a desire to continue relations. Moving on to a number of talking points Ortiz offered to increase the number of Peace Corps volunteers, provided details of five pending U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) programmes the PRG were unaware of and pointed out that as these were administered via the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) they frequently took time to receive and therefore the PRG might be interested in the $5,000 available immediately via the Special Development Act funds for community projects.[77] Bishop expressed interest but was non-committal; he wanted the Peace

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[74] Ibid., p. 4. The theory posits that unsympathetic, or hostile, U.S. responses to Third World revolutions '"pushes" them towards the Communist bloc. The PRG was moderately successful in persuading people of Washington's unresponsiveness over aid and warning against relations with Cuba had indeed "pushed" the PRG towards Cuba. Ambassador Ortiz later warned Washington that such a belief was gaining currency in the region although it was his belief that "a Marxist-Leninist like Bishop is not 'driven' into the Communist camp; that is where he started out to go." Frank V. Ortiz, "Letters to the Editor," *Atlantic Monthly* 253, no. 6 (June 1984): 12.

[75] It is important to remember that for the U.S. diplomatic recognition is an act of approval rather than just an act of recognizing reality. U.S. non-recognition of Grenada for any protracted period was unviable due to the presence of a sizable number of U.S. citizens, notably at St. George's University Medical School (SGU), on the island. Telephone interview with John Bushnell, July 29, 1995.

[76] Telephone interview with Ortiz.

[77] Ortiz, "Letters to the Editor," p. 9.

Corps volunteers to come but was unable to discuss specific economic requests yet and that it would take a few months for the PRG to get on their feet.[78] Ortiz then underlined that the PRG's election promises had made U.S. recognition possible and that three months would be an "acceptable maximum" time period until elections and that six months would "reawaken concern."[79] Bishop explained that Gairy had left the political system in a mess and that even six months was an unrealistic timeframe. As Rossin concludes: "U.S. policy toward Grenada was, until this point, characterized by hopefulness tempered by a concern engendered by the evasiveness about elections. . . coupled with the knowledge of the past radical NJM viewpoints."[80]

U.S. concerns heightened on March 25 when Bishop suspended the Constitution and announced ten fundamental People's Laws which legalized the PRG and gave the PRA police powers amongst other things. Bishop undertook to return to constitutional rule as soon as possible. A "lingering optimism" still remained in the State Department; a quick election was unlikely but this did not preclude the development of a constitutional framework.[81] The State Department were beginning to clutch at straws. The NSC were more cautious: "He [Bishop] is obviously trying to maintain a good relationship with the U.S., but his proclivities to 'revolutionize' the

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[78] On March 28 Bishop called the embassy to put the arrival of the Peace Corps on hold for a couple of weeks. Ortiz, "Subject: USG and Assistance to Bishop," section 1, p. 3.

[79] Rossin, *U.S.-Grenada Relations*, p. 7.

[80] Ibid., p. 12.

[81] Ibid., p. 13.

political system in Grenada may lead him toward a 'Cuban model', which in turn may lead to closer ties with, if not dependence on, Cuba."[82]

Bishop had moved fast to consolidate the Revolution:

> Within a week of the coup, he had arrested many of his political opponents and transferred military and police powers to his followers. Recognized by all his neighbours, he had also received assurances of good relations and offers of aid from both the U.S. and UK.[83]

Concluding that the PRG had used the election issue to gain recognition Washington policymakers decided that "our main purpose is to keep Grenada from drifting into the Cuban orbit. We continue to feel that this can best be accomplished by working with the new government."[84] In light of Jamaica's good relations with Grenada, Hewitt visited Prime Minister Michael Manley on April 4 to discuss the ideological orientation of the PRG and its relationship with Cuba and how the U.S. might best develop a productive relationship.

A new factor was added to the equation on April 4 when a Cuban plane unloaded small arms in Grenada. On April 7 a Cuban flight from Guyana to Cuba was diverted to Grenada and unloaded more arms and eight Cubans. The following day another Cuban plane, allegedly experiencing technical difficulties, landed and left behind more arms and Cubans. On April 9 the Guyanese ship *Jamaito* docked in St. George's carrying more arms and finally, on April 14, the Cuban ship *Matanzas* docked with yet more arms.[85]

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[82] Robert Pastor, confidential NSC memorandum to Zbigniew Brzezinski/David Aaron, "Subject: Update on Grenada," March 27, 1979, no. 1871, p. 2.

[83] Pastor, "Does the United States," p. 8.

[84] Rossin, *U.S.-Grenada Relations*, p. 15.

[85] Pastor, "Does the United States," p.8. A 1981 Grenadian Chief of Staff memorandum detailed the arms received from Cuba in April 1979: 3,400 Soviet and U.S. rifles with three million rounds; 200 machine guns with half a million rounds; 100 pistols with 66,000 rounds; 100 shoulder-fired rocket launchers with 4,000 rockets; 12 82mm mortars with 4,800 shells; 12 75mm cannon with 600 shells

The PRG were supersensitive about the threat of a Gairy countercoup and on April 7, claiming that Gairy was organizing a mercenary invasion, officially requested arms from the U.S. via two junior embassy officials on Grenada. The U.S. remained unaware of the arrival of Cuban arms. Bishop also asked Britain, CARICOM and planned to ask Canada for military assistance. The next day, using the Gairy threat to justify his actions, Bishop told a rally that he planned to ask for Cuban and Venezuelan military help and expected Cuban diplomatic recognition and technical and material assistance soon after.[86] Bishop confirmed his requests to these countries at a press conference on April 9. From the timing of the arrival of Cuban and Guyanese transports it is irrefutable that arms were on route to Grenada even before Bishop's public request to the West or Cuba. Unsettled by these developments the States Department dispatched ambassador Ortiz to Grenada on April 9.

Ambassador Ortiz found the island in the midst of an invasion scare and witnessed PRA soldiers fire on a Holiday Inn charter plane. Ortiz met first with Coard for 30 minutes and later Bishop on April 10. Ortiz commented that the invasion scare would deter tourists and Coard replied that Gairy was a threat. The ambassador assured Coard that Gairy was in the U.S. and not on a neighbouring island as the PRG claimed and suggested that a friendly Western country could send a naval vessel to Grenada on a courtesy call as a deterrent to any invasion but Coard felt it would only scare people. Ortiz informed Coard that the embassy was ready to send AID officers to meet with PRG officials but Coard repeated the familiar message that the new government were not ready. Instead he said that a $3.7 million loan would help the

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and 12 12.7mm anti-aircraft guns with 237,000 rounds. *Grenada: A Preliminary Report* (Washington D.C.: Department of State and Department of Defense, 1983), p. 22.

[86] Rossin, *U.S.-Grenada Relations*, p.18.

PRG's progress. Ortiz tactfully replied that "there was some chance Grenada's frieds (sic) together might be able to help and that they were all ready to start talking."[87] Coard again delayed, explaining that he was very busy but would be in Barbados soon where talks could be continued. The meeting concluded with Ortiz mentioning that the talking points for his meeting with Bishop later that day would include a statement about relations with Cuba but Coard did not respond.[88]

Meeting With Bishop

Ambassador Ortiz's meeting with Bishop has received much attention as the purported starting point for the deterioration of U.S.-Grenadian relations and merits some attention. Bishop was aware that Ortiz was there to carry out some important instructions but Ortiz began by telling Bishop that he would like to talk informally first. Ortiz had a fair amount of leeway because until this meeting Washington had no firm Grenada policy.[89] The ambassador also made a point of mentioning that he would be traveling to Washington soon and that the details of affairs would be available to high officials there.

The first subject was Gairy. Rumours of an invasion were widespread and Ortiz told Bishop that the uncertainty this situation engendered was detrimental to the island's economy, law and foreign relations. He assured Bishop that Gairy was in San Diego and explained that the U.S. Neutrality Act was strictly enforced and that the Federal Bureau of Investigation were keeping track of Gairy's activities although they

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[87] Frank Ortiz, confidential telegram to Secretary of State, "Subject: Grenada: Meeting with Minister of Finance Coard," 111603Z, April 1979, Bridgetown 01363, section 1, p 2.

[88] In his report Ortiz wrote: "Coard is generally believed to be the hard-core ideologue and evil genius of the Bishop government." Ibid., p. 2.

[89] Telephone interview with Bushnell.

had no firm evidence of any invasion plans.[90] Ortiz asked Bishop if he could provide evidence of Gairy's alleged plotting but all he could offer was that he knew Gairy was in touch with people who could organize a mercenary force.[91] Ortiz suggested that it would be helpful if the PRG publicized Gairy's location to calm their fear; Bishop agreed but could provide no explanation as to why this had not been done. The offer of a visit by a naval vessel was again made but Bishop echoed Coard's response in saying that it would only "cause confusion. We don't want that."[92] In relation to the Gairy threat Ortiz, now speaking formally, told Bishop:

> Although my government recognizes your concerns over allegations of a possible countercoup, it also believes that it would not be in Grenada's best interests to seek assistance from a country such as Cuba to forestall an armed attack. We would view with displeasure any tendency on the part of Grenada to develop closer ties with Cuba.[93]

Ambassador Ortiz continued to speak formally, reading verbatim the text of a non-paper containing ten talking points.[94] Once again Gairy was discussed. Ortiz then asked Bishop if there would be a follow-up to the PRG's request for arms that had been made on April 7. Bishop said that there would not be so Ortiz pointed out that the U.S. had no details of the numbers or types of arms required; Bishop estimated that 500 semi-automatic rifles and 200 machine guns should suffice.[95]

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[90] Rossin, *U.S.-Grenada Relations*, p. 21. Ortiz even gave Bishop Gairy's phone and offered to fly someone to San Diego to verify Gairy's whereabouts. Telephone interview with Ortiz.

[91] Frank Ortiz, confidential telegram to Secretary of State, "Subject: Grenada: Meeting with Prime Minister Bishop," 111843Z, April 1979, Bridgetown 01368, section 1, p. 3.

[92] Ibid., p. 3. It could possibly have sent a confusing message to the Cubans just as relations with Grenada were taking off.

[93] Rossin, *U.S.-Grenada Relations*, p. 21.

[94] A non-paper is not an official document but an exact copy of talking points. Ortiz left one with Bishop to avoid any ambiguity. Telephone interview with Ortiz.

[95] Rossin, *U.S.-Grenada Relations*, p. 22.

The conversation now returned to the crucial subject - Cuba. Bishop told Ortiz that "after one month there had been no response to Grenada's urgent needs from its traditional friends and that it had to find help where it could."[96] Ortiz pointed out that the U.S. had only received the request for arms a few days ago and the specific details about ten minutes ago and so it was difficult to call the U.S. "unresponsive." Bishop conceded the ambassador's point and blamed overwork.[97] Ortiz then cut to the quick:

> I asked him [Bishop] point blank if the Cubans had offered assistance. He firmly said they had not. I asked him what his response would be if they did. He answered that depends on the circumstances. I asked what he meant by that. He replied if mercenaries invade [the] PRG would get help wherever it could.[98]

Ortiz suspected, correctly, that Cuban arms were arriving but Bishop did not know this; when Ortiz said out of ignorance that he would be "particularly concerned about arms" Bishop probably assumed that the ambassador knew for certain and that the U.S. would intercept the shipments or inform the Eastern Caribbean governments.[99] Ortiz stressed that Grenada was an independent and sovereign country and could do what it wanted but that the PRG should "have no doubts that developing close ties with Cuba would greatly complicate relations with Grenada's neighbors and with friendly countries like the U.S."[100] Noting Bishop's "apparent exhaustion" Ortiz decided to close the meeting and told Bishop that the U.S. was willing to provide aid,

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[96] Ibid., p. 22.

[97] Ibid., p. 22.

[98] Ortiz, "Subject: Grenada: Meeting with Prime Minister Bishop," section 2, p. 2.

[99] Telephone interview with Ortiz.

[100] Ortiz, "Subject: Grenada: Meeting with Prime Minister Bishop," section 2, p. 2.

possibly even arms, if a clear indication of Grenada's needs was provided. The ball was in Grenada's court for the moment.

"In Nobody's Backyard"

The PRG's response came at 8:00 p.m. on April 13 when a Bishop speech was broadcast on RFG. He spoke at length about his meeting with ambassador Ortiz. According to Bishop, Ortiz had made "veiled threats" against Grenada's tourist industry, saying that if talk of "mercenary invasions by phantom armies" continued Grenada would lose all its tourists.[101] Moving on to the question of economic aid Bishop acknowledged that Ortiz had outlined the multilateral basis of U.S. aid via the CDB and that bureaucracy often made obtaining aid a slow process. In light of this he melodramatically charged that the only aid available in the near future was "the paltry sum of a few $5,000 (sic). . . all that the wealthiest country in the world can offer to a poor but proud people."[102] For a grand finale Bishop returned to the threat of a mercenary invasion to inform people that if Cuba offered assistance Grenada would accept it, affirming that:

> No country has the right to tell us what to do or how to run our country or who to be friendly with. We certainly would not attempt to tell any other country what to do. We are not in anybody's backyard, and we are definitely not for sale.[103]

The Morning After

There are alternative interpretations of the "Backyard" speech and its significance but in Washington it was viewed as a purposeful distortion of events by Bishop to

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[101] "In Nobody's Backyard, April 13, 1979," Marcus and Taber (eds.), *Maurice Bishop Speaks*, p. 27.

[102] Ibid., p.29.

[103] Ibid., p. 29.

justify the "already-in-train" move towards military and diplomatic ties with Cuba. In his speech Bishop had ignored the five AID programs mentioned previously and emphasized the SDA funds that Ortiz had discussed only with Coard. The State Department felt that Bishop had portrayed Ortiz's notification of U.S. displeasure of the development of "closer ties" with Cuba as an outright threat to encourage Grenadians to support the PRG's ties with Cuba.[104]

Back in Washington the NSC met to reassess the situation; until now the approach to Grenada had been "relaxed but concerned," based on the assumption that the PRG were "manipulatable" as Pastor detailed:

> We premised this posture on the belief that Bishop and his followers were of the Manley "socialist democratic" school, but that they were pragmatic and could be co-opted by us or, for that matter, by the Cubans. The feeling was that as time passed, the realities of governing. . . would steer Bishop towards working with us . . . A more confrontational strategy by us could perhaps push the Grenadians in [to] the arms of the Cubans.[105]

The Manley analogy was now discarded as it became clear that Bishop was moving in the direction of a one-party state with close ties to Cuba. Washington was now at an important crossroads: "adopt a different strategy to try to counter Grenada's drift towards the Cubans" or concentrate on "preventing similar kinds of coups on neighboring islands."[106]

As Pastor underlined, it would have to be the U.S. who acted as the "catalyst" to counter the drift towards Cuba in the region. However, he felt that this would be best achieved from behind the scenes by supporting Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago in

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[104] Rossin, *U.S.-Grenada Relations*, p. 24.

[105] Robert Pastor, secret NSC memorandum to Zbigniew Brzezinski/David Aaron, "Subject: Time to Reassess US Policy to Grenada and the Caribbean: Second-Generation Surrogates?," April 14, 1979, no. 2271, p. 1.

[106] Ibid., p. 2.

calling for elections, a cessation of the militarization of Grenada, the freeing of political prisoners and the delegitimization of Cuba's involvement by linking it to the arms build-up and lack of elections.[107] Other measures included the establishment of a regional police force, Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits and naval vessel visits. This "regional" strategy placed the emphasis on consultation with Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago to ensure wider Caribbean support for U.S. policy. If the "regional" approach proved unproductive Pastor speculated that:

> we should test Bishop's alleged interest in good relations with the U.S. by playing with him on aid. We should send teams down to survey, but we should keep from making firm decisions until the direction of his "revolution" is clarified.[108]

It would appear that such a policy was the State Department's preference as they believed the PRG was co-optable and favoured trying to "buy out" Grenada now.[109]

At a mini-SCC meeting on April 27 Washington made the decision. The co-optation strategy of providing bilateral aid was rejected because it was felt that it would have a negative effect on the democratic Eastern Caribbean countries who needed aid just as much and also set a precedent for other regimes to confront the U.S. in order to receive more aid.[110] Perhaps more importantly Bishop had never displayed much interest in being co-opted; PRG requests for aid had been non-specific, vague and perfunctory in nature.

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[107] Ibid., p. 3.

[108] Robert Pastor, secret NSC memorandum to David Aaron, "Subject: Mini-SCC Meeting on Grenada -- April 27, 1979, 10:30-11:30 am," April 23, 1979, no. 2385, p. 2.

[109] Ibid., p. 2.

[110] It dawned on Washington that supporting the democratic countries in the region was essential if the threat of "more Grenadas" was to be reduced. Telephone interview with Bushnell.

Consequently, the "pressures and incentives" of the "regional" strategy won out. Grenada's neighbours would pressure the PRG to hold elections and reduce their ties to Cuba. All the islands would receive more aid except Grenada who would be told that if they implemented changes they too would receive aid. The security capability of the region would also be increased. The participants concluded that this option was:

> more congruent with the Administration's approach to the region; and. . . the regional nations could probably have a more positive influence on the PRG than could the US. It appeared the NJM was comfortable with the US as its enemy, and perhaps the best strategy for the US was to avoid giving them a target.[111]

The change of policy was not as instantaneous as it might appear. The embassy Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) John Eddy visited Grenada on May 9 to meet with Bishop to, among other things, solicit the specifics of Grenada's aid requests.[112] According to John Bushnell, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Grenada remained eligible for regional aid; Washington scaled down bilateral programs and if Grenada had asked for this they would not have received anything.[113]

As Payne suggests, it is difficult to believe that the PRG expected the U.S. to be entirely sympathetic to their policies. Grenada could have accepted U.S. aid to reduce the mounting tension but this might have jeopardized the opportunity of a closer relationship with Cuba:

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[111] Pastor, "Does the United States," p. 14.

[112] Rossin, *U.S.-Grenada Relations*, p. 30.

[113] Grenada's attitude to regional aid suggested they were disinterested anyway. About six months after the revolution a new Coast Guard training programme began. There was uncertainty as to whether Grenada should be included; it was decided that if the Grenadian representative was a member of the PRG they would be rejected but if it was a career civil servant they would be accepted. As it was, nobody showed up. Telephone interview with Bushnell.

> perhaps the best way to resolve the contradiction was to go on the attack and try to organize a diplomatic front against the United States around the themes of non-intervention and sovereignty - that would be ideologically satisfying in itself, would allow the Soviet Union to be courted, and could indeed be the most effective constraint upon the United States.[114]

In a 1982 interview with Pastor both Bishop and Coard insisted that the "Backyard" speech response was a mixture of inexperience and emotion and not premeditated.[115] Pastor goes on to suggest that the speech should be seen in view of the PRG's Third World Marxist outlook which charged U.S. imperialism as the cause of all ills.

On April 17 the State Department issued a statement explaining that Ortiz had simply been relating his government's position on a number of issues. In Washington the PRG's response was seen as "aimless provocation by an irresponsible regime."[116] Ortiz remained sanguine and proposed that the U.S. "see the record straight" by telling the PRG "either as a formal USG statement or as a private, personal aside, that assurances that the Cubans would leave would be met with USG responsiveness to Grenada's development needs"[117] and let him take any flak such statements might attract as he was leaving soon. However, the State Department had decided enough was enough on the Cuban issue and rejected the idea.[118] Soon after, an AID team visiting the Caribbean deliberately excluded Grenada. This signified the beginning of the "distancing" policy that did not change substantially until October 1983.

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[114] Anthony Payne, "The Foreign Policy of the People's Revolutionary Government," in Heine (ed.), *A Revolution Aborted*, p. 140.

[115] Pastor, "Does the United States," p. 11.

[116] Rossin, *U.S.-Grenada Relations*, p. 26.

[117] Ibid., p. 28.

[118] Ibid., p. 28.

Rediscovering the Cold War in the Caribbean

In examining the remainder of the Carter Administration's term I will outline the U.S.' general perceptions of Grenada and the Caribbean and then address the key events which demonstrated the progression of relations.

The Caribbean had always been viewed as an area of central importance to U.S. national security for several reasons: access to raw materials, the protection of sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and the Panama Canal amongst others. The U.S. has traditionally pursued a policy of "strategic denial" of geopolitical presence to non-hemispheric powers that could be a potential threat. From Washington's viewpoint Cuba was the "rotten apple" in the middle of this vital area. After the activism of the 1960's Castro had pursued a more opportunistic strategy in the 1970's. A CIA officer categorized Cuban efforts as "a multifaceted, carefully coordinated mechanism designed to promote Cuban policies and undercut US influence."[119] Grenada was seen as a classic example of this.

Britain's gradual withdrawal from the Caribbean left a legacy of political and economic instability to the newly independent microstates of the Eastern Caribbean. Both the Carter and Reagan administrations perceived the creation of a strategic vacuum that could unsettle the global balance of power. As a result the U.S. encouraged a militarization of the region and integrated it into a broader global context.[120] When the Grenada revolution was followed by left-wing electoral

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[119] "Statement of Daniel Lynch, Office of Political Analysis, Central Intelligence Agency," U.S. Congress. *Economic and Political Future of the Caribbean*, p. 116.

[120] Dion E. Phillips, "The Increasing Emphasis on Security and Defense in the Eastern Caribbean," in Young and Phillips (eds.), *Militarization*, p. 44. A prime example of the literature on the strategic vacuum argument is: Richard Sim and James Anderson, "The Caribbean Strategic Vacuum," *Conflict Studies* 121 (August 1980): 1-24.

victories in Dominica and St. Lucia it resurrected U.S. fears of "splashing dominoes" in the Caribbean. As one government official warned somewhat dramatically, there was "the possibility of upheaval producing radically inclined regimes on the smaller islands that might spread to larger countries like Jamaica, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic and balkanize the region with antagonistic political and economic systems."[121]

The domino theory posits that unrest in one country will engender the progressive and sequential collapse of neighbouring regimes for similar reasons. It is "prediction oriented" and long-term in timescale but offers no explanation as to why events would be triggered.[122] Such thinking would receive more attention during the Reagan administration. President Carter's "discovery" of a Soviet Combat Brigade in Cuba prompted him to announce that: "We will increase our economic assistance to alleviate the unmet economic and human needs in the Caribbean region and further to insure the ability of troubled people to resist social turmoil and possible Communist domination."[123] On October 1, 1979, Carter established a Joint Task Force at Key West, Florida.

The Deterioration of Relations

The tone of future relations was soon set when, on May 8, Bishop accused the CIA of conducting a multistage "Pyramid Plan" to destabilize Grenada.[124] The U.S.

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[121] Schoenhals and Melanson, *Revolution and Intervention*, p. 115.

[122] Stenelo, *Foreign Policy Predictions*, p. 149.

[123] Tad Szulc, "Caribbean," *New York Times Magazine*, May 25, 1979, p. 57.

[124] Bishop outlined a three-stage plan: 1. false media reports and the recruitment of prominent individuals to generate internal dissatisfaction. 2. violence and arson and 3. assassination. Rossin, *U.S.-Grenada Relations*, p. 29. The accusation was based primarily on two fires that had occurred on May 6. A SGU student had burnt down his cottage accommodation and coincidentally a building in St. George's was gutted in a suspected case of arson.

called the accusation "unwarranted and without foundation." Interestingly, at the same time Bishop told the U.S. embassy's DCM Eddy that he understood relations had got off to a bad start and wanted to improve them and believed that the White House and State Department wanted good relations and that the CIA were acting without authority.[125] In public and in private, as the Grenada documents confirm, Bishop saw CIA-backed agents behind every bush. Perhaps by targeting the CIA he felt he was not criticizing the U.S. government directly and that, given the CIA's history and image, the accusation would be more believable.

Probably by coincidence rather than in reaction to Bishop's "Pyramid" speech, NSC Director Brzezinski sent a memo to CIA Director Stansfield Turner on May 8 conveying President Carter's concerns about the growing Cuban presence in Grenada. The memo suggested some sort of covert effort to bring these developments to the attention of the international media.[126] The CIA responded on May 14 with a proposed political programme that went beyond Brzezinski's original suggestion by intending to counter the Cuban presence in Grenada. According to Gates, Carter signed a "finding" on July 3, 1979, that authorised covert operations to promote the democratic process and support domestic resistance to the Marxist PRG.[127]

When the Senate Intelligence Committee were briefed on the plan on July 19 they expressed their "strong displeasure," pointing out how such action would contradict the administration's stance on human rights and non-interference, and sent a letter to

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[125] Ibid., p. 30.

[126] Robert M. Gates, *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), p. 143.

[127] Ibid., p. 143.

the President informing him that they could not "support the projected covert action directed at Grenada."[128] Although the Committee had no legal jurisdiction over covert operations, the CIA, to the White House's dismay, respected the Committee's reaction and all plans for covert action against Grenada were shelved on July 23, 1979.[129]

In contrast to the support for covert action by the White House, NSC and CIA the State Department continued its more moderate line. On June 7 Assistant Secretary of State Viron Vaky met with Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard for 40 minutes at the second annual meeting of the Caribbean Group. Reflective of the State Department's optimism, Vaky told Coard that Washington wanted a "constructive relationship" and that there had been "misunderstandings" in the past but that this could be avoided in the future by establishing a "free and candid" dialogue.[130] Coard apparently agreed that it was time to rebuild the relationship but restated with "force and conviction" that Grenada was not a client state and would accept help from wherever it was offered.[131] Vaky inquired as to what the "true story" was concerning the Cubans in Grenada but Coard sidestepped the issue. Despite learning nothing new, Vaky felt that "the atmospherics were good and tended to support the impression we have received from several sources that the NRG (sic) is looking for ways to mend fences with us."[132]

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[128] Ibid., p. 143.

[129] Ibid., p. 143. The CIA had recently been the focus of an extensive Congressional investigation.

[130] Warren Christopher, confidential telegram to Amembassy Bridgetown, "Subject: Meeting Between Bernard Coard, Finance Minister of the NRG (sic) in Grenada, and Assistant Secretary Vaky," 160008Z, June 1979, Washington D.C. 154578, p. 2.

[131] Ibid., p. 2. Vaky described Coard as "intelligent, aggressive by nature, and self-confident and in explaining his government's policies and goals he was cogent and quite convincing." Ibid., p. 4.

[132] Ibid., p. 4.

By June 1979 the U.S. embassy had adopted a policy of regular consular visits and reduced direct contact with the PRG, working on a "listen and report" basis.[133] Ambassador Ortiz, who the PRG had seemingly taken a personal dislike to, was succeeded by Sally Shelton that same month. The PRG made noises about improving relations and the State Department and embassy felt that Shelton's appointment was "an opportunity for the U.S. to make another effort at reconciliation with the PRG and a new start at achieving our objectives."[134] The U.S. remained concerned about human rights, the lack of elections, the militarization of the island and the growing influence of Cuba. Shelton was instructed to make U.S. concerns clear and inform Bishop that to remove the causes of "tension or misunderstanding" their dialogue should be based on "frankness and candor."[135] An indication of the PRG's position was demonstrated immediately when they postponed Shelton's presentation of her "credentials" for seven weeks due to a newspaper article in which she had expressed her concern about PRG policies and relations.

Ambassador Shelton finally met with Bishop on July 23, 1979. The extradition of Gairy on charges of murder, fraud and misappropriation of government funds, was one of the topics discussed. Shelton explained that extradition was a complex and lengthy process. Afterwards she concluded that Gairy's return was important to the PRG but warned that it would be an easy target for more anti-U.S. propaganda and that she thought the PRG did not place a high priority on good relations with the

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[133] Telephone interview with Bushnell.

[134] Warren Christopher, secret telegram to Amembassy Bridgetown, "Subject: Talking Points for Your Meeting with Prime Minister Maurice Bishop of Grenada on June 18," 142202Z, June 1979, Washington D.C. 153150, p. 2.

[135] Ibid., p. 3. This was essentially the same message Vaky had given to Coard previously.

U.S.[136] A Department of Justice extradition expert visited Grenada in February 1980 to discuss the case in detail. He informed the PRG that their case would be legally stronger if they charged Gairy with financial rather than political crimes, although it could be a lengthier legal process. In reply Radix thanked the official and said, "you can leave it to us now."[137]

The next time the U.S. heard of the matter was via the media when Bishop accused the U.S. of procrastination. Washington felt impelled to announce that the Grenadian documentation on the case was "insufficient and inadequate" and that there was no evidence that Gairy had been plotting against the PRG and that the PRG had been told this repeatedly.[138] Washington's pique was discernible; they had made an appreciable effort to respond to the extradition request and advised the PRG how to expedite the process but once again the PRG had used the public arena to denounce the U.S. The PRG seemed interested in certain subjects but appeared to prefer to use them to generate anti-U.S. propaganda more than anything else.

Grenada's ties with Cuba, and later the Eastern Bloc, were the central concern of the U.S. and precluded the normalization of relations. A Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) meeting was due for September 21, 1979, and the Carter administration had spent the previous six months consulting with NAM governments in an attempt to encourage moderate leaders to participate in voting to prevent Cuba, Nicaragua (sic) and Grenada steering the organization towards a "natural alliance" with the Soviet

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[136] Rossin, *U.S.-Grenada Relations*, p. 36-7.

[137] Ibid., p. 40.

[138] Ibid., p. 42.

Union.[139] Unfortunately, the U.S. embassy in Barbados mistakenly passed on to Bishop a letter from the Secretary of State Cyrus Vance that was intended only for certain Latin American leaders, concerning the Cuban resolution to be proposed at the meeting.[140] Seizing an irresistible opportunity to denounce the U.S., Bishop used his speech at the meeting to accuse the U.S. of trying to get Grenada to lead a movement against Cuba and divide the NAM.

In December 1979 at a UN vote to condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Grenada joined Cuba as the only supporters of the action. For the State Department this was a "deep disappointment and a prime cause of disillusionment."[141] Henceforth, Grenada courted the Soviets as a mixture of ideological affinity and expediency. A number of economic and technical agreements ensued.

Bishop had announced in November 1979 that a second airport would be constructed at Point Salines. The need for improved airport facilities had been discussed several times since 1955.[142] A 1980 World Bank Memorandum confirmed earlier studies when it "identified air access as a major constraint on full utilization of existing capacity and further development of the [tourist] sector. Pearls Airport cannot accommodate international flights or night landings."[143] The PRG placed the

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[139] Robert Pastor, *The Carter Administration and Latin America: A Test of Principle* (Atlanta, Ga.: Carter Center of Emory University, 1992), p. 29. The Nicaraguan revolution did not occur until July 1979.

[140] Rossin, *U.S.-Grenada Relations*, p. 78.

[141] Ibid., p. 83.

[142] Brian Hudson, "The Changing Caribbean: Grenada's New International Airport," *Caribbean Geography* 1, no. 1 (May 1983): 52.

[143] Hugh O'Shaughnessy, *Grenada: Revolution, Invasion and Aftermath* (London: Sphere Books, 1984), p. 88.

airport at the centre of their economic strategy, anticipating that tourism and improved transport facilities would act as a catalyst for the economy.[144]

Grenada had already signed an extensive economic and technical agreement with Cuba and now Castro offered to contribute $10 million, 85 pieces of equipment and 250 technicians towards the project.[145] Grenada requested U.S. help but it was unsurprisingly declined on political and economic grounds.

With Cuba's public offer of aid almost pre-empting Bishop's announcement of the airport project many in Washington concluded that it was part of a Soviet-Cuban masterplan to convert Grenada into a military outpost. Strategists argued that at 9,000 feet the runway was designed to be able to handle military aircraft and that Castro wanted a secure staging post for moving troops to Angola and that Grenada would become a projection of Soviet power as part of a geopolitical circle of bases in the Caribbean.[146] This would pose an intolerable threat to the SLOCs which carried much of the U.S.' trade and, more importantly, would act as a major supply route to allies in time of crisis in Europe.[147] The PRG did little to assuage Washington's fears. When asked about the possibility of Cuba and the Soviet Union using the airport to transport troops to "hotspots" such as Angola, Bishop replied:

> suppose there's a war next door in Trinidad, where the forces of Fascism are about to take control, and the Trinidadians need external assistance. . . Why should we oppose anybody passing through Grenada to assist them.[148]

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[144] Jay Mandle, *Big Revolution, Small Country* (Lanham, Md.: North-South, 1985), p. 23.

[145] Lewis, *Reform and Revolution*, p. 219.

[146] Telephone interview with former Department of Defense official, October 10, 1994.

[147] Michael Desch, "Turning the Caribbean Flank: Sea-Lane Vulnerability During a European War," *Survival* (November-December 1987): 530.

[148] Larry Rohter, "Grenada: A Tiny Exporter Of Revolution?," *Newsweek*, March 31, 1980, p. 44.

Incontrovertible proof that the Cubans or Soviets would have used the airport does not exist. President Reagan would place greater emphasis on the intended use of the airport and I will examine his use of the issue later. Whether it would have been used as a military facility is inconsequential; the airport's potential use as a military facility and Cuban involvement in its construction meant that the U.S. perception of it was as a potential Soviet-Cuban military facility.

Consolidating the Revolution

In keeping with the accusations of destabilisation the PRG moved to control the media. The oppositionist *Torchlight* newspaper was closed down by the government in October 1979 for printing "lies and distorted information and. . . excluding pro-government news, thus threatening national security."[149] People's Law 81 was passed to limit individuals to a four percent stake in any particular medium and banned foreign ownership entirely. This law automatically transferred all foreign shares, and those of Grenadians who held more than four percent, to the PRG.[150] Despite its compliance with People's Law 81 the Roman Catholic Church's *Catholic Focus* was closed down by the PRG after its first issue.

Once in power the PRG began to rely increasingly on state repression for control. Numerous counterrevolutionary plots, real and imagined, were uncovered and arrests made. The most serious of these occurred on June 19, 1980, when a bomb exploded near the podium the entire PRG Cabinet was on at a rally in Queen's Park. Three

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[149] John A. Lent, "Mass Media and Socialist Governments in the Commonwealth Caribbean," *Human Rights Quarterly* (1982): 387.

[150] The main targets of this arrangement were a Grenadian, D.M.B. Cromwell, who owned 22 percent, and the *Trinidad Express* newspaper which owned 13 percent. Ibid., p. 387.

members of the crowd were killed. Bishop soon after claimed that the assassination attempt was one of the "foul deeds of imperialism."[151]

True to form the PRG used the bombing to generate more anti-U.S. propaganda. The chosen forum this time was the UN; on July 2 the Grenadian Representative circulated a note with details of the assassination attempt. The PRG's penchant for propaganda victories was highlighted by this as talks between the State Department and PRG officials, with a view to "high-level" dialogue, were in process.[152] Unsurprisingly the talks quickly ceased.

In the aftermath of the Queen's Park bombing civil liberties were again eroded as a Terrorism (Prevention) Law was passed. The number of political prisoners climbed further and Bishop derided democracy as:

> a situation where every five years, and for five seconds in those five years, a people are allowed to put an "X" next to some candidate's name, and for those five seconds they became democrats.[153]

The PRA functioned as the enforcers of NJM policies and assumed the:

> responsibility for protecting the revolution from counter revolutionaries. They quickly became the eyes and ears. . . Allegations or mere suspicion of being a "counter" resulted in detention because "no one would be allowed to stop the wheels of progress" . . . [T]he net of suspicion of being a "counter" was spread very wide.[154]

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[151] Rossin, *U.S.-Grenada Relations*, p. 53.

[152] Ibid., p. 57. As the embassy sardonically reported: "we are in for an even more difficult period in our relationship with the insecure, paranoid and self-righteous PRG, as it continues to blame the US for its internal security problems and whip up pro-revolutionary fervor at US expense." Sally Shelton, confidential telegram to Secretary of State, "Subject: US-Grenadian Relations in the Aftermath of the Bomb Blast," 232024Z, June 1980, Bridgetown 03122, p.3.

[153] "Forward Ever! Against Imperialism and Towards Genuine National Independence and People's Power, March 13, 1980," Marcus and Taber (eds.), *Maurice Bishop Speaks*, p. 84.

[154] Cynthia Mahabir, "Heavy Manners and Making Freedom under the People's Revolutionary Government in Grenada, 1979-1983," *International Journal of the Sociology of Law* 21 (1993): 225.

In Washington such actions only served to reinforce and advance perceptions of the PRG as a hard-line socialist government with a less than healthy respect for human rights.

In November 1979 two American citizens in Grenada had been arrested and denied access to U.S. consuls. This "mini-hostage" situation was naturally cause for concern. Remarks by the PRG's Minister of Industrial Development Kendrick Radix at the UN and later by minister of Mobilisation Selwyn Strachan suggested that the PRG's obsession with the extradition of Gairy might lead them to seize U.S. citizens in retaliation for perceived U.S. tardiness over Gairy. Such a scenario may or may not have been far-fetched but the spectre of another hostage crisis led Washington to instruct Shelton that in her next meeting with Bishop, scheduled for December 17, 1979, to "carry out a demarche on the treatment of American citizens arrested in Grenada and PRG violations of consular conventions" and convince Bishop that the protection of U.S. citizens was of paramount concern for Washington.[155]

Washington expected Bishop would again express his desire for good relations; this time in light of all that had occurred in the past few months, the message from Washington was that Bishop should get the:

> definite impression that we view the PRG as responsible for the deterioration in U.S.-PRG relations and any improvement in our relations can only occur if there are important changes in the way the PRG relates to the U.S.[156]

The prospects for this were minimal.

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[155] Cyrus Vance, confidential telegram to Amembassy Bridgetown, "Subject: Talking Points for Meeting with PM Bishop," 150133Z, December 1979, Washington D.C. 322604, p. 1.

[156] Ibid., p. 2.

Military, Economic and Political Policies

As U.S. hopes for an improvement in relations ebbed, their policies reflected this. In February 1980 Bushnell warned that: "The rapid reduction in the British role in the Caribbean requires us to open the door to cooperative security relationships. . . To do otherwise is to leave the field to Cuba, which is aggressively expanding its influence with its smaller Caribbean neighbours."[157] The U.S. made its feelings clear in May 1980 with the Operation Solid Shield military manoeuvres in the region involving 20,000 men, 42 ships, 350 aircraft and a landing at Guantanamo in Cuba.[158] The message sent to Grenada was unequivocal.

U.S. economic aid was the most realistic method of nudging Grenada away from Cuba. Bishop had included economic destabilization as part of the CIA's "Pyramid Plan" and it is difficult to dispute that U.S. policy was punitive. The first example of this occurred in January 1980 after severe floods in Grenada. The PRG requested help from the OAS' Emergency Unit, FONDEM, but the U.S. AID delegate questioned the need for aid and insisted that an investigation be conducted.[159] Aid was finally granted but only after a long delay.

On August 2-3, 1980, Hurricane Allen swept through the Eastern Caribbean badly damaging the all-important banana crops.[160] The Windward Islands Banana Association (WINBAN) and St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Dominica immediately

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[157] U.S. Congress, *Economic and Political Future of the Caribbean*, p. 68.

[158] Pearce, *Under the Eagle*, p. 154. Bishop protested that the exercise was "planned to intimidate, and to bring horror to our people." "Grenada and Solid Shield 1980," *GDMC*, no. 006896.

[159] Chris Searle, *Grenada*, p. 56.

[160] 97 percent of the crop were lost in St. Lucia, 95 percent in St. Vincent, 75 percent in Dominica and 40 percent in Grenada. Pearce, *Under the Eagle*, p. 141.

requested U.S. aid, but Grenada did not. It was not until September 8, when the Grenadian Representative to the UN passed a letter to the U.S. Representative, that Grenada requested help. The U.S.' final decision was to dispense $1.8 million between St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Dominica because they were the worst affected. Grenada received nothing on the grounds that she suffered less damage and bananas were not the island's main crop. Washington was cynical: "What it really was was a case of a belated, dubious and relatively unjustified Grenadian request for aid probably made precisely so it would be rejected and could be used for propaganda."[161] The inherent bad faith that pervaded relations and the politicization of the economic aid programme was manifest in this decision.

In the U.S.' defence it must be remembered that both ambassadors Ortiz and Shelton had offered aid when the possibility of good relations still existed but by late 1979 this was not the case. Rossin acknowledges that while many of the PRG's allegations of economic destabilization by the U.S. were "either created from whole cloth or are serious distortions of the original situations. Others did happen, and represent efforts by the United States to protect its own security and interests as the major aid donor in the region."[162]

The regional approach of the AID programs also complicated matters because "direct assistance to individual islands or organizations on individual Islands is precluded much to the consternation of the citizenry who see their problems as specific and immediate."[163] Regional bodies such as the CDB were large

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[161] Rossin, *U.S.-Grenada Relations*, p. 68.

[162] Ibid., p. 62.

[163] U.S. Congress, *Economic and Political Future of the Caribbean*, p. 68.

bureaucracies and made receiving aid a slow process. Setting aside the fact that the PRG were probably never seriously interested in receiving U.S. aid, it is not difficult to imagine the PRG concluding that the U.S. was dragging its feet over the aid question.

As a Commonwealth country, Grenada also approached Britain for help. The newly elected Thatcher government was a firm supporter of the "Special Relationship" and declared their support for Washington's line; London had been pulling out of the Caribbean and saw no reason to oppose the U.S.' policy. The PRG's application for a new bilateral aid programme was rejected. Overseas Development Minister Neil Marten explained to the House of Commons that "greater weight should be given in the allocation of British aid to political. . . considerations."[164] The authoritarian PRG were clearly excluded.

The U.S.' economic policy undoubtedly had an important impact on the PRG but they were already following their chosen road. As Ambursley points out, the PRG's economic policy involved the mobilization of all sources of international sources of financial aid.[165] With Grenada's ideological disposition and Cuba's desire to help Grenada become a showcase for Cuban Third World aid programmes it was inevitable that closer ties would develop.

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[164] Jonathan Bloch and Patrick Fitzgerald, *British Government Policy on Grenada Since 1979* (London: n.p., 1983), p. 4. Grenada had received a £2.25 million grant from Britain upon independence in 1974 but by 1979 most of this had been spent. Although Britain honoured its project commitments under the 1974 agreement no new aid agreement was proposed. Thus British aid gradually decreased, £198,100 in 1979-80 to an estimated £96,300 in 1980-81. U.K. House of Commons. *Parliamentary Questions*, Written PQs (Hansard). Third Series - Volume 45, Session 1980-81, June 9, 1981.

[165] Fitzroy Ambursley, "Grenada: the New Jewel Revolution," in Robin Cohen and Fitzroy Ambursley (eds.), *Crisis in the Caribbean* (London: Heinemann, 1983), p. 208.

Politically, the distancing tactics were also evident. After visiting the embassy in Barbados, U.S. Senator Ottley reported that ambassador Shelton felt she was overextended and accredited to too many places and that more regular visits and a greater physical presence would enhance relations.[166] The recommendation was never followed up. The U.S. also refused to recognize the PRG's nominee as ambassador to the U.S., Dessima Williams.[167] Ambassador Shelton was forbidden from paying the customary farewell visit to Grenada irrespective of Bishop's invite to discuss "matters of mutual interest with a view to promoting and developing friendly relations."[168] Ambassador Shelton and some of her staff believed that it would be in Washington's best interest to accept the invite:

> particularly in view of the apparent shift in PRG views on the questions of Gairy's extradition and Williams' agrement. It may well be that the PRG would like to remove these irritants from our bilateral relations so that it can begin on a different footing with the new U.S. President, a suggestion supported by a diminution of anti-U.S. rhetoric. . . Our policy of distancing ourselves from the PRG may be having an effect with Bishop appearing to feel that it is better to talk face-to-face than to continue to hurl epithets publicly.[169]

Shelton's view had few supporters in Washington or the embassy; by January 1981 the patience and appetite for improved relations had disappeared. The bottom line was that good relations were dependent on the reduction of links with Cuba, a return

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[166] Memo, Jeffrey Farrow to Robert Pastor, NSC, March 28, 1980, "Pastor" folder, White House Central File-Name File, Jimmy Carter Library.

[167] Washington had reservations about Williams due to her repeated verbal attacks on the U.S. as Grenada's Permanent Representative to the OAS, her inexperience and possible involvement in gunrunning from the U.S. to Grenada prior to the revolution. Washington delayed making a decision on the subject hoping that the PRG would get the message that the U.S. would prefer an alternative candidate. Warren Christopher, confidential telegram to Amembassy Bridgetown, "Subject: Request for Agrement for Dessima Williams as PRG Ambassador to the United States,' 151521Z, May 1980, Washington D.C. 127947, pp. 1-3.

[168] "Telex to the United States Embassy, Barbados, 12.12.80," *GDMC*, no. 003104.

[169] Sally Shelton, confidential telegram to Secretary of State, "Subject: Grenada Requests Ambassador to Visit for High-Level Consultations," 161402Z, December 1980, Bridgetown 07147, section 2, p. 2.

to constitutional government, free and fair elections, improved human rights, a reduction in anti-U.S. rhetoric and a true non-aligned policy. This was hardly a flexible line that left room for Grenada to manoeuvre in, but the Grenadian leopard was not about to change its "spots." The U.S. had classified Grenada as "a country which seeks and exploits occasions to harm the interests of democratic societies around it."[170] Washington felt deceived by the PRG's move towards Cuba and violation of its commitments to elections and irritated by Bishop's incessant accusations and thus decided it was preferable to ignore and isolate Grenada. The embassy summed up the U.S.' perception of the situation in October 1980:

> The PRG continues in its mindset that all differences between us are the fault of the United States Government, that they have not acted in any way against us, and that it is up to the USG to take steps to correct these matters. . . We are more useful to the PRG as a bogeyman than as a friend.[171]

It must be remembered that Grenada was never a major concern, mostly being handled at Assistant Secretary level. This would change gradually with the accession of the right-wing Reagan Administration.

Unease in the Backyard

After an optimistic start Grenada's relations with its neighbours declined. The post-independence islands realized they could not afford a national military capability, reasoning that international security arrangements, such as the OAS, or the U.S.' historical pre-eminence would protect them. In addition, CARICOM felt immune to political extremism and regional instability, being isolated by the long tradition of

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[170] Rossin, *U.S.-Grenada Relations*, p. 85.

[171] Virgil Randolph, confidential telegram to Secretary of State, "Subject: Grenada Blames U.S. for Poor Relations," 231915Z, October 1980, Bridgetown 06314, p. 3.

Westminister democracy.[172] Until the 1979 coup the Eastern Caribbean governments "did not assert a perception of threat to national security in the traditional sense."[173]

The Eastern Caribbean's threat perception saw Grenada as a "threat to governmental survival through contagion and possibly subversion, as well as a threat to the traditional political culture."[174] Caribbean concern was increased by left-wing electoral victories in June and July in Dominica and St. Lucia respectively. On August 13 and August 16, 1979, Grenada, Dominica and St. Lucia signed the Declaration of St. George's which, among other things, stated that: "popular democracy, respect for the rights of workers and social and economic justice for the masses must be the main objectives of their government."[175] It appeared that a "new Left" was emerging in the region. Throughout the islands various left-wing opposition groups flexed their muscles in anticipation.

The threat Grenada posed was exaggerated but it must be remembered that a small force of men could overthrow a government and there were a number of coup scares during this period. With the Eastern Caribbean governments growing disquiet the militarization in Grenada only exacerbated the situation.

Grenada's relations with the U.S. worsened almost as fast as those with Cuba, and later the Eastern Bloc, improved. By mid-April there were 2,000 Cuban-armed PRA

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[172] H. Michael Erisman, "The CARICOM States and U.S. Foreign Policy: The Danger of Central Americanization," *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs* 31, no. 3 (Fall 1989): 142.

[173] Vaughan A. Lewis, "International, National and Regional Security Arrangements in the Caribbean," in Anthony T. Bryan, J. Edward Greene and Timothy M. Shaw (eds.), *Peace, Development and Security in the Caribbean* (London: Macmillan, 1990), p. 283.

[174] Jacqueline Anne Braveboy-Wagner, *The Caribbean in World Affairs: The Foreign Policies of the English-Speaking States* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989), p. 29.

[175] "The Declaration of St. George's," *Bulletin of Eastern Caribbean Affairs* 5, no. 3 (July-August 1979): 32.

and militia members and approximately 40-80 Cuban advisors in Grenada.[176] Prime Minister Adams, the harshest critic of the PRG, described the Grenada-Cuba military link as "obnoxious, dangerous and unwise."[177] Several secret military agreements were also signed; that security relationships existed was assumed because in the smallness and intimacy of the Eastern Caribbean system each leader knows approximately the security relationships of their neighbours but this was not so with Grenada, increasing their unease.[178] The leaders had always assumed that the U.S. would act to prevent Cuba establishing a presence in the area but that presumption was now being challenged.

The inflexibility of the PRG foreign policy's "principled positions" and description of Cuba as a "beacon" for the Revolution gave little scope for cooperation with other governments. The neighbouring states continued to pressure Grenada over human rights, links with Cuba, political prisoners and elections. Bishop's unflattering response to Tom Adams' remarks in November 1980 suggesting Grenada's lack of elections would restrict the ability of the CDB to attract investors, compared Adams to "an expectant dog barking for his supper, he rushes in to please his new master Reagan like all good yard fowls by attacking Grenada."[179] This invective mirrored

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[176] Pastor, "Does the United States," p. 12.

[177] Ralph E. Gonsalves, "The Importance of the Grenada Revolution to the Eastern Caribbean," *Bulletin of Eastern Caribbean Affairs* 5, no. 1 (March-April 1979): 9.

[178] U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs. Committee on Foreign Affairs. *The English-Speaking Caribbean: Current Conditions and Implications for U.S. Policy*, Report by the Congressional Research Service of the Proceedings of a Workshop held on December 11, 1984 (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1985), p. 100. Hereafter this will be referred to as U.S. Congress. Workshop, *The English-Speaking Caribbean*. During the PRG's reign military aid treaties were signed with the Soviet Union, Cuba, North Korea, East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Vietnam. For the exact details of these agreement see Michael Ledeen and Herbert Romerstein (eds.), *The Grenada Documents: An Overview and Selection* (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1984). Referred to hereafter as *Grenada Documents*.

[179] Eudine Barriteau, "Regional Comments on Barbados-Grenada Relations," *Bulletin of Eastern Caribbean Affairs* 6, no. 5 (November-December 1980): 23.

Grenada's relations with the U.S. Adams had pursued a policy of "quiet diplomacy" towards Grenada rather than utilizing the media and there was great concern over the personal and very public nature of Bishop's criticism.

Whilst the Eastern Caribbean tolerated Grenada they simultaneously pursued a more security-oriented path. Only a few weeks after the coup, Tom Adams and Trinidad and Tobago's Prime Minister Eric Williams signed a Memorandum of Understanding acknowledging security problems, notably, "terrorism, piracy, the use of mercenaries and the introduction into the region of techniques of subversion."[180] In May 1979 WIAS agreed on the future establishment of the OECS which included plans for a regional defense force.

Grenada's militarization was unsurprisingly interpreted as "offensive" rather than "defensive" and, as Bushnell told Congress, "these events. . . triggered concern among Caribbean leaders themselves about the security of the region, and led them to approach us and others for help."[181] After the Soviet Brigade incident, Carter designated Barbados, who had never received U.S. military aid, for a special role and disbursed five million dollars for communication and navigational equipment to "strengthen the security of the entire Eastern Caribbean."[182] Other measures included increased International Military and Education Training (IMET) programs, wider access to military training, introducing the use of the FMS credit system and more

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[180] Dion E. Phillips, "Defense Policy in Barbados, 1966-88," *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs* 32, no. 2 (Summer 1990): 77. Having almost been toppled by a radical-led revolt and army mutiny fed by Black Power militancy in 1970, Williams had pursued a repressive policy against perceived left-wing subversion. Bishop's letters to Williams went unopened.

[181] "Statement of John A. Bushnell, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State," U.S. Congress, *Economic and Political Future of the Caribbean*, p. 12.

[182] Phillips, "Defense Policy in Barbados," p. 80.

emphasis on a Regional Coast Guard training programme.[183] When the British Foreign Secretary Peter Carrington visited the region in August 1980 he brought details of ten million dollars of aid.[184]

Apart from Grenada, only Barbados had a standing army, the Barbados Defense Force (BDF).[185] In December 1979 Prime Minister Adams had received a request for help from the newly elected St. Vincentian Prime Minister Milton Cato to help him quell an uprising by a group of Rastafarians on Union Island in the Grenadines. Adams' intelligence reports convinced him that it was the beginning of a wider revolt and he did not hesitate in sending a detachment of the BDF to St. Vincent to "hold the fort" and free the St. Vincentian police to retake Union Island. This episode was notable as the first time one Commonwealth Caribbean country had provided military aid to another. Having demonstrated the will to act swiftly against any potential threat, Adams, clearly thinking of Grenada, served notice that the operation was "an assertion by a freely and democratically elected government that the forces of law and

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[183] "Statement of John A. Bushnell," U.S. Congress, *Economic and Political Future of the Caribbean*, p. 8.

[184] Barbados purchased a gunboat, converted four shrimping boats to patrol vessels and received a secondment of Royal Navy officers. St. Vincent received £250,000 and purchased a patrol craft, as did St. Lucia. Britain also enhanced the regional police training programme. Bloch and Fitzgerald, *British Government Policy*, pp. 6-7.

[185] The BDF was formed in August 1979 and by 1983 contained some 610 members. Phillips, 'Barbados Defense Policy,' p. 81. The Dominica Defense Force (Dominican Defence Force) was disbanded in April 1981. The DDF had displayed its animosity toward Prime Minister Charles ever since her election in 1980. In deciding to disband the DDF Charles cited "the army's EC$ three million annual cost, the apparent ties of some of its members to the coup attempt. . . insubordination and lack of discipline among its ranks, its failure to contribute to post-hurricane reconstruction, the poor upkeep of its quarters, and. . . missing weapons." Janet Higbie, *Eugenia: The Caribbean's Iron Lady* (London: Macmillan, 1993), p. 202. Members of the defunct DDF were later involved in another abortive coup against Charles. Of the other islands, the St. Kitts-Nevis Defense Force was also disbanded in 1981 partly due to a lack of justification for its maintenance and the new government's doubts about the allegiances of the army and police leaders. St. Lucia only had a police force as did St. Vincent and the Grenadines. The Antigua-Barbuda Defense Force created in September 1981 was the only other military organisation. Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith, *The Quest for Security in the Caribbean: Problems and Promises in Subordinate States* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), p. 130. The islands basically relied on their police forces for security matters.

order will be used to ensure that the rule of 'one man, one gun' would not prevail throughout our region against the rule of 'one man, one vote'."[186]

Interestingly, as Maingot observes, Grenada's excessive militarization did not generate a "security dilemma" which can occur when "the means by which one state provides for its security creates insecurity for others."[187] Military aid to the region increased dramatically but this was multilateral in nature, with Barbados at the hub. St. Vincent's former leader, James "Son" Mitchell, succinctly summarized the general Eastern Caribbean countries sentiments towards militarization: "the more arms we have available in the country, the greater will be the temptation to solve our problems with a coup."[188]

Conclusion

In conclusion it is possible to say that Gairy was an eccentric, repressive, autocrat. The political awakening and subsequent enfranchisement of Grenada's youth was particularly influenced by the Black Power movement and out of this the NJM emerged. After losing one fraudulent election to Gairy the NJM believed that force was the only way to remove him. Thus on March 13, 1979, a NJM coup toppled Gairy, a widely popular action in Grenada and the region.

The U.S. sought, and accepted, the Eastern Caribbean and British judgment in deciding to recognise the PRG. Bishop's pledge to hold "free and fair" elections assuaged U.S. suspicions and left Washington sanguine about future relations. They

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[186] F.A. Hoyos, *Tom Adams: A Biography* (London: Macmillan, 1988), p. 110.

[187] K.J. Holsti, *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1992), p. 67.

[188] Anthony P. Maingot, "The United States in the Caribbean: Geopolitics and the Bargaining Capacity of Small States," in Bryan et al., *Peace, Development and Security*, p. 74.

conceded that the PRG had different views but initially believed that they wanted good relations with the U.S. Holding the PRG to their promise of early elections was of central importance; elections would have signified the PRG's good intentions, a readiness to rely on a honest test of their support amongst Grenadians and legitimised the new government.[189] Frustrated by the PRG's evasiveness over their aid requirements the U.S. grew concerned when it was apparent that Grenada was establishing close ties to Cuba.

When ambassador Ortiz informed Bishop that the effect of "an intimate relationship between the NRG (sic) and Cuba in the military and security areas might eventually be to limit the breadth and depth of the kind of relationship that would be possible with the US,"[190] Bishop, in a style that became familiar, publicly blasted the U.S. for telling Grenada who they could have relations with. At this formative stage the U.S. lacked solid information on the PRG's intentions and consequently decisionmakers had to rely on images which acted as filters. This is significant because once Cuba became involved the image of Grenada was affected and their evident "rejection of the traditional relations was not seen as a sign of independence. Instead, the U.S. concern was that they would become dependents of the enemy."[191] Whilst it is important not to over-emphasize the Ortiz episode its impact on an inexperienced PRG, feeling vulnerable and sensitive to criticism, was negative. In light of the U.S.' patience and optimism of the previous weeks it was a turning point:

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[189] Edward S. Herman and Frank Brodhead, *Demonstration Elections: U.S.-Staged Elections in the Dominican Republic, Vietnam, and El Salvador* (Boston: South End Press, 1986), p. 181.

[190] Christopher, "Subject: Talking Points," p. 7.

[191] Cottam, *Images and Intervention*, p. 25.

the PRG's "response confirmed the impression in Washington that these young Marxists wanted to provoke the U.S. to justify their militarization and alliance with Cuba.[192]

About six weeks after the revolution the NSC held a mini-SCC meeting that recommended the previously described "regional" strategy to President Carter. With no sign of elections, a steady flow of anti-U.S. rhetoric, vague requests for aid and the growing ties with Cuba, it appeared that the PRG's professed interest in good relations was superficial. It is likely that the PRG clearly understood that their political programme was of the type Washington would not find acceptable. Although they may have wished for normal diplomatic relations they were not willing to sacrifice their domestic and international political programme in order to secure Washington's blessing.

At the State Department the feeling was that good relations with Grenada were not unrealistic but only possible if the PRG did things they were not going to do. Grenadian relations with Cuba would have been acceptable, to the State Department at least, if they had been on the same level as Grenada's relations with the U.S. According to Bushnell, Washington did not have the conscious impression that the PRG deliberately wanted bad relations but felt that they knew their actions would be incompatible with normal relations with the U.S.[193] Despite the fact that covert action was planned for, in the overall scheme of things in Washington, Grenada was never high on the list.

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[192] Pastor, "Does the United States," p. 12.

[193] Telephone interview with Bushnell.

As the point of contact with Grenada, the U.S. embassy in Barbados was more optimistic but as time passed the absence of elections, rising numbers of political prisoners, press restrictions and relationship with Cuba provided little incentive for talking with the PRG. Washington settled into its "distancing" policy, adjusting it to suit its concerns. Some ties with Grenada were cut and the establishment of new ones was avoided; attention was focused on issues where contact with the PRG was unavoidable, basically the welfare of U.S. citizens and SGU business.

In the Eastern Caribbean the coup "opened up a Pandora's Box of questions related to legitimacy, morality, constitutionality and recognition."[194] Grenada's relations with Cuba and the Soviet Union and the prospect of Grenada acting as a political precedent was unsettling. The other islands also feared the divisive effects of the PRG's ideological stance:

> The NJM posture and rhetoric were somewhat extreme in the degree of alignment with Cuba, and the USSR, and the extent of hostility to the United States. Some countries, therefore, distanced themselves from Grenada, thereby weakening the region's collaborative and supportive network.[195]

Whereas U.S.-Grenadian relations nose-dived almost immediately, Eastern Caribbean leaders followed their own agenda, albeit a more security conscious one. The left-wing victories in Dominica and St. Lucia were ephemeral; in 1980 the political climate in the region changed with a series of right-wing victories in Jamaica, St. Kitts-Nevis, Dominica and Antigua, as well as Ronald Reagan's victory in the U.S. By January 1981 the PRG were relatively isolated and relations with her neighbours decidedly frosty.

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[194] Gonsalves, "The Importance of the Grenada Revolution," p. 3.

[195] Griffith, *The Quest for Security*, p. 234.

With Reagan's accession the Caribbean was viewed in even starker Cold War terms and U.S.-Grenadian relations reached an impasse. From this time on Washington resigned themselves to the fact that relations were never likely to improve unless Grenada wished them to. As Cottam notes, "once policy considerations began, any return to any earlier stage was difficult"; the PRG provided the U.S. embassy in Barbados with little positive news to report to Washington and consequently incoming information generally confirmed "earlier interpretations and decisions to allow consideration only of alternatives in the current stage."[196] For both governments relations had an almost irreversible quality that effectively militated against cooperative relations.

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[196] Cottam, *Images and Intervention*, p. 34.

CHAPTER 3

U.S.-GRENADIAN RELATIONS: THE REAGAN YEARS (1981-1983)

In this chapter I will examine U.S.-Grenadian relations from President Reagan's inauguration until Prime Minister Bishop's visit to Washington in June 1983. Whilst the Reagan administration pursued a policy similar to that of its predecessor, relations were noticeably more antagonistic. I will concentrate on certain episodes that highlight the development of relations and examine the economic, political and military pressure that the U.S. exerted on the PRG. The Reagan administration adopted a very different approach to Latin America from Carter and consequently this has to be understood as background to U.S.-Grenadian relations.

Ronald Reagan portrayed the 1970's as a decade of "doubt, defeat, deceit, and despair," frightening and angering the public into supporting him.[1] By January 1981 détente had been discredited, a tougher stance toward the Soviet Union adopted and defence spending increased. Reagan's beliefs were those of a committed Cold Warrior: the world system was bipolar, Communism was monolithic and expansionist, local conflicts were communist-inspired and compromise was a sign of naiveté and weakness.[2] Reagan later described the Soviet Union as the "evil empire" and "the focus of evil in the modern world."[3] He was also strongly influenced by the

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[1] Melanson, "Action History," p. 230.

[2] Rystad, *Prisoners of the Past?*, p. 44.

[3] Cannon, *President Reagan*, p. 316.

legacy of Vietnam, which he believed had produced a more isolationist U.S., hesitant to protect its interests overseas.

The administration's Latin America policy was heavily influenced by the Santa Fe Committee, a group of five Conservative academics, and their *New Inter-American Policy for the Eighties* report which warned that the Caribbean was:

> becoming a Marxist-Leninist lake. Never before has the Republic been in such jeopardy from its exposed southern flank. Never before has American foreign policy abused, abandoned, and betrayed its allies to the south in Latin America.[4]

The administration's geostrategic outlook amalgamated the Caribbean and Central America and defined it as a "Caribbean Basin."[5] This was a highly ideological concept based on bipolarity and the "linkage" theory of world affairs where change represented instability which was fomented by the Soviets and Cubans and was a security threat.[6] An increasingly strong Soviet military and expansionist Soviet policy in Central America led Reagan to adopt a hard-line. Secretary of State Alexander Haig threatened to "go to the source" of the instability (Cuba) and Reagan promised that El Salvador would be the place where the U.S. would draw the line against communism. Aid to Nicaragua was frozen, military aid and advisors sent to El Salvador and a contra army funded in Nicaragua.

Although Reagan talked tough, his Central America policy was restricted by two influential historical analogies. As Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Langhorne Motley said: "There are two things the American people do not

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[4] Robert Pastor, *Whirlpool: U.S. Foreign Policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 67.

[5] The Basin includes the Caribbean islands, Mexico and the littoral countries of Central America and Northern South America.

[6] W. Andrew Axline, "Political Change and U.S. Strategic Concerns in the Caribbean," *Latin American Research Review* 21 (1986): 217.

want. . . Another Cuba on the mainland of Central America, and another Vietnam."[7] Another pro-Soviet communist regime was unacceptable and so was the use of U.S. soldiers in a potentially sustained campaign to prevent it. The impact of these analogies led to the selection of secretly funding a contra army.

In the Caribbean, Cuba was the target of U.S. attention. Reagan was determined to oppose and contain Cuban/communist activity in the region. As one official stated, "Cuba is the vital cog - the element that transforms Soviet ideology, power, and money into an effective policy instrument in the Western Hemisphere."[8] In April 1981 an interagency task force under Secretary of State Haig considered blockading Cuba, fomenting an internal uprising, intercepting Cuban troop ships and planes and even a military invasion.[9] Fundamentally, Reagan continued the U.S. policy of isolating Cuba.

The Importance of the Caribbean to the U.S.

The new administration portrayed the Caribbean as a vulnerable "backyard" area that must be secured and denied to extra-hemispheric incursions.[10] This geostrategic view stressed the importance of the ability to counter Soviet and Cuban activity, access to raw materials, secure SLOCs, access to U.S. military bases and protection

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[7] Walter LaFeber, *Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1993), p. 280.

[8] Nestor Sanchez, "The Communist Threat," *Foreign Policy* 52, (Fall 1983): 44.

[9] Max Azicri, "Cuba and the U.S.: What Happened to Rapprochement?" in Barry B. Levine (ed.), *The New Cuban Presence in the Caribbean* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983), p. 176.

[10] James R. Greene and Brent Scowcroft (eds.), *Western Interests and U.S. Policy Options in the Caribbean Basin*, Report of the Atlantic Council's Working Group on the Caribbean Basin (Boston: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1984), p. 144.

of the Panama Canal.[11] Security was seen as an essential precondition for political, economic and social development. The U.S. has inescapable ties with the Caribbean; Secretary of State George Shultz warned in 1982 that "if this region should be dominated by regimes hostile to us or if it becomes the scene of prolonged social upheavals, the impact on our economy and society would, indeed, be of major proportions."[12] In 1981 alone, U.S. exports to the region totaled $6.8 billion, imports $9.9 billion and investment $22.5 billion.[13]

The Caribbean Basin was also a test site for U.S. credibility. During the Cold War images and perceptions were pivotal. Reagan warned that: "If we cannot defend ourselves in this area. . . we cannot expect to prevail elsewhere. Our credibility would collapse, our alliances would crumble, and the safety of our homeland would be put at jeopardy."[14] Reagan had promised to restore U.S. credibility during his election campaign and the "backyard" was the place to start.

Images

The Reagan administration's perception of Grenada can contribute to understanding the decline of relations. Images are basically:

> perceptual filters that organize our environment and enable us to predict and respond to that environment. . . they contain "facts," which we hold as true, and

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[11] The significance of these factors has been questioned: Schoultz argues that whilst SLOC's are important, the Panama Canal is more a convenience than necessity as most of the important cargoes do not use it and the U.S. possesses a multi-ocean navy. Lars Schoultz, *National Security and United States Policy toward Latin America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 218. For a detailed study of the significance of the Panama Canal see John Major, *Prize Possession: the United States and the Panama Canal* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

[12] Ibid., p. 117.

[13] Thomas Enders, "A Comprehensive Strategy for the Caribbean Basin," *Caribbean Review* XI, no. 2 (Spring 1982): 11.

[14] Michael Klare, "The Reagan Doctrine," *New Statesman*, November 4, 1983, p. 10.

which tell us how we can and should respond to that behaviour.[15]

States naturally categorize other states and ascribe them attributes of each particular category. Richard Cottam described five images: enemy, ally, imperial, colonial and complex.[16] The Soviet Union and Cuba fitted the enemy category and Grenada fitted Martha Cottam's category of "dependent of the enemy."[17] The images were based on the country's military and economic strength, domestic policy and goals and cultural sophistication generally. The dependent image portrayed a childlike, unsophisticated, populace, incapable of making and implementing decisions unaided, a leadership whose intentions threatened the U.S. and were conditioned by the U.S.' relations with the enemy state and a country that was weak and whose reliance on the enemy increased its influence in the area.[18]

Images are time-saving devices and the processing of information would be impossible without them but they are problematical too. Once Grenada was stereotyped U.S. policymakers adopted a simplified view and overlooked the more complex reality. As images also contribute to the evaluation and interpretation of information they tend to ignore or distort information that is not consistent with the image.[19] Thus, assuming Grenada was seriously interested in improving relations, her attempts would be interpreted through this "dependent of the enemy" image rather than at face value.

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[15] Cottam, *Images and Intervention*, p. 10.

[16] Cottam, *Foreign Policy Decision Making*, p. 46.

[17] Cottam, *Images and Intervention*, p. 11. Grenada was variously classified as a Soviet-Cuban satellite, surrogate, protégé and vassal state.

[18] Ibid., p. 21.

[19] Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, p. 143.

Another evident factor was "inherent bad faith." Each side were disposed to believe that good behaviour was forced upon the other by the situation but that bad behaviour was indicative of the opponents negative disposition rather than the situation which consequently reinforced the negative stereotype of the opponent.[20] With neither willing to credit the other with good behaviour a return to better relations was unlikely because:

> when the opponent behaves in a seemingly conciliatory fashion there is a strain toward rendering such discrepant information consistent with one's preexisting negative image of him, and this leads to various stratagems for discounting, ignoring, or discrediting that new information.[21]

Washington's image of Grenada and the bipolar nature of the world system acted as parameters to policy formulation. As Glad concluded, "Reagan's Manichean world view is accompanied by certitude that it is the correct one. For him there are no ambiguities about the nature of the enemy which deserves further exploration, no moral dilemmas, no questions about the 'facts' which support it."[22]

U.S.-Grenada Relations

With the impasse that had been reached under Carter the PRG hoped that with a new President relations might improve. This was to prove fallacious. As a presidential candidate in 1979 Reagan had cautioned that "the Caribbean is rapidly becoming a Communist lake in what should be an American pond and the United States

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[20] Alexander George, *Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980), p. 59.

[21] Ibid., p. 65.

[22] Betty Glad, "Black and White Thinking: Ronald Reagan's Approach to Foreign Policy," *Political Psychology* 4, no. 1., (1983): 51.

resembles a giant, afraid to move. . ."[23] As president he appointed like-minded individuals, "true believers," to all the high governmental positions. Consequently, U.S. policy was to change in style rather than content. Despite the fact that during the Reagan administration several Cabinet officials spoke publicly about Grenada, including the President, it would appear that until October 1983 it was never a major issue. Grenada was never on the front burner. As Motley said of Grenada; "It's not something people dwelled on, but it could be considered a minor irritant."[24] Cuba and Nicaragua were the U.S.' main concerns and Grenada was considered a minor "adjunct to a problem."[25] For the first six months of the Reagan term Grenada policy was a de facto continuation of the Carter policy and throughout 1981 this policy essentially drifted along on autopilot.[26]

The U.S. sent an unambiguous signal to the PRG by not accrediting its new ambassador to Barbados, Milan Bish, to Grenada and continuing to refuse to accept Grenada's nominee ambassador to Washington, Dessima Williams. Some embassy officials favoured a softer line toward Grenada and even ambassador Bish, although he viewed the PRG as a communist Soviet/Cuban style government, believed that a degree of reconciliation was possible.[27] As one of the main functions of an ambassador is to collect information and facilitate the exchange of views, the absence

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[23] Gregory Treverton, *Deciding to Use Force in Grenada*, (Harvard: Case Program John F. Kennedy School of Government, 1986), p. 9.

[24] *PBS Frontline*, Operation Urgent Fury, transcript no. 602 (New York: Journal Graphics, 1988), p. 5.

[25] Interview with Craig Johnstone, September 9, 1994, Washington D.C.

[26] Telephone interview with Bushnell. Bushnell was the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs during the Carter administration and remained in government as part of the transition team until mid-1981.

[27] Interview with Milan Bish, September 21, 1994, Grand Island, Nebr.

of one was naturally criticized. Former ambassador to Costa Rica, Frank McNeil, commented that "we didn't have the diplomatic presence on the island and I think we pretty much lived by the descriptions in our own rhetoric."[28] To be fair, tabs were kept on Grenada: there were always two political officers and two consular officers available for the PRG to talk to and the presence of U.S. medical students and the new airport meant it received the most attention of all the Eastern Caribbean islands the U.S. embassy in Barbados covered.[29]

By contrast the PRG were obsessed about U.S. activity. The *Grenada Documents* reveal that in private, as well as in public, Bishop accused the U.S. of propaganda, political, economic and military destabilization. These charges were exaggerated rather than completely erroneous. The constant barrage of accusations led the U.S. embassy to conclude that these allegations were made with "indeterminate proportions of genuine alarm and calculated cynicism."[30]

Point Salines International Airport

The PSIA was a central issue in U.S.-Grenadian relations. As previously discussed, the need for a second airport was not a new idea.[31] The PRG's economic development plans centred on tourism and they felt that a modern airport was a prerequisite. In reality the PSIA was a major cause of the economic crisis that

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[28] *PBS Frontline*, Operation Urgent Fury, p. 6.

[29] Telephone interview with Linda Flohr, December 19, 1994.

[30] Rossin, *U.S.-Grenada Relations*, p. 61.

[31] The existing airport at Pearls was 15 miles from St. George's, had a 5,250 foot runway which could not accommodate jets and had no night landing facilities which meant visitors had to overnight in Barbados which cost Grenada $1.3 million in lost revenue each year. Courtney Smith, "The Development Strategy of the People's Revolutionary Government: The Political Economy of Economic Transformation in Grenada, 1979-1983" (Ph.D. diss., University of Hull, 1988), p. 328.

engulfed Grenada by 1983. The *Economist* Intelligence Unit, the World Bank and the OAS Secretariat had all recommended the PSIA but questioned its economic feasibility. The PSIA consumed 40-50 percent of capital investment funds and $81 million of the $98.8 million (Caribbean dollars) in Cuban civilian grants Grenada received.[32] The PRG were reliant on foreign aid to construct the airport and operate the tourist sector. A 1982 World Bank report concluded that a 10,000 foot runway was not essential, tourist numbers would have to increase substantially, the accommodation and infrastructure was inadequate, more airflights would be necessary and that the marketing of Grenada was not productive.[33]

The PSIA was of symbolic value too. In a 1981 speech Bishop restated the PRG's "seriousness and determination to transform the dream of our international airport into a concrete reality."[34] Tourism is the lifeblood of the Eastern Caribbean and airports are essential but they are also a sign of prestige and for Grenada the PSIA represented a sign of independence and economic development.

The U.S. concern from the start had been that the Cubans were seizing an opportunity to obtain a safe airport from which to transport their troops to Angola and that the PSIA would extend Soviet-Cuban power projection in the region. When, in January 1981, the European Commission, under the Lome Convention, agreed to provide facilities at a Grenada donors meeting in Brussels in April, the U.S. decided to make their views known.

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[32] Cotman, "Cuba and the Grenada Revolution," p. 132.

[33] Smith, "The Development Strategy," p. 342.

[34] "Together We Shall Build Our Airport, March 29, 1981," Marcus and Taber (eds.), *Maurice Bishop Speaks*, p. 143.

The U.S. argument rested on several points: the airport was too large for Grenada's tourist requirements and was a bad economic development model that was uncoordinated with the overall development plan, international support would distort the pattern of aid to the Eastern Caribbean, the Commission's concentration on one island that is also aligned with the Soviet bloc would seem to reward Grenada's human rights violations, Cuban involvement in the area would be extended, Western donors would be paying to enhance Cuba's image and contribute to the establishment of a Cuban military facility.[35] Apparently, most governments contacted by the U.S. were sympathetic to their case and did not attend or only observed.[36] The PRG accused the U.S. of sabotage. Delegates from the European Commission, World Bank, CDB, OPEC, Venezuela, Syria and Iraq attended the April 14-15 meeting. Although there was not consensual support the Commission issued a Joint Communiqué saying that they were sympathetic to the project and Grenada's goals. The material result was several small grants, less than the $30 million Grenada had optimistically hoped for.

In a March 26, 1981, letter to President Reagan, Bishop addressed U.S. efforts to dissuade potential funders for the PSIA and expressed his "deep concern and dissatisfaction with the position of your administration."[37] In a trend that was familiar, Bishop said in the same letter that he desired good relations. The U.S. response was candid: "The United States Government does not like the airport

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[35] Rossin, *U.S.-Grenada Relations*, p. 71.

[36] The most public opposition came from the European Commission Development Commissioner, French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson, who complained about the U.S.' "robust diplomatic offensive" in *Le Monde*. Ibid., p. 72.

[37] "Official Briefing Document (Draft), n.d.: Appendix II - Prime Minister Bishop's Letter to President Reagan, March 26, 1981," *GDMC*, no. 002303.

project, for it is clearly not in the interest of American security or the security of the Caribbean."[38] Washington's line was that whilst it would do nothing to prevent the construction of the airport, it would aim to prevent its use in a threatening fashion.[39] With funding coming from countries such as Libya and Iraq, the U.S. could do little to prevent construction, but they had made clear their future intentions.

U.S. protestations that the PSIA was a military facility undoubtedly served propaganda purposes but it was a private concern too and came up "not infrequently"[40] when Grenada was discussed. Whilst not classifying the airport as a military facility the government were sentient of its potential:

> The airport was far larger than anything required by even the most expanded tourist trade and it was clear from that size, as well as the nature of its runways and the supporting facilities, that a great deal more than commercial use was intended.[41]

Hypothetically, the airport would enable Soviet MIG-23's to cover the entire Caribbean Basin and act as a base for Cuban flights to Angola and Soviet bloc flights to Central America. When Libyan planes, clandestinely shipping arms to Nicaragua, were detained whilst refuelling in Brazil in April 1983, President Reagan pointed out that if Grenada's PSIA was operational they could have stopped there.[42]

The U.S. also argued that the promotion of tourism and the construction of infrastructure associated with it were insufficient. Eastern Airlines had told the PRG that it would require 2,200 hotel rooms to justify an air service; even by 1983

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[38] Rossin, *U.S.-Grenada Relations*, p. 73.

[39] Ibid., p. 73.

[40] Interview with Johnstone.

[41] Caspar Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years at the Pentagon* (London: Michael Joseph , 1990), p. 72.

[42] *Grenada: A Preliminary Report*, p. 5.

Grenada only possessed 645.[43] The PRG were obviously aware of the airport's military potential too: in December 1981 Minister of National Mobilization Selwyn Strachan told a Workers Party of Jamaica meeting that the airport would be available to regional allies when necessary.[44] The only reference concerning the use of the airport in the *Grenada Documents* is a short note in Central Committee (CC) member Liam James' notebook: "The Revo has been able to crush counterrevolution internationally. Airport will be used for Cuban and Soviet military."[45] The Grenadian project manager of the PSIA confirmed that the airport whilst not a purely military facility would have a dual use.[46] Considering the Cold War geopolitical mindset of the administration and the steady deterioration of relations it is unsurprising that they chose to emphasize the military potential of the airport and Grenadian perfidy.

The image of a Soviet-Cuban airbase was contradicted by reality. U.S., British and Finnish firms were involved in construction and it was far from secret; the U.S. medical school was nearby and students went jogging on the runway. The 9,000 foot runway was a similar length to most of those in the region. Strategically, the airport was never mentioned in the *Military Postures* of the JCS or Department of Defense reports.[47] Discounting the fact that no concrete evidence of military use existed, the U.S. were suspicious because they found the PSIA hard to justify on economic

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[43] Smith, "The Development Strategy," p. 326.

[44] Rossin, *U.S.-Grenada Relations*, p. 73.

[45] "Minutes of Political Bureau Meeting Held on Wednesday, 27th May, 1981," *Grenada Documents*, document 53, p. 3.

[46] Interview with Lawrence Rossin, October 28, 1994, Washington D.C.

[47] Humberto Garcia Muniz, *Boots, Boots, Boots: Intervention, Regional Security and Militarization in the Caribbean* (Rio Pedras, Puerto Rico: Caribbean Project for Justice and Peace, 1986), p. 5.

grounds. Once again image rather than reality proved decisive; no matter what the PRG said or did they could not dispel U.S. doubts and preconceptions.

Economic Pressure

Upon taking office Secretary of State Haig reaffirmed existing policy by instructing the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs to ensure that Grenada would not receive "one penny" from any International Financial Institution (IFI), adding Grenada to the State Department's unofficial "hit list."[48] In March 1981 the PRG applied to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a $19 million, three-year Extended Fund Facility (EFF). The U.S.' IMF representative suggested that the proposal should be postponed, arguing that the money would be used to finance an investment rather than an adjustment program, as EFF's were designed to do, and that more worringly it would replace money already spent on the airport.[49] The PRG accused the U.S. of manipulating the IMF and threatened to withdraw. When Kendrick Radix met with the Head of the Caribbean Section of the State Department in May, he reported that the official admitted U.S. interference with the IMF/airport and that the U.S. considered such action "legitimate."[50] Nevertheless, on April 1 the IMF announced that Grenada had purchased $2.5 million under compensatory financial facilities and on May 12 authorized a one-year $4.1 million standby programme to support the PRG's financial programme. The U.S. felt that the standby program was a thinly disguised version of the first year of the postponed EFF, that

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[48] Robert J. Beck, *The Grenada Invasion: Politics, Law and Foreign Policy Decisionmaking* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993), p. 27.

[49] Rossin, *U.S.-Grenada Relations*, p. 74.

[50] "Minutes of Political Bureau," *Grenada Documents*, document 53, p. 3.

the money would be used for investment rather than adjustment and that it would not improve Grenada's balance of payments.[51] The U.S., who abstained from the vote, were dismayed when the IMF approved a $3.5 million programme anyway.

Further disagreement arose soon after over a report by IMF experts, who had visited Grenada in January and February, which decided that Grenada's "fiscal situation had improved considerably" and recommended a three-year $6.3 million loan for capital projects. As one official stated, Coard, a skilled, slick operator who impressed people with his intellectual capabilities, "pulled the wool over the eyes of the IMF"; it seems that the experts showed Coard the draft report, which was not especially favourable, and he persuaded them to change it "dramatically."[52] Again the U.S. successfully opposed the loan on the grounds that the money would be used on the airport. They also blocked a World Bank endorsement of a PRG "Public Sector Investment Program" for three million dollars from the International Development Agency.

In *US-Grenada Relations* Rossin explains that the U.S.' oppositional stance was primarily an expression of a consistent policy on the use of EFFs and emphasized that "the United States Government has a mandate to ensure that the money it contributes to international financial institutions is spent properly."[53] He admits that the PSIA was also a contributing factor; considering the previous efforts to block aid for the PSIA and the attention the subject had received since 1979 it is probable that the PSIA may well have been the main motivation. The U.S. could not block all funds to

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[51] Rossin, *U.S.-Grenada Relations*, p. 75.

[52] Interview with John Kelly, February 17, 1995, London.

[53] Rossin, *U.S.-Grenada Relations*, p. 75.

Grenada but it could seriously pressure Grenada via the IFI's and did not hesitate to do so.[54] For Washington considerations of economic aid were indivisible from the wider state of relations.

In March 1981 AID drafted a four million dollars aid programme focusing on infrastructure projects as a follow-on from an earlier Basic Human Needs programme. Having discussed the matter with the Caribbean leaders, Washington decided to exclude Grenada on the grounds of human rights violations, the absence of elections and as a bad investment of scarce resources that were needed elsewhere.[55] However, when the CDB board convened on June 19 they decided that, contrary to what had been agreed previously, they could not accept the loan because Grenada was being excluded on political grounds. Reagan was not deterred by the weakening effect this would have on the CDB or the effectiveness of AID missions which channeled half of its total aid to the region through the CDB.[56]

Freedom of the Press

On June 12 a group of 26 shareholders produced the *Grenadian Voice*, the first private newspaper since *Torchlight*. It was closed down by the PRG after one issue

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[54] The PRG proved quite adept at garnering foreign aid. Pryor estimates that Grenada received $125.1 million between 1979-83 from various countries and IFI's. Frederick Pryor, "Socialism via Foreign Aid: The PRG's Economic Policies with the Soviet Bloc," in Heine (ed.), *A Revolution Aborted*, p. 156.

[55] Rossin, *U.S.-Grenada Relations*, p. 76. Grenada had been due to receive $444,000 under the programme. General Accounting Office (GAO), *AID Assistance to the Eastern Caribbean: Program Changes and Possible Consequences* (Washington D.C.: GAO ID-83-50, 1983), p. 15.

[56] The GAO report concluded that: "The Bank provides a channel for AID to assist the Eastern Caribbean efficiently and effectively. Support to the CDB also encourages regional cooperation needed for the region to prosper. These factors, together with AID's potential difficulties in managing its assistance program, provide strong argument for AID to make use of this development organization. We recognize that policy differences between the CDB and the US government regarding assistance to Grenada may be hard to resolve. But in our opinion, there would be advantages if this could be accomplished." GAO, *AID Assistance*, p. 19.

on June 19; they claimed that the "Group of 26" included former shareholders in the defunct *Torchlight*, had been issuing counterrevolutionary pamphlets, had links to the CIA and were supporting a CIA propaganda campaign.[57] A series of "Peoples Laws" were passed which prohibited the publishing of any new papers. Bishop attacked U.S. imperialism and the CIA:

> this is not about freedom of the press, it is about overthrowing the Grenadian revolution. . . [and] when the revolution speaks, it must be heard, listened to Whatever the revolution commands, it must be carried out; when the revolution talks no parasites must bark in their corner.[58]

As Meeks concludes, with the earlier refusal to re-open the *Torchlight* and now the forced closure of the *Grenadian Voice* could "only be attributed to paranoia and rampant authoritarianism."[59] The U.S. had long identified human rights and basic freedoms as lacking in Grenada: "This decision is the latest evidence of the PRG's continuing efforts to stifle free speech and the open debate of public issues in Grenada. As such, it reflects the regime's contempt for democratic practices and values."[60] U.S. perceptions were reinforced by the introduction of preventative detention by the PRG in September 1981.

Ocean Venture

The PRG's CIA paranoia was not totally unfounded. Although it did not become public knowledge until February 1983, President Reagan had been willing to consider

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[57] Rossin, *U.S.-Grenada Relations*, p. 58.

[58] "Freedom of the Press and Imperialist Destabilization, June 19, 1981," Marcus and Taber (eds.), *Maurice Bishop Speaks*, p. 164.

[59] Meeks, *Caribbean Revolutions*, p. 161. Meeks was the editor of the PRG-controlled *Free West Indian* newspaper during 1981-82.

[60] Rossin, *U.S.-Grenada Relations*, p. 59.

a covert operation as early as July 1981 when the CIA presented a plan to the Senate Intelligence Committee "to cause economic difficulties for Grenada in hope of undermining the political control of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop" but not to overthrow him.[61] The Committee rejected it because it contained "unusual and unspecified components."[62] One Committee member explained the consensus view: "yes, there was an operation and we all thought. . . that it was just a small island and so the Cubans or the communists control it, so what?"[63] A covert CIA operation was hardly necessary to cause Grenada economic hardship which was an existing facet of U.S. policy already.

Since 1979 the PRG had constantly warned about the danger of invasion and the U.S. did little to calm these fears. From August 1 until October 15, 1981, the largest naval maneuvers since 1945 occurred. "Ocean Venture" involved 120,000 troops, 250 warships and 1,000 aircraft from 14 nations. Part of the maneuvers included "Operation Amber and the Amberines" (an unsubtle allusion to Grenada and the Grenadines) on the Puerto Rican island of Vieques. Amber and the Amberdines were designated as "our enemy in the Eastern Caribbean," who was supported by "Orange" (Cuba) who were in turn supported by "Red" (Soviet Union), and the objective of the exercise was to "rescue twenty U.S. citizens held hostage there after negotiations with the Amber Government had broken down" and to organise elections that would

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[61] Patrick E. Tyler, "U.S. Tracks Cuban Aid to Grenada: In '81 Senate Unit Nixed CIA Plan to Destabilize Isle," *Washington Post*, February 27, 1983, pp. A1, A11. This was probably an updated version of the CIA's plan that had been opposed by the Senate Intelligence Committee two years before in 1979.

[62] Ibid., p. A11.

[63] Ibid., p. A1.

produce a government "favourable to the way of life we espouse."[64] The maneuvers were probably aimed primarily at Cuba who were transporting arms to Nicaragua at the time.

The PRG's response was that "the manoeuvre code-named Amber and the Amberines was a trial run preparatory to a military invasion of Grenada and the Grenadines."[65] On August 11 Bishop sent another letter to Reagan, criticizing the U.S.' propaganda and diplomatic offensive, economic aggression and military destabilization and restating that PSIA was a non-military facility. He went on to say:

> your Administration has consistently demonstrated an overtly hostile attitude towards the people and Government of Grenada. . . Members of your Administration have persistently made false, malicious and misleading statements. . . particularly in regard to our international airport project.[66]

The letter concluded by saying that the U.S.' actions have been interpreted as a "virtual declaration of war" and that if no reply was received this would be taken to mean that the U.S. "does not desire even normal or minimum relations."[67] Despite the accusatory tones of the letter, Bishop wrote that he still wanted good relations.

The PRG also telexed the Commonwealth Secretariat, pointing out the similarities between "Operation Amber and the Amberines" and Grenada's situation. Bishop warned that the PRG were "absolutely convinced that our country is about to be subjected to a military invasion by the United States of America."[68] Letters were also dispatched to a number of government leaders, international organizations and

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[64] Searle, *Grenada*, p. 37-8.

[65] "Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Information Bureau," *GDMC*, no. 002308.

[66] "Official Briefing Document (Draft), n.d.: Appendix II - Prime Minister Bishop's Letter to President Reagan, August 11, 1981," *GDMC*, no. 002303.

[67] Ibid.

[68] "Telex to Secretary General, Commonwealth of Nations," *GDMC*, no. 002303.

prominent political figures. The PRG put great emphasis on utilizing the public arena to combat the perceived U.S. threat.

Washington's reply to Bishop's letter was sent on October 6, 1981, by DCM Ludlow Flower from the U.S. embassy in Barbados. It read: "While the points raised in your letter have been carefully considered, we continue to look for indications of a serious commitment by your government to establishing a climate conducive to better relations with the United States."[69] On October 20 the embassy received a reply from a low-level PRG official informing them that Flower's letter had "not been referred to Bishop because it ignored the points made in Bishop's letter."[70]

In November 1981 a military manoeuvre on the Honduras-Nicaragua border, "Readex 183," examined methods to deal with populist or revolutionary movements in the region. In a speech soon after, Bishop described the Reagan administration as a "fascist clique" and "neutron warmongers."[71] Against this background it is not hard to see why the U.S. could not reconcile the PRG's desire for good relations with such inflammatory rhetoric. The Reagan administration perceived no reason to make an effort to improve relations. By late 1981 it appears that Washington firmly viewed Grenada's repeated calls for "high-level" dialogue as "propagandistic and insincere";[72] an unavailing option and a waste of time.

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[69] Milan Bish, confidential telegram to Secretary of State, "Subject: Grenada: Text of Grenada-U.S. Exchange of Letters Released," 111453Z, March 1982, Bridgetown 01335, p. 1.

[70] Ibid., p. 1.

[71] "Grenada Is Not Alone, November 23, 1981," Marcus and Taber (eds.), *Maurice Bishop Speaks*, p. 251.

[72] Bish, "Subject: Grenada: Text of Grenada-U.S.," p. 2.

Raising the Stakes

Grenada now gained more attention in Washington; Secretary of Defence Caspar Weinberger described the PRG as a "Cuban satellite" in his annual report to Congress on February 8, 1982.[73] On February 24 Reagan unveiled his Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI).[74] The CBI was partly a response to Commonwealth Caribbean leaders lobbying efforts and partly to criticism that the U.S. was ignoring the socio-economic causes of the unrest in the region. The CBI was based on security though; Reagan described the Caribbean as a "vital strategic and commercial artery" for the U.S. and that "the well-being and security of our neighbours in this region are our own vital interests."[75] The CBI would reinforce the effectiveness of military aid.

There was much criticism of the CBI; the emphasis on private investment excluded Grenada, Nicaragua and Cuba, 87 percent of Caribbean exports entered duty-free already and of the original $350 million made available, $128 million was earmarked for El Salvador and only $10 million for the Eastern Caribbean.[76] A much amended, reduced and delayed version was only passed by Congress in August 1983. The PRG charged that the CBI addressed U.S. national security concerns rather than the real problems of social and economic development.

In his address to the OAS promoting the CBI, Reagan had warned of:

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[73] Hybel, *How Leaders Reason*, p. 268.

[74] The CBI included one-way Free Trade, investment incentives for U.S. businesses, technical assistance to the private sector and $350 million in bilateral aid. Robert Pastor, "Sinking in the Caribbean Basin," *Foreign Affairs* 60, no. 5 (Summer 1982): 1039.

[75] "Remarks on the Caribbean Basin Initiative to the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States, February 24, 1982," U.S. President, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States* (Washington D.C.: Office of the *Federal Register*, National Archives and Records Service, 1982), Ronald W. Reagan, 1982, p. 211.

[76] Schoenhals and Melanson, *Revolution and Intervention*, p. 128.

> the dark future foreshadowed by the poverty and repression of Castro's Cuba, the tightening grip of the totalitarian left in Grenada and Nicaragua, and the expansion of Soviet-backed, Cuban-managed support for violent revolution in Central America.[77]

In hearings before the Congressional Committee on Foreign Affairs in June 1982, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Stephen Bosworth argued that the U.S. had not sought to exclude Grenada from the CBI when it was submitted to Congress but that it did not propose direct aid to Grenada although other elements of the programme would be available. Of Grenada, Bosworth said:

> its remarks and characterizations of the Caribbean Basin program, as it describes it as "chicken feed," and "only a guise for the attainment of military objectives in the area," would certainly seem to indicate that it has no desire to participate.[78]

These were general Caribbean criticisms and certainly not confined to the PRG. As the Caribbean nations had to request CBI help the U.S. telexed the PRG about their possible participation. It seems that Unison Whiteman, the Foreign Minister, was pro-participation but that other government members, including Bishop, felt that participation would make Grenada appear opportunistic and that they should consult with Nicaragua and Suriname to see if they had been asked.[79] The PRG's ideology and concern about their image as a Soviet bloc aligned country overruled participation in the CBI irrespective of its financial benefits or even as a possible initiator to better U.S. relations.

When President Reagan visited Barbados in April 1982 he told regional leaders that Grenada "now bears the Soviet and Cuban trademark, which means that it will

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[77] "Remarks on the Caribbean Basin Initiative," *Public Papers of the Presidents* (PPP), p. 211.

[78] U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs. *United States Policy Toward Grenada* (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1982), p. 47.

[79] "Minutes of the Political and Economic Bureau, August, 31st, 1983," *GDMC*, no. 002306, p. 5.

attempt to spread the virus among its neighbours."[80] In Washington, Weinberger told the Council on Foreign Relations that America "must be prepared to halt and seek to reverse the geographic expansion of Soviet control and presence."[81] This rhetoric was backed up by "Ocean Venture 82" between April 28 and May 16, 1982. 60 naval vessels, 350 planes and 45,000 men participated. One operation involved 2,000 Marines and Army airborne troops landing at Blue Beach on Vieques and seizing an airstrip garrison just inland.[82] To an insecure PRG this increased their anxiety and reinforced their belief that the U.S. would invade in the near future.

This negative trend in relations continued throughout 1982. As Congressman Michael Barnes commented: "If the United States has a policy toward Grenada, it appears to consist of not answering Grenadian mail and avoiding being seen in the same room with officials from Grenada."[83] A House of Commons Report on Central America and the Caribbean was harsher, concluding that the Reagan administration displayed "a paranoid antagonism towards any government in the area which may be remotely described as left wing let alone Marxist."[84] During 1982 Grenada continued to pursue its socialist policies; Bishop visited East Germany, Bulgaria and Libya to

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[80] "Remarks in Bridgetown, Barbados, Following a Luncheon Meeting With Leaders of Eastern Caribbean Countries, April 8, 1982," U.S. President, *PPP*, p. 448.

[81] Klare, "The Reagan Doctrine," p. 10.

[82] David Eric Pearson, "The Betrayal of Truth and Trust By Governments: Deception As Process and Practice," (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1988), p. 171.

[83] Schoultz, *National Security*, p. 242.

[84] Christopher Abel, "Documentary Review: House of Commons. Fifth Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 1981-82. Caribbean and Central America," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 15 (October 1983): 473.

raise money and in July signed a military agreement with the Soviet Union in Moscow.[85]

Relations appeared to quieten after the rhetorical volleys about the CBI. It is likely that this represented a lack of interest on the U.S. side but Grenada naturally interpreted it differently, reasoning that the U.S.' recent inactivity was not a change in policy but tactics and suggested in private that the U.S. might use the private sector to find a credible Grenadian to replace Bishop. Hence, "peaceful infiltration and penetration through the private sector. . . [T]he destabilization could thus take place from within."[86] The PRG had made persistent accusations of U.S. destabilization plans since 1979.

A lessening of these charges in 1982 had led some to believe that the PRG was toning down its anti-U.S. rhetoric to prepare the way for improved relations. The embassy was more pessimistic:

> in view of the PRG's past rhetorical record and more importantly its continued consolidation with Cuba/ USSR. We think the invasion theme was temporarily suspended, not because the PRG intended to send a positive signal to [the] U.S. but because the many false alarms served to undermine the regime's domestic credibility and a certain momentum and revolutionary alertness had already been accomplished amongst army and militia through the use of the "external threat" strategy.[87]

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[85] The Soviet Union and North Korea were far from generous with the terms of their agreements. For example, the PRG had problems meeting the cost of importing the aid from North Korea and talks on this matter dragged on for years. Dae-Ho Byun, *North Korea's Foreign Policy: the Juche Ideology and the Challenge of Gorbachev's New Thinking* (Seoul, South Korea: Research Center for Peace and Unification of Korea, 1991), p. 158.

[86] "The International Situation During 1982-1983: An Analysis, 16.2.83," *GDMC*, no. 004636, p. 4.

[87] Milan Bish, confidential telegram to Secretary of State, no subject heading, 162143Z, n.d. [March 1982?], Bridgetown 01526, p. 2.

Such inherent bad faith and cynicism typified relations and indicates that even if the U.S. had made overtures it would have been far from certain that the PRG would have responded.

A Question of Nutmeg and National Security

The rhetorical attacks on Grenada resumed in December 1982. At the annual Miami Conference on the Caribbean, Vice President George Bush called Grenada "economically weak, militarized, repressive and dependent."[88] The PRG telexed the U.S. Embassy saying that Bush's remarks were "regrettable" and "inaccurate, misleading and made in a context in which Grenada was not allowed to respond."[89]

During February and March 1983 Grenada was censured by several senior members of the Reagan administration. On February 27 the *Washington Post* reported on the aborted 1981 CIA plan (see above), which was probably deliberately leaked to put pressure on Grenada. In the article the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter-American Affairs Nestor Sanchez stated that Grenada was a "vital surrogate" of Cuba and that the Cubans were constructing air and naval facilities in excess of Grenada's needs.[90] On March 9 Sanchez described Grenada as a "Cuban protégé."[91] The next day President Reagan joined in:

> Grenada, that tiny little island. . . is building now, or having built for it, on its soil and shores, a naval base, a superior air base, storage bases and facilities for the

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[88] "Text of a Telex Sent to the United States Embasy (sic) in Barbados on December 30th," *GDMC*, no. 002303.

[89] Ibid.

[90] Tyler, "U.S. Tracks Cuban Aid," p., A11.

[91] Gerald Hopple and Cynthia Gilley, "Policy Without Intelligence," in Peter Dunn and Bruce Watson (eds.), *American Intervention in Grenada: The Implications of Operation "Urgent Fury"* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985), p. 56.

storage of munitions, barracks, and training grounds for the military.[92]

He proceeded to explain how this would extend Soviet and Cuban power and admonished that "it isn't nutmeg that's at stake in the Caribbean and Central America; it is the United States national security."[93]

On the March 23 Reagan unveiled his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), and again, with the aid of satellite photos, drew attention to Grenada:

> the Cubans, with Soviet financing and backing, are in the process of building an airfield with a 10,000-foot runway. Grenada doesn't even have an air force. Who is it intended for?[94]

Reagan concluded that "the Soviet-Cuban militarization of Grenada, in short, can only be seen as power projection into the region."[95] Also during March, Weinberger asserted that Grenada was undergoing a rapid military buildup and Undersecretary of Defense Fred Ikle presented aerial photos of Grenada to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Reagan returned to Grenada yet again in his April 27 address to a Joint Session of Congress, suggesting that Point Salines would facilitate the transshipment of arms to Nicaragua.[96]

This litany of indictments should not be seen as solely for the consumption of the PRG. Central America was the main focus of U.S. attention and things were not going well by 1983; the Contadora peace plan was introduced in January 1983 and whilst the U.S. professed their support it was not exactly flavour of the month in

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[92] "Remarks on Central America and El Salvador at the Annual Meeting of the National Association of Manufacturers, March 10, 1983." *PPP*, 1983, p. 372.

[93] Ibid., p. 373.

[94] "Address to the Nation on Defense and National Security, March 23, 1983." *PPP*, p. 440.

[95] Ibid., p. 440.

[96] "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on Central America, April 27, 1983." *PPP*, p. 609.

Washington. Also, Congress were becoming increasingly sceptical of the administration's Central America odyssey. Consequently, Grenada was a convenient tool to use to demonstrate to Congress the threat posed by Soviet-Cuban activity in the region and the necessity for continued aid to the Contras.

As before, the rhetorical attacks were backed up with military displays of strength. During March, 77 U.S. ships had assembled off Barbados and several moved to within six miles of Grenada. This was followed by "Operation Universal Trek" in May 1983 which demonstrated "how US forces could land in a small Caribbean nation where a civil war [was] taking place."[97]

An internal PRG draft letter to the U.S. Embassy reveals that "until the recent statements, the Peoples Revolutionary Government felt fairly confident that these re-assessments had dispelled the unfounded and unreasonable fears of the US Administration."[98] In public, Bishop, who had curtailed his visit to the NAM Summit in India to return home, harangued the "warmongering Reagan" and his "fascist clique" with "their arrogant designs for regional and world domination" and warned that the PRG were "convinced that an armed attack against our country by counterrevolutionaries and mercenaries organised, financed, trained, and directed by United States imperialism, is imminent and can come any day now."[99] Once again Grenada turned to the international arena to counter the perceived threat.

At the UN on March 28 Unison Whiteman echoed Bishop in announcing that "based on a careful analysis of evidence we are convinced that the Reagan

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[97] Beck, *The Grenada Invasion*, p. 28.

[98] "Draft/ letter to the US embassy," *GDMC*, no. 002308.

[99] "An Armed Attack Against Our Country Is Imminent, March 23, 1983," Marcus and Taber (eds.), *Maurice Bishop Speaks*, p. 279.

Administration is planning an aggression. We believe the attack is imminent."[100] As with previous episodes the Grenadian response was shaped by a mixture of propaganda benefit and real fear. A Special Report to the Security and Defence Committee and Political Bureau detailed military weaknesses; a small People's Revolutionary Army, an inexperienced militia and the concentration of arms at only a few different sites.[101] In addition, the PRA conducted manoeuvres against an aerial and seaborne invasion.

It would appear that the PRG leadership were among the few who believed such threats were real rather than imagined. As the embassy remarked: "PRG charges of a U.S. or U.S.-backed invasion did not appear to have dampened the enthusiasm of most Grenadians for Americans and things American."[102] However, the PRG monopoly of the media made it easy to shape the perceptions of the populace and predictably "popular support for the PRG and interest in the militia and army. . . increased markedly since Reagan mentioned Grenada in his March 10 speech."[103] The President's focus on PSIA perturbed most Grenadians who viewed the airport as vital to the island's future; they felt that the mysterious goings-on at Caviligny merited more attention.[104]

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[100] Hugh O'Shaughnessy, *Grenada*, p. 112.

[101] "Special Report to Security and Defence Committee and the Political Bureau, 16.4.83," *GDMC*, no. 005196.

[102] Ludlow Flower, confidential telegram to Secretary of State, "Subject: Grenada After the Bishop-Reagan Exchange: Quiet, Puzzled, Disgruntled," 201845Z, April 1983, Bridgetown 02334, p. 2.

[103] Ibid., p. 5.

[104] Military equipment arrived during blackouts, road blocks were placed around the site and Cuban and Soviet military advisors were frequently present there. Ibid., p. 7.

This flurry of activity marked the end of the overtly confrontational stage of relations. The next time Grenada came to prominence was with Bishop's June 1983 visit to Washington where he met with U.S. officials. There has been much conjecture about the purpose of this trip and its repercussions.

The first year of Reagan's term had seen a continuation of the Carter policy of distancing and isolation. The PRG were determined to ensure the survival and consolidation of the revolution against efforts, real or imagined, to overthrow or isolate it. External help from ideologically compatible regimes was obtained and strident rhetoric employed to alert the world to the U.S.' alleged intentions. Unfortunately, this only reconfirmed the U.S.' suspicions and increased the tension. The administration had wearied of the constant public criticism and "with no change in the attitude or policies of the PRG, they (relations) remain cool and are conducted at a level appropriate to the PRG's conduct."[105] Any improvement in relations would have had to be initiated by Grenada as the U.S., despite its economic obstructionism and overemphasis of Grenada as a military threat, were not actively looking for a solution to a situation that was no more than a sideshow to Central America.

At a Congressional Hearing in 1982, Sally Shelton, the former ambassador to Barbados, commented that, "you have a lot to gain by talking with people, and a lot to lose by not talking with them."[106] The Reagan administration did not

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[105] "Statement of Stephen W. Bosworth, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs," U.S. Congress, *United States Policy toward Grenada*, p. 29.

[106] Ibid., p. 95. In fact when embassy officials visited Grenada to meet PRG officials the meetings proved invariably fruitless. In early 1983 DCM Flower visited Grenada after receiving an invite, to discuss the question of dialogue, from Bishop at a reception in Jamaica for CARICOM Summit participants in November 1982. Bishop failed to turn up for the meeting with Flower who met Unison Whiteman instead. Flower categorised the trip as a "take their temperature" exercise to acknowledge high-level contact but that it was unproductive and "a waste of time." Telephone interview with Ludlow Flower, November 2, 1995.

conceptualize the situation in this manner. Many administration officials interpreted the PRG's calls for talks as a public relations act and in general found the prospect of talking to Marxist-Leninists as "too distasteful and inconsistent with its own tough posturing to be a serious option."[107] It is hard to imagine that serious negotiations would have yielded anything.

A Difference of Opinion

The most comprehensive summation of the problem areas of U.S.-Grenadian relationship from the U.S.' point of view was provided by Bosworth when he told Congress that for relations to improve Grenada should cease their anti-U.S. propaganda, restore democracy, hold elections, improve human rights and practice genuine non-alignment rather than being a Cuban surrogate.[108] Once again the impetus was on the PRG to make the first move in making changes that were practically unpalatable for a government of its ilk. If, as Bosworth commented, the U.S. were confident that the PRG were aware of their views the U.S. must have been conscious of the unlikelihood that the PRG would accede to their wishes. The administration had decided they would restate their position clearly and leave the ball firmly in Grenada's court.

There had been no tangible changes in the PRG's stance. Anti-U.S. propaganda remained a staple feature and a return to constitutional democracy seemed increasingly remote and free and fair elections improbable in what had become a one-party authoritarian state. As Henfrey points out though, the U.S.' emphasis on

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[107] John Horton, "The Real Intelligence Failure," *Foreign Service Journal* (February 1985): 24.

[108] "Statement of Stephen W. Bosworth," U.S. Congress, *United States Policy Toward Grenada*, p. 31.

elections meant that if the PRG had held them it could be construed as bowing to U.S. pressure.[109] The PRG did make appreciable advances in social justice, education and various economic programmes but "the building of 'a new democracy' serving the interests and needs of the Grenadian masses became. . . dependent upon state repression."[110] Bishop's opponents were incarcerated, the PRA was used to enforce PRG policy and the media firmly government-controlled. The U.S. however, had supported more repressive governments than the PRG; there was another factor, the major one, that condemned the PRG.

The issue of non-alignment was pivotal. The PRG believed that:

> Non-alignment does not imply for us that we must be neutral in the sterile and negative sense. . . Non-alignment for us is a positive concept characterizing a vigorous and principled approach to international issues. It is an affirmation of that fundamental attribute of all peoples and states to sovereignty, independence and the right to freely determine their own domestic and foreign policy.[111]

For the PRG this meant alignment with the Soviet bloc, especially Cuba. Barely a month after the 1979 revolution the U.S. had let Grenada know that it would view with "displeasure" any closer ties Grenada developed with the U.S.' bugaboo, Cuba.

Cuba had been classified as an enemy state by successive U.S. administrations since 1960. A sort of "Cubaphobia" influenced policymakers, making relations "a total impossibility on a strictly ideological basis," and "an equally elusive commodity at a rational, pragmatic level of decision making."[112] NJM contact with Cuba had started prior to 1979 and continued to deepen thereafter. The PRG identified closely

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[109] Colin Henfrey, "Between Populism and Leninism," p. 137.

[110] Cynthia Mahabir, "Heavy Manners and Making Freedom Under the People's Revolutionary Government in Grenada, 1979-1983," *International Journal of the Sociology of Law* 21 (1993): 233.

[111] "Grenada's Foreign Policy," *GDMC*, no. 006097, p. 7.

[112] Azicri, "Cuba and the United States," in Levine (ed.), *The New Cuban Presence*, p. 171.

with Cuba for several reasons: the shared problems of capitalist underdevelopment, a positive view of Cuban socialism, a respect for Cuba's international actions, a confidence in their commitment to anti-U.S. parties in the Caribbean and the belief that Cuba would provide substantial financial aid.[113] There was also a good personal rapport between Castro and Bishop.

From "No More Cubas" to "Splashing Dominoes"

In 1965 President Lyndon Johnson was influenced by the Cuba analogy when he decided to intervene in the Dominican Republic; the prevention of "another Cuba" in the hemisphere became a policymaking maxim. In ensuring this, the other predominant analogy in U.S. foreign policy had to be avoided, "another Vietnam." President Reagan, as well as several of his cabinet, were from the World War Two generation who believed appeasement encouraged aggression and that military strength was more likely to guarantee peace. However, Vietnam taught Reagan that sending U.S. troops to fight protracted wars against the spread of communism was inconceivable. In fact, Reagan invoked the past more frequently than any incumbent since 1945.[114] In his 1982 CBI address to the OAS in which he called Grenada "totalitarian," Reagan warned that:

> If we do not act promptly and decisively in defense of freedom, new Cubas will arise from the ruins of today's conflicts. We will face more totalitarian regimes tied militarily to the Soviet Union - more regimes exporting subversion, more so incompetent yet so totalitarian.[115]

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[113] Cotman, "Cuba and the Grenada Revolution," p. 101.

[114] Deborah S. Smith-Howell, "Using the Past in the Present: The Rhetorical Construction of the Presidency" (Ph.D. diss., The University of Texas at Austin, 1993), p. 143.

[115] "Remarks on the Caribbean Basin Initiative," *PPP*, p. 214.

Analogically, Grenada was the potential "new Cuba" who would export revolution throughout the Caribbean.[116] Thus a domino effect would be triggered, a process which the U.S. had to oppose and/or reverse.

The public use of an analogy does not guarantee its use in private but memoirs and interviews suggest that Grenada was probably not seen as an exact potential replica of Cuba but as another communist regime aligned with Cuba. Using Khong's "analogical explanation"[117] framework it is possible to suggest that the U.S. defined Grenada in terms of Grenada's relationship with Cuba. The stakes were high in terms of reaffirming U.S. credibility. The implied solution was to counter any Soviet-Cuban aggression, although not with the direct use of force (economic and political pressure on the PRG and economic and military support to its neighbours). The chances of success were viewed as good as Grenada was not a realistic military threat. The moral rightness of this anti-Communist crusade was beyond doubt for Reagan. The danger of inactivity was a Caribbean Basin dominated by Soviet-Cuban aligned regimes and the destruction of U.S. credibility globally.

Inextricably linked to the Cuba analogy is the domino analogy. Glad and Taber suggest that the domino theory is adopted for several reasons: the lessons of history (Munich and Vietnam predominantly), it provides an explanation of the world and prescribes simple answers, it serves the immediate domestic political, organizational and psychological interests, acts as a substitute for a lack of information about the

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[116] In April 1981 a DIA report described Cuba's influence over Grenada as "remarkable" and "growing" and that "Bishop and co are determined to evangelize or revolutionize their neighbours if they can." James Herbert Anderson, "National Decisionmaking and Quick-Strike Interventions During the 1980's: A Comparative Analysis of Operations Urgent Fury, El Dorado Canyon and Just Cause" (Ph.D. diss., Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, 1993), p. 53.

[117] Khong, *Analogies at War*, p. 10.

target, it helps to win public and Congressional support for a more active policy and acts as an easy guide to action.[118]

Reagan had made his beliefs clear in 1980; "the Soviet Union underlies all the unrest that is going on. If they weren't engaged in this game of dominoes, there wouldn't be any hot spots in the world."[119] Grenada was consequently seen as a Soviet probe to test the U.S.' resolve and that if the U.S. did not respond, this "loss" would lead to others. This thinking is certainly reflected in the statements of many administration officials. In October 1981 Haig warned:

> we have a vital interest in not allowing the proliferation of Cuba-model states which would provide platforms for subversion, compromise vital sea lanes and pose a direct military threat at or near our borders. . . In the short run we must work to eliminate Cuban/Soviet influence in the region, and in the long run we must build politically stable governments able to withstand such influences.[120]

Speaking before the Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs, Bosworth stated that:

> the PRG had become a center for solidarity meetings and established close ties to small radical movements from elsewhere in the Caribbean. Grenada to some degree acts as a bridge for Cuba to radical. . . groups in the eastern Caribbean.[121]

Grenada's militarization was perceived to be partly to legitimize the revolution but also feasibly to export revolution to a vulnerable, susceptible Eastern Caribbean. At the time, the poor standard of living in many islands provided a plausible scenario for the domino effect; the PRG appealed to many and the U.S. was concerned that the

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[118] Betty Glad and Charles Taber, "Images, Learning, and the Decision to Use Force: The Domino Theory of the United States," in Betty Glad (ed.), *Psychological Dimensions of War* (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1990), p. 63.

[119] Pastor, "The U.S. and the Caribbean," p. 28.

[120] Cotman, *The Gorrion Tree*, p. 84.

[121] "Statement of Stephen W. Bosworth," U.S. Congress, *United States Policy toward Grenada*, p. 29.

PRG would serve as an example to like-minded groups in the region.[122] Nestor Sanchez painted the most portentous scenario:

> the Caribbean islands are weak militarily and economically. Active on many of these islands are leftist elements bent on seizing power at any price and linked to Cuba, Libya, and others of like mind. The tiny eastern Caribbean countries could fall overnight, as did Grenada. The Dominican Republic, Haiti and Jamaica are perhaps less vulnerable, but each has serious weaknesses and each has been a target of Fidel Castro in the past.[123]

The implication was that a supine U.S. reaction would embolden the communists, encourage regional radical groups, disillusion Caribbean allies and reduce U.S. credibility.

The domino theory is a worst case scenario and therefore will always be part of decisionmakers thinking. It is, however, a misleading one. Originating in World War Two Europe it was [mis]applied to Southeast Asia and its use in the Caribbean did not incorporate the conditions in the region. The theory overlooked the indigenous roots of the Grenadian revolution, obscured the tradition of democracy in the surrounding states and overestimated the impact of the revolution on Grenada's neighbours; rather than bandwaggoning they took measures to oppose or inoculate themselves against the revolution.[124]

Grenada-Caribbean Relations

After the brief flirtation with leftist governments in several islands, the Eastern Caribbean reverted to its traditional political make-up as right-wing governments were elected in St. Vincent, Antigua, St. Lucia and Dominica. Grenada lost their only

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[122] Interview with Kelly.

[123] Sanchez, "The Communist Threat," p. 49.

[124] Glad and Taber, "Images, Learning and the Decision to Use Force," p. 73.

real ally in the region in October 1980 when Jamaican Prime Minister Michael Manley lost to Edward Seaga who followed a staunchly pro-U.S. line. As relations with the U.S. worsened, relations with the Eastern Caribbean did not follow suit, adopting a more pragmatic approach than the doctrinaire anti-communism emanating from Washington.

The first manifestation of this stance was displayed in June 1981 when the CDB rejected a four million dollar U.S. grant because it expressly excluded Grenada, on political grounds, thereby contravening the bank's charter. In Washington this rejection was interpreted predominantly as a criticism of the political input into multilateral aid programmes rather than criticism of U.S. efforts to isolate Grenada.[125] Whilst Dominica's Prime Minister Eugenia Charles described the episode as "a foolhardy decision which will not bring the results they are seeking," she continued to criticize Grenada and urge the PRG to refuse U.S. funds so the other islands could accept it.[126] Several other countries subsequently approached the U.S. about bilateral programs.[127]

On June 18, 1981, the OECS Treaty was signed at Basseterre, St. Kitts. The OECS was designed to promote cooperation, unity, sovereignty, a harmonized foreign policy and economic integration. It also included provision for collective security in Article 8.[128] Grenada's inclusion demonstrated the reduced fear of

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[125] Rossin, *U.S.-Grenada Relations*, p. 76.

[126] Higbie, *Eugenia*, p. 214.

[127] Another form of available U.S. aid was via direct assistance to the private sector and AID devised ways to funnel aid through the CDB without it reaching Grenada; the CDB could be used to administer trust funds for specific activities on particular islands for example. GAO, *AID Assistance*, p. i.

[128] Article 8, paragraph 4, of the OECS Treaty states that: "The Defence and Security Committee shall have responsibility for coordinating the efforts of Member States for collective defence and the preservation of peace and security against external aggression and for the development of close ties

subversion in the Eastern Caribbean and the respect for Bishop. The OECS was based on consensus rule and it seemed counterproductive to create a fuss over Grenada. Bishop described the OECS as "an encouraging and significant development for our subregion and region in general. The closer coordination in fields such as economics and foreign policy. . . will help to further consolidate the integration process."[129]

The larger organization, CARICOM, also decided not to discriminate against Grenada. In March 1981 a team of Caribbean experts reporting on CARICOM's integration strategy surmised that they "did not consider that ideological differences between individual member countries constituted a real obstacle to 'meaningful regional integration'."[130] At a CARICOM foreign ministers' meeting in July, the CDB's stand was endorsed and a final communiqué "noted with concern the economic aggression being waged by the United States against Grenada."[131]

In September 1981 CARICOM Foreign Ministers met to discuss the recently announced CBI. They insisted that "participation in the program should be open to all territories in the region" and that "criteria used in granting aid should not be based on political or military considerations."[132] Having lobbied Washington hard for a "mini-

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among the Member States of the Organisation in matters of external defence and security, including measures to combat the activities of mercenaries, operating with or without the support of internal or national elements, in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations." William C. Gilmore, *The Grenada Intervention: Analysis and Documentation* (London: Mansell, 1984), p. 81.

[129] "For Greater Caribbean Community Integration, June 29, 1981," Marcus and Taber (eds.), *Maurice Bishop Speaks*, p. 171.

[130] "CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY - Third meeting of heads of government conference," *Keesings*, February 1983, p. 31946.

[131] Payne et al., *Grenada*, p. 95.

[132] "Memorandum by the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Secretariat," U.K. Parliament. House of Commons. Foreign Affairs Committee, Second Report. *Grenada*. Session 1983-84, p. 304.

Marshall plan" for the Caribbean, the Caribbean leaders were frustrated by the lack of details and the emphasis on private investment and trade rather then direct aid. In addition, Reagan's obsession with anti-communism and Grenada appeared incongruent with reality in the region. As Payne et al state, "the region's rather muted reaction to the US plan was revealing. . . [I]t demonstrated how far the PRG had come in the preceding year in winning the grudging respect of several of its CARICOM colleagues."[133] Admittedly, the other Eastern Caribbean countries were not about to reject the CBI because of Grenada's exclusion but they remained consistent in their stance toward Grenada.

During president Reagan's 1982 Barbados trip only the leaders of Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, St. Kitts-Nevis and St. Vincent were invited to meet with him. As we have seen, Reagan told them that Grenada "now bears the Soviet and Cuban trademark, which means that it will attempt to spread the virus among its neighbours."[134] Barbadian Prime Minister, Tom Adams' response was that Grenada was not a military threat and that he wanted to "get on with policies of economic development."[135] The U.S.' hard-line did not coincide with Eastern Caribbean views; they had learnt to accept the PRG and now wished to conduct "business as usual" after the 1979 disturbance to the equilibrium of the region.

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[133] Payne et al., *Grenada*, p. 96.

[134] "Remarks in Bridgetown," *PPP*, 1982, p. 448.

[135] Maingot, "The English-Speaking Caribbean," in Fauriol (ed.), *Security in the Americas*, p. 243.

The Declaration of Ocho Rios

The Third meeting of the CARICOM heads of government was scheduled for November 16-18, 1982, at Ocho Rios in Jamaica.[136] Although Grenada had been gradually reassimilated into Caribbean politics, the PRG still faced criticism from certain quarters. In May 1982 Antiguan Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Lester Bird commented that:

> while external manipulation is a reality, equally there have been other external efforts which have struck responsive chords in some Caribbean countries. I speak here of the question of ideology, where Caribbean territories are more firmly wedded to ideological bonds with third countries than they are committed to regional integration.[137]

Grenada came under attack again in July from Adams, supported by Seaga, who proffered that the CARICOM Treaty should be amended to commit members to uphold "the principal of political liberty and the protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual through adherence to the principle of the rule of law and practice of free, fair and regular elections."[138] Adams' proposal, considered by some to be engineered by the U.S., was not raised at the November 1982 meeting.

Political issues dominated the meeting. The result was the Declaration of Ocho Rios. This recognized the "political, civil, economic, social and cultural rights" of the populace, promoted integration as the only viable option for development, accepted that each country should be free to chose its own path of development and, most notably, that:

> while recognizing that the emergence of ideological pluralism in the Community

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[136] This was the first meeting since 1975.

[137] "The Political Situation in the Caribbean and Grenada's Present Position within that Scenario," *GDMC* no. 004872, p. 2.

[138] Payne et al., *Grenada*, p. 97.

> responds to internal processes and is an irreversible trend within the international system, we are committed to ensuring that it will not inhibit the processes of integration.[139]

CARICOM asked the U.S. to consider aid to regional organizations such as the CDB, rather than purely bilateral programs, to help the integration process.

For Grenada the meeting was a relative success. The PRG had sent a "high powered" delegation to Ocho Rios to combat the expected opposition of Adams and Seaga and to convey their position and reaffirm their commitment to regional integration, one of the "principles" of PRG foreign policy. During the meeting Bishop made a symbolic gesture by announcing the release of 28 detainees. In a private conversation with Trinidadian Prime Minister George Chambers, Bishop undertook to hold elections but reiterated his commitment to "participatory democracy."[140] In February 1983 the Caribbean leaders endorsed "ideological pluralism." By the next meeting of CARICOM in July, Bishop had established a constitutional commission to draft a constitution and at the meeting assured Chambers that elections would be held by 1985.

The Eastern Caribbean's Toleration of Grenada

The centrality of regional integration to the CARICOM and OECS Charters underlines how essential cooperation is. As head of the CDB William Demas pointed out, "what is lacking in the smaller eastern Caribbean islands in terms of size and natural resource endowment could be more than fully compensated by joint and coordinated actions on the external front to realize their latent geopolitical power."[141]

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[139] "CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY," p. 31948.

[140] Ibid., p. 31946.

[141] Hardt, "Grenada Reconsidered," p. 296.

The islands also had established cultural and population ties; Thorndike describes Caribbean societies as "compact and homogenous with. . . a strong sense of community and widespread and interlocking kinship networks."[142] This tradition of interrelationship helps to explain that once the initial threat from Grenada was perceived to have decreased the Eastern Caribbean were not willing to weaken the unity of the region by exiling Grenada.

The Eastern Caribbean operates on the ballot and consequently in such small countries the leaders are in closer contact with the populace than larger countries. Hence, the Prime Minister's main concern is the population rather than Washington's desires.[143] The relationship between the region's leaders also helped to accommodate Grenada. They felt that Bishop was a potential force for moderation and were willing to give him the benefit of the doubt, even though they knew about Grenada's militarization and ties to Cuba, and followed what a St. Lucian official termed "constructive engagement."[144] When Bishop established a constitutional conference in June 1983 it gave some sort of encouragement to the other leaders. As Charles said:

> I didn't think he was changing his Communist intentions. . . but I think he was a practical man and I think he realized he couldn't do these things if he didn't have the people with him. And that he didn't have the majority of the people with him. So he was prepared to work it in such a way that he got the majority of the people going along with him.[145]

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[142] Tony Thorndike, "Politics and Society in the south-eastern Caribbean," in Colin Clarke (ed.), *Society and Politics in the Caribbean* (London: Macmillan, 1991), p. 124.

[143] U.S. Congress. Workshop, *The English-Speaking Caribbean*, p. 96.

[144] Interview with Edmunds.

[145] Higbie, *Eugenia*, p. 225.

The significant thing is that Grenada was not treated as a pariah and thus the possibility of improved relations was always possible, something notably absent from U.S.-Grenadian relations.

The Eastern Caribbean had not dismissed the threat posed by a militarized Grenada but reassessed the probability of it. Contrary to President Reagan's image of "splashing dominoes," they perceived the threat not as a "territorial one (a physical takeover by Grenada/Cuba/Soviet Union) but a threat to government/survival through contagion and possibly subversion, as well as a threat to the traditional political culture."[146] Grenada represented the usurpation of Westminister democracy and displayed no signs of holding elections and had established close politico-military ties to Cuba. Although Grenada was received in the political arenas of CARICOM and the OECS, the other member nations simultaneously made provisions for improved security.

The definition of security in the Eastern Caribbean usually encompasses military, political and economic threats, ranging from outright civil war or intervention through coups and social conflict to debt and economic mismanagement.[147] The islands' economic weaknesses meant that the less they have to spend on defence the better. On average the islands spend less than one percent of GNP on defence. With economic affairs assuming prominence and the leaders' different threat perception, there was no consensus on Grenada or the question of an operational collective security mechanism.

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[146] Braveboy-Wagner, *The Caribbean in World* Affairs, p. 29.

[147] Griffith, *The Quest for Security*, p. 5.

The Eastern Caribbean's security concerns were articulated on October 29, 1982, in Roseau, Dominica, when Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines and Barbados signed a "Memorandum of Understanding Relating to Security and Military Co-operation." The Memorandum was wide-reaching:

> to prepare contingency plans and assist one another on request in national emergencies, prevention of smuggling, search and rescue, immigration control, maritime policing duties, protection of off-shore installations, pollution control, natural and other disasters and threats to national security.[148]

The Regional Security System (RSS) the Memorandum established provided the operational and institutional instruments for collective security which had been outlined in the OECS Treaty. The Eastern Caribbean felt the need for a stronger military capability than they possessed and decided to ask Barbados to join them.[149] The specific exclusion of Grenada was perhaps a more accurate indication of the attitude toward the PRG amongst her neighbours than the CARICOM relations.

A RSS was not a new idea but its emergence in 1982 was a clear reaction to the Grenada situation. Regional leaders admitted that the Memorandum had been spurred by concerns about Grenada; Prime Minister Bird believed that the purpose of the Memorandum was to establish "a regional defence/security system which would insure against the forcible overthrow of democratically elected governments, thereby preventing any replay of the Grenadian revolution."[150] The RSS provided some semblance of security, even if it could only act as a "trip-wire, containing a situation

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[148] Gilmore, *The Grenada Intervention*, p. 88.

[149] Barbados contributed 49 percent of the cost to a Central Fund, appointed a Chief of Staff to serve as a Regional Security Coordinator and provided facilities for a headquarters on Barbados. H. Michael Erisman, "The CARICOM States and US Foreign Policy: The Danger of Central Americanization," *Journal of Inter-American and World Affairs* 31, no. 3 (Fall 1989): 169.

[150] Ibid., p. 169.

until assistance from abroad could be obtained."[151] Additionally, it acted as a forum where the members could confer without Grenada's presence.

The RSS' formation marked the zenith of an increased emphasis on security that was greatly promoted by the Reagan administration. It was Washington's belief that security, democracy and economic development were inextricably juxtaposed and that democracy was the best framework for economic and social development. For the State Department, "Grenada provided another reason for giving economic and security assistance to the other poor but certifiably democratic nations of the Caribbean."[152] The U.S. offered the Eastern Caribbean significant economic and military carrots to secure their support against Grenada. Between 1980-83 economic aid increased from $323.9 million to $759 million and military aid increased from $13.8 million to $195.2 million; between 1980-86 in general, there was a 212 percent increase in economic aid and a 2052 percent increase in military aid.[153]

The recession-hit Eastern Caribbean welcomed any increase in U.S. aid, even if the military percentage of it grew from four percent to 25 percent and was negotiated on a bilateral basis and therefore was detrimental to the integration process. Aid was also conditional on an anti-Communist policy by each government. As Charles admitted:

> Weak governments must fall into line and learn to beg properly. . . Thus this fragile island. . . must court a special relationship with Washington and, possibly as an inducement, has increased rhetoric against the Bishop regime.[154]

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[151] Paul Sutton, "The Politics of Small State Security in the Caribbean," *The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* XXXI, no. 2 (July 1993): 13.

[152] Frank McNeil, *War and Peace in Central America: Reality and Illusion* (New York: Charles Scribner's sons, 1988), p. 172.

[153] Erisman, "The CARICOM States," p. 162.

[154] H. Michael Erisman and John Martz, *Colossus Challenged: The Struggle for Caribbean Influence* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982), p. 215.

Undoubtedly disquieted by Reagan's cold war ideology, the Eastern Caribbean, even if they had not felt threatened by Grenada, could not realistically afford to object to U.S. aid on the grounds that it excluded Grenada. U.S. aid and the strings tied to it help them to express their latent fears about Grenada via the creation of a RSS.

The PRG and its Caribbean Neighbours

An internal PRG report concluded by warning that "Grenada does need to seek possible friends in the region, in order to prevent the isolation which would provide imperialism with a valuable front of assistance."[155] This train of thought appeared to pervade the PRG's thoughts. CARICOM was seen as a useful forum in which to oppose U.S. policies. The PRG considered their relations with most of CARICOM as normal but were pessimistic about its members. Jamaica was seen as a "lackey of the U.S." and Barbados as the U.S.' "watchdog for [the] Eastern Caribbean."[156] St. Lucia, Barbados, Jamaica, Dominica and St. Vincent were classified as an anti-Grenada bloc in CARICOM; Trinidad's "neutral" position was interpreted as "suspect," Guyana was an "ally of convenience" and only in Antigua, whom the PRG believed saw themselves as mediators between the U.S. and Grenada, was the "door. . . not closed to dialogue."[157] This would suggest that irrespective of their inclusion in the OECS and CARICOM the PRG felt isolated in the region but were not prepared to compromise their "principled positions" to improve the situation.

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[155] "The Political Situation in the Caribbean," *GDMC*, no. 004872, p. 6.

[156] Ibid., p. 3.

[157] Ibid., p. 2.

The PRG continued to extend their ties to the Soviet bloc and Third World socialist-oriented regimes and underwent a substantial militarization process that dwarfed that of its neighbours. During its time the PRG signed five secret military agreements with Cuba, North Korea and the Soviet Union, all but one pre-dating the Eastern Caribbean Memorandum of Understanding. By 1986 these agreements would have provided the PRG with four People's Revolutionary Army battalions and 14 militia battalions equipped with 10,000 rifles, 450 machine-guns, 294 rocket launchers, 84 mortars, 12 cannon, 60 anti-aircraft guns, 60 armed personnel carriers, four patrol boats and 20,000 uniforms.[158] However, the general consensus is that this build-up was designed to defend, rather than export, the revolution. This trend is reflected in the *Grenada Documents*; Grenada did act as a contact for left-wing Eastern Caribbean groups to Cuba but the PRG displayed no fervid desire to export revolution. A December 1983 CIA assessment concluded that the PRA was "mainly engaged in enforcing the NJM policy" and that the militia assisted the PRA in defending the country, performed neighbourhood control duties and served as a "vehicle for ideological recruitment and indoctrination."[159] The assessment also concluded that "the large numbers of weapons seized in Grenada were intended primarily for use by Grenadians in their own defense--first in anticipation of an invasion by counterrevolutionary pro-Gairy forces, later in reaction to U.S. Navy exercises in the Caribbean."[160] Naturally, for Grenada's neighbours such objective

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[158] *Grenada: A Preliminary Report*, p. 21. The U.S. and Britain knew weapons had been arriving but it is unknown to what extent they knew the volume of these deliveries.

[159] CIA Report, Interagency Intelligence Assessment, 19 December, 1983, "A First Look At Mechanisms Of Control and Foreign Involvement," *Declassified Documents Catalog* XIV, no. 5 (September-October 1988), document no. 2444, p. 3.

[160] Ibid., p. 16.

conclusions were clouded by their own security concerns and the PRG's Marxist-Leninist power structure, ties to the Soviet bloc, anti-U.S. posturing and progressive militarization.

Mr. Bishop Goes to Washington

In June 1983 Bishop visited Washington where, amongst other things, he met with U.S. government officials and discussed the normalization of relations. The trip has been interpreted variously as a public relations and lobbying exercise or as an indication that Bishop was seriously considering moving away from the Soviets and that his visit possibly made hard-liners within the party uncomfortable and contributed to his demise in October.

In January 1983 Secretary of State Shultz had sent the first official communication to Grenada, via the leader of the Congressional black caucus, Mervyn Dymally, informing the PRG that all personnel at the embassy in Barbados, except the ambassador, would be accredited to Grenada.[161] Dymally in turn invited Bishop to Washington, supported by the influential black lobby group Trans-Africa. An 11-day visit was arranged for the beginning of June. Bishop's entourage arrived on May 30; during the visit Bishop spoke at the Sixth Annual Trans-Africa Dinner, met with congressional representatives, the secretary-general of the OAS, the secretary-general of the UN, addressed the Latin American group in the UN Security Council and held public meetings in Detroit, New York and Washington.

Shortly before the trip, the PRG's "North American Resistance Movement" submitted a report to the Political Bureau (PB) that detailed a 26-point plan to

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[161] Thorndike, *Grenada*, p. 131.

mobilize public and congressional opinion to limit attacks on Grenada, win long-term contracts and solicit concrete assistance. The report concluded that:

> the attacks (and fightbacks) have widened and deepened our support and sympathy and the awareness of our situation among progressives, academics and Blacks. We are making progress on building a wider network of friends and allies vital for our future work.[162]

An earlier report from Grenada's OAS representative Ian Jacobs, on his eight-city tour of the U.S. to counter Reagan's SDI attack, echoed this and recommended "a properly organised, planned and continuous propaganda campaign that always keeps our revolution in the minds of the North Americans."[163] In a letter to Bishop, Gail Reed, the American-born wife of the Cuban ambassador to Grenada, Julian Torres Rizo, advised him to justify the trip in terms of the long history of relations between the two countries, the large numbers of Grenadians living in the U.S. and tourism and economic links: "the purpose of the visit is to reaffirm and develop these ties at as many levels as possible, and by so doing help lessen the tensions that have cropped up."[164] Reed emphasized the need to deny that the trip would be a cover for a meeting with Reagan as this would make Grenada appear opportunistic. Therefore, Bishop should concentrate on addressing the people directly and leave "open the possibility of meeting with the Reagan administration if it were to come off."[165] Obviously advice can be ignored but Reed's letter would not suggest that talks with the U.S. were of primary importance. A PB document reinforces this supposition; it

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[162] "Interim Report on North American Resistance Movement, 3/29/83," in Paul Seabury and Walter A. McDougall (eds.), *The Grenada Papers* (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1984), p. 161.

[163] "Report on U.S., 4/83," in Seabury and McDougall (eds.), *The Grenada Papers*, p. 170.

[164] "Advice on U.S. Tour," in Seabury and McDougall (eds.), *The Grenada Papers*, p. 173.

[165] Ibid., p. 173.

outlines three "strategic objectives" of the trip: to convey Bishop as a "sober and reliable statesman," to develop "unshakable links" with the U.S. black community and to promote tourism.[166]

The visit was portrayed to the media and public as a goodwill mission from a small, poor country that was not a security threat and had "unwittingly" been caught in the middle of President Reagan's geopolitical designs for Central America.[167] In a similar vein at the OAS, Bishop reiterated that Grenada had repeatedly sought good relations but had been spurned by the U.S. and restated that the new airport was a civilian project vital to Grenada's economy.

Whilst professing that "our concern is to do everything we possibly can to get some form of high-level dialogue going,"[168] Bishop again took the opportunity to criticize the U.S. He told the OAS that Grenada could not support the CBI as it excluded them and sought to divide the region. During the trip he also complained that "after all these years of independence Grenada has not been able to get 'one single cent' from the World Bank or been able to establish a stand-by arrangement with the IMF."[169] One notable factor is that the tone of the criticism had been moderated at least. In a speech to U.S. workers in New York the PRG's misperceptions were highlighted. First of all Bishop announced that "at the level of the people, there has never been any problem. We have always had excellent relations

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[166] Gregory Sandford and Richard Vigilante, *Grenada: The Untold Story* (New York: Madison Books, 1984), p. 105.

[167] "Prime Minister's Standard Opening Statement for Meetings with Media Groups," *GDMC*, no. 006317, p. 2.

[168] Steven Strasser, "Seeking a Dialogue With Washington," *Newsweek*, June 6, 1983, p. 56.

[169] CIA Report, "Technical cooperation pacts signed with U.S.S.R., June 30, 1983," *Declassified Documents Catalog* XIV, no. 5 (September-October 1988), document no. 002432, p. 1.

with the people of the United States."[170] In reality, apart from Grenada's established supporters in the U.S., Americans could not be divorced from their government. Secondly, Bishop acknowledged the importance of normalized relations but promised to continue to build the revolution and that "we will always have relations - warm and fraternal, close relations - with the people and government of Cuba."[171] Such speeches are obviously tailored for public consumption but relations with Cuba had been a constant in Grenadian policy. Bishop was patently aware that the U.S. was unhappy with Grenada's ties to Cuba and on the eve of a meeting with U.S. officials this statement could be perceived as an effort to let the U.S. know the Grenadian position.

The alternative explanation is that Bishop was seeking a rapprochement with the U.S. The Grenadian economy was stalling, PSIA was consuming much of the foreign aid received, the PRG was growing increasingly unpopular amongst the populace and isolated in the region and recently U.S. rhetorical attacks had escalated. There was an obvious incentive to improve relations, especially financial ones. Bishop had had a lengthy conversation in Grenada with the British Undersecretary at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) John Ewer in January 1983. Ewer possibly helped persuade Bishop of the need to re-direct the PRG when he unequivocally told him that the restoration of aid required the restoration of the constitution, the release of political prisoners and elections.[172] Thus in this scenario Bishop, in his own words,

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[170] "Maurice Bishop Speaks to U.S. Working People, June 5, 1983," Marcus and Taber (eds.), *Maurice Bishop Speaks*, p. 289.

[171] Ibid., p. 306.

[172] Interview with Kelly.

went to Washington "in search of a dialogue . . . to clear up personally the misconceptions which exist."[173]

According to Bishop's press statement the initiative for a meeting began when PRG Foreign Minister Unison Whiteman asked DCM Flower to arrange two meetings while the Grenada delegation was in Washington with President Reagan or an "appropriate high official" and with Secretary of State Shultz.[174] It appears nothing resulted from this and when Bishop arrived in the U.S. he again asked for a meeting. The government initially refused to meet Bishop. Only after much media criticism, congressional pressure and the personal intercession of Senators Claiborne Pell and Lowell Weicker on Bishop's behalf did the government change its mind.

Bishop had requested a meeting with the President but the administration offered a meeting with the U.S. ambassador to the OAS William Middendorf. The arrangement was that Middendorf would meet with Bishop and Dessima Williams to present certain points to Bishop, obtain his reactions and, subject to them, suggest that another meeting at a different level might be possible. Bishop rejected this as "inappropriate" and did not even turn up, leaving Williams to inform Middendorf that Bishop wanted to see the President and that the Prime Minister had an "open-ended" agenda.[175] The U.S. then relented and organized a meeting with someone "reasonably close" to the President to hear what Bishop had to say.[176] A meeting

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[173] "GRENADA - Military coup - Intervention by U.S. and Caribbean forces," *Keesings Contemporary Archives* XXX (January 1984), p. 32614.

[174] "Press Statement by Mr. Maurice Bishop, Prime Minister of Grenada," *GDMC*, no. 005810, p. 3.

[175] George Shultz, confidential telegram to Amembassy, "Subject: Prime Minister Bishop's Request for High-Level Talks," 021245Z, June 1983, Washington D.C., number illegible, p. 1-2.

[176] U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs and on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. *U.S. Military Actions in Grenada: Implications for U.S. Policy in the Eastern Caribbean*, 1983, p. 28.

with the unusual combination of President Reagan's National Security Advisor William Clark and Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam was scheduled for June 7.

In Washington there was a mixed view of the visit. The U.S. embassy in Barbados sent a telegram to Shultz saying:

> The fact is that if the PRG had wished to return to democracy, they have had more than four years to do so, but have made no move whatsoever in that direction. Instead, Westminister-style democracy has repeatedly been declared dead, and the constitution and election will change nothing as both will be devised to assure continued PRG control over the country.[177]

Other officials echoed these sentiments. Weinberger did not favour a government meeting because of Bishop and the PRG's bad reputation and the belief that he was simply after financial aid.[178] Others were more optimistic; rumours circulated that Bishop was considering distancing Grenada from Cuba. Shultz described the administration's decision to meet Bishop as "an effort on our part to size him up and see how committed he was to his present course."[179] In a draft of a post-intervention speech Reagan revealed:

> I, too, was convinced that Bishop was at least contemplating a change in his earlier position. That is why I asked my Advisor on National Security, Bill Clark to meet privately with Prime Minister Bishop during his visit. . . It seemed we were cautiously taking some steps toward a new relationship.[180]

At the meeting Bishop proposed an exchange of ambassadors, the extradition of Eric Gairy and the cessation of U.S. economic and propaganda destabilization.[181] He

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[177] Milan Bish, confidential telegram to Secretary of State, "Subject: Grenada: Local Coverage of Bishop's Visit to U.S.," 012008Z, June 1983, Bridgetown 03082, p. 3.

[178] Interview with Caspar Weinberger, October 7, 1994, Washington D.C.

[179] George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993), p. 324.

[180] Memorandum, Constantine Menges and Roger Fontaine for Alan Myer, NSC, October 25, 1983, "Grenada/Lebanon 27.10.83," White House Office of Speechwriting, Research Office, File OA 16044, Ronald Reagan Library (RRL), p. 2.

proceeded to say that the bottom line was "dialogue and normal relations" and advocated a Joint Commission to discuss differences and possible cooperation.[182] Clark replied that the U.S. had no problem with dialogue but was concerned about the PRG's conduct:

> we had some doubts about his bona fides, and. . . we hoped he could demonstrate his true desire for better relations by lowering the level of rhetorical attacks on the United States; and if he was prepared to do that, we were prepared to entertain some of the specific suggestions he had as to intermediary ways to get back to a regular relationship.[183]

For the U.S., actions spoke louder than words. Clark also expressed concern about Soviet influence among Grenada's neighbours and warned that "Soviet influence in [the] region is not acceptable."[184] According to the PRG notes, Clark went on to express his hope that Grenada would keep the parliamentary system and not revert to the East European model, that there should be a change in Grenada's criticism and apparently agreed to a second secret meeting. Clark made it clear that the U.S. preferred to conduct discussion in private rather than in response to public attacks. Encouraged by the U.S.' willingness to discuss normalization, a possible moratorium on denunciations was discussed. Clark then left the meeting and Dam underlined that the key issue was Soviet/Cuban influence and the need to see some change in Grenada's conduct. Bishop brought up the subject of economic destabilization and then told Dam, "we can explore any range of subjects and give (our) fullest assurance

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[181] "Background Notes for Meeting with National Security Advisor Clark," in Seabury and McDougall (eds.), *The Grenada Papers*, p. 175.

[182] "Handwritten Notes of Meeting with National Security Advisor Clark," in Seabury and McDougall (eds.), *The Grenada Papers*, p. 178.

[183] U.S. Congress, *US Military Actions in Grenada*, p. 23.

[184] "Handwritten Notes of Meeting," in Seabury and McDougall (eds.), *The Grenada Papers*, p. 178.

that we constitute no threat to the U.S."[185] Conspicuous by its absence from the notes is the question of PSIA and it is possible that it was now discussed. Dam expressed his interest in Bishop's assurances and then the 45 minute meeting came to an end.

The Results

The U.S. had approached the meeting in the standard diplomatic manner and found Bishop intelligent, articulate and non-provocative.[186] The talks were formal and frank but did not change anyone's minds about the PRG; it was, to use Bishop's words, an "exploratory" meeting. Ambassador Middendorf was not alone in thinking that Bishop was having second thoughts about the increasing Soviet influence in Grenada.[187] One conclusion the U.S. did reach was that Bishop was more moderate than some of his CC colleagues and would be easier to do business with than the likes of Bernard Coard; they also wondered if Bishop had the power to pursue this normalization path.[188] Critics have suggested that Bishop's visit was a missed opportunity to improve relations but as Dam stated, one meeting does not automatically translate into good relations. Dam had tried to create the basis for further meetings but it was never followed up and he categorized this as a failure on the U.S.' part.[189]

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[185] Ibid., p. 179.

[186] Telephone interview with Kenneth Dam, August 26, 1994.

[187] Interview with William Middendorf, August 17, 1994, Washington D.C.

[188] Telephone interview with former Department of Defense official, October 13, 1994.

[189] Telephone interview with Dam.

Bishop described the talks as "a useful first step in the recommencement of dialogue between the governments" and had "delayed" an invasion, but added "we do not think the threat has been entirely removed."[190] He was promised nothing substantive by the U.S.; Clark had agreed to respond to Grenada's proposals but the emphasis was on the PRG changing its behaviour. In light of the events to come many have suggested that Bishop's visit contributed to his downfall.

The general theory is that Bishop and his supporters favoured establishing an election timetable and rapprochement with the U.S. This conflicted with the Marxist-Leninist hard-liners who favoured reform of what they saw as Bishop's "one-manism" leadership and "petty bourgeois" (sic) tendencies, nationalization, government intervention in the economy and closer alignment with the Soviets.[191] By June 1983 an ideology and power struggle was already underway within the PRG; there had been a week-long debate over Bishop's trip and the final vote was not unanimous with Coard and Liam James expressing their uncertainties.[192] To Bishop's opponents in the government dialogue was tantamount to ideological compromise. Some on the CC also felt that Bishop had acted without consulting them by going beyond what had previously been agreed in his dealings with the U.S. As Thorndike points out, Bishop had conceded too much for some: he had ordered the moratorium on denunciations to continue, possibly promised to reduce the Soviet and Cuban presence once Point Salines was completed, had established a Constitutional Commission and recently released political detainees.[193] Interestingly, Grenada's

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[190] Schoenhals and Melanson, *Revolution and Intervention*, p. 136.

[191] "GRENADA," *Keesings*, January 1984, p. 32614.

[192] Interview with Kelly.

[193] Thorndike, *Grenada*, p. 141.

ambassador to the Soviet Union, W. Richard Jacobs, learnt of the Bishop's trip via the Voice of America (VOA) and when asked about the nature of the Clark meeting by the Soviet's Director of the First Latin American Department Vladimir Kazimirov, who found out via the press, had to tell him that "thus far the results are confidential." [194] Presumably Bishop's visit did exacerbate tensions with the PRG but the argument that Bishop was moving away from the Soviets is harder to sustain.

Bishop visited North Korea in April 1983 and stopped over in Moscow. He met with Andrei Gromyko who expressed Soviet "solidarity and understanding" with Grenada. At the end of June the two countries signed four contractual arrangements under the 1982 economic and technical cooperation agreements.[195] A July 1983 summary of Grenada-Soviet Relations by Jacobs reported that the Soviets were impressed with the PRG's management of power, that Grenada should "be the sponsor of revolutionary activity and progressive developments in the region" to increase the PRG's prominence in Soviet eyes and to generally continue to support the Soviet line internationally.[196] These episodes contradict the theory that Bishop visited the U.S. because he wanted to distance himself from the Soviets. From the Soviet side, Kazimirov seemed more concerned that the Grenadian ambassador had not informed him personally of Bishop's trip rather than why Bishop was there. Moscow had always dealt with Grenada cautiously due to doubts over the PRG's reliability and the possibility of a direct confrontation with the U.S.; the recent

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[194] "Grenada's Relations with the USSR," in Seabury and McDougall (eds.), *The Grenada Papers*, p. 205.

[195] The contracts covered education, communication, water supply, a seaport development project and a feasibility study for a satellite earth station. CIA Report, "Technical Cooperation Pacts," p. 1.

[196] "Grenada's Relations," in Seabury and McDougall (eds.), *The Grenada Papers*, p. 216.

escalation of tension by the U.S. may have meant that even the Soviets, presuming they were more confident of the PRG's allegiances, were not as concerned as they may have otherwise been about Bishop's visit if it lowered tension in the region.

Conclusion

President Reagan was determined to restore U.S. credibility and increase military capability after the perceived malaise of the Carter years. Due to geography and history the Caribbean Basin was destined to be the testing ground for this reinvigoration of U.S. foreign policy. Reagan's fervent anti-communism saw the Soviet Union as the cause of all ills in the region; combined with influence of the domino theory the administration thus feared "a chain reaction of leftist revolutions would turn the once subservient tropical basin into a rim of hostile Marxist states taking their cues from Castro's Cuba."[197] The NSC staff knew of Reagan's beliefs and ensured he received information that magnified the communist presence in the region. This supported the contentions of those who argued that even threats to minor interests should be met because all interests are interlinked and it reflected on U.S. global credibility.

To the U.S. the PRG did little to assuage Washington's view of them as a Soviet/Cuban proxy. By 1983 the PRG had a CC and PB, a PRA and militia outnumbering its neighbours combined forces, a developed propaganda machine and monopolized media, mass organizations and an internal security apparatus.[198] The U.S. could not reconcile the persistent anti-U.S. rhetoric emanating from St.

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[197] Tony Thorndike, "Grenada," in Peter J. Schraeder (ed.), *Intervention in the 1980's: US Foreign Policy in the Third World* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1989), p. 256.

[198] *Grenada: A Preliminary Report*, p. 8.

George's with Bishop's professed desire for good relations; this combination led Washington to view talks as "futile and time-wasting."[199] Real concerns about Grenada's ties to the Soviet bloc, the absence of elections, the possible military use of PSIA and the threat to the other islands aside, Washington was never convinced that Grenada seriously wanted normalized relations and with no real time pressure or security threat, the Reagan administration pursued a gradualistic approach of economic, political and military pressure; such extremes as covert or overt military action were unnecessary and unlikely.[200]

As we have already seen, the nature of the Eastern Caribbean meant that the other islands were inevitably affected by events in Grenada and its relations with the U.S. President Reagan made quite clear his displeasure with Grenada by excluding them from the CBI and withholding aid from the CDB. The Eastern Caribbean were not prepared to compromise the unity of the region by isolating Grenada. Several of the Caribbean countries had ignored U.S. pressure and established diplomatic relations with Cuba in the late 1970's and were not about to blithely follow the U.S. line now; they had their own regional concerns to consider. As Payne et al comment:

> the local leaders' rather cool reaction to Reagan's crude anti-Communism showed that they had been rather more sophisticated in their acceptance of the reality of ideological pluralism in the Commonwealth Caribbean than had their supposedly more worldly neighbours in Washington.[201]

However, Washington's image of Grenada as a poor, backward, third world regime that was a "minor irritant" reinforced the power asymmetry between the countries and meant that the U.S. assumed they could pursue their chosen policy without any

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[199] Rossin, *US-Grenada Relations*, p. 62

[200] Cottam, *Images and Intervention*, p. 32.

[201] Payne et al., *Grenada*, p. 96.

serious repercussions. The U.S. never achieved any regional or international consensus on its policy towards Grenada and were not concerned about it. For the region Grenada was a "fact of life"; via CARICOM the islands hoped to nudge Grenada towards constitutionalism, believing this would also place constraints on Grenada's militarization.[202] Simultaneously the Eastern Caribbean felt ever more insecure militarily and established a RSS to calm their underlying fears.

Bishop's visit to Washington was seen by many as a chance to repair fences. Several lower echelon U.S. officials tried to promote it as such an opportunity but they were overruled by those higher up.[203] In a press statement Bishop told reporters that:

> We are here to speak to different strata and sectors of the American society with the hope of providing a better understanding of the Grenada revolution and to initiate a dialogue with officials of the U.S. Administration with a view towards normalizing relations between out two governments.[204]

Throughout the visit the emphasis was on contact with the public, media, Congress and Grenada's friends in the U.S. In this sense the trip could be considered a success although Bishop was probably preaching to the converted most of the time. As to the question of normalizing relations, presuming Bishop was sincere his meeting was no more than a tentative first step on a long road. The history of U.S.-Grenadian relations counted against him and sceptical, or oppositional, U.S. officials gave little incentive, such as a progressive restoration of diplomatic links, to Bishop. This was clearly the prevalent opinion at the embassy in Barbados:

> The PRG continues to place prime importance on potential publicity gains

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[202] U.S. Congress. Workshop, *The English-Speaking Caribbean*, p. 100.

[203] Interview with Rossin.

[204] "Press Statement by Mr. Maurice Bishop," *GDMC*, no. 005810, p. 2.

> which only a meeting with the President would have generated in their view, rather than to be pinned down on the main issues impeding a normalization of relations. Refusing to talk on the basis of diplomatic formalities in our opinion amounts to simply a transparent excuse to avoid the target issues. . . Bishop's much publicized crusade to "forge a new beginning" in our relationship as he put it. . . has regretfully, but predictably, amounted to nothing new at all.[205]

Payne concludes that: "the Washington visit should be interpreted, not so much as a change of strategy in any sense, even less an ideological compromise, but rather a tactical adjustment designed to take the heat off the revolution for a while."[206] It is difficult to believe that the PRG would have reduced its ties to Cuba and it is this which was the crux of the problem for the U.S. June was an anomaly; relations thereafter continued in a similar vein and the issue of normalization was lost amongst the internal power struggle that eventually consumed the PRG.

The deterioration of relations during the Reagan administration was a continuation of the trend that was established during the Carter administration, albeit more pronounced. In conclusion, "given the nature of the Bishop regime's political objectives and of its foreign support, the administration had substantial grounds for wishing the PRG's demise, if not for taking active steps to remove it."[207] Reagan's policy was one of attrition rather than actively seeking the removal of the PRG as they simply did not merit a military solution. The implosion of the revolution in October would change this.

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[205] Milan Bish, confidential telegram to Secretary of State, "Subject: Grenada: Bishop Calls U.S. Arrogant," 081350Z, June 1983, Bridgetown 03195, p. 3.

[206] Payne, "The Foreign Policy of the PRG" in Heine (ed.), *A Revolution Aborted*, p. 142.

[207] Beck, *The Grenada Invasion*, p. 32.

CHAPTER 4

DEATH OF A REVOLUTION: PRELUDE TO AN INTERVENTION

By the summer of 1983 the tension in U.S.-Grenadian relations had decreased. Simultaneously though the PRG's internal problems grew increasingly insurmountable: a faltering economy, waning popular support and an internecine Party power struggle culminated in the implosion of the PRG in October 1983 and its replacement by a Revolutionary Military Council which was then overthrown by a multilateral U.S.-Eastern Caribbean military force. In this chapter I will trace the decline of the PRG and the subsequent arrest of Bishop and his death on Wednesday, October 19, and the U.S. and Caribbean reaction to these events which laid the foundations for a military intervention.

After June

Despite Bishop's Washington meeting with U.S. officials in June 1983 no substantive change in relations materialized. Indeed, it seemed as if the U.S. discounted Bishop's visit as a propaganda exercise rather than a serious effort at improving relations. According to one senior Jamaican leader, even after June a U.S. official had encouraged Jamaica and other Caribbean nations to "isolate Grenada as a communist outpost and to consider taking military action against the Bishop regime."[1]

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[1] Patrick E. Tyler, "The Making of an Invasion: Chronology of the Planning," *Washington Post*, October 30, 1983, p. A14.

The U.S. also continued its policy of economic isolation. In August 1983 Grenada secured a three-year Extended Agreement with the IMF worth $14.715 million, although only $9.7 million of this would be available for direct public sector use with the rest being spent on IMF-identified problem areas of the economy such as banking and the private sector.[2] The PRG believed that once they had the IMF's "seal of approval" the economic climate would improve and attract more domestic and foreign capital.[3] However, as Smith concludes, the PRG's:

> recourse to the IMF on the scale it did in mid-1983 - an institution notorious for dictating and subverting the economic policy and strategy of progressive regimes . . . is clear evidence of the severity of the crisis which gripped the Grenadian economy.[4]

Apparently, the State Department were willing to support the Grenadian request but the Treasury failed to agree.[5] Although the U.S. did therefore oppose the application the IMF ignored their objections anyway. These developments obscured the division within the PRG that would soon tear the government apart.

The Beginning of the End

An indication that all was not well within the PRG came in October 1982 when Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard, the chief political theoretician of the party, resigned from the PB and CC. Coard felt that his authority as Chairman of the Organizing Committee had been undermined and stated that he was "tired and sick of being the only hatchetman and critique. . . he concluded that he was the main fetter

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[2] Smith, "The Development Strategy," p. 528.

[3] Claremont D. Kirton, "Grenada and the IMF: The PRG's Extended Fund Facility Program, 1983," *Latin American Perspectives* 16, no. 3 (Summer 1989): 122.

[4] Smith, "The Development Strategy," p. 533.

[5] "Minutes of the Political and Economic Bureau, August, 31st, 1983," *GDCM*, no. 002306, p. 7.

on the development of the CC because everyone was depending on him for everything especially in the area of the economy."[6] In response a CC meeting identified "petty bourgeois" (sic) tendencies in the party and suggested a more select membership[7] and that "the party must be placed on a firm Leninist footing."[8] Coard also cited accusations against him of undermining Bishop's leadership and a belief that if the stricter adherence to Leninism that he felt necessary was implemented it would cause "personality clashes" with Bishop.[9] The PRG's external relations with Grenadians were similarly troubled.

By the fourth year of the revolution the populace had grown disillusioned with the PRG. The economic downturn meant the government struggled to meet Grenadians increased socio-economic expectations. The Marxist-Leninist dogmatism of the PRG had little in common with the masses and alienated the small middle-class sector. The PRG also criticized the Churches as subversive in a strongly religious society. The PRG's mass organizations gradually lost support and a combination of the dislike of regimentation and poor pay led to the demoralization of many PRA and militia members.

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[6] "Extraordinary Meeting of the Central Committee NJM, 14-16 September, 1983," *Grenada Documents*, document no. 112, p. 43.

[7] There were never more than about 70 full members of the NJM as most of the 300 individuals were "candidate members" who were still receiving political education and lacked full voting rights. As Ambursley and Dunkerley comment, "since the NJM was not just a left-wing party but one which governed a country, its low membership in a society of approximately 85,000 people is remarkable. It confirms that the party continued to repudiate easy populism and membership for its own sake, and that it adhered rigidly to the concept of a 'vanguard organisation'." Fitzroy Ambursley and James Dunkerley, *Grenada: Whose Freedom?* (London: Latin America Bureau, 1984), p. 58.

[8] Meeks, *Caribbean Revolutions*, p. 173.

[9] Jiri Valenta and Virginia Valenta, "Leninism in Grenada," *Problems of Communism* XXXIII (July-August 1984): 16.

In March 1983 a report to the CC concluded that the government was "close to losing its links with the masses."[10] The decision to restrict the size of party membership resulted in administrative overload as overworked officials suffered mental and physical exhaustion. Additionally, inefficiency at all levels, a lack of communication and physical isolation, most Grenadians were unaware of the existence of the CC, all served to reduce contact with the public.[11] The external pressure placed on the PRG by the U.S. had contributed to the militarization of Grenada that had occurred and the subsequent increased intrusion of the PRA, in particular, and militia into everyday life.

Conspiracy Theory

One typical explanation of the demise of Bishop is that it was the result of a carefully planned conspiracy by a radical faction of the PRG led by the ambitious and committed Leninist Bernard Coard who plotted to remove the more moderate Bishop. Accordingly, Coard used his position to appoint his OREL disciples into positions of power and then resigned to disguise his intentions. Finally, in late 1983 the Coard faction manufactured a crisis to introduce the proposal of joint leadership and when Bishop expressed opposition they arrested him to clear the way for Coard's return.[12] Before examining the series of self-critical CC meetings that prefaced the

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[10] Payne et al., *Grenada*, p. 111.

[11] Ibid., p. 106.

[12] Kai Schoenhals, "The Road to Fort Rupert: The Revolution's Final Crisis," Paper prepared for a conference on "Democracy, Development and Collective Security in the Eastern Caribbean: The Lessons of Grenada," sponsored by the Caribbean Institute and Study Center for Latin America (CISCLA) of Inter American University of Puerto Rico, San German, Puerto Rico, October 17-19, 1985: 1.

PRG's demise it is necessary to consider the other reasons for the events that occurred.

That the CC were divided into Bishop and Coard supporters is indisputable, but the struggle that evolved was more of a classic power struggle involving personality and leadership differences rather than ideological ones. Bishop and Coard were very contrasting characters.

Maurice Bishop was the public face of the PRG: "tall, handsome, popular, an inspired and inspiring public speaker, a man who had come to his leadership position in a spontaneous, natural fashion. . . who received the accolades and the recognition."[13] As Marable states, "Bishop was the charismatic, symbolic link between the PRG, the NJM and the Grenadian masses."[14] He was a "pragmatic" and "populist" politician and as his secret September 1982 Line of March speech revealed, he was also clearly committed to Marxist-Leninism.[15] However, Bishop's attitude to the Marxist-Leninist doctrine has been described as "ambiguous and reverential."[16] Indeed, as Feuer points out, "his speeches contain little of the rhetoric or class analysis usually associated with Marxist-Leninism; there seems more emphasis on the youth, women and small farmers than the working-class."[17] Finally, a factor that is important to remember, Bishop's political style was one of consensus and accommodation. Heine concludes that Bishop "was overaccommodating as a

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[13] Jorge Heine, "The Hero and the Apparatchik: Charismatic Leadership, Political Management, and Crisis in Revolutionary Grenada," in Heine (ed.), *A Revolution Aborted*, p. 241.

[14] Marable, *African and Caribbean Politics*, p. 225.

[15] The Line of March speech can be found in Seabury and McDougall (ed.), *The Grenada Papers*, pp. 59-88.

[16] Heine, "The Hero and the Apparatchik," p. 221.

[17] Carl Feuer, "Was Bishop a Social Democrat," *Caribbean Review* XII, no. 4 (Fall 1983): 39.

leader. He didn't want to offend people, and therefore his own beliefs and positions were often compromised."[18] For example, when Coard made the decision to close *Torchlight* in 1979 when Bishop was abroad without consulting him, Bishop made no objection when he returned, despite his reservations about such a measure.

Bernard Coard was the private face of the PRG. His forte was long-term planning and managerial strategy and he was responsible for the PRG's political economy policies. Coard was a dogmatic, ideology-oriented Marxist-Leninist who favoured a pro-Soviet hard-line policy. He was the man behind the party's organization and tactics and "from his positions on the Organizing Committee, the Politburo, and the CC, he kept trying to build a highly centralized, hierarchical, elitist party structure in accordance with his own strict interpretation of Leninist doctrine."[19] It was this situation, combined with his former OREL associates support, that "enabled him to assign loyalists to strategic positions throughout the party, mass organizations, and government ministries."[20] According to some authors this process was all part of a masterplan to remove Bishop from power.

As far as the working relationship between Bishop and Coard was concerned, "Maurice generally bowed to Bernard's tactical and ideological leadership with Bernard in turn accepting his position of chief ideologue/tactician while ceding the kudos of popularity and later national leadership to Maurice."[21] Bishop respected Coard's understanding of the "science" of Marxist-Leninism and trusted his judgment.

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[18] Heine, "The Hero and the Apparatchik," p. 244.

[19] Ibid., p. 238.

[20] CIA Report, "A First Look," p. A1.

[21] Meeks, *Caribbean Revolutions*, p. 171.

Coard accepted that Bishop epitomized the revolution for Grenadians but in private he criticized Bishop's leadership style; before his resignation from the PB and CC in October 1982 he criticized the "dead-weight" leaders on the CC. After heavy criticism by the Coard faction several pro-Bishop members were dismissed: Radix and Noel forcibly and Creft after resigning.[22]

Disregarding the theory of a multi-stage gradualistic plan by Coard to overthrow Bishop, there were obvious problems within the party. Most authors concur that the crisis which destroyed the PRG arose over the Coard faction's disappointment over the rate of social and economic transformation, the persistence of "petty bourgeois" (sic) tendencies in the NJM and the difficulties encountered in establishing a Marxist-Leninist party structure and control system.[23] As Ambursley and Dunkerly suggest, the division within the PRG "was not essentially about ideology, but it did centre on political tactics and party discipline, which inevitably helped to draw out and sharpen incipient differences of style, approach and strategy."[24] At a series of CC meetings in July, August and September 1983 the power-struggle reached its violent denouement.

The First Plenary Session

From July 13-19, 1983, the CC convened its first ever Plenary Session. Here ideological, political and organizational weaknesses were identified:

> The continued failure of the Party to transform itself ideologically and organizationally and to exercise firm leadership along a Leninist path in the face of the

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[22] Marable, *African and Caribbean Politics*, p. 253.

[23] Payne et al., *Grenada*, p. 106.

[24] Ambursley and Dunkerley, *Grenada*, p. 55.

acute rise in the complexities and difficulties facing the Revolution on all fronts.[25]

Concern was also expressed over the "emergence of deep petty (sic) bourgeois manifestations and influences in the party which has led to two ideological traits."[26] Bishop's name was not mentioned but at subsequent meetings he would be strongly denounced for his petit bourgeois tendencies.

The CC complained that mass organization activity had stagnated, workers attendance at classes was low and inconsistent, militia numbers had fallen, anti-Communist activity was rising as was Church activity; a report warned "how dangerously close the Party came to losing links with the masses."[27] Rather than trying to improve external relations with the masses the CC concluded that increased political and ideological training was required, more careful selection of political cadres and stronger leadership.[28] These criticisms would resurface at subsequent meetings as the crisis developed.

The self-critical tones continued at an Emergency Meeting of the CC on August 26, 1983. In addition to concern about the neglect of the militia and low morale amongst the PRA, criticism now focused on the composition and function of the CC. Selwyn Strachan warned that "sections of the party have begun to rebel against the higher organs of the party. . . This silent rebellion will turn into open rebellion and if we do not address it now it will be resolved in a petty (sic) bourgeois way."[29]

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[25] "Central Committee Report on First Plenary Session, 13-19 July, 1983," *Grenada Documents*, document no. 110, p. 1.

[26] Ibid., p. 1.

[27] Ibid., p. 1.

[28] Ibid., p. 7.

[29] "Minutes of Emergency Meeting of N.J.M. Central Committee Dated 26th August, 1983," *Grenada Documents*, document no. 111, p. 4.

Prophetically, Liam James cautioned that "we are seeing the beginning of the disintegration of the party."[30] In summarizing the meeting Bishop agreed with James' diagnosis and recommended greater CC self-criticism, work committees and study groups to improve CC members performance and, ludicrously, that members should read a history of the Soviet communist party.[31] At the next meeting of the CC it would be Bishop and his supporters who became the target of criticism.

September 1983

An Extra-ordinary Meeting of the CC took place between September 14-16, 1983. The meeting started ominously for Bishop when his agenda was rejected as "lacking in focus" and was replaced by the radicals' agenda consisting of an analysis of the present state of the party and revolution, an analysis of the CC and its main problems and discussion of the way forward.[32] Ewart Layne began proceedings by stating that the revolution was in more danger than ever. The population displayed "dispiritiveness and dissatisfaction"; he warned that:

> the party is crumbling, all mass organizations are to the ground, organs of people's democracy is about to collapse (sic). The internal state of the party is very dread (sic). There is wide protest against the higher organs, prestige has fallen in the eyes of the party members and the masses. The C.C. has proven its inability to give leadership to the process e.g. this time the C.C. cannot determine the stage the revolution is at.[33]

The participants felt that the CC was not providing adequate leadership and that the revolution lacked direction. Additionally it was felt that more attention had to be paid

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[30] Ibid., p. 3.

[31] Ibid., p. 6.

[32] "Extraordinary Meeting of the Central Committee," *Grenada Documents*, document no. 112, p. 3.

[33] Ibid., p. 4.

to the people if the revolution was to survive. At the end of the first day Bishop concluded that there was a deep crisis caused by the weaknesses in the functioning of the CC and that this contributed to the low morale of the masses. [34]

On the second day Bishop was the target of direct criticism. Liam James led off by criticizing the "levels of disorganisation, low ideological level and failure to put the party on a firm M.L.[Marxist-Leninist] footing" and opined that "the most fundamental problem is the quality of leadership of the Central Committee and the party provided by Cde. Maurice Bishop."[35] James acknowledged Bishop's talents as a charismatic leader who had gained national and international respect for the revolution but suggested that he lacked the qualities to advance the revolution, namely: "a Leninist level of organisation and discipline, greater depth in ideological clarity [and] brilliance in strategy and tactics."[36] Other members of the Coard faction then joined in; Phyllis Coard, Bernard's wife, commented that:

> the Cde. (sic) Leader has not taken the responsibility, not given the necessary guidance, even in areas where he is directly in charge of the guidance is not adequate. He is disorganised very often, avoid (sic) responsibilities for dealing with critical areas of work.[37]

In response the pro-Bishop George Louison said that Bishop's leadership was "not the only problem." Unison Whiteman, whilst accepting that Bishop had his faults, said that the CC were not exactly blameless. However, Bishop conceded that "it is correct as the maximum leader to take the full responsibilities" and that he needed time to

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[34] Ibid., p. 13.

[35] Ibid., p. 14.

[36] Ibid., p. 14.

[37] Ibid., p. 16.

think about the situation.[38] The stage had been set for what would some authors argue was the final step in Coard's elaborate plan to marginalise Bishop and seize power himself.

Having soundly criticized Bishop's leadership, James, seconded by Layne and Leon Cornwall, proposed a "Joint Leadership" plan: Bishop would be responsible for work with the masses, propaganda, the organs of popular democracy, militia mobilization and regional/international affairs. Coard would be responsible for Party organization work, the Organization Committee, Party organization and development and strategy and tactics.[39] It would seem that the majority of the CC thought joint leadership was the most appropriate solution to the situation. There was general agreement that Coard's return to the CC and PB would be welcome and Bishop's and Coard's abilities did complement one another. As Meeks concludes, "joint leadership was not, as some have implied, a bolt out of the blue. It was simply the formal interpretation of Coard and Bishop's pre-1979 relationship."[40] Bishop did not initially oppose powersharing although he felt it was a vote of "no confidence," his concern was what Coard's view of this arrangement was, the implementation of it and that joint leadership would project an image of a revolution undergoing a power struggle and near collapse.[41] Again, Bishop asked for time to consider the proposal and suggested that the CC should talk to Coard whilst he (Bishop) was in St. Kitts

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[38] Ibid., p. 19.

[39] Ibid., p. 21.

[40] Meeks, *Caribbean Revolutions*, p. 175.

[41] "Extraordinary Meeting of the Central Committee," *Grenada Documents*, document no. 112, p. 29.

attending their Independence Day ceremony.[42] The meeting closed with a vote on the formalization of James' proposal which was passed by nine votes for, one against and three abstentions.

On September 17 the CC met with Coard to discuss joint leadership. Interestingly, none of those who had questioned the proposal were present. Coard had actually met with Bishop before he left for St. Kitts. Coard agreed that the situation was grim and he believed that the Party would disintegrate in six months unless a "fundamental package of measures are done."[43] Coard was initially reluctant to return to the CC and PB and emphasized that the implementation of joint leadership must satisfy Bishop.

On September 25 there was an Extraordinary General Meeting of the Full Members of the Party. A CC report was distributed that explained that joint leadership was:

> an attempt to bring a creative and scientific solution to the leadership question in our concrete circumstances and most fundamentally. . . it is the formal recognition of the leadership of our party for the first ten years. . . up to one year ago.[44]

Bishop's failure to attend was interpreted as "contempt to the C.C. decision and democratic centralism."[45] Coard felt his presence without Bishop would be inappropriate so he did not attend either. Eventually the members voted to force both to attend. It appears that Bishop was having second thoughts, saying that, "I am

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[42] The British Deputy High Commissioner David Montgomery remembers Bishop appearing worried, edgy and unusually quiet throughout the occasion and quick to return to Grenada the next day. Interview with David Montgomery, November 8, 1995, London.

[43] Ibid., p. 43.

[44] Thorndike, *Grenada*, p. 151.

[45] "Extra-Ordinary General Meeting of Full Members, September 25th, 1983," *Grenada Documents*, document no. 113, p. 10.

suspicious that Comrades have concluded that the party must be transformed into a Marxist-Leninist party and I am the wrong person to be leader."[46] Charges of "vacillation" and "individualism" were leveled against him. Despite his reservations Bishop's only response was accommodative; "I sincerely accept the criticism and will fulfill the decision in practice."[47] Bishop and Coard then embraced and it seemed that the crisis had been averted.

On September 27 Bishop and two of his main supporters, Whiteman and George Louison, unwisely left Grenada to visit Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Moscow, East Germany and Cuba. As acting party leader and Prime Minister in Bishop's absence, Coard was able to consolidate his position. It appears that during this trip Bishop, probably encouraged by Whiteman and Louison, had second thoughts about joint leadership. In Budapest, Bishop told his bodyguard, Cletus St. Paul, that the crisis was a "power struggle" and that "no state had joint leadership."[48] In Cuba, Bishop told Castro that he had "given little attention to the militia. I've given little attention to the work of the party. When I return I shall give more attention to the work of the party and mass organizations."[49] It is unknown whether Bishop discussed the power struggle with Castro and, if not, how much Castro knew of the situation. According to one official, whilst in Cuba Bishop was told to be on his guard when he returned home.[50] The CC learnt of Bishop's change of mind when St. Paul phoned them from

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[46] Ibid., p. 14.

[47] Thorndike, *Grenada*, p. 152.

[48] Payne et al., *Grenada*, p. 128.

[49] Cotman, *The Gorrion Tree*, p. 211.

[50] Interview with Kelly.

Cuba and hinted that "blood will flow."[51] The CC accused Bishop of discussing his problems with Castro and interpreted this latest development as a plot to eliminate the radicals.

Bishop was now convinced that joint leadership was a plot to undermine his authority. When he arrived back only one member of the PB, a casually dressed Selwyn Strachan, was there to meet him. Bishop told Strachan that he wanted the joint leadership issue to be put back on the agenda and that he now favoured "collective" rather than joint leadership.[52] Bishop failed to attend a CC Emergency Session on Monday, October 10, and was only visited by Hudson Austin and Layne during this time. In a conversation with Vincent Noel the following day, Noel mentioned that Chalkie Ventour had spoken of an "Afghan solution" if Bishop continued to vacillate; Bishop had also heard of such talk and replied that "what was at stake was much more than whether he had petit bourgeois qualities or weaknesses."[53]

On Wednesday, October 12, the PB met in what was to prove to be the beginning of the end for Bishop. Prior to the meeting Bishop had realized that he either had to accept the CC's decision or get the support of the masses; hence St. Paul was instructed to circulate a rumour that Coard was planning to assassinate Bishop. In response the pro-Bishop militia members tried to arm and mobilize and the Army Chief of Staff, Einstein Louison, tried to rally support for Bishop in the PRA. At the meeting Bishop's challenge to the joint leadership decision received short shrift. He

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[51] Payne et al., *Grenada*, p. 129.

[52] Ibid., p. 129.

[53] "Letter from Noel to Central Committee, 10/17/83," in Seabury and McDougall (eds.), *The Grenada Papers*, p. 338.

was out-voted nine to three; James made it clear that "we have to be cold-blooded and cast all emotions aside, we have to be determined. MB [Maurice Bishop] is mainly responsible for the crisis in the party."[54] Bishop, George Louison and Fitzroy Bain were then accused of "one-manism," "cultism" and "spreading rumours as a precondition for murdering the CC and chasing the party off the streets."[55]

Unbeknown to Bishop, the Coard faction had assembled key PRA figures at 1:00 a.m. that morning and informed them that Bishop had rebelled and that "they were to defend the working-class as a whole and not the life of any individual leaders."[56] At the meeting the PRA issued a statement supporting joint leadership: "Never will we allow cultism, egoism, the unreasonable and unprincipled desires of one man or a minority to be imposed on our Party."[57] With his power undermined and the PRA supporting his removal, Bishop's fate was sealed.

At a meeting of all the 300 or so NJM members on Thursday, October 13, at 10:00 p.m. Bishop was denounced as having "disgraced the party" and was now "without redemption."[58] He denied spreading assassination rumours but when Errol George, a member of Bishop's security personnel, repeated the charges Bishop refused to deny George's claims, an action that was interpreted by the attendants as an admission of guilt. In an atmosphere that Noel described as "a horrendous display of militarism, hatred and emotional vilification,"[59] an isolated and confused Bishop

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[54] *Grenada: A Preliminary Report*, p. 34.

[55] Schoenhals and Melanson, *Revolution and Intervention*, p. 73.

[56] Marable, *African and Caribbean Politics*, p. 258.

[57] "Resolution of People's Army, 10/12/83," in Seabury and McDougall (eds.), *The Grenada Papers*, p. 325.

[58] Beck, *The Grenada Invasion*, p. 14.

[59] "Letter From Noel" in Seabury and McDougall (eds.), *The Grenada Papers*, p. 338.

was a sitting duck. What happened next was a formality. On the pretext of a threat to the Coards and other CC members the CC voted to place Bishop under house arrest. He was put on RFG at 00:15 a.m. to deny that there was any dissension within the Cabinet and to dismiss the assassination rumour.[60] On the morning of Friday, October 14, Bishop was informed by Austin and Strachan that he had been expelled from the party.

Under Arrest: October 13-19

Even before news of Bishop's arrest reached Washington the power struggle in Grenada had attracted attention. The U.S. embassy in Barbados had been monitoring the situation and as Kenneth Kurze, the Counselor for Political and Military Affairs at the embassy, commented, "rumors that the radicals led by Coard were discontent (sic) and planning something (at the very least, pressure on Bishop to conform) had been circulating for weeks."[61] Amongst the first to pick up on this in Washington was the staunch right-wing anti-Communist Constantine Menges, the President's National Security Assistant for Latin American Affairs.[62] Menges was concerned

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[60] Bishop's midnight broadcast was unusual in that he was introduced as the "Leader of the NJM" rather than "Prime Minister" as was customary and RFG normally went off-air at midnight and thus the only people likely to hear Bishop's broadcast were those expecting such an announcement. Interview with Kelly.

[61] Beck, *The Grenada Invasion*, p. 116. There had been rumours of a power struggle in the PRA back in April 1983. Ludlow Flower, confidential telegram to Secretary of State, "Subject: Grenada After the Bishop-Reagan Exchange: Quiet, Puzzled, Disgruntled," 201845Z, April 1983, Bridgetown 02334, section 4, p. 2.

[62] Menges had joined the NSC only two weeks earlier from the CIA where he had been the National Intelligence Officer for Latin America. During his two-year stay at the CIA his ideological fervour had caused three Senators to write a protest letter to CIA Director William Casey after a Menges briefing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee "turned into a harangue against Havana. . . denouncing Communists and attributing the woes of Central America to Moscow and Marxism." Bob Woodward, *VEIL: The Wars of the CIA 1981-1987* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), p. 189. Casey eventually decided Menges had outgrown his usefulness at the CIA where he was causing friction between Casey and his Deputy Chief of Intelligence John McMahon and so "shipped" him off to the NSC. Woodward, *VEIL*, p. 257.

about the possible danger to U.S. citizens, predominantly the 800 or so medical students, on the island. He later recalled that:

> in crises there is opportunity, and I believed that this emergency just might present an excellent chance to restore democracy to Grenada while assuring the safety of our citizens. I immediately asked all the foreign policy agencies to provide their latest facts on Grenada. I also sought up-to-date information on any activities by Cuban or Soviet-bloc secret police or military units that might be sent to help one or the other communist faction. Further, I suggested that there be an immediate increase in efforts to detect any movement of Cuban or other hostile forces toward Grenada.[63]

Subsequently, at a 7:30 a.m. NSC meeting on Thursday, October 13, Menges gave a succinct summary of the situation in Grenada. After the meeting he drafted an ambitious, even presumptuous considering Bishop had not yet been arrested, one-page plan for "the protection of our U.S. citizens and the restoration of democracy on Grenada. It suggested action by an international, legal, collective security force that would include democratic Caribbean countries."[64]

Later that day the State Department's Restricted Inter-Agency Group (RIG)[65] met, chaired by the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Langhorne

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[63] Constantine Menges, *Inside the National Security Council: The True Story of the Making and Unmaking of Reagan's Foreign Policy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988), p. 60.

[64] Ibid., p. 60. Menges' forwardness might be partly explained by the fact that barely a week earlier on October 4, 1983, he had secured presidential approval for a review of Eastern Caribbean regional security policy with National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 105. The partially declassified document outlines a programme to "signal our [U.S.] support for the democratic Eastern Caribbean nations through enhanced public diplomacy and private assurances." In addition an improved security programme to enable the Eastern Caribbean nations to address security threats was outlined: "U.S. material and training assistance. . . to upgrade the effectiveness of both the regional security forces and those of the individual states." Christopher Simpson, *National Security Directives of the Reagan and Bush Administrations: The Declassified History of U.S. Political and Military Policy, 1981-1991* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1995), p. 333.

[65] RIG was an offshoot of the five Inter-Agency Groups (IGs) that existed to handle each of the main regions of the world. IG's commonly had about 20 members; representatives from the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, the Treasury and so on. Motley was in charge of the IG for Latin America. He created RIG so that only the key actors would be involved: the Secretary of State, JCS, CIA and NSC. RIG reported to the National Security Planning Group.

Motley. Grenada was not originally on the schedule but this was amended to discuss the Bishop-Coard split and the possibility of further unrest and the threat this posed to U.S. citizens on the island.[66] Thus the NSC and RIG had both paid attention to Grenada before Bishop was arrested late that Thursday.

Also that Thursday, President Reagan's second National Security Advisor (NSA) William Clark announced his resignation to accept the position of Secretary of the Interior Department.[67] The fight to replace Clark was to divert the attention of top-level officials for several days. Reagan had curtailed the role of the NSA and his NSC staff, removing their cabinet status and placing them under the direct control of the President's Counselor Edwin Meese.[68] Two White House factions emerged in the struggle to find a successor to Clark, divided "not so much by ideology as by personality and a sense of who was better serving the interests of the President."[69] The Deaver-Baker-Shultz group advocated Baker as the new NSA. In opposition to this were the Clark-Weinberger-Meese-Casey group who argued that Baker lacked the necessary experience. However, the conservatives candidate, Jeane Kirkpatrick, was unacceptable to the pragmatists, with Shultz even threatening to resign if she was appointed.

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[66] Interview with Langhorne Motley, August 25, 1994, Washington D.C.

[67] Baker and Deaver had long wanted Clark removed and when Watt was fired from the Interior Department they saw their opportunity and suggested to Reagan that Clark was the logical successor. The dutiful Clark met with Reagan and Deaver and when presented with the proposal had no objections if that was what the President wanted. Allan Gerson, *The Kirkpatrick Mission: Diplomacy Without Apology: America at the United Nations 1981-1985* (New York: Free Press, 1991), p. 218.

[68] Kevin Mulcahy, "The Secretary of State and the National Security Adviser: Foreign Policymaking in the Carter and Reagan Administrations," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* XVI, no. 2 (Spring 1986): 291.

[69] Gerson, *The Kirkpatrick Mission*, p. 218.

Reagan eventually decided over the weekend of October 15-16 that he could not appoint Baker because of fierce opposition which he felt would cause "friction among the cabinet and the White House staff."[70] The result was that Robert McFarlane, a former senior military staff aide on the NSC and at the time Clark's deputy, was appointed. In Cannon's words McFarlane was "everyone's distant second choice. . . the compromise candidate."[71] McFarlane envisaged the NSA as an "honest broker" and the role of the NSC being "not to dominate the policy making process. Instead it must perform the much more difficult task of policy facilitation and coordination."[72] McFarlane's newness and preoccupation with Lebanon, where he advised Reagan to hold the line when the NSC favoured withdrawal, meant that Grenada did not receive cabinet-level attention until Thursday, October 20. Another important factor was that McFarlane initially lacked close access to Reagan and therefore ended up siding with Shultz on many issues.

Returning to the latest developments in Grenada, Washington learnt of Bishop's arrest from its embassy in Barbados. The embassy had had no one on Grenada at the time of the arrest or any intelligence assets there and so learnt of events from the British Deputy High Commissioner in Barbados David Montgomery. Montgomery, informed by the British representative on Grenada, John Kelly,[73] had contacted the

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[70] Cannon, *President Reagan*, p. 434.

[71] Ibid., p. 434.

[72] Robert C. McFarlane with Richard Saunders and Thomas C. Shull, "The National Security Council: Organization for Policy Making," in R. Gordon Hoxie (ed.), *The Presidency and National Security Policy* (New York: Center for the Study of the Presidency, 1984), p. 262.

[73] Kelly had first reported rumours of Bishop's house arrest and the danger to his life on Tuesday, October 11. Kelly remained in contact with the High Commission in Barbados throughout the crisis via the telephone and VHF radio in his small office in St. George's. John Kelly's letter to the author dated December 21, 1995.

embassy late on Thursday, October 13, to report "rumblings from Grenada indicating that Coard [is] about to throw Bishop out and declare a Marxist state."[74] Early on Friday, October 14, Montgomery confirmed that "Coard [had been] all but successful in his maneuver."[75] This was corroborated by Grenadians phoning Barbados.

In the Caribbean, Barbadian Prime Minister Tom Adams heard of Bishop's arrest on Thursday, October 14, from a "friendly diplomatic source," most likely the British. He described it as "an act so extreme as to imply some measure of imminent violence and disorder."[76] Dominican Prime Minister Eugenia Charles did not initially share Adams' concern, believing that "at that time I didn't feel it was my business to even think of interfering because if the people of the country want their leader kept under control, it's their business, not mine."[77] Irrespective of Charles' indifference other Eastern Caribbean leaders concluded that "whatever our differences in the past, Mr. Bishop deserved the support of Caribbean governments in the circumstances."[78] Adams contacted DCM Flower at the U.S. embassy and suggested that "we" (Barbados, OECS and the U.S.) had to act. According to Flower, Adams was not proposing intervention at this stage but more a "united front."[79]

In Washington that Friday, RIG convened again to specifically discuss Grenada. The group, sentient of the possibility of a hostage situation and the inescapable

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[74] Bish's notes.

[75] Ibid.

[76] "Full Text of Speech by the Prime Minister of Barbados the Hon. Mr. Tom Adams Explaining his Reasons for Taking Part in the Invasion of Grenada," in *Documents on the Invasion of Grenada, Caribbean Monthly Bulletin*, October 1983, Supplement no. 1, Item XI, p. 35.

[77] Higbie, *Eugenia*, p. 223.

[78] "Full Text of Speech by the Prime Minister of Barbados," *Documents on the Invasion*, p. 35.

[79] Interview with Ludlow Flower, October 27, 1994, Washington D.C.

analogy with Iran in 1980, which I will discuss later, reviewed standard evacuation procedures. There exists four "layers of active participation for protecting lives"[80]: the host government is reminded of its obligation to protect the welfare of foreign nationals; if the host is unable to guarantee this then they are requested to assist in the removal of nationals from the danger area; if the host is unable or unwilling to do this the U.S. will do it as long as the host pledges non-interference and finally a forced evacuation when the host is unable or unwilling to promise non-interference.[81] The last of these is usually referred to as a nonpermissive evacuation operation (NEO). Additionally, the Assistant to the Chairman of the JCS Vice Admiral Arthur S. Moreau, a RIG member, was instructed to tell the JCS to review their contingency plans for an evacuation operation. In turn, the JCS contacted the Commander-in-Chief Atlantic (CINCLANT) Admiral Wesley McDonald at CINCLANT headquarters in Norfolk, Virginia, and instructed him to "investigate the possibility of conducting U.S. Naval presence and possible non-combatant evacuation operations if the need to evacuate American citizens from the island arose."[82]

Concurrently, Menges showed his plan to RIG member Oliver North to assess the military requirements and to the NSC's senior intelligence director Kenneth deGraffenreid to survey the available intelligence.[83] Menges explained that it was

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[80] Interview with Motley.

[81] Stephen Edward Flynn, "Grenada as a "Reactive" and a "Proactive" Crisis: New Models of Crisis Decisionmaking" (Ph.D. diss., Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1988), p. 106.

[82] John Quigley, "The United States Invasion of Grenada: Stranger than Fiction," *The University of Miami Inter-American Law Review* 18 (Winter 1986-1987): 338. Grenada fell into CINCLANT boundaries which were dominated by the Navy. Donn-Erik Marshall, "Urgent Fury: The U.S. Military Intervention in Grenada" (M.A. diss., University of Virginia, 1989), p. 32.

[83] Menges, *Inside the NSC*, p. 62.

only a "personal idea" and that it should be kept secret. Both men expressed their scepticism that it would be adopted.

Washington had interpreted Bishop's arrest as the result of a power struggle between Bishop and Coard factions but even by this stage it was clear that Bishop's arrest would not be the end of the story. Word of the arrest had spread around the island and when the Minister of Mobilization Selwyn Strachan, a henchman of Coard's, appeared at the offices of the *Free West Indian* newspaper to announce Bishop's removal and replacement by Coard, he was shouted down and chased off the premises. RFG officially broadcast this development at 3:30 p.m. to an unsettled and stunned populace. Perhaps not anticipating the hostile reaction of the people, Coard instructed RFG to announce his resignation at 4:00 p.m. to "put a stop to the vicious rumor that he has been attempting to replace Comrade Maurice Bishop as Prime Minister."[84] RFG also stated that all PRA reservists should report for duty the next morning at Fort Rupert.

Saturday, October 15

In Barbados U.S. ambassador Milan Bish approached the Barbadian Permanent Secretary of Defense and Security with the offer of a transport plane "to cover both a [voluntary] release of Bishop" or "Bishop's forcible freeing by a raid being contemplated by several Caribbean states."[85] The exact origins of the plan are not

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[84] Marable, *African and Caribbean Politics*, p. 259. This announcement directly contradicted the broadcast of a mere thirty minutes before.

[85] Beck, *The Grenada Invasion*, p. 96. One of the authors of the plan, Major Mark Adkin, reveals that the rescue operation "assumed a hostile reception and was based on a surprise coup de main operation. The first phase would occur during darkness, with the troops arriving by helicopter. Key targets were Bishop's house, the governor-general's residence, Pearls and Salines airfields, the radio station, and a series of blocking or ambush positions to the north and south of St. George's." Mark Adkin, *Urgent Fury: The Battle for Grenada* (London: Leo Cooper, 1989), p. 92.

clear but according to Bish it was a CIA initiative.[86] According to one embassy official, the hope was that Bishop's removal would prevent further violence and encourage stabilization in Grenada.[87] Planning for the rescue proceeded but events would soon make it redundant.

In St. George's, Kendrick Radix organized 300 people in the market square and told them that Coard was "obsessed with power" and if they wanted Bishop free they should "seek out Coard."[88] He was arrested soon after and ended up in Richmond Hill prison. On RFG Leon Cornwall condemned Bishop for spreading rumours and underlined that "until now Maurice Bishop has led the NJM and the PRG, but no man is above the party" [89] and that the PRA "would not tolerate any disruption of peace and calm on the island."[90] News of the situation in Grenada had reached Havana by now and on Saturday, October 15, Castro sent a frank letter to the CC saying that "the supposed notion that on passing through our country Bishop had informed me of the problems inside the Party is a miserable piece of slander" and that "everything which happened was. . . a surprise, and disagreeable."[91] Castro also made it clear that

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[86] Interview with Bish. A prime candidate for designing such a plan was Duane "Dewey" Clarridge, the Latin America Division Chief of the Directorate of Operations at the CIA. It was Clarridge who had come up with the proposal for mining Nicaraguan harbours. Woodward describes Clarridge as "endlessly creative, difficult to deal with, not always precise, but always putting new things together." Woodward, *VEIL*, p. 283.

[87] Interview with Flower.

[88] Payne et al., *Grenada*, p. 132.

[89] Bish's notes.

[90] Schoenhals and Melanson, *Revolution and Intervention*, p. 75.

[91] "Letter from Castro to Central Committee, 10/15/83," in Seabury and McDougall (eds.), *The Grenada Papers*, p. 327.

Cuba would "pay strictest attention to the principle of not interfering in the slightest in the internal affairs of Grenada."[92]

The Cuban response was watched closely by the embassy; at this early stage they reported that the Cubans appeared to be "avoiding taking sides at this point. They may be trying to mediate the dispute to insure the factional infighting does not break out into a divisive civil war. . . a situation which would endanger their position in Grenada."[93] With a relatively large Cuban contingent on the island it was felt that if the Cubans were to back one side against the other it would prove decisive:

> A complete political impasse would mean the military will have to weigh in. They are at present divided. Other things being equal, Coard could well need the Cubans to enforce a takeover. On the other hand, Bishop would probably not need the Cubans to restore his rule.[94]

For Washington, Cuban involvement would "create a whole new ballgame."[95] The embassy reported that the situation in Grenada remained "confused and fluid" but that the chances of civil war seemed low and the current level of violence was not a threat to the students although "should widespread disorders develop. . . U.S. citizens could be endangered."[96] In the event that Coard should triumph the embassy recommended a more "energetic" response and promised to forward their suggestions.[97]

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[92] Ibid., p. 328.

[93] Milan Bish, confidential telegram to Secretary of State, "Subject: Grenada Current Situation," n.d. [October 15, 1983?], p. 1.

[94] Milan Bish, confidential telegram to Secretary of State, "Subject: Grenada Unrest: Political Solution Talks Apparently Going On: Military Divided Between Coard and Bishop," 151602Z, October 1983, Bridgetown 06249, section 2, p.1.

[95] Ibid., p. 1.

[96] Bish, "Subject: Grenada Current Situation," p. 1.

[97] Bish's notes.

Over the next three days (Saturday, October 15, to Monday, October 17) serious negotiations took place between Coard and Strachan and the pro-Bishop George Louison, who was arrested on Sunday, October 16, but allowed out to talk, and Unison Whiteman, who had returned from a UN trip that day, to find a solution to the crisis. The four met for several hours on each day; Louison reports that Coard was buoyant during the talks, believing that it was possible to remove Bishop because the CC was popular with the people and that: "once it was sold as a party decision and demonstrated that Maurice was resistant, they thought the masses of the people would say, 'Well look, you cannot have somebody resisting the majority in that way'."[98]

George Louison believed that the joint leadership proposal was folly and that the party and CC had been discredited. He told Coard that it was imperative Bishop be released or it could lead to a civil war as Grenadians were growing increasingly restive. Coard was dismissive of the threat: "Well, the people can march, they can demonstrate, and we won't stop them. But they'll get tired. . . and life will return to normal. And we will continue the revolutionary process on a more Marxist, more Leninist footing."[99] The final meeting ended with Coard promising to convey Louison and Whiteman's views to the CC and to produce a final concrete proposal by the next morning.

At 12:04 p.m. on Sunday, October 16, General Hudson Austin, indicating the growing dominance of the military in the crisis, went on RFG to provide the fullest

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[98] Bernard Diederich, "Interviewing George Louison: A PRG Minister Discusses the Killings," *Caribbean Review* XII, no. 4 (December 1984): 17.

[99] Marable, *African and Caribbean Politics*, p. 259.

account of the situation yet. He reaffirmed collective leadership as a party principle and explained that:

> Maurice Bishop has deeply resented this collective leadership, and has taken the position that no action should be taken to which he is opposed. At the same time, he has become increasingly hostile to criticism and increasingly suspicious that other members of the leadership of the party may be seeking to seize power from him. [100]

Austin went on to deny rumours of a power struggle: "the struggle of Comrade Bishop has been the struggle of one man to exercise unlimited power. And that our party cannot and will not permit."[101] Acknowledging that people were confused about what was happening, Austin informed them that Bishop was at home and safe, he did not mention he was under arrest though, and that the CC was in full control and that this was not a military takeover as rumours had suggested. Finally he stressed the need to "maintain unity in order to ensure that imperialism does not take advantage of this moment of difficulty."[102] A note of insecurity was evident in this last statement. A disbelieving and increasingly angry population were not in the mood to listen though.

Monday, October 17

RIG met again for two hours on Monday, October 17, to review all the available information on Grenada. There was a general awareness of Reagan's "frequent reminder that there must never be 'another Teheran' - a hostage situation involving

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[100] "Statement Broadcast by General Hudson Austin on Behalf of the Political Bureau and the Central Committee of the New Jewel Movement, 16th October 1983, at approximately 12:04 p.m., on Radio Free Grenada," *Documents on the Invasion*, Item IV, p. 5.

[101] Ibid., p. 9.

[102] Ibid., p. 10.

U.S. citizens."[103] Reagan's election success had been strongly influenced by Carter's mishandling of the hostage crisis. In considering the situation in Grenada, Motley was driven by the Iran analogy and knew that Reagan would not tolerate a hostage situation for any period of time.[104] Motley, supported by Eagleburger, was concerned about the safety of U.S. citizens and argued that serious consideration of an NEO was necessary. However, Vice Admiral Moreau was unwilling to initiate planning yet. Similarly, the JCS were not convinced that all non-military options had been examined and that the quality of intelligence was inadequate.[105] Fundamentally, the JCS was unenthusiastic and "preferred to await specific high-level authorization before considering a military operation."[106]

Meanwhile, Menges was still promoting his plan. He discussed it with a Defence Department official, probably Ikle, and explained that action was necessary to protect U.S. citizens, help Grenadians and stop the threat of Communism in the region and because it would have a positive effect in Central America and the Caribbean, encouraging allies and demoralizing communists.[107] Menges was told abruptly that "this plan has no chance whatsoever in this administration. McFarlane doesn't like

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[103] Ralph Kinney Bennett, "Grenada: Anatomy of a 'Go' Decision," *Reader's Digest* (February 1984): 72.

[104] Interview with Motley. Shultz echoes this feeling in his memoir: "He [Reagan] would not stand still while American hostages were held for 444 days. In fact, he probably wouldn't stand still for a week." Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 328.

[105] Beck, *The Grenada Invasion*, p.98.

[106] Don Oberdorfer, "Reagan Sought to End Cuban 'Intervention'," *Washington Post*, November 6, 1983, p. A21.

[107] Menges, *Inside the NSC*, p. 63.

you. He thinks you're too Reaganite. . . This is a waste of time. Take my advice. Don't do anything about Grenada."[108]

In Barbados, Adams had decided that as planning for Bishop's rescue proceeded it was time to discuss the situation with ambassador Bish face-to-face. Adams met with Bish and Flower having conferred with some of his fellow heads of state in the Eastern Caribbean. He suggested that the situation in Grenada provided the U.S. with a golden opportunity to remove an unpopular Marxist-Leninist regime and reduce Soviet and Cuban influence in the region.[109] In response to this tacit request for U.S. involvement Bish could only repeat the offer of a plane and promise to relay Adams' message to Washington. Bish actually disagreed with Adams at this stage, primarily because Grenada was part of the Commonwealth.[110] That same day the U.S. also received another request for help, this time from Eugenia Charles; she believed that Bishop had returned from Eastern Europe wanting a more moderate socialism for Grenada and that now the Marxist hard-liners had made their move the U.S. should deal severely with them.[111] Charles spoke with Charles Gillespie, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, who relayed her oral request to Secretary of State Shultz.

The embassy's earlier speculations proved accurate when they learnt from the Canadians that Coard had approached the Cubans for support but that they had been

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[108] Ibid., p. 64. Menges was even told that if he continued with his plan it could cost him his position on the NSC.

[109] Interview with Bish.

[110] Ibid.

[111] Bish's notes.

non-committal.[112] The U.S. embassy in London cabled Washington to report that the situation was still "too murky to call" and that the success of the Coard faction would depend on "whether Bishop will phase out quietly, [the] extent of Cuban involvement, and how other Eastern Caribbean Commonwealth nations will react."[113] One of the U.S.' fears was that Bishop would call for Cuban intervention to oust Austin. It seems that the embassy at least felt that Bishop was the key to the present crisis and that what happened to him would be pivotal.[114] In Washington President Reagan's Principal Deputy Press Secretary Larry Speakes had told reporters that:

> The situation in Grenada is fluid at this point and is unclear. It is unclear who is in charge. The military seems to be exerting an increasing amount of power. . . foreign journalists continue to be banned from the island and news reports are sketchy and incomplete.[115]

In order to remedy this problem and also to check on U.S. citizens, the embassy decided to send two officials, Kenneth Kurze and Linda Flohr, the Third Secretary, to Grenada.[116]

Thus by Monday, October 17, the decisionmaking process had changed up a gear; McFarlane had briefed Reagan on the situation and persuaded him of the need to order the go ahead with planning of a NEO. Henceforth, "planning took place in an

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[112] Ibid.

[113] Amembassy London, confidential telegram to Secretary of States, "Subject: Grenada: [excised] Bishop's 'Slow Toppling'," 181511Z, October 1983, London 22273, section 1, p. 2.

[114] Ibid., p. 2.

[115] "Press Briefing by Larry Speakes, 9.21 A.M., October 17, 1983," *The White House: Office of the Press Secretary* (WHOPS), no. 876 /10-17, Box 33, Ronald Reagan Library (RRL).

[116] On Monday, October 17, two Barbadian military personnel, Alvin Quintyne and Marita Browne, arrived in Grenada undercover to assess the situation. They returned to Barbados the next day. Adkin, *Urgent Fury*, p. 92.

interagency forum with representatives of all relevant agencies participating on a daily basis. The President and Vice President were kept personally informed of all developments."[117] Washington were also aware by this time that the OECS[118] leaders, along with Adams and Jamaican Prime Minister Edward Seaga, were clearly in agreement about the need for military action and that they viewed U.S. participation as essential.

In Grenada torrential rains kept the people off the streets as the CC met for what would prove to be the final time. Various options for dealing with Bishop were mooted: court martial, jail, continued house arrest, exile in Cuba and even a military solution.[119] As O'Shaughnessy notes, "it was clear to the Coard faction, as it was to their opponents, that the majority in the Central Committee would use force if necessary to impose their will."[120] The meeting concluded with a six-point proposal that would be presented to Bishop: the party was committed to a Marxist-Leninist strategy and Bishop would not impede it, Bishop would assume responsibility for the crisis, he would accept the principles of democratic centralism, remain an ordinary member of the NJM and on the PB as a consultant, accept the supremacy of the party over the state and his Commander-in-Chief post would be abolished.[121] Reading more like an ultimatum than a proposal, it was apparent that the CC had determined not to change its course.

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[117] Langhorne A. Motley, "The Decision to Assist Grenada," *Department of State Bulletin* 84 (March 1984): 70.

[118] The OECS was established in 1981 and consisted of Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Lucia and St. Vincent and the Grenadines.

[119] Diederich, "Interviewing George Louison," p. 17.

[120] O'Shaughnessy, *Grenada*, p. 129.

[121] Ibid., p. 130.

Tuesday, October 18

On Tuesday morning the NSC met and Menges decided to present his plan to McFarlane. To Menges' surprise the NSA simply replied, "Well,. . . that's okay."[122] Menges then met with Middendorf to probe likely OAS reactions to a military operation. Middendorf had served with previous Republican administrations and was a loyal Reagan supporter. He told Menges that "if it could be done, this would be a great step for freedom" but again cautioned that "I wouldn't get my hopes up."[123] Menges also spoke to a Foreign Service Officer at the State Department who informed him that not much had been done there, despite Bish's cables, but that Seaga was due to meet with the OECS leaders.[124] That same day, Shultz authorized the establishment of a Grenada Task Force under Motley which, as Shultz reflected, "put into place a round-the-clock watch and. . . got us all mentally and administratively ready as the problem became more grave."[125] Shultz now replied to Charles' Monday, October 17, request by asking for a formal evaluation of the situation by the OECS. According to Shultz this "attended to her request and showed her that we were responsive and alert, and, second, it set the stage for the United States to act in a manner consistent with our national interests and with international law."[126]

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[122] Menges, *Inside the NSC*, p. 64.

[123] Ibid., p. 65.

[124] Ibid., p. 65.

[125] Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 326.

[126] Ibid., p. 326. The Grenada Task Force had two main functions: "a) dealing with public/congressional/press on the U.S. citizen protection and welfare issue; and b) providing policy guidance and (initially on a contingency basis) coordination for the rescue operation." Department of State, "The Grenada Operation: After Action Report," n.d. [November 1983?], p. 1.

In a move that was coincidental and fortuitous an 11-ship Navy Task Force[127] left Norfolk, Virginia, en route to the Mediterranean where they were to relieve the U.S. 24th MAU in the multinational peacekeeping force in Lebanon. Simultaneously, the military crisis action team at Norfolk began to examine various possible courses of action.[128]

At the embassy in Bridgetown a diplomatic note was sent to Grenada asking for assurances about the safety of U.S. citizens and informing them of plans to send Kurze and Flohr to the island.[129] Grenada's reply the next day stated that:

> the interests of U.S. citizens are in no way threatened by the present situation in Grenada which the Ministry [of External Affairs] hastens to point out is a purely internal matter.[130]

The response did little to allay Washington's concern and noticeably did not mention the proposed visit by Kurze and Flohr. As Motley commented, "the answer contained no assurances, no concrete measures to safeguard foreign residents, just a bland assertion and a blunt slamming of the door."[131] As will become apparent, by Tuesday in Grenada it was doubtful that those in control, to whatever degree, were in any position to make such assurances. Final preparations were made for Kurze and Flohr to travel to Grenada the following morning.

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[127] The Naval Task Force included the Navy's Amphibious Squadron Four (PhibRon 4) and the 22nd Marine Amphibious Unit (22d MAU). Ronald Spector, *U.S. Marines in Grenada* (Washington D.C.: History and Museums Division Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1984), p. 1. At the same time the USS *Independent* left the naval base at Hampton Roads, Virginia. Bennett, "Grenada: Anatomy," p. 73.

[128] Adkin, *Urgent Fury*, p. 117.

[129] Bish's notes.

[130] Motley, "The Decision to Assist Grenada," p. 71.

[131] Ibid., p. 71.

In Grenada it was the eve of the Revolution's ultimate destruction. Negotiations continued; this time Rupert Roopnarine of the Working Peoples Alliance of Guyana and Michael Als of the Trinidad and Tobago People's Popular Movement had volunteered to mediate. Als met with Bishop on Tuesday morning and proposed that Bishop should remain Prime Minister, address Grenada, on lines agreed with the CC, and call for calm and announce that a settlement was in sight and, finally, that he should meet with Coard to hammer out their differences and perhaps see if Cuba would mediate.[132] Bishop provisionally agreed but wanted to consult with Louison and Whiteman before drafting the address.

When Louison phoned Coard to see if the CC had formulated a final proposal as promised the day before, he was simply told that the CC was still meeting and that he should call later. After this occurred several times, finally with Coard telling Louison that he should try again tomorrow afternoon, he concluded that the CC were stalling: Louison and four other pro-Bishop Ministers, Unison Whiteman (Foreign Affairs), Jacqueline Creft (Education), Norris Bain (Housing) and Lynden Ramdhanny (Tourism) resigned their posts in protest and to mobilize the masses.[133] From around 5:00 p.m. Whiteman managed to speak to radio reporters from the Caribbean News Agency, Barbados' two radio stations and Radio Antilles based in Montserrat, it was the most powerful station in the region and receivable in Grenada, and told them that "Coard is running the place singlehandedly" and despite the advancement of a set of proposals by the ex-Ministers to resolve the crisis "Coard had shown that he was not

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[132] Payne et al., *Grenada*, p. 132.

[133] Diederich, "Interviewing George Louison," p. 18. Louison was arrested soon after at 6 p.m. Only Unison Whiteman, Fitzroy Bain and Norris Bain remained free by this stage.

serious about resolving it"; they were now "apprehensive that Coard may try a military solution."[134]

The masses now began to make their presence felt. Approximately 500 people rallied in Grenville, Gouyave and Sauteurs. Students marched on Pearls airport and forced it to close for several hours. Schools and factories closed as the people took to the streets chanting "No Bishop, no revo!"[135]

Four members of the CC, Austin, Layne, James and Bartholemew, visited Bishop that evening to deliver their final six-point compromise proposal. Bishop promised he would respond by the next morning but, again, wanted to talk with Louison, Whiteman and the Cuban ambassador Torres Rizo first. According to Thorndike the CC were willing to impose temporary martial law if this final effort failed.[136]

"Bloody Wednesday"

At 9:30 a.m. on Wednesday, October 19, Kurze and Flohr left Barbados on a Barbadian government Aero Services flight bound for Grenada. The purpose of their trip was to get an "on-the-ground update" of the situation in Grenada and "check on the Medical School people."[137] Halfway through the flight the pilot informed the

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[134] Milan Bish, confidential telegram to Secretary of State, "Subject: Grenada Update: Cabinet Members Resign. Foreign Minister Criticizes Coard," 191905Z, October 1983, Bridgetown 06372, section 1, p. 1.

[135] Marable, *African and Caribbean Politics*, p. 259.

[136] Thorndike, *Grenada*, p. 159.

[137] Kenneth Kurze's letter to the author dated August 20, 1995. Until Kurze and Flohr finally reached Grenada on Saturday, October 22. The U.S. had relied on second-hand reports from Grenadians, the Barbadian government and the British representative on the island. Another source of information was the Vice Chancellor of SGU Geoffrey Bourne; "in the early days of the revolution. . . [he] regularly reported to the White House and State Department through his son Peter, President Carter's drug advisor. During the Reagan administration Bourne remained in close contact with the U.S. embassy in Barbados." Mitchel A. Leventhal, "Entrepreneurship and Nation Building: Proprietary Medical Schools and Development in the Caribbean, 1976-1990" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1995), p. 283. This combination of resources must have provided Washington with a more than adequate picture of the situation in Grenada.

passengers that he had been refused landing permission at Pearls airport and that he was returning to Barbados. Unbeknownst to Kurze and Flohr, Bishop had just been rescued by his supporters on Grenada. Both diplomats realized the failure to reach Grenada meant that "something must be cooking" on the island.[138]

In Barbados there was an important development. From 9:30 a.m. until 11:00 a.m. Bish met with Adams who began by requesting U.S. assistance in rescuing Bishop, his family and seventy political prisoners.[139] He argued persuasively that this was a unique opportunity and would produce a favourable world reaction, especially among developing countries, with the U.S. being seen in a different light:

> promoting human rights on behalf of a popular leftist dictator, and this would be in dramatic contrast to the conventional wisdom that the U.S. supports only conservative, right-wing regimes.[140]

He pointed out how "powerful symbolic asset to the West Bishop would be in exile, especially if he were assisted out by the U.S."[141] Adams assumed that Bishop was under close arrest and that he could not talk alone but believed he would welcome rescue, even if it was by the U.S.[142] The hawkish Prime Minister contended that a rescue would be less problematic than an occupation and was "feasible, necessary and desirable."[143] To reinforce his point he asked hypothetically, "Would the United

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[138] Kurze's letter, August 20, 1995. Motley interpreted this as a negative signal. Interview with Motley.

[139] Adams had apparently heard rumours a few weeks before that there was a serious threat to the prisoners lives. In a conversation with St. Vincent's Prime Minister Milton Cato, Cato had questioned the propriety of rescuing Bishop while ignoring "many other political prisoners in Grenada, put there by Bishop's government." Tyler, "The Making of an Invasion: Chronology of the Planning," *Washington Post*, October 30, 1983, p. A14.

[140] Bish's notes.

[141] Ibid.

[142] Ibid. Adams was willing to offer Bishop asylum as well and had in fact done so long ago.

[143] Ibid.

States consider invading Grenada? If not, we will do so without you." Adams knew this was unlikely, and probably militarily impossible, but such talk persuaded Bish of his candour. Bish inquired as to exactly how far Barbados would support a rescue, likely Barbadian public opinion and regional support. Adams was unequivocal; he offered his country as a staging post, use of the BDF if necessary and assured Bish that only Guyana, Belize and Antigua carried a torch for Grenada.[144] He went on to outline a possible military takeover by a multinational U.S., Eastern Caribbean and Venezuelan force, perhaps under the umbrella of CARICOM,[145] which would establish an interim government and lead to free and democratic elections, even with Bishop as a candidate.[146] Adams stressed that this was only a scenario and not a conclusive plan. A diplomatic-political solution was also discussed whereby the OECS might pressure Coard and the PRA to free Bishop and restore order with the option of sanctions if necessary. Barbados and Jamaica could "chime in forcefully" to reinforce the OECS' efforts.

Adams was clearly hoping to convince the U.S. of the severity of the situation, the Eastern Caribbean's unanimity, the need for external help and the potential benefits Bishop's rescue could yield for the U.S. whilst simultaneously probing Washington's receptiveness to the idea of a more extensive operation. Adams had already conferred with the British High Commissioner Giles Bullard who was sceptical and he expected a similar response from the Canadians later that day. In an emergency meeting of the

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[144] Ibid.

[145] CARICOM was established in 1973 as a primarily economic entity. Its members include Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Trinidad and Tobago.

[146] Bish's notes.

Barbados Cabinet it was agreed to "proceed with a rescue plan, in collaboration with Eastern Caribbean countries and larger non-Caribbean countries with the resources necessary to carry out such an intricate operation."[147] Events in Grenada were soon to make the rescue plan redundant. After Adams left, Bish sent a cable to Washington reporting that Adams would like to see U.S. involvement in an intervention or the OECS would act alone. Bish also sent a "back channel" note to the CIA.[148]

Fort Rupert

As previously mentioned, Bishop had promised to reply to the CC's proposal by Wednesday but only after consulting with Whiteman, Louison and Rizo. Whiteman was on the streets whipping up support among the masses and Coard was not about to let Rizo talk to Bishop, possibly fearing that Bishop would request Cuban assistance. Consequently only Louison, who was already under house arrest, was taken to see Bishop at 7:30 a.m. that Wednesday morning. The two talked over breakfast for ninety minutes before Louison was led away. The two men came up with a two-point reply to put to the CC:

> there would be a formal negotiating committee set up which would start to meet on that day and secondly that he [Bishop] be released from house arrest and that a statement be put on the radio from him pointing out that he was no longer under house arrest and that negotiations were in process.[149]

The proposal was not destined to see the light of day.

The nascent public demonstrations of the previous few days reached their zenith that morning. By 9:00 a.m. about 15,000 people, from a population of 85,000, had

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[147] "Full Text of Speech by the Prime Minister of Barbados," *Documents on the Invasion*, p. 36.

[148] According to Bish, Motley claimed he had not seen Bish's cable or that he had been told not to act on it which dropped the ambassador in hot water. Interview with Bish.

[149] Interview with George Louison by Hugh O'Shaughnessy, transcript, n.d., p. 22.

assembled in St. George's market square. Shops, offices and schools had all been closed. At 9:00 a.m. about 3-4,000 of the crowd, mainly schoolchildren, led by Whiteman, Noel, Fitzroy Bain and prominent businessmen marched towards Bishop's house where he was being held.

While the crowds advanced on Bishop's house the CC met at Coard's house.[150] At 10:00 a.m. Cornwall had been sent to the Cuban workers compound near Point Salines to inform them not to participate in the pro-Bishop demonstrations that had been planned for that morning.[151] Coard's house was adjacent to Bishop's and the crowds had to pass it to reach Bishop's; the CC witnessed the crowd passing chanting "We want Maurice, we want Maurice!" and "B for Bishop and betterment; C for Coard and communism."[152] Recognizing their vulnerability, Layne reinforced the PRA guard at Bishop's to one hundred and sent for three armed personnel carriers (APC) which were brought over by Basil Gahagan. Coard feared that the crowd could turn on him and told Layne to contact Bishop and tell him to calm the crowd and recommence yesterday's talks.[153] However, Layne and Austin's efforts proved futile as the crowd was simply too large and too aroused to listen. Gahagan decided to order the APCs to fire into the air as the masses attempted to open the gates to Bishop's house. Seeing that the soldiers were shooting in the air the people believed they would not fire on them and pushed forward. The PRA officer in charge, Iman

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[150] Present at the meeting were the Coards, Hudson Austin, Ewart Layne, Leon Cornwall, Colville McBarnette, Liam James, Selwyn Strachan, Ian St. Bernard, Chalkie Ventour and later Lester Redhead. Adkin, *Urgent Fury*, p. 49.

[151] Cotman, *The Gorrion Tree*, p. 216.

[152] Thorndike, *Grenada*, p. 159.

[153] Adkin, *Urgent Fury*, p. 51.

Abdullah, ordered his men to withdraw and by 10:35 a.m. Bishop and Creft, who had been found tied to their beds in their underwear, were brought out.[154] Bishop appeared weak and disoriented, he had had little sleep and had allegedly not been eating for fear of being poisoned.

What happened next has been interpreted by some as a fatal mistake that cost Bishop and his companions their lives. After vacillating between a car or truck for the trip into town to address the huge crowd waiting in the market square, Bishop decided to divert to Fort Rupert, the PRA's headquarters, on the promontory overlooking St. George's. In fact, this was a practical move: medical treatment could be obtained from the hospital which was adjacent to the Fort, Bishop wanted to use the Fort's army transmitter to address the people, there were firearms there and it was a defensible position.[155] Fort Rupert's daily security was the responsibility of Lester Redhead who commanded the platoon stationed there. The Coard group had believed that Fort Rupert was in danger before Bishop reached it at around 1:00 p.m. and had decided it should be barricaded and defended with tear gas if necessary; Redhead was sent to Grand Anse police station but there was no gas there and so he had to go to the St. George's station instead and by the time he returned Bishop was in control of the Fort.[156]

Several hundred Grenadians followed Bishop up the steep and narrow road to Fort Rupert, shouting "We get we leader, fuck Coard."[157] With no physical obstacles

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[154] Thorndike, *Grenada*, p. 159.

[155] Adkin, *Urgent Fury*, p. 53.

[156] Ibid., p. 55.

[157] Ibid., p. 56.

and the PRA soldiers uncertain what to do the crowd swept into the Fort unopposed. The Fort consisted of a main lower square connected to an upper square by steps and a tunnel. Bishop's group took up place in the operations room on the upper floor of the communications building in the lower square. Bishop ordered that the Fort's soldiers should be disarmed and their weapons given to the base commandant Chris Stroude. Bishop then summoned Stroude and told him that Coard and his accomplices must submit to the will of the masses, negotiations must begin now in the operations room, Coard, Layne and Cornwall must be arrested and jailed, the PRA should lay down their arms and that the armoury keys must be handed over so that arms could be distributed to defend the Fort.[158] Soon after, Bishop announced that Einstein Louison had replaced Austin as head of the PRA; Einstein Louison arrived at the Fort sometime between 12:00 p.m. and 1:00 p.m., having been freed from house arrest, and was told to organize the defence of the Fort.[159] Arms were distributed to members of the militia present.

Despite his weak condition it seems Bishop had a strategy. He instructed two telephone engineers to hook up a line to the radio transmitter. Peter Thomas, an immigration officer present, was sent to the Cable and Wireless offices, accompanied by two telephone employees with militia training, with a list of numbers to get disconnected, especially the lines to Coard's house and Fort Frederick to prevent Coard organizing a counterattack.[160] Bishop sent his Press Secretary, Don Rojas, to Cable and Wireless and told him to tell the world that the Prime Minister had been

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[158] Ibid., p. 57.

[159] Ibid., p. 58.

[160] Ibid., p. 58. Unfortunately the telephone link at the old water works was overlooked and this allowed Coard to keep in touch with Stroude at Fort Rupert.

freed, that Cuba had not been involved and that all nations, organisations and individuals should organize effective opposition to U.S. intervention.[161] When Bishop had been freed earlier in the day he had sent someone to the Cuban embassy to seek support and in response ambassador Rizo sent a messenger to Fort Rupert to offer aid to Bishop.[162]

Having seen the masses free Bishop and sweep him off to Fort Rupert the increasingly worried CC retreated to Fort Frederick. Layne phoned Abdullah and told him to report in and then left at 11:00 a.m. for Caviligny to call up reinforcements, returning at noon with a squad of twenty-five soldiers.[163] The CC attempted to contact Bishop but he refused to speak with them; Whiteman told them bluntly, "No negotiations; is manners for all you."[164] Stroude had been keeping the CC informed of the developments at Fort Rupert:

> The civilian members of the committee seemed paralysed: to the PRA leaders, the military and political position was intolerable and untenable. They concluded from the information they had received that orders had been given by Bishop to eliminate them, that the Central Committee was to be arrested and an armed assault mounted on Fort Frederick.'[165]

As Adkin comments:

> Up to this moment, no decision had been taken to kill Bishop. . . Negotiations, firing in the air, the use of tear gas - everything short of shooting to kill had been considered or tried. But now it was a simple matter of Bishop's life or theirs. If Bishop triumphed. . . they were all dead men.'[166]

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[161] Cotman, *The Gorrion Tree*, p. 216.

[162] Ibid., p. 216. It is uncertain as to what the offer contained. In a 1985 interview, Castro insisted that "I would never, under any circumstances, have authorized the Cuban personnel to have become involved. Of that you can be sure. Our answer would have been 'no.' But there wasn't even time to answer. There was no need to answer." Cotman, *The Gorrion Tree*, p. 217.

[163] Adkin, *Urgent Fury*, p. 60.

[164] Ibid., p. 60. "Manners" is a colloquial Grenadian term for discipline or punishment.

[165] Thorndike, *Grenada*, p. 160.

[166] Adkin, *Urgent Fury*, p. 61.

Consequently, Austin was told that it was necessary to recapture Fort Rupert and establish military rule for a short period. Austin was not convinced but he could not offer a feasible alternative.[167] This decision was taken around 12:30 p.m.: the three armoured personnel carriers (APC) and the platoon of soldiers from Caviligny would storm Fort Rupert, their headquarters, and Bishop and his supporters would be killed in the fighting.[168]

The three APC's and the squad of soldiers, numbering thirty-five in total, arrived at Fort Rupert at 1:00 p.m. The people in the Fort had seen that the PRA had not fired on them earlier that morning and at first thought that the new arrivals had come to support Bishop. As one eye-witness who had been in the operations room with Bishop recalled:

> With the whole country coming down to town to support Maurice, you wouldn't think that it would enter anybody's head to try and take power in the face of all that because you'd be fighting the whole nation.'[169]

Tragically this was not the case; the pro-Coard soldiers, led by Officer-Cadet Conrad Mayers, did not hesitate when he gave the order to "Concentrate fire on the fort."[170] They opened fire with machine guns, grenades and rocket shells. Although the operations room was hit by a rocket, Bishop and many others with him survived the first onslaught. Dumbfounded, Bishop could only utter "My God, My God, they have

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[167] Thorndike, *Grenada*, p. 161.

[168] Adkin, *Urgent Fury*, p. 63. Thorndike says that the alleged plan was to "take Fort Rupert with the minimum of force and to storm the communications building and, if possible, capture Bishop and his allies." Thorndike, *Grenada*, p. 161.

[169] Marable, *African and Caribbean Politics*, p. 261.

[170] Adkin, *Urgent Fury*, p. 68.

turned the guns against the people."[171] There was some return fire, Mayers was fatally wounded. Between 30 and 40 Bishop supporters were killed, either shot or by jumping off the Fort walls to escape, a drop of between 50 and 90 feet, and over 100 were injured. After the initial burst of shooting had finished "there was a discussion among Maurice and some of the fellows to the effect that what we had to do was go out and say we surrender, that anything else would be suicide."[172] Bishop then led the group out to meet its fate.

As the last remnants of the crowd were let go, Bishop, Creft, the Bains, Whiteman and Brat Bullen were marched to the upper square by Redhead and Abdullah to join two others, Evelyn Maitland and Keith Hayling, who were also condemned. Abdullah consulted with Stroude in the communications room who remained in touch with the CC.[173] The eight prisoners were lined up against the west wall of the square. Abdullah then told them that "this is an order from the Central Committee, that you shall be executed by fire. It is not my order, it is the Central Committee's."[174] The firing squad, composed of Redhead, Abdullah and three other soldiers, then carried out its orders. Thus by about 1:20 p.m. Bishop and his companions were dead; a white flare was fired to signal to the CC that orders had been carried out.

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[171] Gordon K. Lewis, *Grenada: The Jewel Despoiled* (Baltimore, N.J.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), p. 57.

[172] Thorndike, *Grenada*, p. 161.

[173] Ibid., p. 162. Adkin says Redhead, Abdullah and Stroude actually went to Fort Frederick to report to Coard who was not pleased. The Coards, Austin, Layne, James, Strachan, Cornwall, Ventour, McBarnette, Bartholemew and St. Bernard then voted unanimously to execute the eight detainees. This chronology places the executions at 2:00 p.m. Adkin, *Urgent Fury*, p. 74.

[174] Adkin, *Urgent Fury*, p. 76.

By 3:00 p.m. it was decided that a 16-member Revolutionary Military Council (RMC) would be formed with its headquarters at Fort Frederick.[175] Coard had placed himself in "protective custody"[176] and was not an official member of the RMC but it is generally assumed that he was pulling the strings.[177] The RMC was officially headed by General Hudson Austin; this was a tactical choice as Austin was popular with the PRA, of senior rank and, until switching to the Coard camp, had been viewed as a Bishop supporter.[178] In reality Austin was a figurehead, the real power lying with Coard, Layne, Cornwall and the others.

A list of potential pro-Bishop opposition figures was compiled and a statement to be read on RFG was composed. Also, a communiqué was sent to the PRA to explain the day's events and remind them where their true allegiances lay:

> Today our People's Revolutionary Army has gained victory over the right opportunists and reactionary forces which attacked the Headquarters of our Ministry of Defence. These anti-worker elements using the working people as a shield entered Fort Rupert.[179]

It concluded by saying "all patriots and revolutionaries will never forget this day when counter-revolution, the friends of imperialism were crushed."[180] At 5:30 p.m.

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[175] Ibid., p. 77. Although the PRG was disbanded and the Cabinet dismissed, the 16-member RMC contained 5 former ministers. It was headed by Austin with James and Layne as joint vice-chairmen. The other members were Major Leon Cornwall, Major Christopher Stroude, Major Tan Bartholemew, Major Keith Roberts, Major Basil Gahaghan, Major Ian St. Bernard, Captain Lester Redhead, Captain Hughie Romain, Lieutenant Rudolph Ogilvie, Lieutenant Iman Abdullah, Lieutenant Kenrick Fraser and Lieutenant Raeburn Nelson. Coard was not an offical member but was the RMC's de facto head. Cotman, *The Gorrion Tree*, p. 209.

[176] Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 325.

[177] Coard had kept a low profile since resigning on Friday, October 14, and after the massacre the CIA were uncertain if he was still alive. CIA Memo, "Grenada Chronology, 7-25 October," *Declassified Documents Catalog* XIV, no. 5 (September-October 1988), document no. 002449, p. 3.

[178] Indeed, Austin had been an early member of the NJM, led the March 1979 attack on the True Blue barracks and was appointed head of the PRA in 1981. Timothy O'Leary and Denise Cabrera, "Austin had close ties to Grenada's Bishop," *Washington Times*, October 21, 1983, p. A12.

[179] O'Shaughnessy, *Grenada*, p. 139.

RFG returned to the air to request all nurses and Salvation Army personnel to report to the hospital and to announce that Austin would speak at 8:30 p.m.

Austin finally went on air at 10:10 p.m. to present the RMC's version of the day's events. Having recounted Bishop's freeing and the storming of Fort Rupert, emphasizing that the PRA had been ordered only to fire in the air, Austin continued:

> They declared their intention to arrest and wipe out the entire General Committee and the senior members of the Party and the entire leadership of the Armed Forces as well as to smash the Revolutionary Armed Forces.
>
> At that point the Revolutionary Armed Forces sent a company of soldiers to re-establish control of Fort Rupert. Maurice Bishop and his group fired on the soldiers killing two members of the PRA. . .
>
> The Revolutionary Armed Forces were forced to storm the fort, and in the process the following persons were killed: Maurice Bishop, Unison Whiteman, Vince Noel, Jacqueline Creft, Norris Bain and Fitzroy Bain among others.'[181]

The earlier formation of the RMC was announced, stating that it had full executive and legislative powers. Austin then warned that:

> Let it be clearly understood that the Revolutionary Armed Forces will govern with absolute strictness. Anyone who seeks to demonstrate or disturb the peace will be shot. An all day and all night curfew will be established for the next four days. . . Anyone violating this curfew will be shot on sight.[182]

News of the massacre had spread and Grenadians had no reason to doubt this.

The curfew allowed the RMC to impose some sort of control and to clear up the mess at Fort Rupert as well as round-up potential opponents and imprison them at Richmond Hill. Amongst Grenadians fear gradually turned to anger, "for them, it was a simple, straightforward matter that an assault against Bishop. . . had become an

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[180] Ibid., p. 139.

[181] "Statement by General Hustin Austin on Behalf of the Revolutionary Military Council on October 20, 1983," *Documents on the Invasion*, Item V, p. 11.

[182] Ibid., p. 12.

assault against themselves and therefore against the revolution as they understood it."[183] For the moment the curfew repressed any thoughts of action against the RMC.

"Imminent Danger"

The U.S. embassy in Bridgetown had been kept abreast of the dramatic developments in Grenada. Soon after hearing that Bishop had been freed they learnt that he had been recaptured and an unconfirmed radio report from the Voice of Barbados that Bishop had been shot. Ambassador Bish cabled Washington to report that the:

> situation [is] obviously worsening. The "masses". . . decided not to let [the] NJM Central Committee and security forces foist Coard on them. The follow-up means now there can be no peaceful "Joint Leadership" solution. One group or the other will have to come out on top and it could get bloodier.[184]

On Barbados, Adams asked his Cabinet to permit him to demand Bishop's release and asked Charles to do likewise as head of the OECS.[185] Bish and DCM Flower sent another cable to Washington:

> There appears to be imminent danger to U.S. citizens resident on Grenada due to the current deteriorating situation, which includes reports of rioting, personnel casualties (possibly deaths), automatic weapons being discharged, Soviet-built armored personnel carriers in the Grenadian streets, and some loss of water and electricity on the island... [American Embassy] Bridgetown recommends that the United States should now be prepared to conduct an emergency evacuation of U.S. citizens residing in Grenada. . . We are not yet prepared to recommend an evacuation be initiated. Repeat, not yet. But we strongly counsel that all preparations be effected in order to deploy immediately as required. . . It has already come to our attention. . . that the Venezuelans have already initiated action for evacuation of dependents in Grenada because of violence."[186]

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[183] Lewis, *Grenada*, p. 62.

[184] Milan Bish, confidential telegram to Secretary of State, "Subject: Grenada Update: Bishop Re-arrested," 192034Z, October 1983, Bridgetown 06380, p. 1.

[185] Bish's notes.

[186] Milan Bish, secret telegram to Secretary of State, "Subject: Planning for Possible Emergency Evacuation of Amcits - Grenada," 192356Z, October 1983, Bridgetown 06387, p. 1.

Although Bish was not ready to recommend evacuation he sensibly "urged all preparations be immediately taken" as the embassy reviewed contingency plans and identified assets.[187]

Sometime that afternoon, Austin called the U.S. embassy to express his concerns about invasion rumours and to reassure the ambassador that the students were safe. Bish was tough on him and made it clear to Austin that he would be held personally responsible if the students were harmed.[188]

That same afternoon Gillespie arrived at the embassy to help Bish and Flower.[189] He was met at the airport by Flower who told him of Bishop's death. Gillespie had already spoken with Charles and was due to meet St. Lucian Prime Minister John Compton the next day. He met with Tom Adams that night; the Prime Minister explained the difficulties that a revolutionary takeover could pose for the other islands and that he was very concerned.[190] Meanwhile, ambassador Bish hosted a formal dinner party; at about 8:00 p.m. the embassy's Defence Attaché, Lawrence Reiman, interrupted to inform Bish that Bishop's death had been confirmed. Bish

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[187] Interview with Bish.

[188] Ibid. Regional radio had reported Manley's call for "some kind of intervention." Bish's notes.

[189] Gillespie had been in the region by coincidence on a familiarization tour with Vice President George Bush that had been arranged back in July. Bush and Gillespie had heard of the unrest in Grenada before leaving Washington and decided to discover what Jamaica's Prime Minister Edward Seaga knew when they had their scheduled meeting. Whilst in Jamaica, Gillespie heard of the massacre at Fort Rupert on a car radio. Seaga was disturbed by this news. In a breakfast meeting with Michael Manley, Bush and Gillespie were told that if Grenada "blew up" it could spread and pose a serious challenge to Caribbean democracy. Interview with Charles Gillespie, November 27, 1995, Washington D.C. Motley had suggested Gillespie be sent to the Embassy to help Bish and Flower. Beck, *The Grenada Invasion*, p. 102. Shultz confirms this in his memoir: "Gillespie went to Barbados to ride herd on Ambassador Bish in the embassy there and was poised to go on to Grenada." Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 333. When the U.S. established an embassy in Grenada shortly after the intervention Gillespie became the first ambassador there.

[190] Interview with Gillespie.

phoned Adams who corroborated the news. Bish and Gillespie then drafted a cable and dispatched it to Washington.[191]

In Washington, RIG met that Wednesday afternoon, probably in response to the unconfirmed reports of Bishop's death.[192] The participants, including JCS and CIA representatives, discussed "alternate ways of conducting a 'quick in and out' military rescue of U.S. citizens" with or without Grenadian government permission.[193] Existing concerns about the safety of U.S. citizens grew as the situation in Grenada seemed to be deteriorating rapidly; reliable information was scarce as U.S. diplomats had not managed to reach Grenada that morning and RFG had gone off the air. Military preparations advanced as the Pentagon provided a preliminary list of military resources available for an NEO, possibly hoping to demonstrate that they had insufficient military forces in place.[194] Meanwhile, the JCS issued CINCLANT with a warning order to contemplate the "possibility of the evacuation of Americans under both benign and hostile conditions."[195] Admiral McDonald and his staff made a number of plans for an NEO using navy and marines corps units only. Elsewhere, the Joint Special Operations Command, the military's special operations unit, was also

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[191] Interview with Bish.

[192] Interview with Motley. The Barbados embassy had been in frequent contact with the State Department throughout the afternoon via cable and telephone.

[193] Menges, *Inside the NSC*, p. 66. The Chairman of the JCS General John Vessey forced Motley to design a quick in and out operation before he would consider action. Interview with Langhorne Motley.

[194] The JCS emphasised that intelligence on Grenada was limited, human intelligence practically non-existent and intelligence on the Cuban presence inconsistent. They argued that the heavily overworked logistics system would be an impediment to anything more than a limited military operation. Marshall, "Urgent Fury," p. 23.

[195] Anderson, "National Decisionmaking and Quick-Strike Interventions," p. 76.

working on an evacuation plan; these plans subsequently merged and involved other actors.[196]

That evening Motley briefed Shultz on the situation. Bish's "imminent danger" cable had probably been received and the two were aware of the unconfirmed reports of Bishop's death.[197] RIG had already decided that an NEO at least was necessary; Shultz "had to be convinced" that military planning was required but Motley eventually got his agreement.[198] Plans were made for the Cabinet-level Crisis Pre-Planning Group (CPPG) to convene the next day, Thursday, October 20, as the momentum for a military operation gathered.

Conclusion

By July 1983 the PRG was in crisis; the economy was faltering, PSIA was consuming most of the available money, the PRA and militia were demoralized, relations with the U.S. remained cool and, most significantly, connections with the masses lessened. At the First Plenary of the CC on July 13 it was reported that:

> Over the year under review our Party has demonstrated many weaknesses. . . ideologically, politically and organizationally. At the same time, the emergence of deep petty (sic) bourgeois manifestations and influence in the Party has led to

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[196] Marshall, "Urgent Fury," p. 32.

[197] The zealous Menges wasted no time and spent the evening writing three one-page overviews for the CPPG meeting the next day: "First was a short, factual summary of what had happened. Second, I put together, from information I had gathered over the previous few days, a summary of the reactions from the Caribbean governments, Trade Unions, democratic political parties, and religious groups - all of which denounced the bloodshed and urged action to prevent more deaths. Third, I described on one page the prodemocracy leadership and institutions that could provide the basis for the restoration of democracy." Menges, *Inside the NSC*, p. 68. Furthermore, Menges recounts that he met with McFarlane and Poindexter and urged them to convene a CPPG meeting and that they agreed to this. However, most people interviewed said that whilst Menges was a big proponent of action his input actually counted for very little. For example Menges had not been told about the RIG meeting on Wednesday, October 19. As Motley recalled, during the crisis period "no one said 'Here's Menges' invasion plan'." Interview with Langhorne Motley.

[198] Oberdorfer, "Reagan Sought," p. A12.

two ideological trends.'[199]

There was no disagreement amongst the CC that the Party was in trouble, but there was not a consensus that the joint leadership proposal put forward in September was the solution. Differences between Bishop and Coard undeniably existed: "on one level [it] was one of personalities: the spontaneous and charismatic Bishop against the calculating and ascetic Coard" and "on another level, the NJM power struggle was ideological and political. Coard and his supporters were impatient with the pace of social transformation."[200] A December 1983 CIA report concluded that:

> It was becoming increasingly clear that Bishop, ever confident of his appeal to the Grenadian people and his international stature, had paid insufficient attention to the inner workings of the party. He thus found himself in a position of embodying the Grenadian revolution for most of those on the island who continued to sympathize with the New Jewel Movement, but at the same time commanded a dwindling base of support within the upper echelon of the party.[201]

This situation led to accusations of "cultism" and "onemanism" from his opponents.

The argument that Bishop's demise was the result of a long-term operation masterminded by Coard may seem plausible, especially given the extent and personal nature of the criticism of Bishop at the CC meetings, but as Meeks points out, the "inability to escape from a deeply-entrenched cumulative and available ideological context of Leninism and hierarchy and not the chimera of conspiracy was the critical element in the denouement of the revolution."[202]

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[199] "Central Committee Report on First Plenary Session, 13-19 July, 1983," *Grenada Documents*, document no. 110, p. 1.

[200] Valenta and Valenta, "Leninism in Grenada," p. 16.

[201] CIA Report, "A First Look," p. A-3.

[202] Meeks, *Caribbean Revolutions*, p. 178.

The joint leadership plan was considered by the majority of the CC to be the best solution to their problems but in reality it would have eventually reduced Bishop's role to that of a figurehead. Bishop realized this and found it simply unacceptable. His reneging on the acceptance of the powersharing arrangement and his efforts to circulate rumours of plans to assassinate him infuriated the CC and resulted in the irreversible move of placing Bishop under house arrest.

Even as the demonstrations increased the CC ignored the people. The discussions with Louison and Whiteman to find a solution were futile; the final proposal put to Bishop on Tuesday, October 18, suggested that he accept full responsibility for the crisis and not oppose their commitment to a Marxist-Leninist strategy. Essentially, "there was no indication that the committee was prepared to settle the crisis on any terms other than its own."[203] Added to Bishop's intransigence, it did not seem that any agreeable solution would be found. Coard dismissed the protestations of the populace but it was at this point that "people power" took over and started the train of events that would destroy the revolution and lead the U.S. to intervene.

The Eastern Caribbean leaders were unsettled by Bishop's arrest. With U.S. collusion, a plan to rescue Bishop was underway by Saturday, October 15. By the time Adams met with ambassador Bish on the morning of Wednesday, October 19, and requested U.S. involvement in a military operation, he was echoing the sentiments of most of his Eastern Caribbean colleagues.

In Washington the State Department's RIG had been meeting daily and by Wednesday had decided that an NEO was desirable. An analogy with the Iran hostage crisis influenced this decision; Iran was a recent, prominent and negative

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[203] Ambursley and Dunkerley, *Whose Freedom*, p. 74.

event, factors which all combined to make it a very available analogy. Although RIG were aware of Adams' suggestion that this was a perfect opportunity to remove a Marxist-Leninist government and reduce Soviet and Cuban presence in the region, it appears that the situation was predominantly defined as a potential hostage situation. This perception is what set in motion the decisionmaking process that concluded in intervention. After the experience of Teheran the U.S. were hypersensitive to any possibility of another such crisis. Dam highlighted such feelings after the intervention when he said that; "sometimes action is necessary to keep a bad situation from getting worse. This was such a time. . ."[204] RIG certainly reflected such pre-emptive thinking; the office of the JCS were contacted as early as Friday, October 14, because a NEO "required the use of military assets and the securing of military targets on Grenada"[205]

Prior to Bishop's death the military were reluctant to consider action and it was only on Wednesday, October 19, that the JCS agreed to examine the resources available. Memories of Vietnam and Iran made the JCS more cautious than their civilian counterparts and it was only when Grenada was discussed at cabinet-level from Thursday, October 20, onwards that the military began to believe an operation was conceivable.[206] Once the JCS accepted that there was an operation they argued that an evacuation would require the seizure of the island rather than any limited

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[204] "Statement of Hon. Kenneth W. Dam, Deputy Secretary of State," U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. *The Situation in Grenada* (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1983), p. 4.

[205] Motley, "The Decision to Assist Grenada," p. 70.

[206] In the post-Vietnam era military caution has become a familiar trend, especially when the question of committing troops is raised. As Petraeus observes, "the view of military leaders as aggressive and influential presidential advisers on the use of force has been more the premise of political debate than the conclusion of rigorous analysis." David H. Petraeus, "Military Influence and the Post-Vietnam Use of Force," *Armed Forces and Society* 15, no. 4 (Summer 1989): 490.

"surgical strike" style action to evacuate foreign U.S. nationals.[207] This was a prime example of the military's post-Vietnam doctrine of using overwhelming force to ensure quick victories.

By the end of "Bloody Wednesday" Bishop and six of his colleagues were dead and Grenada was under a shoot-on-sight curfew and little intelligence was available on the situation. Although the RIG favoured military action before news of Bishop's death was received the final decision lay with President Reagan and the National Security Planning Group.

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[207] Interview with Motley.

CHAPTER 5

PLANNING AN INTERVENTION

The dramatic events of "Bloody Wednesday" in Grenada took Washington by surprise even though they had been following the situation. The murders forced the U.S. to focus on the situation as concern about U.S. citizens on Grenada was "raised to the highest level."[1] RIG's Chairman, Tony Motley, later clarified the situation: "After October 19, our primary task regarding the safety of U.S. citizens was to determine whether the situation on the ground was likely to improve by itself. Without clear indication of a return to civil stability, an evacuation would be prudent."[2] Momentum for a military action had been mounting with RIG recommending a non-permissive evacuation operation and several Eastern Caribbean leaders making individual invitations to Washington to participate in a collective military action. In the next two chapters[3] I will examine the central period of the crisis, Thursday, October 20 to Tuesday, October 25, tracing the important events and the decisionmaking process that resulted in the launching of a military operation on October 25.

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[1] Jay Mallin, "Army controls Grenada; Caricom nations shocked," *Washington Times*, October 21, 1983, p. 5. At a morning White House press briefing, White House Press Secretary Larry Speakes reported that "we've seen nothing to indicate that they were having particular problems." "Press Briefing by Larry Speakes, 9:17 A.M., October 21, 1983," no. 882-10/21, Container 33, *The White House: Office of the Press Secretary* (WHOPS), Ronald Reagan Library (RRL), p. 4.

[2] Langhorne A. Motley, "The Decision to Assist Grenada," p. 71.

[3] The period is divided into two chapters to maintain the chapter length structure of this thesis rather than because of any obvious point of separation.

Thursday, October 20

At 9:00 a.m. in Washington the President's Deputy National Security Advisor Vice Admiral John Poindexter convened the CPPG[4] in Room 208 of the Executive Office Building, the new "crisis management center." The meeting began with a briefing on the latest developments in Grenada. The RMC were an unknown quantity and U.S. intelligence was relatively poor as they had no one on the island, the CC had been a secretive group and decisions in Grenada were now being made on the spot.[5] The general impression of the RMC in Washington was of a group more pro-Cuban, pro-Soviet than Bishop.[6] An early analogy was drawn with the Soviet-sponsored coup in Afghanistan which removed the government of Mohammed Daud and installed a more pliant puppet government. There were "suspicions" that the Soviets or Cubans were involved with Bishop's demise but it was never a significant issue.[7] It was noted that the Cuban ship *Vietnam Heroica* was moored in St. George's harbour.

Most of the participants had already decided that military action of some sort was necessary.[8] The option under consideration was a quick and effective evacuation although it was unclear how extensive an operation this would require; the difference

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[4] In attendance were State Department representatives Tony Motley and Craig Johnstone, NSC staffers Oliver North and Constantine Menges, Defense Department officials Nestor Sanchez and Fred Ikle, CIA official Duane Clarridge and U.S. ambassador to the OAS William Middendorf. The CPPG was formed in 1982 and served essentially the same purpose as the older Special Situations Group but as well as Cabinet members it included deputy Cabinet officers and their subordinates.

[5] Interview with Larry Rossin, October 28, 1994, Washington D.C.

[6] "Background Briefing by Senior Administration Officials on U.S. Military Involvement in Grenada, 9:38 A.M.," October 25, 1983, no. 890-10/25, Container 34, *WHOPS*, RRL, p. 14.

[7] Interview with Johnstone.

[8] Ibid.

between evacuating the students and seizing the entire island was perceived to be marginal and so the military and logistical requirements for both were discussed.[9] The CPPG estimated the total armed strength available to the RMC to be 4,000 Grenadians, 600 Cubans with Castro able to airlift 5-10,000 men there within days.[10] It was decided that secrecy was essential to prevent this last possibility and reduce the chances that "the students might be put under much tighter military control and declared hostages to prevent any counteraction."[11] After further discussion of a rapid in-and-out action, Menges took the opportunity to promote his plan advocating "a multinational force that would not only rescue citizens and leave, but also restore democracy and eliminate this communist threat permanently."[12] This plan was supported by Middendorf and Ikle; Poindexter then closed the meeting by announcing that the NSC Cabinet would meet that evening at 6:00 p.m. At 10:00 a.m. a subsequent secret meeting was held in Ikle's office to discuss logistical requirements for a military operation.[13]

The Caribbean Response

The consensual Eastern Caribbean response was horror and condemnation, no one had envisaged such a bloody resolution of the power struggle. Adams described the RMC as "brutal and vicious murderers" and announced that "I do not think it will be possible to accommodate so wide a range of governments within the Caribbean. It

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[9] Ibid.

[10] Menges, *Inside the NSC*, p. 69.

[11] Ibid., p. 69.

[12] Ibid., p. 69. Menges conjectured that the RMC would offer Grenada as a base for Soviet-bloc forces and possibly even nuclear weapons!

[13] Bennett, "Grenada: Anatomy," p. 72.

goes far beyond ideological pluralism. This is the difference between barbarism and human beings."[14] Seaga stated that his government, "while not in sympathy with the Bishop government, is repulsed by the tragic death of Mr. Bishop and his colleagues under the new regime of Cuban-trained Army generals and other Marxist ideologies (sic) . . ."[15] Even the Jamaican opposition leader, and former Prime Minister, Michael Manley, condemned the executions as a "squalid betrayal of the hopes of the ordinary people of our region."[16] The region's historical and cultural closeness meant that all the nations were affected. As Charles later expressed it: "We, as part of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, realizing that we are, of course, one region, we belong to each other, are kith and kin. We all have members of our states living in Grenada."[17] Relations with Bishop's government had been strained but endurable; the RMC was simply intolerable.

Prime Minister George Chambers of Trinidad and Tobago was first to take action; he announced that no Grenadians would be allowed to enter Trinidad without a visa, trade concessions to goods from Grenada would be suspended and Grenadian registered ships would be barred from the CARICOM jetty in Port-of-Spain.[18] Seaga followed suit by severing diplomatic relations with Grenada.

That morning Prime Minister John Compton of St. Lucia phoned Adams and "expressed himself in the strongest possible terms that the situation in Grenada could

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[14] *Grenada: Background and Facts*, p. 4.

[15] O'Shaughnessy, *Grenada*, p. 147.

[16] Ibid., p. 147.

[17] "Joint Press Conference with the President of the United States Ronald Reagan and the Prime Minister of Dominica Eugenia Charles," *Documents on the Invasion*, Item X, p. 32.

[18] O'Shaughnessy, *Grenada*, p. 148.

not remain as it was and he proposed that there be a Caribbean initiative to intervene in Grenada on a multinational basis to restore law and order."[19] Compton believed that Coard's regime would attempt to "push the Caribbean community into the Communist camp."[20] Adams, unsurprised and pleased, shared Compton's concerns. It was decided that the OECS should meet the next day in Barbados. Compton took on the task of contacting CARICOM's head, Chambers, to arrange a meeting of the organization. There was some confusion over the setting because Adams preferred Barbados but Chambers insisted on Port-of-Spain. It was only on Friday, October 21, that the venue was finalized as Port-of-Spain, Trinidad, on Saturday evening. The disagreement over venues underlined the tension that existed between the OECS and CARICOM.

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Charles Gillespie had been due to visit St. Lucia to sign an AID agreement and took the opportunity to sound out Compton and discover if he had any better information than the embassy.[21] Meeting privately with Gillespie, Compton asked rhetorically, "What the hell is going on?"[22] He recalled that the situation with the PRG had been uncomfortable enough but that further revolutions would put democracy in the region at risk and consequently "we" (the OECS) must do something about it; in doing this Compton asked Gillespie forthrightly for US help.[23]

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[19] "Full Text of Speech by the Prime Minister of Barbados," *Documents on the Invasion*, p. 36.

[20] *Grenada: Background and Facts*, p. 4.

[21] Interview with Gillespie.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid.

During the meeting Compton outlined a detailed scenario for destabilizing the RMC and replacing it with a legitimate government; he, Adams and Charles would work to mobilize and unite the Eastern Caribbean leaders in an effort to brand the RMC as "murderers, outlaws and illegitimate renegades."[24] Compton speculated that CARICOM would "provide the best and biggest umbrella for such action" and that despite doubts about the supportiveness of Chambers, "initial efforts should be to gain the broadest possible base of support."[25] He assumed that:

> pressure from neighboring states (cut all air transport, communications, refusal to load vessels and move cargo etc.) would lead to a public reaction on the island which would in turn lead to more violence. That would justify. . . [the] insertion of a Caribbean security force to rid the island of the outlaws and re-establish a stable situation.[26]

Once this was achieved Compton described how Governor-General Sir Paul Scoon could appoint a cabinet to govern until elections could be arranged in about six months.[27]

Compton originally stated that he envisaged U.S. participation in response to an OECS request. When Gillespie reminded him of the presence of the U.S. students on Grenada, Compton acknowledged that Washington "might need to act unilaterally but urged that we [United States] consult and concert with Caribbean heads of government in advance if possible."[28] The meeting concluded with Compton inviting Gillespie to the upcoming OECS meeting in Barbados which, along with the as yet

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[24] Milan Bish, secret telegram to Secretary of State, "Subject: Grenada: St. Lucian Prime Minister's Scenario," 210058Z, October 1983, Bridgetown 06451, section 1, p. 3.

[25] Ibid., section one, p. 3.

[26] Ibid., section one, p. 3.

[27] Ibid., section one, p. 3.

[28] Ibid., section one, p. 4.

unfinalised CARICOM meeting, Compton saw as "crucial events" which offered "an opportunity to act which will be diminished (if not lost) if heads of government don't seize it."[29]

Adams was in touch with Compton and Charles and other OECS leaders throughout the day. Adams also sent a representative to Jamaica to sound out Seaga who firmly supported the idea of a Caribbean initiative.[30] Later that day, the Barbadian cabinet summarized feelings that the OECS had expressed before Bishop's death, agreeing on "a military intervention together with such friendly third countries as could assist with the logistic support necessary for such an enterprise."[31] The shrewd Adams knew that the U.S. and Britain would require formal requests so he planned that the OECS would agree to a military solution and would invite Barbados and Jamaica and then depute Barbados to invite the U.S. and Britain to join them.[32]

At 12:00 p.m. Adams met with U.S. ambassador Milan Bish to discuss the situation and argue the case for U.S. participation in a military action again. He told Bish that action was now "more urgent than ever" and that "intervention can only be mounted and carried through by the U.S."[33] He suggested that the intervention could be carried out under the auspices of the OECS, who would probably be unanimously in favour of action, rather than CARICOM as he expected opposition from such countries as Guyana.[34] Adams continued to lobby hard, telling Bish that "there will

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[29] Ibid., section one, p. 4.

[30] Hoyos, *Tom Adams*, p. 115.

[31] Ibid., p. 115.

[32] Adkin, *Urgent Fury*, p. 97.

[33] Bish's notes.

[34] Ibid. The embassy had earlier come to a similar conclusion: "We might expect there to be further aligning of views and agreement on possible action plans when first meeting of EC leaders takes

be enormous private as well as public disappointment throughout the region if the U.S. does not act forcefully to save Grenada."[35] He portrayed three possible outcomes of intervening: the RMC would not resist; the Cubans and the PRA would fight; and the PRA would go it alone. Adams favoured the last of these scenarios as it would remove all vestiges of authoritarianism; he hinted that "such as it is, I have information which suggests that the Cubans would sit it out."[36] After listening to Adams with interest, Bish emphasized that U.S. involvement would depend on "unequivocal written requests" from the Eastern Caribbean nations.[37]

After the midday meeting Bish cabled Washington. The U.S. embassy in Barbados had been in contact with SGU on Grenada that morning and had been told that the students were well and the situation quiet. Bish was very concerned about the safety of U.S. citizens and reported that there were between 500 and 1,000 Americans who were potential hostages. In contrast to the previous day Bish now advocated action:

> I know there are formidable difficulties, but whatever we have to do to assure the safety of American citizens, I urge that we set it in motion now. In the process we could well rid the hemisphere of an obnoxious unwanted regime.[38]

There was no recommendation of timing but Bish did report that it was unlikely that the Eastern Caribbean would act alone. However, the OECS were united and would support U.S. action "materially and morally" in an operation which should aim to evacuate U.S. citizens, remove the RMC and restore democracy to Grenada. The

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place on October 21. Whether that could remain intact in CARICOM is [a] tough question." Bish, "Subject: Grenada: St. Lucian Prime Minister's Scenario," section 1, p. 4.

[35] Ibid., section one, p. 4.

[36] Ibid., section one, p. 4. Washington had claimed on numerous occasions that the Cuban workers on Grenada were actually professional soldiers.

[37] Adkin, *Urgent Fury*, p. 98.

[38] Bish's notes.

optimistic ambassador concluded that: "I believe that sentiment in the Eastern Caribbean for action is now so strong that it might be possible to elicit a public invitation from the region's collective leadership to the U.S. to act for the sake of human decency and human rights."[39] In view of the communications between the Caribbean and Washington previously this was no surprise.

That evening on ABC's *Nightline* programme, Adams admitted that most West Indians hoped for a military intervention. As Sandford and Vigilante conclude, this was arguably "a move deliberately calculated to signal the seriousness of the situation to the U.S. and to help smooth the way for U.S. action."[40]

Under Curfew

In Grenada the situation remained tense. The curfew was particularly harsh on a population that had few foodstocks and only forty percent of households had running water. As the militia could not be relied upon to enforce the curfew the PRA were used; they could not physically patrol the entire island and so in reality hundreds of people broke the curfew to get food and water and none were shot.[41] Nonetheless, the round-up of people continued and Richmond Hill prison was soon overflowing. Much of the phone network was out of order, RFG broadcast only music and a news blackout produced an "atmosphere of suspicion and anger, and did little for the image of the RMC, domestically or internationally. Foreign journalists were expelled or prevented from entering Grenada. . . All telex and communication facilities were

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[39] Ibid.

[40] Sandford and Vigilante, *Grenada*, p. 3.

[41] Adkin, *Urgent Fury*, p. 84.

denied."[42] Grenadians relied on the outside radio stations such as Radio Antilles, British Broadcasting Corporation's World Service and the Voice of America.

Aware of the opposition to them, both from within Grenada and from other countries in general, the next few days witnessed desperate attempts by the RMC to restore some semblance of normality to Grenada. They met that Thursday, October 20, to plan their course of action. One of the first measures taken was to issue a statement presenting their version of Wednesday's events:

> Comrades, it must be very clear to everyone that it was never the intention of the armed forces to shed the blood of our people. That is why the armed forces had firm instructions not to fire when the people invaded Maurice Bishop's house and even when they invaded the Fort.
>
> But comrades the seizure of the military headquarters of the army changed the whole character of the issue. Let us be clear that blood was shed because when the army came to restore control his group led by Vincent Noel fired on the military.[43]

This selective account ended by stating that the RMC was "committed to continuing the work of the revolution and improving it."[44] To retain the loyalty of the PRA a fifteen per cent pay rise was awarded and a message sent to them praising the bravery of those who defended Fort Rupert.[45]

The RMC correctly expected that the OECS and CARICOM would impose trade, fuel and transport sanctions on Grenada. Consequently an Emergency Economic Programme (EEP) was drawn up by Nazim Burke, the former permanent secretary in Ministry of Finance, and Bernard Coard. The EEP recommended the establishment

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[42] Payne et al., *Grenada*, p. 137.

[43] "Statement Issued by Major Christopher Stroude, Member of the Revolutionary Military Council on October 20, 1983," *Documents on the Invasion*, Item IV, p. 14.

[44] Ibid., p. 14.

[45] Payne et al., *Grenada*, p. 148.

of an Emergency Economic Commission and a Political Leader/Minister to guide the Commission and report its views to the government. The Commission's first report concentrated on conserving food, assessing energy stocks, rationing, locating countries willing to provide supplies and making provisions for essential services.[46] The second target of the report was communications; the regime's ability to communicate internationally and the extent to which the island relied on Cable and Wireless was to be assessed. A third target area was international and regional organizations. Those which Grenada belonged to were identified and it was decided that if any of these organizations imposed sanctions the RMC "must get in touch with. . . and insist on our right to be informed of any meeting and to be heard."[47]

The threat of intervention was already looming for the RMC and contact with other countries was seen as essential to survival. The Commissioner for International and Regional Organization Merle Collins was instructed to "identify countries on whom we can hope to depend in the coming period. As soon as is possible we must contact them. At whatever stage our emergency programme has reached, we must inform them of our needs and seek assistance."[48] Austin contacted Trinidad's president Ellis Clarke to tell him that the RMC was prepared to accept a visit by an international group from CARICOM to discuss elections and other matters.[49] In reality Cuba was the only country which could possibly help the RMC by this stage.

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[46] Revolutionary Military Council internal memorandum, *Emergency Economic Programme: Economic Report No. 1*, October 1983, p. 5.

[47] Ibid., p. 5.

[48] Ibid., p. 6.

[49] Robert Pastor, "The Invasion of Grenada: A Pre- and Post-Mortem," in Scott B. MacDonald, Harald M. Sandstrom and Paul B. Goodwin (eds.), *The Caribbean After Grenada: Conflict and Democracy* (New York: Praeger, 1988), p. 94. Clarke conveyed this message to other regional statesman.

The RMC decided to ask Cuba for military assistance, a five million dollar (Eastern Caribbean dollars) loan to pay civil servants and to work for "the best relations" based on "principles of proletarian internationalism."[50] Cuba's reaction however surprised and unnerved the RMC. Castro, who had been good friends with Bishop, authorized this condemnatory statement:

> Bishop was one of the political leaders best liked and most respected by our people because of his talent, modesty, sincerity, revolutionary honesty and proven friendship with our country.
>
> No doctrine, no principle or proclaimed revolutionary position and no internal division can justify atrocious acts such as the physical elimination of Bishop and the prominent group of honest and worthy leaders who died yesterday.
>
> The death of Bishop and his comrades must be cleared up. If they were executed in cold blood, the guilty should receive exemplary punishment.[51]

Castro warned that political relations with the RMC would "undergo profound and serious analysis."[52] Although Cuba promised to continue economic and technical assistance for the sake of the Grenadian people, the RMC's request for five million dollars was refused. Additionally, the regular Cuban air link ceased and Castro refused to provide military reinforcements or place Cubans in Grenada under RMC control. In fact the Cubans in Grenada "detested" the RMC; the workers at PSIA stopped work to protest the arrest of the Grenadian project manager, Bob Evans.[53]

Castro had warned in his statement that "imperialism will try to use this tragedy and the serious mistakes by the Grenadian revolutionaries to sweep away the

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[50] Payne et al., *Grenada*, p. 142.

[51] "Statement by the Cuban Party and Revolutionary Government on the Events in Grenada," *Documents on the Invasion*, Item XII, p. 42.

[52] Ibid., p. 43.

[53] Adkin, *Urgent Fury*, p. 91.

revolutionary process."[54] The statement was an indication of Castro's effort to distance Cuba from the RMC to persuade Washington that Cuba was not involved and perhaps to forestall a U.S. intervention. The only country which did not openly condemn the RMC was the Soviet Union; TASS merely noted that: "An armed clash took place which claimed the lives of the Prime Minister and several ministers. The Revolutionary Military Council assumed full power in the country. It stated its determination to uphold the cause of the revolution."[55] The Soviets were too remote to offer any useful help and nor were they inclined to.

The Students

The RMC probably decided from the outset to be solicitous toward SGU and its 650 students; any threat to them would provide the U.S. with a golden opportunity to act. Therefore, at 9:00 a.m. on Thursday two armed security guards visited SGU's Vice Chancellor Geoffrey Bourne. Bourne initially thought he was being arrested but it transpired that they were there to inquire about the students and if they had sufficient food and water.[56] Bourne was given a pass to travel anywhere on the island. At 10:00 a.m. a military aide visited Bourne to inform him that General Hudson Austin wanted to meet with him at 11:00 a.m. Before Bourne met Austin he asked the British representative John Kelly if he could drop by. They discussed the curfew and Kelly suggested that Bourne try to persuade Austin to lift it.[57]

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[54] "Statement by the Cuban Party," p. 43.

[55] O'Shaughnessy, *Grenada*, p. 148.

[56] Jonathan Kwitny, *Endless Enemies: The Making of an Unfriendly World* (New York: Congdon & Weed, 1984), p. 412. Bourne told them the True Blue campus only had water for one night and within a couple of hours water trucks were sent there.

[57] Interview with Kelly. The curfew was lifted between 10:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m. on Friday, October 21. Kelly also met with some of the Grenadian military that day, to discuss the curfew and the possibility of people leaving, and with Scoon.

Austin arrived at Bourne's house at 11:00 a.m. According to Bourne, the General "looked completely exhausted. He looked like a man completely overwhelmed by what he had done and the worldwide reaction it had caused and that he was looking for help."[58] Austin recounted what had allegedly happened at Fort Rupert and bemoaned that "no country will talk to me. None of the Caribbean countries will talk and the United States will not even respond."[59] Austin said that he hoped to end military rule soon. Bourne inquired about the press and television blackout and whether Austin would be willing to talk to U.S. diplomats if a visit could be arranged. Austin agreed to this. He concluded the meeting by asking Bourne about the students: "Did I think many would want to leave. What were their reaction in general?"[60] Austin assured Bourne that the students were in no danger and gave him his home phone number to call at any time if there were problems.

Bourne adjudged Austin to be a man out of his depth but "not particularly sympathetic to the Marxist cause."[61] Additionally, he felt that "their attitude was unexpected and reassuring," there was little threat to the students.[62] He telexed the substance of the meeting to SGU's' Chancellor Charles Modica in New York. Although Modica was initially sceptical of Austin's sincerity he trusted Bourne's judgment and concluded that:

> [I]n his[Austin] own mind, it was very important that the school remain on the

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[58] "Statement of Geoffrey Bourne, M.D., Vice Chancellor, St. George's University School of Medicine, Grenada, West Indies," U.S. Congress. *U.S. Military Actions in Grenada*, p. 188.

[59] Leventhal, "Entrepreneurship and Nation Building," p. 290.

[60] "Statement by Geoffrey Bourne," U.S. Congress, *U.S. Military Actions in Grenada*, p. 191.

[61] Peter Bourne, "Was Intervention Necessary?" *Los Angeles Times*, November 6, 1983, section 4, p. 1.

[62] Leventhal, "Entrepreneurship and Nation Building," p. 290.

> island and classes be held and he was willing to do any, anything and everything (sic) to make sure that the students were safe and that the classes were held and the employees' jobs were safeguarded.[63]

SGU also telexed the U.S. embassy in Barbados to inform them of Austin's agreement to meet with embassy officials.[64] The embassy had tried unsuccessfully to get two officials to Grenada on Wednesday, October 19, and accepted the offer. According to one official the U.S. were even anxious to talk with the RMC as establishing a dialogue is the preferred first option in hostage situations, or potential ones.[65] Irrespective of the RMC's goals and motives, at least a dialogue would indicate a degree of rationality.[66]

In two lengthy conversations with the embassy that day, Modica expressed his belief that the RMC would do nothing to jeopardize SGU or harm the students to avoid giving the U.S. a pretext to act. He was worried that with RFG off air not all the students would be aware of the curfew which was making communication with them difficult. He feared a "violent backlash" against the RMC with some students caught in the middle.[67] Although Modica also identified two possible helicopter landing points he speculated as to whether the dispersion of the campuses and students and staff would make it safer to leave the students in place or to evacuate

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[63] *PBS Frontline,* Operation Urgent Fury, p. 13. For a detailed study of the history of SGU see Leventhal, "Entrepreneurship and Nation Building."

[64] "U.S. House of Representatives Fact Finding Mission: The Grenada Diary of Congressman Louis Stokes," *Documents on the Invasion*, Item XXV, p. 103.

[65] Interview with Flower.

[66] R. Reuben Miller, "The Bangkok Solution: Peaceful Resolution of Hostage-taking," *Intelligence and National Security* 10 (April 1995): 310.

[67] Bish's notes.

them.[68] In his subsequent conversation just after midnight he considered the situation "to be sufficiently tense and threatening so that if it were simply a matter of evacuating those resident on campuses. . . USG should move as quickly as circumstances dictated."[69] With a curfew in place and the students in multiple locations an evacuation would be difficult; additionally Modica felt that "a move to evacuate American citizens which did not get all of them off the island would. . . trigger vindictive behavior by Grenadians."[70] The Chancellor concluded by saying that "violent reaction by Bishop's supporters should be expected within a week or so -- if not within the next few days."[71]

By Thursday evening the RMC had taken a number of decisions in an attempt to improve their almost untenable position. After Cuba's negative reaction Coard was seen as a burden and dropped out of sight. Curfew passes and escorts were arranged for foreign diplomats and those in essential services and all workplaces would be reopened on Monday, October 24. Lastly, the RMC decided to "create a 'broad-based' civilian government within two weeks, a process that would commence with the deliberate co-option of businessmen, bank managers and hoteliers in order to restore confidence both domestically and internationally."[72] Many of those approached by the RMC were reluctant to become involved or simply refused; after

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[68] Ibid. When Modica inquired if he should have SGU officials talk to the RMC about moving off-campus students on to university campuses, ambassador Bish suggested that such measures might be premature and should be put on hold for the moment. Milan Bish, secret telegram to Secretary of State, "Subject: Grenada: Attitudes of the Grenada Medical School Toward Possible Evacuation of Their Students/Staff," 200739Z, October 1983, Bridgetown 06392, section 1, p. 4.

[69] Bish, "Subject: Grenada: Attitudes of the Grenada Medical School," section 1, p.3.

[70] Ibid., section 1, p. 4.

[71] Ibid., section 1, p. 4.

[72] Payne et al., *Grenada*, p. 139.

much effort a meeting between a civilian group and the RMC was arranged for Sunday, October 23.[73] Despite the RMC's frantic manoeuvring it was impossible to counter the effect of the massacre of the previous day and it was that which guided the Eastern Caribbean and U.S. approach to the new regime.

The Special Situations Group

During the afternoon in Washington, Constantine Menges had composed background memos for Vice President George Bush to use at the Special Situations Group (SSG)[74] meeting later that day. With the help of Oliver North, Menges summarized the views of the State Department, Department of Defence, CIA and NSC. North had grown more interested in Grenada but "predicted that the State Department would oppose action and argue for negotiation and that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would oppose any military action."[75] The SSG convened at 4:45 p.m. in the situation room in the sub-basement of the West wing of the White House.[76] There were two main topics of discussion: the safety of the students and the availability of military forces and the time required to ready them for action.

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[73] Interview with Kelly.

[74] The SSG was a crisis management group that was chaired by the Vice President and included the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, heads of the CIA and the JCS.

[75] Menges, *Inside the NSC*, p. 71. McFarlane recalls North having "as large a role as anyone" in affairs. Ben Bradlee, *Guts and Glory: The Rise and Fall of Oliver North* (New York: Donald I. Fine, 1988), p. 179. North was an indefatigable all-purpose Pentagon action officer who liaised between ambassador Bish, the military and the intelligence community. Motley kept him on a short leash throughout the crisis as he was aware that good judgment was not North's forte. Interview with Motley.

[76] The meeting was chaired by Bush and also attended by McFarlane, North, Menges, Weinberger, Vessey, Ikle, McMahon, Eagleburger, Middendorf and Meese. Shultz and Motley arrived about 5:15 p.m. after testifying at Congress.

Reports from the U.S. embassy in Barbados had recommended action to rescue the students and possibly topple the RMC. Washington knew little about the membership of the RMC or the balance of power within it.[77] In the absence of reliable information about the students situation, decisionmakers, Lawrence Eagleburger in particular, drew an analogy with the Iranian hostage crisis of 1979-1981. Weinberger echoed this thought:

> [W]e naturally had to think about how we could either extricate the Americans, or prevent their being seized as hostages in a reprise of the frustrating and very dangerous Iranian seizure of our citizens and capture of our Embassy in Teheran in 1979.[78]

Comparing the RMC to a group of Iranian militants brought to mind a protracted hostage situation with the U.S. reluctant to act. As Carothers notes, "the Iran experience had left such deep scars in the U.S. psyche that it was enough for the vague possibility of another hostage-taking situation to arise for alarm bells to go off in the U.S. government."[79] The uncertainty of the situation in Grenada played on Washington's fears; as Dam revealed, "it was never clear that Austin or any other coherent group was in fact in charge. The RMC indicated no intention to function as a new government."[80] Motley expressed similar concerns:

> The danger aspect for the students came from the fact that (sic) the absence of assurances from any bona fide authorities. Every report that we got showed that there didn't seem to be much organization or discipline on the island, other than the fact that there was this curfew. . . we didn't have any assurances. . . there were six hundred U.S. citizens in four different concentrations on this island. That gave cause for alarm. The thought, early on, crossed the minds of. . . many people

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[77] Telephone interview with Foreign Service Officer, January 31, 1995.

[78] Weinberger, *Fighting For Peace*, p. 74.

[79] Thomas Carothers, *In the Name of Democracy: U.S. Policy Toward Latin America in the Reagan Years* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), p. 114.

[80] "Statement of Hon. Kenneth W. Dam, Deputy Secretary of State," U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. *The Situation in Grenada* (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1983), p. 4.

that it was a. . . situation ripe for hostages.[81]

This genuine concern for the students and the use of the Iran analogy provided the background for the second point of discussion; a military option.

Earlier that day CINCLANT had produced six options for an evacuation-type operation, as had been requested on Wednesday, October 19, and briefed General Vessey at Norfolk, Virginia.[82] The discussion was "framed in terms of the action being a combined rescue and restoration of democracy."[83] Essentially, the political parameters of any subsequent operation had been set; citizen safety and the removal of the RMC. The Director of the CIA, William Casey, stated his preferences unequivocally: "Hey. . . fuck it, let's dump these bastards."[84] Shultz, backed by McFarlane, supported a less ambitious plan but favoured readiness for possible military action.[85] According to Motley, "initially we looked at a surgical type action, and then a decision was made, properly so by the military, that the situation was such that you could not have a surgical action per se. So the operation became more

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[81] *PBS Frontline*, Operation Urgent Fury, p. 11.

[82] Admiral McDonald's staff had assumed the required forces would be available, no hostile country would intervene and any evacuation would take place near Point Salines. Of the six options, two were under friendly conditions, three under hostile conditions and the final one a "show of force" action. Adkin, *Urgent Fury*, p. 117-18.

[83] Menges had prepared a one-page overview of "genuine democrats who could establish an interim government leading to fair and free elections." Menges, *Inside the NSC*, p. 72.

[84] Woodward, *VEIL*, p. 329.

[85] Marshall, "Urgent Fury," p. 24. Shultz and Motley were both proponents of the "diplomacy not backed by strength is ineffectual" school. As Shultz explained in his memoirs: "The use of force, and the credible threat of the use of force, are legitimate instruments of national policy and should be viewed as such. . . The use of force obviously should not be taken lightly, but better to use force when you *should* rather than when you *must*; *last* means *no other*, and by that time the level of force and the risk involved may have multiplied many times over." Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 345. Emphasis in original.

expanded."[86] Despite this, General Vessey was reluctant to act and got the support of Weinberger in asking for more time and intelligence.[87] After the meeting Vessey notified CINCLANT to prepare advanced planning for an evacuation from a hostile environment.[88]

There was a general consensus amongst the SSG in favour of action and when Oliver North mentioned that a Navy Task Force had left Norfolk on Tuesday, October 18, en route to the Mediterranean, Motley, who was unaware of this, proposed that the Task Force be diverted south towards Grenada. He argued that this would be a "precautionary measure"[89] and a "prudent, low-profile, low-risk" move which would provide Washington with a military capability nearby.[90] Vice Admiral Moreau, Vessey's assistant, flatly refused; he told a frustrated Motley that the JCS

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[86] U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on Armed Services. *Lessons Learned as a Result of the U.S. Military Operations in Grenada* (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1984), p. 19.

[87] Apparently some participants were astonished that no contingency plan existed and that the most recent aerial photos were five months old. Bennett, "Grenada: Anatomy," p. 72. It was decided that the CIA should get someone onto Grenada. It appears that one attempt to do this failed: the CIA contacted Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Richard Stilwell at 4:00 p.m. that afternoon to request his help in getting an agent onto Grenada in forty-eight hours. Stilwell called Lieutenant Colonel Foster at the Seaspray office in Fort Eustus, Virginia. Foster organized the transport of two helicopters needed for the operation from their base in California to Barbados in time only for the expatriate Grenadian agent to "bottle out." Steven Emerson, *Secret Warriors: Inside the Covert Military Operations of the Reagan Era* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1988), p. 145. According to Bish the CIA got someone else onto Grenada that day and by Friday a satellite radio guidance device had been placed in St. George's harbour. Interview with Bish.

[88] The plan was to move as quick as possible to secure Point Salines, Pearls, the medical school campuses, Scoon and political prisoners. The Marines would land in the northeast near Pearls and the Rangers in the southeast at Point Salines and then link up and move north and west to rescue the students and work with the Special Forces to rescue Scoon and the political prisoners at Richmond Hill and capture Radio Free Grenada. Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, p. 76.

[89] Motley, "The Decision to Assist Grenada," p. 70.

[90] Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 327. Admiral McDonald later explained that the diversion was designed to "provide that type of alertness and responsiveness to protect our citizens and to provide potential for evacuating those citizens in a peaceful environment." U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. *Organization, Structure, and Decisionmaking Procedures of the Department of Defense, Part 7* (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1983), p. 285.

would not consider such a measure without a written Presidential order. This obstructionism was soon overcome after the meeting when McFarlane drafted an order from the President to General Vessey to divert the Task Force south.

Washington had received news of Adams' conversation with Bish urging military action to safeguard foreign citizens, restore law and order and remove the RMC. It was noted that the OECS were unsettled and would be meeting the next day. As Menges recalls:

> I knew from our information that these leaders had a practical problem: what if they asked formally for military help from the United States and then were refused? Would the RMC take retaliatory action? Might Castro? Their problem was very real.[91]

An official OECS request for help reduced concern that this would be a unilateral operation. Where military action is involved there was a feeling in Washington that if only the U.S. felt this was a good idea then it was not a good idea.[92] It was thus decided that before any commitment to military action was made, Washington would wait for the outcome of the OECS meeting. It was widely expected in Washington that the OECS would request help, a measure that would aid the U.S.' political and legal justification for intervention.

The U.S. ambassador to the OAS, William Middendorf, was instructed to "test the water" amongst the Latin America community to see if the OAS were likely to issue a condemnatory resolution against the U.S. should they intervene.[93] A final

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[91] Menges, *Inside the NSC*, p. 72.

[92] Interview with Johnstone.

[93] Interview with Middendorf. Grenada had little support in Latin America. A resolution condemning intervention could not be introduced by Grenada because its representative, Dessima Williams, was absent. The Bolivian OAS Chairman was pro-Grenada but no one seconded his position. The U.S. was always cautious about the Latin American countries views but Washington has traditionally had a low opinion of the OAS and this time was little different; Shultz and McFarlane for example were far more concerned about U.S. citizens and their concerns overrode

measure was to maintain secrecy;[94] the schedules of top officials remained unchanged in an effort to mislead the Cubans, the Soviets and the media as to Washington's intentions.

After the SSG meeting concluded at 5:45 p.m. McFarlane, Poindexter, North and Menges assembled to outline the National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) that would function as Reagan's written "prepare-for-action" order to all government departments.[95] Menges then composed a memo from McFarlane to the President, summarizing the SSG meeting and recommending the President sign the NSDD. A revised draft of the NSDD was produced and McFarlane delivered this to Reagan who ordered planning to proceed.[96] This was not the final decision which authorized a military operation though.

The decision to divert the Navy Task Force was enacted around midnight on the Thursday, October 20, when Captain Carl Erie was instructed to turn his fleet, just north of Bermuda at the time, south and take up position five hundred miles northeast of Grenada. No explanation was given but Erie was told that if no further word was received by midnight on Sunday, October 23, the fleet should resume its course to

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those who worried about anti-U.S. feeling in Latin America. Thomas M. DeFrank and John Walcott, "The Invasion Countdown," *Newsweek*, November 7, 1983, p. 44.

[94] By one official's estimation, until the last day or so before intervention when the number of people who knew about the operation had to be expanded, only about twenty-five people in Washington knew what was going on. Interview with Roger Fontaine, July 15, 1994, Washington D.C.

[95] Menges, *Inside the NSC*, p. 73. NSDD's are different from other Presidential orders in that they do not have to be disclosed to any other branch of government, notably Congress; President Reagan issued some 200 NSDD's during his presidency. Eve Pell, "The Backbone of Hidden Government," *The Nation*, June 19, 1989, p. 838. A collection of the Reagan and Bush administrations' NSDDs can be found in Simpson, *National Security Directives*.

[96] Bennett, "Grenada: Anatomy," p. 74.

the Mediterranean.[97] Erie discussed the order with Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) Commander Colonel James Faulkner and his staff who believed that if the MAU was to be involved it would be in an NEO.[98] Although Erie and his colleagues had 'no information on the location or precise numbers of American citizens to be evacuated. . . planning proceeded on the assumption that such information soon would be provided.'[99]

The meeting of the SSG marked the elevation of the Grenada crisis to cabinet-level. As in previous RIG meetings there was agreement on the need for a military solution with, predictably, only the JCS protesting. A number of important decisions had been taken: the safety of American citizens was of utmost importance; the RMC should be removed; intelligence needed to be improved; the JCS were instructed to prepare an advanced plan for a hostile environment evacuation; the Task Force en route to the Mediterranean was diverted south towards Grenada; secrecy was deemed essential to the operation at this stage; the legal aspects of intervention were to be examined to provide a firmer basis for any operation; and the results of the OECS meeting in Barbados the next day would be awaited before any final intervention decision was made.[100]

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[97] Ronald H. Spector, *U.S. Marines in Grenada* (Washington D.C.: History and Museums Division Headquarters, 1987), p. 2.

[98] Ibid., p. 2.

[99] Ibid., p. 2.

[100] Beck, *The Grenada Invasion*, p. 107.

Friday, October 21

Friday began in Washington with a 7:30 a.m. meeting of the NSC chaired by McFarlane. The industrious Menges gave McFarlane a full report of the situation so far and informed him that the State Department was readying a detailed political plan to be reviewed at a midday RIG meeting.[101] In addition a CPPG meeting would be held later that afternoon.

Friday was a busy day in Barbados as the OECS met to discuss the events in Grenada and U.S. involvement in a multinational military solution. That morning, ambassador Bish traveled to St. Vincent to attend a pre-arranged destroyer visit and DCM Flower and Gillespie met with the Foreign Minister of Barbados Louis Tull and his Permanent Secretary H. Brazane Babb.[102] The U.S. embassy also sent a diplomatic note to the RMC to request permission for Kenneth Kurze and Linda Flohr to visit Grenada on Saturday, October 22. At 9:45 a.m. the embassy received the first news of the arrest the previous night of a U.S. citizen, Michelle Gibbs.[103] Later that morning the embassy cabled Washington that in contrast to earlier reports there were now "life threatening situations in Grenada."[104]

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[101] Menges, *Inside the NSC*, p. 74.

[102] Bish's notes. The destroyer monitored Grenadian communications and provided residual security support to St. Vincent. "Sixteen days that shook the Caribbean," *Caribbean Insight* 6, no. 11 (November 1983), p. 5.

[103] Bish's notes. Gibbs had been in Grenada since 1980, working as a teacher, and was sympathetic to the PRG's ideology. After the intervention she was 'invited' to leave as she was on a list of "those people who present[ed] a threat to the country." "U.S. House of Representatives: Critics of American Invasion Detained--U.S. Troops Act on Request of Grenada's Governor General," *Documents on the Invasion*, Item XXV, p. 106.

[104] Bish's notes.

Prime Minister Adams met with the High Commissioner for Trinidad and Tobago to tell him in confidence for transmittal to Prime Minister Chambers that he [Adams] would be unable to attend the upcoming CARICOM meeting because "a military intervention was being contemplated by the OECS with Barbados and other countries, in which participation of all CARICOM countries would be invited."[105] At 12:30 p.m. Adams met the British High Commissioner Giles Bullard[106] to notify him that the OECS was "contemplating" inviting the U.S. and that Britain would also be invited. Finally, Adams met with ambassador Bish to tell him to inform Washington that the OECS was deliberating over intervention and that the U.S. should await a formal request which the Prime Minister was confident would be forthcoming.[107] In reply Bish "undertook to convey the facts to President Reagan while awaiting a formal request should one be issued."[108] The U.S. would not have long to wait as the OECS was scheduled to convene at the Dover Convention Centre near Bridgetown shortly after lunchtime.

Back in Grenada

In Grenada the curfew was lifted from 10:00 a.m. until 2:00 p.m. to enable people to stock up on supplies. The RMC appeared "weakened, divided, and totally isolated from the rest of the Caribbean."[109] Stung by Cuba's rebuff, the RMC criticized Castro, claiming that his personal friendship with Bishop "had caused the Cuban

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[105] "Full Text of Speech by the Prime Minister of Barbados," *Documents on the Invasion*, p. 37.

[106] Bullard had been keeping Adams in touch with developments on Grenada through his contacts. Hoyos, *Tom Adams*, p. 114.

[107] Bish's notes.

[108] "Full Text of Speech by the Prime Minister of Barbados," *Documents on the Invasion*, p. 37.

[109] Pastor, "The Invasion of Grenada," p. 93.

leadership to take a personal and not a class approach to the developments in Grenada" and that "the Cuban's (sic) position creates an atmosphere for speedy imperialist intervention."[110] As one RMC member despaired: "almost have no militia, no social base. Only country which can help is fucking around."[111]

There was a glimmer of hope for the RMC when St. Vincent's Prime Minister Milton Cato offered to meet with Austin to "negotiate a way out of the 'tragic events' on Grenada."[112] Considering the RMC's tenuous position, Austin's twenty-four hour delay in accepting this offer is puzzling, perhaps underlining the turbulence and inexperience within the RMC; Austin eventually responded to Cato's proposal at 2:30 p.m. on Saturday, October 21. By this time Cato was attending the OECS meeting which issued a request to the U.S. to participate in a military action. Irrespective of Austin's delayed response, Cato's initiative was soundly resisted by Vincentians, his Caribbean colleagues and the U.S.[113]

Between 1:30 p.m. and 1:50 p.m. that afternoon the U.S. embassy were in telex contact with SGU who relayed an "apparent invitation" from Austin for U.S. officials to visit Grenada.[114] Austin told SGU officials that he would not oppose the departure of the students but was keen to ensure that the School remained open; he promised

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[110] Cotman, *The Gorrion Tree*, p. 219.

[111] Ibid., p. 219.

[112] Patrick E. Tyler, "The Making of an Invasion: Chronology of the Planning," *Washington Post*, October 30, 1983, p. A14. Cato "particularly wished to take positive steps to put an end to further bloodshed, as well as minimize the danger to Vincentian nationals in Grenada." "Bridgetown CANA report by Albert Brandford, 00:30 a.m. (GMT), October 22, 1983," *Unclassified FBIS - Latin America*, October 24, 1983, p. S5.

[113] Pastor, "The Invasion of Grenada," p. 93. When asked about the offer on Saturday, October 22, Cato simply replied, "I have no meeting with Gen. Austin." Tyler, "The Making of an Invasion," p. A14.

[114] Bish's notes.

that Grenadian forces would protect the School and "instructed the administrators to consolidate the student body on the main campus."[115] The RMC also issued a note stating that: "Not one American citizen has been harmed, neither has any other foreign citizen in Grenada been harmed in any way."[116] This may well have been technically true but obscured the wider picture. As Kelly recalled, on Friday an ever-growing number of people came to see him about leaving Grenada. He started to find out how many people wanted to leave and began arranging evacuation flights for Monday, October 24.[117] At 6:00 p.m. that Friday the SGU Bursar Gary Solin got in touch with the embassy to report that of 200 students that had been contacted, 34 had signed up to leave. However, he was "certain that when emboffs (embassy officers) arrive the urge to leave will snowball."[118] The embassy cabled Washington to suggest that "we will have to consider arranging charter flights or [a] sea lift for at least fifteen per cent of U.S., Canadians, and British nationals."[119]

Meeting at Foggy Bottom

At 12:00 p.m. RIG met for two hours; a political plan for the rescue of U.S. citizens and the establishment of an interim government had been composed. A number of issues were discussed; which pro-U.S. countries would be informed and

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[115] Intelligence reports offered two interpretations: "valid assurances, or a move to make it easier to hold the students hostage." CIA Memo, "Grenada Chronology 7-25 October 1983," *Declassified Documents Catalog* XIV, no. 5 (September-October 1988), document no. 002449, p.2.

[116] George Skelton and David Wood, "U.S. to Post Task Force Off Grenada," *Los Angeles Times*, October 22, 1983, section 1, p. 3.

[117] Interview with Kelly. There were about 200 Britons on Grenada but Kelly was approached by other nationalities as well as many Grenadians who had worked with the PRG.

[118] Milan Bish, secret telegram to Secretary of State, "Subject: Grenada: Welfare/Whereabouts of St. George's Medical School Students," 212328Z, October 1983, Bridgetown 06503, p. 1.

[119] Ibid., p. 1.

when, the post-intervention role of Governor-General Scoon, the formation of an interim government and the domestic and international legality of an action.

The secrecy surrounding the decisionmaking process militated against notifying allies in advance. RIG knew the unrest in Grenada provided an opportunity to "install a process where [a] government would be elected more favourable to our interests"[120] and reasoned that Governor-General Scoon would be the focus of post-intervention political authority and the creation of an interim government.[121]

The introduction of the State Department's lawyers was the result of the suggestion of Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs James Michel; Motley agreed, feeling that should an intervention occur a plausible legal justification would be advantageous. As he subsequently commented, "I didn't want nine thousand years of [post-invasion] Security Council debate."[122] The lawyers began to examine the relevant aspects of the OECS, OAS and UN Charters and also the War Powers Resolution.

With the OECS convening in Barbados that afternoon their position was considered. In Menges' opinion:

> The Caribbean leaders hesitated to suggest military action in Grenada - an ally of Cuba - unless they were certain that the United States would participate. If the United States were unwilling to join them, the best they could do would be to deplore the violence on Grenada and avoid arousing additional hostility from Cuba or the new communist faction that conrolled (sic) Grenada.
>
> At the same time, some in our government were hesitant to act unilaterally. It was my view that a collective security action was by far the most desirable for political and strategic reasons, but that if the Caribbean countries were too afraid

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[120] Interview with Johnstone.

[121] As Shultz recounts, "Tony Motley and Larry Eagleburger met with the British ambassador to Washington, Sir Oliver Wright, who provided detailed information in writing on the Grenada constitution and on the precise line of authority from the queen to the Commonwealth, the Governor-General, and the Grenada government." Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 327.

[122] Beck, *The Grenada Invasion*, p. 91.

> to ask for help, the United States had the right to act alone to protect American citizens.[123]

Menges felt that the likelihood of an OECS invitation would be increased if ambassador Bish "could tell the Caribbean leaders that the probability of U.S. military action would be much higher if they requested military action collectively."[124] It would be late that evening when word of the OECS' decision reached Washington.

Before Shultz left Washington for a weekend in Augusta, Georgia,[125] he met with Motley. Motley told his superior of the OECS meeting in session and that the OECS leaders were "out in front" and that Venezuela were unlikely to join in.[126] Both men were especially worried about the students and by this stage were "increasingly convinced we had run out of ways to accomplish a peaceful evacuation of the American students and that the situation on the ground was deteriorating into total anarchy. Conditions were ripe. . . for hostage taking."[127] Dam later explained Washington's unease:

> Our concern for their welfare was heightened by the murders, the curfew, and difficulty in getting accurate information on their well-being and future prospects. The RMC's failure to reopen the airport to allow free departures suggests that anything was possible.[128]

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[123] Menges, *Inside the NSC*, p. 75. The Caribbean nations would have been surprised if the U.S. had not helped considering their proximity, the plan to rescue Bishop and the general good relations they had with the Eastern Caribbean. Interview with Edmunds.

[124] Menges, *Inside the NSC*, p. 76.

[125] Reagan, Shultz, McFarlane, Treasury Secretary Donald Regan and former New Jersey senator Nicholas Brady left Washington D.C. late Friday afternoon for a weekend of golf at the Augusta National Golf Club just outside Atlanta. According to Shultz, the situation in Grenada was part of the reason why McFarlane accompanied them. Shultz, *Triumph and Turmoil*, p. 323.

[126] Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 328.

[127] Ibid., p. 328.

[128] "Statement of Hon. Kenneth W. Dam," U.S. Congress, *The Situation in Grenada*, p. 5.

For Motley, the question was how to quantify the students' safety; "Our mission just has to be either to get the students out, peacefully if possible, or to get 100 percent assurances that they are safe."[129] It is difficult to imagine how such a guarantee was ever possible. Motley later admitted that for him the situation was simpler; either the students were allowed to leave or the U.S. would intervene.[130] At 4:00 p.m. Reagan signed a preliminary NSDD, ordering planning to proceed, before flying to Augusta for the weekend.

At 5:00 p.m. Poindexter reconvened the CPPG. According to Menges:

> Now the tone of our discussions had shifted from whether we would act to how this could be accomplished with minimum casualties while insuring speed to avoid the likelihood of Cuban or Soviet counteraction.[131]

The State Department representatives, Motley and Johnstone, presented a revised preliminary plan of action based on the earlier RIG meeting. As yet the U.S. had not received a formal invitation from plausible authority: "An invitation from Grenada's neighbours would be of inestimable value in the diplomatic fallout that the State Department saw as inevitable after the U.S. action."[132] McFarlane, amongst others, considered this angle:

> I also instructed that we determine whether the other Caribbean states, including Dominica, Barbados, St. Kitts and Nevis, Antigua and others might be inclined to coordinate a call for assistance from the United States that would legitimize our involvement.[133]

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[129] Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 328.

[130] Interview with Motley.

[131] Menges, *Inside the NSC*, p. 76.

[132] O'Shaughnessy, *Grenada*, p. 155.

[133] Robert C. McFarlane and Zofia Smardz, *Special Trust* (New York: Cadell & Davies, 1994), p. 258.

Despite the strong support for military action amongst civilian decisionmakers the final decision between an NEO and takeover of Grenada had not been made. The JCS had previously opposed action but once they accepted that action was necessary they argued that the dispersal of students in three areas and the multiple targets that an operation would entail meant seizing the entire island.[134] As a result the JCS were instructed to plan for both eventualities; that evening CINCLANT was ordered to develop plans to include an occupation and restoration of democracy.[135] According to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger's instructions, the military were to "plan to begin the operation at the soonest possible time consistent with the maximum safety of our forces, and with the actual time needed to assemble both the forces and supplies for a successful action."[136] Vessey estimated that Tuesday, October 25, was the earliest "safe" date. Despite cautions about the need for secrecy, officials were "appalled" to learn that the lead story on CBS' Evening News was the diversion of the fleet.

That evening after the meeting Menges and North spent four and a half hours composing background and decision memoranda for the next day's NSPG meeting.[137] Poindexter reviewed them and then sent them to Augusta.

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[134] Vessey's philosophy was to minimize casualties which meant the use of overwhelming force. Interview with Weinberger. Vessey's was a typical post-Vietnam military doctrine.

[135] Marshall, "Urgent Fury," p. 33.

[136] Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, p. 78.

[137] Menges, *Inside the NSC*, p. 76.

The OECS Meeting

The meeting began after lunch at the Dover Convention Centre in Bridgetown.[138] Firstly, the Defence and Security Committee met and then the main Authority of the OECS convened. The members expressed their horror at "what had happened in Grenada over the previous few days. They felt such brutal behaviour was as unprecedented as it was unacceptable."[139] The OECS were worried about the domestic repercussions of the coup and "expressed the fear that the bloody leftist military takeover on Grenada could embolden Havana-leaning revolutionaries in their own nations."[140] As Seaga warned:

> If a whole government can be wiped out overnight either by political or military extremists and the governments of the Caribbean remain silent and passive, then no government elected by the people can be safe from madmen of one type or another who would seek to replace a government of the people, elected by the people with one selected by a chosen few of whatever nature.
>
> If we ignore the occurrence of brutal military take-overs or political over-throws of governments, we would immediately give heart to every subversive group in the region.[141]

In their formal request to the U.S. on Sunday, October 23, the leaders clearly communicated their concerns, painting a grim picture of the situation:

> [M]ilitary forces and supplies are likely to be shortly introduced to consolidate

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[138] Six of the seven OECS states were represented: Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Montserrat, St. Kitts, St. Lucia and St. Vincent. Grenada was for obvious reasons not represented. This was the first time the OECS had met in a non-member's country. It was also the first time representatives of non-member countries, Barbados and Jamaica, attended a meeting. Bish and Gillespie were also present at the Centre but did not participate in the meeting as some have suggested. Interview with Bish. Their presence there does perhaps indicate the importance of the OECS request to the U.S.

[139] Payne et al., *Grenada*, p. 149.

[140] John Quigley, "The United States Invasion of Grenada: Stranger than Fiction," *The University of Miami Inter-American Law Review* 18 (Winter 1986-1987): 306.

[141] "Statement to the Nation by the Prime Minister of Jamaica, the Rt. Hon. Edward Seaga, on Developments in Grenada, Tuesday, October 25, 1983," *Documents on the Invasion*, Item XVI, p. 69.

> the position of the regime and that country can be used as a staging post for acts of aggression against its neighbours; and that the capability of the Grenadian armed forces is already at a level of sophistication and size far beyond the internal needs of that country.[142]

Most felt that as long as the RMC endured it could "undermine political, social and economic stability and would have extremely dangerous consequences for the preservation of peace and security in the OECS sub-region as a whole."[143] Something had to be done and without delay.

> The participants were unanimous and quickly reached a decision:
>
> Within a half hour, we all knew we were going to go into Grenada and do something. . . Everyone came with their minds made up, without any discussion, that we were going to go in.[144]

As Braveboy-Wagner comments, the OECS was a small, coherent group with leaders who were well acquainted and of similar political persuasion. Their decision to use force was as much personal preference as any rational ends-means decision.[145] The leaders choice was made easier by the fact that regional public opinion generally favoured some sort of decisive action as well. Although the OECS had the inclination to act they did not have the muscle; as Charles recalls, "we sat back and said 'But

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[142] "Statement of Hon. Kenneth W. Dam, Deputy Secretary of State, Accompanied by Maj. Gen. George Crist, U.S. Marine Corps," U.S. Congress, *U.S. Military Actions in Grenada*, p. 10.

[143] "Organization of Eastern Caribbean States Request For U.S. Assistance in Grenada," October 23, 1983, *American Foreign Policy Current Documents* (AFPCD), document no. 656 (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1983), p. 1397.

[144] Higbie, *Eugenia*, p. 228. The only opposition to military action from within the OECS came from Lester Bird, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Antigua and Barbuda, who abstained from the OECS vote. However, when ambassador Bish learnt of this he phoned the Antiguan Prime Minister Vere Bird Sr., Lester's father, to explain the correctness of a military solution. It is reasonable to assume that Bish's intervention influenced Vere Bird's subsequent decision to withdraw the abstention vote. Interview with Bish. It seems that negotiations were half-heartedly discussed and the idea of the OAS as a peacekeeper suggested but ruled out as it was too time-consuming and almost certain that the Latin nations would oppose action. Braveboy-Wagner, *The Caribbean in World Affairs*, p. 184.

[145] Ibid., p. 189.

how do we go in? What do we have? I have ten policemen, you have ten, you have twenty, and so on, it didn't add up to one hundred'."[146] The OECS knew they needed the support of a larger nation; Britain, Canada, France and Venezuela were considered but the U.S. were the most likely to help it was decided.[147] Adams, Charles and Compton had all discussed the possibility of military assistance with U.S. officials in the past few days[148] and now "the diversion of the U.S. fleet provided a dramatic demonstration of U.S. seriousness and of the availability of a military option."[149] Charles confirmed this, "we asked America because they already had ships in the area because they'd come close to [unintelligible]; they had to evacuate the people."[150]

The situation in Grenada forced the OECS to confront unanswered security questions such as what constituted a threat and how a security arrangement could function in the region. Issuing an invitation to a superpower was possibly a precedent-setting measure that reinforced the belief that [in times of crisis] Eastern

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[146] Higbie, *Eugenia*, p. 228. St. Kitts had only recently gained independence and had no forces and the FCO had previously explained the position of Montserrat as a British dependency: "it is the intention of the Colony of Montserrat to withhold its participation in respect of Foreign Affairs and Defence and Security matters of the Organization, to the extent that any decisions of the Organization or any committee or institution thereof may require action to be taken by the Government of Montserrat inconsistent with the views, directives, policies and obligations of Her Majesty's Government of the United Kingdom." Gilmore, *The Grenada Intervention*, p. 87.

[147] Adams later claimed that the "preference would have been for our traditional protector, Britain, to have taken a or the leading role in restoring democracy." U.K. Parliament. House of Commons. Foreign Affairs Committee, Second Report. *Grenada* (London: HMSO, 1984), p. xi.

[148] In fact, Charles had dropped in on Bish, who was in another room at the convention centre, to push for military help again during a recess of the OECS meeting. Higbie, *Eugenia*, p. 228.

[149] Pastor, "The Invasion of Grenada," p. 93.

[150] "Grenada Invasion/ Beirut Debate," *The MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour*, transcript no. 2107, October 25, 1983, p. 6.

Caribbean security relied on the involvement of extra-regional powers. However, this was an unprecedented problem and called for a commensurate solution.

The legal aspects of an intervention did not concern the OECS, indeed several leaders were lawyers by vocation. According to the OECS' Director General, Vaughan Lewis, they knew the legal definition of self-defence was subjective and concepts of humanitarian intervention disputable.[151] Subsequently, under Article 8[152] of the OECS Treaty, the leaders voted to:

> take action for collective defence and the preservation of peace and security against external aggression by requesting assistance from friendly countries to provide transport, logistic support, and additional military personnel to assist the efforts of the OECS to stabilize this most grave situation within the Eastern Caribbean.
>
> The authority of the OECS wishes to establish a peace keeping force with the assistance of friendly neighbouring states to restore on Grenada conditions of tranquillity and order so as to prevent further loss of life and abuses of human rights pending the restoration of constitutional government.[153]

As it was considered that Grenada had no government, Governor-General Scoon, who had been retained by the PRG as a figurehead, could usefully act as the lawful authority in Grenada.[154] Probably to mask their true intentions, the OECS voted in a package of political and economic sanctions which included no official contact with

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[151] Vaughan Lewis, "Small States, Eastern Caribbean Security, and the Grenada Intervention," in Heine (ed.), *A Revolution Aborted*, p. 260.

[152] Paragraph four of Article 8 reads: "The Defence and Security Committee shall have responsibility for coordinating the efforts of Member States for collective defence and the preservation of peace and security against external aggression and for the development of close ties among the Member States of the Organisation in matters of external defence and security, including measures to combat the activities of mercenaries, operating with or without the support of internal or national elements, in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations." Gilmore, *The Grenada Intervention*, p. 81.

[153] "Organization of Eastern Caribbean States Request," *AFPCD*, p. 1398.

[154] According to Hoyos, Adams sent two emissaries to see Scoon that Friday and he was "persuaded to give his approval to what the OECS intended to do, but indicated that he would issue a formal invitation when it was safe to do so." Hoyos, *Tom Adams*, p. 116.

the RMC, no further issuing of currency to Grenada by the Eastern Caribbean Currency Authority and the cutting of all air and sea links.[155] This last measure made any evacuation operation even less feasible.

Having voted, the OECS requested that Adams attend the meeting. The Barbadian Prime Minister arrived around dusk via a back entrance. The OECS then issued an invitation to Barbados to join them. Another late addition to the meeting was Jamaica's Prime Minister Seaga who had arrived in Barbados earlier that day with the Second-in-Command of the Jamaican Defense Force Colonel Ken Barnes. Seaga was unaware of the OECS decision and proposed a naval blockade of Grenada by the U.S. and Venezuela "in order to preclude the Cubans from augmenting their personnel on the island or taking [any] pre-emptive action."[156] Once apprised of the OECS' earlier decision he agreed that a blockade was superfluous. Seaga then also received an invitation from the OECS for Jamaican participation. The meeting ended with troop numbers being settled and planning commencing and Adams being deputed to inform the U.S. and Great Britain of the decision.

Between 9:30-11:00 p.m. Charles, Adams and Seaga met with Bish, Flower and Gillespie[157] at Adams' residence. Now the U.S. was formally invited to participate in a multinational force "to depose the outlaw regime on Grenada by any means."[158] Several other points were addressed during the evening. The leaders explained that

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[155] Gilmore, *The Grenada Intervention*, p. 92.

[156] Bish's notes.

[157] One account reports that Gillespie was informed of the OECS' decision immediately after the meeting closed by Charles in an anteroom. Don Oberdorfer, "Reagan Sought to End Cuban 'Intervention'," *Washington Post*, November 6, 1983, p. A21.

[158] Ibid., p. A21.

Article 8 could be used to legitimize an intervention. They cautioned that their decision was not public knowledge and they had no intention of announcing it yet.[159] However, Charles stressed that the invitation was official and formal and "it is not repeat not a tentative one to be later withdrawn or denied."[160] Great Britain, France and "others" would be asked but if the U.S. acceded to the request the OECS would not wait for "latecomers."[161]

With the CARICOM meeting due the next day, Saturday, October 22, Adams and Charles feared that CARICOM was "leaky" and hoped the U.S. would reach a decision prior to the meeting. Adams had already decided not to attend the CARICOM meeting and both leaders were pessimistic about the chances of Trinidad joining them; Adams remarked that holding the meeting in Port-of-Spain was "simply a gesture to satisfy that country's vanity."[162] He informed the Americans that the OECS would not cancel the CARICOM meeting as this would be a negative signal that could jeopardize intervention plans; with low expectations of anything useful resulting from the meeting, it was decided that other issues would be placed on the agenda rather than simply intervention.[163] The discussions then drew to a close.

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[159] Interview with Bish. Although news of the actual invitation had not been revealed, it was no secret in the Caribbean that something was afoot. According to Tyler, "opponents. . . were leaking details of the proposed invasion from private council chambers to the news media and to supporters of Grenada's leftist government." Even Charles let slip to newsmen after the OECS meeting that "the range of options under consideration for Grenada included military intervention." Tyler, "The Making of an Invasion," p. A1.

[160] Interview with Bish.

[161] Ibid.

[162] Ibid.

[163] Ibid.

Sometime between 12:00 a.m. and 1:00 a.m. DCM Flower drafted a report of the meeting which was signed by Bish and Gillespie and then cabled to Washington.

Wake Up the President

The news in Washington was received by Motley who instructed Gillespie to inform the OECS that a written request would be required by the U.S. Motley contacted Poindexter around 1:00 a.m. and he relayed the message to McFarlane. Simultaneously Bush, Weinberger, Vessey, Baker, Meese and McMahon were summoned to the White House. At 2:45 a.m. in Augusta, McFarlane called Shultz and the two met in the Eisenhower cottage to discuss the OECS cable which "basically gave the OECS states analysis of the situation and stated their very strong feeling that they must do something about it on Grenada and their feeling that they were not able to do it on their own, and so they asked if we would help them."[164] The OECS advocated swift action to deny the RMC and Cubans time to prepare their defences or take hostages and recommended Sunday, October 23, as the best time to act.[165] The OECS cable was the logical conclusion of the previous few days communications between Washington and the Eastern Caribbean; as McFarlane later recalled, "It was the call we had expected."[166]

At 3:35 a.m. in Washington, Bush chaired a meeting of top advisers joined by Shultz and McFarlane on a secure conference call line from Augusta. Shultz confirmed that the OECS had issued a request and he apparently urged that action be

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[164] "Secretary Shultz's News Conference, October 25, 1983," *Department of State Bulletin* 83 (December 1983): 70.

[165] O'Shaughnessy, *Grenada*, p. 158.

[166] McFarlane and Smardz, *Special Trust*, p. 261. Whilst the request was expected the fervour of it surprised some in Washington. Interview with Johnstone.

taken on Sunday, October 23, as the OECS had suggested.[167] Weinberger expressed his opposition to any rushed operation, emphasizing that there was not enough available information for an operation yet and that Vessey had advised him that Tuesday, October 25, was the earliest "safe" date for an intervention. Nonetheless, it was agreed that "the ships heading for Grenada should be deployed for possible action, but without arousing suspicion."[168] Bush was worried that this would be an all-English-speaking operation and suggested that the help of Venezuela should be enlisted.[169] Although Weinberger had opposed a Sunday operation it now appeared certain that a military operation would be undertaken in the next few days. Weinberger's comments confirmed Shultz's fears; in a separate conversation with Motley after the meeting at 4:30 a.m., Shultz stated:

> We had to move quickly, before this window of opportunity closed. We couldn't let the Pentagon drag out our preparations until it was too late, which I feared they might do.[170]

President Reagan was woken sometime between 4:30 a.m. and 5:00 a.m. and appraised of developments by McFarlane and Shultz at 5:15 a.m. Reagan had met the OECS leaders in Barbados in April 1982 and was apparently impressed and moved by their request.[171] McFarlane presented the case for acting:

> The United States is seen as responsible for providing leadership in defense of Western interests wherever they may be threatened. . . For us to be asked to help and to refuse would have a very damaging effect on the credibility of the United States and your own commitment to the defense of freedom and democracy.[172]

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[167] Beck, *The Grenada Invasion*, p. 114.

[168] Quigley, "The United States Invasion of Grenada," p. 341.

[169] Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 329.

[170] Ibid., p. 330.

[171] Interview with Fontaine.

[172] McFarlane and Smardz, *Special Trust*, p. 261.

Reagan asked McFarlane how long the Pentagon needed to prepare a "rescue mission." When he told him that the JCS believed it was feasible in forty-eight hours Reagan simply replied "Do it."[173] McFarlane described Reagan's response as "very unequivocal. . . He couldn't wait."[174] Reagan later explained, in terms similar to McFarlane's, his support for an intervention:

> We couldn't say no to those six small countries who had asked us for help. We'd have no credibility or standing in the Americas if we did. If it ever became known, which I knew it would, that we had turned them down, few of our friends around the world would trust us completely as an ally again.[175]

The secure conference phone-line was reopened at 6:00 a.m. Reagan spoke with Weinberger and Bush; Weinberger restated his belief that there was insufficient intelligence for an operation yet but Reagan was not deterred.[176] Reagan felt that Bush's suggestion to approach Venezuela would only delay the operation and increase the possibility of a leak.[177] He then approved military planning for an operation, most probably for Tuesday, October 25. In response to the OECS request,

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[173] Reagan, *An American Life*, p. 450.

[174] Cannon, *President Reagan*, p. 441.

[175] Reagan, *An American Life*, p. 451. Given the concerns over the students already expressed by the administration, the students were undoubtedly discussed and played a role in Reagan's decision. This statement was perhaps more a reason for accepting the invitation.

[176] In his memoir Weinberger affirmed that Reagan "was aware of the difficulties, but generally seemed to me to be willing to accept the risks. He urged us to continue developing the detailed plans." Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, p. 77.

[177] Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 329. The secrecy aspect of planning was a high priority; Reagan felt that "Cuba was near enough that with forewarning it could send troops to the island in a hurry. If there were any leaks, the result could be war between us and Cuba. . . and the taking of hundreds of Americans as hostage." Reagan, *An American Life*, p. 450. Reagan's memory of Vietnam provided him with another reason for secrecy. He felt that the post-Vietnam syndrome would cause Congress to oppose any use of force abroad; "I suspected that, if we told the leaders of Congress about the operation, even under terms of strictest confidentiality, there would be some who would leak it to the press together with the prediction that Grenada was going to become 'another Vietnam'." Ibid., p. 451.

Reagan told Bush to "tell Mrs. Charles that we recognize the problem, we'll be glad to respond, and we'll stay in close touch with her while we get busy planning."[178] Having completed the call Shultz advised that Reagan call back and ask General Vessey how many troops would be required and that "after he has told you, Mr. President, I suggest that you tell him to double it."[179] Shultz felt that this would underline Reagan's determination to act and, along with the order to the State and Defense Department to "move beyond a 'warning order' status and prepare for a noncombatant evacuation order, including an invasion plan," would keep the Defense Department moving.[180] A SSG meeting was scheduled for 9:00 a.m. that morning in Washington; the presidential group decided to remain in Augusta and keep in touch by phone to avoid raising suspicion and maintain the secrecy surrounding planning so far in Washington.

For those at Augusta the day's drama was not over. Around 2:15 p.m. an armed unemployed pipefitter named Charles Harris crashed his truck through a side entrance to the golf club and took seven people hostage, including two of Reagan's entourage, in the pro shop. Out on the course the president's group had reached the sixteenth green when an armoured limousine appeared and they were ushered inside. Uncertain if Harris was acting alone the Secret Service issued the "Launch Nighthawk Two" command and within ten minutes an evacuation helicopter was hovering overhead.[181] Harris demanded to talk to Reagan; the president made several unsuccessful attempts

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[178] McFarlane and Smardz, *Special Trust*, p. 262. The OECS leaders were not told that the U.S. had accepted their invitation until the eve of the intervention.

[179] Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 329.

[180] Ibid., p. 329.

[181] Ibid., p. 330.

to talk to Harris by phone but he insisted on talking with Reagan in person. This was obviously impossible and Reagan's party was escorted to the Eisenhower cottage at the course. The situation ended peacefully a few hours later when Harris was persuaded to surrender.

Saturday, October 22

The SSG was convened in Washington at 9:00 a.m. by Vice President George Bush.[182] President Reagan and Secretary Shultz participated via conference phone from Augusta for five minutes. The meeting began with an overview and update of the situation in Grenada; the CIA had "continued to receive unconfirmed reports that Coard had been killed" and "conflicting reports about who was actually in charge indicated that the power struggle was not over."[183] Essentially, intelligence indicated that the RMC were an unsavoury bunch who were more hard-line than the PRG and demonstrated no pro-US tendencies, or the possibility of them, and that it was unlikely relations would improve in the foreseeable future.[184]

The State Department representatives then focused on the political aspects of an intervention. A PERT chart time-line was distributed; this was a detailed outline of actions to be done up until the moment an intervention was launched.[185] As with previous high-level meetings the Iran hostage analogy was invoked. One participant at least "had a real fear that it could be a very bad situation. Desert One all over

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[182] Present were Poindexter, North, Menges, McMahon, Clarridge, Eagleburger, Motley, Weinberger, Vessey and Ikle.

[183] CIA Memo, "Grenada Chronology 7-25 October 1983," p. 3.

[184] Interview with Johnstone.

[185] Speaking hyperbolically, Johnstone recalled that it contained "thousands of items." Ibid.

again."[186] Eagleburger then argued that doing nothing would cause the U.S. to lose face in the region, particularly Central America, at a crucial time.[187] Although the safety of U.S. citizens was a prime concern it is important not to underestimate the influence of such Cold War thinking.

The OECS' oral request received the previous night was also discussed. It was decided that ambassador Frank McNeil would be dispatched to Barbados to "make certain that the Caribbean leaders had in fact a common position and would secure from them a formal written invitation."[188] McNeil would be accompanied by Two-star General George Crist who "would help signal to the Caribbean leadership Washington's serious intent and in the event that the military option were taken, 'make sure that the [Caribbean] flags' were brought in early."[189] Washington realized that without an OECS request they would have to reevaluate the level of anticipated threat to the students against the prospect of a unilateral operation: a further indication of threat, perhaps the shooting of a student, would be needed.[190] Thus decisionmaking was guided to an extent by the importance of a potential multilateral intervention. As Beck suggests, the CARICOM meeting scheduled for that evening in Trinidad was also probably discussed; CARICOM was "an international

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[186] Ed Magnuson, Douglas Brew, Bernard Diederich and William McWhirter, "D-Day in Grenada," *Time*, November 7, 1983, p. 19.

[187] Reynold A. Burrowes, *Revolution and Rescue in Grenada: An Account of the U.S.-Caribbean Invasion* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988) p.139. Eagleburger admitted that "resolve against the communist threat was the proper 'button' to push." Beck, *The Grenada Invasion*, p. 125.

[188] Beck, *The Grenada Invasion*, p. 135. McNeil was ambassador-in-residence at Tufts University at the time.

[189] Ibid., p. 135. A cable was sent to Adams, Charles and Seaga informing them of McNeil and Crist's arrival, explaining that "the purpose of this trip would be to coordinate our response to this fast [breaking] situation." Bish's notes.

[190] Interview with Johnstone.

organization larger, older, and better recognized than the OECS, though not a regional security organization, [that] might decide to request American assistance."[191] The SSG must have been aware of ambassador Bish's report of his meeting with Tom Adams on Thursday, October 20, when Adams had told Bish he believed CARICOM would not support an intervention, with particular opposition expected from Prime Minister Forbes Burnham of Guyana. Guyana was the only other undemocratic regime in CARICOM and the PRG had been a socialist ally of Burnham; military intervention, especially by the U.S., was not a precedent Burnham wanted to endorse.

Discussions proceeded with the military aspects of an intervention. Weinberger and Vessey insisted that not enough was known about the numbers and ability of the Grenadian and Cuban opposition they would face and that more time was needed to gather intelligence. Consequently, Weinberger got approval for the use of Navy SEAL forces to collect pre-landing intelligence.[192] Despite their obvious reservations the JCS was ordered to continue planning on the basis of a "go" order.[193]

The draft NSDD which had been circulated contained three objectives:

> ensuring the safety of American citizens on Grenada; in conjunction with OECS friendly government participants, the restoration of democratic government on Grenada; [and] elimination of current, and prevention of further, Cuban intervention on Grenada.[194]

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[191] Beck, *The Grenada Invasion*, p. 133.

[192] Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, p. 77. SEAL stands for the navy's elite "sea, air and land" special forces.

[193] "Britain's Grenada Shut-Out," *The Economist*, March 10, 1984, p. 22.

[194] Bennett, "Grenada: Anatomy," p. 74.

The first and last objectives were not unrelated; theoretically, if the RMC had been pro-U.S. and anti-Cuban the students would not have been perceived to be in such danger and the Cubans would have had to leave.[195] The pros and cons of going beyond an NEO were discussed with Bush querying the NSDD objective of restoring democracy. Reagan's response was succinct: "Well, if we've got to go there, we might as well do all that needs to be done."[196] Another participant warned Reagan that there would be "a lot of harsh political reaction" to an intervention. Reagan was not dissuaded; "I know that. I accept that."[197]

A perfunctory discussion of the applicability of the War Powers Resolution[198] to an intervention concluded that any action would be finished long before Congress became involved. A final issue was the need for absolute secrecy. Some SSG members had been dismayed that the papers were already carrying report of the diversion of the fleet towards Grenada.[199] Measures were authorized to deceive the Cubans and Grenadians.[200] The presidential party would remain in Augusta as planned to avoid attracting attention by returning early. U.S. allies would remain in

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[195] Interview with Johnstone.

[196] Bennett, "Grenada: Anatomy," p. 74.

[197] Magnuson et al., "D-Day in Grenada," p. 19. Speaking after the intervention about the negative European reaction Dam said, "We realized that the reaction would be on the critical side. We certainly did not expect enthusiasm about it." U.S. Congress, *The Situation in Grenada*, p. 16.

[198] The War Powers Resolution passed by Congress in November 1973 required the president to consult with Congress before committing troops to combat and stipulated that if troops were used they would have to be withdrawn within 90 days unless Congress approved the deployment. See Michael Rubner, "The Reagan Administration, the 1973 War Powers Resolution, and the Invasion of Grenada," *Political Science Quarterly* 100, no. 4 (Winter 1985-86), pp. 627-47.

[199] One who was not was Motley. He pointed out that troop movements in Central America were a regular occurrence. Considering the U.S.' post-Vietnam military malaise and the image of Reagan as all-talk, Motley felt that the "leak" was not so detrimental. Telephone interview with Motley, September 25, 1995.

[200] Oberdorfer, "Reagan Sought," p. A21.

the dark as Reagan later explained; "We did not even inform the British beforehand, because I thought it would increase the possibility of a leak at our end and elevate the risk to our students."[201] Secrecy within the administration was just as important; from the start Shultz had insisted that the situation be "close held." He had established the ground rules and cut out all manner of people who would normally be involved in the decisionmaking process.[202] One prime example was Larry Speakes who was only informed on the morning of the intervention.

The SSG also decided, at Weinberger's suggestion, that the media would be excluded from the operation for the first forty-eight hours.[203] The official reason given for this exclusion was the need to preserve the secrecy of the operation and ensure the element of surprise and also the inability to guarantee the safety of non-combatants. Another reason is what Block and Mungham describe as the "Vietnam legacy" and the "Falklands inheritance."[204] Amalgamating the perceived lessons of Vietnam and the Falklands, Washington decided that "live television coverage of

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[201] Reagan, *An American Life*, p. 451. When two British embassy officials met with the Deputy Director of Politico-Military Affairs Jonathan Howe at the State Department later that day they were only assured that the Britain would be consulted by Washington before any final decision was made. Geoffrey Smith, *Reagan and Thatcher* (London: Bodley Head, 1990), p. 128. Likewise when the Canadian ambassador met Eagleburger and Dam at a social event that evening no mention of a possible intervention was made. Thomas Walkon and Charlotte Montgomery, "Canada and the Grenada Invasion," *Toronto Globe and Mail*, November 17, 1983, p. 3.

[202] Telephone interview with Motley.

[203] Interview with Motley. As Pearson points out, this was unusual because "deceptions generally persist only until an operation is underway. At that moment, the intentions of the source are obviously made clear, but this knowledge provides little benefit to the target audience since the deception has already given the source the advantage of surprise that was the purpose of the deception in the first place. During Operation Urgent Fury, to the contrary, much of the deception took place after the operation was history, and thus well after it could have served any practical military value with respect to the invasion itself." David Eric Pearson, "The Betrayal of Truth and Trust by Government: Deception as Process and Practice" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1988), p. 448.

[204] Marcia Block and Geoff Mungham, "The Military, The Media and the Invasion of Grenada," *Contemporary Crises* 13 (June 1989): 91.

casualties and civilian destruction in the early stages was to be avoided, and almost all press commentary which might be critical was to be postponed."[205] As with previous administrations the Reagan one was not entirely happy with the media's coverage of foreign policy; as Shultz complained, "[t]hese days, in the advocacy journalism that's been adopted, it seems as though the reporters are always against us and so they're trying to screw things up, and when you're trying to conduct a military operation you don't need that."[206] Deciding to exclude the media was one of the easier choices made.

By the conclusion of the meeting at 11:30 a.m. it was apparent that a consensus had been reached. As with other decisionmaking meetings during this period there was a noticeable absence of anyone arguing against intervention; the Department of Defense may have wanted more time to gather intelligence, State interpreted this as unwillingness to act, but there is no evidence that they actively opposed intervention. This pattern is partly explained by the intentionally small number of officials involved which automatically limited the chance of opposition.[207] They obviously also shared similar political beliefs although some were noticeably more hard-line than others. In general it appears that different opinions were sought, points of disagreement discussed and everyone allowed to have a say before a decision was made. The seeming lack of opposition was also indicative of the fact that Washington felt it had a fair idea, rightly or wrongly, of what was happening in Grenada and that they had to act; framed in these terms there was, in the words of one official, "not much of a

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[205] George H. Quester, "Grenada and the News Media," in Dunn and Watson (eds.) *American Intervention in Grenada*, p. 119.

[206] Pearson, "The Betrayal of Truth and Trust," p. 228.

[207] Ibid., p. 228.

decision to be made."[208] As Dam stated; "Inaction would have increased. . . [the] dangers, including the possibility of a hostage situation, and made any subsequent efforts even more costly."[209]

The SSG meeting marked the point at which most of those "in the loop" on Grenada believed that military action was necessary and likely.[210] The final decision to intervene had not been made yet but during the SSG meeting Reagan had made a "75 percent" commitment to action.[211] At 11:45 a.m. McFarlane met Reagan and Shultz at the ninth green of Augusta to update them on the situation. At 12:45 p.m. Shultz conferred with the State Department by secure phone.

Soon after the SSG meeting Weinberger met with the JCS at the Pentagon to review planning. An initial planning conference for a full operation and evacuation had been held that morning at CINCLANT headquarters in Norfolk, Virginia. Weinberger told the JCS to "double whatever CINCLANT says he needs."[212] This measure reflected Weinberger's underlying philosophy from Vietnam that if there was no intention of winning the operation should not be done; if something was to be done more troops than are strictly necessary should be used, it should be done swiftly and with clear objectives.[213]

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[208] Telephone interview with former Department of Defense official.

[209] "Statement of Hon. Kenneth W. Dam," U.S. Congress, *The Situation in Grenada*, p. 5.

[210] Telephone interview with Edwin Meese, January 10, 1995. According to one official at the SSG meeting, "Everyone was gung-ho." Magnuson et al., "D-Day in Grenada," p. 19.

[211] "Britain's Grenada Shut-Out," p. 22. Reagan had accepted the OECS offer and dispatched McNeil to Barbados, ordered the JCS to proceed with planning for full-scale operation, implemented secrecy measures and acknowledged and accepted the political fallout.

[212] Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, p. 77.

[213] Interview with Weinberger.

Back on Barbados

On Saturday morning in Barbados ambassador Bish met with Adams, Compton, Seaga, St. Kitts-Nevis Prime Minister Kennedy Simmonds, Montserrat's Chief Minister John Osbourne and Barbadian Foreign Minister Louis Tull.[214] The leaders again pressed for quick action. Bish underlined that Washington was still studying the possibility of an intervention and even if the U.S. did act they could only remain in Grenada temporarily.[215] Seaga and Compton repeated that an early decision would be helpful; Seaga needed six hours to mobilize his armed forces and Compton was concerned about what he should tell Chambers who was unaware of the pace and direction of U.S.-OECS discussions and the strong possibility of intervention.[216] The leaders then discussed the forthcoming CARICOM meeting in Trinidad. They warned Bish of Chambers' "unpredictability" and Guyanese "untrustworthiness."[217] Adams also pointed out that Belize was unlikely to participate as British consent was required before Prime Minister George Price could make any military decisions.[218]

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[214] The other two OECS leaders, Charles and Bird, had already left for Port-of-Spain. Interview with Bish.

[215] Washington feared getting bogged down in a long occupation operation to restore democracy. Ironically the OECS feared this would happen too and believed that if the U.S. acceded to their request they should hand over Grenada to the OECS as soon as possible after victory had been secured, one leader suggested forty-eight hours, and allow the restoration of democracy to be a predominantly Eastern Caribbean affair. Interview with Bish. As it transpired, the last U.S. forces involved in Urgent Fury left Grenada on December 15. Three hundred "support personnel" remained, including the 1st Psychological operations Battalion. It was June 12, 1984, when the last U.S. peace-keeping troops departed. Vijay Tiwathia, *The Grenada War: Anatomy of a Low-Intensity Conflict* (New Delhi: Lancer International, 1987), p. 190.

[216] Bish's notes.

[217] Ibid.

[218] Adams' prediction was fulfilled later that day when Price met with Adams and "indicated that he did not wish to participate." "Full Text of Speech by the Prime Minister of Barbados," *Documents on the Invasion*, p. 38. Belize also had an ongoing border dispute with Guatemala and were dependent on the British military presence in Belize for their security.

Adams suggested that the CARICOM meeting be prolonged to detain the media who were becoming increasingly suspicious that something was afoot.[219] Concerned about the U.S.' noncommittal stance, and aware that two embassy officials were due to visit Grenada that day, Adams advised Bish that the U.S. should have no contact with Austin as it would only legitimize him.[220]

Ambassador Bish clearly favoured action and urged the Eastern Caribbean leaders to take the lead in advocating action but the wily Adams knew that the "political costs" were too great for the leaders without a U.S. guarantee of action.[221] This, of course, Bish was not authorized to provide them with. The ambassador later cabled Washington recommending that "to stop the carnage and spread of communism I recommend that you positively support the call for help by our friends and neighbours."[222] Motley instructed Bish to be careful and work closely with the OECS because it was *their* action.[223]

Whilst the ambassador met the leaders the embassy was making final arrangements for Kurze and Flohr's visit to Grenada. They would be accompanied by the British Deputy High Commissioner David Montgomery. A last minute problem was encountered when RMC representative Major Leon Cornwall contacted Bish and attempted to delay the flight until the next day, Sunday, October 23, and have the diplomats stay for two days. Bish reported back to Washington that Cornwall "said

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[219] Interview with Bish.

[220] Bish's notes.

[221] Ibid.

[222] Ibid.

[223] Ibid. Emphasis added.

to please say that they have the best intentions of cooperating with your seeing the Americans here and can best facilitate it this way."[224] Having had the flight turned away once, on Wednesday, October 19, any further delays were unacceptable and the U.S. was insistent that the visit be that same day. The embassy contacted SGU's Solin to try and remedy the situation; Bourne later recalled:

> I called New York and talked to [Chancellor] Modica who had been keeping in close touch with Washington and the U.S. ambassador in Barbados. . . He immediately got on the phone to Maj. Stroude and finally got him to agree that we should let the American diplomats come at once.[225]

Bourne telexed the embassy at 11:15 a.m. to report that the problem had been resolved and the flight could proceed as planned.

Visiting the Students

The diplomats flight left Barbados at midday, arriving in Grenada forty-five minutes later. Kurze and Flohr's instructions were "to learn more of what was going on; to check out the situation and morale at the Medical School; to talk to other American citizens as possible; to impress on those whom. . . [they] met the wider implications of the RMC's actions."[226] Montgomery similarly was to check on British citizens and also meet with the Governor-General. On arrival the threesome noticed an anti-aircraft gun emplacement at the end of the runway and PRA soldiers on the roof of the terminal building with guns trained on them. Unaware of their destination the group were escorted by armed soldiers directly to SGU in two cars, the

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[224] Milan Bish, secret telegram to Secretary of State, "Subject: Grenada: First Telex Contact of the Day with Medical Students, 0805-0845," 221539Z, October 1983, Bridgetown 06517, pp. 1-3.

[225] Geoffrey Bourne, "Revolution, Intervention and Nutrition: What Happened in Grenada," *Nutrition Today* (January/February 1985): 21.

[226] Kurze letter, August 20, 1995.

Americans in one and Montgomery in the other. During the journey Kurze observed that the streets were empty; "It was an eerie atmosphere, with an obvious RMC show of strength/ 'we are in full control' effort behind it."[227]

On arriving at SGU Kurze and Flohr met with Bourne for approximately an hour whilst Montgomery waited with his car outside.[228] Bourne had hoped that:

> once these officials realized that the students and faculty were in no danger and had also a chance to see the political direction in which Austin wanted to move it would be clear an invasion was entirely unwarranted.[229]

After leaving SGU the Americans were driven to the Ross Point Inn to check in; Montgomery meanwhile joined John Kelly and toured the island checking on British citizens and seeing how many wanted to leave.

Kurze and Flohr visited the SGU's Grand Anse campus[230] and addressed the students at 6:00 p.m. The diplomats problem was that they could not shout "everybody evacuate" because they did not know how feasible an evacuation was and also could not promise that Washington would actually get them out.[231] Isolated on Grenada, 99.9 percent of the students were oblivious of Grenadian politics and the extent of the crisis and regional uproar.[232] Kurze emphasized the outrage in the

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[227] Ibid. As Gilmore concludes, "the RMC was through the instrumentalities of repression available to it, in effective control of the entire territory of the state within the meaning of international law." Gilmore, *The Grenada Intervention*, p. 73.

[228] Montgomery recalled that after about five minutes groups of somewhat scared students appeared out of nowhere all wanting to ask him questions, wanting to know what was happening as they had no idea. Interview with Montgomery.

[229] Peter Bourne, "Was the U.S. Invasion Necessary?," p. 1.

[230] Flohr visited SGU's other campus, True Blue, the following morning. She also arranged to meet with about 150 students who lived off-campus in the same area as Bourne at Bourne's house at 7:00 a.m. that morning. Bourne, "Revolution, Intervention and Nutrition," p. 23.

[231] Kurze letter, August 20, 1995. Although Kurze felt that evacuation was a possibility, Flohr believed that whilst an evacuation was technically feasible there was no way out for the students under the present conditions. Telephone interview with Linda Flohr, December 19, 1994.

[232] Telephone interview with Peter Bourne, September 6, 1995.

Eastern Caribbean and their calls for the U.S. to "do something." He also felt it imperative "to impress on people our view that just lifting the curfew [on Monday, October 24,] would not stabilize the situation. Radicals had taken power. Where would it end?"[233] Kurze and Flohr had attempted to impress upon the students what a "hot" situation they were part of and reassured them that they should remain calm. They did not encourage the students to leave simply because there was no way out presently without the RMC's cooperation.

News of the diversion of the U.S. fleet and the scheduled OECS and CARICOM meetings had made the RMC increasingly agitated. Cornwall issued a notice commandeering vehicles and instructing owners to deliver them to Tanteen pasture, Grenville or Sauteurs by 12:00 p.m. that day. Ominously, the notice warned that "any one who resist in any way or another this directive of the RMC will be dealth (sic) with in the strickest (sic) manner."[234] At 2:30 p.m. RFG broadcast a mobilization order for the militia "in view of the threat facing Grenada."[235] Such announcements were being monitored back in Washington and could only have increased decisionmakers concerns.

Continuing the RMC's conciliatory line, Pearls airport was to be opened on Monday, October 24, at 6:00 a.m. and the curfew would be reduced to 8:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m.[236] At 6:40 p.m. that evening Stroude read out the RMC's "Statement of Intention" on RFG. He announced that a new cabinet would be established within ten

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[233] Kurze letter, August 20, 1995.

[234] Revolutionary Military Council, *Notice From The R.M.C.*, October 22, 1983.

[235] Tyler, "The Making of an Invasion," p. A14.

[236] *Grenada: Background and Facts*, p. 4.

to fourteen days, "ensuring that all social classes and interests in our country are represented."[237] More promptly:

> efforts would be made to immediately explain the real situation in Grenada to the many countries and organizations, as well as to our Caribbean neighbours, to counter the lies being told in the foreign press. Efforts made recently to better relations with the United States government would continue.'[238]

Additionally it was stated that all SGU students should be treated with the "utmost consideration" by the PRA.[239] Whatever Grenadians made of this it was apparent that there was a difference of opinion between Bourne and the U.S. diplomats. Bourne had already met with General Austin and believed he had established a good dialogue and with the arrival of Kurze and Flohr thought that a peaceful resolution was possible;[240] in his eyes this announcement was "very encouraging."[241] Contrastingly, Kurze's interpretation was that "it was bullshit, farcical, really. They were stalling for time."[242] Whichever interpretation was most accurate, the broadcast conveyed the image of an RMC desperately scrambling to preserve their tenuous position.

Also that Saturday Cuba clarified their position. In a message to ambassador Rizo, Castro ruled out evacuation as "highly demoralizing and dishonourable for our country in the eyes of world opinion."[243] Cuban personnel should strengthen their

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[237] Adkin, *Urgent Fury*, p. 85.

[238] Ibid., p. 85.

[239] Beck, *The Grenada Invasion*, p. 142.

[240] Telephone interview with Peter Bourne.

[241] Kwitny, *Endless Enemies*, p. 414.

[242] Ibid., p. 414.

[243] "Statement by the Cuban Party and Revolutionary Government on the imperialist intervention of Grenada," in Nora Madan (ed.), *Statements by CUBA on the events in GRENADA: October 1983* (La Habana, Cuba: Editora Politica, 1983), p. 6.

positions and "vigorously defend" themselves "but only if. . . directly attacked."[244] The Army and Ministry of Interior advisors were to remain at their posts and await further orders whilst trying to "exert as much positive influence as possible on the behaviour of the [Grenadian] Army and the Security forces towards the people."[245] When Rizo met with RMC officials he told them that Castro had precluded the sending of reinforcements as "impossible and unthinkable."[246] Furthermore, the RMC should seek a "reconciliation with the people" by clarifying the deaths at Fort Rupert and "seeking out those responsible" and "try to prevent affording a pretext for intervention by publicly offering and reiterating total guarantees and facilities for the security and evacuation of U.S., English and other nationals."[247] Finally, Cuban officials emphasized that Cuban personnel would not go beyond the perimeter of Point Salines under any circumstances and RMC troops should not enter this area or attempt to coordinate their defences with the Cubans.[248] If the RMC had harboured any hopes of Cuban help this must have dispelled them.

Drafting the NSDD

In Washington the level of activity increased. After the SSG meeting Menges went to his office to draft McFarlane's memo to Reagan and a final version of the NSDD. The document contained a "total action plan" that would "land U.S. and allied Caribbean military forces in order to take control of Grenada no later than

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[244] Ibid., p. 7.

[245] Ibid., p. 7.

[246] Ibid., p. 7.

[247] Ibid., p. 8.

[248] Cotman, *The Gorrion Tree*, p. 219.

dawn Tuesday, October 25."[249] At 2:10 p.m., after Poindexter,[250] North and several senior officials contacted by phone had checked it, the NSDD was dispatched to State, Defense and the CIA. This was another preparatory step in the intervention timetable rather than any final decision; as Motley underlined, Washington "retained the ability to halt final implementation until the last moment."[251]

Pursuant to the SSG decision, William Montgomery, Eagleburger's executive assistant, set about contacting Ambassador McNeil in Boston. He eventually reached McNeil between 1:30 p.m. and 2:00 p.m.; the ambassador was only told to come to Washington and bring tropical clothing.[252] Also rounded up was Larry Rossin who would accompany McNeil to Barbados and "assist in any way necessary Ambassador McNeil in his special mission."[253]

When the U.S. had received the OECS' request the legal implications had to be seriously considered. The State Department's Deputy Legal Advisor Michael Kozak

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[249] Bennett, "Grenada: Anatomy," p. 74.

[250] According to Menges he told Poindexter that Washington had just received information that the RMC had reopened the airport and want to talk. In reply Poindexter joked; "Constantine, tell the State Department to inform Grenada that we will send some people to talk, and that they will arrive early next week." Menges, *Inside the NSC*, p. 79. This is rather bizarre considering Kurze and Flohr were already on Grenada.

[251] Motley, "The Decision to Assist Grenada," p. 71.

[252] McNeil chose to drive and arrived in Washington around 3:00 a.m. on Sunday. Robert J. Beck, "The McNeil Mission and the Decision to Invade Grenada," *Naval War College Review* 44 (Spring 1991): 98.

[253] Beck, *The Grenada Invasion*, p. 137. At the time Rossin was the Peru desk officer in the State Department but prior to that had been a political officer at the U.S. embassy in Barbados from 1980-82 and had visited Grenada several times. He expected to "stay in Barbados a couple of weeks assisting with reporting from the Embassy there, though everything was very fluid and. . . [he] quickly realized that nothing was firm." Ibid., p. 137. He finally left Grenada in January 1984. Rossin was one of a number of political officers who had previously served at the Barbadian embassy that were hastily recalled to Barbados; the others included Barbro Owens and Ashley Wills. These measures were "an attempt to help the Embassy staff cope and to give Motley and Gillespie simultaneously more control over the Embassy." Kenneth Kurze letter to the author dated March 11, 1996.

assembled lawyers from the State Department, the Justice Department and the Defense Department. As well as studying all the domestic and international legal angles, 'the lawyers had to prepare an outline or list of essential points to be included in any formal OECS written request for assistance.'[254] It was this list that McNeil would take with him to Barbados for his meeting with the OECS leaders.

At 4:54 p.m. the JCS issued CINCLANT with orders to plan to:

> conduct military operations to protect and evacuate U.S. and designated foreign nationals from Grenada, neutralise Grenadian forces, stabilise the internal situation, and maintain the peace. In conjunction with OECS/ friendly government participants assist in the restoration of a democratic government on Grenada.[255]

In the Caribbean the task force had continued to steer a southern course, unaware of the decisions being made in Washington. That evening the head of the 22d MAU on the *USS Guam*, Colonel Faulkner, met with two of his Lieutenant Colonels, Ray Smith and Granville Amos, to discuss options for an evacuation operation. They focused on the capture and securing of an evacuation site rather than the extensive operation Washington had authorized.[256] Despite this planning, most aboard echoed Faulkner's belief that it was "doubtful that we'll be called upon to carry out this mission."[257]

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[254] Ibid., p. 138.

[255] Adkin, *Urgent Fury*, p. 126. CINCLANT was responsible for the overall plan that the JCS would have to approve before Urgent Fury could be launched. However, CINCLANT lacked the intelligence and communications facilities and planning expertise for an operation of this magnitude which would involve the navy, air force and army contingents. As a result an ad hoc joint headquarters was established at Norfolk with an on-scene commander, Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf III, in charge of the Joint Task Force. Ibid., p. 126.

[256] More precisely, the plan envisaged a "combined surface and air assault, with the primary objectives being: the Grand Anse Beach area on the southwest coast, south of the city of St. George's; the partially completed Salines airfield at the southwestern tip of the island; and the high ground overlooking the Salines area, which controlled the road network through which all traffic from St. George's would have to pass." Spector, *U.S. Marines in Grenada*, p. 3.

[257] Ibid., p. 3.

At 10:00 p.m. however, Captain Erie received the message to move south towards Grenada. A second message provided general information about the strength and disposition of forces on Grenada[258] and stated that further intelligence would follow. A final message from Metcalf informed Erie that the Army were planning for an airborne assault.[259]

A Message From Cuba

Cuba's relations with the RMC were cool at best; Castro made it clear that the RMC had made "serious errors" and that Cuban forces would not come to the rescue of the revolution. The OECS had made little effort to hide their sentiments and the diversion of the U.S. fleet was public knowledge by Saturday; cognizant of the likelihood of U.S. military action Castro sent a message to the U.S. Interests Section of the Swiss Embassy in Havana at 9:00 p.m. that evening:

> That the U.S. side is aware of the developments in Grenada; that it is also aware of our position on these developments and of our determination of not interfering in the internal affairs of that country. That we are aware of their concern about the numerous U.S. residents there. That we are also concerned about the hundreds of Cuban cooperation personnel working there in different fields and about the news that U.S. naval forces are approaching Grenada.
>
> That according to the reports we have, no U.S. or foreign national, nor our personnel has had any problems. It is convenient to keep in touch on this matter, so as to contribute to solve favorably any difficulty that may arise or action that may be taken relating to the security of these individuals, without violence or intervention in the country.[260]

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[258] The estimated force strength on Grenada was as follows: 1,200 PRA soldiers, 2-5,000 militia members, 3-400 policemen, 30-50 Cuban military advisors and 600 Cuban workers. Ibid., p. 3.

[259] Ibid., p. 3.

[260] "Statement by the Cuban Party," Madan (ed.), *Statements by CUBA*, p. 8. It is uncertain whether Cuban intelligence had learnt of the OECS' request to the U.S. by this time.

It was not until 8:30 a.m. on Tuesday, October 25, three hours after Urgent Fury began, that the U.S. replied to the Cuban letter. As Motley explained, Washington viewed the Cuban reaction to events in Grenada as "smart." Grenada had been "tailor-made" for Cuba to "bug" Washington via a surrogate country and they had made a big investment in Grenada. By this rationale Bishop's demise would have been seen as irresponsible and wasteful and in the aftermath Castro had no interest in seeing something he had some influence over escalate into an international episode.[261]

Britain's Involvement

Grenada was one of the microstates that had gained independence (1974) from Britain in the wave of decolonization that swept the region in the late 1970's and early 1980's.[262] As former Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe commented; "we [Britain] had learned to refrain from post-imperial intervention in the affairs of several newborn Commonwealth states. By now we had come to regard their chequered post-independence history. . . as no longer our business."[263] Britain remained concerned about the island though never to the same degree as the U.S. appeared to be.

With a representative on Grenada and established contacts within the region, Britain was a valuable source of intelligence for the U.S. throughout the crisis period.

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[261] Telephone interview with Motley.

[262] Dominica gained independence in 1978, St. Lucia in 1979, St. Vincent and the Grenadines in 1980, Antigua and Barbuda in 1981 and St. Kitts-Nevis in 1983.

[263] Geoffrey Howe, *Conflict of Loyalty* (London: Macmillan, 1994), p. 326. Prime Minister Charles described the situation thus: "The British made it quite clear when they gave us our independence that they have nothing to do with our security in the future." Barbara Reynolds, "Anarchy in Grenada was really frightening," *USA Today*, October 27, 1983, p. 7.

However, the secrecy surrounding decisionmaking in Washington and the OECS' request to the U.S. led a Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee Report on Grenada to conclude that "it was not the intention of the United States Government that the United Kingdom should be actively involved in the military intervention in Grenada, and that the timing, nature and extent of the information provided. . . by the United States were consistent with this position."[264] In reality the British had a reasonable idea of what was occurring.

On the morning of Saturday, October 22, Adams confirmed what British High Commissioner Bullard had learnt of the night before: the OECS' intention to form a multinational force. He explained that British participation would be desired and other countries, France, Canada, Venezuela and the U.S., would also be asked. Adams also explained that a formal written request would follow shortly.[265] At 1:00 p.m. local time Bullard reported this news to London where it was received by duty minister Richard Luce.[266] Luce and FCO officials apparently agreed that it was unlikely that Britain would participate and informed Washington and Barbados of this.[267] It was also decided to wait for the outcome of the CARICOM meeting before making any further decisions. One decision was made; the West Indian guardship,

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[264] U.K. Parliament, *Grenada*, p. xvi. Similarly the *Economist* stated that Britain was "planned out of the operation from the start." "Britain's Grenada Shut-Out," p. 22.

[265] However, this formal written request was never received. Adams explained that "our attitude was that the formal request in writing would go when the oral request had been answered and since the oral request was never answered. . . the formal written request was overtaken by the operation itself." U.K. Parliament, *Grenada*, p. xiv. Eugenia Charles, Head of the OECS, recalled that; "I was supposed to send letters to England and Canada. . . but I never got around to doing it because things were happening too fast after that and so they had only been invited verbally, never in writing." Higbie, *Eugenia*, p. 229.

[266] Luce was in charge as Thatcher was at Chequers, Howe in Athens and junior Minister Lady Young in Cyprus. Luce was in regular contact with Chequers and Howe received copy telegrams from the British embassy in Athens. Howe, *Conflict of Loyalty*, p. 326.

[267] "Britain's Grenada Shut-Out," p. 22.

HMS Antrim, and her supply ship *Pearleaf*, were diverted from Cartagena, Colombia, to Grenada as a "precautionary measure," echoing the diversion of the U.S. fleet, should an evacuation of British citizens be necessary.

Mission Impossible

London's apparent unwillingness to become involved generated a post-intervention feeling in the region that by not participating, Britain had "failed both the people of Grenada, and the people of the Caribbean in general."[268] As Tom Adams explained, London knew "from the word go that the Eastern Caribbean States hoped for a military intervention in which British forces would take part."[269]

The belief that Britain deserted the Caribbean nations in their hour of need is misleading. The reality was that Britain simply could not mount an operation in the timescale envisaged by the Eastern Caribbean leaders. The only British forces in the region were the British Forces in Belize who numbered 1,800.[270] As Deputy High Commissioner Montgomery told Adams, it would take weeks rather than days for a British intervention to be planned and executed. Washington felt no need for British involvement and so all Britain could realistically do was offer "tea and sympathy and make a few belligerent noises."[271]

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[268] U.K. Parliament. *Grenada*, p. xi.

[269] Ibid., p. xi. As Sutton observes, Britain's relationship with the region contains "a sensitivity to local context and a familiarity of approach which is often lacking in US assistance." Sutton, "The Politics of Small State Security," p. 7. The Caribbean were used to dealing with Britain who remained a major export market.

[270] The force consists of army, air force and navy elements. *The Military Balance*, 1983-84 (Cambridge, England: Heffers, 1983), p. 42. Belize became indepedent in 1981 at which time an ongoing territorial dispute with neighbouring Guatemala led Britain to maintain a military presence there to guard against Guatemalan aggression, assist in training the Belize army, gathering intelligence on the situation in Central America and help with disaster relief. Griffith, *The Quest for Security*, p. 69.

[271] Interview with Montgomery.

Fishing for Clues

British embassy officials in Washington had been "fishing" for indications of the U.S.' intentions. At 5:00 p.m. Washington informed London that they "were considering. . . [the OECS request], had made no decision on how to respond and were proceeding very cautiously, and we [London] were assured there would be consultation with us before any further steps were taken."[272] This promise would prove to be not entirely true.

The CARICOM Meeting

The emergency CARICOM[273] meeting was scheduled to start at 9:00 p.m. in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad. Representatives from all of the CARICOM nations, except for Grenada, assembled at the Trinidad Hilton shortly before 9:00 p.m.[274] They were kept waiting by Forbes Burnham who did not appear until 9:00 p.m. sharp. As previously discussed, the OECS did not expect much from the meeting but did not cancel, a negative move that would have aroused suspicion.

Talks centred on a peaceful settlement; Seaga's contention that the use of force should not be ruled out was flatly rejected by Chambers, Burnham, Pindling and

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[272] U.K. Parliament, *Grenada*, p. lxxx.

[273] CARICOM came into existence in 1973 with the Treaty of Chaguaramus, replacing the Caribbean Free Trade Association. CARICOM was primarily a trade organization and its Treaty did not include any security provisions. Eugenia Charles for one viewed it in such terms; "I have refused to ever attend a meeting of ministers of foreign affairs of CARICOM. I think it is unnecessary." Braveboy-Wagner, *The Caribbean in World Affairs*, p. 60.

[274] The participants at the meeting were: Lester Bird (Antigua and Barbuda), Eugenia Charles (Dominica), John Osbourne (Montserrat), Kennedy Simmonds (St. Kitts-Nevis), John Compton (St. Lucia), Milton Cato (St. Vincent and the Grenadines), Edward Seaga (Jamaica), Louis Tull (Barbados), George Price (Belize), Lynden Pindling (the Bahamas), George Chambers (Trinidad and Tobago) and Forbes Burnham (Guyana).

Price. The OECS group remained silent about their request to the U.S.; as Seaga stated, "we did not want anything to leak out."[275] For the moment the OECS decide to go along with CARICOM proposals that there should be no external involvement in what was an internal problem which required a CARICOM solution that would respect international law and restore normalcy to Grenada.[276] The Governor-General in Grenada would be the point of contact for these efforts to avoid the possibility that the RMC interpret this as some sort of official recognition. Four aims were outlined: the establishment of a broad-based civilian government that would arrange elections at the earliest possible date; a fact-finding mission by eminent CARICOM state figures; arrangements to ensure the safety of foreign citizens in Grenada and/or their evacuation and the deployment of a CARICOM peacekeeping force.[277] At 3:06 a.m. the meeting was adjourned. With even the OECS representatives proposing people for the fact-finding mission Chambers was confident that a consensus had been reached. The one problem for those who favoured a peaceful solution faced was what should happen if the RMC refused to comply with CARICOM's measures.[278]

Charles, Bird, Seaga and Tull immediately met secretly to consider how to steer CARICOM back towards the issue of a military solution. The first session had perhaps gone worse than expected. Sometime around 4:00 a.m. Adams phoned the

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[275] Beck, *The Grenada Invasion*, p. 140.

[276] "Statement by the Honourable Prime Minister George Chambers to the House of Representatives of the Parliament of Trinidad and Tobago on October 26, 1983 on the Grenada Crisis," *Documents on the Invasion*, Item XVII, p. 76.

[277] Ibid., p. 77.

[278] Ibid., p. 77.

group; it was probably at this stage that the OECS group decided to proceed with their plans irrespective of CARICOM's position.

The reconvening of the meeting later that morning, Sunday, October 23, was delayed by one hour because the U.S. ambassador to Trinidad met with the OECS group. When things did get underway certain Heads of Government announced that:

> there was no consensus on the proposals and that in any event they were of the opinion that no further discussions should continue along those lines.[279]

Continuing the offensive Charles introduced the sanctions the OECS had previously agreed on. Additionally, Seaga put forward a proposal that human rights and democracy become qualifications for inclusion in a restructured CARICOM and the unanimity voting regulations be changed in some areas. The later was part of a deliberate OECS ploy to put other issues on the meeting's agenda to mask their intentions.[280] The meeting finally closed by imposing sanctions on Grenada and voting by eleven to one to expel Grenada from CARICOM.[281]

The opposition to the use of force from the Bahamas, Belize, Guyana and Trinidad underlined the divisions over the question of security within CARICOM. As Vaughan Lewis explained:

> there are two views in the region: one is that in certain kinds of crisis it is nec-

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[279] Ibid., p. 78.

[280] Interview with Bish.

[281] The official reasons for the expulsion were: the manner of the RMC's assumption of power; the RMC did not represent the rights and obligations of the government of Grenada; the situation was a security threat to the region; the integrity of the Caribbean must be restored and the rights and property of Grenadians must be protected. "CARICOM Suspends Grenada," *Daily Nation*, October 24, 1983, p. 1. As the OECS had expected, the sole opponent to these measures was Guyana who had been a close socialist ally of Bishop's Grenada. Forbes Burnham explained his position thus; "It's not binding because in the first place it is not a decision of CARICOM, because one of the constituents of CARICOM was not invited - Grenada. . . even if it were a CARICOM decision, the fact that Guyana was opposed to any suspension or expulsion makes any majority decision worthless in terms of the CARICOM treaty which on an issue like this calls for unanimity." "Burnham: Why I don't agree," *Daily Nation*, October 24, 1983, p.1.

> essary to seek external assistance; the other is that in all crises the resolution ought to be handled indigenously. By October 1983 these debates were being postponed over and over again, so that when the crisis erupted, there was no mechanism in place. The discussion was incomplete; alternative mechanisms had to be sought.[282]

In the aftermath of Grenada the OECS-CARICOM relationship was slow to heal.

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[282] Lewis, "Small States," in Heine (ed.), *A Revolution Aborted*, p. 260.

CHAPTER 6

PLANNING AN INTERVENTION: PART II

At 12:22 a.m. Washington time on Sunday, October 23, a suicide bomber crashed a truck laden with almost two tons of TNT into the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon. The massive explosion which followed claimed the lives of 241 marines. In Augusta, Reagan was woken early, 2:27 a.m., for the second successive day by McFarlane to be told; "We've had a terrible attack on the marines with a substantial loss of life."[1] According to McFarlane, "the President's face turned ashen when I told him the news; he looked like a man, a 72-year-old man, who had just received a blow to the chest. All the air went out of him."[2] It was the start of a long and arduous day for Reagan; he later remembered it as the "saddest day of my presidency, perhaps the saddest day of my life."[3] After talking with the Marine Commandant General Paul X. Kelley at 3:00 a.m., Reagan met with McFarlane and Shultz for two hours. At 6:30 a.m. the presidential group left Augusta Golf Club for Washington. After an hour-long flight they touched down at Andrews Air Force Base (AFB) at 8:17 a.m. and transferred by helicopter to the White House, arriving at 8:38 a.m.

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[1] Cannon, *President Reagan*, p. 443. At that moment the number of known fatalities was forty-six. Oberdorfer, "Reagan Sought," p. A21.

[2] McFarlane and Smardz, *Special Trust*, p. 263.

[3] Cannon, *President Reagan*, p. 443.

"Beirut, then Grenada"

Reagan dived straight into the first of the day's two National Security Planning Group[4] (NSPG) meetings at 8:40 a.m. The subject of both meetings that day were identical: "Beirut, then Grenada."[5] Critics have suggested that intervention in Grenada was a reflex action. This reasoning portrayed the U.S. as a weak and impotent power in the face of Third World challenges; swift and successful action in Grenada would help restore U.S. credibility.

Apart from Reagan, three other senior officials were particularly affected by Beirut. Shultz, a former marine himself, was shocked and saddened. Likewise McFarlane who had visited the troops, knew many of the officers and as Reagan's former Personal Representative to the Middle East had supported their presence there.[6] Weinberger was "horrified and frustrated." He and the JCS "were convinced that Shultz and his diplomats were blind to the dangers of allowing the Marines to remain in the hostile environment of Lebanon" with no clearly defined mission and inadequate forces.[7] Weinberger had argued for the Marines withdrawal as recently as Tuesday, October 18, and lamented that he "had not been persuasive enough in the long series of meetings to secure approval for the withdrawal of our marines from the international force."[8] In the first half of the morning meeting Weinberger and the JCS

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[4] Present were Bush, Weinberger, Shultz, McFarlane, Poindexter, McMahon, Baker, Deaver and Vessey. The NSPG is the top level group that meets to discuss foreign affairs.

[5] Oberdorfer, "Reagan Sought," p. A21.

[6] Cannon, *President Reagan*, p. 443.

[7] Ibid., p. 418.

[8] Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, p. 79.

made their position clear: the situation in Lebanon was futile and the Marines should be withdrawn as soon as possible.

For the second half of the meeting the Grenada group, Eagleburger, Motley, Menges, Ikle and North, who had been waiting in McFarlane's office were called in to update the group on the situation and military preparedness. Reagan asked everyone for their opinions. Speaking for the military, JCS Chairman John Vessey gave a "very clear, sober, cautious" assessment "without recommendation":

> there are a lot of questions, we don't know the answers. . . We have very bad intelligence, our Navy SEALS are down there collecting intelligence, but we don't have much from them. . . it is going to be a violent, opposed landing and we are going to lose some people and I believe we can prevail Mr. President, but it is going to be a fight and I can't guarantee you that it will be easily secured.[9]

Nonetheless, the primary issue was whether Beirut should affect planning for Grenada.[10] Having got everyone's views Reagan made his position clear:

> If this was right yesterday, it's right today, and we shouldn't let the act of a couple of terrorists dissuade us from going ahead.[11]

It is clear that Beirut did not derail intervention plans but it obviously did have some impact on decisionmakers: it was a question of degrees rather than direction though. A "do something" mentality could be detected in certain quarters; Shultz for one pursued intervention in Grenada with more "fervour" post-Beirut.[12] For the

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[9] Interview with Robert McFarlane by Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Randall Bently and Stephen Flynn, November 10-11, 1988, Washington D.C., transcript, *Oral History Project*, International Security Studies Program, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Medford, Mass., p. 146.

[10] When North had heard about Beirut he feared that Reagan would cancel Grenada. Bradlee, *Guts and Glory*, p. 179. Eugenia Charles was also concerned: "My God, this is going to prevent them from coming to help us." Higbie, *Eugenia*, p. 229.

[11] Bennett, "Grenada: Anatomy," p. 75. Reagan reportedly also reasoned that; "We cannot let an act of terrorism determine whether we aid or assist our allies in the region. If we do that, who will ever trust us again?" Magnuson et al., "D-Day in Grenada," p. 20.

[12] Interview with Johnstone.

Grenada group the disaster in Beirut did not have much impact; what it did do that Sunday was to provide good cover as the press overlooked the presence of the Grenada group at the White House.[13] It is evident that the decision to intervene was not a product of Beirut, it was simply too soon afterwards to be a reflex action, nor was it particularly affected by the bombing. Reagan had not signed the "go" order yet but Grenada had been discussed at cabinet level since Thursday, October 20, and preparations were well underway by the Sunday, October 23. Fundamentally, Grenada and Lebanon existed on "parallel but separate tracks."[14]

Over at the State Department that morning, ambassador Frank McNeil was given the details of his special mission. McNeil had been collected from his hotel at 7:00 a.m. by a member of the Grenada Task Force and informed about the situation in Grenada en route to the State Department to attend an 8:00 a.m. RIG meeting.[15] The ambassador was told that Reagan wanted another assessment of the situation before he made any final decision. A list of instructions and essential points, prepared by Kozak's legal team the previous day, to be included in any formal OECS request was presented to McNeil; he felt that the list was unsuitable as it lacked orderliness and

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[13] Interview with Motley.

[14] Interview with Weinberger. It is ironic that in his televised "Address to the Nation" on October 27, Reagan specifically juxtaposed the two crises: "The events in Lebanon and Grenada, though oceans apart, are closely related. Not only has Moscow assisted and encouraged the violence in both countries, but it provides direct support through a network of surrogates and terrorists." "Address to the Nation on Events in Lebanon and Grenada, October 27, 1983," *PPP*, p. 1521. This redefinition and simplification of events in both places diverted attention from Reagan's foreign policy problems. Additionally, Grenada may not have been a response to Lebanon but Reagan's "rhetoric about Grenada functioned in such a way to do so. Literally overnight, Grenada became a condensation symbol (sic) of victory and pride, reminding citizens of gains in tangible and symbolic resources. Lebanon's failure seemed blunted - almost forgotten - in the aftermath of Grenada's triumph." Denise M. Bostdorff, "The Presidency and Promoted Crisis: Reagan, Grenada, and Issue Management," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* XXI (Fall 1991): 741.

[15] The meeting was headed by Motley as usual with Crist, North, Kozak and Johnstone also present. Beck, "The McNeil Mission," p. 99.

might be interpreted as a Washington-written invitation.[16] For half an hour after the meeting McNeil met with Eagleburger, Motley, Howe, Crist and a few others to review his instructions. It was emphasized that McNeil should make his own independent appraisal. His written instructions were supplemented by oral instructions from Shultz, via Eagleburger, informing the emissary that no final decision had been made and that he should give no hint of his recommendations.[17]

McNeil later summarized the purpose of his trip:

> I was to make crystal clear to the OECS that the president had not yet decided whether to intervene and that the decision could go either way. I was to assess with the Caribbean leaders the situation on the island, including particularly that of the American students. . . and discuss in depth with the Caribbean leaders their rationale for intervention. Finally, after assessing such other information and intelligence as might be available on the scene, I was to report back my assessment and my recommendations.[18]

He was whisked off to Andrews AFB to board a C-140 Jetstar to take a 10:30 a.m. flight to Barbados.[19]

A Walk in the Garden

In the aftermath of the intervention one of the justifications advanced was the issuing of an invitation by Governor-General Sir Paul Scoon. Adams revealed that his

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[16] Ibid., p. 99.

[17] Ibid., p. 99.

[18] McNeil, *War and Peace*, p. 174. McNeil was not sanguine about the possibility of action: "When I left I sensed that we would probably not intervene. The White House, shocked by the loss of 250 marines in the Beirut bombing, feared the political consequences, and the Department of Defense was reluctant at the least, wanting more time to prepare." Ibid., p. 174.

[19] The flight arrived in Barbados at 4:56 p.m. having stopped at Homestead AFB, Miami, at 12.50 p.m. to refuel. Accompanying McNeil on the journey were Crist, his assistant Jim Connelly, Larry Rossin, Gary Alexander (a State Department Administrative Support official) and a CIA official. Bish's notes. McNeil reviewed his instructions with Crist and formulated a checklist of twenty-eight points to be raised in the impending meeting with the Caribbean leaders. Beck, *The Grenada Invasion*, p. 153. The CIA official was sent to establish ground communications. McFarlane and Smardz, *Special Trust*, p. 263.

"views were sought well before the military operation commenced on the issuing of an invitation of friendly countries to enter Grenada and restore order."[20] An examination of the legal validity of Scoon's request is beyond the scope of this study; Scoon obviously issued a request but the doubt surrounding its authorship has attracted some strong criticism.[21]

Although the PRG had suspended the constitution in March 1979 People's Law Number Three stated that: "The Head of State shall remain Her Majesty the Queen and her representative in this country shall continue to be the Governor-General who shall perform such functions as the People's Revolutionary Government may from time to time advise."[22] Politically, Scoon was just a figurehead with minimal power. Lewis describes him as an "obedient and deferential colonial public servant" who had "developed a finely honed instinct for survival, so that he was able to serve, without any evident qualms of conscience, four different governmental regimes of different ideological characters."[23] Austin had visited Scoon to inform him of the RMC's plans and asked him to remain in office and help establish a civilian-based government.

During the days prior to Montgomery's visit Scoon had been in contact by phone with Buckingham Palace, Secretary-General of the Commonwealth Shridath

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[20] "Full Text of Speech by the Prime Minister of Barbados," *Documents on the Invasion*, p. 39.

[21] The *Economist* concluded that the request was "almost certainly a fabrication concocted between the OECS and Washington to calm the post-invasion diplomatic storm. As concoctions go, it was flimsy." "Britain's Grenada Shut-Out," p. 24. A British Foreign Affairs Committee report was also critical: "Both the timing and nature of this request . . . remain shrouded in mystery, and it is evidently the intention of the parties directly involved that the mystery should not be dispelled." U.K. Parliament, *Grenada*, p. xvi.

[22] Peter Fraser, "A Revolutionary Governor-General? The Grenada Crisis of 1983," in D.A. Low, *Constitutional Heads and Political Crises: Commonwealth Episodes, 1945-85* (London: Macmillan, 1988), p. 154.

[23] Lewis, *Grenada*, pp. 140-1.

Ramphal, Prime Minister Chambers and Vaughan Lewis among others; he had not requested help on any occasion. If anything it seems that Scoon insisted on talking to the Queen's Secretary to ask advice on what he should do.[24] During Sunday morning Scoon met with Montgomery for an hour. The Governor-General was unaware of the advanced state of intervention planning and Montgomery presented him with an "appreciation of the developing situation" and advised him that "it cannot be ruled out that there will be some sort of military action."[25] He told Scoon to prepare himself for such an eventuality and emphasised that as Governor-General he was the only constitutional authority on Grenada: if the U.S. intervened they could not run Grenada, only he could and consequently Scoon should plan the appropriate political measures.[26] Scoon certainly did not request help of his own volition and it was only when Montgomery directly asked him, "Would you welcome intervention?" that Scoon admitted that he saw it as the "only solution."[27] The Governor-General was not informed beforehand of the formal written invitation that he eventually signed after being rescued on Wednesday, October 26. The meeting ended sometime after 11:00 a.m. when Kelly, who had accompanied Montgomery, received a phone call informing them of a meeting that had been arranged with Cornwall.

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[24] Interview with Rossin.

[25] Interview with Montgomery. Scoon possibly knew more because he told Montgomery that he had been in touch with the OECS' Director-General Vaughan Lewis. Interview with Kelly.

[26] Interview with Kelly.

[27] Ibid. Montgomery told the Foreign Affairs Committee that Scoon "gave the impression, indeed, that his best course of action would be to wait in Government House and see what opportunities might arise for him to play a proper role in the light of the revolutionary situation on the island." U.K. Parliament, *Grenada*, p. lxxxi. Although not exactly the image of someone who allegedly requested military intervention, Scoon did not have many options at the time: if he had made any public condemnation of the events at Fort Rupert or openly condemned the RMC they would have most likely turned on him. Interview with Kelly. Marshall states that Scoon requested help in the "restoration of law and order" from Montgomery. Marshall, "Urgent Fury," p. 27.

Meeting the RMC

As the NSPG met in Washington and CARICOM met in Port-of-Spain another important meeting was occurring in St. George's. At 9:00 a.m. that morning a RMC military aide had visited Bourne with a message from Cornwall. He asked Bourne to arrange a time and place for a meeting with the U.S. and British representatives; Bourne proposed 11:00 a.m. at the Ross Point Inn where the diplomats were staying.[28]

The meeting with Cornwall[29] was attended by Kurze, Flohr, Montgomery, Kelly, Bourne and Solin. Cornwall began by admitting that mistakes had been made and time was needed to restore normalcy but that the RMC was in control. The curfew would be lifted and a cabinet formed soon. Montgomery felt this was just a "catalogue of reassuring noises" for the diplomats benefit and if the RMC were really in control why was the curfew still in place.[30] Montgomery asked to see Coard as soon as possible but Cornwall nonchalantly replied that he was not even sure if Coard was still on the island. When Montgomery pressed Cornwall about Coard later in the meeting he was told that today's meeting was to discuss practicalities and that

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[28] "Statement of Dr. Geoffrey Bourne," U.S. Congress, *U.S. Military Actions in Grenada*, p. 192. Bourne was also invited to attend the meeting. The group were kept waiting for an hour by Cornwall who arrived around noon. The meeting eventually lasted from 12:00 p.m. until 12:50 p.m.

[29] The U.S. diplomats had been instructed not to meet with Austin to avoid implying any sort of diplomatic recognition. Kwitny, *Endless Enemies*, p. 412. Adams had previously made this suggestion and it is probable that the embassy had followed his advice. It was assumed that Austin, the number five in the RMC, was a "puppet"; possibly unstable and acting under duress as he was "too close to Bishop to go this far wholeheartedly." Milan Bish, secret telegram to Secretary of State, "Subject: Grenada: Comments/Plans of Grenada Democratic Movement," 202026Z, October 1983, Bridgetown 06431, section 1, p. 1.

[30] Interview with Montgomery.

another meeting could be arranged for tomorrow.[31] The main topic of conversation was the students and the possible methods of evacuation; Kurze and Flohr's primary interest was to get an assurance that if evacuation flights were arranged they would get clearance.[32] Cornwall made repeated assurances that the students were in no danger and "bragged that things would be back to 'normal' the next day when the curfew was lifted."[33] He promised that Pearls would reopen on Monday, October 24, and that "those U.S. . . . citizens who want to leave Grenada for whatever reason would be able to do so tomorrow following normal procedures" on regularly scheduled flights.[34] Kurze emphasized that CARICOM had suspended LIAT flights and that Pearls could only accommodate 46-seater planes and therefore any evacuation would be too time-consuming and the difficult journey across the island to the airport made it difficult to ensure safety. Plane evacuation was further complicated by the RMC insisting that flights would be properly organized and formalities such as customs would not be waived; "If it took hours or even days to process all 1,000 Americans, very well, they would have to wait."[35] When Cornwall revealed that the RMC was willing to let 40-50 people leave each day at most, both

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[31] Ibid. Cornwall was well aware that Montgomery and Kurze were scheduled to leave that afternoon.

[32] Interview with Montgomery.

[33] Kurze letter, August 20, 1995.

[34] Tyler, "The Making of an Invasion," p. A14. Cornwall also approved the use of civilian charter planes. Kwitny, *Endless Enemies*, p. 413. Beck reports that charter flights were not allowed. Beck, *The Grenada Invasion*, p. 144. Motley had leased three Pan-American jets in Miami but was unable to get landing permission for them from the RMC. Interview with Motley.

[35] Sandford and Vigilante, *Grenada*, p. 8. The RMC wanted a list of those who wanted to leave and opened the passport facilities especially on Sunday so that students could obtain the necessary paperwork. Telephone interview with Peter Bourne.

Kurze and Montgomery told him he was not being realistic.[36] Other alternatives were examined.

Kurze suggested an evacuation by a large ship, not necessarily a warship, from St. George's harbour as it was more central than Pearls. Cornwall rejected evacuation by warship believing it to be "tantamount to allowing a military occupation of his state"[37] and an evacuation by the cruise-liner *Countess*, volunteered by Cunard in response to an embassy request, was never pursued.[38] When the meeting ended after fifty minutes Kurze was not hopeful; "We wanted a quick evacuation; the RMC was stalling, stressing normalcy and no need to rush as everyone was safe; no progress was made."[39]

That afternoon two more U.S. diplomats, James Budeit and Gary Chafin,[40] arrived to replace Kurze whose mother had just died. Their arrival was not uneventful. On the plane's first approach their pilot could not contact the Pearls

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[36] Kurze letter, August 20, 1995.

[37] Beck, *The Grenada Invasion*, p. 144.

[38] The *Countess* was apparently an embassy initiative but not one authorized by Bish. He told the political officer who had made the inquiry to "forget it" as the U.S. had its own resources to call upon. Interview with Bish. Budeit said that Cornwall "okayed in principle" the cruise liner and Chafin recalls him "skirting the cruise-liner issue noncommittally." Kwitny, *Endless Enemies*, p. 415. Motley states that, "we explored the possibility of using a Cunard-line cruise ship then in the vicinity to evacuate Americans. It became apparent, however, that conditions on the island would not permit evacuation by civilian carrier." Motley, "The Decision to Assist Grenada," p. 71. The *Countess* had been due to call in Grenada on Tuesday, October 25, but Cunard decided that the ship would only stop if Washington so desired and even then only with a U.S. naval escort and a request from the RMC. Kelly recalls being told much later that Cunard's headquarters in New York were told by Washington not to send the *Countess* anywhere near Grenada because the students were not to be evacuated as this would undermine the U.S.' rationale for intervening. Interview with Kelly.

[39] Kurze letter, August 20, 1995. Flohr expressed the same sentiments. Telephone interview with Flohr.

[40] Chafin was a political officer and had instructions to get information on the political situation and as well as the students. Wanting to know exactly what type of situation he was going into he had been told by DCM Flower in Barbados that no action decision had been made but that he should expect something to happen. Interview with Gary Chafin, November 20, 1995, Washington D.C.

control tower and refused to land without confirmation, diverting instead to Union Island about fifteen minutes away. Budeit and Chafin contacted the embassy explaining what had happened. The embassy phoned Bourne to discover what had happened; it transpired that Austin's secretary had misdialed the airport's number to alert them of the plane's arrival.[41] Bourne straightened the problem out and the plane was allowed in but the drama was not over.

Upon landing the plane was surrounded by the security forces who "looked and behaved like Caribbean pirates."[42] Budeit and Chafin were already running late and there was no sign of Kurze and Montgomery who were due to return to Barbados and nobody knew where they were. Their pilot grew agitated, telling the diplomats that the tower had told him the plane had been shot at on its approach. Budeit and Chafin now became worried that they had walked into a trap; they heard gunfire, the sonic booms of U.S. reconnaissance planes overhead and rumours that a counterrevolution was underway in St. George's.[43] Soon after, one of the APC's that had wreaked havoc at Fort Rupert arrived. Budeit had already decided that if Kurze "hadn't come out, I wasn't going in"[44] and Chafin began to think it might be wise to reboard the plane and leave. He phoned the embassy to report that their plane had allegedly been shot at and, somewhat ominously, that Kurze and Montgomery were "mysteriously missing"; the embassy told them to "stay put."[45] Kurze and

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[41] Bourne recalled later that "we were doubled up with laughter during this period. . . It was just a bunch of people inexperienced at running that kind of operation and unable to make command decisions." Kwitny, *Endless Enemies*, p. 414.

[42] Bourne, "Revolution, Intervention and Nutrition," p. 22.

[43] Interview with Chafin.

[44] Kwitny, *Endless Enemies*, p. 415.

[45] Chafin had arranged a code phrase with the embassy that he would use if he felt the situation was threatening and that he and Budeit should leave while they could. The phrase was "I think I have

Montgomery had simply been delayed and arrived at Pearls in one piece about two hours later. Their flight left without incident at 3:30 p.m.

No Way Out

Back at the embassy Budeit and Chafin's dramatic, but inaccurate, reports presented officials with an exaggerated picture of the volatility of the situation on Grenada. Kurze and Flohr's reports were not positive either. Kurze noted that the students were safe and well and there were no reports of injuries or threats being made but that a significant number of students were scared and wanted out.[46] However, he felt that:

> you could not have an orderly evacuation of large numbers of foreigners in a situation controlled by the military council, given their shakiness and the large chance of violence. Therefore, if you're going to do this, you have to secure control of a certain area.[47]

If an evacuation was problematic then a negotiated solution was even less likely; "A piecemeal deal with the RMC would not work. The RMC had no local support, was over its head, and would likely fall like a house of cards."[48] Images of another hostage crisis weighed heavily on the two diplomats minds; they believed the RMC would have little compunction about using foreign citizens to get themselves out of a

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lost my passport." However, when Chafin said this over the phone the embassy, obviously having forgotten about the arrangement, told him not to be so careless in the future! Interview with Chafin.

[46] Kurze estimated that 22/85 Canadians, 40-50/200 British and 2-500/1000 Americans wanted to leave. Secretary of State, secret telegram to all American Republic Diplomatic Posts, "Subject: Grenada Situation Report No. Eight," 241128Z, October 1983, Washington D.C. 302451, p. 1.

[47] Kwitny, *Endless Enemies*, p. 414. Kurze told the press that before he left Grenada "he did not recommend. . . that the American citizens leave in any particular time." "Results of US Survey by Today," *Daily Nation*, October 24, 1983, p. 16. This was because he believed they could not be got out rather than because there was no danger as many assumed.

[48] Beck, *The Grenada Invasion*, p. 182.

corner. As Kurze's explained, "these were desperate people, heavily indoctrinated to boot. I think that if the situation had dropped out, without an intervention to nip it, this [hostage-taking] was a clear possibility."[49] The diplomats told Bish that the RMC had no organizational structure, no coherent leadership and could disintegrate rapidly. More worringly, it seemed that the RMC simply did not understand the problem; they believed that if they held on to the students they would be safe when in fact the opposite was true.[50] As far as the RMC were concerned an evacuation was the prelude to an intervention. They probably felt that the longer they could prevent intervention by diplomatic means any external intervention would be harder to justify internationally. Kurze and Flohr's conclusion was that the U.S. had run out of choices and that an intervention was necessary to rescue American citizens. Their report was naturally read with interest in Washington; as Speakes explained, the report "amplified our thinking. It increased our worries."[51]

The British High Commission received a different picture from Montgomery. He reported that between 30 and 40 British citizens and 22 Canadians wanted to leave but that they were not in imminent danger. Montgomery described the situation on Grenada as "calm, tense, and pretty volatile" but was in "no doubt that members of the revolutionary council would keep their word"[52] and open Pearls on Monday to

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[49] Kurze letter, August 20, 1995. Flohr later stated that the students "food and water supply was totally controlled by the government. These students were in effect at that point hostages for four days." NBC Evening News, November 7, 1983, *Weekly News Summary*, Week of 07-13 November 1983, White House Communications Agency Videotapes (WHCAV), RRL. Back in Washington Motley was concerned that the RMC would develop a "bunker mentality" and seize hostages. Telephone interview with Motley.

[50] Telephone interview with Flohr.

[51] "Press Briefing by Larry Speakes, 1:00 A.M., October 26, 1983," *WHOPS*, no. 892-10/26, Container 34, RRL, p. 34.

[52] "Still no word on Coard," p. 16.

allow people to leave. He also reported his conversation with Scoon to Bullard. Bullard had received an oral request from the OECS on Saturday, October 22, and after Montgomery's report he now recommended to London that Britain should participate in any action. The FCO backed this with the qualification that the impact on the Commonwealth be taken into consideration. Downing Street approved participation, although they favoured a slower time frame to allow the insertion of an elite Special Air Services (SAS) team onto Grenada to secure certain targets and prepare the way for a full-scale intervention.[53] Despite British willingness to act, it seems that Washington did not take London into its full confidence. The Foreign Affairs Committee later concluded that British officials' inquiries in Washington yielded little more than the promises that Washington was proceeding "very cautiously" and that Britain would be "consulted immediately if the United States decided to take any action" or "before further steps are taken."[54]

NSPG II

In Washington a busy day continued as the final decision to intervene loomed. After the morning NSPG meeting Vessey requested a further meeting with Reagan; also present were McFarlane, Weinberger, Shultz and McMahon. Vessey briefed the group about the stage of military planning, the intention to use the Special Forces and the possible dangers they faced. At 11:00 a.m. CINCLANT submitted its plan for

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[53] The SAS team were aboard the *HMS Antrim* which had been diverted toward Grenada the previous day. Interview with Kelly.

[54] U.K. Parliament, *Grenada*, p. xv.

Urgent Fury, the assigned code name, to the JCS and after some minor alterations received approval.[55]

At the State Department decisionmakers were increasingly worried that Defense's cautiousness would undermine the central rationale for intervention; the unstable conditions in Grenada and the concomitant threat to American citizens. Another day or two and the situation there might de-escalate, making any action harder to justify politically at home and abroad. At 2:45 p.m. Shultz reviewed the military aspects of an intervention with Howe who told him that:

> Timing is important. . . and we are losing time. Some reconnaissance flights have been out. There are some advance CIA elements under way. But the Pentagon officers are still saying that if we invade, we have to do it right. They are reflecting Cap Weinberger's mood."[56]

Shultz felt that Weinberger's request for more time and information was "the counsel of no action at all."[57]

At 4:00 p.m. the NSPG reconvened again to discuss Lebanon and Grenada.[58] According to Bennett, the discussion centred on the political risks of the operation and the possibility of hostage-taking. Reagan was not deterred by the possibility of failure in Grenada being amplified by the Beirut bombing; he felt an obligation to the

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[55] Vice Admiral Metcalf, who would be in command of JTF 120, thought it was a "lousy" plan, weakened by the "jointness" philosophy that advocated the use of all the military forces rather than just the Marines. Interview with Joseph Metcalf III, August 16, 1994, Washington D.C. This accentuated the inescapable problems of interservice rivalry.

[56] Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 331. The reconnaissance flights referred to were F-14's from the *USS Independence* which were equipped with cameras and infrared detection capabilities. Also used were the SR-71 Blackbird and U-2 spyplanes which carried "photo reconnaissance and signal collection assets [which] provided coverage of Cuba and Grenada prior to and throughout the operation." Marshall, "Urgent Fury," p. 9.

[57] Ibid., p. 9.

[58] As before, the Grenada group waited in McFarlane's office. Menges claims that during this time he cornered Eagleburger, enthusing that "Grenada could be a positive example of reconciliation after liberation from communist dictatorship." Menges, *Inside the NSC*, p. 80.

U.S. citizens in Grenada and the OECS who had requested help.[59] Even with only the slightest chance of a hostage situation the Iran analogy was invoked as Reagan reputedly bemoaned that "I'm no better off than Jimmy Carter."[60] Not wishing to continue the parallel Reagan asked whether an intervention could precipitate hostage-taking.[61] The State Department representatives told him that if the operation was done soon and done quickly the chances of this would be low. They advised that "it was risky to abort the operation. . . news of it might leak out and. . . [the] Americans would be seized before the Marines could land."[62] Irrespective of the political risk of an intervention so soon after Beirut and the nightmare of a potential hostage crisis, Reagan remained resolute. As Meese says, "the negatives arrayed against decisive action in Grenada were almost too numerous to count. Not only did the operation proceed in the very wake of the disaster in Beirut, it flew in the teeth of fashionable opinion about the uses of American military power."[63] It appears that the only thing that would have deterred Reagan was the "flat military infeasibility of it and nobody implied that."[64]

The military still urged caution; Weinberger told Reagan that he favoured a delay and reconsideration of the situation. Weinberger was understandably concerned about

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[59] Bennett, "Grenada: Anatomy," p. 76.

[60] "Britain's Grenada Shut-Out," p. 22. According to Jeane Kirkpatrick, the U.S. ambassador to the UN at the time, Reagan "always had a 'particular horror' that he would face a large-scale hostage situation like his predecessor.' Anderson, "National Decisionmaking and Quick-Strike Interventions," p. 77.

[61] Interview with Weinberger.

[62] Beck, *The Grenada Invasion*, p. 149.

[63] Edwin Meese III, *With Reagan: The Inside Story* (Washington D.C.: Regney Gateway, 1992), p. 217.

[64] Anderson, "National Decisionmaking and Quick-Strike Interventions," p. 63.

the safety of the troops and anxious that Reagan understood the risks, the lack of intelligence and the need for a larger force.[65] State feared that the opportunity for positive action was slipping away. Motley asked Defense officials if they could guarantee to the president that the situation on Grenada would not deteriorate and hostages taken.[66] Naturally they could not guarantee this and Motley had clearly made his point. Perhaps in response to this Vessey asked Reagan if a definite decision had been made: "Not yet" was the reply.[67] For the last hour of the meeting discussion focused on Lebanon and Grenada.

When the meeting ended Reagan made what Shultz described as a "tentative" decision to accede to the OECS' request and conduct Urgent Fury as planned. This was essentially a "confirmation of the decision that had been 75% made on Saturday" at the SSG meeting.[68] After the meeting Reagan gave McFarlane the oral "go" order. Later that evening McFarlane delivered the "smooth copy" of the NSDD to Reagan to sign "go." Once again this decision was not irreversible; as Speakes subsequently claimed: "If at any time up until 5:00 a.m. on Tuesday morning. . . we had been in any way certain that we could have accomplished this short of a military situation, we would have done so."[69] This scenario was highly improbable but not impossible.

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[65] Interview with Weinberger.

[66] Motley later learnt that his vocalization of their reluctance had irritated the military. Telephone interview with Motley.

[67] Oberdorfer, "Reagan Sought," p. A21.

[68] "Britain's Grenada Shut-Out," p. 22.

[69] "Press Briefing by Larry Speakes, 1:00 P.M., October 26, 1983," p. 11.

The McNeil Visit

As we have seen, Special Emissary McNeil's party had arrived in Barbados just before 5:00 p.m. local time. Having checked in at the Sands Hotel, McNeil and Crist were escorted to Government House for their 6:30 p.m. meeting with the Caribbean leaders. Bish, Flower and Gillespie were also in attendance for the meeting with Adams, Charles, Seaga, Foreign Ministers Louis Tull and his Jamaican counterpart Neville Gallimore amongst others. The OECS had still not received a definite answer from the U.S. and had grown agitated. Adams had cabled Washington the previous day to report that the OECS "felt they must do something about it on their own if the U.S. was not going to participate."[70] Charles was similarly concerned by Washington's procrastination: "all the way going I was thinking, 'we must hurry the Americans up, if they're going to come with us, we must hurry them up'."[71] The Caribbean leaders knew that they had to convince McNeil of the need for action. McNeil came to verify from an independent and external viewpoint the OECS request and to ensure that the U.S. embassy had not "gone native" in recommending that Washington support the request and to that end he came "appropriately skeptical."[72]

From Nebraska to Bridgetown

As the crisis in Grenada unfolded it became clear to Washington that the embassy in Bridgetown, Barbados, would play a major role in relaying the views of the Eastern Caribbean countries. However, the State Department noticeably lacked

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[70] Hardt, "Grenada Reconsidered," p. 303.

[71] Higbie, *Eugenia*, p. 230. Motley confirmed that the U.S. almost had to drag Charles back from acting alone. Telephone interview with Motley.

[72] Interview with Flower. Bish also thought McNeil was skeptical. Interview with Bish.

complete confidence in the U.S. ambassador Milan Bish. Bish was a Nebraskan businessman with friends in Washington D.C.; he was a staunch Reaganite and a heavy contributor to the 1976 and 1980 campaign coffers. The reward was an ambassadorship in the quiet diplomatic backwater of Barbados in late summer 1981.

At the State Department there was a certain "skepticism" about Bish's abilities. For his part Bish believed he was there to serve the President above all. As a political appointee he was not concerned about his future career in government and was therefore very candid.[73] In his memoirs Shultz is particularly harsh on Bish:

> We found that Bish had recently prohibited embassy political and U.S. Information Agency officers from even visiting Grenada to do the normal contact and reporting work. His rationale. . . seemed to be: these are communists; therefore, they are evil and not trustworthy; therefore we shouldn't talk to them. . . The upshot was that we had neither current information nor good contacts with whom to talk.[74]

The ambassador was never accredited to Grenada by Washington, although many other embassy officers were. The embassy maintained chiefly consular-level links. Bish did view the PRG as Communists and was not sanguine about embassy foreign service officers' suggestions that consular and reportage trips to Grenada be increased, but he never banned it as Shultz claims.[75]

As the crisis broke, Bish was instructed to use the OECS meeting on Friday, October 21, to approach the Heads of Government to discuss Grenada and:

> to advise of our [U.S.] willingness to consider supporting others in an effort to restore freedom to the Grenadian people, but only after a strong request from

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[73] Interview with Bish. Doubts about the "outspoken" ambassador led the State Department to send an emissary from the Bureau of American Republic Affairs (ARA) to "check Bish out"; he reported back that nothing was amiss at the embassy. Interview with Flower. Bish was able to rely on his competent DCM Ludlow Flower.

[74] Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 327.

[75] Kurze letter, August 20, 1995. Other interviewees concur with this. Bish admits that he was dismayed that embassy staff had been discussing the need to increase travel to Grenada behind his back but that was all. Interview with Bish.

our friends and after knowing what kind of forces others are willing to commit.[76]

As we have seen, Bish intervened in the OECS proceedings to phone Antigua's Vere Bird to persuade him to withdraw Lester Bird's opposition to an intervention. Washington felt that Bish was "out of his depth" and possibly "exceeding his instructions"; there was concern that Bish was "too readily committing us [Washington] to a course we might not be able to pursue or defend."[77] Indeed, by Thursday, October 20, the very next day after Bishop's death, Bish had cabled Washington to express his "strong conviction that if we must, and we may have to, we should: (1) evacuate American citizens, by force if necessary and (2) depose the thugs who have taken over, and (3) restore Grenada as a free society."[78] As one participant recalled, Bish was ready to act without all the facts, essentially an "intervention on principle."[79]

In July 1983 Charles Gillespie had arranged a familiarization tour of the region as part of his new job as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. His presence in the Caribbean that October was coincidental and a bonus for his boss, Tony Motley, who wanted someone more professional at the embassy to provide a situation report. Gillespie was "Motley's man" and it has been suggested that once in Barbados he "ran the show." Bish had no problems with Gillespie's presence and was glad of the help as the embassy lacked the manpower. Gillespie offered his advice and

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[76] Department of State, "Consultations Chronology," n.d., p. 1.

[77] William Russell Nylen, *United States-Grenada Relations, 1979-1983: American Foreign Policy towards a "Backyard" Revolution*, Pew Case Studies in International Affairs: Case 306 (Washington D.C.: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, 1988), p. 34. According to Nylen, Gillespie cabled a similar assessment to Washington.

[78] Milan Bish, secret telegram to Secretary of State, "Subject: Ambassador's Assessment of the Situation on Grenada," 200749Z, October 1983, Bridgetown 06393, p. 3.

[79] Telephone interview with Frank McNeil, December 13, 1995.

opinion and handled most of the late night meetings, along with Flower, due to Bish's poor health, but ensured that the ambassador was kept informed of developments.[80] He was not sent to replace Bish though. In a similar move, ambassador Frank McNeil was dispatched to Barbados as someone who was "not expected to salivate at the notion of sending in troops"[81] to "check Bish out" and confirm the embassy's reports that the OECS were champing at the bit.

Bish's handling of the SGU has come under scrutiny. Beck states that on Wednesday 19, October, on his own initiative Bish phoned SGU's Chancellor in New York Charles Modica to persuade him to fly to Barbados and publicly request intervention.[82] Bish did not recall doing this and other embassy officials were extremely skeptical that it occurred. Motley had assigned Grenada Task Force member Richard Brown to handle Modica. A call for intervention that early would only have served to panic the students. According to McNeil, Bish dealt with SGU rather badly, tending to get into shouting matches with officials instead of explaining that the U.S. would have to make its own assessments of the situation.[83]

In retrospect Bish's performance during the crisis was perfectly adequate; his reports to Washington may have been enthusiastic in tone but they did not distort the strength of feeling amongst the Eastern Caribbean countries. McNeil's visit validated Bish's reportage; he spoke to the same people and came to the same conclusions: the Eastern Caribbean nations were united in their support for U.S. action and were

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[80] Interview with Gillespie.

[81] Nylen, *United States-Grenada Relations*, p. 34.

[82] Beck, *The Grenada Invasion*, p. 103.

[83] Telephone interview with McNeil.

ready, with the U.S., to share the inevitable "knee-jerk" type criticism that an intervention would draw from various quarters.[84]

Without a Doubt: McNeil Meets the Caribbean Leaders

The meeting began with McNeil emphasizing that the Caribbean request was under "active consideration" in Washington but no final decision had been made. The initiative for military action had to originate with the Caribbean leaders and they would have to take the lead. McNeil stressed that whilst Eastern Caribbean concerns about the threat to regional security were understandable the U.S.' main concern was the safety of its citizens. Adams picked up on this and asked whether "the restoration of Grenada to a constitutional government could be a legitimate U.S. goal."[85] The emissary told Adams that "we [the U.S.] might be supportive of such a policy objective but only if set by local initiative and fully supported at the local and regional level."[86] Aware that U.S. diplomats had met with an RMC official over the past two days, Adams wanted to know what would happen if the RMC offered safe passage for U.S. citizens; would Washington's inclination to help wane?[87] As an emissary, McNeil had no authority to speculate and simply restated that Washington's paramount worry was the citizens, but reassured Adams that they were also concerned about Grenada and the restoration of the rule of law, although the Eastern

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[84] Kurze letter, March 11, 1996.

[85] Milan Bish, secret telegram to Secretary of State, "Subject: Uncleared Informal Minutes of Meeting Between Ambassadors Bish and McNeil with West Indian Heads of Government to Discuss Grenada Situation," 252203Z, October 1983, Bridgetown 06654, section 1, p. 3.

[86] Ibid., section 1, p. 3.

[87] Ibid., section 1, p. 3.

Caribbean leaders would have to lead the way on this. McNeil later recalled that judging from the signals the RMC's actions emitted no such decision was necessary.[88]

McNeil told the leaders that if there was to be U.S. involvement an appropriate and official method for the OECS to request assistance, a written invite, would be essential for the record. Adams revealed that they had been "grappling" with the problem all afternoon. He was happy to "go along with whatever language and content met the needs of the OECS and would be favorably received by the United States."[89] McNeil had brought a Washington-written draft invite but felt it was badly worded and its use would cast doubt over the origins of the invite. He would not have mentioned the draft but discovered that Gillespie had already apprised the Caribbean leaders of it and so they asked to see it. McNeil let them peruse the draft but told them they could produce a better version.

Prime Minister Seaga commented that McNeil's draft seemed to focus on the "vacuum of authority" in Grenada as a justification for action. Seaga argued that the world leftist movement would quickly condemn an intervention and therefore it was necessary to rely on the best argument for intervention: foreign interference. In Seaga's mind:

> the overthrow of Bishop was accomplished by forces hostile to the values of the Caribbean and coming from outside the region. . . the Russians and Cubans took over Grenada in order to now have complete control over the island as a platform to project their power into the Caribbean.[90]

Seaga also explained that if he contributed 150 soldiers as part of a Caribbean force and 30 were killed an abstract justification such as a "vacuum of authority" would be

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[88] Telephone interview with McNeil.

[89] Bish, "Subject: Uncleared Informal Minutes," section 1, p. 4.

[90] Ibid., section 1, p. 4.

incomprehensible to the Jamaican populace. What he wanted was "a tough, believable justification like foreign intervention to make his case at home."[91] He reiterated his position strongly several times throughout the meeting.

The other leaders did not doubt Soviet and Cuban involvement but as Adams pointed out, at this stage their precise role was ambiguous and there was a lack of hard evidence.[92] McNeil asked Seaga to elaborate on his claims of external interference; Seaga told McNeil that there had been much communication between Grenadian and Jamaican Marxists and that there had been constant activity at the Soviet embassy in Kingston.[93] Possibly to appease Seaga, McNeil acknowledged that "it could be said that foreign interference on Grenada provided the ambiance even if not the spark for the violence and collapse of authority."[94] Adams, like Charles a lawyer by training, explained to the Americans that Article 8 of the OECS Charter provided for "the possibility of a preemptive strike by member countries in the interest of their collective security"[95] and would therefore legitimize any action. He proposed that human rights violations on Grenada should be stressed and that the OECS' letter should quote from the Charter as much as possible as its validity relied

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[91] Ibid., section 3, p. 2. McNeil reassured Seaga that it would make little sense exposing inexperienced regional forces to the same risks as experienced U.S. forces; Crist elaborated by explaining that the type of intervention under consideration would reply on "overwhelming force" which only the U.S. could provide. Ibid., section 3, p. 3.

[92] Adams told McNeil that he saw "a typical Soviet footprint in the fact that the previous political arrangement between the factions of the PRG had now come apart in violent ideological warfare. . . a typical Russian tactic for destabilization." He felt that the Cubans "might be as shocked as others by the brutality of the violent schism now apparent in the New Jewel Movement." Ibid., section 2, p. 4.

[93] Ibid., section 2, p. 3.

[94] Ibid., section 2, p. 4.

[95] Ibid., section 2, p. 4.

heavily on it.[96] The Americans accepted this as a reasonable approach to the situation. Adams deputized his Foreign Minister Louis Tull to chair a drafting committee on the spot to prepare another draft. They returned about forty minutes later with the new document and after a few minor amendments it was approved by the Caribbean leaders.

Another topic of discussion was Montgomery's meeting with Governor-General Scoon that afternoon. According to McNeil the fact of Montgomery's visit was known but not the substance or result of the meeting.[97] As Adams later argued, "Scoon was the only one who, in addition to any treaty rights which might and did exist, could issue a formal invitation to foreign countries."[98] Consequently Washington figured it would be expedient to discover Scoon's views prior to any intervention. At some time that Sunday, McNeil received a cable instructing him to "ask OECS military representatives if it would be possible to communicate with Governor-General Scoon in advance of military operations to elicit a request for military assistance from Scoon."[99] They believed it might make things easier if Scoon characterized the situation as an emergency and his request a cry for help.[100] There

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[96] Bish, "Subject: Uncleared Informal Minutes," section 2, p. 4.

[97] Telephone interview with McNeil. However, Montgomery had returned to Barbados several hours before McNeil's meeting and it is quite possible that Scoon's request had been conveyed to the meeting's participants and was subsequently discussed.

[98] "Full Text of Speech of the Prime Minister of Barbados," p. 38.

[99] Department of State, "Consultations Chronology," p. 6. Following up on this the next day the State Department provided the text of a draft letter the OECS might want to send to Scoon to elicit a request. The draft contained an "assurance that any request received from the Governor General would be kept private until he is safe" and promised "assistance as long as necessary to permit the people of Grenada to reconstitute governmental institutions." Ibid., p. 6.

[100] Interview with Gillespie. Deputy Secretary of State Dam later stated that Scoon's request "carried exceptional legal and moral weight." "Statement of Hon. Kenneth W. Dam," U.S. Congress, *The Situation in Grenada*, p. 5.

was a feeling that Scoon's request would be important at some stage but Washington was not going to hold its breath waiting for it. The Caribbean leaders probably reasoned that if Washington had an invitation from a Head of State it might make their final decision easier and quicker.

Prime Minister Adams took the opportunity to remind the group of two examples of Grenada's overt aggression against St. Vincent: the Union Island uprising in 1981 and later an armed PRA incursion onto one of St. Vincent's Grenadine islands in pursuit of escapees. Reflecting on the years since the Grenadian revolution in 1979, Adams told the other leaders:

> we all knew what Bishop was all about from the very beginning. . . we knew that the instability introduced into our sphere of small parliamentary democracies by Bishop's unconstitutional takeover would ultimately lead to where we are today.[101]

Eugenia Charles was especially conscious of the security threat having been the target of several coup attempts. McNeil posed several questions:

> Was resistance to the hardline faction growing on the island? Was a civil war on Grenada likely? In the event of such a conflict, what was the probability that the communist forces would prevail? How would the Soviets and Cubans react in the event of a civil war?[102]

The leaders replied that a bloody civil war appeared likely and that the Soviets and Cubans would become involved. They also revealed that Coard's car had been seen daily at PRA headquarters and that in due process he would probably reappear as a Communist puppet leader.[103] Eventually, the leaders argued, democracy in the entire region would be undermined.

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[101] Bish, "Subject: Uncleared Informal Minutes," section 3, p. 2.

[102] Beck, "The McNeil Mission," p. 101.

[103] Bish, "Subject: Uncleared Informal Minutes," section 3, p. 3.

Another question McNeil posed was the likely reaction of Grenadians to an intervention. Latin American countries in general had a natural antipathy towards U.S. interventionism in the hemisphere. Seaga and Adams both asserted that anti-Cuban sentiment on the island was growing, as was pro-U.S. sentiment. The Prime Ministers pointed out that during the demonstrations on Wednesday, October 19, Grenadians had carried banners reading "America we love you." McNeil was assured that an intervention would be welcomed. Adams astutely commented that "the U.S. is so used to dealing with countries where the U.S. is unpopular that it may not know how to deal with countries where it is popular or at least not unpopular."[104]

The Caribbean leaders raised the question of what McNeil termed the "endgame." They feared the U.S. would secure their students and then leave, rather than staying to improve conditions in Grenada. Post-intervention elections would be an opportunity to provide a firm base for democracy. There was some difference of opinion over the timetable for elections. Seaga did not favour early elections because he felt there were too many problems on Grenada and that "to do it [elections] right would take time. Not to do it right would risk a return of the Russians and Cubans."[105] Adams acknowledged Seaga's point but suggested that:

> an early election would be desirable because while the U.S. intervention on Grenada would be very popular he didn't want to see the purity of the motive come to be questioned in a long and drawn-out interim government and election process.[106]

A timetable of six months was eventually agreed upon. The leaders also emphasised that Eric Gairy would not be permitted to have any political role in elections.[107]

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[104] Ibid., section 3, p. 4.

[105] Ibid., section 4, p. 2.

[106] Ibid., section 4, p. 3.

Repeating that Washington had not made a final decision yet, McNeil told the leaders that he thought that Washington would be "willing to provide technical assistance in this area to assure an early and fair election" and that "it would be very important for there to be good effective international supervision of the election in order that its fairness could not be later questioned."[108] McNeil raised the subject of an interim government should intervention occur and if the Governor-General would be a suitable figure to head it. Adams indicated that if it came to intervention Scoon would be the sole remaining legitimate authority and a "good prospect" to form an interim government, one that had a strong anti-Gairy and anti-Bishop bias.[109]

A final topic of discussion was what to do with the Cubans, Soviets, Libyans and other Eastern bloc officials on Grenada and also the RMC and NJM members. Adams asked McNeil if Washington had any thoughts about the Cubans on Grenada and if they should be allowed to complete the airport project. McNeil had discussed this subject in Washington before he left but had not received exact instructions beyond a general "get them out of there" brief.[110] He thus recommended that all the Soviets, Cubans, Libyans and Eastern Bloc nationals should be invited to leave on the first available transports. Charles was characteristically adamant on the subject: "The Russians, Cubans, Libyans --- out!"[111]

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[107] Ibid., section 4, p. 3. Charles went as far as to propose that the first law to be passed by the new government should be to prohibit Gairy from ever returning. Adams agreed with Charles' sentiments but questioned the legality of such a measure; he instead suggested an unwritten secret protocol.

[108] Ibid., section four, p. 3. McNeil apparently made a hypothetical offer of $750,000 of assistance which Adams readily accepted.

[109] Ibid., section 4, p. 3.

[110] Telephone interview with McNeil.

[111] Bish, "Subject: Uncleared Informal Minutes," section 4, p. 4.

It was decided that the PRA would be disarmed and disbanded although the police force, who were less politicized, were to be retrained. In the case of the RMC itself McNeil proposed two options: trial and punishment or exile. Once again Seaga took the hardest line by suggesting that show trials would be useful for public education but it appears the majority favoured the traditional form of justice: arrest, trial and conviction according to the law.[112] The meeting then concluded with McNeil yet again underlining that no final decision had been made[113] but that he would indicate to Washington the need for a quick decision either way. The Americans then returned to the embassy.

Judging by the comprehensive nature of the discussions, the Caribbean leaders knew this meeting was crucial in securing U.S. assistance. As one participant recalled, the leaders "wanted it [an intervention] badly."[114] Washington's concern was that the Caribbean countries would not stand up to be counted in the aftermath of intervention when they had time to reflect upon everything in the cold light of day.[115] As McNeil realized a mere ten minutes into the meeting these concerns were unfounded; everybody was deadly serious and "no one expressed second thoughts."[116]

At 11:00 p.m. Major General Crist met with Caribbean military officials at Barbadian Defense Force headquarters to be briefed on the military situation and

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[112] Ibid., section 5, p. 3.

[113] Unknown to all the participants Reagan had made a "tentative" decision to respond to the OECS request during the meeting.

[114] Telephone interview with Bish, November 2, 1995.

[115] Telephone interview with McNeil.

[116] Ibid.

discuss contingency plans. He reminded the officials that U.S. participation should not be presumed. Crist was told:

> we are very small countries. We do not have military forces. We are basically police and there they are with weapons, troops. They have murdered their leaders. What can you do? Can you help us?[117]

Part of Crist's mission was to convey that the Eastern Caribbean ought to be willing to contribute forces as a sign of seriousness and to "ensure that in the event of an invasion, Caribbean troops would quickly be introduced to the island, thus facilitating an early U.S. withdrawal."[118] Back in Washington prior to his trip, Crist had reflected the JCS' position that all this was "a lot of effort for something that probably won't happen" because the RMC would "bottle out."[119] Once in Barbados, Crist found it was a "different world" and he was highly impressed by the Caribbean leaders. He finally returned to the embassy around 1:00 a.m.

"Get the Hell Out"

Sometime on Sunday evening Budeit and Chafin met with the students to conduct a census to discover how many wanted to leave. When Kurze and Flohr had arrived on the Saturday they reported that about fifteen percent of the students wanted to leave. Kurze and Flohr had not encouraged the students to leave and reassured them that their best course of action would be to stay put for the moment. When Budeit and Chafin met and addressed the students they painted a grim picture of imminent

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[117] U.S. Congress, *U.S. Military Actions in Grenada*, p. 42. Castro knew this and communicated it to the RMC: "Jamaica, Saint Lucia and Barbados have no forces to invade Grenada, and in that case they [RMC] could defeat them with their own forces without greater difficulties." "Statement by the Cuban party," Madan (ed.), *Statements by CUBA*, p. 9.

[118] Beck, "The McNeil Mission," p. 101.

[119] Interview with Flower.

danger; Chafin believed it was important to emphasize that if a peaceful evacuation was arranged the students should not reject the opportunity lightly because this situation was serious and with the possibility of military action things could become very dangerous.[120] Bourne observed that "as the students asked questions. . . the U.S. diplomats made it clear they felt the wise course was to get off the island."[121] Critics have suggested that Budeit and Chafin's tone appeared "more oriented toward worrying them about their future safety than to ascertain their honest views."[122] In fact Budeit and Chafin's advice reflected their own personal feelings; after their eventful arrival they had grown very concerned about their own safety.[123]

The diplomats may have unsettled the students but they emphasized that the students had to make up their own minds. As one student commented, "they really left it up to us to decide if we were in danger. . . The [School] administration was attempting to quell our fears, but not giving us any real information."[124] Irrespective

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[120] Interview with Chafin.

[121] Edward Cody, "Medical School Director Says He Backs Invasion," *Washington Post*, November 1, 1983, p. A12. Apparently when Budeit was asked by a student what he would do in their situation he replied "Get the hell out." Kwitny, *Endless Enemies*, p. 413. Having previously reassured the students to keep them calm, Flohr was stunned by the diplomats encouraging students to leave. Interview with Flohr. On Monday, October 24, Budeit visited the married students homes near RFG. He explained the danger they would be in in the event of a countercoup because RFG would be a prime target. Budeit admitted "scaring the hell out of those people" and when he saw them later "they were weeping, crying. . . I stayed the hell away from them. I had done my bit, and gotten them out of there." Ibid., p. 414. It would seem that the diplomats never discussed evacuation arrangements with SGU officials. Telephone interview with Peter Bourne.

[122] Maurice Waters, "The Invasion of Grenada, 1983 and the Collapse of Legal Norms," *Journal of Peace Research* 23 (1986): 243.

[123] Telephone interview with David Ostroff, October 27, 1995.

[124] David Michael Ettlin, "Invasion abruptly ended medical students' doubts," *Baltimore Sun*, October 30, 1983, p. 3. At the embassy in Barbados a student who had left Grenada by boat on Friday, October 21, told officials that "many medical students were terrified and Bourne [was] not being honest with the students on the political danger." U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on Foreign Affairs. *Miscellaneous Legislation Concerning Various Foreign Policy Issues* (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1984), p. 64.

of the extent to which the diplomats convinced the students they were in danger, there was another cause of the increasing numbers of students who wanted to leave. With the conclusion of the CARICOM meeting people on Grenada heard:

> rumours from outside radio, mostly Caribbean stations, that the Caricom countries were going to invade Grenada. That stirred up the students quite a bit. They were scared, and that jumped the number who wanted to leave to over 50 percent by Monday.[125]

Upon telexing the U.S. embassy and inquiring about the veracity of these reports, Bourne was given a "No comment" reply. He then contacted Chancellor Modica in New York to see if he could get any information from the Washington end. Modica telexed back that an intervention was unlikely. Bourne did not believe that the Caribbean countries could arrange an intervention so quickly and "pooh-poohed" the idea.[126] Nonetheless, the prospect of military action now loomed one step closer to the students, the majority of whom had been uncertain as to what was going on until then.

The View From SGU

With the question of student safety one of the central rationales for intervention it is interesting to note that SGU officials in Grenada and New York maintained until after Urgent Fury that intervention was unnecessary. It is arguable that as the School had been there since 1976 they were as "in touch" as anyone. SGU had enjoyed good relations with the PRG. As Maurice Bishop had explained:

> Our government. . . is very happy to have the school with us in Grenada. We are very conscious of the benefits which the school has brought to our people and our

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[125] Kwitny, *Endless Enemies*, p. 414.

[126] Bourne, "Revolution, Intervention and Nutrition," p. 24. According to one student, "the only reason why one hundred percent of the students didn't want to go right away is because we didn't know what was going on." ABC News, Thursday, October 27, 1983, *Weekly News Summary*, Week of 24-30 October 1983, WHCAV, RRL, Tape IV.

> country over the years, in terms of jobs, in terms of foreign exchange, in terms of direct government revenues. . . [and] in several intangible ways also.[127]

In his dealings with the RMC, Bourne got the impression that they were struggling and, with Coard reviled by the populace, Austin had been thrust into the limelight "unprepared, unequipped and on his own."[128] It would seem that Austin respected Bourne's judgment and at one stage simply asked "Tell me what to do. I need advice."[129] Modica, who relied heavily on Bourne's reports from Grenada, felt that:

> the negotiations I had set up with the U.S. Embassy and the Grenadian officials were working. They did produce two people to leave (sic) the country on Monday, and I felt that would open up on Tuesday and Wednesday and Thursday, we could probably get most, if not all, the students who wanted to leave off of the island.[130]

Bourne met with the students twice each day, keeping them informed of the situation and getting their reactions which were "pretty controlled"; he advised them that he believed it was "pretty safe" and that the School had been through one revolution in 1979.[131] Modica and Bourne were confident that the economic impact of the School

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[127] Leventhal, "Entrepreneurship and Nation Building," p. 264. Bourne estimated that SGU contributed around five million dollars to the Grenadian economy per annum and was the largest employer on the island. "Statement of Dr. Geoffrey Bourne," U.S. Congress, *U.S. Military Actions in Grenada*, p. 185. The emergence of the hardliners in the NJM makes it important to note that they only tolerated the School, aware of the security risk it was and also the Leninist contradictions of having a capitalist transnational business contributing so much to the economy. Leventhal, "Entrepreneurship and Nation Building," p. 281.

[128] Telephone interview with Peter Bourne.

[129] According to Peter Bourne, Austin sent a cable to former Carter official Robert Pastor in Washington D.C. saying that he was ready to do whatever was necessary to resolve the impending conflict. Telephone interview with Peter Bourne.

[130] "Grenada Aftermath/Coronary Bypass Report/Argentine Elections," *The MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour*, October 27, 1983, transcript no. 2109, p. 2.

[131] Kwitny, *Endless Enemies*, p. 413.

on the island's economy would guarantee its future, even under hard-line rule.[132] By Sunday, October 23, Bourne sensed that events were moving inexorably towards intervention and he tried forlornly to stall this process; his concern was that should an intervention occur students would most likely be killed which was exactly what an intervention was supposedly meant to prevent.[133]

A Willingness to Surrender?

That same evening Cornwall sought out Budeit, Chafin and Flohr to plead for talks to avoid bloodshed; a similar message was sent to Tom Adams.[134] The diplomats were in periodic contact with Gillespie at the embassy keeping him up to date. Upon hearing of Cornwall's request, Gillespie instructed Chafin to take the line that Washington was interested in seeking a way out without military intervention to see what type of flexibility Cornwall would offer in response.[135] Chafin and Flohr met Cornwall who "looked like death warmed up" as rumours of divisions within the RMC and Austin's death circulated. Cornwall presented details of a civilian cabinet that would be set up and told the diplomats that he was willing to "entertain suggestions as to the make-up of the cabinet."[136] Some have argued that this was a missed opportunity but the details Cornwall had of the cabinet suggested they would

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[132] As Leventhal speculates, "It is likely that the paranoid Coard faction, with its monopoly over the security apparatus, saw the medical school as a much more real and immediate security threat. From the perspective of internal security, therefore, it appears medical school prospects would have been unpromising under hardline rule." Leventhal, "Entrepreneurship and Nation Building," p. 284. Leventhal concludes that "the economic argument may still have held sway in a post-Bishop environment, despite the ideological unpalatability." Ibid., p. 285.

[133] Telephone interview with Peter Bourne.

[134] Bish's notes.

[135] Interview with Chafin.

[136] Kwitny, *Endless Enemies*, p. 416.

be puppets and merely a cosmetic change.[137] The RMC had already spoken to businessmen, Scoon and Bourne about establishing a civilian government and appeared serious although with the hopelessness of their situation becoming evermore apparent it could have been a stalling effort.

In an effort to establish who exactly was in command the diplomats asked if Coard was still alive or dead but Cornwall was non-committal. The gravity of the situation was communicated to Cornwall and he was advised that the RMC should be flexible. Chafin still felt that if the RMC had been willing to make concessions at that stage an intervention could possibly have been forestalled.[138]

Chafin and Flohr reminded Cornwall that they were there mainly to discuss the students. The use of the Cunard liner to evacuate them was raised but Cornwall evaded the issue, joking that he did not want them to drown. Whilst arrangements to evacuate those students who wanted to leave were discussed Austin phoned Bourne, complaining that Chafin and Flohr were insisting on military planes and helicopters to evacuate all the students, rather than the ten percent Bourne had estimated wanted to leave. According to Bourne the General was not pleased: "he [Austin] reacted very strongly to me and as a result of that I actually had grave doubts if they [the students] could have been gotten out."[139] Again Bourne acted as go-between, phoning Budeit to inform him of Austin's fears. The consul explained that they were only discussing what might be necessary if an evacuation had to be executed quickly.[140] Bourne related this to Austin who seemed to be placated.

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[137] Interview with Chafin.

[138] Ibid.

[139] "Statement of Dr. Geoffrey Bourne," U.S. Congress, *U.S. Military Actions in Grenada*, p. 177.

[140] Ibid., p. 193.

Back at their hotel Chafin and Flohr contacted the embassy to report that it was uncertain who was in charge of the RMC. Cornwall, or the RMC, or both, had proved inflexible during discussions and it appeared that they were determined to remain in power. This report, and subsequent ones, did nothing to deter intervention. At 10:00 p.m. Chafin and Flohr were visited by Cornwall again at their hotel. He looked "tired, eyes bloodshot, flexibility gone" and told the diplomats that the RMC had decided to retain its links with the Cubans and Soviets and that a diplomatic note would be delivered to them at 2:00 a.m. which:

> will request a clear, definite and immediate response regarding a U.S. commitment not to invade Grenada, will point out that Grenada is a sovereign nation, and will restate that recent events are an internal matter. The government will also point out that an invasion will be resisted to the last man.[141]

Reach Out and Touch Someone

At 6:10 p.m. an unusually well-informed RFG had announced that:

> Member countries of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, along with Barbados and Jamaica this afternoon took a decision to send military forces to invade Grenada and to call on foreign forces also to invade our country.
>
> The decision was opposed by Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, The Bahamas and Belize. However, some islands have already sent armed forces to Barbados as a jumping off point for this invasion of Grenada and units from Jamaica and Antigua are on their way to join them.
>
> At this time a warship is only seven and-a-half miles from Grenada, well inside our territorial waters. An invasion of our country is expected tonight.[142]

The broadcast was by turns bellicose and appeasing as it stated that the RMC were "prepared to fight to the last man and woman to defend our homeland, though it is equally prepared to hold discussions with any of these countries in order to find a

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[141] Secretary of State, secret telegram to all American Republic Diplomatic Posts, "Subject: Grenada Situation Report No. Eight," 241128Z, October 1983, Washington D.C. 302451, p. 1.

[142] "Invasion Fears," *Daily Nation*, October 24, 1983, p. 1. Adams for one, suspected that Forbes Burnham had leaked details of the CARICOM meeting to the RMC.

peaceful solution."[143] That evening the RMC dispatched a diplomatic note to the U.S. embassy in a desperate effort at self-preservation: it announced that any invasion would be viewed as "a rude violation of Grenada's sovereignty and of international law" and that "[t]he present situation in Grenada is of an entirely internal and domestic nature and presently peace, calm and good order prevailed." The embassy was assured that:

> the lives, well-being and property of every American and other foreign citizen residing in Grenada are fully protected and guaranteed by our government.
>
> However, any American or foreign citizen in our country who desires to leave Grenada for whatever reasons can fully do so using the normal procedures through our airports on commercial aircraft. As far as we are concerned, these aircraft can be regular flights or chartered flights and we will facilitate them in every way we can.[144]

The note was ignored;[145] events had overtaken any possibility of a peaceful solution to the RMC's predicament. The RMC also fired off a cable to the FCO, including a copy of the note to the U.S. embassy, requesting Britain to act to prevent an intervention.[146]

After the lengthy meeting that evening, McNeil called Motley in Washington to report that the Caribbean leaders were firmly behind their request. McNeil, Gillespie

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[143] Ibid. This suggests a RMC uncertain of what to do, possibly divided and feeling totally isolated from its neighbours.

[144] Gilmore, *The Grenada Intervention*, pp. 93-4. The note also quixotically detailed its plans for a civilian government which would "pursue mixed economy with state cooperatives and private sectors and would encourage foreign and local investment within the framework of the national interest of the country." Ibid. 94.

[145] The U.S. embassy finally replied at midnight on Monday, October 24, that under Grenada's 1973 constitution Governor-General Scoon was the "remaining legitimate authority, and not the ruling military council" and therefore the U.S. "could not respond to the message received, but reiterated U.S. concern over recent violence and the safety of American citizens on Grenada." "Press Briefing by Larry Speakes, 1:00 P.M., October 26, 1983," p. 9.

[146] The comedy of errors continued: the RMC was using an out-of-date fax number which had been reallocated to a plastering company, Scanplast. Scanplast contacted the FCO about the RMC fax and were told to "Put them in an envelope" and "leave them at the front desk." Sensing a lack of interest and urgency Scanplast decided to post the material. O'Shaughnessy, *Grenada*, p. 152.

and Flower then reviewed the latest intelligence on Grenada; things were happening very fast and McNeil wanted to wait and assess the situation more thoroughly. Gillespie called an increasingly impatient Motley to tell him that McNeil would call soon. At 11:30 p.m. McNeil spoke to Chafin on Grenada who told him that the island had become an "armed camp" with constant military activity. An atmosphere of fear was prevalent and several hundred students wanted to leave. Chafin reported Cornwall's dramatic plea for talks but that during the meeting he was initially interested in providing assurances about the students but subsequently backed away and became intransigent.[147]

McNeil cabled his appraisal to Washington:

> The new Grenadan (sic) government seems stupid as well as brutal. But they have put two and two together and come up with something near three and a half. They clearly expect the U.S. and the Caribbeans to come storming across.[148]

The RMC's plea for talks perhaps suggested a "willingness to surrender" but when the subject had come to light during McNeil's meeting with the leaders they 'wanted to charge ahead. Don't want to respond to Grenada's message. Only Adams even contemplates the notion of giving them an ultimatum.'[149]

McNeil suggested that if Washington could nail down who was actually in charge within the RMC an ultimatum might be possible. He outlined the case against such a move first:

-- Tip our hand and permit them to take hostages, kill political enemies or otherwise do things that would raise the potential loss of life.

-- Plays into the hands of what may simply be a ploy to buy time.

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[147] Telephone interview with McNeil.

[148] Milan Bish, secret telegram to Secretary of State, "Subject: Grenada: Request for Talks," 240639Z, October 1983, Bridgetown 06575, p. 2.

[149] Ibid., p. 2.

-- And, even if they are serious, would ultimately fail because they probably couldn't accept the Adams formula, the only one that would be acceptable to the Caribbeans and, we are sure, to the people of Grenada.[150]

In favour of the ultimatum was the fact that:

-- How could we turn down out of hand the possibility, though slim, of achieving our objectives without any bloodshed, which might include Amcits, bringing about public and congressional protest that we had needlessly gotten people hurt in order to exercise our military capabilities.[151]

McNeil did not believe the RMC would respond to an ultimatum but, following his instructions to be objective, advised Washington not to dismiss it out of hand:

It is a close call. I conclude that Washington should -- with Ambassador Bish and DAS Gillespie -- game plan a contingency scenario for a last minute ultimatum and consult it with Prime Minister Adams. . . so that Caribbeans (not yet the US) could go ahead with ultimatum if we judge that there is some prospect of success.[152]

It is doubtful that there were many supporters for an ultimatum by this stage; certainly not among the Eastern Caribbean leaders who had maintained constant pressure on the U.S. for assistance.

At 12:30 a.m. Tom Adams called the embassy; he told DCM Flower that the British High Commissioner had contacted him to inform him that during Montgomery's afternoon meeting with the Governor-General, Montgomery had received an oral request for OECS assistance. Flower conveyed the message to Gillespie and McNeil and after further discussion Motley was contacted in Washington.

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[150] Ibid., p. 3. Adams' ultimatum envisaged the RMC surrendering peacefully and therefore possibly going into exile rather than facing trial although this plan had its problems.

[151] Ibid., p. 3.

[152] Ibid., p. 4.

Motley viewed the Governor-General's request as an "added stimulus" and a "nice legal justification."[153] McNeil reaffirmed the conclusions of his earlier cable: the RMC believed an invasion to be imminent and were not keen to let the students leave, possible planning to use them as bargaining chips, and the situation on the island was deteriorating steadily. Recalling the Iran hostage crisis, he consequently:

> recommended sending in the troops, so long as it was done quickly before surprise was lost. In doing so, I was mindful of Teheran. . . It is far easier to prevent a hostage situation than to deal with it once it was consummated, and I judged the danger to the students was growing.[154]

Having made his recommendation McNeil was told that the military intervention would proceed as planned. Gillespie learnt of this later when Motley called to tell him that Washington felt that having a civilian in charge in Grenada after the intervention was essential and that he would be "it."[155] No final decision had been made though and a couple of fail-safe measures remained in place.

In the waters off Grenada the *USS Guam* moved within helicopter flight distance of Antigua. Instead of the State Department officials that had been expected, two liaison officers from CINCLANT were flown aboard with additional intelligence and a draft operation order for the assault on Grenada.[156] At this point D-Day was set for Tuesday, October 25, at 2:00 a.m.

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[153] Interview with Motley. Legally Scoon's request was an embellishment; even the Statement Department's Legal Advisor Davis Robinson conceded that the legal justifications for the intervention would have been no weaker without the request. Interview with Davis Robinson, August 17, 1994, Washington D.C.

[154] McNeil, *War and Peace*, p. 174.

[155] The job was originally offered to McNeil but he was not interested. Interview with Gillespie.

[156] Metcalf "assigned the amphibious force, now designated Task Force 124, the mission of seizing Pearls Airport and the port of Grenville, and of neutralizing any opposing forces in the area. Simultaneously, Army Rangers (Task Force 121) - together with elements of the 82d Airborne Division (Task Force 123) - would secure points at the southern end of the island, including the nearly completed jet airfield under construction at Point Salines. A carrier battle group (Task Force

Metcalf's Morning Meeting

As head of JTF 120 Metcalf wanted it understood that he would coordinate forces and tell commanders "what" to do rather than "how" to do it and to ensure he got this point across, and to meet his commanders "eyeball to eyeball," he arranged for a meeting of the available commanders at Norfolk on Monday, October 24, at 7:00 a.m.[157] The meeting was basically a preparatory one; in a frank and candid session participants discussed their problems and clarified their responsibilities.[158] McDonald began by stating, "[b]efore we get into the operational plan, everyone should bear in mind the strong possibility that we won't have to carry it out. The crisis is still being handled through diplomatic channels, and we are told it is very likely that the rebels will back down."[159] The discussion started with a review of the coup de main operation. The optimistic briefers assured the commanders that the opposition would melt away:

> Intelligence had portrayed the PRA as poorly armed and with such low morale that it was not expected to resist, and had portrayed the Cubans as not likely to fight. The intelligence depicted anti-aircraft defenses as three or four guns with

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20.5) and air force elements would support the ground forces." Spector, *The U.S. Marines in Grenada*, p. 5.

[157] Joseph Metcalf III, "Decision Making and the Grenada Rescue Operation," in James G. March, Roger Weissinger-Baylon and Pauline Ryan (eds.), *Ambiguity and Command: Organizational Perspectives on Military Decision Making* (London: Pitman, 1988), p. 283. Present at the meeting were Metcalf, McDonald, deputy commander of JTF 120 Major General Norman Schwarzkopf, commander of the 82d Airborne forces Major General Edward Trobaugh, commander of the Special Operations forces Major General Richard Scholtes, the JCS' Deputy Director for Plans and Policy Commodore Jack Darby and Craig Johnstone from the State Department. In a highly unusual arrangement State had sent Darby and Johnstone to ensure that the military did not find a reason to delay the operation.

[158] Interview with Johnstone.

[159] Norman Schwarzkopf with Peter Petre, *General H. Norman Schwarzkopf: The Autobiography: It Doesn't Take a Hero* (London: Bantam Press, 1992), p. 246. Johnstone apparently confirmed this although by this stage it was unlikely that a diplomatic solution was possible; the U.S. had accepted the OECS request, Scoon had made a request and the U.S. diplomats had reported back from Grenada that the RMC were unstable and the students in danger.

poorly trained crews.[160]

Major General Norman Schwarzkopf, deputy commander of JTF 120, was concerned about these assumptions and Major General Richard Sholtes, commander of the Special Operations forces, was worried about the deployment of the Rangers; they were due to parachute into Point Salines but he felt it would be safer if they could simply land at the airport. One SEAL team had been lost on Sunday evening when their boat foundered twenty-five miles off Grenada and Sholtes wanted a twenty-four hour delay to gather more intelligence. McDonald was amazed: "I can't believe what I'm hearing around this table. All you're going to face is a bunch of Grenadians. They're going to fall apart the minute they see our combat power. Why are we making such a big deal of this?"[161]

As the State Department representative, Craig Johnstone began to feel that nothing would get done at this rate. Whilst some military officials did have genuine fears about the potential opposition they would face, he felt that others would do anything to find a reason to halt, or delay, an operation.[162] Feeling that the military might conclude that it was impossible to act on Tuesday, October 25, Johnstone, supported by navy Commodore Jack Darby who courageously argued against CINCLANT and the JCS, countered that the size of Grenada alone made it ridiculous to say that the operation could not be done militarily.[163] Johnstone also told the group that Washington would oppose any delay because: "The Organization of

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[160] Marshall, "Urgent Fury," p. 14.

[161] Schwarzkopf with Petre, *General H. Norman Schwarzkopf*, p. 248.

[162] Interview with Johnstone.

[163] Ibid. Motley echoed this: "If the Pentagon can't knock it over overnight then it ought to disappear." Telephone interview with Motley.

Eastern Caribbean States, which asked us to intervene, is a shaky coalition at best. There's no telling how long it's going to support this thing."[164] This statement was most likely tailored for the audience; Johnstone and Darby had been specifically sent to ensure the military did not falter. The OECS were the strongest advocates of intervention and were keen that the U.S. should help.

After hearing Johnstone and Darby out, McDonald was convinced that Urgent Fury should proceed as planned although Sholtes did get H-Hour delayed by two hours until 4:00 a.m. Metcalf later postponed it again by one hour to 5:00 a.m. With this confirmed Johnstone outlined the political parameters of the operation: the removal of the RMC, the securing of the students and Governor-General Scoon. The students were the crucial factor. Failure to secure them or indeed the Governor-General would make the operation a political failure.[165] Other critical components were the rescue of political prisoners, who were thought to be at risk, and the use of the minimal level of force necessary.[166]

In Washington at a morning CPPG meeting the situation in Grenada had not appeared to worsen and no hostages had been taken. Nonetheless Weinberger argued in favour of an ultimatum rather than an intervention.[167] At noon Weinberger, having found no support for an ultimatum, met with Vessey at the Pentagon. Vessey was

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[164] Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 334.

[165] Interview with Johnstone.

[166] Adams had previously claimed that he had learnt of a number of political prisoners held in the condemned cell who were to be executed at an "early date." Hoyos, *Tom Adams*, p. 114. It transpired that the political prisoners were not in danger and therefore not a political priority and it would not have been unacceptable if fatalities had been incurred. Interview with Johnstone.

[167] Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 331. Weinberger's position was most likely the result of McNeil's report from Barbados.

told "Be sure we have enough strength and was authorized to use the 82nd Airborne as back-up if required."[168]

Meeting with the JCS

From 2:15 p.m. to 3:30 p.m. Reagan met with Weinberger and the JCS for a final technical planning meeting. News of the loss of one SEAL team had reached the White House and, according to McFarlane, "concern about the mission began to grow; we faced the possibility that our lack of knowledge about the beach and the level of resistance we might face could end up aborting the operation."[169] Despite this, when Reagan polled each member of the JCS they all assured him that the operation could be done, casualties were expected to be low and that they were ready to go. After the experience of Vietnam, and especially the failed Iran hostage rescue mission, the JCS also stressed that once the operation commenced it was important that the White House left the military to do their job.[170]

The JCS appeared more concerned about the political problems of an intervention. Vessey told Reagan that "there is a potential public opinion downside to this because of what happened to the marines."[171] He also allegedly cautioned Reagan against intervention because it would jeopardize the 1984 election. Reagan admonished him with the warning that if he heard anything like that again he would be looking for a new Chairman of the JCS.[172] Reagan had considered the political costs of action in

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[168] Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, p. 77.

[169] McFarlane and Smardz, *Special Trust*, p. 264.

[170] Telephone interview with Meese.

[171] Meese, *With Reagan*, p. 218.

[172] Interview with Bish.

the previous few days and had not been dissuaded;[173] he knew the cost of unpopular action but had made definitive action decisions since his days as a Governor in California.[174] The president simply asked the JCS, "Is there any military reason for not going ahead with the operation?"[175] The JCS replied "no."

The meeting concluded at 3:30 p.m. and a "semi-final military decision"[176] to intervene had been made. Weinberger concluded that "by this time it was clear to me from his [Reagan] comments and questions that the President had decided to move into Grenada unless something was done by Grenada to free the American students from danger."[177] The final "go" decision would be considered later that day.

Saying Good-bye to Seaga

That morning in Barbados McNeil and Gillespie met with Adams and Seaga, at the latter's request, at the airport for an hour before Seaga departed for Jamaica. Washington had not given the Caribbean leaders a final answer yet; Adams expressed the leaders satisfaction with the talks. He also played the Scoon card again, assuring the Americans that Scoon was prepared to cooperate and would issue a formal request for assistance from the OECS to establish a secure peace once he had been

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[173] Shultz speculated that Reagan's resoluteness was probably "bolstered by the fact that, by chance, he had been in Augusta with McFarlane and me, two strong supporters of the action, and therefore was insulated somewhat from the Pentagon's reluctance." Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 344.

[174] Telephone interview with Meese. As Cannon says, "California had been on the cutting edge of the peace movement. . . and the student protests against the Vietnam War had left a lasting impression." Cannon, *President Reagan*, p. 78. Reagan had also taken decisive action to end an air traffic controllers dispute with mass dismissals.

[175] Meese, *With Reagan*, p. 218.

[176] Shultz, "Secretary Shultz's News Conference," p. 70.

[177] Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, p. 77.

rescued.[178] Adams and Seaga agreed that the Caribbean troops participating would form the Caribbean Peace Force (CPF) and the U.S. would support them but not be a member. The two leaders suggested that "no provisional government can or should be established immediately" and that the OECS defence committee would work with the Governor-General and forces commander to direct activities on Grenada for one week.[179] Yet again McNeil could only reiterate that no final decision had been made but did deviate slightly from his instructions by revealing that he had "urged Washington to act immediately if it were to act at all."[180]

McNeil and Gillespie saw Seaga off and returned to the embassy. McNeil reported back to Motley in Washington and was told to collect Eugenia Charles from Guadeloupe.[181] Charles had returned to Dominica, via Antigua, after the McNeil meeting unsure if the U.S. would participate; she decided to travel to Washington to make a final effort to elicit help. Her message was that "it doesn't take much - just a cell of twenty or so determined men, and they wouldn't have any trouble finding recruits, to overthrow a state like Dominica" and that the PRA "has access to an airstrip more than 9,000 feet long. . . [and] clearly for military use. A thousand armed Cuban advisers are there to help them. That's what it's all about: to point a dagger at the Eastern Caribbean states."[182] When McNeil left Barbados around 5:00 p.m. with

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[178] Bish's notes. Crist was subsequently informed that Scoon's rescue would be a priority.

[179] Ibid.

[180] Beck, *The Grenada Invasion*, p. 166.

[181] Charles had been invited to Washington by Bish who was talked into it by Motley. Interview with Bish. Charles herself claims that she phoned the embassy to arrange a seat on McNeil's plane. Higbie, *Eugenia*, p. 231. Charles was flown to Guadeloupe by the French because Dominica's airport was too small to accommodate McNeil's plane.

[182] Gerson, *The Kirkpatrick Mission*, pp. 221-2.

the OECS' official request for assistance under Article 8, he had been told that unless he heard otherwise by 4:30 p.m., to inform Charles that Washington had acceded to the request at 6:00 p.m. Washington time.

Countdown in Grenada

By Monday, October 24, the RMC's situation looked grimmer than ever: the OECS and CARICOM had imposed sanctions; domestically and internationally the RMC was a pariah; Cuba had made it clear that it would not get involved in Grenada's internal political problems; fuel and money were running low and U.S. warships were massing on the horizon for an expected intervention. On Grenada a modicum of normality was restored; shops and offices reopened and classes at SGU resumed although schools remained shut and the curfew in place from 8:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m.

The embassy received the official results of the student survey that day, confirming earlier reports that about half wanted out. The U.S. diplomats also reported that they felt the RMC had "changed their tone," asking for six hours notice of evacuation flight schedules.[183] More ominously the embassy learnt that anti-aircraft guns had been positioned near the SGU campus and the Ross Point Inn.[184] The RMC had promised on Saturday, October 22, that Pearls would be opened on Monday for people who wanted to leave. As far as Washington was concerned there had been "lots of promises about the airport being open but very little action."[185] At a

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[183] Hedrick Smith, "Reagan Aide says U.S. Invasion Forestalled Cuban Arms Buildup," *New York Times*, October 27, 1983, p. A10.

[184] Telephone interview with Flohr.

[185] U.S. Congress, *U.S. Military Actions in Grenada*, p. 37.

press briefing Speakes asserted that "[n]o one has been leaving the island on regularly scheduled or chartered air flights. . . The situation remains unstable. Trouble and considerable uncertainty remain."[186] In fact four planes did land at Pearls that day.

During Congressional hearings, Congressman Stephen Solarz pressed Dam on whether the U.S. renewed its request for the students to be allowed to leave once it learnt about the planes that had left. Dam replied that: "I am not clear as to what extent we were aware. We were certainly aware planes were not getting in. To what extent we were aware the small planes had been able to get out. I do not know."[187] The embassy had initially been unable to confirm if LIAT would be able to operate flights if the curfew was raised on Monday, October 24. They were eventually assured that LIAT would have five flights available; the embassy simultaneously explored the possibility of chartering planes if LIAT was unable to carry all those who wanted to leave.[188] Undeniably the RMC had complicated and obstructed a straightforward evacuation, stalling for time, but it appears that air flights were hindered by the OECS countries as well.

At the OECS meeting on Friday, October 21, it was decided to suspend air and sea links with Grenada. On Saturday, October 22, the Canadian High Commissioner Noble Power had chartered a plane from LIAT having been assured by the RMC that

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[186] "Press Briefing by Larry Speakes, 12:16 P.M., October 24, 1983," no. 889-10/24, Container 34, *WHOPS*, RRL, p. 15.

[187] U.S. Congress, *U.S. Military Actions in Grenada*, p. 46. It is reasonable to assume that the embassy in Barbados was aware of which planes were leaving. Chafin returned from Grenada that afternoon with a Peace Corps couple and a pregnant lady and Consular Officer David Ostroff flew to Grenada to replace him. Bish's notes. The U.S. also has an agreement with Canada and Britain that if they have space on evacuation flights they will carry Americans so the embassy would have been aware of the progress of these planes. Telephone interview with Motley.

[188] Milan Bish, unclassified telegram to Secretary of State, "Subject: W/W: Amcits in Grenada," 241339Z, October 1983, Bridgetown 06547, p.1.

Pearls would be open on Monday. On Sunday, October 23, the Canadian flight was blocked by Adams. LIAT was apprised of the OECS decision to suspend all air and sea links and that they were "not allowed to make flights even for humanitarian reasons."[189] On Monday, October 24, minutes before the Canadian flight was due to leave for Grenada at 11:00 a.m., Barbados again blocked the flight. It was rescheduled for 2:30 p.m. only to be vetoed by the Heads of Antigua, Montserrat and St. Kitts.[190] After Charles' mediation the situation was resolved and the flight given the go ahead but it was too late to find a crew and too dark for planes to land in Grenada.[191] There was no question of a large-scale evacuation but the planes that did leave encountered no problems as a former U.S. government official Robert Myers recalled:

> There were no police, no military; we got to the airport, everything was calm. There were about one hundred people trying to get out on the few charter planes, but there was no rioting.[192]

By this time intervention was a virtual certainty and the departure of a few planeloads of people, even if it contradicted Washington's argument that the airport was closed and no one could leave, was not about to disrupt this.

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[189] Gilmore, *The Grenada Intervention*, p. 63. After British and Canadian pressure, flights on humanitarian grounds were permitted.

[190] Walkon and Montgomery, "Canada and the Grenada Invasion," p. 4. Vere Bird was the strongest opponent of flights to Grenada for any reason. Interview with Kelly. Canada suspected that U.S. and OECS had pressurised LIAT. "Ottawa probing if Grenada flights purposely scuttled," *Toronto Globe and Mail*, November 12, 1983, p. 1.

[191] Ibid., p. 1.

[192] "Grenada Aftermath/Marines' Families," *The MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour*, October 28, 1983, transcript no. 2110, p. 7. Myers was a retired director of the Social Security administration and had been hired by the OAS as a technical advisor to Grenada to aid the government with its National Insurance Scheme. Spencer Rich, "Ex-U.S. Official Saw Grenada After Coup," *Washington Post*, October 27, 1983, p. A10.

In addition to the four charter planes that flew in that day, a Cuban plane carrying Colonel Pedro Tortolo Comas, Carlos Andres Diaz Larranga and a twelve-man flight and security team arrived at 11.50 a.m.[193] Tortolo had been sent to take charge of the Cuban contingent and ensure that the RMC knew that the Cubans would only defend their positions, would not undertake other missions and advised that the area around SGU be demilitarized.[194] In Washington, Tortolo's arrival,[195] made Motley nervous; he knew of Tortolo's past and felt Cuba had "upped the ante,"[196] perhaps increasing the danger to the students.

At least one of the U.S. diplomats on Grenada now knew that an intervention would occur the next morning.[197] Discussion about evacuation had ceased. When Budeit met Cornwall at the Foreign Ministry at 4:00 p.m. he told him off-handedly

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[193] Cotman, *The Gorrion Tree*, p. 220. Tortolo was a senior figure in the Cuban military; he had graduated from the Soviet Army's Frunze Academy and Voroshilov Staff College. He had risen to prominence commanding Cuban forces in Angola and in October 1983 was Chief of Staff of the Army of the Centre in Cuba. He had also been head of the Cuban military mission on Grenada from 1981 until May 1983. Daniel P. Bolger, *Americans at War: 1975-1986, An Era of Violent Peace* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1988), p. 280. Larranga was a PCC expert on Grenada; he was killed during the intervention. Cotman, *The Gorrion Tree*, p. 220.

[194] "Statement by the Cuban Party," Madan (ed.), *Statements by CUBA*, p. 10. O'Shaughnessy writes that Tortolo's job was to instruct the Cuban contingent on what to do if they were attacked and that he was due to return to Cuba the next day. O'Shaughnessy, *Grenada*, p. 15.

[195] Tortolo's arrival was observed by Chafin who was at the airport to meet his replacement Consular Officer David Ostroff and return to Barbados with the RMC's diplomatic note. Ostroff thought Chafin looked "scared and upset" and Chafin felt that Ostroff, who had been told he was being sent to register students who wanted to leave, had been treated a bit unfairly but that he (Chafin) was glad to be out of the picture. In retrospect Ostroff concluded that the notable absence of efforts to evacuate the students peacefully meant that he and Budeit had been sent as "sacrificial lambs" for public relations purposes. Telephone interview with Ostroff.

[196] Motley never believed Castro would try to reinforce Grenada but he knew that Tortolo had been sent to establish good command and control over the available forces there and that the U.S. forces job had been made a little bit harder. Any delay would only give the Cubans more time to organize themselves. Telephone interview with Motley.

[197] John Kelly was told of the action and that it would be a "pushover." Interview with Kelly. Chafin left with a clear picture of the timing of the intervention and that it might be as early as that evening. Interview with Chafin.

that the U.S. had no evacuation proposal for the RMC because it had taken a long time to relay it to President Reagan. Cornwall was now "rather pressing" and more interested in getting an assurance that the U.S. would not intervene rather than guaranteeing the welfare of American citizens.[198] Probably in desperation Cornwall asked Budeit, "Can you tell me, really confidentially, what you advise me to do? Budeit could only reply, 'I can't advise you anything. Wait for the response'."[199] In fact, Navy SEALs had already carried out reconnaissance missions and Urgent Fury was scheduled for just before dawn the next day.

"News Distorted and Exaggerated"

Although lectures had resumed at SGU, about half of the students now wanted to leave. At a turbulent meeting at the True Blue campus with Bourne and other officials, they were ready to blame the SGU administration for the entire situation.[200] Bourne still felt the students were not in danger and telexed his son, Peter, in Washington to report that; "we are all still well and safe. News distorted and exaggerated."[201]

With rumours of intervention rife and U.S. warships on the horizon the RMC knew intervention was only a matter of time. Around 1:00 p.m. Bourne received a

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[198] Michael Ryan, "Scenes of a War," *People Weekly*, November 14, 1983, p. 42.

[199] Kwitny, *Endless Enemies*, p. 416. In a bizarre conclusion to the meeting Cornwall invited Budeit to a local disco. Budeit politely declined: "I can't go to discos together. Our president called them a gang of leftist thugs, although Cornwall seemed a nice enough guy and might not have murdered anyone. What he was trying to indicate was, 'We could be influenced along the way. There's no need to shake us up'." Ibid., p. 416.

[200] Bourne, "Revolution, Intervention and Nutrition," p. 24.

[201] Peter Bourne, "Was the U.S. Invasion Necessary?" section 4, p. 1.

call from a sombre Austin saying, "I want to thank you for all you have done and I am not going to forget it." Bourne concluded that:

> If General Austin knew an invasion was coming when he spoke to me, then I assume[d] that he meant by his statement that his revolutionary army would not harm the students or attempt to take them hostage. I believe this may have been the correct interpretation of what he said.[202]

Austin had previously asked Bourne frankly what he should do to defuse the situation and avert an intervention and possibly asked Bourne again, out of despair more than hopefulness by this stage. Bourne decided to contact his son in Washington who in turn contacted Robert Pastor and Sally Shelton, two other former Carter administration officials, to compose a "strategy paper."[203] The paper was telexed to Bourne from SGU's New York office at 11:00 p.m.; Bourne planned to present it to Austin the next morning but this initiative was overtaken by events.

Another futile cable was sent to London asking them to raise the crisis issue in the UN and to "condemn publicly this planned invasion which is a blatant violation of international law."[204] Once again though the RMC's plea ended up at the Scanplast offices.

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[202] "Statement by Dr. Geoffrey Bourne," U.S. Congress, *U.S. Military Actions in Grenada*, p. 178.

[203] Pastor was a member of Carter's NSC and Shelton was a former U.S. ambassador to Barbados. The trio suggested that any approach to Austin should be based on scepticism and designed to test his sincerity. The paper recommended "that Austin treat his regime as a transition to parliamentary democracy. . . he should make a statement aimed at regaining the trust of the CARICOM countries. Austin should say he was deeply hurt by what happened and explain the bloodshed as a necessary act to prevent Bishop from consolidating his control as a dictator. . . He should say he was determined to break with past. They recommended that he say nothing about the Cubans, but let things work themselves out with goals of democracy, early elections and a free press." Tyler, "The Making of an Invasion," p. A14.

[204] O'Shaughnessy, *Grenada*, p. 152.

Let's Go to Work

In Washington the decisionmaking had been done and attention focused on the handling of Congress, allies and the media. On Monday afternoon, around 4:00 p.m. to 4:30 p.m., a final NSPG[205] meeting was held where a final confirmatory decision was taken. Shultz, accompanied by Motley, presented a comprehensive ten-point checklist of "plans and actions" including: a signed, formal request from the OECS; a carefully prepared legal justification; press statements; a guarantee from the JCS and CINCLANT that the CPF would "land at a respectable time, not after everything was over"; a plan for immediate transition to civilian power; the establishment of an embassy on Grenada; and the dispatch of Larry Rossin, to join the SEALs rescuing Scoon, to brief him on the situation because "[h]is first public statements would be critical."[206] At 6:00 p.m. Reagan made an immutable decision. Motley recalls that everyone:

> gave their appropriate briefings, there were some questions raised by some of the members, exploratory, not aggressive type of questions. To the point. The president asked, made a couple of questions himself. . . then asked if there were any other questions, any other comments and there ensued a silence that probably lasted thirty seconds. . . And after this silence, he said, "O.K., let's go."[207]

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[205] Present were Reagan, Shultz, Weinberger, Vessey, McFarlane, Motley and a few others.

[206] Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 334. The importance of securing Scoon had increased after news of his request had reached Washington. According to Shultz, Rossin "was well known to the governor-general. We wanted to make sure that when the SEALs, in black uniforms and black faces, woke the governor-general up in the middle of the night and said, 'Hi there, we've come to help you,' he would see a friendly face." Ibid., p. 334. In fact Rossin had only met Scoon once and was not "well known" to him. Interview with Rossin.

[207] *PBS Frontline*, Operation Urgent Fury, p. 16.

A Letter From America

In London the British had been promised by Washington that they would be kept informed. At 10:00 a.m. (GMT) on Monday, October 24, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher chaired a cabinet meeting that reviewed reports of the OECS and CARICOM meetings, Montgomery's meeting with Scoon and news from Washington. Ministers made clear their opposition to intervention at this time and a list of legal, constitutional and practical difficulties of an intervention was compiled.[208] At 4:00 p.m. Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe was in the House of Commons; when asked by Shadow Foreign Secretary Denis Healey, "Can the Foreign Secretary assure us that there is no question of American military intervention on the island?" he could only reply, "I know of no such intention."[209] At 12:00 p.m. in Washington the British ambassador, Oliver Wright, communicated British reservations about an intervention to Jonathan Howe. Howe contacted Eagleburger who phoned Wright to express his disappointment and explain that a message would be sent to Downing Street.

At 2:00 p.m. McFarlane suggested to Reagan that: "This [Urgent Fury] is going to be something which may create some misgivings among allies who never want you to do anything but support Nato, and at any time you get very far off that course they begin to worry. So you ought to consult."[210] Thatcher could not be reached however.

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[208] Adkin, *Urgent Fury*, p. 123.

[209] U.K. House of Commons. Parliamentary Debates (Hansard). Sixth Series - Volume 47, Session 1983-84, October 24 - November 4, 1983, *Grenada*, p. 24, col. 27.

[210] Smith, *Reagan and Thatcher*, p. 126.

Probably as a result, at 2:15 p.m. Reagan sent a letter to Downing Street.[211] It cited Bishop's elimination, the violence and danger to U.S. citizens as causes for Washington's concern and advised London that the U.S. had received a request from the OECS and that it was understood that London had received such a request. The letter referred to emissary McNeil's meeting and that he had told Tom Adams that the U.S. "firmly endorses the political objectives of restoring order and security to permit the formation of a provisional government to hold elections."[212] Reagan concluded by stating that he was "giving serious consideration" to the OECS' request for assistance and that he would "welcome" Mrs. Thatcher's "thought and advice."[213]

Thatcher was at a farewell function for the U.S. Ambassador J.J. Louis when she was informed of Reagan's letter. She gave instructions for a reply to be drafted reiterating the British position on intervention. During dinner she received a phone call to return to Downing Street. Arriving back at around midnight, (GMT) she was informed that a second letter from Reagan had been received at 11:50 p.m.; the President had decided to "respond positively" to the OECS request.[214] She met with Howe, Heseltine and the military to prepare a reply to Reagan's letters. The reply was sent at 12:30 a.m. and made four points:

> First, the only credible justification for intervention would be the need to protect the safety of US and British citizens. Their lives were far more likely to be endangered by military action than the reverse. . . Secondly, we had particular and express reason to be fearful for the life of the Governor-General in such circumstances. Thirdly, we had received no formal request for help from the

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[211] The Department of State's "Consultations Chronology" records the letter being sent at 1:00 p.m. (GMT). As every other account cites the later time, including Thatcher and Howe's versions, I have retained the later time.

[212] Ibid., p. 5.

[213] Howe, *Conflict of Loyalty*, p. 329.

[214] Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years* (London: HarperCollins, 1993), p. 331.

> OECS, and most members of the CARICOM. . . had declared themselves against the use of force. Fourthly. . . the action would be criticized as an unjustified intervention by a Western country in the internal affairs of a small independent nation.[215]

Thatcher emphasized her own personal feelings: "I cannot conceal that I am deeply disturbed by your latest communication. You asked for my advice. I set it out and hope that even at this late stage you will take it into account before events are irrevocable."[216] In Washington that stage had already been reached.

In accordance with his instructions, McNeil informed Charles of the presidential decision shortly after 6:00 p.m. as their jet left Homestead AFB having refueled.[217] In Barbados, Bish informed Adams of the decision at 7:02 p.m. local time. Bish and Adams briefly discussed the U.S.' objectives: the protection of citizens and facilitation of the evacuation of those students who wished to leave; helping Grenada's neighbours to stabilize the island, working in close cooperation with the OECS forces; and importantly "the restoration of functioning institutions."[218] The continued uncertainty and potential for further violence on Grenada and its threat to regional security would be emphasized once the intervention was underway.[219]

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[215] Howe, *Conflict of Loyalty*, p. 330.

[216] Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years*, p. 331.

[217] According to McNeil, Charles was slightly surprised and said "My, that's fast!" Telephone interview with McNeil. In a recent biography Charles recalls saying: "Why didn't you tell me so in Guadeloupe before we went. . . that's what I'm coming up for man! I wouldn't have left home, I would have slept in Guadeloupe and gone home the next day! I wouldn't have come all the way up here with you! The only reason for coming was to make them hurry up and make a decision!" Higbie, *Eugenia*, p. 231. After letting her finish McNeil told Charles that she would be meeting Reagan the next morning.

[218] Bish's notes.

[219] Ibid.

Canadian efforts to evacuate their citizens had been unsuccessful and the Canadian government was not informed before the event. Jacques Roy, a Canadian embassy official was told by Motley at 7:00 p.m. that a number of options were being considered although no intimation about intervention was made.[220]

"Preposterous!"

The administration had stressed the need for secrecy and when the media picked up on a possible story on the eve of the intervention the response was emphatic. Around 5:00 p.m. that afternoon at Grantly Adams International Airport, Barbados, Sharon Sakson of ABC and Mark Potter, a correspondent, saw a U.S. jet land and fifty marines transfer to helicopters and fly off towards Grenada. An embassy spokesman offered that, "What you are seeing could be used as Part One of the option to effect a departure of the Americans (from Grenada) and to ensure their security."[221] CBS' Bill Plante approached Speakes with this story. Speakes checked with NSC Spokesman Robert Sims who contacted Poindexter. Poindexter's response was "Preposterous!" Speakes was told to "Knock it down hard."[222] Plante agreed not to pursue the story and relayed the message to colleagues in Washington and New

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[220] Walkon and Montgomery, "Canada and the Grenada Invasion," p. 4.

[221] "U.S. 'copters seen in Barbados; Grenada landings denied in U.S.," *Washington Times*, October 25, 1983, p. 1. An inquiry from ABC's Pentagon correspondent John McWerthy got the response that the marines were left behind by the carrier group going to Lebanon and were catching up with their ships. Mark Hertsgaard, *On Bended Knee: The Press and the Reagan Presidency* (New York: Shocken Books, 1991), p. 206.

[222] Larry Speakes, *Speaking Out* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1988), p. 152. As Pearson concludes the administration followed a pattern of deception throughout the period: "Its initial manifestation was secrecy -- hiding the U.S.' actual intentions. When information about the movement of forces could not be concealed, these were described in as innocent a fashion as possible. . . It was only when administration officials were directly asked whether there would be an invasion was the response to flatly lie, saying reports to that effect were 'preposterous'." Pearson, "The Betrayal of Truth and Trust," p. 177.

York.[223] As far as Speakes knew he was telling the truth; "I suspected we might send troops into Grenada at some point to rescue the American students, but I had no inkling that that was imminent, nor did I have any idea that we might launch a full-scale invasion."[224] Not only were the public misled but sections of the administration too.

Briefing Congress

At 8:00 p.m. the bipartisan leadership of Congress were assembled at the White House to be informed of the intervention by Reagan and his advisors.[225] The briefing was restricted to the bipartisan leadership because the administration felt it was "impossible to have any kind of leak-proof contact with Congress. Therefore, it was important to keep this [the Urgent Fury decision] as close hold (sic) as possible until Grenada went down."[226] The President opened the two hour meeting by announcing his decision to assist the OECS and that the troops would land at 5:00 a.m. the next morning. Reagan handed over to McFarlane who provided a background to the crisis: McFarlane reported that:

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[223] As Plante explained: "There are unwritten rules concerning the qualifiers and statements made by White House spokesmen and with that much of a knockdown, there wasn't much choice. . . you have to assume they're not lying." Hertsgaard, *On Bended Knee*, p. 214.

[224] Speakes, *Speaking Out*, p. 152. Speakes began to suspect something was going on around 8:00 p.m. when he saw the Congressional leaders arriving at the White House. He was only given the full story at 5:45 a.m. on the day of the intervention, with a thick wad of papers to digest before the 7:00 a.m. press briefing. Dismayed at being misled by his superiors, Speakes sent a strong message to Baker the next day warning that the credibility of the administration was at stake. Interview with Larry Speakes, July 27, 1994, Washington D.C. Baker later claimed that the "White House had been leaking like a sieve, and there were American lives at stake. . . It was my view that because the military operation depended on surprise, and lives therefore depended on surprise, we should make certain there was no risk of premature disclosure." Hertsgaard, *On Bended Knee*, p. 214.

[225] Present at the meeting were Speaker of the House Tip O'Neill, Senators Howard Baker and Robert C. Byrd, Congressmen Robert H. Michel and James C. Wright, Reagan, Shultz, Weinberger, Vessey, McFarlane, Meese, Deaver, Baker, Darman and Duberstein.

[226] Anderson, "National Decisionmaking and Quick-Strike Interventions," p. 79.

there were six hundred Cubans in Grenada, building an airport, and that Cuba had several hundred armed troops there as well. He added that some of Grenada's neighbors were afraid the island was being used for training terrorists. But the most pressing reason we were going into Grenada was to protect approximately a thousand Americans, most of whom were medical students.[227]

Weinberger and Vessey then detailed the military aspects of the operation. Reagan related the OECS' request and his belief that Washington had "absolutely no alternative but to comply,"[228] emphasized that the need for military action to avert a possible hostage situation and warned that "failure to act now. . . would mean the prospect of a permanent, Soviet-sponsored Cuban presence on the island."[229]

The Congressional leadership's response was unenthusiastic. Speaker O'Neill thought the intervention was premature and warned Reagan that he was "going to take a lot of heat over this. Americans don't want their kids put at risk for something that's none of our business."[230] A number of questions were asked but the Congressional leaders did not raise any strong objections. Eventually, O'Neill told Reagan that "if you are determined [to act] we'll support you."[231] Having been presented with a fait accompli the Congressional leadership left with the distinct impression that they had been "informed but not consulted."[232] Reagan had listened to their views but was not discouraged.

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[227] Thomas P. O'Neill, *Man of the House* (New York: Random House, 1987), p. 365.

[228] Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, p. 81.

[229] McFarlane and Smardz, *Special Trust*, p. 265.

[230] Ibid., p. 264. Elsewhere, McFarlane had said of the Congressional leadership that "not one of them supported it" and that O'Neill was "violently opposed" and thought it was a "nutty idea." Interview with McFarlane, *Oral History Project*, p. 149.

[231] Interview with Weinberger.

[232] Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 335. Senator Pell later raised the same point: "there is a world of difference between being consulted and being asked do we think this is wise or not, or being informed, saying we are doing this at 5:00 a.m. tomorrow." U.S. Congress, *The Situation in Grenada*, p. 11. In defence of the administration Hall argues that under the War Powers Resolution Congressional participation in a presidential decision to use force is unnecessary; "The President is

London Calling

In London it was clear that Washington had decided that, for whatever reason, it could not accede to Britain's desire to insert an SAS team to protect the Governor-General and prepare the ground for an intervention.[233] Thatcher decided to call Reagan on the secure telephone link between Downing Street and the White House; the 12:50 a.m. (GMT) call reached Reagan in the middle of the Congressional briefing. In his memoirs Reagan remembers that "[a]s soon as I heard her voice, I knew she was very angry" and that she asked him to call off the operation "in the strongest possible language."[234] Thatcher was uneasy about speaking at length on the phone, the conversation lasted only fifteen minutes, but apparently repeated the points she had made in her reply to Reagan's earlier letters. McFarlane recalls that Reagan told her that: "I cannot sit here with a formal request from a group of friendly governments who are facing a threat that I have declared as the central dimension of threat to stability in the world today and refuse it and you must know that."[235]

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free. . . to decide, without the benefit of congressional advice, that the use of armed force is warranted under a particular set of circumstances and to consult with Congress after making the initial determination. What the President must do. . . is give Congress the opportunity to offer an opinion and to engage the President in debate prior to the commencement of hostilities." Hall admits that the definition of "Congress" in these circumstances is problematical but concludes that "the most reasonable interpretation. . . is that it requires the President to consult with the congressional leadership." David Locke Hall, *The Reagan Wars: a Constitutional Perspective on the War Powers and the Presidency* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 196-7.

[233] Interview with Kelly. The SAS team on *HMS Antrim* were put on alert at 1:00 a.m. local time. Interview with Bish.

[234] Reagan, *An American Life*, p. 454. Britain was never likely to outrightly condemn the U.S. action, abstaining in the UN vote on the intervention, and defended the U.S.' reputation. Thatcher was critical, most publicly in a World Service interview when she commented: "We in the Western countries, the Western democracies, use our force to defend our way of life. We do not use it to walk into independent sovereign territories. . . If you're going to pronounce a new law that wherever communism reigns against the will of the people, even though it's happened internally, there the USA shall enter, then we are going to have really terrible wars in the world." Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 340.

[235] Interview with McFarlane, *Oral History Project*, p. 153.

Reagan heard Thatcher out but told her that "we are already at zero."[236] On this note the conversation concluded.

Reagan sent a third letter at 7:00 a.m. (GMT) thanking Thatcher for her thoughts but informing her that he had decided to go ahead with the operation. He restated the danger to U.S. citizens and acknowledged that "military operations will pose risks but. . . that the risks assumed by not acting are larger."[237] He also assured Thatcher that there was "special planning" to protect the Governor-General.[238] Elaborating on his decision Reagan explained that the:

> formal written request from [the] OECS. . . weighed heavy in his decision. . . [R]elying on economic and political sanctions would give the new regime more time to consolidate itself, with [the] likelihood that it would be even more closely aligned to Cuba and the Soviet Union than was the Bishop regime.[239]

Reagan was surprised and disappointed by Thatcher's response; he had been hoping for understanding at least.[240] Downing Street's response was an indication of Thatcher's "personal frustration. . . mixed with her indignation"[241] in a situation where her government had actually supported action but then been shut out by Washington at the last stages of decisionmaking. Another important factor was the

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[236] Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years*, p. 331.

[237] "Consultations Chronology," p. 5.

[238] Ibid., p. 5.

[239] Ibid., p. 5.

[240] Other officials were "irritated" by Thatcher's position. In 1982 Weinberger had "bent over backwards" to help Britain in the Falklands. Interview with Motley. There was probably a feeling in Washington that London should return the favour over Grenada. Another view in Washington was that Britain had no need to participate, they had demonstrated their resolve in the Falklands and non-participation put them back in the political mainstream in Latin American eyes after the harm caused by the Falklands conflict. Interview with Johnstone. The Foreign Affairs Committee report noted that British non-involvement had avoided damaging relations with the rest of the Commonwealth. U.K. Parliament. *Grenada*, p. xix.

[241] Smith, *Reagan and Thatcher*, p. 129.

political embarrassment for her government involved, it had "been made to look impotent; at worst. . . deceitful."[242] Indeed, Prime Minister Thatcher and Foreign Secretary Howe faced a tough time in the Commons in the following days.

Last Touches

After the White House meeting Weinberger and the JCS returned to the Pentagon to issue the "execute" order and review the latest information available. One SEAL team were already missing at sea and it was now feared another two SEALs had been lost and still "no real pre-landing intelligence" had been gathered.[243] At 11:30 p.m. in the situation room a final NSC meeting was held; present were McFarlane, Poindexter, North, Menges and Sims. The response of the Congressional leadership was discussed and McFarlane assigned several present to brief a few members of the House and Senate Foreign Relations committees.[244] This done, the meeting broke up. Urgent Fury was now in the hands of the military.

Conclusion

The execution of Bishop and his associates at Fort Rupert on Wednesday, October 19, led to a convergence of thinking in Washington and the Eastern Caribbean that would climax in a U.S.-Caribbean military intervention six days later. With Bishop's death the Caribbean leaders were immediately convinced of the need

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[242] Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years*, p. 331. At the time the lack of consultation was also interpreted in terms of the state of U.S.-British relations in general and the impending stationing of U.S. Cruise missiles in England. McFarlane recalls Thatcher telling Reagan that: "it may be the right thing to do Ron, but it is going to make clear that you don't have a very high regard for my government because you told us one thing and you did another. . . In short, it will be seen to be a deception and I will be fairly embarrassed by it, so don't do it." Interview with McFarlane, *Oral History Project*, p. 153.

[243] Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, p. 82.

[244] Menges, *Inside the NSC*, p. 83.

for a swift military solution. The central concern was that whilst it was Grenada today it could be any one of their countries tomorrow.[245] The OECS leaders were all resolute, articulate individuals with strong conservative views and the decision to use force was a reflection of personal preference combined with public pressure for decisive action rather than a diplomatic solution. A triad of sorts shaped the proceedings with Adams as the brains, Compton as the engine and Charles as the spokeswoman.[246]

The OECS were under no illusions about the situation as Charles explained:

> We looked at the options that were available to us to regularize the situation because it was a situation we thought that was extremely dangerous to us, knowing firstly the military might that was in Grenada and, secondly, in whose hands this might was. And therefore we realized that the only thing we had was a military option, and we examined our resources to see what we had available to us. In the Eastern Caribbean we did not have enough.[247]

The consequence was a request to Washington for assistance; as Adams explained, "aid was sought where aid was most easily available."[248] The leaders were pessimistic about gaining CARICOM support. CARICOM was a much looser organisation with different political orientations, different perceptions of the crisis and different leader personalities.[249] When certain CARICOM countries ruled out the use of force almost immediately it confirmed the OECS' expectations that the CARICOM involvement would only cause delays. The RMC had shown no remorse and retained the allegiance of most of the PRA; quick and decisive action was necessary to prevent

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[245] Interview with Edmunds.

[246] Interview with Bish.

[247] *MacNeil/Lehrer*, "Grenada Aftermath," p. 8.

[248] U.K. Parliament, *Grenada*, p. xvii.

[249] Braveboy-Wagner, *The Caribbean in World Affairs*, p. 189.

the RMC becoming entrenched. They knew they had little influence in Washington beyond the extent to which their views and objectives coincided with Washington's. Hence they stressed the serious danger to the political, economic and social security of the region, the opportunity to remove a Marxist-Leninist regime and reduce the Soviet and Cuban presence in the area and the threat to U.S. nationals. The OECS leaders talked of military action in terms of "how" rather than "whether" and to the delight of Washington were "way out in front" in calling for intervention.

In Washington the OECS request was not unexpected and it marked the moment when U.S. decisionmaking escalated:

> The drastic changes that had occurred in Grenada and the reaction of the neighboring Caribbean governments raised the level of concern and the possibility of involvement of Washington. Rather than thinking in a reactive manner about what should be done to forestall a hostage crisis or to protect U.S. citizens should the situation in Grenada worsen, the United States was instead being asked to consider invasion - invasion as a partner, by invitation.[250]

The early morning consultations between Washington and Augusta on Saturday, October 22, effectively signalled the stage at which military planning was officially transformed from an NEO to a takeover of Grenada.

The degree to which the American citizens on Grenada were in danger is imponderable but memories of Teheran, combined with the lack of intelligence available on the situation, undoubtedly generated genuine concerns for their safety.[251] Essentially, the presence of the students gave proceedings a sense of urgency.[252] The

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[250] Burrowes, *Revolution and Rescue in Grenada*, p. 138.

[251] Dam later admitted that the administration had "no information" on any harm/threat to the students after October 19. Reagan clarified the situation on Tuesday, October 25: "They were in no danger in the sense of that, right now, anything was being done to them. But we know that there was concern on the part of those, because already we'd been informed of several hundred who wanted to leave. But the airports were closed. There was no way of leaving." "Remarks of the President and Prime Minister Eugenia Charles," *PPP*, p. 1507.

[252] Interview with Weinberger.

origins of the RMC and its seemingly unstable nature meant Washington "didn't trust them. . . so, consequently, any assurances they gave us, in our opinion, weren't worth two cents."[253] Although the signals Washington got from the RMC were not overly aggressive they were nothing that could be relied on.[254] With time passing and students dispersed around the island the RMC began to stall, fearing intervention, and grew intransigent. The U.S. diplomats that visited Grenada assessed the RMC official they met with as "obstructionist and uncooperative."[255] This rekindled Washington's initial fears and led to a situation where Reagan:

> had to decide which was the greater risk, the risk that we might go in in response to this request in order to safeguard American lives. . . or the risk that we would wait and find that, as in Iran, it was too late, that we had hostages or we had dead Americans.[256]

In this case Washington erred on the side of caution and decided action was necessary.

At the first SSG meeting on Thursday, October 20, there was a consensus that planning for a military operation was necessary; with the diversion of the fleet that night and the receipt of the OECS' oral request the next day the odds on action shortened. At the SSG meeting on the Saturday, October 22, Reagan made a "seventy-five per cent" commitment to act and a NSDD was drawn up.

The presence of the students on Grenada was easily the strongest political and legal justification for action but it would be cynical to suggest that efforts to evacuate

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[253] "Press Briefing by Larry Speakes, 1:00 P.M.," p. 20.

[254] Interview with Motley.

[255] Motley, "The Decision to Assist Grenada," p. 71.

[256] U.S. Congress, *U.S. Military Actions in Grenada*, p. 32.

them were superficial. As one sympathetic member of the bipartisan Congressional mission to Grenada concluded:

> every attempt was made to extract the students prior to the intervention, but those attempts were met by a persistently hardening opposition on the part of the revolutionaries. The State Department was prepared to bring in a commercial cruise ship, Pan American aircraft, military aircraft, charter aircraft, civilian boats, and military boats to get the students out, but all of these avenues were rejected by Revolutionary Military Council official Leon Cornwall.[257]

The State Department were the main proponents of military action and a certain amount of opportunism was involved. As Brands states; "Instability provided the opportunity for intervention in that in an unstable and fluid situation the possibility of tipping the balance in a direction favourable to the United States was increased."[258] Washington estimated that there was a very low probability of Soviet or Cuban counteraction and Grenada's size made prompt military victory inevitable; senior military officials dismissed a protracted conflict as "not a serious military consideration."[259] The State Department were confident that Grenada was a low-risk opportunity that an ideologue like Reagan would not refuse. However, the "window of opportunity" would not remain open for long:

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[257] Congressman William Broomfield in Beck, *The Grenada Invasion*, p. 202. Motley likewise states that; "Under the situation of what we knew, the time frame which we were working, I am totally satisfied that we took every possible step." *PBS Frontline*, Operation Urgent Fury, p. 15. In a recent interview though Motley did speculate that perhaps a more senior figure should have been sent to visit Grenada. Telephone interview with Motley.

[258] H. W. Brands Jr., "Decisions on American Armed Intervention: Lebanon, Dominican Republic, and Grenada," *Political Science Quarterly* 102 (1987): 621. Domestic instability has long been recognized as a cause of external intervention but as Pearson concludes, "assassinations, coups (successful or unsuccessful), political executions, purges, and governmental crises were quite unlikely to result in. . . intervention from abroad" and that foreign intervention is usually aimed at "preserving rather than destroying a target government." Frederic S. Pearson, "Foreign Military Interventions and Domestic Disputes," *International Studies Quarterly* 18 (September 1974): 286. See also Karen A. Feste, *Expanding the Frontiers: Superpower Intervention in the Cold War* (New York: Praeger, 1992). In Grenada's case the political violence, deaths and curfew associated with the instability were repugnant to the particularly close-knit Eastern Caribbean states and promoted intervention to remove a government.

[259] Anderson, "National Decisionmaking and Quick-Strike Interventions," p. 63.

> The chance would exist for a few days, a week at most, before events and world opinion made intervention impossible. . . The opportunity for inflicting military defeat on a rigid Marxist dictatorship, establishing democratic government, and getting away with it virtually unscathed was unlikely to be repeated.[260]

The Defense Department were concerned about lack of planning time and shortage of good intelligence. When Washington received news of the Beirut bombing it was the JCS who raised the potential political costs of action in Grenada so soon afterwards. Over at the State Department they knew that any significant delay would make an operation politically untenable. Craig Johnstone's trip to CINCLANT on the day before the intervention was the most obvious manifestation of their concern.

During the preceding days a significant momentum had built up in favour of intervention and when Reagan signed the NSDD on Sunday, October 23, it almost guaranteed Urgent Fury would be undertaken. As Motley recalled, all the "diplomatic rabbits were out of the hat" by that stage.[261] Monday was a day of military preparation; all the important decisions had been made. Washington's fears about a hostage situation, desire to remove a Marxist regime and the Cuban presence in the area, and the OECS' request for assistance combined to result in a military intervention.

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[260] Adkin, *Urgent Fury*, p. 107.

[261] Telephone interview with Motley.

CHAPTER 7

HISTORICAL ANALOGIES AND THE GRENADA INTERVENTION

This concluding chapter will assess how three particular analogies - the Iran hostage crisis, Vietnam and Cuba - helped define the situation in Grenada, affect the options that decisionmakers had to chose between and shaped the military intervention. It also examines the influence of the OECS request and the perception of events as a challenge to U.S. credibility.

The Reagan Administration and History

In examining the use of history by the Reagan administration it is obviously unfeasible to study the beliefs of each decisionmaker; however, it is fair to assume that the President sets the tone and style of the administration, appointing like-minded individuals, and therefore his lessons of history will be somewhat representative of the wider administration's views.[1]

In his biography of Reagan, Lou Cannon noted that the President's perspectives were:

> the product of the past. Reagan's mental pictures of the world had been formed when the Nazi storm was gathering in Europe and imperial Japan was on the march in China. He viewed the world through World War II eyes, and he had learned his generation's lesson that unwillingness to prepare for war invites aggression. . . the word "appeasement" carried connotations of "surrender."[2]

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[1] Joanna Spear and Phil Williams, *Belief Systems and Foreign Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1990), p. 191.

[2] Cannon, *President Reagan*, p. 334.

Throughout his presidency Reagan made constant reference to the Munich analogy. In a March 1983 address before the Evangelist Society about the threat of Marxist-Leninism he criticised the "historical reluctance to see totalitarian powers for what they are. . . We saw this phenomenon in the 1930's" and cautioned that, "[i]f history teaches us anything, it teaches that simpleminded appeasement or wishful thinking about or adversaries is folly."[3] In August 1983 he told the American Legion that: "Neville Chamberlain thought of peace as a vague policy in the 1930's, and the result brought us closer to World War Two. History teaches us that by being strong and resolute we can keep a peace."[4]

Other top officials such as Bush, Shultz, Weinberger and Casey shared Reagan's belief that appeasement invited aggression and that peace was attainable through strength. Shultz wrote that: "History teaches. . . that peace is not achieved merely by wishing for it. Noble aspirations are not self-fulfilling. Our aim must always be to shape events and not be the victim of events."[5] Similarly, Weinberger had been concerned by Europe unpreparedness for war and the U.S.' isolationism in the 1930's and explained that: "I was determined to apply all the lessons I had learned from the past and I determined to fight for peace - a peace we could win and keep if we were strong."[6] Against this background the Reagan administration's first term followed a fundamentalist Cold War paradigm.

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[3] Sterling J. Kernek, "Historical Reflections on the Dangers Ahead," *Virginia Quarterly Review* 60, no. 2 (Spring 1984): 199.

[4] Beck, "Munich's Lessons," p. 161.

[5] George P. Shultz, "Foreword," in Hoxie (ed.), *The Presidency and National Security Policy*, p. 5.

[6] Weinberger, *Fighting For Peace*, p. 15.

Reagan's simple, black-and-white view saw the Cold War world "divided into two camps, with all morality on one side, all evil on the other, with two possible outcomes - to win or to lose."[7] In this bipolar world Communism was a "diabolical and conspiratorial"[8] monolith, the cause of all the unrest in the Third World, pursuing world revolution and Soviet domination. Continuing the American doctrine of global containment and the maxim of peace-through-strength, the Reagan administration increased defence spending massively, increased military assistance to its allies and emphasised its commitment to NATO.[9]

The administration's idea of peace-through-strength was inevitably influenced by Vietnam. Reagan believed that the war had been fought for a "noble cause"[10] but lost due to the government's lack of will to win. He realised that Vietnam was a divisive and frustrating issue for the populace, that it had left the military disaffected and disillusioned and that "it was realistically impossible for any President to commit U.S. troops to a protracted war that lacked public support."[11] Reagan thus entered office promising "no more Vietnams" but simultaneously determined to cure the Vietnam syndrome.[12]

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[7] Glad, "Black-and-White Thinking," p. 48.

[8] George W. Breslauer, "What Have We Learned About Learning?," in Breslauer and Tetlock (eds.), *Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy*, p. 832.

[9] Between 1980 and 1984 Reagan increased military spending by 40 percent, from 1.1 trillion dollars to 1.5 trillion dollars. LaFeber, *The American Age*, p. 671.

[10] Cannon, *President Reagan*, p. 26.

[11] Ibid., p. 336. The Vietnam analogy restricted Reagan's policy toward Central America and resulted in the support of the Contras in Nicaragua and the evolution of the so-called Reagan Doctrine.

[12] Zakheim defines the Vietnam Syndrome as: "(1) an inward-looking mentality, and in some quarters, a somewhat isolationist view of the U.S. role in the world, (2) a fatalistic resignation to the 'fact' of America's limited ability to influence world events, (3) a mea culpa attitude to the world's troubles. . . (4) the implicit and sometimes explicit acceptance of the notion that America was a reactionary power that had come to terms with progressive developments taking place in the Third

The military establishment was haunted by Vietnam and its shadow was apparent in every military recommendation.[13] Weinberger was shocked by the post-Vietnam backlash against the military. In a November 1984 speech he proposed six criteria, reflecting the lessons the military had drawn from Vietnam, that should be met before the use of military force was considered appropriate.[14] When Secretary of State Haig, Shultz's predecessor, advocated that Reagan "go to the source" of the problem in Central America (Cuba), the JCS and Weinberger "insistently raised the specter of Vietnam and worried over the possibility that the president would be drawn into 'involuntary escalation'."[15] It is the Vietnam analogy that helps to explain the administration's restraint in using force in Nicaragua, opting instead for economic pressure and covert operations.

World War Two had shaped the beliefs of many of the key members of Reagan's administration and contributed to the president's image of the Soviet Union. Vietnam had made Reagan aware of the limits of the U.S.' reduced power.

World, and (5) suspicion about American military modernization programs." Dov S. Zakheim, "The Grenada Operation and Superpower Relations: A Perspective from the Pentagon," in Jiri Valenta and Herbert J. Ellison (eds.), *Grenada and Soviet/Cuban Policy: Internal Crisis and U.S./OECS Intervention* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986), p. 179.

[13] Cannon, *President Reagan*, p. 347.

[14] The six criteria for the use of combat forces are: (1) a situation "vital to our national interest or that of our allies," (2) the commitment should be made "wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of winning," (3) "clearly defined political and military objectives," (4) constant reassessment of the commitment, (5) "reasonable assurance" of public and congressional support, and (6) the "commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be a last resort." David T. Twining, "Vietnam and the Six Criteria for the Use of Military Force," *Parameters* XV, no. 4 (1985): 10-15.

[15] Melanson, "Action History," p. 242.

Options

Before analysing how analogies affected the decision to intervene in Grenada, it is necessary to list the possible options Washington had: (1) do nothing and let events take their own course, (2) provide diplomatic backing to an OECS or CARICOM non-military solution with a possible show of force to support this, (3) a rapid and limited military action to evacuate foreign nationals, under friendly or hostile conditions, and (4) a full-scale military intervention to seize the island and depose the RMC. The range of options was naturally affected by the time and information constraints typical of a crisis situation.

Which Analogies?

In the aftermath of Grenada, administration officials invoked a plethora of analogies in public to justify and explain their decisions. The analogies in question included: the Iran hostage crisis, Vietnam, Cuba, Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Lebanon, the Dominican Republic and Suriname amongst others. As *Time* magazine remarked, it was the "worst outbreak in memory of the 'another' syndrome."[16] The vast majority of official U.S. government records on Grenada remains classified; however, declassified documents, public statements[17] by administration officials after the event, memoir accounts by participants[18] and interviews provide a fair indication of the

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[16] "Ghosts (Or: Does History Repeat?)," *Time*, November 21, 1983, p. 38.

[17] Assessing the degree to which public statements reflect private beliefs has been a much-studied subject. It is safe to assume that there is a division between what decisionmakers say in private and public but on average public statements function as an accurate reflection of private deliberations. A democratic government can mislead the public some of the time but not all of the time. Public pronouncements might be an exaggeration of the private position but the audiences are very different.

[18] Political memoirs must likewise be approached with a degree of scepticism; as McMahon says, the "amalgam of commercial, historical, political, and personal motivations on the part of the memoirists and their publishers combine to create books whose very raison d'être stands at odds with

analogies which were used most. In this case it appears that the dominant analogies were: the Iran hostage crisis, Vietnam and Cuba.

The Iran Hostage Analogy

On November 4, 1979, the U.S. embassy in Tehran was overrun by several hundred Iranian militants and 53 embassy staff taken hostage. Ayatollah Khomeini, the spiritual leader of the Iranian revolution stated his support for the action. After diplomatic efforts and economic sanctions were unsuccessful, President Carter approved an ambitious airborne military operation to rescue the hostages. The mission ended prematurely in the Iranian desert when two helicopters suffered mechanical malfunctions and a third one crashed killing eight Americans. The crisis effectively destroyed Carter's re-election chances; the hostages were eventually released on January 20, 1981, the day Carter left office, after 444 days in captivity.

President Reagan was particularly sensitive to the Iran analogy: "Having ridden to office on charges of his predecessor's incompetence in handling the Iranian affair, Reagan did not intend to experience such a predicament himself."[19] This made the analogy very available as a base: it was dramatic, recent, a failure and first-hand for most decisionmakers. As well as the potentially disastrous domestic political repercussions of such a crisis, Iran represented U.S. humiliation, helplessness and loss of credibility on the world stage. The taking of Americans as hostages was Reagan's greatest concern; an earlier draft of his "Address to the Nation" on October 27 read:

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the needs and standards of scholarly discourse." Robert J. McMahon, "Review Essay: Making Sense of American Foreign Policy during the Reagan Years," *Diplomatic History* 19, no. 2 (Spring 1995): 369. However, as many of these accounts utilise classified documents they can be an important source of information.

[19] Brands, Jr., "Decisions on American Armed Intervention," p. 620.

"It is the sworn duty of every President to protect American lives, never to gamble with them."[20]

It is interesting to note that the hostage analogy had also been used by the Carter administration in November 1979 when two U.S. citizens were arrested by the PRG and denied access to a U.S. consul. Two PRG officials hinted that hostage-taking might be considered to encourage the U.S. to extradite deposed Prime Minister Eric Gairy. The State Department were "fearful that [the] PRG may take adverse action against Americans once the PRG is informed of our inability to move more promptly on the extradition of Gairy."[21] Although Menges refers briefly to this episode in his account of the intervention decisionmaking[22] it is unlikely that it was even known of by most involved. In Washington there was a new administration and at the U.S. embassy in Barbados there was the standard two-year rotation of foreign service officers.

When RIG convened during the first few days after Bishop's arrest on October 13 it was the Iran analogy that they drew upon. With around 1,000 U.S. citizens on Grenada the potential for an "Iran-in-the-Caribbean" hostage situation was evident.[23] The U.S. embassy in Barbados reported that Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard had staged a Marxist coup against Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, the PRA were

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[20] "Presidential Address to the Nation: Foreign Policy, Thursday, October 27, 1983," (Elliot/Myer) October 26, 1983, 9:00 a.m., White House Office of Speechwriting: Speech Drafts, OA8206, RRL, p. 9.

[21] Vance, "Subject: Talking Points for Meeting with PM Bishop," p. 9.

[22] Menges, *Inside the NSC*, p. 69.

[23] Ibid., p. 69. The majority, about 650, of these citizens were students at the privately owned American SGU. As McNeil pointed out, the fact that they were students only there to study, rather than retirees or businessmen who had chosen to go there, seemed to increase the emotional image of them as "innocents abroad." Telephone interview with McNeil.

divided in their support for Coard, the Cubans' position was unclear and mass demonstrations were occurring. Ambassador Bish stated that the situation was fluctuating and whilst there was no threat to the students yet, further disorder could easily reverse this situation.[24] The failure of two embassy officials to reach Grenada and the Grenadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs' reply to a U.S. diplomatic note promising that "the interests of U.S. citizens are in no way threatened by the present situation in Grenada. . . which is a purely internal affair,"[25] sounding like a warning to keep out, only reinforced Washington's anxiety.

The Chairman of RIG, Langhorne Motley, thus decided to review the standard evacuation procedures. CINCLANT were simultaneously informed to review their plans for such operations. As the situation in Grenada remained uncertain, RIG favoured a NEO be planned for to pre-empt a possible hostage situation. They envisaged an Entebbe-style quick in-and-out rescue mission by specially trained U.S. soldiers.[26]

When the massacre at Fort Rupert occurred on Wednesday 19 it became the prism through which Washington viewed the RMC. With Grenada under a shoot-on-sight 24 hour four-day curfew, the imprisonment of certain prominent figures, the cutting of communications and expulsion of journalists, fears of a hostage situation grew. Ambassador Bish felt that Americans "could be taken hostage, as in Iran" and

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[24] Bish, "Subject: Current Situation," p. 1.

[25] Motley, "The Decision to Assist Grenada," p. 71.

[26] Beck, *The Grenada Invasion*, p. 98. In June 1976, Palestinian terrorists had hijacked a French aircraft en route from Tel Aviv to Paris and diverted it to Entebbe airport, Uganda. All non-Israeli nationals were released; 96 Israelis remained hostages. Several days later Israeli airborne commandos stormed the plane and freed the hostages. Natalino Ronzitti, *Rescuing Nationals Abroad Through Military Coercion and Intervention on Grounds of Humanity* (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985), p.37.

therefore whatever measures were necessary to assure their safety should be "set in motion" whilst the U.S. could also "rid the hemisphere of an obnoxious unwanted regime."[27] The RMC were young and inexperienced group in a highly charged, politicized situation; even if it was a suicidal move Washington felt they might seize hostages.[28] A U.S. military intervention could not be resisted for long but "[w]ith fifty or so students locked up. . . it would become a very different ballgame. Demands for the invasion force to withdraw or at the least for the RMC's safe conduct out of the country would be difficult and costly to refuse."[29]

The discussions between embassy officials and RMC member Leon Cornwall did little to dissipate the fear of a hostage situation. The RMC were not keen to allow a quick evacuation. The diplomats reported that it was not clear who was in charge; the RMC appeared to have no organizational structure or coherent leadership and could disintegrate quickly when the curfew was lifted.[30] Cornwall's last minute plea for talks on Sunday 23 displayed some interest in arranging the students' evacuation but he became intransigent and the U.S. concluded that the RMC were trying to stall, fearing an imminent intervention. It is probable that the RMC's strategy was to try and delay an intervention for a few days or a week by alerting the world to the U.S. and OECS' plans, thereby increasing the political cost of action for the interveners.[31] In Washington though:

> The specter of Teheran. . . was beginning to take on a more definite and fright-

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[27] Bish, "Subject: Ambassador's Assessment," p. 2.

[28] Interview with Weinberger.

[29] Adkin, *Urgent Fury*, p. 108.

[30] Kurze's letter, August 20, 1995. The embassy was not sure to what extent Cornwall had authority or if he was reporting accurately to RMC or if he was perhaps afraid to. Interview with Chafin.

[31] Adkin, *Urgent Fury*, p. 158.

> ening shape. The students were not yet hostages and perhaps they would never have become hostages. But, as of this conversation with Cornwall, they had been made into pawns.[32]

For Washington it was obvious that the RMC believed an evacuation was the prelude to an intervention and they were not keen to let the students leave. The students safety was the bottom line for decisionmakers and in their eyes the RMC may well have seized hostages to preserve its position or to "make something happen."[33]

The Iran analogy had already advanced the argument for an NEO but it also suggested the timing of a military operation. The prevention of a hostage situation was essential and therefore the analogy promoted a pre-emptive action as soon as possible. The JCS favoured such action because if the students were taken hostage the "military forces might not be permitted or able to rescue them."[34] Inaction would only give the RMC more time to consider hostage-taking; as Senator Tom Foley said afterwards:

> the President did not have the luxury of waiting a week to see how things developed before making a decision. "Waiting a week was a decision", . . . There is no doubt in my mind that the President would have been irresponsible had he risked so many American lives by delay.[35]

A rapid, secret military operation would minimise the chance of hostage-taking.

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[32] Sandford and Vigilante, *Grenada*, p. 8.

[33] Interview with Gillespie.

[34] Richard Halloran, "Joint Chiefs Supported U.S. Action as Feasible, "New York Times, October 27, 1983, p. 23.

[35] John Norton Moore, "Grenada and the International Double Standard," *American Journal of International Law* 78 (1984): 150. The consensual view in Washington was that "a government ought not to be forced to wait until its citizens are harmed or killed before taking action. . . [It is] best to err on the side of haste when lives, and not mere ideology, are at stake in an uncertain and highly volatile situation." Richard P. Dieguez, "The Grenada Invasion: Illegal in Form, Sound as Policy," *New York University of International Law and Politics* 16 (Summer 1984): 1198.

The Iran analogy also served as a justificant of the intervention. In his announcement of Urgent Fury to the press, President Reagan explained that action was taken because: "First, and of overriding importance, to protect innocent lives, including up to a thousand Americans."[36] In his "Address to the Nation," Reagan invoked the hostage analogy again: "The nightmare of our hostages in Iran must never be repeated."[37] On November 4 Reagan remarked that:

> With 1,000 Americans, including 800 students, on that island we weren't about to wait for the Iran crisis to repeat itself, only this time in our own neighborhood -- the Caribbean.[38]

In a "Questions and Answers" session on November 3 Reagan commented that, "I know your frequent use of the word invasion. This was a rescue mission."[39] As Bostdorff observes, "by renaming the Grenada crisis a 'rescue mission,' Reagan allowed the Americans the chance to relive the hostage situation and win."[40] In retrospect, "with the Iran hostage crisis still fresh in American minds and world crises having prompted a national state of anti-Communist fervor, a more calculated appeal

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[36] "President's Remarks, October 25, 1983," *Department of State Bulletin* 83 (December 1983): 67. The same point made by number of government officials over following days.

[37] "Address to the Nation," *PPP*, p. 1521. An earlier draft read: "A few years ago we all watched in agony for 444 days as a tyrannical regime held more than 50 of our fellow citizens hostage. I could not risk seeing that tragedy repeated." "Address to the Nation: Thursday, October 27, 1983," (Elliot/Myer/Gergen) October 26, 1983, 3:00 p.m., White House Office of Speechwriting: Speech Drafts, OA8206, RRL, p. 12.

[38] "Text of Remarks by the President to Cherry Point Marine Corps Air Station Personnel and Families, Cherry Point Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, North Carolina, November 4, 1983," Press Release 12:00 noon, *WHOPS*, no. 3333, RRL, p. 1.

[39] "President's Remarks and Question-and-Answer Session (Excerpts), November 3, 1983," *Department of State Bulletin* 83 (December 1983): 78.

[40] Bostdorff, "The Presidency and Promoted Crisis," p. 744.

to unchecked emotion would be hard to imagine."[41] The protection of nationals has been a traditional justification for military interventions.

The Vietnam Analogy

As previously discussed the Reagan administration had entered office promising "no more Vietnams" determined to dispel the Vietnam Syndrome. The promise of "no more Vietnams" was complicated by the fact that there remains no consensus on what the lessons of Vietnam are. Some argued that "no more Vietnams" means avoiding conflicts in far-off places of minimal strategic interest, where the causes are questionable, success is unlikely and casualties likely to be high.[42] This scenario would be unacceptable to the U.S. populace. The alternative interpretation suggests that when the U.S. does intervene it should do whatever is necessary to win.[43] It was this interpretation of "no more Vietnams" that the Reagan administration embodied. In his memoirs Reagan explained that: "I understood what Vietnam had meant for the country, but I believed the United States couldn't remain spooked forever by this experience to the point where it refused to stand up and defend its legitimate national security interests."[44] Washington was careful to select its battles and then do what was necessary to win quickly. In this respect Grenada was an almost irresistible opportunity.

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[41] Ralph E. Dowling and Gabrielle Marraro, "Grenada and the Great Communicator: A Study in Democratic Ethics," *Western Journal of Speech Communication* 50, no. 4 (Fall 1986): 265.

[42] Khong, *Analogies at War*, p. 258.

[43] Ibid., p. 258.

[44] Reagan, *An American Life*, p. 451.

Vietnam, compounded by the unsuccessful *Mayaguez*[45] and Iran embassy rescue operations, had the greatest impact on the military who had experienced:

> sound tactical and strategic decisions overturned for "political reasons"; restrictions on winning; the military, individually and collectively, trashed on the campuses, in the news, and in Congress. All this left a bitter taste for many years, and especially among the military professionals, who spent years rebuilding the pride, prestige, and capabilities of their institutions.[46]

As Petraeus states, even before Vietnam caution rather than activism has characterized military participation in decisions to use force.[47] This trait was heightened by Vietnam and in the White House and State Department there was the feeling that; "the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not just resist mounting an operation; they could take forever to put one together."[48]

When RIG presented the idea of an NEO to JCS representative Vice Admiral Moreau on Monday, October 17, he was unenthusiastic and wanted higher authorization before beginning planning. By Wednesday, October 19, the Pentagon had given notice that a lack of human intelligence and overstretched logistics made any action problematic. With decisionmakers growing more concerned about the possibility of a hostage situation and the OECS clearly willing to support a U.S. military action to rescue the students and depose the RMC, the military were forced to begin serious planning.

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[45] In May 1975 a Cambodian gunboat had seized the *SS Mayaguez*, a U.S. merchant ship in transit from Hong Kong to Thailand. The 40-man crew were taken to Koh Tang island. The crew were then transferred to the mainland by sea despite U.S. efforts to force the boat to turn back. Believing the crew to still be on Koh Tang the U.S. Marines launched a ill-conceived attack on Koh Tang. The *Mayaguez* crew were released by the Cambodians shortly after reaching the mainland. The final U.S. casualty toll for the operation was 41. Chris Lamb, "Belief Systems and Decision Making in the *Mayaguez* Crisis," *Political Science Quarterly* 99, no. 4 (Winter 1984-85): 681-2.

[46] Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 343.

[47] Petraeus, "Military Influence," p. 491.

[48] Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 343.

Once the politicians had decided to use force, the military argued that the multiple targets and dispersed locations of U.S. citizens meant that to evacuate citizens safely would require a stable and political environment which in turn required a complete takeover of the island. Vietnam had made the Pentagon extra cautious and they had "real misgivings"[49] about military action, not unreasonably, due to the lack of intelligence. Thus, up until the eve of the intervention Weinberger and the JCS argued in favour of delaying military action to enable more intelligence to be collected.

In keeping with the lessons of Vietnam, Urgent Fury would use overwhelming force to "get in there in a hurry and overwhelm the opposition. . . and in a very short period of time."[50] Such decisive strategy had become doctrine because:

> Gradualism is a mistaken way to achieve success. . . it exaggerates the illusion of control, violates the strategic principle of force, and encourages underestimation of the domestic political costs entailed by any use of American military force abroad.[51]

A quick victory, and the restrictive rules of engagement, would serve to minimise casualties.[52] The Pentagon also insisted on clear arrangements for their withdrawal once victory had been achieved.[53]

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[49] Interview with McFarlane, *Oral History Project*, p. 139.

[50] Interview with John W. Vessey , 14-15 June, 1986, transcript, *Oral History Project*, International Security Studies Program, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Medford, Mass., p. 124. Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf III, commander of the Joint Task Force, described the essence of his orders as "Do it fast and minimize casualties." Metcalf, "Decision Making," in March et al., *Ambiguity and Command*, p. 281. The U.S. troop level on Grenada peaked on October 31 at 7,335. Lawrence S. Germain, "A Chronology of Events Concerning Grenada," in Dunn and Watson, *American Intervention in Grenada*, p. 175. The high level of troops deployed was also a result of a lack of knowledge of whether the Cubans would fight and what percentage of the Grenadian PRA and militia would turn out. As Admiral James D. Watkins put it the intervention force was "sized for the unknown." U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. *Organization, Structure and Decisionmaking Procedures of the Department of Defense, Part 8* (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1983), p. 332.

[51] Weinberger quoted in Tiwathia, *The Grenada War*, p. 138. It is arguable that the small-scale nature of Urgent Fury perhaps made it difficult to imagine the incremental use of force.

Another lesson military and civilian decisionmakers adhered to from Vietnam concerned the handling of the media. In Vietnam the absence of formal censorship, adversarial journalism and television coverage had all contributed to reducing public support for the war. As a consequence of this, and the careful management of the media by the British in the Falklands,[54] the military requested, and were granted, a total media exclusion from the operation for the first 48 hours.[55]

Vietnam, and the Iran hostage crisis, had underlined the dangers of micromanagement of operations from the White House. Thus the military made it clear that once Reagan had signed the final "Go" order, they should have full authority to execute the operation and be left to get on with it.

The administration's last-minute briefing of the Congressional leadership reflected not only the perceived need for secrecy but Congress' post-Vietnam resistance to any use of military force abroad, as epitomised by the 1973 War Powers Resolution. As Reagan recalled:

> I knew that if word of the rescue mission leaked out in advance, we'd hear this from some in Congress: "Sure, it's starting small, but once you make that first commitment, Grenada's going to become another Vietnam."[56]

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[52] The rules of engagement were as follows: 1) "Use force and weapons as may be essential to the accomplishment of the mission," 2) "Minimize the disruptive influence of military operations on the local economy commensurate with the accomplishment of the mission," and 3) "Execute initial tasks readily with minimum damage and casualties." Metcalf, "Decision Making," in March et al., *Ambiguity and Command*, p. 281.

[53] Weinberger felt that this was necessary to avoid charges of colonial imperialism. Interview with Weinberger. Metcalf also felt quick military withdrawal was essential as he did not want the military to become an occupying force. Interview with Metcalf.

[54] As Speakes said of the British management of the media during the Falklands conflict: "That's the way to run a war." Interview with Speakes.

[55] The official reasons for the exclusion was: to maintain the secrecy of the operation, preserve the element of surprise, reduce casualties and not burden the troops with protecting non-combatants. U.S. Congress. *Miscellaneous Legislation*, p. 61. The question of the media's total exclusion almost became as big a story as the intervention itself. The military's request for media exclusion was not opposed as there was little sympathy for the media amongst decisionmakers.

[56] Reagan, *An American Life*, p. 451.

The Cuba Analogy

After the 1959 Cuban revolution Washington's Caribbean Basin policy was based around a "no more Cubas" position. President Johnson's 1965 intervention in the Dominican Republic was motivated by this rationale. Grenada did enjoy good relations with Cuba; as Manigat observed, there was a kind of "Cuban fixation" in Grenada and the island seemed to be the "mini-Cuba of the Eastern Caribbean."[57] If Washington did not view Grenada as an exact replica of Cuba, it was variously described as a protégé, vassal or appendage of Cuba. The analogy was particularly used in reference to PSIA's potential military use, the export of revolution and, in general, another pro-Castro country in Washington's backyard.

On several occasions Reagan invoked the Cuba analogy. In March 1980 he warned; "Must we let Grenada, Nicaragua, and El Salvador all become additional Cubas, new outposts for Soviet combat brigades."[58] The hard-liners in the administration perceived a hostile Cuba-Nicaragua-Grenada "red triangle" in the region. In February 1982 Reagan cautioned that: "If we do not act promptly and decisively in defence of freedom, new Cubas will arise. . . We will face more totalitarian regimes tied militarily to the Soviet Union - more regimes exporting subversion."[59] In May 1982 he was more specific; "Grenada. That country now bears

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[57] Leslie Manigat, "Revolutionary Shockwave, Crisis and Intervention," in Jorge Heine and Leslie Manigat (eds.), *The Caribbean and World Politics: Cross Currents and Cleavages* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1988), p. 187.

[58] John Lehman, *Command of the Seas* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1988), p. 294.

[59] "Remarks on the Caribbean Basin Initiative," *PPP*, p. 214.

the Soviet and Cuban trademark, which means that it will attempt to spread the virus among its neighbors."[60]

The Cuba analogy represented the geostrategic concerns of Washington. A second Cuba meant the "institutionalization of another well-armed Communist state. . . supported by the Soviet Union and working actively against U.S. interests and friends who depend on us."[61] At the UN, ambassador Kirkpatrick stated that "the familiar pattern of militarization and Cubanization [was] already far advanced in Grenada"[62] and a Coard-run Grenada only promised closer alignment with the Soviet Union and threat of further Soviet and Cuban subversion in the region. As Pearson states:

> To reports of an extant military threat in place on Grenada, administration officials offered the dark prophesy (sic) that Grenada would become "another Cuba," . . . Once accepted, this prophesy virtually guaranteed that any action taken would be military.[63]

Eagleburger confirmed that "fears of 'another Cuba' were 'clearly involved' in the administration's invasion decision."[64]

The analogy promoted a preventative military action.[65] As McFarlane recalled: "The prospect of a second Cuba at our doorstep, with all that implied for the export

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[60] "Remarks in Bridgetown," *PPP*, p. 448.

[61] "Prepared Statement of the Honorable Langhorne A. Motley, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs before the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, January 29, 1985," file FG (Federal Government - Organizations) 011 National Security Council, White House, no. 8500943, RRL, p. 4.

[62] "Ambassador Kirkpatrick's Statement, UN Security Council, October 27, 1983," *Department of State Bulletin* 83 (December 1983): 74. In fact, "[d]espite its profound influence Cuba had little lasting positive impact on its ally's domestic politics. Cuban political advice proved incapable of forestalling the NJM's drift towards authoritarian politics." Cotman, "Cuba and the Grenada Revolution," p. 212.

[63] Pearson, "The Betrayal of Truth and Trust," p. 173.

[64] Beck, *The Grenada Invasion*, p. 227.

of revolution to countries in South America, was a serious challenge from Moscow. We were going to have to act."[66] Reagan shared such a view; "he saw this as the Russians trying to come into his backyard on his watch and he wasn't about to let that happen."[67] Reinforced by the domino theory, which implies direction action is necessary in such situations, Washington chose a rapid pre-emptive intervention to nip the situation in the bud before it threatened to become another Cuba. According to Pastor:

> Reagan was convinced that the United States should never forget one important lesson learned from the Cuban revolution - that the best time to confront a radical regime was at its conception.[68]

Preventing another Cuba in Grenada therefore meant eliminating current and future Cuban intervention on the island.

On October 27 in a television address to the nation, Reagan described Grenada as a "Soviet-Cuban colony being readied as a major military bastion to export terror and undermine democracy."[69] The large stockpiles of weapons discovered on Grenada and the PRG's secret military agreements with the Soviet Union, Cuba and North Korea did reinforce the Cuba analogy somewhat but the *Grenada Documents* do not

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[65] Richard Betts describes this type of action as that taken "in anticipation of eventual vulnerability, not against immediate threats, and is designed to engage the enemy before he has improved his capabilities." Dorothea Cypher, "Grenada: Indications, Warning, and the U.S.," in Dunn and Watson (eds.), *American Intervention in Grenada*, p. 46.

[66] McFarlane and Smardz, *Special Trust*, p. 257. Weinberger echoed this: "One Cuba, we felt, was enough, and we counted our preventing the establishment of a second Cuba in Grenada as being not only a great success, but a necessity." Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, p. 87.

[67] Interview with McFarlane, *Oral History Project*.

[68] Hybel, *How Leaders Reason*, p. 271.

[69] "Address to the Nation," *PPP*, p. 1521.

support the U.S.' claims that the weapons were for offensive purposes and or that there were any existing plans for Grenada to become a Soviet-Cuban military base.

An earlier draft of Reagan's address was more direct:

> Grenada will not become another Cuba. The Cuban presence has been reduced. . . Democracy has been strengthened by our joint actions, not only for Grenada, but for the rest of the Caribbean as well. . . [L]et there be no mistake, the tide of Cuban aggression and subversion in the Caribbean is receding. . . There will be no more Cubas in this hemisphere.[70]

After citing the protection of U.S. citizens and the OECS' request as justifications for acting, Washington now added the prevention of "another Cuba."

Three Analogies and Four Options

1. **Do nothing**: the presence of some 1,000 U.S. citizens on Grenada automatically triggered the Iran hostage analogy and made this option more complicated. Doing nothing is usually an option chosen when it is believed that the problem will disappear if no action is taken or as a last resort measure.[71] Reports from the embassy indicated that the situation was uncertain. The OECS' advocation of action and the massacre on Wednesday, October 19, effectively ruled out this option.

2. **Support for a non-military solution**: there has been much criticism along the lines that "the administration turned to the military option as a first step rather than a last resort."[72] With momentum for an intervention gathering in Washington, CARICOM met in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad, on October 22-23, to discuss a peaceful solution to the crisis. Their four-point plan envisaged: the creation of a civilian

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[70] "Address to the Nation, Thursday, 27 October, 1983," (Elliot/Myer), White House Office of Speechwriting: Speech Drafts, OA 8206, RRL, p. 11.

[71] Cottam, *Foreign Policy Decision Making*, p. 54.

[72] Pastor, "The Invasion of Grenada," p. 103.

government to arrange elections; a CARICOM fact-finding mission; arrangements to protect and/or evacuate foreign nationals and the deployment of a Caribbean peacekeeping force.[73] Judging by the RMC's behaviour and determination to retain power, it is far from clear that any CARICOM solution was feasible or would have worked; if it had been tried and failed, then what was to be done? There was strong public pressure in the region to "do something" and the CARICOM solution did not seem to promise this. By the time CARICOM met the OECS had already requested U.S. help and embassy officials reported from Grenada that the RMC were "obstructionist and uncooperative"[74] and not anxious to evacuate the students. Washington was now thinking primarily in military terms.

When Cornwall delivered a last minute plea to Linda Flohr and Gary Chafin it is possible that if the RMC had made some concessions, fundamentally this meant relinquishing power, an intervention might have been averted. In his cable to Washington, Special Emissary McNeil considered that, apart from being a possible ploy to buy time, an ultimatum might allow the RMC to take hostages.[75] Additionally, both the Vietnam and Cuba analogies promoted a pre-emptive military operation that would seize the entire island and remove the RMC and the Cuban presence.

The U.S. did not consider referring the crisis to the OAS or UN. As Karas and Goodman note, "the Latin American obsession with proclaiming an absolute doctrine

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[73] "Statement by the Honourable Prime Minister George Chambers," *Documents on the Invasion*, p. 76.

[74] Motley, "The Decision to Assist Grenada," p. 71.

[75] Bish, "Subject: Grenada: Request for Talks," p. 3.

of non-intervention and binding every nation in the hemisphere. . . to adhere"[76] meant that the OAS would never have supported an intervention.[77] Those in Washington who voiced their concern about the impact of an intervention on inter-American relations were overruled by Shultz and McFarlane who were more worried about another hostage situation.[78] According to Gerson, "not a second's thought was given. . . to bringing the crisis in Grenada to the United Nations."[79] Ikle later explained, with some hyperbole, that:

> Well, we could have gone on for 6 weeks or 6 years in the United Nations addressing concerns. But within 6 days the island would have been much more fortified.
>
> On the Monday [24th] before the operation, we saw some Cubans going in, organizing the resistance. Another day or so and our losses would probably have been much more severe. Another 2 days and perhaps students would have been kidnapped, held ransom, or held hostage.[80]

Essentially the U.S. and OECS' perception that the "window of opportunity" for action would not remain open for long precluded any likelihood of a CARICOM, OAS or UN solution.

3. **A NEO**: this was the option that RIG favoured after reviewing standard evacuation procedure and assessing the situation in Grenada. It was challenged when the Pentagon believed that to effect an NEO a takeover of the island was necessary and finally discarded when the OECS' oral request was received. This reflected the

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[76] Jon M. Karas and Jerald M. Goodman, "The United States Action in Grenada: An Exercise in Realpolitik," *The University of Miami Inter-American Law Review* 16, no. 1 (Spring 1984): 80.

[77] This was especially true after the U.S.' support of Britain during the Falklands conflict in 1982.

[78] DeFrank and Walcott, "The Invasion Countdown," p. 22D.

[79] Gerson, *The Kirkpatrick Mission*, p. 221. Gerson was the Legal Adviser to the U.S. Mission to the UN.

[80] U.S. Congress, *Lessons Learned*, p. 37.

military's post-Vietnam policy of using overwhelming force in quick-strike operations. The desire to prevent "another Cuba" by taking the opportunity to remove a Marxist-Leninist regime and restore law and order also argued against a simple NEO. Finally, Washington had to consider the OECS' worry that if the U.S. intervened just to evacuate their nationals what state would they leave a post-intervention Grenada in.[81]

4. **Military intervention to remove the RMC**: after Bishop's death on Wednesday, October 19, a military solution appeared more likely. The concern about another hostage crisis formed the backdrop for consideration of a military operation. As we have seen, the military's belief that an occupation of Grenada was necessary to secure the safety of U.S. citizens, the willingness of the OECS to publicly request a full intervention and Washington's desire to remove the RMC and Cubans, accounts for the selection of the full-scale intervention option.

<u>The Influence of the OECS Request</u>

The history of U.S.-Grenadian relations since 1979 has led many authors relegate the OECS' role to that of providing a justification for the intervention when in actuality the Eastern Caribbean nations did influence Washington to a larger degree as has been demonstrated.

When Washington received the OECS' oral request on Friday, October 21, it prompted lengthy early morning discussion between top officials in Washington and Augusta. The dispatching of Special Emissary McNeil reflects the importance

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[81] Telephone interview with McNeil.

Washington attached to the request; it was imperative that the initiative for military action clearly come from them.

It would be inaccurate to suggest that the OECS request was the decisive factor in Washington's decision to intervene but it was an important part of it and "cleared up a lot of doubts" circulating amongst decisionmakers.[82] A multinational intervention was preferable to any unilateral U.S. action and in this respect it was important for Washington to have serious democratic leaders in the Caribbean laying out a cogent case for intervention.[83]

Finally, both Washington and the military were keen to withdraw the troops once the military objectives had been achieved to remove any chance of a long-term occupation developing. The Eastern Caribbean leaders shared this view and they provided Washington with the option of maintaining political support whilst the Eastern Caribbean forces oversaw Grenada's return to democracy.

Credibility: No More "Paper Tiger"

Washington's decision to intervene is frequently framed in realist terms as a test of credibility in regard to the U.S.' commitment to allies and to the exercise of power to contain communism. Credibility itself is intangible and subjective, relying essentially upon influencing the perception and beliefs of other states and the lessons one state believes another will draw from its actions. As McMahon concludes, credibility is "a blend of resolve, reliability, believability, and decisiveness."[84]

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[82] Interview with Weinberger.

[83] Interview with Gillespie.

[84] Robert J. McMahon, "Credibility and World Power: Exploring the Psychological Dimension in Postwar American Diplomacy," *Diplomatic History* 15, no. 4 (Fall 1991): 455.

Several senior administration officials emphasised the wider importance of honouring the OECS' request for help. Shultz felt that the U.S. could not afford not to act:

> it is precedentially terribly important that a formal request from small countries for our help against a significant, and yet certainly not towering opposition, could be refused, is out of the question. . . We must win this one. It is terribly important not just for the outcome in Grenada, but the precedent it sends all over the world, from Moscow to Korea, to European capitals.[85]

In 1983 there was a palpable feeling amongst many White House and State Department officials that a credible show of force was needed to counter the image of the U.S. as a "paper tiger."[86]

In this respect the intervention restored a degree of self-confidence, especially amongst the military who were "back on their feet and standing tall"[87] having seen that the effective use of force was still possible. Military action also gave some substance to Reagan's hardline rhetoric, demonstrating that the U.S. was willing and capable of exerting force to protect its interests. According to Woodward, "Grenada grew as a positive symbol in Administration lore. It was routinely invoked as a sign of a new toughness."[88]

The U.S.' action against Grenada also served to increase the credibility of a U.S. military intervention in Central America. Although Washington stressed that the

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[85] Shultz quoted in interview with McFarlane, *Oral History Project*, p. 147. It is important to note however that only the OECS wanted an intervention; Britain were in favour but on a slower timetable. Whether any of the U.S.' allies were reassured, or felt the need to be at that time, by Washington's honouring of the OECS request is moot. European governments were more concerned about Washington's willingness to use force.

[86] Interview with Motley.

[87] President Reagan quoted in Juan Williams, "President Defends Using Force," *Washington Post*, December 13, 1983, p. A1.

[88] Woodward, *VEIL*, p. 336.

intervention was the result of a unique combination of circumstances and should "not [be] taken as a sign about anything else,"[89] the Nicaraguan government feared they would be next. Indeed, the Sandinistas 'gave every appearance of being prepared to go to considerable lengths to achieve settlement.'[90] It seemed that Suriname's military leader Lieutenant Colonel Desi Bouterse, who had had good relations with the PRG, also received a message from the intervention; only days afterwards he expelled nearly 100 Cuban embassy staff, including the ambassador, and military advisors.[91]

Decisionmakers in Washington were undoubtedly concerned about containing communism in Grenada as the portion of the NSDD which cited the prevention of current and future Cuban intervention as an objective highlighted.

The perceived fundamental importance of the Caribbean is the result of geographical proximity and history. The intervention was therefore an important symbolic roll back of the Soviet Union's Third World advances in Angola, Ethiopia, Cambodia and Afghanistan and Central America in the past decade. As Reagan later

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[89] "Secretary Shultz's News Conference, October 25, 1983," *Department of State Bulletin* 83 (December 1983): 70. Gerson explains the reason for this: "How we chose to characterize the Grenada operation - whether as a fluke, as an isolated incident in U.S. foreign relations" or "as part of the pattern and strategy of U.S. foreign policy - would help determine U.S. foreign policy. Our explanations. . . would give the world notice on how the Administration perceived the Grenada operation, and whether other 'Grenadas' might be in store in the future." Gerson, *The Kirkpatrick Mission*, p. 225. Some officials were not so quick to dismiss the possibility of other interventions. See Fred Barnes, "Weinberger refuses to rule out American invasion of Nicaragua," *Baltimore Sun*, November 7, 1983, p. 1.

[90] McNeil, *War and Peace*, p. 175. McNeil felt that the success in Grenada "created a magnificent opportunity for a durable peace in Central America." Ibid., p. 175. Johnstone concurred that Grenada opened up certain avenues which resulted in two rounds of negotiations in Nicaragua. Interview with Johnstone.

[91] It is likely that the decision to expel the Cubans was made before the intervention rather than being a knee-jerk reaction to it. However, "it is possible that the move was a more calculated and opportunistic gesture to woo, or at least disarm, Brazil, the United States and The Netherlands." Edward Dew, "Did Suriname Switch? Dialectics a la Dante," *Caribbean Review* 12, no. 4 (1983): p. 29.

emphasised: "Communist subversion is not an irreversible tide. We have seen it rolled back in Venezuela and, most recently in Grenada."[92]

Whilst considering the importance of containment and credibility factors it is important to remember that although Washington wanted the Cubans out of Grenada it was never going to act for that reason alone.[93] There were other factors, the safety of U.S. citizens and the OECS request, at work.

The perceived opportunity to strengthen U.S. credibility was a by-product of the turmoil in Grenada. The suggestion is that this credibility had been steadily eroded since Vietnam and Washington saw Grenada as an opportunity to reverse the trend. As previously mentioned, the intervention did bolster the U.S.' credibility, notably in the region itself, demonstrating a willingness to act to protect U.S. interests.

Elsewhere, the issue of credibility was overshadowed by the "sledgehammer to crack a nut" aspect of the intervention, the general perception of the action as a violation of international law, comparisons with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the prospect of the evolution of a Grenada Doctrine as a guide for future military interventions.

<u>In Somebody's Backyard</u>

Ever since the Monroe Doctrine, Washington has made it clear that it viewed the Caribbean "backyard" as a region vital to national security. Such beliefs were especially prominent amongst the Reagan administration. Within this "realpolitik fiefdom"[94] Grenada was a fly in the ointment, especially considering Reagan's pro-

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[92] Holly Sklar, *Washington's War on Nicaragua* (Boston: South End Press, 1985), p. 174.

[93] Telephone interview with McNeil.

[94] Interview with Montgomery.

democracy and anti-Communist policy for the region. The rapid deterioration of U.S.-Grenadian relations led the U.S. to adopt a "distancing" policy. Grenada was soon on the receiving end of various political, economic and military pressure tactics from Washington. The Reagan administration's approach was undeniably exaggerated but it was prudent to be concerned; there was a lot of left-wing activity in the region. As one diplomat explained, taken in isolation Grenada was not a major item but when it was placed in a wider context there was enough to form a "picture of concern."[95]

Grenada's lack of elections, a poor human rights record and anti-U.S. rhetoric were all important factors in accounting for frosty relations but it was the PRG's foreign relations that particularly concerned Washington. Apart from the large Cuban investment and presence in Grenada, there were military agreements with the Soviet Union and North Korea.

The Bishop-Coard schism and its dramatic denouement was the finale to a wider problem that affected the PRG and precipitated its demise: the failure to reconcile their ideology with reality. As the regional hegemon the U.S. was an inescapable fact of life for Grenada and as Thorndike astutely concluded; "to believe that Grenada was not in anybody's backyard was an exhilarating experience - but it was an illusion."[96] Similarly, the pursuit of the socialist path of development did not take into consideration local socio-economic, socio-cultural and geopolitical realities and imported wholesale authoritarian models that were discordant to the local situation.[97]

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[95] Ibid.

[96] Thorndike, *Grenada*, p. 118.

[97] Smith, "The Development Strategy," p. 570.

Who's Afraid of the RMC?

As we have seen there was a dual approach to Grenada by its neighbours. Firstly, apart from concern over the coup process itself, there was concern about the military buildup, the PRG's human rights practices, press restrictions and lack of elections. This last factor was particularly significant because Bishop's:

> ridiculing of elections as "rum and sardines" events did not sit well with leaders whose whole decolonization struggle had been centred on the right to self-determination through universal suffrage and free elections.[98]

Contrastingly, Grenada was accepted as a fact of life for the Eastern Caribbean. One of the PRG's foreign policy "Principled Positions" was support for regional cooperation and integration in CARICOM and the OECS, a commitment that all the Member States recognised as essential to their prospects.

For the OECS the real threat Grenada posed was not military. The PRG was supported by socialist movements throughout the Caribbean who saw it as a breakthrough. Grenada's neighbours fears were not unfounded; in his report on Grenada's relations with the Soviet Union, Grenada's ambassador to the Soviet Union, Ian Jacobs, noted that Grenada figured in a "very minute way" in the Soviet Union's global relationships and recommended that:

> For Grenada to assume a position of increasingly greater importance, we have to be seen as influencing at least regional events. We have to establish ourselves as the authority on events at least in the English-speaking Caribbean, and be the sponsor of revolutionary activity and progressive developments in the region.[99]

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[98] Maingot, *The United States*, p. 118.

[99] "Grenada's relations with the USSR," Seabury and McDougall (eds.), *The Grenada Papers*, p. 207.

Admittedly, after a string of right-wing governments took power in the Eastern Caribbean in 1980 the political climate in the region was not conducive to such activity.

When the PRG imploded in October 1983 the Eastern Caribbean leaders' unease that "a set of circumstances had been put in train that perhaps could be emulated and copied in their territories"[100] led them to conclude that something had to be done, and quick. The RMC were beyond the pale:

> not only the Caribbean politicians and leaders felt this. The Caribbean man-in-the-street also felt strongly that the guys in Grenada had to go. That was the gut Caribbean reaction, and they left the delicate questions of international law, sovereignty and constitutional exercise to the experts. They just knew those guys had to go.[101]

As Braveboy-Wagner suggests, the events in Grenada were "a threat to the Caribbean way of life, to Caribbean ideals and morality."[102]

Conclusion

Even though the Caribbean leaders were fairly confident that the U.S. would accede to their request, they were wary about asking because if for whatever reason Washington declined the Caribbean leaders would have been left "high and dry."[103] Unsurprisingly though the leaders found a willing ear in Washington. Amongst the White House, State Department, Defense Department, CIA and NSC there was a

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[100] U.S. Congress. Workshop, *The English-Speaking Caribbean*, p. 111.

[101] Ibid., p. 111.

[102] Braveboy-Wagner, *The Caribbean in World Affairs*, p. 186.

[103] Telephone interview with Flower.

consensus on the use of force if not on "all aspects of the timing, means, and objectives."[104]

It is evident from a study of the crisis period that the primary motivating fear for the U.S. was the prospect of another hostage crisis. As Beck suggests, to claim that Washington was unconcerned about the students and viewed them as an excuse to act is to "impute to every Reagan administration decisionmaker either a cavalier disregard for life or Machiavellian motives in the extreme."[105] As the primary motivating hope the Cuba analogy communicated Washington's desire to oust a pro-Cuban, pro-Soviet Marxist regime and prevent another potential offensive military facility in the Caribbean.

The tragedy of "Bloody Wednesday" led to a convergence of thinking in the Caribbean and Washington. The Caribbean leaders, especially Barbados' Prime Minister Adams, did pressure the U.S. to act but this in itself would never have been enough to persuade Washington. However, in combination with the possibility of hostage-taking it was an important factor.

After four and a half years of PRG warnings about U.S. invasion plans and CIA destabilization, the U.S. finally did intervene in Grenada. On this occasion though it was not Bishop's PRG that was the target but the RMC who were, judging by their actions, little more than "a brutal group of leftist thugs."[106] Considering the history of unilateral U.S. interventionism in the region, operation Urgent Fury was, by contrast, "truly. . . a collective enterprise. . . brought about through collective actions and

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[104] Brands, "Decisions on American Armed Intervention," p. 616.

[105] Beck, *The Grenada Invasion*, p. 202.

[106] "Remarks of the President and Prime Minister Eugenia Charles," *PPP*, p. 1505.

wishes."[107] Appropriately, it was Tom Adams, the architect of the OECS request, who concluded that:

> The pros and cons of the action of the Caribbean Governments will long be debated. So will those of President Reagan in coming to our aid. But I think that history will agree with the verdict of public opinion in the Eastern Caribbean. There has seldom in these islands been such virtually unanimous support in the media and at political and popular level for an action so potentially divisive.[108]

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[107] Anthony P. Maingot, "American foreign policy in the Caribbean," p. 327.

[108] "Full Text of Speech by the Prime Minister of Barbados," *Documents on the Invasion*, p. 35.

APPENDIX 1

DRAMATIS PERSONAE

Carter Administration (1977-81)

Zbigniew Brzezinski - National Security Adviser

John A. Bushnell - Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs

James E. Carter - President

Robert A. Pastor - NSC Latin American Director

Viron P. Vaky - Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs

U.S. Embassy, Bridgetown, Barbados

John Eddy - Deputy Chief of Mission

Frank V. Ortiz - U.S. Ambassador, Barbados (until June 1979)

Sally Shelton - U.S. Ambassador, Barbados (until January 1981)

Reagan Administration (1981-84)

James A. Baker III - White House Chief of Staff

George H. Bush - Vice President

William J. Casey - Director of the CIA

Duane R. Clarridge - Latin America Division Chief of the Directorate of Operations, CIA

Kenneth W. Dam - Deputy Secretary of State

William P. Clark - National Security Adviser (resigned October 13, 1983)

Major General George Crist - accompanied Special Emissary McNeil to Barbados

Commodore Jack N. Darby - Deputy Director for Plans and Policy, JCS

Michael K. Deaver - Presidential Assistant

Lawrence S. Eagleburger - Undersecretary for Political Affairs

Roger W. Fontaine - NSC Latin American Director

Charles A. Gillespie - Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs

Rear Admiral Jonathan Trumbull Howe - Director of Political-Military Affairs

Fred C. Ikle - Undersecretary of Defense for Policy

Craig Johnstone - Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs

Jeane J. Kirkpatrick - Ambassador to the United Nations

Michael G. Kozak - Department of State Deputy Legal Adviser

Admiral Wesley McDonald - Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Forces

Robert C. McFarlane - National Security Adviser (appointed October 17, 1983)

John N. McMahon - Acting Director of the CIA

Francis J. McNeil - President's Special Emissary

Edwin Meese III - Presidential Counselor

Constantine C. Menges - National Security Assistant for Latin America

Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf III - commander of Joint Task Force 120

James H. Michel - Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs

William J. Middendorf - Ambassador to the Organisation of American States

William Montgomery - Executive Assistant to the Undersecretary for Political Affairs

Vice Admiral Arthur S. Moreau, Jr. - Assistant to the Chairman of the JCS

Langhorne A. Motley - Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs

Lieutenant Colonel Oliver L. North - Deputy Director of Political-Military Affairs

Vice Admiral John M. Poindexter - Deputy National Security Adviser

Ronald W. Reagan - President

Davis R. Robinson - Department of State Legal Adviser

Lawrence G. Rossin - Foreign Service Officer

Nestor D. Sanchez - Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter-American Affairs

George P. Shultz - Secretary of State

Larry Speakes - Principal Deputy Press Secretary

General John W. Vessey - Chairman of the JCS

Caspar W. Weinberger - Secretary of Defense

U.S. Embassy, Bridgetown, Barbados

Milan D. Bish - Ambassador to Barbados

James Budeit - Consul General

Gary Chafin - Political Officer

Linda Flohr - Third Secretary

Ludlow Flower III - Deputy Chief of Mission

Kenneth A. Kurze - Counselor for Political and Economic Affairs

David Ostroff - Consular Officer

Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence Reiman - Military Attaché

British Government

Giles Bullard - High Commissioner, Barbados

Geoffrey Howe - Foreign Secretary

John Kelly - British Representative, Grenada

Richard Luce - Minister of State

David Montgomery - Deputy High Commissioner, Barbados

Margaret Thatcher - Prime Minister

Oliver Wright - British Ambassador, U.S.

<u>OECS</u>

Vaughan Lewis - Director General

Lester Bird - Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Antigua and Barbuda

Vere Bird, Sr. - Prime Minister of Antigua and Barbuda

Milton Cato - Prime Minister of St. Vincent and the Grenadines

Eugenia Charles - Prime Minister of Dominica

John Compton - Prime Minister of St. Lucia

John Osbourne - Chief Minister of Montserrat

Kennedy Simmonds - Prime Minister of St. Kitts-Nevis

<u>The Other Caribbean States</u>

Tom Adams - Prime Minister of Barbados

H. Brazane Babb - Permanent Secretary to the Foreign Minister of Barbados

Forbes Burnham - President of Guyana

Fidel Castro - President of Cuba

George Chambers - Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago

Neville Gallimore - Foreign Minister of Jamaica

Brigadier General Rudyard Lewis - commander of the Barbados Defence Force

Lynden Pindling - Prime Minister of the Bahamas

George Price - Prime Minister of Belize

Bernard St. John - Deputy Prime Minister of Barbados

Edward Seaga - Prime Minister of Jamaica

Louis Tull - Foreign Minister of Barbados

Grenada

Geoffrey Bourne - Vice Chancellor of SGU

Charles Modica - Chancellor of SGU (based in New York)

Paul Scoon - Governor-General

Gary Solin - Bursar of SGU

Julian Torres Rizo - Cuban Ambassador, Grenada

Bishop Faction

Fitzroy Bain - Trade Union Leader

Norris Bain - Minister of Housing

Maurice Bishop - Prime Minister, Minister of Defence, Interior and Carriacou Affairs

Jacqueline Creft - Minister of Education, Youth and Culture

Major Einstein Louison - Army Chief of Staff

George Louison - Minister of Agriculture

Vincent Noel - Trade Union Leader

Kendrick Radix - Minister of Legal Affairs, Agro-Industries and Fisheries

Lynden Ramdhanny - Minister of Tourism

Unison Whiteman - Minister of Foreign Affairs

Coard Faction

General Hudson Austin - Minister of Communications, Works and Labour, Commander of the PRA

Major Tan Bartholomew - PRA

Bernard Coard - Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Finance

Phyllis Coard - Head of RFG and National Women's Organisation

Major Leon Cornwall - PRA, Grenadian Ambassador, Havana, Cuba

Lieutenant Liam James - PRA

Ian St. Bernard - Commissioner of Police

Lieutenant Colonel Ewart Layne - PRA

Selwyn Strachan - Minister of National Mobilisation

Major Christopher Stroude - Political Commissar of the PRA

APPENDIX 2

STRUCTURE OF A U.S. EMBASSY

Executive Section

Ambassador
Deputy Chief of Mission
Two secretaries

Political Section

Counselor for political affairs
Four political officers
Three secretaries

Economic Section

Counselor for economic affairs
Two economic officers
Two secretaries

Consular Section

Consul general
Four consular officers

Foreign Agriculture Service*

Counselor for agricultural affairs
Assistant agricultural attaché

United States Information Service

Counselor for public affairs
Executive officer
Information officer
Assistant information officer
Cultural affairs officer
Two assistant cultural affairs officers
Secretary

Administrative Section

Counselor for administration
Two general service officers
Personnel officer
Budget and fiscal officer
Security officer
Two secretaries
Communications supervisor
Two support communicators
Two telecommunications specialists
Seven marine guards

Foreign Commercial Service*

Counselor for commercial affairs
Two commercial officers
Director, Export Development Office

Agency for International Development

Mission director
Deputy Director
Executive officer
Controller
Project development officer
Program officer
Agricultural development officer
Rural development officer
Health/population officer
Science/technology adviser
Secretary

Non-Foreign Affaris Agencies

Service Attaché	Military Assistance Advisory Group
Defence attaché (and air attaché)	Commander
Army attaché	Chief, Army section (and deputy commander)
Assistant air attaché	Four officer advisers
Administrative officer	Chief, Air force section
Two clerks	Three office advisers
	Administrative officer
Peace Corps	Three clerks
Peace Corps representative	Six NCO trainers
Deputy representative	
Physician	

Source: "U.S. Staffing at a Hypothetical Medium-sized Embassy," in Andrew L. Steigman. *The Foreign Service of the United States: First Line of Defense*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1990, p. 125.

* No representatives at the U.S. embassy in Barbados.

All U.S. embassies have basically the same core structure but at smaller embassies such as Barbados the Political Section and the Economic Section are a joint section under one counselor. Similarly the Service Attaché only consisted of a Defense Attaché due to a lack of branches of the services in Barbados.

APPENDIX 3

ORGANISATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES REQUEST FOR U.S. ASSISTANCE IN GRENADA

October 23, 1983

Your Excellency,

The Chairman of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States presents her compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of the United States to the Eastern Caribbean and has the honour to transmit herewith a request for assistance under Article 8 of the Treaty establishing the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States.

The Chairman of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States avails herself of this opportunity to renew the assurances of her highest consideration.

Sincerely

Eugenia Charles

Attachment:

TEXT OF OECS REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE

The authority of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) met at Bridgetown, Barbados on Friday 21st October 1983 to consider and evaluate the situation in Grenada arising out of the overthrow of the Government led by Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and the subsequent killing of the Prime Minister together with some of his colleagues and a number of other citizens.

The authority is aware that the overthrow of the Bishop administration took place with the knowledge and connivance of forces unfriendly to the OECS leading to the establishment of the present military regime.

The meeting took note of the current anarchic conditions, the serious violations of human rights and bloodshed that have occurred and the consequent unprecedented threat to the peace and security of the region created by the vacuum of authority in Grenada.

The authority was deeply concerned that military forces and supplies are likely to be shortly introduced to consolidate the position of the regime and that the country can be used as a staging post for acts of aggression against its members.

The authority further noted that the capability of the Grenada armed forces is already at a level of sophistication and size far beyond the internal needs of that country. Furthermore the member states of the OECS have no means of defence against such forces.

The member governments of the organisation hold the strong view that such a situation would further undermine the political, social and economic stability and would have extremely dangerous consequences for the preservation of peace and security in the whole OECS sub-region as a whole.

The authority noted that the present regime in Grenada has demonstrated by its brutality and ruthlessness that it will stop at nothing to achieve its ends and to secure its power.

Under the authority of Article 8 of the Treaty establishing the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States, the authority proposes therefore to take action for collective defence and the preservation of peace and security against external aggression by requesting assistance from friendly countries to provide transport logistics support and additional military personnel to assist the efforts of the OECS to stabilize this most grave situation within the Eastern Caribbean.

The authority of the OECS wishes to establish a peace keeping force with the assistance of friendly neighbouring states to restore on Grenada conditions of tranquillity and order so as to prevent further loss of life and abuses of human rights pending the restoration of constitutional government.

Source: "Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States Request For U.S. Assistance in Grenada," *American Foreign Policy Current Documents* (1983), Document 656, pp. 1397-98.

APPENDIX 4

LETTER FROM THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF GRENADA TO THE PRIME MINISTER OF BARBADOS

October 24, 1983

Dear Prime Minister,

You are aware that there is a vacuum of authority in Grenada following the killing of the Prime Minister and the subsequent serious violations of human rights and bloodshed.

I am therefore seriously concerned over the lack of internal security in Grenada. Consequently I am requesting your help to assist me in stabilizing this grave and dangerous situation. It is my desire that a peacekeeping force should be established in Grenada to facilitate a rapid return to peace and tranquillity and also a return to democratic return.

In this connexion I am also seeking assistance from the United States, from Jamaica, and from the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States through its current chairman the hon. Eugenia Charles (Prime Minister of Dominica) in the spirit of the treaty establishing that organization to which my country is a signatory.

I have the honour to be,
Yours faithfully,
Paul Scoon,
Governor-General.

Source: William C. Gilmore, *The Grenada Intervention: Analysis and Documentation* London: Mansell, 1984, p. 95.

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[1] A number of these declassified Department of State telegrams can be found in the National Security Archives in Washington D.C. These are indicated by the abbreviation *NSAGC* (National Security Archives Grenada Collection). The remaining documents appear courtesy of Dr. Mitch Leventhal.

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