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The English Aristocracy at War, 1272-1314

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By

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Acknowledgments

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Finally, to my mum, dad and sister, I can never express gratitude enough. It is to them that this thesis is dedicated, with all my love,

FOR MUM, DAD AND KAREN

David Simpkin

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The English Aristocracy at War, 1272-1314

In the closing decades of the thirteenth century, the king of England, Edward I, embarked upon a series of wars in Wales, France and Scotland that placed unprecedented demands on the community of the realm. Although the Crown's war aims varied depending on whether the campaigns were being fought within the British Isles or on the continent, one factor remained constant: the need to recruit hundreds and sometimes thousands of soldiers on an almost annual basis from among the landholding elites. It is the aim of this thesis to assess how the gentry and nobility responded to these demands; how they discharged their military obligations; and what their service patterns and military experiences can tell us about the strengths and weaknesses of the armies that were put into the field.

By using an innovative methodological approach established in recent decades by historians such as Philip Morgan, Andrew Ayton and Anne Curry, the thesis seeks to gain insights into the characteristics of the military community in its entirety. The individual soldier forms the main focus of enquiry throughout much of the discussion; and the frequency with which he gave military service, his connections to other members of the military elite, and, in the case of the king's chief commanders, the leadership duties that he performed, are each considered in detail. Nevertheless, the experiences of medieval combatants are best understood in the context of the local communities from which they were recruited and the retinues in which they served. Consequently, an attempt is also made to reassess the subject of military organisation under the first two Edwards by examining the composition and structure of these armies from the perspective of the soldiers and small units that comprised them.

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Abbreviations

Ann. Dunstaple	'Annales Prioratus de Dunstaplia (A.D. 1-1297), *Annales Monastici*, ed. H.R. Luard, 5 vols, Rolls Ser., xxxvi (London, 1864-9), iii.
Ann. Lond.	'Annales Londonienses', *Chronicles of the Reigns of Edward I and Edward II*, ed. W. Stubbs, 2 vols, Rolls Ser., lxxvi (London, 1882-3), i.
Ann. Paulini	'Annales Paulini', *Chronicles of the Reigns of Edward I and Edward II*, ed. W. Stubbs, 2 vols, Rolls Ser., lxxvi (London, 1882-3), i.
Ann. Waverley	'Annales Monasterii de Waverleia (A.D. 1-1291)', *Annales Monastici*, ed. H.R. Luard, 5 vols, Rolls Ser., xxxvi (London, 1864-9), ii.
Ann. Wigorn.	'Annales Prioratus de Wigornia (A.D. 1-1377), *Annales Monastici,* ed. H.R. Luard, 5 vols, Rolls Ser., xxxvi (London, 1864-9), iv.
Ann. Winton.	'Annales Monasterii de Wintonia, 519-1277', *Annales Monastici*, ed. H.R. Luard, 5 vols, Rolls Ser., xxxvi (London, 1864-9), ii.
BIHR	*Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*
BL	British Library
Bury St. Edmunds	*The Chronicle of Bury St. Edmunds, 1212-1301*, ed. A. Gransden (London, 1964).
Cal. Ch. Rolls	*Calendar of the Charter Rolls*, 6 vols (London, 1903-27).
CCW	*Calendar of Chancery Warrants, 1244-1326* (London, 1927).
CDS	*Calendar of Documents Relating to Scotland*, ed. J. Bain, 4 vols (Edinburgh, 1881-8); v, ed. G.G. Simpson and J.D. Galbraith (Edinburgh, 1986).
Chronica et Annales	*Willelmi Rishanger, quondam Monachi S. Albani, et quorundam Anonymorum, Chronica et Annales, Regnantibus Henrico Tertio et Edwardo Primo*, ed. H.T. Riley, Rolls Ser., xxviii 2 (London, 1865).
Chronica Majora	*Matthaei Parisiensis, Monachi Sancti Albani, Chronica Majora*, ed. H.R. Luard, 7 vols, Rolls Ser., lvii (London, 1872-83).
Complete Peerage	*The Complete Peerage*, by G.E. Cockayne, revised and edited by V. Gibbs, H.A. Doubleday, Lord Howard de Walden and G.H. White, 13 vols (London, 1910-59).
Cotton	*Bartholomaei de Cotton, Historia Anglicana (A.D. 449-1298)*, ed. H.R. Luard, Rolls Ser., xvi (London, 1859).
CPR	*Calendar of Patent Rolls*
CVCR	*Calendar of Various Chancery Rolls. Supplementary Close Rolls. Welsh Rolls. Scutage Rolls. (A.D. 1277-1326)* (London, 1912).
EHR	*English Historical Review*
Feudal Aids	*Inquisitions and Assessments Relating to Feudal Aids, 1284-1431*, 6 vols (London, 1899-1920).
Flores Historiarum	*Flores Historiarum*, ed. H.R. Luard, 3 vols, Rolls Ser., xcv (London, 1890).
Foedera	*Foedera, Conventiones, Litterae etc.*, ed. T. Rymer, revised edition by A. Clarke, F. Holbrooke and J. Caley, 4 vols in 7 parts (Record Commission, 1816-69).

Gough	*Scotland in 1298: Documents Relating to the Campaign of Edward I in that Year*, ed. H. Gough (London, 1888).
Guisborough	*The Chronicle of Walter of Guisborough*, Camden Society 3rd ser., lxxxix (1957).
IPM	*Calendar of Inquisitions Post Mortem and other Analogous Documents*, 23 vols (London, 1904-2004).
Lanercost	*Chronicon de Lanercost M.CC.I.-M.CCC.XLVI.*, ed. J. Stevenson (Edinburgh, 1839).
Langtoft	*Pierre de Langtoft, le règne d'Édouard Ier*, ed. J.C. Thiolier (Créteil, 1989).
Liber Quotidianus	*Liber Quotidianus Contrarotulatoris Garderobae, 1299-1300*, ed. J. Topham *et al.* (London, 1787).
List of MPs	*Return of the Name of Every Member of the Lower House of the Parliaments of England, Scotland and Ireland, 1213-1874* (London, 1878).
Melsa	*Chronica Monasterii de Melsa, a Fundatione usque ad Annum 1396, Auctore Thoma de Burton, Abbate. Accedit Continuatio ad Annum 1406 a Monacho quodam ipsius Domus*, ed. E.A. Bond, 3 vols, Rolls Ser., xliii (London, 1866-8).
Parl. Roll.	*The Parliament Rolls of Medieval England, 1275-1504*, ed. C. Given-Wilson *et al.* 16 vols (London, 2005).
PDS	*Documents and Records Illustrating the History of Scotland and the Transactions between the Crowns of Scotland and England*, ed. F. Palgrave (London, 1837).
PW	*Parliamentary Writs and Writs of Military Summons*, ed. F. Palgrave, 2 vols in 4 parts (London, 1827-34).
RG	*Rôles Gascons 1242-1307*, ed. F. Michel, C. Bemont and Y. Renouard, 5 vols (Paris, 1885-1962).
Rotuli Scotiae	*Rotuli Scotiae in Turri Londinensi et in Domo Capitulari Westmonasteriensi asservati*, ed. D. MacPherson, J. Caley, W. Illingworth and T.H. Horne, 2 vols (Record Commission, 1814-19).
Scalacronica	Sir Thomas Gray: *Scalacronica, 1272-1363*, ed. A. King, Surtees Society, ccix (2005).
SHR	*Scottish Historical Review*
Stevenson	*Documents Illustrative of the History of Scotland from the Death of King Alexander the Third to the Accession of Robert Bruce MCCLXXXVI-MCCCVI*, ed. J. Stevenson, 2 vols (Edinburgh, 1870).
TRHS	*Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*
Trivet	*Nicholai Triveti, de Ordine Frat. Praedicatorum, Annales (A.D. M.C.XXXVI.-M.CCC.VII.)*, ed. T. Hog, English Historical Society (London, 1845).
Trokelowe	*Johannis de Trokelowe et Henrici de Blaneforde, Monachorum S. Albani, necnon quorundam Anonymorum, Chronica et Annales*, ed. H.T. Riley, Rolls Ser., xxviii 3 (London, 1866).
WHR	*Welsh History Review*
Wykes	'Chronicon vulgo dictum Chronicon Thomae Wykes, 1066-1289', *Annales Monastici*, ed. H.R. Luard, 5 vols, Rolls Ser., xxxvi (London, 1864-9), iv.

Documents cited by class number alone are taken from the National Archives, Kew

Introduction

War, conquest and overreaching ambition provide the connecting thread to the history of the British Isles between 1272 and the battle of Bannockburn. Therefore, it is no surprise to find that those decades have been well served by generations of military historians. J.E. Morris' history of *The Welsh Wars of Edward I*, published for the first time over a century ago and since reprinted for a modern readership, set new standards of scholarship and source analysis when it was written and has remained the seminal book on the subject to this day.[1] More recently, work by Michael Prestwich on the financing and organisation of the wars of Edward I has placed the military developments of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries into their political, logistical and administrative contexts.[2] With these two historians as the main standard-bearers, supported by the works of various others on subjects such as military obligation and garrison service,[3] it is evident, to quote the words of a scholar of a slightly earlier period, that 'the organisation of military service in the later thirteenth century…has received a lot of attention'.[4] The appeal of the wars of Edward I and his son to the historian lies not only in the scale of the campaigns that were launched, but also in the extensive trail of documents that they left in their wake. Consequently, a great deal is now known about the sizes of the armies that were put into the field; the conduct of the campaigns; the means by which armies were supplied with money and food; and the impact of the wars on English society. In contrast, the role of the aristocracy in its widest sense and their contribution to the war effort are less perfectly understood. Over the last twenty years or so, studies on genteel military service have become an established feature of historical writing on the later Middle Ages. They have contributed significantly to our understanding of the dynamics of regional military communities, and of the composition of armies raised at various stages of the Hundred Years War.[5] In

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[1] J.E. Morris, *The Welsh Wars of Edward I* (Oxford, 1901); reprinted with new introduction by M. Prestwich and R.F. Walker (Stroud, 1996).

[2] M. Prestwich, *War, Politics and Finance under Edward I* (London, 1972).

[3] E.g. M.R. Powicke, *Military Obligation in Medieval England: A Study in Liberty and Duty* (Oxford, 1962), chapters 6-8; F.J. Watson, *Under the Hammer: Edward I and Scotland, 1286-1306* (East Linton, 1998).

[4] J.S. Critchley, 'Summonses to Military Service early in the Reign of Henry III', *EHR*, lxxxvi (1971), 79.

[5] E.g. P. Morgan, *War and Society in Medieval Cheshire, 1277-1403* (Manchester, 1987); A. Ayton, *Knights and Warhorses: Military Service and the English Aristocracy under Edward III* (Woodbridge, 1994); A. King, 'War, Politics and Landed Society in Northumberland, *c.*1296-*c.*1408', University of Durham D.Phil. thesis, 2001; A.R. Bell, *War and the Soldier in the Fourteenth Century* (Woodbridge, 2004); A. Ayton, 'The English Army at Crécy', *The Battle of Crécy, 1346*, A. Ayton and P. Preston (Woodbridge, 2005), 159-251; A. Curry, *Agincourt: A New History* (Stroud, 2005).

this respect, the hosts of Edward I and Edward II have been less well served: much remains to be discovered about the ancestors of the men who later fought so courageously on the battlefields of France. The aim of this study is to redress this imbalance, and to place alongside the traditional images of the wars of conquest. the majestic castles of Caernarfon, Conwy, Harlech and Beaumaris, that of the genteel warrior whose deeds with sword in hand made such grandiose building schemes possible.

The personalities of the kings who governed England during these turbulent years could not have been more different. Edward I, we have been assured by his biographer, 'was a formidable king; his reign, with both its successes and its disappointments, a great one'.[6] Upon returning from crusade for his coronation in 1274, Edward quickly put behind him the mischievous tendencies of his youth and embarked upon his duties with relish. The crowning glory of his reign, the conquest of Wales, was completed and then consolidated by 1295. Furthermore, just two years before his death, in 1307, it seemed that the northern kingdom of Scotland, too, had been brought under his imperial sway. Two factors, however, determined that Edward's dream of uniting Britain under one ruler would not be realised. The rebellion in 1306 of Robert Bruce, who was enthroned at Scone in March of that year, ensured the failure of the political 'settlement' of 1305 to bring about a lasting peace.[7] To compound this problem, the death (after a lingering illness) of Edward the following year brought to the throne his son, Edward of Caernarfon, a man universally judged to have been unfit to rule. Unlike his father, Edward II would prove to be 'a procrastinator; someone who shunned unpleasant duties whether administrative, political or military'.[8] This new king was no idler: he launched himself into campaigns north of the border with only slightly less frequency than his father had done. Yet, within a few years of assuming the regalia of kingship, he had divided the realm and surrendered the initiative in the north to the Scots. At Bannockburn in 1314, on the approach to Stirling castle where a strong Scottish army had gathered to prevent the relief of that besieged fortress, all was lost within two bloody days of battle. Whilst the English continued to wage war with the Scots for many years to come, the strong kingship of Robert Bruce, combined with the political instability south of the border and the outbreak of war with France in 1337, meant that there would be no unification of the two crowns under one king. For the

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[6] M. Prestwich, *Edward I* (London, 1988), 567.

[7] Cf. *Anglo-Scottish Relations 1174-1328: Some Selected Documents*, ed. E.L.G. Stones (Oxford, 1965), no. 33.

[8] R.M. Haines, *King Edward II: Edward of Caernarfon, His Life, His Reign, and Its Aftermath, 1284-1330* (Montreal, 2003), 333.

remainder of the Middle Ages, the energies of the kings of England would be consumed, primarily, on the continent.

The wars with Wales and Scotland, along with the campaigns that were conducted against Philip IV of France over the disputed territory of Gascony between 1294 and 1298, took place against a shifting social, political and economic background. Despite this, and whoever happened to be governing the country at any particular moment in time, one factor remained constant: the need of the kings of England to ensure a constant supply of manpower from the manors and vills that dotted the realm so as to pursue their ambitious and unsparing military objectives. From the mid-1290s, when expeditions were launched with great regularity and sometimes against more than one rival at the same time, this need was felt with added urgency. Between 1294, when war broke out in Wales and France almost simultaneously, and 1314, hardly a year passed unless the landholders and sub-tenants of the shires were called upon to man the king's armies. These wars were much more than petty disputes between rival kings and their immediate entourages. On the contrary, they saw the weight of the landholding communities of the competing realms pressed into the struggle on an unprecedented scale. As such, there is a real need to know more about how the aristocracy responded to these pressures and how, as individuals and as members of families, communities, and localities, they met and discharged their military obligations. Who were these men? How often did they serve in the king's armies? What were their relationships with other warriors who fought in the royal hosts? Indeed, how might we use our knowledge of these individuals and their careers to enhance our understanding of the forces that were put into the field? This study seeks to answer these questions through an analysis of the records for military service that were created and preserved during the course of these wars, and which name a large proportion of the combatants.

No account of the wars of conquest would be complete without a thorough examination of the role played by the landholding elites and their families. Despite the debate currently being waged as to the relative contributions of cavalry and infantry forces to the conduct of medieval warfare when viewed over the *longue durée*,[9] there can be no denying that noble and genteel warriors were the soldiers of choice within medieval English armies. Aristocratic leadership in war, however defined, was one of the constant factors throughout the Middle Ages and beyond. Matthew Strickland's observation on the Anglo-Norman era, when the aristocracy was 'defined first and

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[9] Cf. B.S. Bachrach, 'Medieval Military Historiography', *Companion to Historiography*, ed. M. Bentley (London, 1997), 203-20.

foremost by its military function', may be applied equally well to the Angevin, Plantagenet, Lancastrian and Yorkist epochs of English history.[10] The rise of contract armies during the course of the fourteenth century did not alter the superior role occupied by the social elite, and there is undoubtedly a great deal of truth in the assertion that 'for better or worse, aristocratic leadership carried potent associations with sheer force, on or off the field of battle'.[11] Over the years, a number of explanations have been put forward as to why the aristocracy were so dominant within the sphere of medieval warfare. The most common explanation is that the fall of the Roman Empire created a vacuum of public authority which 'left governance, such as it was, to rural warrior chieftains and their followers'. This 'class' of men then went on to dominate society's resources, as well as the way that it used those resources to conduct warfare.[12] Consequently, 'under the aristocratic-feudal model, civilian and military elites were socially and functionally integrated', and 'a narrow base of recruitment for both elites and a relatively monolithic power structure provided the civilian elite with a comprehensive basis for political control of the military'.[13] The dual nature of this dominance was well expressed during the reigns of Edward I and his son when the 'peerage', the leading landholders who received individual summonses to attend parliament, were also the men who commanded the largest retinues when the king's armies were gathered.

At the closing decades of the thirteenth century, the aristocracy retained their position as the natural military and political leaders of English society. Around the same time, the social elite was undergoing a process of diversification and stratification which led gradually to the emergence of a new rank of men among the lower rungs of the aristocracy, known to history as the gentry. Whether or not the gentry had fully formed by the reign of Edward I, or even by the end of it, remains open to question: Peter Coss has recently argued that the gentry did not exist as a distinct social order until later in the fourteenth century. Even use of the term 'proto-gentry', he has suggested, may be unwise for the period around 1300.[14] Despite Coss' caution on this point, there is some room for flexibility. David Crouch, for one, has employed 'gentry' as a term of

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[10] M. Strickland, ed. *Anglo-Norman Warfare: Studies in Late Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-Norman Military Organization and Warfare* (Woodbridge, 1992), ix.
[11] J. Powis, *Aristocracy* (Oxford, 1984), 44.
[12] S. Morillo, 'The "Age of Cavalry" Revisited', *The Circle of War in the Middle Ages: Essays on Medieval Military and Naval History*, ed. D.J. Kagay and L.J.A. Villalon (Woodbridge, 1999), 53.
[13] M. Janowitz, 'Military Organization', *Handbook of Military Institutions*, ed. R.W. Little (Beverley Hills, CA, 1971), 24.
[14] P. Coss, *The Origins of the English Gentry* (Cambridge, 2003), 161-4.

convenience to denote the lesser knights of the twelfth century.[15] However we choose to describe them, whether 'gentry', 'knightly class' or whatever, the point of greatest importance from a military perspective is that these 'middling' men were being recruited in increasing numbers during the reign of Edward I to serve in the king's armies. The wars of Edward I and his son, in Wales between 1277 and 1295, on the continent from 1294 to 1298, and in Scotland from 1296 to Bannockburn and beyond, placed new and intense demands on the landholders of England and their families. In such circumstances, it was not enough to rely on the leading nobles, bannerets and knights alone. Instead, the Crown came to call increasingly heavily upon the services of the 'county' knights and sergeants, estate-holders of relatively modest wealth and status and their often landless relatives. During the reign of Edward I, soldiering once again became a viable career option for men of gentle blood, including those at the lower end of the scale.[16] Whether all of these individuals, squires, sergeants and all, should strictly be described as members of the aristocracy during this period is open to debate. What is clear is that when the armies of Edward I and his son were raised, such men-at-arms served under the leading earls and bannerets in the retinues of the social elite. In contrast, their participation in the wars of Henry III's reign would appear to have been minimal, with relatively few opportunities available for military adventure. Owing to the great scale of the wars of Edward I and, just as importantly, the greater administrative capacity of the English state which produced and preserved the records relating to military service, the late thirteenth century opens up new possibilities to the military historian. Moreover, it does so at a time when English armies still bore many of the imprints of those of an earlier period, such as the traditional feudal levy and the recruitment of large numbers of mounted warriors not serving for Crown pay.

That administrative records survive in abundance from Edward I's reign is important, for it is only from then onwards that a detailed investigation into the composition of the military community can be carried out. Any glance through the catalogues listing the military records of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries reveals a notable difference in the scale of documentary survival between the reigns of Henry III and his successor. Edward's expeditions, which grew in intensity and regularity as the reign progressed, were managed and administered by the king's household officials whose lengthy accounts enable us to trace the contours of genteel military service in some detail. The greater administrative efficiency of these years facilitated an increase

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[15] D. Crouch, *The Image of Aristocracy in Britain, 1000-1300* (London, 1992), 27.
[16] M.J. Bennett, 'Careerism in Late Medieval England', *People, Politics and Community in the Later Middle Ages*, ed. J. Rosenthal and C. Richmond (Gloucester, 1987), 21.

in the scale of war, which in turn led to further progress in government.[17] Indeed, 'the English royal administrative system was, at the end of the thirteenth century, precociously developed by contemporary European standards'.[18] The penetrative nature of the Edwardian government, analysed by M.T. Clanchy in his celebrated study *From Memory to Written Record*, enabled contemporary royal officials to keep track of individuals down to the village level.[19] More importantly for our purposes, it enables us, more than for previous reigns, to trace warriors of less elevated social origins, albeit from among the landed elites. This enquiry therefore seeks to trace the military careers not only of men like Simon de Montacute, a leading banneret from Somerset whose years of active service match almost exactly with the period under investigation, but also of more obscure individuals drawn from the ranks of thousands of lesser knights and sergeants.[20] This means soldiers like the Cornish knight Roland de Coykin, a regular companion of Elias d'Aubeny during the later Welsh and early Scottish wars;[21] the Yorkshireman Richard de Thurston, a frequent follower of Henry de Percy;[22] and the altogether more obscure sergeant Luke de Hercy, who served in the garrisons of north Wales in 1295 before being drawn from Worcestershire for service in Flanders two years later.[23] Individuals such as these formed the backbone of the expeditionary forces and garrisons of Edward I and Edward II, and it is therefore only right that they should be allowed their place in the history of these wars.

Reconstruction of the careers of so many soldiers depends upon the successful linkage of thousands of names to the men-at-arms who bore them. Fortunately, the size of the landholding pool within Edwardian England was not so great as to preclude a certain familiarity with most of these men, particularly those who held knightly rank. In all probability there were not many more than a thousand knights within England by the time that Edward II came to the throne. Nevertheless, in attempting to trace the service records of individuals who lived 700 years ago, one inevitably encounters a number of source-based and methodological difficulties along the way. Not least of these is the tendency of many retinue leaders and their men-at-arms to give service during these

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[17] R. Frame, *The Political Development of the British Isles 1100-1400* (Oxford, 1990), 144.
[18] M. Keen, *England in the Later Middle Ages*, 2nd edition (London, 2003), 2.
[19] M.T. Clanchy, *From Memory to Written Record: England 1066-1307* (London, 1979), 31-2.
[20] Montacute appears to have begun his military service in the first Welsh war when he proffered his feudal service as a sergeant (*PW*, i, 208) and went on to serve as a knight in Wales in 1282 (E 101/4/1, m. 1), Gascony in 1294 and 1297 (*RG*, iii, 110, 350), and Scotland in 1298 (C 67/13, m. 6), 1300 (E 101/8/23, m. 6), 1306 (C 67/16, m. 10), 1307 (*CCW*, 259) and 1310 (E 101/374/5, f. 77r). He died in 1316.
[21] C 67/10, m. 7; C 67/11, m. 6; C 67/13, m. 2; *PDS*, 218. A man of that name had also been with Philip Daubeny in west Wales during the war of 1282-3; C 47/2/4, m. 10.
[22] C 67/10, m. 6; *Rotuli Scotiae*, i, 32, 42; C 67/15, m. 7.
[23] E 101/5/18, m. 1; BL, Add. MS 7965, f. 73v.

years without Crown pay. This means that unless they took out letters of protection or attorney, or received respites of debts, pleas or fines, they do not appear in the military sources. The incompleteness of the records for military service therefore poses a greater problem during these four decades than for later reigns when all men-at-arms received Crown pay. Even if the personnel of the armies could be recovered in their entirety, there would still be limits to what nominal record linkage could tell us about the genteel soldiers within Edwardian hosts. As Nigel Saul has noted, 'the details of office-holding and military service that can be gleaned in relative abundance from the public records tell us much about their public careers but little about their private lives'.[24] Put another way, 'the very many people whom the historian encounters in his researches are, as a rule, knowable by their externals only – age, sex, habitation, occupation. We have a massive collection of passport descriptions without even passport photographs'.[25] Nevertheless, whilst the motives that drove members of the gentry to war are usually difficult to discern, the many letters and petitions that have survived from this period sometimes shed light on the private concerns of Edwardian men-at-arms and their attitudes towards war. A letter from Richard de Baskerville to the king's council in the spring of 1298, for example, shows that he wished to be respited from military service in that year because of his financial difficulties and the problems that he faced in finding men to go with him to Scotland.[26] Baskerville had fought in Wales under the earl of Hereford just three years previously and later took out a letter of protection for the Scottish campaign of 1301.[27] His concerns in 1298 would, therefore, appear to have been genuine. It is likely that there were many more men like him who were willing to serve in the king's armies, but who simply could not afford to do so.

Perhaps a greater problem than the lack of service data on some men-at-arms is that posed by the recurrence, within the military sources, of a small number of very popular forenames. As P.M. Stell discovered in his analysis of the forenames used by landholders in Yorkshire during the reign of Edward I, almost half the men of the county possessed one of the four most favoured names of William, John, Robert and Thomas.[28] A similar phenomenon has been observed by Richard Gorski in his study of

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[24] N. Saul, 'A "Rising" Lord and a "Declining" Esquire: Sir Thomas de Berkeley III and Geoffrey Gascelyn of Sheldon', *BIHR*, lxi (1988), 345.
[25] G.R. Elton, *England, 1200-1640* (London, 1969), 243.
[26] SC 1/26, no. 74.
[27] C 67/10, m. 3; C 67/14, m. 6.
[28] P.M. Stell, 'Forenames in Thirteenth- and Fourteenth-Century Yorkshire: A Study Based on a Biographical Database Generated by Computer', *Medieval Prosopography*, xx (1999), 118-21.

local administrative personnel in fourteenth-century England.[29] This can lead to major identification problems in those instances when a common forename is twinned with a common surname, as in the case of John de Neville. At least three men of that name appear in the military sources between 1277 and 1314: a John de Neville of Snarford, a John de Neville of Stoke, and a John de Neville of Grimsthorpe. This is without the various additional instances when men of that name are listed in the military records but are not accorded any place of habitat.[30] Other, similar examples abound. Gorski's conclusion, that 'if the historian's aim is to produce valid conclusions based on the most accurate set of data possible, then the priority must be to minimise these errors rather than to seek in vain for a panacea for their complete elimination', sounds like shrewd advice.[31] Whilst bearing in mind the need for caution, the favourable survival of horse inventories, pay accounts and related documents from the reigns of Edward I and his son, combined with the additional reference works (albeit sometimes flawed) of men like Sir Francis Palgrave, Charles Moor and Gerard Brault, provide an ideal opportunity for further investigation.[32] The scope and composition of English landholding society in this era are now reasonably well defined, at least for those wealthy and important enough to possess a coat of arms. Even lesser men, when viewed in the context of the retinues in which they served and the counties from which they were summoned, can usually be identified with some precision.

It is, in fact, one of the aims of this study to show that prosopography can tell us much more than the lengths of soldiers' careers and the spheres of war in which they fought, valid as those fields of research are. Nominal record linkage also sheds much light on the composition of the retinues and of the armies at large. That medieval armies were very different from modern armies is hardly to be denied, but one unfortunate consequence of this distinction is that characterisations of these earlier forces have generally been far from favourable. Michael Wolfe recently referred to medieval armies as 'notoriously motley agglomerations of knightly vassals, hired mercenaries, militia auxiliaries, and all manner of irregular contingents often hastily thrown together for a

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[29] R. Gorski, 'A Methodological Holy Grail: Nominal Record Linkage in a Medieval Context', *Medieval Prosopography*, xvii (1996), 158.

[30] A John de Neville of Snarford was retained as a man-at-arms from Lincolnshire in 1297 (C 47/2/16, m. 6), a John de Neville of Stoke served in Scotland in 1310 (C 71/3, m. 3), and a John de Neville of Grimsthorpe was distrained to knighthood in Lincolnshire in 1312, having previously been summoned to Berwick in 1301 (*PW*, i, 356; C 47/1/7, m. 15).

[31] Gorski, 'Methodological Holy Grail', 165.

[32] *Parliamentary Writs and Writs of Military Summons*, ed. F. Palgrave, 2 vols in 4 parts (London, 1827-34); *Knights of Edward I*, ed. C. Moor, 5 vols, Harleian Society, lxxx-lxxxiv (1929-32); *Aspilogia III: Rolls of Arms, Edward I (1272-1307)*, ed. G.J. Brault, 2 vols (Woodbridge, 1997).

season's campaigns'.[33] As they were not standing armies, Edwardian hosts and other forces of the later Middle Ages are generally believed to have been inferior to those of a later epoch. However, the work of J.F. Verbruggen and others should long ago have rendered such myths about the poor quality of medieval armies redundant.[34] The key to understanding these hosts, including those raised by Edward I and his son, lies in the observation that 'military organisation reflects the social structure and political and cultural values of each particular environment'.[35] In other words, the organisational cohesion within medieval armies was provided by the small groups and units that combined at the muster; that is, the retinues brought to war by their military leaders and normally consisting of their friends, relatives, tenants and landed neighbours. Studies on the forces raised by the Italian city-states during the thirteenth century and on French armies during the early stages of the Hundred Years War have indicated that such socio-military units held the key to the organisation of armies in those parts of Europe.[36] It remains to be seen how far local recruitment networks and small-group structures obtained within the armies of the first two Edwards, and what effect they had on the way that these forces functioned when on campaign. What is certain is that a fuller understanding of these hosts cannot be arrived at until we first know more about the soldiers who served in them.

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[33] M. Wolfe, 'New Perspectives on Medieval Siege Warfare: An Introduction', *The Medieval City under Siege*, ed. I.A. Corfis and M. Wolfe (Woodbridge, 1995), 12.
[34] J.F. Verbruggen, *The Art of Warfare in Western Europe during the Middle Ages: From the Eighth Century to 1340*, 2nd edition (Woodbridge, 1997).
[35] Janowitz, 'Military Organization', 13.
[36] J. Heers, *Family Clans in the Middle Ages: A Study of Political and Social Structures in Urban Areas* (Oxford, 1977), 169-70; P. Contamine, 'Batailles, Bannières, Compagnies: Aspects de l'Organisation Militaire Française Pendant la Première Partie de la Guerre de Cent Ans', *Les Cahiers Vernonnais* (1964), 24-5.

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Mobilisation

In medieval England, the beginning of a new reign often furnished the occasion for a shift in the direction and fortunes of the realm; and the events following upon the death of King Henry III in 1272 were certainly a case in point. The accession of Henry's son, Edward I, sparked an era of conflict, both within the British Isles and in France, on a scale that had never previously been witnessed during the Middle Ages. For T.F. Tout, writing shortly after the defeat of Kaiser Wilhelm II's armies in the Great European War, the parallel with the increased military demands of his own day seemed striking. 'The magnitude of the military efforts of Edward I', he observed, 'as far transcended those of his predecessors as the war which has laid low German imperialism transcended the Napoleonic wars, or the Napoleonic wars the war of the Spanish Succession'.[1] The comparison seems all the more appropriate when we consider that both the Great War and the Napoleonic wars necessitated the extension of the obligation to military service to new social groups and classes. By stretching his manpower reserves to their limit through his wars in Wales, France and Scotland, Edward ensured that the landholding elites of late thirteenth and early fourteenth-century England were engaged in the martial calling to an extent that could not have been foreseen during the reign of his father. The demands placed on the gentry and nobility were particularly great from the mid-1290s when the confiscation of Gascony by Philip IV, together with the deterioration of relations with the Scots, posed new threats to the Edwardian polity. During these years the capacity of the medieval kingdoms to wage war reached new heights, leading to a rapid increase in the number of men regularly engaged in military activities.[2] Contemporaries were well aware of the new departure that these campaigns marked in the military affairs of the realm. Above all, however, it was the steadfastness of Edward I in the face of such adversity that aroused their admiration.[3] No prince, it was noted, had encountered so much trouble and strife as had 'sire Edward' during his

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[1] T.F. Tout, *Chapters in the Administrative History of Mediaeval England, The Wardrobe, the Chamber and the Small Seals*, 6 vols (Manchester, 1920-33), ii, 143.
[2] R.W. Kaeuper, *War, Justice and Public Order: England and France in the Later Middle Ages* (Oxford, 1988), 389.
[3] *Bury St. Edmunds*, 133.

time on the throne, and for many writers the king simultaneously personified the war effort and was the moving figure behind its most pivotal events.[4]

The tendency of medieval commentators to view warfare as the preserve of the Crown is understandable given the hierarchical bent of that society. Nevertheless. Edward could not have succeeded in the conquest of Wales. or in the near-conquest of Scotland, had he not been supported by a willing and bellicose aristocracy. His success, therefore, lay not only in his castle-building projects in Wales, or his victory in battle at Falkirk, but in his ability to engage the energy and enthusiasm of the social elite for his ambitious campaigns. Edward's achievements in this respect have not been overlooked in the historiography of the reign. It has been customary when discussing his wars to draw contrasts with the far more modest ambitions that had characterised the fifty-six year rule of his father, Henry III. During that long period only twenty years were affected by war, including six spells of war on the continent, five in Wales, and two on the Scottish border.[5] Still more indicative of the reduction in military activity during the middle third of the century was the absence of any royal expeditions against an external enemy between 1257 and the first Welsh war twenty years later. If it had not been for the Barons' Wars of 1264-5, or the Lord Edward's crusade to the Holy Land from 1270-2, the landholders of medieval England would not have taken up arms for nearly twenty years. Furthermore, the number of knights involved in the civil war does not appear to have been great.[6] The most formidable army that Henry was able to raise during his reign was for the Breton expedition of 1230 when he had put some 548 knights into the field. Subsequently, his reign witnessed a gradual demilitarisation among the gentry and nobility.[7] For Michael Prestwich, the peace agreement with Louis IX in 1259 marked an important stage in the retreat of the Crown from its military commitments; the changing of the seal at that time was particularly significant. 'Whereas the king had been depicted on the old one bearing a sword, on the new he carried a sceptre'.[8]

It was not only the infrequency of Henry's wars, but also their unimpressive scale, which meant that Edward had much work to do when he came to the throne. The forces that Henry managed to muster, both overseas and within Britain, do not seem to have been particularly large. One reason for this was that whilst Edward sought to

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[4] *Langtoft*, 229.
[5] P. Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages* (Oxford, 1984), 65.
[6] Cf. P. Coss, *The Knight in Medieval England, 1000-1400* (Stroud, 1993), 70.
[7] R.F. Walker, 'The Anglo-Welsh Wars, 1217-1267', University of Oxford D.Phil. thesis, 1954, 48. On the decline in the number of knights, see N. Denholm-Young, 'Feudal Society in the Thirteenth Century: The Knights', *Collected Papers of N. Denholm-Young* (Cardiff, 1969), 84-5.
[8] Prestwich, *War, Politics and Finance*, 14.

conquer new territories. Welsh campaigns under his father 'were more often punitive, or attempts to establish secure footholds by constructing yet more castles'.[9] Distinctions between the armies of the mid- and late thirteenth centuries should not be exaggerated, for Henry sometimes put into the field forces which seem to have equalled in number those for Edward's more modest campaigns.[10] On the other hand, it is generally agreed that Henry failed to draw on as wide a cross section of English landholding society for his wars as did his son. Whilst the household force of Henry III was strong, he does not appear to have exploited the military potential that lay dormant in the shires to any great extent. In his perceptive study of the formation of the gentry, Philip Morgan saw the reign of Henry III as a time when the lesser landholders occupied their time primarily in non-military pursuits. 'There was simply not enough actual experience of arms to create a class of soldier careerists such as that which fuelled the gentry in the fourteenth century'.[11] For Andrew Ayton, 'that experience was to be gained during the reign of Edward I, whose wars in Wales, France and Scotland provided plentiful opportunities for a real military role'.[12] Looking back from the reign of Edward III, it is evident that the years between 1272 and 1327 represented the stage of adolescent immaturity for the gentry as a military order. By the time of the French wars of Edward I's grandson, the seeds sown during the 1280s and 1290s, when the Crown attempted to mobilise the gentry on a grand scale for the first time, had begun to bear fruit. Yet when Edward I came to the throne in 1272, he could not have known that the glories of Falkirk, Crécy and Poitiers lay ahead. Unlike his grandson and the Black Prince, Edward was not able to draw upon a broad range of military experience among his leading subjects. J.E. Morris was undoubtedly right when he suggested that Edward 'was teaching the art of war to poor material'.[13] Indeed the relative scarcity of experienced warriors in the armies of his early years meant that Edward was forced to act with promethean ingenuity, forging a military community out of a realm of estate dwellers.

To do this, Edward acted with thoroughness and innovation, extending and adding to the recruitment methods that had been established by his father. The main developments in military obligation during his reign have been considered by Michael

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[9] J.S. Critchley, 'Military Organisation in England, 1154-1254', University of Nottingham D.Phil. thesis, 1968, 173.
[10] For some comparisons, see Walker, 'The Anglo-Welsh Wars', 510.
[11] P. Morgan, 'Making the English Gentry', *Thirteenth Century England V*, ed. P.R. Coss and S.D. Lloyd (Woodbridge, 1995), 26.
[12] A. Ayton, 'Sir Thomas Ughtred and the Edwardian Military Revolution', *The Age of Edward III*, ed. J.S. Bothwell (Woodbridge, 2001), 112.
[13] Morris, *Welsh Wars*, 30.

Powicke and can be broken down into three stages.[14] During his early years on the throne, Edward continued with the policy of distraint to knighthood: the process by which landholders of specified landed wealth were forced to become knights, or pay fines for respites or exemptions. Twenty-six such writs were issued during the reign of Henry III, the first in 1224. Those of the later part of that king's rule were possibly sent out with financial rather than military aims in mind.[15] Under Edward I, however, distraint to knighthood seems to have been employed primarily as a way of increasing the pool of military reserves within England. Three national writs of distraint were issued during the first half of Edward's reign, in 1278, 1285 and 1292. Later, around the time of Bannockburn, these writs were reintroduced, with Edward II ordering the distraint of the forty- and fifty-librate holders in 1312 and 1316. The Crown's need for greater manpower reserves was particularly urgent during the years of emergency from the mid-1290s. At that stage, Edward I deviated from the policies of his father and began to seek more innovative methods of recruitment. In 1295, 1300 and 1301 he summoned forty-librate holders throughout the counties of England, whether they were knights or not. For the expedition to Flanders in 1297, he took this a step further by lowering the income bracket to include all men with twenty pounds of landed wealth a year. Finally, in his later years, Edward returned to his earlier preoccupation with knighthood. He invited all men who wished to receive *arma militaria* to London in 1306 to be knighted alongside his son, then adopted a similar measure later the same year with plans for a mass knighting ceremony at Carlisle.

Although the general outline of Edward's mobilisation policies is well known, the aristocratic response to these measures remains a more shadowy subject. It is far from clear whether Edward was able, as a result of his efforts, to draw on the assistance of men who had not previously taken up arms. The records for military service that may cast some light on this are, for the most part, bulky, unpublished and incomplete.[16] Yet these sources, mainly letters of protection; horse inventories; proffer rolls of feudal service; and pay rolls; have survived in sufficient quantity to enable the reconstruction of a large proportion of the mounted warriors who served in the king's armies. Only by using these sources, in conjunction with the records for distraint to knighthood and the

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[14] Powicke, *Military Obligation*, chapter 6; idem, 'The General Obligation to Cavalry Service under Edward I', *Speculum*, xxviii (1953), 814-33.
[15] On the distraint orders of Henry III's reign, see Powicke, *Military Obligation*, chapter 4; idem, 'Distraint of Knighthood and Military Obligation under Henry III', *Speculum*, xxv (1950), 457-70; S.L. Waugh, 'Reluctant Knights and Jurors: Respites, Exemptions, and Public Obligations in the Reign of Henry III', *Speculum*, lviii (1983), 937-86.
[16] Cf. Ayton, *Knights and Warhorses*, 138-9.

summons lists mentioned above, is it possible to analyse the process of mobilisation among the aristocracy in any detail.

When considering the development of military obligation under Edward I, Powicke concluded that the king's favoured force would probably have consisted of 'a class of effective knightly cavalry'.[17] During his lifetime, the king gained a reputation for his commitment to the knightly cause. In the *Commendatio Lamentabilis*, written shortly after his death in 1307, Edward was described as the flower of the world of chivalry, and praised as a ruler who had augmented the glory of knighthood.[18] His martial reputation spread far and wide. Foreign lords sometimes wrote to the king, expressing a desire to be knighted at his court, or to serve alongside him on crusade.[19] In Edwardian England, knighthood occupied an elevated position within an increasingly status-orientated society. Edward sought to cultivate this social snobbery to suit his own ends. For many men, indeed, knightly arms remained something to aspire to, despite the growing costs incumbent upon the rank.[20] By 1302, a slight blow to a knight or noble was considered by legal theorists to be 'as bad as a wound given to one of the rabble', which shows that knighthood was held alongside nobility as a status of the highest prestige.[21] Ladies from the noble classes were discouraged from marrying anyone who had not assumed the title 'dominus'.[22] Furthermore, Piers Gaveston's desperate situation before his execution in 1312 must have presented a sorry sight when set against the privileges that he had once enjoyed as a member of the knightly elite.[23] Above all, knighthood retained its primary function as a military rank. For Peter Coss, 'the ultimate *raison d'être* of the chivalric knights was to fight. The consequences of the ideology that underpinned their privileged station in the world were inescapable'.[24]

Some historians have suggested that distraint to knighthood might have been intended to augment the number of knights available for work in the shires, or to serve on juries, rather than for waging war. For David Crouch, 'it may well be that the administrative and not the military problems posed by lack of knights was what

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[17] Powicke, 'The General Obligation to Cavalry Service', 816.
[18] 'Commendatio Lamentabilis in Transitu Magni Regis Edwardi', *Chronicles of the Reigns of Edward I and Edward II*, ed. W. Stubbs, 2 vols, Rolls Ser., lxxvi (London, 1882-3), ii, 16.
[19] Cf. *Foedera*, I, ii, 523, 529, 793.
[20] Coss, *Knight in Medieval England*, 70-1.
[21] *Year Books of the Reign of King Edward the First, Years XXX and XXXI*, ed. A.J. Horwood, Rolls Ser., xxxi (London, 1863), 108.
[22] *Chronica et Annales*, 416.
[23] *Vita Edwardi Secundi*, ed. W.R. Childs (Oxford, 2005), 45.
[24] Coss, *Knight in Medieval England*, 111.

eventually concerned the king more than anything else'.[25] However, a recent study on the fourteenth-century sheriff has shown that the connection between distraint and administrative service was by no means clear-cut. In fact, the ideal of knighthood as represented by contemporaries was invariably that of the *miles strenuus*, or the knight at war.[26] Barbour regarded Giles de Argentein as the third best knight of his time not as a consequence of any work that he may have done in the shires, but because he had fought valiantly against the Saracens.[27] In contrast, the bad or unworthy knight was he who failed to draw his sword, as revealed by the indictment by one chronicler of the knights who failed to assist the earl of Gloucester when he fell at Bannockburn.[28] The martial superiority of the knightly order is suggested by their entitlement to double the pay of ordinary men-at-arms; but also, more subtly, by the distinction made between them and other soldiers in the references to war mortalities in the chronicles. Thomas Wykes noted that around 160 knights were killed at the battle of Evesham in 1265, along with numerous others who had not yet been girded with the belt of knighthood.[29] Chroniclers tended to name the knights who had been slain or captured in combat, whereas they simply numbered the other men-at-arms. The London annalist recorded the names of thirty-seven knights slain on the English side at Bannockburn. As for the others, we are told merely that the greater part managed to flee before being killed.[30] This concern to record the deaths of knights, rather than sergeants or others of inferior status, implies an important military distinction between the two. It would seem that knights continued to be sought for their value during times of war, whatever additional tasks they may have fulfilled in peacetime.

The only way to test this theory is to turn to the military sources where it is possible to trace individual responses to the distraint process. If writs of distraint were issued with the aim of widening the military reserve, one would expect men who had been forced to become knights to appear in the pay and related records shortly after assuming that honour. Responses to the writ of 1278 are not as easy to trace as those for later in the reign, for warfare during the 1270s and 1280s was intermittent compared with the crisis years from the mid-1290s. Of those who were distrained in that year, an appreciable number can nonetheless be traced in the records for the second Welsh war

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[25] Crouch, *Image of Aristocracy*, 146. For an alternative view, see N. Saul, *Knights and Esquires: The Gloucestershire Gentry in the Fourteenth Century* (Oxford, 1981), 47.
[26] R. Gorski, *The Fourteenth-Century Sheriff: English Local Administration in the Late Middle Ages* (Woodbridge, 2003), 100.
[27] John Barbour, *The Bruce*, ed. A.A.M. Duncan (Edinburgh, 1997), 497.
[28] *Vita Edwardi Secundi*, 93.
[29] *Wykes*, 173.
[30] *Ann. Lond.*, 231.

of 1282-3. The names of around 400 of these men have survived in the sheriffs' returns from ten counties, and a minimum of sixty of these served in the war against Llywelyn. This is a significant figure given that many soldiers did not receive Crown pay during the Welsh wars and cannot therefore be found on the horse inventories and pay rolls. Furthermore, if we extrapolate from these figures, in the country as a whole, it is likely that several hundred of the men distrained in 1278 participated as cavalrymen within four years of taking up knightly arms. Taking the sixty in our sample, a few, such as Laurence de Preston, Robert de Somerville, William de Say and Robert Luterel, had served as *servientes* in the war of 1277 and now returned as knightly combatants.[31] Even allowing for the incompleteness of the records for the first Welsh war, the larger part would appear to have been fighting for the first time in 1282. It is not possible to know how many of these had taken up knightly arms during the intervening period, as the service of a large number is indicated by enrolled letters of protection, which do not state the soldiers' ranks. Even so, of those who appear on the horse inventory, proffer roll and pay roll, the majority were returned as knights. Whilst four of the men distrained in 1278 fought as sergeants,[32] around twenty had received the honour of knighthood. It is likely that most of those with letters of protection also held knightly rank.[33] Of these new knights, several, such as William Grimbaud, Hugh de Broke, William de Audley and Laurence de St. Michael, served either as retinue leaders or co-knights of the leaders within the army,[34] whilst a group of others, including Richard de Horseley, Humphrey de Cael, Richard de Harcourt and Richard Fouke, registered their service with the marshal at the feudal muster.[35] It should also be noted that many of the men distrained in 1278, but who do not appear to have served in the second Welsh war, can nevertheless be traced as knights on later campaigns.

Few sheriffs' returns have survived relating to the distraint order of 1285 when, owing to the good service given during 1282-3, the obligation to knighthood was relaxed to those possessing a hundred pounds of landed wealth per annum. The efforts of Edward and his father meant that the number of landholders who fell within that wealth bracket and had not received knighthood was in any case very small: only one

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[31] Preston (*PW*, i, 204; C 47/1/2, m. 4; E 101/4/1, m. 2); Somerville (*PW*, i, 203; *ibid*, 216, 230); Say (*PW*, i, 209; C 47/1/2, m. 21; *PW*, i, 232); Luterel (*PW*, i, 203; C 47/1/2, m. 5i; E 101/4/1, m. 1).

[32] Roger le Breton (C 47/1/2, m. 5i; *PW*, i, 230); William Maletake (C 47/1/2, m. 5ii; C 47/2/7, m. 10); Robert de Burghershh (*PW*, i, 216; C 47/2/7, m. 7); Roger de Conyers (*PW*, i, 216; E 101/4/1, m. 8).

[33] On protections, see Ayton, *Knights and Warhorses*, 162.

[34] Grimbaud (C 47/1/2, m. 4; C 47/2/7, m. 1); Broke (C 47/1/2, m. 21; E 101/4/1, m. 3); Audley (C 47/1/2, m. 7; C 47/2/6, m. 5; C 47/2/7, m. 7); St. Michael (*PW*, i, 218; C 47/2/7, m. 4).

[35] Horseley (*PW*, i, 216, 229); Cael (C 47/1/2, m. 2; *PW*, i, 228); Harcourt (C 47/1/2, m. 8; *PW*, i, 234); Fouke (C 47/1/2, m. 10; *PW*, i, 229).

man was returned from Lancashire, and four from the larger county of Yorkshire.[36] In response to the writs issued to the forty-librate holders seven years later, we have the names of thirty distrained men in the county of Lincolnshire, along with two individuals from Lancashire.[37] We are unfortunate that the returns for other counties have not survived; yet, because this order was issued just two years prior to the outbreak of war in France, and four before the start of the war in Scotland, it is possible to evaluate the responses of these forty-librate holders in some detail. The writ of 1292 would appear to have been enforced with some success. A list of men-at-arms retained in the king's service from Lincolnshire in 1297 shows that a third of those distrained five years previously had become knights by that date.[38] Not one was returned among the esquires, so the remainder were probably already engaged in Flanders or Scotland at that time. Inquests carried out into the enforcement of the order reveal that in some counties, Kent, Middlesex and Rutland, all those who possessed forty pounds in landed wealth had received knighthood by the deadline.[39] In other counties, it was seldom the case that more than one or two individuals had failed to comply. Powicke suggested, given the dating of the writ, that the order of 1292 was probably issued with financial rather than military aims in mind.[40] That might have been the case, but the evidence of the military records shows that many of those distrained in 1292 were drafted into the war effort during the final years of the reign. Peter de Dutton, knighted on the deadline in Cheshire in 1292, obtained a letter of protection with Reginald de Grey in the Welsh war of 1294-5,[41] whilst Philip de Chauncy, William Fraunk of Grimsby and Peter de Gipthorp were just several of those distrained to knighthood in Lincolnshire who served during the crisis years of 1294-1298.[42] William Dacre, one of the two men returned by the sheriff of Lancashire, was the leader of a large contingent of footmen going from that county to Scotland in 1298.[43] Furthermore, some of those who had not received knighthood by the deadline had done so and were fighting in Edward's wars within a few years.[44]

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[36] C 47/1/2, mm. 14d, 20d. Seven men were returned from Wiltshire; E 198/3/3, m. 2.

[37] C 47/1/3, mm. 2, 4.

[38] C 47/2/16, m. 6. Roger de Huntingfeld, William Caus, Robert de Brakenbergh, Baldwin Pygot, William de Funtaynes, William de Diseney, Robert de Hakebech, Peter de Gipthorp, William le Breton and Ralph de Wellewyk had all probably assumed knighthood in response to the writ of 1292.

[39] E 198/3/5, mm. 10d, 12, 22.

[40] Powicke, *Military Obligation*, 109.

[41] C 67/10, m. 3. He was with William le Botiller of Warrington as a sergeant in 1282; C 47/2/7, m. 7.

[42] Chauncy (*RG*, iii, 120, 126, 325, 352); Fraunk (C 67/11, m. 3); Gipthorp (C 67/11, m. 4). All three were distrained at C 47/1/3, m. 2.

[43] E 101/6/30, m. 1iv. [The membranes on some of the rolls are imperfectly or imprecisely numbered, so Roman numerals have been employed to assist the reader in locating the references. In this instance the data can be found on the fourth of the membranes incorporated under membrane '1'].

[44] John de Clivedon had not taken up knighthood by the deadline in Somerset and Dorset (E 198/3/5, m. 1) but was summoned to Wales as a knight in 1294 and had a letter of protection for Gascony in the same

The connection between distraint to knighthood and military service continued during the early years of the reign of Edward II. However, the writs of 1312 and 1316 would not appear to have been as effective as those issued during his father's time on the throne. The sheriffs' returns for 1312 contain around 350 names from twenty-eight counties, whilst those for 1316 give some 260 names from thirty-three counties. The unpopularity of the new king, and his inability to engage the martial instincts of his subjects as his father had done, may account for the return of around seventy-two of the men distrained in 1312 four years later.[45] Whatever the reasons for this reluctance to assume knightly arms, quite a few of those distrained to knighthood followed the military calling much as their predecessors had done during the previous reign. It is not always possible, owing to the nature of the sources, to know whether or not these men had received knighthood prior to embarking on their military careers, but in a few instances the pressure that was brought to bear on them probably had the desired effect. Henry de Cokefeld, who was distrained in Suffolk in 1312, fought under Payn de Tibetot at Bannockburn two years later before leading a retinue to the siege of Berwick in 1319.[46] Several other men distrained in that county in 1312 followed Cokefeld by serving in the king's army for the first time two years later, including John de Tendring, John de St. Philibert and Bartholomew de Avylers.[47] The latter was with the earl of Norfolk in 1322 and on the Weardale campaign five years later. In between times, he accompanied the king's other half-brother, the earl of Kent, to Gascony during the War of St. Sardos.[48] Among the distrainees who later saw service in Scotland or France there were some, such as Aymer Pauncefot, who did so whilst retaining the rank of sergeant.[49] A few others, like Patrick de Curwen of Westmorland, had joined the king's armies prior to receiving that honour.[50] Clearly, there was no precise correlation between the assumption of knightly arms and service in the king's armies. Even so, the frequent issuing of distraint orders does seem to have encouraged some individuals who had never previously been on campaign to embark on military service.

Whilst soldiering provided just one of a number of possible outlets for men of gentle blood anxious to make their mark in aristocratic society, it was the form of

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year (*PW*, i, 265; *RG*, iii, 119). For a similar example, see Roger de Thornton (E 198/3/5, m. 17d; *RG*, iii, 177; C 81/1740, m. 69).

[45] C 47/1/7; C 47/1/8.

[46] C 47/1/7, m. 33; C 71/6, m. 5; E 101/378/4, f. 26r.

[47] C 47/1/7, m. 33. For their service at Bannockburn; C 71/6, mm. 1, 5.

[48] 1322 (*CPR, 1321-24*, 187); 1324-5 (E 101/35/2, m. 7); 1327 (C 71/11, m. 5).

[49] C 47/1/8, m. 9d; C 71/10, m. 3, C 81/1733, m. 97. The protection warrant describes him as a sergeant and almost certainly relates to the campaign of 1319.

[50] C 47/1/7, m. 17; 1298 (C 67/13, m. 6d); 1306 (E 101/612/15, m. 1d); 1307 (E 101/612/21, m. 1i); and as a knight in 1314 (E 101/14/15, m. 5).

service most likely to win the respect of their peers and the king. Distraint to knighthood enabled Edward I and his son to augment their armies with new recruits through a direct appeal to the sense of honour that prevailed among the landholding elites. The importance of knighthood to the Crown's recruitment efforts is further demonstrated by the link between campaigning and the mass knighting ceremonies of these years. Simon de Montfort created a number of new knights prior to the battle of Lewes in 1264 in an attempt to encourage his followers before the royalist onslaught.[51] In like manner, the earl Warenne is reported to have conferred knighthood on some of his soldiers on the morning of the battle of Stirling Bridge in 1297, many of whom fell together that day.[52] The most famous mass knighting ceremony of the reign of Edward I was that which took place on 22 May 1306, on the occasion of the knighting of Edward of Caernarfon at Westminster.[53] Several chroniclers noted at the time that the king's aim in offering *arma militaria* to young men who wished to be knighted alongside his son was to strengthen his army for Scotland in that year.[54] This is supported by the appearance with letters of protection on the Scottish roll of 129 of the 297 men who had been knighted. Around sixty-three of these joined the companies of leading magnates; of the remainder, most obtained protections with either the prince or the king. Many of these letters of protection and attorney were enrolled within just four or five days of the main event.[55] This, combined with the fact that many of these new knights went on to be summoned for military service on a regular basis during the early years of the reign of Edward II, highlights the success of the knighting ceremony as a recruitment initiative. Although the ceremony scheduled for Carlisle at the beginning of the following year has not received as much attention from historians, it is evident, from the location specified for the conferment of knighthood, that the measure was again intended as a way of obtaining more soldiers for the king's army.[56] This was to be no modest occasion: the issue rolls show that a sum of £1,480 15s 10d had been set aside for the purpose of equipping the new knights.[57] Unfortunately, Edward's illness disrupted his plans in that year, and the lack of comment in the chronicles suggests that nothing came of this proposed sequel.

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[51] *The Chronicle of William de Rishanger of the Barons' Wars*, ed. J.O. Halliwell, Camden Society 1st ser., xv (1840), 31.
[52] *Guisborough*, 300.
[53] Cf. *Ann. Lond.*, 146. For the list of men knighted, see E101/362/20, printed in C. Bullock-Davies, *Menestrellorum Multitudo: Minstrels at a Royal Feast* (Cardiff, 1978), appendix.
[54] E.g. *Flores Historiarum*, iii, 131; *Guisborough*, 367-8.
[55] E.g. Fulk Fitz Waryn junior's protection was enrolled on 25 May (C 67/16, m. 11), and Robert le Constable's on 24 May (C 67/16, m. 12).
[56] *CCR, 1302-07*, 520.
[57] E 403/134, m. 4.

It may seem strange, given Edward I's apparent preference for knightly cavalry forces, that between 1292 and 1306 the idea of enforcing or encouraging more men to become knights was abandoned. In truth, the distinction between distraint to knighthood and the summonses to the twenty- and forty-librate holders, in 1295, 1297, 1300 and 1301, which made no mention of knighthood, was more apparent than real. Distraint to knighthood was based on the same kind of economic criteria as these later writs, and by 1295 Edward had reason to assume that the great majority of those summoned directly from the shires would be knights. Returns made in the spring of 1295 show that among the men with forty pounds of landed wealth in Wiltshire, twelve were knights whilst only six were sergeants. In Oxfordshire, the ratio for the same year was thirty-eight knights to thirteen men who had not received knighthood, whilst in Berkshire there were twenty-eight knights as against just eight men of inferior rank.[58] It is at this point that Edward's attempts to tap the military potential of the country gentry becomes most apparent; but, as we have seen, the writs of distraint had already been quite successful in energising that order of men during the first half of the reign. The sources for the armies that campaigned in Wales and Gascony in 1295 are far from complete, but of the 204 names that were returned for Wiltshire, Bedfordshire, Buckinghamshire, Berkshire and Oxfordshire some forty-five can be traced in the hosts for that year.[59] Of these, perhaps three-quarters served in direct response to the order of 10 February. Fortunately, the sources for the royal expeditions of 1297, 1300 and 1301 are more extensive. Michael Powicke noted that for the Flanders campaign of 1297-8, some 713 names were returned from thirteen counties. Fifty-two of these men received letters of protection as a direct result of the summons to the twenty-pounders, not including the paid company leaders. Extrapolating from this, Powicke arrived at a figure of around 150 soldiers from all counties who were added to the army by these means.[60] His calculations did not include the returns for Buckinghamshire, Bedfordshire, Essex and Hertfordshire, which bring the total up to 872 names from seventeen counties. A little over a hundred of these men took out letters of protection or attorney, or had an appraised horse.[61] That most of the twenty-pounders who were summoned did not follow the king to Flanders is clear enough, but even if only fifty men were added to the army in this way the innovation might have been deemed worthwhile. Of the thousand or so men returned in 1300 from twenty-three counties, some 255 can be traced in the military records, not including

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[58] E 198/3/6, 8.
[59] For the returns: *ibid*; E 198/3/7.
[60] Powicke, *Military Obligation*, 111-2.
[61] The additional returns can be found at C 47/1/5, mm. 1ii, 2ii. Some of these 111 men were also included in the summons to the magnates.

forty described in the sheriffs' returns as going to Scotland but for whom no further details survive. There were also a further fifty individuals who made proffers at the feudal muster in their capacity as tenants-in-chief. Finally, for the ambitious expedition of the following year when two armies were launched, at least 133 of the 856 individuals who received a summons appear to have served.[62]

That the records for the well-documented army that besieged Caerlaverock castle in 1300 reveal the names of more than a quarter of the forty-pounders summoned in that year, whereas the figures for the other expeditions are less impressive, shows just how cautious we must be when assessing the effectiveness of these writs. The tendency to underestimate the success of the Crown's recruitment policies is exacerbated not only by patchy source survival, but also by the invisibility of many soldiers who did not receive wages or serve as part of their feudal obligations. Furthermore, the Crown was sometimes willing to accept substitutes in place of the men who were summoned and it is therefore likely that a few of those who did not serve in person sent sons and brothers instead.[63] Taking these factors into account, it is probable that on average at least a quarter, and in some cases more than a half, of the men summoned according to economic criteria took part in the royal campaigns, representing a mobilisation effort of some magnitude. What the king desired most of all was the enlistment of individuals and families who had never previously seen active service. In this he would appear to have been at least partly successful. Around twenty of the forty-pounders summoned in 1300 can be found in the service records for the first time in that year. Included among these were middling knights and sergeants like Richard de Hywysh, Roger de Kerdeston and John de Farlington,[64] as well as young members of well-established families such as Robert de Ufford, whose father had died a couple of years previously, and John Mauleverer.[65] The more fragmented evidence for the twenty-pounders who went to Flanders three years earlier indicates that on that occasion, too, quite a few of those conscripted were virgin warriors. Edmund de la Hyde, who took out a letter of protection with John de Drokensford, seems to have been taking part in the king's wars

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[62] For the records consulted, see: Flanders 1297-8 - wardrobe book (BL, Add. MS 7965), inventories (E 101/6/19, 28, 37) and protections (C 67/12); Scotland 1300 - wardrobe book (*Liber Quotidianus*), inventory (E 101/8/23), protections (C 67/14) and proffer roll (*PDS*, 209-231); and Scotland 1301 - wardrobe book (BL, Add. MS 7966a), inventories (E 101/9/23, 4) and protections (C 67/14).

[63] E.g. Simon de Ormesby (*CCR, 1296-1302*, 37). In 1297 Ralph Perot was summoned from Essex (C 47/1/5, m. 2ii), but his son Simon might have served in his place (E 101/6/37, m. 6i).

[64] Hywysh, (E 101/8/23, m. 6); Kerdeston (C 67/14, m. 9); Farlington (E 101/8/23, m. 6). For the summonses, see C 47/1/6, m. 65; *PW*, i, 334; *PW*, i, 339.

[65] Ufford (E 101/9/24, m. 2; E 101/612/11, m. 2; C 67/16, m. 7) and Mauleverer (C 67/14, m. 2; C 67/15 m. 1; C 67/16, m. 10) went on to serve in 1301, 1303-4 and 1306, as well as in other years. See C 67/14, mm. 11, 14, for their service in the army in 1300, and C 47/1/6, m. 35 and *PW*, i, 331 for the summonses.

for the first and final time,[66] whilst the Peter de Suthcherch with Walter de Teye can be traced on just one other campaign in the following year.[67] What we see then, during the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, is an attempt by the Crown to reach out to the more humble members of the country gentry, and the gradual emergence of that social order as a military elite.

Tracing the recruitment of 'new' knights and sergeants in the military records is a difficult and imprecise exercise, particularly during the 1270s and 1280s when we lack a successive series of accounts such as those that are available for the Scottish wars. Despite the relatively poor source survival for some of these earlier campaigns, it is clear that Edward was willingly supported by his leading subjects in his struggles against the Welsh. By winning over the aristocracy upon his return from the Holy Land, the king paved the way for a successful partnership in war, one that bore fruit in the expeditions of the opening two decades of the reign. The full extent of the Crown's achievement in mobilising its forces only comes into full focus from the mid-1290s, but it was during these earlier expeditions that Crown-aristocracy relations were at their most harmonious. The extent of the nobility's involvement in the wars against Llywelyn and Dafydd is demonstrated by the concerns that were raised over the stability of the realm whilst the king's hosts were in Wales. In July 1277, orders were sent to the sheriffs throughout England to levy local policing forces which were to arrest those who sought to disturb the peace whilst the king and his magnates were at war.[68] Similar orders were issued to the sheriffs in June 1283, instructing them to deal with all criminals and evildoers who aimed to profit from the absence of the king and his nobles by sowing discord in the shires.[69] These precautionary measures demonstrate the king's success in mobilising the landholding elite for his early military ventures, an achievement that is also reflected by comments made in the chronicles. The monk of Bury St. Edmunds wrote, albeit with some exaggeration, that the king took with him in 1277 'an army comprising nearly all the knights of England'.[70] Pierre de Langtoft was equally hyperbolic, noting that both northerners and southerners accompanied the king to war five years later, with nobody holding back.[71] Although the martial enthusiasm of the aristocracy might have peaked during the first half of the reign, Edward and his son were still able to enlist the support of the military community for their later campaigns

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[66] Service (C 67/12, m. 3); summons (*PW*, i, 293).
[67] Service (E 101/6/37, m. 1i; C 67/13, m. 5); summons (C 47/1/5, m. 4).
[68] *CPR, 1272-81*, 218.
[69] *CPR, 1281-92*, 66.
[70] *Bury St. Edmunds*, 63.
[71] *Langtoft*, 239.

against the Scots. In 1297-8, the justices of the Bench were informed that the 'chevalers, serjauntz e tuz autres vigrous' of Yorkshire were unable to attend to judicial business in that county as they had been summoned to Scotland.[72] Six years later, a group of landholders from the palatinate of Durham informed the king that they were unable to treat with him at that time due to their commitments on the northern March.[73]

The anxieties expressed by the gentry and nobility during the crisis years of the mid-1290s were not, therefore, a consequence of any open hostility towards warfare *per se*. Rather, the Crown's military demands had by that stage created a certain war-weariness which meant that few landholders were prepared to take up arms without first assessing the likely benefits of doing so. In particular, whilst they were still willing to fight against aggressive enemies within the British Isles, the aristocracy were less keen on foreign wars and any attempts to force them to serve overseas.[74] An interesting insight into this mindset, enabling us to look beyond the comments made in the chronicles into the thought processes of the men involved, is provided by a letter written by the household knight and traitor, Thomas de Turberville, to the provost of Paris in 1295. This correspondence reveals that there was widespread disaffection towards the war in France at a time when the leaders of society had other, more immediate threats to deal with in Wales and Scotland. He and the other magnates of the realm, Turberville assured the provost, had no stomach for the war in south-western France, for 'we think we have enough to do against the Scotch'.[75] Credence is given to this view by the refusal of a number of leading magnates, including Walter de Huntercombe, Robert Fitz Roger, Philip de Kyme and Roger de Mohaut, to go to Gascony in 1295. Only the threat of punishment eventually persuaded some of these men to relent.[76] Such opposition towards continental ventures came to a head in 1297 when the constable and marshal of England refused to follow the king to Flanders at a time when the realm was surrounded by enemies much nearer at hand.[77] Similar fears were later expressed by Edward II's advisers shortly before the outbreak of the War of St. Sardos in 1324.[78]

The difficulty facing Edward I in his later years, and Edward II, was therefore to ensure the continued commitment of the gentry and nobility to their military projects at

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[72] SC 1/30, no. 136.
[73] *PW*, i, 405-6.
[74] Prestwich, *War, Politics and Finance*, 39.
[75] *Cotton*, 437-8.
[76] *Book of Prests of the King's Wardrobe for 1294-5*, ed. E.B. Fryde (Oxford, 1962), xlviii.
[77] *Bury St. Edmunds*, 138-9. On the opposition to the king in 1297, which spread beyond the leading magnates and out to the country gentry, see *Documents Illustrating the Crisis of 1297-98 in England*, ed. M. Prestwich, Camden Society 4th ser., xxiv (1980).
[78] *Calendar of Ancient Correspondence Concerning Wales*, ed. J.G. Edwards (Cardiff, 1935), 218.

a time when money and enthusiasm were rapidly drying up. This required a subtle combination of strong-arm tactics and palliative measures: the former, to deal with the more intransigent of the king's subjects; the latter, for the benefit of those who wished to serve, but who could not afford to do so. One of the greatest expenses shouldered by the aristocracy was that of equipping themselves with armour for the king's wars. Edward I attempted to assist his soldiers in meeting these costs whenever possible. Knightly armour consisted primarily of the coat of mail, war-helm, lance, shield and sword, the cost of which would appear, from grants made by Edward to some of his supporters in Gascony during the 1290s, to have been around five pounds per knight, or, the equivalent of between a quarter and an eighth of the annual income of a man of that rank.[79] This excludes the additional cost of the destrier, which would normally cost in excess of twenty or thirty pounds. In 1297, the king granted 510 pounds in custodies and marriages as compensation to William Martin, who had lost his armour and horses at sea when returning from Flanders.[80] Eight years later, he excused Hugh de Audley repayment of the fifty pounds that he had been granted for equipping his followers during the war in Gascony.[81] The king also provided a form of insurance for the families that were left behind when their fathers, brothers, or husbands had been killed on active duty. A sum of twenty pounds was made available to the wife and children of John de Horne, who had died during the course of the first Welsh war.[82] In November 1302, Edward offered a more substantial 200 pounds towards the marriages of Margaret and Catherine de Creting, whose father, Adam, had given sterling service in Gascony prior to his death.[83] The soldier and chronicler Thomas Gray of Heton observed that the king looked particularly kindly upon those who had fought for him in Gascony.[84] This is confirmed by the large number of favours conferred on those who saw service in south-western France in 1294 and 1295.[85] Realising that overseas campaigns were deeply unpopular among even his most experienced soldiers, Edward also made available a number of rewards to those of his countrymen who agreed to embark with him to Flanders in 1297. 'Actions of novel disseisin were halted, debts owed to men on campaign were to be levied by the exchequer on their behalf, and in general the king tried to ensure that no one would suffer loss to their possessions because they had

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[79] E 213/40; E 213/218.
[80] *CPR, 1292-1301*, 340.
[81] SC 8/9, no. 414.
[82] *CCR, 1272-79*, 575.
[83] *CPR, 1301-07*, 72.
[84] *Scalacronica*, 15.
[85] *CCR, 1288-96*, 357, 422, 465, 496; *CPR, 1292-1301*, 87, 88, 152-3.

chosen to accompany him overseas'.[86] Such incentives were certainly most welcome, but the costs and strain of war during the years of heaviest conflict remained too much for many landholders to bear.

For the most part, then, Edward and his son tried to manage the recruitment process by offering as many incentives to their subjects to serve as possible. Whilst such an approach was preferred, the Crown was also prepared to resort to threats in its attempts to man its armies. One of the most effective ways of doing this was to keep records of those who had performed military service so as to bring pressure to bear on those who had chosen to remain at home. In February 1300, the king issued writs to the sheriffs throughout the realm, ordering them to draw up lists of those who had accompanied him or his magnates to Scotland since the start of the war.[87] Although none of these lists would appear to have survived, a few of the sheriffs who drew up the returns for the forty-librate holders in that year took the unusual step of indicating which men had made preparations to go to Scotland and which had not. The sheriff of Cornwall grouped his men into those who were setting out to join the army, those who were staying behind, and a third group about whose intentions he was unsure. Six men fell into the first category, eleven into the second, and fourteen into the third, supporting the suggestion made above that between a quarter and a half of the forty-pounders thus summoned actually took part in the campaign.[88] That these records were kept and referred to is shown by a letter sent by the king to John Fitz Reginald in 1302, in which he expressed astonishment at his absence from recent campaigns.[89] In a separate incident, a certain William Pappeworthe had his granges sealed up, albeit unjustly, for not sending men-at-arms to Scotland in 1296.[90] Edward I was also willing to use blackmail. He promised to restore the lands of the countess of Gloucester, who had married the parvenu Ralph de Monthermer, only on condition that she find a hundred men-at-arms for the king's expedition to the continent in 1297. A similar tactic was employed by Edward II when he pardoned Thomas de Vere for marrying the widow of Payn de Tibetot (whose former husband had recently been killed at Bannockburn) so long as he agreed to serve with twenty men-at-arms in Scotland.[91] In both cases, this

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[86] *Documents Illustrating the Crisis of 1297-98*, 36.
[87] *CCR, 1296-1302*, 375.
[88] C 47/1/6, m. 8. The sheriff of Bedfordshire and Buckinghamshire returned twenty men who were coming into the king's pay, nineteen who were serving in the retinues of the magnates or the bishop of Durham, and some forty who were not going, whilst in Herefordshire the ratio was twelve men going to thirteen who were not; *ibid*, mm. 3, 24. These figures do not include ecclesiastics and women.
[89] *PW*, i, 367.
[90] *CDS*, ii, no. 732.
[91] *PW*, i, 296; *CPR, 1313-17*, 303.

policy was probably pursued so as to ensure that the retaining power of the men who had died was not lost to the king as a result of the non-service of their successors.

Ultimately, Edward I and his son were prepared to go to almost any lengths to recruit as many men to their armies as possible. The half century that followed the death of Henry III witnessed a relentless mobilisation programme, necessitated by the wars in Wales, France and Scotland. Through a variety of measures, Edward I was able to draw upon manpower reserves that had never previously been exploited; he created a new brand of warriors among the gentry who came to share in the military ethos promoted by their king. Hundreds of men whose fathers and grandfathers might have exercised arms only intermittently, if at all, were now encouraged, and if necessary forced, to become soldiers. If these efforts sometimes provoked a strong or hostile reaction, as they did during Edward's later years and the early years of the reign of his son, this was only to have been expected given the scale of what Edward I was trying to achieve. Furthermore, by offering incentives and admonishments in roughly equal measure, Edward I was able, for the most part, to manage the fallout of his policies with some success. Only during the reign of Edward II, who lacked the leadership qualities that had been characteristic of his father, did such difficulties become too much. In the end it would be left to Edward III to reap the full reward of his grandfather's audacity and foresight.

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The general success of Edward I's recruitment policies can perhaps best be illustrated by reference to the large cavalry forces that he was able to raise for his campaigns. Although the armies that he put into the field were not always of the same magnitude, sometimes barely exceeding the numbers mustered by his father, on other occasions he was able to mobilise his subjects on a scale that was seldom equalled during the Middle Ages. Calculating the sizes of medieval armies is an imperfect and imprecise exercise. Nevertheless, acquaintance with the sources at our disposal, as well as with the way that Edwardian armies were raised, enables us to make some informed estimates. The host that went to Wales in 1277 was one of the smallest of the reign, with perhaps 800 cavalrymen serving on what was 'a surprisingly uneventful' expedition.[92] Later armies in that sphere of war, particularly that which mustered for the war of conquest in 1282-3, appear to have been much larger than this, but calculations are hindered by the fact

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[92] Prestwich, *Edward I*, 179.

that overall command was divided between several regional captains. We are on safer ground when we come to the Scottish wars that dominated the later years of Edward's kingship. Michael Prestwich has estimated that around 3,000 mounted soldiers were put into battle against the Scots at Falkirk in 1298.[93] This seems plausible given that the horse lists alone name some 1,350 men in the king's pay. Many of the leading magnates in that year, including most of the earls, served without wages and paid their men from their own resources.[94] A similar-sized host was assembled in the spring of 1303.[95] When we take into account that there were at most around 9,000 to 10,000 genteel families within England at the time, including the 'marginal' parish gentry, it can be seen that a very sizeable proportion of the landholding community was engaged in the king's wars at one stage or another.[96] Nor were these levies exceptional. At least 2,000 cavalrymen were probably conscripted in 1300,[97] a figure not dissimilar to the 2,500 mounted soldiers that J.E. Morris once estimated were on the English side at Bannockburn.[98] Given that Scottish expeditions were taking place almost annually between 1296 and 1314, the impact on the aristocracy must have been great. What we may be seeing, in fact, is a process of militarization, as a large number of noble and genteel families, 'including recently established ones', became 'conditioned to the acceptance of an active martial role'.[99]

Gaining insights into the mentality of the aristocracy is rather more difficult than providing estimates for the number of men who served in royal and baronial armies. Even more problematic is the task of trying to discern subtle variations in the way that the landholding classes perceived themselves, and their role within society, over time. One possible way of overcoming this problem is by analysing the concerns that occupied the thoughts of the gentry and nobility as they neared their deaths. Wills provide a rare insight into the minds of the leading men of the age, and a number that have survived from the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries reveal that martial considerations were often uppermost in their thoughts. When preparing for his death in September 1296, the earl of Warwick requested that two great horses be provided to carry his armour at his funeral. In this he followed his father, whose corpse had been

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[93] *Ibid*, 479.
[94] *Gough*, 160-237; E 101/6/39, 40. There were also around 900 protections; C 67/13.
[95] M. Haskell, 'Breaking the Stalemate: The Scottish Campaign of Edward I, 1303-4', *Thirteenth Century England VII*, ed. M. Prestwich, R. Britnell and R. Frame (Woodbridge, 1999), 229.
[96] C. Given-Wilson, *The English Nobility in the Late Middle Ages: The Fourteenth-Century Political Community* (London, 1987), 72-3.
[97] Cf. *PDS*, 209-31; *Liber Quotidianus*; E 101/8/23; C 67/14.
[98] J.E. Morris, *Bannockburn* (Cambridge, 1914), 41.
[99] A. Ayton, 'The Battle of Crécy: Context and Significance', *The Battle of Crécy*, 31.

preceded by a horse 'completely harnessed with all military caparisons'.[100] The panoply of the military funeral was not, however, restricted to those of comital rank. In 1311, just two years before his death, William le Vavasur requested that his best horse be equipped in full military apparel, the resulting cortege presumably having formed a most impressive sight to onlookers. Vavasur's fellow northerner, John Daudre, was similarly intent on martial display when he composed his will two years later.[101] It is interesting that these men wished to be remembered, above all, for their military prowess. Equally revealing, in these wills, is the preoccupation with the conferment of military equipment. 'The accumulation of arms and armour', it has been noted, was one of the most obvious 'practical consequences' of the increased military activity of the reigns of the first three Edwards: the passing down of armour from one generation to the next helped to perpetuate traditions of military service.[102] Perhaps the most well-known instance of this practice is supplied by the will of Fulk de Penebrigg, dating from 1325, in which he bestowed military equipment upon four members of his line. Strangely, for one with such an array of equipment to bequeath, he does not appear in the military sources, although he was summoned as a forty-librate holder in 1300 and 1301.[103] It is likely that he was one of the many landholders with estates on the Welsh March who served without Crown pay. The above-mentioned William le Vavasur, in like manner, conferred armour on two of his sons, Walter and Henry. Both of these men gave military service: the former with his father in 1306: the latter on the Weardale campaign of the opening year of the reign of Edward III.[104] Vavasur also bequeathed a lance from Gascony, where he had served on more than one occasion, to another regular campaigner, Ralph Fitz William, as well as additional armour to John de Crepping.[105] The interesting bonds that these bequests reveal were in all probability strengthened by shared campaigning experiences.

Unfortunately, wills are a far from perfect guide to the mindsets of the English aristocracy during the reigns of Edward I and Edward II. Besides not having survived in

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[100] *Testamenta Vetusta: Being Illustrations from Wills, of Manners, Customs etc. as well as of the Descents and Possessions of many Distinguished Families*, ed. N.H. Nicolas, 2 vols (London, 1826), i, 50-2.

[101] *Wills and Inventories Illustrative of the History, Manners, Language and Statistics, etc. of the Northern Counties of England from the Eleventh Century Downwards*, Part 1, ed. J. Raine, Surtees Society, ii (1835), nos 14, 16. This was probably the same man as the 'John Dautrie' who accompanied the earl Warenne to Scotland in 1311; *CCW*, 354. Vavasur had fought in Wales in 1277 and 1282 (*PW*, i, 199; C 67/8, m. 8), Gascony in 1294 and 1295 (*RG*, iii, 161, 294), and on many campaigns to Scotland, including in 1298, 1300 and 1306 (C 67/13, m. 7; C 47/2/13, m. 8; C 67/16, m. 10).

[102] Ayton, 'Sir Thomas Ughtred', 113.

[103] BL, Stowe Charter 622; M. Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages: The English Experience* (London, 1996), 26-7. For Penebrigg's summonses, see C 47/1/6, m. 45; *PW*, i, 351.

[104] *Wills and Inventories*, no. 14; C 67/16, m. 10; E 101/18/6.

[105] *Wills and Inventories*, no. 14.

sufficient quantity to enable anything beyond a superficial analysis. they also tell us little about changing attitudes to warfare over time. We can show that the gentry and nobility were actively engaged in the promotion of military culture and the dispersal of armour, but we lack the continuity in evidence that would enable us to make profitable comparisons with earlier and later decades. It is less in the written documentation of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, than in the development of a visual martial culture to which this era bore witness, that the process of militarization among landed families can be most productively traced. The reign of Edward I was notable for the re-emergence of the Arthurian cult; indeed, military symbolism and pageantry played a key role in the development of a strong martial ethos among the social elite. Round Tables were held at Nefyn in Wales in 1284 and Falkirk in 1302 to celebrate the victories of the English over their enemies within the British Isles.[106] Likewise, in 1296, Edward held a banquet with his knightly companions to mark the abdication of John Balliol.[107] These events helped to forge a spirit of camaraderie between the king and his soldiers and provided the aristocracy with a pseudo-historical framework for their actions. Yet the prevalence of a strong martial culture, represented through visual imagery and symbols, was most strikingly conveyed through the diffusion and celebration of heraldry. Langtoft wrote of how the unfurling of the king's banner at Falkirk, 'ove les treys lepardz en place desplaé', struck fear into the hearts of the Scots,[108] and two years later Edward added the sign of the cross to his standard to signify that he had divine support for his wars.[109] Where the king led, the gentry and nobility naturally followed. Consequently, one of the most striking images of Edwardian England are the military effigies and brasses which, with increased regularity, were erected throughout the parish churches of the realm.[110] 'The self-image which the nobility left on their tombs after their death was of the man-at-arms': the heraldry that adorned such images was central to the martial impression that the aristocracy wished to communicate.[111] In life, too, the landholding elites were keen to portray themselves as warriors, as shown by the fact that 'virtually all the seals

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[106] *Flores Historiarum*, iii, 62; *Ann. Lond.*, 104.

[107] *Lanercost*, 180. For the value of the tournament as one of the mediums through which Edward sought to promote enthusiasm for his wars, see J.R.V. Barker, *The Tournament in England, 1100-1400* (Woodbridge, 1986), 12-13.

[108] *Langtoft*, 395.

[109] *Chronica et Annales*, 439.

[110] Cf. M. Clayton, *Catalogue of Rubbings of Brasses and Incised Slabs* (London, 1979), and for some revised dates, J. Coales ed., *The Earliest English Brasses: Patronage, Style and Workshops 1270-1350* (London, 1987). For details relating to effigies, see H. Lawrance, *Heraldry from Military Monuments before 1350 in England and Wales*, Harleian Society, xcviii (1946).

[111] Alexander, J., and P. Binski, eds., *Age of Chivalry: Art in Plantagenet England 1200-1400* (London, 1987), 246.

of noble lords in the thirteenth century show them in armour, on horseback, with some heraldic indication of their descent'.[112]

Such evidence supports Peter Coss' statement that 'in Edwardian England knighthood and heraldry expressed the cultural hegemony of the landed upper class'.[113] However, it is difficult to argue from the mere popularity of armorial display that the late thirteenth century bore witness to a process of militarization among the aristocracy. Heraldry was not new to the reign of Edward I, but had emerged during the mid-twelfth century following a period of 'proto-heraldry' in the 1120s and 1130s. Initially, lords had placed symbols on their banners and shields as individual marks to aid the process of identification on the battlefield and tourney ground. True heraldry developed only once these designs had become hereditary within particular families. Although use of the face visor, which led to greater concealment, might have provided an important stimulus to the adoption of these images, Adrian Ailes has convincingly argued that changes in military accoutrements, most notably the development of the smooth shield, surcoat and lance pennon, are likely to have been decisive.[114] The practical origins of the science of heraldry are further demonstrated by the phrase 'coat of arms', for 'it was the practice of painting arms on the linen surcoats worn by knights over their mail which gave rise to the term "cote armure"'.[115] Once armorial imagery had become established on the battlefield its use spread rapidly into other areas of aristocratic life. By the mid-twelfth century, equestrian seals were already being employed in private correspondence, showing heraldic devices being 'widely used on the decoration of horse harness and knightly equipment'.[116] More significant was the way that such patterns and designs filtered down from the earls and nobility to ordinary knights and eventually, during the early fourteenth century, to men of sub-knightly rank. 'Peer pressure' ensured that lesser men were keen to adopt the martial images and symbols borne by their social superiors, so although the 'esquires' of the 1290s and 1300s were still

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[112] T.A. Heslop, 'English Seals in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries', *Age of Chivalry: Art in Plantagenet England 1200-1400*, ed. J. Alexander and P. Binski (London, 1987), 116. On the rise in the use of the shield-of-arms on seals by the late thirteenth century, see P.D.A. Harvey and A. McGuiness, *A Guide to British Medieval Seals* (London, 1996), 50.

[113] P. Coss, 'Knighthood, Heraldry and Social Exclusion in Edwardian England', *Heraldry, Pageantry and Social Display in Medieval England*, ed. P. Coss and M. Keen (Woodbridge, 2002), 40.

[114] A. Ailes, 'The Knight, Heraldry and Armour: The Role of Recognition and the Origins of Heraldry', *Medieval Knighthood IV*, ed. C. Harper-Bill and R. Harvey (Woodbridge, 1992), 16. Also, see M. Keen, *Chivalry* (London, 1984), 125.

[115] A. Payne, 'Medieval Heraldry', *Age of Chivalry: Art in Plantagenet England 1200-1400*, ed. J. Alexander and P. Binski (London, 1987), 55.

[116] J. Cherry, 'Heraldry as Decoration in the Thirteenth Century', *England in the Thirteenth Century*, ed. W.M. Ormrod (Stamford, 1991), 124.

expected to wear the arms of their lords,[117] 'by 1410 a non-armigerous gentleman was a rarity needing explanation'.[118] The diffusion of heraldry, therefore, took place over the course of several centuries, and was already well advanced by the time Edward I succeeded to the throne.

What the intense and unprecedented scale of warfare in the late thirteenth century did was to instil this visual culture with renewed martial meaning at a time when heraldry was becoming detached from its origins in the practicalities of war. Put another way, 'the Edwardian wars transformed an adopted military culture into a more vibrant one underpinned by collective experience and a shared mentality'.[119] Whilst the reign of Henry III had provided few opportunities for members of the gentry to share in the military pursuits of their feudal lords, the increased frequency and scale of warfare under Edward I meant that lesser landholders were once again serving in large numbers in the king's hosts alongside the nobility. In this atmosphere it was only natural that they should wish to share in the trappings and decorations of war that were so celebrated by their social superiors. It was partly as a consequence of the need to keep track of the growing number of armigerous families that heralds began to keep rolls of arms which listed, either in the form of heraldic charges or in blazon, the arms borne by a large number of the militarily-active men of the age. Whilst the first of these rolls, Glover's Roll containing around 200 names, dates from the 1250s,[120] it was not until the 1270s that rolls of arms began to proliferate and the number of men recorded on them markedly increased. It is for this reason that Noel Denholm-Young has described the thirteenth century as 'the great age of heraldry in Britain'.[121] Nineteen rolls have survived, either in the original or as copies, from the years 1272 to 1307, although the largest and most impressive, the Parliamentary Roll of Arms, dates from early in the reign of Edward II. Five of the armorials from the reign of Edward I, the Falkirk, Caerlaverock, Galloway, Stirling and Nativity rolls, were 'occasional rolls' compiled to commemorate the men present at specific martial events. The remainder were 'general rolls', probably put together by heralds to serve as works of reference. Taken together these rolls of arms 'were the product of an intense, varied and continuous heraldic

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[117] *The Statutes of the Realm, 1101-1713*, ed. A. Luders *et al.* (Record Commission, 1810-28), i, 230.
[118] A.R. Wagner, *Historic Heraldry of Britain* (London, 1939), 20.
[119] Ayton, 'Sir Thomas Ughtred', 112.
[120] *Aspilogia II: Rolls of Arms, Henry III*, ed. A.R. Wagner, Harleian Society, cxiii, cxiv (1961-2), 115-66.
[121] N. Denholm-Young, *History and Heraldry 1254 to 1310: A Study of the Historical Value of the Rolls of Arms* (Oxford, 1965), 15.

activity that would never be exceeded or even rivalled in any other time or place during the Middle Ages'.[122]

Although these records contain the names of only a few men below the status of knight bachelor, they do provide information on a remarkably wide body of men of that rank. Usually the shields are listed according to precedence; the earls and bannerets are placed above lower ranking knights. Alternatively, as we shall see in the following chapter, on the occasional rolls individuals sometimes appear in the battles in which they fought on campaign. It is the large number of lesser men named on the armorials, those of more humble origin who seldom appear in earlier heraldic records, except occasionally on seals, that provides the historian with the most interesting research possibilities. 'What is new and perhaps most important here is the roster of second- and third-rank armigers in the reign of Edward I'.[123] Given that Edward's wars saw the gentry engaged in military activity to an extent that had never been possible under Henry III, it is interesting to reflect on how many of the individuals named on these armorials came from newly-armigerous families that had been energised as a consequence of the king's campaigns in Wales, France and Scotland. Before discussing such possibilities, we need to establish what proportion of the men named on the rolls of arms fought as cavalrymen under Edward I and his son. By determining whether the rolls represent an attempt to record the names of active soldiers, or those of all bearers of arms regardless of whether they participated in the king's wars or not, we can learn much about the strength of the connection between heraldry and war during this militaristic age. For Maurice Keen, 'we are still, at the turn of the thirteenth into the fourteenth century, very much in the period of the "practical use of heraldry in war and tournament"'. Consequently, the bearer of the heraldic insignia 'was the sort of person who was entitled to appear in his own surcoat of arms and with his own blazoned shield at musters of important hosts or at tourneys'.[124] Denholm-Young was also of the mind that 'in this period the use of armorial bearings was [probably] confined to the "strenuous" knights, i.e. those who had seen or hoped to see military action'.[125] Although by the reign of Edward I 'more was attached to the use of heraldry than its utility on the battlefield',[126] there are therefore strong grounds for believing that the rolls of arms emerged from a military context and with martial motives in mind.

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[122] *Aspilogia III*, i, 41.
[123] *Ibid*, i, 75.
[124] M. Keen, *Origins of the English Gentleman: Heraldry, Chivalry and Gentility in Medieval England, c.1300-c.1500* (Stroud, 2002), 16.
[125] Denholm-Young, *History and Heraldry*, 1-2.
[126] Crouch, *Image of Aristocracy*, 235.

The only way to test this theory is to turn to the sources for military service and to discern what proportion of the men named on the armorials participated in the military campaigns of the first two Edwards. One of the largest rolls was the Lord Marshal's Roll, composed in 1295 shortly before the outbreak of war in Scotland. This armorial, of which the only version to have survived is a copy dating from the seventeenth century, contains 588 charges, but when kings, earls, Welshmen and Scotsmen are subtracted, together with the numerous unidentifiable blazons, we are left with 499 Englishmen of the ranks of banneret and knight bachelor. Of these, around 405, or 81 per cent, can be traced in the service records between 1277 and 1314, but for a number of reasons this figure is likely to underestimate the total. As noted already, not all soldiers served for pay or as part of their feudal obligations. Unless they took out letters of protection or attorney, men such as these simply do not appear in the campaign records compiled by royal clerks. A more serious problem is that the seventeenth-century copy appears to be riddled with transcription errors. Some of the captions on the roll 'are garbled',[127] and it has already been shown that the William Ughtred named on the roll, a man who does not seem to have existed, was a transcription error for Robert Ughtred who fought in the king's wars.[128] Of the ninety or so men on the roll who do not appear to have given military service, Gerard Brault has been unable to identify fifteen. The most likely reason is that there are a few mistaken identities. These errors were made because 'Lord Marshal's Roll was a seriously flawed armorial at the outset…or [one] that had deteriorated badly'.[129]

The largest armorial of the age was not the Lord Marshal's Roll but the Parliamentary Roll which dates from around 1312. This heraldic record, which contains some 1,100 names, including around 850 knights bachelor arranged, albeit imperfectly, by county, has been described as 'the nearest that medieval England ever produced to a national armorial'.[130] Given the sheer number of men who are listed, the natural inclination would be to assume that most of the individuals whose coats are blazoned had never seen active military service. However, a prosopographical analysis of the knights named on the roll, utilising the military records for the four decades leading up to and including Bannockburn, shows that the majority had fought as mounted warriors at some stage in their careers. These results are summarised below.

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[127] G.J. Brault, 'A French Source of the Lord Marshal's Roll (1295-6)', *The Antiquaries Journal*, lxxiii (1993), 27.
[128] Ayton, 'Sir Thomas Ughtred ', 115, n. 36.
[129] *Aspilogia III*, i, 324.
[130] M. Keen, 'Heraldry and Hierarchy: Esquires and Gentlemen', *Orders and Hierarchies in Late Medieval and Renaissance Europe*, ed. J. Denton (London, 1999), 97. For the roll; *PW*, i, 410-20.

Table 1.1: Military Service among the 'County' Knights on the PRA

County	Total knights	Number who served	County	Total knights	Number who served
Corn./Devon	14	9 (64%)	Derb./Notts.	22	19 (86%)
Dorset/Som.	20	17 (85%)	Lincolnshire	58	48 (83%)
Wilts./Hants.	33	32 (97%)	Yorkshire	43	38 (88%)
Sussex/Surrey	26	22 (85%)	Huntingdon.	12	8 (67%)
Kent	41	39 (95%)	Northants./Rut.	36	29 (81%)
Middlesex	5	3 (60%)	Leicestershire	40	32 (80%)
Berkshire	13	13 (100%)	Warwickshire	31	26 (84%)
Oxfordshire	23	20 (87%)	Worcestershire	11	10 (91%)
Buckingham.	29	22 (76%)	Gloucestershire	54	47 (87%)
Bedfordshire	21	14 (67%)	Herefordshire	20	20 (100%)
Hertfordshire	12	9 (75%)	Cheshire	10	8 (80%)
Essex	58	49 (84%)	Shropshire	17	17 (100%)
Suffolk	60	47 (78%)	Staffordshire	12	11 (92%)
Norfolk	59	46 (78%)	Cumb./Northu.	28	26 (93%)
Cambridge.	29	20 (69%)	Westm./Lancs.	17	13 (76%)
Total number of men: 854			Total who had served: 714 (84%)		

Remarkably, a total of 714, or 84 per cent, of the knights bachelor whom it has been possible to identify on the county section of the PRA appear to have given military service between the first Welsh war of 1277 and the battle of Bannockburn. Nominal record linkage on such a scale, even when the various reference works are consulted, is a difficult and imperfect exercise, but the margin of error is unlikely to be great. Furthermore, when we consider that military service among genteel *families* is just as revealing as that given by *individuals*, the problem of duplicated names need not cause concern. With these caveats in mind, the figures presented here retain their significance, not simply as they mirror those given for the Lord Marshal's Roll, but also because they show that military service among the gentry was more widespread than has generally been perceived. Denholm-Young's suggestion, that 'there were, including earls and barons, some 1,250 actual knights in England, as against some 500 fighting knights', has to be revised, not least because the 700 warriors noted above does not include the hundred or so earls and bannerets who are also listed on the PRA and who were, almost without exception, the most active campaigners of their day.[131] For some counties, this commitment to military service should not occasion surprise. Cheshire and Shropshire, along with other shires on the Welsh border, had become highly militarised during the Welsh wars. Many of the knights listed under those counties on the PRA gave regular

[131] N. Denholm-Young, 'Feudal Society in the Thirteenth Century: The Knights', 87.

service in the retinues of the Marcher lords. John Pichard took out letters of protection with John Tregoz and Fulk Fitz Waryn on separate occasions; John de Orreby rode in the *comitiva* of Reginald de Grey in Wales in 1294, and Scotland in 1301 and 1303; and Roger de Chandos can be found in the retinue of the earl of Gloucester in 1306 before joining the earl of Hereford at Bannockburn.[132] The results for other counties with far less 'geographical' connection with Edwardian theatres of war are more startling. Table 1.2 provides a breakdown of the data for the knights listed under Berkshire where the proportion of those who had given military service was surprisingly high.

Table 1.2: Military Service of Berkshire Knights on the PRA (1277-1314)[133]

Name	Place and year of service
Thomas de Coudray	Gascony (1294), Flanders (1297), Scotland (x 7, 1298-1314)
Robert Achard	Scotland (1300, 1303, 1306, 1314)
Richard Fokeram	Wales (1294)
Robert de Sindlesham	Wales (1282), Scotland (1298)
John de la Ryvere	Wales (1294), Flanders (1297), Scotland (x 8, 1298-1314)
John de la Huse	Wales (1294), Scotland (1303, 1306)
John de Lenham	Wales (1277), Gascony (1294), Scotland (1304, 1310)
Adam Martel	Scotland (1314)
Roger de Ingelfeld	Scotland (1306)
William Videlou	Flanders (1297), Scotland (1303)
John de la Beche	Scotland (1297, 1301, 1303, 1306, 1310, 1314)
Richard de Wyndesore	Flanders (1297), Scotland (1300)
John de Foxley	Wales (1294)

That so many of the knights listed under counties like Berkshire, Oxfordshire and Kent appear to have served as cavalrymen illustrates just how widespread military service was among the gentry. It also confirms the point made earlier on the strong connection between knighthood and war under Edward I and his son. More importantly, the

[132] Pichard: 1296 (C 67/11, m. 1); 1297 (C 67/12, m. 9). Orreby: 1294 (*CCW*, 46); 1301 (BL, Add. MS 7966a, f. 84r); 1303 (C 67/15, m. 4). Chandos: 1306 (C 67/16, m. 11); 1314 (C 71/6, m. 5).

[133] Coudray (*RG*, iii, 166; C 67/12, m. 3d; *Gough*, 187; C 67/14, m. 11d; C 67/14, m. 3; C 67/15, m. 11; C 47/5/7, m. 1; *CDS*, v, 446; C 71/6, m. 5); Achard (C 67/14, m. 11; C 67/15, m. 12; C 67/16, m. 6; C 71/6, m. 3; another Robert Achard died c.1298, so only the service after that date has been ascribed to this individual, *Knights of Edward I*, i, 3-4); Fokeram (C 67/10, m. 4); Sindlesham (SC 1/10, no. 99; C 67/13, m. 8); de la Ryvere (C 67/10, m. 5d; E 101/6/28, m. 2i; *Gough*, 216; C 67/14, m. 10; C 67/14, m. 2; E 101/612/10, m. 1; *CDS*, v, 445; J.R.S. Phillips, *Aymer de Valence, Earl of Pembroke 1307-1324: Baronial Politics in the Reign of Edward II* (Oxford, 1972), appendix 2; C 71/5, m. 4; C 71/6, m. 5); de la Huse (C 67/10, m. 5; C 67/15, m. 15; C 67/16, m. 10; this individual has been distinguished, as far as possible, from another man named John de Huse); Lenham (*PW*, i, 207; *RG*, iii, 125; *CVCR*, 93; *PW*, II ii, 408; we are probably right to ascribe this service to the father rather than the son, who inherited his father's lands in 1316, *Knights of Edward I*, iii, 29-30); Martel (C 71/6, m. 5); Ingelfeld (C 67/16, m. 6); Videlou (C 67/12, m. 2; C 67/15, m. 9); de la Beche (E 101/6/30, m. 1; E 101/9/23, m. 3; E 101/612/11, m. 3d; E 101/13/16, f. 17r; C 71/4, m. 13; C 71/6, m. 3), Wyndesore (C 67/12, m. 3; C 67/14, m. 9); Foxley (C 67/10, m. 4).

evidence provided by both the Lord Marshal's Roll and PRA indicates that the rolls of arms of Edward I and Edward II should be understood in a military context. Once it is accepted that the individuals named on the rolls of arms are primarily, if not exclusively, men who served as mounted warriors in the king's armies, we can begin to relate the information contained in the rolls to the military history of the two reigns. Particularly interesting in this context is the way that the appearance of knights on the rolls of arms often coincided with the onset of their military careers. Ingelram de Berenger is named on the Lord Marshal's Roll a year after serving for the first time in Wales.[134] Other men whose military careers began around 1295 and who are listed for the first time on that roll include Adam de Welles, John de Ralegh and Adam de Huddleston.[135] Still more striking, given the link between knighthood and military service that has already been noted, is the rapidity with which newly-made knights appeared on the rolls of arms following their receipt of that honour. At least seventeen of the men who were knighted at the Feast of Swans in 1306 are named on the Nativity Roll, which was probably composed in the following year.[136] Heralds were evidently very diligent in the modification of their records. Closely linked to this point is the way that many individuals appear in the heraldic records within a short time of being distrained to knighthood. Not only does this provide more evidence of the success of the distraint orders in creating new knights but it also, more importantly, enables us to trace the widening of the armigerous community to include new families and individuals who may never previously have borne coats of arms.[137]

The first distraint order issued by Edward I was of the twenty-librate holders in 1278. Intriguingly, no fewer than thirty-three of the men who were forced to become knights on that occasion appear on the Heralds' Roll of the following year. It is difficult to know how many of the families thus represented were receiving coats of arms for the first time but it is clear that some, such as John d'Abernon of Surrey, whose arms *azure, a chevron or* can be found on a monumental brass in the parish church that bears his name, were simply assuming the charges that had been borne into battle by their ancestors.[138] Nevertheless, there were others, such as Richard de Ashburnham, Roger le Covert and Hamo Bonet, each of whom was distrained from the counties of Surrey and

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[134] *Aspilogia III*, ii, 46; C 67/10, m. 5.
[135] Welles (C 67/10, m. 3); Ralegh (*RG*, iii, 170); Huddleston (*RG*, iii, 161). For their heraldic biographies, see *Aspilogia III*, ii, 233, 355 and 451.
[136] Denholm-Young, *History and Heraldry*, 117.
[137] The number of knights in England 'would seem to have risen somewhat in the time of, and as a result of the activities of, Edward I'; P. Coss, 'Knights, Esquires and the Origins of Social Gradation in England', *TRHS*, 6th ser., v (1995), 155.
[138] Clayton, *Catalogue of Rubbings of Brasses*, Plate 1.

Sussex, who might have been the first members of their families to bear arms. Given that we only have the returns from ten counties, a very large number of families were possibly adopting heraldic trappings in response to the distraint order of 1278. This pattern re-emerges later in the reign: eleven of the men who were distrained to knighthood in 1292 appear on the rolls of arms for the first time in either 1295 or 1300. By that time there had been ample opportunity for the forebears of these knights to have been named on the earlier armorials, but Alexander de Botheby, entered on the Lord Marshal's Roll of 1295, seems to have been the first, and perhaps only man of that name to bear the arms *gules, two chevrons within a bordure argent.*[139] The same applies to Robert de Flixthorp who appears on the rolls of arms for the only time in 1295.[140] This influx of new men and families into the social and military elite continued into the reign of Edward II. Several men who were distrained to knighthood in 1312 or 1316, and whose ancestors seem never to have been knights, later emerged on the early rolls of arms of Edward III. Gilbert de Cokerington, who was distrained in Yorkshire in 1316, was perhaps the 'G. de Cokerington' listed on the Ashmolean Roll of 1334,[141] whilst the 'Monsieur de Metstede', who is on both that roll and Cotgrave's Ordinary, might have been the Andrew de Medestede who was distrained for the counties of Surrey and Sussex in the same year.[142] No knights with these surnames appear in the military records, or rolls of arms, of the reign of Edward I.

What the combined testimony of the military and armorial records reveals, therefore, is a process of heraldic diffusion which was both driven by, and reflective of, the heightened military demands of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. Warfare during this period was instrumental in instigating social and cultural change. It led to the militarization not of the leading magnates and nobility, whose interest in warfare probably never ceased even during the relatively peaceful reign of Henry III, but of the men who lay on the fringe of the social elite and whose previous experience of warfare is likely to have been minimal.[143] Furthermore, by adopting the arms of their feudal lords and military leaders, these new knights absorbed the militaristic ethos of their superiors. In this way, a visual culture which may otherwise have been in danger

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[139] C 47/1/3, m. 2; *Aspilogia III*, ii, 66.

[140] He did not receive knighthood by the deadline in 1292 (E 198/3/5, m. 106d), but this pressure seems to have persuaded him to accept knighthood during the intervening years before the Lord Marshal's Roll was composed in 1295 (*Knights of Edward I*, ii, 74; *Aspilogia III*, ii, 178).

[141] C 47/1/8, m. 31; R.W. Mitchell ed. *English Mediaeval Rolls of Arms: Volume 1, 1244-1334* (Peebles, 1983), 482. He should not be confused with the Cokington family who bore different designs.

[142] C 47/1/8, m. 26d; Mitchell, *English Mediaeval Rolls of Arms*, 483; N.H. Nicolas ed., *Rolls of Arms of the Reigns of Henry III and Edward III* (London, 1829), 38.

[143] This is a modification of the view expressed by J. France, *Western Warfare in the Age of the Crusades, 1000-1300* (London, 1999), 58-9.

of gradual stagnation and decay was enlivened and enriched. Coss has shown that the Richard de Egebaston knighted at the Feast of Swans in 1306 abandoned the arms of his father and adopted those of the Astley family with whom he served on the campaign of that year.[144] Such modifications can also be detected among newly-distrained knights who were keen to associate themselves with prestigious figures within the military community. On the Lord Marshal's Roll William de Stopham, who was distrained to knighthood in Yorkshire in 1278, appears with the arms *argent, a bend sable*. By the time of Collins' Roll of the following year he had added an escutcheon bearing the lion rampant purpure of the earl of Lincoln with whom he served on numerous occasions.[145] Roger le Bret, who was distrained by the sheriff of Lincolnshire in 1292, also made his armorial debut on the Lord Marshal's Roll where he bore the arms of his feudal lord and military leader Edmund Deyncurt differenced.[146]

The reason why prominent magnates like Deyncurt were prepared to allow lesser men to adopt arms similar to their own is demonstrated by an entry on the patent rolls dated February 1314. By that time, Deyncurt's thoughts were turning increasingly towards his death. Although he was to live on until 1327, he was already concerned that his surname and arms would be lost from memory in the person of his immediate heir, his daughter Isabella. He therefore begged Edward II to allow him to enfeoff whomsoever he wished of the lands that he held in chief, so that the persons whom he so enfeoffed might bear his surname and arms in his memory and honour.[147] This concern, to ensure that his name and arms, *azure billety and a fess dancetty or*, continued beyond his death, demonstrates the strong link between heraldry and lineage which, as David Crouch has shown, obtained in the Middle Ages.[148] It also reminds us of the image presented by Geoffrey Luterel in the famous psalter that bears his name where Sir Geoffrey, adorned in full heraldic trappings on his warhorse, is represented on the same folio as Psalm 108, which 'makes it plain that the continuance of a lineage is dependent upon righteous living'.[149] Coats of arms carried several layers of meaning, both individualistic and familial. Indeed a magnate's armorial bearings were the most striking indication of his status and identity within aristocratic society, as well as of his

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[144] Coss, 'Knighthood, Heraldry and Social Exclusion', 63; C 67/16, m. 6.
[145] *Aspilogia III*, ii, 402. C 47/1/2, m. 5i; 1277 (*CPR 1272-81*, 189); 1294 (*RG*, iii, 161); 1298 (C 67/13, m. 5); 1300 (C 67/14, m. 11); 1301 (C 67/14, m. 2); 1306 (C 67/16, m. 10).
[146] *Aspilogia III*, ii, 73. C 47/1/3, m. 2 (distraint); for his links to Deyncurt, see *PW*, i, 204, 230.
[147] *CPR, 1313-17*, 89; M. Prestwich, *Plantagenet England, 1225-1360* (Oxford, 2005), 408.
[148] D. Crouch, 'The Historian, Lineage and Heraldry, 1050-1250', *Heraldry, Pageantry and Social Display in Medieval England*, ed. P. Coss and M. Keen (Woodbridge, 2002), 17-37.
[149] Coss, 'Knighthood, Heraldry and Social Exclusion', 43, after R. Marks, 'Sir Geoffrey Luttrell and Some Companions: Images of Chivalry *c.*1320-50', *Wiener Jahrbuch für Kunstgeschichte*, Band XLVI/XLVII (1993/4), 351.

martial prowess.[150] Given the pride and honour that was invested in such images it is not surprising that members of the nobility and baronage were glad to see their associates bearing arms similar to their own. Furthermore, men who held just one knight's fee, or whose influence did not stretch beyond the shire, were just as keen to share in the national fame and reputations of their leaders.

Through combined study of the military and heraldic records one can trace many men who, upon beginning their military careers, adopted differenced versions of the arms of their retinue commanders. The years from 1295 to 1300, when Edward began to call directly upon the services of the twenty- and forty-librate holders, were important in this respect, as many knights appear for the first time on the rolls during that time bearing arms similar to those of the men with whom they had recently begun their military service. Robert de Haustede senior, who had been a king's yeoman during the 1280s, first appears on the Lord Marshal's Roll of 1295 with an erroneous tincture. On Collins' Roll of the following year the correct blazon is given as *gules, a chief checky or and azure*: the charge in the chief was that of Robert de Clifford who Haustede accompanied to Scotland in 1296 and 1297-8.[151] A number of lesser knights had their arms listed for the first time on the Galloway Roll of 1300 which commemorates the men who were present during a skirmish at the river Cree in south-west Scotland.[152] Some of these, too, were bearing more complex versions of the arms of their superiors. One of Adam de Welles' former knights Robert de Bavent, who was with him in Flanders in 1297, appears to have differenced the Welles arms *or, a lion rampant with a forked tail sable*.[153] Edmund Bacon, who followed the St. John family to Flanders and then to Scotland in 1298, 1299, 1302 and 1303, carried on his shield the charge *gules, on a chief argent two mullets sable*, which were the arms of St. John with different tinctures.[154] In like manner, Hugh de Paunton,[155] John le Moyne[156] and William de

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[150] The centrality of heraldry to the mentality of the aristocracy is highlighted by the content of the late thirteenth-century romance, *Fouke Le Fitz Waryn*, which records the coats of arms borne by many of the characters; *Fouke Le Fitz Waryn*, ed. E.J. Hathaway, P.T. Ricketts, C.A. Robson and A.D. Wilshere, *Anglo-Norman Text Society*, xxvi-xxviii (Oxford, 1975).

[151] *Aspilogia III*, ii, 221; E 101/5/23, m. 1i; E 101/6/30, m. 1iv.

[152] On the Galloway Roll, see N. Denholm-Young, *The Country Gentry in the Fourteenth Century, With Special Reference to the Heraldic Rolls of Arms* (Oxford, 1969), 151-2; idem, 'The Galloway Roll', *Collected Papers of N. Denholm-Young* (Cardiff, 1969), 131-2.

[153] E 101/6/37, m. 4; *Aspilogia III*, ii, 37.

[154] C 67/12, m. 1; E 101/8/26, m. 3; E 101/612/12, m. 6; C 67/15, m. 14; *Aspilogia III*, ii, 23.

[155] With Bek in Scotland in 1296 (C 67/11, m. 2) and Flanders in 1297-8 (C 67/12, m. 3d), and bore *gules, two bars and in dexter chief a cross moline ermine*, the chief containing the arms of Bek; *Aspilogia III*, ii, 44, 330. He also witnessed a notarial authentication for the bishop in 1303; *Records of Antony Bek, Bishop and Patriarch 1283-1311*, ed. C.M. Fraser, Surtees Society, clxii (1953), no. 84.

[156] With Robert de Tibetot in Gascony in 1296 (*RG*, iii, 349) and Robert's son Payn in Scotland in 1306 and 1307 (E 101/13/7, m. 1; E 101/14/15, m. 9). He bore the arms *or, a saltire indented gules*, whereas both Robert and Payn de Tibetot bore *argent, a saltire indented gules*; *Aspilogia III*, ii, 295, 415.

Beaumont[157] each adopted and adapted the arms of their military leaders, namely the bishop of Durham, Payn de Tibetot and William de Ryther respectively. The complexity of many of these new arms is indicative of a visual culture which was expanding and constantly being updated as the hectic schedule of the years of crisis saw increasing numbers of men engage in military activity for the first time.

The personal relations that led to this process of dissemination can often be traced back to landholding, marital and friendship ties, which is not surprising given the overlap between the military and social spheres that obtained during the Middle Ages. One need not see a dichotomy between heraldic links that arose from social connections and those which were the result of shared military experience, for war helped to strengthen the familial and tenurial bonds that existed within local communities. Indeed, the adoption of heraldic designs by one family from another as a result of marriage ties, such as those noted by Robert Norton in relation to the retainers of Eustace de Hacche, were invested with greater meaning when the men connected in this way had served together on campaign.[158] Social bonds, military service and heraldic adaptation went hand-in-hand, each reinforcing and strengthening the other. John de Crumwell seems originally to have differenced the arms of his military leader Roger de Mohaut, *azure, a lion rampant argent*, with whom he served on the Welsh expedition of 1294-5, by adding a forked tail and a crown of gold.[159] Following Mohaut's death and his marriage into the north-western Vepont family in 1301 he changed his arms to *gules, six annulets or*, which were those of his new patrons with tinctures reversed. Before this time he had already begun to forge military service connections with other genteel families on the western March. In the opening years of the Scottish war he fought alongside Thomas de Hellebek and Hugh de Louther in the retinue of the leading magnate from that region, Robert de Clifford.[160] Louther bore the arms *or, six annulets sable*, whilst Hellebek bore *gules, six annulets or, a label argent*.[161] Although Crumwell first appears with his new arms on the Stirling Roll of 1304 and John de Vepont did not go to war with him until the year of the marriage, it would seem that Crumwell's betrothal followed, rather than

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[157] With Ryther in 1300 (E 101/8/23, m. 5) and 1301 (E 101/9/24, m. 1). He incorporated Ryther's crescents into his arms; *Aspilogia III*, ii, 42, 369.
[158] R. Norton, 'The Arms of Eustace Hatch and Others', *The Coat of Arms*, new ser., v (1982), 18-19.
[159] *Aspilogia III*, ii, 128, 294; *CCW*, 51. The lion rampant emblem was not that of his father Ralph, who had borne *argent, a chief gules surmounted by a bend azure.*
[160] Crumwell: 1297 (E 101/6/30, m. 1iv); 1298 (*Gough*, 196); 1300 (*Liber Quotidianus*, 176). Hellebek: 1298 (*Gough*, 196); 1300 (E 101/8/23, m. 5). Louther: 1297 (E 101/6/30, m. 1iv); 1298 (C 67/13, m. 7); 1300 (E 101/8/23, m. 5).
[161] *Aspilogia III*, ii, 224, 268.

preceded, his entry into the north-western military community.[162] By marrying into the Vepont family he therefore strengthened and expanded upon the social and military bonds that he had already begun to build in that region, bonds that gained expression through the distinctive six annulets charge.

Arms were not only disseminated between retinue leaders and their followers, but also between men who fought alongside one another or who shared the same locality. This has been demonstrated by Andrew Ayton with reference to the Ughtred family of Yorkshire who shared the cross patonce design with other families in the East Riding.[163] A similar charge was borne by a number of north-western families who might have been associated with the Hollands or Banasters.[164] Giles de Trumpeton, a knight who regularly followed the earl of Lincoln to war between 1294 and 1306, used a canting device in the form of *azure crusily and two trumpets pilewise or*. Given the distinctiveness of the charge we can be sure that James de Neville, who served under the earl during the same years and bore the trumpets whilst changing the tincture of the field, adopted his coat from the Trumpeton family.[165] The Echingham and St. Leger families were also bound to one another by shared military experiences. Robert de Echingham, Thomas de St. Leger and Edmund de St. Leger fought as sergeants in the company of William de Leyburn in Flanders in 1297. At Bannockburn in 1314, Robert de Echingham can again be found alongside a member of the St. Leger family, this time in the retinue of the earl of Gloucester. The camaraderie that such shared endeavours must have forged between these families was proudly displayed in the common charge of *azure fretty argent*.[166] These arms were different from those of their leaders, Leyburn and Clare. Both Bartholomew de Avylers and John de Loudham, members of genteel families from Suffolk who can be found together in Ralph de Monthermer's *comitiva* in 1314, displayed three escutcheons on a silver field.[167] Similarly, Philip de Geyton and Theobald de Neville of Northamptonshire, with John de Segrave on the Dunbar campaign in 1296, are listed close to one another on the Parliamentary Roll of Arms and bore variations on the same coat.[168] That such 'horizontal' dissemination was taking place concurrently with the process of 'vertical' dissemination between leaders and their

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[162] Crumwell was still using the lion rampant charge in 1300 so the adoption of the new coat was clearly a consequence of his marriage to Idonea de Vepont in 1301; *Aspilogia III*, ii 128. John de Vepont was with Crumwell in 1301 (E 101/9/23, m. 1); 1303 (E 101/612/7, m. 3); 1306 (E 101/612/15, m. 1).
[163] Ayton, 'Sir Thomas Ughtred', 115-8.
[164] *PW*, i, 420.
[165] *Aspilogia III*, ii, 319, 423. Trumpeton and Neville were with the earl in Gascony in 1294 and 1295 (*RG*, iii, 161, 294), and Scotland in 1300 (C 47/2/13, m. 8; C 67/14, m. 11) and 1306 (C 67/16, m. 10).
[166] E 101/6/37, m. 4; C 71/6, m. 5; C 81/1727, m. 11; *Aspilogia III*, ii, 157, 374; *PW*, i, 412.
[167] C 71/6, m. 1; *PW*, i, 414.
[168] C 67/11, m. 6; *Aspilogia III*, ii, 191, 321; *PW*, i, 417.

retainers supports Peter Coss' point about the vitality of heraldry within Edwardian England, and affirms the close connection that existed between martial display and martial conduct.[169]

When we reflect on the evidence presented here, bearing in mind the intense recruitment programme that was undertaken by Edward I, it is evident that the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries bore witness to a fundamental shift in the activities and lifestyles of the aristocracy. Most especially, for the gentry, the reigns of the first two Edwards must have come as a shock to the system as the demands of the king's wars placed unanticipated strains on their resources, both human and financial. More detailed work on the lives and activities of genteel families must be conducted before we can gauge the true extent of this shift. Some attempt will be made towards that end in a later chapter. Yet, the evidence of the mobilisation programme, combined with the enthusiasm with which many genteel families adopted the martial culture of the nobility through the medium of heraldry and visual display, suggests that both the social and the cultural consequences of Edward I's wars were immense. It may be too soon to be writing about the creation of a socio-professional elite during these years, but it is undeniable that the number of families and individuals who were involved in warfare at some stage in their lives increased dramatically. Edward I had gone a long way towards expanding the manpower pool for his wars; it was now the responsibility of the nobility and baronage to provide the leadership with which to exploit those resources to the full.

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[169] Coss, 'Knighthood, Heraldry and Social Exclusion', 56.

2

Captains, Retinue Leaders and Command

The achievements of Edward I in mobilising the country gentry for his wars in the British Isles and on the continent should not disguise the fact that the responsibility for conducting the king's campaigns and those of his son still lay primarily with the upper ranks of the aristocracy. Whilst the scale of the Crown's ambitions required the enlistment of many individuals and families who had never previously seen active service, it was the leading magnates who provided both kings with the human and financial resources without which it would have been impossible to pursue their military objectives. The earls, barons and bannerets of the realm were Edward I's chief henchmen in his attempts to conquer and colonise Wales and Scotland, and it was their assistance that both kings relied upon most heavily when attempting to defend their lands in south-western France. Without the support of the large retinues brought to war by their magnates, the kings of England would have been powerless to meet their enemies in open battle.[1] Military organisation in the Middle Ages rested as much upon the shoulders of the social elite as it did upon those of the king, and in many respects, not least in the link that they provided between Crown and gentry, theirs was the predominant role. Before proceeding to look at the identities of this elite, their careers in arms and the duties that they performed, this chapter will begin with two preliminary and closely-related questions: how did contemporaries refer to those men who held positions of military command, and what can these terms tell us about the different kinds of military leadership exercised by the aristocracy during this period?

RANK AND TITLE IN EDWARDIAN ARMIES

The terminology of rank in medieval warfare was dominated by nouns that for the most part tell us little about the details of military command. Knight, or *miles*, is a word of ancient origin that initially meant 'soldier'. As a consequence of the barbarian invasions of the fourth and fifth centuries the term gradually became associated, on the continent, with mounted warfare, but in England it was only after the Norman Conquest that

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[1] As witnessed by the farcical expedition to Flanders in 1297, on which, see N.B. Lewis, 'The English Forces in Flanders, August-November 1297', *Studies in Medieval History Presented to F.M. Powicke*, ed. R.W. Hunt, W.A. Pantin and R.W. Southern (Oxford, 1948), 310-18.

milites became synonymous with mounted soldiers, or *equites*.[2] The warriors who came to England with the Conqueror were men of varying pedigree.[3] However, towards the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, due in part to its association with the Church and the crusading movement, knighthood began to acquire the more elitist status that it had finally attained by the reign of Edward I.[4] Crystallisation at the top of the military hierarchy led in turn, as Nigel Saul has demonstrated, to the development of other military ranks below the level of knight. *Serviens*, *scutifer*, *armiger* and *vallettus* were all employed by the late thirteenth century to describe those who continued to fight on barded horses, but could no longer afford the costly trappings of knighthood.[5] Ultimately, such men were to become known as 'esquires', a term of humble origin which by the time of the sumptuary legislation of 1363 had come to denote both 'those who were on the same level economically as knights' and others with 'all manner of gentle men below the estate of knight'. Only at this point did 'esquire' truly arrive as a mark of social status.[6] Neither 'knight' nor 'esquire' had direct associations with positions of leadership on the battlefield, though here one needs to distinguish between knights bachelor and banneret. The latter received twice the pay of ordinary knights and bore rectangular banners rather than simple pennons. Unlike knights bachelor and esquires, for whom command over other soldiers was incidental to their rank, bannerets were expected to lead troops of men to war. The rectangular banner was a status symbol reflecting the wealth and social precedence of the man who bore it; but, unlike the other terms already discussed, 'banneret' did not survive as either a social or military rank much beyond the chivalrous age.[7]

'Banneret', 'knight' and 'esquire' are the socio-military terms most familiar to students of the Middle Ages. The problem that military historians face, and which highlights one of the key differences between medieval hosts and modern forces, is that whilst there were various types of military command within Edwardian England, there was no fixed hierarchy of ranks to mirror those distinctions. Even the honour of 'banneret', whilst denoting a position of authority in the field, is something of an anomaly and appears to have been conferred according to the landed wealth and social

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[2] S. Morillo, *Warfare under the Anglo-Norman Kings, 1066-1135* (Woodbridge, 1994), 11.
[3] Cf. S. Harvey, 'The Knight and the Knight's Fee in England', *Past and Present*, il (1970), 3-43; but also the revised view by D.F. Fleming, 'Landholding by *Milites* in Domesday Book: A Revision', *Anglo-Norman Studies XIII*, ed. M. Chibnall (Woodbridge, 1991), 97.
[4] Crouch, *Image of Aristocracy*, 139; K. Faulkner, 'The Transformation of Knighthood in Early Thirteenth-Century England', *EHR*, cxi (1996), 20-1.
[5] Saul, *Knights and Esquires*, 12-14.
[6] Coss, *Origins of the English Gentry*, 228-9.
[7] *Ibid*, 241-2; Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare*, 13-15.

status of the recipient rather than as a reward for outstanding military ability; at least during the reigns of the first two Edwards. One reason for the absence of any clearly-demarcated system of titles or ranks is that the armies of Edward I and his son were social organisms knitted together from the communities and localities of genteel England, rather than political institutions imposed from above. Consequently there were few precise terms, other than that of banneret, to denote soldiers who led other men-at-arms to war. As Peter Coss has reminded us, 'if we look for terminological exactitude in medieval sources we are likely, as often as not, to be disappointed'.[8] This problem is apparent in the military records throughout the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and is perhaps most clearly seen in the ordinances of war that were drawn up for Richard II's Scottish expedition of 1385. These regulations have been studied in some detail by Maurice Keen who noted that medieval hosts, unlike modern standing armies, were 'forces raised in particular circumstances, and for a limited period of service'.[9] One consequence of this was that the terms used to denote army leaders were derived from social titles used in everyday life, as well as from designations more specifically associated with the conduct of war. Thus, in clause four of the ordinances it was ordered that 'no one be so hardy as to go before, or otherwise than in the "battle" to which he belongs, under the banner or pennon of his lord or master', whilst in clause sixteen we find, in like manner, that every soldier was obliged to give a third of his booty 'a son seignur, ou mestre'.[10] Use of such phrases speaks volumes about the continued importance of social ties to the formation of English hosts, even well into the era of 'contract' armies.

Another term more traditionally used by military historians when referring to troop commanders in medieval armies is that of 'captain'. Indeed we find the words 'chevytaigne' and 'capitaigne' employed alongside 'lord' and 'master' in the army ordinances of 1385. It is not at all clear whether the words 'captain', 'lord' and 'master' were synonymous, or even whether they were always being used in the same context or to refer to the same men. In 1282, the Marcher lord Roger de Mortimer was granted permission to accept the Welshmen of Builth into the king's peace, but the gesture of conciliation was not extended to their 'captains' and 'lords'.[11] Whether 'captains' and

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[8] Coss, *Origins of the English Gentry*, 218.
[9] M. Keen, 'Richard II's Ordinances of War of 1385', *Rulers and Ruled in Late Medieval England: Essays presented to Gerald Harriss*, ed. R.E. Archer and S. Walker (London, 1995), 35.
[10] Keen, 'Richard II's Ordinances of War', 38; *Monumenta Juridica: The Black Book of the Admiralty*, ed. T. Twiss, 4 vols, Rolls Ser., lv (London, 1871-76), i, 453, 456. For more on the structure of the army, see S. Armitage-Smith, *John of Gaunt. King of Castile and Leon, Duke of Aquitaine and Lancaster, Earl of Derby, Lincoln and Leicester, Seneschal of England* (London, 1964), appendix 2.
[11] C 77/3, m. 8; *CVCR*, 221.

'lords' were here simply different words used to refer to the same men is now impossible to discern. Nevertheless, some attempt at greater precision is necessary so as to distinguish between the two main types of military leadership exercised in the armies of Edward I and his son: the command of armies, garrisons and conquered territories on the one hand, and of small troops of men-at-arms on the other. Generally speaking, 'captain' was used in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries to denote the superior type of commander. When war broke out in Wales towards the end of 1276, some prominent 'captains' were sent to the border fortifications to defend the March and organise the armed forces in that part of the country. By late November of that year, the earl of Warwick was placed in command of the king's men-at-arms in Lancashire and Cheshire, whilst Roger de Mortimer kept guard of the central Marches from his strategic position as 'captain' of Shropshire, Staffordshire, Herefordshire and the surrounding areas.[12] When Hugh de Vere was placed in charge of the garrison of St. Sever in Gascony in 1295, the chronicler Nicholas Trivet felt it appropriate to describe him as a *capitaneus*.[13] The word 'captain' was also frequently employed when referring to the high-ranking officers who commanded the major divisions within royal and baronial armies. Thomas Wykes described the earl of Gloucester as the captain of a 'battle' (*aciei...capitaneus*) when he fought on the royalist side at Evesham.[14] Furthermore, the roll of arms for the battle of Falkirk names the earl of Lincoln as the *cheveteyn de la premiere batayle* and the earl Warenne as *cheveteyn de la quarte batayle*.[15]

The type of military command with which the word *capitaneus* or *cheveteyn* was most closely associated was the leadership of regional armies, or of hosts gathered when the king could not be present in person. During the first Welsh war, Payn de Chaworth was active as a captain in west Wales whilst the main army was being assembled in the north.[16] Later, the earls of Richmond, Lancaster and Lincoln were employed in a similar capacity in Gascony at a time when Edward was distracted by rebellions in Wales and Scotland.[17] Such captaincies became increasingly common as Scottish resistance stiffened in the years following Bruce's rebellion. In 1306 the English force was divided, for strategic purposes, into several smaller hosts. The leaders of these armies - Aymer de Valence, Henry de Percy, and Robert de Clifford - were described as

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[12] *PW*, i, 193.
[13] *Trivet*, 336.
[14] *Wykes*, 172.
[15] *Aspilogia III*, i, 406, 415.
[16] *Trivet*, 296.
[17] Below, 62-3.

'captains' in the letter of confirmation sent by the king to the men of the north.[18] In some years, even though large royal armies ventured north of the border, it was necessary to appoint lieutenants to control the areas where the king could not be present in person. The host that campaigned in Scotland in 1303 spent much of its time in the north of the country, which left the south and the border counties of England open to enemy incursions. To reduce this threat, Edward appointed Aymer de Valence as captain south of the Firth of Forth.[19] During his tenure of that office, Valence referred to himself in his correspondence with the Crown as 'cheventeyn del ost et lui tenaunt nostre seignur le Roi'.[20] In 1311, when the army of Edward II spent many months inactive in the vicinity of Berwick upon Tweed, the earl of Angus was made captain in the north of Scotland: his objective was to prevent Bruce from obtaining more supporters in that part of the country. Although he was joined by a small group of barons headed by Payn de Tibetot, only the earl was accorded the official title of *capitaneus*.[21] Following the complete breakdown of order on the northern border after Bannockburn, an attempt was made to return to the old system under which the peacekeeping powers of the *custos* had been combined with the military weight of the captain.[22] In 1315, Edward II and his council reacted to the threat of a further Scottish invasion of northern England by making Aymer de Valence, that most trusted leader, captain and warden of the March (*capitaneus et custos Marchie*). Once again, though joined by the powerful lords Mohaut and Badlesmere, it was made clear that overall command lay in the hands of the earl.[23]

'Captain' was not the only word used to denote military commanders during the wars of Edward I and Edward II. Walter of Guisborough employed *duces* to refer to John Giffard and Roger de Mortimer junior, two of the chief officers during the Welsh war of 1282. The same author felt that *custodes* was the most appropriate usage for the three main army leaders in 1307.[24] Personal taste and stylistic idiosyncrasies are always likely to impose themselves on the neat constructs of historians, so one must be careful not to exaggerate the predominance of one particular mode of description over another. Despite his observation that the duties of the military captain and the *custos pacis* were separated early in the reign of Edward I, Alan Harding was aware that 'on the Welsh

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[18] C 66/127, m. 28; *CDS*, ii, no. 1754; *CPR, 1301-07*, 426.
[19] *CCR, 1302-07*, 59.
[20] SC 1/31, no. 33.
[21] Bodleian Library, Tanner MS 197, f. 52r.
[22] Cf. *CPR, 1292-1301*, 185.
[23] E 101/376/7, f. 60r. For further discussion on such captains, see C. McNamee, *The Wars of the Bruces: Scotland, England and Ireland 1306-1328* (East Linton, 1997), 147-52.
[24] *Guisborough*, 220, 378.

March the captain and the *custos pacis* remained undifferentiated, for the subjugation of the Welsh was regarded as a matter of "the king's peace"'.[25] A similar situation obtained in Scotland and the northern counties of England where the constant threat of enemy attack meant that the captain had defensive duties to perform not dissimilar to those of the *custos*. As we have seen, the two roles were sometimes combined under the same man. Fluctuating fortunes on the northern March meant that there was often little to distinguish aggressor from victim: raids from both sides were a common phenomenon of border life. The first appointment of a *custos*, or 'warden', in disputed territories came in 1201 when Hubert de Burgh was named keeper of the border between England and Wales (*custodem finium Angliae et Walliae*).[26] During the early stages of the Anglo-Scottish wars of the late thirteenth century such appointments became increasingly common until by 1309 they had evolved into the permanent institution of Warden of the March.[27] Insurgent activity following the English victory at Dunbar meant that all of Scotland rather than simply the border area was regarded as a region requiring the attention of a permanent official. Consequently, one finds the earl Warenne being named *custodem nostrum regni et terre Scotie* in 1296 and Brian Fitz Alan offered the same position the following year.[28] The wording of these appointments suggests that the *custos* was primarily a territorial official, in contrast to the *capitaneus* for whom the emphasis was on command over other men-at-arms. However, given the notorious vagueness of medieval military terminology, it would be unwise to make too much of this distinction: wardens also commanded men-at-arms, just as captains patrolled regional zones.

The captains and wardens of government record evidently possessed considerable authority, wielding powers that had been conferred on them by the king and his council. In other contexts the 'captain' could be understood in a more pluralistic sense, sometimes referring, as in the later fourteenth century, to the lesser company leaders within the armies; but, it is unusual to find *capitaneus* employed in this way in the chancery and exchequer accounts of the period.[29] Contemporaries were aware of the need to distinguish between the different levels of military command within Edwardian hosts and sought, where necessary, to make such distinctions clear. This is shown by a

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[25] A. Harding, 'The Origins and Early History of the Keeper of the Peace', *TRHS*, 5th ser., x (1960), 101.
[26] F.C. Suppe, *Military Institutions on the Welsh Marches: Shropshire, A.D. 1066-1300* (Woodbridge, 1994), 102.
[27] R.R. Reid, 'The Office of Warden of the Marches; Its Origin and Early History', *EHR*, xxxii (1917), 481-2.
[28] *Rotuli Scotiae*, i, 27, 45.
[29] For a rare instance of such usage, see C 54/123, m. 8d; *CCR, 1302-07*, 455.

list that has survived from 1315 containing the names of northern lords summoned by the archbishop of York to do military service. The archbishop wished to convene a meeting of the region's most influential landowners, to be held at Doncaster, for the purpose of defending the north of England against Scottish invasion. Some fifty men were summoned by name but only ten of these were described as chief captains (*principales capitanei*). This group included Robert de Clifford, Henry de Percy, Ralph Fitz William and Peter de Mauley: the elite of the northern soldiery. The remaining list ended with the word *milites*. Some prominent names can be found among this second group of 'knights', such as Twenge, Furnivall, Meynill and Constable.[30] These were all men who led armed companies on royal campaigns in the hosts of Edward I and his son, but the distinction between the 'chief captains' and 'knights' is significant. It reflects the presence within medieval armies of different levels of power and authority, as well as the tendency to use social or quasi-social terms, such as *barones* or *milites*, for the lower rung of leaders. In this context it should be remembered that the ordinances drawn up for Richard II's campaign of 1385 referred to retinue leaders not only as 'capitaignes' but also, more frequently, as 'seignurs ou mestres'. Such usage was reflective of the fundamentally social nature of these tightly-knit companies.

If, under Edward I and Edward II, the word 'captain' normally referred to men appointed by royal commission to lead hosts or defend territorial zones, the question remains as to how we should characterise the smaller companies that comprised English armies. As we have seen, the leaders of these units were sometimes simply referred to as 'lords' or 'masters', but there were other alternatives. One way of describing these units was to refer to the banners that each lord led into battle. 'Men who had banners were great men, for the practical reason that only a man with the resources to lead a company of troops would need such an item to distinguish himself from others'.[31] The army that the Lord Edward led towards London in 1267 consisted, we are told, of 109 *vexilla*.[32] Bartholomew Cotton goes into greater detail on the English army at Falkirk. The host was divided into four 'battles', the first of which consisted of twenty-three *vexilla comitum et magnatum*.[33] He puts the count for the second battle under the bishop of Durham at twenty-three banners, but Guisborough gives a higher figure of thirty-six *vexillarii*.[34] Cotton's account would appear to have been the more accurate of the two,

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[30] *Historical Papers and Letters from the Northern Registers*, ed. J. Raine, Rolls Ser., lxi (London, 1873), 246-7.
[31] Crouch, *Image of Aristocracy*, 114.
[32] *Ann. Winton.*, 105.
[33] *Cotton*, 343-4.
[34] *Ibid*; *Guisborough*, 327.

for the Falkirk Roll names twenty-seven bannerets in Bek's division.[35] In 1324, it was reported that Roger de Mortimer of Wigmore was planning to cross to England as the 'cheventein' of a rebel army along with 'les autres bannis', traitors of the lord king.[36] This highlights a terminological distinction between the main commander and his subordinate leaders. The significance of bannerets and banner-bearers at this level of military organisation is further suggested by the canon of Bridlington who described the rebel baronial army of 1322 as comprising *multi...barones et baneretti*.[37] This division into battles and banners matched continental practice: J.F. Verbruggen has noted that the French army that fought the Flemish at Cassel in 1328 consisted of a dozen battles comprising a total of 196 banners.[38] Most other depictions of royal hosts tended to be less precise than this. The army that fought in Wales in 1277 consisted, we are told, of 'earls and barons'.[39] Similarly, the host that the earl of Cornwall led into Wales against Rhys ap Maredudd in 1287 was led by the earl, as keeper of England, along with other 'earls, barons, knights, and all the army of England'.[40] Few chroniclers entered into much detail concerning the composition of the king's forces.

Such descriptions of medieval armies may strike the modern reader as imprecise and vague, but they reflect the way that these armies were formed. Military captains and wardens were essential to the smooth running of the Crown's campaigns; their power stemmed primarily from the fact that they were agents of the central administration. These officers, as revealed in the records of chancery and exchequer, were men who occupied specific positions of command, whether that was over garrisons in the Welsh borderlands or regional armies in the north of Scotland. For the most part, the contingents that comprised royal hosts were led not by 'captains' of this kind but by 'earls', 'barons' and 'knights', terms of a social origin. Bannerets formed the crucial tactical link between the battle commanders and the lesser company leaders, but such precise ranks were rare below the level of captain or warden. Both high command and retinue leadership were important elements of the martial dominance enjoyed by the social elite. Therefore, each must be considered separately if we are to appreciate the

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[35] *Aspilogia III*, i, 408-11.
[36] *The War of Saint-Sardos (1323-1325). Gascon Correspondence and Diplomatic Documents*, ed. P. Chaplais, Camden Society 3rd ser., lxxxvii (1954), 72.
[37] 'Gesta Edwardi de Carnarvon, Auctore Canonico Bridlingtoniensi, cum Continuatione ad A.D. 1377', *Chronicles of the Reigns of Edward I and Edward II*, ed. W. Stubbs, 2 vols, Rolls Ser., lxxvi (London, 1882-3), ii, 74.
[38] Verbruggen, *Art of Warfare*, 81.
[39] *Annales Cestrienses; or, Chronicle of the Abbey of St. Werburg, at Chester*, ed. R.C. Christie, The Record Society for the Publication of Original Documents Relating to Lancashire and Cheshire, xiv (1886), 104.
[40] *Ann. Lond.*, 96.

layered and multi-faceted nature of magnate authority and influence in war. To reflect this distinction, the words 'captain' and 'warden' are used throughout the ensuing discussion and the rest of the thesis to refer to those who held high command, whereas 'retinue leaders' is employed to denote the leaders of the individual *comitivae*, however great or small the latter.

HIGH COMMAND: POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

In the summer of 1297, Hugh de Cressingham, treasurer of Scotland and figure of hatred among the native population, sent a letter to Edward I on the state of affairs north of the border. Policing the country was proving difficult and, to make matters worse, a crisis had arisen among the leaders of the English force. Brian Fitz Alan's refusal to take up the position as keeper of Scotland had created uncertainty within the army as day by day the strength of the enemy continued to grow. In his report, Cressingham urged the king to appoint a new commander-in-chief with all haste, 'for, in proportion as the matter is pressed onwards with good thought and good deliberation, so much the better for you'.[41] On 7 September the earl was reappointed as leader of the expedition, but just four days later, at a time when both he and his men were still coming to terms with the new command structure, the occupying army was routed by the Scots at Stirling Bridge. The treasurer was among those killed, his warning having been heeded too late to save his life and the lives of many others. Some twenty years later, in 1319, the English suffered yet another military setback at the hands of the Scots. As the host under Edward II besieged Berwick castle, a Scottish raiding force slipped across the border and proceeded to plunder the north of England. At Myton on Swale it met with resistance from a local militia organised by the archbishop of York, but the valiant defence did not last for long. According to the author of the *Anonimalle Chronicle*, 'the Scots, who were well marshalled and well equipped for war, had great scorn for the English…and soon the English were killed and defeated'.[42] What had begun as a battle degenerated into a massacre, and the unskilled and untrained Yorkshiremen proved to be no match for the enemy under experienced baronial commanders.

The defeat at Stirling Bridge and the debacle at Myton, though separated by two decades and different in a number of respects, illustrate equally well the importance of strong and decisive leadership in medieval warfare. Though a number of errors,

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[41] *Stevenson*, ii, 226.
[42] *The Anonimalle Chronicle 1307-1334, From Brotherton Collection MS. 29*, ed. W.R. Childs and J. Taylor, The Yorkshire Archaeological Society Record Ser., cxlvii (1991), 99.

including tactical decisions made on the day of the battle, led to the catastrophe in 1297, the confusion over leadership of the army, together with the slow resolution of that problem, was undoubtedly a contributing factor. At Myton, the contrast between the trained and disciplined Scottish host and the piecemeal contingents put together by William de Melton meant that the outcome of the 'battle' was never really in doubt. An army without competent leadership, no matter how brave the men in it, was little better than a disorderly rabble. Medieval military theorists, like modern historians, were able to discern the implications of such events. Writing early in the fifteenth century, Christine de Pizan observed that in war, 'nothing has greater importance than the selection of military leaders'.[43] As military men themselves, most medieval kings were aware of the need to select captains whose good service and prestige would set an example to others. A problem that they faced, as in all ages, was to discern who the most able men were, for the numerous administrative and military qualities that were required in a leader were rarely found in one man. The processes by which military commanders were selected are now hidden from view, but by considering the characteristics of the soldiers who were entrusted with such responsibilities it may be possible to reconstruct the criteria according to which captaincy commissions were issued.

Experience was perhaps the most relevant qualification that a candidate for military leadership could possess. It was the strong war record of the earl Warenne that made him such a promising choice for the custodianship of Scotland in 1297: the composer of a contemporary song on the Scottish wars observed that the king had appointed 'a worthy man to the government of the kingdom, John de Warenne, whom he had often proved'.[44] The earl's military career had been suitably active for a man of his status. A veteran of the reign of Henry III, he had fought alongside the Lord Edward at Lewes before going on to serve with distinction throughout the Welsh wars, helping to put down the rising of Rhys ap Maredudd in 1287 whilst the king was in France.[45] Although a sexagenarian by 1297, he had shown sufficient ability in defeating the Scottish feudal army at Dunbar in the previous year to suggest that his age need not be a

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[43] Christine de Pizan, *The Book of Deeds of Arms and of Chivalry*, trans. S. Willard and ed. C.C. Willard (Pennsylvania, 1999), 23.

[44] *Thomas Wright's Political Songs of England: From the Reign of John to that of Edward II*, with introduction by P. Coss (Cambridge, 1996), 168.

[45] *Chronica et Annales*, 26. He received a prest in 1287 (E 372/132, m. 1), and obtained letters of protection for his men in 1277 (*CPR, 1272-81*, 222), 1282-3 (C 67/8, mm. 3-4), and 1294-5 (C 67/10, m. 7).

bar to success.[46] For the greater part of his reign Edward placed his trust in those, like the earl, who were soldiers of his own generation.[47] A number of knights who had been on crusade with the prince during 1270-2, including Robert de Tibetot, Payn de Chaworth, William de Valence and the king's brother, Edmund of Lancaster, held positions of command during the Welsh wars of 1277 and 1282-3.[48] Other veterans of the expedition to the east, most notably John de St. John, later gave prominent service in Gascony and Scotland, providing the king with an experienced and able leadership corps during the years of crisis.[49] Despite the arrival of a new generation of commanders in the late 1290s, the majority of those employed as wardens on the Scottish March had cut their teeth as retinue leaders during the wars against Llywelyn ap Gruffydd. Brian Fitz Alan was offered the position of *custos* of Scotland in 1297, twenty years after first campaigning against the Welsh;[50] and William le Latimer,[51] Robert Fitz Roger[52] and John de Segrave[53] were just a few of those for whom command in the Scottish wars was reward for a lifetime of military activity on behalf of the Crown.

From the mid-1290s, when the scale of warfare increased due to the outbreak of hostilities in France and Scotland, military experience was less difficult to come by than it had been during the relatively peaceful period following Edward I's accession. When the earl of Pembroke was appointed as captain and keeper in Scotland in 1314, it was observed that he had been selected because of the industry and diligence that he had shown in the past.[54] In the seventeen years since first serving as a retinue leader on the Flanders campaign in 1297, he had fought, not uncommonly for those coming of age at that time, on at least eight different expeditions, seven of which had been conducted north of the border.[55] Following a successful apprenticeship as captain in southern

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[46] The earl was born 'in or after August 1231'; *Complete Peerage*, xii (i), 503. On the battle of Dunbar, see G.W.S. Barrow, *Robert Bruce and the Community of the Realm of Scotland*, 3rd edition (Edinburgh, 1988), 72.

[47] Cf. Prestwich, *War, Politics and Finance*, 49.

[48] For their participation in the crusade, see S. Lloyd, *English Society and the Crusade 1216-1307* (Oxford, 1988), appendix 4; B. Beebe, 'The English Baronage and the Crusade of 1270', *BIHR*, xlviii (1975), appendix. For their appointments to captaincies in Wales, see: Tibetot (*PW*, i, 222); Chaworth (*CCR, 1272-79*, 366); Valence (*PW*, i, 227); Lancaster (*CPR, 1272-81*, 213).

[49] Below, 56, 58-9, 61-6.

[50] Service in Wales (*CPR, 1272-81*, 190). For his appointment in 1297, see above, n. 28.

[51] Captaincy (*PW*, i, 319); in Wales (E 101/4/1, m. 2); household service (E 101/4/9; E 101/351/26, m. 1).

[52] Captaincy (*PW*, i, 301); Wales in 1277 (E 101/3/12), 1282 (C 67/8, m. 8d), 1287 (E 372/132, m. 1), 1294-5 (C 67/10, m. 6); Scotland in 1296 (C 67/11, m. 3).

[53] Captaincy (*Foedera*, II, i, 70); service in Wales (*PW*, i, 206, 233).

[54] *Foedera*, II, i, 252.

[55] Flanders in 1297 (BL, Add. MS 7965, f. 68r); Scotland in 1298 (Gough, 216), 1300 (C 67/14, m. 11), 1301 (E 101/9/24, m. 1d), 1302 (C 67/15, m. 16), 1303-4 (E 101/612/8, m. 1), 1306 (E 101/13/16) and 1307 (C 67/16, m. 3). He was also on the March in the winter of 1311-12; C 71/5, m. 4.

Scotland in 1303, he went on to lead small armies north of the border in 1306 and 1307. During that time, he confronted Robert Bruce in battle on two occasions and defeated his adversary at Methven. When the northern counties of England were faced with repeated Scottish raids in the months following Bannockburn, he was the commander to whom Edward II naturally turned to stem the tide. Reappointments of this kind were common as an elite band of warriors was repeatedly drawn on to occupy the most important military positions. Robert Fitz Roger served on the eastern March in 1297, then again in 1300, before leading a group of Northumbrian stipendiaries in 1306.[56] John de Segrave was employed as a captain on the March throughout much of the opening decade of the fourteenth century.[57] Earlier, both William de Valence and Reginald de Grey had provided an important thread of continuity throughout the Welsh campaigns of the first three decades of the reign.[58]

Not all men appointed by the Crown to important positions of command were experienced war veterans. Robert de Clifford was in his early twenties and had only recently begun to serve as a retinue leader when he was named keeper of the western March in 1296.[59] In this instance, geographical proximity to the sphere of war appears to have been decisive, as the Cliffords were the largest landowning family in the affected area. It has been suggested that 'lack of money' sometimes forced the king 'to engage as his captains the men who had a personal interest in keeping the Marches safe'.[60] In all likelihood, such men were especially strenuous in the fulfilment of their military duties. During the Welsh wars, the comital families of Clare and Bohun, alongside the baronial dynasties of Mortimer, Grey and Lestrange, played prominent roles in the conflicts fought close to their own lands. Scottish landowners, such as Alexander d'Abernethy, the earl of March, and the earl of Angus, were not infrequently called upon to serve as captains north of the border. Membership of the king's household could also be a factor in the selection of officers as those in receipt of fees could be supervised with less difficulty than comital warriors who liked to remind the king of their rights and privileges. Authority in the Welsh and Scottish Marches was often committed to household knights. Four of the king's bannerets, Robert de Clifford, John de St. John, John Botetourt, and Richard de Siward, each acted as warden of the Scottish March between 1296 and 1307. Both Roger de Mortimer of Wigmore and

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[56] *PW*, i, 301, 340; *CDS*, ii, no. 1760.
[57] In 1302-3, 1305 and 1309-10; *Knights of Edward I*, iv, 236-7.
[58] Valence: 1277 (*CPR, 1272-81*, 211); 1282-3 (C 67/8, m. 8); 1294-5 (C 67/10, m. 7). Grey: 1277 (*CPR, 1272-81*, 189); 1282-3 (C 67/8, m. 5); 1287 (E 372/132, m. 1d); 1294-5 (E 101/5/18, m. 14).
[59] *Complete Peerage*, iii, 290-1; *CDS*, ii, no. 734.
[60] Reid, 'Office of Warden of the Marches', 490.

Roger Lestrange were members of the household during their periods of command in the second Welsh war of 1282-3.[61] Despite this, the role of the household knights as military leaders should not be exaggerated. For all their reliability, 'the major military commands were rarely entrusted to them';[62] and, owing to the objections that the king would have faced from the higher nobility, 'no household knight was ever made commander-in-chief of a battalion in a major campaign'.[63]

Alongside experience, ability was the most desirable component of the war captain. However, as J.R. Maddicott has reminded us, 'one of our chief difficulties in writing about medieval nobles is our lack of the means to judge their capabilities'.[64] Those upon whom the Crown most frequently relied, such as Aymer de Valence, were probably also the men who possessed the greatest ability in the field. Unfortunately, detailed descriptions of commanders in action, such as that of the earl of Warwick at the battle of Maes Moydog in 1295, are rare.[65] In any case, social status and material wealth were important prerequisites of military leadership: without these, even the most competent soldiers would find it difficult to exercise their authority. When offered the position of keeper of Scotland in August 1297, Brian Fitz Alan famously declined the post, explaining to the king that 'the goods which I have would be too small, as far as I can stretch them, well to keep that land to your honour'. The earl Warenne had struggled to perform his duties owing to insufficient resources, and Fitz Alan claimed that with an annual income of just a thousand pounds he would find it difficult to keep fifty armed horses in the field as befitted the status of the commander-in-chief.[66] In the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries social eminence was still regarded, for the most part, as a necessary precondition for the exercise of high command. The Scottish force that invaded Weardale in 1327 was led by 'les plus haults barons de tout le royaume d'Escoce'.[67] In Edwardian England, too, the leading positions of command were almost invariably given to men drawn from the upper echelons of noble society. Combatants of comital rank disliked the notion of serving under men of inferior status. In 1277, Payn de Chaworth, who had been a captain in west Wales since the end of the previous year, was placed under the higher authority of the earl of Lancaster as king's lieutenant in the

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[61] R.L. Ingamells, 'The Household Knights of Edward I', University of Durham D.Phil. thesis, 1992, 2 vols, i, 105, ii, 48.
[62] Prestwich, *War, Politics and Finance*, 60.
[63] Ingamells, 'Household Knights of Edward I', i, 102.
[64] J.R, Maddicott, *Simon de Montfort* (Cambridge, 1994), 358.
[65] *Chronica et Annales*, 148.
[66] *Stevenson*, ii, 223.
[67] *Chronique de Jean le Bel*, ed. J. Viard and E. Déprez, 2 vols (Paris, 1904-5), i, 52.

area.[68] Five years later, Robert de Tibetot was replaced as captain in south Wales by the earl of Gloucester after only two weeks in the office.[69] It was not easy to reconcile the king's wish to appoint the most able commanders with the traditional precedence afforded in such matters to men of comital rank.

One way around this problem was to issue joint commands so that young men of high social status could learn their trade in the company of more experienced baronial leaders. On 1 July 1294, John de St. John was made seneschal of Gascony and the young earl of Richmond captain of the king's forces there. According to Nicholas Trivet, St. John and another knight, Robert de Tibetot, had been specially chosen to act as advisors to the young earl as they were experienced and skilled in war.[70] This must have seemed quite natural as St. John was the earl of Richmond's senior by some twenty years.[71] Joint commissions of this kind were not uncommon. In October 1294, the earl of Arundel, who was in his late twenties at the time, was sent on an expedition to Bere castle in Wales along with Robert Fitz Walter, a veteran of the first and second Welsh wars. Although the earl was officially made captain, in recognition of his high social standing, it was understood that he was 'to succour and furnish the said castle' according to the recommendations given to him by Fitz Walter. The earl was assisted not only by the latter but also by a number of experienced Marcher lords, including Roger Lestrange and Peter Corbet.[72] In like manner, the earl of Gloucester was only seventeen when he was made captain of an expeditionary force to Rutherglen in Scotland in 1308. Whilst the earl was appointed captain of the expedition (*capitaneus nostrum expeditionis*), John de Crumwell was made leader of the knights, valets, sergeants, and footmen.[73] Crumwell and those serving under him were officially subordinated to the young earl's command. However, given the latter's inexperience and the fact that Crumwell had served with distinction as a retinue leader on several previous campaigns, it is likely that Crumwell was expected to act in an advisory capacity to the future tragic hero of Bannockburn.

The man responsible for the appointments of the earl of Gloucester and John de Crumwell in 1308, Edward II, had undergone a similar period of tutelage in the art of

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[68] *CPR, 1272-81*, 213.
[69] *CVCR*, 213.
[70] *Trivet*, 331; Morris, *Welsh Wars*, 241.
[71] I. Lubimenko, *Jean de Bretagne, Comte de Richmond: Sa Vie et son Activité en Angleterre, en Éscosse et en France (1266-1334)* (Paris, 1908), 6-7.
[72] *CVCR*, 360. The earl was born in 1266 or 1267 (*Complete Peerage*, i, 240), and seems to have had his first experience of war in 1287 (*PW*, i, 253). For Fitz Walter's service in 1277 and 1282-3: *CPR, 1272-81*, 220; E 101/4/1, m. 1. He had also fought during the Barons' Wars.
[73] *Rotuli Scotiae*, i, 60.

military command as a teenage prince. Like the young Gilbert de Clare, Edward had acquired little military experience prior to his appointment as leader of an army in western Scotland in 1301. On that occasion he was accompanied by a number of elder bannerets, including William de Leyburn and Reginald de Grey, who were trusted associates of the prince's father.[74] Members of the royal family shared with sons of the higher nobility the need to obtain training in war from an early age; indeed, many of the commissions that were given to young men can be explained in this light. Be that as it may, not all joint commissions were granted because of the need to combine status with experience, or wealth with ability. In August 1315, in response to an attack on Carlisle by Robert Bruce, the earl of Lancaster was made commander-in-chief (*superiorem capitaneum*) over all men-at-arms and foot between the River Trent and Roxburgh.[75] The earl of Pembroke had already been appointed as captain in that area in July and would appear to have been a more able and trustworthy commander than the king's troublesome cousin. J.R.S. Phillips has suggested that 'the major reason for putting Pembroke under Lancaster's orders on 8 August may have been because the immediate Scottish threat to Carlisle was close to Lancaster's home base and also because Pembroke's forces happened to be in the area at the time'. If this was so, then it may well be that captaincies were sometimes conferred in recognition of a noble's claim to territorial supremacy, rather than for the purpose of strengthening national defence. 'In effect', Phillips pointed out, 'Pembroke and his men were doing Lancaster's job for him'.[76]

Several factors influenced the selection of military captains, not least experience, ability, wealth, and social status. The process by which these captains were chosen is of interest in its own right. In mid-fourteenth century France, during a period of national crisis following the capture of John II at the battle of Poitiers, a series of ordinances were issued aimed at regulating the process by which military captains were appointed. In May 1358, it was announced that, owing to the way that many captains had been ordained in various parts of the country without due consideration of their merits, and had spent a great deal of the king's money for no apparent profit, all captains were to be chosen in future in full council.[77] Within England, the method of appointing military captains only after consideration by the king and his advisers seems to have been adopted from a relatively early date. Following the death of the veteran,

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[74] BL, Add. MS 7966a, f. 84r.
[75] *Rotuli Scotiae*, i, 148.
[76] Phillips, *Aymer de Valence,* 90.
[77] *Ordonnances des Roys de France de la troisième race*, ed. D.F. Secousse *et al.*, 21 vols (Paris, 1723-1849, repr., 1967-8), iii, 224.

John de St. John, in 1302, some thought was given to who should replace him as warden on the western March. The treasurer, Walter de Langton, informed the king that he believed John Botetourt to be a suitable man for the position, but Edward, despite being aware that the latter was a 'bon homme et sage et suffisant', declared that he was not willing to make a decision until he had had the opportunity to talk with his council at the next parliament.[78] In the event, Botetourt was appointed as *custos* just three months after this letter was written. The discussion of such issues in council was not confined to this one occasion. Captaincy commissions were often made *per regem et consilium suum*, as witnessed by the appointments of the earl of Angus in 1311 and the earl of Pembroke in 1315.[79] This is what one would expect given that defence of the realm was a matter of concern for everyone, not just the king.

Following the selection process the captain or warden was invested with wide-ranging powers which he exercised in the name of the Crown. Royal support was essential if these captains were to retain control over the hundreds of soldiers placed under their authority: the more prominent these soldiers were, the more carefully the king's officials had to tread. This was particularly the case during the Welsh wars when the traditionally independent and very powerful Marcher lords had to be cajoled into cooperating with the captains placed over them. In 1282, Roger de Mortimer of Wigmore was placed in command not only of the lesser men-at-arms of the central Marches, but also over ten leading border magnates, including Ralph de Tony, Peter Corbet and Roger Lestrange. Each of these men was sent an individual summons by the chancery clerks, informing him of the appointment.[80] Following Mortimer's death in October, one of these men, Lestrange, was given the captaincy in his stead. The magnates who had previously served under Mortimer were now bound to his leadership.[81] Such local appointments made practical sense and would have been less objectionable to the Marchers than the appointment of 'outsiders'. It was also necessary to divide the captains' spheres of influence into clearly-defined regional zones. During the second Welsh war, Reginald de Grey was given command of Cheshire and Flint; Roger de Mortimer possessed control on the central Marches; and Robert de Tibetot held sway in west Wales.[82] The king's household force, meanwhile, led operations in Gwynedd. When John de St. John was made captain in 1300, his authority was spread over a large area to incorporate 'Cumberland, Westmorland, Lancaster, Annandale, and

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[78] SC 1/13, no. 110; 'Notes and Communications', *SHR*, xxiv (1927), 325-6.
[79] Bodleian Library, Tanner MS 197, f. 52r; E 101/376/7, f. 60r.
[80] *CCR*, 212.
[81] *Ibid*, 244.
[82] *PW*, i, 222.

the whole Marches to the bounds of Roxburgh'.[83] In the summer of 1310, Alexander d'Abernethy was given authority over the area *inter aquam de Forth et montes Scocie*.[84] Within these regions, captains were empowered to call on the services of all men fit to bear arms. To facilitate the smooth transition to wartime government, orders were sent to the men of the towns and counties, via sheriffs and other royal officials, ordering them to be obedient to the commanders who had been placed over them.[85] It was necessary to supply the captains with a strong body of men-at-arms if they were to exercise control over these areas effectively. Sometimes the number of men-at-arms to be retained at the king's wages was agreed in the contracts. An indenture drawn up with Robert de Clifford in 1296 stipulated that he was to have 140 men-at-arms and 500 foot,[86] and the earl of Richmond and John de Segrave each had sixty mounted warriors in their *comitivae* whilst serving as keepers of Scotland in 1307 and 1309.[87]

These terms of service provided a basic framework upon which captains and other royal officials could build their authority, but the powers that they exercised by no means stopped there. This is most vividly demonstrated by a commission issued early in the reign of Edward I's grandson, Edward III. On 25 April 1338, the earl of Arundel was appointed as captain and leader of the English forces in Scotland. As part of his duties, he was given full powers to punish transgressions and felonies committed by all men within the army; to elect as many men-at-arms, hobelars and archers as he required between the March of Scotland and the river Trent; to meet with the keepers of the various castles and garrisons within Scotland to arrange for their better defence; to supervise the armaments at the said garrisons; to raise all men between the ages of sixteen and sixty within the northern counties, placing them into infantry troops of thousands, hundreds and twenties; and to imprison all those who disobeyed his orders.[88] Although such a long list of powers and responsibilities was quite exceptional, this gives some idea as to the degree of control that English war captains could theoretically possess over those placed under their charge. It is probable that as Edward III's thoughts were moving increasingly towards France and the Low Countries, he was all the more willing to confer freedom of action upon those who stayed behind in northern England to keep the Scots in check. Although it is rare to find all of these powers

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[83] *CDS*, ii, no. 1134.
[84] *Foedera*, II, i, 108.
[85] E.g. *PW*, i, 193.
[86] *CDS*, ii, no. 734. Several earls were paid for the winter expedition against the Scots in 1297-8 with large companies of horse: E 159/71, m. 106d; Prestwich, *Edward I*, 478-9.
[87] *Foedera*, II, i, 6, 70. Aymer de Valence also had sixty men in his retinue when serving in Scotland in a similar capacity during the reign of Edward II; E 101/373/23.
[88] *Rotuli Scotiae*, i, 524-5.

bestowed upon one man, various aspects of the command exercised by the earl of Arundel in 1338 were also possessed by English war captains during the reigns of Edward I and Edward II.

Of all the powers conferred on Richard Fitz Alan by Edward III, perhaps the most important were the judicial and punitive rights that he enjoyed. Although military captains and keepers were granted extensive authority over large numbers of soldiers, they had no way of enforcing their will unless the king gave them the right to use coercion and punishment. One of the main problems facing the Crown's agents in Scotland, Wales and Gascony was that of desertion. An entry on the close rolls dated 13 December 1295 reveals that William Fitz Waryn had left the king's service in Gascony and returned to England without the permission of the captain of the king's men in those parts.[89] Such actions are likely to have been commonplace, but it is only when large numbers of aristocratic warriors deserted simultaneously, as they did during the Scottish campaign of 1306, that any particular motives or groupings can be discerned among the men involved.[90] To deal with such offences, captains were given powers to punish and discipline those who disobeyed their orders, or who rebelled against their authority.[91] This enabled them to deal with such malefactors without having to resort to the king's courts. On 10 December 1297, the earl Warenne was given authority to arrest, imprison and punish those under his command if he deemed it necessary for the better pursuance of the king's business and the defence of the realm.[92] Six years later, both John Botetourt and John de Segrave, captains on the western and eastern Marches of Scotland respectively, were given full power to arrest all those who they found to be disobedient or rebellious.[93] Although such powers were primarily conferred to deal with the problem of infantry desertion, which was a far more common occurrence than desertion among the gentry and nobility, it seems likely that they were also used to deal with more socially-elevated offenders whenever necessary.

Prerogatives of punishment and distraint were an essential feature of the captain's weaponry in his struggle against disobedience and apathy. In addition to such disciplinary responsibilities, the king's officers were expected to deal with matters pertaining to castles and garrisons. Indeed this was one of their principal duties for,

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[89] *CCR, 1288-96*, 502.
[90] J.S. Hamilton, 'Desertion from the Army of Edward I, 1306-7'. Unpublished paper presented at Leeds International Medieval Congress, July 2006.
[91] They were also sometimes called upon by civilian authorities to prevent escalations in crime and disorder within areas affected by war; *Ancient Correspondence Concerning Wales*, 40.
[92] *PW*, i, 307.
[93] *Ibid*, 368.

once the armies had returned to England, the castle garrisons were all that remained to remind the conquered of their subordinate condition. In a letter of 1300, the king gave to John de St. John full powers to garrison and victual all castles that were surrendered to him or which he had taken by force. Exceptions were made in the case of forts that the king had already granted to his other magnates.[94] Captains appear to have enjoyed some independence in the methods that they used to obtain strongholds from the enemy. In the course of the second Welsh war, William de Valence and Roger Lestrange promised eighty pounds to the Welsh garrison at Bere if they would surrender the castle.[95] Once they had acquired a fortification, English commanders were expected to hold on to it, occupying it as they saw fit, unless another member of the landholding elite had a prior claim on the castle. In June 1282, Edward ordered the earl of Gloucester, his captain in south Wales, to give seisin of the castle of Llandovery to John Giffard of Brimpsfield.[96] Giffard had occupied that fort during the war of 1277 and had since laid claim to it through his wife, but his designs in that part of Wales had been put on hold due to a legal dispute with a native lord, Rhys Fychan.[97] The conquest enabled Giffard and many more like him to take a more secure hold on their disputed possessions. On the English side of the borders, castle supervision took on added significance in the years following Bannockburn. John de Crumwell and the earl of Angus, wardens of the March of Northumberland in 1319, were obliged, as part of their contracts with the Crown, to defend Newcastle upon Tyne and to supervise and supply each of the garrisons in the county. Any shortcomings in the defence of the region were their responsibility, and many of the fine details, such as the number of men to be stationed in the garrisons, were left to the wardens' discretion.[98]

More mundane, but just as significant, were the many administrative duties that captains had to perform. One of the most important of these was the reception of men into the king's peace. In 1306, Aymer de Valence was empowered to absolve the lesser men (*mediocres homines*) of Scotland who wished to surrender.[99] The following year the offer was extended to all the king's former enemies, except those who had participated in, or assented to, the murder of John Comyn.[100] When the feudal levy was called out it was sometimes the responsibility of those in command of regional armies

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[94] *CCR, 1296-1302*, 334.
[95] *Littere Wallie*, ed. J.G. Edwards (Cardiff, 1940), no. 325.
[96] *CVCR*, 222.
[97] Morris, *Welsh Wars*, 117, 125, 147.
[98] E 101/15/26. For the powers enjoyed by these officers, see M.L. Boyle, 'Early History of the Wardens of the Marches of England towards Scotland, 1296-1377', University of Hull M.A. thesis, 1980, 103-4.
[99] E 101/331/17.
[100] E 39/95/10.

to record the proffers that were made. In 1282, the king ordered all soldiers on the central Marches and in the south to perform their service under the regional commanders rather than with his own army in the north. Consequently, captains like William de Valence were called on to testify to the performance of feudal service throughout the course of that campaign.[101] William's son, Aymer, fulfilled a similar role during his spell as captain in southern Scotland twenty years later.[102] Captains were also responsible, wholly or in part, for a wide range of administrative duties, such as the payment of wages (or declaring when such payment should begin);[103] the receipt of attorneys for their men;[104] the provision of horse compensation;[105] and the distribution of letters sent by the king to the other prominent men in their hosts.[106] When reading indentures for service or writs of commission it is easy to forget the many difficulties that military leaders must have faced on an everyday basis, for in addition to the punitive powers that they exercised captains might also be required to oversee the building of bridges;[107] to send for warhorses from abroad;[108] or to raise revenues from vacant sees within occupied territories.[109] Each of these duties added to the overall power wielded by the captains, but the many obligations incumbent on them may indicate why military leadership was not to everyone's taste.

Military commanders within the British Isles possessed extensive powers, but compared to their counterparts in Gascony the scope of their authority was rather limited. Despite spending many years at war in Wales and Scotland, Edward I would have preferred to have committed more of his time to the pursuit of his ambitions on the continent. His attempts to concentrate on his interests in France were held back by rebellions closer to home. This, perhaps, explains why he was willing to give free rein to the seneschals, captains, and lieutenants who represented him in Gascony. In 1294, both John de St. John and the earl of Richmond, seneschal and captain in the province respectively, were empowered to make agreements of friendship with the king of Castile and with powerful local lords such as the count of Foix.[110] The writs of commission appointing the earls of Lancaster and Lincoln as captains and lieutenants in 1295 illustrate even more clearly the extraordinary independence of action enjoyed by

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[101] E.g. *Ancient Correspondence Concerning Wales*, 46, 132-3.
[102] SC 1/31, no. 33.
[103] E 159/71, m. 106d.
[104] *CCR, 1272-79*, 358.
[105] *Littere Wallie*, nos 329, 332.
[106] *Foedera*, I, ii, 889.
[107] *Littere Wallie*, no. 323.
[108] *CPR, 1272-81*, 194.
[109] *Foedera*, I, ii, 877.
[110] *RG*, iii, 172.

the king's representatives in south-west France. Not only were the earls given full powers to make agreements with kings and princes whomsoever they may be (*amicicias et confederaciones cum quibuscumque regibus vel principibus*) but they were also granted special authority to appoint lieutenants, captains, seneschals, sub-seneschals, castellans, mayors, and other ministers as they saw fit throughout the region.[111] In effect, the king's captains and seneschals in Gascony were empowered to act almost as petty kings. This freedom of action gave men like John de St. John and the earl of Richmond much of the experience that they were later able to draw on as leaders in the war against the Scots.

The king's willingness to alienate so much of his power to representatives in Gascony throws into sharp relief the more restrictive nature of his relations with his commanders in northern England, Scotland and Wales. Closer to home, Edward attempted to retain in his own hands as much of the responsibility for the conduct of the war as possible. This could only be achieved so long as the lines of communication between the king and his captains remained open. For their part, commanders in the field were expected to correspond with the Crown on a regular basis about a wide range of subjects. In the spring of 1277, Payn de Chaworth and the earl of Warwick wrote to Edward informing him that their men had come to the end of their periods of service. Both men were aware of the need to keep these soldiers in the field, but were powerless to act without first obtaining Edward's consent.[112] When Alan Plukenet sent a letter to the chancellor in 1294-5 requesting assistance with the business of the men staying with him in Wales, he betrayed a reliance on the lines of communication between the central administration and the war front which must have been a hindrance to the soldiers on the ground.[113] Captains were also expected to contact the king whenever a castle came into their possession, supplying details of its location and features, as well as of how they had armed the fortress. Prince Edward, leader of the army in western Scotland in 1301, wrote to his father in that year informing him of the way that the castle at Turnberry was being guarded and provisioned.[114] The king also wished to be notified of all movements in the field, even if he was far removed from the theatre of war in which they were taking place. In the summer of 1297, the earl Warenne and Henry de Percy maintained regular contact with Edward about their activities in Scotland, explaining

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[111] *Ibid*, 300.
[112] *Ancient Correspondence Concerning Wales*, 67, 71-2.
[113] SC 1/27, no. 116.
[114] SC 1/16, no. 148.

the reasons for their decisions and assuring him that as soon as their circumstances changed, they would let him know 'with all the haste possible'.[115]

Correspondence of this kind flowed in both directions as the king kept his captains well informed about his decisions and requirements. On some occasions, the news that Edward sent to his commanders could prove vital for their safety and the security of the lands under their control. In his long message to John de St. John in 1300, he warned that the Scots were planning to surround him as soon as he had crossed the border into enemy territory. Edward had been updated, about enemy movements in south-western Scotland, by John de Clavering, and his position as supreme commander of all armed forces enabled him to relay news from one war zone to another with relative ease.[116] The following year, Edward wrote to Alexander de Balliol, reporting that John de Soules was active in the passes of Galloway with a large company of Scots. Balliol was ordered to inform the wardens of the March immediately and to employ spies in the area to keep abreast of the enemy's activities.[117] The image of the king as a spider at the centre of an intricate web of communications should not be overstated, for this was an age when news still took some time to pass from sender to receiver. As already noted, the king's attempts to pull so many strings might even have had the opposite of the desired effect. Whatever the truth of this, it is clear that Edward had more than one reason for keeping the lines of communication open: there were also times when he sought counsel from those beneath him in the command hierarchy. In the spring of 1298, for example, the king wrote to the earl Warenne, confirming that he would be at York by Whitsuntide and requesting that the earl come in person, together with a suitable number of barons, to discuss the business of the forthcoming Scottish campaign.[118] Having spent several months in Flanders, the king needed to be briefed about the prevailing situation in Scotland. For that purpose there was no better man to consult than the keeper who had governed that land in his absence.

Although Edward sometimes wrote to his captains and other military leaders warning them of enemy movements, or requesting their counsel, his main concern was to ensure that they were acting in accordance with his wishes. Early in 1298, he ordered his captain and keeper in Scotland, the earl Warenne, not to wait until the arrival of levies of footmen coming from Wales but to proceed against the enemy immediately.[119] At the time of writing, Edward was seeking to resolve the problems of his own army in

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[115] *Stevenson*, ii, 183-4, 215-6.
[116] *CCR, 1296-1302*, 334-5.
[117] SC 1/15, no. 2.
[118] *CCR, 1296-1302*, 201.
[119] *Foedera*, I, ii, 884-5.

Flanders, so his interference in the earl's decisions suggests that he did not have full confidence in the wisdom of his subordinate. This was possibly a consequence of Warenne's failings during the previous year at Stirling Bridge, yet it seems likely that Edward was generally inclined to meddle in the affairs of his officers. John de Segrave and the cofferer, Ralph de Manton, might have felt so, for in the autumn of 1302 they were expressly ordered to march by Stirling and Kirkintilloch, keeping in close contact with the enemy without straying too far from English-held lands. The foray being completed, they were to dispatch a special messenger to explain to the king how they had fared.[120] Edward's orders reveal an obsession with attention to detail and micro-management which must have infuriated experienced soldiers like Segrave. In response, some of his captains resorted to silence when things were not going their way. Such, at least, was the method employed by Aymer de Valence, John de St. John and Henry de Percy early in 1307, when the Scots under Robert Bruce were beginning to show signs of recovery. Edward intimated in a writ to his treasurer that events had gone so badly that they did not wish him to know.[121] Being a competent military leader in his own right, the king felt that it behoved him to direct military operations in person, so far as it lay within his power to do so. To some extent, this type of centralised command structure was retained during the reign of the less martially-inclined Edward II. In 1315, John Botetourt, the captain of the royal fleet, was reprimanded for delaying to proceed against the Scots.[122] Eight years later, Andrew de Harcla, earl of Carlisle, was executed for treacherous behaviour in his dealings with the enemy.[123] Captains in Britain were rarely afforded the freedom of action enjoyed by their counterparts in Gascony, a consequence, perhaps, of the more immediate threat to national security posed by the warfare on the northern and western Marches, but also of the difficulties involved in communicating between Westminster and south-western France.

Edwardian captains had to maintain regular contact not only with the Crown, but also with other military leaders appointed by the central government. When the earl of March was chosen as captain of the king's men-at-arms in the garrisons of southern Scotland in 1298, a series of overlapping areas of jurisdiction were created. So as to clarify the situation, it was set out in the terms of the earl's commission that should it be necessary for them to assemble, the earl would be captain of all, and each constable

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[120] *Stevenson*, ii, 448.
[121] *CDS*, ii, no. 1895.
[122] C 47/2/23, m. 32.
[123] Cf. J. Mason, 'Sir Andrew de Harcla, Earl of Carlisle', *Transactions of the Cumberland and Westmorland Antiquarian and Archaeological Society*, new ser., xxix (1929), 98-137.

would be captain of his own men.[124] Relationships also had to be forged with the bureaucrats sent by the king to assist the captains in organising and supplying their armies. On most campaigns the responsibility for supplies of victuals and money lay with clerks stationed in the main border towns such as Chester, Carlisle and Berwick upon Tweed. Relations between commanders and these bureaucrats were essential to the smooth running of the armies. The bishop of St. Davids supervised payments to the army in south Wales in 1282.[125] Normally, however, such duties were performed by men who had obtained their administrative experience as barons of the exchequer. Edward was aware that conflicting interests might arise between his captains on the one hand, and the clerks sent to assist them on the other, so in the spring of 1300 he explained to John de St. John why he had employed Richard de Abingdon to work alongside him, making it clear that Abingdon was there to assist him, not to interfere in his plans.[126] The following year St. John complained to Ralph de Manton that payments had fallen into arrears and that the poor people in his area of jurisdiction were suffering for want of victuals: this indicates that not everything had gone according to plan.[127] Nevertheless, for the most part the system of engaging royal administrators to assist military officials appears to have worked tolerably well.

Given the numerous duties that military leaders were expected to perform, and the potentially grave consequences should they fail to carry them out successfully, the onus was on the king to provide sufficient rewards to his captains for their services. K.B. McFarlane believed that under Edward I 'lifelong and devoted service was too often inadequately rewarded', but the situation was a little more complex than that.[128] Whilst it is true that the king did not create any new earldoms, he did try to reward his chief military officers in other ways. The chronicler Ranulph Higden noted how, during the campaign of 1282-3, Edward divided the central Welsh lands among the leading men of the realm whilst keeping the coastal castles for himself.[129] So extensive were his grants that 'the Edwardian endowments…transformed the March in terms both of its political geography and of the personnel of its lords'.[130] The earls of Gloucester, Hereford and Pembroke might have felt poorly rewarded, but a number of military leaders and captains, including the Mortimers, Reginald de Grey, and the earls of

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[124] *CPR, 1292-1301*, 372.
[125] *CVCR*, 222.
[126] *CCR, 1296-1302*, 334; *CDS*, ii, no. 1133.
[127] *CDS*, ii, no. 1218.
[128] K.B. McFarlane, *The Nobility of Later Medieval England* (Oxford, 1973), 266-7.
[129] *Polychronicon Ranulphi Higden Monachi Cestrensis*, ed. C. Babington and J.R. Lumby, 9 vols, Rolls Ser., xli (London, 1865-86), viii, 264.
[130] R.R. Davies, *Lordship and Society in the March of Wales, 1282-1400* (Oxford, 1978), 37.

Lincoln and Warenne, had much reason to be pleased with the lands granted to them.[131] A similar policy was adopted throughout the Scottish wars. After Falkirk, Edward announced that his earls and barons were to be rewarded with property in the conquered territories.[132] The shifting political situation north of the border meant that the king was not always able to fulfil his promises. Still, those who were frustrated in their attempts to occupy the lands conferred on them in Scotland were sometimes compensated with grants or wardships in England.[133] The final windfall of the reign came following Bruce's rebellion in 1306. His titles and estates were distributed among some of Edward's most faithful servants, including Robert de Clifford and Henry de Percy.[134] However, such opportunities for largesse were few and far between at a time when the Crown's financial reserves were stretched to their limit. Bearing these problems in mind, it seems that the scarcity of rewards noted by McFarlane was probably, for the most part, a consequence of necessity rather than of choice.

So far we have examined in detail the powers and responsibilities incumbent upon military captains and commanders-in-chief, but those were not the only men who exercised military authority within Edwardian England. The most important officers responsible for the organisation and discipline of the king's armies were the marshal and constable. Richard II's ordinances for the Scottish expedition of 1385 reveal that, by the late fourteenth century, these individuals possessed extensive powers over all men within the armies. Those who broke ranks, robbed, caused disturbances within the host, or committed any other offences whilst in battle array, were referred to them for punishment. The marshal and constable were also responsible for the guarding of prisoners and the distribution of ransoms, as well as for all matters relating to discipline and order.[135] A plea roll for the host that campaigned in Scotland in 1296 shows that these officers discharged similar functions in the armies of Edward I. All manner of transgressions, ranging from neglect of watch and ward through to trespass and robbery, were dealt with and recorded on the deputy marshal's roll.[136] Indeed 'one of the many striking features of the document', according to its editor C.J. Neville, 'is the tremendous development in the judicial powers of the marshal which it attests'.[137] In

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[131] Cf. Prestwich, *Edward I*, 204.
[132] *Guisborough*, 328-9.
[133] M. Prestwich, 'Colonial Scotland: The English in Scotland under Edward I', *Scotland and England 1286-1815*, ed. R.A. Mason (Edinburgh, 1987), 10.
[134] *Guisborough*, 369-70.
[135] *Monumenta Juridica*, 453-8; Keen, 'Richard II's Ordinances of War', 40-2.
[136] 'A Plea Roll of Edward I's Army in Scotland, 1296', ed. C.J. Neville, *Miscellany XI*, Scottish History Society, 5th ser., iii (1990), 7-133.
[137] *Ibid*, 13.

addition to such judicial responsibilities, the marshal and constable played a pivotal organisational role in the build-up to royal campaigns. Writing in the 1380s, the French military theorist Honoré Bonet noted how medieval armies were divided into 'battles', 'which each marshal of the host makes large or small at pleasure'.[138] Although it is difficult to be sure how much influence the marshal and constable possessed over tactical dispositions within the armies of Edward I and his son, it seems likely that they were the kings' main supporters, alongside the captains, in ensuring that operations ran smoothly.

Under Edward I both the constable, the earl of Hereford, and the marshal, the earl of Norfolk, held their positions by hereditary privilege. Yet these were not merely honorific titles devoid of any significance in the field. On the contrary, it was necessary for practical purposes that these officials, or associates representing them, were with the armies. When the earl of Hereford could not be present at the start of a campaign during the Welsh wars he appointed his uncle, John de Bohun, to take his place until his arrival.[139] In like manner, the king sent a letter to the earl of Norfolk in 1301 requesting that if, due to bodily weakness, he was unable to come in person, he should appoint another good and sufficient man to serve as marshal of the host in his stead.[140] Not only was it essential to have a marshal and constable with the main army led by the king, but it was also sometimes deemed advantageous to assign men to these positions within the regional armies under noble captains. At the beginning of the Welsh uprising of 1294-5, the earl of Norfolk was sent to south Wales to serve in the regional host under William de Valence, so the king appointed the banneret Roger de Molis to occupy the post of temporary marshal for his own troops in the north.[141] Similarly, when the earl of Hereford was assigned to the Prince of Wales' army in the west of Scotland in 1301, the king requested that the earl send somebody else to act as constable with the main force setting out from Berwick upon Tweed.[142] In return for fulfilling their duties, both the constable and marshal claimed special privileges. Whilst the former demanded two pence in every pound that was paid to the king's stipendiaries, the marshal asserted his right to the weaponry of the enemy keeper whenever a castle or town fell into the king's hands.[143] The significance of these positions is further demonstrated by the military capabilities of the men who succeeded the earls of Hereford and Norfolk and who took

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[138] *The Tree of Battles of Honoré Bonet*, ed. G.W. Coopland (Liverpool, 1949), 130.
[139] SC 1/22, no. 117.
[140] *Foedera*, I, ii, 927.
[141] *CPR, 1292-1301*, 126.
[142] *CCR, 1296-1302*, 487.
[143] SC 1/12, no. 170; C 47/2/21, m. 23.

their places when they could not be present. Following the death of Roger le Bygod in 1306 the rank of marshal was bestowed upon Robert de Clifford, one of the king's ablest soldiers, and then, for a more prolonged period, on Nicholas de Segrave.[144] Humphrey de Bohun's refusal to perform his duties on the Scottish campaign of 1310-11 meant that Bartholomew de Badlesmere, who had sixteen years of military service behind him, was called upon to act as the constable's lieutenant.[145]

Besides captains, constables and marshals, 'battle commanders' held the most elevated rank within Edwardian armies. Although the men who occupied these positions seem to have enjoyed disciplinary rights over the troops under their command, their most important function was as leaders of tactical units in combat. Contemporary battle narratives often placed these sub-commanders in the forefront of the action. Guisborough's version of the battle of Falkirk shows that they were responsible for the movements of the massed ranks of cavalry under their authority.[146] The English defeat at Bannockburn might have been due to the ineffective functioning of these divisions at the start of the battle: Thomas Gray recalled, possibly on the testimony of his father who had been present, that the English were unable to fight effectively because the main divisions of the army were jammed together.[147] There is no evidence for the activities of these men during Edward I's Welsh wars, but we do possess the names of the soldiers who led the English battles in a number of later encounters. Experience in this role, as in the main positions of command, appears to have been desirable, as three of the battle commanders at Falkirk, the earl of Lincoln, earl Warenne, and the king himself, were also employed in the same capacity two years later at Caerlaverock.[148] The only alteration came when the young Prince Edward, who was only seventeen at the time, replaced the bishop of Durham. The latter had been in command of the second battle at Falkirk but his appointment, as an ecclesiastic, to such an important position, seems to have created some resentment among the knights under his command.[149] As with the Black Prince at Crécy, Edward was expected to earn his spurs as a sub-commander within the main army before going on to lead large hosts on later campaigns. The author of the heraldic *Song of Caerlaverock* noted how six barons were

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[144] Clifford could draw on a wealth of experience as a leader on the Marches, including during the winter of 1298-9: *PW*, i, 318; E 101/7/19, m. 2. Segrave fought throughout the Scottish wars following his father's death in 1295.

[145] Badlesmere had served in Gascony in 1294 (*RG*, iii, 97), Flanders (C 67/12, m. 1), and in Scotland in 1298 (*Gough*, 190), 1300 (*Aspilogia III*, i, 443), 1301 (E 101/9/23, m. 2), 1303-4 (BL, Add. MS 8835, f. 59v), 1306 (E 101/612/15, m. 1), 1307 (*CDS*, v, 445) and 1308 (*CDS*, v, 447).

[146] *Guisborough*, 327-8.

[147] *Scalacronica*, 75.

[148] *Aspilogia III*, i, 406-17, 434-43.

[149] *Guisborough*, 327

placed alongside the prince as his 'conductors and guardians'; John de St. John and William le Latimer were set aside 'to array his squadron'.[150] That these posts were reserved for members of the royal family and the higher nobility indicates the value that was attached to the 'battle' as a tactical division in war.

Below this there were a number of other officers within Edwardian armies such as millenars, centenars and vintenars. These were commanders of infantry and the men who occupied such positions tended to be drawn from lower down the social scale.[151] The leading members of the Edwardian aristocracy were only willing to serve the Crown in more elevated capacities. From the evidence presented here it can be seen that Edwardian captains and wardens were the most influential members of the aristocratic leadership corps. To be a captain required a combination of wealth, status, and ability, as well as a capacity to exercise leadership over large numbers of independently-minded men. Despite possessing a wide range of military and judicial powers, these commanders were agents of the Crown who, whether paid by the king or not, were expected to conform to the terms of service by which they had been employed. To ensure that they were performing their duties the Crown kept a careful watch over all of their activities. Even so, some captains, such as those serving in Gascony, enjoyed a greater freedom of action than those engaged closer to Westminster. Though the rewards for service could at times be sizeable, the responsibilities incumbent on the offices probably outweighed any perquisites that might have been on offer. Only the most dedicated soldiers and trusted confidants, like John de St. John, Robert de Clifford, and Aymer de Valence, were charged with such commissions, and if a military elite existed within England at this time then it was surely personified by these men.

RETINUE LEADERS

The tenor of the discussion so far suggests that military leadership in Edwardian armies issued outwards from the centre. Appointments to captaincies, custodianships and other positions of high command were the prerogative of the king and his council; the pool of men employed in this way was not very large. An important distinction therefore has to be made between the command exercised by those chosen to lead armies, hold castles and defend border areas, and the very different kind of authority enjoyed by soldiers who led companies to war as part of royal or baronial hosts. Whilst the former were

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[150] *The Roll of Arms of the Princes, Barons, and Knights who attended King Edward I to the Siege of Caerlaverock, in 1300*, ed. T. Wright (London, 1864), 19-20.
[151] Men of knightly rank did sometimes perform such roles, as in 1296; E 101/5/23, m. 1ii.

government agents whose influence rested on the political power conferred on them by the Crown, the latter derived their pre-eminence solely from the social prestige arising from the lands that they held at a local and regional level. Many of these company commanders served at their own expense because of the subordination that acceptance of royal wages would have implied. Indeed, each leader was master of his own *comitiva* in much the same way as the king was lord of the whole. Edwardian hosts were therefore conglomerates made up of numerous aristocratic contingents. Just as the lack of modern communications placed limits on the coercive power of the government at a local level, so the absence of a standing officer corps forced the Crown to rely on the aid of semi-independent retinue leaders drawn from the shires. In short, whilst Edward I was a strong centralising monarch, his ability to enforce his will through armed struggle would have been seriously curtailed had it not been for the cooperation of the wider military community.

The companies that combined to form royal armies had a separate existence independent of Crown control: each lord exercised dominion over his own sphere of influence. Private warfare remained a threat to internal peace and stability throughout the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, as demonstrated by the actions, in 1273, of Hugh de Turberville and Reginald Fitz Peter, who wasted the earl of Hereford's lands in Wales.[152] Recurring violence was also a major problem among the gentry of south Lancashire in the months and years leading up to the battle of Boroughbridge.[153] Such conflict was endemic among the landholding elites, but the legal distinction between criminal and legitimate acts of violence should not disguise the fact that public and private warfare had many features in common. The banner was raised in feuds just as it was in the royal host. Furthermore, when a lord's men pillaged the lands of his neighbour, he took a share of the booty as was his right under the king.[154] Essentially, the warband served much the same function in national armies as it did in local disputes, resembling an army in miniature dependent upon its immediate lord. Just as prominent landholders employed receivers and attornies to manage their financial and judicial affairs in peacetime, so they needed men with military and administrative expertise to assist them when summoned to arms by the king. We have seen how the marshal of England performed an important judicial and organisational role throughout the wars of Edward I. Perhaps in imitation of this, the earls and leading

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[152] *CCR, 1272-79*, 56.
[153] *South Lancashire in the Reign of Edward II*, ed. G.H. Tupling, Chetham Society 3rd ser., i (1949), *passim*.
[154] Cf. *CVCR*, 337-8.

magnates had their own marshals with them when on campaign. Gilbert de Lyndeseye served as marshal for the earl of Hereford in Scotland in 1296, finding lodgings for his lord's men at the end of each day's march, and John de Morley performed the same function for Robert de Tateshale on that expedition.[155] Some retinue leaders also took their own secretariats with them to war to facilitate correspondence with the king or to oversee payments to their soldiers: Piers Gaveston had five clerks in his company as earl of Cornwall during the campaign of 1310-11.[156] It is unlikely that retinue leaders had time to carry out the many administrative tasks incumbent upon them in person, so clerks such as these were an essential feature of a large number of retinues.

Hundreds of men of varying status served as retinue leaders during the reigns of Edward I and Edward II; indeed, the sheer weight of numbers precludes any generalisations about this group as a whole. Command over other men-at-arms, even at the very lowest level, required some degree of influence within the royal household or in the provinces, but ability, wealth and experience varied considerably from one individual to the next. Some soldiers served under other men for several campaigns prior to becoming company leaders in their own rights. Henry de Appelby followed Robert de Tateshale as a knight in the war against Madog in 1294, in the opening campaign of the Scottish war, and to the siege of Caerlaverock, before establishing himself as a valued member of the Prince of Wales' household by 1304. He served the prince as a company commander in 1306 and 1307 and continued to act in that capacity once Edward had become king.[157] Appelby was not alone in finding himself elevated into the royal household following a successful spell of service as the companion of a leading magnate. John de Usflete staffed the retinue of John de Eyville during the second Welsh war and was with Peter de Champayne throughout the rebellion of 1294-5. The following year he appears as a knightly leader on the household horse inventory before proceeding to lead companies of men on the Flanders, Falkirk and Caerlaverock campaigns. He appears to have ended his career as a company leader in 1301.[158] There was no more prestigious aristocratic household in which to obtain military experience than that of the much-praised Robert de Clifford. John de Crumwell fought under the latter's banner within the household division at Falkirk in 1298. Three years later he

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[155] 'Plea Roll, 1296', nos 160, 168.
[156] C 71/4, mm. 8, 10.
[157] With Tateshale (C 67/10, m. 7; C 67/11, m. 5; C 67/14, m. 10); as leader/sub-leader (BL, Add. MS 8835, f. 58r; *PDS*, 271; E 101/13/7, m. 2; E 101/14/15, m. 9; *CDS*, v, 445; BL, Cotton Nero C VIII, f. 4r).
[158] With Eyville (C 47/2/7, m. 8); with Champayne (C 67/10, m. 2); as leader, 1296 (E 101/5/23, m. 1ii); 1297 (E 101/6/37, m. 6i); 1298 (*Gough*, 176); 1300 (*Liber Quotidianus*, 234); 1301 (E 101/9/24, m. 2).

began a long period of service as a household retinue leader in his own right.[159] Whilst some soldiers moved up through the ranks before establishing themselves at the head of a group of companions, others led troops of men to war from the beginning of their military careers. Lineage could qualify men to hold authority over other men-at-arms even when experience was lacking. Bartholomew de Badlesmere began his military career at the head of a small troop in Gascony in 1294. He served independently at Falkirk and Caerlaverock before being absorbed into the households of Robert de Clifford and the earl of Gloucester.[160] His father, Guncelin, had fought in the Welsh wars, and it is probable that Bartholomew was encouraged from an early age to follow in his footsteps. Likewise, Payn de Tibetot probably owed his prominent place at court to the reputation of his father, Robert, for prior to appearing as a sub-leader of Prince Edward in 1303 he had only been giving military service for two or three years.[161]

The earls and leading barons were the most important retinue leaders within Edwardian armies as a consequence of the resources, both human and financial, that they could bring to bear. For the same reason, the absence of some of these men in crisis years such as 1297, 1310 and 1314 might seriously undermine the king's military plans. Yet, not all retinue leaders were men of such high social status, and even the lowliest sergeants would occasionally go to war with small troops of one or two men under their command. John de Bilton, a valet-at-arms from Northumberland, petitioned Edward II for the arrears of 153 pounds that he was owed for service alongside three men-at-arms in the Scottish wars. Two of his brothers had died at the hands of the king's enemies, and Bilton evidently felt aggrieved at the Crown's lack of urgency in meeting his costs and expenses despite the sacrifices that he and his family had made.[162] Such small companies can often be detected in royal pay documents. However, retinues led by men of sub-knightly rank were not quite as common during this period as they were to be later in the fourteenth century when the status of the 'esquire' had risen considerably. An examination of the horse inventories drawn up for campaigns between 1282 and 1307 shows that generally, between a half and two-thirds of retinue leaders were accorded the title *Dominus*, indicating knightly rank. Most troop commanders

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[159] For his service with Clifford in 1297, 1298 and 1300, see chapter 1 n. 160. For 1301; E 101/9/23, m. 1.
[160] Above n. 145. He was with the earl of Gloucester in 1307, 1308 and 1310 (C 71/4, m. 13) and acted as a sub-leader for him in 1314 (C 71/6, m. 5; C 81/1727, m. 18).
[161] E 101/612/11, m. 2d.
[162] *Ancient Petitions Relating to Northumberland*, ed. C.M. Fraser, Surtees Society, clxxvi (1966), no. 143.

'were the heads of established and prominent county families'.[163] In the later stages of the Hundred Years War, it was quite normal for esquires to contract for service with one or two other men-at-arms.[164] The horse lists also provide a rare opportunity to compare the status and prestige of the retinue leaders with that of the men who followed them to war. Surveying the inventories for the reign of Edward III, Andrew Ayton noted that the horse of each leader 'would generally be more valuable than those of his retainers and often of higher quality than those employed by others of comparable military rank'.[165] In this he was in agreement with Philippe Contamine who observed that in the armies of mid-fourteenth century France, the *chefs de montre* possessed greater social prestige than their companions: they disposed of the best equipment and the most valuable mounts.[166] Table 2.1 compares the horse valuations of retinue leaders with those of their companions for a number of royal armies.

Table 2.1: Mean Warhorse Values (£) for Retinue Leaders and their Men[167]

Year	Retinue leaders	Knightly retainers	All retainers
1282	17.5 (67 men)	12.3 (70 men)	7.3 (476 men)
1296	16.9 (47)	14.3 (16)	8.3 (190)
1297-8	23.6 (89)	21.4 (64)	10.5 (690)
1298	20.8 (131)	18.6 (130)	9.7 (941)
1300	26.5 (67)	19.8 (51)	11.6 (385)
1301	24.1 (96)	21.1 (64)	10.7 (553)
1303-4	24.9 (107)	19.9 (57)	10.2 (634)
1306	24.2 (53)	19.7 (37)	10.1 (245)
1307	17.2 (36)	15.3 (17)	7.8 (154)
1311-14	19.3 (10)	8.6 (7)	6.8 (184)

It was normal, during the reigns of Edward I and Edward II, for company leaders to possess mounts worth around ten pounds more than that of an average follower, and in

[163] A.R.J. Juřica, 'The Knights of Edward I: An Investigation of the Social Significance of Knightly Rank in the Period 1272-1307 based on a Study of the Knights of Somerset', University of Birmingham D.Phil. thesis, 1976, 202.
[164] Cf. M.R. Powicke, 'Lancastrian Captains', *Essays in Medieval History Presented to Bertie Wilkinson*, ed. T.A. Sandquist and M.R. Powicke (Toronto, 1969), 375.
[165] Ayton, *Knights and Warhorses*, 229.
[166] P. Contamine, *Guerre, État et Société à la Fin du Moyen Âge, Études sur les Armées des Rois de France 1337-1494* (Paris, 1972), 80.
[167] Sources: Wales 1282 (C 47/2/7); Scotland 1296 (E 101/5/23); Flanders 1297-8 (E 101/6/19, 28, 37); and Scotland 1298 (*Gough*, 160-237); 1300 (E 101/8/23); 1301 (E 101/9/23, 4); 1303-4 (E 101/612/7, 8, 9, 11); 1306 (E 101/13/7; E 101/612/15, 19); 1307 (E 101/612/20, 21; E 101/14/15 m.9); 1311-14 (E 101/14/15, mm. 1-5). The section headed 'all retainers' includes clerks, 'masters' and those ascribed no rank as well as knights and valets, but not 'independent' men-at-arms. Many archers had horses appraised on the March in 1313-14 which explains the low valuations in the bottom row. Not all men had appraised horses, hence the slight difference between some of these figures and those presented below in table 2.2.

some years, such as 1297, 1300 and 1301, the difference was even greater. As we have seen, most of those who led contingents to war in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries were men of knightly status. For the most part, there was a great gulf between them and the lowliest sergeants in their companies. In 1296, Hugh le Despenser was in Scotland with a horse valued at seventy marks, but thirteen of the twenty-four men in his company, twenty-one of whom were valets, had mounts worth less than ten pounds.[168] An examination of the composition of Edwardian armies shows that, in most years, over 75 per cent of men-at-arms were of sub-knightly rank, so a comparison between retinue leaders and the average man-at-arms who accompanied to war them is always going to show a marked divergence in values.[169] More indicative of the social and material pre-eminence of the retinue leaders is the fact that they also served with horseflesh of greater quality than that of the other men of knightly status under their command. In 1282, William le Latimer served on a mount valued at fifty marks whilst the other six knights in his *comitiva* campaigned on horses worth thirty-five marks or less;[170] and twenty-four years later, Robert de Clifford was on a steed appraised at thirty marks more than that of the most valuable mount among his knightly companions.[171]

The horse inventories enable us to quantify the difference in status between retinue leaders and their followers in a way that is not possible with any other source. Yet, the value of a man's mount was probably less important as an indicator of his credentials in the eyes of his contemporaries than the number of men whom he was able to lead to war under his command. 'A man's worship, his standing among his fellow noblemen, and his influence in his own county, were measured by the number and consequence of those who were enrolled in his *meinie*'.[172] This is most graphically demonstrated by the contents of a petition sent to the king by one of the most prominent members of the military community, Walter de Huntercombe. Since the beginning of the Scottish war, Huntercombe claimed, he had served at the siege of Berwick with twenty mailed horse, at Stirling Bridge with thirty-two horse, and at Falkirk with a troop of thirty men-at-arms, as well as in Galloway two years later. It was the ability to lead such large troops of men to war which placed certain individuals in the forefront of

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[168] E 101/5/23, m.1i.
[169] Ayton, *Knights and Warhorses*, 5.
[170] C 47/2/7, mm. 4, 6.
[171] E 101/612/15, mm. 1, 2.
[172] McFarlane, *The Nobility of Later Medieval England*, 106.

the military community.[173] Not all retinue leaders were able to command followings as powerful as those of Walter de Huntercombe, however, and the evidence of the horse inventories drawn up between the second Welsh war and the battle of Bannockburn indicates that companies of rather more modest size were common.

Table 2.2: Average Retinue Sizes based on the Horse Lists (1282-1314)[174]

Year	Leaders	Knight retainers	Av. per Leader	Other retainers	Av. per Leader	Total retainers	Av. per leader
1282	87	71	0.8	409	4.7	480	5.5
1296	51	16	0.3	176	3.5	192	3.8
1297-8	114	64	0.6	648	5.7	712	6.2
1298	151	136	0.9	835	5.5	969	6.4
1300	90	51	0.6	336	3.7	387	4.3
1301	113	64	0.6	495	4.4	559	4.9
1303-4	143	58	0.4	594	4.2	652	4.6
1306	60	37	0.6	210	3.5	247	4.1
1307	61	18	0.3	141	2.3	159	2.6
1311-14	12	7	0.6	224	18.7	231	19.3
Total	882	522	0.6	4068	4.6	4588	5.2

The average aristocratic contingent, as revealed on the horse lists, consisted of only five men-at-arms, the majority, if not all of whom, were soldiers of sub-knightly rank. (In this respect the figures for the retinues on the Scottish March for the years 1311-14 should be regarded as an anomaly, caused by the exceptional circumstances of the war on the border and the small number of retinues contained within that sample). It is striking, particularly considering that the vast majority of the company commanders were knights, that most of these units did not contain a single follower who had been girded with the belt of knighthood. Although these figures do not encompass the companies led to war by the earls and other leading barons, who did not accept Crown pay, or the unpaid parts of other retinues, they do highlight the significant role played by a large number of small companies within Edwardian hosts. Knights, followed to war by just a few valets, such as Thomas Paynel in Flanders in 1297,[175] or John Fitz Simon in 1300,[176] were a common phenomenon, and for every man who led a large company of more than a dozen men there were likely to be several accompanied by less

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[173] *Parl. Roll.*, ii, 475. In 1282-3 he served at wages with two knights and seven sergeants (C 47/2/7, m.7), and on the horse list of 1300 he had 21 men-at-arms (E 101/8/23, m. 7).
[174] Information compiled from the same sources as in Table 2.1.
[175] E 101/6/37, m. 2ii.
[176] E 101/8/23, m. 1.

impressive followings. Of some ninety retinues and sub-companies on the horse inventory for the second Welsh war in 1282, around fifty consisted of fewer than five soldiers. In contrast, only one unit, that of William le Latimer, comprised more than twenty men-at-arms.[177] Analysis of the various lists compiled for the army that campaigned in Scotland in 1303 shows that just three companies, those of Robert de Clifford, John de Drokensford and John de Benstede, were staffed by more than a score of cavalrymen, whereas about ninety consisted of four men or fewer.[178] Many of the most prominent magnates who led larger companies to war do not appear on these lists, either because they did not receive wages or because the inventories are incomplete. Urian de St. Peter can be seen on the main pay roll in 1282 with nine knights and thirty-one sergeants, but the value of his mount and those of his men are not given.[179] As a rule, the company sizes of the leading earls can only be estimated from the letters of protection. However, the earl of Warwick had the horses of twenty-seven men appraised in 1297 before withdrawing from the Flanders campaign, eighteen fewer than were listed under the earl of Lancaster for the Falkirk campaign the following year.[180] The royal wardrobe books for 1297, 1300, 1301 and 1303 offer more precise figures for the company sizes of knights bachelor and banneret: these sources differentiate, unlike the inventories, between the two kinds of leader. This data is presented in the table below.

Table 2.3: Company Strengths of Knights Bachelor and Banneret[181]

	1297		1300		1301		1303-4	
	Bann.	Bach.	Bann.	Bach.	Bann.	Bach.	Bann.	Bach.
Leaders	22	49	25	39	31	41	20	28
Knights	55	7	66	6	60	4	35	1
Average	2.5	0.1	2.6	0.2	1.9	0.1	1.8	0.04
Sergeants	230	151	267	108	293	102	182	68
Average	10.5	3.1	10.7	2.8	9.5	2.5	9.1	2.4
Total av.	13	3.2	13.3	3.0	11.4	2.6	10.9	2.44

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[177] C 47/2/7 *passim*; *ibid*, mm. 4, 6.

[178] The wardrobe book for 1303-4 shows that payments were made to Drokensford's three knights rather than to the keeper of the wardrobe himself. Two of these knights had also been with him in 1301; BL, Add. MS 8835, f. 58r; BL, Add. MS 7966a, f. 85v.

[179] E 101/4/1, m. 13.

[180] E 101/6/37, m. 6i; *Gough*, 179-81. Earls did occasionally accept pay. The earl of Lincoln served at the king's wages with 6 knights and 23 sergeants in 1277 (E 101/3/12), and the earl of Arundel was paid for a company of 39 men-at-arms in 1298 (E 101/6/35, f. 12r).

[181] 25 Edward I (BL, Add. MS 7965); 28 Edward I (*Liber Quotidianus*); 29 Edward I (BL, Add. MS 7966a); 32 Edward I (BL, Add. MS 8835). One or two large retinues brought from overseas, such as that of the earl of Ulster in 1301, have been left out so as not to distort the figures. Optimum retinue figures have been used for the purposes of analysis as retinue sizes changed frequently.

Michael Prestwich has previously observed, based on information contained in the early thirteenth-century *Histoire* of William Marshal, that each banneret was responsible for an average of around thirteen men-at-arms.[182] The figures presented in the above table, though based on evidence that does not lend itself easily to statistical analysis, seem to bear that statement out. Whilst knights bachelor seldom received pay for other belted soldiers, bannerets could usually count two or three men of knightly rank among their followers. Furthermore, the average banneret led around ten men more than knights of inferior rank, the latter generally being accompanied by just two or three sergeants on campaign.[183] Given the divergence in the armed strengths of companies led by bachelors and bannerets, it may be assumed that promotion from one rank to another brought with it greater expectations and responsibilities. John Botetourt had one knight and seven sergeants in his *comitiva* on the Flanders campaign in 1297 and was promoted to the rank of banneret on 23 August. At Falkirk, in the following year, he can be found on the horse lists with three knights and thirteen sergeants, a reflection no doubt of his newly-won status.[184] The special position of the knights banneret among the military elite of Edwardian England is well illustrated by the pre-eminence given to them on the Parliamentary Roll of Arms. Following a section devoted to the king, the earls and the bishop of Durham, the roll lists some 150 bannerets with their arms given in blazon. These are then followed, as we have seen, by the other knights of England divided into the counties in which they held their principal lands.[185] The importance of the bannerets in organisational terms is also indicated by Jean le Bel's account of the Weardale campaign in 1327, where he describes how each morning all the men-at-arms arranged themselves under the appropriate banners before the army set out.[186] Besides the earls and the king himself, bannerets were the most indispensable component of royal armies.

Many of the most powerful magnates served as bannerets within the *familia regis* at some stage during their careers. Robert de Clifford, John de Crumwell and John de St. John were just several of the prominent men in receipt of fees and robes during the period of the Scottish wars, whilst family groups such as the Badlesmeres, Latimers and Beauchamps supplied a thread of continuity within the royal household throughout

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[182] Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare*, 14.
[183] These figures conceal variations between the retinue sizes of individual bachelors and bannerets. On the Flanders campaign of 1297-8 Geoffrey de Geneville led a company of four knights and twenty-two sergeants, but another banneret, Simon Fraser, had a contingent of only one knight and two sergeants; BL, Add. MS 7965, ff. 64r, 68r.
[184] BL, Add. MS 7965, f. 64r; *Gough*, 166-7.
[185] *PW*, i, 410-20.
[186] *Chronique de Jean le Bel*, i, 55.

much of the reign.[187] R.L. Ingamells has shown how many of the household bannerets in the 1270s and 1280s were soldiers who had previously served as *familiares* of either Henry III or the Lord Edward. A large number of household retainers during the Scottish wars of the later part of the reign were the sons of these men.[188] The wealth of documentation on the king's household makes it possible to follow the careers of knights and bannerets in receipt of the king's livery in greater detail than those who fell outside the purview of the wardrobe clerks. Some soldiers worked their way up the military hierarchy from relatively humble origins to become important members of the king's personal following. Aymer de la Bret was a king's sergeant in the wardrobe account for 1286 and still occupied the same rank three years later. By 1300 he can be found receiving pay as a banneret.[189] In this instance, persistent service on behalf of the Crown appears to have been rewarded with gradual recognition. For others, the rewards might come more rapidly. In 1304, Payn de Tibetot was made a banneret despite the fact that he had never been knighted and had inherited his father's lands just a few years previously.[190] Such a double promotion was highly unusual and may indicate a desire on Edward's part to create a new and younger leadership corps capable of supporting his son following his own death. Whatever the reason for this exceptional measure, it would seem that special favour could accomplish in one moment what it took others many years to achieve.

That bannerets were the most important company leaders in Edwardian armies is indicated by the fact that, usually, only soldiers who held that rank were named on the occasional rolls of arms, the Galloway Roll being the prime exception. These rolls offer an intriguing insight into the structure of these armies which is often lacking in the more mundane pay documents drawn up by the wardrobe clerks. One of these rolls, that for the Falkirk campaign of 1298, has been considered in some detail by J.E. Morris and Michael Prestwich, both of whom observed that only forty-eight of the 115 men named on the roll also appear on the horse lists drawn up for that year.[191] Though Morris did not draw out the full significance of this discovery, Prestwich used it to show how large numbers of magnates were giving unpaid gratuitous service in the armies of Edward I. This observation has improved our understanding of late thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century armies, providing an insight into the independence retained by many baronial warriors during their service on behalf of the Crown, as well

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[187] On the military role of the household, see Prestwich, *War, Politics and Finance*, 42.
[188] Ingamells, 'Household Knights of Edward I', i, 36.
[189] E 101/351/26, m. 1; E 101/352/31, m. 1; *Liber Quotidianus*, 200.
[190] BL, Add. MS 8835, ff. 55v, 114r; *Knights of Edward I*, v, 24.
[191] Morris, *Welsh Wars*, 314; Prestwich, *War, Politics and Finance*, 68; *Aspilogia III*, i, 406-417.

as an awareness of the mixed 'paid', 'unpaid' and 'feudal' elements within the hosts.[192] From a structural perspective, it should also be noted that there are 107 company leaders who appear on the horse inventory who are not named on the heraldic roll, together with a further twenty-eight leaders who obtained protections for their men but who are named on neither the roll nor the horse list. The implication is that the leaders of these smaller companies were serving independently of the bannerets named on the armorial, which would suggest an extremely atomised structure, or were incorporated into these larger companies for the duration of the campaign.

A comparison of the three main sources at our disposal, the roll of arms, the horse inventory and the letters of protection, suggests that many of the smaller companies were attached to the larger retinues led by bannerets. Richard de Herthill, Fulk Lestrange and Hugh de St. John each obtained letters of protection for small troops of men-at-arms, but all three also had letters enrolled for service in the company of Ralph de Monthermer, the earl of Gloucester.[193] Both John de Heselarton and Gerard Salveyn led their followers within the greater *comitiva* of William le Latimer senior, whilst John de Kyngeston and Gilbert Talebot served as small company leaders under the umbrella retinue of the household steward, Walter de Beauchamp.[194] What appears to have happened is that the smallest companies, the social units which constituted the most fundamental components of Edwardian armies, fed into the larger retinues of the bannerets to increase the organisational and tactical cohesion of the armies. Viewed from this perspective, the bannerets appear not only as leaders of large groups under their own immediate command, but also as focal points around which other smaller units would assemble. Furthermore, this process of integration took place independently of any central planning, the initiative coming from the bannerets who applied for letters of protection for the lesser company leaders under their authority. Although the marshal and constable played an important organisational role at the muster, it is probable that the larger companies consisting of a number of smaller units arrived at the start of campaigns already constituted. Nor did the grouping process end there. Many of the bannerets who appear on the rolls of arms were evidently serving under associates of the same or superior rank. The herald who composed the *Song of Caerlaverock* for the army that fought in Galloway two years after Falkirk grouped many of the bannerets together into larger troops under noble and comital commanders.[195] A similar policy

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[192] Prestwich, *War, Politics and Finance*, 91.
[193] C 67/13, mm. 5, 6d, 8 and 9.
[194] C 67/13, m. 5; *Gough*, 185; C 67/13, m. 8.
[195] *The Siege of Caerlaverock*, 4, 6.

seems to have been adopted by the herald who composed the Falkirk Roll. Henry de Pinkeney appears in the household division immediately after Thomas de Furnivall with whom he had his horse appraised for the campaign; elsewhere, Aymer de Valence is listed just two places before his companion, Thomas de Berkeley.[196] Seven bannerets had letters of protection enrolled with the bishop of Durham, who was the leader of the second battle, and all seven fittingly appear among the bishop's followers on the roll of arms.[197] Leadership within Edwardian armies was therefore exercised on more than one level: knightly leaders of small companies served under bannerets, and the latter gathered together under battle commanders and other noble warriors.

The army of 1298 was by no means unique in the way that it was organised. For the host that campaigned in Wales in 1282 the main cavalry pay roll can be compared with the horse lists and letters of protection to show the presence of around 200 company leaders. A number of prominent magnates, including Thomas de Berkeley, Reginald Fitz Peter and Edmund de Mortimer, appear on neither the main pay roll nor the inventory.[198] In all likelihood there were many other company leaders in other parts of Wales who have gone undetected in the army records for that year. A comparison of these three sources shows that many of the smaller companies were grouped together within larger baronial *comitivae*, as with the army at Falkirk. Ingelram de Bovyngton and John de Bordell appear as leaders of independent retinues and sub-companies on the pay roll, but on the horse list both men are entered as knights within the company of John de Eyville.[199] William de Derneford is named on the main pay roll independently alongside a William de Hodenet, as well as in the larger retinue of the banneret, Ralph Basset of Drayton.[200] In 1282, as with the army at Falkirk, a number of bannerets can be found grouped together under the authority of prominent earls and captains. Thomas de Berkeley, Richard Fitz John and Robert de Wilughby, for example, each served under the earl of Gloucester, captain in south Wales.[201] The presence of such prominent landholders within the larger comital companies may explain how a later earl of Gloucester, the son of the man who had fought in Wales, was reportedly able to put 500 men-at-arms in the field at Bannockburn.[202]

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[196] *Gough*, 211, 216, 222; *Aspilogia III*, i, 412-3, 416.
[197] C 67/13, mm. 1, 5d, 6d, 7; *Aspilogia III*, i, 408-11.
[198] For their protections, see C 67/8, mm. 2d, 4d, 6d, and 7d.
[199] E 101/4/1, mm. 11i, 12; C 47/2/7, m. 9.
[200] E 101/4/1, m. 5; C 47/2/5, m. 2. A man of that name also appears on the pay roll for west Wales with John de Columbers, who was in Basset's retinue on the inventory; C 47/2/4, m. 2.
[201] SC 1/22, no. 158; *PW*, i, 234; C 67/8, m. 8d.
[202] C 71/4, mm. 8-14; *Vita Edwardi Secundi*, 93.

The processes by which numerous smaller companies joined together to create larger retinues are generally hidden from view in the pay documents drawn up by royal clerks. There is, however, a corpus of documents that enables us to examine this phenomenon more closely. Enrolled letters of protection provide neat summaries of the main company leaders within the army and the men-at-arms in their service: they generally offer little insight into any subdivisions that might have existed within these units. However, the *fiat* warrants for protection, which were 'the product of an earlier stage in the process of retinue recruitment', sometimes enable us to see more clearly the way that aristocratic companies were constructed in the build-up to royal campaigns.[203] The earl of Gloucester's retinue in 1310, already referred to, is a particular case in point. In that year the Scottish roll shows forty-five men with letters of protection enrolled in the earl's company. Presented in this way the evidence suggests that all of these soldiers stood in a direct relationship towards the earl, but a protection warrant drawn up prior to this enrolment indicates that at least one sub-unit existed within this larger whole. The banneret Geoffrey de Say is listed at the head of a small contingent consisting of two knights and three sergeants, with each of these men-at-arms identified as Say's personal retainers. At the side of these men, who are bracketed together, is written the name of the earl of Gloucester.[204] When we look again at the enrolled letters of protection on the Scottish roll we find the same six soldiers listed in the order that they appear on the warrant, but no indication is given that Say was a sub-leader within the larger company, or indeed that these men formed a separate group of companions at all.[205] For the Bannockburn campaign of four years later, the weight of the earl's troop was enhanced by eleven knights and twenty sergeants brought to him by Bartholomew de Badlesmere.[206] Nicholas de Segrave junior also acted as a sub-recruiter, taking a troop of seven men-at-arms into the *comitiva* of the earl of Hereford during the earlier Welsh wars.[207] One protection warrant issued by the earl Warenne, probably for one of the Scottish campaigns early in the reign of Edward II, suggests that such sub-leaders were expected to obtain letters of protection for their own men.[208] We are fortunate if that was the case, for otherwise there would be little way of knowing about the existence of these small sub-units.

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[203] Ayton, *Knights and Warhorses*, 161.
[204] C 81/1738, m. 66.
[205] C 71/4, m. 13.
[206] C 81/1727, m. 18.
[207] C 81/1728, m. 55.
[208] C 81/1741, m. 63.

Careful scrutiny of the military sources yields much information about the structure of the armies of the first two Edwards. No less crucial in determining how these forces performed in the field was the experience of the men who led these contingents to war. So far we have said little about the collective experience of the retinue leaders of our period, partly for the reasons outlined by Michael Jones in his study of the English commanders in Brittany during the 1340s.[209] Large-scale reconstruction of this kind inevitably fails to do justice to the individuals concerned. Nevertheless, examination of the bannerets named on the Falkirk Roll, which offers a manageable sample of an elite band of warriors, shows that English armies at the beginning of the Scottish wars were led by a substantial number of veterans of the Welsh campaigns of the 1270s and 1280s. Of the 115 bannerets who are named on the armorial, some fifty had given service in either one or both of the main expeditions against Llywelyn in 1277 and 1282. Reginald de Grey,[210] Walter de Huntercombe,[211] Peter de Mauley[212] and Hugh Pointz[213] were among several who had fought in every major army raised against the Welsh, including those gathered to put down the risings of 1287 and 1294-5. These men were joined at Falkirk by numerous other veterans of the first two Welsh wars, such as Peter Corbet,[214] Ralph Fitz William,[215] Walter de Beauchamp[216] and Thomas de Berkeley.[217] A further group of around twenty bannerets appear to have gained their first experience of war during the later Welsh conflicts against Rhys ap Maredudd and Madog ap Llywelyn, with Adam de Welles, Hugh le Despenser, Henry de Percy and John Wake counting among this number.[218] A minimum of around three-quarters of the bannerets named at Falkirk had therefore seen service in Wales before the focus of attention moved to the north and the war with the Scots. Of the remainder, many were the sons of soldiers who had died during the 1290s after many years of military service on behalf of the Crown. The fathers of Hugh de Courtenay, Philip Darcy, John de Engayne and Thomas de Furnivall all died between

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[209] M. Jones, 'Edward III's Captains in Brittany', *England in the Fourteenth Century*, ed. W.M. Ormrod (Woodbridge, 1986), 101.
[210] Above, n. 58.
[211] *PW*, i, 201; C 47/2/7, m.7; *CPR, 1281-92*, 272; C 67/10, m. 7d.
[212] *PW*, i, 199; C 67/8, m. 7; *CPR, 1281-92*, 274; C 67/10, m. 7d.
[213] E 101/3/13; C 67/8, m. 7; *CPR, 1281-92*, 272; C 67/10, m. 7.
[214] *PW*, i, 204; C 67/8, m. 7.
[215] *PW*, i, 204; C 47/2/7, m. 6.
[216] *PW*, i, 199; C 67/8, m. 4d.
[217] *PW*, i, 204; C 67/8, m. 6d.
[218] For their service in 1294-5, see C 67/10, mm. 5, 5d, 6, 7.

1291 and 1297, leaving their offspring to perform the leadership roles at Falkirk formerly carried out by themselves.[219]

Such continuity from father to son helped to guarantee a certain element of stability within the leadership corps of these armies. Lineage was probably just as important as individual ability in determining which men served as retinue leaders. Some soldiers were fortunate in having several sons who were able to carry on the leadership baton handed down to them. James de Audley, the justice of Chester who accompanied the Lord Edward on the crusade of 1270, had one son, William de Audley, who gave service during the Welsh wars before being killed at the bridge of boats in 1282, whilst his youngest son, Hugh, later led small bands of men-at-arms during the Scottish wars.[220] Not all magnates were so lucky. The destruction of the English army at Bannockburn, and the deaths there of a large number of prominent warriors, should remind us that the fortunes of warfare did not always favour those of most distinguished rank. Many of the magnates who succumbed to the Scottish pikemen were men who either had no children or whose descendants were too young to supply their places immediately. The earl of Gloucester's lands were divided among his three sisters when it was found that his wife had not conceived.[221] William de Vescy, Edmund Comyn, and John Lovel, meanwhile, were just three of the lesser company leaders who either had no heirs or whose lands passed to young daughters.[222] Although Payn de Tibetot did have a son of just over one year old, it would be some years before he would be able to occupy the boots previously filled by his father.[223] These mortalities show that the problem facing the Crown after 1314 was not only a lack of earls, but also the absence of numerous other prominent men who had been killed in battle. The deaths of these leaders seriously depleted the forces available to the king during the years of crisis that followed, illustrating just how important such company commanders were to the military fortunes of the Edwardian kings.

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[219] *Knights of Edward I*, i, 243, 266, 307; ii, 92-3.
[220] For James' service, see Lloyd, *English Society and the Crusade*, appendix 4. His second son William is named in the annals of Chester as one of sixteen knights drowned in the crossing from Anglesey in 1282; *Annales Cestrienses*, 110-11.
[221] *IPM*, v, no. 538.
[222] *Ibid*, nos 534 (Vescy), 499 (Comyn) and 520 (Lovel).
[223] *Ibid*, no. 519.

3

The Military Community

Although of central importance to the Edwardian war effort and to the organisation of English hosts in this period, captains, wardens and retinue leaders were in a minority when set against the total number of landowners and non-landed gentry who took up arms in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. Attempts to calculate the size of this pool, a community of men-at-arms consisting of both regular and occasional campaigners, have hitherto been hindered both by the sheer bulk of the records relating to military service and the interpretative problems associated with their use. However, such a quantitative approach is necessary if we are to gauge the extent of the English aristocracy's involvement in war during the reigns of the first two Edwards. By analysing the service records that provide information relating to military rank, (primarily the horse inventories but also pay rolls, proffer rolls and others) it has been possible to identify some 1,350 knights and 4,900 men of sub-knightly status, or sergeants, who took part in campaigns in Wales, Scotland and on the continent between 1272 and 1314. Given that the said records are far from complete, that sources not providing information relating to rank, such as letters of protection and attorney, have not been included in this calculation, and that between a half and two-thirds of mounted soldiers tended to serve without Crown pay, it may be estimated that around 1,700 knights and 6,000 sergeants acquired some experience of war between the accession of Edward I and the battle of Bannockburn.[1] For the historian, attempting to interpret and summarise the broad range of experience encompassed by these figures is a most difficult task. Behind every name inscribed on parchment there lies a different story waiting to be told. The aim of this chapter is to trace the aspects of war that were common to these men-at-arms, whilst acknowledging the unique details that made many of their careers so remarkable.

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[1] These figures have been extracted from a database containing some 38,000 records relating to the performance of military service, not including data on distraints to knighthood and military summonses. The figures of 1,350 and 4,900 were originally increased by 50 per cent to account for soldiers who do not appear in the service records or with specified ranks on particular campaigns. However, as some of these would have been accorded ranks on other occasions the rate of increase has been reduced to 25 per cent. Such calculations are necessarily imperfect. The fact that there are over 18,000 letters of attorney and protection, as well as respites of debts, pleas and fines, including duplicates, which do not normally specify soldiers' ranks, highlights the potential shortfall in the figures given here.

MEN-AT-ARMS AND THE FORTUNES OF WAR

During times of war, ordinary men were capable of performing extraordinary feats. In the winter of 1282, the last native Prince of Wales, Llywelyn ap Gruffydd, was killed near Builth as he struggled with a regional English army under the command of the Marcher lord Roger Lestrange. His death was one of the most significant events of the Edwardian wars, depriving the men of Gwynedd of their natural leader and thereby accelerating the English conquest of Wales. Such an important historical figure deserved a fitting end, yet of the man responsible for Llywelyn's demise, identified by the chronicler Walter of Guisborough as Stephen de Frankton, we know relatively little.[2] Although J.E. Morris was able to identify him as an associate of Lestrange who later served as an infantry commander in the war of 1287, he has left few other traces in the military sources.[3] It is not until 1314 that we again find a man of that name preparing to go to war, and there is no way of knowing whether the Stephen de Frankton who obtained a letter of protection with Theobald de Verdon for the Bannockburn campaign was the man who had played so singular a role in the events of thirty-two years earlier.[4] Frankton's story demonstrates the important contribution that the more obscure members of the Edwardian military community made to the English war effort, but it also highlights the difficulties that are involved in trying to reconstruct the military careers of such men. Too often, individual soldiers of modest status are captured only momentarily, their names recorded because of some courageous act or villainous treachery, before they disappear, leaving the historian with few traces of their other activities.[5] One such man was Peter de Kirkeswold, who wrote to the king in the autumn of 1297 stating that he had been present in the garrison at Berwick during the siege of that town by the Scots. In a display of great courage, he had swum the Tweed in a desperate bid to reach the earl Warenne at Norham with letters of assistance before the town fell into the hands of the enemy. Although he claimed to have served the king in Wales and Scotland, the only other evidence of his service is as a crossbowman in north Wales under John de Havering in 1295.[6] For information on men like Kirkeswold and Frankton, the source materials can be infuriatingly incomplete. For this reason, a large number of the men-at-arms who served in English armies during this period must

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[2] *Guisborough*, 220-1.
[3] Morris, *Welsh Wars*, 210.
[4] C 71/6, m. 3. For other possible candidates for Llewellyn's assassin, see L.B. Smith, 'The Death of Llywelyn ap Gruffydd: The Narratives Reconsidered', *WHR*, xi (1982), 200-13.
[5] The chroniclers were particularly keen, for example, to record the name of one Peter de Spalding who treacherously betrayed the garrison of Berwick to the Scots in 1318: *Trokelowe*, 103; *Ann. Paulini*, 282.
[6] *Stevenson*, ii, 228-9; E 101/5/18, m. 1.

remain as nothing more than names. In this respect it is not difficult to empathise with Edward II who, upon receiving a petition from a certain William de Cranbergh *c.*1320 requesting some reward for his service in Scotland, wished to know 'qi il est et de son service'.[7]

Whilst it is not always possible to know who these men were and what service they had performed, there can be no doubt that the attempts of Edward I to establish his supremacy throughout the British Isles and in south-west France placed great demands on the lesser landowners of England. 'Fighting war on an unprecedented scale', Scott Waugh has noted, 'demanded more out of communities in terms of both money and men than they had been accustomed to providing'.[8] Few genteel families could have escaped the burdens imposed by the king's wars completely. During the years of crisis, between the outbreak of war with France in 1294 and the victory over the Scots at Falkirk in 1298, the pressure placed by the Crown on its subjects was particularly intense. Fighting wars in Wales, France and Scotland required the maximisation of human resources. This inevitably had consequences both for those who were expected to send men to war and those who were serving in the field. In the closing months of 1294, Edward wrote to John Giffard of Brimpsfield ordering that in addition to the men that he had sent to Gascony under the earl of Lancaster, he must dispatch more soldiers to Wales to fight under the earl of Hereford.[9] In the following year, similar orders were sent to the earl of Cornwall, demanding that he raise a troop of men to go to Scotland despite the fact that some of his tenants were already fighting on his behalf in France.[10] Unsurprisingly, the knights and sergeants who shouldered the burden of these orders sometimes found themselves being called on to serve in several spheres of war at once, or accused of trying to avoid military service even though they were performing it elsewhere. In the summer of 1297, an anonymous writer sent word to Edward informing him that James de Multon could not be present at the forthcoming muster as he was staying 'en la compaignie monsieur Henri de Perci e monsieur Robert de Clifford en ceste guerre Descoce as chevaux e armes'.[11] That August, the king also received a letter from the bishop of Durham explaining that John de Craystok had not been able to attend the muster arranged by Henry de Percy for a raid into Scotland because he was already

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[7] SC 8/82, no. 4083.
[8] S.L. Waugh, 'The Third Century of English Feudalism', *Thirteenth Century England VII*, ed M. Prestwich, R. Britnell and R. Frame (Woodbridge, 1999), 54.
[9] *PW*, i, 266.
[10] *Ibid*, 277.
[11] SC 1/21, no. 167. Multon was in Gascony in 1294 (*RG*, iii, 120) and 1295 (*RG*, iii, 318) before switching to Scotland in 1297, 1298 (C 67/13, m. 5d), 1300 (C 67/14, m. 14) and 1304 (C 67/15, m. 4d).

with the bishop elsewhere north of the border. Craystok had wrongly been accused of non-service, for which default his lands had been taken into the king's hand.[12]

Once men like Multon and Craystok had been conscripted it is most difficult to reconstruct their campaigning experiences and to know whether they enjoyed giving military service, or regarded it as an unwanted burden. Whilst it is sometimes possible to trace the daily activities of leading captains like Robert de Tibetot and John de St. John as they corresponded with the Crown and issued orders to their subordinates, the picture becomes increasingly blurred as one goes further down the military hierarchy. Many of the less wealthy knights and sergeants might have hoped for nothing more than to perform their service without suffering any personal damage or losses, for war could be both a risky and expensive business. One major concern was the protection of military equipment: the warhorse, in particular, was frequently at the centre of disputes between men-at-arms on campaign. In a case brought before the king's council in 1295, Ralph Saunsaver complained that the warhorses provided for him by William de Breouse for his service in Gascony had not been of sufficient quality. He had covenanted with Breouse for a hundred pounds which the latter had met by giving him sixty pounds and two horses; as the horses did not meet his expectations, Saunsaver demanded ten marks more.[13] Arguments over military equipment and the rightful ownership of horses can also be traced on the plea roll for the army that went to Scotland in 1296. Laurence de Preston complained that Matthew de Forneys was withholding a grey horse of his valued at eight marks which had run away from its groom. In another incident, Alan Fitz Waryn launched a suit against Robert de St. Paul for a similar theft.[14] Such material concerns are hardly surprising given that 'the horse represented a very major investment for a knight, perhaps in many cases equivalent to a years income',[15] and the importance of having a ready mount was increased due to the severe shortage of warhorses in England at this time.[16]

The misfortunes of war often amounted to much more than the mere loss of a horse whilst on campaign. For many men the experience of war was a savage and brutal one, leading to personal disfigurement, the loss of property or even death. Fatalities and heavy casualties, whilst not common, were encountered with sufficient regularity by the English throughout this period to ensure that men-at-arms could not take military

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[12] SC 1/21, no. 123.
[13] *Select Cases Before the King's Council, 1243-1482*, ed. I.S. Leadam and J.F. Baldwin, Selden Society, xxxv (1918), 16.
[14] 'Plea Roll, 1296', nos 38, 63.
[15] M. Prestwich, '*Miles in Armis Strenuus:* The Knight at War', *TRHS*, 6th ser., v (1995), 211.
[16] Cf. *Ancient Correspondence Concerning Wales*, 201.

service lightly. In addition to the heavy losses suffered at the bridge of boats in 1282, Stirling Bridge in 1297, and Bannockburn, there were also some lesser battles and skirmishes in which English soldiers were discomfited.[17] Financial difficulties were regularly encountered by those who had served in the king's wars: the author of the *Song of Trailbaston* probably spoke for many when he bemoaned the fact that despite many years of service in Gascony, Flanders and Scotland he had made little gain.[18] One man who might have empathised with the author of this poem was William de Weston, a northern sergeant who, despite years of service in Flanders, Scotland and in the garrison at Berwick, was some 600 pounds out of pocket in owed wages and lost horses when he petitioned the king in 1318.[19] Weston's petition was typical of many that were sent to the king and his council by ordinary men-at-arms who had suffered loss and damage during the course of their service to the Crown. Particularly common were petitions for financial assistance by men who had been captured by the enemy and forced to pay ransoms for their release. John le Fraunceys wrote to the Crown in 1307 of how he had been taken by the Scots at the battle of Roslin, losing the horses, armour and other equipment that were with him, and had been detained north of the border for fifty-seven weeks until he had found the forty marks that he needed to secure his release.[20] The Northumbrian men-at-arms John de Heselrigg and Robert de la Vale were both imprisoned following the debacle at Bannockburn. They were later forced to pay 200 marks and 500 marks respectively before they could return to their war-torn lands.[21] A further petition highlights the way that the pitfalls of war affected not only the men who served, but also their families. During the reign of Edward II a certain Simon de Rosse wrote of how his father Wadyn, who had served the king and his father 'en vos gweres de gaschoun galis et descoce' for thirty years and more, had been decapitated, leaving Simon and his four siblings in a state of destitution.[22] Evidently, military service under Edward I and his son was no guarantee of prosperity, or even financial security.

The risks involved in warfare meant that many men-at-arms deemed it desirable to enlist the patronage of more prominent figures within the military community. For most soldiers, this meant entering the service of a retinue leader of some standing. As

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[17] E.g. *Cotton*, 319.
[18] *Thomas Wright's Political Songs*, 232.
[19] *Northern Petitions Illustrative of Life in Berwick, Cumbria and Durham in the Fourteenth Century*, ed. C.M. Fraser, Surtees Society, cxciv (1981), no. 33. A William de Weston was in garrison at Berwick in 1298[?] (E 101/7/5, m. 1), 1301 (E 101/9/9, f. 2v), 1303 (E 101/612/9, m. 2), and 1310 (BL, Cotton Nero C VIII, f. 5r).
[20] *Parl. Roll.*, ii, 449.
[21] *Ancient Petitions Relating to Northumberland*, nos 115, 122. However, see King, 'War, Politics and Landed Society', 129-30.
[22] SC 8/87, no. 4309. For Wadyn's service; E 101/10/5, m. 9.

we have seen, military service was strewn with potential hazards, and it could prove difficult for obscure sergeants and lesser knights, acting on their own behalf, to obtain redress for losses, or to gain some other favour from the Crown. By entering the service of more prominent men, such individuals were able to find some insurance against the worst that military campaigning had to offer. Retinue leaders would sometimes write to the king on behalf of those in their service to ask that they be released from the debts that they owed to the Crown, as the earl of Warwick did on behalf of Roger de Springehose who was with him in Wales in 1294.[23] Alternatively, such patronage was used by some men to obtain writs excusing them from the performance of military service, which is how Gilbert Sikelfont benefited from his relationship with the earl Warenne in 1312, the year he was distrained to knighthood.[24] The *quid pro quo* of this favour was that men-at-arms were expected to perform reliable service for their lords whenever and wherever it was required. Indeed it was in the process of fulfilling their side of the bargain that rank-and-file soldiers demonstrated their value to their military leaders. Apart from fighting, which was the most obvious and also the most important service that men-at-arms could provide, such individuals might be employed on special logistical missions on behalf of their lords. The yeoman John le Bret was sent to Ireland by Robert Fitz Walter in 1282 to purchase victuals for him and the members of his retinue in Anglesey.[25] Similarly, a number of commanders in Gascony in 1294 and 1295 dispatched sergeants from their retinues to obtain much-needed supplies from within the British Isles.[26] In 1297, the earl Warenne employed two of his knights, Elias d'Aubeny and Saer de Huntingfeld, on a special mission to inspect the castles of Scotland.[27] Later, in 1310, two of the earl of Richmond's valets acted as the eyes and ears of their lord, relaying news to him from the Scottish campaign whilst he was engaged on diplomatic business in France.[28]

In addition to such 'vertical' relationships, men-at-arms could normally find support among others of equal status residing within their own counties and localities. Whilst there has been much debate about the importance of the 'county community' within medieval England, and, indeed, over whether such communities existed at all,[29]

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[23] *Ancient Correspondence Concerning Wales*, 148.
[24] *PW*, II, ii, 419; C 47/1/7, m. 3.
[25] *CVCR*, 241.
[26] *RG*, iii, 173, 214.
[27] *Stevenson*, ii, 175-6.
[28] *CDS*, iii, no. 166.
[29] For contrasting views, see J.R. Maddicott, 'The County Community and the Making of Public Opinion in Fourteenth-Century England', *TRHS*, 5th ser., xxviii (1978), 43; M. Prestwich, *English Politics in the Thirteenth Century* (London, 1990), 58-9.

there can be little doubt that landholders of the same region would tend to find themselves operating in close proximity to one another when on campaign. During the second Welsh war, the men of Somerset, Dorset, Devon and Cornwall were ordered to perform their feudal service in west Wales with William de Valence, whilst those of Herefordshire, Shropshire and Staffordshire were commanded to serve at Montgomery under Roger de Mortimer.[30] Evidence of men-at-arms from the same county serving together can also be found during the years when England was at war with France: the sheriff of Essex claimed in 1295 that the knights and free tenants of the county were unable to attest a proof of age as too many of them were guarding the coast against French invasion.[31] When war broke out with Scotland in 1296 the focus shifted to the north of England, and there is plentiful evidence to suggest that the men-at-arms of the northern counties fought alongside their landed neighbours. Rishanger noted how in 1297 Henry de Percy launched a raid into Scotland *cum militia Comitatus Karleoli*.[32] His statement is supported by a chancery warrant which confirms that the men of Cumberland and Westmorland served under Percy and Robert de Clifford in that year without Crown pay.[33] Voluntary service was also given for a short time by the men of Northumberland under John de Segrave in 1303.[34] Anthony Tuck has questioned whether the extent of soldiering among the gentry of the latter county during the later fourteenth century was in any way exceptional,[35] but it would seem that, under Edward I and his son, the men of the eastern March were heavily engaged in military activity. A contemporary song indicates that many of those killed at Stirling Bridge in 1297 were landowners from the north-east,[36] and Edward reportedly employed a group of Northumbrians to garrison Stirling castle in the following year.[37] Although writing some time after these events, John Barbour was probably justified in assigning to the men of Northumberland a prominent place in the border warfare of the reign of Robert Bruce.[38] Indeed, recent work by Andy King has confirmed the important contribution made by the men of the March to the Anglo-Scottish wars.[39] For the men-at-arms of

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[30] *CVCR*, 254.
[31] *Select Cases in the Court of King's Bench under Edward I*, ed. G.O. Sayles, 3 vols, Selden Society, lv-lviii (1936-9), iii, no. 20.
[32] *Chronica et Annales*, 171.
[33] *CCW*, 98.
[34] *CPR, 1301-07*, 101.
[35] A. Tuck, 'The Percies and the Community of Northumberland in the Later Fourteenth Century', *War and Border Societies in the Middle Ages*, ed. A. Goodman and A. Tuck (London, 1992), 184.
[36] *Thomas Wright's Political Songs*, 173.
[37] *Chronica et Annales*, 388.
[38] *The Bruce*, 201, 287.
[39] A. King, 'Englishmen, Scots and Marchers: National and Local Identities in Thomas Gray's *Scalacronica*', *Northern History*, xxxvi (2000), 225-8; idem, '"Pur Salvation du Roiaume": Military

communities like these, 'horizontal' ties with fellow genteel soldiers were often more important than the patronage offered by a leading earl or banneret.

Middling landowners from counties that lay close to the theatres of war were particularly well placed to take advantage of the office-holding opportunities created in the conquered territories. Soldiering during these years was not as profitable as it was later to prove for many during the Hundred Years War, but gainful employment was to be had for those willing to reside in hostile regions for a prolonged spell. The conquest of Wales ensured the creation of new offices for the purposes of wartime and peacetime government. Whilst the major captaincies and custodianships were offered to men of high social standing, such as Roger de Mortimer and Roger Lestrange, lesser positions were available to men-at-arms of more modest status. Following the war of 1282-3, the native aristocracy were excluded from the prominent positions that they had formerly held.[40] Overwhelmingly, 'the personnel of the new governmental dispensation in Wales was…"colonial" in its recruitment'.[41] Among those who stepped into the breach were middling families with connections to Wales, like the Camvilles of Llanstephan. During the second Welsh war, Geoffrey de Camville played a prominent role in the garrisons of west Wales, where he served at his own cost. Maintaining this family tradition, William de Camville was later appointed as keeper of the counties of Carmarthenshire and Cardiganshire.[42] Roger de Springehose, the member of a Shropshire family and sheriff of that county in 1282, was placed in charge of the garrison at Oswestry in that year during the absence of Roger de Mortimer, and was rewarded for his services with the lands of a Welsh rebel.[43] Another family that came to prominence in the office-holding community of post-conquest Wales was the Stauntons of Staffordshire. Robert de Staunton was appointed as the sheriff of Merioneth in March 1284 and his son Vivian later found employment as the constable of Harlech castle, where he was serving by the time of the revolt of 1294-5.[44] Some of the men elevated to office in post-conquest Wales appear to have been landowners of modest means. Hugh de Wlonkeslowe, granted the constableship of Harlech in October 1284, held only half a knight's fee in the vill of Longslow, Shropshire, at the time of Kirkby's Inquest, and it is probable that

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Service and Obligation in Fourteenth-Century Northumberland', *Fourteenth Century England II*, ed. C. Given-Wilson (Woodbridge, 2002), 13-31.

[40] A.D. Carr, 'An Aristocracy in Decline: The Native Welsh Lords after the Edwardian Conquest, *WHR*, v (1970), 103-29.

[41] R.R. Davies, *Conquest, Coexistence, and Change: Wales 1063-1415* (Oxford, 1987), 366.

[42] *CVCR*, 229, 354.

[43] *Ibid*, 222, 265. A sergeant of that name later served under John de Havering at Falkirk; *Gough*, 229.

[44] *CVCR*, 283; *Calendar of Ancient Petitions Relating to Wales (Thirteenth to Sixteenth Century)*, ed. W. Rees (Cardiff, 1975), 507; E 101/5/17, m. 5.

he relied on the hundred pounds that he received from that office yearly to maintain his family in the rank of knighthood to which they aspired.[45]

Similar office-holding opportunities were available to the men of the northern March during the war with Scotland. Whilst the major captaincies were given, as we have seen, to prominent figures of a national standing, such as Robert de Clifford and the earls of Pembroke and Richmond, auxiliary posts were sometimes granted to knights bachelor whose interests were usually confined to one county or region. Richard le Brun and Hugh de Multon were employed as keepers of Cumberland and Westmorland in 1302 under the higher authority of John de St. John.[46] A year into Bruce's rebellion Brun was again employed on the western March with John de Wigeton, a fellow Cumbrian knight, whilst Roger Heron and Simon Warde of Northumberland and Yorkshire respectively were made keepers of the peace on the eastern March.[47] More numerous opportunities for employment were created in the towns and castles north of the border during the years when the English were in the ascendancy. Following the victory at Dunbar in 1296 Edward had initially allowed many Scots to retain possession of their castles,[48] but in the wake of Wallace's revolt this policy changed and numerous Englishmen were appointed as garrison constables and sheriffs over the ensuing years. As the Scottish chronicler Andrew de Wyntoun later ruefully reflected, Edward took possession of all the Scottish castles 'and stuffit thaim with Inglismen'.[49] By no means were all of those appointed to Scottish castles and shrievalties drawn from the northern counties. Whilst Robert de Joneby and John de Huddleston of Cumberland found service in Dumfries and Galloway,[50] offices in Scotland were regularly granted to household knights drawn from various parts of the country,[51] to pro-English Scots,[52] and to leading magnates who had already obtained experience of colonial government from other spheres of war.[53] Characteristic of the latter was the Staffordshire knight

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[45] *CVCR*, 291; *Feudal Aids*, iv, 221. It is not clear whether this Hugh de Wlonkeslowe was a knight, but his son later appears bearing arms on Collins' roll; *Aspilogia III*, ii, 264.
[46] *PW*, i, 364.
[47] *PW*, II, ii, 369.
[48] *Scotichronicon by Walter Bower*, ed. D.E.R. Watt *et al.*, 9 vols. (Aberdeen and Edinburgh, 1987-98), vi, 81.
[49] *The Original Chronicle of Andrew of Wyntoun*, ed. F.J. Amours, 6 vols, The Scottish Text Society, l-lxiii (Edinburgh, 1903-14), v, 346. Also, see *Bower*, vi, 293; *Johannis de Fordun Chronica Gentis Scotorum*, ed. W.F. Skene, The Historians of Scotland Series, i (Edinburgh, 1871), 335.
[50] S.J.P. Howarth, 'King, Government and Community in Cumberland and Westmorland *c.*1200-*c.*1400, University of Liverpool D.Phil. thesis, 1988, 230.
[51] Prestwich, 'Colonial Scotland', 12.
[52] M. Brown, 'War, Allegiance, and Community in the Anglo-Scottish Marches: Teviotdale in the Fourteenth Century', *Northern History*, xli (2004), 226, 236.
[53] Watson, *Under the Hammer*, 99.

Robert de Hastang senior who had been employed in Ireland before using this expertise as constable of Roxburgh castle.[54]

The establishment of an English hegemony throughout the British Isles created opportunities for advancement in the service of the Crown which might to some extent have offset the hazards of war. In truth, the path to promotion was available to relatively few of the thousands of knights and sergeants who engaged in warfare; and it would be a mistake to assume that those who held constableships and other offices in conquered territories made rich pickings during their periods of tenure. On the contrary, castle constables and other royal officers who resided in enemy territory on a permanent basis were in a precarious position and had to be constantly vigilant. Robert Hastang, for one, frequently found it necessary to draw his sword during his time as constable at Roxburgh.[55] He and men like William Biset, the sheriff of Clackmannan and Stirling, were forced to employ spies and scouts in their service because of the constant threat of enemy attack.[56] Far from being the route to prosperity and individual glory, service for the Crown in Scotland, aptly described by Fiona Watson as the 'Siberia of English office-holding', was a dangerous and energy-sapping task.[57] Nor were such dangers and burdens restricted to those who held office in Scotland, for constables and sheriffs who were employed in other areas of war also encountered numerous difficulties during the course of their employment. In *c.*1308-9 Hugh de Paunton, the former constable of Haverford in Wales, claimed that despite having spent large amounts of his own money on restoring and maintaining the castle there, he was now unable to recover his outlay because the fort had been granted to the earl of Pembroke. He had received no assistance, financial or otherwise, and was being forced from the office to which he had devoted so much energy without having anything to show for his efforts.[58] Seven years later, the king's yeoman John de Scudemor wrote to Edward II of how he lived in fear of reprisals by his enemies in Wales who sought revenge for the judicial punishments that he had carried out whilst constable of the castle at Llanbadarn Fawr. He and other English officials were the most hated men in Wales, so it was a timely decision on the part of the Justice, William Martin, to remove him from his post before the situation deteriorated still further.[59]

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[54] Ireland (*Documents Illustrative of English History in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries* [London, 1844], ed. H. Cole, 73); Scotland (E 101/7/7, m. 2; E 101/9/9, f. 2r).
[55] *Scalacronica*, 45.
[56] *CDS*, ii, no. 1221; SC 1/12, no. 71.
[57] Watson, *Under the Hammer*, 209.
[58] *Ancient Petitions Relating to Wales*, 100.
[59] *Ibid*, 285.

Although the number of men-at-arms who served under these constables in the garrisons of Wales and Scotland was negligible when set against the size of the military pool as a whole, their contribution to the English war effort was essential. Garrison service tended to be dominated by soldiers of fairly humble origins: sergeants far outnumbered knights in the retinue lists and pay accounts drawn up by royal clerks. Four sergeants were stationed at the castle of Dryslwyn in the late 1280s, in addition to the numerous crossbowmen and archers who were a common feature of garrison life.[60] At Roxburgh in 1301, there were just three knights alongside twenty-seven men-at-arms of inferior rank.[61] One important sub-group within this larger body of low-ranking soldiers was the king's sergeants-at-arms. Whilst the work of these men has tended to be overshadowed by that of the knights and bannerets who staffed the royal household, their activities were of the utmost importance to the stability of Edwardian government within the conquered territories. Under Henry III, the king's sergeants-at-arms had sometimes been stationed in strategically-important castles such as Carmarthen and Montgomery.[62] Once his son had come to the throne, they were able to continue with such activities over a broader geographical range. In the spring of 1279, two of these officers, John le Convers and Robert de Vilers, were sent on the king's business to Llanbadarn Fawr.[63] Six years later, Adam de Riston was granted land near to Rhuddlan castle: presumably to aid his service in that part of Wales.[64] Following the outbreak of war with Scotland in 1296 large numbers of these men were employed in the garrisons of Scotland. Richard de Chaumbre, John de Enefeld, William de Hulle and several others could be found in the garrison of Linlithgow in 1302, and eight of the king's sergeants-at-arms were employed at Dundee in 1311.[65] It was no surprise that when a raiding force from the Berwick garrison was ambushed by the Scots in the years following Bannockburn, the majority of those either captured or killed in the attack were sergeants drawn from the royal household.[66]

The king's sergeants-at-arms were not alone in giving repeated service in these hazardous theatres of war. Whilst most men-at-arms were probably keen to avoid garrison service, others carried it out willingly for a number of years; their motives for

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[60] E 101/4/23, m. 1.
[61] E 101/9/9, f. 3v.
[62] *Calendar of the Liberate Rolls*, 6 vols (London, 1916-64), iii, 7. For information relating to the sergeants-at-arms more generally, see C. Given-Wilson, *The Royal Household and the King's Affinity: Service, Politics and Finance in England 1360-1413* (London, 1986), 21-2.
[63] *CPR, 1272-81*, 309.
[64] *CPR, 1281-92*, 173-4.
[65] E 101/10/5, m. 9; Bodleian Library, Tanner MS 197, ff. 30r-v.
[66] *CDS*, iii, nos 470, 477.

doing so are, however, difficult to discern. During the course of their prolonged service in enemy territory, some soldiers appear to have formed strong bonds with their fellow garrison members. In 1305, for example, we find evidence of a communal identity among the men of the Linlithgow garrison, who petitioned as a group for the arrears of their pay.[67] There seems, for the most part, to have been a clear distinction between the majority of men-at-arms, whose experience of military service was obtained by campaigning in royal hosts, and a smaller group, who spent most of their time walled up in strongholds and fortified towns. A typical member of the latter was John de Untank, who resided in the garrison at Carstairs in 1302 before going on to serve at Kirkintilloch in 1303-4 and Linlithgow in 1305.[68] Another soldier, Hugh de la Mare, was at Berwick between 1298 and 1301, and Edinburgh in 1302, before later re-appearing at Berwick at the time of Edward II's first expedition as king.[69] Given the close quarters in which these soldiers were forced to live, as well as the arduous nature of garrison life, it is not surprising to find that many men-at-arms chose to serve alongside their kinsmen. Four members of the Bilton family can be found among the garrison at Carstairs in 1302.[70] Elsewhere, the brothers John and William de Cotes fought alongside one another for a number of years at Roxburgh; and, Hugh, John and Robert de Herley were each engaged as sergeants at Linlithgow.[71] Kinship groups such as these are likely to have enhanced garrison camaraderie.

These bonds were important because garrison service was a risky business for the men-at-arms employed in them, just as it was for the constables placed over them. Gerald of Wales had written in the twelfth century of the bloodthirsty nature of the struggles between the English garrisons and the native populations in Wales.[72] The situation at the time of the Edwardian conquest was no different. The author of the *Brut y Tywysogyon* noted that the only reason that Gruffudd ap Maredudd and Rhys Fychan spared the lives of the men of the Aberystwyth garrison in 1282 was because of the approach of Easter.[73] On other occasions and in other parts of the Edwardian empire, the English were not so fortunate. Inevitably, the risks facing those stationed in enemy

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[67] *Memorando de Parliamento, or, Records of the Parliament holden at Westminster on the Twenty-Eighth Day of February, in the Thirty-Third Year of the Reign of King Edward the First (A.D. 1305)*, ed. F.W. Maitland, Rolls Ser., xcviii (London, 1893), 170.
[68] E 101/10/5, m. 9; E 101/12/18, f. 4r; E 101/12/38.
[69] E 101/7/1, m. 9; E 101/7/7, m. 1; E 101/9/9, f. 2v; E 101/10/5, m. 9; BL, Cotton Nero C VIII, f. 5r.
[70] E 101/10/5, m. 9.
[71] The Cotes family (E 101/9/9, f. 3v; E 101/12/18, ff. 1v-2v), and the Herleys (E 101/12/18, f. 4v; E 101/12/38).
[72] *Giraldi Cambrensis Itinerarium Kambriae, et Descriptio Kambriae*, ed. J.F. Dimock, Rolls Ser., xxi 6 (London, 1868), 49-50.
[73] *Brut y Tywysogyon or The Chronicle of the Princes, Peniarth MS. 20 Version*, trans. T. Jones (Cardiff, 1952), 120.

territory on a permanent basis were markedly greater than for those who simply embarked on a short spell of campaigning each year. Geoffrey de Ampelford, for one, noted that he had been maimed in the right eye during his service at Carstairs, and it is likely that many soldiers were forced to retire from military service early because of the injuries that they had sustained.[74] This kind of damage to life and limb might have been worthwhile had garrison service offered much prospect of material gain, but it is more likely that the reverse was the case, particularly during the years when the English were on the back foot following Bannockburn. Robert de Blakeburn of the Berwick garrison was perhaps typical of the fortunes of many, for by 1320 his long military career had left him with nothing to live off following the fall of that town to the Scots.[75] Such stories give some idea of the reality of warfare for many ordinary English soldiers, and remind us that warfare in the age of chivalry was not all about glory and material gain.

THE CAVALRY AT FALKIRK

Evocative as the above evidence may be, the snapshots of military service provided by petitions and other personal testimonies shed light on the experiences of only a small proportion of the *homina ad arma* who went to war. The historian who wishes to know more about the 'average' mounted soldier and his career in the service of the Crown must rely on more prosaic materials, such as pay rolls and letters of protection, which often supply little more than the names of the knights and sergeants who participated in particular campaigns. But it is precisely these sources which, when taken together, provide us with the names of thousands of warriors who fought for the English cause under Edward I and his son, and offer the most accurate impression of the size and composition of the military community. Furthermore, by linking the names found in these records, a complex exercise known as 'military service prosopography',[76] it is possible to reconstruct at least some portion of the careers in arms of thousands of individuals who fought during these years. The difficulty, when dealing with such a large and amorphous body of men, is to know how to sample the group in such a way so as to facilitate meaningful analysis and discussion whilst retaining the diversity of the whole. Most historians whose research has brought them into contact with the gentry, both those preoccupied with their military service as well as others whose interests have lain elsewhere, have sought to solve this problem by adopting a land-centric approach,

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[74] SC 8/9, no. 443.
[75] *Northern Petitions*, no. 35.
[76] Ayton, 'The English Army at Crécy', 160.

thereby rooting knights and esquires in the counties and localities where they resided.[77] Such a method, whilst enabling detailed scrutiny of the personal networks of the landholders of medieval England and providing some idea as to the military commitments of the men of particular localities, is less suitable for a study such as this which aims to create a more universal picture of aristocratic military service.[78]

So as to cut across local and regional boundaries a different sampling technique has here been employed. Ideally, one would seek a group of soldiers both large enough to encompass a wide range of military experience and sufficiently diverse in terms of rank, status and geographical origin to justify the claim to universality. For this purpose the most appropriate type of source, offering a slice through the military community at a particular moment in time as many of its constituent members prepared for war, are the horse inventories. 'The greatest yield of detailed nominal data on the "ordinary" men-at-arms in Edwardian armies is to be had from the horse inventories, where the modestly-priced mounts of these men are listed alongside the destriers and coursers of their wealthier or more celebrated comrades-in-arms'.[79] By providing the names of hundreds of cavalrymen of both knightly and sub-knightly rank as they had their horses appraised at the beginning of royal campaigns, these lists offer the ideal starting point for a discussion of the military service of the aristocracy. From this corpus of documents the most suitable sample is provided by the inventories drawn up for the Falkirk campaign of 1298: these contain a larger number of men-at-arms than any of the other horse lists of the period. Furthermore, the Falkirk expedition took place only twenty-one years after the first Welsh war, and sixteen before Bannockburn. It is therefore possible, by using these lists, to trace the activities of veterans from the early wars of Edward I, as well as those of men who would later go on to fight under his son.

Knights

22 July 1298 was a momentous date in the Anglo-Scottish wars. On that day a large English host of around 3,000 cavalry and 25,000 infantry routed a Scottish force under

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[77] For the aims of such studies, see M.J. Bennett, *Community, Class and Careerism: Cheshire and Lancashire Society in the Age of* Sir Gawain and the Green Knight (Cambridge, 1983), 3. Bennett drew inspiration from R.H. Hilton, *A Medieval Society: The West Midlands at the End of the Thirteenth Century* (London, 1966). On a more cautious note, see C. Carpenter, 'Gentry and Community in Medieval England', *Journal of British Studies*, xxxiii (1994), 345-52; D. Crouch, 'From Stenton to McFarlane: Models of Societies of the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries', *TRHS*, 6th ser., v (1995), 192-3.

[78] For military service within particular localities, see Morgan, *War and Society*, and Saul, *Knights and Esquires*, 36-59. For a later, campaigns-based perspective, see Bell, *War and the Soldier*.

[79] Ayton, *Knights and Warhorses*, 5.

command of William Wallace at Falkirk. Although the victory was not decisive, either politically or militarily, it did ensure that the English retained the upper hand in warfare north of the border for many years to come. As G.W.S. Barrow once noted, 'not for another sixteen years did the Scots attempt a full-scale pitched battle against the English'.[80] For the men-at-arms who rode north of the border with Edward I, the events of that day must have constituted the high point in their military careers. Success no doubt tasted all the sweeter given the dismal defeat at Stirling Bridge the previous year, and the devastation caused by Scottish raids into northern England throughout the winter months that followed.[81] It is therefore to be regretted that the names of only a proportion of the English cavalrymen who took part in the Falkirk campaign can now be recovered. The horse lists for that year reveal the identities of 136 knights serving within the companies, not including the retinue leaders themselves, and a further four who were taking part in the campaign 'independently'. It is these 'lesser' knights who will form the subject of our enquiry. Given that only forty-eight of the 115 earls and bannerets named on the Falkirk Roll also feature on the horse lists, including the retinue of just one earl, Thomas of Lancaster, it can be readily estimated that there were around 350 knights within the retinues. If we also allow for men-at-arms on the horse lists whose ranks are not specified, as well as for those who were with leaders not named in either source, then there were probably around 450 knights in the companies at Falkirk, or 650 knightly combatants in total.[82] The 140 men in our sample therefore represent around 30 per cent of the knights in the English retinues when the hosts clashed in open field on St. Magdalene's day. This figure puts the group under investigation into quantitative context, and indicates the important contribution made by the large number of combatants who did not receive Crown pay.

Our 140 knights were distributed throughout forty-eight retinues: over a hundred of the fighting units recorded on the Falkirk inventories could boast no knights at all. Eighty-nine soldiers were in the household division whilst the other fifty-one were brought into pay for the duration of the campaign. As noted already, four of these men were serving independently.[83] Thirty-nine of the retinues in which knights can be found were manned by three belted warriors or fewer whereas just two, those of Hugh le Despenser and the earl of Lancaster, contained ten or more. By 1298, some of these

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[80] Barrow, *Robert Bruce*, 103.
[81] C.J. McNamee, 'William Wallace's Invasion of Northern England in 1297', *Northern History*, xxvi (1990), 40-58.
[82] The ranks of 283 men are not stated and it is possible that a few of these were knights. I have confined the sample group to those who definitely were knights for the purposes of clarity.
[83] Robert de Bures, John de Luda, Adam de Blida and John Kirkpatrick (*Gough*, 161, 163, 175, 228).

men-at-arms had been landowners for many years; indeed, a few knights were already in possession of their estates in the mid-1270s at the time of the Hundred Roll enquiries. Robert Barry, who was in the retinue of Ralph Pipard at Falkirk, had been accused in 1276 of withholding a suit concerning the lands that he held of the king in Billing, Northamptonshire.[84] This may explain why it seems to have taken some time before he was willing to lend his support to the king's military projects.[85] Also in possession of their estates in the 1270s were William de Scalebroke, another knight of Ralph Pipard, and John de Blakeford, who was with Simon de Montacute at the battle.[86] William de Horkesley, who inherited from his father Robert in December 1295, joined the landed elite just a few years before serving in the king's army at Falkirk; others, like Robert de Haustede junior, had to wait until well into the reign of Edward II before receiving their patrimonies.[87] To draw distinctions between the numbers of landed and non-landed knights who served at Falkirk would therefore be to miss the point: in 1298, military service attracted both those whose landholding status carried a concomitant military obligation, and others for whom a lack of land might have acted as a stimulus for adventure. Likewise, it would be wrong to distinguish too sharply between military service given by older and younger sons, for members of both groups can be found among our sample of knights.[88]

Most of those who had come into possession of their inheritances by 1298 held land in more than one county, which was normal for the knightly class. An inquisition into the men-at-arms available for coastal defence in Essex in 1295-6 showed that of 102 knights who held land in the county, only around twenty-four were residing there, with a further eleven being unfit for service.[89] Many of those not present might have been away on military service. Thomas de Scales, who was with Fulk Fitz Waryn at Falkirk, had landed interests in Cambridgeshire, Hertfordshire and Norfolk; William de Hardreshull, meanwhile, held numerous lands in Lincolnshire, in addition to his manor of Hartshill in Warwickshire.[90] Nevertheless, most middling knights, as opposed to the leading earls and bannerets, tended to hold their lands in one part of the country, so it is

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[84] *Rotuli Hundredorum temp. Hen. III. and Edw. I. in Turr' Lond' et in Curia Receptae Scaccarii Westm. asservati*, ed. W. Illingworth and J. Caley, 2 vols (Record Commission, 1812-18) ii, 13.
[85] Below, 106.
[86] *Ibid*, ii, 714, 764-5; i, 65, 86-7.
[87] *IPM*, iii, no. 345; *ibid*, vi, no. 316.
[88] On the prospects for older and younger sons, see G. Duby, 'Youth in Aristocratic Society: Northwestern France in the Twelfth Century', *The Chivalrous Society* (London, 1977), 117-8. Younger sons among the knights at Falkirk included Edmund Foliot, Fulk Peyforer and Henry de Segrave, whilst among the elder sons were Ingelram de Berenger and Nicholas Pointz.
[89] *PW*, i, 273-4. Cf. J.C. Ward, *The Essex Gentry and the County Community in the Fourteenth Century*, (Essex Record Office, 1991), 20.
[90] *IPM*, ii, no. 520; *ibid*, nos 185, 807.

possible to divide the 140 knights in our sample into the regions in which they appear to have held most of their lands. One product of this enquiry is that relatively few northerners, defined as those who held their main estates in Cumberland, Westmorland, Lancashire, Yorkshire, Durham or Northumberland, can be found among the knights on the inventories. This is contrary to what one would expect given that the campaign was in Scotland and that knights from the northern counties were closest to the border. Comparison with the Falkirk Roll shows that the reason for this is that a relatively large number of northern bannerets were not receiving Crown pay. Of the bannerets who appear on both the roll of arms and the horse inventory only five, Robert de Clifford, Thomas de Furnivall, William de Ryther, William de Cantilupe and Nicholas de Meynill, held their main estates in the north, whereas seventeen of those who do not appear in pay on the inventories were northerners.[91] What one finds, therefore, in the group of knights who appear in the retinues on the Falkirk inventories, is a picture of the military community which is very much orientated towards those who held lands in the midlands and the south. A particularly large group of around thirty-two knights came from the south-west under leaders like Robert Fitz Payn, Hugh de Courtenay, John de Beauchamp of Somerset and Simon de Montacute. The next largest subset (around twenty knights) was drawn from the south-east.

Diversity is evident not only in the knights' geographical origins but also in their ages at the time of the campaign. The Statute of Winchester of 1285 had specified that all between the ages of fifteen and sixty were to be assessed and sworn to armour.[92] In November 1298, just a few months after the battle, Thomas de Furnivall was ordered to raise men-at-arms in Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire between the ages of twenty and sixty.[93] An Edwardian soldier's career was therefore potentially a very long one, and there was nothing to prevent men from taking up arms as early, or retiring as late, as they wished. Nicholas Orme has noted how late-medieval writers encouraged young men to undertake military training in their mid-teens;[94] a point echoed by the author of the *Song of Lewes* who stipulated that many of the knights on the baronial side under Simon de Montfort were adolescents and novices in war.[95] John de Claron, who was with Henry de Beaumont at Falkirk, was later said to be forty years-old in 1324, which

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[91] For a fuller list, see C.H. Hunter Blair: 'Northern Knights at Falkirk, 1298', *Archaeologia Aeliana, or Miscellaneous Tracts Relating to Antiquity*, ed. C.H. Hunter Blair, 4th ser., xxv (1947), 68-114.
[92] *Statutes of the Realm*, i, 97.
[93] *CPR, 1292-1301*, 387.
[94] N. Orme, *From Childhood to Chivalry: The Education of the English Kings and Aristocracy 1066-1530* (London, 1984), 182.
[95] *The Song of Lewes*, ed. C.L. Kingsford (Oxford, 1890), 4.

would have made him just fourteen in 1298. Whilst there is every reason to doubt the accuracy of the Inquisitions Post Mortem as a source for age, it seems likely that he was in his teens at the time that the host was raised.[96] Other youngsters included Robert de Haustede junior, who was '36 and more' when he inherited his father's lands in 1323, placing him roughly in his mid-teens at the time of Falkirk, and Maurice de Berkeley, who was perhaps seventeen when he accompanied his father to war.[97] At the other end of the age spectrum were men like the Staffordshire knight William de Mere, who claimed that he was eighty in 1323 at a proof of age, making him about fifty-five in 1298.[98] Of the same generation was Thomas de Berkeley senior: aged fifty-three.[99] The majority of the knights at Falkirk whose ages can be estimated from the evidence of such inquisitions naturally fell somewhere in between these two extremes, with Thomas de St. Loe, aged around twenty-nine in 1298; Geoffrey de Aubermarle, thirty-one; and Nicholas de St. Maur, in his mid- to late-twenties; characteristic of this group.[100]

The broad range in age, wealth and experience among the 'lesser' knights at Falkirk was naturally reflected in the varying quality of the horses that accompanied them to Scotland. To some extent the horse valuations serve as a convenient indicator as to the status of these men. At the lower end of the scale were two knights, Stephen de Depham and Nicholas de la Launde, who were on horses valued at just 8 marks.[101] Those who had been landholders since the 1270s, not surprisingly, had higher value mounts: Robert Barry's *equus* was appraised at 24 marks. But the most expensive chargers were reserved for regular campaigners like Roger de Bilney (50 marks) and William de Hardreshull (80 marks); men who were sub-retinue leaders or bannerets, such as Thomas de Berkeley senior (60 marks), William de Ferrers (70 marks) and John ap Adam (100 marks); and the sons of the retinue leaders, like Thomas de Leyburn, who was with his father William (100 marks).[102] Judged simply by the concentration of high valuation horses in his retinue, Hugh le Despenser led the most prestigious company. The distinction between retinue leaders and their men was blurred at the edges. Knights

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[96] *IPM*, vi, no. 422. On the IPMs, see J.T. Rosenthal, *Old Age in Late Medieval England* (Philadelphia, 1996), chapter 1, and for the methods that were used to calculate age; J. Bedell, 'Memory and Proof of Age in England 1272-1327', *Past and Present*, clxii (1999), 3-27.

[97] *IPM*, vi, no. 316; *Complete Peerage*, ii, 128. For evidence of teenage soldiers, see A. Ayton, 'Knights, Esquires and Military Service: The Evidence of the Armorial Cases before the Court of Chivalry', *The Medieval Military Revolution: State, Society and Military Change in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*, ed. A. Ayton and J.L. Price (London, 1995), 92; M. Keen, 'English Military Experience and the Court of Chivalry: The Case of Grey v. Hastings', *Guerre et Société en France, en Angleterre et en Bourgogne XIVe-XVe siècle*, ed. P. Contamine, C. Giry-Deloison and M. Keen (Lille, 1992), 131.

[98] *IPM*, vi, no. 354.

[99] *Complete Peerage*, ii, 127.

[100] *IPM*, v, no. 157; *ibid*, ii, no. 720; *ibid*, iii, no. 386.

[101] *Gough*, 169, 226.

[102] *Ibid*, 220, 209, 191, 216, 189, 187 and 194.

like Berkeley senior, John ap Adam and William de Ferrers led small companies of their own within the larger *comitivae* of their patrons, a phenomenon which, as we have seen, was very common. Thomas de Berkeley senior had been constable of the army in Flanders during the previous year.[103] Even lesser knights like Reginald de St. Martin and Robert de Bures had led small troops of two or three men to war in the past.[104] The knights in the retinues at Falkirk were therefore diverse in their social status and military standing, a point that should be borne in mind as we consider their careers in arms in greater detail.

The first thing that we would like to know about the military service of our knights is the lengths of time that they had been participating in the king's wars prior to Falkirk. Based on the evidence available between the Lord Edward's crusade of 1270-2 and the expedition of 1298, the following table shows the years in which the 140 knights in our sample appear to have taken up arms.

Table 3.1: First Recorded Military Service of 'Lesser' Knights at Falkirk

	1270	1277	1282	1287	1294	1295	1296	1297	1298
Holy Land	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Wales	-	6	12	3	21*	-	-	-	-
Gascony	-	-	-	-	15	1	-	2	-
Flanders	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	20	-
Scotland	-	-	-	-	-	-	20	4	34
Total	2	6	12	3	36	1	20	26	34

* Includes those who served in Wales in both 1294 and 1295

It should be noted that these figures must not be taken at face value. Not only is the survival of records containing the names of English soldiers rather patchy, but on all campaigns there were a large number of knights who did not receive Crown pay, and who therefore do not appear on the pay rolls and horse inventories. Maurice le Brun is first mentioned in the service records in 1298, but the plea roll for the first year of the Scottish war shows that he was militarily active at least two years before that time when he was accused of killing a man.[105] Some knights were summoned some years before they appear to have begun their military service. Simon de Ralegh was ordered to Wales

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[103] *Chronica et Annales*, 173.
[104] BL, Add. MS 7965, f. 79r; E 101/6/37, m. 1i.
[105] 'Plea Roll, 1296', no. 127.

in 1294, but is first named on the household inventory in Scotland two years later.[106] Hugh Godard and Henry de Mortimer had letters of protection for the Gascon campaign of 1294 with Roger de Mortimer of Chirk; but he was exempted from service there because of the Welsh rebellion, and his men might have followed him to Wales.[107] Others, like Nicholas de Carru, who spent much of his military career in Ireland, served in spheres of war away from the purview of the royal paymasters.[108] The above figures are, therefore, biased towards more recent military activity and service given for Crown pay, meaning that a few men-at-arms probably began giving military service earlier than is indicated here. Nevertheless, the data as presented do point towards some general trends. Whilst many had fought in the early Welsh wars, most of the knights appear to have taken up the sword during the crisis years between 1294 and 1298 when the English were almost simultaneously at war with all of their rivals. This is not surprising given that this was when military commitments placed the greatest strain on the Crown's resources: the regnal year 1294-5 witnessed the greatest royal expenditure in the reign.[109] There were also quite a few debutants in 1298, which is as one would expect given the size of the host that was gathered in that year.

Although table 3.1 gives some idea as to when the knights at Falkirk began their military service, it does not reveal the full extent to which they had participated in previous campaigns under Edward I. This information is presented in the table below.

Table 3.2: Previous Military Service of Knightly Followers at Falkirk

	1270	1277	1282	1287	1294	1295	1296	1297	1298
Holy Land	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Wales	-	7	17	5	38*	-	-	-	-
Gascony	-	-	-	-	18	7	1	6	-
Flanders	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	68	-
Scotland	-	-	-	-	-	-	34	8	140
Total	2	7	17	5	56	7**	35	82	140

* Includes those who served in Wales in both 1294 and 1295
**Not including those continuing their service from Wales in the previous year

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[106] *PW*, i, 265; E 101/5/23, m. 2.
[107] *RG*, iii, 167-8. For Mortimer's exemption, see *PW*, i, 260.
[108] *Siege of Caerlaverock*, 7. No English expeditionary forces served in Ireland during our period; R. Frame, 'Military Service in the Lordship of Ireland 1290-1360: Institutions and Society on the Anglo-Gaelic Frontier', *Medieval Frontier Societies*, ed. R. Bartlett and A. MacKay (Oxford, 1989), 102.
[109] *Book of Prests*, lii.

Whilst the aforesaid caveats must be borne in mind, it is possible to discern three or four distinct groups with varying levels of military experience. A substantial minority fell into the 'veteran' category. Two knights, William Wyther and William de Detling, had fought in the Holy Land with Edward and his brother Edmund at the beginning of the 1270s.[110] Detling was proffered as a knight in the war of 1277 prior to campaigning in France, and appears to have given his last service with Aymer de Valence in 1301, three years before his death.[111] Two other soldiers to have registered their service as knights at the feudal muster in 1277 were Thomas de Eyville, who was in the *comitiva* of Thomas de Furnivall in 1298, and Thomas de Berkeley senior who had fought, as a teenager, during the Barons' Wars.[112] Some in the veteran group began their military careers as *servientes* during the first two Welsh wars. William de Wygebere, with Robert Fitz Payn at Falkirk, registered his service as a sergeant in 1277.[113] Stephen de la More, John de Bracebridge and Robert de Bavent were probably all very young men when they fought as *servientes* in the great war of 1282-3.[114] Others who took up arms at that time and whose ranks during the war with Llywelyn are not specified include Ralph le Bygod, Humphrey de Beauchamp and Robert Fitz Nigel.[115] A few of these men appear on the rolls of arms at an early date: Detling and Fitz Nigel on Heralds' Roll (*c.*1279); and Ralph le Bygod on Charles' Roll (*c.*1285).[116] In addition to these survivors from the early Welsh wars there was a second group who had first seen active service in Wales or Gascony in the later 1280s or mid-1290s. This category included Hugh de St. Philibert; Ingelram de Berenger; Roger de Bilney; Thomas de Coudray; and Laurence de Hameldon; amongst others.[117]

The above tables suggest that the majority of the knights at Falkirk were relative novices in war; therefore, most retinues would have had their fair share of younger recruits serving alongside more seasoned campaigners. By 1298, many of these knights

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[110] Lloyd, *English Society and the Crusade,* appendix 4.
[111] 1277 (*PW*, i, 207); 1294 (*RG*, iii, 179); 1298 (*Gough*, 194); 1301 (E 101/9/24, m. 1d).
[112] Eyville served in 1277 (*PW*, i, 197), 1282 (C 67/8, m. 5), 1297 (C 67/12, m. 3d), and for the final time in 1298 (*Gough*, 211). In addition to the Barons' Wars (*Complete Peerage*, ii, 127-8), Berkeley had fought in 1277, 1282 (see chapter 2, n. 217), 1294-5 (C 67/10, m. 4), and 1297 (E 101/6/28, m. 2i).
[113] He was in Wales in 1277 (*PW*, i, 206), 1282 (C 47/2/4, m. 8) and 1294 (C 67/10, m. 7).
[114] De la More was in Wales in 1282 (*PW*, i, 234), and 1295 (C 67/10, m. 3) and in Flanders in 1297 (E 101/6/37, m. 1ii), Bracebridge in 1282 (C 47/2/7, m. 2), in Wales then Gascony in 1295 (C 67/10, m. 5d; *RG*, iii, 298) and Flanders in 1297 (C 67/12, m. 2), and Bavent in 1282 (E 101/4/1, m. 9), 1294 (*Book of Prests*, 51) and as a knight in Scotland by 1296 (E 101/5/23, m. 3). There were two John de Bracebridges but the sergeant in 1282 was the son as the father had been a knight in 1273. M. Jones, 'An Indenture between Robert, Lord Mohaut, and Sir John de Bracebridge for Life Service in Peace and War, 1310', *Journal of the Society of Archivists*, iv (1972), 387; *CCR, 1272-79*, 41.
[115] Bygod (C 67/8, m. 7); Beauchamp (C 67/8, m. 4d); Fitz Nigel (C 67/8, m. 4).
[116] *Aspilogia III*, i, 139, 294.
[117] St. Philibert (*CPR, 1281-92*, 273); Berenger (C 67/10, m. 5); Bilney (C 67/10, m. 3); Coudray (*RG*, iii, 166); Hameldon (*RG*, iii, 168).

had been girded with the belt of knighthood for no more than a year or two. For men such as these, the Falkirk campaign must have constituted a pivotal stage in their progression towards fully-fledged membership of the knightly elite. One such individual was Waleran de Rocheford. He had been knighted on 25 March 1296 in the retinue of John de Engayne, the man who he followed to war again two years later.[118] Several other bachelors in our sample, Adam de la Forde; William de Chabenore; Philip de Welles; Philip Paynel; Simon le Chamberleyn; Simon de Asshton; Nicholas Pointz; and Ralph de Seccheville; each received the honour in Flanders on All Saints' Day 1297 at what was clearly a mass knighting ceremony.[119] Bartholomew de Somerton and Robert de Scales' follower John de Vaux, both of whom served as sergeants in 1297, might have been among the young men who were knighted at the beginning of the Falkirk campaign.[120] Many of these new *milites* were among the forty-six who began their military careers either in 1296 or the following year, but when we look in more detail at the knights who seem to have taken up arms at that late stage we find one or two surprises. Among those who appear in the military records for the first time in 1297 or 1298 are a few, like John de Blakeford and Robert Barry, who had been in possession of their lands for many years. It may be that they had hitherto served without Crown pay and avoided the attention of the royal clerks, but it is likely, given that the Falkirk host was the largest of the reign, that many of the more established knights were forced out of their country idylls for the first time in 1298.

For up-and-coming knights, as well as for some of the veterans who were not yet ready to hang up their swords, the Falkirk campaign was not the end but perhaps the beginning of many more years of military service. An attempt has been made to summarise this post-Falkirk activity below.

Table 3.3: Service by the Falkirk Knights in Scotland (1298-1314)

	1298	1300	1301	1302	1303	1306	1307	1309	1310	1314
Independent*	4	19	7	-	7	12	2	1	2	5
Retainer	136	51	38	1	42	27	10	3	15	13
Ret. Leader	-	5	15	3	18	9	9	1	1	4
Total	140	75	60	4	67	48	21	5	18	22

* Includes those who took out letters of protection or attorney with the king

[118] E 101/5/23, m. 1i.
[119] BL, Add. MS 7965, ff. 64v, 68r, 69r, 78r.
[120] E 101/6/37, mm. 1i, 2i; *Guisborough*, 325.

Many of the Falkirk knights, as we have seen, only began their military service three or four years before 1298, but it was precisely those individuals, for the most part, who formed the core of English armies for the Scottish expeditions that followed. That is not to say that the veterans of the earlier Welsh wars had all died or stopped fighting within a few years of Falkirk, for a few, such as Robert de Bures, Henry de Glastingbury, Edmund Foliot and Stephen de la More, had numerous campaigns still ahead of them.[121] Yet the long-term future naturally lay with those soldiers, like the men who were knighted in 1296 or 1297, whose military careers coincided with the onset of the Scottish wars. Continuity of service beyond 1298 was very high; and we should remember that these are minimum figures, that some of the later armies, such as those of 1306 and 1307, were relatively small, and that source survival for several campaigns, particularly that of 1314, is poor. Among the knights whose careers seem to have begun at Falkirk, but who featured prominently in the campaigns that followed, was the Hampshire knight John de Scures, who served in 1300, 1301, 1303, 1306 and 1314.[122] One or two others, like Robert de Haustede junior and Nicholas de Meynill junior, continued beyond Bannockburn into the later stages of the reign of Edward II.[123] Twenty-one of the knights at Falkirk later obtained letters of protection in 1314 and would therefore appear to have taken part in the two great battles of the era,[124] but given the absence of any pay documents for Bannockburn this is probably only the tip of the iceberg. In any case, quite a few soldiers continued to serve beyond that convenient cut-off point: Robert Fitz Nigel, a veteran of the war of 1282, was at the siege of Berwick in 1319; and the relatively fresh-faced Walter de Beauchamp junior, the son of Edward I's steward, was still in arms on the Weardale campaign in the first year of the reign of Edward III.[125] Some twenty-seven of the Falkirk knights were returned in the lists of men-at-arms drawn up from the counties in 1324, even if one, Thomas de Scales, was by that stage unfit for service.[126] Although the men mentioned here were evidently very active campaigners, not all possessed the same appetite for the king's wars. There were

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[121] Bures appears in the military records for the final time in 1307 (C 67/16, m. 3), whilst Glastingbury, Foliot and de la More, whose service likewise began in the second Welsh war, can still be traced in 1306, 1307 and 1310 respectively (E 101/13/7, m. 1; E 101/612/21, m. 1; C 71/4 m. 10).

[122] 1300 (*Liber Quotidianus*, 202-3); 1301 (BL, Add. MS 7966a, f. 71v); 1303 (E 101/612/11, m. 5); 1306 (C 67/16, m. 9); 1314 (C 71/6, m. 3).

[123] Haustede served in 1300 (E 101/8/23, m. 1), 1301 (BL, Add. MS 7966a f. 87r), 1303 (BL, Add. MS 8835, f. 58v), 1314 (C 71/6, m. 3), 1319 (C 71/10, m. 4), and 1322 (BL, Stowe MS 553, f. 60r), and Meynill in 1300 (C 67/14, m. 12), 1301 (C 67/14, m. 2), 1303 (E 101/612/10, m. 1), 1314 (C 71/6, m. 1) and 1319 (C 71/10, m. 9).

[124] Those present in 1314 included Ingelram de Berenger (C 71/6, m. 3), John de Scures (C 71/6, m. 3), Maurice le Brun (C 71/6, m. 4), Walter de Beauchamp junior (C 71/6, m. 4), Simon le Chamberleyn (C 71/6, m. 1), Henry de Segrave (C 71/6, m. 3) and Walter Haket (C 71/6, m. 5).

[125] Fitz Nigel (C 71/10, m. 5); Beauchamp (C 71/11, m. 6).

[126] *PW*, II, ii, 637-57.

some who took up arms far more frequently, and over a longer period of time, than others. Some indication as to the varying commitment to military service among the knights in our sample group is given in the table below.

Table 3.4: No. of Campaigns fought on by Falkirk Knights (1270-1314)

Hosts served in	Number of knights	% of total
1	19	13.6
2	17	12.1
3	15	10.7
4	15	10.7
5	17	12.1
6	18	12.9
7	15	10.7
8	9	6.4
9	9	6.4
10	5	3.6
11	0	0
12	1	0.7

Nineteen of the knights at Falkirk seem to have given military service on no other occasion. However, included among the men who fall into this category are ten knights who were with overseas commanders such as Pons de Castillion, Peter de Burdegala and Otto de Casnawe.[127] The number of English knights who fought only in that year was, therefore, not so great. At the other extreme was a group of thirty-nine knights who served on seven occasions or more, including Maurice le Brun who took up arms eight times between 1296 and 1314; Stephen de la More and Thomas de Coudray who can be located in nine different hosts; and Henry de Segrave, who wielded the sword a further nine times following his debut alongside his father, Nicholas, in Wales in 1295.[128] These figures are most impressive given that we are only considering service given up to 1314, but the prize for the most bellicose record would be taken by John de

[127] The origins of some of these knights, such as Ebles de Lignan, have been traced by Malcolm Vale; M.G.A. Vale, 'The Gascon Nobility and the Anglo-French War 1294-98', *War and Government in the Middle Ages: Essays in Honour of J.O. Prestwich*, ed. J. Gillingham and J.C. Holt (Woodbridge, 1984), infra 135 and 136.

[128] Brun: 1296 ('Plea roll, 1296', no. 127); 1298 (*Gough*, 176); 1300 (C 47/2/13, m. 8), 1301 (C 67/14, m. 4), 1303 (E 101/612/11, m. 2), 1306 (C 67/16, m. 10), 1307 (*CDS*, v, 446), 1314 (C 71/6, m. 4). De la More: for his service prior to Falkirk, see above n. 114, and 1298 (*Gough*, 183); 1300 (E 101/8/23, m. 2); 1301 (E 101/9/24, m. 2); 1303 (E 101/612/8, m. 1d); 1307 (E 101/14/15, m. 9); 1310 (C 71/4, m. 10). Coudray: see chapter 1 n. 133. Segrave: 1294 (C 67/10, m. 6); 1296 (E 101/5/23, m. 3); 1297 (C 67/12, m. 9); 1298 (*Gough*, 187); 1301 (C 67/14, m. 6); 1303 (C 67/15, m. 15); 1306 (C 67/16, m. 6); 1307 (*CDS*, v, 445); 1311 (C 71/4, m. 6); 1314 (C 71/6, m. 3).

Crumwell, who can be traced in twelve armies between 1294, when he had a letter of protection for service in Wales, and 1314.[129] The careers of these knights seem to test the view that a professional soldiery did not emerge until a later era in English history, but knights like Segrave and Crumwell were exceptional. Table 3.4 shows that it was more normal for knights to participate in royal campaigns on between four and seven occasions, supporting Keen's observation that 'a very common pattern of service...is one that lies somewhere between the professional and the occasional'.[130] Representative of this group were Adam de la Forde, who participated in four expeditions between 1297 and 1301, and John de Caltoft, who appears in the records the same number of times between 1294 and 1306.[131]

Such varied recruitment patterns produced military careers that differed markedly in length, many lasting for a good number of years. Given that landholders were obliged to possess arms between the ages of fifteen and sixty, it is not surprising to find that the martial activities of some of the Falkirk men spanned several decades. Whilst none of the knights at Falkirk were able to match the records of Sir John Sully or Sir Thomas de Rokeby, who claimed during the Scrope-Grosvenor dispute of 1385 to have served for eighty and sixty years respectively,[132] quite a few can be shown to have been militarily active for over two or three decades. At least nine knights bore arms for over thirty years, including John de Bracebridge, Thomas de Berkeley junior, William de Detling, John ap Adam and Robert Fitz Nigel, whilst a further twenty-nine engaged in military service for two decades or more.[133] When we bear in mind that the service records are incomplete, it seems probable that most militarily-active knights bore arms for at least fifteen years, even if there was a significant minority who took part in only one or two campaigns during their lives. This accords well with the evidence provided by the depositions in the Court of Chivalry case between Thomas, lord Morley, and John, Lord Lovel, during the reign of Richard II, when careers spanning thirty or forty

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[129] For his service on five expeditions between 1294 and 1301, see chapter 1 nn. 159-60, and chapter 2 n. 159. He also fought in 1303 (E 101/612/7, m. 3), 1306 (E 101/612/15, m. 1), 1307 (E 101/14/15, m. 9), 1308 (*CDS*, v, 446), 1309 (*CDS*, v, 448), 1310 (BL, Cotton Nero C VIII, f. 2r) and 1314 (C 71/6, m. 5).

[130] Keen, *Origins of the English Gentleman*, 62.

[131] Forde: 1297 (BL, Add. MS 7965, f. 64v); 1298 (*Gough*, 164); 1300 (E 101/8/23, m. 5); 1301 (E 101/9/23, m. 1). Caltoft: 1294 (C 67/10, m. 4); 1298 (*Gough*, 172); 1303 (E 101/612/11, m. 2); 1306 (C 67/16, m. 11).

[132] *The Controversy between Sir Richard Scrope and Sir Robert Grosvenor in the Court of Chivalry, A.D. MCCCLXXXV-MCCCXC*, ed. N.H. Nicolas, 2 vols. (London, 1832), i, 74, 116. On the tendency during the Middle Ages for old people to exaggerate their age and experience, see S. Shahar, *Growing Old in the Middle Ages: "Winter Clothes us in Shadow and Pain"* (London, 1997), 30.

[133] The start and end dates for those mentioned who served 30 years and more are: Bracebridge 1282-1315 (C 47/2/7, m. 2; E 101/15/6, m. 2); Berkeley junior 1294-1335 (C 67/10, m. 7; C 71/15, m. 26); Detling 1270 (and before that the Barons' Wars)-1301 (Lloyd appendix 4; E 101/9/24, m. 1d); ap Adam 1277-1307 (*CPR, 1272-81*, 217; *CDS*, v, 446); Fitz Nigel 1282-1319 (C 67/8, m. 4; C 71/10, m. 5).

years were shown to have been quite common.[134] Certainly, there is reason to believe that the grandparents and great-grandparents of those men, who lived during the reigns of Edward I and Edward II, had been just as martially inclined, if not more so. For all that, there came a day when even the most strenuous knights had to sheath their swords for good. Perhaps in old age some of these men had time to reminisce on the fortunes of former years. In doing so, they encouraged a new generation of warriors whose successes in France would one day surpass even their own endeavours.

Sergeants

Throughout the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries knights continued to perform an important role within royal armies, providing the Crown with a hardened core of regular campaigners. What the careers and experiences of the knights at Falkirk do not reveal is that this was also a time when the proportional contribution of these elite soldiers to the manpower of English hosts was gradually decreasing. This shift was due not to any decline in the number of knights engaged in military activity under Edward I, for quite the reverse was true. Rather it was reflective of the heightened demands placed on the lesser tenants and rear-vassals of the shires and localities which saw the 'squire', or 'sergeant', gradually replace the knight as the mainstay of the king's forces. Some indication as to the extent of this shift can be given by comparing the armies raised by Henry III with those of his son. In 1223, at least 387 knights and 145 sergeants appeared at the feudal muster to go against Llywelyn the Great, whilst for the Deganwy campaign of twenty-two years later there were around 354 knights as against 306 men of lesser rank.[135] Under Edward I, by contrast, both the feudal levies and the armies at large were weighted far more heavily towards mounted soldiers of more modest rank and status. Whilst the forty knights and 366 sergeants registered at the feudal muster for the Scottish campaign of 1300 may be indicative less of a general trend than of a specific policy regarding the provision of feudal service,[136] it was nevertheless the case that sergeants normally outnumbered knights in the armies of Edward I and Edward II by around three to one. In some years the imbalance was even greater. Figures for the Flanders campaign of 1297-8 reveal that at its peak the army of that year contained 140 knights and bannerets with 755 squires.[137] At Falkirk, the 734

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[134] Ayton, 'Knights, Esquires and Military Service', 88.
[135] Walker, 'The Anglo-Welsh Wars', 182, 510
[136] *PDS*, 209-231.
[137] Lewis, 'The English Forces in Flanders', 312-3.

men described on the inventories as *valletti* represented some 74 per cent of the total number of men-at-arms in Crown pay. If the proportion in receipt of royal wages was the same as for the knights, which seems more than likely, then around 2,400 English sergeants were engaged north of the border in that year.

It is not surprising, given the growing dependence of the Crown on its sub-knightly combatants and the increase in the squire's social standing, that the 'knightly class' in its widest sense has attracted a great deal of attention among historians. Much ink has been spilled on 'the rise of the esquire'. Moreover, the shifting boundaries between knights and those below them in the social hierarchy, and the extent to which such boundaries became less or more solidified over time, have occupied the thoughts of many prominent scholars.[138] Social and economic theories of growth and crisis have naturally contributed much to the debate.[139] Even the problem of definition has sometimes proved difficult to resolve: for David Crouch, at least, 'to talk of squires as *potential*, rather than actual, aristocrats would be safest before 1300'.[140] Whilst that may be the case, the consensus is that the squires were rising, inexorably so, and that the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries lay at the heart of that process. Where disagreement has arisen is between those who have traced the new-found confidence of the 'squires' to their control over lands in the shires and localities, and others for whom the military nexus was more pertinent. If, according to Peter Coss, 'territoriality is crucial to the understanding of the gentry as a social formation',[141] then for Maurice Keen, it was through military service that the squires came of age as a social group. The imposition of military obligations on non-knights by Edward I created a greater self-awareness among that body of men. Later in the fourteenth century, campaigning became 'a principal forcing experience, teaching the esquire to aspire to a coat [of arms].'[142] Given the heavy recruitment of the country gentry during these years, war was almost certainly a driving factor behind the changes taking place.

The emergence of 'esquire' as a prominent social rank during the course of the fourteenth century should not obscure the fact that the men of sub-knightly status who

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[138] E.g. Coss, 'Knights, Esquires and the Origins of Social Gradation', *passim*; M. Bennett, 'The Status of the Squire: The Northern Evidence', *The Ideals and Practice of Medieval Knighthood I*, ed. C. Harper-Bill and R. Harvey (Woodbridge, 1986), 1-11; J. Scammell, 'The Formation of the English Social Structure: Freedom, Knights, and Gentry, 1066-1300', *Speculum*, lxviii (1993), 613. On the early terminology used for men of sub-knightly rank, see D. Crouch, *The Birth of Nobility: Constructing Aristocracy in England and France 900-1300* (Harlow, 2005), 249-50.

[139] P. Coss, 'Sir Geoffrey de Langley and the Crisis of the Knightly Class in Thirteenth-Century England', *Past and Present*, lxviii (1975), 26-7; D.A. Carpenter, 'Was there a Crisis of the Knightly Class in the Thirteenth Century? The Oxfordshire Evidence', *EHR*, xcv (1980), 748-52.

[140] Crouch, *Image of Aristocracy*, 171.

[141] Coss, *Origins of the English Gentry*, 9.

[142] Keen, *Origins of the English Gentleman*, 81.

took up arms under Edward I were an extremely heterogeneous group. In fact, the focus on the 'squire' as a social category is misleading for, as Nigel Saul has noted, 'there was no stratification of landed society below the rank of knight in 1300'.[143] For this reason, it is more accurate to talk of 'sergeants' rather than 'squires' when discussing the lesser cavalrymen within early Edwardian armies. However we choose to describe them, the point of real significance is that these men were defined less by a unity of status and wealth, than by a process of deduction whereby, as non-knights, they came to share a common identity as mounted soldiers of the secondary order. The sergeants of the reigns of Edward I and Edward II lacked any common social origin, for whilst they included 'the descendants of landed families who could count knights in their ancestry', there were also others, 'of non genteel, urban or even peasant origins'.[144] Warfare therefore provided the bonds that other forms of social and political activity could not. More particularly, it was their position as mounted combatants that distinguished the lesser sergeants from the massed ranks of peasants in the infantry and which, for military purposes at least, brought them into contact with the social mores of the upper echelons of the aristocracy. This was not an equal relationship: knights remained the elite soldiers of English armies, and at the feudal muster the service of two sergeants was seen as equivalent to that of one knight.[145] Even so, the proportional contribution of these lesser cavalrymen to the armed strengths of royal hosts does appear to have led to an increased recognition of their role. It is perhaps significant that by the time of the Weardale campaign of 1327, Jean le Bel was seeing fit to rank 'chevaliers et escuiers' together at the heart of Edward III's army, distinguishing between them and the other mounted soldiers 'sur petites hageneez'.[146]

These developments lay in the future, but the martial instincts of the squires who rode across France with Edward III and the Black Prince can be traced back to the experiences of their fathers and grandfathers during the reigns of the first two Edwards. Many of the sergeants who took part in the Falkirk campaign of 1298 could certainly have staked a claim to as strong a military pedigree as their more celebrated scions who took up arms during the Hundred Years War. Fortunately, the details of some of their careers have survived in the form of petitions and other personal testimonies. One such sergeant was a certain William de Walhope who claimed that he had been present at the

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[143] Saul, *Knights and Esquires*, 16.
[144] Keen, *Origins of the English Gentleman*, 73.
[145] As shown by the preparations made by the abbot of Ramsey for his feudal contingent to serve in Gascony in 1294; *Select Pleas in Manorial and other Seignorial Courts Volume One: Reigns of Henry III and Edward I*, ed. F.W. Maitland, Selden Society, ii (1888), 80.
[146] *Chronique de Jean le Bel*, i, 53.

conquest of Berwick in 1296, Dunbar, and 'la baille de la Vere Chapele', before joining the garrisons of Berwick and Melrose.[147] Walhope does not appear on the horse lists for the Falkirk campaign so was presumably one of the 1,500 or so cavalrymen of lesser rank who served in the retinues of magnates not in receipt of Crown pay.[148] One soldier who does appear on the *forinsec* inventory was Alan de Walingford, a man-at-arms from Berkshire. During the reign of Edward II a man of that name wrote to the king stating, among other things, that he had served him and his father 'trente aunz et plus en totes vos guerres de Gales, Gasconie e Escoce'.[149] The most celebrated account to have come down to us is that relating to a certain John de Thirlewall who, according to a deposition given by his son during the Scrope-Grosvenor controversy, had seen Richard de Scrope's grandfather, William, knighted during the Falkirk campaign. Thirlewall was said to have been 145 years old at the time of his death, making him the oldest esquire in the north, and to have given military service for sixty-nine years.[150] Although the veracity of much of this story has rightly been questioned, two men named John de Thirlewall did have their horses appraised in 1298: one appears as a man-at-arms from Northumberland, the other in the retinue of Adam de Swyneburne.[151] As such the deposition, fantastical as it was, did have some grounding in truth. Testimonies such as these show that sergeants, just as much as their knightly counterparts, were often seasoned campaigners, a point that is sometimes obscured by the relatively poor documentary survival for the men of that rank.

As already noted, to analyse the sergeants at Falkirk as a single body of men would be to miss the very important distinction between the more wealthy sergeants, those descended from knightly families and who would eventually go on to become knights themselves, and the lesser men-at-arms like Walhope and Thirlewall. J.E. Morris noted this dichotomy many years ago when he commented on the presence among the sergeants of this period of 'both the young aspirants to knighthood and the plebeian troopers who never rose higher'.[152] Some of the former can be detected among the sergeants at Falkirk. Economically, the upper crust among the *valletti* in 1298 were

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[147] *CDS*, ii, no. 1969.

[148] A sergeant of that name was in Scotland earlier in 1298 (E 101/6/35, f. 11v) and was drawn as a man-at-arms from the county levy in Northumberland in 1301 (BL, Add. MS 7966a, f. 95r; E 101/9/15).

[149] SC 8 152, no. 7563. Walingford served in the armies of 1298 (*Gough*, 210) and 1301 (BL, Add. MS 7966a, f. 96r), before staying in the Edinburgh garrison between 1302 and 1304 (E 101/10/5, m. 9; E 101/12/11; E 101/12/20). He had also been in the Berwick garrison following Falkirk (E 101/7/1, m. 9).

[150] *Scrope-Grosvenor Controversy*, i, 181-3.

[151] *Gough*, 195, 210.

[152] J.E. Morris, 'Cumberland and Westmorland Military Levies in the Time of Edward I and Edward II', *Transactions of the Cumberland and Westmorland Antiquarian and Archaeological Society*, new ser., iii (1903), 310.

those twenty- and forty-librate holders who were summoned from the counties for royal campaigns and who could hold their own against the lesser knights in terms of income. William de Launceleyn, summoned from Northamptonshire as a twenty-pounder in 1297,[153] and Benedict de Blakenham, also recruited from the counties for the Flanders expedition,[154] would certainly have been among the more affluent sergeants to venture north of the border in 1298. One can also trace on the rolls of arms those sergeants who went on to become knights later in their military careers, as well as a few who were listed on such armorials even before they were knighted. Giles de Argentein, one of the most celebrated knights of the early part of the fourteenth century, served as a valet at Falkirk in the retinue of Hugh le Despenser. He appears on Collins' Roll five years before we first encounter him as a knight in the military records.[155] Others among the more prosperous sergeants at Falkirk may be traced among the sixteen who went on to be knighted alongside the Prince of Wales in 1306, including Stephen de Burghershh, Hugh de Pikeworth and John de Chandos.[156] They, like Henry de Broke, who was with John de Beauchamp of Somerset in 1298 prior to being distrained to knighthood eighteen years later, were evidently men of some substance.[157]

The presence of knights at Falkirk who appear to have received the honour at the beginning of their military careers should not lead us to conclude that those sergeants prosperous enough to aspire to knighthood were automatically fast-tracked to the top of the military hierarchy. On the contrary, quite a few of the Falkirk sergeants spent many years among the sub-knightly ranks before they were accepted into the exclusive club of the chivalrous elite. Some, such as William Botetourt, fought as lower ranking soldiers on three or four campaigns before appearing in the service records as knights, and it may well be that he and other sergeants from knightly families were very young and inexperienced soldiers in 1298.[158] Thomas de Monteny first appears in the service records as a valet on the Scottish expedition of 1296. He continued to serve as a man of that rank in 1300, 1303 and 1306 before finally receiving the belt of knighthood at some point before 1311 when he fought as a knight under Robert de Clifford.[159] A lack of resources might have placed limits on the military and social aspirations of some

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[153] *PW*, i, 289; *Gough*, 191.
[154] *PW*, i, 290; *Gough*, 175.
[155] *Gough*, 189; *Aspilogia III*, ii, 16; E 101/9/23, m. 1.
[156] Bullock-Davies, *Menestrellorum Multitudo*, 185, 187.
[157] *Gough*, 193; C 47/1/8, m. 25.
[158] Botetourt was a sergeant in 1297 (E 101/6/37, m. 1i), 1298 (*Gough*, 166), 1300 (E 101/8/23, m. 3) and 1302 (E 101/612/12, m. 6), before appearing as a knight in 1304 (*PDS*, 272).
[159] 1296 (E 101/5/23, m. 1i); 1297 (E 101/6/30, m. 1iv); 1298 (*Gough*, 197); 1300 (*Liber Quotidianus*, 176); 1303 (E 101/612/11, m. 2); 1306 (E 101/612/15, m. 1); 1311 (BL, Cotton Nero C VIII, f. 20r).

individuals, but one way around this problem was to find service in the royal household where there were greater opportunities for advancement than elsewhere. Ralph de Kerdiff's military career appears to have begun as a valet at Falkirk in 1298 in the retinue of Robert de Mohaut.[160] Thirteen years later he can still be found receiving a prest as a sergeant on the Scottish campaign of 1310-11, but on 23 June 1311 he was knighted, before being admitted into the household as a *miles simplex* the following day.[161] The Parliamentary Roll of Arms contains the names of around forty of the Falkirk sergeants and they, like Kerdiff, were probably among the younger soldiers who rode to Scotland in 1298.

Whilst squires such as Kerdiff may be regarded as knights-in-waiting for whom the length of apprenticeship depended on their age and wealth at the time of the Falkirk campaign, mounted soldiers at the other end of the sub-knightly spectrum were very much the finished product, in so much as they were not expected to make further progress, either socially or militarily. Some of these men, 'squires who were descended from squires rather than knights', as Helen Nicholson has put it,[162] still retained a degree of gentility, but there were also others, 'members of modestly endowed families "hovering perilously close to the level of the richer peasantry"', who were not aristocratic or genteel by even the most admissive standards.[163] These were possibly the kind of men that the author of the *Anonimalle Chronicle* had in mind when he wrote of the 'fraunkleyns' who were captured by the royalists during the baronial uprising of 1322,[164] and who Nigel Saul has depicted as the sub-genteel parvenus of the later fourteenth century.[165] There were certainly a good number of less wealthy sergeants among the ranks in 1298, yet it is far from easy to distinguish between those who had their feet on the lowest rungs of the genteel ladder, and others who were rummaging around at its base for scraps. Perhaps the most obvious place to look for evidence of the latter is among those with the lowest appraised horses at the muster for the Falkirk campaign. Around 23 per cent of the 700 or so soldiers listed as *valletti* had mounts valued at a hundred shillings or less. It may be that men like William Howel, who had a horse appraised at just sixty shillings under Robert de Scales, relied on military service

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[160] *Gough*, 209.
[161] Bodleian Library, Tanner MS 197, ff. 8v, 26v, 33r.
[162] H. Nicholson, *Medieval Warfare: Theory and Practice of War in Europe 300-1500* (Basingstoke, 2004), 56.
[163] Ayton, *Knights and Warhorses*, 5, quoting C. Carpenter, *Locality and Polity. A Study of Warwickshire Landed Society, 1401-1499* (Cambridge, 1992), 38.
[164] *Anonimalle Chronicle*, 110.
[165] N. Saul, 'The Social Status of Chaucer's Franklin: A Reconsideration', *Medium Aevum*, lii (1983), 22.

as their main source of income.[166] Still, we must be cautious about generalising from evidence such as this, for members of prominent knightly families such as Geoffrey de Bracebridge also served with low priced mounts on the Falkirk campaign.

More profitable subjects of enquiry are the middling sergeants and squires who fought at Falkirk, those owners of fractional fees and landholders in small vills who constituted the emerging squirearchy in its truest sense. It has been possible to trace around a third of the sergeants at Falkirk in the various landholding enquiries carried out in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries.[167] Soldiers such as John de Rothewell, who held the third part of a fee in Orby, Lincolnshire, in 1303, and John de Cary, a modest landowner in Dorset during the reign of Edward II, were representative of the kind of men who seem to have formed the bulk of the valets at Falkirk in 1298.[168] Though neither wealthy, nor perhaps ambitious enough to take up the rank of knight or to find service in the royal household, many of these middling landholders served quite happily for many years whilst retaining the rank of sergeant. Among those who forged the longest careers were a few who appear to have had previous experience of the wars in Wales, something that is not always possible to trace owing to our reliance on letters of protection for a number of earlier campaigns. Ralph de Worteley was probably one of the older sergeants at Falkirk, for a man of that name had his horse appraised as a valet during the second Welsh war before disappearing from the military records following the Caerlaverock campaign of 1300.[169] Nominal record linkage becomes more difficult as one goes further down the military hierarchy, but other Falkirk sergeants who appear to have been veterans of the early Welsh wars include Henry de Curzon, a soldier with Roger de Mortimer in 1282, and Roger de Bray, who was proffered as a *serviens* in 1277 prior to fighting in Wales in 1294.[170] Some, such as Isambert de St. Blimund and William le Skirmissour, began their service during the years of crisis and went on to fight as sergeants into the reign of Edward II, despite never attaining the rank of knight.[171] Furthermore, three of the valets with Aymer de Valence in 1298 - William Symeon, John de Stodley and John de Gacelyn - were still being summoned as

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[166] *Gough*, 170.
[167] *Feudal Aids, passim.*
[168] *Feudal Aids*, iii, 161; *ibid*, ii, 39. For Cary, see *The Dorset Lay Subsidy Roll of 1327*, ed. A.R. Rumble, Dorset Record Society, vi (1980), 91.
[169] Worteley was with William le Latimer in 1282 (C 47/2/7, m. 4) and later served in Gascony (*RG*, iii, 156), before going north of the border in 1298 (*Gough*, 178) and 1300 (E 101/8/23, m. 2)
[170] Curzon was in Wales in 1282 (C 67/8, m. 4), and Bray served there in 1277 (*PW*, i, 208) and 1294 (C 67/10, m. 4).
[171] Both began their service in Wales: St. Blimund (C 67/10, m. 7); Skirmissour (C 67/10, m. 2). St. Blimund later took out a letter of protection for the Bannockburn campaign whilst Skirmissour was also in Scotland in 1314: C 71/6, m. 1; E 101/14/15, m. 5d.

sergeants from the Home Counties into the 1320s.[172] The careers of middling men such as these show that war service appealed to a wide cross section of English landed society.

Among the mounted soldiers listed on the inventories there were over a hundred, the majority not placed within retinues, who were described as coming from particular counties and who seem to have been drawn from shire levies conducted by sheriffs and other royal officials. We find, for example, a *Johannes Sampson de comitatu Eboracum* and *Nicholaus de Leeke de comitatu Notingham*.[173] Similar arrays were conducted for other campaigns, including those of 1297, 1300 and 1301. Many of these individuals were sent to serve in the garrisons of Berwick and Roxburgh and it is therefore unlikely that they took part in the battle. The remainder possibly served independently, or fought alongside one another in small groups. Although not denoted as holding any particular military rank, these were evidently individuals of quite humble status. Table 3.5 shows the number of men-at-arms who were raised in this way in each of the represented shires.

Table 3.5: Men-at-Arms on the Horse Lists drawn from the Counties (1298)

County	No. of men	County	No. of men
Berkshire	2	Northants.	7
Buckinghamshire	1	Northumbria	9
Cheshire	3	Nottinghamshire	3
Derbyshire	1	Oxfordshire	1
Essex	1	Shropshire	5
Hampshire	1	Somerset	2
Herefordshire	3	Staffordshire	2
Lancashire	2	Suffolk	1
Leicestershire	2	Warwickshire	1
Lincolnshire	5	Westmorland	6
London	2	Wiltshire	1
Middlesex	1	Worcestershire	1
Norfolk	2	Yorkshire	48
Total: 26 counties		113 men-at-arms	

Whilst the knights and sergeants in the retinues on the Falkirk horse lists were drawn primarily from the southern counties and midlands, most of the soldiers recruited directly from the shires were northerners. Comparison with other military sources suggests that all of these men were sergeants, with the exception of Sir John de Boys of

[172] *PW*, II, ii, 588.
[173] *Gough*, 206.

Lincolnshire who led one other man on the campaign.[174] The lack of landholding information for most of these soldiers indicates that the larger part were of very obscure origin. Some, like Adam de Doxford of Northumberland, seem to have been reasonably wealthy individuals at a local level,[175] but the average man-at-arms raised from the counties was of only moderate status. According to the survey of 1303, Robert de Essington held just three bovates of land in Nunburnholme in the East Riding of Yorkshire.[176] His fellow Yorkshireman, Hugh de la Mare, had four bovates in the North Riding vill of Yafforth, being assessed at four shillings and four pence for a fifteenth on his moveable goods in the thirtieth year of the reign.[177] Despite the lowly origins of some of these men, quite a few do appear in the military records on other occasions. This should occasion no surprise given that such individuals probably had only limited responsibilities at a regional level. Some fought as valets in later hosts under local retinue leaders: in 1301, John de Ixinynge was with Robert de Scales;[178] and Nicholas Lenginneur of Cheshire was in the company of Hamo de Mascy.[179] Others remained in Scotland once the army had returned to England and continued to receive pay in the garrisons there. John de Hedlegh was sent to Roxburgh in 1298. Later, he was stationed under his fellow Northumbrian William de Felton in the garrison at Linlithgow.[180] Another man to accompany a castle constable from his own county was Adam de Chetewynde of Staffordshire, who was with Richard de Hastang at Jedburgh from October 1298, having been apportioned to the garrisons that summer.[181] Several among the large group of Yorkshiremen, such as Thomas Nowel and Peter de Tadcaster, were called out in the following year to defend the north-eastern counties.[182]

The sergeants raised in the shires in 1298 were quite a bellicose subset of the military community, comprising a surprisingly large number of regular campaigners for such a socially-obscure group of individuals. Most valets on the horse lists, however, were serving not independently, nor in the garrisons, but within the retinues of the leading earls and bannerets. The earl of Lancaster had a contingent comprising thirty-one men of sub-knightly rank. Analysis of his retinue in that year shows that the system observed by Simon Walker, by which John of Gaunt was able, later in the fourteenth

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[174] *Ibid.*
[175] *The Northumberland Lay Subsidy Roll of 1296*, ed. C.M. Fraser (Newcastle upon Tyne, 1968), 160.
[176] *Feudal Aids*, vi, 147.
[177] *Ibid*, 100; *Yorkshire Lay Subsidy being a Fifteenth, collected 30 Edward I (1301)*, ed. W. Brown, The Yorkshire Archaeological Society Record Ser., xxi (1897), 11.
[178] *Gough*, 214; E 101/9/24, m. 2.
[179] *Gough*, 211; E 101/9/23, m. 2.
[180] *Gough*, 214; E 101/10/12, m. 2; E 101/12/38. Also, see *CDS*, iii, 423.
[181] *Gough*, 215; E 101/7/7, m. 2d; E 101/8/7, m. 1d; E 101/9/9, f. 4r; E 101/12/18, f. 2v.
[182] BL, Add. MS 37654, ff. 12r-v.

century, to recruit retainers from twenty-two different counties where he exercised some control, was already, to some extent, in place under the earlier earls of Lancaster.[183] J.R. Maddicott has shown that Thomas of Lancaster's knightly retainers were drawn from several regions: the north Midlands; the south Midlands and East Anglia; Yorkshire; the far north; Lancashire; and the Welsh March.[184] Whilst the geographical origins of many of the sergeants with him at Falkirk are less easy to ascertain, there appears to have been a similar spread. Some, such as Robert de Jorz and William de Basing, became fairly established figures in the north and east Midlands.[185] John de Kenilworth and Richard de Melbourne, though more difficult to pin down, seem to have come from Lancaster's estates in Warwickshire and Derbyshire respectively.[186] There was also a smattering of Yorkshiremen and Lancastrians, not least of whom was the infamous Robert de Holland, who later betrayed his lord in 1322. His relationship with Lancaster, as it developed in the years following Falkirk, has been described by Maddicott as one of 'junior partner' rather than retainer.[187]

Lancaster's ability to draw on sergeants from several parts of the country, including a number of prominent men who later went on to become knights, was rare but by no means exceptional. Robert de Clifford also recruited valets whose demesne lands lay far from the main concentration of his own estates in the north-west. Whilst most sergeants with Clifford at Falkirk, such as Robert de Whiterugg, Thomas de Hauteclou and William de Boyville, were Cumbrians and Westmorlanders,[188] he could also call on the services of Gilbert and John de Ellesfeld, Thomas de Monteny, and Gilbert Mauduyt, who had significant landed interests in other parts of the country.[189] Each of these men went on to receive knighthood, though Mauduyt's future was not completely prosperous as he was hanged for his adherence to Bruce in 1306.[190] Even men like Lancaster and Clifford, however, had their fair share of obscure sub-knightly associates riding alongside these knights-in-waiting. Indeed the average sergeant in the retinues at Falkirk was a man of more modest wealth and status than those discussed so far. Whilst Nicholas de Audley's retinue included prominent Shropshire lords such as William and Ralph le Botiller of Wem, men like Richard de Cleobury and Simon de

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[183] S. Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity 1361-1399* (Oxford, 1990), 32.
[184] J.R. Maddicott, *Thomas of Lancaster 1307-1322: A Study in the Reign of Edward II* (Oxford, 1970), 54-5.
[185] *Knights of Edward I*, ii, 274; *IPM*, v, no. 566.
[186] Kenilworth and Melbourne were Lancastrian estates.
[187] J.R. Maddicott, 'Thomas of Lancaster and Sir Robert Holland: A Study in Noble Patronage', *EHR*, lxxxvi (1971), 450.
[188] *IPM*, iv, no. 264; *IPM*, v, no. 533, 303; *IPM*, vi, no. 238, 143-4.
[189] *Knights of Edward I*, i, 303-4, iii, 129, 194.
[190] *CPR, 1301-07*, 482.

Madeley would be difficult to place were it not for toponymical evidence linking them to areas close to where Audley and the Botillers had their estates. At the core of Hugh de Courtenay's retinue were three Devonshire men, Robert Beaupel, Ralph Beaupel and John de Chevreston, figures of some standing locally but who had little influence outside of their own county.[191] Surrounding this nucleus were more obscure individuals like Richard de Wastehose, Eustace de Eyville and Alan de Roseles, the latter two perhaps younger sons or members from cadet branches of families in Yorkshire.[192] Although the net was here being cast beyond the county, the sergeants drafted in from outlying regions by Courtenay were of more humble status than those with Lancaster and Clifford.

If the geographical origins and wealth of the sergeants in the retinues at Falkirk were varied, then one may also expect to find a similar lack of uniformity in their military activities. The evidence available for the military service of men of sub-knightly rank is less complete than that for their knightly counterparts and this, combined with the prosopographical pitfalls of working with a group of men for whom landholding records and reliable reference guides are largely unavailable, means that the large-scale reconstruction carried out for the knights at Falkirk cannot be repeated here. Nevertheless, a closer examination of the military activities of the sergeants in one of the retinues, that of Hugh de Courtenay, may serve as a convenient indicator as to some of the more general trends arising from the evidence.

Table 3.6: Military Service of Sergeants with Hugh de Courtenay in 1298

Name of valet	Years of military service to 1314
John de Chevreston	1298, 1303, 1306
Richard de Wastehose	1298, 1310
William de Sully	1296, 1298, 1303, 1307, 1310
Auger Joce	1298
Alan de Roseles	1298
Eustace de Eyville	1282, 1296, 1297, 1298, 1303, 1311
Robert Beaupel	1295, 1296, 1298, 1300, 1306, 1314
Ralph Beaupel	1295, 1298
Nicholas de Romesey	1298, 1299, 1300

[191] *Feudal Aids*, i, 351, 359-62; *The Tax Roll for Devon 31 Edward I*, ed. T.M. Whale, *Transactions of the Devonshire Association for the Advancement of Science, Literature, and Art,* xxxi (1899), 383, 389, 407-13; *The Devonshire Lay Subsidy of 1332*, ed. A.M. Erskine, Devon and Cornwall Record Society, new ser., xiv (1969), 6-8, 25-8, 55, 62, 76, 83, 122.

[192] For the holdings of the Eyville and Roseles families in Yorkshire, see *Feudal Aids*, vi, index.

Courtenay's retinue contained a mixture of regular campaigners, such as Eustace de Eyville and Robert Beaupel, occasional soldiers, exemplified by John de Chevreston, and men who do not appear in the service records at any point before or after 1298, like Alan de Roseles and Auger Joce.[193] Although it is impossible to know for certain whether the Eustace de Eyville who fought in the second Welsh war was the same individual as the man of that name at Falkirk, it would be surprising if there were not a few veterans of the early Welsh wars spread among the younger comrades in arms, as was the case with the knights. When we look at the sergeants in the retinues at Falkirk we sometimes find the same combination of veterans and virgin soldiers, and of regular and occasional campaigners, as we did among those of higher rank. One veteran of the Welsh wars was Peter de Ros, a valet of William de Echingham described by Nigel Saul as akin to 'those protean administrators…who could turn their hand equally to land management, man management, and soldiering'.[194] Others who appear to have begun their military careers in Wales in the 1280s include: Adam de Cateby, a valet of Thomas de Furnivall;[195] Roger le Burgilloun, who was with Nicholas de Audley at Falkirk, having previously served with William de Audley in 1282;[196] and John de Kenilworth, a follower of the earl of Lancaster.[197] Whilst the careers of these men add to the point made about the lengthy service given by sergeants as well as knights, we should also note that a much larger number of sergeants appear to have served on only two or three occasions, not to mention the many whom it is difficult to trace in military or any other kinds of record either before or after 1298. Of the valets with Hugh Bardolf, a few, such as Warin de Bassingburn,[198] William de Calveley[199] and Alexander de Montfort,[200] can be found on four or more campaigns; but six of the ten sergeants with John Tregoz do not appear in the military records on any other occasion than at Falkirk. The same can be said to a greater or lesser extent of most of the retinues in the army.

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[193] Eyville: Wales in 1282 (C 67/8, m. 6d); Scotland in 1296 (E 101/5/23, m. 3); Flanders in 1297 (E 101/6/37, m. 6i); Scotland in 1298 (*Gough*, 208); 1303 (C 67/15, m. 6); 1311 (C 71/4, m. 6). Robert Beaupel: Gascony in 1295 (*RG*, iii, 326); Scotland in 1296 (E 101/5/23, m. 2); 1298 (*Gough*, 208); 1300 (C 67/14, m. 10); 1306 (C 67/16, m. 10); 1314 (C 71/6, m. 5). Chevreston: 1298 (*Gough*, 208); 1303 (C 67/15, m. 8); 1306 (C 67/16, m. 5).

[194] C 47/2/5, m. 2; N. Saul, *Scenes from Provincial Life: Knightly Families in Sussex 1280-1400* (Oxford, 1986), 65-6.

[195] C 67/8, m. 5d; *Gough*, 211.

[196] *Gough*, 219; C 47/2/7 m. 7.

[197] C 67/8, m. 4d; *Gough*, 180.

[198] 1298 (*Gough*, 221); 1300 (*PDS*, 224); 1301 (C 67/14, m. 3); 1303 (E 101/612/8, m. 1); and possibly later campaigns.

[199] 1294 (*RG*, iii, 156); 1298 (*Gough*, 221); 1301 (C 67/14, m. 3); 1303 (E 101/612/8, m. 1).

[200] 1294 (*RG*, iii, 156); 1298 (*Gough*, 221); 1300 (*PDS*, 224); 1301 (C 67/14, m. 3); 1303 (E 101/612/8, m. 1); 1306 (C 67/16, m. 12).

Although there were sergeants, therefore, who can be shown to have been just as prolific in their military activities as the bachelors and bannerets whose orders they obeyed and by whose martial culture they were imbued, there were probably many more who have escaped the attention of the historian completely. Not only do the surviving records leave an image that distorts the contribution of knights and sergeants to the English war effort in favour of the former, but the sergeants on whom we are more fully informed are generally those, like Giles de Argentein and Thomas de Monteny, who went on to become knights. If it is true that the military activities of English men-at-arms during this period can only ever be partially reconstructed, then it is just as important to stress that those of sub-knightly rank are the ones for whom the process of reconstruction tends to be least satisfactory. These reflections should serve to remind us that many of the sergeants whose names appear on the Falkirk inventories for whom no other trace of military service has survived, might in fact have been among the most committed soldiers of their day. It is at least worth bearing in mind that were it not for the testimony of his son during the reign of Richard II, John de Thirlewall, the 'oldest squire in the north' and veteran of numerous martial adventures, would have been, like so many others, nothing more than a name on parchment.

War and Public Service: The Wider Context

Many of the knights and sergeants who took part in the Falkirk campaign of 1298 were, then, regular campaigners. Furthermore, a substantial number surrounding this core gave military service on four or five occasions. The heavy involvement of the gentry in the wars of Edward I and his son attests to a continued predilection among the landholding elites for the heat of the battlefield and camaraderie of the march; a disposition that was doubtless enhanced by the successes achieved against the Welsh. Yet, the kinds of service patterns outlined above were all the more impressive given that this was also a time of increased genteel activity in the affairs of local government and shire administration. The first twenty years of Edward I's reign were marked by campaigns waged against corruption and the alienation of royal rights: campaigns that placed demands on the king's subjects scarcely less tasking than those of the Welsh wars.[201] Several of the Falkirk knights had served on juries during the *Quo Warranto*

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[201] For an idea of the numbers involved in the hundred enquiries, see H.M. Cam, 'Studies in the Hundred Rolls: Some Aspects of Thirteenth-Century Administration', *Oxford Studies in Social and Legal History*, ed. P. Vinogradoff, vi (Oxford, 1921), 131, where evidence is given for Norfolk.

proceedings; many more had been summoned to testify before the king's justices.[202] If such responsibilities were exceptional then the growing number of commissions issued by the Crown ensured that there were plenty of other activities to keep the gentry busy. The appointment of keepers of the peace to enforce the articles of the Statute of Winchester in 1287 marked an important stage in the arrival of those officials in local government.[203] The increased military requirements of the reign also led to a more prominent role for commissioners of array, as well as for collectors of the lay subsidies that were granted by parliament.[204] War was the prime catalyst behind many of these developments, not least in the process by which representatives from the shires came to be summoned regularly from the mid-1290s to give assent to the Crown's tax-raising initiatives.[205] For G.L. Harriss, 'the need for representatives to come with full powers and participate in common counsel was an inescapable concomitant of the demand for the war taxation of these years of emergency'.[206] On many levels, and not only in war, the reign of Edward I required a great effort on the part of the gentry, placing constant demands on their services and binding them more firmly to the king.

The intensification of local government inevitably added to the pressure placed on the middling landowners of medieval England to contribute to public life. During times of peace, the gentry would have been able to shoulder such burdens with ease; but, the heavy recruitment demands created by the wars in Wales, France and Scotland meant that, from the mid-1290s at least, relatively few landholders were able to avoid public service completely. This was not a time when the military service of English landholders 'was being transformed into the exercise of territorial authority in the name of a developing state',[207] as had been the case during the reign of Henry III, for under Edward I the proliferation of commissions and the extension of the obligation to serve in the king's armies ran along parallel lines. Rather, genteel service, as in the later fourteenth century, was becoming more complex, producing 'a lifestyle in which military and civilian responsibilities, family interests and private passions competed for

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[202] The jurors were John de Blakeford, Richard de Kirkebride, William de Mere and William Wyther; *Placita de Quo Warranto temporibus Edw. I. II. and III. in Curia Receptae Scaccarii Westm. asservata*, ed. W. Illingworth (Record Commission, 1818), 701, 119, 713, 708. For comment on the intensity of the proceedings, see D.W. Sutherland, *Quo Warranto Proceedings in the Reign of Edward I 1278-1294* (Oxford, 1963), 2.

[203] H.M. Jewell, *English Local Administration in the Middle Ages* (Newton Abbot, 1972), 167.

[204] On the latter, see G.O. Sayles, 'Parliamentary Representation in 1294, 1295 and 1307', *The English Parliament in the Middle Ages*, ed. H.G. Richardson and G.O. Sayles (London, 1981), 110.

[205] Cf. D.A. Carpenter, 'The Beginnings of Parliament', *The Reign of Henry III* (London, 1996), 393-4; D. Pasquet, *An Essay on the Origins of the House of Commons* (London, 1964), 197.

[206] G.L. Harriss, *King, Parliament, and Public Finance in Medieval England to 1369* (Oxford, 1975), 52.

[207] A. Harding, *England in the Thirteenth Century* (Cambridge, 1993), 180.

precedence whilst becoming interwoven'.[208] The requirements of war did not always sit easily alongside the more mundane business of local administration. Whilst it may be true that there were enough knights and squires within the country to keep the cogs of government turning when armies were put into the field, the military expeditions that took place almost annually from 1294 removed from the equation many of those most qualified for office.[209] In 1295, Osbert de Spaldington had to be replaced as the justice of gaol delivery in Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire because he was with the king's army in Wales.[210] Twelve years later, John de Hotham was too busy with Henry de Percy north of the border to fulfil his duties as a coroner in Yorkshire.[211] Evidently, one could not be a soldier and at the same time take part in local administration. Many, therefore, might have followed the example of John de Swyneford, who in 1306 surrendered his office as a coroner in Huntingdonshire and committed himself to the calling of arms.[212] The dual requirements of the king's wars and of provincial government created a tension that could not always be easily resolved.

In this respect, the experiences and career paths of the knights and sergeants who took part in the Falkirk campaign can tell us much about the way in which the gentry responded to these dual pressures. As soldiers they encompassed a broad range of military experience, from those who appear to have served in the king's armies only once or twice during their careers, to others who campaigned relentlessly over two or three decades. Still, these men were also members of a social order from which the leaders of local society were being recruited in ever-increasing numbers. One way of reconciling these conflicting roles was through specialisation. Philip Morgan, in his study of the military community of Cheshire, noted that 'many of its members found only a somewhat truncated role in county society as a consequence of their military careers'.[213] The evidence for the knights at Falkirk, for whom the record is more complete than the sergeants, to some extent supports this conclusion. If we discount the nineteen non-English knights who rode north of the border in 1298 we are left with 121 men in our sample, of whom fifty-two appear never to have served in any of the five major capacities of sheriff, knight of the shire, arrayer, keeper of the peace and tax

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[208] A. Ayton, 'Edward III and the English Aristocracy at the Beginning of the Hundred Years War', *Armies, Chivalry and Warfare in Medieval Britain and France* (Stamford, 1998), 175.
[209] Cf. Saul, *Knights and Esquires*, 57-9. The evidence from Lincolnshire suggests that the campaign of 1298 did not leave a major imprint on the affairs of local government, but the Welsh expedition of 1276-7 affected the hearing of pleas: *A Lincolnshire Assize Roll for 1298*, ed. W.S. Thomson, Lincoln Record Society, xxxvi (1944), xxxiv; *Select Cases in the Court of King's Bench*, i, no. 21.
[210] *CCW*, 55.
[211] *CCR, 1302-07*, 487.
[212] *CCR, 1302-07*, 389.
[213] Morgan, *War and Society*, 168.

assessor.[214] Some of these were the less active men of their day, preferring to manage their estates rather than trouble themselves with local or national affairs. Such, perhaps, was Ralph de Picheford, who appears in the military records on just two occasions in 1294 and 1298, but never in any other capacity; and William de Horkesley, who seems to have served only at Falkirk.[215] Yet some of these men, such as Edmund Foliot, who served in nine different hosts, Thomas de St. Loe, present on eight campaigns between 1296 and 1307, and Hugh Godard, were regular campaigners who would appear to have put their military responsibilities before all other commitments.[216]

Even if such a group of specialist soldiers did exist, one cannot draw a simple distinction between knights who served in royal hosts and others who were responsible for maintaining law and order in the localities. At least sixty-nine of the knights in our sample, or some 57 per cent when we exclude the foreigners, served in some form of administrative capacity during the course of their careers. Table 3.7 compares the different forms of public service given by these men up to 1335.

Table 3.7: Forms and Frequency of Service given by Falkirk Knights (1270-1335)

Frequency	Service given by the knights at Falkirk as:					
	Soldier	MP	Sheriff	Arrayer	KP	Taxer
1 (occasion)	3	18	8	16	13	9
2	6	7	4	5	7	6
3	5	8	1	3	3	3
4	5	2	-	2	2	1
5	9	3	-	2	2	-
6	8	1	-	1	2	-
7	9	3	-	1	1	-
8	10	-	-	-	-	-
9	7	-	-	-	-	-
10 or more	7	-	-	-	-	-
Total	69	42	13	30	30	19

[214] I acknowledge the kindness of Dr. Richard Gorski of the University of Hull for allowing me to consult his database on administrative personnel from which this, and much of the following evidence, has been extracted.

[215] Picheford: Wales in 1294 (C 67/10, m. 5); Scotland in 1298 (*Gough*, 192). Horkesley; *Gough*, 203.

[216] Foliot: 1282 (C 67/8, m. 7d); 1296 (C 67/11, m. 4); 1298 (*Gough*, 211); 1300 (C 67/14, m. 9); 1301 (C 67/14, m. 1); 1302 (E 101/10/12, m. 3); 1303 (C 67/15, m. 10); 1306 (E 101/612/19, m. 1); 1307 (E 101/612/21, m. 1). St Loe: Flanders in 1297 (E 101/6/28, m. 3i); Scotland in 1296 (E 101/5/23, m. 1i); 1298 (*Gough*, 224); 1300 (*Liber Quotidianus*, 196); 1301 (E 101/9/24, m. 1); 1303 (E 101/612/11, m. 2); 1306 (C 67/16, m. 11); 1309 (*CDS*, v, 448). Godard: Scotland in 1298 (*Gough*, 224); 1301 (E 101/9/23, m. 2); 1303 (C 67/15, m. 11); 1306 (C 67/16, m. 8); 1310 (C 71/4, m. 13); 1314 (C 71/7, m. 9).

Given that the activities of over half of the knights at Falkirk extended beyond the purely military sphere, it cannot be said without some qualification that these men were professional soldiers. At the same time, it would be equally misleading to draw too sharp a distinction between military and civilian duties, for it was precisely their experience of war that qualified many of these men for office. An acquaintance with arms was certainly advantageous for those appointed as commissioners of array and keepers of the peace, for both posts required the use of strong-arm tactics to discipline troops and restore order.[217] Furthermore, the election of experienced soldiers as knights of the shire to some extent mirrored the prevailing practice among the peerage, who were summoned both to military assemblies and to parliament.[218] The one post for which a strong campaigning record was perhaps less necessary was that of sheriff, whose military duties, it has been argued, had become 'purely auxiliary' by the late thirteenth century.[219] Nevertheless, as both Nigel Saul and Richard Gorski have demonstrated, many of the sheriffs appointed during the fourteenth century did have military experience.[220] Looked at from another angle, the evidence suggests that a few of the knights at Falkirk seem to have served in administrative capacities far more frequently than they did as soldiers. For men such as these, the campaign of 1298 probably came as an unwanted distraction from their normal activities. One such knight was William Trumwyn who in 1298 went to war, in the retinue of James de la Plaunche, for what appears to have been the only time in his career. He was knight of the shire for Staffordshire on four occasions, keeper of the peace the same number of times, tax assessor thrice and commissioner of array two times.[221] Likewise, Robert Barry served in the royal host on only three occasions: 1298, 1300 and 1301. He was knight of the shire for Buckinghamshire three times and for Northamptonshire twice, in addition to receiving several other commissions.[222] Such overt commitment to administrative rather than to military service was rare among the Falkirk knights. Nevertheless, these examples indicate that men who normally served as officials in local government did

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[217] Cf. A. Verduyn, 'The Selection and Appointment of Justices of the Peace in 1338', *BIHR*, lxviii (1995), 7; Gorski, *Fourteenth-Century Sheriff*, 145-6.

[218] P.W. Smith, 'A Study of the Lists of Military and Parliamentary Summons in the Reign of Edward I: The Families of Lists and their Significance', University of Iowa D.Phil. thesis, 1967, 2 parts, ii, 544-5.

[219] W.A. Morris, *The Medieval English Sheriff to 1300* (Manchester, 1927), 237. Cf. B. Breslow, 'The English Sheriff during the Reign of King Edward I', University of Ohio D.Phil. thesis, 1968, 136; H.M. Cam, *The Hundred and the Hundred Rolls: An Outline of Local Government in Medieval England* (London, 1930), 85-7.

[220] Saul, *Knights and Esquires*, 55-6; Gorski, *Fourteenth-Century Sheriff*, 144.

[221] *Gough*, 199; *List of MPs*, 15, 18, 49 and 51; *CPR, 1307-13*, 31, 53, *CPR, 1313-17*, 107, 123; *CPR, 1307-13*, 23, *CPR, 1313-17*, 474, 530; *Rotuli Scotiae*, i, 97; *CPR, 1313-17*, 461.

[222] *Gough*, 220, C 47/1/6, m. 3, E 101/9/23, m. 1; *List of MPs*, 5, 25, 35, 42, 53; *CPR, 1281-92*, 265; *CPR, 1292-1301*, 104, *CPR, 1307-13*, 185, *CFR*, iii, 31.

occasionally go to war, just as career soldiers were perfectly adept at carrying out other duties.

One of the most striking features to emerge from the figures presented in table 3.7, despite the presence of leading players in local government like Trumwyn and Barry, is the preponderance of military service over other forms of public service given by the knights at Falkirk. To some extent this is to be expected given that the sample group has been taken from a military source. Nevertheless, the sheer frequency with which these men took part in royal expeditions in comparison with others forms of public service indicates that most knights spent far more time at war than they did attending parliament, or keeping the peace in the shires. Whilst war did not exercise a monopoly over their activities, it did take up enough of their time to prevent them, at least for a large part of their careers, from taking part in local government on anything more than an intermittent basis. As Nigel Saul noted in his study of fourteenth-century Gloucestershire, 'the *strenui milites*...cannot be identified exclusively with the men who shouldered the burden of local administration'.[223] Of the sixty-nine knights at Falkirk employed in administrative capacities at some point in their lives, around a quarter performed the role of the soldier on at least five occasions more than they did that of county administrator or MP. Characteristic of this group were men like Nicholas de St. Maur, a follower of Thomas of Lancaster who rode in eight different hosts between 1294 and 1306 but whose sole contribution to peacetime affairs was as knight of the shire for Gloucestershire in 1313;[224] and Robert Fitz Nigel, a frequent campaigner whose involvement in local government was limited to one spell each as an arrayer and peace commissioner in Buckinghamshire in the 1320s.[225] That archetypal career soldier John de Crumwell was present at the battle of Halidon Hill some forty years after making his military debut in Wales. During his long career, his work in the shires amounted to no more than three appointments to commissions of array.[226] Such examples could be multiplied, and support Andrew Ayton's point that 'of the forms of

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[223] Saul, *Knights and Esquires*, 55.

[224] Military service: 1294 (C 67/10, m. 3); 1295 (*RG*, iii, 296); 1297 (E 101/6/19, m. 1); 1298 (*Gough*, 179); 1300 (C 67/14, m. 9); 1301 (C 67/14, m. 7d); 1303 (C 67/15, m. 12); 1306 (C 67/7, m. 3). For his appointment as knight of the shire, see *List of MPs*, 37.

[225] For his military service, see chapter 4, n. 156 and n. 212, plus 1294 (*RG*, iii, 161); 1297 (*RG*, iii, 346); 1298 (*Gough*, 221). For his other duties, see *CPR, 1324-27*, 221; *CPR, 1327-30*, 89.

[226] For his military career up to 1314, see above n. 129. He went on to serve in 1319 (E 101/378/4, f. 21r); 1322 (*CPR, 1321-24*, 185); 1327 (C 71/11, m. 6); 1333 (C 71/13, m. 31). For his work as an arrayer, see *Rotuli Scotiae*, i, 159; *CPR, 1321-24*, 212, 265.

public service open to men of gentle blood, that which was performed by the largest number, if only occasionally, was campaigning in the king's armies'.[227]

For most of the knights at Falkirk, participation in expeditions to Wales, France and Scotland provided a far more regular focus for activity than work in the shires. Nevertheless, even the most frequent campaigners tended to give other forms of service in addition to their military duties. Some idea as to the way that they were able to combine such activities can be obtained by considering the decades in which these knights began different forms of public service.

Table 3.8: Decades in which Falkirk Knights began Different Forms of Service

	Soldier	MP	Sheriff	Arrayer	KP	Taxer
1270-79	5	-	-	-	-	-
1280-89	9	-	-	1	3	-
1290-99	55	6	1	1	-	4
1300-09	-	17	5	4	9	6
1310-19	-	17	3	12	6	7
1320-29	-	1	3	10	8	-
1330-39	-	1	1	2	4	2

The evidence presented here shows that few of the Falkirk knights had served in an administrative capacity prior to riding north of the border in 1298. Most, in fact, did not commence their activities as knights of the shire and in local government until the closing years of the reign of Edward I or later. To some extent this can be explained by the problems of documentary survival for the final years of the reign of Henry III and the first half of that of his son, for whilst representatives from the shires participated in a number of parliaments during the 1260s, 1270s and 1280s, the returns of the names of the knights present at those assemblies have been lost.[228] In like manner, the lack of service given by the knights as keepers of the peace before 1298 is due in large measure to the fact that those officials were not appointed on a regular basis until the reign of Edward II.[229] Whilst these caveats have to be borne in mind, the lack of evidence for the administrative service of the Falkirk knights before the opening decades of the fourteenth century is primarily a consequence of a deliberate division of labour between

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[227] Ayton, 'Edward III and the English Aristocracy', 202.

[228] See J.R. Maddicott, 'Edward I and the Lessons of Baronial Reform: Local Government, 1258-80', *Thirteenth Century England I*, ed. P.R. Coss and S.D. Lloyd (Woodbridge, 1986), 16-17; idem, 'The Crusade Taxation of 1268-1270 and the Development of Parliament', *Thirteenth Century England II*, ed. P.R. Coss and S.D. Lloyd (Woodbridge, 1988), 113.

[229] B.H. Putnam, 'The Transformation of the Keepers of the Peace into the Justices of the Peace, 1327-1380', *TRHS*, 4th ser., xii (1929), 23.

the earlier and later parts of their careers. In her study of the men appointed to office in Yorkshire between the mid-thirteenth and mid-fourteenth centuries, Helen Jewell noted that 'men became most active in administration around the age of forty'.[230] A similar trend has been discerned by J.S. Illsley in his study of the knights of the shire returned from Essex under Edward I.[231] Not all individuals conformed to this pattern, and there were certainly many veteran soldiers and young administrators at work within Edwardian England.[232] Still, the careers of the Falkirk knights add weight to the theory that regular campaigners did not usually turn their hands to shire administration until later in life. John de Scures gave military service on six occasions between 1298 and 1314 and was first returned as a knight of the shire during a year of relative peace in 1309. He then went on to serve as a representative for Hampshire in 1314 and 1322, sheriff for that county in 1321, arrayer on seven occasions during the 1320s and 1330s, and peace commissioner three times during the same decades.[233] Stephen de Haccombe fought six times between 1294 and 1306 before being returned as knight of the shire for Devon twice, keeper of the peace once and commissioner of array five times over the following twenty years.[234] Meanwhile, Thomas de Coudray campaigned regularly from the mid-1290s to Bannockburn before beginning an equally intensive administrative career in the southern counties in 1318.[235] For individuals such as these, the most active men of their day, a division of duties according to different stages in the life cycle was the most appropriate way of reconciling the pressures of military service with the need to participate fully in the affairs of the shire.

Although it is possible to create a more complete picture of the careers of the knights who took part in the Falkirk campaign than it is for their sub-knightly comrades in arms, it would be a mistake to presume that local administration under Edward I and Edward II was monopolised by men who held that rank. On the contrary, the expansion

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[230] H.M. Jewell, 'Local Administration and Administrators in Yorkshire, 1258-1348', *Northern History*, xvi (1980), 12-13.

[231] J.S. Illsley, 'Parliamentary Elections in the Reign of Edward I', *BIHR*, xlix (1976), 37. Also, see Juřica, 'Knights of Edward I', 223.

[232] Gorski, *Fourteenth-Century Sheriff*, 142-3.

[233] For his military service, see above, n. 122. Also, see *List of MPs*, 29, 45, I6; *List of Sheriffs for England and Wales, From the Earliest Times to A.D. 1831*, PRO Lists and Indexes, ix (London, 1893), 54; *CPR, 1321-24*, 96, 213, 267, *CPR, 1324-27*, 220, *Rotuli Scotiae*, i, 249, 370, *Foedera*, II, ii, 1071; *CPR, 1324-27*, 228, 285, *CPR, 1330-34*, 293.

[234] He campaigned in Wales in 1294 (C 67/10, m. 7) and in Scotland in 1296 (E 101/5/23, m. 1i), 1298 (*Gough*, 208), 1300 (C 67/14, m. 9), 1303 (C 67/15, m. 8) and 1306 (C 67/16, m. 9). Also, see *List of MPs*, 30, 33; *CPR, 1317-21*, 459; *CPR 1321-24*, 213, 267, 274, *CPR, 1324-27*, 8, 218.

[235] For his military service, see chapter 1 n. 133. Also *List of MPs*, 54, 67; *CPR, 1327-30*, 429, *CPR, 1330-34*, 295, *CPR, 1334-38*, 210, 357, 368; *CPR, 1324-27*, 8, *CPR, 1327-30*, 571, *Rotuli Scotiae*, i, 249, *CPR, 1334-38*, 138, *Rotuli Scotiae*, i, 329, 370. His only administrative work before 1314 was as a commissioner of array for Hampshire in 1311; *Rotuli Scotiae*, i, 97.

of government and the proliferation of commissions meant that increasing numbers of squires were being called upon to participate in shire administration. Consequently, it is not surprising to find that some of those who fought as sergeants on the Falkirk campaign also made notable contributions to other spheres of public life. A significant portion of these men, as one would expect, were the more prominent sergeants who went on to become knights later in their careers. John de Haustede was in the company of his father, Robert, in the household division in 1298. During the course of his career he benefited extensively from Crown patronage, progressing from a yeoman in the household of Prince Edward during the opening years of the fourteenth century to the ranks of the parliamentary peerage in the 1330s.[236] Following a long military career, which began in Flanders in 1297 and appears to have ended with the war of St. Sardos in the 1320s, he was appointed as a justice of the peace for Buckinghamshire in 1332 and returned as a knight of the shire for the same county three years later.[237] His service, like that of many of the other knights-in-waiting at Falkirk, closely mirrored that of the knights already discussed. Reginald de Paveley, a sergeant with Robert Fitz Payn in 1298, went on to serve in Scotland in 1300, 1301, 1306 and on the Bannockburn campaign before receiving his first commission as a keeper of the peace for Wiltshire in 1320.[238] John de Twyford, with Ralph Pipard at Falkirk, was first returned to parliament in 1315, five years after appearing in the military records for the final time.[239] Each of these men had already attained the rank of knight when they embarked upon service in local government.

'Lesser' or 'permanent' sergeants also made an important contribution to public life, even though they did not occupy the leading offices of sheriff and knight of the shire as frequently as their sons and grandsons were to do later in the fourteenth century. Of the sergeants at Falkirk who never became knights, only a few appear to have served in either of those capacities during the course of their careers. Adam de Skelton, a sergeant under Thomas of Lancaster in 1298, who still held that rank when he accompanied Andrew de Harcla on the Scottish March eighteen years later, was

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[236] J.S. Bothwell, *Edward III and the English Peerage: Royal Patronage, Social Mobility and Political Control in Fourteenth-Century England* (Woodbridge, 2004), 17.

[237] He served in Flanders in 1297 (E 101/6/37, m. 2ii), Scotland in 1298 (*Gough*, 170), 1300 (E 101/8/23, m. 1). 1301 (E 101/9/23, m. 1), 1303 (E 101/612/11, m. 3d), 1306 (E 101/13/7, m. 2), 1319 (E 101/378/4, f. 26v), 1322 (*CPR, 1321-24*, 188), and Gascony in 1324-5 (BL, Add. MS 7967, f. 33v). For his administrative service, see *CPR, 1330-34*, 293; *List of MPs*, 90.

[238] 1298 (*Gough*, 171); 1300 (*PDS*, 229); 1301 (E 101/9/24, m. 1d); 1306 (C 67/16, m. 10); 1314 (C 71/6, m. 5). For his other work, see *CPR, 1317-21*, 462, *CPR, 1327-30*, 429, *CPR, 1330-34*, 137, 286; *List of MPs*, 77; *CPR, 1321-24*, 124, 268, *CPR, 1324-27*, 8, 221; *List of Sheriffs*, 152.

[239] He served in Scotland in 1298 (*Gough*, 220); 1306 (C 67/16, m. 11); 1310 (*PW* II, ii, 406). Also, see *List of MPs*, 46, 52, 55; *CPR, 1330-34*, 137, 295, 401, 445.

possibly the man of that name returned as knight of the shire for Cumberland in 1318.[240] Richard de Cleobury was also elected to parliament without ever appearing to have obtained the rank of knight. He was a sergeant with Nicholas de Audley in 1298 prior to representing Worcestershire eighteen years later.[241] Inevitably, the activities of such men are more difficult to trace than those of their more established comrades. For example, it is impossible to know whether the John de Stafford who served the earl of Lancaster in 1298 was the same individual as the man of that name returned as a man-at-arms from Staffordshire in 1324, and who was a knight of the shire for that county in 1339.[242] On the whole, we are probably right to err on the side of caution. It is far more common to find the sergeants at Falkirk occupying the lesser positions of arrayer, tax assessor and keeper of the peace than among the names of those returned to parliament or appointed as sheriffs. Commissioners of array in Yorkshire were drawn from both the 'knightly class' and 'the squirearchy immediately below it'.[243] Evidence relating to the Falkirk sergeants indicates that the 'squirearchy' had a similar role to play in other counties. William Hathewy, a valet of the Marcher lord John Tregoz, can be found levying troops in Gloucestershire in 1311;[244] Robert de Whiterugg was appointed in that capacity in Cumberland in 1307;[245] and William de Colebroke, with Ralph de Manton at Falkirk, was an arrayer for Middlesex in 1311.[246] Whilst such men appear to have contributed relatively little as individuals to the running of the shires, collectively their services were vital at a time when the demands placed on the gentry were increasing by the year.

As with their military service, so with their administrative service, there is perhaps a tendency to underestimate the contribution made by men of sub-knightly rank to the Edwardian polity. Whilst in the military sphere this is due primarily to the way that many of the records are biased in their coverage towards the landholding elite, elsewhere the problem is related to the kind of office in which most squires tended to serve. If A.J. Musson is right that most sub-keepers of the peace in the hundreds 'were perhaps minor gentry and included some who were substantial peasants', then it may be that many of the Falkirk sergeants carried out activities of this kind that are sometimes

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[240] Military service: 1295 (*RG*, iii, 298); 1298 (*Gough*, 180); 1300 (C 67/14, m. 10); 1303 (C 67/15, m. 8); 1306 (C 67/16, m. 10); 1311 (E 101/14/15, m. 3); 1314 (E 101/14/15, m. 2). Also, see *List of MPs*, 52.
[241] He fought in 1298 (*Gough*, 220); 1301 (E 101/9/23, m. 3); 1303 (E 101/612/11, m. 3d); 1306 (C 67/16, m. 11); 1314 (C 71/6, m. 5). Also, see *List of MPs*, 49.
[242] *Gough*, 181; *PW*, II, ii, 647; *List of MPs*, 107.
[243] Jewell, 'Local Administration and Administrators in Yorkshire', 14.
[244] *Rotuli Scotiae*, i, 100.
[245] *CPR, 1301-07*, 498.
[246] *Rotuli Scotiae*, i, 98.

difficult to trace in the records.[247] Other sergeants might have been employed as coroners who assisted the sheriffs in much of their work in the provinces.[248] However, given that almost half of the knights in our sample appear to have given no major administrative service at all, and that the majority of those who did served far more regularly as soldiers than in any other capacity, it might simply be that most of the sergeants who campaigned in Scotland in 1298 had also chosen to follow the military calling and therefore had little opportunity to carry out other duties. The incompleteness of both the military records and the administrative records unfortunately prevents the kind of meaningful comparisons that were made for the knights. Yet it seems likely that the *valletti* who fought at Falkirk, like the knights who served alongside them, spent far more time at war than they did at work in the shires. For both ranks of men, military service in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries constituted far more than an occasional break from the daily routine of shire administration. On the contrary, between 1294 and 1314 the demands of war were almost incessant: for the first time in several generations a career in arms had become a viable alternative to the mundane business of estate management. Many of the men who took part in the Scottish campaign of 1298 evidently saw some wisdom in pursuing the life of the soldier. In doing so, they helped to forge a military tradition that was to serve the kings of England well in the years to come.

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[247] A.J. Musson, 'Sub-Keepers and Constables: The Role of Local Officials in Keeping the Peace in Fourteenth-Century England', *EHR*, cxvii (2002), 20.
[248] Cf. R.F. Hunnisett, *The Medieval Coroner* (Cambridge, 1961), 173.

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Recruitment Networks

A cautionary note must always be struck when attempting to apply abstract concepts and phrases to complex historical phenomena. Nevertheless, it does not seem inappropriate, if we understand the term to mean a large society of frequent campaigners who were connected to one another through an extensive web of personal relationships, to suggest that there was a military community in late thirteenth and early fourteenth-century England. To comprehend the dynamics of that community, given its scale and the variety in rank and social status of its members, is probably beyond the capacity of any historian working independently. Still, the evidence of the previous chapter demonstrates that there are sufficient data available to reach some conclusions about the military service patterns, length of careers, and frequency of employment of a large number of men-at-arms who went to war under Edward I and his son, particularly those of knightly rank. To gain a greater appreciation of the social bonds and personal networks that brought such men into the Crown's service, and to understand why so many individuals were willing to risk life and limb on an almost annual basis throughout the years of heaviest campaigning from 1294 to 1314, it is necessary to consider in greater detail the relationships between the military leaders and those who followed them to war. By the reign of Edward I this still meant the personal connections and mutual obligations of lords and their men. With the aid of the records for military service it is possible to analyse such bonds across a wider spectrum than for any previous reign, but first we must consider the main characteristics of the lordship nexus as it had evolved by the late thirteenth century.

THE LORDSHIP NEXUS

Few forms of social relationship were as pervasive and adaptable within medieval England as that between lords and their men. Scratch their surface and the *comitivae* of the earls and barons who went to war under Edward I do not appear so very different from the warbands which were so prominent a feature of the military landscape in Anglo-Saxon England, or the retinues which accompanied the duke of Normandy and his followers on their fateful expedition in 1066. Indeed 'lordship and hierarchy were

present in Germanic society from the very beginning of the Middle Ages'.[1] Furthermore, this type of connection transcended emerging national frontiers and formed the common currency of the chivalric culture of medieval Christendom. Not only Germanic societies but also lands on the Celtic fringe were dominated by the political rivalries and internecine strife engendered by the potentially stabilising, but all-too-often destabilising influence of powerful lords and their bellicose followers.[2] Binding the lord and his men together during times of war was the military retinue, aptly described by Robert Bartlett as 'one of the basic social organisms of medieval Europe'.[3] Even in less threatening circumstances, 'horizontal relations among the gentry…would always be supplemented by vertical ties to the local nobleman where possible'.[4] The nature of the relationship between lord and man and, in particular, the honour due from soldiers to their lords in war and peace, occupied the thoughts of a number of influential writers during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, including Ramón Lull and Geoffrey de Charny.[5] One can also trace in the annals of the reigns of Edward I and his son the conspicuous presence, albeit variably expressed, of lords and their retainers. We read how in 1296 the earl of Lincoln departed for Gascony with 'son menage';[6] elsewhere, John de Trokelowe used the word *commilitones* to describe the earl of Gloucester's followers at Bannockburn.[7] The annalist of St. Paul's noted how the magnates who followed Edward II to Scotland in 1319 were accompanied by their *sectae*, or suites,[8] and three years later the king is said to have evaded the Scots at Blackmoor Forest *cum suis secretioribus*.[9] Despite the variety of terms used, the regularity with which passages about lords and their followers occur in the chronicles tells us a great deal about the social significance of such bonds.

Be that as it may, it is necessary to distinguish between the part of a lord's following which was retained on a permanent basis and his wider society of 'hangers-

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[1] R.P. Abels, *Lordship and Military Obligation in Anglo-Saxon England* (London, 1988), 22.
[2] Suppe, *Military Institutions on the Welsh Marches*, 11; S. Davies, *Welsh Military Institutions, 633-1283*, (Cardiff, 2004), chapter 1; *The Annals of Loch Cé*, ed. W.M. Hennessy, 2 vols, Rolls Ser., liv (London, 1871), i, 491, 521.
[3] R. Bartlett, *The Making of Europe: Conquest, Colonization and Cultural Change 950-1350* (London, 1993), 45.
[4] C. Carpenter, 'Who Ruled the Midlands in the Later Middle Ages?', *Midland History*, xix (1994), 7.
[5] *The Book of the Ordre of Chyvalry,* translated and printed by W. Caxton from a French version of Ramón Lull's "Le Libre del Orde de Cavayleria", ed. A.T.P. Byles, Early English Text Society, clxviii (London, 1926), 29-33; *The* Book of Chivalry *of Geoffroi de Charny: Text, Context, and Translation*, ed. R.W. Kaueper and E. Kennedy (Philadelphia, 1996), 106-9.
[6] *Langtoft*, 299.
[7] *Trokelowe*, 85.
[8] *Ann. Paulini*, 286.
[9] *Adami Murimuthensis Chronica sui Temporis, nunc primum per Decem Annos aucta (M.CCC.III-M.CCC.XLVI) cum eorundem Continuatione (A.D. M.CCC.LXXX.) a quodam Anonymo*, ed. T. Hog, English Historical Society (London, 1846), 38.

on'. When Henry III's baronial opponents put their case before Louis IX of France in 1264, one of their complaints was that Roger de Mortimer had disturbed the peace by allowing his men and members of his household (*homines...et familiares ipsius Rogeri*) to attack one of the earl of Leicester's castles and its constable.[10] The distinction between Mortimer's 'men' and the members of his *familia* was a common one, reflecting contemporary perceptions about the dual nature of magnate affinities.[11] In 1312, the constable of Dublin castle, John le Ussher, was accused of appropriating the money given to him for the purpose of retaining twelve additional soldiers and of using it to pay the members of his own household.[12] Despite considerable overlap between the two, the *familia* and the larger expanded group of men-at-arms did not, therefore, amount to the same thing. Nigel Saul has inferred from this that by the fourteenth century it was perhaps the looser, less stable element of magnate retinues that performed the most important military role: by then, 'magnates kept their corps of household knights and esquires with a view to peacetime, not wartime, conditions'.[13] Far from being of diminished military importance under Edward I and Edward II, however, household knights and sergeants seem to have formed the core of most magnate retinues that were organised for war, and to have continued to do so for some time afterwards.[14] Less easy to dismiss is the concept of 'bastard feudalism' which emerged from this perceived cleavage between the traditional core of household retainers and tenants on the one hand, and a wider circle of associates on the other.[15] Whilst any discussion of military lordship in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries must take 'bastard feudalism' and all its connotations into account, there is no consensus as to the extent to which retaining practices under Edward I and Edward II differed from those of previous reigns. G.A. Holmes long ago described 'bastard feudalism' as 'a misnomer'.[16] More recent critics of the concept have included J.M.W. Bean and David Crouch, both of whom have stressed continuity over change in lordship practices.[17] Whilst the debate will continue to rage, it is reassuring to note that lordship, and military lordship in particular, retained many of its older features.

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[10] *Documents of the Baronial Movement of Reform and Rebellion 1258-1267*, selected by R.F. Treharne and edited by I.J. Sanders (Oxford, 1973), 266.
[11] E.g. *CCR, 1272-79*, 315; M. Hicks, *Bastard Feudalism* (London, 1995), 68.
[12] *Historical and Municipal Documents of Ireland AD 1172-1320*, ed. J.T. Gilbert, Rolls Ser., liii (London, 1870), 304-8.
[13] Saul, *Knights and Esquires*, 84.
[14] Cf. Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, 9.
[15] The seminal study remains K.B. McFarlane, 'Bastard Feudalism', *BIHR*, xx (1943-5), 161-80.
[16] G.A. Holmes, *The Estates of the Higher Nobility in Fourteenth-Century England* (Cambridge, 1957), 83.
[17] J.M.W. Bean, *From Lord to Patron: Lordship in Late Medieval England* (Manchester, 1989), 234; D. Crouch, 'Debate: Bastard Feudalism Revised', *Past and Present*, cxxxi (1991), 176.

The household was the single most consistent element of magnate retinues throughout the Middle Ages; its important place within medieval society has long been recognised.[18] Much of this chapter will be dealing with the military role performed by the households of the lords of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, but it is important to recognise that the *familia* was much more than a collection of men organised for war.[19] The aristocratic household was a social and political organism which provided for the every need of its lords: its value as a source of patronage and political control is attested by the many attempts that were made to interfere in the organisation of the kings' households by their enemies during times of political turmoil, most notably in 1258 and 1311.[20] Viewed in its widest sense, a lord's household would consist of 'a body of knights, esquires and men-at-arms involved in the fulfilment of his quota of military service, the nucleus of officials who carried out the administration of his estates, and other officials who handled the routines of everyday life'.[21] In essence the magnate retinue, in its widest sense as an affinity of well-wishers but particularly in its core household organisation, provided a form of cement which held together the different strata of medieval society under powerful leaders. The binding nature of the *familia* is well illustrated by the attempts made to bring men to justice following the Barons' Wars by identifying which households they had belonged to at the time of the troubles.[22] Retainers were judged by the political principles of their lords and held to be equally culpable for their wrongdoings. In the law book *Fleta*, an attempt was made to distinguish between felonies committed by men on the orders of their superiors and crimes carried out according to their own whims.[23] Membership of a magnate household or retinue therefore constituted a substantial personal commitment that was not to be entered into lightly, particularly during times of political turmoil.

One feature of lordship that was of particular importance for the pursuit of war was the practice of retaining large numbers of men, often on a short-term basis, through the granting of fees and robes. 'Livery – the issue of cloth, or clothing, to members of

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[18] Cf. C.M. Woolgar, *The Great Household in Late Medieval England* (London, 1999).
[19] For examples of household lists and accounts, see: *A Roll of the Household Expenses of Richard de Swinfield, bishop of Hereford, during part of the years 1289 and 1290*, ed. J. Webb, 2 vols, Camden Society 1st ser., lix, lxii (1854-5), i, 194-7; *Household Accounts from Medieval England*, ed. C.M. Woolgar, 2 parts, Records of Social and Economic History, new ser., xvii-xviii (Oxford, 1992-3), ii, no. 25.
[20] *Documents of the Baronial Movement*, 111; *Sources of English Constitutional History: A Selection of Documents from A.D. 600 to the Interregnum*, ed. C. Stephenson and F.G. Marcham, 2 vols (London, 1972), i, 195.
[21] M.W. Labarge, *A Baronial Household of the Thirteenth Century* (London, 1965), 53.
[22] E.g. *Calendar of Inquisitions Miscellaneous (Chancery)*, 8 vols (London, 1916-2003), i, no. 936.
[23] *Fleta*, ed. H.G. Richardson and G.O. Sayles, 3 vols, Selden Society, lxxii, lxxxix, xcix (1953-83), iii, 55.

the household – was a practice at least as old as the middle of the twelfth century',[24] but it would appear that the granting of livery to members of the wider affinity was a slightly more recent development. The larger the body of men that one could put into the field bearing one's designs on their clothing, the greater one's prestige was likely to be amongst one's fellow soldiers. In this sense, livery offered a more flexible symbol of association than retaining by fee or annuity: it enabled a lord to extend his circle of followers with relative ease.[25] There is evidence that the granting of robes was being used for subversive purposes long before the end of the thirteenth century.[26] Despite this, livery had great practical value and was particularly useful as a reflection of seigneurial power on campaign. When Richard of Cornwall set out on crusade in 1250, he was attended by a large retinue consisting of forty knights, all of whom wore the same splendid new garments.[27] Likewise, the earls who witnessed the coronation of Edward I were reputedly joined by a hundred knights each, adorned in their arms.[28] Sporting of a common uniform was therefore an important visual expression of the bond between a lord and his men: it might even have been a means of distinguishing between the followers of different retinue leaders on military ventures. Livery could also indicate one's allegiance to a political cause, as in 1321 when the king's enemies were all attired in the same way.[29] Consequently, the clothes one wore might say a great deal not only about one's place within the military community, but also about one's stance on some of the most pressing issues of the day.

Whilst the granting of livery was a common phenomenon by the late thirteenth century and was practiced by many men of different rank and status, relatively few lords had sufficiently large households and retinues to play a major leadership role on military campaigns. John de Hastings led 160 men-at-arms to the siege of Caerlaverock on behalf of the bishop of Durham.[30] However, the household accounts of prominent lords suggest that the full-time companies of knights and sergeants permanently attendant on them were much smaller than this. A list of the members of Edward of Caernarfon's *familia* in 1301, the year that he led an army in western Scotland, shows that it contained three bannerets, six knights and fifty-eight *valletti et servientes*. Such a large household appears to have been exceptional, understandably so for the future

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[24] Woolgar, *The Great Household*, 9.
[25] Bean, *From Lord to Patron*, 21-2.
[26] N. Saul, 'The Commons and the Abolition of Badges', *Parliamentary History*, ix (1990), 306.
[27] *Chronica Majora*, v, 97.
[28] *The Brut, or the Chronicles of England*, ed. F.W.D. Brie, 2 vols, Early English Text Society, cxxxi, cxxxvi (London, 1906-8), i, 179.
[29] *Scalacronica*, 85; *Trokelowe*, 109.
[30] *Siege of Caerlaverock*, 23.

king.[31] Surviving lists are less readily available for ordinary members of the aristocracy. Nevertheless, additional passing references allow one to supplement such accounts with other material. John de Vescy was reported to have had at least seventeen knights in his *familia* in 1280 when the said men were accused of a collective trespass.[32] Twenty years later, the earl of Lincoln took eight household knights with him on his journey to the papal court.[33] Households of the size and strength discussed here were capable of providing magnates with a significant portion of their war retinues, yet they were seldom sufficient on their own. For this reason, the permanent corps of soldiers was usually supplemented by additional men drafted in for the duration of a campaign.

At their full extent, war retinues might contain men who were only loosely associated with their lord, or who had joined the *comitiva* as members of sub-units under his bachelors and bannerets. Yet, at the heart of the retinue, it was still common for the leader to be accompanied by his kinsmen and close friends; a phenomenon that dated back many centuries. In his study of Cheshire, Philip Morgan noted how 'the extended kinship group, expanded within the locality, shaped the character of many of the retinues in the county during the later medieval period'.[34] John de Eyville's company in Wales during the first Welsh war included Gocelyn and Thomas de Eyville, amongst others.[35] Similarly, three members of the Zouche family, Philip, Aymer and William, accompanied Alan la Zouche to Scotland in 1306.[36] It has been noted that 'family and neighbourhood connections were probably as important' to the formation of magnate retinues 'as formal contracts',[37] and contemporary chronicles abound with evidence of family members fighting alongside one another.[38] Of the four Neville brothers active in Scotland under Edward II, one was killed and the other three were taken prisoner for ransoms.[39] According to Langtoft, John de Segrave's brother and son were captured alongside him on an expedition into Scotland in 1303.[40] Such incidents

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[31] E 101/360/17. Also, see E 101/370/29; H. Johnstone, *Edward of Carnarvon, 1284-1307* (Manchester, 1946), 74-6.
[32] *CCR, 1279-88*, 19.
[33] *CCR, 1296-1302*, 370. Cf. M. Cherry, 'The Courtenay Earls of Devon: The Formation and Disintegration of a Late Medieval Aristocratic Affinity', *Southern History*, i (1979), 72-3, and G.G. Simpson, 'The *Familia* of Roger de Quincy, Earl of Winchester and Constable of Scotland', *Essays on the Nobility of Medieval Scotland*, ed. K.J. Stringer (Edinburgh, 1985), 121, for household numbers in later and earlier periods.
[34] Morgan, *War and Society*, 13.
[35] C 47/2/7, m. 8; C 67/8, m. 5.
[36] C 67/16, m. 8.
[37] Prestwich, *Plantagenet England*, 382. The importance of kinship ties to lordly retinues can be traced back to the early Middle Ages; S.S. Evans, *The Lords of Battle: Image and Reality of the* Comitatus *in Dark-Age Britain* (Woodbridge, 1997), 34.
[38] E.g. *Ann. Wigorn.*, 484-5.
[39] *Northern Petitions*, no. 132.
[40] *Langtoft*, 410.

show that the fortunes of military retainers, whether they were kinsmen of their lords or not, frequently followed those of their leaders. Despite the protection that the lord could confer in the form of office or land grants, support often ended with the death of the patron. Gaveston's followers are said to have borne the news of his execution in 1312 with great sorrow: not surprisingly given the generous donations that he had made in his lifetime.[41] Worse still, membership of a retinue could have catastrophic consequences during times of war. When Brian Jay, Master of the Order of the Templars in England, was killed at Falkirk in 1298, five or six of his squires are reported to have died alongside him.[42] In a similar incident, William de Muntchensy of Edwardstone's household followers were crushed by the walls that killed their lord in Wales in 1287.[43] Such evidence gives some idea of the close proximity with which knights and sergeants stood in relation to their lords when engaged in military activity. It is also interesting to note the harshness with which the followers of the Contrariants were treated by Edward II. The wives, sons and *familiares* of those who had opposed the king were stripped of their lands and goods,[44] and the earl of Lancaster's men pursued through judicial inquests.[45] This mirrors the eagerness with which rebels were tracked down after Evesham, and shows that the receipt of fees could be something of a poisoned chalice.

From what has been said, it is clear that there was both a positive and a negative aspect to retaining during the reigns of Edward I and Edward II. Used appropriately, the *familia* and the wider affinity could provide the lord with important support in war and contribute to the stability of the realm. All too often, though, the converse was true, and such bonds were exploited for personal gain and illegal activities. The 'Song Against the Retinues of the Great People', written during the later years of the reign of Edward I, reveals a contemporary mistrust of the large gatherings of associates who accompanied lords on their travels.[46] There is plentiful evidence to suggest that such fears were justified. Writs against confederations and the maintenance of friends in lawsuits were issued by Edward I in 1279, 1288 and 1289: these were sorely needed given the growing tendency for great men to misuse their powers for criminal pursuits.[47]

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[41] *Vita Edwardi Secundi*, 51; J.S. Hamilton, *Piers Gaveston, Earl of Cornwall 1307-1312: Politics and Patronage in the Reign of Edward II* (Detroit, 1988), 44-5.
[42] *Lanercost*, 192.
[43] *Cotton*, 168.
[44] *Melsa*, ii, 343.
[45] *South Lancashire in the Reign of Edward II*, 5.
[46] *Thomas Wright's Political Songs*, 237-40.
[47] *CCR, 1272-79*, 519; *CCR, 1279-88*, 547; *CCR, 1288-96*, 45. Also, see J. Bellamy, *Crime and Public Order in England in the Later Middle Ages* (London, 1973), 23-4; J.R. Maddicott, *Law and Lordship: Royal Justices as Retainers in Thirteenth- and Fourteenth-Century England*, Past and Present supplement iv (1978), 13-14.

In 1274, a group of archers and other armed men of the earl Warenne were accused of encroaching upon the lands of Robert Aguillon in Sussex.[48] Three years later, Fulk Fitz Waryn was found to be using members of his affinity to influence land inquests on the Welsh March,[49] and in 1308 the earl of Warwick employed his bachelor and sheriff of Leicestershire, John de Dene, to sway elections to the post of coroner in that county.[50] Such actions, symptomatic of 'bastard feudalism',[51] were by no means confined to these prominent lords. Both Edward II at one extreme, and lesser members of the gentry at the other, also exploited their personal ties and social networks in the pursuit of material gain or local influence.[52] More seriously, opponents of the king, such as Thomas of Lancaster, increased the size of their affinities to pursue their struggles.[53] In 1297, the earl of Norfolk had been ready, with his adherents among the earls and barons, to resist Edward I's attempts to force him to serve overseas.[54] Such nefarious activities demonstrate the potentially detrimental effects of large-scale retaining.

Be that as it may, the attendance of large companies of armed men on their lords remained a necessary evil if the Crown was to gain the support that it needed for its wars. Maurice Keen was undoubtedly right to argue that large-scale retaining had its most positive impact when used 'in the military context of warfare against external enemies'.[55] 'Bastard feudalism', or the extended web of connections that the term implies, has been described as 'a *central* mechanism for the waging of war';[56] rightly so, for the demands of warfare remained one of the greatest incentives for the gathering of large companies of men in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Both Simon de Montfort and Thomas of Lancaster countered the claims levelled against them that they were retaining too many armed men by stating that they were doing so for the stability and defence of the realm. The latter drew attention, in 1317, to the fact that Edward II had ordered a muster at Newcastle upon Tyne to go against the Scots with as many armed men as possible.[57] Although such claims were possibly nothing more than calculated ruses to cloak their political objectives, both earls were aware that neither king could cope without the support of the recruitment networks of their leading men.

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[48] *CCR, 1272-79*, 116.
[49] *Ancient Correspondence Concerning Wales*, 83.
[50] *CCW*, 271.
[51] Cf. D.A. Carpenter, 'Debate: Bastard Feudalism Revised', *Past and Present*, cxxxi (1991), 178-9.
[52] *CCW*, 487-8; *State Trials of the Reign of Edward the First 1289-1293*, ed. T.F. Tout and H. Johnstone Camden Society 3rd ser., ix (1906), no. 12.
[53] J.F. Baldwin, 'The Household Administration of Henry Lacy and Thomas of Lancaster', *EHR*, xlii (1927), 191.
[54] *Melsa*, ii, 266.
[55] Keen, *England in the Later Middle Ages*, 15.
[56] Hicks, *Bastard Feudalism*, 2.
[57] *Documents of the Baronial Movement*, 209; 'Gesta Edwardi de Carnarvon', 50.

Indeed, it was difficult for the Crown to oppose a system of recruitment that it exploited so well for its own benefit: Edward I's personal company formed the core of the armies that he led to Wales in 1294 and Flanders in 1297, as well as on other occasions.[58] When the need arose, all lords, including the king, desired first and foremost that their men be available to them for the pursuit of war. In 1300, the earl of Hereford tried to have his retainer, Richard Damory, taken off the justice rota in Oxfordshire because he required his services in Scotland.[59] The following year, Walter de Teye managed to have one of his men removed from the position of coroner in Sussex for the same reason.[60] In wartime, it was evidently more important for the martial elite to have their men with them in the field than at work in the counties.

The demands of warfare under Edward I, particularly from 1294, meant that landholders did not always find it easy to persuade their men to follow them into hostile territory. Ahead of the expedition to Flanders in 1297, the earl of Arundel wrote that he could not find anyone willing to go with him unless he granted away more lands.[61] The burdens of overseas service might, in fact, have been one of the main reasons for the increased use of military contracts. Although these were used for the Lord Edward's crusade and the Welsh war of 1287,[62] the largest number of indentures drawn up for any single year during the reign of Edward I was in 1297: the year of the Flanders campaign. A few, including those between John de Grey of Rotherfield and Robert de Tothale, and John Bluet and William Martel, refer specifically to service overseas and the war against the king of France.[63] The link between the wars of Edward I and the production of such contracts seems clear enough.[64] However, it may be that the household force continued to be the most important element of magnate companies organised for war. The idea that contracting grew out of an older system of household retaining has been put forward by J.M.W. Bean, and the continued emphasis on lordly obligations in such contracts seems to support his view.[65] Both Scott Waugh and David Crouch have asserted that the indentured retinue was a continuation of, rather than a

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[58] *Cotton*, 253; *Chronica et Annales*, 379.
[59] *CCW*, 111-2
[60] *Ibid*, 146.
[61] *Documents Illustrating the Crisis of 1297-98*, no. 132.
[62] H.G. Richardson and G.O. Sayles, *The Governance of Mediaeval England from the Conquest to Magna Carta* (Edinburgh, 1963), 463-5; N.B. Lewis, 'An Early Indenture of Military Service, 27 July 1287', *BIHR*, xiii (1935), 85-9; *CCR, 1279-88*, 486.
[63] 'Private Indentures for Life Service in Peace and War 1278-1476', ed. M. Jones and S. Walker, *Camden Miscellany XXXII*, Camden Society, 5th ser., iii (1994), nos 6, 7.
[64] On the link between Edward's wars and the development of the contract system, see N.B. Lewis, 'The Organisation of Indentured Retinues in Fourteenth-Century England', *TRHS*, 4th ser., xxvii (1945), 31.
[65] Bean, *From Lord to Patron*, 129, 143; idem, '"Bachelor" and "Retainer"', *Medievalia et Humanistica: Studies in Medieval and Renaissance Culture*, new ser., iii (1972), 125-6.

break with, the past. The latter's claim, that 'the honorial barons [of the twelfth century] were the political and often physical ancestors of the indentured retainers of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries', speaks volumes about the tenacity of traditional methods of lordship, whatever their guise.[66] Not surprisingly, indentures sometimes seem to have formulated new relationships between men who were serving together for the first time. Aymer de Valence and Thomas de Berkeley, and Edmund de Stafford and Philip de Hardreshull, can first be found together in Flanders in the year that their contracts with one another were drawn up.[67] In like manner, the granting of an annuity by Hugh de Neville for John Filiol in 1300 in return for service in the Scottish war appears to have created a new connection between the two men who set out together in that year.[68] On other occasions, such agreements merely formalised bonds that had existed *de facto* for some time. Nicholas de Hastings had been going to war with Ralph Fitz William for eleven years before an indenture between the two men was drawn up in 1311.[69] The purpose of such contracts therefore varied from case to case.

Whatever their function and purpose, military contracts emphasise the key role played by retinue leaders as the hubs of recruitment networks. For this reason, it was essential that the king always had a ready supply of lords ready and willing to perform military service with their bands of retainers, whether indentured or not. The author of the *Vita Edwardi Secundi* had the right idea when he referred to the magnates as 'the king's chief member, without which the king cannot attempt or accomplish anything of importance'.[70] A clear indication of the truth of this statement is provided by the pitiful failure of the Flanders expedition when Edward had proceeded to the continent without the support of the military community.[71] The need to have a ready supply of magnates available for military service may explain why the earl of Cornwall issued a quittance of the common summons of the eyres of Buckinghamshire and Gloucestershire to Ralph Pipard in the spring of 1287.[72] Pipard was frequently summoned to give military service throughout our period. The regent could ill afford to have men like him tied up on duties in the shires at a time when tensions were increasing across the border in Wales. For his

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[66] S.L. Waugh, 'Tenure to Contract: Lordship and Clientage in Thirteenth-Century England', *EHR*, ci (1986), 839; D. Crouch, *The Beaumont Twins: The Roots and Branches of Power in the Twelfth Century* (Cambridge, 1986), 101.

[67] 'Private Indentures for Life Service', nos 4, 8. Valence and Berkeley (E 101/6/28, m. 2i); Stafford and Hardreshull (BL, Add. MS 7965, f. 68r).

[68] DL 25, no. 1318; *Liber Quotidianus*, 216.

[69] 'Private Indentures for Life Service', no. 19; 1300 (C 67/14, m. 12); 1301 (C 67/14, m. 4); 1306 (C 67/16, m. 12); 1309 (*CDS*, v, 449); 1310 (C 71/4, m. 10).

[70] *Vita Edwardi Secundi*, 49.

[71] *Langtoft*, 386.

[72] SC 1/25, no. 64.

part, Edward I was always keen to exploit the personal contacts and relationships of the leading families of the realm. In 1303, for example, he ordered that Henry de Percy be delivered from prison in Yorkshire so that he could join the king on his journey north of the border.[73] Still, and despite his best efforts, it would appear that for major campaigns the king could never be sure just how large an army he would have at his disposal. The royal proclamation at Udimore in August 1297 shows that it was only possible to ascertain the size of the force available to the king for service in Flanders once the muster had been convened.[74] In the age of the pre-contract armies, planning military campaigns with any precision must have been very difficult indeed.

The nature of such decentralised recruitment, whereby groups of men were organised around the banners of their leaders, means that any study of the war retinues of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries must begin with the lords themselves. A single military summons list might contain in excess of 300 names, as it did in the aftermath of Bannockburn.[75] It would therefore be impractical to attempt to analyse the retaining practices of all lords who led companies to war, or the loyalties and shifting allegiances of the whole of genteel society. For this reason, and to enable more detailed analysis, a sample of retinue leaders has been chosen based on the lords named on the Falkirk horse inventories of 1298. The benefits of these lists as a basis for the sample have already been outlined in chapter 3. Of the 150 or so lords who appear with armed contingents on those inventories, fifty, or a third, have been selected for closer analysis.[76] A number of factors were taken into account when deciding which lords and retinues to include in the sample and which to leave out, including: the size of the companies with them at Falkirk; whether or not there is sufficient evidence of the identities of their retainers from other campaigns to allow for meaningful analysis over time; and whether the lords had connections, familial or otherwise, with other prominent leaders within the military community. Available service records vary considerably from one lord and retinue to another according to the status and importance of the leader. The earl of Lancaster had forty-five men in his service at Falkirk and in total we have information on some ninety men with him in the years prior to Bannockburn, not including those who campaigned at one point or another with his father, Edmund, or brother, Henry.[77] Aymer de Valence had forty-nine fighting men with him at Falkirk. A

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[73] *CCR, 1302-07*, 27.
[74] *English Historical Documents*, iii (1189-1327), ed. H. Rothwell (London, 1975), 478.
[75] *PW*, II, ii, 427-430.
[76] For a full list of these lordship groups and a summary of their retinue personnel continuity, see Appendix. Only the sample leaders' surnames are used in most subsequent footnotes.
[77] *Gough*, 179-81.

total of around 400 can be traced in his company up to and including the expedition that he led to Scotland as captain in 1315.[78] At the other end of the scale, the household retainer Edward Charles and the northern lord John Fitz Reginald led only four men at Falkirk; evidence for soldiers associated with these men in other years is quite sparse.[79] Not a great deal separates lords such as these and others who have been left out of the sample. Finally, in several instances, such as with Hugh le Despenser senior and junior, and Peter and John de Chavent, the retinues of the father and son have been considered as one, either because they served in close proximity to one another on a number of military ventures, or because their careers overlapped at around the time of the Falkirk campaign.[80]

As much of the rest of this chapter will be based primarily on the knights and sergeants who served with these lords rather than the leaders themselves, it may first prove useful to enter into a little detail about the military experiences and career patterns of these fifty men, or lordship groups. Firstly, it is important to note that whilst the landed wealth and social status of these lords varied a great deal, each was a prominent and powerful individual in his own right. The number of manors of a man like William le Brun differed markedly from those held by Aymer de Valence, but even the former was a lord of some stature in Hampshire and Dorset where most of his estates lay.[81] Whilst service on more than seven campaigns was quite exceptional among the knights in the retinues at Falkirk, the majority of the retinue leaders in our sample took part in at least eight military ventures during their careers. Eighteen can be traced in the service records on ten or more occasions whilst one man, Henry de Beaumont, fought in seventeen hosts between 1296 and the Scottish campaign of Edward III in 1335, including as commander in Scotland in 1332.[82] Furthermore, Bartholomew de Badlesmere,[83] Robert de Clifford,[84] one or other of the Despensers[85] and Aymer de

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[78] *Ibid*, 216-18; E 101/15/6.
[79] *Gough*, 195, 207.
[80] Cf. N. Saul, 'The Despensers and the Downfall of Edward II', *EHR*, xcix (1984), 6. Other fathers and sons whose retinues will be considered as one are: Peter (d.1303) and John (d.1344) de Chavent; Nicholas de Meynill senior (d.1299) and junior (d.1322); Alan Plukenet senior (d.1298) and junior; Fulk Fitz Waryn senior (d.1315) and junior (d.1336) and Robert de Haustede senior (d.1321) and junior (d.1330).
[81] *IPM*, iv, no. 34; *IPM*, vi, no. 518.
[82] 1296 (E 101/5/23, m. 3); 1297 (E 101/6/37, m. 7); 1298 (*Gough*, 172); 1300 (E 101/8/23, m. 2); 1301 (E 101/9/24, m. 1); 1303 (E 101/612/11, m. 1); 1306 (E 101/13/16, f. 2r); 1308 (*Rotuli Scotiae*, i, 57-9); 1309 (*CDS*, v, 447); 1310 (C 71/4, m. 11); 1314 (C 71/6, m. 3); 1319 (E 101/378/4, f. 31r); 1322 (*CPR, 1321-24*, 185); 1327 (C 71/11, m. 6); 1332 (*Scalacronica*, 108-9); 1333 (C 71/13, m. 1); 1335 (C 71/15, m. 17). For a summary of his military activities, see S. Cameron and A. Ross, 'The Treaty of Edinburgh and the Disinherited (1328-1332), *History*, lxxxiv (1999), 251-2.
[83] See chapter 2 n. 145 and n. 160 for his military service up to and including Bannockburn, and 1315 (E 101/376/7, ff. 60r) and 1319 (E 101/378/4, f. 19v) for his activities after that time.
[84] 1294 (C 67/10, m. 4); 1296 (E 101/5/23, m. 1i); 1297 (E 101/6/30, m. 1); 1298 (*Gough*, 196); 1300 (E 101/8/23, m. 5); 1301 (C 67/14, m. 2); 1302 (C 67/15, m. 15); 1303 (E 101/612/11, m. 2); 1306 (E

Valence[86] can each be traced in at least a dozen instances, almost invariably with identifiable men-at-arms under their commands. The distinction made previously between the knights and sergeants in the retinues at Falkirk and their leaders is therefore reflective of a significant split that most soldiers at the time would have recognised. Most of these men were born into positions of authority, as indicated by the fact that around a half served as leaders on the first occasion that they appear in the military records. None fought in the retinues of other lords for any great length of time.

What of the military experience of these lords prior to the Falkirk campaign, and their service beyond Bannockburn? As with those with them in 1298, the lords who took part in the Falkirk campaign included a mixture of veterans of the early Welsh wars and younger, more recent recruits. Nineteen of the individuals in the sample had taken part in one or both of the Welsh wars of 1277 and 1282-3, but only eight (including Walter de Beauchamp, Eustace de Hacche and William de Leyburn) were retinue leaders on either of those occasions.[87] Nevertheless, this allows for comparison between the composition of their retinues in the Scottish wars and for earlier campaigns. Of the remainder, a few fought for the first time in 1287.[88] The greater part, however, began their military service during the years of crisis, whereas just one, Edmund de Mauley, made his bow at Falkirk. Such a breakdown does not highlight the full range of military service data available on these men and their followers, for most continued to fight for many years after 1298. Fourteen performed their duties as retinue leaders beyond Bannockburn; three, Henry de Beaumont, Fulk Fitz Waryn junior, and Richard Lovel, were still leading companies into war during the early years of the reign of Edward I's grandson.[89] Ten lords were around at the siege of Berwick in 1319; seven took part in the ill-fated campaign of three years later, not including those who appear as tenants-in-chief only.[90] Therefore, our sample of fifty retinue leaders allows much

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101/612/15, m. 1); 1307 (E 101/14/15, m. 9); 1309 (*CDS*, v, 448); 1310 (E 101/374/5, ff. 76r-v); 1314 (C 71/6, m. 1).

[85] 1294 (C 67/10, m. 6); 1296 (E 101/5/23, m. 1i); 1297 (C 67/12, m. 7); 1298 (*Gough*, 187); 1300 (C 67/14, m. 10); 1301 (C 67/14, m. 5); 1303 (C 67/15, m. 14); 1306 (C 67/16, m. 11); 1307 (*CDS*, v, 445); 1308 (*Rotuli Scotiae*, i, 55); 1314 (C 71/6, m. 3); 1319 (E 101/378/4, f. 19v); 1322 (BL, Stowe MS 553, ff. 61r-v).

[86] For his service between 1297 and the winter of 1311-12, see chapter 2 n. 55. He also led troops of men to war in 1314 (C 71/6, m. 5); 1315 (E 101/15/6, m. 1); 1319 (C 71/10, m. 5); 1322 (BL, Stowe MS 553, f. 56r); 1324-5 (*CPR, 1321-24*, 427).

[87] Beauchamp (E 101/4/1, m. 1); Hacche (C 47/2/6, m. 2); Leyburn (E 101/3/12; C 47/2/5, m. 2).

[88] E.g. Audley (*CPR, 1281-92*, 273) and Fitz Reginald (*ibid*, 271).

[89] For Beaumont, see above n. 82. Fitz Waryn junior in 1327 and 1333 (C 71/11, m. 5; C 71/13, m. 1), and Lovel in 1327 (C 71/11, m. 6).

[90] 1319: Badlesmere (E 101/378/4, f. 19v); Beaumont (E 101/378/4, f. 31r); Despenser (E 101/378/4, f. 19v); Haustede junior (C 71/10, m. 4); Lancaster (C 71/10, m. 4); Lovel (C 71/10, m. 7); Mohaut (E 101/378/4, f. 28v); Meynill junior (C 71/10, m. 9); Mortimer of Chirk (E 101/378/4, f. 19r); Valence (C 71/10, m. 5). 1322: Beauchamp of Somerset (*CPR, 1321-24*, 184); Beaumont (*CPR, 1321-24*, 185); the

scope for reflection on the changing composition and personnel of military retinues over a number of years and decades. The documentation for these campaigns is variable and frequently patchy, but this should not detract from the vast amount that can be recovered about the affinities and recruitment networks of these men. This is even more the case when we consider the familial relationships that existed between many of these soldiers and other military leaders. Although Ralph Basset of Drayton died in the year following Falkirk, his son of the same name continued to lead retinues on the campaigns of Edward II and Edward III.[91] Thomas Bardolf, the son of Hugh who died in 1304, took up the leadership reins within a couple of years of his father's death.[92] In sum, the survival of voluminous records for military service from the reigns of Edward I and his son offers an ideal opportunity to study military lordship at work.

TAPPING THE GENTEEL POOL

The English defeat at Bannockburn in 1314 makes it easy to forget that Edwardian armies during the decades preceding that setback were, for the most part, quite successful. Although they have failed to receive the critical acclaim bestowed upon later English hosts which won famous victories at Crécy, Poitiers and Agincourt, the achievements of these earlier forces were far from negligible.[93] Within just over a decade of his accession, Edward I and his men had succeeded in conquering Wales: a thorn in the side of many earlier English kings. Furthermore, victories on the battlefields of Dunbar and Falkirk helped pave the way for what seemed, by 1305, to be the permanent subjugation of the Scots. There were, of course, reversals along the way, most notably at the bridge of boats in 1282, Stirling Bridge in 1297 and at Roslin in 1303; but the fact that the English were able to retain a hold on Gascony whilst simultaneously pursuing these conquests closer to home speaks volumes about the capacity of the English war machine at that time. The defeat in 1314 revealed that there were still many flaws susceptible to exploitation by enemy commanders, and a fundamental restructuring was required before the triumphs of Edward III could be achieved.[94] Yet already, by the end of the reign of Edward I, many of the traditions of

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Despensers (BL, Stowe MS 553, ff. 61r-v); Haustede junior (BL, Stowe MS 553, f. 60r); Lovel (BL, Stowe MS 553, f. 60v); Mohaut (*CPR, 1321-24*, 198); Valence (BL, Stowe MS 553, f. 56r).

[91] 1319 (C 71/10, m. 3); 1333 (C 71/13, m. 31).

[92] C 67/16, m. 9.

[93] For a critical view of these earlier armies, see S. Reynolds, 'How Different was England?', *Thirteenth Century England VII*, ed. M. Prestwich, R. Britnell and R. Frame (Woodbridge, 1999), 15.

[94] For the reforms of Edward III and the composition of later hosts, see Ayton, *Knights and Warhorses*, chapter 1; idem, 'English Armies in the Fourteenth Century', *Arms, Armies and Fortifications in the*

military service that were to benefit later English armies on the battlefields of France were in place. As such, it seems pertinent to consider whether the service bonds between the leaders of these armies and their men contributed in any way to the cohesion of the king's forces. Did the armies of Edward I and his son benefit from the kind of stable retinue composition and group camaraderie which historians working on armies from the eleventh through to the late fourteenth century have shown to be of practical importance to the conduct of war?[95] If it is true that 'constant training was necessary then, as now, to make a capable soldier', then it was essential that lords and their men-at-arms should be acquainted with one another and accustomed to fighting together in the melting pot of war.[96] Only through closer scrutiny of the service bonds between lords and their men can we ascertain the extent to which the armies of Edward I and his son were built upon firm foundations.

Exceptional in size and in the social and military standing of its members, the royal household is nevertheless a good place to begin any study of retinue composition. This is due to the survival of numerous lists of fees and robes recording the names of knights and sergeants who staffed the *familia regis*. The royal household had played a central role in the organisation and conduct of war since Anglo-Norman times,[97] and the king's knights and sergeants were still recruited for primarily military purposes during the reign of Edward I. Many of those who received fees and robes during the first half of the reign were no longer members of the household by the time of the French and Scottish wars. This was due in most cases to natural factors, such as old age and death, rather than any desire to enter the service of other men.[98] Viewed from a short-term perspective, it is evident that the composition of the *familia* changed little on an annual basis. Of twenty-two bannerets listed in the wardrobe accounts for the end of the thirteenth year of the reign, seventeen were still members five years later. A similar degree of retention can be traced for the knights bachelor.[99] Conflict with the barons and other leading members of the military community placed a great strain on the loyalties of the king's followers between 1307 and 1326, as it had done under John.[100]

Hundred Years War, ed. A. Curry and M. Hughes (Woodbridge, 1994), 21-38; N.B. Lewis, 'The Recruitment and Organization of a Contract Army, May to November 1337', *BIHR*, xxxvii (1964), 1-19.

[95] E.g. R.A. Brown, 'The Battle of Hastings', *Anglo-Norman Warfare: Studies in Late Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-Norman Military Organization and Warfare*, ed. M. Strickland (Woodbridge, 1992), 176; A. Goodman, *John of Gaunt: The Exercise of Princely Power in Fourteenth-Century Europe* (Harlow, 1992), 213.

[96] V.B. Redstone, 'Some Mercenaries of Henry of Lancaster, 1327-1330', *TRHS*, 3rd ser., vii (1913), 153.

[97] J.O. Prestwich, 'The Military Household of the Norman Kings', *EHR*, xcvi (1981), 1-35.

[98] Ingamells, 'Household Knights of Edward I', i, 27.

[99] E 101/4/13, m. 1; E 101/4/27.

[100] Cf. S.D. Church, *The Household Knights of King John* (Cambridge, 1999), 104.

Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that even the unpopular Edward II could rely, at least in some years, on the adherence of a large number of his associates. Between the tenth and eleventh years of his reign, eight of eleven bannerets and forty-nine of sixty-three lesser knights remained in his service.[101] In subsequent years, continuity levels were less impressive as the threat of civil war loomed large and men hedged their bets in deciding between the king and his cousin. Many of the bachelors and bannerets present in 1318 had left the household by 1322.[102] Unfortunately, we lack a series of magnate household lists to compare with those of the king, so it is necessary to consider the question of retinue stability among the aristocracy on a much broader scale. For this purpose, our fifty sample retinues provide an ideal focus for analysis.

Before consulting the military records for evidence of the recruitment networks of these fifty lords, we must first consider in more detail the availability and reliability of the evidence at our disposal. Too often statements have been made about patterns of retaining and levels of retinue stability within Edwardian armies without due consideration of the pitfalls of working with this kind of material. Through careful scrutiny of the service records available to historians of Edwardian armies, Andrew Ayton has done much to redress this problem.[103] All the same, it is worthwhile reiterating some of his points here and linking them to the evidence available for our fifty leaders. One of the main obstacles to a full understanding of the recruitment practices of these men is that two of the sources on which we are most reliant for names of their followers, letters of protection and attorney, regularly reveal the names of only a third or fewer of the soldiers in their companies. Only three of the eleven men with William de Cantilupe on the household inventory of 1300, for example, also took out letters of protection.[104] In such instances the problem can be overcome by consulting other records; in others, however, the protections and attornies are the only sources available. For the campaign of 1310-11 we lack an inventory, so of the four knights and twenty-five sergeants who were with Robert Fitz Payn in Scotland in that year, only ten of whom received protections, the identities of the majority remain unknown to us.[105] When a lord appears with a well-documented retinue for some campaigns, but less well-documented companies for others, the resulting data is inevitably skewed, giving an

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[101] Society of Antiquaries of London MS 120, ff. 58v-61r, 82r-82v, 86r-86v; Society of Antiquaries of London MS 121, ff. 36v-38v, 55r-55v, 62r-62v.
[102] M. Prestwich, 'The Unreliability of Royal Household Knights in the Early Fourteenth Century', *Fourteenth Century England II*, ed. C. Given-Wilson (Woodbridge, 2002), 5.
[103] Ayton, *Knights and Warhorses*, chapter 5.
[104] E 101/8/23, m. 2; C 67/14, m. 11.
[105] BL, Cotton Nero C VIII, f. 6r; C 71/4, m. 13.

impression of retinue continuity which suggests a higher rate of turnover than was probably the case. Thomas de Furnivall is recorded with ten men on the *forinsec* inventory in 1298, including his sub-commander Henry de Pinkeney. In 1296 we have the name of just one man who took out a letter of attorney, and four years later only two with protections.[106] Sometimes the imbalance in the data is due to the changing status of the lords, as some men, such as Bartholomew de Badlesmere and Henry de Beaumont, grew in importance in the years leading up to Bannockburn.[107] A further problem is the presence of sub-units within the retinues. Soldiers tended to take out protections for some campaigns with their sub-leaders, but for others with their main company commanders. This can inflate the impression of instability, particularly in our period when the process of sub-contracting is often difficult to discern.[108]

The impression of retinue composition provided by the service records is therefore distorted in such a way as to decrease the number of times that knights and sergeants appear to have served with their lords. Bearing this in mind, it cannot be stressed enough that the figures and statistics given in the remainder of this chapter are minimum figures, probably dramatically so in some cases. This will be taken into consideration throughout the discussion. Nevertheless, minimum figures have their uses, and can be relied upon to the extent that they err on the side of caution. Of the military campaigns that took place between the Welsh war of 1277 and Bannockburn, the parameters set for this study, the Falkirk campaign of 1298 was the only one (for obvious reasons) on which all fifty of our sample leaders were present and served with armed contingents. Service continuity data for all fifty companies put into the field on that occasion can be found in the Appendix, but some of the main conclusions can be summarised here. Of the 647 knights and sergeants who appear on the horse lists in the retinues of these lords in Scotland in 1298, a total of 289, or 45 per cent, can be traced in the service of the same men on at least one other campaign between 1277 and 1314. In addition to this, 169, or 26 per cent, served within the same retinue on two other occasions or more. This suggests a fairly high level of continuity, particularly given that

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[106] *Gough*, 211, 222; C 67/11, m. 4; C 67/14, m. 9.

[107] One man took out a protection with Badlesmere for Gascony in 1294 (*RG*, iii, 101), one had a protection for service in Flanders (C 67/12, m. 1), four appear on the horse list in 1298 (*Gough*, 190), and then only five took out protections with him for the Scottish campaigns of 1301 (C 67/14, m. 2), 1303 (C 67/15, mm. 7, 13), 1306 (C 67/16, m. 13) and 1310 (C 71/4, m. 13). In contrast, some fifty men appear in his sub-retinue at Bannockburn; C 71/6, mm. 1, 5; C 81/1727, m. 18. For Beaumont we have the names of one man in 1296 (E 101/5/23, m. 3), five in 1297 (E 101/6/37, m. 7), five in 1298 (*Gough*, 172), six in 1300 (E 101/8/23, m. 2), seven in 1301 (E 101/9/24, m. 1), six in 1303 (E 101/612/11, m. 1), and two in 1306 (E 101/13/16, f. 19r). For his larger companies in 1309 and 1314: *CDS*, v, 447-9; C 71/6, mm. 3, 4.

[108] Evidence of sub-retaining becomes more obvious during the Hundred Years War. Cf. J. Sherborne, 'Indentured Retinues and English Expeditions to France, 1369-80', *War, Politics and Culture in Fourteenth-Century England*, ed. A. Tuck (London, 1994), 25; A. Curry, *Agincourt: A New History*, 62-3.

some of these retinues are poorly documented and therefore bring the average down. John de Havering, the justice of Wales who played a prominent role in putting down the Welsh rebellion of 1294-5, was present at Falkirk with a retinue of twenty-five men, but little evidence survives of his followers from other campaigns.[109] In contrast, nineteen of the sample retinues at Falkirk reveal continuity levels of 60 per cent or higher. All four of the sergeants with Edward Charles, namely John de Boxstede, Roger de Aston, William de Shoreham and Thomas de Harlesdon, had been with him the previous year in Flanders. Two of these, Boxstede and Harlesdon, followed him to war on a third occasion.[110] Other modestly-sized retinues at Falkirk which display high continuity ratios include those of Hugh Pointz (four out of five men with him on other campaigns),[111] William le Brun (seven out of eight men)[112] and John Botetourt (eleven out of sixteen men).[113] Whilst it is not possible to enter into detail on all of these retinues, the service continuity of the men with Robert de Mohaut in 1298 reflects the recruitment practices of many other lords of similar wealth and status.

Table 4.1: Service given with Robert de Mohaut by Men in his Retinue in 1298[114]

Name of soldier	Campaigns served on with Mohaut
John de Bracebridge (k)	1297, 1298, 1301, 1303, 1307, 1310
Roger de Bilney (k)	1297, 1298, 1301, 1303, 1310
Nicholas de Mohaut (s)	1298, 1301, 1303
William de Bilney (s)	1298, 1300, 1301, 1303
Ralph de Kerdiff (s)	1298
Robert Botevilleyn (s)	1298, 1301, 1303
Thomas Fattinge (s)	1297, 1298, 1300, 1301, 1303
Richard Strech (s)	1298, 1300, 1301, 1303, 1310
Adam Place (s)	1298
Adam de Werington (s)	1298
Nicholas de Lalleford (s)	1298
Bartholomew de Morley (s)	1298
William de Bibington (s)	1298
John de la Mare (s)	1298, 1300, 1301
Geoffrey de Bracebridge (s)	1298

[109] *Ann. Wigorn.*, 522; *Gough*, 228-9; E 101/5/18, m. 1; SC 1/27, no. 24.
[110] *Gough*, 195; E 101/6/37, m. 7; E 101/5/23, m. 1i; E 101/612/11, m. 6.
[111] Including two men, his son Nicholas and Isambert de St. Blimund, who were with him on a further three campaigns in 1294-5 (C 67/10, m. 7), 1297 (E 101/6/19, m. 1), and 1300 (C 67/14, m. 9).
[112] Including four men who were with him in 1297 and 1300, namely John de Roches, Peter de Roches, Reginald de la Forde and Hugh de Godeshulle (*Gough*, 176; E 101/6/37, m. 1i; E 101/8/23, m. 4).
[113] His kinsman William Botetourt was with him on six other occasions, for most of which service, see chapter 3 n. 158. Also, see: 1301 (C 67/14, m. 6); 1306 (E 101/612/15, m. 3).
[114] 1297 (C 67/12, m. 2, 7); 1298 (*Gough*, 209); 1300 (*PDS*, 231); 1301 (E 101/9/23, m. 2); 1303 (C 67/15, mm. 8, 12; E 101/612/8, m. 1); 1307 (*CDS*, v, 445-6); 1310 (C 71/4, mm. 6, 12).

Re-service within the Mohaut retinue was even greater than is shown here as a number of these men, including Roger de Bilney, John de Bracebridge and Bartholomew de Morley, had taken out letters of protection with Robert's older brother, Roger, in the mid-1290s.[115] The presence of a group of men with several years of collective experience must have added to the cohesion and mutual trust of the Mohaut retinue at Falkirk. Many of the thirty-two lords who led companies to the Low Countries in 1297 and then to Scotland in the following year were accompanied by men who served with them on both occasions: 172 of the 387 soldiers in their retinues in Flanders (44 per cent) subsequently followed them north of the border. One of these lords was Aymer de Valence. His retinue in Flanders in 1297 consisted of fifty-four soldiers, including those with letters of protection or attorney, of whom twenty-seven went on with him to Falkirk. Of those present on both occasions, thirteen, or around a half, also appear in his retinue on at least one other campaign. Well-known associates, such as Walter de Gacelyn and John de la Ryvere, led the way.[116] These patterns of re-service match what has been said for the men at Falkirk in general. Furthermore, they show that it was not only the leaders of more compact or average-sized retinues, like Mohaut, who could count on the continued support of many of their men. Another of the larger retinues in Flanders, that of the steward Walter de Beauchamp, reveals similar trends: seventeen of the thirty-four men with him and his son in 1297 also appeared in his company at Falkirk, eleven of whom were with him on more than just those two expeditions. Eight had also accompanied him to Scotland in 1296,[117] whilst at least three - Roger de la Mare, John Paynot and William le Skirmissour - had been connected to him since the Welsh war of 1294-5.[118] Therefore, even though the Falkirk campaign took place at an early stage in the Scottish wars, some retinues were already benefiting from military experience that had been acquired during the wars in Wales and France. There is no ideal standard against which retinue stability can be tested. Indeed historians probably differ in the criteria that they set in this respect. Yet, evidence of service with the same lord on at least two campaigns for around 50 per cent of the men in the retinues in Flanders and at Falkirk, and on at least three expeditions for around 25 per cent of these men, seems to contradict prevailing thoughts on this issue. Certainly, it cannot be said without some qualification that war retinues in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth

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[115] *RG*, iii, 121, 298.
[116] Gacelyn: 1297 (E 101/6/28, m. 2i); 1298 (*Gough*, 216); 1299 (Phillips, *Aymer de Valence*, appendix 2); 1300 (C 67/14, m. 10); 1302 (Phillips, *Aymer de Valence*, appendix 2); 1303 (C 67/15, m. 7); 1311 (C 71/5, m. 4). For de la Ryvere's service, most of which was with Valence, see chapter 1 n. 133.
[117] E 101/5/23, m. 2.
[118] *CCW*, 48.

centuries did not show much stability in membership.[119] This becomes clearer still when we consider the re-service rates of the soldiers who were with the sample lords in Scotland in 1296.

Table 4.2: Retinue Continuity for Sample Leaders in Scotland, 1296 (1277-1314).

Leader	Number of men with leader:		% continuity	Times served with leader other than in 1296:						
	In 1296	In 1296 (who also served in another year)		1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Audley	3	2	66	1	1	-	-	-	-	-
J. Beauchamp	3	1	33	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
W. Beauchamp	10	8	80	1	1	-	4	2	-	-
Beaumont	1	1	100	-	-	-	1	-	-	-
Brun	2	1	50	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
Charles	3	1	33	-	1	-	-	-	-	-
Chavent	9	4	44	-	2	-	1	1	-	-
Clifford	14	8	57	3	3	1	-	-	-	1
Courtenay	2	2	100	1	-	1	-	-	-	-
Despenser	26	12	46	6	2	2	-	1	-	1
Fitz Payn	7	5	71	-	2	1	1	-	1	-
Fitz Waryn	11	1	9	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
Furnivall	1	1	100	-	1	-	-	-	-	-
H. Mortimer	1	1	100	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
Plukenet	13	5	38	2	1	2	-	-	-	-
Scales	4	4	100	-	1	-	1	2	-	-
Tony	1	1	100	-	1	-	-	-	-	-
Tregoz	1	0	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Tuchet	2	0	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Welles	8	3	38	-	-	1	-	1	1	-
Total	122	61	50	17	16	9	8	7	2	2

Once again, these figures indicate that, on average, the retinue leaders who went to war during the opening stages of the Scottish war could count on re-service levels of at least around 50 per cent. For some lords, such as the future steward of the royal household Robert Fitz Payn, the 1296 campaign brought together a group of men who would serve

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[119] For views and evidence of retinue compositions and instability, see Prestwich, *War, Politics and Finance*, 65; Saul, *Knights and Esquires*, 83; K. Fowler, *The King's Lieutenant: Henry of Grosmont, First Duke of Lancaster, 1310-1361* (London, 1969), 182-3 and appendix III; D.S. Green, 'Politics and Service with Edward the Black Prince', *The Age of Edward III*, ed. J.S. Bothwell (Woodbridge, 2001), 58-9; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, 50; C. Carpenter, 'The Beauchamp Affinity: A Study of Bastard Feudalism at Work', *EHR*, xcv (1980), 519-20; S. Stewart, 'Simon de Montfort and his Followers, June 1263', *EHR*, cxix (2004), 967-8. In contrast, see Ayton, 'Sir Thomas Ughtred', 123; idem, 'The English Army at Crécy', 204-15; Bell, *War and the Soldier*, 97-8.

together several times in future years, even though they apparently had no collective military experience at that date. Of the seven men who are known to have been with him in that year, five can be found in his retinue in the Low Countries and the later Scottish wars, but none appear in his retinue before that time.[120] This may be the result of unbalanced documentary survival, for other leaders, such as Hugh le Despenser senior and Nicholas de Audley, could count on men-at-arms who had been with them in Wales.[121] The truly striking feature of the data presented in this table, when compared with what has already been noted for the Falkirk campaign, is the large number of men who served with their lords on more than two occasions up to 1314. Forty-four of the 122 individuals who can be identified in the sample retinues in 1296, or 36 per cent, gave military service with their 1296 leaders on at least three ventures, compared with 26 per cent of the men at Falkirk. Among these were two soldiers, Thomas de Monteny with Robert de Clifford and John de Haudlo with Hugh le Despenser senior, who rode with their lords a further seven times.[122] Adam de Welles, meanwhile, could count on the service of Thomas de Brumwych in no fewer than six other hosts.[123] The higher rate of re-service in 1296 is possibly due to our reliance for some of the retinues on letters of protection and attorney, which tend to name those who were most closely associated with their lords. In contrast, the 1298 horse lists provide the names of many middling sergeants whose service on other campaigns is difficult to trace. That is not to say, however, that the Falkirk data are the more reliable of the two, for the presence on the inventories of so many lesser men who did not take out letters of protection for other campaigns inevitably increases the number of one-timers in that year. This point raises the more general issue of whether the rank of the soldier in any way influenced the likelihood of his re-service with the same lord. So as to avoid the documentary pitfalls outlined above, five successive campaigns for which horse lists are available have been analysed to investigate whether there was any great disparity between the continuity

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[120] John de Cary was also with him in 1297 (E 101/6/19, m. 1), 1298 (*Gough*, 171), 1300 (*PDS*, 221), 1303 (C 67/15, m. 6), 1306 (C 67/16, m. 4), and 1310 (C 71/4, m. 13), John de Derneford in 1297 (E 101/6/19, m. 1), 1298 (*Gough*, 171), and 1310 (C 71/4, m. 13), Geoffrey de Harden in 1297 (E 101/6/19, m. 1), 1298 (*Gough*, 171), 1300 (*PDS*, 221), and 1303 (BL, Add. MS 8835, f. 46v), Geoffrey de la Linde in 1297 (E 101/6/19, m. 1) and 1298 (*Gough*, 171), and Simon de Ralegh in 1297 (E 101/6/19, m. 1) and 1298 (*Gough*, 171). For 1296; E 101/5/23, m. 2. For earlier campaigns we have the names of three men proffered by Fitzpayn in 1277 (*PW*, i, 202) and three in 1282 (*PW*, i, 229).

[121] At least five of the men with Despenser, namely John de Haudlo, John Hastang, Robert de Stanegrave, Henry le Tyes and Theobald de St. George, and two of those with Audley, John de Everus and Robert de Meynill, were with them in Wales in 1294-5: C 67/10, mm. 5d, 6; *CCW*, 46.

[122] Monteny; see chapter 3 n. 159 for his service up to and including 1311, and 1314 (C 71/6, m. 1). Haudlo: 1294 (C 67/10, m. 6); 1296 (E 101/5/23, m. 1i); 1297 (C 67/12, m. 3d); 1298 (*Gough*, 187); 1300 (C 47/1/6, m. 3); 1303 (*CVCR*, 82); 1306 (C 67/16, m. 6); 1314 (C 71/6, m. 3).

[123] 1296 (E 101/5/23, m. 1i); 1297 (E 101/6/37, m. 4); 1300 (E 101/8/23, m. 4); 1301 (E 101/9/24, m. 1); 1303-4 (BL, Add. MS 8835, f. 49r); 1306 (C 67/16, m. 11); 1310 (C 71/4, m. 11).

patterns of knights and those of lesser rank. From these hosts, eleven companies which appear on each of the said inventories have been selected for closer scrutiny. The data is presented on a year-by-year basis so as to provide an impression of continuity from campaign to campaign as it might have been discerned at the time.

Table 4.3: Service Continuity in Selected Retinues by Rank (1297-1303)[124]

Leader	Retinue continuity from campaign to campaign:*							
	1297-1298		1298-1300		1300-1301		1301-1303	
	K	S	K	S	K	S	K	S
Beaumont	1/1	3/4	1/1	3/4	1/1	2/5	0/1	2/6
Benstede	2/2	2/5	-	-	2/2	3/9	1/2	4/10
Bykenore	-	2/3	-	1/3	-	2/2	-	3/3
Drokensford	1/3	6/25	3/3	10/21	3/6	7/21	2/3	9/20
Haustede	-	2/4	-	1/3	-	1/2	-	1/3
Leyburn	1/4	7/18	1/3	4/12	3/6	4/15	2/3	5/12
Lovel	-	2/3	-	2/5	-	4/5	-	4/8
Malemains	-	2/6	-	0/3	-	2/2	-	1/4
Scales	0/1	3/8	0/1	1/6	0/1	2/6	0/3	2/14
Tony	2/2	2/12	1/2	3/14	1/2	4/8	0/3	1/15
Welles	0/1	7/13	1/3	3/11	1/4	3/11	1/2	3/10
Total (% by rank)	7/14 (50%)	38/101 (38%)	7/13 (54%)	28/82 (34%)	11/22 (50%)	34/86 (40%)	6/17 (35%)	35/105 (33%)

* Clerks not included. Only one clerk is named on the 1300 inventory with Benstede so his figures for 1300-1301 are carried over from the Falkirk campaign.

The figures given here offer a more nuanced insight into levels of retinue stability showing that, on a campaign-by-campaign basis, lords could usually rely on the continued service of around 40-55 per cent of the knights who had been with them in the previous year, compared with 35-40 per cent of the sergeants. Before reading too much into this, a couple of factors must be taken into consideration. Firstly, the tendency of large retinues to contain a number of smaller sub-units probably had a much greater impact on the re-service ratios of sergeants than knights as in such instances the bachelors, rather than the sergeants, would have acted as the secondary recruiters. This is well illustrated by the retinue of the earl Warenne during the War of St. Sardos, which shows that no less than eighty of the lesser men-at-arms in his extended retinue were recruited by his sub-leaders, primarily his bachelors such as Ralph de Cobham and

[124] 1297 Flanders (E 101/6/19, 28, 37), 1298, 1300, 1301 and 1303 Scotland (*Gough*, 160-237; E 101/8/23; E 101/9/23, 24; E 101/612/7, 8, 9, 11).

Ralph Dacre.[125] Just as significantly, although the continuity rate among the sergeants seems to have been relatively low when viewed from a proportional perspective, in real terms sergeants tended to contribute more of a lord's regular followers than did his knights. Thus, taking the five years as whole, the keeper of the wardrobe John de Drokensford could count on a pool of eight sergeants who served with him twice, seven who were with him on three occasions, two (John de Flambard and William de Fauconberg) who were with him four times, and one, Thomas de Burghunt, who loyally served him on all five of his expeditions between 1297 and 1303.[126] Similar re-service rates can be found among the sergeants who accompanied Drokensford's fellow wardrobe clerk John de Benstede, as well as among those with lesser lords, such as Richard Lovel and Thomas de Bykenore.[127] These figures, therefore, do not show that sergeants were less inclined to follow the same lords to war repeatedly, merely that the pool of sergeants was so large that retinue leaders could afford to recruit a few new men of that rank each time that they were summoned by the king. Retaining the services of a loyal body of knights and sub-recruiters was probably a more pressing concern. Nevertheless, the particularly high continuity of the knights is worthy of our attention, revealing as it does that the more established members of the gentry - precisely the kind of individuals whom, it has been suggested, were more inclined to pursue their own interests - were not averse to giving repeated service in the retinues of the same lords. Both of the knights with Robert de Tony in Flanders, Adam de la Forde and William de Chabenore, were with him in 1298,[128] whilst Fulk Peyforer served with William de Leyburn in all five years.[129] One notable exception was Robert de Scales who recruited almost a new set of knights for each campaign. Only one of his knights, John de Vaux, served him more than once, in the hosts of 1298 and 1301, although he had also previously accompanied Scales to Flanders as a sergeant.[130]

Whilst providing a detailed short-term insight into continuity patterns at the height of Edward I's wars, the above figures do not account for the many men who

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[125] E 101/17/31.

[126] For Drokensford's retinues on these campaigns: E 101/6/37, mm. 2i-ii; *Gough*, 174-5; E 101/8/23, mm. 3-4, 7d; *Liber Quotidianus*, 202-3 (the latter for confirmation that the men on the 1300 inventory were indeed with Drokensford); E 101/9/24, mm. 1d, 3, 4; E 101/612/11, m. 5.

[127] One sergeant, Alexander de Norton, was with Benstede on all four campaigns for which men-at-arms are listed whilst two others, Richard de Dunmowe and John de Aulton, are named three times: E 101/6/37, m. 2iii; *Gough*, 177; E 101/9/24, m. 2; E 101/612/11, m. 3. All the men-at-arms with Lovel and Bykenore were sergeants, William de Punchardon serving with the former, and John de Bykenore with the latter, in all five armies. Punchardon: 1297 (E 101/6/37, m. 4); 1298 (*Gough*, 179); 1300 (E 101/8/23, m. 1); 1301 (E 101/9/24, m. 2); 1303 (E 101/612/11, m. 1). J. de Bykenore: 1297 (E 101/6/37, m. 4); 1298 (*Gough*, 162); 1300 (E 101/8/23, m. 4); 1301 (E 101/9/24, m. 2); 1303 (E 101/612/11, m. 3).

[128] E 101/6/37, m. 4; *Gough*, 164.

[129] E 101/6/37, m. 4; *Gough*, 194; E 101/8/23, m. 4; E 101/9/23, m. 3; E 101/612/11, m. 5d.

[130] *Gough*, 170; E 101/9/24, m. 4; E 101/6/37, m. 2i.

disappeared from service with their lords between 1297 and 1303 only to turn up again in their retinues in later armies. Connections between lords and their men often lasted much longer than would seem to have been the case from a cursory glance at the military records. The sergeant Thomas de Hauteclou was with Robert de Clifford at Falkirk and was possibly in his company on some of the campaigns that followed, but the next time that he appears with his lord in a martial context was when he had his horse appraised on the Scottish March during the winter of 1311-12.[131] Similar evidence is available for men in other retinues. The interesting point arising from such gaps is that the length of time that some men spent in the service of their lords reveals a degree of continuity much greater than that suggested by a consideration of their frequency of service alone. It is only when one consults other kinds of record that many more lasting connections begin to emerge. The sergeant Roger de la Mare served with Walter de Beauchamp on six occasions between 1294 and 1301, but it would seem, from the evidence of a commission of oyer and terminer issued in Worcestershire in 1284, that the two men had been connected for at least a decade by the time of the great Welsh rebellion.[132] Likewise, William Malherbe, who took out a letter of protection with Richard Lovel for the only time in 1314, had been granted a weekly market in Somerset at Lovel's request five years earlier.[133] Evidently, it would be wrong to assume that all of the men who accompanied their lords to war on only one occasion were previously unfamiliar to them. This is most clearly indicated by an analysis of the arms of the knights who fought at some stage or other within the retinue of William de Leyburn. Of the various knights who served with Leyburn between the first Welsh campaign of 1277 and his death in 1310, at least six bore variations of the Leyburn coat *azure, six lions rampant argent*. Yet all six of these knights, Thomas de Sandwich,[134] Nicholas Pessun,[135] Richard de Rokesley,[136] John le Sauvage,[137] Roger de Tilmanston[138] and William de Detling,[139] can be found in Leyburn's company on no more than one occasion. It seems highly likely that all of these south-eastern landholders and their families had close links with the Leyburn family in Kent. However, were it not for such

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[131] *Gough*, 197; E 101/14/15, m. 3.
[132] 1294 (see above, n. 118); 1296 (E 101/5/23, m. 2); 1297 (E 101/6/37, m. 1ii); 1298 (*Gough*, 183); 1300 (*Liber Quotidianus*, 174); 1301 (E 101/9/24, m. 2). Also *CPR, 1281-92*, 144.
[133] C 71/6, m. 3; *Cal. Ch. Rolls*, iii, 128.
[134] *Aspilogia III*, ii, 380; E 101/13/7, m. 2 (1306). (*Or, on a chief azure three lions rampant argent*).
[135] *Aspilogia III*, ii, 339; *PW*, i, 203 (1277). (*Ermine, on a fess azure three lions rampant argent*).
[136] *Aspilogia III*, ii, 368; E 101/8/23, m. 4 (1300). (*Azure, a fess gules between six lions rampant argent*).
[137] *Aspilogia III*, ii, 381; E 101/6/37, m. 4 (1297). (*Ermine, on a chief azure three lions rampant argent*).
[138] *Aspilogia III*, ii, 416; C 47/2/5, m. 2 (1282-3). (*Gules, six lions rampant with forked tails argent*).
[139] *Aspilogia III*, ii, 141; *Gough*, 194 (1298). (*Sable, six lions rampant argent*).

armorial evidence, one might be inclined to suspect that their ties to Leyburn did not last beyond the one military expedition.

Having established that soldiers who appear to have served with their lords on only one or two occasions often had more lasting connections to them, the question remains as to where these lords drew their most regular military followers from. This is a problem that has attracted many historians in a variety of contexts. In his study of the men who rebelled against John in 1214-15, J.C. Holt observed that familial, tenurial and neighbourhood bonds each played conflicting and overlapping roles in influencing the way that men acted during times of political crisis.[140] Kinship, land and locality likewise determined the composition of a large proportion of the military retinues that were brought together during the wars of Edward I and Edward II. Soldiers related to their lords can be found at the heart of many retinues in our sample: it was often these individuals who accompanied the retinue leaders to war most frequently. The kinship bond between the families of Badlesmere and Burghershh certainly had practical resonance in the field. Stephen de Burghershh went to Scotland with Badlesmere in 1298 and 1303 before serving with him at the Dunstable tournament in 1309, and Robert and Bartholomew de Burghershh also appear in his retinue.[141] In like manner, the marriage contract drawn up between the families of Valence and Hastings in 1275 to overcome an enmity that had arisen during the Barons' Wars had lasting consequences: John de Hastings junior was in the earl of Pembroke's *comitiva* north of the border several decades later in 1311, 1314, 1315, 1319 and 1322.[142] Despite the perceived decline in the importance of 'feudal' tenants to the composition of war retinues by the late thirteenth century, such landed ties still retained much of their vitality. Henry de Beaumont's inquisition post mortem in 1340 shows that five of the men who had served with him prior to 1314, or their descendants, were tenants of his in Lincolnshire, including a William Marmyon, possibly the man of that name who had been with him to Scotland in 1308, 1309, 1310, and 1314.[143] Robert de Clifford's inquisition in 1314, the year of his death at Bannockburn, shows that no fewer than seventeen individuals or

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[140] J.C. Holt, *The Northerners: A Study in the Reign of King John* (Oxford, 1961), 36.

[141] For the kinship bond, see SC 8/66, no. 3291. Also: *Gough*, 190; C 67/15, m. 7; A. Tomkinson, 'Retinues at the Tournament of Dunstable, 1309', *EHR*, lxxiv (1959), 76; E 101/15/6, m. 3.

[142] *Calendar of Entries in the Papal Registers Relating to Great Britain and Ireland: Papal Letters,* ed. W.H. Bliss *et al.*, 20 vols, vols i-xiv (London, 1893-1960), vols xv-xx (Dublin, 1978-2005), i, 450. For Hastings' service with Valence: 1311 (C 71/5, m. 4); 1314 (C 71/6, m. 3); 1315 (E 101/15/6, m. 1); 1319 (C 71/10, m. 5); 1322 (*CPR, 1321-24*, 186).

[143] *IPM*, viii, no. 271; 1308 (*Rotuli Scotiae*, i, 59); 1309 (*CDS*, v, 449); 1310 (C 71/4, m. 11); 1314 (C 71/6, m. 3). The other families were St. Loe, Bayouse, Doune and Darcy.

families who had given military service with him were, in fact, his tenants.[144] Some of these men might have been granted lands or rents as a consequence of their military service. Richard de Harley, who was in Roger de Mortimer of Chirk's service in 1306 and 1310 before joining the retinue of his nephew in 1314, was favoured with rents in Shropshire.[145] John de Wymer and Fulk Peyforer, regular campaigners with Robert de Tony and William de Leyburn respectively, received similar remuneration for their continued loyalties.[146]

The most substantial forms of reward for military service were bound up in the terms of indentures of retinue, but it is difficult to reconcile the great emphasis that has been placed on indentured retainers by historians with the lack of evidence for such connections. The first indenture that was drawn up between the Crown and a contractor for a military campaign dates from 1316-17.[147] It may be that few lords went to the trouble of employing them in their own relationships until the Crown began to use the indenture system more frequently. The few that relate to the lords in our sample and their men support the view that where used, such contracts could be very useful in guaranteeing the re-service of a small core of soldiers. Adam de la Forde, an indentured retainer of Robert de Tony, was with his lord on four occasions between 1297 and 1301 after an agreement was drawn up during the preparations for the Flanders campaign;[148] and John Darcy was among Aymer de Valence's most regular campaigners, following him to war frequently during the reign of Edward II.[149] The overlap between the household and indentured retainers has already been noted by J.M.W. Bean.[150] It would seem that members of a lord's *familia* were just as important as the indentured group in providing him with a reliable source of manpower. The chronicler Nicholas Trivet observed that Geoffrey de Langley, who was with Edmund of Lancaster in Wales in 1282 and Gascony in 1295, was a member of Lancaster's household.[151] His son,

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[144] *IPM*, v, no. 533. Thomas de Hellebek, Andrew de Harcla, Richard de Musgrave, Robert de Askeby, Robert le Engleys, the Tailleboys family, Thomas de Multon of Gilsland, John de Harcla, the Coupland family, the Helton family, Thomas de Hauteclou, the Engayne family, the Swyneburne family, the Mauleverer family, John de Penreth, John le Engleys and the Monteny family.

[145] C 67/16, m. 4; C 71/4, m. 13; C 71/6, m. 1; C 143/106/2. Cf. I. Mortimer, *The Greatest Traitor: The Life of Sir Roger Mortimer, 1st Earl of March, Ruler of England, 1327-1330* (London, 2003), 66.

[146] Wymer: 1297 (E 101/6/37, m. 4); 1300 (E 101/8/23, m. 5); 1301 (E 101/9/23, m. 1); 1303 (C 67/15, m. 10d); and rents (C 143/131/13). Peyforer: above n. 129; *A Descriptive Catalogue of Ancient Deeds in the Public Record Office*, 6 vols, (London, 1890-1915), iii, 160.

[147] N.B. Lewis, 'An Early Fourteenth Century Contract for Military Service', *BIHR*, xx (1943-5), 111-18.

[148] Above n. 128 and chapter 3 n. 131; Bean, *From Lord to Patron*, 47-8.

[149] Indenture ('Private Indentures for Life Service', no. 15); 1306 (C 67/16, m. 13); 1310 (*PW*, II, ii, 401); 1314 (C 71/6, m. 5); 1315 (E 101/15/6, m. 1); 1319 (C 71/10, m. 5); 1322 (*CPR, 1321-24*, 186).

[150] Bean, *From Lord to Patron*, 143.

[151] *Trivet*, 330; C 67/8, m. 5d (1282); *RG*, iii, 296 (1295). Also, see W.E. Rhodes, 'Edmund, earl of Lancaster', *EHR*, x (1895), 228; 'Account of the Expenses of John of Brabant and Thomas and Henry of Lancaster, AD. 1292-3, ed. J. Burtt, *Camden Miscellany II*, Camden Society 1st ser., lv (1853), xv, 10.

Edmund, later gave service with Thomas of Lancaster in Scotland in 1297, 1298 and 1301: he was probably a member of the Lancastrian *familia* as his father had been.[152] John de Cam, the steward of Roger de Mortimer of Chirk, provides another example of a household retainer who gave regular military service on behalf of his lord. He can be traced either preparing for or serving in war with Mortimer on seven occasions between 1294 and 1319.[153] Other connections between lords and their regular followers are more difficult to pin down, and might have arisen from less tangible bonds of friendship or neighbourly association. J.R. Maddicott traced the connection between Robert Fitz Nigel and Thomas of Lancaster back to 1302 when he witnessed one of the earl's charters,[154] but a roll of household expenses of Thomas and Henry of Lancaster, dating from 1297 and recording payments for two saddles with the arms of Sir Robert Fitz Nigel, suggests that the connection went back still further.[155] The nature of the bond between these men is not clear. It was, at least, long-lasting, for Fitz Nigel later appears in Lancaster's retinue in Scotland in 1303, 1306 and 1319, as well as at the first Dunstable tournament.[156] William de Scalebroke, who was with Ralph Pipard in Wales in 1295 and Scotland in 1298 and 1300, witnessed the granting of a manor by the latter to Hugh le Despenser in 1301.[157] Meanwhile Ralph le Bygod, with Peter de Chavent in 1297 and 1298, later accompanied him overseas on what might have been a diplomatic mission in the summer of 1301.[158] Whether the ties between such men arose from within the household, through indentures, or by less formal bonds is now difficult to discern. Still, it is clear that soldiers and their lords did not confine their mutual associations to the sphere of war, and that their connections often lasted well beyond the duration of a campaign.

From what has been said thus far it is evident that the ties between military leaders and their men in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries were often of a durable nature. The analysis has been focussed, for the most part, on the well-documented campaigns that took place at the height of the wars of Edward I because it is only by carrying out the kind of in-depth analysis facilitated by such favourable record survival that meaningful conclusions can be reached about retinue stability.

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[152] 1297 (C 67/12, m. 3); 1298 (*Gough*, 179); 1301 (C 67/14, m. 5).
[153] *Ancient Deeds*, iii, 439; 1294 (*RG*, iii, 167); 1300 (E 101/8/23, m. 6); 1301 (E 101/9/23, m. 2); 1306 (C 67/16, m. 8); 1310 (C 71/4, m. 13); 1314 (C 71/6, m. 1); 1319 (C 71/10, m. 3).
[154] Maddicott, *Thomas of Lancaster*, 61, n. 5.
[155] C 47/3/28, m.3.
[156] 1303 (C 67/15, m. 13); 1306 (C 67/16, m. 10); 1309 (Tomkinson, 'Retinues at Dunstable', 74); 1319 (Maddicott, *Thomas of Lancaster*, 61, n. 5).
[157] C 67/10, m. 3; *Gough*, 220; *PDS*, 222; *Ancient Deeds*, ii, 163.
[158] E 101/6/37, m. 1i; *Gough*, 168; *CPR, 1292-1301*, 601.

Nevertheless, consideration of the service continuity for earlier and later campaigns may also tell us a great deal about retaining and recruitment practices. In this respect the Welsh war of 1282-3, the only early venture for the reign of Edward I for which horse inventories have survived, offers an ideal opportunity to compare the retinue continuity in the first and second halves of the reign. Did magnate retinues follow those of the king in revealing a high rate of turnover between the 1280s and the French and Scottish wars of the 1290s, or did the aristocracy display greater stability in retinue composition? Of the fifty lords in our sample nine, or around a fifth, also served as retinue leaders during the second Welsh war, but we lack the names of the two sergeants who were with Walter de Beauchamp. Taking the remaining eight fully-documented retinues which appear on the horse inventories for that year, four reveal evidence of personnel continuity with the later expeditions of the 1290s and 1300s. Three of the nineteen men with Ralph Basset of Drayton later served with him in Wales in 1294-5; one of these, Robert de Shelton, was also with him in Gascony the following year and in Scotland in 1298.[159] Two of the six soldiers with Peter de Chavent joined him on either the Flanders or Falkirk campaign some fifteen years later;[160] two of the nine soldiers with William de Leyburn also re-appear with him in the 1290s;[161] and Thomas de Bykenore was accompanied by his kinsman John in both 1282 and 1298.[162] These figures may not seem particularly impressive by comparison with those given above, but it should be remembered (as little evidence survives relating to these retinues for the Welsh campaign of 1287) that over a decade separates the phases of war under analysis. Many of the men who had served in Wales might simply have died or retired during the intervening period. Furthermore, whilst the majority of the soldiers with our sample leaders in 1282 cannot be traced with them on later campaigns, individuals with the same surnames, probably their descendants, sometimes can. Thus, the William Caus with Hugh Pointz in Flanders in 1297 may be linked to the Richard Caus who was with him in 1282,[163] and the Ralph de Pipe with Ralph Basset in 1282 to a Thomas de Pipe with his son twenty-four years later.[164]

So far, the issue of familial continuity within the retinues has been avoided because of the need to establish, in the first instance, the rates of re-service among

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[159] John de Bodeham and John de Clinton: 1282 (C 47/2/7, m. 4); 1294 (C 67/10, m. 6). Robert de Shelton, *ibid*, 1296 (*RG*, iii, 324) and 1298 (*Gough*, 224).
[160] Peter Doleyns: C 47/2/7, m. 12; *Gough*, 168. Caned de Staney: C 47/2/7, m. 12; E 101/6/37, m. 1i.
[161] William de Iffeld: 1282 (C 47/2/5, m. 2); 1297 (E 101/6/37, m. 4); 1298 (*Gough*, 194). Peter de Ros: 1282 (C 47/2/5, m. 2); 1297 (E 101/6/37, m. 4); 1303 (E 101/612/11, m. 5d).
[162] C 47/2/6, m. 6; *Gough*, 162.
[163] E 101/6/19, m. 1; C 47/2/7, m. 1.
[164] C 47/2/5, m. 2; C 67/16, m. 5.

individual soldiers. Furthermore, family relations between men with the same surname, particularly those of sub-knightly rank, can rarely be proven beyond doubt. Yet, the family was one of the most important units of social organisation within medieval Europe. Therefore, even if *familial* continuity within the retinue does not lend itself to the same kind of statistical analysis as *individual* continuity, it is something which we must take into account and without which our impression of retinue stability would be severely distorted. Earlier, we saw how a minimum of 45 per cent of the men-at-arms in the retinues of our Falkirk leaders served with them on at least one other occasion between the first Welsh war and Bannockburn. When we factor in re-service within the same family the degree of stability becomes all the more impressive. Four of the soldiers in Ralph Pipard's company in 1298 who seem to have followed him to war on just that one occasion - Adam le Mareschal, Simon Barry, John de Scalebroke and George Giffard - shared their surnames with other men in the retinue at Falkirk who can be shown to have served with Pipard at least twice.[165] Five of the soldiers with Aymer de Valence in 1298 fall into a similar category.[166] The significance of such family links becomes more evident when we study the composition of magnate retinues over extended periods of time. Robert de Clifford's retinue reveals around twenty-two kinship groups: service within his *comitiva* rotated as family members came and went on a regular basis.[167] Whilst John de Harcla was with Clifford in Scotland in 1296, William de Harcla accompanied him to Falkirk and Andrew de Harcla in 1311.[168] Although none of these men seem to have served with Clifford more than once, the family was represented in his company on at least three occasions. In like manner, Andrew de Penreth was with Clifford in 1311, John de Penreth in 1303, 1306, 1307 and 1310, and a third member of the family, Robert, in 1300.[169] Clifford's retinue was by no means exceptional in this respect for John de Drokensford's company reveals around fifteen family groupings with rotating service in the *comitiva*,[170] Thomas of Lancaster's

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[165] *Gough*, 220-1. Ralph le Mareschal and William de Scalebroke in 1294-5 (C 67/10, m. 3), and John Giffard and Robert Barry in 1300 (C 47/1/6, m. 3).

[166] William de Acton, Peter de Paris, Richard Pauncefot, Roger de Sakeville and Hugh le Taillour were with Valence at Falkirk only (*Gough*, 216-18), but a Walter de Acton and Gilbert de Paris were with him in 1297 (E 101/6/28, m. 2i), a Walter Pauncefot in 1306 (C 67/16, m. 13), a Richard de Sakeville in 1315 (E 101/15/6, m. 1) and Thomas de Sakeville in 1301 and 1303 (E 101/9/24, m. 1d; E 101/612/10, m. 1), and a Robert and William le Taillour in 1297 and 1301 (E 101/6/28, m. 2i; E 101/9/24, m. 1d).

[167] The families of Hellebek, Multon, Redman, Penreth, Engleys, Harcla, Vepont, Monteny, Stirkeland, Lancaster, Kirkebride, Latimer, Rossegill, Louther, Sheffeld, Boys, Haustede, Leyburn, Joneby, Mauneby, Swyneburne and Ellesfeld.

[168] E 101/5/23, m. 1i; *Gough*, 197; C 71/4, m. 4.

[169] Andrew; E 101/14/15, m. 3. John: 1303 (E 101/612/11, m. 2); 1306 (C 67/16, m. 13); 1307 (E 101/14/15, m. 9); 1310 (*Rotuli Scotiae*, i, 89). Robert; E 101/8/23, m. 5.

[170] The families of Chamberleyn, Flambard, Sauvage, Harenhull, Blakenham, Kendal, Molenders, Punchardon, Burghunt, Popham, Cormailles, Burnel, Gilbert, de la Hyde and Staney.

the same number,[171] and Aymer de Valence's a startling fifty-one.[172] There is no space to analyse all these connections here. Nonetheless, the figures speak volumes about the importance of kinship networks to the recruitment drives of leading magnates in these years.

Family relations become increasingly relevant as we look towards Bannockburn and the years beyond. Several lords, such as Ralph Pipard (d.1303), Hugh Bardolf (d.1304) and Robert de Tony (d.1309) predeceased that defeat; Edmund de Mauley and Robert de Clifford, on the other hand, were slain in the battle. Careful analysis of the retinues of the ten men in our sample who were still serving as leaders in 1314 gives the impression that many soldiers were recruited in that year who had not served with them in the past. Only eleven of the sixty men with the Despensers can be found with them in previous hosts,[173] and five of the twenty-seven with Henry de Beaumont.[174] Both Beaumont and two other men with low continuity rates, Edmund de Mauley and Bartholomew de Badlesmere, appear to have had far larger retinues with them at Bannockburn than in previous years, particularly in the case of the latter two. We must also take into account that neither of the Despensers had given military service for several years. These factors, together with the consideration that Bannockburn is a relatively poorly-documented campaign, means that we should not read too much into these figures. At least twenty of the men with Aymer de Valence at Bannockburn had ridden with him before,[175] and seven of the thirteen soldiers who took out protections with Robert de Clifford.[176] Therefore there is no reason to believe that the army in 1314 was any less experienced than the hosts that had been raised at the height of the wars of

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[171] Gacelyn, St. Maur, Legh, Swynnerton, Waldeshef, Dacre, Holland, Lughtburghe, Limesy, Botiller, Grandison, Metham, Segrave, St. Martin and Trussell.

[172] E.g. Reginald de Paveley appears in the retinue in 1301 and 1314 (see chapter 3, n. 238), and was proffered by Valence in 1322 (C 47/5/10, m. 1iii), Richard de Paveley was with him in 1315 (E 101/15/6, m. 1), and Walter de Paveley during the War of St. Sardos (*CPR, 1321-24*, 427).

[173] Ralph de Cammoys: 1297 (C 67/12, m. 3d); 1298 (*Gough*, 188); 1300 (C 67/14, m. 10); 1303 (C 67/15, m. 14); 1306 (C 67/16, m. 11); 1307 (*CDS*, v, 445); 1308 (*Rotuli Scotiae*, i, 55). John de Ratingden: 1294 (C 67/10, m. 6); 1297 (C 67/12, m. 3d); 1298 (*Gough*, 187); 1303 (*CVCR*, 81); 1306 (C 67/16, m. 5); 1307 (C 67/7, m. 1). John de Haudlo; see above n. 122. Walter Haket: 1297 (C 67/12, m. 3d); 1298 (*Gough*, 187); 1300 (C 67/14, m. 10). John Russel: 1296 (E 101/5/23, m. 1i); 1298 (*Gough*, 187). John Joce: 1296 (E 101/5/23, m. 1i); 1297 (C 67/12, m. 3d); 1298 (*Gough*, 188). Martin de Fishacre; 1306 (C 67/16, m. 9). Richard de Everley: 1298 (*Gough*, 188); 1300 (C 67/14, m. 10). Richard de Chastillon; 1306 (C 67/16, m. 8). Robert de Bologne; 1300 (C 67/14, m. 10). Nicholas de Alneto; 1306 (C 67/16, m. 11). For their service in 1314; C 71/6, mm. 1-5.

[174] Richard le Breton; 1311 (C 71/5, m. 5). Henry de Percy; 1309 (*CDS*, v, 448). John de Eure: 1308 (*Rotuli Scotiae*, i, 58); 1311 (C 71/4, m. 5). Roger de Haudlo: 1301 (E 101/9/24, m. 1); 1303 (E 101/612/11, m. 1); 1308 (*Rotuli Scotiae*, i, 59). William Marmyon: 1308, 1309 and 1310 (above n. 143). For their service in 1314; C 71/6, mm. 3, 4.

[175] Eight, Maurice de Berkeley, Robert de Berkeley, Richard Wyriott, John de la Ryvere, John de Gacelyn, Thomas de Gurnay, William de Wauton and Roger de Ingepenne, had been with him at Falkirk: *Gough*, 216-18; C 67/13, m. 7. For 1314; C 71/6, mm. 1, 3, 5, 8.

[176] Most of these, such as Richard de Huddleston (C 67/16, m. 8; C 71/6, m. 1) and Nicholas and Robert de Leyburn (C 67/16, m. 13; C 71/6, m. 1) had joined the retinue since 1306.

Edward I, although the more extended gaps between major campaigns under Edward II might have increased the number of first-timers a little. If we go back a few years to the more fully-documented army of 1310-11, we find that the degree of retinue stability was very similar to that for previous expeditions.

Table 4.4: Retinue Continuity for Sample Leaders in Scotland, 1310-11 (1277-1314)*

Leader	Number of men with leader:		% continuity	Times served with leader other than in 1310						
	In 1310	In 1310 (who also served in other year)		1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Badlesmere	1	0	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Beaumont	13	3	23	1	1	1	-	-	-	-
Botetourt	7	2	29	1	1	-	-	-	-	-
Clifford	47	24	51	11	5	4	2	1	-	1
Fitz Payn	11	6	55	3	1	1	-	-	1	-
Lovel	2	2	100	-	-	-	1	-	1	-
Mohaut	14	4	29	-	1	-	2	1	-	-
R. Mortimer	9	6	66	1	-	2	2	1	-	-
Welles	1	1	100	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
Total	105	48	46	17	9	8	7	3	3	1

* Table does not include men proffered by sample lords at the feudal muster

Given that we lack a horse inventory for the army of 1310, it seems reasonable to assume that the continuity rates for that campaign were again around the 50 per cent mark, as with previous hosts. The sample for that year is smaller than one would like. Even so, it is interesting to note that a minimum of three of those with Henry de Beaumont, and five with Robert de Clifford, were also with their lords in 1314, suggesting that whilst many new men might have been recruited for Bannockburn, there was also a core of experienced campaigners within most of the retinues.[177] Three of those with Robert de Mohaut in 1310 had been with him at Falkirk;[178] and the same number had been associated with Roger de Mortimer of Chirk since the time of the Gascon campaign of 1294.[179] The decision to use Bannockburn as a cut-off point means that the table does not account for many interesting bonds that lasted beyond 1314. No fewer than nine of the twenty-two men who had letters of protection with Henry de

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[177] Beaumont: Breton, Eure and Marmyon, see above n. 174. Clifford: Nicholas and Robert de Leyburn (see preceding note), Thomas de Monteny (see above n. 122 and chapter 3 n. 159), John Mauleverer (*CCW*, 351; C 71/6, m. 1), and William de Penyngton (*Rotuli Scotiae*, i, 89; C 71/6, m. 1).

[178] Roger de Bilney, John de Bracebridge and Richard Strech (see above, table 4.1 and n. 114.)

[179] John de Cam (see above n. 153), Hugh Godard (see chapter 3 n. 107 and n. 216) and John de Mortimer (*RG*, iii, 167; C 71/4, m. 13).

Beaumont at the siege of Berwick in 1319 had fought with him at Bannockburn or earlier, including the father of the famous Northumbrian chronicler, Thomas Gray of Heton.[180] Gray junior, though writing several decades later, recalled the bond between his father and Beaumont and how the two men had squabbled at Bannockburn. This point is of particular interest given that comments by contemporaries on lord-follower relations are very rare. That the younger Gray remembered this earlier tie between his father and Beaumont says a great deal about the durability of traditions of service within genteel families.[181] We lack the names of the warriors who later accompanied Beaumont to Scotland during the early years of the reign of Edward III, including during his finest hour at Dupplin Moor in 1332.[182] Nevertheless, at least fourteen of the men-at-arms who headed north of the border with the Despensers in 1322 had been connected to them since Bannockburn or earlier.[183] The same applies to a similar number who had previous links with the earl of Pembroke.[184] Therefore, the continued allegiance of a large group of soldiers to Beaumont beyond 1314 was by no means exceptional, nor should we expect it to have been given what has been said about retinue stability for many earlier English armies.

Particularly striking is the way that a number of the bonds between men-at-arms and their lords continued or were revived among their descendants later in the fourteenth century. Five of the men in the company of Ralph Basset of Drayton in Scotland in 1333, John and Richard de Stafford, John de Sutton, and William and Richard de Whytacre, were probably related to Edmund de Stafford, Richard de Sutton and Richard de Whytacre who had earlier accompanied Basset senior to Wales and

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[180] William de Bokminster; 1309 (*CDS*, v, 448). Robert le Breton; 1314 (C 71/6, m. 3). Peter de Saltmarsh, John de Lymbury, Thomas de Gaveley, and Philip and Norman Darcy in 1314; C 71/6, m. 3. Thomas Gray; 1311 (C 71/5, m. 5). William le Mareschal: 1297 (E 101/6/37, m. 7); 1298 (*Gough*, 172); 1300 (E 101/8/23, m. 2); 1301 (E 101/9/24, m.1); 1303 (E 101/612/11, m. 1). For 1319; C 71/10, m. 4.

[181] *Scalacronica*, 75.

[182] For Beaumont's victory at Dupplin Moor, see J. Sumption, *The Hundred Years War: Trial by Battle* (London, 1990), 124-6.

[183] Ralph de Cammoys, Richard de Chastillon, Martin de Fishacre, John de Haudlo, John Joce and John de Ratingden; see above, n. 173. Ralph Basset: 1300 (C 67/14, m. 10); 1301 (C 67/14, m. 5). Thomas Chaunterel; 1314 (C 71/6, m. 3). Ralph de Gorges: 1304 (C 67/15, m. 2); 1306 (C 67/16, m. 12); 1309 (Tomkinson, 'Retinues at Dunstable', 76). Simon de Lyndeseye; 1314 (C 71/6, m. 5). Richard de Mascy; 1314 (C 71/6, m. 3). Robert de Stanegrave: 1294 (C 67/10, m. 5d); 1296 (E 101/5/23, m. 1i). Robert de Torkesey; 1314 (C 71/6, m. 3). Philip de Verley; 1310 (*PW*, II, ii, 402). For 1322: *CPR, 1321-24*, 186-9; BL, Stowe MS 553, ff. 61r-v.

[184] John de Hastings, John Darcy and Reginald de Paveley; see above n. 142, n. 149, n. 172. John la Zouche; 1315 (E 101/15/6, m. 1). Robert Bendyn and Ralph Bagot; 1314 (C 71/6, m. 5). William de Cleydon; 1306 (C 67/16, m. 12). John de Gacelyn: 1297 (E 101/6/28, m. 2i); 1298 (*Gough*, 217); 1311 (C 71/5, m. 4); 1314 (C 71/6, m. 5). William Lovel and Richard de Muntchensy; 1314 (C 71/6, m. 5). John Morice; 1310 (*PW*, II, ii, 401). John de Pabenham; 1306 (C 67/16, m. 13). Percival Symeon: 1306 (C 67/16, m. 13); 1314 (C 71/6, m. 5). John de Stodley; 1298 (*Gough*, 217). John de Wolaston; 1311 (C 71/5, m. 4). For 1322: *CPR 1321-24*, 185-6; BL, Stowe MS 553. f. 56r; C 47/5/10, m. 1iii).

France during the 1280s and 1290s.[185] Similarly, the Richard Foliot with Thomas de Furnivall junior in the same year might have been linked to the Edmund Foliot who had fought in the retinue of Furnivall senior during the wars of Edward I.[186] Ralph de Cammoys served the Despensers on at least nine expeditions between 1297 and 1322, so it is interesting to find a John and Hugh de Cammoys in the retinue of a later Hugh le Despenser in northern France in 1340. John went on to ride alongside the same lord in Brittany shortly afterwards.[187] Some of the most impressive instances of continuity can be found among the earls and dukes of Lancaster. At least thirty of the men-at-arms who later campaigned under Henry of Grosmont during the years of greatest success in the Hundred Years War were members of families whose forebears had been followers of the duke's father and uncle.[188] The William Trussell who accompanied Thomas of Lancaster to Scotland in 1306 and who was proffered by him at the feudal muster four years later may or may not have been the man of that name who can be found in Henry of Grosmont's retinue in 1335, 1341 and 1345, although that seems very unlikely. There was also a Theobald Trussell who was with the king's lieutenant on eight campaigns between 1334, when he served as an esquire in Scotland, and the Reims expedition of 1359-60.[189] This is without including the numerous members of the St. Maur, Twyford, Vernoun and Zouche families who served with more than one member of the Lancaster dynasty at one time or another during the fourteenth century. Evidently, the loyalties of men to their lords often transcended the coming and going of kings as well as the stresses of civil war and political turmoil, and provided an element of stability that no doubt contributed to the military successes of these years.

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[185] Edmund de Stafford in 1294-5 (C 67/10, m. 6); Richard de Sutton in 1282 (C 47/2/7, m. 5); Richard de Whytacre in 1287 (*CPR, 1281-92*, 274). For Basset junior's retinue in 1333, see C 71/13, m. 31.

[186] Richard Foliot (C 71/13, m. 28); Edmund Foliot (see chapter 3 n. 216 for 1296, 1298 and 1300).

[187] Ralph de Cammoys (above, n. 173), Hugh and John in 1340 (C 76/15, m. 20), and John in Brittany (C 61/54, m. 30). On the elder Cammoys, see N. Fryde, *The Tyranny and Fall of Edward II 1321-1326* (Cambridge, 1979), 47-8, 183.

[188] Walter de Bonyngton, Henry Cliff, Ralph and William de Ferrers, Richard de Havering, John de Holland, William de Lughtburghe, Peter de Melbourne, Thomas de Metham, Richard and Robert de Shelton, Robert and William de St. Maur, Theobald, Thomas and William de Trussell, John de Twyford senior, John de Twyford junior, Ralph and Robert de Twyford, Edmund, Robert and Thomas de Ufford, John and Geoffrey Vernoun, and John, Richard and three men named William la Zouche.

[189] For the man of that name who was associated with Thomas of Lancaster, see C 67/16, m. 4 and *PW*, II, ii, 406, and for the later service with Henry of Grosmont: 1335 (C 71/15, m. 27); 1341 (C 71/21, m. 5); 1345-6 (E 101/25/9, m. 3). Theobald was with Grosmont in 1334 (E 101/15/12); 1338-9 (*The Wardrobe Book of William de Norwell, 12 July 1338 to 27 May 1340*, ed. M. Lyon, B. Lyon, H.S. Lucas and J. de Sturler [Brussels, 1983], 312); 1342-3 (C 76/17, m. 22); 1345-6 (E 101/25/9, m. 3); 1347 (*Crecy and Calais*, ed. G. Wrottesley [London, 1898], 131); 1348 (C 76/26, m. 7); 1356-8 (C 76/34, mm. 8, 14, 15); 1359-60 (C 76/38, m. 16; C 76/40, m. 11).

LOYAL SERVICE, SHIFTING ALLEGIANCES

From the perspectives of the lords in our sample, there appears to have been greater stability in retinue composition within the armies of Edward I and Edward II than has generally been perceived. Retinue leaders raising companies for war were able to rely upon well-defined recruitment pools consisting of soldiers who were familiar to them from previous campaigns, or were to become so in the future. To obtain a deeper understanding of the service networks within late thirteenth and early fourteenth-century England it is now necessary to alter our viewpoint, and to examine in more detail the allegiances of the gentry who staffed these retinues. In the previous chapter we saw how many of the men-at-arms who fought at Falkirk, both knights and sergeants, had careers spanning twenty years or more. To fully appreciate the nature of the personal ties that brought so many men into the king's armies, however, we must attempt to analyse the military service connections of the gentry *en masse*. This inevitably means interpreting hundreds of career profiles. To summarise the military lordship bonds of all the men-at-arms who went to war between the first Welsh war and Bannockburn lies beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless, our fifty sample retinues at Falkirk provide ample opportunity to reconstruct a proportion of these ties, providing as they do the names of 647 mounted soldiers. Not all of these individuals can be traced with absolute certainty; there were also many whose military careers appear to have been fairly short-lived. Yet overall, this group provides us with a sufficiently large number of soldiers who were regularly active during the wars in Wales, France and Scotland to enable us to reach meaningful conclusions relating to a number of important questions. How many of these men, for instance, remained with the same lords throughout their military careers? What proportion seems to have changed their allegiance on a regular basis? And in those instances when soldiers do appear to have changed their lords for others, what factors, now often difficult to discern, might have influenced their decisions?

Since the publication of K.B. McFarlane's seminal studies on 'bastard feudalism' and the late-medieval nobility, all discussions about noble and genteel military service have been coloured by his conclusions. His assessment of the gentry during the Wars of the Roses as men who 'turned their coats as often and with the same chequered success as their betters', and his belief that the fourteenth-century soldier 'seemed more anxious to see service than to care whether it was always under the same banner', have left an indelible imprint on subsequent historiography.[190] Nor was he

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[190] K.B. McFarlane, 'The Wars of the Roses', *England in the Fifteenth Century: Collected Essays* (London, 1981), 248; idem, 'Bastard Feudalism', 176.

alone in expressing such views. Helen Cam was of the opinion that the aristocracy of the later Middle Ages were an altogether less faithful and dependable group than their forebears during the eleventh and twelfth centuries. In her eyes, the 'parasitic institution' of 'bastard feudalism' was 'far removed...from the atmosphere of responsibility, loyalty and faith which had characterised the relationship of lord and vassal in the earlier Middle Ages'.[191] Although written primarily about the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries when the system of contracting for military service had taken deeper root within English society, the views of McFarlane and Cam have been widely accepted and applied to earlier periods. 'The evidence', a fairly recent summary of research on retinue personnel in medieval English armies has indicated, 'suggests that there was a floating population of men willing to take service with whoever offered them the best terms'.[192] Despite certain elements of stability and continuity, 'the society of late medieval England was one in which loyalty to a lord, even if nurtured by generations of family tradition, was subject to erosion'.[193] There can be no denying that such statements contain a large element of truth. The faithlessness detected by modern historians was often only too evident to contemporaries: one song on the reign of Edward II depicted the knights of that era as debased and lamentably arrayed, and the squires as deceitful men who could not keep to their words.[194] When we also consider the well-documented and widely-condemned betrayals by their retainers of the earl of Gloucester at Bannockburn and Thomas of Lancaster at Boroughbridge, it is evident that not all soldiers active under the first two Edwards were unreservedly devoted to their lords.[195] Yet, whilst men-at-arms often did move from one retinue to another, and sometimes, in difficult circumstances, abandoned their lords to their miserable fates, it is not quite so clear whether such actions were all that common, or motivated purely by selfish interests.

Rather than moralise about a body of men whose actions, let alone motives, can be notoriously difficult to reconstruct, it may be more appropriate to accept that some movement within the military community was inevitable. Personal relationships changed then, just as they do today, and it would be strange indeed if during the course of several decades of military service large numbers of men-at-arms did not, at one

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[191] H.M. Cam, 'The Decline and Fall of English Feudalism', *History*, xxv (1940), 225.
[192] Prestwich, '*Miles in Armis Strenuus*', 217.
[193] Bean, *From Lord to Patron*, 188.
[194] *Thomas Wright's Political Songs*, 335-6.
[195] See chapter 1 n. 28; *Thomas Wright's Political Songs*, 270-1. For further comment on lordship bonds and the rebellion of 1322, see O. de Ville, 'Jocelyn Deyville: Brigand, Or Man of his Time?', *Northern History*, xxxv (1999), 45; C. Valente, *The Theory and Practice of Revolt in Medieval England* (Aldershot, 2003), 149-53.

point or another, ride within the retinue of more than one lord. Furthermore, it would seem (though the debate continues to rage) that in most parts of England for most of the time, the gentry constituted an independent body of men, free from the coercive influence of the leading nobles and barons. As Colin Richmond has rather amusingly put it, 'men were not Pavlovian dogs, jumping at the chance of a fee, a rent charge, a stewardship here, a parkership there. No more were lords puppet masters manipulating their marionette retainers to dominate the provinces or pack parliaments'.[196] In part, the freedom of action of the gentry was guaranteed by the inability of the nobility to retain all members of their social group.[197] One needs only to glance at the long lists of 'independent' protections that were enrolled before campaigns, or the large number of men summoned to a muster in 1322 who had not already been organised into retinues, to appreciate that the image of a floating population of men-at-arms is not unfounded.[198] By the same token, it would be inaccurate to see in every instance of a change of retinue evidence of instability and disloyalty. 'Disloyalty' is a loaded term that gives a moralistic dimension to the study of history that can seldom be supported by evidence from the sources. In many respects it would be more suitable to regard such changes as evidence of fluidity rather than instability. Certainly, there were many instances in which joint raids or commands made the transfer of personnel and sharing of retainers a practical necessity; and it would be wrong to presume that men who changed lords or served within a different company always did so without the consent, or good will, of their usual retinue leader. Edward II was happy to share his retainers and place them at the service of his favourite and possible brother-in-arms, Piers Gaveston.[199] Lords sometimes even encouraged their household retainers to have connections with other men: Thomas of Lancaster's accounts for 1318-19 record robes for Robert de Holland in the liveries of Hugh de Audley and Bartholomew de Badlesmere.[200] Similarly, the indenture of 1297 between the earl of Norfolk and John de Segrave allows the latter to serve in other companies if the earl was not on campaign.[201]

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[196] C. Richmond, 'After McFarlane', *History*, lxviii (1983), 57.

[197] For a slightly later period, see S. Payling, *Political Society in Lancastrian England: The Greater Gentry of Nottinghamshire* (Oxford, 1991), 105; C. Carpenter, 'Gentry and Community', 360.

[198] For the 1322 returns; *PW*, II, ii, 587-95.

[199] Hamilton, *Piers Gaveston*, 102, 167 n. 100. I have identified ten men with Gaveston in 1306 or 1310 who were also members of Edward's household or joined it after Gaveston's death, namely Edmund Bacon, John Howard, John de Charlton, John de la Beche, Robert de Sapy, Humphrey de Littlebury, Thomas de Chaucombe, Warin de Lisle, John Knokyn and Robert de Kendal. With Gaveston: E 101/13/7, m. 1; *Rotuli Scotiae*, i, 89; C 71/4, mm. 4-13. Household service: E 101/369/11, f. 107r; BL, Cotton Nero C VIII, ff. 36r, 42r, 90v-92r; E 101/376/7, f. 54v. On the relationship between Gaveston and Edward, see P. Chaplais, *Piers Gaveston: Edward II's Adoptive Brother* (Oxford, 1994), 20-22.

[200] Maddicott, 'Thomas of Lancaster and Sir Robert Holland', 465.

[201] Hicks, *Bastard Feudalism*, 88.

As Christine Carpenter has pointed out, 'impressionistic surveys confined to a small number of the gentry are not enough' when studying the personal networks, military or otherwise, of the active men of this age. Our sample of 647 soldiers enables us to push beyond such limits, and to conduct an analysis that is conducive to a study 'both comprehensive and systematic'.[202] In an attempt to provide as subtle and nuanced a perspective of the military bonds of these individuals as possible, the career profiles of each soldier have been placed into one of several categories. At either extreme are those who can be shown to have either remained in the service of the same lord throughout their military careers or to have changed allegiance at some stage or other, often on a regular basis and for no obvious reason. Between these two extremes is a third group consisting of individuals who did serve in the retinue of more than one company commander, but whose change of unit can be explained by one of a variety of factors, such as the death of their lord; service with another man from the same family or region; or the absence of their usual leader from a campaign. A few others took out letters of protection or attorney with the campaign captains and were therefore not necessarily changing retinues. Dividing the profiles of hundreds of men into these categories is by no means an easy exercise, yet the resulting data is likely to provide a more accurate insight into the networks of these men than a simple division into those who appear to have remained 'loyal' and those who did not.

Table 4.5: Lordship Allegiances of Sample Knights and Sergeants (1277-1314)

	Knights	Sergeants
Served one lord only	37	311
Changed lord according to:		
Regional factors	5	28
Familial factors	6	8
Death of leader	12	23
Non-service of leader	6	13
As part of sub-retinue	3	22
Combination of above	6	6
Other explanation	3	2
Change of lord unexplained	35	84
Total	113	497

[202] C. Carpenter, 'Gentry and Community', 369.

Difficulties of identification mean that it has been necessary to exclude thirty-seven of the sergeants in our sample from the above table. Also, many individuals can be traced on campaign within the service of a lord on only one occasion: five of the knights, and 193 of the sergeants, fall into this category. This means that the number of men who seem to have served with only one lord throughout their military careers was not quite as impressive as would appear from the table. Nevertheless, if we exclude these soldiers from our calculations it remains the case that thirty-two of the 108 knights who served within a magnate retinue on more than one expedition, or 30 per cent, and 118 of the equivalent 304 sergeants (39 per cent), fought under one lord only. Thus, around a third of the men-at-arms who went to war in 1298 would appear to have remained under the banner of the same retinue leader in all other hosts in which they served during their careers. This figure might be lower if the records at our disposal were more complete. Still, it would seem that the proportion of men-at-arms who had no desire, or need, to change their allegiance was far from negligible. A considerable number of these men, particularly the sergeants, can be traced in the service records in the years up to and including Bannockburn on just two or three occasions. However, there were also some who stayed with the same lord on four, five or more campaigns. Such were the knights Hugh Godard, who prepared for war with Roger de Mortimer of Chirk on six occasions between 1294 and 1310,[203] and Robert de Dutton and Thomas de Cirencester, who followed their respective lords, John de Benstede and Hugh de Courtenay, to war four times.[204] Even among the sergeants, there were those who gave regular bouts of service without apparently leaving the confines of the one retinue. Alan de Sumborn and Hamo Bygod each served in four different hosts with Alan Plukenet senior or junior.[205] Robert de Suthwold was with Thomas de Verdon an equal number of times,[206] and John de Cary and Geoffrey de Harden are listed in the company of Robert Fitz Payn on seven and five campaigns respectively.[207] To some extent, individuals such as these were the exception that proves the rule, but the important stability that they provided to magnate war retinues probably compensated for their modest numbers.

It would be a mistake to draw too sharp a distinction between these 'stable' elements within Edwardian armies and other individuals who served several lords in

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[203] Above n. 179. He took out a protection 'independently' in 1314.
[204] Dutton: 1297 (E 101/6/37, m. 2iii); 1298 (*Gough*, 177); 1301 (E 101/9/24, m. 2); 1303 (E 101/612/11, m. 3). Cirencester: 1296 (E 101/5/23, m. 1ii); 1298 (*Gough*, 208); 1300 (*Aspilogia III*, i, 454); 1304 (*PDS*, 272).
[205] E 101/5/23, m.1ii; E 101/6/37, m. 1i; *Gough*, 190; C 67/14, m. 11; *PDS*, 218; E 101/9/24, m. 1d.
[206] 1297 (E 101/6/37, m. 6i); 1298 (*Gough*, 173); 1300 (C 67/14, m. 10); 1301 (E 101/9/24, m. 1).
[207] Above n. 120.

different hosts. In truth, the 'stable' element was probably less stable, and the 'unstable' element more stable, than would seem to have been the case through our distorted lens. Sometimes a man might serve a lord for over a decade before suddenly turning against him for reasons that are now difficult to discern. Members of the Berkeley family went to war with Aymer de Valence on numerous occasions, including at Falkirk and Bannockburn, before destroying his lands at Painswick in 1318.[208] Moreover, we should not forget that Thomas of Lancaster had been on amicable terms with his cousin Edward of Caernarfon for a number of years prior to becoming his irreconcilable opponent for reasons which continue to task historians.[209] At the other extreme, many of the soldiers in the table who have been placed into the category 'changes unexplained' displayed a great deal of continuity in their service patterns. Thomas de Coudray can be found in three different lordship groups between 1297 and 1314, but he gave repeated service in each. He was with Hugh le Despenser, or his sub-leader John ap Adam, in 1297, 1298 and 1307; John de St. John in 1294, 1299, 1300 and 1301; and either Ralph de Monthermer or Gilbert de Clare in 1303, 1306 and 1314.[210] From one perspective he may appear to have been one of K.B. McFarlane's prototype freelances, 'going abroad in the "comitiva" of now this commander and now that'.[211] Alternatively, if we think of his military service in terms of a network of relations, then it is clear that he operated within well-defined lordship parameters. Nor was his example singular. Robert Fitz Nigel served within three retinues, those of Richard Fitz John, Hugh de Vere and Thomas of Lancaster, on more than one campaign;[212] a sergeant named William de Cotun fought under the northern lords Edmund de Mauley and Andrew de Harcla on two occasions each.[213] There were also knights and sergeants who changed lords only once or twice but who accompanied one of their leaders on numerous expeditions. Henry de Glastingbury has been placed in this 'unstable' group because he joined the retinue of John de Mohun in 1303. He was also with one or other of the Lancaster brothers, or their father, in four other hosts, and with Thomas of Lancaster's tenant, Payn de Tibetot, in 1306.[214] Thus whilst satisfying a natural desire for demarcation

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[208] M. Prestwich, *The Three Edwards: War and State in England 1272-1377* (London, 1980), 145.
[209] Cf. A. King, 'Thomas of Lancaster's First Quarrel with Edward II', *Fourteenth Century England III*, ed. W.M. Ormrod (Woodbridge, 2004), 31-45.
[210] For his service record, see chapter 1 n. 133.
[211] McFarlane, 'Bastard Feudalism', 176.
[212] For his service with Lancaster, see above n. 156, plus 1282 and 1287 with Fitz John (C 67/8, m. 8; *CPR 1281-92*, 272), and 1300 and 1301 with Vere (C 67/14, mm. 1, 12).
[213] Mauley: *Gough*, 233; BL, Add. MS 7966a, f. 75v. Harcla: E 101/14/15, mm. 4, 5.
[214] With the Lancasters in 1295 (C 67/10, m. 3); 1297 (C 67/12, m. 3); 1298 (*Gough*, 179); 1300 (C 67/14, m. 10). Also, see C 67/15, m. 8; E 101/13/7, m. 1. For Tibetot's links with Lancaster; *IPM*, v, no. 519.

between 'loyal' soldiers and those who changed their allegiances, neither the perception of such a dichotomy, nor its reflection in the above table, tells the full story of the ties that bound within the military community. Simultaneously stable and fluid would be the best description of most soldiers' career patterns for, within the framework of recruitment networks, these terms were not irreconcilable.

Bearing this in mind, it is the third group in our table, representing the individuals who changed their allegiances but who did so due to altered circumstances, or within the parameters of identifiable recruitment networks, that best reflects the experiences of the 'average' soldier in early Edwardian armies. It is also this group that, by taking into account alterations in the composition of the military community through deaths and non-service, most accurately conforms to the diachronic approach according to which all forms of network analysis should ideally operate.[215] It may be a truism to state that personal relationships change naturally with the passage of time, but it is an important point that must be reiterated. Work by David Crouch on the tenants and retainers of the twelfth century earls of Warwick,[216] and by David Green and Simon Walker on the affinities of the Black Prince and his younger brother John of Gaunt respectively,[217] have each highlighted the way in which generational changes and distances between campaigns served to undermine personal bonds which, viewed from a short-term perspective, often proved stable and strong. We will shortly have cause to look at the impact of deaths and non-service on the recruitment networks of the military community in greater detail. As we have already seen, it was perfectly possible for men to join the companies of other military leaders whilst their usual lords were still alive without this in any way reflecting disloyalty. One of the most obvious channels through which transference from one lord to another might take place was the lordship family. Two of the knights and three of the sergeants in Thomas of Lancaster's retinue in 1298 can also be traced serving on other occasions with his younger brother Henry: not all of these have been included in the 'familial' section of the table due to other connections in different years.[218] Another fraternal tie that was exploited to the full for the purposes of military recruitment was that between the household steward, Walter de Beauchamp,

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[215] *Network Analysis: Studies in Human Interaction*, ed. J. Boissevain and J.C. Mitchell (The Hague, 1973), xi.

[216] D. Crouch, 'The Local Influence of the earls of Warwick, 1088-1242: A Study in Decline and Resourcefulness', *Midland History*, xxi (1996), 11-12.

[217] Green, 'Politics and Service with Edward the Black Prince', 59; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, 50.

[218] Knights: Henry de Glastingbury (above, n. 214); Nicholas de St. Maur (*Gough*, 179 *et alia*; C 67/7, m. 3). Sergeants: William de Lughtburghe (*Gough*, 180; C 67/16, m. 6); Adam de Skelton (see his service for 1298, 1300, 1303 and 1306 in chapter 3 n. 240); Roger de Bray (C 67/12, m. 3; *Gough*, 181; C 67/14, m. 10; C 67/14, m. 3; C 67/16, m. 10).

and his older brother, William, earl of Warwick. Although only two of the men in Walter de Beauchamp's company at Falkirk, the knight William le Blount and his probable relation Walter, also appear to have accompanied the earl to war,[219] analysis of the affinities of the two brothers for all campaigns shows no fewer than ten families or individuals who had allegiances to both siblings.[220]

If fraternal and other familial bonds provided one connecting thread along which retainers and military followers might manoeuvre, it was not the only one. Membership of a regional network of soldiers might enable men-at-arms to shift between lords who had close neighbourly associations with one another whilst remaining part of a well-established military pool. Although, as we have seen, the idea of 'county communities' is fraught with conceptual problems and interpretative difficulties, there is no doubt that men of the same locality, county or region often operated in close proximity to one another when dealing with local issues.[221] Furthermore, the existence of regional networks was sometimes reflected in the military summons lists issued by the Crown, which in some years, including 1298, were drawn up partly on a county-by-county basis.[222] In other instances, men of the same locality might serve together in raids against the Scots or in defence of the sea coast from enemy invasion. Therefore, for a variety of reasons, military leaders from the same region or locality were far more likely to share their soldiers with one another than were retinue leaders whose lands lay far apart. Table 4.5 shows that there were around five knights and twenty-eight sergeants in our sample whose change of retinue can be explained by such regional factors. Richard de Kirkebride found service with two fellow north-westerners, Robert de Clifford and John de Lancaster, in separate years,[223] and his fellow knight Richard Mauleverer was with the northern landholders John de Craystok and William de Cantilupe in 1294 and 1298 respectively.[224] In like manner, a Simon de Blakeshale was in the company of William de Ryther at Falkirk and of Ryther's fellow Yorkshireman Robert de Mauley in Scotland in 1306.[225] The interconnection of the landholding families of Yorkshire is

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[219] William: 1294-5 and 1297 with the earl (C 67/10, m. 5; E 101/6/37, m. 6i), and 1298 with the steward (*Gough*, 183). Walter: 1294-5 with the earl (C 67/10, m. 5), and 1297 and 1298 with Walter de Beauchamp and his son (E 101/6/37, m. 1ii; *Gough*, 184).
[220] Astley, Blount, Brompton, Cheney, Fitz Waryn, Harpur, Heton, Saltmarsh, Sapy and St. Mareys.
[221] Cf. M.J. Bennett, 'A County Community: Social Cohesion amongst the Cheshire Gentry, 1400-1425', *Northern History*, viii (1973), 43.
[222] *PW*, i, 311-2.
[223] *Gough*, 196; E 101/612/15, m. 1d.
[224] *RG*, iii, 157; *Gough*, 177.
[225] *Gough*, 226; E 101/13/16, f. 20v.

highlighted by the proximity of their family shields in the nave of York Minster.[226] Indeed, the presence of a regional recruitment pool in that county has already been demonstrated for a slightly later period in Andrew Ayton's study of the retinue of Thomas Ughtred, a lord of the East Riding who was Edward III's marshal at Crécy.[227] Northern England was by no means unique in this respect, however: many of the sergeants at Falkirk alternated between service with different lords of the south-east, or south-west. Robert de Echingham served no fewer than four men with landed interests in the south-east in the years leading up to and including Bannockburn, namely his brother William, William de Leyburn, the earl of Gloucester and Bartholomew de Badlesmere;[228] and Edmund de St. Leger had links to three Kentish lords, William de Leyburn, Stephen de Burghershh and the earl of Gloucester.[229] The presence of such regional networks shows that changes of retinue were not necessarily indicative of instability. Soldiers might move between lords without undermining the cohesion of royal hosts.

The largest retinues were usually composed of much smaller units of men-at-arms. Although the more unwieldy companies might see soldiers come and go on a regular basis, small groups of two or three men-at-arms would stick together, constituting sub-retinues within these larger wholes. One of Robert Fitz Payn's knights at Falkirk, Ingelram de Berenger, and two of his sergeants had been to Flanders during the preceding year with John de Berewyk. It is almost certain that the sergeants, Michael Criketot and Frary de Ameney, were associates of Berenger rather than either of the main retinue leaders.[230] As such, the sergeants were not changing retinues but remaining within the same unit on both occasions, as were the sergeants who joined Nicholas de St. Maur in Fitz Payn's retinue in 1297 but then followed him into the service of Thomas of Lancaster at Falkirk.[231] Horizontal bonds between soldiers would continue to be activated for military purposes when vertical bonds to a lord had, for whatever reason, long since dissolved, or when the lord with whom they normally served was not present. The knight Edmund Foliot led the sergeant Edmund de Misne to

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[226] S. Brown, *'Our Magnificent Fabrick'. York Minster: An Architectural History* c.*1220-1500*, English Heritage publication (Swindon, 2003), 129, appendix 2.
[227] Ayton, 'Sir Thomas Ughtred', 124-5.
[228] For his service with Leyburn in 1297 and Gloucester and Badlesmere in 1314, see chapter 1 n. 166. He was with his brother in 1298 (*Gough*, 213). The other lords whom he served, the Despensers, had links to the earl of Gloucester through the marriage of Despenser junior to the young earl's sister, Eleanor, and held Swanscombe manor in Kent: 1303 (C 67/15, m. 9); 1306 (C 67/16, m. 10); *CPR, 1301-07*, 443; *Aspilogia III*, ii, 140-1.
[229] With Leyburn in 1297 (E 101/6/37, m. 4), 1298 (*Gough*, 194), and 1300 (E 101/8/23, m. 4), Burghershh in 1306 (C 67/16, m. 6), and the earl in 1314 (C 81/1727, m. 11).
[230] C 67/12, m. 1; E 101/6/28, mm. 2i-2ii; *Gough*, 171.
[231] E 101/6/19, m. 1; *Gough*, 179-80. The sergeants were Warin de St. Maur and Robert de Strode.

Scotland in 1302 when their usual lord, Thomas de Furnivall, seems not to have served.[232] In some instances lords lost the service of a group of men because they did not join a particular campaign. The earl of Norfolk's aversion to service in Flanders in 1297 is well known, but his decision not to go did not stop at least thirteen of the men who had been associated with him in previous years from participating without him. These men joined the retinues of other lords; in many cases, on a permanent basis. Most notably, all three knightly members of the Berkeley family who were active at this time, Thomas and his sons Thomas junior and Maurice - at least two of whom were with Bygod in Wales during 1294-5 - began their association with Aymer de Valence in that year.[233] This constituted a major drain on the earl's military resources, although it may be that his growing illness in the years that followed would have prevented him from retaining these men for much longer in any case. In other instances, it would seem that when a lord did not take part in a campaign few of his men did either. Only four of Valence's large retinue can be found in Scotland in 1310 when he was busy with his duties as an Ordainer: two with the earl of Gloucester.[234] And in 1314, neither the earl of Lancaster nor his political supporters who stayed at home with him appear to have haemorrhaged too many of their followers. The few who did go to Scotland without them probably did so with their lords' consent.[235]

The absence of a lord on a short-term basis inevitably caused far less disruption than his death. Whilst those who journeyed to Scotland in the absence of the earl of Lancaster in 1310, or at Bannockburn, might have returned to his allegiance at the siege of Berwick or during the civil war of 1322, the retainers of a lord who had died did not have that option. Sometimes they chose to remain within the service of the same family, but there was no guarantee that their relationships with the father would extend to the son. Even if they did, service with an older, more seasoned campaigner might have appealed more than starting afresh with a youth who had little or no previous experience of war. For all of these reasons, as well as because not all lords had male successors

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[232] *Gough*, 211; C 67/15, m. 15.

[233] C 47/2/10, m. 8; E 101/6/28, m. 2i. The other ten were John ap Adam (Bygod 1277, *CPR, 1272-81*, 217, 1287, *CPR 1281-92*, 273, 1294, C 67/10, m. 7, 1296, *CCW*, 71; 1297, C 67/12, m. 9d); Ralph le Bygod (Bygod 1282, C 67/8, m. 7; 1297, E 101/6/37, m. 1i); William de Boyton (Bygod, 1294, C 67/10, m. 6, 1296, C 67/11, m. 2; 1297, E 101/6/37, m. 6i); Richard le Keu (Bygod 1287, *CPR, 1281-92*, 274; 1297, C 67/12, m. 3d); John de Knoville (Bygod 1294, C 67/10, m. 6; 1297, E 101/6/37, m. 4); Hugh Pointz (Bygod 1294, C 47/2/10, m. 8, 1296, C 67/11, m. 6; 1297, BL, Add. MS 7965, f. 69r); Nicholas Pointz (*ibid*); Thomas de Scales (Bygod 1296, C 67/11, m. 4: 1297, E 101/6/19, m. 2); John de Sotebroke (Bygod 1287, *CPR, 1281-92*, 273, 1294 C 67/10, m. 7; 1297, E 101/6/37, m. 1ii); Nicholas de Stotevillle (Bygod 1283, SC 1/9, no. 83; 1297, C 67/12, m. 9d). For information on some of these men and their relations with the earl of Norfolk, see M. Morris, *The Bigod Earls of Norfolk in the Thirteenth Century* (Woodbridge, 2005), 138-53.

[234] John Darcy, Gilbert Pecche, Edmund de Gacelyn and Thomas de Sakeville; C 71/4, mm. 5, 10, 11.

[235] *Lanercost*, 224.

who were of an age to lead men to war, retainers whose lords had died sometimes had to seek elsewhere for direction on future campaigns. This applied to twelve of the knights and twenty-three of the sergeants in our sample, and provides one of the most striking instances in which men-at-arms changed their allegiance simply because they had little or no choice in the matter. When the Marcher lord Roger de Mortimer died during the course of the Welsh war of 1282, there were reports of disturbances and unrest among his tenants.[236] In a society that depended so much for its stability on the personal connections of landed society, it is not surprising that the death of a lord could lead to the erosion of his retinue and to subtle shifts in the recruitment networks of the regions in which he had operated. Walter de Beauchamp's death in 1303 saw his men move in several directions. Some stability was maintained by the fact that two of his former soldiers, the knight Simon le Chamberleyn and the sergeant Geoffrey Fitz Waryn, later served under Aymer de Valence,[237] but others among his former followers joined the companies of different lords. Stephen de la More of Gloucestershire naturally gravitated towards the leading magnate of that region, Gilbert de Clare, with whom he served on the 1310 campaign.[238] The steward's younger son, William, associated himself with another leading figure of the south-west, Robert Fitz Payn.[239] In most cases, soldiers who were released from their former allegiances by the death of their lords ended up either in the company of other lords from the same region or members of the same family. Following Nicholas de Audley's death in 1299, one of his sergeants, Ralph le Botiller, went on to serve at Bannockburn with the former's younger brother, Hugh.[240] Richard de Cleobury, on the other hand, attached himself to Audley's fellow Marcher lord Roger de Mortimer of Wigmore.[241] Walter de Hormede was with John Tregoz at Falkirk but later appears with the earl of Hereford following Tregoz's death in 1300;[242] and in 1310, Nicholas Pointz found service with his tenurial lord, the earl of Gloucester, a couple of years after his father, Hugh, had passed away.[243]

As old recruitment hubs died out, new ones arose to take their place. Such 'new' men were naturally keen to tap into as many pre-existing networks as they possibly could. The overwhelming majority of newly-risen lords were the heirs of long-established aristocratic lines: there were far fewer parvenus rising meteorically from

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[236] *Ancient Correspondence Concerning Wales*, 131.
[237] Chamberleyn in 1314 (C 71/6, m. 1); Fitz Waryn in 1306 (C 67/16, m. 13).
[238] C 71/4, m. 10.
[239] C 47/5/7, m. 1; C 71/4, m. 13.
[240] C 71/6, m. 1.
[241] C 67/16, m. 11.
[242] *Gough*, 192; *CDS*, v, 448.
[243] C 71/4, m. 10.

obscurity to the top during the Welsh and early Scottish wars than there were to be during the French war of Edward III. One man who did rise from membership of a minor genteel family to become a leading member of the military community was the Cumbrian lord Andrew de Harcla, whose family prior to the early years of the reign of Edward II had led a fairly quiet existence. We are fortunate that for the years 1313-14 we have complete inventories listing the names of the men-at-arms who were with Harcla on the Scottish March. These make it clear that he called upon a wide range of service connections with other prominent lords from Cumberland, Northumberland, Westmorland and southern Scotland in order to create his retinue.[244] Of the men whom it has been possible to identify on other campaigns, five had previous military experience in the retinue of the dominant lord of the region, Robert de Clifford.[245] Some, such as Patrick de Curwen and Adam de Skelton, had fought alongside other members of the north-western gentry, like John de Lancaster and Gilbert de Bromley.[246] Others, such as Thomas de Torthorald and David le Mareschal, were drawn from across the border, and Adam de Kirkby and William de Sutton were probably the same individuals as the men of those names who had accompanied William de Cantilupe to Scotland before his death in 1308.[247] Therefore, Harcla did not need to create a new retinue from scratch, but simply to tap into the service networks that already existed within that highly-militarised area of the British Isles.[248] The same also applies to the rising lords within our sample who began their military service in 1296 or later. Both Thomas of Lancaster and Aymer de Valence inherited the affinities of their fathers: thirteen of the men with Lancaster at Falkirk had served with his father Edmund,[249] and three of the knights with Valence were former associates of William de Valence from the Welsh wars.[250] Furthermore, two of the men with William le Brun in 1298 had previously been to Gascony under his fellow Hampshire lord John de St. John, three years before Brun first appears to have seen service as a retinue leader in his own right.[251] Others who began to serve as company leaders after 1296 and who tapped into

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[244] E 101/14/15, mm. 2, 4, 5.
[245] Robert de Bampton, John de Harcla, John de Lancaster, Roger de Lancaster and Richard le Latimer.
[246] C 67/13, m. 6d; E 101/612/15, m. 1d; E 101/14/15. m. 3.
[247] E 101/8/23, m. 2; E 101/9/24, m. 3; E 101/612/11, m. 5.
[248] For a similar phenomenon among the new lords of southern Scotland during the 1330s and 1340s, see M.H. Brown, 'The Development of Scottish Border Lordship, 1332-58', *BIHR*, lxx (1997), 7-9.
[249] William Wyther, Reginald de St. Martin, Alan de Waldeshef, Henry de Glastingbury, Nicholas de St. Maur, William le Lung, Jordan Label, Adam de Skelton, Robert de Strode, Richard de Waldeshef, Roger de Bray, Walter de Baa and William de Bonyngton.
[250] John de Columbers, Nicholas de Carru and John de la Ryvere. The Gacelyn family also had links with both the father and son; H. Ridgeway, 'William de Valence and his *Familiares*, 1247-72', *BIHR*, lxv (1992), 244.
[251] John de Roches and William de Draycote: *RG*, iii, 127.

existing regional networks include Richard Lovel and Hugh de Courtenay.[252] By the onset of the Scottish wars, most retinue leaders could employ at least a few soldiers with several years of military experience behind them, even if it had not been obtained with them.

Far from consisting of a shifting mass of men who changed retinues at will from one campaign to the next or, at the other extreme, a monopoly of 'loyal' soldiers who stayed with the same lords throughout their careers, the military community was therefore characterised, as one would expect, by something in between those two extremes. That there was a large degree of mobility and fluidity should come as no surprise given the independence that most members of the gentry enjoyed in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. However, the movements that did take place usually involved subtle shifts within the well-established frameworks of familial or regional networks, or were necessitated by changes within the composition of the arms-bearing elite. Only rarely do soldiers who went to war under Edward I and Edward II appear to have displayed no continuity in their choice of lords and retinues. Such individuals did exist but, just like those who stayed with one lord for six or seven campaigns without ever entering the service of another man, they were the exception rather than the rule. For most knights and sergeants, it made sense to stay with soldiers whom they knew personally and had campaigned with in the past. Their links to other lords and members of the gentry meant that, more often than not, any movement that they did make involved no loss of face with their previous lords. To view such fluidity as indicative of declining standards or confused loyalties among the gentry and nobility would therefore be to read far more into the evidence than is really there.

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[252] William de Punchardon had fought under Hugh de Courtenay senior in 1282 and 1287 prior to the latter's death in 1292 (C 67/8, m. 8d; *CPR, 1281-92*, 275), and went on to be one of Lovel's most regular followers. Robert Beaupel was with William Martin in 1295 and Robert Fitz Payn in 1296 before serving with the younger Courtenay in 1298; see chapter 3 n. 193.

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'Feudal' Service and the Pre-Contract Army

A detailed understanding of the military service given by the English gentry and nobility during the wars of Edward I and his son, including their frequency of service, connections to other members of the military community, and the methods by which they were recruited, can add a great deal to our understanding of the armies of the period. If, as is commonly perceived, Edward I inherited a far from glorious military legacy from his father, then by the end of his reign he would appear to have moulded a well-trained military elite, hardened by years of regular campaigning and strengthened by a sense of group solidarity that was reflected in the wide dissemination of new and more complex coats of arms. Bannockburn might have brought any progress that had been made during the previous four decades to a momentary halt, but it could not reverse the process. By the 1340s, Edward III was demonstrating to the French what the Welsh and Scots already knew: that English armies had come a long way since the days of Lewes and Evesham. The previous chapters have highlighted some of the factors that contributed to this transformation through a study of the careers and activities of the mounted soldiers who fought in these hosts. Years of military experience in a variety of theatres of war, and recruitment ties that were grounded within local communities, no doubt added to the stability and effectiveness of the armies that Edward I and Edward II led on campaign. The strong military records of captains like Aymer de Valence and Reginald de Grey meant that the Crown was able to draw upon a ready supply of apparently able commanders, whilst the whole edifice was underpinned, as we have seen, by a monarchy that was eager to maximise the martial potential of its subjects, both in number and quality. One question that remains to be answered is how such progress was possible, if indeed we accept that advances were made, at a time when the *structure* of English armies looks, at least superficially, very much the same as it had throughout the major part of the Middle Ages. Could English field forces ever have fulfilled their potential so long as 'feudal' summonses continued to be issued and soldiers were raised through the calling out of the *servicium debitum*, as had been the case since the Norman Conquest? Was not the feudal host a remnant of a bygone age, and the dogged persistence with which both Edward I and his son continued to raise it one of the main bars to military success? Indeed, could it not be argued that any

advantages gained through factors such as collective experience, well-tried recruitment practices and familiarity among soldiers who fought together on campaign were undermined by more fundamental flaws relating to the way that the armies were organised in the field?

Feudal service has, of course, had a very bad press among historians. The received wisdom is that it had very little to contribute to medieval warfare, whether in the late eleventh or early fourteenth century. J.E. Morris, who was certainly aware of the progress made in the conduct of war under Edward I, believed that the latter had tried to abandon traditional feudal service completely, and that he attempted to 'substitute paid for feudal service…just because the formal feudal service was unsatisfactory'.[1] Other historians in the decades following Morris' pioneering work followed him by focussing on the transformation from feudal to paid service which, it appeared, had undergone considerable acceleration under the guidance of Edward I. Bryce Lyon, whose work on *fiefes-rentes* seemed to provide evidence for a missing link between these two phases in military history, affirmed that feudalism was 'no longer…equal to supplying the forces needed for the more extensive, frequent, and distant campaigns of Edward I'.[2] K.B. McFarlane was also of the opinion, which by then had acquired the status of orthodoxy, that the days of the old fee-based method of raising armies were numbered 'when the need was felt for an army more efficient and more durable than the feudal host'.[3] The simplicity of such explanations, and the conviction with which they were expressed by these eminent scholars, might have sealed the argument were it not for a number of awkward facts that did not comply with this theory of gradual decay. Work by F.M. Powicke, J.O Prestwich and Marjorie Chibnall has demonstrated that armies of the eleventh, twelfth and early thirteenth centuries were already staffed by a combination of paid and 'feudal' soldiers, much as was the case under Edward I.[4] As such, the feudal host had never formed the sole prop upon which the kings of England had based their military strength. Furthermore, far from abandoning the *servicium debitum* and attempting to replace it with wholly paid armies, both Michael Powicke and, more recently, Michael Prestwich have shown that Edward I and his son continued to call out

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[1] Morris, *Welsh Wars*, 36.
[2] B.D. Lyon, 'The Feudal Antecedent of the Indenture System', *Speculum*, xxix (1954), 504; idem, *From Fief to Indenture: The Transition from Feudal to Non-Feudal Contract in Western Europe* (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), 198-232.
[3] McFarlane, 'Bastard Feudalism', 162.
[4] F.M. Powicke, *The Loss of Normandy (1189-1204): Studies in the History of the Angevin Empire* (Manchester, 1913), 322-3; J.O. Prestwich, 'War and Finance in the Anglo-Norman State', *TRHS*, 5th ser., iv (1954), 42-3; M. Chibnall, 'Mercenaries and the *Familia Regis* under Henry I', *History*, new ser., lxii (1977), 15-23.

the feudal host on a regular basis. Indeed, Powicke has asserted that 'the army of Edward I achieved a balance between contractual, feudal, and communal troops which exceeded anything achieved before or after'.[5] Whilst the replacement of soldiers raised by means of the feudal summons with mounted forces levied through contracts is still generally perceived to have been desirable, even by those historians who have proved that the feudal host was far from dead and buried in the first quarter of the fourteenth century,[6] it can clearly no longer be maintained that Edward I sought to abandon feudal service for wholly paid armies.

Why, then, was feudal service retained by this allegedly modernising king? Moreover, how did it affect the way that the aristocracy discharged their military obligations, if at all? These are difficult questions that cannot satisfactorily be answered without close scrutiny of the military careers of the men who fought in response to the feudal summonses. First, however, we must consider the subject of feudal service in its wider setting, including what the king hoped to gain from it and how such service was controlled and enforced by the Crown. Something that can be easily forgotten when one considers the role of the feudal host is that Edward's formative military experiences were gained during the civil wars of his father's reign. During those wars the feudal levy had been called on repeatedly to deal with the king's internal enemies, including before the siege of Northampton in 1264 and in order to confront the rebels who were holding out at Kenilworth two years later.[7] Indeed, it was said that Henry III could memorise and recite the names of 250 of the tenancies-in-chief within the realm.[8] Edward would therefore have been well acquainted with the uses to which this form of military obligation could be put. On coming to the throne, he issued feudal summonses for the majority of his campaigns, not only for the Welsh wars of 1277 and 1282-3 and the Scottish campaigns of 1300, 1303 and 1306, but also for a continental campaign in 1294.[9] His son, in turn, raised the feudal levy for most of the armies that he marched north of the border, in 1310, 1314 and 1322, as well as for abortive campaigns such as

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[5] Powicke, *Military Obligation*, 97; M. Prestwich, 'Cavalry Service in Early Fourteenth Century England', *War and Government in the Middle Ages: Essays in Honour of J.O. Prestwich*, ed. J. Gillingham and J.C. Holt (Woodbridge, 1984), 148.

[6] For some of the problems associated with feudal service, see Prestwich, *War, Politics and Finance*, 80-2.

[7] *Documents of the Baronial Movement*, 181-3; *Royal and Other Historical Letters Illustrative of the Reign of Henry III*, ed. W.W. Shirley, 2 vols (London, 1862-6), ii, 300-2; *Ann. Dunstaple*, 229; *Ann. Waverley*, 370.

[8] Critchley, 'Summonses to Military Service', 80.

[9] Cf. H.M. Chew, *The English Ecclesiastical Tenants-in-Chief and Knight Service, especially in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries* (London, 1932), 71.

that of 1309.[10] It was one thing to issue such summonses but quite another to form an effective fighting force from the resulting troops, and opinions of the practical value of such feudal levies in the field have been universally unfavourable.[11] Yet, it should not be forgotten that at a time when cavalry forces usually numbered between 2,000 and 2,500 men, the numbers raised through the traditional feudal summons, even at the most conservative estimate, might constitute a quarter of the whole.[12] In 1310, when the total cavalry strength probably fell short of 2,000 men, the 500 or so mounted soldiers who proffered their service at the feudal muster constituted an even greater proportion of the army.[13] Despite the emphasis that has always been placed on the fact that feudal forces were only obliged to serve for forty days, this form of military obligation was actually very flexible and adaptable. Service owed by tenants-in-chief might be directed towards the regions in which they had the most immediate interest,[14] whilst the shortage in warhorses was partly overcome by encouraging some men to provide mounts for their service rather than soldiers.[15] The kinds of force raised by feudal summons might vary. In 1322, two tenants-in-chief proffered hobelars, whereas archer service was widely employed in Scotland as a way of dealing with the English cavalry.[16] Finally, on campaigns such as that of 1282-3 when several armies were raised in different parts of the country, those performing feudal service could in turn muster in the places where they were most needed, or where they were already engaged.[17] There is no substance to the view that the feudal host was an encumbrance that had a negative impact on field operations.

As an explanation for the continued use of the feudal summons, the value of feudal service in the field has tended to be overlooked in favour of explanations focussing on the political and financial benefits that accrued from it to the Crown.[18] However, as we shall see in more detail later in this chapter, there is little reason to regard feudal service any differently from many other forms of recruitment and

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[10] Powicke, *Military Obligation*, 162, note A.
[11] E.g. F.M. Powicke, *The Thirteenth Century, 1216-1307*, 2nd edition (Oxford, 1962), 543; Critchley, 'Military Organisation in England', 230; Morillo, *Warfare under the Anglo-Norman Kings*, 71.
[12] M. Prestwich, 'Money and Mercenaries in English Medieval Armies', *England and Germany in the High Middle Ages*, ed. A. Haverkamp and H. Vollrath (Oxford, 1996), 133.
[13] Cf. D. Simpkin, 'The English Army and the Scottish Campaign of 1310-11', *England and Scotland in the Fourteenth Century: New Perspectives*, ed. A. King and M. Penman (Woodbridge, forthcoming).
[14] E.g. *Cal. Ch. Rolls*, ii, 7, relating to service owed by Roger de Mortimer.
[15] *CVCR*, 185.
[16] C 47/5/10, mm. 1iii, 2; *The Acts of Robert I, King of Scots 1306-1329*, ed. A.A.M. Duncan, *Regesta Regum Scottorum*, v (Edinburgh, 1988), 50. Also, see A. Grant, 'Service and Tenure in Late Medieval Scotland, 1314-1475', *Concepts and Patterns of Service in the Later Middle Ages*, ed. A. Curry and E. Matthew, *The Fifteenth Century I* (Woodbridge, 2000), 149-52.
[17] *CVCR*, 253-4.
[18] E.g. Prestwich, 'Cavalry Service', 151-2.

obligation. Stephen Morillo has defined feudal service under the Anglo-Norman kings as 'a system of maintaining a reserve of trained manpower', and that is precisely what it was.[19] If it had been a hindrance in the field, the Crown could simply have requested its tenants-in-chief to pay fines rather than send corporal service. Many did pay, but in some years, as Helena Chew has shown, the monarchy deliberately sought to reduce the numbers who commuted for their service.[20] Given the great need that both Edward I and his son had for efficient fighting forces, it is unlikely that they would have persevered with the *servicium debitum* unless it had already proven its worth on numerous occasions. Edward I certainly took the obligations of his tenants-in-chief to provide corporal service very seriously, pardoning his nephew Thomas of Lancaster in 1306 only after it had been noted that despite serving with a fitting company, he had failed to acknowledge his full quota at the feudal muster.[21] Even as late as the opening year of the reign of Edward III and the Weardale campaign, which witnessed the final feudal summons for over half a century, permission to make fine was limited to those who did not hold a whole knight's fee, ecclesiastics, and women in an attempt to obtain as much corporal service from the male lay tenants-in-chief as possible.[22] Chew, whose detailed study of the feudal service of the ecclesiastical tenants-in-chief remains the seminal work on this subject, was in no doubt as to the Crown's long-term interest in the field service of its feudal forces.[23] This is not to say that the financial advantages reaped through the feudal summons were not also important, or that the Crown did not follow up its rights in this respect as zealously as it did its rights to corporal service. The rigorous searches of the financial repositories of the tenants-in-chief ahead of the Gascony campaign in 1294, recorded with much disgust by one chronicler, testifies to that.[24] Nevertheless, when Edward I obtained scutage he sometimes used it to reward those who had served in his armies; and, as Michael Prestwich has noted, the time taken by the Crown to collect the money due to it from feudal service suggests that financial gain cannot always have been uppermost in its mind.[25] When the earl Warenne died in 1304 it was found that he still had debts relating to the scutage for the armies of 1277 and 1282-3, debts that were subsequently cancelled.[26] By the time that the archbishop of

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[19] Morillo, *Warfare under the Anglo-Norman Kings*, 6.
[20] Chew, *Ecclesiastical Tenants-in-Chief*, 54, n. 1.
[21] *CPR, 1301-07*, 469.
[22] N.B. Lewis, 'The Summons of the English Feudal Levy, 5 April 1327', *Essays in Medieval History Presented to Bertie Wilkinson*, ed. T.A. Sandquist and M.R. Powicke (Toronto, 1969), 240.
[23] Chew, *Ecclesiastical Tenants-in-Chief*, 54.
[24] *Bury St. Edmunds*, 121-2.
[25] E.g. *CCR, 1279-88*, 381; Prestwich, 'Cavalry Service', 151.
[26] *Ancient Petitions Relating to Wales*, 303.

York was acquitted of scutage for the same campaigns in 1311, any interest that the Crown had in obtaining the money had probably long since lapsed.[27] There seems little reason to doubt, therefore, that feudal summonses continued to be issued primarily for the additional manpower supplies that they could yield during wartime.

There were problems with the feudal system, if as such we may describe it, and it was far from perfect. Besides the well-documented eccentricities of the military duties that many tenants-in-chief owed to the Crown, particularly those who held by serjeanty tenure and who might be requested to serve with items such as a horse worth five shillings, or a pin and a sack,[28] there were also the more serious difficulties of knowing how many fees were owed to the king and the problems that the Crown faced in enforcement. Confusion early in the reign as to whether service was to be owed according to the old assessments or the 'new' quotas that had been established under Henry II was expressed on several occasions. As late as 1302, the king was ordering the rolls to be searched to assess whether the abbot of Abingdon was liable for thirty fees or just three.[29] This grey area might have arisen in part from the Crown's attempts to levy scutage on the old fees.[30] Concern was expressed late in the reign of Edward II about the Crown's inability to discern precisely how much service was owed to it.[31] Furthermore, the proffer rolls reveal many instances in which tenants-in-chief declared uncertainty as to whether or not they had performed the correct amount of service.[32] What is beyond doubt is that despite such problems, the Crown was still keen to utilise the feudal system late in the thirteenth century: where ambiguity prevailed, it was determined to assert its rights. The search of the charters of Meaux abbey during the reign of Edward I to ascertain whether that ecclesiastical house owed feudal service or not,[33] and the claim by Thomas Lercedekne of Cornwall that his lands had been taken into the king's hand despite the fact that neither he nor his family had ever owed such obligations,[34] suggest that the Crown was eager to maintain and even extend its right to this traditional form of recruitment. Edward I appears to have attempted to introduce a new kind of feudal obligation north of the border during the opening decade of the fourteenth century, requiring the Englishmen who had been granted lands in Scotland to

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[27] *CCR, 1307-13*, 313.
[28] *CFR*, i, 523. Cf. E.G. Kimball, *Serjeanty Tenure in Medieval England* (London, 1936), 70-1.
[29] *CCR, 1296-1302*, 562-3.
[30] H.M. Chew, 'Scutage under Edward I', *EHR*, xxxvii (1922), 323.
[31] *The Red Book of the Exchequer*, ed. H. Hall, 3 parts, Rolls Ser., xcix (London, 1896), iii, 960-3.
[32] E.g. *PW*, i, 198.
[33] *Melsa*, ii, 210.
[34] *Parl. Roll.*, ii, 479-80.

provide men-at-arms for garrison service there.[35] Furthermore, the chronicler Peter de Langtoft maintained that had Edward introduced a form of feudal service into Wales, he might have been able to subdue that country with less difficulty.[36] Even if the king did not reinvigorate such service within the conquered lands, his leading henchmen certainly did: R.R. Davies has drawn attention to the extensive process of colonisation that was carried out within the Welsh territories in the years following the conquest.[37] Feudal service was evidently still very much alive in the minds of contemporaries and was far from being obsolete. As one of many different forms of land-based military obligation it was a principal method by which Edward I and his son sought to raise their armies. For this reason it deserves to be considered afresh by historians. The remainder of this chapter will focus on the cavalrymen who performed this form of service, their identities and career patterns, as well as the way in which they were organised in the field alongside those raised by other forms of obligation.

WHO WAS THE 'FEUDAL' SOLDIER?

One of the main drawbacks with previous studies on the feudal army is that relatively little attempt has been made to look at the issue of feudal service, as with other forms of military obligation, from the perspectives of the soldiers themselves. Fundamental questions relating to the identities of these men, their relationship to the tenants-in-chief who proffered them at the feudal musters, and their military service patterns in a more general sense, have not been considered in sufficient detail. An obvious reason for this is that, prior to the reign of Edward I, the detailed military sources on which such studies must be based do not exist in sufficient quantity or depth. Furthermore, whilst such records have survived for the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, relatively little interest has been shown in the workings of the feudal host at that stage because of the common perception that it was in a state of terminal decline.[38] Yet, although the view that the corporal service of soldiers raised by means of the feudal levy was of some value to the Crown even as late as the 1320s may not receive universal acceptance, it remains the case that any study of the military activities of the English aristocracy under the first two Edwards would be incomplete without consideration of these men and their activities. Seven feudal armies were raised between

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[35] Prestwich, 'Colonial Scotland', 9; E 101/10/5, m. 5.
[36] *Langtoft*, 283-4.
[37] R.R. Davies, 'Colonial Wales', *Past and Present*, lxv (1974), 5-6.
[38] The main exceptions being the works of Chew and Prestwich.

the accession of Edward I and Bannockburn, including the host of 1314 for which the proffer roll has been lost. Marshals' registers of varying degrees of completeness have survived for the armies of 1277, 1282, 1300, 1303, 1306 and 1310. The names of around 2,000 individual proffered cavalrymen of all ranks can be traced on these rolls, suggesting that around one in four men-at-arms gave feudal service at some point in their careers.[39] A number of questions arise from the extant data. To what extent did these feudal soldiers constitute a continuation of the wider military community, or were their service patterns fundamentally different from those of men-at-arms who served gratuitously or for pay? Were the same individuals proffered on several occasions, or did these men alternate between different forms of military service, sometimes serving in response to the feudal summonses, while on other campaigns for Crown wages? Why were these men chosen to discharge feudal service, and what proportion had previous campaigning links to the men who proffered them? Are we, indeed, dealing with obscure men who are difficult to trace? What is clear is that a true estimation of the strengths and weaknesses of the feudal element in Edwardian armies cannot be formed without a better knowledge of the men who comprised it, and that a prosopographical analysis of these 'feudal' soldiers is long overdue.

Before one can begin to delve deeper into the activities of these 'feudal' soldiers, it is necessary to assess the completeness of the sources that are available. It would be a mistake to take the formal strengths recorded on the marshals' registers, or proffer rolls, at their face value, as it is clear that on many campaigns feudal service was performed without being enrolled, and that quite a few of the rolls are incomplete.[40] At first glance, the methods by which feudal service was recorded seem clear. The marshal and constable would note down the names of the tenants-in-chief, along with the sizes of their quotas and the names of the men who were being proffered. Once the campaign was over, the rolls were sent into the chancery and exchequer.[41] Usually, the king would request to see the rolls at some subsequent stage so as to ascertain who had done their service.[42] In truth, however, the picture was often more complicated than that. When several armies were serving simultaneously in different areas of war, the responsibility for recording the performance of feudal service might fall, as we have seen, on a number of regional army captains.[43] A letter from Robert de Chandos to the chancellor

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[39] See chapter 3, 85, for the size of the military pool as a whole.
[40] Morris, *Welsh Wars*, 65; Prestwich, *War, Politics and Finance*, 79-80.
[41] The proffer rolls can be found at: 1277 (*PW*, i, 197-213); 1282 (*ibid*, 228-243); 1300 (*PDS*, 209-231); 1303 (E 101/612/10; E 101/612/29); 1306 (C 47/5/7); 1310 (*PW*, II, ii, 401-8); 1322 (C 47/5/10).
[42] E.g. *CCR, 1272-79*, 484.
[43] E.g. *CDS*, ii, no. 1397; *CCR, 1307-13*, 12.

(*c.*1285) showed incidentally that his service in 1282 had been recorded on the rolls of Roger de Mortimer senior, the captain at Montgomery, as well as with the earl Marshal.[44] Sometimes the constable or captain would provide written confirmation in the form of certificates to verify that feudal service had been performed, as was the case with that discharged by Eleanor de Parles in 1322.[45] Although her quota was also recorded on the proffer roll in that year, there were other instances in which such certificates or indentures were the only proof that obligations had been met. The scutage and related rolls are replete with references to indentures delivered in to chancery recording feudal service,[46] as well as with instances when it was simply stated that *a* (often the chancellor or a campaign captain) testified that *b* had performed his service.[47] Whether this involved oral or, as seems more likely, written testimony, is unclear; but it is certain that the proffer rolls were only one way in which feudal service might be recorded, and that we should not assume that these rolls are complete. Roger de Somerville relied on letters of Prince Edward to show that he had performed his service in 1306.[48] Even the king might be called on to testify in the absence of other records: Edward I recalled that William de Breouse had met his obligations in 1303 despite the fact that his name was not recorded on the marshal's register for that year.[49]

Fortunately, it is possible to ascertain just how complete the proffer rolls are by drawing not only on the information contained within the said rolls, but also on the scutage rolls and those recording fines made in lieu of corporal service. The numerous petitions sent to the king by tenants-in-chief (particularly for the Welsh campaign of 1282 and the Scottish expedition of 1306) protesting that they were being charged with scutage even though they had performed their service, indicates that there were a number of flaws in the recording process.[50] But the scale of these problems, and how much they have led to an underestimation of the strengths of the feudal forces that were raised, remains to be worked out. Firstly, only a portion of the men summoned to bring their due service in any given year can be traced on the rolls, whilst large numbers who had not been summoned in person made proffers. Table 5.1 provides data for all six campaigns for which proffer rolls have survived between 1272 and 1314. It shows what proportion of the male lay tenants-in-chief who were summoned individually proffered

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[44] *Ancient Correspondence Concerning Wales*, 114.
[45] BL, Add. Charter 21506; C 47/5/10, m. 1iii.
[46] E.g. *CVCR* (supplementary close rolls), 108 (Henry de Grey), 109 (Payn de Tibetot), *et al.*
[47] *Ibid*, (scutage rolls) 365-73.
[48] *Parl. Roll.*, ii, 386.
[49] *CCW*, 253.
[50] *Ancient Correspondence Concerning Wales*, 132-3; *Parl. Roll.*, ii, 386-8.

their service or made fines, as well as how many men in each of the said years gave service despite not having been summoned.

Table 5.1: Nos. of Male Lay Tenants-in-Chief who Proffered Feudal Service[51]

	1277	1282	1300	1303	1306	1310
No. summoned in person	179	165	107	100	81	138
Made proffers (on roll)	88	42	41	23	14	53
Paid fine	11	15	2	4	13	3
Not summoned in person						
Made proffers (on roll)	144	77	117	83	36	80
Paid fine	39	42	3	14	22	0

These figures demonstrate that there was no precise correlation between the men who were individually summoned to bring their due service and the tenants-in-chief who were enrolled on the registers with their contingents. Particularly striking is the large number of landholders in each of the said years who proffered their service despite not having been summoned in person. Presumably they were responding to the sheriffs' summonses, but precisely how the Crown was able to enforce the service of these men, and why some responded to the summonses but others did not, is less clear.[52] If feudal service was unpopular, it seems remarkable that so many individuals should have been willing to perform service without being directly ordered to do so by the king. On the other hand, of the lay tenants-in-chief who received a personal summons, it is frequently the case that only a quarter to a half appear on the proffer rolls as having met their obligations. Here we must return to the thorny problem of the incompleteness of the records, for it is evident that not all tenants-in-chief who performed their feudal service appear on the marshals' rolls. Consequently, we lack the names of many tens of soldiers who were sent to war on behalf of these individuals. An examination of the scutage rolls for these armies, which show the names of men who had performed their feudal service and were entitled to collect scutage from their under-tenants, reveals many tenants-in-chief who had sent their quotas to the musters but whose names do not appear on the

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[51] Cf. For the summonses, see: *PW*, i, 193-5, 225-6, 327-8, 366-7, 377; *PW*, II, ii, 394-6. For the fines: *CFR*, i, 85-7; E 370/1/13, mm. 1-6, 11. Many fines for the 1277 and 1282 campaigns can also be found on the proffer rolls for those years, as can a couple on the roll for 1300. The figure given for the men summoned who made proffers in 1310 is a little higher than that given by M.R. Powicke. Cf. Powicke, 'Edward II and Military Obligation', *Speculum*, xxxi (1956), 117.

[52] Also, see Critchley, 'Summonses to Military Service', 85.

registers. The following table reveals the extent of this practice and demonstrates just how incomplete the proffer rolls are.

Table 5.2: Tenants-in-Chief who Proffered Service but are not on the Marshals' Rolls[53]

	1277	1282	1300	1303	1306	1310
Summoned individually	n/d	32	14	29	14	21
Not summoned individually	n/d	37	25	37	57	4
Total	n/d	69	39	66	71	25

Besides forcing us to modify our figures in table 5.1, showing that more of those who were summoned individually performed their service than would appear to have been the case at first glance, the above table demonstrates how incomplete are the proffer rolls that have come down to us. Although the scutage rolls provide the names of the tenants-in-chief who fulfilled their feudal obligations, they do not stipulate the names of the men-at-arms who they proffered. Nevertheless, it is evident that the number of knights and sergeants who had their names enrolled on the marshals' registers cannot be taken as the sum total of those performing feudal service. Indeed, we need to revise our figures relating to the strengths of feudal hosts, and their proportional contribution to English armies during the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, by some margin. Evidently, feudal service was not quite as outdated as it is often portrayed.

It is clear that any prosopographical analysis of the men who performed feudal service during this period must necessarily be incomplete. This should be borne in mind throughout the following analysis. Before we look in more detail at the knights and sergeants who were proffered at feudal musters, it may first prove useful to examine the service records of the tenants-in-chief themselves.[54] In his work on the feudal forces of an earlier period, J.H. Round described the tenants-in-chief of eleventh and twelfth century England as the middlemen of the feudal system.[55] This continued to be the case through to the fourteenth century. A total of some 237, or 203 if we discount females and ecclesiastics, appear on the marshals' registers as proffering corporal service on more than one expedition between 1277 and 1310: 127 of the male lay tenants-in-chief proffered their service twice; fifty, on three occasions; twenty, four times; four, on five

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[53] For service not on the proffer rolls, see *CVCR* (supplementary close rolls and scutage rolls), *passim*.
[54] For a detailed prosopographical analysis of the service performed by the baronial tenants-in-chief between 1210 and 1322, see I.J. Sanders, *Feudal Military Service in England: A Study of the Constitutional and Military Powers of the* Barones *in Medieval England* (Oxford, 1956), 136-60.
[55] J.H. Round, *Feudal England: Historical Studies on the XIth and XIIth Centuries* (London, 1895), 248.

occasions; and just two in all six years.[56] An additional 252 male lay tenants-in-chief proffered their service during these years on only one occasion, but around 130 of these can be tentatively linked to family members who appear in that capacity on the proffer rolls in other years.[57] The majority of those named as tenants-in-chief on just one occasion can be traced in either 1277 or 1310, the years that form the parameters of our analysis. Continuity rates would be higher if we included those who are said to have performed their service on the scutage and related rolls. Many tenants-in-chief, particularly in 1277 and 1282, gave feudal service in person. Forty-three did so on more than one campaign, and one individual, Thomas de Scales, proffered himself at the feudal muster on four occasions between 1300 and 1310.[58] Most, however, preferred to discharge their service through substitutes, particularly during the Scottish wars. Even so, it is evident that the majority of the tenants-in-chief were present on the king's expeditions in person. The military service records for the well-documented campaign of 1300 show that at least seventy-five of the 107 male lay tenants-in-chief who received an individual summons were in the army in Scotland in that year, the majority as retinue leaders. For the expedition of three years later, seventy-eight of the hundred individuals summoned can be traced in the same way.

As for the knights and *servientes* who made up the quotas of these tenants-in-chief, the greater part, not surprisingly, appear in their feudal contingents on no more than one occasion. An inquest into the lands of Henry de la Pomeray in Devon in 1293 revealed that some fifty tenants held land from him by military service in just one estate.[59] The pool from which tenants-in-chief could draw the men to discharge their feudal service was therefore very large. Despite this, there was some continuity, and at least eight of the knights and thirteen of the sergeants who were proffered at the feudal muster in Wales in 1277 were employed by the same tenants-in-chief five years later. Many of the ecclesiastical tenants-in-chief, in particular, repeatedly drew on the same soldiers to discharge their feudal service. The abbot of St. Albans, for example, used one of the knights and three of the sergeants whom he proffered in the first Welsh war to represent him at the feudal muster in 1282.[60] It was not only ecclesiastics who

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[56] Cf. Prestwich, 'Cavalry Service', 149.

[57] Oliver de Dynaunt, for example, appears only in 1277 but his son Joyce later acknowledged his family's service in 1300 following Oliver's death: *PW*, i, 203; *PDS*, 212.

[58] 1300 (*PDS*, 216); 1303 (E 101/612/29, m. 1); 1306 (C 47/5/7, m. 1); 1310 (*PW*, II, ii, 407).

[59] *Liber Feodorum. The Book of Fees commonly called Testa de Nevill*, 3 vols (London, 1920-31), ii, 1316-9.

[60] The knight Stephen de Cheynduit (although the Cheynduit junior who served in 1282 might have been the son of the knight of that name who fought for the abbot in 1277), and the sergeants John de Linlegh, John le Mareschal and John de Russepot: *PW*, i, 198, 228.

repeatedly drew on the same individuals to perform their feudal service: between 1277 and 1310, at least forty male lay tenants-in-chief enlisted men-at-arms whom they had employed to discharge their obligations in the past. The knights Ralph de Trehampton and William le Vavasur can be found in the feudal quotas of the earl of Lincoln in both of the first two Welsh wars.[61] In like manner, the Doddingseles family sent or led the sergeants Clement de la More and John de Wygenhale to more than one muster: the former in 1300 and 1303, the latter in those years as well as 1310.[62] Even when a soldier was not re-employed in this way, members of the same family might be. An attempt by the abbot of Ramsey in 1294 to force William de Haningfeld to give feudal service on his behalf in the way that his ancestors had done demonstrates that tenants-in-chief were keen to maintain these links over succeeding generations.[63] In such instances, the proffered men tended to be related to the tenants-in-chief, but not always. Whilst a Simon de Coleford can be found in the company proffered by Hugh de Courtenay in 1300, an Alexander de Coleford performed the service for him six years later.[64] Two members of the Bakepuz family, John and Reginald, were brought into the army as part of Nicholas de Meppershall's contingent in separate years.[65] As noted already, the majority of feudal quotas recorded on the proffer rolls do not reveal such continuity. In fact, most tenants-in-chief appear to have relied upon the services of different individuals on each occasion that they were summoned by the king.

This does not tell the whole story of the connections between tenants-in-chief and those who they proffered, nor does it reveal whether the knights and sergeants who gave feudal service also gave different forms of military service on other occasions. This last point is particularly important when attempting to discern the extent to which 'feudal' soldiers were an extension of the normal military community. What is evident, from a prosopographical analysis of the knights and sergeants who performed feudal service between 1277 and 1310, is that these men were not, for the most part, untrained and untested soldiers who were drawn into the army for forty days and then never seen again. On the contrary, they were ordinary members of the military elite who sometimes happened to perform feudal service but who on many other occasions served for Crown wages, or gratuitously. Distinctions between 'feudal' and other types of mounted soldier

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[61] *PW*, i, 199, 229.
[62] *PDS*, 216; E 101/612/29, m. 1; *PW*, II, ii, 403.
[63] *Select Pleas in Manorial and Other Seignorial Courts*, i, 78.
[64] *PDS*, 225; C 47/5/7, m. 1.
[65] *PW*, i, 204, 234.

therefore have little merit.[66] Whilst many of the sergeants proffered in 1277 and 1310 do appear to have been obscure men who are difficult to trace in the military records in other years, an analysis of those who gave feudal service in the middle of our period shows that this was by no means universally the case. Of the forty or so knights proffered at the feudal muster in 1300, no fewer than thirty-five can be traced in armies on other campaigns in non-feudal capacities. There is insufficient space to discuss all of the individual cases here, but the example of Robert Peverel may be taken as representative. He had letters of protection with the king for service in non-feudal armies north of the border in 1296, 1298 and 1299, and also fought as a retinue leader in Flanders in 1297, prior to being proffered by Walter de Langton at the feudal muster in 1300.[67] Despite the great difficulties involved in tracing the service records of the sergeants who fought in these armies, around a half of those who were proffered in 1300 can be found on campaigns in non-feudal capacities in other years. Geoffrey de Briggeford fought for pay in Scotland under Eustace de Hacche in 1298 and 1301. In between, in 1300, he gave a spell of feudal service on behalf of Edmund Deyncurt.[68] An analysis of the sergeants who registered their names with the marshal in other years reveals similar trends. Men-at-arms who gave feudal service were sometimes, in fact, among the most exalted warriors of their day. Giles de Argentein fought as a sergeant in the feudal levy of 1300 and as a knight for Piers Gaveston in Scotland in 1310.[69] Furthermore, at least ten of the knights proffered in 1277 had taken part in the Lord Edward's crusade to the Holy Land a few years previously.[70]

That 'feudal' soldiers sometimes served for Crown wages and, as J.E. Morris noted in his study of the Welsh wars of Edward I, entered pay once their feudal service had been discharged, may not be particularly surprising.[71] Indeed, it has been recognised for a long time. Yet the obvious point arising from this, that the feudal host can hardly have been less competently manned than armies that were raised through other means if the soldiers in both kinds of army were the same, seems to have been overlooked. Furthermore, although tenants-in-chief might not have used the same men

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[66] For a similar view relating to an earlier period, see S.D.B. Brown, 'Military Service and Monetary Reward in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries', *History*, lxxiv (1989), 22, 34.
[67] 1296 (C 67/11, m. 4); Flanders 1297 (C 67/12, m. 3d); 1298 (C 67/13, m. 7); 1299 (C 67/14, m. 15); 1300 (*PDS*, 210).
[68] 1298 (*Gough*, 192); 1300 (*PDS*, 215); 1301 (E 101/9/24, m. 3). He also served for pay in the retinue of Hacche's sub-leader William de Hardreshull in Flanders in 1297; BL, Add. MS 7965, f. 73v.
[69] *PDS*, 212; *PW*, II, ii, 403.
[70] Ralph de Wodeburg, Thomas Lercedekne, Peter de Chalons, John de Gurnay, William de Wodeburg, Thomas Boter, Thomas du Pyn, Walter de Cambhou, Robert Martin and Ralph de Cotun: Lloyd, *English Society and the Crusade*, appendix 4.
[71] Morris, *Welsh Wars*, 132.

repeatedly to discharge their feudal obligations, many of the soldiers who were proffered at the feudal musters did have service connections with them in different capacities in other years. Sixteen of some forty knights proffered in 1300, and twelve out of thirty-four in 1310 (not including tenants-in-chief who performed the service in person) had additional military ties to the men who they represented. There were many similar bonds, in other years, between the tenants-in-chief and the men whom they proffered. Again, some examples will have to suffice to illustrate this point. The knight Thomas de Wokyndon was proffered by Henry de Grey in 1303. He had letters of protection enrolled in Grey's service not only in that year, but also in 1298, 1300 and 1306.[72] Thomas Paynel, who gave feudal service for John de St. John in 1282, can also be found in his retinue, or that of his son, in Gascony in 1294, and in Scotland in 1299, 1300, 1301, 1303 and 1306.[73] In 1310, John Darcy and Simon de Cokefeld were proffered by Aymer de Valence and Payn de Tibetot respectively: both had joined the retinues of those lords on previous expeditions.[74] Meanwhile, all four knights sent by Thomas of Lancaster had been with him either in 1306 or at the Dunstable tournament of 1309.[75] In other instances, the connections between tenants-in-chief and their feudal soldiers are less immediately obvious. Richard de Mascy gave feudal service on behalf of Ralph de Cammoys in 1310. Four years later he can be found in the retinue of Cammoys' lord, Hugh le Despenser, at Bannockburn.[76] Likewise, two of the sergeants proffered by Richard de la Ryvere and John de Columbers on the Caerlaverock campaign had fought alongside both men in the retinue of Aymer de Valence at Falkirk two years previously.[77] Evidently, the service patterns of 'feudal' soldiers did not differ from those of other soldiers within Edwardian armies. Indeed, it is doubtful whether armies that contained feudal elements looked any different from other armies of the age once they had been put into the field, something that we will now have cause to look at in greater detail.

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[72] 1298 (C 67/13, m. 6d); 1300 (C 67/14, m. 10); 1303 (E 101/612/10, m. 1; C 67/15, m. 14); 1306 (C 67/16, m. 13).
[73] 1282 (*PW*, i, 231; E 101/4/1, m. 10); 1294 (*RG*, iii, 167); 1299-1300 (E 101/8/26, m. 1); 1301 (C 67/14, m. 4); 1303 (C 67/15, m. 7d); 1306 (E 101/612/15, m. 1); temp. Edward II (E 101/17/32).
[74] Darcy; see chapter 4 n. 149. Cokefeld: 1303 (E 101/612/11, m. 2d); 1306 (E 101/13/7, m. 1). Also, see *PW*, II, ii, 401, 405.
[75] Peter de Limesey and William Trussell junior in 1306 (C 67/16, mm. 9, 4d) and Roger de Swynnerton and John de Twyford in 1309 (Tomkinson, 'Retinues at Dunstable', 74-5); *PW*, II, ii, 406.
[76] *PW*, II, ii, 403; C 71/6, m. 3.
[77] Roger de Weston (proffered by Columbers) and Roger de Sakeville (proffered by de la Ryvere): *PDS*, 222, 230; *Gough*, 216-18.

STRUCTURE AND ORGANISATION: AN INTRICATE FUSION OF ELEMENTS

In any study of medieval armies, the most important question is also invariably the most difficult to answer: how were these hosts organised in the field? This question takes on added complexity prior to the reign of Edward III, that is in the era of the pre-contract armies, for the forces of Edward I and his son, like those of their predecessors, were composed of diverse elements. During the middle third of the fourteenth century, important innovations were made in the way that royal hosts were recruited and organised. Foremost amongst these were the universal use of Crown pay and the gradual employment of mixed retinues. The improved performance of English armies during the early stages of the Hundred Years War has been attributed to the development of these apparently simple and efficient methods of raising soldiers.[78] In contrast, the armies of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries were, superficially at least, more difficult to manage. Mounted men-at-arms were gathered in a variety of ways: some were paid by the king, others served gratuitously, whilst still more, as we have seen, served in fulfilment of their feudal obligations. In effect, 'there is no simple way of describing the cavalry forces in the armies of Edward I's reign: they cannot with justice be termed either mercenary, feudal or contractual'.[79] If characterising these pre-contract armies and understanding how they functioned in the field is difficult, historians have nevertheless shown little restraint when assessing their flaws and shortcomings. In particular, the feudal part of these hosts has been the focus of much criticism. For J.E. Morris, 'the paid squadrons under professional captains…were more effective than the incoherent units of a feudal host';[80] and F.M. Powicke was of the opinion that feudal forces could never be of use for anything more than mere 'martial demonstrations'.[81] The perceived lack of usefulness of the feudal host has even led one historian to suggest 'that English feudalism was in its origins as much a fiscal as a military institution'.[82] Little attempt has been made to modify or oppose such views, and the received wisdom is that the rise of the contract army was an inevitable consequence of the inadequacies of the feudal host.

Few would deny that the contract armies of Edward III and his successors performed better than did the hosts raised by his father and grandfather. Edward I might have won at Falkirk, but it is doubtful whether he could have done so at Crécy. It also seems that these contract armies were easier to manage and control than the fluctuating

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[78] Ayton, *Knights and Warhorses*, chapter 1; idem, 'English Armies in the Fourteenth Century'.
[79] Prestwich, *War, Politics and Finance*, 91.
[80] Morris, *Welsh Wars*, 68.
[81] Powicke, *The Thirteenth Century*, 543.
[82] J.M.W. Bean, *The Decline of English Feudalism, 1215-1540* (Manchester, 1968), 5.

forces put into the field by the first two Edwards. However, whilst the beneficial impact of the use of contracts and the rise of wholly paid armies is irrefutable, the suggestion that the feudal hosts within the armies of Edward I and Edward II were incompetent and ineffective is less clear-cut. Not only is it doubtful that the English government would have persisted with the feudal summons for over two-and-a-half centuries if the forces raised in this way were not of some value; it also seems unlikely that a society organised for war would be unable to manage and arrange its field forces effectively, however they were raised.[83] The problem is that evidence relating to the way that these armies were organised in the field is conspicuously lacking.[84] Monastic chroniclers either were unaware of the more intricate matters of military organisation, or deemed them too commonplace to be worth recording. And the soldier-chronicler Sir Thomas Gray also has little to say about military organisation during the Scottish wars in which his father played so honourable a part, whereas by the time of his own martial career the feudal host was effectively a relic of the past. What does seem clear is that some reorganisation usually took place at the muster under the supervision of the king (if he was present), marshal and constable, a process that comes more fully into focus for later armies.[85] Before the main army set out from Chester in 1282, Edward ensured that his men were kept in good order with barded mounts.[86] Furthermore, an interesting account in *The Annals of the Reign of King Edward the First* shows that some intricate organisation took place when the army arrived at Carlisle in 1300.[87] For their part, the feudal contingents were reviewed and monitored with particular care. Some of the men-at-arms who arrived at the muster in 1322 were described on the marshal's register as 'well-armed',[88] and the equipment of individuals serving according to serjeanty tenure was recorded in minute detail.[89] One thing that can be said with certainty is that, in general, 'feudal' soldiers were just as well equipped and armed as other soldiers within the armies.

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[83] The inherent implausibility of the 'feudal hosts' of this period being poorly organised is further suggested by the use of similar methods of raising armies in other countries. Cf. J.S. Critchley, *Feudalism* (London, 1978), 24-9; P. Engel, *The Realm of St Stephen: A History of Medieval Hungary, 895-1526* (London, 2001), 104-5; B. Arnold, *German Knighthood, 1050-1300* (Oxford, 1985), 116, 124; A. Ayton, 'From Muhi to Mohács – Armies and Combatants in Later Medieval European Transcultural Wars', *Transcultural Wars from the Middle Ages to the 21st Century*, ed. H-H. Kortüm (Berlin, 2006), 229-32.

[84] For the longevity of this source problem, see F.M. Stenton, *The First Century of English Feudalism, 1066-1166* (Oxford, 1932), 177.

[85] Cf. A.L. Brown, 'The English Campaign in Scotland, 1400', *British Government and Administration: Studies Presented to S.B. Chrimes*, ed. H. Hearder and H.R. Loyn (Cardiff, 1974), 45.

[86] *Ancient Correspondence Concerning Wales*, 201-2.

[87] *Chronica et Annales*, 439.

[88] C 47/5/10, m. 2.

[89] As with the sergeant Adam le Brun in 1300; *PDS,* 211.

Unfortunately, despite the appealing simplicity of this image, of soldiers (both 'feudal' and non-feudal alike) who arrived at the muster before being integrated into the army as the constable and marshal saw fit,[90] the reality is likely to have been more complex than that. For one thing, whilst the muster might have been the ideal place to group the retinues of various sizes into larger units and battles, it is unlikely that the internal structure of the retinues was interfered with at that point. Much of the necessary organisation took place before the muster convened. Secondly, it must be remembered that in many years there was no single muster and that men and units arrived and departed from the army at different times. 'A medieval army', as F.M. Powicke once noted, 'was a fluctuating thing'.[91] Finally, few accounts that have survived relating to the mustering process tell us in sufficient detail exactly what was happening there. The exceptions are few, but useful, and will be discussed in due course. In sum, if we wish to know how these armies were organised in the field, and how the so-called feudal contingents were arranged alongside those serving for pay or gratuitously, we cannot rely solely on odd snippets in chronicles or monastic registers. Instead, we must draw on as wide a range of sources as possible. Fortunately, the Crown records, and in particular the proffer rolls, shed some light on this process. Sometimes it would appear that the king or the army's commanding officer might have some say as to how and where the feudal contingents performed their service. At the macrocosmic level, the king might order individuals to proffer their feudal service in one regional army or another. During the first Welsh war, Edward commanded Geoffrey and Ralph de Gacelyn to perform their feudal service in west Wales under William de Valence. This order would have come quite naturally as the Gacelyn family were associates of that captain.[92] Five years later, there is evidence that some leading Marcher lords were stationed at Ellesmere and Montgomery at the king's behest.[93] Roger de Somerville offered his service to the Prince of Wales in 1306 because he had been knighted by him during the spring, so Edward sent him to perform it under Henry de Percy who was captain of one of the small armies north of the border.[94] The ways in which such service was discharged therefore varied from case to case.

The way in which feudal contingents could be distributed throughout several regional armies shows that they, and the feudal hosts in general, were perfectly flexible and adaptable. In this respect the feudal units were no different from those serving for

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[90] Cf. Powicke, *Military Obligation*, 34.
[91] Powicke, *The Thirteenth Century*, 411.
[92] *CPR, 1272-81*, 212.
[93] *Ancient Correspondence Concerning Wales*, 77-8; *PW*, i, 234.
[94] *CDS*, iii, no. 52.

pay or gratuitously. When we begin to look at the organisation of the feudal contingents at a lower level, that is, among the retinues that comprised the armies, the situation becomes still more intriguing. What does seem clear is that the feudal contingents were not serving in a separate all-feudal brigade.[95] The king did not concern himself too much with the internal organisation of the army retinues. Still, one entry on the close rolls relating to the army of 1306, in which it is stated that John Fitz Reginald had his feudal service in Hugh le Despenser's company by the king's orders, suggests that he could do so if he wished.[96] More importantly, this entry demonstrates that 'feudal' soldiers could be and were integrated into the retinues. In fact, numerous entries on the proffer rolls of 1277 and 1282 suggest that it was normal for the feudal contingents to be organised in this way. Baldwin Wake and Matthew de Lovayn requested in 1277, for example, that they be allowed to perform their feudal service 'in ii quarentena' because they belonged to a magnate 'familia'.[97] The precise meaning of such entries, and what they tell us about how these men performed their feudal service, is a little unclear. Yet, sometimes the testimony of the proffer rolls is less ambiguous. In 1282, Robert de Sevans gave his forty days' service in the company of John le Mareschal and John de Vaux in the *comitiva* of the earl Marshal.[98] A generation later in 1306, we find both Thomas de Scales and William le Mareschal, tenants-in-chief who were performing their service in person, fighting within the company of Hugh de Vere.[99] Such evidence can be supplemented by miscellaneous entries in other sources. In 1313 it was found that Ralph Fitz William had performed his service of three knights' fees in the army of 1306 because he had been present in that year with ten men-at-arms.[100] This implies that his 'feudal' soldiers were integrated with the other men in his retinue who were present in response to other forms of obligation.

Such combinations of 'feudal' and non-feudal soldiers within the retinues highlight the danger of drawing simplistic distinctions between feudal hosts and paid armies, or of juxtaposing feudal hosts with later professional or national forces.[101] One of the reasons why quasi-feudal armies are believed to have been structurally defective is because the feudal contingents, so the theory goes, were not normally combined with

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[95] Cf. Prestwich, 'Cavalry Service', 150-1; idem, *Edward I*, 485; idem, *Armies and Warfare*, 73.
[96] *CCR, 1302-07*, 490.
[97] *PW*, i, 200, 204; M. Altschul, *A Baronial Family in Medieval England: The Clares, 1217-1314* (Baltimore, 1965), 138-9.
[98] *PW*, i, 232, 233.
[99] C 47/5/7, m. 1.
[100] *CCR, 1313-18*, 17.
[101] Cf. S. Reynolds, *Kingdoms and Communities in Western Europe, 900-1300*, 2nd edition (Oxford, 1997), 253-4.

those serving gratuitously or for pay. But just why this was not possible, and how these 'feudal' soldiers performed their service if they were not integrated into the paid and other retinues, has never been fully explained.[102] Morris believed that the size of the retinues varied according to whether feudal or paid service was being given. If a leader were serving for pay, then performed his feudal service for forty days before entering pay again, he 'possibly [had] larger troops out during the obligatory period than either before or after'.[103] Here Morris was evidently aware that at some stages in the Welsh wars and under particular circumstances it was necessary for 'feudal' and paid soldiers to fight alongside one another within the same retinues. Yet he did not draw the logical conclusion from this, possibly because of a due sense of caution, that such integration might well have been a normal state of affairs. Consequently, the impression of 'feudal' soldiers as men who were somehow separate and different from other men-at-arms within the armies has been repeated in the historiography.[104] Nevertheless, Morris' observation raises an obvious question. If 'feudal' and non-feudal soldiers could be combined on some occasions, then why not on others? Fortunately, the survival in 1300 of two occasional armorials, the Caerlaverock Roll and the Galloway Roll, allows us to look at this problem in more detail. On 2 July in that year, the Gloucestershire knight Thomas de Berkeley proffered three knights at the feudal muster: the brothers Edmund and John Basset, along with Thomas de Gurnay.[105] In one of the short apparently eye-witness accounts towards the end of the Caerlaverock poem, which recalls the events of 15 July, the herald notes that the Basset brothers were present alongside the Berkeley brothers, Maurice and Thomas, during the siege.[106] On the Galloway Roll, recording an encounter that took place between the English and Scots at the river Cree on 8 August, the Basset brothers are again arranged within the Berkeley retinue, as is the third 'feudal' knight, Thomas de Gurnay. The Berkeley brothers were not giving feudal service and appear, along with William de Wauton and another unidentified knight who is listed in the retinue on the Galloway Roll, to have been serving without Crown pay.[107] Evidently, the three 'feudal' knights performing their obligatory service did so alongside the Berkeleys' non-feudal men-at-arms (including the sergeants who are not

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[102] R.F. Walker's work on the Welsh wars of Henry III contains much information on the feudal levies but the sources do not really allow for close analysis of the relationships between such men and those serving according to other forms of obligation; Walker, 'The Anglo-Welsh Wars', 178-9, 182, 277-8, 542-3.
[103] Morris, *Welsh Wars*, 75.
[104] E.g. G.W.S. Barrow, *Feudal Britain: The Completion of the Medieval Kingdoms 1066-1314* (London, 1956), 362-6; A. Nusbacher, *The Battle of Bannockburn 1314* (Stroud, 2000), 54.
[105] *PDS*, 221.
[106] *Aspilogia III*, i, 443.
[107] *Ibid*, 468.

listed on the rolls but who must have been present) and did not perform their service elsewhere.

Unfortunately, the Caerlaverock Roll, which records events that took place during the forty days of feudal service, is of limited value in this respect as few men below the rank of banneret are listed on the armorial. The Galloway Roll, on the other hand, records the names of many knights bachelor organised into retinues. This enables us to trace other instances of 'feudal' soldiers who served within the magnate companies alongside paid and other cavalrymen. John de Hulles was proffered at the feudal muster by the tenant-in-chief and campaign leader Hugh de Vere on 29 June 1300. Interestingly, not only was a letter of protection enrolled for him within Vere's company on 13 June, but he also appears on the Galloway Roll four places after Vere and alongside his other, non-feudal retainers: Alphonse de Vere, Robert Fitz Nigel and Arnold de Monteny.[108] In like manner, the knight John de Grendon was proffered by his former retinue leader Edmund, baron Stafford on 28 June before having a protection enrolled in Robert de la Warde's company on 2 July. He appears on the armorial three places after de la Warde, again alongside the latter's other, non-feudal followers.[109] These men appear on the Galloway Roll shortly after their periods of feudal service were due to expire. This proves that they did not depart from the army as soon as their feudal service was over. It also seems unlikely that they would have appeared within the retinues just a few days after completing their feudal service had they not been there all along: restructuring at that stage would only have created confusion, particularly as not all men-at-arms began their obligatory service on the same date. Fortunately, there are some men on the Galloway Roll whose periods of feudal service began later in the summer. These individuals should therefore have been performing their feudal service on 8 August at the time of the events that the Galloway Roll commemorates. In mid-July, the household banneret and one of Edward's most trusted military associates, William de Leyburn, proffered two knights in his capacity as a tenant-in-chief: Fulk Peyforer and Henry de Leyburn. Had these men been serving in a separate feudal brigade then one would not expect them to appear under Leyburn on the armorial. However, both men can be traced on the roll just a few entries down from him along with his other bachelors: Simon de Leyburn, William de Creye and John de Champayne.[110] To complicate matters still further, on 8 July, just a few days before their feudal service was due to begin, these two 'feudal' knights also appear, within

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[108] *PDS*, 216; C 67/14, m. 12; *Aspilogia III*, i, 456.
[109] *PDS*, 213; C 67/14, m. 10; *Aspilogia III*, i, 465-6.
[110] *PDS*, 228; *Aspilogia III*, i, 463.

Leyburn's retinue, on the household horse inventory for the expedition.[111] This is peculiar as the inventory records only the part of the army that was in receipt of Crown wages. The integration of the feudal contingents within Edwardian armies was, therefore, a complex business that requires more detailed investigation.

For the purposes of such an analysis it is not enough to rely on the testimony of the rolls of arms alone. All the evidence shows that the armies of Edward I and Edward II were complex structures, and it is therefore necessary to look at the problem of the organisation of the feudal contingents from as broad a perspective as possible. Furthermore, although the Galloway Roll is a more inclusive armorial than any of its predecessors among the occasional rolls, it does not name any men of sub-knightly status. This is a major problem as by the time of the Scottish wars around 90 per cent of the feudal levies consisted of *servientes* rather than knights. The only way to investigate this matter in detail, therefore, is to carry out a wide-ranging prosopographical analysis; that is, to compare the information contained in the proffer rolls with the other military records of this period: the letters of protection and attorney, horse inventories, wardrobe books and pay rolls. The best place to begin is with the lay tenants-in-chief as many of these men not only made proffers at the feudal musters but also went on to serve as retinue leaders within the armies. In this light, it is possible to reflect on how many of the men proffered by these serving tenants-in-chief also appear in their military retinues. In all years for which the feudal summons was issued, it is possible to find some overlap between the men named in the feudal contingents of the tenants-in-chief and the men-at-arms who fought alongside them. Four of the eight men proffered by the earl of Lincoln on the Welsh campaign of 1277 - Aymer de Bruycurt, Ralph de Trehampton, William le Vavasur and Robert de Kirketon - also took out letters of protection with him in that year.[112] All, with the possible exception of Kirketon, had been in Lincoln's retinue since the earliest operations of the war during the previous winter, when he had led six knights and twenty-three sergeants in his paid retinue as captain on the March.[113] It seems unlikely that these men would have left the earl's retinue, in which they had been serving for several months, during their forty days of feudal service. In 1303, all four of the men proffered by Richard Lovel on 2 June had had their horses appraised in his retinue on 18 May, meaning that they were giving paid service under him before beginning their obligatory spell. It also suggests that they were probably with Lovel

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[111] E 101/8/23, m. 4; *Liber Quotidianus*, 195.
[112] *PW*, i, 199; *CPR, 1272-81*, 189, 190, 221.
[113] See the dates of the protections in the previous footnote; E 101/3/12.

during their six weeks of feudal service.[114] This is all the more likely given that three of these sergeants (Hugh de Sturgeun, Michael de Wemmes and Elias de la Forde) had followed Lovel to Scotland in previous years, the last having been proffered by him at the feudal muster in 1300.[115] What these and many other similar examples illustrate is that more often than not, when a tenant-in-chief who made a proffer also served as a retinue leader, his 'feudal' soldiers served alongside his non-feudal men-at-arms within the wider *comitiva*.[116]

Alternatively, 'feudal' soldiers sometimes performed their service not with the men who had proffered them, but in the retinues of other campaign leaders. They might even follow the lay tenants-in-chief into those retinues.[117] In some instances, there was no choice but for men-at-arms to serve with a lord other than the man who had proffered them as the landholders who discharged their obligations were either too old to give service in person, or did not take part in the campaigns for political reasons.[118] In 1310 and 1314, political unrest and opposition to Edward II among the magnates meant that some of the earls and leading barons did not take part in the campaigns in person, even though they did make proffers.[119] No records survive for the feudal contingents that served on the Bannockburn campaign. Still, it is interesting to note that a certain John Darcy had a letter of protection in 1310 for service with the earl of Gloucester, and that a knight of that name had been proffered at the muster on behalf of the earl of Pembroke who was back in London carrying out his duties as an Ordainer.[120] The possibility that Pembroke's feudal contingent was with Gloucester in that year is strengthened not only by the fact that the earls were men of the same rank, making any such agreement acceptable to both parties, but also by the presence of a Nicholas de Reseby in Gloucester's retinue, a sergeant named Walter de 'Rysebegh', possibly a relative, having been proffered by Valence.[121] Gilbert Pecche, who had been to Scotland with Aymer de Valence in 1301 and 1306, was also with the earl of Gloucester in 1310.[122] That agreements between lay tenants-in-chief and the campaign leaders were not uncommon is suggested by many similar prosopographical links grounded in local and

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[114] E 101/612/29, m. 2; E 101/612/11, m. 1.
[115] Sturgeun: 1298 (*Gough*, 179); 1300 (E 101/8/23, m. 7d); 1301 (E 101/9/24, m. 2). Wemmes; 1301 (E 101/9/24, m. 2). Forde; 1300 (E 101/8/23, m. 7d; *PDS*, 220).
[116] In such instances the 'feudal' soldiers would have been treated no differently from the other men in the retinues, receiving the same pay and benefits, such as horse compensation, from their retinue leaders; Ayton, *Knights and Warhorses*, 88-9.
[117] Powicke, 'Edward II and Military Obligation', 118.
[118] Cf. A.L. Poole, *Obligations of Society in the XII and XIII Centuries* (Oxford, 1946), 39.
[119] *Vita Edwardi Secundi*, 21-3, 86-9; *Lanercost*, 224; *Flores Historiarum*, iii, 338.
[120] C 71/4, m. 10; *PW*, II, ii, 401.
[121] C 71/4, m. 13; *PW*, II, ii, 401.
[122] For his service with Valence: E 101/9/24, m. 1d; E 101/13/16, f. 5v. For 1310: C 71/4, m. 10.

regional familiarity. Two of the men-at-arms proffered by Edmund earl of Cornwall in 1277 had letters of protection earlier that year for service in the company of the south-western lord, Oliver de Dynaunt.[123] In 1300, the two sergeants proffered by Nicholas de Kiryel of Kent, Peter Pycard and Edmund de St. Leger, had their horses appraised under another landholder from that county: William de Leyburn.[124] Kiryel made his proffer immediately after Leyburn and had previously served in his company on the Flanders campaign of 1297-8.[125] On other occasions, the retinue leaders were related to the tenants-in-chief by whom the men had been proffered. In 1303, a Roger de Wellesford registered his service on behalf of Cecily de Beauchamp, just a couple of weeks after having his horse appraised with her son, Robert.[126] Furthermore, the Warin Martin who was proffered by the countess of Pembroke on the same campaign can later be found receiving compensation for horse losses within the retinue of Aymer de Valence.[127] What these links prove is that 'feudal' soldiers operated within the same networks of regional and familial relations as did other men-at-arms, and that their service bonds were essentially the same as theirs.

On most campaigns it would appear that around a half of the retinue leaders within the armies were not serving for Crown pay, but had chosen, instead, to pay their men-at-arms directly from their own resources. In such instances, the campaign pay accounts tell us little about the integration of the feudal contingents within the retinues. It is also far from clear how reliable and precise the pay rolls actually are: careful scrutiny of the *vadia guerre* accounts of a slightly later period has shown that royal clerks were more interested in making their accounts add up than in reflecting the practical reality of what was happening in the field.[128] Nevertheless, in a few instances, the pay accounts can be of some value for our investigation. The pay entry for William de Cantilupe for the Caerlaverock campaign states that he had three knights and eight sergeants in his retinue between 3 July and 31 August; and that the pay of one of his sergeants had been stopped for eight days because he owed the service of the tenth part of one knights' fee. This sergeant, William de Sutton, was proffered by Cantilupe at the feudal muster on 3 July. Intriguingly, Sutton is also listed among his lord's paid men-at-arms on the horse inventory on the same date, even though he should have been

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[123] *PW*, i, 198; *CPR, 1272-81*, 189. For evidence of the familiarity of the earl with the Dynaunt family, see *Ministers' Accounts of the Earldom of Cornwall, 1296-1297*, ed. L.M. Midgley, 2 vols, Camden Society 3rd ser., lxvi, lxviii (1942-5), ii, 231.
[124] *PDS*, 228; E 101/8/23, m. 4.
[125] E 101/6/37, m. 4.
[126] E 101/612/29, m. 1; E 101/612/11, m. 1. Also, see *CCR, 1296-1302*, 567.
[127] E 101/612/10, m. 1; BL, Add. MS 8835, f. 46v; *PDS*, 269.
[128] Ayton, *Knights and Warhorses*, 138-55.

beginning his period of feudal service at that time. His inclusion in Cantilupe's pay account, as well as among his soldiers on the horse inventory, strongly suggests that he performed his feudal service within his lord's paid retinue.[129] On the other hand, the men who gave their feudal service in west Wales under William de Valence in 1282 simply disappeared from the pay records for forty days between 2 August and 10 September.[130] In addition to the evidence provided by the pay accounts, it is sometimes possible to trace instances in which 'feudal' soldiers followed the lords who had proffered them into the retinues of other men. On 14 July 1300, Andrew Luterel and Roger de Arundel, among others, were proffered at the feudal muster by John de Mohun. Just ten days previously, both men, along with Mohun, had had letters of protection enrolled in the company of the earl of Warwick.[131] In a similar instance in 1310, the *serviens* Raymond Harang took out a letter of protection with the earl of Gloucester within three weeks of being proffered at the feudal muster by Nicholas Pointz. He would appear to have given his feudal service within Pointz' sub-retinue on the Scottish campaign of that year, as Pointz also received a protection with Gilbert de Clare during the autumn.[132] Such examples could be multiplied and, along with the evidence of the pay rolls, enhance our understanding of how the 'feudal' soldiers were woven into the army structures.

It is not surprising to find that 'feudal' soldiers who had been proffered by male lay tenants-in-chief were integrated into the armies in much the same way as those who were serving for pay or gratuitously. After all, these men would often have been relatives, neighbours, friends or tenants of the lords for whom they performed their obligatory service. Furthermore, as we have seen, it was common for 'feudal' knights and sergeants to have had service links to the men who proffered them in non-feudal capacities on other campaigns. With the notable exception of the bishop of Durham, however, this cannot have been the case with the ecclesiastical tenants-in-chief. These men and women were not warriors accustomed to the intricacies of military organisation and recruitment, but simply landholders who by virtue of the estates that they held in chief of the king were obliged to provide a quota of men-at-arms for forty days of military service whenever a summons was issued. How, then, were the men named within the feudal contingents of these ecclesiastical tenants-in-chief organised within the armies? Here, the evidence of the monastic chronicles and registers may provide

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[129] Simpkin, 'The English Army and the Scottish Campaign of 1310-11' (forthcoming).
[130] R.F. Walker, 'William de Valence and the Army of West Wales, 1282-1283', *WHR*, xviii (1997), 415.
[131] *PDS*, 227; C 67/14, m. 9.
[132] C 71/4, m. 10; *PW*, II, ii, 403.

some clues. The most familiar accounts are those composed at that most renowned house of historical writing, the abbey of St. Albans. Matthew Paris' well-known passage relating to the army in Wales in 1257 shows (although Paris' lack of proximity to events must be remembered) that the knights and sergeants proffered by the abbot in that year were distributed by the marshal and constable among the retinues at the muster, the former being separated from the latter.[133] In 1277, in contrast, it would appear that the men proffered by the abbey stayed together during their service. Other than the fact that the contingent was well-armed and served for eight weeks, some of this service being for pay, the account for that year tells us nothing of how the contingent was organised within the host.[134] Similarly frustrating are the accounts preserved in the register of the abbey of Malmesbury.[135] Nevertheless, there is evidence to suggest that 'feudal' soldiers who were proffered by ecclesiastics, like those sent by their lay counterparts, were organised within the retinues. One of the knight's fees owed by the abbot of St. Albans for the army of 1303 was held by the household yeoman, William de Montacute. In compliance with the king's wishes, it was agreed that Montacute would do his service to the king in that year, presumably in the household division, and that the abbot would be allowed the service of that fee.[136] If the king sometimes arranged for soldiers proffered by ecclesiastical tenants-in-chief to serve within his own retinue, it is probable that lesser retinue leaders were also involved in similar agreements.

What might well have happened, therefore, is that when an ecclesiastical tenant-in-chief had well-established landholding or personal connections with a local military leader, some agreement might be reached between the two men by which his quota could be discharged. In other cases, when such agreements were not possible prior to the muster, or when such relationships did not exist, it might be left to the marshal and constable to distribute the ecclesiastical quotas at the muster; as in the case recorded by Paris in 1257. It was quite common for ecclesiastics to contract with military leaders for the fulfilment of their military obligation before the start of a campaign. Indeed, in the few instances where contracts have survived, it is relatively easy to trace the integration of these quotas within the retinues. The archbishop of York, William Wykewane, paid a hundred pounds to John de Eyville in 1282 to discharge his feudal service in Wales.[137]

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[133] *Chronica Majora*, vi, 374.
[134] *Gesta Abbatum Monasterii Sancti Albani, a Thoma Walsingham, Regnante Ricardo Secundo, ejusdem Ecclesiae Praecentore, compilata*, ed. H.T. Riley, 3 vols, Rolls Ser., xxviii 4 (London, 1867-9), i, 435.
[135] *Registrum Malmesburiense: The Register of Malmesbury Abbey*, ed. J.S. Brewer, 2 vols, Rolls Ser., lxxii (London, 1879-80), ii, 404-5.
[136] *CCR, 1302-07*, 32.
[137] *The Register of William Wickwane, Lord Archbishop of York 1279-1285*, ed. W. Brown, Surtees Society, cxiv (1907), no. 839.

Eyville was included in the archbishop's quota and was clearly leading the other five men who were proffered: they can be found in his retinue on the horse inventory, or with protections, just two weeks prior to the muster alongside other, non-feudal soldiers.[138] In this instance, the relationship between the Eyville family and the archbishops appears to have been firmly established, as a Gocelyn de Eyville later appears as a yeoman of another archbishop, Thomas de Corbrigg, in 1301.[139] A third archbishop of York, William de Grenefeld, later contracted with the local north Yorkshire knight, Thomas de Coleville, for the fulfilment of his feudal service in 1310. There is evidence to suggest that Coleville led the archbishop's feudal contingent into the retinues in that year.[140] It was not only the archbishops of York, however, who employed retinue leaders for this purpose: in 1300, the bishop of Hereford contracted with a local knight, William de Grandison, for his feudal service.[141] Significantly, the knight in the bishop's proffered contingent, Thomas de Bermingham, appears under Grandison on the Galloway Roll shortly before entering pay in his retinue. This demonstrates that he was riding within the *comitiva* alongside Grandison's other men during his spell of feudal service.[142] It seems likely that these 'feudal' soldiers were associates of Grandison rather than of the bishop, as Bermingham was also with Grandison in Scotland in 1301 and 1304. Furthermore, two of the sergeants proffered by the bishop in 1300, John de Dun and Walter de Cadington, were likewise with Grandison in Scotland the following year.[143] Sometimes the wording of these agreements makes it clear that the service was to be performed within the retinues. A chancery warrant relating to a planned Scottish campaign of Edward II in 1318 shows that the household steward William de Montacute had contracted with the abbot and convent of Abingdon to take their feudal service north in his company.[144] In such instances, the records leave little doubt as to the way in which the 'feudal' soldiers discharged their service during the forty days.

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[138] *PW*, i, 228; C 47/2/7, mm. 8-9; C 67/8, m. 5. This contract has been mentioned before but without reference to the horse lists and other military service records for that year; Chew, *Ecclesiastical Tenants-in-Chief*, 156, n. 2; Lewis, 'The Summons of the English Feudal Levy, 5 April 1327', 243, n. 27.
[139] *The Register of Thomas of Corbridge, Lord Archbishop of York, 1300-1304*, ed. W. Brown with introduction by A. Hamilton Thompson, 2 vols, Surtees Society, cxxxviii, cxli, (1925-8), ii, no. 949.
[140] *The Register of William Greenfield, Lord Archbishop of York 1306-1315*, ed. W. Brown and A. Hamilton Thompson, 5 vols, Surtees Society, cxlv-cliii, (1931-40), iv, no. 2312; Simpkin, 'The English Army and the Scottish Campaign of 1310-11' (forthcoming).
[141] *Registrum Ricardi de Swinfield, Episcopi Herefordensis, A.D. MCCLXXXIII-MCCCXVII*, ed. W.W. Capes, Canterbury and York Society, vi (1909), 375-6; *PDS*, 214.
[142] *Aspilogia III*, i, 455; *Liber Quotidianus*, 199.
[143] E 101/9/23, m. 2; *PDS*, 270.
[144] *CCW*, 493.

The number of contracts that have survived account for only a small portion of the total feudal service discharged by ecclesiastical tenants-in-chief during the wars of Edward I and his son. Nonetheless, it is possible to augment such documents with evidence of other connections between ecclesiastics and military leaders, drawn from a wider prosopographical analysis. Although only a small number of contracts have come down to us, it is clear that many more were drawn up at the time, or that oral agreements were made between the two parties. In 1282, the abbot of Winchcombe sent a unit of one knight and two sergeants to perform his service of two knights' fees and these men - Theobald de Neville, William de Bermingham and James de Eley - duly registered their service on behalf of the abbot on 2 August.[145] All three (Neville, Bermingham and a James de 'Astlegh') also appear on the main horse inventory in the retinue of Nicholas de Segrave alongside ten other men: the names of Bermingham and Astlegh are crossed through.[146] Although the entry on the inventory is undated, the pay roll shows that Segrave and his men entered the king's pay on 9 June.[147] The likelihood is that he had contracted with the abbot and that these men stayed in his retinue during their forty days of feudal service. For the same campaign, no fewer than six of the sixteen men proffered by the bishop of Durham can be traced on the inventory in the retinue of the Yorkshire banneret William le Latimer. All six appear on a separate membrane that was stitched into the middle of Latimer's retinue and which contained the names of a further seven men.[148] For the expedition that resulted in the siege of Caerlaverock eighteen years later, three of the men-at-arms proffered by the bishop of Salisbury on 2 July had obtained letters of protection in the retinue of John de Ferrers on 28 June, just a few days prior to the muster.[149] Some kind of agreement must have been reached between Ferrers and the bishop during the days and weeks that preceded the campaign. To give one more of many similar examples, the sergeant Stephen de Bannebury was proffered by the abbot of St. Augustine's of Canterbury in 1300 and 1303, and in both years he appears in the retinue of the Kentish lord Roger le Sauvage within the wider *comitiva* of John de Drokensford.[150] This particular case provides yet more evidence of local recruitment networks in action.

So far we have looked at the way that the feudal contingents, both of lay and ecclesiastical tenants-in-chief, were woven into the retinues within royal armies. The

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[145] *PW*, i, 228.
[146] C 47/2/7, m. 8.
[147] E 101/4/1, m. 2.
[148] *PW*, i, 228; C 47/2/7, mm. 4, 6.
[149] *PDS*, 221; C 67/14, m. 11.
[150] 1300 (*PDS*, 210; E 101/8/23, m. 7); 1303 (E 101/612/29, m. 1; E 101/612/11, m. 5).

main point arising from this investigation is that, fundamentally, 'feudal' soldiers were no different from other men-at-arms within the armies: they were flexible and might take part in royal campaigns in a number of different ways. During times of war, men were needed not only to serve in the main field armies, but also in the garrisons in occupied territories. As such, it should not occasion surprise to find that 'feudal' soldiers, like other men-at-arms, sometimes discharged their service within these garrisons. Helena Chew noted how the bishop of Hereford's contingent in 1282 was sent to serve under Roger de Mortimer at Builth.[151] This was not an isolated incident; in fact, there was clearly quite a long tradition of this practice as 'feudal' soldiers had been sent to serve in the garrisons of the March during the Welsh wars of Henry III.[152] This practice probably varied from campaign to campaign depending on the exigencies of the moment, but in 1282, at least, the proffer roll contains several references to men who performed their service in the castles of the March, including William le Botiller of Wem and Hugh de Wlonkeslowe at their local fort of Shrewsbury.[153] One interesting example relating to the Scottish campaign of Edward II in 1310-11 suggests that the feudal contingents might sometimes have performed their service together in the garrisons *en bloc*, under the command of one of the leading men in their group. On 10 September, John de Grey proffered two knights and nine *servientes* at the feudal muster at Tweedmouth in fulfilment of his feudal obligations.[154] In July the following year, as this campaign was stuttering to a close, one of these knights, Edmund de Hastings, could be found in command of six of Grey's sergeants in the garrison of Dundee.[155] Evidently, Grey had contracted with Hastings for his feudal service. In fact, Hastings was probably leading these men-at-arms in the Scottish garrisons from the beginning of the campaign the previous autumn: he had received a prest on 11 November 1310 for service in the garrison at Perth with twelve men-at-arms, under the command of Henry de Beaumont.[156] A sergeant named Alexander de Vaux, who was proffered by John de Noers at the muster on 10 September 1310 immediately after Grey's unit had registered their names with the marshal, also appears under Hastings in the garrison at Dundee the following summer.[157] It seems likely that feudal soldiers were sometimes grouped together during the mustering process. Indeed, the order in which soldiers were

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[151] Chew, *Ecclesiastical Tenants-in-Chief*, 94.
[152] Walker, 'The Anglo-Welsh Wars', 277-8.
[153] *PW*, i, 233.
[154] *PW*, II, ii, 402.
[155] *CDS*, iii, 430.
[156] BL, Cotton Nero C VIII, f. 43v.
[157] *PW*, II, ii, 402; *CDS*, iii, 430.

registered on the proffer rolls may provide clues as to the ways in which they performed their service.

Many other interesting phenomena arise from a detailed study of the proffer rolls and a prosopographical analysis of the soldiers who performed feudal service. On some campaigns, one finds examples of tenants-in-chief who not only made proffers, but who also appear in the feudal contingents of other tenants-in-chief. One such man was Ingelram de Berenger, who gave service on behalf of the abbess of Wilton in 1300 two days before fulfilling his own obligations.[158] Alternatively, the same group of men-at-arms sometimes discharged the service of more than one tenant-in-chief. In 1282, three of the sergeants proffered at the feudal muster by John de la Mare also served in the contingent of the abbot of Malmesbury: some kind of compromise had probably been reached between the two men.[159] One thing that is clear is that 'feudal' soldiers should not be bracketed as particular types of soldier who were somehow different from other men-at-arms. As we saw earlier in this chapter, 'feudal' soldiers might alternate between gratuitous, paid and feudal service, whilst a few of the sergeants who were proffered at the muster in 1300 appear to have had links to the county levies in that year.[160] More particularly, there is little reason to believe that 'feudal' soldiers and the raising of the feudal levy had a detrimental impact on the way that these armies operated in the field. Even if 'feudal' soldiers were only obliged to join the armies for forty days, that was forty days for which the Crown did not need to pay them and could save on its resources. After that, if it wished, it was simple enough for the Crown to take the 'feudal' soldiers over into pay, or for these men to carry on as many others did without receiving such wages. Finally, so far as the structures of these armies are concerned, it is difficult to see how the feudal contingents could have undermined the performance of English armies. Certainly, it would seem that hosts raised partly through the traditional feudal summons would have looked very much the same as armies that were not. It would have made no sense for the king to arrange his host any differently in 1300 or 1303, when feudal levies were called on, than he had at Falkirk when no feudal summons was issued. The evidence gathered here, showing that 'feudal' soldiers were integrated within retinues that included men serving for pay and gratuitously, demonstrates that there would have been no need for him to have done so. To

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[158] *PDS*, 216, 221.
[159] *PW*, i, 228, 231.
[160] Men by the names of Philip Burnel, Roger de Swerkeston, Robert de Mandeville, Thomas de Norton and Roger de Watford are listed in the pay accounts as "de diversis comitatibus" in the summer of 1300 and appear on the proffer roll in that year: *PDS*, 212, 217, 220, 224, 228; *Liber Quotidianus*, 224, 233-234.

summarise, distinctions between paid, 'feudal' and gratuitous soldiers simply distort a less complex reality in which soldiers were soldiers and armies were armies, however we choose to label them. The real key to the organisation of these hosts was not the methods by which soldiers were or were not paid, but how they were recruited at ground level.

THE END OF AN ERA

In recent years, the theory that the reign of Edward I witnessed fundamental changes in the way that English armies were recruited and organised in the field has been superseded by a new consensus emphasising continuity with previous reigns. Far from 1272 constituting a break with the past, the armies of Edward I (and indeed those of his son) differed little in fundamentals from those put into the field by John and Henry III.[161] 'In terms of tactics and organization, the historian searches in vain for a "military revolution" in this period. Instead we detect developments more fragmented and subtle'.[162] The progress made under Edward I had less to do with advances in battlefield tactics or in the way that armies were structured, than with the sheer size of the forces that he was able to raise for his campaigns in Wales and Scotland.[163] Particularly large armies were gathered for the Welsh wars of 1282-3 and 1294-5,[164] whilst as we have seen, an estimated 30,000 men took part in the Falkirk campaign of 1298. Warfare on this scale was made possible by fundamental improvements in the way that the campaigns were managed and administered and, in particular, by the system of war finance that was supervised by the wardrobe clerks. The conquest of Wales owed more to the increased capacity of the English state to pay for those wars, partly through the exploitation of a system of credit finance, than to any drastic alterations in weaponry, strategy, tactics or armour.[165] One of the factors that gave this period its unity and which was brought to an end by the English defeat at Bannockburn in 1314, an event now regarded as the true watershed in the warfare of the period, was the important role

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[161] For John, see A.R. Fisher, 'The Organisation of War in England under John, 1199-1216', University of Hull D.Phil. thesis, 1997, 81-2.
[162] N. Housley, 'European Warfare, *c.*1200-1320', *Medieval Warfare: A History*, ed. M. Keen (Oxford, 1999), 114.
[163] On the lack of tactical progress, see M. Prestwich, 'England and Scotland during the Wars of Independence', *England and her Neighbours, 1066-1453: Essays in Honour of Pierre Chaplais*, ed. M. Jones and M. Vale (London, 1989), 189.
[164] Prestwich, *Plantagenet England*, 163.
[165] Cf. Prestwich, *War, Politics and Finance*, chapters 7-9, but also W.M. Ormrod, 'State-Building and State Finance in the Reign of Edward I', *England in the Thirteenth Century*, ed. W.M. Ormrod (Stamford, 1991), 15-35, for a more sceptical discussion.

played by heavy cavalry.[166] Whether or not 'cavalry was the essential feature of a medieval army', as R.H.C. Davis put it,[167] there can be no doubt that the genteel ranks fought on horseback throughout most of the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, including at the pitched battles of Lewes, Evesham, Falkirk and Bannockburn. Sir Thomas Gray's account of the debacle in 1314, when the army leaders 'mounted on horseback in great consternation, for they were not at all used to dismounting to fight on foot', must remain definitive on this point.[168] In this respect, the hosts of Henry III, Edward I and Edward II were distinct from royal armies of earlier and later periods in which the aristocracy were regularly required to dismount to fight on foot. There are therefore strong grounds for regarding Bannockburn as the end of an era for English warfare in the Middle Ages, one that reached its apogee under Edward I.

That Edward I and Edward II were conservative in the methods that they used to recruit soldiers and organise them in the field is supported by their repeated resort to the feudal host for most of their campaigns. Both kings did make important innovations, such as their attempts to create a new form of military obligation based on the landed wealth of the subject, but there is little evidence to suggest that this was ever intended to replace the traditional *servicium debitum*. The claim by the magnates at the York parliament in 1300 that they did not owe feudal service in Scotland, and the successful bid by the king to refute those claims by appeal to the chronicles, shows that it was the king, not the aristocracy, who wished to maintain that method of recruitment.[169] As we have seen, such conservatism does not appear to have had a detrimental impact on the way that English armies were recruited and structured. It must remain extremely doubtful as to whether soldiers such as Robert del Escheker, who campaigned under John de Engayne in the non-feudal army in Flanders in 1297 before giving feudal service in the same lord's retinue in 1300, carried out their military service any differently when they gave feudal service from when they did not.[170] Of course, the way that soldiers appear to have been recruited and organised in the Crown records may not always reflect the way that they fought on campaign. Anne Curry's cautionary note, that

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[166] For the impact of Bannockburn, see Verbruggen, *The Art of Warfare*, 72; Ayton, *Knights and Warhorses*, 18.

[167] R.H.C. Davis, *The Medieval Warhorse: Origin, Development and Redevelopment* (London, 1989), 11. For more nuanced views on infantry and cavalry forces, see J. Gillingham, 'Richard I and the Science of War in the Middle Ages', *War and Government in the Middle Ages: Essays in Honour of J.O. Prestwich*, ed. J. Gillingham and J.C. Holt (Woodbridge, 1984), 91; S. Morillo, '*Milites*, Knights and Samurai: Military Terminology, Comparative History, and the Problem of Translation', *The Normans and their Adversaries at War: Essays in Memory of C. Warren Hollister*, ed. R.P. Abels and B.S. Bachrach (Woodbridge, 2001), 167-84.

[168] *Scalacronica*, 75.

[169] *Bury St. Edmunds*, 156.

[170] 1297 (E 101/6/37, m. 2iii); 1300 (E 101/8/23, m. 5; *PDS*, 227).

'organisation for war is not necessarily the same as organisation in war', serves as a useful warning in this respect.[171] However, given the absence of more conclusive evidence, the service records remain our best bet if we wish to reconstruct the way that medieval armies functioned when in formation and fought in the field. So far as feudal service is concerned, a prosopographical analysis of the administrative records can tell us much more about how these units were organised and integrated into the armies than any other methodological approach. We will never know for certain whether William de St. John, who received a letter of protection with Robert Fitz Nigel in April 1303 before being proffered by Hugh de Vere in June, gave his feudal service in Fitz Nigel's retinue in that year or not. That he did so is likely given that he had served alongside Fitz Nigel within Vere's retinue in the past.[172] The least that we can say is that that scenario is highly probable. It is far more profitable to attempt to reconstruct English armies in this way than to rely on brief and vague descriptions in the chronicles, or on rare fragments that may give some direct insight into military organisation but which in isolation can ultimately tell us little. The records for military service yield a great deal about medieval armies that would otherwise inevitably be obscured.

For all that the quasi-feudal army might have functioned effectively under Edward I and Edward II, it was ultimately abandoned, despite a brief revival under Richard II, following the Weardale campaign of 1327.[173] If the armies raised partly by means of the feudal summons were structured and organised in the same way as those that were not, then why the need for change? Although some armies for which a feudal summons were issued, such as that of 1314, failed to obtain the desired results, others, such as those gathered in 1282 and 1303, were successful. Furthermore, many armies that were raised later in the century under the unpopular leadership of Richard II were as ineffective as those raised by Edward II.[174] This suggests that military success and failure often had more to do with leadership than with whether the armies were feudal or paid. Explanations of the decline of feudal service must, therefore, take other factors into account. Perhaps the most convincing explanation is also the simplest: that feudal service became surplus to requirements once the focus of royal campaigns had shifted to

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[171] A. Curry, 'Medieval Warfare. England and her Continental Neighbours, Eleventh to the Fourteenth Centuries', *Journal of Medieval History*, xxiv (1998), 95.
[172] 1303 (C 67/15, m. 13; E 101/612/29, m. 2); 1300 (C 67/14, m. 12); 1301 (C 67/14, m. 4).
[173] For the summons of 1385, see N.B. Lewis, 'The Last Medieval Summons of the English Feudal Levy, 13 June 1385', *EHR*, lxxiii (1958), 1-26; J.J.N. Palmer, 'The Last Summons of the Feudal Army in England (1385)', *EHR*, lxxxiii (1968), 771-75; and N.B. Lewis, 'The Feudal Summons of 1385', *EHR*, c (1985), 729-43. On 1327, see A.E. Prince, 'The Importance of the Campaign of 1327', *EHR*, l (1935), 299-302, which shows that innovation and feudal service were not irreconcilable.
[174] Powicke, *Military Obligation*, 166.

the continent. During the twelfth century, attempts to enforce feudal service for overseas campaigns were unpopular: both Henry I and Henry II relied on non-feudal soldiers for their continental campaigns after Tinchebray.[175] The same problem – how to encourage an aristocracy that had previously been unwilling to serve overseas to follow him to France - probably gave Edward III and his advisors recourse to a similar rethink during the 1330s and '40s. Certainly, A.E. Prince was of the opinion that the requirements of overseas campaigns 'dealt the coup de grâce to the feudal method of enlistment'.[176] Once armies raised by indenture had proven their worth, there would have been no need to return to an older system which, though perfectly adequate at the time, had now been replaced by a better one. Whatever the reason for this transformation, it is important to stress that there were many points of continuity across the dividing line of Bannockburn, the impact of which only began to be fully worked out once Edward II had been forcibly removed from the throne.[177] J.E. Morris noted that 'with all its faults the feudal system lent itself to the new [paid] one'.[178] The contracts that were so essential a feature of the system that replaced feudalism had already, as we have seen, been employed for the provision of feudal service prior to its demise.[179] Finally, it is interesting to find that the forty-day period, usually associated with feudal service, was still being envisaged as a unit of account for paid service prior to the proposed continental campaign in 1341.[180]

The most important aspect of continuity between the quasi-feudal armies of Edward I and Edward II and the later hosts of Edward III lay in the way in which the retinues were composed. As Philippe Contamine has observed, during the age of wholly paid armies soldiers 'came to the assembly point in family, feudal or regional groups and continued to fight in the service of their rightful sovereign…but under the orders of their immediate natural lords. In other words, they left home together in their customary social formations'.[181] The transition from feudal to paid service, a lengthy and gradual process which was never inevitable, did not suddenly transform the English aristocracy from occasional campaigners into full-time professionals or mercenaries. The nature of the obligation had altered, but the tightly-knit social bonds between the men in the

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[175] S. Painter, *Studies in the History of the English Feudal Barony* (Baltimore, Maryland, 1943), 32-3; C.W. Hollister, *The Military Organization of Norman England* (Oxford, 1965), 123-4.
[176] A.E. Prince, 'The Payment of Army Wages in Edward III's Reign', *Speculum*, xix (1944), 152.
[177] On the attempts at innovation made by Edward II in response to Bannockburn, see Powicke, *Military Obligation*, chapter 8.
[178] Morris, *Welsh Wars,* 70.
[179] Lewis, 'The Summons of the English Feudal Levy, 5 April 1327', 242.
[180] M. Prestwich, 'English Armies in the Early Stages of the Hundred Years War: A Scheme in 1341', *BIHR*, lvi (1983), 102, 107.
[181] Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, 99.

retinues for the most part remained the same. Even as late as the duke of York's expedition of 1441, an English lord's retinue normally comprised 'his own family, his household, tenants, neighbours and well-wishers'.[182] Whether men like Edmund de Wasteneys and Roger de Swynnerton, who gave feudal service in Edward II's army of 1310 and later went on to fight at Halidon Hill, would have noticed any major changes in military service during the course of their careers, other than the important fact that they were now being required to fight on foot, is difficult to discern.[183] It may be that the changes in the way that English armies were recruited and organised under Edward III had a more profound effect on the yeomanry than on the ranks of the gentry. Whatever the truth of this, it would be wrong to regard the reforms of Edward III as a necessary consequence of the inadequacies of the feudal system. War was a major preoccupation of the Crown and aristocracy in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. We should therefore assume that they knew how to conduct it, irrespective of the types of military obligation employed.

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[182] A. Marshall, 'The Role of English War Captains in England and Normandy, 1436-1461', The University of Wales: University College, Swansea, M.A. thesis (1974), 100.
[183] Wasteneys: *PW,* II, ii, 403; C 71/13, m. 31. Swynnerton: *PW,* II, ii, 406; *Rotuli Scotiae*, i, 253.

Conclusion

This study has focussed primarily on three main areas of enquiry: the Edwardian soldier; the retinues that he led to war or in which he served; and the armies at large. Upon completion, it is appropriate to reflect upon each of these units of investigation and what they can tell us about the military activities of the aristocracy during the wars of Edward I and Edward II. One thing that can be said with certainty is that most genteel families had representatives who fought in the king's wars at least some of the time. No fewer than 80 per cent of the knights listed on the Lord Marshal's Roll (405 out of 499 individuals) and the Parliamentary Roll of Arms (714 out of 854 knights bachelor) can be traced in the military records between the first Welsh war and the battle of Bannockburn. These figures give a numerical dimension to notions of aristocratic militarization and demonstrate the close connection that existed between martial display and martial reality during these years. That the demands of warfare made the greatest call on the financial and energy reserves of the landholding elite should not occasion surprise, but perhaps more striking is the extent of this commitment and the vast numbers of men involved. It has traditionally been assumed that the wars of Edward I and his successors affected but a particular section of the landholding community and that most members of the gentry went about their business as usual in the years that the king's armies set out. A.L. Brown has surmised that during the later Middle Ages, 'the values of the upper ranks of society were certainly chivalrous and military, but it was a somewhat artificial chivalry, and enthusiasm for war had to be cultivated by the king. Among the gentry in particular there were many men who were not bellicose, and the same was true of the lesser people in the community'.[1] However, the repeated and frequent service given by the knights who fought at Falkirk, together with the large proportion of bachelors named on the PRA who had accompanied the king and his household to war at some point in their lives, indicates that the wars of Edward I and his son affected a much broader cross section of English landholding society than has generally been perceived.

The average genteel soldier who fought in the king's hosts remains something of an abstraction: no amount of work in the archives can ever fully restore a perfect image of the Edwardian combatant. 'Record', J.C. Holt once remarked, 'gives us for each man

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[1] A.L. Brown, *The Governance of Late Medieval England 1272-1461* (London, 1989), 88.

a skeleton biography',[2] yet among historians there must always be a lingering regret that the bare bones can never be more than partly fleshed out. In attempting to reconstruct the military activities of the aristocracy on a national scale over a period spanning forty years and more, it has been difficult to make anything more than the most fleeting of acquaintances with the *dramatis personae* named in this study. Nevertheless, by carrying out a large-scale prosopographical analysis, it *has* been possible to reach some conclusions which more than compensate for the inevitable loss of detail in places. Only by casting the interpretive net beyond the county or region can one provide universal answers to the kind of questions that have been framed here - such as how frequently Edwardian men-at-arms gave military service, and how they combined such duties with their responsibilities in the shires. In contrast to many of the landholders who took part in Edward I's initial expedition as king in 1277 and who 'must', according to J.E. Morris, 'have been utterly without experience',[3] the vast majority of those who fought at Bannockburn would have been well acquainted with the rigours of warfare. Among the older men who took part in the Falkirk campaign of 1298, the greater part had seen active service either in Wales or France. Of the younger generation, meanwhile, there were few who did not go on to become regular campaigners on the almost annual expeditions that were launched north of the border. The wars in Scotland have fittingly been described as a 'proving ground' for the aristocracy.[4] Between 1272 and 1314, the English gentry and nobility learned a great deal about the sacrifices and hardships that came with regular campaigning in the king's armies. When the time arrived during the reign of Edward III to transfer that knowledge to France, they were consequently well prepared for all eventualities.

By focussing on the backgrounds and experiences of individual soldiers, it has been possible to trace the armies that were raised during these years back to the regions and localities from which they arose. Each man-at-arms was but a single link in an intricate web of relationships that spanned the realm. Through an investigation of these personal connections, one can at least begin to reconstruct the main characteristics of the armies at large. In the Middle Ages, 'mounted warriors were obtained, trained and retained, not by central governments raising cavalry regiments from public funds as in the modern period, but by lordship and vassalage and by the integrating and overlapping

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[2] Holt, *The Northerners*, 18.
[3] Morris, *Welsh Wars*, 127.
[4] Prestwich, *The Three Edwards*, chapter 2.

institutions of the household and the fief'.[5] Consequently, the retinue holds the key to a comprehensive and systematic study of military organisation under the first two Edwards. The traditional view is that the companies that were led to war in this period lacked stability in membership. However, the findings made here suggest that the evidence on this subject needs to be reassessed. Whilst soldiers did serve under different lords and change their allegiances on a fairly regular basis, there was also a measure of continuity in the bonds between lords and their men that should not be overlooked. What mattered was not that each lord led the same troop of men on every campaign, but that a sufficiently large group should stick together so as to contribute substantially towards the *esprit de corps* of the retinue. In this context, it is worth bearing in mind John Keegan's words, 'that ordinary soldiers do not think of themselves, in life and death situations, as subordinate members of whatever formal military organization it is to which authority has assigned them, but as equals within a very tiny group – perhaps no more than six or seven men'.[6] Although written primarily with modern armies in mind, the importance of 'primary groups' to medieval forces has also received some attention in recent years, and may assist in overcoming many of the widely-held prejudices against pre-modern hosts.[7]

When viewed in isolation, these points about aristocratic militarization and retinue stability may appear to be of secondary importance by comparison with subjects that have tended to receive more attention, such as logistics, war finance and, in more recent years, developments in strategy and tactics.[8] Nevertheless, understanding how these armies were recruited can possibly contribute more than any of the above to our understanding of the way that Edwardian hosts functioned and performed when on campaign. We have often been told of how cavalrymen during the high Middle Ages were individuals who found it difficult to conform to the mentality or the discipline of the group. For Nigel Saul, chivalry was an individualistic cult, and 'what mattered' most in this age were therefore 'the brave deeds of brave men'.[9] Even so, individual valour and bravery were not necessarily irreconcilable with the 'small group' ethos. The retinue, which was without doubt the fundamental and most important unit of military recruitment and organisation in the armies of Edward I and Edward II, was the perfect

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[5] R.A. Brown, 'The Status of the Norman Knight', *Anglo-Norman Warfare: Studies in Late Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-Norman Military Organization and Warfare* (Woodbridge, 1992), 138.
[6] J. Keegan, *The Face of Battle* (London, 1976), 53.
[7] Ayton, 'The English Army at Crécy', 229.
[8] For grand strategy in fourteenth-century armies, see C.J. Rogers, *War Cruel and Sharp: English Strategy under Edward III, 1327-1360* (Woodbridge, 2000).
[9] N. Saul, ed. *Age of Chivalry: Art and Society in Late Medieval England* (London, 1992), 7.

medium through which the requirements of group discipline and individual honour could simultaneously be channelled. After all, what good are deeds of bravery and courage if one has no colleagues, family members and friends to witness them? We can assume that it was, in fact, the competitiveness of the small group and the experience of campaigning together that drove Edwardian men-at-arms towards great feats of arms, as well as knowing that performance in the field would influence the way that they would be perceived by their peers when they returned to their manors during peacetime. This, rather than any isolated notion of daredevil valour, was what drove the medieval aristocrat to excel in war. Such an interpretation is given further credence by the many heraldic connections between men-at-arms who fought together on campaign, for was this not the ultimate symptom of a 'small-group' mentality? Soldiers of this era had numerous ties to lords, friends, kinsmen and neighbours. Whilst such overlapping commitments inevitably introduced a degree of fluidity into their social and military relationships, the dissemination of arms among such men demonstrates that group identities, however fleeting, were as central to the chivalrous ethos as more selfish concerns.

That there was some stability in the composition of the hosts gathered in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, both among the soldiers who served and in the units in which they fought, enables us to assess the likely effectiveness of these armies with greater precision. Had the structure and composition of these retinues changed almost completely from one campaign to the next then it is unlikely that they could have functioned at all smoothly in the heat of battle. However, this was evidently not the case, and if around 40 or 50 per cent of the men in a lord's retinue had served with him on at least one other occasion at some point in the past, as happened in most instances, then it is probable that these armies, when led by wise and respected commanders, were perfectly efficient and competent by the far from negligible standards of their time. Further credence is given to this positive assessment by the evidence relating to the structure and organisation of the feudal army which, despite receiving a great deal of attention (and comments of varying degrees of negativity) from numerous historians, has never previously been studied from the perspectives of the soldiers concerned. In the light of the research carried out here, not only is it clear that the armies of the first two Edwards, whether of the feudal or non-feudal variety, relied for their quality on the networks of relations between men-at-arms within the retinues, just as with the later hosts of Edward III, but there is also reason to believe that the transition from the 'quasi-feudal' armies of the reigns of Edward I and his predecessors to the wholly paid

hosts of the 1330s onwards constituted less a revolutionary rupture than a natural progression in military organisation. Whilst there is no doubt that 'the English army underwent important organizational, structural, and administrative changes in the decades between Bannockburn and the opening of the Hundred Years War', it may be that such reforms simply involved tinkering with pre-existing systems of recruitment and organisation.[10] Certainly, the rapidity with which these new procedures were put into effect during the 1330s and 1340s suggests that they cannot have been completely alien to the older generation of soldiers.

Ultimately, it may be some time before the picture of the military activities of the thirteenth- and fourteenth-century aristocracy can be restored in its entirety. The need to know more about the men who served within Edwardian armies so as better to understand the impact of war on the societies from which these armies arose has already been noted by Andrew Ayton.[11] Although this study has endeavoured to make a contribution towards that end, much additional work remains to be done. For example, the motives that led members of the gentry to serve in the armies of the first two Edwards. This is a particularly interesting area of study given that the wars of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries are generally held to have been far less lucrative for the soldiers who took part in them than those of a later period. The experience of Gilbert Pecche, who had to wait until a lay subsidy was levied in Kent in 1302 before his wage arrears could be met for service in Gascony in the 1290s, provides just one of many examples of men who were left out of pocket because of their commitment to the king's cause.[12] There is also much scope for work on the contribution of non-English soldiers to the Edwardian war effort, for men-at-arms from Gascony, Wales, Scotland and Ireland all played a significant part in the armies of Edward I and his son, one that has not sufficiently been recognised in this study. Despite these obvious lacunae, there are strong grounds for optimism given what has already been achieved. English armies of the Hundred Years War and the men-at-arms who fought in them are now, owing to the work of Ayton, Anne Curry and others, much better understood than they were just a couple of decades ago. If this study has demonstrated the benefits of applying the same methodological approach to the armies of a slightly earlier period then it will have achieved one of its main objectives.

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[10] C.J. Rogers, '"As if a New Sun had Arisen": England's Fourteenth-Century RMA', *The Dynamics of Military Revolution 1300-2050*, ed. M. Knox and W. Murray (Cambridge, 2001), 23.
[11] Ayton, *Knights and Warhorses*, 2.
[12] E 179/237/52, mm. 1, 2.

Appendix: Personnel continuity for 50 sample retinues on the Falkirk campaign of 1298 (1277-1314)[i]

Leader	Number of men with leader:		% continuity	Times served with leader other than in 1298:						
	In 1298	In 1298 (who also served in other year)		1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Audley	15	2	13	1	1	-	-	-	-	-
Badlesmere	4	1	25	-	1	-	-	-	-	-
Bardolf	14	6	43	2	2	1	1	-	-	-
Basset	11	3	27	2	-	1	-	-	-	-
J. Beauchamp	11	7	64	4	1	2	-	-	-	-
W. Beauchamp	25	16	64	6	2	2	4	2	-	-
Beaumont	5	4	80	-	1	1	2	-	-	-
Benstede	14	9	64	2	5	2	-	-	-	-
Botetourt	16	11	69	7	2	1	-	1	-	-
Brun	8	7	88	3	4	-	-	-	-	-
Bykenore	3	2	66	1	-	-	-	1	-	-
Cantilupe	11	2	18	1	-	1	-	-	-	-
Charles	4	4	100	2	2	-	-	-	-	-
Chavent	16	12	75	7	3	1	-	1	-	-
Clifford	34	18	53	5	7	1	2	1	1	1
Courtenay	11	5	45	2	1	2	-	-	-	-
Despenser	49	18	37	6	3	5	-	1	1	2
Drokensford	25	14	56	4	4	5	1	-	-	-
Echingham	5	3	60	3	-	-	-	-	-	-
Fitz Payn	19	8	42	3	2	1	1	-	1	-
Fitz Reginald	4	0	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Fitz Waryn	5	3	60	3	-	-	-	-	-	-
Furnivall	10	3	30	2	1	-	-	-	-	-
Grandison	9	1	11	-	1	-	-	-	-	-
Hacche	12	8	66	3	2	3	-	-	-	-
Haustede	3	2	66	1	-	1	-	-	-	-
Havering	25	2	8	2	-	-	-	-	-	-
Kyngeston	3	0	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Lancaster	45	14	31	7	3	4	-	-	-	-
Leyburn	15	9	60	2	2	1	1	3	-	-
Lovel	5	2	40	-	-	1	-	-	1	-
Malemains	3	2	66	2	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mauley	4	1	25	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
Meynill	7	2	29	1	-	1	-	-	-	-
Mohaut	15	8	53	-	3	1	3	1	-	-
Montacute	9	1	11	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
H. Mortimer	9	0	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
R. Mortimer	20	11	55	3	4	1	1	1	1	-
Pichard	2	0	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Pipard	20	5	25	4	1	-	-	-	-	-
Plukenet	4	4	100	-	1	3	-	-	-	-

Pointz	5	4	80	-	2	2	-	-	-	-
Ryther	8	1	13	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
Scales	7	3	43	-	-	-	1	2	-	-
Tony	17	10	59	5	4	1	-	-	-	-
Tregoz	12	1	8	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
Tuchet	4	3	75	1	1	1	-	-	-	-
Valence	49	27	55	16	6	1	2	-	2	-
Verdon	2	2	100	1	-	1	-	-	-	-
Welles	14	8	57	2	4	1	-	1	-	-
Total	647	289	45	120	76	49	19	15	7	3

[i] The full names of the 50 leaders in the sample are as follows: Nicholas de Audley, Bartholomew de Badlesmere, Hugh Bardolf, Ralph Basset of Drayton, John de Beauchamp of Somerset, Walter de Beauchamp, Henry de Beaumont, John de Benstede, Thomas de Bykenore, John Botetourt, William le Brun, William de Cantilupe, Edward Charles, Peter/John de Chavent, Robert de Clifford, Hugh de Courtenay, Hugh le Despenser senior/junior, John de Drokensford, William de Echingham, Robert Fitz Payn, John Fitz Reginald, Fulk Fitz Waryn, Thomas de Furnivall, William de Grandison, Eustace de Hacche, Robert de Haustede senior/junior, John de Havering, John de Kyngeston, Thomas of Lancaster, William de Leyburn, Richard Lovel, Nicholas de Malemains, Edmund de Mauley, Nicholas de Meynill senior/junior, Robert de Mohaut, Simon de Montacute, Hugh de Mortimer, Roger de Mortimer of Chirk, Miles Pichard, Ralph Pipard, Alan Plukenet senior/junior, Hugh Pointz, William de Ryther, Robert de Scales, Robert de Tony, John Tregoz, William Tuchet, Aymer de Valence, Thomas de Verdon and Adam de Welles.

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