

THE UNIVERSITY OF HULL

**MEDIA AGENDA-BUILDING BATTLES BETWEEN GREENPEACE AND
SHELL: A RHETORICAL AND DISCURSIVE APPROACH.**

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Tamara Vian Bakir

B.A.(Hons.) Philosophy, Politics & Economics, University of Oxford

M.A. in Journalism Studies, College of Cardiff, University of Wales

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GLOSSARY

The following definitions are specialised language used in Rhetoric.

alliteration - repetition of the initial consonant.

assonance - repetition of the medial vowel

emotive abstraction - appealing to abstract ideas with a strongly positive or negative connotation, reflecting communal experience and aspiration

enargia - graphic vividness

meiosis - denigration/ "doing down"

metonymy - a principle of structural association where one part of a syntactic structure is used to express another part of that structure

nominalisation - the conversion of processes, events, etc., into names

plote - random repetition

synecdoche - a relationship between an expressed idea and an unexpressed one where the part represents the whole

synathrismos - listings, heapings-up, the effect of piling nouns or verbs within a sentence

whitewash - the flattery of error by the application of a neutral or positive term

ACRONYMS

APTV - Associated Press TV

BARB - Broadcasters' Audience Research Board, Ltd.

BATNEEC - Best Available Techniques Not Entailing Excessive Cost

BEP - Best Environmental Practice

BP - British Petroleum

BPEO - Best Practical Environmental Option

CBI - Confederation of British Industry

CDHR - Committee for the Defence of Human Rights

CHOGM - Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting

CLO - Civil Liberties Organisation of Nigeria

CMAG - Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group

CNN - Cable News Network

CRP - Constitutional Rights Project

CU - Close-up

DNV - Det Norske Veritas

DTI - Department of Trade and Industry

ECU - Extreme close-up

EU - European Union

ELS - Extreme Long Shot

EPA - Environmental Protection Act (1990)

FEPA - Food and Environmental Protection Act (1985)

FoE - Friends of the Earth

G7 - Group of Seven nations

G77 - Group of 77 nations

INGO - International Non-Governmental Organisation

IRS - Integrated Removal Strategy

LDCs - Less Developed Countries

LS - Long shot

MAFF - Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food

MCS - Medium-close shot

MLS - Medium-long shot

MNC - Multi-National Corporation

MORETO - Movement for Reparation to Ogbia

MOSIEND - Movement for the Survival of the Izon Ethnic Nationality in the Niger Delta

MOSOP - Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People

MPF - Mobile Police Force

MS - Medium shot

NADECO - National Democratic Coalition

NGO - Non-Governmental Organisation

NNPC - Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation

OBR - Ogoni Bill of Rights

OSPAR - Oslo and Paris Commissions

PR - Public Relations

Shell Expro - Shell-UK Exploration and Production

SPDC - Shell Petroleum Development Corporation (Shell-Nigeria)

SRI - Shelter Rights Initiatives

UK - United Kingdom

UN - United Nations

US - United States of America

VNRs - Video news releases

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 The research motivation and question

This research was inspired by a shift in my intense admiration for the environmental group, Greenpeace, as a teenage supporter in the mid-1980s, to a gradual distancing over the years as personal efforts at Green consumerism and lifestyle are challenged and compromised daily by the economic and social structures of living in Britain. My "deep green" consciousness was awakened in the mid-1980s at a time prior to the popularisation of "green" issues in society and in the mass media, and I was highly aware of the radical potentiality of such issues in their challenge to the consumerist-oriented status quo.¹ My subject position remains one of a belief in the need for radical and global change in the organisation of production and consumption, but of pessimism regarding the political viability of such an exercise.

Several theorists see the mass media as making a key contribution to this process of social change. Giddens (1991) posits that the mass media can foster an awareness of global problems and of the interconnectedness between "*personal activity and planetary problems*" (ibid.: 221), hence inculcating a sense of personal moral responsibility for solving the problems. Beck (1996: 191) posits that media-directed publicity can potentially monitor political decisions. However, in a less optimistic vein, Beck also argues that media attention to modern industrially created hazards (like radioactivity and toxins), combined with conflicting scientific opinion about the level of environmental risk these hazards pose, can be detrimental: "*Where*

¹ Geographically, a significant part of my childhood was split between the Middle-East and South-East England. Time spent in the Middle-East laid early foundations for my interest in issues of development, economic growth and environmental degradation since these were visibly entwined - most memorably in the gas-flaring, desert oil fields, visible pollution and harsh wealth differentials in the cities. Such images can impact deeply on a young child. A major source of politicisation of these memories/environmental leanings came from living in south-east England as a teenager during the Thatcherite 1980s, when individualistic consumerism and self-serving politics were at their most prominent. For a while, I joined the Green Party as an active member, and supported Greenpeace.

everything turns into a hazard, somehow nothing is dangerous anymore," (ibid.: 36-37). This allows private and political moods to swing in any direction: *"The risk society shifts from hysteria to indifference and vice versa,"* (ibid.: 37). These conflicting views of the value of the mass media feed my interest in the construction of mass mediated environmental messages. Could environmental messages be constructed with which a mass audience can identify, to the extent that people are moved to make long-term changes to their world?

The empirical focus of this research comprises the UK television news battles between Greenpeace (a highly media-aware International Non-Governmental Organisation (INGO)), and the oil company Shell (a multinational corporation (MNC)). Specifically, two such media battles are examined, both receiving international attention and intense media publicity during 1995:

- The battle between Royal Dutch/Shell, particularly, its subsidiary Shell-UK, and Greenpeace over the deep-sea disposal of the Brent Spar oil platform;
- The battle between Royal Dutch/Shell's Nigerian subsidiary, the Shell Petroleum Development Corporation (SPDC) (hereafter referred to as Shell-Nigeria), and Greenpeace (amongst others) over environmental pollution in Ogoniland, Nigeria.

These two battles were chosen mainly because they share the same main protagonists - Greenpeace and Shell - providing rich material for a number of interesting questions regarding media agenda-building.

Greenpeace can be described as a radical environmental pressure group, targeting value structures in society (McCormick, 1989). Greenpeace-UK explains that it campaigns: *"... for the protection of nature and the elimination of industrial abuses, not their mitigation,"* (Greenpeace-UK, 1996: 3). Attacking the oil industry furthers some of Greenpeace's more specific aims, which include securing the introduction of innovations to replace fossil and nuclear fuels with renewable energy; stopping the use of the environment as an industrial

waste dump; and introducing clean methods of production (ibid.: 4-5). This stimulates the question: are these radical aims manifested in media coverage of Greenpeace's campaigns against Shell?

Given its radical remit, Greenpeace operates as an "*ideological outsider group*", to use Grant's (1995: 3) terminology. As the name suggests, an outsider group is not privy to privileged access to the executive.² This is in contrast to "*insider groups*", which, perhaps because their objectives and methods are more acceptable to government or perhaps because they wield large sanctions, are routinely consulted in the policy-making process. An outsider group presents its case by raising public awareness and support for its positions, rather than behind-the-scenes negotiation with policy-makers and the attendant risks of becoming ensnared in the political system (ibid.: 2). Accordingly, Greenpeace believes that the important thing is to "*give people the hope that personal commitment can make a difference,*" (Rose, 1993: 288). In seeking to influence the public (and through this route, decision-makers³) gaining media attention has been Greenpeace's paramount strategy since its creation in 1971. Subjecting decision-makers like MNCs to the glare of negative publicity is designed to stimulate action and social change (Dale, 1996: 3). Greenpeace's media strategy was professionalised when the old Greenpeace Films was replaced by the new Greenpeace Communication Ltd. - set up in 1986 as a service division for both international campaigns and national offices. Its main objective is to secure "*maximum media coverage of Greenpeace campaigns, principally by providing international news agencies with photo, print and video material originated or acquired by Greenpeace,*"

² Grant (1995, 1989) identified three sub-divisions of "*outsider groups*". "*Ideological outsiders*" are the most radical: they are likely to oppose the existing political order, with their "illegitimate" views leading to their exclusion. The less radical "*outsiders by necessity*" may wish to become insiders but lack the required understanding of the political system to do so. "*Potential insiders*" desire insider status but have not yet been successful in their quest (Maloney et al., 1994: 28). For more on Greenpeace's outsider status, see Grant (1995), Rothgang (1991) and Lowe and Goyder (1983: 78).

³ See Cracknell (1993: 10). See Manheim (1987: 506) for citations on public opinion influencing decision-makers. For instance, Page and Shapiro (1983) show that changes in public opinion are important causes of policy change, especially when the opinion changes are large and sustained and when the issues are salient.

(Greenpeace Communication Ltd. Annual Report 1990/91, cited in Linne, 1993: 77). Sending material to international news agencies provided Greenpeace with an instant international presence and platform, with their direct action giving them a product to sell in terms of a news event (Dale, 1996:114). Its ability to build the media agenda was, and perhaps still is, one of its greatest resources (for instance, see Hansen, 1993).

Although Greenpeace International is represented internationally in seventeen different offices (Eyerman and Jamison, 1989: 105), the economic resources of Shell are far greater. Shell is the world's largest non-state oil company, active in more than 130 countries: in 1994 its net profit reached a record £4 billion (The Economist, 24th June 1995: 80). Furthermore, during the first half of the 1990s, Shell was often held up as a model for MNC managers (ibid.), having worked assiduously with conservationists and some environmentalists to promote its green image (Elkington and Trisoglio, 1996: 766). Ketola (1993: 27) notes that Shell's statement of general business principles (Royal Dutch/Shell 1990) includes environmental principles in which Shell companies give proper regard to the conservation of the environment, going beyond legislative requirements. Its principles of responsibility mention due regard to safety and environmental standards, and its economic principles say that: "*criteria for investment decisions are essentially economic but also take into account social and environmental considerations*," (ibid.). To this end, Shell-UK has been running its "*Better Britain*" Campaign since 1970 which aims to "*support conservation projects carried out by UK volunteer groups, by providing information, advice and grants*" (Shell press release, 18th June 1995). Partly funded by Shell-UK as part of its Community Investment Programme, Shell claims that its Better Britain Campaign pioneered the concept of a link between industry, environmental organisations and statutory bodies to encourage self-help in conservation work. However, the extent of Shell's environmentalism remains limited, and arguably is stated largely for the perceived benefits of a green image.

The need for a green image is now well-recognised among industry.⁴ The impetus came from the US where, as Manheim (1991: 101) reports, on Jan 30th 1969, an offshore well operated by Union Oil along the Santa Barbera Channel on the Californian coast polluted some of the most photogenic shoreline in US, to be followed by an epidemic of oil spills world-wide. The Santa Barbera oil spill turned oil companies into villains for their perceived cavalier attitude towards the environment. Manheim sketches how "*Big Oil*" fought back. In a controversial move in the early 1970s that has since become commonplace, Mobil began buying space in magazines and elite newspapers to express its political views, also producing TV adverts (ibid.: 103). Since the mid-1980s substantial energies have been channelled into risk-management and corporate green advertising (see Anderson, 1997: 111): "*The oil company, Shell, for example, would appear from its glossy and expensive advertisements to be dedicated to turning much of Britain into a nature reserve full of birds clean of wing and with unoiled feathers,*" (Lowe and Morrison, 1984: 86). In the 1990s, this promotionalism has stepped up a gear, at least in the US. For instance, Shell has supported the "*Wise Use*" pro-industry movement - a coalition of industrial, agricultural and conservative political interest groups organised to capitalise on a relatively narrow, but committed, support base (Brick, 1995/1998: 197). Wise Use groups resist environmental initiatives and try to roll back existing environmental laws in the name of protecting free enterprise and private property. Thus, Shell, along with the rest of "*Big Oil*", appears to be aware of the need for a green image whilst its prime concern remains profits.

This research therefore examines the conflict between two differentially-resourced actors. On one side is Greenpeace, with a well-established experiential knowledge base of media targeting and raising public awareness, but an outsider group as far as policy-making influence goes. On the other side is Shell, with a growing awareness of the need for an environmentally-friendly image, married with vast economic resources and greater insider status: for instance, at least

⁴ The need for a socially responsible image has been recognised even longer by the oil industry. Miller & Dinan (2000: 5) and Ewen (1996) cite a number of studies on the history of the Public Relations (PR) industry in the US which credits PR with significant victories on behalf of business since 1918.

some of its interests are represented by core insider groups like the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) which has bargaining/exchange relationships with policy makers over a broad range of issues (Grant, 1995: 2).⁵

This research has two foci - one substantive (where the phenomenon is studied in one particular situational context), and one formal (where formal theory emerges from study of a phenomenon under different types of situations) (Strauss and Corbin 1990: 174-175).⁶ On a substantive level, this research investigates how Greenpeace and Shell conducted these media battles (i.e. what "*information subsidies*" (Gandy, 1991: 267)⁷ they offered); how they impacted on each other's media strategies; and how they fared in building the UK television news agenda (see section 1.2 for background information needed to understand the substantive level). On a formal level, these media battles are used to develop theory regarding news media agenda-building - specifically theory regarding news values and news media-oriented discursive strategies (see section 1.3).

1.2 Background to the Substantive Issues: Brent Spar and Ogoniland

The Brent Spar and Ogoniland issues were chosen for several reasons - the main ones being constancy of key protagonists (Greenpeace and Shell); variation in the extent of media campaigning (very intense over several months in the case of the Spar); and variation in allies, opponents and political-economic contexts. These are outlined in the following sub-sections.

1.2.1 The Battle over Brent Spar

During the summer of 1994 Greenpeace was made aware of an internal review being carried

⁵ Furthermore, since primary energy production accounts for 10% of UK's Gross Domestic Product - one of the highest shares of any industrial nation (CIA, 2000) - a close relationship is to be expected between oil companies engaged in exploration and production, and the UK government.

⁶ This terminology comes from the methodology of grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), which will be explained further in chapter 3.

⁷ Information subsidies are efforts to reduce prices for information.

out by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) on options for decommissioning redundant offshore installations (Wallace, <http://www.greenpeace.org/~comms/brent/bpol.html>, June 1999). This disposal process was unpublicised, in keeping with Whitney's (1991: 351) observation that most public policy is formulated outside the public eye and that most communication within a topic-specific domain is "*insider*", conforming to goals and values shared within that domain. Indeed, between 1991 - February 1995, the review process of the Spar's disposal involved Shell-UK, the UK government and those selected for consultation - mainly conservation bodies and fishing interests (Dickson, 1996: 124). The decision to dispose of the Spar by dropping it in a deep trench in the North East Atlantic was taken in February 1995 by the then Energy minister, Tim Eggar, in line with Shell's Best Practical Environmental Option (BPEO) proposals. This was the first oil platform to be disposed of since North Sea oil drilling began in the 1970s.⁸ After the DTI approved deep-sea disposal, under the guidelines of the new convention on the marine environment (the Oslo-Paris Convention), the UK Government notified other European nations on 16th February 1995 of Shell's plan. As no country responded within the 60 day deadline for objections imposed by the Convention (i.e. by 16th April) the UK Government issued Shell the disposal licence in the first week of May.

In keeping with Bolton's (1997: 267) observation on consultation with the public, the public debate started only when the decision had already been taken. That the public debate arose at all was due to Greenpeace, who decided to go ahead with the Spar campaign on 11th April 1995 with a projected cost of £600,000 bankrolled by Greenpeace in the UK, Netherlands and Germany - the three strongest Greenpeace organisations in Europe (Bate, 1999: 52).

Greenpeace's stated concern over the deep-sea disposal decision was the potential disposal precedent it would set for all other North Sea rigs; and the potential effect on marine life from

⁸ The Spar was installed in the North Sea Brent Field in 1976, to provide a storage and tanker off-loading system for the Brent platforms (Rudall Blanchard Associates Limited, 1994), <http://www.greenpeace.org/~comms/brent/Bpe-O.html>, December 1996.

any toxic and radioactive remains of oil in the Spar's tank. Shell's counter-argument was that the Spar was a unique structure, hence deep-sea disposal would not set a precedent; that they had to balance the safety of the workforce and environment with economic concerns; and that deep-sea disposal was preferable to land disposal on each of these counts.

Greenpeace decided not to make the projected occupation of the Spar just another sit-in, but to turn the platform into the headquarters for Greenpeace's entire North Sea operations. In time-honoured fashion, Greenpeace created a "*media event*" (Dayan and Katz, 1992/1996) through its direct action, boarding the rig on 30th April 1995 and remaining there until 23rd May, when they were forcibly removed by Shell (although returning later and remaining there until 20th June). Hansen (2000: 59) observes that until Greenpeace's action, the proposed deep-sea disposal of the Spar was a non-issue in the British press. His analysis of The Daily Telegraph, Daily Mail, Daily Mirror and their Sunday editions from January - October 1995 show that there had been only a single article in each of the daily newspapers mentioning the Spar in the months prior to Greenpeace's action, and of these only two made reference to the government's decision to allow deep-sea disposal. Greenpeace's media campaign was accompanied by widespread boycotts of Shell across Northern Europe - particularly in Germany where a ten-day boycott of Shell's 1,700 petrol stations was organised, cutting sales by 30 - 50% (Tsoukas, 1999: 515). Loefstedt (1997: 132) documents that Greenpeace's campaign inspired Germans to write letters to the UK DTI enclosing money to help pay for onshore disposal, and German women sent pictures of their children to Shell-UK, urging its chairman, Dr. Chris Fay, to consider the needs of future generations. During this period, Shell-Germany received over 11,000 letters complaining about the disposal. Companies and public authorities entered the fray by canceling their contracts with Shell, or threatening to do so (Grolin 1997: 4-5, cited in Tsoukas, 1999: 515). European politicians joined the protest. On 9th May (9 days into Greenpeace's occupation, and several days after the UK Government had issued the deep-sea disposal licence) the German Environmental and Agricultural Ministries protested to the UK

Government that land disposal had not been significantly investigated. This protest was heightened on 15th - 17th June when Germany's Chancellor Kohl protested to John Major, the UK Prime Minister, at the G7 summit over the disposal plans (Loefstedt, 1997: 132). Given this mounting pressure, Shell made an unprecedented "U-turn" on 20th June 1995 when it cancelled the deep-sea disposal.

1.2.2 The Battle over environmental destruction in Ogoniland

Unlike the media campaign over the Spar, which was initiated solely by Greenpeace and was comparatively short and focused, the Ogoniland campaign was initiated by the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) in 1990, with Greenpeace's involvement starting in 1993. This is a protracted campaign that still continues. Its intractability stems from the social, political and economic relationships between the Nigerian regimes, the Ogoni people and the oil companies.

In 1958 Shell-Nigeria discovered oil in Ogoniland - 404 square miles of largely wild, fertile land in the Niger Delta, home to 500,000 Ogoni people out of an estimated population of 100 million Nigerians (Brock, 1999: 27). Chevron moved its oil exploration to Ogoniland in 1977, and overall, both companies have jointly extracted about US \$30 billion worth of oil from Ogoniland (Westra, 1998: 154). Obi (1997: 141) describes how from the 1970s onwards, oil became the fiscal basis of the Nigerian state, accounting for 80% of national revenue and 95% of foreign exchange earnings. Like the other minority tribes in the Niger Delta, the Ogoni felt disenfranchised and deprived of their fair share of the oil wealth. The oil-producing areas have almost no infrastructure whilst suffering massive environmental degradation. Oil pollution has negatively impacted the Ogoni's economy, since their main livelihood is fishing, farming and trading (Brock, 1999: 27). Compounding this is the abuse of the spiritual connection between the Ogoni and their land - which is widely seen as the abode of the gods, and carries significant traditional respect, sometimes worship, since it is believed that the lives of the Ogoni are

controlled from the land (Idowu, 1999: 166). Hence, the assertion by Nigerian writer, Ken Saro-Wiwa, that the Ogoni *are* the land (Harvan, 1998: 145).

Saro-Wiwa had been campaigning on these issues since 1968, and in 1990 he helped set up MOSOP - a peaceful resistance organisation (Vidal, The Guardian, 4th January 1995: 2). It was founded by traditional chiefs and civil servants who advocated dialogue with the central Nigerian Government to get a better deal for the Ogoni (Adams, Financial Times, 11th January 1995: 3). MOSOP adopted the Ogoni Bill of Rights (OBR) and published it in several newspapers in 1991, claiming the right to self-determination as a distinct people within Nigeria, a fair share of the oil revenue, more national representation and control over their environment. This started the mobilisation of the Ogoni. Naanan (1997: 92) describes how the subsequent presentation of the Ogoni case by Saro-Wiwa before the United Nations (UN) Commission on Human Rights in Geneva in May 1992 (widely reported by the Nigerian media) marked an important turning point in building the Ogoni's confidence. Cayford (1996: 189) reports that in December 1992, having received no response from the Nigerian administration, MOSOP took its complaint directly to the oil companies, sending a letter to Shell-Nigeria, Chevron and Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). Among MOSOP's demands were that companies stop the continued environmental destruction; pay US \$6 billion in royalties backdated to 1958; and pay US \$4 billion in compensation for environmental damages.⁹ The companies were told to meet the demands within thirty days or face mass action protests. Indeed, the 4th January 1993 saw the massive "Ogoni Day" demonstration in Nigeria. In response, the oil companies increased security and the Nigerian government announced a ban on public demonstrations and decreed that demands for the right to self-determination and disruption of oil production were punishable by death under the treason laws. As the Nigerian election of 12th June 1993 approached, Saro-Wiwa advocated

⁹ To see MOSOP's full demands, consult Shell-Nigeria's website (<http://www.Shellnigeria.com/>, 22nd February 2001).

that it be boycotted because participation would be a validation of its underlying constitution, which made no guarantees of minority rights (Cayford, 1996: 190). Consequently, Saro-Wiwa and other Ogoni leaders were arrested in late June 1993 and charged with treason. Saro-Wiwa was later released on bail, but the charges were not dropped. On 21st May 1994 four pro-government Ogoni leaders were attacked by a mob and beaten to death. The Ogoni claim that the Nigerian Government had bribed these leaders into exposing MOSOP's plans and strategies to Shell-Nigeria and the government (Idowu, 1999: 178). Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni activists were arrested and accused of complicity in these murders. They were sentenced to death on 31st October 1995, and ten days later they were executed by the then military regime.

The Ogoni's cause has been taken up by a range of groups, including Greenpeace, which was involved since the first Ogoni Day on January 4th 1993 (it sent a camera crew) (Naanan, 1997: 83). Shell has borne the brunt of the criticism because Shell-Nigeria has an advantaged position, in its control of Nigeria's oil;¹⁰ and because nearly all its production is on land - unlike the next biggest producers, Mobil and Chevron, which are mainly offshore. As with the Spar issue, an appeal was made for consumer boycotts of Shell. Rowell (1995) reports that from his jail, Saro-Wiwa wrote in 1995: "*I have one suggestion for those whose conscience has been disturbed by my story: boycott all Shell products. Picket Shell garages,*" (Saro-Wiwa, cited in *ibid.*: 213). Following Saro-Wiwa's execution, on 23rd November 1995 Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth (FoE) and Body Shop took out a full page Sunday newspaper advertisement calling for a boycott of Shell products. The extent to which these boycotts were implemented in the UK is unclear. Greenpeace said its members took action against more than 100 Shell stations; FoE said 125 stations; Shell International argued that only a fraction of this number was affected (Ghazi, The Observer, 19th November 1995: 1), but Shell-UK said 131 stations had been affected (Vidal, The Guardian, 24th November 1995: 5). In the international

¹⁰ The Nigerian state's equity in its joint venture with Shell-Nigeria is currently 55% (NNPC), with 10% owned by Elf and 5% by Agip, while Shell-Nigeria owns 30% equity participation. (Fryas, 1998: 462).

political arena, at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in New Zealand in November 1995, Nigeria was immediately suspended from the Commonwealth for two years pending an introduction of a democratic regime.

1.3 The Formal Issues: contributing to a theory of media agenda-building

1.3.1 The public knowledge project

This research is part of the wider "*public knowledge*" project identified by Corner (1998: 108). This project is concerned with the media as agency of public knowledge and definitional power (for instance, see Schattschneider, 1961: 68), with a focus on news and current affairs output, and a direct connection with the politics of information and viewer as citizen. A well-established strand within this project is that of *agenda-setting*, the basic premise of which is that issues emphasised in news coverage subsequently come to occupy prominent positions on the public agenda: i.e. the media influence which issues are discussed and prioritised in society (Rogers and Dearing, 1988). Much research activity has explored agenda-setting, most of which looks at the relationship between the media and public agenda (Berkowitz, 1987: 508),¹¹ and some of which looks at the relationship between the media and policy agenda.¹² However, less often studied is how the media agenda develops - the *media agenda-building* approach. "*Agenda-setting research has consistently accepted the media agenda as a given without considering the process by which the agenda is constructed,*" (Carragee, 1987: 43). The media agenda-building approach asks the question "who sets the media agenda?" and tries to identify the variables that determine whether an issue has a successful career on the news agenda or not (Mathes and Pfetsch, 1991: 34). Dearing and Rogers (1996: 17) note that how the media agenda is built has only been investigated in fairly recent years – with less than 20

¹¹ For instance, research indicates a correlation between public awareness of environmental concerns, and media coverage (see Hansen, 1991: 444 for a range of citations).

¹² For instance, Pritchard (1987) cites studies, most of which suggest that the media impacts on the policy agenda, although not always by the expected route. Also see Whitney (1991: 349) and Rogers and Dearing (1988: 578) for further citations.

publications. Thus, this research, in focusing on media agenda-building in UK television news, helps address the gap in the public knowledge project.

The public-knowledge project draws on Habermas' (1981/1995) notion of the "*public sphere*". This is the realm in which a "*time-consuming process of public enlightenment*" (ibid.: 195) may take place for the general interest. For this to happen, Habermas argues that rational agreement between publicly competing opinions must be freely reached. This is a state of "*communicative action*" (ibid.: 286) where the actions of actors are coordinated through acts of reaching understanding. However, Habermas sees the mass-mediated public sphere as dominated by "*strategic*" rather than communicative action. Strategic action (also termed "*success-oriented action*") (ibid.: 333) consists of concealed strategic action (i.e. unconscious deception, "*systematically distorted communication*" (Habermas, 1989/1996: 178)) and open strategic action (i.e. conscious deception, manipulation) where "*Critical publicity is supplanted by manipulative publicity*" (ibid.). Habermas sees this as helping to engineer public consent on behalf of interest groups (ibid.: 194), creating a "*quasi-public opinion*", which can be traced back to specific institutions (ibid.: 246).

Since this is not a piece of agenda-setting research, it does not investigate Habermas' contention that public consent is engineered by media publicity.¹³ Such a study would enter the vexed area of media effects, which are notoriously difficult to prove in any causal manner given the complex web of interactions between the public, policy-makers and the media (Kosicki, 1993: 111).¹⁴ Rather, the usefulness of Habermas' perspective to this research lies in his concept of strategic action (Habermas, 1981/1995). This research, in focusing on the news

¹³ Furthermore, Habermas (1992/1996: 438) later revised his pessimistic assessment of the impact of the debased public sphere on public opinion. He acknowledged that his original analysis had been strongly influenced by Adorno's (1978) theory of mass culture, which simplistically ignores the resistive power and critical potential of a pluralistic mass public.

¹⁴ For a flavour of the complexity of the agenda-setting process, see Mathes and Pfetsch (1991: 57), Gamson and Modigliani (1989), Hilgartner and Bosk (1988), Krimsky and Plough (1988) and Manheim (1987).

media-oriented campaigning discourses of Greenpeace and Shell, entails examination of their press releases - a form of open strategic action (i.e. manipulation, as they are designed to get influential messages into the media). Examination of news broadcasts looks at concealed strategic action (as Greenpeace's and Shell's press releases are incorporated into news broadcasts, and so are converted into "*serious speech acts*" (Foucault, 1979) stamped with the journalistic hallmark of newsworthiness and objectivity). In identifying Greenpeace's and Shell's news media-oriented campaigning discourses, this analysis will make use of the Aristotelian perspective on rhetoric, which Aristotle (384 -322 BC) defines as aiming: "*not [absolutely] to persuade, but to discover the available means of persuasion in a given case,*" (Aristotle, 1965: 59).

1.3.2 A critical look at the ideal of rational-critical debate

Habermas (1989/1996: 221) wishes to revitalise the public sphere by re-instating rational-critical debate amongst the public (i.e. a conscious grappling with cognitively accessible states of affairs - an "*ideal speech situation*"). However, this prompts the critical question: what value and role does rational-critical debate have in the modern television news media?

Habermas' ideal of rational public debate leading to consensus formation neglects the value of other aspects of mass mediated communication - for instance, the "*ritual*" understanding of media impact which: "*centres on the sacred ceremony that draws persons together in fellowship and commonality,*" (Carey 1989: 43, cited in Cottle, 1993: 110). Cottle (ibid.: 111) argues that working more at the levels of sentiment, myth and ritual, shared realities can be publicly appealed to at a less than rational level. Similarly, Anderson (2000: 93) argues that the symbolic content of environmental actions involving, for instance, protestors burrowing underground or chaining themselves to trees, is significant in a society increasingly dominated by the circulation of images and signs. Hence, affective dimensions of communication may be as valuable as rational dimensions.

However, the communicative situation does not consist of the simple binary opposition of affect versus rationality, since the process of defining rationality is a complex business (especially if rationality is a constructed truth (see Waddell, 1990: 393)). Of use is Weber's (1952/1995) distinction between formal/instrumental rationality and substantive rationality. Formal/instrumental rationality is a measured process which looks at the means used to achieve the end, and the way they are applied.

"Action is instrumentally rational (zweckrational) when the end, the means, and the secondary results are all rationally taken into account and weighed. This involves rational consideration of alternative means to the end, of the relations of the end to the secondary consequences, and finally of the relative importance of different possible ends," (ibid.: 26).

By contrast, substantive ("*normative*" or "*value rational*") rationality is when the actors, regardless of foreseeable consequences, act according to their convictions of what seems to them to be required by considerations which are "*ethical, political, utilitarian, hedonistic, feudal, egalitarian, or whatever,*" (ibid.: 326). Substantive rationality, then, can be conceptualised as drawing upon beliefs, affective states and instrumental reason.

Given the existence of different types of communicative discourse (such as affective, instrumentally rational and substantively rational), the central focus of this investigation is an examination of different types of news media-oriented campaigning discourses used by Greenpeace and Shell. To explore these discourses, this research uses the structuring principles of rhetorical persuasion identified by Aristotle (1965: 60): "*pathos*" (persuasion through the arousal of emotion), "*logos*" (persuasion through reasoning seeking to demonstrate the real or apparent truth), and "*ethos*" (persuasion through personality, moral character and stance).

It is expected that Greenpeace will use a different mix of media-oriented campaigning discourses to Shell, given Greenpeace's adoption of highly principled stances in its campaigns.¹⁵ Greenpeace's strategy, inspired by the Quakers has always been: "*to bear witness and confront power with truth,*" (Rose, 1993: 287) (initially in the Pacific nuclear testing grounds). In addition, Greenpeace is campaigning here on issues which are, to a certain extent, modern "*risk issues*" (Beck, 1992). Unlike "*traditional*" risks, modern risks are largely invisible and can be pointed out only in scientific theorising and experimentation (Beck, 1996: 23). Although in the two campaigns examined there were visible indicators of pollution, such as the Spar's rusting hulk, and black, oil-polluted waters in Ogoniland, the environmental impact or cause of these issues involved hotly disputed scientific and technical information, as the extent of the Spar's toxicity became an issue and the cause of the Ogoniland pollution was disputed.¹⁶ The fact that Spar and Ogoniland issues show features of being modern risk issues reinforces the expectation of a principled stance by Greenpeace because, as Tsoukas (1999: 505) indicates, the very notion of risk implies normative criteria defining what is acceptable - a set of values in terms of which a particular activity is considered risky.

However, Greenpeace's use of a principled discourse may be compromised by the fact that, as strategic action, press releases must negotiate first media "*gatekeepers*" (Shoemaker (1991/1997: 57), and then public attention-spans and comprehension. Where communication is strategically-oriented, will pressure groups ask awkward and value-laden questions? If so, will the media broadcast them? If such questions are not asked, what is asked in their place, and are such questions likely to contribute to greater public understanding of the issues? If the public sphere is debased, how is it debased?

¹⁵ See Tsoukas (1999: 519); Bennie (1998: 90); Wilkinson & Schofield (1994: 119); Rose (1993: 287); and Eyerman & Jamison (1989: 105).

¹⁶ For instance, whereas Shell claims that 69% of spills in Ogoniland (1985-93) were the result of sabotage, a World Bank analysis shows that oil spills are generally caused by companies themselves, with corrosion being the most frequent cause (Fryas, 1998: 464).

1.4 Structure of this research

Chapter 2 demonstrates the value of using an Aristotelean rhetorical approach for studying news media agenda-building in environmental issues, focusing particularly on analyses of the news text and analyses of source strategies. Arising from this discussion Chapter 3 elucidates an appropriate methodology, inspired by Critical Theory and largely based on qualitative sampling of various texts to generate theory on news media agenda-building. Chapter 4 generates theory regarding news values, and in doing so, highlights the formal and informal rules of television journalism, so indicating the journalistic constraints that sources must negotiate when attempting to build the media agenda.

The main empirical focus of this research is on source news media-oriented discursive strategies. These are elucidated in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 which examine the news media-oriented discourses used by Greenpeace and Shell, and their appearance in UK television news. The three discourses defined in these chapters conform to the three structuring principles of rhetorical persuasion identified by Aristotle (1965: 60): "*pathos*", "*logos*", and "*ethos*". Chapter 8 brings together the discursive practices of journalists, Greenpeace and Shell, in a discussion of the importance of rhetorical discourse in media strategies, locating these discursive practices within wider non-discursive practices. It ties in a quantitative and qualitative analysis of media agenda-building with an analysis of what is not said, thus explicating the extent to which the media agenda was built. Chapter 9 summarises the main findings, and discusses their implications for media-oriented discursive strategies and the public sphere.

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW:
THE VALUE OF A RHETORICAL STUDY OF MEDIA AGENDA-BUILDING IN
ENVIRONMENTAL NEWS COVERAGE

2.1 Introduction

The news genre has been much researched, both empirically and theoretically, creating a situation of fragmented knowledge of the news text, news sources and audience interpretation. Several attempts have been made to classify this fragmented knowledge into over-arching approaches. Perhaps the most useful and enduring is Schudson's (1989/1997) classification of research on the news genre into political-economic, sociological and culturological approaches.

As Schudson (1989/1997: 9) summarises, political economic approaches relate the outcome of the news process to the economic structure of the news organisation, which is seen as shaping political dialogue; limiting information diversity; or predisposing news to routinely uncritical treatment of corporate and governmental power sources. Problems with political-economic approaches are that they do not investigate what institutional mechanisms, cultural traditions or contradictions of power provide room for debate and revision (ibid.: 12).

This is partially addressed by sociological approaches which study how working arrangements within news organisations and occupational beliefs shape expectations for accomplishing news (ibid.). Zelizer (1993/1997: 24) summarises that sociological approaches have addressed the news text (for instance, GUMG, 1980), the news-gathering setting (for example, Gans, 1979) or the news audience (for instance, Robinson and Levy, 1986). They have spawned a range of models regarding the dynamic processes surrounding news access (for an incisive summary see Cottle, 2000), some of which will be examined in this chapter. Sociological approaches are generally criticised for their under-theorisation of important processes of "*cultural mediation*" at work (ibid.: 427).

This is addressed by culturalist (culturological) approaches which emphasise the constraining force on news production of broad, cultural symbol systems (Schudson, 1989/1997). Cottle (2000: 428) notes that culturalist studies are sensitised to news actors' symbolic role; how they perform/enact within the conventions of news representation; and how they thereby sustain wider cultural myths with popular resonance. Various approaches fall under this rubric: semiotic analyses of journalism and journalistic ideologies (such as news values) (Schudson, 1989/1997: 10); and narrative, rhetorical and ideological studies (Berkowitz, 1997).

Culturological approaches are criticised for being over-deterministic, arising from an absence of empirical work attending to the complexities of news production (Cottle, 2000: 428).

Cottle (2000: 443) calls for integration between the sociological and culturalist approaches, with sustained empirical inquiry investigating how strategic and definitional power meld with the professionally crafted and changing forms of journalism. This research goes some way to integrating the sociological and culturalist approaches in that it returns attention to the news broadcast, but from a position which considers the rhetorical discourses used by sources, and the journalistic ideologies (news values) that they must negotiate. The focus is therefore on the rhetorical discursive interface between sources' messages (press releases) and media messages (news broadcasts) - a rhetorical study of news media agenda-building.

Section 2.2 explains why this research uses a rhetorical and discursive approach. Section 2.3 explicates the value of using the rhetorical approach given existing studies on rhetoric and the environment (section 2.3.1), textual studies on environmental news coverage (sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3), studies of news form (section 2.3.4), studies on source strategies and environmental news coverage (section 2.3.5) and studies from the literature on Public Relations (section 2.3.6). From these various literatures, gaps are addressed and relevant links are made, to produce a framework for the rhetorical study of news media agenda-building.

2.2 The discursive and rhetorical approach

2.2.1 The importance of knowledge in the risk society

Arguably, not all social problems that become issues for society have intrinsically harmful effects (Blumer, 1971) or intrinsic importance (Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988). Rather, this perception of harm or importance is largely influenced by how they are defined in society's recognised arenas of public discussion. This is particularly so with modern risk issues which, as Beck (1996: 23) suggests, generally remain invisible, are based on causal interpretations, and so initially only exist in terms of the (scientific or anti-scientific) knowledge about them.¹

"They can thus be changed, magnified, dramatised or minimised within knowledge, and to that extent they are particularly open to social definition and construction. Hence the mass media and the scientific and legal professions in charge of defining risks become key social and political positions," (ibid.).

Thus, knowledge (of problems) and (problem) definitions are vital in influencing the world. When different actors compete for public attention for their definitions, they will engage in rhetoric since, as Toth & Heath (1992: xi) argue, rhetoric is used to advance interests by expressing and challenging ideas. Thus, rhetoric can be seen as a type of discourse - a discourse that aims to persuade.

2.2.2 Types of discursive approach and their appropriateness for studying rhetoric

As a type of discourse, rhetoric lends itself to analysis using a discursive approach. There are several well-established discursive approaches ("discourse analyses") (for example, Van Dijk, 1994, 1988; Fairclough, 1994) each of which directs attention to various parts of the discourse. For instance, van Dijk's (1988) discourse analysis is distinguished by close attention to features of text production and reception to establish social context; and by his call for a detailed account of textual structures and cognitive processing (Boyd-Barrett, 1994: 26). Fairclough's

¹ For empirical examples of social constructionism in environmental issues, see Koopmans & Duyvendak (1995: 235).

(1994: 72) premise is that text is part of discursive practice, which is part of social practice. Hence, Fairclough's discourse analysis requires: close textual and linguistic analysis; the microsociological position of seeing social practice as actively produced and understood by people on the basis of shared commonsense procedures; and the macrosociological tradition of analysing social practice in relation to social structures. However, existing models of discourse analysis were rejected for this study due to their over- specification of what structures to examine textually, whilst simultaneously directing minimal explicit attention towards rhetorical structuring principles. Both of these criticisms are expanded below.

Discourse analyses are highly specific in identifying what textual features to examine. For instance, Van Dijk's (1994: 117-122) suggested analysis of news structures includes: "*topics*" - i.e. the propositions that form the semantic macro-structure and which embody the discourse's most important information; "*schemata*" - i.e. superstructural categories, which in press news reports tend to be "*summary*", "*main event*", "*backgrounds*", and "*verbal reaction and comments*"; "*local meaning*" of propositions; "*local coherence*" of sentences; implicitness; presuppositions: use of detail; "*functional relations*" between propositions; style - for instance, word choice; and syntax - such as how formal structures of sentences convey meaning. Similarly, Fairclough (1994: 75-77) examines a wide range of linguistic structures (vocabulary, grammar, cohesion and text structure). Such specific directions regarding what to analyse was considered to be over-specific given this research's central aim, to generate theory on news media agenda-building, and its central methodology, Layder's (1998) adaptive theory (explained further in Chapter 3). The "adaptive" part of adaptive theory suggests that theory is both shaped by and adapts to incoming data (ibid.: 38).

"Specifically, adaptive theory attempts to combine an emphasis on prior theoretical ideas and models which feed into and guide research while at the same time attending to the generation of theory from ongoing analysis of data," (ibid.: 19).

In brief, adaptive theory enables creativity and generation of new theory by using procedures that encourage researchers to create new links and order out of the old. It was felt that following highly specified, previously designed research methodologies like discourse analysis, would hamper this creative process.

As this research progressed, a central focus became the Aristotelean rhetorical structuring principles. Aristotle (1965) describes three main structuring principles in rhetoric - pathos, logos and ethos - which appeal to the whole person through a complex interplay. "*Pathos*" is persuasion through the arousal of emotion: "*for we give very different decisions under the sway of pain or joy, and liking or hatred,*" (ibid.: 60). "*Logos*" is a more complex term, of which there have been many translations.² Cockroft & Cockroft (1992: 10) define logos as including: the range of diverse arguments in the discourse; the structure of thought (simple or complex) which these arguments compose (logos structures emotion as well as reasoning); and the sequence, coherence and logical value of these arguments. As Aristotle argues: "*... persuasion is effected by the arguments, when we demonstrate the truth, real or apparent, by such means as inhere in particular cases,*" (Aristotle, 1965: 60). "*Ethos*" is persuasion through the speaker's character and stance (i.e. the wider framework of attitudes adopted by the persuader, and tone taken towards the topic of interaction and its context (see Cockroft & Cockroft, 1992: 8)). "*The character [ethos] of the speaker is a cause of persuasion when the speech is so uttered as to make him worthy of belief,*" (Aristotle, 1965: 60).

Thus, the second reason for rejecting existing discourse analyses in this research is their minimal explicit attention to rhetorical structuring principles. For instance, whilst van Dijk (1994: 122) suggests examining rhetoric as a linguistic structure, this is only one of many linguistic structures he directs attention to, as explained above. Furthermore, van Dijk sees rhetoric as having only affective force, consisting of techniques like metaphor and hyperbole that are used to attract attention, and to emphasise specific meanings. Similarly, Fairclough

² Ackrill (1987: xiv) translates its various meanings as: "*utterance, statement, argument, account, definition, formula, ratio, language, reason, principle*".

(1994: 75-77) examines a wide range of linguistic structures, but only refers to rhetoric as constituting the structure of "*cohesion*", which deals with how clauses and sentences are linked together. He notes that cohesion analysis is a way into what Foucault calls: "*various rhetorical schemata according to which groups of statements may be combined (how descriptions, deductions, definitions, whose succession characterises the architecture of a text are linked together)*" in ways that depend on the discursive formation (Foucault, 1972: 57, cited in Fairclough, 1994: 46). Although this sounds like a promising foray into the structuring principles of rhetoric, in fact the linkages Fairclough describes simply refer to a limited range of rhetorical tools - such as using vocabulary from common semantic fields, and referring and substituting devices (such as pronouns).³

Unlike van Dijk and Fairclough, this study uses "rhetoric" from the much wider Aristotelian perspective. The structuring principles of pathos, logos and ethos may well include specific rhetorical tools like metaphor and linkage, but this is only a small part of the Aristotelian rhetorical approach. Given this wider approach to rhetoric, this research uses Foucault's (1972) concept of discourse - which is broader and less specified (rigid) than established discourse analytic approaches. Unlike much linguistically-oriented discourse analyses, which focus on spoken and written language, Foucault, in his earlier "*archeological*" work, uses "*discourse*" in a wider sense by looking at the conditions in which a discursive practice is exercised (ibid.: 270). This includes examination of "*discursive practices*" - the "*system of anonymous, historical rules*" (ibid.: 117) underlying actual practice. Simply put, these rules govern what is said, how, by whom, to whom and in what context (a basic formulation which underlies the various discourse analytic approaches (for instance, see Fairclough, 1994: 71). Thus, a Foucaultian discursive analysis from an Aristotelian rhetorical perspective attends to the construction of "what is said" through the following lenses:

³ This difference in these approaches to rhetoric probably stems from use of different rhetoricians. Aristotle was unusual in that he included logos - the study of argumentation - in rhetoric (Baumslag, 2000: 129). Many other rhetoricians, like Ramus, hold that it is only the "frills" that are the subject of rhetoric - such as devices to attract attention and "spin" meaning - and it is from this perspective that van Dijk comes from.

- The structuring principles of pathos, logos and ethos (i.e. "how" it is said);
- How well it reflects the interests of the speaker (i.e. "by whom" it is said);
- And how well this construction is likely to resonate with its intended audience (i.e. "to whom" it is said).

2.2.3 Discourse, rhetoric and power

Both the rhetorical and discursive approaches make links to power. Classical rhetoric was fundamentally concerned with public deliberation about policy matters (Waddell, 1998: 36).

This concern still has currency. Toth (1992: 5) argues that institutional rhetors can create issues through the use of symbolic strategies, and in this way, communication can influence the public policy debate.

From a discursive perspective, Foucault's later "*genealogical*" studies (for instance, Foucault, 1979) focus on power-knowledge relationships rather than looking solely at relations of meaning. Foucault (1979) asserts: "*I believe that it is not to the great model of signs and language [la langue] that reference should be made, but to war and battle,*" and specifically to "*analyses in terms of genealogy, relations of force, strategic developments and tactics,*" (ibid.: 33).⁴ In brief, Foucault argues that power and knowledge build on each other, so forming power-knowledge strategies: "*... there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations,*" (Foucault, 1979: 27). This view of power and knowledge is pertinent to socially recognised risks, which Beck (1996) sees as containing a peculiar political explosive. What was once considered apolitical becomes political. "*Suddenly the public and politics extend their rule into the private sphere of plant management - into product planning and technical equipment*" (ibid.: 24). By drawing societal attention to a situation, it becomes an issue worthy of political attention and perhaps action. Where various social actors battle to

⁴ Also see Foucault (1982: 93).

define via the news media, a strategic situation arises, with actors using their knowledge of the media, their intended audience and their opponents to argue their positions.

This focus on discursive strategies necessarily entails minimal attention to other structural factors involved in building the news media agenda, for instance, political, economic and legal structures affecting broadcast journalism and interest group politics. However, how such structural power impacts on, or implicates, the media and society is already well-documented by previous research.

The following section critically demonstrates the value of using a rhetorical approach to study news media-agenda building in environmental issues, starting with an assessment of the literature on rhetoric and the environment.

2.3 Using a rhetorical approach to study media-agenda building in environmental issues

2.3.1 The absence of rhetorical research on the environment and the media.

Lange (1998) and Killingsworth and Palmer (1992) observe that literature on rhetoric and the environment has only emerged in the last 20 years. This section briefly expands on environmental rhetorics pertinent to this research - namely that of environmental pressure groups, business and the environment, and the popularisation of science and the environment - before addressing research on environmental rhetoric and the mass media.

Amongst the perspectives used for examining the rhetoric of environmental pressure groups is that of environmental groups' rhetorical strategies (for instance, Cooper, 1996; and Condit and Condit, 1992: 241). Cooper's (1996) analysis of the US radical group Earth First! and conservative group Nature Conservancy concludes that connections should be forged between the different rhetorical strategies of these two groups, since social change is successful when groups link new values to accepted political positions. Condit and Condit (1992: 241) discern the rhetorical strategy of "*incremental erosion*" where, working on different target audiences at different times, the activist group chips away at its opponent's support base.

There are fewer analyses of the rhetoric of business and the environment (for instance, Porter, 1992; and Dionisopoulos and Goldzwig, 1992).⁵ Porter (1992: 279) argues that Chevron's "People Do" advertisements - which use short stories about Chevron's environmental contributions - are a powerful form of rhetoric because the viewer is required to suspend judgement on the warrants used to make the story's case and focus instead on the tale's plausibility. Dionisopoulos and Goldzwig (1992) examine the rhetorical strategies used by the US nuclear industry to target women, such as the use of "pseudo-events" (Boorstin, 1961/1992: 11), i.e. happenings that occur only to gain news coverage; and equating the general term "energy" with the specific technology of atomic power.

The rhetoric of the popularisation of science and the environment is analysed by Evernden (1989: 153), who argues that Carson's (1965) book Silent Spring was revolutionary not because it challenged the indiscriminate use of pesticides, but because she abandoned the old rhetoric which presumed that nature was not widely valued, resulting in the ensuing popularity of environmental issues.⁶

Although there are analyses of a variety of environmental rhetorics, several researchers have pointed to the minimal rhetorical analyses of mass mediated environmental discourse (Waddell, 1998: xix; Herndl & Brown, 1996 18; and Lange, 1993/1998: 126). There a number of exceptions to this gap.⁷ However, these studies rarely examine the range of rhetorical structuring devices used in mass media environmental coverage (i.e. pathos, logos and ethos), instead, focusing on specific rhetorical tools. For example, Moore (1993/1998) focuses on "synecdoche" (the relationship between an expressed idea and an unexpressed one where, for instance, the part represents the whole) in the controversy between environmentalists and the Northwest Forestry Association; and Lange (1993/1998) focuses on how advocates' and

⁵ Also see Phillimore and Moffatt (2000).

⁶ See Bucchi (1998) for rhetorical strategies used in the popularisation of science. See Simmons (1993) for analysis of various cultural constructions of the environment and science.

⁷ For instance, Cottle (2000: 30); Myerson and Rydin (1996); Coleman (1995/1997: 490); Lange (1993/1998); Moore (1993/1998); Short (1991/1998); Gamson and Modigliani (1989) and Lowe and Morrison (1984). See Lange (1993/1998: 126) for citations from the 1980s-1990s.

counter-advocates' rhetorical and communicative strategies "*mirror and match*" (ibid.: 127) one another in the media, so leaving the disputants talking past, rather than to, each other.

Out of these studies, Gamson and Modigliani's (1989) gives the most attention to the range of rhetorical structuring devices. They deconstruct US media discourse about nuclear power since 1945 into "*frames*" using rhetorical techniques of metaphors, exemplars, catchphrases, depictions, visual images, roots (i.e. a causal analysis), consequences and appeals to principle. From this structure, they distinguish seven packages, such as the "*progress*" package and the "*energy independence*" package - major pro-nuclear packages (ibid.: 15-24). They argue that the picture that emerges is a newly dominant "*runaway*" package (one that suggests resignation more than opposition) (ibid.: 30).

Despite these studies on mass mediated environmental discourse, the weight of textual analysis of news media and the environment does not come from a rhetorical perspective. These analyses generally either utilise the quantitative method of content analysis, or qualitatively analyse news texts without making explicit reference to rhetorical structuring principles (although often using specific rhetorical tools, but failing to acknowledge their rhetorical roots). The following sections on textual studies of environmental news coverage will highlight the problems with this body research from a rhetorical perspective.

2.3.2 A rhetorical critique of quantitative textual analyses of environmental news coverage

There is a large body of quantitative analyses of environmental news coverage, demonstrating several patterns. One such pattern is the routinisation of environmental news coverage.⁸ Other research has found patterns in the type of environmental news covered, most of which examine

⁸ See Hansen (1993: 160); Strodhoff et al.(1985); Sandbach (1980); Bowman and Hanaford (1977) and Brookes et al.(1976).

press coverage of the environment,⁹ whilst some examine television coverage.¹⁰ For instance, Cottle's (1993) content analysis of environmental coverage by different UK news programmes shows several patterns, one being that the environment is unequally expressed across the television news spectrum, according to the "*reach*" of the issue (such as international versus global).

Quantitative content analysis of media texts has been extensively used by two models - these being the agenda-setting model and Hall et al.'s (1978) model of primary definition

2.3.2.1 The agenda-setting model and environmental news coverage

There is a wide range of agenda-setting research on environmental issues.¹¹ The agenda-setting model assumes that the prominence of items in the news influences the prominence of these items in the public's mind (Rogers and Dearing, 1988: 558-559). Typically, agenda-setting research investigates how the news ranks an issue by quantifying the number of newspaper articles on an issue (for instance, Atwater et al. (1985: 395) measured weighted column inches), or the number of television news broadcasts (for example, Parlour & Schatzow, 1978). More complex studies count more finely defined elements: for instance, Einsiedel and Coughlan (1993: 135) measured overall tone, pattern of source use, diversity of sub-topics covered, and the problems and benefits portrayed in a sample of environmental newspaper stories.

However, the agenda-setting model has been critiqued for its reductiveness in measuring the media agenda (see Edelstein, 1993: 92; and Becker, 1982: 525). Kosicki (1993: 117) notes that agenda-setting research typically discusses specific issues as broad, content-free topic domains. This strips almost everything worth knowing about media coverage of issues, leaving only the shell of the topic (*ibid.*: 112). Perhaps this is why Iyengar and Kinder (1987) state:

⁹ See Riechert (1995); Einsiedel and Coughlan (1993); Lacey and Longman (1993); Mathes and Pfestch (1991); Faupel et al. (1991); Gamson and Modigliani (1989); Howenstine (1987); Lundburg (1984); and Hungerford & Lemert (1973). See Allan et al. (2000: 10) for further citations.

¹⁰ See Cottle (1993), Friedman (1991: 24) and Hansen (1990).

¹¹ For example, Gooch (1996); Shaw and Martin (1992); Protess et al. (1987); Atwater et al. (1985); Parlour & Schatzow (1978) and Murch (1971).

"Although research on agenda-setting has proliferated over the last decade, so far, unfortunately, the results add up to rather little. With a few important exceptions, agenda-setting research has been theoretically naïve, methodologically primitive, both confused and confusing," (ibid., cited in Rogers and Dearing, 1988: 557).

Recognition that the environment is an issue consisting of contestable definitions has directed more empirical attention to the media text, using the model of primary definition to investigate "bias" in news reporting.

2.3.2.2 The primary definition model and environmental news coverage

Hall et al.'s (1978) primary definition model looks at structured dominance within the news message, generally using content and semiotic analyses. The model posits that the media's structural operations systematically privileges certain sources, who become "*over-accessed*" "*primary definers*" establishing the initial definition of a topic, which then sets the terms of reference for all further coverage (ibid.: 58-59). Although there are "*secondary definers*", they must respond in terms pre-established by primary definers (ibid.), or else risk being defined out of the debate, and labeled as illegal or irrational. Structural operations within the news media fostering primary definition include their commitment to regular news production (ibid., 53) which pre-directs them to certain kinds of event and topic. This, combined with time pressures and problems of resource allocation and work scheduling (Murdock, 1973: 163), leads journalists to: "*position themselves so that they have access to institutions, which generate a useful volume of reportable activity at regular intervals,*" (Rock, 1973, cited in Hall et al, 1978: 57).¹² Arising from journalistic news values of impartiality and accuracy, these institutional sources must be "*accredited*". Accredited sources include: those with institutional power, because they have access to information, and cannot afford to lie openly; those with representative status who are consequently endorsed by a public (for instance, Members of

¹² See Brown et al. (1987), Fishman (1980) and Dunwoody (1978) for empirical examples of journalistic reliance on "*routine*" channels.

Parliament represent "the people"); and those with available facts and no vested interests (such as experts' disinterested pursuit of knowledge) (Hall et al., 1978: 58).

The primary definition model has been much used in empirical work on environmental news coverage. This section looks at how politicians, scientists, business corporations and environmental pressure groups fare as primary definers.

Politicians are an expected set of primary definers on any issue, because of their representative and authoritative position, and because of their large public relations machinery (see Turk, 1991: 217). Although Britain differs from most European countries in that public service broadcasting is, by law, independent of political influence (Siune and McQuail, 1986: 45), there is a close de facto relationship between politicians and broadcasters, operating through the "lobby" system.¹³ Also, politicians are supported by a bureaucracy, which Gandy (1982: 11-12) suggests is often used because it is viewed as reliable.¹⁴ Primary definition by politicians is apparent in environmental issues.¹⁵ For instance, the then Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher's, "green" speech to the Royal Society in 1988 is described as impacting the media agenda of environmental issues (Linne, 1993: 70; Anderson, 1991).

Scientists are expected primary definers in environmental stories because: they possess expert opinion; environmental issues often revolve around scientific arguments; scientists are increasingly interested in explaining their work to a wider public (White et al., 1993: vii); and science writers are often in collegial contact with scientists and so are likely to report science in a way that accords with the scientific community's norms (Gandy, 1991: 269). Some empirical research suggests scientists' success in building the media agenda (for instance, Burtscher, 1993; Weiss and Singer, 1988; Goodell, 1986: 173). However, there is also evidence to suggest

¹³ See GUMG (1985) for a description.

¹⁴ Empirical evidence of politicians acting as primary definers comes from Turk (1991: 212), Weaver and Elliott (1985), Seymour-Ure (1968: 265-266, 284-286) and Cohen (1963: 267).

¹⁵ See Gooch (1996: 122); Coleman (1995/1997); Entman and Rojecki (1993); Linne (1993); Anderson (1991); Friedman (1991: 21); Lievrouw (1990); Gamson and Modigliani (1989); Nelkin (1989/1994); Molotch and Lester (1975) and Hungerford & Lemert (1973). See Anderson (1993: 53) for more citations.

that scientists' expert knowledge is not enough to guarantee them primary definition status (Friedman, 1991; Rogers et al., 1991; Weiss and Singer, 1988). For instance, Friedman (1991: 23) argues that typically environmental reporting avoids the technical aspects of issues. Weiss and Singer (1988) found that reporters rarely defined the topics they dealt with as "*science stories*", instead framing them as crime or poll stories, hence rarely using scientific information.¹⁶

In terms of primary definition, the predicted role of business corporations in the coverage of environmental issues is ambiguous. On the one hand, business corporations possess institutional power and are authoritative in that they have the resources to acquire expert knowledge; and journalists covering financial news tend to move in small circles consisting largely of City sources (see Davis, 2000: 285 for empirical citations). However, companies may be perceived as biased in that their over-riding aims are market power and profits – aims generally at odds with environmental protection. This ambiguous predicted primary definition status is reflected in empirical research on general issues (see Davis, 2000, for citations; and Arnold, 1987: 20). However, the few studies that exist regarding business and environmental issues show the predominance of corporations and business groups. For instance, Molotch and Lester's (1975) study of newspaper coverage of the Santa Barbara oil spill found that oil companies were the third most significant group to receive access (after the President and Congress).¹⁷

In terms of primary definition, the predicted role of environmental pressure groups is also ambiguous. On the one hand, they have specialist knowledge of environmental issues; specialist environmental journalists are often sympathetic towards environmental protection (Hetherington, 1985: 41; Brookes, et al., 1976); and together this has established an environmental category within the news, which then needs to be filled (Lowe and Morrison, 1984). On the other hand, environmental pressure groups could be perceived as biased, or

¹⁶ See Wilson (2000: 207) for more citations.

¹⁷ Also see Friedman et al. (1986).

alarmist, by journalists: and they have to compete with already established authoritative sources. This ambiguous predicted primary definition status is reflected in empirical research. Much research documents the favourable media coverage received by environmental groups.¹⁸ However, against this, most evidence points to environmental pressure groups as infrequent primary definers.¹⁹ For instance, Hansen (1993) shows that coverage of Greenpeace is closely related to its campaign initiatives, indicating that it has not yet become an automatic definer.

Thus, in terms of scientists, business corporations and environmental pressure groups, empirical research on primary definition produces inconclusive results. Only (government) politicians come out as unquestioned primary definers in all issues. Viewed as a whole, these inconclusive results support critiques of the model as poorly conceptualised on at least three fronts.

- **Its monolithic conception of the media.** Whilst most of the research cited above looks at the press, the types of newspapers examined differ by genre (tabloid, broadsheet) and country.

Television news is just as differentiated (see Cottle, 1993).

- **Its lack of specification regarding how to measure primary definition.** Content analysis is usually used to measure things like the quantity of key phrases, or quotations from sources. The problem with such measurements is illustrated by Linne (1993) who points out that a group like Greenpeace might attract media attention to an occurrence through direct action, and that attention might then shift to the polity as the story progresses to cover political implications.

Arguably, Greenpeace is the primary definer through drawing attention to the issue and because the actual discussion continues to deal with the issue at hand; yet this would not be revealed by a content analysis of sources. Hansen (1991) makes the related criticism that primary definition does not indicate the varying degrees of legitimacy with which different primary definitions are accredited; nor does it address how actors wish to be portrayed.

¹⁸ Hansen (1993); Linne (1993); Anderson (1991); Hansen and Linne (1991); Lowe and Morrison (1984); Lowe and Goyder (1983); and Brookes et al. (1976).

¹⁹ See Hansen (1993); Nohrstedt (1991); Greenberg et al. (1989); Einsiedel (1988); Nimmo and Combs (1985); and Molotch and Lester (1975). For further citations, see Hansen (1991: 450) and Walter et al. (1989).

- Its monolithic and atemporal conception of accredited sources. Schlesinger (1990) critiques the model's lack of engagement with: "*dynamic processes of contestation in a given field of discourse*" (ibid.: 68). Schlesinger posits that due to the struggles between sources: "*primary definition becomes an achievement rather than a wholly structured predetermined outcome,*" (ibid., 79).²⁰

To summarise, although content analysis of news texts usefully demonstrates changes in environmental news coverage over time, or patterns in the type of environmental news covered, the fact that content analysis is often allied with reductive and static models has produced reductive and "thin" information (especially agenda-setting research) or largely inconclusive results (primary definition research). Obviously, the use of reductive and static models has limited explanatory power in a field dominated by strategy and tactics. By contrast, a rhetorical perspective is more context-sensitive, directing attention to how specific messages serve the specific interests of their promoters, how messages have been constructed for their intended audience, and the constraints and opportunities offered by the message's medium.

2.3.3 A rhetorical critique of qualitative textual analyses of environmental news coverage

Most qualitative analyses of environmental news coverage use aspects of the rhetorical approach, but fail to make this approach explicit, often using only the loose label of "*framing*". Miller & Riechert (2000: 45) define frames as "*interpretive dimensions for evaluating the facts*", observing that communication researchers were quick to apply framing to news investigations. The following section highlights the range of rhetorical devices used by research coming from a framing perspective, and in doing so collates the empirical findings around the rhetorical structuring principles of pathos, logos and ethos.

²⁰ Also see Hansen (1991).

2.3.3.1 Pathos

Pathos - persuasion through the arousal of emotion - leaves a powerful impression in the audience's memory and a strong stimulus to their wills (Cockroft & Cockroft, 1992: 97). From this perspective, communication engaging in pathos should incite emotion or promote strong imagery. This may happen through the nature of the content, and through how the content is presented.

The content of a message may make a direct attempt to appeal to an audience's emotions - such as using inciting or reassuring statements. For instance, a range of research on environmental news coverage examines the ability of the nuclear industry in various countries to project reassuring rather than alarming messages following the Chernobyl accident (see Anderson, 1997: 116 for citations; and Nohrstedt, 1991).

In terms of emotive presentation of content, Einsiedel and Coughlan (1993: 147) argue that much work on environmental news neglects the important role of symbolism. Indeed, imagery is often used in environmental reporting (Lowe and Morrison, 1984), particularly in the forms of metaphor and metonymy.

Metaphor is the relation of similitude and resemblance (Blair, 1965: 119). Instead of using the proper name of any object, the name of some other which is like it is used. The rhetorical importance of metaphors is that they are couched in feeling as well as rationality and so yield both an affective and cognitive understanding (Olds, 1992). Senecah (1996: 97) argues that metaphors selectively highlight ideas, and often suggest new relationships between ideas, hence acting as powerful tools in persuasive discourses. For example, Einsiedel and Coughlan (1993: 141) find increasing urgency in keywords framing the environment in Canadian newspapers: by 1990, more war and dominance images were used (like "*eco-spy*") as were "*sick planet*" metaphors (such as "*wounded earth*").²¹

²¹ For more empirical examples see Myerson and Rydin (1996: 25), Hansen (1991) and Gamson and Modigliani (1989). For further citations, see Anderson (1997: 117, 128).

Metonymy uses a principle of structural association: one part of a syntactic structure is used to express another part of that structure (Cockroft & Cockroft, 1992: 120). Edelman (1977: 16) argues that it is through such symbolic devices that linguistic references evoke mythic cognitive structures in people's minds since we naturally define ambiguous situations by focusing on one part of them or by comparing them with familiar things. Metonymy is found by the following research on environmental news coverage. Holtz (1999: 200) suggests that oil-slicked birds symbolised the Exxon Valdez crisis. Hansen (1993: 169) posits that Greenpeace is the popular shorthand for environmentally conscious attitudes. Television visuals are exceptionally good metonymic conveyors and can be used to convey loaded messages - such as presenting images of a nuclear explosion when reporting on an accident at a nuclear power station (see Anderson, 1997: 115 for citations). Indeed, Corner (1995) posits that the kind of "*symbolism-within-naturalism*" which television's visual language can project, combining the evidential with the metaphoric, provides the conditions for performing the "*promotional trick*" (ibid.: 50).

2.3.3.2 Logos

Aristotle (1965: 67) presents a wide a range of argumentative procedures and Cockroft & Cockroft (1992: 59) distil this list into ten models of argument. Some of these argumentative models are discerned by the following research on environmental news coverage, covering the models of definition, association, cause and effect and part/whole.

The definition model (Aristotle, 1965: 70) involves identification of whatever requires definition as belonging to some general category; then particularising its unique features (Cockroft & Cockroft, 1992: 60). Since environmental issues are often contested, environmental groups can play an important role in definition (see Mormont and Dasnoy, 1995; and Anderson, 1993). Much research on environmental news coverage looks at issue definition through the concept of "*framing*".²² Integral to the argumentative procedure of definition is that

²² See Adam (2000). For citations see Miller & Riechert, (2000: 50-51) and Dunwoody and Griffin (1993: 25).

of omission. What is omitted in environmental news coverage is generally background information and context.²³ For instance, Hansen's (2000: 66) analysis of UK press coverage of the Spar shows that they offered little information about how science establishes whether deep-sea disposal would harm marine life, or on what scale such harm might occur.

The associative model of argumentation connects issues and creates overlapping contexts, so allowing arguments to move between reference points (Myerson and Rydin, 1996: 150, Cockroft & Cockroft, 1992: 74). For instance, the aim may be to link sustainable development with other policy issues and goals thereby cementing support for the package of goals, with one lending legitimacy to others (Myerson and Rydin, 1996: 173). This strategy is observable in Anderson's (1997: 161) analysis of the August 1988 reporting of the seal virus by the UK national press. This showed Greenpeace's success in using the seal deaths to draw attention to their anti-pollution campaign by suggesting that pollution was responsible for the plague.

The cause and effect model of argumentation is central to all persuasive discourse (Cockroft & Cockroft, 1992: 61). The implications of directing attention to one cause rather than another in media coverage of nuclear power is highlighted by Allan et al. (2000: 7). They cite research showing that news framing of the Chernobyl crisis as caused by a "*freak accident*" contributed to the naturalisation of nuclear power as a safe energy source.

The part/whole model of argumentation (Cockroft & Cockroft, 1992: 72) is where further information about the quality, function or significance of the part can be gained by seeing it in relation to the whole, or vice versa. Solesbury (1976: 385) argues that in environmental issues, particularisation is an important means of securing media coverage and building a popular constituency for an issue.

²³ For empirical examples, see Allan et al. (2000: 9) and Hansen (2000: 66). For further citations see Hansen (2000: 66), Anderson (1997: 117), and Haslam & Bryman (1995: 187).

2.3.3.3 Ethos

Aristotle saw ethos as the most important of the structuring principles:

"... as a rule we trust men of probity more, and more quickly, about things in general, while on points outside the realm of exact knowledge, where opinion is divided, we trust them absolutely. ... It is not true, as some writers on the art maintain, that the probity of the speaker contributes nothing to his persuasiveness; on the contrary, we might almost affirm that his character [ethos] is the most potent of all the means of persuasion," (Aristotle, 1965: 60).

From the perspective of moral "*character*" (ibid.), the credibility of the actor is paramount. Hansen's (1993: 165) qualitative analysis of UK press coverage of Greenpeace (1987-1991) notes the various ways in which legitimacy is conferred onto the group. This includes journalists accompanying Greenpeace boats to cover campaigns (ibid.: 168); and minimal explicit criticism of Greenpeace. However, such tactics do not work for all media and for all times. Hansen (1991: 451) cites research showing how pressure group legitimacy in relation to media coverage changes with different phases in the career of particular problems. With low profile issues, pressure groups rely heavily on the less legitimate forum of public demonstration or protest action for media coverage (Hansen, 1990).²⁴ Degrees of legitimacy are also conferred by the format in which the source is allowed to speak. Cottle (1993: 121-123) finds that most environmental portrayal across the UK television news spectrum tends towards the limited opportunities of tightly edited and packaged news formats ("*restricted*" formats) rather than "*expansive*" formats (which offer more opportunities for discursive engagement).

From the perspective of stance (the wider framework of attitudes adopted by the persuader), environmental reporting contains an underlying moral structure.²⁵ For example, Lowe and Morrison (1984) argue that many environmental issues can be presented as a conflict of good

²⁴ Also see Hansen (2000: 71); Cracknell (1993: 8); Entman and Rojecki (1993); Nohrstedt (1991) and Lowe and Morrison (1984).

²⁵ See Anderson (1997: 126); Cottle (1993); Lowe and Morrison (1984); and Pirages and Ehrlich (1974).

versus evil. Cottle's (2000: 30) research into value systems investigates the extent to which television news allows laypeople to articulate a form of "*social rationality*" (i.e. Weberian substantive rationality) in contrast to "*scientific rationality*" (i.e. Weberian formal/instrumental rationality), and so confront politicians' failure to manage hazards and scientists' failures to predict risks. Cottle finds that laypeople are positioned to symbolise the world of everyday experience, so minimising their opportunities to challenge the objectivist claims of experts and politicians involved in risk management (ibid.: 38).²⁶

An integral part of ethos is "*personality*" (Cockroft & Cockroft, 1992: 8), i.e. the ability to identify with an audience. This is important because in order to gain prominence in the public sphere an issue must be cast in terms that resonate with widely held cultural concepts. Much analysis of environmental news coverage has demonstrated this quality.²⁷ Such orientation towards the audience may be actively constructed by the media. For instance, Hansen's (2000: 66) analysis of UK press coverage of the Spar issue, shows that The Mirror rhetorically constructed an active role for its readers by characterising Shell's U-turn as a result of people power. The importance of orientation towards the audience is highlighted by Phillips' (2000: 171) audience reception study. This shows that people's limited sense of responsibility towards the environment arises from its constitution within a discourse that constructs most political action as belonging to a separate realm, accessed only through the mass media.

2.3.4 A rhetorical critique of culturalist studies on the news media's form and environmental news coverage

2.3.4.1 News values

There are a range of approaches to studying news form: for instance, discourse analysis (such as Van Dijk, 1994), narrative analysis (for example, Zelizer, 1993/1997) and news values analysis (see Manheim (1987: 501) for citations). This section focuses on news values -

²⁶ A similar finding is made by Coleman (1995/1997).

²⁷ See Corner & Richardson (1993: 223); Cottle (1993); Einsiedel and Coughlan (1993); Linne (1993: 74); Hansen (1991: 452-3); Gamson and Modigliani (1989); and Lowe and Morrison (1984).

the: “*working rules, comprising a corpus of occupational lore which implicitly and often expressly explains and guides newsroom practice,*” (Golding & Elliott, 1996: 405). Arguably, most research on news values is implicitly rhetorical. This is because the rhetorical approach analyses discourse in terms of the interests of its speakers (Cahn, 1993: 62) and its audience appeal. Since the “speaker” in news comprises both sources and journalists, a rhetorical analysis of news should include an analysis of the “interests” of journalists - or their “news values”. Furthermore, these news values have evolved over time to produce news designed to attract a specific audience. This section addresses key aspects of the news values literature, highlighting existing research on news values and the environment, and the problems with such research.

An early study on news values identified two sets of professional norms. Breed (1955/1997: 108) describes “*technical norms*” (such as those engendering efficient news processing); and “*ethical norms*” (like impartiality, accuracy and objectivity). Galtung & Ruge’s (1973) seminal comparative study found eight conditions that must be met before journalists consider an event to be news. These are: “*frequency*” (the time needed for the event to unfold itself); “*threshold*” (absolute intensity and intensity increase); “*scale*”; “*unambiguity*”; “*meaningfulness*”; “*consonance*” (with preconceptions about the social group from which the news actors come); “*unexpectedness*” (but within the meaningful and consonant); “*continuity*” (once defined as news, something remains so); and “*composition*” (a mix of interesting items). They proposed four additional criteria used solely by the western media - “*elite nations*”, “*elite people*”, “*personalisation*” and “*negative consequences*”. Others have added to this list of news values. Tuchman (1978) describes “*facticity*” (orientation towards facts). Van Dijk (1988) describes “*relevance*” (to the audience’s lives). Bell (1991: 159) describes: “*competition*” (such as a new angle on the same story); “*co-option*” (presenting a tangentially-related story in terms of a high profile story); “*predictability*” (such as prescheduled events); and “*prefabrication*” (ready-made texts which journalists can process rapidly into stories). Schlesinger (1978/1987: 60) adds the

news values of "*time constraints*" and "*logistics*" (like deploying resources).²⁸ Widely cited are the news values of "*human interest*" (for example, Fishman, 1982/1997; and Gans, 1979); and "*event orientation*" - where the outcome takes priority over the action or process (for instance, Berkowitz; 1997; and Galtung & Ruge, 1973) so allowing news stories to be updated hourly (Bell, 1991: 153). "*Visual appeal*" is a prime news value of television news (Boyd: 1988).

However, such lists generally describe the main features of the news message without explaining them (see Shoemaker et al., 1991: 781).²⁹ An increasingly used, but limited, explanation for all these news values is the catch-all category "*infotainment*".³⁰ Infotainment sees news values as comprising two broad areas - information-oriented news values (like objectivity and impartiality) and entertainment-oriented news values (like drama and human interest).

2.3.4.2 News values and environmental news coverage

A number of researchers have identified news values regarding environmental news coverage (see Dunwoody and Griffin, 1993: 25). Key news values observed in environmental reporting are elucidated below, categorised as information-oriented or entertainment-oriented.

Coming from the information perspective, the news value of objectivity aims to inform rather than interpret, with any interpretive material being attributed to sources (Sigal, 1973: 66).

Journalists are often passionately committed to their ideology of objectivity (Miller & Riechert, 2000: 50; Linne, 1993: 74; Schudson, 1989/1997: 16). Research on the media and the environment confirms the existence of this objectivist epistemology (see Anderson, 1997: 63).

²⁸ For more news values, see Gans (1979: 42) and Murphy (1976: 21).

²⁹ One attempt at systematic integration is Venables' (1993) conceptual category of "*security concern*". Venables posits that audiences have a fascination with change and need to know how that change will affect them (ibid.: 34). However, some of the security-oriented explanations are reductive. For instance, the news value of "*drama*" is explained by rapid change producing greater impact than slow change: however, as chapter 4 will demonstrate, "*drama*" consists of much more than rapidity of change. Furthermore, the model is too audience-driven, failing to address other discourses that may contribute to news values.

³⁰ See Teo (2000: 36); Corner (1999: 55); Golding & Elliott (1996: 407); Wallis and Baron (1990); Boyd (1988: 5) and Bantz (1985).

However, although this epistemology would deny that journalists have any "interests" beyond impartial, factual reporting, the non-neutral consequences have long been recognised (see Tuchman, 1972). Others point to the impossibility of achieving objectivity or impartiality, given journalistic practice. Objectivity demands "*a complete and unrefracted capture of the world*" whereas impartiality implies that material has not been shaped or selected according to a particular view (Golding, 1997: 258). However, it is impossible to be objective since there are socio-political assumptions in what is newsworthy (LaMay, 1991: 108; Smith, 1980); whilst time and resource constraints ensure that the world is never captured completely (Swisher and Reese, 1992: 989, cited in Miller & Riechert, 2000: 50). As for impartiality, although there are mechanisms to minimise partiality,³¹ as Ventola (2000) argues, ideological position and rhetorical purpose will determine aspects like which sources are deemed reliable and hence used.

Also coming from the information perspective is the news value of event orientation. News is so event-oriented that those seeking to build the news agenda create artificial events, for instance: event summaries - situations that sum-up non-newsworthy events in a newsworthy way; and pseudo-events - events staged for the purpose of being reported in the news (Funkhouser, 1973). Research shows environmental news to be event-oriented (for example, see Cottle, 1993; Einsiedel and Coughlan, 1993; and Sandman et al., 1987).

Coming from the entertainment perspective, research on environmental news coverage finds the news values of negativity (for instance, Einsiedel and Coughlan, 1993: 135; and Lowe and Morrison, 1984: 78), drama (for instance, Allan et al., 2000: 6; Cottle, 1993; and Greenberg et al., 1989), human interest (for example, Anderson, 1997: 115) and visual appeal (for example, Cottle, 1993; and Lowe and Morrison, 1984).

³¹ The UK broadcast media are constrained to impartiality by statutory regulations covering fair and balanced political coverage (Sanders et al., 1999: 469).

Thus, it has been demonstrated that there are long lists of news values, with some attempts to see if they apply to environmental news and why. However, the research is both partial (only some news values have been examined in environmental news coverage) and largely descriptive. Chapter 4 attempts systematically to integrate the list of news values into more useful conceptual categories than "*infotainment*", and apply them to environmental news coverage.

As well as paying attention to the content and form of environmental news coverage, the rhetorical approach demands that more attention be paid to the source of the message. This is the focus of the remaining sections.

2.3.5 A rhetorical critique of source strategies' studies of environmental news coverage

2.3.5.1 Source Strategies Models

Describing the source-journalistic relationship are source strategies models, a range of which are discussed by Schlesinger (1990: 73-74). As Gans (1979: 117) explains, the source-journalistic relationship is a tug-of-war: sources attempt to manage the news whilst journalists try to manage sources to extract needed information. Synthesising the various theoretical and empirical studies of source-journalistic activity, two broad areas of analysis can be discerned - sources' incentives to publicise; and their access to journalists.³² These are discussed below.

2.3.5.1.1 Incentives to publicise

Gans (1979: 117) notes that sources may be eager to provide information because they benefit from widespread and legitimated news publicity. Sources' incentives to publicise differ according to the type of source. This section considers the incentives of scientists, environmental groups, politicians and businesses.

³² Sources' resources are another identified area (Schlesinger, 1990) but there are few empirical studies on this aspect.

Scientists are well aware of the possible advantages for research funding of media visibility.³³ Other motives for publicisation include the promotion of a technology or a political stand (Peters, 1995); and the desire to educate the public (Bader, 1990: 88; DiBella et al., 1991).

Lowe and Morrison (1984) see environmental groups as having three incentives to build the media agenda. The first is to ensure their own continued legitimacy to a range of publics: activists, the general membership, and potential recruits.³⁴ The second incentive is to transform public values through long-term educational and propaganda campaigns. The third incentive is to create a resource for further political action (see Burgess, 1991). The media can pave the way for the establishment of private negotiations with government and present the threat of adverse publicity should they fail (see Banham, 1996: 21). This is the politics of appeal backed up by public censure - the classic position of an ideological outsider group.

In many respects, the incentives of politicians to build the media agenda are similar to those of environmental groups - for instance, to ensure their own continued legitimacy in the eyes of voters; to improve the climate of opinion regarding their actions on environmental issues through long-term educational and propaganda campaigns; and to create a resource for further political action in a divided or fragmented polity. As Beck (1992: 105) points out, Ministers of the Environment are hampered by the scope of their ministry and its financial constraints, and so must counter the cycle of destruction in a primarily symbolic fashion.

Businesses generally wish to highlight their pro-environmental activities, and hide their anti-environmental activities. Pinsdorf (1999: 25) argues that businesses operate increasingly on the consent of their various publics, and so must assume the risks of heightened exposure and accessibility. Stauber & Rampton (1995:173) describe how, in response to environmental

³³ See Bucchi (1998: 44); Gee (1996: 7) and Peters (1995: 33).

³⁴ Also see Wilkinson and Schofield (1994: 53) and Eyerman and Jamison (1989: 108).

pressure groups' "*media events*", companies attempt to minimise damage to their reputation or market position by ensuring no follow-up stories.³⁵

2.3.5.1.2 Access to journalists

Access to journalists may be institutionalised, or may need to be created via news management strategies. Gans (1979: 117) argues that institutionalised access is a function of power, authoritativeness and social and geographic proximity to journalists. For instance, geographical concentration of newsgathering brings about the routinisation of media search procedures (as described in the primary definition model).

Where access to the media is not institutionalised, it can be created through news management strategies. Schlesinger (1990: 79) argues that this is facilitated by:

- The ability to supply suitable information - i.e. "*a well-defined message to communicate framed in optimal terms capable of satisfying news values,*" (ibid.). For instance, Esser et al. (2000: 214-16) describe how political spin doctors centralise communication so that all speak in unison.
- "[T]he optimal locations for placing that particular message have been identified, as have the target audiences of the media outlets concerned," (Schlesinger, 1990: 79).
- "[T]he preconditions for communicative "success" have been assured so far as possible by, for instance, cultivating a sympathetic contact or fine-tuning the timing of a leak;" (ibid.). Examples include the spin-doctoring strategies of media monitoring; and professional collating of databases about the electorate and the media's inner structure (Esser et al., 2000: 214-16).
- [T]hat opposition has been neutralised or anticipated (for example by astute timing or discrediting)," (Schlesinger, 1990: 79). Examples include complaints to journalists regarding perceived bias (Richards, 1998: 119, cited in Esser et al., 2000: 120); and "*rapid rebuttal*" - responding immediately to the opponent's every statement in order to introduce

³⁵ They draw this information from the Clorex public relations crisis plan, 1991 draft prepared by Ketchum Public Relations.

specific interpretations or corrections of false information into the news cycle (ibid.: 214-16).

A number of empirical studies examine sources' news management strategies across a range of issues. Most examine strategies used by the polity, such as the government and civil service,³⁶ and unofficial sources.³⁷ A smaller number of studies examine corporate media management strategies.³⁸

Research directed at news management of environmental issues generally examines strategies used by environmental pressure groups.³⁹ Environmental groups are becoming professional in dealing with the media, as reflected in their widespread media monitoring, and in the increase in staff responsible for media relations.⁴⁰ Cracknell (1993: 7) argues that groups compete to have their names mentioned in media reports. However, Anderson (1993: 60) argues that environmental groups experience a fundamental conflict over reaching their membership (upon which they rely for funds) through the media and influencing the political domain. Another conflict is over their need to develop their own identities to attract recruits, and their need to develop a unified public image if in a coalition (ibid.: 61).

Much of the research on news management strategies of environmental groups focuses on Greenpeace, given the importance it places on visually effective media publicity (McCormick, 1989) and novel and dramatic stunts (Greenberg, 1985). Anderson (1993: 57, 1991) observes that Greenpeace take advantage of cutbacks in broadcasting by supplying broadcast format footage to television networks. However, Hansen (1993: 153) argues that today's Greenpeace enters into media discourse in much more varied ways (see Mormont and Dasnoy, 1995). Since

³⁶ See Cottle (2000: 436) for citations; and Martel (1983).

³⁷ See Cottle (2000: 436) for citations; and Gitlin (1980).

³⁸ See Davis (2000: 283) for citations; and Turk (1991).

³⁹ Most research does not look at other actors' attempted media management of environmental issues. An exception is Cracknell (1993) who argues that the UK civil service takes advantage of the media's short attention span by using the tactic of "*suppression*" to delay issue resolution, exhaust its sponsors and thereby reduce their chances of maintaining public interest.

⁴⁰ See Gamson and Wolfsfeld (1993); Hansen (1990); Lowe and Morrison (1984); Lowe and Goyder (1983) and Solesbury (1976).

Greenpeace's claims are doubted by some journalists (Anderson, 1991, 1993) Greenpeace tries to confer legitimacy on itself by continuously linking into developments in existing and established fora rather than completely new issues (Hansen, 1993: 170); and by allying itself with science and "fact-finding" publications (ibid.: 175).

2.3.5.2 A rhetorical critique of the source strategies literature

To summarise, the source strategies' models have inspired a range of useful empirical work in directing attention to sources' incentives to publicise and their types of access to journalists (institutionalised or created by news management strategies). Schlesinger's (1990) model of news management strategies considers whether the message accords with journalists' constraints and demands; the placement of the message and its potential audience; and wider strategies which are mindful of the opposition.

However, Schlesinger's model fails to deliver deeper insights regarding the following aspects of the news message:

- The message construction: how effectively does the broadcast advocate the actor's stance?
- The audience, beyond identifying the target audience: how can a message be created that persuades the audience?
- The precise and varied nature of journalistic demands and constraints: *which* news values, *how* to appeal to them, and with *what* success, are not addressed.

Analysis of such questions can be addressed by using a rhetorical approach, since this approach aims to provide insights on how effectively the message advocates the actor's stance; the audience for whom the message is intended; and more generally, the available means of persuasion in a message. Here, useful links can be made to the literature on Public Relations, a significant section of which engages with rhetorical issues of image-manipulation.

2.3.6 The rhetorical approach and the literature on Public Relations

There are obvious links to be made between the literature on source strategies and rhetoric, and to the literature on Public Relations (PR), given that the dominant view of PR practice is one of persuasive communication performed on behalf of clients (Gandy, 1992: 132).

2.3.6.1 Awareness of the need to create an appropriate stance in the message

Certain basics on how to bridge the gap between the company's projected image and the audience's appreciation of that image are timeless. Ewen (1996: 216) documents a range of PR advice from the 1920s to companies regarding establishing credibility and choosing an appropriate stance (ethos): "*Successful business is business plus personality*" (Kennedy, 1920: 3, cited in *ibid.*). More recently, Arnold (1987) advocates that to combat the growth of anti-business environmentalism, business should promote the "*the civilisation ethic*, which starts: "*I pledge to help produce, to wisely use, and to preserve the resources of my civilisation ...*" (*ibid.*: 94), so creating a credible value system for businesses to project. Crisis communications PR specialists, Regester & Larkin (1997: 144), advise companies in a crisis to talk about people first, then the environment and property and finally, money; to anticipate and fill the information void; and to remember that media pollution can outlast environmental pollution with greater economic damage.

2.3.6.2 Awareness of the need to understand the audience

Since its inception in the 1920s, the PR industry has been aware of the need to understand how the audience operates (Ewen, 1996: 146) in order to tailor messages appropriately. For example, PR advice to companies includes the following:

- In crisis communications, the first statement made to each public is crucial in establishing credibility (Fearn-Banks, 1996: 33).
- The "*no comment*" response is usually damaging (Charland, cited in Pinsdorf, 1999: 45). In the short-term it creates negative media relations; a public perception of guilt; and an information vacuum. In the long term it lessens the company's ability to manage messages

for the public; creates potential difficulties with government officials, who dislike secrecy (ibid.: 48); and prolongs media coverage of a crisis (Fearn-Banks, 1996: 65).

- In terms of how much information to reveal, Pinsdorf (1999: 82) argues that where public safety is involved, the rule is " *tell it all and tell it fast*". This minimises fear because the public is informed, whilst making news headlines only once.
- The use of third parties is effective for manipulating public opinion when facing a publicised crisis (Regeister & Larkin, 1997: 27). Useful third parties include independent experts (Stauber & Rampton, 1995: 173); or rank and file employees and their families to act as company spokespeople (ibid.: 211).
- Constant audience and media monitoring is urged by Holtz (1999: 201) who recommends that companies conduct random telephone surveys of consumers to assess the impact of pressure groups' media events.
- Preparatory groundwork is advised by Arnold (1987: 140- 148) to help business defeat environmentalism, such as doing public-spirited works to develop public support for the company; and creating "*astroturf*" pro-industry citizen activist groups (see Stauber & Rampton, 1995: 111).

In addition to understanding the audience, over the past fifteen years, the literature on PR increasingly focuses on understanding opponents. Arnold's (1987: 140- 148) advice to business on how to defeat environmentalism includes engaging in diplomacy with environmental leaders. Regeister & Larkin (1997: 21) advocate "*outside-in thinking*", given that there are now more than 1000 single-issue campaign groups in the UK. Outside-in thinking depends on an organisation's ability to move away from one-way information flow towards active dialogue with stakeholder groups.

While the PR industry pays close attention to the various audiences, it also attends to the audience-media relationship.

2.3.6.3 Awareness of the need to understand the audience-media relationship

Over the past century, the PR industry has increasingly used the mass media to target the mass audience (Sproule, 1988: 469). When insights on the media-audience relationship from the literature on PR are married with Media Studies' audience reception studies, the following insights can be made.

- **The news value of objectivity may mask bias**

Audience reception studies indicate that audiences are aware when bias occurs in documentaries:⁴¹ this may be because documentaries do not have a commitment to impartiality - unlike news broadcasts. Unacknowledged use of PR reports in news broadcasts may therefore be the most effective way of slipping past audience's bias detectors.

- **Audience skepticism and lack of attention.**

On the one hand, Philo (1996: 448) argues that where no critical view of television exists, the likelihood of accepting its account may be great - the "*seeing is believing*" attitude. On the other hand, Burgess & Harrison's (1993: 218) audience reception study found that people are awash with communications, rarely paying direct attention to them and adopting a skeptical attitude toward the content and its sources. Corner et al.'s (1988) audience reception study of the nuclear power debate found viewers who respected argumentative form without having the capacity or desire to engage deeply in its content. Corner & Richardson (1993: 228) observe audience skepticism of "*official rational-bureaucratic discourse*"; and argue that the "*symbolic*" should be seen as a primary feature of public discourse rather than a consequence of "*emotive overflow*".

- **The concrete is better understood and/or recalled than the abstract**

A range of audience reception studies shows limited information recall through the media, especially broadcast news.⁴² Thus, exemplars (i.e. short verbal/visual quotations from interested people illustrating a problem or opinion) are often used in journalism because of their

⁴¹ See Burgess et al. (1990) and Corner & Richardson (1988).

⁴² See Bell (1991: 231) for citations; La Baschin (1986); and Silverstone (1985).

authenticity and vividness (Brosius, 1999: 222). Brosius cites research indicating that exemplars influence opinions more strongly than statistics, overviews or official information (ibid.: 213). Related to the use of exemplars is the audience's ability to connect with personal experience rather than abstract concepts (Burgess et al., 1990: 516; see Phillips, 2000: 179, for citations).

The PR industry is highly aware of the importance of these audience-media relationships. Given audience recognition of bias in documentary, the news media has long been a target of PR activity through providing "*information subsidies*" (Gandy, 1992: 142). Ewen (1996: 215) notes that throughout the 1920s, a growing array of large business disseminated "*canned*" news to US newspapers, calculated to uphold the canon of laissez-faire capitalism. The PR industry attends to issues of how to attract attention and help recall (see Pinsdorf, 1999: 11; Ewen, 1996: 335; Manheim, 1991: 202). PR advice on manipulation of image extends to interview technique and trick questions (Pinsdorf, 1999: 49; Fearn-Banks, 1996: 65-70); and word usage. For example, Pinsdorf (1999: 12) notes that the spreading use of deceptive words kills credibility, whilst buzz-words irritate through overuse. Manheim (1991: 11) describes the range of political talk available: for instance, holistic messages rather than isolated bits of information; and visualisation where words are used to paint mental pictures rather than convey ideas. Martel (1983) discusses the images, strategies and tactics in US televisual presidential campaigns. For instance, "*relational tactics*" are behaviours intended to influence the audience's perception of the candidate's personality (ibid.: 77-88).

2.3.7 Summary of the value of the rhetorical approach

In examining the news media-oriented rhetorical discourses of Greenpeace and Shell, and how the media negotiates these rhetorical discourses, this research makes a number of contributions to the literature on Rhetoric, Media Studies, Public Relations and the environment.

From the literature on Rhetoric and the environment, this research addresses the following deficits.

- In looking at environmental discourse in television news, this research addresses the minimal research on the mass media (as noted by Waddell, 1998: xix; Herndl & Brown, 1996: 18; and Lange, 1993/1998: 126).
- In looking at the interaction between two of Greenpeace's and Shell's information campaigns over 1995, this research helps fill the void noted by Lange (1993/1998: 140) regarding rhetorical research on how competing information campaigns interact.

From the Media Studies literature, this research explores the following deficits.

- In generating news values theory (i.e. more useful higher-order conceptual categories than "*infotainment*"), this research helps redress the paucity of theory-building in television research identified by Corner (1998: 148).
- By examining aspects of Greenpeace and Shell's news management strategies, it meets a gap in the source strategies' literature identified by Schlesinger (1990) - that empirical studies "*have largely failed to investigate the forms of action adopted by non-official sources*" (ibid.: 76), focusing instead on the role of official sources in government and administration.
- By examining the discursive source-media message interface, this research helps meet Cottle's (2000: 443) call for integration between the sociological and culturalist approaches to studying news. It offers sustained empirical inquiry into how Greenpeace's and Shell's strategic and definitional power melds with the constraints of television news journalism, particularly focusing on how these condition the discursive and symbolic entry of Greenpeace and Shell.
- It reinvigorates the literature on Public Relations by demonstrating this literature's use of the rhetorical approach.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This study aims to critically explore and evaluate the news media-oriented information campaigns of Greenpeace and Shell. In doing so, it explores their news media-oriented rhetorical discourses, and the extent to which these discourses appear in UK television news. Thus, this study examines the discursive practices of journalistic news values; and actors' strategies in utilising their knowledge of the operations of the media, their opponents and their allies. Ultimately, the relationship between these discursive practices and non-discursive practices are examined by looking at whether these rhetorical discourses resulted in any "real world" change (see chapter 8). Thus, in aiming to expose and thematise contradictions between an aspect of society's performance and its legitimating ideologies, this research is broadly inspired by critical theory (Horkheimer, 1941, cited in Held, 1980: 184). In accordance with critical theory's argument for a plurality of methods, and its stance that there is a false opposition between quantitative and qualitative research, (Morrow, 1994: 218), this research combines quantitative and qualitative research.

Chapter 2 explicated the detailed aims of this research. One such aim is to address several deficits in the Media Studies literature, these being theory-building in television research (Corner, 1998: 148) and news management strategies of "*non-official sources*" (Schlesinger, 1990: 76). This research aims to generate news values theory (i.e. more useful higher-order conceptual categories than "*infotainment*"), and theory regarding news management strategies.

To help generate new theory, this research uses the method of "*adaptive theory*" (Layder, 1998: 1) (see section 3.2). This combines the use of pre-existing theory and theory generated from data analysis during empirical research. Adaptive theory is a less inductively-based method than the theory that inspired it - Glaser and Strauss' (1967) "*grounded theory*". Rather than starting the research with as little pre-formulated theory as possible so that it might be

generated during the research process (as in grounded theory) (ibid.,15), adaptive theory harnesses the inputs of prior theory (Layder, 1998: 4). Where adaptive theory borrows heavily from grounded theory is in its qualitative sampling techniques. Such techniques help move the analysis away from the substantive analysis of individual case studies (see section 3.2.1) towards more formal analysis, but in an empirically grounded manner (see section 3.2.2).

Chapter 2 states that this research aims to address several deficits in the literature on Rhetoric and the environment, these being a rhetorical examination of mass mediated environmental discourse (Waddell, 1998: xix; Herndl & Brown, 1996 18; and Lange, 1993/1998: 126); and a rhetorical examination of how competing information campaigns interact (Lange, 1993/1998: 140). These are operationalised in section 3.3 which explains how the media agenda is textually analysed both quantitatively (section 3.3.1) and qualitatively (section 3.3.2). Section 3.3.3 demonstrates patterns of relationships found in the textual analysis, namely the appearance of different actors' world-views in the television news sample - "discursive primary definition" (section 3.3.3.1); the hierarchy of discourses in the television news sample (see section 3.3.3.2); relationships between news values and discourses (section 3.3.3.3); and analysis of what is not said (section 3.3.3.4). Section 3.4 discusses the main strengths and weaknesses of this methodology.

3.2 Generating theory: the use of adaptive theory

3.2.1 The case-study approach

At the heart of this method is the case study approach, examining the Spar and Ogoniland issues. The centrality of the case study to research design has been rediscovered.¹ Its main benefit is that it can provide freshness in perspective to an already researched topic arising from its focus on understanding the dynamics present within single settings (Eisenhardt, 1989).

Thus, utilising the case study approach enables deeper investigation of the news media-oriented rhetorical discourses.

¹ See Morrow (1994: 251); Hamel (1992: 1); Ragin and Becker (1992); and Rogers and Dearing (1988: 576).

The Spar issue was chosen for the most in-depth case study analysis. This is because Greenpeace was spectacularly successful in making this an issue of concern for the news media in both the UK and Europe (Documentary: "The Battle for Brent Spar", BBC2, 3rd August 1995). It was therefore expected that this case study would encompass the winning formulae for building the news media's agenda. The Spar issue is used to generate theory on television's news values; and news media-oriented rhetorical discourses.

The main drawback of the case study approach is its limited generalisability. To help overcome this limitation, a range of tools derived from grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) are used - particularly its qualitative sampling methods which encourage greater abstraction. Thus, the second case study - the Ogoniland issue - was used to verify the "*transferability*"² (Henwood & Pidgeon, 1994: 27) of these news values and news media-oriented rhetorical discourses (explained further below). It was also used to investigate the changing media-oriented discursive strategies of the main protagonists over time, since the Ogoniland issue received media attention both before and after the Spar issue during 1995.

3.2.2 Using qualitative sampling to overcome the limits of the case study approach

Strauss and Corbin (1990: 23) explain that the method of grounded theory involves moving between inductive and deductive thinking. Its central process involves "*coding*" data. During this process, statements of relationships are deductively proposed; then what has been deduced is verified against the data as each incident is compared. The exploratory character of such research means that the focus of inquiry is clarified during data collection and analysis as the analytical categories are gradually developed (see Kersten, 1987: 720). This contrasts sharply with research that begins with a set of hypotheses and proceeds to test them (Boulton and

² "*Transferability*" is a narrower concept than "generalisability". It refers to applying the findings of a study in contexts similar to the context in which they were first derived (ibid.).

Hammersley, 1996: 290) and is well suited to this research in its exploration of source's news media-oriented discursive strategies.³

In grounded theory the initial stage of coding ("*open coding*") applies relevant labels to the data by breaking down, comparing, conceptualising and categorising the data. Open coding produces data labels termed "*concepts*". These concepts are compared to each other, and where they pertain to a similar phenomenon, they are grouped together under a higher-order category (Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 69). As categories are developed in this way, these too are mutually compared and where relevant, are re-grouped under higher order, more abstract categories (ibid.). This finally produces a hierarchical organisation ranging from the smallest unit of analysis (the "*concept*") through to sub-categories ("*sub-themes*"), categories ("*themes*"), main categories ("*main themes*") and finally, the core category ("*core theme*") (if one can be found). The systematic oscillation between induction and deduction, always rooted in the empirical data, provides rigor to the qualitative analysis.⁴

Qualitative sampling techniques encourage both theoretical development and generalisation, since the method is concerned with the representativeness of concepts. There are various types of qualitative sampling associated with each level of abstraction/categorisation in grounded theory.

During the open coding process, openness rather than specificity guides the sampling choice, the aim being to uncover as many potentially relevant categories as possible. Things are sampled that will provide the greatest opportunity to gather the most relevant data about the concept under investigation. In open coding, data can be searched in a number of ways, such as:

- Systematic sampling (going through a set of given documents in a systemised manner, for instance looking only at every second document);

³ The research used the QSR.NUD.IST freetext statistical package (Qualitative Solutions and Research. Non-numerical Unstructured Data Indexing Searching and Theorising). This computer package is designed to handle non-numerical unstructured data, facilitating close data inspection and categorisation.

⁴ In coming from an adaptive theory rather than a grounded theory approach, this research does not utilise all of grounded theory's coding procedures, such as "*axial coding*".

- Purposeful sampling (where data is chosen to maximise the possibility of certain themes emerging). The logic and power of purposeful sampling lies in selecting information-rich cases for in-depth study (Layder, 1998: 6).

As categories are formed (the "*selective coding*" process), the sampling choice is guided by the need to encourage greater abstraction from the data. This is known as "*theoretical sampling*," i.e. sampling on the basis of concepts that have proven theoretical relevance to the evolving theory (Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 186).⁵ It aims to maximise opportunities for verifying relationships between categories, and for filling in poorly developed categories. Data samples are chosen that are different enough from the original set of data from which the categories emerged to provisionally test the "*transferability*" (Henwood & Pidgeon, 1994: 27) of these categories. This research followed the general rule in grounded and adaptive theory - to sample until "*theoretical saturation*" (Strauss and Corbin 1990: 188) of each category is reached (i.e. the stage when further empirical analysis reveals no new information about the category's characteristics).⁶

3.3.2.1 Qualitative Sampling: selecting the media

Since this research aims to investigate the news media-oriented discursive strategies of Shell and Greenpeace, an important consideration was which media to examine. Cracknell (1993: 5) argues that the media should be thought of as a set of arenas, each of which has differences in terms of factors like the audience it can reach, the selection principles that govern it and its political significance. Which media Greenpeace appears in has consequences for whether it reaches the public or policy-makers in its bid to change environmentally destructive behaviour. Given that Greenpeace aims to influence policy-makers by changing public opinion, the media deemed central to this research were national television news broadcasts, for several reasons. Television news is the most-consumed news form (Philo, 1996: 1). It is also more credible than

⁵ Theoretical sampling, as developed by Glaser and Strauss (1967) selects events, people, settings and time periods in relation to the emergent nature of theory and research. The researcher is enjoined to collect and analyse the data simultaneously so generating feedback from the data, which in turn impacts on theory-generation.

⁶ Also see Glaser and Strauss (1967: 6-62, 111-112); and Strauss and Corbin (1990: 188).

the next most consumed news medium - tabloid newspapers: this is relevant because channel credibility influences whether or not people use the source for information gathering (for example, see Wanta and Hu, 1994, cited in Dearing and Rogers, 1996: 51). Finally, if an issue appeared on television news, it is likely to have also appeared in a wide range of other media, due to the fact that television is the most selective medium. Since the case studies involve Greenpeace's attempted use of the media to sway public opinion, the fact that the issue is reported widely is relevant.

The choice of news programmes was governed by purposeful sampling. Since the main reason for analysing television news is that it reaches a wide audience, the most popular national news broadcasts are used - the evening news broadcasts of BBC1 9.00pm News and ITN 10.00pm News.⁷ Other longer, more in-depth evening news programmes were also chosen (Channel 4 News, 7.00pm and Newsnight, BBC2) in order to get a fuller range of television news' debate on the issue. It should be noted that the evening news broadcasts, coming at the end of the day, feature stories, which have survived the day's "pecking order": often stories that appear in the daytime news programmes are pushed off the evening news agenda by harder-hitting stories. Environmental stories are particularly vulnerable to this since they are often viewed as soft news, compared to the harder news topics of economics, governmental politics, or societal disruption. Indeed, Cottle (1993) finds that environmental stories are most often found in the more marginal broadcast news outlets like regional and breakfast news. Thus, in examining only evening news, this may well be under-representative of the day's television reportage of the two issues. However, this defect was outweighed by the fact that the evening news broadcasts have the largest audience figures - which is one of the main reasons for using television broadcasts.

⁷ 1996 audience figures for television news are as follows: BBC1 9.00pm News - 6.1million; ITN 10.00pm News - 6.2million (Source: BARB, cited in Guardian Education, 11th February 1997: 8).

The dates of television news broadcasts of the two issues needed to be ascertained, in the absence of any detailed log at the news archive used.⁸ The Financial Times, The Guardian and The Observer were used to generate these dates for the two issues over 1995.⁹ News recordings on all of these dates were then searched for in the television news archive, producing a database of national television evening news broadcasts from 30th April - 11th October 1995 for the Spar broadcasts, accompanied by a number of Scottish regional news and national day-time news broadcasts.¹⁰ The Ogoniland database consisted of national daytime and evening news broadcasts on 16th January 1995, and the period of 31st October - 14th November 1995.

Analysis of newspapers' articles, editorials and letters were used to create a database from which to examine source strategies. The Financial Times helps generate the business community's world-view; and The Guardian helps generate the environmentalists' world-view (since it has a weekly environment section; and since Lacey and Longman (1993: 218) suggest that the most significant outlet for all environmental groups was the national press with The Guardian the most prominent).¹¹ In order to reach a deeper understanding of the scientific debates, articles from two scientific journals - the New Scientist and Nature - were examined, since, in the Spar issue, the environmental debate hinged on hotly disputed scientific evidence. Also, specialist correspondents for the general news media refer to such scientific journals when writing their stories (White et al., 1993: 23).

3.2.2.2 Qualitative Sampling: generating theory on news values.

As stated earlier, one aim of this research was to generate news values theory (i.e. more useful higher-order conceptual categories than "*infotainment*"). In this analysis, news values are both deductively derived from existing literature, and inductively derived from qualitative sampling of the news broadcasts, and from qualitative sampling of the qualitative e-mail interviews and

⁸ This archive was that of the Glasgow University Media Group (GUMG).

⁹ Some research shows that unless an issue has been raised in the press, it is unlikely to be aired on television (Anderson, 1993: 59; GUMG, 1985: 2).

¹⁰ In the GUMG archive, tapes for July 1995 could not be located: hence this database does not cover the six month period in an unbroken manner.

¹¹ These newspapers are available on CD-ROM, thus facilitating computer-based analysis.

open-ended questionnaires (Wilson, 1996) with broadcast and science journalists (see Appendix 1 for the types of questions asked). Since the aim is to derive televisual news values that are widely used, the initial focus on the Spar national evening news is widened to national daytime news and Scottish regional news (purposeful and theoretical sampling).

Theoretical sampling of daytime and evening news broadcasts on the Ogoniland issue was conducted to verify the transferability of the news values found in the Spar broadcasts. The Ogoniland broadcasts were expected to adhere to many news values since the issue gained television exposure despite being a "development" and foreign story - which generally get less broadcast attention than other story types (Lacey and Longman, 1993: 207).

3.3.2.3 Qualitative Sampling: Generating theory on news management strategies

Systematic sampling was used to examine every Greenpeace and Shell press release on the Spar and Ogoniland issues. This comprised press releases publicised on their web sites, and additional press releases provided by the institutions on request. This provided a database of press releases covering the time period of February 1995 - April 1998 for the Spar issue; and May 1994 - September 1997 for the Ogoniland issue. In the Spar issue, the six month period from 30th April - 11th October 1995 was analysed the most intensively (hence mirroring the time period covering the Spar news broadcast database). In the Ogoniland issue, press releases in January 1995, and from October 1995 - November 1995 were most intensively analysed, again mirroring the time period of the Ogoniland news broadcast database. Other press releases (up until April 1998) were analysed less intensively, to monitor the progression of the media campaigns of Greenpeace and Shell on the two issues.

Theoretical sampling was used to select press releases for analysis in the Ogoniland issue. This campaign was considered different enough from the Spar campaign to test the transferability of concepts in that: one of the main protagonists was Shell-Nigeria rather than Shell-UK; Greenpeace was faced with different allies; and this was a development and human rights issue as well as an environmental issue.

In order to further understand Greenpeace and Shell's media strategies, relevant articles, editorials and letters from The Financial Times, The Guardian and the Observer were examined between 1995-1998.

3.3 Operationalising a rhetorical investigation into the interaction between competing information campaigns

To operationalise the rhetorical examination of the interaction of competing information campaigns, both quantitative and qualitative methods were used. These are described below.

3.3.1 Quantitative textual analysis

Quantitative content analysis¹² is an established research technique used to measure the amount of attention given to particular themes in media texts (see Anderson, 1997: 138, for citations). In this research, it is used to measure the amount of attention given to certain key phrases in press releases and broadcast news, and occasionally to establish certain formal features of the news broadcasts.

There are a number of critiques of content analysis, addressed below. In its measurement of manifest rather than latent content, it can be criticised for assuming that the link between the external object of reference and the reference to it in the text will be clear and unambiguous (McQuail, 1994: 277). In fact, this is questioned by structural semiotics (for instance, Barthes, 1973/1980¹³); psychoanalysis (such as Lacan's (1981) "*sliding signifiers*"¹⁴); post-structuralism (such as Barthes' later work¹⁵); post-modernism (for example, Baudrillard's (1972/1988)

¹² See Beardsworth (1980) and Berelson (1952) for descriptions of this methodology.

¹³ Semiotic analysis involves close reading of media texts – especially to identify and decode the underlying ideological frameworks. For example, Barthes (1973/1980) describes the second-order semiological system of "*myth*".

¹⁴ Lacan (1981) talks of "*glissement*" (slippage, slide) of the signifier along the "*signifying chain*", with the signifier engaging in multiple relations with signifieds. Over time, the individual builds up chains of signification, always substituting new terms for old and increasing the distance between the signifier that is accessible and those that are unconscious.

¹⁵ Deconstruction argues that texts do not have determinate meanings, as any close examination of any text shows. For instance, Barthes (1977: 167) develops a concern with textual plurality by showing how meaning "*explodes*" by integrating the reader and the moment of reading in the text being read.

"floating signifiers"¹⁶); and audience reception studies (such as Morley, 1980¹⁷). However, others have responded to such critiques by arguing that textual meaning is not so radically indeterminate that analysts' readings of texts are illegitimate in principle (Corner & Richardson, 1993: 229). Analysts inhabit the same media-interpretive community as most ordinary viewers at the most basic level of construing speech and imagery. Corner (1995: 137) argues that although viewers produce meanings, they do so in relation to the signifiatory work undertaken by the programme-makers.

Content analysis is critiqued for assuming that the frequency of occurrence of chosen references will validly express the dominant meaning of the text in an objective way (McQuail, 1994: 277). This critique is pertinent to television news, since the power of a single compelling image allied with a single pithy caption could hold more meaning than endless repetition of tired phrases. However, countering this critique is the argument that if there are a number of compelling images, then quantification may again become a relevant factor to observe. The crucial aspect concerns making a sensible decision about what to count: this is addressed in section 3.3.3.

Finally, content analysis is criticised for pertaining to scientific objectivity. In fact, as with all methods the chosen categories reflect the particular biases and interests of the researcher (Anderson, 1997: 139). Due to these deficiencies, content analysis is used in this research only in conjunction with qualitative analysis, to demonstrate localised patterns suggested by utilising a qualitative approach, rather than demonstrating universal generalisations. In combination with qualitative techniques, content analysis enables greater analysis of latent meanings of texts and the overall context in which they are placed.

¹⁶ Baudrillard (1972/1988) argues that in contemporary consumer capitalism we no longer consume products but sign/images which float free from the referent. Baudrillard argues that the masses accept all images as a "*spectacle*"/"*simulation*", refusing to attach meaning to images that have been intended to carry meaning.

¹⁷ These show that audiences decode texts differently according to their own specific cultural knowledge.

3.3.2 Qualitative textual analysis

Television texts have long been the subject of semiotic analysis (for example, Lewis, 1996; see Hart, 1988: 26 for citations). Semiotics claims to be able to unearth a text's ideological motivation and effect (indeed, conflating the two). Some Barthesian (1973) semiotic terminology is used in this research, namely "*denotation*" (i.e. non-coded and literal messages) and "*connotation*" (i.e. coded and symbolic messages). However, the use of such terminology is minimised due to problems with the semiotic project - namely its ideologically-laden language and categorisations, with its attendant claims to scientifically-knowable universal truths and its assumptions about how the meaning-making process relates to viewers (Corner, 1995). A fundamental problem with semiotic analysis is similar to that leveled at content analysis - that the link made by the analyst between the external object of reference and the reference to it in the text will be reasonably clear and unambiguous, and the same for all analysts. With the rise of the post-structuralist critique, this assumption is less tenable. However, Corner and Richardson's (1993: 229) response that analysts inhabit the same media-interpretive community as most ordinary viewers (noted in section 3.3.1 above) applies here too. Further supporting the case for shared social meanings, television news is more tightly constructed than many other genres, with textual "*anchorage*" (Barthes, 1977: 38-41) limiting the potential meanings of the accompanying visuals.

Nonetheless, given the problems with semiotic language, rhetorical language is largely preferred to semiotic language in this research (a procedure also used by Corner (1995) in his studies of television programmes). Rhetorical language is preferable because rather than assuming an ideological impact in the audience, it analyses what the text offers in its attempts as persuasion, using the knowledge of the world-view of the (institutional) author of the text. The following tools of rhetorical analysis are used to analyse the text qualitatively.

- **Examination of visuals.** Visuals are examined since media practitioners question the strong textual bias in discourse theory: for instance, television producers' experience is that it is the pictures which drive the creation of the narrative, not the words (Crowley & Mitchell, 1994:

12). Visual elements to be studied will include denotations and connotations; the use of pointed imagery; the framing of visuals; and how the affective resonances link with the propositional text.

- **Analysis of the persuasive stylistic repertoire.** This involves examining rhetorical features like types of argumentation offered. Lexical choice (Cockroft & Cockroft, 1992: 27) is examined, including elements like pronominal usage (ibid.: 29) and figurative language (ibid.: 118). Sound patterning, like alliteration¹⁸ and assonance¹⁹, is observed since they create and enhance meaning. Schematic language is examined, involving elements like repetition (ibid.: 131); amplification and diminution (which may, for instance, develop or shorten an argument) (ibid.: 132); and tricks and ploys like “*whitewash*” (which flatters error by the application of a neutral or positive term) (ibid.: 135).

- **Determination of who is speaking and at what institutional site.** Analysis of who is accorded the right to speak on any particular occasion involves criteria of competence and knowledge in relation to the institutional site of speech. Fairclough (1994: 75) suggests that analysis should also be made of the force of utterances, i.e. what sort of speech acts (promises, threats etc.) they constitute.

3.3.3 Demonstrating patterns of relationships found in the textual analysis

At attempt was made to quantitatively demonstrate certain patterns of relationships found in the qualitative analysis.

Qualitative data can be quantified, as long as the qualitative data is coded in a way that enables it to be statistically analysed (Alasuutari, 1995: 123; Strauss and Corbin, 1990, 18). The only prerequisite is to have a sufficient number of cases (see Hagood, 1970). Alasuutari (1995: 123) explains that although qualitative research often has small numbers of interviewees or collected text samples (which in survey research, would make generalisations invalid) the unit of analysis

¹⁸ Repetition of the initial consonant.

¹⁹ Repetition of medial vowel.

does not have to be interviewees or text samples.²⁰ Statistical relationships derived from such analyses merely indicate that within the data, certain variables describing the observational units are on average associated with other variables in certain ways (ibid.: 130). Interpreting these relationships still necessitates a "*local*" explanation i.e. going back to the data to find out what has produced the statistical relationships. Thus, quantitative data can be used to aid qualitative analysis, for instance, in searching for new questions (ibid.: 129). Such quantitative analysis was used in this research to ascertain discursive primary definition, the hierarchy of discourses, the relationships between news values and discourses, and analysis of what is not said.

3.3.3.1 Ascertaining discursive primary definition

One of the criticisms of primary definition made in chapter 2 concerned the fact that it does not indicate the varying degrees of legitimacy with which different primary definitions are accredited; nor does it address how actors wish to be portrayed (Hansen, 1991). To address this deficiency, this research operationalises primary definition according to the type of message promoted by actors supporting Greenpeace's or Shell's world-view, and found in national television evening news. (World-views are gleaned mainly from Greenpeace's and Shell's press releases, and augmented by their other literature such as web-sites, newsletters and books.)

In order to quantify the extent to which a world-view appeared in the Spar broadcast news data, the chosen observational unit was "*the concept*" (from grounded theory). Once stable concepts had been created from the open coding process, a record was kept of each concept belonging to message type "z" supporting the world-view of actor "y" in television evening news. For clarification, the following example shows three situations which would each be recorded as two instances of message type "z" supporting the world-view of Greenpeace. (In the example given, "z" is the message type of "emotivism", hence all the following concepts described are

²⁰ For example, Alasuutari's (1992) observation unit is the particular way in which the people talked about watching different programme types when a certain programme type was mentioned for the first time during interviews.

emotive concepts.) Greenpeace promotes "z" (or a different actor promotes "z" and "z" supports Greenpeace's world-view) by the following means:²¹

- Two different concepts in two separate statements in the same broadcast.

E.g. "*13 Greenpeace shock troops took over the abandoned ...*" produces the concept of "battle metaphor". "Visual of Greenpeace banner: '*Stop Shell Now. Greenpeace*' on top of Brent Spar" produces the concept of "champion of the environment".

- The same concept in two separate statements in the same broadcast.

E.g. "*13 Greenpeace shock troops took over the abandoned ...*" and "*In harbour at Lerwick, the Moby Dick, a converted trawler turned mother ship...*" each produce the concept of "battle metaphor".

- Two separate concepts that come from the same statement in the same broadcast.

E.g. "Visual of a Greenpeace banner: '*Stop Shell Now. Greenpeace*'" produces the concepts of "champion of the environment" and "environmentally uncaring/damaging".

This method of recording aims to render an accurate picture of primary definition. For instance, if only the number of broadcasts in which emotive concepts occurred was noted, this would not indicate the extent of emotivism to be found within that broadcast. If only the number of different emotive concepts to be found in a broadcast was noted, this could disguise the frequency with which certain actors' emotive concepts make the news and would ignore the importance of repetition. Given that this procedure measures Greenpeace's or Shell's world-view, and given that this world-view may be promoted by Greenpeace, Shell or an ally (i.e. arising at different institutional sites), primary definition is re-termed here "*discursive primary definition*".

To ensure a complete picture of the extent of discursive primary definition, the data was sampled systematically for the period of agenda-building under examination (in this case, every press release and national television evening news broadcast on the issue was sampled). Thus,

²¹ All these examples are taken from Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 15th May 1995.

in a quantitative manner, the extent of discursive primary definition according to type of message promoted and in terms of the world-view it supports is calculated.

3.3.3.2 Ascertaining the hierarchy of discourses

The quantitative approach, with the unit of counting being grounded theory's "*concept*", helps discern the hierarchy of discourses in UK television evening news. This is useful because discourses are problematic to recognise given that Foucault (1972) uses "*discourse*" in at least 3 distinct ways:

"Finally, instead of making the rather hazy meaning of the word "discourse" more distinct, I think I have multiplied its meanings: sometimes using it to mean the general domain of all statements [enoncés], sometimes as an individualisable group of statements [enoncés], and sometimes as an ordered practice which takes account of a certain number of statements [enoncés]," (ibid.: 16).

In quantifying concepts, this research is actually quantifying discourses. The logic behind this is as follows. For Foucault (1972) the smallest unit of discourse is the "*statement*" ("*enoncés*"). A statement cannot be conceived according to linguistic or logical categories. It is not necessarily a sentence or proposition (although sometimes it can be) (Tilley, 1990: 295). A statement has no unitary essence. Its form shifts and changes according to context and circumstances.

"An enoncé exists in a way which makes any notion of its reappearance impossible; and the relationship it has with what it enunciates is not identical to a set of rules of usage. What we find is a one-off relationship: and if under these conditions an identical formulation reappears – even if the same words are used, even if we find substantially the same nouns, even if in total it is the same sentence – it is not necessarily the same enoncé," (Foucault, 1972: 138).

Similarly, the grounded theory "*concept*" also may change form, in the same manner as Foucault's "*statement*". Because of this correspondence, in this research, the "*concept*" is the data label applied to each "*statement*".

Cousins & Hussain (1984: 84-5) argue that discourses are recognisable in that they appear across a range of texts, and as forms of conduct, at a number of different institutional sites across society. In this research, the "concepts/statements" are drawn from several institutional sites (Greenpeace & Shell press releases, and a variety of UK television news programmes), and are then re-categorised to eventually form main themes. The main themes can therefore be described as discourses.

3.3.3.3 Relationships between news values and discourses

With the Spar broadcast news data, after having generated categories of news values and categories of media-oriented rhetorical discourses produced by actors and found on television evening news, this analysis relates these categories to each other. Again, the chosen observational unit was the "*concept*". Ultimately, a statistical relationship is described between the main categories of news values, and the main categories of the media-oriented rhetorical discourses generated by actors and found on national television evening news. This relationship is worked out in a summative manner, following the advice of Galtung and Ruge (1973: 70) who argue that the more news values adhered to by an event, the more likely that it will be registered as news.²²

3.3.3.4 Analysing what is not said

In accordance, with Foucault's (1974: 109) advocacy of examining discursive constraints, absences of information are also searched for. This involved discovering whether any concepts in press releases were absent from television news, and whether any beliefs held by the actors

²² Each concept coded from the news broadcasts is examined to see what news values it adheres to. These figures are summed to reach a total figure for each main theme.

were absent from their press releases (self-censorship), so creating a “*spiral of silence*” (Noelle-Neumann, 1974).

3.4 Strengths and weaknesses of this research

This section addresses four areas of potential weakness in this research design, demonstrating how they are either met or outweighed by corresponding strengths.

Adaptive theory helps generate the main categories/themes of news values and sources' news media-oriented rhetorical discourses, so providing greater explanatory power than case study research normally allows. A problem with adaptive theory, however, is that it tends to marginalise textual forms. This arises from coding procedures, where a text, such as a press release, is broken down into concepts which are then recategorised to form a different “whole”. Marginalisation of form is potentially problematic in that, as Macdonell (1986: 11) notes, discourse is approached in terms of the struggles traversing it, so that the contradictory modes in which it exists *as a whole* should be studied.²³ However, this problem is outweighed by the benefits of fresh perspectives that adaptive theory helps generate. Had adaptive theory not been used, it is unlikely that the discourses discovered in news values and sources' news media strategies would have been uncovered and empirically verified. Furthermore, although the interplay between the rhetorical discourses is generally not examined within individual texts (i.e. individual press releases and news broadcasts), the interplay between the rhetorical discourses as a whole, as they operate across a number of texts over time, is examined.

Generalisation of the theory generated by this research would be increased by applying qualitative sampling to a greater range of settings. For instance, the typology of news values generated would be made more robust by examining other news forms (such as television news broadcasts from other countries and channels); and by examining a wider range of issues (although the two issues chosen for analysis have several interesting cleavages - environmental

²³ This problem would be minimised by analysis of key press releases and news broadcasts in their entirety. However, due to space constraints, this type of analysis is kept to a minimum in this research.

versus human rights, national versus international reach). The typology of media-oriented rhetorical discourses generated would have greater generalisability by sampling from a wider range of organisations, such as other long-established media-oriented organisations (like FoE). Due to time and space considerations, this is not undertaken in this research. Instead, this research devotes its time and space to the question of media agenda-building through rhetorical discourses.

Quantitative analysis of the various rhetorical discourses by counting the concept/statement allows comparative analysis of Greenpeace's and Shell's relative quantitative use of each rhetorical discourse; and the relative quantitative appearance of these discourses in the broadcast news sample. Using the concept/statement as the basic unit of analysis is preferable to using a more rigid, pre-conceived category because it allows quantitative agenda-building analysis to emerge from the data, rather than being pre-determined and then forced upon the data. Thus, a quantitative picture of a meaningful set of categories can be built, so minimising the reductive nature of much quantitative analysis. Such quantitative analysis also allows a refinement of the primary definition concept (Hall et al., 1978), incorporating discourse. Rather than counting appearances of an actor in the news, what is counted is the appearance of concepts supporting the actor's world-view - "discursive primary definition". This requires detailed knowledge of the actor's arguments and position on an issue. The problem with using the concept/statement as the unit of measurement is that the quantitative aspect of this study may be harder to verify through replication, since the concept/statement is not easily definable. However, the import of this problem is minimised since the quantitative analysis is used here to aid local interpretations rather than to create universalising generalisations.

This study does not observe the sociological micro-processes in the newsroom as the issues of the Spar and Ogoniland became news. Thus the full range of complexities determining how and why these issues became news on some days and not on others is not revealed - such as whether they were pushed off the news agenda by competing news items. However, this is partially addressed by reconstruction of the events from newspaper articles and documentaries

on the two issues, together with e-mail interviews and postal questionnaires to journalists who covered the issues. Gunter (2000: 58) notes the benefit of asking questions without the interviewer being present - namely that reactive influences caused by a person's presence are excluded. He adds, however, that reactivity may occur in that, in the absence of guidance regarding the meaning of the questions, interviewees may construct their own self-made meaning (considering what the absent interviewer would suggest as the correct meaning). This research minimises the presence/absence quandary by using extended e-mail conversations with some respondents, initiated by sending them an open-ended postal questionnaire.

There are no interviews with the main protagonists, Greenpeace and Shell, despite many attempts at securing communication with them. This is partially addressed through close scrutiny of their press releases; analysis of relevant newspaper articles, books and documentaries; and analysis of some internal documentation sent on request. (Greenpeace-UK sent a draft review of their "remit". Shell-UK sent several PR packs containing a range of press releases not found on their web-site; the technical assessments of the Spar's decommissioning process; and a number of internal company newsletters.)

A weakness with all qualitative research, and shared by this research, is the potential distortion in interpretation arising from the researcher's own biases. Arguably, "*triangulation*" (Denzin, 1978) of data sources and methods, each with its own claim to representing reality, helps increase validity.²⁴ Triangulation of data sources is achieved by utilising multiple data sources: press releases; television news broadcasts; web pages; broadsheet newspapers, science journals; qualitative interviews (conducted by e-mail) and postal questionnaires with a range of actors (three television news journalists, one television news editor, one reporter for the New Scientist and one scientist); and internal documents from Greenpeace and Shell. Triangulation of methods is achieved via use of adaptive theory and qualitative sampling, content analysis, semiotic/rhetorical analysis, and qualitative questionnaires and e-mail interviews.

²⁴ Valid research is that which produces credible conclusions, with the evidence offered bearing the weight of the interpretation put on it (Sapsford and Jupp 1996: 1).

In addition to triangulation, validity is increased through "*reflexivity*" (McCall and Simmons, 1969) - requiring alertness to distortions from selective interpretations. The importance of reflexivity in research is emphasised in Foucault's later genealogical work where he critically analyses the social conditions of existence of concepts/statements and their relationship to power. Here, the "*self*" becomes an important part of this methodology of interpreting (rather than merely describing) discourses, since the discourse of the self impacts upon the interpretation (Tilley, 1990: 283; also see Tanaka, 1994: 2). There are, however, problems with incorporating a reflexive approach - particularly the question of when to stop doubting the interpretations (see Woolgar, 1988: 17).²⁵ In order to avoid the vortex of endless relativism, reflexivity is used here in two ways only:

- To add to the reader's understanding of the author's interpretations of data, where triangulation has failed to locate the probable socially agreed meaning;
- To interrogate the methods proceeding simultaneously with, and as an integral part of, investigation of the object (as advocated by grounded and adaptive theory).

3.5 Summary

This chapter has explained the central methodology of this research - namely the case study approach. It has highlighted how qualitative sampling methods are used both to overcome the limitations of the case study approach and to help generate theory on news values (the subject of the following chapter) and news management strategies. The quantitative and qualitative methods used to operationalise examination of the interaction between Greenpeace and Shell's media-oriented campaigns have been explicated. It has been described how quantitative analysis using the "concept/statement" will enable the exploration of certain patterns of relationships found in the textual analysis - namely discursive primary definition, the hierarchy

²⁵ Also see Latour (1988: 169) and Woolgar and Ashmore (1988: 8).

of discourses, the relationships between news values and discourse, and analysis of what is not said.

CHAPTER 4

NEWS VALUES THEORY: A DEDUCTIVE AND INDUCTIVE SYNTHESIS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter starts the investigation of the news agenda-building process by exploring the news values of UK television news. Chapter 2 demonstrated that news values are a much researched, but under-synthesised, area. This chapter offers a more useful conceptualisation of news values than "*infotainment*", these being "professional" (section 4.2.1), "logistical" (section 4.2.2) and "audience-maximising" (section 4.2.3).

Many note that the environment as a news category does not get as much news coverage as other categories (Andrew Veitch, science correspondent, Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, interview, "Costing the Earth", Radio 4, 23rd October 1996). A further indication of the low level in which editors hold the environment is that neither Channel 4 News nor ITN have their own "environmental" correspondents, but instead have "science" correspondents. Thus, the fact that the Brent Spar issue received extensive media coverage, occasionally acquiring the status of "*media event*"¹ (Dayan and Katz, 1992) (such as the U-turn) despite being an environmental story, indicates that it must have had exceptional appeal to news values. It is therefore used as the main database from which to build news values theory. The Ogoniland broadcasts are used to verify the transferability of the news values found in the Spar broadcasts. (Where the Ogoniland broadcasts merely confirm the transferability of news values found in the Spar data, this is footnoted. Where they offer additional explanatory information, this is included in the main body of the text.) These findings on news values are triangulated through questionnaires and e-mail interviews with journalists.

¹ Dayan and Katz (1992: 5-7) describe media events as those which interrupt routine broadcasting, typically broadcast live and covered by all stations.

4.2 Induced and deduced News Values

4.2.1 Professional news values²

Chapter 2 cites much research on the media's claim to present a mirror of reality in their objective and accurate reports of the world. Empirical study of news reports should therefore find the categories of revealing new information ("mirroring" the real world); exposing problems/ revealing malpractice (seeking to mirror all aspects of the world); objectivity and accuracy. These are described here by the category of "professional" news values.

4.2.1.1 Professional news value: new information

State-authorized broadcasting corporations are expected to behave informatively (Golding & Elliott, 1996: 407). News stories need fresh, new information in order to survive (Palmer, 1994; Schlesinger, 1978/1987: 101). New information, as a news value, is confirmed by journalists' questionnaire responses. For instance, "*News is telling people what they didn't know before.*" *That Harry Evans' definition and he's dead right,*" (Television news editor, questionnaire response, April 2000).

As expected, the news value of new information was apparent in the Spar story, which was broadcast almost every week for the duration of Greenpeace's seven-week campaign (30th April 1995 - 21st June 1995), and in the following 4 months on certain days. All news broadcasts had some new information to reveal.³ Thus, there was national television evening news coverage on the following dates:

- 30th April: the Spar's occupation by Greenpeace;
- 13th May: Shell's legal attack on the Spar's occupiers;
- 23rd May: Greenpeace's eviction from the Spar;
- 24th May: Greenpeace's legal challenge to deep-sea disposal;

² See Appendix 2, Tables 1 and 2 for the full list of concepts, sub-themes and themes relating to the main theme of "professional news values".

³ The Ogoniland issue verified the existence of "new information" as a transferable concept.

- 15th June: Chancellor Kohl's raising of the Spar issue at the G7 meeting;
- 16th June: Greenpeace's re-occupation of the Spar; and boycotts and firebombing of Shell petrol stations in Germany;
- 17th June: Greenpeace's picketing of Shell-UK petrol stations;
- 20th June: Greenpeace's helicopter drop of two more activists onto the Spar, Greenpeace's leaking of a government memo claiming that the Spar was toxic; and Shell's "U-turn", where it agreed to cancel the deep-sea disposal;
- 21st June: Shell's apology to the British Government for its U-turn;
- 5th September: Greenpeace's apology to Shell for its mistake about the Spar's toxicity;
- 11th October: Shell's launching of its open consultation on the Spar's future.

Thus, new information was forthcoming, mirroring certain events and keeping the Spar in the news. But what is the nature of this new information, and did any of it arise from journalists shining a torch into darkened areas?

4.2.1.2 Professional news value: watchdog (negativity)

The watchdog news value is a core journalistic aspiration: "*C.P.Scott said "opinions are cheap, facts are sacred". Slightly wrong - facts are expensive. All journalism should be investigative - too little of it is,"* (Television news editor, questionnaire response, April 2000).⁴ Another widely acknowledged western news value is that of negativity (for instance, Gans, 1979; Galtung and Ruge, 1973, 1965), but as Bell (1991: 156) argues little explanation is offered as to why. It is argued here that one reason for the prevalence of negativity is its association with the professional news value of watchdog, in informing the public of problems and malpractice.

To take the sub-category of **identifying problems** first, the discovery of plans that could lead to environmental damage should appeal to watchdog norms. In the Spar issue, the predominant concept within the sub-category of identifying problems is that "deep-sea disposal is bad". For

⁴ Also see Eide and Knight (1999: 526).

instance: “*The rig was occupied three weeks ago in protest at Shell’s plans to dump it in the Atlantic,*” (presenter, Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 23rd May 1995). On the day of the U-turn, problems with the next line of action - onshore disposal - were then presented: “*...but the biggest problems are yet to come: how to get the rig safely ashore. According to Shell, two storage tanks are split and the whole structure has been over-stressed,*” (reporter, Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 21st June 1995).⁵

Lowe and Morrison (1984: 78) claim that even allowing for the special position of the negative within news stories in general, it is especially difficult to feature the positive within environmental reporting. In order to test this claim, the Spar news broadcasts were scrutinised for identification of solutions rather than problems. Table 4.1 shows that there were many more broadcasts identifying problems than solutions. This watchdog attribute, however, mainly appears to lie in the initial “*alarmed discovery stage*” (Downs, 1972: 30), as most of the news broadcasts on the Spar issue came during Greenpeace's intensive seven-week campaign, rapidly tailing off after the U-turn, although a solution for the Spar's disposal had not yet been found.

Table 4.1 Number of broadcasts identifying problems and solutions in the Spar national television evening news broadcasts (30th April – 11th October 1995)

PROBLEMS	Number of broadcasts	SOLUTIONS	Number of broadcasts
Deep-sea disposal is bad	27	Deep-sea disposal is good	3
Why deep-sea disposal is bad	13	Deep-sea disposal may be good	3
Onshore disposal is difficult/dangerous	10	Onshore disposal/ recycling is good	2
The best solution (deep-sea disposal) has been repudiated	10	It is possible/likely that a solution will be found	6
Ineffectual leaders, managers & pressure groups	13	Temporary solution found	1
Total	73	Total	15

⁵ The sub-category of "identifying problems" is verified by the Ogoniland issue.

Another sub-category of the news value of watchdog is "revealing malpractice." Murphy (1976) argues that an investigative story should reveal suppressed malpractice by those in authority, defined in terms of their own norms.

Within the seven-week Spar campaign, it is only on the day of the U-turn and the following day that the issue of malpractice regarding the Spar is addressed, covering the following concepts:

- Governmental malpractice and government-industry conspiracy: "*The triumph came after Greenpeace released details of a leaked memo in which it was claimed that government scientists had two years ago been opposed to the sinking of the Brent Spar,*" (reporter, Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 20th June 1995).
- Business' malpractice: "*Greenpeace activists who occupied the Brent Spar claim Shell's stand-by vessels deliberately trained water canons on them to knock them off the structure,*" (presenter, BBC1 "Reporting Scotland", 21st June 1995).
- Greenpeace's malpractice: "*But the flair for a photogenic stunt has also earned Greenpeace a reputation for overlooking scientific fact if it spoils a good story,*" (reporter, BBC1 9.00pm News, 21st June 1995).⁶

Quantitatively, the pro-Greenpeace version prevails in the television news sample (i.e. malpractice by Shell, the UK Government and scientists).

However, in the Spar broadcasts, much of this "revealing malpractice" does not come through investigative journalism, but through journalists publicising information volunteered by Greenpeace (who leaked the memo revealing government-industry conspiracy; and who made claims about Shell's treatment of the Greenpeace activists on the Spar). When asked why this was the case, one journalist replied: "*sloppy, spoon-fed journalism,*" (Jon Snow, Presenter, Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, questionnaire response, April 2000). This observation tallies with Parlour & Schatzow's (1978) study of environmental news coverage in Canada (1960-72), that due to resource shortages, the media relied heavily on: "*information received from secondary*

⁶ The sub-category of "revealing malpractice" is verified in the Ogoniland broadcasts, the most prevalent concept being "Nigerian government malpractice".

sources which may have been far from impartial in deciding what, how and in what form information should be communicated," (ibid.: 12).

In such situations, the credibility of the source is paramount. The characteristics of a good source were described by one broadcast journalist as: *"Proven reliability, openness, and transparency of motive."* (television news editor, questionnaire response, April 2000).

Broadcast journalists contacted differed in their opinions of Greenpeace's credibility, with responses ranging from: "8/10" (ibid.) to *"not very credible* (anonymous broadcast journalist, Ogoniland issue, questionnaire response, April 2000) and *"...any publication of their opinion or use of information and footage given out by them must be given a strong health warning and treated with respect because of its origin,"* (Tim Lambon, Freelance producer, editor and cameraman to US and UK networks, e-mail interview, 21st February 2000). Given this mixed assessment of Greenpeace's credibility, why did a pro-Greenpeace version of "revealing malpractice" dominate the news? The answer may lie in the fact that it is only at the height of the televisual discussion regarding the Spar (the day of the U-turn and the following day) that the news value of revealing malpractice (as it relates to the issue of the Spar) is displayed at all. Confinement of this news value to this short time period is not driven by prior absence of Greenpeace's claims regarding malpractice. On the contrary, before the U-turn, seven Greenpeace press releases variously reported violence against Greenpeace activists; Shell misinformation regarding Brent Spar; and Spar-related environmental data ignored by Shell and its allies. It is possible that these press releases were ignored until the U-turn because Shell's capitulation signaled that Greenpeace's allegations were true, hence increasing Greenpeace's credibility on this issue.

The other instances of revealing malpractice (i.e. Greenpeace's malpractice) demonstrated journalists' critical attitude rather than investigative journalism, since the line of investigation relies on accepted journalistic "truths": for instance, the questioning of Greenpeace's scientific credibility has a long history.

Thus, the news value of revealing malpractice appears to be linked to receiving new information from credible sources; or arising from widely-held journalistic "truths". This suggests that the operation of this news value is constrained by journalists' lack of time and resources - a point reinforced by contact with journalists, who cited the following constraints to performing their job:

- "*Time and money for filming abroad*" (anonymous broadcast journalist, Ogoniland issue, questionnaire response, April 2000).

- " ... *on a daily television news programme one seldom has the time for serious investigative journalism - even less so in 24hr television news. The beast just has to be fed and that doesn't allow time to dig up the details,*" (Tim Lambon, Freelance producer, editor and cameraman to US and UK networks, e-mail interview, 21st February 2000).

Given that the news value of watchdog, and in particular "revealing malpractice" is largely dependent on credible sources supplying journalists with information, this prompts the question: how objectively was information reported?

4.2.1.3 Professional news value: objectivity and impartiality

Chapter 2 discusses at length the problems with the concept of objectivity. Despite these problems, it is a news value endorsed by journalists. In response to a question about the role of journalists in setting society's agenda, one journalist replied: "*I write news. I don't set agendas, or at least not deliberately,*" (Fred Pearce, Environment Consultant, New Scientist, questionnaire response, March 2000). Another replied: "*I don't think we set society's agenda, but certainly our coverage of it changes people's perceptions and can lead to the agenda modifying itself. We only really report what society sees itself as,*" (Tim Lambon, Freelance producer, editor and cameraman to US and UK networks, e-mail interview, 21st February 2000).

Impartiality is less difficult to operationalise, and is expressed in the BBC via a balancing of competing definitions of problems and the truth and the interviewing of opposing spokesmen (Schlesinger, 1978/1987: 171). As the BBC news guide explains: "*The BBC has no editorial opinions of its own. It has an obligation not to take sides; a duty to reflect all main views on a given issue,*" (cited in Boyd, 1988: 160). This drive for impartiality was expressed by journalists contacted. One described the following measures taken to prevent interest groups' attempted manipulation of the news agenda: "*Never rely on one account of events*", (anonymous broadcast journalist, Ogoniland issue, questionnaire response, April 2000).

In order to measure whether the news is impartial (using the BBC's definition - the balancing of competing definitions), a content analysis was conducted on the Spar broadcasts to see whose world-view was promulgated - Greenpeace's or Shell's.⁷ Table 4.2 shows that throughout the seven-week campaign, the visual balance favours Greenpeace in that Greenpeace videos are broadcast. Several months later the visual balance favours Shell, showing positive images, such as fish swimming in the sea (to illuminate Shell's "rigs-to-reefs" disposal option - i.e. sinking the rig in shallow water); and Shell's Conference (called to find a solution to the Spar's disposal) displaying a banner: "*Brent Spar The way ahead*" (BBC1 9.00pm News, 11th October 1995). In terms of the verbal balance during the seven-week campaign, most broadcasts were either balanced or pro-Greenpeace: pro-Shell broadcasts did not appear until the day before the U-turn, and predominated thereafter.

⁷ A content analysis was conducted on all the complete Spar broadcasts sampled, with the unit of counting being a statement (concept) promulgating or repudiating the world-view of Greenpeace or Shell. The following types of statement were each classified as a pro-Greenpeace instance to be counted: a pro-Greenpeace action, a pro-Greenpeace aim, a pro-Greenpeace opinion, a reason for these pro-Greenpeace actions/aims/opinions, and a pro-Greenpeace visual image (for instance, from their VNRs, or an image supporting their world-view). A distinction was made between counting statements (concepts) that were reported, those directly uttered by actors in interviews, and visuals. A verbally balanced broadcast was classified as one where Greenpeace's and its opponent's world-views were promulgated an equal number of times. A visually balanced broadcast was one where there was an equal number of pro-Greenpeace and pro-Shell images (length of time that the visual was shown was not considered). Although this is a reductive way of measuring balance, it is used here as an approximation of the assessment of impartiality used by journalists themselves (i.e. are opposing sides accessed equally?).

Table 4.2 Extent of balance in Spar television news broadcasts (30th April -11th October 1995)

Pro-Greenpeace visually	Pro-Greenpeace verbally	Balanced visually	Balanced verbally	Pro-Shell visually	Pro-Shell verbally
ITN 30 th April	ITN 30 th April				
BBC1 Regional, 15 th May			BBC1 Regional 15 th May		
	Ch4 15 th May	Ch4 15 th May			
BBC1 Regional, 22 nd May	BBC1 Regional, 22 nd May				
BBC1 22 nd May			BBC1 22 nd May		
Ch4, 23 rd May			Ch4, 23 rd May		
ITN regional, 24 th May	ITN regional, 24 th May				
	Ch4, 15 th Jun	Ch4, 15 th Jun			
BBC1, 16 th Jun	BBC1, 16 th Jun				
BBC2, 16 th Jun	BBC2, 16 th Jun				
ITN, 16 th Jun			ITN, 16 th Jun		
Ch4, 16 th Jun 1995	Ch4, 16 th Jun 1995				
BBC Regional, 16 th Jun	BBC Regional, 16 th Jun				
ITN, 17 th Jun			ITN, 17 th Jun		
Ch4, 17 th Jun			Ch4, 17 th Jun		
BBC1, 19 th Jun					BBC1, 19 th Jun
Ch4, 19 th Jun			Ch4, 19 th Jun		
BBC1, 20 th Jun			BBC1, 20 th Jun		
BBC2, 20 th Jun					BBC2, 20 th Jun
ITN, 20 th Jun					ITN, 20 th Jun
Ch4, 20 th Jun	Ch4, 20 th Jun				
BBC1, 21 st Jun					BBC1, 21 st Jun
				ITN, 21 st Jun	ITN, 21 st Jun
	Ch4, 21 st Jun			Ch4, 21 st Jun	
BBC1 Regional, 23 rd Sep					BBC1 Regional, 23 rd Sep
		BBC1, 11 th Oct			BBC1, 11 th Oct
				ITN, 11 th Oct	ITN, 11 th Oct
				Ch4, 11 th Oct	Ch4, 11 th Oct

It is notable that broadcasters generally try to ensure equal access to the two opposing sides.

For instance, where one side is given more interview space than the other, this is usually

compensated by greater attempts by the reporter to explain the other side, (such as in BBC1 9.00pm News, 20th June 1995). Another device is to ask more "loaded" or aggressive questions of the side receiving greater broadcast attention. For instance, in ITN Regional News, 24th May 1995, the reporter counters Greenpeace's Jan Rispens' description about the danger faced by Greenpeace activists on the Spar when repelling Shell's boarding party as follows:

Jan Rispens: " *The crane driver simply bashed the basket into our people which was quite dangerous, I think.*"

Reporter: "*What about the people in the basket? Weren't they in some danger as well as you tried to push...?*"

The reporter quickly follows the response to this question with another charged question: "*You were on the rig but Shell have now begun to scuttle it, so do you think the occupation was a bit of a waste of time? Have you failed in what you were trying to achieve?*"

However, sometimes there is total lack of balance regarding interviews with authoritative expert opinion. A pro-Shell scientist was interviewed without a parallel pro-Greenpeace scientific view (either interviewed or referred to in any form) several times. For instance, ITN 10.00pm News, 16th June 1995 interviewed only the pro-Shell Dr. Tony Rice, Institute of Oceanographic studies.

In the Ogoniland issue, three broadcasts were chosen to examine the transferability of the news value of objectivity. Those chosen were BBC daytime news, 31st October 1995, BBC1 6.00pm News, 2nd November 1995 and Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 13th November 1995. This sample choice was dictated by the expectation that after Saro-Wiwa's execution (10th November 1995), broadcasts would be less balanced than before the execution (the search for the negative case). It was found that whereas all three news programmes broadcast both sides of the human rights issue, content analysis⁸ showed that they favoured Greenpeace verbally and visually or were

⁸ The unit of counting was a concept/ statement promulgating or repudiating the world-view of Greenpeace, Shell, MOSOP and the Nigerian Regime.

anti-Nigerian regime (see Table 4.3). This suggests that Greenpeace's world-view was accepted by journalists - unsurprisingly since much of Greenpeace's message concerned an issue of basic human rights.⁹

Table 4.3 Extent of balance in 3 selected Ogoniland television news broadcasts (1995)

Aspect of balance examined	Broadcast
Pro-Green-peace visually	BBC1 6.00pm News, 2 nd Nov. Channel 4 News, 7.00pm 13 th Nov.
Pro-Green-peace verbally	BBC1 6.00pm News, 2 nd Nov. Channel 4 News, 7.00pm 13 th Nov.
Anti-Greenpeace visually	
Anti-Greenpeace verbally	
Pro-Shell visually	
Pro-Shell verbally	
Anti-Shell visually	
Anti-Shell verbally	
Pro-MOSOP visually	
Pro-MOSOP verbally	
Anti-MOSOP visually	
Anti-MOSOP verbally	
Pro-Nigerian regime visually	
Pro-Nigerian regime verbally	
Anti-Nigerian regime visually	
Anti-Nigerian regime verbally	BBC daytime news, 31 st Oct.

Thus, balance is a strongly held aim of broadcasters, which is sometimes, but not always achieved, particularly not visually. It is affected by the extent to which a credible source can supply information, access to the opposing side, and the extent to which the issue accords with the journalists' own values.

4.2.1.4 Professional news value: facticity

The news value of facticity (Tuchman, 1978) - the degree to which a story contains facts - is partly motivated by the potentially libelous situation arising from transmitting inaccurate information (Bell, 1991: 158). Thus, allied with facticity is the news value of accuracy.¹⁰

However, not only must journalists be accurate, they must be *perceived* by their audience to be accurate. Two main authenticating devices were found in the Spar news broadcasts.

⁹ This is similar to the news value of "consonance" (Galtung & Ruge, 1973).

¹⁰ See the National Union for Journalists' code of professional conduct (cited in Boyd, 1988: 171).

One such device is to use quotes, interviews or testimonial visual footage¹¹ since these are **first-hand statements/evidence** about the real world, or about actors' views. This authenticating device, however, can backfire. In the Spar broadcasts, actors' views were accurately reported, but in doing so, factually inaccurate information about the real world was sometimes transmitted. The main inaccuracy was over the location of the Spar's deep-sea disposal site. Although broadcasters always (correctly) referred to the disposal site as the "Atlantic", the "ocean" or the "seas", inaccurate information came through visuals of Greenpeace's banner on the Spar, reading: "*Save the North Sea*" (for instance, ITN 10.00pm News, 30th April 1995); and through translations of statements by "authoritative actors":

"... Germany's Helmut Kohl has come in here saying he has something of a bone to pick with Mr. Major insisting that the British Government should not allow the Shell oil company to sink that oil platform, the Brent Spar, out in the North Sea," (Channel 4 news, 7.00pm, 15th June 1995).¹²

A second authenticating device is to use or quote sources that are deemed credible through their knowledge of the issue in question. This knowledge can be acquired through first-hand experience, such as by being witnesses to an event. For instance, motorists were interviewed for their opinions on whether or not they would boycott Shell (Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 17th June 1995). Another way of acquiring knowledge is through professional experience - hence interviews with scientists on scientific matters,¹³ PR experts on PR matters¹⁴ etc. This ties in with Bell's (1991: 158) news value of "*attribution*" where, in order to be viewed as credible, sources must be affiliated with some organisation or institution. It also ties in with the

¹¹ Testimonial visual footage is important in providing the "*reality effect*" of television news - that "*seeing is believing*" (Philo, 1996:448). Also see Fiske (1987) and Brunson and Morley (1978/1996).

¹² This statement was ambiguous: it could (accurately) imply that the Spar was currently located in the North Sea, or it could (inaccurately) imply that the North Sea was where the Spar would be sunk.

¹³ For instance, Tony Rice, Institute of Oceanographic science: BBC1 9.00pm News, 19th June 1995.

¹⁴ For instance, Stephen Farish, Editor of PR Week: Channel 4 News, 7.00pm 20th June 1995.

conclusion of many media sociologists, that news is what an authoritative source tells a journalist (see GUMG, 1980; Gans, 1979; Tuchman, 1978).¹⁵

In addition to professional news values elaborated above, some news values arise from the nature of the media's time and space constraints - "logistical news values".

4.2.2 Logistical news values¹⁶

In television news there is a pre-eminent concern with "logistics", i.e. "*the mechanics of the thing, getting the stuff in*" (Schlesinger, 1978/1987: 51). News must be made easily accessible to journalists because of resource constraints¹⁷ and the drive to minimise costs: " ... *it all costs money and the channel inevitably wants maximum bang for its buck and a limited amount of bucks per programme,*" (Tim Lambon, Freelance producer, editor and cameraman to US and UK networks, e-mail interview, 21st February 2000). Furthermore, television news as a finished product is subject to time constraints¹⁸ (see Table 4.4 below), so the news must lend itself to succinct presentation - producing news values of **simplification and symbolisation**. Given that television news is broadcast at least several times daily, another main logistical news value is **event orientation** - where the outcome is prioritised over the action or process, so allowing news to be more easily updated hourly (Bell, 1991: 153).

Table 4.4 Length of television evening news broadcasts dealing with the Brent Spar issue (30th April - 11th October 1995)

Length (minutes)	< 0.5	0.5 - 1	1-2	2-3	3-4	4-5	5-6	6-7	7-8	8-9	9 - 10	10 - 15	15 - 20
No. of national broadcasts	5	0	1	8	2	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	2
No. of regional broadcasts	4			1	1	1							

¹⁵ In the Ogoniland issue the chosen broadcasts showed the full range of authenticating devices found in the Spar analysis.

¹⁶ See Appendix 2, Tables 3 and 4 for the full list of concepts, sub-themes and themes relating to the main theme of "logistical news values".

¹⁷ See Greenberg et al. (1989: 268). The news gathering process involves deploying reporting staff and technical resources like camera crews and outside broadcast vehicles (Schlesinger, 1978/1987: 51).

¹⁸ The modal length of time for Spar national news broadcasts is 2 - 3 minutes (supporting the findings of Heinderyckx (1993: 425-450)).

4.2.2.1 Logistical news value: accessibility to journalists

Accessibility to journalists comprises the extent to which information is made easily available to journalists. One aspect to this is whether the information comes in a ready-packaged form - the news value of “prefabrication” (Bell, 1991: 159-160).¹⁹ Press releases are now accompanied by radio and video news releases (VNRs) - a practice that took hold during the 1980s (Stauber & Rampton, 1995: 184). As Lambon explains:

"The biggest time and cost saving device to get a story on air is to use someone else's footage. When garnered from a reliable agency such as Reuters or APTV, then this is usually incorporated in the piece without any ado, but VNR footage from corporations or lobby groups is and should be labelled as such," (Tim Lambon, Freelance producer, editor and cameraman to US and UK networks, e-mail interview, 21st February 2000).

In the Spar campaign, Greenpeace maximised its accessibility to journalists, given that the only available point of access for the BBC journalist covering the incident at sea was the Greenpeace ship. Greenpeace recognised that: *"the more vocal and better organised an environmental lobbying organisation, the more likely it is to be used as a contact for comment and footage,"* (ibid.). Greenpeace spent about £ 350,000 on television equipment and feeds, *'many times what a news organisation could devote'* (Richard Sambrook, news-editor of BBC Newsgathering, cited in Thorncroft, 1995: 6). Greenpeace employed its own photographer and cameraman to capture vital images; and the Spar occupants had satellite telephones and a computer that downloaded visuals to a media base in Frankfurt. Greenpeace sent out 42 press releases on the Spar issue from 30th April - 11th October 1995, whilst also circulating the campaign on the Internet. This latter point is important given that all journalists contacted in this study heavily use the internet as a resource: *"because there's masses of stuff there and environmentalists' lobby is particularly well-versed in using it,"* (Jon Snow, Presenter, Channel 4 News, 7.00pm,

¹⁹ Golding & Elliott (1996: 406) describe two related news values: “*prominence*” - i.e. to what extent the event is known to the news organisation and how obviously it has made itself apparent: and “*ease of capture*” - i.e. is the event physically accessible and manageable technically in a form amenable to journalism?

questionnaire response, April 2000). Thus, Greenpeace maximised the publicity potential of the Spar issue.

Shell, by contrast, did not appear to want this issue to reach the public eye. Apart from their initial press release on 16th February 1995, when Shell-UK announced the DTI's approval of deepwater disposal, they did not start issuing press releases until 16 days after Greenpeace's first press release, in total releasing only 18 press releases from 30th April – 11th October 1995. For much of the seven-week campaign, Shell gave few television interviews, unlike Greenpeace. It did not circulate its campaign on the Internet until long after its U-turn (see Shell press release, 22nd March 1996).

All television evening news items on the Spar took some information from Greenpeace and Shell press releases. Information that was broadcast but not taken from press releases consisted of either recent action or reaction.²⁰

A second aspect of accessibility to journalists is **temporal proximity**²¹ and the related aspect of **predictability** (Bell, 1991: 159). Timing of press releases, and publicisation of availability for interview, can be instrumental in determining media coverage (White et al., 1993: 29). There is evidence in the press releases of the heralding of future events, some of which were subsequently broadcast. Another aspect of temporal proximity, noted by Molotch and Lester (1975) is that news must be recent, due to the "scoop" mentality. Indeed, one of the strengths of broadcasting is its ability to follow events as they unfold (Boyd, 1988: 68). Accordingly, the Spar broadcasts showed that, although the news would refer back to events in the past, the event which initiated the bulletin was never more than a day old.²²

²⁰ The concept of prefabrication was transferable to the Ogoniland issue.

²¹ The earlier a story breaks before a bulletin goes on air, the more chance an editor has of arranging coverage (Golding, 1997: 250-251; Schlesinger, 1996: 417, 1978: 60; Venables, 1993: 9).

²² This is related to Galtung & Ruge's (1973) news value of "*frequency*".

A third aspect of accessibility to journalists is **inertia**:²³ lack of resources and time may well lead the media to “run with” a story. A fourth aspect of accessibility to journalists is **geographic proximity**. Due to the limited supply of reporters and technical resources such as camera crews, it is easier to report stories in urbanised, developed countries than in rural, less-developed countries, so producing an orientation towards elite nations, areas and people (Schlesinger, 1978/1987: 51; Galtung & Ruge, 1973). As Lambon observes:

"Budgets are also part of the conundrum of what to broadcast. Things which may be important, but which would require expensive travel and crew hire etc, will be covered from agency footage and as such be relegated to the short news items on the News Belt unless they are of absolutely mind numbing importance." (Tim Lambon, Freelance producer, editor and cameraman to US and UK networks, e-mail interview, 21st February 2000).

Geographic proximity is evidenced in the Spar issue by the constant referral to comments from Westminster during the U-turn; and in the Ogoniland issue by constant referral to comments from to the UK Government and the CHOGM in Auckland, New Zealand.

4.2.2.2 Logistical news value: simplification and symbolisation

Making the message clear and easily understood helps combat the lack of scientific know-how amongst the population. One broadcast journalist's response to the question "*how do you try to maximise the story's relevance to the public?*" was "*simplifying it*" (Jon Snow, Presenter, Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, questionnaire response, April 2000). **Simplification** is also encouraged by limitations in prime public space (see Heinderyckx, 1993) and individual attention spans (Golding & Elliott, 1996: 408). This helps explain the constant search for the “sound-bite” (a short phrase that sums up the essence of the argument) or a **symbolising** image. A factor minimising the use of scientists as sources is that their "*answers are inevitably*

²³ Galtung & Ruge (1973: 65) term this news value "*continuation*".

too intricate and lengthy," (Tim Lambon, Freelance producer, editor and cameraman to US and UK networks, e-mail interview, 21st February 2000).

It was found that the Spar issue was simplified and symbolised as a battle between Greenpeace and Shell. A variation on this battle theme was "David and Goliath" symbolisation. For instance: "*The oil giant Shell say they will waste no time evicting Greenpeace protesters from the Brent Spar installation.*" Visual: Greenpeace video of tiny activists scaling the large Brent Spar (presenter, BBC1 Regional News, 15th May 1995).

The Spar itself became a symbol of corporate social irresponsibility. John Wybrew, Shell-UK Planning and Public Affairs Director concluded: "*Greenpeace had acted as a catalyst and made deepwater disposal a symbol of man's misuse of the clean seas,*" (Shell-UK Limited, 1995c). This symbol was found in television evening news, for instance, Greenpeace's banner on the Spar: "*Stop Shell Now. Greenpeace*" (Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 15th May 1995). A ramification of this simplification and symbolisation process is that complex ideas do not get much of a hearing. Instead, pressure groups work hard at providing symbols that convey the essence of their message.

4.2.2.3 Logistical news value: event orientation

Event orientation is apparent, where each new broadcast further unfolded the story by reporting on a new event.²⁴ However, there is usually some reference back to the reason for the campaign and the background to the event being reported. Sometimes this was very rudimentary (coded as "basic contextualisation"). Greater contextualisation occurred in two ways, the first being through linked items - the news value of co-optation (Bell, 1991: 159; see Worcester, 1996: 27). In the Spar issue, examples of linked items are: Greenpeace's past campaigns (BBC1 Regional News, 22nd May 1995); and the economic impact of oil exploitation (Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 16th June 1995). Here, the Spar-related events are used

²⁴ The news value of event orientation is transferable to the Ogoniland issue.

as a “news peg” on which to hang other items.²⁵ The second mechanism of greater contextualisation is through context (background information) given within the news item. In the seven-week Spar campaign, context was given regarding reasons for Shell’s disposal plans, Greenpeace’s campaign, Shell’s U-turn and the future disposal of oil rigs.

It is instructive to see how the news broadcasts reported the Spar issue some months after Shell’s U-turn. Explanations of why Shell planned to dispose of the Spar in the ocean, and why Greenpeace was opposed to this, stopped after the U-turn, so corroborating the later remark of Peter Melchett, Executive Director of Greenpeace UK: *“as often happens with our campaigns, the historical context in which we work was ignored by all those looking at things in a much more short-term framework”* (Consequences of the Brent Spar Victory, <http://www.greenpeace.org/~comms/brent/index.html>, September 1999).

Television evening news, therefore, is event-oriented. Although it tries to contextualise enough for viewers to understand that there is an unfolding story, the reasoning behind this story is often omitted, or highly summarised. The lack of air-time in television news is often cited as reason for the limited contextual information promulgated. As Andrew Veitch notes:

“On Channel 4 News we get maybe eight minutes to do a long piece. In that time, if you can’t express an issue, you’re not a good journalist. I think if you’re doing a shorter piece of one and a half minutes - a normal news length piece - it’s more than hard to do it,” (Veitch, Science correspondent, Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, interview on “Costing the Earth”, Radio 4, 23rd October 1996).

However, in the Spar issue, the ability to contextualise was only rudimentally connected with the broadcast's length. Although all items that were less than 30 seconds long were “basically

²⁵ The news value of co-optation is transferable to the Ogoniland issue, where linked items extended to the reception of the issue of French nuclear testing at the CHOGM; and the success of past sanctions against different countries.

contextualised", some items that were only marginally longer than 30 seconds managed to give greater context. For instance, Chancellor Kohl's request at the G7 Summit to prevent the deep-sea disposal is quickly contextualised by the information that people in Germany are angry, and that this was a significant issue (Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 15th June 1995). Furthermore, news items that were 2 - 3 minutes long did not necessarily give more contextualisation. For instance, about half the news item on Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 23rd May 1995 is given over to the (visual) details of Shell boarding the Spar, resulting in only basic contextualisation (i.e. a simplified version of Shell's disposal plans, and the precedent it set).

This suggests that there are additional, non-logistical, reasons for event-orientation and variations in contextualisation, leading to a third type of news value - audience-maximising news values.

4.2.3 Audience-maximising news values²⁶

Audience-maximising news values are those arising from the need to attract and maintain audiences. All media must ultimately justify their existence in terms of profits, sales or audience ratings.²⁷ Yet, broadcasters have little detailed knowledge of the audience and its interests. Questionnaire responses from journalists indicated that audience interest is ascertained crudely through the use of BARB ratings. Determining what the public should know about - the "public interest" - is ascertained by: "*intuition, I suspect*" (Jon Snow, Presenter, Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, questionnaire response, April 2000). One response to the question "*how do you try to maximise the story's relevance to the public*" was "*I regard myself as a member of the public*" (Television news editor, questionnaire response, April 2000). This lack of any real knowledge of the audience (beyond ratings figures or journalistic intuition) leads Boyd (1988: 169) to suggest that this can create pressure to pander to the lowest, mass-

²⁶ See Appendix 2, Tables 5 and 6 for the full list of concepts, sub-themes and themes relating to the main theme of "audience-maximising news values".

²⁷ Boyd-Barrett & Rantanen (2000: 97); Neveu (1999: 380); Jacobs (1996: 385); Ehrlich (1995/1997); Downs (1991, 31); Manheim (1991: 19); Wallis and Baran (1990: 7); Gans (1979: 214); and Murphy (1976: 21).

market-oriented, public taste for fear that audiences or advertisers will desert the station. This research identifies two main audience-maximising news values - **copying the competition** (for fear of losing market share) and **entertainment** (to attract and maintain audience share).

4.2.3.1 Audience-maximising news value: Copying the competition

Dearing & Rogers (1996: 33) argue that given the daily cross-checking by editors at different media organisations, there is a high degree of similarity between how they cover an issue.²⁸

This is confirmed by contact with broadcast journalists, most of whom said that they "*continuously*" monitored what other news organisations were doing (questionnaires, March-April 2000). In response to the question: "*what is the starting point for creating the news agenda at the beginning of the day*", responses generally referred to other media. For instance: - "*Last night's TV/radio, today's papers and wires and diary,*" (Jon Snow, Presenter, Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, questionnaire response, April 2000).

- "*When the editor wakes up and listens to the 7am bulletin on Radio 4 after scratching his crotch,*" (television news editor, questionnaire response, April 2000).

Mathes and Pfetsch (1991: 36) use the term "*reciprocal co-orientation*" to describe how the media influence each other, with certain prestigious media functioning as media opinion leaders).²⁹ Unfortunately, a "follow-my-leader" strategy can emerge, where there is hesitation to carry something that the opposition has missed or turned down. This homogenisation is accompanied by a concentration on style rather than substance (Gans, 1979), with originality in details rather than in whole stories (Tunstall, 1971: 209, 212). Lambon notes that:

"Its seldom that a news programme manages to break away from these [news values] - and even C4N's [Channel 4 News] attempt in the last few years has actually changed little. It's just changed the style, not the content vis-à-vis the stories covered and the news mix, (Tim

²⁸ See Cottle (2000: 434) for citations. Also see Altheide (1995); Ettema et al. (1987/1997: 35) and Tunstall (1971: 209).

²⁹ The direction of influence between media is unclear from past research (for instance, see Palmer, 1995; Anderson, 1993: 58 and Tunstall, 1971).

Lambon, Freelance producer, editor and cameraman to US and UK networks, e-mail interview, 21st February 2000).

There are two main explanations for reciprocal co-orientation - one is supply-led and the other stems from journalists' lack of knowledge about the audience. The supply-led explanation is strong, related to the logistical news value of accessibility.

"The competition is there, but not keenly felt except in the field and then very seldom - the technology and professional associations (i.e. C4N and ITN share material with ZDF, ABC (America) and CNN, and our stuff can be picked up by both the agencies) are great equalisers and just about everyone gets the story now. The only edge can be the angle and possibly unique access or interviews," (ibid.).

The explanation for reciprocal co-orientation stemming from journalists' lack of knowledge about the audience is that news broadcasters actively copy each other for fear of losing audience share to other channels in a highly competitive market. Where there is little real knowledge about what the audience considers important, this orientation of colleagues with respect to other media offers a replacement for the lack of audience contact (Mathes and Pfetsch, 1991). This interpretation is reinforced by Lambon's response to the question "*How does your organisation decide what constitutes the 'public interest'?*"

"“Public interest” is gauged by the editorial team. Personally I think this is quite incestuous because we all read the same newspapers, magazines and watch the same coverage on other nets before deciding what’s going to be on the agenda," (Tim Lambon, Freelance producer, editor and cameraman to US and UK networks, e-mail interview, 21st February 2000)

Examination of the Spar data found much repetition between news broadcasts on different channels. For instance, the Spar issue reached the status of a "*media event*" (Dayan and Katz,

1992) on the occasion of the U-turn (being reported on all four evening news programmes, with a live-link up to Shell's press conference in Channel 4 News, 7.00pm). The supply-led argument - that these news programmes used the same sources out of convenience (the logistical news value of accessibility) - can be seen in the Spar data, where the information that was repeated generally originated in Greenpeace or Shell press releases; statements (such as Shell-UK's apology to the Prime Minister); or interviews with the same people (for instance, BBC1 9.00pm News, ITN 10.00pm News and Channel 4 News, 7.00pm all interviewed Jens Stoltenberg, Norway's Energy Minister, who stated Norway's position on sheltering the Spar over winter).

In order to ascertain whether copying the competition was solely due to accessibility of sources, or whether it arose out of fear of losing audience share to other channels in a highly competitive market, evidence of individuality was sought - where the competition had not been copied despite the fact that the information was freely available in press releases. Instances of individuality are found. These instances fall into several patterns with plausible audience-maximising explanations (although the actual reasons cannot be ascertained without observing the editorial process).

Individuality was more apparent in regional news broadcasts than in national television news. For instance, only regional news reported support for Greenpeace from the EU's Environment Commissioner (BBC1 Regional News, 15th May 1995); and Greenpeace's claims of Shell's extreme violence towards activists,³⁰ as shown by the following extract:

Reporter: *"Today the Greenpeace climbers who occupied the Brent Spar insisted that those guiding the high pressure water canons on the installation had deliberately tried to hit them."*

Visual: Brent Spar being hosed by water canon.

³⁰ National news only broadcasts Shell's use of "reasonable" force against Greenpeace where this is sanctioned by the presence of police and sheriff officers - such as Shell's winching operation to forcibly remove activists from the Spar.

Al, Greenpeace-UK activist: *"At first it really seemed like they were intent on killing us, you know. It would blow you right across the deck and slam you against a wall,"* (BBC1 Reporting Scotland, 21st June 1995).

It is plausible to suggest that these examples of individuality can be explained by regional news' search for a different angle on a national news story, to maintain a regional audience whose attention has already been captured by national news reportage of the issue.

The more in-depth national news programmes on the Spar showed individuality in, for instance, covering Greenpeace's avoidance of legal injunctions (Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 15th May 1995); and Chancellor Kohl's request to Prime Minister John Major to stop the deep-sea disposal (Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 15th June 1995). None of these news items was longer than the average for prime-time television news, hence the fact that they were covered is not due to a larger news hole. A more plausible explanation is that Channel 4 News, 7.00pm caters for audiences who want more in-depth news with greater analytical power. This is confirmed by Lambon, who holds that the audience profile: *"indicates a level of intelligence in the average C4N viewer that would predicate a degree of education and awareness that would include interest in current issues of which the environment is one,"* (Tim Lambon, Freelance producer, editor and cameraman to US and UK networks, e-mail interview, 21st February 2000). Hence, individuality can be expected to be well-received among this audience.

News programmes with the largest audiences only displayed individuality in covering the Spar story if it was extremely dramatic and novel. The only two events which were covered by such a channel and not copied by another in the seven-week campaign were Greenpeace's occupation of the Spar for the first time (ITN 10.00pm News, 30th April 1995); and the details of the embarrassment caused to the Prime Minister by Shell's U-turn (ITN 10.00 News, 21st June 1995).

Evidence therefore indicates that individuality is only displayed in television news if the story being covered ranks highly in maintaining audience share in other ways (retaining interest for regional news; attracting analytically-oriented viewers for in-depth news; and attracting audiences through high entertainment value for prime-time news). Since individuality can be explained by maintaining audience share, it is likely that this is also a reason (although not the only reason) for copying the competition.

4.2.3.2 Audience-maximising news value: entertainment.

Entertainment is regarded as a prime news value.³¹ News values comprising the category of entertainment are: novelty, drama, visual appeal and human interest.

4.2.3.2.1 Audience-maximising news value: novelty

Related to the professional news value of “revealing new information” is the audience-maximising news value of novelty. Most stories require some novel element in order to lift them into news visibility.³² Novelty can be used in the sense of “*extraordinariness*” (Hall et al., 1978). Murphy (1976: 21) notes that this may be a new sort of event, an inversion of a normal event, or a jocular anecdote.

The Spar data revealed three concepts subsumed by the news value of novelty,³³ the first being that of an uncommon event. Situations can be uncommon at many levels, such as in terms of issues, actors, or presentation. One example is the unusual solutions offered for the Spar's disposal in Shell's open consultation - ranging from a floating casino (BBC1 9.00pm News, 11th October 1995) to someone offering a no-questions disposal in return for £50m (Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 11th October 1995).

³¹ See Chouliaraki (2000: 305); Golding & Elliott (1996: 407); Wallis & Baran (1990); Downs (1972).

³² Bell (1991: 157); Merrill (1983); Richstad & Anderson (1981); Murphy (1976: 21) and Molotch and Lester (1974: 108).

³³ These concepts were also apparent in the Ogoniland issue.

The second concept identified was that of inversion of a normal event. For example, Greenpeace's victory over Shell: *"Tonight Shell said its position had become untenable and it would now dispose of the platform onshore,"* (presenter: BBC1 9.00pm News, 20th June 1995). Here, the expected event was that Greenpeace's occupation would have no concrete results and that Shell would dispose of the Spar in the ocean, as planned. A related concept to "inversion of a normal event" is that of "farce". An example is the captain of Greenpeace's boat avoiding the sheriff's injunction by going *"on holiday"* (Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 15th May 1995).

4.2.3.2 Audience-maximising news value: drama

Drama is associated with Bell's (1991: 157) news value of "superlativeness".³⁴ Evidence of superlativeness was found in the Spar broadcasts, for instance: *"... half of Europe seems to be up in arms over the environmental consequences,"* (reporter, Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 16th June 1995). Superlativeness is also apparent in warnings of impending ecological disaster, which dramatically project urgency (Lowe and Goyder, 1983: 76), taking advantage of audience concern for the future (Cracknell, 1993). There were a number of statements in the Spar data implying that the U-turn had averted disaster, for instance:

"Will the Prime Minister tell us how the Government intends to stop the other 50 North Sea oil rigs awaiting disposal being similarly disposed of by dropping them into some vast underwater toxic scrap metal dump off the coast of Scotland?" (Paddy Ashdown, Liberal Democrat leader, speaking in the House of Commons, Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 20th June 1995).

Drama is often associated with the negative. This is because dramatic structure is often achieved by the presentation of conflict – most commonly by showing two opposing sides of the issue.³⁵ Conflict was the essence of this issue from the start of Greenpeace's campaign:

"13 Greenpeace shock troops took over the abandoned rig on May 1st. They planned to lock

³⁴ This is similar to Galtung and Ruge's (1973: 64) term of "threshold".

³⁵ See Golding & Elliott (1996: 406); Bell (1991: 156); Murphy (1976: 65); Epstein (1973: 168-9); Tunstall (1971: 20).

themselves into rooms, challenging Shell to tip the structure and tow it away while they're still inside," (reporter: Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 15th May 1995). The conflict was often dramatised by using metaphors of battle, so projecting importance and urgency, for instance: "*Greenpeace has planned this campaign with more than military precision*"(ibid.).

The risk involved in the conflict was used to highlight the drama:

- "*Greenpeace say they're ready to take risks if it can stop the dumping,*" (reporter, BBC1 Regional News, Reporting Scotland, 6.00pm, 22nd May 1995).

"Dodging water canons, two Greenpeace activists managed to board the container this afternoon," (presenter, BBC2 Newsnight, 16th June 1995).

Another dramatic and negative sub-theme is that of violence (Hall et al., 1978: 68; Murphy, 1976: 21; Tunstall, 1971: 20). In the first weeks of the Spar campaign, the concept of potential violence is aired: "*Shell says it will seek the court's approval before using force,*" (reporter, Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 15th May 1995). By week four, reports of violence are a regular feature of the Spar's coverage.

- Violence against Shell comes through Greenpeace resisting eviction from the Spar, such as a Greenpeace video of activists trying to repel police and Shell security staff being winched onto the Spar (Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 23rd May 1995); and through fire-bomb attacks on Shell petrol stations in Germany (BBC2 Newsnight, 16th June 1995).

- Violence against Greenpeace is reported more often, usually visually in the form of Shell aiming its water canons at the Spar, but occasionally verbally: "*At first it really seemed like they were intent on killing us, you know. It would blow you right across the deck and slam you against a wall,*" (Al, Greenpeace-UK activist: BBC1 Reporting Scotland, 21st June 1995).

Analysis of television news coverage of the Spar confirms the primacy of the news value of drama. Almost every news item revealed dramatising tendencies. The only exception was a "talking heads" piece on the issues of importance at the G7 Summit (Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 15th June 1995). Presumably, this was dealing with weighty enough issues (such as Bosnia and

the impending trade war between the US and Japan) and authoritative enough actors (the heads of the G7 states) to warrant news coverage without any other dramatic elements.³⁶

Some argue that drama is a primary news value in environmental stories because they are intrinsically dramatic (Einsiedel and Coughlan, 1993) - such as environmental disasters (Lowe and Goyder, 1983). However, this accounts for only one category of environmental issues. A more plausible argument is that dramatic problem formulations are simple (Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988), and so can better survive competition with other stories in meeting logistical news values of simplification.

4.2.3.2.3 Audience-maximising news value: human interest

Several sub-categories combine to make up the news value of **human interest**.³⁷ One such sub-category is **identification** – i.e. the effect on audience’s own lives or closeness to their experience.³⁸ Phil Corbel advises environmental groups:

“... to start translating complex, far-reaching issues down to basic people issues. So if, for example, you’re campaigning on anti-consumerism, you’ve got to start translating that broad, humungous radical message into things that effect the public on the street,” (Corbel, media advisor to FoE, “Costing the Earth”, Radio 4, 23rd October 1996).

Identification was apparent in the Spar broadcasts on several levels. Giving detail on the actors involved - their hopes and problems - stimulates interest at the level of shared human experience, putting a human face on distant corporate images. For instance, in the Spar broadcasts after the U-turn, Shell-UK's Chairman explains: *“My first problem is I have to find a safe anchorage for the Brent Spar,”* (Chris Fay, Chairman Shell-UK, Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 21st June 1995). Spelling out the implications of actions for people is another way of making it

³⁶ The Ogoniland issue confirmed the transferability of the dramatic concepts.

³⁷ These human interest sub-categories are also evident in the Ogoniland broadcasts.

³⁸ Van Dijk (1988: 122) uses the term “*relevance*”. Bell (1991: 158) and Tunstall (1971: 19) use the term “*personalisation*”.

relevant: “They [Shell] say it won’t damage fisheries, and it will be less hazardous to humans than cutting it up onshore,” (reporter, Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 15th May 1995). Identification can be increased by referring to the public in media reports; and by reporting human tragedies (Hall et al. 1978: 54) or scandals (Bell, 1991: 160; Moloch & Lester, 1974). Identification aims to produce news that will make people discuss it. This is important because two-step flow models show that much of the media’s impact occurs only in combination with personal advice from a local opinion leader (Tunstall, 1971: 19).

A second sub-category of the news value of human interest is parochialism (see Gans, 1979: 3; Schlesinger, 1978/1987: 117). Journalists believe that the closer the cultural proximity (Golding & Elliott, 1996: 408), the greater the public interest.³⁹

Table 4.5 Number of news broadcasts in which the Spar issue is referred to on a regional, national, European and world-wide level.

	Regional dimension (Scotland)	UK dimension	European dimension	International dimension	Global dimension
No. of national broadcasts (out of a universe of 23)	9	20	19	17	2
No. of regional broadcasts (out of a universe of 7)	4	6	3	3	
Total	13	26	22	20	1

Parochialism is evident in the Spar broadcasts despite the fact that as a political issue, the Spar is primarily a European one (in that most of the protest against the deep-sea disposal occurs in mainland Europe, where Greenpeace’s campaign is most active); and an international issue since the disposal site is the Atlantic (which borders many non-European countries). Table 4.5 shows that more news broadcasts refer to the UK dimension than to the European or international dimensions of the issue. Furthermore, the broadcasts referring to the international dimension are mostly accounted for by statements that the disposal site is the Atlantic. Much

³⁹ This is similar to Galtung & Ruge’s (1973: 64) news value of “*meaningfulness*”.

less frequent are references to international regulations, or the international impact of the Spar issue.⁴⁰

A third sub-category of the news value of human interest is that of patriotism. This news value, virulent in the tabloids, can be observed in more impartial media - even television news - during war-time (see Harris, 1983). They contribute to the "feel-good factor", and so can arguably be seen as a sub-category of the news value of entertainment. Patriotism was evident in the Spar issue in that its absence was heavily criticised by British ministers: "*It is extremely regrettable that a major British company should have acted in this way,*" (Tim Eggar, industry minister, BBC2 Newsnight, 20th June 1995). Greenpeace also played on Shell's lack of pride in its country, such as through a visual of a Greenpeace placard: "*Keep Britain filthy with Shell*" (Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 17th June 1995).

4.2.3.2.4 Audience-maximising news value: visual appeal

The ability to provide visuals is a fundamental requirement of television news (Ericson et al., 1991: 22; Boyd, 1988: 120), and one that Greenpeace is adept at exploiting. Blair Palese, Greenpeace International, explains: "*In the case of the Brent Spar, obviously it was just as important to get images of the rig - the support ships hosing down the activists trying to get on board - as it was to do the action itself,*" (BBC1 9.00pm News, 21st June 1995).

The importance of visuals is emphasised by the fact that almost every time the Spar issue made the news,⁴¹ it was accompanied by videos or photographs of the Spar and the associated direct action; and when there were no Greenpeace videos, Greenpeace "stunts" were filmed (such as Greenpeace protesters at Shell petrol stations). It can be inferred from analysis of the news broadcasts that visuals are used for a number of audience-maximising purposes.

⁴⁰ Parochialism is transferable to the Ogoniland issue. For example, the UK was repeatedly referred to, despite the issue revolving around Nigeria.

⁴¹ The one exception was the reporting of the Spar issue within a wider report on the G7 summit.

One purpose is to convey a sense of drama (see Cottle, 1993; Greenberg et al., 1989). The six Greenpeace press releases stating that video footage or photographs were available all concerned dramatic footage of Greenpeace's direct action in the North Sea. All of these videos were used on British television evening news (except those released on 10th June showing a Shell vessel ramming the Greenpeace boat⁴²). The Greenpeace video used most frequently was that of the Spar being hosed by Shell as a Greenpeace helicopter threads through the water jets to drop activists onto the Spar.

A second audience-maximising purpose of visuals is to act as a short-hand explanation, to convey information quickly and hence minimise viewer boredom - a "visual-bite". For instance, visuals of the Greenpeace banner "*Save the North Sea: Stop Shell now*" immediately explain the essence of Greenpeace's action. Visuals of a radioactive sign on equipment inside the Spar (Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 15th May 1995) explain why Greenpeace wants to prevent the deep-sea disposal. Diagrams of the Spar are used to help explain how it is to be dismantled (ITN, 10.00pm News, 20th June 1995).

A third audience-maximising purpose of visuals is to add interest (see Lowe and Morrison, 1984; Cottle, 1993). For instance, in the Spar broadcasts, there is film of the Greenpeace boat sailing through sparkling, sunlit waters (ITN 10.00pm News, 30th April 1995); and film of rigs at sea illuminated at night (Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 16th June 1995). Television journalism's drive to create interesting visuals is backed up by Lambon's comment regarding the difficulty of engaging in investigative journalism:

"There's a programme to fill and we can't spend a day hanging around for a contact who might hand over some photocopies of some crucial documents - documents are boring on telly if he's not prepared to speak or at least let me film a sequence of him being secretive about the

⁴² It was used in European media, however ("The Battle for Brent Spar", BBC2, 3rd September 1995).

drop!" (Tim Lambon, Freelance producer, editor and cameraman to US and UK networks, e-mail interview, 21st February 2000).

4.3 Summary

Three main categories of news values were derived from the Spar broadcasts, with their transferability verified by the Ogoniland broadcasts:

- Professional news values: those that journalists claim are professional norms (revealing new information, watchdog roles, objectivity and facticity).
- Logistical news values: those arising from the nature of the media's time, space and resource constraints (accessibility to journalists, symbolisation and simplification, and event orientation).
- Audience-maximising news values: those arising from the media's need to appeal to an audience (copying the competition, and entertainment-oriented news values, comprising the news values of novelty, drama, human interest and visual appeal).

Together, these three categories of news values show that there is a push towards "logistical audience-maximising professionalism." This is a much more encompassing, resource-constrained and strategically-oriented description than the increasingly frequent labeling of news values as "*infotainment*". In explaining these news values, this chapter draws attention to how non-discursive practices - in particular economic constraints - impact upon all three categories of news values (the professional news value of watchdog, the logistical news value of accessibility, and all audience-maximising news values).

Perhaps the most pertinent point for this research is that by fore-grounding the three main types of news values, it highlights the main news values that sources should meet when attempting to build the media agenda. In particular, this new categorisation formalises the importance of logistics, indicating that normally marginalised items may become more newsworthy if a media-aware source can provide media-honed information. This highlights the importance of

strategic manipulation of information, and is the focus of the next three chapters.

CHAPTER 5

MAIN THEME: EMOTIVISM (PATHOS)

5.1 Introduction

Shell-UK explained the success of Greenpeace's Brent Spar campaign as resulting from its emotive appeal.


"We'd covered all the scientific angles; we'd covered all the technical angles; we certainly very much covered all the legalistic angles. And maybe you could say, well, that was, maybe a bit inward thinking. We hadn't taken into account hearts and emotions, you know, where people are coming from,"(Chris Fay, Chairman and Chief Executive Shell-UK, "The Battle for Brent Spar", BBC2, 3rd September 1995).

Emotivism is a main theme derived from the Spar data, and verified by the Ogoniland data, comprising the themes of "vilification" and "ennoblement".¹ This chapter describes salient points from Greenpeace's and Shell's media strategies regarding their promotion of the discourse of emotivism, and their ability to build the agenda of British television news. The Spar issue is addressed first (section 5.2). Here, Greenpeace's and Shell's relative attempts and success in building the news agenda through emotive discourse are quantitatively and qualitatively analysed (in terms of the concepts they promote in their press releases and those found in the national television evening news sample). Where a theme/sub-theme is more successful than its counter-theme/sub-theme in building the television news agenda, some of the key news values appealed to by the more successful theme/sub-theme are described.² The Ogoniland issue is addressed in section 5.3. This is used to verify the transferability of themes/sub-themes derived from the Spar issue, and to demonstrate how Greenpeace's and Shell's use of emotivism changed over time. Section 5.4 summarises key features of emotive agenda-building.

¹ The full variation of emotive themes, sub-themes & concepts can be found in Appendix 3.

² Quantitative summary tables of the news values appealed to by each theme/sub-theme are found at the end of the chapter.

Graph 5.1
"Vilification" promoted in Greenpeace and Shell press releases and found in national television evening news broadcasts on the Spar issue (30th April - 11th October 1995)



5.2 Emotive themes in the Brent Spar issue

5.2.1 Emotive theme: vilification

5.2.1.1 Vilification of Shell

Greenpeace engaged in a wide range of activity promoting the emotive sub-theme of "vilification of Shell" (see graph 5.1). Those discussed here are the vilification of Shell as an organisation; vilification of Shell's intentions towards the Spar; misinformation regarding the location of the deep-sea disposal site; and descriptions of the Spar.

The vilification of Shell as an organisation can be likened to the classical rhetorical model of wartime propaganda where the opponent must first be "killed" psychologically before war can commence - the ritual of "*becoming enemies*," (see Ewen, 1996: 364; and Stauber & Rampton, 1995:155). Greenpeace used its time-honoured strategy of attracting media attention through direct action (like occupying the Spar, and organising protests at Shell petrol stations), and supplying the media with carefully worded information explaining the direct action's significance. It used a range of rhetorical strategies to vilify Shell: for instance, draping the Spar with banners like: "*SAVE THE NORTH SEA. GREENPEACE*" (ITN 10.00pm News, 30th April 1995). This piece of rhetoric uses the strategy of moving from the particular to the general (Corner et al., 1990: 40), implying that if we prevent the Spar from being dumped then the North Sea will be saved.

Greenpeace played with memorable sound patterning on placards at petrol station protests. For instance, "*Honk to stop Shell sea hell*" (Greenpeace placard, Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 17th June 1995) uses alliteration (honk, hell, stop, sea), assonance (honk, stop / Shell, hell) and rhyme. In its many vilificatory press releases (see Graph 5.1), Greenpeace often used the rhetorical device of emotive abstraction (Cockroft & Cockroft, 1992: 45), i.e. appealing to abstract ideas with a strongly positive or negative connotation, reflecting communal experience and aspirations.

These included the following concepts.

- Shell has double standards (lacking integrity): "*...In the United States' waters, where Shell operates in the Gulf of Mexico, all abandoned platforms must be removed within one year*

of decommissioning. This thing has been sitting here in the North Sea, unused, for four year," (Greenpeace press release, 4th May 1995).

- Shell is irresponsible (lacking honour and justice): *"To dump the Brent Spar as a cheapskate alternative to responsible decommissioning with decontamination onshore is nothing short of obscene,"* (Greenpeace press release, 13th May, 1995).
- Shell is environmentally uncaring/ damaging (lacking integrity and justice): *"The UK Government and Shell continue to view the North Sea as their private dumping ground for rubbish,"* (Greenpeace press release, 9th June 1995).
- Shell engages in assault (lacking honour and justice): *"This morning, a Shell rigid-hulled speed boat rammed and drove over a Greenpeace life raft attached to one of the Brent Spar's six massive anchor chains, upending it and throwing three activists overboard into the sea,"* (Greenpeace press release, 10th June 1995).
- Shell withholds information/peddles misinformation (lacking integrity): *"Employing an independent consultant and not allowing Greenpeace access to the sampling and research process compromises the independence of the company,"* (Greenpeace press release, 12th July 1995).

Only two of these concepts appeared in the national television evening news sample, largely through definitions of Shell. For instance:

- Shell is environmentally uncaring: *"polluters of the ocean"* (Greenpeace (reported), ITN, 10.00pm News, 20th June 1995).
- Shell is irresponsible: *"unaccountable spoilt children"*: (Chris Rose, Greenpeace, Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 16th June 1995).

A second form of "vilification of Shell" was through descriptions of its intentions towards the Spar. This comprised nominalisations³ of the process as "dump(ing)" rather than "sink(ing)/disposal" (see Table 5.1); and misinformation about the location of the disposal site.

³ Nominalisation is the conversion of processes, situations, events, etc. into names (Fairclough, 1994: 75).

Nominalising the disposal process as “dump(ing)” is provocative since one of its meanings is: “to dispose of without subtlety or proper care,” (Collins Shorter English Dictionary, 347, meaning 4). The words “dump(ing)” were used in all 42 of Greenpeace's press releases in the sample period - 34 of which never used neutral words like "disposal" (those that did were via quotes from Shell, experts⁴ or ministers). Greenpeace combined this nominalisation with the rhetorical device of "*plоче*", i.e. random repetition (Cockroft & Cockroft, 1992: 131). It reached a high of 14 in one press release early in its campaign, an extract of which is shown below:

"Dumping it could start a domino effect that will lead to tonnes of hazardous substances being dumped at sea, and flouts our international commitments to prevent such substances being dumped," (Greenpeace press release, 2nd May 1995).

By contrast, Shell's press releases were careful to use the word "sink(ing)".

Table 5.1 Content analysis of the use of the words "dump(ing)" and "sink(ing)/disposal" in national television evening news broadcasts, Greenpeace press releases and Shell press releases regarding the Spar issue, 30th April - 11th October 1995.

Number of broadcasts/press releases	"Dump(ing)" only/mainly used	"Dump(ing)" & "sink(ing)/ disposal" used equally	"Sink(ing)/disposal" only/mainly used
Television news broadcasts	9	3	8
Greenpeace press releases	39	1	2
Shell press releases	0	0	16

Several patterns regarding Shell's intentions towards the Spar were observed in national television evening news.

⁴ For instance, the AURIS and the SMIT reports.

- The news was biased towards using "sink(ing)/disposal" in the weeks before the U-turn; and biased towards "dump(ing)" on the day of the U-turn and the following day (the two days of maximal media attention) - probably because at this point, Greenpeace was perceived to have won. Several months later, the news was more balanced in its usage of "dump(ing)" and "sink(ing)/disposal" - probably because neither Greenpeace nor Shell were perceived to be "in the right" - Greenpeace because of its mistake over the Spar's toxicity (Greenpeace press release, 5th September 1995), and Shell because it had U-turned - almost an admission that deep-sea disposal was wrong.

- The most common usage of "dump(ing)" occurs through language used by journalists rather than through direct reporting of interviews with Greenpeace: for instance, *"The battle between Greenpeace and Shell over plans to dump at sea..."* (presenter, Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 20th June 1995). Where "dump(ing)" rather than "sink(ing)/disposal" is used, this implies some journalistic acceptance of Greenpeace's definition of the situation.

- There was some unproblematised usage of "dump(ing)" - where the actors concerned clearly had not considered the implications of word choice. For instance, Chris Fay, Shell-UK, in interview said: *"You have to look at each aspect - environmental, safety, occupational health, economics - whichever one you wish. On each and every one of those separate instances in this case, everything pointed that indeed it should be dumped in the deep Atlantic,"* (Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 17th June 1995).

A third form of vilification of Shell was Greenpeace's misinformation about the location of the disposal site. Greenpeace was ambivalent in its locational message - sometimes promoting the Atlantic, and sometimes the North Sea. The location of the deep-sea disposal site is significant for the following reasons.

- The North Sea is an emotive area for North Europeans, being their "backyard", unlike the Atlantic ("The Battle for Brent Spar", BBC2, 1995).

- The Dutch and Danes see the North Sea as a political priority because of the vital role played by the fishing industry in their economies (Hansen, 1991, cited in Anderson, 1997: 141).

- Pollution of the North Sea was soon to be up for discussion at the North Sea Ministers meeting in June 1995 - adding synergy to the Spar issue.⁵
- The North Sea is covered by various international agreements regarding pollution (discussed in Chapter 6).

In the crucial period from the start of Greenpeace's campaign leading up to Shell's U-turn, there are references to the "Atlantic" or "ocean" in only 9 Greenpeace press releases, whereas 13 refer to the "North Sea" as the disposal site (5 directly, and 8 by association). "Guilt by association" is achieved by using a potent mixture of reference to various happenings concerning the North Sea together with more vague references to "the sea" as the disposal site, thus implying that the North Sea is the disposal site. For instance:

"Today, the first day of the fourth North Sea Conference in Esbjerg, Denmark, Greenpeace erected a 7.5 metre high steel replica of the Brent Spar North Sea Oil installation outside the Conference Centre. The erection of the one and a half tonnes steel structure was in protest at continued use of the sea as industry's dumping ground."

... "As delegates arrived to discuss new measures to protect the North Sea they had to pass the Greenpeace "monument to pollution". "The Brent Spar represents the North Sea Governments' and industry's attitude to the sea which they continue to use as a toxic sewer. This must stop," said Tim Birch, Greenpeace North Sea campaigner," (Greenpeace press release, 8th June 1995).

In addition to its press releases, Greenpeace used other routes to spread misinformation regarding the disposal site:

⁵ By week four of its campaign, Greenpeace released an "alternative progress report" - *"The North Story - a dirty story"*, which critically analyses the environmental record of North Sea countries, in response to the imminent North Sea Conference in Denmark (Greenpeace press release, 24th May 1995).

- Greenpeace supplied VNRs in which there were banners urging: "*SAVE THE NORTH SEA*".

In the first few weeks of its campaign, this was the only mention of the North Sea as the disposal site in national television evening news.

- By the sixth week of the campaign, Greenpeace had convinced "authoritative" actors that the Spar was to be disposed of in the North Sea, who then promulgated this information on television evening news. For instance: "*We also have a very strong environmental education at schools, and so I think that a lot of people see that this is a very serious case of pollution of the North Sea,*" (Uwe Paulson, German Green Party, BBC1 9.00pm News, 16th June 1995).

- Greenpeace gave interviews where it propagated this misinformation. "*We've shown throughout Europe that public opinion believes that you cannot use the North Sea to dump litter of any size,*" (Lord Melchett, Greenpeace Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 20th June 1995).

These routes, however, were only successful inadvertently. Inaccuracies regarding the location of the disposal site were found in one sixth (4 out of the 23) of national evening news broadcasts analysed. The "*SAVE THE NORTH SEA*" banners were only glimpsed, and were only broadcast in the first place as part of the highly newsworthy direct action video package (explained further in section 5.2.2.1). Inaccuracies through interviews arise because interviews contain a certain wildcard element, where journalists cannot predict what is going to be said (although inaccuracies could have been edited out). Thus, the dominant locational message in the television news sample was that the Spar was to be disposed of in the Atlantic. There are a number of reasons why journalists largely ignored Greenpeace's North Sea locational message, the first being that this locational message is wrong - and so fails to live up to the professional news value of accuracy. A second reason may be that Shell established that the disposal site was the Atlantic long before Greenpeace's campaign: "*Shell Expro has now received from the DTI approval for the abandonment of the Spar, which will involve removing it from its moorings, following a clean-up operation, and towing it to a designated deep water site in the North East Atlantic for disposal,*" (Shell press release, 16th February 1995).

A fourth form of vilification of Shell came in descriptions of the Spar. Greenpeace press releases named the Spar negatively - the most common concept being “rubbish” - for instance: “*oil industry's toxic garbage*” (Greenpeace press release, 13th May 1995). This was also the most commonly used vilificatory concept used to describe the Spar in television news, for instance: “*oil companies' rubbish*” (reporter, Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 15th May 1995) and “*floating dustbin*” (ibid.). These definitions appeal to the logistical news values of symbolisation and simplification. News' broadcasting of this form of vilification diminished several months after the U-turn, when Shell held an open consultation on the Spar's future. The Spar was no longer framed as an environmental problem, but rather as Shell's problem. The Spar was now a “*floating white elephant*” (reporter, BBC1, 9.00pm News, 11th October 1995) (i.e. unwanted, but expensive to upkeep); a “*continuing embarrassment for Shell*” (ibid.); and an “*albatross around its neck*” (reporter, ITN, 10.00pm News, 11th October 1995) (i.e. an inescapable burden).

5.2.1.2 Vilification of Greenpeace

Whereas Greenpeace was highly adept at vilifying Shell, Shell was initially much less adept at vilifying Greenpeace (see Graph 5.1). By week seven of Greenpeace's campaign Shell became more adept, promoting the following vilificatory concepts:

- Greenpeace's misinformation: “*I feel very sad that the Shell Better Britain Campaign, which is such a hardworking and quietly successful example of genuine environmental campaigning, should now be belittled by others whose activities in recent weeks have amounted to little more than publicity-seeking misinformation and unlawful action,*” (Shell press release, 18th June 1995). Here, Shell tries to minimise Greenpeace's projection of the faceless, marauding corporation by personalisation (“*I feel very sad*”); whilst heightening the vilification of Greenpeace by contrasting its “*publicity-seeking*” illegitimacy with Shell's “*quietly successful*” environmental activities, which are framed using the rhetorical device of understatement
- Greenpeace's double-standards: “*The material removed [from the Spar] included waste lubricating oil, batteries (which contained cadmium and lead), light bulbs (which contained mercury), a crane boom and loading boom, hoses, a shelter household equipment including*

bedding - and 20 tonnes of items left behind by Greenpeace," (Shell press release, 15th June 1995). This uses emotive abstraction, appealing to the wider idea of integrity - here Greenpeace's lack of it. It also uses "synathrismos" (listings/heapings up), where the effect of piling nouns within a sentence is designed to replicate emotional, intellectual or sensory pressure in the audience (Cockroft & Cockroft, 1992: 130). Here details of the Spar's contents are listed to highlight their insignificance (for instance, pointing out that the heavy metals came only from batteries and light-bulbs); whilst the final clause contrasts the mundaneness and limited toxicity of the Spar's contents with the vast amount of Greenpeace's rubbish ("20 tonnes").

- Greenpeace's childish behaviour: *"We don't see that the actions of Greenpeace contribute in any positive way to this necessarily adult debate."* (Hughes, Director-general, UK Offshore Operators Association (UKOOA), Financial Times, 20th June 1995: 22). This is designed to delegitimise Greenpeace's status as a worthy stakeholder. However it does not have the intensity of the vilificatory concepts used by Greenpeace.

Given this difference in source activity, it is not surprising that the sub-theme of "vilification of Greenpeace" was extremely limited in the national television evening news sample, during the seven-week campaign (see Graph 5.1). It consisted of the following concepts.

- Greenpeace's irresponsibility. For instance, regarding Greenpeace's helicopter drop onto the Spar: *"They chose to take action, to actually ride a helicopter, which I would consider would be somewhat outside the international rules of flying,"* (Chris Fay, Shell-UK, ITN, 10.00pm News, 16th June 1995).


- Greenpeace's misinformation: *"Shell said Greenpeace were making alarmist and misleading claims ... ,"* (presenter, Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 17th June 1995).

- Greenpeace is unscientific: *"But the flair for a photogenic stunt has also earned Greenpeace a reputation for overlooking scientific fact if it spoils a good story,"* (reporter, BBC1, 9.00pm News, 21st June 1995).

After the U-turn, however, Shell's increased promotion of its world-view pays off. Shell vilifies Greenpeace for its unscientific behaviour regarding its sampling methods, in a press release which highlights that: "*Greenpeace admit that they attempted to take samples from only one of the Spar's six tanks, and have now learned that their samples were not taken from this tank at all, but that the sampling device had been lodged in a pipe,*" (Shell press release, 5th September 1995). The press release then labels Greenpeace as "*alarmist*" (ibid.). This labeling sticks, as over a month later, Greenpeace is vilified in the news broadcasts for being unscientific. For instance: "*It ended in embarrassment for... Greenpeace, who apologised for miscalculations over the amount of oil inside,*" (reporter, Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 11th October 1995). This concept adheres highly to the professional news values of watchdog (identifying Greenpeace's malpractice) and the audience-maximising news values of human interest (describing Greenpeace's embarrassment). By contrast, the news sample's vilification of Shell is limited to negative descriptions of the Spar (and these are diluted compared to pre-U-turn negative descriptions).

Thus in terms of vilification, Greenpeace was successful in building the news agenda, particularly during the seven-week campaign. Table 5.10 shows that the sub-theme of vilification of Shell appeals more than the sub-theme of vilification of Greenpeace to the logistical news values of symbolisation/simplification (such as the "*SAVE THE NORTH SEA*" message); and the audience-maximising news values of copying the competition, novelty (Shell is vilified in lots of different ways), drama (the conflict between Greenpeace and Shell) and visual appeal (VNRs). However, Greenpeace's success largely ends with the close of its intensive seven-week campaign, and the start of Shell's counter-campaign.

Graph 5.2
Ennoblement promoted in Greenpeace and Shell press releases and found in national television evening news broadcasts on the Spar issue (30th April - 11th October)



5.2.2 Emotive theme: ennoblement

The theme "ennoblement" consists of the sub-themes "laudability of Greenpeace" and "laudability of Shell".

5.2.2.1 Laudability of Greenpeace

Greenpeace heavily promoted the sub-theme of "laudability of Greenpeace" (see Graph 5.2), engaging in well-publicised "heroic" direct action, like occupying the Spar. This includes the following concepts:

- Champion of the environment. For instance, the phrase "*The sea itself has granted us a stay of execution today,*" (Greenpeace press release, 22nd May 1995) evokes the order of natural justice. "*You can't sink a rainbow,*" (ibid.) uses the metonymic rhetorical device of "*synecdoche*", with "*sink*" and "*rainbow*" reinvigorating memories of Greenpeace's boat, Rainbow Warrior, sunk by France in 1985 (Wilkinson & Schofield, 1994: 60). The message is: despite adversity, Greenpeace continues to champion the environment.
- Greenpeace's integrity. This concept appeared when Greenpeace admitted its error over its toxicity measurements of the Spar, and uses the rhetorical tools of contrast and shifting the issue: "*Greenpeace relies on the trust of the public. Because of this we were happy to make it known that we had made a minor mistake. Greenpeace only wishes that Shell and the UK Government would be as honest and publicly admit their mistakes,*" (Greenpeace press release, 5th September 1995).
- David and Goliath. This was particularly apparent visually (as described below).

The laudability of Greenpeace was extremely successful in building the agenda of the television news sample.⁶ The concept of "champion of the environment" was picked up on the first day of Greenpeace's campaign (ITN, 10.00pm News, 30th April 1995), with the news showing Greenpeace's boat sailing through sparkling waters, whilst the activists are described as *braving* the elements (see Table 5.2). Shell's disposal plans are framed in a way that augments

⁶ The only concept promoted by Greenpeace but absent in television evening news was that of Greenpeace's honesty.

Greenpeace's cause. No specifics on the nature of the waste or the disposal site are given, yet enough detail is given to imply that there might be 15,000 tonnes of waste, and that the disposal site is close to the UK. This latter point adds relevance to the UK audience via the audience-maximising news value of human interest (parochialism). Greenpeace's cause is further ennobled by its banner, with the emotive imperative: "*SAVE THE NORTH SEA*" (again appealing to the news value of parochialism). Again, no explanation or technical detail is offered. Instead, its plain language projects an axiomatic "truth" - that Shell needs to be prevented from damaging the environment (here meeting the professional news value of watchdog and the logistical news values of simplification and symbolisation).

Table 5.2 Excerpt from ITN 10.00pm News, 30th April 1995

Image	Voiceover	Ambient sound
<p><u>Studio mode:</u>⁷ Presenter voice-over used with film and actuality sound.</p> <p>Film: Greenpeace boat sailing through sparkling gray/silver sunlit waters. Close-up (CU) of Greenpeace's white flag attached to the mast. In black capitals it reads "<i>SAVE THE NORTH SEA</i>". In rounded green capitals is the "<i>GREENPEACE</i>" logo.</p>	<p>Presenter: "... <i>brave the North Sea off the coast of Shetland. They're protesting at Shell's plans to dump the 15,000 tonne structure, and the waste it holds, 100 miles off the coast of Shetland.</i>"</p>	<p>Hum of engine.</p>

The concept of Greenpeace as champion of the environment is followed through two weeks later in broadcast usage of romantic metaphors allied with richly connotative visuals (see Table 5.3). For instance, the visual of Greenpeace's harboured ship, *Moby Dick*, positions Greenpeace as contiguous with natural beauty (hills, silvery sea) and man-made beauty (harbour) (shot 1). Greenpeace's capacity to adapt its tools to its needs is illustrated through the verbalisation of "*converted trawler turned mother ship*" in conjunction with a close-up of clothes hung on a washing line on the boat. The romantic metaphor "*eco-pirates*" is then used

⁷ I.e. from behind the newsdesk with a background image. See Corner (1995: 56) for a full definition of studio modes.

Table 5.3 Excerpt from Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 15th May 1995

Shot	Image	Voiceover	Ambient sound
1	<u>Location mode:</u> ³ Reporter's voice-over filmed sequences in which reporter is not shown, with actuality sound. Momentary caption: " <i>Andrew Veitch, Lerwick</i> ". Film: CU of clothes on a washing line on a boat, zooming out, to reveal more of the boat and its lettering, " <i>MOBY DICK, AMSTERDAM</i> ". Seagulls swoop around the harboured boat, which is dark green with a white trim. Middle distance shows a moored boat and pale blue sea, and rolling fields in background.	Reporter: " <i>In harbour at Lerwick, the Moby Dick, a converted trawler turned mother ship for the eco-pirates ...</i> "	Seagulls crying and wind whistling
2	Film: Cut in to billowing flag - dark green, with a central picture of a red and yellow rainbow, with " <i>GREENPEACE</i> " following the curve. It frames a white dove in flight with leaves in its beak.	"... <i>occupying the Brent Spar...</i> "	Seagulls crying and wind whistling
3	Film: Medium shot (MS) of Greenpeace's moored boat, (now in shadow) in the left-hand side of the frame. The right-hand side of the frame and the background shows sparkling dark blue/silver sea, with a sliver of green land in the middle distance, and cumulus-type white clouds in a blue sky.	"... <i>120 miles out in the North Sea. Appearances are deceptive.</i> "	Seagulls crying and wind whistling
4	Film. Cut in to CU of the mast area of the Moby Dick, showing a MS of Greenpeace's flag and mast on the right-hand side, and a white curved satellite dome on the left-hand side. Background shows billowing white clouds and a portion of blue sky.	"... <i>The electronics are among the most sophisticated in the ...</i> "	Seagulls crying and wind whistling
5	Film: cut away to CU of yellow Greenpeace logo. Zoom out to show that this is on the side of a rubber dinghy, which is nested in one of the larger Greenpeace boats.	"... <i>North Sea. Greenpeace has planned this campaign with more than military precision</i> ".	Seagulls crying and wind whistling

³ See Corner (1995: 56) for a full definition of location modes.

- a potentially ambiguous label (mercenary seafarers, pillagers of the environment, even).

However, this potentially negative reading is diverted by the anchoring image of the billowing Greenpeace flag, the centre of which depicts the symbol of peace - the dove (shot 2). The symbolisation of Greenpeace as champion of the environment is completed by the flag's dark green background (equating to deep green beliefs?) and its picture of the red and yellow rainbow - the colours of Shell's logo - perhaps to remind us why the environment needs championing. A more critical stance towards Greenpeace is suggested when we are warned not to take Greenpeace at face-value ("*Appearances are deceptive*") - especially since the accompanying visual depicts one half of the screen filled by Greenpeace's boat "Moby Dick" now in shadow and appearing black (evil, sinister?) rather than dark green (shot 3). This is in marked contrast to the other half of the screen which shows a much lighter natural environment. However, this potentially negative reading of the visual image is anchored by the reporter explaining Greenpeace's technological and organisational sophistication (shot 4). Thus the tension created is not one of "evil/sinister versus good" but one of "rustic versus sophisticated" (so countering any "country bumpkin" image that may have been initially projected by the washing on the line, and the fact that Greenpeace's boat is an old fishing vessel).

Taken together, these metaphors and visuals can connote that Greenpeace, through its ingenuity and its capacity to appropriate and evolve, is the rightful mediator between nature and humans, occupying a role that protects nature whilst also promoting the positive aspects of humankind. This strongly appeals to the professional news value of watchdog, the logistical news values of symbolisation and simplification, and the audience-maximising news values of visual appeal (see Table 5.11).

Images with David and Goliath connotations were used repeatedly by national television evening news. For instance, the banner "*STOP SHELL NOW*" (Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 15th May 1995) highlights Shell's might, with the monosyllables creating a sound pattern of a driving force - like a hammer - connoting the need for continuous pressure. The following

David and Goliath images, mostly from Greenpeace VNRs, are in order of appearance in the Spar campaign. Table 5.4 depicts tiny activists (David) scaling the enormous Spar (Goliath). Whereas this visual treatment of the Spar depicts it as an obstacle to be overcome (i.e. to be scaled and occupied) and hence represents Goliath, visuals from subsequent broadcasts depict the occupied Spar as David, since Greenpeace is now in residence and marks its new territory with its logo and anti-Shell messages.

Table 5.4 Excerpt from Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 15th May 1995

Image	Voiceover	Ambient sound
<p><u>Location mode:</u> Reporter's voice-over filmed sequences in which reporter is not shown, with actuality sound.</p> <p>Film: Extreme close-up (ECU) of Spar, taken from a low angle so that it towers obliquely above. The first third of the Spar above the water line is shown. The yellow cylindrical structure fills the whole screen, the upper half of which shows a cylindrical outer-structure (like scaffolding) - normally red but here seen as black. The lettering "SPAR 1" on the Spar's side is framed so that it is in the middle of the screen. Underneath there are red and brown rust spots on the Spar's yellow surface.</p> <p>Caption: "<i>Greenpeace video</i>".</p>	<p>Reporter: "<i>13 Greenpeace shock troops ...</i>"</p>	<p>Faint sound of engine</p>
<p>Film: Camera pans up the Spar (again from a low angle, and then zooms in on two activists wearing red boiler suits positioned near the top of the Spar (where it mushrooms out into the wide cylindrical black platform), and still climbing up, using climbing gear.</p> <p>Caption: "<i>Greenpeace video</i>"</p>	<p>"... <i>took over the abandoned rig on May 1st. They plan to lock themselves into rooms, challenging Shell to tip the structure ...</i>"</p>	<p>Faint sound of engine</p>

The image of the Spar as the new "David" is visually reinforced when Shell's much larger stative vessel (a new embodiment of Goliath) moves in alongside. In this widely used image,⁹

⁹ Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 15th May 1995; BBC1 9.00pm News, 22nd May 1995; Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 23rd May 1995.

activists (David) on the Spar try to repel a basket being winched aboard from Shell's sta-dive vessel (Goliath) containing a boarding party of Shell's security men, sheriff officers and policemen.

The most enduring and popular image used by television news is the Spar being pounded with water from hoses on Shell's vessels (see Table 5.5).¹⁰

Table 5.5 Excerpt from BBC1 9.00pm News, 19th June 1995

Image	Voiceover	Ambient sound
<p><u>Location mode:</u> Reporter's voice-over filmed sequences in which reporter is not shown, with actuality sound.</p> <p>Caption: "<i>Greenpeace video</i>" Film: oblique, long shot (LS), top-down view of the Spar (from a helicopter), surrounded by gray sea. The Spar initially tiny - occupying one seventieth of the screen - is framed in the centre of the middle distance. On either side, two large ships each emit fountains of water reaching as high as the Spar. The water jets are not touching the Spar at this point. The camera slowly circles the Spar.</p>	<p>Reporter: "<i>At sea, the real thing is now some 70 miles from where Shell hopes to sink it.</i>"</p>	<p>Drone of helicopter</p>
<p>Caption: "<i>Greenpeace video</i>". Cut in to MS of the top half of the Spar. In front of the Spar is a plume of water, largely obscuring most of the Spar. Zoom out, to reveal full length of Spar and the two boats hosing it, one in front of the Spar and one behind it. Grey sea.</p>	<p>"<i>On board, two Greenpeace activists are still braving the barrage of water from Shell's hoses.</i>"</p>	<p>Drone of helicopter</p>

The next set of ennobling images to be broadcast are of the tiny Greenpeace helicopter (David) trying to thread its way through the spray of water from Shell's water canons (Goliath), as it tries to land more activists on the Spar (used by all four national television evening news programmes on the day of the U-turn).

¹⁰ This image was used in all four evening news programmes on 16th June 1995; Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 17th June 1995; BBC1 9.00pm News and Channel 4 News 7.00pm on 19th June 1995; and BBC1 9.00pm News and ITN 10.00pm News on 21st June 1995.

These VNRs appealed highly to the logistical news values of accessibility (the visuals were largely provided by Greenpeace) and symbolisation (David and Goliath). They appealed highly to the audience-maximising news values of novelty (unusual events happening in the North Sea); drama (conflict); human interest (individual Greenpeace activists were pictured and appeals to consumers were made); and visual appeal (the "visual-bites" offer an explanatory short-hand of the conflict as well as adding interest through dramatic images) (see Table 5.11).

In contrast to Greenpeace, Shell totally failed to promote itself emotively (see Graph 5.2). Accordingly, there was very little ennoblement of Shell in the news sample, consisting only of two sub-themes.

- The laudability of Shell's actions. For instance: "... *we've actually spent a considerable amount of time rescuing Greenpeace people in and around the Spar,*" (Chris Fay, Shell-UK, BBC1,9.00pm News, 20th June 1995).

- A volte-face on the terminology used to describe deep-sea disposal. Some months after the U-turn, it is described as "... *the green option - rigs to reef disposal: this would involve cleaning out the oil from the Brent Spar and sinking it as an artificial reef for sea life,*" (reporter, ITN,10.00pm News, 11th October 1995).

In terms of ennoblement, Greenpeace was much more successful than Shell in building the news agenda during the seven-week campaign. Table 5.11 shows that the sub-theme of laudability of Greenpeace appeals much more than the sub-theme of laudability of Shell to the professional news values of authentication (Greenpeace provides much visual authentication); the logistical news values of symbolisation/simplification (such as David and Goliath imagery); and audience-maximising news values of copying the competition, drama (such as the conflict in the North Sea), human interest (such as visual details of the activists' experiences, and the appeal to consumers' shopping habits via the boycotting message) and visual appeal (the VNRs).

5.3 Emotive themes in the Ogoniland issue

5.3.1 Emotive theme: vilification

In the Ogoniland issue, Greenpeace used the same concepts as in the Spar issue to vilify Shell, heavily promoting the concept that Shell is "environmentally damaging": "*Greenpeace has consistently been asking Shell to improve its environmental standards in Nigeria,*" (Greenpeace press release, 13th November 1995). Greenpeace promoted the additional concept of "abuser of human rights" (see Appendix 3, Table 2): "*Saro-Wiwa's death sentence was given by a military tribunal widely slated by human rights groups and lawyers. ... two key prosecution witnesses stated that they were bribed by Shell and the Nigerian military to give evidence against the Ogoni people,*" (Greenpeace press release, 31st October 1995).

However, in marked contrast to the Spar campaign, Shell was more prepared and responded to Greenpeace quickly and with a wider range of vilificatory concepts (see Appendix 3, Table 2). The extent to which Shell was geared up to the media can be seen in Table 5.6 which analyses Shell's full press release on the day of the announcement of Saro-Wiwa's death sentence. This press release aims to distance Shell from the Ogoniland issue. This is evidenced in the opening sentences which strongly vilify Saro-Wiwa (through the concepts of violence and illegality) whilst emphasising that this is not Shell's personal view but the "*verdict*" of a "*tribunal*" (sentences 1-2). Shell's distancing tactics again appear in lines 8-11 where it justifies its inaction by using emotive abstraction to appeal to the sanctity of state sovereignty. The press release aims to vilify Greenpeace and MOSOP, but without alienating the public through charges of insensitivity. Thus, Shell emphasises their naïvety and wrong-headedness rather than through colourful and personalised attacks on their character - even referring to them as "*respected organisations*" (lines 5-7).

**Table 5.6 Shell press release, "Verdict on Mr Ken Saro-Wiwa and Others",
31st October 1995**

Sentence	
1-2	<i>"The tribunal in the "Ogoni trials" has reached a verdict and found nine of the defendants guilty. Ken Saro-Wiwa has been found guilty of inciting the murder of four prominent Ogoni leaders.</i>
3-4	<i>We have every sympathy with the families of Ken Saro-Wiwa and his co-defendants, and with the families of the murdered Ogonis. It is natural and understandable that the families of the people sentenced are making emotional and moving appeals on their behalf.</i>
5-7	<i>Throughout the trial a number of respected organisations and campaigners raised questions over the fairness of the trial procedure. There are now demands that Shell should intervene, and use its perceived "influence" to have the judgement overturned. This would be dangerous and wrong.</i>
8-9	<i>Ken Saro-Wiwa and his co-defendants were accused of a criminal offence. A commercial organisation like Shell cannot and must never interfere with the legal processes of any sovereign state.</i>
10-11	<i>Those who call on us to do so might well be the first to criticise in any situation where that intervention did not suit their agenda. Any government, be it in Europe, North America or elsewhere, would not tolerate this type of interference by business.</i>
12	<i>But what Shell has said, repeatedly and publicly, is that, while it does not agree with Ken Saro-Wiwa's approach or opinions, it nevertheless recognises his right to hold and air his views, and that he is entitled to due legal process and medical support.</i>
13-14	<i>The Ogoni region is beset by a host of complex and difficult economic, social and ethnic problems. The violent scenes which resulted in the death of the four Ogoni leaders are a tragic example of the tensions running through these communities.</i>
15-16	<i>If these problems are to be addressed successfully it will require compassion, good will and a real commitment to peaceful resolution of the region's problems by all concerned. Shell sympathises with many of the grievances felt by the communities in the oil producing regions of the Niger Delta, and while it will not intervene in Nigeria's domestic politics, it is involved in discussions with a wide range of groups who are interested in finding solutions to these complex issues.</i>

Sent- ence	
17-18	<i>In addition, Shell makes its own contribution to improving the communities' quality of life, funding roads, clinics, schools, water schemes, scholarships and agricultural support projects. Spending on these community projects will reach more than US\$25 million this year alone."</i>

Both the themes of "vilification of Greenpeace" and "vilification of Shell" were apparent in the television news sample. However, "vilification of Greenpeace" was not found in the two-week period around Saro-Wiwa's execution, but only in the broadcast earlier on in the year, which mentioned the illegality of Greenpeace's cause: "*Greenpeace representatives met Shell officials who said in a statement that environmental devastation was in many cases caused by deliberate sabotage so that compensation claims could be made,*" (reporter, Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 16th January 1995). The absence of "vilification of Greenpeace" in the two-week period around Saro-Wiwa's execution suggests that Shell's vilificatory campaign failed. Furthermore, televisual "vilification of Shell" broadcast both Shell's abuse of human rights and its damage to the environment, suggesting that Shell's distancing tactics were unsuccessful.

However, Shell's campaign may have been partially successful in that there is minimal reference to Shell's role in the environmental degradation in the broadcasts during the two-week period around Saro-Wiwa's execution. This is in marked contrast to the news broadcast earlier on in the year before Shell's Ogoniland campaign. Table 5.7 shows that Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 16th January 1995 has much environmental content, whereas this is largely lost by October and November.¹¹

¹¹ A content analysis was conducted on a sample of the Ogoniland broadcasts, with the unit of counting being a concept/statement promulgating the human rights aspect or the environmental aspect of the issue.

Table 5.7 Extent to which a broadcast focuses on the human rights aspect and environmental aspect of the Ogoniland issue in a selection of television news broadcasts (16th January – 13th November 1995)¹²

Broadcast (1995)	Number of times a "human rights" concept is mentioned (verbally and visually)	Number of times an "environmental" concept is mentioned (verbally and visually)
Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 16 th January	27	Ogoniland: 19
BBC daytime news, 31 st October	8	French nuclear: 22
ITN 10.00pm News, 31 st October	11	French nuclear: 18
ITN daytime news, 31 st October	4	French nuclear: 17
ITN daytime news, 31 st October 1995	15	French nuclear: 18
Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 31 st October	93	Ogoniland: 8
BBC1 6.00pm News, 2 nd November	16	Ogoniland: 2
BBC1 1.00pm news, 8 th November	6	French nuclear: 2
BBC2 Newsnight, 8th November 1995	51	Ogoniland: 2
ITN daytime news, 9th November	2	French nuclear: 12
BBC daytime news, 9 th November	26	Ogoniland: 1 French nuclear: 1
BBC day time news, 9 th November	34	Ogoniland: 3
ITN, daytime news, 13 th November	16	Ogoniland: 1
Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 13 th November	38	Ogoniland: 3

More detailed analysis of two broadcasts highlights the difference in focus as the year progressed. Table 5.8 shows that the broadcast early in the year (Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 16th January 1995) starts its introduction with the human rights concept, but this is voiced by the presenter as an accusation from the "*environmental group Greenpeace*" (shot 1). Grass-roots mobilisation against the pollution is then mentioned in the next sentence (shot 3). The presenter concludes the introduction by returning to the human rights issue (shot 5), whilst a stirring visual of Saro-Wiwa is depicted against a background of flaring oil wells, so visually symbolising Saro-Wiwa's fight for his environmentalist cause. The broadcast switches to "location mode" (shot 6) with the reporter spending some time on Shell's environmental damage. It starts with the Ogoni's definition of the issue, using strong spoken and visual language: for instance, the extended close-up of the oil from the water adds emphasis to the phrase "*ecological war*" (shot 7). Official figures of the extent of pollution are voiced (shot 8), which are then elaborated from the Ogoni's point of view, and then Greenpeace's (shots 9-15).

¹² Many of the October and November broadcasts dealt simultaneously with the issues of Ogoniland and French nuclear testing in the Pacific. The content analysis differentiates between environmental concepts referring to Ogoniland and French nuclear testing.

Meanwhile, strong visual evidence of uncontrolled gas flaring is provided, the images' impact coming from the juxtaposition of flames in an unusual environment - green fields and streams used by Ogoni children to wash in (shots 13-14).¹³ Identification with the Ogoni's plight is increased by their direct gaze at the camera. There follows an interview snippet with Greenpeace - the only voice so far to be directly accessed (shot 15): here Greenpeace elaborates on the pollution. The reporter then provides a brief history of the Ogoni's campaign (shots 16-18), along with strong visual evidence of the strength of Ogoni feeling regarding Shell's destruction of their environment. It is only then that the broadcast moves onto the human rights aspect of the Nigerian regime's trumped up charges against Saro-Wiwa (shot 19).

Table 5.8 Transcript from Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 16th January 1995

Shot	Image	Voiceover	Ambient sound
1	<u>Studio mode</u> : Presenter's to-camera speech (from behind newsdesk with background image in top right-hand corner). Image shows CU of Nigerian flag (green with a white stripe) on the left-hand-side. The right-hand-side shows a still image of an oil refinery with flaring gas taking up half of the picture (LS). Trees in background.	Presenter: <i>"The environmental group campaign Greenpeace says it has obtained a leaked Nigerian government memo which it says links the government to human rights atrocities against one of the country's ethnic groups, the Ogonis."</i>	
2	Presenter's voice-over used with graphic of green map depicting Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle-East and Southern Europe. Nigeria (darker green) is marked out by a square around its border.	<i>"Until recently, most of Nigeria's oil was produced in Ogoniland, in South West Nigeria,..."</i>	
3	Visual: Zoom in until Nigeria fills the screen. The word "NIGERIA" is placed in the map's middle. "OGONILAND" is marked at the southern border, shown as a tiny yellow section.	<i>"... but two years ago, a grass-roots campaign against the pollution caused by the oil production forced Shell to stop operations in the area."</i>	

¹³ My memories of gas flaring are in infertile deserts.

Shot	Image	Voiceover	Ambient sound
4	Same image as shot 1	<i>"That campaign was led by the Ogoni playwright Ken Saro-Wiwa. He was later arrested on charges of murdering four Ogoniland leaders, but his trial, due to start today, was adjourned when the prosecution lawyers failed to turn up in court. "</i>	
5	Presenter's voice-over used with film of Saro-Wiwa (medium-close shot (MCS), three-quarters profile) with clenched fist and arm raised, taken from a low angle (Saro-Wiwa is on a podium). The moving image fades in and out with visuals of yellow flames (burning land) and pipelines. Saro-Wiwa turns, smiling, to directly face camera, arm still raised, waving at crowd of Ogonis around him. He is framed by the green top of a palm tree directly above his head and gray (smoky?) skies, a bright yellow/white flame over his right shoulder, a bright orange horizontal streak of land behind him, and brown ground to the front. Caption: <i>"A TRIAL OF STRENGTH?"</i>	<i>" Liz Donnelly reports on the plight of Ken Saro-Wiwa and of the prospects of the Ogoni people now under military occupation."</i>	
6	<u>Location mode:</u> Reporter's voice-over filmed sequences in which reporter is not shown. Visual: Film of 3 Nigerians (LS), two in traditional Nigerian dress standing on edge of (stagnant?) black, shiny water mass, with lush vegetation in the background. One of them pokes the water with a stick. The water is polluted with oil.	Reporter: <i>"Here on the plains of south-eastern Nigeria ...</i>	Nigerians talking

Shot	Image	Voiceover	Ambient sound
7	Cut in to MS of a lump of viscous oil on the end of the stick, as it is raised from the water. (This stays in shot for 4 seconds).	<i>"... the Ogoni people are accusing the oil business of waging an ecological war against them."</i>	
8	Film: Close up of clumps of mud/soil covered in shiny blue-black oil. Film of Shell oil plant in background: CU of sign on wire fence, reading in black capitals: "YORLA FLOWSTATION OPERATED BY [in green capitals:] SHELL PETROLEUM DEV.COMPANY OF NIG. LTD (in black capitals:) ON BEHALF OF NNPC AND SHELL". In red capitals underneath: "RESTRICTED AREA". Underneath in red lettering: a large "NO" on the bottom left-hand side of the sign. On the bottom right-hand-side next to the "NO" is "SMOKING, LANTERNS, FIRE". Underneath in red capitals: "NO ENTRY BY UNAUTHORISED PERSONS". In the top right-hand and left-hand corners are a small Shell logo (the yellow shell outlined in red). Behind the sign, on the fence, several Nigerians walk by.	<i>"Over a period of fifteen years official figures show an average of four oil spills a week."</i>	
9	Still image (LS) of refinery buildings, with green grass in foreground. Film: Burning gas pipe with palm trees in the background.	<i>"They say that Shell which for 35 years operated a joint venture ..."</i>	
10	Film: Cut to another LS of the refinery, this time with brown earth in the foreground and gray sky above.	<i>" ... with the Nigerian government"</i>	
11	Film: Zoom out from LS of oil refinery, widening the frame to include a large yellow-white flame on the left-hand-side of the screen (MS).	<i>" ... acted with total disregard for the environment. And they accuse the company ..."</i>	Crackling and hissing fire

Shot	Image	Voiceover	Ambient sound
12	Cut to film of large flame from another angle (LS). Two palm trees in the background are shrouded in smoke. Middle distance around flame is bright orange. Dull orange land in foreground.	<i>"... in the past of burning gas from oil wells for 24 hours a day ..."</i>	
13	Film of group of Ogoni people (LS) (18 children and two adults, one male one female) in a green field gathered around a water pump and stream. One young child washes clothes in a bucket. In the back-ground is a line of trees and two yellow gas flares.	<i>"... in places close to where people live, polluting the air and causing terrible damage to the land."</i>	
14	Film (MS) of 10 Ogoni children, most looking at the camera. Two carry plastic buckets, and a large metal bucket rests on the ground at the front. In the background is a field and a line of trees, with a gas flare in the top left-hand corner.	<i>"Streams used by fisheries are now heavily polluted, and according to Greenpeace, this sort of activity would never be allowed in this country."</i>	
15	<u>Location mode:</u> Reporter interview with only interviewee in shot and reporter's questions edited out. Close-up of Horsman, looking serious and pale with dark shadows under his eyes, in white jumper being interviewed against a background of dark (tropical) green leaves. Caption: <i>"Paul Horsman, Greenpeace"</i> .	Paul Horsman, Greenpeace: <i>"There are several things they do there. They used substandard equipment, they have pipelines that go through villages, they do flaring that goes on 24 hours a day, it is practically illegal in this country."</i>	

Shot	Image	Voiceover	Ambient sound
16	Film: Ogoni demonstration in Ogoniland (momentary caption: "1993"). A crowd of Ogoni adults and children jog forward, waving bushels, and banners. One banner is printed on a large bright yellow cloth. Most of the writing is obscured by the cloth's folds, only "FOR MOSOP" is visible. Other placards are hand-written in felt-tip on flimsy white paper: "SHELL STEALS OGONI LAND", "Save Ogoni ENVIRONMENT", "OGONI DAY", "OGONI AUTONOMY NOW". Caption fades in: "1993".	Reporter: <i>"Two years ago the Ogoni began actively campaigning against the environmental destruction after several appeals to Shell had brought ..."</i>	Ogoni chanting and singing loudly.
17	Film: cut to different angle of crowd. An Ogoni man (LS) looks directly into the camera and holds up a neat hand-written sign on white paper "Save Ogoni ENVIRONMENT". Background shows more Ogoni demonstrators and vegetation.	Reporter: <i>"... what they considered an unsatisfactory response."</i>	Ogoni chanting and singing loudly.
18	Film: Camera pans across a white banner high in the sky stretching across the road (in red capitals:) "1993 OGONI DAY (in blue capitals:) INTERNATIONAL YEAR OF THE *** PEOPLE) (partially obscured by bushels carried by the crowd). The crowd continues forward. The man carrying the placard: "Save Ogoni ENVIRONMENT" comes back into shot.	<i>"Their campaign was led by ..."</i>	Ogoni chanting and whistling and cheering
19	Film of Saro-Wiwa (MS, three-quarters profile) with clenched fist and arm raised, taken from a low angle (Saro-Wiwa is on a podium) and smiling.	<i>"...Ken Saro-Wiwa, a novelist and playwright, He is now accused of ordering the deaths of four people."</i>	

The later news broadcasts emphasise either the human rights aspect of the Ogoni cause, or the environmental aspect of UK support for French nuclear testing (an issue current at the time). The environmental aspect of the Ogoniland issue is relegated to a few telling visuals, as exemplified in Table 5.9. Here, a Greenpeace placard captioned "*SHAME ON SHELL*" makes the environmental link through the Greenpeace and Shell logos. However, the other placards in shot and the voice-over anchor these visuals more as a human rights concept rather than an environmental concept.

Table 5.9 Extract from ITN daytime news, 13th November 1995

Image	Voiceover
<p><u>Location mode:</u></p> <p>Three Greenpeace placards fill the screen. They are all on a white background, with the yellow Shell logo (a shell) outlined in black in the top half of the placard; at the very bottom is the Greenpeace logo - in white capitals in a green rectangle. The bottom half of one placard, in black capitals, reads "<i>SHAME ON SHELL</i>". The bottom half of the other two placards, in black capitals, read "<i>BLOOD ON SHELL'S HANDS</i>". Here, the Shell logo has red smeared down one side, which drips off in seven big red drops down the placard's side.</p>	<p>Reporter: "<i>Shell is currently prime target for exploiting tribal lands in Nigeria which led to the execution of human rights activists there.</i>"</p>

Such minimal reference loses the contextual information and direct verbal and visual accessing of the environmental issue of the broadcast on Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 16th January 1995 (see Table 5. 8).

5.3.2 Emotive theme: ennoblement

In the Ogoniland issue, Greenpeace ennobled itself as both champion of the environment and champion of human rights: "*Suspension from the Commonwealth is simply not enough, ... We need to send a much stronger signal that the ongoing environmental devastation and human*

rights abuse in Nigeria is not acceptable. An embargo will do just that," (Greenpeace press release, 19th December 1995).

This time, Shell was much more vocal than in the Spar campaign in ennobling itself, promoting this sub-theme through a wide variety of concepts, many of which appeared in its press release on 31st October 1995 (see Table 5.6). Shell orients itself to the emotional response expected from its western audience through the concepts that Shell is compassionate (sentences 3-4, 15-16) and Shell is understanding (sentences 12-14). Such concepts are used with the knowledge that Greenpeace's campaign had a vast reserve of natural emotive appeal to draw on: reaction of the concerned public to the "judicial murder sentence" of an internationally renowned author and playwright would inevitably be one of anger and sorrow. The press release ends with the concept that Shell makes a positive contribution to the quality of life (sentences 17-18). Here, Shell uses the rhetorical device of "*synathrismos*" (Cockroft & Cockroft, 1992: 130) to emphasise its contribution: "... *funding roads, clinics, schools, water schemes, scholarships and agricultural support projects,*" (Shell press release, 31st October 1995).

In terms of the structure of the press release, Shell begins by distancing itself from Saro-Wiwa's verdict and justifying its inaction, before moving on to promote its understanding and positive contributions. This suggests that Shell appreciates that its implicit support of a repressive regime is likely to be foremost in the public's mind - and certainly foregrounded by Greenpeace and the Ogoni. Through this ordering, Shell may have hoped to add credibility to its character and stance of being a "positive force", which comes later in the press release. Indeed, in subsequent press releases, Shell promotes the concept that it has integrity (an appeal to abstract emotive concepts): "*We have never denied that there are some environmental problems connected with our operation and we are committed to dealing with them,*" (Shell press release, 14th November 1995).

Despite Shell's self-promotion, however, the national television news sample failed to broadcast the laudability of Shell, broadcasting only the laudability of Greenpeace. It portrays

Greenpeace as the champion of human rights, and Saro-Wiwa as the champion of the environment (for example, see Table 5.8 shots 1-5).

5.4 Summary of emotive agenda-building

There were a number of similarities and differences in the news media-oriented emotive rhetorical discourses promoted by Greenpeace and Shell in the Spar campaign (spring and summer 1995) and two-week period of the Ogoniland campaign around Saro-Wiwa's death sentence and execution (October-November 1995).

In both campaigns, Greenpeace undertook a double-pronged strategy of attracting media attention through direct action, and explaining its significance. By itself, such direct action would mean little, but by careful use of certain rhetorical practices and semiotic codes, Greenpeace was able to richly imbue these actions with meaning.

Shell switched from its initial apparent strategy in the Spar issue of "*disdaining debate*" (Billig, 1996: 252) with those whose views are thought to be beyond the bounds of reasonable controversy, to fully embracing the importance of establishing the discursive frames. This is demonstrated by the quickness and slickness of Shell's response to the chronologically post-Spar phase of Greenpeace's and MOSOP's Ogoniland campaign: the day that Saro-Wiwa's death sentence was announced (31st October 1995) saw the release of a lengthy, and rhetorically loaded, press release from both Greenpeace and Shell - suggesting that Shell now matched Greenpeace in terms of its media targeting.

In the Spar issue, the media negotiated these emotive discourses by initially following Greenpeace's lead. Thus, Greenpeace is discursive primary definer in the emotive themes of vilification of Shell and ennoblement of Greenpeace throughout the seven-week campaign. Afterwards, however the themes of vilification and ennoblement are much reduced in the Spar news, and where they occur, Shell's discourse is more dominant.

The following chapter examines Greenpeace's and Shell's relative promotion of the discourse of rationalism.

Table 5.10 News Values displayed by the emotive theme of vilification in national television evening news on the Spar issue (30th April - 11th October 1995)

Themes /sub-themes	Total no. of concepts in sub-theme	Number of times the concepts display the news value & %age of total number of concepts displaying the news value												
		PROFESSIONAL NEWS VALUES					LOGISTICAL NEWS VALUES					AUDIENCE-MAXIMISING NEWS VALUES		
		New info.	Watch -dog	Objectivity/balance	Facticity (authentication)	Accessible to journalists	Symbolisation/simplification	Event orientation	Copying the competition	Entertainment	Novelty	Drama	Human interest	Visual appeal
Vilification of Greenpeace	9	8 89%	9 100%	8 89%	9 100%	8 89%	6 67%	9 100%	2 22%	1 11%	5 56%	9 100%	0	
Vilification of Shell: Descriptions of Shell	21	14 67%	21 100%	7 33%	19 90%	9 43%	17 81%	21 100%	14 67%	8 38%	18 86%	17 81%	5 24%	
Spar will be sunk in North Sea	6	2 33%	1 17%	0	5 83%	6 100%	5 83%	6 100%	0	5 83%	6 100%	6 100%	1 17%	
Negative descriptions of Spar	13	4 31%	12 92%	8 62%	5 38%	9 69%	13 100%	13 100%	6 46%	1 8%	5 38%	7 54%	0	
Sub-total (vilification of Shell)	40	20 50%	34 85%	15 38%	29 73%	24 60%	35 88%	40 100%	20 50%	14 35%	29 73%	30 75%	6 15%	
3. SUB-TOTAL FOR VILIFICATION	49	28 57%	43 88%	23 47%	38 78%	32 65%	41 84%	49 100%	22 45%	15 31%	34 69%	39 80%	6 12%	

Table 5.11 News Values displayed by the emotive theme of ennoblement in national television evening news on the Spar issue (30th April - 11th October 1995)

Themes & sub-themes	Total no. of concepts in sub-theme	Number of times the concepts display the news value & %age of total no. of concepts displaying the news value												
		PROFESSIONAL NEWS VALUES					LOGISTICAL NEWS VALUES					AUDIENCE-MAXIMISING NEWS VALUES		
		New info.	Watch-dog	Objectivity/balance	Facticity (authenticity)	Accessible to journalists	Symbolisation/simplification	Event orientation	Copying the competition	Novelty	Drama	Human interest	Visual appeal	
<u>Laudability of Shell</u>														
Positive descriptions of Shell	1	1 100%	0	1 100%	1 100%	1 100%	0	1 100%	0	1 100%	1 100%	1 100%	0	
Positive descriptions of Shell's plans for the Spar	3	3 100%	0	0	0	3 100%	3 100%	3 100%	3 100%	0	1 33%	1 33%	0	
Sub-total for Ennoblement of Shell	4	4 100%	0	1 25%	1 25%	4 100%	3 75%	4 100%	3 75%	1 25%	2 50%	2 50%	0	
<u>Laudability of Greenpeace</u>														
Positive descriptions of Greenpeace	67	50 75%	0	15 22%	38 57%	55 82%	67 100%	67 100%	56 84%	38 57%	66 99%	57 85%	32 48%	
SUB-TOTAL FOR ENNOBLEMENT	71	54 76%	0	16 23%	39 55%	59 83%	70 99%	71 100%	59 83%	42 59%	67 94%	59 83%	32 45%	

CHAPTER 6

MAIN THEME: RATIONALISM (LOGOS)

6.1 Introduction

Shell-UK argued that the Spar issue was: "*a case based on sound science, reason, and careful balance*" (Shell-UK, 1995a). Shell stated that its strategy was: "*to counter allegations with facts, to explain the technical, regulatory and scientific case to all who would listen,*" (Fran Morrison, Media Relations manager, Shell-UK, 1995d: 8). This is an example of Weber's formal/instrumental rationality which consists of:

"... rationally established norms, by enactments, decrees, and regulations, in such a manner that the legitimacy of the authority becomes the legality of the general rule, which is purposely thought out, enacted, and announced with formal correctness," (Weber, 1952/1995: 299).

Weber's "*substantive rationality*", which analyses the values underlying such formally rationalistic procedures, is useful in examining Greenpeace's stance. This is because Greenpeace's use of the scientific and legal arguments was one which involved turning facts and procedures to the service of a campaign largely based on principles, challenging the values that lay beneath Shell's formal rationality.

Rationalism is a main theme derived from the Spar data, and verified by the Ogoniland data, comprising the themes of "scientific arguments" and "legal arguments".¹ This chapter describes salient points from Greenpeace's and Shell's media strategies regarding their promotion of the discourse of rationalism, and their ability to build the agenda of British television news. In doing so, it is deciphering "*logos*" - persuasion through reasoning, involving establishing the true or the apparently true (Herndl & Brown, 1996: 11; Cockroft & Cockroft, 1992: 8). This takes up Foucault's (1991) argument that Western thought has a tendency to invalidate ordinary

¹ The full variation of rationalistic themes, sub-themes & concepts can be found in Appendix 4.

speech acts and convert increasingly more statements into serious speech acts ("truth") produced by specialists within institutional settings - often those of science. Foucault (ibid.: 73) argues that each society has its "*regime of truth*" - i.e. the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements; and the means by which each is sanctioned. In order to see how "truth" is established, examination of logos includes analysis of the range of arguments in the discourse; and the sequence, coherence and logical value of these arguments (Cockroft & Cockroft, 1992: 10).


The Spar issue is addressed first (section 6.2). Here, Greenpeace's and Shell's relative attempts and success in building the news agenda through rationalistic discourse are quantitatively and qualitatively analysed (in terms of the concepts they promote in their press releases and those found in the national television evening news sample). Where a theme/sub-theme is more successful than its counter-theme/sub-theme in building the television news agenda, some of the key news values appealed to by the more successful theme/sub-theme are described.²

The Ogoniland issue is addressed in section 6.3. This is used to verify the transferability of themes/sub-themes derived from the Spar issue, and to demonstrate how Greenpeace's and Shell's use of rationalism changed over time. Section 6.4 summarises key features of rationalistic agenda-building.


² Quantitative summary tables of the news values appealed to by each theme/sub-theme are found at the end of the chapter.

Graph 6.1

**The "precedent" argument in national television evening news broadcasts on the Spar issue
(30th April - 11th October 1995)**



Graph 6.2
Promotion of the "precedent" argument in Greenpeace and Shell press releases on the Spar issue (30th April - 11th October 1995)



6.2 Rationalistic themes in the Brent Spar issue

6.2.1 Rationalistic theme: scientific arguments

The scientific journals New Scientist and Nature were examined to unearth the scientific discourse on the Spar's disposal. Notably, there was no independent scientific opinion published in these journals on the disposal issue until after Shell's U-turn. This is because of the relatively long time it takes to get published in scientific journals,³ and also because: "*Frankly, there wasn't much independent scientific opinion,*" (Fred Pearce, Environment Consultant, New Scientist, questionnaire response, March 2000). Since scientific journals are an important source in mass media coverage of environmental stories (ibid.), there was a gap in the market for scientific verification of the Spar issue. Thus, during Greenpeace's seven-week campaign the media had to turn elsewhere for scientific explanation. The following analysis reveals the extent and manner in which they turned to Greenpeace and Shell, and any experts who were willing to speak on the issue. The scientific and technological issues covered were the precedent set by the Spar's disposal, the toxicity of the Spar, the environmental impact of deep-sea disposal, and the environmental impact of onshore disposal.

6.2.1.1 Precedent or one-off?

The argument regarding the precedent set by the Spar's disposal was important to Greenpeace because at the start of its campaign, the UK Government had yet to publish its guidelines on the decommissioning of offshore facilities.⁴

The precedent argument in the Spar issue covered two stages. Greenpeace argued that: (1) disposing of the Spar at sea would set a precedent of deep-sea disposal for all other oil and gas platforms in the North Sea; and (2) bringing the Spar ashore set a precedent of onshore disposal. These arguments used the "*part/whole*" model of rhetorical argumentation where more about the whole is learned from examining the part (Cockroft & Cockroft, 1992: 72).

³ Nature has a policy of not offering unpublished evidence to the media (Anderson, 1997: 163).

⁴ These guidelines were published half way through Greenpeace's seven-week campaign, near the end of May 1995. They allowed for the disposal method to be decided on a case-by-case basis, including techniques like toppling rigs in place.

Greenpeace began its campaign with the argument that the Spar would set a precedent for dumping 400 other North Sea platforms, thus defining the issue without reference to Shell's position that the Spar was a unique structure deserving special treatment. In most of its later press releases, Greenpeace does not quantify the number of platforms, allowing the threat to be magnified through vagueness anchored by prior suggestion. Shell did not respond to Greenpeace's precedent argument until week three of Greenpeace's campaign, and only minimally thereafter, merely stating that the Spar was a special case because it was: "*an unusual installation in that it is a floating oil storage terminal and buoy*," (Shell press release, 16th May 1995). Shell never elaborated *how* the Spar was different to other rigs and *why* this was significant. The opportunity to control the discourse by using the rhetorical strategy of the "*special case*" (Billig, 1996: 173) was therefore missed. It would have necessitated an immediate explanation as to what the general rule was, and why the Spar was an exception.

Graph 6.1 shows that in stage one of the precedent argument, Greenpeace's world-view was more successful than Shell's in building the agenda of national television evening news. Examination of the news values adhered to by this sub-theme (see Table 6.6) showed that it adhered more highly than Shell's counter-argument to the professional news value of watchdog, the logistical news value of symbolisation and simplification, and the audience-maximising news value of drama (superlativeness) as demonstrated below.

"Will the Prime Minister tell us how the government intends to stop the other 50 North Sea oil rigs awaiting disposal [drama - superlativeness] being similarly disposed of [watchdog] by dropping them [simplification] into some vast underwater toxic scrap metal dump [drama - superlativeness] off the coast of Scotland?" (Paddy Ashdown, Liberal Democrat leader, speaking in the House of Commons, Channel 4 News, 7.00pm. 20th June 1995).

Shell's world-view was not broadcast until week four of the campaign - and then the precedent argument was stated baldly, with no explanation given: "*But the scientist who assessed the*


pollution danger for Shell say the Spar will not set a precedent. Few of the older rigs will be dumped in the North Sea," (reporter, Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 23rd May 1995). The only elaboration of why the Spar was a special case came on the day of the U-turn, where the Spar was reported as unique because it was: "... *a storage container vessel and not typical of most production platforms which are just pumping stations,*" (reporter, BBC1, 9.00pm News, 20th June 1995). Indeed, Deutsche-Shell's Peter Duncan recognised that: "*This is a failure of our communications effort, of why we have not been able to put over that this is a unique case,*" (BBC2 Newsnight, 20th June 1995).

On the day of the U-turn, the precedent argument shifted to stage two - does bringing the Spar ashore set a precedent? In the weeks following the U-turn, Greenpeace argued that it did. However, the frequency with which Greenpeace made this argument in its press releases diminished greatly (see Graph 6.2) whilst Shell took a much more pro-active stance.


In the television news sample, Greenpeace's version is initially privileged over Shell's - getting relatively more broadcast time on the day of the U-turn (see Graph 6.1). The argument ranged from the weak version (other platforms *may* be brought ashore) through to the strong version (all other platforms will come ashore). The much less frequent broadcasting of Shell's world-view comes through the concepts that sinking was still being considered as an option for the Spar; and that a case-by-case basis continues to operate. However, Shell's stronger promotional activity pays off as this pattern of media agenda-building changes some months after the U-turn (see Graph 6.1). The strong version of the pro-Greenpeace argument - that a precedent had been set - was diluted into an argument centred on the Spar's disposal again - so ignoring the issue of the precedent for other rigs. Thus, the power of Greenpeace's original rhetorical argument, which was achieved by use of the part/whole rhetorical model of argumentation (Spar/all North Sea rigs), was greatly diminished by Shell's re-definition of the issue as one focused solely on the Spar. At the same time, Shell's world-view that no precedent had been set achieved dominance in television broadcast news. For instance: "*We're not ruling out anything and we're not ruling in anything,*" (Eric Faulds, Brent Spar Project Manager, BBC1 9.00pm

news, 11th October 1995). Compared to Greenpeace's precedent argument regarding onshore disposal, Shell's version adhered more highly to the professional news values of facticity (authentication - for instance, it gave more statements), the logistical news value of accessibility (Shell issued more extensive press releases) and the audience-maximising news value of novelty (Shell's argument that its U-turn had not set a precedent for onshore disposal was unusual given that previous broadcasts had favoured Greenpeace's argument that a precedent had been set) (see Table 6.6).

Graph 6.3
Toxicity of the Spar promoted by Greenpeace and Shell press releases and found in national television evening news on the Spar issue (30th April - 11th October 1995)



Graph 6.4
Promotion of environmental impact of deep-sea disposal of the Spar in Greenpeace and Shell press releases
(30th April - 11th October 1995)



6.2.1.2 Toxicity of the Spar

The toxicity of the Spar proved to be a key issue. After Shell's U-turn, the safety foundation Det Norske Veritas (DNV) was commissioned to perform an independent audit of the Spar. Their results, published on 18th October 1995, found that Greenpeace's high estimates of the Spar's toxicity were wrong, with the true figure closer to Shell's original, much lower, estimate (Shell press release, 18th October 1995).

These toxicity figures, however, were not available during Greenpeace's seven-week campaign. In the absence of independent scientific evidence, Greenpeace repeatedly labeled the Spar's waste as toxic (see Graph 6.3), probably because international commitments regarding the North Sea ban the dumping of toxic waste there (see section 6.2.2.2, below). Greenpeace was also aware of the forthcoming meeting of North Sea Ministers in June, where pollution targets and achievements would be discussed.⁵ Greenpeace uses the "*definitional model*" of rhetorical argumentation (Aristotle, 1965: 70), initially mixing definitional precision with deliberate vagueness, so creating an image of maximum potential risk. The first Greenpeace press release in the campaign states:

"The Brent Spar contains over 100 tonnes of toxic sludge - including oil, arsenic, cadmium, PCBs and lead - including more than 30 tonnes of radioactive waste left over from oil drilling and storage operations on the Brent Oil Field," (Greenpeace press release, 30th April 1995).

Contrast this with the specificity of Shell's toxicity estimate:

"The irreducible sources of possible contamination left before disposal will consist of the paints and sacrificial anodes on the structure itself and up to 100 (not 300 as has been alleged) tonnes of sludge, consisting of 90% sand and 10% oil residues containing very small quantities of

⁵ For example, see Greenpeace press releases, 2nd May 1995; 24th May 1995.

heavy metals, and 30 tonnes of solid deposits of low level radioactive salts in the tanks and pipework," (Shell press release, 16th May 1995).

Thus, Greenpeace was accurate regarding the weight of the sludge, but inaccurately classified all of it as toxic. Greenpeace used the rhetorical device of amplification (Cockroft & Cockroft (1992: 134), consisting of a summary statement ("*100 tonnes of toxic sludge*") preceding a graphic list of what the sludge contains. This impacts through a mounting series of increments - finishing with arguably the most chilling detail - "*30 tonnes of radioactive waste*" (omitting Shell's adjective of "*low-level*"). After setting the scene, Greenpeace's subsequent strategy was hyperbole and imprecision. In ten press releases whenever the Spar was referred to it was "*highly toxic and radioactive*" containing "*hazardous substances.*" Greenpeace's claims about the Spar's toxicity became wilder as the weeks progressed, the most over-stated being: "*14,500 tonnes of toxic rubbish.*" (Greenpeace press release, 9th June 1995). This hyperbolic intensity was maintained until Shell's U-turn. Thus, Greenpeace uses a form of argumentation that had successfully built the media agenda regarding environmental issues in the past: namely that of threat and risk (see Hansen, 1991).

However, emotive promotion of the Spar's toxicity encounters the problem of the credibility of the scientific claims. To overcome this, Greenpeace backed up its toxicity claims with its own scientific analysis:

"The Brent Spar is carrying more than 5,000 tonnes of oil, and many more toxic chemicals than Shell knew about", Greenpeace said today after analysing the results of samples taken from the Brent Spar during the Greenpeace occupation," (Greenpeace press release, 16th June 1995).

Greenpeace also turned to independent scientific testimony by publicising a leaked document from the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries (MAFF) to the DTI saying that:

"the zinc and copper aboard the Spar should be "treated as hazardous waste"; ... and that "Shell will have to apply for a dumping licence to dispose of any water or other wastes from the Brent Spar, and very stringent controls should be applied," (Greenpeace press release, 20th June 1995).

Greenpeace tried to further bolster its scientific credibility through use of the "testimonial model" of argumentation (Plato, 1965: 40): "... Greenpeace has also been contacted by an oil worker who was on the Spar in 1980/81, when he was asked to seal three concrete tanks of chemicals into the Spar," (Greenpeace press release, 16th June 1995). Greenpeace's final challenge in making the toxicity argument a corner-stone of its campaign was translating the invisibility of the toxins into visualisations for television news. To counter this, Greenpeace activists provided visual aids, for instance, erecting a sign inside the Spar reading "POLLUTED SEA WATER" (see Table 6.1) - an idea visually augmented by the brown water inside the Spar.

Table 6.1 Excerpt from Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 21st June 1995

Image	Voiceover
<p>Location mode: Reporter's voice-over filmed sequences in which reporter is not shown.</p> <p>Caption "Greenpeace video". Film inside the Spar. Camera pans up from dirty brown water on the floor to the walls of a room, a large red cylinder on the right, a white wall face on.</p>	<p>Reporter: "The Norwegians want to know how much toxic material is inside the rig."</p>
<p>Caption "Greenpeace video".</p> <p>Visual: Black felt-tip capitals on white arrow, stuck to green wall, reading "POLLUTED SEA WATER".</p>	<p>"Shell's provided that information..."</p>
<p>MS of two people in Wellington boots (focus is on the boots) walking through the brown water in the dark Spar.</p>	<p>"... for the environmental impact assessment when they were given a license ..."</p>

Two-and -a-half months later, however, found Greenpeace backtracking on its toxicity claims (see Table 6.2).

Table 6.2 Greenpeace press release, "Greenpeace stands by its campaign to stop the Brent Spar being dumped at sea ", 31st October 1995

Sent-ence	
1	<i>"Throughout the Brent Spar campaign Greenpeace based its case upon figures supplied by Shell.</i>
2	<i>These indicated that the Brent Spar contained approximately 100 tonnes of toxic sludge and 30 tonnes of low level radioactive waste.</i>
3	<i>However, during its campaign against the dumping of the Brent Spar installation, Greenpeace took samples from three of the six storage tanks because of Shell's failure to provide an inventory of the contents of the installation.</i>
4	<i>The results were published only five days before Shell reversed its decision to dump the Brent Spar.</i>
5	<i>Greenpeace scientists who analysed the samples were given the wrong information regarding the depths that the samples were taken.</i>
6	<i>Instead of the depths being measured at the top of the storage tanks they were taken from top of vent pipes that gave access to the tanks.</i>
7	<i>As a result of this, the estimate for the amount of oil remaining in the Brent Spar is likely to be in error.</i>
... 11	<i>... Our opposition to the plans for deep-sea disposal, and our public and political work were based on the information provided by Shell.</i>
12	<i>The reports on which they based their initial decision have been criticised by independent scientists.</i>
... 16	<i>... The Greenpeace position on the Spar has never been based on kilos or tons, but on the principles of dumping.</i>
17	<i>This has also been the debate in the wider political community."</i>

Here, Greenpeace comes clean about its scientific error (sentences 6-7) - probably because it could afford to (in that it had already forced Shell to U-turn) and because it could not afford not to (in that much of its public appeal comes from assuming the moral high ground). Before admitting its mistake, Greenpeace tries to shift the blame onto Shell for withholding inventory information (sentence 3) and supplying "wrong information" about the depths at which Greenpeace's samples were taken (sentence 5). Meanwhile, Greenpeace clings to its scientific argument by vaguely citing support from "independent scientists" in general (sentence 12). At

the same time as explaining the technicalities behind its science, however, Greenpeace reaffirms the widely held (sentence 17) principle on which its campaign was based (sentence 16); and tries to minimise the relevance of the scientific specifics to the issue (sentence 4).


At first, Shell did little to counter Greenpeace's toxicity argument (see Graph 6.3). In these press releases, Shell responds to Greenpeace's allegations, arguing that Greenpeace's claims are overstated, and that the Spar had been made safe. Thus, Shell's main problem was its tardiness in countering Greenpeace's claims that the Spar was a pollutant. Further evidence that Shell was reactive, rather than proactive, can be seen in its defensive language the day after its U-turn: *"This is not a toxic waste bin. The 100 tonnes of sludge, everybody quickly forgets, is over 90 tonnes of sand. Everything in that so-called dustbin is actually naturally produced items,"* (Chris Fay, Shell-UK, Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 21st June 1995).

As a result of Shell's late and minimal response to Greenpeace's toxicity claims during the seven-week campaign, Greenpeace's version was broadcast before Shell's counter-argument and more frequently (see Graph 6.3). The day of the U-turn found Greenpeace's wilder claims about the amount of waste in the news: *"The estimate from the Greenpeace lab at Exeter University, which has yet to be confirmed, is that there are 5,500 tonnes of oily sludge on the Spar, 100 times more than Shell's figure,"* (reporter, Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 21st June 1995). Compared to Shell's toxicity arguments, Greenpeace's adhered more to the professional news values of watchdog (revealing Shell's malpractice in "covering up" the Spar's "real" toxicity); the logistical news value of symbolisation and simplification (the precise contents of the Spar were rarely mentioned); and the audience-maximising news values of copying the competition (Greenpeace's version was reported widely across news programmes), novelty and drama (superlativeness and risk) as the toxicity claims became progressively wilder (see Table 6.7).

Hand-in-hand with the toxicity argument was the related argument about the environmental impact of deep-sea disposal.

Graph 6.5

Environmental impact of deep-sea disposal of the Spar in national television evening news broadcasts on the Spar issue (30th April- 11th October 1995)



6.2.1.3 Environmental impact of deep-sea disposal

Most scientific opinion, published after the U-turn, supported the sub-theme of "unknown environmental impact of deep-sea disposal". Many reasons were given for this, including the following.

- Contamination of food chain: "*... the report ignores the recent growth in deep-water fishing close to the proposed dumping grounds,*" (Pearce, New Scientist, 26th August 1995).
- Poor scientific assessment of environmental impact: "*John Gage and John Gordon of the government-funded Scottish Association for Marine Science (SAMS) ... claim that Shell's environmental assessment of the dumpsite and public statements by some government scientists have been 'very misleading',*" (ibid.).
- Disturbance of accumulated waste: "*Greenpeace says that toppling platforms could also disturb toxic drilling muds and chemicals on the seabed beneath the platforms, spreading the waste over wider areas,*" (New Scientist, 24th June 1995: 14-15).
- Possible collision: "*... oil companies worry that they may lay themselves open to legal liability for an accident involving a partially demolished rig. Their "worst case scenario involves a submarine carrying nuclear weapons,"*" (ibid.).
- Potential species destruction: "*The waste stored aboard Brent Spar could well act as an energy source for deep-sea bacteria, but may not necessarily benefit species already present: rather, they may be replaced by specialists better adapted to the changed conditions,*" (Elderfield et al. Nature, 376, 20th July 1995).

Despite the fact that the weight of scientific opinion was on the side of **unknown environmental impact**, this sub-theme was promoted in only two Greenpeace press releases during its seven-week campaign (see Graph 6.4). It comprised two concepts: lack of knowledge regarding both the contents of the Spar, and the impact on the marine environment of deep-sea disposal. Occasionally, Greenpeace gives a reason for the unknown environmental impact: "*There is a lack of understanding of the deep sea environment, and it is currently impossible to predict the effects of the proposed dumping on deep sea ecosystems,*" (Greenpeace press release, 20th July 1995). This uses the "cause-and-effect" model of rhetorical argumentation

(Cockroft & Cockroft, 1992: 61): the lack of understanding of the deep sea causes an inability to predict the effects of dumping on deep-sea ecosystems.

Much more prevalent in Greenpeace press releases during the seven-week campaign was the sub-theme that deep-sea disposal of the Spar would have a large negative impact on the environment (see Graph 6.4).⁶ In the first week of its campaign, Greenpeace explained why sinking the Spar would damage the environment, taking some of the arguments for "unknown environmental impact" and casting them as certainties. These covered the following concepts:

- Pressurised eco-system: "*Marine ecosystems, especially in the North Sea, are still under serious pressure from chemical and radioactive discharges, sewage pollution, pesticide run-off, atmospheric pollution, among other sources. ... Dumping oil platforms laden with toxic cocktails will only add to the list of contaminants,*" (Greenpeace press release, 30th April 1995).

The rhetorical tool of synathrismos operates here in that these environmentally-charged nouns seem designed to induce intellectual pressure in the audience - so drawing a parallel with the pressurised eco-system.

- Persistent and bioaccumulative waste: "*Many of the contents are persistent and bioaccumulative and will cause irreparable damage to the marine environment and its wildlife,*" (Greenpeace press release, 2nd May 1995). This uses vagueness in that the toxic contents are not named, nor is the "*irreparable damage*" specified. Referring to the "*wildlife*" uses the rhetorical device of "*enargia*" (graphic vividness) (Cockroft & Cockroft, 1992: 45) which pictures circumstances in which emotion is inherent. "*Wildlife*" produces mental images of familiar creatures - from those seen in our natural environment to those seen regularly in nature programmes. It is a more appealing term than "worms" - the main visible inhabitants in deep sea ocean ridges - or more specifically: "*white vestimentiferan tubeworms, grey limpets and several polychaete worm species,*" (Nisbet and Fowler, *Nature*, 29th June 1995: 715).

- Danger to marine vessels. Greenpeace argues that toppling rigs in situ: "... *will further endanger fishing and other vessels in the North Sea,*" (Greenpeace press release, 5th May 1995).

⁶ This argument received no independent scientific backing after the U-turn.

This uses the device of personalisation (Corner et al., 1990: 40) to draw out the impact of deep-sea disposal on humans.

Greenpeace's reasoning becomes rarer after week two of its campaign. The issue becomes nominalised, so that it is presented in a more simple and sound-bite-friendly manner:

- "*Peter Sand Mortensen, Chair of the Fishermens' Sector, International Transport Federation, ITF: "It is quite simply a catastrophe. For the environment, ..."*" (Greenpeace press release, 13th May. 1995).

- "*Shell is trying to appear responsible to the public whilst carrying out one of the most irresponsible acts of environmental vandalism we have seen for years,*" (Greenpeace press release, 23rd May 1995).

Thus, after establishing a range of explanations regarding why deep-sea disposal would damage the environment, Greenpeace uses simplification combined with repetition over fifteen press releases during the seven-week campaign, to hammer its point home.

Analysis of the scientific journals showed that there was a lot of eventual scientific support for Shell's sub-theme that **deep-sea disposal would minimally damage the marine ecosystem** (see Appendix 4, Table 1). Reasons for this included:

- Natural sources of deep water pollution are worse: "*... the Broken Spur vent field in the North Atlantic churns out up to five million tonnes of heavy metals annually, by which yardstick Brent Spar's cargo is insignificant,*" (Nature, 29th June 1995: 708).

- Localised pollution effects: "*The initial impact would affect an area equivalent to two football fields. The organisms affected would be relatively few ...*," (Masood, Nature, 3rd August 1995).

- Short-term pollution effects: "*The biological community would be re-established within a few years,*" *predicts Krebs,*" (ibid.).

- No useful living resources on deep sea floor: "*Angel claims that "there are almost without exception no living resources worth exploiting" on the deep seafloor,*" (New Scientist, 16th September 1995).

- No impact on biodiversity: "... Angel also argues in his paper that local dumping would cause 'no impact on biodiversity ... because the distribution of species are ocean basin in scale'," (ibid.).

However, given the absence of published scientific opinion during Greenpeace's seven-week campaign, it was largely left to Shell to publicise why there would be limited environmental impact from deep-sea disposal. Shell did so minimally (see Graph 6.4), promoting the sub-theme in only four press releases during the seven-week campaign, and limiting its explanations to statements about localised pollution effects and the absence of useful living resources on the deep sea floor. Rather than using the reactive argument of minimal environmental impact, Shell tried to re-define the issue through a discussion of the positive environmental impact of deep-sea disposal, as can be seen by the following concepts:

- Deep-sea disposal is the Best Practicable Environmental Option (BPEO): "*Deepwater disposal of the Spar has been independently assessed as the best option from an environmental point of view, and in terms of several other considerations including health, safety and economic efficiency,*" (Shell press release, 16th May 1995). This sub-theme was heavily promoted by Shell. It is a cost-benefit type of argument, which claims to look rationally at a number of factors when determining a course of action.

- Deep-sea disposal is ecologically friendly:⁷ "... risks could be reduced if the oil storage tanks could be cleaned in-situ. If this was successful, a 'rigs to reefs' solution, for example, could be feasible," (Shell press release, 11th October 1995). Here, Shell tries to simplify the issue into a sound-bite ("*rigs-to-reefs*").

As a result of this promotional activity, Greenpeace quickly loses its initial lead in building the media agenda with its world-view (see Graph 6.5). This is despite the variety of mechanisms by which Greenpeace's world-view is broadcast. One such mechanism is visual aids, an example

⁷ This sub-theme was later supported by some independent scientists who argued that deep-sea disposal is good for deep-sea bacteria since many require heavy metals as electron or energy sources in their metabolism (Editorial, *Nature*, 29th June 1995: 708).

of which is shown in Table 6.3. Here, Greenpeace's lettering on the Spar model reads "*SAVE OUR SEA: GREENPEACE*", also forming an "SOS" (see Table 6.3). This slogan uses the first person pronoun "*our*" in an attempt to identify with the audience and recognise common problems (Cockroft & Cockroft, 1992: 29).

Table 6.3 Extract from BBC1 9.00pm News, 19th June 1995

Image	Voiceover	Ambient sound
<p><u>Location mode.</u> Reporter's voice-over filmed sequences in which reporter is not shown. Visual: To the left of the entrance to a five-storey building is a yellow model of Brent Spar, about two storey's high, in extreme long shot (ELS). Several people in business suits mill about the entrance of the building. A car drives past. In the bottom left hand corner is a medium-close shot (MCS) of a person (Greenpeace protestor?) in a red boiler suit.</p>	<p>Reporter: <i>"In the Hague, a Brent Spar model ..."</i></p>	<p>Car driving past</p>
<p>Visual: CU of the model, taken from an oblique angle from the ground looking up at it. Black lettering on the yellow bottom three quarters of the model reads "<i>SAVE OUR SEA GREENPEACE</i>". The first three words are vertically arranged underneath to read "<i>SOS</i>" (in red). At the bottom of the yellow section of the Spar model is the Shell logo, outlined in red, with black drips over it (resembling oil). The top quarter of the model is red, bearing "<i>BRENT SPAR</i>" in white lettering. A flag billows at the top.</p>	<p><i>"...focused attention on the Greenpeace campaign."</i></p>	

Another mechanism by which the sub-theme of large environmental impact was broadcast was interviews with European and British politicians supporting deep-sea disposal. For instance, when commenting on Shell's U-turn, Frank Dobson, Labour Shadow Environment Minister states: "*It's very good news. It is good for the environment and for jobs. I'm glad that Shell has seen the light and done the sensible thing,*" (BBC1 9.00pm News: 20th June 1995). This implies that Shell has undergone a significant transformation - perhaps even involving their belief system ("*seen the light*"), and now acknowledge that deep-sea disposal would have damaged the environment (in fact, a stance never adopted by Shell).

On the day of the U-turn, the promoters of scientific support for Greenpeace widen to government scientists. There is extensive reporting of Greenpeace's claims that Government scientists condemned the sinking - to the extent that it provoked the following reaction from an originally pro-Shell scientist: "Dr. Gordon Picken, the study's author [AURIS report] said: "If the Greenpeace figures are shown to be accurate we would have to recalculate the environmental impact assessment," (reporter, Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 21st June 1995).

However, Shell's promotional activity was more successful in building the news agenda, particularly its sub-theme of the positive environmental impact of deep-sea disposal (see Graph 6.5) comprising the concepts that sinking is the BPEO; and that sinking is ecologically friendly. For instance, the extract below (see Table 6.4) raises the possibility of rigs-to-reefs disposal in a visually appealing way.

Table 6.4 Extract from BBC1 9.00pm News, 19th June 1995

Image	Voiceover
<p><u>Location mode</u>: Reporter's voice-over filmed sequences in which reporter is not shown</p> <p>Film: LS of two divers underwater in turquoise water, framed by a criss-crossing of barnacle-encrusted girders.</p>	<p>Reporter: "<i>In the Gulf of Mexico some dismantled platforms ...</i>"</p>
<p>Film: Two yellow fish swim amongst barnacle encrusted rocks/girders in black water.</p>	<p>"...form reefs for fishes and some experts suggest something similar could be done here and some experts suggest something similar could be done here."</p>


Compared to Greenpeace's sub-theme of large negative environmental impact of deep-sea disposal, the sub-theme of its positive environmental impact adheres strongly to the professional news values of new information and balance (counteracting the previous broadcasts favouring Greenpeace's argument); the logistical news value of accessibility (it was heavily promoted in Shell's press releases); and the audience-maximising news value of copying the competition and novelty (since this was a frame shift from the broadcasts over the

previous weeks, which had primarily engaged in the risk issue regarding the extent of the pollution deep-sea disposal might cause).

Shell's world-view is broadcast mainly on the day of the U-turn and the following day, via interviews with Shell and its allies (see Graph 6.5). Yet, why did Shell continue to proclaim the environmental benefits of deep-sea disposal whilst simultaneously pulling out from this option? It is likely that Shell may have been undertaking a form of damage limitation. By stressing that deep-sea disposal was the most environmentally friendly choice, this emphasises that its U-turn had been forced by Greenpeace, so trying to re-establish Shell's green credentials whilst highlighting Greenpeace's wrong-headedness. More significantly, it paves the way for Shell to later capitulate on its U-turn and return to the option of deep-sea disposal. Indeed, some months later, Shell refuses to rule out the deep-sea disposal option if other alternatives fail to match it in terms of BPEO. Thus, Shell's argument that deep-sea disposal is good for the environment is the sole surviving scientific sub-theme to be broadcast several months later in October.

The absence of scientific arguments in the television news sample after the U-turn stems from the relative lack of promotion by Greenpeace or Shell regarding the Spar's toxicity and environmental impact (see Graph 6.4). Another reason may have been lack of journalistic interest in covering this issue, given that the main event - the U-turn was over (the "event-orientation" of television news).

Graph 6.6
Onshore disposal of the Spar promoted in Greenpeace and Shell press releases and found in national television evening news broadcasts on the Spar issue (30th April - 11th October)



6.2.1.4 The advocacy of onshore disposal?

Statutes governing onshore disposal include the Environmental Protection Act (1990) (EPA), which introduced a system of integrated pollution control to minimise pollution. AURIS predicted that it was likely that several of the activities involved in the cleaning and dismantling of the Spar onshore would fall within the scope of this legislation (ibid.: 24).⁸ Underpinning these instruments, it is an offence in England and Wales under the Water Resources Act (1991) to pollute any "*controlled*" water. Thus, the questionable structural integrity of the Spar and the consequent dangers of it breaking up in controlled waters was a consideration (ibid.: 25). Another problem with bringing the Spar ashore was the radioactivity (LSA scale) aboard the Spar. Although this scale has a low level of radioactivity it is a hazard to human health, particularly if allowed to dry and form an inhalable dust. The removal and disposal of LSA scale is therefore strictly regulated, principally by the Radioactive Substances Act (1993).

By contrast, offshore disposal is subject to much less legislation. When Greenpeace started its campaign against deep-sea disposal, the UK Government had not produced guidelines concerning disposal of offshore installations (it only did so at the end of May 1995). Thus, the main UK legislation regulating the disposal of materials offshore was the Food and Environmental Protection Act (FEPA) (1985). This requires the preparation of a statement on the BPEO - something that Shell had already prepared as part of its decommissioning (under the Petroleum Act 1987) (University of Aberdeen and AURIS Ltd., 1994: 24). Furthermore, the radioactivity of the Spar was at a level that exempted it from the Radioactive Substances Act (1960) and (1993). Because of these reasons, Shell was eager to avoid onshore disposal: being subject to much more UK legislation than offshore disposal, it would prove more costly.

⁸ Operations during onshore cleaning and scrapping in port would be regulated under the Environmental Protection Act (1990) parts 1 and 2; the Control of Pollution (Landed Ship's Waste) Regulations (and Amendments) (1989); and the Dangerous Substances in Harbour Areas Regulations (1987) (and amendments) (ibid.,25).

There was limited independent scientific support for Greenpeace's advocacy of onshore disposal, and much scientific support for Shell's counter-argument that onshore disposal was difficult. This covered the following concepts.

- Practical problems getting ashore: *"To float [the Spar] to land and dispose of it would be an immense task with many steps and many risks both to workers and to the environment," says McIntyre [marine biologist]. "It would be easier and safer to dump it in the deep ocean",* (New Scientist, 24th June 1995: 15).

- Onshore disposal is environmentally risky: *"The alternative to dumping on the deep ocean floor is to dispose of the heavy metals from the Brent Spar on land. But this will be problematic, as it will involve a difficult breaking-up process, followed by storage in a landfill, where aquifers may become contaminated. To land biota, elements such as cadmium can be very toxic,"* (Nature, 29th June 1995b: 715).

Given the uphill task of persuading Shell to adopt a disposal solution which would involve much more regulation (and hence expense), and given the absence of scientific support for its position, Greenpeace worked hard to set the terms of debate early on (see Graph 6.6). Thus, it started its campaign by promoting the sub-theme of **scientific advocacy of onshore disposal**, covering the concepts that onshore disposal is technically feasible, cost-effective, safe, good for jobs and the best environmental option. Most of these concepts were made in Greenpeace's first press release of its campaign: *"A Greenpeace report released today ... concludes that total removal is not only the best environmental option but also the most cost-effective, feasible and job-saving,"* (Greenpeace press release, 30th April 1995). Here Greenpeace responds in kind to Shell's initial press release several month earlier which said of onshore disposal that:

"this approach, involving reversing the installation process, would be technically complex, involving a high number of offshore operations, would give no environmental benefit compared with deep water disposal, and would involve a significantly higher cost than the approved option [i.e. deep-sea disposal]," (Shell press release, 16th February 1995).

In effect, although never using this terminology, Greenpeace is arguing that onshore disposal is the BPEO, hence mirroring Shell's argument that deep-sea disposal was the BPEO.

Given the absence of independent scientific comment during the U-turn, Greenpeace turned this to its advantage. It commissioned new studies on onshore disposal, for instance, an analysis by an "*independent offshore engineering consultant*" (Greenpeace press release, 2nd May 1995). It turned to old studies on onshore disposal, such as the Smit Engineering report (1992) (Greenpeace press release, 9th June 1995). It turned to its own scientists for added credibility: "*Greenpeace's scientific advisory Dr. Paul Johnston is available to discuss, in detail, why land disposal is not only the best available disposal option, but how it should be done,*" (Greenpeace press release, 23rd June 1995). Greenpeace scientists also wrote into the scientific journals: "*Engineering firms are queuing up to show that they can dismantle the Brent Spar safely and effectively (ref.10) as has already been done with hundreds of oil installations in the Gulf of Mexico and nine in the North Sea itself,*" (Wallace and Johnston, *Nature*, 20th July 1995).

In the week leading up to the U-turn, Shell heavily promoted the arguments against onshore disposal (see Graph 6.6). For instance, Shell argues that Greenpeace was wrong to use earlier studies to claim that onshore disposal was better than deep-sea disposal, such as Greenpeace's use of a 1994 Heeremac study (originally commissioned by Shell Expro to review studies on onshore disposal). Shell accuses Greenpeace of ignoring the safety aspects of the report's suggestions: "*Shell Expro has serious concerns regarding the safety of relying on compressed gas to maintain the necessary buoyancy whilst towing the Spar through an environmentally sensitive marine area with only an eight meter seabed clearance,*" (Shell press release, 18 June 1995).

Neither Greenpeace's nor Shell's arguments were broadcast until the day of the U-turn, when onshore disposal was suddenly framed as a potential reality. Shell's late promotional activity was successful to the extent that on the day of the U-turn, both Greenpeace's and Shell's arguments were broadcast. The broadcasts later in the year show that the balance swings more

in Greenpeace's favour (see Graph 6.6). This was perhaps due to Greenpeace's post-U-turn trickle of advocating onshore disposal, combined with an absence of Shell's promotional activity against onshore disposal. In fact, Shell issued a press release in which onshore disposal was shown to be a possibility (amongst other options) (Shell press release, 11th October 1995). The predominance of Greenpeace's world-view may also be explained in terms of news values. Advocation of onshore disposal adheres more than its counter-argument to the professional news value of facticity/authentication (Greenpeace's press releases in July and September combined with Shell's press release in October); the logistical news value of accessibility to journalists (Shell's press release in October) and simplification (the argument for onshore disposal did not go into the complexities of the process) (see Table 6.7).

6.2.1.5 Summary of news agenda-building in the Spar issue via scientific discourse

This analysis indicates the importance of self-promotion of one's scientific world-view in building the news agenda. This is evidenced by the fact that Greenpeace's world-view was generally broadcast via Greenpeace activists or scientists; and Shell's world-view was often broadcast by interviews with scientists from the Institute for Oceanographic Sciences. That this arose through self-promotion is suggested by one scientist involved in the Spar issue:⁹ *"Those scientists that were heavily involved [in broadcast coverage of the Spar issue] were often touting for research funds rather than taking an objective view of the issues,"* (John Gray, Professor, Marine Biology, University of Oslo, e-mail interview, January 2000).

The scientific world-view, however, must be promoted in a media-friendly manner. As Lambon observes: *"Scientists are useful in that they can alert one to a story, explain the technicalities of an issue and provide opinions on scientific matters. However, scientists tend to be academics and as such are seldom good for television as their answers are inevitably too intricate and lengthy,"* (Tim Lambon, Freelance producer, editor and cameraman to US and UK networks, e-mail interview, 21st February 2000).


⁹ Gray commented on the Spar issue in the New Scientist (24th June 1995: 15). His stance was that the cost of complete removal of the Spar would be disproportionate to the risks of leaving it behind.

From the very start of its campaign, Greenpeace alerted the media to the science behind the issue, filling the gap in the market for immediate scientific verification of claims, and doing so in a media-friendly manner. Greenpeace mixed specific details with vague statements to maximise the threat of risk. It offered early explanations for its scientific positions, but quickly reduced these in favour of simplified sound-bites. It used evidence from its own scientists, from previously published (if out-dated or decontextualised) reports from independent and government scientists, and from a testimony by an oil worker. As one journalist notes: "*It pushes the data as far as it can. As you'd expect,*" (Fred Pearce, Environment Consultant, New Scientist, questionnaire response, March 2000).

With all of the scientific arguments, Shell acted three weeks later than Greenpeace in promoting its counter-arguments. This allowed Greenpeace to achieve discursive primary definition status in the arguments that deep-sea disposal would set a precedent and that the Spar was toxic. However, as Shell's counter-campaign starts, Greenpeace loses its initial discursive primary definition status in the argument that onshore disposal sets a precedent (lost after the U-turn) and the argument regarding the Spar's environmental impact (lost by week 3 of the campaign). Greenpeace wins discursive primary definition status in its argument regarding the advocacy of onshore disposal (after the U-turn). Therefore, Greenpeace had mixed success in building the news agenda with scientific discourse.


Graph 6.7

The legality of Greenpeace, promoted by Greenpeace and Shell press releases and found in national television evening news broadcasts on the Spar issue (30th April - 11th October)



Graph 6.8

Legality of Shell promoted in Greenpeace and Shell press releases and found in national television evening news broadcasts on the Spar issue (30th April - 11th October 1995)



6.2.2 Rationalistic theme: legal arguments

6.2.2.1 The legality of Greenpeace

Greenpeace's direct action lays itself open to the charge of illegality. Shell capitalised on this, actively promoting the sub-theme of Greenpeace's illegality (see Graph 6.7) - for instance issuing three press releases on the same day, all heavily imbued with the concept of the illegal occupation: "*Shell UK Limited can confirm that as of 1700 today (Tuesday 23 May) a total of 20 illegal occupiers had been removed from the Brent Spar ...*," (Shell press release, 23rd May 1995b).

Greenpeace tried to minimise its illegal actions by promoting its legal efforts to stop the Spar being sunk (see Appendix 4, table 3). This sub-theme comprised the following concepts:

- Greenpeace uses non-violent means: "*As an organisation committed to peace and non-violence, Greenpeace has consistently condemned the use of violence,*" (Greenpeace press release, 19th June 1995).
- Greenpeace uses legal channels. For instance, it publicised that it was seeking a judicial review to challenge the government licence allowing deep-sea disposal. Greenpeace's attempts in the High Court in London to get their requested judicial review heard in the English Courts, rather than the Scottish was an important goal for Greenpeace since it has no standing in the Scottish Courts (Greenpeace press release, 24th May 1995).
- Greenpeace strategically uses its knowledge of the law. The Spar activists remained unnamed by Greenpeace so that Shell could not legally evict them. This is because under Scots law, the court does not usually grant eviction orders against unknown and unnamed people (Greenpeace press release, 19th May 1995).
- Greenpeace engages in lobbying activities. Greenpeace publicised its lobbying of the OSPAR Commission, the North Sea Ministers Meeting and UK Government departments.

The news sample broadcast some of Greenpeace's concepts (see Graph 6.7), mainly the concept of Greenpeace using non-violent means, which was reported both in specific reference to the German fire-bombing of Shell petrol stations, and in more general terms. Other legal activity

by Greenpeace was reported only in the barest of terms. For instance the broadcasting of the sub-theme that Greenpeace seeks a judicial review was highly simplified: *"The signs are once the confrontation in the North Sea is over, the battle will continue in court. Greenpeace wants to seek a judicial review of the government's decision to allow companies to dump their oil rigs at sea,"* (reporter, Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 15th June 1995). The news sample ignored the concepts that Greenpeace engages in lobbying and that Greenpeace strategically withholds information.

Graph 6.7 shows that more predominant than the sub-theme that Greenpeace acts legally are Greenpeace's illegal activities. The television news sample repeatedly broadcast the concepts of Greenpeace's illegal occupation of the Spar: *"Despite a flurry of injunctions from Shell designed to prevent the Moby Dick re-supplying the company's abandoned oil platform, she slipped quietly out of Lerwick last night,"* (reporter, Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 15th May 1995).

Greenpeace has long justified its illegal activities, however by appeal to higher moral authority: *"carrying out acts which are legitimised by the moral deficit they address, rather than the means which are used,"* (Rose, 1993: 291). Here we see the power of the principle at play. This is echoed in Greenpeace's promotion of the sub-theme "Shell acts illegally" (see below).

6.2.2.2 The legality of Shell

Greenpeace promoted the sub-theme that Shell acts illegally in its efforts to dispose of the Spar (see Graph 6.8). This partly comprised vilificatory concepts accusing Shell of violence against Greenpeace activists (see Chapter 5, section 5.2.1.1). It also comprised the concept that Shell contravenes international conventions which oppose deep-sea disposal. This was promoted heavily in the first month of Greenpeace's seven-week campaign: *"The dumping of the Brent Spar is also against the spirit of several international conventions that the UK is party to, including the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, London Convention and OSPAR Convention,"* (Greenpeace press release, 10th May 1995).

Greenpeace's focus on international law may have arisen from the fact that many international provisions govern offshore disposal, regulating large structures, radioactivity and environmental impact.¹⁰ The Geneva Convention of the Continental Shelf (1958) specifies that offshore installations should be completely removed when they are no longer required. This was later made subject to standards drawn up by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO). In 1989 the IMO suggested criteria for which structures could be suitable for partial removal, and which should be totally removed (IMO, 1989). As described earlier, Greenpeace played up the radioactivity of the Spar's waste, arguably in the hope that it would then be subject to the provisions of the London Dumping Convention (1972). (In November 1993 the contracting parties to the London Dumping Convention imposed a ban on the disposal of low-level radioactive waste at sea (University of Aberdeen and AURIS Ltd., 1994: 24)). Any such disposal must satisfy the requirements of the appropriate Regional Dumping Convention, which for the Spar is the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the N.E. Atlantic adopted by the Oslo and Paris Commissions in 1992 (ibid.,70). The 1991 Oslo Commission guidelines, however, are still applicable. These guidelines for the dumping of oil and gas platforms recommend that, at the minimum, sea disposal must be shown to be the least detrimental option. The guidelines also include recommendations to prepare an "*Impact Hypothesis*", a study which would predict the likely environmental consequences of disposal at sea (ibid.).

However, although there are many international provisions governing offshore disposal, the problem is that there is no one to enforce international law. It is a soft law. Nations and corporations mainly act in their own self-interest, and that tends to produce weak and non-binding accords. Even binding accords are difficult to enforce without a world government (Holmes,1995: 736). Why, then, did Greenpeace focus more on international rather than national law? Despite the problems of enforcing international law, it can be more powerful

¹⁰ At the time of the Spar campaign, the OSPAR Commission (the intergovernmental body regulating pollution in the N.E. Atlantic) had banned sea dumping of industrial wastes, radioactive wastes, and ocean incineration: but it still allowed sea dumping of offshore installations (Greenpeace press release, 23rd June 1995).

than hard law enforced by the authority of the courts or police because its authority is moral (ibid.). Moral authority can move across borders where coercive authority cannot, persisting whereas governments can come and go. (Moral authority is the addressed in the next chapter.)

Shell and its allies countered Greenpeace's allegations from week four of Greenpeace's campaign (see Graph 6.8), widely promoting the sub-theme of the legality of Shell, particularly the concept that Shell's disposal plans comply with UK legislation. The first press release to promote this concept did so extensively, with seven references to this concept - using the rhetorical device of plocche.

Unfortunately for Greenpeace, national television news broadcast the sub-theme of Shell's legality extensively (see Graph 6.8) - particularly the sub-theme that Shell's plans for the Spar comply with UK legislation. By contrast, Greenpeace's sub-theme of the illegality of Shell totally failed to build the news agenda. For instance, regarding Shell's use of violence against Greenpeace activists, although there was extensive footage of Shell blasting the Spar with water canons, at no point was there any mention of these being trained on individual activists.¹¹

Here, Greenpeace's promotional activity is not enough to build the agenda of the national television news sample, although Greenpeace puts forward its legal world-view from the start of its campaign, whereas Shell is slower of the mark in putting its case. Perhaps this is because the legality of Shell was inadvertently also promoted by Greenpeace press releases when promoting themselves as champion of the environment (see Graph 6.8). Greenpeace heightened its "David" image by painting Shell as the "Goliath" with might on its side - including heavy-handed legal means. When vilifying Shell and the UK Government over their deep-sea disposal plans, Greenpeace conveyed the concept that Shell complies with UK legislation. Furthermore, Greenpeace highlights its (illegal) direct action in its bid to ennoble itself (see Chapter 5, section 5.2.2.1). Another reason for the predominance of Shell's legal

¹¹ Scottish Regional News, however, did report this.

world-view is that it appeals more than Greenpeace's world-view to logistical news values of symbolisation; and audience-maximising news values of novelty and human interest (all stemming from its direct action) (see Table 6.8).

6.3 Rationalistic themes in the Ogoniland issue

6.3.1 Rationalistic theme: scientific arguments

In the Ogoniland issue, scientific arguments regarding the extent of pollution by oil companies were much sparser than in the Spar issue (see Appendix 4, table 2). This is partly because impartial, independent corroboration of MOSOP's environmental allegations was scant since access to Ogoniland was barred to outsiders (Vidal, The Guardian, 4th January 1995: 2). The last people to report on the environmental destruction visited Ogoniland in 1993, amongst them Greenpeace and Pro Natura (a Brazilian-based group), both of which published reports. Greenpeace's report showed that Shell spilt 1.6 million gallons of oil in the Niger Delta between 1982-1992 - almost 40% of its spills world-wide in the same period (ibid.). Pro Natura's report in 1993 detailed pollution from badly-maintained and leaking pipelines (ibid.). Analysis of the scientific journals, Nature and New Scientist, found no commentary or analysis of the scientific issue by independent scientists. In fact, to make any comment at all on the science, the scientific journals turned to Greenpeace, MOSOP and Shell, whose basic claims were re-iterated. Indeed, one editorial highlighted the absence of meaningful scientific information:

"Shell's statement continues: "In the Ogoni area where Shell has not operated since January 1993 - over 60% of oil spills were caused by sabotage..." But again what does this 60% represent? Where the spills big or small? ...But is the pollution caused by sabotage greater than that caused by the industry's own activities? Or much smaller? What does Shell's 60% mean?" (Editorial, New Scientist, 25th November 1995).

As with the Spar issue, Greenpeace capitalised on the absence of scientific data. From the announcement of Saro-Wiwa's death sentence on 31st October 1995, Greenpeace

promoted the large environmental impact in Ogoniland, using broad brush strokes rather than details: *"Shell has been drilling in the Ogoni region of the Niger River delta for three decades. The area has been subject to widespread environmental degradation due to spills and gas flaring,"* (Greenpeace press release, 8th November 1995). These broad brush strokes may have been designed to appeal to news as an add-on sound-bite given the news peg provided by Saro-Wiwa's death sentence. This interpretation is supported by the contrast in terms of detail between this press release and the previous year's press releases on the issue:

"According to official Nigerian government figures, between 1986 and 1991, over 2,700 oil spills took place in Ogoniland. Flaring of natural gas in the community has exposed the Ogoni to a wide range of pollutants including polyaromatic hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide, and methane on a daily round the clock basis," (Greenpeace press release, 2nd May, 1994).

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To bolster its scientific claims, Greenpeace cited forthcoming independent scientific support and testimony, such as that of Dr. Owens Wiwa, Saro-Wiwa's brother: *"... who has just escaped from Nigeria with additional news about the impact of oil pollution in Nigeria,"* (Greenpeace press release, 30th November). Greenpeace cast doubt on Shell's claims of minimal environmental impact by pointing to the incompleteness of the current survey Shell was carrying out (the Shell Niger Delta Environmental Survey). At the same time, Greenpeace maximised the threat of pollution by implying that Shell was covering up findings from its own previous environmental impact assessments.

"Shell know what to do now in order to protect the environment -- it's time they got on with it instead of using delaying tactics like the "environmental survey". It must also be noted that this survey was never a full environmental impact assessment of the impact of the oil industry on the Niger Delta. Shell claims to have carried out such assessments but has never publicly released any of them, despite the many calls from

Greenpeace and other organisations to do so," (Greenpeace press release, 23rd November 1995).

As with the Spar issue, Shell did not immediately counter Greenpeace's scientific allegations. (Its first press release on the day of the announcement of Saro-Wiwa's death sentence dealt instead with justifying Shell's position of investment in Nigeria, and "whitewashing" its activities in Nigeria - see chapter 5, section 5.3.2.) However, its response time (one week) was quicker than it had been in the Spar issue, indicating a greater sense of the need to counter Greenpeace's scientific allegations. Shell did so with the sub-theme that "factors other than the oil industry cause the most pollution". To give this claim credibility, Shell cites the World Bank survey: " ... *the recent World Bank survey confirmed that while the oil industry has contributed to some of the environmental problems of the Niger Delta, population growth, deforestation, soil erosion and over farming have been other major factors,*" (Shell press release, 12th November 1995). Here, Shell tries to build its credibility by taking a small portion of the blame, but deflecting most of it back to developmental problems faced by a third world country.

Shell, recognising that the absence of hard scientific data could work to its detriment (as it had in the Spar issue) promoted its sponsorship of the Shell Niger Delta Environmental Survey:

"... we are aware that there are very few facts available for informed debate and to decide how best to manage the needs for resource development and for sustaining the ecosystem of the Niger Delta. That is why we launched, and are helping to fund, a comprehensive and independent environmental survey of the Niger Delta area," (Shell press release, 14th November 1995).

Despite Greenpeace's attempts at using science to put across the environmental degradation, this was unsuccessful in building the agenda of television news in the two-week period around Saro-Wiwa's death sentence and execution. As chapter five (section 5.3.1) demonstrated, the

environmental issue faced stiff competition from the human rights issue. Thus, in the minimal time spent on broadcasting the environmental issue, no room was left for engaging in scientific proof or debate. The promotional activities of Greenpeace and Shell were not totally wasted, however, as they prompted several articles in the New Scientist and Nature, as explained above (see Appendix 4, table 2).

6.2.3 Rationalistic theme: legal arguments

Stemming from Saro-Wiwa's trial and death sentence, criticised as unjust by human rights groups and many world leaders, Greenpeace promoted the sub-theme that Shell and the Nigerian Government act illegally. *"Mr. Saro-Wiwa was convicted last week by an illegal military tribunal for allegedly inciting the 1994 murders of four men. The primary witnesses against Mr. Saro-Wiwa later recanted their testimony, saying they received bribes from the Nigerian government and Shell Oil,"* (Greenpeace press release, 8th November, 1995). Here Greenpeace uses emotive abstraction to appeal to international principles of justice and human rights, together with the rhetorical device of testimony.

As in the Spar issue, Shell promoted the concept that "Shell keeps within the legal framework": *"We believe as a multinational company that to interfere in such processes, whether political or legal, in any country would be wrong,"* (Shell press release, 14th November 1995). Here Shell uses emotive abstraction, appealing to the sanctity of state sovereignty. Shell also promoted the illegality of the actions of Greenpeace and its supporters: *"In the Ogoni area - where Shell has not operated since January 1993 - over 60% of oil spills were caused by sabotage, usually linked to claims for compensation,"* (Shell press release, 19th November 1995). Here Shell casts doubt on the integrity of the Ogoni, attempting to shift the issue from Greenpeace's framing of Shell's mercenary activities, to the mercenary activities of the Ogoni. In fact, according to the World Bank, oil spills are generally caused by corrosion, which is the oil companies' responsibility (Fryas, 1998: 464).

Unlike in the Spar issue, national television news does not confine itself to broadcasting only the illegality of Greenpeace and its supporters and the legality of Shell. It also broadcasts the illegality of Shell (see Table 6.5)

Table 6.5 Extract from ITN Daytime news, 13th November 1995

Image	Voiceover
Visual of demonstrators carrying placards bearing Greenpeace's logo beneath Shell's logo which drips with blood, captioned " <i>Blood on Shell's hands</i> ". Also carried are Amnesty International banners and placards bearing photos of Saro-Wiwa.	Reporter: " <i>Shell is currently prime target for exploiting tribal lands in Nigeria which led to the execution of human rights activists there.</i> "

Here, the alleged malpractice does not centre on a complicated series of scientific or legal arguments, as in the Spar issue, but on a simple appeal to internationally accepted human rights. As such it appeals highly to professional news values of watchdog (Shell's complicity in human rights abuses); logistical news values of simplification (the political and ethnic context is not explained); and audience-maximising news values of drama (conflict between Shell and the Ogoni) and human interest (Shell's actions impact directly on Ogoni people).

6.3 Summary of rationalistic agenda-building

In the Spar campaign, Greenpeace had mixed success in building the news agenda with scientific discourse. The media initially privileged Greenpeace's scientific discourse, in the absence of independent scientific opinion or promotion by Shell. Greenpeace was initially the discursive primary definer in terms of the precedent argument regarding deep-sea and onshore disposal, the toxicity of the Spar and its large environmental impact; and gradually becomes discursive primary definer in the argument over the scientific advocacy of onshore disposal. However, as Shell's promotional activity take effect, Greenpeace loses its discursive primary definition status in its argument about the Spar's large, negative environmental impact and in its argument that onshore disposal set a precedent. The media's negotiation of the legal discourses in the Spar issue favoured Shell's version. Thus Shell was discursive primary definer in the issues of Greenpeace's illegality and Shell's legality.

There were certain aspects of Greenpeace's and Shell's rationalistic campaigning that remained the same in both the Spar campaign (spring and summer 1995) and the two-week phase of the Ogoniland campaign around Saro-Wiwa's death sentence and execution (October - November 1995).

In both campaigns, Greenpeace starts with scientific claims, citing independent scientific support and eye-witness testimony, and attempting to vilify Shell's science. This is attempted both through criticisms of Shell's science, and through appeal to wider principles (like "it is wrong to dump"). Similar strategies are observable in the legal arguments, where Greenpeace uses eye-witness testimony to vilify Shell's position and to appeal to wider principles of human rights.

In both campaigns, in terms of the scientific arguments, Shell tries to shift the focus of the issue, re-defining it. In the Spar campaign Shell re-defines the precedent argument; and shifts the focus of the issue of the Spar's pollution towards its positive environmental impact. In the Ogoniland campaign, Shell tries to shift the focus from the environmental degradation by oil companies towards its efforts to improve the environment. In both campaigns, in terms of the legal arguments, Shell publicises its adherence to national law (its compliance with UK government regulations for deep-sea disposal in the Spar issue, and its policy of non-interference with decisions made by the Nigerian government in the Ogoniland issue).

There are certain aspects of Greenpeace's and Shell's rationalistic campaigning that differed across their two campaigns. In the Ogoniland campaign, both Greenpeace and Shell were less detailed in their use of science.¹² Shell was quicker in its response to Greenpeace's scientific claims, and this time cited support for its position from "independent" science early on (such as the World Bank survey). Shell publicised its sponsorship of studies to get more data, so trying

¹² It should be noted that Greenpeace had been campaigning on this issue for several years, and had used much more scientific detail in its press releases earlier on in its campaign.

to plug the media gap left by the absence of hard scientific data. In terms of the legal arguments, in the Ogoniland campaign Shell tries harder to shift attention away from its mercenary activities, towards the mercenary activities of MOSOP and Greenpeace, highlighting their illegality in an attempt to counter their appeal to international principles.

This appeal to principles will be explored in the next chapter, which examines Greenpeace's and Shell's promotion of the discourse of belief.

Table 6.6 News Values displayed by scientific themes in national television evening news on the Spar issue (30th April - 11th October 1995): precedent argument

Themes/sub-themes	Total no. of concepts in sub-theme	Number of times the concepts display the news value & %age of total no. of concepts displaying the news value												
		PROFESSIONAL NEWS VALUES					LOGISTICAL NEWS VALUES					AUDIENCE-MAXIMISING NEWS VALUES		
		New info.	Watch -dog	Objectivity/balance	Facticity (authentication)	Accessible to journalists	Symbolisation/simplification	Event orientation	Copying the competition	Novelty	Drama	Human interest	Visual appeal	
PRO- GREENPEACE WORLD-VIEW														
Sinking Spar sets precedent	7	6 86%	6 86%	3 43%	6 86%	4 57%	4 47%	6 86%	3 43%	0	7 100%	4 57%	0	
Onshore disposal sets precedent	19	18 95%	14 74%	10 53%	10 53%	10 53%	7 37%	18 95%	19 100%	7 37%	10 53%	8 42%	0	
Sub-total	26	24 92%	20 77%	13 50%	16 62%	14 54%	11 42%	24 92%	22 85%	7 27%	17 65%	12 46%	0	
PRO-SHELL WORLD-VIEW														
Sinking will not set precedent.	3	3 100%	0	2 66%	3 100%	3 100%	0	3 100%	0	0	0	2 67%	0	
Onshore disposal will not set precedent	11	11 100%	0	5 45%	9 82%	9 82%	0	11 100%	10 91%	7 64%	6 55%	3 27%	0	
Sub-total	14	14 100%	0	7 50%	12 86%	12 86%	0	14 100%	10 71%	7 50%	6 43%	5 36%	0	

Table 6.7 News Values displayed by scientific themes in national television evening news on the Spar issue (30th April - 11th October 1995): toxicity and environmental impact

Themes/sub-themes	Total no. of concepts in sub-theme	Number of times the concepts display the news value & %age of total no. of concepts displaying the news value												
		PROFESSIONAL NEWS VALUES					LOGISTICAL NEWS VALUES					AUDIENCE-MAXIMISING NEWS VALUES		
		New info.	Watchdog	Objectivity/balance	Facticity (authenticity)	Accessible to journalists	Symbolisation/simplification	Event orientation	Copying the competition	Entertainment	Novelty	Drama	Human interest	Visual appeal
PRO- GREENPEACE														
Spar is toxic	27	22 81%	27 100%	4 15%	18 67%	19 70%	18 67%	26 96%	15 56%	8 30%	20 74%	16 59%	1 4%	
Large, negative environmental impact	16	9 56%	13 81%	5 31%	15 94%	12 75%	13 81%	16 100%	8 50%	2 13%	12 75%	8 50%	5 31%	
Unknown environmental impact	4	4 100%	4 100%	4 100%	4 100%	4 100%	4 100%	4 100%	0	0	0	0	0	
Advocation of onshore disposal	17	15 88%	2 12%	11 65%	14 82%	14 82%	8 47%	17 100%	16 94%	5 29%	3 18%	5 29%	0	
Sub-total	65	51 78%	46 71%	24 37%	51 78%	49 75%	43 66%	64 98%	39 60%	18 28%	36 55%	30 46%	6 9%	
PRO- SHELL														
Spar is not toxic	7	5 71%	2 29%	6 86%	7 100%	7 100%	1 14%	7 100%	0	0	1 14%	5 71%	1 14%	
Small negative environmental impact	8	7 88%	2 25%	5 63%	8 100%	8 100%	1 13%	8 100%	0	0	1 13%	5 63%	1 13%	
Positive environmental impact	28	21 75%	23 82%	15 54%	21 75%	27 96%	19 68%	28 100%	25 89%	11 39%	5 18%	12 43%	0	
Onshore disposal is difficult	14	14 100%	14 100%	10 71%	9 64%	8 57%	3 21%	14 100%	13 93%	1 7%	4 29%	7 50%	0	
Sub-total	57	47 82%	41 72%	36 63%	45 79%	50 88%	24 42%	57 100%	38 67%	12 21%	11 19%	29 51%	2 4%	

Table 6.8 News Values displayed by legal rationalistic themes on the Spar issue (30th April - 11th October 1995)

Themes/sub-themes	Total no. of concepts in sub-theme	Number of times the concepts display the news value & %age of total no. of concepts displaying the news value												
		PROFESSIONAL NEWS VALUES					LOGISTICAL NEWS VALUES					AUDIENCE-MAXIMISING NEWS VALUES		
		New info.	Watch dog	Objectivity/balance	Facticity (authentication)	Accessible to journalists	Symbolisation/simplification	Event orientation	Copying the competition	Novelty	Drama	Human interest	Visual appeal	
PRO- GREENPEACE														
Greenpeace acts legally in its efforts to stop deep-sea disposal	5	4 80%	0	5 100%	3 60%	5 100%	3 60%	5 100%	2 40%	4 80%	3 60%	0		
PRO- SHELL														
Shell acts legally in its efforts to sink Spar	9	6 67%	0	6 67%	8 89%	9 100%	6 67%	8 89%	6 67%	5 56%	6 67%	0		
Greenpeace acts illegally	8	8 100%	0	6 75%	2 25%	8 100%	8 100%	8 100%	2 25%	8 100%	8 100%	1 13%		
Sub-total	17	14 82%	0	12 71%	10 59%	17 100%	14 82%	16 94%	8 47%	13 76%	14 82%	1 6%		
TOTAL	39	32 82%	0	29 74%	23 59%	39 100%	31 79%	37 95%	18 46%	30 77%	31 79%	2 5%		

CHAPTER 7

MAIN THEME: BELIEF (ETHOS)

7.1 Introduction

Aristotle (1965: 60) saw "*ethos*" as the most important of the three main rhetorical structuring principles. Ethos is an important part of Greenpeace's media-oriented campaigns since its: "*positions' are essentially moral ones, intervening on the moral boundary of an "issue"*, (Rose, 1993: 291).

Belief is a main theme derived from the Spar data, and verified by the Ogoniland data, comprising the themes of "scientific beliefs", "standard-setting beliefs", "human-nature relationship beliefs" and "global inter-connectivity beliefs."¹ This chapter describes salient points from Greenpeace's and Shell's media strategies regarding their promotion of the discourse of belief, and their ability to build the agenda of British television news. In doing so, it is deciphering persuasion through "*stance*" (the wider framework of attitudes adopted by the persuader, and the tone taken towards the topic of interaction and its context). The Spar issue is addressed first (section 7.2). Here, Greenpeace's and Shell's relative attempts and success in building the news agenda through the belief discourse are quantitatively and qualitatively analysed (in terms of the concepts they promote in their press releases and those found in the national television evening news sample). Where a theme/sub-theme is more successful than its counter-theme/sub-theme in building the television news agenda, some of the key news values appealed to by the more successful theme/sub-theme are described.²


The Ogoniland issue is addressed in section 7.3. This is used to verify the transferability of themes/sub-themes derived from the Spar issue, and to demonstrate how Greenpeace's and Shell's use of belief changed over time.

¹ The full variation of belief themes, sub-themes & concepts can be found in Appendix 5.

² Quantitative summary tables of the news values appealed to by each theme/sub-theme are found at the end of the chapter.

Section 7.4 summarises key features of agenda-building through the discourse of belief. As well as summarising Greenpeace's and Shell's stances, it also highlights how they aim to persuade through "*personality*" (central to which is the ability to identify with an audience); and "*moral character*" (involving credibility and legitimacy claims) (Cockroft & Cockroft, 1992: 8-9).

Graph 7.1
Belief theme: attitude towards risk in Greenpeace & Shell press releases and national television evening news broadcasts on the Spar issue (30th April - 11th October)



7.2 Belief themes in the Brent Spar issue

7.2.1 Theme: scientific beliefs

In Western eyes, science is popularly conceived as the objective arbitrator which can differentiate between our “real” and perceived environment. However, despite its claim to objectivity, arising from its commitment to systematic and “unbiased” methodologies (induction and deduction) (Pepper, 1984 : 54), science is not free from value systems (Kuhn, 1970).

Two scientific beliefs (sub-themes) are explored in the Spar issue: attitude towards risk; and attitude towards science and technology (see Appendix 5, table 1).

7.2.1.1 Attitude towards risk

The risk-based framework was originally developed as a technical procedure for evaluating the health risks of toxic chemicals (Andrews, 1997: 208). In theory, risk assessment is a purely scientific activity based on expert analysis of facts, but in practice it is permeated by value judgements - such as deciding what substances to select for risk assessment, and how much evidence is needed before regulating (ibid.: 210, 216).

One of Greenpeace's strong beliefs is the need for the precautionary principle. This principle takes into account the “*pipeline problem*” common to many environmental hazards, where the absence of short-term damage produces a false sense of security, so that exposure to the substance can go on increasing (Gee, 1996: 8). By the time convincing evidence of damage has been gathered, so much hazardous material has accumulated in the “*pipeline*” that the damage can only get worse before it gets better: for instance, from persistent hazardous substances remaining in the environment. The problem is exacerbated by scientific uncertainty, such as data deficiencies, and ignorance of nature’s processes. The precautionary principle therefore opts for giving the benefit of scientific doubt to planetary welfare, rather than to potentially hazardous human activities. Greenpeace was instrumental in getting the

precautionary principle adopted by the Governing Council of the UN Environment Programme (1989), the Paris Commission which covers discharges into the North Sea (1989), and the Barcelona Convention which covers discharges into the Mediterranean (1989) (Brown and May, 1991: 166). This approach was extended from the sea to the whole environment by other conventions and by the 1992 Rio declaration (Gee, 1996: 13).

However, despite this long-standing belief in the precautionary principle, Greenpeace's direct advocacy of the sub-theme of a "cautious attitude towards risk" occurred only once in the Spar issue: "*There will always be scientific debate, but in the arena of this debate the principle of precautionary action is applied and the benefit of the doubt given to the environment,*" (Greenpeace press release, 20th July 1995). During the seven-week campaign (30th April - 21st June 1995) Greenpeace referred to the principle particularly in the first few weeks (see Graph 7.1) but did so only indirectly, using emotive rather than technical language. For instance, Greenpeace starts its campaign with the accusatory concept that "companies act now and think later": "*The [deep-sea disposal] decision is short-sighted and the latest example of governments allowing industry to treat the seas as a toxic dump,*" (Greenpeace press release, 30th April 1995).

Shell's advocacy of the precautionary principle is minimal (only one press release) and only in relation to onshore disposal (notably, the option Shell did not want to implement): "*The evaluation has highlighted...areas of uncertainty that may have a substantial impact on the feasibility, safety and financial aspects.... At this stage of the project, none of these areas of uncertainty discount the (onshore) disposal option in its entirety, although some may do so after further detailed evaluation,*" (Shell press release, 15th June 1995).


More prevalent in Shell press releases (see Graph 7.1) is the stance of an "incautious attitude towards risk", with the assumption that hazardous waste is safe in the ocean (see Appendix 5,

table 1). Thus, Shell's professed belief in the precautionary principle is used only selectively - when wishing to discount a process they do not wish to implement (i.e. onshore disposal).

The national television evening news sample starts by broadcasting the belief of an incautious attitude towards risk, fielding interviews and statements from Shell and scientists. However, for the rest of the seven-week campaign, the balance swings between Greenpeace's and Shell's beliefs (see Graph 7.1). Advocation of a cautious attitude towards risk is broadcast through several routes. The concept that "science does not offer clear-cut solutions" is implied, largely through fielding opposing scientists in the same broadcast (arising from the news value of balance). In interviews, Greenpeace directly advocates the precautionary principle: *"They've done no structural analysis of the Brent Spar; they have done no detailed investigation, scientific analysis of the Brent Spar and no detailed inventory. All they've said has been assumed and extrapolated from what is on other rigs,"* (Paul Horsman, Greenpeace, BBC1 9.00pm News, 19th June 1995). This example adheres highly to the professional news value of watchdog; and the logistical news value of symbolisation (the Spar being the symbol of corporate irresponsibility). That the issue of the precautionary principle is broadcast at all says something about the promotional activities of Greenpeace, since research suggests that the scientific and technical aspects of risk are often not considered within media reporting of the environment.³

³ Sachsman (1993), Dunwoody and Peters (1992), Wilkins and Patterson (1987), Rubin (1980: 1-2,10-13, cited in Dunwoody and Griffin,1993: 25).

Graph 7.2
Belief theme: attitude towards science and technology in Greenpeace & Shell press releases and national television evening news broadcasts on the Spar issue
(30th April - 11th October)



7.2.1.2 Attitude towards science and technology

Arguably, the ideal of "progress through science & technology" has been dominant in western society since the Enlightenment (Pepper, 1984: 17). Francis Bacon justified his argument for the establishment of state-supported scientific institutions by highlighting science's philanthropy: inductive understanding of nature's laws would enable them to be used for humanity's benefit (ibid.: 55).

Both Greenpeace's and Shell's press releases in the Spar issue support the belief of progress through science and technology (see Graph 7.2), comprising the following concepts.

- Economic progress through science & technology: "*Mr Eggar is more interested in attacking Greenpeace than he is in fulfilling his job ensuring Britain's growth in trade and industry ... The potential exists to develop an onshore dismantling industry,*" (Greenpeace press release, 19th July 1995). Here Greenpeace highlights the symbolic activities of Mr.Eggar, the then industry minister, by using the oppositional model of argumentation (Cockroft & Cockroft, 1992: 66) which functions on the basis of contrast. The contrast set up is Mr.Eggar's actual actions ("*attacking Greenpeace*") compared to what his actions should be (ensuring economic growth by championing "*onshore dismantling technology*").

- Science & technology offers solutions: "*The further independent audit of the Brent Spar which has since been commissioned from the internationally-recognised certification authority Det Norske Veritas is to provide further independent verification of the Spar's contents. The aim is to allay concerns about alarmist Greenpeace claims and to assist with further work on disposal options,*" (Shell press release, 5th September 1995). Faith in the procedures, findings and recommendations of "*the internationally-recognised certification authority*" is complete, given that no information is given on how it reaches its findings; nor is any doubt cast on the usefulness of its findings.

Television news displays only the belief in progress through science and technology (see Graph 7.2) with the following concepts.

- Science & technology offers solutions. For instance, Table 7.1 shows that anchoring the technical explanation of moving the Spar are visuals showing the vast machinery, used with precision (signified by the dials), needed to accomplish the job. This supports Evernden's (1989) observation that mastery over nature is one of the beliefs anchoring much environmental reporting.

Table 7.1 Extract from Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 21st June 1995

Visual	Voicover
Location mode: reporter's voice-over filmed sequences in which reporter is not shown. CU of Spar, on its side, in a fjord, Camera pulls back to reveal the whole structure. Caption: "1976".	Reporter: <i>"The Spar was launched in 1976. Shell now has to reverse the process."</i>
Cut to different angle of the Spar, now in the background. Middle ground shows machinery and several workers in boiler suits. Foreground shows silhouette of person's head.	<i>"They'll take off the superstructure, pump up the tanks then tip the rig on its side ..."</i>
CU of dials and levers. A hand pulls the lever. Cut to ECU of one dial. "PNEU" is written beside it.	<i>"...so it can be towed back into harbour to be dismantled."</i>

- Economic progress through science and technology. For instance, Table 7.2 shows that anchoring the spoken text celebrating the discovery of oil and its revenue, is a visual of a disused refinery. This underscores the vast technological resources which are used (and then discarded) for economic transformation, helping the nation move forward. The following visual of the royal ceremony involving British Petroleum (BP) connotes that this oil is good for the nation. This supports the findings of past media research regarding the prominence of the belief in economic progress through science and technology (for instance, Daley and O'Neill, 1991).


Table 7.2 Extract from Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 16th June 1995

Visuals	Voiceover
<p>Location mode: Reporter's speech in ongoing participant-action sequences. MS of reporter walking around a disused refinery. Grey buildings in background, wasteland in foreground.</p>	<p>Reporter: <i>"Oil worth £180 billion has come from the North Sea, and in the process the UK economy has been transformed."</i></p>
<p>Reporter's voice-over filmed sequences in which reporter is not shown. Film of Queen, and several suited men, at a BP opening ceremony. She presses a button on top of a box bearing the BP logo. Caption "1975".</p>	<p><i>"The implications were immense, As more oil came ashore, so did a new source of revenue for the government."</i></p>

Thus, the belief in progress through science and technology is held by a wide range of actors, including Greenpeace. By contrast, the counter-belief that "science and technology does not lead to progress" is totally absent from Greenpeace and Shell press releases and the broadcast news sample. Arguably, Greenpeace's exclusive promotion of the belief of progress through science and technology is surprising since this is usually an anti-environmental theme. This belief generally produces a "technical-rational" mentality to solving problems, which favours short-term solutions to immediately visible problems, rather than looking at the problems' deeper causes and the long-term structural changes needed to solve them (see Cracknell, 1993; Shanahan, 1993). However, Greenpeace may simply be acknowledging that the belief in progress through science and technology is entrenched within society, and to rail against it would be counter-productive (for instance, increasing the risk of being branded as extremist). Also, this belief allows an environmentally-friendly spin, encompassing the development of alternative and renewable forms of energy, and energy-saving mechanisms.

Graph 7.3

Belief theme: standard setting regarding legislation in Greenpeace & Shell press releases and national television evening news broadcasts on the Spar issue (30th April - 11th October 1999)



□ TV news: new standards needed
 ■ TV news: no new standards needed
 ▨ Greenpeace press releases: new standards needed
 ▩ Shell press releases: no new standards needed

7.2.2 Theme: standard-setting

7.2.2.1 Legislative standard-setting

The "need to set new legislative standards" was a consistent and much touted belief by Greenpeace in the Spar issue (see Graph 7.3) consisting of the following concepts (see Appendix 5, table 2).

- Harmonisation of legislation needed. This concerned legislation on deep-sea disposal of oil platforms: *"... most countries in the EU think this is dirty and that it should be stopped. If it is banned in the US they try other places and unfortunately there is both countries and enterprises in this situation who choose the cheapest option and we have to make sure they do not have that opportunity,"* (Ritt Bjerregaard, EU Environment Commissioner, Greenpeace press release, 13th May 1995). Here, Greenpeace aims to maximise its persuasive appeal using testimony by an authoritative source voicing EU majority opinion.

- Implementation of legislation needed: *"Dumping it already goes against the spirit of several international conventions to which the UK Government is party - the London Convention and the OSPAR Convention - both of which rule out dumping of toxic and radioactive substances at sea,"* (Greenpeace press release, 12th May 1995).

The intensity with which Greenpeace promoted this principle during its seven-week campaign (see Graph 7.3) may have been to maximise the presence of this issue at the North Sea environment ministers' conference (falling in week six of Greenpeace's campaign). This strategy appears to have been successful:

"The oil platforms were the most emotive issue of a two-day conference at which environment ministers from nine countries bordering on the North Sea or with rivers feeding into it sought to tackle a range of marine pollution problems," (Boulton, Financial Times, 10th June 1995: 2).

Shell's stance was that "no extra legislation is needed". This included the following concepts.

- Existing legislation is responsible: *"The disposal plan has followed on every count the procedures, principles and standards of best international oil industry practice, within a UK regulatory regime which is amongst the most scrupulous in the world,"* (Shell press release, 31st May 1995). Here lexical choice establishes favourable comparisons on a global basis (for instance, *"best international oil industry practice"*, *"most scrupulous in the world"*). The use of *"regulatory regime"* connotes the hard discipline such legislation produces.

- The case-by-case basis suffices: *"The responsible option for the Brent Spar, an unusual installation, is carefully-managed deepwater disposal; but in accordance with the UK Government policy of case-by-case consideration, many future disposals of redundant British installations are likely to entail onshore recovery and waste management,"* (Shell press release, 31st May 1995). Here Shell stresses the legitimacy of case-by-case disposal through lexical choice (like *"responsible"*, *"carefully-managed"*); and through contrasting the Spar (*"an unusual installation"*) with other installations.

After the seven-week campaign, Shell-UK maintained its stance that "no extra legislation is needed", instead promoting the legitimacy of existing standards. Chris Fay, Shell-UK, told activists and politicians in London in November 1996:

"We have to consider why trust in companies is declining. I think the roots of this mistrust lie in the fact that people increasingly fail to see the relationship between business success and their own quality of life... They are suspicious that business standards do not protect people and the environment ...," (cited in Cowe and Entine, The Guardian (Weekend), 14th December 1996: 30).

Despite Greenpeace's heavy promotion of the principle that new standards are needed, this appeared minimally in the television news sample (see Graph 7.3). For instance, the concept "harmonisation of legislation needed" appeared only in one interview (see Table 7.3). In this interview, Hans Wuers, Dutch Trade and Industry Minister, raises the point regarding Shell's realisation that its problem differed in extent between the Continent and the UK (shot 2).

Table 7.3 Extract from Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 21st June 1995

Shot	Visuals	Voiceover
1	<u>Studio mode:</u> Presenter (Jon Snow) behind newsdesk interviews Wuers through visual link-up.	... Presenter: <i>"But you were already talking to them a week earlier. I mean there were rumours that you'd managed to get them to change their mind as long ago as a week ago."</i>
2	Cut to MCS of Wuers.	Wuers: <i>"No, I think at that moment Shell was still contemplating the different alternatives, and it certainly had not made up its mind by that time. I think it realised it had a serious problem, particularly in the Continent; that there was less of a problem in the UK; that there was no clear alternative at that moment. So they were really considering alternatives, but they certainly did not made up their mind at the moment."</i>
3	Presenter's speech (three-quarter angle, gaze directed at a point outside the screen).	Presenter: <i>"So in a sense you're suggesting that if they'd tried, just hypothetically, to dump it off the coast of Holland, they knew that ..."</i>
4	Cut to two-shot of presenter and Wuers.	<i>"... neither the government nor people of Holland would ever permit something like that; but they thought that maybe off the UK there was a much less explosive situation?"</i>
5	Cut to MCS of Wuers.	Wuers: <i>"No, I think it's different. I think that's actually part of the beginning of the problem - that different countries in the EU have different laws on this matter. For instance, it would never, according to the law, never would be accepted by the Dutch authorities that Shell would dump platforms or any other installation like this in the sea. But the UK is the only country in this region that actually allows this to happen."</i>
6	Same shot as shot 3.	Presenter: <i>"So do you think, in fact, that one of the lessons here is that the EU's got to get its act together, and get a united view on what should happen to these platforms. After all there are 40 more to go."</i>

Shot	Visuals	Voiceover
7	Cut to MCS of Wuers.	Wuers: <i>"Yes, I think you're quite right, I think on a broader level actually. I think we need, if we talk about environmental issues and environmental policies, that we need to cooperate within Europe much tighter together in order to avoid situations like this."</i>
8		Presenter: <i>"And that's something that you'll be pushing for?"</i>
9	Cut to MCS of Wuers. Caption: <i>"HANS WUERS, Dutch Trade and industry Minister"</i>	Wuers: <i>"Well, we've been pushing for that before this incident, actually, and we'll be pushing for it even harder, even stronger after this one."</i> Presenter: <i>"Minister, thank you very much for joining us."</i>

The presenter pitches a value-laden hypothetical question, using enargia, to suggest that Shell was manipulating different public attitudes towards dumping (shots 3-4). Here Wuers directly addresses the question of different standards, singling the UK out as the dirty man of Europe (shot 5). The presenter shifts the focus from blaming the UK for its low standards, framing the question so that responsibility lies with the EU (shot 6). This is affirmed and emphasised by Wuers, who ends the interview on the reassuring note that everything possible is being done (shot 9). This framing suggests that no further action need be pressed for regarding harmonising standards, since the international political system is engaging in the issue. Thus, the appearance of the concept "harmonisation of legislation needed" is weakened in impact.

Despite Shell's lesser promotion in press releases of its belief that no new standards were needed, this was broadcast much more than Greenpeace's counter-belief (see Graph 7.3). For example, the concept of "case-by-case basis suffices" was broadcast on three different channels on the day of the U-turn: *"Now I obviously understand that, you know, to drop a tin can, if you like, into the sea is deemed by most people to be wrong. The perception is wrong, and that is why the OSPAR Convention in 1992 says "OK, a case-by-case basis,"* (Chris Fay, Shell-UK, interview, BBC2 Newsnight, 20th June 1995). Here Fay orients his message to the audience by recognising the widespread belief in the sanctity of the deep ocean. However, Fay


simultaneously trivialises the audience's concern by metaphorically equating the Spar with a "tin can" (carrying the implications of litter but not toxic waste), and then stating that the audience's concern is "wrong" (having earlier explained why in the interview - i.e. that deep-sea disposal is the BPEO). He legitimises this stance by citing an international Convention.

A related concept bolstering the belief that existing standards suffice is the "polluter pays the full cost unless it meets the BPEO". *"It must be fair to the British tax-payer that if Shell reverses their decision – is now advocating what they admit to be the second-best option - then they should pick up the bill,"* (Tim Eggar, Energy minister, BBC1 9.00pm News, 21st June 1995). This assumes that the BPEO is an adequate regulatory standard, accepted by government and tax-payers.⁴ The BPEO has been defined by the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution in the UK as: *"the option that provides the most benefit or least damage to the environment as a whole, at acceptable cost, in the long terms as well as the short term,"* Shell-UK (1995f: 1). Although from the start of its campaign Greenpeace criticised BPEO as a cheap rather than responsible option (Greenpeace press release, 5th May 1995), the broadcasts do not question the BPEO. No discussion is offered of other ways of assessing environmental impacts - such as Best Environmental Practice (BEP), which is restricted to the environmental dimension alone and involves applying the most appropriate combination of environmental control measures and strategies (Shell-UK, 1995f: 1).

Shell's belief that no new standards are needed adheres more than Greenpeace's counter-belief in terms of the professional news value of balance (putting Shell's world-view in order to balance Greenpeace's victory); and the audience-maximising news values of copying the competition (three different channels carried Shell's world-view on the day of the U-turn) and human interest (the example above - BBC1 9,00pm News 21st June 1995 - spells out the relationship between the BPEO and the UK tax-payer) (see Table 7.13).

⁴ The BPEO concept sets the regulatory standard against which licenses for decommissioning oil installations are judged by the UK Government. It has international status: for example, it has been adopted by the IMO as part of the international guidelines for decommissioning offshore installations.

Graph 7.4
Belief theme: standard-setting regarding corporate social responsibility in Greenpeace & Shell press releases
and national television evening news broadcasts on the Spar issue
(30th April - 11th October 1995)



7.2.2.2 Corporate social responsibility

Recent research shows that the public desires corporate social responsibility. For instance, MORI⁵ found that 53% of people holding investments or making financial decisions considered the environment "very important" or "important" in their decision-making, and 57% thought the same of ethical issues (cited in Vidal, The Guardian, 17th May 1995: 24). Companies increasingly have to consider their "stakeholders". The stakeholder model (see Shepard et al., 1995: 593) is based on the premise that the corporation's stakeholders – including employers, consumers, stockholders, special interest groups and the government – have the ability to influence and be influenced by the corporation. If there is a risk, then it is in the corporation's enlightened self-interest to inform those that bear the risk and to solicit their agreement (Frederick and Hoffman, 1995: 701).

Greenpeace press releases promoted the belief that companies should have a high sense of corporate social responsibility (see Graph 7.4), as shown by the following concepts (see Appendix 5, table 2).

- Social responsibility is ignored: *"Shell is chasing cash at the expense of the North Sea marine environment ... To dump the Brent Spar as a cheapskate alternative to responsible decommissioning with decontamination onshore is nothing short of obscene,"* (Greenpeace press release, 13th May 1995a). Here Greenpeace uses the rhetorical tool of "meiosis" (doing-down) (Cockroft & Cockroft, 1992: 135) to expose the absence of Shell's principles (such as "chasing cash", "cheapskate").
- Communication with stakeholders is necessary: *"Lord Kirkwood, in denying Shell's request [for a gagging order on press coverage of Greenpeace's occupation of the Spar], has recognised that the dumping of toxic oil platforms at sea is a matter of great public interest. He has decided that if Shell are to do any dirty business it must be done in public,"* (Greenpeace press release, 13th May 1995 b). Here Greenpeace highlights Shell's reluctance to communicate with

⁵ This was research for NPI, which manages one of Britain's leading environmental and ethical investment trusts.

its stakeholders by drawing attention to Shell's legal tactics to keep the issue out of the news. A further slur on Shell's principles is provided, again by meiosis ("*dirty business*").

Shell countered Greenpeace by promoting the belief that companies have a high sense of corporate social responsibility. This comprised the concepts that Shell is environmentally friendly & socially concerned, and that consultation with stakeholders occurs. Table 7.4 presents an extract of the first time in Greenpeace's seven-week campaign that Shell promotes this belief. Thereafter, it is promoted heavily (see Graph 7.4).

Table 7.4 Shell press release, 16th May 1995

Sentence	Data
1	<i>"The Government has endorsed the plan after several months' careful consideration of the options and three years of painstaking analysis by Shell.</i>
2	<i>Both Shell and independent assessments have concluded that the impact on the marine environment will be very localised, and negligible.</i>
3	<i>Fishing and environmental organisations consulted have agreed with this analysis..."</i>


The strength with which Shell projects its principle of high corporate social responsibility comes through lexical choice that emphasises arduous care, like "*careful consideration*", "*painstaking analysis*" (sentence 1). Shell stresses the independence, and hence legitimacy, of supporting environmental impact assessments (sentence 2). Only the most obvious stakeholders are mentioned (sentence 3) with no details on precisely who has been consulted. Through vagueness, this projects an impression of widespread consultation. In fact, prior to submitting its proposal for deep-sea disposal to the UK Government in October 1994, Shell consulted only those explicitly required by the British Petroleum Act (1987) - namely Scottish fishery organisations and British Telecom. Shell did not elicit the views of Greenpeace or the Scottish Association for Marine Science which had expressed grave concerns over Shell's plans (Tsoukas, 1999: 518).

After the U-turn, Greenpeace joins Shell in promoting the belief that companies have a high sense of corporate social responsibility, with the concept of "morally redeemed behaviour": *"Shell's decision to seek an onshore disposal option was welcomed by Greenpeace. 'Shell thought they were doing the right thing in dumping offshore, now they are right in selecting onshore dismantling',"* (Greenpeace press release, 11th July 1995). It is possible that Greenpeace were extending an olive branch to Shell in the hope that Shell would include Greenpeace in future stakeholder consultations. Another possibility is that Greenpeace was "wooing" the section of the public who had supported deep-sea disposal, by suggesting that Shell had misplaced good intentions, rather than vilifying Shell with stronger language. Greenpeace maintains the pressure for onshore disposal by presuming that Shell had chosen this option, and congratulating them on making the morally correct choice.


Both Greenpeace's and Shell's slant on this belief were echoed in the television news sample (see Graph 7.4). Greenpeace's world-view was broadcast before Shell's, and marginally more frequently before the U-turn, largely through interviews with Greenpeace and PR experts. However, after the U-turn, only the belief that companies have a high sense of corporate social responsibility is broadcast, probably because both Greenpeace and Shell promoted it in their press releases.

Beliefs regarding which standards are acceptable will be strongly coloured by beliefs regarding the human-nature relationship. This is examined in the next section.

Graph 7.5
Belief theme: Human-nature relationship in Greenpeace & Shell press releases on the Spar issue (30th April - 11th October 1995)



Graph 7.6
Belief theme: human-nature relationship in national television evening news broadcasts on the Spar issue
(30th April - 11th October 1995)



7.2 3 Theme: human-nature relationship

Whereas technocentrics hold that scientific knowledge tells us that we can manage and dominate nature for our own ends, ecocentrics respect nature for its own sake (Pepper, 1984: 173). Rather than trying to break the “*machine*” into its component parts, ecocentrics study how the parts work together (ibid.). Ecocentricism advocates sustainability, such as utilising alternative/appropriate and environmentally friendly technology; and is orientated towards a no-growth economy and population, where resources and waste are recycled (Schumaker, 1987).

7.3.1.1 Prioritising of the environment

One of Greenpeace's core values is a “*commitment to protecting the natural world,*” (Rose, 1993: 291). This ecocentric world-view was promoted heavily in Greenpeace press releases from day one of its seven-week campaign, embodied in the sub-theme that “**the environment is a top priority**” (see Graph 7.5). This includes the following concepts.

- Risks are worth taking to protect the environment: “*Greenpeace has done its research on the safety of our occupation and all precautions have been taken. But we consider that the risks we are taking are nothing compared with the threat posed to the marine environment with the dumping of the Brent Spar at Sea,*” (Greenpeace press release, 4th May 1995). Here, Greenpeace uses contrast and hyperbole (“*nothing compared to the threat posed*”) to project the worthiness of its cause.
- Dumping is morally unacceptable. When Greenpeace later admitted that it had been mistaken over the Spar's toxicity, it proclaimed that its mistake was unimportant, since: “*The Greenpeace position on the Spar has never been based on kilos or tons, but on the principles of dumping,*” (Sue Mayer, Greenpeace-UK Science Director, Greenpeace press release, 5th September 1995).

Shell press releases promote the counter-belief (sub-theme) that “**the environment is not the top priority**”. This covered the following concepts.

- Factors in addition to the environment are important to consider: "*Solutions must be based on the pursuit of sound science, reason and the careful balancing of environmental, safety, health, technological and economic considerations,*" (Shell press release, 11th October 1995). Here Shell justifies its stance using the touchstone of science.

- Small environmental damage is acceptable: "... *disposal of the Brent Spar in the deep Atlantic poses negligible threat to the marine environment,*" (Shell press release, 17th June 1995). This neglects to explain by whose standards the threat is "*negligible*".

Both Greenpeace's and Shell's beliefs were found in the sample of national television evening news, but Greenpeace's were more prevalent (see Graph 7.6). Greenpeace's beliefs were broadcast mostly through promotion by a wide range of actors (like European politicians), and through interviews with Greenpeace. An example is the concept that "dumping is morally unacceptable": "*Dumping Brent Spar in the ocean would have sent a signal that big companies and governments still believe you can use it for a dumping ground,*" (Lord Melchett, Greenpeace, interview, ITN, 10.00pm News, 20th June 1995). This particularly appeals to the news value of watchdog (revealing the potential malpractice of big companies and government); symbolisation (dumping the Spar as a symbol of corporate irresponsibility); and drama (conflict between Greenpeace and government-backed big business; and superlativeness, with the image of a free-for-all "*dumping ground*") (see Table 7.14). A further reason for the greater broadcasting of Greenpeace's belief is Greenpeace's accurate orientation towards its audience: in April 1995 Gallup found that 57% of a large sample (30,000 people) said they were more concerned about broad ethical and environmental issues than five years previously (cited in Vidal, The Guardian, 17th May 1995: 24).

7.3.1.2 Extent of materialism

Complementing the belief that the environment is a top priority, is the ecocentric world-view of **anti-materialism**. This belief came to the fore in 1972 when the Limits to Growth team advocated world-wide zero population and economic growth to avoid a population crash

(Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1972, cited in Pepper, 1984; 22). Sustainable development captured public attention with the publication of Our Common Future (Report of the World Commission on Environment Development, 1987, cited in Elkington and Trisoglio, 1996: 764).

However, the sub-theme of anti-materialism is limited in Greenpeace press releases, expressed only by the belief in recycling: "*Greenpeace welcomes the fact that Shell UK is now studying 200 options for onshore disposal or re-use of the Brent Spar,*" (Greenpeace press release, 8th August 1995). No Shell press releases promoted anti-materialism. Correspondingly, there was minimal expression of this belief in the television news sample (see Graph 7.6), being limited to Greenpeace's proposal for the disposal of the Spar: "*Greenpeace's proposal comes next week. It argues for recycling most of the structure,*" (reporter, Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 11th October 1995).

The belief in **pro-materialism** was much more predominant. Greenpeace press releases promoted this belief via two concepts (see Graph 7.5), one being that "economic growth is good": "*Mr Eggar is more interested in attacking Greenpeace than he is in fulfilling his job ensuring Britain's growth in trade and industry... The potential exists to develop an onshore dismantling industry,*" (Greenpeace press release, 19th July 1995). Why would Greenpeace espouse the belief in the benefits of economic growth, given its radical remit to change the nature of society (Greenpeace-UK, 1996: 3; McCormick, 1989), and given that economic growth (and consumerism) encourages unnecessary consumption of scarce resources? A likely reason is that Greenpeace is orienting itself towards its audience, recognising that consumerism has a long history in western society (Featherstone, 1991: 13) and is difficult to value to change. Even individuals who are nominally environmentally concerned find it hard to escape the prevailing paradigm of economic growth because the economy is structured so that material survival often depends on environmentally insensitive acts. A 1992 Eurobarometer survey

found that 69% of Europeans think that "*economic development must be ensured but the environment protected at the same time*," (Worcester, 1994: 38, cited in Anderson, 1997: 92).

The other pro-materialistic concept promoted by Greenpeace is the belief in green consumerism: "*Motorists should choose other petrol stations whilst Shell pursues its dumping policy*," (Greenpeace press release, 15th June 1995). Shanahan (1993: 182) observes that recycling and purchasing environmentally friendly products are examples of things that can be done without challenging the core belief that "economic growth is good" - light green environmentalism (ibid.: 195). Cracknell (1993) argues that green consumerism requires a change in behaviour that is of negligible cost to the consumer, with the higher monetary cost of environmentally-sound products being offset by higher self-esteem and peer approval. MORI surveys in the 1990s have consistently found over a third of the British public claiming to have acted as green consumers (Worcester, 1994: 15). In April 1995 a Gallup survey found that between 60-70% of a large sample (30,000 people questioned for the Co-Op.) said they wanted responsible ethical consumerism: a third said they had boycotted shops or products in the past and 60% said they were ready to do so (Vidal, *The Guardian*, 17th May 1995: 24). Thus, working within the prevailing values of a consumer society, Greenpeace advocates green consumerism, again orienting itself towards its audience.

Shell press releases espoused the belief that "economic growth is good". It also espoused additional pro-materialistic concepts, for instance, "business values are best": "*It is disappointing that some opposition spokesmen, including Mr. Dobson [Labour Shadow Environment Minister], are not prepared to acknowledge and defend the established framework of policy, regulation and standards which is the essential basis for business enterprise, investment and employment*," (Shell press release, 18th June 1995). Here Shell essentialises the relationship between the existing regulatory framework and the capacity for conducting business.

Pro-materialistic beliefs are much more dominant in television news than anti-materialistic beliefs (see Graph 7.6), including the following concepts.

- Economic growth is good. Table 7.5 shows that the visual of the pipe slowly filling up with black oil anchors the spoken text that Britain has used this oil revenue to get itself "into the black".

Table 7.5 Extract from Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 16th June 1995

Visual	Voice-over
<p><u>Location mode</u>: reporter's voice-over filmed sequences in which reporter is not shown.</p> <p>Film of an oil worker (MS) in the bottom left-hand corner of the screen, which is mostly taken up by a clear horizontal pipe filling up with oil.</p> <p>Slow zoom in to the section of the pipe filling up with oil.</p>	<p>Reporter: "... as more oil came ashore, so did a new source of revenue for the government. Britain became not only self sufficient, but a major exporter. The prospect of being free from debilitating balance of payments cases also transformed the political scene,"</p>

- Resources are not scarce. Table 7.6 shows that where one source of oil runs out, another can be pinpointed (shot 1), which is a cause for celebration (shot 2).

Table 7.6 Extract from Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 16th June 1995

Shot	Visual	Voice-over
1	<p>Visual: CU of white map on a white wall, showing North Sea with oil reserves marked. A finger points at one of these marks. Another finger points at another mark.</p>	<p>Reporter: "The Argyle field - ..."</p>
2	<p>Camera slowly zooms out to include arm of one man, and three-quarters shot of another man (both in suits). In the foreground is the top half of a champagne bottle. Camera zooms out further to show that the bottle is being held by both men.</p>	<p>"... now run out. But with so much other output ministers were hailing the new bonanza,"</p>

The greater broadcasting of the belief of pro-materialism was therefore partly due to source activity by both Greenpeace and Shell. In Shell's case, it appears to be a deeply-held belief, given the variety of concepts it uses to express it. In Greenpeace's case, it appears to be a case


of expediency, toning down deep-green beliefs in order to orient itself to its largely pro-materialistic audience. It is possible that anti-materialism is simply too subversive to broadcast widely, alienating too many vested interests.⁶ For example, Paul Fitzgerald, from the anti-consumerism group “Enough” describes how their media stunts attract media attention (i.e. they satisfy the news values of simplification, novelty and event-orientation), but that they still have difficulty in getting their basic anti-consumerist message across.

“...[W]e wanted to get one simple statistic to come across in our media coverage, which was that 20% of the world's population consumes 80% of its resources - which is a problem that is going to have to be tackled if we want to see equitable sustainability. And across the board that went missing. Our conclusion from last year is that it's not possible to have that read out in the media,” (Fitzgerald, anti-consumerism group “Enough”, “Costing the Earth”, Radio 4, 23rd October 1996).

Another problem with promoting the belief of anti-materialism may be the difficulty in defining what it constitutes. There is little agreement on what sustainable development means in practice (see Elkington and Trisoglio, 1996: 763 for competing definitions). Rowle (1995) argues that industry has co-opted the language of environmentalists, using the concept of sustainable development to argue for a business-as-usual scenario.

⁶ The 1990 anti-environmentalist “Wise Use” conference funded by Chevron, Exxon, Shell Oil and Georgia-Pacific (a timber firm) featured a talk, “Red into Green”, by Reed Irvine of Accuracy in Media and Accuracy in Academia. His talk claimed that environmentalism is the latest incarnation of socialism (Stauber & Rampton, 1995:141).

Graph 7.7
Belief theme: global interconnectivity in Greenpeace and Shell press releases and national television evening news broadcasts on the Spar issue
(30th April - 11th October 1995)



7.3.2 Theme: global inter-connectivity

Internationalism is one of Greenpeace's core values (Rose, 1993: 291). It sees the world as an indivisible whole, recognising that national boundaries are false divisions on a natural landscape (Brown and May, 1991: 5). In the Spar issue, Greenpeace promoted the theme of global inter-connectivity (see Graph 7.7) via the sub-themes of the "global commons", "international economic interdependence", and "save planet Earth" (see Appendix 5, Table 4).

The principle of the global commons sees aspects of nature, such as the high seas and the seabed (Vogler, 1992: 118-37) as a universal free space (Eyerman and Jamison, 1989: 110). These commons, once established, require international management if they are to be conserved against the prospect of unlimited economic exploitation.⁷ Greenpeace promoted this principle from the start of its Spar campaign: "... *the UK Government and the oil and gas industries have total disregard for the health of our seas,*" (Greenpeace press release, 30th April 1995). Greenpeace's use of the pronoun "*our*" constructs a stance of common ownership of the ocean.

The principle of "international economic interdependence" includes the following concepts.

- MNCs exploit different standards world-wide: "... *while Shell cannot get away with dumping such installations anywhere else in the world, the UK Government has granted permission,*" (Greenpeace press releases, 24th May 1995).

- International pressure/influences on Shell: "*It is likely that the Dutch Government will put pressure on the UK Government about the dumping of the Brent Spar,*" (ibid.). Here

Greenpeace maximises the strength of its moral position by projecting future support.

Greenpeace also orients itself towards the widespread international concern for the environment.⁸

⁷ Notable examples of management include the various conventions of the law of the sea signed between 1967-1982 (Waters, 1995: 107).

⁸ A number of studies indicate a relative stability of attitudes to environmental protection: see McCormick (1989) and Lowe and Rudig (1986: 514) for citations regarding the US and West Germany.

The principle of "save planet Earth" consisted of the concept "think globally, act locally": *"Greenpeace is now asking the public to join its campaign. If Shell forecourts remain empty and their petrol pumps stay unused, Shell may finally see sense and call a halt to its dumping plans,"* (Greenpeace press release, 15th June 1995). This principle, which urges people to take personal responsibility for the environment, is echoed elsewhere in Greenpeace's literature (Greenpeace UK, 1996: 3). Here Greenpeace orients itself towards the rise of direct action, single-issue pressure groups in western society (such as the road lobby, (see Banham, 1996)), and the rise of environmentally-conscious behaviour in the populace (Inglehart, 1990, 1971).

Noticeably absent from the Greenpeace press releases' espousal of "save planet Earth" is the deep-green philosophy of Lovelock's (1979) Gaia hypothesis, linking culture and economy to perceptions of a world ecosystem and its protection. The Gaia hypothesis proposed that:

" the entire range of living matter on Earth, from whales to viruses, and from oaks to algae, could be regarded as constituting a single living entity, capable of manipulating the Earth's atmosphere to suit its overall needs and endowed with faculties and powers far beyond those of its constituent parts," (ibid.: 9).

Neither is there any evidence of the deep-green-friendly Chaos theory (Gleick, 1987) which asserts that global and other systems are interconnected but inherently disorderly. As they evolve, minute perturbations can amplify very rapidly. Thus, the condition of the planet is not only full of danger but this danger can be exacerbated rapidly by inadvertent individual events - perhaps a oil spill.

Shell's press releases promoted the belief in global interconnectivity only via the sub-theme of "international economic interdependence" - a predictable finding given that MNCs plan and execute their production, marketing and distribution with the world economy firmly in mind (Held, 1991: 151). This sub-theme comprised the concepts of:

- International pressure/influences on Shell: *"The European companies of the Royal Dutch/Shell Group find themselves in an untenable position and feel that it is not possible to continue without wider support from the governments participating in the Oslo-Paris Convention,"* (Shell press release, 20th June 1995).

- International liaison on business decision: *"Shell-UK has expressed its appreciation to both the Norwegian and British authorities for their support in ensuring the Spar can be anchored safely in a sheltered deep water haven ...,"* (Shell press release, 12th July 1995).

The broadcasting of the different world-views on the theme of global interconnectivity show Greenpeace acting as discursive primary definer during the seven-week campaign, but Shell re-establishing itself by October, if only marginally (see Graph 7.7). Greenpeace was most successful in broadcasting its principle of "save planet Earth" comprising the concept of "think globally, act locally". This concept was broadcast through visuals of Greenpeace's banners urging consumer boycotts (satisfying logistical news values of symbolisation and simplification, and audience-maximising news values of drama, human interest and visual appeal); and more importantly, through co-optation of authoritative actors holding these principles (satisfying news values of authentication and accessibility to journalists). For instance: *"The Danish foreign minister has urged motorists not to use Shell garages, and German environmentalists have mounted a series of protests at petrol stations,"* (presenter, BBC1 9.00pm News, 16th June 1995). A notable aspect of "save planet Earth" is the broad coalition of interests that espouse it: ecological activists, scientists, politicians, etc. One possible reason for this widespread support, noted by Hansen (1993), is that in Britain a shift towards this more global focus is politically expedient in deflecting attention from environmental problems on Britain's doorstep. A further reason may be the strong symbolic imagery associated with planet Earth as a unified entity. Rose (1993) observes: *"From the moment NASA sent back images of the earth alone in space, environmentalists had secured the imagery and the moral high ground of the global commons,"* (ibid.: 287). Thus there is a close alliance between the principle of "save planet Earth" and the principle of the global commons.

7.3 Belief themes in the Ogoniland issue

7.3.1 Theme: scientific beliefs

The two scientific beliefs (sub-themes) visible in the Spar issue (attitude towards risk; and attitude towards science and technology) are also evident in the Ogoniland issue - but to a lesser extent because scientific arguments were not central to the debate (see Appendix 5, Table 5).

Greenpeace advocated a "cautious attitude towards risk", but only through promoting the concept "companies act now and think later": *"If Shell had really cared about the effect of the gas flaring on the local population they would never have let it go ahead in the first place,"* (Greenpeace press release, 15th November 1995). Here Greenpeace uses a cause-and-effect model of argumentation (Shell's uncaring attitude causes pollution) to project the absence, and desirability, of Shell's belief in the precautionary principle.

As in the Spar issue, the belief in "progress through science and technology" was espoused by both Greenpeace and Shell. This time, however, Shell tailors this belief towards environmental benefits, promoting the concept of "environmental progress through science & technology". For instance it promotes its plans for the Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas plant by arguing that it: *"... will process increasing amounts of gas currently flared in the Delta during oil production. Gas flaring is a major environmental concern of ours and the national and international community"*, (Shell press release, 14th November 1995).

Neither Greenpeace's nor Shell's scientific belief themes were found in the two-week national television news sample around Saro-Wiwa's death sentence and execution, largely because of its minimal focus on the science of the issue.

7.3.2 Theme: standard-setting

7.3.2.1 Legislative standard-setting

As in the Spar issue, Greenpeace promoted the need to set new legislative standards, consisting of the concepts of the need for harmonisation of environmental and human rights legislation (see Appendix 5, Table 6). The following example uses *enargia* to appeal to its western audience: *"Following demonstrations against Shell, the Ogoni have been massacred, tortured and gagged by the Nigerian military. Shell's appalling environmental double standards are to blame for the plight of the Ogoni people and Ken Saro Wiwa's death sentence today,"* (Greenpeace press release, 31st October 1995).

Unlike in the Spar issue, where Shell detailed a number reasons why new legislation was unnecessary, in the Ogoniland issue Shell simply promoted the principle of its "non-interference in legislation" (see Appendix 5, Table 6). Table 7.7 shows how Shell justifies its stance.

Table 7.7 Shell press release, 31st October 1995

Sentence	Data
... 5	<i>... "Throughout the trial a number of respected organisations and campaigners raised questions over the fairness of the trial procedure.</i>
6	<i>There are now demands that Shell should intervene, and use its perceived "influence" to have the judgement overturned.</i>
7	<i>This would be dangerous and wrong.</i>
8	<i>Ken Saro-Wiwa and his co-defendants were accused of a criminal offence.</i>
9	<i>A commercial organisation like Shell cannot and must never interfere with the legal processes of any sovereign state.</i>
10	<i>Those who call on us to do so might well be the first to criticise in any situation where that intervention did not suit their agenda.</i>
11	<i>Any government, be it in Europe, North America or elsewhere, would not tolerate this type of interference by business."</i>

It refers to the organisations calling for Shell's involvement as "*respected*" (sentence 5), so orienting its position towards those who support these organisations' cause (most people would

be against death penalties for free speech). Later, however, Shell reminds us that these organisations have an "agenda" (sentence 10). Shell minimises its own power, referring to "*its perceived 'influence'*" (sentence 6), then labels Saro-Wiwa as a "*criminal*" (sentence 8), so suggesting that, in any case, it would be improper to intervene. Shell stresses the principle of non-interference of business in the legal process of any nation (sentence 9). Such a stance is particularly suited to Shell's operations in Nigeria, where in order to attract foreign investments, the Nigerian Government has allowed ecological dumping, i.e. lower environmental standards for the sake of economic development.⁹

Whereas Greenpeace's beliefs appeared in the news broadcasts, through interviews with Greenpeace, Shell's world-view is broadcast only through interviews with Nigerian officials - such as the concept that "existing legislation is responsible": "*What has been done in respect of my country [suspension from the Commonwealth] will stand as selected, discriminatory and grossly unfair,*" (Tom Ikimi, Nigerian Foreign Minister, Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 13th November 1995). This suggests that Shell did not want to draw further attention to its involvement in an issue which television news was framing as a human rights, rather than an environmental, issue. Forwarding spokespeople would only serve to raise the issue of environmental degradation and further negatively associate Shell with an oppressive regime.

7.3.2.2 Standard-setting theme: corporate social responsibility

Greenpeace promoted the belief that companies should have a high sense of corporate social responsibility (see Appendix 5, Table 6), with the concept that Shell ignores its social responsibility: "*Due to Shell's oil operations in the Niger Delta, the Ogoni people have lost their farmlands, fisheries and livelihood,*" (Greenpeace press release, 31st October 1995). Here Greenpeace emphasises Shell's impact on the Ogoni by listing to the point of redundancy ("*farmlands, fisheries and livelihood*").

⁹ Fryas (1998: 465) maintains, most environmental damage in Ogoniand is caused by Shell's equipment problems arising from 40 years of neglect of oil installations.

Shell responded with the belief that companies have a high sense of corporate social responsibility, promoting the concepts that Shell is environmentally friendly, socially concerned and consults with stakeholders (see Table 7.8).

Table 7.8 Shell press release, 31st October 1995.

Sentence	Data	Concept
... 16	<i>... "Shell sympathises with many of the grievances felt by the communities in the oil producing regions of the Niger Delta, and while it will not intervene in Nigeria's domestic politics, it is involved in discussions with a wide range of groups who are interested in finding solutions to these complex issues."</i>	Consultation with stakeholders
17	<i>In addition, Shell makes its own contribution to improving the communities' quality of life, funding roads, clinics, schools, water schemes, scholarships and agricultural support projects.</i>	Shell is environmentally friendly & socially concerned
18	<i>Spending on these community projects will reach more than US\$25 million this year alone."</i>	Shell is socially concerned

Here Shell upholds its belief in non-interference in legislation, but suggests that it is taking action in other arenas to compensate (sentence 16). These actions are described only as "discussions", and the issues as "complex", whilst the groups with whom discussions are taking place are not named (sentence 16). Hence, Shell gives the impression of social concern without allowing itself to be pinned down by detailed promises of change. This impression of social concern is bolstered by a long list of Shell's "contribution to improving the communities' quality of life" (sentence 17), but without detailing whether Shell is making good its past damage.

Despite Shell's heavy promotion of its belief during the two weeks around Saro-Wiwa's execution, only Greenpeace's belief - that companies should have a high sense of corporate social responsibility - was broadcast in the television news sample: "*Ken Saro Wiwa's movement for the survival of the Ogoni people began as a pressure group to force the oil*

industry to clean up the region," (reporter, Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 31st October 1995).

Perhaps the visual and verbal evidence against Shell was too strong for journalists to warrant accessing Shell's views. Perhaps Shell felt that, given the strength of the allegations, it would be easier to defend itself in print (i.e. press releases) rather than under the scrutiny of a camera and awkward questions in interviews.

As explained earlier (chapter 5, section 5.3.1) the environmental framing of the Ogoniland issue was largely neglected in favour of a human rights framing in the two week period around Saro-Wiwa's execution. There are several explanations for this related to the theme of corporate social responsibility. Unlike the Spar issue, where the Spar quickly became a visible symbol of corporate irresponsibility, the Ogoniland issue was more difficult to visually simplify and symbolise. Attempts were made earlier in the year to turn Shell-Nigeria into the symbol of corporate social irresponsibility regarding environmental issues. Table 7.9 shows attempts to create meaning out of the most impactful environmentally-destructive image available - flaring gas stations - with the associations of fire and Hell reinforcing each other.

Table 7.9 Extract from Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 16th January 1995

Image	Voiceover
Visual: film of demonstrators outside a Shell building. They carry banners depicting the Shell logo and " <i>Shell on earth</i> " with the "S" crossed out.	Reporter: " <i>Shell went on to say that Mr. Saro-Wiwa and his supporters were seeking self determination for the Ogoni people and a greater share of oil revenue.</i> "

Mostly, however, available environmental images lacked visual impact. Polluted oil fields were shown, but these mostly showed static pictures of blackened vegetation, or sticky ooze. Such images were not as striking as an enormous, rusting yellow object sticking out of the North Sea. By contrast, the human rights issue was more easily symbolised: for instance, images of protestors erecting a gallows outside Shell's offices (Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 13th November 1995). Perhaps the most compelling (and frequently used) image was that of Saro-Wiwa at a rally, fist raised in a sign of victory.

Another reason for the comparative neglect of the environmental framing of corporate social irresponsibility, as opposed to the human rights framing, is that the environmental issue did not fit so easily into the most common frame to be found regarding Less Developed Countries (LDCs) - the "*coup, crisis, famine*" syndrome. This is where LDCs are presented as subject to recurring political and military crises, which then become the only context within which most LDCs are reported (Elliot and Golding, 1974).¹⁰ Arguably, the environmental degradation was not visibly devastating enough for this to be the main frame of reportage. For instance, there were no visibly starving people. To make matters worse, where *potential* oil pollution was indicated by images of pipes criss-crossing deep green, heavily cultivated fields, the predominant visual image was one of fertile abundance and vitality. The human rights issue, by contrast, had associated dramatic and compelling pictures of slaughtered villages (seen in the Documentary The Drilling Fields); whilst news broadcasts played on the dramatic tension of the last minute international official rush by CHOGM governments to avert the crisis of Saro-Wiwa's execution.

7.3.3 Human-nature relationship

7.3.3.1 Sub-theme: prioritising of the environment

Greenpeace promoted the principle that "the environment is the top priority" (see Appendix 5, table 7). For instance, it argued that "the environment is/should be the top priority": "*The decisions before Shell today should not be whether to continue with business as usual, but how to pull out of Nigeria altogether,*" (Greenpeace press release, 15th November 1995). Here Greenpeace suggests a course of action which would affect Shell's vital interests.

Shell promoted the following counter-beliefs.

- Factors in addition to the environment are important: "*We believe our most useful role is helping Nigeria overcome its economic problems and creating wealth that will give the people*

¹⁰ See Said (1982) on media coverage of Islam and Sreberny-Mohammadi (1991) on media coverage of Iran.

of Nigeria a better living standard and open up for them more options for progress and development," (Shell press release, 14th November 1995). Here Shell promotes its "role" in the generation of wealth, ignoring the fact that oil-generated wealth rarely reaches "the people". As Khan (1994: 7-8) points out, oil revenues accrue directly to the government, and since the oil revenues do not require any taxation of incomes, this removes a set of political pressures which might otherwise have checked government disbursement of this wealth. Hence, this wealth is largely wasted through corruption and mismanagement, such as inefficient show-piece projects. Shell's rosy picture of sustaining the Nigerian economy is therefore more accurately described as sustaining the Nigerian regime.

- Small environmental damage is acceptable: *"However, we totally reject accusations of devastating Ogoni land or the Niger Delta. This has been dramatised out of all proportion. The total land we have acquired for operations to build our facilities, flowlines, pipelines and roads comes to just 0.3 per cent of the Niger Delta. In Ogoni land we have acquired just 0.7 per cent of the land area,"* (Shell press release, 14th November 1995). Here Shell's details neglect to mention that Ogoniland is densely populated and highly fertile, hence even the small figures it cites would impact on many people (Ezetah, 1997: 824).

Both of Shell's beliefs are supported by globally accepted normative principles found in the Rio Declaration, which provides that: *"environmental standards, management objectives and priorities should reflect the environmental and developmental context to which they apply,"* (UN Conference on the Environment and Development Declaration, Rio de Janeiro, 1992, Principle II). Ezetah (1997: 824) notes how this can be used to justify Shell-Nigeria's environmental standards in Ogoniland, by arguing that it is the government's responsibility to satisfy the community's economic needs.

During the two-week period around Saro-Wiwa's trial and execution, only Greenpeace's world-view was broadcast, perhaps because Greenpeace's concepts are more explicitly linked to the human rights angle predominating in the news. An example is Greenpeace's concept that a

"clean environment is a basic human right": *"Ken Saro Wiwa's movement for the survival of the Ogoni people began as a pressure group to force the oil industry to clean up the region."*

Visual: Ogoni people in a field, with gas flaring in the background, (Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 31st October 1995).

7.3.3.2 Extent of materialism

As in the Spar campaign, the belief in anti-materialism was not promoted by Greenpeace or Shell. Rather the belief in pro-materialism was used by both sides. Greenpeace press releases promoted the concepts of "green consumerism" and "ethical investment is desirable": *" Commonwealth calls for clemency have been ignored. If Commonwealth governments are serious they should act to impose an oil embargo on the Nigerian regime. The EU already has an arms embargo,"* (Greenpeace press release, 13th November 1995). Here Greenpeace suggests that the tool of boycotts has worked in the past, and reminds us why this tool should be used, i.e. to change an oppressive *"regime"*. Shell countered this with the pro-materialistic concept that economic growth is good: *"The Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas Project is of long-term benefit to Nigeria because it will create more than 6,000 jobs during construction and a significant number of jobs later on, which is particularly important in the delta region where employment levels are very low,"* (Shell press release, 14th November 1995).

However, only Greenpeace's pro-materialistic beliefs are found in television news, with the broadcasting of concepts of green consumerism, and calls for ethical investment. Table 7.10 shows that strongly emotive visuals equating Shell with death are used to anchor the spoken report of political anger over Shell's Nigerian investments. Given the human rights frame widely adopted by television news, journalists may have regarded Shell's "job creation scheme" as relatively unnewsworthy. Alternatively, Shell may have realised that the promise of jobs would show it to be trivialising the issue of human rights, and so may have refrained from drawing undue attention to it, such as through interviews.

Table 7.10 Extract from Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 13th November 1995

Visual	Voiceover
<p><u>Studio mode</u>: presenter voice-over used with a darkly lit film of a line of demonstrators carrying banners. A white banner in German reads: "<i>Gesellschaft fur bedrohle ***. Shell an der Zerstörung des Ogoni-Lands hindern!</i>" Underneath are two posters with the writing "<i>Ken Saro-Wiwa</i>". Next to this banner is another showing the Shell logo converted into skull and crossbones with red paint.</p>	<p>Presenter: "<i>Shell's already facing political anger here in ...</i>"</p>
<p>Cut to film of a gallows being erected by three people outside a gray Shell building bearing "<i>Shell</i>" and the Shell logo in white. A line of demonstrators are in the background, one holding the Shell logo with the skull and cross-bones.</p>	<p>"... <i>Germany and in Britain for its investment in Nigeria.</i>"</p>

Such orientation towards the belief of "pro-materialism" suggests that this is a wider societal belief. It should be noted that pro-materialism was the dominant belief of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development at Rio de Janeiro. Here, the G77 nations felt that the uncontrolled escalation of capitalistic consumption is the cause of the environmental crisis; and the over-consumption of the G7 nations is matched by under-consumption in the G77 nations, resulting in increasing environmental degradation there (Holmes, 1995: 737). However, the two solutions envisaged were both pro-materialistic. Given that the G77 have one fifth of "*the pie*" (ibid.: 743), one solution was to produce more growth, and the other was redistribution - the principle of an equitable economic order (ibid.: 742). Neither solution suggests less consumption or production.

7.3.4 Global interconnectivity

Both Greenpeace's and Shell's press releases promoted the belief in global interconnectivity, most prominently with the sub-theme of "international economic interdependence" (see Appendix 5, table 8). Greenpeace uses the fact of international economic interdependence as a tool of protest against Shell, for instance, in the concept of "international oil links": "*As a major investor in Nigeria, and as a company which depends on the rule of law and stability in*

the countries where it operates, Shell cannot and should not stay silent when a country's constitution is so clearly breached, with such violent and unjust consequences, as has happened in this case," (Greenpeace press release, 8th November, 1995).

However, Shell anticipates Greenpeace's use of this belief and promotes its own version - "international economic repercussions of boycotts". For instance, regarding Saro-Wiwa's death sentence, Shell International said: *"We are concerned that certain protests against the Nigerian government at this point could actually precipitate the kind of developments we most want to avoid,"* (Shell press release, 8th November 1995). Here Shell claims to be more far-sighted than the pressure groups.

Television news broadcast both sides of the sub-theme of "economic international interdependence", perhaps because they both fit into the human rights frame which the news was favouring. It provides two sides to the question: what can we do about human rights?

7.4 Summary of belief agenda-building

The media-oriented belief discourses of Greenpeace and Shell regarding the promotion of their stance (i.e. their belief themes) varied according to their moral character and their orientation towards their audience.

The following analysis summarises whose stance achieves discursive primary definition status in the Spar issue. Where Shell and Greenpeace share the same belief discourse (the beliefs of progress through science and technology, pro-materialism, and global interconnectivity), this suggests that they are either part of a dominant belief system, or that they are trying to harness it to their own ends. For instance, although both Greenpeace and Shell share the belief in global interconnectivity, they project different versions of this belief. Greenpeace promotes the activist beliefs of the global commons, and "think globally, act locally" - both of which are apparent in the news broadcasts. Regarding the shared belief of economic international

interdependence, Greenpeace accuses Shell of exploiting different standards world-wide, whereas Shell simply promotes the apolitical belief in the interconnectedness of the world economy: here, Shell's version rather than Greenpeace's is broadcast.

Shell's and Greenpeace's belief discourses differ regarding scientific and standard-setting beliefs. In terms of scientific beliefs, Shell's discourse promoting an incautious attitude towards risk achieves initial discursive primary definition status in television news, but this position moves towards a more balanced negotiation of Shell's and Greenpeace's beliefs by week four of Greenpeace's seven-week campaign. In terms of standard-setting beliefs, Shell achieved discursive primary definition status with its belief that no new legislation is needed. Greenpeace was initially the discursive primary definer in its belief that companies should have a high sense of corporate social responsibility, but Shell's belief, that companies do have a high sense of corporate social responsibility, takes over after the U-turn. Thus, in terms of scientific and standard-setting beliefs, Shell is generally more successful in building the media's agenda.

In terms of human-nature beliefs - which underpin all other beliefs (scientific, standard-setting, and global interconnectivity) - an interesting anomaly is observable. Greenpeace's belief that the environment is the top priority achieves discursive primary definition status, but so does the belief in pro-materialism - together comprising a light green approach to prioritising the environment. This suggests that it is very difficult to broadcast a dark green version of the human-nature relationship (and hence it is very difficult to broadcast a dark green version of any other belief).

When projecting a stance, it is important to maintain continuity. To do otherwise would be perceived as grossly inconsistent and can expose a persuader to damaging criticisms of distortion or hypocrisy (Cockroft & Cockroft, 1992: 24). Greenpeace largely sticks to its professed beliefs throughout both campaigns (changing stance only in the Spar issue on its

attitude towards materialism). However, in the Spar issue Shell makes the mistake of changing its stance regarding the precautionary principle, using it only where it suits its agenda (i.e. in arguing against onshore disposal). However, by the Ogoniland campaign, Shell's stance is more consistent.

In terms of projecting its moral character, Greenpeace has the advantage over Shell in having a much stronger ethical capital base built up over years of campaigning. Greenpeace capitalises on this by engaging in the double-pronged strategy of vilifying and praising Shell's moral character. In the Spar issue, for instance, Greenpeace vilifies Shell's morals by highlighting how they fall short of the precautionary principle. After the U-turn, Greenpeace praises Shell's corporate social responsibility in choosing onshore disposal (although Shell had not actually done so); this congratulatory assumption is designed to pressurise Shell to conform. Given Shell's weaker ethical capital base, it has to work hard to project its moral character, which it does mainly through careful lexical choice and framing of its actions. The best example is in the Ogoniland issue where Shell promotes its high corporate social responsibility by highlighting its good intentions, yet keeping its commitments vague.

Moral character helps determine an actor's credibility. Credibility is greatly influenced by how one appears on camera - particularly when under pressure from difficult questions in interviews (Fearn-Banks, 1996: 67-70). For instance, in the Spar issue, Shell-UK's chairman, Chris Fay, gives an extended, live interview on the day of the U-turn (see Table 7.11) in an attempt to explain Shell's new position and project a positive image. The interview follows a damning interview with Tim Eggar, Industry Minister, who expresses extreme annoyance at Shell's "*collapse*". The presenter (Jeremy Paxman) leads with a loaded statement (rows 2-3). Fay, tries to correct this inaccurate statement (row 4) but is cut off by Paxman who accuses Shell of changing its stance (row 5). Fay continues with his detailed explanation about onshore disposal being the second-best option, so correcting the accusation of changing stance. He tries to bolster his credibility by appearing reasonable, and far-sighted (row 8), so

conforming to Fearn-Banks' (1996: 67) suggestion that during interviews the interviewee should be calm, courteous, responsive, direct, positive, truthful, concerned and if necessary, repentant and apologetic. The presenter then insinuates that Shell was lying when it claimed that its "*collapse*" was nothing to do with Greenpeace's campaign (row 10). Rather than rejecting this definition of the U-turn, and before answering the question, Fay patiently works to reject the insinuation of lying (boosting its own moral character), giving a detailed response about the folly of single-issue groups and the benefits of the BPEO process (rows 11-13). As Fay eventually explains why Shell collapsed (the withdrawal of support from European governments) he adopts an aggrieved stance (row 14), so changing from the earnest expression he maintains for most of the interview. Fay's composure falters when Paxman accuses Shell of "*losing its nerve*" (row 15). Fay's terse and defensive response (rows 16-18), provokes a highly indignant rejoinder from Paxman (row 19). Fay's humble agreements with Paxman shows him working hard to appear open, particularly as he maintains eye-contact with Paxman (row 19) (as Fearn-Banks (ibid.: 68) advises). However, agitation starts to creep in (row 20) as Paxman again attacks with a demand for an apology to the Prime Minister (row 19). At this point, Fay tries to defuse the tension, again resorting to calm and detailed explanation (row 21). However, Fay's annoyance shows when Paxman insults Shell's ability to manage (rows 24 and 26). During this attack, Fay looks belligerent (rows 23, 25), and launches into an attack on media misinformation (row 33). Fay re-composes himself with his final response (row 35) but looks annoyed at the end of the interview (row 37). All of these changing facial expressions and moods are captured by the close-ups throughout the extended interview.

Table 7.11 Extract from BBC2 Newsnight, 20th June 1995,

Row	Visuals	Voiceover
1	<p><u>Studio mode</u>: Presenter (Jeremy Paxman) interviews Fay at newsdesk, and Tim Eggar through a visual link-up. Establishing medium-long shot (MLS) shows Paxman facing Fay over a table with a live link-up with Eggar behind them.</p>	<p>... Presenter: <i>"With us now is Chris Fay, who runs Shell-UK. ..."</i></p>
2	<p>Cut to CU of Fay. He looks blank/ resigned. His lip twitches once.</p>	<p><i>"... We have got this straight, haven't we? You are now going to dispose of this construction... "</i></p>
3	<p>Cut to CU of Paxman reading from his desk. He looks up as the word <i>"environmentally-unfriendly"</i> with a look of consternation.</p>	<p><i>"... in the most environmentally unfriendly way available to you."</i></p>
4	<p>Cut to CU of Fay. He shifts in his seat. Caption: <i>"Chris Fay, Shell-UK"</i></p>	<p>Fay: <i>"Well - it's not the most environmentally unfriendly way. What has been said tonight..."</i></p>
5	<p>Presenter voice-over with Fay remaining in shot.</p>	<p>Presenter: <i>"Well it's what you've been saying up 'til now."</i></p>
6	<p>Fay engages in direct gaze with Paxman, using his hands to emphasise his words.</p>	<p>Fay: <i>"No no. I think you're already mixing your words. What the ministry has said is totally and utterly true...."</i></p>
7	<p>Cut to CU of Tim Eggar (live link-up). Eggar averts his gaze at the word <i>"option"</i>.</p>	<p><i>"... The deep-water disposal option ..."</i></p>
8	<p>Cut to CU of Fay. He leans forward at the words <i>"not the worst"</i> for emphasis. He falters on the word <i>"why."</i></p>	<p><i>"... is the best environmental option when you take everything into account. We do not deny that at all. The second-best option - not the worst - is indeed to bring the rig onshore. Now, I do not have a license to bring that onshore and I have to secure that license from the British Government. And I do not underestimate one iota the difficulty I will have</i></p>

Row	Visual shots	Voiceover
		<i>... in explaining to Mr. Eggar and his DTI colleagues the rationale for doing that. Because I have indeed got to answer the question ...of why ... now we are taking the second-best option, so I have to narrow the gap between the two."</i>
9	Cut to CU of Paxman. With open palm he asks the question.	Presenter: <i>"Right, perhaps you could explain that too. You maintained this evening that it has nothing to do with Greenpeace's ..."</i>
10	Cut to the same shot as the establishing shot (1). Fay twiddles his thumbs.	<i>"... environmental campaign, its sit-ins and the rest of it. In that case, why have you suddenly collapsed?"</i>
11	Cut to CU of Fay. Fay pauses at the start of his answer. He looks earnest.	Fay: <i>"You were talking about single-issue campaigns early on. Now in business it's invariably wrong if you only look at one issue in making a decision. That is what the BPEO, what the Best Practical Environmental Option, is about - is you look at the totality. ..."</i>
12	Fay looks concerned (frowns).	<i>"... Now I obviously understand that, you know, to drop a tin can, if you like, into the sea is deemed by most people to be wrong. The perception is wrong, ..."</i>
13	Fay looks earnest.	<i>"... and that is why the OSPAR Convention in 1992 says "OK, a case-by-case basis". We might make a mistake if we do the obvious. This is why the analysis, and it comes down, indeed to that. What we've got here, and it came out from Mr. Bell earlier on - we've got an issue that people only concentrate on the one part. (Pause). Now why have we changed our minds? Basically Shell Group Companies - you know - have had - have been exposed to a situation whereby government ministers (and that's not UK government ministers, because what they've said is totally right - they've abided by international law and by</i>

Row	Visual shots	Voiceover
		<i>international rules, so have we), but confidential government ministers suddenly say, ..."</i>
14	Fay frowns. His voice raises, aggrieved, from the word "agree".	<i>"... well, they don't really suit us any more. Even though we've signed an agreement we're going to agree and go along with the protestors."</i>
15	Cut to two-shot, looking over Fay's shoulder (his back to camera) with Paxman facing the camera.	Presenter: <i>"So it wasn't that you were losing money; it was you lost your nerve?"</i>
16	Fay's arms move to emphasise "untenable", his voice defensive.	Fay: <i>"We were put in an untenable position. ..."</i>
17	Cut to CU of Eggar in link-up, looking reflective.	
18	Cut to CU of Fay, both hands palm-upwards, in a gesture of resigned exasperation.	<i>"... We had an untenable position presented to us. We said last ..."</i>
19	Presenter's voice-over. Paxman raises his voice in pitch, indignantly. Each time Fay says "correct", he bows his head, whilst maintaining eye contact with Paxman. At the word "apologise", Paxman's open palm comes into view at the bottom-left of the screen.	Presenter (interrupting): <i>"You had the Prime Minister of this country going out batting for you." Fay: "Correct". Presenter: "You had him standing up in the House of Commons and intervening internationally for you". Fay: "correct". Presenter: " Have you written to him to apologise? Are you going to?"</i>
20	Fay speeds up his speech.	Fay: <i>"No, you are absolutely right. Clearly he was right, and I think this is where I think we've got to get it down to the real issue here. This is an issue for business; it's an issue for government; it is actually an issue for society...."</i>
21	Fay slows down to his normal pace and looks earnest.	<i>"... We've actually got the problem that single-issue people are only looking in one direction. And yet, by definition, we have to look at the</i>

Row	Visual shots	Voiceover
		<i>totality if we're going to get the best option. I - yes- have got a problem tonight. I've got to persuade Tim Eggar over a course of time that, indeed, I can narrow the gap between the best and the second-best, and that's difficult...."</i>
22	Cut to CU of Paxman with raised eyebrows and an incredulous expression.	Presenter (interrupting): <i>"But you just took three years persuading him the other way."</i>
23	Cut to CU of Fay, looking resigned/belligerent.	Fay: <i>"Absolutely correct."</i>
24		Presenter: <i>"But does this seem to you like the smack of firm management?"</i>
25	At the word "weeks", Fay flashes his eyebrows in a quick look of anger, followed by a beleaguered look.	Fay: <i>"I would suggest to you that if you have to analyse what has gone on in the last four to five weeks, it remains tonight, the best practical option is to dispose of this in the North ..."</i>
26		Presenter: <i>"Are you going to sack your PR people?"</i>
27	Fay's head tilts to one side	Fay: <i>"I'm not too sure that it's just a case of sacking the PR people."</i>
28	Cut to Paxman, hand palm-upwards	Presenter: <i>"But you're suggesting it's purely a public relations problem?"</i>
29	Cut to Fay. Both hands flick from the wrist as he emphasises his points. On the word "two", Fay's index fingers point on each hand.	Fay: <i>"Just get the facts, and this is the problem. There's a lot of misinformation.</i> Presenter: <i>"You ...".</i> Fay: <i>"Let's just get two basic facts."</i>
30		Presenter: <i>"There's no problem with the facts in disposing it at sea."</i>
31	Fay looks earnest. Much hand movement	Fay: <i>"Let's get two basic facts - significant. February 16th, the UK Government writes to the OSPAR Commission and all the North Sea countries, notifying them of their intention to issue a licence for us to dump. April 16th - no answer. You can assume, I would suggest, that</i>

Row	Visual shots	Voiceover
		<i>everyone agrees. Or at least they don't disagree. They formally issue a license. ..."</i>
32	Fay winces, looking pained.	<i>"... It's only two weeks after that, all of a sudden, and maybe for another agenda, perhaps, something starts to happen..."</i>
33	Fay's tone is annoyed. He emphasises the word "while"	<i>"... Now from a PR point of view, can you second-guess that? From a PR viewpoint, am I supposed to react every day to the misinformation which the media takes in, and spend all my time arguing against misinformation, while the media doesn't seem to want to cover the total story. Like tonight ..."</i>
34	Paxman talks at the same time as Fay	Fay: <i>"... Do people actually outside understand..."</i> Presenter: <i>"People were proposing that it was a David and Goliath story."</i>
35	Fay pauses and re-iterates, looking earnest.	Fay: <i>"Do people actually outside understand tonight what is the best practical environmental problem or do they still think single-issue? There is the problem we've got, and we singly obviously failed. I don't honestly believe we failed in the UK, and I'm not saying that because I'm Shell-UK. I think we failed in the wider context of Europe to explain what BPEO is. And I think society has got to be persuaded what, if you wish, the overall picture, rather than the single issue."</i>
36		Presenter: <i>"Chris Fay, thanks very much."</i>
37	Fay looks off-camera after saying "thank-you", with a look of annoyance (an eye-brow flick).	Fay: <i>"Thank-you"</i>

In the Ogoniland issue, in the two-week period around Saro-Wiwa's death sentence and execution, Shell gave no interviews in the television news sample. Shell may have been wary of interviews given its rough ride in the above Spar interview which dealt with a far less emotive issue. Indeed, some crisis communications specialists advise that the best way to shorten a crisis and avoid prolonged "*media contamination*" afterwards is by avoiding unnecessary news conferences. As Fearn-Banks advocates: "*During a crisis you want to get off the news pages and broadcasts,*" (ibid.: 67). To some extent, this strategy worked in that in the news focused on the vilification of the Nigerian regime far more than on the vilification of Shell. However, it also ensured that there were no positive representations of Shell's world-view. As Regester & Larkin (1997: 149) argue, in crisis situations, the media normally become hostile when they believe that the organisation at the centre of the crisis is being reticent about providing talking heads for interview or thought to be withholding information.

In terms of orientation towards its audience, Greenpeace is very adept at this. For instance, in both the Spar and Ogoniland issues, Greenpeace promotes the precautionary principle whilst avoiding technical language, so catering for its audience of journalists and the wider public. Greenpeace does not promote the dark green belief of "anti-materialism" or "no progress through science and technology" because this would be too subversive for its audiences, instead opting for light green beliefs. For the same reason, the belief in global interdependence is not framed to appeal to deep-greens, but instead is framed pragmatically - concentrating on the tools it allows for combating Shell (such as "think globally, act locally"). Shell does not make such attempts to identify with its audience until the Ogoniland campaign, where Shell promotes why it believes it should not interfere in Nigerian legislation

The following chapter summarises the discursive primary definition status across the three rhetorical discourses of emotivism, rationalism and belief. It describes these discourses more formally, and explores their interlinkages and relative prominence in the Spar and Ogoniland issues.

Table 7. 12 News Values displayed by scientific belief themes in national television evening news broadcasts on the Spar issue (30th April 1995 - 11th October 1995)

Themes & sub-themes	Total no. of concepts in sub-theme	Number of times the concepts display the news value & %age of total no. of concepts displaying the news value		PROFESSIONAL NEWS VALUES							LOGISTICAL NEWS VALUES					AUDIENCE-MAXIMISING NEWS VALUES										
		New info.	Watch dog	Objectivity/balance	Facticity (authentic-ication)	Accessible to journalists	Symbolisation/simplification	Event orientation	Copying the competition	Novelty	Drama	Human interest	Visual appeal	New info.	Watch dog	Objectivity/balance	Facticity (authentic-ication)	Accessible to journalists	Symbolisation/simplification	Event orientation	Copying the competition	Novelty	Drama	Human interest	Visual appeal	
Attitude Towards Risk:																										
- Cautious attitude	11	11 100%	7 64%	11 100%	11 100%	11 100%	11 100%	11 100%	11 100%	9 82%	11 100%	0	0	3 27%	0	0	0	0	9 82%	11 100%	0	3 27%	0	0	0	0
- Incautious attitude	12	10 83%	1 8%	9 75%	12 100%	12 100%	12 100%	12 100%	12 100%	1 8%	12 100%	0	0	1 8%	6 50%	1	1	6 50%	1 8%	12 100%	0	1 8%	6 50%	1	1	1
Attitude Towards Science & Technology:																										
- Progress through science & technology	29	25 100%	9 31%	17 59%	17 59%	17 59%	17 59%	17 59%	13 45%	6 21%	29 100%	14 48%	11 38%	5 17%	10 34%	5	5	10 34%	6 21%	29 100%	14 48%	11 38%	5 17%	10 34%	0	
- No progress through science & technology	0																									
Total	52	46 88%	17 33%	37 71%	40 77%	36 69%	40 77%	40 77%	36 69%	16 31%	52 100%	14 27%	11 21%	9 17%	16 31%	9	9	16 31%	16 31%	52 100%	14 27%	11 21%	9 17%	16 31%	1 2%	

Table 7. 13 News Values displayed by belief theme "standard-setting" in national television evening news broadcasts on the Spar issue (30th April - 11th October 1995)

Themes/sub-themes	Total no. concepts	Number of times the concepts display the news value & %age of total no. of concepts displaying the news value												
		PROFESSIONAL NEWS VALUES					LOGISTICAL NEWS VALUES					AUDIENCE-MAXIMISING NEWS VALUES		
		New info.	Watch dog	Objectivity/balance	Facticity (authentication)	Accessible to journalists	Symbolisation/simplification	Event orientation	Copywriting competition	Novelty	Drama	Human interest	Visual appeal	
Legislative standard-setting														
- Need for legislation	5	5 100%	5 100%	0	5 100%	5 100%	0	5 100%	2 40%	0	5 100%	1 20%	0	
- No extra legislation needed	3	3 100%	0	3 100%	3 100%	3 100%	0	3 100%	3 100%	0	0	2 67%	0	
Sub-total	8	8 100%	5 63%	3 38%	8 100%	8 100%	0	8 100%	5 63%	0	5 63%	3 38%	0	
Corporate social responsibility standard-setting														
- Companies should have high sense of responsibility	21	18 86%	19 90%	8 38%	18 86%	10 48%	14 67%	21 100%	13 62%	5 24%	12 50%	16 76%	0	
- Companies have a high sense of responsibility	16	15 94%	1 6%	4 25%	14 88%	16 100%	10 63%	16 100%	16 100%	9 56%	2 13%	11 69%	0	
Sub-Total	37	33 89%	20 54%	12 32%	32 86%	26 70%	24 65%	37 100%	29 78%	14 38%	14 38%	27 73%	0	
Total	45	41 91%	25 56%	15 33%	40 89%	34 76%	24 53%	45 100%	34 76%	14 31%	19 42%	30 67%	0 0%	

Table 7.14 News Values displayed by belief theme "human-nature relationship" in national television evening news broadcasts on the Spar issue (30th April - 11th October 1995)

Themes/sub-themes	Total no. of concepts in sub-theme	Number of times the concepts display the news value & %age of total no. of concepts displaying the news value												
		PROFESSIONAL NEWS VALUES					LOGISTICAL NEWS VALUES					AUDIENCE-MAXIMISING NEWS VALUES		
		New info.	Watch -dog	Objectivity/balance	Facticity (authentication)	Accessible to journalists	Symbolisation/simplification	Event orientation	Copying the competition	Entertainment	Novelty	Drama	Human interest	Visual appeal
Environment is top priority	41	33 80%	28 68%	13 32%	32 80%	38 93%	38 93%	41 100%	25 61%	20 49%	31 76%	23 56%	5 12%	
Environment is not top priority	20	15 75%	7 35%	10 50%	19 95%	17 85%	8 40%	20 100%	13 65%	6 30%	5 25%	11 55%	0	
Anti-materialism	3	3 100%	2 67%	1 33%	3 100%	3 100%	3 100%	3 100%	3 100%	3 100%	0	0	0	
Pro-materialism	31	29 94%	3 10%	17 55%	26 84%	30 97%	15 48%	31 100%	11 35%	5 16%	29 94%	14 45%	10 32%	
Total	95	80 84%	40 42%	41 43%	80 84%	88 93%	64 67%	95 100%	52 55%	34 36%	65 68%	48 51%	15 16%	

Table 7.15 News Values displayed by belief theme "global interconnectivity" in national television evening news broadcasts on the Spar issue (30th April - 11th October 1995)

Themes/sub-themes	Total no. of concepts in sub-theme	Number of times the concepts display the news value & %age of total no. of concepts displaying the news value												
		PROFESSIONAL NEWS VALUES					LOGISTICAL NEWS VALUES					AUDIENCE-MAXIMISING NEWS VALUES		
		New info.	Watch -dog	Objectivity/balance	Facticity (authentication)	Accessible to journalists	Symbolisation/simplification	Event orientation	Copying the competition	Entertainment	Novelty	Drama	Human interest	Visual appeal
Principle of global commons	2	2 100%	2 100%	0	2 100%	2 100%	1 50%	2 100%	0	1 50%	2 100%	2 100%	2 100%	0
International economic interdependence	1	1 100%	1 100%	1 100%	1 100%	0	0	1 100%	0	1 100%	1 100%	1 100%	1 100%	0
Save Planet Earth	73	45 62%	27 37%	16 22%	73 100%	70 96%	66 90%	73 100%	66 90%	53 73%	66 90%	68 93%	15 21%	
Total	76	65 86%	30 39%	17 22%	76 100%	72 95%	67 88%	76 100%	66 87%	55 72%	69 91%	71 93%	15 20%	

CHAPTER 8

THE IMPORTANCE OF RHETORICAL DISCOURSE

IN NEWS MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES

8.1 Introduction

Chapters 5 - 7 show how Greenpeace's and Shell's media battles over the Spar and Ogoniland issues engage in the rhetorical discourses (main themes) of emotivism (pathos), rationalism (logos) and belief (ethos). This chapter synthesises the media-oriented rhetorical discourses of Greenpeace & Shell in a discussion of their media strategies, locating their media-oriented "*discursive practices*" (Foucault, 1972: 117) within wider non-discursive practices.

Section 8.2 summarises the extent to which the agenda of UK national television news was built according to the rhetorical discourses promoted by Greenpeace and Shell. What was "not said" - either in Greenpeace and Shell press releases, or in the news sample, is explained with regard to "*procedures*" which Foucault suggests control discursive practices. Together, these lead to an analysis of the "*rules of formation*" (Foucault 1972: 31-9) of the rhetorical discourses (section 8.3). The power-knowledge nexus is further explored by examining how Greenpeace and Shell use their knowledge of the media, their audience and their opponents (section 8.4). Section 8.5 explores the "*orders of discourse*" (Fairclough, 1994: 43), explaining the relative prominence of the rhetorical discourses with reference to the notion of instrumental rationality and hegemony. Section 8.6 examines links between Greenpeace's and Shell's media-oriented discursive practices and non-discursive practices.

Table 8.1 Summary of emotive themes/sub-themes promulgated in national television evening news by various actors in the Spar issue (30th April - October 11th 1995)

Themes/ sub-themes	GP (Int./ quote/ video)	GP (Rep)	Shell (Int./ quote/ video)	Shell (rep)	UK Gover- nment (int/ quote)	UK Gover- nment (rep)	Other politic- ians (int/ quote)	Other politic- ians (rep)	Expert (int/ quote)	Expert (rep.)	Other press- ure/ interest groups	The public	Journ- alists	TOTAL no.of concepts
Pro-Greenpeace	47	3	0	0	1	1	1	2	3	0	2	0	47	107
Pro-Shell	0	0	3	5	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	3	13

Table 8.2 Summary of rationalistic themes/sub-themes promulgated in national television evening news by various actors in the Spar issue (30th April - October 11th 1995)

Themes/ sub-themes	GP (Int./ quote/ video)	GP (Rep)	Shell (Int./ quote/ video)	Shell (rep)	UK Gover- nment (int/ quote)	UK Gover- nment (rep)	Other politic- ians (int/ quote)	Other politic- ians (rep)	Expert (int/ quote)	Expert (rep.)	Other pressure /interest groups	The public	Journ- alists	TOTAL no.of concepts
Pro-Greenpeace scientific	18	11	1	5	1	0	14	1	8	1	0	0	31	91
Pro-Shell scientific	1	0	13	19	11	1	1	0	8	2	2	0	13	71
Pro-Greenpeace legal	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	5
Pro-Shell legal	1	0	2	1	1	3	1	0	0	0	1	0	7	17

KEY

GP = Greenpeace

Int/quote/video = interviewed, quoted or filmed

Rep = reported

Table 8.3 Summary of belief themes/sub-themes promulgated in national television evening news by various actors in the Spar issue (30th April - October 11th 1995)

Themes/sub-themes	GP (Int./ quote/ video)	GP (rep)	Shell (Int./ quote/ video)	Shell (rep)	UK Government (int/ quote)	UK Government (rep)	Other politicians (int/ quote)	Other politicians (rep)	Expert (int/ quote)	Expert (rep.)	Other pressure / interest groups	The public	Journ- alists	TOTAL no.of concepts
Scientific:														
Pro-Greenpeace	4	1							2				4	11
Pro-Shell			3	3					5	1				12
Shared	1	1	2	6			1		1				17	29
Standard-setting:														
Pro-Greenpeace	3				3	4	4		6				6	26
Pro-Shell	4	2	9	6	6				2		1		1	31
Human-nature relationship:														
Pro-Greenpeace	15	10	0	2	3	1	0	1	3	1	0	1	7	44
Pro-Shell			4	2	4	2			2	1	1		4	20
Shared	9	3			1		6	2	1			2	7	31
Global interconnectivity														
Pro-Greenpeace	21	3					5	13	4		2	8	1	57
Pro-Shell			9	2	1	3	2	1	1				1	20

KEY

GP = Greenpeace

Int/quote/video = interviewed, quoted or filmed

Rep = reported

Table 8.4 Total themes promulgated in national television evening news by various actors regarding the Spar issue (30th April - 11th October 1995)

Themes	GP (Int./ quote/ video)	GP (rep)	Shell (Int./ quote/ video)	Shell (rep)	UK Govern -ment (int/ quote)	UK Govern -ment (rep)	Other politic -ians (int/ quote)	Other politic -ians (rep)	Expert (int/ quote)	Expert (rep.)	Other pressure /interest groups	The public	Journ- alists	TOTAL no.of concepts
EMOTIVE THEMES														
Total pro-Greenpeace	47	3	0	0	1	1	1	2	3	0	2	0	47	107
Total pro-Shell	0	0	3	5	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	3	13
RATIONAL THEMES														
Total pro-Greenpeace	19	14	1	5	1	0	14	1	8	1	0	0	32	96
Total pro-Shell	2	0	15	20	12	4	2	0	8	2	3	0	20	88
BELIEF THEMES														
Total pro-Greenpeace	43	14	0	2	6	5	9	14	15	1	2	9	18	138
Total pro-Shell	4	2	25	13	11	5	2	1	10	10	2	0	6	83

KEY

GP = Greenpeace

Int/quote/video = interviewed, quoted or filmed

Rep = reported

8.2 Building the news media agenda through rhetorical discourses

Schlesinger (1990: 79) argues that a crucial aspect of news management strategies is the ability to supply suitable information - i.e. *"a well-defined message to communicate framed in optimal terms capable of satisfying news values"* (Schlesinger, 1990: 79). This research has problematised this aspect of news management strategies, questioning how these *"well-defined"* messages and *"optimal terms"* are rhetorically structured and which news values they appeal to. In exploring these questions, this analysis addresses the gap left by the source strategies models examined in chapter 2 - namely their limited attention to the nature of the message and consequently to the links between the discursive strategies of sources and discursive outcomes in the media.

8.2.1 What was said

This section summarises the media-oriented rhetorical discourses promoted by Greenpeace and Shell, and their relative success in building the agenda of UK television news in the Spar issue (30th April - 11th October 1995).¹

Chapter 5 showed that Greenpeace achieves discursive primary definition status in promoting the emotive sub-themes of vilification of Shell and laudability of Greenpeace throughout the seven-week campaign (30th April - 21st June 1995). Afterwards, however the themes of vilification and ennoblement are much reduced in the news, and where they occur, Shell's version is more dominant (see Chapter 5 graphs 5.1 and 5.2, & section 5.4). Table 8.1 helps explain the extent of discursive primary definition status within the discourse of emotivism in the Spar issue by showing which actors were broadcast supporting pro-Greenpeace or pro-Shell emotive themes.² It shows that Shell is rarely depicted propagating an emotive discourse;

1

¹ Appendix 6 presents a set of tables showing the extent to which the emotive, rationalistic and belief discourses built the news agenda (with the unit of counting being the concept/statement). They also show which actors support each theme/sub-theme.

² See Appendix 6 Table 1 for the full variation in discursive primary definition status within emotive themes.

and that it had few allies broadcasting emotive concepts on its behalf. By contrast, Greenpeace is frequently depicted propagating an emotive discourse (particularly in the sub-theme of "laudability of Greenpeace"); and it had a wide range of allies broadcasting the sub-theme of "vilification of Shell" (see Appendix 6, Table 1).

Chapter 6 showed that in the Spar issue, discursive primary definition regarding the rationalistic scientific discourse is highly complex. Pro-Greenpeace scientific arguments appear more strongly in the news broadcasts in the first few weeks of the seven-week campaign, but Shell catches up or takes over in several aspects of the scientific arguments. Greenpeace's discursive primary definition status in the first few weeks regarding the large environmental impact of deep-sea disposal quickly gives way to Shell's counter-argument regarding positive or small negative environmental impact (section 6.2.1.3, graph 6.4). After the U-turn, Shell is marginally more successful than Greenpeace in building the media's agenda regarding the precedent argument (section 6.2.1.1, graph 6.1). Greenpeace retains its discursive primary definition status regarding the Spar's toxicity, which dominates until the U-turn, after which the issue is not reported at all (section 6.2.1.2, graph 6.3); and becomes discursive primary definer on the scientific aspects of onshore disposal after the U-turn (section 6.2.1.4, graph 6.6). Table 8.2 shows that Greenpeace is the most frequent actor depicted broadcasting pro-Greenpeace scientific themes, with support from "other politicians" (usually European), experts and journalists; whilst Shell is the most frequent actor depicted broadcasting pro-Shell scientific themes, with support from the UK Government and experts.³ Chapter 6 showed that despite much promotion by Greenpeace of a rationalistic legal discourse during the seven-week campaign, the media's negotiation of the legal discourses in the Spar issue favoured Shell's version. Thus Shell was discursive primary definer regarding the issues of Greenpeace's illegality and Shell's legality (section 6.2.2, graphs 6.7 and 6.8). Table 8.2 shows that Shell's

³ See Appendix 6, Tables 2 and 3 for the full variation in discursive primary definition status within rationalistic scientific themes

more successful legal discourse is largely promulgated by Shell and the UK Government, whereas Greenpeace lacks allies.⁴

Where Greenpeace's and Shell's beliefs diverge, they have variable success in achieving discursive primary definition status.⁵ Chapter 7 showed that in the Spar issue, Shell is the discursive primary definer in terms of scientific beliefs (although Greenpeace quickly catches up) (Chapter 7 section 7.2.1.1, graph 7.1) and legislative standard-setting beliefs (section 7.2.2.1, graph 7.3). Appendix 6, Table 6 shows that this is largely through Shell's self-promotion efforts, and those of its allies (experts with scientific beliefs, and the UK Government with legislative standard-setting beliefs). During the seven-week campaign, Greenpeace is discursive primary definer in the beliefs of corporate social responsibility standard-setting (section 7.2.2.2, graph 7.4); global interconnectivity (section 7.3.2, graph 7.7); and the human-nature relationship belief that the environment is the top priority (section 7.3.1.1, graph 7.6). However, after the U-turn Greenpeace retains this discursive primary definition status only in the latter belief. Where Greenpeace and Shell promote the same beliefs (i.e. the beliefs of progress through science and technology (Appendix 6, Table 5) and pro-materialisticness (Appendix 6, Table 7), these are also broadcasted by a wide range of actors and generally achieve discursive primary definition status compared to their counter-beliefs (see graphs 7.2 and 7.6).

8.2.2 What was not said

An important indicator of the limits of actors' discursive promotional activity comes through examining what is not said. This section examines what was not broadcast in the news sample despite promotion by Greenpeace and Shell; and what was not promoted by Greenpeace and Shell, despite being core beliefs.

⁴ See Appendix 6, Table 4 for the full variation in discursive primary definition status within rationalistic legal themes.

⁵ See Appendix 6, Tables 5 - 8 for the full variation in discursive primary definition status within belief themes.

Foucault (1991: 72) sees discourses as produced only by multiple forms of constraint. For instance, within a discourse, certain techniques and procedures are "*sanctioned*" within society's "*regime of truth*" (ibid.: 73; 1980: 131); and those who are "*charged with saying what counts as true*" have a certain status (Foucault 1980: 131). Foucault examines a range of procedures by which discourses are constrained and controlled. These include: constraints upon what can be said, by whom, and on what occasions; the effects of attribution of authorship, boundaries between disciplines; and social constraints on access to certain discursive practices (see Fairclough, 1994: 51).

In the Spar issue, arguments promoted heavily by Greenpeace but which failed to be broadcast in the news sample were the emotive vilificatory concept that "Shell engages in assault"; and the rationalistic sub-theme that "Shell acts illegally", comprising the concepts of violence towards activists and the breaking of international conventions regarding deep-sea disposal. The omission in the national television news sample of all illegal activities conducted by Shell, despite both emotive and rationalistic promotion by Greenpeace, suggests the existence of procedures constraining discourse. One constraint is journalistic news values regarding what is broadcastable. Arising from legal prohibition, direct allegations of illegality could risk libel charges from Shell. Hence the news is careful not to broadcast such allegations if, for any reason, there is doubt over their facticity, accuracy or authentication. Another constraint is journalistic perception regarding which subject Greenpeace legitimately has the right to pronounce on. It is likely that journalists view Greenpeace as having the right to legitimately speak a belief discourse regarding the environment, but not to stray into areas where others (such as the executive, judiciary or science) are qualified to speak.

Chapter 6 showed how Greenpeace mobilised science to vilify Shell, in projecting the large environmental impact of deep-sea disposal. However, in doing so, Greenpeace ignored the biggest cause of marine pollution - overfishing.

"In the marine environment the greatest damage is caused not by pollution, nor by the oil industry but by the fishing industry. But there is no clear target and there will not be public support for a campaign against fishermen. So the problems are ignored," (John Gray, professor of Marine Biology, University of Oslo, e-mail interview, January 2000).

Here, Gray succinctly highlights various constraints under which Greenpeace operates. Greenpeace's vilification of Shell arises from its need for a clear target. This, in turn, is fed by its need to appeal to the media (enabling ease of story expression); and its need to appeal to the public (providing a scapegoat that the public will accept and remember).

Chapter seven observed that Greenpeace shies away from promoting deep-green beliefs. In the Spar issue, it fails to promote the belief of "no progress through science and technology"; it minimally promotes the belief of anti-materialism (whilst promoting pro-materialism more often); and it avoids the deep-green version of "save planet Earth". Correspondingly, these beliefs are not broadcast. This lack of promotion of deep-green beliefs suggests the existence of procedures constraining discourses - namely self-censorship in orienting its stance towards its, at best, light-green mass audience. Indeed, (Dale, 1996) argues that Greenpeace International are a filtering mechanism so that morally-inspired, zealous campaigners do not put off news editors, who: "*search for the "gotcha" value, not moral lessons*" (ibid.: 115).

In the Spar issue, Shell engaged minimally in the emotive discourse compared to the rationalistic discourse (see Table 8.4). Shell focused on the scientific debates, and the fact that its disposal decision was sanctioned by the UK Government and complied with UK law. Institutional constraint may explain Shell's focus on rationalistic rather than emotive discourse. It is well documented that the dominant culture within business is that of an instrumental-

rational discourse, where the: "*end, the means and the secondary results are all rationally taken into account and weighed,*" (Weber, 1952/1995: 26).⁶

In the Spar issue, Shell engages in the belief discourse, but less frequently than Greenpeace (see Table 8.4), and out of concern to uphold the status quo rather than campaigning for change. (Greenpeace's "campaigning beliefs" are those which promote different standards regarding scientific risk, legislation and corporate social responsibility; and those which prioritise the environment over humans, and the inter-connectivity of the world's ecosystem.)

Shell's more conservative use of the belief discourse may arise from constraint of the dominance in business of instrumental-rationality. Waters and Bird (1989, cited in Frederick and Hoffman, 1995: 706) identify the phenomenon of "*moral muteness*" where business managers find it difficult to talk about ethics even when they believe that ethics are relevant to the problem. Possible reasons for this include the perception that moral language threatens harmony because it is confrontational; and threatens efficiency because it is merely private opinion, leading to no obvious issue resolution (ibid.). Another cause of moral muteness is that moral language introduces an extra element of complexity and risk into an already risky world: it is difficult enough to evaluate a problem from just a legal or technical angle (Frederick & Hoffman, 1995: 706). Thus, Shell's minimal engagement in the emotive discourse, and different engagement in the belief discourse (compared to Greenpeace), can be explained by recourse to the constraint of the instrumental-rational mode of conducting business.

Thus, procedures constraining discourses help explain what is not said in Greenpeace's and Shell's media campaigns. So what are the discursive "*rules of formation*" (Foucault 1972: 31-9) that help determine what *is* said?

⁶ Indeed, a number of authors point to the inadequacy of the dominant rational-instrumental approach of the management discourse. See Stacey (1996), Mintzberg (1994), March and Olsen (1976) and Lindblom (1959).

8.3 The rules of formation of news media-oriented rhetorical discourses

This section describes the “*rules of formation*” (ibid.) of the rhetorical discourses of emotivism, rationalism and belief. The rules of formation make it possible for certain statements but not others to occur at particular times, places and institutional locations. They include, the following.

- “*Objects*” (of knowledge) (ibid.): i.e. the entities which particular disciplines or sciences recognise within their fields of interest, and which they take as a target of investigation (Fairclough, 1994: 40).

- “*Concepts*” (Foucault, 1972: 31-9): i.e. the battery of categories, elements and types which a discipline uses as an apparatus for treating its field of interest. There are shifting configurations of changing concepts (ibid.: 45).

- “*Subject positions*” (ibid.) arising from “*enunciative modalities*” (ibid.) (i.e. types of discursive activity - like reporting or promoting - each of which has its own associated subject position). Statements position subjects - both those who produce them and those they are addressed to - in particular ways. So to describe a formulation of a statement involves: “*determining what position can and must be occupied by any individual if he is to be the subject of it,*” (Foucault, 1972: 95-6, cited in Fairclough, 1994: 43). Given the institutional sites examined in this research's case studies, consideration must be given to the subject positions of the news sources (Greenpeace and Shell), the gatekeepers (television news) and the audience (the wider public).

The rhetorical discourse of emotivism takes peoples’ emotions as its objects of knowledge. It is a discourse which aims to appeal to the heart. It uses concepts involving negative and positive descriptions of actors and their actions, which build to form the categories of vilification and ennoblement. (The full range of emotive concepts can be found in Appendix 3). Chapter 5 gives a flavour of the range of rhetorical strategies particularly suited to propagating a news media-oriented emotive discourse. These include metaphor; metonymic synecdoche; sound patterning; hyperbole; personalisation; the use of vagueness combined with

detail; nominalisation (the conversion of processes, events, etc., into names); and connotative visual imagery with mythical appeal (such as David and Goliath). The subject position that actors occupy when promoting an emotive discourse must be one that justifies the use of emotivism. Such a position must involve a “worthy” cause otherwise the subject of an emotive discourse could be perceived as a vindictive trouble-maker (if engaging in vilification) or a pompous braggart (if engaging in ennoblement). For instance, describing Greenpeace as “*eco-pirates*” (Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 15th May 1995) places Greenpeace into the subject position of active defender of the ecosystem. It invites the person to whom Greenpeace is described to agree both that the environment needs defending, and that Greenpeace can fulfil this role.

The **rhetorical discourse of rationalism** takes its objects of knowledge as that which can be proved to be true and correct, given the use of logic and societally-established rules and procedures. It is a discourse which appeals to the mind. It consists of concepts such as scientific and legal facts, definitions and explanations. (The full range of rational concepts can be found in Appendix 4). Chapter 6 showed that rhetorical strategies particularly suited to propagating a news media-oriented rationalistic discourse are rhetorical models of argumentation. These include the part-whole model (which pertains to learn more about the whole by looking at the part, and vice versa); the definitional model (which uses vagueness and specificity in varying degrees, and attempts to shift the issue); the testimonial model; and the cause-and-effect model (this includes scape-goating). Also used are rhetorical tools of the special case; hypotheticals; establishing the ground-work to pave the way for future argumentation; moving from detailed explanation to simplified statements over time; and closely mirroring the opponent’s argument with a counter-argument. The subject position that actors must occupy when promoting a rational discourse is one in which they are recognised as capable of pronouncing “correct” statements. This can happen either through actors’ specialised knowledge of certain types of information that society considers possible to validate (for example, empirical rather than metaphysical knowledge); and through their knowledge of society’s established rules and procedures for validating “truth” (hence acting as

adjudicators). For instance, this subject position can be seen in the following statement: “*You have to look at all aspects - environment, safety, occupational health, economics. In this case each of these instances pointed that Brent Spar should be dumped in the deep Atlantic,*” (Chris Fay, Chairman, Shell-UK, Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 17th June 1995). Here Shell positions itself as logically evaluating all the important angles - or at least, all the angles that society has deemed important enough to devise some standard and means of measurement for. Fay’s statement invites the broadcast audience to agree that Shell is rightfully in a position where it can, and should, consider all these aspects and decide on the best course of action.

The rhetorical discourse of belief takes its objects of knowledge as that which appeals to principles - notions of what is right. This could be described as a kind of intellectual emotivism in that gut feeling is involved as well as intellectually worked-out moral stances. It consists of value-laden concepts such as those concerned with standard-setting and establishing priorities. (The full range of belief concepts are detailed in Appendix 5.) A fundamental belief appears to be the human-nature relationship (comprising the extent of the prioritising of the environment, and the extent of materialisticness). Coloured by these beliefs are those regarding science, standard-setting and global interconnectivity. Chapter 7 showed that rhetorical strategies particularly suited to propagating a news media-oriented belief discourse include referring to principles directly and indirectly (for instance, through emotive language); orientation towards the audience; essentialism; and using the full range of rhetorical devices often found in emotive discourse to establish moral character (such as metaphor, visual semiotics, meiosis, enargia, hyperbole and pronominal usage). The subject position adopted by actors promoting a belief discourse must take into account the actors’ moral character and stance, and its audience’s principles. For instance, when Greenpeace espouses the belief “save planet Earth”, Greenpeace must occupy the subject position of rightful (its moral character) defender of the Earth (its stance); and the audience must recognise that Greenpeace is the rightful defender and agree that the Earth needs saving.

It should be emphasised that no discourse stands alone. For instance, in the Spar issue, Greenpeace uses rationalistic argumentation in conjunction with emotivism and belief. Where Greenpeace's rationalism melds into emotivism (such as its emotive science), Greenpeace urges people to take note of its scientific "facts" by allying them with strong feelings. Where Greenpeace's rationalism melds into belief, such as the mingling of scientific and moralistic language in its advocacy of the precautionary principle, Greenpeace brings the facts alive by investing them with a higher purpose (i.e. Weber's (1952/1995) substantive rationality). Another example of the inter-connectedness of discourses is that emotive discourses appear to work best when allied with a moral stance. For instance there would have been no justifiable reason for broadcasting the emotive sub-theme of "vilification of Shell" had Greenpeace not also pointed to Shell's corporate social irresponsibility.

Having established the rules of formation of these rhetorical discourses, the following section offers a Foucaultian explanation of differentiations in news media-oriented rhetorical discursive activity by Greenpeace and Shell, and in rhetorical discursive media outcomes.

8.4 Power/knowledge, rhetorical discourses and news media strategies

As chapter 2 observed, Foucault (1979) argues for the interconnectedness of knowledge and power. This section looks at how Greenpeace and Shell use knowledge strategically to build the media agenda. This will be discussed under four broad headings: using knowledge of the media; using knowledge of the audience; using knowledge of the opponent; and using knowledge of potential allies. Both the Spar and Ogoniland issues are addressed.

8.4.1 Using knowledge of the media

Table 8.5 shows the extent to which each rhetorical discourse used in the Spar issue is associated with the three main types of news value generated in Chapter four. Within each rhetorical discourse apparent in the television news sample, the extent to which each of their

concepts displayed professional, logistical and audience-maximising news values was calculated, and then totalled.

Table 8.5 Summary of news values displayed by rhetorical discourses in national television evening news broadcasts on the Spar issue (30th April - 11th October 1995)

Main theme/discourse	News values (percentage of concepts)		
	Professional	Logistical	Audience-maximising
Emotive	50	90	63
Rationalistic	67	78	41
Belief	65	84	48

Table 8.5 shows that the emotive discourse is associated with logistical and audience-maximising news values more than rationalistic or belief discourses. Given that in the seven-week Spar campaign, Greenpeace was discursive primary definer in the emotive discourse, and given that this occurs largely through Greenpeace's promotional activities (see Table 8.4), it is true to say that through this discourse Greenpeace appealed particularly to logistical and audience-maximising news values but minimally to professional news values. This is expected from Cottle's (1993) findings that environmental items on television news often deliberately appeal to emotive responses, eschewing those professional claims to objectivity and impartiality.

Table 8.6 shows that emotive themes are much more likely to adhere to the following news values than rationalistic or belief themes.

Table 8.6 Total news values displayed by all themes on the Spar issue (30th April - 11th October 1995)

Themes	Total no. of concepts in theme	Number of times the concepts display the news value & %age of total no. of concepts displaying the news value		PROFESSIONAL NEWS VALUES			LOGISTICAL NEWS VALUES			AUDIENCE-MAXIMISING NEWS VALUES			
		New info.	Watch dog	Objectivity/balance	Facticity (authentication)	Accessible to journalists	Symbolisation/simplification	Event orientation	Copying the competition	Novelty	Drama	Human interest	Visual appeal
Total for all emotive themes	120	68%	36%	33%	64%	76%	93%	100%	68%	48%	84%	82%	32%
Total for all rational themes	184	84%	54%	55%	74%	82%	55%	98%	64%	31%	50%	54%	5%
Total for belief themes	281	87%	42%	41%	88%	86%	64%	100%	62%	43%	60%	62%	12%

- **Symbolisation/ simplification.** Emotive messages were generally of a sound-bite and "visual-bite" nature. In Greenpeace's Spar campaign, simplification was aided by targeting Shell alone, despite the fact that the Spar is half-owned by Esso. This was a successful strategy. For instance, in the Spar issue, a computer database search showed there had been 470 (95% hostile) recent mentions in the national press of "*Shell *Brent Spar*", but only 17 (mostly neutral) for "*Esso *Brent Spar*" (Vidal, The Guardian, 28th June 1995: 24). Neither was Esso boycotted. The high adherence to symbolisation supports findings from past research on environmental news coverage. Hansen (1991) suggests that news reporting of the environment often uses images and phrases with a highly charged symbolic resonance, drawing on the central iconography of the culture (such as those concerning nature and death) and re-charged by frequent media usage.

- **Novelty.** Emotive messages, coming from Greenpeace, often appear as the result of its direct action, which unfolded stage by stage, each adding a new twist.

- **Drama.** Emotive messages often engage in superlativeness and conflict - for instance, Greenpeace's direct action.

- **Human interest.** Emotive messages often highlight the feelings of the actors involved (personalisation and identification); or make direct references or appeals to the public (such as appeals to the shopping habits of consumers, via the boycotting message).

- **Visual appeal.** Greenpeace provided ready access to visuals of its direct action - its VNRs.

As well as building the media agenda with its emotive discourse more than Shell, and hence appealing more to logistical and audience-maximising news values, Table 8.4 shows that Greenpeace was broadcast promoting a rationalistic discourse slightly more than Shell. This is significant since Table 8.5 shows that the rationalistic discourse is associated with professional news values more than emotive or belief discourses. Table 8.6 shows that rationalistic themes are associated with the following specific news values more than emotive or belief themes.

- **Watchdog.** A rationalistic concept is likely to explain and problematise an issue in terms of society's accepted scientific and legal norms (the news value of "revealing problems").

- **Balance .** Given that a pro-Greenpeace emotive discourse was prominent in the news, broadcasters felt the need to balance this with rationalistic arguments. This is evidenced by an address to the Edinburgh television festival by Richard Sambrook (a senior BBC news editor). Sambrook admitted that Greenpeace, "*can target more resources at one story than a news organization can and provide better, more compelling, more frequent coverage,*" but that the BBC tried to redress this by analysing scientific arguments and explaining the context (Nature, 7th September 1995).

In using a discourse that appeals the most to professional news values (i.e. rationalism), Greenpeace may have been trying to lend legitimacy to its overall package of claims (which initially attracted journalistic attention through its media stunt of direct action). Given that rationalistic discourse lends itself less easily to simplification and symbolisation compared to emotive discourse (see Table 8.6), Shell's engagement with a rationalistic discourse largely without an accompanying emotive discourse, meant that it failed to simplify or symbolise its message. Furthermore, Shell, as an MNC, did not speak with a unified voice, producing an ill-defined (rather than simplified) message. Shell's disarray was such that several days before the U-turn, Greenpeace publicised opposition to deep-sea disposal from Shell-Austria (Greenpeace press release, 14th June 1995) and Shell-Netherlands (Greenpeace press release, 15th June 1995). Regester & Larkin (1997: 73) note that when public outrage developed in Germany, Shell-Germany tried to distance itself from its Shell-UK, claiming it had no influence there. One comment attributed to the German chief executive was that the first he knew about the proposed deep-sea disposal plan was when he saw Brent Spar on television (ibid.).

Table 8.4 shows that many more pro-Greenpeace belief concepts were broadcast than pro-Shell belief concepts: Greenpeace is broadcast promoting pro-Greenpeace belief concepts via interview, quotation, reported speech or visual 57 times compared to Shell's 38 times for pro-

Shell belief concepts. Table 8.6 shows that belief themes are more likely to adhere to the following news values than emotive or rationalistic themes.

- **New information.** A belief theme is information-rich since, being a type of intellectual emotivism, it will utilise facts as well as emotion in its expression.
- **Facticity (authentication).** A belief theme expresses a value system, and so needs to be attributed to a source, especially when the belief system is perceived to be at odds with that of the journalist or the public.
- **Accessibility.** Given that a belief theme expresses a value system rather than an "event", actors will need to actively promote it if it is to be broadcast. Furthermore, a belief discourse is likely to have greater rhetorical impact if it is delivered by the proponent of that belief. Actors realising this will make themselves readily available for interviews.

In the Spar issue, therefore, since Greenpeace's world-view regarding emotive, rationalistic and belief rhetorical discourses was broadcast more frequently than Shell's during the seven-week campaign, it can be concluded that Greenpeace was more adept than Shell at providing information suitable for television news.

In the two-week period around Saro-Wiwa's execution, the Ogoniland issue was less successful than the Spar issue in making the national television evening news agenda (although it frequently made daytime broadcasts); and the human rights angle was predominantly favoured over the environmental angle. The following qualitative analysis of the news values appealed to by the Ogoniland issue suggests that, as a whole, it appealed to fewer news values than the Spar issue; and that the environmental angle appealed to fewer news values than the human rights angle.

In terms of professional news values, the Ogoniland issue appeals highly to the news value of **watchdog** (Shell's environmental double standards and Shell's complicity with the Nigerian regime which abuses human rights). However, it does not appeal highly to the news values of

balance (because Shell appeared to be trying to close down the debate on television news, avoiding interviews given the likelihood of appearing defensive or shifty). Neither does it appeal to the news value of **facticity** (because up-to-date scientific analysis of the extent of environmental destruction was not available).

In terms of the **logistical news value of accessibility** to journalists, on the human rights aspect, international politicians were highly accessible since they were at the CHOGM conference - an event which the media would cover as a matter of course. However, on the environmental issue, although both Greenpeace and Shell supplied press releases, only Greenpeace and its supporters gave interviews. **Simplification** was more difficult, given that there were at least two prominent villains - Shell and the Nigerian Government - but each on a different aspect of the issue (Shell on environmental destruction and the Nigerian Government on human rights abuses). Greenpeace tried to simplify the issue by targeting Shell alone rather than including Chevron (which also operates in the Niger Delta). In terms of **symbolisation**, the human rights aspect was more easily visually symbolised than Shell's environmental destruction in Ogoniland - for instance, images of Saro-Wiwa leading rallies and images of mock gallows erected by protestors in Europe. Attempts were made at symbolising the environmental aspect of the Ogoniland issue - such as visuals showing Shell's sign at its Nigerian plant gate in close sequence with images of oily water and gas flares amongst vegetation. These are compound images however, which need verbal explanation. As such, their symbolic value has less impact than an easily encapsulated image of a valiant human rights protestor, Saro-Wiwa, supported by his people. In terms of the news value of **event-orientation**, there was much coverage of the human rights-oriented events of the announcement of the death sentence, the executions, and the reaction of CHOGM and human rights protestors; but the only environmental events covered were MOSOP's yearly anti-Shell rally (of which library pictures were used - originally filmed by Greenpeace in 1993). Unlike in the Spar issue, there was no continual drip-feed to the media of recent events, like protestors being helicoptered onto the Spar and resisting eviction.

The Ogoniland issue failed to meet the audience-maximising news value of novelty, since both the human rights and environmental issue fell into the "coup, crisis, famine" syndrome of reporting on LDCs. The human rights aspect appealed more to the news value of drama than the environmental aspect. The news reported the conflict between the Ogoni and the Nigerian Government, communicating tension regarding whether international appeals to save Saro-Wiwa from execution would work. By contrast, the only dramatic aspect of the environmental issue was the extent of the damage (superlativeness), and this was not visually compelling (for instance, the farmlands where flaring took place looked lush and green rather than damaged and scorched). Appeals to human interest were attempted through reminders that Saro-Wiwa was an author who wrote in English (as opposed to a faceless mass of Ogoni demonstrators); and by appealing to the belief in human rights as a universal value. The environmental aspect of the issue failed to appeal to the news value of human interest - with the best attempt being visuals of Ogoni children using polluted water in a field. Visual variation was limited due to the fact that Saro-Wiwa and the other arrested Ogonis were behind bars, whilst the execution was carried out in secret.

8.4.2 Using knowledge of the audience

Chapter 5 and Table 8.4 showed that in the Spar issue, Greenpeace was far more pro-active than Shell in promoting its emotive rhetorical discourse. The strategic value of emotive messages is indicated by previous research. Robinson and Davis (1986: 205) find that news content which arouses strong emotions may increase comprehension, especially through a combination of human interest and attractive pictures (ibid:, 198). Jacobs & Shapiro (1996: 10) suggest that emotional content in news stories, allied with the news value of human interest, increases salience (i.e. the relevance of that emotive concept to audiences' needs). Past research on other news values (those associated with emotivism) also indicates that they help recall by news consumers. For instance, Bell (1991: 233) finds that the negative or spectacular (the news value of drama) is better recalled, as is personalisation of news in notable individuals

(the news value of human interest) and presentation of unique events (the news value of novelty). The ability of the emotive discourse to aid audience comprehension, relevance and recall is of strategic importance to a media-oriented campaigning organisation like Greenpeace. As Golding & Elliott (1996: 407) observe, in order to inform an audience, you must first have its attention. Similarly, Boyd (1988: 47) argues that if peoples' interest is held, issues can be understood better, public awareness can be raised, and accountability of decision-makers can be increased.

Table 8.4 shows that Greenpeace promotes its belief discourse more often than Shell. This demonstrates Greenpeace's use of its knowledge of the audience - namely that its authority is derived almost entirely from the perceived rightness of its case.⁷ It is the politics of appeal backed up by public censure. For Greenpeace, using a belief discourse allows it to simplify issues and assign blame, so increasing their symbolic value. As Greenpeace has long-recognised: "*Conservationists need to realise that scientific evidence, rational arguments and compromise do not win political arguments,*" (Lord Melchett, executive director of Greenpeace, 1981, cited in Pepper, 1984: 1). In other words, mere volume of data is unlikely to be intrinsically persuasive since people tend to either ignore, or be selective in heeding the "facts of the matter" (see Corner et al., 1990: 225).

Thus, Greenpeace understands its audience's limitations, and promotes the two most audience-friendly rhetorical discourses. The emotive discourse should increase audience comprehension, relevance and recall. The belief discourse provides a basic justification for the emotive discourse, and aids the process of simplification and symbolisation (and hence, arguably, memorability).

⁷ Lowe and Morrison (1984) explain that this is unlike most major interest groups that are in a powerful position because they possess economic sanctions, or because their co-operation is vital to the implementation of policy.

Nonetheless, Greenpeace also engages in rationalistic discourse. Table 8.4 shows that Greenpeace is broadcasted propagating a rationalistic discourse slightly more often than Shell. Arguably, Greenpeace's rationalistic arguments were mere vehicles for its emotive and belief discourses. For instance, Greenpeace's rationalistic scientific arguments lead it to emotively vilify Shell for polluting the sea and to promote beliefs regarding the precautionary principle. Greenpeace's rationalistic legal arguments allow it to point to Shell's disregard for international environmental conventions, hence giving substance to its more emotive vilification of Shell; and enabling Greenpeace to propagate its beliefs regarding standard-setting.

In the Spar issue, Shell and the UK Government failed to understand the importance that its European audience accorded to the environment, despite opinion polls which consistently showed that the environment ranked high among people's concerns: *"The prevailing view in Whitehall has been that the recession has pushed the environment down the political agenda, and it would take a while to resurge,"* (Lascelles, Financial Times, 22nd June 1995: 21). Thus, Shell and the UK Government promoted beliefs, which, taken together, indicate satisfaction with existing standards. After the U-turn, Shell (and other oil companies) hired a PR firm to help them in the continuing decisions over the Spar ("The Battle for Brent Spar", BBC2, 3rd August 1995). Consequently, the post-U-turn period saw Shell-UK paying greater attention to its audience and the part played by emotive, rationalistic and belief discourses in the Spar issue. Two months after the U-turn, Shell-UK explained:

"Clearly there are lessons from the Brent Spar event for Shell companies: that emotions and beliefs can ultimately have at least as much influence on our "licence to operate" as hard facts and demonstrated performance; ... Account must be taken not only of the rational arguments but also deep-seated emotions and subconscious feelings which some projects may evoke," (Shell-UK Ltd. Management brief, 1995e).

Shell's reaction to the Ogoniland issue around the time of Saro-Wiwa's death sentence shows that Shell appears to have learnt this lesson well. Chapter 7, section 7.3.2, demonstrated that Shell followed Holtz's advice (1999: 201) of working hard to convey compassion, concern and control in a crisis situation, rather than engaging in rational debate, so attempting to augment its credibility.

8.4.3 Using knowledge of the opponent

Much political action is of a symbolic nature (see Edelman, 1977, 1964). Greenpeace is very aware of this. Rose argues that despite industry's and politicians' co-optation of environmental language, they failed to deliver convincing environmental improvements, and so then proceeded to disown the environmental issues, so that it was "*nobody's problem*" except the individual consumer or abstract market or moral forces (Rose, 1993: 293). Greenpeace, in engaging in emotive and belief discourses, gives ownership back to the issue (by assigning blame, and preaching what should be done). Greenpeace engages successfully in this strategy by making use of its multi-national presence to garner international support (for instance, the Spar issue resulted from combined action by Greenpeace-UK, Greenpeace-Germany and Greenpeace-Netherlands). The fact that Shell is a multinational makes it vulnerable to such pressure.

Shell appears to have had inadequate knowledge of Greenpeace in the Spar issue. Evidence suggests that Shell, operating in the knowledge that it was undertaking the BPEO in its disposal plans, and with the full support of the British Government, was unprepared for Greenpeace's campaign and its impact. This interpretation is backed up by Shell-UK's statement on the day of the U-turn:

"February 16th, the UK Government writes to the OSPAR Commission and all the North Sea countries, notifying them of their intention to issue a licence for us to dump. April 16th - no answer. You can assume, I would suggest, that everyone agrees. Or at least they don't

disagree. They formally issue a license. It's only two weeks after that, all of a sudden, and maybe for another agenda, perhaps, something starts to happen. Now from a PR point of view, can you second-guess that?" (Chris Fay, Chairman and Chief Executive of Shell-UK, BBC2 Newsnight, 20th June 1995).

Furthermore, Shell did not promote its world-view until week three of Greenpeace's campaign. This may have arisen from Shell trying to close down the debate, refusing to dignify Greenpeace with a response. Perhaps Shell hoped that, in the interest of balance, the media would not broadcast an issue when only one side of the issue was available.

Whereas in the Spar issue, Shell seemed unprepared for Greenpeace's campaign, they were much more alert in the phase of the Ogoniland issue around Saro-Wiwa's death sentence and execution (autumn 1995). Leaked documents of a meeting in London between the Nigerian high commissioner, Alhaji Abubaka, and Shell executives show that the High Commissioner asked Shell directly for help to "debunk" the bad publicity being generated by British campaigners for Saro-Wiwa. He suggested that Nigeria should "counter-attack" with an advertisement campaign and television documentary. Shell rejected suggestions that pressure groups should be taken on directly because it "*would play into the hands of the groups*" and "*bring the matter more into the public domain*" (Donegan and Vidal, The Guardian, 13th November 1995: 8). Shell's greater understanding of its opponent is further evidenced by the fact that on the day that Saro-Wiwa's death sentence was announced (31st October 1995), both Shell and Greenpeace each publicised a carefully rhetorically-structured press release (see Chapter 7, section 7.3.2). Shell kept up this momentum with further press releases and a newspaper advertising campaign.

8.4.4 Using knowledge of allies

An important aspect determining the success of a media strategy is the extent to which each discourse is propagated by others (allies).

Evidence suggests that a major reason for Shell's U-turn in the Spar issue was its inability to win allies beyond the UK Government. (Throughout the seven-week campaign, the UK Government had staunchly supported Shell's plans for deep-sea disposal, offering support on the rationalistic scientific and legal arguments (see Table 8.2).) Shell's rationalistic discourse failed to persuade European governments, who were more swayed by the emotive discourse. Shell complained, after its U-turn, that:

"... most of the Continental northern European governments which are parties to the Oslo and Paris Conventions, and had originally raised no objection to the [deep-sea disposal] plan, were now openly opposing it - not on its technical merits, but because of its symbolic significance in the light of the Greenpeace campaign," (Shell-UK, 1995e).

By contrast, Greenpeace had a wide range of allies in the Spar issue. Through its emotive discourse of vilifying Shell, and its belief discourse of global interconnectivity ("save planet Earth"), Greenpeace captured the support of North European governments and parties during the seven-week campaign - particularly Germany. In addition, a number of companies felt compelled to speak out over the Spar (Elkington and Trisoglio, 1996: 766). For instance, the Danish enzymes-to-insulin company Novo Nordisk, as a signatory to the International Chamber of Commerce's Business Charter for Sustainable Development, had committed itself to challenging suppliers on the environmental commitments and performance. Coming under intense media pressure to say what it intended to do, Novo Nordisk made a statement encouraging Shell to explain to its various publics (including its business partners) why it had chosen deep-sea disposal (ibid.). After the U-turn, Greenpeace kept many of its allies. In January 1998 Greenpeace announced the decision by the EU to take over the funding of the Greenpeace 'Beyond Sparring' project which had been run by the consultancy SustainAbility in 1997 (Greenpeace press release, 26th January 1998). This meant that Greenpeace could now express its opinions on decommissioning as one of the many stakeholders in the project.

This overall pattern of alliance-building was similar in the Ogoniland issue where Shell maintained its close relationship with the domestic government whereas Greenpeace's range of allies was much wider.

Regarding Shell-Nigeria's operations, the British Government was in a delicate position. On the one hand, it felt compelled to publicly condemn the human rights abuses of the Nigerian Government. On the other hand, Nigeria is an important export market, with the UK being one of the main investors there (Adams, Financial Times, 11th November 1995: 3). The UK Government negotiated this dilemma by remaining silent on Shell's involvement in Nigeria, and keeping its public condemnation strictly levelled at the Nigerian Government for human rights violations, so separating this from the issue of oil companies' environmental degradation. Thus the UK Government's media-oriented discourse was a belief discourse focused on legislative standard-setting, arguing for implementation of human rights legislation.

Shell-Nigeria also maintained close relations with the Nigerian Government. Westra (1998: 156) observes that Nigeria's government depends on oil for 80% of its income (of which Shell oil accounts for about half), and sees any threat to the industry as imperilling its shaky hold on power (Brooks, 1994). Thus, over the years, Nigerian Governments have offered a range of incentives to keep the oil flowing. For instance, Khan (1994: 12) shows that changes in government in Nigeria have had no significant negative impact on oil industry operations. In fact, the more unpredictable the domestic political situation in Nigeria, the greater were the governmental incentives given to the oil industry (ibid.: 14). Fryas (1998: 461) argues that this trend could be clearly seen in the 1990s when political instability became worse. Another incentive to oil companies investing in Nigeria is the Nigerian Government's attitude to its large oil wealth - namely unlimited depletion. Fryas argues that even if at present oil exploitation on Ogoniland is considered uneconomic, Ogoniland may be considered as a future option - an undeveloped resource reserve (ibid.: 473). Yet another incentive offered to oil companies comes from the Nigerian Government's attitude towards environmental protection.

Idowu (1999: 176) argues that since its policy has been to own 60% of the equity shares in MNCs' activities (see the Nigerian Indigenisation Decree 1970), the Government's attention is often directed more towards profit-maximisation than towards precautions against environmental degradation. Indeed, the relationship between the Nigerian regime and Shell-Nigeria was so close that Shell was accused of human rights abuses arising from complicity with the Nigerian military and its "*crackteam*", the Mobile Police Force (MPF). According to Greenpeace, key prosecution witnesses in Saro-Wiwa's trial swore affidavits that they were bribed to give evidence against Saro-Wiwa, part of those bribes being offers of contracts with Shell (<http://www.greenpeace.org/>, 10th January 1996).

Following its failure in the Spar issue to build a wide range of alliances, Shell tried to address this situation in the Ogoniland issue. After Saro-Wiwa's execution, Shell sought (unsuccessfully) to make allies with Nelson Mandela, South Africa's president - an important potential ally given his enormous stature in world councils (van Niekerk, The Observer, 19th November 1995: 24). On 24th November 1995 John Drake, head of Shell-South-Africa contacted Mandela, warning him that Shell's attempts at '*quiet diplomacy*' in Lagos offered '*the best hope for avoiding a fundamental breakdown in Nigerian society*,' (Ghazi, The Observer, 3rd December 1995: 22).

Pitted against Shell, and its alliances with the Nigerian and UK Government, MOSOP commanded a much wider range of allies. This included Greenpeace, FoE, and the Body Shop - all organisations that adopt principled stances. Many other allies were "pure" human rights INGOs, including Amnesty International, FIAN International (a human rights organisation working for the right to food), Human Rights Watch Africa, Article 19 and Interrights (Skogly, 1997: 51). Other allies include PEN, the Church of England (Scott, The Observer, 19th November 1995: 4); and NGOs such as the Civil Liberties Organisation of Nigeria (CLO); the Committee for the Defence of Human Rights (CDHR); the Constitutional Rights Project

(CRP); the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO); and the Shelter Rights Initiatives (SRI) (Skogly, 1997: 51).

It is highly probable that these allies were a major factor in putting the Ogoniland issue onto the UK news agenda. This is evidenced by comparing coverage of the Ogoniland issue with the total lack of British media coverage of the other disenfranchised groups in Nigeria, with circumstances similar to the Ogoni. Omoweh (1998: 17) describes how the worst oil-generated pollution is to be found in the Isoko area⁸, 300 km further west of the Ogoni community, yet this has not made the UK media agenda, despite calls since 1974, by the Isokos for the exit of Shell for environmental degradation (ibid.: 38). Omoweh attributes this to the absence of an umbrella organisation like MOSOP; no linkage with oil communities outside of the oil areas; and no contact with relevant INGOs. The latter factor seems to be the most important because even where resistance groups have been organised elsewhere in Nigeria, UK broadcasting coverage has been non-existent. For instance, during coverage of the Ogoniland issue in 1995, no links were made to the Movement for the Survival of the Izon Ethnic Nationality in the Niger Delta (MOSIEND), which produced their own charter of demands in October 1992; or to the Ogbia ethnic community in Oloibiri (the Movement for Reparation to Ogbia - MORETO) who produced their charter in November 1991 (Rowell, The Guardian, 8th November 1995).

One advantage of a wide range of allies comprising INGOs and NGOs is widespread propagation of a credible belief discourse. INGOs and NGOs are desirable allies because they take an unambiguous and simplified (emotive and moral) stance, and have high credibility ratings arising from their large ethical capital base. Their combined appeal may help convince the media that an issue is worthy of public attention. Another advantage is that this disparate web of overlapping interests may be useful in helping to deflect criticism from these

⁸ The Isoko area was the second place where Shell found crude oil in 1958 - about the same period as it discovered oil in Ogoniland.

organisations. Rose (1993) argues that such a situation helped the environmental movement in 1989 -1991:

"The difficulty of sorting out what was properly the territory of NGOs, of political parties (e.g. the Green Party), of TV eco-evangelists, of agencies, of the individual or of shops, prevented the formulation of any coherent critique of the "environment movement", despite the high public and media interest of the time," (ibid.: 289-90).

Thus, whilst Shell and its domestic government can be easily targeted and vilified, its opponents are too widespread and varied in interests to allow easy targeting.

Other desirable allies include international politicians in that they take an unambiguous and simplified (emotive or moral) stance (for instance, condemnation of Saro-Wiwa's death sentence), and pertain to represent their nation (although they often have low credibility ratings, being masters of "spin"). Experts are desirable allies in that they have access to, and are expected to use, rationalistic discourse. Taken together, these allies can credibly propagate one's world-view via all three rhetorical discourses.

Having explained Greenpeace's and Shell's strategic use of media-oriented rhetorical discourses in terms of exploiting their knowledge of the media, audience, opponents and allies, the following section explores the changing "*orders of discourse*" (Fairclough, 1994: 43) in the Spar and Ogoniland campaigns.

8.5 The Orders of Discourse

In investigating the "*orders of discourse*" (ibid.) this section explores the changing relative prominence of the three rhetorical discourses in the Spar and Ogoniland campaigns. It does so by using the notion of instrumental rationality (Weber, 1952/1995). As Weber argues: "*Action is instrumentally rational (zweckrational) when the end, the means, and the secondary results*

are all rationally taken into account and weighed," (ibid.: 26). By the same token, a discourse will be instrumentally rational if it is put to the service of strategic goals. By definition, therefore, all media-oriented rhetorical discourses are ultimately instrumentally rational.

8.5.1 Greenpeace's instrumental rationality

In the Spar issue, all three rhetorical discourses were used by Greenpeace to further its strategic aims of getting media attention and influencing the public. Evidence that Greenpeace's minimal use of rationalistic discourse was instrumental (i.e. strategically chosen) is that after media attention died down, Greenpeace re-embraced the rationalistic discourse in different arenas. For instance, two years after Shell's U-turn saw Greenpeace launching its '*Beyond Sparring*' project in June 1997, which aimed to build the case for an integrated approach across all the installations due for decommissioning (termed the "*Integrated Removal Strategy*" - IRS)⁹ (Greenpeace press release, 24th June 1997). Thus, rather than emotively assigning blame, as it had done for the media's benefit, Greenpeace rationalistically put forward a scientifically and technologically plausible solution of onshore disposal.

There are several explanations for this - all of them strategically-oriented. Greenpeace may have been responding to the increased scientific discourse regarding the Spar issue happening elsewhere in society: after the Spar issue, Shell commissioned an independent company to verify the Spar's toxicity; and the government set up a Scientific Group on Decommissioning (the Shepard Commission) to consider the scientific environmental aspects of deep-sea disposal of the Spar (Lofstedt & Renn, 1997: 133). Another reason is that Greenpeace may have been pushing for "*insider*" (Grant, 1995, 1989) status. In 1996 Greenpeace identified that many technological and social solutions to environmental problems were known but not implemented: "*Consequently, the major environmental task is shifting from demonstrating the existence of problems to implementing solutions,*" (Greenpeace-UK, 1996: 4). Greenpeace's

⁹ Its other aims were to move towards a consensus on the IRS amongst all the stakeholders (including the oil, engineering and recycling industries, and interested NGOs); and to base the IRS on the environmental, social and economic elements of sustainable development.

"*solutions campaigning*" involves working with industry to facilitate a changeover to environmentally friendly production techniques. Greenpeace-UK argues:

"Linking with technologists and consumers creates the potential for intervening in product development and markets themselves. Once a competitive advantage can be created, industrial sectors can be split and change can be driven much more quickly than would otherwise occur," (ibid.,8).

Thus, analysis of the Spar issue from 1995-1997 shows that Greenpeace uses emotive and rationalistic discourses selectively, where it believes it will further its aims, and according to the forum in which it is primarily operating (be it the media, the bureaucracy or business).

Greenpeace's use of instrumental rationality is also evident in the Ogoniland issue, where emotive and belief discourses were prominent whilst the rationalistic scientific discourse was less apparent. On the face of it, this could be due to lack of scientific data in the Ogoniland issue. However, such a situation did not stop Greenpeace engaging in emotive science during the seven-week media glare on the Spar issue. A more likely reason is that Greenpeace may have been less willing to engage in emotive science given that its media-oriented rationalistic scientific discourse in the Spar issue eventually backfired (Greenpeace's mistake over the Spar's toxicity).

Greenpeace's use of instrumental rationality is further evidenced by the fact that the Ogoniland campaign was honed to a belief discourse which prioritises human rights and global interconnectivity. This indicates that Greenpeace and MOSOP were orienting their stance towards a western audience through their promotion of internationally relevant beliefs. This stance was partly based on their reading of certain international developments in the belief discourse:

"the end of the cold war, increasing attention being paid to the global environment, and the insistence of the European Community that minority rights be respected in the USSR successor states and in Yugoslavia," (Saro-Wiwa, 1992: 7).

MOSOP's incentives to internationalise its struggle reflects its conviction of the futility of lobbying the Nigerian military government, given that it does not behave as if it is publicly accountable (Skogly, 1997: 59). The Nigerian Government's response to increasing protests from the Ogoni, was to offer 3% of its oil revenues to them, but in practice these percentages never reached the Ogoni as the money was spent in tribal lands of the ruling majority instead, or vanished in corrupt deals (Brooks, 1994, cited in Westra, 1998: 156). The reason for the Nigerian Government's lack of accountability to the Ogoni, and the many other ethnic groups in Nigeria, can be traced back to British colonial administrations, which concentrated their patronage on the three big ethnic majorities - the Hausa, the Yoruba and the Ibo. Since these were the main three with whom the British negotiated the transition to independence, when independence finally came in the late 1950s, the Ogoni were not consulted about their political aspirations and found themselves without a voice in Nigeria's new federal system (Brock, 1999: 27). Furthermore, as Cayford (1996: 188) notes, the Ogoni's demands are unlikely to be met since not only do they undermine the primary source of government revenue (oil and mineral rights), but they offer a radically different vision of the balance of power in which the centralised Nigerian federation would become a decentralised confederation of many, semi-autonomous states.

8.5.2 Shell's instrumental rationality

There is much evidence to suggest that Shell also engaged in instrumental rationality in the Spar and Ogoniland issues, given its changing use of belief and emotive discourses.

The Spar issue showed that during Greenpeace's seven-week campaign, Shell engaged mainly in a rationalistic and belief discourse. It has already been demonstrated that the belief

discourse was used in defence of the status quo (for instance, to maintain existing standards, see section 8.2.2) - a strategic aim of Shell. As the Spar issue progressed after the U-turn, Shell made greater use of the belief discourse - for instance, propagating Shell's belief in corporate social responsibility, in particular, stakeholder consultation. In October 1995 Shell put in place *"The New Way Forward"*, which consisted of a technical development process and a dialogue process, intended to: *"capture the ingenuity of varied ideas and develop the most promising of these by using experienced contractors, whilst keeping people ahead of what is happening and listening to their views,"* (Shell Expro, 1995). From November 1996 to May 1997, Shell held three well-publicised *"Brent Spar Dialogue Seminars"*, attended by a broad range of stakeholders (from consumer and ethical groups to business interests) where they discussed the issues and criteria surrounding the potential solutions.

As the Spar issue progressed after the U-turn, Shell made greater use of the emotive discourse. Thus, by February 1996 Shell was explaining the technical details in easily understandable terms (the human interest angle). Whereas in their first press release on the Spar issue, they described the Spar thus: *"The Spar, which is 141 metres in height and weighs 14,500 tonnes, has been decommissioned since August 1991"*, (Shell press release, 16th February 1995), later on, Shell were describing it quite differently, making extensive use of simile.

"People have become familiar with the sight of its topsides - large enough in themselves - showing above the water. But the Spar is like an iceberg. Most of its bulk, mainly the six huge storage tanks, is beneath the water's surface. At 14,500 tonnes the Spar weighs about the same as two thousand double-decker buses, it is longer than a football field floating on its end, and its huge tanks displace 66,500 tonnes of water - a capacity that means they could hold the equivalent of almost four Big Bens. Apart from the waters to the north of Orkney, most of the North Sea is too shallow to accommodate it," (Faulds, Shell-UK, 1996: 1).

Once Shell finally decided on the new disposal solution, it "greenwashed" it through careful lexical choice and metaphor. Faulds described the new disposal solution for the Spar thus:

"This elegant solution is not so much an end, as a new life for a hardworking North Sea workhorse. Brent Spar will now serve another community for perhaps a hundred years as a useful quay, saving money, energy and greenhouse gas emissions in construction," (Shell press release, 29th January 1998).

A new piece of green jargon was put also forward - that of "waste hierarchy",¹⁰ which is where:

"... re-use is preferred to recycling, and recycling preferred to disposal, with the aim of minimising waste. All the options have a positive energy balance except deep sea disposal. Of the best four technical options, Wood-GMC's has the best energy balance and is highest in the waste hierarchy, with re-use at more than 80%," (Shell press release, 29th January 1998).

Shell not only engaged in emotive discourse to ennoble itself, it vilified Greenpeace with pre-emptive discursive activity. In the same press release, Shell was careful to vilify Greenpeace's preferred solution of onshore disposal, whilst keeping open the deep-sea disposal option for future rigs. *"Our choice is not deep sea disposal, and it is not 'scrap onshore at any cost' as some have urged. It is a unique re-use solution for a unique structure,"* (Shell press release, 29th January 1998). Here Shell uses meiosis to denigrate Greenpeace's onshore disposal option (*"scrap onshore at any cost"*). Shell correctly anticipated Greenpeace's spin on the new disposal decision. On the same day Greenpeace claimed victory for its own preferred solution of onshore disposal:

¹⁰ Waste hierarchy is aired as a concept arising from the first Brent Spar Dialogue in November 1996 (Shell press release, 12th December 1996).

"Shell has taken over two years to accept what the European public told it in 1995. You don't dump - you re-use or recycle. ... In its statement today Shell said that the onshore disposal option will help in "saving money, energy and greenhouse gas emissions in construction," (Greenpeace press release, 29th January 1998).

In the phase of the Ogoniland issue around Saro-Wiwa's death sentence and execution, once it was in the media's eye, Shell did not rely so heavily on the rationalistic discourse. It had perhaps learned the lesson advocated by Holtz (1999: 202) that a company engaging in debate during a crisis - even if its point of view is logical or rational - is viewed as defensive and guilty. In contrast to the eruption of the Spar issue where Shell was taken by surprise, Shell had much time to anticipate Saro-Wiwa's execution and the potential crisis it could have provoked. Greenpeace had been championing the environmental aspect of the campaign since 1993; and the Ogoniland issue had been periodically attracting television media attention throughout 1995 (through national news broadcasts and an emotive documentary, The Drilling Fields, about the Ogoniland issue, made in 1994 and repeated in 1995). Thus as television news coverage of the Ogoniland issue heated up in October-November 1995, Shell engaged more prominently in the emotive discourse, to the extent that one Ogoni activist accused the Nigerian government and Shell of trying to demonise MOSOP to damage its credibility (Rowell, 1995: 211).

8.5.3 Summary of the orders of discourse

Analysis of Shell's use of the rhetorical discourses of emotivism and belief show that they help Shell augment its credibility (for instance, shining a green light on itself); and that Shell uses these discourses in support of the status quo. Both of these functions help Shell in its overall aim to continue operating its "business as usual". Similarly, analysis of Greenpeace's use of the rhetorical discourses of emotivism, rationalism and belief demonstrates Greenpeace's orientation towards its audience, so making its message more palatable (for instance, the absence of deep-green beliefs for media audiences; and the greater use of rationalism for

talking to decision-makers out of the glare of media attention). It also demonstrates that they are used in support of Greenpeace's aim of changing the status quo. Both of these functions help Greenpeace in its overall strategy to change society by influencing the public.

Thus, both Greenpeace and Shell vary their use the media-oriented rhetorical discourses of emotivism, rationalism and belief over time to further their own strategic ends. However, did anything change beyond discursive practices?

8.6 Changing discursive practices, changing social practices?

Foucault (1972: 117) sees a discursive formation as made up of discursive and non-discursive practices. Non-discursive practices include relations between institutions, economic and social processes, norms and value systems. This section critically examines the use made of the rhetorical discourses of emotivism, rationalism and belief. Was their persuasive power used merely to "spin" meaning, or were non-discursive practices altered?

8.6.1 Shell's discursive and non-discursive practices

Arguably, Shell's increasingly vocal concern regarding environmental performance since Greenpeace's Spar media campaign is an attempt to avoid adverse public opinion and accompanying "knee-jerk" regulatory reactions. This is in line with Regester & Larkin's (1997: 29) findings that at the end of 1995, corporations were most concerned with legislative/regulatory issues, closely followed by environmental issues. This section examines the extent to which Shell's rhetoric regarding environmental friendliness and stakeholder consultation in the Spar and Ogoniland issues changed its non-discursive practices.

Environmental issues are unlikely to be high on the agenda of oil companies unless they further their financial interests - the expansion or maintenance of global profits and market power (Held , 1991: 151). "*Businesses do not have a natural propensity to do good. What is natural for them is to minimise costs and maximise profits,*" (The Economist, 24th June

1995: 15). This is evidenced by the AURIS report (University of Aberdeen and AURIS Ltd., 1994: 15) which shows that financial considerations were a major rationale for the decommissioning of the Spar in October 1991. AURIS describes how the cost of maintaining the Spar increased substantially in the period 1987-1990. It explained that the Certificate of Fitness for the Spar would expire in 1995 and refurbishment would be required before this deadline if it was to be renewed: *"The buoy is no longer used, however, and the expense of refurbishment cannot be justified,"* (ibid.: 11). Table 8.7 illustrates the drive for cost-minimisation. It shows the cost of deep-sea disposal, compared to onshore disposal options, and the solution Shell finally adopted - the Wood-GMC solution, to use cleaned slices of the Spar's hull to build a quay extension at Mekjarvik, Norway (Shell press release, 8th August 1998).

Table 8.7 Cost of Spar's disposal via some of the six short-listed methods¹¹

Contractor	Disposal method	Contractor's price
-	Deepwater disposal - the original plan approved by the UK Government in 1995 - adjusted for the Spar being towed from its mooring in Norway, rather than from the Brent Field, to a UK deepwater disposal site.	£4.7 million.
Brown and Root Energy Services	Upend Spar at its mooring in Norway. Tow it across the North Sea to a yard in Scotland for scrapping onshore.	£48 million
Thyssen-Aker	Partly raise Spar, then tow it to a yard in Norway, for scrapping onshore.	£21.3 million.
Wood-GMC	Raise Spar vertically at its present location, then cut the hull into 'rings'. Re-use these to extend a quayside in Norway. Scrap the topsides onshore.	£21.5 million.

¹¹ The prices are as submitted by the contractors (Shell press release, 13th October 1997).

The importance of financial considerations is also indicated by Shell's choice of instrument for weighing up different disposal options: *"In terms of BATNEEC¹², BPEO and Impact Hypothesis, the deepwater disposal option is the more appropriate,"* (ibid.: 8). Indeed, the eventual chosen solution for the Spar's decommissioning was also the BPEO (Shell press release, 29th January 1998).

Given this drive for profit-maximisation and cost-minimisation, Shell became increasingly aware of the economic importance of a green image as consumer boycotts emerged during the seven-week campaign. Arguably, before the Spar campaign, Shell's awareness of the need for a green image was not so acute. Throughout Greenpeace's campaign Shell was aware enough never to refer to "BATNEEC" in its press releases, instead opting for the more environmentally-friendly sounding term "BPEO"; but it neglected to explain further the benefits of BPEO. It was not until after the U-turn, that Shell became adept at making the case that BPEO was a more holistic environmental solution than Best Environmental Practice (BEP):

"Environmental decisions cannot be taken in isolation. Many different factors have to be considered to find the best option. Sustainable development depends on the well-being of the whole complex natural system on land, sea and air - there is no benefit in giving one part a special, symbolic significance," (Fay, Shell-UK Limited, 1995b: 3).

By 1996, Shell had polished its argument regarding why environmental concerns should be balanced with financial concerns. *"Society faces many problems and resources spent disproportionately on one make it harder to tackle others,"* (Faulds, Shell-UK, 1996: 5).

¹² BATNEEC (Best Available Techniques Not Entailing Excessive Cost) is widely applied throughout industry. It implies that the cost of environmental protection should be in proportion to the degree of protection appropriate for any given situation (University of Aberdeen and AURIS Ltd., 1994: 70).

Evidence indicates that this increasingly publicised prioritising of the environment was "spin" rather than value change. Arguably, there was potentially large financial damage to Shell unless it was perceived to be environmentally friendly. On the day of the U-turn, Keith Henschall, president of the Institute of Public Relations, advised:

"... the claimed 20% drop in sales in Germany last week was 'an enormous figure when you consider that Germany hasn't even got an Atlantic coastline. If the same thing happened here as well then one might be talking about hundreds of millions of pounds lost. A lot of service stations would go out of business,'" (cited in Lascelles et al, Financial Times, 20th June 1995: 13).

A Shell Management Brief paper two months after the U-turn shows that profits remained Shell's ultimate concern:

"The wealth creation and employment needed to sustain its standard of living depend on investment and growth. Otherwise both wealth and employment will flow away from Europe. In this context, can Europe afford to exclude completely offshore disposal of North Sea structures in general - with the cost implications of such a decision - and with further possible consequences in terms of future investment in the North Sea?" (Shell-UK, 1995e).

Here Shell, speaking to a narrower audience than the broadcast mass audience, strongly appeals to the belief in pro-materialism, valorising the drive towards economic wealth creation, and its large role in this process. Shell's argument takes the form of a veiled threat: if it is not allowed to dump disused "structures" at sea, then it may curb "future investment" in the North Sea, to the detriment of Europe's economic growth.

Shell's rhetoric regarding stakeholder consultation became increasingly honed after the Spar issue. Its U-turn was followed by two years of "Brent Spar Dialogue" - a process which aimed:

"... to find a solution that on balance would be at least as good as, or better than, deep sea disposal; to work openly; and to gather a wide range of views and values to help inform our choice," (Heinz Rothermund, Managing Director, Shell Expro, Shell press release, 29th January 1998). This was a significant change from Shell's consultation process during its original plans for deep-sea disposal, where, as Tsoukas (1999: 518) notes, it consulted only those explicitly required by the British Petroleum Act (1987). Greenpeace, however, observed that the oil industry was fighting to keep open the sea-dumping option for oil platforms, and that Shell's New Way Forward was mostly spin: *"to provide a regular drip-feed to the media about the minutiae of the installation and the plans for its eventual fate."* (Consequences of the Brent Spar Victory, <http://www.greenpeace.org/~comms/brent/index.html>, January 2000).

Thus, the impact of the Spar campaign on Shell's non-discursive practices appears to be limited to the obvious examples of the U-turn; and Shell's subsequent stakeholder consultation (the Brent Spar Dialogue process). Greenpeace's media campaign victory did not ultimately decide the fate of the Spar (in that Greenpeace's advocacy of onshore disposal was not implemented).

The Ogoniland issue also indicates that Greenpeace impacted on Shell's discourse rather than its practice. There is evidence that Shell's avowed prioritising of the environment was "spin" rather than value change. Shell repeatedly publicised that it was environmentally friendly & socially concerned (see Chapter 7). However, Shell's stock is ignored by most of the 'ethical' or 'green' unit and investment trust funds since Shell usually fails at least one of these funds' investment criteria, typically environmental concerns or operating in countries with oppressive regimes (Scott, The Observer, 19th November 1995: 4). In November 1996, one year after the executions of Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogonis, newspapers reported Shell's adoption of a code for business behaviour that includes references to human rights (Skogly, 1997: 59). This code, however, has not impacted on Shell's investment in Nigeria. Shell continues to operate

and invest there - the prime example being the Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas plant which was agreed shortly after the execution of Saro-Wiwa, and came on stream in October 1999.

Arguably, winning the Ogoniland issue was much more important to Shell than winning the issue over the Spar's disposal (although it was concerned to win the argument over whether or not the Spar's disposal set a precedent). In the Ogoniland issue, calls for oil sanctions against Nigeria and for Shell to withdraw from Nigeria affected Shell's vital interests. Detheridge & Pepple (1998: 481) observe that over the past five years Nigeria has accounted for an average of 7% of the Royal Dutch/Shell Group's total profits from exploration and production: this is the sector in which the biggest profits in the oil industry are to be made (Elden, 1995, cited in Fryas, 1998: 467). Fryas (1998: 468) also points out that the quality of Nigerian oil is much higher than elsewhere - a key comparative advantage. In addition, Nigeria is closer to the markets of Europe and the USA than is the Middle East - a strategic advantage that allows lower transport costs. Thus, Shell continues to regard Nigerian oil as a vital asset, despite continuing violence and protest.

It could be argued that the Spar campaign was detrimental to the overall cause of environmental protection, since it alerted Shell to Greenpeace's capacity for swift mobilisation of opinion. As can be seen from the Ogoniland campaign, Shell was better prepared, and more willing to engage with Greenpeace on a range of discourses. Such an argument, however, would ignore the wider non-discursive practices that the Spar and Ogoniland campaigns impacted on.

8.6.2 Wider non-discursive practices

Although the Spar issue impacted more on Shell's discourse rather than its practice, it appears to have contributed to the greater priority widely accorded to the issue of ocean dumping - a campaign that Greenpeace had been running for over a decade. A MORI poll (October 1995, cited in Worcester, 1996: 4) on attitudes towards the environment of British environmental

journalists during October 1995 found that 17% of environmental journalists questioned thought that marine pollution was a pressing problem - a 10% change from the year before. MORI found that when asked: "*How serious a problem do you think decommissioning of oil platforms is for Britain today?*" 42% of British environmental journalists perceived it as a very/fairly serious problem (ibid.:6). This raising of journalists' awareness is important given their gatekeeper role.

Although in the Spar issue, the British public was less mobilised than the European public, evidence suggests some impact. An opinion poll carried out for Greenpeace between 26-27th January 1996 showed that its campaign had some long-term impact in putting the merits of its case across to the UK public. Six months after the U-turn 57% of the people had heard of the controversy, 42% believed that Greenpeace should continue its campaign to stop oil rig dumping, and 23% backed Greenpeace in stopping the sinking of the Spar (Greenpeace press release, 5th February 1996b). Therefore, Greenpeace helped raise public awareness about the issue of oil rig disposal.

Perhaps most importantly, Greenpeace's campaign contributed to the wider political discourse and practice. Following the public outcry over the Spar, most governments from North Sea states passed a decision at the Oslo Convention meeting in June 1995 for a moratorium on the ocean dumping of offshore installations with a view to a future ban.¹³ Although the Tory Government under John Major had agreed to deep-sea disposal in 1995, this changed under Tony Blair's Labour Government that followed. In September 1997, this Government announced that policy would now be based on '*a general presumption against sea disposal*', for radioactive and hazardous substances and offshore installations: "*There will be no more Brent Spars under Labour*," (interview with Michael Meacher, UK Environment Minister, "Today", Radio 4, 2nd September 1997, cited in <http://www.greenpeace.org/~odumping/noticeboard/index.html>, September, 1999). Finally, on

¹³ Only the British and Norwegian governments expressed reservations to this decision.

23rd July 1998, OSPAR Commission Environment Ministers in Portugal voted for a full ban on the dumping of steel oil installations¹⁴ and a 'zero discharge' requirement for radioactive waste.

This series of events appears to have impacted on the discursive (and potentially, the non-discursive) practices of the offshore oil industry. Richard Hoare, managing director of environmental consultancy Cordah (a subsidiary of BMT which has been closely involved with the Spar decommissioning) argues that: "*Brent Spar has changed the whole approach to environmental assessment offshore,*" (Offshore Engineer, July 1999: 21). Within the oil industry the concept of "*life extension*" is becoming increasingly prominent in the debate over environmental management and the decommissioning of offshore oil related structures (ibid.). Although there is no agreement on "*the relative ranking of incineration, waste to energy recovery and recycling*" there is "*universal agreement on the overriding value of minimising waste,*" (ibid.). Similarly, Gordon Stirling (Wood Group managing director of engineering projects) predicts that the decommissioning experience of the Spar will lead to future "*green*" platforms which would have dismantling as well as reuse and recycling of modules built-in to their design from the start (Snieckus, 1999).

By contrast, the Ogoniland issue had little impact on non-discursive practices. The industrial powers, in particular the G-7 countries, regard oil as a vital asset: for instance, it is the most viable source of energy for transforming nature into commodities, which are then exchanged to realise surplus value (Obi, 1997: 138). It is therefore unsurprising that, despite calls by international governments for respect for human rights, and despite Greenpeace's and MOSOP's calls for boycotts, little action was taken. In terms of economic sanctions, Nelson Mandela, South Africa's president, eventually called for an oil boycott (Ghazi, The Observer, 19th November 1995: 1), but implementation was minimal, and South Africa's ban on oil imports from Nigeria was later lifted (Connors, 1997: 51). The US was reluctant to boycott oil

¹⁴ Only footings from the heaviest rigs will be given further consideration, with a presumption for onshore disposal (Greenpeace press release, 23rd July 1998).

since it already had oil embargoes against Libya and Iraq. A vote for an EU oil embargo in 1996 was blocked by the UK and the Netherlands (the argument being that it would hurt the Nigerian people more than the Nigerian leaders, and that it would lead to increased petrol prices, especially in the US). After Saro-Wiwa's execution, a Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG) was set up to consider further action against the military regime of General Abacha, to pressure it to restore human and democratic rights. However, it merely settled on a fact-finding mission to the country (ibid.: 52) despite the Nigerian regime's refusal to allow it access to political prisoners like Moshood Abiola (who had been elected president in 1993 and held on treason charges since). As a result, little has changed in Ogoniland. A special military task force occupies Ogoniland with the aim of repressing the Ogoni movement, serving as a deterrent to others. Since Saro-Wiwa's execution there have been 45 cases of extra-judicial executions and disappearances and 365 detentions (including that of the Ogoni 20 arrested under similar circumstances to Saro-Wiwa) (Mitee, 1999: 435)

The only real change from the Ogoniland campaign is - ironically - its perpetuation of the cycle of resistance through its inspiration to the other movements in Nigeria. The most recently formed is the Chicoco Movement, which formed in 1997 as an alliance of different ethnic groups and has staged mass protests against oil companies (Fryas, 1998: 464).

8.7 Summary: a rhetorical-discursive explanation of news media agenda-building

The Spar issue was more successful than the Ogoniland issue in building the agenda of UK national television news; and within the Ogoniland issue the environmental aspect was less successful than the human rights aspect in building the news agenda. This is explained by examining Greenpeace's and Shell's use of rhetorical discourses in exploiting their differential knowledge of the news media, audience opponents and allies.

In the Spar issue, Greenpeace made maximum use of emotive and belief rhetorical discourses whilst also using a rationalistic rhetorical discourse, so appealing to all news values. This

enabled Greenpeace to build the news media agenda quickly, and before Shell could react. Its focus on emotive and belief discourses utilised its knowledge of their likely impact on the audience (especially compared to Shell's reliance on the less impactful rationalistic discourse), successfully persuading the European public and politicians to its cause.

In the Ogoniland issue, in the two week period around Saro-Wiwa's death sentence and execution, the environmental aspect received minimal exposure on UK national television news despite Greenpeace again focusing on emotive and belief discourses. This is partially explained by the lack of simplicity of Greenpeace's message: it was less simple than its appeal to stop dumping in the Spar issue. This time it engaged in a two pronged-attack on both human rights abuses and environmental abuses - two angles which ended up competing for prime time broadcast space . The environmental angle lost because, compared to the human rights angle, it has low appeal to professional, logistical and audience-maximising news values. In addition, Greenpeace's prominent allies supported it on the human rights aspect rather than on the environmental aspect. This time Shell had better knowledge of its audience and of its main opponent, Greenpeace, having learned lessons from the Spar issue earlier that year. This time Shell was prepared in terms of its media strategy, and was ready to both close down the debate and combat Greenpeace discourse by discourse.

Arguably, in the Spar issue, Greenpeace's focused seven-week media campaign followed by its prolonged involvement in the Spar issue as Shell engaged in the Brent Spar Dialogue Process, contributed to changing non-discursive practices - such as the UK Government's policy of '*a general presumption against sea disposal*', for offshore installations in September 1997, and the OSPAR Commission's ban on the dumping of steel oil installations in July 1998. In the Ogoniland issue, by contrast, little changed beyond Shell's discourse.

CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

9.1 Introduction

This chapter offers a resumé of the aims and approaches of this research, its methodological innovations, its main findings and their implications for news management strategies and the public sphere.

9.2 Resumé of aims and approaches

This media agenda-building research is part of the wider public knowledge project. Its focus on news media agenda-building addresses the gap within agenda-setting research identified by Carragee (1987: 43) and Dearing and Rogers (1996: 17) that there are few studies on how the news media agenda develops.

On a substantive level, this research explores news media agenda-building by investigating how two media battles between Greenpeace and Shell during 1995 impacted on each other's news media strategies; and how they fared in building the agenda of UK television news. On a formal level, examination of these media battles leads to the development of theory regarding news media agenda-building in environmental issues, so addressing a number of gaps in the literature on Media Studies and Rhetoric.

From the Media Studies literature, this research addresses the absence of theory-building in television research (Corner, 1998: 148). This research generates theory regarding news values. It demonstrates that past research on news values has produced long lists of news values; and that attempts to understand how these news values apply to environmental news have been both partial and largely descriptive. This research systematically integrates the list of news values into more useful conceptual categories than "*infotainment*", and applies them to environmental television news coverage.

Another deficit in the Media Studies literature is investigation of news management strategies of "*non-official sources*" (Schlesinger, 1990: 76). This is accompanied by voids in the literature on Rhetoric regarding research on the mass media (identified by Waddell, 1998: xix; Herndl & Brown, 1996: 18; and Lange, 1993/1998: 126); and research on how competing information campaigns interact (Lange, 1993/1998: 140). This research addresses all of these deficits, together with that identified by Corner (1998: 148) regarding the absence of theory-building in television research, by using Aristotle's insights on rhetorical structuring principles. This helps generate theory regarding news media-oriented discursive strategies of Greenpeace and Shell. Using the Aristotelean rhetorical approach also helps moves research forward from Schlesinger's (1990) model of news management strategies, by delivering deeper insights into various aspects of news message construction. The rhetorical approach provides insights on: how effectively the message advocates the actor's stance; the audience for whom the message was intended; the precise and varied nature of journalistic demands and constraints that news media-oriented messages must negotiate; and more generally, the available means of persuasion in a message. Throughout this exploration, insights are used from the literature on Public Relations, given that the dominant view of PR practice is one of persuasive communication performed on behalf of clients (Gandy, 1992: 132).

The different types of news media-oriented rhetorical discourses promoted by Greenpeace and Shell are examined from Foucault's (1972) discursive viewpoint to produce their "*rules of formation*" (ibid.: 31-9). By focusing on the discursive source-media message interface, this research goes some way towards meeting Cottle's (2000: 443) calls for integration between the sociological and culturalist approaches to studying the news genre. It returns attention to the news broadcast, but from a position which considers the rhetorical discourses used by sources, and the journalistic ideologies (news values) that they must negotiate

9.3 Methodological innovations


This research pins down Foucault's (1972) slippery notion of a "*statement*" by equating it to the grounded theory notion of a "*concept*" (i.e. the smallest unit of meaningful analysis, derived from the data, the form of which changes according to context). These concepts are subsequently grouped and re-grouped to build higher categories (sub-themes, themes and main themes). By arriving at main themes in this way, and by examining texts and practices from several institutional sites, this allows a number of analytical thrusts.

- It enables the equating of the term "*main theme*" with the term "*discourse*".
- In quantifying concepts/statements, this research is actually quantifying discourses.

Quantitative analysis of the various rhetorical discourses by counting the concept/statement allows comparative analysis of Greenpeace's and Shell's relative use of each rhetorical discourse. It also allows comparative analysis of the relative quantitative appearance of these discourses (and Greenpeace's and Shell's versions of these discourses - their world-views) in the broadcast news sample. This is an advance on normal methods of quantifying agenda-building - i.e. quantitative content analysis using pre-conceived categories - since it allows quantitative agenda-building analysis to emerge from the data, rather than being forced upon it. Thus, a quantitative picture of a meaningful set of categories can be built, so minimising the reductive nature of much quantitative analysis.


- By counting the appearance of concepts supporting the actor's world-view - here termed "*discursive primary definition*" - this addresses some of the criticisms leveled at Hall et al.'s (1978) primary definition model: namely that it does not indicate the varying degrees of legitimacy with which different primary definitions are accredited, nor how actors wish to be portrayed (Hansen, 1991).

Graph 9.1
Emotive discourse promoted in Greenpeace and Shell press releases and found in national television evening news broadcasts on the Spar issue (30th April - 11th October 1995)




Graph 9.2

Rationalistic discourse promoted in Greenpeace and Shell press releases and found in national television evening news broadcasts on the Spar issue (30th April - 11th October 1995)




Graph 9.3
Belief discourse promoted in Greenpeace and Shell press releases and found in national television evening news broadcasts on the Spar issue (30th April - 11th October 1995)




Graph 9.4

Discourses found in national television evening news broadcasts on the Spar issue
(30th April - 11th October 1995)



Graph 9.5
Discourses promoted in Greenpeace and Shell press releases on the Spar issue
(30th April - 11th October 1995)



9.4 Summary of findings

A new typology of news values is generated by this study - professional, logistical and audience-maximising (see Chapter 4). This replaces the incomplete idea of "*infotainment*" with the fuller idea of "logistical, audience-maximising professionalism". Highlighting the logistical element of news values draws attention to the potential for manipulation of the news, for instance through the ready supply of news-oriented materials.

A typology of media-oriented rhetorical discourses is generated - namely those of emotivism (see Chapter 5), rationalism (see Chapter 6) and belief (see Chapter 7). The "*rules of formation*" (Foucault, 1972: 31-9) of these discourses are described by referring to their objects of knowledge; their concepts; the rhetorical tools used to propagate these concepts; and their subject positions (see Chapter 8 section 8.3). Procedures constraining discourse largely explain what is not said in Greenpeace's and Shell's media campaigns (see Chapter 8 section 8.2.2). Such procedures include: journalistic perceptions regarding who legitimately has the right to speak on which issues; source perceptions regarding what is likely to be received favourably by media gate-keepers and the wider public; and the need to adhere to discourses dominant within one's own institution - such as Shell's instrumental rationalism.

The relative success of Greenpeace and Shell in building the UK television news agenda was examined, discourse by discourse. In the Spar issue¹ this showed that Greenpeace was the discursive primary definer in terms of the emotive discourse during the seven-week campaign (see Graph 9.1). By October, however, the emotive discourse is minimal in the news broadcasts, and where it occurs, Shell has the edge. Graph 9.2 shows Greenpeace to be the discursive primary definer in the rationalistic discourse in the first few weeks of its Spar campaign. However Shell catches up by week four of the seven-week campaign, and afterwards, maintains an edge over Greenpeace. Graph 9.3 shows that during the seven-week

¹ This covered all the national television evening news broadcasts during the seven-week campaign (April - June 1995), and those broadcast four months later on the day Shell announced its New Way Forward (October 1995).

campaign, Greenpeace is discursive primary definer in the belief discourse, but that Shell takes over after the U-turn. Thus, across the three discourses, Greenpeace's initial discursive primary definition status during the seven-week campaign is largely lost to Shell after the U-turn (see Graph 9.4).

A Foucaultian explanation of differentiations in discursive news media-oriented activity by Greenpeace and Shell, and in discursive news media outcomes, is offered by examining how Greenpeace and Shell use knowledge strategically in the two issues examined (see Chapter 8 section 8.4). This comprises their use of knowledge of the media, audience opponents and allies. Some of the key features are elucidated below.

Graph 9.5 shows that Greenpeace uses all three emotive, rationalistic and belief discourses in its press releases throughout the seven-week campaign, varying the proportion of these discourses weekly. For instance, in week 2 of May Greenpeace promotes the rationalistic discourse the most strongly, whereas in week 2 of June it more strongly promotes the emotive and belief discourses. Shell makes little use of emotivism at any point, using a combination of rationalism and belief throughout (April - October). During the seven-week campaign, Shell focuses more on the rationalistic rather than belief discourse, but by July this situation is reversed.

In the Spar issue, the extent to which each rhetorical discourse is associated with each news value is quantitatively worked out. It was found that the emotive discourse is associated the most with audience-maximising and logistical news values; and the rationalistic discourse is associated more than the other two discourses with professional news values (although only marginally more so than the belief discourse) (see Chapter 8, Section 8.4.1, Table 8.5). Given that during the seven-week campaign Greenpeace is discursive primary definer in emotive, rationalistic and belief discourses (see Graph 9.4), this suggests that Greenpeace was successfully using its knowledge of the media (for instance, filling the gap in the market for scientific claims). Greenpeace used knowledge of its audience (for instance, promoting light

rather than dark green beliefs; and targeting a single "villain" - Shell - so enabling more focused campaign messages). Greenpeace demonstrates knowledge of its opponents in its use of emotive and belief discourses which assign blame for environmental damage to Shell. Whilst simplifying and symbolising the issue makes it more palatable for broadcast news, it also complicates matters for Shell by adding moral language as yet another factor to consider in an already complicated risk-analysis process. Greenpeace demonstrates strategic knowledge of its allies in that through its emotive discourse of vilifying Shell, and its belief discourse of global interconnectivity ("save planet Earth"), Greenpeace captured the support of North European governments, parties and the public during the seven-week campaign.

In the Ogoniland issue, Greenpeace's knowledge of the media was demonstrated in its appeal to a wide range of news values (see Chapter 8, Section 8.4.1). These include the news values of watchdog (for example, Shell and the Nigerian regime's malpractice); symbolisation/simplification (for instance, targeting Shell and not Chevron); human interest (for instance, the personification of the Ogoni's cause in Saro-Wiwa); and accessibility (such as its capitalising on the absence of clear-cut, independent scientific data - see Chapter 6, Section 6.3.1).

Greenpeace's knowledge of the audience is evidenced by its honing of its campaign towards the human rights, as well as environmental, issue using an emotive discourse (Chapter 5, Section 5.3) and belief discourse on standard-setting (Chapter 7, Section 7.3.2) and global interconnectivity (Chapter 7, Section 7.3.4). This combination and inflection of discourses works to internationalise the Ogoni struggle by appealing to a western audience in the knowledge that the Nigerian Government was unresponsive to the Ogoni's demands.

Greenpeace demonstrates knowledge of the strategic importance of allies in campaigning alongside a wide range of INGOs and NGOs and lobbying international politicians (see Chapter 8, Section 8.4.4). Such establishment of a range of prominent allies is vital in the battle for discursive primary definition.

Media coverage of the Ogoniland issue (October - November 1995), coming several months after the media glare on the Spar issue, found Shell much more prepared than it had been

during Greenpeace's seven-week Spar campaign, suggesting that it had acquired and used knowledge of Greenpeace's media-oriented activity. After its U-turn in the Spar issue, Shell, with the help of a PR firm, identified its failure to win over hearts and minds during the seven-week campaign. Subsequently, in both Spar and Ogoniland issues, Shell made greater use of the belief discourse, combating Greenpeace on specific belief discourses. Shell chooses to promote only those belief discourses in which it can adopt a credible stance (for example, the beliefs of corporate social responsibility and global interconnectivity - see Chapter 7, Sections 7.3.2.2 and 7.3.4). It steers clear of adopting beliefs that do not fit into its prevailing stance (such as the belief that the environment is the top priority). In the Ogoniland issue, Shell also engages in the emotive discourse (ennobling itself (Chapter 5, section 5.3.2) and vilifying MOSOP and Greenpeace (Chapter 5, section 5.3.1)), having learned that a company engaging in rational debate during a crisis is often viewed as defensive and guilty. Shell also tries to build a wider range of allies, such as prominent international politicians, but unsuccessfully (see Chapter 8, Section 8.4.4).

Thus, this research highlights the utility of understanding how the rhetorical discourses of emotivism, rationalism and belief operate, given that this knowledge can be used strategically in building the news media agenda; making a favourable impact on one's audience; combating one's opponent; and recruiting a range of allies to one's cause. These findings have implications for news management strategies and for the public sphere.

9.5 Implications of the findings

9.5.1 Implications for news management strategies

The findings from this research suggest that there are several key elements of media-oriented discursive strategies.

- **A media-oriented discursive strategy should aim to recruit a wide range of allies who can credibly contribute to each (or all) of the three rhetorical discourses.**

For instance, in the Spar issue, Greenpeace recruited European politicians and experts to emotively vilify Shell (see Appendix 6, Table 1); to rationalistically label the Spar a pollutant

(see Appendix 6, Table 2); and to promote the beliefs that companies should have a high sense of corporate social responsibility (Appendix 6, Table 6) and that the environment is a top priority (Appendix 6, Table 7). Similarly, Greenpeace's belief in "save planet Earth" was widely promoted by European politicians, other pressure/interest groups and the public (Appendix 6, Table 8).

- **A media-oriented discursive strategy should be aware of how rhetorical discourses are inter-connected.**

For broadcast news, a combination of emotive and belief rhetorical discourses works well in that the emotive discourse appeals highly to audience-maximising and logistical news values, whilst a belief discourse appeals highly to professional news values (see Section 8.4.1, Table 8.5). In addition, the two discourses are mutually supportive in that an emotive discourse adds feeling to a belief discourse whilst a belief discourse adds legitimacy to an emotive discourse. For instance, emotive vilification of Shell adds colour to the belief in the need for corporate social responsibility; and the belief in the need for corporate social responsibility adds legitimacy to the vilification of Shell. Another useful combination of rhetorical discourses is allying a rationalistic with a belief discourse. This is evidenced by Greenpeace's and Shell's use of this combination in the Spar issue in October 1995, both of which receive broadcast attention (see Graphs 9.4 and 9.5).

Throughout the Spar campaign (April - October 1995), a belief rhetorical discourse is almost always apparent in the mix of rhetorical discourses used. (The only appearance of an emotive or rationalistic rhetorical discourse without being allied with a belief discourse is in week 2 of June, with Shell's purely rationalistic press release (see Graph 9.5). This suggests that the belief discourse is the most useful to combine with. As Waddell (1990: 383) argues, both purely emotional and instrumentally rational appeals are problematic for at least three reasons. They can both be inauthentic and deceptive; they may lead to agreement, but not to conviction, lacking the motive force to move us to action; and naked reason can lead to morally indefensible conclusions. Combining the emotive or rationalistic discourse with the belief

discourse, however, should avoid these problems. Inauthenticity and deception will not be an issue since the appeal will be motivated by a higher purpose (the belief discourse). It will move those who believe in the ethical foundation of the appeal (the belief discourse). Given that it is informed by a belief system, the reason will never be "*naked*", but inspired. However, the beliefs propagated must be credible within the propagator's overall stance. For instance, the Ogoniland issue saw Shell's careful promotion of its beliefs regarding its corporate social responsibility, yet these failed to be broadcast - probably because its operations within an oppressive regime simply did not ring true with the stance it was claiming.

Arguably, the best combination is to use all three rhetorical discourses - as Greenpeace did during its seven-week Spar campaign (see Graphs 9.4 and 9.5). Given that each discourse has a closer affinity with certain rhetorical tools (see Chapter 8 section 8.3), the use of all three discourses will maximise rhetorical force by enabling a range of rhetorical tools to be applied.

- **A media-oriented discursive strategy should carefully choose its rhetorical discourse (or combination of rhetorical discourses) in relation to those used by the opponent (also considering what rhetorical discourses the opponent has used in the past, and is likely to use in the future).**

For instance, a rationalistic rhetorical discourse used as a defensive maneuver requires careful handling. When used in response to emotive and belief rhetorical discourses, it suffers from its relative complexity (such as Shell's explanation that deep-sea disposal was the BPEO - see Chapter 6, Section 6.2.1.3). It can also make the proponent look defensive (such as the interview by Chris Fay, Shell-UK, on the day after the U-turn where he repeatedly explains that the Spar is not toxic - see Chapter 6, Section 6.2.1.2). When allied with an emotive discourse, a rationalistic discourse may have greater impact, but runs into the danger of subsequent verification (for instance, Greenpeace's emotive science in the Spar issue fell foul of Shell's later use of rationalistic science to verify the Spar's toxicity - see Chapter 6, Section 6.2.1).

- **A media-oriented discursive strategy should appreciate the constraints it engenders.**

As Foucault (1982: 223; 1977) describes, power/knowledge arises from the practices of surveillance and documentation that constrain behaviour precisely by making it more thoroughly knowable or known. Greenpeace's use and knowledge of media requirements has led to self-censorship. It causes Greenpeace to limit its message to what it knows the media want and the public will accept and remember: for instance, Greenpeace's most radical deep-green beliefs were not promoted.

- **A media-oriented discursive strategy should appreciate that strategic knowledge has a limited shelf life.**

Unfortunately for Greenpeace, its successful use of its knowledge of how to build the media agenda can backfire. Rose (1993) describes how the media have become uncomfortable with being so closely identified with environmental campaigning. In some cases they felt that the campaigning organisations: "*were not 'doing' real campaigning directly themselves but had made the media into the campaigners, hence the accusations that NGOs were engineering 'stunts',*" (Greenpeace-UK, 1996: 10). Indeed, in the Spar issue, during the seven-week campaign Greenpeace's "media savvy" became a topic worthy of reporting on television news. After the U-turn, at a meeting of television executives at the Edinburgh Television Festival in August 1995, television editors expressed awareness of Greenpeace's manipulateness, pointing to its ability to outspend television companies in shooting footage of its protests: "*this particular David isn't armed with a slingshot so much as an AK47,*" (Sambrook, cited in Boulton and Corzine, Financial Times, 6th September 1995: 8). Television news coverage of the Ogoniland issue also showed signs of journalistic awareness of Greenpeace's attempts at manipulation. This is demonstrated by Table 9.1 which depicts a Greenpeace demonstration (shots 1-2), and then suggests journalistic awareness that Greenpeace is performing for the media (shot 3).

Table 9.1 Extract from Channel 4 News, 7.00pm, 13th November 1995

Shot	Visual	Voiceover
1	<u>Studio mode</u> : presenter voice-over used with a darkly lit film of a line of demonstrators carrying banners in German. Underneath are two posters with the writing "Ken Saro-Wiwa". Next to this banner is another showing the Shell logo converted into skull and crossbones with red paint.	Presenter: " <i>Shell's already facing political anger here in ...</i> "
2	Cut to film of a gallows being erected by three people outside a gray Shell building bearing "Shell" and the Shell logo in white. A line of demonstrators are in the background, one holding the Shell logo with the skull and cross-bones.	"... <i>Germany and in Britain for its investment in Nigeria....</i> "
3	Visual: Slow zoom-out to include the camera-people filming the erection of the gallows outside Shell offices.	"... - <i>an echo of the protests raised by the Brent Spar action earlier this year.</i> "

The shelf-life of strategic knowledge is further shortened when opposing sources learn from each other's highly public media successes and mistakes. In the two-week phase of the Ogoniland issue around Saro-Wiwa's death sentence, Shell learned from its mistakes and Greenpeace's success in the Spar campaign earlier that year. For instance, unlike in the Spar issue, Shell complied with logistical news values like simplification, supplying a well-defined message by maintaining its line that business was above politics, and that it would be unethical to interfere in another country's internal affairs. Shell even provided visuals (a news value Shell totally failed to meet in the Spar issue):

"Shell yesterday showed a film taken during a helicopter tour of the region this week. None of the gas outlets were being flared, and the presence of undergrowth, which cannot survive the heat of burning gas, indicated that no flaring had taken place for some time," (Holman, Financial Times, 24th November 1995: 8).

Perhaps most importantly, Shell kept out of television's glare by not giving interviews, and so avoiding the credibility test of visual close-ups and awkward questions (encountered by Chris Fay in his interview for Newsnight on the day of the U-turn in the Spar issue - see Chapter 7 section 7.4). Shell simultaneously ensured that there was no information gap to be plugged by opposing sources, by promoting its world-view extensively in carefully rhetorically-structured press releases.

Such media management appears to include knowing when to publicly admit defeat in order to quietly protect vital interests. The Spar and Ogoniland campaigns demonstrate that Shell's media management was concerned to avoid adverse public opinion and accompanying "knee-jerk" regulatory reactions. In the Spar issue, Shell was keen to avoid stimulating new regulations regarding deep-sea disposal of all oil platforms. Chapter 6, Graph 6.2 shows that after the U-turn, Shell's press releases increasingly promote its argument that onshore disposal of the Spar would not set a precedent, climaxing in Week 2 of October during the launch of its "*New Way Forward*". In the Ogoniland issue, Shell campaigned vigorously to maintain its right to invest in Nigeria, pointing out the benefits of its investment to the Nigerian people, and propagating its belief of non-interference in the internal politics of another country. Arguably, in the name of protecting vital interests, Shell allowed Greenpeace its well-publicised victory regarding Shell's U-turn on deep-sea disposal of the Spar, in the hope that the issue would cease to matter to the public and the world at large once the media spotlight had moved on. However, this lack of "real world" change from media campaigning alone was already recognised by Greenpeace.

"Through decades in which NGOs sought to use the media to raise awareness ... it tended to be assumed that local, national or international action would follow from "proof" of a case in the media. But by the 1990s it was clear that this was no longer the case: there was a surplus of proof and a deficit of delivered change," (Rose, 1993: 292).

Given this situation Greenpeace continues lobbying outside of the media spotlight in order to keep the issue alive - with success in the issue of oil rig disposal. This situation highlights the limits of purely media-oriented strategies.

The Spar and Ogoniland issues illustrate well Foucault's (1982: 223) contention that power is exercised through an agent's actions only to the extent that other agents' actions remain appropriately aligned with them. The Spar and Ogoniland issues indicate that media-aware sources are constantly struggling for media attention as all involved - journalists, editors, opponents and the public - shift their expectations and their attention. What was once a surprise tactic becomes learned and incorporated by the opponent. What is a credible source for a journalist reporting on one issue is an incredible source for a journalist reporting on another issue. This last point is illustrated by two different assessments of Greenpeace's and Shell's credibility by two journalists. One journalist responded to the question of Shell's credibility in the Spar issue as "*8/10 - getting better*" and Greenpeace's credibility as "*8/10*" (television news editor, questionnaire response, April 2000). However, another broadcast journalist, reporting on the Ogoniland issue, rated Shell-Nigeria, Royal-Dutch Shell and Greenpeace all as "*not very credible*", compared to "*very credible*" for Saro-Wiwa and Archbishop Desmond Tutu (anonymous broadcast journalist, Ogoniland issue, questionnaire response, April 2000). Yet both journalists had similar criteria for a "good source" - namely "*proven reliability, openness, transparency of motive*" (television news editor, questionnaire response, April 2000) and "*truthfulness and authority i.e. highly placed*" (anonymous broadcast journalist, Ogoniland issue, questionnaire response, April 2000). Thus, credibility is contingent on actor, issue, and journalistic perception of actor and issue.

9.5.2 Implications for the public sphere

The findings from this research have two notable implications for the public sphere - one negative and one positive.

The negative implication arises from the new typology of news values generated by this research - "logistical, audience-maximising professionalism" - which highlights the importance of logistical news values. Pandering to such news values encourages media-aware sources to spend significant amounts of time and resources creating and packaging their message to the media. In the Spar issue, Shell claims that Greenpeace spent over a quarter of the £1.4 million total budget on recording and transmitting their TV pictures alone (Shell-UK Limited, 1995d: 8). Greenpeace claims that Shell spent more money on PR and inviting tenders from engineering companies to deal with the Spar since the Greenpeace campaign, than it did for the original disposal proposal (Consequences of the Brent Spar Victory, <http://www.greenpeace.org/~comms/brent/index.html>, September 1999). The importance of logistical news values has negative implications for the likelihood of broadcasting issues that do not have a resource-rich and logistically-aware champion. The findings of this research also suggest that that professional news values are constrained by logistical and audience-maximising news values which, in turn, are best met through the emotive discourse (see Chapter 8, Table 8.4.1, Table 5). Taken together, these findings have negative implications for the serious reporting of all issues that cannot be emotively "spun", or do not have a resource-rich and logistically media-aware promoter who knows how to emotively spin the issue.

A more positive implication for the public sphere comes from the suggestion in Section 9.5.1 that news media-oriented discursive strategies, to maximise their persuasive potential, should be allied with a belief rhetorical discourse. An emotive discourse allied with a belief discourse may encourage audiences to take note of the values propagated. A rationalistic discourse combined with a belief discourse (creating a "*substantively rational*" (Weber, 1952/1995: 326) discourse) leads to a questioning of society's accepted values underlying its technocratic procedures. Both outcomes would be applauded by Beck (1992), given his vision of a utopian ecological democracy where politics and science hone their largely inactive direction-finding and self-monitoring instruments through two steps - an opening of science from within and the filtering out of its limitations in a public test of its practice:

"Making threats publicly visible and arousing attention in detail, in one's own living space - these are cultural eyes through which the "blind citizens" can perhaps win back the autonomy of their own judgement," (ibid.: 120).

Where rationalistic debate cannot lead to clear-cut solutions - as in risk issues - propagation of the belief discourse in combination with the emotive and/or rationalistic discourses may be the best way of encouraging public consideration of such issues. The use of all three rhetorical discourses should both attract audience attention whilst encouraging the questioning and critical mind-set that Habermas (1989/1996: 221) desires in order to re-vitalise the public sphere.

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APPENDIX 1

QUESTIONNAIRES AND INTERVIEWS

Open-ended questionnaires were sent to a range of actors involved in the Spar and Ogoniland issues - namely all journalists who covered the issues in broadsheets (The Guardian, The Observer and the Financial Times), UK television news and the New Scientist and Nature; all scientists who commented on the issues in the New Scientist and Nature; and individuals within Greenpeace, Shell and MOSOP who were involved in the two issues. Responses were received from three television news journalists, one television news editor, one reporter for the New Scientist and one scientist. In several cases, an extended e-mail "interview" was conducted with the respondents. No responses were received from Shell or Greenpeace, and promised responses from MOSOP never materialised. Given their lack of response, the questions asked of these organisations have not been included here. What follows is a selection of the types of questions asked of journalists and scientists.

Questions to journalists

Some of the following questions were omitted or varied depending on what issue the journalist had covered, and which news programme, newspaper or scientific journal the journalist was from.

With environmental issues, do you see your news organisation as reacting to public concern or creating public concern?

Which news organisation do you think gives the best coverage to the environment and science?

Why?

How does your news organisation decide what constitutes the "public interest"?

Do you think your news organisation helps form policy agendas? If so, how?

To what extent do you measure/monitor what other news organisations are doing?

Given the vast amounts of potentially newsworthy events that happen each day, why do you think that the news broadcasts on each channel are so similar?

What is the starting point for creating the news agenda at the beginning of the day?

Do you think that in general your news organisation under-reports any type of area, issue or perspective? If so, what and why?

Is there a regular environmental correspondent or slot in your news organisation?

It is an old adage of the Sociology of Journalism that "news is what an authoritative source tells a journalist". Can you comment on this?

What sort of sources are important in environmental stories? Why?

Are any environmental groups regularly turned to for information in environmental stories? Are any never or rarely used? If so, which ones, and why?

Are there any constraints limiting the number and type of source you pursue? Can you give examples?

How credible is Greenpeace as a source? Has it always been so?

How credible is Shell as a source? Has it always been so?

How aware are you of attempted manipulation of your news agenda by interest groups and pressure groups? Do you take any measures to help prevent this?

What are the main challenges in performing your job?

To what extent do you engage in investigative journalism? Are there any constraints?

In general how happy are you with Greenpeace's publicisation of its scientific viewpoint?

Can you comment on why there was little independent scientific opinion published in the New Scientist and Nature on the Brent Spar disposal issue until after Shell "U-turned" in June 1995, some six weeks into Greenpeace's occupation of the Spar?

Do you aim for a specific audience type? Why?

How does your organisation ascertain audience interest in a news programme?

Do you think your general news coverage is of maximum interest to the public? If so, why? If not, how could it be improved?

How do you try to maximise a story's relevance to the public?

How interested do you think your viewers/listeners are in the environment? Why?

Do you have any training in science or environmental studies? Would you like more, or do you think that your existing knowledge base is adequate?

Questions to scientists

How often is your organisation in the mass media? Please specify whether coverage is print (tabloids or broadsheets) or broadcast (television or radio) coverage.

Would your organisation like more mass media attention?

What are the normal routes for getting media attention? E.g. press release, letters, contacted by journalists etc.?

What, if anything, would you like to see changed about broadcast news media coverage of environmental stories?

Are there any features of environmental issues that make them attractive or unattractive to the news media?

In general how happy are you with Greenpeace's publicisation of its scientific viewpoint?

In general how happy are you with Shell's publicisation of its scientific viewpoint?

Is your organisation's work dependent on outside bodies e.g. for funding, contracts etc.? Can you comment further on this?

Do you advise any other body on policy e.g. government, company, pressure group, etc.?

The following questions are specifically about the Brent Spar issue:

- Were you happy with the way the science was covered by the broadcast media? If so, why? If not, why not?

- Were you happy with the way the science was covered by the print news media? If so, why? If not, why not?

- Were you happy with the way Greenpeace portrayed the science of the issue? Why?

- Were you happy with the way Shell portrayed the science of the issue? Why?

- Can you speculate on why there was little independent scientific opinion published in the New Scientist and Nature on the Spar disposal issue until after Shell "U-turned" in June 1995, some six weeks into Greenpeace's occupation of the Spar?

All questionnaires ended with the following questions:

Are there any other points or comments you wish to make regarding the interplay between journalists, their sources, and real world impacts of media news articles and broadcasts?

What is your name and position?

Do you wish to remain anonymous?

Are you interested in being kept notified of the results of this study?

Would you be willing to contribute further to this study, eg via telephone, interview or e-mail?

Do you know of anyone else who would be willing to fill in a similar questionnaire?

APPENDIX 2
DERIVATION OF MAIN THEMES: NEWS VALUES

Table 1. Main theme: Professional news values in the Spar issue

1.1 Theme: new information	1.2 Theme: watchdog	1.3 Theme: impartiality/ balance	1.4 Theme: facticity
1.1.1 New event	1.2.1 Identifying problems rather than solutions	1.3.1 Pro-Greenpeace reported	1.4.1 Inaccuracies
1.1.2 New opinion	1.2.1.1 Deep-sea disposal is bad	1.3.2 Pro-Greenpeace visual	1.4.1.1 Visually portrayed inaccuracy
	1.2.1.2 Why deep-sea disposal is bad	1.3.3 Pro-Greenpeace interviewed	1.4.1.2 Reported ambiguity
	1.2.1.3 Ineffectual leaders	1.3.4 Pro-Shell reported	1.4.1.3 Inaccuracy via interview
	1.2.1.4 Ineffectual managers	1.3.5 Pro-Shell visuals	1.4.2 Authenticating devices used to show facticity & accuracy
	1.2.1.5 The best solution (deep-sea disposal) has been repudiated	1.3.6 Pro-Shell interviewed	1.4.2.1 Testimonial visuals
	1.2.1.6 Onshore disposal is difficult/dangerous		1.4.2.2 Attribution
	1.2.1.7 Onshore disposal is expensive to tax-payer		1.4.2.3 Testimonial interview
	1.2.2 Revealing malpractice		1.4.2.4 Credible source
	1.2.2.1 Greenpeace malpractice: misuse of resources		
	1.2.2.2 Shell malpractice		
	1.2.2.3 Government malpractice: misuse of resources		
	1.2.2.4 Government-industry conspiracy		
	1.2.2.5 Business malpractice		
	1.2.2.6 Scientists' malpractice		

Table 2. Main theme: Professional news values in the Ogoniland issue

1.1 Theme: new information	1.2 Theme: watchdog	1.3 Theme: impartiality/ balance	1.4 Theme: facticity
1.1.1 New event	1.2.1 Identifying problems rather than solutions	1.3.1 Pro-Greenpeace reported	1.4.1 Authenticating devices used to show facticity & accuracy
1.1.2 New opinion	1.2.1.1 Unjust death sentence	1.3.2 Pro-Greenpeace visual	1.4.1.1 Testimonial visuals
	1.2.1.2 Military dictatorship continues	1.3.3 Pro-Greenpeace interviewed	1.4.1.2 Attribution
	1.2.1.3 British condemnation too weak	1.3.4 Pro-Shell-Nigeria reported	1.4.1.3 Testimonial interview
	1.2.1.4 Existing sanctions too weak	1.3.5 Pro-Shell-Nigeria visuals	1.4.1.4 Credible source
	1.2.1.5 Imminent miscarriage of justice	1.3.6 Pro-Shell-Nigeria interviewed	
	1.2.1.6 Economic sanctions unlikely to be applied		
	1.2.1.7 Diplomatic pressure unlikely to work		
	1.2.2 Revealing malpractice		
	1.2.2.1 Oil industry malpractice: pollution		
	1.2.2.2 Shell malpractice: pollution		
	1.2.2.3 Nigerian government malpractice: human rights abuses		
	1.2.2.4 Nigerian government malpractice: unjust trial		
	1.2.2.5 MOSOP malpractice		

Table 3. Main theme: Logistical news values in the Spar issue

2.1 Theme: accessibility to journalists	2.2 Theme: symbolisation/Simplification	2.3. Theme: event-orientation/contextualisation
2.1.1 Press releases used in TV news broadcast	2.2.1 Symbolisation	2.3.1 Events
2.1.1.1 Greenpeace press release used	2.2.1.1 Greenpeace v Shell	2.3.1.1 Government's action
2.1.1.2 Shell press release used	2.2.1.2 Global interconnectivity	2.3.1.2 Pressure group's action
2.1.2 No press release used	2.2.1.3 Greenpeace is champion of environment.	2.3.1.3 Shell's action
2.1.2.1 Recent action	2.2.1.4 Sign of Greenpeace	2.3.2 Basic contextualisation
2.1.2.2 Reaction	2.2.1.5 David v Goliath.	2.3.2.1 Shell's aim
2.1.3 Publicisation in press releases of future events.	2.2.1.6 Corporate irresponsibility	2.3.2.2 Greenpeace's aim
2.1.3.1 Future event publicised by Greenpeace	2.2.1.7 Ineffectual leaders	2.3.2.3 There is a history of conflict
2.1.3.2 Future event publicised by Shell	2.2.1.8 Corporate responsibility	2.3.3 Greater contextualisation
2.1.4 Inertia	2.2.2 Simplification	2.3.3.1 Reason for Greenpeace's campaign
2.1.4.1 Re-use of visual footage	2.2.2.1 No explanation re. why Greenpeace wants judicial review of plans to dispose of Spar to be heard in England	2.3.3.2 Reason for Shell's disposal plans.
	2.2.2.2 No explanation re. how Shell intends to dispose of Spar onshore	2.3.3.3 Implications of Greenpeace's campaign
	2.2.2.3 No explanation re. why sinking is BPEO	2.3.3.4 Reason for Greenpeace's victory
	2.2.2.4 No explanation re. why onshore disposal is good for environment and jobs	2.3.3.5 Implications of Shell's decision
	2.2.2.5 No explanation of international legislation	2.3.3.6 Reason for Shell's U-turn
	2.2.2.6 No explanation re. why onshore disposal is difficult	2.3.3.7 Future disposal options explored
	2.2.2.7 No explanation of UK legislation	2.3.3.8 There is a history of UK Government support for Shell
	2.2.2.8 Simplified aims of North Sea Ministers' Conference	2.3.3.9 Lessons learned from Spar
	2.2.2.9 Little explanation of disposal options	2.3.3.10 Possible solutions
		2.3.3.11 Linked items

Table 4. Main theme: Logistical news values in the Ogoniland issue

2.1 Theme: accessibility to journalists	2.2 Theme: symbolisation/ Simplification	2.3. Theme: event-orientation/ contextualisation
2.1.1 Press releases used in TV news broadcast	2.2.1 Symbolisation	2.3.1 Events
2.1.1.1 Greenpeace press release used	2.2.1.1 Greenpeace: champion of human rights	2.3.1.1 Government's action
2.1.1.2 Shell press release used	2.2.1.2 Saro-Wiwa: champion of environment	2.3.1.2 Pressure group's action
2.1.2 No press release used	2.2.1.3 Greenpeace is champion of environment.	2.3.2 Basic contextualisation
2.1.2.1 Recent action	2.2.1.4 Corporate irresponsibility	2.3.2.1 Pressure group's aim
2.1.2.2 Reaction	2.2.1.5 Global interconnectivity	2.3.2.2 Government's aim
2.1.3 Publicisation in press releases of future events.	2.2.2 Simplification	2.3.2.3 There is a history of conflict
2.1.3.1 Future event publicised by Greenpeace	2.2.2.1 Simplification (coup, crisis, famine syndrome)	2.3.3 Greater contextualisation
2.1.3.2 Future event publicised by Shell		2.3.3.1 Reason for Nigerian government's action
2.1.4 Old visual footage re-used: inertia		2.3.3.2 Reason for Greenpeace's action
2.1.4.1 Re-use of visual footage		2.3.3.3 Reason for MOSOP's actions
		2.3.3.4 Implications of pressure group's aim
		2.3.3.5 Implications of government's actions
		2.3.3.6 Linked items

Table 5. Main theme: Audience-maximising news values in the Spar issue

3.1. Theme: copying the competition (for fear of losing audience)	3.2 Theme: entertainment
3.1.1 Same source used	3.2.1 Novelty
3.1.1.1 Greenpeace press release	3.2.1.1 Uncommon event
3.1.1.2 Shell press releases	3.2.1.2 Inversion of normal event
3.1.1.3 Contact with Shell	3.2.1.3 Farce
3.1.1.4 Contact with Greenpeace	3.2.2 Drama
3.1.1.5 Interviews	3.2.2.1 Risk
3.1.1.6 Shell statement	3.2.2.2 Superlativeness
	3.2.2.3 Potential violence
	3.2.2.4 Conflict
	3.2.2.5 Violence
	3.2.2.6 Dramatisation of emotion:
	3.2.3 Human interest
	3.2.3.1 Identification
	3.2.3.1.1 Detail on actor's' actions
	3.2.3.1.2 Detail on actor's' feelings/ problems/ hopes
	3.2.3.1.3 Implications for people
	3.2.3.1.4 Scandal
	3.2.3.1.5 Human scale/timeframe
	3.2.3.1.6 Interview with the public
	3.2.3.1.7 Reference to public
	3.2.3.2 Parochialism
	3.2.3.2.1 Regional dimension
	3.2.3.2.2 UK dimension
	3.2.3.2.3 European dimension
	3.2.3.3.3 International & global dimension
	3.2.3.3 Patriotism
	3.2.3.3.1 Pride in country desirable
	3.2.3.3.2 Support for British firms
	3.2.3.3.3 British resolve needed
	3.2.4 Visual appeal
	3.2.4.1 Dramatic image
	3.2.4.2 Explanatory image
	3.2.4.3 Visual interest
	3.2.4.4 Testimonial image

Table 6. Main theme: Audience-maximising news values in the Ogoniland issue

3.1. Theme: copying the competition (for fear of losing audience)	3.2 Theme: entertainment
3.1.1 Same source used	3.2.1 Novelty
3.1.1.1 Greenpeace press release	3.2.1.1 Uncommon event
3.1.1.2 Shell press releases	3.2.1.2 Inversion of normal event
3.1.1.3 Contact with Shell	3.2.1.3 Farce
3.1.1.4 Contact with Greenpeace	3.2.2 Drama
3.1.1.5 Interviews	3.2.2.1 Risk
3.1.1.6 Shell statement	3.2.2.2 Superlativeness
	3.2.2.3 Potential violence
	3.2.2.4 Conflict
	3.2.2.5 Violence
	3.2.2.6 Dramatisation of emotion:
	3.2.3 Human interest
	3.2.3.1 Identification
	3.2.3.1.1 Detail on actor's' actions e.g Saro-Wiwa's literary work
	3.2.3.1.2 Detail on actor's' feelings/ problems/ hopes
	3.2.3.1.3 Implications for people
	3.2.3.1.4 Scandal
	3.2.3.1.5 Human scale/timeframe
	3.2.3.1.6 Interview with the public
	3.2.3.1.7 Reference to public
	3.2.3.2 Parochialism
	3.2.3.2.1 Regional dimension
	3.2.3.2.2 UK dimension
	3.2.3.2.3 European dimension
	3.2.3.3.3 International & global dimension
	3.2.3.3 Patriotism
	3.2.3.3.1 Support for British firms
	3.2.4 Visual appeal
	3.2.4.1 Dramatic image
	3.2.4.2 Explanatory image
	3.2.4.3 Visual interest
	3.2.4.4 Testimonial image

APPENDIX 3
DERIVATION OF MAIN THEME: EMOTIVISM

Italicised concepts are those which were promoted by Greenpeace or Shell but did not build the agenda of national television evening news (i.e. what was not said). Non-italicised concepts built the agenda of national television evening news.

Table 1. Main theme: Emotivism in the Spar issue

1. Theme: Vilification	2. Theme: Ennoblement
1.1 Vilification of Shell	2.1 Laudability of Shell
1.1.1 Negative descriptions of Shell	2.1.1 Positive descriptions of Shell
1.1.1.1 Environmentally uncaring/ damaging.	2.1.1.1 Concern for human safety
1.1.1.2 Double-standards	<i>2.1.1.2 Deeply-held creed of professionalism & good conduct</i>
1.1.1.3 Irresponsible	<i>2.1.1.3 Pride in high environmental standards</i>
1.1.1.4 Irrational	2.1.1.4 Conciliatory penance
1.1.1.5 Treacherous	
1.1.1.6 Weak/ ineffective	
1.1.1.7 <i>Assault</i>	
1.1.1.8 <i>Withholding information</i>	
1.1.2 Negative description of Shell's intentions towards Spar	2.1.2 Positive descriptions of Shell's intentions towards Spar
1.1.2.1 Nominalisations of the process as "dump(ing)"	2.1.2.1 Rigs-to-reefs
1.1.2.1.1 Promotional use of "dump(ing)"	
1.1.2.1.2 Hegemonic use of "dump(ing)"	
1.1.2.1.3 Unproblematised use of "dump(ing)"	
1.1.2.2 Misinformation about the location of the disposal site	
1.1.2.2.1 North Sea association (guilt by association)	
1.1.2.2.2 Direct North Sea reference	
1.1.2.2.3 Vague reference	
1.1.3 Negative descriptions of Spar	
1.1.3.1 Rubbish	
1.1.3.2 Pollutant	
1.1.3.3 Problem for Shell	
1.2 Vilification of Greenpeace	2.2 Laudability of Greenpeace
1.2.1 Negative descriptions of Greenpeace	2.2.1 Positive descriptions of Greenpeace
1.2.1.1 Irresponsible	2.2.1.1 Champion of the environment
1.2.1.2 Spreading misinformation	2.2.1.2 Risk-taker
1.2.1.3 Unscientific	2.2.1.3 David & Goliath
1.2.1.4 Illegal activities	2.2.1.4 Battle metaphor
1.2.1.5 <i>Childish</i>	2.2.1.5 Perseverance

Table 2. Main theme: Emotivism in the Ogoniland issue

<u>1. Theme: Vilification</u>	<u>2. Theme: Ennoblement</u>
1.1 Vilification of Shell	2.1 Laudability of Shell
1.1.1 Negative descriptions of Shell	2.1.1. Positive descriptions of Shell
1.1.1.1. Environmentally uncaring/ damaging.	2.1.1.1 Commitment to environmental improvement
1.1.1.2 Abuser of human rights	2.1.1.2 Upholder of state sovereignty
1.1.1.3 Double-standards	2.1.1.3 Positive contribution to quality of life
1.1.1.4 Irresponsible	2.1.1.4 Shell is dependable
	2.1.1.5 Shell has integrity
	2.1.1.6 Shell is compassionate
1.2 Vilification of Greenpeace	2.2 Laudability of Greenpeace
1.2.1 Negative descriptions of Greenpeace	2.2.1 Positive descriptions of Greenpeace
1.2.1.1 Illegal sabotage	2.2.1.1 Greenpeace: Champion of human rights
1.2.1.2 Hidden agenda	2.2.1.2 Saro-Wiwa: champion of environment
1.2.1.3 Violence	2.2.1.3 Greenpeace has integrity
1.2.1.4 <i>Greenpeace & its allies advocate dangerous and wrong action</i>	2.2.1.4 <i>Greenpeace: Champion of environment</i>
1.2.1.5 <i>Double standards</i>	2.2.1.5 <i>Greenpeace: risk-taker</i>
1.2.1.6 <i>Spreading misinformation</i>	
1.2.1.7 <i>Preventing solutions</i>	
1.2.1.8 <i>Irresponsible</i>	

APPENDIX 4
DERIVATION OF MAIN THEME: RATIONALISM (LOGOS)

Italicised concepts are those which were promoted by Greenpeace, Shell or scientists but did not build the agenda of national television evening news (i.e. what was not said). Non-italicised concepts built the agenda of national television evening news.

Table 1. Scientific theme in the Spar issue

Scientists' arguments (New Scientist, Nature)	Greenpeace's scientific arguments	Shell's scientific arguments
1.1 Precedent	1.2 Precedent	1.3 Precedent
	1.2.1 Deep-sea disposal will/would have set precedent	1.3.1 Deep-sea disposal will not set precedent
	<i>1.2.1.1 400 platforms may be dumped</i>	1.3.1.1 Unique case
	1.2.1.2 50 platforms may be dumped in next decade	1.3.1.2 Most rigs are dismantled onshore
	1.2.1.3 Other offshore platforms will be dumped	
	1.2.1.4 60 platforms may be dumped	
	1.2.1.5 All other platforms may be dumped	
	1.2.2 Onshore disposal has/should set a precedent	1.3.2 Onshore disposal will not set precedent
	1.2.2.1 40 other platforms may come ashore	1.3.2.1 Case-by-case basis continues
	1.2.2.2 50 platforms may come ashore	1.3.2.2 Explanation regarding special case
	1.2.2.3 60 platforms may come ashore	1.3.2.3 Precedent not set: sinking considered
	1.2.2.4 All other platforms may come ashore	1.3.2.4 Spar may come ashore
	1.2.2.5 Other offshore platforms may come ashore	
	<i>1.2.2.6 400 platforms may come ashore</i>	
2.1 Toxicity	2.2 Toxicity	2.3 Toxicity
	2.2.1 High toxicity of Spar	2.3.1 Low toxicity of Spar
	2.2.1.1 100 tonnes of rubbish	2.3.1.1 Low toxicity
	2.2.1.2 5,500 tonnes of rubbish	2.3.1.2 Mostly natural materials
	2.2.1.3 14,000 tonnes of rubbish	2.3.1.3 <i>Made safe</i>
	2.2.1.4 Toxic waste	2.3.1.4 <i>100 tonnes sludge, 90% sand & 10% oil residues</i>
	2.2.1.5 Lots of toxic waste	2.3.1.5 <i>Small amounts of heavy metals</i>
	2.2.1.6 Oily waste	2.3.1.6 <i>30 tonnes of low-level radioactivity</i>
	2.2.1.7 Radioactive waste	2.3.1.7 <i>Naturally occurring low-level radioactivity</i>
	2.2.1.8 Lots of radioactive waste	2.3.1.8 <i>Internationally accepted level of radioactivity</i>
	2.2.1.9 <i>> 100 tonnes of toxic waste</i>	2.3.1.9 <i>Greenpeace's toxicity claims are overstated</i>
	<i>2.2.1.10 14,500 tonnes toxic rubbish</i>	
	<i>2.2.1.11 Unknown levels of toxic waste</i>	
	<i>2.2.1.12 >30 tonnes of radioactive waste</i>	
	2.2.1.13 > 5,000 tonnes of oil	

Table 1. (continued) Scientific theme in the Spar issue

Scientists' arguments (New Scientist, Nature) (continued)	Greenpeace's scientific arguments (continued)	Shell's scientific arguments (continued)
3.1 Environmental impact of deep-sea disposal	3.2 Environmental impact of deep-sea disposal	3.3 Environmental impact of deep-sea disposal
3.1.1 Unknown environmental impact	3.2.1 Unknown environmental impact	
<i>3.1.1.1 May contaminate food chain</i>	3.2.1.1 Unknown impact	
<i>3.1.1.2. May disturb accumulated waste</i>	3.2.1.2 Reason for unknown impact: unknown contents of Spar	
<i>3.1.1.3 Potential species destruction</i>	3.2.1.3 Reason for unknown impact: poor knowledge of deep sea ecosystem	
<i>3.1.1.4 Possible collision</i>		
<i>3.1.1.5 Non-comparable data</i>		
<i>3.1.1.6 Poor scientific assessment of environmental impact</i>		
	3.2.2 Large negative environmental impact	
	3.2.2.1 Deep-sea disposal damages environment	
	3.2.2.2 Shallow water disposal damages environment	
	3.2.3.3 Reason for damage: dangerous waste	
	<i>3.2.3.4 Reason for damage: pressurised ecosystem, danger to vessels, bioaccumulative waste.</i>	
3.1.2 Minimal negative environmental impact		3.3.1 Minimal negative environmental impact
3.1.2.1 Minimal damage to the marine ecosystem		3.3.1.1 Minimal damage to the marine ecosystem
3.1.2.2 Reason for minimal damage: natural sources of deep water pollution are worse		3.3.1.2 Reason for minimal damage: other sources of pollution are worse
3.1.2.3 Reason for minimal damage: localised pollution effects		3.3.1.3 Reason for minimal damage: localised effects
<i>3.1.2.4 Reason for minimal damage: short-term pollution effects</i>		3.3.1.4 Reason for minimal damage to marine ecosystem: removal of pollutants
<i>3.1.2.5 Reason for minimal damage: no useful living resources on deep sea floor</i>		<i>3.3.1.5 Reason for minimal damage: no useful living resources</i>
<i>3.1.2.6 Reason for minimal damage: no impact on biodiversity</i>		
3.1.3 Positive environmental impact		3.3.2 Positive environmental impact
3.1.3.1 Deep-sea disposal is ecologically friendly		3.3.2.1 Deep-sea disposal is the BPEO
<i>3.1.3.2 Deep-sea disposal is good for bacteria in deep sea</i>		3.3.2.2 Deep-sea disposal is ecologically friendly
4.1 Onshore disposal	4.2 Onshore disposal	4.3 Onshore disposal
4.1.1 Advocation of onshore disposal	4.2.1 Advocation of onshore disposal	4.3.1 Onshore disposal is difficult
4.1.1.1 Technically feasible	4.2.1.1 Technically feasible	4.3.1.1 Onshore disposal is risky
	4.2.1.2 Best environmental option	4.3.1.2 Practical problems getting ashore
	4.2.1.3 Safe	4.3.1.3 Lack of proper facilities
	4.2.1.4 Second best environmental option	

Table 2. Scientific theme in the Ogoniland issue

1. Scientists' arguments (New Scientist, Nature)	2. Greenpeace's scientific arguments	3. Shell's scientific arguments
1.1 Environmental impact of deep-sea disposal	1.2 Environmental impact of deep-sea disposal	1.3 Environmental impact of deep-sea disposal
1.1.1 Unknown environmental impact		1.3.1 Unknown environmental impact
1.1.1.1 Shell produces meaningless figures		1.3.1.1 Shell seeks to find out extent of environmental pollution
1.1.1.2 Lack of data		
1.1.2 Large environmental impact	1.2.1 Large environmental impact	
1.1.2.1 Environmental destruction in Niger Delta from oil companies	1.2.1.1 Large environmental destruction in Niger Delta from oil companies	
1.1.2.2 Environmental destruction in Niger Delta from Shell		
1.1.3 Small environmental impact		1.3.2 Small environmental impact
1.1.3.1 Small environmental destruction in Niger Delta from Shell		1.3.2.1 Factors other than oil industry cause most pollution
1.1.3.2 Shell acts to repair to environmental damage		

Table 3. Legal themes in the Spar issue

1. Legality of Greenpeace's actions	2. Legality of Shell's actions
1.1 Greenpeace acts legally	2.1 Shell acts legally
1.1.1 Greenpeace is non-violent	2.1.1 Shell uses legal methods to evict Greenpeace from Spar
1.1.2 <i>Greenpeace strategically uses its knowledge of the law</i>	2.1.2 Shell's disposal plans comply with UK legislation
1.1.3 <i>Greenpeace uses lobbying tactics</i>	2.1.2.1 <i>Scottish Office grants licence to dump</i>
1.1.4 Greenpeace uses legal channels	2.1.2.2 UK Government grants licence to dump
	2.1.2.3 <i>OSPAR decision to ban dumping is not legally binding in UK</i>
	2.1.2.4 Shell keeps within UK legal framework
1.2 Greenpeace acts illegally	2.2 Shell acts illegally
1.2.1 Illegal occupation	2.2.1 <i>Shell uses violence against Greenpeace activists.</i>
	2.2.2 <i>Shell contravenes international legislation/ conventions which oppose deep-sea disposal</i>

Table 4. Legal themes in the Ogoniland issue

1. Legality of Greenpeace's actions	2. Legality of Shell's actions
1.1 Greenpeace acts legally	2.1 Shell acts legally
1.1.1 Greenpeace is non-violent	2.1.1 Shell keeps within legal framework
	2.1.2 Shell supports legal process
1.2 Greenpeace acts illegally	2.2 Shell acts illegally
1.2.1 Violence	2.2.1 Shell bribes witnesses
1.2.2 Sabotage	2.2.2 Theft
	2.2.3 Violence

APPENDIX 5
DERIVATION OF MAIN THEME: BELIEF (ETHOS)

Italicised concepts are those which were promoted by Greenpeace or Shell but did not build the agenda of national television evening news (i.e. what was not said). Non-italicised concepts built the agenda of national television evening news (N.B. usually, not always, promoted by Greenpeace or Shell).

Table 1. Scientific beliefs in the Spar issue

Greenpeace's beliefs	Shell's beliefs
1.1 Theme: scientific beliefs	1. 2 Theme: scientific beliefs
1.1.1 Attitude towards risk	1.2.1 Attitude towards risk
1.1.1.1 Advocation of a cautious attitude towards risk	1.2.1.1 Advocation of a cautious attitude towards risk
1.1.1.1.1 Precautionary principle advocated directly	1.2.1.1.1 Precautionary principle advocated
1.1.1.1.2 Precautionary principle advocated indirectly	1.2.1.1.2 Existing legislation is responsible
1.1.1.1.3 Companies act now, think later	
1.1.1.1.4 Science does not offer clear-cut solutions (TV only)	
	1.2.1.2 Incautious attitude towards risk
	1.2.1.2.1 Assumption that hazardous waste is safe in the ocean
1.1.2 Attitude towards science & technology	1.2.2 Attitude towards science & technology
1.1.2.1 Progress through science & technology	1.2.2.1 Progress through science & technology
1.1.2.1.1 Science & technology offers solutions	1.2.2.1.1 Science & technology offers solutions
1.1.2.1.2 Economic progress through science & technology	1.2.2.1.2 Economic progress through science & technology
1.1.2.1.3 Potential economic progress through science & technology	

Table 2. Standard-setting beliefs in the Spar issue

Greenpeace's beliefs	Shell's beliefs
2.1 Theme: standard-setting beliefs	2.2 Theme: standard-setting beliefs
2.1.1 Legislative standard-setting	2.2.1 Legislative standard-setting
2.1.1.1 Need for legislation	
2.1.1.1.1 Harmonisation of legislation needed	
2.1.1.1.2 <i>Implementation of legislation needed</i>	
	2.2.1.1 No extra legislation needed
	2.2.1.1.1 Case-by-case basis suffices
	2.2.1.1.2 Existing legislation is responsible
	2.2.1.1.3 Polluter pays full cost unless it meets BPEO
	2.2.1.1.4 <i>International standards complied with</i>
2.1.2 Standards regarding corporate social responsibility	2.2.2 Standards regarding corporate social responsibility
2.1.2.1 Companies should have a high sense of social corporate responsibility	
2.1.2.1.1 Public want environmentally concerned companies (TV only)	
2.1.2.1.2 Social responsibility ignored	
2.1.2.1.3 Communication/ consultation with stakeholders necessary	
2.1.2.2 Companies have a high sense of social corporate responsibility	2.2.2.1 Companies have a high sense of social corporate responsibility
2.1.2.2.1 Shell is socially concerned	2.2.2.1.1 Shell is socially concerned
2.1.2.2.2 Consultation with stakeholders occurs	2.2.2.1.2 Consultation with stakeholders occurs
2.1.2.2.3 Morally redeemed behaviour	2.2.2.1.3 Shell is environmentally friendly

Table 3. Human-nature relationship beliefs in the Spar issue

Greenpeace's beliefs	Shell's beliefs
3.1 Theme: human-nature relationship	3.2 Theme: human-nature relationship
3.1.1 Prioritising of the environment	3.2.1 Prioritising of the environment
3.1.1.1 Environment is top priority	3.2.1.1 Environment is top priority
3.1.1.1.1 Risks are worth taking to protect environment	3.2.1.1.1 Concern to protect environment
3.1.1.1.2 Concern to protect environment	
3.1.1.1.3 Dumping is morally unacceptable	
	3.2.1.2 Environment is not top priority
	3.2.1.2.1 Factors in addition to the environment are important to consider
	3.2.1.2.2 Small environmental damage is acceptable
	3.2.1.2.3 Polluters' right to pollute (TV only)
	3.2.1.2.4 Waning public environmental concerns (TV only)
3.1.2 Extent of materialism	3.2.2 Extent of materialism
3.1.2.1 Anti-materialism	
3.1.2.1.1 Recycle	
3.1.2.2 Pro-materialism	3.2.2.1 Pro-materialism
3.1.2.2.1 Green consumerism	3.2.2.1.1 Economic growth is good
3.1.2.2.2 Economic growth is good	3.2.2.1.2 <i>Business values are best</i>
	3.2.2.1.3 <i>Technical solutions sought rather than value change</i>
	3.2.2.1.4 Resources are not scarce (TV only)

Table 4. Global inter-connectivity beliefs in the Spar issue

Greenpeace's beliefs	Shell's beliefs
4.1 Theme: global inter-connectivity	4.2 Theme: global inter-connectivity
4.1.1 Global commons	-
4.1.1.1 Seas are part of global commons	
4.1.2 Economic international interdependence	4.2.1 Economic international interdependence
4.1.2.1 <i>MNCs exploit different standards world-wide</i>	4.2.1.1 International liaison on business decision
4.2.1.2 International pressure/influences on Shell	4.2.1.2 International pressure/influences on Shell
4.1.3 Save planet Earth	4.2.2 Save planet Earth
4.1.3.1 Think globally, act locally	-

Table 5. Scientific beliefs in the Ogoniland issue

Greenpeace's beliefs	Shell's beliefs
5.1 Theme: scientific beliefs	5.2 Theme: scientific beliefs
5.1.1 Attitude towards risk	
5.1.1.1 Advocation of a cautious attitude towards risk	
5.1.1.1.1 Companies act now, think later	
5.1.2 Attitude towards science & technology	5.2.1 Attitude towards science & technology
5.1.2.1 Progress through science & technology	5.2.1.1 Progress through science & technology
5.1.2.1.1 Science & technology offers solutions	5.2.1.1.1 Environmental progress through science & technology
	5.2.1.1.2 Economic progress through science & technology

Table 6. Standard-setting beliefs in the Ogoniland issue

Greenpeace's beliefs	Shell's beliefs
6.1 Theme: standard-setting	6.2 Theme: standard-setting
6.1.1 Legislative standard-setting	6.2.1 Legislative standard-setting
6.1.1.1 Need for legislation	
6.1.1.1.1 Harmonisation of environmental legislation needed	
6.1.1.1.2 Harmonisation of human rights legislation needed	
6.1.1.1.3 Implementation of human rights legislation needed (TV only)	
	6.2.1.1 No extra legislation needed
	6.2.1.1.1 Shell does not interfere in legislation
	6.2.1.1.2 Existing legislation is responsible (TV only)
6.1.2 Standards regarding corporate social responsibility	6.2.2 Standards regarding corporate social responsibility
6.1.2.1 Companies should have a high sense of social corporate responsibility	
6.1.2.1.1 Social responsibility ignored	
	6.2.2.1 Companies have a high sense of social corporate responsibility
	6.2.2.1.1 Shell is socially concerned
	6.2.2.1.2 Consultation with stakeholders occurs
	6.2.2.1.3 Shell is environmentally friendly

Table 7. Human-nature relationship beliefs in the Ogoniland issue

Greenpeace's beliefs	Shell's beliefs
7.1 Theme: human-nature relationship	7.2 Theme: human-nature relationship
7.1.1 Prioritising of the environment	7.2.1 Prioritising of the environment
7.1.1.1 The environment is the top priority	
<i>7.1.1.1.1 Environment is/should be top priority</i>	
<i>7.1.1.1.2 Clean environment is a basic human right</i>	
<i>7.1.1.1.3 Concern to protect the environment (TV only)</i>	
	7.2.1.1 The environment is not the top priority
	<i>7.2.1.1.1 Small environmental damage is acceptable</i>
7.1.2 Extent of materialism	7.2.2 Extent of materialism
7.1.2.1 Pro-materialism	7.2.2.1 Pro-materialism
<i>7.1.2.1.1 Green consumerism</i>	<i>7.2.2.1.1 Economic growth is good</i>
<i>7.1.2.1.2 Ethical investment desirable</i>	

Table 8. Global inter-connectivity beliefs in the Ogoniland issue

Greenpeace's beliefs	Shell's beliefs
8.1 Theme: global inter-connectivity	8.2 Theme: global inter-connectivity
8.1.1 Economic international interdependence	8.2.1 Economic international interdependence
<i>8.1.1.1 External influences on MNCs</i>	<i>8.2.1.1 International repercussions of boycott/sanctions</i>
<i>8.1.1.2 International oil links</i>	
8.1.2 Save planet Earth	
<i>8.1.2.1 There is international pressure to protect human rights</i>	

APPENDIX 6

In the following tables the unit of counting is the concept/statement.

The key is as follows.

KEY

GP = Greenpeace

Int/quote/video = interviewed, quoted or filmed

Rep = reported

Table 1 Emotive themes/sub-themes promulgated in national television evening news by various actors in the Spar issue (30th April - October 11th 1995)

Themes/sub-themes	GP (Int./ quote/ video)	GP (Rep)	Shell (Int./ quote/ video)	Shell (rep)	UK Government (int/ quote)	UK Government (rep)	Other politicians (int/ quote)	Other politicians (rep)	Expert (int/ quote)	Expert (rep.)	Other pressure / interest groups	The public	Journ- alists	TOTAL
VILIFICATION														
Vilification of Greenpeace			2	2	1				1				3	9
Vilification of Shell	12	2			1	1	2		3		1		17	40
ENNOBLEMENT														
Laudability of Greenpeace	35	1									1		30	67
Laudability of Shell			1	3										4
TOTAL PRO-GREENPEACE	47	3	0	0	1	1	1	2	3	0	2	0	47	107
TOTAL PRO-SHELL	0	0	3	5	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	3	13
TOTAL	47	3	3	5	2	1	1	2	4	0	2	0	50	120

Table 2 Pro-Greenpeace rationalistic scientific themes/sub-themes promulgated in national television evening news by various actors in the Spar issue (30th April - 11th October 1995)

Themes/sub-themes	GP (Int./ quote/ video)	GP (rep)	Shell (Int./ quote/ video)	Shell (rep)	UK Government (int/ quote)	UK Government (rep)	Other politicians (int/ quote)	Other politicians (rep)	Expert (int/ quote)	Expert (rep)	Other pressure /interest groups	The public	Journ- alists	TOTAL
PRO- GREENPEACE WORLD VIEW:														
Deep-sea disposal sets precedent	1	1		1			3						1	7
Onshore disposal sets precedent	3	1					2						13	19
Spar is a pollutant	5	4					3	1	4	1			9	27
Large environmental impact	5	3					4		3				1	16
Unknown impact of sinking	2	1											1	4
Advocation of onshore disposal	2	1	1	4	1		2		1				6	18
TOTAL (PRO- GREENPEACE)	18	11	1	5	1	0	14	1	8	1	0	0	31	91

Table 3 Pro-Shell rationalistic scientific themes/ sub-themes promulgated in national television evening news by various actors in the Spar issue (30th April - 11th October 1995)

Themes/sub-themes	GP (Int./ quote/ video)	GP (Rep)	Shell (Int./ quote/ video)	Shell (rep)	UK Government (int/ quote)	UK Government (rep)	Other politicians (int/ quote)	Other politicians (rep)	Expert (int/ quote)	Expert (rep)	Other pressure / interest groups	The public	Journ- alists	TOTAL
PRO- SHELL WORLD VIEW:														
No precedent from sinking			1	1						1				3
No precedent from onshore disposal			1	5	2						1		2	11
Low toxicity			4	1					1				1	7
Small environmental impact				2					5	1				8
Sinking is BPEO			5	3	4				1		1		2	16
Sinking is ecologically friendly				4	3				1				3	12
Onshore disposal is difficult	1		2	3	2		1						5	14
TOTAL (PRO- SHELL)	1	0	13	19	11	1	1	0	8	2	2	0	13	71

Table 4 Rationalistic legal themes/sub-themes in national television evening news promulgated by various actors in the Spar issue (30th April - 11th October 1995)

Themes/sub-themes	GP (Int./ quote/ video)	GP (rep)	Shell (Int./ quote/ video)	Shell (rep)	UK Government (int/ quote)	UK Government (rep)	Other politicians (int/ quote)	Other politicians (rep)	Expert (int/ quote)	Expert (rep.)	Other pressure / interest groups	The public	Journ- alists	TOTAL
PRO- SHELL WORLD VIEW:														
Shell acts legally			1	1	1	3	1				1		1	9
Greenpeace acts illegally	1		1										6	8
TOTAL PRO-SHELL	1	0	2	1	1	3	1	0	0	0	1	0	7	17
PRO- GREENPEACE WORLD VIEW:														
Shell acts illegally														0
Greenpeace acts legally	1	3											1	5
TOTAL PRO- GREENPEACE	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	5
TOTAL	2	3	2	1	1	3	1	0	0	0	1	0	8	22

Table 5 Scientific belief themes/sub-themes in national television evening news promulgated by various actors in the Spar issue (30th April - 11th October 1995)

Themes/sub-themes	GP (Int./ quote/ video)	GP (Rep)	Shell (Int./ quote/ video)	Shell (rep)	UK Government (int/ quote)	UK Government (rep)	Other politicians (int/ quote)	Other politicians (rep)	Expert (int/ quote)	Expert (rep.)	Other pressure / interest groups	The public	Journalists	TOTAL
ATTITUDE TOWARDS RISK:														
Cautious	4	1							2				4	11
Incautious			3	3					5	1				12
ATTITUDE TOWARDS SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY:														
Progress through science & technology	1	1	2	6			1		1				17	29
No progress through science & technology														0
TOTAL	5	2	5	9	0	0	1	0	8	1	0	0	21	52

Table 6 Belief theme: Standard-setting themes/sub-themes promulgated in national television evening news by various actors regarding the Spar issue (30th April - 11th October 1995)

Themes/sub-themes	GP (Int./ quote/ video)	GP (Rep)	Shell (Int./ quote/ video)	Shell (rep)	UK Govern -ment (int/ quote)	UK Govern -ment (rep)	Other politicians (int/ quote)	Other politicians (rep)	Expert (int/ quote)	Expert (rep.)	Other pressure /interest groups	The public	Journ- alists	TOTAL
LEGISLATIVE STANDARD-SETTING:														
Need for legislation							3						2	5
No extra legislation needed			5	1	5				2		1		1	15
SUB-TOTAL	0	0	5	1	5	0	3	0	2	0	1	0	3	20
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY STANDARD-SETTING:														
Companies should have a high sense of corporate social responsibility	3				3	4	1		6				4	21
Companies do have a high sense of corporate social responsibility	4	2	4	5	1									16
SUB-TOTAL	7	2	4	5	4	4	1	0	6	0	0	0	4	37
TOTAL	7	2	9	6	9	4	4	0	8	0	1	0	7	57

Table 7 Belief themes/sub-themes: the human-nature relationship promulgated in national television evening news by various actors regarding the Spar issue (30th April - 11th October 1995)

Themes/sub-themes	GP (Int./ quote/ video)	GP (rep)	Shell (Int./ quote/ video)	Shell (rep)	UK Government (int/ quote)	UK Government (rep)	Other politicians (int/ quote)	Other politicians (rep)	Expert (int/ quote)	Expert (rep.)	Other pressure /interest groups	The public	Journ- alists	TOTAL
ECO-CENTRIC:														
Environment is top priority	15	9		2	3	1		1	3	1		1	5	41
Anti-materialisticness		1											2	3
ECO-CENTRIC TOTAL	15	10	0	2	3	1	0	1	3	1	0	1	7	44
TECHNO-CENTRIC:														
Environment is not top priority			4	2		2			2	1	1		4	20
Pro-materialisticness	9	3			1		6	2	1			2	7	31
TECHNO-CENTRIC TOTAL	9	3	4	2	5	2	6	2	3	1	1	2	11	51
HUMAN-NATURE TOTAL	24	13	4	4	8	3	6	3	6	2	1	3	18	95

Table 8 Belief theme/sub-themes: global interconnectivity promulgated in national television evening news by various actors regarding the Spar issue
 (30th April - 11th October 1995)

Themes/sub-themes	GP (Int./ quote/ video)	GP (rep)	Shell (Int./ quote/ video)	Shell (rep)	UK Government (int/ quote)	UK Government (rep)	Other politicians (int/ quote)	Other politicians (rep)	Expert (int/ quote)	Expert (rep)	Other pressure / interest groups	The public	Journ- alists	TOTAL
PRO-GREENPEACE WORLD-VIEW														
Principle of global commons	1								1					2
Save Planet Earth	16	2			5		13				2	8		46
Economic international interdependence	4	1							3				1	9
PRO-GREENPEACE SUB-TOTAL	21	3	0	0	0	0	5	13	4	0	2	8	1	57
PRO-SHELL WORLD-VIEW														
Economic international interdependence			9	2	1	3	2	1	1				1	20
TOTAL	21	3	9	2	1	3	7	14	5	0	2	8	2	77