

**The University of Hull**

**Tourism and terrorism: A crisis management perspective**

**An investigation of stakeholders' engagement in the context of Egyptian holiday destinations**

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in  
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by

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## **Abstract**

Terrorism has come to be considered as one of the defining crises facing the tourism industry. In spite of its importance, the knowledge of how to manage the terrorism crisis in the tourism industry is rudimentary. The main aim of this study is to narrow this gap. In particular, it proposes a conceptual framework applying stakeholder theory to the practical methods used and strategies followed in the management of crises in the tourism industry. The point of departure of this conceptual framework is the twofold premise that stakeholders inherently influence the management of an organization and that the organization should meet their demands and balance their claims. This task, however, is complicated by the fact that stakeholders vary in their salience and that they interact with one another differently. In addition, stakeholder management does not take place in isolation; cultural factors have an influence on the ways that stakeholders interact. These factors constitute the theoretical foundation of the proposed framework. These theoretical assumptions are then applied to the practical postures or strategies that stakeholders adopt in managing terrorism crises in the tourism industry. This conceptual framework is applied in particular to the Egyptian case of the bombings in Sharm El Sheikh, Dahab and Taba. The findings of the study indicate that because of the idiosyncratic nature of terrorism, which is regarded as raising major security issues, the participation of a large number of stakeholders at most stages of crisis management does not necessarily lead to the most effective and efficient crisis management. Instead, as the thesis indicates, a crisis management model in which the crisis stage is dominated by police and security forces and where the recovery stage relies upon the participation of most stakeholders has proved to be both efficient and successful.

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## **List of Abbreviations**

ANOVA	Analysis of Variance
CAPMAS	Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (Egypt)
CEO	Chief executive officer
CM	Crisis Management
CPTED	Crime prevention through environmental design
CRHC	Capstone Rural Health Centre
DDB	Demographic database
DMO	Destination management organization
EIU	Economist Intelligence Unit
ETA	Egyptian Tourism Authority
ETF	Egyptian Tourism Federation
GATD	General Authority for Tourism Development
IACVB	International Association of Convention and Visitor Bureaus
IG	The Islamic Group
MANOVA	Multivariate Analysis of Variance
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NTO	National Tourism Office
RDWTI	RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents
SIS	Egypt State Information Service
SPSS	Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
STO	State Tourism Organization
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNWTO	United Nations-World Tourism Organization
WAHS	West Alabama Health Service

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# Chapter 1 Introduction

There is little doubt that security crises like terrorism now constitute a primary threat to the tourism industry, requiring the urgent attention of academics and practitioners alike. Given its importance, this thesis seeks to contribute to existing knowledge of crisis management in the tourism industry. To take a fresh approach to the subject, it examines the terrorism crisis in the tourism industry from a crisis management perspective while attempting to incorporate insights from terrorism studies into the literature on tourism crisis management and more specifically to offer a conceptual framework for the study, drawing on stakeholder theory and considering both national and organizational culture as determinants.

Basically, this study aims to gain a broader understanding of the terrorism crisis in the tourism industry and seeks to achieve the following research objectives:

- 1- To examine the salience of stakeholders in tourism crisis management and the ways in which their salience changes at different stages of a crisis.
- 2- To describe and analyse the nature of the interactions among key stakeholders in tourism when managing a crisis, both in a normal situation and after the crisis.
- 3- To explain the role of organizational and national culture and their impact on the stakeholders' involvement in crisis management in the tourism industry.
- 4- To promote a deeper understanding of the crisis management techniques employed in managing the different stages of terrorism crises.
- 5- To examine the economic and social impacts of the terrorism crisis on the Egyptian tourism industry.

The occurrence of terrorist attacks on the Egyptian tourism industry serves as the context of the research, owing to the prevalence of terrorism crises in Egypt compared to other tourist destinations, as will be explained later in this chapter (section 1-2) and reinforced by the regional picture reported in the literature review (section 2-2-1).

Reviewing the extant literature on tourism crisis management, one can identify two strands: the first body of literature represents a tendency to explore the nature of tourism crises from the perspectives of consumers and buyers, including how such crises influence tourists' perceptions and willingness to travel; the second draws on crisis management studies and discusses the methods and strategies by which organizations deal with crises. Without denying the merit of the first trend in the literature, it should be noted that this thesis places its main focus on the latter body of work. Indeed, although the perception of tourists in relation to crisis-affected tourism destinations is one of the key issues discussed in the tourism crisis management literature, the present study does not intend to examine this topic. An additional restriction of scope is that this thesis focuses primarily on the bombings in Sharm El Sheikh, Dahab and Taba, although some of the issues raised also relate to earlier terrorist attacks on Egyptian tourism destinations.

In particular, although the overall aim of this study is to gain a broader understanding of crisis management in the tourism industry, its focus is on terrorism as a significant and prevailing source of crises and on the utilization of stakeholder theory and cultural dimensions in crisis management, because it is felt that these are the areas where the main contributions can be made. This judgement is based on the fact that only limited efforts have been made to examine these important determinants in crisis management, as will be shown by the literature review chapter, which will discuss the detailed relation of stakeholder theory and national cultural dimensions to tourism and crisis management. Furthermore, this thesis reports one of a very few studies conducted to date which examine the terrorism crisis in the tourism industry by drawing on a variety of issues discussed within the terrorism literature, including specific counter-terrorism methods and those people and organizations involved in the prevention of terrorism.

In order to fulfil the research objectives, a combined approach of qualitative and quantitative research methods was used. Quantitative data were collected through a structured questionnaire survey of 130 respondents in Cairo, 52 in Taba, 97 in Sharm el Sheikh and 49 in Dahab, while qualitative data were collected in 36 semi-structured, face-to-face, in-depth interviews conducted in Cairo and Sharm al Sheikh.

This introductory chapter continues with an overview of writing on the management of terrorism crises in the tourism industry, allowing the identification of some gaps in the relevant literature and explaining how the current research narrows this gap. The rationale for choosing to focus on the Egyptian case is then explained and the chapter concludes with an overview of the structure of the thesis.

## **1-1 Gaps in the literature and contribution to knowledge**

A review of the literature on crisis management in the tourism industry shows that an important advance has been the division of crisis management strategies into different phases or stages, creating what have since become known as ‘staged’ crisis management models (Faulkner, 2001; Santana, 2004; Ritchie, 2004; Evans and Elphick, 2005). These studies also follow a holistic and strategic approach, viewing crisis management as a circular process that starts and ends with the “default” stage of information gathering and monitoring—what Mitroff et al (1996) and Coombs (2007) refer to as “signal detection”—in order to discover potential crises in advance through meticulous internal and external monitoring. They also take into consideration the post-crisis stage, undertaking comprehensive evaluation of the whole range of crisis management procedures, using lessons learned to plan for the future. However, such proposed models can be faulted in two ways. First, they have been developed predominantly ad hoc, addressing each tourism crisis as it has occurred. This has produced a



heterogeneous body of knowledge which is largely descriptive and largely inapplicable to different contexts. In addition, they have paid insufficient attention to the idiosyncratic character of individual crises and to how these plans and procedures should be adapted to meet the peculiarities of each crisis or type of crisis (Robert & Lajtha, 2001). This thesis seeks to narrow these gaps by drawing on the wider body of management theory.

Several studies have stressed that tourism destinations are affected by crises and that without the close partnership of the stakeholders in these destinations, crisis management policies have little if any chance of achieving their goals (Ritchie, 2004; Sheehan and Ritchie, 2004; Ulmer, 2001). This indicates a need for the closer application of stakeholder theory to crisis management efforts in the tourism industry, where it has much to offer; yet there has been a disconnection between these two fields of study. Although a few studies (Ritchie, 2004; Yeoman et al, 2005; Paraskevasa and Arendell, 2007) have identified destination management organizations (DMOs) as the most significant stakeholders involved in the management of terrorism crises, neither the significant role of other stakeholders nor the ways in which they interact with one another at different stages of crises have been adequately explored.

In addition, there is a degree of consensus among scholars that different countries deal with crises differently (Elsubbaugh et al, 2004; Chandler, 2005) and that each crisis management plan should be made appropriate to its specific context by taking into account locally applicable ideas and practices (Johnson and Peppas, 2003). However, with notable exceptions (Schmidt and Berrell, 2007; Campiranon and Scott, 2007), few studies have systematically considered the national and organizational dimensions of culture in crisis planning and crisis response.

This thesis seeks to narrow this gap by the application of stakeholder theory and cultural concepts to crisis management studies. Another significant contribution of this thesis is to take into consideration strategies and methods specific to terrorism crises by drawing on the counter-terrorism literature, where the specific characteristics of terrorism crises are comprehensively discussed. The present study therefore seeks to bridge the above epistemic divide through the integration in tourism scholarship of previously divergent research traditions—terrorism studies and crisis management—and to pursue the advancement of knowledge by addressing the capacities and limitations of both perspectives.

## **1-2 Rationale for choosing the case of Egypt**

This conceptual framework will be applied to the Egyptian case of the bombings in Sharm El Sheikh, Dahab and Taba. There are several reasons for the selection of Egypt as a case study. It is a well-known beneficiary of the tourism industry and one of the few Arab countries which depend heavily on tourism as the main source of foreign income and as the largest employer (Sakr and Massoud, 2003; Essner, 2003; Hamzawi, 2001; Rudwan, 2002). However, in recent years the Egyptian tourism industry has witnessed a growing number of terrorist attacks, apparently intended to weaken the position of the Egyptian government and cause damage to the tourism industry and hence to the whole economy (Richter and Waugh, 1986; Aziz, 1995; Abdulwahed, 1998). The government has had difficulty in managing a fundamentalist Islamic undercurrent that uses terrorism as a tool to further its cause (Essner, 2003: 8). The destructive terrorist attacks on tourists and tourism destinations which are the particular concern of the present study began in 1992, when gunmen opened fire on a Nile cruise ship carrying 100 German tourists. This was followed by an attack in Luxor in 1997, when six gunmen disguised as police officers fired randomly at tourists, killing 70 people including 58 foreign tourists (Essner, 2003: 9; Wheatley and McCauley, 2008).

More recently, a series of terrorist attacks in Dahab in April 2006 killed twenty people and injured eighty. A year earlier, in July 2005, a terrorist massacre in Sharm El Sheikh killed more than 60 people, while in October 2004, three bombs exploded in Taba, resulting in the deaths of 34 people. The attacks on these three towns were chosen to constitute a case study as they allowed for a relatively representative study of typical terrorist attacks in Egypt. They also appeared to be ‘information-rich’ cases which are worthy of in-depth study (Patton, 1990). Furthermore, because of the freshness of events, significant information was likely to be available, although stakeholders were relatively unwilling to share it. Indeed, given the sensitivity of the terrorism issue in the Egyptian context, potential respondents were expected to be very reluctant to participate. This was the main barrier facing the researcher in conducting the field research. The solution adopted was to utilize an innovative research method appropriate to such a closed society, which is discussed in detail in Chapter 4.

### **1-3 Structure of the thesis**

Following this brief introductory chapter, Chapter 2 reviews critically the literature relevant to the various academic strands which constitute the building blocks of this study, including terrorism studies. It comprises seven sections, the first of which outlines the scope and range of the literature review. Section 2-2 provides a general overview of terrorism incidents in the tourism industry in the past four decades and analyses the economic impact of terrorism on the tourism industry. The third section explores the strategies and methods adopted to manage crises and the models and frameworks explaining their application. It first seeks to clarify the concept of crisis and to formulate a classification within which to place terrorism. Secondly, it examines crisis management models by focusing on the most influential approaches that have emerged. Finally, it reviews the debates concerning the application of crisis management techniques to tourism studies. The next section draws on terrorism studies, examining a variety of issues including clarification of the concept of terrorism, approaches

to counter-terrorism strategies and methods, the agencies responsible for counter-terrorism operations and the way these agencies cooperate and coordinate. Section 2-5 then seeks to build an academic foundation on which to explore the application of stakeholder theory to the management of terrorism crises in the tourism industry. It begins with a brief discussion of the definition and classification of stakeholder theories. The rest of the section is devoted to the fundamental debates within stakeholder theory which constitute the building blocks of the framework, including the identification and salience of stakeholders, their strategies and management. Once these concepts have been clarified, their specific application to the study of tourism and crisis management are reviewed. Section 2-6 is devoted to the impact of national culture. It first offers a definition on the flawed concept of culture and discusses the differentiation between national and organizational culture, then proceeds to consider the cultural determinants that may shape and condition stakeholders' management of a tourism crisis. The second chapter ends with a summary of gaps in the literature and a detailed exposition of the research questions to be addressed; this constitutes the outlining of an overall theoretical foundation for the research.

Chapter 3 paints a general picture of the tourism industry in Egypt and of the terrorist incidents affecting it. It begins with a brief review of the Egyptian context and a discussion of the ebb and flow of tourism in Egypt over the last 30 years. The analysis draws on the official data, comparing international tourist arrivals and receipts. The chapter also offers a brief review of the main stakeholders in tourism in Egypt. It finally discusses the emergence, evolution and challenges of terrorist groups in Egypt and their engagement in attacks on tourist destinations. In this section, counter-terrorism strategies ranging from oppression to co-operation and accommodation are reviewed and the degree to which each has been successful is examined.

Chapter 4 provides an account of the research methodology adopted. It discusses why the most appropriate method of collecting data in this study is triangulation and how this methodology matches the research problem. It also spells out the conceptual framework of the research.

Chapter 5 presents an analysis of the qualitative data gathered by interviewing representatives of key stakeholders. Its structure follows that of the interview protocol reproduced in Appendix 3, where each section covers a major topic: identifying stakeholders, the impacts of terrorism on the tourism industry, the role of culture, and crisis management practices and strategies. In Chapter 6, the quantitative data gathered by means of a questionnaire is presented, mostly in the form of tables, and analysed descriptively. The presentation follows the format of the questionnaire itself, which is reproduced in Appendix 1.

The analyses offered in Chapters 5 and 6 are then drawn together in Chapter 7, which presents an integrated interpretation of all the data collected. This discussion addresses each of the research questions in turn and thus covers the following themes: the impact of terrorism on tourism in Egypt, changes in stakeholder salience as a result of crises, strategies for managing key stakeholders and communication among them, crisis management techniques and the effect of contextual factors.


The final chapter summarises the findings and discusses their implications, as well as the conclusions to be drawn from the Egyptian experience.

## **Chapter 2 Literature Review**

### **2-1 Introduction**

As with any new study, it is necessary to review previous studies in order to place the present one in context. As indicated in the introduction, this thesis seeks to offer new insight to the literature by bringing together different strands of learning within the fields of terrorism, tourism and crisis management. It also seeks to offer a rigorous theoretical foundation for the study based on stakeholder theory and national cultural dimensions. As such, the research subject encompasses issues that span many disciplines, so there are elements of cross-over among all sections within this chapter, as shown in Figure 2.1. The areas that constitute the building blocks for this literature review include terrorism, tourism and crisis management, while its theoretical foundation draws on stakeholder theory and the dimensions of national culture. In order to obtain a richer and more holistic picture, in the following lines each main area of study is first discussed, then the peripheral subjects and more importantly the boundaries and interconnections with other areas are highlighted. It is noteworthy that the classification of the literature presented here is neither fixed nor definitive, but was rather adopted to help the researcher to navigate through the complexities encountered in the literature.

Nevertheless, every attempt has been made to adopt a logical structure based upon the development of knowledge. The departure point for research was general crisis management studies. Thus, section 2.3 first explores advances in this field and spells out the conceptual underpinnings of some approaches to crisis management. Reviewing the related literature, two important variants are identified: the tactical and strategic approaches.



**Figure 2.1: Interconnections in the literature**

Source: Author


Having established a general understanding of crisis management, the next step is to review its application to tourism studies. To do so, section 2-3-3 offers a brief review of the works related to managing crises in tourist destinations. It draws predominantly on scholarly discussion of tourism crisis management and discusses the extent to which this literature has kept pace with developments in the crisis management field. It first discusses the concept of tourism crisis and its categorization, then seeks to place security and terrorism within the appropriate classification. Next, it examines crisis management models by focusing on the most influential approaches that have emerged. Finally, it attempts to identify divergence and convergence between the strategies and methods developed to address the security and terrorism crises and those strategies and methods used to manage other crises affecting tourism.

Section 2-4 turns to the second major strand: the study of terrorism and counter-terrorism. It defines terms and examines details of methods suggested and adopted for combating terrorism, with particular reference to interagency cooperation.

Section 2-5 is largely theoretical in nature, seeking to lay a robust theoretical foundation by drawing on stakeholder theories and applying them to the management of crises in the tourism industry. It begins with a definition of terms and a brief discussion of the evolution of stakeholder theories. It proceeds to report the debates on types of stakeholder theory based on the best-known taxonomy, distinguishing normative, instrumental and descriptive theories. It then discusses how stakeholder theory is applicable in the public sphere and to the management of tourism destinations. The rest of the section is devoted to the building blocks of the conceptual framework of the present research, including the identification and salience of stakeholders, their strategies and management, while section 2-6 explores the final component: the impact of national culture.



Overall, then, the chapter lays out the theoretical foundation of the study, then discusses its application to the study of tourism stakeholders and crisis management. With respect to crisis management it is argued that the significance of stakeholders will vary during the different stages of crisis management. The final section of this literature review draws together the main strands of the preceding sections to establish a theoretical framework for the study. The logical order outlined in Figure 2.2 is thus followed throughout this chapter. Each section of this literature review also provides a scholarly basis for one of the main research questions. Once the related literature has been reviewed in each section, the place of the relevant question is spelled out and the implications for further research explored.



**Figure 2.2: The logical structure of knowledge examined in this chapter**

Source: Author

Before proceeding to the central body of the literature on crisis management, the following section offers a general appraisal of the impact of terrorism on the tourism industry.

## **2-2 The impact of terrorism on tourism destinations**

This section reviews the literature on the impact of terrorism on tourism destinations. It is necessary to review such material before turning to the main discussion of how terrorist attacks on tourism destinations can be managed effectively. There is almost complete consensus among scholars that security incidents in the broader sense and terrorism attacks in particular have a very substantial negative impact on tourists, the tourism industry, the local community and the economy of the host country at large (Mansfield and Pizam, 2006). The impact of these incidents on tourists changes their perception of risk, which in turn determines their decisions to travel or otherwise to security-affected destinations. Such consequences are of great importance and extensively discussed in the literature (e.g. Seddighi et al, 2000; Sakr and Massoud, 2003; Lepp and Gibson, 2003; Mansfield and Pizam, 2006), but lie beyond the scope of this study. Rather, central to this study is the impact of terrorism incidents on the destinations, including the economic consequences of the reduction of tourist arrivals. In addition, this study seeks to understand the potential impact of terrorism incidents on the social life of ordinary people. This section begins with a discussion of the critical impact of terrorism on the tourism industry, based on a review of the relevant research conducted in several countries, before discussing the susceptibility of the tourism industry to crises. As a contribution to the literature, a time series analysis with yearly aggregated data is presented to show how and to what extent terrorists have targeted tourism since the 1970s. The economic impact of terrorism attacks across the world is then examined via a focus on a number of case studies.

### **2-2-1 Records of terrorist attacks on tourist targets**


The preferred type of terrorist target has varied in the last four decades. According to Mansfield and Pizam (2006: 42), during the 1960s and 1970s many aircraft were hijacked, so

that tourists, travellers and their destinations were targeted initially through such hijackings. In the 1960s, the flights involved were often from the US to Cuba, and there was no intention to harm passengers. However, in the 1970s, the purposes of terrorists' actions were the loss of life and damage to property. Thus, they perpetrated more brutal assaults. During the 1970s, athletes at the Munich Olympic Games fell victim to one of the most notorious terrorist attacks, which marked a turning point for terrorism. In the subsequent years, the target list encompassed a variety of sites, including airlines, cruise ships, buses, restaurants and cafes, events and festivals, sporting and cultural institutions; indeed, wherever people assembled for leisure or any other purpose.

At the beginning of the 1990s, a significant number of terrorist incidents occurred at tourist destinations. The targeting of tourist destinations by terrorists has been so frequent that Mitroff (2005: 34), a leading scholar in the field of tourism crisis management, states that "it is no longer a question of 'if' terrorists will strike but rather a question of 'when,' 'how' and 'how prepared' the destination is to deal with them". This trend continued towards the end of the 1990s, but in recent years there has been a shift in terrorist targets from tourist destinations. Despite this shift, the industry has remained a key target for terrorist attacks. The RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (RDWTI),<sup>1</sup> which records terrorist attacks on the tourism industry between January 1968 and July 2009, indicates that tourists were the targets of 269 of 40129 terrorist incidents. These attacks killed 684 tourists and injured 1191 others. As Figure 2.3 demonstrates, there were signs of a considerable increase in the number of terrorist incidents in the 1990s, reaching the highest point in 1993 with around 40 terrorist attacks on tourism destinations. Although the number fell in the 2000s, there were still a large number of such attacks.

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
<sup>1</sup> RDWTI is the most comprehensive database on terrorism incidents, containing data in a wide range of categories including incidents in countries, the location of attacks, the groups involved, who were the key targets, and the tactics and weapons of attack, from 1972 to 2009.



**Figure 2.3: Number of terrorist incidents in tourism destinations 1970-2008**

*Source: Data collected from RDWTI*


Figure 2.4 is a graph of the number of tourist injuries and fatalities as a result of terrorism, showing that although the volume of incidents fell in the 2000s, the number of deaths and injuries continued to grow. The increasing number of injuries and fatalities culminated in the horrific attack in Bali, Indonesia in 2002. Recognized as the worst act of terrorism targeting tourists to date, the Bali incident killed 202 people and injured 300. Nearly three-quarters of the victims were foreigners and most were in the crowded bars in the tourist district. Australian tourists accounted for the largest group killed, at 88, while 38 Indonesians formed the second largest group killed; the rest were tourists from Great Britain, the United States and various European nations. The explosion was blamed on the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) group, which is thought to be linked to Al Qaeda.



**Figure 2.4: Number of tourists injured and killed in terrorism attacks, 1970-2008**

*Source:* Data collected from RDWTI

Another trend that can be identified from this data concerns the global locations of the incidents. These are shown graphically in Figure 2.5, which indicates that from 1970 to 2008, the most insecure regions for tourists in terms of terrorist attacks were Africa and the Middle East/Persian Gulf, each of which experienced 67 terrorist attacks on tourism destinations. (This goes some way to reinforcing the choice of Egypt as the setting for the present study, explained in section 1-2, as it lies geographically and culturally where these two regions meet.) Western Europe followed, with 59 terrorist attacks, while the most secure place was North America, the only tourism-related terrorist incident in the United States being in 1997, when a Palestinian opened fire on the observation deck of the Empire State Building in New York City, killing a Danish tourist and wounding an American, an Argentinean, a Swiss and a French tourist.



**Figure 2.5: Numbers of terrorism incidents in tourism destinations by region**

*Source:* Data collected from RDWTI

This section has offered a brief review of the impact of terrorism on the tourism industry. It has not merely reviewed other scholars' ideas, as suggested by the term literature review, but has attempted to offer new insight into some pertinent areas of scholarship. The aggregated data on the number of terrorist incidents reveals that a significant number of terrorist incidents have occurred in tourist destinations, while recent years have witnessed a shift in the targets of terrorism.

### **2-2-2 The economic impact of terrorism in the tourism industry**

Once it is acknowledged that terrorism is a widespread and pervasive phenomenon in tourism destinations, the second significant question raised is the extent to which it has affected the tourism industry. In the affected regions, events of this nature often have a profound impact on the economy and social life of residents. In some cases, tourism flows are interrupted as tourists seek other seemingly safer destinations. Table 2.1 offers an overview of some

published studies examining the impact of terrorism on tourism in several countries. These studies (and others) are then discussed in some detail.

**Table 2.1: Evidence of the impact of terrorism on tourism**

Study	Analytical Scope	Main Results
Enders and Sandler (1991)	Spain, monthly data, 1970-1988	Terrorism negatively affects the number of tourists visiting Spain. There is no evidence
Enders et al (1992)	Greece, Italy and Austria, quarterly data, 1974-1988	Greece, Italy and Austria suffered severe revenue losses from tourism as a
Fleischer and Buccola (2002)	Israel, 1987-1999	Foreign tourism is sensitive to terrorism, while domestic terrorism is not. Shifts from foreign to domestic tourism in the face of
Llorca-Vivero (2008)	Cross-sectional gravity model, 2001-2003	Terrorism works as a “bad advertisement”, making tourism in targeted countries less
Aly and Strazicich (2000)	Egypt and Israel, 1955-1997 and 1971-1997	While terrorism (along with instability and external war) negatively affects tourism flows, the tourism sector remains important,
Pizam and Fleischer (2002)	Israel, monthly data, 1991-2001	A high frequency of terrorism is more dangerous to tourism flows than the severity
Drakos and Kutun (2003)	Greece, Italy and Turkey, monthly data, 1991-2000	Terrorism reduces tourist arrivals, reducing market shares of targeted countries. Terrorism also produces regional spillover

Adapted from Schneider (2011)

During the 1970s and 1980s, Spain was the target of attacks by Basque nationalists and separatists and by other (mostly left-wing) terrorist groups. The approximate reduction in the number of tourists as a result of these terrorist acts was 140,000 (Enders and Sandler, 1991). Enders et al (1992) estimate that between 1974 and 1988, the losses of tourism profits in

Austria, Italy and Greece amounted to US\$ 4.538 billion, US\$ 1.159 billion and US\$ 0.77 billion respectively. In the same period, they state that continental Europe lost US\$ 16.145 billion because of terrorism attacks. This demonstrates the importance of tourism losses in Europe as a whole. Calculating these as percentages, Austria, Greece and continental Europe as a whole lost 40%, 23% and 21% of their revenue respectively, whereas the loss in Italy was only 6%.

Outside Europe, the negative impact of terrorism on tourism has been observed in countries including Israel and Turkey. Fleischer and Buccola (2002) propose a supply and demand framework for the performance of the Israeli hotel industry between 1992 and 1998, estimating a 1.27% loss of total income during this period. Their evidence shows that in general, terrorism affects the tourism industry negatively because tourists factor in terrorism as a risk when planning their holidays. The findings of Llorca-Vivero (2008) add to this view, as the study shows that both domestic and transnational terrorist attacks enter a tourist's consideration when travel choices are made.

While the existence of an effect seems more or less universal, its timing appears to vary considerably, so that income and numbers of arrivals may fall almost immediately after an attack, or not until many months later. Thus, Enders and Sandler (1991) and Fleischer and Buccola (2002) report relatively rapid effects of terrorism on tourism, i.e. after two to three months for Spain and Israel respectively, while Enders et al (1992) found that there was a three to four month lag before terrorism affected tourism in Greece, whereas tourism remained unaffected by a terrorist incident until a full 18 to 21 months afterwards in the cases of continental Europe as a whole and Austria respectively. Frey and Luechinger (2005) explain these variations in terms of differences in the structure of terror campaigns, not just across countries but also across time. Differences in time lags could also stem from



differences in booking systems, where existing bookings are preserved, so that changes become apparent only in the number of new bookings.

The research also shows that these effects, whenever they occur, tend to be transient. Aly and Strazicich (2000) studied annual tourist arrivals in Egypt and Israel, concluding that the impact on the tourism industry of acts of terrorism remained transitory, despite their repeated occurrence and regional instability. Conversely, Pizam and Fleischer (2002), considering the case of Israel, argue that the tourist industry can recover even from severe acts of terrorism as long as the terrorist acts are not repeated. Thus, when acts of terrorism (whether of high or low severity) occur at high frequency and regular intervals, tourism demand will constantly decrease, until eventually the destination's tourism industry will come to a standstill. It is interesting to note that the frequency of attacks seems to influence tourism demand, while their severity does not appear to do so.

Indeed, while tourism demand, arrivals and income do clearly suffer the negative effects of terrorism, the findings show that the terrorist acts at Luxor, Cairo and Bali, the PKK attack in Turkey or the Basque nationalist and separatist attacks in Spain have not halted the long-term growth of international tourism. The destinations targeted by terrorist attacks have largely regained the lost tourist arrivals within a few months or years, because potential visitors forget such incidents and demand returns to normal relatively soon after the occurrence of such shocking attacks (Freyer and Schröder, 2005).

### **2-2-3 Summary and implications for further research**

The main argument put forward in this section was that terrorism has often imposed significant costs on the tourism industry in certain countries, yet tourists continue to travel to such destinations. What has been overlooked in these studies is the potential impact of terrorism incidents on the social life of the community at large. Indeed, the emphasis of most

of the literature has been on the macroeconomic effect of these incidents on the host countries. Although Fuchs and Pizam (2011) have recently underscored the importance of this issue, they do not go further, to clarify and expand it adequately. The present study seeks to examine this issue in the context of Egypt. Overall, this section has thus provided a conceptual base from which to address one of the main research questions, concerning the various effects of terrorism incidents in Egypt, in a social as well as an economic context. After this brief review of records of terrorism incidents in the tourism industry and their broad economic impact, the next section turns to the main body of literature of interest to this study: on crisis management and its contribution to the management of terrorism incidents in the tourism industry.

## **2-3 Crisis management**

This section seeks to offer some insights into the evolution of the crisis management (CM) field of study, which constitutes the subject of the main body of literature referred to in this thesis. To understand better this field of study it is essential to make sense of the main issue that it was established to deal with: that of crises. Thus, this section first seeks to clarify the concept of crisis by reviewing several attempts to define the term. Having done so, it reviews the definition of crisis management to offer an overall view of this field. However, the main concern of this section is to trace the evolution of CM by discussing critically and analysing the main approaches adopted since its inception.

### **2-3-1 Crisis and crisis management defined**

One of the significant issues in crisis management studies which has remained unresolved is the definition of what constitutes a crisis. To date, numerous authors have attempted to address this need, but as with many other concepts in social science, it has proved difficult to offer an unequivocally valid definition of the term ‘crisis’. A significant source of ambiguity

comes from the diverse terms and concepts typically used synonymously with it. For example, the terms ‘disaster’, ‘negative event’, ‘catastrophe’, ‘problem’, ‘turning point’, ‘risk’ and ‘chaos’ have all been used interchangeably with crisis, which has also been associated with vulnerability or the absence of safety and security (see, for example, Pforr and Hosie, 2008; Prideaux et al, 2003; Pizam, 1999; Faulkner, 2001; Glaesser, 2003). Santana (2004: 307) concludes that “the literature provides no generally accepted definition of crisis and attempts to categorize types or forms of crises have been sparse”.

Glaesser (2006) and Pauchant and Douville (1993) trace the word back to its Greek origin, which means ‘differentiation’ or ‘decision’. Likewise, Darling (1994: 5) describes a crisis as a “turning point for better or worse”, a “decisive moment”, or a “crucial time”. Smith and Elliot (2006) argue that the term is often used in literature to describe events and situations that are not easy to deal with, even if they do not cause damage. Pearson and Mitroff (1993: 49) define a crisis as “an incident or event that poses a threat to the organization’s reputation and viability”. It is also described by Mitroff et al (1996) as an occurrence or event which is usually unexpected, happens at short notice and causes damage. An earlier definition related to business is that of Fink (1986: 15), who defines a crisis as:

a situation that runs the risk of i. escalating in intensity; ii. falling under close media or government scrutiny; iii. interfering with the normal operations of business; iv. jeopardising the positive public image presently enjoyed by a company or its officers; and v. damaging a company’s bottom line in any way.

Pforr (2006) identifies two approaches to crisis definition: generalized and precise definitions. He argues that the generalized approach is taken by those who tend to offer relatively vague definitions; for instance, Ritchie et al (2004: 202) state that “crises are indefinite, numerous, unexpected and unpredictable”, while Prideaux (2004: 282) notes that “history tells us that disasters and crises are usually unforeseen, occur regularly, act as a shock to the tourism industry and are always poorly handled”. An example of a precise

definition is that of Faulkner (2001), who makes a distinction between a crisis and a disaster. For Faulkner, a crisis is a situation “where the root cause of an event is, to some extent, self-inflicted through such problems as inept management structures and practices or a failure to adapt to change”, whilst a disaster can refer to a situation “where an enterprise ... is confronted with sudden unpredictable catastrophic changes over which it has little control” (p. 136). Similarly, McKercher and Hui (2003) regard disasters as either natural events such as floods, typhoons and earthquakes or as human-induced events (e.g. war and terrorism). In the context of tourism, Coles (2004: 175) adds that these events:

unfold at a variety of spatial scales that impact on local tourism sectors and can cause temporal market disturbances of varying duration ... Such events take a variety of forms from natural landscape disasters to episodes of famine, disease and pestilence to wars, terrorist atrocities and political instability.

Santana (2004: 318), however, argues that a “crisis is not an event. It is a process that develops in its own logic”.

A practical solution to make sense of crisis is to differentiate among crises by classifying them into different typologies. Taking into account different criteria allows a range of classifications to be constructed. The most straightforward criterion is the magnitude of the crisis. Based upon this criterion, Comb (1999) places crises on a continuum. At one extreme there are small-scale organizational issues, including crises regarding the health and behaviour of staff, such as illness and breakdown, while at the other extreme are severe ones such as natural disasters and terrorist incidents.

Another approach—and perhaps the most common one—is the classification of crises according to their causes. The broadest distinction based upon this criterion is between naturally occurring and human-made crises (El-Khudery, 2003), where the second category includes technical disasters, economic and political crises, conflicts, riots and terrorist actions. The most common alternative general classification recognizes three main

categories: natural disasters, organizational crises and political upheavals. Natural crises include earthquakes, floods and volcanic eruptions, while the second category comprises unintended consequences of human activities, such as industrial explosions and pollution, and the third covers deliberate acts such as political activities and terrorism (Lynch, 2004).

As with the definition of crisis, that of crisis management is not free from difficulty. Different scholars have defined crisis management differently. Table 2.2 lists some of the definitions of crisis management given in the literature.

**Table 2.2: A selection of definitions of crisis management**

<b>Author</b>	<b>Definition</b>
Rosenthal and Pijenburg (1991)	Crisis management involves efforts to prevent crises from occurring; to prepare for better protection against the impact of a crisis agent; to make for an effective response to an actual crisis; to provide plans and resources for recovery and rehabilitation in the aftermath of a crisis.
Scherler (1996)	Measures of all types which allow a business to cope with a suddenly occurring danger or risk situation in order to return as quickly as possible to normal business routines.
Santana (2004)	An ongoing integrated and comprehensive effort that organizations effectively put into place in an attempt to first and foremost understand and prevent crisis, and to effectively manage those that occur, taking into account at every step of their planning and training activities, the interests of their stakeholders.
Glaesser (2006)	Crisis management is understood as the strategies, process and measures which are planned and put into force to prevent and cope with crisis.
Coombs (2007)	Crisis management seeks to prevent or reduce the negative outcomes of a crisis and protect the organization, stakeholders and industry from harm.

In light of these definitions and as its very name implies, CM constitutes a series of strategies and gestures undertaken to combat a crisis and to mitigate its actual damage. As Coombs (2007) puts it, crisis management seeks to prevent or mitigate the negative outcomes of a crisis and thereby protect the organization, stakeholders and industry from harm. Thus, it appears as a strategy to concentrate on the issue of instability that results from the crisis and to develop strategic objectives to overcome the problems. As is discussed in greater detail later in this section, crisis management can be divided into two main phases: proactive and

reactive. Proactive crisis management occurs at the pre-crisis stage and comprises measures that should be taken to prevent crises from happening. In contrast, reactive crisis management refers to the post-crisis phase or actions that must be taken when a crisis has occurred, to mitigate and control its effects (Pauchant and Mitroff, 1992). All these definitions involve common features of crisis management, such as all the procedures that should be undertaken before, during and after a crisis to prevent it or to minimize its impacts.

Some writers differentiate between crisis management and risk management. As argued by Barton and Hardingree (1995), risk management often focuses on the identification of potential problems, whereas crisis management is concerned with the management of the critical event itself. There are different types of crisis management. For example, functional CM is the modification of tasks and processes in response to a crisis, while institutional CM refers to groups of persons who are responsible for crisis management activities (Glaesser, 2006). To avoid falling into a definitional trap, this thesis will adopt the following comprehensive definition proposed by Santana (2004: 308):

Crisis management can be defined as an ongoing integrated and comprehensive effort that organizations effectively put into place in an attempt to first and foremost understand and prevent crisis, and to effectively manage those that occur, taking into account in each and every step of their planning and training activities, the interest of their stakeholders.

This definition seems appropriate for this research, as it is widely accepted and often cited in the tourism crisis management scholarship (Henderson, 2007). Rather than extending unnecessarily and unproductively the discussion of its definition, the focus is now on approaches to CM, which should be of more value to this research.

### **2-3-2 Genesis and evolution of crisis management**

Although dealing with crises has long been one of the main concerns of humankind, CM as a field of study is a new endeavour, rooted in earlier research into natural disasters such as

earthquakes, fires and floods, which largely dealt with how organisations and social groups responded to such crises once they occurred. The fundamental premise of this strand of research was the idea that disaster prevention is impossible because such disasters are nothing but acts of God and thus inevitable in essence (Smith, 1990; 1995). However, certain terrifying technological crises of the late 1970s and 1980s, including the Tylenol poisonings (1982), the Chernobyl disaster (1986) and the Bhopal tragedy (1984), along with substantial increases in the incidence of global terrorism, political upheaval and major criminal activities, made it evident that many such incidents were caused by industrial or socio-political processes resulting from the acts of leaders and managers—rather than acts of God—and thus possibly preventable (Elliott and Smith, 2004).

In response, a number of scholars drew attention to the causes and dynamics of these crises and to ways of minimising the harm and damage caused. Against this backdrop, the current field of crisis management emerged. For the most part, this new strand of academic activity draws on business and management studies, particularly on public relations, emergency planning, risk management, safety and political science. Revisiting the development of scholarly works on CM, two distinct approaches can be identified: tactical and strategic approaches. During the 1980s, CM practitioners largely sought to offer tactical advice in the form of specific plans and checklists. Then, in the 1990s, CM scholars began to place more emphasis on strategic issues, highlighting the effects of contingency and uncertainty and the possibility of compound outcomes (Gilpin and Murphy, 2008). These approaches are discussed in turn, in greater detail, in the following subsections.

### **2-3-2-1 The tactical approach**

As noted above, the early studies in CM were largely in response to a series of man-made crises. Most scholars trace the origin of CM to the Tylenol case, in which the Johnson & Johnson Company was able to launch a public relations programme in order to save its

reputation after seven people had died on suspicion of poisoning by their product (Fearn-Banks, 2007; Mitroff & Anagnos, 2001; Murray & Shohen, 1992). Despite Johnson & Johnson's success, the company had lacked a specific crisis plan before the incident. The subsequent academic studies paid specific attention to the need for comprehensive planning. Several initial works (Brewton, 1987; Ramée, 1987; Smith, 1979) focused largely on the crisis communication plan, or crisis management plan. In response to strong public concern as to crises, these works emphasized the communication aspects of planning, such as information distribution, media relations and the necessity of developing meticulous press releases, collecting media contact lists and training spokespersons as integral components of CM efforts (Fugel, 1996; Hearit, 1994; Murray & Shohen, 1992; Shell, 1993; Spencer, 1989).

One of the most significant contributions to this approach is that of Turner (1976; 1978), who argues that organizations can 'incubate' the potential for crisis as a function of relatively routine management processes. Turner identifies a series of factors shaping the precautionary norms that an organization seeks to put into place to control its activities. These norms and assumptions may well lead to a gap between the task demands generated by a crisis and the controls that are in place. It is this gap between assumptions and controls, and what can be described as 'emergent' properties within a crisis, which generate the potential for crisis incubation. Turner highlights the strategic nature of crisis and points to the manner in which decisions taken elsewhere within the organization can help to shape the emergence of a crisis. He was also amongst the first to recognize the importance of organizational learning within crisis management. His contribution to the crisis literature has influenced a significant amount of subsequent research in the field, which divides crisis management strategies into different phases or stages, creating what have since become known as 'staged' crisis management models.




Inspired by Turner, Fink (1986) developed a four-stage model, adopting a medical illness metaphor to set out four phases in the crisis lifecycle: (1) prodromal: the initial signs of crisis begin to emerge; (2) crisis breakout or acute: a triggering event occurs, along with the attendant damage; (3) chronic: the effects of the crisis linger as efforts to clean up the crisis progress; (4) resolution: there is some clear signal that the crisis is no longer a concern to stakeholders—it is over. Fink's approach was one of the first to treat a crisis as an extended event. Of particular importance to his model is that warning signs precede the trigger event. The duty of crisis managers goes beyond traditional tasks and becomes more proactive when they come across such signs. Therefore, well-prepared crisis managers do not just enact a crisis management plan when a crisis hits (being reactive); they are also involved in identifying and resolving situations that could become or lead to a crisis (being proactive). In addition, Fink (1986) divides the crisis event into three stages. A crisis does not just happen, it evolves. It begins with a trigger event (acute phase), moves to extended efforts to deal with the crisis (chronic phase) and concludes with a clear ending (resolution). The different stages of the crisis lifecycle require different actions from the crisis manager. Thus, crisis management is enacted in stages and is not a single simple action.

### **2-3-2-2 The strategic approach**

Although the early explanations of staged crisis management models made a great contribution to the development of the CM field, they can be faulted in that they tend to view the lifetime of each crisis as linear and finite, so that with the post-crisis stage, the CM function ends (Fink, 1986). Recognising this shortcoming, subsequent scholarly works in CM shifted their attention to a continuous, cyclical approach to crisis. Particularly since the early 1990s, CM scholars began to consider the crisis plan alone as inadequate to ensure a company's reputational and tangible assets. Rather, they emphasized a strategic approach which views CM as a cyclical process where each cycle starts and terminates with the default

stage of intelligence collecting and monitoring, or what Mitroff et al (1996) and Coombs (2007) call “signal detection”, intended to discover probable crises at an early stage by means of careful internal and external monitoring. This approach also takes into consideration the post-crisis stage, focusing on post hoc evaluation to spell out the lessons learned and incorporate them into the plan for future use (Fishman, 1999; O’Rourke, 1996; Smallman & Weir, 1999).

In a broader sense, this new trend in crisis management can be seen to represent a more strategic approach than the tactics-driven one of the 1970s and 1980s. For example, Pauchant and Mitroff (1992) divide CM into five phases, as illustrated in Figure 2.6: (1) signal detection, where new crisis warning signs should be identified and acted upon to prevent a crisis; (2) probing and prevention, when organization members search for known crisis risk factors and work to reduce their potential for harm; (3) damage containment, where a crisis hits and organization members try to prevent the damage from spreading into uncontaminated parts of the organization or its environment; (4) recovery, as members of the organization work to return to normal business operations as soon as possible; and (5) learning, when members review and critique their crisis management efforts, thereby adding to the organization’s memory.



**Figure 2.6: Sequential representation of the stages of crisis management**

Source: Adapted from Pauchant and Mitroff (1992: 13)

While the similarities between the Fink (1986) and Pauchant and Mitroff (1992) approaches are apparent, the differences are strong. Pauchant and Mitroff's stages reflect Fink's crisis lifecycle to a large degree. Signal detection and probing can be seen as part of the prodromal phase; the difference is the degree to which Pauchant and Mitroff's model emphasizes detection and prevention. While Fink's model implies that crises can be prevented, the Pauchant and Mitroff model actively identifies them, seeking to prevent them. There is a strong correspondence between the damage containment and crisis breakout stages and between the recovery and abatement stages. Both damage containment and crisis breakout focus on the trigger event, when the crisis hits; however, Pauchant and Mitroff's (1992) model places greater emphasis on limiting the effects of the crisis. Augustine (1995) and Ammerman (1995, in Barton, 1995) both highlight the need to limit the spread of a crisis to healthy parts of the organization. The recovery and chronic stages reflect the natural need to

restore normal operations. In fact, one measure of the success of crisis management is the speed with which normal operations are restored (Pauchant and Mitroff, 1992). Pauchant and Mitroff's model emphasizes how the crisis management team can facilitate recovery, while Fink's (1986) model simply documents the assumption that organizations can recover at varying speeds.

The essential difference between the Fink (1986) and Pauchant and Mitroff (1992) models is revealed by comparing the final phases: Pauchant and Mitroff's is active and stresses what crisis managers should do at each phase, whereas Fink's is more descriptive and stresses the characteristics of each phase. This is not to say that Fink does not offer recommendations to crisis managers. Rather, the Pauchant and Mitroff model is more prescriptive than Fink's. Fink is concerned with mapping how crises progress, Pauchant and Mitroff with how crisis management efforts progress. Early models tended to be descriptive, so this essential difference is not unexpected.

Reviewing the above literature, it is evident that although more recent contributions to CM have proposed a proactive and strategic approach, the methods are still largely prescriptive in nature and inadequate in terms of the implications for different contexts. Indeed, their main weakness is that they ignore the idiosyncratic character of individual destinations (Carlsen and Liburd, 2008) and different types of crisis. By and large, CM traditionally focused on plans and procedures rather than the adaptive capabilities of the organisation adopting them in accordance with the peculiarities of context and the nature of each crisis (Robert & Lajtha, 2001). These shortcomings call for a reorientation of crisis management and in response, more recent CM studies have begun to focus on the interaction between stakeholders within and outside organizations, on cultural determinants that affect CM and on the specific requirements of each crisis (Gilpin and Murphy, 2008). For instance, Acquier et al (2008)

have utilized the rich literature in stakeholder theories to remedy the perceived inadequacies of earlier approaches, developing an extensive discussion of the operational importance of stakeholder frameworks for crisis management. Schmidt and Berrell (2007) discuss how national and organizational factors influence the way CM is undertaken in non-Western contexts. These new strands of empirical study and their theoretical underpinnings are discussed in greater detail in the subsequent sections of this chapter.

### **2-3-3 Crisis management in tourism**

In spite of increasing concerns about tourism crises, as noted earlier, there are still few works on crisis management specifically in the field of tourism. In fact, prior to 2000, the studies tended to consider particular events or issues, such as the impact of crises on specific sectors of the tourism industry, including hotels, restaurants, tourism agencies and most importantly, airline companies. As Steene (1999: 15) observes, “Very little has been done when it comes to concrete research and publications concerning risks within the service sector in general and tourism and travel in particular”. To capture this literature scarcity, Ritchie (2004: 680) notes that

a small but growing body of research on crisis and disaster management has been conducted in the tourism industry. This may be due, in part, to the chaotic and complex nature of these incidents and an inability by some managers and researchers to understand such phenomena.

It was not until the early 2000s that scholars began to consider specifically the issue of crisis management in the tourism industry. This section seeks to review this scant literature. It begins by offering a typology of tourism crises, then reviews the application of CM in tourism studies. Given that the main issue of this research is the management of terrorism crises in tourism, the main focus of the section is to shed further light on studies concerning security and terrorism crises in the tourism industry.

### **2-3-3-1 A typology of tourism crises**

As with the mainstream CM literature, the initial concern of the scholars whose work is reviewed here was the nature of crises in the tourism industry, therefore they sought to define and classify tourism crises. Faulkner (2001: 136), for instance, notes that crises or disasters can be defined as “sudden challenges which might test the organization’s ability to cope”. Faulkner (2001: 138) reviews the work of a number of authors and points out that the key elements of crisis situations are:

- a triggering event, which is so significant that it challenges the existing structure, routine operations or survival of the organization,
- high threat, short decision time and an element of surprise and urgency,
- a perception of an inability to cope among those directly affected,
- a turning point, when decisive change, which may have both positive and negative connotations, is imminent,
- characterised by ‘fluid, unstable, dynamic’ situations.

The decisive innovation made by Faulkner (2001) is the distinction between a crisis and disaster: as explained in section 2-3-1 above, a crisis results from organizational malfunction or inability to respond, whereas a disaster is an abrupt event that takes the organization by surprise. Following the mainstream literature, Faulkner begins by discussing the classification and analysis of crises. As he notes, crises range from slight issues such as staff illness through to natural disasters (e.g. floods), terrorist incidents and those causing severe disruption to business and everyday activities.

Fuchs and Pizam (2011) offer a very straightforward alternative classification and definition of tourism crises, which they divide into security and safety incidents. Security incidents are defined as those crises where “tourists suffer harm as a result of deliberate actions of others”, while safety incidents are conceptualized as those in which “tourists are injured accidentally

and without malice aforethought” (pp. 300-301). According to them, four generators of security accidents are crime, terrorism, war and civil/political unrest. They also group safety incidents into four clusters, namely: (i) destination management-related incidents, which range from incidents such as problems caused by infrastructure (e.g. poor sanitation), safety measures in tourism establishments (e.g. fire. construction errors) and traffic accidents to infectious diseases; (ii) nature-related incidents such as detrimental change in weather conditions; (iii) incidents related to tourists practising hazardous sports and leisure activities such as skiing and diving, plus accidental falls, cuts and burns; and (iv) natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods, hurricanes and volcanic eruptions. They argue that nature-related incidents or natural disasters are difficult to prevent, while other incidents can be avoided or mitigated (ibid: 301-303).

### **2-3-3-2 The development of crisis management studies in tourism**

Again in line with early CM scholarship, the majority of CM studies set in the tourism industry were initially context-based and prescriptive, thus less likely to generate models and theories. For instance, scholars such as Ketelhohn (1989), Murphy and Bayley (1989), Cohn (2000), Beirman (2003), Glaesser (2003) and Lynch (2004) have set forth guidelines, case studies and a practical manual for crisis management in the tourism industry. Such studies often focus on the role that communication and information management can play in recovery after a crisis has occurred. In addition, they have favoured reactive crisis management as opposed to proactive planning. To be sure, literature that considers the issue systematically and holistically has until recently been scarce. Impressed by the development of mainstream CM literature, however, during the 2000s some scholars began to incorporate the holistic and strategic approaches taken in CM into tourism research. Thus, Faulkner and Russell (2000) suggest a systems approach to the analysis of the topic and have applied chaos theory to the study of disasters. They maintain that the classic Newtonian, positivist

methodology of tourism research is more appropriate to unchanging systems than to the dynamic nature of change caused by tourism crises. They argue that to understand such a turbulent context for tourism practitioners, a more multifaceted and holistic research paradigm is required to appreciate the both the immediate and follow-on effects of crises.

Since the above study, some authors (Faulkner, 2001; Santana, 2003; Ritchie, 2004; Evans and Elphick, 2005) have taken a strategic approach to tourism crisis management, offering a comprehensive framework to understand and respond to crises in a structured and ordered way. Faulkner (2001: 146) reminds readers of the need to create a rigorous framework “to structure the cumulative development of knowledge about the impacts of, and effective responses to, tourism disasters”. Similarly, Ritchie (2004: 12) stresses the need for “proactive planning, effective implementation of strategies as well as the monitoring and evaluation of outcomes”. In this context, Faulkner (2001) offers a proactive and strategic approach to crisis management, the so-called Tourism Disaster Management Framework, which appears to be applicable to diverse contexts. Ritchie (2004) later refined and improved this model. Due to their importance, these two approaches will now be reviewed in more detail.

Faulkner (2001) brought together many previous contributions to the field to develop a strategic and holistic model, which was further refined by Faulkner and Vikulov (2001) and applied to many cases of tourism crisis. The model incorporates insights derived from the general analysis of disaster and crisis management strategies and from the more specific examination of tourism disaster strategies, to produce the first tourism-specific disaster management framework, which is applicable with minor modifications to diverse cases. Specifically, this model combines risk assessment and disaster contingency plans as principal elements of disaster management strategies, while recognizing specific components that have to do with each stage of the crisis lifecycle.



In short, Faulkner's comprehensive framework consists of five phases in the disaster process: pre-event, prodromal (disaster imminent), emergency, intermediate and long-term recovery. Each is associated with elements of the disaster management response (precursors, mobilization, action, recovery, reconstruction, reassessment and review) and with the main ingredients of disaster management strategies (risk assessment and disaster contingency plans). For instance, in the pre-event phase, contingency plans are designed and possible assessments are undertaken. At this stage it is possible to mitigate or prevent a disaster before it reaches the prodromal phase, when there is little chance of preventing the crisis and all that can be done is to put into action the contingency plans developed earlier. In the emergency phase the disaster's effects are felt by stakeholders and priority is given to those actions that help protect tourists and property in tourism destinations. The most urgent needs of tourists, including rescue and health treatment, should be dealt with by the appropriate stakeholders in the intermediate phase, during which the role of the media communication strategy is also crucial. In the recovery phase a longer-term approach is needed to reconstruct the affected areas and damaged infrastructure in order to return the situation to normal. Finally, in the resolution phase, what has been done during the crisis is evaluated and the shortcomings addressed in order to ensure future improvement.

Faulkner's model is assumed to be applicable to other businesses. However, it can be criticized on the ground that, in reality, events do not always proceed in such a consistent sequence and that this leaves too little time to prepare well to deal with the crisis. Nonetheless, Faulkner sets out a suitable framework for analysing complex crisis management strategies to combat natural and man-made crises in the tourism sector. Miller and Ritchie (2003) applied this framework to the 2001 foot-and-mouth outbreak in the UK. Their findings indicate that although the framework can be applied holistically to special cases, it hardly enables tourism stakeholders to affect the course of crises significantly.

However, they point out that this ineffectiveness is due to the nature of the outbreak as a farming crisis and its “ripple effect” on the tourism industry (Miller and Ritchie, 2003: 169). In short, many of the crisis management phases are incorporated into Faulkner’s (2001) framework for tourism disaster management and make it a revolutionary model, since it was developed specifically for crisis management in the tourism industry.

Ritchie (2004) has distilled Faulkner’s model in an attempt to produce a comprehensive model of a strategic approach to crisis and disaster management in public and private sector organizations. Ritchie (2004) proceeds to outline a strategic framework within which to manage tourism crises in a predictable way. He argues that developing an organizational strategy could help destinations to limit the severity of change induced by crises or disasters. Strategic planning is usually concerned with four main elements: strategic analysis, strategic direction and choice, strategy implementation and control, and strategic evaluation and feedback. The classification also recognises three stages, which are prevention and planning (proactive planning and strategy formulation, scanning to planning); strategic implementation (strategic evaluation and strategic control, crisis communication and control, resource management, understanding and collaborating with stakeholders) and resolution, evaluation and feedback (resolution and normality, organization learning and feedback).

Mistilis and Sheldon (2006) enrich this approach by utilising a knowledge framework to examine how different sorts of knowledge and information can be applied to cope with tourism crises. They highlight the importance of the continuous recognition, processing and sharing of strategies and knowledge by stakeholders in the tourism industry. Given this reality, it is plausible to argue that the development of literature on CM in tourism studies has kept pace with the equivalent development in broader CM studies. The next subsection discusses the degree to which these studies address the particularities of terrorism and security crises in the broader sense. Thus, the chapter continues its examination of theorising

related to tourism crisis management and seeks to set forth a rigorous theoretical framework for CM in the tourism industry.

### **2-3-4 Strategies for the management of security crises in tourism**

In line with their proposals for a more proactive and strategic approach (Faulkner, 2001; Ritchie, 2004) to crisis management in the tourism industry, scholars began paying further attention to the specific requirements of different tourism crises. The security crises initially attracted less attention than safety crises, but in the mid-1980s, terror attacks on tourist destinations in Western Europe and some Middle Eastern countries triggered interest in putting the issue of security on the research agenda. This trend was intensified by the consequences for global tourism of the 1991 Gulf War. In 1995 an international conference on tourism, safety and security was held in Östersund, Sweden, where academics discussed for the first time the relationships between tourism, security and safety. The issue has also been a central concern of international organizations such as the World Tourism Organization (UNWTO). The first guidebook on how to deal with the safety and security challenges to tourism destinations was published by UNWTO in 1996; however, it failed to make a clear distinction between security and safety crises (UNWTO, 1997). The first effort to put both theoretical and practical characteristics of security crises at the forefront of academic literature was made by Mansfield and Pizam (1996), who, as editors of *Tourism, Crime and International Security Issues*, concluded that a comprehensive crisis management approach was required for the successful management of security incidents in tourism destinations. This and other studies (e.g. Pizam, 1999; Mansfield and Pizam, 2006; Fuchs and Pizam, 2011) argue that despite several commonalities, there are distinctive differences among the strategies adopted to manage safety and security crises in tourism. In particular, they maintain

that in the earlier stages of crisis management, the strategies developed for tourism security crises differ substantially from those applied in safety crises.

Mansfield and Pizam (2006) identify several strategies specific to tourism security incidents at different stages of crisis management, listed in Table 2.3.

**Table 2.3: Effective strategies as to stakeholders' reactions to security incidents in tourism (Simplified and Classified)**

<b>Preventive strategies</b>
<u>Strategies specific to the security sector</u> Housing tourists in gated all-inclusive resorts to separate them from local residents Maintaining many visible security measures Increasing the presence of uniformed officers in tourist zones Training police officers in tourism issues Making police visible, accessible and friendly to tourists Working closely with the community and tourism industry representatives Advising and training tourism industry employees in crime prevention techniques Assisting the tourism industry by conducting background checks on employees Encouraging tourism enterprises to adopt crime prevention/reduction practices (installation of electronic room locks, surveillance cameras, room safety deposit boxes, employing full-time security officers, etc.) Establishing a partnership between law enforcement agencies, tourism enterprises, the community at large and the tourists themselves.
<u>Strategies specific to government</u> Formulating regulations that impose serious legal consequences and penalties for crimes against tourists Introducing social changes and reducing social gaps by creating local jobs in the tourism industry
<u>Strategies specific to the private sector</u> Incorporating the principles of crime prevention through environmental design Considering the function of security important to the success of their business Allocating a significant portion of their financial and human resources to security Using crime prevention/reduction methods, such as security hardware and security policies
<u>Strategies specific to tourists</u> Making tourists aware of the possibility of becoming victimized by criminals and instructing them in crime prevention methods Developing and implementing tourist education programmes aimed at reducing the risk of being victimized
<u>Strategies specific to local citizens</u> Offering rewards for information leading to the arrest and conviction of those who commit serious crimes against tourists Educating citizens on the serious impact that crime against tourists can have on their communities Engaging citizens in neighbourhood watch schemes Establishing a partnership between local community leaders and national and local governments

### **Recovery strategies**

#### Information dissemination

Establishing a mechanism for sharing information and coordination of publicity and PR activities aimed at creating positive public opinion among the media, local community and customers

#### Reassurance campaigns

Undertaking intensive marketing campaigns to convince the general public that things are back to normal

Encouraging area residents within a short drive of the affected destination to visit their region or hometown by appealing to their sense of local patriotism

#### Marketing schemes

Appealing to domestic tourists

Identifying and developing new market segments abroad

Scheduling of special events to attract local residents and out-of-town tourists

Reducing prices and offering a variety of incentives (e.g. package deals)

Undertaking comprehensive marketing campaigns initiated by Ministry of Tourism in cooperation with other NGOs and governmental agencies

#### Financial measures

Offering financial assistance (grants, tax holidays, subsidized loans, etc.) from local, state and/or national governments

Providing governmental grants for financing the promotion of their destination

Reducing operational costs by laying off a proportion of their employees

Postponing major expenditure on maintenance and renovation

Source: Mansfield and Pizam (2006: 19)

The extensive list of strategies in Table 2.3 can be divided into two categories, in line with crisis stages: prevention and recovery strategies. The former can in turn be categorised under five broad headings: (i) strategies specific to government, including conventional punishment, such as the formulation of laws that impose serious legal penalties for crimes against tourists, and public protection, such as introducing social changes and reducing social gaps by creating local jobs in the tourism industry; (ii) strategies specific to the security sector, such the establishment of distinct police units that are trained to support and watch over tourists and the tourism industry; (iii) strategies specific to the private sector, including the enhancement of private sector security initiatives such as training staff members in security issues, improving security devices (secure locks, CCTV) and incorporating the principles of crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED); (iv) strategies specific to tourists, including advising and educating them by offering security awareness

brochures or by providing instructions that direct them to safe pathways; and (v) strategies specific to local citizens, such as raising their awareness by informing them of the serious harm done to the community by violent acts against tourists, and soliciting their help in reporting suspected cases to the police (Pizam, 1999; Mansfield and Pizam, 2006).

Four categories are also identifiable regarding recovery strategies: information dissemination, reassurance campaigns, marketing schemes and financial assistance programmes. Information dissemination includes acknowledgement by the government that problems exist and a commitment to resolve them quickly. The authorities should report on a regular basis to the media, tourism industry in the country and tourism generating markets abroad, reassuring all stakeholders that the destination is back to normality. They should also establish a mechanism consisting of coordinated public relations activities adopted to generate positive public opinion and reassure people that things are back to normal (Pizam, 1999; Mansfield and Pizam, 2006; Rittichainuwat and Chakraborty, 2009). Marketing schemes are those initiatives that seek to encourage new and former customers to travel to crisis-affected destinations by offering extra benefits in the competitive market, ranging from reduction of prices and sales promotion to packaging (i.e. all-inclusive vacations) and product repositioning (Pizam, 1999; Mansfield and Pizam; Rittichainuwat and Chakraborty 2009). A promising marketing scheme which can contribute to the recovery of a destination is the identification and development of new market segments such as domestic tourists, who can be encouraged to travel by cutting prices, arranging special events and soliciting their sense of patriotism (Mansfield and Pizam, 2006; Paraskevas and Arendell, 2007). Finally, recovery measures often come at a price and thus their success depends heavily on the availability of adequate finance from local and national governments (Mansfield and Pizam, 2006).

Apart from the above studies, which largely seek to identify and list specific strategies, some scholars have taken the initial steps towards formulating a tourism security theory by offering a typology, concepts, propositions and empirical generalizations that are broadly applicable to security incidents in the industry (Mansfield and Pizam, 2006; Paraskevas and Arendell, 2007). While this initiative should be welcomed and utilized by those who adopt a positivist research methodology, it is nonetheless evident that a general set of theories on this issue is problematic, largely because security crises such as terrorism are geographically, demographically and temporally discrete, which considerably blurs the boundaries of study. For example, the September 2001 terrorist attacks undoubtedly provoked a global crisis, with consequences for all sectors of national economies, including tourism. The array of research methods and approaches for understanding the impacts of this event would be very different from those needed to research the impacts of terrorism attacks on tourism sites in Egypt, for instance. As such, there is always a need to modify the boundaries of the framework to suit the event being researched. Indeed, regardless of several commonalities, the effects of security incidents in the tourism industry certainly vary for discrete locations, types and magnitudes of crises. Mansfield and Pizam (2006) themselves indicate that their work is not definitive, because these building blocks will require refinement once the proposed generalizations are confirmed or refuted by further case studies. Indeed, what Mansfield and Pizam (2006: 12) seek to achieve is merely to take the initial steps towards what they call “the paradigmatic basis for a confirmed tourism security theory”.

### **2-3-5 The management of terrorism crises in tourism**

Given that terrorism is one sort of security crisis, broader research into managing security crises in tourism can provide a foundation for the management of terrorism crises more particularly, but the latter must differ from the former in at least some salient respects.

Reviewing the existing literature, it appears that few studies which specifically consider terrorism crises in the tourism industry have yet been conducted. This is partly because the issue of the security concerns related to terrorism make the authorities reluctant to involve the traditional tourism stakeholders, especially before and during any terrorism crisis. This amounts to a major barrier to the disclosure of information and to the development of the field of study. In spite of this obstacle, however, there exists a small but growing body of studies in this field.

Among other things, to prevent terrorist attacks on tourist destinations, political breakthroughs and international resolutions are recommended, but those concerned should bear in mind that no amount of security measures can provide certain protection from the horrors of terrorism (Pizam, 1999). Nonetheless, Pizam (2002) maintains that the tourism industry should adopt specific actions to reduce the possibility of terrorist attacks at tourism destinations and to help it to recover quickly from their negative effects. He specifically makes a number of suggestions to both private and public sector organisations. With respect to the private sector, Pizam (2002) proposes close relations between tourism employees and security officers, who should train them in security prevention and emergency operations, recommend the establishment of committees to ensure that tourism stakeholders follow security standards, and emphasise the necessity of formulating crisis plans to reduce the negative image acquired by the destination as a result of any terrorist attack. Pizam's (2002) suggestions to the public sector are to consider undertaking several activities, such as enhancing security measures on all public modes of transport and their terminals, training citizens to be aware of the possible occurrence of terrorist attacks in their communities, and setting up tourist police units to work closely with tourist stakeholders. He also recommends effective international cooperation to minimise the negative effects of terrorist attacks on tourism destinations.



Another significant study in this regard is the work of Yeoman et al (2005), who utilized a scenario planning methodology to incorporate terrorism into the context of tourism, assessing the extent to which a terrorist attack could cause disruption to Scotland and how it would connect to other mitigating factors such as economics and consumer behaviour. They predominantly focus on the role of destination management organizations in three areas: setting forth communications and contingency plans concerning terrorist events, outlining the marketing strategies to deal with consumers' risk-averse behaviour, and designing and practising a number of simulated exercises to construct an issue-reaction model. Yeoman et al (2005) tested four different scenarios and ultimately make several recommendations for amendments to Visit Scotland policies. Without denying the merits of this model, it should be noted that it adopts a reactive approach to dealing with a terrorist event.

Paraskevasa and Arendell (2007) conducted a study to examine the key role of DMOs in coordinating counter-terrorism measures within a given destination and to offer a holistic framework by which one can develop, implement and assess anti-terrorism strategies in a given destination. Their results offer useful insights into the issues and challenges that such an endeavour would face. The findings indicate that the major obstacle to be overcome is "the mentality of territorialism" among destination stakeholders and that there is a need to move to an 'interoperability' mode. Central to this framework is the flexible role of DMOs: when terrorism causes a crisis, this must change from being merely promotional and managerial to an extremely active role, taking the lead in coordinating initiatives such as the development of contingency plans depending upon collective action, mutual trust, transparent communication and pragmatic expectations. The expert insights offered by participants led the authors to develop the destination anti-terrorism strategy framework. Paraskevasa and Arendell (2007) call for the application of counter-terrorism studies to enrich the study of managing terrorism crises in tourism industry. Inspired by these studies, their framework

spells out in some detail the key components of a terrorism crisis management strategy, focusing on the development of specific measures aimed at identifying threats, securing targets, constraining terrorist access and defending the destination against attacks. In particular, they place emphasis on the centrality of specific preventive counter-terrorism strategies such as ‘exposure analysis’, aimed to assess the potential targets susceptible to terrorist attacks, and ‘impact analysis’, intended to consider the effect of attacks on possible targets. They maintain that these concepts are consistent with that of risk assessment proposed in tourism crisis management studies by Faulkner (2001). They also highlight the role of the DMO in persuading all destination stakeholders, be they private or public, to develop contingency plans before, during and after a terrorist attack, while taking a catalytic role in connecting central government to destination stakeholders, especially through the allocation of scarce resources. Yet, the issue of how DMOs can fulfil this role and the extent to which other stakeholders appear cooperative or pose obstacles to the DMO remain unanswered. In addition, considering the DMO to be the most powerful and legitimate stakeholder for fulfilling this role is unduly simplistic. Finally, they place adequate emphasis on the practice of organizational learning and feedback; this includes the constant validation of the strategy by making the best use of advanced technology, desktop exercises and simulations, as well as the documentation of best-practice crisis management strategies against terrorism attacks, based on information taken from other countries and international tourism bodies.

### **2-3-6 Summary and implications for further research**

This section has outlined recent advances in crisis management and their implications for the management of tourism crises. It was indicated that despite these advances, serious shortcomings apply to studies in this field. In particular, these studies fail to offer a

comprehensive theoretical framework capable of meeting the requirements of different contexts and to a large extent fall short of addressing adequately the peculiarities of terrorism crises. There is therefore a clear need to formulate a rigorous conceptual framework for the development of crisis management models to enable them to meet the idiosyncratic characteristics of different contexts. This represents a major gap in the current literature and the manner in which this theoretical framework is being developed is discussed in sections 2-5 and 2-7.

A key issue that has emerged from this literature review is that specific strategies and methods have been used to combat security crises in the tourism industry. It was also found that there are many commonalities among the strategies adopted to manage terrorism crises and other sorts of security incidents. In particular, in the recovery stage, the strategies used in mitigating the negative impacts of terrorism attacks bear a close resemblance to those of other sorts of tourism crises. The most significant difference lies in the importance of prevention and mitigation techniques used predominantly by security agencies, such as exposure analysis. Furthermore, these studies (e.g. Pizam, 2002) put special emphasis on the crucial role of security and police forces and how they interact with other stakeholders, especially their cooperation with DMOs. The role of the security sector has been discussed in greater detail in a related field, namely counter-terrorism studies. Therefore, the next section offers an overview of counter-terrorism studies and discusses the value that they can add to this research.

## **2-4 Terrorism and counter-terrorism**

Given that the terrorism issue constitutes an integral part of this thesis, it is imperative to review the related literature in the field of terrorism studies. In recent years, the academic world has produced a plethora of such literature (Ganor, 2009), amongst which the most

relevant to this research are those studies that have to do with counter-terrorism strategies. Yet before proceeding with a discussion of counter-terrorism strategies, this section first seeks to set the scene by offering some definitions of terrorism. It then reviews at some length the strategies and methods used in counter-terrorism efforts. Next, it considers agencies and people responsible for combating terrorism and the issue of interagency cooperation in counter-terrorism work as an integral and essential element of such efforts.

### **2-4-1 Terrorism defined**

Despite the frequency of terrorist attacks throughout the world today, there has been little consensus among scholars on the concept of terrorism itself. LaFree and Dugan (2009) attribute the difficulty in reaching agreement on a definition of terrorism to its controversial and extremely politicized nature. They maintain that the USA was unwilling to consider the attacks by Contra insurgents in Nicaragua as terrorism, while regarding nearly all violence in Iraq and Afghanistan as such. More than two decades ago, Schmid and Jongman (1998) had already enumerated 109 definitions of terrorism suggested by scholars in the field. Some scholars argue that it is impossible to find, or even pointless to seek, an internationally agreed definition of terrorism. Those who adopt this view often refer to the cliché “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” to demonstrate how subjective is the definition of terrorism. Others maintain that terrorism and national liberation can be placed at the two extremes of a continuum legitimizing the use of violence. Those struggles alleged to seek national liberation are placed at the positive and justified end of the violence continuum, while terrorism is at its unjust and negative extreme.

In defining terrorism it is also important to make a distinction between terrorist acts and other, non-political criminal activity. One such distinction is to view terrorist actions as acts of war, so that the countermeasures mounted against it would be conducted in accordance

with the norms and laws of war rather than criminal legal norms. Wedgwood and Roth (2004) argue that the criminal law may be inadequately powerful to counter terrorism, since destroying terrorist infrastructure and networks requires a combination of diplomacy, the use of force and the criminal law. They add that the restrictions associated with a criminal justice system are applicable to civil society, where its integral element is deterrence, but this may not be suitable in a fight against a highly networked terrorist organization. Hoffman (2006) points to a fundamental difference between a criminal and a terrorist, maintaining that the former seeks personal material goals, while a terrorist usually views himself as an altruist struggling for and on behalf of many others. Therefore, a terrorist would pose a greater threat through his actions, since he is significantly more prepared than a criminal to sacrifice his personal interests and safety to accomplish his goals. Tarlow (2001) argues that dealing with criminal acts requires a well trained police force, while terrorism is more warlike in nature and cannot be addressed by police actions alone. Rather, it needs cooperation among many stakeholders. In addition, the goals of terrorists are to gain publicity and cause massive economic damage through victimization, causing loss of life.

Since the extent to which terrorism challenges governments and threatens civilian populations varies considerably, it is possible to constitute a typology based on which one can compare different types of terrorism. One approach is to differentiate between domestic terrorism, restricted to the territory of one country, and international terrorism, which affects the citizens of more than one country. However, this distinction proves to be confusing in practice, as most terrorist groups have links to people abroad (Chalk, 1996). A more elaborate typology categorizes groups in terms of their primary motivations. Based upon such criteria, Peters (2002) places terrorists in two broad categories: practical and apocalyptic. The demands of practical terrorists are restricted to changing a state and its society without destruction of the whole society; what its followers have in mind is to eradicate what they see

as a political evil. A prime example is anti-abortion terrorism in the United States. Apocalyptic terrorists are very different: their ultimate goal is to destroy completely the current system and build an entirely new order.

Notwithstanding the definitional difficulties and differences already alluded to, it is evident that the effectiveness of apparatuses in charge of countering the terrorist threat is dependent upon a clear, broad and objective definition of terrorism that can be accepted internationally. Descriptions of typical terrorist acts and their common features are often included in proposed definitions of terrorism—particularly in those that address the fear and anxiety created by terrorist operation. In such definitions, terrorism is depicted as a form of violent activity that intends to terrify a group of people beyond the immediate victims (Horgan, 2005: 1). Revisiting the evolution of the definition of terrorism and examining a wide array of definitions, Hoffman (2006: 40) reaches the following conclusion:

We may therefore now attempt to define terrorism as the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change... [T]errorism is specifically designed to have far-reaching psychological effects beyond the immediate victim(s) or object of the terrorist attack... .

Based on this definition, if an act is not violent, does not deliberately target civilians, or does not attempt to achieve a political goal, then it is not a terrorist attack. Adding the element of fear and anxiety to the definition significantly changes the term's application. If an attack which would otherwise be considered an act of terrorism does not aim to frighten, but rather seeks to achieve only concrete, tangible objectives—such as the release of prisoners or the assassination of a leading political figure—then it will not be considered to constitute terrorism.

## **2-4-2 Combating terrorism**

Having clarified the concept of terrorism, the next fundamental question is how to combat the terrorism phenomenon. The traditional approaches to fighting terrorism were overwhelmingly militaristic, based on suppression and criminalisation (Guelke, 2006: 195). A prime example of this approach is the counter-terrorism strategies developed in the 1970s and 1980s and applied in Northern Ireland. It became evident that strategies based on such traditions risked escalating the terrorism that they sought to suppress (Horgan, 2005), resulting in long-term adverse consequences for police-community relations (Pickering et al, 2008). The contemporary work of leading scholars offers two alternative frameworks through which current challenges to counter-terrorism strategies and community engagement can be understood. The best known new approach is the community intelligence model of counter-terrorism, which has been very popular in Europe and North America. Increasingly encouraged by the work of Innes (2004; 2006) and Skogan (1990), this approach gives priority to the importance of community-police interaction to meet police requirements. Another recent approach, called ‘enhanced belonging’, has emerged from the application of Loader’s (2006) writing on increasing a sense of political community through an explicitly rights-based approach to democratic policing, which seeks to overcome the undesirable consequences of police-community contact, specifically to avoid the dominance of police-community interactions by the most vocal and robust members of society. Pickering et al (2008) argue that a combination of the elements of the enhanced belonging and community intelligence models would help counter-terrorism agencies and authorities to build trust and legitimacy between the community and themselves. The bottom line of these new approaches is the continued and effective interaction and involvement of security agencies with as many stakeholders as possible, especially within the local community.

Coupled with these approaches, which provide a general basis for making sense of counter-terrorism strategies, the literature identifies a number of specific methods and techniques which governments across the world have used to combat terrorism. These consist of a mix of public and foreign policies formulated to constrain acts of terrorism and to protect the public at large from terrorist attacks (Omelycheva, 2007). A number of lists and classifications of such policies have been proposed by various practitioners and academic scholars (van Dongena, 2010). The taxonomy proposed by the European Council to determine such policies within the EU (EU, 2008) is of special importance because it covers a wide array of counter-terrorism policy choices, as well as offering a clear-cut understanding of such policies and their goals. Based upon the European Council framework, four main sub-categories are identified: protection, prevention, response and pursuit policies (EU, 2008). This framework will be used to discuss counter-terrorism methods here.

Protection policies are those intended to protect citizens (EU, 2008). Examples are those policies that enhance border security, related infrastructure and the intelligence apparatus to ensure security and—in case of a terrorist plan—the reinforced system to identify and mitigate the threat. It is argued that terrorists are adaptable to the different obstacles they face and can either change their targets or alter their tactics altogether. For example, a strengthening of security measures by installing more sophisticated airport security apparatus (e.g. metal detectors and x-ray scanners) was recently circumvented in the attempted 2009 Christmas Day attack, where a man boarded Northwest Flight 253 headed for Detroit and attempted to set off plastic explosives sewn into his underwear. Thus, a protection-oriented policy, by itself, cannot necessarily eradicate the terrorist threat.

Prevention refers to a strategy whereby states take measures to prevent vulnerable groups from resorting to terrorism (EU, 2008). This can be as simple as providing alternative options for would-be terrorists such as jobs in a security force. Ideally, the terrorist socialization



process is not abrupt but incremental, so combating the ideology via contact with youths potentially at risk will reduce the terrorists' support base (Nacos et al, 2010).

Response policies are those aimed at addressing the aftermath or immediate consequences of a terrorist attack in order to restore order in the midst of such chaos and to quell the fear instilled in the civilian population. Examples of this group of policies would be the deployment of damage control teams and working with the media to counter terrorist publicity. These measures do not directly reduce or deter the terrorists' activities, but send a message to them that they come at a cost (Pape, 2003).

The final significant category of counter-terrorist policy that contributes considerably to reducing terrorism attacks is pursuit. These policies are predominantly aimed at pursuing terrorist groups and disrupting financial and human networks (EU, 2008). This is the most crucial policy area, undertaken by law enforcement and other security agencies with the cooperation of intelligence networks (Nacos et al, 2010).

#### **2-4-2-1 Agencies and people responsible for combating terrorism**

Whatever policies are adopted and irrespective of their categorisation, a significant question is who has responsibility for counter-terrorism. In particular, is counter-terrorism allotted to specialised agencies or to the police? How are such bodies organized to carry it out? Is it assigned to a special unit or carried out by all staff, along with their other tasks? Most countries have specialized agencies entirely separate from the police that engage in counter-terrorism abroad. Such agencies rarely have exclusive authority for intelligence gathering abroad, but are supported by the military as well as other civil agencies such as embassies. Some of these specialized foreign intelligence agencies are controlled by the military, as in Italy (SISMI) and Sweden (MUST). Although these agencies are important in counter-terrorism strategies, they are outside the scope of this study because they have little to do

with the tourism industry. The most relevant ones for the purpose of this study are those which fall within the responsibility of the police. Bayley and Weisburd (2009) reviewed national models of counter-terrorism in several countries and note that the responsibility for counter-terrorism is distributed domestically in three ways: (1) to a national agency specializing in counter-terrorism, to one or more national police services, or to all police agencies at any governmental level.

Each of the countries in their review has established an agency in charge of collecting domestic intelligence about possibly violent subversion; examples are Australia (ASIO), France (DST), Israel (Shin Bet), Japan (PSIA) and the United States (FBI). At the same time, these agencies differ in their powers to take pre-emptive action. Some do intelligence collecting only, such as the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Shin Bet and Britain's MI5 (Bayley and Weisburd, 2009: 35). They will not, then, fall within the typical definitions of a police organization, which involves the application of constraint to individuals, as in arresting. Undoubtedly, many of these services also undertake clandestine action to disrupt potentially violent subversion without invoking the power of arrest or detention. Information about these activities and their legal status is limited. A crucial topic for future research into comparative counter-terrorism is the degree of visibility required under law with respect to proactive counter-terrorism actions.

The review also states that some national counter-terrorism agencies delegate the whole of their powers to the police, who are authorized to detain, arrest and refer for prosecution, examples being India's Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), Italy's Intelligence and Democratic Security Service (SISDE), Japan's Public Security Investigation Agency (PSIA), Spain's National Intelligence Centre (CNI) and Sweden's National Security Service (SAPO). As such, it is police forces that specialize in counterespionage. Having said that, in all countries, centralized police services are responsible for counter-terrorism, with the exception

of Sweden, where it is the sole responsibility of SAPO (Bayley and Weisburd, 2009: 36). With this notable exception, the centralized counter-terrorism agencies of national governments are created within the police structure. However, their activities may be accompanied by those of specialized military counter-terrorism ‘strike forces’, such as the UK’s Special Air Service, America’s Delta Force, Canada’s Task Force 2, France’s Groupe d’intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale (GIGN), Germany’s Grenzschutzgruppe 9 (GSG-9) and Spain’s Grupo Especial de Operaciones (GEO).

All countries that have established police forces at subnational, decentralized levels authorize them to carry out counter-terrorism operations. Indeed, all subnational counter-terrorism is undertaken by the police. Thus, the police in all federal systems have counter-terrorism responsibilities. The police in centralized systems may also delegate counter-terrorism functions to subordinate levels of command for reasons of operational effectiveness. This is the case in France, Japan and Israel. The UK is a peculiar case. It does not have a federal system of government, nor does it have a national police force, but its 43 territorial police forces have a single dedicated intelligence capability (Special Branch) and, since 2004, a Counter Terrorist Security Advisor (Bayley and Weisburd, 2009: 37).

In sum, according to the research of Bayley and Weisburd (2009) in the above countries, different agencies at different levels of the state are authorized to engage in counter-terrorism strategies in all of them. These agencies, acting within and outside police organizations and their jurisdictions and responsibilities, often overlap. The resultant maze of agencies with common responsibilities raises another important question, as to how they coordinate their shared duties. This is discussed in the next subsection.

#### **2-4-2-2 The success of counter-terrorism strategies and interagency cooperation**

There is a degree of consensus among counter-terrorism scholars and practitioners that the principles which encourage interagency coordination and cooperation are an integral element of any strategy to combat terrorism (Behm and Palmer, 1991). In fact, a terrorist attack, particularly one that targets various sites, requires a prompt and coordinated response from the diverse agencies whose responsibilities are explained in the previous section. The extent of this response requires practical coordination and deliberate planning of resource allocation, communication methods, training and networking (Strom and Eyerman, 2007). In essence, coordination problems arise when agencies share identical policy responsibilities for the same set of problems (Downs, 1966). Rivalry over the control of the policy can lead to confusion among agencies and to parallel, redundant and costly systems (Peters, 1981). Besides, agencies in a shared policy environment turn into opponents once they seek finance from the same restricted sources. Where such coordination problems arise, solutions should be sought through cooperative policymaking (Downs, 1966).

Hearne et al (2004), considering the United States' counter-terrorism strategies, maintain that it is extremely difficult to achieve sustained coordination among the agencies involved. They argue that the difficulty largely lies in the fact that the agencies' jurisdictions and responsibilities overlap in several instances. They conclude that budgetary concerns and miscommunication among the responsible agencies are the main obstacle to efficient counter-terrorism strategies in the United States. Behm and Palmer (1991) suggest that there are two main performance indicators against which coordination arrangements can be assessed: streamlined organizational structures as the test for efficiency, and positive personnel attitudes as the test for effectiveness.

Strom and Eyerman (2007) examine interagency coordination, including barriers and solutions to the coordination problem in the USA, the UK, Canada and Ireland, and argue that

previous collaborative experience was a significant factor in interagency coordination. Those agencies that had been forced to work jointly in the past were proved generally better at working together, because they were fully aware of each other's roles. The authors also identify other factors affecting interagency coordination. They stress, for example, that a lack of clarity as to the chain of command is a major obstacle to coordination as it creates confusion regarding who is in charge. Interestingly, they argue that limited budgets, although burdensome, appear to enhance coordination, because the circumstances push agencies to get together to deal with problems. They also found that the size of a country or jurisdiction shaped the coordination which was practised. In their sample, Ireland, the UK and Canada all enjoyed the advantage of a small number of agencies requiring coordination; in contrast, the USA had to coordinate not only across the responsible agencies, but also at federal, state and local levels. They finally recommend that the most inexpensive and readily available solution to the coordination problem is to involve as many responsible agencies as possible in joint discussions. The authors believe that this process could be smoothed by creating a standing committee that regularly holds meetings to address topics relevant to preparedness for and response to terrorism attacks.

In a similar vein, Chandler (2005) argues that to combat transnational terrorism nothing is more crucial than good interagency cooperation and coordination, which in turn depends on the timely and precise sharing of intelligence and information, therefore on a reliable means of communication. However, he contends that joint activities, which bring all the diverse agencies together under one roof, need sufficient human and technical resources, which many countries have difficulty in providing. He finally suggests that the exchange of liaison officers between agencies can provide a relatively cost-effective choice from which both sides benefit.

### **2-4-3 Summary and implications for further research**

In light of the above discussion, it can be concluded that a variety of methods and strategies are at the disposal of governments to combat terrorism. These range from protection by focusing on security measures and instruments, via preventive general policies such as reducing poverty, to responding by taking emergency action in the midst of chaos and to the pursuit, arrest and prosecution of terrorists. Overall, this section has shed light on the specific strategies which are appropriate to combating terrorism crises. Although these strategies overlap in many ways with those proposed by CM scholars, there are some significant differences between these two types. The most obvious differences are identifiable in prevention and pursuit policies. It is also notable that the success or failure of counter-terrorism strategies depends largely on the way states have structured and organised their various agencies to combat terrorism and the extent to which they involve a wide array of stakeholders in their efforts. Indeed, the issue of deciding counter-terrorism strategies has much to do with stakeholders' interaction and their importance in organizational and management studies. The relevance of this assertion is highlighted in the next section, where stakeholder theory is examined and applied to terrorism and tourism studies.

### **2-5 The application of stakeholder theory to the study**

It has been shown that the most significant challenge faced by CM models in tourism studies is the lack of a rigorous theoretical framework that allows them to meet the requirements of application to different contexts (section 2-3-6). Some scholars have suggested that applying stakeholder theory to these models would contribute to narrowing this gap. This section seeks to lay such a theoretical foundation by drawing on stakeholder theories for the management of crises in the tourism industry. It is organized as follows. It begins with a definition of terms and a brief discussion of the evolution of stakeholder theory, before raising the debate

as to types of stakeholder theory based on the taxonomy proposed by Donaldson and Preston (1995), which identifies normative, instrumental and descriptive theories. It then discusses the applicability of stakeholder theories to the public sphere and particularly to tourism destinations. The rest of the section is devoted to the building blocks of the conceptual framework for the present research, including the identification and salience of stakeholders and the strategy of stakeholder management. Once the theoretical issues have been debated, their application to tourism and crisis management studies is considered.

### **2-5-1 Stakeholders defined**

The origin of the term ‘stakeholder’ in management literature is traceable to an internal memo published by the Stanford Research Institute in 1963 (Freeman, 1984). Some authors trace the principle underlying stakeholder theory as far back as the eighteenth century, in Adam Smith’s writing, or to the early twentieth century work of Follet (1918). Whatever its origin, the concept of the stakeholder has grown in popularity in various disciplines as a possible solution to the challenges of a rapidly changing environment (Friedman and Miles, 2006) and ‘stakeholderism’ has become an integral feature of modern management texts. At the date of writing this thesis (June 2011), a simple search of the word ‘stakeholder’ in Google Scholar returned more than 424,000 references. A number of issues of renowned academic journals have been devoted to elucidating the stakeholder concept, which has since become commonplace throughout many fields. Interestingly, the mass media use the term frequently. In the UK, it achieved widespread popularity when used in reference to the New Labour party of Tony Blair and its ‘big idea’ of the Third Way (Blair 1994; 1996), with consequent application to specific issues which occupy a central place in the public attention, such as ‘stakeholder pensions’. Since 2004, most US states have initiated and passed a series of laws carrying the term in their titles.


This widespread popularity has resulted in ambiguity and the concept has become subject to divergent interpretations. Stoney and Winstanley (2001) noted a decade ago that the word had become “content free” and was often used to refer to “anything the author desires”. This, they maintained, accounted for a certain ambiguity in debates concerning stakeholders. Since then, there have been many attempts to clarify the concept. Many definitions appear in the strategic literature. A commonly cited definition is that set forth by Freeman (1984), who integrated stakeholder theory into the current management literature, defining a stakeholder as “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives” (p. 31). This is very similar to the earliest definition offered by the Stanford Research Institute: “those groups without whose support the organization would cease to exist” (ibid: 46). Starik (1994: 90) summarizes the diverse range of definitions:

...there may be numerous levels of specificity as to what the term ‘stakeholder’ means, depending on what the user is referring to. The range appears to be bounded in this case, on one end, by those entities which can and are making their actual stakes known (sometimes called ‘voice’), and, on the other end, by those which are or might be influenced by, or are or potentially are influencers of, some organization or another, whether or not this influence is perceived or known.

Considering fifty-five definitions given in seventy-five texts, Friedman and Miles (2006: 10) set forth a model for defining the term, suggesting that any definition has two components: the first is “the connection between organizations and stakeholders”, expressed through verbs such as ‘impact’, ‘influence’ and ‘interact’; the second is an “adjective or other qualifier or aspect of either the organization or the stakeholder” which narrows them in two ways: strategic or normative (Figure 2.7). Within the strategic dimension, definitions can be arranged along a continuum, at one end of which there are definitions with a very high strategic implication, limiting stakeholders to those who are critical or affect the very survival or existence of the organization. At the other end there are those characterized by legal or institutional constraints that push organizations to engage stakeholders. As we move along



the continuum, we find definitions that define stakeholders in terms of their power, legitimacy or responsibility.



**Figure 2.7: Representation of strategic and normative dimensions to the narrowing of stakeholder definitions**

Source: Friedman and Miles (2006: 11)

## 2-5-2 A brief review of stakeholder theories

Since 1963, when the Stanford Research Institute put the stakeholder concept at the forefront of management studies, a growing number of authors have proposed theoretical foundations in an attempt to explain this new concept (Friedman and Miles, 2006; Freeman et al, 2010). There exist a wide range of theories concerning the stakeholder concept. A commonly cited typology of such theories is that proposed by Donaldson and Preston (1995), who distinguish three branches within stakeholder theory on the basis of its descriptive accuracy, instrumental power and normative validity, as follows.

Stakeholder theory can first be regarded as descriptive, because it sets forth a model to describe what the corporation is, or how organisations cooperate with stakeholders. “It


describes the corporation as a constellation of a cooperative and competitive interests possessing intrinsic value. It explains past, present and future states of corporations and their stakeholders” (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). In this sense, stakeholder theory is related to the ways that managers actually deal with stakeholders (Berman et al, 1999). This strand is also labelled ‘empirical’.

Secondly, stakeholder theory can be considered instrumental when it “establishes a framework for examining the connections, if any, between the practice of stakeholder management and the achievement of various corporate performance goals” (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). This means, other things being equal, that corporations practising stakeholder management will be relatively more successful. As Jones (1995) elaborates, instrumental theory makes connections between certain practices and certain goal states. To put it another way, if a firm is pursuing certain results such as sustained profit, long-term growth and so on, then it should undertake certain practices, such as stakeholder management. As Berman and colleagues (1999) maintain, instrumental stakeholder theory has to do with what happens if managers treat stakeholders in a certain way.

Finally, stakeholder theory can be regarded as normative when it acknowledges that “stakeholders are persons and/or groups with legitimate interests in a corporation” and that “the interests of stakeholders are of intrinsic value” (Donaldson and Preston, 1995: 71). That is, each stakeholder is of intrinsic value and merits consideration for its own sake and not merely because of its capacity to advance the interests of the other groups, such as the shareowners. Normative stakeholder theorists maintain that all stakeholders should be treated with proper respect and consideration for their own sake (Jawahar and McLaughlin, 2001).

Donaldson and Preston (1995) argue that the normative thesis is the strongest and the only one that can offer an epistemological explanation for stakeholder theory. This does not lead

to a rejection of instrumental and descriptive theories, but supports the idea that the three strands can be regarded as nested one within the other (Figure 2.8). The external shell is the descriptive feature, which presents and explains practice. Instrumental stakeholder theory shapes the next layer, supporting the descriptive thesis through predictive power. At the core is the normative thesis.



**Figure 2.8: Three branches within stakeholder theory**

Adapted from Donaldson and Preston (1995)

Reed (2002) suggests the terms ‘positive’ and ‘strategic’ as alternatives to Donaldson and Preston’s ‘descriptive’ and ‘instrumental’. In a simpler taxonomy, Friedman and Miles (2006) use analytic stakeholder theory as a label to cover all stakeholder theory that is not strictly normative. This includes theories that Donaldson and Preston (1995) term descriptive and instrumental and which Reed (2002) calls positive and strategic. Following Friedman and Miles (2006), stakeholder theories are divided in this work into the analytic and normative categories; the following pages carry a discussion of how they can be used to set forth a theoretical foundation for the study.

### **2-5-3 The application of normative stakeholder theorizing to the study**

The discussion in this subsection indicates how the language and tools of normative stakeholder analysis can be useful for this study. There exists a variety of normative stakeholder theories drawing on different philosophical foundations. For the purpose of this research those normative stakeholder theories proposed by Bryson (2004) and Friedman and Mason (2005) will be considered.

Bryson (2004) offers a comprehensive discussion of stakeholder theory and in particular, a detailed development of specific techniques of stakeholder analysis. He mentions the importance of the way in which we define stakeholders and who is counted as a stakeholder, specifically for normative reasons that come from his concern with democracy and social justice. He argues that stakeholder theory should not focus only on those with power or on easily identified stakeholders, but that it should “urge consideration of a broader array of people, groups or organizations as stakeholders, including the nominally powerless” (Bryson 2004: 22). He then considers the importance of stakeholder analysis for creating and sustaining “winning coalitions” and fostering organizational success over time. Bryson claims that key stakeholders “must be satisfied” at least minimally and that organizations need to “attend to the information and concerns of stakeholders” (ibid: 23). Special attention is given to several factors that make stakeholder analysis important: the need to determine the feasibility of certain objectives and to take measures to make them more likely to occur; the importance of keeping stakeholders satisfied (based on their own ideas of this); and the need to ensure that managers have met the requirements of procedural justice, rationality and legitimacy. Based on these insights, Bryson proposes that the systematic use of stakeholder analyses would be associated with more successful outcomes.

Friedman and Mason (2005) discuss stakeholder analysis, stakeholder management and their usefulness as a lens for inspecting important public policy decisions, taking as an example the move of the Houston Oilers professional American football team to Nashville, Tennessee. In assessing the literature on stakeholder theory, the authors deduce from Freeman's (1984) work that the use of stakeholder management principles will better satisfy constituent needs and claims, helping organizations over the long term to achieve their objectives. In thinking through the challenge of balancing the various needs and claims of stakeholders, Friedman and Mason (2005) maintain that Freeman's work is not refined enough, so they draw on that of Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997) to prioritize. They then follow the four-step process outlined in a previous paper (Friedman and Mason, 2004): first, a preliminary map is drawn of the core (thirteen) stakeholders; second, the map is adapted to fit Nashville's unique context and the particularities of the stakeholders involved; third, they conduct an event analysis to follow how the focal stakeholder (Phil Bredesen, the mayor of Nashville) sought to gain support and diminish opposition; fourth, key events and stakeholders are reassessed over time to reflect changed circumstances (Friedman and Mason, 2005: 99). The authors then proceed to analyse the case via their four-step process and to fit various stakeholders into the Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997) typology. Like Bryson (2004), they argue that their case study underscores the importance of a systematic use of stakeholder analysis for "more efficient and effective constituent management" (Friedman and Mason, 2005: 112).

From the above discussion the important normative conclusion that can be drawn for the theoretical model of this study is that organizations should attempt to understand and balance different stakeholder interests. This responsibility is based on the argument that an organization cannot survive in the long run unless it treats its key stakeholders fairly.

## **2-5-4 The application of analytic stakeholder theorizing to the study**

In the previous section, based on normative stakeholder theory, it was indicated that the organization must meet the demands of stakeholders and balance their claims if it is to manage efficiently. Yet it should be noted that it is neither easy nor straightforward to achieve equilibrium in stakeholder management. This is in part because stakeholders vary in their salience to the organization (Freeman, 1984; Mitchell et al, 1997). In addition, it has been proven that stakeholders interact with one another differently; some have the potential to pose obstacles, while others have the potential to cooperate with the organization (Savage et al, 1991). Freeman (1984) suggests that to achieve equilibrium in stakeholder management one should first identify and assess the importance of each stakeholder, then analyse how they interact with one another. In the following pages the notion of stakeholders' salience proposed by Freeman (1984) and Mitchell et al (1997) and the formulation by Savage et al (1991) of the way stakeholders interact with one another will be used as two building blocks of analytical stakeholder theory, explaining the management of stakeholders.

### **2-5-4-1 Identification and salience of stakeholders**

There have been many attempts to shed light on the identification of stakeholders, alluded to in the discussion of definitions above. A very well known approach is to define them as any groups of people who have an apparent relationship with the agency in question. In his seminal work on stakeholder theory, Freeman (1984: vi) takes this approach by defining a stakeholder broadly as "any group or individual who can affect, or is affected by, the achievement of a corporation's purpose". Accordingly, he lists the most common groups of stakeholders as shareholders, customers, suppliers, distributors, employees and local communities. Based on such a wide definition, many types of individual and group are liable to be stakeholders, in addition to those listed above, including:

- Stakeholder representatives, including trade unions or trade associations of suppliers or distributors;
- NGOs or activists;
- Competitors;
- Government(s), regulators and other policymakers;
- Financiers other than stockholders (creditors, bondholders, debt providers);
- The media;
- The public in general;
- Non-human aspects of the earth and the natural environment;
- Business partners;
- Academics;
- Future generations; and
- Past generations (in particular the memory of founders of organizations).

While these categories are practically useful and help the manager to understand better the stakeholders' characteristics, they fail to highlight the affiliation of stakeholders to multiple groups. Therefore, scholars have attempted to find more sensible criteria by which to classify stakeholders. A key criterion proposed by them is whether stakeholders are limited only to those that are essential for the accomplishment of the agency's aims or whether mere contact with an agency is enough to be identified as a stakeholder. The latter entails a very broad identification of stakeholders. Freeman and Reed (1983) and Freeman (2004) distinguish these bases as 'narrow' and 'wide'. Similarly, several authors classify stakeholders as primary or secondary. For instance, Clarkson (1998) regards primary ones as those who have a "formal, official or contractual" relationship with the organization. In particular, Clarkson (1998: 106-107) notes that a primary stakeholder "is one without whose continuing participation the corporation cannot survive as a going concern", while secondary ones are

“those who influence or affect, or are influenced or affected by, the corporation, but not engaged in transactions with the corporation and not essential for its survival”.

Mitchell et al (1997) offer a novel insight by combining the concepts of power, urgency and legitimacy to create a typology to analyse stakeholder salience. They argue that scholars disagree on what Freeman (1994: 25) calls “the principle of who or what really counts”. Alternatively, they call for a theory of stakeholder identification to discover why and how managers recognize stakeholders, differentiate them from non-stakeholders and classify them in terms of their importance. They maintain that three characteristics of stakeholders make them salient to managers, namely their power to influence the firm, the legitimacy of their relationship with the firm and the urgency of their claim on the firm. These concepts of legitimacy, power and urgency are employed to create seven stakeholder categories and one non-stakeholder category. These attributes are paraphrased here as:

- Power: the extent to which an organization possesses or is able to invoke coercive, utilitarian, or normative apparatus to take the lead in the relationship with another organization. Coercive power is determined by the physical resources of force, violence, or command; utilitarian power includes material or financial resources; and the main components of normative power are symbolic resources.
- Legitimacy: a common awareness or assumption that makes the measures of an organization desirable, suitable or proper within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions.
- Urgency: the extent to which immediate stakeholder involvement is required because of time constraints and the sensitivity of the situation in question.

Mitchell et al (1997) also maintain that it is the perceptions of managers that characterize each feature. Therefore, a stakeholder possessing these three features is given a higher



preference by managers for involvement in decision-making; when a stakeholder possesses two features, the preference is modest; and a stakeholder possessing only one has little if any importance in the decision-making process. Finally, any entity which does not possess any of these features cannot be considered a stakeholder at all.

#### 2-5-4-2 Strategies for managing stakeholders

Once stakeholders have been identified and their salience determined, management may develop and utilize appropriate strategies to govern its interactions with them. Various authors have long advocated specific management strategies or responses to stakeholders, beginning with Carroll (1979), followed by Wartick and Cochran (1985) and Clarkson (1988, 1991), who have identified a scale with reference to organizational reaction. This scale, “reactive, defensive, accommodative, or proactive”, explains the organization’s posture or strategy relating to stakeholders (Clarkson, 1995: 103).

In a fashion analogous to SWOT analysis, which examines strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats, it is possible to analyse those stakeholders who support, oppose or are undecided about an organization’s given actions by considering a variant of relevant stakeholders’ potential for threat and cooperation (Freeman, 1984; Rowe et al, 1989). On this basis, Savage et al (1991) note that stakeholders’ potential to threaten or cooperate constitutes an important determinant of management’s strategic response to them. They outline four main managerial strategies taken by stakeholders towards one another (Figure 2.9).

		Potential for threat	
		High	Low
Potential for cooperation	High	Stakeholder type 4 Mixed blessing Strategy: collaborate	Stakeholder type 1 Supportive Strategy: involve
	Low	Stakeholder type 3 Non-supportive Strategy: defend	Stakeholder type 2 Marginal Strategy: monitor

### **Figure 2.9: Stakeholders' management strategies**

Source: Savage et al (1991: 65)

The first, termed 'supportive', is characterized by a low potential for threat and a high potential for cooperation. This strategy resembles Freeman's notion of 'offensive' and the related strategy of exploitation, as both models put emphasis on involvement. The second strategy is termed 'marginal' and its main feature is the low potential for both threat and cooperation; thus it assumes a monitoring role for stakeholder interactions. The third strategy is called 'non-supportive' and is characterized by a high potential for threat and a low potential for cooperation. According to this strategy, stakeholders pose many dangers for corporations which take a defensive posture. The final strategy is called 'mixed blessing', with a high potential for both threat and cooperation, leading to collaborating strategies. In short, the models of Freeman and of Savage et al both strive to increase the potential for cooperation and reduce the potential for threat.

Interestingly, the formulation of stakeholders' salience proposed by Mitchell et al (1997) and the theory of Savage et al (1991) concerning the way stakeholders interact with one another have been applied to tourism and crisis management studies. In the following pages, these applications will be reviewed, along with commentary and explanation.

#### **2-5-5 The application of stakeholder theory to the tourism industry**

Stakeholder theory has been used as a planning and management tool in the tourism industry by Sautter and Leisen (1999), Yuksel et al (1999) and Getz and Jamal (1994). Robson and Robson (1996) have utilized the theory as an ethical business management vehicle, maintaining that stakeholders should take part in decision-making and that stakeholders' concerns, goals and values should be included in the strategic framework of tourism businesses. Stakeholder identification and involvement have been recognised as key steps

towards achieving partnership and collaboration within tourism in the studies of both Jamal and Getz (2000) and Medeiros de Araujo and Bramwell (1999). Ioannides (2001) applied a stakeholder framework in conjunction with the destination lifecycle concept to analyse varying stakeholder attitudes toward tourism and sustainable development at different stages of destination development. Stakeholder theory has also been used as an ethical tool in sustainable tourism marketing by Walsh et al (2001). The application of stakeholder theory to tourism so far, however, has been mostly superficial, with the exception of Hardy and Beeton (2001), who applied it both to identify stakeholder groups and to understand their perceptions of sustainable tourism. The stakeholder concept has largely been defined in a management and organisational context, but the organisational setting of a firm and the concept of a 'destination' that is managed are somewhat similar. In this context, Ryan (2002: 27) argues that "destinations are also bundles of resources, like companies" and that at the strategic level "destinations seek to configure their product, and to sustain it through adopting a mix of environmentally friendly and economically viable policies".

#### **2-5-5-1 Tourism stakeholders**

People, groups, communities, organisations, firms and the natural environment are entities that are generally considered to qualify as genuine or potential stakeholders (Starik, 1995; Mitchell, Agle and Wood, 1997). The tourism literature has enumerated a number of stakeholder groups (Sautter and Leisen, 1999; Ryan, 2002; Timur and Getz, 2002). The tourism industry generates business opportunities, employment and investment by offering a wide range of tourism services. Prime examples of these services include transportation, lodging, food and drink, and travel. Some scholars have applied the concept of 'mixed industry' to tourism to stress the divergent sectors and stakeholders operating within it (Anderson and Getz, 2009). As clarified by Kapur and Weisbrod (2000), the concept of mixed industry is based upon the notion of a 'mixed economy', in which the public, private

and not-for-profit sectors are considered to co-exist in generating economic activity. Drawing on this notion, tourism stakeholders can be said to fall within the three broad categories of public, private and non-profit stakeholders. Although the boundaries of these sectors are blurred, even in countries at a high level of economic development, the notion of mixed industry is nonetheless helpful to identify and clarify the sectors and stakeholders of tourism. The main tourist attractions, such as historic sites, in common with cultural, sporting and recreation facilities, are usually owned and managed by governments. When it comes to the private sector, a variety of stakeholders can be identified including accommodation providers, transport firms and organisations in intermediary organisations such as travel agencies. Non-profit organizations, which are formed to act in the interests of the tourism business in general, include chambers of tourism. They might also organize tourism events such cultural festivals and sporting events. Indeed, the most influential not-for-profit stakeholder in the tourism industry is the chamber of tourism organization. Some scholars (e.g. Swarbrooke, 1999) consider the host community, including all those people who live within the tourist destination, to constitute another important tourism stakeholder. Within these categories, several different stakeholders can be identified. Since considering all of these is beyond the scope of this study, in what follows the most significant tourism stakeholders, DMOs, will be reviewed in detail.

#### **2-5-5-2 Destination management organizations**

While tourism is an industry sustained largely by private enterprise, governments have customarily played a crucial role in its development and in the advancement of their countries as tourism destinations. The state's intervention in the tourism industry is clearly more crucial in developing countries or countries where tourism is in its initial stages (WTO, 1996; 2000; Edgell, 1999; Jeffries, 2001). There are a variety of reasons why governments involve themselves in the tourism industry: regulating the balance of payments, regional growth and

regeneration, broadening the national economy, harmonisation of a fragmented tourism industry, creating job opportunities and increasing revenue (Hall, 1994; Hall & Jenkins, 1995). Bonham and Mak (1996) in particular argue that government interference in the form of public finance is necessary because promotion is essentially a public good whose benefits permeate to the whole community. This intervention is mainly exerted through the leading tourism organization, commonly known as a destination management organization. The empirical research of Sheehan and Ritchie (1997) found that DMOs received most of their funds from government and for this reason they are viewed as the organizations responsible for investment on behalf of the targeted community. DMOs are as diverse as the countries within which they operate. They include visitors' bureaus, regional marketing organizations and state and local tourism offices (Pearce, 1992). In North America, the most typical form of DMO is the Convention and Visitors Bureau, but there exist several other forms of tourist offices. Gehrisch (2005: xxv) defines these as organizations "serving as a coordinating entity bringing together diverse community stakeholders to attract visitors to their area". Pike (2004: 14-15) offers the following classification of DMOs: A *destination marketing organization* is any organization at different levels of government in charge of the marketing of a particular destination. This definition disregards government departments responsible for planning and policy. A *national tourism office* (NTO) is an organization with inclusive authority for marketing a country as a tourism destination. The China National Tourism Administration and the Mexico Government Tourism Office are prime examples of NTOs. A *state tourism organization* (STO) is an organization with inclusive authority for marketing a state, province, or territory as a tourism destination, in federal countries. Examples are the California Division of Tourism and the Hawaii Visitors and Convention Bureau. A *regional tourism organization* is an organization responsible for marketing a homogenous tourism area

as a tourism destination. Examples include the European Travel Commission and the South Pacific Tourism Organization.

Apart from definitions, there remains some ambiguity about the abbreviation DMO, which used to stand for 'destination marketing organization', because these organizations initially concentrated largely on marketing. In recent years, however, DMOs have developed to take a significant role in tourism management more generally. Nevertheless, according to Harrill (2005), most veteran DMO directors have acknowledged that marketing is still at the heart of the tourism industry and that selling is a common activity of all DMOs. Pike (2004) states that the main aim of destination marketing organizations is to nurture sustained destination competitiveness. He then summarizes the main specific goals of DMOs as enhancing destination image, increasing industry profitability, reducing seasonality and ensuring long-term funding. Ritchie and Crouch (2003) refer to other functions of DMOs including building brand awareness and destination image, research (e.g. into the profitability of tourism investments), employment and leadership. Destination image and brand awareness in particular are examined further by Blain et al (2005) and Pike (2004). Blain et al (2005) propose a more wide-ranging definition of the branding role of DMOs, including identification, differentiation, experience, expectations, image, consolidation, reinforcement, recognition, consistency, brand messages and emotional response.

Another area of DMOs' new responsibilities which goes beyond traditional marketing and promotional goals is in managing responses to external disasters or crises (Pike, 2004). They have undertaken a new role as crisis management coordinators in response to crises occurring in several destinations. Harrill (2009) identifies three key roles for DMOs in responding to crises: the dissemination of information about safety and security shortly after a crisis, monitoring and reporting regarding steps taken towards economic recovery and making

recommendations to local and central government about the requirements for rebuilding crisis-affected zones.

Jamal and Jamrozy (2006) argue that there is a wide gap between destination marketing and planning that can lead to the unsustainable development of a destination. To remedy this shortcoming, they formulate a comprehensive model of destination sustainability, focusing on diversity and equity and on environmental and economic balance. They maintain that the model's main objectives "are not to design a product, price, place and promotion of a tourism destination or attraction, but to ensure quality of life and environments through tourism development" (ibid: 168). They also formulate an integrated destination management framework drawing on three factors: a collaborative and systems-based approach, sustainable tourism and community-based principles, and the destination's sense of place, along with its economic and cultural diversity. However, the application of this model, according to the authors, requires some fundamental changes in existing destination management practices. Among others, they emphasize governance structures and processes that ensure active participation in destination development from those who are assumed to be most affected by tourism, including residents and NGOs. This calls for collaborative practices among the DMOs and the multiple stakeholders and interests that they manage. This aspect of DMOs' new role has been developed further by scholars who have utilized stakeholder theory in the analysis of DMOs; it is discussed in detail in the following pages.

#### **2-5-5-3 The salience of tourism stakeholders**


Stakeholder theory has been applied as a planning and management tool (Sautter and Leisen, 1999; Yuksel et al, 1999; Getz and Jamal, 1994; Robson and Robson, 1996; Walsh et al, 2001; Jamal and Getz, 2000; Medeiros de Araujo and Bramwell, 1999) and for stakeholder identification (Hardy and Beeton, 2001; Sheehan and Ritchie, 2005). Recently, Sheehan and Ritchie applied stakeholder theory to assess destination stakeholders from the perspective of

DMOs and concluded that if these agencies were to be re-conceptualized as destination management organizations it would require the DMO to effectively build and manage stakeholder relationships. They specifically called for a network approach “to create a picture of the connectedness of destination stakeholders” and to test the hypothesis that “the DMO is the most central and most connected actor in the network” (Sheehan and Ritchie, 2005: 731). In their discussion of community planning, Jamal and Getz (1995) argue that the effectiveness of tourism destination planning will depend on encompassing the following key stakeholder groups:

- Local government and other public sector bodies with the authority to allocate resources;
- Tourism industry associations and bodies such as chambers of commerce, visitor bureaus and regional tourist authorities;
- Community groups;
- Social agencies (e.g. school boards, hospitals) and
- Relevant interest groups.

Robson and Robson (1996) detail the stakeholder theories applied to the tourism industry and refer to the stakeholder groups for a tour operator and local government tourism marketer. Their work, however, is descriptive rather than analytical; nor does it present DMOs as the most important tourism stakeholders. Rather, it suggests the term ‘government tourism marketer’, which actually includes different DMOs (Figure 2.10).






**Figure 2.10: Stakeholder groups for the local government tourism marketer**

Source: Robson and Robson (1996: 536)

In a concise study, Wheeler (1993: 356) identifies local authorities, including local council headquarters, departments and councillors, along with their customers, as the primary stakeholders in UK tourism, while the central government, national tourist boards, local businesses and the environment hold secondary status. The classification of stakeholders as primary versus secondary is very helpful both in practice and theoretically, yet it fails to provide a series of standards by which one can distinguish one stakeholder from another.

Sheehan and Ritchie (2005) start by offering a definition of the most important stakeholders, the DMOs, then proceed to list 32 tourism destination stakeholders identified in an empirical study. Their sample frame was members of the International Association of Convention and Visitor Bureaus (IACVB), which represents about 389 key DMOs in North America and

some other countries. The questionnaire distributed to them asked them to identify their stakeholders and evaluate their salience. The respondents were first asked to list some 10 key players in the tourism industry, then to identify the three most important of these. The results indicate that hotels were ranked first in terms of their importance, followed by city/local government, regional/county government, attractions/ attraction associations and state/ provincial tourism departments (Figure 2.11). This topic is referred to again in the discussion chapter (section 7-2) indicating some differences between the Egyptian context and other contexts, and between Eastern and Western studies.



**Figure 2.11: A stakeholder view of the DMO**

Source: Sheehan and Ritchie (2005: 728)

#### **2-5-5-4 The strategies of tourism stakeholders' interactions**

Jamal and Getz (1995) are among the pioneers in applying stakeholder theories to tourism management. They point out the "...necessity of involving key stakeholders and refining processes for joint decision making on destination planning and management issues within a community-based domain" (p.192). They also identify five important points to enhance the collaboration of stakeholders in planning, including the perception of stakeholders of their

importance, interdependence and the benefit from collaboration and the decisions that should be implemented.

Based on the typology of Savage et al (1991) for management's strategic response to stakeholders, Sheehan and Ritchie (2005) examined stakeholders' relationships with DMOs, basing two groups of questions on two theoretical pillars proposed by Savage et al. The first group asked whether each stakeholder had created problems, had the potential to threaten and had the potential to cooperate with the chief executive officers (CEOs) of DMOs. The second group asked the respondents about the extent to which CEOs would support different management strategies. Respondents were asked to choose the most suitable of four strategies for managing the relationship with each stakeholder:

- 1) A collaborative strategy ranging from cooperation to joint ventures or mergers;
- 2) An involvement strategy soliciting opinions/ input for planning and decision-making purposes;
- 3) A defensive strategy, protecting CEOs from negative actions; and
- 4) A monitoring strategy, assessing the stakeholder's ability to threaten or cooperate with changes.

Finally, the respondents were asked to match the stakeholders' potential for threat and cooperation to their related management strategy in order to make comparisons with the classification of Savage et al. The study revealed that CEOs perceived hotel and city stakeholders to have a high potential to threaten and cooperate with the DMO. However, some CEOs preferred involvement rather than collaborative strategies as suggested by Savage et al (Sheehan and Ritchie, 2005: 727). Figure 2.12 shows the Sheehan and Ritchie framework.


		<b>Stakeholder's Potential for Threat to Organization</b>	
		High	Low
		Mixed Blessing	Supportive

<b>Stakeholder's Potential for Cooperation with Organization</b>	High	<i>Strategy: Collaborate</i> <i>Stakeholders: Hotels, City government, Regional government, State/provincial government, Board of directors, Convention centre, Residents</i>	<i>Strategy: Involve</i> <i>Stakeholders: Attractions, Members, Restaurants, University/college, Chamber of commerce, Sponsors</i>
	Low	<i>Nonsupportive Strategy: Defend</i> <i>Stakeholders: None</i>	<i>Marginal Strategy: Monitor</i> <i>Stakeholders: None</i>

**Figure 2.12: Management strategies as a result of cooperation with and threat to DMOs**

Source: Sheehan and Ritchie (2005: 727)

Sheehan, Ritchie and Hudson (2007) later explored in detail the relationship between the DMO and two critical stakeholders: city government and local hotels. Their research was based on three case studies which compared the views of CEOs with those of another very important person in the DMO, as well as with representatives of the stakeholder groups themselves. The results, from the perspectives of both the DMO and its two key stakeholders (city government and local hotels) support the existence of a destination promotion 'triad' (Figure 2.13).



**Figure 2.13: The tourism destination triad**

Source: Sheehan et al (2007: 72)

The authors suggest that each member of the triad performs a unique role and that all are interdependent, in that each needs the resources of the others if destination promotion is to be effective. Their research is unique in that they consider the nature of specific stakeholder relationships in a qualitative manner. They argue that the role of the city (the public sector) is to provide the majority of financial resources, acting as financer to the triad. However, the city depends on the DMO to enhance its vision and in turn can help the DMO to achieve the tourism vision. Hotels enjoy the unique role of providing operational resources, acting as a partner to the triad. Hotels bring to the triad an ability to partner with the DMO by providing in-kind resources (complimentary or discounted rooms) to promote the destination to key travel influencers, information on room prices and availability to support DMO efforts to bring large meeting groups to the destination, and aligning plans including travel to promote the destination in key markets. Hotels should also communicate with the city regarding the operational performance of the DMO, since the city can only observe the macro-level results

of the DMO's efforts. The most important role of the DMO is to act as a coordinator by offering organizational resources. More specifically, its role is to manage the critical interface between the destination and its internal and external environments, as well as promoting strategy development and implementation. DMOs, as noted, have critical financial and operational relationships with the other two stakeholders.

The most successful DMOs excel in establishing partnerships and collaborative networks. Sheehan et al (2007), having explored the DMO-city-hotel triad, conclude that while such an arrangement can be productive and functional, it may also be problematic and highly political. They recommend four key strategies for DMO survival: collaborate with strategic stakeholders; institutionalize this collaboration by ensuring that they are represented on the board of directors; ensure regular, frequent and clear communication with triad members using personal relationships; and receive, interpret and disseminate market information to stakeholders.

Wang and Fesenmaier's (2007) study of collaborative destination marketing in Elkhart, Indiana, is also instructive. They found that collaboration destination marketing evolves through stages and results in three important types of outcome, oriented towards strategy, organizational learning and social capital. The authors found that collaboration and cooperation may improve a DMO's marketing skills and operations, but may also result in particular learning problems, such as uncontrolled information disclosure.


### **2-5-6 The application of stakeholder theory to crisis management**

The field of crisis management has also utilized stakeholder thinking in its analysis. Pauchant and Mitroff (1992) were the first to draw attention to the application of stakeholder theories to crisis management, arguing that organizations should be aware that a crisis may introduce new stakeholders which had not been anticipated. As a result, the criteria for determining

stakeholders after a crisis are likely to be noticeably different from those applying under normal conditions. Thus, the authors offer “emotional, ecological, social, ethical, medical, moral, spiritual, aesthetic, psychological, and existential” criteria as the basis for stakeholder identification in crisis situations (Pauchant and Mitroff, 1992: 129). Their call for the application of stakeholder thinking in crisis management analysis prompted a number of studies. For the purpose of the present research, two key aspects of these studies are now reviewed: the identification and salience of stakeholders, and strategies for managing them.

#### **2-5-6-1 Identification and salience of stakeholders and crisis management**

Ulmer and Sellnow (2000) make a distinction between external and internal stakeholders but argue that such a dichotomy often results in overemphasis on internal stakeholders at the expense of external ones in crisis situations; organizations should work to balance the needs of both groups. Smith and Elliot (2006: 102) argue that giving more attention to stakeholder saliency would represent a significant opportunity for research into crises, stating that “it is evident that any crisis response must also take into consideration the diversity of stakeholder involvement and need if management efforts are to be effective”. They go on to cite the framework of Mitchell et al (1997) for determining stakeholder saliency using a ‘metric’ of power, urgency and legitimacy. The application of such a framework to a crisis scenario represents a significant opportunity for research. Alpaslan et al (2009) address this demand and apply this framework to investigate the extent to which crises might change the interests and salience of different stakeholders (Figure 2.14).



**Figure 2.14: The salience of stakeholders before and after a crisis**

Source: Alpaslan et al (2009: 42)

They contend that crises or the element of urgency, combined with the elements of power and/or legitimacy, have the potential to increase the salience of a given stakeholder. Based on the terms used by Mitchell et al (1997), they identify three different forms of change in importance when stakeholders are influenced by a crisis. First, they argue that *dormant* stakeholders, or those whose main attribute is the possession of power but not the elements of legitimacy and urgency, may increase their salience when affected by a crisis and in some instances become ‘dangerous’. *Discretionary* stakeholders, who are characterized by the element of legitimacy but not the attributes of power and urgency, are also susceptible to increase their salience and become ‘dependent’ when they are hit by a crisis. Finally, *dominant* stakeholders possess the characteristics of legitimacy and power, but not the element of urgency; they may increase their salience and become ‘definitive’ when the firm is affected by a crisis. The most significant conclusion that can be drawn from their analysis is that the salience of stakeholders does not remain stable during different stages of a crisis.



### **2-5-6-2 Strategies for managing stakeholders and crisis management**

Although the debate on the strategies for managing stakeholders seems intuitively to offer much to the understanding of the crisis management field, it has not been widely taken into consideration in the current literature. Acquier et al (2008: 104) argue that “the managerial value of stakeholders’ frameworks for crisis situations has been systematically discussed so far neither by the stakeholder management literature, nor by the crisis management literature.” Similarly, Ritchie (2004: 670) calls for close attention to be paid to stakeholder theories in tourism crisis management, stating that “understanding and working with key internal and external stakeholders are required to plan and manage crises and disasters in the tourism industry”. He highlights the role of stakeholders in the strategic implementation phase by focusing on the need to understand and collaborate with them during any crisis:

In the case of crisis and disaster planning and management, understanding the impact of a crisis or disaster on internal (business units, staff, managers, shareholders) and external (other agencies and organizations, general public, media, tourists) stakeholders and the relationship between these stakeholders is critical (Ritchie, 2004: 670).

The work of Savage et al (2004) is a notable exception. They examine how two health centres, one small and newly established, namely the West Alabama Health Service (WAHS), and the other large and well established, namely the Capstone Rural Health Centre (CRHC), responded to a crisis by using the Savage et al (1991) framework to discover how the main relationships with stakeholders were altered by the crisis. They argue that the collapse of WAHS changed the urgency of the stakes for many stakeholders whose relationships before the WAHS crisis were neither threatening nor cooperative. These marginal stakeholders, however, promptly awakened from their latent states and their relationships became either non-supportive or, at best, mixed blessings for WAHS. The change in stakeholder relationships occurred abruptly and accelerated as the authority of the leadership and the authenticity of its actions came under question. Savage et al (2004) argue

that the pattern of change in stakeholder relationships was a self-reinforcing negative spiral. The importance of dormant, marginal stakeholder relationships was also evident as both the CRHC and WAHS responded to the crisis brought about by WAHS's failure. However, for both bodies, these marginal stakeholder relationships were transformed into either supportive or mixed-blessing relationships. At the same time, they were able to transform many mixed-blessing relationships into supportive ones. In both instances, these transformations were achieved through intensive negotiations to establish partnerships and by expanding board memberships. Table 2.4 shows the changing strategies of WAHS internal stakeholders .

**Table 2.4: Strategies for managing stakeholders before and after crises**

	<b>Pre-Crisis</b>	<b>Post-Crisis</b>
<b>Supportive Relationships</b>	Bureau of Primary Health Care Clients County Commissioners Capstone Rural Health Centre Greene County Hospital Citizens Federal Savings Bank RWJ Foundation WARS Attorneys/ Board/ Employees	Clients WAHS employer
<b>Mixed blessing relationships</b>	Alabama Medicaid Capstone Family Clinic Media Other Regional/County Hospitals Whatley Health Services	Alabama Circuit Court Alabama Medicaid Capstone Family Clinic Capstone Rural Health Center Media Other regional/county hospitals WAILS attorneys WAILS Board WAILS Compliance Officer/ Whatley Health Services
<b>Non-supportive relationships</b>	Some Rural Private Physicians	Alabama Attorney General Bureau of Primary Health Care/ FBI Office of the Inspector General Citizens Federal Savings Bank Some clients Some County Commissioners Greene County Hospital RWJ Foundation Some Rural Private Physicians
<b>Marginal Relationships</b>	Alabama Attorney General Alabama Circuit Court / FBI Office of the Inspector General WAILS Compliance Officer	

Source: Savage et al (2004: 68)

The most important findings of the Savage et al (2004) study is that the way stakeholders interact with one another differs considerably before and after a crisis. In light of this

contrast, changes in stakeholders' strategic management across different stages of crisis can be identified and analysed. In fact, Savage et al (2004) incorporate the stakeholder strategies within the notion of staged crisis management, which has significant implications for the present study, including the theoretical framework discussed in section 2-7. This discussion of the theoretical framework also serves to summarise the present section on stakeholder theory and the next, which examines the final major element of that framework: culture.

## **2-6 The impact of culture**

Up to this point, this chapter has discussed the procedural factors influencing the management of stakeholders in tourism crises, be they normative or analytical, such as how to balance their interests or the way they interact. The focus of this section is on a conceptual issue that plays a crucial role in this regard: the impact of culture. Culture has become a main theme of discussion in recent years for most management periodicals, largely because organizations consider it a crucial element of failure or success. One example is that of Japanese firms, whose economic performance far exceeded that of their Western counterparts. Many researchers attribute the 'Japanese miracle' to the collective and group work characterizing the Japanese culture and consequently influencing its organizations in terms of staff behaviour and relationships (Ahmed, 1995).

In line with this trend, cultural issues have been discussed in the literature on tourism and crisis management (Campiranon and Scott, 2007; Schmidt and Berrell, 2007). Indeed, there are many cultural differences between individual countries which influence the ways that they view crises (Bland, 1998). Johnson and Peppas (2003) point out that crisis intensity varies from country to country and culture to culture, which means that it is very important that crisis response plans are developed for a specific location and involve input from both local managers and public officials. Crisis management, in the sense of prevention and

damage control, is an essential responsibility in national culture. The crisis management process begins before a crisis occurs, with the stakeholders' perception of risk and a conscious decision to seek ways to prevent or reduce it (Smits and Ezzat, 2003). In times of crisis, stakeholders must demonstrate strong interpersonal skills (King, 2002; Ucelli, 2002) by implementing the most effective plan of action, adhering to it and continually monitoring the organization's performance (Brenneman, 2000).

In some developing countries, the national culture is often unsympathetic to the active management of crises (Elsubbaugh et al, 2004). Normally, stakeholders will use locally available ideas and practices to guide their interactions, to coordinate their responses and ultimately to live in culture-specific ways (Prentice and Miller, 1999). As a result, stakeholders tend to manage crises differently among diverse national cultures. This crisis response issue has been acknowledged by several authors (e.g. Elsubbaugh et al, 2004; Chandler, 2007). For instance, senior managers in some countries perceive the need to eradicate the individualistic culture, mostly found in developing countries, and to encourage a cooperative culture in times of crisis, both horizontally among managers and vertically between them and the workers (Elsubbaugh et al, 2004).

Thus, national culture has an undeniable influence on both crisis planning and crisis response. Campiranon and Scott (2007) argue that the different contexts necessitate modification of the crisis management models and in turn they extend those models by taking account of cultural influences. Their model draws on the findings of earlier studies (e.g. Hofstede, 2001; Liu and Mackinnon, 2002; Schneider and Littrell, 2003) to the effect that people from different cultural backgrounds appear to have different styles of management. They conclude that it is vital for governments and organizations to acknowledge the impact of national culture on crisis management.

In light of these discussions, this section first seeks to clarify the concept of culture by offering a definition and then elucidates the cultural elements which shape the stakeholder relations in managing a tourism crisis.

### **2-6-1 Culture: definition and classification**

The definition of culture varies among scholars. The classical definition proposed by Kroeber and Kluckholn (1952: 181) states that:

Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behaviour acquired and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of human groups, including their embodiment in artefacts; the essential core of culture consists of traditional ideas and especially their attached values.

These authors suggest that a large culture exists in a society and it may comprise other smaller sub-cultures. For them, culture is a set of shared distinctive values of a human group, usually expressed in their behaviour and artefacts. A more recent definition of culture is offered by Spencer-Oatey (2000: 18):

Culture is a fuzzy set of attitudes, beliefs, behavioural norms, and basic assumptions and values that are shared by a group of people, and that influence each member's behaviour and his/her interpretations of the 'meaning' of other people's behaviour.

She likens culture to an 'onion' composed of several layers and suggests that basic assumptions and values form its inner core, surrounded by a layer of beliefs, attitudes and conventions. The third layer consists of systems and institutions, followed by an outer layer of culture. This cultural model has made two significant contributions: first, it highlights the functions of culture in addition to the values and behavioural outcomes. Second, it suggests the existence of two core levels of culture with a fuzzy boundary; the new core component contains attitudes, beliefs and behavioural conventions (Dahl, 2004).

Several classifications have been offered to clarify the concept of culture. Schein (1992) contends there are different types of culture. At the broadest level are civilizations (Western and Eastern cultures); at the country level, there are national or country cultures (e.g. American Culture and Mexican culture) and at a group level, there are ethnic cultures (e.g. Caucasian / American and Asian / American cultures) and occupational cultures (e.g. white and blue collar cultures). Hofstede (1991) also recognises the presence of different levels of culture, albeit within a slightly different typology:


1. National level, according to one's country
2. Regional, ethnic, religious, and linguistic affiliation level
3. Gender level
4. Generation level, which separates grandparents from parents from children
5. Social class level, associated with educational opportunities and a person's occupation or profession
6. Organizational or corporate level.

Most authors on management, while seeking to determine the impact of culture on organizational success, have differentiated between two types of culture: national and organizational. Van Oudenhoven (2001) maintains that national culture distinguishes members of a nation from others, while organizational culture distinguishes the employees of one organization from another. Moreover, he assumes that national culture refers to values and profound beliefs along with the practices shared by the vast majority of people belonging to a certain nation, reflected in the way people behave or act in their day to day life. They are reinforced through national laws, governmental policies, the education system, family life, and business. Organizational culture, on the other hand, refers to values, beliefs and practices shared by most members of a corporate body and which may be applicable outside the organization.

The nature of an organizational culture as a social system differs in many respects from a national culture. Hofstede and Hofstede (2005: 3) define organizational culture as the “The collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one organization from another”, adding that it is constructed of “perceived common practices: symbols, heroes, and rituals”. This means that organizational cultures can be meaningfully delineated by a number of practical dimensions referring to practices which depend on organizational characteristics such as structures and systems. Organizational cultures are mainly expressed not in members’ values but in more superficial manifestations such as common symbols, heroes and rituals. This has two important consequences: first, organizational practices can be easily influenced by changing these organizational characteristics, compared to people’s collective values, which are extremely difficult to change. Second, there is no one cultural model for all organizations, because different organizations may have different organizational practices and characteristics.

Another difference between national and organizational cultures seems to be based on their different mix of values and practices. Hofstede and others conducted research between 1985 and 1987, under the auspices of the Institute for Research on Intercultural Cooperation, on several companies in Denmark and Netherlands. They found the roles of values versus practices at the organizational level to be exactly the opposite of their roles at the national level. There were considerable differences in practices but much smaller differences in values between similar people in different organizations (Figure 2.15). Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) suggest that societies, organizations and individuals represent the gardens, bouquets and flowers of social science. They conclude that the three are related and part of the same social reality. All three levels should be taken into account to better understand our social environment. They add that national cultures are part of the mental software we acquire during the first ten years of our lives and that they contain most of our basic values, while

organizational cultures, which are acquired when we enter an organization with our values in place, consist mainly of the organization's superficial practices. Apart from this clear distinction, the concept of culture has often been used interchangeably to describe the national or organizational level. To avoid confusion, this research makes a distinction between these two concepts.



**Figure 2.15: The balance of values and practices for various levels of culture**

Source: Hofstede and Hofstede (2005)

## 2-6-2 Dimensions of national cultural differences

In light of the above discussions, it can be suggested that national cultural values may have some impact on the behaviour of all stakeholders. This raises the important question of how national cultural differences affect the behaviour of managers, the corporate culture in which they work and thus the behaviour of firms in general. Several scholars have tried to categorize the aspects of culture into taxonomies, applying different criteria and bases for their classifications. The work of Hofstede (1979; 1980; 1983; 1984; 2001) and more recently of Hofstede & Hofstede (2005) offers the best-known framework in this regard. Hofstede (2001) suggests that five different elements can be identified to describe variations in national culture: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism versus collectivism, masculinity versus femininity and long-term versus short-term orientation. While a number of



authors have called Hofstede's theory into question (e.g. Fang, 2003; Litvin et al, 2004; Venezia, 2005), it is still the most popular, because of its persistent reliability and validity. A similar and often-cited framework is that offered by Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars (2000), who identify six dimensions as pairs of opposing values which can be a source of value creation: (1) universalism-particularism, (2) individualism-communitarianism, (3) specificity-diffusion, (4) achieved status-ascribed status, (5) inner direction-outer direction and (6) sequential time-synchronous time. The present research takes as its main framework the conceptualization and classification of cultural dimensions offered by Hofstede (1979; 1980; 1983; 1984; 2001) and by Hofstede & Hofstede (2005), while insights from Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars (2000) and other relevant discussions provide complementary explanations. The following four subsections examine in turn those of Hofstede's dimensions which have been found appropriate for this study.

#### **2-6-2-1 Power distance**

Power distance is described as "the extent to which the less powerful members of organizations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally" (Hofstede, 2001: 28). Examples suggest that flat organizational structures are more often seen in low power distance cultures, whilst tall organizational structures are more common in high power distance ones (ibid). In societies with high power distance, "superiors are expected to act autocratically without consulting subordinates. This would tend to indicate that a greater importance is given to both the cues of superiors and more formal norms in countries with a large power distance" (Vitell et al, 1993). In such conditions, it can be argued that it is less probable that stakeholders in societies marked as high power distance will act as individuals (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005). Equally, in countries with low power distance, it may be that the opinions of peers matter more than those of superiors (Zey-Ferrell et al, 1979; Zey-Ferrell

& Ferrell, 1982). As a result, we would expect stakeholders as individuals to be more likely to take the initiative in a crisis situation, rather than communicating with one another.

#### **2-6-2-2 Uncertainty avoidance**

Uncertainty avoidance is the degree to which the members of a culture feel threatened by vague or unknown circumstances. This contributes to unwillingness to take risks and a greater degree of planning to diminish uncertainty. For instance, senior managers in a low uncertainty avoidance culture are more willing to become involved at a strategy level, while their counterparts in a high uncertainty avoidance culture tend to be engaged at the operational level, according to Hofstede (2001: 28). Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars (1997; 2001) have reached very similar findings using their individualism-collectivism or individualism-communitarianism continuum.

Using Hofstede's conceptualisation of uncertainty avoidance would lead to the belief that stakeholders in societies with high uncertainty avoidance are likely to show a high degree of internal consistency in their behaviour, leading to trust, as a result of the variety of bonds that connect people closely, whether through *guanxi* mechanisms, as with the Chinese, or through *kankei* in the case of the Japanese (Pye, 2000). In low uncertainty avoidance cultures, a low level of trust is likely to prevail, arising from high levels of ambiguity (Ferrell & Skinner 1988). As a result, the key stakeholders cannot be assumed to have in mind the best interests of all involved stakeholders, unlike in Japan (Ouchi, 1981). Within the context of crisis management, this dimension may help to explain or enhance models based on the integration of participation by the community and less important stakeholders in crisis management.

#### **2-6-2-3 Individualism vs collectivism**

According to Hofstede (2001), individualism is the characteristic of a society where the links between individuals are loose; thus individuals tend to look after themselves and their

immediate families. In contrast, collectivism is the feature of a society where people are predominantly integrated into strong, unified in-groups, which throughout people's lifetime continue to protect them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty. In management decision-making, a collective decision is preferable in a collectivist culture, whilst an individual decision is more likely to be seen in an individualist one.

The Hofstede conceptualisation suggests that managers and stakeholders from countries that are low on individualism are more likely to be susceptible to group pressure than those from countries that are high on individuality. Caution is needed in coming to this conclusion, however, when we remember that America ranks high on individualism but at the same time has always been an ardent exponent of voluntary associations, noted as long ago as 1835 by De Tocqueville in *Democracy in America*, and this will weaken the tendency for individualists to be solely concerned with their own self-interest. Nevertheless, Hampden-Turner & Trompenaars (1997) support the contention that the focus will be different, because in countries with an individualistic culture people will tend to put shareholders ahead of other stakeholders and may be more likely to believe in the virtues of all-out competition and task-orientation. On the other hand, in communitarian cultures, it is more likely that the interests of all stakeholders will be taken care of and rather than looking to voluntary associations people will look to family for help, which may be particularly true of Chinese communitarians, though not so true of the Japanese (Fukuyama, 1995).

More important still is the contention that in individualistic cultures, people are inner-directed, believing in self-reliance and seeking to satisfy self-interest, whereas in communitarian cultures, people are outer-directed and so more concerned with what society or their in-group has to say about their actions. Perhaps the most important distinction is that in individualistic cultures the underlying assumption is that the individual is self-made,

whereas in communitarian cultures the belief is that the social system creates personal success (Hampden-Turner & Trompenaars, 2000).

#### **2-6-2-4 Long-term orientation**

A long-term orientation stands for the fostering of values oriented towards future rewards, perseverance and thrift. Conversely, a short-term orientation stands for the fostering of values related to the past and present, based on respect for tradition, preservation of 'face' and fulfilling social obligations. In the business environment, a short-term orientation culture tends to look for short-term results, ending with the strength of the bottom line, whereas a long-term orientation culture builds a strong relationship and market position (Hofstede, 2001). In the context of crisis it can be expected that such a society will act more proactively and be well prepared from the beginning. Such societies may also be marked by patience and tolerance of problems in the short term, because their emphasis will be placed rather on the future consequences of their current actions. It may be thought that confronting problems immediately may solve them more quickly, but may lead to recriminations or bad feeling, which will affect future relationships adversely.

In contrast, societies with low long-term orientation tend not to reinforce long-term commitments and traditional values, but focus much more on short-term relationships with more immediate outcomes. This leads to a greater emphasis on the quality and use value of time and the understanding of time as a scarce resource that has to be allocated efficiently. This has a direct impact on crisis management, in which the pre-crisis phases including preparation is always taken for granted, because there is likely to be less patience and tolerance of problems in the short run and a greater tendency to confront problems more immediately. As a result, action will be taken more rapidly in these societies, because the

focus is on the best use of time and the return on time invested in projects, rather than on long-term commitments and traditions.

To summarise, it can be argued that the management of stakeholders during a crisis does not take place in a vacuum, nor is it something that can be applied in exactly the same way in all places, cultures and societies. To be effective, the managing of stakeholders in crisis management must be open to adaptation to the specific consideration of each context. To understand how culture matters, many scholars have sought to conceptualize cultural values in terms of pairs of opposing dimensions, which can be a source of value creation.

## **2-7 Theoretical framework of the study**

This chapter concludes with a short discussion serving to summarise those aspects of the sections most directly relevant to the conduct of the original research reported in this thesis, with the aim of proposing an overall theoretical foundation for the study. The chapter has outlined recent advances in crisis management and their implications for the management of tourism crises. It was indicated that despite these advances, serious shortcomings apply to studies in this field. In particular, these studies fail to offer a comprehensive theoretical framework capable of meeting the requirements of different contexts and to a large extent fall short of addressing adequately the peculiarities of terrorism crises. There is therefore a clear need to formulate a rigorous conceptual framework for the development of crisis management models to enable them to meet the idiosyncratic characteristics of different contexts. This represents a major gap in the current literature. It was shown in section 2-5 that stakeholder theories have mainly been utilized in the private sector and in the context of commercial firms, so the application of stakeholder theories to the tourism industry, which is a broader context involving mainly public sector actors, is not free from difficulty. To remedy this problem, it is argued that as far as stakeholder management is concerned, there is

significant similarity between the organisational setting of a firm and that of a tourism destination (Ryan, 2002). The most evident difference is that a tourism destination is more complex than a single organisation (Pavlovich, 2003).

Having acknowledged the possibility of the application of stakeholder theory to the context of tourism destinations, the next step was to set forth a theoretical foundation drawing on the most relevant stakeholder theories. Both normative and analytic strands of stakeholder theory contribute to the theoretical foundation of this study. Drawing on the former, it is argued that the organization must meet the demands of stakeholders and balance their claims if it is to manage efficiently and to survive in the long run (Bryson, 2004; Friedman and Mason, 2005). It is, however, problematic to achieve such equilibrium, in part because stakeholders vary in their salience to the organization and in part because they do not appear always to be prepared to cooperate fully with it. To address this problem, the following analytical stakeholder theories will be applied. Firstly, based upon the model of Mitchell et al (1997), the significance of each stakeholder will be determined in terms of two criteria: power and legitimacy. Alpaslan et al (2009) apply this framework to investigate the extent to which crises might change considerably the interests and salience of different stakeholders. They contend that crises or the elements of urgency, combined with the elements of power and/or legitimacy, have the potential to increase the salience of a given stakeholder. The questions related to this argument are:

*Q1: What are the key stakeholders in managing terrorism crises in tourism? Which are more powerful or legitimate? How does their importance change after a crisis?*

Secondly, the model proposed by Savage et al (1991) will be used to distinguish those stakeholders having the potential to pose obstacles from those with the potential to cooperate with the organization. Savage et al (1991) note that stakeholders' potential to threaten or

cooperate constitutes an important determinant of management's strategic response to them. They outline four main managerial strategies taken by stakeholders towards one another. Based on the typology of Savage et al (1991) for management's strategic response to stakeholders, Sheehan and Ritchie (2005) examined stakeholders' relationships with DMOs in the tourism industry. Savage et al (2004) used the Savage et al (1991) framework to discover how the main relationships with stakeholders were altered by the crisis. Drawing on this discussion, the next research question is as follows:

*Q2: What is the nature of the relationships among stakeholders before and after a crisis? Which stakeholders tend to cooperate or pose threats in normal situations and after a crisis?*

To be effective, the managing of stakeholders in crisis management must be open to adaptation to the specific consideration of each context. To understand how culture matters, many scholars have sought to conceptualize cultural values in terms of pairs of opposing dimensions, which can be a source of value creation. Section 2-6 discussed the concept of cultural dimensions developed by Hofstede (1979; 1980; 1983; 1984; 2001) and by Hofstede and Hofstede (2005), the relevant dimensions in the present context being power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism versus collectivism and long-term versus short-term orientation. These dimensions will be utilized to examine the influence of culture on the ways in which the stakeholders manage a tourism crisis, while the work of Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars (2000) and others will be evoked as appropriate to complement the analysis. Based on this literature, the next question can be formulated as follows:

*Q3: What is the influence of national culture on the management of stakeholders in the crisis management efforts?*

The abovementioned elements ultimately shape and condition the specific strategies and methods that have been used to combat security crises in the tourism industry. It was found that early tactical explanations of staged crisis management models and the strategic approach which views CM as a cyclical process made a great contribution to the development of the CM field. It was also argued that the development of literature on CM in tourism studies has kept pace with the equivalent development in broader CM studies (Faulkner, 2001; Ritchie, 2004). In line with their proposals for a more proactive and strategic approach to crisis management in the tourism industry, scholars began paying further attention to the specific requirements of security crises in tourism. It was also noted that there are many commonalities among the strategies adopted to manage terrorism crises and other sorts of security incidents. Among others Pizam (1999), Mansfield and Pizam (2006) and Fuchs and Pizam (2011) identify several strategies specific to tourism security incidents at different stages of crisis management, which can be divided into two categories in line with crisis stages: prevention and recovery strategies. The prevention strategies can in turn be categorised under five broad headings: (i) strategies specific to government; (ii) strategies specific to security sectors; (iii) strategies specific to private sectors; (iv) strategies specific to tourists; and (v) strategies specific to local citizens. Four categories are also identifiable regarding recovery strategies: information dissemination, reassurance campaigns, marketing schemes and financial assistance programmes. In section 2-4-2, it was also concluded that a variety of methods and strategies are at the disposal of governments to combat terrorism. These range from protection by focusing on security measures and instruments, via preventive general policies such as reducing poverty, to responding by taking emergency action in the midst of chaos and to the pursuit, arrest and prosecution of terrorists. Although these strategies overlap in many ways with those proposed by CM scholars, there are some significant differences between these two types. The most obvious differences are identifiable



in prevention and pursuit policies. Two underlying issues in these strategies are the degree to which these strategies are active or reactive and how these strategies involve the participation of a wide range of stakeholders. In the light of these studies, the following questions can be formulated:

*Q4: What strategies do stakeholders employ in managing a terrorism crisis? In particular:*

- *To what extent are these strategies active or reactive?*
- *Do these strategies involve the participation of a wide range of stakeholders?*

Finally, it was noted in section 2-2 that terrorism has often imposed significant costs on the tourism industry in certain countries, yet the emphasis of most of the literature has been on the macroeconomic effect of these incidents on the host countries. Although Fuchs and Pizam (2011) have recently underscored the importance of this issue, they do not go further, to clarify and expand it adequately. The Egyptian tourism industry has witnessed a growing number of terrorist attacks which have caused damage to the tourism industry and hence attracted much scholarly attention regarding their economic impact (Richter and Waugh, 1986; Aziz, 1995; Abdulwahed, 1998). Nevertheless, knowledge of the social impact of terrorism crises on the Egyptian tourism industry is rudimentary. Based on this observed gap, the final question of the study can be proposed as:


*Q5: What has been the overall impact of terrorism crises on the tourism industry in Egypt?*

Thus, the main purpose of this study is to generate a systematic understanding of the crisis management environment by application of stakeholder theories to the crisis management field, which will help stakeholders in the tourism industry to create an effective and more flexible crisis management programme to avoid having crises or minimise them when they occur.

The theoretical framework of this study presented in this concluding section is illustrated in Figure 2.16, which shows it as consisting of three main building blocks. The first of these is the national cultural dimension. As noted earlier in this section, national cultural determinants that affect other elements of the framework are cultural values in terms of pairs of opposing dimensions developed by Hofstede (1979; 1980; 1983; 1984; 2001) and by Hofstede and Hofstede (2005), which for present purposes are power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism versus collectivism and long-term versus short-term orientation.

The second building block of the framework is the stakeholder dimension, which encompasses important factors discussed above, such as the salience of stakeholders and their strategic management. Following the model of Mitchell et al (1997), the significance of each stakeholder will be determined in terms of two criteria: power and legitimacy. The element of urgency also recognized by Mitchell et al (1997) is excluded from our theoretical foundation, largely because in a crisis situation the term has a different meaning (Alpaslan et al, 2009). The notion of stakeholders' strategic management draws on the model proposed by Savage et al (1991), which distinguishes those stakeholders having the potential to pose obstacles from those with the potential to cooperate with the organization.

The final dimension of the framework is crisis management, which draws largely on the strategic models (Fink, 1986; Mitroff, 1994), making distinctions among pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis stages of crisis management and their application to tourism (Faulkner, 2001; Ritchie, 2004). More precisely, models proposed for the management of security and terrorism crises will be utilized in this study (Mansfield and Pizam, 2006). A diverse range of strategies is undertaken by stakeholders in managing security crises. Following Mansfield and Pizam (2006), these strategies and methods are divided into two categories: prevention and recovery methods, each with subsections.



**Figure 2.16: Conceptual framework**

Source: Author

This chapter has examined the relevant literature and outlined the theoretical framework of the study. The next examines in detail its context: tourism and terrorism in Egypt.

## Chapter 3 Tourism and Terrorism in Egypt

### 3-1 Introduction

An abundance of major historical sites and a rich cultural heritage have made Egypt a unique tourism destination. The prominence of the tourism industry has had such an impact on the overall national economy that it has been regarded by many observers as the economic lifeblood of the country. The crucial significance of the tourism industry has not been overlooked by Egyptian political dissenters. Although hitherto unsuccessful, they have at times attempted to further their political ends by carrying out terrorist attacks on this vulnerable industry.

This chapter attempts to offer some general insights into the dimensions of Egyptian national culture, the tourism industry in present-day Egypt and the effects on it of terrorist incidents. It begins with a brief overview of the geographical, economic and political context, proceeding with a review of Egyptian national culture as perceived by Hofstede (1980; 1983; 1984) and others, as set out in Chapter 2 (section 2-6). It then discusses the changing fortunes of the tourism industry in the past three decades. The analysis is largely based upon official data provided by Egypt's Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS) and the annual analysis of the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). On occasions, complementary aggregated data have been adapted from other sources, such as the *Business Source Premier and Regional Surveys of the World, the Middle East and North Africa* (2008). The analysis is split into three periods, comparing international tourist arrivals and receipts. These results are then represented in a graph tracing the trends over the past three decades. The next section deals with the main tourism stakeholders in Egypt and the final section discusses the emergence, evolution and challenges of terrorist groups in Egypt and their attacks on tourism

destinations. It then reviews counterterrorism strategies, which have oscillated between ‘carrot’ and ‘stick’, assessing the degree to which each has been successful.

## **3-2 Egypt**

The Arab Republic of Egypt is located in the north-east of the African continent and on the Sinai Peninsula. It has land borders with Sudan in the south, with Libya in the west and with Israel and Palestine in the east. Its shorelines extend along the Mediterranean Sea to the north and the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aqaba to the east. Since most of the country is desert, the population is distributed very unevenly, being concentrated in Cairo and Alexandria and around the River Nile and the Suez Canal. These areas are among the world’s most densely populated regions (Ellicott, 2008). Egypt’s geographical situation, the distribution of its population and especially the total reliance on the Nile for irrigation have resulted in a strongly centralised administration and allowed the government to extend its authority to the peripheries (Goldschmidt, 1988).

In 2008, the total population of Egypt was 81,713,520, making it one of the most populous countries in the region. A large proportion of the population is young: half of Egyptians are under twenty years of age and two-thirds are under thirty, a demographic imbalance that severely strains the economy (CAPMAS, 2008). Egypt’s government is hardly able to meet the demands for food, shelter, education and jobs. Around three million Egyptians have migrated to other Arab countries, particularly the oil-rich states, in search of work. Their remittances to their families constitute a major source of national income (Conrad, 2005).

Much like elsewhere in the world, the economy has come to play a crucial role in Egyptians’ lives. The long history of colonial exploitation and the enduring legacy of authoritarian rulers forestalled the industrial development of Egypt in the nineteenth century. At the turn of the twentieth century, industrialization began to take root, with rapid growth in the textile

industry, which was comparatively satisfactory before the socialist government of Abdel Nasser (1956-1970) took power (Al-Awa, 2006). Nasser's sixteen-year rule was characterized by the militarization of politics and the concentration of power through the supremacy of the executive branch. Under Nasser, the state took control of the economy to ensure equitable development, a policy known later as Arab Socialism. Nasser was a charismatic leader and earned a reputation as a champion of Arab interests, but his economic policies brought the country to the verge of bankruptcy (Fahmy, 2002a). His death in 1970 was followed by profound political and economic changes in Egypt. By initiating the economic policy of *enfetah* (openness) or liberalization of the economy, his successor, Anwar El Sadat, began a series of fundamental reforms of the economy. In addition, Sadat's regional foreign policy, including a peace initiative and rapprochement with Israel, enhanced the international image of Egypt (Al-Awa, 2006). From 1981 to 2011, under President Hosni Mubarak, Egypt followed the same route and strove for the same goals; however, Ellicott (2008) argued towards the end of this period that there was a long way to go, as the country was still grappling with chronic problems emanating from within and from abroad.

### **3-3 Egyptian national culture**

In Egypt, loyalty to one's group takes precedence over the individual's interpretation of the requirements of his or her job. Among Arabs, a friend is someone whose company is enjoyed. However, equally important to the relationship is the duty of a friend to give help and perform favours to the best of his or her ability (Nydell, 1987). The position of friendship as a cornerstone of Egyptian culture has a major effect on selection and promotion practices. Not surprisingly, nepotism is common in many Egyptian organisations and saving face is of utmost importance in the national culture. Egyptians hate to say no, a phenomenon which may appear to westerners as dishonest and lacking in integrity, but is instead the result of a strong desire to preserve harmony. It is no surprise that Hofstede (1980; 1983; 1984)

classifies Arab societies such as Egypt as collectivist in nature, noting that workers from collectivist cultures tend to be more involved and identified with their workplaces. In contrast to individualism, collectivism requires the members of a group to work together for survival.

As an Arab nation, Egypt has a culture characterized by high power distance (Hofstede, 1984), as explained in Chapter 2 (section 2-6-2-1), one characterised by the acceptance of a superior's opinion simply because it emanates from one's superior. In a high power distance culture, superior and subordinate consider each other as unequal: indigenous organisations centralise power more and subordinates are expected to be told what to do (Hofstede, 1984). Order—a phenomenon critical to Egyptian organisational practice—is preserved more by autocratic decision making than by establishing and following rules and regulations. In high power index countries like Egypt, employees are frequently afraid to disagree with superiors, who are often seen as autocratic or paternalistic.

The Arab cultural cluster also scores highly on Hofstede's (1984) uncertainty avoidance index (section 2-6-2-2). One of the factors that might have lowered the Arab region's collective score is its affiliation with the fatalistic tendencies inherent in the form of Islam prevalent in Egypt. Muslims generally do not question events and are more likely to accept the uncertainties of life. Nonetheless, the relative immobility of the Egyptian people because of their dependence on the Nile may have reduced their tolerance for uncertainty and change as compared to many other Arab countries where nature is harsher. Such is likely to be the case in the Gulf region, where physical movement in search of work and food has historically been a more critical issue.

It should be noted that when Hofstede conducted his original cultural research, Egypt was combined with other nations (Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya and the United Arab Emirates) in a category which he called "Arab speaking countries". While there may be

some similarities among these countries, these are not sufficiently strong or comprehensive to justify combining them uncritically in this way, give the loss of information that this entail regarding the differences in culture between them. To elucidate some of the unique cultural characteristics of Egypt, Hatem and Hearn (2003), in a comparative study of American and Egyptian culture, identify as many as sixteen cultural dimensions which can be used to explain the national culture of Egypt, including three of those proposed by Hofstede. The full list of sixteen is: individualism, communication and language, dress and appearance, food and feeding habits, time and time consciousness, work habits and practices, relationships, values and norms, environment, beliefs and attitudes, action, power distance, competitiveness, structure, thinking, religion and humour. The use of these dimension places Egypt within a national cultural taxonomy in an almost opposite position to that of the countries chosen for Hofstede's original study in three of the four cultural dimensions of the Hofstede framework (power distance, individualism and uncertainty avoidance). This means that any effect of the national culture of Egypt should be examined closely in its own right, because of the major differences in cultural dimension scores of these countries compared to Egypt.

### **3-4 The recent development of tourism in Egypt**

Between 1982 and 1990, the number of international tourist arrivals in Egypt rose from 1,423,251 to 2,600,117, an increase of 182 percent. Given that international tourists are the most significant source of tourism revenue in Egypt, the revenue from international tourism had reached about 2.5 billion US dollars by 1990, making it one of the most lucrative sectors of the Egyptian economy (Table 3.1) (SIS, 2009). Such great progress was in part because of the Egyptian government's economic initiatives of liberalization, as indicated in section 3-2 (Al-Awa, 2006; Wahab, 1996, in Pizam and Mansfeld, 1996: 175-186). However, the tourism industry proved to be one of those most susceptible to instability in the region. The triggering



of terrorist activity in the Middle East after the mid-1980s and the growth of anti-American sentiment in the region, intensified by the US air strikes on targets in Libya in 1986, resulted in a reduction in the number of tourists, particularly US citizens, travelling to these areas. For instance, by the end of 1986, American visitors recorded a 50% decline in bookings to Mediterranean countries and a 65% reduction to Egypt (Sonmez 1998: 427).

**Table 3.1: International tourism arrivals and receipts in Egypt, 1982 to 1990**

	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
International Arrivals	1,423,251	1,497,932	1,560,932	1,518,426	1,311,250	1,794,953	1,969,493	2,503,980	2,600,117
Receipts (x 1000 US dollars)	304,100	288,840	409,600	315,300	379,600	885,900	900,600	1,071,800	2,502,200

Source: CAPMAS

The 1990s began with a dramatic sequence of events: the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, followed by the dispatching of international troops to the region. Not surprisingly, the tourism industry in Egypt was affected considerably by the consequences of this event (Conrad, 2005). In February 1991, international tourist arrivals in Egypt fell to 57,000, compared with 208,000 in February 1990. Following the end of the Gulf conflict, however, tourist numbers recovered quickly, reaching 2,214,277 on average (Table 3.2). Interestingly, in 1991, despite considerable falls in international tourist numbers, the corresponding revenue did not fall but actually increased slightly, largely because of the unprecedented growth of luxury hotels in Egypt as a result of the opening of the sector to private investment, after decades of tight public control. As Vignal (2010) reports, since the 1990s the number of 4 and 5-star hotels as a proportion of the total number of hotels has risen significantly, from 11% and 15% respectively to 16% and 21% in 2008. She argues that the effects of investing in the hotel industry became evident in the early 1990s, more particularly in 1992, when the Egyptian tourism industry witnessed a record figure of more than 3 million arrivals.

However this flourishing of the tourism industry was short-lived, as it crashed again when tourism destinations were targeted by Islamist terrorists (Al-Awa, 2006). The number of international tourists visiting Egypt fell by about 22% in 1993, while revenue fell by 38% (Table 3.2). Having failed to eradicate the problem of terrorism through its campaign against militant Islamists, the government allocated 25 million US dollars to a venture to promote tourism in 1994, with the aim of restoring revenue from this sector to its 1992 level (Wahab, 1996 in Pizam and Mansfeld, 1996: 175-186). Notwithstanding this initiative, the number of international visitors in the first three months of 1994 was 15% lower than the 1993 level. In January 1993, the World Bank had approved a loan of 130 million US dollars for the development of new tourism infrastructure, within the framework of a programme valued at some 805 billion US dollars (EIU, 2004). Recognizing tourism as one of the cornerstones of the national economy, a comprehensive plan was prepared for the fiscal year 1994/1995 to enhance the efforts in three main aspects of tourism: development, promotion and public awareness (El Beltagui, 1995). The Ministry of Tourism was among the pioneers of a policy of privatization. In addition, an overall national tourism development strategy drawing on marketing techniques was adopted. This strategy laid out the priority zones and determined the detailed rules for investors while taking into account a sustainable development strategy by protecting the natural and cultural resources (SIS, 2009).

The Ministry of Tourism also undertook practical measures in the promotion of the tourist industry through an ambitious plan, one important element of which was to strengthen Egypt's international image as a conventional tourist destination. Furthermore, it attempted to raise public awareness of the significance of tourism through the mass media. Ten public information films were produced in 1993-1994 and repeatedly shown on the main Egyptian TV channels. An agreement was also made between the Ministry of Tourism and the Ministry of Education to incorporate tourism issues in the curricula of primary and secondary

schools (El Beltagui, 1995). By mid-1995 several developmental plans with the aim of enhancing tourism infrastructure had been implemented in Abu Soma and the Red Sea coast at Sahl Hashish. According to a Tourism Development Authority report, during these years some 27 new projects were also undertaken on the south Sinai coast (EIU, 1998). The consequences of such measures were obvious: in 1995, international tourist arrivals increased by 25% over the previous year, reaching 3.13 million, a pattern repeated in the following year, with some 3.9 million tourist arrivals and an estimated revenue of 3.7 billion US dollars (Table 3.2).

**Table 3.2: International tourism arrivals and receipts in Egypt, 1990 – 1997**

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
International arrivals	2,600,117	2,214,277	3,206,940	250,776,2	2,581,988	3,133,461	3,895,942	3,900,000
Receipts (x 1000 US dollars)	2,502,000	2,529,000	2,375,000	1,779,300	2,298,900	3,009,100	3,700,000	3,700,000

Source: CAPMAS

The strong recovery of the tourism industry was halted by yet another dramatic setback in late 1997. Constant fears for the safety and security of travellers followed a terrorist attack on a German tour bus in Cairo in September of that year, in which nine German tourists and one Egyptian lost their lives. These fears were aggravated the following month by the massacre of 58 tourists and 12 Egyptians in Luxor (Essner, 2003: 9; Wheatley and McCauley, 2008). Many tourist agencies cancelled trips and many potential tourists from across the world withdrew their plans to travel to these destinations. For its part, the government took immediate and extensive measures, including attempts to compensate for the loss of external tourism by boosting internal tourism in the region (SIS, 2009; Conrad, 2005). Egypt Air, which had lost many foreign tourists, offered half-price tickets for domestic tourists. Key among the recovery measures taken in these years were numerous discounts on a range of goods and services to encourage potential travellers to return to the region. The official

statistics estimate that a cost of 1.2 billion US dollars resulted from the decrease of tourist numbers from 3.9 to 3.7 million and from other expenses (CAPMAS, 2008).

In 1999, the tourism industry underwent a significant recovery and the former construction plans for the industry were accelerated. The statistics for that year confirm that around 4.8 million tourists visited Egypt and brought in revenue of about 3.9 billion US dollars (CAPMAS, 2008). Investment in the industry in the following years was unprecedented. For instance, the value of a single contract for development of luxury accommodation in Port Ghaleb on the Red Sea was around two billion US dollars. Such investments proved to be effective, as tourist arrivals increased to 5.5 million in 2000, bringing in an income of almost four and a half billion US dollars (EIU, 2000).

No sooner had this recovery begun, however, than the sector was plunged once again into decline by regional and international crises, namely the renewed conflict between Palestinians and Israelis marked by the second *intifada* of September 2000 and the attacks on the USA in September 2001. A number of projects were put on hold and many travellers cancelled their flights as a result. By November 2001, international tourist numbers had fallen by 54.5% compared with the same month the previous year. Thereafter, international tourist arrivals began to rise steadily again, so that by August 2002 arrivals were a remarkable 15% up on the previous year. However, revenues were taking longer to return to pre-September 11<sup>th</sup> levels, as a result of increased discounting (Table 3.3). Once again, the government took recovery measures in 2002 to make up for the heavy losses of international tourist revenues. Due to the global value of the Egyptian heritage, prestigious international organizations showed a willingness to invest in the tourism industry in Egypt. A prime example is UNESCO, which supported a 350 million dollar project to reconstruct the Great Egyptian Museum near the Pyramids at Giza. The second Gulf War in 2003 affected the tourism industry in Egypt to some extent. In the same year, Egypt was host to an international

conference on the promotion of sustainable tourism, which contributed immensely by offering a positive image of the Egyptian tourism industry (SIS, 2009). In 2004, tourist income reached 6.1 billion US dollars, which was the most important current-account credit in the economic history of the country. International tourist arrivals increased by 35% in 2004 to 8.1 billion, a second successive record (EIU, 2004).

The Egyptian government has since maintained support for the industry by targeting the markets in European and Arab countries and removing the existing barriers to foreign investment (Al-Ahram, 2007). Two successful measures taken by the government were to sponsor the travel of tourism journalists and to allow German and Italian visitors to use identity cards rather than passports. Among the most important government measures have been its investments in human resources, such as the signing of a contract with Cornell University to offer training courses for Egyptians in the hospitality and tourism industry. Similar educational contracts have also been signed with countries having long experience in the tourism industry, such as Greece and France. In addition, a five-year campaign with the aim of raising the awareness of the public was undertaken in April 2006. Within these programmes, Egyptians are given training in the significance of the tourism industry in the national life and how to communicate in a hospitable manner. Such training has been incorporated into the primary school curriculum. The campaign also makes full use of televised and printed media (Conrad, 2005). Another campaign has been undertaken to enhance tourism at international level, with the hiring of the UK-based DDB International. Marwa Fayed, senior account manager, notes, “The campaign borrows some of the same concepts used by Malaysia and India ... We are trying to make Egypt into a brand” (cited by Meed, 2007).


Finally, according to recent statistics, in 2006 tourism revenue reached 7.6 billion dollars, Egypt's largest source of export earnings. International tourist arrivals rose by 5 percent to 9.1 million, a third successive record (EIU, 2008).

**Table 3.3: International tourism arrivals and receipts in Egypt, 1998 – 2006**

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
International arrivals	3,213,000	4,809,000	5,506,179	4,648,485	5,000,000	6,044,160	8,103,609	8,607,807	9,082,000
Receipts (x 1000 US dollars)	2,564,000	3,903,000	4,657,000	4,119,000	4,133,000	4,704,000	6,128,000	7,206,000	7,600,000

Source: CAPMAS

Figure 3.1 shows graphically the data presented in Tables 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3, indicating the way in which steady overall growth in international tourist arrivals and revenues has been punctuated temporarily. Yet, as the overall trend shows, terrorism attacks in Egypt have not halted the long-term growth of tourism in the country. The destinations targeted by terrorist attacks have largely regained the lost tourist arrivals within a few months or years, because of the successful recovery strategies undertaken by Egyptian tourism stakeholders, helping potential visitors to forget such incidents; thus, international demand has returned to normal relatively soon after the occurrence of such shocking attacks. The next section examines the various stakeholders in the Egyptian tourist industry.



**Figure 3.1: International tourism arrivals and national revenue from tourism (US \$) in Egypt, 1982 – 2006**

Source: CAPMAS

### **3-5 Tourism stakeholders in Egypt**

#### **3-5-1 Central and local government**

Due to the centralized system of governance, the appointed authorities in Egypt at local and central levels have always played major roles in the tourism industry. In particular, in recent years, they have drawn considerable attention to the industry. Egypt is organized into 27 governorates, each headed by an appointed governor. The Local Government System Act of 1960 stipulates diverse responsibilities for governorates, ranging from social, health, welfare and educational services to the social and economic development of the regions. Governors monitor the activities and plans of the city and village councils. The real authority, however, rests with top officials in Cairo in a highly centralized manner, through a rigidly hierarchical bureaucracy. The village mayors, who were at one time the only elected local officials, are now appointed by the Ministry of the Interior (Fahmy, 2002a).


#### **3-5-2 Ministry of Tourism**

The Egyptian Ministry of Tourism has come to play the role of a destination management organization in Egypt, albeit with more limited power than its Western counterparts. It is the national body authorized to make tourism policy (Figure 3.2). It is in charge of maintaining a comprehensive legal and regulatory framework in the context of a sustainable tourism development strategy. The role of the Ministry is seen as that of a regulator and a facilitator of tourism activities, as well as a promoter of good governance, particularly in publicly-owned tourism establishments. Like most other ministries, however, it suffers from

overstaffing and inadequate technical capability. In recent years, it has taken many proactive steps to support and monitor the activities of the private tourism sector. The initial step was the establishment of the Tourism Development Authority (TDA) in 1991, with the aim of enhancing the relationship of the private sector with the Ministry and the role of the latter in guiding and promoting touristic investments (Wahab, 1996, in Pizam and Mansfeld, 1996: 175-186). The TDA works primarily on setting and implementing regulations for tourism projects and investments (OECD, 2010) The Ministry also supervises a number of public sector organizations: both the Egyptian Tourism Authority (ETA) and the General Authority for Tourism Development (GATD) fall under its jurisdiction. The Ministry is supported by five directorates working with the abovementioned authorities. Of particular relevance to the present study, a crisis management unit has been established within the Ministry of Tourism to coordinate the activities of stakeholders during and after any crisis (SIS, 2009).

Key to the recent changes in the Ministry is the new position of the public sector Tourism Authority, as an umbrella body consisting of five associated companies: the Egyptian General Organization for Tourism and Hotels, the Misr Travel Company, the Egyptian Hotels Company, Misr Hotels and Grand Hotels of Egypt (Wahab, 1996, in Pizam and Mansfeld, 1996: 175-186). Appointments made in 2004 to the top managerial body of the Ministry of Tourism also represent fundamental positive changes for the tourism sector in Egypt (American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt, 2008).





**Figure 3.2: Organizational structure of the Egyptian Ministry of Tourism**

Source: OECD, 2010

### 3-5-3 Interior Ministry and Police

There are two major branches of the police force in Egypt: the State Security Investigations Sector, which investigates crime, and the Central Security Force, which deals with internal security issues like policing public protests and countering opposition. As a whole, the force maintains law and order, detects and prevents crime, collects evidence, processes passports, controls traffic and screens immigrants. In each governorate, a director of police oversees law enforcement in the district. The director reports to the governor and both are overseen by the Ministry of the Interior. Police ranks reflect the gradations within the army, with the highest ranking police officers having the ranks of major general down to first lieutenant. Below this are lieutenant-chief warrant officers. Enlisted officers hold the ranks of master sergeant,

sergeant, corporal and private. There is a special tourist police, whose members wear an armband with an insignia in Arabic and English and are able to speak English. The tourist police, which forms part of and is affiliated to the Central Security Force, was established in 1997 after the massacre of 58 tourists at the Hatshepsut temple in Luxor (Essner, 2003: 9; Wheatley and McCauley, 2008). The Tourist Police have offices in every main tourist location throughout Egypt. They are authorized to deal with a variety of security problems that tourists may face, ranging from being cheated or overcharged to being victims of criminal acts or terrorism. They have the power to investigate immediately and to obtain refunds of overcharges where warranted. According to one report, a large body of tourist police has been deployed to guard tourist sites (Fielding and Shortland, 2005).

#### **3-5-4 Egyptian Tourism Federation**

Private sector tourism operators in Egypt are represented by the Egyptian Federation of Tourist Chambers, which was established in 1968, when the first tourism law was enacted. With new demands for enhancement of the tourism industry, its official title was changed to the Egyptian Tourism Federation (ETF) in 2002. The ETF's main task, stipulated in its constitution, is to ensure "the common interests of the tourism industry by developing strategic cooperation and joint planning between the five Affiliate Associations". This is accomplished through close relationships with the five affiliate business associations:

- Egyptian Hotels Association
- Egyptian Travel Agents Association
- Egyptian Chamber of Tourist Establishments
- Egyptian Chamber of Tourist Commodities
- Egyptian Chamber of Diving and Water Sports.

The ETF also works in association with travel and tourism enterprises, with the Ministry of Tourism and public authorities in general and with the supply structure of the tourism industry. According to its official website, an important function of the ETF is to enhance and support the following:

- Development of resources
- Transportation
- Infrastructure and superstructure of tourism destinations
- Human resources development
- International and regional organizations concerned with tourism development.

### **3-5-5 Egypt Air**

Egypt Air is a major state-owned airline established in 1932 and headquartered in Cairo. Beginning in 1980, Egypt Air embarked on a modernization and marketing strategy. Accordingly, it planned its network to maximize its traffic and scope, serving major cities in all five continents. To carry out its marketing plan, Egypt Air purchased several new aircraft and then developed an autonomous infrastructure to support and serve its fleet in order to operate in a safe and efficient manner (SIS, 2009). As a result of its market research, Egypt Air was restructured as a stepped pyramid whose base was its most profitable markets. This was a significant step toward establishing the airline's financial credibility, which can be very challenging for an airline from an underdeveloped region of the world such as North Africa. Egypt Air owns shares in many tourism companies and hotel chains, such as Cairo Airport Mövenpick, Tut Amon, Nefertari in Aswan and Abu Simbel, and Taba Hilton resorts in Sinai. It also owns shares in many charter companies, such as Shorouk Air and Air Cairo. Such investments have increased Egypt Air's assets tenfold since the implementation of its modernization and expansion plan in 1980 (Groenewege, 2003).

### 3-6 Terrorism in Egypt

There is little doubt that the main challenge to the tourism industry comes from a major anti-government extremist movement, the Islamic Group (IG, known in Arabic as *Al-Gamaat-Islamiya*). IG emerged in the late 1970s with the principal objective of removing the current Egyptian government from power and replacing it with an Islamic regime. Affiliated to al-Qaida, it is also strongly anti-American. Between 1992 and 1999, IG militants carried out several attacks against tourist destinations in Egypt, most notably in November 1997 at Luxor, when 58 foreign visitors were killed. Overall, 95% of violence in Egypt in the 1980s and 1990s has been blamed on IG (Essner, 2003: 9).

In 1992, the Egyptian police and security forces embarked on a major offensive against Islamist groups. Coupled with these counterterrorism measures, the Egyptian parliament passed a new anti-terrorism law stipulating the death penalty for some crimes and subsequently the Egyptian martial judiciary sentenced a number of terrorists to death on charges of trying to overthrow the regime. The Islamist groups fought back through terrorist attacks, mainly on tourism destinations. Such attacks continued throughout 1993 and proved to be a suitable vehicle for terrorists to pursue their goals, while the tourism industry suffered considerably from these attacks, leaving a strongly negative image of Egypt as a tourist choice and resulting in the withdrawal of many international tourism operators from Egypt (Al-Awa, 2006). This time, the government accelerated its counterterrorism measures, undertaking a very large deployment of security forces. Those found guilty of terrorist acts received very severe punishments from the military courts, which in 1993 sentenced to death an unprecedented number of Islamists: 38, of whom 29 were executed (Al-Awa, 2006: 141; Tal, 2005). Not surprisingly, these measures were seen to conflict with the principles of human rights and triggered extensive international criticism. Such opposition caused the government to ease somewhat its aggressive countermeasures. It also adopted a policy of replacing the


stick with the carrot, allowing the political opposition to occupy some minor public posts (Kepel, 2005).

The tug-of-war between the government and Islamist dissenters continued until 1997, when in a mass trial 98 opposition members were convicted on charges of subversion, four being sentenced to death and eight to imprisonment for life. This triggered a new wave of terrorism, including an attack on a tourist bus in Cairo which killed nine German tourists and injured 11 others (Al-Awa, 2006: 143). The responsibility for this attack remains unclear, as the government claims the terrorists had no link with IG, but there is evidence to support a strong connection of IG members with the event, following which two suspected perpetrators were executed. This severe reaction led in turn to the tragedy of Luxor, in which 70 people, including 58 foreign tourists, were massacred by members of IG (Essner, 2003: 9; Wheatley and McCauley, 2008).

This overreaction taught the government to place more emphasis on policies of reconciliation rather than repression. It therefore opened a dialogue with moderate opposition activists as part of a programme of national reform (Al-Awa, 2006; Kassem, 2004). As a result, the Muslim Brotherhood condemned the Luxor attack. Another political measure taken to combat terrorism was a secret agreement between Egypt and the West to facilitate the identification and extradition of IG leaders in exile. Since public opinion no longer supported the aggressive actions of terrorists, IG showed signs of seeking a ceasefire in 1999. In 2000, Al-Jihad took the same route and declared a halt to terrorist attacks. The ceasefire was short-lived, however: in October 2004, 34 people were killed in bomb attacks at Taba. These were followed by terrorist attacks in Sharm El Sheikh in 2005, in which 64 people died, and a series of bombings in Dahab in April 2006, which killed 20 people. The government has

linked these attacks to ‘terror cells’ of local Bedouin from North Sinai, which have connections to al-Qaida (Al-Awa, 2006; Wheatley and McCauley, 2008).

Figure 3.3 is a graph of the numbers of terrorist incidents in Egypt between 1992 and 2006, showing clearly the episodic nature of the problem.



**Figure 3.3: Numbers of terrorist incidents in Egypt, 1992 – 2006**

Source: MIPT Terrorist Knowledge Base, <http://www.tkb.org>

### 3-7 Conclusion

Progress in the tourism industry in Egypt was extremely slow under Nasser; however, in the aftermath of his death, the country drew attention back to tourism and since then, as the official statistics indicate, it has thrived and developed dramatically. The industry has, however, proved to be very vulnerable to security incidents. In response, the Egyptian government has employed a number of counterterrorism techniques. The results over the last two decades demonstrate the country’s capacity for rebounding strongly from such incidents,

but indicate that a sustained campaign to ensure long-term stability and security would be far more difficult. The first three chapters of this thesis have placed in context the problem addressed by the present study and examined in some detail its theoretical and historical background. The next turns to the selection of an appropriate research methodology.


## **Chapter 4 Research methodology**

### **4-1 Introduction**

From an examination of the literature on (social) research methods, it is evident that different scholars used different terminology for the same concepts in the field. For instance, Bryman (2004) uses the term ‘research strategy’ to cover quantitative and qualitative research types, while Saunders et al (2009) consider grounded theory, case studies and surveys as research strategies. Confusion reaches its peak when scholars seek to construct epistemological and ontological typologies and definitions. Easterby-Smith et al (2002), for instance, refer to ‘positivism’ and ‘relativism’ as the ‘epistemology of science’ and to ‘realism’ and ‘relativism’ as the ‘ontology of science’. Conversely, Bryman (2004) uses ‘interpretivism’ and ‘positivism’ as ‘epistemological’ terms, while ‘objectivism’ and ‘constructionism’ are labelled ‘ontological’. Such examples are abundant in the field. Thus, it is probably wise to rely on one typology or a few similar ones, without ignoring the merits of the others.

The typologies and definitions of the overall methodology process offered by Saunders et al (2009) are often cited in the business and management literature. They use the metaphor of an onion to describe the formulation of research methodology in this field (Figure 4.1), suggesting that, as with an onion, one has to peel away the outer layers to reach the core; so one has to understand the research philosophy and the various approaches to research before dealing with the research strategies and the selection of appropriate data collection methods. Their work provides the foundation of terminology and definitions required to give an account of the methodology of the present research, which nonetheless sometimes makes reference to other authors. This chapter takes a brief look at the outer layers of the onion, termed the research philosophy, approaches and strategies, before offering a more detailed discussion of the data collection methods.





**Figure 4.1: The research process ‘onion’**

Source: Saunders et al (2000: 85)

## 4-2 Research philosophy

A research philosophy captures the way researchers think about the genesis and evolution of knowledge and is often described by the term ‘paradigm’, which in turn “refers to the progress of scientific practice based on people’s philosophies and assumptions about the world and the nature of knowledge; in this context, about how research should be conducted” (Hussey and Hussey, 1997: 47). In business and management, three dominant paradigms are usually identified: positivism, phenomenology (or interpretivism) and pragmatism.

Social science methodologists explain the positivistic and phenomenological paradigms through different assumptions as to ontology and epistemology. Ontological assumptions

seek to address the substantial question of the nature of reality. The positivistic paradigm views the social world as having an external existence, objective and singular, apart from the researcher, while the phenomenological paradigm sees reality as subjective and multiple, depending on the ways humans perceive and experience the world. Epistemological assumptions deal with the nature of knowledge: what can be known, how knowledge can be obtained, and the relationship between the researcher and the researched. Positivism views the researcher as independent from what is being researched, whilst the phenomenological/interpretivist paradigm assumes a kind of interaction between researcher and researched (Collis and Hussey, 2003). These fundamental assumptions about the nature of reality and knowledge have implications for the way research is conducted. Positivist researchers focus on facts and seek cause-effect relationships and basic patterns that can be tested. In contrast, phenomenological/interpretivist researchers seek to develop a holistic understanding of the meanings people attach to their experiences of the world, sometimes immersing themselves in the research context and collecting data by a variety of means. Table 4.1 outlines the main elements of these two paradigms and the role of the researcher in relation to them.

**Table 4.1: Key Features of Positivist and Phenomenological Paradigms**

Aspects	Positivist Paradigm	Phenomenological Paradigm
<b>Basic belief</b>	The world is external and objective. Observer is independent. Science is value-free.	The world is socially constructed and subjective. Observer is part of what is observed. Science is driven by human interest.
<b>Researchers should</b>	Focus on facts. Look for causality and fundamental laws. Reduce phenomena to simplest elements. Formulate hypotheses and then test them.	Focus on meanings. Try to understand what is happening. Look at the totality of each situation. Develop ideas through induction from data.
<b>Preferred methods include</b>	Operationalizing concepts so that they can be measured. Taking large samples.	Using multiple methods to establish different views of phenomena. Small samples investigated in-depth or over time.

Source: Easterby-Smith et al (1991: 27)

In the world of social research, these different paradigms are often aligned with two distinct traditions of research, namely, quantitative and qualitative. Denzin and Lincoln (2000) note that measurement and analysis in quantitative studies are based on large amounts of data

which relate to causal relationships between variables rather than processes. Therefore, quantitative research consists of mathematical models, graphs and statistical tables. Qualitative studies, on the other hand, investigate things in their natural settings and try to make sense of phenomena using a variety of empirical materials such as case studies, observations or interviews, to name the most common ones. Quantitative research is usually associated with positivism and qualitative research with phenomenology, although Hussey and Hussey (1997: 55) indicate that “it is possible for a positivistic paradigm to produce qualitative data and vice versa.” Creswell (1994) appears to use the terms quantitative and qualitative synonymously with positivist and interpretive. He moves beyond the ontological and epistemological assumptions to clarify three other assumptions that distinguish the two paradigms (Table 4.2).


**Table 4.2: Distinctions between quantitative and qualitative paradigms**

<b>Assumption</b>	<b>Question</b>	<b>Quantitative</b>	<b>Qualitative</b>
Ontological	What is the nature of reality?	Reality is objective and singular, apart from the researcher.	Reality is subjective and multiple as seen by participant in a study.
Epistemological	What is the relationship of the researcher to that researched?	Researcher is independent from that being researched.	Researcher interacts with that being researched.
Axiological	What is the role of value?	Value-free and unbiased.	Value-laden and biased.
Rhetorical	What is the language of the research?	Formal. Based on set definitions. Use of accepted quantitative words.	Informal. Evolving decisions. Use accepts qualitative words.
Methodological	What is the process of research?	Deductive process. Causal relationship. Static design categories isolated before study. Context-free. Generalizations leading to prediction. Accurate and reliable through validity and reliability.	Inductive process. Context-bound. Emerging design categories identified during research process. Accurate and reliable through verification.

Source: Creswell (1994)

The paradigmatic debate eventually diminished considerably in the mid-1990s and early 21<sup>st</sup> century (Patton, 2002), mainly because “most researchers had become bored with philosophical discussions and were more interested in getting on with the task of doing their

research” (Smith, 1996: 162-163). The pragmatist paradigm was a natural response to this frustration. Pragmatism as a research philosophy concerns what works well as a solution to problems (Patton, 1990). Pragmatists recommend that instead of focusing on parsimonious methodological distinctions, researchers should draw attention on the research problem and use all approaches at their disposal to understand it as much as possible. As Saunders et al (2009:109) note, “pragmatists argue that the most important determinant of the epistemology, ontology and axiology you adopt is the research question—one may be more appropriate than the other for answering particular questions”. That is said, this approach is typically associated with mixed-methods research in that the quantitative and qualitative methods to research are not dichotomous and disconnected. Instead, every element or aspect of a study is on a continuum between the quantitative and qualitative (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2009). Figure 4.2 presents this continuum.



**Figure 4.2: The pragmatic approach as a continuum of quantitative and qualitative integration**

Source: Tashakkori (2006:21)

In light of the above discussion, it can be argued that the present research lies somewhere between positivism and phenomenology and thus it adopts a pragmatist philosophy. Most of the studies reported in the literature which have applied the stakeholder concept to crisis management (e.g. Ulmer and Sellnow, 2000; Smith and Elliot, 2006; Alpaslan et al, 2009) and

to the tourism industry (e.g. Sheehan and Ritchie, 2005; Sheehan et al, 2007) have followed positivist principles. This research cannot be purely positivistic, however, because it also concerns national culture as a factor significantly influencing the way crisis management takes place in the context of the study. Since national culture has to do with human beliefs, attitudes and behaviour, it tends, as does any other research engaging these determinants (in contrast to physical laws or mathematical equations), to be largely phenomenological (Quinton and Smallbone, 2006). In addition, the ambiguity of the concept of terrorism means that the perceptions of its researchers will inevitably influence the subject of research. As suggested in Chapter 2, section 2-4-1, the extant literature on terrorism has proved to be biased and value-laden, reflecting as it does both ruling groups' and authors' assumptions and priorities.

### **4-3 Research approach**

Research approaches also fall into two broad categories, inductive and deductive. Positivistic research follows a deductive logic, whereby the starting point is theory and the generation of hypotheses. Data collection is then carried out to test the hypotheses (Collis and Hussey, 2003). In phenomenological/interpretivist research, the research logic operates in the opposite direction, beginning with the collection of data and proceeding towards the development of theory (Bryman and Bell, 2003).

It can be argued that a mixed approach of induction and deduction is utilized in this thesis. A review of the extant literature made it evident that several scholars had already researched tourism crisis management in other contexts. As such, a deductive approach can be adopted, building the study on existing frameworks and verifying them by empirical research. An inductive approach is also applicable to the research, because there is very little literature in Egyptian context. The inductive approach helps to offer a general picture of the terrorism crisis

management situation in the tourism industry in Egypt and contributes to the development of hypotheses appropriate to this specific context.

#### **4-4 Research strategy**

Having decided on the adoption of the research philosophy and approach, the next step is to design the process of research or translate the research question into a research project (Robson, 2002). Saunders et al (2009) differentiate between two main tasks in research design: strategy and tactics. The strategy deals with the overall approach that the researcher adopts, whilst the tactics concern the finer detail of data collection and analysis. A wide range of possible research strategies are suggested by methodology scholars, including experiments, ethnography, action research, case studies and survey (Saunders et al, 2009). In the following a number of research strategies will be reviewed briefly and most of them rejected as inappropriate to this research, while the survey strategy, identified as the most suitable, is discussed at some length.

Experiment is the conventional form of research customarily linked to natural science, although some social sciences such as psychology use it extensively. Experiments are conducted in a systematic way, either in a natural setting or in a laboratory, and are therefore associated closely with the positivist paradigm and the deductive approach (Bryman, 2004). Ethnography and participant observation (the most popular ethnographic research method) are used in some business studies within an inductive approach; although ethnography is not dominant in business research, it is the classic example of fieldwork research. Action research is a strategy which assumes that the social world is constantly changing and that the research and the researcher are part of this change. Consequently, the purpose of action research, which is used in applied sciences, is to find an effective way of bringing about a

conscious change in a partly controlled environment (Easterby-Smith et al, 2002). Thus it is attached to a phenomenological philosophy.

Case study can be defined as “the detailed examination of a single example of a class of phenomena” (Abercrombie et al, 2000: 41). Yin (2003) makes a distinction between holistic and embedded case study design. The holistic case study includes only one unit of analysis, while embedded case study consist of one or a number of sub-units. Dul and Hak (2008) provide a structured and broader view of the use of case study research in management and business studies. They make clear the differences between the varying uses of case studies, including the difference between practice-oriented and theory-oriented research. In particular, in addition to theory-building, they pay attention to two areas: theory-testing and replication, with its consequent impact on generalizability. Yet, the main focus of case study research in business remains theory building through qualitative research such as interviewing (Tharenou et al, 2007). Morris and Wood (1991) argue that a case study is most appropriate when one wishes to advance a rich understanding of the context of the research and the processes being followed.

Survey is a very common strategy in business management research, owing to the advantage of collecting a large volume of data from a sizable population in a highly economical way and the ability to have control over the research process. Questionnaires, structured observations and structured interviews are the most popular data collection devices which belong to the survey category. Social research makes a distinction between descriptive and analytical surveys: the former deals with identifying and counting the frequency of a specific population, while the latter is concerned with determining whether there is any relationship between different variables. Surveys are largely linked to a positivistic paradigm and a deductive approach.

The most appropriate strategy is the one which is most likely to generate satisfying answers to the research questions. Therefore, experiments, ethnography and action research were not considered for use in the present study, while others, such as participant observation, were considered but then rejected. Initially, it was intended to adopt the case study strategy by focusing on one case (tourism destinations in Sharm El Sheikh) and employ semi-structured interviews to collect the data, largely because there is a dearth of literature on tourism crisis management in Egypt, so a case study would offer a better understanding of the nature and complexity of the research phenomena. However, when work on the first stage of study began in the field, it became apparent that this method failed to yield plausible and trustworthy results, mainly because contextual constraints and the sensitivity of the topic prevented informants from offering satisfactory responses. In addition, one of the objectives of this research is to give an overall picture of the management of terrorism crises in the Egyptian tourism industry, but the investigation of the single Sharm El Sheikh case would provide only a particular view, rather than an overview. Consequently, a questionnaire was also designed to collect complementary data from a wide range of respondents from Sharm El Sheikh and two other terrorism-affected destinations, namely Taba and Dahab, as well as a number of tourism stakeholders in Cairo, to provide a thorough picture regarding terrorism crisis management in Egypt. These amendments led to a number of changes in the research strategy. Therefore, it seemed most appropriate to combine the elements of a survey and a case study.

## **4-5 Data collection methods**

Within the pragmatic research paradigm, the present study adopted a combination of methods intended to gather both qualitative and quantitative data (Bryman and Bell, 2007; Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003). There are many designs for mixed methods (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007), but the most basic families of design have been described as parallel,



sequential and conversion. A fourth family (fully integrated) includes combinations of these three basic types (Tashakkori et al, 2009). In parallel designs, two sets of data (one qualitative and one quantitative) are collected and analysed independently at the same time or with an interval, in order to answer a mixed research question. In sequential designs, the second round of data collection and analysis is rooted in (initiated from, made possible by, or modified according to) the results of the first set. In conversion mixed designs, the qualitative data are transformed (quantized) into numerical indicators that may be analysed separately using statistical techniques. Alternatively, in these studies, quantitative indicators (e.g. test results) might be transformed (qualitized) into qualitative data (e.g. profiles) that are analysed separately as they originated from a separate sample (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009). In practice, many mixed-methods studies use a combination of these three families in an iterative and dynamic manner. These studies have been labelled fully integrated mixed studies, using an iterative mixed-methods design (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009).

This research design lies somewhere between sequential and parallel, with a tendency towards parallel design. This design allows the researcher to use both qualitative and quantitative methods dynamically, taking insights from one type of data to modify or enhance the other across stages of the study. As noted in the previous subsection, the main data collection process which began the field research included a number of exploratory conversations with tourism stakeholders in Sharm el Sheikh. Although these conversations were not conducted in a systematic way, the preliminary findings proved very helpful in making sense of the field reality and prompted the researcher to modify and enhance the theoretical basis of the study. Once the conceptual framework of the study had been determined, by drawing on the literature review and these exploratory conversations, it was possible to begin the main data collection process, comprising a structured questionnaire survey in parallel with semi-structured, face-to-face, in-depth interviews. Although these

steps seem to be in a logical sequence, at times the phases overlapped or even ran in parallel. This design allowed both quantitative and qualitative data to be gathered and thus for corroborated conclusions to be drawn (Creswell, 1999).

Depending on the nature of the research questions and the sensitivity of exploring specific issues, further emphasis was placed on specific data collection methods which were more appropriate to addressing these questions. For instance, to explain the role of contextual factors (national culture) in the effectiveness of strategies, qualitative data proved to be more helpful than quantitative ones. Because of their qualitative nature, the interactions of the stakeholders were best analysed through qualitative methods. To address the overall impact of terrorism on the tourism industry, the data regarding the perception of stakeholders collected through interviews were compared and contrasted with the facts and figures based on official statistics (Table 4.3).

**Table 4.3: Links between research goals and methods of analysis**

Main goals of research	Methods of analysis		
To identify and describe key stakeholders in the tourism industry and management of crises in tourism destinations	Qualitative analysis, interview	Quantitative analysis, questionnaire	
To describe and analyse the nature of the interaction among key stakeholders in normal situations and after crises	Quantitative analysis, questionnaire	Quantitative analysis, questionnaire	
To explain the role of culture in the interaction of stakeholders in crisis management in tourism	Qualitative analysis, interview		
To promote deeper understanding of the crisis management techniques that stakeholders employ in the tourism industry to combat terrorism	Qualitative analysis, interview	Quantitative analysis, questionnaire	Secondary data obtained from statistics
To make sense of the overall impact of terrorism on the tourism industry in Egypt	Secondary data obtained from statistics		Qualitative analysis, interview


Figure 4.3 presents a schematic view of the research process. The first stage comprised the literature review and the exploratory conversations in Sharm el Sheikh, which helped to

modify the theoretical basis, to provide a better understanding of stakeholder thinking and crisis management methods and to furnish the study with an initial framework. As discussed earlier in this section, the adoption of mixed methods required qualitative and quantitative data to be collected in a combined process. Quantitative data were collected through a structured questionnaire survey of 130 respondents in Cairo, 52 in Taba, 97 in Sharm el Sheikh and 49 in Dahab, while qualitative data were collected in 36 semi-structured, face-to-face, in-depth interviews conducted in Cairo and Sharm al Sheikh.

The remainder of this section gives details of the various stages of the data gathering process, both quantitative (4-5-1) and qualitative (4-5-2), beginning with the in-depth interviews.

#### **4-5-1 Qualitative interviews**

Designing and conducting the semi-structured interviews for this study was fairly difficult and involved the use of a number of procedures, including sampling, designing the interview protocol, running a pilot study and conducting the interviews, after which the data so collected was subject to analysis. Although these steps seem to be in a logical sequence, at times the phases overlapped or even ran in parallel. For example, when the first batch of interviews had already been carried out and partly transcribed, other interviews were just in preparation. The following subsections describe the various phases in greater detail.



**Figure 4.3: Schematic view of the research process**

Source: author

#### **4-5-1-1 Sampling**

The first step in any interviewing endeavour is to identify those people whose ideas are important for the research, or in technical terms, to produce a sample. The most common sampling method used for qualitative interviews is purposive sampling (Denscombe, 2010). This is a type of non-probability (or non-random) sampling in which researchers choose to select samples based on their subjective judgement rather than statistically at random (Babbie, 2010). Purposive sampling in particular allows the researcher to make choices among particular cases, because it will best enable the researcher to answer the research question and to meet the research objectives. It was also relevant to choose the sample so as to “... identify particular types of cases for in-depth investigation... the purpose is to gain a deeper understanding of types” (Neuman 2006: 222). In snowball sampling, the initial participants introduce further potential participants themselves. This kind of sampling is used “... to select members of a difficult-to-reach, specialised population” (ibid). These two sampling techniques were deemed most appropriate to this research.

The main plan was to conduct several interviews with tourism stakeholders as well as security officials involved in counter-terrorism in Egypt, in order to elicit a range of opinions and ideas. Because of the sensitivity of the terrorism issue, the security officials who were approached refrained from participating in the research. As mentioned in the literature review (section 2-5-5-1), the most common classification of tourism stakeholders is that which makes distinctions between private, public and non-profit sector stakeholders. A clear distinction was also identified in the pilot study between local and central stakeholders, in Sharm El Sheikh and Cairo respectively, so a matrix was constructed which combined these two dimensions to produce six categories of stakeholder (Table 4.4). With regard to time and financial resources, a sample size up to a maximum of thirty-six interviews had been set, ideally to be shared equally among the six categories. The initial choice of respondents was

based on the Egyptian Tourism Information Guide (*Dalil Maloomat al-Siahiah Mesriah*), a booklet released by the Ministry of Tourism identifying key tourism stakeholders, such as public authorities and others involved in tourism. In addition, during the interview process, the snowball technique was employed so that respondents could introduce others whom they assumed to have the relevant characteristics and valuable information as to the purposes of the study (Saunders et al, 2009). The final sample of respondents thus included not only key stakeholders but also their referrals, representing divergent stakeholders from government agencies and private sector organizations. Of the total of 36 interviews, 17 were conducted in Cairo and 19 in Sharm El Sheikh; more specifically, there were 15 interviewees from public bodies (eight in Cairo and seven in Sharm El Sheikh), 16 from private sector organisations (eight each in Cairo and Sharm El Sheikh) and five from the non-profit sector (one in Cairo and four in Sharm El Sheikh) (see Appendix Five).

**Table 4.4: Interview sample**

	Public	Private	Not-for-Profit
Cairo	8	8	1
Sharm el Sheikh	7	8	4

#### **4-5-1-2 Designing interview questions**

This section discusses the technical issues involved in designing the interview questions, whereas specific details relating to the content of questions according to the research objectives and main themes will be discussed in Chapter 5. The task of designing started with a determination of the interview objectives. These objectives, which were derived directly from the study purpose, were translated into open-ended questions, based on the literature review. In other words, the objectives were represented in conversational form in order to collect deep information related to the study themes. In addition, using open-ended questions allowed the researcher to involve respondents fully and naturally in the interviews (Daymon

and Holloway, 2002). The structure recommended by the various resources has more or less the same structure, including the following elements.

- 1) Introduction: information regarding the researcher and the main goals of research, use of findings, confidentiality and permission to record.
- 2) Questions: open questions, starting with general background information regarding the respondent's role, then turning to more specific questions. Finally, a question regarding whether the respondent would like to ask anything or add to the list of questions.
- 3) Presentation of interim findings and discussion, time permitting and off the record.

Overall, the interview questions were carefully written and formatted to cover the research themes while taking into consideration several important factors, including flexibility, the duration of each interview, the opportunity to cross-check the validity of the responses and the clarity of the questions. For example, interviewees were asked to identify the other stakeholders involved in the tourism industry in Egypt and not included in the list of stakeholders provided, then to assess which of these were most influential in the industry in general and in tourism crisis management in particular.

Based on the main themes of the research, interview questions were designed to cover these main themes: the identification and importance of stakeholders, the differing impact of terrorism crises, crisis management and the role of national and organizational culture. To ensure the flexibility of questions, each theme was represented by a number of more specific questions according to the respondents' categories. Thus, although the main themes were the same, three different series of specific questions were designed within each theme, appropriate to peculiarities of private, public and non-profit stakeholders. For instance, for private stakeholders the focus of specific questions was on how they were able to cover

financial losses, while public stakeholders were asked if and how they allotted financial help to the private sector. A copy of the interview questions is given in Appendix Three.

#### **4-5-1-3 Pilot study of semi-structured interviews**

The pilot study is an important stage in any research. As noted in the introduction to section 4-5, the results of this pilot study were used to shed light on both the main qualitative interviews and the quantitative survey. Given that in this research, qualitative and quantitative analysis were conducted in parallel, the pilot study provided a good opportunity to make sense of various aspects of the field research. It consisted of a series of exploratory conversations with key stakeholders in Egypt and was carried out with the cooperation of the Director of the Tourism Department in the Ministry of Tourism in Cairo, managers of the Sharm El Sheikh Marriott Hotel, one tour operator and a manager of Egypt Air. These selected people were all involved in managing the terrorism crisis that affected tourism in 2005; therefore, they were knowledgeable about the research topic.

The information gained from a pilot study can be divided into two broader categories: logistical topics (e.g. learning about the field time needed to cover certain procedures and how to get access to respondents) and more substantive ones (e.g. refining a study's research questions) (Yin, 2003). The logistical issues will be discussed in greater detail in section 4.6 on the sensitivity of the research, while the present subsection seeks to review the numerous lessons learned and challenges identified regarding the study aims and research questions. Perhaps the most important issue to be clarified was that of the importance of stakeholders. A number of stakeholders were identified and an important distinction was perceived between those on one hand who sit at the centre and are involved mostly in decision-making and those on the other hand who work in the locally affected terrorism destinations and are tasked largely with the implementation of crisis management policies.



As a result of these pilot interviews, the structure of the main interviews was amended. In particular, the issue of the impact of inadequate financial help and the negative effect of terrorism crises on the quality of life of the entire country were included in the questions. In addition, the respondents were found to be unfamiliar with the terminology of cultural dimensions, such as 'power distance'. The researcher therefore decided to use words which were familiar to the local tourism industry, as part of the language used in the everyday conversations of Egyptian tourism stakeholders.

In summary, the findings of the exploratory qualitative study provided insights which allowed the researcher to more fully understand the concepts and helped him to identify issues affecting the management of terrorism crises in Egypt as perceived by various tourism stakeholder groups. These results assisted in preparing both the interview and survey instruments so as to address the research questions appropriately.

#### **4-5-1-4 Conducting the interview**

Once the sampling frame had been determined, the next design choice was to gain access to the respondents. Easterby-Smith et al (2002: 90) note that "an important factor underlying the effectiveness of social interaction within qualitative interviewing is trust" and that "the first point is to ensure that one is well clued up" about the interviewee. Due to the sensitivity of the terrorism issue there were a number of barriers to establishing a rapport with participants. A number of measures were therefore undertaken to manage the sensitivity of the topic. Key to the concerns of Egyptian participants was the need for official proof that the researcher was authorized to conduct the research. This required the researcher to show a letter from the relevant authorities in Egypt confirming his position. Obtaining such a letter required a lengthy procedure. He first had to ask his employer, the Saudi Ministry of the Interior, to draft a letter to the Saudi Arabian Cultural Bureau in London, because the research was due

to be conducted outside Saudi territory. In turn, the Bureau had to inform the Saudi Embassy in Cairo, which contacted the local authorities, requesting them to issue the necessary letter (see Appendix Six). This procedure was carried out in due course; however, no reply was forthcoming from the Egyptian authorities, so the researcher had no choice but to travel to Egypt to pursue the matter in person. After three months of direct contact and requests, the researcher finally obtained approval from the Egyptian authorities, but this was only verbal.

All in all, the cooperation of the Egyptian authorities was very poor and unsatisfactory. The only helpful support the researcher received was from the Ministry of Tourism, after he managed to visit the Minister with a recommendation from the Saudi Embassy in Egypt (see Appendix Six). The Minister made it possible to arrange a number of interviews with people in his department, such as the Director of the Hotel Sector and Tourism Villages, a spokesperson at the Ministry of Tourism and the Director of the Crisis Management Unit in the Ministry. However, many stakeholders engaged in the crisis management of tourism did not operate under the auspices of the Tourism Ministry. Nevertheless, informing the rest of participants that a number of tourism authorities had participated in this project reassured them and make them feel that their own participation was possible, especially when the researcher provided them with some names of senior managers at the Ministry of Tourism who had agreed for their participation to be recorded and declared, such as those mentioned above.

In the main study, a total of thirty-six interviews were conducted in Cairo and Sharm El Sheikh in September, October and November 2007, each lasting two to three hours. One significant factor that influences the quality of the qualitative analysis is “subjectivity or qualitative researcher’s internal understanding of the phenomena” (Hays and Singh, 2011: 145). Some authors argue that to minimise subjectivity, researchers are well advised to base

their analysis only on data from the audio-recorded and transcribed text of interviews (Drapeau, 2002). In the present research, however, only 11 interviews were recorded, six in Cairo and five in Sharm El Sheikh, because it was felt that in consideration of the sensitivity of the topic, interviewees who had agreed to their responses being audio-recorded were more careful and restrained in their answers than those whose words were not recorded. For this reason, the researcher stopped seeking permission to record interviews; instead, during each interview he took notes and tried to make these as complete as possible. His fast typing skill was very helpful, allowing him to capture and record many details. As with transcribed data, the data produced in this way reflected accurately the responses of the participants and thus the subjectivity of the researcher was minimized.

The prepared list of questions proved to be a good guide through the interview. However, some questions were sometimes dropped during the interview in favour of more important questions which arose during the course of it, and sometimes the sequence of questions was changed spontaneously. By November 2007 the phase of collecting primary data through qualitative interviews had been completed.

#### **4-5-1-5 Analysing the qualitative data**

The final stage of research design is the analysis and interpretation of data, because once researchers have collected their data, they need to analyse them to answer their research questions or test their hypotheses. This stage is essential to make sense of the research. As mentioned in section 4-2, a qualitative interview is associated with the phenomenological paradigm in which an in-depth understanding is pursued instead of explanation via causal relationships and findings that may be generalisable to similar settings and contexts.

The first choice to make in analysis of qualitative data is whether software such as NVivo shall be used. A discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of computer-assisted data

analysis is an integral element of many studies of qualitative data analysis. The pertinent question is whether computers can take over the analytical process and how they can improve the validity of qualitative analysis, if at all. Computer-assisted data analysis can offer many advantages to the researcher in the storage, coding and systematic retrieval of qualitative data, especially when the researcher deals with an extensive amount of textual data. However, it is subject to some criticisms, including (1) the sacrificing of depth for breadth of analysis and the application of quantitative principles such as frequency, (2) the favouring of distance rather than personal engagement with data and (3) overemphasizing data analysis with grounded theory rather than a wide range of theories (Bazeley, 2007). Some scholars have attempted to address these criticisms largely by focusing on developments in software. However, the most significant concerns are that computer-assisted analysis cannot substitute for the analytic mind, nor can it provide a shortcut to data coding.


Apart from the potential shortcomings indicated above, each of which can serve as a barrier to using computer-assisted data analysis in research such as this, the decision to use it in a particular project is influenced by a number of factors, such as the nature of the data and the researcher's preferred approach to data analysis, which will have at its basis certain epistemological and ontological assumptions (Morison and Moir, 1998: 106). The present research relied on relatively short data extracts and focused on individualized understanding such as can be gained from interpretive, constructive, or negotiated processes, rather than on the thematic content of qualitative data. Having said that, computer-assisted data analysis would arguably be less beneficial to this study. A further practical reason for rejecting the application of analytical software is the fact that many of the functions of such software, for example searching for a series of interrelated texts, can be found in simple word-processing packages such as Microsoft Word, making it unnecessary and inefficient to invest the time needed to become familiar with intricate software packages.

Analysis of data is time consuming and researchers have to think about it in advance (Walsh, 2001) and should organize such qualitative data into manageable formats. Perhaps there are long written answers or a great deal of tape to be listened to. This is what is called preparing data for analysis and in this case the act of data analysis is very likely to occur at the same time as the researcher gathers these data, as well as afterwards. It is widely believed that there are neither easy nor straightforward procedures in qualitative analysis. Yin (2003) refers to quantitative researchers as having access to several tried and tested statistical methods whilst qualitative and case study researchers have a number of language-based analytical techniques at their disposal. In contrast to statistical analyses, there are few certain formulas or pre-determined structures at the forefront of qualitative analysts. However, many researchers suggest that the process of analysis involves certain distinct stages.

For instance, Miles and Huberman (1994: 10) propose an interactive data analysis model consisting of the following three elements: data reduction, which “refers to the process of selecting, focusing, simplifying, abstracting, and transforming the data that appear in written-up notes or transcription”; data display, which “is designed to assemble organised information into an immediately accessible, compact form so that the analyst can see what is happening and either draw justified conclusions or move on to the next step of analysis the display suggests may be helpful”; and conclusion drawing/verifying, using various patterns, such as clustering, making metaphors, making contrasts/comparisons, finding intervening variables and noting relations between variables, building a logical chain of evidence, or making conceptual/theoretical coherence.

Miles and Huberman (1994) point out that data reduction and data display are not separate from analysis but are part of it. The three streams of qualitative data analysis together with

the process of data collection can be represented either in parallel form or in a cyclical interactive model, as indicated in Figure 4.4.



**Figure 4.4: Interactive Data Analysis Model**

Source: Miles and Huberman (1994)

Jennings (2005) proposes a modified qualitative analysis of interviews to suit tourism research. He divides the process into various stages which include all of Miles and Huberman's (1994) tasks of analysis. He particularly identifies these stages: transcription, identification of general themes, specific findings relating to research objectives, comparing and contrasting specific findings, developing interpretations and verification, presentation and writing. Miles and Huberman (1994) and Jennings (2005) both seem to provide useful techniques in order to analyse the collected data. For the purpose of this research, the two concepts have been combined in a five-step-analysis-process.

### **Step 1: Transcription**

After the interviews had been carried out, the tapes were transcribed. Linguistic characteristics such as dialect or fillers were cleared up as far as they had no relevance to the content. Although the literature suggests that interviews can be transcribed by other people

than the researcher, all the interviews were transcribed by the author himself in order to get a feeling for the data.

### **Step 2: Creation of subject areas**

The transcribed interviews were read through several times in order to get a feeling for the data and the content. During this stage, some comments were made on each individual interview. These comments then led to the creation of relevant subject areas in combination with the already existing research subjects/questions mentioned earlier in this chapter.

### **Step 3: Selection of statements and allocation to specific subject areas**

After the subject areas had been created, the transcriptions were read through again in order to select relevant statements, which were then allocated to the specific subject areas.

### **Step 4: Comparison of statements within specific subject areas**

The individual statements within specific subject areas were then compared with each other in order to filter differences and/or similarities. Of special interest was the question as to whether there were any contrasts between public and private or local and central statements.

### **Step 5: Conclusions**

From the data generated in the previous stages, conclusions were then drawn and were used to build principal research propositions and hypotheses, as described in greater detail in Chapter 7.

## **4-5-2 Quantitative survey**

As noted in section 4-5-1, the qualitative and quantitative research phases were conducted in parallel. The quantitative phase, which took several months, comprised a number of stages. First, a the population frame had to be created and samples defined, then the questionnaire

had to be designed and pilot tested before it was distributed and collected. The last stage was to prepare and analyse the data. These stages are described in the following subsections.

#### **4-5-2-1 Creating the sample**

In order to conduct a survey, the first step is to make sense of its target population, which is “the entire set of individuals to which findings of the survey are to be extrapolated” (Levy and Lemeshow, 1999: 13). This target population is considered to be the ideal population to be studied, but this ideal is hardly ever achieved in practice. Instead, researchers choose to study a desired number of units, which is technically termed a sample of the population. To execute a real-life survey, researchers also need a sampling population or ‘sampling frame’, which is a comprehensive or quasi-comprehensive list of all units (e.g. people, employers, organisations) in the target population (Groves et al, 2004). The greatest challenge regarding sampling frames is that in some instances they do not represent the target population adequately, because they miss some parts of it or include item which lie outside it. The congruence or disparity between target populations and sampling frames has always been a matter of concern. Another problem is that a sampling frame is not always available to researchers, who therefore have to compile one that suits the research aims best by collecting the information from printed sources or digital databases.

For this research, an accurate and up-to-date database (i.e. a suitable sampling frame) of tourism stakeholders involved in crisis management in Egypt was not available. Therefore, the first task of the researcher in creating a sample was to construct the such a sampling frame, so he conducted an archival search of the relevant sources. It became clear that there were a number of databases holding details of tourism stakeholders in Egypt, but they suffered from two main limitations. First, they were limited to private sector bodies, having been produced for commercial tourism purposes. Second, in several instances, detailed lists of names and addresses were incorrect or outdated. A very helpful source of information



proved to be the Egyptian Tourism Information Guide (*Dalil Maloomat al-Siahiah Mesriah*), which provides some useful key contact details for Egyptian tourism stakeholders. This provided a very valuable basis for identifying the target population, but in order to produce a more comprehensive list of the tourism stakeholders involved in crisis management and to collect accurate details of potential respondents for the purpose of the questionnaire survey, it was necessary for the researcher to consult lists compiled by the Egyptian Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation and by the Central Agency for Mobilization and Statistics, which provided useful data on both public and private sector stakeholders, with detailed lists of names and addresses. With respect to stakeholders in the non-profit and community sectors, a booklet published by the Ministry of Awqaf (Endowment) was used to compile a list of some imams, while the databases of the Egyptian Social Fund for Development offered useful information regarding other NGOs active in the tourism industry in Egypt. Overall, it was not difficult to create a list of public-sector tourism stakeholders, given the limited number of government agencies involved in the industry, but there was a potentially limitless number of organizations and representatives within the private sector involved in one way or another in Egyptian tourism. In the case of non-profit organizations, the task was even more challenging, as there was a clear lack of useful and publicly available data concerning these entities and their involvement in the tourism industry.

Once the target population had been broadly defined, within the limitations noted above, the next step was to carry out the sampling. Probability sampling was not possible, because the population size was ambiguous. As discussed in section 4-5-1-1, non-probability sampling takes various forms. For this quantitative phase, quota techniques were deemed more appropriate than the purposive and snowball techniques used in the qualitative phase, largely because the relevant quota variables were available and the intention was to create a sample as representative of the population as possible (Babbie, 2010). Quota sampling, frequently

used in business and marketing, involves selecting a sample based on specific criteria, such as age, gender or social class, in proportions equal to those represented in the population. However, interviewers select individual respondents, rather than having a pre-defined list as with probability sampling (Fowler and Mangione, 1990). The non-probability nature of quota sampling means that it is not possible to estimate sampling error; however, its strength lies in the speed with which data can be collected and its usefulness in situations where no finite sampling frame exists (Moser and Kalton, 1971).

The process of sampling begins with defining a matrix, describing the quotas in terms of strata of the target population. The first stratum represented the categories of stakeholders. The main categories of tourism stakeholders in Egypt had already been identified in the pilot study of the qualitative phase. They were divided into 10 categories: central/ local government; Ministry of Tourism; Ministry of the Interior (Tourism Police); General Authority for Promoting Tourism; hotels/ Hotel Association/ resorts; tourism companies/ travel agencies; Chambers of Tourism; airlines and cruise lines; religious scholars (imams); national media, international media (Al Jazeera TV's representative in Cairo) and international tourism organizations (WTO representatives in Cairo and Sharm El Sheikh). The Tourism Police was later excluded as it refrained from participating in the research. Another distinctive feature was the central or local geographical location of stakeholders, a distinction being made between those stakeholders based in Cairo and those based locally in the terrorism-affected cities.

Once these quotas were set and the matrix was created, the researcher proceeded with sampling by filling each cell of the matrix with respondents having all the characteristics of a given quota. An important consideration in this process was that all respondents in each cell should be given a weight appropriate to their proportion of the total population, so that the matrix would ultimately present a picture of respondents reflective of the whole target

population. This is illustrated in Table 4.5 in that the number of units allocated for sampling in each cell represents around 70 percent of the overall population. For instance, 24 respondents in the sample had the characteristics of the first cell of the matrix (local/ governmental stakeholders in Cairo), making approximately 70% of the whole population of 43. The respective numbers for Sharm El Sheikh, Taba and Dahab were 16 out of 29, 12 out of 19 and 14 out of 17.

**Table 4.5: Questionnaire matrix**

Location	Cairo		Sharm el Sheikh		Taba		Dahab	
Stakeholders categories	Distribution of units in population and samples		Distribution of units in population and samples		Distribution of units in population and samples		Distribution of units in population and samples	
	Sample size	Population size	Sample size	Population size	Sample size	Population size	Sample size	Population size
Central/ local government	24	43	16	29	12	19	14	17
Ministry of Tourism	58	89	37	48	18	31	17	26
Ministry of the Interior	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tourism bodies and chambers	40	64	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tourism companies/ travel agencies	30	58	27	58	17	22	23	32
Hotels/ restaurants/ associations	21	41	22	41	18	37	25	31
Airlines and cruise lines	22	30	15	28	15	26	16	21
National media	20	24	19	23	8	9	0	0
International Media	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
Imams	8	19	13	23	12	17	5	9
International Tourism Organization	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
Total Number	228	372	150	250	100	161	100	136

This method of sampling has a number of inherent weaknesses. First, the samples might not be representative of their populations (although in this case the total populations—of private stakeholders in particular—were limited). The question is therefore how well these samples represent the populations as a whole. In this study, the populations under scrutiny were largely public, private and non-profit tourism stakeholders in Egypt. In the case of private tourism stakeholders, the sampling frame represents the population only partially, because it can be assumed that the available databases and booklets did not list all private sector stakeholders. One might conclude that the research does not represent accurately the crisis management situation in the Egyptian tourism industry. However, in the case of public stakeholders, the sample was drawn from an approximately complete list. In addition, the proportion of public stakeholders responding supports the conclusion that the sample was representative.

Another limitation of quota sampling relates to the data analysis, in view of the fact that the selection of sample elements within a given cell may be biased, even though its proportion of the population is accurately estimated. In relation to this problem, it can be argued that the underlying assumption was that top stakeholders had unique characteristics giving them a greater influence on the overall management of security crises than that exercised by minor or peripheral stakeholders. For example, a large and prestigious hotel can be more effectively involved in crisis management than a small inn. However, it was assumed that local stakeholders would be of particular importance to the extent that they were involved directly in crisis management efforts, so the main sampling quota was allocated to them.

Despite these justifications, these limitations of quota sampling have to be taken into consideration when dealing with samples. One option would have been not to include a quantitative stage at all, in light of the sampling problem. However, it was felt that a number of the factors emerging from the qualitative stage merited measurement. Therefore, other

strategies had to be found to overcome the above problems. The most popular strategy to address such limitations is the use of a multi-method approach, combining qualitative research with quantitative measures of population, as proposed by Silverman (2000). As noted in section 4-3 and 4-4, the methodology adopted for this study is based on a parallel mixed-methods approach involving qualitative interviews and a quantitative survey. Denscombe (2003: 133) explains the value of mixed methods as follows:

Seeing things from a different perspective and the opportunity to corroborate findings can enhance the validity of the data. They do not prove that the researcher has 'got it right', but they do give some confidence that the meaning of the data has some consistency across methods and the findings are not too closely tied up with a particular method used to collect the data. Effectively, they lend support to the analysis.

In summary, the problems of quota sampling were taken into consideration, limitations relating to this study were recognized and strategies were followed in order to overcome these limitations.

#### **4-5-2-2 Designing the questionnaire**

This section deals with the formal issues of questionnaire design (i.e. layout considerations, length of questionnaire, covering letter, pilot testing), while specific details relating to the actual content of the questionnaire (i.e. the initial questions according to the research areas and actual scales used in the questionnaire) will be dealt with in Chapter 6.

Saunders et al (2009) suggest that the design of the questionnaire will affect not only the response rate, but also the validity and reliability of the data. They emphasise that a careful design of individual questions, a clear layout of the questionnaire form, a lucid explanation of the purpose of the questionnaire, pilot testing and carefully planned and executed administration of the questionnaire are crucial points in achieving a good response rate and ensuring reliability and validity. Hague (1992) identifies poor layout/sequence, inappropriate

length of questionnaire, inconsiderate questions and items which miss the mark as the major pitfalls of questionnaire design.

Concerning an appropriate length for a questionnaire, Saunders et al (2009) recommend 6-8 A4 pages. This is confirmed by Sharp, Peters and Howard (2002: 156), who explain that “it would usually be considered unwise to have a questionnaire requiring more than about twenty minutes to fill in or covering more than, say, six A4 pages.” The length of the questionnaire has always been considered an important issue in this study, assuming that it has an impact on the response rate. The aim of the research was therefore to restrict the questionnaire to eight A4 pages in order to produce a user-friendly booklet (four A4 pages on each of two A3 sheets, double-sided and folded). Length is also related to layout issues. In order to be manageable for the respondents, the questionnaire should be orderly and the instructions should be clear, according to Hague (1992), who continues that the convenience of respondents is a major issue in self-completion questionnaires and determines the response rate. Therefore, everything was done to make it easy for the respondent to fill in the questionnaire and reply to it, even if that meant additional work on the part of the researcher. Edwards et al (2002) note that questionnaires originating from universities are more likely to be returned than questionnaires from other sources (such as commercial organisations), so the University of Hull logo was reproduced on the cover of the questionnaire.

May (2001: 100) emphasises that “the most important part of the actual design of questions is to construct them unambiguously and to be clear in your own mind what the question is for, who it is to be answered by and how you intend them to interpret it”. This advice was carefully followed in designing the questions. The actual process of question wording was based on recommendations made by May (2001), who rates the following points as important: ensuring that questions are not too general, using the simplest language possible to convey the meaning of the question, avoiding using prejudicial language and ambiguity,

eliminating vague words in order to avoid vague answers, avoiding leading and hypothetical questions, and ensuring that the respondents have the necessary knowledge to answer the questions.

Questionnaires can be pre-coded to allow the classification of responses into meaningful categories and therefore to make the questionnaire easier to analyse (May, 2001). Pre-coding was considered but then abandoned, in the belief that respondents might be confused by additional numbers. Here again, the convenience of the participants was more important than that of the researcher.

The cover letter is as important as the questionnaire itself, according to Czaja and Blair (1996: 82), who explain that it ought to help obtain cooperation. Therefore, it “must be eye-catching (yet professional), clear (but brief), and compelling (but neutral). The letter must stand out from the welter of junk mail most people receive and must speak for the researcher to the respondent, addressing the key obstacles to cooperation.” A polite and clearly formulated cover letter was designed following the recommendations of Dillman (1978), Hague (1992) and Czaja and Blair (1996), including a personal salutation (whenever the name of the contact was known), a brief description of the research project, a rationale for selecting the stakeholders in question, clear instructions, a reassurance of confidentiality and anonymity, and finally contact details of the research team. The statement of confidentiality was made explicit, as this not only protects respondents’ identity, but also increases their willingness to take part in surveys (Bryman and Bell, 2003; Saunders et al, 2009). It was especially important in the Egyptian context at the time of conducting the fieldwork. Each letter was then signed by the researcher using blue ink.

#### **4-5-2-3 Pilot testing**

Pilot testing is a crucial aspect of every questionnaire survey, as it enables one to “refine the questionnaire so that respondents will have no problems in answering the questions and there will be no problems in recording the data” (Saunders et al, 2009: 308). Oppenheim (1992: 64) adds that “studies which have been inadequately piloted, or not piloted at all, will find that a great deal of effort has been wasted on unintelligible questions producing unquantifiable responses and uninterpretable results.” The pilot test consisted of two stages.

First, a draft of the instrument was shown to a group comprising 20 fellow postgraduate students of the Business School from Egypt and other Middle Eastern countries (Libya, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Iran), as well as some people working in the tourism industry across Egypt, including a manager of the tourism company Kimidar Tours and the Director of the Public Relations Office of the Tourism Development Authority in Sharm El Sheikh. Experts in questionnaire design within and outside the Business School were also consulted. They reviewed the questionnaire for clarity, wording and layout, then suggested changes to the first draft of the survey instrument. All pilot testers were contacted beforehand and asked whether they were willing to test the questionnaire. They then received a copy of the covering letter and the questionnaire. Following the recommendation of Bell (1999), they were also given a list of factors to consider, such as the length of the questionnaire, its layout and manageability as well as its content. Most of the pilot testers were quite happy with the length of the questionnaire, although three suggested a shorter version. The clarity of instructions was not a problem, according to the respondents. However, some suggested rethinking a number of the questions. For example, a question dividing strategies into ‘supportive’, ‘marginal’, ‘non-supportive’ and ‘mixed blessing’ was deleted because of the ambiguity in the understanding of the concepts and difficulty in operationalization. The use of term ‘terrorism’ was also reduced throughout the questionnaire, as many respondents considered



this a highly sensitive issue which made them reluctant to take part in the survey. Following pilot testers' recommendations, the section about specific measures and strategies was reconsidered and modified, as the initial questionnaire offered a single list, whereas respondents felt that the list should be broken into three parts. The sections dealing with the powers of stakeholders and their interactions were also modified. In the initial questionnaire, two separate tables had been used for each stage of crises, while the pilot testers felt that it was better to merge all stages into one table. Thus, all tables these sections were reduced and some of them modified as suggested by some respondents.

Based on this feedback, the researcher developed a second draft, which was subsequently delivered to seven stakeholders (three from the tourism industry and four from government bodies) in Sharm El Sheikh, who were asked to complete it and provide additional feedback on matters relating to content, wording, comprehension and the appropriateness of questions. At this stage, the Arabic wording of the questionnaire was improved according to pilot testers' recommendations. Based on the recommendations of the respondents in the pre-test, the researcher then produced the final version of the questionnaire. The purposes of the pre-test were to ensure that the instrument measured what was intended and to improve the quality of the questionnaire before finalizing the survey.

All in all, pilot testing proved to be useful, as modifications in response to recommendations made by the pilot testers improved the quality of the final questionnaire.

#### **4-5-2-4 Distribution and collection of the questionnaire**

After the process of questionnaire design had been completed, the final instrument was distributed. The timing of questionnaire distribution was an important consideration, as it might well have an impact on the response rate. Gillham (2000: 46) suggests avoiding "holiday periods or when organisations are likely to be closed, or exceptionally busy". In this

respect, the summer months seemed to be problematic, because all private stakeholders were likely to be very busy. The period shortly before or after summer holidays might also cause problems, as most private sector stakeholders would be preparing or reviewing their peak-time activities. In the case of public stakeholders, however, the timing seemed less problematic. In view of these observations and considering the timeframe of the study, it was decided to approach private and public stakeholders at the beginning of September 2007, thus avoiding both the summer months and Christmas time, which is another busy season for tourism stakeholders. Given that the overall process of data collection took 3 months, it was over before the Christmas peak.

Another decision which had to be made concerned the method of distribution of the questionnaire, in person or by post. The primary method was the latter: respondents received a mailed package including a covering letter, a questionnaire and a postage-paid return envelope, making it easy for them to reply and therefore contributing to the convenience factor mentioned by Hague (1992). In Cairo, the mailing package also included an endorsement letter from the Graduate School of Hull University. Unfortunately, no support was received from the Egyptian authorities to issue an endorsement letter which could also be attached. Instead, the researcher stated in the cover letter that verbal permission for the research to be conducted in the Egyptian tourism sector had been given by Egyptian Minister of Tourism. He also mentioned that some high level managers at the Ministry of Tourism had already participated in the project. These procedures helped to reassure respondents and to increase the level of participation. Public stakeholders were pre-notified by telephone, as suggested by Jobber and O'Reilly (1996) and Edwards et al (2002), as their number was manageable.

The distribution process was carried out in two stages: the physical preparation and actual sending out of the postal questionnaires. Lists were made of the addresses and names

provided in the population frame, then questionnaires, covering letters, requests forms and return envelopes were printed three weeks before distribution. A total of 578 letters were sent out to tourism stakeholders across Egypt on Monday, 08 September 2007. This caused no problems thanks to strict and solid planning. In the first instance, 201 completed questionnaires were returned, which was considered an unsatisfactory response rate. The importance of follow-up letters in reaching a high overall response rate is mentioned by various authors (Hague, 1992; Saunders et al, 2003; Gillham, 2000; Bryman and Bell, 2003) and supported by some studies (e.g. Edwards et al, 2002). Following recommendations made by Hague (1992), a special covering letter was created for the second mailing, emphasising the importance of contribution and reiterating the objectives of the study. The covering letter also included an apology in case the reminder had crossed with a response to the first mailing. It was decided to distribute the follow-up letters purely by post. This second mailing carried out at the end of October 2007, but the result was unsatisfactory. Therefore, to increase the response rate, the researcher hired a number of local assistants to issue frequent reminders to the respondents. However, these efforts failed to overcome serious difficulties faced during data collection, especially in Dahab and Taba. Therefore, to maximize the response rate, the local assistants contacted targeted stakeholders and in many instances visited them in person, leaving the entire package once again with those who agreed to fill in the questionnaires. They also telephoned all stakeholders on the list and requested their participation in the study. Those who agreed to participate were provided with the entire package either by fax or by arranging a hand delivery via a third party living in the town concerned. These attempts resulted in the return of 195 additional questionnaires. All in all, 396 questionnaires were returned. The response rate is discussed in greater detail in chapter 6.

#### **4-5-2-5 Analysing the quantitative data**

After the quantitative data collection process had been completed, data analysis began. Chapter 6 explains the various stages of this process in greater detail, whereas this section provides a brief overview of the process and techniques used. The decision of which data analysis technique to use was based on a number of factors, including the techniques used in previous similar studies. Another decision criterion is stated by Bryman and Bell (2003), who note that the techniques used are limited by the type of variables and the nature and size of the sample. In the first version of this thesis, the researcher decided to use only simple descriptions, that is, simple summaries of the characteristics of variables. However, on the recommendation of the examiner, this version has been analysed in a more sophisticated way, employing sound multivariate statistical methods.

Most statistical resources differentiate between two types of statistical analysis: comparing the groups and exploring the relationships. The former is called causal-comparative research and concerns differences between groups, aiming to compare the values of certain continuous variables for different groups and occasions, while the latter is termed correlational research and focuses on the strength of the relationships between variables (e.g. Charles, 1998; Gay & Airasian, 2000; Martella et al, 1999).

According to Johnson and Christensen (2000: 3), a main distinction between these two methods is that “causal-comparative includes a categorical independent and/or dependent variable (thus the word comparative implying a group comparison) and correlational only includes quantitative variables”. The causal-comparative approach starts with the selection of two or more groups with existing differences, which are then compared on an outcome (dependent) variable. Some causal-comparative designs involve only two independent groups to be compared on a particular continuous dependent variable, for example, studying the differences between male and female students on exam scores. In such causal-comparative

studies, the most common technique is the t-test, for testing the research hypothesis that there are differences between the two independent sample means. Some other causal-comparative research designs involve more than two groups, for example, studying differences between white, black and Hispanic students on exam scores. In such work, analysis of variance (ANOVA) will be used to analyze the data. Other causal-comparative designs involve studying differences between (among) two or more independent groups on two or more related dependent variables. In this case, multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) is the correct statistical procedure to determine whether two or more independent groups differ on more than a single dependent variable. It is important to note that the t-test, ANOVA and MANOVA are parametric statistical procedures that require interval- or ratio-level data, a large sample size and the satisfying of statistical assumptions such as normality and independence of observations.

The present research has adopted a causal-comparative approach to analysis as more appropriate because it includes two different categories of stakeholders (local vs. central) and different stages of crises (pre- and post-crisis). In addition, the research produced an extensive set of variables by using a five-point Likert scale. Likert items can be analysed in different ways. It is common to treat them as interval- or ratio-level data, and if relevant assumptions are met, parametric statistical tests, which usually use casual-comparative research, can be applied. However, before proceeding to this technique, the quantitative analysis chapter first seeks to offer a descriptive general view by organizing and summarizing the Likert scales in terms of means and standard deviation scores in a tabular format. To do so, each table lists in descending order all means from the highest to the lowest. The mean is selected because it is the most commonly used measure of a central tendency and is what is commonly referred to as the average of the data values. In addition, this research uses cross-tabulations methods to present descriptive statistical findings by using quadrant analysis, in

which responses to two rating scale questions are plotted in four quadrants of a two-dimensional table (Zikmund and Babin, 2006:508). The research used the IBM SPSS 19 and Minitab 16 software as analytical tools to analyze and compare the basic information.

#### **4-5-2-6 Reliability and validity of the questionnaire**

According to Neuman (2006), although perfect reliability and validity are virtually impossible to achieve, there are principles that researchers can apply to improve both. Reliability deals with an indicator's dependability, which means that the information it provides does not vary as a result of the characteristics of the indicator, instrument, or measurement device itself (Neuman, 2006). Reliability is concerned with the accuracy and precision of a measurement procedure. In other words, a measure is reliable to the degree that it supplies consistent results (Cooper and Schindler, 2003).

To improve reliability, this study not only replicated some measures that other researchers had used but also used a pre-test approach, as noted in section 4-5. The purposes of the pre-test were to ensure that the instrument measured what was intended and to improve the quality of the questionnaire before finalizing the survey. As noted in section 4-5-1-1, there was a problem regarding the quota sampling that may have influenced reliability. As the samples were not random and the population of tourism stakeholders was potentially limitless, it would have been impossible to achieve perfect reliability. The results were potentially biased by the fact of who responded. However, this was unavoidable and does not negate the findings.

Validity is the degree of fit between a construct and its indicators (Neuman, 1994). It refers to how well the conceptual and operational definitions mesh with each other or the extent to which a test measures what the researcher wishes to measure (Neuman, 1994; Cooper and Schindler, 2003). Two types of measurement validity, face and content validity, were

checked in this study. Face validity is a judgment by the scientific community that the indicator really measures the construct (Neuman, 1994). It was established in this case by asking experts in crisis management, tourism and terrorism studies whether or not the definitions and methods of measurement fitted. More specifically, the academic experts in crisis management were asked to determine how well the beliefs and perceptions of tourism stakeholders concerning crisis management were defined and measured in the study; they were also asked how well the stakeholder theories were defined in the study and whether the operationalization of stakeholder analyses measured what the study aimed to assess.

The content validity of a measuring instrument addresses the question of whether the full content of a definition is represented in a measure. In other words, it is the extent to which the measuring instrument provides adequate coverage of the topic under study (Cooper and Schindler, 2003). To achieve content validity, thorough research was used to define concepts clearly and to select the scales used in the study, then an international scholar who was an expert in crisis management in the context of tourism was asked to judge how well the instrument covered the relevant dimensions of the topic under study. His expertise was used to determine whether the instrument was able to analyse the structure of existing relations among destination stakeholders and to verify the appropriate sample for the study. He suggested minor changes, which were made to the second draft of the instrument.

## **4-6 Sensitivity of the Research**

It is no exaggeration to say that terrorism is and has been among the most sensitive issues in Egypt. Few researchers are willing to approach topics associated with terrorism, particularly when the link between terrorism and an economically significant activity such as tourism is in question. Apart from the lack of literature, the primary resources on the topic are very rare and inaccessible. As with other closed societies, there is a prevailing tendency in Egypt to

classify documents as secret for no legitimate reason (Hatem, 1994). The only available information is that which the authorities allow to circulate; it is mainly in the form of self-presentation, speeches and published interviews in the public press, which are unreliable in many ways. For one thing, there is an incentive amongst Egyptians to misrepresent themselves and to confuse hopes with realities (ibid).

What made the situation particularly complicated in respect of the present study was the risk and potential harm that respondents thought they would face if they contributed to the research. One participant stated, “I have every intention of making a contribution to the project, but please do not blame me, as the release of information you requested would put me behind bars”. Another challenge was the widespread suspicion of conspiracy among citizens at large, due to Egypt’s long colonial history. This negative perception made respondents very reluctant to offer full and correct answers to the questions (Hatem, 1994). They often saw the research as a plot hatched by rivals from abroad as a means to collect sensitive information and ultimately use it to damage the tourism industry in Egypt.

A number of measures were undertaken to manage the sensitivity of the topic. The researcher routinely explained to interviewees the value of the study and assured them that he had in mind their interests as well as the search for knowledge. However, these measures proved to be inadequate in the Egyptian context to build trust with participants. Therefore, alternative methods were used to demonstrate the independence of the researcher. Key to the concerns of Egyptian participants was the need for official proof that the researcher was authorized to conduct the research. This required the researcher to show a letter from the relevant authorities in Egypt confirming his position. Obtaining such a letter required a lengthy procedure. He first had to ask his employer, the Saudi Ministry of the Interior, to draft a letter to the Saudi Arabian Cultural Bureau in London, because the research was due to be



conducted outside Saudi territory. In turn, the Bureau had to inform the Saudi Embassy in Cairo, which contacted the local authorities, requesting them to issue the necessary letter (Appendix six). This procedure was carried out in due course; however, no reply was forthcoming from the Egyptian authorities, so the researcher had no choice but to travel to Egypt to pursue the matter in person. After three months of direct contact and requests, the researcher finally obtained approval from the Egyptian authorities, but this was only verbal.

All in all, the cooperation of the Egyptian authorities was very poor and unsatisfactory. The only helpful support the researcher received was from the Ministry of Tourism, after he managed to visit the Minister with a recommendation from the Saudi Embassy in Egypt (Appendix six). The Minister made it possible to arrange a number of interviews with people in his department, such as the Director of the Hotel Sector and Tourism Village, a spokesperson at the Ministry of Tourism and the Director of the Crisis Management Unit in the Ministry. However, many stakeholders engaged in the crisis management of tourism were not under the auspices of the Tourism Ministry. Nevertheless, informing the rest of participants that a number of tourism authorities had participated in this project reassured them and make them feel that their own participation was possible, especially when the researcher provided them with some names of senior managers at the Ministry of Tourism who had agreed for their participation to be recorded and declared, such as those mentioned above.

Another measure that helped to increase quality and validity, while minimizing harm, was to give participants assurances of confidentiality (Palys and Lowman, 2006). To this end, interviewees were promised that information given to the researcher would not be disclosed in such a way that the participants could be publicly identified. However, many were still reluctant to participate fully and to share information, because the anonymity of participants

is partial in face-to-face interviews (Marx, 1999). To ensure full confidentiality, so that nobody could know the identity of participants in any way, a questionnaire with no identifiers was designed and local assistants were asked to distribute it under conditions of complete anonymity. In this case, since the researcher himself did not know the names of respondents, other interested parties were unlikely to attempt to access confidential research files. Such anonymity, however, raises validity concerns, because it was also impossible to know whether the survey was completed by the desired respondents; yet it was the only possible way to collect data while ensuring thorough confidentiality. The abovementioned measures all helped to increase the likelihood that participants would provide truthful information. However, because of the high sensitivity of the topic, it was very difficult to carry out the research in such a context.

## **4-7 Summary**

This chapter has examined the methodological considerations applicable to a study of this kind and described in detail the choices made and procedures followed at each stage of the research design and implementation. It began by stating the purpose, the objectives and the research questions, then discussed the central conceptual issues, taking research philosophy as comprising five concentric dimensions: research paradigm, research approach, research strategy, data collection methods and time horizon. The choices made at each level were set out and explained. There was then a description of the qualitative and quantitative data collection methods used, including the selection of a research sample for the fieldwork and the administrative procedures followed. After a description and justification of the data analysis procedures which were adopted, the chapter ended with a consideration of the sensitivity of the research topic. The results of the data analysis are set out in detail in the two chapters which follow, beginning with the qualitative data gathered in face-to-face interviews with tourism stakeholders in Egypt.

## **Chapter 5 Qualitative Data Analysis**

### **5-1 Introduction**

The aim of this chapter is to present an analysis of the qualitative data gathered during the study. Drawing on the research objectives set out in Chapter One, the interview responses are grouped into five subject areas, each covering a major theme in the Egyptian context. The first research objective was to examine the salience of stakeholders in tourism crisis management and the ways in which this changes at different stages of a crisis. Thus, section 5-2 examines data on the identification and salience of tourism stakeholders before and after crises. The second objective was to describe and analyse the nature of the interactions among key stakeholders in tourism when managing a crisis, both in a normal situation and after the crisis. This theme is explored in section 5-3, while section 5-4 addresses the fourth objective, to promote a deeper understanding of the crisis management techniques employed in managing the different stages of terrorism crises, by analysing responses concerning the methods adopted by stakeholders, categorized as preventive and recovery strategies. The third research objective was to explain the role of organizational and national culture and their impact on the stakeholders' involvement in crisis management in the tourism industry; section 5-5 is devoted to addressing this crucial question. The final research objective, which was to examine the economic and social impacts of terrorism on the tourism industry in Egypt, is dealt with in section 5-6 and the chapter ends with a summary of the findings. Within each of the sections, responses to interview questions are analysed, compared and contrasted, then where appropriate, the findings are visualised by means of diagrams.

## 5-2 Identification and salience of stakeholders in tourism

The main purpose of the questions in the first section of the interview was to elicit data which would provide information on the identification and importance of tourism and crisis management stakeholders in Egypt. To this end, respondents were first asked to identify the main stakeholders in the tourism industry as a whole and those involved in crisis management in particular, then to prioritize them in terms of their key roles in managing terrorism crises.

The majority of respondents reported an impression of ambiguity concerning the classification of stakeholders as belonging to the private and public sectors; they also appeared uncertain about the existence of an independent non-profit sector in the Egyptian tourism industry. On the other hand, most referred to an obvious distinction between stakeholders based in Cairo and those operating locally in tourism destinations, the former being responsible for making major decisions and the latter for implementing those decisions, reporting to the central authorities and providing consultation services to them. Due to the politically and administratively centralised nature of public decision-making in Egypt, the key decisions on crisis management issues were made at a very high level of government in the capital, according to four public-sector interviewees who involved in making key decisions in Cairo (CPP1, CPP3, CPP6, CPP9). This was said to be especially the case when decisions had to do with tourism crisis management. A respondent in Sharm El Sheikh said:

*“All we do is to report to the Minister of Tourism in Cairo, who can make decisions about crises in the light of these reports” (SPP10).*

This was supported by other respondents, one of whom said:

*“We register hotel occupancy rates through our internal offices and report them to the Minister of Tourism in Cairo. He reports to the Prime Minister and President of the Republic, who in turn make decisions....” (SPP9).*

Another clarified this:

*“In case of a massive crisis such as Sharm El Sheikh in 2005, decisions are taken at the highest level, such as the Prime Minister and the Tourism Minister.... I do not know how, but it seems to be through taking into account the related authorities’ reports” (SPP10).*

When asked to identify the crisis management stakeholders in Egypt, including in tourism, respondents referred to two important bodies: the National Crisis Management Committee (NCMC) and the Crisis Management Unit (CMU) at the Ministry of Tourism. The NCMC was said to be responsible for making decisions on all potential crises facing the country, its members being the President, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Tourism, the Minister of the Interior and the Chairman of Egypt Air. The committee was chaired and coordinated by the Prime Minister and decisions were based on reports and comments received from responsible ministers (CPP1, CPP5, SPP11).

The CMU was said to be largely responsible for the management of tourism crises, as its title implies. The director of the Unit explained that its original brief was simply to publish positive news about tourism destinations to improve their image in the target markets, but that the role of the CMU within the ministry had changed, so that it now acted as mediator and coordinator between the Ministry of Tourism and other relevant stakeholders in the public and private sectors (CPP1).

Respondents were asked to list as many stakeholders as possible that they perceived to be important in the Egyptian tourism industry. On occasions, a list based on that of key tourism stakeholders proposed by Sheehan and Ritchie (2004) and other major tourism textbooks was provided, to help respondents to remember the key stakeholders in their own particular context. The suggested list comprised central/ local government, the Ministry of Tourism, the Ministry of the Interior (Tourism Police), tourism chambers, tourism companies/ travel

agencies, hotels/hotel associations/ restaurants/restaurant associations, airlines and cruise lines, imams, state media, international media, governments of generating markets and international tourism organizations.

Once an initial list of key stakeholders in Egypt had been made, the researcher asked respondents to classify them as private, public and non-profit organizations, but many found it difficult to distinguish clearly between the public and private sectors. Indeed, Egypt stands in contrast to many Western countries in that it is difficult to draw a clear boundary between public and private sector organizations within tourism, as government has penetrated all aspects of the industry. Some large tourism organizations like Egypt Air, a national airline company, are largely government owned, while the ownership and operation of others, such as Misr Travel, a leading Egyptian travel agency, are under public control. This matter was mentioned implicitly or explicitly by the majority of interviewees, one of whom noted:

*“We are hardly able to differentiate among hotels, tourism companies and airlines from the private sector and the Ministry of Tourism with all its departments from the public sector, representing the main stakeholders in tourism in Egypt... They are so interwoven that even members of staff have no clear idea of their career identity” (CPP7).*

However, there was a working solution to this problem, as one of the respondents (CPP1) declared that the most important criterion distinguishing the public from the private sector in Egypt was that the revenue of public sector organizations would appear as components of the national budget.

It is also notable that non-profit and community organizations appeared not to have consolidated a significant role in the Egyptian tourism industry. The prime example of these organizations is the Egyptian Tourism Federation, which several respondents described as not entirely independent of the public sector (CPP1, CPP10, SPP11). Another group of stakeholders of this kind is religious establishments and imams. Indeed, one of the most

controversial aspects of stakeholder identification in the Egyptian tourism industry is whether to consider religious scholars or imams as independent stakeholders. Another ambiguity regarding these stakeholders is their potential role in tourism in general. Some of the participants indicated that imams played no significant role in tourism (SPP7, CPP5, SPP1). However, one of the participants emphasized the importance of the role that they could play in persuading people of the importance of tourism to the community:

*“There is little doubt that imams play an important role in the tourism industry, as most Egyptians are religious and respect them. Thus, they have power to persuade people through their sermons, enhancing the hospitality culture and raising public awareness of the importance of tourism” (SPP9).*


With the reservations noted above regarding ambiguity and uncertainty, the responses of interviewees can be interpreted as amounting to the classification of stakeholders set out in Figure 5.1.

Finally, respondents were asked to put these stakeholders in order of their importance in managing terrorism crises. In general, they rated the public stakeholders as more important than the private ones. In addition, many emphasized that the importance of the stakeholders differed considerably once a crisis occurred. As one respondent said:

*“In normal times the all tourism stakeholders have a balanced weight, but during a crisis, the situation is totally different. There is chaos and the police role is dominant and the Crisis Management Unit of the Ministry of Tourism has a marginal role” (SPP12).*

Shortly after the resolution of terrorist attacks or during the recovery stage, however, the most important stakeholder appeared to be the General Authority for Tourism Development (GATD) within the Ministry of Tourism. The GATD was said to be responsible for marketing campaigns throughout the world, through its internal and external offices (SPP7).

It also had close relationships with private sector organizations (CPP5) and Egyptian embassies abroad (SPP7).



**Figure 5.1: Tourism stakeholders classified as public, private and non-profit**

Overall, the responses of interviewees provide the basis of a better understanding of the various stakeholders in the Egyptian tourism industry and their affiliations within the classic sectorial divisions of public, private and non-profit sectors. A rough idea also was gained as to their importance in normal times and times of crisis. The most crucial finding of this section was that in the Egyptian context a functional distinction can be drawn between local and central stakeholders. Broadly speaking, the public and central stakeholders were found to play more important roles than their local and private counterparts. It was also shown that



during a crisis the security sector would play a dominant role, to be replaced at the recovery stage by the GATD.

### **5-3 Stakeholder interaction and stages of crisis management**

Having identified and classified the stakeholders and assessed their relative importance before, during and after crises, the next step was to discover the nature of their interactions in normal times and during crises. According to the theoretical underpinnings spelled out in the previous chapters (particularly sections 2-5, 2-5-5-4 and 2-5-6), the extent to which stakeholders tend to cooperate or pose obstacles will determine the nature of their interactions, as will how and how often they interact with one another. As with the changes in the importance of stakeholders which follow the occurrence of a crisis, it was argued that the ways in which stakeholders interact differ considerably before and after crises. Drawing on these theoretical debates, several questions were formulated to address whether and how the stakeholders interacted to manage a crisis.

Interviewees were first asked about their perceptions of the importance of stakeholder cooperation before and after crises in the tourism industry. Interestingly, there was widespread agreement among respondents that the cooperation of stakeholders was of great importance. The expressions they used to stress the importance of this engagement included ‘*essential and very important*’, ‘*integral part of any crisis management*’, ‘*the essence of the proper solution to the crisis*’ and ‘*a basic part of any successful action*’. Two respondents argued that the cooperation of stakeholders in crisis management had made the well-organized engagement of stakeholders more or less inevitable. One explained:

*“There are hotel managers, customs officers, Ministry of Health to follow up the wounded, Ministry of Foreign affairs etc. ... During a crisis, some countries send planes to repatriate all their nationals... All these must have a high level of cooperation”*  
(SPP14).

Similarly, another respondent said:

*“There is no doubt that cooperation is very important in the tourism sector due to the wide range of stakeholders often involved, including hotels, airlines, tourism companies, shops, other public services, government security ... effective communication and cooperation between stakeholder and among their subsidiaries and internal departments is vital” (SPP11).*

Although there was consensus on the importance of cooperation, most interviewees declared that actual cooperation among tourist stakeholders in Egypt was poor. One clearly spelled this out:

*“There is cooperation, but unfortunately less than we would expect. All stakeholders are more or less reluctant to cooperate (CRP23).*

Interviewees identified several major barriers to efficient cooperation. Some attributed the difficulty of cooperation to the massive size of the tourism industry and the involvement of a wide range of stakeholders from different sectors. One said:

*“The tourism sector needs an advanced communication network which brings together different parties such as the Ministry of Tourism and the Ministry of Interior from the public sector with hotels, tourist companies and airlines from the private sector. Although they have little in common, they are working in one field. Considering such a wide range of stakeholders it is very difficult to reach compromises among them” (CPP8).*

In the same vein was the following contribution:

*“The nature of the tourism sector implies the involvement of different parties from different areas... Yes, all of them are active in the field of tourism and in the service of tourists, but there are fundamental differences: hotels differ from the Ministry of Tourism; similarly, airline services differ from tourism companies” (SRP17).*

This problem was noted by other respondents in different terms; for example:

*“There exists cooperation among most of the relevant ministries. However, in some cases the nature of the work simply does not allow good cooperation with others, as each party has its functions which are distinct from others. ... Cooperation gets underway in the tourism industry when a crisis happens, but perhaps the size of the industry and its inclusion of both public and private sectors makes cooperation between them very difficult” (CPP13).*

Some respondents associated the problem of the size and diversity of stakeholders with another problem, which they called the sector-oriented behaviour of different organizations. Interviewees referred to this as a major obstacle to satisfactory cooperation. One said:

*“Sector-oriented thinking means each party works alone and pursues only its own interests. Therefore, cooperation between stakeholders is not what we would hope” (SPP12).*

An important factor that was said to adversely affect cooperation among stakeholders was the occurrence of crises. Several respondents stated that during crises, cooperation among stakeholders would fall to its lowest level. One spelled this out:

*“It’s true that all stakeholders show a willingness to cooperate, but during a crisis, everything is entirely different. As chaos prevails, everyone works individually; everyone wants to do his work regardless of the others’ work. Everyone feels that his work is more important than the others. In fact, according to what I’ve heard from my colleagues, what’s needed is a neutral position to carry out coordination among all stakeholders” (SRP26).*

In this context, security agencies were identified as the most difficult stakeholders with which to cooperate. As one respondent complained:

*“The most difficult people to cooperate with are those in the Ministry of the Interior, which represents tourist security. They are very reluctant to engage in this*

*communication. This unfortunately causes a big gap... I do not know the reasons behind their behaviour; they may have their reasons, but ultimately this leads to failure to interact satisfactorily with us” (SPP13).*

Another interviewee described how in the case of the Sharm El Sheikh attacks, the police acted by taking the lead and ignoring others:

*“... there was real chaos... there was no prior coordination between the police and the hotel... Police prevented any person or vehicle from entering, even those whose services were urgently needed. It took several hours to get permission to enter; only ambulances were allowed to enter” (SRP26).*

The uncooperative behaviour of the security sector was itself a consequence of a phenomenon which respondents called the securitization of crises. This was confirmed by other respondents, one of whom said:

*“Presumably, the police should not be the only responsible actors and ignore the decisive roles of stakeholders... but the police always use the security excuse to justify all actions and take the lead... Perhaps the most important reason for the domination of the police is the securitization of crises in Egypt” (SRP26).*

As a result, some respondents called for an effective central body to coordinate these diverse parties and put aside their differences. The CMU was set up within the Ministry of Tourism to play just such a role, according to a senior manager of the Unit:

*“Our main task is to bridge between the public and private sectors before, during and after a crisis. [...] There is permanent cooperation between the public sector, represented by the Ministry of Tourism, and the Egyptian Federation of Tourism Chambers, which represents important private sector bodies. The Federation has a governing council which can meet in cases of crisis. The heads of the individual chambers gather with the head of the Federation and the Commissioner of the Crisis Management Unit. It is chaired by the Minister of Tourism...” (CPP1).*


However, almost all other respondents declared that the coordinating role of the Ministry of Tourism was unsatisfactory and that the security sector had gained the upper hand.

Notwithstanding this criticism, there was agreement that once an immediate crisis had passed and recovery strategies were being followed, the coordinator organizations played a more important part. As will be discussed in greater detail in section 5-4, the GATD was found to play a crucial role in coordinating these recovery strategies. The Egyptian Federation of Chambers of Tourism had traditionally acted as a coordinator between public and private sector organizations. Many participants confirmed that they had communicated with the public sector through the Federation and directly. One said:

*“There is cooperation, of course, depending on the nature of the work and common interests. We also cooperate with government departments such as the Ministry of Tourism through the chambers” (CRP16).*

The findings regarding the factors affecting cooperation among stakeholders at the various stages of crises are outlined graphically in Figure 5-2, where a positive effect is indicated by (+) and a negative one by (-). As Figure 5.2 illustrates, a number of interrelated factors were seen as preventing stakeholders from cooperating with one another efficiently in normal times. These included inherent characteristics of the tourism industry such as its extremely large size and its dispersal across the diverse sectors of the economy. The interview data indicate that these two factors in turn gave rise to sector-oriented behaviour, in that each organization tended to work alone and to pursue only its own interests. This lack of cooperation was seen to worsen whenever a crisis arose: the security sector would take the upper hand during crises and have the last word, while the Ministry of Tourism Crisis Management Unit would exercise only a nominal coordinating function. By contrast, there was said to be some degree of cooperation once crises began to diminish, as the GATD and

the Federation of Chambers of Tourism began to play an important role in facilitating interactions among stakeholders.



**Figure 5.2: Factors affecting stakeholders' cooperation at different stages of crises**

The next question was formulated to elicit information about the means and frequency of communication among stakeholders. Most respondents answered that they contacted one another from time to time, using both modern technology and traditional means of communication, as these three responses show:

*“Our contact with travel agencies outside Egypt is through email, to send programmes and tourism offers... Tourism companies are our customers, so there is close cooperation with them” (CRP21).*

*“Our contact with tourism companies is done by telephone or in meetings, especially before the summer season and before the winter season... The relationship is very close” (CRP22).*

*“It is typical contact by using the usual means of communication such as email, phone, fax and others... Of course, most communications are concerned with bookings and organizing celebrations... We contribute to the financing of some events” (SRP27).*

Two important common features of these examples of communication given by stakeholders were that they were limited to handpicked counterparts with whom they had most in common and that contact was made only when the need arose, rather than on a regular basis. As one respondent said:

*“Our contact is largely confined to those people with whom we are linked by common interests... There are also some meetings with the relevant agencies, such as some airlines, but just when the need arises, or when one of the parties requests it” (CRP22).*

Similarly, another stakeholder stated:

*“We use all modern communication channels. Direct contact through meetings and things like that... Our contact is, however, with people who are linked with us in common interests, but regarding the others, contact will take place if there is a need” (CRP16).*

Given these features, it is apparent that the relative infrequency and the nature of communication would be unlikely to facilitate effective and comprehensive cooperation among the multiple tourism stakeholders in Egypt.

## **5-4 Methods and techniques of crisis management**

The main aim of the third section was to understand better how terrorism crises are managed in the tourism industry in Egypt by asking respondents various questions about their perceptions regarding the strategies and techniques they adopted to deal with crises. Following the research theoretical framework, this section was divided into two subsections, covering the prevention and recovery methods used in this regard.

### 5-4-1 Preventive methods

As discussed in section 2-3 of the literature review chapter, a number of methods are used in tourism crisis management to prevent crises. The application of these methods in turn gives an indication of the extent to which the stakeholders concerned act in a reactive or proactive manner. The preparation of contingency plans and the training of personnel were identified as two important methods which could be used to help prevent crises.

The first question to interviewees on the topic of prevention asked about contingency plans for managing terrorism crises. The results reveal that the CMU in the Ministry of Tourism had formulated a series of plans setting out the tasks of each stakeholder in the event of certain crises (CPP6). For instance, one respondent stated:

*“To my knowledge there is a department or unit for crisis management in the Ministry of Tourism, and one of its main tasks is to formulate preventive plans to manage a crisis. In fact, I do not know its details, but there is a plan for sure”* (CPP4).

Another, representing the airline industry, noted:

*“Yes, there are plans. Each tourism site has a plan. For example, at the airport, we have a plan about how to deal with skyjacking. In terms of terrorism crises, especially Sharm El Sheikh 2005, we made use of a plan that had been used on a previous occasion”* (SRP19).

However, respondents referred to a number of shortcomings associated with this approach, stating for example that the plans were not disseminated adequately to all stakeholders, most of whom were unaware of the existence of such plans and preventive measures. They also criticized the plans as narrow and selective, giving a poor fit to some types of crisis and making them particularly inappropriate to terrorism crises. One respondent declared:

*“As far as I am concerned there have been some preventive plans, especially in the health and emergency services. For example, in the recent terrorism crisis (Dahab 2006), the*



*sector was totally prepared to cope with the crisis by rapid treatment of injuries and wounds ... there was also financial help available to reimburse the losses to some services. However, there was no comprehensive plan for terrorism crisis management” (SPP13).*

Another respondent confirmed the existence of such a plan, but stressed its ineffectiveness because it took for granted the cooperation of stakeholders with one another:

*“Some plans have been formulated in advance. However, they fall short of efficiency in practice in confrontation to the crisis. ... In fact, each stakeholder works separately when a crisis takes place. Things are mixed up... confusion occurs both at the individual and organization level” (CPP5).*

Perhaps the most severe challenge identified as facing these contingency plans and their implementation was lack of finance. Since fiscal planning is an integral part of any contingency plan, the next set of questions addressed the issue of the budget for such plans. There was almost complete consensus among respondents that there was no such budget. One said:

*“There is no specific budget for crises.... but as soon as a crisis takes place, it will be estimated and allotted” (CPP2).*

Another stated:

*“There is no specific budget for confronting terrorist attacks, but according to my knowledge, it is possible for the Tourism Minister to allot the budget of other resources to the crisis, an emergency measure which results in the suspension of other projects” (CPP4).*

The next question asked whether and how organizations prepared themselves for a possible terrorism crisis through simulations and training. The results reveal a lack of such training among tourism stakeholders, for tourists and citizens in general in Egypt. However, the most

intriguing aspect of the responses here was the negative perception of Egyptian tourism stakeholders of the necessity and usefulness of such training. The only respondent who did not deny its merits was from the CMU; she maintained that the lack of interest among Egyptian stakeholders in training was a result of a shortage of funds:

*“No, we are not undertaking training to prepare to confront such terrorist crises, largely because it is very costly for the tourism industry in Egypt... Tourism companies’ expenses are very high. It is supposed that the expenses will come from the company’s profit... Many travel agents in Egypt are in debt to banks as a result of overstaffing” (CPP1).*

Some respondents argued that training was unnecessary because maintaining security was beyond their power and authority. They considered that this kind of activity should remain exclusively in the hands of police and security sector. One respondent stated:

*“We are not warriors to protect against terrorists. We are the staff of a hotel. A hotel is like a home. All the people working here and tourists love peace and living in peace. Tourists are looking for enjoyment and workers are looking for a living” (SRP25).*

Similarly, another respondent asked:

*“When security escorts are present everywhere in the city, why we should bother to take unnecessary courses to prepare ourselves for potential attack?” (CRP17).*


Other respondents attributed the uselessness of training to the very nature of terrorist attacks.

In their view, such attacks cannot be anticipated or prevented. One stated:

*“Regarding tourism companies, I believe that they have taken preparedness measures, but the problem is that terrorism incidents are unexpected crises or are beyond their control. For example, a crisis has already happened in Sharm El Sheikh in the past, when heavy rain blocked the main route to the airport and this caused a muddle in passports and among tourist arrivals and their accommodation.... Once again, at Sharm El Sheikh Airport when its water supply was cut off. All these unexpected crises... Yes, we expect a*

*terrorism crisis but do not expect many such crises, which may seem to be simple, but their impacts and damage are significant” (SRP18).*

Figure 5.3 illustrates the relationships among a number of factors that were found to have contributed to the inefficiency or lack of major preventive strategies. As noted above, contingency plans were available but were not effectively executed because knowledge of them was not adequately disseminated and made available to all stakeholders. Furthermore, interviewees considered them to be narrow and selective, thus failing to fit well with many types of potential crisis. Another shortcoming of these strategies appears to have been insufficient attention being given to coordination between the diverse stakeholders involved in the tourism sector. It also appears that the financial resources required for the formulation and implementation of such a programme were not available. Finally, training in preventive strategies was reported not to have been generally provided, largely because of widespread negative perceptions as to the efficacy of such training programmes. These factors can be seen as having combined to produce poor preventive strategies.



**Figure 5.3: Factors associated with poor preventive strategies**

### 5-4-2 Recovery strategies

Several questions were formulated to elicit data concerning the recovery methods. The central concern of this subsection of the interview protocol was to obtain a clear understanding of the strategies adopted and steps taken after a crisis to restore the image of a destination or the industry as a whole from the negative impact of terrorism. Drawing on the conceptual framework of the study, four distinctive groups of such strategies were identified: information dissemination, reassurance campaigns, marketing schemes and financial assistance.

Interestingly, the findings of the research are that the recovery strategies used in Egypt were very much consistent with the latest developments in such techniques in other parts of the world. This may have been partly because the Egyptian government had paid specific attention to the enhancement of the most enduring qualities of the national tourist industry and to keeping pace with modern marketing techniques. One respondent explained how such techniques had been improved and modernized in Egypt by resorting to foreign experts and encouraging the private sector:

*“As a result of the terrorist crises in the nineties, we entered into contracts with a foreign public relations company for training on how to deal with media and answer journalists’ questions. It was very helpful... but I believe that the private sector in Egypt has a greater capacity and strategies to recover rapidly from crisis” (CPP5).*

Another respondent also emphasised the role of the private sector in improving modern campaigning techniques:

*“Marketing campaigns fall within the responsibility of the GATD through its internal and external offices, which make contracts with foreign agencies, but we should not overlook the role of the private sector in marketing Egypt around the globe” (SPP9).*

Interviewees reported that several strategies were followed at this stage. The first concerned measures for the dissemination of accurate and updated information. As an interviewee explained:

*“There is also follow-up of the situation in the foreign press, especially in the target markets. We make sure that there is no incorrect information transmitted; this often happens in the absence of information about a crisis. Where there is no true information about a crisis, the circulation of false information becomes easier... All journalists want to fill space in their papers or TV programmes; therefore, you must give correct and updated information”* (CPP1).

An additional mechanism, undertaken by the GATD, consisted of coordinated publicity and public relations activities, aimed at creating positive public opinion among the media, local community and customers. The director of the GATD in Sharm El Sheikh stated:

*“We are part of everything here. We have to pass information and statements to the high level immediately after any incident... everything related to air traffic, statistics on victims in hospitals, compensation inquiries such as shop owners, stores and restaurants affected by the crisis. They come here to register their names as victims eligible for compensation... There is an important step taken by the minister and the Supreme Council for Tourism, which was held for the first time after the events of the Sharm El Sheikh and represented by the President of the Republic”* (SPP9).

Other PR methods commonly mentioned by interviewees included press interviews, conferences and television advertisements. One explained:

*“There were TV advertisements for internal and external tourists... normally, there was also a campaign at all levels to educate people (shop owners, taxi drivers and others) to highlight the importance of tourism to the country and their own benefit”* (SRP25).

In addition to these information dissemination and PR measures, various reassurance campaigns were reported to have been run following crises in Egypt. One common measure

was on-site visits by senior figures in authority. This strategy was thought to give importance and credibility to the crisis management team and extend the message that everything was under control. The presence of the President at destinations targeted by terrorists was intended to achieve such goals (SPP9).

Another measure involving senior political figures was foreign diplomatic trips by the Minister of Tourism. One respondent said:

*“After the incident, there was an overwhelming concern among Italian nationals, who represent around 30-40% of the tourists at Sharm El Sheikh; the same percentage of Italian tourists were present there during the crisis. The Italian authorities warned Italian tourists to avoid travelling to Sharm El Sheikh and this caused a sharp reduction in the number of tourists visiting Sharm El Sheikh after the events. This forced the Egyptian Tourism Minister to travel to Italy to persuade the Italian government that things were back to normal in Sharm El Sheikh”* (SPP10).

Another respondent described additional diplomatic efforts in this vein:

*Egyptian Embassies around the world also make distinctive efforts in marketing Egypt around the globe after a crisis. They cooperate with international travel agencies in marketing Egypt in these countries”* (CPP3).

The reassurance campaigns described as being used in crisis management in Egypt varied widely. Another commonly reported by interviewees was to invite journalists or other media people to visit affected destinations, as explained in the following response:

*“We welcome all media delegations, either radio or television, important personalities who have an important role in their societies. We accompany these delegations to inform them of the security situation after the incidents, especially in areas that have been targeted by terrorist acts. This is mainly because we want to show these people on behalf of their respective communities and audiences that the situation is now normal”* (SPP11).

Similarly, a Cairo-based public servant said:

*“We organize regular visits (called van trips) for media and tourism companies. These visits continue until business recovers after the incident”* (CPP1).

Referring to the main task of GATD, a local respondent stated:

*“They used their external tourism offices effectively. To my knowledge, these offices used several means such as holding press conferences, inviting journalists and those interested in tourism to visit Egypt and get a firsthand account of the situation...”* (SPP13).

A person from the tourism chamber made a similar point:

*“Tourism chambers play an important role in the transmission of positive information when officials from tourist-exporting countries visit Egypt after any crisis, to show them that the situation is normal and that the whole country, especially tourism destinations, is completely safe and secure”* (CPP3).

These statements reveal the extensive efforts of tourism stakeholders in undertaking these recovery strategies.

Another group of strategies used by Egyptian stakeholders to accelerate the recovery process was marketing schemes. The most common of these methods was reported as focusing on new markets. One respondent stated:

*“After the Sharm El Sheikh events, we faced a considerable reduction of tourism from markets such as France, Britain and Italy; as such we drew attention to the Arab countries and the Gulf States. ... In fact, it was since the Sharm El Sheikh crisis that we discovered lucrative markets such as the Gulf, other Arab countries and Scandinavia”* (CRP21).

In parallel with such strategies, stakeholders encouraged domestic tourists to travel to Egyptian destinations (CPP3), while substituting other tourism destinations in Egypt for the affected places, as the following interviewee explained:

*“Temporarily, we removed Sharm El Sheikh from our packages, while focusing on other areas such as Luxor, Cairo and Aswan. Afterwards, we started gradually to offer Sharm El Sheikh in our tourism packages when normal life returned to Sharm El Sheikh and security improved” (CRP16).*

Another effective marketing scheme undertaken by Egyptian stakeholders in the private sector was to reduce prices while offering very attractive packages. Two such interviewees said:

*“Travel and tourism companies presented new offers with discounted prices. This reduced our income, but to recover from the crisis and return to normal, we had no choice” (SRP18).*

*“We reduced our tourism package prices as much as we could, but we did our best not to discriminate against employees in their redundancy payments. We only reduced the profitability of the tourism packages by asking hotels to give us a discount to help Egyptian tourism products after the crisis” (CRP16).*

The reductions in some cases were as much as fifty percent, as the following respondents reported:

*“We reduced prices by 40%, which helped travel agencies to sell our packages at a discount in a competitive market. By this method, we were able to overcome the crisis” (CRP16).*

*“The reductions made after crises are often deep. In some crises they tend to be over 50%. This is our only weapon... It is really attractive prices... The cost of a trip to Egypt after a crisis can be one third of the cost of the trip at normal times” (SRP27).*

The final group of strategies identified and recommended in the literature is financial assistance. Surprisingly, many respondents stated that no financial assistance was available from the government. One said:



*“Despite the fact that we were in desperate need of financial help, we did not receive any assistance from any source” (SRP21).*

A similar complaint was this:

*“We as a company did not get paid and do not know if there is support or not. It should be allotted by the state, but as a private sector organization we did not receive any support or loans. I could control the crisis with my employees by reducing the profitability of our tourism packages... It was not easy to overcome the crisis, but we were patient and were able to manage” (CRP16).*


The only financial help available was said to be in the form of bank loans, which were difficult to obtain when needed:

*“Sometimes the loan process is a lengthy one, as the banks wait until they are sure that the situation has returned to normal, so it is difficult to obtain a loan shortly after a crisis. This is a big problem... I do not know what I can say to you, but it is not easy for any party to receive a loan. It needs a long procedure and many guarantees” (CRP17).*

Given the lack of available funds to compensate for the damage caused terrorist attacks, it can be concluded that terrorism crises will tend to have serious effects on the lives of Egyptians for whom the tourism industry represents a major source of income, whether directly or indirectly. This issue is discussed further in section 5-6 of this chapter.

The findings of the present section on crisis recovery strategies in the Egyptian tourism industry are summarized in Figure 5-4. As discussed above, the combined efforts of public and private sector stakeholders appears to have led to success in the formulation and implementation of these strategies. In particular, the dissemination of accurate and updated information, efficient and coordinated PR techniques, effective reassurance campaigns and suitable marketing schemes were reported to have contributed positively to effective recovery

strategies. The only factor working against this trend appeared to be the lack of sufficient public sector finance for such recovery strategies.



**Figure 5.4: Factors associated with efficient recovery strategies**

## 5-5 Organizational and national culture

In the penultimate section of the interview protocol, several questions were formulated to assess the degree to which national and organizational culture were perceived to help or hinder tourism stakeholders' efforts in managing terrorism crises. Due to the narrative and value-laden character of the questions, the qualitative approach was most appropriate for the questions in this section. Thus, this section can be seen to have made the most significant contribution to the research through qualitative analysis.

Since organizational culture is a very broad and inclusive concept, drawing on Schwartz and Davis (1981: 33), it was defined for participants as: “a pattern of beliefs and expectations shared by the organization’s members, resulting in the norms that shape the behaviour of the individuals in the organization”. First, respondents were asked to describe the culture of their organization based on the definition they were offered. Almost all respondents said that they believed in the importance of tourism as the guiding principle determining their behaviour. One said:

*“We are fully convinced of the importance of tourism for the country and for every individual working in tourism and I think that every Egyptian knows that tourism is beneficial to Egypt” (CPP1).*

Another elaborated on this theme:

*“Of course, everyone is aware of the importance of tourism to the country. They also realize the effects of crisis on the country. Tourism has moved the country to a good position in the world... Tourism has proved to contribute to the economic recovery of the country in general and every individual’s lifestyle in particular. There is an important point, which is that tourism is not limited to a certain category; tourism is for all, from the highest level, such as hotels and company branches, to the lowest level, such as street traders” (SPP15).*

This core belief was termed by many ‘tourism culture’ or ‘tourism thinking’. One respondent said:

*“In my opinion, Egypt as a tourist country primarily needs to enhance the tourism culture among all citizens ... I mean that everyone should be aware of the importance of tourism for the country in general and for every individual in particular, whether working in tourism or in another area... Simple farmers and shepherds must know that they also have benefits from tourism, both in the marketing of agricultural products and marketing sheep as meat to tourists and restaurants, hotels and so on” (SRP29).*

Regardless of this wide awareness of the importance of tourism in every aspect of Egyptian daily life, there were also many cultural barriers that appeared to hinder efficient crisis management in tourism. Some respondents argued that these cultural barriers were not limited to tourism organizations but rooted in the culture of the country itself. One said:

*“It is a national culture that has prevailed in the country for ages, so it is difficult to change or adopt another country’s culture. The managers, senior staff and workers all share it. The existing culture obviously covers tourism organizations”* (SVP36).

Similarly, another respondent said:

*“It is our current culture. Most of the staff here come from this country, therefore our culture is not very different from the dominant culture in the country”* (CRP19).

Interviewees were then asked to give their opinions regarding the different dimensions of national culture affecting stakeholders’ crisis management. Although the dimensions of national culture were not elicited explicitly from respondents, their answers interestingly represent ideas which are very consistent with these dimensions. The most important cultural obstacle, according to many respondents, was individualism, described by them as the egoistic and dictatorial culture. This is distinct from the concept of individualism as opposed to collectivism. One respondent explained this problem as follows:

*“Unfortunately, we are still suffering from a culture of egotism, self-centredness and dictatorship in decision-making. I am afraid to say that it is the dominant culture in our administration”* (CPP8).

This problem was described by another respondent as “individual-based” decision-making (CPP7). A consequence of such a cultural orientation was what others called “the culture of secrecy” and “lack of confidence”. It is also inconsistent with the concept of uncertainty avoidance. One said:

*“An enduring problem in Arab administrations is a culture of secrecy. Secrecy is always predominant, precluding cooperation and hindering communication between different parties working in tourism... In fact, there is no satisfactory cooperation, which is really required... Decisions are always taken individually” (SPP12).*

The same problem was ascribed by another respondent to a lack of confidence:

*“There are too many negatives in the culture. There is a lack of confidence in official statements and there is also a lack of confidence in official statements about crises...” (SVP34).*

Perhaps the most infuriating cultural obstacle described by stakeholders is what they termed a “culture of reaction”. This concept also reminds us of short-term orientation. This cultural feature was described by one respondent as follows:

*“A culture of reaction dominates in the chambers of tourism, tour companies and travel agencies. In fact, not only there ... but at all levels. There are angry and emotional outbursts at moments of crisis, as it is known that the Egyptian people are emotional people. You can observe the Egyptian people’s warmth and kindness in the street and at the same time they are very hot blooded, especially when a crisis or a problem occurs. Stress and anger intensify in a crisis, but they soon calm down. After a short period of time, everything is forgotten and nobody bothers to think about problems” (CPP23).*

Two other respondents offered contributions which were consistent with this:

*“It is our prevalent culture that everyone at a moment of crisis is excited and overreacts ... After that they all forget what happened until the situation returns to normal” (CPP6).*

*“There is little doubt that the dominant culture is to work by reaction. This culture is dominant in most Arab countries; we have to be wiser during crises, not forget former crises even if they happened a long time ago....” (SPP15).*

Indeed, this problem was referred to by many stakeholders, using different expressions. For instance, another one said:

*“Unfortunately, there exists a reaction culture at times of crisis, which disappears shortly after the crisis. Egyptians have short memories about what happened in the past. Therefore, a crisis occurs suddenly, which leads to confusion, serious panic and individual decisions” (CRP17).*

The next group of questions in this section was about the possible impact of organizational structure, the distribution of power and decision-making procedures on the handling of terrorism crises. One respondent stressed the importance of structure, stating:

*“Yes, organizational structure, especially division of labour and job duties and responsibility, have a very great impact on managing crises. In my opinion, the professionalization and complexity of organizations is of great importance for crisis management” (SPP10).*

Another respondent, while agreeing that organizational structure was important, felt that managerial competence was a more significant factor:

*“Although organizational structure has a great impact in dealing with crises, I believe that tourism organizations that have a competent senior management will deal with crises effectively” (CPP6).*

Two further respondents made similar points:

*“Yes, it plays a very important role. There should also be trained and well qualified people to deal with crises” (CPP3).*

*“I completely agree that the size and shape of the organization, distribution of authority and the method of decision-making help greatly in the way an organization deals with crises. I also think that the competence of top leaders of the organization has a great impact in preparing for crises” (CVP32).*

Another respondent raised the issue of the size of the organization:

*“From my point of view, it does not depend on the size of organization, but on the efficient way of working and the competence of the people in the organization. Experience has proved that large tourist organizations fail to deal with crises effectively, compared to small tourist organizations” (CPP4).*

Another respondent (CPP5) put emphasis on the establishment of a central body dedicated to dealing with crisis management.

To sum up, consistently with the dimensions of national culture identified in the literature review chapter (section 2-6-2), three important cultural barriers were identified by respondent as the main obstacles to conducting an efficient crisis management strategy. These were uncertainty avoidance, described by respondents as “the culture of secrecy” and “lack of confidence”, short-term orientation, which they called a “culture of reaction”, and power distance, described by interviewees in terms of the difficulty arising from organizational structures and the allocation of individual functions within organizations.

The next question addressed whether and how the organizations represented by interviewees should change their culture in order to become more effective in dealing with crises. Although the majority of respondents agreed on the need for cultural changes, they differed as to what changes should take place and how these goals should be achieved. One respondent gave priority to democratic values as the fundamental cultural alternative:

*“We need a transparency culture and employee participation. We need to enhance our tolerance and respect others’ opinions, rather than ignoring them...” (SPP9).*

Similarly, another respondent said:

*“We need a culture of acceptance and understanding of others’ views, even if different from ours” (CPP3).*

A third interviewee put emphasis instead on respect for professionalization as the main fundamental issue for change:

*“The important tasks should be left to the experts, who are able to deal with a crisis and are aware of the strengths and weaknesses of crisis management” (SPP11).*

Another respondent agreed:

*“We need to believe in specialization, following experts’ advice rather than making decisions individually, understanding the importance of training, educating young people” (CVP1).*

The following contribution presented related arguments:

*“We cannot deny the importance of advertising and marketing campaigns. However, human capital is of more importance. Ongoing training and employing qualified employees in tourism must be the top priority of the public sector. The top managerial posts must be occupied by qualified people as well. This will help a lot to change the current prevailing culture and it will be replaced by a culture of understanding and taking the opinion of specialists rather than selling short the opinions of others working in the field” (CPP6).*

However, there were other respondents who believed that cultural change was not required.

One such person said:

*“I do not think we need to change the culture – we need to develop its performance, but given that we are living in this country we have to hire people from this context. As such we have to adapt ourselves to them rather than fight against them” (SVP35).*

Another respondent agreed that change was needed, but not within private sector organizations:

*“Yes, we need cultural change, but it is the police and public officials who are responsible for managing the incidents who must be changed. The private sector*



*operators know their jobs. In spite of initiating chaos and anxiety, they must leave everyone to perform their work” (SRP26).*

As for the mechanisms of change, many stakeholders believed that changes could occur through training, but they had different views on how this should take place. One respondent said:

*“The culture should be changed from the basics, first from the Ministry of Education and also through religious scholars; they have an important role in directing public opinion” (SPP15).*

An alternative suggestion was this:

*“The World Tourism Organization has a great role in clarifying the importance of tourism to all states and could play a distinctive role in related training” (CPP3).*

## **5-6 Social and economic impacts of terrorism**

The main goal of the last section of the interview was to investigate the social and economic effects of terrorism incidents, or more particularly, its impact on the tourism industry and especially on the life of local communities. The analysis of the data gathered in this section is complementary to the evidence based upon official statistics presented in Chapter Three, concerning the reduction in the numbers of tourists and financial losses to the tourism industry. Given that Egypt relies largely on tourism as one of the main national sources of income, any damage to this sector would result in major disruption to the lives of a large number of Egyptians. One of the participants said:

*“The tourism industry has come to be considered as the economic lifeblood of Egypt .... there exist many industries which are not affiliated to tourism yet have benefited considerably from it. Take the agricultural sector – although farmers do not work in tourism, their main customer is the tourism industry” (CPP 2).*

Indeed, many people and organizations within both public and private sectors are bound to the tourism industry. Another participant observed:

*“Employment in the tourism industry in Egypt is hardly limited to one level or organization. A wide range of Egyptians, from high level managers working for huge tourism companies and well-known hotels to low income people such as boot boys have something to do with tourism” (CRP3).*

To show the intense impact of crises on local stakeholders compared with central ones, one of the participants said:

*“Look, the impacts of crises on tourist towns like Sharm El Sheikh are much more than on the other towns or even on the capital city, because as you know everything here is for tourists, so more than 90% of the customers are tourists. For example, if there are two restaurants, one in Cairo and the other in Sharm El Sheikh, after the crisis and decline in tourists, the one in Cairo will lose about 50% of its customers because the other 50% of customers are residents, whereas the one in Sharm El Sheikh will lose more than 90% of its customers, because the residents are fewer and prices are targeted at tourists... they are high” (SRP 30).*

He also gave another example:

*“Hotel clients in Cairo come to the town for different reasons, including tourism, whereas most hotel clients in a tourist town like Sharm El Sheikh come for tourism and a very few other clients come for other reasons” (SRP 30).*

The results of this field research were intriguing. In sharp contrast to the official remarks of central government, the local community appeared to have been severely affected. One respondent used the term *karab buoot* (خراب بيوت), meaning ‘devastation’, to describe the impact of terrorist attacks. Another persuasively argued:

*“To be sure, the crisis had an extreme impact on the local community in Egypt. It is also certain that it influenced in many ways the vulnerable citizens who depend heavily on the*

*tourism industry, as well as the rich travel companies, airlines and hotels. However, its impact on the low-income people grappling with poverty is always ignored and overlooked” (SRP12).*

This respondent was considering the negative impact of the crisis as establishing the causes of other problems which society would face in the years to come. He stated:

*“The very direct impact of the crisis, i.e. unemployment, led to negative consequences, increased crime rate and other social problems usually associated with unemployment and poverty... This point is very important... Unemployment and poverty in a destination country put tourism safety and security at risk and thus have negative effects on tourism, resulting in a drop in the number of tourists” (SRP12).*

Another participant from the public sector referred to a study conducted in 1999 of those affected by crises in tourism:

*“We conducted a study in 1999 of those suffering from tourism crises. The result was that there were 57 industries where a large part of their income came from tourists and tourism. Therefore, if the tourism industry undergoes a crisis, they will all be affected. The industries affected by crisis range from related sectors such as air conditioning, boats, wood used in hotels, to any goods and services offered to tourism companies, hotels and transportation. All were affected severely by this crisis when it happened. In short, a record number of people will be affected in one way or another by tourism crises” (CPP 5).*

A pertinent question was the estimated cost of providing alternatives for tourists who had already booked their trips to affected areas. There was almost complete consensus among participants that these costs had been very high and in some cases had led to business failure. One participant in Sharm El Sheikh commented:

*“For many tourists Sharm El Sheikh is a major destination to visit. It may represent the second most important destination after Cairo... I remember that a number of journeys*

*scheduled to Sharm El Sheikh were cancelled or postponed. In order to minimize the cost we had to shift the passengers to other destinations, which cost us a fortune” (SRP 27).*

Another participant referred to the high cost of stopping operations in destinations already included in products and the temporary relocation of clients whose visits had begun.

Another question in this section addressed the impact of the recent terrorism crisis on the quality of installations and services in cases where employees were made redundant and funds for regular maintenance were not available. The answers indicated that the quality of installations and services had been little degraded and that professional and permanent staff were safe and secure, but that the rank and file and temporary staff suffered significantly. In other words, the main victims of the crisis were the most vulnerable staff. One respondent noted:

*“Since recovery is a time-consuming process we have no choice but to require some staff to look for temporary work elsewhere or to take a long holiday without salary while we are in touch with them and as soon as the tourists return... we will ask them to return to their work” (SRP26).*

Another respondent stated:

*“Yes, some projects were cancelled, the company had to slow down its activities for some time to make sure that the situation returned to normal .... We had to reduce the number of tourist buses, of course, including the drivers and tourist guides... the contracts of temporary staff were not renewed” (SRP18).*

A further question in this regard was related to transnational tourism companies, mainly international hotel and restaurant chains, whose representatives were asked if they tended to cease their operations in security affected destinations. The responses indicated that this was the case in the past and in recent terrorism crisis in Egypt. One respondent noted:


*“It happened during the Luxor crisis 1997; our company stopped its tourism project for two years at Taba (North Sinai) as a result” (CRP21).*

Another interviewee replied:

*“This did not happen during Sharm El Sheikh 2005 but this is very possible, especially as the terrorist operations continue... No sooner do we get over one crisis than we face another” (CRP24).*

## 5-7 Summary

This chapter has presented an analysis of the rich data gathered by means of face-to-face interviews with thirty-six key stakeholders in Cairo and Sharm El Sheikh, reflecting the structure of the interview schedule set out in Appendix three. In particular, the findings can be divided into three levels of analysis: the macro level, comprising the cultural dimensions, the meso level, consisting of the way stakeholders interact with one another, and the micro level, i.e. the actual strategies undertaken by stakeholders at different stages of crisis management. As Figure 5-5 demonstrates, the factors at different levels of analysis appear as barriers to effective crisis management techniques. The only successful part is the recovery strategies, which stakeholders appeared to have adopted very effectively.



### **Figure 5.5: Summary of findings**

The data and their analysis are summarised and discussed interpretively in Chapter Seven, having been integrated with those of the quantitative part of the data collection process. It is the analysis of this questionnaire data that is addressed now, in Chapter Six.

## **Chapter 6 Quantitative Data Analysis**

### **6-1 Introduction**

Following the analysis of qualitative data in Chapter Five, this chapter presents an analysis of the quantitative data gathered by means of the questionnaire survey. The questionnaire used to collect data had two major sections. The first consisted of three questions concerning the independent categorical variables of respondents' characteristics: their location, their affiliation to stakeholder categories and their work experience. There were four locations in which respondents were based, viz. Cairo and the three terrorism-affected tourism destinations of Sharm El Sheikh, Dahab and Taba, and thirteen categories of respondent stakeholders: Central/ local government, Ministry of Tourism, Ministry of the Interior (Tourism Police), General Authority for Promoting Tourism, Hotels/Hotel Association/ resorts, General Authority for Tourism Development, Tourism companies/ Travel agencies, Tourism chambers, Airlines and cruise lines, Religious scholars (imams), International media and National media. As discussed earlier in Chapter 4, in the Egyptian context the most important distinction among the stakeholders is that between local and central stakeholders. Therefore, the distinction between local and central stakeholders constitutes the main independent variable whose impact the work reported in this chapter seeks to test on the dependent variables measured by the second section of the questionnaire.

The second section, covering dependent continuous variables, had two main sub-sections, the first comprising nine questions based on prior theories and designed to elicit information regarding the salience of stakeholders and interactions among them. A list of stakeholders was provided and respondents were asked to tick the box corresponding to their perception of each stakeholder (see the format of the questions in Appendix One). To compile the list of

these stakeholders, a tentative draft was initially developed, based on the classifications used by UNWTO and the standard lists appearing in major tourism textbooks. This was modified by the data collected during interviews with stakeholders in Cairo and Sharm El Sheikh in a pilot qualitative analysis. Each question in this sub-section had two parts, referring to the situation before and after the occurrence of a crisis.

The second sub-section included three main questions about the perceptions of stakeholders regarding various measures and strategies for responding to terrorist attacks on the tourism industry. Respondents were given a list of the strategies most widely followed in managing terrorism crises in tourism destinations and were asked to tick boxes corresponding to their perceptions of the relevant strategies for each question asked (see the format of the questions in Appendix One). The list was based on the work of Pizam (1999) and of Mansfield and Pizam (2006), revised in light of the qualitative analysis of data collected during pilot interviews with stakeholders in Cairo and Sharm El Sheikh. As discussed in earlier chapters, crisis management in tourism destinations targeted by terrorist attacks is a complex phenomenon, so that there are likely to be multiple and diverse perceptions of strategic and practical responses among the different tourism stakeholders.

The work reported in this chapter used a number of statistical techniques to test the impact of independent categorical variables on the dependent continuous ones. These include parametric techniques, ranging from basic statistical techniques such as means, standard deviation and t-tests, to advanced statistics like multivariate analysis of variance. This chapter starts with an overview of respondents' profiles. Given that parametric statistical procedures should meet general and specific requirements, the next section examines the normality of dependent and independent variables to ensure that they meet the general requirements of parametric tests. The rest of chapter is devoted to the analysis of the data gathered in the



quantitative survey. It first seeks to offer a general descriptive view by organizing and summarizing the findings in terms of mean scores in a tabular format, then turns to more advanced statistical tools such as the t-test, analysis of variance (ANOVA) and multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) where appropriate, to determine the impact of the independent variables on the dependent ones. The tables corresponding to these more advanced tools are to be found in the appendix Seven.

## 6-2 Profile of respondents

A total of 578 questionnaires were mailed to stakeholders: 228 in Cairo, 100 in Taba, 150 in Sharm El Sheikh and 100 in Dahab. A total of 396 forms were returned: 158 from Cairo, 64 from Taba, 103 from Sharm El Sheikh and 71 from Dahab, giving response rates of 69%, 64%, 68.6% and 71% respectively. Some of the questionnaires returned could not be used due to missing data and incomplete responses. After these had been eliminated, the final sample consisted of 130 questionnaires from Cairo, 52 from Taba, 97 from Sharm El Sheikh and 49 from Dahab. Table 6.1 summarizes responses received from participants in each location. The final sample size was 328, which represents a 53% response rate.

**Table 6.1: Distribution of responses by location**

Location	No. distributed	No. returned	% returned	No. valid	% valid
Cairo	228	158	69.3	130	82.2
Taba	100	64	64	52	81.2
Sharm El Sheikh	150	103	68.6	97	94.1
Dahab	100	71	71	49	69
Total	578	396	68.5	328	78.3

The breakdown of responses in each location by major stakeholder groups (shown in Table 6.2) indicates that in Cairo 37 respondents were from the Ministry of Tourism, eight from central or local government, 11 from airlines and cruise lines, 29 from chambers of tourism, 13 from tourism companies or travel agencies and 11 from hotels, hotel associations,

restaurants or restaurant associations. Responses were also received from imams, the national and international media, and international tourism organisations. In Taba, 14 respondents were from the Ministry of Tourism, two from central or local government, nine from tourism companies or travel agencies and nine from the hotel and restaurant sector. Additional responses came from airlines and cruise lines, imams, the state media and some community-based organizations. In Sharm el Sheikh, 32 respondents were from the Ministry of Tourism, six from central or local government, 17 from tourism companies or travel agencies and 15 from the hotel and restaurant sector. There were also responses from airlines and cruise lines, imams and the state media. Finally, in Dahab, 12 responses came from the Ministry of Tourism, two from central or local government, 10 from tourism companies or travel agencies and 14 from the hotel and restaurant sector. Additional responses came from airlines and cruise lines, imams and the state media.

As mentioned before, no forms were sent to the Ministry of the Interior, which was reluctant to participate because of security concerns. Tourism bodies and chambers were predominantly based in Cairo and responses from their members were limited to the capital. Initially it was intended to distribute the questionnaires among a sample of stakeholders representing foreign generating markets; however, it was not possible to do so because of constraints on time and resources.

**Table 6.2: Number and percentage of valid responses by location and stakeholder type**

	Cairo		Sharm El Sheikh		Dahab		Taba	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Central/ local government	8	2.4	6	1.8	2	.6	2	.6
Ministry of Tourism	37	11.3	32	9.8	12	3.7	14	4.3
Ministry of Interior	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tourism bodies and chambers	29	8.9	1	.3	0	.0	5	1.5
Tourism companies/ Travel agencies	13	4.0	17	5.2	10	3.1	9	2.8
Hotels/Hotel association/ Resorts	11	3.4	15	4.6	14	4.3	9	2.8
Airlines and cruise lines	11	3.4	7	2.1	3	.9	5	1.5
National media	7	2.1	6	1.8	3	.9	2	.6
International media	3	.9	0	0	0	0	0	0
Imams	4	1.2	9	2.8	3	.9	2	.6
Governments of generating markets	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Regional and international tourism organizations	1	.3	1	.3	0	0	0	0
Other	4	1.2	2	.6	2	.6	3	.9
Total	129	39.4	97	29.7	49	15.0	52	15.9

Data on the work experience of respondents (shown in Table 6.3) indicates that 64.5% of them had 11 years experience or more and that 20.2% had 6 to 10 years, while 14.7% of respondents had 5 years or less work experience in the tourism industry. This indicates that respondents can be considered on the whole to have had adequate prerequisite knowledge and experience to answer the questions meaningfully.

**Table 6.3: Work experience of respondents in the tourism industry**

<b>Work experience</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Valid Percent</b>
0	2	.6
5 years or less	48	14.7
6-10 years	66	20.2
11 years or more	211	64.5
Total	327	100.0

### 6-3 Assessment of normality

As noted above, when applying parametric statistical techniques, a number of assumptions should be met, the most significant being that the distribution of variables to be used in the analysis should be normally distributed (Hair et al, 2006; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2008).

There are a number of cases in the social science field where scores on the dependent variable are not normally distributed. There are a number of techniques to determine whether a variable is normally distributed. The most common method is to superimpose a normal curve on a histogram of the variable, which SPSS will do by producing normal probability plots, but a related problem is that there are no commonly agreed criteria for determining how far it is acceptable for data to deviate from normality (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2008).

Another method often used to examine normality is to examine skewness and kurtosis. According to Hair et al (2006, p.37), skewness refers to the “measure of symmetry of a distribution; in most instances the comparison is made to a normal distribution,” while kurtosis refers to the “measure of the peakedness or flatness of distribution when compared with a normal distribution”. SPSS offers these tests for any given variable along with standard error measures. In this formulation, both skewness and kurtosis should be zero for a perfectly normally distributed variable; authors vary in the rules of thumb they propose to determine the extent to which these measures can deviate from perfect normality. Some researchers are satisfied to accept variables with skewness and kurtosis values in the range +2 to -2 as near enough normally distributed for most purposes, while values outside this range indicate a normality problem. Others are slightly stricter and use a +1 to -1 range (Hair et al, 2006). Still other scholars (e.g. Brown, 1997) argue that to assess whether a distribution is normal one should consider not only the values of skewness and kurtosis but more importantly their respective standard errors. Thus, if kurtosis or skewness exceeds twice the absolute value of the standard error of skewness/kurtosis, the normality of the data is problematic.

SPSS version 19 was used to check both skewness and kurtosis, showing that the absolute values were within acceptable levels (Table 6.4) and that there was univariate normality. The final descriptive statistics for the dependent variables used in this section are also indicated in

Table 6.4. The dependent variables passed the test of normality, because neither skewness nor kurtosis values were outside the +2 to -2 range. Therefore, there was no need to make any adjustments such as a transformation of the data (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2008).

**Table 6.4: Test of normality for dependent variables**


	N Statistic	Mean Statistic	Std. Deviation	Skewness		Kurtosis	
				Statistic	Std. Error	Statistic	Std. Error
<b>Stakeholders' salience</b>							
The importance of stakeholders	323	46.57	3.55	-.289	.136	.488	.271
Stakeholders' power before crises	328	42.07	3.97	-.437	.135	.395	.268
Stakeholders' power after crises	328	36.93	3.77	-.089	.135	-.163	.268
Legitimacy of stakeholders before crises	328	43.23	4.41	-.358	.135	.065	.268
Legitimacy of stakeholders after crises	328	39.24	4.39	-.069	.135	-.357	.268
<b>Stakeholders' management strategies</b>							
Ability to cooperate before crises	328	44.64	4.69	-.431	.135	.404	.268
Ability to cooperate after crises	328	41.17	5.34	-.305	.135	-.443	.268
Potential to pose obstacles before crises	328	30.53	5.33	.401	.135	-.310	.268
Potential to pose obstacles after crises	328	33.32	4.87	.339	.135	-.467	.268
<b>Frequency of interaction</b>							
Frequency of interaction before crises	328	17.36	7.47	.520	.135	.726	.268
Frequency of interaction during crises	328	44.78	8.10	-.813	.135	.095	.268
Frequency of interaction after crises	328	24.98	10.41	.945	.135	-.027	.268
<b>Strategies for managing terrorism crises in tourism</b>							
<i>Preventive strategies</i>							
Strategies specific to security sector	328	27.58	3.81	-.103	.135	-.227	.268
Strategies specific to private sector	328	8.97	2.28	.264	.135	-.364	.268
Strategies specific to tourists	328	4.28	1.28	.535	.135	.074	.268
Strategies specific to citizens	327	10.69	2.46	.341	.135	-.054	.269
<i>Recovery strategies</i>							
Reassurance campaign	328	5.60	1.13	.365	.135	.417	.268
Marketing scheme	328	19.86	2.35	-.713	.135	.342	.268
Financial measures	328	11.41	1.47	-.072	.135	.293	.268
<i>Strategies specific to participation of stakeholders in crisis management</i>							
Involvement of the security sector with other stakeholders	328	11.75	1.85	.733	.135	1.403	.268
Involvement of public/ private stakeholders with citizens	328	12.36	2.20	.054	.135	-.137	.268
Valid N (listwise)	322						

While not identical to the dependent variables, the basic logic of meeting the normality assumption remains the same for the independent variables. It is widely accepted that very unequal group sizes of respondents' categories, particularly if the group sizes are small, would make it inappropriate to run some analyses such as ANOVA (Pallant, 2011). Therefore, the two major independent categorical variables of location and stakeholder category were recoded so that location was either local (the three tourist destinations) or central (Cairo) and the categories were based on a sectorial division into public, private and non-for-profit stakeholders. Skewness and kurtosis scores were again used to determine the normality of distribution of these variables. As the figures in Table 6.5 indicate, there was no deviation from normality.


**Table 6.5: Test of normality for independent variables**

		Geographical Division	Sectorial Division
N	Valid	328	324
	Missing	111	115
Mean		1.60	1.81
Median		2.00	2.00
Mode		2	1
Std. Deviation		.490	.763
Skewness		-.426	.338
Std. Error of Skewness		.135	.135
Kurtosis		-1.830	-1.214
Std. Error of Kurtosis		.268	.270

This result was confirmed by the visual assessment of normal probability plots, which indicated no serious deviation from normality (Figures 6.1 and 6.2). All the values clustered around the line.



**Figure 6.1: Visual test of normality for geographical division of respondents**



**Figure 6.2: Visual test of normality for sectorial division of respondents**

The abovementioned tests indicate that the variables met the general assumption of normality; thus the parametric t-test, ANOVA and MANOVA could be used if they also met



the specific requirements of these statistical tests. These specific assumptions, such as homogeneity, are discussed individually for each test below, as appropriate.

## 6-4 Stakeholders' salience

The first goal of this study was to explore the salience of stakeholders in tourism destinations and the extent to which their salience changed after being affected by a crisis. Three questions (4-6) were formulated to determine salience. Question 4 simply asked respondents to rank the importance of stakeholders on a 5-point Likert scale, while questions 5 and 6 took a more theoretical tone by utilizing the Mitchell et al (1997) concepts of power and legitimacy as a typology to analyse stakeholder salience (Table 6.6).

**Table 6.6: Questionnaire items on stakeholder salience**

Purpose	Research Questions	Measures Used	Theoretical foundation
To identify stakeholders perceived as key in tourism before and after crises	Who are perceived to be the most important stakeholders?	Question 4	
	Who are perceived to be powerful before and after crises?	Question 5	Mitchell et al. (1997)
	Who are perceived to be legitimate before and after crises?	Question 6	

### 6-4-1 The importance of stakeholders

The results of question 4, listed in Table 6.7, indicate that the Ministry of the Interior (Tourism Police) was perceived as the most important stakeholder, with a mean (M) of 4.71 and standard deviation (SD) of 0.893, followed by the Ministry of Tourism (M=4.58, SD=.888), central/ local government (M=4.46, SD=.874), tourism chambers (M=4.11, SD=.952), international media (M=4.10, SD=1.091), hotels, restaurants and their associations (M=3.94, SD=1.047) and tourism companies/ travel agencies (M=3.91, SD=1.090). These findings offer only a general view of the importance of stakeholders. To examine the issue in greater detail, questions 5 and 6 were designed to elicit perceptions of two major attributes of

stakeholder salience, viz. power and legitimacy, using the definitions proposed by Mitchell et al (1997).

**Table 6.7: Respondents' assessments of stakeholder importance**

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Ministry of Interior (Tourism Police)	327	4.71	.839
Ministry of Tourism	328	4.58	.888
Central/ local government	328	4.46	.874
Tourism bodies / chambers	327	4.11	.952
International media	328	4.10	1.091
Hotels/ associations	328	3.94	1.047
Tourism companies/ travel agencies	327	3.91	1.090
National media	326	3.63	.931
Airlines and cruise lines	328	3.56	1.027
Regional and international tourism organizations	328	3.25	1.138
Imams	327	3.22	1.086
Governments of generating markets	328	3.08	1.054
Valid N (listwise)	323		

## 6-4-2 The power of stakeholders

Question 5 drew on the definition of power by Mitchell et al (1997) as the extent to which a stakeholder has or can gain access to resources (physical, financial and symbolic). To address this concept, respondents were asked about the extent of power that they perceived stakeholders to have over others, before and after crises, using a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (very powerful) to 5 (very weak). The mean and SD of scores for each stakeholder are given in Tables 6.8 and 6.9, for power before and after crises respectively.

### 6-4-2-1 Stakeholders' power before crises

To test how respondents perceived the power of stakeholders in normal situations, descriptive statistics were first run to ascertain their mean values. The Ministry of Tourism was revealed as the most powerful stakeholder with a mean rating of 4.46 and SD of .848, while central/ local government came second with a mean of 4.32. The respondents gave almost equal

weight to tourism bodies/ chambers and airlines and cruise lines. Hotels/ associations and tourism companies/ travel agencies took fourth and fifth places respectively. It is important to note that the Tourism Police was ranked sixth once respondents perceived the power of stakeholders in normal situations. International media, imams, regional and international tourism organizations, national media and governments of generating markets were seen as not very powerful, scoring only 2.87, 2.87, 2.75, 2.59 and 1.89 respectively (Table 6.8).

**Table 6.8: Perceptions of stakeholders as powerful before crises**

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Ministry of Tourism	328	4.46	.848
Central/ local government	328	4.32	.948
Tourism bodies / chambers	328	4.29	1.094
Airlines and cruise lines	328	4.28	1.069
Hotels/ associations	328	4.13	1.138
Tourism companies/ travel agencies	328	4.10	1.072
Ministry of Interior (Tourism Police)	328	3.54	1.292
International media	328	2.87	1.331
Imams	328	2.87	1.375
Regional and international tourism organizations	328	2.75	1.300
National media	328	2.59	1.195
Governments of generating markets	328	1.89	.899
Valid N (listwise)	328		

So far, basic descriptive statistics have been used to give a general idea of stakeholders' power. From now on, bivariate statistical techniques are used to determine the impact of different categories of stakeholders based on location, as explained above, on the perceptions of respondents of their power in normal times.

To determine the equality of variances or homogeneity (specific assumption for t-test), Levene's test was conducted. The result was .992, which is larger than the required cut-off of .05 (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2008). This means that the assumption of equal variances was not violated and it was then possible to conduct an independent-samples t-test to compare local

respondents' perceptions of stakeholders' power scores before crises with those of central respondents. There was a significant difference in scores between central (M=42.68, SD=4.158) and local stakeholders (M=41.66, SD=3.802);  $t_{(326)}=2.296$ ,  $p=0.022$ , two-tailed. The p (2-tailed value) is .022, which is less than required cut-off of .05 (Field, 2009).

#### **6-4-2-2 Stakeholders' power after crises**

Table 6.9 shows the perceptions of respondents of the power of stakeholders in times of crisis. The Tourism Police took the place of the Ministry of Tourism as the most powerful stakeholder, with a mean rating of 4.26, while Ministry of Tourism dropped to second place with a mean rating of 4.13, followed by central/ local government (M=4.12). The respondents identified tourism bodies / chambers as the fourth most powerful stakeholder during crises, while tourism companies/ travel agencies and hotels/ associations took fifth and sixth places respectively. International media, regional and international tourism organizations and airlines and cruise lines were seen as not very powerful, scoring 2.73, 2.65 and 2.61 respectively.

**Table 6.9: Perceptions of stakeholders as powerful after crises**

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Ministry of Interior (Tourism Police)	328	4.26	1.048
Ministry of Tourism	328	4.13	.926
Central/ local government	328	4.12	.941
Tourism bodies / chambers	328	4.06	.872
Tourism companies/ travel agencies	328	3.34	1.219
Hotels/ associations	328	3.16	1.155
International media	328	2.73	1.213
Regional and international tourism organizations	328	2.65	1.140
Airlines and cruise lines	328	2.61	1.157
Governments of generating markets	328	2.14	1.064
Imams	328	2.05	1.009
National media	328	1.67	.617
Valid N (listwise)	328		

As with perceptions of stakeholders' power in normal times, discussed in section 7-4-2-1, the influence of respondents' location on their perceptions of stakeholders' power in times of crisis was examined. To determine the equality of variances or homogeneity (specific

assumption for t-test), Levene's test was conducted. The result was .013, which is larger than the required cut-off of .05 (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2008). This means that the assumption of equal variances was not violated and it was possible to conduct an independent-samples t-test to compare central with local respondents as to their perceptions of stakeholders' power during times of crisis. There was no significant difference between scores for central (M=36.9923, SD=4.21789) and local respondents (M=36.8939, SD=3.46613);  $t_{(326)}=.230$ ,  $p=.230$ , two-tailed. This p-value is greater than the required cut-off of .05 (Field, 2009).

In addition, a one-way between-groups MANOVA was performed to investigate location differences in the respondents' perceptions of stakeholders' power before and after crises. Thus the two dependent variables were stakeholders' power before and after crises, while the independent variable was respondents' location. Preliminary assumption testing was conducted to check for normality, linearity, univariate and multivariate outliers, homogeneity of variance-covariance matrices, and multicollinearity, with no serious violations noted. There was a statistically significant difference between local and central stakeholders on the combined dependent variables:  $F(2, 325)=3.004$ ,  $p=.051$ , Wilks' lambda=.982, partial eta squared=.018. An inspection of the mean scores indicated that central respondents reported slightly higher levels of stakeholders' power before crises (M=42.68, SD=.346) than did central respondents (M=41.66, SD=.28).

### **6-4-3 Legitimacy of stakeholders before crises**

Question 6 was based on the concept of legitimacy, defined by Mitchell et al (1997) as the extent to which the action of a stakeholder is legally or morally appropriate in the tourism industry. To address this concept, the respondents were asked how legitimate they thought the various stakeholders were compared to others, before and after crises, using a five-point Likert scale ranging from 'very legitimate' to 'very illegitimate'. In line with the presentation

above of data on perceptions of power, Tables 6.10 and 6.11 show the mean and SD of scores that each stakeholder was given for legitimacy before and after crises respectively.

#### **6-4-3-1 Stakeholders' legitimacy before crises**

The reported perceptions of respondents of the legitimacy of stakeholders in normal situations are presented in Table 6.10. Participants judged the Ministry of Tourism to be the most legitimate stakeholder (M=4.09, SD=1.127), followed by tourism bodies and chambers (M=4.07, SD=1.192), central/ local government and tourism companies/ travel agencies both having means of 4.01. Next came national media and hotels/ hotel associations, to which respondents allocated almost equal legitimacy (M=4.07, SD=1.192 and 1.262). Interestingly, the Ministry of the Interior was seen by respondents in tourist towns as having less legitimacy (M=3.73, SD=1.30) than all of the above, including imams.

**Table 6.10: Perceptions of stakeholders as legitimate before crises**

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Ministry of Tourism	328	4.09	1.127
Tourism bodies / chambers	328	4.07	1.192
Central/ local government	328	4.01	1.176
Tourism companies/ travel agencies	328	4.01	1.040
National media	328	3.88	1.192
Hotels/ associations	328	3.88	1.262
Airlines and cruise lines	328	3.84	1.172
Ministry of Interior (Tourism Police)	328	3.73	1.309
Imams	328	3.59	1.178
Regional and international tourism organizations	328	2.90	1.125
International media	328	2.65	1.205
Governments of generating markets	328	2.59	1.094
Valid N (listwise)	328		

An independent-samples t-test was also conducted to compare local with central respondents' perceptions of stakeholders' legitimacy scores before crises. The results showed no significant difference: for central respondents, M=42.71, SD=4.44 and for local respondents, M=43.57, SD=4.37;  $t_{(326)}=-1.731$ ,  $p=0.084$ , two-tailed. This p-value is greater than the required cut-off of .05 (Field, 2009).

#### 6-4-3-2 Legitimacy of stakeholders after crises

Responses regarding the legitimacy of stakeholders in managing terrorism crises after they had occurred are summarized in Table 6.11. The results were significantly different from those regarding stakeholders' legitimacy before crises. Central/ local government was perceived as the most legitimate stakeholder during a crisis, followed by the Ministry of the Interior, with mean ratings of 4.26 and 4.10 respectively. The Ministry of Tourism dropped to third place (M=4.02, SD=1.036), followed by Tourism bodies / chambers (M=4.05, SD=1.14). Respondents identified the national media, imams and hotels/ associations as the fifth, sixth and seventh most legitimate post-crisis stakeholders respectively.

**Table 6.11: Perceptions of stakeholders as legitimate after crises**

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Central/ local government	328	4.16	1.027
Ministry of Interior (Tourism Police)	328	4.10	1.009
Ministry of Tourism	328	4.02	1.036
Tourism bodies / chambers	328	4.05	1.142
National media	328	3.16	1.199
Imams	328	3.02	1.166
Hotels/ associations	328	2.92	1.292
Airlines and cruise lines	328	2.89	1.184
Tourism companies/ travel agencies	328	2.88	1.294
Regional and international tourism organizations	328	2.86	1.110
International media	328	2.62	1.196
Governments of generating markets	328	2.57	1.061
Valid N (listwise)	328		


An independent-samples t-test was also conducted to compare the local and central respondents' perceptions of stakeholders' legitimacy scores after crises. There was a significant difference in these scores: for central stakeholders, M=38.64, SD=4.52 and for local stakeholders M=39.64, SD=4.26;  $t_{(326)}=-2.016$ ,  $p=0.045$ , two-tailed. This p-value is less than the required cut-off of .05 (Field, 2009).

A one-way between-groups MANOVA was also performed to investigate location differences in respondents' perceptions of stakeholders' legitimacy before and after crises.

The dependent variables were stakeholders' legitimacy before and after crisis and the independent variable was the location of the respondents. Preliminary assumption testing was conducted to check for normality, linearity, univariate and multivariate outliers, homogeneity of variance-covariance matrices and multicollinearity, with no serious violations noted. No statistically significant difference was found between local and central respondents on the combined dependent variables,  $F(2, 325) = 2.310$ ,  $p = .101$ ; Wilks'  $\lambda = .986$ ; partial  $\eta^2 = .014$ .

Finally, in order to visually analyze the importance of stakeholders based on the two elements of power and legitimacy, a quadrant analysis was conducted (Zikmund and Babin, 2006). The legitimacy and power means for each stakeholder were plotted on a four-quadrant grid whose y-axis represented the power scale and whose x-axis represented the legitimacy scale. Each quadrant of the grids shown in Figures 6.3 and 6.4 thus represent the degree of stakeholders' importance based on the elements of power and legitimacy defined by Mitchell et al (1997), before and after crises respectively. The four quadrants are classified as I (high power, low legitimacy), II (high power, high legitimacy), III (low power, low legitimacy) and IV (low power, high legitimacy). The locations of the stakeholders on the grid represent their relative importance.






**Figure 6.3: Stakeholders' importance before crises**

1=Central/ local government, 2=Ministry of Tourism, 3=Ministry of Interior (Tourism Police), 4=Tourism bodies / chambers, 5=National media, 6=Imams, 7=Hotels/ associations, 8=Airlines and cruise lines, 9=Tourism companies/ travel agencies, 10=Regional and international tourism organizations, 11=International media, 12=Governments of generating markets

Figure 6.3 shows that before crises, most stakeholders (7 of 12) fell within quadrant II, indicating high power and high legitimacy. This distribution was changed after crises, when only four stakeholders fell within quadrant II, while there were now six (half of the total) in quadrant III, representing low power and low legitimacy (Figure 6.4).



**Figure 6.4: Stakeholders' importance after crises**

1=Central/ local government, 2=Ministry of Tourism, 3=Ministry of Interior (Tourism Police), 4=Tourism bodies / chambers, 5=National media, 6=Imams, 7=Hotels/ associations, 8=Airlines and cruise lines, 9=Tourism companies/ travel agencies, 10=Regional and international tourism organizations, 11=International media, 12=Governments of generating markets

## 6-5 Stakeholders' management strategies

To examine the management strategies of stakeholders and how they changed after a crisis, a series of research questions were proposed. Following the definition of Savage et al (1991) of types of strategy and stakeholder management strategies, applied by Sheehan and Ritchie (2005) to tourism stakeholders and by Savage et al (2004) to crisis management, three questions were formulated (Table 6.12). The central premise of Savage et al (1991) concerns stakeholders' potential to threaten and to cooperate. Questionnaire items 7 and 8 comprised two groups of questions based on these theories, while question 9 addressed the frequency of interaction based largely on Rowley (1997). The frequency of interaction at each stage of

crisis management (before, during and after) can be used as an indicator of the extent to which stakeholders were proactive or reactive in dealing with a crisis.

**Table 6.12: Questionnaire items on management strategies**

Purpose	Research Questions	Measures Used	Theoretical foundation
To identify the management strategies that stakeholders followed to interact	Do stakeholders have the ability to cooperate or pose obstacles before and after crises?	Questions 7-8	Savage <i>et al.</i> (1991) & Savage <i>et al.</i> (2004)
	How often do stakeholders interact at different stages of crisis management?	Question 9	Rowley (1997)

### 6-5-1 Ability to Cooperate

Question 7 asked respondents about potential cooperation from other stakeholders, by inquiring about their level of agreement (on a 5-point Likert scale) that each of a list of stakeholders had the potential to cooperate in efforts to manage a terrorism crisis in the tourism industry. The aggregated results in the form of means and standard deviation of responses scores are presented in Tables 6.13 and 6.14.

**Table 6.13: Degree of agreement that stakeholders were likely to cooperate before a crisis**

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Airlines and cruise lines	328	4.05	1.168
Tourism bodies / chambers	328	4.04	1.034
Ministry of Tourism	328	3.98	1.056
Imams	328	3.91	1.032
Hotels/ associations	328	3.89	1.150
Governments of generating markets	328	3.88	1.261
Tourism companies/ travel agencies	328	3.88	1.068
National media	328	3.79	1.204
Regional and international tourism organizations	328	3.76	1.260
Central/ local government	328	3.71	1.282
International media	328	3.09	1.237
Ministry of Interior (Tourism Police)	328	2.66	1.292
Valid N (listwise)	328		

**Table 6.14: Degree of agreement that stakeholders were likely to cooperate after a crisis**

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Hotels/ associations	328	3.90	1.070
Airlines and cruise lines	328	3.83	1.043
Tourism companies/ travel agencies	328	3.81	1.117
Ministry of Tourism	328	3.75	1.105
Regional and international tourism organizations	328	3.60	1.302
Governments of generating markets	328	3.59	.972
Imams	328	3.59	1.320
National media	328	3.52	1.089
Tourism bodies / chambers	328	3.19	1.273
Central/ local government	328	2.99	1.160
International media	328	2.77	1.262
Ministry of Interior (Tourism Police)	328	2.63	1.266
Valid N (listwise)	328		

In a normal situation, respondents identified airlines and cruise lines as the most cooperative stakeholders ( $M=4.05$ ,  $SD=1.168$ ), followed by tourism bodies/ chambers ( $M=4.04$ ,  $SD=1.034$ ). Interestingly, the Ministry of Tourism and imams were also perceived as cooperative stakeholders, ranking third and fourth most cooperative stakeholders in normal times. Of the other stakeholders, the least likely to cooperate was perceived to be the Ministry of the Interior, which received particularly low scores from respondents ( $M=2.66$ ,  $SD=1.292$ ). After a crisis, however, the level of perceived cooperation changed: hotels/associations ( $M=3.90$ ,  $SD=1.07$ ), airlines and cruise lines ( $M=3.83$ ,  $SD=1.04$ ) and tourism companies/ travel agencies ( $M=3.81$ ,  $SD=1.11$ ) were perceived as the most cooperative stakeholders, while the least cooperative remained the Ministry of the Interior ( $M=2.63$ ,  $SD=1.26$ ) and the international media ( $M=2.77$ ,  $SD=1.26$ ). These descriptive statistics help to shed light on the extent to which different stakeholders appear cooperative in managing terrorism crises in tourism in Egypt.

An independent-samples t-test was also conducted to compare the local and central respondents' perceptions of stakeholders' ability to cooperate. The results show a significant difference between the scores for the perceptions of local and central respondents. Indeed, there were more significant differences in perception between local and central respondents regarding the level of cooperation of stakeholders after a crisis than before it. With respect to cooperation before crises, the scores for central respondents were  $M=45.27$ ,  $SD=4.80$  and for local ones  $M=44.23$ ,  $SD=4.58$ ;  $t_{(326)}=1.97$ ,  $p=0.050$ , two-tailed. This p-value is equal to the required cut-off (Field, 2009). In respect of cooperation after a crisis, however, the scores for central respondents were  $M=42.22$ ,  $SD=4.92$  and for local respondents  $M=40.47$ ,  $SD=5.50$ ;  $t_{(326)}=2.92$ ,  $p=0.004$ , two-tailed. This p-value is considerably less than the required cut-off of .05 (Field, 2009) and this implies a considerable difference.

In addition, a one-way between-groups MANOVA was performed to investigate location differences in respondents' perceptions of stakeholders' cooperation before and after crises. Thus, the dependent variables were stakeholders' cooperation before and after a crisis, while the independent variable was respondent's location. Preliminary assumption testing was conducted to check for normality, linearity, univariate and multivariate outliers, homogeneity of variance-covariance matrices and multicollinearity, with no serious violations noted. There was a statistically significant difference between local and central stakeholders on the combined dependent variables,  $F(2, 325)=4.392$ ,  $p=.013$ ; Wilks' lambda=.974; partial eta squared=.026. An inspection of the mean scores indicated that central respondents perceived slightly higher levels of stakeholder cooperation after crisis ( $M=42.22$ ,  $SD=.464$ ) than did local respondents ( $M=40.48$ ,  $SD=.376$ ).

### 6-5-2 Potential to pose obstacles

Question 8 elicited respondents' level of agreement (on a 5-point Likert scale) to the proposition that each of the list of stakeholders had the potential to pose obstacles, in normal situations and after a crisis. As for question 7, the aggregated results in the form of means and SDs of response scores are presented, in Tables 6.15 and 6.16.

**Table 6.15: Degree of agreement that stakeholders were likely to pose obstacles before a crisis**

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Ministry of Interior (Tourism Police)	328	3.82	1.119
Central/ local government	328	2.98	1.152
Tourism bodies / chambers	328	2.63	1.106
Governments of generating markets	328	2.61	1.058
International media	328	2.57	1.373
Hotels/ associations	328	2.36	1.055
National media	328	2.34	1.015
Tourism companies/ travel agencies	328	2.34	.944
Regional and international tourism organizations	328	2.29	.947
Airlines and cruise lines	328	2.23	.996
Imams	328	2.23	1.094
Ministry of Tourism	328	2.15	1.110
Valid N (listwise)	328		

**Table 6.16: Degree of agreement that stakeholders were likely to pose obstacles after a crisis**

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Ministry of Interior (Tourism Police)	328	3.90	1.032
Central/ local government	328	3.53	1.152
Governments of generating markets	328	3.50	.971
International media	328	3.43	1.053
National media	328	2.65	1.132
Tourism bodies / chambers	328	2.54	1.135
Imams	328	2.46	1.198
Regional and international tourism organizations	328	2.41	1.156
Hotels/ associations	328	2.25	1.137
Ministry of Tourism	328	2.24	1.160

Airlines and cruise lines	328	2.24	1.061
Tourism companies/ travel agencies	328	2.19	1.001
Valid N (listwise)	328		

In normal situations (i.e. before a crisis), respondents indicated that the Ministry of the Interior was the most obstructive stakeholder ( $M=3.82$ ,  $SD=1.119$ ), followed by central/ local government ( $M=2.98$ ,  $SD=1.152$ ), while all other stakeholders were perceived by clear majorities of respondents as posing fewer obstacles. After a crisis, however, there were some dramatic changes in the perceptions of both sets of respondents. Now, the international media and the governments of generating markets were perceived as most likely to pose obstacles to efforts at managing the crisis. The Ministry of the Interior was still perceived as the most obstructive stakeholder, whereas the least obstructive stakeholder in a crisis was perceived to be the Ministry of Tourism. Others seen as particularly unlikely to pose obstacles were tourism bodies and chambers, tourism companies/ travel agencies, hotels/ associations and airlines/ cruise lines.


An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare local and central respondents' perceptions of stakeholders' potential to pose obstacle before crises. There was a significant difference between scores for central ( $M=42.56$ ,  $SD=5.18$ ) and local respondents ( $M=40.50$ ,  $SD=5.29$ );  $t_{(312)}=3.390$ ,  $p=0.001$ , two-tailed. This p-value is less than the required cut-off of .05 (Field, 2009). When the same test was applied to compare local and central respondents' perceptions of stakeholders' potential to pose obstacles after a crisis, however, no significant difference was found between scores for central ( $M=35.47$ ,  $SD=4.48$ ) and local respondents ( $M=34.79$ ,  $SD=4.53$ );  $t_{(318)}=1.317$ ,  $p=0.189$ , two-tailed. This p-value is again less than the required cut-off of .05 (Field, 2009).

A one-way between-groups MANOVA was also performed to investigate location differences in respondents' perceptions of stakeholders' potential to pose obstacles before

and after crises. Thus, the dependent variables were stakeholders' potential to pose obstacles before and after a crisis, while the independent variable was again the location of the respondents. Preliminary assumption testing was conducted to check for normality, linearity, univariate and multivariate outliers, homogeneity of variance-covariance matrices and multicollinearity, with no serious violations noted. A statistically significant difference was found between local and central respondents on the combined dependent variables:  $F(2, 304) = 11.112$ ,  $p = .000$ ; Wilks'  $\lambda = .932$ ; partial  $\eta^2 = .068$ . An inspection of the mean scores indicated that central respondents perceived stakeholders as slightly more likely to pose obstacles before a crisis ( $M = 42.69$ ,  $SD = .476$ ) than did local respondents ( $M = 40.51$ ,  $SD = .386$ ).

Finally, in order to analyze visually the management strategies of stakeholders in terms of their ability to cooperate and potential to pose obstacles, a quadrant analysis was undertaken. As with the scatterplots discussed in section 6-4-3-1 in relation to importance, the means for each stakeholder were plotted on a four-quadrant grid whose y-axis represented their ability to cooperate and the x-axis their potential to pose obstacles. Each quadrant of the grids shown in Figures 6.6 and 6.7 for the situation before and after crises respectively thus represents the assessment of stakeholders' management strategies based on the definitions of Savage et al (1991). The four quadrants are classified as I (high ability to cooperate, low potential to pose obstacles), II (high ability to cooperate, high potential to pose obstacles), III (low ability to cooperate, low potential to pose obstacles) and IV (low ability to cooperate, high potential to pose obstacles). The location of each plot on the grid represents the type of management strategies of the stakeholder concerned.






**Figure 6.5: Stakeholders' management strategies before crises**

1=Central/ local government, 2=Ministry of Tourism, 3=Ministry of Interior (Tourism Police), 4=Tourism bodies / chambers, 5=National media, 6=Imams, 7=Hotels/ associations, 8=Airlines and cruise lines, 9=Tourism companies/ travel agencies, 10=Regional and international tourism organizations, 11=International media, 12=Governments of generating markets

Figure 6.5 shows that a strong majority of ten of the twelve stakeholders fell within quadrant I (high ability to cooperate, low potential to pose obstacles) before a crisis. This distribution was changed slightly after a crisis (Figure 6.6), when only a small majority (seven of twelve) stakeholders remained in quadrant I, while two (central/ local government and tourism companies/ travel agencies) moved to quadrant IV (low ability to cooperate, high potential to pose obstacles) and one (international media) to quadrant II (high ability to cooperate, high potential to pose obstacles).



**Figure 6.6: Stakeholders' management strategies after crises**

1=Central/ local government, 2=Ministry of Tourism, 3=Ministry of Interior (Tourism Police), 4=Tourism bodies / chambers, 5=National media, 6=Imams, 7=Hotels/ associations, 8=Airlines and cruise lines, 9=Tourism companies/ travel agencies, 10=Regional and international tourism organizations, 11=International media, 12=Governments of generating markets

### 6-5-3 Frequency of interaction

As discussed in sections 2-3 and 5-4-1, the extent to which players are proactive or reactive as a crisis emerges is crucial to crisis management in terrorism and tourism. Question 9 was formulated to address this concern by asking the stakeholders their frequency of interaction at three stages of crisis management. The poor frequency of interaction before and after a crisis or alternatively the concentration of interaction during the crisis would give an indication of how reactive or proactive the stakeholders were. Specifically, respondents were asked to indicate the frequency, on a scale from 1 (usually) to 5 (never), of their interactions with each


of the listed stakeholder groups at each of the three main stages of crisis management: before, during and after a crisis.

A one-way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to compare scores on the frequencies of interactions with statistics tests at stage 1 (prior to crisis), stage 2 (during crisis) and stage 3 (after crisis). There was a significant effect for stages of crisis, Wilks'  $\lambda=.080$ ,  $F(2, 326)=1875.375$ ,  $p<.0005$ , multivariate partial eta squared=.920.

**Table 6.17: Descriptive Statistics for the frequencies of interactions with statistics test scores for stages 1, 2 and 3**

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Stage 1	18.7226	7.90884	328
Stage 2	44.7805	8.10712	328
Stage 3	24.9817	10.41287	328

Table 6.17 reveals that interactions were on the whole reported to be much more frequent during the crisis phase ( $M=44.7805$ ,  $SD=8.10712$ ) than during either the pre- ( $M=18.7226$ ,  $SD=7.90884$ ) or post-crisis ( $M=24.9817$ ,  $SD=10.41287$ ) phases, when reported interactions with other stakeholders were few and far between. This trend is also well presented in Figure 6.7.



**Figure 6.7: Frequency of stakeholders' interaction before, during and after crises**

Again, a one-way between-groups MANOVA was performed to investigate location differences in respondents' perceptions of stakeholders' frequency of interaction at three stages of crisis management. The dependent variables were stakeholders' interaction at three stages of crisis management, while the independent variable was respondent's location. Preliminary assumption testing was conducted to check for normality, linearity, univariate and multivariate outliers, homogeneity of variance-covariance matrices and multicollinearity, with no serious violations noted. No statistically significant difference was found between local and central respondents on the combined dependent variables:  $F(3, 324) = 1.799$ ,  $p = .147$ ; Wilks'  $\lambda = .984$ ; partial  $\eta^2 = .016$ .

## **6-6 Techniques employed in managing terrorism crises**

Another purpose of this study was to understand the perceptions of stakeholders regarding the employment of effective crisis management techniques during different stages of crisis. In chapter 2 (section 2-3-4, Table 2.3), a comprehensive list of such techniques currently

employed in the field of tourism security was presented, as identified by Mansfield and Pizam (2006). This list was utilized during the present research by asking respondents to indicate the extent to which they agreed that these techniques were adopted in managing terrorism crises in Egypt. The question was divided into two groups of strategies, the first consisting of those considered effective in prevention, reduction and/or mitigation plans, while strategies in the second group have to do with effective recovery methods. A series of techniques was also placed within a subgroup of police actions to distinguish the key role of these stakeholders from their counterparts. Table 6.18 sets out the relevant research questions and identifies the associated questionnaire items.

**Table 6.18: Questionnaire items on crisis management techniques**

Purpose	Research Questions	Measures used	Theoretical foundation
To promote deeper understanding of the crisis management techniques that stakeholder employ	What strategies do stakeholders employ in prevention, reduction, and/or mitigation plans?	Question 10	(Pizam, 1999; Pizam and Mansfield, 2006)
	What strategies do the law enforcement and police employ during crises?	Question 11	
	What strategies do stakeholders employ in the recovery phase?	Question 12	

Responses are analyzed below according to different sub-groups within each of the two main categories identified above. The main sub-groups within the prevention category were strategies specific to the security sector, to government, to the private sector, to tourists and to local citizens. Within the recovery strategies, four sub-groups of strategies were identified: information dissemination, reassurance campaigns, marketing schemes and financial measures. Having reviewed the data regarding these sub-groups, this section addresses two important questions concerning these strategies: the extent to which they were seen to be proactive or reactive and the extent to which they required the involvement of the different stakeholders. The results and descriptive statistics are presented in Tables 6.19 and 6.20.

The most important conclusion is that on average the recovery strategies received higher scores than the preventive strategies. Eight of the 12 strategies in the recovery category had mean scores of 4 or above, while only three of the 22 preventive strategies did so.

**Table 6.19: List of preventive strategies**

Preventive strategies	N	Mean	Standard Deviation
Assisting the tourism industry by conducting background checks for employees	328	4.59	.584
Offering rewards for information leading to the arrest and conviction of those who commit serious crimes against tourists	328	4.37	1.053
Maintaining many visible security measures	328	4.32	1.161
Increasing the presence of uniformed officers in tourist zones	328	3.70	1.420
Using crime prevention/reduction methods—such as security hardware and security policies	328	3.16	1.129
Training police officers in tourism issues	328	3.15	.967
Being visible, accessible and friendly police to tourists	328	3.09	.986
Considering the function of security important to the success of their business	328	2.40	.923
Making tourists aware of the possibility of becoming victimized by criminals and instructing them in crime prevention methods	328	2.33	.871
Educating citizens on the serious impact that crime against tourists can have on their communities	327	2.29	.953
Encouraging tourism enterprises to adopt crime prevention/reduction practices (installation of electronic room locks, surveillance cameras, room safety deposit boxes, employing full-time security officers, etc.)	328	2.13	.891
Engaging citizens in neighbourhood watch schemes	328	2.12	1.085
Developing and implementing tourist education programmes aimed at reducing the risk of being victimized	328	1.96	.891
Allocating a significant portion of their financial and human resources to security	328	1.93	1.083
Establishing a partnership between the leaders of the local community and the national and local governments	328	1.90	.933
Advising and training tourism industry employees in crime prevention techniques	328	1.84	.689
Formulating a comprehensive contingency plan	328	1.81	.820
Working closely with the community and tourism industry representatives	328	1.79	.854
Housing tourists in gated all-inclusive resorts to separate them from local residents	328	1.58	.774
Incorporating the principles of crime prevention through environmental design	328	1.48	.770
Establishing a partnership between law enforcement agencies, tourism enterprises, the community at large and the tourists themselves.	328	1.41	.583

Within preventive strategies, the most common strategies were those specific to the security sector, such as “assisting the tourism industry by conducting background checks for employees”, which was ranked first with a mean rating of 4.59, while “maintaining many visible security measures” achieved the third highest score with a mean of 4.32. “Increasing the presence of uniformed officers in tourist zones”, “training police officers in tourism

issues” and “being visible, accessible and friendly police to tourists” took the fourth, sixth and seventh positions respectively. It is important to note that these strategies fall within the traditional approaches identified in section 2-4-2 in fighting against terrorism, drawing on suppression and criminalisation. The rest of the strategies, having to do with community-based policing and counter-terrorism strategies, are seen as not very usual in the Egyptian context, as all received mean scores below two.

Those strategies which have to do with tourist and citizens also achieved comparatively high scores; thus, “making tourists aware of the possibility of becoming victimized by criminals and instructing them in crime prevention methods” and “educating citizens on the serious impact that crime against tourists can have on their communities” scored means of 2.40 and 2.33 respectively. With respect to strategies specific to the private sector, the highest score was given to “using crime prevention/reduction methods—such as security hardware and security policies”, with a mean rating of 3.16, followed by “considering the function of security important to the success of their business”, with a mean of 2.40. “Allocating a significant portion of their financial and human resources to security” and “incorporating the principles of crime prevention through environmental design” ranked third and fourth with means of 1.93 and 1.48 respectively.

Within the recovery category, the most common strategy identified by respondents was “reducing prices and offering a variety of incentives (e.g. package deals)” with a mean of 4.56 and SD of .775, the second highest score overall. This was followed by “identifying and developing new market segments abroad” ( $M=4.46$ ,  $SD=.819$ ) and “undertaking comprehensive marketing campaigns initiated by the Ministry of Tourism in cooperation with other NGOs and governmental agencies” ( $M=4.35$ ,  $SD=.828$ ). Reducing operational costs by laying off a proportion of their employees ( $M=4.33$ ,  $SD=.814$ ) and “postponing

major expenditure on maintenance and renovation” (M=4.27, SD= .855) ranked fourth and fifth. The lowest scores were given to those strategies to do with government financial assistance.

**Table 6.20: List of recovery strategies**

<b>Recovery strategies</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Standard Deviation</b>
Reducing prices and offering a variety of incentives (e.g. package deals)	328	4.56	.775
Identifying and developing new market segments abroad	328	4.46	.819
Undertaking comprehensive marketing campaigns initiated by the Ministry of Tourism in cooperation with other NGOs and governmental agencies	328	4.35	.828
Reducing operational costs by laying off a proportion of their employees	328	4.33	.814
Postponing major expenditure on maintenance and renovation	328	4.27	.855
Establishing a mechanism for sharing information and coordination of publicity and PR activities aimed at creating positive public opinion among the media, local community and customers	328	4.10	.965
Appealing to domestic tourists	328	4.06	.962
Undertaking intensive marketing campaigns to convince the general public that things are back to normal	328	3.99	1.014
Scheduling of special events to attract local residents and out-of-town tourists	328	2.43	1.082
Encouraging area residents within a short drive of the affected destination to visit their region or hometown by appealing to their sense of local patriotism	328	1.61	.778
Providing government grants for financing the promotion of their destination	328	1.42	.725
Offering financial assistance (grants, tax holidays, subsidized loans, etc.) from local, state and/or national governments	328	1.40	.576

Another conclusion to be drawn from these descriptive statistics is that those strategies requiring the involvement of different stakeholders in managing crises received the lowest scores on the whole. A notable exception is “establishing a mechanism for sharing information and coordination of publicity and PR activities aimed at creating positive public opinion among the media, local community and customers”. Among these strategies, those requiring the involvement of the police and security sector with other stakeholders received the lowest scores; for example, “establishing a partnership between law enforcement agencies, tourism enterprises, the community at large and the tourists themselves” had a mean of 1.41 and SD of .583.



As with the analyses presented earlier in this chapter, a one-way between-groups MANOVA was performed to investigate location differences in the respondents' perceptions of the strategies used in combating terrorism crises in the tourism industry. The dependent variables were the listed preventive and recovery methods, while the independent variable was respondent's location. Preliminary assumption testing was conducted to check for normality, linearity, univariate and multivariate outliers, homogeneity of variance-covariance matrices and multicollinearity, with no serious violations noted. There was, however, no statistically significant difference between local and central respondents on the combined dependent variables:  $F(33, 293)=1.730$ ,  $p=.010$ ; Wilks'  $\lambda=.873$ ; partial  $\eta^2=.163$ . This means that respondents from both groups identified almost the same methods as being employed in managing terrorism.

## **6-7 Summary**

This chapter has presented and descriptively analysed the quantitative data gathered by means of a questionnaire survey administered to key tourism stakeholders in Cairo and in three Egyptian tourist destinations affected by recent terrorism crises. The perceptions explored have been shown to have been affected variously by factors including the location of the respondents (central or local) and the stage of the crisis cycle. The findings show that there are statistically significant differences between the perceptions of respondents as to the power of stakeholders before crises, the legitimacy of stakeholders after crises and the way stakeholders interact before and after crisis. The analysis has addressed the main goals of the research and linked these to the theoretical basis for the major elements of the conceptual framework set out above in Figure 2.16. It is now possible to integrate these findings with those presented in Chapter Five, which is the purpose of the discussion that follows in Chapter Seven.

## **Chapter 7 Discussion**

### **7-1 Introduction**

This chapter presents an interpretation of all the data collected. The research questions are answered by interpreting the analyses discussed in the previous chapters. The discussion includes the interpretation of the following issues in the context under study: the overall impact of terrorism on the tourism industry, the salience of stakeholders and the way their importance may change after a crisis, the strategies for managing key stakeholders and the ways they communicate with one another during the different phases of a crisis, the crisis management techniques employed in managing terrorism crises and finally, the role of contextual factors in determining the effectiveness of the strategies adopted.

It was indicated in Chapter Four that the main research design adopted here is a mixed-methods one involving the collection of both qualitative and quantitative data. It was also explained that although there was a tendency towards collecting the quantitative and qualitative data in parallel, they were in practice collected and analysed dynamically, taking insights from one type of data to modify or enhance the other throughout the stages of the study. In addition, it was argued that broadly equal weighting should be given to each type of data, but that in some instances, more emphasis would be placed on a specific data collection method because it was more appropriate to address a particular research question. For instance, to explain the role of contextual factors in the effectiveness of the strategies adopted by stakeholders, the qualitative data proved to be more helpful than the quantitative. To address the overall impact of terrorism on the tourism industry, the data regarding the perceptions of stakeholders collected through interviews were compared and contrasted with the facts and figures based on official statistics. Nonetheless, the data were finally merged into a single interpretation.

The remainder of this chapter comprises five main sections, dealing in turn with stakeholders' salience, their management strategies, the impact of national culture, crisis management in action and the overall impact of terrorism crises on the tourism industry in Egypt, followed by a concluding summary.

## **7-2 Stakeholders' salience**

The first main research question is concerned with the identification of the key stakeholders in terrorism crisis management in the Egyptian tourism industry and the way their importance changes as a result of the occurrence of a crisis. The qualitative and quantitative analyses contributed to the identification of these stakeholders, while the descriptive results of the qualitative analysis helped to understand the main stakeholders and their importance. These results revealed that it was not easy to make sharp distinctions among stakeholders, because the tourism industry was found to be the major national source of income for a wide variety of citizens, so that numerous people and organizations in the public and private sectors were associated with the industry in one way or another. It was also difficult to identify them because in Egypt the boundary between the private and public sectors is blurred. As with many developing countries, the primacy of the public sector is evident and private sector organizations are overshadowed by an influential and powerful governmental apparatus (Hatem, 1994). It is also notable that non-profit and community organizations appeared not to have consolidated a significant role in the Egyptian tourism industry. Notwithstanding these difficulties, the findings of the qualitative analysis show a sectorial division in the Egyptian context similar to that proposed by Kapur and Weisbrod (2000) for the tourism industry. Table 7.1 classifies the most important tourism stakeholders in Egypt in this way.

**Table 7.1: Sectorial classification of tourism stakeholders in Egypt**

<b>Sectorial Division</b>	<b>Stakeholders</b>
<b>Public</b>	Central/ local government Ministry of Tourism Ministry of Interior (Tourism Police) State media
<b>Private</b>	Tourism companies/ travel agencies Hotels and restaurants Airlines and cruise lines
<b>Non-profit</b>	Tourism chambers Imams and clerical establishment International media International tourism organizations

The most crucial finding in the classification of stakeholders was that in the Egyptian context a functional distinction can be drawn between local and central stakeholders, the former being responsible for making major decisions and the latter for implementing those decisions, reporting to the central authorities and providing consultation services to them. Broadly speaking, the public and central stakeholders were found to play more important roles than their local and private counterparts. However, the importance of stakeholders was found to change when a crisis emerged. Indeed, a crisis might introduce new stakeholders that the organization had not anticipated. It was also shown that during a crisis the security sector would play a dominant role, to be replaced at the recovery stage by the GATD. As a result, the criteria for identifying stakeholders after a crisis were likely to be noticeably different from those which apply in normal conditions. This is a very important point, which emphasizes the importance of identifying stakeholders at all stages of crisis management.

To address the question of stakeholder salience, two concepts, of power and legitimacy, were chosen. The results of the quantitative analysis of data collected from respondents in local tourist destinations which had suffered terrorist attacks and from the authorities in Cairo showed the power and legitimacy which they perceived the various stakeholders to have. These respondents listed central/ local government and tourism bodies / chambers as the most legitimate and powerful stakeholders in normal situations, followed by the Ministry of Tourism, then the national media, imams, hotels/ associations and finally the Ministry of the

Interior (Tourism Police). However, after a crisis, they had different perceptions of the power and legitimacy of other stakeholders: the only ones to have high power and legitimacy were central/ local government, tourism bodies / chambers, the Ministry of Tourism and the Ministry of the Interior, while those perceived as having low power and legitimacy were now hotels/ associations, airlines and cruise lines, tourism companies/ travel agencies, regional and international tourism organizations, international media and governments of generating markets, as Table 7.2 shows.

**Table 7.2: Importance of stakeholders in Egypt before and after a crisis**

	<b>Before Crisis</b>	<b>After Crisis</b>
<b>High power, low legitimacy</b>		National media, Imams
<b>High power, High legitimacy</b>	Central/ local government Tourism bodies / chambers, Ministry of Tourism, National media, Imams, Hotels/ associations Ministry of Interior (Tourism Police),	Central/ local government, Ministry of Tourism, Tourism bodies / chambers Ministry of Interior (Tourism Police),
<b>Low power, Low legitimacy</b>	Tourism companies/ travel agencies, International media, Governments of generating markets	Hotels/ associations, Airlines and cruise lines, Tourism companies/ travel agencies, Regional / international tourism organizations, International media, Governments of generating markets
<b>Low power, High legitimacy</b>	Airlines and cruise lines, Regional / international tourism organizations	

The findings of the quantitative analysis are corroborated by the qualitative results. According to these findings, the most salient stakeholders in crisis situations were central and local government. The qualitative results also explain that the main decisions on any potential crises that the country might face were made by the National Committee of Crisis Management. The members of the Committee hold the highest positions in the country and include the President, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Tourism, the Minister of the Interior and the Chairman of Egypt Air. The committee is chaired and coordinated by the Prime Minister himself.

The Tourism Police within the Ministry of the Interior was ranked as both powerful and legitimate after crises. The qualitative analysis suggests that this stakeholder was very uncooperative but performed a dominant role in the reactive stage of crisis management. Knowledge of the exact techniques adopted by the police is rudimentary, because they were very reluctant to give information. Therefore, seven questions based on best crisis management practice were formulated and put to the other respondents in order to elicit their perceptions of the role of the police. The results revealed the existence of a special unit called the Tourism Police, whose officers were trained in tourism issues and were considered to be highly visible, accessible and friendly to tourists. Thus, in the periods shortly after a crisis every tourist would be expected to notice the ubiquitous presence of uniformed officers in tourist zones. In addition, the police and security sector was found to be strongly involved in assisting the tourism industry by conducting background checks on employees.

Although, because of the politically and administratively centralist nature of public decision-making in Egypt, the key decisions on crisis management issues are made at a very high level of government, the Ministry of Tourism and its affiliated departments are often involved in making decisions. Different departments of the Ministry of Tourism are engaged in crisis managements activities. It has a Crisis Management Unit charged with the formulation and implementation of crisis management policies. The main task of this unit, however, is advisory and it often acts as coordinator among different stakeholders. Another important unit of the Ministry of Tourism is the General Authority for Tourism Development, which is responsible for marketing campaigns throughout the world, through its internal and external offices. The GATD is also in close partnership with the private sector and Egyptian embassies abroad (Egyptian Ministry of Tourism, 2008).

The Egyptian Tourism Federation was found to be another powerful and legitimate stakeholder before and after crises, representing various private sector tourism bodies in

Egypt. During a crisis, its members (the heads of chambers of tourism) would meet with the Minister of Tourism. Like the Ministry of Tourism, it would act as a hub for private sector organizations, coordinating their activities with those of the public sector, during and after a crisis.

Among the stakeholders in the Egyptian tourism industry, the media were found to be the most controversial. The results of the quantitative analysis indicate that they were seen as a comparatively legitimate stakeholder group whose legitimacy decreased after a crisis, while the qualitative results corroborate to some extent this assessment of their importance. Although most of the participants indicated that religious scholars or imams did not play a significant role in tourism industry, some still emphasized the importance of the role that imams could play in raising awareness of the importance of tourism and its contribution to the national economy and to public prosperity. Since most Egyptians are religious and have considerable respect for religious scholars, they can play an influential role in the public perception of tourists and tourism (Al-Awa, 2006).

### **7-3 Stakeholders' management strategies**

The second research question addressed strategic management and the relationships among stakeholders before and after a crisis. The results of qualitative analysis revealed that most respondents were in agreement about the poor cooperation among tourist stakeholders during terrorism crises and they identified several major barriers to efficient cooperation among them in managing such crises. These included inherent features of the tourism industry, which consists of many organizations, institutions and sub-industries, making relations and compromise among them very contentious. This lack of cooperation was seen to worsen whenever a crisis arose. In this context, the security sector would take the upper hand during crises and have the last word, while the Ministry of Tourism Crisis Management Unit would

exercise only a minimal coordinating function. By contrast, there was said to be some degree of cooperation once crises began to diminish, as the GATD and the Federation of Chambers of Tourism began to play an important role in facilitating interactions among stakeholders. Respondents further suggested that when a crisis occurred, some stakeholders would become more uncooperative than in normal times. The lack of contingency plans intensified this sense of uncooperativeness.

To address this question, the study adopted the model of stakeholders' capacity and willingness to threaten or cooperate in their relationships proposed by Savage et al (1991). The results of quantitative analysis were consistent with those of the interviews and precisely show that at both pre- and post-crisis stages those stakeholders affiliated to private sector organisations such as airlines and cruise lines had the greatest potential for cooperation and the least potential for posing obstacles, followed by the Ministry of Tourism and tourism bodies; therefore they can be classified under the category of supportive relationships, according to the Savage et al (1991) model. This is partly due to the close relationship with the Ministry of Tourism and the clarity of its plans to the stakeholders. Central/ local government had also the greatest potential for cooperation and less potential for threats before a crisis and therefore should be categorized as a supportive, but after a crisis its potential for threat increased and its potential for cooperation decreased and as result it should be regarded as non-supportive. The results of the qualitative analysis reveal that this is largely because in times of crisis the central government would work closely with police and security sector the issue.

Another conclusion which can be drawn is that the Ministry of the Interior was regarded at both pre- and post-crisis stages as the least cooperative and most threatening partner. The result of qualitative analysis corroborates this finding. Several interviewees indicated that they saw the Ministry, which provided tourist security, as 'the most difficult people to



cooperate with' and 'the most uncooperative partners', among others. What is more, the results of qualitative and quantitative analysis confirm that the tourism police became more uncooperative during a crisis. Working under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior, they failed to build a partnership with the tourism sector in general and the Ministry of Tourism in particular. For example, despite the presence of tourism police at each hotel gate for security purposes, there was said to be no meaningful interaction between the police and the hotels.

Another intriguing conclusion which can be drawn from this analysis is that the international media changed and began to pose obstacles once a destination was affected by a crisis, according to the analysis of quantitative data collected through the survey. There are several reasons for this alteration in the strategic relationship of these stakeholders. For one thing, as discussed before, the tourism industry is very sensitive to the media, especially when nationals of other countries are involved. The international media give extensive coverage to violent events and at the same time they bypass government censorship (Sonmez, 1998; Weimann and Winn, 1994). Indeed the foreign media were more concerned about their business and thus about reaching the largest possible audience than about portraying the facts accurately.

Another factor is perhaps the fact that Egyptian perceptions tend to be dominated by conspiracy theories. As indicated by the qualitative analysis, participants viewed foreigners with cynicism and believed that the causes of their troubles emanated from abroad. One interviewee, for example, claimed that the rivalry between Egypt and neighbouring countries, especially Israel and Jordan, over attracting more tourism was responsible for fomenting crises and supporting terrorism. Another conclusion to be drawn is the importance of imams, as the results of the quantitative analysis reveal them to be supportive before and after a crisis. This means that they were perceived to play an active role against terrorism.

There was a statistically significant difference between the attitude of respondents in the local tourist towns and those in Cairo. Central respondents perceived slightly higher levels of stakeholder cooperation after a crisis and saw them as more likely to pose obstacles before a crisis than did local respondents. Table 7.3 summarizes this section by tabulating stakeholders' pre- and post-crisis management strategies.

**Table 7.3: Stakeholders' management strategies before and after a crisis**

	Pre-Crisis	Post-Crisis
<b>Cooperation ↑</b> <b>Threat ↓</b> <b>Supportive Relationships</b>	Central/ local government, Ministry of Tourism, Tourism bodies / chambers, National media, Imams, Hotels/ associations, Airlines and cruise lines, Regional and international tourism organizations, International media, Governments of generating markets	Ministry of Tourism, National media, Imams, Hotels/ associations, Airlines and cruise lines, Regional and international tourism organizations, Governments of generating markets
<b>Cooperation ↑</b> <b>Threat ↑</b> <b>Mixed blessing relationships</b>		International media
<b>Cooperation ↓</b> <b>Threat ↑</b> <b>Non-supportive relationships</b>	Ministry of Interior	Central/ local government Ministry of Interior Tourism companies/ travel agencies
<b>Cooperation ↓</b> <b>Threat ↓</b> <b>Marginal relationships</b>	Tourism companies/ travel agencies	Tourism bodies / chambers

↑high ↓low

## 7-4 The impact of national culture

The second group of factors determining the crisis management behaviour of stakeholders was assumed to be related to national culture and the third research question was formulated on the basis of this assumption. The results indicated that tourism stakeholders in Egypt had a

common perception regarding the significance of tourism. Despite this common belief, they indicated a number of other cultural barriers rooted in general national culture that could be said to account for the failure of stakeholders to operate efficient crisis management. Key among these barriers were several consistent with the dimensions of national culture identified Hofstede (2001), Hofstede & Hofstede (2005) and Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars (2000), including uncertainty avoidance, described by respondents as “the culture of secrecy” and “lack of confidence”, short-term orientation, which they called a “culture of reaction”, and power distance, described by interviewees in terms of the difficulty arising from organizational structures and the allocation of individual functions within organizations. These barriers contributed to inadequate stakeholder cooperation, which in turn led to poor implementation of crisis management strategies.

Also of importance to this section was how the organizational culture should be modified in order for the organization to become more efficient in managing crises. Although the bulk of respondents agreed on the need for cultural changes, they differed on what changes should take place and how these goals should be achieved. Some respondents regarded democratic values as the fundamental alternative culture, whilst others gave pre-eminence to professionalization as the most fundamental condition of change. The majority of respondents believed that changes could be achieved through training, but there was also consensus that there was a long way to go and that success would not happen overnight. Some participants believed that the whole political system needed to be changed and that this would help to remove cultural barriers. For them, the elimination of these barriers would allow the best qualified people to occupy management positions. Respondents in the local tourist towns were more sceptical of the likelihood of any significant changes in the culture in the near future than were respondents in Cairo.

## **7-5 Crisis management in action**

The fourth goal of this study was to gain an understanding of the crisis management techniques that stakeholders employed in managing terrorism-related crises in the Egyptian tourism industry. The rationale behind this goal was the need to make sense of actual crisis management efforts in action and to compare and contrast these with the findings of the first part of our analysis, which was mainly based on stakeholder theories. An extensive series of data were collected through interviews and survey questions and the results of their analysis can be divided into two broad categories: the extent to which crisis management was seen to be proactive or reactive and the extent to which different stakeholders interacted with one another and participated in crisis management.

### **7-5-1 Proactive vs. reactive crisis management**

In discussing the role of national culture, it was indicated that one important characteristic of Egyptian organizational culture is reactive thinking. This dominant trait was perceived to have a direct impact on stakeholders' strategies during a crisis. An important indication of the extent to which stakeholders are reactive or proactive is their frequency of interaction at the three stages of crisis management. The results of qualitative analysis show that in normal times, stakeholders in this study were in contact with one another on a regular basis, through both modern technology and traditional means of communication. However, participants stressed that these contacts had nothing to do with the preventive measures of crisis management but were limited to their day-to-day business. Then, once a crisis occurred, everything changed dramatically. Analysis of the quantitative data also indicates a low frequency of pre-crisis interaction and a marked increase during crises, for the purposes of crisis management. Based upon these results, it can be argued that tourism stakeholders in Egypt may be regarded as reactive.

This conclusion is supported by responses to other questions regarding the strategies undertaken by stakeholders in crisis management. Mansfield and Pizam (2006) argue that the advanced formulation of contingency plans for managing crises is an indication of proactive crisis management. Interviewees were asked about the existence of contingency plans. The initial results revealed that the Crisis Management Unit of the Ministry of Tourism had formulated a series plans to face a variety of crises and circulated these among the stakeholders. However, this circulation does not appear to have been sufficiently wide, as most respondents claimed to be unaware of the existence of such plans and preventative measures. Responses to the questionnaire confirm this lack of awareness. Some interviewees indicated that they were aware of these programmes, but considered them to be narrow and selective, thus failing to fit well with many types of potential crisis. Another shortcoming of these strategies appears to have been insufficient attention being given to coordination between the diverse stakeholders involved in the tourism sector. It also appears that the financial resources required for the formulation and implementation of such a programme were not available. Finally, training in preventive strategies was reported not to have been generally provided, largely because of widespread negative perceptions as to the efficacy of such training programmes. Indeed, the respondents perceived such training to be useless and unnecessary. These factors can be seen as having combined to produce poor preventive strategies.

These findings were corroborated by the quantitative results, showing that on average the recovery strategies received higher scores than the preventive ones. Within preventive strategies, the most common strategies were those specific to the security sector, such as “assisting the tourism industry by conducting background checks on employees”, followed by “maintaining many visible security measures”, then by “increasing the presence of uniformed officers in tourist zones”, “training police officers in tourism issues” and “making the police

visible, accessible and friendly to tourists”. These strategies all fall within the traditional approaches identified in section 2-4-2 in fighting against terrorism, drawing on suppression and criminalisation. The rest of the strategies, having to do with community-based policing and counter-terrorism strategies, are seen as not very usual in the Egyptian context, as all received mean scores below two.

Those strategies which have to do with tourists and citizens also achieved comparatively high scores, including “making tourists aware of the possibility of becoming victimized by criminals and instructing them in crime prevention methods” and “educating citizens on the serious impact that crime against tourists can have on their communities”. With respect to strategies specific to the private sector, the highest score was given to “using crime prevention/reduction methods, such as security hardware and security policies”, followed by “considering the function of security important to the success of their business”, then “allocating a significant portion of their financial and human resources to security” and “incorporating the principles of crime prevention through environmental design”.

### **7-5-2 Stakeholders’ engagement and participation in crisis management**

Interestingly, there was almost complete consensus among respondents that the extent of engagement of stakeholders had a great effect on the efficiency of crisis management. The words and expressions they used to stress the importance of stakeholder engagement included ‘essential and very important’, ‘integral part of any crisis management’, ‘the essence of the proper solution to the crisis’ and ‘the basic action of any successful work’. However, in practice there was little sign of participation by a wide range of stakeholders in the pre-crisis and reactive stages of crisis management. These results confirm those discussed above regarding the reactive nature of crisis management strategies in this context. With respect to the pre-crisis stage, four questions were formulated in the quantitative analysis to discover the

extent to which different stakeholders were involved at this stage in managing terrorism crises. These questions have to do with the strategies which were based on the participation of stakeholders, including the education of citizens on the impacts of crime, the engagement of citizens in neighbourhood watch schemes, establishing partnerships among law enforcement agencies, tourism enterprises, the community at large and the tourists themselves, and finally establishing a partnership between the leaders of the local community and the national and local governments.

The results of quantitative analysis also revealed that these strategies were not followed in the Egyptian context during a crisis. A number of questions were formulated to explore such engagement at the crisis stage, mainly based on the partnership and cooperation of the tourism stakeholders with the police and security sector and with one another. There was consensus among the respondents in local tourist towns and in Cairo that these strategies were not adopted sufficiently. The notable exceptions reported to be implemented actively in this context were that the police assisted the tourism industry to conduct background checks on employees and the establishing of a mechanism for sharing information and coordination of publicity and PR activities, aimed at creating positive perceptions among the media, the local community and customers. Among these strategies, those requiring the involvement of the police and security sector with other stakeholders received the lowest scores; for example, “establishing a partnership between law enforcement agencies, tourism enterprises, the community at large and the tourists themselves” was perceived as the strategy least frequently undertaken by stakeholders in Egypt to manage tourism crises.

## **7-6 Overall impact of terrorism crises on tourism in Egypt**

Chapter Three, on tourism and terrorism in Egypt, reviewed recent trends in travel and tourism in Egypt to ascertain how major terrorist attacks have affected tourism flows. The

qualitative data analysed above, based on the perceptions of stakeholders, show that many, especially those living in local destinations, had suffered greatly soon after terrorist attacks. In fact, local communities were found to have been deeply affected in the short term; however, the facts presented in section 3-4 show that Egyptian tourism had recovered fully from the severe damage done by terrorism, enjoying robust growth in the last few years in tourist arrivals. This is illustrated most clearly in figures showing that while international visitor arrivals to Egypt fell after terrorist attacks, they soon increased again (Figure 3.1). It can therefore be suggested that the current tourism boom in Egypt is explained in part by the effectiveness of crisis management efforts undertaken by tourism stakeholders.

## **7-7 Summary**

This chapter has offered an interpretation of the data collected during this study and presented in earlier chapters, addressing the research questions in turn by confronting them with triangulated data from the qualitative and quantitative arms of the field study, supported by documentary evidence and aligned with the literature-based conceptual framework set out in Chapter Two. It has identified the stakeholders seen as most salient before and after crises and categorised them according to their roles in decision making, coordination and implementation, adding the symbolic role of the media in building destination image and the imams in improving the tourism culture. It next outlined the relationships among stakeholders and their use of crisis management strategies. When the effects of national and organizational culture were examined, they were found to be largely negative, characterised by secrecy, lack of confidence and uncertainty avoidance. While agreement was reported on the need for cultural change, no such consensus was forthcoming as to the means to achieve it. Then, when crisis management techniques were explored, they were found to be more reactive than proactive. Notwithstanding the criticisms of culture, strategy and methods expressed by many participants, the final section of this chapter has considered evidence suggesting that tourism



stakeholders in Egypt are at least partly effective in countering the effects of terrorism by means of crisis management.

The final chapter summarises the main points of the thesis, draws conclusions and offers pertinent recommendations.

## **Chapter 8 Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations**

### **8-1 Introduction**

The main aims of this study were twofold: to propose a framework of analysis based on the application of stakeholder theory in the management of security crises in the tourism industry and to explore the terrorism crisis in Egypt within this framework. The following pages address a series of important issues: the contribution of the study, both theoretical and managerial, its limitations, areas for further research and a concluding summary.

### **8-2 Contribution of the study**

A variety of conclusions can be drawn from this study, which contributes to knowledge in several ways. These conclusions are divided into two groups: theoretical and managerial. This research has also contributed to knowledge through its innovative methodology applied in a closed context such as Egypt. This contribution is explained in section 8-3 on the limitations of the research.

#### **8-2-1 Theoretical contribution**

First, this study contributes to the development of stakeholder theory as utilized in the management field. Existing studies predominantly draw on stakeholder salience and strategic management as practised in a private sector context; there is limited evidence concerning how it operates in the public context and particularly in the management of tourism crises. This research provides an opportunity to understand how stakeholder salience and strategic management operate in a public context. This is significant, given the potentially wider range of stakeholders and different relationships prevailing in the public sector, particularly the dominant role played by powerful state actors: central and local government and the police.

Another theoretical contribution of the present study was to examine systematically the salience of stakeholders in the tourism industry and how their importance changed when a crisis emerged. The main contribution of this study in this regard is the identification of an obvious distinction between stakeholders based in Cairo and those operating locally in tourism destinations, the former being responsible for making major decisions and the latter for implementing those decisions, reporting to the central authorities and providing consultation services to them. Due to the politically and administratively centralised nature of public decision-making in Egypt, a functional distinction can be drawn between local and central stakeholders. It was also shown that a crisis might produce new stakeholders that the organization had not anticipated. As a result, the criteria for identifying stakeholders after a crisis were likely to be noticeably different from those which apply in normal conditions. This is a very important point, and emphasizes the importance of identifying stakeholders at all stages of crisis management. To assess the significance of stakeholders, two criteria, of legitimacy and power, were defined and applied to the context of tourism crisis management during terrorism crises.

In addition, this study adds to theory by showing how different stakeholders interacted with one another before and after a crisis, some tending to pose obstacles, while others had the potential to cooperate. To address this issue, the study adopted the model of stakeholders' capacity and willingness to threaten or cooperate in their relationships proposed by Savage et al (1991). Four management strategies proposed by Savage et al (1991)—supportive, non-supportive, mixed and marginal relationships—were applied to crisis management in the context of terrorism against tourist destinations and it was evident that different stakeholders undertook different strategies at different stages of crisis management. In this way, the part of the conceptual framework concerning the procedural aspects of stakeholder theory was validated.

Perhaps the most important contribution of the study to stakeholder theory, however, is that it has taken into consideration the effect of national and organizational culture on the behaviour of stakeholders in crisis management. Indeed, the different contexts necessitate modification of the crisis management models and in turn they extend those models by taking account of cultural influences. In this respect, Hofstede (1979; 1980; 1983; 1984; 2001) and Hofstede & Hofstede (2005) dimensions of culture proved useful. In particular, “the culture of secrecy” and “lack of confidence” identical to uncertainty avoidance concept, “culture of reaction” identical to short-term orientation concept and the difficulty arising from organizational structures and the allocation of individual functions within organizations identical to the power distance concept were identified as significant cultural barriers complicated the efficient crisis management efforts. It could further be argued that the issue of willingness to engage in proactive planning for potential crises versus post-hoc reactivity gives salience to the notion of long versus short-term orientation.

### **8-2-2 Managerial contribution**

This study has largely taken into account the potential application of managerial and practical aspects of stakeholder theory to operational crisis management processes. Previous applications of stakeholder theory to crisis management have been predominantly descriptive. It has highlighted the fact that the management of stakeholders does not take place in a vacuum; nor is it something that can be applied in exactly the same way in all places, cultures and societies. To be effective, the managing of the stakeholders in crisis management must be open to adaptation to the specific considerations of each context. The practical and managerial conclusions drawn from the case studies can be summarized as follows: First, different stakeholders performed major roles in Egyptian tourism and were active in a wide range of crisis management activities. The conventional division between private and public

stakeholders is hardly applicable to the Egyptian tourism industry, largely because of the strong domination of the public sector. The Ministry of Tourism was identified as the most legitimate and powerful stakeholder in normal conditions; however, after a crisis, central and local government replaced it as the most powerful stakeholder. Interestingly, central/ local government, which was identified as the most powerful stakeholder in a crisis, was found to be responsible for making key decisions, while the Ministry of Tourism had only an advisory role. The Ministry and the Egyptian Tourism Federation performed coordinating roles and were both considered highly legitimate stakeholders. During the implementation phase the maintenance of security was found to be wholly in the hands of the Tourism Police, while the marketing campaigns were initiated by the General Authority for Tourism Development in the Ministry of Tourism, with the cooperation of other stakeholders. The religious scholars identified as relatively legitimate stakeholders especially before crises.

Secondly, it was argued that stakeholders interacted differently after a crisis and that their interaction strategies differed. The Ministry of Tourism, tourism bodies/ chambers, national media and imams were identified as engaging in supportive relationships before and after crises, being perceived as less threatening and more cooperative. The Ministry of the Interior was identified as the least cooperative stakeholder before a crisis, with the greatest potential to pose a threat, while after a crisis Central/ local government was added to the list of non-supportive stakeholders. International media was the only stakeholder which was perceived as highly cooperative and highly threatening once crises occurred, i.e. a mixed blessing in the terminology of Savage et al (1991).

Thirdly, the peculiarities of the Egyptian case highlighted a number of cultural issues complicating the interactions among stakeholders in particular and crisis management efforts in general. Two characteristics of Egyptian culture, the 'culture of secrecy' and the 'culture of reaction' were identified as the main barriers to cooperation and communication among the

various parties working in tourism (Hatem, 1994). This allowed an appraisal of the degree to which the strategies adopted by stakeholders in the Egyptian tourism industry in managing terrorism crises were active or reactive. As with findings drawn from national culture, the particular strategies associated with proactive crisis management were absent in the Egyptian case. For instance, there was no effort to formulate in advance any contingency plans for managing a crisis or to prepare for a possible terrorist incident through simulations and training. Furthermore, those strategies which involve the participation of a wide range of stakeholders were taken for granted in the Egyptian case. This persuasively challenges the conventional wisdom which argues that the participation of all stakeholders is necessary at all stages of crisis management. Because of the peculiarities of terrorism crises, which are regarded as constituting a major security issue, the participation of a good number of stakeholders at most stages of crisis management does not necessarily lead to effective and efficient crisis management. Instead, as the case study indicated, a crisis management model in which the crisis stage is dominated by police and security forces, while at the recovery stage the participation of most stakeholders was ensured, proved to be efficient and successful.

At this point, a question arises as to the applicability of the findings of this study to other countries, industries and types of crisis. In this regard, caution should be exercised. It has been shown that the Egyptian response to terrorism crises has been influenced by structural and cultural factors which may differ from one country to another; for example, the degree of centralization of public decision making. As regards industry, tourism may have different stakeholders from other industries, or their salience may differ. Tourism is particularly susceptible to media influence, for instance, while some other industries may be less so. As for the types of crisis, terrorism has special features that may make co-operation particularly difficult, being linked as it is to highly sensitive issues of national security. Thus, it cannot be

assumed that stakeholders in other contexts will or should behave as described in the study. What this research has achieved, however, is to highlight a range of factors that interact to affect crisis management, which may provide some insights to inform debates, planning and analysis in other contexts. In this respect, a more appropriate concept than generalizability is that of transferability (Guba and Lincoln, 1989).

### **8-3 Limitations**

The limitations of this study can be divided into substantive/conceptual and contextual/methodological ones. With respect to substantive/conceptual limitations, the most evident issue was the novelty of the research approach. This study sought to propose a conceptual framework applying the managerial aspects of stakeholder theory to the practical methods and strategies undertaken in the management of crisis in tourism industry. To do so, the research attempted to merge three previously separated strands of literature: crisis management, tourism studies and stakeholder theory. Synthesising these virtually distinct fields was neither easy nor straightforward, largely because of the dearth of literature. The most significant barrier to this study, however, may be attributed to contextual/methodological limitations. Due to the sensitivity of the issue, there was little information available to the public regarding terrorism-related issues in the tourism industry. The risk and potential harm that respondents thought they would face if they contributed to the research was another barrier that prevented potential respondents in Egypt from giving information to the researcher. To overcome this problem, a series of practical and methodological measures was undertaken, ranging from building rapport to local researchers to convincing the respondents by producing a variety of permission documents, and to appealing to informal links to give participants assurances of confidentiality. In addition, the scope of samples was

expanded. Initially, it was intended to focus on one case (tourism destinations in Sharm El Sheikh) and use semi-structured interviews to collect the data. However, when work on a pilot study began in the field, it became evident that this method would fail to yield plausible and trustworthy results, mainly because contextual constraints and the sensitivity of the topic prevented informants from offering satisfactory responses. Therefore, two further cases (Taba and Dahab) were added to the analysis and a questionnaire was also designed to collect data from a wide range of respondents within the three destinations and in Cairo. As a result, the design of the research changed to the mixed methods, in which the quantitative and qualitative research were given emphasis by obtaining these two different and complementary types of data. This design proved to be more appropriate to research conducted on a sensitive issue in a closed society.

#### **8-4 Further research**

There are some areas which were beyond the scope of this study. For one thing, this research did not incorporate explicitly counterterrorism techniques into crisis management strategies in the tourism industry. This is an interesting and worthwhile aspect which emerged during the empirical research and deserves further independent research. Another potential area for further studies is to take into account the important role that peculiar stakeholders such as imams play in determining the efficiency of crisis management. Given the findings in the study as to the influence of the national context and political system on stakeholder behaviour in a crisis situation, further investigation of these issues, both within individual countries and comparatively across cultures, would be informative. Specific areas of focus could include the impact of the political system on the interaction among tourism stakeholders, the impact of culture and potential of cultural change to enhance crisis management, and the specific strategies most effective in different cultures and political contexts. Another matter requiring further investigation is the applicability of the conceptual model developed here to other



industries and types of crisis. It is recommended that future research should address these issues.

## **8-5 Summary**

To sum up and to highlight the value of this study, it should be emphasised once again that it incorporates a number of novel features, as follows:

The research breaks new ground by examining the potential application of managerial aspects of stakeholder theory to operational crisis management processes in a public context, which may have different stakeholders and relationships from those of private contexts and where power relations may operate differently. Moreover, the innovatory systematic application of stakeholder theory to terrorism crisis management in the tourism industry is timely, given the reliance of many states on tourism income and the severe impact of terrorism crises in recent years.

A significant contribution is made by examining the management of terrorism crises in the tourism industry within a culturally different context and applying a modified framework appropriate to this context. National dimensions have been shown to be useful and relevant in this respect. Thus, the research develops and enriches stakeholder theory by emphasizing the role of culture in crisis management behaviour. Previous studies have not offered an in-depth analysis of terrorism crisis management specifically in Egypt, a country where the tourism industry has often been the target of terrorism attacks. This study therefore contributes to filling this gap in the literature. Moreover, whilst it is not claimed that the findings are generalisable to all other countries, the rich contextual information provided affords a basis for assessment of the appropriateness of transfer.

In this respect, a valuable contribution of the study is its examination of the application to a non-Western context of a wide range of crisis management techniques developed in the West

and hitherto associated with Western crisis management. The transfer of Western-derived concepts, theories and practices to non-Western contexts has become increasingly controversial and is often challenged by non-Western writers. This study provides a more balanced contribution to the debate by showing a broad level of applicability of Western stakeholder theory in Egypt, whilst also taking account of context-specific cultural issues. Finally, the research findings challenge the conventional wisdom that the participation of all stakeholders is necessary if crisis management is to be efficient, thereby contributing both to theory and to managerial practice.

While the above summary illustrates that this study has taken an important initial step, it is nonetheless recognized that further research is needed to understand better the nature of stakeholders' interactions in managing terrorism crises in the tourism industry in different contexts. Only when this final recommendation for future study has been addressed will the full potential of stakeholder theory in this domain become apparent.

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## Appendix One: Questionnaire (English)

Q1. What city/town are you based in?

1. Cairo. ☐
2. Sharm El Sheikh. ☐
3. Dahab. ☐
4. Taba. ☐

Q2. Which of these tourism stakeholder categories best describes your organization? (Please tick ✓ the appropriate box).

1. Central/ local Government. ☐
2. Ministry of Tourism. ☐
3. Ministry of Interior (Tourism Police) ☐
4. General Authority for Promoting Tourism. ☐
5. Hotels/Hotel Association/ Resorts ☐
6. General Authority for Tourism Development. ☐
7. Tourism Companies/ Travel Agencies ☐
8. Tourism Chambers. ☐
9. Airlines and Cruise Lines. ☐
10. Religious Scholars (Imams). ☐
11. International Media. ☐
12. National Media. ☐
13. The Governments of Generating Markets. ☐
14. Others (please specify).....

Q3. Please indicate your experience in the tourism sector:

1. 5 years or less. ☐
2. 6 – 10 years. ☐
3. 11 years or more. ☐

Q4. Please indicate what you consider to be the importance of following stakeholders in managing the terrorism crisis in the tourism industry in Egypt. (Please tick √ the appropriate box for each of the following stakeholders).

Stakeholders	Very important	Important	Neutral	Un-important	Very Unimportant
Central/ local Government					
Ministry of Tourism					
Ministry of Interior (Tourism Police)					
Tourism Bodies and Chambers					
Tourism Companies/ Travel Agencies					
Hotels/Hotel Association/					
Airlines and Cruise Lines					
National Media					
International Media					
Religious Scholars ( Imams )					
Governments of Generating Markets					
Regional and international tourism organization					

Q5. Some stakeholders might have more power than others. Power is defined as *the extent to which a stakeholder has or can gain access to the resources (physical, financial and symbolic.)* How much power do you think the following stakeholders have over others in pre- and post crisis phases? (Please tick √ the appropriate box for each of the following stakeholders).

Stakeholders	Pre-crisis					Post-crisis				
	Very powerful	powerful	Neutral	weak	Very Weak	Very powerful	powerful	Neutral	weak	Very Weak
Central/ local Government										
Ministry of Tourism										
Ministry of Interior (Tourism Police)										
Tourism Bodies and Chambers										
Tourism Companies/ Travel Agencies										



Hotels/Hotel Association/										
Airlines and Cruise Lines										
National Media										
International Media										
Religious Scholars (Imams )										
Governments of Generating Markets										
Regional and international tourism organization										

Q6. Some stakeholders might have more legitimacy than others. Legitimacy is defined as *the extent to which the action of a stakeholder is legally or morally is appropriate in tourism industry in Egypt*. How much do you think the following stakeholders have legitimacy over others in pre-and post crisis phases? (Please tick  $\checkmark$  the appropriate box for each of the following stakeholders).

Stakeholders	Pre-crisis					Post-crisis				
	Very Legitimate	Legitimate	Neutral	Illegitimate	Very Illegitimate	Very Legitimate	Legitimate	Neutral	Illegitimate	Very Illegitimate
Central/ local Government										
Ministry of Tourism										
Ministry of Interior (Tourism Police)										
Tourism Bodies and Chambers										
Tourism Companies/ Travel Agencies										
Hotels/Hotel Association/										
Airlines and Cruise Lines										
National Media										
International Media										
Religious Scholars (Imams )										
Governments of Generating Markets										
Regional and international tourism organization										

Q7. To what extent do you think that the following stakeholders are likely to cooperate in the tourism industry? (Please tick ✓ the appropriate box for each of the following stakeholders).

Stakeholders	Pre- Crisis					Post-Crisis				
	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Central/ local Government										
Ministry of Tourism										
Ministry of Interior (Tourism Police)										
Tourism Bodies and Chambers										
Tourism Companies/ Travel Agencies										
Hotels/Hotel Association/										
Airlines and Cruise Lines										
National Media										
International Media										
Religious Scholars (Imams)										
Governments of Generating Markets										
Regional and international tourism organization										

Q8. To what extent do you agree that the following stakeholders are likely to pose obstacles in tourism industry? (Please tick ✓ the appropriate box to each of the following stakeholders).

	Pre- Crisis	Post-Crisis
--	-------------	-------------

Stakeholders	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Central/ local Government										
Ministry of Tourism										
Ministry of Interior (Tourism Police)										
Tourism Bodies and Chambers										
Tourism Companies/ Travel Agencies										
Hotels/Hotel Association/										
Airlines and Cruise Lines										
National Media										
International Media										
Religious Scholars (Imams)										
The Governments of Generating Markets										
Regional and international tourism organization										

Q9. How often do you communicate with the following before, during and after terrorism crises? (Please tick ✓ the appropriate box for each of the following stakeholders).

Stakeholders	Before crisis					During crisis					After crisis				
	usually	sometimes	not very often	rarely	never	usually	sometimes	not very often	rarely	never	usually	sometimes	not very often	rarely	never
Central/ local Government															
Ministry of Tourism															
Ministry of Interior (Tourism Police)															
Tourism Bodies and Chambers															
Tourism Companies/ Travel Agencies															

Hotels/Hotel Association/															
Airlines and Cruise Lines															
National Media															
International Media															
Religious Scholars (Imams)															
Governments of Generating Markets															
Regional and international tourism organization															

Q10. To what extent do you agree that the stakeholders have adopted the following measures and strategies in recent terrorist attacks in tourism in Egypt? (Please tick ✓ the appropriate box for each of the following measures and strategies).

<b>Measures and Strategies</b>	<b>Strongly agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Neither agree or disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly disagree</b>
Formulating and implementing crisis and contingency plans in advance					
Housing the tourists in gated all-inclusive resorts to divide off tourists and local residents.					
Maintaining too many visible security measures.					
Offering rewards for information leading to the arrest and conviction of those who commit serious crimes against tourists.					
Incorporating the principles of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design					
Considering the function of security important to the success of their business					
Allocating a significant portion of their financial and human resources to security purpose.					
Making their tourists aware of the possibility of becoming victimized by criminals and instruct them in crime prevention methods.					
Using crime prevention/reduction methods—such as security hardware and security policies.					
Educating the citizens on the serious impacts that crime against tourists can have on their communities					
Engaging citizens in a neighbourhood watch scheme					

Establishing a partnership between law enforcement agencies, tourism enterprises, the community at large, and the tourists themselves.					
Establishing a partnership between the leaders of the local community and the national and local governments					

Q11. To what extent do you agree that the law enforcement agencies and police have adopted the following measures and strategies in recent terrorist attacks in tourism in Egypt? (Please tick ✓ the appropriate box for each of the following measures and strategies).

Activities	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Train their officers in tourism issues					
Are visible, accessible, and friendly to tourists					
Work closely with the community and tourism industry representatives					
Advise and train tourism industry employees in crime prevention techniques					
Assist the tourism industry by conducting background checks for employees					
Encourage tourism enterprises to adopt crime prevention/reduction practices (i.e., installation of electronic room locks, surveillance cameras, room safety deposit boxes, employing full-time security officers, etc.)					
Develop and implement tourist education programs aimed at reducing the risk of being victimized					

Q12. To what extent do you agree that the stakeholders have adopted the following measures and strategies in recent terrorist attacks in tourism in Egypt? (Please tick ✓ the appropriate box for each of the following measures and strategies).

Recovery Methods	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Reducing their operational costs by laying off a proportion of their employees.					
Appealing to domestic tourists					
Identifying and developing new market segments					

abroad.					
Undertaking intensive marketing campaigns to convince the general public that things are back to normal;					
Scheduling of special events to attract local residents and out-of-town tourists.					
Reducing prices and offer a variety of incentives (e.g., package deals)					
Offering financial assistance (i.e., grants, tax holidays, subsidized loans, etc.) from their local, state, and/or national governments.					
Providing governmental grants for financing the promotion of their destination					
Undertaking comprehensive marketing campaigns initiated by Ministry of Tourism in cooperation with other NGOs and governmental agencies					
Encouraging area residents within a short drive of the affected destination to visit their region or hometown by appealing to their sense of local patriotism.					
Establishing a mechanism for sharing information and coordination of publicity and PR activities aimed at creating positive public opinion among the media, local community, and customers.					
Postponing the major expenditures on maintenance and renovation					

**Do you have any comments or suggestions about any of the issues covered in this questionnaire?**

.....  
.....

## Appendix Two: Questionnaire (Arabic)

س1 : ما المدينة التي تقيم فيها؟

1- القاهرة ☐

2- شرم الشيخ ☐

3- دهب ☐

4- طابا ☐

س2: الي أي من الجهات السياحية التالية ترتبطون؟

2- وزارة السياحة ☐

1- الحكومة المركزية / المحلية ☐

4- الغرف السياحية ☐

3- وزارة الداخلية (شرطة السياحة) ☐

6- هيئة تنشيط السياحة ☐

5- هيئة التنمية السياحية ☐

8- الخطوط الجوية والبحرية ☐

7- شركات ووكالات السياحة ☐

10- وسائل الإعلام المحلية ☐

9- الفنادق/اتحاد الفنادق ☐

11- جهة أخرى، اذكرها -----

س3 يرجى بيان مدة خبرتك في القطاع السياحي

(5) سنة أو أقل ☐

(10-6) سنة ☐

(11) سنة أو أكثر ☐

س4 ما مدى أهمية الجهات (الموضحة في الجدول أسفل) في السيطرة والتغلب على العمليات الإرهابية التي حدثت في القطاع السياحي المصري مؤخراً؟ (ضع علامة √ في الخانة المناسبة أمام كل جهة).

الجهات المعنية	هام جداً	هام	متوسط	غير هام	غير هام إطلاقاً
الحكومة المركزية / المحلية.					
وزارة السياحة.					
وزارة الداخلية ( شرطة السياحة).					
هيئات وعرف السياحة.					
شركات /وكالات السياحة.					
الفنادق/اتحاد الفنادق.					
الخطوط الجوية والبحرية.					
وسائل الإعلام المحلية.					
وسائل الإعلام الدولية.					
علماء الدين (خطباء المساجد /المفتون).					
حكومات الدول المصدرة للسياح.					
المنظمات السياحية الإقليمية والدولية.					

س5 بعض الجهات السياحية (الموضحة في الجدول أسفل) قد يكون لها نفوذ/ سلطة أكثر من غيرها. (يعرف النفوذ بالمدى الذي يكون للجهة القدرة و تستطيع الحصول على المصادر المادية أو المالية أو المعنوية) من وجهة نظرك، ما مدى النفوذ والسلطة التي تمتلكها كل جهة من الجهات في معالجة العمليات الإرهابية قبل و بعد وقوع الأزمة ؟ (ضع علامة √ في الخانات المناسبة أمام كل جهة وفي كل مرحلة ).

الجهات المعنية	قبل وقوع الأزمة					بعد وقوع الأزمة				
	أبداً	بعض	متوسط	بعض	أبداً	أبداً	بعض	متوسط	بعض	أبداً
الحكومة المركزية / المحلية										
وزارة السياحة										
وزارة الداخلية ( شرطة السياحة)										
هيئات وعرف السياحة										
شركات /وكالات السياحة										
الفنادق/اتحاد الفنادق										
الخطوط الجوية والبحرية										
وسائل الإعلام المحلية										
وسائل الإعلام الدولية										
علماء الدين (خطباء المساجد /المفتون)										
حكومات الدول المصدرة للسياح										
المنظمات السياحية الإقليمية والدولية										



س 6 ما درجة مشروعية الإجراءات التي تتخذها الجهات (الموضحة في الجدول اسفل) في التعامل مع العمليات الإرهابية .  
(السلطة الشرعية تعني مدى قانونية ومشروعية الإجراءات التي تتخذها تلك الجهة في مواجهة العمليات الإرهابية) .  
باعتقادك ما مدى مشروعية كل جهة من الجهات في التعامل مع العمليات الإرهابية؟

(ضع علامة √ في الخانات المناسبة امام كل جهة وفي كل مرحلة)

بعد وقوع الأزمة					قبل وقوع الأزمة					الجهات المعنية
لا أوافق بشدة	لا أوافق	أوافق إلى حد ما	أوافق بشدة	لا أوافق بشدة	لا أوافق	أوافق إلى حد ما	أوافق بشدة	لا أوافق بشدة	لا أوافق	
										الحكومة المركزية / المحلية
										وزارة السياحة
										وزارة الداخلية ( شرطة السياحة)
										هيئات وغرف السياحة
										شركات /وكالات السياحة
										الفنادق/اتحاد الفنادق
										الخطوط الجوية والبحرية
										وسائل الإعلام المحلية
										وسائل الإعلام الدولية
										علماء الدين (خطباء المساجد /المفتون)
										حكومات الدول المصدرة للسياح
										المنظمات السياحية الإقليمية والدولية

س 7 إلى أي مدى ترى أن الجهات السياحية المعنية (الموضحة في الجدول أسفل) لديها القدرة على التعاون للسيطرة على العمليات الإرهابية التي تحدث لقطاع السياحي المصري؟ (ضع علامة √ في الخانات المناسبة أمام كل جهة وفي كل مرحلة).

بعد وقوع الأزمة					قبل وقوع الأزمة					الجهات المعنية
لا أوافق بشدة	لا أوافق	أوافق إلى حد ما	أوافق بشدة	لا أوافق بشدة	لا أوافق	أوافق إلى حد ما	أوافق بشدة	لا أوافق بشدة	لا أوافق	
										الحكومة المركزية / المحلية

										وزارة السياحة
										وزارة الداخلية ( شرطة السياحة)
										هيئات وغرف السياحة
										شركات /وكالات السياحة
										الفنادق/اتحاد الفنادق
										الخطوط الجوية والبحرية
										وسائل الإعلام المحلية
										وسائل الإعلام الدولية
										علماء الدين (خطباء المساجد /المفتون)
										حكومات الدول المصدرة للسياح
										المنظمات السياحية الإقليمية والدولية

س8 إلى أي مدى ترى أن الجهات السياحية المعنية (الموضحة في الجدول أسفل) قد تشكل عائق للقطاع السياحي المصري في التعامل مع الأزمات، قبل الأزمة وبعدها؟ (ضع علامة √ في الخانات المناسبة أمام كل جهة وفي كل مرحلة).

الجهات المعنية	قبل وقوع الأزمة					بعد وقوع الأزمة				
	أوافق بشدة	أوافق	أوافق إلى حد ما	لا أوافق	لا أوافق بشدة	أوافق بشدة	أوافق	أوافق إلى حد ما	لا أوافق	لا أوافق بشدة
الحكومة المركزية / المحلية										
وزارة السياحة										
وزارة الداخلية ( شرطة السياحة)										
هيئات وغرف السياحة										
شركات /وكالات السياحة										
الفنادق/اتحاد الفنادق										
الخطوط الجوية والبحرية										
وسائل الإعلام المحلية										
وسائل الإعلام الدولية										
علماء الدين (خطباء المساجد /المفتون)										
حكومات الدول المصدرة للسياح										
المنظمات السياحية الإقليمية والدولية										

س9 كيف يكون عادة اتصالاتكم مع الجهات المعنية (الموضحة في الجدول أسفل) لإدارة العمليات الإرهابية قبل وأثناء وبعد حدوث الأزمة ؟ (ضع علامة √ في الخانات المناسبة أمام كل جهة وفي كل مرحلة).

الجهات المعنية	قبل وقوع الأزمة					أثناء وقوع الأزمة					بعد وقوع الأزمة				
	دائمًا	غالبًا	أحيانًا	نادرًا	لم يسبق لي أن اتصلت	دائمًا	غالبًا	أحيانًا	نادرًا	لم يسبق لي أن اتصلت	دائمًا	غالبًا	أحيانًا	نادرًا	لم يسبق لي أن اتصلت
الحكومة المركزية / المحلية															
وزارة السياحة															
وزارة الداخلية (شرطة السياحة)															
هيئات وغرف السياحة															
شركات /وكالات السياحة															
الفنادق/اتحاد الفنادق															
الخطوط الجوية والبحرية															
وسائل الإعلام المحلية															
وسائل الإعلام الدولية															
علماء الدين (خطباء المساجد /المفتون)															
حكومات الدول المصدرة للسياح															
المنظمات السياحية الإقليمية والدولية															

س10 إلى أي مدى توافق على أن الجهات المعنية اتخذت التدابير والاستراتيجيات التالية في التعامل مع الهجمات الإرهابية الأخيرة على قطاع السياحة المصري؟ (ضع علامة √ في الخانة المناسبة أمام كل جهة).

الإستراتيجية	أوافق بشدة	أوافق	أوافق إلى حد ما	لا أوافق	لا أوافق بشدة
إعداد وتطبيق خطط طوارئ و إستراتيجية مسبقة لمكافحة الإرهاب بمشاركة مختلف الجهات المعنية بالسياحة.					
وضع السياح في المنتجعات السياحية المغلقة لعزلهم عن السكان المحليين.					
اتخاذ إجراءات أمنية مرئية كوضع الحواجز وغيرها					
تخصيص جوائز لمن يدلي بمعلومات عن الأشخاص الذين يمارسون أنشطة إرهابية.					
أو (CPTED) إدراج مبادئ منع الجريمة من خلال التصميم البيئي استخدام التصميم البيئي الملائم والفعال و البيئة المادية المناسبة.					
النظر إلى النواحي الأمنية باعتبارها عنصر هام لنجاح الاستثمار في					

					السياحة.
					تخصيص جزء كبير من الموارد المالية والبشرية للأغراض أمنية
					تحذير السياح حول احتمال وقوعهم ضحية للأنشطة الإرهابية.
					استخدام أساليب المنع والحد من الجريمة، مثل استخدام الأجهزة الأمنية وسن تشريعات وقوانين أمنية
					تتقيف المواطنين حول تأثير وخطر الأنشطة الإرهابية الموجهة للسياحة على مجتمعاتهم.
					إشراك المواطنين في مراقبة الجيران.
					إقامة شراكة بين سلطات تطبيق القانون والجهات السياحية والمجتمع والسياح أنفسهم.
					إقامة شراكة بين زعماء المجتمعات المحلية والحكومات المحلية والوطنية .

س11 إلى أي مدى توافق على أن سلطات تنفيذ القانون والشرطة اتخذت التدابير (الأنشطة) والاستراتيجيات التالية في التعامل مع الهجمات الإرهابية الأخيرة على قطاع السياحة المصري؟ (ضع علامة √ في الخانة المناسبة أمام كل جهة).

النشاط	هام جداً	هام	هام إلى حد ما	غير هام	غير هام إطلاقاً
تدريب رجال الأمن والموظفين علي التعامل مع القضايا السياحية.					
هل هم متواجدين في الأماكن السياحية ويمكن التواصل المباشر معهم ويتعاملون بلطف مع السياح					
هل يعملون بشكل مباشر مع المجتمع المحلي وممثلي القطاع السياحي					
تقديم المشورة وتدريب العاملين في قطاع السياحة على تقنيات منع الجريمة					
تقييم القطاع السياحي عن طريق التأكد من خلفية وسيرة العاملين به.					
تشجيع المؤسسات السياحية لتبني أساليب وقاية وتخفيف للحوادث الإرهابية مثل (تركيب أقفال إلكترونية للغرف، كاميرات مراقبة، أدوات سلامة للغرف وتعيين حراسات أمنية دائمة... إلخ).					
تطوير وتنفيذ برامج تعليم سياحية تهدف إلى الحد من خطر الوقوع ضحية للجرائم.					

س12 إلى أي مدى توافق على أن الجهات السياحية التالية اتخذت التدابير (الأنشطة) والاستراتيجيات التالية في التعامل مع الهجمات الإرهابية الأخيرة على قطاع السياحة المصري؟ (ضع علامة √ في الخانة المناسبة أمام كل جهة).

طرق التعافي من الأزمة	هام جداً	هام	هام إلى حد ما	غير هام	غير هام إطلاقاً
بتخفيض التكاليف التشغيلية عن طريق الاستغناء عن نسبة من الموظفين.					
التركيز على سياح الداخل					
اكتشاف وتطوير قطاعات سوقية جديدة.					
بالقيام بحملات تسويقية لإقناع الجمهور بأن الوضع قد عاد إلى حالته الطبيعية.					
بوضع جدول لمناسبات خاصة لجذب السياح المحليين و من هم خارج المدينة.					
تخفيض الأسعار عن طريق توفير مجموعة متنوعة من العروض السياحية.					

					طلب مساعدة مالية من الجهات الحكومية.
					تقديم منح حكومية للحصول على تمويل لتطوير السياحة.
					القيام بحملات تسويقية شاملة من قبل وزارة السياحة بالتعاون مع الجهات الحكومية غير الحكومية.
					بالقيام بحملات تسويقية بهدف تشجيع المواطنين والمقيمين بالقرب من المنطقة المتضررة بزيارة منطقتهم أو مدينتهم السياحية المتأثرة وإظهار شعورهم بحب الوطن.
					إيجاد آلية لتبادل المعلومات وتنسيق أنشطة الدعاية والعلاقات العامة بهدف خلق رأي عام إيجابي بين وسائل الإعلام والمجتمع المحلي والعلماء.
					تأجيل الإنفاق على الصيانة والتجديد الرئيسة.

هل لديك أي تعليقات أو اقتراحات حول أي من الأمور المغطاة في هذه الاستبانة؟

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## **Appendix Three: Semi-Structured interview (English)**

### **Identifying Stakeholders**

**A. First, I would like to ask a few questions about your organization and other stakeholders in tourism industry in Egypt.**

A.1. Could you tell me about your organization and its involvement in tourism in Egypt?

A.2. Could you tell me the names of other organizations which are involved in the tourism industry in Egypt?

#### *A- Public Authorities*

- Local/Provincial Government
- Police and Intelligence Authorities(Special branch For Tourism)
- Central/Provincial/Local Tourism Department (DMO)
- Chamber of tourism/ Commerce
- Local Economic Development Authority
- Central Government

#### *B- Private stakeholders*

- Hotels/Hotel Association
- Restaurants/Restaurant Association
- Airlines and Cruise Lines
- Media Directors/Journalists
- Travel Companies/Association
- Retail Stores/Association
- Religious Scholars (Imams)

- University/College

*C- External Stakeholders*

- The governments of generating markets
- Regional and international tourism organization

A.3. Which of these are most influential in the industry in general and tourism crisis management in particular? In what ways?

## **Impacts**

**B. Now I would like to turn to the impacts of the terrorism crisis in Egypt in 2005, on the tourism industry.**

B.4. Generally speaking, what were the effects of the Sharm El Sheikh terrorism crisis in 2005 on the Tourism Industry in Egypt in general and on your organization in particular?

- Decline in tourism
- Decrease in investment in tourism and other sectors which partly rely on tourism
- Negative affect on quality of life of the entire country

B.5. What in your judgement are the main reasons why terrorist attack on tourism industry in Egypt?

- Cultural motivation
- Strategic motivation

## **Management (Action)**

**C. In this section I would like to ask some questions about what you have done in relation to the terrorism crisis in 2005.**

***(Preventative stage)***

C.6. Is there any contingency and crisis plan for managing terrorism crises? Please explain?

C.7. In tourism industry in Egypt, is there a financial plan (budget) for managing such terrorism crises? If “yes” is it enough to restore the industry to normal situation? If no, why?

C.8. Is any training is undertaken for the tourism stakeholders regarding to the crisis management? How important are these educational plans and these are undertaken?

***(Reactive stage based on stakeholders' communication)***

C.9. How important is the participation of stakeholders in the management of terrorism crisis in the tourism industry in Egypt?

C.10. Could you explain about the level of engagement among stakeholders on planning and implementation of crisis management operations?

C.11. Could you explain if and how stakeholders does tend to cooperate with one another ?

C.12. Could you give me a brief description about these headlines on the recent terrorist accident in Sharm El Sheikh, 2005?

- a. Presence of law enforcement or Security Police in tourist zones;
- b. The level of technologically based means of protection in and around tourism installations;
- c. The availability of dedicated tourist police units;
- d. The level of dedicated tourism policing;
- e. The level of visibility of security measures;
- f. The availability of rewards for information leading to arrests of offenders;
- g. Facilitation of tourist victims' testimony in criminal cases;



- h. Adoption of CPTED (Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design) principles in the design of tourism physical plants;
- i. Designating crime against tourists a major criminal offense;
- j. Maintaining a database of crimes against tourists; and
- k. Creating and maintaining safe roads.

*(Recovery stage)*

C.13. Could you tell me precisely, what steps did you take to rebuild the tourist industry after the Sharm El sheikh terrorism crisis 2005?

C.14. Please explain the steps and strategies which were taken to rebuild the tourism industry after the terrorism attacks in Sharm El sheikh in 2005?

C.15. Did you undertake marketing campaigns to convince the general public that things are back to normal? If so, how?

C.16. Was there any coordination with travel advisories, local and national mass media, Ministry of Tourism for sending information to tourists after the Sharm El Sheik terrorism crisis in 2005? If so, how?

C.17. To what extent did you send positive information to existing and potential tourists?

## **National Culture**

**D. Now I would like to ask some precise questions about the impact of national culture on the engagement of different stakeholders during terrorism crisis in the tourism industry in Sharm El Sheikh in 2005.**

D.18. If the organizational culture was defined as a pattern of beliefs and expectations shared by the organization's members, resulting in the norm that shape the behaviour of the individuals in the organization, how would you describe the culture in your organization?

D.19. What changes in the national culture should be take place if they are to be more effective in dealing with crisis?

D.20. In your opinion what are the cultural barriers which affect the interaction of stakeholders in managing the crisis? Please explain in detail?

D.21. Could you please explain your role in decision making during the crisis?

### **Recommendations**

**E. Finally I would appreciate your suggestions/recommendations on managing terrorism attacks in the tourism industry in Egypt. (Such as cooperation of different parties working in tourism industry in Egypt)**

E.22. What kind of measures do you recommend to be taken by different stakeholders before over and after crisis to mitigate the crisis effects?

E.23. What lessons were learned from the Sharm El Sheikh 2005 terrorism attacks, and how could these be used to help reduce the damage caused?

## Appendix Four: Semi-Structured interview (Arabic)

### جدول مقابلة أصحاب الحصص / المصالح

#### تحديد أصحاب الحصص / المصالح

أ. أولاً ، أود أن أطرح بعض الاسئلة عن منظماتكم وغيرها من اصحاب الحصص/ المصالح في صناعة السياحة في مصر.

1. هل يمكن أن تحدثني عن منظماتكم ومشاركته في صناعة السياحة في مصر؟

2. هل من الممكن أن تذكر أسماء المنظمات الأخرى التي تشكل القطاع السياحي في مصر؟

أصحاب الحصص / المصالح الجهة السياحية

- السلطات العامة

- الحكومة المحلية / الإقليمية

- سلطات الشرطة والاستخبارات (الفروع الخاصة بالسياحة)

- فروع وزارة السياحة المركزية/ المحلية/ القروية

- الغرف التجارية

- هيئات التطوير السياحي

- الحكومة المركزية

ب- أصحاب الحصص / المصالح / القطاع الخاص

- الفنادق / اتحاد الفنادق

- المطاعم / اتحاد المطاعم

- الخطوط الجوية / البحرية

- الشركات السياحية / اتحاد الشركات السياحية

- متاجر التجزئة / رابطة متاجر التجزئة

- علماء الدين (المفتون)

- الجامعات / الكليات

ج- أصحاب الحصص / المصالح خارجيين

- حكومات الأسواق المولدة للسياح

- المنظمات السياحية الإقليمية / الدولية

3. أي من هذه المنظمات أكثر تأثراً بالأحداث بشكل عام وبإدارة الأزمات السياحية بشكل خاص؟ و إلى أي مدى؟

## التأثيرات

ب. الآن ارغب في العودة إلى التأثيرات الناجمة عن أزمة الإرهاب سنة 2005 علي القطاع

السياحي في مصر؟

4. ما هي آثار أزمة شرم الشيخ الإرهابية 2005 علي القطاع السياحي المصري بشكل عام و علي منظماتكم تحديداً؟

- انخفاض عدد السياح

- نقص في الاستثمار السياحي وفي القطاعات المرتبطة بالسياحة

- تأثيرات سلبية علي حياة البلد بشكل عام

5. ما هي دوافع الإرهابيين نحو صناعة السياحة في مصر؟ في رأيك ما هي أهم أسباب الهجمات الإرهابية علي

صناعة السياحة في مصر؟

- دوافع ثقافية

- دوافع إستراتيجية

## الإدارة

ج. في هذا الجزء أود أن اطرح بعض الأسئلة حول ما قامت به منظماتكم حيال أزمة شرم الشيخ

الإرهابية عام 2005؟

(المرحلة الوقائية)

6. هل كان هناك خطة أزمة او طواري لإدارة ازمات الإرهاب 2005 ؟ كرما اشرح

7. في القطاع السياحي في المصري، هل هناك ميزانيه لإدارة مثل هذه الازمات الارهابيه؟ اذا "نعم" هل هذه الميزانية

كافية لاستعداد الوضع الى طبيعته؟ اذا لا ، لماذا؟

8. هل كان هناك تدريب للعاملين بالسياحة في الجهات السياحة المختلفة بشأن إدارة الازمات؟ ما مدى اهمية خطط

التدريب وتلك التي تم تطبيقها؟

### (مرحلة رد الفعل المعتمدة على الاتصال بين اصحاب المصالح)

9. ما مدي أهمية الاتصال بينكم و بين المنظمات الأخرى خلال أزمات الإرهاب في السياحة المصرية؟
10. هل ممكن ان تشرح مستوى التعاون بين اصحاب الحصص / المصالح في التخطيط وتنفيذ عمليات ادره الأزيمة؟
11. هل ممكن ان تشرح كيف يكون التعاون بين اصحاب الحصص / المصالح السياحية ليتعاونون فيما بينهم ان وجد؟
12. هل لك ان تعطيني وصفا موجزا عن هذه العناوين عن الحوادث الارهابيه الأخيرة فى شرم الشيخ عام 2005؟
- وجود شرطة او أمن الشرطة في المناطق السياحية
  - مستوى تكنولوجيا وسائل الحماية في المنشآت السياحية وحولها
  - توفر وحدات الشرطة السياحية المكّسة
  - مستوى مراقبة السياحة المكّسة
  - مستوى رؤية التدابير الأمنيّة؛
  - توفر الجوائز مقابل معلومات تؤدّي إلى اعتقالات الجانحين
  - تسهيل شهادة الضحايا السياح في حالة الجرائم
  - اعتماد مبدئي CPTED (منع الجريمة من خلال التصميم البيئي)

(والهدف هو ضمان ان جميع جوانب البيئة المادية (الشوارع والمباني والمساحات المفتوحة) تهدف الى خلق بيئات آمنة).

- اعتبار الجريمة ضد السياح جريمة كبرى

- الاحتفاظ بقاعدة بيانات عن الجرائم ضد السياح

- انشاء وصيانة طرق امنه.

### (مرحلة الانتعاش)

13. هل من الممكن أن تشرح لنا تحديدا، الخطوات التي تم اتخاذها لإعادة بناء صناعة السياحة بعد الهجمات

الإرهابية في شرم الشيخ في عام 2005؟

14. كرما، ممكن أن تشرح الخطوات والاستراتيجيات التي تم اتخاذها لإعادة بناء صناعة السياحة بعد هجمات شرم

الشيخ الإرهابية في 2005؟

15. هل نفذتم وقمتم بحملة تسويقية لإقناع الجمهور بأن الأمور عادت إلى طبيعتها؟ إذا كان الأمر كذلك، كيف؟

16. هل كان هناك أي تنسيق مع وكالات السفر، وسائل الإعلام المحلية والوطنية، وزارة السياحة، لإرسال معلومات

إلى السياح بعد أحداث شرم الشيخ عام 2005؟ إذا كان الأمر كذلك ، كيف؟

17. إلى أي مدى استطعتم أن ترسلوا معلومات ايجابية عن الوضع الحالي والمحتملة السياح؟

## الثقافة المحلية

د. والآن أود أن أ طرح بعض الأسئلة الدقيقة عن تأثير الثقافة التنظيمية الخاصة بك ، وهيكل إدارة

الاتصال بين مختلف المنظمات أثناء أزمة شرم الشيخ الإرهاب في 2005؟

18. تعرف الثقافة التنظيمية بأنها نمط من المعتقدات والتوقعات التي يتقاسمها أعضاء المنظمة، مما يسفر عن

إنتاج القاعدة التي تشكل سلوك الأفراد في المنظمة، كيف تصف الثقافة في منظماتكم؟

19. ما هي التغييرات الثقافية التي تحتاجها منظماتكم لتصبح أكثر فاعلية في مواجهة الأزمات؟

20. في رأيك، ماهي العوائق الثقافية التي اثرت على فاعلية التعاون والتنسيق بين اصحاب الحصص / المصالح

السياحية ؟ كرما اشرح بالتفصيل؟

21. هل ممكن أن تشرح طريقة منظماتكم في اتخاذ القرار أثناء الأزمة؟

## التوصيات

هـ. أخيرا سوف أكون ممتن لسماع اقتراحاتك و توصياتك حول إدارة الهجمات الإرهابية في

السياحة المصرية. ؟ (مثل استراتيجيه شبكة الاتصالات وتعاون لمختلف الجهات العاملة في

صناعة السياحة في مصر)

22. ما هي التدابير التي توصي باتخاذها من قبل مختلف أصحاب الحصص / المصالح قبل و أثناء و بعد الأزمة

لنقليل أثارها؟

23. ما هي الدروس المستفادة من هجمات شرم الشيخ الإرهابية عام 2005 وكيف يمكن استخدامها للمساعدة في الحد من

الأضرار الناجمة؟



## Appendix Five: List of Participants and Interview Coding

Abbreviations: CPP- Cairo Public Participants. SPP- Sharm el Sheikh Public Participants. CRP- Cairo Private Participants.

SRP- Sharm el Sheikh Private Participants. CVP- Cairo Various participants. SVP- Sharm el Sheikh Various participants.

	Position and Organisation /public Sector	Name	Interview Coding
1	spokesman of the Minister of Tourism and Head of the crisis management unit in Egyptian Ministry of Tourism	Ms Hala al-Khatib	CPP 1
2	Head of hotels and Tourism Resorts Sector in The Ministry of Tourism	Mr Shokri Jaweesh	CPP 2
3	Public Relations Director of the Egyptian General Authority for the revitalization of tourism	Mr Adel Almasri	CPP 3
4	Egyptian Tourism Federation	anonymous	CPP 4
5	General Secretary of companies and agencies of travel and tourism Chambers	Mr Riyadh Kabeel	CPP 5
6	General Director of Planning and Follow-up of the Egyptian General Authority for the revitalization of tourism	Ms Neven Halouani	CPP 6
7	Chief of the EgyptAir Office, Almohandeseen Branch	Ms Rokayah	CPP 7
8	Misr Travel Company	anonymous	CPP8
9	General Director of the General Authority for Tourism Development (GATD), Sharm El-Sheikh Office	Mr Tahir Ali Dekrony	SPP 9
10	head of the information centre at Sharm el-Sheikh City Council	Mr Mahmood Hammad	SPP 10
11	Chairman of the Sharm El-Sheikh city Council	Mr Mahmood Eissa	SPP 11
12	Director of Public Relations Office of Tourism Development Authority in Sharm El-Sheikh	Mr Mohammed Ata	SPP 12
13	General Authority for Tourist Development	anonymous	SPP 13
14	Sharm El Sheikh Airport, Public Relations	Mr Ahmed Samir	SPP 14
15	Sharm El-Sheikh central Mosque	anonymous	SPP15
<b>Private Sector</b>			
<b>Tourism Company/ Travel agency/ Airlines</b>			
16	The Tourism Manager of Kimidar Tours	Mr Peter Habib	CRP16
17	The Tourism Manager of Emeco travel	Mr Ilhami Zayyat	CRP 17
18	First City Group Tourism Company, Sharm El Sheikh	anonymous	SRP 18
19	Director of sales and Marketing, Saudi Arabia Airlines	Mr Mustafa Al-Shenawi-	CRP 19
20	KLM Royal Dutch Airlines/ Sharm El Sheikh office	anonymous	SRP20
<b>Hotels</b>			
21	Director of sales, Cairo Marriott hotel	Ms Heba Eissa	CRP 21
22	Irea Director of Public, Cairo Semiramis -	Ms Nabila Samak	CRP 22

	Intercontineintal Hotel,		
23	Cairo Noble Hotel	Mr Ahmed Saleh	CRP 23
24	Public Relations Manager, Hilton Nile,	Ms Farida Mansour	CRP 24
25	The Sheraton Sharm El Sheikh Hotel & Resort, Public Relations	anonymous	SRP 25
26	The Ghazala Gardens Hotel, Sharm El Sheikh	anonymous	SRP 26
27	Sharm El Sheikh Four Seasons Hotel, Public Relations	anonymous	SRP 27
	<b>Restaurants</b>		
28	Egyptians Restaurant, Sharm El Sheikh	anonymous	SRP 28
29	Hard Rock Sharm el Sheikh Café	anonymous	SRP 29
30	Kanzaman Restaurant, Sharm El Sheikh	anonymous	SRP 30
	<b>Various participants</b>		
31	Egyptian republic Newspaper, journalist	Mr Nabeel Nor	CVP 31
32	Egyptian Al-Ahram Newspaper, Chairman of the Editorial Section	Mr Mustafa Alnaggar	CVP 32
33	Diving World, Operations Manager, Sharm El Sheikh	Mr Andrea de Laurentiis	SVP 33
34	Western Union, Currency Exchange, Sharm El Sheikh	Mr Weil Awad	SVP 34
35	Thrifty Car rental, Sharm el Sheikh	anonymous	SVP 35
36	Egyptian Investor in Sharm El Sheikh	Ms Rasha Bba	SVP 36

## Appendix Six: Official Correspondence

Royal  
Embassy of Saudi Arabia  
Cultural Bureau  
Cairo - Egypt



سفارة  
المملكة العربية السعودية  
فك جمهورية مصر العربية  
الملحقية الثقافية  
الشئون الدراسية

الموضوع :

سعادة الأمين العام للمجلس الأعلى للسياحة والآثار  
حفظه الله  
السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته ...

تهديكم الملحقية الثقافية السعودية بجمهورية مصر العربية خالص تحياتها ، وتود  
الإفادة بأن الباحث السعودي / عبد الرحمن محمد الثنيان يدرس بجامعة Hull في  
بريطانيا، وأن بحثه العلمي في موضوع : إدارة الأزمات السياحية، مما له وثيق الصلة  
بتفجيرات شرم الشيخ التي حدثت عام ٢٠٠٥م ومدى تأثيرها على السياحة .  
لذا فإن الباحث بحاجة ماسة إلى زيارة بعض المنشآت السياحية في القاهرة وشرم  
الشيخ، لإجراء مقابلات شخصية مع بعض الجهات المعنية وذات العلاقة بالسياحة. علماً  
بأن هناك موافقة من قبل سفارة المملكة العربية السعودية في مصر على استكمال بحثه  
العلمي في تلك المناطق السياحية .  
فنرجو التكرم بتسهيل مهمته البحثية ، شاكرين لسعادتكم تعاونكم معنا. والله يحفظكم  
ويرعاكم .

وتفضلوا سعادتكم بقبول خالص تحياتي وتقديري

المستشار الثقافي  
ر

محمد بن عبد العزيز العقيل



الرقم ٩١٦٥١٤ التاريخ ١٤٢٨/١٦/١٢ الموافق ٢٠٠٧/١١/١٨ المرفقات  
القاهرة : ٢٣ شارع هارون - الدقي ت : ٣٣٦٠٦١٣ - ٣٣٦٠٦١٤ فاكس : ٧٤٩١٧١٥ ص.ب : ٤٥٧ الدقي  
E-mail : contact@sacaegypt.org web site : http://www.sacaegypt.org



الموضوع :

حفظه الله

سعادة رئيس قطاع الفنادق والقرى السياحية

السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته . . .

تهديكم الملحقية الثقافية السعودية بجمهورية مصر العربية خالص تحياتها ، وتود  
الإفادة بأن الباحث السعودي / عبد الرحمن محمد الثنيان يدرس بجامعة Hull في  
بريطانيا، وأن بحثه العلمي في موضوع : إدارة الأزمات السياحية، مما له وثيق الصلة  
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ويرعاكم .

وتفضلوا سعادتكم بقبول خالص تحياتي وتقديري

المستشار الثقافي

محمد بن عبد العزيز العجيل



الرقم ٤١٦٥٤٢ التاريخ ٢٠١٢/١٢/٢٤ الموافق ٢٠١٨/٧/٢٨ المرفقات

القاهرة : ٢٣ شارع هارون - الدقي ت : ٣٣٦٠٦١٣ - ٣٣٦٠٦١٤ فاكس : ٧٤٩١٧١٥ ص.ب : ٤٥٧ الدقي  
E-mail : contact@sacaegypt.org web site : http://www.sacaegypt.org

## Appendix Seven - Tables of statistics

### Stakeholders' salience

#### Stakeholders' power before crises

**Group Statistics**

Geographical Division		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Tpwppe	Centre	130	42.68	4.158	.365
	Local	198	41.66	3.802	.270

**Independent Samples Test**

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
									Lower	Upper
Tpwppe	Equal variances assumed	.000	.992	2.296	326	.022	1.023	.446	.147	1.899
	Equal variances not assumed			2.254	258.526	.025	1.023	.454	.129	1.917

#### Stakeholders' power after crises

**Group Statistics**

Geographical Division		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Tpwpst	Centre	130	36.9923	4.21789	.36993
	Local	198	36.8939	3.46613	.24633

**Independent Samples Test**

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
									Lower	Upper
Tpwpst	Equal variances assumed	6.238	.013	.230	326	.818	.09837	.42687	-.74141	.93814
	Equal variances not assumed			.221	238.101	.825	.09837	.44444	-.77717	.97391

## Multivariate Tests

**Multivariate Tests<sup>b</sup>**

Effect		Value	F	Hypothesis df	Error df	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Intercept	Pillai's Trace	.993	22845.867 <sup>a</sup>	2.000	325.000	.000	.993
	Wilks' Lambda	.007	22845.867 <sup>a</sup>	2.000	325.000	.000	.993
	Hotelling's Trace	140.590	22845.867 <sup>a</sup>	2.000	325.000	.000	.993
	Roy's Largest Root	140.590	22845.867 <sup>a</sup>	2.000	325.000	.000	.993
CentrevsLocal	Pillai's Trace	.018	3.004 <sup>a</sup>	2.000	325.000	.051	.018
	Wilks' Lambda	.982	3.004 <sup>a</sup>	2.000	325.000	.051	.018
	Hotelling's Trace	.018	3.004 <sup>a</sup>	2.000	325.000	.051	.018
	Roy's Largest Root	.018	3.004 <sup>a</sup>	2.000	325.000	.051	.018

a. Exact statistic

b. Design: Intercept + CentrevsLocal

**Geographical Division**

Dependent Variable	Geographical Division	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
				Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Tpwpres	Centre	42.685	.346	42.004	43.366
	Local	41.662	.280	41.110	42.213
Tpwpst	Centre	36.992	.332	36.340	37.645
	Local	36.894	.269	36.365	37.423

## Legitimacy of stakeholders before crises

**Group Statistics**

Geographical Division		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Tlegpre	Centre	130	42.7154	4.43949	.38937
	Local	198	43.5758	4.37712	.31107

**Independent Samples Test**

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
									Lower	Upper
Tlegpre	Equal variances assumed	.021	.885	-1.731	326	.084	-.86037	.49691	-1.83792	.11717
	Equal variances not assumed			-1.726	273.312	.085	-.86037	.49837	-1.84150	.12076

## Legitimacy of stakeholders after crises

### Group Statistics

Geographical Division		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Tlegpost	Centre	130	38.6462	4.52703	.39705
	Local	198	39.6414	4.26861	.30336

### Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
									Lower	Upper
Tlegpost	Equal variances assumed	.959	.328	-2.016	326	.045	-.99526	.49361	-1.96632	-.02420
	Equal variances not assumed			-1.992	264.537	.047	-.99526	.49967	-1.97910	-.01142

## Multivariate Tests

### Multivariate Tests<sup>b</sup>

Effect		Value	F	Hypothesis df	Error df	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Intercept	Pillai's Trace	.991	17931.174 <sup>a</sup>	2.000	325.000	.000	.991
	Wilks' Lambda	.009	17931.174 <sup>a</sup>	2.000	325.000	.000	.991
	Hotelling's Trace	110.346	17931.174 <sup>a</sup>	2.000	325.000	.000	.991
	Roy's Largest Root	110.346	17931.174 <sup>a</sup>	2.000	325.000	.000	.991
CentrevsLocal	Pillai's Trace	.014	2.310 <sup>a</sup>	2.000	325.000	.101	.014
	Wilks' Lambda	.986	2.310 <sup>a</sup>	2.000	325.000	.101	.014
	Hotelling's Trace	.014	2.310 <sup>a</sup>	2.000	325.000	.101	.014
	Roy's Largest Root	.014	2.310 <sup>a</sup>	2.000	325.000	.101	.014

a. Exact statistic

b. Design: Intercept + CentrevsLocal

### Estimates

Dependent Variable	Geographical Division	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
				Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Tlegpost	Centre	38.646	.384	37.892	39.401
	Local	39.641	.311	39.030	40.253
Tlegpre	Centre	42.715	.386	41.956	43.475
	Local	43.576	.313	42.960	44.191

## Stakeholders' management strategies

### Ability to cooperate before crises

**Group Statistics**

Geographical Division		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Tcooppre	Centre	130	45.2769	4.80635	.42154
	Local	198	44.2374	4.58636	.32594

**Independent Samples Test**

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
									Lower	Upper
Tcooppre	Equal variances assumed	.255	.614	1.970	326	.050	1.03955	.52769	.00143	2.07766
	Equal variances not assumed			1.951	266.886	.052	1.03955	.53286	-.00959	2.08869

### Ability to cooperate after crises

**Group Statistics**

Geographical Division		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Tcooppost	Centre	130	42.2231	4.92622	.43206
	Local	198	40.4798	5.50746	.39140

**Independent Samples Test**

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
									Lower	Upper
Tcooppost	Equal variances assumed	2.151	.143	2.922	326	.004	1.74328	.59660	.56960	2.91696
	Equal variances not assumed			2.990	296.740	.003	1.74328	.58298	.59598	2.89058



## Multivariate Tests

**Multivariate Tests<sup>b</sup>**

Effect		Value	F	Hypothesis df	Error df	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Intercept	Pillai's Trace	.990	16065.937 <sup>a</sup>	2.000	325.000	.000	.990
	Wilks' Lambda	.010	16065.937 <sup>a</sup>	2.000	325.000	.000	.990
	Hotelling's Trace	98.867	16065.937 <sup>a</sup>	2.000	325.000	.000	.990
	Roy's Largest Root	98.867	16065.937 <sup>a</sup>	2.000	325.000	.000	.990
CentrevsLocal	Pillai's Trace	.026	4.392 <sup>a</sup>	2.000	325.000	.013	.026
	Wilks' Lambda	.974	4.392 <sup>a</sup>	2.000	325.000	.013	.026
	Hotelling's Trace	.027	4.392 <sup>a</sup>	2.000	325.000	.013	.026
	Roy's Largest Root	.027	4.392 <sup>a</sup>	2.000	325.000	.013	.026

a. Exact statistic

b. Design: Intercept + CentrevsLocal

**Geographical Division**

Dependent Variable	Geographical Division	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
				Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Tcooppre	Centre	45.277	.410	44.470	46.083
	Local	44.237	.332	43.584	44.891
Tcooppost	Centre	42.223	.464	41.311	43.135
	Local	40.480	.376	39.741	41.219

## Potential to pose obstacles before crises

**Group Statistics**

	Geographical Division	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
TRposobs	Centre	125	42.5600	5.18279	.46356
	Local	189	40.5079	5.29413	.38509

**Independent Samples Test**

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
									Lower	Upper
TRposobs	Equal variances assumed	.006	.936	3.390	312	.001	2.05206	.60527	.86113	3.24300
	Equal variances not assumed			3.405	269.534	.001	2.05206	.60265	.86557	3.23856

## Potential to pose obstacles after crises

**Group Statistics**

Geographical Division		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Tposobspost	Centre	127	35.4724	4.48600	.39807
	Local	193	34.7927	4.53901	.32673

**Independent Samples Test**

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
									Lower	Upper
Tposobspost	Equal variances assumed	.005	.944	1.317	318	.189	.67969	.51624	-.33598	1.69537
	Equal variances not assumed			1.320	271.953	.188	.67969	.51498	-.33417	1.69356

## Multivariate Tests

**Multivariate Tests<sup>b</sup>**

Effect		Value	F	Hypothesis df	Error df	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Intercept	Pillai's Trace	.985	9983.176 <sup>a</sup>	2.000	304.000	.000	.985
	Wilks' Lambda	.015	9983.176 <sup>a</sup>	2.000	304.000	.000	.985
	Hotelling's Trace	65.679	9983.176 <sup>a</sup>	2.000	304.000	.000	.985
	Roy's Largest Root	65.679	9983.176 <sup>a</sup>	2.000	304.000	.000	.985
CentrevsLocal	Pillai's Trace	.068	11.112 <sup>a</sup>	2.000	304.000	.000	.068
	Wilks' Lambda	.932	11.112 <sup>a</sup>	2.000	304.000	.000	.068
	Hotelling's Trace	.073	11.112 <sup>a</sup>	2.000	304.000	.000	.068
	Roy's Largest Root	.073	11.112 <sup>a</sup>	2.000	304.000	.000	.068

a. Exact statistic

b. Design: Intercept + CentrevsLocal

**Geographical Division**

Dependent Variable	Geographical Division	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
				Lower Bound	Upper Bound
TRposobs	Centre	42.697	.476	41.760	43.633
	Local	40.519	.386	39.759	41.279
Tposobspost	Centre	35.385	.409	34.580	36.191
	Local	34.843	.332	34.189	35.497

## Frequency of interaction

**Multivariate Tests**

	Value	F	Hypothesis df	Error df	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Pillai's trace	.920	1875.375 <sup>a</sup>	2.000	326.000	.000	.920
Wilks' lambda	.080	1875.375 <sup>a</sup>	2.000	326.000	.000	.920
Hotelling's trace	11.505	1875.375 <sup>a</sup>	2.000	326.000	.000	.920
Roy's largest root	11.505	1875.375 <sup>a</sup>	2.000	326.000	.000	.920

Each F tests the multivariate effect of Frequencies. These tests are based on the linearly independent pairwise comparisons among the estimated marginal means.

a. Exact statistic

**Descriptive Statistics**

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Tcommunipre	18.7226	7.90884	328
Tcommuniduring	44.7805	8.10712	328
Tcommunipost	24.9817	10.41287	328

## Multivariate Tests

**Multivariate Tests<sup>b</sup>**

Effect		Value	F	Hypothesis df	Error df	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Intercept	Pillai's Trace	.968	3245.213 <sup>a</sup>	3.000	324.000	.000	.968
	Wilks' Lambda	.032	3245.213 <sup>a</sup>	3.000	324.000	.000	.968
	Hotelling's Trace	30.048	3245.213 <sup>a</sup>	3.000	324.000	.000	.968
	Roy's Largest Root	30.048	3245.213 <sup>a</sup>	3.000	324.000	.000	.968
	Root						
CentrevsLocal	Pillai's Trace	.016	1.799 <sup>a</sup>	3.000	324.000	.147	.016
	Wilks' Lambda	.984	1.799 <sup>a</sup>	3.000	324.000	.147	.016
	Hotelling's Trace	.017	1.799 <sup>a</sup>	3.000	324.000	.147	.016
	Roy's Largest Root	.017	1.799 <sup>a</sup>	3.000	324.000	.147	.016
	Root						

a. Exact statistic

b. Design: Intercept + CentrevsLocal

### Frequency of interaction before crises

Descriptive Statistics			
	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Ministry of Tourism	328	1.86	1.269
National media	328	1.78	1.117
Tourism companies/ travel agencies	328	1.78	.883
Airlines and cruise lines	328	1.65	1.068
Hotels/ associations	328	1.62	.859
International media	328	1.59	.985
Regional and international tourism organizations	328	1.59	.904
Tourism bodies / chambers	328	1.56	.953
Central/ local government	328	1.45	.862
Imams	328	1.37	.742
Governments of generating markets	328	1.26	.587
Ministry of Interior (Tourism Police)	328	1.22	.581
Valid N (listwise)	328		

### Frequency of interaction during crises

Descriptive Statistics			
	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Ministry of Tourism	328	4.67	.727
Tourism companies/ travel agencies	328	4.32	.956
Hotels/ associations	328	4.23	.761
Airlines and cruise lines	328	4.04	.808
Tourism bodies / chambers	328	3.91	1.243
Governments of generating markets	328	3.86	.987
Imams	328	3.86	.863
National media	328	3.84	1.373
International media	328	3.72	.909
Ministry of Interior (Tourism Police)	328	3.45	.988
Central/ local government	328	3.36	1.367
Regional and international tourism organizations	328	1.53	.874
Valid N (listwise)	328		

### Frequency of interaction after crises

Descriptive Statistics			
	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Ministry of Tourism	328	2.49	1.496
Airlines and cruise lines	328	2.41	1.074
Tourism bodies / chambers	328	2.37	1.189
Hotels/ associations	328	2.27	1.158
Imams	328	2.09	1.106
Tourism companies/ travel agencies	328	2.08	1.191
Regional and international tourism organizations	328	2.03	1.251
Central/ local government	328	1.95	1.071
International media	328	1.94	1.100
Ministry of Interior (Tourism Police)	328	1.93	1.220
National media	328	1.87	1.132

Governments of generating markets	328	1.55	.753
Valid N (listwise)	328		

## Preventive strategies

Descriptive Statistics			
	N	Mean	SD
1.1.2.5.Assisting the tourism industry by conducting background checks for employees	328	4.59	.584
1.5.1.Offering rewards for information leading to the arrest and conviction of those who commit serious crimes against tourists	328	4.37	1.053
1.1.1.2.Maintaining many visible security measures	328	4.32	1.161
1.1.1.3.Increase the presence of uniformed officers in tourist zones	328	3.70	1.420
1.3.4.Using crime prevention/reduction methods—such as security hardware and security policies	328	3.16	1.129
1.1.2.1.Training police officers in tourism issues	328	3.15	.967
1.1.2.2.Being visible, accessible, and friendly police to tourists	328	3.09	.986
1.3.2.Considering the function of security important to the success of their business	328	2.40	.923
1.4.1.Making tourists aware of the possibility of becoming victimized by criminals and instructing them in crime prevention methods	328	2.33	.871
1.5.2.Educating citizens on the serious impacts that crime against tourists can have on their communities	327	2.29	.953
1.1.2.6.Encouraging tourism enterprises to adopt crime prevention/reduction practices (installation of electronic room locks, surveillance cameras, room safety deposit boxes, employing full-time security officers, etc.)	328	2.13	.891
1.5.3.Engaging citizens in neighbourhood watch schemes	328	2.12	1.085
1.4.2.Develop and implement tourist education programs aimed at reducing the risk of being victimized	328	1.96	.891
1.3.3.Allocating a significant portion of their financial and human resources to security	328	1.93	1.083
1.5.4.Establishing a partnership between the leaders of the local community and the national and local governments	328	1.90	.933
1.1.2.4.Advising and training tourism industry employees in crime prevention techniques	328	1.84	.689
1.2.1.Formulating a comprehensive contingency plan	328	1.81	.820
1.1.2.3.Working closely with the community and tourism industry representatives	328	1.79	.854
1.1.1.1.Housing the tourists in gated all-inclusive resorts to divide off tourists from local residents	328	1.58	.774
1.3.1.Incorporating the principles of crime prevention through environmental design	328	1.48	.770
1.1.2.7.Establishing a partnership between law enforcement agencies, tourism enterprises, the community at large, and the tourists themselves.	328	1.41	.583
Valid N (listwise)	327		

## Recovery strategies

Descriptive Statistics			
	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
2.3.4.Reducing prices and offering a variety of incentives (e.g. package deals)	328	4.56	.775
2.3.2.Identifying and developing new market segments abroad	328	4.46	.819
2.3.5.Undertaking comprehensive marketing campaigns initiated by Ministry of Tourism in cooperation with other NGOs and governmental agencies	328	4.35	.828
2.4.3.Reducing operational costs by laying off a proportion of their employees	328	4.33	.814
2.4.4.Postponing major expenditure on maintenance and renovation	328	4.27	.855
2.1.1.Establishing a mechanism for sharing information and coordination of publicity and PR activities aimed at creating positive public opinion among the media, local community and customers	328	4.10	.965
2.3.1.Appealing to domestic tourists	328	4.06	.962
2.2.1.Undertaking intensive marketing campaigns to convince the general public that things are back to normal	328	3.99	1.014
2.3.3.Scheduling of special events to attract local residents and out-of-town tourists	328	2.43	1.082
2.2.2.Encouraging area residents within a short drive of the affected destination to visit their region or hometown by appealing to their sense of local patriotism	328	1.61	.778
2.4.2.Providing governmental grants for financing the promotion of their destination	328	1.42	.725
2.4.1.Offering financial assistance (grants, tax holidays, subsidized loans, etc.) from local, state and/or national governments	328	1.40	.576
Valid N (listwise)	328		

## Strategies specific to security sector

Descriptive Statistics			
	N	Mean	SD
1.1.2.5.Assisting the tourism industry by conducting background checks for employees	328	4.59	.584
1.1.1.2.Maintaining many visible security measures	328	4.32	1.161
1.1.1.3.Increase the presence of uniformed officers in tourist zones	328	3.70	1.420
1.1.2.1.Training police officers in tourism issues	328	3.15	.967
1.1.2.2.Being visible, accessible, and friendly police to tourists	328	3.09	.986
1.1.2.6.Encouraging tourism enterprises to adopt crime prevention/reduction practices (installation of electronic room locks, surveillance cameras, room safety deposit boxes, employing full-time security officers, etc.)	328	2.13	.891
1.1.2.4.Advising and training tourism industry employees in crime prevention techniques	328	1.84	.689
1.1.2.3.Working closely with the community and tourism industry representatives	328	1.79	.854
1.1.1.1.Housing the tourists in gated all-inclusive resorts to divide off tourists from local residents	328	1.58	.774

1.1.2.7.Establishing a partnership between law enforcement agencies, tourism enterprises, the community at large, and the tourists themselves.	328	1.41	.583
Valid N (listwise)	328		

### Strategies specific to private sector

Descriptive Statistics			
	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
1.3.4.Using crime prevention/reduction methods—such as security hardware and security policies	328	3.16	1.129
1.3.2.Considering the function of security important to the success of their business	328	2.40	.923
1.3.3.Allocating a significant portion of their financial and human resources to security	328	1.93	1.083
1.3.1.Incorporating the principles of crime prevention through environmental design	328	1.48	.770
Valid N (listwise)	328		

### Strategies specific to tourists

Descriptive Statistics			
	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
1.4.1.Making tourists aware of the possibility of becoming victimized by criminals and instructing them in crime prevention methods	328	2.33	.871
1.4.2.Develop and implement tourist education programs aimed at reducing the risk of being victimized	328	1.96	.891
Valid N (listwise)	328		

### Strategies specific to local citizens

Descriptive Statistics			
	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
1.5.1.Offering rewards for information leading to the arrest and conviction of those who commit serious crimes against tourists	328	4.37	1.053
1.5.2.Educating citizens on the serious impacts that crime against tourists can have on their communities	327	2.29	.953
1.5.3.Engaging citizens in neighbourhood watch schemes	328	2.12	1.085
1.5.4.Establishing a partnership between the leaders of the local community and the national and local governments	328	1.90	.933
Valid N (listwise)	327		

## Recovery strategies

Descriptive Statistics			
	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
1.1.2.5.Assisting the tourism industry by conducting background checks for employees	328	4.59	.584
2.1.1.Establishing a mechanism for sharing information and coordination of publicity and PR activities aimed at creating positive public opinion among the media, local community and customers	328	4.10	.965
2.3.3.Scheduling of special events to attract local residents and out-of-town tourists	328	2.43	1.082
1.1.2.6.Encouraging tourism enterprises to adopt crime prevention/reduction practices (installation of electronic room locks, surveillance cameras, room safety deposit boxes, employing full-time security officers, etc.)	328	2.13	.891
1.5.3.Engaging citizens in neighbourhood watch schemes	328	2.12	1.085
1.5.4.Establishing a partnership between the leaders of the local community and the national and local governments	328	1.90	.933
1.1.2.4.Advising and training tourism industry employees in crime prevention techniques	328	1.84	.689
1.1.2.3.Working closely with the community and tourism industry representatives	328	1.79	.854
1.1.2.7.Establishing a partnership between law enforcement agencies, tourism enterprises, the community at large, and the tourists themselves.	328	1.41	.583
Valid N (listwise)	328		