THE ORIENTAL CONTEXT FOR THE END OF GREEK RULE IN THE HELLENISTIC AGE.

Thesis for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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F. A. Gordon-Kerr, M.A. (Dunelm)

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

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Preamble and acknowledgements

A connected account of the decline of Greek power in the Hellenistic East can be justified nowadays by noting the relative antiquity of available works on the subject when archaeological and numismatic work has continued and has rendered dated such works as those by Bevan and Bouche-Leclerq although still valuable. The excavation of Ai Khanum and Shahr-i-Qumis alone should provoke a reassessment of Seleucid objectives and so of Seleucid history. We are grateful to Getzel Cohen for a recent coherent study of the process of the colonisation movement in these Eastern parts. Recent events in Afghanistan and Iran should encourage historians of the central Asian land mass to study pressures which in the past affected these countries from the north, and in particular to pay attention to the cultural dimension of such contacts. There has been a tendency to omit the Seleucid enterprise from thorough study[1], and to give Livy the benefit of the doubt in his comment that 'no power was despised so much by the Romans'.[2] Such omissions and this attitude could be seen as a current emphasis on Hellenism as a Western and not an Eastern phenomenon, thus leaving - quite wrongly in my view - Bactrian and Indian history in the Hellenistic Age to be seen simply as the purview of Indian Historians and Indian History.[3]

This work is an account of Seleucid history from 280 to roughly 100 B.C., with a summary account of the end of Seleucid Rule down to its extinction under Pompey for the sake of completeness. It tries to take in most modern work on the subject in the fields of archaeology, numismatics and literary comment on what scant sources we have. Being an account of Seleucid history it is valid to term the process it records 'The oriental context for the end of Greek Rule in the Hellenistic Age.' I do recognise the blurred edges of the Graeco-Macedonian partnership,

if it can be called that, and this is discussed, as is the Macedonian-Iranian partnership of Seleucus and Apama.

Proper names are used as they normally occur: Greek proper names are latinized if that has become the general usage: e.g. Seleucus not Seleukos. Mithridates of Parthia is differentiated by the 'i' in his name from Mithradates of Pontus for the sake of convenience. The usage in the matter of proper names in authors I have quoted is their own, not mine.

I am most grateful for facilities accorded me for Study abroad by the British School in Athens and the British Institutes in Teheran and Kabul, and acknowledge the invaluable assistance of museum curators in this country and abroad, in particular the Iran Bastan Museum (to whom I am indebted for the inscription frontispiece), and the British Museum Coin Department. The coin portraits were photographed in Hull University by its photographic service and the casts involved were provided by the Ashmolean Museum: to Dr. Metcalf and above all to Colin Kraay, my thanks. Valuable comment is acknowledged from David MacDowall, David Selwood and David Bivar. Derek Waite's splendid maps deserve grateful comment.

Past and present professors of Classics in the University of Hull have given time and effort to the perusal of what I have written. To them too I am grateful.

NOTES.

1. Current general works on Hellenistic history in English (at present in print), e.g. Cary: 'Greek History from 323 to 146', and P. Grimal: 'Hellenism and the rise of Rome', represent respectively a very pro-Tarn view of the East and omit it almost completely. Neither is remotely satisfactory now although both have excellent sections on other hellenistic issues. E. Will is first class but has a very wide area to cover and is a source book rather than a monograph. We await Walbank's forthcoming work with great interest.
2. Livy: Book XXXVII, 39, 3.
3. As Narain assumes it is and Tarn assumed it wasn't.

CHAPTER I.

The establishment of Seleucid Rule.

In an attempt to chart the process of the disintegration of the Seleucid empire and to indentify some of the causes of that decline, a narrative account must also note those episodes outside the Seleucid Empire which were part of that process.

When Seleucus Nicator crushed the aspirations of Lysimachus at Corupedion in Lydia in 280 he established himself as the natural successor on the Asian continent to Antigonus Monophthalmos, and so, it could be said, to Alexander himself, whose kingdom Antigonus - and all the diadochoi - had so much wanted to inherit. By the time of Corupedion, Seleucus' own kingdom had been securely established (311) with its centres at Seleucia-on-Tigris and Antioch-on-the-Orontes; and the eastern boundary had been trimmed by the tactically expensive but strategically sensible barter of territory in north-west India to Chandragupta the Maurya[1] (305) in exchange for elephants, due to which heavy cavalry accession Antigonus had been defeated in the crucial battle at Ipsus in Phrygia in 301 by the coalition of Ptolemy, Seleucus, Lysimachus and Cassander.

Seleucus I lived only a short time to enjoy his new-found hegemony as the last of the Diadochoi. His death at the hands of Ptolemy Keraunos only months after Corupedion meant that his son Antiochus succeeded him in a good position to strengthen the resources and structure of an empire whose eastern section he had already been ruling as Eastern Viceroy for seven years[2]. This wise allocation of duty by Seleucus I had potentially ensured that loyal and secure government would be available, as Bengtson had described[3], to the eastern provinces of what Seleucus I had demonstrated was a long empire with long lines of communication. What would now have to be proved was the resilience of this arrangement, given the chance that future appointees would not implement it with the same

loyalty and competence that Antiochus seems to have displayed; for Seleucus' and Antiochus' judgement was correct: their eastern territory was vulnerable, for reasons which they might not then have fully understood[4], and the erosion of Seleucid power was to come at least as menacingly from the nomad east as from the as-yet distant Roman west. In a phrase the east was possibly more uncertain than the Seleucids, even with their Iranian marriage ties, had imagined. Other less well-known political and military forces were gathering. And whereas one would wish to give full value, when examining the relationship of Graeco-Macedonian control to its eastern provinces, to the links between Iran and Macedon deriving from Seleucus' marriage to Apama the daughter of Spitamenes, this is a different matter from proceeding on the assumption that the insecurity of these provinces had been notably strengthened by that marriage or that their tenuous retention was simply a fiction designed to make Seleucid problems seem more drastic than they were.

It is however noticeable that, from all we can discover, attitudes adopted towards the 'Greeks' in the east were qualitatively different from attitudes expressed in (e.g.) Coele-Syria and Egypt where from about 200 B.C. native revolts were a continuing problem. The wellknown reversal of a previous antagonism between the Greeks in newly-independent Bactria and the rising Parthian state of Arsaces II, which took place under Diodotus II, suggests that this alliance between Barbarian and Greek was not too difficult to achieve; and one might speculate that a half-Iranian Seleucid royal house should have therefore been able to establish a stronger hold upon the eastern provinces than seems actually to have been the case. That, of course, would make the presumption that a royal lead on the issue of cooperation with Iranians in the broad sense was acceptable to ruling circles in Macedonian and Iranian society, and that too is conjecture.

To the problems of administration and defence in the Seleucid Empire was added the problem of its Graeco-Macedonian population of

settlers and soldiers, importing into the military and civilian structure of the dangerously-extended state the rivalries and incompatibility which had been demonstrated on the Greek mainland since the days of Philip and Demosthenes.[5] In many instances, including the dissimilar sources of Trogus and Arrian, the Greek settlers are referred to as 'the Macedonians'.[6] In Indian writing we find 'Greeks' referred to as 'Yavanas'[7] - a straight derivation from 'Ionians', which many of them, including one of their most distinguished kings Euthydemus of Magnesia, were in fact. It is not our object to make out that all the dynastic quarrels of the Seleucid State were attributable to this continuing resistance to the Imperium Macedonicum: it would be idle to ignore the feuding of the Diadochoi and the running sore of the Lagid-Seleucid conflict in Coele-Syria; but it is true that in Strabo, Arrian and Trogus (as preserved in Justin's Epitome), Macedonians are the people from whom others revolt, while, at least in the Milindapanha, Greeks are those with whom one holds a philosophical dialogue, even although the Greeks themselves might be 'viciously valiant'.[8]

The attempt of Antiochus III in his European campaign to 'reclaim', as he put it, the empire of his ancestors is another instance of the distance politically between a great Macedonian king and the Greeks he was claiming, by invading their country, to free. As John Briscoe points out clearly, Antiochus' argument to the Romans, who contested his right to be in Europe at all, was that he was entitled 'to all the lands which had belonged to Lysimachus' and passed to Antiochus' great grandfather Seleucus' by his victory at Corupedion.' 'The conflict', Briscoe continues, 'is one of different legal conceptions'. Rome did not recognise rights derived from such victories.[9] What we do not detect in Livy's narrative is the assessment Antiochus (should have) made as to whether he would be likely to succeed in drawing Greeks into his imposed freedom. It is Badian who comments that Antiochus would have been received by the Greeks, had he won at Thermopylae, with the same 'cowed resignation' that the Romans

received from these same Greeks.[10] The whole question of the Graeco-Macedonian symbiosis[11] can be regarded as a part of the cultural back-cloth against which the decline of Greek power in the east was enacted.

In the matter of establishing an administrative centre in Iran, Altheim is quite clear that the Seleucids were affected by a renunciation of the policy of racial fusion upon which Alexander appeared to have embarked.[12] I would not want to argue that Seleucus I went about establishing his power as a crusader for 'equal opportunities' for Greeks, Macedonians and Iranians, for example. But it does seem clear to me that Antiochus I could not help being the son of his Iranian mother as well as his Macedonian father; and that one cannot easily leave this fact out of the reckoning when considering the policies for stabilisation that he seems to have followed, and which we glance at in the next chapter. We do not know that the eternal antagonism of the Greek towards the barbarian was the natural attitude of the Seleucids towards the steppe people or to the Iranian town-dwellers, and the point made by Tarn that the subject peoples of the empire showed loyalty to the reigning Seleucid needs little defence.[13] A striking instance was the return to loyalty after the revolt of Molon early in Antiochus III's reign.

Seleucus I had made a home base in the 'Seleucis' round about Apamea-on-the-Orontes; and although we may note grounds on which to disapprove of this choice, the reasons at the time seemed very good.[14] There was access to the Mediterranean for trade and for contact with the Greek homeland, and there was the possibility of participation on the power-politics of the Mediterranean seaboard, to have abandoned which would certainly have led to erosion of western Seleucid influence in the relationship with Egypt.[15] By 280 Seleucus and Ptolemy had still managed to maintain their peaceful co-existence between friends, despite differences over policy and an incipient conflict over Coele-Syria. Also Egypt was at that time a formidable naval power in the Mediterranean upon which a

Seleucid check had to be kept.

More generally, 280 marked the end of a stage, generally referred to the 'wars of the Successors' which had been fought since the agreement at Triparadeisos in 320[16] between the immediate circle of Alexander's colleagues; or, more accurately, since the breakdown of that agreement, leading to the hegemonial ambitions of Antigonus Monophthalmos and the coalition of Ptolemy, Seleucus, Lysimachus and Cassander which arose to contest the hegemony. In the course of that contest not only was the 'legitimate' line of succession eliminated (which would have secured a succession based upon Alexander's son by Roxane, Alexander IV) - and the rule of the regents until the child's majority; but the ruthless killing of Alexander's secretary Eumenes of Cardia raises again the question of the relationship of Macedonians to Greeks within the ranks of the Diadochoi, and the extent to which such tensions would find a reflection in the rule, extent, organisation, colonisation and settlement objectives of whatever successor-state or states took over Alexander's inheritance. By 280 it was clear that Seleucus' successor Antiochus I would have a major role in deciding the future course of what was now 'the Seleucid Empire', not least because he was Spitamenes' grandson: the question as to whether and to what extent, Greeks were committed to Alexander's concepts of oecumenical strategy, particularly if led by a monarch of mixed Macedonian and Barbarian stock, was raised by 280 in such an acute form that the difficulties of social organisation posed by Antiochus I's heterogeneous realm seem as substantial as the problems posed by its geopolitical shape and extent.[17]

The uneasy tension which existed in the Seleucid Empire between its various ethnic minorities and the ruling administration was further accentuated by ancient kingdoms like Aradus, which had a 'flourishing maritime commerce'[18], and had been a coin-issuing mint through most of the period we will be examining. The issue of 'free cities',

itself a cherished expression of the eleutheria which Alexander and Philip had for long accused Persia of denying to their citizens, need not be viewed as a symptom of disarray or danger within the Seleucid empire, given that overall government was wise, liberal and strong. If it weakened, pressures to disaffection might result, as we shall demonstrate: if it did not weaken, Seleucid commerce flourished and vigorous trade kept down piracy. As Seyrig points out[19] the Macedonian engineers constructed artificial harbours at Seleucia in Pieria and Laodicea in order to facilitate maritime trade, and presumably to respond to it.

It is frequently pointed out that at no time was the Seleucid 'empire' ever a homogeneous block of territory: it was a loose association of poleis and of the territory surrounding them which the Macedonian occupation had colonised.[20] It was an empire built upon communications and its political integrity was dependent on the lines of communication which existed: mainly the old Achaemenid royal roads. Consequently any fracture of these lines of communication would have serious consequences and might effectively sever the east of the Seleucid territory from the west. Seleucia-on-Tigris[21] was to perform a 'holding function' as a more easterly focus of Seleucid activity and to be the seat of the Seleucids' eastern governor, Bengtson's 'General Commander of the East' - the ὁ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄνω σατραπειῶν of the inscriptions. By 280 the hellenistic stage had been cleared of the original participants in Alexander's arrangements, and so of the dispositions they made or fought over; Antiochus I's organisation was both personally and politically committed to an Ost-Politik in circumstances that were finely balanced for failure or success.

Notes for Chapter I.

1. On relations between Seleucus and Chandragupta, Strabo XV, 29 and Justin XV, 4, 12 - 21. Also Appian, Syriaca 55. As E. Will points out and P. M. Fraser has recently underlined, the exact extent of territory ceded to Chandragupta is not known. We do know that Arachosia (or more specifically Kandahar) yielded Asokan rock edicts in 1958 and 1964 (printed in the Appendix to this work). On all this see the discussion in E. Will: Histoire Politique I, 1979, p. 265 (with full and recent bibliography.) Excavation reports on Kandahar are in Afghan Studies I, 1978 and II, 1980, the last with a thorough discussion and notes accompanying P. M. Fraser's article: 'The Son of Aristonax at Kandahar', pp. 9 - 23.

2. 294 or 293; as Will says in Politique I, p. 267, the date is uncertain.

3. H. Bengtson: Strategie in der hellenistischen Zeit, Munich, 1944. A good account of the nature of the state the Seleucids inherited is in Pierre Grimal: Hellenism and the rise of Rome, London, 1968, p. 271 f.

4. Quite apart from the indications of full-scale nomad invasion (studied in greater detail in Chapter II), whose indications, pressed by Josef Wolski, are not uncontested (Wolski: L'effondrement, pp. 22 - 31), as Will points out in Politique I, p. 271, the existence of a developed system of crop irrigation points to a secure civilisation in the Chroasmian region between the Oxus and the Jaxartes even before the Achaemenid conquest. (Will, Op. cit., p. 272), Frumkin: Archaeology in Soviet Central Asia, Leyden, 1970, p. 82 f.

5. Traced out with implications by T. T. B. Ryder in Koine Eirene, Oxon, 1965.

6. Justin XLI, 2, 1: Arrian Fr. Gr. H. Parthica Fr. 30 a.

7. Milindapanha: Passim. (Ed. Rhys Davids: Sacred Books of the East).

8. Yuga Purana of the Gargi Sarmita.

9. John Briscoe: Commentary on Livy (XXXIII, 40, 4 f.), Oxon, 1973.

10. E. Badian: 'Rome and Antiochus the Great: a study in cold war', quoted also in its Roman context in Chapter IV , p. 84 .

11. The whole issue is carefully dealt with in Charles Edson's article on 'Imperium Macedonicum' in Classical Philology, LIII,1958, p. 153 f.

12. F. Altheim in 'Les Successeurs d'Alexandre', Paris, 1954, p. 156.

13. W. W. Tarn: The Greeks in Bactria and India, Cambs. 1952, p. 5 . Tarn discussed the issue of Seleucus' marriage to Apama in 'Queen Ptolemais and Apama' in Classical Quarterly 1929, p. 138 - 140.

Notes to Chapter I - continued.

14. D. Musti describes the choice and development of Northern Syria as a Seleucid heartland in 'Lo Stato di Seleucidi' (Studi Classici et Orientali 1966, p. 59 - 201). Useful comments are in H. Seyrig's article in Syria XLVII, 1970, pp. 290 - 311.

15. So Seyrig, compellingly, in Syria, 1970, p. 300, making the point that the quadrilateral of Greek cities: Seleucia-in-Pieria, Antioch, Apamea-on-the-Orontes and Laodicea ad Mare was a cornerstone of Seleucus' home organisation. The emotional reasons are developed by D. Musti (Op. cit., passim), and also by Seyrig (Op. cit., p. 302).

16. The period between Alexander's death and the Treaty of Triparadeisos is traced out carefully by R. M. Errington in JHS 1970, pp. 49 ff.

17. The issues are spelt out in substantial detail by Edouard Will in Hist. Pol. I, 1979, pp. 262 f. He is extensive and fair in his summary of the problems. The more purely geographical issues are faced squarely by H. C. Schmitt: Untersuchungen, pp. 66 f.

18. H. Seyrig: 'Aradus et sa perée sous les rois Seleucides', Syria 1951, p. 206 f.

19. H. Seyrig in Syria 1970, op. cit., p. 305.

20. Getzel Cohen: The Seleucid Colonies. Historia Einzelschrift, Wiesbaden 1978.

21. G. Gullini: Fifth Preliminary Report of the Excavations at Seleucia and Ctesiphon, Mesopotamia 1972, Vol. VII, p. 9 - 41, contains the most recent series of reports on work conducted earlier by the American mission in the 1930s, and often noted in this work, at Tel Umar in present-day Iraq.

CHAPTER II

The Revolts of Parthia and Bactria

Tribal movements

As a stage in the diminution of the territorial extent of the Seleucid Empire the secession of Parthia and Bactria has a particular importance. It demonstrated a process in the erosion of Seleucid power in the east which turned out to be irretrievable, and in the last analysis it was a process which the Seleucids, despite all their counter-measures, could not finally prevent. The consequences were to have powerful repercussions for the history of the next five hundred years in central Asia.

From Alexander's time and before it, the Oxus and Jaxartes frontiers had marked the edge of the civilized world, beyond which there were nomad tribes with their own agriculture and stock-rearing, social organization and art.[1] Spitamenes had represented this danger as far as Alexander had been concerned, but the nomad presence was constant and was not confined to any one period of Greek history, although its character might change with the arrival of a different tribe or confederation of tribes such as the Massagetae.

So Greek defences in the Jaxartes region were organized on the basis of a holding operation, with cities and colonies holding the line against a nomad presence, but all of them consisting of Macedonian and Greek veterans whose loyalty were not to the principle of founding the cities but rather to the particular Seleucid king who had established the settlement. For instance the northernmost Alexandrian foundation of Alexandria Eschate was designed to defend Soghdiana and to preserve the Jaxartes as a far northern frontier for the Greek presence in the Upper Satrapies. And Merv, Achaea, Bactra and Alexandria Oxiana, for example, were all founded as

Greek settlements or poleis with the object of checking the influence of nomad power in the northern marches of Alexander's empire (Plutarch: De. Fort. Alex I, 328E). When the Seleucids inherited that empire, following the establishment of Seleucus's rule in Babylon in 311, the maintenance of the Greek presence in these northern parts became a Seleucid responsibility, as Appian points out (Syriaca 57).

Invasion was a constant possibility, and we hear of a penetration by barbarians from Turkestan which spread fire and confusion in the north of Iran and threatened the towns in Aria, Margiana and Bactria sometime after 290 BC.[1a] Alexandria in Margiane (Merv) and Heracleia in Aria were subsequently rebuilt by Antiochus I as Antioch and Achaea respectively, Antiochus himself having been placed during the reign of Seleucus I as co-regent in charge of the Upper Satrapies in 293.

Pliny is not precise about who these early third-century invaders were, but we are told that the troops of Demodamas advanced into the Steppes to bring the nomad tribes under control again. The fortifications of Alexandria in Aria (Herat) were increased, and to protect the oasis of Margiana against nomad attack Antiochus put a wall around it. That this was a wise policy is shown in that we have no reason to doubt that the expedition that Demodamas led seems to have settled a serious invasion of Seleucid territory. Strabo suggests (XI, 8, 3) that the Dahae invasions must have lasted a long time, but the Dahae were themselves newcomers to the country south of the Oxus, having been in the territory between the Jaxartes and the Oxus during the time of Alexander the Great. Possibly pushed forward by other elements of the Massagetae horde, they were in a position to make permanent conquests in the region of the Greek provinces of Parthia and Hyrcania. Our evidence is that a branch of the Dahae called the Parni = Aparni ('Sparnos') probably split away from the main horde between the Jaxartes and the Oxus in about 282 and proceeded to the banks

of the Oxus. Justin tells us that the Parni '... domesticis seditionibus pulsi Scythia solitudines inter Hyrcaniam et Dahas et Areos et Sparnos et Margianos furtim occupavere.'[2] The actual migration probably took place from about 282 to after 250, and, if we follow Wolski's view of Strabo XI, the Parni may themselves have constituted the early irruption which Demodamas had had to deal with. The steppe north of Aria, Parthia and Hyrcania became Dahae country and the Parni tribe became poised for another drive southwards to the lush vegetation of the Caspian littoral and the easier pasturage which would result for their flocks and herds from such a move. On this view, not only will the Parthian and Hyrcanian satrapies now have been exposed to the danger of an invasion from a neighbouring region immediately to the north - which was not the case to the same extent when Alexander took over the former Achaemenid satrapies in that area - but the effect of these nomad population movements and the efforts of Antiochus I to take measures to contain them cannot have been unobserved by the other Greek satrapies of the area, notably Bactria and Aria. These formed a bloc of Greek-controlled territory north of the Dasht-i-lut and Dasht-i-Kavir and south of the new Parni zone of influence. So the Greek satrap of Bactria is bound to have looked at the situation with concern. His own territorial security will have assumed a rapidly-increasing significance. He will have had to look to his own defences on his own terms while there was time.

Another aspect of the difficulty of governing the eastern satrapies, which Antiochus I's own appointment as viceroy in 293 was designed to ameliorate, (Appian: Syriaca 62), was the growing concentration of Seleucid power and interests, already so early in the history of the dynasty, in the west of the empire. The emotional ties with the Mediterranean world constituted a reason for a continuing interest in the Mediterranean area, but to this was quickly added the increasing polarization of attitudes and objectives between the Seleucids and the Ptolemies. The first

Seleucus (Nicator) and Ptolemy Lagus had been fellow commanders under Alexander, and their comradeship had stood the test of a dispute over the control of Coele-Syria. This had been disallowed to Ptolemy by the victors of the battle of Ipsus in 301 owing to Ptolemy's absence from the coalition at the time of the battle. And the result had been that Ptolemy's successor Ptolemy II Philadelphus had fought the first of a long series of wars with the Seleucids for the control of that Mediterranean coastline with its harbours and forests, as well as actions that ranged more widely over Egyptian possessions in Asia Minor and the Greek islands. This contest between Egypt and the Seleucid Empire was to occupy the disproportionate attention of both the Seleucids and the Ptolemies for the whole of the future history as major powers, but its immediate effect on the conduct of the Seleucids' western enterprise was to ensure a permanent change of focus away from Babylon and Seleucia-on-Tigris, where Seleucus I had originally made his capital, to the city to which it was later moved, Antioch on the Orontes in Western Syria.[2a]

This removal of royal authority westwards rendered the proper control of the Eastern Iranian satraps very difficult to maintain. And the tendency was established for these eastern satraps not only to exercise a proper autonomy in domestic affairs but to have to make judgements of a strategic nature regarding the integrity of their provinces and about the best methods of preserving them intact in the face of nomad attack or provocation, as has been the case when Demodamas had this task during his period of command, which included the refounding of poleis (Pliny NH VI, 48). As we have seen, by 282 or thereabouts this became a major issue for the Seleucid satraps in Parthia and Bactria, alarmed not just by the near presence of the Dahae but by the sight of what destruction they could wreak on neighbouring territory. To this concern will have been added the awareness that help was less likely (and less swiftly) to come from the

Seleucid home government since its transfer westwards out of effective administrative range. Provision for interim authority in the person of the Commander of the Upper Satrapies had been made, as we saw, but the fact remains that when it came to doing something about the situation in Parthia and Bactria events had to wait before Seleucus II himself could bring troops.

Formal Secession

In a passage which is most probably taken from Apollodorus of Artemita's Parthica, Strabo says that 'when revolutions were attempted by the countries outside the Taurus, because of the fact that the kings of Syria and Media, who were in possession also of these countries, were busily engaged with others (or with each other)[3], those who had been entrusted with their government first caused the revolt of Bactriana and of all the country near it, I mean Euthydemus and his followers; and then Arsaces, a Scythian, with some of the Daae (I mean the Aparnians, as they are called, nomads who lived along the Ochus), invaded Parthia and conquered it'. An attempt to refer this passage to a co-regency said to have been established between Antiochus II Theos and his son Seleucus II Calinicus, appears to be unnecessary in view of the contest which we know was taking place over a considerable period of time between Callinicus and his brother Antiochus Hierax over much of Western Asia - the Fratricidal War - which would thus justify the ascription of the phrase 'the kings of Syria and Media'.[4]

Justin in his Epitome of Trogus also has a section which appears to bear out this view of events: 'Huius defectionis inpunitatem illis duorum fratrum regum, Seleuci et Antiochi, discordia dedit, qui dum invicem eripere sibi regnum volunt, persequi defectores omiserunt'. Wolski is clear that this also refers to the Fratricidal War, and it seems a conclusive argument because of the specific mention of both brothers. From this chronological pointer it would seem that the Arsacid state was

indeed established during this period and not earlier under Antiochus II, as Arrian - a much later source in an even later transmission - seems to indicate.[5a]

The view quoted in Strabo, that Arsaces was himself a Bactrian, and that in escaping from the increased power of Diodotus I of Bactria and his followers, he caused Parthia to revolt (ἀποστῆναι) does not win much support from Strabo himself.[6] There is a continuing discussion as to the date of the revolt of both Parthia and Bactria, and in the view of A. K. Narain[7], who nowhere mentions the work of Wolski in his bibliography, seems to have had unjustified pre-eminence in the very recent works of Mitchener on Indo-Greek coinage[8], and even Bickerman on chronology.[9] The difficulty may well arise from the coinage of Diodotus I who, as is well-known, issued coinage with his own head but with Antiochus II's name, possibly as an indication of gradually-increasing autonomy[10]. The coins ~~names~~ of both Diodotus I and of Diodotus II who succeeded him, seem to have carried the name of Antiochus, according most reliably to E. T. Newell[10a], but there are coins in their own names, and the series can best be explained on the grounds that their hegemony over their eastern Seleucid provinces was being gradually increased. 'Defecit','Revolted' is Justin's word: (XLI, 4, 5) it need not represent any more than the description of a process, complete in itself, but gradual. Or why would they use Antiochus' name? There is plenty of evidence of satraps who revolted, for example Timarchus, issuing coinage unashamedly in their own name.

In a comparison between the passage in Justin XLI, 4 and Strabo XI, 9 2 - 3 speaking of the revolts of Parthia and Bactria, the phrase οἱ περὶ Εὐθυδήμον should be emended Διόδοτον because, as Strabo himself goes on to mention, it was Diodotus who was the contemporary in question; it could be that 'Euthydemus and his followers' is used (XI, 9, 2) because the Greeks knew about Euthydemus better (or Apollodorus of Artemita, Strabo's source did) as the result of Antiochus III's expedition. In the matter of the comparison of sources as between Strabo

and Trogus, Wolski, in one of his more recent contributions to the debate[11], makes the point that the main problem is whether the source of the Parthian accounts in Trogus' Historiae Philippicae is distinct from the source that Strabo used, as Tarn thinks[12], or the same, as Altheim believes[13].

Wolski will have nothing to do with coinage when pressing for an accurate chronology, and so quotes the problems that have arisen over the various Diodotus issues as an example of the pitfalls that can occur.[14] This seems a safe way of proceeding, but it is limited, because judgements may and should be made about the inscriptions on this Diodotid coinage, which, if they are made at all, do bear on chronology. It is a factor that cannot be left out of the reckoning. But I feel sure that the substance of Wolski's case has been left holding the field, and his objection to a reading of Strabo XI, 9, 2 as διὰ τὸ πρὸς ἀλλοις(ἀλληλους) εἶναι τοὺς τῆς Συρίας instead of διὰ τὸ πρὸς ἀλληλοις(ἀλληλους) εἶναι... is well-made, and does seem indeed to be a suspect emendation which he says was made to agree with Arrian.[15] Whether or not the last point of the argument is true, or just Wolski's suspicion of Arrian, it cannot be denied that in Strabo we have independent evidence of Civil war in the Seleucid empire from the phrase 'the kings (sic) of Syria and Media.'

The account of Justin in XLI, 4, 4 (not 3) to 7 does agree with the Strabo quotation, in that his source has preserved the names of Seleucus and Antiochus. In Narain's summary of the text of Justin[16], this part of the passage is significantly omitted (in three dots!), and whereas it is also true that Wolski has begun his quotation after, and therefore excluding the mention of '... the first Punic War when Lucius Manlius Vulso and Marcus Atilius Regulus were consuls...', we should observe that Justin has already said that the 'revolt', as he puts it, took place under Seleucus. The question of the consular date given in Justin is important, but is not solved in Justin's own rendering as he has already given Seleucus as king. The passage has been used by Eusebius as the basis of his own dating of 250

for the Parthian revolt - which is also outside Seleucus's reign. We do know that G. Atilius Regulus was consul with Vulso in 250[18], but also know how a Roman epitomist might have included the name of M. Atilius Regulus on account of his (well-justified) fame. It seems that Justin did make a mistake in the epitomising of Trogus, and as Wolski pertinently remarks, a Greek author would have been unlikely to have called the first Carthaginian war 'primo Punico bello'.[18a]

A fixed point in the chronology of the breakaway of Parthia is the date 247 BC which marks the start of the Parthian era[19], at which point Arsaces, the chief of the Parni, was crowned at Asaak on the River Atrek on the borders of Astauene. It is important to separate the settlement of the Parni, in an encroaching movement to the north of the Seleucid provinces of Parthia and Hyrcania, which seems to me a straightforward if protracted military campaign, from what Justin calls a 'defectio Parthorum' - a revolt in the more usual sense but about which there are a good number of questions remaining to be asked - also in the reign of Seleucus II.[20] Strabo and Justin speak of the attack of the Parni on Parthia after they have mentioned Diodotus' secession, whereas the revolt of the province of Parthia probably took place earlier, as allowed by both Strabo and Justin, at the point where Seleucid defences were at their most fully stretched, namely at the time of the Third Syrian war during which the invasion of Seleucid territory by Ptolemy III made drastic inroads, and will have exposed Seleucid weakness. There is good circumstantial evidence therefore for 245 or thereabouts being the time when the satrap of the province of Parthia, who was probably called Andragoras, for reasons which we will give below, revolted. As we have observed, the nomad threat and also the absence of nearby royal control will likewise have made a greater degree of autonomy both necessary and desirable. The occasion for such a break had now for both these reasons arisen: 'revolted' is in these circumstances a dubious phrase.

Andragoras is not mentioned directly in the context of the

revolt, but a satrap Andragoras is mentioned in Justin XLI, 4, 7 in the context of Arsaces' invasion. Justin had earlier said that a certain Andragoras was the ancestor of the subsequent 'kings of Parthia'[21]. Inaccurate as this point of information may be, it is near enough to suggest that Andragoras was the name of the satrap in question, a conclusion backed up by the legend ANDRAGORAS on coins of the period,[22] accompanied by a portrait but omitting the title of king and without the diadem[23]. He may have been a relation of the Andragoras who was a general under Alexander and who is referred to above.

There were certainly good reasons for a nearer source of control than Antioch-on-the-Orontes, for the Greek and Macedonian forces manning the garrison towns, or otherwise settled in Parthia, Bactria and the other Upper satrapies; and Andragoras may well have seen taking matters into his own hands as justified by the practicalities of the situation alone, without there being any sense of a political rupture of otherwise close links with the far-off Seleucid power. With the arrangements for the overall command of the upper satrapies thrown into some confusion by the events of the third Syrian war and its inevitable requirement for troops to be supplied from these satrapies, such an arrangement becomes very plausible and is suggested by subsequent events as well as by the personal position such satraps of outlying territories found themselves in[24].

The Arrian passage in Parthica Fr. 1 refers to Arsaces as having a brother Tiridates who was similarly involved in the original attack on Parthia and the subsequent penetration into Hyrcania. There is I think no reason to doubt the existence of this Tiridates and no reason to doubt his partnership; the fact that the sources of Strabo and Justin do not mention him is not an argument that he did not exist[25], although there is no compulsion to believe Arrian's story that one of the brothers was insulted by Andragoras whereupon they killed Andragoras and raised the revolt. Both Strabo and Justin[26] say that warfare between the Parni and

the Greeks followed the Parthian takeover in the satrapies that had been occupied by Arsaces and his troops. According to Arrian, Hyrcania to the south west of Parthia, a well-watered region at least in parts, due south of the Caspian, was conquered by 'Tiridates', presently to succeed to the throne as Arsaces II. A radically different lifestyle would be required by Parthian settlers there: the terrain would demand it.

The present-day town of Gorgan lies in this region, and another part of the information we have about Andragoras may come from an inscription discovered near Gorgan some time in 1958-9. In his article describing this inscription, Louis Robert says that the name (and although he does not say so, also the location) of the inscription both suggest that we might be dealing with the Andragoras of the Parthian secession. Agreeing with Wolski's dating - of the striking of Andragoras' gold coinage to 245 and his 'disappearance' to 238 or so - Robert suggests[27] that as lines 4, 5 and 6 of the inscription have ὑπὲρ βασιλέως Ἀντιόχου καὶ βασιλίσσης Στρατονίκης we have a dating during the reign of Antiochus I, i.e. between 281 and the beginning of June 261[28]. Possibly it predates 266, the year in which the future Antiochus II was associated in the throne, and who would therefore be mentioned in official proclamations[29]. There is no final certainty that we have here the mention of the Andragoras whom we are discussing, but it is conceivable that the Andragoras of the inscription was still exercising authority in 247 - 245 (or later), and it is quite possible that his writ extended to Hyrcania during this period. There are certainly traces of a hellenized town in the vicinity of Gorgan in a region which is at present heavily populated[30], and will have been so at an earlier period. The inscription is in fact an act of enfranchisement by consecration to a divinity ἀφιεναι ἐλευθερον, ἱερὸν Σαράπιδι.

The fixed points of chronology arising out of our investigations are therefore that Arsaces was proclaimed chief of the Parni at Asaak in 247, inaugurating the Arsacid era, that Andragoras satrap of

Parthia - with authority possibly also in neighbouring Hyrcania - seceded from the Seleucid empire in 245; and that in Bactria, Diodotus, having gradually untied his moorings, was independent as king of Bactria in 239, while Arsaces' invasion of Parthia - with its consequences for Andragoras and the Greek satrapies of both Parthia and Hyrcania - took place in 238[31].

By that time Seleucus II was heavily committed against Antiochus Hierax and his Galatian allies, having been defeated by them at the battle of Ancyra (Ankara) shortly after 240 and was in no position to reclaim lost ground in the east of his empire. However, if the process of the secession of these two satrapies is one matter on which there can now be, within limits which I have tried to chart, general agreement, the causes of the secession and its subsequent course raise issues also not just of military action and uncertainty about chronology, but of ideology and political control as well as of culture in its widest sense. To these we will now turn.

POLITICAL CONTROL

What was the position of the Greek power in Bactria and Parthia at that time? In order to examine this we will have to cover the antecedants to their secession in these two provinces. As a security zone against nomad intrusion 20,000 Macedonian soldiers had been settled in Bactria by Alexander and distributed among the Greek towns of the province such as Alexandria Oxiana and Alexandria ad Caucasum. On Alexander's death in 323 these settlers had risen in revolt to be crushed with some ferocity by Peithon[32]. Those who survived that massacre were the continuing Greek presence in Bactria, no doubt bearing a grudge against the central government for that massacre, quite apart from any strategic insights they may have possessed as to the reality of their own political position in Bactria.

It was this situation which Seleucus I inherited when he

took the eastern provinces in 311, and which he began to rationalise by his treaty with Chandragupta in 305, by which he obtained his heavy cavalry of Elephants in exchange for the Punjab region which then he ceded to Chandragupta. Bactria he kept, but will have been able to exercise some control over the nomad situation perhaps, owing to his marriage to Apama the daughter of Spitamenes of Soghdia. This marriage did mean that the children of this marriage - and in particular Antiochus I who was to succeed his father, were therefore half-Iranian, and it would be difficult not to see this as having implications for future Seleucid policy - or at the very least of people's expectations of that policy.

Under Antiochus I, whom as we have seen Seleucus placed in charge of the eastern satrapies long before his own death, as a viceroy in the east, defensive precautions were taken - for example the fortification of Merv - which probably ought to be seen as an indication that Seleucus' beneficial influence on the nomad problem, if he had one, was waning. As a scheme for dealing with the problem the appointment of Antiochus I to this task was probably very wise, and it was certainly followed as a point of policy by his successors. It will have enabled Antiochus I before his own accession to have a good knowledge of the territories most at risk from outside forces. It does seem significant that the first serious nomad invasion of Greek-controlled territory did not take place until Seleucus I was dead, and the inactivity of Spitamenes' own successors may have ceased at that point. There is always the possibility of course that Spitamenes in his barony in Soghdia was himself - and his successors - at risk from other Iranian, more truly nomad forces.

Antiochus I took steps, as we have already noted, to fortify the Greek cities wrecked by the nomad invasions which took place during his reign. And there is archaeological evidence about Merv itself made available as the result of Russian excavations there.

Tarn believed that similar circumstances as had attended the

founding of Merv must also have led to the founding of Ptolemy's Alexandria in Soghdiana on the north bank of the Oxus.[33] In his reconstruction of the evidence for the existence of 'Tarmita' as the hellenistic polis near the modern town of Termez Tarn points out that this outpost, of which there are archaeological traces,[34] was in a good position strategically at the point where the trade route from Bactra to Samarkand crossed the Oxus: at least a part of the Silk Route subsequently crossed the river there also. Tarn made a case for there being a Demetrias in that location and previous to that an Antioch - 'Tarmita'. Tarn makes Demetrius, the son and successor of Euthydemus of Bactria, have no scruples about refounding Antioch as Demetrias as he was in no way committed to maintaining Seleucid names for cities. This Antioch, Tarn claims, was destroyed in the same nomad invasion as had put an end to Alexandria Eschate (referred to by Stephanus as Antioch-in-Scythia) and which was the cause of Demodamas' punitive expedition. At some point after 293 he was στρατηγος of Bactria/Soghdiana, and is said by Pliny to have crossed the Jaxartes and to have erected altars to Apollo of Didyma, ancestor and patron of the Seleucids: Pliny VI, 49. Tarn believed that these were connected with the foundation of the new Antioch-in-Scythia, and he saw the action of Demodamas as the final activity in the drive to repel 'a very considerable Saca invasion'. (p. 93). The Sacae may have learned how to storm walled cities, and Tarn makes an interesting speculation that the diminution of the Greek element in the cities destroyed was one of the causes of this conquest by the Saca. Certainly Antiochus I when king - or earlier when viceroy - must have brought out east a considerable number of Greek settlers.

Demodamas himself was probably succeeded as Strategos in these parts by Patrocles who, sometime later than 285, explored the Caspian for peaceful commercial purposes, noting that a tribe called the Cadusii 'for a stretch of almost five thousand stadia' occupied the mountainous country of the Caspian seaboard near Hyrcania[36]. It had been a salient

point of Alexander's policy to retain orientals as governors in the ex-Achaemenid satrapies of his new empire; but even before his own death Alexander had had to revise this policy, and Stasanor's appointment to Bactria and Peithon's to Media had been a part of this revised policy. It is tempting to speculate upon the hypothetical consequences if oriental satraps had been left in charge of these provinces.

Strabo is at pains to point out that the original governors of 'the Hyrcanians' were 'barbarians' and that the whole country was 'full of brigands and nomads and deserted regions': he goes on to inveigh against the Seleucids, but calls them 'Macedonians' and says that they did indeed rule over Hyrcania for a short time, 'but they were so occupied with wars that they could not attend to their remote possessions'.[37]

It seems that it was not so much a question of the control the Seleucid monarchs could or could not exercise upon their eastern governors, as the expectation of the Seleucid kings that military reinforcements would be forthcoming from these eastern satrapies for the frequent hostilities in the west, notably with Egypt, which must potentially have sapped the vitality as well as the good intentions of these satraps to contribute men and materials to distant conflicts. An alert and informed appreciation of possible invasion on their own doorstep will have been sufficient to make such satrapal responses to central government in Antioch and Seleucia less than whole-hearted. Some idea of the extent of the demand can be gained from noting Polybius' inventory of Antiochus III's forces at Raphia in 217.[38]

We have echoes of this tension in the military movements of the year 245 when war broke out between Seleucus II and Ptolemy III of Egypt (the Third Syrian War) which involved Seleucus' wife Laodice and his second wife Berenice, whose feud was a severe handicap to Seleucus' plans for dealing with a dangerous situation in the west and the east of his empire at the same time.[39] Appian is specific that this was the time the Parthians began their revolt, taking advantage of the confusion

in the house of the Seleucids.'

At this juncture Seleucus' brother Hierax was persuaded by his mother Laodice to make himself an independent ruler: already in charge of Asia Minor and recognised as joint king by Seleucus II, there was wisdom in Seleucus' policy of splitting royal control over such a large kingdom at this critical time - or there might have been, were it not for Laodice's policy of interfering with the working of the law of primogeniture which seems to have helped to corrupt a good working arrangement. It was too late to try to negotiate with Hierax, and Seleucus was distracted from action against Parthia in order to face a real rebellion in the west, thus allowing the Arsacid annexation of Parthia and subsequently Hyrcania to become a reality. The beginning of the Fratricidal War has been reliably dated by Wolski to 239-8 [40].

There may at this early stage in the Seleucid conflict with the Parni have been some sense in an alliance between Diodotus of Bactria and Seleucus II - between whom there is no recorded open hostility. One of our sources does hint at hostilities between Diodotus and the Arsacids (Arrian Parthica , Fr. XVII), and although it is suspect, there would plainly have been similar fears among Greeks in Bactria and elsewhere in Seleucus' own existing territories. It is not until the reign of Diodotus II that we have evidence of an actual alliance between Bactria and Parthia, and this move is itself represented as a reversal of previous policy.

The place of the third Syrian War in the question of the secession of Parthia and Bactria has been often speculated upon, and the connection chronologically can seem obvious; it is often less so upon examination, but its indirect influence may have been strong.

As the third in what was to become a whole series of extended and wasteful conflicts between the Ptolemies and the Seleucids the third war is peculiar in that we have no really substantial account of its circumstances or its course. The Appian passage in Syriaca 65 is short and quite late, and will have relied on an earlier source which is lost, but he is probably the most connected account we have.

In origin, the war involved an attempt by Ptolemy II to repair relationships with the Seleucids, the better to deal a blow against Antigonus Gonatas of Macedonia whose activities in the Mediterranean had led to Ptolemaic losses in the second Syrian war. Ptolemy's scheme was to offer the hand of his daughter Berenice (conventionally known as Berenice II) to Antiochus II, now an ageing king in Antioch, along with a dowry possibly consisting of territory in Asia which had been earlier captured from the Seleucids by the Ptolemies. All this was to happen on condition that the Seleucids renounced their claim to Coele-Syria.

Antiochus II did indeed marry Berenice and had a child by her, whom he told her would be the next Seleucid king. The matter was complicated by the fact that Antiochus was himself already married to Laodice his cousin whom he thereupon divorced, leaving her with four children - and a large estate in Asia Minor as a consolation prize. On a visit to Laodice at Ephesus, Antiochus died leaving Seleucus II, his eldest son by Laodice, as king; and Berenice, with a son also by Antiochus, was put into a position where her son was at a disadvantage in the contest which now began between the queens to decide whose son should rule - a contest made personal because of the minority of Berenice's child implying a regent. Berenice recruited Syrian cities to her cause and sought help from Egypt. By the time her request reached there Ptolemy II was dead and Ptolemy III Euergetes was ready to take energetic action in support of his sister Berenice.

In the opening moves of this war Berenice was captured in Antioch and her son killed. Berenice herself died soon afterwards[41]; but Ptolemy, apparently anxious for his own reasons to prosecute the war, represented to the Seleucid court that Berenice and her son were still alive and that he, Ptolemy, would be their champion.

It was at this point that Ptolemy III undertook his expedition into the heart of the Seleucid empire, and this seems to have

led him at least as far as Seleucia on Tigris. Accounts which claim more for him, including an advance as far as India are almost certainly legendary[42], but in any case have to bear the weight of their own chronology, let alone the logistics of slow overland military expeditions. We do have cuneiform indications that Babylon had resumed its alliegiance to Seleucus II by the Summer of 245[43]. If Ptolemy was still at Seleucia in the summer of 246 receiving the alliegiance of some of the eastern satraps[44], two questions arise: firstly, why then did he need to go east subsequently - if he did, and second, how could he possibly have got as far as Bactria and India and back in a year, bearing in mind the distances involved? One is inclined to opt for Appian's more conservative account of the campaign.

The possibility of a Ptolemaic advance as far as these eastern limes is fascinating to contemplate in the circumstances of what we know by hindsight was really their imminent secession, but this makes it easier to admit that Polyaenus 8, 50, 1.36 could indeed have got hold of an earlier account which exploited the known weakness of the Seleucid east as the background for what was in fact a wholly fictitious advance.

In attempts over the next four years (to 241) to reinstate his Mediterranean coastal possessions, Seleucus was only partially successful; and a peace signed in 241 gave the Seleucids very little and Ptolemy most of the Syrian coastline. But it was a treaty which was to stand for twenty years, and this was to be important from the point of view of the Seleucids' other concerns further east. The problem was that by 241 secession in Parthia was progressive; and in Bactria, for what may have been the best of defensive reasons, Seleucid rule was not absolute by any means, although 'hostility' involves far too many assumptions about Bactrian attitudes to the Seleucids and about the adequacy of Seleucid defence against Bactria's neighbours which cannot be supported by any evidence that we can cite.

Seleucus was probably unable to undertake any expedition to pacify or reclaim the east of his straggling empire until between 235 and 230.

This may additionally have been spurred on by the extension of Parthian conquests into Hyrcania which happened under Arsaces.II (Tiridates) in about 235, but the proximal reason was the pressure of internecine strife in the west, and the relations between Hierax, Laodice, Ptolemy III and Seleucus II. Not until the twenty years peace which we have mentioned between Ptolemy and Seleucus was the extraordinary geopolitical nature of the Seleucid state to allow Seleucus any real eastern concentration. It is significant that when Seleucus was able to move his forces onto the offensive in Hyrcania success was spectacular. 'Tiridates' retreated into the steppe country of Turan, the country of the Apasiacae, (the water Sacas) on the east coast of the Caspian where the Jaxartes flows to the sea[45]. There is a coin of Seleucus II from the Seleucia mint which could be a celebration of this victory: the bronze double-drachm has Nike placing a wreath on Seleucus who is standing facing her in armour and with his hand placed on a spear[46].

On Seleucus' return from the east the war with Hierax resumed, with Seleucus' motive now to regain some access to the Aegean, which had been in Hierax' possession since the closing stages of the third Syrian war when Hierax had been granted sovereignty over Asia Minor in return for help against Ptolemy. Had Hierax' joint kingship with Seleucus been regularised and organized so that sea access was not allowed to become a major issue, all might have been well; as it was, the action against Hierax - who had now contracted an alliance with Galatian mercenaries - meant a constant campaign-emergency in the west of the empire and serious involvement again with the Galatians. The major action fought by Seleucus against them has already been mentioned and has been dated to 240[47] and 236[48], but should probably be placed after Seleucus' return from the east, and so about 235.

The battle was indeed a serious defeat for Seleucus, but it led to the eventual eclipse of Hierax, whose alliance with the Gallic tribes of Asia Minor had reached the point at which he was in their control. His future career need not detain us in detail, but an important by-product of the strength of the Galatian threat (with or without Hierax) was the enforced

rise of the power of Pergamum as a state with the will and the capacity to contain this Gallic threat. Attalus was able to defeat the Tolistoagii and the Tectosages - as well as the troops of Hierax - in battle twice, on the second occasion in the city of Pergamum itself. The results of this victory were not only significant for Hierax, whose power in Asia Minor was now broken, but also for Pergamum, whose reputation in the Greek world was considerably strengthened as an emerging major power. The results of that were momentous.

In the future Pergamum's strength and influence and the independent alliances she was now strong enough to make would have to be borne in mind in all Seleucid strategic dispositions. And, most important for the eastern provinces of the Seleucid empire, a hostile Pergamum would constitute yet another reason for the Seleucids to watch over their western concerns and consequently another reason for satraps in the east to go their own way, or to be allowed to do so. The need for a governor general of the Upper Satrapies ὁ ἐπὶ τὴν ἄνω σατραπείαν whose jurisdiction may have included Babylonia, was now stronger than it had ever been[49]. Such powers we have noted were delegated to Antiochus I by Seleucus I, and by Antiochus I possibly to Seleucus II: Seleucus II was now to delegate them to Antiochus III. The appointments were not in all cases to succeed in their object of holding the west and the east of the empire together under Seleucid rule. Both Molon and Timarchus were to lead revolts against the Seleucid government from their position in that command, and the inscription from Teheran now indicates that in Seleucus IV's reign also c.183-182 an official whose name has not been preserved had this function in the Upper Satrapies.[50]

By 230, Antiochus Hierax seems to have been overtaken by the course of events which he had set in motion in Asia Minor, and to have conceded to his Galatian allies not only a right to levy tribute from him, but also to enjoy a 'free-fire' area for plunder and extortion. Hierax

lost Hellespontine Phrygia, Lydia and Caria, and was defeated in three actions with the Pergamene army: by 229-8 he had been confined as a local ruler to Sardis. After this, Hierax sought refuge with Arsames of Armenia Minor, and gained his support in a new campaign against Seleucus II. He suffered a reverse during a campaign in Mesopotamia from a Seleucid army under Andromachus (Seleucus II's father-in-law). Following this Seleucus himself drove him out of Asia Minor, and Hierax, compelled to flee to Thrace was killed by the Galatians there. Seleucus was also able to recover Antioch which had been seized by Stratonice, the king's aunt, on behalf of Hierax at an earlier stage. Seleucus himself died shortly afterwards.

In retrospect, it is difficult to stress how calamitous over ? Antiochus Hierax and his ambitions had been to the whole Seleucid cause. He was indirectly responsible, as we have observed, not only for the eventual loss of the Parthian and Bactrian satrapies, but also for aiding the rise of Pergamum: two losses which effectively shrank the Seleucid empire at both ends, and furthermore did so in a manner which was to leave active opponents in power in both east and west: Parthia and Pergamum owed their chances to the other concerns of Seleucus II's reign. As we have seen, given the opportunity, Seleucus was a decisive and successful general - his defeat by the Galatians at Ancyra was in every way an exception - but by the end of his reign, with almost continuous military action on two fronts having taken its toll, his strategy was fatally weakened, and the final blow must surely have come with the accession of Diodotus II to the throne of Bactria to succeed Diodotus I in about 235,[51] when a pact seems to have been struck between Parthia and Bactria thus converting the two neighbouring secession states into a virtual power-bloc. We have no grounds for supposing de facto Bactrian hostility to the Seleucids in 238 - as we have seen there were other, better reasons for independent administration. In 230 the Bactrian state will have had to recognise the power of Parthia, now in occupation of at least part of Hyrcania, as a reality with which it

had better come to terms. It is that Parthian-Bactrian accord which marks the decisive break of the eastern satrapies from Seleucid control: other secession arrangements were ad hoc measures and preliminary and provisional in character. It would be extremely difficult to maintain that either the general assumption of sovereignty, which we note in the case of Bactria, or the several phases of the Parthian secession, were the result of policy 'decisions' by the Seleucids. Future action by Seleucid kings suggests that there was a longing amounting to paranoia to recoup losses in the east, and that in the process of future attempts to do so lay much of their undoing.[51a]

The question as to whether Seleucus II was able to arrive at a treaty with Arsaces I is certainly raised in connection with the defeat he inflicted on the retreating Parni following his campaign in the steppe country. In view of the fact that he was subsequently attacked by the nomads and suffered heavy losses this is unlikely[52]. The statement that Antiochus III had Dahae contingents in his army at Raphia in 217[53] is possibly better explained by confining Arsaces' conquests to a section of Hyrcania in the north of the province rather than supposing that he annexed all of it[54].

We will need to look at the General Command of the Upper Satrapies in the chapter dealing with Antiochus III in greater detail than has been attempted so far, but in the meanwhile it is necessary to view the establishment of such a post as a real attempt by the Seleucid kings to compensate for the lack of an administrative centre in the east in which the king himself might live and work - by the appointment of an important deputy, usually royal, who would do so and be what the commentators on the rulers of Bactria and India would call a 'sub-king'. The question was to arise as to how much power this official should have: enough to rule adequately or enough to rule independently.[55] If he was to have sufficient power to rule adequately, would he be seen as a threat

to the king by himself - or by the king? We have no evidence that this was so under the first Seleucids, but the occupant of this post would have to have sufficient autonomy to impose his will on the eastern satraps as though he was king in all but name. The power of devolved authority was put to severe test, and it is not unrealistic to see the secession of Parthia and Bactria as being in essence a breakdown of the credibility of the 'Regent of the East' as an administrative concept, rather than an act of treason against the king on the part of Andragoras or Diodotus.

Newell's evidence for the extreme gradualness of the change in coin designations[56], and his statement that Diodotus I was still minting coins with Antiochus II's name 'for a considerable time after accepting the diadem'[57] are strong evidence against a 'treason' argument and good evidence for the inadequacy of the control being exercised by whoever was the Upper satrapies' regent at the time. It may be that we are near a solution to that problem when we note that Ptolemy Euergetes appointed Xanthippus as viceroy of the whole area from the Euphrates eastwards following his invasion of 245, thus replacing the Seleucid appointee who was there at the time, and who was dismissed or killed in the course of Ptolemy's invasion. If, then, the person whose authority was not enough to hold Andragoras and Diodotus was probably not a Seleucid at all but an Egyptian appointee, would they have had the same respect for him, always supposing that he was militarily and politically competent? Our written tradition is unfortunately not complete enough to answer these questions definitively, but the possibilities remain.

Notes for Chapter 2.

1. The uncovering of Chorasmian history in these parts by the Soviet Archaeological Survey in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan is detailed in S..P. Tolstov 'Po Sledam Drevnekhorezmiskoi Tsivilisatsii.' Moscow, 1948 and reviewed at length by R. Ghirshman in Artibus Asiae, XVI, 1953, p. 209 f.

1a. Pliny: Nat. Hist. VI, 47.

2. Justin: XLI, 1, 10. Strabo: XI, 9, 2. The interpretation of these events and in particular their derivation from these two sources is largely that of Josef Wolski in 'L'effondrement de la domination des Seleucides en Iran au III siecle avant J.C.' Bull. Int..de l'academie Polonaise des Sciences et des Lettres. Suppl. 5, Cracow, 1947 and in other works by him listed in the bibliography. The most cogent modern support for his views comes from E. Will in Histoire Politique I, p. 288, who places caveats where he thinks they are warranted. The view of Strabo XI as suggesting an early Parni occupation of these northern territories is that of Will himself (p. 268).

2a. Appian: Syriaca passim. Discussion by E. Will in Politique IV, p. 267 f.

3. Strabo, XI, 9, 2. Other manuscripts - e.g. Strabo's palimpsest in the Vatican library - have ἀλληλοις , not as here ἀλλοις : others have ἀλληλους ; see Wolski's important discussion in Berytus XII, 1956-7, p. 35 f. making a very strong case for ἀλληλοις , which I will therefore accept. The current text in the Loeb edition, whose translation I have otherwise used, should therefore be amended accordingly. The comments of E. Will in REG LXXV, 1962, p..106, do not really enable us to date the Strabo passage to the revolt of Molon as Strabo makes, 'the kings who were engaged' a different matter from the countries which 'revolted'.

4. Strabo: ibid. A. Aymard in 'Du nouveau sur la chronologie des Seleucides' REA 57, 1955, and cuneiform evidence e.g. in Sachs and Wiseman, IRAQ 16, 1954, p. 202 f. do not support this co-regency.

5. Wolski: 'The decay of the Iranian Empire of the Seleucids and the chronology of Parthian beginnings' Berytus XII, 1956-7, p. 40.

5a. Arrian: Parthica Fr. XVII, 2.

6. Strabo XI, 9, 3.

7. A. K. Narain: The Indo-Greeks, Oxford, 1957.

8. M. Mitchener: The coins of the Indo-Greeks, Vol. 1, London, 1975.

9. E. Bickermann: The chronology of Ancient History, London, 1968.

10. In particular see E. T. Newell: Eastern Seleucid Mints, p. 245 - 249, and in this work see plate Coin1 . Discussion has been extensive on this matter in the works of Narain, Tarn and now Mitchener; and also by E. Will in Histoire Politique I, 1979, p. 287 f. and in Schmitt: Untersuchungen p. 65.

11. Wolski: Berytus XII, p. 36, note 5.

12. Tarn: The Greeks in Bactria and India, Cambs. 1952, p 39f.

13. F. Altheim: Weltgeschichte Asiens, Vol. II, Halle, 1948.

14. Wolski in Berytus XII, p. 37 and n.1 infra.

15. Arrian: Parthica Fr. XVII and Wolski OP. cit. p. 38.

16. Narain: The Indo-Greeks, Oxon, 1957, p. 12.

17. Eusebius: Chron. II, 120.

18. M. Atilius Regulus was elected Consul Suffectus on the death of Q. Caedicius the Consul Ordinarius for 256; dating by the consul suffectus would be most exceptional. On this issue, which is critical, Wolski Op. cit. p. 51, and also T. R. S. Broughton: Magistrates of the Roman Republic, Vol. I, 1951, p. 208 and 213.

18a. J. Wolski in Berytus XII, p. 52.

19. Following George Smith's discovery of a double-dated tablet in 'Assyrian Discoveries', London, 1875, p. 389.

20. Justin XLI, 4, 3, paralleled by Appian Syriaca 65.

21. Justin XII, 4. 12.

22. B. Head. Historia Numorum, Vol. II, Oxon..1911, p. 825. Modern source: G. F. Hill: Catalogue of the Greek coins of Arabia, Mesopotamia and Persia, London, 1922, p. cxlviii - clx discusses 'coins of Andragoras', as does E. T. Newell in 'Eastern Seleucid Mints'.

23. Kraay and Davis: The Hellenistic Kingdoms, p. 197.

24. H. Bengtson: Die Strategie in der Hellenistischen Zeit, Munich, 1944, p. 49 f.

25. As Wolski thinks in L'Effondrement, p. 30. Arrian: Parthica, F 1. is the evidence that he did exist.

26. Justin XLI, 4, 7. Strabo XI, 9, 2 - δικπολεμων

27. L. Robert: Inscription Hellenistique d'Iran in Hellenica XI, p. 85 f. The word Ανδραγορου is in line 1 of the inscription.

28. Robert: Op. cit. p. 88. The actual date has been obscured in the bottom left-hand corner of the inscription (before the mention of the month Gorpaios) by mutilation or other damage.

29. OGIS 222.

30. E. L. Schmidt: Flights over Ancient cities of Iran, Chicago, 1940, plate 67, is a vertical view of a town on the southern bank of the Gorgan River. It seems to me very Greek-looking with regular, rectangular street-planning and three main thoroughfares plainly visible. Schmidt indicates that 'a citadel formation is visible on the north bank'. He says that the south bank of the river is lined with town-ruins as in his plate 66, and the site is at one end of the ancient fortification known as Alexander's barrier.

31. Very recent support for this chronology has come from D. G. Selwood in conversation with me, and in his 'Coins of Parthia'. The cavalier treatment of sources by A. K, Narain must raise questions about his attitude to textual evidence more generally. By the time 'The Indo-Greeks' (sic) was written there was already a bibliography to hand unnoticed in his text. F. W. Walbank in his Commentary on Polybius X, 48, 1 (Vol. II, p. 262) agrees with Tarn in the view that Arsaces I seized Hyrcania during the Fratricidal War and that he was expelled (by Seleucus II) in 228 - 7: Strabo XI, 513. In the Addenda and Corrigenda to Vol. I (Vol. II, p. 644) Walbank says that 'the presence of Dahae contingents in Antiochus III's army suggests, though it does not prove, that Hyrcania was not yet Parthian.'

32. Revolts of the Greeks in Bactria are mentioned in Diodorus XVII, 99 and Justin XV, 4, 11.

33. Ptolemy VI, 12, 6. Tarn in JHS LX, 1940, p. 89, f. on 'Tarmita'.

34. Tarn Op. cit. p. 90 f.

35. Tarn Op. cit. p. 93.

36. Strabo XI, 7. 2.

37. Strabo: ibid.

38. Polybius V. 82.

39. Appian: Syriaca 65: 'Began' ἤρξαν is significant.

40. Following Bouche-Leclerq: Histoire des Seleucides II, Paris, 1914, but arguing it out at length in Berytus XII, 1956-7, p. 41 - 42.

41. M. Cary: 'The Greek World from 323 to 146' has a series of Appendices on issues arising out of the Third Syrian War, including the death of Berenice and the extent of Ptolemy III's progress into, or through, Seleucid territory.

42. Notably the inscription in Dittenberger OGIS 54 which lists the countries through which he passed, or more accurately over which his aegis was claimed;
...καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν πᾶσαν ἕως Βακτριανῆς ... Dittenberger I, p. 87

43. Cary: History of the Greek World, 323 - 146. Appendix 8, p. 399.

44. E. T. Newell: Eastern Seleucid Mints, p. 76.

45. Strabo's word for Arsaces's retreat is φεύγων 'fled'. E. T. Newell had a very different view of Seleucus' anti-nomad activities (Eastern Seleucid Mints, passim) than Wolski had and held a very high opinion of him as a restorer of peace.

46. E. T. Newell: Eastern Seleucid Mints, p. 79: Group C, No. 208: Newell was prepared, however, to admit that the coin could be celebrating Seleucus' subsequent recovery of Antioch from Hierax (p. 80).

47. N. Debevoise: 'Political History of Parthia', Chicago 1938, p. 12, and commented upon in his notes (50 infra) which effectively leaves the issue wide open.

48. M. Cary: Op. cit. p. 110.

49. Such a person is honoured in the inscription from the Iran Bastan Museum described in Robert: Inscriptions Seleucides de Phrygie et Iran (Hellenica VII), p. 23 f. The inscription was sited at Hihavend (Laodicea-in-Media).

50. Another inscription from Nihavend (CRAI 1967, p. 291), discussed by Robert indicates Menedemus as a governor of these upper satrapies in 193.

51. E. T. Newell: Eastern Seleucid Mints,
E. Mitchener: Coins of the Indo-Greeks, London, 1975.

51a. H. C. Schmitt: Untersuchungen does make an effort to do so, p. 6.

52. J. Wolski: L'effondrement makes a case for such a treaty on p. 52, but Schmitt, Op. cit. p. 63, rightly doubts it.

53. Polybius V, 19, 3.

54. We are not yet in a position to say by coinage, or by other means, the exact year in which Hekatompylos, now being excavated at Shahr-i-Qumis in Iran, became the Parthian capital, although Parthian levels are being investigated. See Hansman and Stronach in IRAN, 1970 and most recently a short report in IRAN 1977. I visited the site in 1974 before detailed work on the Parthian site began. It is not certain to what extent the present political climate will hinder future work.
A discussion by H. C. Schmitt (Op. cit. p. 64, note 4) repeats the views of Holleaux and Tarn on the likelihood of Comisene, Choarene and Hyrcania being annexed at that time. But see Walbank's comments in his Vol. II, p. 644.

55. The issues are clearly stated in H. Bengtson: Strategie in der Hellenistischer Zeit, Munich, 1944, p. 78 f.

56. E. T. Newell: Eastern Seleucid Mints, New York, 1938, p. 245 f.

57. H. C. Schmitt: Untersuchungen, p. 65, note 2.

58. Droysen's suggestion in 'Geschichte der Hellenismus', noted in Pauly-Wissowa Realencyclopadie: Xanthippos, p. 1350.

Chapter III.

The Eastern Question during the reign of Antiochus III.

A look at the eastern situation facing the Seleucids during the reign of Seleucus II produces the dominant impression of the king being unable to make the two flanks of his long empire settle sufficiently for reasonable government to be imposed again. It also suggests that the strategy of dealing with the eastern question by placing a high, usually royal official permanently at Seleucia as Grand Vizier or Viceroy, successful under the first Seleucids, had now become inoperative or ineffective - or distrusted by the king at Antioch. It ought, for example, to have been unnecessary for the King to leave Antioch in the critical circumstances of the civil war against Antiochus Hierax and his Galatian allies, in order to wage a temporarily successful retaliatory war upon the Parni. If the war was to be waged at all, rather than negotiations being conducted, it should surely have been done by the General commander of the East with forces organised - and paid - by him.[1] In the event Seleucus turned his back on the west to deal with the east, and vice-versa alternately, and each time trouble blazed up in his absence.

After the short reign and murder of Seleucus III, Antiochus III came to the Seleucid throne in 223, and inherited an unstable eastern situation from his deceased brother. This involved the appointment of Molon as commander of the upper satrapies along with his brother Alexander;[2] and to Achaeus, a great grandson of Seleucus Nicator, was entrusted the province of Asia Minor at a time when the Pergamene threat in the west of the empire required strong and resolute but also loyal activity.[3] At the age of 19 Antiochus had to undertake the rule of this unsettled state in company with his Carian chief minister Hermaeus whose despotic and harsh influence he may have had little chance then of countering;[4] and whom it is possible to see as a force acting against the interests of the Seleucids

in that risings against the royal control could easily have been in fact opposition to Hermaeus' control.

Molon was satrap of Media and Alexander his brother satrap of Persis at the start of Antiochus' reign, and by 222 Molon had taken the title of King. Antiochus appears to have been originally responsible for putting these governors into their respective offices, and whether he was coerced by them, or badly-advised by others, preparations for their own revolt seem to have begun straightaway. By the summer of 222 Molon was in revolt and had begun to coin at Ecbatana in his own province of Media with the title of King,[6] before advancing westwards towards Seleucia.

We have Polybius' mention of Alexander's satrapy as Persis (V, 40, 7) as our only indication of a Seleucid reclamation of this province after a continuous period of rule by independent kings since the time of Seleucus' death. The British Museum has tetradrachms of Bagadat, Oborsus and Autophradates I, all native rulers of Persis, and all coining at Persepolis or Istakhr in the years between 280 and 222. As E. T. Newell points out there is a break in the coinage of independent Persis after the time of Autophradates, and this may mean that Seleucus II had re-annexed it in the course of his reign. It would seem that Seleucus III did not reign long enough to do so, and here we have Polybius statement (V, 40, 7) that Alexander was satrap of Persis - in this instance under the new king Antiochus III.

The campaign which followed against Molon was not so much a campaign to re-take the upper satrapies as a necessary emergency action on Antiochus III's part to stabilise the empire as it had come down to him. If by 'upper satrapies' we mean Parthia, Hyrcania, Bactria, Carmania, Gedrosia, Drangiana and the Paropamisadae, these had been independent under Greek and Parthian rulers for something approaching twenty years at the time of Antiochus III's accession; and reclamation of them was indeed to occupy Antiochus during the middle years of his reign, but it was then to involve a major and lengthy anabasis against rulers already confirmed

in considerable power by their own people, and it is a different issue to that of the revolts of Molon and Alexander - more of a police action than a foreign re-conquest. The situation presented by this comparison does illustrate the change in the composition of the Seleucid Empire since 250-240, and therefore the alteration in attitude and disposition which Antiochus III would be required to make in order to deal with it.

The first necessity in either the long or the short term strategic disposition was to reclaim the loyalty of the people in the east of what was now his empire, however much he might be dissuaded from doing so by the machinations of Hermaeus or Achaeus with their own insistence - for whatever reason - upon the king's involvement with the west of the empire and the Egyptian question.

The question as to whether Carmania, Aria, Drangiana, Gedrosia and Arachosia joined what Schmitt called the secession movement is answered largely on geographical grounds where there is no more concrete evidence. The Parthian movement from 240 to 230 had split the Eastern provinces of Antiochus II and Seleucus II's Seleucid empire away from its central Iranian provinces by driving a wedge into the chain of Greek poleis along the northern trade route. The southern route through Carmania was much less populated with Greek settlers and their cities, and was also separated from the northern Iranian settlements by the Dasht-i-Kavir in the north and the great Persian desert further south; thus Carmania itself was isolated in a way which made it more accessible to first the Mauryas and later the Euthydemids. Arachosia, as we know from the Rock-cut edicts of Asoka found at Kandahar, was Maurya during Asoka's time. Broadly we have to say that all territory east of the Caspian had fallen away from Seleucid control by the time of Antiochus III's accession.[9] It is not, I think, true to say that any attempt to discover anything beyond the bare fact of the loss of Bactria and Parthia always leads to contradiction and confusion.

In an attempt to arrive at a definition of Seleucid

territorial holdings by another route to that of Justin and Strabo, i.e. by using Erastosthenes, Schmitt attempts to define Ariana. According to Erastosthenes Ariana basically included the provinces whose political alliegiance was doubtful in the years after the breakaway of Bactria (i.e. after 239), or in geographical terms the whole Iranian upland east of the central desert, now either independent of the Seleucids or only loosely connected with them, the Parthian empire of Erastosthenes' own day, which Schmitt says included Parthia, Hyrcania and the northern steppe.[10] Erastosthenes himself, as Schmitt says, was not writing a political geography but more of an astronomical one. 'Ariana' to him was one of the σφραγίδες into which he divided Asia in order to calculate the area of the earth's surface.

Perhaps the best way to discuss the extent of Seleucid control in Antiochus III's reign is to compare what countries' forces he could draw upon for his army in the two crucial campaigns in the west at the beginning and end of his reign. At Raphia in 217, which he was able to fight after the extinction of Molon's revolt, his army according to Polybius included Medes, Persians, Carmanians, and Cadousians from the Caspian litoral near the lands of the Mardi. In addition there was a Cissian contingent from Susiana.[11] Even after the great eastern anabasis of Antiochus' middle years the forces which comprised his host at Magnesia in 190 were not greatly different: Medes, Elymaeans, Cadousians and Cyrtians from the mountains of Persis and Media. He did have 1200 mounted archers from the Dahae[12] who may have been there as a result of Antiochus' treaty with the Parthians, to whom the Dahae were related. But, as Wolski says, there is nowhere any mention of contingents from Aria, Arachosia or Drangiana.[13] This absence rather suggests that Euthydemus was able, after the treaty Teleas had arranged in 206, to keep these provinces as the western marches of the Bactrian state.

Today, as in Antiochus' day, Aria, Arachosia and Drangiana are separated from Media by the Persian desert which tends to make an

obvious political division. Parthia and Hyrcania are further north in a different climatic zone. In this way, now as then, these provinces would tend to gravitate towards the east rather than to be easily assimilated into a central Iranian bloc - particularly if ruled from the west. Today they form part of Afghanistan not Iran, and are administered from Kabul and not from Teheran. From the time of Diodotus I the whole northern connecting route through Media, the Caspian Gates, Parthia and Margiana was in the control of either Parthia or Bactria, both seceding states. These facts suggest that Antiochus III was not able to impose his will on Bactria and that the treaty he entered into was a much more equal agreement than his all-conquering attitude to the campaign might lead us to suppose. It is difficult to believe that Polybius would have invented a Dahae contingent or concealed the presence of contingents from Arachosia, Drangiana and Aria.

The extent of the territory which he ruled is important in the context of Molon's revolt and its aftermath, as the position of strategos or Viceroy of the upper satrapies was made more or less untenable according to his capacity to hold at bay foreign invaders or, alternatively, to rule Greek and Macedonian settlers and the local population at one and the same time. Antiochus' first priority was to arrest the further fragmentation of the territories he had inherited as an empire (in many ways a misleading term to apply to the Seleucid state), and having stabilised the position, to continue to strengthen what he had managed to retain. As we shall see, with one disastrous mistake he was largely able to do this. The suppression of the revolt of Molon (and Alexander) was the first move in that direction.

Molon's campaign began successfully with a rapid advance beyond the Zagros into Apolloniatis leaving Media behind him, with the royal generals Xenon and Theodotus retreating in front of him, according to Polybius 'into the cities'.[14] This large acquisition of territory enabled Molon to build up supplies and communications with his Median base (presumably at Ecbatana): he had already made sure of the cooperation of local satraps by means of bribery,[15] although here we might detect prejudice

on the part of Polybius who is our only source. There is nothing to suggest at this point that the local rulers required any coercion to join the revolt: they may well have been Greek anyway; and there is equally nothing to suggest that this was not, at least in part, an anti-Macedonian reaction among Greek settlers. And although we read that they later deserted the cause of Molon, this only happened when Antiochus arrived in person at the head of a determined opposition. The suggestion that a better stand against the Parthians could be made by Molon in his geographical position than by Antiochus in his is an attractive one[16], and would suggest that such local rulers, if threatened by Parthia, would be more likely to join the ruler in immediate command in the area. After all Antiochus had acceded in his appointment to do precisely that task. Far from coercion being required, authority was vested in Molon.

Antiochus meanwhile was at Seleucia-on the Euphrates (Zeugma) where he received as wife Laodice the daughter of Mithridates II of Pontus who had himself been married to a daughter of Seleucus II;[17] the continued alliance between the Seleucid Empire and another hellenized kingdom to the north is an interesting aspect of Antiochus III's statecraft, and he went on to found or to refound cities in her name, notably in Media, Molon's province.[18] The marriage is not only important for its alliance; it also demonstrates at one or two removes the Seleucid willingness to marry an Iranian wife following the good example of Seleucus Nicator.[19] The point may not have been lost on Molon's army, some of whom will certainly have been Iranians, (Pol. V, 43).

Molon appears to have begun his rule with a province which had many natural advantages not so apparent nowadays after centuries of cultivation and some drying-out of the soil; apart from horses he is said to have had corn and cattle in abundance, and his province was a governable, relatively easily-defended unit.[20] The retreat of the royal generals seems to have confirmed his control of the province, and Antiochus' own decision to follow the advice of Hermaeus and leave the reconquest of

Media to his generals made Molon's next move - to advance to Seleucia-on-Tigris and to winter at Ctesiphon, at that time an unimportant settlement opposite Seleucia, an obvious and easy development. As matters turned out, he was prevented from laying siege to Seleucia by the seizure of the river boats by Antiochus' general Zeuxis, and this tactical success was to have most important results,[21] in that it gave Antiochus himself time to join in hostilities earlier than would have been possible if Seleucia had been taken before the winter set in.

Hermaeus was responsible, we are told, for forestalling Antiochus in his plan to move against Molon at this juncture, and to deal instead with the situation in Coele-Syria which Hermaeus is said to have regarded as a more suitable war for a king to fight.[23] An Achaean mercenary captain called Xenoitas was given full powers for the suppression of Molon and was sent east, presumably by Hermaeus. At Seleucia he was joined by some of Molon's troops who swam the Tigris to join him, and who encouraged him to cross over with his army, as Molon's army were disaffected and would desert to the royal forces. Xenoitas' forces did indeed cross, and pitched camp near Molon's army; misconstruing the subsequent withdrawal of Molon's troops as a retreat, Xenoitas allowed his guard to drop, and while his men feasted Molon's army returned in a surprise attack upon Xenoitas' camp, inflicted very severe casualties on the unsuspecting royal troops, many of whose bodies, according to Polybius, were carried by the current down the Tigris.[24]

Molon's next move was to attack Seleucia, while Zeuxis withdrew in front of him, and he was able to take the city at the first assault, as Zeuxis and the epistates Diomedon abandoned it. He was then able to reduce Babylonia, and in a southerly movement to annex Susiana where he was successful except for the citadel at Susa where the commander Diogenes held out against the detachment Molon had left to complete the capture. Molon subsequently regrouped at Seleucia-on-Tigris again,

and occupied the Mesopotamian region (Pol. V, 48, 16) as far as Dura Europus[25], and Dura on the eastern bank of the Tigris. Having gained a large territorial holding Molon withdrew to Babylon where he was when Antiochus III's punitive expedition reached the Euphrates.[26]

Antiochus had abandoned his campaign in Coele-Syria on news of Molon's continued success, and had summoned a council to consult on measures to be taken against Molon. Epigenes, who was a skilled general and who had earlier objected to Hermaeus' misreading of the gravity of Molon's rising, now claimed that he had been correct in his assessment of the military situation and pressed Antiochus to undertake an expedition against Molon. This course of action was agreed by the council and accepted by Antiochus[27] who set out for the Euphrates, collecting reinforcements there and reaching Antioch-in-Mygdonia by winter where he rested for 40 days.[28] Epigenes was quickly eliminated on the orders of Hermaeus.[29]

Zeuxis, who appears as a general with good strategic sense, advised Antiochus to cross the Tigris and to advance into Apollonaitis: it was probably a decision of political wisdom too, as the people of that district had, according to Polybius, submitted to Molon in the first place, and that recently, not from choice but from fear of the consequences of refusal.[30] After a 10-day stay at Antioch-in-Mygdonia Antiochus advanced to Libba[31], and eventually, again taking the advice of Zeuxis, crossed the Tigris and marched to Dura on the Tigris which he released from Molon's attempt to besiege it. Molon then withdrew into Apollonia across the Tigris and in this way came into contact with the skirmishers of Antiochus' army on the heights of what was probably Qyrmyzy Dereh[32], and the two main armies were brought to battle just south of the city of Apollonia (Baradan Tepe). After an abortive attempt at a surprise night action, battle was joined on the following day, and was decided in the event by the wholesale desertion of Molon's left wing to the king's side; Molon saw that he was surrounded and he took his own life while his brother Neolaus fled to Persis, where, in a

family massacre - described in matter-of-fact terms by Polybius - Molon's children were killed and his brother Alexander committed suicide, as eventually did Neolaus.[33] Antiochus meanwhile restored Molon's army to loyalty and ordered that Molon's body should be impaled as a warning against rebellion, at Callonitis[34] in the Zagros. Diogenes, who had held the citadel at Susa for Antiochus was rewarded with the satrapy of Media, and Tychon, his military secretary, received the Gulf area. It was left to Antiochus to reduce to obedience the territory of Artabazanes in Atropatene, whose potential for waging war in terms of Antiochus' supply lines is stressed by Polybius. Artabazanes, partly in view of his age and partly as a result of victories Antiochus had already won, came to terms with the king. (Pol. V, 55).

Discredited in his schemes but unbridled in his ambition, Hermaeus, shortly after the treaty with Atropatene, was himself the victim of a conspiracy mounted by Apollophanes the king's physician; and, under the pretext of walking with Antiochus, was stabbed by Apollophanes' accomplices with the foreknowledge of the king: his family perished separately at the same time.[35] Antiochus was now able to deal with the machinations of Achaeus, whom he had earlier appointed as governor of Asia on this side of the Taurus with an appropriate supervision of local officials, tribal organisation and poleis similar to that which Philetairos had exercised at Pergamum under the early Seleucids, [36] and not dissimilar to that of Molon whom Polybius mentions in the same section dealing with Antiochus' early appointments, with the comment that Molon and Alexander hoped that Achaeus would join them in their revolt.[37] Achaeus had earlier, in 226, assumed the title of king following an otherwise statesmanlike period in charge of this province. Polybius says that he thereupon became 'puffed up' by his good fortune (ἐπαιθὶς τοῖς εὐτυχήμασι..)[38]. It seems to have been Achaeus' doubts about the capacity of the new king, even after the success of Antiochus' suppression of Molon, which led Achaeus to attempt to seize the district of Syria and therefore to take the throne in a regular revolt, helped by the people of Cyrrhestice who were possibly restive after a royal

suppression of their own army mutiny.[39] In the event the army declared for Antiochus and the revolt collapsed.[40]

It had been Hermaeus' plan that Antiochus should invade Egypt, which seems then and later to have appeared as the 'natural enemy' of the Seleucids, despite earlier, and later, marriage alliances designed to bring about peace:[41] we get a poor view of Antiochus' strategic sense at this stage from the realization that Antiochus could even have considered a campaign against Coele-Syria while Seleucia-in-Pieria remained a Ptolemaic possession, and it was due to the advice of Apollophanes that hostilities began with a land and sea attack on Seleucia to reverse an occupation which had existed since the days of Ptolemy III,[42] when it was taken during the Third Syrian War. It is to Antiochus' credit that he attempted to negotiate with the city magistrates and promised bribes so that the city might be taken without an attack; and, although that overture was rejected and the lower town in fact carried by storm by Antiochus' commanders Ardys and Diognetus, eventually terms were sought and settled for the surrender of the city by Leontius its governor, which Antiochus carried out in a statesmanlike manner, with a restoration of property to exiled citizens and the installation of garrisons to secure the city.[43]

A proposal from Antiochus' Aetolian general Theodotus to 'put Coele Syria into Antiochus' hands' was taken seriously by the Seleucid on account of the influence Theodotus had with the Ptolemies, particularly as he had recently taken the important city of Ptolemais from the Ptolemies.[44] At this juncture it is right to point out the bias which Polybius displays against Ptolemy Philopator: Polybius adopts a hectoring tone, although his observations on the preparations for defence made by Agathocles and Sosibius, the chief ministers of Egypt, are much more complimentary.[45] At first, they pursued a policy of coercion to force Antiochus to evacuate the country, backed up by delegations sent to Greek cities and islands which might be expected to exercise some influence upon Antiochus; then they reorganised

the Egyptian army, properly using the time they had gained from the process of diplomatic travelling to prepare for war.[46] Polybius gives a full account of their military preparations throughout 218 with a view of their work which is decidedly sympathetic (V, 63, 64) and represents these activities as proceeding while Antiochus besieged the city of Dor (Dora) a small Israelite town eight or nine miles north of Caesarea:[47] already the Seleucid hold on Coele Syria was spreading south from their original base at Apamea over the line of the River Eleutherus, for many years a de facto frontier. Achaeus could now be regarded as a formal or informal ally of Ptolemy Philopator, and Polybius is quite specific on this point,[48] which alliance Antiochus should have taken more seriously than he apparently did: as matters were, he agreed to a four-month suspension of hostilities and withdrew northwards to Seleucia to organize his forces into their winter quarters. We gain the impression from Polybius that the Egyptian administration was wholly more astute in its diplomatic negotiations, as well as in its preparations for war, and that Antiochus waited for Coele-Syria to drop into his hands.[49]

Negotiations took place through the winter of 219-218, and covered the questions arising from Ptolemy Lagus' original occupation in 319, and the subsequent annexation after the defeat of Antigonus Monophthalmus at Ipsus in 301 - an occupation by Ptolemy which was contested by Seleucus Nicator on the grounds that Ptolemy was not actually there at the battle to help to win it, having been prevented from taking part.[50] The valuable assets of plentiful timber and harbours acted as a lure for both the Seleucids and the Ptolemies throughout the third century, and became a reason for the annexation of Coele-Syria quite separate from the more obvious territorial advantages which would be gained from the capture of a block of territory abutting Egypt on the one hand and Syria on the other. Coele Syria was in an unique position to alter the balance of power between Ptolemies and Seleucids from a geopolitical point of view, and consequently its

inhabitants were involved in the struggle between Egypt and Syria to an increasing extent.

Having gained time through the negotiations during the winter of 219-8, Agathocles and Sosibius equipped and trained a new Egyptian field force, including in the phalanx native Egyptians for the first time (Polybius V, 82). In doing this they were able significantly to increase the total of Ptolemaic forces in the field, and in doing so set native Egyptians in a new role in the state. Subsequent revolts may have resulted, at least in part, from this recognition of Egyptian native status in the Ptolemaic state. It was a bold move, and was not necessarily a foolish one. In 218 Antiochus advanced from Apamea through Galilee to Philoteria, and so, via Scythopolis and the Jordan valley to Philadelphia.[51] Achaeus during this time was fully employed in Asia Minor in hostilities against Attalus, and insofar as he seems to have been involved in Pamphyllia and Pisidia, cannot have been an actual participant in hostilities against Antiochus.[52] Antiochus wintered in Ptolemais in 216 to 217.[53]

In 217 the Seleucid army marched down thecoast of Coele-Syria past the Greek towns of the seaboard: Apollonia, Joppa, Anthedon and Gaza to Raphia which was the first city in Coele Syria on the Egyptian side after Rhinocolura. The armies met just south of Raphia, and prior to the battle an attempt on Ptolemy's life failed.[54] The result of the battle was decided by the charge of the Egyptian phalanx under the command of Ptolemy IV himself, whose conduct before and during the battle does much to redeem his indolent reputation. The Egyptian victory was complete, Antiochus' losses being 10,000 foot, 300 horses and 4,000 prisoners;[55] but Ptolemy did not force terms other than the restoration of Coele-Syrian territory proper to Egypt. The retaken towns of Palestine are said to have been glad to see Ptolemy 'for the peoples of Coele Syria have always been more attached to that house than to the Seleucidae'.[56] Antiochus took steps to make a treaty with Sosibius which led to peace for a year, and he was anxious to do this so

that his hands should be free to deal with the situation in Asia Minor where Achaeus seems to have achieved a position which Antiochus regarded as threatening and as requiring prompt action[57] which had been delayed by his conflict with Egypt.

So, while Ptolemy Philopator returned to face a revolt of the native Egyptians, now confident in their own military standing and anxious for independence, Antiochus crossed the Taurus, made a treaty with Attalus of Pergamum and launched his war against Achaeus.[58] In Greece proper, Philip V of Macedon had brought the exhausting conflict with the Aetolian league to a satisfying conclusion at the Peace of Naupactus despite the simmering discontent of some of the Aetolians. The view which Polybius has of the gradual drawing together of various strands of national history in the hellenistic world is well put in the words of Agelaus, the Aetolian strategos at Naupactus: (Pol. V, 104, 1.) 'The best thing of all is that the Greeks should not go to war with each other at all...', and more in the same strain. Polybius' own comment on the situation comes later when, no doubt with the benefit of hindsight, he says: 'neither Philip nor the leading statesmen of the Greek cities made war or peace any longer with each other with a view to Greek affairs, but were already all fixing their eyes on Italy.'[59] In the June before the August conference at Naupactus in Aetolia, Hannibal had decisivelycrushed the Roman armies at the Battle of Lake Trasimene; and although this was a disastrous defeat for Rome, events relating to Rome could no longer be left out of the reckoning: they had implications for everyone, as Hannibal's presence was later to have for Antiochus III. Philip himself seems to have had a plan to invade Italy, egged on by Demetrius; but, alarmed by reports of the approach of Roman ships, abandoned this project as Polybius would have us believe 'with considerable dishonour' (Pol.V, 110).

Philip's next move was one more out of prudence than policy perhaps: he made a treaty with Hannibal after the disastrous Roman defeat at Cannae in 216,[61] which did serve to erect an anti-Roman coalition in the

hellenistic world in that it indicated tangible opposition rather than simple political disquiet as at Naupactus.

Against this more general hellenistic background, Antiochus III meanwhile went about pacifying Asia Minor and dealing with Achaeus. In the years 215 and 214 having, as Polybius indicated (Polybius V, 107.), secured the connivance of Attalus, Antiochus laid siege to Achaeus in the city of Sardis and captured him when the city was stormed in 213,[62] having him tortured before death. This defeat of Achaeus effectively stamped out civil war in the Seleucid state for fifty years, a long period for a state whose later history was for muchof the time occupied and finally terminated by such civil wars and their consequences. Antiochus' treaty with Pergamum had given that kingdom enough territory to satisfy it for the time being; or rather, it had acquired in Pergamene possession of the Caicus Valley, the Troad and the west coast from Lampsacus to Teos. In so doing, Antiochus had effectively established Pergamene power, and it was to prove an inevitable and increasing threat to the Seleucids - and in particular to Antiochus III in the latter part of his reign - simply because of the alliances which Pergamum could now independently make - or which other powers, notably Rome, could enter into with her. It had been the price paid for the extirpation of Achaeus and the exclusionof the Ptolemaic power. Seleucid power was strong in Cilicia still and would continue to be so until the end of the dynasty: other Seleucid possessions in Asia Minor were few.

Having dealt with Achaeus, and with the Pergamene question stabilised for the present, Antiochus turned east to reclaim the loyalty of the centre and east of the Seleucid Empire. His first target was Armenia, and he was successful in besieging Xerxes, the son of the dissident ruler Arsames, in his capital city Samosata between the Tigris and the Euphrates in 212.[64] An agreement was subsequently concluded by whose terms Antiochus gave his sister Antiochis in marriage to Xerxes, and he showed tact and sensitivity in his handling of the question of tribute which Arsames apparently still owed, commuting this to a payment of three thousand talents, a thousand

horses and a thousand mules 'with their trappings'.[65] The settlement of the city and country followed smoothly. Later, following Xerxes' death, Antiochus re-annexed Armenia and placed it under the governors Artaxias and Zariadris. (

In 211 Arsaces II, Tiridates, died, having left his state far stronger strategically than it had been when he had inherited it some thirty-seven years previously.[66] An increased army, and foundations or refoundations of cities gave him the possibility of holding his conquests once he had obtained them. It was possibly Arsaces II who refounded Rhagae-Europus as Arsacia,[67] and Hekatompylos in Comisene became a Parthian capital city later on.[68] Arsaces II was succeeded by the third Arsaces known as Artabanus I, or on another view as Phriapites,[69] reliably thought to be the brother of Arsaces II and not his son.[70] Antiochus III might well have seen in this change of ruler a chance to attempt the reclamation of Parthia: in any case he was at the Euphrates in the Autumn of 211;[71] he seems to have invaded first Media and then Parthia at that time,[72] and is said to have looted the temple of Anahita at Ecbatana (Hamadan) to gain revenue to finance what we must deduce that he intended as a lengthy expedition: it proved to be so, but this anti-religious action marks a volte-face in the liberal attitude of previous Seleucids to the sacred shrines and religious customs of subject peoples.[73] By 209 Antiochus was again on the march eastwards towards Parthia; and this must now be viewed as the real beginning of his great eastern anabasis, although judging from A/ the gradual way in which he methodically pacified the west and only then turned east, 'anabasis' as a term can give the impression of an expedition per se, rather than the inevitable continuation of a process of reclamation of territory taken by others - Achaeus, Molon, Alexander or Phriapites as the case may be: it seems like an overall policy, energetically conducted, proceeding in successive stages.

The Seleucid forces seem to have reached Hekatompylos without much opposition, although Justin's figure for the size of the army is no

doubt much exaggerated at 120,000![74] An attempt to destroy the qanats, or underground canals through which irrigation water is conducted, was at least partially foiled by Antiochus' cavalry, and therefore a cavalry action of some sort must have taken place; possibly near Calliope, which Polybius mentions in the course of Antiochus' march to Hekatompylos, but whose site, named by Isidore of Charax, has not yet been located.[75] Antiochus seems to have followed the caravan route from present-day Teheran to Meshed, and in doing so to have reached Hekatompylos, now established to be off the gravel road a few miles west of Damghan. From there, whose Seleucid remains are yet to be unearthed, Antiochus headed for Hyrcania northwards over or through the Elburz. As Pedech points out[76], Alexander had faced the same problem, and had split his forces into a small group to force a difficult pass and a larger body to take an easier route. Pedech believes that Antiochus took the easier route via Shahrud, the route followed by Erygnos on Alexander's expedition, and several details in Polybius' narrative seem to point to this view being the correct one.[77]

First of all, Antiochus moved with his army to Tagae (Tak) northof Damghan in what is now very desolate country; and then, keeping his army in one large body instead of dividing it, led it in three echelons or waves as the best way of dislodging opposition to his ascent (of which the inhabitants of Tagae had already warned him)[78] of the Mount Labutas. However, inorder to achieve this, he did split both the light-armed troops and the pioneers into little groups and ordered them to take independent action to open up a pathway for the heavytroops under Nicomedes of Cos and an Aetoliannamed Nicolaus.[79] Diogenes and his light-armed units accordingly fought their way up the defiles of Mount Chahkouh, as it is now known, through the Tchaltchanyan Col to the village of Soundouk Chaken at the entrance to the Tchasman-Sawer valley.[80] The ascent up to this point had taken eight days and had covered about 33 miles of mountainous terrain. In this valley Antiochus regrouped his forces for his descent into Hyrcania

where he camped in front of Tambrax, which Polybius tells us was without walls but had a royal palace:[81] Tambrax was the summer residence for the nearby capital city of Syrinx which Polybius says had three encircling ditches, whose necessity is puzzling in view of the steppe nomads being their only opposition, unless they had taken a lesson from Antiochus I who, not many years previously had fortified Alexandria-in-Margiane in just this way, also against the nomads.[82] Syrinx was invested and its wall undermined while fierce fighting took place, until eventually the defending Parthians abandoned the city and retreated, later to surrender to Antiochus,[83] but not before all the Greek inhabitants had been killed.

Some time after this episode Antiochus seems to have made peace and an alliance with Phriapites:[84] we know nothing about its terms, but it is likely that the Parthian king had to pledge himself to recognise Antiochus as king and to assume the status of a vassal. It may be the case that the terms also included the provision of troops or finance.[85]

Antiochus' next objective was Bactria whoseruler, since shortly after 230, had been Euthydemus, a Greek from Magnesia. He had apparently displaced Diodotus II, the sonof Diodotus I who had seceded originally, and may have done so in a coup whose implications have fascinated scholars.[86] Euthydemus told Antiochus, when terms were discussed at a later stage, that he was not a rebel (against the Seleucids) but had only obtained possessionof Bactria by destroying the descendants of those who <u>had</u> revolted (viz. the Diodotids).[87] We may, and scholars do, conjecture whether Euthydemus took this action because Diodotus II had been allied to Parthia; and it was a view, expressed long ago by Rawlinson[88], that Bactria constituted a serious potential hazard to the emerging Parthian nation as well as to the Seleucids, and that it may have been the Parthian king who suggested this Bactrian campaign to Antiochus. Parthia had nothing to lose either way, as an alliance with either neighbour would strengthen her hand against the other. It is, I think, true that the Seleucid <u>casus belli</u> against Bactria was much stronger than that against Parthia. The Bactrians were Greek and could be

regarded as traitors by Antiochus III and his army. We have only fragmentary information from Polybius upon this campaign, the rest of his account having been lost, and so must draw conclusions, where they are required, from inadequate evidence.

Euthydemus' cavalry forces faced Antiochus on the banks of the Arius (Hari Rud) possibly about 80 m. east of the modern Meshed in what Polybius calls Tagouria, and Tarn terms 'Tapuria',[89] where there must have been a settlement, to which Antiochus set siege, three days march from the river. He very soon raised the siege, and went forward with his cavalry to the river where he managed to get most of his horsemen over to the other side before Euthydemus, who had withdrawn for the night, attacked. In the sharp action which followed, Antiochus' cavalry, led by Antiochus himself and his own bodyguard of 2000 horsemen, managed to break Euthydemus' first squadron of horse . And Panaetolus with the rest of the Seleucid cavalry turned the narrow victory into something of a rout as the Euthydemid cavalry retreated to their camp having lost the majority of their number. Antiochus was wounded in the engagement, but earned a high reputation among his troops for courage.[90] Euthydemus and his army then retreated through Aria to Bactra (Zariaspa) to which city Antiochus promptly laid siege, in 208.[91] The siege appears to have lasted for about two years to 206, and was raised eventually by Antiochus following an agreement managed by Teleas, whose main point was that the common safety of both Antiochus and Euthydemus was in danger from the nomadic tribes on the borders of Euthydemus' kingdom. Antiochus saw the force of these arguments, and agreed to a peace treaty ratified by Euthydemus' son Demetrius to whom Antiochus promised to give a daughter in marriage. Euthydemus was officially recognised as king and Antiochus took possession of at least some of Euthydemus' elephants.[92]

Thus equipped, Antiochus went forward over the Hindu-Kush from Bactria, which is properly the country between the Hindu-Kush and the Oxus, and down into the Punjab, perhaps consciously traversing Alexander's route, but at all events renewing his alliance with the local ruler who had fallen

heir to that part of Asoka's great empire.[93] This prince was Subhagesena (Sophagasenus), possibly the son of Virasena, himself a sonof Asoka,[93a] and Polybius represents this as a renewal of an amity which had previously existed - which it certainly had under Seleucus Nicator and Chandragupta the Maurya. But there is room for doubt whether Antiochus, who evidently detailed Androsthenes tocollect tribute from this ally and went off with still more elephants, now numbered at 150,[94] took anything more than an expedient interest in such a συμμαχία. But we are nowhere told that Antiochus had to campaign against him, or that such terms were the substance of a peace treaty, as Schmitt seems to imply;[95] but this writer's view that Seleucid influence on the east of the empire,following Antiochus'subsequent withdrawal from India,waned is surely correct, and is borne out by events in India as well as by Seleucid operations in the west.[96]

Antiochus did not delay in India , but turned west again through Arachosia (which had been Mauryan territory at the time of Asoka) and so over the river Erymanthus (Helmand?) through Drangiana and Carmania with apparently much less discomfort than that experienced by Alexander.[97] He arrived with his army at Seleucia on Tigris in 205, having covered himself with gloryand a good deal of credibility. Following his return Antiochus sailed down the Tigris and the Persian Gulf to the port of Gerrha so as to be able to control trade there; but he did not annex it, being satisfied with tribute, no doubt necessitated by thecosts of his recent expedition. Antiochus took the title of 'the Great' at Seleucia in 205, and can be thought of as the 'restitutor orbis', but all such phrases about him require clarification.

In judging the results of Antiochus III's eastern expedition, it depends on what criteria one is making an assessment. As a military campaign of lasting territorial significance it was not great; it was conducted after Arsacid Parthia and Euthydemid Bactria had consolidated their own boundaries, and these countries were both now too strong to be conquered in the accepted sense of the term. What Antiochus had done was to stabilise

conditions in the east: he had by his de facto (and de iure) recognition of Bactria strengthened Hellenism in that part of Asia, and had helped the Parthian state to a firmer hold upon its own recent accessions. Bactria was confirmed in its status, and <u>that</u> was the value to the panhellenic cause which Antiochus' expedition conferred. It did give to Bactria legitimacy, and the removal of the Seleucid threat may have released that energy which was certainly to enable Bactria's impending conquests to the north and China through the Waikhan corridor,[98] and to the south and east in the reign of Demetrius I. Antiochus, in that he failed tocrush Parthia, enabled it to recover to a position where it was a threat as much to the Seleucid state asto the Bactrian kingdom: but he is not to be held responsible for events he could not have foreseen, and his achievement in the east was not that he restored Alexander's world but that he restored his own.[99]

Shortly after Antiochus' return from his eastern campaign, Ptolemy IV, the victor of Raphia, died leaving his kingdom to his son Ptolemy V Epiphanes who was then a young boy. Polybius carries in Book XV, a graphic account of the palace revolt which ensued in which Ptolemy's wife Arsinoe was murdered; and Agathocles and Sosibius, Ptolemy IV's energetic ministers, seem also to have been killed at about that time. The situation presented Egypt's enemies, and in particular Macedonia and the Seleucid state, with a chance to corrupt Egyptian schemes at a time when Egypt was not in a position to counter such a threat. A native revolt, probably consequent on the new status of the Egyptians recognised in the phalanx at Raphia, broke out at about that time, and there was no strong government to deal with internal or external emergencies. It is probably too easy to see in Polybius' account[100] a coordinated bi-partisan policy by Philip V and Antiochus III, even when Polybius goes to considerable lengths to draw long-range strategic conclusions about Rome's future dealings with Philip and Antiochus from this situation. Appian (Macedonica 4) and Jerome (Commentary on Daniel) also carry brief accounts of the 'alliance', as does Livy who here depends on

Polybius.[101] The problem with this narrative is that the alleged partition never actually took place, despite the extremely propitious circumstances. Antiochus did begin a fifth Syrian War in 201 with an invasion of Coele-Syria, but this was, as we know, simply a continuation of hostilities he had already been involved in. That he carried it to a successful conclusion, with a resounding victory over the Ptolemaic general Scopas at Panium near the headwaters of the Jordan in Galilee in 200, is not in dispute; but it is not evidence of Macedonian collusion. Peace was duly signed after that defeat, by which Coele Syria was finallyceded to the Seleucids, and Ptolemy presently married Antiochus' daughter Cleopatra I in about 195. It is also interesting that Philip, who subsequently invaded Pergamene territory (not Ptolemaic) in Asia Minor, was not supported by Zeuxis, who was now the Seleucid satrap of Lydia.[102] In204 Philip V was at large in the Aegean but was committed against Rhodes: it is also true that Philip had been approached by the Egyptians themselves at that stage with an offer of Epiphanes' marriage to one of Philip's daughters, (Pol. XV, 25) and a request for Macedonian help with hostilities against Antiochus, which were as we know shortly to commence. The activitiesof Philip against Seleucid foundations in the interior of Caria at Stratonicea and Alabanda do not inspire confidence in his relationship with the current Seleucid court.

What is important about this 'personal relationship' between Antiochus and Philip is that Rome, recovering after the Second Punic War, was led to believe that the relationship existed - which may be why Polybius relates it as he does.[103] Antiochus' eastern expedition had ensured that Rome would take notice of him, before his impending involvement with the Aetolian League led to outright conflict - and Philip was already the object of (justified) hostility by Pergamum, to whom Rome was allied in any case. War never took over where evidence was lacking.[104]

Notes for Chapter III.

1. As it was, the Seleucids probably had to draw on Media for cavalry and on the other provinces for infantry and provisions. S. K. Eddy is surely right in seeing in this a reason for Median resentment of the Seleucid king: 'The King is Dead', Lincoln, NA., 1961, p. 98.

2. Polybius V, 10.

3. E. Will points out that there are two accounts of Achaeus' appointment to the command in Asia Minor: IV, 48 and V, 40, in the writings of Polybius. The first is much fuller, and places the reasons for Achaeus' autonomy squarely on the success gained against Pergamum: 'Les premières Années du regne d'Antiochos III', REG, 1962, LXXV, p. 74.

4. Polybius V, 42 sets out the manner in which Hermaeus sought to intrigue against the king in order to assert his own power.

5. Polybius V, 41.

6. There is a bronze double of 'Apollo with flowing locks' inscribed ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ ΜΟΛΩΝΟΣ and showing a nike with palm branch from the Ecbatana mint. Newell ESM, p. 204. As Newell points out on p. 205, bronze issues tended to survive Seleucid attempts to efface the new coinage.

7. E. T. Newell: 'Eastern Seleucid Mints', p. 161.

8. H. C. Schmitt: Untersuchungen, p. 68.

9. Schmitt is a great deal more cautious about this. His careful evaluation of passages in Justin and Strabo, which we noted in our previous chapter, only partly apply to the situationas it stood at Antiochus' accession, I think. He says (Op. cit., p. 76) that nothing can be inferred about the position in the east of Iran in the 30s and 20s of the third century.

10. H. C. Schmitt: Op. cit., p. 77, n.1.

11. Polybius V, 79. J. Wolski in Klio, 1960, p. 118 and 119.

12. Livy XXXVII, 40.

13. J. Wolski in Klio, 1960, p. 119.

14. Polybius V, 43.

15. Ibid.

16. By S. K. Eddy in 'The King is dead', p. 98.

17. F. W. Walbank on Polybius V, 43 (Walbank I, p. 573). On Seleucia-Zeugma there is a good monograph by Jorg Wagner, Wiesbaden, 1976. The site had been established as being at the village of Belkis.

18. See in particular the inscription from Laodicea-in-Media (Nihavend) referred to elsewhere in this work in several places and printed in the Appendix.

19. Mithridates I had siezed the throne in 302 as Lord of Pontius (Strabo XII, 562).

20. PolybiusV, 44.

21. Underestimated in recent research, e.g. in Pedech: 'Deux campagnes d'Antiochos III' in REA, 1958, LX, pt. II, p. 67 f. where there is no mention of this incident.

23. Polybius V, 45 suggests strongly that Polybius did not believe Hermaeus' rather lame excuse for this diversion of Antiochus to the Syrian theatre of operations because he goes on to point out that Antiochus was in Hermaeus' power (V .45 ,7)

24. Polybius V, 48.

25. Polybius V, 48. Walbank makes Europos = Dura Europos on the northern Euphrates, and he notes that the absence of coins of Molon there 'can hardly be taken as evidence that Molon did not occupy the town' (Walbank I, p. 579). Onthis rapid campaign this view is surely right. Dura is probably the modern village of Imam Dur according to Walbank I, p. 579.

26. Polybius V, 51.

27. As Walbank points out (p. 580) only the king could actually take decisions: the council advised only.

28. Polybius V, 51.

29. Polybius V, 50. E. Will notes that a revolt of troops from Cyrrhestice in opposition to the schemes of Hermaeus (Pol. V, 50) contributed to Epigenes' death as they had been in favour of Epigenes' accompanying the expedition, and so could be regarded as Epigenes' responsibility. REG. LXXV, 1962, p. 101.

30. Polybius V, 51.

31. Possibly Libana, 28 miles east of Hatra, (Walbank I, p. 581).

32. P. Pedech in REA LX, 1958, p. 73. Polybius V, 52.

33. Polybius V, 54.

34. Walbank believes that this place is Holuan, to the east of Apollonaitis (p. 583). Polybius V, 54.

35. Polybius V, 56.

36. E. Bickermann: 'Institutions des Seleucides', p. 166 (Walbank I, p. 571).

37. Polybius V, 41.

38. Polybius V, 48.

39. Polybius V, 57. Walbank I, p. 584.

40. Polybius V, 57.

41. E.g. Between:

42. Polybius V, 58 and 59. Walbank I, p. 585.

43. Polybius V. 60.

44. Polybius V, 61. Walbank cites the stele of Pithom which states that Ptolemy IV made an agreement with Antiochus after Raphia two years and two months after the treason of the generals, which gives us a date for Theodotus' defection of about August, 219.

45. Polybius V, 62 and 63.

46. Polybius V, 63.

47. Polybius has Δουελ . Walbank quotes Reiske on the correct reading of Δῶελ and enables us to pinpoint Dor as the town in question. Walbank I (V. 66), p. 592.

48. Polybius V, 66. E. Will denies that Polybius says this: 'Les Premieres Annees', p. 125.

49. Polybius V, 66.

50. Diodorus Siculus.

51. Polybius V, 70.

52. In his substantial comments on the alliance which Polybius says existed between Achaeus and the Egyptians, E. Will points out that in doing what he did in Asia Minor Achaeus will have posed a greater threat to Lagid interests than to Seleucid in that he would have threatened the security of Egyptian possessions on the Asia Minor coast. The differing views of Walbank (Vol. I re Pol. IV, 48, 12) and Will (Op. cit) who respectively see collusion and no collusion between Achaeus and the Egyptians is set out and analysed in Will's paper, p. 127. The burden of his argument is that Polybius nowhere provides evidence for what he claims is an alliance.

53. Polybius V, 71.

54. By Theodotus the Aetolian in Polybius V, 81.

55. Polybius V, 86.

56. Polybius ibid.

57. Polybius presents Antiochus as thoroughly alarmed about Achaeus and as anxious to conclude terms with Ptolemy so as to face Achaeus, the real enemy (V, 87).

58. Polybius V, 107.

59. Polybius V, 105.

60. Polybius V, 110.

61. Polybius VII, 9. Livy XXIII, 33 - 39.

62. Polybius VII, 15 - 18.

63. Polybius tells of the eventual capture of Achaeus and the treachery of Bolis, who had been hired by the Egyptians to rescue Achaeus, in some detail in sections 15 to 23 - indicating the importance with which Achaeus was viewed by his contemporaries - and by Polybius.

64. Polybius VIII, 25.

65. Polybius ibid.

66. Arrian Parthica Fr. 1 (Syncellus' transmission).

67. Strabo XI, 13, 6.

68. Strabo XI, 9, 1. Excavations began in 1970, and were in progress when I visited the site in 1974. They have been published in the various issues if IRAN since that date, and the Parthian Tel has been dealt with in David Stronach's article in IRAN 1977, the last report we have. We should note P. A. Brunt's caveats on this site. Loeb Arrian, Vol. I, Appendix VIII, p. 497 (1976) o/

69. J. Wolski in 'Arsaces II et la genealogie des premiers Arsacides' (Historia XI, 1962, p. 138 ff) wishes Phriapites, as against (e.g.) Nelson Debevoise in 'The Political History of Parthia' who sees other problems in our tradition, but not this one. Trogus Pomp. XLI Prol. is the passage in question. On balance Phriapites seems preferable (XLI, 5, 8): Wolskihas, in various other works cited, made a very good case for the credibility of the Justin-Trogus tradition, which I accept and which is now almost the 'communis opinio'.

70. Wolski (op. cit) p. 143. Justin nowhere implies that he was the son of Arsaces II.

71. Polybius IX, 43.

72. Appian: Syriaca I, 1.

73. Polybius X, 27. S. K. Eddy in 'The king is dead' spells out the serious consequences of this act for native attitudes to the Seleucids.

74. Justin XLI, 5, 7.

75. Isidore: Mans. Parth. 7 - 8. Polybius mentions this town in X, 31, 15: see Aymard in REA LX, 1958, p. 74, n.1. Polybius X, 28, 2 refers to the line of quanats at the foot of the Elburz, plainly visible still in that area.

76. P. Pedech in REA LX, 1958, p. 75. Arrian: Anabasis III, 23, 2.

77. Polybius X, 29 f.

78. Polybius X, 29, 3.

79. Polybius X, 30.

80. Pedech in REA. LX, 1958, p. 79. Polybius X, 30, 9 - 31, 3.

81. Polybius X, 31, 5. Various views exist on the location of Tambrax. The positionis discussed by Pedech on p. 79 of his article. Marquart placed it near to Sari on the modernroad from Meshed to Teheran just to the south of the Caspian, and Pedech thinks it unlikely because it is between the Elburz and the Caspian and would 'shut in' the Parthians whose natural habitat was 'the vast spaces to the east of the Caspian', and because it was too far from the scene of the rally which immediately preceded the pitching of tents (κατεσκηνωσεν) in front of Tambrax - which must therefore be further up into the Elburz. Similar attempts have been made to locate Syrinx, but again only approximations have been obtained.

82. Polybius X, 31, 8 On Merv see generally Ch. Exc. p. 225. A possibility is that Syrinx may be sited at Turang Tepe near Astrabad.

83. Polybius X, 31, 6 - 13.

84. Justin XLI, 5. 7.

85. Justin ibid. The suggestion about the pledges is H. Bentgson's in Strategie II, p. 61; and is noted inpassing by H. C. Schmitt in Untersuchungen, p. 63, who also suggests that the Parthian may have kept his title of king.

86. E.g. Rawlinson in Bactria, 1912 (reissue 1970), p. 66 - 67, and recently in H. C. Schmitt Op. cit, p. 65.

87. Polybius XI, 39, 2.

88. Rawlinson: Bactria, p. 66.

89. Polybius X, 49, 1 W. W. Tarn: Seleucid-Parthian Studies, Br. Acad. London 1930, p. 24, insists on 'Tagouria' not ταπουρίαν

90. Polybius X, 49.

91. The northern route at present used goes from Herat (Alexandria-in-Aria) to Balkh (Bactra) via Sheberghan and Maimana, about 300 miles as the crow flies.

92. I do not see that we are committed to a view of an anti-nomad alliance by the terms of this treaty, of which we have only a scant summary. Polybius does speak of a συμμαχία (X, 39, 10), but I think we can note (as does Schmitt, op. cit. p. 66) that the terms were moderate - though we are not told how far Seleucid morale and strength had been sapped by the long siege - and that this could be seen as a conclusion favourable to Euthydemus. Although Schmitt says (p. 66) that there was no (Bactrian) contingent in Antiochus' army later on in his reign, there was one in the Seleucid forces in Demetrius II's army (Justin XXXVI, 1, 4). The interesting American excavations at Balkh-Bactra are described by Rodney Young in AJA 1959, p. 267 f., and the French observations are set out by Daniel Schlumberger in Syria XXVI, p. 173 f. The total area of the tel and its surrounding wall is huge.

93. Polybius XI, 34, 11 - 12.

94. Polybius XI, 34, 11. R. Tharpar in 'Asoka and the decline of the Mauryas', p. 181 f. doubts the relationship between Virasena and Asoka.

95. H. C. Schmitt: Untersuchungen, p. 67.

96. H. C. Schmitt: ibid.

97. Polybius XI, 34, 12. The Asoka Inscriptions from Kandahar (both of them) are described in the Appendix.

98. Strabo XI, 11, 1.

99. Schmitt points out (p. 82) that nothing prevents us from believing that there were still satraps in e.g. Drangiana and Arachosia who had remained more or less loyal to the Seleucids; and that his troops actually set up winter quarters in Carmania, (Polybius XI, 34, 12).

100. Polybius III, 2, 8.

101. Jerome's material is preserved in Jacoby, Fr..Gr. Hist. II, 1224. Livy relates the events patchily in XXXI, 14, 5. The whole issue is sorted out with great clarity by David Magie in 'The agreement between Philip V and Antiochus III for the partition of the Egyptian Empire.' JRS 29, 1939, p. 32 f.

102. Magie, Op. cit, p. 33.

103. It is entirely possible that Polybius reflects a Roman view of this alleged alliance, particularly because he treats Philip and Antiochus in Book XV (20, 2) as rulers who got their just deserts. And Romans, in the wake of the Second Punic War, were apt to deduce threatening behaviour from ordinary diplomatic contact and to conjure up alliances.

CHAPTER IV

Antiochus III and the West

Simply because of the increasing involvement of Rome in Greek affairs, some attention has to be paid, in a work dealing predominantly with the eclipse of Greek power in the east, to relations between Rome and the Greek states a good deal further west, because the effects of Roman action upon the Seleucid, Ptolemaic and Macedonian Kingdoms could not be isolated from Seleucid activities in the orient. Many attempts have been made to trace the progress of relations between the hellenistic states, in particular the Seleucid state and Macedon, and the growing power of Rome.[1] During the Hannibalic War Rome's own resources had been greatly stretched, and not until the defeat of Hannibal's reinforcements at the Battle of the Metaurus in 207 (Pol. XI, 1 - 3), could Roman fortunes in that contest really be said to have changed. It is not our purpose to deal in depth with Rome, as our concern is with the Greeks in what was to them (and not to the Romans) 'the East'; but some notice has to be taken of Roman politics at the point at which the Seleucid thrust westwards and the Roman probing eastwards met each other. In general terms this can be dated to the end of the third century, and its locus classicus is the Battle of Magnesia which seems to mark a watershed in both Roman and Seleucid affairs. We must therefore examine the events which led up to this.

Surrounding this confrontation, however, were the relationships which existed between the various hellenistic states themselves, and their connection in turn with the Aetolian and Achaean Leagues in mainland Greece. Rome's Illyrian Wars had involved her, before Hannibal became a serious menace, in the politics of north-western Greece; and the first of four Macedonian Wars grew out of Rome's awareness of Greek states with which her arch-enemy Hannibal might make alliances. That she did indeed have grounds

for such a fear is attested by Polybius.[2] Before he died at the court of another Hellenistic king, Prusias of Bithynia, Hannibal had been a guest at the court of Antiochus; and the idea of an anti-Roman coalition, certainly in the years following Magnesia, was never far below the surface.[3] To what extent Rome's subsequent actions can rightly be ascribed to 'preventative imperialism', and how much to territorial (and political) greed, depends partly upon one's interpretation of Polybius (not always as pro-Roman as he often seems), and partly upon the extent to which we are entitled by hindsight to read into Roman policy at the time motives which it seems to us to have had, but which at the time may have been the result of fear and expediency rather than long-range strategic intention.[4] However the manner in which Livy describes[5] the army and the defeat of Antiochus leads one to agree with C. B. Welles' comment that 'it is pure humbug when Roman historians smugly justify Rome's occupation of the hellenistic east on the ground that these states had 'failed'. Their primary failure consisted in their inability to defeat the Roman legions.'[6]

An extraordinary piece of strategic thinking led Philip V to attack the Romans during their war against Hannibal (apparently on the advice of Demetrius of Pharos) when the Romans were reeling after their defeat at Lake Trasimene. The move, attributed by Polybius to Philip's ambition,[7] was ignominiously foiled while Philip's forces were at sea with no actual hostilities being entered into: but the preparations and the embarkation had been reported to the Romans, and a casus belli had been established by the Romans which they could later use.[8] In 215 Philip offered an alliance to Hannibal.[9]

The first Macedonian War which began in 214 led to an alliance[9a] between Rome and the Aetolian League in 212 which took Rome into the sphere of Greek home politics, and Philip, without naval reinforcements from Carthage, was unable to compel the Romans to evacuate their possessions in Illyria. Rome therefore was in territorial and political contact with

Greece, and in a position to build upon this influence. Although the prevailing view among historians[9b] is that further conquest was not at that point anticipated (or desired?) by Rome, her future actions had a way of building upon these two areas of contact which leaves the suspicion that they were bridgeheads, and not merely the result of expedient arrangements.[10] Polybius even sets out this chain of consequences in terms of a policy of world domination: 'I regard the war with Antiochus as deriving its origin from that with Philip, the latter resulting from that with Hannibal, and the Hannibalic war as a consequence of that about Sicily (the first Punic War), the intermediate events, however many and various their character, all tending to the same purpose.'[11] It is possible that Polybius saw Philip as the one who was waging war with a policy of world domination in mind[12], and that Rome - in Polybius' eyes at any rate - saw itself in the role of guardian of Greek freedom against the various varieties of Macedonian expansionism. That is certainly how Flamininus presented himself at the Isthmian Games in 196. But we are left with the impression that Philip was heavily encouraged, in the instances we have looked at, by Demetrius of Pharos - who had advocated precisely the expedition to Italy which Rome could most easily claim as provocation against her.[13] What we may not go on to say is whether, left to himself, Philip would or could have entertained such imperialist schemes. And Polybius' rationalization of Rome's progress to domination in the eastern Mediterranean at this stage and later is that it has been destined by τυχή for Rome to achieve that dominance:[14] Polybius cannot therefore reasonably claim, on that basis, that her eventual annexation of the Greek mainland was the result of anything else, even Philip V's action. That would go some way to explaining Flamininus' actions as a would-be Philhellene in his negotiations with the Aetolians (his allies) and eventually with Philip and then with the other Greek states. Flamininus himself strikes us as a smooth negotiator aware of Greek intentions and disposed to misinterpret them in a way likely to benefit Rome. That even the senate was wary of him seems

indicated in Livy by the appointment of additional legates for Macedonia, when Flamininus was prorogued for 197, in Publius Sulpicius Galba and Publius Villius who had been consuls in that province.[15] The Aetolians, for example, loyal allies of Rome in the first Macedonian war, appear to have been excluded from territorial gains at the peace signed in 206 by them, and in 205 at Phoenice by the Romans. In that the Romans ceded to Philip some of the Adriatic coastline, Philip could be said to have come out of the first Macedonian war with success.

The second Macedonian war, which Flamininus was to use to stake Rome's claim to be the protector of the Greek states from the designs of Philip, took place from 200 until 194, and came about very largely as the result of atrocities committed by Philip in the Aegean and its coastlands in the years since 205, which had antagonised and embittered relations between him and the islands, as well as bringing him into direct conflict with both Rhodes and Pergamum. This represents a complete change of policy by him, and of the attitude taken by the Greek states towards him, since his position at the Peace of Naupactus, when he could even be looked upon as the protector of Greek states against Rome.[16] And it must be that he brought this change upon himself: he had enabled Rome to take his role of 'protector' from him. Most unfortunately his antagonism towards Rhodes (partly understandable, in view of Rhodes' attack on Crete in which Philip had an interest as 'prostates' of part of the island)[17] effectively let Rhodes slip into the Roman camp.

Rome itself was about to come to a final military account with Hannibal in north Africa, and would thereafter be able to take an interest in Eastern Mediterranean affairs unfettered by her long struggle with Carthage. It was a moment for the hellenistic world to note and act upon. The indications that some such alliance, between Philip and Antiochus, did take place are provided, as we noted in the last chapter, by Polybius in the third book as well as in the fifteenth book (XV, 20, 2f.). Both Appian in his Macedonica (4) and Livy in Book XXXI echo such an agreement, but almost

certainly rely on Polybius, as Livy so often does. The question which concerns us, as we proceed gradually to note Antiochus III's increasing involvement in the Mediterranean, is whether the agreement ever actually came into effect in the terms in which it is described.[18] And as we pointed out in another context in the last chapter, we are bound to say that it did not,[19] and that there was no actual partition of the Ptolemaic realm, conceived in these terms; what does seem to have happened is that Philip's raids in the Aegean, to which we have referred above, were extended to impinge upon Ptolemaic possessions, for example in Samos and Caria; and Antiochus did indeed invade Coele-Syria eventually after winning the battle of Panium against the Ptolemaic general Scopas in 200: but this as we know was a long-cherished Seleucid objective, and had already been attempted, and not accomplished, by Antiochus III both before and after the revolt of Molon. The activities coincided, to be sure, but as Magie clearly shows, they were not orchestrated to do so: so the mention in Justin XXX, 2, 8, is incorrect as well - although here there is probably no dependence upon Polybius.

Ptolemy Epiphanes' actual accession has been the subject of debate. We have 4th day of Xandikos (April) from the Rosetta Stone[20] as the date of the inscription, and this refers to Epiphanes' ninth year, and to a ceremony carried out at Memphis to commemorate the coronation of the king. The Rosetta inscription itself records an anniversary which seems itself to have fallen on 27/28 November 197[21] when Ptolemy was eight years of age, which would give 205 as the year of his birth: there seems no objection to a date of 204 for the death of Philopator although Polybius sees 203/2 as the year in which Epiphanes was proclaimed king.[22] What the decree does itself show conclusively is the degree to which Ptolemy or/and his advisors had attempted to placate the Egyptian national cause, and its religious arm, since coming to the throne, and if this shows the wisdom of the Ptolemaic administration at the time it also suggests the size of the problem they were dealing with, and might indicate also their lack of muscle in the handling of overseas possessions in Asia Minor leading to Philip's successes

in that area. But it is not evidence for the likelihood of a Macedonian-Seleucid pact, even if the results were similar.[23] It is interesting, in passing, to note that among the benefits said in the decree to have been conferred by Ptolemy upon Egypt (in the second section) is the 'despatch of troops by sea and land against the enemies of Egypt' (No. 11)[24].

Philip had actually been asked for a marriage alliance by Agathocles, the Ptolemies' chief minister, under Philopator, and this was renewed under the young Epiphanes, as security and ἐπιγαμία in the event of a war with Antiochus - which, as Magie points out, is more evidence against a Seleucid-Macedonian pact.[25] The position of Philip was to change critically following the capture and destruction of Chios in 202, as this led to the Aetolian League asking for assistance from Rome,[26] and to Rhodes declaring war on Philip. Philip was presently to be seriously defeated by the combined navies of Pergamum and Rhodes in a naval battle off Chios, although he was able to reverse this with a victory over Rhodes at Lade (Pol. XV, 1 - 8). Rome was aroused, even in her war-weary situation at the close of the Zama campaign in 202, by the two dangerous powers of Philip and Antiochus - her intelligence sources may have told her that the Ptolemies had a native revolt on their hands as well as a very young monarch - and Polybius (XVI, 25, 2) recounts the embassy which carried the senate's ultimatum to Philip; and Justin says that it visited both Antiochus and Philip (XXX, 3, 3) to warn them, according to Appian (Mac. 4, 2), against aggression.[27]

Pergamum's action in appealing to Rome was probably a natural reaction to the threatening behaviour of Philip. Rome was not demonstrating territorial claims on any part of Asia Minor, and must have seemed the best kind of strong ally. Philip rejected the senate's call to refrain from war and to compensate Attalus, and Rome took the inevitable step of declaring war, having first seen that her demands of Philip were well known among the Greek states. The political statements were orchestrated so as to present Rome in the role of liberator, and it is not enough to describe the Greek states as at

that time simply 'objects of concern'.[28] Philip's activities had played into Rome's hands and she had taken appropriate action.

The war began in 200 with a Roman expeditionary force landing in Greece and campaigns from 200 to 198 occupy Polybius' 17th book. During this period Philip had suffered severe reverses, including the decision of the Aetolian League in 199 to join the Roman side. In the Autumn of 198 a truce was arranged between Philip and the Romans under Flamininus,[29] partly at least owing to the fact that Philip's own energetic conduct of the war had foiled the aspirations of the various alliances which Rome had engineered against him. At the conference which ensued at the instigation of Epirote ambassadors, Flamininus ordered Philip to evacuate the whole of Greece, evidently for the sake of the Greek cities themselves:[30] it was a direction which Flamininus could not possibly have expected Philip to obey, and hostilities were resumed. Drawing attention to the time which Philip seems to have been allowed by Flamininus to regroup, Badian points out that the Roman policy seems to have been not so much to win a war in Macedonia (by invading it) as to win Greece;[30a] but even in this he was hindered by the crushing military force with which Roman campaigns seem then to have been conducted. Galba's operations, noted in Livy (XXVIII, 7, 5) and (XXXI, 23, e.g:) in the context of the first Macedonian War, had been characterised by this extreme ruthlessness. Not even Flamininus had been able to avoid harsh measures against Eretria, Carystus and parts of Thessaly; and all this compared unfavourably with the policy which Flamininus had declared at Aous in June, 198.[31] As Badian puts it: 'If Greece was to be destroyed (by the Romans) it would find little profit in being liberated from Philip'.[32] By this time the Achaean League had also joined the war on the Roman side under threat of blockade by the Roman, Rhodian and Pergamene fleets.

At the conference of Nicaea we understand that Philip was to hand over Pharsalus and Larissa to the Aetolians, Corinth and Argos to the Achaeans, and the Peraea to Rhodes. The Romans, interestingly, were to retain the

their bridgehead in Illyria.[33] In the agreement that was reached, about which there is a good deal of discussion, it is difficult to decide what Philip himself received, but there is a good deal of support for Holleaux' view that Philip should be allowed to keep 'le plupart de ses anciennes dependances helleniques'.[34] The issue as to whether he should evacuate or be allowed to keep the 'fetters' of Greece, i.e., Demetrias, Chalcis and the Acrocorinth, is critical, as it was used when the terms of the negotiations were referred to the senate at Rome as a point which would mean war if Philip refused to evacuate them. He did refuse - or, rather, the Macedonian envoys said they had no instructions: (Pol. XVIII, 11, 13) - and the negotiations were declared closed by the senate. Flamininus was then able to continue the war to its finish, and to win the gloria and auctoritas which not only he but the senatorial class was beginning increasingly to covet.[35] Although here it is in point to note with Badian that 'the fact that we do not admire such conduct gives us no justification for assuming, as self-evident, that Flamininus and his friends would be ashamed of it'.[36]

I have dwelt on this issue in the Second Macedonian War because I believe it to be important and indeed critical for our assessment of Roman policy in these years generally, and in particular as far as Antiochus III is concerned, with whom Philip was frequently said to be allied either by Rome's allies or by Rome. As the Second Macedonian War passed on from the conference table to the decisive battle at Cynoscephalae in Thessaly in the campaigning season of 197, the issue of Macedonia and her relationship to Rome becomes clearer. A straight set-piece battle was fought in which the phalanx was at first successful and then, hampered by its own inherent inflexibility, was cut to pieces by the more manoeverable legions. Flamininus subsequently acted in what seems a statesmanlike manner over the question of terms, and these were that Philip should confine himself to Macedonia proper, that his fleet should be confiscated, and that he should pay an indemnity of 1000 talents: (Appian, Mac. 2; Pol. XVIII, 44): Roman troops were removed

from Demetrias, Chalcis and the citadel of Corinth in 194 after Flamininus had carried out a process of rationalization on the Greek mainland, including conceding to the Aetolian League Phocis and the western half of Thessaly which they had claimed were proper to their previous conquests. As for the dispute between the Achaeans and Sparta under Nabis over Argos' defection to Philip, Flamininus was able to induce the Greek cities to brand Nabis as a tyrant rather than the social revolutionary which he really was. A siege of Sparta by this collective force followed, and Nabis made peace (195).

At the end of his eighteenth book Polybius looks at Antiochus' progress through Asia Minor, and it will be useful to return to our study of his rule at this point. Polybius prepares his readers, in a small section which survives from Book XV, for a change in the fortunes of Antiochus by suggesting a change in the character of the king who now showed himself to be 'much inferior to his former self' and that he 'disappointed general expectation'.[37]

In 198, according to Livy, Antiochus was asked to withdraw his troops from Pergamene territory by the Senate at the request of Pergamum - which had, for good reasons (as it must have seemed) become allied to Rome in the face of Philip's and Antiochus' known power in the Aegean and the Asia Minor area since the death of Ptolemy IV. In this instance the senate addressed Antiochus as 'amicus', and Antiochus apparently did withdraw, as Livy indicates a Pergamene vote of thanks for this Roman support.[38] 198 found Antiochus preparing for his serious expedition into Asia Minor launched in the next year; but 197 was dominated by the battle of Cynoscephalae, and this meant a reconsideration of the position in which Philip should be viewed. To Asia Minor states fearing a combination of Antiochus and Philip the suspected alliance could no longer be a threat, and Rhodes at any rate seems to have changed its attitude to Antiochus.[39]

Polybius speaks of Antiochus' wish to get to Ephesus, but it is Polybius' comment that 'Ephesus is always a most favourable point of defence

against Europe for the kings of Asia':[40] in fact Antiochus seems to have taken it with Rhodian assistance, and to have spent the winter of 197-6 there.[41] The seeds of the war with Antiochus may be partly connected with this Rhodian change of position: it does seem, if we are to believe Polybius, that Antiochus' seaborne expedition to Asia Minor was the proximal cause of Flamininus' decision to make a quick peace with Philip, however lightly we may take Polybius' remark that Flamininus was afraid that if the war were allowed to drag on, Flamininus' successor would be the recipient of gloria and not he.[42] In the event the Isthmian Games of 196 were used by Flamininus, amid scenes of wild rejoicing, as the occasion for the proclamation announcing the defeat of Philip and the Macedonians, and proclaiming the freedom of Corinthians, Phocians, Locrians, Euboeans, Phthiotic Achaeans, Magnesians, Thessalians and Perrhaebians (a country to the north of Thessaly).[43]

The impression left by Flamininus' activities in Greece is that he did wish to dispose of the problem of mainland Greece in order to deal with Antiochus; and this objective, clearly stated by Polybius (XVIII, 39) does place the arrangements - and indeed the Isthmian Declaration itself - in a different light. It behoved Flamininus to placate and settle the west: he might need the Greeks there as allies. The Aetolians had already perceptively noted that what was happening in Greece was 'a readjustment of masters, and not the delivery of Greece out of servitude' (Pol. XVIII, 45, 6), a point to note about Polybius' standpoint when pushed to a decision.

The senatorial commission saw Antiochus' ambassadors after the Games, and ordered the king to keep his hands off the Asiatic poleis that were autonomous, and to withdraw from those which he had taken previously belonging to Egypt and to Philip: and the commissioners pointed out clearly that there was no need for Antiochus to cross to Europe as no one was being attacked there.[44] One member of the commission had warned Philip of the advisability of seeking an alliance (συμμαχία) with Rome in case he was persuaded to welcome Antiochus![45]

In the meanwhile Antiochus' advance proceeded, and cities were taken, although Rhodes and Lampsacus had to be circumvented.[46] Ambassadors were sent to Rome to argue that places he had occupied, mostly now in Thrace on the European side of the Hellespont, 'had always belonged to his ancestors':[47] this was shaky ground, as it depended how far back in time one was prepared to go - to Seleucus I? -, although Antiochus was quite in order to object to an instruction to remit tribute. The nub of the matter is put by Appian so: 'If Antiochus will leave the Greeks in Asia free and independent, and keep away from Europe, he can be the friend of the Roman people if he desires.'[48]

Ambassadorial exchanges took place between Hegesianax and Lysias acting for Antiochus and Lucius Cornelius on behalf of the Senate upon the issues at stake in territorial terms. And upon the issue of returning Asiatic possessions to Ptolemy V Antiochus brought out his trump card, and announced that 'a family alliance' was in prospect between him and Ptolemy.[49] In the meantime the future Seleucus IV was established as a governor of the new European sector of the Seleucid realm with a base at Lysimacheia.[50] As Badian says, the round had gone to Antiochus,[51] and as the envoys dispersed and Rome turned to deal with Nabis at Sparta, pressure built up for a move against Antiochus, led by Scipio, while Flamininus tried to turn Greek public opinion towards Rome more definitely by proposing the Roman evacuation of Greece.[52] Both viewpoints were ultimately designed to strengthen the influence of Rome in the Mediterranean world, and the concept of 'the freedom of Greece' was a useful and emotionally-charged tool in Flamininus' armoury when posing as its guardian. It is not clear to me that Greeks ever understood until it was too late, in 146 in the ruins of Corinth, what Rome regarded as its relationship with Greece. The Aetolians had seen that 'deditio in fidem' meant one thing to them and another thing to Flamininus.[53] And as for freedom, it was a quality for the Greeks and a state of affairs for the Romans, the eternal pragmatists. As Badian acutely observes, Flamininus 'took Greek public opinion as seriously as any Hellenistic ruler did, and in

this important respect he may indeed be called philhellenic.'[54]

It was of course natural that Greeks, who regarded their Aegean neighbours in Ionia as kinsfolk, which in many cases they were, should find the concept of freedom (viewed in Roman terms) extended to cover Ionia also - and so to impinge on territory that was already Seleucid in Asia Minor. Antiochus had already crossed the Hellespont as we saw in the spring of 196, and Madytus, Sestus and other towns had surrendered to him.[55]

The arrival of Hannibal at Antiochus' court in 195 raised fears at Rome that Hannibal was 'conspiring with Antiochus to foment war',[55a] and an embassy noting this was sent by the Roman senate to Carthage where the faction opposed to Hannibal's apparently successful financial reforms was determined to censure him. Scipio objected to this move as discreditable; and in view of the fact that there was substantial and knowledgeable disagreement about the sending of the embassy, we should beware of accepting that 'the arrival of Hannibal was no small factor in making up Antiochus' mind' to make war on Rome, as Livy says it was.[56] That would be to impute motives for which we have insufficient evidence.

Although Scipio Africanus was awarded a second consulship in 195, Antiochus did not immediately take up a belicose stance, and Flamininus was able to make his proposal that Roman troops should evacuate Greece into a fact. They left after becoming briefly involved in the affairs of Nabis at Sparta, and marched north withdrawing garrisons, as Livy tells us, from Demetrias, Chalcis and Corinth, and so through Thessaly to Oricum and on to Brundisium, frequently 'with all the citizens escorting (Flamininus).'[57] That this withdrawal was intended to be a substantial public relations exercise on the part of Flamininus is adequately indicated in the terms in which Livy notes Flamininus' speech at the assembly of the Greek states which he had convened, it seems, precisely for this purpose at Corinth in the Spring of 194 (LivyXXXIV, 48, 3). It is Balsdon's sympathetic article on Flamininus which goes so far as to note that Flamininus became with experience 'a harder and more cynical man.'[58] He was a born populist, it seems, but

saw clearly the requirements of Roman policy and worked to make them more easily realised in practice. It is the judgement of a more gentlemanly age which sees all, or most, of his schemes as base trickery.[59] It was Antiochus' task, on the other hand to have to be recognised as more of a Greek, or at least a Greek sympathizer, than the Roman could ever hope to be; in this Antiochus had the built-in handicap of being a Macedonian. It was to be Flamininus who ultimately won this psychological battle of oratory and political manipulation for the allegiance of mainland Greece. In Badian's apt phrase, he 'contributed to making the further expansion of Roman power technically much easier, as well as more acceptable to those who became subject to it.'[59a]

Antiochus followed his meeting with the Romans at Lysimacheia by making an alliance with the Galatian people - good material possibly for his army. Ariarathes of Cappadocia was betrothed to Antiochus' daughter Antiochis, and Cleopatra Syra another daughter went, as he had already announced, to Ptolemy Epiphanes with Coele Syria as a dowry.[60] A proposal of marriage for his remaining daughter to Eumenes of Pergamum was unfortunately rejected: and that was a desirable connection which Antiochus could not afford to miss. It was another pointer that affairs were going against him.

A conference took place in the next year in Rome between the senate's ten commissioners and Menippus and Hegesianax appearing for Antiochus, along with ambassadors from 'all Greece and a great part of Asia'. Flamininus took the opportunity to say that basically Antiochus must keep out of Europe and the Romans would keep out of Asia - to which Hegesianax retorted that Asia had never belonged to Rome - whereas the cities of Thrace and the Chersonnese had been won by Seleucus Nicator in fair fight with Lysimachus.[61] Appian tells us that the ultimatum of Flamininus was that Antiochus must evacuate Europe and 'free' the Greek cities of Asia.[62] If he did not, Flamininus went on to declare that Rome would liberate the Greeks from Antiochus as she had liberated them from Philip.[63] This shrewd exploitation of the known and long-standing antagonism between Greece and Macedon was

itself a directive which Antiochus could neither accept with honour nor reject without war.

Both Livy and Appian immediately go on to discuss the preparations for war as they concerned both Antiochus and Hannibal, and an inscription from Delphi records contacts made by Antiochus' ambassadors there on their way back to the king[64] in 193. The process of gathering allies for a struggle which both sides now knew to be imminent (because of the terms in which ultimata had been expressed) gathered momentum.[65] Already in the late Autumn of 194 the Aetolian League at a meeting in Naupactus had agreed to build a coalition against Rome which included (or was to include) Philip, Nabis of Sparta and now Antiochus.[66] By the summer of 193 a Roman Embassy was in Pergamum where Eumenes, with Roman allies, stood to gain in any encounter with Antiochus. As we have already noted, a marriage alliance between Eumenes and Antiochus had been rejected by Eumenes, and as we know from Livy (XXXV, 13, 5), Antiochus' son, on being sent to Syria as co-ruler, in the manner we have earlier observed the Seleucids using, died there.[67] It was not so much the grief, one may conjecture, as the instability that this unfortunate death might have produced which prevented Antiochus from continuing the conference with Villius at Apamea, a re-run (according to Livy) of the debate between Flamininus and Antiochus' ambassadors at Rome. We ought not, I think, to deduce that the Romans could not make any more concessions: the conference broke up for personal reasons which could not have been foreseen, and the Roman ambassador withdrew, not, we gather, because he had reached the end of his negotiations, but because, in the midst of widespread and evidently sincere mourning, he would have been 'incommodus'.[68] The source Livy used has Antiochus deciding on war at a council convened for the purpose, and conducted in inflammatory terms. As Badian points out, this is most unlikely to reflect the situation;[69] and the Romans at any rate proceeded with Flamininus' policy, and only reinforced the Achaeans against Nabis.[70]

Roman commissioners were meanwhile visiting Rome's allies to

ensure their loyalty: Athens, Chalcis and Thessaly were all visited, but there was some trouble at Demetrias, whose citizens found that they had been promised to Philip by the Romans in a secret deal in order to assure Rome of Philip's support. This was not the climate in which Rome could be seen as an ally to be warmly espoused. The length of Livy's narrative of this episode conveys plausibly its considerable importance. While Rome went about nervously reassuring potential or actual allies, the Aetolians received Antiochus' ambassador Menippus on a mission of solidarity which proclaimed that Antiochus would restore their freedom.[71] As Holleaux pointed out, the fear that Antiochus would win over both Philip and the Aetolians haunted Rome: one part of that alliance had now been sealed.[72] The Romans had succeeded in prising Philip away from an alliance with Antiochus, because, despite Philip's objections to the conduct of the decemviral commission, he still regretted Antiochus' seizure of what Philip saw as legitimate acquisitions in Asia Minor - and he accepted the Roman proposal in 196. The Roman expectation that Greece, now 'liberated' from Philip would be 'loyal' against Antiochus rested on a belief which shows the Romans to be a good deal less perceptive than their advocates lead us to believe. This expectation reckoned without the attitude that the Greek proletariat would take to Rome's conquest of Nabis, for instance - seen, as Holleaux points out,[73] as a defeat of the champion of the 'have-nots' by the champions of the 'haves'. Nothing else, it seems to me, could explain the accelerating hatred of Rome, accompanied by the impatient warlike intentions which characterised Aetolian behaviour, as we have pointed out, since the Roman defeat of Nabis in the spring of 192.[74]

Antiochus spent the summer of 192 in Thrace; and the Aetolian assembly decided to attack certain points in Greece in a softening-up operation to prepare the way for Antiochus and so to ensure that war could not be postponed any longer. The Aetolians under Thoas and Diocles accordingly attacked Chalcis and Demetrias while Alexamenus went to Sparta. Sparta and

Chalcis withstood Aetolian attacks but Demetrias fell to Aetolian troops:[75] at Sparta, the Aetolians, after being well-received by Nabis, assassinated him, which enabled Philopoemen to ensure that the Spartans, disgusted at Aetolian treachery, joined the rival Achaean League.

Demetrias was available to Antiochus as a base therefore in mainland Greece, but he did not occupy it until the Autumn of 192. As Badian points out, Livy accounts for the small force that Antiochus then brought over with him by relating how Thoas the Aetolian pleaded with Antiochus to send these ships, already committed to the support of Hannibal at Carthage, to Greece instead.[76] No doubt, as Holleaux pointed out,[77] Aetolian haste was for fear of Roman anger, but the plans of the allies were already dangerously out of phase, and the Aetolians regretted the paucity of Antiochus' forces, although these did enable him to take Euboea and some of Thessaly.[78] War had been begun, one hesitates to say 'declared', although Antiochus' hesitancy is underlined by the fact that in Asia Minor Smyrna, Lampsacus and Alexandria-Troas were still being besieged by Seleucid forces; presumably this was one reason why more could not be brought to Europe until later, and another reason for thinking that Antiochus had not intended this scrappy start to hostilities.

The first military conflict seems to have been the annihilation of a Roman detachment in the temple precinct of Apollo at Delium near Tanagra by Menippus and his Aetolians, which action was seen as a flouting of normal military convention, as according to Livy (XXXV, 51, 5), Rome had not declared war, although the Achaeans had (XXX, 50, 2),[79] Philip of Macedon decided for Rome, as he had been expected to since an Aetolian attempt to involve him in a coalition against Rome had failed in 193.[80] Antiochus had also alienated Philip by his own alliance with the Aetolians, and his very presence with force on Greek soil seems to have usurped a position that Philip, in other circumstances, would have wished to occupy.

The course of the war, with a major defeat of Antiochus at

Thermopylae, and its subsequent denouement at Magnesia, need not concern us in detail, although its consequences will. Antiochus seems to have found, as many would-be liberators have, that once landed with an army, the expected enthusiasm (and consequent indigenous reinforcements) either did not materialise or were paltry in comparison with what was required. Antiochus had to deal with, and suffer, the position he discovered; and it was very different from what he had been led to expect, and what he would need. The cheap victory won by Menippus at Delium had been a complete propaganda defeat for Antiochus, as Flamininus could and did point out.[80a] Livy's account of the preliminaries and first stages of the war in Book XXXV ends with Antiochus in charge of Euboea and the Romans evacuating the Euripus; Antiochus is in charge of Thessaly as far as Larissa.

The severity of the defeat at Thermopylae,[81] in which Antiochus lost virtually his entire army to a combined force under M' Acilius Glabrio and King Philip, was at least in part due to the inadequacy of his own Aetolian contingent which, in country familiar to it, left the outflanking route, used earlier in Greek history by Xerxes' army, very poorly defended and able to be used by a Roman force led by Cato.[82] The real tragedy of Thermopylae seems to have been this culpable negligence on the part of the Aetolians, and it was to become one of the leitmotifs of the war. I do not agree with Holleaux's comment that Antiochus 'could not have foreseen the ineffectiveness of the Aetolians':[83] the rashness with which they precipitated hostilities should have warned him of their ill-ordered and untrustworthy propensities. Some of their honour was saved by their subsequent resistance in their own cities to Glabrio's attacks on them in the months that followed, until Glabrio's forces were removed to Asia Minor for the Magnesia campaign.[84]

Antiochus left for Ephesus via Chalcis and Tenos, and Euboea was reclaimed by the Romans[85] shortly after the defeat at Thermopylae. But due to Glabrio's Aetolian campaign Roman forces were not available for a more immediate pursuit of Antiochus, and, as Livy puts it, 'the Aetolian war remained as before'.[86] Eventually, with their ambassadors dismissed as still-suspected

allies of Antiochus,[87] by the senate in 189, further Roman campaigns under Fulvius Nobilior led to a settlement of the Aetolian question with a declaration that the Aetolians were subject-allies of Rome. Antiochus' naval forces suffered a defeat off Cape Corycus by Roman and Pergamene fleets in 191, and again in much the same location by Romans and Rhodians in 190.[88] As Livy says of this second defeat, 'Antiochus was alarmed (territus) because, having lost his dominion of the sea, he doubted whether he could defend his distant possessions',[89] and neither could he contest a Roman landing in Asia Minor: the initiative had now completely passed to Rome. Antiochus was forced, in default of Aetolian support, to seek troops from his son-in-law Ariarathes of Cappadocia, convinced that he would have to fight a land battle in Asia Minor.[90]

And so it was. As Livy says: 'Antiochus pace nequiquam temptata' [91] in negotiations with L. Scipio, Rhodes and Pergamum, turned to devastate Pergamene territory in Asia Minor. It is reasonably clear that Antiochus had gone a long way to meet Roman requirements - to the extent of returning Publius Scipio's son, earlier taken prisoner, without asking a ransom: and all Rome could do was to demand Antiochus' evacuation of the whole of Asia Minor to the north and west of the Taurus range.[92] It does seem that the Romans had decided on a resumption of the war whatever Antiochus might say; and that, whereas he was prepared to continue negotiations for peace, they were not. As Livy puts it, 'with the aid of the gods' the war could be finished by winter.[93]

With Antiochus leading an army of more than 70,000, including a large cavalry contingent, the Seleucid and Roman armies joined battle on the Campus Hyrcanius east of Magnesia-ad-Sipylum behind the rivers Phrygius and Hermus. Deprived of an alliance with Prusias of Bithynia[94], Antiochus still had a most variegated mass of cavalry and infantry including Galatians, and Dahae from the Caspian Steppe[95] as well as the Medes, Elymaeans and Cadusians who had followed him over the Hellespont in 192.[96] As Scipio was ill, the battle was directed on the Roman side by Gnaeus Domitius Ahenobarbus.

At the end of the day Antiochus' army was routed and destroyed as a fighting force with a loss of over 50,000 men, many of them in the phalanx, whose awful vulnerability in the flank was again demonstrated.[97] The battle honours went equally to the staying power and flexibility of mind as well as of formation of the Roman legionaries and to the quick thinking and gallantry of the Pergamene detachment under Eumenes and his brother Attalus. The very composition of Antiochus' assorted host added to the confusion of his own ranks as his scythed chariots and elephants trampled their own army.[98]

Antiochus retreated to Sardis with what troops he had left and so to the Seleucid main base at Apamea. The whole of Seleucid western Asia Minor declared for Rome, saving those parts which were already Rhodian or Pergamene, and as Holleaux points out, that 'was all they sought' (sic).[99] An immediate peace settlement between Antiochus and Publius Scipio was referred to Rome, and the full treaty was sealed at Apamea in 188. Antiochus renounced his possessions in Europe and in Asia Minor on the Cis-Taurian side. He agreed to pay an indemnity of 15,000 Euboeic talents (500 at once, 2500 upon the ratification of the treaty and the balance in 12 annual instalments) - which would take the Seleucid State until 177-6 to pay off if every payment was prompt, practically the whole of the reign of Seleucus IV.[100] Antiochus was ordered to surrender all his elephants and most of his fleet and forbidden to recruit troops from what the Romans now regarded as their sphere of influence. Twenty thousand hostages were to be handed over, including the future Antiochus IV and Thoas the Aetolian. And the Seleucid was to surrender Hannibal: as Holleaux puts it, 'Antiochus saw to it that Hannibal escaped.'[101]

Rome's allies stood to gain from their assistance, and did so. The Rhodians and the Pergamenes were both fully worthy of rewards in this connection, and Philip gained at the expense of the Aetolians who in turn became a Roman client state 'Aetolia'.[102] The Galatian allies of Antiochus were subject to systematic slaughter, rapine and slavery by the Romans; and Polybius' easy rationalisation that this constituted a release from the 'terror of the barbarians'[103] does not stand much examination, when viewed

alongside this methodical Roman pillage under C. Manlius Vulso in the Autumn of 189. To Eumenes were given Lycaonia, Greater Phrygia and Pisidia, Hellespontine Phrygia, Mysia, Lydia and the districts of Caria north of the Maeander and Telmessus in Lycia. Rhodes took a much smaller share: Caria south of the Maeander and Lycia (with the exception of Telmessus).[104] In another clause, Antiochus was forbidden to levy export tax on merchandise bound for Rhodes.[105]

The actual issue of whether Rome could or should dispose of territory and towns - with the connivance of Pergamum, and to a much lesser and more critical extent Rhodes, is an issue which raises the inevitable question as to whether and to what extent Roman action and that of her allies had 'liberated' Greek cities in Asia Minor. And here again one is bound to say that the cities had merely passed from one protectorate to another, not noticeably more benign despite the long-standing 'rights' of such cities. Even Rhodian interests had had to urge that Rome should give full freedom to Greek cities on the Aegean seaboard and so prove herself to be a bringer of Freedom: Eumenes on the other hand was after a different solution which would have added such poleis to his new, expanding empire. Rome settled the issue by granting to Pergamum the cities that Antiochus had taken from Attalus, and indeed granting independent status to the rest. All the autonomous towns which Antiochus had laid under tribute were to be freed of this if they subsequently supported Rome.[106]

Strategically Rome's objectives in Asia Minor were clear: to prevent Antiochus from engaging in further aggression there and to protect the territory, and the communications, of its Pergamene and Rhodian allies: 'they had to deny Antiochus any point of strategic advantage in the western Taurus Range'.[107] There was disagreement between the Seleucid side and Eumenes as to the position of Pamphyllia: if Antiochus were to be allowed that, it would threaten Eumenes.[108] Apart from this, a glance at a map shows that with Pamphyllia's long coastline Antiochus could use his fleet there and make the clause that he should not sail west of Cape Sarpedon

into a dead letter.[109] The purpose of that clause had been to keep Antiochus' ships out of Rhodian territorial waters, and much more important, to add a general strengthening to the purpose of the Treaty of Apames, which was to deny Antiochus the means of breaking out of his national boundaries:[110] Cilicia was deemed to be a part of Seleucid territory, but we are left with an ambivalence about Pamphyllia whose status was referred to the Senate.[111] Antiochus' naval strength in 197, which had included 100 κατάφρακτοι νῆες and 200 ἄφρακτα , had constituted enough of a threat to justify Rome's strictures ten years later.[112] The 'nuisance value' of Antiochus' fleet had probably been a trying feature for Rome in the naval war.[113] In fact Rome's limitation of Seleucid naval freedom was not enforced in the terms in which it was announced - as we know, and will presently describe, in the context of Antiochus IV's and Antiochus V's reigns when envoys had to be sent to burn the κατάφρακτοι νῆες which ought not to have been there if the terms of the Treaty of 188 had actually been enforced.[114] Subsequent to this settlement Roman troops evacuated Asia Minor in the Autumn of 188: the fleet had already left and the army reached Rome in Spring, 187.

That these provisions were not finally enforced until a later period in Seleucid history is at least partly attributable to the shortness of Antiochus' own reign after the Treaty of Apamea. The peace itself was the beginning of a new era for the cities of Asia Minor and marks the end of Antiochus' attempt to reestablish Seleucid rule there on anything like its former scale.[115] That that attempt failed was not so much the fault of Antiochus, or the consequence of the rise of Rhodes and Pergamum, whose real ascendancy was made possible by the Treaty, as the result of the intervention of Rome. The autonomy exercised until 213 by Achaeus had marked a temporary revival only in Seleucid influence, and even then it was not centrally controlled.

Antiochus' empire was to lose Armenia and Sophene to independent dynasts, and the focus of Seleucid activity for the next ten

years at least was to centre on the need to recoup financially and psychologically the losses sustained in the war with Rome. This may well have been the reason for Antiochus' rare action in apparently pillaging a temple in Elymais, although comment has been expressed that this was simply a further example of the way in which the Seleucids' attitude to temples had changed during the third century - or, more specifically, during Antiochus' own reign:[116] Ecbatana had been despoiled in 209 during the opening stages of Antiochus' eastern expedition, no doubt with a view to raising funds for the payment of his troops. After the terms set by the Romans at Apamea Antiochus was again in need of money, not least in order to pay the Romans some of the indemnity they had imposed. The most important result of this raid, whatever the actual reasons for the despoiliation, was that Antiochus met his death in the course of the attack. Elam is a rugged mountainous area, and the combination of independently-minded mountain people and a religious vigilance may have combined to produce a successful defence. In the event the attack failed and Antiochus was killed. Diodorus recounts the raid so: 'Antiochus, pressed for funds, and hearing that the temple of Bel in Elymais had a large store of silver and gold, derived from the dedications, resolved to pillage it. He proceeded to Elymais, and after accusing the inhabitants of initiating hostilities, pillaged the temple: but though he amassed much wealth, he speedily received meet punishment from the gods![117] In Book XXVIII Diodorus goes on to amplify this by stating that in the course of the attack Antiochus 'perished with all his host'.[118]

The actual date of Antiochus' death has been the subject of some discussion. It is now fairly certain, on the basis of a tablet in the British Museum quoted by Kugler, and settled by Sachs and Wiseman, in their account of the Babylonian King-List, to have been July 3 or 4, 187 BC.[119] In any assessment of Antiochus' overall stature, room must be found for a view of him as a late 3rd century ruler with all the difficulties raised by

A/ an anabasis in the vastly-changed conditions of the eastern provinces compared to Alexander's time. He had, as we have noted, made assumptions regarding his entitlement to territory, for example in Thrace and Asia Minor, which paid little heed to the protectorate established by Rome in Macedonia after Cynoscephalae - or indeed to the legitimate aspirations of the Greek cities of Asia Minor. In both instances he was not in a position to reinstate a former Seleucid supremacy. Circumstances had changed radically, and other views of what constituted 'Greek Freedom' were now current and were the object of formidable Roman propaganda. As Badian acidly observes, 'with victory in Asia won, the Roman claim to be fighting for all the Greeks was quietly buried.' 'Had the fortunes of war been different', he comments, 'Antiochus would have been received with the same cowed resignation that greeted the Romans'.[120] In all his European schemes, or what our sources allow us to discover about them, there appears a certain lack of reality as to what actions he could reasonably expect to accomplish. In sharp distinction to the east, where as we have indicated he could be said to have restored his own (early 3rd century) empire, the projects he launched in the Roman-influenced west, seem grounded in a belief that he could lay claim to Seleucius Nicator's or even Lysimachus' world, and there were many there to contest not just the legitimacy of such a claim, but its justice, and even its credibility.

As for the eastern enterprise of Antiochus, its weakness was not so much in the comparative speed with which (with the exception of the siege of Bactra) it had been accomplished, as that conditions had changed there too since Alexander's day. Bactrian and Parthian power was now a fact, and the blow to his prestige which these events in the west, which we have been discussing, dealt to his schemes in the east was very severe. Parthia, Bactria and Armenia ceased to send tribute or to acknowledge sovereignty.[121] Bactrian coinage, on the Attic weight standard, continued through its great period with no hint of recognition of the Seleucid power;

and the change of ruler in Parthia from Arsaces II to Arsaces III[122] is similarly devoid of any indications of suzerainty. These countries were free to grow, for the time being, to political strength outside the orbit of Seleucid control. That they were now able to do so would make future attempts by the Seleucids to reclaim them very difficult, and so the pressure towards the eclipse of Greek rule in Asia gained new strength.

Notes for Chapter IV

1. Notably by Holleaux (CAH VIII), also 'Rome, la Grece et les Monarchies Hellenistiques' and in REG 36, 1923.

   Recently in various works by Badian and Walbank, inter alios, cited in the Bibliography.

2. Polybius VIII, 2, 1 f. in the case of Syracuse.

3. Noted by Edwyn Bevan in the House of Seleucus and by Cary in his 'History of the Greek World, 323 - 146:' Livy XXXV, 12 refers.

4. On the whole issue Tenney Frank's 'Roman Imperialism', though dated, is interesting for his doughty pro-Roman stance, while later Holleaux, and now Badian present a much more realistic assessment, recently in Badian's 'Titus Flamininus and Real-politic', Cincinnatti, 1970. The issue of whether economics played a significant role in Rome's war policies is set out carefully by W. V. Harris: 'War and Imperialism', p. 54 f. Economic factors were not so much a cause of war as an inevitable consequence of the booty that was known to result.

5. Livy. XXXVII, 39, 3. 'No enemy was ever held in such contempt by the Romans.'

6. C. B. Welles in 'The idea of history in the Ancient Near East' - The Hellenistic Orient, 1955, p. 159. His observation that by the end of the third century, 'the Hellenistic man was beginning to falter in his idea of history' is a very telling point, because individual and national aspirations begin to diverge from a common, although imposed, cultural stream which up to then had been demonstrably that of the Macedonian imperial presence: native forces set in motion their own histories.

7. Polybius V, 101 - 102.

8. Polybius V, 110.

9. Polybius VII, 9.

9a. The inscription is preserved in SEG 18 (1956) p. 382, lines 15 f.

9b. So Cary, Op. cit., p. 193.

10. A point made by Harris (Op. cit., p. 207): 'Rome created conditions which led almost inevitably to an appeal for military help' and summarized well in Badian, 'Flamininus', p. 36: 'The conclusion must be that ... the Senate has decided not only to intervene in the east, but to keep up an interest there.'

11. Polybius III, 32. Quoted in these terms in F. W. Walbank: 'Polybius and Rome's Eastern Policy', JRS 59, 1963, p. 6. But further explored by P. S. Derow in 'Polybius, Rome and the East', JRS 75, 1979, confirming Polybius.

12. Polybius V, 102. The various references in this present work point to the possibility of this view: The question is: How far did Polybius distrust Macedonians?

13. Polybius V, 101.

14. Polybius, I, 4. Walbank Op. cit., p. 6 says 'courage to aim at universal dominion.' But again see P. S. Derow, op. cit., passim.

15. Livy XXXII, 28. So Badian, 'Flamininus', p. 48.

16. Pierre Grimal: 'Hellenism and the Rise of Rome', London, 1968, p. 168.

17. Polybius XIII, 3 - 5.

18. See again the excellent paper by David Magie on 'The agreement between Philip V and Antiochus III for the partition of the Egyptian Empire', in JRS 29, 1939, p. 31 - 44; and also Badian's supporting comments in 'Rome and Antiochus III: a study in cold war', in Studies in Greek and Roman History, Oxon, 1964, p. 135, note 3.

19. See page 55

20. 'The Rosetta Stone', ed. Wallis Budge, New Ed., London, 1950. The date of the accession of Epiphanes, and of the decree itself are discussed in Walbank, Polybius II, p. 434 - 437.

21. Magie has 28 November (p. 34); Walbank has 27 November (p. 435).

22. Walbank, Polybius II, p. 436. Walbank does say that the actual date is the subject of two theories, both with difficulties: the actual resolution of this argument need not detain us; see also Magie, op. cit., p. 35.

23. On the general issue of Ptolemaic overseas possessions see R. S. Bagnall: The administration of Ptolemaic possessions outside Egypt, Leiden, 1976. Walbank II, p. 439, notes also the serious Egyptian revolt in the Delta and in Upper Egypt from 207/6 to 186. We can only conclude that the decree was intended to normalise conditions in one part of Egypt while the revolt continued unabated elsewhere; perhaps in Upper Egypt, as Walbank says (p. 439).

24. Budge, op. cit., p. 7.

25. Magie, op. cit., p. 37.

26. Livy XXXI, 9 and XXIX, 4.

27. Walbank suggests that the 'real purpose of the embassy was to secure Seleucid neutrality' in the coming war with Philip, if necessary at the expense of Egypt. Did the Romans really think that Antiochus would not be neutral (and against whom would he fight?). Badian is sceptical about the embassy, in 'Rome and Antiochus the Great - a study in cold war', p. 113. It is W. V. Harris (op. cit., p. 212) who points out that although there <u>was</u> an alliance (203/2) between Philip and Antiochus it was not intended against Rome: but Rome feared it.

28. So Badian in 'Titus Quinctius Flamininus', p. 36, although he does go on immediately to modify this, and to talk of Rome deciding to 'keep up an interest there' (op. cit., p..36), Harris (op. cit., p. 216 - 217) is quite clear that the Embassies from Attalus and Rhodes were largely responsible for Rome's moves towards war: and in any case the consul Sulpicius 'was entitled to the opportunities of war' (p. 218).

29. Livy XXXII, 32, 6 - 8.

30. Appian: Macedonica V. Livy XXXII, 32, 5. The conference took place at Nicaea in 198.

30a. Badian, op. cit., p. 38.
Briscoe points out that this demand is considerably more extreme than the earlier demand made at Abydus, but that it is the same as at Nicaea. (Livy Comm. 186).

31. Livy XXXII, 10, 3.

32. Badian, Titus Quinctius Flamininus, p. 40.

33. Polybius XVIII, 8. Badian (op. cit.) p. 41 describes Illyria as a Roman protectorate.

34. Holleaux, Revue des Etudes Grecques 36 (1923) p. 150.

35. On this I am sure that Flamininus was principally anxious for his own prorogatio to take place, so as to be able to conclude this war himself; and it is a sad reflection on the virtus of Flamininus, whatever his philhellenic blandishments, and that of his colleagues, that he should have been allowed to manipulate the treaty in his own interests, and apparently with the help of 'friends' like King Amynander of Athamania. Polybius XVIII, 10. Balsdon, Phoenix 1967, p. 180 f. Badian, Flamin[illegible]us, p. 40 - 42, and the succinct comment in Walbank, Polybius II on XVIII, 10, 3 κατὰ τοὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς διαλογισμούς 'a clear statement that the embassy to Rome was contrived by Flamininus' - which seems to settle the issue. On the whole question, see Holleaux in REG 36 (1923) 167 f.

36. Badian op. cit., p. 47.

37. Polybius XV, 4, 37. The translation is Paton's from the Loeb Edn. p. 557.

38. Livy XXXII, 27, 1. Briscoe points out that H. C. Schmitt (Untersuchungen, p. 271 - 6) makes a very good case for a temporary arrangement between Antiochus and Attalus (Briscoe p. 219).

39. Livy XXXIII, 20. The agreement allowed Rhodes to gain cities, or rather, as Briscoe points out (p. 287) it allowed Rhodes to assume the defence of Ptolemaic cities, Ptolemaic control itself having dwindled.

40. Polybius XVIII, 40 a (Paton).

41. Walbank, Polybius II, p. 603 (from Frontinus. Strat. III, 9, 10).

42. Polybius XVIII, 39.

43. Polybius XVIII, 46, 5. Polybius relates this with obvious emotion.

44. Polybius XVIII, 47, 2.

45. Polybius XVIII, 48, 4. Walbank says this firm stand was because of Antiochus.

46. Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum III, 591 contains Lampsacus' appeal to Rome.

47. Appian Syriaca II, 6. Polybius XVIII, 51. Walbank believes this argument would have been accepted. Polybius II, p. 622.

48. Appian, ibid.

49. Polybius XVIII, 51, 10.

50. Polybius XVIII, 51, 8. Walbank, ibid.

51. Badian, in 'Rome and Antiochus the Great', p. 121. The whole article is an admirable summary of the position in which Antiochus seemed to find himself. It is very fair.

52. Livy XXXIV, 43. 3.

53. Polybius XVIII, 45, 6.

54. Badian: 'Rome and Antiochus the Great', p. 123. He goes on to comment that it is the grain of truth in Tenney Frank's view.

55. Livy XXXIII, 38, 8 - 9. Appian Mac. II, 6 points out that Antiochus 'liberated' the Greek cities in Thrace from the Thracians.

55a. Livy XXXIII, 47, 6.

56. Livy XXXIII, 49, 7 (Ewen Sage's translation: Loeb).

57. Livy XXIV, 50, 4 (Ewen Sage's translation: Loeb).

58. J. P. V. D. Balsdon in Phoenix 21, 1967, p. 189. I do take Badian's point in 'Titus Quinctius Flamininus', passim, that the whole account by Balsdon is laudatory beyond the evidence.

59. This is Balsdon's criticism of Maurice Holleaux, whom he calls 'the cleverest and worst of Flamininus' enemies'. op. cit., p. 181.

59a. Badian, 'Titus Quanctius Flamininus', p. 56.

60. Appian, Syriaca I. There is a good deal of distrust among scholars that Antiochus actually did give this territory as dowry. The whole solution is too convenient. Hengel I, 10 f.

61. Livy XXXIV, 57 - 58 f.

62. Appian, Syriaca II, 6. See Badian, 'Rome and Antiochus the Great', p. 137, note 70.

63. Livy XXXIV, 59.

64. SIG. Vol. III, 585, lines 43 f.

65. Badian goes too far in saying that such activity 'was' essential: the trouble was that it seemed essential, and so they engaged in it, as at Delphi. The envoys of Antiochus - and indeed also the Romans - were driven by what they felt, not by what they saw.

66. Livy XXXV, 12, 6. The date is given by Badian as 193, and by Ewen Sage in Loeb, Livy p. 33, note 5, a little earlier. Given that ambassadors would need time for their work, 193 is preferable.

67. Note the interesting discussion in Charles Edson's review of W. W. Tarn, 'Greeks' in Classical Philology, 1954, p. 115 about the inscription from Nihavend, often noted in this thesis. He discounts the idea that the Laodice there mentioned was the daughter of Antiochus III and became the wife of her brother, whose death we note here.

68. Livy XXXV, 15, 6.

69. Badian, 'Rome and Antiochus the Great', p. 129.

70. Livy XXXV, 20, 13. In the matter of the council itself, Livy includes Hannibal's speech about the oath of enmity to the Romans, and gives this speech a crucial role in pushing Antiochus towards war: XXXV, 19, 7.

71. Livy XXXV, 32, 10.

72. Holleaux in CAH VIII, p. 185. This I still believe; but note has to be taken of Harris' view that the Romans wished 'the positive benefits of a successful war against Antiochus' (p. 223).

73. Holleaux in CAH VIII, p. 197 - 8, and it also reckoned without the independence of Greek views on the issue of whether to support Rome qua Rome at all.

74. Livy XXX, 53, 11.

75. Livy XXX, 34, 11.
For Harris (op. cit., p. 220) the fall of Demetrias (or rather the attack upon it) was also an attack on a part of Greece which Rome 'directly regulated': and so it was the immediate cause of war.

76. Badian, 'Rome and Antiochus the Great', pp. 132 and 133. I agree that the smallness of the force suggests 'cold war' tactics.

77. Holleaux in CAH VIII, p. 207.

78. Livy XXXV, 43.

79. Sage makes the point in his note 1 in Vol. X of the Loeb Edn. p. 146.

80. Livy XXXV, 51. Holleaux (CAH VIII, p. 210) made the important observation that this wanton, small-scale massacre put Antiochus (by virtue of this action by his allies) into the role of aggressor. Livy says that this attack 'seemed to have given some further justification for declaring war on Antiochus': (Ita ad ius inferendi Antiocho belli adiecisse aliquantum videbatur), XXXV, 51, 5 (Sage).

80a. Livy XXXV, 51, 5.

81. Livy XXXVI, 15 - 19.

82. Livy XXXVI, 18, 8.

83. Holleaux CAH VIII, p. 215; and on the rash and ill-advised speech of Damocritus to Flamininus in Livy XXXV, 33, 11 see Cary's comment in his volume of Methuen's 'History of the Greek and Roman World', (p. 196, note 1) that this was quite in keeping with the pride that went before the Aetolian fall.

84. Livy XXXVI, 22; XXXVI, 35 , 14.

85. Livy XXXVI, 21, 1.

86. Livy XXXVI, 22, 4.

87. Livy XXXVII, 49.

88. Livy XXXVI, 44 and 45 and XXXVII, 29 - 30: the second site is generally referred to as Myonessus (near Teos).

89. Livy XXXVII, 31, 1.

90. Livy XXXVII, 31, 4.

91. Livy XXXVII, 19, 7.

92. Holleaux CAH VIII, p. 222.

93. Livy XXVII, 19, 5. Holleaux dates the actual battle to 'probably January, 189'. CAH VIII, p. 223.

94. Livy XXXVII, 26, 1.

95. Livy XXXVII, 38, 3.

96. Livy XXXV, 48, 5.

97. Livy XXXVII, 42, 3.

98. Livy XXXVII, 43, 10. Cary makes a good point that although attacked front and rear, the Phalanx made a stand worthy of 'the best Macedonian traditions'. Cary p. 212. We have no Polybian account of the battle extant, though this may well be derived from one.

99. Holleaux in CAH VIII, p. 224. The concept of 'defensive imperialism' is neatly put in this phrase.

100. On this important implication see chapter V

101. Holleaux in CAH VIII, p. 226. The terms of the treaty of Apamea are set out in Livy XXXVII, 45, 14 (as the first proposals), and later in Polybius XXI, 43 and Livy XXXVIII, 38 as a ratified settlement. They are developed in discussion by Holleaux in CAH VIII, p. 225, f, by Cary (p. 212), by Pierre Grimal in 'Le Siecle des Scipions', Paris, 1975, p. 197 f. The treaty provisions are covered in detail by Mc Donald in JRS 1967, p. 1 - 8 and the naval clauses are separately explored by McDonald and Walbank in JRS 1969, p. 30 f.

102. Holleaux CAH VIII, p. 227.

103. Polybius XXI, 41, 2.

104. Holleaux CAH VIII, p. 230.

105. P. Grimal, 'Le siecle des Scipions', p. 197.

106. Polybius XXI, 45, 2: this presumably included the Colophonians of Notium and the people of Cymae and Mylasa.

107. A. H. McDonald, 'The Treaty of Apamea', JRS 1967, p. 4.

108. Polybius XXI, 45, 11. A. H. McDonald, op. cit., p. 4.

109. Polybius XXI, 42, 14, 'unless carrying tribute, envoys or hostages'.

110. McDonald and Walbank, 'The Treaty of Apamea: the Naval Clauses', JRS 1969, p. 31.

111. Polybius XXI, 45, 11.

112. McDonald and Walbank, op. cit., p. 32.

113. McDonald and Walbank, op. cit., p. 34, n. 23. The actual details of the naval provisions in the treaty in Livy and Polybius are found to be much emended in the course of transmission, and the authors cited here do not trust either text: Livy XXXVIII, 38, 8 and Polybius XXI, 42, 13 f, (not 43, 13 as in Loeb).

114. McDonald and Walbank, op. cit., p. 38.

115. Wolfgang Orth: 'Königlicher Machtanspruch and Stadtische Freiheit', Munich, 1977, p. 176.

116. So S. K. Eddy in 'The King is dead', Lincoln, Nebraska, 1961, p. 98. The magoi at Ecbatana were anti-Hellenic, and Eddy implies that this was a reason for Antiochus' attack - rather (surprisingly) than its consequence; although he says there is no Median literary evidence.

117. Diodorus XXIX, 15 in which Bel = Βηλου : while the account in Book XXVIII, 3 has the sanctuary of Zeus = Διος : Loeb ed. F. R. Walton.

118. Diodorus XXVIII, 3. Justin XXXII, 2, 1 - Didymaei Jovis.

119. A. J. Sachs and D. J. Wiseman: A Babylonian King-List of the Hellenistic period, IRAQ XVI, 1954, p. 202 - 211. F. X. Kugler in 'Von Moses bis Paulus', 1922, p. 323 f. See also Bevan in 'The House of Seleucus' II, pp. 119 - 120, and H. C. Schmitt: Untersuchungen, p. 2. A. Aymard in 'Du nouveau sur la chronologie des Seleucides in REA 1955, Vol. 57, p. 108 - 9, wants 4 June, 187 and not 4 July as the date of death. See also Aymard in Rev. de Phil., 1940, p. 89 - 90. Comments on this issue are given by H. Bengtson in the Mizellen of Historia 4, 1955, p. 113, and he seems to opt for 3 or 4 July, 183.

120. Badian, 'Rome and Antiochus the Great', p. 134.

121. Armenia: Strabo XI, 14, 5.

122. Wolski's titles for these kings in his article in Historia XI, 1962, p. 138 f. The coins are well illustrated and individually commented upon by Selwood, p. 24 - 5. But Selwood says that there are no coins to be attributed to Arsaces III 'Phriapatius' (c. 191 - 176) or Phraates I (c. 176 - 171 BC), 'perhaps because they remained feudatory to the Seleucids', (p. 24) although he does note that we cannot say when in fact the resumption of coinage occurred; he suggests that it did not resume until Mithridates I (p. 25). I can see no hint of feudatory coining between 211 and 191 (which presumes that all the issues Selwood illustrates must have been struck in 211 - 209.).

CHAPTER V.

FROM SELEUCUS IV UNTIL THE DEATH OF ANTIOCHUS IV

1. The reign of Seleucus IV

By the terms of the Treaty of Apamea[1] which followed Antiochus III's defeat at Magnesia, the Seleucid Empire was obliged to pay a huge indemnity; and it was this financial burden, 12,000 talents in twelve annual instalments, which was to confine the Seleucid expectations more than the instructions about not sailing further west than Cape Sarpedon, and not recruiting mercenaries from the Roman territories. It was the task of Seleucus IV, when he acceded in 187 to the throne of Syria, to ensure that this was paid, and that there were no rash exploits to imperil Seleucid power further. It is increasingly possible to talk of the Seleucids as kings of Syria - which is not at all what they would have wished as the successors of the great Seleucus Nicator, whose realms were secure to the Punjab until 305; and it is a measure of the limitations now placed upon their power by invasion or secession in the west or east. The traditional home territory of the Seleucids had been Asia Minor, but that had been lost largely owing to the intervention of Rome, and Magnesia had finally taken it from the Seleucids. Where they ought to have tried to be at home was Seleucia-on-Tigris; but that site, as we saw, had lost administrative importance when the capital moved to Antioch on the Orontes.

The old philo-Roman assertion of Tenney Frank and others that Rome took nothing for herself from the Treaty of Apamea does seem increasingly suspect[2] as our knowledge of its consequences for the Seleucids increases. Rome simply did not require to 'take'; Pergamum for the moment was cowed or bribed into co-operation[3]; and Rome certainly carried out her obligations to Pergamum, but no one was under any illusion that Pergamum was other than a client state. Rhodes also, as an ally of Rome,

was granted territory in Caria and Lycia. But the agreements later made in a clandestine manner by the Hellenic states as a protection against the incursions of Rome prove: one, that the states themselves knew the consequences of opposition - a submission to Rome as client states and the end of any effective autonomy; and two, that they regarded the moves so far made as threatening moves.

Edwyn Bevan has observed[4] that at no previous time could such general support have been likely for anyone who, wile observing due diplomatic prudence, stood out as the antagonist of Rome. In time this responsibility devolved upon Macedon; and when Philip died in 179 his illegitimate son Perseus prepared to undertake this role: preparations already made were considerable, and it remained both to find a pretext which would be militarily realistic, and one which would in fact command the support of the hellenic states despite likely moves by Rome to weaken the resolve behind such an alliance.

These states also lacked a power in Asia Minor to act as a focus for an anti-Roman movement. Pergamum could not supply this, as despite her current expressions of amity towards the anti-Roman Hellenistic states, her previous actions appeared too hostile for any easy change of heart. Pontic Cappadocia appeared as a candidate for this new role of champion under Pharnaces the son of Mithridates II, who was now allied to Mithridates the satrap of Lower Armenia. But this warlike alliance had aroused the hostility of Eumenes, Ariarathes of Cappadocia and Prusias of Bithynia, all of whom had been in alliance with Rome. In the ensuing war (183 - 179), Seleucus seems to have marched with an army towards the Taurus range in support of Pharnaces, but in the event did not carry through this enterprise and Pharnaces was subsequently defeated. Rome's hand in the politics of Asia Minor may be seen in the activities of Titus Flamininus who was ambassador to both Prusias and the Seleucid court in 183. He subsequently, as related by Livy,[5] contrived the death of Hannibal

on a visit to Prusias; and Bevan connects his presence with 'the abortive schemes of Seleucus'.[6] That may be going too far, as we have observed that the whole Asia Minor land mass was in a high state of nerves and conflicting ambitions by this time.

Sometime in 177 - 6 Antiochus, the brother of Seleucus IV, was exchanged as a hostage by Rome (under the terms of the Treaty of Apamea) for Seleucus' son Demetrius,[7] and Antiochus made his way to Athens where he seems to have been able to take a fairly active part in Athenian public life. This period in Athens was important to him, and his munificence towards the city is seen for example in the construction of the temple to Olympian Zeus, eventually finished in the reign of Hadrian, a vast and splendid structure even in its present-day ruin, whose immaculate proportions (of the remaining sections) and dignified Corinthian capitals are a notable piece of Hellenistic architecture owing much to Decimus Cossutius, Antiochus' architect.

Meanwhile the situation in the Mediterranean, which was later to cause Antiochus severe problems, had been given a new and positive twist by the marriage of his brother Seleucus' daughter Laodice to Perseus of Macedon, now widely regarded as the principal protagonist of the Greek world. The astute Rhodians had lowered their guard to the extent of escorting the new queen with their formidable fleet, itself presently to suffer the ravages and indignity of Roman meddling.

According to the Jewish view of Seleucus IV, he appears as a money-hungry ruler who debased 'the royal dignity',[8] not involving himself in the expensive and, as it turned out, tenuous foreign conquests of his predecessor. By the terms of the Treaty of Apamea, which we have mentioned, the Syrian monarchy's affluence on any great scale was made a thing of the past - or so it must have seemed at the time; and the good and wise ruler would be he who paid the indemnity promptly without

incurring the displeasure of Rome any further, and who suspended actions likely to be either belligerent or expensive. And it cannot be doubted that Seleucus succeeded in the main objective. That these years were a time of comparative quietness and financial reconstruction in Syria and the Seleucid empire generally is shown by the attitude of Rome to another provision of the Treaty - the surrender of the fleet and the hanstringing of the elephants[9]: these actions were not carried out until much later, which is an indication that such a measure was not pressing at an earlier date. And the lavishness and the range of Antiochus IV's later activities suggest that considerable reserves of wealth were in hand, by say 170, to enable him to consider his schemes viable.[9a]

Unfortunately for Seleucus IV, and still more so for his kingdom, it was by the action of his Chief Minister Heliodorus that his reign was brought to a premature close. The Jewish view of him is not flattering,[10] and reflects an antipathy which was ominous for future relations between the Jews and the Seleucids which had begun so well. In short, Heliodorus formed a conspiracy against Seleucus,[11] and he was murdered in 175, to be succeeded by Antiochus IV. Seleucus' death was a foolhardy move brought about by personal motives, and no good could come of it; the allaying of Rome's fears about Seleucid foreign policy was not yet so complete that Syria could afford the panache with which Antiochus was to go about his various enterprises. It could be said both that Seleucus died too soon, and that Antiochus arrived too soon for the ultimate safety of the Seleucid kingdom.

For Antiochus did not accede in any normal way. The true heir was Seleucus' elder son Demetrius who had been exchanged as a hostage to Rome, thus freeing Antiochus. It is probable that Heliodorus intended to act as regent, with a great deal of say in the running of the kingdom, for Seleucus' younger son, an infant Antiochus, in Antioch. At this point Antiochus IV was, as we saw, at Athens as στεφανηφόρος ἐπὶ τὰ ὅπλα, and news

will have come to him of the assassination. The chain of events by which he himself became first regent then king now began with an offer from Eumenes of Pergamum, who wished an ally on the Seleucid throne, to assist Antiochus in seizing the throne. Eventually a treaty of amity was signed; and, supported by the troops of Eumenes and his brother Attalus, Antiochus entered Antioch, and in time silenced or abolished the opposition.[11a] The most important element in the legitimate opposition, this infant Antiochus, over whom Heliodorus had been exercising guardianship, Antiochus had killed by his agent Andronicus whom he subsequently disposed of as well;[12] but, as the cuneiform tablets underline, there was a relationship (and there was also coinage) until 170 BC.[12a]

Antiochus' character is important to this discussion because of the strange combination of insight, recklessness, far-sightedness and petulant cruelty which all our sources seem to present[13]: and it is not sufficient to say simply that he dealt with one situation according to one facet of his character and a different one with another. Because his actions were full of inconsistency, part of the difficulty involved in unravelling the process and implications of his actions is knowing how much weight to allow to each part of his chameleon-like personality. The historian is entirely at the mercy of contextual factors as all sources are suspect for various reasons.

There were three main areas of Antiochus Epiphanes' activity, and each tends to present him in a different light - which is a result only partly explained by the different bias of the sources we have at our disposal. These were respectively his relations with the Jews,[14] his involvement with Egypt[14a] and the Romans, which really have to be taken as one issue, as the ramifications were so interdependent, and finally - much the most obscure - his Eastern enterprise, if it can be called that. We will deal with these in that order, as I think they show a certain development of character as well as a rough chronological progression.

The Jewish question is really bound up with the aspirations of the aristocracy and the merchant class within mid-hellenistic Judaism who wished to see the cultural colour of Greek civilisation influencing in a liberal direction the conservative and exclusivist character of the Jewish state. This had existed since the Ezraonic reforms following the return of the exiles from Babylon, and had largely been due to the rule of the High Priests who combined a religious and a secular role, similar in many ways to the ἄρχων βασιλεύς of early Athens, or the Prince Bishops of pre-19th century Durham. It was not, I think, that the Jewish state was in any kind of cultural stalemate - just that it was keen to preserve its distinctive character in an over-defensive way against its own class-conscious progressive element, and to that extent tended to invite breaches of that system.

Politically it had apparently welcomed Antiochus III after his overthrow of Ptolemaic power at Panium in 200[14b], but this had never led to a unanimous support of the Seleucid cause; and as Coele-Syria straddled the land route from Syria to Egypt, it was in a quite critical strategic position - which was a factor quite apart from any consideration of Jewish particularism and its incipient conflict with Hellenism. But its effect on that quarrel was to be profound. It had been the case during the period of the Syrian Wars in the earlier Ptolemies' time that up to a point the little hill state had been content to watch the ignorant armies clash in the plain to their westward border; but with Coele-Syria now in Seleucid hands, this happy isolation was also now at an end. She was involved in Seleucid policy willy-nilly, and the changeover of power had left a section of Jewish opinion sympathetic to Egyptian schemes and so in effect a fifth-column in a Seleucid state. This state of affairs was complicated and inflamed in the case of Judaea by the antagonism which existed between the Oniad and Tobiad houses, both of them zealous hellenizers, but in political terms contenders for the priestly offices

in this theocratic state. That the Tobiads happened to have Ptolemaic sympathies and the Oniads Seleucid, although it varied, was a matter of history and served to bring the power politics of the rival Hellenistic nations into a sharper focus within a relatively small community, already marked by the emotional antipathies we have mentioned. It was a volatile situation. But it could not reasonably be expected that either Antiochus or the regents for the young Egyptian king Ptolemy Philometor could know what a hornets' nest could be upset by their own hostilities.[15]

The Tobiad leader Hyrcanus had in fact negotiated with Ptolemy V Epiphanes and ingratiated himself with presents to the value of 1000 talents quite recently, and had therefore, before the Seleucid conquest took Coele-Syria from the Ptolemies, acted as a taxation agent for the Egyptian government, basing his activities on his fortress at 'Araq-el-Emir in Transjordan.[16] This palace was excavated by the Princeton University expedition of 1904-9 and reflects vividly the profitability of his Ptolemaic appointment. All this bears on the Seleucid position in that, at the time of Antiochus IV's accession in 175, Onias III the High Priest in Jerusalem was a friend of Hyrcanus. Hyrcanus' father Joseph, and later he himself, were determined hellenizers and were anxious to maintain a lively contact with the Greek world: so much comes from the style of architecture employed in their mausoleum at 'Araq. The lust for power and profit which they represent became the most profound marks for the hellenizing movement in Judaea. Antiochus IV had merely to help along this process, long in being, in order further to alienate one section of Jewish public opinion from another - basically corresponding, although this is an over-simplification - to the division between the rich merchants and the 'Am Ha Ares, the people of the land, the poor.

Antiochus had seen by his experience in Rome that her political success was due to centralisation, and so he aimed at the same

kind of centralisation in his kingdom, employing in this case the unifying Alexandrine concept of divine kingship as a ruling force. Coins showing the resemblance of his Zeus-type to this type in Babylon, enthroned with victory in its hand, have been seen as a proof that he wished Babylon to be the destined capital of the new deity upon earth.[17] According to this view, with which I am inclined to agree as it seems the one obvious and possible way to shift the administrative centre of the Seleucid empire eastwards again, where it had long required to be, the west was to be left alone and the wishes of Rome were to be respected: Antiochus' attitude to the peremptory demands of Gaius Popilius Laenas at Eleusis[17a], which we will look at in this context presently, can be seen as a part of this policy of not antagonising Rome. There seems no other adequate explanation for his extraordinary withdrawal in that instance.

In Antiochus' case the ascription of divinity, with its centralising intentions in the interests of cultural homegeneity, was imposed by the king in clear contrast both to the Greek cities, which like Lemnos normally bestowed it on the Seleucid sovereign as a mark of esteem, and to the wishes of the Jewish state which in the view of its conservative stronger element regarded such an ascription as blasphemy anyway.[18] For the Jew there was no such thing as formal political worship; worship and politics were concerned with different realms of thought and activity, though he would agree that they did overlap at points - notably in the person and function of the high priest: but that again was only because the high priest represented Jahweh to the people of Jahweh, and the people in their turn to Jahweh: he was in no sense, although a ruler, in receipt of this worship himself.

So this politically astute and generally acceptable religious innovation in Antiochus' empire encountered a tribe in whose religious beliefs it could find no part. It was extremely unfortunate

for Antiochus - maybe he should have foreseen it - that Judaea occupied that particular geographical position, centrally situated between Syria and Egypt and with sympathies still, as we have seen, partially pro-Egyptian. Nor were Rome and Egypt his only antagonists: for as we shall see the threat from the East was at least as menacing - and as close; and again Coele-Syria was in a crucial position.

A change of High Priest at Jerusalem in 175 from Onias III, who may be referred to as the teacher of righteousness in the Dead Sea Scrolls, to Jason and then to Menelaus, who had bribed himself into the position by overtures to Antiochus on his accession,[18a] had given to the Tobiads and to the rest of the hellenizing aristocracy in Judaea the opportunity to press for political and cultural reform. Jason had obtained permission from the king to convert Jerusalem into a Greek πόλις called Antioch (in this instance after Epiphanes) and to register the people for voting purposes as Antiochenes;[18b] a Gymnasion and an Ephebion were thereupon installed, marking, as they were expensive to attend and maintain, a further division between the poor and the better-off within the Jerusalem community. The former gerousia of Antiochus III's time was reconvened as the βουλη of the new Antioch. And youths entered into the spirit of the new Greek environment by taking their exercises naked and by wearing hats![19] Antiochus IV was the patron-founder; and II Maccabees[20] relates the joy with which Antiochus was received by Jason and the citizens of the new πόλις, possibly in 172, the year of Ptolemy Philometor's coronation.

The building of authentic Greek cities was over, and we can see the results of some of this in its great phase at Hekatompylos and Nihavend for example. A few exceptions may well be possible in the case of the Greek kingdoms in Bactria and India, particularly Eucratideia[21] which we will look at later on; but as far as Antiochus was concerned, if he wished to have some more Greek cities as allies, he would have to create them. As it transpired, the Greek cities of Antiochus were in many

cases merely Syrian towns that had assumed the shape of poleis: the striving of the Jerusalem aristocracy for economic and political growth met Antiochus' desire for a friendly power in Palestine's geographical position. Meanwhile, the overt alliance between those Jews who favoured the objectionable Greek practices in Jerusalem, and so (apparently) the Seleucid power, gave the pro-Ptolemaic faction, which had never really abandoned its cause, grounds for action. Their stronghold became the fortress of the Tobiads at 'Araq el Emir.[21a]

II Maccabees 4 verses 30 - 38 tells of the murder of the ex-High Priest Onias III while he was taking refuge in the precinct of Apollo, a suburb of Antioch, in 171 by one Andronicus, an administrator left in charge of Syria while Antiochus was suppressing a rebellion in Cilicia. Antiochus dealt summary justice upon Andronicus and seems to have genuinely grieved at the murder,[22] but he did not then go on to deal with Menelaus the more extreme hellenizing High Priest who had succeeded Jason by bribery. Menelaus appears to have engineered this assassination and, in spite of a complaint actually being brought against him by the Sanhedrin to Antiochus, Menelaus' talent for successful bribery bought him the support of one Ptolemy, a favourite of the king. When the Sanhedrin assembly sent an embassy to talk to the king at Tyre in what was now a grave situation, he had them put to death.[23] This was presumably because of the influence of Ptolemy, but it did not endear him to the Jews of Tyre who gave the victims of this outrage magnificent funerals. Needless to say Antiochus lost face with the loyal Jews, as now both his justice and his policies were suspect.

It is at this point that Egyptian politics enter the discussion. Future repressive activities in Coele-Syria were in considerable measure a reflection of the vicissitudes of Antiochus' Egyptian campaigns, and we have already seen that there was serious pro-Egyptian opposition to him within the Jewish state. Among the larger issues of the years immediately preceding the Maccabean Revolt, it is impossible to overstress the importance

of the Egyptian question and its ramifications.

Modern scholars admit between two and four expeditions of Antiochus into Egypt between the years 172 and 168, and the overwhelming majority favour the years 170 to 168; in the matter of harmonising the various accounts, I follow Ludin Jansen[24] who put the two expeditions into the years 170 - 169 and 168; the first is dealt with in 1 Maccabees 1, 20 and the second in II Maccabees 5, 1f; it is most unlikely that there were more than two. In 170 Egypt invaded Coele-Syria, and so provided Antiochus with a casus belli[25] for which the Egyptian regents Eulaeus and Lenaeus were responsible. The invasion was defeated swiftly by Antiochus at Mount Casius near the border with Egypt close to Pelusium; and in the panic which ensued the young Ptolemy Philometor was shipped to Samothrace for safety,[26] only to be intercepted by Antiochus' ships en route and captured. His brother Euergetes 'Physcon' was invited to assume the throne at Alexandria where the new ministers were Commanos and Cineas. The Alexandrian fleet was defeated at a battle near Pelusium while trying to block the Syrian retreat, and the Syrian army thereupon moved into Egypt without further resistance. Antiochus set up a rival government at Memphis in the name of Ptolemy Philometor to rival Physcon's administration at Alexandria. Alexandria for its part held out and reorganised its defences under Commanos and Cineas, while negotiations proceeded between the new administration and Antiochus.

Various Greek ambassadors met Antiochus at Sais in an attempt at arbitration, possibly being led to do so by the eastern Mediterranean policies of Rome: when Antiochus continued his advance on Alexandria, the new ministers sent ambassadors to Rome to move the senate to action. The Macedonian war with Perseus, which had begun in Spring 171, delayed the senate's response for some eighteen months, and in the meantime Antiochus had raised the siege of Alexandria and had returned to Coele-Syria before the winter rains in 169. On the way back, for some reason, possibly monetary, he raided Jerusalem, killed some of the

inhabitants and pillaged the temple, perhaps with Menelaus' connivance.[27]

Towards the end of 170, apparently between 5 October and 12 November, the Egyptian government had associated Philometor and his brother in the throne, along with Philometor's sister-wife Cleopatra II; this had consolidated Egyptian power in that it presented something like a united stand at a time when this was beginning to be desirable not only in the face of Antiochus' activity, but also in view of increasing nationalist Egyptian restlessness which had been brought into the reckoning by Ptolemy IV's action of using native troops in his phalanx at Raphia in 217. As far as the war policy against Syria is concerned, if the first round of hostilities began after this joint rule was declared then Ptolemy Physon (and presumably also his sister) must have been additionally responsible for the war policy: or, if not, on account of their age, then their respective factions must. This presents a different picture of Egyptian intentions than previous interpretations have suggested; but a dating of 170 - 169 for the first campaign would be able to be sustained.[28]

Ptolemy Philometor attained his anacleteria, or coming of age, in the autumn of 170 also, and so provided a figure for official Egyptian policy to be based around. It was probably an astute political move for the regents to have reported this important alteration in Philometor's status in an embassy to Rome, possibly in mid-November 170.[29] One is continually struck, in connection with Antiochus' Egyptian campaigns, at the effect of time-lag in the sending and receiving of what were on any understanding important embassies and delegations: delays caused not just by the exigencies of ancient travel - which are understandable - but by delays in the reception of embassies, for example by the Roman senate, which are not so easily explained. The delay in hearing Antiochus' original urgent statement to the senate in the autumn of 170 is a good case in point. By the time his representatives were heard war had been declared. Collusion, or at least deliberate procrastination by Rome,

becomes strongly suspect. It may well be that Rome's position in the war with Perseus would not permit her to take up a decisive standpoint on the Egyptian-Syrian conflict until the issue in Greece was clearer; but it is a measure of the delicate nature of Eastern Mediterranean politics at that time that she did not allow Antiochus any knowledge of her attitude. As a direct consequence, the events of 168 came as a surprise to Antiochus in the manner we shall discuss.

After Antiochus' reconciliation with Philometor and the setting up of the rival government for him at Memphis, Antiochus was in an extremely strong political position. Because it was the legitimate Egyptian king who was ruling - who happened in any case to be Antiochus' nephew - a visit by Titus Numisius from Rome to determine the position[30] was met by the fait accompli of a cessation of the war, agreed by both Philometor and Antiochus.

The siege of Alexandria and the ensuing stalemate followed, and for this period our sources are scant. Antiochus' next move was to try to reconcile Philometor and Physcon, but his efforts to do so were compromised at the outset by his own insistence that Philometor was the legitimate king, which was after all correct. Ambassadors were dispatched to various parts of the Greek world to draw attention to his policy being in the interests of the legitimate Egyptian king. The trouble was that however clever Antiochus had been, the very subtlety of it left the impression that he had used Philometor to further Syrian ends; and so his publicity campaign, far from persuading the Greek world of the justness of his policies, actually alerted their suspicion of him. And all this at a time when what was wanted above all in the Hellenistic states was a strengthening of the common front against the really dangerous political moves of Rome. His action in placing ΝΙΚΗΦΟΡΟΣ on his coins when he returned to Antioch from this campaign does seem, to say the least, 'provisional'.[31]

In Egypt Philometor meanwhile became reconciled with Physcon and Cleopatra, and Philometor re-entered Alexandria where he reigned as joint king with Physcon. In 168, Antiochus again entered Egypt, having first attacked Cyprus; Greek opinion was hostile to this and the Achaean League supported Egypt - but withdrew the support before taking any action. Antiochus now demanded the cession of Cyprus and Pelusium; but he had already made peace with Egypt in 169, and there had been no new offence, such as Eulaeus and Lenaeus' invasion of 170, to justify these new demands. He had left an effective lever for this new invasion of Egypt in the existence of the Seleucid garrison at Pelusium, placed there at the conclusion of the 170/169 campaign. But this was only garrisoned 'so that the door of Egypt should be open for him if ever he wished to return'.[32]

Antiochus advanced successfully upon first Memphis and then Alexandria but at that point, 21 June, 168, Perseus was defeated by Lucius Aemillius Paullis at Pydna, and Macedon as an independent state vanished for ever; Egyptian ambassadors met Antiochus at Rhinocolura and Antiochus stated his terms: that Egypt was to vacate Cyprus and Pelusium. In the end the senate did listen to the Alexandrian deputation of 169 - in 168, and appointed a commission of three, C. Popillius Laenas, C. Decimus and C. Hostilius charged to stop the war in Egypt. Polybius says: "The Senate, when they heard that Antiochus had become master of Egypt and very nearly of Alexandria itself, thinking that the aggrandisement of this king concerned them in a measure, dispatched Gaius Popillius as their legate to bring the war to an end, and to observe what the exact state of affairs was".[33]

Antiochus was not to know that the victory of Pydna[34] had accelerated the journey of the Roman ambassadors, and that the commission had landed in Alexandria: they met suddenly at Eleusis. In the celebrated incident of Popillius and his staff we have Rome's increasing arrogance flexing its political muscles, and the incident - during which Popillius delivered the Senate's letter, ordering Antiochus out of Egypt forthwith -

reflected better on Antiochus' self-control than on Popillius' courtesy.[35] Laenas also arranged with the Egyptian kings for the expulsion of Seleucid troops from Cyprus. Concerning this confrontation, Arnold Toynbee has said that 'Antiochus had the sense to swallow his pride and obey',[36] which does not in itself enhance our idea of Syria's influence at the time but does support the view that Antiochus knew what was a politic move, as does his subsequent action in sending ambassadors to Rome to compliment the Senate on the victory at Pydna. Dancy points out that despite Laenas' rudeness at Eleusis the Senate seems to have had more respect for Antiochus after his withdrawal than before it,[37] because it waited until his death in 163 before demanding the surrender of elements of the Seleucid navy and the hamstringing of elephants under the terms set at Apamea back in 188. The success of Laenas' mission itself is somewhat modified by the legitimate view that Egypt's troubles were not so much foreign (from Antiochus) as domestic from native unrest.[37a]

It is the view of most authorities that it was also in 168, on Antiochus' return from Eleusis, that the suppression occurred of the rising which had occurred in his absence.[38] For the Seleucids a fairly normal occurrence, revolts were normally containable, but this one was to have permanent consequences. It seems that at this time the pro-Ptolemaic faction in Jerusalem had the upper hand; and that a rumour that Antiochus was dead brought Jason back across the Jordan from his base in Ammanitis with a thousand men, and civil war began in the city.[39] After taking Jerusalem with bloodshed, Jason was unable to hold it, and was forced to withdraw again to his base. There need be no connection between Jason's attack and the pro-Ptolemaic feeling as such, but there is a connection, I believe, between both and the rumoured death of Antiochus. This will have been more than sufficient to convince Antiochus on his dismal journey back to Syria in 168 that this civil disturbance in Jerusalem was a pro-Ptolemaic rising in his rear:[40] whether it was or not, in fact, is beside the point. The results were exactly the same.

According to II Maccabees, 5, 5f, Jason's expulsion by Menelaus, after his raid on the city and the killing that accompanied it, was the proximal cause of the Maccabean rebellion proper. We have seen that if Antiochus understood this raid as constituting a Ptolemaic reaction, there is point in the view that it was one of the causes of his final measures in the field of religion, and so of the Maccabean Revolt which was, amongst other things, the means of Jewish religious opposition to them. The proximity of the bedouin tribes in the territories beyond the Jordan to at least the vanguard of Parthian influence will also have caused Antiochus to beware of a resurgence of Jason's power at Jerusalem. Parthian relations with the Jews were to become a significant factor by the time of the Roman occupation.[40a]

In the 145th year of the Seleucid era, or 167 BC, the suppression of the Jewish religion began; the date given in 1 Macc. 1, 54 was the 15th of Chislev (November). On that day an altar was erected to Zeus Olympius or Ba'al Shamaim the Semitic Lord of Heaven, of which Zeus was the Greek equivalent. Prior to the construction of this altar in Jerusalem various orders were apparently published over the whole Seleucid kingdom, including Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia, Persis and the southern coast of Asia Minor that 'all should be one people and that each should give up his customs'.[41] This was politically a potentially wise move, in that it was in theory an excellent way of rendering the Seleucid empire a more coherent cultural unit, and as such, a more solid barrier against Roman and Parthian attack and infiltration. There is probably a bit of vanity in Antiochus' choice of Zeus Olympius as the god to whom the Jerusalem altar was dedicated - he did claim a special affinity with Zeus himself. However, this particular deity does emphasise the essentially Hellenic character of the religion he wished to introduce.

Although, according to the author of I Maccabees, the gentiles are said to have accepted the command of the king,[42] the Jews objected strongly to this measure. However, the systematic carnage said

to have taken place when Apollonius entered Jerusalem[43] is not recorded in the more sober account in I Maccabees, which does not inspire confidence that the slaughter actually took place; and further it does not lead one to believe that the persecution which accompanied the imposition of pagan sacrifices was necessarily as widespread or as ruthless as is made out in II and IV Maccabees. A groundswell of nearly three hundred years of organised seclusion, separatism and strict religious orthodoxy of a somewhat blinkered variety will have helped to alienate 'progressive' opinion to the point where, when it was really required in the national interest, in the face of a real cultural threat, such support was not readily available. And this partly explains not only the impatience of the trading fraternity in Judaea to break its bonds, and to move into the new Hellenistic cultural and economic scene, but also the unwillingness of that same community to stand by its conservative national, religious and cultural antecedents.

In a perceptive comment on the revolt which was to follow under Judas Maccabaeus and his brothers, and which itself need not concern us in detail, John Bright observes: "Antiochus was probably never able to understand why his actions (in setting up the new worship) should have evoked such irreconcilable hostility among the Jews".[44]

From the Jewish point of view the pressures to revolt can be summarised under three main headings. First there was the enmity between the Tobiad and Oniad parties of the priestly aristocracy which split the population of Jerusalem into factions in the manner of the later Roman trouble between the supporters of Clodius and Milo. These factions had, as we noted, in view of the political alliegiances of their leaders, divided the city into Ptolemaic and Seleucid camps, at least by 170 BC, and probably before. To this schism had been added all the bitterness caused by the contest for the high priesthood between Jason and Menelaus, together with the religious and social debasement of the office as a result of the bribery which had accompanied the contest. The contest

resulted in the highest bidder, Menelaus, being allied to the Seleucid king so that he was no longer his own agent but the pawn of Seleucid policy. This further alienated his opponents. The apparent seizure of gold from the Babylonian priests of E- Sagila, whom Antiochus IV had just appointed, seems to be another indication not only of a more tightly-controlled priesthood but of its manipulation.[44a]

Second, the population of Jerusalem and of Judaea as a whole was divided into the rich merchant and priestly aristocracy and the relatively poor 'Am Ha Ares' the people of the soil, and this carried religious overtones which were presently to emerge in the personnel of the Maccabean party. The alliance of 'godly' with 'poor' against 'ungodly' with 'rich' is common to the Bible as a whole but particularly common in this period, in view of the orthodox Judaism of the poorer classes and the pseudo-Hellenism of the aristocracy. This socio-economic gulf was a permanent feature of the Jewish state at the time,[45] and combined with the religious factors we have indicated to make the division almost unbridgeable.

Third, this religious difference was accentuated by the fear of godly Jews that the purity of Jewish religion was being tarnished by contact with the Hellenistic religious liberalism. The acceleration of the hellenising process from 175 to 170 will have deepened this fear of being surrounded by hostile religious forces, even though these outside 'religions', being differently conceived, may have had no real intention of interfering in Jewish religion as such. The objection of gentile nations towards the Jewish people, which has regrettably and demonstrably become a feature of history, was a social antipathy as well as a religious one, even though religion may have caused it. The reaction of the merchant class against the separatism implied in the Ezraonic reforms, however understandable it may have been, gave a possibility of exposure to syncretistic trends among that class which was not the case with orthodox Jewish believers. The introduction of the altar of Zeus Olympius with its

concomitant worship of the royal cult was not taken by the Jews as lightly as it was by Greeks who had a long tradition of formal political worship. This meant that from an orthodox Jewish point of view, pagan worship was now installed; and insofar as the hellenisers in Jerusalem had not volubly objected, this new cult was allowed to become an unwelcome bedfellow to the Jewish religion. This religious innovation speeded up the process of syncretism until it was out of control, and in a religion-orientated state all the obvious social and political consequences followed.

Fourth, Jews following the deep-rooted and splendidly-expounded religious traditions and beliefs of contemporary orthodox Judaism had reason to become very dissatisfied with the quality of life under Syrian Hellenism - for which Antiochus IV was not, of course, wholly responsible, but which he sought to put in place of traditional Jewish culture and religion (in themselves almost interdependent entities). Posidonius of Apamea gives a vivid picture of a small campaign in latter-day Syria, 50 years on from this Antiochus, which casts doubts on the hardihood and 'arete' of the Syria of Antiochus' own earlier days.[46] It is, of course, possible that Antiochus meant to change all this on to a higher, and not just a tighter cultural level. But this same passage of Posidonius could equally well be used as evidence that in the end that attempt failed. It is not true to allege generally that this was the fate of Seleucid culture on the Asian continent: Parthian Dura and Kushan Surkh Kotal alike bear witness, as do many facets of Taxila and Turkmenistan, to the staying power of Greek language, institutions and coinage in former Seleucid territories. It can, however, be argued that the Syrian brand of Greek culture was threatened by internal problems much more basic than foreign attack or an abandonment consciously of 5th century Athenian ideals. Syria was just rich. The Posidonius quotation again makes this point: of an effete rather than a desperate society; and in the pompe at Daphne, to be noted presently, we see another confirmation of this superabundance.

Under Antiochus I, in 268 there had been repairs to the Babylonian temple at Borsippa, and Babylonian life and religion seems to have revived under the early Seleucids;[47] but the deterioration in culture, as the Jews saw it operating in 168, is a powerful case for the Maccabees' opposition to the hellenistic way of life. And it was also a reason for their objection to any specific reforms its protagonists might wish to introduce - particularly if accompanied, as in the gezerot, with the threat of force, in itself a sharply untypical action for a Greek government to take towards the beliefs and culture of a native state, and a course of action furthermore which seems to have been specifically ruled out by undertakings given by earlier Seleucid rulers.[48] It is an activity which is paralleled by civic reconstruction of a hellenic character at Babylon and dubious royal appointments to the post of High Priest, as well as likely seizure of temple finances there also under Antiochus IV.[49] It is not difficult to conclude that a part of the reason for the Persecution Decrees was the attitude already taken up towards the conservative element - who would wish to stand up for the purity of the Jewish religion as they had come to understand it - by their own fellow-countrymen whose cultural aspirations found in this religious conservatism an obstacle which would have to be removed, and in Antiochus an agent whom they could employ to remove it.

According to the tradition preserved in I Maccabees, our best historical source for the revolt, hostilities began as the result of the demand of one of Antiochus' officers that Mattathias of the House of Hashmon should offer swine's flesh on the altar and repudiate the Jewish religion as he saw it (I Macc. 2, 15). From his refusal to sacrifice, and the death of the king's agent which ensued, the revolt grew, as those willing to fight for the traditional Jewish faith took to the country and the hills. The house of Mattathias is said to have been at Modiin, which is near the hills on the western side of the central plain of Palestine.

The skirmishes in which the rebels were involved gradually

grew in importance and in ferocity: and on the death of Mattathias, Judas Maccabaeus was made the commander of the insurrection: Judas was nicknamed Maccabaeus, possibly from מַקָּבָה hammer. The rebel army was joined by a number of Jewish religious zealots, the Hasidim, who may be said to be the intellectual vanguard of their day and the true spiritual leaders of the nation[50]: the determination and piety of many of these people is shown by their refusal to fight on the sabbath day and their consequent slaughter (I Macc. 2, 29 - 38). This passive resistance on the sabbath gave way to a resolve to kill or be killed, and it became the practice of Judas' army to massacre in return, to fight on the sabbath and forcibly to circumcise children. In the sporadic engagements with the Syrians which took place at that time the Maccabees easily beat Seron and Apollonius.[51]

Judas was able to rally those of the population of Judaea who opposed the hellenisation policy - or, following an early line of reasoning, who opposed those who for their own ulterior motives wished it to succeed. Those who did not so object fled to the Greek cities, particularly to the west and north of Judaea, the Decapolis. In the ensuing period Judaea was gradually won back for Judaism, and Judas' irregulars became consolidated into a national liberation army, while Mispeh functioned as their temporary national centre. At this point Antiochus left Antioch for the north and east, leaving the regent Lysias in charge of the country as the guardian of his son, the young Antiochus. And it is, therefore, also at this point that we will follow him to see what the implications of his eastern schemes might be. It should be emphasised that our sources are scattered or imperfect, and the proponents of one line are as suspect as those they criticise. There are, however, one or two fixed points.

In 166 Antiochus held a splendid parade and festival in the sanctuary of Apollo at Daphne on the outskirts of Antioch,[52] and we are at once on the track of an argument as to what the games and

festivities were actually celebrating. The received account in Athenaeus[53] dwells on the splendours of the festival, and Polybius' account which is reproduced in it, includes specifically Polybian understandings of its significance - that it was for example intended to outshine the triumph of Aemilius Paullus for his victory at Pydna. It really is too much to make it into a similar set-piece, in this instance for Antiochus' own victory in Egypt. If he were wise enough to obey the requirements of Popillius, then he would hardly regard the Egyptian operation as a triumph in these terms. Nor does the view that it was all done to outpoint the Romans contain much worth if it is also asserted, as it is and I think quite correctly,[53a] that Antiochus' main preoccupation was not to offend the Romans. The Romans did indeed attend, and regarded it as impressive and not impudent: Polybius speaks of Tiberius Gracchus' satisfaction at the attitude and demeanour of Antiochus, on a visit paid to discover the position,[54] but Walbank's point - that it is unlikely that Gracchus was as simple, or Antiochus as Machiavellian as Polybius suggests - is very convincing.

So if not a triumph for Egypt, and if not a crude overtopping of Aemilius Paullus, then what? A huge propaganda venture is suggested,[55] and it may well be so, but surely not without some specific cause which it could depend upon and in some way extol. For its own sake it would cause more ill-feeling than it was worth in a power which, like Rome, needed pacification. So we come to the less obvious conclusions in search of a solution whose logic will stand up to examination more securely, even if the evidence for it is more circumstantial.

Antiochus set out for the East after the festival at Daphne and celebrated Charisteria (thank offerings) in Babylon in September 166, or they were celebrated for him, and in the inscription which informs us of this, Antiochus was hailed as 'saviour of Asia'.[56] Any attempt to relate this to events in Egypt or Coele-Syria, is, if it refers to

celebrations in Babylon, fraught with obvious difficulties, including the one that in both places he had been far from being the saviour of anything except his own skin. It is always instructive in a lightly explored area of history to discover what else was going on in the wider Greek world at about this time. And it is here that we meet again the Greek enterprise in the far East, in Bactria, which our sources are beginning to illuminate more clearly as the years pass.

There was indeed victorious Greek action here which we shall look at in more detail in the next chapter. But the suggestion was made at a relatively early stage in Greco-Bactrian studies[57] that Antiochus might perhaps have had a hand in the lightning success of Eucratides, a Greek usurper who dealt a blow to the continuity of Euthydemid power in Bactria and overthrew the line, killing Demetrius the son of Euthydemus I before being himself eventually assassinated in the particularly bloodthirsty way which tended to distinguish the Bactrian Greeks. (Justin XLl, 6, 5.)

The circumstantial evidence for this hypothesis of Antiochus' involvement in the affairs of Bactria is growing, not receding. One small detail is the observation by M. Paul Bernard, the excavator of Ai Khanum, that Greek Corinthian pillar capitals there seem to demonstrate the style of Decimus Cossutius, the Roman architect of Antiochus' temple of Olympian Zeus at Athens.[58] The argumentation for this connection partly depends on the possible relations between the Seleucids as a house and the coin portraits of Eucratides.[59] Basically as far as this section of our work is concerned, the thesis of Tarn was that the Charisteria celebrated for Antiochus at Babylon was a thanksgiving for the success of Eucratides who, if he were Antiochus' regent in the East, could claim his success against the Euthydemids to have been in part a Seleucid victory - and therefore a partial restoration of formerly lost territory. If Eucratides were to have set off from Babylon on this enterprise in 168, as Tarn suggests, the timing of the Charisteria at

Babylon would exactly fit the position politically and militarily in Bactria in 166. It is not necessary to make Antiochus out to be a 'man of quite extraordinary visions',[60] or indeed to imply that he was not. An eastern policy is a very possible explanation, both of the Charisteria and of Eucratides' episode in Bactria. It is not necessary either to make the argumentation for this link to depend on the Laodice on one of Eucratides' coins being a Seleucid princess, or to discard the hypothesis because such a relationship is thought to be unproveable.[60a] It is circumstantial evidence and no more - but it is interesting. And the bead-edging of this pedigree-coin is thoroughly Seleucid in any case. Taken in conjunction with the extensiveness of his coinage and the probable dates of his reign, it is very interesting indeed. It is said that he founded a city Eucratideia, and suggestions have been made that Ai Khanum, as Alexandria Oxiana refounded, might be that city.[61] I think we now have to say that the overthrow of Tarn's theory, and of the chronology on which he based it, is now much less secure than it once was.

Antiochus' recorded exploits in the East after Daphne included an attack upon Armenia: "Artaxias, the king of Armenia, broke away from Antiochus, founded a city named after himself and assembled a powerful army. Antiochus, whose strength at this period was unmatched by any of the other kings, marched against him, and was victorious and reduced him to submission".[62] In the meantime a disastrous campaign took place in Judaea during which the nationalist army, as it now was, inflicted defeats on Nicanor and Gorgias, Antiochus' Syrian Generals, and the guardian of Antiochus V, Lysias, was held up by the Jewish garrison of the fortress of Beth Zur.[63]

After the Armenian campaign, Antiochus undertook an expedition against the Eastern provinces of his empire as it existed at that time, and this may have been limited to a policing action or an expedition to insist on the payment of tribute. Good reasons have been

given against its being an expedition to deal with the Parthians.[64] Certainly the impression is strong both that Antiochus was not ready, and would not have wanted, at least at that juncture, to attack the Parthians, and that Mithridates I did not then for various reasons wish to attack him. Mithridates' northern border was becoming increasingly hard pressed itself by the nomad incursions. These were not to become critical until about 134, but the pressure had by 165 or thereabouts built up behind the Parthian northern (and Eastern) boundaries to the point where the Yueh-chi and the Sacas constituted a formidable hostile force. Quite apart from the question of Antiochus' power, the pressure on Parthia from that quarter alone will have been enough to prevent her involving herself in dangerous exercises against the erratic Seleucid. The existence of an inscription on a rock relief at the Bisutun Rock on the road between Hamadan and Kermanshah seems to confirm that Media was in Seleucid hands at this time, and does seem also to underline the lull in Parthian activity until at least the summer of 148.[65] The value of this inscription is strong and crucial and gives new significance also to the remains of the Greek cities at Nihavend (Laodicea) and Kangavar. Apart from any other considerations, the mountain barrier of the Zagros marks a rocky western boundary to the wide plains of Media; and the terrain changes now in a definite way from the scrub and fairly sparse grazing land of today's western Iran to the foothills over which the main road to Hamadan now winds, and so further west and north to the mountains of Kurdistan. It does have the feeling of a psychological barrier as well as a merely physical one.

One Philip was appointed as regent of the kingdom while Antiochus was in the East, and this was contested by Lysias who at this point in time was involved in the siege of the Maccabean fortress at Beth Zaccariah in Judaea. Antiochus himself took part in an expedition against the sanctuary of Artemis-Nanaia in Elymais, east of Susa. In itself an illustration of the religious syncretism which Antiochus had

not apparently so far attacked and had, therefore, presumably approved - the sanctuary was a fatal attraction, in view of the widespread middle-eastern custom of those days of using the temple sanctuaries rather like banks. And it was, naturally enough, defended with a zeal which reflected the religious fervour of the worshippers, hardy mountain people.[66] Polybius and the author of I Maccabees alike report the failure of this expedition and the ensuing death of Antiochus at a place in Iran variously reported as Gabae and Tabae: the actual modern location could be Isfahan, with which Gabae has been identified.[67] A possibility that this account could be a 'double' of the account of Antiochus III's death has been proposed and successfully rebutted:[68] a money shortage was common to them both - as was temple-looting.

With his death the real opposition to Parthia, again psychological as well as physical, was removed; and between 161 and 142 Parthian power grew to be too strong to be resisted by the Seleucids despite various valiant and partially successful expeditions, notably under the last great Seleucid king Antiochus VII Sidetes.

Although it would be true to say that the manner of Antiochus' repulse from Elymais was symptomatic of his attitude to native religion in the latter part of his reign, which he never really understood and which was to play a substantial part in the undoing of his dynasty, the actual pressures for the Seleucid decline, to which his reign seems to have given a new twist, were of longer standing and are simply accentuated by the position he found himself in in 163. His seizure of the Seleucid throne in the place of Seleucus IV's son, the legitimate heir,[69] marks the start of a series of dynastic feuds which never stopped until Antiochus XIII, incredibly named Asiaticus, and Philip II went down before the might of Pompey. Unable to see the long-term dangers of superficially-attractive expedients, he was to show a degree of political rashness in this aspect of his policies which contrasts oddly with his statesmanlike treatment of Popillius at Eleusis, and indeed the Romans and Parthians generally. If we

leave the question of his 'Ost-Politik' as a moot point in default of convincing evidence, it still leaves us with a monarch of ability and shrewdness and yet with an enigmatic opacity in questions in which he might be most personally or emotionally involved. His religious identification with the cult of Zeus Olympius shows that he did concern himself with some religious questions and that his treatment of religious issues was not, therefore, wholly that of petulance or ignorance: it would more likely have been the result of conviction. This goes some way to disturbing the easy rationale that the Maccabean revolt was a purely political revolt against his socio-political schemes: it largely was, but not completely.

More tangible echoes of Antiochus' stormy reign can be found in his coins and in various artefacts displayed among other places in the Iran Bastan Museum in Teheran. At Shami in Iran, sited near Malamir in the Bakhtiari mountains, was found the great bronze statue which Ghirshman suggests may be an effigy of Dionysus: it is more obviously a portrait of a Parthian prince. Also at Shami were found the various fragments of large bronze statues of Zeus and Dionysus, and a face mask in bronze of a Seleucid monarch, probably Antiochus himself; it is an interesting side-light on Antiochus' religious policies in the East that he is on record[70] as having built two temples at Shami, which were later destroyed or at least pillaged by Mithridates I during his attack on Elymais. In itself this action was the result of the local population's refusal to recognise the new Parthian dynasty: not an indication of widespread hatred of Antiochus, even in Iran, or of Demetrius II, from whom this territory was conquered in 139 BC.

Beside the task of consolidating the Seleucid Empire, Antiochus' apparent requirement for money does have political implications. He apparently still owed the Romans 2,000 talents of the Apamean indemnity;[71] and Jansen believed that the Romans had, therefore, a moral right to intervene in Syria's politics,[72] increasing their pressure

on Antiochus for that reason amongst other ones: they would feel they had to guard against wastage on army or fleet. The position Rome had achieved in Asia Minor, Greece and Macedonia was well-known personally to Antiochus and will have caused many problems of a personal psychological nature in addition to the obvious difficulties of running a large heterogeneous state under these conditions.

Notes for Chapter V.

1. The terms are detailed in Polybius XXI, 42 f.; Livy XXXVIII, 38 and Appian, Syriaca 39. On the Treaty see McDonald in JRS 1967 and on the Naval Clauses: McDonald and Walbank, JRS 1969.

2. See Tenney Frank: 'Roman Imperialism', New York, 1929, generally and also Edwyn Bevan: The House of Seleucus II, p. 116, and in particular the comments by W. V. Harris in 'War and Imperialism.' Also all the material assembled in Chapter III.

3. By the terms of the Treaty, Pergamum received substantial territorial gains, so much so that its kingdom latterly included most of late Seleucid Asia Minor: Polybius XXI, 45, 9. On the general terms of the settlement Walbank III, p. 164 f.

4. E. R. Bevan: The House of Seleucus II, p. 121: see Polybius' reference to the coming and going of envoys between Seleucus and the Achaeans, Polybius XXII, 7, 4.

5. Livy XXXIX, 51, 1 - 12. Walbank III p. 221 charts the different possible objectives of this embassy: the death of Hannibal or the ending of Eumenes' war v. Prusias.

6. Bevan: The House of Seleucus, Volume II, p. 124.

7. Appian: Syriaca 45.

8. Daniel, 11, 20: on this view of Seleucus see V. Tcherikover: Hellenistic Civilisation and the Jews, Philadelphia, 1961, p. 157.

9. This Treaty provision in Polybius XXI, 42, 12 - 13.

9a. I am not impressed by the arguments advanced by J. W. Swain that Seleucus was <u>at that stage of his reign</u> desperate for money. He must have accumulated all that Antiochus IV was so patently to inherit. So I am not persuaded that Heliodorus raided the temple with Seleucus' impious connivance. (Swain, p. 77).

10. II Maccabees, 3. See on Seleucus IV the inscription in L. Robert Hellenica VII, p. 22 f (Teheran).

11. Appian: Syriaca, 45. Sachs and Wiseman: 'A Babylonian King - List of the Hellenistic Period'. IRAQ XVI, 1954. p. 208. = Sept. 2 or 3, 175. A. Aymard "Du nouveau sur la chronologie des Seleucides", p. 109, notes that Seleucus 'died', but accepts he was killed.

11a. The inscription recorded in OGIS, 248 contains a decree of the Athenian Athenian people in honour of Eumenes , thanking him for the assistance given to Antiochus in the expulsion of Heliodorus.

12. Tarn rejects this attribution of guilt to Antiochus, which he dates to about 170 - 169, just before the first Egyptian Campaign. Tarn: The Greeks in Bactria and India, Cambs., 1953, p. 190. Sachs and Wiseman: Op. cit., p. 208 agree Antiochus was responsible (in July/Aug. 170).

Notes for Chapter V - continued.

12a. A. Aymard noticed the difficulty about the 'Son' of the cuneiform tablet and the 'nephew' of Appian. He proposes that the two are conflated, but points out that the murder of the nephew is much more likely: a slight exoneration of Antiochus. REA 1958 p. 110 - 112.

13. In I Macc. and II Macc. in many places, also Jos. Antiquities, Diodorus, Polybius and Appian (Syriaca). Bouché-Leclerq, Toynbee, H. L. Jansen and Mørkholm are interesting examples of assessment of his character. Edwyn Bevan's in H. Sel. II, 128 f. is memorable. V. Tcherikover is very thorough. See especially Livy XLI, 20 and the fragments of Polybius XXVI preserved in Athenaeus X, 439a.

14. An enormous literature on Antiochus and the Jews; pride of place must surely go to E. Bickermann: "Der Gott Der Makkabäer", and V. Tcherikover, Op. cit., O. Mørkholm is the fullest recent treatment, but is strangely unsympathetic in parts. Martin Hengel:"Judaism and Hellenism",2 vols. London 1978, covers all the ground discursively.

14a. A balanced view of the evidence in J. W. Swain: Antiochus Epiphanes and Egypt. Class Phil. XXXIX. 1944.

14b. Josephus Antiquities XII, 132 ff.

15. See on all this Tcherikover, op. cit., New light has since been thrown on the ramifications of Antiochus' policies, supplied mainly by a consideration of his eastern strategy, q.v.

16. Josephus. Antiquities XII, 229.

17. Tarn, op. cit., p. 191.

17a. Polybius XXIX, 2, 1 - 4.

18. Θεος Επιφανης 'the god manifest', clearly ran counter to the provisions of the first commandment, Ex. 20, 3, and the author of the contemporary Book of Daniel was not slow to notice the arrogance that this implied - or was thought to imply.

18a. Josephus: Antiquities XII, 237 f.

18b. On the life and structure of a Hellenistic πολις see the Excursus.

19. II Macc, 4. 12.

20. II Macc, 4, 22.

21. See p. 142 f.

21a. Josephus Antiquities XII, 230 f: See the explanatory note in the Loeb Josephus Antiquities, p. 117, note c.

22. II Macc. 4, 37.

23. II Macc. 4, 47.

24. H. L. Jansen: "Die Politik Antiokos des IV", Oslo, 1943.

25. Polybius XXVIII, 1, 6; for the campaign generally XXVIII, 19 f. very much from Polybius' urbane philo-Roman standpoint.

26. Pol. XXVIII, 21, 1. Diodorus Siculus XXX, 17.

27. I Macc. 1, 20 - 24.

28. Mørkholm: "Antiochus IV of Syria", p. 69, note 21 relating to the important papyrological date in Papyri Rylands IV, (1952) No. 583, and Skeat's harmony of dates in JEA. 1961 (107 - 112).

29. Mørkholm, op. cit., p. 71. Moshe Pearlman in "The Maccabees", London and Jerusalem, 1973, omits any Egyptian provocation at all, and any mention of Antiochus' embassy to Rome, referring to his invasion of Egypt as though it were an unprovoked attack. His treatment of Antiochus generally is in keeping with this uncritical attitude.

30. Polybius XXIX, 25, 3 - 4.

31. Noted by Mørkholm, op. cit., p. 87.

32. E. R..Bevan: "A History of Egypt under the Ptolemaic Dynasty", London, 1927, p. 285, Livy, XLV, 11. Justin XXXIV, 2.

33. Polybius XXIX, 2, 1 - 4 (Splendid translation by W. R. Paton in Loeb. Walbank III, p. 362 agrees with Swain Op. cit., that Popillius may have been dispatched before the Senate knew of the reconciliation of the Ptolemies and Antiochus' return to Syria. It is a crucial point.

34. Livy XLIV, 37.

35. Polybius XXIX, 27, 8: Justin XXXIV, 3, 2, tries to exonerate Popillius. On the meeting and implications, Walbank III, p. 403 f, who thinks (p. 405) that a fixed number of days was written in to the 'Senatus consultus'.

36. Arnold Toynbee: "Hellenism: the history of civilisation", Oxford, 1939, p. 162.

37. J. C. Dancy: "A Commentary on I Maccabees: Oxford, 1954, p. 70. Mørkholm, op. cit., p. 96, gives a very sound summary of the arguments in favour of Antiochus doing what he did.

37a. J. W. Swain 'Antiochus Epiphanes in Egypt', C.Phil.1944, p. 87.

38. For instance, Mørkholm, op. cit., p. 144, I. Macc. 1, 29; II Macc. 5, 5f. Swain doubts the connection, and says Antiochus wanted to go east, and left Egypt for that reason primarily (p. 84).

39. Schürer was certain of this connection on the basis of Dan. XI, 30 f. "A History of the Jewish people in the time of Jesus Christ", Edinburgh, 1890, Div. 1, p. 206, note 32, New Edn.

40. Josephus, Bellum Judaicum I, 31 f.

40a. See G. Widengren: "Quelques rapports entre juifs et iraniens a l'epoque des Parthes". Supplement to Vetus Testamentum 4, 1956, p. 197 - 241.

41. I Macc. 1, 41, 42. R.S.V.

Notes for Chapter V - continued.

42. I Macc. 1, 43, although see concerning Babylon my comments on p. 111 and in 49 below.

43. II Macc, 5, 24 - 26.

44. John Bright: "A History of Israel", London, 1961, p. 407.

44a. See note 49 below.

45. M. Rostovtzeff: S.E.H. II, Oxford, 1953, p. 705: As H. Kreissig points out in "Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft im Seleukidenreich" (Passim), this was usual in the Hellenistic world - from a Marxist standpoint.

46. Posidonius Ap. Frags. 31 and 33 (F.H.G. ed Jacoby, 86, 20 - 22).

47. S. K. Eddy: The King is dead. p. 117.

48. Josephus, Antiquities XII, 142.

49. Cuneiform tablet in T. G. Pinches: Historical Records and legends of Assyria and Babylonia 1903, No. 553, in S. K. Eddy, op. cit., p. 135 - 6.

50. V. Tcherikover: "Hellenistic Civilisation and the Jews", p. 198, (sc. Daniel 11, 33).

51. I Macc. 3, 10 - 14.

52. See Mørkholm's important observations in 'Antiochus IV', p. 98, n. 37 on the dating of the pageant,

53. Athen, X, 439 b. and Athenaeus v, 194 - 5.
Polybius XXX, 25, 1 - 26, 9.
See again Mørkholm: ibid. Launey rebuts Tarn's point that the display shows a marked Seleucid recovery (Launey ; 319. Tarn GBI, 186).

53a. Tarn: The Greeks in Bactria and India , p. 190.

54. Polybius XXX, 27. Walbank III, 454.

55. A much more sober proposition occurs in E. Will'Histoire Politique II', p. 290, that this festival was no doubt the prelude to 'This new Anabasis ', which he goes on to justify on the grounds that Rome would not object to schemes which took Antiochus out of the Mediterannean scene for a few years!

So Mørkholm: op. cit., p. 99.

56. O.G.I.S. I, 253: line 2 begins σωτηρος της Ασιας.

57. Sir George MacDonald in C.H.I. p. 454, London and Bombay, 1922. The thesis, as developed by Tarn (Greeks) was opposed by Altheim and Narain . E. Will: Hist. Pol. Vol. II, p. 295.

Notes for Chapter V - continued.

58. Paul Bernard: "Ai Khanum on the Oxus: A Hellenistic City in Central Asia", British Academy, 1967. Much more fully in P. Barnard: "Chapiteaux Corinthiens hellenistiques d'Asie Centrale decouvertes à Aikhanum". Syria XLV, 146 - 151, 1968.

59. The argument fully set out in Tarn: "The Greeks in Bactria and India", Cambs. 1953, p. 196 f.
It is also interesting to note that the only Greek rulers to use an Elephant's head as a coin-type are Antiochus IV and Demetrius I of Bactria: R. Plant. 'Greek Coin Types', London 1979, p. 70, Nos. 1088 and 1089.

60. Mørkholm: op. cit., p. 175.

60a. In Charles Edson's review of the 2nd Edition of 'The Greeks' we are reminded of Antiochus III's Nihavend inscription (q.v.) which does indeed point to the existence in the upper Satrapies in the Spring of 193 of a 'very prominent lady Laodice.' He points out that the probability is high of her being the mother of Eucratides. C. Edson. Class Ph.7. 1954, p. 116.
The coin appears in P. Gardner : Catalogue of Coins in the British Museum. Greek and Scythian Kings of Bactria and India, London 1886, plate VI, 9 and 10. c/

61. By the writer in a letter to M. Wheeler and by M. Wheeler in an address to the A.G.M. of the British School in Athens, 8th February 1966, and in a subsequent letter to the writer. More detail from the excavations is eagerly awaited, but a lot has already been published by Klingsieck in 1974, and the various issues of CRAI referred to, or quoted in, this work and cited in the Bibliography. Ptolemy V, 12, 6. The chronology of Aï khanum matches this view: 'vers 150'. CRAI. 1976, p. 288.

62. Diodorus Siculus XXXI, 17a (Loeb Ed. RR. Walton) Harvard, 1957.

63. 126 coins found there 'belong to the reign of Antiochus IV and V. W. F. Albright: The Archaeology of Palestine, Harmondsworth, 1960, p. 150 - 2.

64. Ecbatana appears to have minted for the Greeks until the reign of Alex/Balas (150 - 145) E. T. Newell. E.S.M.
Le Rider: Suse. Seems to see Mithridates I as the fundamental cause: p. 311 f.

65. The dedication reads: Ἔτους ϡξϛ', μηνὸς Πανήμου, Ἡρακλῆν Καλλινίκου Ὑάκινθος Πανταύχου ὑπὲρ τῆς κλεομένου του ἐπὶ τὴν ἄνω σατραπείαν σωτηρίας
quoted in Mørkholm, op. cit., p. 178; Gnomon, 1963.

Notes for Chapter V - continued.

66. Polybius XXXI, 9 and I Macc. 6, 2. H. L. Jansen: "Die Politik Antiokos des IV", also Walbank III, p. 473 - 4. The date is about November or December, 164.
See also 'La Mort d'Antiochus IV Epiphanes' and Holleaux' remarks there.

67. Mørkholm opts for Tabae in his chronological table: op. cit., p. 171 and 173.

68. By M. Holleaux in the work quoted above: the proposal was by Bouché-Leclerq: Histoire des Seleucides I, 223 - 4 and 297 - 298.

69. And its corollary in Antiochus' elimination in 170 of this boy, with whom he had been ruling as Regent - if one accepts that he was responsible, which is not absolutely necessary. The birth in 173 of the future Antiochus V merely made the split permanent between the disposessed House of Seleucus IV and that of Antiochus IV; and pretenders arose in consequence.

70. In Ghirshman: "Iran: Parthians and Sassanians", London, p. 21.

71. II Macc. 8, 10. The trustworthiness of II Macc. is often suspect.

72. H. L. Jansen: "Die Politik Antiokos des IV", Oslo., 1943.

Chapter VI.

The Seleucid East: Parthia And Bactria.

1. The Nomad Problem at 163.

The last hundred and fifty years of Greek rule in the East was intimately bound up with the problems created by increasing nomad activity on the northern and eastern borders of Bactria and Parthia. This stemmed from the military situation in China. The Former Han dynasty in central and north-western China had been troubled militarily since the accession of Mao-Tun as the Shanyu or great chief of the Hsiung-nu in about 206 BC.[1] It was against the Hsiung-nu pressure on Han domains that the Great Wall of China was originally built. Mao-Tun turned the internal organisation of the tribe and its military expertise, including the use of a much improved and strengthened bow, into a determined activist policy, not really, so far as we can discover, from conscious foreign policy motives but from a need for Lebensraum, as the Han effectively blocked any further progress to the East and the Gobi Desert lay to the north.

In the south west part of the Gobi, however, around Lop Nor, lived the Yueh Chi, a large confederation of Nomad people who would automatically be touched by any Western expansion of the newly-militant Hsiung-nu. In about 200 this began to happen for the foregoing reasons, and many neighbouring peoples were subjugated between 200 and 175. In 177 - 6 this led to war with the Yueh chi who were temporarily subjugated. Under Mao-Tun's successor Lao Shang, who reigned about 174 - 160, prolonged and bitter fighting between the Hsiung-nu and the Yueh chi led to the defeat of the Yueh chi tribe, as recounted in the Shi-ki.[2]

As a direct consequence of this war the Yueh chi left their home territory in the south west of Kansu province and headed in a body slowly westwards. One group went to north-eastern Tibet: and these, known as the Little Yueh chi, settled near the Richhofen Range there.

The rest, the Great Yueh-chi, went west, defeating the Saca (Sai or Sok) in the area of the northern Tien Shan, on the upper Ili Valley and subsequently dislodged them too, so that the growing succession of Nomad migrations caused a chain-reaction and the Saca also began to move in a generally westward direction. The Chien-han-Shu[3] tells us that some of these became amalgamated with the Yueh chi.

In this region, near the Alexandrowski Range, they came into conflict with the resident tribe there around the north shore of Lake Issyk Kul, the Wu-Sun people. Only this time, instead of the Wu Sun themselves moving west, it defeated the Yueh chi and sent them forward again, in two directions: west again towards Bactria and south-west, with mainly Saca components, towards Chi-Pin (Arachosia), of which this group went on to make a complete conquest; and Arachosia, and the land to the south of it, became Sacastan. In the meanwhile war between the Wu Sun and the Ta (Great) Yueh chi had led to the death of the Wu Sun chief, and the capture of his son by the Hsiung-nu chief, who brought up the child to be a resolute and successful military commander who eventually defeated the Great Yueh-chi, sending them over the Oxus River into Bactria where they settled.[4]

In the course of his pioneering work on the Iranians and Greeks in South Russia, Rostovtzeff[5] discusses the question of the Sarmatian movements westwards to the Russian Black Sea Coast, and all the cultural consequences which stemmed from this movement. He also examines the influence of Iran on the customs of the Han dynasty during this period, and says that certain features of the life of this dynasty cannot be explained without this influence. He says: "I maintain that the whole military life of China was reorganised by the kings of the Han dynasty on Iranian lines. The Iranian influence reached China not directly from Parthia or Bactria but through the medium of the Sarmatian tribes, many of which beyond doubt took part in the Hunnish assaults on China."[6]

The work of Sulimirski[7] in recent years has greatly amplified and enlightened our knowledge of the Sarmatians in those critical years during the first half of the second century, when it must have seemed that the world was on the move. It was a restless background against which the Hellenistic world was to go through its difficult years. Rostovtzeff takes care to make the vital point that the Sarmatians were in no way destructive barbarians but 'brought to Europe the achievements of Iranian culture',[8] and that their aim was not, when they reached it, the abolition of Greek civilisation on the Bosphorus - or anywhere else - but a kind of symbiosis: 'they fought with the Greeks, but never because they were bent on destroying or subduing the Greek cities'.[9] Connections of many kinds have been made between what is known as the Scythian animal style and the general koine of nomad art forms in the culture of the Sarmatians and the Scythians who preceded them, and the Parthians who were their Eastern neighbours.[10]

The Sarmatian question is an issue in any discussion of the nomadic situation affecting the Seleucid Empire, because they marked for hundreds of years, from the late fourth century BC until the mid-first century or thereabouts the westward limit of a possible western expansion of the Hsiung nu, the Yueh chi and their associated tribes. In fact, as we have seen, the Yueh-chi went to Bactria and the north of India. The Hsiung-nu appear to have remained as a threat to the Former Han well into the first century BC., and for that reason ceased to be a westward-moving threat to Greeks and Parthians. The vexed question of their relationship with the Huns of the Roman centuries AD. has really now been solved by the comparative work of various scholars,[11] and we have arrived at the view that there was no cohesive horde of Hsiung-nu who would have remained far enough west as a distinct people to have become the ancestors of the Huns. Some, however, may have been absorbed by Iranian and Sarmatian peoples generally, and out of that mixed population the Huns seem to have emerged.

The most attractive solution is that proposed by Maenchen-Helfen who says:[12]

"1. The theory that the Huns originally came from the far east cannot be supported by any direct or indirect literary or archaeological evidence.

2. There is no evidence to demonstrate that the Huns and the Hsiung-nu spoke the same language.[13]

3. The art of the Huns, so far as it is known, was fundamentally different from that of the Hsiung-nu".[14]

The splendid work done on the general field of Nomad Art and its cultural effects and preconditions, in particular the examination of Hsiung-nu artistic remains at Lop Nor and in the Ordos bronzes, has really opened up a new chapter in our way of looking at nomadic people in a field where classical scholarship requires this knowledge. We will return to the question they posed for the Greeks in Bactria presently.

Meanwhile further west, in the territories into which Parthia had now expanded, Parthian civilisation itself was having to make its accommodation with the Hellenistic world. It is now time to examine what kind of a civilisation the Parni brought with them, and what they managed to evolve when settled. Their first capital in any sense of the word was Nisa in the south of present-day Soviet Russia. Parthian Nisa had three main parts: a citadel, pentagonal in plan, covering more than ten acres and built on a natural crag; the town itself; and the urban precinct with its defensive wall: Mihrdatkart, the 'royal city' with the burial place and the treasury of the Parthian kings was nearby. In the square hall, about 3rd century BC., were founded some remarkable marble statues, probably imported from Seleucid Syria, including one of a goddess wringing out her hair. The crowning glory of the excavations at Nisa is, however, probably the rhytons, horn-shaped vessels, standing some 20 inches high, decorated with protomes of centaurs and griffins - and these vessels also exhibit masks, scenes of Bacchus' festivities and representations of Zeus, Hera and Athene, Apollo and so on. The purpose of these rhytons was in

connection with ceremonial and sacrificial libations. From this and similar finds in contemporary Parthian settlements has been built up a picture of Parthia in its Philhellenic period with a Grecizing portrait-style and a competent assimilation of the Greek language[15] which was to remain long after the philhellenism had been eroded by conquest and by the evolution of indigenous art and architectural concepts and forms, such as frontality and the creation of the Iwan.

The first of six ostraka in Aramaic was discovered in the Autumn of 1948 on the site of 'New Nisa', South of the citadel: later, in 1951, nearly 150 more were brought to light at Old Nisa, and the total unearthed now passes 'un millier'. M. Sznycer: 'Ostraka d'epoque Parthe trouvées a Nisa' includes text and translation from I. M. Diakonov's first samples: the Ostraka were from taxes on wines from royal vineyards, and are dated, as are the Parthian texts from Avroman in Khurdistan, to 83 - 64 BC.[16]

The present city of Shahr-i-Rey, or the city of Rayy, became a Parthian city some time in the early part of the second century, although there is quite a lot of discussion about the speed of the Parthian advance. While the Parthians occupied it, they took steps to fortify the existing city which had previously been rebuilt by Seleucus I, and to build temples there. The city later became the spring residence of the Parthian kings and was described by Isidore of Charax as the greatest city in Media.[17] Its previous name under Seleucus I had been Europos, after his birthplace in Macedonia; Shahr-i-Rey is now a suburb of Teheran, and of the remains of the original Hellenistic and Parthian site little remains which has not been overbuilt.

Any idea of an Iranian revenge on the Greeks by the advancing Parthians can be dismissed: they seem altogether broader-minded people than that. Their architecture has been well popularised by Colledge[18] and others; and it has grown in dignity as scholars have discovered more about it. The work of Rostovtzeff is of first importance here as is that of

Ernst Herzfeld and before him Aurel Stein, whose work on the fortress of Kuh-i-Khwaja is essential for our assessment of the cultural quality and staying power of the Parthians. Ghirshman cites two factors which seem to have played a major part in the Parthian episode in Middle Eastern history. "First, the forward drive of the Iranians, as well as the Turco-Mongols, in the wake of the advancing nomads; and secondly, the decadence from a military point of view of the Seleucids and Graeco-Bactrians who were now incapable of making a united stand against the invaders, their energies being dissipated in internecine strife".[19] This has perhaps long been accepted too glibly, as though we knew that attempts to co-operate never occurred to them. This depressing conclusion is now, we believe, less likely to be true, because of the relationship, e.g.: between the Parthians and Diodotus II and the questions it raises.

Ghirshman is, however, marvellously broad in his insistence that the Iranian tribes really did have a deep and lasting influence on the culture of many countries in Central Asia. "The Sarmatians, the Sacae and the Parthians succeeded in creating a composite civilisation where ever they established themselves ..... Their civilisation acted as a centripetal force, the movement which originated in the region of ..... outer Iran was of a centrifugal nature. In some of its developments it broke through the limits set by the resistance of its neighbours: the Graeco-Roman world in the west, India and even China in the East. And in this movement the Parthians played a leading part."[20] Ghirshman gives a round figure of 110 years (250 - 140 BC.) for the Parthian 'reconquest of Iran', and he does not believe that Parthian art in the full sense existed before the accession of Mithridates II in about 123 BC,[21] but that depends upon how much intrinsic value one proposes to give to the products of the earlier phil-Hellenic period: it is not necessary to dismiss them as non-Parthian.

C. N. Debevoise[22] gives an admirably thorough survey of the

political history of Parthia during our period. The problem of the doings of Arsaces' brother 'Tiridates' have been much disputed, partly due to the suspect nature of Syncellus' source, and the Arrian account on which it seems to be based has already been found inferior in respect of its chronology and context to that used by Justin and Strabo.[23] A late encounter between Tiridates and Seleucus Callinicus on his eventual expedition to recapture dissident Parthia led, as we saw in Chapter II, to Seleucus' eventual defeat: Tolstov has proposed the very sound hypothesis that the original revolt of the Tribes of Chorasmia and Turkestan was not against the Greeks but against the Macedonian hegemony[24]: this agrees with Strabo's view of Arsaces I as a Bactrian anxious to throw off the Suzerainty of Diodotus I - but raises the question of whether Diodotus was himself therefore a Macedonian - and, if so, from whom he was revolting.[25] We do not, I think, require to agree with Tolstov (and Ghirshman ?) who see in this revolt a liberation movement of the tribes of Central Asia and Eastern Iran.

Tiridates was succeeded by Artabanus who had to bear the weight of Antiochus III's much more resolute action, but seems with admirable diplomatic farsightedness to have bowed before the inevitable but short-lived presence of Antiochus, and in the end to have made an agreement with him,[26] very likely at Antiochus' instigation in view of his more serious impending contest with Euthydemus. It would have been an elementary precaution for Antiochus to guard his exposed rear in this way.

Nomad trouble with Mardi, which will have been a warning to the Parthians, themselves lately nomadic, of the pressures building up in the Steppe even early in the 2nd century, occupied Phraates the son of Priapatius, who was Artabanus' successor. This action on the part of the Parthians was successful, and the defeated tribesmen of the Mardi were deported to Charax.[27] Phraates was succeeded, possibly at his own suggestion, by the next great Parthian conqueror Mithridates I in 171,

and the chronology is suddenly clearer. It becomes possible to work out a harmony of events with the Seleucid enterprise at this time with some surprising results, due to Mithridates' dated coinage.

Mithridates' first responsibility was to develop his strength in the East. There was a Median campaign, as a result of which Mithridates forced the defeated Medes to accept the rule of his nominee Bacasis (Justin XLl, 6, 7). After the death of Antiochus IV, in 163 Mithridates moved against the people of Elymais whom Antiochus had himself attacked in a punishment expedition, as we saw, shortly before his death. This was an important geopolitical move on Mithridates' part as it really was striking at the 'soft underbelly' of Seleucid power in the area bordering the Persian Gulf, where there was unrest and disaffection, and where there was, as Le Rider points out, great commercial activity in the reigns of Seleucus IV and Antiochus IV in connection with the sea route to India. Danish excavations in the Persian Gulf area have revealed a Seleucid settlement at Falaika-Icarus, an island off Kuwait; and, although the inscription from its temple is dated to the reign of Seleucus II, and other buildings to before 200, it is, I think, fairly certain that Antiochus IV was already conducting preventative measures, some of them probably naval, against Parthian expansion in his Eastern campaigns of 166 - 163[28]; if so, it is another interesting light on Antiochus' wary and prophylactic Eastern Policy. And in fact no actual Parthian move against his realm occurred during his life time, or if it occurred - we have no evidence - then his measures, such as this possible Gulf presence, were enough to contain it. And, as has been pointed out,[29] the Elymaeans were not welcoming to Mithridates when eventually he did come, (Justin XLl, 6, 8).

In the north the Parthians attacked Armenia which had been in Seleucid hands following Antiochus IV's expedition of 166, and Mithridates' brother Valarsaces became its new king, which Moses of Chorene recounts with an exaggerated view of the territorial extent of Valarsaces' kingdom.[30] Armenia's critical strategic position as the protector of Parthia's northern

salient was, therefore, to be secured as a point of Arsacid policy by some kind of blood tie. It was a prudent move, as Armenia marked not only an ex-Seleucid province, and, therefore, an attack-angle for any potential avenging Seleucid, but also a northern barrier against nomadic intrusion from the southern elements of the Alani and the other Sarmatian tribes north of a line occupied by the Phasis River on its westward passage into the Black Sea.

On Parthia's eastern frontier, where the greatest extent of expansion took place, Strabo says that the Parthians were able to take 'Turiva' and 'Aspionus' from Eucratides, whose reign can be seen springing to light in several different contexts now. The interpretation of this passage has long been a source of scholarly worry, and W. W. Tarn produced a genuinely workable solution which he has not seen any reasons to alter, and nor has anyone else, to any real extent.[31] Strabo XI, 517 says that the Parthians took from Eucratides of Bactria two satrapies την το Ασπιωνου την το Τουριουαν and subsequently (XI, 515), that they had to retake the same territory from the Scythians (Sacae) who had earlier occupied it. Strabo seems to be referring to Bactria as a province and not to what we know as the burgeoning Bactrian Empire: he mentions Bactra, Eucratideia and Darapsa.[32] Strabo says the Greeks divided Bactria into satrapies as the Seleucids did,[33] e.g., Cappadocia, Elymais, Armenia, Adiabene and Parthia. Bactria itself seems possibly to have been divided into little satrapies or eparchies, whose names are unfortunately lost to us, perhaps in a similar way to the contemporary division of Afghanistan into police districts each with its commissioner, but this proposal of Tarn's was cogently rebutted in Charles Edson's careful review of Tarn's work.[33a]

Tarn[34] says that these two lost Satrapies are to be identified with Tapuria and Traxiane, and that Eastern Tapuria (in Kiessling's designation) was the valley and watershed of the Upper Atrek which was Parthian country, part of Astauene; "the Bactrians then in the days of

their power had reached out westward across the Arius, taken a wedge of territory from the then weaker Parthia, added it to Bactria ... and made of it two little satrapies like the Bactrian. This wedge of territory was Astauene; and when Mithridates I recovered these two satrapies from Eucratides, Justin (XLl, 6, 7) calls it an expedition into Hyrcania ... for Astauene had probably been part of the old Seleucid Hyrcania".[35]

The Bactrians would have found it impossible to hold Eastern Tapuria without holding also the tract of territory to the east of it, the rest of Astauene - the valley of the Kasef Rud, a tributary of the Arius (Hari Rud). At present the principal town of the area is Meshed, on the main railway from Teheran and a major Moslem pilgrimage centre. Ruins at Tus (Susia), the birthplace of Firdausi, a few miles to the west are said to denote the importance of this site as a Seleucid garrison town.[36]

It would seem that prior to about 100 BC. (the date of Apollodorus of Artemita, Strabo's source), Susia was the seat of a provincial governor (βασιλειον) - Isidore implies (§ 11) that the capital of Astauene was Arsacia, Ἀσακ : Kusan on the Upper Atrek. Therefore, if we follow Tarn, at some point in the 2nd century the Kasef Rud valley with its chief city at Susia was a separate province from the Atrek country. So the 'Pasiani' who occupied that area could be called invaders of Bactria: 'Pasiani' can, in that context, only mean Parthians.[37]

Tarn goes to one of the campaign coins of Parthia[38] for the name of the second western satrapy: the three provinces taken from the Sakas by Eucratides were Aria, Traxiane and Merv (Alexandria-in-Scythia), going from south to north - this is a straight line - so Traxiane must lie between them and must be the missing Bactrian province.

2. The Rise of Bactria as a Kingdom

If Tapuria and Traxiane were the eastern marches of the Parthian kingdom, it is now time to deal with Eucratides himself in his

Bactrian, as distinct from Seleucid context, and to discover what the Bactrian state was doing in the middle of the second century.

Following Antiochus III's negotiated withdrawal from Bactria in 206 or thereabouts Euthydemus had continued to extend his territory in every direction.[37a] The evidence of coin find-spots indicates that he ruled in Bactria and Soghdiana, which we may call his 'home state', but also in the Paropamisadae - the region to the south of the Hindu Kush around Kabul and Kapisa, and in Arachosia - where his coins have been unearthed in the current British excavation at Kandahar (Alexandria Arachosia) - in Drangiana, Margiane and Aria to the south and west. It is possible that Euthydemus extended Bactrian arms also to the north and east, to Ferghana and Sinkiang:[38a] Tolstov, following Tomaschek and Marquart, holds that what Strabo meant by saying that 'the Bactrian kings extended their posessions as far as the Seres and the Phryni was that they had established an alliance with the nomads, and that this was actually with the 'Huns' under Mao-Tun against the Yueh-chi who as Chiang K'ien knew were a threat to both Huns and Greeks - as well as to the H n state. His coins show him to have a stern and resolute expression at various periods of his life,[39] and we may also deduce from his coinage that his reign was a long one from approximately 225 to 190.[40] His son Demetrius I succeeded him, and his now extensive territories were very probably governed in his name by a small number of Sub-Kings in the areas which he would find it inconvenient or impossible to rule personally. In this category came Antimachus I,[41] ruling probably in Arachosia, and Euthydemus II his brother. Dates, locations and relationships for the Bactrian kings - and queens - have always been hypothetical with few exceptions; the following account tries to be a plausible synthesis in the prevailing uncertainty in this field.

Demetrius I seems to have continued his father's expansionist policies, because to his reign is to be assigned the extension of Euthydemid conquests southwards over the Paropamisadae into Gandhara and later under

Demetrius II into India proper, territory which had lately been Mauryan but which had fragmented on the collapse of the Mauryan power in 187. Demetrius I was able at least to annex the western Punjab,[42] and Demetrius II may have penetrated much further south and east, even to the region round Mathura,[43] while his brother (?) Apollodotus I seems to have gone in the direction of the Gulf of Cambay and the valley of the Nerbudda.

Demetrius' reign is celebrated by echoes in Indian literature[44] and for us by a probable reference in Chaucer.[45] He may well have founded a city, Euthydemia, which existed in the Punjab sixty miles from Lahore, west of the River Hydracotes, and which probably later became the Sagala of Menander's day. There is, according to Isidore (§19) a Demetrias in Arachosia but so far there is no sign of it. He seems also to have founded a name-city in Sind and may also have founded one at Termez on the Oxus[46]: this city on the Oxus has been the subject of Russian investigations, and seems, as was often the case with Greek cities, to be a rebuilding on earlier foundations. It was an important halting place on the caravan route from India and Bactria to Eastern Turkestan, where there seems to have been Greek penetration anyway, and China which had outposts in the Tarim Basin.[47]

There is reason to suppose that Demetrius divided his Bactrian and Indian possessions into smaller units for easier government with groups of these 'eparchies' - if we accept Tarn's phraseology - under viceroys or Sub-Kings, an analogy to the earlier satraps. There was Seleucid and Achaemenid precedent for this form of organisation as far as the territorial division was concerned, and such sections would have logically formed the residual principalities to which the Greeks were in the end reduced.

Rawlinson's comments on the small satrapal divisions of this organisation and its implications are worth quoting in full for their conciseness: "The small satrapy appears to have been the natural political

unit in India, as the city state was in Greece. However, Demetrius did not arrive at a satisfactory solution of the problem of simultaneously governing two distinct and diverse kingdoms. Perhaps his continuous absence in India aroused the jealousy of the Graeco-Iranian kingdom in the north; it may be that the inhabitants of Bactria looked upon Sagala with jealous eyes, as a new and alien capital; at any rate the absence of Demetrius gave ample opportunity for a rival to establish himself securely in Bactria before the arrival of troops from the far south to overthrow him".[48]

How far Demetrius I actually went himself towards the east is not known with certainty. With his son Demetrius II left to take charge of the Paropamisadae and probably Gandhara there was no immediate requirement of Demetrius to confine himself to the western part of north India. Tarn believed that Demetrius I's forces reached Pataliputra (Patna) on the Ganges at this time, taking the years of the invasion to be 183/2 - 167,[49] the date of Eucratides' irruption into Bactrian politics, but that they were commanded at that point and in that direction by Menander whose task it was to press eastwards, leaving Demetrius in Sind. The attack on Pataliputra is not itself in question, as evidence for it comes from Apollodorus of Artemita,[50] a major source of Strabo, and also from the Indian side in the Yuga - Purana of the Gargi Sarmita,[51] an astrological work reproducing an older source. There seems no need to make the attack and capture of Pataliputra seem just like a raid, as some have tried to do. That is to downgrade the enterprise and to ignore the planning and scale of such an advance, and it avoids the implications of the source which talks of the Yavanas not being able to stay in Pataliputra because of a terrible civil war in their own country. They did not stay, not because they would not or could not organise it municipally like any other city they took of such importance, but because their enormously long lines of communication and their distance from the new source of strife made it unsafe for them to do so. Despite the fighting in Pataliputra, which we

know preceeded his withdrawal, from what we know of Menander this withdrawal, when it took place in about 166 - 5 cannot have caused him anything other than sadness. His respect in Indian eyes was not diminished at the end of his life, and leads us to suspect a larger view of this invasion than just a raid.[52]

Greek forces are recorded as being at Mathura and Saketa, and it seems likely that some degree of Greek control will have been established over a large part of northern India during Demetrius' reign, and that of Menander which was to succeed it. One circumstantial reason for this is that the Greek action had taken place independently, or as a consequence, of the collapse of Mauryan power, and not in the harder circumstances of a well-organised and unified Indian power bloc. Pushyamitra the Sunga, who came from the area around the River Nerbudda, had arisen as a contender for the Mauryan throne, and had disposed of the last of Asoka's line in 187. Being a Brahmin it is very likely that he was antagonistic to the Buddhist colour of north India, which was strong enough to interest Menander, if not to compel his own conversion.

We must now turn temporarily to consider the impact of Eucratides on this scene. Justin[54] seems to imply that Eucratides seized the throne of Bactria at about the time of the accession to the Parthian throne of Mithridates I in 171. It is not necessary to make them simultaneous; and Eucratides' possible Seleucid connections, which might point to a slightly later date than 171 for the start of his unfortunate irruption onto the Bactrian scene, have a genuine basis. One of Eucratides' coins has on the obverse a male and a female head and the legend ΗΛΙΟΚΛΕΟΥΣ ΚΑΙ ΛΑΟΔΙΚΗΣ There is general agreement that this coinage is commemorative in character: the question arises as to whom it is commemorating. It seems certain that Heliocles and Laodice were Eucratides' father and mother, as Eucratides' son will have been named after his grandfather. Laodice wears a diadem on this coinage and must, therefore, have been a princess - of whom? It would give Eucratides a claim to royalty on his

mother's side: the head and reel ornamentation would suggest a Seleucid connection; as we have observed in the distinctively Seleucid context in Chapter V, when added to the appearance of Laodice, a traditionally Seleucid name, the hypothesis seems to have been under-valued in recent studies, and to be a likely possibility again.[54a] The evidence from Aï Khanum[55] of Greek architecture, already noted, does seem to suggest a refoundation or additions coinciding in time with Antiochus IV's cities in Europe and Western Asia, and would offer, again hypothetically but plausibly, an answer to the problem of where Eucratides founded his name-city. Strategically, Aï Khanum is where Eucratides should have found one. As his son Heliocles was to prove the last ruler of Greek Bactria, it is reasonable to assume that Eucratides also was aware of the increasing danger from the nomads on the other side of the Oxus, whose arrival in strength we have just noted. Its salient position[56] as a guard to his northern marches, Soghdiana presumably already having been lost, would have been too valuable not to have been fortified (or refortified, for - as we saw earlier - a possibility is that it had originally been Claudius Ptolemy's Alexandria Oxiana).

Eucratides had to begin his reign by justifying his right to the throne he has usurped, on his own account or conceivably Antiochus'. After besieging Eucratides, Demetrius was himself later beaten by him;[57] and Demetrius' Bactrian, but not necessarily Indian territories then fell into the hands of Eucratides, whose victory is probably commemorated in the fine coins showing the Dioscuri charging,[58] and Eucratides' helmeted portrait showing a resolute face without the whimsy of Antimachus or the nobility of Menander. Some of Eucratides' coins are bilingual with a blending of Greek and Indian motifs and a Pali inscription in Karoshthi characters, a parallel to some of Demetrius' own coinage and as usual coined on the Indian and not the attic weight standard. We note a similar but possibly derivative intention of removing some of the distance between Greek-speaking conquerors and native subjects: it was to mark an

important departure in attitudes as well as coin-types. There is no other way to explain the apparent change in coining policy. The commercial usage of Western Asia was Greek in language and so in script, and although there would have been a reason for the change to Pali, in the business sense of making the rulers and their designations better known in the recently conquered Indian territories, this had not happened elsewhere in the Greek world; and the introduction of a bi-lingual currency and the adherance to an Indian weight standard in coinage can, therefore, validly be seen as at least a concession, a recognition of the native territories of this very senior civilisation with which Demetrius' and Eucratides' Greeks were now in contact. It would have been unsophisticated and unfeeling to deposit a totally Greek coinage on it in those circumstances.[59] In an otherwise strongly critical assessment of the political circumstances of the Greek rule in Bactria, Rawlinson did long ago agree that there was a 'blending' of Greek and Indian art forms in the bi-lingual coinage.[60]

Eucratides appears to have captured these Indian territories in about 160, but by 156 he was dead. According to Rawlinson there is a case for either Apollodotus I or Heliocles I having violently succeeded him.[61] But I prefer Tarn's view that Apollodotus I acted in the regular Euthydemid way as a sub-king, in this case for Demetrius I.[62] He may have had a brief period of rule before the accession of Heliocles I, and the question of Eucratides' own death is, therefore, raised at this point, because we have the brutal story of his murderer driving his chariot through the blood of his stricken foe,[63] and ordering that the corpse should go unburied. Justin assures us that the murderer was his son. On balance this would appear to have been HelioclesI, but there are lingering doubts in view of the apparent middle-age of Heliocles' splendid portrait - one of the most realistic of the whole series[64] - difficult to reconcile with his own comparatively short reign and the moderate youth of Eucratides' own portraits - all of them. This difficulty would be solved

if one could extend Heliocles I's reign to 129 BC., and we will presently see reasons for proposing that. Plato was also probably a son of Eucratides I, and coinage depicting him with his 'Helios on Quadriga' type on the reverse has now come to light in greater quantities than previously. The pieces are not bi-lingual - no bi-lingual coinage has been discovered of Plato at all - and this would suggest that he was not involved in the Indian schemes of Eucratides. It seems to me very likely that he could have been a sub-king looking after the home territory in Bactria while Eucratides was in the Paropamisadae or Gandhara. He bears the title 'Epiphanes' and will have been contemporary with Antiochus IV; it is not necessary to revive the old theory[65] - that his coin bearing the Greek letter ΛMH ϚΛ represents 147 of the Seleucid era = 165 BC. - to see in this a possibility of a Seleucid parallel if not an outright connection - a son of Eucratides destined to bear the title of the great Seleucid. Narain[66] observes the closeness of the modelling of his head to that of Eucratides I. It is not necessary to argue that Plato was himself the killer, and 'Epiphanes' need not represent his ambition but that of his father. I agree, however, that 'Dikaios' is a strange name to apply to a parricide of such brutality, if we take Heliocles to be the son in question; but it would be justified if the Bactrian population loathed the name of Eucratides: and there are two reasons, at least, for thinking that.

First, Eucratides' irruption, for whatever reason, into Bactrian political affairs produced a situation - which was foreseeable - which, in setting up a new House to contest the Euthydemids - ultimately brought about the internecine strife which weakened Bactria to its death. And the further Indian teritories of this brilliant oriental episode in Greek life were beset by the same feud. Second, he had arrived, for whatever reason, (and there is no need to expect the Bactrians to see the possible long-term anti-Parthian possibilities of Eucratides' venture), at a time when the Bactrian enterprise was going supremely well. Demetrius

was lord of all he surveyed and had extended the Bactrian influence, on any view, considerably into Northern India. He only died because Eucratides killed him. The more likely Eucratides' Bactrian subjects were to see in his take-over an unwarranted, and possibly foreign-based attack on their ruling house, the more likely they will have been to honour the man who disposed of him. This is in itself another, if circumstantial argument for the connivance of Antiochus.[67]

It does seem that Parthia stood to gain by whatever ill befell Bactria, and a dating of about 155 - 6 for the Parthian-Bactrian War after, or at the time of, Eucratides' death is consonant with the evidence for Mithridates' westward drive to capture Tapuria and Traxiane, which we have from Strabo[68] and Justin.[69] After his accession Heliocles will have had to consolidate his stricken country with a wary eye to the situation in Soghdiana, where the advance guard of the Yueh-Chi would be gaining ground in its gradual, semi-circular movement south-westwards from Ferghana and the region of Lake Issyk Kul.[70] We know that by about 100 BC. the site of Aï Khanum had been destroyed by fire, and that the last phase of rebuilding, presumably under Heliocles or Eucratides, had lasted 50 years.

There is recent support for the view that there was an anti-Parthian party (and presumably also a pro-Parthian party) at work in Bactrian home politics, although I do not agree with the conclusion that Heliocles and Plato are to be seen on opposite sides in this,[71] with Heliocles siding with the anti-Parthian party and labelling himself as 'Dikaios' because of his disposal of the pro-Parthian Plato. We do not have enough evidence for this. But we do know that Mithridates' aggressive policy was continued against Bactria after Eucratides' death and this may have led to an invasion of the southern kingdom as far as Euthydemia.[72] This may have been only a demonstration in force, but it could not have come at a worse time, and might suggest collusion at this

stage between the Parthians and the Yueh-chi, or perhaps, although unlikely in the circumstances, between the Parthians and the Sacas. In the event, the government and people of Bactria, unreplenished with Greek or Macedonian settlers owing to the land barrier of the Parthian state, found support - again too late - from the Seleucids under Demetrius II, who had presumably invoked with his home government the obligations resulting from the treaty made between Antiochus III and Euthydemus and the consequent ties of marriage between the two royal families: he may even, if our contentions about Antiochus IV and Eucratides are correct, have adduced that episode also as grounds for action in support of this, Eucratides' son and heir. Such a connection would be strengthened by our evidence of this action in 142 - 136. In these years Demetrius advanced against Parthia on another of the Seleucids' waning attempts to deal decisively with Parthia - it is a little difficult to decide whether this was a move of Seleucid grand strategy designed to isolate Parthia and surround her again with Greek forces, or a first-aid action to draw fire off Heliocles, or again, an independent effort loosely geared with the action which they realised was happening in the Parthian campaign against Heliocles. We do know specifically that Demetrius' army had reinforcements from Persia, Elymais and Bactria, and that it routed the Parthians in a succession of battles.[73] However, in the end, whether their activities were concerted or not, it was not Heliocles who went down before the Parthians, but Demetrius - who was eventually defeated, captured and paraded as a warning both to Syria and her allies, Bactrian or otherwise.

But at this point it was to be the Parthians who in their turn had nomadic misfortune. Mithridates I died in 136 and was succeeded by Phraates II, during whose reign Parthia was itself invaded by Sacas, dislodged by the Yueh-chi movements in Soghdiana. The sacas had been settled partially south of the Jaxartes, whose swamps elements of them had occupied as fish-eaters for a considerable time, the Saka-Rawaka; 5/

and the Greek presence here had been withdrawn partially by the southwards drain of the Indian venture of Demetrius, Apollodotus and Menander and partly by a kind of tactical withdrawal to strengthen the line of the Oxus. We have seen reasons to regard the refoundation of the Greek city at Aï Khanum, if indeed it was refounded under Eucratides, as a part of this withdrawal. Be that as it may, the area between the Jaxartes and the Oxus was no longer an active Greek military area, and Phraates II died possibly trying to put down a plundering expedition by Saca mercenaries in the Parthian army.[74] His successor Artabanus was killed in a campaign against the 'Thogarii'[75]: Rawlinson did not contest the identification with the Tochari, who he says were more or less ensconced in Soghdiana and so would naturally be "the chief opponents of the Parthians".

The beginning of the nomad invasion of Parthia may be dated to 130 BC. as Phraates II could not, for this reason, be in Babylonia to meet the initial thrust of Antiochus VII Sidetes' invasion of Parthia in 129.[76] Phraates seems to have fallen in battle with the Sacas in 129 or 128 and was succeeded by Artabanus II. The invasion of Parthia seems to have followed two lines: westward and eastward along the roads Merv - Hekatompylos - Ecbatana, and Merv - Herat - Seistan. Tarn thought that the Parthian capture of Merv was the last act in the invasion's liquidation.[77] The Sacas occupied Eastern Tapuria and Traxiane and over-ran Hyrcania. Hekatompylos was apparently destroyed at that time[78] but the Parthians seem to have saved Media. The invaders who went southwards from Astauene occupied Herat, Seistan and Arachosia: Mithridates II seems to have recovered Seistan and Kandahar[79]. "It looks as if the Parthians cut the invaders into two south of Herat and then rolled up one end of their long line towards Kandahar and India, and the other end northwards towards Merv and the desert they had come from".[80] Tarn is at pains to stress the very large numbers of the Saca horde when the westwards movement of the

Yueh-chi sent them south into Arachosia and westwards to Merv. Two Parthian kings Artabanus and Phraates II were killed in the course of this period of hostilities, and it seems generous and right to agree with Tarn when he says that Mithridates II deserves well of western civilisation.

From this account of nomad pressure (largely Massagetae and Dahae elements of the Saca horde), it can be seen that Parthia had played a dangerous game in weakening Bactria - and, if the theory about the party disagreement between the supporters of Plato and Heliocles has any foundation - so had Bactria in weakening Parthia. They had more to gain from alliance; and the argument for a Bactrian alliance with Parthia for mutual anti-nomad defence was in 141 - 135 as strong as it had ever been in the time of Diodotus II, who had reversed the original policy of Diodotus I to make it pro-Parthian (against the avenging Seleucids), or in the time of Antiochus III when independence of Seleucid rule seemed again to be justified - although this time in more general Greek terms - because of the immediate nature of the nomad problem, explained by Teleas to Antiochus III as an argument for abandoning the siege of Bactra in 206. We shall deal with the question of Parthian involvement with the Seleucid Empire in the period from Demetrius I in the next chapter. Mithridates II had dealt successfully with the nomad threat by 115, and was overlord of the Massagetae tribe as far as the lower Oxus and the Aral range, which brought his rule up to the boundary of the Aorsi (the An t'sai of Chang K'ien); this overlordship over one of the 'many nations' which Justin says[81] he added to the Parthian empire was lost again after his death, though Parthia seems to have remained in possession of Merv which she had taken before 115.

All the Greek territory in Bactria proper - the country north of the Hindukush - seems then to have fallen as the result of the final impetus given to the Yueh-chi movement by their confrontation with the Wu-Sun in the area round Lake Issyk Kul. By the time of Chang K'ien's

visit in 128 it was all over, and he is able to report coolly on the people's fixed abodes and walled cities and the absence of a king (Heliocles having presumably died or been killed), their shrewd trading, weak and fearful army (presumably weakened by the drain of manpower southwards to India since the days of Demetrius), but 'full of rare things'.[82] Trade with India is specifically mentioned to him by the people of Bactria with the implication that it was commonplace. This is a significant comment as it denotes a direction of trade and so of the focus of attention southwards: a process which will have brought Bactria to this unfortunate, vulnerable position in the first place. India has proved more of a drain than a reservoir it seems.

Notes to Chapter VI.

1. On the general course of this migrations I have used Ernst Herzfield's 'Archaeologische Mitteilungen aus Iran', Volume IV, Berlin 1932, in this instance, pp. 14f.

2. Ssu-Ma-Tsien: Shi-ki. Chapter 123, 3, tr. Friedrich Hirth in J. A. O. S. xxxvii, p. 93, 1917. The primacy of the Shi-Ki as a source has been recently underlined by E. G. Pulleyblank. B.S.O.A.S. 1970, XXIII.

3. Ch'ien Hun-Shu - The Annals of the Former Han. For the progress of this migration I have in general followed this source and the Shi-ki; but I have used Lohuitzen de Leew's account of it, as at this stage her comments seem to make for greater clarity. The works by Herzfeld and Haloun mentioned in the Bibliography are invaluable, also the account by Pulleyblank: "The Wu-Sun and Sakas and the Yueh- chi migration." Op. Cit., p. 154 - 160.

4. Haloun (ZDMG), Kuwabara and Yasuma say that the first march of the Yueh-chi took place in the years 172 to 161, and the second stage - from the Upper Ili to the Oxus - between 133 and 129 BC. Sten Konow says this conquest of Bactria took place in about 160, but Lohuitzen says that this is a misreading of the Chinese sources and she makes out a good cause for saying that "... the Chinese sources indeed point to a conquest of Bactria by the Yueh-chi in about 129". The various sources I have studied, in particular Trogus and Strabo, do seem to agree with this, and the circumstantial argument is impressive - in particular from a dating of Chang K'ien's Report to 128. Lohuitzen goes on to make 129 the commencement of the 'Old Era'.

5. M. I. Rostovtzeff: Iranians and Greeks in South Russia, Oxford, 1922.

6. Rostovtzeff: Op. Cit., p. 203.

7. Tadeuz Sulimirski: The Sarmatians, London, 1970.

8. Rostovtzeff: Op. Cit., p. 146.

9. Ibid.

10. See in particular: Karl Jettmar: 'The Art of the Steppe", London.

11. O. Maenchen-Helfen, Lohuitzen de Leew, Robert Göbl, E. D. Philips, S. Rudenko and many others.

12. O. Maenchen-Helfen: Huns and Hsiung-nu. 'Byzantium', Volume XVII, 1944 - 1945.

13. F. Altheim: 'Geschichte des Hunnen' is the most comprehensive recent work on the Huns.

14. Quoted in Maenchen-Helfen: Op. Cit., p. 243.

15. See Chapter VIII in which the parchments from Avroman in Kurdistan are discussed.

16. M. Szyncer: 'Ostraka d'epoque Parthe trouves à Nisa', Semitica, V, p. 66 f.
As a postscript to his article Szyncer mentions the discussions, following the release of Diakonov's first discoveries as to whether the language used was Iranian (Pahlavi) or some other. This has now been resolved by Vinnikov as being Aramaic, and we must therefore note the prevalence of Aramaic throughout the Seleucid empire.

17. Isidore: Parthian Stations (Mans. Parth.).

18. M..Colledge: 'The Parthians', London, 1969; 'Parthian Art', London, 1977.

19. R. Ghirshman: 'Iran: Parthians and Sassanians', London, 1962, p. 17.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. C. N. Debevoise: 'A Political History of Parthia', Chicago, 1938.

23. See Chapter II

24. R. Ghirshman : Article reviewing S. P. Tolstov: "Drevniy Choresm" in Artibus Asiae, 1953, Vol. XVI, p. 298. We do have to note that Euthydemus was a Greek from Magnesia in Ionia.

25. Ibid.

26. Justin, XLI, 5.

27. Isidore: Mans. Parth. 7. Charax is on the northern shore of the Persian Gulf; if this is the correct site then it shows remarkable southward expansion at this period. See A. R. Bellinger: 'Hysaosines of Charax' in Yale Class. Studs. VIII, 1942, re Charax.

27a. G. le Rider: Un Atelier Monetaire Seleucide dans la Province de la Mer Erythrée in RN. 1965 p. 36 - 43.
Mørkholm has made out a very good case for a mint at Charax (Spasinou). American Numismatic Society Museum notes, Vol. 16, 1970, pp. 31 - 44, and as a more uncertain suggestion in Acta Archaeologica, 1966.

28. Mørkholm: Antiochus IV of Syria, Gyldenal, 1966, p. 168.
Detailed material including the dating is in K. Jeppesen: A Royal Message to Ikaros. KUML 1960, p. 187 f.

29. See p. 172 , Mørkholm in 'A Greek Coin Hoard from Susiana' in Acta Archaeologica, p. 146 - 147.

30. Moses of Chorene ii, 3 - 7. See also: Sirarpie der Nersessian: The Armenians, London, 1969, p. 25. There is criticism of Moses' exaggeration in Gardner: Parthia, p. 5.

31. Tarn: Seleucid-Parthian Studies. British Academy, London, 1930.

32. Strabo, xi, 11, 2.

33. Ibid.

33a. Charles Edson: Review of 'The Greeks in Bactria and India', in Class. Phil. 1954, p. 116.

34. Tarn quotes Kiessling ('Hyrcania' in P.W., 483), as saying that one Aspiones 'must have been (the) satrap of the Eastern Tapuri' - which is interesting but purely hypothetical. Tarn: Op. Cit., p. 22.

35. Tarn: Op. Cit., p. 22.

36. I have been to Meshed and have enquired about remains extant at Tus, but have no hard information so far. See Tarn: Ibid.

37. See Tarn's proposed emendation of 'Pasiani' to 'Asiani' in Strabo XI, 511: Tarn, Op. Cit., p. 14.

37a. The break with Seleucid traditions in coinage, and the onset of a period of prosperity consequent on Antiochus' departure, are noted by Bivar in connection with the 'Bactra Coinage of Euthydemus and Demetrius'. Bivar in NC. 1951, p. 22 f.

38. Tarn: Op. Cit., p. 24. Refers to Artabanus I ? (Selwood, p. 51 f.)

38a. So R. Ghirshman in his article on S. P. Tolstov 'Dre.niy Choresm' in Artibus Asiae 1953, Vol. XVI, p. 299.

39. See Plates Coin 1.

40. A. K. Narain (The Indo-Greeks) suggests 235 - 200 for Euthydemus' reign - but this would give insufficient time for Diodotus I and II before him, if we accept that Diodotus I was on the throne issuing coins in 240 - 238.

41. Evidence of territory from find-spots, sc. Tarn: Greeks: the coins of Antimachus are among the most splendid examples of Bactrian coinage, in particular his enigmatic smile is magnificently caught, (B.M. in Kraay and Davis, pl. 143).

42. Rawlinson seems alone in not assigning this conquest to Demetrius I's reign: more modern authorities Tarn, Woodhead and Narain, e.g., all do. Rawlinson: Bactria, p. 72.

43. Evidence in Tarn: Greeks p. 145. The inherent probability of this more extensive conquest is implicit in the piecemeal nature of the territory, lately Mauryan, which he was invading, and in the time which was to elapse before his death.

44. A possible deduction by Tarn: Greeks p. 142.

45. 'The Grete Emetrius, the King of Inde'. Chaucer 'Knight's Tale.'

46. Tarn in 'Tarmita' (JHS LX 1940) says Tarmita comes from a Tibetan translation of a Sanskrit work (S. Levi: Journal Asiatique, 1933, p. 271, note 1). The original mentions a town Dharmamitra (Demetrias), and the translator says the name was the origin of Tarmita on the Paksu (Oxus). Tarmita, says Tarn, was the mediaeval Termedh, now Termez). It had been successively an Alexandria, an Antioch and a Demetrias. Greek coins have been found in the ruins of Old Termez. See also G. Frumkin: "Archaeology in Soviet Central Asia", Leiden, 1970, passim.

47. Strabo XI, 516. 'Seres and Phryni'. For Tolstov's (and his own?) interpretation of the territory implied by this phrase, see Ghirshman, Op. Cit., p. 298 f.

48. Rawlinson: Bactria. New Edition, New York, 1970, p. 79. The use of Rawlinson in this work requires the defence that this new edition revives old views, and cannot therefore escape comment.

49. Tarn: Greeks, p. 133.

50. Strabo XV, 698.

51. Yuga - Purana, See Tarn, Greeks p. 452 f.

52. Narain: The Indo-Greeks. Oxford, 1958, p. 81. The dating of the reign of Menander can make a difference of 20 years or so to the date of the capture of Pataliputra. If conducted as a campaign during Menander's own reign, this would put it forward to about 150, which might make Vasumitra's defeat of the Greek army on the Sindhu a factor in that campaign, but the date of the attack is of much less importance than its happening.

53. Yuga Purana, see Tarn, Greeks, p. 452 f.

54. Justin XLI, 6, 1.

54a. Coin in P. Gardner: Catalogue of coins in the British Museum: Greek and Scythic Kings of Bactria and India, London, 1886, pl. VI, Nos. 9 and 10. See note 60a of Chapter IV.

55. Paul Bernard: Aï Khanum on the Oxus, London 1967, p. 83 - 84.

56. Paul Bernard: Fouilles d'Aï Khanum, Paris, 1973.
E. Will: Histoire Politique II, p. 338, puts Eucratides neatly into his strategic context.
The Qunduz hoard of 1946 produced 130 tetradrachms of Eucratides I and 130 tetradrachms of Eucratides I or II, as well as 204 from the reign of Heliocles I. The site is at Khisht Tepe on the Oxus very near to Aï Khanum; although Aï Khanum itself yielded only Agathocles Specimens. Thompson, Kraay and Mørkholm, No. 1826, p. 264 - 5.

57. Justin, XLI, 6.

58. See Plate Coin 2. In Bactria the Greek rulers coined on an Attic weight standard: in India on an Indian one.

59. I dissent strongly from the view propounded by Rawlinson (Op. Cit., p. 83) that the Bactrian rulers took a militantly Greek line in all this: perhaps in Bactria they did - though we have no evidence - but when Bactria carried the Greek conquest to India we have the problem of this coinage, and of Menander's respected reign to answer inter alia. As the Kandahar inscriptions suggest, a 'blending' of Indian and Greek had already to some extent occurred.

60. Rawlinson: Op. Cit., p. 82. This is the view still held.

61. Rawlinson: Op. Cit., p. 84.

62. But see Narain's arguments, (Indo-Greeks, p. 64 - 69) against there being <u>any</u> Apollodotus I, on the basis of his rejection of Justin xli being emended (by Bayer) from Apollodorus to Apollodotus. It should be pointed out that an emendation is necessary in either case. On all this see what seems to be a definitive statement in "Apollodoti Reges Indorum", MacDowall and Wilson's article in Numismatic Chronicle Volume XX, 1960.

63. Justin XLI, 6.

64. See Plate Coin 2.

65. Percy Gardner: Coins of the Greek and Scythic Kings of Bactria in the British Museum, London, 1886, p. xxvi. Tarn's thesis was that Antiochus IV and Eucratides would take Parthia 'between two fires', Greeks, p. 199.

66. Narain: The Indo-Greeks, p. 71.

67. Narain's objections to a Seleucid involvement (Op. Cit., p. 57) will not bear serious examination: "A Seleucid king could not attack the Indo-Greeks in the East (sic) without involving the Parthians". Why not? It was in Parthia's interest that Bactria should be kept in check. If it was to be done by a pro-Seleucid rising the Parthians had everything to gain. The 300 soldiers Dr. Narain wonders about are also appropriate to this task. It is a normal guerilla number.

68. Strabo XI, 11, 2.

69. Justin. XLI, 6, 1.

Notes for Chapter VI - continued.

70. P. Bernard: Fouilles d'Aï Khanum , Paris, 1973, passim.

71. Kraay and Davis: "The Hellenistic Kingdoms", London, 1973, p. 239.

72. Justin xxxvi, 1, 4.
Bellinger wanted to locate a Mithridates I minting in Bactra in 160. YCS. 1950, Vol. XI, p. 312 - 315.

73. Justin xxviii, 1, 3. 4. 'The Bactrians' were among Demetrius' allies on this occasion. See Bellinger's suggestion in Hyspaosines of Charax, Yale Class. Studs., Volume VIII, 1942, p. 53 f: On p. 63 we do not need to prefer Bellinger's Hyspaosines as Demetrius' ally to Tarn's suggestion of Heliocles (I)(p. 199 and 272 f.).

74. Rawlinson: Op. Cit., p. 92.

75. Ibid., p. 93.

76. See next chapter, p.

77. Tarn: "Seleucid-Parthian Studies", London, 1930, p. 16.

78. See the Report on the B.I.P.S. excavations at Shahr-i-Qumis (Hekatompylos) in Comisene. (JRAS 1970), and now in IRAN (1977).

79. Parthian and Saka pottery are both among the recent finds in the trial excavations of B.I.A.S. at Alexandria Arachosia (Kandahar). - A. D. McNicholls' talk on 10th November 1975 at the Afghan Society Annual General Meeting and Svend Helms' report a year later. Now published in Afghan Studies, Vo. I, 1978.

80. Tarn: Op. Cit., p. 16.

81. Justin xlii, 2, 4.

82. Bivar in NC. 1951, p. 27, points out the (temporary) period of prosperity following Antiochus III's departure from Bactria. Shi-Ki, paras. 46 - 54 fr. Fr. Hirth in JAOS XXXVII, 1917, p. 89.

CHAPTER VII.

The Seleucid Decline.

The position of Syria and of the Seleucid kingdom generally had been weakened by the rule of Antiochus Epiphanes, whatever his intentions may have been concerning the strengthening of the Hellenistic cultural framework of his Empire.[1] The future course of Seleucid history, almost exactly a century, was to be marked by continuous dynastic conflict, wholly explicable by the situation which Antiochus' own usurpation of the Seleucid throne had created. Seleucus IV's line was, and remained, the legitimate succession, and both Rome and Antiochus knew this and for their own diverse reasons saw fit to deny it. It seems inevitable that on Antiochus' death in Iran in 164, Rome would favour any scheme that would complicate the Seleucid succession and would prevent any attempt by the legitimate Seleucid line to reassert its own sovereignty.[1a] All future Seleucid history is more a tale of the wars of the competitors than of Seleucid foreign policy in action: foreign policy was in fact at all points hindered by an over-concentration on the fomenting or averting of domestic discord. The demonstrable interference of Rome has to be balanced against this internal dissension.

Polybius was in a uniquely good position to observe and to record the early stages of this dynastic vendetta. As the friend and counsellor of the exiled Demetrius, the elder son of Seleucus IV and now a hostage of Rome, he could see Seleucid chances more clearly than the Seleucids themselves could. His honorary membership of the Scipionic Circle of philhellenes in the Roman administration made him aware of Roman political intentions, at least of one group, although it may have blunted his own political edge.[1b.]

Demetrius' position was made critical because of the accession crisis on Antiochus' death, and more immediately because of the

assassination of the Roman legate Gn. Octavius in 163, whose death the agents of the regent Lysias were quick to disclaim.[2] Antiochus IV's young son could probably have had a trouble-free accession when he reached his majority had not Demetrius not only been the legitimate heir but capable also. Demetrius went to put this point to the Senate at the instigation of his young friend Apollonius, and predictably the Senate held that nothing had happened to change the circumstances,[3] whereas, of course, it had: Demetrius' presence in Rome was not originally intended to be a permanent Seleucid presence there whoever was on the throne at Antioch. Really in view of this senatorial intransigence, Demetrius was encouraged by Polybius and others to try to effect an escape to Syria and reclaim his rightful throne. The time was propitious, and Demetrius had good intelligence of the Syrian political situation from his foster-father Diodorus. His Egyptian flank seems to have been stabilised by Roman approval of his first cousin Ptolemy Philometor, whom Demetrius met outside Rome with some show of friendship[4]: the Senate decided to assign Cyprus to Philometor in the face of his brother Eurgetes' counter-claims, and appointed Titus Torquatus and Gnaeus Merula to travel with Philometor to Cyprus to ensure the transfer of Cyprus, and to reconcile the brothers 'without war'.[5]

Demetrius' escape eventually took place, and is related vividly by Polybius (XXX, 2, 11 - 15): the Senate held their hand and appointed a commission to see what the attitude of the other kings of Asia was to this escape: the wise Tiberius Gracchus was included in this because of his experience.[5a]

Demetrius' own character seems to have been resolute as well as convivial. A fine life-size hellenistic bronze in the Terme Museum at Rome is said to be a portrait of him, and if so, demonstrates him as a fine, if somewhat arrogant, athlete.[6] This is important because these same qualities of arrogance and a certain impetuous athleticism are aspects of Seleucid character common to the dynasty, and omit the two

priceless virtues of wisdom and tact which they were increasingly to require.

Demetrius landed at Tripolis and virtually the whole country rose for him. In the process of the initial security measures the troops who declared for Demetrius seized both Antiochus' sons,[7] Antiochus V Eupator, and another one, and the army eliminated them. Although the indigenous Syrian population seems glad to have had Demetrius back, in Media things were different: there Timarchus seems to have had considerable success with the people of Western Iran: Kurdistan and the Zagros; and Artaxias of Armenia forsook his Seleucid alliance for Timarchus. Rome also, true to her policy of confounding the Seleucids, and encouraged by Timarchus' former friendship with Antiochus Epiphanes, granted Timarchus recognition but no active support. This was judiciously contrived to worry Demetrius without bringing him down. Diodorus Siculus seems to think his power greater than it actually became (και τελος της βασιλειας ἐγκρατης ἐγενετο),[9] but Antiochus IV's appointee as Satrap of Babylon was in a good position to inflict damage. Demetrius countered Timarchus' invasion threat at Zeugma and the defeat and death of Timarchus followed, while Demetrius proceeded to Babylon to be hailed as Σωτηρ.[10] Timarchus' hold on Babylon, according to the cuneiform tablets, was very slight.[10a]

The occurrence of Timarchus' revolt, similar in many ways to those of Molon under Antiochus III and Antiochus Hierax under Seleucus II, underlines the danger of dynastic or at least home-based discontent for the stability of Seleucid rule in view of the distance of Antioch from the Eastern Provinces. In all these three cases not only was the Seleucid Ost-politik in danger - in Timarchus' case to the extent of his coining as ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ ΜΕΓΑΛΟΥ ΤΙΜΑΡΧΟΥ [11] - but the whole empire became dangerously split with two situations, not one, having to be dealt with in detail. And the longer this continued, the more able Rome was to use her Mediterranean hegemony to influence Antioch. This is a

good indication of the wisdom of Antiochus IV's interest in Babylon as an adminstrative centre. Timarchus had administered the government at Babylon, but badly, (Appian, Syriaca 45 and 47).

Rome further tied Demetrius Soter's hands in the matter of Cappadocia. Ariarathes III was probably the first king of an independent Cappadocia, an arrangement which Antiochus II had brought into being probably to help with the provision of a joint front against the Gauls who threatened Syria. The alliance was confirmed by a marriage between Antiochus II's daughter Stratonice and King Ariamnes' eldest son, this Ariarathes III - at first linked with his father in kingship, but on his death the sole ruler.[12] His son Ariarthes IV married a daughter of Antiochus III, but later made a treaty of friendship with Rome. The younger of two adopted sons of this marriage, later Ariarathes V Eusebes Philopator, grew to become a good philhellene and a respectful son. When he came to inherit the Cappadocian throne in 163[13] he had already established an enviable reputation as a wise ruler, and in consequence Greek scholars and philosophers resorted there. Politically Ariarathes was wise enough to renew his alliance with Rome,[14] Tiberius Gracchus having asserted that the kingdom was well-governed. A proposed partition of Sophene, ruled by the house of Zariadris, was rejected out of hand by Ariarathes after overtures by Artaxias of Armenia.[15] Demetrius, on landing in Syria, tried to win over Ariarathes, who was his cousin, into an alliance, confirmed by marriage to his sister; but short-sightedly Ariarathes rejected this proposal in the interests of the Roman alliance, and the Senate, no doubt overjoyed not to say bewildered, showered him with approval and the sceptre and sella curulis.[16] Steps towards a hellenistic alliance against Rome were once more apparently frustrated, although by 157 Attalus was apparently ready to support Ariarathes; and Rome did not object.[16a]

Demetrius then sent an embassy to Rome, along with Leptines

the assassin of Octavius the Roman legate killed in 163, and a crown of 10,000 gold pieces;[17] the Senate accepted the crown but not the prisoner, and temporised with Demetrius saying 'that he would meet kindness from them if his conduct during his reign was satisfactory to the Senate'.[18] If this kind of language had been backed up by a formal move to reduce the Seleucid state to a client kingdom it would not have been surprising: Rome had after all been disposing of the affairs of the eastern Mediterranean since Magnesia; but this did not happen. It was to be in fact almost exactly 100 years before Pompey officially annexed the tiny remaining Seleucid kingdom of Philip II. The cause of this failure to act was to be found in Rome's own internal power struggles and partly in her energetic campaigning in the west against the Macedonians, Jugurtha and the Gauls. The coincidence of later Roman involvement with the Cimbri and the Teutones and the ensuing civil war between Marius and Sulla gave the dying Hellenistic Monarchies of the Near East a respite from Roman oversight. Edwyn Bevan observes that from the date of the return of Demetrius there is a great waning in overt Roman influence[19] and no more of Popillius' statecraft, although her unseen presence was felt.

In Judaea, where Demetrius' nearest and most active dissident people were strengthening their position after the unfortunate rule of Lysias, Demetrius was petitioned by Alcimus (Heb. Jakim) for the High Priesthood as a helleniser to confound the schemes of the now-dominant Hasmonean house. Demetrius complied with his request, and his general Bacchides was detailed to instal him by force. In Alcimus the difficulty of dealing with the Jewish situation was at its clearest and hardest and most intractible. He was of the line of Aaron: he was, therefore, a legitimate contender; or at least he was qualified to contend. The Hasmoneans, although they could claim to have a religious mandate in that they had won a religious war for the spiritual liberation of their

countrymen, could not claim that legitimacy. And there continued to be within the Jewish body-politic those who would see Jakim's claim to that position as more authentic than that of the Maccabees, hellenist or not. The Hasidim, as this conservative party were called, reached an understanding with Jakim, and the Hasmoneans found themselves politically outflanked while their enemies returned in force.[20] Predictably the Hasmoneans, now in disfavour, became again a menace, and Jakim had to appeal to Demetrius. This time Nicanor was charged with the duty of reducing the Hasmoneans, but instead befriended Judas. On being reminded that he was to capture Judas, Nicanor tried an open confrontation with the priests of the temple, and on being denied Judas by them antagonised them by his imperious conduct. Judas meanwhile was ready to mount a regular engagement in the country against no proper Seleucid army but only Palestinian levies: the issue of the battle was never in doubt, and Nicanor and many of his troops were left dead at Adasa (13th March, 161).[21]

In March 161 Rome had still not officially recognised Demetrius as king, and so, in order to add Roman approval to national aspiration, Judas sent a delegation of Eupolemus and Jason to Rome to make an alliance.[22] Rome agreed, partly probably out of a desire to weaken the Seleucid cause, but also partly to keep the Eastern Mediterranean in a state of flux. Meanwhile Demetrius had taken swift steps to recoup the loss of Nicanor's army, and while the embassy from Judas was at Rome, the nationalist army was routed by Bacchides at Eleasa, and Judas was killed.[23]

The remains of the Hasmonean resistance retired into the inhospitable low-lying country to the north of the Dead Sea, the Wilderness of Tekoah, and there participated in the continual tribal warfare among the bedouin. It was no place for a Seleucid army, and Bacchides lost contact with them. At that point the Hasmonean cause still had three of its original five leaders: Simon, Jonathan and John. The last was killed in a skirmish there, but it was fortunate for their efforts that the

leadership was continuous: this was to have important consequences for nationalist resilience. Bacchides then strengthened the frontiers with strong points, one of which has been discovered and excavated at Beth Zur.[24] This operation was a telling indication of the firm intentions of Demetrius' government, given a local situation which it could not only comprehend but deal with. There were, however, two serious limiting factors.

Trouble arose again presently over Cappadocia, whose territory was contiguous with Seleucid possessions on the Taurus Range. The frontier policy of the Seleucids saw this as a natural danger which should be neutralised by annexation or agreement. Ariarathes V's elder brother Orophernes was to be backed by Demetrius as a contender for the Cappadocian throne for a sum of 1000 talents.[25] This backing involved a military undertaking, and the Seleucid army crossed the Taurus to support Orophernes in his bid for the throne: he was indeed successfully installed in Ariarathes' place. Ariarathes predictably complained to Rome, and shortly afterwards envoys from Orophernes arrived to defend his position,[26] to bear a crown dedicated to Rome and with orders to renew the alliance with Rome. Demetrius also sent one Miltiades to defend the Syrian action in backing Orophernes. Polybius has a very poor opinion of the veracity of Demetrius' envoy, and is clearly against the usurpation of Orophernes, which was in fact short-lived as Ariarathes himself was presently restored to his throne as a joint-ruler with Orophernes - according to a decree of the Senate.[27] The success of Demetrius' policy here does not seem to me to be as complete as Bevan (e.g.) seemed to suggest[28]: Demetrius' change of power in Cappadocia was only half successful, and was subject to Roman agreement - or Demetrius' envoy would not have made his journey to defend the action. If this was the summit of his power it was weakly based: if we take the winter of 159 to

6/8/ Spring or Summer of 158 as the period taken by the various embassies and the settlement of the Cappadocian kingdom, Rome had had five years to deal with the problem and could be said to have taken no real action against

Demetrius, although its psychological effect was no doubt considerable. But Demetrius was not just menaced by Rome. The rule of Orophernes was not worth the trouble that Demetrius had taken to bring it about: Diodorus[29] and Polybius[30] tell a story of mass proscription and of extortion and avarice on a large scale. A passage quoted from Polybius by Athenaeus says that 'Orophernes reigned for a short time in Cappadocia, and despising their traditional customs introduced the refined debauchery of Ionia'[31]: this was a disastrous result from Demetrius' diplomacy for it had no real cause other than Ariarathes' rejection of marriage to Demetrius' sister: certainly nothing that would inter alia satisfy the senate that it was proper conduct. In Cappadocia predictably there was widespread resentment. And Demetrius' own credibility seems to have been damaged by associating with Orophernes: Appian tells us that a Senatus Consultum was passed to the effect that the two kings should rule jointly. And it is too easy to see this just as Roman meddling.[31a] It reads more like a lame attempt at mediation, and gave Pergamum a cause for action against Demetrius which it should not have been handed .

In Pergamum, according to Diodorus,[32] Eumenes wished to curb Demetrius' schemes, and to reinstate Ariarathes possibly. With this end in view he found a rival claimant to dispute the Seleucid throne, a young man whom he alleged to be Antiochus Eupator's brother, rescued from Demetrius' agents when Eupator was himself killed on Demetrius' accession, and living at this juncture at Smyrna in the Pergamene kingdom. There was just enough plausibility in the story to allow it credibility: Eumenes had the new aspirant brought to Pergamum and crowned him as the legitimate Seleucid king. Pergamum was in this at least being consistent, as it was the Pergamene troops of Attalus who had supported the equally illegitimate accession of Antiochus IV in 175: but it is also true to say that Pergamum could apparently never act without some latent fear of Syria on the one hand and the connivance of Rome on the other.[32a] This simultaneously

explains Pergamum's client-relationship with Rome and her activities against Syria of which this latest move to unsettle the Seleucid succession is probably the most potentially dangerous from Syria's point of view. It is just possible that the new usurper was the second son of Antiochus[33]: but Pergamum's record on this matter does not inspire confidence that he was, apart from the fact that the reported reasons for the common people's acceptance of the new Alexander Balas were those of a people looking for a new freedom - not necessarily an authentic sovereign. The senate at Rome, Polybius relates, were 'frankly disgusted' with Heracleides[34], the supporter of Alexander's claims - and, significantly, the brother of Timarchus: Polybius himself is patently sceptical of Alexander's claim, but the sober members of the Senate were out-voted by the majority 'seduced by the charlatanry (τῆς γοητείας) of Heracleides'[35], and the Senate drew up a Consultum agreeing that Alexander and Laodice should go home to regain their father's throne with Roman help.[36] Meanwhile, one Zenophanes a Cilician chieftain was involved by Pergamum in the support of Alexander, including the enlistment of troops.

Meanwhile, in Cappadocia, Ariarathes was re-instated in his kingdom with the help of Pergamum,[37] and Demetrius' position began to look very unsure. Demetrius had also encountered a check in his scheme to wrest Cyprus from his cousin Ptolemy Philometor by bribing the Egyptian garrison commander, who committed suicide when Philometor discovered the plot[38]: this was in 154, and Demetrius was in danger of being discredited as well as simply being unsuccessful in his various enterprises. The dissatisfaction among the Syrian people which resulted from this is seen best perhaps in the attempt recorded in Diodorus to put one of Demetrius' own mercenary troops on the throne.[39] A man called Andriscus from Adramyttium, claiming to be the son of Perseus, and seemingly similar in build and appearance to the Macedonian king, who happened to have the necessary drive and magnetism to rally the populance,

approached Demetrius with a request to put him (back) on the throne of Macedon. Andriscus' followers said that if he could not or would not help Andriscus to recover his alleged position in Macedon, Demetrius should abdicate. Quick thinking here saved Demetrius, for probably rightly guessing that it was his own throne that was in danger, he had Andriscus arrested and sent to Rome with a full account of what Andriscus had claimed;[40] this was possibly in 152 - 1.

Having fled to Antioch on the collapse of his cause and the near-mutiny of his men,[41] a mutiny only avoided by the pillaging of Cappadocian Zeus' temple on Mount Ariadne, Orophernes now tried to make a plot with a mob at Antioch, as Justin says 'ingrato animo'.[42] Demetrius learned of this scheme, spared Orophernes but ordered that he should be kept under guard at Seleucia-in-Pieria.

There was now nothing political or military to delay Alexander Balas' next move: as Justin says, Demetrius' rule had become exceedingly unpopular,[43] and this had in effect produced not only opposition at home but an alliance of powers against him and his schemes abroad: we have seen how Ariarathes, Philometor and Attalus came to oppose him, and they did so now in combination. This would not, as we have seen, have been his father Seleucus IV's intention, under whom an anti-Roman alliance was steadily building.

As Will reminds us, Balas was officially recognised by Rome, Attalus and Ariarathes V as well as by Ptolemy Philometor - who had not simply been opposed to Demetrius. Alexander's first action was to take Ptolemais, and his fifth column had ensured that this would involve no actual fighting.[44] As was to happen with increasing frequency in the next hundred years, a rival court was set up by Alexander at Ptolemais and the country's loyalty divided by war instead of united by actual external pressure. Ptolemy's hatred (Appian's phrase μῖσος) of Demetrius and the opposition of Ariarathes and Attalus was tested by the first military

engagement, in which Alexander seems to have been defeated;[45] in the final action, however, Demetrius' left seems to have pursued the enemy too far - a Seleucid military failing - and he was then surrounded by the section of the enemy which remained steady: he died 'very bravely' and 'invicto animo' on the battlefield in 150.[46]

Appian places the principal responsibility for the de-throning of Demetrius upon Ptolemy Philometor,[47] and one can make a case for this latest pointless struggle being another in the long series of Syrian Wars whose object was to decide control of Coele Syria and of the timber and harbours of the Phoenician coast. But the political balance of power between Syria and Egypt was still, certainly to Egypt, more of an issue than the inimical attitude of Rome: whereas it is true that Roman influence was undergoing an eclipse, it was not a good moment to choose to renew quarrels between the two major Hellenistic powers who were capable, possibly in combination, of withstanding her.

The first reason is through hindsight an obvious one: it only remained for Rome to find a genuine casus belli in Syria or Egypt - or some nearby country - for Rome's interest to be quickly rekindled: and second, in supporting Balas, Ptolemy was gambling not only upon Balas's adequacy as a ruler, for which he can have had in the nature of the case no evidence, but also on the acceptability of the new intruder to the Syrian people, by this time growing restive from the alternation of would-be dynasties. As if to cement by personal ties what he could not guarantee politically, Philometor married off his daughter Cleopatra to Alexander soon after Balas' accession. This prudence was justified, for Balas was a worthless ruler, dominated by luxury and mistresses, and content to leave the government to his minister Ammonius who was probably of Egyptian extraction.[48] A purge was carried out to remove opposition, and Diodorus records that the government of Antioch was placed in the hands of Hierax and Diodotus.[49]

The position of the nationalist movement in Judaea was, of course, able to profit considerably by the contest over the throne of Syria, playing one contender off against the other with an apparent heedlessness to the eventual effect this might have on the Eastern Mediterranean similar to that displayed by the contending Ptolemy and Seleucid themselves. In the end the Jews were to suffer more from the admission of Rome into the approaching power vacuum than any of the other neighbouring states,[50] although for the present Rome was seriously committed against Carthage in the Third Punic War, and so Rome's concern was peripheral to the interests of Coele-Syria and Judaea. Added to the understandable if imprudent nationalist fervour, we have the personal and clan ambitions of the Hasmoneans themselves who saw in each succeeding ruler an object for bribery or strife. In 152 Jonathan was able to wrest Jerusalem from Demetrius as the price of Jewish support, and then Alexander granted him the High-Priesthood; in the celebrations which followed Alexander's marriage to Cleopatra, recorded in I Maccabees, the Jewish delegation was prominent, and Jonathan was rewarded by being nominated as Strategos of Judaea.[51]

Not only in Judaea were secessionist indigenous kingdoms showing their power. In about 147 at about the time Mithridates was overcoming Media, a native dynast Kamniskires was installed at Susa where he had a seven or eight-year reign until expelled in the South-Westwards expansion of Parthia. In Persis the dynasty of the Fratadara was, free now of the Seleucid control exercised temporarily under Antiochus III, now in a position to strengthen their hold on the country from their capital at Istakhr ,[51a] before becoming feudatory to Parthia.

By 147 Alexander Balas' days as ruler of Syria were numbered. His coinage demonstrates by its propaganda purpose the tenuous nature of his claim to legitimacy. He uses the 'seated Zeus' type of Antiochus V, his 'brother', and the legend ΘΕΟΠΑΤΟΡΟΣ is calculated to evoke a connection with Antiochus IV, whom he claimed as his father but which will

not have endeared him to the Jews.[52] It is an interesting reflection on his own and his backers' attitude to Antiochus IV that his own claim to be ΘΕΟΣ ΕΠΙΦΑΝΗΣ could still be taken seriously. Demetrius, the elder son of Demetrius I was now about 14 years old,[53] and ready to assume with help his rightful throne; equipping him with mercenaries under Lasthenes who were largely Cretan but probably operating from Cilicia[54] where mercenaries could be obtained, his supporters let him appear in Syria, probably landing at Seleucia. At this point, Apollonius the governor of Coele-Syria declared for Demetrius, and Alexander was cut off in the north at Antioch: fighting took place in Coele-Syria between the two factions but Apollonius' army was defeated by Jonathan's Jewish army, supporting Alexander, near Azotus and destroyed in the temple of Dagon in that city by Jonathan's action in setting light to the temple.[55]

Philometor now began to take a hand in the prosecution of the war against Demetrius, and advanced together with his fleet up the Phoenicean coastline,[56] viewing the carnage at Azotus en route: Philometor garrisoned the coast towns and so secured Alexander's rear; but at Ptolemais, possibly the seat of Alexander's court, Alexander and Ammonius formed a conspiracy against him. On discovering that Ammonius was involved, Philometor demanded that he be surrendered and punished. Alexander refused and the alliance between Ptolemy and Alexander was rescinded. To formalise the end of this connection he offered his daughter Cleopatra ~~and~~ wife to as / Demetrius II, and Alexander sent his own child by Cleopatra, Antiochus, to be brought up by an Arab chieftain Yamlik. Hierax and Diodotus, the governors of Antioch went over to Demetrius , and Alexander fled to Cilicia whence he had come. Ammonius was killed by the Antioch mob.[57]

Alexander's purpose in returning to Cilicia was probably to raise reinforcements for the continuation of his campaign, now made much less likely to succeed by the defection of Philometor. Hierax and Diodotus had actually offered Ptolemy the throne of Syria, and, being a

Seleucid on his mother's side, this may have seemed attractive, except that Egypt will have been more than enough to handle in view of the almost continuous local unrest since the involvement of Egyptians in the phalanx at Raphia in 217. As Diodorus says, Ptolemy 'had no appetite for the throne',[58] but he did arrive at an arrangement in which he ruled Coele-Syria, and Demetrius ruled the rest of the Seleucid kingdom: the author of I Maccabees, possibly for his own partisan reasons, makes Ptolemy attempt to dispose of Alexander because 'he coveted his kingdom'[59]: there seems in the foregoing, as well as in Diodorus' words, good pragmatic reasons why Philometor should not want Alexander's kingdom: but he was involved in its accession question. Demetrius was duly installed as the new Seleucid king, and marriage to Cleopatra, who was destined to be a woman of amazing versatility, took place.

The inevitable military conflict occurred[60] in the early summer of 145 on the River Oenopares between Alexander and his Cilician forces and others still loyal to him, and the combined forces of Ptolemy and Demetrius. Defeat for Balas followed, and he fled with 500 survivors to Abae in Northern Syria (Diod. 'Arabia'). Ptolemy was badly wounded in the fighting. Alexander's eventual death five days later took place as a result of an arrangement by Demetrius and two of Balas' Greek officers Heliades and Casius that the death of Balas was to be obtained in exchange for their own freedom. So Balas was beheaded by Zabdiel an Arab Chieftain, and the head sent to Ptolemy who died three days later from his own wounds.

Ptolemy's death was followed by a re-assertion of Seleucid sovereignty, and this took the form of annihilating the Egyptian garrisons in the Phoenician ports: survivors did reach Antioch, but this action on behalf of Demetrius II's new government, really under the supervision of his Cretan ally Lasthenes, had alienated the Jews who all along had been supporters of Balas because of the way he had dealt with them. Lasthenes, for his part, was only in Syria for what he and his troops could exact from it, and this became quickly apparent.

With a shrewd eye to the likely course of events Jonathan quickly made overtures to the young Demetrius, and was confirmed in all his honours including the high-priesthood and made one of the king's 'Chief Friends'[61]: we have the transcript of a letter said to have been written by Demetrius to Lasthenes detailing the release of taxes and of payments in kind, normally tribute from the Jewish state to the government at Antioch,[62] all this being the result of Jonathan's bid for Demetrius' support and vice-versa. It was now more than usually necessary for the reigning Seleucid to retain what support he could master, especially from such near neighbours. The districts of Aphairema, Lydda (modern Lod) and Rathamin[63] were added to Judaea from Samaria, a territorial <u>putsch</u> which was to issue in continuous bad feeling, but was itself only the result of local anti-Samaritan expeditions under the earlier Maccabees.

Demetrius, secure in his Cretan protectors, now dismissed his own troops - an action which not only alienated them but added fuel to the discontent already growing among the population of Antioch against the Cretan presence. Josephus states that money usually given to Syrian regulars now went to the Cretan soldiery[64]: this provoked open rebellion in Antioch, and it is not an elevating chapter in Jewish history which records the ferocity of the slaughter which accompanied Jonathan's intervention in this civil strife at the bidding of Demetrius.[65] It was only to be expected that the barbarity with which this revolt had been put down would result in another contender for the throne.

This person was one Diodotus, also called Tryphon, who took advantage of the growing disenchantment of the public and revolted from Demetrius, supported by large numbers of troops including possibly the garrison of Larissa, colonists from Larissa in Thessaly.[66] Tryphon then went to the Arab chief whom Diodorus calls Iamblichus,[67] and with whom Alexander Balas had left his son Antiochus, and took the child back to Syria with him proclaiming him as Antiochus VI Epiphanes: Tryphon assembled his army at Chalcis on the Arabian border and prepared for hostilities.

Attempts to stamp out this revolt by a regular military confrontation failed with the defeat of Demetrius' general. Moving northwards to the large Seleucid military base at Apamea on the Orontes, Tryphon was able to arrive at Antioch well-armed, where he was predictably welcomed by the citizens. The court of Demetrius moved to Seleucia-in-Pieria, and this became a base for Demetrius extending his territory southwards, while Tryphon and his protegé seem to have controlled Cilicia and most of the rest of the Seleucid realm, except Mesopotamia and Babylonia: Jewish support of Alexander Balas was continued for his son. Again here we should note the increasing military complications in the extreme West of the Seleucid Empire.

In 143 - 2 Tryphon connived at the elimination of the young Antiochus[68] and put himself forward for acclamation by the army as the new king, in this way setting aside all pretensions of legality which Alexander Balas had tried so hard to simulate. The process of acclamation was ancient Macedonian army practice but appealed to the source of military power rather than to the accepted method of dynastic succession; it can be seen as a shrewd move by Tryphon to win support. He coined using the title Αὐτοκράτωρ which, as Bevan points out,[69] was not a Macedonian title, and was only used by the Parthians after 77 BC. Its use by Tryphon may have been as a justification for his assuming the throne, or perhaps a re-statement of Seleucid authority viz-à-viz Parthia, now dangerously active. Tryphon's next move was to inform and placate the senate at Rome, which he did by dispatching envoys with a statue of victory to the value of 10,000 gold staters, not so much a gift as a bribe. It is to the senate's credit that it treated this with the contempt it deserved, kept the statue, (and its value), but inscribed it with the name of Antiochus VI, the young boy king Tryphon had assassinated.[70]

The Hasmonean Jewish state was able to use the Seleucid predicament again to wrest almost complete control of the country, including

permission for new fortifications, from Demetrius whose cause needed their support. The Jews proclaimed a new era, and the next year, with Simon as Ethnarch, the Seleucid garrison in the אקרא at Jerusalem surrendered.[71] I Maccabees relates the joy with which the Jewish state welcomed the eventual success of its long struggle for independence from Seleucid rule.

Meanwhile Demetrius, presumably hoping to replenish his forces and re-assert his authority in one move, set out for the East with the intention of recovering some of the ground lost to Parthia. Josephus stresses that ambassadors arrived at his court requesting that he should help the eastern Greeks against the schemes and power of Mithridates I who was pursuing an actively aggressive foreign policy towards the Greek states in Iran, both east and west in Bactria and Elymais.[72] In 138, despite the formidable force and successful progress of his troops, he was defeated, captured and taken to Hyrcania where Mithridates' daughter Rhodogune was given to him in marriage. The proximal cause of the expedition, if we discount the author of I Maccabees' short-range explanation, was Mithridates' threat to Mesopotamia - itself only made possible by the success of the Parthian arms on the eastern front: Babylonia had certainly still been Seleucid in 144,[73] but at that time Parthian attention was fully occupied not only with an anti-Bactrian policy but with rising and more dangerous nomad activity which was later to recur, as we have already seen in the previous chapter. That Demetrius' army did in fact contain a Bactrian contingent is not in doubt,[74] and it does raise the question as to what motives prompted its presence when, in 141 in Heliocles' Bactria, the danger of a serious nomad invasion must have been imminent. Perhaps at that time Parthia seemed, to Bactria, and had seemed for some time, the more menacing and marginally the more dangerous enemy: in July 141 we have cuneiform evidence of Mithridates' (temporary) occupation of Seleucia-on-Tigris.[74a] It does seem that some co-ordination took place: a conceivable possibility is that by 141 northern Bactria, or possibly

Sogdiana had already fallen, and that this contingent were not volunteers but refugees. This is, however, unlikely in view of the distance involved: their presence seems to have been arranged, and is important chronologically as well as politically for that reason.

Meanwhile, in Syria the civil war ground on. An attempt by Demetrius' troops to take Ptolemais was defeated, but Tryphon's support was declining owing to his increasingly forceful and imprudent attitude to the Syrian people. His army mutinied and joined Cleopatra, Demetrius' wife, at Seleucia-in-Pieria; and Demetrius' brother Antiochus, from Side in Pamphyllia, then married Cleopatra at her invitation as her third husband and assumed the Seleucid throne as Antiochus VII.[75]

The Seleucid cause now had a genuine protagonist as its new leader, and the loyalty which the Seleucids seemed on many occasions to call out in their subjects re-asserted itself. Sidetes drove Tryphon out of upper Syria and into the fortress of Dor (Dora) in Phoenicia; eventually, driven out of Dor and Ptolemais, Tryphon went via Orthosia to the main Seleucid garrison town of north Syria Apamea where his reign had begun. Near there he was defeated and captured and allowed to commit suicide.[76]

Antiochus was faced with the difficult task of reducing his shrunken kingdom to order and this involved arriving at some accommodation with Simon Maccabeus who as High Priest, and the last of Judas' brothers to reign, was a powerful antagonist, although too old now to be himself a field commander. Antiochus proceeded against the Jews because of complaints of extortion and armed intrusion over their own borders by Jewish forces, and rejected attempts by Simon and his representatives to justify continued Jewish occupation of Joppa and Gazara which Simon claimed were an integral part of the Jewish state. When Athenobius, Antiochus' ambassador, reported a Jewish refusal to evacuate these cities, Antiochus declared war and sent his general Cendebaeus against the Jewish army via Jamnia.[77] Cendebaeus was defeated by Judas and John, Simon's sons,

and Simon died shortly after, February 135.

Antiochus himself took charge of operations against the Hasmonean state in 134, and the Jewish forces fell back on Jerusalem which was then besieged. John Hyrcanus had been occupied in avenging the death of his father Simon at the hands of his son-in-law Ptolemy, and for this reason had been involved in the siege of the fortress of Dagon near Jericho.[78] He had now to set about defending Jerusalem against a most determined and well-organised investment on the part of Antiochus VII. Antiochus' behaviour during the Jewish feast of Tabernacles, in which he had not only acceded to Hyrcanus' request for a seven-day truce but also had contributed a sacrifice of bulls and spices, convinced his Jewish antagonists that he was of a different nature from Antiochus Epiphanes.[79] This in turn led to negotiations between Hyrcanus and Antiochus who had the wisdom to realise that the only political solution to the Jewish question, having once shown reasonable strength, lay in agreement and not in perpetrating another running campaign. The negotiations resulted in the garrisoning of the Jerusalem citadel, which Antiochus commuted to a money payment, and the exaction of tribute from Joppa and other border towns. Antiochus was also given a sum of money from the Tomb of David, possibly as an added incentive to raise the siege - the tomb of David was in an easily-defensible position anyway - and possibly to make a point of Hyrcanus' desire to be the ally of a strong Seleucid king. Whether or not that was the case, Hyrcanus was to prove his alliance in 130 BC. by accompanying Antiochus on the ill-fated and the last of the grand Seleucid expeditions to 'reclaim the Orient'.

In the meantime Demetrius II had been kept as a royal captive in Hyrcania, possibly in Hecatompylos, for a long time the Parthian capital, and while there had cultivated a Parthian beard which his coins later display.[80] Mithridates I died soon after his capture of Demetrius in 138, to be succeeded by Phraates II, the heir to an

immeasurably stronger Parthia than his father had inherited. Mithridates had given Rhodogune his daughter in marriage to Demetrius by whom the exiled Seleucid presently had children to complicate the Seleucid succession question to a further generation. An attempt was made by Demetrius, aided by a friend Calimander, to escape from his captivity but he was caught and returned: when this had happened a second time, Phraates became derisory in his attitude and gave Demetrius some golden dice, perhaps to while away his time[81]: it is interesting in the relations between the Parthians and Seleucids at this time that the Parthian attitude seems almost indulgent rather than genuinely respectful. Later Parthian actions show them quite capable of executing a foe they actually feared.

At this point Antiochus VII entered the arena with an army of colossal size for Seleucid resources, put at 300,000 but probably much smaller.[82] Even so, 80,000 would have been a formidable force, and in this respect of size one can see by hindsight the roots of possible trouble for Antiochus. His object was to restore Greek rule in Mesopotamia and Media perhaps over the line of the Zagros into nearer Iran. He was successful in three battles and Justin says that many of the local rulers joined his cause.[83] One of these actions, in which the Jewish contingent under John Hyrcanus was involved,[84] took place against the Parthian general Indates on the Lycus river. The Parthian army seems then to have evacuated Babylonia and Antiochus advanced to recover Media: the Parthian general Ennius was roughly treated by the Greek population of Seleucia-on-Tigris,[85] and the revolt from Parthian rule became general. Winter came, 130, and the troops of this huge army with their unwieldy crowd of camp-followers went to winter quarters, billeted among the local Iranian population. We can only re-construct what went wrong from suspicions and the final result. Phraates' agents seem to have been zealously at work during the winter months stirring up discontent against the Seleucid troops who must have been a considerable trial to the local population, however much they may

at first have been ostensible liberators from the Parthian yoke.[85a]

When spring came in 129 negotiations did take place between Phraates and Antiochus in which Antiochus agreed to peace on condition that Demetrius was returned; tribute would be paid and the Parthians would retire beyond the Seleucid border which was at this point taken to run to the west of Parthia and Astauene "his (Phraates) ancestral domain".[86] Arsaces rejected these terms, which were quite unrealistic and would have wiped out 100 years of Parthian intrusion (and their Philhellenic culture as well) at a stroke. They were also geographically unrealistic as there is no real geographical separation between the Elburz and the Zagros, when, from what was the original province of 'Parthia', further Parthian incursions westwards became a matter of seepage as first Hekatompylos and then Rhagae and finally Ecbatana became their capital. The Zagros range would have been feasible as a boundary, but Seleucid temperament from all we know of it would not have been likely to settle for such a modest outcome of this large expedition. In the meantime, with an astute insight into the realities of Seleucid home politics Phraates released Demetrius secretly to return to Syria and sow sedition there. In the long view that was the most damaging result of the campaign.[87]

The Seleucid general Athenaeus had made the difficult circumstances of winter-billeting of troops worse for the native population by mistreating the villages,[88] and theanger thus aroused enabled a general rising in the spring of 129 against Antiochus' army: Antiochus himself seems to have escaped the general slaughter and to have been caught with a section of his army in a valley where an unequal struggle ensued. He was killed in the battle that followed,[89] unable because of the terrain to use his cavalry. As for Athenaeus, he predictably deserted in face of the enemy, but found that because of his extortion and misconduct he had alienated the villages from whom he now wished food and shelter. So he died, as many others may have done, a straggler by the wayside.[90] In

Antioch public mourning was proclaimed for the death of Antiochus, but everywhere in the cities families mourned the loss of relatives who were lost, wounded or missing in action, or who had become prisoners of the Parthians.[91] Retribution followed for the ill-treatment of Ennius by the people of Seleucia, and a deputation from the Greek city was faced with the sight of Pitthides, one of their fellow countrymen sitting on the ground with his eyes gouged out - a warning according to Phraates of the fate awaiting them all.[92] And Phraates duly handed over the city to his general Euhemerus, or as Justin calls him Himerus, to receive punishment.[93] This man seems to have been left in charge of Babylonia while Phraates hurried to the East to meet the advancing Sakas. He may have already seen action against them prior to Antiochus' own expedition. The captives of Antiochus' army were pressed into service against the Sakas in the desperate campaign on the eastern marches of the Parthian state as a serious situation developed.[94] In the event Phraates was killed in this campaign and so was Artabanus, his father-in-law who succeeded him; but the nomad tide, in country most favourable to it, was stemmed, and Parthian civilisation breathed again.[95]

The Yueh-chi invasion of Bactria from the north-east had reduced Bactria's ability to offer any eastern support to Phraates' and Artabanus' campaigns against the nomads; and the virtual coincidence of dates raises again the question of who invaded Bactria. The evidence is fairly clear that these two thrusts - against Iran and Parthia by the Sakas, and against Bactria by the Yueh-chi came from different places and were aimed in different directions. But there is no reason to suppose that they were not both part of a general nomad pressure of which these two attacks were simply the driving points, owing their advance perhaps to the personalities of respective nomad leaders.[96]

Notes for Chapter VII.

1. I Maccabees 1, 441.

1a. A helpful analysis of the Senate's actions in respect of Egypt, Syria and Pergamum, et. al. appeared in Briscoe's article in Historia XVIII, 1969, p. 49 ff. 1b. See also F.W.Walbank 'Polybius and Rome's Eastern Policy', JRS. 53, 1963 and P. S. Derow in JRS. 1979.

2. Polybius XXXI, 11, 2.

3. Pol. XXXI, 11, 12.
E. Will points out (Politique II, p. 307) that the Senate would prefer to see on the throne a minor (whom they could manipulate) rather than an energetic man who would be less pliable.

4. Diodorus XXI, 18.

5. Pol. XXXI, 10, 10.

5a. Will wonders if some Senators wished 'this change of reign': Op. Cit., p. 3 7.

6. T. B. L. Webster: Hellenistic Art, London, 1967, Pl. 30.
The face is well cast in his coinage, (App. Coin 5.)

7. I Maccabees, 7, 2 - 3.

8. Diodorus XXXI, 27A.

9. Loc. cit.
Bronze Coinage of Timarchus is examined in A.N.S. Museum notes, 1945 and emanated from mints at Ecbatana and Babylon, which he made his capital. Bellinger accepted Tarn's views too readily.

10. Appian, Syriaca 47.

10a. Timarchus' reign dated from January 11th to May 14th, 161, Bellinger: Op. Cit., p. 43.

11. Timarchus' coinage is referred to in Babelon, p. cxv, and in Newell: Eastern Seleucid Mints. The comments of Bellinger in YCS, 1950, p. 312 - 315 on the assumed alliance of Timarchus and Eucratides are very pertinent. As Will points out, it was McDowell in 'Stamped and Inscribed Objects' who pointed out (p. 214 ff) that the Western sources deform the events and so obscure the probability that Timarchus sought to make a common front with Bactria against the Parthians. (Will II, p. 310).

12. Diodorus XXXI, 19, 6.

13. Diodorus XXXI, 19, 8.
Briscoe describes the relationships between Rome and Cappadocia, among other states, in the context of Senatorial politics. (Historia XVIII, 1969).

14. Polybius XXXI, 3. 15.
Gracchus gave a favourable report again during his second eastern embassy. (Pol. XXXI, 32).

15. Diodorus XXI, 22.

16. Diodorus XXI, 28A and note 2 infra.

16a. Briscoe: Op. Cit., p. 57, and the literature cited there: e.g.: Magie: Roman Rule.

17. Diodorus XXXI, 29.

18. Polybius XXXII, 3, 13 and Diodorus XXXI, 30.

19. E. R. Bevan: The House of Seleucus, Volume II, p. 197, although the Senate did pass a consultum recognising Alexander Balas and Laodice. (Pol. XXXIII, 18).

20. II Macc. 14, 14.
As E. Will says (Hist. Pol. II, p. 310), the Hasidim had obtained what they had sought.

21. I Macc. 14, 26.

22. I Macc. 8, 17.
Briscoe agrees that we 'need not doubt' that an alliance was concluded, whether or not we accept the authenticity of II Macc. (p. 53).

23. I Macc., 9, 1 ff. The success of the Hasmonean cause was underpinned continuously by the fact that Judas had able brothers who were similarly committed and trusted.

24. W. F. Albright: The Archaeology of Palestine. Harmondsworth, 1960.

25. Appian, Syriaca 47.

26. Polybius XXXII, 10, 1 and 4. Polybius shows himself often critical of Demetrius.

27. Appian, Syriaca 47.

28. Bevan: House of Seleucus II, p. 205.

29. Diodorus XXXII, 32.

30. Polybius XXXII, 11, 1 and 11. For an example of Orophernes' misdoings, see the inscription: 'Senatus consultum de Priensibus et Ariathe' in 'Roman Documents from the Greek East' (Sherk), Baltimore, 1969, No. 6, p. 40, in which Ariathes is prevented from withdrawing 400 talents deposited in the temple at Priene after a spell of Orophernes' extortionate taxation. Priene had said that the money should not be handed over to Ariarathes instead, and appealed to Rome and to Rhodes for help in the controversy. Pol. XXXIII, 6 specifically refers. The decree is dated (loc. cit.) to 156.

31. Athen. X, p. 550 b. Loeb. edn.

31a. Briscoe, Op. Cit., p. 57, sees this restriction of Ariarathes as a senatorial attempt to divide Cappadocia.

32. So Bevan in House of Seleucus II, p. 207. Pergamum's schemes against the Seleucids seem to spell the death knell of any pan-Hellenic alliance against Rome such as might have arisen under Seleucus IV. But see contra in 'The Foreign policy of the Attalids of Pergamum', (Hansen), passim.

32a. Briscoe points out the Roman fear of an alliance between Pergamum and Syria (Op. Cit., p. 55). (Pol. XXXI, 6).

33. See Bevan, op. cit., Appendix M.

34. Polybius XXXIII, 18, 10, Wallbank III, p. 561, stresses the unwillingness of some members of the senate to become involved in 'an Eastern intrigue'.

35. Polybius XXXIII, 18, 11.
An indication of the senatorial split explored by Briscoe. (Op. Cit., passim).

36. Polybius XXXIII, 18, 13.
As Wallbank points out, 'help' meant permission to help themselves: little more. (loc. cit.)

37. Polybius XXXII, 12, 1.
In Spring, 157. (Wallbank III, p. 534).

38. Polybius, XXXIII, 5. Wallbank thinks Demetrius was 'encouraged' by the similar action of Antiochus IV in seizing Cyprus (Wallbank III, p. 547).

39. Diodorus XXXI, 40 a. Bevan's dating: H of S II, p. 209.

40. Diodorus ibid.

41. Diodorus XXXI, 34.

42. Justin XXXV, 1, 3 f.

43. Justin XXV, 1, 8 and 9.

44. I Macc. 10, 1 f. Will: Hist. Pol. II, p. 315.

45. Justin XXXV, 1, 10.

46. Justin XXV, 1, 11.

47. Appian Syriaca 67.
This whole episode seems at odds with Philometor's generally creditable statesmanship; and with Demetrius' favourable attitude to Philometor at first.

48. Bevan's suggestion of H of S II, p. 213 - from Ammon? And a question must arise as to whether he was a Ptolemaic appointee.

49. Diodorus XXXIII, 3.

50. For the whole question of Jewish/Roman hostilities see Josephus' 'Bellum Judaicum', passim.

51. I Macc. 10, 57 - 65.

51a. Detailed accounts of these dynasties are in Le Rider 'Suse'. p. 349 f. and for the Fratadara in Altheim: Hunnen , p. 375 f.

52. Kraay and Davis: The Hellenistic Kingdoms. London 1973, pls. 89, 90 and 92.

53. So Bevan in H of S II, p. 218.

54. See Bevan, Op. Cit., Appendix N, but I see no need for his emmendation: Josephus Ant. XIII, 86.

55. Josephus Ant. XIII, 131 = Malcus. I Macc. 11, 39 = Imalkue.

56. Josephus Ant. XIII, 112 and 108.
As mentioned in .47 above the extent of Philometor's volte-face is remarkable, and is noted in passing by Briscoe (Op. Cit., p. 61).

57. Josephus Ant. XIII, 108.

58. ὁ δὲ τῆς μὲν βασιλείας οὐκ ὀρεγόμενος
Diod. XXXII, 9c.
It is the author of I Macc. (Ch. 11) who believes that Philometor intended the seizure of the whole Seleucid Empire, hence his support of, and the withdrawal of this support again from, Balas.

59. I Macc. 11, 11.

60. Diodorus XXXII, 9 d: I Macc. 11, 15.

61. I Macc. 11, 27, Jos. Ant. XIII, 124 f.

62. Josephus Ant. XIII, 127.

63. Variant in Jos. XIII 'Ραμαθαιν , possibly the Arimathea of the Gospels: Bevan H of S II, 224, No. 2 (I Macc, 11, 34).

64. Jos. Ant. XIII, 133 ff in full: also I Macc. 11, 45.

65. Diodorus XXXIII, 4a.

66. Ibid.

67. F. R. Walton says that the first coins of Antiochus VI are dated to Sel. 167 = 145 BC. Loeb Edn. of Diodorus, Volume XII, p. 11, n. 2.

68. Jos. Ant. XIII, 219 Appian Syriaca 68. Justin XXX, 1, 7 has 'occiso pupillo'. Opinions of how and when the death occurred vary, but the blame is generally put on Tryphon in view of his obvious motive. A late date of 138 is impossible on numismatic grounds.

69. See Bevan Op. Cit., Appendix Q; Kraay and Davis, plate 99, which catches Antiochus' cherubic face well. Tryphon did not even coin with a Seleucid dating, but by the year of the reign (Will - Hist. Pol. II, p. 341).

70. Diodorus XXXIII, 28a. This senatorial move is remarkably different from its previous unhelpful activity and leads one to wonder if the Scipionic group defeated the Fulvian caucus on this issue (Briscoe Op. Cit., passim and esp. 67 f.)

71. I Macc. 14, 41 and 49.

72. I Macc. 14, 1 gives Demetrius the more limited object of simply recruiting troops with which to suppress Tryphon; an impossible reason in view of Parthia. Will inclines to the view that the Parthian conquest of Elymais was near the end of Mithridates' reign. (Op. Cit., p. 339).

73. Zeitschrift f. Assyr. viii (1893), p. 111 in Bevan Op. Cit., p. 233, n 4. For the eastern question, Justin XLI, 6, 1 and 6, 9. G. K. Jenkins raised the question in NC 1951 p. 18 f whether Demetrius II coined at Ecbatana. Le Rider (Suse p. 372) thought not.

74. Justin XXXVI, 1, 4: 'Itaque et Persarum et Elymaeorum Bactrianorumque auxilio iuvaretur'. Jos. Ant. XIII, 184 f. The existence of Elymaean forces in this army argues for Seleucid control of Elymais, and so supports the proposition in note 72 (above).

74a. A. T. Olmstead : Cuneiform Texts and hellenistic Chronology, Class. Phil. XXXII, 1937, p. 12 f. Demetrius, according to Le Rider (Suse, p. 664 f.,) was also coining in Seleucia from that date.

75. Jos. Ant. XIII, 222. Cleopatra was daughter of Ptolemy Philometor and successively wife of Alexander Balas, Demetrius II and Antiochus VII. Appian Syriaca 68 relates that the news reached Antiochus in Rhodes.

76. Jos. Ant. XIII, 224. Appian Syriaca, 68. Strabo XIV, 668.

77. I Macc. 15, 38 f. and for the political antecedents, I. Macc. 15, 26 - 36. Jos. Ant. XIII, 225 f.

78. Jos. Ant. XIII, 230 - 235. See also Diodorus XXIV, I f.

79. Jo. Ant. XIII, 242 - 244.

80. Kraay and Davis, plate 98.

81. Justin XXXVIII.

82. Bar Cochba: The Seleucid Army. Bevan says 80,000. H of S II, p. 242, from Justin XXXVIII, 10, 2. Diodorus gives the inclusive larger figure in XXXIV, 17.

83. Justin XXXVIII, 10, 5.

84. Jos. Ant. XIII, 251 quoting Nicolas of Damascus. The Lycus is the greater Zab in Assyria (Norther Iraq).

85. Diodorus XXXIV, 19.

85a. It is E. Will who observes the Seleucid problem acutely when he doubts whether Sidetes understood the irreversible change in Iran (Op. Cit., p. 347).

86. Diodorus XXXIV, 15.

87. Justin XXXVIII, 10, 7.
Will believes (evidence ?) that Phraates called in the Saka against Antiochus (in view of the scale of Antiochus' success militarily). (Op. Cit., p. 347 - 8).

88. Diodorus XXXV, 2. Justin XXXVIII, 10, 8: Villages and towns.

89. Appian Syriaca 68; Diodorus XXIV, 16; Justin XXXVIII, 10, 10.

90. Diodorus XXXIV, 17.

91. Ibid.

92. Diodorus XXXIV, 19.

93. Justin XLII, 1, 3, 'tyrannica crudelitate' and what follows; also Diodorus XXXIV, 21.

94. Justin XLII, 1, 4 and 5; 2, 1. Coins in Selwood p. 49 - 56, and Gardner, p. 6.

95. See Chapter VI. Artabanus is, according to Selwood, Phraates' uncle: Selwood, p. 49.

96. Chang K'ien's Report tr. Hirth, p. 94.
So E. Will (Op. Cit., p. 347 - 8) also.

CHAPTER VIII.

The End of the Seleucids.

The end of Antiochus Sidetes' eastern campaign was an appropriate place to break in an account of the problems of the later Seleucids because it marks the end of their last recovery. Demetrius II, now about 32, bearded in the Parthian style,[1] and married to Rhodogune, a Parthian princess, was despatched by Phraates late in 129 to reclaim his throne and the remains of his empire. Demetrius' release had been premature, as the spring rising destroyed the Seleucid intentions without the need for this fifth column activity of Demetrius and Phraates. Justin[2] tells us that horsemen were sent in pursuit of Demetrius to prevent his now unnecessary pro-Parthian action, but Demetrius was going to reclaim his kingdom and he could not be caught. An immediate Parthian invasion of Syrian territory was contemplated, but had to be abandoned because of a rebellion among Phraates' Saka mercenaries, Antiochus Sidetes' soldiers, pressed into service in this situation, having defected,[3] on one view possibly to rejoin Greek elements in the Bactrian and East Iranian territories.

Demetrius' position was bound to be weak: personally he was compromised in Cleopatra Thea's eyes by his marriage to Rhodogune who had borne him children. The resulting mistrust led to her two sons being sent away to be educated: Antiochus, the son of Demetrius to Cyzicus and Sidetes' son Antiochus, later to be called 'Grypus', ('the hook-nosed') with reason, to Athens.[4] Of her other children, her daughter by Demetrius, and Seleucus, her son by Sidetes, were both captured by the Parthians after being unwisely taken east with their campaigning fathers.

Demetrius' critical step to reasserting his authority was his occupation of Antioch; from there he was able to extend his power

to Commagene, parts of Cilicia and Syria proper. At this point Hyspaosines of Charax,[5] on the lowest reaches of the Tigris, extended his breakaway kingdom of Characene (Mesene) northwards to include Babylon and Seleucia-on-Tigris, an annexation of a city which should have been the mainstay of Seleucid power in the area. In the event his accession of power here was to prove ephemeral. Once an ally of Antiochus Sidetes, he had been able to benefit from local revulsion at the excesses of Himerus the Parthian viceroy, who was himself presently to be dispossessed by a satrap of Mithridates II who succeeded Artabanus as king of Parthia in 124/3. Mithridates, whose splendid portrait we have on many tetradrachms,[6] reasserted his power over Hyspaosines' kingdom in 122/1 and also later over Armenia which had slipped from Seleucid control after Antiochus IV's reign.[6a] In Armenia Artavastes was deposed as king and his son Tigranes taken prisoner. By 113 the Parthian army had overrun Mesopotamia and had entered Dura Europos:[7] Mithridates II had succeeded by roughly 100 in imposing Parthian authority in Western Asia as far as the Euphrates.

In the further East, Mithridates had asserted his stabilising control, as we have seen, on the nomad situation; and the Annals of the Former Han credit him with control over the area round Merv and the Massagetae region.[8] Eventually the Han emperor Wu-ti was to send an embassy to the Parthian court which was later reciprocated, and a trade route for silk commerce opened. With Bactria now in nomad hands, at least the political situation between the Parthians and their Eastern neighbours had become less complicated. And, with the passage of the Saka down the Eastern borders of Parthian domains into Sacastane, the northern nomad threat was removed because the Saca themselves were to be occupied with securing their own eastern border with the Greek domains of the later Greek rulers of the Punjab and the Kabul valley who were to prove secure and competent enough to keep the Saca at bay

for the next hundred years or so.[9] It remains true that in the years following his accession Mithridates II will have had to watch his eastern frontier with much more care than was required on the western front. Had the Seleucids composed their differences even at this late date things might have been different, and the Parthian army might not have been able to win control of the Mesopotamian region. Mithridates' coinage is significantly ubiquitous demonstrating the commercial vigour of his kingdom, and it includes for the first time the title ΕΠΙΦΑΝΟΥΣ which is now added to the accurate description of him as ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ ΜΕΓΑΛΟΥ .[10] Cuneiform inscriptions report that Mithridates assumed the title 'king of kings' in about 109 BC. and this appears on coins (Selwood's type 27).[11]

Parthian territory now extended from Mesopotamia to the Oxus and a future clash with Rome could not long be delayed. From being a major asiatic power the Seleucid kingdom was now reduced to the status of a buffer-zone between Rome and Parthia, and with the installation of his protegé Tigranes as king of Armenia, Mithridates II was to occupy a position in which he could intervene in the affairs of Syria more directly, and even in those of Asia Minor. Before long Armenia would pursue her own policy of expansion at the expense of the Seleucids.

The progress of work on Parthian Iraq and Iran, some of whose findings are dealt with in the addendum to this chapter, continues to provide evidence of the quality of the culture with which Antiochus Grypus and his various successors were faced when he came to the throne of Syria as Antiochus VIII in 121. Apart from Dura, which was in many ways peculiar because of its trading position, slavery was not a Parthian custom: the whole domestic culture had been mobile for two hundred years of Parthian geopolitical advance, and while slavery may have gone on to develop at this conclusion of Parthian migration, Greek

slavery was a function of the state economy, particularly in mining. It is predictable that we observe philhellene style in plastic art, and philhellene coin-inscriptions, changing or disappearing as the Seleucid state which had evoked them itself disappears from history. If we were to need a justification in a political background for a change in artistic and philosophical attitudes there could be few better examples.

Palestine - the extended Jewish kingdom - had resumed its formal secession from Seleucid power, interrupted by the strong arrangements of Antiochus Sidetes.[12] John Hyrcanus, who succeeded Simon Maccabaeus as Ethnarch and High Priest in 134, had accompanied this Antiochus on his ill-fated Parthian expedition, but on his own safe return from the debacle had taken the opportunity provided by Seleucid confusion to strengthen his rule both north and south: north by capturing Samaria, south by the annexation of Idumaea and the forcible circumcision of its inhabitants: Josephus tells[13] us that this action was acceded to by the Roman Senate. From this point onwards the Jewish kingdom becomes a separate entity, involved, as occasion arose, in the disputes of the Seleucid state, but never its vassal again.

Demetrius II was drawn into the politics of Ptolemaic Egypt as the result of action against his mother-in-law Cleopatra, the former wife of Philometor and now married to Ptolemy VII Physcon. Lured on by Cleopatra's promise that she would make him king of Egypt[14] - an old Seleucid dream - Demetrius went south with an army to invade Egypt, an act of incredible folly in view of the likelihood of usurpation at Antioch when his back was turned. The invasion failed, the Syrian army mutinied and the usurpation took place: Antioch and Apamea revolted,[15] and one Alexander Zabinas ('the bought one') was placed on the throne of Syria by Egyptian troops as an adopted son of

Antiochus Sidetes.[16] Whether he was or not is unclear. It has been noted that Ptolemy Physon (Euergetes II) employed the same policies against Demetrius II as Philometor had against Demetrius I.[17]

We have no detailed information about this contest, but know that Demetrius coined at Ptolemais, which was presumably his base. Fighting continued until 126 - 5 when he was defeated at Damascus, and finding himself shut out of Ptolemais, was subsequently poisoned at Tyre on the orders[18] of Cleopatra Thea, the daughter of the Cleopatra who had lured him into the struggle. His son Seleucus (by Thea) assumed the throne as the legitimate successor, but was promptly killed by Thea (Appian, Syriaca 69), [19] who assumed the position herself as the opponent of Alexander Zabinas who was still at large in the north of Syria. Coins of her reign are extant, first alone,[20] and then in association with Antiochus (Grypus), then aged about seventeen.[21] In the meantime Ptolemy Physon's wife Cleopatra was persuaded to come back to Egypt, and as Physcon abandoned his championship of Zabinas he now backed Antiochus VIII as the new king of Syria, sealing the arrangement by marrying off his daughter, another Cleopatra (Tryphaena) to Grypus. In time the continuing alliance between Cleopatra Thea and Grypus became very strained at Ptolemais, and seems to have ended in 120 or thereabouts with her death by poisoning.[22] In the meantime Alexander Zabinas had been defeated and disposed of by Grypus at some time in 123,[23] after having attempted to escape first to Seleucia in Pieria where the inhabitants barred his way into the city, and then to Poseideium along the coast where, according to Eusebius,[24] he was captured by pirates who delivered him to Grypus. The Diodorus passage points out that he had had an army of 40,000 men when at the height of his power. Without Physcon's backing there was no real chance that Zabinas would make any further headway.[25]

Alexander had been well-disposed towards John Hyrcanus

who was then the autonomous high priest of the Jewish kingdom, and Grypus seems to have meditated and abandoned a possible invasion of Judaea at this juncture.[26] It would have been an extraordinarily foolish move to have left his newly-won power, as his brother seems to have been making preparations for war. How long these preparations were in progress we do not know. In the period between poisoning his mother and taking up arms against his brother Grypus may well have had a peaceful and uneventful reign! Justin says this eight-year period was one of quiet and the securing of Grypus' kingdom, presumably also economically. In the meanwhile Mithridates II of Parthia had set the Saca invasion well behind him and could concentrate his forces again in the west untroubled as yet by the civil strife in his own kingdom which was presently to occupy him. The Rock relief from Bisutun in Iran, dated from 123 to 110 BC. shows Mithridates facing four of his vassals: Gotarzes, Mithrates, Kopasates and one other, and in 122 or 121 Mithridates forced Hyspaosines to evacuate Charax.[27]

It is probable that the final stage of the Seleucids' struggle with each other started in 114 with an attempt by Grypus to forestall trouble by attempting to poison his half-brother, Cyzicenus.[28] It was an ancient and frequently successful way of eliminating the potential usurper, but in this instance may have been the final blow to a reconciliation between the rival houses of the Seleucid line: apart from this long-term result which Grypus may not have foreseen, his action was also the immediate cause of this next round of hostilities. Egypt was now linked inseparably with the quarrels of the Seleucid house, seeing that Ptolemy Physcon had now involved himself in the cause of the legitimist line against Alexander Zabinas. However, when Physcon died in 117, his widow, conventionally known as Cleopatra III, attempted to seize power, but legalised her position by sharing the throne with Ptolemy Soter II (Ptolemy VIII): this led to factional strife between the party supporting Ptolemy and those who

who sided with his mother. The situation was exacerbated by Ptolemy Alexander, the governor of Cyprus, Ptolemy VIII's brother, who took the side of their mother, who seems to have continued her championship of Grypus which Physcon had begun.[29]

Cleopatra III now tried to break up the marriage Ptolemy Soter had contracted with his sister Cleopatra because of a suspected disaffection towards herself; and in fact she forced Ptolemy to marry his other sister Selene instead, whereupon his erstwhile wife fled to Syria where she offered herself as wife to Antiochus Cyzicenus, no doubt equally despising her husband and her mother. Along with her she seems to have brought Ptolemy Alexander's army from Cyprus[30] as her own way of settling the issue with both Syria and Egypt. It is clear that with this access of strength Cyzicenus was in a very strong position, and seems to have won most of Syria including Antioch[31] - to which Grypus then laid siege accompanied by his wife Tryphaena, Cleopatra's sister.[32] On the fall of Antioch, Tryphaena, more one suspects out of family bitterness than loyalty to Grypus, ordered Cleopatra's brutal execution at the precinct of Daphne.[33] Ptolemaic Egypt was now in serious danger of neglecting the tense social state of native Egyptians in an over-concentration in Seleucid affairs: Ptolemy II's careful commercial organisation of Egypt was now in disarray.[34]

The fall of Antioch is dated to 112 and seems to mark a temporary eclipse of the otherwise considerable success of Cyzicenus who seems to have held most of the south of Syria. Grypus, who was stronger in the north, now went to Aspendus in what had been Pergamene territory up to the time of the Attalid transfer of power to Rome in 133. Seleucia-in-Pieria seems to have remained loyal to him through this period, which occupied the time to July or thereabouts, 111.[35]

During this period the Hasmonean King John Hyrcanus had carried the aggressive foreign policy of his house to the coastal

plain of Palestine, where he had captured all the ports and cities, previously valued so highly as bases for naval operations, to Ptolemais which he was at present besieging, and which, because of their own war, neither Cyzicenus nor Grypus was in a position to help.[36] Samaria seems to have called on Grypus to help her against Hyrcanus before the accession of Aristobulus whose reign was to be only a year long. Josephus relates the dispatch of six thousand Egyptian soldiers from Ptolemy Lathyrus to help Cyzicenus[37] much to the disgust of Cleopatra III. It is sad to relate that the army of Cyzicenus could be described by Josephus as ravaging Hyrcanus' territory 'like a brigand',[38] but it seems a true measure of the aimlessness of the fighting in Coele-Syria in years of ever-growing strength for the Jewish state that the activities of Cyzicenus could be described in this way. In the meantime Tyre (126 - 5) and Sidon (111) had already become 'free cities': Seleucia-in-Pieria was granted independence out of gratitude by Grypus in 109 - 8.[39] Gradually the Seleucid kingdom was being strangled by independent or Jewish or Parthian or ex-Pergamene cities in a ring, north, south, east and west around its borders - a process which had been gradually increasing throughout the second century. It has been observed that at one point towards the end of the second century there was a Ptolemy and a Seleucid engaged in each side of the double civil war in Syria.[40]

In November 108 Samaria was taken by the Jews,[41] Cyzicenus' help against Hyrcanus having been of no avail, and the city was destroyed. Scythopolis (Beit She'an) was betrayed to Hyrcanus' army by one of Cyzicenus' generals: what we now know of Beit She'an is largely Roman as far as classical remains are concerned, but its strategic position, facing the increasingly pro-Parthian wastes on the east bank of the Jordan,[41a] will have made it an important prize for the Hasmonean kingdom. Hyrcanus died in 104, to be succeeded in an ephemeral rule by his elder son Aristobulus, who was not only the first Hasmonean to call himself

'king', but also took the title 'Philhellene'. It is another Seleucid paradox that such a reversal of the original Maccabean attitude to Hellenism comes so late in the Seleucid era, possibly to be explained on the grounds that the Jewish Kingdom had nothing now to fear from the Seleucids.

Josephus speaks of the co-operation between Cleopatra and her generals Hilkiah and Hananiah, whose father Onias had built a temple for the Jewish community at Heliopolis: in the event this alliance seems to have lost her the support of many of her subjects who went to join the army of Ptolemy Lathyrus in Cyprus, only the Jews in the Oniad district of Egypt remaining loyal.[42] The alliance of Lathyrus and Cyzicenus had sustained reverses in the newly-formed pact between Cleopatra III and Ptolemy's brother Alexander, Ptolemy IX. Lathyrus does seem to have been able to consolidate his position in Cyprus, for, after the accession of Alexander Jannaeus to the Hasmonean kingdom on the death of Aristobulus in 103, he was asked to give protection to the city of Ptolemais, whose eponymous connection with Egypt may have prompted the citizens who feared the attacks of Jannaeus on the coastal towns: it was hoped by those who invited him that their cause would be joined by people from Gaza, Strato's Tower and Sidon.[43] Lathyrus duly landed at Scamina, a port south of Mount Carmel, and camped at Ptolemais with an army of 30,000. Alexander Jannaeus thereupon tried to make an alliance with him to dispose of Zoilus, and a clandestine agreement with Cleopatra: this attempted change of loyalties stung Lathyrus into conducting a raid on Galilee, recently forcibly annexed by Aristobulus to the Hasmonean kingdom,[44] during his one-year reign.

The main threat which this new alignment of Ptolemy Lathyrus and Antiochus Cyzicenus posed for Cleopatra was an attack on Egypt itself. We should not be persuaded by the factional fighting in these campaigns into under-estimating the strength of the forces involved, an easy

mistake if one despises the period. Cleopatra now persuaded Grypus to marry her daughter Selene, presumably as the price of her support in terms of troops: financially, and in terms of economy generally, Egypt was still far stronger than Syria. Ptolemy Alexander's agreement with Cleopatra, we may presume, was as much in her interests as his, in view of the possibility of an invasion of Egypt. Grypus seems to have held Damascus from 104/3 to 102/1, and in the interval until Grypus was himself murdered by Hercleon, his minister for war in 96, desultory fighting continued and Cyzicenus seems to have held Tarsus and Antioch.[44a] On Grypus' murder Cyzicenus seems to have married the luckless queen Selene himself (Appian, Syria 69). In nothing that Cyzicenus did, as far as our records go, (we do get the impression that he brought saving gifts of humanity or compassion to the failing Seleucid state. His portraits on coinage, though well-carved, betray no gentleness of character.[45] In much the same way Cleopatra III seems to have enjoyed the manipulation of power and politics rather than to have actually understood them. The enemies to both Egypt and Syria were still Rome - and now, increasingly to both states, Parthia. Rome was about to be involved in the disastrous series of wars between rival consuls such as Marius, Sulla and Cinna which ought to have given to the eastern Mediterranean states time and reason and energy to regroup in the face of the threat that Rome continued to pose: Parthia also had her own dynastic troubles at this time - one Gotarzes was certainly reigning in Mesopotamia before the end of Mithridates II's reign,[45a] and tablets record his expulsion from Babylon, while Orodes I was also active. But there was no-one we know of who had the wisdom to see this foreign political disarray. Cleopatra herself could have done so, but self-interest was more of an issue than grand strategy,[47] and so the chance was lost. Both Rome and Parthia would recover.

Contemporary with the period of civil war between Grypus and Cyzicenus had been the calamitous northern invasions of the Roman Republic by the Cimbri and the Teutones which had required all the resources and concentration which the senate could bring to bear against them. The ensuing struggle between Marius, the victor at Aquae Sextiae, and Sulla and the Senate certainly was a feature in senatorial thinking which seems to have involved a lower profile in diplomacy towards Syria until in 96 Ptolemy Apion willed Cyrene to Rome.[47a]

Ernst Badian's important work on the circumstances surrounding Roman foreign policy in the late republic provides a cogent series of reasons why, as he says, Rome pursued 'open aggression and expansionism against barbarians; hegemonial imperialism with careful avoidance of annexation towards cultural equals or superiors'. The difficulty of administering large areas of new territory was realised and avoided, the self-aggrandisement of conquerors like the Scipios was not encouraged; and a case can even be made for the Senate's not wishing bad government to exist in areas it did administer, and consequently restricting expansion for that reason.[47b] A change came, as it did in the first century BC., with the demands of the populares and the decline in the morality of the ruling class. The warlord was becoming aggressively independent of Senatorial control, and booty and conquest followed. Full-blown provincial annexation followed as the only conceivable rationalisation of an imperial position wished on to the senate by its maverick field commanders and business interests. All this is not to say that Rome had not much earlier looked east with envy, deliberate interference, possible malice and a good deal of obstruction. Her treatment of the Seleucids bears this out. But it is true that at times her lack of willingness to annex and administer properly, as in the case of Pergamum in 133 and Cyrene after 96 point to an inability to take on serious imperial commitments, voluntarily arrived at, in a serious manner.

Part of Rome's apparent inaction on the eastern Mediterranean question may possibly be attributed to an unwillingness to annex, amounting to a dereliction of imperial obligation, given that territories were, as we have seen, now being willed to her. But it is also true to say that she seems to have seen the major threat in the Eastern Mediterranean not in any country or combination of countries but in the growing pirate menace, against which she passed a Pirate Law in 99. Commercially this was extremely serious and it is arguable that connections between Cilicia, which in the weak state of Seleucid control was now more or less a pirate state, and the Seleucid kings themselves - notably Alexander Balas - made the desirability of dealing with the pirate question an issue for eastern Mediterranean politics as well. On this understanding, resolute action against them would weaken the Seleucids as well: but that is a conjecture.

Ptolemy Lathyrus seems to have waited until Grypus' legitimate successor, Seleucus VI Epiphanes Nicator, had assumed control in Syria and had defeated and killed Cyzicenus in battle before interfering again in Seleucid affairs. Cyzicenus' son Antiochus X Eusebus Philopator seems to have arrived at Aradus on the Syrian coast[48] with an army and to have waged a series of victorious actions against Seleucus, driving him out of Syria into Cilicia and the city of Mopsuhestia. Seleucus' death at the hands of the inhabitants when they set fire to the palace (or, according to Appian the Gymnasium)[49] followed swiftly. His twin brothers Antiochus and Philip, both named Epiphanes Philadelphus, raided Mopsuhestia in retaliation, stormed it and took it: Philip became an independent king as Philip I and Antiochus became Antiochus XI Philadelphus. Philip seems to have held northern Syria for a time, and Philadelphus to have been caught and defeated by Eusebes in battle near Antioch and subsequently drowned in the Orontes on horseback.[50]

At this juncture Ptolemy Lathyrus took a hand in events again, and aided another son of Grypus, Demetrius III (Theos Philopator Soter) to establish a reign in Central Syria. Ptolemy was still living in Cyprus, and his actions seem to be those of a man who simply backed the most likely usurper and maintained chaos; the time when Egypt could conceivably gain by this kind of action had now gone for good. So Demetrius began his reign as Demetrius Eukairos, and each time we see them on coin reverses, the legends become less credible and more fulsome, while the portrait, in this case of Demetrius III, scores a new low in Hellenistic artistic expression.[51] Parthian numismatic art on the other hand was at its apogee.

Three separate Seleucid kingdoms - in North, Central and Southern Syria - had now emerged, and an alliance took place between Demetrius and Philip against Eusebes. Eusebes then seems to have taken part in an expedition to help Laodice the queen of the Samenians, an Arab tribe,[52] against the renewed westwards expansion of Mithridates II's Parthia. Philip and Demetrius seem at this stage to have ruled Syria jointly; and in the Hasmonean kingdom at this juncture the cruelty and excesses of the rule of Alexander Jannaeus gave rise to a violent rebellion in Judaea: his own aggressive foreign policy against Moab and Galaaditis in the east had nearly led to his own death.[53] The Jewish people sought and obtained an alliance with Demetrius III against Jannaeus: an action fought near the city of Shechem led to Jannaeus being defeated, and in this desperate situation Jannaeus was joined by 6000 Jews. Demetrius seems to have withdrawn to fight against Philip his erstwhile ally,[54] and Jannaeus was left with no substantial opposition to wreak a frightful vengeance, for which the Hasmonean line has never been forgiven, upon the Jewish rebels.[55]

In 88 Demetrius was involved in a siege of Beroea where Philip was allied to Strato the ruler of Beroea, and who in turn brought

in an Arab phylarch as an ally, and also incredibly Mithridates Sinakes, the Parthian governor of Mesopotamia,[56] no doubt himself testing the quality of the surviving Seleucid kingdom. Demetrius was himself besieged in his camp by this coalition: with no water and plagued by the ubiquitous Parthian arrows,[57] Demetrius surrendered and he was sent to Mithridates II, who by that time will have been at Ctesiphon, the new Parthian capital to succeed Ecbatana. One of Mithridates' last recorded actions was the display of courtesy with which he treated Demetrius, yet another Seleucid prisoner of the Parthians, and significantly the last. Eventually Demetrius died of an illness in Parthia, and Philip was left as king of Syria with his capital at Antioch.

Almost inevitably, as though the hands of both Parthia and Rome had been stayed by the death of Mithridates II, the war with Mithridates VI of Pontus and the rivalry between Marius and Sulla, the last son of Antiochus Grypus plunged into the place of Demetrius III as a rival for Philip I to deal with, calling himself Antiochus XII Dionysus Epiphanes Philopator Kallinikos.[58] His coins, dated 227 = 86 - 85 BC., are struck in Damascus. Part of any ruler of Damascus' problem was how to keep the constant Arab inroads at bay; increasingly penetrating and heavily Parthian-infiltrated they must have posed a constant threat. So it was that Antiochus XII was involved when Philip attacked his capital, but was forced to withdraw without any success after having been briefly admitted by its governor Milesius and then expelled.[59]

Antiochus thereupon resumed his expedition against the Arabs under King Aretas, being ineffectually blocked by Alexander Jannaeus en route, but finally, falling victim to a sudden massed cavalry attack by Aretas' Arabs, was killed with most of his army.[60] Aretas' opportunity to consolidate his remarkable rise to power was presented by Damascus, now without a competing Seleucid dynast in occupation. Aretas occupied it first as protector against Ptolemy, the petty ruler of Chalcis, then

as king.[61] In that capacity he was involved in hostilities against Alexander Jannaeus, but after defeating Jannaeus at Adida, near modern Lod, Aretas annexed Damascus as a new addition to the Nabatean state.[62] Alexander Jannaeus' campaigns in the wild country to the east of the Jordan occupied the three years from 83 to 80 BC., and in conducting them he had practically isolated Syria from Egypt and had become a significant Middle-Eastern power to counterbalance the continued westwards pressure of Parthia and to hold Aretas' new kingdom at bay. It was a position of some influence and might have been so used by him had he not died after a three-year illness which Josephus tells us was the result of heavy drinking (ἐκ μέθης εἰς νόσον κατα πεσὼν),[63] exacerbated no doubt by continuous campaigns. He died during the siege of the fortress of Ragaba, but not before his wife had prevailed upon him to make peace with the Pharisaic party, whose courageous stand against him had greatly increased the Pharisees' power and standing in the eyes of the Jews, a power which was now to be confirmed by statute.[64]

Peace was signed between Sulla and Mithridates of Pontus in 84, but before then Mithridates had used the unease in Rome's domestic politics between the factions of Marius and Sulla to extend his rule southwards and westwards for a time over most of Asia Minor. His hand had been strengthened by the venality of Roman provincial administration there, itself surely the result of senatorial slackness and incompetence. King Philip I, now at Antioch, was there, as we know with at least the tacit agreement of Parthia: it is entirely possible that Parthia was herself watching the progress of Mithridates Eupator, and wished now to let matters rest as far as the Seleucids were concerned[65] with whom Parthia had no specific casus belli any way. Philip's reign, which could be described as restoring some security to the late Seleucid scene, was terminated by two quite different movements.

Mithridates Eupator, unbowed from his treaty with Sulla,

was a northern threat too near to ignore; and, connected with this activity in Pontus, the rise of Armenia as a major power took place under Tigranes who only had to march south to take up residence at Antioch in 83.[66] In fact his governor Magadates occupied the palace, and coins were struck at Antioch in Tigranes' name.[67] Seleucia-in-Pieria seems to have held out against Tigranes, possibly becoming the base for Antiochus Eusebes' sons who were later recognised by the Senate at Rome as 'kings of Syria'.[68] Justin informs us that in the event Tigranes came to Antioch as the result of an invitation to do so.[69]

Tigranes had himself been a hostage at Mithridates' court, and seems to have been released in return for seventy valleys in Atropatene.[70] On his accession he annexed Sophene, and, consequent on discontent in Parthia late in Mithridates II's reign, Tigranes was able to recover this part of Atropatene, thus uniting his kingdom west of the Euphrates. He occupied northern Mesopotamia between 88 and 85, and had previously secured his own northern flank by a marriage alliance with Cleopatra, the daughter of Mithridates Eupator of Pontus.[71] His own fortunes were presently to change, and after defeats by Lucullus before his own capital Tigranocerta, and later decisively by Pompey, he sued for peace in 66 BC.

5/

Rome's capacity to mount this action against Tigranes followed the end of actual Seleucid power in Syria, and Pompey's eventual victory against Mithridates Eupator at Nicopolis. Tigranes withdrew from Syria to deal with the defence of his own country and his general Magadates who had been his viceroy in Syria left to face Lucullus, and with him the short period of Armenian control over Syria ended.[72] It had been gained by an invited occupation and Justin describes Tigranes' fourteen years' rule over Syria as 'tranquillissimo regno',[73] presumably in the sense that a strong, unified military presence, even if foreign - or especially if foreign - was the only hope of forestalling yet more

domestic discord. Queen Cleopatra Selene had induced Ptolemais to hold out against Tigranes[74] for a time until it was eventually captured, but Alexandra, Queen of Judaea contrived to bribe Tigranes to leave the Hasmonean state in peace.[75] And at that point Tigranes had to withdraw his forces northwards.

Selene had herself been attempting to win favour from Rome; in 75 her two sons were sent to Rome laden with gifts to impress the senate and to back up their claim to Syria. Rome confounded matters by agreeing to their claim to Syria - but not to Egypt, and so the question of the Egyptian succession, following Lathyrus' death in 80 BC. was still in confusion. Tigranes' eventual capture of Ptolemais seems to have been his last success in Syria: the city was taken in 69, and Selene deported to Seleucia on the Euphrates, where Strabo tells us that Tigranes killed her.[76] Her son Antiochus, on the other hand, went north to somewhere in Asia Minor where he lived for a short time, and from which sojourn he took the title 'Asiaticus', in the circumstances an extraordinary name. Tigranes' move northwards, following Rome's peremptory request to surrender Mithridates Eupator, Tigranes' father-in-law, gave the young Antiochus his unexpected chance to reclaim his throne, and he went back to Syria in 69 or 68.[77] He did coin at Antioch but his reign lasted only a year: however, we do know that Lucullus seems to have agreed to this brief reign and did not object to Antiochus exercising his 'ancestral authority' (οὐκ ἐφθόνησεν ἀρχῆς πατρῴας).[78] This authority was soon in conflict with the objectives of Sampsiceramus, the sheikh of Emesa, whose territory had by now eaten into much that was left of northern Syria. Antiochus seems to have been defeated, possibly by one Aziz[79] who was later to support a rival for the Seleucid throne, and to have made an alliance with Sampsiceramus. As the result of this particular defeat Antiochus had to withstand Antiochene pressure to withdraw from Antioch, and those who had attempted to depose him fled instead from

Syria and gathered in Cilicia, proposing to support Grypus' grandson Philip, the son of Philip I. Philip agreed with the plan of usurpation, and so for the last time we have a Seleucid dynastic contest.[80] The difference this time was that both men, Philip - known as the 'heavy-footed', and Antiochus Asiaticus were backed by a different Arab Chieftain who had more to gain from disposing of the Seleucid than from supporting him.

Antiochus, therefore, met Sampsiceramus, unaware of the pact now devised between the Arabs, and was promptly arrested by Sampsiceramus, later to be put to death by him. Aziz was unable to hold Philip who escaped to Antioch;[81] there he was to succeed Antiochus as the last Seleucid king, while the command of the Roman war against Mithridates passed from the able, courageous but uncharismatic Lucullus to Pompey who was eventually able, as we have said, to bring the Mithridatic Wars to a successful end, having finally attained some control over the Pirate menace in the Eastern Mediterranean.[82]

Philip's brief reign was entirely ephemeral, and must have ended before 64/3 by which time Pompey was resident in Damascus and had 'regulated' the affairs of Syria by making it a Roman province and Antioch a 'free city'. Appian observes that Antiochus XIII had done the Romans no wrong,[83] and we may draw the conclusion, which seems inevitable, that the Seleucid line finally fell because there was not enough muscle left in its members to sustain it. Usurpation, gratuitous internecine conflict, unwise use of money and military potential had done their work, and the Seleucid cause was at an end. There was a strong and ever-strengthening outside pressure, but the eventual collapse was internal as well, certainly.

ADDENDUM

From this period we have records of the wine store of the imperial property of Mihrdatkart found in the ruins of a Parthian fortress at the village of Bagin near Ashkabad. 2000 ostraka found here indicate the value of the discovery in this estate which, like the other estates, was the personal property of the Arsacid ruler.[84] From Avroman in Kurdistan we have three parchments (two in Greek and one in Aramaic), being contracts for the sale of a vineyard, dating (according to the Seleucid Era) from 88 B.C., the year before Mithridates II died, 22 - 1 B.C. and 11 A.D. respectively. The documents establish the ownership of the small vineyard there by the brothers Baraces and Sobenes, and deal with maintenance and cultivation.[85]

From an earlier Median site at Nush-i-Jan near Malayer in Western Iran comes the recent discovery, with pottery fragments, of a Parthian village built on the Tepe occupied by a Median fire-temple on a spectacular expanse of what is now rather sparse rough grazing land.[86] The unfortunate history of the 19th century French excavations at Susa leading to the destruction of much of the Seleucid and Parthian layers, has been compensated for by many other successful examinations of Parthian sites including that of Kuh-i-Khwaja by Aurel Stein and the Parthian temple at Shami in Khuzistan with its bronzes, including the mask of Antiochus Epiphanes.

Perhaps the most significant Parthian discoveries have been at Dura Europos, where artistic as well as historical conclusions about the Parthians themselves in a Hellenistic environment could begin to be drawn with accuracy.[87] On the Upper Euphrates Dura was re-discovered fortuitously in the 1920s, and James Breasted and Franz Cumont worked on the site until in 1928 the Yale Expedition under Rostovtzeff took over. Fragments of wall-paintings of Palmyrene deities (Malakhbel, Aglibol and Jahribol) were discovered at an early stage; and the city is important in the context of the present chapter chronologically as it was to become one

of the nearest major Parthian centres to the declining Seleucid kingdom: it was not more than 200 miles from Damascus and 250 from Antioch. It was founded in about 300 B.C. as a Seleucid city under Seleucus I demonstrating Seleucid urbanisation (Europos is a Macedonian place-name), and it became - by virtue of its location - a trading caravan-city on the route from Syria to Iran and the East, and also, like any Seleucid military settlement, an outpost of Hellenisation. Excavations carried out before the Second World War revealed extensive areas of houses, temples and public buildings and tombs: and, in the more specifically artistic field, wall-painting, pottery, domestic equipment and tools. The wall-painting in particular overthrew some commonly-held assumptions about the lack of an iconography in dispersed Jewish settlements, of which the Jewish politeuma at Dura had been one for a long time. Written documents, inscribed sherds, graffiti and parchments came to light here in Aramaic, Palmyrene and Greek.

Also in Mesopotamia, Assur and Hatra[88] (which was to have a stormy history in Roman times) were brought to new life under the Parthians. Andrae's work at Hatra was continued by Iraqi archaeologists in 1951 - 54, and these excavations have so far disclosed ten temples, a palace, dwelling houses and an amphitheatre. And all this is in addition to the glories of Ctesiphon, built deliberately, at the end of our period in this work, opposite Seleucia - on the eastern bank of the Tigris - as though to make obvious what was implied anyway, the eclipse of Greek rule in the Middle East. All that said, one must note the astonishing persistence of Greek life, language and literature at Seleucia in the first century A.D. - a mark, as are the Avroman parchments, of the staying power of Greek culture. From an almost ostentatiously philhelline position, preserved on coins until the time of Phraates II in 2 B.C., the Parthian state was to assume - at least in artistic terms - an overt anti-hellenic position, reverting, in a kind of cultural reaction, to an earlier more

obviously Asiatic artistic koine of Oriental art, in the concepts of frontality and an uncompromising stylization of portraiture. In this reaction the Zoroastrian religion will have played a part, even to the extent of influencing Hebrew literature in the erstwhile Greek-controlled Jewish kingdom, now almost contiguous with Parthian-held territory. In all this period it is to be remembered that certain parts of Seleucid Iran, notably Persis (Fars), which revolted in about 280 B.C., had not been Seleucid territory for two hundred years, and had continued to develop native art-forms owing more to the influence of the Achaemenid age, to which they emotionally responded, than to the imported Western artistic canons of the Seleucids.

Notes for Chapter VIII.

1. See Kraay and Davis, Plate 98. Demetrius II's portrait, apart from the beard, has a strangely un-Greek wide-eyed passivity about it.

2. Justin xxxviii, 10, 11.

3. Diodorus xxxiv, 18: Justin xlii, 1, 1 - 5. So Edouard Will in Hist. Pol. II, 1969, p. 348, after Simonetta.

4. Appian: Syriaca 68.

5. A. R. Bellinger: "Hyspaosines of Charax" in Yale Class Stud. VIII, 1942, pp. 53 - 67. In greater detail in S. A. Nodelmann, 'A Preliminary History of Characene' in Berytus XIII, 1960, p. 83 f. See also O. Mørkholm in Acta Archaeologia 36, (1965), p. 152 - 156 for coinage.

6. (E. G.) Hirmer and Kraay: "Greek Coins", London, 1966, p. 379; pl. 212/781. Selwood: "The Coinage of Parthia", London, 1971, p. 70, etc.

6a. E. Will: Hist. Pol. II, p. 379 - 380. The same authority puts the Armenian Conquest at about 97.

7. M. A. R. College: "The Parthians", London, 1967, p. 32. There is good detail in A. R. Bellinger: Seleucid Dura: 'The evidence of the coins'. Berytus IX, 1949, p. 64 ff.

8. Chien-Han-Shu in A. Wylie 'Notes on the Western Regions', J. Anthrop. Inst. Vol. X, 1881, p. 20.

9. I am accepting about 30 BC. as the conclusion, however arrived at, of the reign of Hermaeus. For the detail of this, see most radically A. D. H. Bivar: 'Indo-Bactrian Problems', in NC 1965, p. 69 - 108. The arguments of Simonetta, Tarn, Woodcock (1969) and now Mitchener (1975) seem to outweigh those of Bivar (Op. Cit.), Narain and others who wish an earlier terminus ante quem. Bivar nowhere explains how he can accommodate his chronology to the required coinage density.

10. Selwood, p. 61 f. Le Rider (Suse, p. 405 f) makes the point that economic activity at Seleucia-on-Tigris recovered strongly round about 100.

11. Selwood, p. 70 f.

12. I Maccabees, 15.

13. Josephus: Antiquities, XIII, 9, 1 - 2. This is the final instance of Roman connivance at Jewish secession. Briscoe (Op. Cit., p. 53) makes the obvious but vital point that Rome's action was not likely to be taken out of a 'regard for the rights of religious minorities'. Will (Op. Cit., p. 363) suspects Parthian complicity also.

14. Justin xxxix, 1, 2.
As Will points out, if Antiochus IV, failed, Demetrius II was not likely to succeed, (Will: loc. cit.)

15. Justin xxxix, 1, 3.

16. Justin xxxix, 1, 5.

17. So E. Will in Hist. Pol. II, p. 364 - 5.

18. Justin xxxix, 1, 7 - 8. Josephus: Antiquities XII, 9, 3. Appian: Syriaca 68.

19. Appian: Syriaca 69 declares that his mother 'shot him dead with an arrow, either fearing lest he should avenge his father's murder, or moved by an insane hatred for everybody', Loeb Edition, p. 235.

20. Kraay and Davis, plates 108, 114.

21. Kraay and Davis, plate 115.

22. Justin xxxix, 2, 7.

23. Josephus: Antiquities, XIII, 9. Justin xxxix, 2, 5 - 6. Diodorus XXXIV, 28 f.

24. Eusebius I, pp. 257 - 8. Diodorus XXXIV, 28, 1 and 2.

25. The attempt by Zabinas to use temple funds for coinage is noted by Will (Op. Cit., p. 365).

26. Josephus: Antiquities, XIII, 270.

27. E. Will. Hist. Pol. II, p. 381 notes coins by Mithridates on Hyspaosines' originals, and the general re-establishment of trade after the Parthian Conquest of Characene. The detail is contained in Le Rider 'Suse', p. 405 f. Nodelmann, in 'A preliminary History of Characene', claims that Hyspaosines was still coining tetradrachms and Mithridates in 121/120, (Nodelmann, p. 91), but that thereafter the coinage was overstruck at the Charax mint itself. (Berytus XIII, 1960, p. 83 f.)

For the Bisutun rock-inscription (text and chronology) see K. Walton Dobbins, NC 1975, Vol. XV, p. 19 - 55.

28. Appian: Syriaca 69.

29. Justin xxxix, 3, 1f.
It should be pointed out that certain authorities refer to Physcon as Ptolemy VIII because of the existence (and no reign) of Ptolemy Neos Philopator (VII) killed in 144/3.

30. Justin describes the army as 'Peregrinos' in xxxix, 3, 6, and the Seel edition has 'exercitum Cypri' in 3, 3; but see Bevan's notes in H of S II, 254, n.1. p/

31. Justin-Trogus Prol. xxxix speaks of war in Cilicia. Bellinger presents numismatic evidence for the fall of various Syrian cities in the excursus to 'The End of the Seleucids' which I do not have access to. Granville Downey's 'History of Antioch in Syria' (p. 132) points out that a library was constructed at Antioch under Cyzicenus or Eusebes.

32. That is Cleopatra IV, Ptolemy's estranged wife.

33. Justin xxxi, 3, 12.

34. See on the Pergamene question generally: McShane: "The Foreign Policy of the Attalids of Pergamum", Urbana, Ill, 1964.

34a. See the admittedly scant literary references to Papyri in Will. Op. Cit., p. 368, infra. but the much greater quantity of material on concessions to native Egyptians.

35. Bellinger stresses the strength of Grypus' position (Justin xxxix, 3, 4 "per igitur iam viribus fratris proelium committit").

36. Josephus: Antiquities XIII, 325. The officer in charge of Strato's Tower is Zoilus, both names redolent of Greek India. Tcherikover in 'Hell. Civilisation and the Jews' draws attention to the anger of Greek cities in Palestine at this Jewish expansion (p. 243 ff.).

37. Josephus: Antiquities XIII, 278.

38. Ibid.

39. Inscription (in Wilcken: Hermes xxix (1894), p. 436, f.) quoted by Bevan in H of S II, p. 256, n. 5. Welles: "Royal Correspondence", New Haven 1934, 71 f., pp. 289 - 294. September 109 BC. On the general question of 'Free Cities' see Excursus.

40. So Will (Op. Cit., p. 370): this further provoked foreign intervention.

41. To be exact, 25 November, 108 - from Megillah Ta'anith, quoted in the Loeb Edition of Josephus, p. 369, note d.

41a. G. Widengren: "Quelques rapports entre les juifs et les Iraniens" outlines the future development of such contacts.

42. Josephus: Antiquities XIII, 287.

43. Op. Cit., 328 - 9.

44. Op. Cit., 337 - end, concerning the annexation of Iturean Galilee, 318: in the latter passage Aristobulus is said to have adopted the epithet φιλελλην . The dating of Aristobulus' reign and the succeeding Hasmonean chronology was discussed at length by Kolbe in "Beiträge zur Syrischen und Judischen Geschichte", Berlin, 1926, p. 27. But he starts with a murder-date for Simon in Spring, 135, which should give Alexander Jannaeus an accession-date in 103/2, and not in 102/1 as he suggests.

44a. Murdered possibly at the instigation of Grypus' nephew, Seleucus VI (Will, p. 375).

45. Plate No. Coin 4.

45a. K. W. Dobbins in NC. 1975, p. 20/21. Cuneiform tablets ix, x, xiii and xiv mention Gotarzes and his expulsion by Arsaces = Mithridates I.

46. Selwood, p. 58.

47. A sharply-drawn portrait of this Cleopatra (and of Selene) in Grace Macurdy: "Hellenistic Queens", Baltimore, 1932, p. 161 - 170.

47a. E. Will, Hist. Pol. II, p. 372 details Apian's position: See (n.b.) P. M. Fraser in Berytus XII (1956-8) No. 7, p. 113 f.

47b. E. Badian: 'Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic', Oxon, 1968, p. 8 and 9.

48. Josephus: Antiquities, XIII, 367.

49. Appian: Syriaca 69. Josephus: Antiquities XIII, 368. Bellinger notes (in Newell "The Seleucid Mint of Antioch", p. 111 - 113) that Seleucus seems to have held Antioch long enough to have issued two sets of coins (Bellinger, Op. Cit., p. 73, note 67).

50. Josephus: Antiquities, XIII, 369. Eusebius I. Eusebius implies that both Antiochus and Philip were defeated, - so Bellinger: Op. Cit., p. 74, n. 72.

51. Plate No. Coin 5.

52. So Ralph Marcus in the Loeb Josephus, p. 411, note h. Josephus is the source to be preferred in this, and usually is reliable on this period. See also Bellinger: Op. Cit., p. 75, n. 73 and R. H. Shutt: Studies in Josephus, London, 1961.

53. Josephus: Antiquities XIII, 372 f., and in particular 375.

54. Op. Cit., 379. About 89, according to Bellinger, Op. Cit., p. 76.

55. Op. Cit., 380. Josephus does not exonerate or mitigate: he simply puts a context for this butchery: E..Will (Hist. Pol. II, p. 377) fits Jannaeus' religious and political problems neatly into their late Seleucid context.

56. This is Bevan's suggestion (H of S II, p. 261 and n. 2) on the basis of Reinach's 'Mithridate Eupator', p. 311. It does seem geographically very likely. Parthian satraps were at that time not only restless, but nearby. See again K. W. Dobbins, Op. Cit, passim.

57. Josephus: Antiquities, XIII, 385.

58. Bevan: H of S, p. 261, n. 3.

59. Josephus: Antiquities XIII, 387, f.

60. Josephus: Antiquities XIII, 390 f.

61. See the long significant note in Bellinger, Op. Cit., p. 78, n. 88 which discusses Aretas' royal coins minted of bronze in Damascus.

62. Josephus: Antiquities, XIII, 392.

63. Josephus: Antiquities XIII, 398.

64. Josephus: Antiquities XIII, 399 f. The enlightened self-interest of the queen and her family is underlined by Josephus, but as the king points out, the Pharisees' position was now socially (and religiously) so strong as to be un-assailable: all this is backed up by a kind of deathbed confession of cruelty towards them, which is doubtful.

65. I am sure it is too strong to call the indications in Jos. Ant. XIII, 386 an 'alliance', as Bellinger does (Op. Cit., p. 79), but his implication that Philip's tetradrachms (Plate Coin 7) went as far east as Dura is interesting. Parthia had ruled there since 113.

66. Justin xl, 1, 1 - 4.

67. See plate Coin 7, - not an Antioch minting.

68. See Bevan H of S II, p. 263. As Cilicia was in Armenian hands at the time, Justin's suggestion (xl, 1, 3) that Cyzicenus' son 'in angulo Ciliciae latuerit' seems vague and unlikely - Seleucia is much more probable (Cicero: Veres, Act II, iv, 27 f.).

69. Justin xl, 1, 3.

70. Strabo XI, 15.

71. Plutarch: 'Life of Lucullus': Lucullus was consul in 74, and commander in the east until 69.

72. Appian: Syriaca 48, 49; Strabo XI, 15.

73. Justin xl, 1, 4.
In his article in Revue Numismatique 1959/60, p. 22 f, Le Rider lists and describes many coins of Tigranes including bronze from the Antioch mint (p. 22).

74. Josephus: Antiquities XIII, 419.

75. Josephus: Antiquities XIII, 420.

76. Strabo XVI, 2, 3.

77. So Bellinger: Op. Cit., p. 83. Appian: Syriaca 70.

78. Appian: Syriaca 49: so Horace White in the Loeb Ed. p. 197.

79. Diodorus XL, 1a.

80. Diodorus XL, 1a and 1b.

81. Diodorus: Ibid. Bellinger infers that this was the same Aziz who had helped Philip I against Demetrius III. It is just possible that, following Appian: Syriaca 70, we can reconcile Pompey's take-over of Syria in 63/3, putting an end to Antiochus XIII's reign, with Diodorus' account of his death at the hands of Sampsiceramus. Diodorus does not specifically say that captivity and death were contiguous: he does say ὕστερον δε ἀνείλεν Diodorus XL, 1b. Loeb. Ed. p. 276.

82. The operations against the Pirates were put into Pompey's hands by the Lex Gabinia of 67 which gave Pompey an imperium infinitum by sea for three years in the Mediterranean: this produced resources adequate to the task (600 Talents, 500 ships, 120,000 infantry and the right to appoint 24 legates). The campaign was complete by 66. H. H. Scullard 'Gracchi to Nero'. London, 1959, p. 100.

83. Justin xl, 2, 3 - 5. Appian Syriaca 49.

84. V. G. Lukonin: "The Ancient Civilisation of Persia, II", London, 1971, p. 22.

85. Lukonin: Op. Cit., p. 24 and 37.

86. D. Stronach in 'Archaeology in Iran', 1972,

87. On Dura see Rostovtzeff: "Caravan Cities", Oxford, 1932. His article on Parthian Art (Yale, 1935), and the Preliminary Reports - - IX, issued in 1929 - 55 (New Haven). The Final Reports III, V and VIII came out in 1956 - 9. A good summary is in Lukonin Op. Cit., p. 41 f, and at places in M.A.R. Colledge's "The Parthians": Also in Bellinger: 'Seleucid Dura'.

88. Andrae and Lenzen: "Die Partherstadt Assur", 1933.

EXCURSUS

Poleis in the Hellenistic World: Development and influence.

A part of any study dealing with the history of the hellenistic world must concentrate on the role played by the πολις in the historical process. I believe this to be particularly true when dealing with the eastern provinces, partly because they were far from the orthocentre of Greek civilisation, and also partly because their wide dispersal raised questions of a cultural nature in a particularly acute form. This excursus stands separate from the main narrative because it was thought sensible to deal en bloc with the question of the polis and its implications and not to try to integrate it into the main body of the thesis which has been intentionally narrative and chronological in character. This excursus will deal with a selection of archaeological discoveries to illustrate various aspects of the polis in its distribution, siting, character, political purpose and cultural implications, but it will also discuss the reasons why such features were important in the historical process.

πολεις in the hellenistic world traced their development back to the early foundations of the city states of mainland Greece, Ionia and Magna Graecia before, during and after the colonising waves of the seventh and sixth centuries; and their character was dictated by the necessities of civic organisation in small, frequently mountainous and geographically separate civil communities. Their mode of government was dictated by the requirements of the location, and a certain homogeneity resulted from the similarity of their individual situations.

In the hellenistic world the self-government which had been a feature of the original πολεις , whether in the hands of an oligarchy, a democracy or a τυραννος , became subservient to the hellenistic ruler of the day, with the important qualification that the concept of a 'free city' able to decide very largely its own affairs and to mint coinage, was generally viewed

with reverence and care by hellenistic rulers, particularly during times in which the alignment of such self-determining poleis (or at least their ability to exercise this freedom) could all too clearly be seen as a status which could not be interfered with without a consequent resentment which might be difficult to handle. In the Seleucid empire in particular, with its extended frontiers, fluid composition and very large area, such rights as 'free cities' possessed required to be respected.[1] Antiochus II 'conceded' privileges in the form of freedom from tribute to Erythrae on receiving an embassy from the city which reminded him of this status being granted to the city under Alexander and Antigonus. This example seems to indicate that in each case the new ruler had to ratify what his predecessor(s) had granted to the city, and he did so on receipt of honours (τιμαί) which the city sent him.[2] The system seems to have acted as a means of royal control, and the status was applied for by hellenistic cities and peoples in a more general way also, not purely confined to autonomous poleis: for instance, the Jews were anxious, after Antiochus III took over the Ptolemaic hegemony in Coele-Syria after 200, that he should respect 'the customs of their ancestors'.[3]

The situation in which long-established cities found themselves in the hellenistic age was created not only by the centralised, imperial style of government by a king whose sway over political affairs was theoretically absolute: the conquests of Alexander had also created poleis, and raised to polis-status many settlements over the Asian land-mass, as far as the Jaxartes.[4] In some cases the character of these places is known to us through excavations which we will be noting, while in other cases the sites have developed to be cities in later ages, overbuilt on the hellenistic foundations, the most famous being Alexandria in Egypt.[5] Two possible Alexandrias are at present being excavated in Afghanistan at Kandahar (Alexandria Arachosia) and Ai Khanum (Alexandria Oxiana).[6]

Alexander's foundations, estimated at 70 in number[7], were supplemented on his death by a similar policy on the part of Seleucus,

although his own foundations were less prolific (Appian, Syriaca 57); other hellenistic rulers, e.g. Antigonus, the Ptolemies and various kings (usually Seleucid) called Antiochus also carried out this policy, as may have been the case with Eucratides, Euthydemus and Demetrius in Bactria and India.[8] The founding of Alexander's (and his successors') cities in Asia was in many cases the consequence of a military settlement subsequently being raised to polis-status; and the foundations arose for military reasons - particularly perhaps in the case of Alexandria Eschate and Alexandria in Margiane - in order to safeguard frontiers against external attack, and to ensure a Greek, or at least a Macedonian presence in the area. The issue of a cultural influence being deliberately devised, and the further issues of such settlements being founded with a predetermined cultural objective, is a good deal more tendentious and debatable. It is much easier to argue from hindsight (on the basis of a few examples which evidence does suggest to have had this purpose, e.g. Jerusalem-Antioch in 167[10]) that all must have had such an objective, than to prove that such poleis actually had this task as a rule. There has been a certain amount of 'post hoc ergo propter hoc' in such discussion[11].

What is not in question is the evident arrangement of the Asiatic foundations along trade routes and frequently using ancient, already-important towns for the purpose. In these cases culture-change did take place as a matter of fact and the reorganisation in planning terms can be seen clearly at, for example, Gerasa in modern Jordan. Founded as Antioch-on-the-Chrysorrhoas, possibly by Seleucus I or Antiochus I, excavations have revealed that Gerasa was occupied in Neolithic and Early Bronze times[12], and the same observations apply to Kandahar.[13]

The provision in genuine poleis of the symbols of cultural and civic organisation such as the acropolis, administrative headquarters, gymnasium and places like a mausoleum and necropolis, as well as the expected pieces of statuary, have all been found at even such a remote site as Ai Khanum[14]. They seem to indicate the tenacity with which the founders and subsequent settlers of such outlying sites held on to their civic (and cultural) principles.

It is interesting to note the tension, seen in the various inscriptions to exist between the Greek love of ἐλευθερία and the concept of the 'free city', to which we have already drawn attention, and the obsequious nature of such cities' dealings with the current sovereign.[15] The reason seems to be that a relationship which would incur minimum hindrance was an advantage to both parties - even if obtained at a price in terms of self-respect; and there is evidence that such cities were, if treated in a cavalier manner, a serious threat to the reigning Seleucid, in the accounts (e.g.) of Antiochus III's progress in Asia Minor prior to his invasion of Greece, and of course after his retreat to Magnesia.[16] That rulers as secure in their position as Seleucus II had had to woo the cities (because of the competing claims of his brother Antiochus Hierax) shows, as do the declarations from Smyrna, Mylasa and Ilium, that the king had to be almost as ingratiating to his subjects in these cities as they were to him.[17] The reality of the situation seems to be that these free cities were a collection of bargaining counters which could be used individually by either party to extort concessions of alliance or neutrality as required by the situation.

Cities whose origins were to be found in ancient native communities frequently sought a status as a hellenic polis for reasons of trade, and their own cultural advancement and economic development, and again Jerusalem is a well-documented case in point where the citizens - or rather the hellenic party within the citizen body - sought to have the city renamed 'Antioch' (after Epiphanes)[18], and pressed this objective (as we have seen in chapter 5) against the wishes of a more conservative element in the native population, and with tragic consequences.[19]

In the early days of Alexander's Asiatic enterprise the 'free' Greek cities of Asia (Minor) were expected to join in the hellenic crusade against Persia, and therefore to contribute finance to this end. So a σύνταξις would be levied as though these cities were members of a league, contributing finance as a part of the obligations of membership[20]. As treasure kept being

accumulated from various sources, notably Egypt, this arrangement ceased, although the actual payment of contributions did not[21]. Badian points out that 'control' of Greek cities, liberated by Alexander's campaign from Persian rule, was regulated in 330 and developed out of the function of collecting συντάξις Some such person as Philoxenus, who had originally had a financial role in respect of Asia,[22] (which included at least 'some Greek cities')[23] may now have exercised a general supervision of the Greek cities in his area, not confined to matters of finance - indeed the collection of finance, at least by this method, may have dropped from Philoxenus' brief;[24] but the control in some form of 'free cities' continued to pose a question over the αὐτονομία into which these cities had been liberated by Alexander - but also, in the disturbed times of the wars of the Diadochoi, to present the cities themselves with the bargaining counter we have mentioned. ἐλευθερία could be used as a concept to be traded. As Seleucid control weakened during the second century, the practice increased.

We have mentioned native insistence on the re-naming of the city with a Greek (in that case a Seleucid) dynastic name. This was a widespread practice in the hellenistic east[25], but the fact of genuine dynastic foundations of cities in the Seleucid east is not in dispute, and continued in most regions down to the time of Antiochus IV. In some cases these foundations were indeed the elevation of native settlements, or Achaemenid centres, to polis-status; but in others, military bases developed a civilian administrative apparatus and the appurtenances of a regular polis. Ai Khanum is a good example of a city of this type. In these military settlements veterans could be installed and the wounded rested[26], and usual agricultural activity to raise crops for subsistence was encouraged. For example Strabo represents the fertility of Margiana as a prime reason for Antiochus I refounding Alexandria-in-Margiana as Antioch, and enclosing a circuit of 1500 stades with a wall: the Seleucids were able to benefit from the wine-producing capacity of this site, even if Strabo's estimate of the quality of the grapes is excessive![27]

As hellenic foundations, whether under Alexander's or some later empires the πολεις thus set up in Asia kept their traditional structure : popular assembly, council (βουλή), annual officials and law courts. Ehrenberg points out that the mutual relations of πολις and the Seleucid monarchy defy neat definition,[28] but we can conclude from inscriptions from many places that the cities acted as the king's bidding;[29] and their creation of foreign policy initiatives, for example, was obviously a thing of the past[30]; although in the days when Seleucid control was less strong than at the beginning of the third century, it is not uncommon to find a city declaring for a particular monarch on its own initiative, no doubt after prudent consultation as to its own likely fate if it refused. The presence of Seleucid garrisons in the citadel of the polis, particularly if its hellenic associations were new or weak, as at e.g., Jerusalem[31], exacerbated relations between the population and that species of royal control which the presence of the garrison was felt to epitomise. This might in turn make it more receptive to a foreign takeover if it was threatened or likely, as in the case of Tigranes' invitation to Antioch by its inhabitants in 83, now thoroughly disillusioned with all Seleucids and their garrisons, heralding a lengthy period of Armenian occupation before Seleucid rule resumed ephemerally in 69.[33]

Perhaps it is enough to say that ultimately the success of the Seleucid kingdom (or indeed any other Hellenic state in the Hellenistic Age), viewed as a governmental operation, depended on the stability of the city organisation, as well as on the loyalty of its civil service, and that this was not an arm of the state which could be treated in a cavalier fashion. It all placed a heavy responsibility upon the king's personal representative, the ἐπιστάτης who was an 'intermediary' (Ehrenberg's phrase) between the polis and the king. Even the privileges of granting asylum and freedom from taxation were things to be earned rather than assumed.

Every polis was a mixed community, and tended eventually to be composed of varying proportions of citizens, κάτοικοι and πάροικοι (whose status could be raised to that of full citizens[35]), and the inevitable number

of slaves and serfs to be found in any ancient Greek city. These could, of course, be liberated, and there is evidence that in the reign of Attalus III of Pergamum, for example, the king liberated in his will his own royal serfs.[36] παροικοι were the equivalent of μετοικοι elsewhere in the Greek world, and the status of metics had long been an issue of some controversy. One way in which the problem of foreigners could be solved was to create a community within the polis specifically devoted to them, the πολιτευμα. In the case of Alexandria in Egypt, the Jewish community there constituted such a politeuma, and as such formed a 'ghetto' whose character the Jewish community strove to preserve.[37]

The existence of poleis in the Seleucid Empire in particular, because of the widely-dispersed nature of its settlement patterns, gave rise to problems of reinforcement and resettlement by new colonists. The impression is strong that, although several Seleucid kings created poleis, the first flush of colonisation died soon, and - more seriously - the replenishment of those that did exist, in Parthia, Hyrcania and Bactria for instance, was impeded by the distance and by the isolation which this involved.[38] The problem was to become acute with the rise of Parthia as a nomad power creating an alien wedge between the Greek communities in Media and Bactria respectively, and - even more serious - the cutting of the northern trade route between Media and Bactria which was the obvious means of access for any new colonists to Bactria. This had the other obvious result that the Greek community in Bactrian poleis, and in later Indian ones, tended to become more mixed: the implications of that were both good and bad; while oecumenism was fostered in religion and coinage (and presumably marriage), national Greek identity seems to have become more blurred.[39]

In the sense that settlers came out or were sent, or placed by royal command, the poleis in the distant parts of the Seleucid state were dependent for their survival upon the king; but Welles makes the point that these poleis in some way guarded trade routes, which were also military lines

of communication, and, as he says, 'they might offer a secure repository for the revenues'.[40] It is too bleak, and in the light of our new knowledge (e.g. about Ai Khanum) probably inaccurate, to believe Arrian's description that such settlements were planned as fortified camps and nothing more.[41] Their longevity alone raises serious questions about Arrian's own view, and we ought not to treat it as binding.

The structure of the polis was a strong factor in ensuring this sometimes-remarkable longevity. With walls and militia, frequently with a mint, and often with the esprit de corps which, in the case of Ai Khanum, involved a representative being sent to Delphi to discover there the epigram subsequently engraved on the temenos of the city's founder Cineas,[42] the Hellenistic poleis in the Seleucid east were a powerful political and cultural factor in Seleucid statecraft. And they were, generally speaking, able to exert this influence because of the stability which their structure gave them. The royal official who was the responsible link between the king and the colony was the ἐπιστάτης . Among the cities which we know had such an official, the relatively recent inscription from Laodicea-in-Media (Nihavend) dating to 193 BC is addressed to 'Apollodorus and the magistrates of the town of Laodicea'[43] by Menedemus who was the governor of the satrapy of Media. The epistates was merely concerned with civil affairs; the military side was dealt with by the φρουραρχος .[44] A distinction between a polis-proper and a colony which might in time become one, is probably to be found in the extent to which it could enter into free arrangements with a king, which he would actually honour: for instance whether it could enter into a συμμαχία or not, or could be declared free or autonomous. But as Getzel Cohen points out,[45] the way in which a colony became a polis - where colonies had been set up near existing native towns - is nowhere made clear; and, in view of the frequency of the occasion in which such a transformation will have happened, (and the commonness of the situation geographically, as at Kandahar, for instance[46]), it would be interesting to know.

Pausanias indicated (X, 4, 1) that a polis had to have ἀρχεῖα, a γυμνάσιον - which created a considerable cultural shock when introduced with its customs into native Jerusalem[47] - a θέατρον and the ἄγορα. In his translation of the edict from Nihavend, Louis Robert renders ἄρχουσι as 'magistrates'[48], and it may well be that archons as such were not involved at that stage (or in that place).

A method of government by prytany and boule, representing a democratic constitution, had become the norm for the Greek communities of the Mediterranean by the time of Alexander; and it was the apparatus of this arrangement - tribes and demes as voting categories - which was, at least in theory, transplanted to the new Seleucid πόλεις and other hellenistic foundations[48a]. The democratic model was adopted by cities which had recently been native communities (Diod. XXXIII, 5a) - in the case of, e.g. Balbura; but the degree to which it operated as a political fact, in the sense in which it had been envisaged, is difficult accurately to uncover: as we know from numerous inscriptions, including the one from Nihavend, poleis were required to undertake activities by the king, and were expected to comply.[49] Plutarch alleges that Antiochus Hierax, when ruler of the province of Asia Minor (co-regent from 242/1) practised sovereignty over subjugated cities; his authority is described as ἀρχή, and the poleis are the recipients of orders.[50] This in its turn gave rise to attempts, to which we have already referred, to win the loyalty of cities by what Orth calls 'splendid-sounding proclamations'[51].

The economic organisation of cities was helped by the creation of the posts of χρεοφύλαξ and βιβλιοφύλαξ - 'keepers of contracts' and 'keepers of documents', whose documents and records, rolled into circular clay cylinders (bullae) and stamped with a seal, have been discovered and studied in the excavations at Uruk (Orchoi) in Babylonia where they may well represent a compromise between the Greek and Babylonian methods of sealing documents.[52] The officials in question signed themselves χρεοφυλακικὸς-Ὀρχηνῶν, or whatever the town might be. Rostovtzeff stresses that both state and private business interests were served by the organisation of such registry offices as

these officials operated, and taxation was facilitated by such city record offices.[53]

Parchments from Dura and Susa indicate the activity of a χεσοφυλαξ there as well, and discoveries at Susa (Seleucia-on-the-Eulaeus) tell a similar story: the χεσοφυλαξ seems to have been a crown officer appointed by, and answerable to, the reigning Seleucid.[54] There appears to have been a slave tax in operation at Orchoi in 220 BC, and this coincides with Antiochus III's first offensive activity after the revolt of Molon, for which he required money to pay his troops. It seems that this could have been introduced as a tax to provide money for this purpose:[55] salt tax and ship tax were already in operation, but the chronic need of the Seleucids for revenue - even before the crushing demands of the Romans' Apamea indemnity - argues the likelihood of an introduction of slave tax at this time (as the bullae date suggests, but does not of course prove).

When colonies became fully-fledged poleis, with a city-organisati such as we have described, they frequently had a wall and not just lighter fortifications, and sometimes, as at Alexandria-in-Margiane, this was a major feature of their plan, allied to a square-grid structure of roads after the ideas of Hippodamas of Miletus. Walls are readily-detectable in recent hellenistic excavations at Ai Khanum and Alexandria-on-the-Caucasus (Begram).[56]

The right to coin varied in different parts of the Seleucid realm: the right to coin in the Greek cities of Asia Minor was confined to the emission of copper coinage,[57] and the answer to the question whether the Greek cities of Bactria coined on their own account is partly dependent upon whether the mint-mark connotes the mint-city or the moneyer in question; even so, it is the king's image and canting-badge which invariably appear. There is nothing like the city coinage of Athens.[58]

The settlers' associations of colonists became citizens of the πολις when city states became a reality; and as in the case of Jerusalem-Antioch, e.g., it was by a sectional (not a general) request that the polis was

inaugurated: the native community or communities formed 'politeumata', as did the Jewish community in Alexandria in Egypt[59]. The fact that the πολιτεύματα were created, or allowed to develop, apparently as an expedient in view of the need at least to accommodate a native, frequently Asian population, is not to be used as a justification for their separate, alien status: whereas the politcuma acted as a structural vehicle for separating the Graeco-Macedonian inhabitants from the rest, that was also its weakness when the need was to integrate the native population and not to separate it off. It is a tendency which persists. Whether it was a conscious act of Seleucid and Ptolemaic policy, or a spontaneous growth, is matter for speculation.[60]

The philosophical basis for the government and character of hellenistic poleis can only be derived from what Plato or Aristotle wrote about the ideal constitution of the polis as they envisaged it:[60a] C. B. Welles rightly stresses, in writing about Dura Europus in its pre-Roman phase[61], that Dura was not hellenic but hellenistic, and he goes on to point out - with a side-reference to the fact that, as Seleucus I's wife Apama was Iranian, therefore the succeeding Seleucids partly were - how mixed a community in racial terms Dura was. There was a small Graeco-Macedonian core, whose wives already included some Aramaeans, and the population as a whole included both Aramaeans and Arabs. The city was bi-lingual in Greek and Aramaic, and the religion was largely local. As Welles observes wryly: 'It was not so easy to import Apollo and Artemis into the purlieu of Bel and Nana'[62], although as we read, later on syncretism did exist - as in this very case of Artemis-Nanaia, in the district of Elymais.[63]

Even in the midst of this mixed cultural scene the Greek or Macedonian settlers of Dura seem to have maintained, until the introduction of a Roman garrison in the Third Century AD, a form of 'conservative and correct' Attic in their writing of texts. Welles takes this to be some evidence for such small hellenistic poleis being centres of quite a stable culture[64], and this comment is borne out by the quality of Greek inscription-carving, at for

instance, Kandahar in Afghanistan, where the quality of the lettering is considerable - although much earlier - being both sharp and accurate.[65] This observation also holds true for the inscription from Nihavend, often referred to in this work, and illustrated as a frontispiece.

The question of writing style and accuracy, with its inevitable cultural indebtedness, raises the issue of education in Near and Middle Eastern poleis. We can reasonably conclude from the inscriptional evidence we have quoted from Dura, Nihavend, Ai Khanum and Kandahar (for example) that the inhabitants were literate in Greek (and often, as at Kandahar, in Aramaic as well); and that this implied an educational establishment where the children of citizens were taught to read and write.[66]

Later on, the youth were usually educated as Epheboi in the Ephebeion where Rhetoric and more advanced studies, added to physical training, went to produce the young Greek in his correct cultural environment, with his chlamys and his petasos exhibited for all to see, as in Antiochus IV's pompe at Daphne in 166[67], and whose very Greekness was unacceptable to the conservative wing of the Jewish community at Jerusalem, for instance.[68]

Alexandria in Egypt, with its celebrated Museum and Library was, because of these buildings, a city apart from the normal city-organisation of the hellenistic world; but libraries as such are noted elsewhere in the hellenistic east, and in particular there is a record in the Suda[69] of Antiochus III appointing Euphorion of Chalcis in Euboea to be librarian of the public library at Antioch in Syria, although there is no trace of the building itself in other literature or in excavations.[70]

The philosophy which lay behind the institutions of the polis, and indicated how they should ideally operate (for instance, Aristotle's precept that a city had to be of a certain size to do its work adequately)[70a], found expression in the planning of the cities and the type of buildings they contained. The Administrative Quarter of Ai Khanum has been uncovered: the lower city there has northern and southern administrative units, a large

colonnaded area here is held to be a governmental, or even a royal residence,[71] and this grand ensemble of 116 columns and 4 colonnaded porticoes is to be distinguished from an agora (as at Athens) by the lack of shops. In Athens we now have, of course, the remarkable American reconstruction of the Pergamene stoa presented by Attalus. At Ai Khanum, gateways (Propylons) and portico columns have Corinthian capitals of a type of Corinthian which Paul Bernard has described in various articles,[72] and which he associates with the Olympeion at Athens and the Bouleuterion at Miletus, both of them dating, in this respect, to the time of Antiochus Epiphanes, whose enthusiasm was devoted to their construction under his architect Decimus Cossutius. We do also have from Ai Khanum its gymnasium, a residential quarter to the south west of the city overlooking the intersection of the rivers Kokcha and Oxus, and a mausoleum - the Heroon[73] - with a shrine (cella), whose building and modifications spread over four separate building phases, all dedicated to the memory of Cineas, the κτίστης of the polis, and his family, for whom the inscription was sought at Delphi by Clearchus. The whole group is referred to as the Temenos of Cineas.

An examination of the recovered remains of hellenistic cities from Pergamum in the west to Charsadda-Pushkalavati in the east indicates the similarity of the collection of buildings which constituted the polis. Of these poleis Susa (Seleucia-on-the-Eulaeus) is a typical example, and indicates the compactness of the settlement as well as its defensive capability, with a prominent acropolis,[74] perhaps less dramatically situated than those at Ai Khanum or Kandahar. At Susa the components of that city-plan include the village of Susa itself, the acropolis, the royal quarter, the necropolis, an artisan quarter and the tomb of Daniel[75]. The ancient royal palace of Darius and Artaxerxes Memnon underlines its previous importance as a centre in Achaemenid times and illustrates the Seleucid practice of building new settlements or founding colonies, later to become poleis, near to, or as a part of, a pre-existent town.

There are of course exceptions to this rule as particular local, geographical or strategic requirements demanded radical reshaping or restructuring of old foundations or idiosyncratic approaches to their defence, as for example at Alexandria-in-Margiane; at others like Kabul (Kophen) and Herat (Alexandria-in-Aria) we can only presume that what subsequently became the citadel for later generations and other ethnic communities as the Bala Hissar served that purpose also for the Greeks. At Charsadda-Pushkalavati[76] and Kandahar this certainly seems to have been the case - and perhaps for Bactra also, of whose siege under Antiochus III notice has already been taken, but of whose Greek remains it is astonishingly difficult to uncover traces.[77]

Ghirshman, in a review of the work done on the Seleucid and Parthian levels at Susa, says that the excavations there demonstrate the existence of a mixed population in which Iranians and Susites rubbed shoulders with Greeks and Macedonians: 'In one area native houses with central courts stood beside villas with courtyards having peristyles, tiled roofs adorned with terracotta acroteria and living rooms embellished with frescoes'.[78]

Nineveh seems to have acquired the semblance of a polis during the hellenistic period. An inscription found in 1904, during the excavation of the Nabu temple there, records the dedication by an Apollophanes, the son of Asclepiades on behalf of Apollonius, who is described as the strategos and epistates of the city, to the 'theoi epikoi'.[79] These officers, mentioned here in a Parthian context, demonstrate how the Seleucid organisation lived on into the Parthian period which began about 130 BC. It is difficult to say whether the citadel was continuously occupied: the pottery and architectural remains of the hellenistic stratum, according to Oates, 'are too confused to permit analysis',[80] but he continues: 'It seems probable that the greater part of the town lay in the plain below, where a small shrine of Hermes the travellers' patron, particularly appropriate to a bridgehead site, was recently identified.'[81] No direct evidence for its date was available: the

cult statue was a provincial hellenistic product which, Oates thinks, might have been made at almost any time in the Seleucid or Parthian periods.[82]

Alexandria-in-Margiane, which we have mentioned in the context of the settlements Alexander required to found in order to preserve the frontiers of his empire, was - as we saw - refounded, probably after a nomadic irruption early in the third century, as Antioch-in-the-Waters. It was an example of a pre-existent, possibly an Achaemenid city, founded about 500 BC, and became a huge city under the Parthians.[83] What we have now, the 'archaeological Merv', is a great complex of several cities 30 km. east of the modern Mary. Its area seems originally to have been about 940 acres. In the centre of the ancient city of Antioch was the powerful fortress of Erk Kala, the citadel-feature common to most Asiatic poleis, probably built in the second century BC, and reconstructed later under the Parthians. This would seem to indicate a Bactrian rebuilding, as the date coincides with the reign of Eucratides, or perhaps that of Antimachus Theos.[84]

From the remains of the old Antioch (Giaur Kala) has come, inter alia, a stucco capital of Corinthian inspiration which represents a female head among acanthus leaves and is reminiscent of the remains at Termez on the Oxus. Such hellenistic motifs also occur at Munchak Tepe, Angka-Kala (Khorezma), Airtam and Kara Tepe in Uzbekistan as well as at Surkh Kotal in Kushan-period Bactria. Margiane has no monuments comparable with those from Nisa, and no object of outstanding artistic value such as the rhytons from Nisa, sixty of which have been reconstructed so far. The representations on the Nisa rhytons are, according to Frumkin, 'mostly expressive and typically Greek', but seem occasionally to exhibit the 'rigid and hieratic Parthian style'.[85] Frumkin adds that this evolution of style seems to represent the replacement of hellenism by local elements and also the growing decentralisatio of the Seleucid empire when some provinces, in this instance Margiane became increasingly autonomous[86], or became a part of the Bactrian state.

Nisa, whose life in the Parthian period has been illustrated

by the ostraka discovered there and written in a cursive form of Aramaic, is 18 km. from Ashkabad in Turkmenistan at the foot of Kopet Dagh, and is referred to by Strabo (Nesaea,XI, 7, 3), Ptolemy (VI, 101) and Isidore of Charax in his Parthian Stations who calls it 'Parthaunisa' and informs us that it contains the tombs of the Parthian Kings.[87] Excavations, halted by the war, began again in 1946, and have revealed a funerary temple (?) - which may indicate the necropolis mentioned by Isidore at the site known as New Nisa. 'Old Nisa' has revealed the ruins of a powerful walled fortress which the ostraka say was built by Mithridates - 'Mihrdatkart'. This was possibly the work of Mithridates I, but is more likely to have been Mithridates II, whose dates are on a large number of documents[89]. A large pillared hall serving as a treasury perhaps dates from the first century AD, and it was near this building that the ostraka came to light between 1948 and 1957. By 1960 170 had been published, although the total number discovered is about 2,200. Most of these concern the etiquette related to the royal wine cellars, but their most valuable contribution to the history of this hellenistic city is the light they shed on the chronology of the Parthian period by indicating unambiguously that the dating begins on 1st. Nisan 247 BC.[90]

In the Kafirnigan valley in South Tadzhikistan, Key-Kobad-Sakh is a typically-fortified Bactrian town on the River Kafirnigan, said to have been founded in the 3rd or 2nd century and to have been inhabited throughout the Kushan period to the 3rd or 4th century AD. It displays similarities with Begram, and among the remains found in the Kobadiyan district are big bases of columns and 'Corinthian' capitals of demonstrable hellenistic influence, similar - according to Frumkin - to those found by Bernard at Ai Khanum.[91] In the Vaksh valley of south-west Tadzhikistan the later Bactrian period is represented by the remains of the fortified building compound at Kukhna Kala, discovered in 1954 by Litvinsky near Voroshilovobad. The building of this site, apparently never finished, contains some similarities to Begram; and as it stood in the track of the Yueh-chi and Sakas as they passed southwards, is judged to have been left incomplete for

that reason.[92] Remains of stone architecture, terracottas of hellenistic type and other artefacts have been removed from other sites in south Tadzhikistan.

Seleucia-on-Tigris itself was a polis founded by Seleucus I on the site of Opis, and serious colonisation took place when the inhabitants of Babylon were transferred to Seleucia by Antiochus I twenty years after the founding. It is worthy of note that the arrangements made by Seleucus I (and AntiochusI) for the heir apparent to reside at Seleucia modify, though they do not actually cancel out, the view taken in this work that the main emotional centre, and the administrative and military headquarters of the Seleucid Empire, still lay dangerously far west at Antioch-on-the-Orontes if the area to be ruled had its geographical centre approximately in Media. This no doubt explains the strategic thinking which led Seleucus I and his successors to leave relatives at Seleucia as Governor of the Upper Satrapies (or some such designation). We have from the discoveries at Seleucia indications of a possible revolt of Antiochus I's son Seleucus against Antiochus II Theos when he had succeeded to the throne[93]. From Seleucia also comes a tablet in clay bearing the name of Alexander Balas, and indicating that he was still acknowledged as king in Babylonia in the eighth month of the Babylonian year, i.e., late in 146/5.[94]

We do know that the polis was regarded as an autonomous municipal unit, and that even when quite small frequently had a mint, as Dura Europus had - coining in the reign of Antiochus I with distinctive coin-types (a horned horse, a Macedonian helmet and an elephant)[95]. There also seems to have been, under Antiochus I and Antiochus II a royal official with the power to countermark currency emanating from the capital city at Antioch[96], although Bellinger makes a point of the dependence of Dura upon Antioch, at least as far as coinage is concerned[97] - another instance of what we could call the gravitational pull of Antioch-on-the-Orontes. And whereas Antioch, Pergamum and Seleucia-on-Tigris were all capital cities, this status was no

guarantee of autonomy but rather a reason for even stricter royal control.[98]

Lastly, in our brief survey of some sites of individual poleis in hellenistic Asia, mention should be made of Pushkalavati, which - there is good reason to suppose - was the principal city of Greek India in Menander's day. Some of the more detailed finds from this site have been mentioned in the main work, but as a major Greek city in India a survey of poleis would be wrong to ignore it. The site of the Greek city at Charsadda, now known as Shaikhan (Deri) was discovered by aerial survey at the instigation of Mortimer Wheeler, who handed the work over to A. H. Dani of the University of Peshawar. Coinage did include 15 Menander coins at least,[99] as well as coinage from the reigns of Antialcidas, Heliocles (II), Lysias, Telephus and Philoxenus; and Dani ascribes the foundation of this city 'substantially' to Menander.[100] Coinage of Agathocles and Agathocleia is also to be found there, dating from near Menander in time.

Wheeler's original excavation at Charsadda in 1962 exposed several cultures in Gandhara from the 6th to the 1st centuries BC in the Bala Hissar mound: it was this excavation which Dani extended to Shaikhan Deri. This site is virtually surrounded by water and is at the intersection of the Khaili and Adezai rivers (which join to form the Surdenjab), and the site is watered on the east by the Abazai and Shambar Nala: it is also on the western side of the River Sina, a branch of the Swat. The mound stands on an alluvial plain and is itself 1045 feet above sea level.[101] This topographical information indicates the similarity of siting to Ai Khanum and Begram in its combination of easy defensibility and strategic location at the intersection of prominent waterways.

The fact that the hellenistic city at Taxila (Sirkap) is demonstrably laid out according to strict Hippodamian canons of street planning suggests the pervasiveness of Greek architectural models; and the progress of excavations in recent years at Ai Khanum for instance, and previously at Taxila, demonstrates how far and how accurately such concepts could travel.

The Jandial temple at Sirkap, complete with columns and cornices, although without images, is eloquent testimony to this cultural buoyancy in a Buddhist milieu in a way that the temenos of Kineas at Ai Khanum is not.[102] Ai Khanum asserted Hellenism in a wilderness: the Jandial, and indeed Sirkap in many respects, asserted Hellenism in partibus infidelium.

It was the task of Greek and Iranian, and also Indian, artists to embellish the poleis created by the settlement and colonisation movement which Alexander and the first Seleucids instigated, and in this they were governed by the twin streams of history and artistic antecedents to which they were indebted. It is now not enough to say that what they produced was neither Greek nor Iranian[103]. We have now produced and cited examples of genuine Greek planning and architecture which Iranians in the broad sense had not seriously altered in the case of Ai Khanum, nor Indians violated in the case of the Jandial. It is true that the Ai Khanum capitals are 'different', but in many details the spirit lived on; and the same thing can be said about the Corinthian capital without its abacus at Istakhr.[104]

The excavations at Failaka in the Persian Gulf demonstrate how in hellenistic times a small site could include, in a complex only 60 metres long by 60 metres broad, various buildings including a temple, so that it could be described by the excavators as 'the island's cultural and administrative centre';[105] and this complex could contribute the working base for what was in effect a sacred community. In the context of this brief look at the art and architecture which the poleis gave rise to, we should note at Failaka the small temple containing the sanctuary of a saviour-goddess, as the inscription found there makes clear.[106] The inscription itself may date from the time of Antiochus Epiphanes although the settlement probably goes back to Alexander's day (Arrian VII, 20, 3 f.). A base for the cult statue has been uncovered in the course of the excavation. The pillars of the temple have Persian bases, but it is thought that this is the result of pre-existent architectural members which were re-used, so

the pillar would not be an architectural hybrid[107] - indeed it is asserted by Jeppesen that 'nothing actively was done to continue pre-Greek building methods'.[108]

The spread of hellenistic artistic elements, and their longevity, have frequently been discussed[109]; and the subsequent Roman invasion and settlement of the Near East in the 2nd century AD continued the proliferation of hellenistic features in buildings (e.g. at Palmyra)[110] which were Roman and not Greek in origin. The Roman theatre at Beit She'an in Coele Syria (Northern Israel) demonstrates this in a considerable state of preservation. And, of course, the economic life of the poleis of the Greek world generally gave both impetus and resources for the production of works of art such as the four bronze statuettes recovered from the temple at Nihavend in Media whose hellenistic style is as pronounced as their artistic quality.[111] Further afield the workmanship displayed in the silver vessels with their scenes from Euripides, and attributed with good reason to Bactria, demonstrate what purity of style could be achieved in extremely remote areas of the hellenistic world.[112] The recent excavation of a splendid mosaic pavement in the residence of the administrative quarter at Ai Khanum, whose technique suggests similarities to Olynthus and Pella, is further proof of the durability of hellenistic style and its careful preservation when transplanted to the Oxus[113].

Although the coinage from the Greek kingdoms in Bactria and India is mostly useful as a guide to the reigning kings in those parts, and as a basis for arriving at some workable chronology, such coins are eminent examples of portrait carving and coin engraving, achieving in this field results so convincing as to suggest really authentic representation and not merely an idealised likeness. As has been often pointed out, their value as royal propaganda[114] was distinct from their usefulness as currency - and again the mastery of realism and style seem to show, down to the time of Hermaeus and Archebius (in fact to the end of the line), an esprit de corps in those eastern parts which tends to confirm our findings from the other

areas of political and city life. In so far as coins are the product of the mint cities - at Seleucia, Bactra, Ecbatana, Gardez, Pushkalavati or Taxila, for example, so their quality was also a genuine product of the life of these cities.

Sufficient has been mentioned in this excursus, and elsewhere in this work, of the presence of, and construction and embellishment of shrines and temples to make it clear how important religion was, on the surface at least, in the hellenistic age, although with a varying impact and a much more syncretistic ambience than in classical times. The rebuilding of the temples of E-Sagila and Borsippa[114a] under the Seleucids indicates how seriously this aspect of city and national life was regarded, until the later Seleucids' chronic lack of available finance led to the temples' wealth being seen as a more important factor in the political equation than respect for religious customs and shrines.

The fact that poleis did tend, because of their demographic composition and location, to be Greek or Macedonian oases of culture in an alien (but not uncultured) population was increasingly to lead to a social and economic cleavage seen clearly in the construction of poleis. Colledge makes the point[115] that the Hippodamian principles of a rectangular, walled layout replaced a much more pronounced division in Achaemenid times between palace complexes and the rest of the towns' surface area which was left to semi-chaos. But whether this was consciously politically intended, to dissipate tensions which would certainly exist between Greek and native communities, is doubtful. As Cohen points out[116], the first need of a colonial site was to ensure security and protection for the settlers, and the attitude taken to the Greek garrison on the Akra is well-known in the case of Jerusalem.[117] S. K. Eddy has performed a valuable service in underlining the hostile reaction to the Hellenising movement in various countries in the Middle East, frequently as the result of religious or religion inspired opposition: it can no longer be maintained that this was a purely,

or even primarily Jewish phenomenon. Persis, Media and Elam at least reacted violently.

The class tension, endemic in the hellenistic world, between a hellenised, or hellenising middle class, whether Jews, Iranians or Egyptians and the peasantry of town, or more particularly country, has been underlined,[119] and it made the effort to instil hellenistic culture - even if consciously intended - doubtful of accomplishment. There were too many social imponderables to guarantee a genuine pro-Greek, by which I also mean pro-Macedonian, popular movement. The popular movement, when it came, was invariably in the opposite direction, as this work has indicated - in Egypt, Judaea, Elam or Media, and this is in part attributable precisely to the concentration on poleis which was the Greeks' great contribution to the Orient. Paradoxically it heightened rather than resolved tensions which made continued Seleucid rule intolerable - as the inhabitants of Media graphically demonstrated to the troops of Antiochus Sidetes, the last great Seleucid. Ghirshman gives excellent social reasons for concluding that 'the conquest of Iran was a defeat for hellenism'[120], because the hellenism which arrived with the Macedonian conquest only touched the surface of Iranian society, and by implication, further divided that society. But results do not prove intentions.

Possibly involving the military settlers in the new colonies were the κοινά of the hellenistic world, and the existence of these clubs goes some way to confirming Ghirshman's conclusions about the fissiparous nature of Greek settlement patterns. Associations, which may well have 'satisfied the social and religious needs of the colonists'[121] - along with the gymnasia and the other features which archaeology has revealed as the superstructure of the poleis of Asia - simply make plain a process which further separated the Greeks and Macedonians from the natives 'on site'. While it would probably be unrealistic to see in the normal soldiery of such Greek settlements active proponents of hellenism, that is not to say that the cities they were helping willy-nilly to create could not themselves have

become at least Hellenic landmarks which did have influence and could not be ignored.

The later history of Seleucid-on-Tigris in Roman times, which C. B. Welles (rightly) cites as 'a symbol of Hellenism in the East'[122], confirms the longevity and vitality of such poleis - as do Gerasa, Ba'albek and Beit She'an-Scythopolis, for example, which all had a considerable role to play in Syria under the Romans. All these cities - and others too - indicate how anxious the Romans were to embellish and preserve them so that their life continued, transformed rather than supplanted.

It is always difficult to talk about what founders intended the cities to become: all we have is the evidence of their existence, their siting, their embellishment and their economic, and in some cases cultural activity; but what we have outlined is, I believe, sufficient to indicate that the contribution they made was a positive one, whatever its ethnic and cultural failings may have been[123]. It was a worthy contribution to the life of the ancient world - very much underplayed in recent discussion, which tends to dwell on the origins of the polis rather than its later development, principally under the Seleucids[124]: not only is this process important from the point of view of trade and commercial development in the Greek East, but it delineates an attempt to produce a working political idea in scores of locations - notwithstanding the self-interest in terms of defence and commerce which the presence of the polis no doubt implied. As Welles points out,[125] the Seleucids were told by their court poets that 'they were setting up model communities for future generations to enjoy', and we should accept Libanius' encomium[126] for the Seleucids' progenitor - that 'by hellenising the barbarian world he brought it to an end' - as a sincere compliment, however jingoistic it seems to our quite different perceptions.

EXCURSUS NOTES

1. On the issue of autonomous cities as it afected Asia Minor see K. M. T. Atkinson: 'The Seleucids and the Greek cities of Western Asia Minor' in Antichthon, 1968, p. 32 f,

2. C. B. Welles: Royal Correspondence, No. 15, Atkinson, Op. cit. p. 32.

3. Josephus: Antiquities XII, 142.

4. Arrian: Anabasis III, 30, 7 et passim. Pliny: Nat. Hist. VI, 18, 49.

   Isidore of Charax has left an interesting account of the Stathmoi Parthikoi which had, in a number of cases, been Alexandrine foundations, e.g. Nicephorium on the Euphrates.

5. See in particular P. M. Fraser: Ptolemaic Alexandria, 2 vols. Oxon, 1972.

6. These are the names which have been suggested by their excavators: Ai Khanum reports have appeared until 1977 in CRAI, and Kandahar reports in Afghan Studies, Vol. 1, 1978.

7. Tarn: Greeks, p. 7; Cohen: Seleucid Colonies, p. 1 f. Plutarch: De Fort. Alex. I, 328 e. Tarn (ibid) points out that this figure included 'military colonies' as such.

8. The Bactrian and Indian foundations are known by their names in Strabo, Ptolemy and Stephanus although the identification of present-day sites may be informed conjecture in some cases. Archaeological investigation continues on this, but matters are hindered by the present trouble in Afghanistan.

9. See on all this: Getzel Cohen: 'Seleucid Colonies,' Historia Einzelschrift, Wiesbaden, 1978.

10. II Macc. 4, 9.

11. See comments in Cohen, op. cit., and in Bevan.

12. Gerasa in M. Finley: Atlas of Classical Archaeology, Oxon, 1977, p. 223.

13. Afghan Studies, Vol. I, 1978, p. 32 f: Mundigak VI = Early Iron Age.

14. Finley, op. cit. p. 242, and the various issues of CRAI listed in the bibliography. The remains so far discovered were copiously illustrated in the First Preliminary Report in 1973, and commented upon in detail by Elisabeth During-Caspers in her review of the Report in Bibliotheca Orientalis XXXIII, No. 3/4, 1976, as well as by Mortimer Wheeler in 'Flames over Persepolis', London, 1968, passim. The implications of the discovery of this polis are most significant in many fields: art, epigraphy, and military strategy among them. Digging was brought to an end in 1976.

15. For instance in the gift of 'special honours' marking all birthdays of Antiochus I by the κοινὸν at Clazomenae. That Clazomenae should do so as a long-established Ionian League polis is also remarkable. Atkinson, op. cit. p. 32. Reference is to OGIS 222.

16. Livy. XXXVII, 8, 5 and 9, 7.

17. W. Orth: Koniglicher Machtanspruch und Stadtische Freiheit, Munich 1977, p. 174. Atkinson, op. cit. p. 33.

18. II Maccabees, 4, 9: 'to enrol the men of Jerusalem as citizens of Antioch'.

19. Although the Jewish community did not have to forge its title deeds by claiming kin with great cities of Greece, as Tarsus in Cilicia and Scythopolis (Beit She'an) in Palestine did, for example. A. H. M. Jones: The Greek city, Oxford, 1940, p. 49.

20. E. Badian: Alexander the Great and the Greeks of Asia in 'Ancient Society and Institutions: Essays in honour of V. Ehrenberg', Oxon, 1966, p. 53.

21. E. Badian, op. cit., p. 55.

22. Arrian: Anabasis III, 6. 4.

23. E. Badian, op. cit., p. 57.

24. Badian's suggestion; op. cit., p. 59.

25. Many examples are quoted by Jones; op. cit., p. 49 f.

26. Bactra was an example of an old foundation re-used as a base for military settlement and a staging post for wounded as well as being, later, a royal capital.

27. Alexandria-in-Margiane (a) = Antioch = Merv. Strabo XI, 10, 2; bunches of grapes are said to be two cubits in length; so H. L. Jones in the Loeb Edition of Strabo, 1961, p. 279, note 3.

28. V. Ehrenberg: 'The Greek State', Oxon, 1960, p. 194.

29. Quite recently from Nihavend (Laodicea-in-Media, in which Antiochus III requests honours for Laodice his queen. L. Robert in Hellenica VII, 1949.

30. Ehrenberg, op. cit., p. 195.

31. I Maccabees 6, 18 - 27.

32. Ehrenberg, op. cit., p. 195.

33. A. R. Bellinger: 'The End of the Seleucids', p. 80.

34. Ehrenberg, op. cit., p. 197.

35. K. M. T. Atkinson: 'The Seleucids and the Greek cities of Western Asia Minor' in Antichthon, 1968, p. 38. Attalus III's will is in Dittenberger OGIS 338.

36. Atkinson, ibid.

37. V. Tcherikover: 'Hellenistic Civilisation and the Jews', Philadelphia, 1961. p. 320 f. He disputes that they were a 'ghetto' there, but lacks evidence from our period (p. 284).

38. Tarn: Greeks, p. 67. See also C. B. Welles' comments in 'Alexander's historical achievement', p. 225.

39. Coinage adopted an Indian weight standard, Karoshthi script and Buddhist symbols, and, most notably, Menander was honoured as a Buddhist sage in the Milindapanha.

40. C. B. Welles in 'Alexander's Historical Achievement' in Greece and Rome XII, 1965, p. 225.

41. Arrian, IV, 4, 1. Welles cites the passage and inclines to agree with it, although he does add that 'They must have acquired proper garrisons presently'. Welles, op. cit., p. 225.

42. P. Bernard: 'Fouilles d'Ai Khanum' I, p. 207 - 237: (L. Robert's contribution on the epigraphy from the site).

43. L. Robert in Hellenica VII, 1949; inscription on p. 7, line 1. The ἐπιστάτης received his instructions from the satrap Menedemus.

44. G. Cohen: 'The Seleucid Colonies', p. 81, does suggest that an ἐπιστάτης may not have been appointed for every colony.

45. Cohen, op. cit., p. 83.

46. Excavations at Kandahar in Afghan Studies, Vol. 1, 1978.

47. II Maccabees, 4, 12 ff.

48. L. Robert in Hellenica VII, p. 7, line 2.

48a. C. B. Welles: 'Royal Correspondence', p. 280, No. 70; In the letter from King Antiochus (?) to Euphemus at Baetocaece, late in the Seleucid period, the king orders 'the usual officials to be contacted'.

49. Welles, op. cit., p. 45, No. 26, records Demes and Tribes at Seleucia-in-Pieria in 186 BC.

50. Wolfgang Orth: 'Koniglicher Machtanspruch and Stadtische Freiheit' p. 173.

51. Orth, op. cit., p. 174.

52. See M. Rostovtzeff's detailed study 'Seleucid Babylonia' in Yale Classical Studies, Vol. III, 1932; in particular p. 23 ff.

53. Rostovtzeff, op. cit., p. 58.

54. Rostovtzeff, op. cit., p. 63.

55. Rostovtzeff, op. cit., p. 69. Temple looting did not begin until Ecbatana was stripped in 209 by Antiochus III.

56. Alexandria-in-Margiane: Strabo XI, 10, 2.
Ai Khanum: there is a fine view in Wheeler: 'Flames over Persepolis' p. 70. f.
Alexandria-ad-Caucasum: a plan appears in Wheeler, op. cit., p. 92.

57. Cohen: 'Seleucid Colonies', p. 85, note 64.

58. Kraay and Hirmer: 'Greek Coins', London, 1968, pl. 357 ff.

59. Fraser: 'Ptolemaic Alexandria', Oxon. 1972.

60. Cohen is specific that it was conscious Seleucid policy to preserve the Seleucid Settlement as πολις Ἑλληνίς rather than to permit it to be a πολις μιξοβαρβαρος (p. 86).

60a. See the comments of S. Meikle on 'Aristotle and the political economy of the Polis' in JHS, 1979, p. 57f.

61. C. B. Welles: 'The Hellenism of Dura Europos' in Aegyptus XXXIX, p. 24.

62. Welles, op. cit., p. 25.

63. Polybius XXXI, 9, where Antiochus IV met his death.

64. Welles, op. cit., p. 27.

65. Wheeler: 'Flames over Persepolis', p. 66f. The inscriptions are published as: 'Une Bilingue Greco-Aramienne d'Asoka' in Journal Asiatique, 1958, p. 1 ff and 'Une Nouvelle Inscription d'Asoka' in CRAI, 1963, p. 126f.

66. Welles, op. cit., p. 26.

67. Polybius XXX, 25 f.

68. II Maccabees. 4, 12 f.

69. Noted in Granville Downey: 'Antioch in Syria', p. 94, note 36.

70. Downey, op. cit., p. 94.

70a. Aristotle: Niomachean Ethics IX, 10.

71. P. Bernard: Fouilles d'Ai Khanoum in CRAI.

72. P. Bernard in 'Ai Khanum on the Oxus', Br. Acad., London, 1967, p. 83f. and in Syria XLV, 1968, p. 111 - 151, particularly 146 f.

73. P. Bernard: 'Fouilles d'Ai Khanum, 1968, pp. 85 - 102.

74. G. le Rider: 'Suse sous les Seleucides et les Parthes', Paris, 1965,

75. G. le Rider: op. cit.,

76. Ancient Pakistan II, 1965, contains A. H. Dani's excavation reports on Charsadda-Pushkalavati.

77. Among reports on the possibilities of excavations at Balkh/Bactra are: D. Schlumberger: Observations sur les Remparts de Bactres, Syria XXVI, 1949, and Rodney Young on 'The South Wall of Balkh-Bactra'in AJA, 1956. Wheeler casts a longing eye over the scene in 'Flames over Persepolis', p. 70 f.

78. R. Ghirshman in 'Iran, Parthians and Sassanians', London, 1972, p. 102. He is critical of Rostovtzeff's conclusions about the excavations at Dura Europus.

79. Thompson and Hutchinson in Archaeologia LXXIX, p. 140 - 2.

80. D. Oates: 'The rise and fall of the great city' (Studies in the ancient history of Northern Iraq), London, 1968, p. 61.

81. Oates, ibid.

82. Oates, ibid.

83. G. Frumkin: 'Archaeology in Soviet Central Asia', Leiden and Cologne. 1970, p. 146, and in conversations with M. Frumkin.

84. Ibid.

85. Frumkin, op. cit., p. 150.

86. Frumkin, op. cit., p. 152.

87. Isidore of Charax, Parthian Stations XII, ed. W. H. Schoff.

88. Marie-Louise Chaumont: 'Les Ostraca de Nisa' in Journal Asiatique 1968, p. 12, who recognises that this hypothesis is based upon 'no decisive evidence'.

89. M. L. Chaumont, op. cit., p. 25, note 5.

90. M. L. Chaumont, op. cit., p. 14 f.

91. Frumkin, op. cit., p. 96. Alexandr Belenitzky: 'Central Asia', London, 1969, p. 74 - 75.

92. Shi-Ki, tr. by Fr. Hirth in JAOS XXXVII, 1917, p. 89.

93. R. H. McDowell: 'Stamped and inscribed objects from Seleucia-on-Tigris', Ann Arbor 1935, p. 214.

94. McDowell, op. cit., p. 87, No. 50. Rostovtzeff notes, in 'Seleucid Babylonia', p. 39 (Bulla No. 51 from Orchoi), that the oval seal of Athena standing, with a victory in her hand, holding a spear and leaning on a shield, occurs in the cases of both Demetrius I (146) and Alexander Balas who supplanted him.

95. A. R. Bellinger: 'Seleucid Dura: the evidence of the coins', Berytus IX, Fasc. I, 1948, p. 55.

96. A. R. Bellinger, op. cit., p. 59.

97. A. R. Bellinger, op. cit., p. 61.

98. So McDowell in 'Stamped and inscribed objects from Seleucia', p. 171.

99. A. K. Narain: 'The Indo-Greeks', Oxon, 1957, p. 173, Appendix III.

100. M. Wheeler: 'Flames over Persepolis', p. 101.

101. A. H. Dani: 'Shaikhan Deri Excavations' in Ancient Pakistan II, 1965, passim.

102. A point impressively made in the local handout to visitors to Taxila issued by the Pakistan Tourist Board (Ministry of Minorities Affairs and Tourism) at Karachi, 1978. On the whole series of excavations at Taxila the best summary is Sir John Marshall's 'Guide to Taxila', Cambs., 1960. Wheeler deals with the issues arising for hellenism in 'Flames over Persepolis', p. 113 - 115.

103. R. Ghirshman in 'Iran', Harmondsworth, 1954, p. 232.

104. Ghirshman, op. cit., p. 233.

105. K. Jeppesen: 'A royal message to Ikaros: the hellenistic temples of Failaka', KUML, 1960, p. 188.

106. Jeppesen, op. cit., p. 196 f.

107. Jeppesen, op. cit., p. 190 - 1.

108. Jeppesen, op. cit., p. 191.

109. By K. Trever in 'Monuments of Graeco-Bactrian Art' (in Russian) 1940 inter alia, and recently by M. A. R. Colledge in 'Parthian Art', London, 1978, p. 51 - 53 and passim.

110. Colledge, op. cit., p. 51.

111. Ghirshman: Iran, p. 236. On display at the Iran Bastan Museum in Teheran where I viewed them.

112. 'Three Bactrian Silver Bowls with illustrations from Euripedes' by Kurt Weitzman in 'The Art Bulletin', 1943: the vessels are 'Megarian Bowls', (p. 289).

113. P. Bernard: 'Fouilles d'Ai Khanum', CRAI 1975, p. 177.

114. Most recently in the short study by Ian Caradice for the British Museum coin collection, London, 1978.

114a. S. K. Eddy: 'The King is dead', Nebraska, 1961, pp. 117 f and 120.

115. M. Colledge: 'Parthian Art', London, 1977, p. 32.

116. G. Cohen: 'The Seleucid Colonies', 1978, p. 23.

117. II Maccabees. 13, 49 - 50.

118. S. K. Eddy: 'The King is dead', passim.

119. M. I. Rostovtzeff: 'Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World'. Oxford, Vol. II, p. 1107 succinctly, but in many other works, including V. Tcherikover: 'Hellenistic Civilisation and the Jews', Philadelphia, 1961, p. 169.

120. R. Ghirshman: 'Iran', Harmondsworth, 1954, p. 242.

121. G. Cohen: 'The Seleucid Colonies', p. 87.

122. C. B. Welles: The Hellenistic Orient in 'The idea of history in the Ancient Near East', p. 156.

123. The concept of a ghetto which hellenistic politeumata, in some senses, were, has taken a good deal of colour from the events of this century; and it is unhistorical - as it cannot be cleansed of recent associations - to use it to describe, or to decry, hellenistic arrangements.

124. E.g. in the recent Centenary Colloquium of the Hellenic Society in 1979, where the spread and development of the polis received scant attention, even in papers ostensibly devoted to this topic.

125. Welles, op. cit., p. 157.

CONCLUSION.

The year 280/281 not only saw the Battle of Corupedion and then the death of Seleucus I; it also marked the secession of Persis (Fars) from the Seleucid Empire, to be only temporarily reclaimed, and to that extent it set in train a succession of territorial losses for reasons usually connected with the rise or establishment of local political autonomy, but sometimes dependent on the military or political situation which governors on the spot had to face. Examples of this were the Bactrian satrapy under Diodotus I, and possibly the Parthian satrapy under Andragoras. If the evacuation of Indian and Bactrian territory under Seleucus I in 305 could be seen as intelligent pruning of an over-extended land-mass (and therefore as the partial solution to a problem of control), this rationale could not be applied to the secession of Parthia or Bactria, whose demise as Seleucid-controlled territory came about as the result of no agreement that we can detect. The contextual picture which we have endeavoured to sketch does suggest that a description of the secession of either of these states as a 'revolt' would be open to doubt, and would depend upon one's point of view. But the fact remains that, shorn of them, the Seleucid State not only lost provinces, and therefore also the ability to control the defence of such provinces against external attack, but further, that a process had been started which would encourage attempts at 'reclamation' - under Seleucus II, Antiochus III, possibly under Antiochus IV, certainly Demetrius II and eventually Antiochus VII - which expeditions were themselves exercises which diverted and weakened the Seleucid state instead of stabilising and strengthening it.

This process of secession in Persis, Bactria and Parthia, for example, was tackled by Antiochus III by agreement and a relationship, possibly of vassalage, but was in effect a legal, or tacit recognition of

the state of affairs which had come into existence in these parts and with which Antiochus may well have been in reluctant agreement by that time. Certainly his offer of a marriage arrangement to Euthydemus I of Bactria suggests accommodation to an acceptable compromise rather than an attempt at an impossible revanche.

Such secessions were of course followed by those of Media Atropatene, Characene, Elymais and Judaea under their own native rulers, and sometimes as the result of military campaigns, notably so in the case of Maccabean Palestine. It is not suggested that all these states seceeded for the same reasons or combination of reasons: Judaea had grounds which, although possibly similar to those of Elam as far as the perceived Seleucid contempt for religious sanctuaries was concerned, really had a considerable bearing on the understanding which near eastern natives had of Hellenism.[1]

The concept of Hellenism as a cultural force was far too closely tied up with the aspirations of a particular social group within, e.g. Judaea. In a country as strategically vital to the Seleucids as Coele-Syria this was a dangerous social polarisation; and the Seleucid cause never recovered from the Maccabean Revolt, which took place during a period of particularly careful balancing by the Seleucid state between the interests (and advances) of Parthia on the one hand and Rome on the other. As we have attempted to demonstrate, if Antiochus IV's usurpation was a cardinal error of policy with enduring consequences for dynastic succession, the character of his involvement with Jewish religion was a bad reflection on the culture he was commending and attempting to impose. John Hyrcanus' involvement with Antiochus Sidetes' expedition to reclaim the East cannot, we think, be interpreted as a final admission that Hellenism was worth fighting to preserve against Parthia. Rather it was an inevitable consequence of a political arrangement with the current (and strong) Seleucid which he wished, and was probably bound, to preserve.

This leads us to suggest that the whole issue of the Greek 'Effondrement' in Asia is wrapped up with the personality of the Seleucid rulers and the loyalty they were able to command or enjoy (or not) to an extent which reduces the weight to be attached to Hellenism as their enterprise. We cannot argue that the dissemination of Greek culture did not happen - or that it was not frequently welcomed: there is too much evidence, much of which we have cited, ~~that~~ Graeco-Macedonian influence for/ upon Literature, Art, Architecture, Political Thought, Town Planning, Religion and Philosophical concepts and attitudes to allow of any such bleak conclusion to Alexander's /anabasis in Asia and its consequences. a/ What we do, I believe, have to say is that such influences were a by-product of the presence of Graeco-Macedonian personnel and not its cause, and that therefore the Seleucids were not in occupation in order to commend Hellenism.

This conclusion enables us to see what they did actually achieve in rather a different and a better light. Treatment of captured Seleucid kings by the Parthians was generous and courteous up to and including Demetrius Eukairos, and this suggests a tolerance of the Seleucid house, even in its death throes, which is remarkable if nothing else. It comes as no surprise to find even later Parthians, after the b/ /attle of Carrhae, being entertained by a performance of the 'Bacchae' i/ of Euripides, or to note that for two centuries Parthian sculptors imitated Hellenistic style. This only changed when the Seleucid line became extinct.

The eclipse of Greek influence in India is another, but related, issue, and is not treated in this work except tangentially; but there too are the marks of respect in coinage and in literature of Greek for Indian and vice-versa. The Seleucids' substantial contribution to trade between India and the Mediterranean world, for instance by the building and maintenance of harbours, seems a genuine example of

constructive economic thinking; and although the actual arrangements in Greek India around the Rann of Cutch in Sigerdis and Saraostos are shrouded in mystery, there is good reason to believe that Antiochus IV rebuilt an Alexandria as Antiochia on the Persian Gulf (later Charax Spasinu) to revive and to stimulate trade between India and the rivers of the Persian Gulf. Ambassadors were appointed to the courts of both Chandragupta and Bindusara his successor, under Seleucus I and Antiochus I, and from the pen of Megasthenes the Seleucid state obtained graphic impressions of the culture of contemporary India. The final independence of Persis in about 150, and the defeat of the Elymaeans under Kaminiskeres by the Parthians between December 141 and February 140, put this Indian seaborne trade into Parthian hands at its western end.

The quality of life in the Babylonia which the Seleucids left to Mithridates has revealed traces in the excavations at Uruk/Orchoi; and Goosens' sad article describes the spiritual deadness of this Babylonian city as disclosed by the cuneiform tablets - or rather the 'sealed' character of its arrangements as though the city were a 'little world apart', from which only two families stay 'loyal to Hellenism': those of Kephalon and Strato. I think we must deduce from this that where colonisation was strong and continuous and Greek life could be not only self-supporting but also self-perpetuating (and perhaps self-commending), as at Seleucia-on-Tigris, it enjoyed remarkable longevity. Where this municipal and cultural strength was lacking, it shrivelled away. Such a conclusion is supported by what we know to have been the political and military pressures upon an elongated Seleucid state from its inception. Colonisation had to succeed emotionally in order for it to be politically effective.

280 was the date also of the 'War of Succession' in Syria as Antiochus I attempted successfully to hold onto his kingdom in the face of Ptolemy Philadelphus' drive for power in the Eastern Mediterranean.

And we must assign to the Seleucid-Lagid conflict for control of the Eastern Mediterranean coast (and the separate struggle for Coele-Syria) a role in the erosion of Greek power in the east, because of the constant distraction the five Syrian Wars provided - requiring finance, military force and above all oversight. Only at the eventual instigation of Rome were such hostilities terminated, and then not until 58, by which time Egypt had become more or less a pawn of Roman policy, and Ptolemy Auletes was heavily financially dependent upon Rome. The last Seleucid king, Philip II, was <u>invited</u> by the people of Alexandria to govern Egypt; and Aulus Gabinius, by then Roman pro-consul of Syria, forbade him to accept (Eusebius I, 261). In the intervening two hundred years, the Ptolemaic dynasty had ensured that all dynastic measures were employed to disturb the smoothness of the Seleucid succession; and the comradeship between Seleucus and Ptolemy Lagus never returned in their descendants.

As for Rome, her influence on the Seleucids seems to have been intended to distract them from hindering Roman plans, and it developed into a systematic constraint on Seleucid policy. A species of oversight arose which antagonised Seleucid rulers, for example Antiochus III, Antiochus IV and Demetrius I, and diverted the Seleucid house from eastern responsibilities it had to discharge. Polybius noted this development, and as Walbank declares, Books XXX to XXXIII 'furnish us with an almost unbroken run of cynical comments on Roman policy'.

The Seleucid responsibility for Greek rule in the East had been assumed at Babylon in 311 as the result of military conquest of Antigonus' territory, and in circumstances in which Greek rule might have taken over successfully the Achaemenid mantle. Within thirty years Antiochus I had evidence from the activities of Demodamas and his own experience that the northern marches of his state were critically vulnerable. Despite valiant and continuing efforts to stiffen resistance to invasion from that quarter (and to reclaim territory subsequently

invaded by Parthia), that northern frontier proved ultimately indefensible - and the pressures upon it remained, even after the Parthians had established control, for Mithridates II to deal with after the loss of two Parthian kings to the Saca.

The Greek poleis lived on, with their municipal arrangements now adopted by the Parthians and their language preserved for hundreds of years as perhaps the most tangible of the Seleucids' considerable achievements.

We may philosophise over the eclipse of Greek rule in the East and regret it, as Tarn so notably did, but with what Welles warned was the beguiling tongue of the lawyer used to presenting a case. We may merely comment, but from an antipathetic standpoint as Narain did. Nowadays we have (rightly) to adopt a more independent and possibly a more objective stance, and not to try to be cultural proponents. So we follow Will, Pulleyblank and Lozinski among others and report on what the state of affairs appears to have been. This lets us off the accusation of bias and imperialism and enables us to say what we can and not what we like; but no one can prevent regret at the demise of a notable experiment (the first) of western rule in the East. We should not allow feelings of annoyance, frustration or dismay at the internecine feuding of the Seleucid line's last hundred years to blind us to the real quality of the Seleucid achievement. If their most enduring memorial was their colonisation programme and the poleis which emerged from it, that success must itself have been the result of the settlers who inhabited the poleis and operated their institutions.

It is paradoxically only in the closing years of Greek hegemony in Asia that the powers who had been attacking the Hellenistic monarchies, and had in the end prevailed, themselves assumed the pattern of Hellenistic state-organisation and proclaimed themselves 'Philhellenes': of these states Parthia, Judaea and the Nabatean kingdom of Aretas III are good examples. And perhaps a last comment on Greek rule in Asia should

come from Antiochus Epiphanes (this time of Commagene) who claimed to be descended from Alexander and Darius, and proclaimed a Graeco-Iranian syncretism: he also called himself a Philhellene - perhaps a wistful recollection of Alexander's dream and of Apama's own marriage.[3]

Notes.

1. A point made in detail throughout S. K. Eddy's work 'The King is Dead', Lincoln, Nebraska, 1961, but also very recently by M. Hengel in 'Jews, Greeks, and Barbarians', London, 1980.

2. B. Goosens: Au declin de la civilization Babylonienne: Ourouk sous les Seleucides: Bulletin de la classe de lettres, Academie royale de Belgique V, 27, p. 222 f.

3. T. Goell in Anatolian Studies V, 1955, p. 13 - 14. Inscription from Commagene (Nemrud Dagh) in SEG. XXVI, Alphen aan den Rijn, 1979.

ALEXANDER THE GREAT, HIS SUCCESSORS AND THE SELEUCIDS

(from E. J. Bickermann: The Chronology of the Ancient World, London, 1969, p. 159)

Alexander	336-10 June 323
Philip Arrhidaeus	323-316
Alexander IV	316-312
Seleucus I Nicator	311-281
Antiochus I Soter	281-2 June 261
Antiochus II Theos	261-(Summer) 246
Seleucus II Callinicus	246-225
Seleucus III Soter	225-223
Antiochus III (the Great)	223-187 (early summer)
Seleucus IV Philopator	187-175 (3 Sept.)
Antiochus IV Epiphanes	175-164 (?)
Antiochus V Eupator	163-162
Demetrius I Soter	162-150
Alexander Balas	150-145
Demetrius II Nicator	145-140
Antiochus VI Epiphanes	145-142
Antiochus VII (Sidetes)	138-129
Demetrius II Nicator	129-125
Cleopatra Thea	126
Cleopatra Thea and Antiochus VIII (Grypus)	125-121
Seleucus V	125
Antiochus VIII (Grypus)	121-96
Antiochus IX (Cyzicenus)	115-95
Seleucus VI Epiphanes Nicanor	96-5
Demetrius III Philopator	95-88
Antiochus X Eusebes	95-83
Antiochus XI Philadelphus	94
Philip I Philadelphus	94-83
Antiochus XII Dionysus	87-84
(Tigranes of Armenia)	(83-69)
Antiochus XIII Asiaticus	69-64
Philip II	65-64

This is a basic King-List. I make acknowledgement, as does Bickerman, to work on Babylonian Chronology, and in particular to the work of Sachs and Wiseman. Discussions as to dates in dispute are noted in my text with comments from the relevant authorities, e.g. Holleaux and Bengtson. A. R. Bellinger's work on 'The end of the Seleucids' weaves its way through the tortuous network of late Seleucid dates convincingly and must now be regarded as canonical until it is overthrown.

(Laodicea: Nihavend)

1. Μενέδημος Ἀπολλοδώρωι καὶ Λαοδικέων
τοῖς ἄρχουσι καὶ τῆι πόλει χαίρειν· τοῦ
[γ]ραφέντος πρὸς ἡμᾶς προστάγματος
4 [παρὰ το]ῦ βασιλέως ὑποτέταχται
[τὸ ἀντί]γραφον· κατακολουθεῖτε οὖν
τοῖς ἐπεσταλμένοις καὶ φροντίσατε
ὅπως ἀναγραφὲν τὸ πρόσταγμα εἰς στήλην
8 λιθίνην ἀνατεθῆι ἐν τῶι ἐπιφανεστάτωι
τῶν ἐν τῆι πόλει ἱερῶν.

Ἔρρωσθε. Θιρ΄, Πανήμου ι΄.

Βασιλεὺς Ἀντίοχο[ς Μ]ενεδήμωι χαίρειν·
12 [βου]λόμενοι τῆς ἀδ[ε]λφῆς βασιλίσσης
Λαοδίκης τὰς τιμὰς ἐπὶ πλεῖον αὔξειν
καὶ τοῦτο ἀναγκαιότατον ἑαυτοῖς
νομίζοντες εἶν[αι] διὰ τὸ μὴ μόνον ἡμῖν φιλοστόργως
16 καὶ κηδεμονικῶς αὐτὴν συμβιοῦν, ἀλλὰ καὶ
πρὸς τὸ θεῖον εὐσεβῶς διακεῖσθαι, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα μὲν
ὅσα πρέπει καὶ δίκαιόν ἐστιν παρ' ἡμῶν [αὐτ]ῆι
συναντᾶσθαι διατελοῦμεν μετὰ φιλοστοργίας
20 ποιοῦντες, χρίνομεν δὲ, καθάπερ ἡμῶ[ν]
ἀποδείκνυνται κατὰ τὴν βασιλείαν ἀρχιερεῖς,
καὶ ταύτης κ[αθ]ίστασθαι ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς τό[ποις]
ἀρχιερείας αἳ φ[ορ]ήσουσιν στεφάνους χρυ[σοῦς]
24 ἔχοντας εἰκόν[α]ς αὐτῆς, ἐνγραφήσονται δὲ [καὶ]
ἐν τοῖς συνα[λ]λάγμασ[ιν] μετὰ τοὺς τῶν προ[γόνων]

καὶ ἡμῶν ἀρχι[ερ]εῖς· ἐπεὶ οὖν ἀποδέδεικτ[αι]
ἐν τοῖς ὑπὸ σ[ὲ τό]ποις Λαοδίκη⟨ς⟩, συν[τελείσθω]
πάντα τοῖς προγεγραμμένοις ἀκολο[ύθως]
καὶ τὰ ἀντίγραφα τῶν ἐπιστολῶν ἀναγραφέν[τα]
εἰς στήλας ἀνατεθήτω ἐν τοῖς ἐπιφανεστάτοις τό[ποις],
ὅπως νῦν τε καὶ εἰς τὸ λοιπὸν φανερὰ γ[ίν]ῃ ται ἡ ἡμε[τέρα]
καὶ ἐν τούτοις πρὸς τὴν ἀδελφὴν π̣[ροα]ίρεσις.

Θιρ΄, Ξαν[δικοῦ.].

(Gorgan, 1959)

2. Εὔανδρος Ἀνδραγόραι,
Ἀπολλοδότωι χαίρειν·
ἀφεώκαμεν Ἑρμαῖον
ἐλεύθερον ὑπὲρ βασιλέως
Ἀντιόχου καὶ βασιλίσσης
Στρατονίκης καὶ ἐκγόνων
ἱερὸν Σαράπιος καὶ ἀνα-
τεθείκαμεν ἐν τῶι ἱερῶι
τὴν ἄφεσιν αὐτοῦ τε
[κ]αὶ τῶν ἰδίων αὐτοῦ.
. . Γορπιαίου· ἐρρῶσθε.

(Kandahar, 1958)

3. Δέκα ἐτῶν πληρη[θέντ]ων βασιλεὺς
Πιοδάσσης εὐσέβεια[ν] ἔδειξεν τοῖς ἀν-
θρώποις, καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου εἰσεβεστέρους
τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐποίησεν καὶ πάντα
εὐθηνεῖ κατὰ πᾶσαν γήν, καὶ ἀπέχεται
βασιλεὺς τῶν ἐμψύχων καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ δὲ
ἄνθρωποι καὶ ὅσοι θηρευταὶ ἢ ἁλιεῖς

βασιλέως πέπαυνται θηρεύοντες, καὶ
εἴ τινες ἀκρατεῖς, πέπαυνται τῆς ἀκρα-
σίας κατὰ δύναμιν, καὶ ἐνήκοοι πατρὶ
καὶ μητρὶ καὶ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων παρὰ
τὰ πρότερον, καὶ τοῦ λοιποῦ λωΐον
καὶ ἄμεινον κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα
ποιοῦντες διάξουσιν.

(Kandahar, 1963)

4. [.εὐ]σέβεια καὶ ἐγκράτεια κατὰ πάσας τὰς διατριβάς· ἐγκρατὴς δὲ μάλιστά ἐστιν | ὃς ἂν γλώσης ἐγκρατὴς ἦι. Καὶ μήτε ἑαυτοὺς ἐπα[ι]νῶσιν, μήτε τῶν πέλας ψέγωσιν | περὶ μηδενός· κενὸγ γάρ ἐστιν· καὶ πειρᾶσθαι μᾶλλον τοὺς πέλας ἐπαινεῖν καὶ | μὴ ψέγειν κατὰ πάντα τρόπον. Ταῦτα δὲ ποιοῦντες ἑαυτοὺς αὔξουσι καὶ τοὺς | πέλας ἀνακτῶνται· παραβαίνοντες δὲ ταῦτα, ἀκ(λ)εέστεροι τε γίνονται καὶ τοῖς | πέλας ἀπέχθονται. Οἳ δ' ἂν ἑαυτοὺς ἐπαινῶσιν, τοὺς δὲ πέλας ψέγωσιν φιλοτιμότερον | διαπράτονται, βουλόμενοι παρὰ τοὺς λοιποὺς ἐγλάμψαι, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον βλάπτου[σι] | ἑαυτούς. Πρέπει δὲ ἀλλήλους θαυμάξειν καὶ τὰ ἀλλήλων διδάγματα παραδέχεσθαι[ι]. | Ταῦτα δὲ ποιοῦντες πολυμαθέστεροι ἔσονται, παραδιδόντες ἀλλήλοις ὅσα | ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἐπίσταται. Καὶ τοῖς ταῦτα ἐπ[α]σκοῦσι ταῦτα μὴ ὀκνεῖν λέγειν ἵνα δει-|αμείνωσιν διὰ παντὸς εὐσεβοῦντες. Ὀγδόωι ἔτει βασιλεύοντος Πιοδάσσου | κατέστρ(α)πται τὴν Καλίγγην. Ἦν ἐζωγρημένα καὶ ἐξηγμένα ἐκεῖθεν σωμάτων | μυριάδες δεκαπέντε καὶ ἀναιρέθησαν ἄλλαι μυριάδες δέκα καὶ σχεδὸν ἄλλοι τοσοῦ-|τοι ἐτελεύτησαν. Ἀπ' ἐκείνου τοῦ χρόνου ἔλεος καὶ οἶκτος αὐτὸν ἔλαβεν· καὶ βαρέως ἤνεγκεν· | δι' οὗ τρόπου ἐκέλευεν ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἐμψύχων σπουδήν τε καὶ σύντα(σ)ιν πεποίηται | περὶ εὐσεβείας. Καὶ τοῦτο ἔτι δυσχερέστερον ὑπείληφε ὁ βασιλεὺς· καὶ ὅσοι ἐκεῖ

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καὶ μητρὶ καὶ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων παρὰ
τὰ πρότερον, καὶ τοῦ λοιποῦ λωΐον
καὶ ἄμεινον κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα
ποιοῦντες διάξουσιν.

(Kandahar, 1963)

4. [.εὐ]σέβεια καὶ ἐγκράτεια κατὰ πάσας τὰς διατριβάς· ἐγκρατὴς δὲ μάλιστά ἐστιν | ὃς ἂν γλώσης ἐγκρατὴς ἦι. Καὶ μήτε ἑαυτοὺς ἐπα[ι]νῶσιν, μήτε τῶν πέλας ψέγωσιν | περὶ μηδενός· κενὸγ γάρ ἐστιν· καὶ πειρᾶσθαι μᾶλλον τοὺς πέλας ἐπαινεῖν καὶ | μὴ ψέγειν κατὰ πάντα τρόπον. Ταῦτα δὲ ποιοῦντες ἑαυτοὺς αὔξουσι καὶ τοὺς | πέλας ἀνακτῶνται· παραβαίνοντες δὲ ταῦτα, ἀκ(λ)εέστεροι τε γίνονται καὶ τοῖς | πέλας ἀπέχθονται. Οἳ δ' ἂν ἑαυτοὺς ἐπαινῶσιν, τοὺς δὲ πέλας ψέγωσιν φιλοτιμότερον | διαπράτονται, βουλόμενοι παρὰ τοὺς λοιποὺς ἐγλάμψαι, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον βλάπτου[σι] | ἑαυτούς. Πρέπει δὲ ἀλλήλους θαυμάξειν καὶ τὰ ἀλλήλων διδάγματα παραδέχεσθαι[ι]. | Ταῦτα δὲ ποιοῦντες πολυμαθέστεροι ἔσονται, παραδιδόντες ἀλλήλοις ὅσα | ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἐπίσταται. Καὶ τοῖς ταῦτα ἐπ[α]σκοῦσι ταῦτα μὴ ὀκνεῖν λέγειν ἵνα δει-|αμείνωσιν διὰ παντὸς εὐσεβοῦντες. Ὀγδόωι ἔτει βασιλεύοντος Πιοδάσσου | κατέστρ(α)πται τὴν Καλίγγην. Ἦν ἐζωγρημένα καὶ ἐξηγμένα ἐκεῖθεν σωμάτων | μυριάδες δεκαπέντε καὶ ἀναιρέθησαν ἄλλαι μυριάδες δέκα καὶ σχεδὸν ἄλλοι τοσοῦ-|τοι ἐτελεύτησαν. Ἀπ' ἐκείνου τοῦ χρόνου ἔλεος καὶ οἶκτος αὐτὸν ἔλαβεν· καὶ βαρέως ἤνεγκεν· | δι' οὗ τρόπου ἐκέλευεν ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἐμψύχων σπουδήν τε καὶ σύντα(σ)ιν πεποίηται | περὶ εὐσεβείας. Καὶ τοῦτο ἔτι δυσχερέστερον ὑπείληφε ὁ βασιλεὺς· καὶ ὅσοι ἐκεῖ

ωἴκουν | βραμεναι ἢ σραμεναι ἢ καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς οἱ περὶ τὴν
εὐσέβειαν διατρίβοντες, τοὺς ἐκεῖ οἰκοῦ-|ντας ἔδει τὰ τοῦ βασιλέως
συμφέροντα νοεῖν, καὶ διδάσκαλον καὶ πατέρα καὶ μητέρα | ἐπαισχύνεσθαι
καὶ θαυμάζειν, φίλους καὶ ἑταίρους ἀγαπᾶν καὶ μὴ διαψεύδεσθαι, |
20 δούλοις καὶ μισθωτοῖς ὡς κουφότατα χρᾶσθαι, τούτων ἐκεῖ τῶν τοιαῦτα
διαπρασσο-|μένων εἴ τις τέθνηκεν ἢ ἐξῆκται, καὶ τοῦτο ἐμ παραδρομῆι
οἱ λοιποὶ ἠγεῖνται, ὁ δὲ | [β]ασιλεὺς σφόδρα ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐδυσχέρανεν.
Καὶ ὅτι ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς ἔθνεσίν εἰσιν


BLACK SEA
ALANI
Diascorias
Phasis
R. Phasis
CASPIAN SEA
MASSAGETAE
R. Cyrus
R. Araxes
COMMAGENE
Lake Van
GORDYENE
Edessa
Antioch-Nisibis
Seleuceia
Antioch
Zeugma
Carrhae
Lake Uramieh
GREATER BALKAN MTS.
Nisa
HYRCANIA
R. Atrek
PARTHIA
Hekatom pylos
ATROPATENE
Hatra
ADIABENE
Dura-Europus
Asshur
Emesa
Palmyra
Tyre
Damascus
SYRIA
Syrian Desert
BABYLONIA
R. Euphrates
Artemita
Seleuceia
Ctesiphon
Vologesias
Babylon
R. Tigris
MEDIA
Europus-Rhagae
GREATER MARGIANE
Ecbatana (Hamadan)
Conchobar (Kangivar)
Nush-i-Jan
Laodicea (Nihavend)
Caspian Gates
Dasht-i-Kavir
ELYMAIS
Persian Desert
SUSIANA
Seleucia-Susa
? Gabae
GABIENE
Orchoi-Uruk
? Apamea
PALESTINE
ARABIA
Antioch-Charax
Naqsh-i-Rustam
Persepolis
Seleucia on the Erythreian Sea
Kerman
PERSIS
Areotis
Antioch
CARMANIA
R. Amanis
Harmosia-Amana
PERSIAN GULF
G. Ormuz
Gerrha
GREEK ASIA (West)
0 100 200 300 Miles
0 100 200 300 400 500Kms


Lake Balkash
Swamps
ARAL SEA
Swamps
R Jaxartes (Syr Daria)
SACAS
WU-SUN
SACARAUCAE
Alexandrowski Ra
Lake Issyk Kul
AORSI (An-tsai)
Kizil Kum Desert
SACAS
YUEH CHI from 160 B.C.
FERGHANA
Tashkent
Terek Pass
Parthian boundary 115 B.C.
R Oxus (Amu Daria)
CHORASMIA
Chinese Commerce 128 B.C.
Kashgar
Alexandria Eschate
R Surkhab
Alai Valley
Yarkand
R Polytimetus (Zarafshan)
Bokhara
Samarkand
Kargalik
MASSAGETAE
SOGDIANA
PAMIRS
130 B.C.
160 B.C.
Darwaz
Roshan
CHINESE TURKESTAN
Silk route
R Oxus
Wakhan
Demetrias (Termez)
Antioch (Merv)
Shignan
Hunza
HINDU KUSH
HIMALAYA MTS.
Alexandria Oxiana? or Eucratideia? (Ai Khanum)
Mazar-i-Sharif
Chitral
Gilgit
TAPURIA
Sarakhs
115 B.C.
Bactra
BACTRIA
PAROPAMISADAE
R Indus
Meshed
GHANDARA
TRAXIANE
R Margus
Kapisa
Pushkalavati
Cartana (Bamyan)
Alexandria-on-the Caucasus (Kapisa-Begram)
Taxila
Bucephala?
R Beas
GOURIANE
Kophan (Kabul)
Sagala
ARIA
R Ochus (Arius)
R Jhelum
R Chenab
Alexandria (Ghazni)
Alexandria-in-Aria (Herat)
ARACHOSIA
Bactrian boundary at greatest extent
Phra (Farah)
Demetrias
Alexandria Arachosia (Kandahar)
R Ravi
R Sutlej
Neh
Lake Hamun
DRANGIANA (Seistan)
Dasht-i-Lut
Quetta
R Jumna
Mathura
MAURYA EMPIRE
Kalat
R Indus
SACASTANE (Parai takene)
To Pataliputra
Mulla Pass
PATALENE
R Purali
INDIA
Demetrias-Patala
GEDROSIA
Old coastline
GREEK ASIA (East)
INDIAN OCEAN
SARAOSTOS
0 100 200 300 Miles
0 100 200 300 400 500 Kms.

SELEUCID COINAGE I

Antiochus II (O)

Antiochus Hierax (O)

Seleucus II (O)

Antiochus II (R)

Antiochus Hierax (R)

Seleucus II (R)

Antiochus III (O)

Antiochus IV (O)

Demetrius I (O)

Antiochus III (R)

Antiochus IV (R)

Demetrius I (R)

COINS OF SELEUCUS IV ARE NOT INCLUDED

SELEUCID COINAGE II

Alexander Balas (O)



Demetrius II
(First Reign) (O)

Tryphon (O)

Alexander Balas (R)



Demetrius II
(First Reign) (R)

Tryphon (R)

Antiochus VII (O)

Antiochus VIII (O)

Antiochus IX (O)

Antiochus VII (R)

Antiochus VIII (R)

Antiochus IX (R)

COINS OF ALEXANDER ZABINAS ARE NOT INCLUDED

Seleucus VI (O)

Antiochus X (O)

Antiochus XI (O)

Seleucus VI (R)

Antiochus X (R)

Antiochus XI (R)

Philip I (O)

Demetrius III (O)



Tigranes (O)

Philip I (R)

Demetrius III (R)

Tigranes (R)

COINS OF ANTIOCHUS XII, ANTIOCHUS XIII AND PHILIP II ARE NOT INCLUDED

Diodotus I (O)

Diodotus I (O)

Diodotus I (R)
(Inscr. Antiochus II)

Diodotus I (R)

Euthydemus I (O)

Euthydemus I (O)

Euthydemus I (O)

Euthydemus I (R)

Euthydemus I (R)

Euthydemus I (R)

Demetrius I (O)

Eucratides I (O)

Demetrius I (R)

Eucratides I (R)

Eucratides I (O)

Eucratides I (O)

Heliocles I (O)

Eucratides I (R)



Eucratides I (R)

Heliocles I (R)

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