

**Trade and the Merchant Community of the Loango Coast in the  
Eighteenth Century**

**Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy  
University of Hull**

**by**

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**May 2012**

# Synopsis

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This thesis explores the political, economic and cultural transformation of the Loango Coast during the era of the transatlantic slave trade from the point of contact with Europeans in the sixteenth century until the end of the eighteenth century, with particular focus on the eighteenth century. While a number of previous studies of the West Central African slave trade have focused principally on the role of the Portuguese on the Angola Coast, this thesis makes a new contribution by evaluating the balance of power between Dutch and Loango Coast merchant communities. In doing so, this thesis concludes that well into the eighteenth century, local African religious and political traditions remained relatively unchanged on the Loango Coast, especially in comparison to their southern neighbours in Angola. Drawing upon detailed records compiled by the Middelburgse Commercie Compangie (MCC), the thesis builds upon an original database which accounts for approximately 10,000 slaves sold by 640 identified African merchants to the Dutch Middelburg Company over the course of 5,000 transactions.

Expanding upon the work of Phyllis Martin and other scholars, this thesis highlights a distinction between the Loango and the Angola coasts based on models of engagement with European traders; furthermore, it draws attention to the absence of European credit data in the MCC slave purchasing balance sheets; and, finally, it explores the difficulties involved in procuring slaves via long distance trade. While making extensive use of the Slave Voyages Database, this study also seeks to move beyond the European focused studies of shipping patterns to begin to discover the identities of the African traders. In doing so, the thesis provides the first comprehensive list of African merchants in the eighteenth century. This list of African merchants also reinforces fragmented lists of rulers for the polities of Loango, Kakongo, and Ngoyo, and also gives us a more concrete picture of the role of the principal traders on the coast, Mafouks, in the eighteenth century. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the thesis emphasises the large numbers of relatively small African investors in the trade, giving names and faces to the minor merchants of the slave trade. Consequently, African merchants stop being depicted only as amorphous interchangeable figures in the history of the transatlantic slave trade and begin to gain identities comparable to those of their European counterparts.

Dedicated to  
Alfred and Muriel Langstaff  
who always believed in me

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# Acknowledgements

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Firstly, I would like to offer gratitude to my supervisors David Richardson and Simon D. Smith for their significant contributions to my research. Without their vision, commitment, and organizational support this project would have been impossible. It has been a privilege to work with them and to be a member of the Wilberforce Institute. My thanks to Mike Turner for his insights into economic history and his comments on my first analysis of my database. Judith Spicksley has provided sustained support and encouragement throughout the project as well as having offered invaluable comments on the final draft. I owe her a debt of gratitude. Additionally I would like to thank my colleagues Filipa Ribeiro da Silva, Kate Hodgson, Nick Evans, David Wilkins, Alexia Rogers-Wright, Cicely Alsbury, Julius Nganji, and Gloria Nganji for their friendship and support throughout the process.

A number of individuals have offered suggestions and source material to strengthen this project. Thank you to José Curto and Paul E. Lovejoy for introducing me to African history and their sustained support and encouragement. To Jelmer Vos, my thanks for your help with understanding my Dutch sources. I sincerely appreciate the comments Phyllis Martin offered on an early draft of Chapter 4. I would also like to acknowledge the generosity of Bruce Mouser in sharing the *Valley Sunday Star-Monitor-Herald* articles with me. Mariana Candido who has offered me friendship and encouragement as well as commenting on multiple drafts of my thesis, you have my deepest thanks.

I would also like to acknowledge the financial support of the Canadian Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, the Overseas Research Students Awards Scheme, and the University of Hull in the writing of my thesis. The generosity and hospitality of Jos Hopman and Martine Voors during multiple research trips to the Netherlands is much appreciated. I owe much to my parents who taught me that anything is possible and to my sisters who have always sought to keep me grounded. Finally, I would like to thank Joel Quirk who has helped me to grow in so many ways as an individual and as an academic.

# Introduction

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Between 1514 and 1865, approximately 12.5 million enslaved Africans entered the Atlantic World via the transatlantic slave trade.<sup>1</sup> This massive forced migration transformed coastal communities throughout the Atlantic Ocean and beyond. Europeans acted as brokers in the redistribution of goods from Europe, and later Asia and the Americas, in exchange for enslaved labourer to develop the Americas. Thus, the transatlantic slave trade was truly a global phenomenon which was facilitated by European advances in shipping technology in the Early Modern period. During this period the Loango Coast, Africa's Atlantic coastline north of the mouth of the Congo River to the Equator, emerged an important market of exchange.

According to the Transatlantic Slave Voyages Database (hereafter the Voyages Database), the first known transatlantic slaving voyage departed the African Coast with a cargo of slaves in 1514. Unlike the more famous transatlantic voyages to come later, this ship was in search of labourers for use in Europe not the Americas. The voyage was undertaken by a Portuguese ship. This ship embarked an estimated 237 slaves at the Congo River, the southern boundary of the Loango Coast. An estimated 168 of these slaves disembarked in Vigo, Spain, the remaining 69 slaves having died en route.<sup>2</sup> In 1865 the last transatlantic voyage recorded in the Slave Voyages Database, whose area of slave embarkation is known, set sail for the Congo River. This vessel's name was the *Cicerón*, a steamship built in Liverpool. Although a British built ship, the ship's last slaving voyage began in Cadiz, Spain. Mesquita directed this voyage as the ship's captain. The ship docked in the Congo River where it embarked an estimated 1,265 enslaved Africans. Upon its arrival in Cuba, 1,004 slaves remained to be disembarked.<sup>3</sup> These two voyages, which bookend the Slave Voyages Database, highlight the continuity of trade on the Loango Coast while

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<sup>1</sup> *The Transatlantic Slave Voyages Database*. <http://www.slavevoyages.org/tast/assessment/estimates.faces> Accessed on 8 September 2011.

<sup>2</sup> <http://www.slavevoyages.org/tast/database/search.faces> Query: Principal place of slave purchase – West Central Africa. Accessed on 23 May 2010.

<sup>3</sup> <http://www.slavevoyages.org/tast/database/search.faces> Query: Voyage Identification Number - 5052. Accessed on 23 May 2010.

simultaneously drawing our attention to the economic and technological advances which evolved as a result of continued contact between the four continents of the Atlantic world.

Stretching from Cape Lopez in the north to the Congo River in the south, the Loango Coast is best known for its three slave trading ports, Loango Bay, Malemba, and Cabinda Bay, which serviced the transatlantic slave trade between 1660 and 1867. Although Europeans frequented the coast before this time, they came primarily in search of cloth, ivory, redwood, and elephant tails. In this early period, trade policy was defined by Loango, the dominant polity to the north of the Congo River. In the 1660s, the external trade of the Loango Coast shifted definitively from products to people. Between 1660 and 1810, the French, English, and Dutch were the dominant trading partners of the merchants on the Loango Coast. During this period at least 475,000 slaves entered the transatlantic slave trade through Loango Coast ports. This was the formative stage in slave trading on the Loango Coast, when the mechanisms of long-distance slave trade were established. Between 1811 and 1867 a further 1.3 million slaves are recorded to have passed through these ports on Portuguese, Brazilian, and American ships which made the Loango Coast one of the top four transatlantic slave trading regions in Africa.<sup>4</sup> Despite its importance as a site of cross-cultural exchange in the early-modern world and its major contribution to the Atlantic world via the transatlantic slave trade, the Loango Coast has not excited much scholarly interest.

Using slave trading negotiations to measure the tempos of change, this thesis uses the understudied topic of the eighteenth century Loango Coast to create a more nuanced understanding of:

- the economic and political geography of the Transatlantic slave trade in Western Africa;
- the role of political structures in Africa in mediating European influence;
- the significance of key features of cross cultural encounters and patterns of exchange;
- the structure of day-to-day transactions of European and African slave traders;

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<sup>4</sup> <http://www.slavevoyages.org/tast/database/search.faces> Query - Principal place of slave purchase: Cabinda, Congo North, Congo River, Rio Zaire, Kilongo, Loango, Malembo, Mayumba, and Mpinda. Accessed on 8 August 2011. These figures are the raw data rather than the estimates provided by the database. For a more complete explanation of why the raw data, rather than the estimates, are used throughout this thesis see *Sources and Methodology* below.

- and, the implications of these transactions for comprehending credit arrangements and economic markets.

Two main lines of inquiry develop these themes. The first compares and contrasts experiences on the Loango Coast with parallel experiences in cross-cultural exchange in other African coastal settlements which participated in the transatlantic slave trade, but it also sometimes involves looking further afield to European trading networks. The second line of inquiry looks more closely into the specific practices and procedures which governed trading relationships in Loango. Despite the major contribution of Loango to the overall slave trade, there have been surprisingly few studies that have specifically focused upon this region. By focusing upon trading records and associated activities, this thesis generates additional insights about a region about which historians currently know relatively little. In this introductory chapter, I will primarily focus on the first of these two lines of inquiry, by offering a preliminary analysis of the types of literatures and subject areas to which this thesis aims to contribute.

### ***Defining the Study Area: West Central Africa***

From the 1980s onwards, a growing literature has examined the crucial role of West Central Africa in the transatlantic slave trade. This now-substantial literature has demonstrated the scope of the transatlantic slave trade, impact of this trade both demographically and economically, and the methods of procuring and selling slaves from West Central Africa into the Atlantic World, but it has also tended to favour Portuguese archives and Portuguese activities. This Lusophone orientation has contributed to a general neglect of the Loango Coast. While the Portuguese dominated the southern Angolan slave trade, the Loango Coast emerged as an 'open trade' zone that saw the British, French, and Dutch all play key roles. By chiefly focusing upon the Portuguese, recent historians have rarely engaged with Loango in a systematic fashion, but have instead primarily concentrated on activities south of the mouth of the Congo River. Significantly, most of the main sources on Loango were published in the 1960s and 1970s.

This thesis will add to a growing body of literature on West Central Africa. Joseph Miller, John Thornton, Linda Heywood, and José Curto are among the scholars whose research has focused more dominantly on Portuguese sources and therefore develop a picture with Luanda at the



center. The works of Mariana Candido and Roquinaldo Ferreira have focused on Benguela on the southern periphery of Portuguese control.<sup>5</sup> Furthermore, Jan Vansina and Robert Harms have engaged in studies of the riverine trading communities in the interior of West Central Africa. However, this thesis points to the Loango Coast as an integrated yet separate part of the West Central African coast as a whole.<sup>6</sup> The single most significant work on this topic remains Phyllis Martin's 1972 book: *The External Trade of the Loango Coast, 1576-1870: The Effects of Changing Commercial Relations of the Vili Kingdom of Loango*. In this book, Martin compiled and analysed descriptions of political, economic, and religious institutions on the Loango Coast through exploring the unpublished journals and published narratives of European travellers and traders over a period of three centuries. During this period Martin suggests that the polity of Loango grew

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<sup>5</sup> Mariana Candido, *Fronteras de la Esclavización: Esclavitud, Comercio e Identidad en Benguela, 1780-1850* (Mexico City: El Colegio de Mexico Press, 2011); Mariana Candido, "Transatlantic Links: Benguelan-Bahian Connections, 1700-1850," in Ana Lucia Araujo (ed.) *Paths of the Atlantic Slave Trade: Interactions, Identities, and Images* (Amherst, NY: Cambria, 2011); Mariana Candido, "Different Slave Journeys: Enslaved African Seamen on Board of Portuguese Ships, c. 1760-1820," *Slavery and Abolition*, 31, 4 (2010) pp. 395-409; Mariana Candido, "Trade, Slavery and Migration in the Interior of Benguela: the case of the Caconda, 1830-1870," Beatrix Heintz and Achim von Oppen (eds.) *Angola on the Move: Transport Routes, Communications, and History* (Frankfurt: Otto Lemberck Publishers, 2008); Mariana Candido, "Merchants and the Business of the Slave Trade in Benguela, c. 1750-1850," *African Economic History*, 35 (2007) pp. 1-30; José C. Curto, *Enslaving Spirits: The Portuguese-Brazilian Alcohol Trade at Luanda and its Hinterland, c. 1550-1830* (Boston: Brill, 2004); Roquinaldo Ferreira, "The Suppression of the Slave Trade and Slave Departures from Angola, 1830s-1860s," in David Eltis and David Richardson (eds.) *Extending the Frontiers: Essays on the New transatlantic Slave Trade Database* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008) pp. 313-334; Roquinaldo Ferreira, "The Atlantic Networks of the Benguela Slave Trade (1730-1800)," in Centro de Estudos Africanos do Porto (CEAP) (ed.) *Trabalho Forçado Africano: Experiências Coloniais Comparadas* (Lisboa: Campo das Letras, 2006), pp. 66-99; Joseph C. Miller "The Numbers, Origins, and Destinations of Slaves in the Eighteenth-Century Angolan Slave Trade," *Social Science History*. Vol. 13, No. 4, (1989) pp. 381-419; Joseph C. Miller, *Way of Death: Merchant Capitalism and the Angolan Slave Trade 1730-1830* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988); John Thornton, *Warfare in Atlantic Africa, 1500-1800* (New York: Routledge, 2003); and, John Thornton, *Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic world, 1400-1680* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

<sup>6</sup> Robert Harms, *Games Against Nature: An Eco-Cultural History of the Nunu of Equatorial Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Robert Harms, *River of Wealth, River of Sorrow: The Central Zaire Basin in the Era of the Slave and Ivory Trade* (London: Yale University Press, 1981); Robert Harms, "Sustaining the System: Trading Towns along the Middle Zaire," in Claire C. Robertson and Martin A. Klein (eds.) *Women and Slavery in Africa* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983) pp. 95-110; Jan Vansina, *Paths in the Rainforests* (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1990); Jan Vansina, *The Tio Kingdom of Middle Congo, 1880-1892* (London: Oxford University Press, 1973); Jan Vansina, *Kingdoms of the Savannah* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966); Jan Vansina, 'Long-Distance Trade-Routes in Central Africa' in *The Journal of African History*, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1962) pp. 375-390; and, Jan Vansina, "Long-Distance Trade-Routes in Central Africa," *The Journal of African History*, Vol. 3, No. 3, (1962) pp. 375-390.

to its height in the mid-seventeenth century, and diminished in the eighteenth century due to the growing economic and therefore political independence of the lesser polities of Ngoyo and Kakongo which controlled the ports of Cabinda and Malemba respectively.

Although Martin acknowledges the diminishing political influence of Loango in the eighteenth century, this thesis argues that the patterns of external trade developed on the Loango Coast in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries persisted in the eighteenth century.<sup>7</sup> Thus, in the eighteenth century the Loango Coast remained a common economic region and continued to develop trade strategies within a common framework. This thesis further argues that this standardization may have persisted so as to not interrupt a common system of external trade which was developed between Europeans and Loango merchants in an earlier period.

David Birmingham's book, *Central Africa to 1870*, gives a prominent place to Loango as a growing economic power in the seventeenth century while acknowledging its relative autonomy in comparison to the Angola Coast. Birmingham's conclusions about the Loango Coast mirror Phyllis Martin's:

Loango was more successful in retaining its integrity, and in controlling its economic relations with the Atlantic powers. As the political and economic strength of Loango increased, so its influence spread into the northern interior. At the end of the seventeenth century, when the Kongo had virtually disappeared as a commercial kingdom, Loango extended its economic control to dominate a new pattern of southern trade routes as well.<sup>8</sup>

In 1981 Birmingham wrote: "The study of history came late to Central Africa but is now developing rapidly" suggesting that the newness of the study in this region had resulted in an enthusiasm and

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<sup>7</sup> Phyllis M. Martin, *The External Trade of the Loango Coast 1576-1870: The Effects of Changing Commercial Relations on the Vili Kingdom of Loango* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972) pp. 29-32.

<sup>8</sup> David Birmingham, *Central Africa to 1870: Zambezia, Zaire and the South Atlantic*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981Press1981), p. 53. Chapters 1, 2 and 3 of this book are a reprint of Birmingham's earlier chapters in the Cambridge History of Africa Volumes 3, 4, and 5, first published in 1977, 1975, and 1976 respectively.

openness in the field.<sup>9</sup> Since this time two studies of historical religious practices on the Loango Coast have been published: Frank Hagenbucher-Sacripanti's *Les Fondements spirituels du pouvoir au royaume de Loango* and Zdenka Volavka's *Crown and Ritual: The Royal Insignia of Ngoyo*. While both studies delve into the oral traditions of the Loango Coast in an attempt to explain the origins of religious practices, both studies are primarily dependent on evidence collected in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Hagenbucher-Sacripanti's study uses the frameworks of oral traditions to inform his analysis of religious practices on the Loango Coast. These oral traditions point to the Kongo, south of the Congo River, as the origin of the polities of Loango, Kakongo, and Ngoyo.<sup>10</sup> Volavka's study focuses more narrowly on the polity of Ngoyo. In contrast to Hagenbucher-Sacripanti's focus on oral traditions, Volavka's exploration of the Ngoyo shrine of Lusunsi is viewed through the prism of art history. Her analysis centers on a basket of copper objects collected by Constantin Tastevin at Cabinda in the 1930s and later deposited in the Musée de l'Homme, Laboratoire d'Ethnologie, Département de l'Afrique noire. While Volavka's conclusions were obscured by her premature death in 1990 before the finalization of her manuscript, Volavka's basic argument was that the objects of insignia found at the shrine of Lusunsi provide evidence of two periods of political authority preceding the foundation of the Ngoyo polity: the first period being organized by élite associations of blacksmiths and the second being the creation of matriclan leadership.

Volavka's observations closely mirror those of Jan Vansina's 1990 book *Paths in the Rainforests: Towards a History of Political Tradition in Equatorial Africa*. Primarily using the evolution of Bantu languages as a guide, Vansina traces political transitions in West Central Africa from the arrival of the Bantu speakers circa 1000 B.C. until the beginning of colonization in the late nineteenth century. In doing so, Vansina advances a rough timeline for the development of political traditions in this region. Through this exercise Vansina concludes that while European contact up to 1880 radically expanded markets and challenged traditional structures, the crises which developed were equalized using innovations based on local political traditions rather than innovations from

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid., vii.

<sup>10</sup> Frank Hagenbucher-Sacripanti, *Les Fondements spirituels du pouvoir au royaume de Loango* (Paris: Office de la Recherche Scientifique et Technique Outre-Mer, 1973), p. 22.

Europe. These innovations expanded upon existing matrilineal, kin, and association models which predated European contact. To illustrate this type of innovation Vansina uses the example of caravan routes which built upon the tradition of parties of tribute bearers for long distance travel. This method of travel was adapted to suit the needs of long distance trade.<sup>11</sup> This thesis expands upon the economic and political transitions outlined by Vansina and Volavka in a specific case study of the Loango Coast in the eighteenth century, particularly focusing on the transition of power from the traditional authorities, the Maloango, Mangoyo, and Manikakongo, to the economic brokers, the Mafouks. Like Vansina, this thesis finds that while contact with Europeans provided stimulus for change, change was mediated by local matrilineal traditions of authority.

### **Historical Approaches to the Transatlantic Slave Trade**

In the last five decades the field of African history has expanded rapidly. Spurred on by the American civil rights movement and the decolonization of Africa and given an academic voice in Philip Curtin's 1969 book *The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census*, historians, anthropologists, archaeologists, and linguists have sought with increasing energy to explore Africa through examining European documents, recording oral histories and traditions, collecting artifacts, studying language, and tracing the movements of peoples.<sup>12</sup> The proliferation of African ports in the Atlantic coast region features in a growing body of historical literature. Some of the most substantial contributions on African merchant communities explore the transformation of the Atlantic ports of Ouidah, Calabar, Bonny, Lagos, Luanda and Benguela. Robin Law's *Ouidah* focuses on the formation of Ouidah first as a Hueda settlement and later, after the Hueda were defeated, as a Dahomey village which grew in importance as a point of cross-cultural trade upon the arrival of Europeans on the coast. He traces its evolution through the slave trade to the free trade period. Law suggests the eventual success of Ouidah over its neighbours was partly due to fluctuations in the internal political system, partly due to convenience of location, and partly due to the evolution of relationships of trust. Furthermore, he argues that if Ouidah emerged as a neutral port it was

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<sup>11</sup> Jan Vansina, *Paths in the Rainforests: Towards a History of Political Tradition in Equatorial Africa* (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1990) p. 200.

<sup>12</sup> Philip D. Curtin, *The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census* (Madison: Wisconsin University Press, 1969).

due to European rather than African design.<sup>13</sup> This offers an interesting counterpoint to the study of the Loango Coast as the focus of trade shifts from Loango Bay in the early commodity trade to Cabinda in the slave trade. However, this study suggests that unlike Ouidah, it was the stability of the Loango Coast which contributed to the effective supply of the external trade with Europeans, and that neutrality, or non-preference among trade partners, was an indigenous rather than European innovation.

Paul E. Lovejoy and David Richardson's articles on Calabar and Bonny analyse the development of mechanisms of trade in this region and are particularly interested in the role of credit in the transatlantic slave trade. Of particular importance to this thesis is the model of transatlantic trade developed in Lovejoy and Richardson's chapter "African Agency and the Liverpool Trade." Based on evidence from Sierra Leone, the Windward Coast, and the Bight of Biafra, they divide European strategies of trade in Africa into three categories: a system based on trust, a system guaranteed by a central authority, and a system based on pawning.<sup>14</sup> This thesis suggests that evidence from the Loango Coast presents a fourth more complex strategy of trade which builds upon Lovejoy and Richardson's second category of trade guaranteed by a centralized government. This strategy involves the support of a centralized government in combination with a barter-based, ship trade, with elements of internal financing. Furthermore, it argues that this trade strategy was the result of active negotiation between African and European merchants, and as such, it evolved to accommodate the expectations and limitations of both trading partners.

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<sup>13</sup> Robin Law, *Ouidah: The Social History of a West African Slaving 'Port', 1727-1892* (Oxford: James Curry, 2004) p.48.

<sup>14</sup> Paul E. Lovejoy and David Richardson, "African Agency and the Liverpool Slave Trade," in David Richardson, Suzanne Schwarz and Anthony Tibbles (eds.) *Liverpool and Transatlantic Slavery* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2007) pp. 43-65. Also see: Paul E. Lovejoy and David Richardson, "'This Horrid Hole': Royal Authority, Commerce and Credit at Bonny, 1690-1840" *The Journal of African History*, Vol. 45, No. 3 (2004) pp. 363-392; Paul E. Lovejoy and David Richardson, "The Business of Slaving: Pawnship in Western Africa, c. 1600-1810" *The Journal of African History*, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2001) pp. 67-89; Paul E. Lovejoy and David Richardson, "Trust, Pawnship, and Atlantic History: The Institutional Foundations of the Old Calabar Slave Trade" *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 104, No. 2 (Apr., 1999) pp. 333-355; Paul E. Lovejoy and David Richardson, "British Abolition and its Impact on Slave Prices Along the Atlantic Coast of Africa, 1783-1850" *The Journal of Economic History*, Vol. 55, No. 1 (Mar., 1995) pp. 98-119; and, Paul E. Lovejoy and David Richardson, "Competing Markets for Male and Female Slaves: Prices in the Interior of West Africa, 1780-1850" *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 2 (1995) pp. 261-293.

In Kristin Mann's 2007 book *Slavery and the birth of an African city: Lagos, 1760-1900*, Mann attributes the rise of Lagos "from a minor coastal kingdom into an Atlantic port" to the security of its location, the proximity to a steady supply of slaves, and "policies and acumen of its political and commercial elite." However, she suggests that this new found commercial wealth fuelled existing power struggles and undermined the strength of the polity in the long term.<sup>15</sup> In contrast, the Loango Coast offered three primary ports, two of which, Loango and Cabinda, offered safe anchorage and one, Malemba, which required anchorage a fair distance from shore. None of these ports were particularly close to a steady supply of slaves. Nevertheless, the merchants of the Loango Coast were able to provision a substantial number of slaving voyages. This thesis offers support to Phyllis Martin's argument that the economic success of the Loango Coast ports lay partially in their ability to generate competition among European traders, and later among traders from the Americas as well. While the support structures which were built up on the Loango Coast to facilitate the transatlantic slave trade temporarily buffered the long term culturally transformative effects of cross-cultural exchange, these buffers had begun to weaken by the end of the eighteenth century. In terms of the political impact of the transatlantic slave trade, this thesis finds that while the end of the slave trade destabilized the power structure of the Loango Coast, during the eighteenth century political institutions on the Loango Coast were able to create a barrier between European traders and local communities, slowing the rate of change stimulated by cross-cultural exchange and the inevitable transformation of local societies.

Mariana Candido's book, *Fronteras de Esclavización: Esclavitud, Comercio e Identidad en Benguela, 1780-1850*, focuses on the migration of people to and from Benguela. Candido argues that the transatlantic slave trade transformed the identity of the people in Benguela and its hinterland by creating new paths of migration and new forms of commerce. New people brought new culture and religious practices which mixed with the old.<sup>16</sup> Candido's emphasis on religious and cultural change concurs with the findings of Linda Heywood and John Thornton in *Central Africans, Atlantic*

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<sup>15</sup> Kristin Mann, *Slavery and the birth of an African city: Lagos, 1760-1900* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007) p. 313.

<sup>16</sup> Mariana P. Candido, *Fronteras de la Esclavización: Esclavitud, Comercio e Identidad en Benguela, 1780-1850* (Mexico City: El Colegio de Mexico Press, 2010).

*Creoles, and the Foundation of the Americas, 1585–1660*.<sup>17</sup> In a more focused study of the impact of the European and Brazilian trade goods which were exchanged for slaves, José Curto's *Enslaving Spirits* has argued that the Luanda sub-region of West Central Africa received a remarkably high proportion of alcohol which in turn led to increased alcohol consumption in trade centres and eventually led to "a serious socio-economic and health problem for increasing numbers of Angolans" that persists to this day.<sup>18</sup> Thus, the impact of the transatlantic slave trade reached beyond the losses of enslaved Africans to the transformation of African communities themselves. Using the intensity of cultural change and the growing demand for foreign trade goods at Luanda and Benguela during the transatlantic slave trade as a point of comparison, this thesis explores the impact of this trade on the communities of the Loango Coast. It concurs with Heywood and Thornton's findings that the Loango Coast experienced a lesser degree of cultural transformation than the Angola Coast. Furthermore, this thesis argues that this continuation of traditional cultural norms runs parallel to the continued use of traditional problem solving strategies in the political spheres of the Loango Coast.

Within this literature, this thesis will provide a model of contact between the MCC and the traders of the Loango Coast in the eighteenth century against which other models of contact can be compared and contrasted. This comparison will enable a greater understanding of the negotiations and transformations which took place in pre-colonial African history. Using the transatlantic slave trading records of Loango Coast merchants and the merchants of a privately owned Dutch trading company, the Middelburgse Commercie Compangie (hereafter the MCC), this thesis identifies 640 African agents in the slave trade and explores their potential sources of slaves, the hierarchy structure among local traders, and the increasing influence of the wealthiest slave traders in the political arena. In doing so, it makes a major contribution to the identity of African agents, the slaves themselves, and the cultures in which they interacted. This is the first study of the Western African transatlantic slave trade to achieve this level of detail in the identification Europe's African trading partners. Furthermore, this thesis explores the

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<sup>17</sup> Linda M. Heywood and John K. Thornton, *Central Africans, Atlantic Creoles, and the Foundation of the Americas* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

<sup>18</sup> Curto, *Enslaving Spirits*, p. 185-201.

transformation in African political structures at the peak of the transatlantic slave trade in West Central Africa.

### ***Situating the Loango Coast in Atlantic History***

Beyond these questions surrounding economic and cultural impact of the slave trade on West Central Africa's development lays the debate about the demographic impact of the transatlantic slave trade in Western African and the broader Atlantic World. Prominent voices in this debate include David Eltis, Joseph Miller, Walter Rodney, Joseph E. Inikori, and Paul E. Lovejoy. David Eltis has suggested that the impact of the transatlantic slave trade on African communities has been overemphasised: "The slave trade for most regions and periods was not a critically important influence over the course of African history. At the very least, those who place the slave trade as central to West African and west-central African history should be able to point to stronger common threads, if not themes, across African regions than have so far come to light."<sup>19</sup> In *Way of Death*, Joseph Miller has argued that while the transatlantic slave trade did not decrease "local artisanal or industrial output" in the agricultural regions of West Central Africa that it encouraged a dependency on European trade: "The quest for imports, once begun, thus tended to gain uncontrollable momentum in these areas, and the rate of importing, while not destroying local production, created a kind of political dependence on foreign trade."<sup>20</sup> Walter Rodney represents perhaps the most extreme position among his colleagues, arguing that "the process by which captives were obtained on African soil was not a trade at all. It was through warfare, trickery, banditry and kidnapping. When one tries to measure the effect of European slave trading on the African continent, it is very essential to realize that one is measure the effect of social violence rather than trade in any normal sense of the word."<sup>21</sup> Joseph E. Inikori's 2002 book *Africans and the Industrial Revolution in England* emphasises the impact of enslaving Africans in Europe and the Americas while Paul E. Lovejoy emphasises the agency of Africans on the African continent. In his

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<sup>19</sup> David Eltis, *Economic Growth in the Ending of the Transatlantic Slave Trade* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987) pp. 226-227.

<sup>20</sup> Miller, *Way of Death*, p. 73.

<sup>21</sup> Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (London: Bogle-L'Ouverture Publications, 1981) p. 143.



seminal work, *Transformations in Slavery*, Lovejoy creates a broader framework for these more specific studies.<sup>22</sup> Here Lovejoy has argued: “Slavery was transformed, in part because of external influences and in part because of the dynamics of internal forces ... Africa responded to outside influences to a greater extent than it influenced the outside world.”<sup>23</sup> This thesis follows Lovejoy’s lead in examining how the transatlantic slave trade influenced African political economies by focusing on the specific case study of the Loango Coast, and where possible, contrasting the case of the Loango Coast with different adaptations throughout Western Africa.

As few historians have written monographs focusing specifically on the Loango Coast, our knowledge of the Loango Coast most often is framed within a broader study of Atlantic History and the transatlantic slave trade. In Bernard Bailyn’s *Atlantic History: Concepts and Contours*, he traces the conventional boundaries of Atlantic history. Although Bailyn acknowledges the presence of Africa on the periphery of the Atlantic world, he identifies Europe and the Americas as the primary actors. He highlights D. W. Meinig’s description of the birth of the Atlantic world as “‘a sudden and harsh encounter between two old worlds that transformed both and integrated them into a single New World,’ ” adding his own commentary, “this was the origin of Atlantic history.” Thus for Bailyn, Curtin’s *The Transatlantic Slave Trade: A Census* is a footnote in the story of the genesis of the Atlantic World.<sup>24</sup>

This thesis builds on the work of numerous scholars of the transatlantic slave trade and African history who have followed in Phillip Curtin’s footsteps and sought to reintroduce Africa as a major rather than minor actor in the foundations of the Atlantic System. In *Slavery and the rise of the Atlantic System*, Barbara L. Solow describes the fundamental contribution the African continent made to the rise of the Atlantic System:

The mere existence of imperialism or colonialism does not explain how the metropolis exploited the periphery, as some would have it: It was the coerced

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<sup>22</sup> Joseph E. Inikori, *Africans and the Industrial Revolution in England: A Study in International Trade and Economic Development* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

<sup>23</sup> Paul E. Lovejoy, *Transformations in Slavery: A History of Slavery in Africa*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) p. xvi.

<sup>24</sup> Bernard Bailyn, *Atlantic History: Concept and Contours*, (London: Harvard University Press, 2005) p.56.

labor of African slaves that allowed Europe to benefit so greatly from its conquests in the New World. When we assess the distribution of those benefits, we find that although the race went to the swift, the glittering prize was hammered out by African hands.<sup>25</sup>

While Solow focuses on the agency of Africans in creating a “new world” in the Americas, this thesis focuses on the agency of Africans in creating the markets which shipped these enslaved African labourer to the Americas.

Joseph C. Miller suggests that enslaved African labour, acquired through low-cash-cost, in combination with free land in the Americas eased the strain on European finances to allow an incredibly fast rate of expansion in the Atlantic economy<sup>26</sup> Thus, the innovation of inter-continental shipment of slaves was fundamental to the formation of the Atlantic System in the early modern period. Walter Hawthorne, James Sweet, Linda Heywood and John Thornton have made recent and significant contributions to a growing literature which describes the movement of enslaved Africans from Africa to the Americas and traced their impact on the formation of new economic, social, and political systems of the Americas.<sup>27</sup>

In addition to the considerable contributions of enslaved Africans to the Atlantic system from their positions on plantations in the Americas, the active role of Africans in procuring slaves was fundamental to the foundations of this system. John Thornton emphasises the instrumental role Africans played in establishing the supply chains for the slave plantations in the Americas: “Africans controlled the nature of their interactions with Europe. Europeans did not possess the

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<sup>25</sup> Barbara L. Solow, “Introduction,” in Barbara L. Solow (ed.) *Slavery and the rise of the Atlantic System* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) pp. 1-20.

<sup>26</sup> Joseph C. Miller, “A marginal institution on the margin of the Atlantic system: The Portuguese southern Atlantic slave trade in the eighteenth century” in Barbara L. Solow (ed.), *Slavery and the rise of the Atlantic System* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) p. 149.

<sup>27</sup> Walter Hawthorne, *From Africa to Brazil: Culture, Identity and an Atlantic Slave Trade, 1600 to 1830* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); James H. Sweet, *Recreating Africa: culture, kinship, and religion in the African-Portuguese world, 1441-1770* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003); and, John Thornton and Linda Heywood, *Central Africans, Atlantic Creoles, and the Foundation of the Americas* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

military power to force Africans to participate in any type of trade in which their leaders did not wish to engage. Therefore all African trade with the Atlantic, including the slave trade, had to be voluntary.”<sup>28</sup> Thornton’s assessment of Africans’ contributions to the Atlantic economy brings us one step closer to one of the key themes of this thesis: African agency in pre-colonial trade negotiations.

Significant volumes have been written on the role of European trading cycles in procuring slaves, including: Johannes M. Postma’s *The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1600-1815*; David W. Galenson’s *Traders, Planters, and Slaves: Market Behavior in Early English America*; Kenneth G. Davies’ *The Royal African Company*; and Herbert S. Klein’s *The Atlantic Slave Trade*.<sup>29</sup> While Postma, Galenson, and Davies were predominantly interested in the decision making structures and patterns of particular European nations, Klein has favoured a broader approach which begins to include the African organization of slave supply. Admittedly, this Eurocentric approach is partially due to the limitations of the documents about exchange on the Western African coast, the majority of these sources being European trade and travel documents, as the majority of African societies prior to the eighteenth century were dependent on oral preservation of histories. However, this thesis shows how the European sources can be used to fill in some hitherto blank pages of the African side of Atlantic history. Using these studies to add to the picture of the European role in Atlantic exchange, this thesis carefully mines these sources to test and supplement our knowledge of pre-colonial African societies thus adding to our limited knowledge of the African role in this exchange.

In *Atlantic History: A Critical Appraisal*, Philip D. Morgan and Jack P. Green expand the definition of Atlantic History beyond the conventional framing of Europe and the Americas to encompass all four continents of the Atlantic with equal emphasis:

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<sup>28</sup> Thornton, *Africa and Africans in the Making of the Modern World*, p. 7.

<sup>29</sup> Johannes M. Postma, *The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade 1600-1815* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); David W. Galenson, *Traders, Planters, and Slaves: Market Behavior in Early English America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Kenneth Gordon Davies, *The Royal African Company* (London: Routledge, 1999); and, Herbert S. Klein, *The Atlantic Slave Trade* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1999).

Atlantic history is an analytic construct and an explicit category of historical analysis that historians have devised to help them organize the study of some of the most important developments of the early modern era: the emergence in the fifteenth century and the subsequent growth of the Atlantic basin as a site for demographic, economic, social, cultural, and other forms of exchange among and within the four continents surrounding the Atlantic Ocean – Europe, Africa, South America, and North America – and all the islands adjacent to those continents. As people, pathogens, and plants – to mention three key agents of change – moved ever more intensively across the Atlantic, profound transformations occurred in all spheres of life.<sup>30</sup>

Within this context, this thesis examines the transformations of the Loango Coast as it comes into contact with an increasing diversity of trade goods from Europe, and in some cases trade goods transhipped through Europe, and an increasing demand for slaves from the Americas. In their assessment of the future of Atlantic History, Morgan and Green suggest that while Atlantic History has “focused primarily on the movement of people and goods, [it] would do well to explore more fully the exchanges of values and the circulation of ideas.”<sup>31</sup> This thesis begins to fill this hole through observing the evolution of the merchant communities of the Loango Coast. It shows how the leaders of the Loango Coast successfully resisted permanent European settlement in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, in contrast to the experiences of Europeans in other Atlantic ports. This resistance resulted in the slow spread of European economic, political, and social norms in the eighteenth century. This pattern of change is particularly evident in the slow absorption rate of European religious practices on the Loango Coast in comparison to its neighbours to the south.

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<sup>30</sup> Jack P. Greene and Philip D. Morgan, *Atlantic History: A Critical Appraisal*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) p. 3.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 14.

## ***Global Migrations and World History***

A study of Loango not only has something to offer our understanding of the Atlantic World, it can also offer broader insights into global patterns of cross-cultural encounter and exchange. The story of first contact between Europeans and the leaders of the Loango Coast and the consequent establishment of a mutually beneficial set of trade norms and social customs is not a story limited to the Atlantic world but also belongs to the broader frame of world history. Through occasionally stepping back and describing the transformations of the polities of the Loango Coast through a global rather than a European or African framework, this thesis attempts to move beyond stereotypes of individual European traders and travelers as projecting the power of a broader European hegemony or of individual African communities being politically decentralized, economically disorganized, and responsive to European whims. In order to challenge this frame of European hegemony, this thesis acknowledges the place of the Loango Coast within broader topics of global migration and world systems theories.

In Patrick Manning's *Migration in World History*, he creates a framework for understanding the movements of people through space without using modern sociological constructs of ethnicity, empire, or state organizing identities. Through focusing on language as the defining factor in community membership, Manning outlines four types of migration: migration within the home community, colonial migration (to unoccupied territory or territory from which the previous occupants are expelled), whole community migration, and cross-community migration. Within this framework he identifies cross-community migration as being the most transformative of the four types of migration. Cross-community migration is defined by one of three motivations: to improve the situation of the individual; to bring resources, skills, or aid back to the community of origin; or, to help other communities by sharing technology and resources of the home community. Within the context of European contact with Sub-Saharan Africa in the early modern period, this thesis identifies Europeans merchants and travelers as belonging to this second category, at first returning with valuable trade items such as ivory, redwood dye, and copper, and later in providing labourers to facilitate colonial expansion in the Americas. Although European migrants attempted to implement both colonial and cross-community migration strategies in Africa, this thesis shows how the centralized power of the Loango Coast community framed European interaction and how Europeans were limited to strategies of cross-community migration in the eighteenth century. These European migrants, particularly the MCC merchants in the eighteenth century, were what

Manning describes as “sojourners” or people passing through. These merchants and their crews travelled in cycles, spending two to eight months on the Loango Coast before heading to the Americas and then on to Europe. They did not leave permanent brokers on the coast. They lived at sea as much or more than they lived on a single continent. This transient form of migration is consistent with Manning’s conception of a temporary settlement. He defines sojourners as “those moving to a new community, usually for a specific purpose, with the intention of returning to their home community.”<sup>32</sup> These merchants stopped long enough to begin to understand and be understood by the local without the intention of becoming local.

Manning asserts: “More often than not ... the movement of cross-community migrants is facilitated by *networks*: chains of people who facilitate their movement and their settlement at the end of the journey.” He goes on to argue: “[Cross-community networks], involving cooperation across distance and across boundaries of language and culture, facilitate the movement of migrants from one place to another.”<sup>33</sup> However useful this framework, the focus of this thesis is not the migration itself, but how migration transforms communities. Greg Dening provides a useful description of the places where cross-community contacts happen using the metaphor of beaches:

Beaches are beginnings and endings. They are frontiers and boundaries of islands. For some life forms the beaches divide the world between here and there, us and them, good and bad, familiar and strange ... Crossing beaches is always dramatic. From land to sea and from sea to land is a long journey and either way the voyager is left a foreigner and an outsider. Look across the beach from the sea, there is what the mind’s eye sees, romantic, classic, savage but always uncontrollable. The gestures, the signals, the codes which make the voyagers own world ordered no longer work. He does not see the islander’s colors or trees or mountains. He sees his [own].<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> Patrick Manning, *Migration in World History* (London: Routledge, 2005) pp. 8-9.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9.

It is on these “beaches” that communities meet, each with their differing notions, each with their own agendas, to negotiate a common language and mutually beneficial terms of exchange.

It is difficult to interpret the preconceived notions which framed the world view of non-literate African coastal communities beyond the broad outlines available through oral histories and linguistic and archeological evidence. However, an understanding of the world view of European migrants is easier to access.<sup>35</sup> Janet L. Abu-Lughod suggests that the modern world system of European hegemony which emerged in the sixteenth century owed a significant debt to the world economy which had developed in the thirteenth century. She argues that in the thirteenth century surplus production of goods became possible throughout the Old World, allowing the spreading of complex trade networks from northeastern Europe to China. These networks spanned huge distances and traders moving along them took years to follow a complete circuit. No common language or currency connected these communities, however “goods were transferred, prices set, exchange rates agreed upon, contracts entered into, credit – on funds or goods located elsewhere – extended, partnerships formed, and obviously, records kept and honored.”<sup>36</sup> When Europeans set sail for the African continent, it was with the intent of building upon a set of common understandings based on their prior understanding of cross-cultural trade. Using Paul Sharp’s categories of encounter relations, discovery relations, and re-encounter relations, this thesis traces the evolution of the relationship between Europeans and the people of the Loango Coast.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> Greg Dening, *Islands and beaches: Discourse on a silent land: Marquesas, 1774-1880* (Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press, 1988) pp. 33-34.

<sup>35</sup> For an analysis of oral histories of West Central Africa see Robert Harms, “Oral Tradition and Ethnicity” *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 10, no. 1 (1979) pp. 61-85 and Jan Vansina, *Oral Tradition as History* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985); for a linguistic approach see Vansina, *Paths in the Rainforests*; for an archeological approach see F. Van Noten ed. *The Archaeology of Central Africa* (Graz, 1982).

<sup>36</sup> Janet L. Abu-Lughod, *Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250-1350* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) p. 8.

<sup>37</sup> Paul Sharp, *Diplomatic Theory of International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

## ***Sources and Methodology***

In Stuart B. Schwartz's Preface to *Implicit Understandings: Observing, Reporting and Reflecting on the Encounters between Europeans and Other Peoples in the Early Modern Era*, he writes: "The voices and attitudes of the indigenous peoples of Asia, Africa, Australia, and the Americas need to be recorded, understood, and appreciated, but also subjected to the same kind of nuanced analysis now increasingly accorded to sources."<sup>38</sup> While it is important to make use of local sources where they exist, we cannot disregard the importance of European sources for these regions even though they are indelibly marked by the voice of the "outsider" or the "other".<sup>39</sup> Thus, this thesis deals with two types of primary sources: the first, and most obvious, is a collection of European impressions, observations, geographical descriptions, and trade records; the second is a collection of oral traditions recorded by Europeans. Due to the scarcity of the second set for this region, the former receive substantially more attention than the latter.

The majority of sources on the Loango Coast fit into two categories: descriptive texts and economic data. Written sources include both European descriptive texts and transcriptions of African oral traditions. The published contemporary, or near contemporary, accounts and collections of oral traditions include, but are not limited to F. Michael Angelo and F Denis Carli's "Account of the Congo," Georges Balandier's *Sociologie actuelle de l'Afrique noire*, Adolf Bastian's *Die deutsche Expedition an der Loango-Küste*, Andrew Battell's *Strange Adventures*, Pieter van den Broecke's *Journal of Voyages to Cape Verde, Guinea and Angola*, Giovanni Antonio Cavazzi's *Istorical descrizione de'tre regni Congo, Matamba et Angola*, Jean Cuvelier's "Tradition congolaise," Olfert Dapper's *Naukeurige Beschrijvinge der Afrikaensche Gewesten*, Richard Dennett's *Notes on Folklore of the Fjort and Seven years among the Fjort*, Louis de Grandpré's

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<sup>38</sup> Stuart B. Schwartz, "Preface" in Stuart B. Schwartz (ed.) *Implicit Understandings: Observing, Reporting and Reflecting on the Encounters between Europeans and Other Peoples in the Early Modern Era* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) p. xiii.

<sup>39</sup> For a critique on the use of European sources in reconstructing African history see: Toyin Falola and Christian Jennings (eds.), *Sources and Methods in African History: Spoken, Written, Unearthed* (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2003); Beatrix Heintze, "The Extraordinary Journey of the Jaga Through the Centuries: Critical Approaches to Precolonial Angolan Historical Sources," with Katja Rieck (trans.) in *History in Africa*, Vol. 34 (2007), pp. 67-101; and, Jan Vansina, "On Ravenstein's Edition of Battell's Adventures in Angola and Loango," *History in Africa*, Vol. 34 (2007), pp. 321-347.



*Voyage a la cote occidentale d’Afrique*, Sheila Lambert’s transcriptions of the *House of Commons Sessional Papers of the Eighteenth Century*, Jerome Merolla’s “Voyage to the Congo,” Liévain Proyart’s *Histoire de Loango*, Jan Vansina’s *Notes sur l’origines du royaume de Kongo* and Annie Merlet’s *Autour du Loango*.<sup>40</sup> The unpublished papers include a collection from the British ship the *Madampookota*, and the journals of the MCC ships which traded on the Loango Coast in the eighteenth century. These sources provide a combination of European written interpretations of African economic, social, and political systems and, to a lesser degree, European recordings of African oral traditions. They have been used predominantly as an aid to interpreting the MCC business records and the Voyages Database. Due to the absence of an in-depth analysis of the economic records of trade on the Loango Coast, a heavier emphasis has been placed on the organization, analysis, and presentation of the Voyages Database, available at <http://www.slavevoyages.org>, and the MCC records, available at the Zeeuwse Archief (Zeeland Archive) in Middleburg in the Netherlands.

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<sup>40</sup> F. Michael Angelo and F. Denis Carli, “Account of the Congo” in Awnsham Churchill and John Churchill (eds.) *A collection of voyages and travels, some now first printed from original Manuscripts* Vol. 1 (London: Awnsham and John Churchill, 1704); Georges Balandier, *Sociologie actuelle de l’Afrique noire : dynamique des changements sociaux en Afrique central* (Paris : Presses universitaires de France, 1955); Adolf Bastian, *Die deutsche Expedition an der Loango-Küste, nebst älteren Nachrichten über die zu erforschenden Länder*, 2 vols. (Jena: Hermann Costenoble, 1874); Andrew Battell, *The Strange Adventures of Andrew Battell in Angola and Adjoining Regions* E. G. Ravenstein (ed.), (London, 1901); Pieter van den Broecke, *Journal of Voyages to Cape Verde, Guinea and Angola (1605-1612)*, J. D. La Fleur (ed.), (London: Hakluyt Society, 2000); Giovanni Antonio Cavazzi, *Istorica descrizione de’ tre regni Congo, Matamba et Angola*, (Bologna, 1687); Jean Cuvelier, “Traditions congolaises,” in *Congo* ii, 4 (Nov. 1930 & Sept. 1931) pp. 469-487, 193-208; Olfred Dapper, *Naukeurige Beschrijvinge der Afrikaensche Gewesten* 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed. (Amsterdam, 1676); Richard Edward Dennett, *Notes on Folklore of the Fjort*, (London: J. B. Nichols and Sons, 1898); Richard Edward Dennett, *Seven Years among the Fjort: Being an English Trader’s Experiences in the Congo District* (London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle, & Rivington, 1887); David Eltis, Stephen D. Behrendt, David Richardson, and Herbert S. Klein eds. *The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade: A Database on CD-ROM* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Louis-Marie-Joseph O’Hier de Grandpré, *Voyage a la cote occidentale d’Afrique, fait dans les années 1786 et 1787, contenant la description des mœurs, usages, lois, gouvernement et commerce des Etats du Congo, fréquentés par les Européens, et un précis de la traite des Noirs, ainsi qu’elle avait lieu avant la Revolution francaise, suivi d’un voyage fait au cap de Bonne-Esperance, contenant la description militaire de cette colonie* (Paris: Dentu, 1801); Sheila Lambert (ed.), “Minutes of Evidence on the Slave Trade 1790, Part I” in *House of Commons Sessional Papers of the Eighteenth Century*, vol. 71 (Wilmington, 1975); Jerom Merolla, “A Voyage to Congo and several other Countries in southern Africa,” in A. Churchill (ed.) *A Collection of Voyages and Travels*, vol. I (London, 1732) p. 593-685; Liévain Bonaventure Proyart, *Histoire de Loango, Kakongo et autres royaumes d’Afrique* (Paris : C. P. Berton, 1776).

This thesis will use the recorded data collected in the Voyages Database rather than the supplementary estimates to evaluate the broader trends of the slave trade on the Loango Coast. Whereas the estimated figures in database conflate the records of the Loango and Angola coasts; this thesis contests that West Central Africa is best understood as two distinct regions. The estimates in the Voyages Database do not offer port by port estimates, but rather regional estimates, making disaggregation of the numbers very difficult without knowing how the estimates were calculated. Using the recorded data rather than the estimates, the Loango Coast contributes at least one million slaves primarily through the coastal trading centers of Loango Bay, Malemba, and Cabinda. Separating out the total slaves recorded to have left each individual port and using them to calculate the total number of slaves embarked from the Loango Coast, the Loango Coast emerges as the fourth largest supply region on the Western African Coast, behind the Angola Coast (2.1 million), the Bight of Benin (1.5 million), and the Bight of Biafra (1.1 million). Given the large scale of the slave trade on the Loango Coast, it is hard to understand why many economic historians have continued to represent the Loango Coast as an undifferentiated part of West Central Africa.<sup>41</sup>

In order to gain a more nuanced understanding of the Loango Coast within the context of West Central Africa, it is useful to look at early trading records of Europeans at the Loango Coast. A particularly rich set of documents can be found in the eighteenth century slave trading records of the Dutch Middleburg Commercial Company on the Loango Coast. The MCC was the largest Dutch slave trading company in the eighteenth century. Unlike the centuries before when the Dutch West India Company exerted a monopoly of Dutch shipping to Africa, the Dutch transitioned in to a period of private traders in the eighteenth century. Due to fastidious record keeping, a significant portion of the original MCC records have been preserved and are currently housed in

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<sup>41</sup> This pattern is established in Curtin, *The Atlantic Slave Trade*, and persists in the Voyages Database, <http://www.slavevoyages.org>. Studies continue to use the region of West Central Africa in a comparative context to sub-regions of West Africa such as the Bight of Biafra and the Gold Coast. These studies included but are not limited to: David Richardson, "Slave export from west and west-central Africa 1700-1810: new estimates of volume and distribution," *Journal of African History*, 30, 1 (1989), p. 1-22; David Eltis, "The Volume and Structure of the Transatlantic Slave Trade: A Reassessment," *The William and Mary Quarterly*, (January 2001) pp. 17-46; and, Paul E. Lovejoy and David Richardson "African Agency and the Liverpool Slave Trade," in David Richardson, Suzanne Schwarz and Anthony Tibbles (eds.) *Liverpool and transatlantic Slavery* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2007) pp. 43-65.

the Zeeuwse Archief (Zeeland Archives) in Middelburg. Although the broader academic community has shown little interest in these substantial records, our knowledge of the MCC was significantly furthered by W.S. Unger's catalogue and preliminary studies of the MCC published in 1951 and 1961 respectively.<sup>42</sup> Aided by significant advances in computer technology, Johannes Menne Postma has compiled the most significant database on Dutch slave trade data, which is showcased in his 1990 book *The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1600-1815*. In this book he calculated price and profit data for MCC ships as well as providing an analysis of "coasting, mortality, crowding and efficiency".<sup>43</sup> Postma's database subsequently was incorporated in the transatlantic Slave Trade Database project, which was made public first as a CD ROM in 1999 and later was expanded to the online Slave Voyages Database.<sup>44</sup> Through this process, Postma's data were augmented by a team of researchers under the leadership of David Eltis, Stephen D. Behrendt, David Richardson, and Herbert S. Klein. The online database currently contains a record of 114 voyages of ships owned by the MCC. Of these 114 voyages, the database records 32 voyages which mark 'West Central Africa' as their primary port for the embarkation of slaves. In this context, 'West Central Africa' is understood to be the Loango Coast, as further explained in Chapter 1. Despite the richness of these sources, the MCC records have excited little interest outside of Dutch academic circles.

In this thesis, I will engage in a more in-depth analysis of trade on the Loango Coast focusing on the MCC's trade negotiation documents between 1732 and 1796. This time period is defined by the documents themselves as the first MCC ship arrived on the Loango Coast in 1732 and the last MCC ship departed from the coast in 1796. During this period, the MCC outfitted 32 voyages; significant data have been preserved for 29 voyages. For each of these voyages between two and eight documents have been preserved. These documents contain hundreds of pages of records including purchases and sales of materials on the European, African, and South American coasts; journals of brief anecdotes, sailing coordinates and weather patterns; crew lists and wage tallies;

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<sup>42</sup> W. S. Unger, *Het Archief der Middelburgsche Commercie Compagnie* (s'Gravenhage: Ministerie van Onderwijs, Kunsten en Wetenschappen, 1951) ; and, W. S. Unger, "Bijdragen tot de gentschiedenis van Nederlandse slavenhandel II" *Economische-Historisch Jaarboek*, vol. 28 (1961) pp. 3-148.

<sup>43</sup> Postma, *The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade*, pp. 393-401 & 407-410.

<sup>44</sup> David Eltis, Stephen D. Behrendt , David Richardson, and Herbert S. Klein eds. *The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade: A Database on CD-ROM* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1999) and <http://www.slavevoyages.org>

and even occasional packets of letters. Although each document has a story to tell, this thesis focuses on the transaction records between Loango merchants and MCC captains. These data have been organized in a database which records ships' names, captains' names, African merchants' names, port of transaction, day of transaction, number of slaves exchanged (men, women, boys, and girls), and values of European goods exchanged. One significant advantage of focusing on the economic records of European traders rather than on their journals and log books is that the economic data provide significant information on the identity of Loango Coast merchants. They contain all of the purchases made in the name of the MCC during a voyage. As employees of the MCC were not allowed to make private purchases or to sell personal slaves in the Dutch colonies, it is unlikely that such purchase would have been recorded in the MCC books if captains or their crews made such purchases on the side. These MCC data contribute significantly to our understanding of how trade proceeded on the Loango Coast, offering concrete data on approximately 10,000 slaves sold by 640 African merchants in 5,000 transactions.

This thesis represents only a preliminary exploration of the utility of this database. This database can also be used in future endeavours to trace the dispersion of Loango Coast slaves in Suriname, Curacao, Paramaribo, St. Martin, and St. Eustatius. Once analysis of these data has been extended, it will be possible to explore options for making this database more broadly available. The primary focus of this study is the role of the MCC on the Loango Coast.

### ***Terminology***

As long as Europeans have been aware of African peoples, they have struggled to define systems of authority and control on the African continent. In 1995 Denise Miller initiated an online debate on the H-Net forum entitled "tribal/ethnic/language groups" by asking the question "Do you find the term "ethnic group" more effective and less problematic [than tribal or language identities]?"

<sup>45</sup> In response to this discussions, Chris Lowe, Tunde Brimah, Pear-Alice March, William Minter, and Monde Muyangwa produced the paper "Talking about 'tribe': Moving from stereotypes to analysis", which suggests the term "tribe" is tainted by implications of "primitive savagery" and

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<sup>45</sup> This discussion is available at <http://www.h-net.org> query: "tribal ethnic language groups". This discussion involved 42 posts between 26 May 1995 and 17 June 1995.

that groups in Africa can be more accurately described as nations, peoples, communities, chiefdoms, kin-groups, or villages.<sup>46</sup> In *Paths in the Rainforests*, Jan Vansina's discussion of "tribe" and "ethnicity" emphasizes the Eurocentric nature of the word "tribe" and the problems of assuming homogeneity among people living in the same environment and at the same time inventing difference between neighbours. He emphasizes the changing composition of "ethnic" groups and the multiplicity of identities present in a single geographical location. Given these problems Vansina decides "ethnic units must be abandoned as unanalyzed units for study."<sup>47</sup> However misleading these categories, it is still necessary to make reference to them within carefully qualified parameters as disregarding them would cause a disconnect between the literature and this thesis. In defining these parameters, we must avoid the assumption that all members of any given group shared the same religious, linguistic, genetic, or political allegiances. Nor should we ignore the multiple strategies through which people can assimilate into a group or the multiple motivations people can have for modifying their identities. Furthermore, acceptance into a group can take time, even generations, and it often comes with a cost, the greatest of these being enslavement. Thus, terms like "Vili" are used in this thesis to represent people who have privileged one common goal above all others to share membership in a group. Most often, these groups are concentrated in geographical location. However, these identities are not stagnant, and groups can integrate and exclude members at different times to meet different goals. Limited evidence has survived on the Loango Coast making it difficult to trace all of the alliances, conflicts, and dislocations within the Loango Coast which occurred to reconstitute identities over time. Nevertheless, this thesis identifies the slave trade, and the economic gains made particularly by the polities of Ngoyo and Kakongo, as an important element in the changing political allegiances of

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<sup>46</sup>Chris Lowe et al. "Talking about "tribe": Moving from stereotypes to analysis" Africa Policy Information Centre, June 1997, republished 1 June 2005 at <http://www.africafiles.org/article.asp?ID=9130&ThisURL=&URLName>, accessed on 5 June 2011. Also see, A. B. M. Mafeje's "Tribalism" and Okwudiba Nnoli's "Ethnicity" in *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World* edited by Joel Krieger, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993; Aidan Southall, "The Illusion of Tribe," in Peter Gutkind (ed.) *The Passing of Tribal Man in Africa* (Leiden: Brill, 1970), 28-51; and Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban, Richard Lobban and Linda Zangari's "'Tribe': A Socio-Political Analysis," in *Ufahamu VII: 1* (1976) pp. 143-165.

<sup>47</sup> Vansina, *Paths in the Rainforests*, pp. 19-20.

the Loango Coast in the eighteenth century, and therefore as an important element in the forging of new identities.

In describing these consensus groups or political organizations, another term commonly used is the term “king.” John Thornton problematizes this term in his second edition of *Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World, 1400-1800*, suggesting that “although sixteenth- and seventeenth-century sources routinely refer to African rulers as “kings,” the term must always be qualified by noting that in many cases they were elected by officials, even if family or hereditary claims were honored the rulers were overwhelmingly powerful relative to the electors.”<sup>48</sup> Furthermore, the term “king” has a very specific meaning rooted in European political structures. Thus, in an attempt to eliminate the ambiguity posed by these false kings and to find a term less rigidly conforming to European political structures, this thesis will take one step farther, using the words “ruler” or “leader”.

If African “kings” were not the same as European kings, then the same could be said of African “kingdoms” and even “states”. A state, particularly in the context of a Westphalian conception of a sovereign state, is traditionally defined as existing within a fixed and clearly demarcated territory. However, within a Sub-Saharan African context prior to the nineteenth century, African political organizations did not necessarily exist within a bounded territorial model. Therefore the term polity, defined as a political community that is capable of defending itself militarily, administering justice, raising and redistributing revenue, and commanding the allegiance of its subjects, is more reflective of a pre-nineteenth century Sub-Saharan context.<sup>49</sup> Thus African political communities will be referred to as polities throughout this thesis.

Rather than appropriating English words to fit an African reality, this thesis takes a different approach. Assuming that if you stretch definitions too far they cease to have any specific relevance, this thesis privileges African words where possible to describe African organizations and political figures explaining each organization or role within their specific context. In describing

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<sup>48</sup> Thornton, *Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World*, p. 83.

<sup>49</sup> See Thornton, *Warfare in Atlantic Africa*, p. 12-13; and Joseph C. Miller, *Kings and Kinsmen: Early Mbundu States in Angola* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976) pp. 1-11.

these organizations and posts, comparisons are drawn to European structures without equating local African systems with European power structures. A glossary of the key African terms can be found in Appendix E. Likewise, when describing groups of Africans holding a set of common economic, political, or religious practices, the terms “communities” or “polities” are used rather than outmoded terms such as “tribe” or language groups such as “Bantu”, as they do not reflect the variations in economic, political, or religious practices which are integral to the arguments of the thesis. An exception is made where primary or secondary sources are quoted directly. This approach is not meant to suggest that Africa developed a homogeneous or a uniquely “African” type of governance but rather to discern the specificity of one African region. For place names on the Loango Coast where alternate spellings arise the most common spelling from the MCC documents are used, i.e. the Dutch spelling “Malemba” rather than the Portuguese spelling of “Malembo”.

Moving from political to geographical concerns, for the purposes of this thesis, the Loango Coast will be defined geographically as the section of the West Central African Coast running from Cape Lopez in the north to the Congo River the south. Through the early period of contact between Europeans and the peoples of the Loango Coast, three primary trading centres emerged at Loango, Malemba, and Cabinda. Although the term Loango can be used to refer to bay, a polity, and a sphere of influence, I will follow Phyllis Martin’s lead in differentiating these three by using the terms Loango Bay, Loango, and the Loango Coast respectively. Loango’s sphere of influence builds and diminishes over time, but at its zenith it encompassed tributary polities such as Gobby, Sette, and Bukkameale to the north and to a lesser extent Kakongo and Ngoyo to the south.<sup>50</sup> As such, the Loango Coast makes up the northern section of the West Central African Coast, while the Angola Coast makes up the southern section. Likewise, for the purposes of this thesis Western Africa represents the whole of Atlantic Africa and, West Africa represents the northern portion of Western Africa and West Central Africa represents the southern portion dividing the coast between the southern boundary of the Bight of Biafra and the northern boundary of the Loango Coast. Thus West Central Africa is understood as the southern section of Western Africa and, the Loango Coast makes up the northern region of West Central Africa.

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<sup>50</sup> Martin, *The External Trade of the Loango Coast*, pp. 11-12, 16-7, 31.

## ***Thesis Summary***

The structure of the thesis is organised around a central question: *What were the distinguishing features of and primary causes behind patterns of cross-cultural exchange on the Loango Coast in the eighteenth century?* This central question is approached through six secondary questions, each of which is addressed in some way by the thesis' most significant primary source, the eighteenth-century MCC trade records:

1. Why was there such a significant divergence between the patterns of slave supply on the Loango and Angola coasts?
2. How did the trading relationship between Loango Coast and European merchants change through time?
3. How do the patterns of trade evident in the MCC records confirm or modify the generalizations in the existing literature?
4. How did the buyers in the hinterland of the Loango Coast pay for and make use of the influx of European trade goods?
5. What political strategies along the Loango Coast did Atlantic resources enable?

While some of these questions are answered in one coherent chapter, others are answered in threads which are woven throughout the thesis and are tied together in the final chapter. In order to begin answering these questions, this thesis is organized around three themes: the distinct nature of the Loango Coast, the development of mechanisms that facilitated large scale slave trade, and the persistence of traditional structures on the Loango Coast which mediated cultural transformation during the transatlantic slave trade.

This thesis is organized into an introduction followed by six chapters. Chapter 1, "Loango and the transatlantic Slave Trade," explores the position of the Loango Coast in the transatlantic slave trade. It establishes the Loango Coast as a region distinct within West Central Africa. In a port-by-port analysis of West Central Africa, this chapter outlines the Loango Coast as an open trade zone characterized by trade with multiple partners whereas the Angola Coast markets privileged Portuguese interests. Moreover, the Loango Coast slave trade started later than the Angola Coast trade and fluctuated at different rates than the Angola Coast trade, with the exception of parallel booms in the 1811 to 1820 period. This chapter concludes that while the



focus of scholarship on the Lusophone trade has led us to conclude that the Portuguese had a dominant impact throughout West Central Africa, the impact of the Portuguese was concentrated most heavily on the Angola Coast prior to the nineteenth century. Therefore, to understand the cross-cultural exchanges of the Loango Coast we should redirect our focus to Dutch, French, and English experiences.

Chapter 2, “Afro-European Encounters on the Loango Coast,” takes a step back from this Atlantic framework to explore theories of first contact and how the Loango Coast reflects and diverges from the general trade and migration trends throughout the early modern world. This chapter traces how Europeans formed trade communities throughout Europe and how Europeans attempted to negotiate these same privileges and responsibilities in African trading communities. However, African communities also had preconceptions of the roles of insiders and outsiders within their communities. In each trading context, a balance had to be struck which accommodated both trading partners. On the Loango Coast in the eighteenth century, this process of negotiation led to a number of understandings or mechanisms to facilitate trade: first of all, traders of all nations were welcome on the Loango Coast; second, Europeans could not create permanent settlements and were limited to ship trade; third, local traders supplied slaves to the Europeans; fourth, slaves were bartered for goods on the coast; and fifth, local governments guaranteed the smooth running of trade.

The third chapter, “Maximizing Profits and Minimizing Risks: Transatlantic Shipping and the Loango Coast Slave Trade,” narrows the focus to the ebb and flow of the slave trade on the Loango Coast in the eighteenth century. This chapter shows the importance of developing a specialized knowledge of patterns of transatlantic shipping and Loango Coast slave markets was required for Europeans to profit from the slave trade. An analysis of trade patterns indicates that MCC ships favoured the Loango Coast; this preference may have been in part due to the lower prices, faster loading times, larger cargos, and shorter middle passages available to slave trading voyages from the Loango Coast. The accumulation of shipping data and slave prices and the accuracy of the information would have been crucial to making the calculated risks inherent in long-distance trade.

The next chapter, “Cross-Cultural Exchange and the Transformation of the Loango Merchant Community, 1732-1797,” compares the political structure of the Loango Coast as assembled primarily by Phyllis Martin and Zdenka Volavka, to a list of Loango Coast merchants’ transactions.

It concludes that by the eighteenth century political authorities on the Loango Coast had little direct investment in, and therefore little direct profit from, the transatlantic slave trade, though they collected indirect profits through the taxes imposed by the Mafouks. Instead, we find a few major traders and many minor traders involved in the provisioning of each European slaving voyage. Among the major traders we find the Mafouks of Loango Bay, Malemba, and Cabinda Bay who, as appointees of the local ruler to oversee cross-cultural trade, were able to amass significant personal wealth that they used to undermine the authority of the rulers themselves.

Chapter 5, “Negotiating Cross-Cultural Trade: From Coastal Markets to the Interior,” explores the evolution of trade conventions on the Loango Coast, the prevalence of textiles, weapons, and alcohol in the trade bundles exchanged for slaves, and the importance of these goods to both the Loango Coast and the interior markets where these goods were exchanged for slaves. An examination of the supply chains suggests that the long-distance caravan routes were profitable for Loango Coast traders as they were able to supply the internal slave trading markets with textiles and firearms superior to the competing offerings of Portuguese-linked traders from the south. Furthermore, Chapter 5 provides a rough calculation of MCC and Loango trading schedules including estimated provisioning times of European slaving ships, travel times from Europe to West Central Africa, arrival dates of ships, peak loading times of slaving voyages on the Loango Coast, and the equivalent provisioning and delivery schedules of caravan supply routes from the interior. This calculation suggests that the MCC shipping cycle does not support evidence of European investment in the slave procurement process. Rather it supports a model where Europeans brought their goods to trading ports where they bartered with Loango Coast merchants and moved on as quickly as possible to repeat the cycle.

Finally, Chapter 6 brings together these observations to elaborate the broader implications of this thesis. Through exploring the transformations which take place on the Loango Coast in the eighteenth century, this thesis endeavours to get a step closer to a better understanding the impact of trade between Loango Coast and Middelburg traders in eighteenth century Loango Coast, particularly the economic and political transformations. By focusing on the evolution of trade relations between the Middelburg and Loango merchants, it attempts to evaluate the balance of power between these communities without an assumption of European dominance. In showing the Africans as the purchasers of a growing diversity of trade goods originating in Europe, Asia and the Americas, and transhipped by Europeans to African ports, this thesis highlights the

global dimension of the transatlantic slave trade. In its focus on the ports of the Loango Coast, it is situated between three spheres of research reflecting the role of ports as the spaces between places, the meeting grounds of cultures and the stage for the beginnings of political relations between Sub-Saharan Africa and Western Europe.

# Chapter 1: Loango and the Transatlantic Slave Trade

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Since Philip Curtin's attempt to quantify the transatlantic slave trade in 1969, calculating the number of slaves who entered the transatlantic slave trade has been a major preoccupation of African, American, and Atlantic historians.<sup>51</sup> Phyllis M. Martin's influential work on the Loango Coast was published three years later.<sup>52</sup> Although Martin's work remains the definitive history of the eighteenth-century Loango Coast, it did little to expand upon Curtin's admittedly rough assessment of the volume of the slave trade in this area. Until the late 1980s, the scholarship on West Central Africa focused primarily on the Portuguese sources.<sup>53</sup> However, in 1989 and 1990 two prominent studies were published which highlighted the British, French, and Dutch involvement in the West Central African slave trade.<sup>54</sup> More recently, the release of the Voyages Database has provided the means to reassess this trade. This chapter addresses this gap in the literature.

An examination of patterns of trade on the West Central African coast between 1515 and 1800 reveals two distinct pictures: the first is a picture of a Portuguese dominated trade in the regions to the south of the Congo River; the second is a picture of multinational trade on the regions to the north of the Congo River. This divergence raises the question: If West Central Africa was a

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<sup>51</sup> Philip D. Curtin, *The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census* (Madison: Wisconsin University Press, 1969).

<sup>52</sup> Phyllis Martin, *The External Trade of the Loango Coast 1576-1870*.

<sup>53</sup> See: David Birmingham, *Trade and Conflict in Angola the Mbundu and their Neighbours under the Influence of the Portuguese, 1483-1790* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966); Herbert S. Klein, "The Portuguese Slave Trade from Angola in the Eighteenth Century," *The Journal of Economic History*, Vol. 32, No. 4 (1972) pp. 894-918; John Thornton, "The Slave Trade in Eighteenth Century Angola: Effects on Demographic Structures," *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 3 (1980) pp. 417-427; and, Joseph Miller, *Way of Death*.

<sup>54</sup> See: David Richardson, "Slave export from west and west-central Africa 1700-1810: new estimates of volume and distribution," *Journal of African History*, 30, 1 (1989), p. 1-22; and, Postma, *The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade*.

coherent slaving region, why did the Portuguese fail to dominate the Loango Coast? This chapter argues that West Central Africa encompasses two slaving regions: the Loango and Angola Coasts. In doing so, it focuses on the Loango Coast as a key contributor to the Atlantic and African commercial spheres in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries primarily concentrating on the exchange in human beings as a test case. This chapter begins by exploring the geographic and political contexts of the trade; this discussion is followed by a general analysis of the economic importance of the Loango Coast to the transatlantic slave trade; and it concludes with an argument to disaggregate West Central Africa into two economic spheres by analysing annual patterns, thus setting the stage for a more specific discussion of the evolution of trade mechanisms later in this thesis.

### ***A Brief Sketch of the Loango Coast***

The Loango Coast stretches 460 miles, or 740 kilometres, between Cape Lopez in the north and the Congo River in the south (see Map 1 below). This area includes three sheltered bays at Loango, Pointe-Noire, and Cabinda. Loango is used as the name for a specific settlement at Loango Bay as well as a polity containing four provinces: Loangiri (also Loango or Longo), Loangomongo (hilly Loango), Pili, and Chilongo.<sup>55</sup> The Loango Coast refers to Loango's sphere of influence at the time of European contact, which included tributary polities such as Gobby, Sette, and Bukkameale to the north and, to a lesser extent, the polities of Kakongo and Ngoyo to the south.<sup>56</sup> Published by an Amsterdam printing house circa 1700, the map below likely represented these regions as they related to a Dutch sphere of influence in the lighter shaded region to the north and a Portuguese sphere of influence in the darker shaded region to the south. In contrast to this map's interpretation of spheres of influence, this thesis will argue that the Congo River represented the major boundary of Portuguese influence encompassing the southern polities of Kongo, Ndongo, and Benguela, while the northern bank of the Congo River, dominated by Loango, Kakongo, and Ngoyo, was characterized by open trade. Today, the Loango Coast is split between the modern

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<sup>55</sup> Postma, *The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade*, pp. 11-12.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 16-7, 31.

nations of Gabon, the Republic of Congo, Angola (Cabinda Enclave), and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The Loango Coast was inhabited by three groups of people. The first group of people was known as the Vili or Fioti. These people lived in Loango and traded with Europeans primarily at Loango Bay. The second group was known as the Kotchi. They belonged to the polity of Kakongo and traded at Malemba. The third group was called the Woyo. They belonged to the polity of Ngoyo and traded at Cabinda Bay. Also, the people of Kongo, who resided to the south of the Congo River, referred to the Vili, and perhaps even all the people of the Loango Coast, as the Mubiri.<sup>57</sup> Jan Vansina also has suggested that the term Vili could be used to refer to all of the people of the Loango Coast as a single linguistic or ethnic identity.<sup>58</sup> However, this thesis uses the term Vili only to refer to the members of the Loango polity. In the early period of contact, Loango was the most dominant among these polities.

This stretch of coast was renowned for its great surf and occasional underwater earthquakes, which posed high risks for sailors.<sup>59</sup> These geographical hazards begin to explain what Phyllis Martin has described as the “spasmodic and impermanent” European presence on this stretch of the western African coast.<sup>60</sup> The winds and currents which prevailed on the Loango Coast promoted a pattern of approaching the coast from the north and leaving the coast by sailing southward to use the strong current which pushed westward from the mouth of the Congo River. In contrast, approaching the Angola Coast was easiest from the south and leaving the coast was most expedient by sailing northward to catch the same strong currents of the Congo River. Thus

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<sup>57</sup> David Birmingham, *Central Africa to 1870*, pp. 72-74 ; A. Doutreloux, “Les Kongo” in Jan Vansina (ed.) *Introduction a l’ethnographie du Congo* (Bruxelles: CRISP, 1966) pp. 115-116; Gervais Loëmbé, *Parlons Vili: Langue et Culture de Loango* (Paris : L’Harmattan, 2005) pp. 26-29; and, Martin, *The External Trade of the Loango Coast*, pp. 3, 5,10, 29-30, 70, 98-99..

<sup>58</sup> Jan Vansina, *Paths in the Rainforests*, p. 202.

<sup>59</sup> Martin, *The External Trade of the Loango Coast*, p. 1.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, p. vii.

the Congo River served a significant divider for sailing ships approaching the Loango and Angola Coasts and moving between the coasts.<sup>61</sup>

Unlike the people of the Kongo and Angola, the people of the Loango Coast maintained their own trading routes to the interior to the exclusion of the Portuguese *pombeiros* or African agents of European merchants.<sup>62</sup> These trade routes went from the Atlantic coast to Stanley (Malebo) Pool to the Teke town of Monsol, where they traded for slaves, ivory, and copper. On trade routes to the north-east the Vili sold European goods and salt from Mayombe to the Jaga in exchange for slaves, copper, and ivory.<sup>63</sup> Thus by acting as the middle men in the trade and though imposing tributes on neighbouring coastal polities of Ngoyo and Kakongo during the period of early contact with Europeans, Vili trade policy heavily influenced the trade of the Loango Coast. Therefore, this chapter will highlight the early contact between the Vili and Europeans on the Loango Coast.

Although the primary and arguably most infamous export from the Loango Coast was slaves, from the late fifteenth century Portuguese traders had sought palm-cloth, redwood, elephant tails, and copper to be sold for slaves in Angola, and ivory to be sold in Portugal.<sup>64</sup> Jan Vansina draws attention to the fact that ivory was a royal monopoly in Portugal during this early period which indicates that the trade in ivory would have been minimal at best given the difficulties in selling it

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<sup>61</sup> Miller, "The Numbers, Origins, and Destinations of Slaves," pp. 386-387; Candido, "Merchants and the Business of the Slave trade at Benguela," p. 1; and, P. R. Crowe, "Wind and Weather in the Equatorial Zone," *Transactions and Papers* (Institute of British Geographers), No. 17 (1951), pp. 23-76.

<sup>62</sup> Vansina, "Long-Distance Trade-Routes in Central Africa," pp. 375-390. Vansina describes *pombeiro* as follows: "*Pombeiro* comes from *Mpumbu*, the name applied by the Kongo to Stanley Pool. The name is derived in Kongo from the Kikongo name for the Hun or Wumbu, living on the south bank of the Pool... [In] 1584, [it was used] as a generic name for trader in the interior." *Ibid.*, p. 378n.


<sup>63</sup> In a footnote Vansina suggest that these may be "the Jaga who destroyed Bungu in Mayombe." *Ibid.*, pp. 380; Also see Martin, *External Trade*, p. 18. Vansina also hypothocises that the Jaga may now be Sundi, Manyanga, or Yaa. However, as discussed in the introduction, insufficient evidence has been assembled to date to show the continuity between these two groups.

<sup>64</sup> Eugenia W. Herbert, "Portuguese Adaptation to Trade Patterns Guinea to Angola (1443-1640)," *African Studies Review*, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Sep., 1974) p. 419.

Map 1: Petrus Schenck and Gerard Valck's engraving "Regna Congo et Angola" Amsterdam, 1700







Source: Petrus Pieter Schenck and Gerard Valck's engraving "Regna Congo et Angola" Amsterdam, 1700. <http://catalog.afriterrra.org/viewMap.cmd?number=449> Accessed on 10 September 2010. Used with permission of the webmaster.

in Portugal.<sup>65</sup> Alternatively, ivory was initially the primary interest of the Dutch in Loango beginning in the late sixteenth century.<sup>66</sup> Over this 350-year period, a substantial amount of cloth, ironware, alcohol, guns, ammunition, and beads entered African markets; Chapter 5 addresses the configuration of supply and demand on the Loango Coast during the transatlantic slave trade in more detail.

### ***The Vili and the early trade with Europeans***

First contact between the Vili and the Portuguese can be dated to the late fifteenth century, with the arrival of the first Portuguese vessel on the Loango Coast in 1483. Originally joined to the polity of Kongo, by this time the Loango Coast operated largely as an independent economic and political unit under the authority of the Vili, though it was not until 1535 that the Kongo formally acknowledged this separation, or at least until the Kongo explained this separation to the Portuguese. For the next hundred years or so, the Vili dominated the Loango Coast. The Dutch made their first appearance almost 60 years later in 1593.<sup>67</sup> Portuguese and Dutch trade was well established by the mid seventeenth century. The primary goal of the Portuguese was to obtain goods such as raffia cloths and redwood from the Vili to trade in Luanda for slaves.<sup>68</sup> Despite Portuguese claims of dominance in the West Central African trade, they barred European competition effectively only south of the Congo River.<sup>69</sup> Martin suggests that the Vili preferred Dutch, French, and English traders who “brought a more varied selection of trade goods, of better

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<sup>65</sup> Vansina, ‘Long-Distance Trade-Routes in Central Africa’, p. 379; The difficulties in selling ivory in Portugal had changed by the late seventeenth century when Portuguese merchants were able to trade Angolan ivory in Portugal with ease. See: Joseph C. Miller, “Capitalism and Slaving: The Financial and Commercial Organization of the Angolan Slave Trade, according to the Accounts of Antonio Coelho Guerreiro (1684-1692),” *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (1984) pp. 1-56.

<sup>66</sup> See the following travel logs: Olfred Dapper, *Naukeurige Beschrijvinge* and, Broecke, *Journal of Voyages*.

<sup>67</sup> Martin, *The External Trade of the Loango Coast*, p. vii.

<sup>68</sup> Vansina, ‘Long-Distance Trade-Routes in Central Africa’, pp. 378-379; and, Herbert, ‘Portuguese Adaptation to Trade Patterns’, p. 419.

<sup>69</sup> Daniel B. Domingues da Silva, “The Coastal Origins of Slaves Leaving Angola: From the Eighteenth to the Nineteenth Century,” Paper presented at *the 124th Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association* (San Diego, CA, 2010).

quality and cheaper prices.”<sup>70</sup> In addition to the roll of local traders in encouraging trade with specific traders, winds and ocean currents created a natural barrier at the Congo River, as outlined above. These geographical features facilitated a triangular shipping pattern on the Loango Coast allowing Northern Europeans to ship textiles, guns, and alcohol from Europe in exchange for slaves in Africa, which were in turn exchanged for cash crops in the Americas. Whereas, Portuguese traders favoured a bilateral shipping pattern allowing them to eliminate return trips to Europe in favour of a more direct trade of Brazilian alcohol for Angolan slaves.

The structures of trade established between the Vili and their European counterparts in the early period of contact created foundations for negotiations throughout the slave trading period. Understanding the internal and regional politics in Loango is a key factor in reconstructing the Vili trade policy. In describing the polity of Loango, Dutch trader and explorer Pieter van den Broecke wrote the following *ca.* 1600: “The king keeps his residence less than a mile inland in a town named Bansa de Loango [=Mbanza Loango], which lies on a very high hill and is an extremely pleasant location.”<sup>71</sup> This proximity to the coast was important to maintaining tight personal control over trade relations on the coast without middlemen.<sup>72</sup> Much the same as the system of trade that evolved later at Bonny in the Bight of Biafra which relied upon a centralized authority to guarantee justice and safe conduct, this centralized organization of trade on the Loango Coast may have presented barriers to initiating trade in the early period. However, as a system evolved, it allowed facilitated relationships between European trading partners and a select number of Vili traders to sustain rapidly growing demands for cloth, guns, and alcohol goods on the Loango Coast and slaves to work European plantations in the Americas.

Loango had an active trade network that included trading networks to Mayumba in the north, to Malebo Pool in the east, and to Luanda in the south. The Vili operated independent of Europeans throughout West Central Africa; however, these Vili networks resembled Portuguese trading

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<sup>70</sup> Phyllis M. Martin, “The Cabinda Connection: A Historical Perspective,” *African Affairs*, Vol. 76, No. 302, (Jan., 1977) p. 51. On the superiority of Dutch over Portuguese trade goods, also see José C. Curto, *Enslaving Spirits*, p. 62.

<sup>71</sup> Broecke, *Journal of Voyages*, p. 94.

<sup>72</sup> Martin, *The External Trade of the Loango Coast*, p. 24.

networks which focused on forming permanent contacts in other communities through settlement encouraging a flow of merchants and caravaneers between communities. Thus, the Vili emerged as a distinct group with a distinct, though interconnecting, trading network from their neighbours to the south.<sup>73</sup>

Although reconstructing a picture of the Loango Coast is challenging due to the scarcity of sources, one major source of information which reaches beyond episodic evidence and cultural misrepresentation is the economic data produced by the trans-cultural trade between the merchants of the Loango Coast and Europeans. The release of the Voyages Database was a substantial achievement in organizing the bulk of these fragmented data to show how Western Africa fit into the Atlantic World. The MCC produced a more specific and particularly rich collection of economic data specific to the Loango Coast, which has been organized into a database for the purposes of this thesis. These data offer not an unbiased source but rather an additional source that can be used to test our observations that come from European travel narratives and ship logs. While Phyllis Martin's work focused on letters, shipping logs, and travel narratives, this thesis focuses on the transaction records in the Voyages Database and in the MCC.

### ***Defining West Central Africa***

Understanding the transatlantic slave trade is one of the key driving forces behind the emergence of Atlantic History. The web of interconnections which developed between Europe, Africa and the Americas during this period laid the foundations for trade, migrations (both forced and free), and cultural exchange. Table 1, below, lists 39 key trading regions identified in the Voyages Database. Each of these regions was a node in this web of interconnections ranging from Europe to Africa to the Americas and even reaching into Asia, sorting them in terms of their role as consumers textiles, guns, and alcohol (Africa) or as consumers of slaves (predominantly the Americas and Europe) . As outlined in the Introduction, the Voyages Database contains two types of data: raw data and estimates. For the purposes of this thesis, I will focus on the raw data except where specifically noted as the online database does not supply figures for specific embarkation regions.

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<sup>73</sup> Martin, "The Cabinda Connection," pp. 48 & 50.

Table 1: Primary Trading Regions of Consumption in the Transatlantic Slave Trade, 1514-1865<sup>74</sup>

Textiles, Guns and Alcohol	Slaves
1. Senegambia and offshore Atlantic	10. Europe
2. Sierra Leone	11. Northern [American] Mainland Colonies/States
3. Windward Coast	12. Chesapeake
4. Gold Coast	13. Carolinas/Georgia
5. Bight of Benin	14. Mississippi/Alabama/Florida
6. Bight of Biafra and Gulf of Guinea Islands	15. Guadeloupe
7. West Central Africa and St. Helena	16. Martinique
8. Southeast Africa and Indian Ocean Islands	17. Saint Domingue
9. Asia e Africa	18. French Guiana
	19. Dutch Caribbean
	20. Dutch Guianas
	21. Rio de la Plata
	22. Spanish Caribbean Mainland
	23. Puerto Rico
	24. Cuba
	25. Amazonia
	26. Pernambuco
	27. Bahia
	28. Southeast Brazil
	29. Danish West Indies
	30. Barbados
	31. St. Kitts
	32. Montserrat/Nevis
	33. Antigua
	34. Jamaica
	35. Dominica
	36. Grenada
	37. St. Vincent
	38. Trinidad/Tobago
	39. British Guiana

Source: <http://www.slavevoyages.org/tast/database/search.faces> See: "Voyage Itinerary" Accessed: 7 August 2011.

Nine of these 39 trading zones are on the Western African Coast: Senegambia and offshore Atlantic, Sierra Leone, Windward Coast, Gold Coast, Bight of Benin, Bight of Biafra and Gulf of Guinea Islands, West Central Africa and St. Helena, Southeast Africa and Indian Ocean Islands, and Asia and Africa. Of these trading regions, the Bight of Biafra, the Bight of Benin, and West Central Africa easily dominate the slave trading market with 1 million, 1.5 million, and 3.3 million enslaved Africans being transferred from African to European or Brazilian ownership respectively. This

<sup>74</sup> See David Eltis and David Richardson, "A New Assessment of the Transatlantic Slave Trade," in David Eltis and David Richardson (eds.) *Extending the Frontiers: Essays on the New Transatlantic Slave Trade Database* (Yale: Yale University Press, 2008) pp. 46-50.

represents approximately 70 per cent of the total enslaved Africans recorded by the Voyages Database between 1514 and 1865.<sup>75</sup>

Within this context, West Central Africa and St. Helena<sup>76</sup> clearly emerges as the primary market of exchange. This dominance could be explained in two ways: first in looking at economic factors of supply and demand, which will be discussed later in this thesis; and second by looking at the way the region is defined. Stretching from Cape Lopez on the Equator in the north to Cabo Negro on the edge of the Kalahari Desert in the south, the Voyages Database estimates that the West Central African coast exported as many as 5.7 million slaves between 1505 and 1866. This was the single largest slaving region in the Atlantic world, which exported an estimated total of at least 12.5 million slaves from Africa to the Americas during this period.<sup>77</sup> Despite its prominence as a slave trading region, the early literature focused almost exclusively on the Portuguese slave trade in West Central Africa with the notable exception of Phyllis Martin's early works.<sup>78</sup> It was not until 1989 that David Richardson began draw attention to the volume of British and French slave trade on the Loango Coast in the eighteenth century.<sup>79</sup> A year later Johannes M. Postma published his

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<sup>75</sup> These numbers represent the known embarkations as recorded in the Trans-Atlantic Slave Voyages Database. <http://www.slavevoyages.org/tast/database/search.faces> Query: Primary place of slave purchase = West Central Africa and St. Helena; Table – Rows: embarkation port, Columns: Flag. These are not to be confused with the estimates from the same database which use these figures as a foundation for speculation on the total number of enslaved Africans who embarked from African ports. Accessed 28 December 2009.

<sup>76</sup> For the purposes of this thesis, the definition of West Central Africa includes St. Helena as St. Helena was the central post of British administration in their efforts to suppress the Southern Atlantic slave trade, and thus an important site in the West Central African slave trade in the nineteenth century.

<sup>77</sup> <http://www.slavevoyages.org/tast/assessment/estimates.faces> Query - Table - Rows: Specific disembarkation regions, Columns: Embarkation regions, Cells: Only embarked. Note: these are the estimates, not the hard numbers which are available on another section of the webpage. Accessed on 15 March 2011.

<sup>78</sup> See Phyllis M. Martin's *The External Trade of the Loango Coast* and "The Cabinda Connection," pp. 47-59.

<sup>79</sup> David Richardson, "Slave export from west and west-central Africa," p. 1-22. Also see, Paul E. Lovejoy, "The Impact of the Atlantic Slave Trade on Africa: A Review of the Literature," *The Journal of African History*, Vol. 30, No. 3 (1989) p. 374.

study of the Dutch Atlantic slave trade which emphasised the Dutch role in the slave trade on the Loango Coast as early as the 1670s.<sup>80</sup>

Although the geographical categories of the Voyages Database build upon a conventional understanding of Western Africa, the validity of these geographical categories has come under scrutiny in recent scholarship.<sup>81</sup> At the *Slave Voyages Database and African Economic History* workshop in Toronto, 2010, Paul E. Lovejoy and Jelmer Vos presented papers questioning the boundaries between the Upper Guinea Coast and the Windward Coast. Furthermore, Stacey Sommerdyk and Filipa Ribeiro da Silva presented a paper questioning the conflation of the Loango and Angola Coasts into the single category of West Central Africa.<sup>82</sup> This thesis expands upon this last question. The category of West Central Africa encompasses a number of geographical regions with conflicting definitions. The map above gives one interpretation of these definitions. The primary terms used to describe sections of this coast are Angola, Kongo, and Loango. While Kongo and Loango are pretty straight forward categories, Kongo being an African community situated to the south of the Congo River and Loango being an African community to the North of the Congo River, the definition of Angola's location and size differs from one group of European traders to the next and shifts significantly over time.

In his book *Warfare in Atlantic Africa 1500-1800*, John K. Thornton defines three "military-diplomatic regions" in Atlantic Africa: Upper Guinea, Lower Guinea and Angola. He suggests that people within these regions "had more interactions among themselves than with

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<sup>80</sup> Postma, *The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade*, p.60.

<sup>81</sup> Philip D. Curtin, *The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census* (Madison: Wisconsin University Press, 1969); Joseph C. Miller *Way of Death*; Paul E. Lovejoy, *Transformations in Slavery*; and Joseph Inikori, *Forced Migration: The Impact of the Export Trade on African Societies*, (London: Hutchison, 1982) have used West Central Africa as a transatlantic slaving region in their assessments of the slave trade. In contrast, Patrick Manning has identified Loango and Angola as separate slave trading regions. See: Patrick Manning, *Slavery and African Life: Occidental, Oriental, and African Slave Trades* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

<sup>82</sup> The *Slave Voyage Database and African Economic History* Workshop was hosted by the Harriet Tubman Institute at York University, Toronto, Canada on Monday, May 3, 2010. Papers presented included: Jelmer Vos, "The Growth of the Atlantic Slave Trade on the Windward Coast of Africa"; Paul E. Lovejoy, "What Happened to the Upper Guinea Coast in the Voyage Database?"; and, Stacey Sommerdyk and Filipa Ribeiro da Silva, "Re-examining the Slave Trade on the West Central African Coast: Looking behind the Numbers". These papers will be included in a forthcoming special issue of *African Economic History*.

those lying around them.”<sup>83</sup> Within this context, Thornton defines Angola as “the whole of west central Africa, from the coast of Gabon to Angola.”<sup>84</sup> This definition in itself contains a difficulty: Angola is both a region and a distinct sub-region within that region. Having defined the region, what is the definition of the sub-region? This question is difficult to answer as definitions shifted over time. Economic and cultural exchange predated Portuguese settlement in this area. The first major period of cross-cultural exchange mediated by Portuguese navigator Diogo Cão and Kongo leader Nzinga a Nkuwu got underway in 1485 when Nkuwu requested the Portuguese send priests and artisans to build a church in Kongo. This was followed by a period of Kongo experimentation with Portuguese legal, agricultural, and religious practices, many of which were limited or disregarded as unsuitable to the local environment.<sup>85</sup> It was not until almost a century later that Thornton suggests that the initial Portuguese colony of Angola was formed in the 1570s. Through the seventeenth century the Portuguese expanded their economic and cultural interests on the Angola Coast to include a military presence by inserting themselves in a series of conflicts between the Kongo and the Ndongo. While Joseph Miller contest the ability of this military presence to exert the will of the Portuguese state over the polities of the Angola Coast in the early period of contact, these outposts formed the foundations of the Portuguese settlement in Angola.<sup>86</sup> Thus, at the dawn of the seventeenth century Angola was a small colony centered on Luanda and hemmed in by Kongo to the north and Ndongo to the east. Throughout the seventeenth century, the Portuguese along with their Imbangala allies pressed steadily eastward gaining land and slaves from Ndongo.<sup>87</sup> The eighteenth century was characterized by less intense fighting, minimal expansion of the Angola colony, and frequent raids to supply the slave trade. The Portuguese colony exerted nominal power over its subjects in the vicinity of the colony engaging in frequent “low key wars.”<sup>88</sup> In Jan Vansina’s book *Kingdoms of the Savanna*, he aptly reminds us: “The

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<sup>83</sup> Thornton, *Warfare in Atlantic Africa*, p. 14.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 15.

<sup>85</sup> Heywood and Thornton, *Central Africans*, pp. 60-66.

<sup>86</sup> Miller, *Way of Death*, p. 541.

<sup>87</sup> Thornton, *Warfare in Atlantic Africa*, pp. 136-7.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 138-9.



conquest of Angola is something that lasted for centuries.”<sup>89</sup> Using modern maps of Angola, which reach from the Congo River in the north (including the hotly contested region of Cabinda to the north of the Congo River) to the Kalahari Desert in the south and reach roughly a third of the way to the eastern African coast, it is impossible to project backwards and imagine the Angola of the transatlantic slave trade.

In addition the problem of fluctuating definitions of Angola over time, the Dutch present a contrasting definition of Angola altogether. Johannes Postma addresses this issue in his 1990 book *The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1600-1815*: “The northernmost portion of [the West Central African Coast], between Cameroon and the Congo River, was generally referred to by the Dutch as Angola, although it has also been referred to as Loango after the seventeenth-century African state in that region. This mix up of historical and contemporary labels can be confusing.”<sup>90</sup> To avoid this confusion Postma chooses to use the term *Loango-Angola* in reference to the region north of the Congo. Postma goes on to explain:

Contemporary Dutch documents nearly always referred to [West Central Africa] as Angola, although after 1649 they really meant the area north of the Congo River. This area would be more appropriately referred to as Loango, after the dominant state of the region during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries... For a few years after 1642, when the WIC [Dutch West India Company] also controlled the coast of what today is called Angola, the whole Loango-Angola region was separately administered as Africa-South from the port of Luanda, while the Guinea coast under Elmina was referred to as Africa-North.<sup>91</sup>

Another example of confusing geography on the West Central African coast is found in the category ‘Congo North’ found in the Voyages Database. On the online version of the database, no

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<sup>89</sup> Vansina, *Kingdoms of the Savannah*, p. 18.

<sup>90</sup> Postma, *The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade*, pp. 56-7.

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 60-1.

definition of this region is available. Masquerading under the title of 'Port', this first region stands out as the origin of 88 per cent of enslaved Africans embarked on Dutch ships, by far the category with the highest Dutch involvement on the Loango Coast. Further investigation revealed that Dutch historian Johannes Postma collected the data for 176 of the 238 voyages in this category. This raises some questions: What was Postma's original purpose in creating this category? Do the original sources contain more detailed information? And perhaps most importantly, how did this key information get lost in between Postma's analysis and the Voyages Databases? This first question can be easily answered by looking at Postma's 1990 analysis of his Dutch data. As Postma explained above: when the Dutch refer to Angola after 1649, they almost always are referring to the Loango Coast.<sup>92</sup> Thus the category 'Congo North' might be better understood as Loango Coast undefined.

### ***Examining the Numbers***

Having problematized the definitions used for West Central Africa in the construction of the Voyages Database, this section will use the raw data collected in the database to examine the number of enslaved Africans embarking at each port and describe the patterns of trade which emerge. Along the 1,200 kilometre stretch of coast referred to as West Central Africa, Europeans purchased slaves at 25 known locations. From north to south, these are the locations recorded by European traders from which slaves were embarked: Mayumba, Kiloango, Loango, Malemba, Cabinda, Congo North, Congo River, Rio Zaire [Congo River], Mpinda, Ambriz, Rio Dande [Dande River], St. Paul de Loanda [Luanda], Salinas, Coanza River [Kwanza River], Ambona, Benguela Velha [Old Benguela], Novo Redondo, Quicombo [Kikombo] and Benguela. Although economic historians have hitherto dealt with this coast as one unit to be compared with the Gold Coast or the Bight of Biafra, the diverging shipping patterns of this region, the geographical divide of the Congo, the differing political systems, and the volume of trade itself all indicate a clear divide between the Loango Coast to the north of the Congo River and the Angolan Coast to the south.

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<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 60-1.

Tracing trading patterns of different European groups in the various ports of West Central Africa can help to understand trading relations on the coast. This section will identify the location and evaluate the importance of each West Central African port (as listed in Table 2 below) beginning with the northernmost port of Mayumba. Mayumba and Kiloango sat on the northern periphery of the West Central African slave trading region. Mayumba was the northernmost port, trading a mere 2,596 slaves. This port traded the bulk of these slaves to French ships. Slightly to the south of Mayumba was Kilongo which traded 1,145 slaves to American ships.

The next port to the south of Kilongo was Loango Bay. Loango is a sheltered bay to the north of Cabinda. This port was the dominant trading port of the Vili people who provided at least 116,000 slaves for the transatlantic trade. The slave trade at Loango Bay was dominated by the French who shipped almost half or 55,000 of the slaves from this port. They were followed by the British and the Dutch with 23,000 slaves apiece, with the remainder split between Portuguese/Brazilian, American and Spanish ships.<sup>93</sup>

To the south of Loango Bay was Malemba, the primary Atlantic port of the Kotchi people. Current figures from the database record 191,000 slaves purchased at Malemba. This port was dominated by the French who embarked almost 78,000 slaves. The Portuguese followed closely with 63,000 slaves, and the Dutch and the British with approximately 25,000 apiece. Malemba is central to this thesis as it stands out as the most important MCC port in West Central Africa.<sup>94</sup>

Further south, Cabinda was the most significant slaving port of the three sheltered bays on the Loango Coast. Cabinda Bay was the primary Atlantic port of the Woyo people. Situated to the north of the Congo River, it was the second largest exporter of slaves in West Central Africa exporting one third of the number of slave exported from Luanda at approximately 348,000.

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<sup>93</sup> David Eltis and David Richardson have suggested that Loango Bay was the eighth largest port of the transatlantic slave trade estimating 418,000 slaves passed through this port. This is almost four times the total for the raw data listed above. See Table 5 in David Eltis and David Richardson, *Atlas of the Transatlantic Slave Trade* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010) p. 90.

<sup>94</sup> Eltis and Richardson have estimated that 549,000 slaves entered the Atlantic market by way of Malemba making it the sixth largest port of the transatlantic slave trade. This is more than double the raw data listed above. *Ibid.*

Table 2: Numbers of Enslaved Africans Embarked in the Primary West Central African Ports by Ship Flag

Port	Spain / Uruguay	Portugal / Brazil	Great Britain	Netherlands	U.S.A.	France	Denmark / Baltic	Other	Totals
<b>Loango Coast</b>									
Cabinda	4,276	241,198	29,572	6,521	10,347	55,972			347,886
Congo North (Loango North)	140	1,034	4,179	78,057	2,635	2,859	100		89,004
Congo River	5,132	32,022	39,113		37,797	3,392	562	1,250	119,268
Rio Zaire		2,542							2,542
Kilongo					1,145				1,145
Loango Bay	3,727	5,176	23,293	23,148	4,873	55,311			115,528
Malemba		63,066	24,572	25,742		77,843			191,223
Mayumba	210	212	716		149	1,309			2,596
Mpinda				2,554					2,554
<b>Angola Coast</b>									
Ambona			1,016						1,016
Ambriz	1,895	61,486	11,646		4,853	4,665			84,545
Benguela	3,982	336,442			1,537	331	391		342,683
Benguela Velho		401							401
Coanza River	29	531							560
Novo Redondo		1,795							1,795
Quicombo		622							622
Salinas		572							572
Luanda	5,424	1,350,134	1,304	15,827	107	801	150	325	1,374,072
<b>Northern Region</b>	<b>13,485</b>	<b>345,250</b>	<b>121,445</b>	<b>136,022</b>	<b>56,946</b>	<b>196,686</b>	<b>662</b>	<b>1,250</b>	<b>871,746</b>
<b>Southern Region</b>	<b>11,330</b>	<b>1,751,983</b>	<b>13,966</b>	<b>15,827</b>	<b>6,497</b>	<b>5,797</b>	<b>541</b>	<b>325</b>	<b>1,806,266</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>24,815</b>	<b>2,097,233</b>	<b>135,411</b>	<b>151,849</b>	<b>63,443</b>	<b>202,483</b>	<b>1,203</b>	<b>1,575</b>	<b>2,678,012</b>

Sources: Primary West Central African Ports exclude all ports embarking enslaved Africans on less than three ships in addition to geographically obscure ports as discussed above accounting for approximately 480,000 enslaved Africans. Figures for this table were taken from <http://www.slavevoyages.org/tast/database/search.faces> Accessed: 12 March 2010.

Although the Portuguese were notably the highest exporters embarking approximately 241,000 slaves, the French managed to acquire 56,000 slaves, the British 30,000 and the Americans 10,000. The Dutch and Spanish also had moderate success acquiring slaves at Cabinda, embarking 6,500 and 4,200 slaves respectively.<sup>95</sup>

Acting as the dividing line between the Loango and Angola regions, the banks of the lower Congo River (also known as the Rio Zaire) exported approximately 122,000 slaves. It is important to note that this “port” does not represent a single market but rather a series of markets dispersed around the mouth of the Congo River. Interestingly, this “port” marks the boundary of Portuguese dominance in West Central Africa, as the Portuguese did not embark the majority of slaves. Instead it was the British who embarked the largest number with 39,000 slaves, followed by the Americans with 38,000 and the Portuguese with 35,000. France, Spain, “other” countries (this is the category designation from the Voyages Database), and Denmark acquired the remaining slaves. This port was one of only two in which “other” countries are reported to have traded in West Central Africa.<sup>96</sup>

Congo North was not a port at all. It could be more accurately defined as the Loango Coast undefined, as argued above. This definition of Congo North would include the ports of Mayumba, Kiloango, Loango, Malembo, and Cabinda. Congo North embarked 89,000 slaves. The Dutch reportedly used this description with overwhelming frequency, accounting for 78,000 of the slaves listed in this category. The British, French, and Americans follow distantly with a few thousand slaves apiece, the Portuguese with one thousand, and the Spanish with a couple of hundred.

Mpinda was a port on the south bank of the Congo River. This port exported 2,554 slaves, trading exclusively with the Dutch. Just to the South of Mpinda was Ambriz, situated at the mouth of the Rio Loge. Eighty-five thousand slaves embarked from Ambriz. Marking the northernmost point dominated by the Portuguese, 61,000 of these slaves were purchased by the Portuguese for

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<sup>95</sup> According to Eltis and Richardson’s estimates, Cabinda embarked 753,000 slaves. These data suggest that Cabinda was the fourth largest slave supplying port below Luanda, Ouidah and Benguela, and the most significant slaving port of the Loango Coast. This is more than double the raw data listed above. *Ibid.*

<sup>96</sup> Eltis and Richardson estimate 276,000 slaves were embarked at the Congo River, making it the twelfth most significant slave supplying “port”. This is more than double the raw data. *Ibid.*

export. The British shipped 12,000, the Americans and French shipped 5,000 apiece, and the Spanish shipped the remaining 2,000.

Situated in the middle of the West Central Africa coast, Luanda was the single most important port in West Central Africa exporting approximately 1.4 million slaves. It transported these slaves to the coast along the Bengo River to the north of Luanda and from the Kikombo and Kuvo Rivers to the south. Interestingly, all seven major European slave trading nations attempted to gain a foothold in the lucrative Luanda trade. Yet the Portuguese maintained tight control over this port. They transported the majority of the slaves sold at Luanda to the Americas, approximately 1,350,000. The Dutch were a far distant second in this trade, transporting only 16,000 slaves or barely one per cent of slaves from this port, primarily during the Dutch occupation of Luanda between 1641 and 1648. Great Britain, Spain, the United States, France and Denmark together shipped less than one per cent of the slaves from this port.<sup>97</sup>

Between Ambriz and Benguela there were six very minor ports: Salinas, Coanza River, Ambona, Benguela Velha, Novo Redondo, and Quicombo. Salinas was the northernmost of these six ports, exporting 572 slaves via the Portuguese/Brazilians. Next was Kwanza River with a similar number of 560 slaves exported. Below the Coanza River was Ambona; this port exported a surprising 1,016 slaves on British vessels between 1797 and 1808. This was the only port south of Mpinda to export the majority of slaves on non-Portuguese/Brazilian ships. South of the Coanza River was the port of Benguela Velha or Old Benguela. Portuguese/Brazilian ships loaded all 401 slaves reported to have been purchased at Old Benguela. Between old and new Benguela there were two ports: Novo Redondo and Quicombo. These ports exported 1,795 and 622 slaves respectively via Portuguese Brazilian vessels.

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<sup>97</sup> Eltis and Richardson identify Luanda as the single most significant source of slaves in the Atlantic World. They estimate as many as 2,826,000 slaves passed through this port into the transatlantic slave trade. This is approximately double the raw data. *Ibid.*

According to the online version of the Voyages Database, Benguela is the third most important port of West Central Africa having exported 343,000 slaves.<sup>98</sup> Benguela is located between the Katumbela and Kuporolo Rivers and was the southernmost port of the transatlantic slave trade on the West Central African Coast. The breakdown of national purchases in Benguela, according to the database, follow the same pattern as Luanda, being heavily dominated by the Portuguese who exported 336,000 of the total slaves, or 98 per cent. The remaining two per cent were embarked on Spanish, American, Danish and French ships.<sup>99</sup>

These numbers, for the most part, support the thesis of a Portuguese dominated south. However, Mpinda emerges as a port which traded exclusively with the Dutch, complicating the idea of Portuguese dominance below the Congo River. Due to the relatively low number of slaves exported from Mpinda, 2,554, this Dutch dominance simply could represent an anomaly in the data. Furthermore, this pattern of trade could have been the result of a less consolidated Portuguese sphere of influence in the early trade (this will be discussed in the next section). If so, Mpinda could have been the boundary of Portuguese dominance in the earlier period, and as Portuguese power consolidated, the boundary shifted to the Congo River.

In discussing the role of Mpinda in the transatlantic slave trade, Joseph Miller suggest that the importance of Mpinda rose in the seventeenth century due to an influx of capital from Dutch and British slave merchants. Whereas the financing of the trade had been hitherto primarily internal based out of markets at the Malebo Pool and along the Kwango River, this new influx of capital allowed substantial markets to form on the Atlantic Coast. By the late seventeenth century the

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<sup>98</sup> Mariana Candido has argued that closer to 491,000 slaves embarked from this port. Later she revised this figure to 499,000. See, Mariana Candido, *Enslaving Frontiers: Slavery, Trade and Identity in Benguela, 1780-1850*, PhD Thesis, (Toronto: York University, 2007) p. 3; and Candido, *Fronteras de la Esclavización*, p. 37. While, the Voyages Database does not give a specific estimate for slaves embarking only at Benguela, Candido's figures are completely plausible within the Voyages Database's estimate of 5.7 million African slaves embarking in West Central Africa as a whole. In fact, Daniel Domingues has suggested that the number of slaves embarked at Benguela could be as high as 671,100. See: Daniel Domingues, "The Coastal Origins of Slaves." Also, see Table 3 below.

<sup>99</sup> Eltis and Richardson suggest as many as 764,000 slaves may have entered the Atlantic market through Benguela making it the third most significant supply market. This is well above both Candido and Domingues' estimates for the port (see footnote above). Eltis and Richardson, *Atlas of the Transatlantic Slave Trade*, p. 90.

locus of Dutch and British trade shifted again, this time north of the Congo River to Malemba and Cabinda.<sup>100</sup> This theory of a shifting locus of trade based on investment offers an alternative or perhaps even supplementary explanation to the theory of fluctuation of Portuguese power to the north postulated above.

The organizing principle of African regions as defined in the Voyages Database focuses on what the key researchers identified as the slaving hinterland, or a set of ports drawing slaves from a common source.<sup>101</sup> However, this analysis of West Central Africa argues that African regions should be defined by the patterns of trade that evolved between African and European traders. Phyllis Martin offers compelling evidence that, in addition to overlapping with the Luanda hinterland via the Congo River, the traders of the Loango Coast purchased numerous slaves from the same northern and eastern traders from whom they sought ivory and copper.<sup>102</sup> Thus, even if slaving hinterlands are the criteria for separating the parts of the African Coast, the Loango Coast still stands out as a distinct region. (For a more detailed discussion of slaving hinterlands see Chapter 5).

This port-by-port analysis of the slave trade based on national shipping patterns raises questions about placing the Loango and Angola Coasts into one category. While the aggregation of these two coasts simplified the data collection for this area and emphasized the overall importance of West Central Africa as a slave supply region in contrast to the West African Coast, it also ignored the diversity of polities and the resulting diversity in trade systems which developed within West Central Africa. Now that more information is available on the coast, splitting the West Central

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<sup>100</sup> Miller, *Way of Death*, p. 235.

<sup>101</sup> The *Encyclopædia Britannica* defines hinterlands in terms of imports and exports: "An export hinterland is the backcountry region from which the goods being shipped from the port originate and an import hinterland is the backcountry region for which the goods shipped to the port are destined. Export and import hinterlands have complementary forelands that lie on the seaward side of the port. An export foreland is the region to which the goods being shipped from the port are bound and an import foreland is the region from which goods being shipped to the port originate." In this sense the Loango Coast's slaving hinterland is the regions to the interior from which the Loango Coast obtains its slaves for export. See "hinterland" (2011). In *Encyclopædia Britannica*. <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/266517/hinterland> Accessed on 25 August 2011. For more information on the origins of slaves sold at the Loango Coast, see Chapter 5.

<sup>102</sup> Martin, *The External Trade of the Loango Coast*, pp. 116-130.



African coast into two regions based on the boundary at Mpinda acknowledges the distinct natures of the trading systems, with export markets characterized by open trade in the north and dominated by Portuguese interests in the south. Traditionally these two regions are called the Loango Coast and Angola. Of the 3.3 million enslaved Africans shipped from the West Central African coast, the total number of enslaved Africans embarked at geographically identifiable ports in this region is 2.7 million. Of these enslaved Africans 870,000, or 33 per cent, were embarked at the Loango Coast and 1.8 million, or 67 per cent, were embarked at Angola. Building upon Joseph Miller's idea of the development three competing centers of trade in West Central Africa in the eighteenth century, scholars with more expertise in Portuguese Angola may even suggest a further separation of Benguela from Luanda, though that reaches beyond the boundaries of this thesis.<sup>103</sup>


Table 2, above, clearly marks the northern and southern ports according to the above categories. These categories are characterized by Portuguese domination in the south and open trade in the north. While the data from the ports listed provide a cumulative total of over two million slaves shipped by the Portuguese from West Central Africa, a further analysis shows that almost 84 per cent of these slaves were embarked south of the Congo River. Furthermore, the Portuguese account for 97 per cent of slaves sold in this region during the transatlantic slave trade. In contrast, within West Central Africa the French, British and Dutch traders dominantly favoured the region to the north of the Congo River: the French purchased 97 per cent of their slaves on the Loango Coast; the British purchased 89 per cent of their slaves there; and, the Dutch made 90 per cent of their purchases there.

Thus, an analysis of the West Central African ports has yielded a result that there is a clear boundary of the Portuguese slave trading monopoly at the Congo River. Dividing the data for the Loango Coast into two chronological categories further emphasises this difference. Graphs 1, 2 & 3, below, emphasize a clear shift in the Loango market in the nineteenth century. In an analysis of the whole period, Graph 1, it appears that the Portuguese played a significant role on the Loango Coast, engaging in 40 per cent of the trade. While this is strictly true, a break down between the


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<sup>103</sup> See Miller, *Way of Death*, pp. 207-244. In addition to Miller, both Ferreira and Candido point to the distinct nature of the Benguela trade while stopping short of suggesting this separation. See: Ferreira, "The Suppression of the Slave trade and Slave Departures from Angola, 1830-1860," p. 31; and Candido, "Merchants and the Business of the Slave Trade," pp. 1-2.


Graph 1: Flag of Ships Embarking Slaves at the Loango Coast, 1514-1866



Graph 2: Flag of Ships Embarking Slaves in the Loango Coast, 1514-1800



Graph 3: Flag of Ships Embarking Slaves at the Loango Coast, 1801-1866



Sources: Graph 1 Calculated using figures from Table 2 below. Data for Graphs 2 & 3 was taken from <http://www.slavevoyages.org/tast/database/search.faces> Query - Principal place of slave purchase: Cabinda, Congo North, Congo River, Rio Zaire, Kilongo, Loango, Malemba, Mayumba, and Mpinda. Accessed: 24 August 2011.

1514 to 1800 period (Graph 2) and the 1801 to 1866 period (Graph 3) clearly indicates that the Portuguese were not dominant slave trading partners with the traders of the Loango Coast until the French, Dutch, and British had abandoned the coast. In the early period, the French clearly dominated the trade having embarked 46 per cent of the slaves, followed by the Dutch with 33 per cent, and the British with 20 per cent; Portugal trailed far behind having purchased only one per cent. However, in the later period, the Portuguese (and by this point the Brazilians as well) dominate the trade having purchased 75 per cent of the slaves. Here the United States and Spain/Uruguay also emerge as players, buying 13 and 3 per cent of slaves respectively. However, the combined total of Great Britain, the Netherlands, and France drop to nine per cent. This transition was partly due to European wars, and partly due to the success of the British in abolishing the slave trade on the West African Coast.

The Loango Coast ranked among the top four exporters of enslaved Africans, shipping numbers of enslaved Africans comparable to the Bights of Biafra and Benin. The calculation in Table 3, below, is based on the division of the West Central African Coast as indicated in Table 2 where Loango (north) represented one third of the enslaved Africans who embarked from the West Central African coast and Angola (south) represented two thirds. Thus calculated, the figures for the Loango Coast represented approximately one million enslaved Africans and were comparable to the Bight of Biafra which also embarked approximately one million enslaved Africans. These regions are only surpassed by the Bight of Benin with 1.5 million enslaved Africans embarked and the 2.1 million embarked at the Angolan Coast.

By creating a time series of the data available for the Loango Coast we can get an even closer look at the patterns of trade which evolved throughout the transatlantic slave trade period (see Graph 4 below). Graph 4 illustrates that traders using the Portuguese (and later Brazilian) flag had only nominal engagement in the slave trade on the Loango Coast before 1810. Prior to 1650 slaves did not represent a significant commodity on the Loango Coast. Between 1651 and 1720 the Dutch purchased the largest number of slaves on the Loango Coast. This Dutch dominance was followed by a brief period of British dominance between 1721 and 1740. Between 1741 and 1790 the French exported the largest numbers of slaves. Between 1791 and 1810, the British experienced a brief resurgence, ended by their abolition of their own trade in 1807. In the 1811 to 1820 period,


*Table 3: Total Documented Enslaved Africans Embarked for Shipment to the Americas Divided by Region*

<b>Region where Slaves Embarked</b>	<b>Raw Data</b>	<b>Estimates</b>
Senegambia and offshore Atlantic	403,837	755,513
Sierra Leone	235,541	388,771
Windward Coast	181,358	336,868
Gold Coast	737,236	1,209,321
Bight of Benin	1,514,814	1,999,060
Bight of Biafra and Gulf of Guinea islands	1,079,846	1,594,560
<b>Loango Coast</b>	<b>1,028,286</b>	
<b>Angola Coast</b>	<b>2,129,840</b>	<b>5,694,574</b>
Southeast Africa and Indian Ocean islands	378,283	542,668
Other Africa	330,661	n/a
Asia and Africa	490	n/a
<b>Total</b>	<b>8,020,191</b>	<b>12,521,336</b>

Source: Figures for this table were taken from <http://www.slavevoyages.org/tast/database/search.faces> Query 1: Principal place of slave purchase – West Central Africa and St. Helena and, Query 2: All. Accessed on 8 June 2011. Note: the Database contains a combined estimate for the Loango Coast and the Angola Coast together. The data used to calculate separate totals from the raw data for the West Central African Ports excludes all ports embarking enslaved Africans on fewer than three voyages in addition to geographically obscure ports as discussed above, accounting for approximately 480,000 enslaved Africans.

the volume of slaves embarked on the Loango Coast experienced its most significant increase as the Portuguese/Brazilians emerged as the dominant traders. Between 1821 and 1850, the Portuguese continued to dominate this trade, embarking the majority of all of the Loango Coast slaves they purchased throughout the entire slave trade. For the last 13 years of the trade, the Americans embarked the majority of slaves. However these numbers cannot be taken at face value, the Voyages Database simply records the categories captains recorded in their logs. In a more nuanced analysis, Daniel B. Domingues da Silva has suggested that some of these records may have been falsified causing the numbers of slaves embarked at Malemba and Cabinda to have been overinflated as Portuguese ships. During the era of British suppression of the slave trade, Brazilian traders would obtain licences for Cabinda and Malemba, but continued to trade in the Bight of Benin. This allowed them both to avoid the bureaucracy of Portuguese dominated ports,

Graph 4: Slave Exports from the Loango Coast by Ship Flag



Source: <http://www.slavevoyages.org/tast/database/search.faces> Query - Principal place of slave purchase: Cabinda, Congo North, Congo River, Rio Zaire, Kilongo, Loango, Malemba, Mayumba, and Mpinda. Accessed: 12 March 2010.

such as Luanda and Benguala, and to avoid seizure by British patrols, should they be boarded after loading slaves. This strategy was particularly used between 1810 and 1830.<sup>104</sup>


Despite the ambiguities introduced by the Portuguese/Brazilian trade in the early nineteenth century, the data from the Voyages Database provide enough information to trace the broad patterns of trade on the Loango Coast throughout the transatlantic slave trade. Contrary to popular opinion, these data show the Netherlands, Great Britain, and France competing for the domination of the slave trade between 1650 and 1810, while the Portuguese/Brazilians dominated the slave trade on the coast for a mere 40 years between 1810 and 1850. Thus a pattern of open trade defined the slave trade on the Loango Coast, while the Angolan Coast was distinct for its Portuguese-dominated trade. The degrees to which these contrasting patterns depended on local politics or on European wars are discussed in Chapter 3.

Due to the limits of the online version of the Voyages Database, it is difficult to get a picture of the overall trading patterns of slave embarkation on the Loango Coast throughout the transatlantic slave trade. However, the website is useful to look at the overall trading patterns on the West Central African Coast. Graph 5, below, shows that the West Central African trade began to increase sharply in 1723 and grew steadily to its peak in 1829 with the embarkation of almost 58,000 enslaved Africans in a single year. This pattern of embarkation is in contrast to the overall trend of the transatlantic trade which, despite its peak in 1829 when approximately 113,000 enslaved Africans were embarked, was already in decline; the majority of trade happened between 1765 and 1807. One major explanation for this difference can be found in Britain's abolition of the slave trade and their commitment to enforce abolition in the Northern Atlantic through navy patrols from 1807. While these patrols significantly decreased the transatlantic trade as a whole, the West Central African Coast experienced a boom as it continued to supply pre-established markets in South America and the Caribbean and at the same time began to feed

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<sup>104</sup> Daniel B. Domingues da Silva, "The Coastal Origins of Slaves Leaving Angola: From the Eighteenth to the Nineteenth Century," Paper presented at *the 124th Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association* (San Diego, CA, 2010), p. 4.

Graph 5: Total Number of Captives Embarked in Africa separated by West Central Africa and All Other Regions



Source: <http://www.slavevoyages.org/tast/database/search.faces> Query: All except West Central Africa and St. Helena, and Query: Principal place of slave purchase – West Central Africa and St. Helena. Data exported 06 June 2011.


new markets in the Caribbean, and to a lesser degree markets in North America, that had previously been supplied by West Africa.<sup>105</sup> It is important to reemphasize that this analysis, in consistency with the rest of the thesis, uses the raw data. The editors of the Voyages Database stress their expectation that the data for the earlier stages of the slave trade, and particularly the Portuguese shipping, are incomplete.<sup>106</sup> Therefore, this analysis provides only a rough sketch of the broader patterns of trade.

<sup>105</sup> The question of the demand for slaves in the Carribean is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.

<sup>106</sup> <http://www.slavevoyages.org/tast/database/methodology-17.faces> Accessed on 19 August 2011.

Using the categories of the Loango and Angola Coasts as defined above, it is possible to trace the trading patterns of these distinct regions, (see Graph 6 below). If the West Central African Coast had truly been one trading region, minimal differences between the trading patterns of the two regions might be expected. While the trajectories of the two lines are similar, divergences occur as is clear in Graph 4. The two coasts embarked slaves at different rates at different times. Slave trading on the Angola Coast predated the emergence of a sustained slave trade on the Loango Coast by at least seven decades, beginning in the 1580s. Interestingly, slave trading on the Angola Coast had an early peak in the 1620s, when 32,000 slaves were recorded to have left this coast. In the 1650s the slave trade at the Angola Coast went into sharp decline as the slave trade on the Loango Coast emerged.

*Graph 6: African Embarked in West Central Africa Divided by Region*



Source: <http://www.slavevoyages.org/tast/database/search.faces> Query: Principal place of slave purchase – West Central Africa and St. Helena. Table exported 17 May 2010. This chart uses the categories as defined by Table 2.

From 1661 to 1720 the Loango Coast maintained a modest but steady stream of slave exports, embarking between ten and fifteen thousand slaves per decade. Through the eighteenth century, the Angola and Loango Coasts both peaked in the 1760s, but the Loango Coast did not experience the large peak in exports that Angola did in the 1740s. Likewise, as the number of exports on the Angola Coast skyrocketed in the 1790s, exports were actually falling in Loango. Remarkably, the Loango Coast recovered in the early nineteenth century to provide a suspiciously disproportionate



number of slaves in the era of early British naval suppression, exporting an extraordinary 176,000 slaves in only ten years.<sup>107</sup> Between 1811 and 1830, the number of slaves known to have embarked from the Loango Coast account for a total of almost 20 per cent of the known total for the entire Loango Slave trade. Thus, while both the Loango and Angola Coast engaged in growing percentages of the transatlantic trade in the nineteenth century, the two patterns of supply diverged throughout the entire slave trading period. However, the figures from the 1811 to 1830 period should be viewed with caution, in light of suggestions that Brazilians' used false records in this period (as discussed above).

Building from geographical separation and the divergent slave trade patterns, this chapter and subsequent chapters seek to show the Loango and Angola Coasts were distinct trading regions. These coasts were distinguished by their differing patterns of European settlement, maritime trade, and cultural interaction. Table 4 below summarizes these differences. This division is underpinned by the contrasting characteristics of local governance. The Angola Coast was distinguished by a much earlier pattern of cross-cultural exchange and settlement followed by the insertion of the Portuguese into the seventeenth century conflicts between the Ndongo and Kongo, and the Ndongo and Matamba, which allowed the Portuguese to establish a military presence on the Angola Coast. The earlier and more stable presence of these settlements allowed for a more significant degree of cultural transfer. In contrast, the Loango Coast was characterized by centralized polities which remained relatively peaceful throughout the transatlantic slave trade, allowing them to maintain open trade with European partners and a level of insulation from European influences.

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<sup>107</sup> During the era of British suppression Eltis estimates that approximately 7750 slave ships embarked on transatlantic slave trading missions and that 1635 of these ships were prevented by the British from delivering their slave cargo. David Eltis, *Economic Growth in the Ending of the Transatlantic Slave Trade* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987) pp. 97-8. For further details on suppression and the end of the slave trade in the nineteenth century see: Leslie Bethel, *The Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade: Britain, Brazil and the Slave Trade?* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970); Suzanne Miers, *Britain and the Ending of the Slave Trade* (New York: Africana Press, 1975); and João Pedro Marques, *The Sounds of Silence: Nineteenth-Century Portugal and the Abolition of the Slave Trade* (New York: Berghahn, 2006).

*Table 4: Patterns of Cross-Cultural Exchange in Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century West Central Africa*

	<b>Loango Coast</b>	<b>Angola Coast</b>
<b>European Settlement:</b>	Minimal	Sustained
<b>Maritime Trade:</b>	Open maritime trade	Portuguese nominal monopoly
<b>Government:</b>	Loango Domination followed by the Comparatively Peaceful Independence of Kakongo and Ngoyo	Periods of political conflict between the Ndongo and Kongo up until 1665 and between the Ndongo and Matamba until 1656
<b>European Cultural and Religious Influence:</b>	Minimal	Sustained within a steadily growing sphere of influence

## Conclusion

This chapter has highlighted the difficulties in defining geography in the pre-colonial period before Africans had a written culture and before Europeans agreed upon a standardized map. It suggests that Atlantic Africa, or Western Africa, is made up of two large regions: Western Africa stretching from Senegambia to the Bight of Biafra, and West Central Africa which encompasses the Loango and Angola Coasts. The Loango and Angola Coasts were politically and geographically distinct regions divided at the Congo River. This contrast is evident in the differing slave trading patterns which developed on the coasts. While the Loango Coast established and maintained competitive trade among European nations, the Angola Coast, at least south of Ambriz, developed as a nominal Portuguese monopoly. Furthermore, an analysis of the Voyages Database concurs with Phyllis Martin's findings that the Dutch, British, and French ships embarked the majority of slaves from the Loango Coast prior to 1810. Thus, it was first the Dutch and later the British and French who developed the slave trading systems, which will be described in later chapters, rather than the Portuguese.

Though the historiography of the slave trade has been slow to acknowledge the significant contribution of this area to the transatlantic slave trade, the detailed information of the Voyages Database has allowed us to discover not only that it was the fourth largest slave trading region in

the Atlantic World, but also that the Loango Coast was one of the most stable regions of the transatlantic slave trade. Thus, it is a region with a rich history of Afro-European trade relations and economic development. As such, understanding this history helps us to begin to gain a greater understanding of the context in which the Atlantic World was created.

## Chapter 2: Afro-European Encounters on the Loango Coast

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Current discussions of trade relations between Africans and Europeans continue to be highly influenced by themes of modernity and “civilization”.<sup>108</sup> The idea of “modern” Europeans and their moral and technological superiority over “traditional” or “backward” African systems can be at times projected backwards to assume that Europeans had always been a source of enlightened ideas and superior knowledge to peoples in Africa. This emphasis on inherent inferiority stands in opposition to the Walter Rodney approach to Afro-European contact, in which Europeans instead are held to have perverted previously progressing African cultures and political systems by forcing Africans to adopt new economic and political arrangements which conformed to European demands for goods and persons.<sup>109</sup> However, both explanations of Africa’s lack of development along the lines of modern Western Europe undercut African agency and the existence of complicated mechanisms of governance and trade prior to European contact.

In *The World that Trade Created*, Kenneth Pomeranz and Steven Topik emphasise the importance of understanding the local within the global context. Furthermore, they highlight the need to acknowledge the contributions of all actors in the global market without privileging one group. In their understanding of the formation of a global market they argue:

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<sup>108</sup> For a critique of this focus on modernity and “civilization” see: Frederick Cooper, *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History* (Berkeley: California University Press, 2005), pp. 91-93, 102-104, 113-149; John Thornton, *Africa and Africans*, pp. 1-7; John M. Cinnamon, “Colonial Anthropologies and the Primordial Imagination in Equatorial Africa,” in Helen Tilley and Robert J. Gordon (eds.), *Ordering Africa: Anthropology, European Imperialism and the Politics of Knowledge* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007), pp. 225-251; Richard Rathbone, “Law, Politics, and Inference,” in Derek R. Peterson and Giacomo Macola (eds.), *Recasting the Past: History Writing and Political Work in Modern Africa* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2009), pp. 113-124; and, Siba N’Zatioula Grovogui, *Sovereigns, Quasi Sovereigns, and Africans* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), pp. 11–110.

<sup>109</sup> See Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*. While Walter Rodney’s argument has been strongly challenged in academic circles, it continues to have significant popular currency. See Rhoda Howard-Hassmann, *Reparations to Africa* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008) p. 61-87.

The market structures that are basic to our world were not natural or inevitable, always latent and waiting to be “opened up”; rather, markets are, for better or worse, socially constructed and socially embedded. They require a host of agreements on weights, measures, value, means of payment, and contracts that have not been universal nor permanent, plus still more basic agreements about what things should be for sale, who was entitled to sell them, and which people could haggle about prices...without compromising their dignity in the eyes of their neighbors.<sup>110</sup>

This chapter follows Pomeranze and Topik’s lead in first trying to imagine the global context in which Europeans encountered the Loango Coast in the sixteenth and seventeenth century, and second in which the Dutch Middelburg Commercial Company traded in the eighteenth century. Moving away from Pomeranze and Topik’s focus on Asia to focus on the African contribution to the World Economy in the eighteenth century, this chapter begins to reimagine the perspective of both European and African trade partners at the beginning of the Modern Era and to document what kind of socially constructed trade mechanisms they may have attempted to develop on the Loango Coast and the relative success or failure of these attempts..

Until the nineteenth century Europeans did not enjoy decisive technological or military advantages over their counterparts in many other regions of the world.<sup>111</sup> This chapter will show the complexities of both systems, while emphasising the negotiations and adaptation inherent in making these systems compatible. This approach involves inherent difficulties: the source material for medieval and early-modern European trade is diverse, and analysis of it has been extensive. At the other extreme, Afrocentric sources are scarce, and the written material we have from the period of contact is overwhelmingly Eurocentric. When it comes to the Loango Coast, the sources are more limited than most Western African trading regions as few Europeans spent sustained periods of time on the coast prior to the nineteenth century, and the discourse around these

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<sup>110</sup> Kenneth Pomeranz and Steven Topik. *The World that Trade Created: Society, Culture, and the World Economy*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. M. E. Sharpe, London: 2006, p. xii.

<sup>111</sup> John Hobson, *The Eastern Origins of Western Civilization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) pp. 135–57; John Darwin, *After Tamerlane: The Global History of Empire* (London: Penguin, 2007) pp. 104–55; and, Kenneth Pomeranz, *The Great Divergence: China, Europe and the Making of the Modern World Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

sources is even more limited. However, this critique is not meant to imply that analysis is impossible but rather to note the boundaries of our knowledge and caution against formulating definitive conclusions.

First, this chapter will rely upon an extensive secondary literature to construct a picture of the European trading conventions which had evolved by the time of contact with sub-Saharan Africa. Second, this chapter will examine early records of contacts between European traders and explorers and the people of the Loango Coast, contrasting them with experiences of other cross-cultural contact across the globe. This analysis will place the discussion of African models of trade and European reactions to these models, within a broader context of cross-cultural encounters. This is followed by a more specific contextualization of the MCC within the Dutch transatlantic slave trade. Finally, this chapter will use the port of Malemba as a case study to trace the evolution of trading mechanisms during the peak of the slave trade between Middelburg and Malemba merchants in the eighteenth century. The data for this case study have been taken from Middelburg Commercial Company's trading records, which list 3,154 transactions at Malemba for purchases of 6,819 enslaved Africans. In these transactions, the Mafouk emerges as a dominant figure in negotiating Afro-European trade relations. This case study of a single port provides a theory that the MCC and Malemba merchants developed a system of barter based, ship trade supported by a centralized African authority. This structure allowed the modification of existing structures to allow the significant transfer of goods and persons without constituting a significant threat to preexisting traditions based on matrilineal or kin based legitimization structures. This theory is tested for the entirety of the Loango Coast in subsequent chapters. This analysis has implications not only for the histories of the transatlantic slave trade, but also for the histories of the evolution of merchant communities and the formation of global trading networks.

### ***European Merchant Communities in the 1500s***

In her 1989 book *Before European Hegemony*, Janet L. Abu-Lughod writes:

Before Europe became *one* of the world-economies, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, when it joined the long distance trade system that stretched through the Mediterranean into the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf and on into the Indian Ocean and through the Strait of Malacca to reach China, there were numerous preexistent world-economies. Without them,

when Europe gradually “reached out,” it would have grasped empty space rather than riches.<sup>112</sup>

Abu-Lughod raises a point of vital importance to this study: Europeans did not create trade as they “reached out” but rather tapped into other existing trade-economies. Before examining the transatlantic slave trade or even the European “reaching out” into Sub-Saharan Africa, it is vital to understand the experiences Europeans were familiar with and the systems which they had developed.

Most historians agree that the 1500s mark the beginning of a new era of trade and migration in world history, if not in European history, brought on by innovations in shipbuilding. Comprehending European conceptions of trade mechanisms and merchant communities on the eve of the shipping revolution is a key element in reimagining the cross-cultural contact and the trade which evolved out of this transition.<sup>113</sup> This section will explore the state of affairs in European trade at the point of sub-Saharan contact. In his discussion of the origins of long distance trade, Patrick Manning identifies a basic motivation for these trading networks: “For rare or desirable goods, people have long been willing to travel great distances or to pay unusual prices.”<sup>114</sup> Given the uncertainties of travel, especially in earlier periods, the potential gain had to outweigh not only the significant investment of time and capital but also the risks of theft or loss of life. Thus merchants began to create networks to minimize these risks. Manning explains:

Moving goods from one place to another involved more than identifying the desirable goods and developing means of transporting them. In addition, the people who transported goods had to be able to sustain themselves, to

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<sup>112</sup> Abu-Lughod, *Before European Hegemony*, p.12.

<sup>113</sup> In this context the “shipping revolution” refers to the transformative period where shipping technology, led by the Portuguese and Spanish, which brought together the ship building techniques of Northern European, Mediterranean, and Arabian shipbuilders to create the “three-master” or ship with three masts and three mainsails which could withstand the challenges of trans-ocean travel. See Jaap R. Bruijn, “Productivity, Profitability, and Costs of Private and Corporate Dutch Ship Owning in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,” in James D. Tracy (ed.) *The Rise of Merchant Empires, Long-Distance Trade in the Early Modern World, 1350-1750* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 174-194.

<sup>114</sup> Manning, *Migration in World History*, p. 78.

establish cordial relations with those along the way, and to communicate in detail. The social systems needed to provide food and housing for those on the move, and needed to protect them against bandits who would surely arise to seize valuable goods.<sup>115</sup>

Manning goes on to emphasise the need for merchants to acquire not only language skills but also knowledge of supply and demand. This knowledge would allow their travel to be profitable. Additionally, knowledge of methods of exchange would allow travelers to gain sustenance, safety, and shelter along the way.<sup>116</sup>

Over time, merchants employed various strategies to address these obstacles. By the late middle ages, European merchants had formed networks linking key trading ports throughout the Baltic, the Atlantic Coast, and the Mediterranean. Through these networks, merchants travelling beyond their own countries developed mechanisms of trade which allowed them to navigate the hurdles of cross-cultural trade over long distances: safety, transport, communication, and information. These mechanisms would inform the European approach to cross-cultural trade in the subsequent expansion into African markets.

One method of examining this transformation lies in tracing the development of institutions. Douglas North has described the role of institutions in economic development:

Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction. They consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights). Throughout history, institutions have been devised by human beings to create order and reduce uncertainty in exchange. Together with the standard constraints of economics they define exchange.<sup>117</sup>

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<sup>115</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 79-80.

<sup>116</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>117</sup> Douglas C. North, "Institutions," *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Winter, 1991), p. 97.



In contrast to North's conceptions of formal rules encompassing property rights, African economic systems privileged labour control over property rights. Nevertheless, North's description of institutions can be useful in examining the development of the transatlantic slave trade.<sup>118</sup> Avner Greif, in his 2006 book *Institutions and the Path to Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade*, went on to further develop the function of an institution:

Institutions are the engine of history because...they constitute much of the structure that influences behaviour, including behaviour leading to new institutions. Their independent impact and their interrelations with social and cultural factor imply that we cannot study them as reflecting only environmental factors or the interests of various agents ... Comparative and historical institutional analysis ... foster our ability to capture and study institutions from the required broader perspective.

Furthermore he suggests: "Institutions may well be the engine of history, and to the extent that the Rise of the West is due to its underpinning institutions, the roots of this rise may have begun to take hold as early as the late medieval period."<sup>119</sup> While Greif's emphasis on institutions as fundamental to processes of change and his identification of roots of an early modern transformation in medieval European institutions is consistent with the argument of this thesis, this chapter goes on to suggest that the negotiation of institutions throughout the world had a lasting impact on all of the cultures which engaged in these negotiations. Furthermore, this impact was not a process of Europeans imprinting their values and behaviours on other cultures but rather a cross-fertilization of ideas throughout the world which created new systems of interaction between continents which transformed all of the actors involved.

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<sup>118</sup> A number of commentators have argued that economic and political systems in Sub-Saharan Africa were primarily organized around control over labour (which was scarce), instead of control over land (which was relatively abundant). This may be true at a general level, but a number of regional variations have also been identified. See, Herbst, *States and Power in Africa*, p. 38-55; John Thornton, *Warfare in Atlantic Africa*, pp. 16-17; and, Suzanne Miers and Igor Kopytoff, "African 'Slavery' as an Institution of Marginality," in Suzanne Miers and Igor Kopytoff (eds.), *Slavery in Africa: Historical and Anthropological Perspectives* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1977), pp. 3-81.

<sup>119</sup> Avner Greif, *Institutions and the Path to Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) p. 379.

Merchant communities also held a key role in creating and transforming these institutions. Frédéric Mauro's discussion of merchant communities positions the merchant community as a social organization separate from the other elements of trade: "Apart from the geography of the trade and commercial mechanisms, institutions, techniques, commercial doctrines, and politics, merchant community is the social base of the merchant universe."<sup>120</sup> The merchant community is the web that connects all of these elements of trade, which fosters the community's development and protects it as it evolves.

In fifteenth-century Europe, foreign merchants collected together in port cities to protect their trading interests. Membership in these groups was linguistically and nationally specific: "the members of these communities were foreigners who formed the "nation", autonomous groups with their own privileges and rivalries. The prosperity of these "nations" depended, above all, on the attitude of the city toward foreigners and on the legal status awarded to them by the city."<sup>121</sup> These foreign "nations" were the key organizing principle of merchant communities in this period. Multiple "nations" scattered throughout Europe, and later throughout the world, made up an ethnicized trading diaspora. Varying slightly in nature from port to port, nations were a common feature of the fifteenth-century European market. A merchant nation was made up of "merchants from the same geographical area, speaking a common language and often subjects of the same political entity – [which] represented the corporate body to the host country's authorities."<sup>122</sup> Drawing from evidence from the Hanseatic League, an economic alliance of trading ports which dominated commerce from the Baltic to the North Sea from the thirteenth to seventeenth century, Mauro describes the function of such a nation: "In legal matters, they occupied a place between the guilds or the corporations and lesser associations known as *eendrachtigheid*. A merchant nation was established with the tacit approval of the territorial prince and with the

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<sup>120</sup> Frédéric Mauro, "Merchant Communities 1350-1750" in James D. Tracy (ed.) *The Rise of Merchant Empires: long-distance trade in the early modern world, 1350-1750* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 255.

<sup>121</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 262.

<sup>122</sup> Ivana Elbl, 'Nation, Bolsa, and Factory: Three Institutions of Late-Medieval Portuguese Trade with Flanders,' *The International History Review*, 14 (February 1992) p. 1.

consent of the prince of the merchants' land."<sup>123</sup> Thus, establishing and maintaining a merchant community involved a balancing act between the political and economic spheres.

Membership in a mercantile nation and the implicit expression of mutual trust also came with a communal responsibility. This responsibility was often supported by both the local government and the nation's origin. The example of the Portuguese nation in Flanders illustrates one path for these transitions. The Portuguese nation was formally recognized by Flanders in 1411 when John the Fearless granted them legal status, protection, right of assembly, limited self-governance, and self representation. At the same time, the Portuguese nation was absolved of the burden of collective responsibility.<sup>124</sup> The 1438 amendment of this charter allowed the election of judges and consuls for the litigation of Portuguese civil disputes. In 1487 the Portuguese were recognized as having some recourse against the defaults of local money-changers, a protection granted earlier to the "Spaniards and Easterlings".<sup>125</sup>

The recognition of legal status of merchant communities brought obligations, or rather shifted obligations. Prior to the fifteenth century, if a merchant attached to a nation impinged upon local laws or customs the entire nation was liable for the fault and felt the consequences, but with the development of support systems for the individual foreign merchant, individual merchants faced the consequences of their actions with the support of their nation, rather than nations taking the brunt of a conflict. "[Collective responsibility's] gradual abandonment by the major European commercial powers was a major achievement, and a sign of the growing importance of foreign trade in the late Middle Ages."<sup>126</sup> Nevertheless, this path was a gradual one, and attempts to punish a trading nation for the transgressions of an individual factor or merchant continued well into the fifteenth century.

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<sup>123</sup> Frédéric Mauro "Merchant Communities 1350-1750", p. 262.

<sup>124</sup> Elbl, "Nation, Bolsa, and Factory," p. 14.

<sup>125</sup> It can be presumed that by "Easterlings" that Elbl is referring to Baltic merchants. It is also possible that she is simply referring to merchants from the East. *Ibid.*, p. 15.

<sup>126</sup> Ivana Elbl, "Nation, Bolsa, and Factory," p. 12.

With the diminution of collective responsibility came the evolution of mutual trust. European systems of trust between Portugal and Flanders “were based on the reciprocity of favours and ... friendship ... The relationship between them, dating back to the early Middle Ages, was of a dynastic and religious nature.”<sup>127</sup> If trust in Europe was primarily based on a common identity, this raises questions about how non-Europeans fared in European markets during this period.

Within Western Europe, Jews and Armenians “stood out against the purely European western background.”<sup>128</sup> In order to understand how Iberian merchants, as the first Europeans to encounter sub-Saharan Africa, acted in their early encounters with Western African merchants, it is important to note the transition which was taking place within the Iberian Peninsula during this period.<sup>129</sup> During this transformation the Jewish separation from local Christian communities became more pronounced, with the imposition on them of new limitations on social mobility and employment opportunities. Due to these limitations, Jewish people remained outsiders, lacking full integration, though they had often resided in the same location for generations. As outsiders attempting to integrate into upper levels of society, they were limited to employment as merchants and money lenders. As a fringe profession equally protected and restricted within nations, merchant groups were allowed to achieve relatively high levels of integration and economic success. Heather Rae in her 2002 book *State Identities and the Homogenisation of Peoples* highlights the transformation of Spain from a tolerant society to a more homogeneous model in the early modern period.<sup>130</sup> However, Rae goes on to argue that though the Spanish crown offered protection for Jewish communities through the medieval period, the growth of anti-Semitic attitudes, which was supported by the Catholic Church, led to growing violence and the exclusion of Jewish people from state professions including military, church, university, and

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<sup>127</sup> Frédéric Mauro “Merchant Communities 1350-1750,” p. 263.

<sup>128</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 266.

<sup>129</sup> Toby Green, *The Rise of the Transatlantic Slave Trade in Western Africa, 1300-1589*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) pp. 71-73.

<sup>130</sup> Heather Rae, *State Identities and the Homogenisation of Peoples* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) p. 65.

municipal employment. Under the leadership of Ferdinand and Isabella, Spain eventually “opted for the path of forced homogenization, through conversion and expulsion.”<sup>131</sup>

During this transition, long distance trade offered a social safety valve for non-integrated European merchants. Jewish communities were pressed by violence on the one hand and religious coercion on the other hand.<sup>132</sup> These pressures of religious conformity and violence led many Jewish Iberians to take advantage of emerging opportunities in sub-Saharan trade. They held a pivotal role in the financing and administration of numerous shipping vessels in the foundational period of European merchant empires.<sup>133</sup> As key brokers in transnational shipping they brought unique experience of negotiating identity and space into their negotiations with African merchants. More broadly, these interactions between European insiders and outsiders formed expectations of how European traders would be treated when they began to explore the trade opportunities beyond Europe.

Within this environment, Africa presented a new challenge of how to build trust among strangers and how to create the institutions which would facilitate reciprocal favours and friendship in a relatively alien cultural environment. The Iberian Peninsula, which had offered merchants the most freedom in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, simultaneously demonstrated a growing intolerance for non-Christian minorities.<sup>134</sup> These experiences of accepting foreign traders while rejecting foreign religions undeniably shaped Iberian attitudes towards the trading communities they encountered in Africa. Furthermore, the establishment of merchant communities, the foundation of nations, and the abandonment of collective responsibility in cross-cultural exchange within Europe would have framed the expectations of Europeans as they sailed beyond Europe.

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<sup>131</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 81.

<sup>132</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 267. Also see Jonathan I. Israel's *European Jewry in the Age of Mercantilism 1550-1750*, (Oxford: Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2003) 3<sup>rd</sup> Ed. pp. 18-28.

<sup>133</sup> Filipa Ribeiro da Silva, *The Dutch and the Portuguese in West Africa: Empire Building and Atlantic System (1580-1674)* (Unpublished Thesis: University of Leiden, NL, 2009) pp. 265-268, 273-275.

<sup>134</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 263.

The institutions of nations, guilds, city authorities, and merchant associations provided the framework upon which the European owned Atlantic trade monopolies, such as the Dutch West India Company, were founded. The two key goals of a trade guild were to educate skilled workers and to protect those workers from open competition. Guilds, city authorities, and merchant associations all served as mediators and guarantors in foreign markets where it was crucial to establish and maintain trust to conduct business.<sup>135</sup> Eric Mielants emphasises the role of guilds and other organizations originating in the medieval era in providing the structural base for modern economic growth.<sup>136</sup> Ideas of trade guild and monopoly were well intertwined by the eighteenth century in Europe when Adam Smith accused guilds of being “oppressive monopolies” which limited open competition and free market.<sup>137</sup> Julia Adams, in her article “Trading States, Trading Places: The Role of Patrimonialism in Early Modern Dutch Development”, suggest that it was the particular ability of the Dutch to innovate based on traditional European institutions which allowed them to shift an emerging surplus into an emerging world market with the Netherlands at its centre.<sup>138</sup> As the Dutch began to mobilise their new economic institutions, they reached out and encountered new markets in Africa, Asia, and the Americas. The next section will explore initial contact between Portuguese and Dutch merchants and Atlantic Africa, particularly focusing on the peoples of the Loango Coast and how these first contacts compare to other first encounters.

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<sup>135</sup> S. R. Epstein, “Craft Guilds, Apprenticeship, and Technological Change in Preindustrial Europe,” *The Journal of Economic History*, Vol. 58, No. 3 (Sep., 1998) p. 686.

<sup>136</sup> Eric Mielants, “Perspectives on the Origins of Merchant Capitalism in Europe,” *Review (Renand Braudel Centre)*, Vol. 23, No. 2 (2000) p. 238.

<sup>137</sup> Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations: Books I-II* (London: Penguin, 1986 [1776]) p. 227. On the connections between guilds and monopolies also see: Sheilagh Ogilvie, “Guilds, Efficiency, and Social Capital: Evidence from German Proto-Industry,” *The Economic History Review*, New Series, Vol. 57, No. 2 (May, 2004), pp. 286-333.

<sup>138</sup> Julia Adams, “Trading States, Trading Places: The Role of Patrimonialism in Early Modern Dutch Development” *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Apr., 1994), pp. 319-355.

### ***Initial contact of Europeans on the Loango Coast***

It is impossible to know the exact degrees to which European identity, religious beliefs, and behavioural norms distorted the recording of the first contacts between Europeans and the peoples of the Loango Coast. Equally, it is extremely difficult to glimpse the Africans' perceptions of what we see as European technologies, trade, and social norms. On one hand, which new sources of economic, social, and religious knowledge did Africans embrace, and in which combinations; and on the other hand, to what degree did different African polities retreat into a mode of cultural preservation? To what degree were cultures of the Vili, Ngoyo, and Kakongo experiencing growth, innovation, stagnation and/or degeneration? Although these questions are difficult to answer, perhaps there are some clues in the adaptability and resilience with which the people of the Loango Coast responded to European offers of trade. (This idea of cultural preservation will also be discussed in Chapter 4.)

In an examination about what happens when representatives of two cultures come into contact with each other, political scientist Paul Sharp explores how cultures adapt and react to new stimuli. His categories of diplomatic theory can be useful when considering the outcome of these encounters. He theorises that cultures encountering each other for the first time attempt “to manage three sorts of diplomatic relations: *encounter relations* between peoples meeting for the first time; *discovery relations* between peoples seeking to find out more about, and enjoy closer relations with each other; and *re-encounter relations* where peoples stay in touch, yet keep one another at arm’s length.” He goes on to suggest: “the social character of all but the most brutal and simple of relations between groups very quickly brings diplomacy, if not diplomats, into existence.”<sup>139</sup> Taking this accent on collaboration one step farther, Sharp implies that material gains trump violence and coercion in most cases. Within this context, merchants not only represented themselves and their own economic interests, but they were also the conduits of cultural, religious, and even political exchanges. One could suggest that, with the exception of pirates and interlopers who were trading outside of their home government’s mandate, most early merchants who engaged in overseas trade participated in some or all of these types of these

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<sup>139</sup> Sharp, *Diplomatic Theory of International Relations*, pp. 10-11.

diplomatic relations. Building upon this idea of merchants as diplomats and the need of both the visitors and their hosts to maintain a degree of separation, Philip Curtin observes,

At a first glance, there is no apparent reason why traders living in an alien society must necessarily live separately from their hosts, but physical segregation of this kind was almost universal ... Without barriers of some kind, the traders from abroad would likely disappear through assimilation into the host society within a generation or so; their capacity to act as cross-cultural brokers would then come to an end. Diaspora merchants needed contact with their hosts, but they also needed to keep their distance and enough of their original culture to serve as brokers for the traveling merchants from the original homeland. The host society also had reason to keep alien merchants at a distance. They were, after all, normally considered to be unpleasant people on the double qualification of being both merchants and foreigners – however profitable it might be to have them around when needed. The interests of the hosts and the strangers alike suggest that a slightly distant contact was the most desirable relationship between the two communities.<sup>140</sup>

This thesis discusses the degree to the polities of the Loango Coast maintained a set of organizational principles exclusive of European models of organization. This chapter focuses on the negotiation cultural and economic barriers to trade in the period of initial contact, whereas Chapter 5 discusses the physical barriers between Europeans and local communities.

The concepts of “discovery” and “re-encounter” are particularly interesting in analysing the Loango Coast. The former category involves the mutual assimilation of knowledge between cultures as they connect. In Joel Mokyr’s discussion of knowledge economies in *The Gift of Athena*, Mokyr suggests that each society is characterized by its “collective knowledge.” He goes on to argue that access to knowledge is key to progress: “Progress in exploiting the existing stock of

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<sup>140</sup> Phillip D. Curtin, *Cross-Cultural Trade in World History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984) p. 38.



knowledge will depend first and foremost on the efficiency and cost of access to knowledge.”<sup>141</sup> Knowledge transfer was at the centre of successful long-distance trade. In the period of mutual discovery, Europeans’ external networks and transportation resources allowed an accelerated pace of information acquisition in the Atlantic world. However, their African counterparts retained sole access to knowledge of internal trading practices on the African continent. This balance of separate knowledges did not begin to tip toward European favour until the mid-nineteenth century.

However, this chapter is particularly interested in the acquisition of Loango’s “collective knowledge” by European visitors, as understanding this knowledge is essential to conducting cross-cultural trade:

Each society has access to some metaset of feasible techniques, a monstrous compilation of blueprints and instruction manuals that describe what societies can [and cannot] do ... From that set, economic decision makers, be they households, peasants, small-scale craftsmen, or large corporations, select the techniques actually used.<sup>142</sup>

For outsiders, during the encounter phase this information can take years, even decades, to decipher, particularly in the case of Europeans in sub-Saharan Africa who collected bits and pieces of information over extended time horizons. In these processes of interpreting behaviours, misunderstandings are inevitable for both sides. Thus, the most intense period of misunderstandings between Europeans and the peoples of the Loango Coast was likely to have occurred in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

This discussion of the limitations of knowledge brings us back to Sharp’s idea of “re-encounter relations”: “Re-encounter relations attempt to keep others who are known ... at arm’s length by reproducing and emphasizing difference. They may do so to a variety of degrees, to maintain

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<sup>141</sup> Joel Mokyr, *The Gifts of Athena: Historical Origins of the Knowledge Economy* (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002) p. 7.

<sup>142</sup> Mokyr, *The Gifts of Athena*, p. 11

pre-existing identities completely intact, for example, or to maintain them in some sectors and not others.”<sup>143</sup> The people of the Loango Coast were very careful to both maintain relations while simultaneously preventing Europeans from integrating into their local communities. As time went on, mutually recognized institutions would develop to help maintain this distance while facilitating trade.

First contact between the Portuguese and the people of Loango can be dated to the late fifteenth century, though Martin argues that: “it was not until the last quarter of the sixteenth century and the founding of Luanda that the Portuguese established regular trade with the area.”<sup>144</sup> Even then, the European presence was “spasmodic and impermanent” on this stretch of the western African coast.<sup>145</sup> The primary goal of the Portuguese was to obtain goods such as cloth and redwood from the Vili to trade in Luanda for slaves.<sup>146</sup>

In the early seventeenth century much of the slave trade was conducted in two stages. In the first stage salt and shells as well as European trinkets and beads were used to buy palm-cloth from the peoples of the forest regions to the north and east of Kongo. In the second stage this cloth, which was used for clothing as well as being the most widely accepted currency in Angola, was exchanged for slaves.<sup>147</sup>

The quality of cloth was very important in these exchanges. The *enscaca* bought on the Loango Coast was double the price of the best cloth available in Kongo due to its superior quality and perhaps also due to the greater trading skills of the Vili.

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<sup>143</sup> Sharp, *Diplomatic Theory of International Relations*, p. 90.

<sup>144</sup> Phyllis M. Martin, “The Cabinda Connection,” pp. 51.

<sup>145</sup> Martin, *The External Trade of the Loango Coast*, p. vii.

<sup>146</sup> Vansina, “Long-Distance Trade-Routes in Central Africa,” pp. 378-9; and, Herbert, “Portuguese Adaptation to Trade Patterns Guinea to Angola,” p. 419.

<sup>147</sup> Birmingham, *Trade and Conflict in Angola*, p. 79. Also see Battell, *Strange Adventures*, pp. 43-44.

In order to obtain these goods, traders needed brokers. Curtin has outlined the importance of the role of brokers to European trade in Africa:

From their first visits to the African coast, Europeans recognized the need for some kind of cross-cultural brokers. Though they began with naïve solutions, like kidnapping a few Africans for training in Europe as interpreters, they soon shifted. Even before the end of the fifteenth century, Portuguese shippers began to leave crewmen on shore between voyages to bargain with the “natives” and gather a cargo ready for loading at the next visit. These were the earliest “stayers” of the Portuguese African trade diasporas.<sup>148</sup>

Whereas on many parts of the Western African Coast it was the norm for Europeans to provide a broker to facilitate trade and provide translation, on the Loango Coast a Mafouk eventually oversaw a network of local brokers.<sup>149</sup> Wary of Europeans and interested in maintaining high levels of control over long-distance trade, Loango Coast merchants were providing their own brokers by the time Italian missionaries F. Michael Angelo and F. Denis Carli arrived in 1666.<sup>150</sup>

The Dutch joined the Portuguese in trading on the Loango Coast in 1593.<sup>151</sup> During the initiation of Dutch trade on the Loango Coast, approximately 1593 to 1670, Filipa Ribeiro da Silva identifies various experimental trading strategies employed by European traders along the Loango Coast. The first strategy involved a small yacht or sloop being dispatched in advance of the main trading ship to begin negotiations and expedite the trading process. Once the main ship arrived, it

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<sup>148</sup> Curtin, *Cross-Cultural Trade in World History*, p. 57.

<sup>149</sup> For a more comprehensive definition of the role of the Mafouk in the Loango Coast economy see Chapter 4.

<sup>150</sup> Angelo and Carli, “Account of the Congo” in *A collection of voyages and travels, some now first printed from original Manuscripts* Vol. 1 (London, 1704) available in *The Making Of The Modern World Database*: <http://find.galegroup.com/mome/infomark.do?&contentSet=MOMEArticles&type=multipage&tabID=T001&prodId=MOME&docId=U100417869&source=gale&userGroupName=unihull&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE> Accessed on 2 September 2011.

<sup>151</sup> Thornton and Heywood, *Central Africans, Atlantic Creoles, and the Foundation of the Americas*, p. 107. Also see Phyllis Martin, *The External Trade of the Loango Coast*, p. 43.

anchored in Loango Bay, conducting trade while the smaller ship(s) ran up and down the Loango Coast collecting trade goods.<sup>152</sup> Pieter van den Broecke's voyages are a key example of this multi-ship strategy.<sup>153</sup> The second strategy involved the temporary settlement of factors and junior factors at various ports: "To stay on shore, the traders rented a house from an African, where the factor or junior factor and his helper could live and store the merchandise used as barter for African goods as well as the products bought until the arrival of the main fleet and of the sloops and the yachts employed in the coastal trade."<sup>154</sup> Broecke also provides an example of this strategy when he stationed Marten van Colck as a junior factor in Mayumba on 18 February 1612 where he stayed even after Broecke returned to the Netherlands.<sup>155</sup> A third strategy employed by the Dutch was to send a wave of ships to the Loango coast to establish a steady supply of trade goods and create a permanent presence. Between November 1607 and June 1609, Broecke's employer sent three boats to the Loango Coast: the yacht *Merminne* and the ships *Neptunnis* and *Merman*. In 1612, Broecke returned to the Loango Coast on the ship *De Son* and found two barques, the *Mauritius* and *Mercurius*, already trading at Kakongo. In April of the same year, Broecke reports the arrival of another boat: "the 22<sup>nd</sup> day. The yacht the *Maen* arrived here from Holland [and came] under my control; our *majoris* sent it to me to be used along the [Loango] coast."<sup>156</sup> Thus we can see the beginnings of a steady Dutch presence on the Loango Coast.

Ribeiro da Silva emphasizes the role of knowledge accumulation in establishing this presence: "[Dutch merchant's] adaptation to the West[ern] African trade was based on the knowledge of the Portuguese experience gained by direct observation ... or via the Portuguese Sephardic Jews established in Amsterdam, who were deeply involved in the commerce with these regions."<sup>157</sup> The

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<sup>152</sup> Filipa Ribeiro da Silva, *The Dutch and the Portuguese in West Africa*, pp. 178-9.

<sup>153</sup> Broecke, *Journal of Voyages*, pp. 87-91.

<sup>154</sup> Filipa Ribeiro da Silva, *The Dutch and the Portuguese in West Africa*, pp. 178-9.

<sup>155</sup> Broecke, *Journal of Voyages*, pp. 28 & 88.

<sup>156</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 53, 76, 79 & 91.

<sup>157</sup> Ribeiro da Silva, *The Dutch and the Portuguese in West Africa*, pp. 179.

ability of early traders to acquire knowledge about the internal and regional politics in Loango was essential in their endeavours to exploit trade opportunities to their full capacity.

Peter van den Broecke played a key role in establishing Dutch trade relations on the Loango Coast. He recorded many of his experiences and published them in the Netherlands facilitating the formation of a collective knowledge, or a common set of understandings, between the merchants of the Netherlands and the Loango Coast. In these documents he emphasized the key role of the Maloango, the ruler of Loango, in establishing and maintaining trade relations. During the early seventeenth century, the Maloango dictated the terms of trade which Broecke and other European traders adhered to on the Loango Coast.<sup>158</sup> Observing these strict rules and conventions was essential if European traders wished not only to profit but also to survive. For example, in the early period of cross cultural trade, escorts were often provided to European traders with escorts, presumably to both facilitate trade, to protect the European traders, and to ensure European traders adhered to local customs. Throughout his journal entries, Broecke mentions the presence of escorts in his trade negotiations.<sup>159</sup>

Violations of local laws and customs could be incredibly dangerous. Pieter van den Broecke records an incident on 22 April 1608 which illustrates the informed, independent, and self-interested nature of the Vili ruler in reaction to a Portuguese act of aggression against the Dutch off the Loango Coast:

[I have] heard that the Portuguese here at Loango had shot dead with a flintlock the master of the same yacht, named Augustijn Cornelissen, thinking that he was Pieter Brandt, whom they loathed unto death because he had revealed this place to our company. The Portuguese invited Pieter Tillemans, Pieter Brandt and the master to visit them. But Pieter Brandt, who was ill, or because his heart gave him warning, excused himself for that time and let the other two aforementioned persons go. And because the master had no hat to wear, he borrowed Pieter Brandt's. The Portuguese saw him coming and thought he was

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<sup>158</sup> Broecke. *Journal of Voyages*, Pg. 94. Also see Martin, *The External Trade of the Loango Coast*, pg. 24.

<sup>159</sup> Broecke, *Journal of Voyages*, pp. 56, 78, 90.

Pieter Brandt. As the *schuijdt* came alongside the ship they shot him dead with a long flintlock, and then the others were immediately taken prisoner to be taken to Loando de St. Pauwel [=Luanda; São Paulo de Luanda]. This they would have accomplished if the king of Loango's people had not followed them. [They] took them from the Portuguese and right then and there struck the Portuguese master dead with elephant's tusks. Well, the Portuguese were forced to pay a large fine, which clearly showed that the natives were loyal to our nation.<sup>160</sup>

Broecke saw this resolution as evidence of preferential treatment for the Dutch. Though the Vili were capable of offering such preferential treatment, preferential treatment does not appear to have been an end in itself. Rather, it seems more likely that this reaction was the people of Loango protecting their own monopoly over justice and trade rights in this region, as the Portuguese had attempted to administer their own form of justice without regard for the law of the land. Up to this point, the Vili had shown clear interest in trading with both the Portuguese and the Dutch. When the Portuguese threatened these interests, the Vili acted, not in favour of the Dutch or against the Portuguese, but rather in their own favour. The Vili were sending a clear message: this is our territory, we hold the monopoly of power, and we will trade with whom we please. Also, by playing one trader against another, regardless of their nationality, the Vili may have been attempting to gain greater trading concessions from one or both parties involved. Whatever their motives, the strength of the Vili government in maintaining control over their exports and their active role in cultivating trade relationships with numerous nations limited the power of any single European nation in that region.

Moving from the early records of contact, to the eighteenth century, additional examples of Europeans attempting to circumvent local laws include the 1755 attempt of a French captain to by-pass the Cabinda market and come to a private arrangement with local merchant Muene Poukouta Pandy Massigne. When Massigne attempted to acquire slaves by raiding merchant competitors, the ensuing chaos resulted in long delays in loading slaves for all of the ships at Cabinda. Nearly 50 years later an American merchant attempted unlawfully to seize freemen as

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<sup>160</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 54-55.

slaves; the merchants of Cabinda responded by blowing up the responsible American ship.<sup>161</sup> However, unlike the first example where the local reaction to European infringement upon local laws was unpredictable, in the latter two cases the French and American captains were aware of the institutions of trade but failed to observe them. Operating outside of local laws was a risky business indeed. These two examples illustrate the continued responsibility of Europeans to adhere to local laws or face severe consequences.

Before the arrival of Europeans, it is likely that Loango attitudes to long-distance trade evolved from experiences of trade within West Central Africa. Loango had an active trade policy that included exporting to the north, east, and south. The Vili operated trading networks independent of Europeans throughout West Central Africa that resembled Portuguese trading networks, forming permanent contacts in other communities.<sup>162</sup> Evidence of Vili trade networks predating European trade on the coast supports Abu-Lughod's theory, discussed above, that European traders did not expand into a void but rather connected with other pre-existing economies to their mutual financial benefit. However, these trade networks underwent significant transitions to accommodate trade with Europeans. The transitions of these internal trade networks will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.

In addition to the European need to accommodate local laws and customs, they also attempted to use the knowledge they brought from Europe to integrate the trading process on the Western African Coast. These efforts met with varying levels of success. Failed attempts to transpose their understanding of a "factory", which had evolved out of at least two centuries of trade negotiations in Europe, into an African context is a key example of this process. At this time the European idea of a factory "did not necessarily refer to a warehouse, but rather to a company branch abroad, distinct from the main office and run by an accredited factor"<sup>163</sup> A factory usually did not exist in isolation but as part of a merchant community or "nation", as discussed above. Though the people of the Loango Coast had engaged in of the foundation of trade settlement throughout West

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<sup>161</sup> Martin, *The External Trade of the Loango Coast*, pp. 114-115.

<sup>162</sup> Martin, "The Cabinda Connection," pp. 48 & 50.

<sup>163</sup> Elbl, "Nation, Bolsa, and Factory" p. 5.

Central Africa by the seventeenth century if not sooner, they had conflicting opinions about allowing European traders similar privileges. Perhaps something in their experience of long-distance trade or in their knowledge of Portuguese military posts among their neighbours to the south of the Congo River discouraged them from allowing any type of settlement. Whatever the case, the settlement of Europeans on the Loango Coast was only ever semi-permanent at best.

Sporadic and fragmented evidence shows that between 1608 and 1612 Dutch merchants established factories at Mayumba and Loango bays with the help of the charismatic trader Pieter van den Broecke. However, the people of Kakongo received Broecke's envoy with less enthusiasm: "A trader sent by Broecke to Kakongo was killed after he had completed his business with the king."<sup>164</sup> Few details are known about this encounter, though it is reasonable to suppose that this envoy engaged in duplicitous or otherwise offensive behavior leading to his death. Later reports indicate that by 1620 the Dutch were maintaining three factories on the coast collecting ivory and copper. There is also evidence of the Portuguese trading in local raffia cloth at this time. Though European traders co-existed in this period, it was not without attempts at subterfuge. Martin records one such attempt:

Towards the end of 1624, Souza [the Portuguese Governor at Luanda] wrote to the Maloango, asking him to close the Dutch factories and to expel the heretics. He promised that the Portuguese would buy all the ivory and copper which the Vili could supply; they would bring better-quality goods than the Dutch; they would provide protection against the enemies of Loango; as a final incentive, Jesuit priests would be sent to baptize the Maloango. The latter replied firmly that he intended to continue trading with the Dutch and Portuguese on equal terms and that he had no desire to become a Catholic.<sup>165</sup>

In 1640, Dutch traders were involved in the seizure of a Portuguese ship. This act of aggression resulted in a breach in relations with the Maloango, and despite the best efforts of the WIC agent, Cornelis Hendrickx Ouwman, to smooth matters over, relations remained strained. "It is clear that

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<sup>164</sup> Martin, *The External Trade of the Loango Coast*, p. 45.

<sup>165</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 50.



the Maloango was not more prepared to accept Dutch domination in 1640 than he had been prepared to accept a Portuguese monopoly earlier in the century.”<sup>166</sup> Despite these and no doubt other attempts on behalf of both the Dutch and the Portuguese the local rulers maintained their insistence on open trade.

The Dutch factory at Zarry was one of the shortest lived factories. Established in 1638 on the northern coast of the Congo River in an eastern province of Kakongo, this factory was abandoned within three years. In 1641, the Mangoyo refused the Portuguese permission to set up a factory at Cabinda. In 1648, the same year the Portuguese regained Luanda from the Dutch, Portuguese attacks at Mpinda, Cabinda, and Loango caused the Dutch to evacuate their factories. However, by the 1650s the Dutch had re-established small factories at Loango and Kakongo. In the 1670s the Dutch maintained small factories at Loango, Malemba, and Cabinda. Prior to the 1670s, trade on the Loango Coast consisted mainly of cloth, copper, ivory, redwood and elephant tails. Slaves were available, but not in quantities large enough to make up a complete cargo. In the 1630 to 1670 period, Martin asserts: “The Maloango’s strength was shown by the fact that no Europeans were able to gain a monopoly of the Loango trade, with the possible exception of the years when the Dutch ruled Luanda. Nor were Europeans able to acquire land to build permanent forts.”<sup>167</sup>

Martin identifies 1670 as a transition point for economics and governance on the Loango Coast: “By about 1670, a new trading era was established on the Loango Coast. It was a period dominated by the slave trade: a time when Dutch and Portuguese merchants faced increasing competition from the French and English. In the eighteenth century, Loango’s hegemony over external trade, which had lasted for a 100 years, came to an end; Kakongo and Ngoyo emerged as serious rivals.”<sup>168</sup> Given Martin’s reliance on Dutch sources, it is worth questioning to what degree the identification of 1670 as a transition point is impacted by the failure and reinvention of the Dutch West India Company (WIC) at precisely the same time. However the time series data compiled from the transatlantic slave trade database in Chapter 1 confirm that a transformation

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<sup>166</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 56.

<sup>167</sup> *Ibid.*, 72. Also see p. 56, 59, 64-65, 68.

<sup>168</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 72.

was happening in the Loango trading markets during this period, 1660-1670, allowing the first boom in the sale of slaves on this coast. It is also evident that by the late eighteenth century Europeans had a substantial and growing knowledge of trade on the Loango Coast and the people of the Loango Coast had no less familiarity with European merchants.

Between 1670 and 1793, Europeans had very limited success in establishing permanent settlements: “The three states of Loango, Kakongo, and Ngoyo resisted almost all European efforts to exert a monopoly. By following a free-trade policy, the Africans were able to benefit from European competition which reached its peak in the second half of the eighteenth century.”<sup>169</sup> In light of their numerous failures and in an attempt to minimize costs and maximize profits, Dutch merchants closed down their factories permanently and shifted to shipboard trade. Thus, Dutch merchants on the Loango Coast acknowledged their inability to profitably transfer the pattern of residential factory trade, which had been beneficial in cross-cultural trade in Europe, to the Loango Coast.

In her examination of the limited European settlement on the Loango Coast, Martin suggests: “In the course of the seventeenth century, some Portuguese traders had established themselves with their families on the Loango Coast and had attained some independence from Luanda.”<sup>170</sup> To the minor degree to which these types of settlements existed, they were irregular and impermanent. This strategy of containing contact returns us to the idea of “re-encounter relations” outlined above as a period of contact in which two groups maintain contact while also maintaining a degree of separation. The peoples of the Loango Coast were among the most effective peoples on the West Central African Coast at engaging with European trade without compromising their own cultural values. David Birmingham concluded that this was a result of the deployment of re-encounter relations: “Loango ... had a more limited experience of early European contacts [than the Kongo], and preserved more of its traditional economic political customs.” He went on to argue: “Loango was more successful [than Kongo] in retaining its integrity, and in controlling its economic relations with the Atlantic powers. As the political and economic strength of Loango increased, so its influence spread into the northern interior. At the end of the seventeenth

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<sup>169</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 73.

<sup>170</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 69.

century, when Kongo had virtually disappeared as a commercial kingdom, Loango extended its economic control to dominate a new pattern of southern trade routes as well.”<sup>171</sup>

Whereas Linda Heywood and John Thornton have approached the issue of African agency by exhibiting the adaptive ability of African peoples, on the Loango Coast agency can be found in the preservation of African cultures from the angle of religious conversion and European settlement:

Loango’s principle interest in its relations with the Dutch, Portuguese, and English was to maintain itself as an independent open trading port. The absence of large and long settled traders from abroad with their slaves and close African allies made the development of a sort of Christian community (as took place in Okanga) impossible, and politics made conversion of rulers difficult to maintain. Loango was therefore the most religiously conservative region that had ongoing contacts with the Atlantic community and therefore outside the world of Atlantic Creole religion.<sup>172</sup>

The disinterest in European religion which was exhibited on the Loango Coast was only one of many possible responses to European attempts to bring “the true faith” to African peoples. While this exhibits their ability to delay change once contact was made, but they could not resist it all together. Vansina suggests that it is through the use of local traditions in to address the challenges created by European contact that African peoples continued to determine their own destiny.<sup>173</sup> Furthermore, this is not to imply that agency can only be found in preserving some kind of “traditional” society, but rather in evidence that African voices persisted in the conversation over how their communities addressed the question of change. (See Chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion about the nature of this insulation.)

Brokers from within Loango societies facilitated the trade in the relative absence of permanent European settlement of the Loango Coast, though sojourners – in Manning’s conceptualization of

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<sup>171</sup> David Birmingham, *Central Africa to 1870*, p. 53.

<sup>172</sup> Thornton and Heywood, *Central Africans, Atlantic Creoles, and the Foundation of the Americas*, p. 207.

<sup>173</sup> Vansina, *Paths in the Rainforests*, pp. 235-6.

the term as temporary migrants – often stayed in these communities for a time. Pieter van den Broecke was one of the earliest of these sojourners. The last lines of his Journal read: “This is as much as I have understood and seen in three voyages [to Loango] and during the roughly thirty months I stayed ashore there.”<sup>174</sup> The underlying implication is that Broecke, despite his intensive experiences on the Loango Coast, had an incomplete knowledge of the area. In explaining how mechanisms of trade are developed, Mokyr suggests: “A minimum has to be known before a technique can be created.”<sup>175</sup> Though Broecke and his European colleagues had collected substantial data on the Loango Coast by the early seventeenth century, their knowledge was still insufficient to impact the creation of mechanisms of trade on the coast. By the dawn of the eighteenth century, both European and Loango merchants had acquired enough mutual knowledge to transform Loango markets. By following the trail of trade transactions left by the MCC we can begin to unravel this progression of technical creations or rather recreations of existing structures to achieve new ends. While in some circumstances the peoples of the Loango Coast chose to outright reject European traditions, as was the case with attempts to introduce Christianity, in other circumstances the challenges associated with trade led to innovation in trading techniques. In both cases, these peoples were actively involved in shaping this innovation.

The systems of factory and shipboard trade which came to dominate trade on the Loango Coast built upon Europeans’ understandings of trans-cultural trade that were first developed in the western ports of Europe. Though it is difficult to distinguish all the African elements of this system, it is clear that on the Loango Coast the local people resisted permanent settlement of Europeans. Even more so, they resisted shows of force between European trading nations, especially when conflict interfered with profits. As we shall see in Chapter 4, the people of the Loango Coast closely regulated the flow of goods through their markets, appointing Mafouks and a range of lower officials to supervise the trade. The eventual establishment of a regularized barter-based, ship trade supported by a centralized Ngoyo government and internal financing, emerged only in the eighteenth century. Before this time, European and African traders were testing the waters of

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<sup>174</sup> Broecke, *Journal of Voyages*, p. 102.

<sup>175</sup> Mokyr, *The Gifts of Athena*, p. 13.

trade, trying and rejecting some methods developed for different times and different spaces while adapting others to meet the needs unique to the transatlantic slave trade.

## **The Dutch in the Transatlantic Slave Trade**

The development of the WIC was a conscious reaction to Spanish Imperialism and by extension to Portugal during its union with Spain between 1580 and 1640.<sup>176</sup> In the late 1500s and early 1600s, the Netherlands was undergoing process of national unification. Unification enabled the Dutch to engage more actively in the Atlantic economy, particularly through the purchase and sale of slaves. During the struggle for independence, the Netherlands went through a period of economic growth, artistic innovation, and imperial expansion. The establishment of the WIC in 1621 marked the Netherlands' first major foray into the Atlantic market. The WIC's mandate stretched beyond the conventional boundaries of economic profit to include the capacity to engage in military and diplomatic missions in the Atlantic world. One of their primary goals was to disrupt Spain's overseas empire, compromising Spain's ability to maintain its political hold over the Netherlands.<sup>177</sup> Indeed, Filipa Ribeiro da Silva has gone as far as to argue that the transition of the Netherlands from a system of private trade to a trade monopoly in the Atlantic World was not an economic decision at all. She supports this by pointing out that the Dutch were unable to find adequate funding for this venture so the Dutch state had to provide substantial capital.<sup>178</sup> Although the first WIC failed in achieving its economic goals, it was more successful in achieving its political goals, since the Netherlands obtained its independence from Spain in 1648. Indeed, prior

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<sup>176</sup> For an analysis of the interconnections between the development of the the Dutch and Portuguese Atlantic empires see: Filipa Ribeiro da Silva, *Dutch and Portuguese in West Africa: Empires, Merchants, and the Atlantic System, 1580-1674*, (Leiden: Brill, 2011); P. C Emmer, "The First Global War: The Dutch versus Iberia in Asia, Africa and the New World, 1590-1609," e-JPH Vol. 1 (Summer, 2003); idem, "The Struggle over sugar: The abortive Attack of the Dutch on Portugal in the South Atlantic," *Mare Liberum* Vol. 13 (June, 1997), pp. 57-69; and Charles R. Boxer, *The Dutch in Brazil, 1624-1654* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957).

<sup>177</sup> Wim Klooster, "Introduction," in Klooster and Padula, *The Atlantic World*, p. 14.

<sup>178</sup> Filipa Ribeiro da Silva, *Dutch and Portuguese in Western Africa: Empires, Merchants, and the Atlantic System, 1580-1674*, (Leiden: Brill, 2011), pp. 93-4. For more information on opposition to the formation of the WIC and difficulties in convincing investors see: Boxer, *Dutch Empire*, pp. 11-16.

to independence, the WIC had played a crucial role in the capture, governing, and supplying of north-eastern Brazil between 1630 and 1654, which was then a colony of Spain.

Jelmer Vos, David Eltis and David Richardson have presented five different periods of motivation of the Dutch transatlantic slave trade under the WIC monopoly: the first period (1596-1637) encompasses the early years of the Dutch slave trade and the establish of the Dutch WIC monopoly in the non-European Atlantic; the second period (1637-1650) focuses around the Dutch expansion into the Americas and their establishment of trade in Pernambuco; the third period (1650-1674) is characterized by a reorganization of the Dutch Atlantic after the loss of Pernambuco and an expansion of Dutch interests in the slave trade; the fourth period (1674-1730) follows the restructuring and ultimate failure of the WIC; and the fifth period (post-1730) see the overall importance of the Dutch in the Atlantic World diminish as British and French interests flourish. Using these categories, this section will use these categories to give a brief sketch of the evolving priorities of Dutch shipping interests in the Atlantic World to provide a context for the MCC trade. Furthermore, it will outline the nature of the MCC trade in Africa.

During the first period of trade, 1596 to 1637, the Dutch engagement in the slave trade was minimal.<sup>179</sup> The lack of a demand for labour and a general scepticism about the morality of slavery discouraged Dutch merchants from purchasing slave cargos in the early stages of trade in Western Africa.<sup>180</sup> This period saw the emergence of the Dutch state coincide with expanded knowledge of the Atlantic world.

Following the model developed by Charles Boxer, Johannes Postma identifies the Dutch occupation of northern Brazil as the definitive moment in the beginning of the Dutch slave trade.<sup>181</sup> However, Vos, Eltis and Richardson contend that it was not until 1637 that the Dutch, led by the WIC, obtained their military objectives in Pernambuco and shifted to a trade agenda. For the next 13 years the WIC focused almost exclusively on the establishment of a Dutch presence in Pernambuco. This involved the purchase and transfer of approximately 30 000 enslaved Africans

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<sup>179</sup> Vos, Eltis, Richardson, "The Dutch in the Atlantic World," p. 5.

<sup>180</sup> Postma, *The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade*, p. 10; Boxer, *Dutch Empire*, pp. 8, & 18-19.

<sup>181</sup> Postma, *The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade*, p. 14; Boxer, *Dutch Empire*, pp.32-66.

to the Americas between 1637 and 1650.<sup>182</sup> This period also included the failed attempt of the Dutch to force the Portuguese out of Angola, in an attempt to obtain a secure supply of slaves for their new possessions in the Americas.

By the end of the 1640s, the ambitious military and economic plans of the Dutch had been diminished by Spanish and Portuguese counter offences. By 1650, the Dutch began to reorganized and retrenched their investment in the Americas around supplying slaves for a contract with Spain for the provision of slaves from Africa, the *asiento de negros*, and the supply of slaves for their remaining colonies, particularly Suriname. The island of Curacao was at the centre of this supply chain, acting as a first landing place for the Dutch ships carrying African slaves. This third period (1650-1674) is described by Vos, Eltis, and Richardson as the most ambiguous and, therefore, the most interesting. It is at this point that the WIC restructured to form a trading model dominated by the slave trade.<sup>183</sup> During this period the majority of slaves shipped by the Dutch found their way to Curaçao and from Curaçao to the Spanish Americas. The remaining slaves were distributed among New Amsterdam, Rio de la Plata, Surinam, Jamaica, and Barbados.<sup>184</sup> During this period, the Dutch doubled the volume of their slave trade into the Americas. Particularly in this third period of trade, Vos, Eltis, and Richardson credit the Dutch as playing an important role in the solidification of the Atlantic slave trade.<sup>185</sup> However, after this point the influence of the Dutch diminishes in the Atlantic World.

The fourth era of Dutch slaving (1674-1730) was dominated by the second Dutch West Indies Company.<sup>186</sup> This commerce was mostly conducted from Caribbean Islands of Curaçao and St. Eustatius; small numbers of these slaves were smuggled to English and French islands, but the majority remained in Dutch colonies. This period Dutch trade corresponds with the beginning of

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<sup>182</sup> Postma, *The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade*, p. 6.

<sup>183</sup> On the failure and restructuring of the WIC see Postma, *The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade*, p.22-24, & 36-38.

<sup>184</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>185</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7.

<sup>186</sup> *Ibid.*

the slave trade on the Loango Coast. Under the administration of the WIC monopoly, the Dutch preferred a model of trade which involved the establishment of settlement in castles, forts, factories, or stations in or near African market towns. These settlements served as spaces to mediate contact between Africans and Europeans. Postma refers to this model of trade as “stationary trade” whereas Galenson prefers the term “castle-trade.”<sup>187</sup> However, permanent settlement on the Loango Coast could not be established, therefore the WIC shifted to a model of shipboard trade.<sup>188</sup> This involved using the ship as the carrier of the administration apparatus rather than the administration being permanently located on the coast. When the ship arrived, an administration centre was set up on the coast, when the ship left, the apparatus of administration was shifted back to the ship. These impermanent administrative centres are often referred to as lodges which create confusion with more permanent settlement arrangements. However on the Loango Coast, the repeated failure of the Dutch to establish a permanent base resulted in a model of mobile administration. (The repeated attempts and failures of European traders to set up permanent bases of trade on the Loango Coast are discussed above.)

The last period following the transition of the Dutch slave trade from monopoly back to free trade began in 1730 and marked the final decline of the Dutch as formative traders in the transatlantic slave trade, with the Dutch giving way to English and American slave traders even in the supplying of the Dutch Guianas.<sup>189</sup> This is the period of trade most relevant to this study. It is in this context that the MCC shifts from commodity trade in the Mediterranean to slave trade in Western Africa. This also marks a transition among Dutch merchants from combined trade, shipping both goods and slaves, to a specialization almost exclusively in slave trading.

Through its focus on the expansion of the sanctioned Dutch slave trade, this categorization misses two crucial factors in Dutch and, more broadly, in early Atlantic shipping: the ongoing presence of privateers and pirates on the one hand and the multiplicity of trade relationships overlapping state

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<sup>187</sup> See Postma, *The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade*, p.134; and Galenson, *Traders, Planters, and Slaves*, pp. 23-24.

<sup>188</sup> Postma, *The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade*, pp.61 & 136.

<sup>189</sup> *Ibid.*



boundaries on the other.<sup>190</sup> While the former can be seen as acting beyond the purview of the emerging Dutch state, the latter played an important part in creating the information base upon which Dutch merchants framed their involvement – or skepticism towards – the development of the WIC. This introduction to the Atlantic trade was partly due to the relocation, as early as 1586, of many Portuguese Jewish merchants to Antwerp:<sup>191</sup> soon thereafter, Antwerp became the principal redistribution centre for Asian and Atlantic goods.<sup>192</sup>

Christopher Ebert notes, due to tensions between the Netherlands and Spain, this was an awkward apprenticeship.<sup>193</sup> Furthermore, he suggests that multiple crises of privateering, the Inquisition, failing economics, and raising political tensions led the Dutch to seek economic and political separation from their dependent relationship with the Iberians through the formation of the Dutch West India Company and a Dutch Republic. He acknowledges that informal and indirect trade continued with Brazil despite these difficulties. Indeed, the Jewish community in Amsterdam financed 13 voyages to Portuguese ports between 1621 and 1630, the year in which the WIC successfully invaded Pernambuco in northeastern Brazil.<sup>194</sup>

### ***European Merchants on the Loango Coast***

Driven first by demand for specie and exotic commodities and later by their need for labour to develop the Americas, Europeans probed the Loango Coast in ever increasing numbers. Through the processes of discovery and re-encounter relations, as discussed above, Middelburg and Loango merchants developed a trading model which was a barter based, ship trade supported by a centralized African authority. This section will explore how this model fits into the African context by testing it against Paul Lovejoy and David Richardson's models of African slave trade as

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<sup>190</sup> For a discussion of Dutch piracy and privateering see: Heywood and Thornton ; for a discussion of extra-national trade networks in the Atlantic see Ribeiro da Silva, *Dutch and Portuguese in Western Africa*, pp. 271-324.

<sup>191</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 18-19.

<sup>192</sup> Christopher Ebert, "Dutch Trade with Brazil before the Dutch West India Company, 1587-1621," in Postma and Enthoven, *Riches from Atlantic Commerce*, pp. 49-76.

<sup>193</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 50-51.

<sup>194</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 73-75.

presented in their 2007 study of “African Agency and the Liverpool Slave Trade”. In their chapter Lovejoy and Richardson divide Africans’ trade with Europeans into three categories based on the theory that credit provision of Europeans to African traders was central to trade negotiations. They outline three categories of securing these investments: First, they outline a system of personal trust built upon the settlement of European traders in African communities and the extension of their trade networks through local marriages. This trading-diaspora strategy, the one termed “nations” in Europe, was particularly dominant in Sierra Leone and the Windward Coast. Second, they outline a system of trade in which a strong centralized authority enforced the repayment of loans. This strategy was dominant in the port of Bonny at the Bight of Biafra. Third, they outline a system of private credit which was “linked to the pawning or pledging of human beings as collateral for debt.”<sup>195</sup> This system was dominant at Old Calabar, which was also in the Bight of Biafra. Lovejoy and Richardson go on to propose: “this third mechanism of credit protection appears to have become the most common form of credit protection mechanism as trade with regions where European shipmasters dealt directly with Africans grew relative to other regions.”<sup>196</sup> While not questioning the relevance of these models to the areas which they describe, I will suggest that evidence from the MCC records for the Loango Coast presents a fourth model of trade, a model in which barter rather than MCC credit dominates slave trading transactions. In this sense barter refers to a simultaneous exchange of one set of goods for another, rather than lending goods on credit or offering a commodity intermediary or currency. It is barter in the sense that each party has a good the other wants and is willing to exchange it. There is no delay in payment. Furthermore, this is barter within an organized market system, a system which is administrated and negotiated by an appointee of the local ruler, and a system that involves complex strategies of price fixing and controls on goods exchanged. Therefore, this could be best understood as “complex barter” or barter without cash or credit but still involving a degree of

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<sup>195</sup> Lovejoy and Richardson, “African Agency and the Liverpool Slave Trade,” p. 60.

<sup>196</sup> *Ibid.*

market control.<sup>197</sup> This model of trade encompasses both the “informal constraints” and “formal rules” of an institution as defined by Douglas North above.

This section uses the Loango Coast port of Malemba as a case study. It uses detailed trade statistics on Malemba slave traders collected by the Dutch MCC between 1749 and 1776 while also drawing information from the broader records collected by the MCC on the Loango Coast between 1732 and 1797. Situated between Loango and Cabinda bays, Malemba was one of three principal slave-trading centers on the Loango Coast. Malemba stands out as the most important MCC port in West Central Africa. From 1749 to 1776, the Voyages Database has recorded 59,579 slaves embarking at Malemba: 28,663 by the French, 20,217 by the Dutch, and 10,699 by the British.<sup>198</sup> The MCC records alone account for 6,819 of these slaves, which represents a third of Dutch trading interests on the coast during this period and nine per cent of the total number of enslaved Africans embarked at Malemba during this period.<sup>199</sup> The key data for this section are compiled from the captains’ trade books which detail the negotiations between Middelburg and Malemba merchants. A transcript and translation of four sample transactions can be found in Chapter 5. These records retain their original format: in the far left column is a date containing day, month, and year, this is followed by four columns listing the number of males, females, boys, girls involved in a single purchase. The name or title of the Malemba trading partner is listed in the middle column above a list of goods exchange for the slaves. Each item is accompanied by a measure and a value in both pieces (the local currency based on a measure of cloth) and a value in Guilders (the Dutch currency). In the 3,154 records of trade transactions between the Middelburg

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<sup>197</sup> For a discussion of the elements involved in a barter exchange see: D. M. P. McCarthy, “Media as Ends: Money and the Underdevelopment of Tanganyika to 1940” *The Journal of Economic History*, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Sep., 1976), pp. 645-662; Benjamin S. Orlove, James M. Acheson, John Clammer, Thomas Crump, Stephen Gudeman, David Guillet, Olivia Harris and Henry J. Rutz, “Barter and Cash Sale on Lake Titicaca: A Test of Competing Approaches [and Comments and Replies]”, *Current Anthropology*, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Apr., 1986), pp. 85-106; and Anne Chapman, “Barter as a Universal Mode of Exchange” *L'Homme*, T. 20, No. 3 (Jul. - Sep., 1980), pp. 33-83.

<sup>198</sup> <http://www.slavevoyages.org/tast/database/search.faces> Query: Principal place of slave purchase – Malemba. Accessed 22 August 2011.

<sup>199</sup> MCC Records: 216, 219, 400, 456 517, 524, 528, 533, 677, 795, 825, 938, 980, 990, 1019, 1224, 1229, 1286, 1289.

and Malemba merchants, 3,101 of these interactions took place within a one-day period, indicating that slaves were exchanged for European trade goods at the shore without the credit that would have secured transactions based on delayed payments for MCC goods offered. There would have been little purpose in fabricating these dates if the different parts of these transactions were completed on different days. While these records only show a section of trade which occurred in one port in a limited time period, the records offer incredible detail of who was trading with the MCC, the exact dates which they traded, and what items were exchanged. This provides evidence of a different model of trade than has hitherto believed to have been practiced on the Loango Coast.

This evidence adds the Loango coast as an exception to Lovejoy and Richardson's emphasis on the use of European credit in expanding the slave trade on the Atlantic coast of Africa: "The transactions for slaves that occurred on the beaches of the Windward coast were essentially barter-based and involved little or no credit. Credit was, however, a feature of the commerce in people in almost every part of Atlantic Africa."<sup>200</sup> These trade records indicate that a barter-based, ship trade was the most common method of exchange at Malemba in the mid eighteenth century, definitely with the Middelburg merchants, and likely with all European groups.<sup>201</sup> See Chapter 5 for a more detailed analysis of the day to day negotiations of the slave trade on the Loango Coast as a whole.

In 1986 David W. Galenson published a similar study on the organization of the slave trade on the Western African coast in which he examined the different methods of exchange. This study used the records of the English Royal African Company. Using K. G. Davies' categories of 'castle-trade' or 'factory-trade' and 'ship-trade', Galenson describes how these systems worked:

In the castle-trade, the ship's captain would be instructed to sail to a specified company fort, or perhaps to one of the larger factories. The captain would deliver his ship's cargo to the company factor who resided there, and the factor would be responsible for furnishing a designated number of slaves for the ship's

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<sup>200</sup> Lovejoy and Richardson, "African Agency and the Liverpool Slave Trade," p. 52.

<sup>201</sup> Martin, *The External Trade of the Loango Coast*, pp. 73-92.

cargo. Alternatively, in the ship trade ... the ship's captain would act as supercargo, and he would personally select the places where he would trade his goods to the natives for slaves.<sup>202</sup>

Whereas in the fort-based system factors engaged in the bulk of trading resulting in the fragmentation of sources in forts around the Atlantic, shipboard records were recorded by a single captain, and although surviving captains' logs are far from numerous, they offer a broader range of information about the entire shipping cycle rather than information about one segment of trade.<sup>203</sup> By the time the MCC ships set sail in the early eighteenth century, the Dutch retained only one Western African fort at Elmina. Therefore, the majority of Dutch private traders relied heavily upon shipboard trade to obtain enslaved Africans. The MCC produced one of the most complete and coherent set of slave trading records of any private trading company that has been preserved. This concentrated collection of Middelburg documents detailing trade on the Loango Coast in the eighteenth century is an excellent resource for historians that has been hitherto underutilized.

At the same time that the MCC was beginning to trade in Africa using the system of shipboard trade, Lovejoy and Richardson suggest that the Liverpool ships popularized this system of trade in the early 1700s:

Over three out of four slaves carried by Liverpool ships came from areas of the African coast where there was little or no permanent European presence in 1701-1725. Liverpool traders were, in short, among the leading slave carriers to diversify the pattern of slaving activity in Africa in the eighteenth century and, in the process, forge new commercial alliances with local African slave dealers.<sup>204</sup>

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<sup>202</sup> Galenson. *Traders, Planters, and Slaves*, pp. 23-24.

<sup>203</sup> For more information on the RAC's methods of sale in the Americas see: Galenson, *Traders, Planters, and Slaves*, p. 27.

<sup>204</sup> Lovejoy and Richardson, "African Agency and the Liverpool Slave Trade," pp. 50.

Despite their continued interest of the heirs to the RAC in the castle trade, by the 1730s the Liverpool competitors of the Londoners began a shift towards ship trade and joined Dutch efforts to engage on trade on the Loango Coast. Dutch, British, French and Portuguese traders' efforts to establish permanent factors on the Loango Coast were continually frustrated on this stretch of the coast throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Therefore, they resorted to ship board trade and the use of temporary lodges which were abandoned once their cargoes were obtained. Shipboard trade was therefore an example of the institutionalization of trade on the Loango Coast based on a local resistance to permanent European settlement. Barred from establishing permanent settlements, all foreign traders were forced to engage in ship trade.<sup>205</sup>

Mambouks and Mafouks were appointed to represent these institutions. These representatives of trade were not simply brokers as they also engaged in transactions on their own account. Although they, or their proxy, were represented at all transaction, the majority of the Malemba traders engaged in their own negotiation of bundles for slaves. Like the trade at Bonny, strong centralized political communities supported trade at the Loango Coast. The Ngoyo people controlled trade at Malemba. The political representative in charge of trade at Malemba was the Mambouk. Middleburg merchants record 13 transactions with the Mambouk of Malemba during which 36 enslaved Africans were purchased, suggesting that, while this office holder engaged in slave trade at a moderate level, he was not a major supplier.<sup>206</sup> The Mambouk was the supervisor of the Mafouk, who Martin describes as: "the official in charge of the overall management of trade ... he was a royal appointee."<sup>207</sup> In exchange for this office, the Mafouk paid the ruler an initial fee and an agreed upon annual fee from the taxes or 'gifts' collected by the Mafouk as the administrator of international trade. These gifts are recorded in each set of trade books. At the beginning of the trade between Middelburg and Malemba merchants in the 1730s, gifts are recorded as a single payment, often at the end of the slave purchasing, but by the end of the 1780s each trade transaction includes a price that went to the merchant and a 'gift' that went to the markedores, the brokers of the trade. This transition from gifts to a payment for each

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<sup>205</sup> Martin, *The External Trade of the Loango Coast*, p. 94-5.

<sup>206</sup> MCC 456 & 938. See Appendix A.

<sup>207</sup> Martin, *The External Trade of the Loango Coast*, p. 97.

individual slave seems to be the regularization of a taxation on the sale of slaves and seems to replace the informal ‘gifts’ initially offered to the Ngoyo for the privilege of trade.<sup>208</sup> During the 1749 to 1776 period, at least 27 different names of merchants include references to this post of Mafouk. This office holder is listed in connection to 241 transactions, or 7.6 per cent of total transactions. In these 241 transactions, the Mafouks sold a total of 415 slaves.<sup>209</sup> These numbers highlight the persistent presence this representative in Malemba/Middelburg trade negotiations. Other officials of lesser importance in the polities of the Loango Coast included the Mangove, the Manibanse, the Maquimbe, the Manibele, and the Makossa, all of whom are represented to a lesser extent in the Middelburg trading records.<sup>210</sup> All of these positions organized under one political leader indicate a centralized political system similar to what Lovejoy and Richardson describe in Bonny in the same period. (For a more in-depth discussion of political roles on the Loango Coast, see Chapter 4).

Lovejoy and Richardson suggest that the “barter-like exchanges” for slaves which developed on the Sierra Leone and Windward coasts were the result of Europeans settling and integrating into these cultures in combination with minimal political interference. They contrast this model of trade with the shipboard trade in the Bight of Biafra, which is said to be more representative of the larger patterns of trading, where pawns were used to secure credit with either a single or corporate guarantor.<sup>211</sup> The use of shipboard trade in Loango in combination with a “barter-like” exchange system would suggest that there were not two types of local trade arrangements but many different combinations of arrangements. These arrangements had some similarities but also some differences to other areas of the Western African coast. Thus Lovejoy and Richardson’s

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<sup>208</sup> For more information on the role of gifts in negotiating trade and creating mutual obligation see: Marcel Mauss, *The Gift: the Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies* (New York: Norton, 1990); Natalie Zemon Davis, *The Gift in Sixteenth Century France* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); and, Irma Thoen, *Strategic Affection? Gift Exchange in Seventeenth-Century Holland* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2007).

<sup>209</sup> MCC Records: 216, 219, 400, 456, 517, 524, 528, 533, 677, 795, 825, 938, 980, 990, 1019, 1224, 1229, 1286, 1289. For a more detailed description of the process involved in recording and organizing these merchants see Chapter 4.

<sup>210</sup> Martin, *The External Trade of the Loango Coast*, pp. 97-100.

<sup>211</sup> Lovejoy and Richardson, “African Agency and the Liverpool Slave Trade,” p. 59.

assertion that similar conditions arose in Biafra, Loango, and Angola is only partially correct and raises the question: Why did trade expand in Biafra, Loango, and Angola, but not the Windward Coast? Perhaps the centralized organization of the trading systems around one central figure in both Bonny and the Loango Coast may be a stronger correlation in regards to their success in these areas. (This question of centralized leadership is examined further in Chapter 4). Whatever the case, the practice is more complex than Lovejoy and Richardson's categories of trust, authority, and pawnship suggest.

In contrast to Lovejoy and Richardson's theory that claims that Europeans supplied the bulk of credit in the transatlantic slave trade, the MCC data indicates that Malemba traders may have financed their trade internally, as merchants on the Loango Coast had engaged in long-distance trade prior to European contact. The expansion of trade following contact with Europeans led to a more intensive exploitation of preexisting trade routes into the interior. Following a pre-established model, Vansina argues that "outfitting caravans did not involve the provision of credit by European traders to a large extent, but was realized on the profits of earlier expeditions."<sup>212</sup> By the 1750s, this pattern of trade had been modified and refined into the system recorded by the Middelburg merchants.

In order to understand this process, it is helpful to break down the negotiation into stages. In Philip Curtin's discussion of assortment bargaining, he describes a two-step process of exchange: "Bargaining between men who are both buying and selling normally involves two agreements, one on the price of the items being sold and one on the price of those bought in return."<sup>213</sup> The following three levels of information and bargaining power builds on Curtin's understanding of bargaining: first, a Malemba merchant presented a slave to a Middelburg merchant and a price was agreed in the local currency based on the value of a measure of cloth known as a piece. In this step of the process Malemba merchants had an undeniable advantage: their knowledge of the

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<sup>212</sup> Stacey Sommerdyk, "Rivalry on the Loango Coast: A Re-examination of the Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade," in CEAP (ed.) *Trabalho Forçado African* (Lisboa: Campo das Letras, 2009) pp. 55-6; Vansina, *Paths in the Rainforest*, p. 206; and, Martin, *The External Trade of the Loango Coast*, p. 35.

<sup>213</sup> Curtin, *Economic Change in Precolonial Africa*, p. 249.



value of a slave on the local and interior markets. Second, the pieces were exchanged for European goods. At this stage the Malemba and Middelburg merchants were relatively equal: the Middelburg merchant knew the original currency prices of the goods, and the Malemba merchant knew their values in the hinterland of the Loango Coast. The Middelburg merchant's priority would have been to include as many goods of little value in the negotiated "piece" as he could, whereas the Malemba merchant would have been concerned with obtaining objects of greatest value on the internal market. Third and lastly, Middelburg merchants recorded in their ledger the value of goods in Dutch currency; this information was held exclusively by the Middelburg traders. Thus the transactions themselves hold a key to the balance of power in negotiations.

Another key element in the institutionalization of trade on the Loango Coast that is not mentioned in the discussion of trade negotiations above is the regulation of credit. Significantly, the MCC financial records do not offer evidence of Middelburg merchants receiving pawns on the Loango Coast in security for advances of trade goods. Although it is difficult to substantiate claims that pawnship was used regularly in the procurement of slaves on the Loango Coast, Lovejoy and Richardson cite James Fraser's testimony to the British House of Commons as evidence of pawnship on the Loango Coast.<sup>214</sup> The court transcript, which is dated 1790, reads:

Is it the practice at Angola for European ships to take pawns?

It is a practice, and a very bad one. It is the custom at Angola for the traders and inhabitants to pawn their Slaves, their children or relations to procure goods for different purposes – it is sometimes, I believe, the custom with some great men in the country to order some of their friends to order some of their friends, their relations, or families to be sold.<sup>215</sup>

Fraser went on to describe the "evil" of pawnship. Despite his assertions that pawnship was commonly practiced on the Loango Coast, he gave an example of pawnship on the Windward Coast rather than the Angola Coast: "When I was taken by a French man of war on the Windward

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<sup>214</sup> Lovejoy and Richardson, "The Business of Slaving: Pawnship in Western Africa, c. 1600-1810," p. 80.

<sup>215</sup> Sheila Lambert (ed.) "Minutes of Evidence on the Slave Trade 1790, Part I," p. 14-15.

Coast, a Liverpool ship that happened to be taken, had a number of pawns on board.”<sup>216</sup> Thus, Fraser seems to have been offering anecdotal evidence rather than speaking to his own experiences. In an additional question, Fraser was asked about the greater prevalence of pawnship throughout Africa:

Does the account of the pawns you have given relate to the Trade in other parts of Africa, as well as at Angola?

It relates to all parts that I know where the custom of putting pawns on board ships prevails.

Does that custom generally prevail?

It does at Angola and the Windward Coast, to my own knowledge, and I believe in other parts – but seldom at Bonny.

It is worth drawing attention to the fact that he does not link pawnship specifically to slave trading. Furthermore, he suggested that pawnship was rare at the Bonny, at the Bight of Biafra. This is consistent with Lovejoy and Richardson’s findings that credit in Bonny was secured by a centralized government rather than by the exchange of pawns.

When asked to describe the slave trade earlier in his testimony, Fraser described a barter exchange rather than a credit exchange:

In what manner are the Slaves purchased, on the Coast of Angola, by the Europeans?

We commonly have factories on shore, at Melimba [Malemba], Cabenda [Cabinda], and Loango – the people on the Sea Coast act commonly as brokers – they are generally called Linguisters, and receive a commission, which were called Linguisters Wages – the people from the interior parts of the country,

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<sup>216</sup> *Ibid.*

who by their own accounts are sometimes a month, two months, and three month, on their journey down, come to our factories, attended by some of these brokers – our trade with them is a mere barter; we received their Slaves at a price fixed on – they get our goods in return, and sometimes we see them back again, in a month or six weeks, returning with slaves.<sup>217</sup>

A second time the questioner asked Fraser to confirm what he meant by barter:

In what manner is the barter you mentioned between Europeans and the natives conducted?

The natives examine the European goods, and if the quantity and quality is to their satisfaction, and the Slaves to ours, the barter is complete.<sup>218</sup>

This testimony seems to indicate that while pawnship may have been used as a credit mechanism on the Loango Coast, it was not necessarily linked to the transatlantic slave trade. Furthermore, Fraser clearly identified barter as the primary method of acquiring slaves on the Loango Coast. In regards to the factories Fraser refers to at Malemba, Cabinda, and Loango, these most likely refer to temporary lodges set up when a ship arrived and abandoned when it departed. This question is further explored in Chapter 5's discussion of the physical environment of the slave trade.

In the region of Gabon, the trading region to the north, pawnship was commonly practiced, in contrast to the Loango Coast. An 1810 petition to the Portuguese Court protested the illegal seizure of pawns at Gabon for the sale at the Island of Príncipe. In these documents the author, José Baptista Velles, also cited a case of the illegal seizure of pawns at Calabar, which caused a strain on Portuguese-Calabar trading relations.<sup>219</sup> Additionally, K. David Patterson found evidence in a Report of the Lord's Committee, in evidence provided by David Henderson, which referred to

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<sup>217</sup> *Ibid.* p. 9.

<sup>218</sup> *Ibid.* p. 12

<sup>219</sup> Rio de Janeiro, National Archive, XM – 787. My thanks to Judith Spicksley for providing me with a translation of this document.

pawnship as a means of slave procurement on the Gabon Coast.<sup>220</sup> Thus it is clear that while that pawnship was an established mechanism of trade in West Central Africa, it was not a dominant method of exchange. Rather it seems that barter was a more dominant method of slave trade on the Loango Coast in the late eighteenth century.

African traders were important figures in the bartering process in the pattern of trade at the Loango Coast. As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, the majority of slave brokers trading with the MCC seemed to engage in this trade as a side line rather than a primary means of survival. Over the 27 year period of this study, 631 merchants sold 6,819 slaves in 3,154 transactions at Malemba. Merchants conducted an average of five transactions; these transactions averaged two enslaved persons. Thus, merchants sold an average of 10 slaves to the MCC over a 27 year period. While the MCC represented only nine per cent of the slaves boarded in this period, these data give us a better picture of the organization of trade on the Loango Coast in the eighteenth century. Specifically, the average Malemba merchant seems to have made a relatively small investment in the trade: the purchase of one to two slaves in a hinterland market probably in combination with the purchase of other goods such as ivory, copper, and redwood. These enslaved Africans were not only an investment for potential economic gain through resale, they were also sources of labour that could be exploited in local salt, cloth, or agricultural production while awaiting sale. In contrast, by the time Middelburg merchants had reached the Loango Coast, they had made a relatively large investment in terms of both the outfitting of the ship and the voyage from Europe. When they reached the Loango Coast they needed to exchange their goods for enslaved Africans or they faced the loss of investment made on the journey thus far.

As already discussed in this chapter, the office of Mafouk was a marked exception to this pattern of small investment in slaves: Mafouks sold 7.6 per cent of the total enslaved Africans purchased by Middelburg merchants and thus assuming the largest risk in terms of investment. A Mafouk was able to support this significant investment in the slave trade through a position granted by the ruler in combination with substantial personal wealth. A similar pattern emerged on the Loango Coast as a whole between 1730 and 1790, in which a few merchants controlled a quarter of the

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<sup>220</sup> K. David Patterson, *The Northern Gabon Coast to 1875* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975) pp. 35-36.

trade, while the remaining three-quarters were contributed by small merchants.<sup>221</sup> For a more in-depth discussion of the pattern of merchant engagement on the Loango Coast, see Chapter 4.

If the merchants of the Loango Coast used internal financing to outfit slave trading caravans, this form of investment may have limited their ability to expand slave supply to meet the growing demand in the late eighteenth century. Although Lovejoy and Richardson's categorization of trading systems is overly dependent on European credit to the exclusion of other key factors, their explanation of the role of credit in the expansion of the trade is particularly pertinent for the Loango Coast. As a market which seems to have depended heavily upon internal financing, at least in the slave trade, it is possible that the traders of the Loango Coast limited the growth of their slave supply.

In contrast to Lovejoy and Richardson's approach to three categories of trust, authority, and pawnship as exclusive models of trade, this evidence suggests a system of trade evolved on the Loango Coast which included three key elements of organization: barter-based transactions supported by internal financing; ship trade rather than permanent settlement; and trade guaranteed by a centralized Ngoyo government. Thus elements of authority and financing are not exclusive; they can overlap in a number of ways in a number of different contexts. In the case of Malemba, a barter-based system evolved where internal financing allowed the greater independence of Malemba traders from their European counterparts and negated the need for systems of credit. Ship-based trade may have delayed the loading times, as Africans not Europeans controlled the volume of trade, but the absence of permanent settlements also prevented European encroachment on Ngoyo power while simultaneously minimizing maintenance costs for European traders. Finally, a centralized government created the stability and regulation which allowed the trade to flourish without threat of default or trickery, both parties knowing the terms of negotiation are guaranteed by the Mafouk on the one side, as appointees of the local rulers, and the ship captain on the other, as representatives of the MCC. Thus, Western African transatlantic trade relations should not be evaluated only in terms of their relation to European credit but rather in terms of three dimensions: credit vs. barter, fort/castle trade vs. ship trade,

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<sup>221</sup> See Appendix A for raw data.

and centralized vs. autonomous trade. The range of financing, settlement, and authority structures present on the Western African coast, and the multiple possible combinations of these structures highlights the need to understand each Western African port within its own unique context, while at the same time acknowledging the common features which bind them together in the transatlantic slave trade.

### ***Conclusion***

Driven by initial demands for gold and luxury goods, European encounters with African merchants on the western coast of Africa were characterized by an early period of openness and flexibility on the part of the European merchants adapting to new markets. During this period, European merchants modified their mechanisms of trade, which had been developed in the European contexts, to meet the new challenges and demands of sub-Saharan ports. Examples of this negotiation on the Loango Coast show that although European vulnerability diminished over time, African merchants continued to set the terms for trade. The ability of European merchants to adapt to the ebbs and flows of African markets was a key factor in their successful exploitation of first luxury goods in European markets, and later slaves in transatlantic markets.

By focusing on the challenges of long distance trade, this chapter has explored the barriers of trade and the strategies developed between European and Loango Coast merchants to both limit and sustain trade. Here it is argued that the early period of contact in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries involved a cross-fertilization of European and African ideas to create new set of trade mechanisms on the Loango Coast. One strand of the development of trade mechanisms involves the use of medieval institutions such as nations, guilds, and merchant associations in developing Atlantic trading monopolies; followed by the gradual replacement of monopolies with free trade. This adaptation of a European trading strategy involved multiple African factors including the settlement strategies available at different ports, the variations in political environment, and the types of market arrangements negotiated. Through an accumulation of collective knowledge Europeans were able to move beyond the most intense period of cultural/social misunderstandings of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to establish the mutual trust and reciprocity necessary for the success of cross cultural trade in the eighteenth century; however their African counterparts constructed significant barriers to European control. Evidence from the MCC records suggests that the mechanisms of trade on the Loango Coast were

characterized by its barter-based, ship based exchanges and that a greater degree of internal financing was involved in these purchases than has hitherto been suggested by Lovejoy and Richardson. These mechanisms came together to build an “institution” which facilitated trade while insulating the communities of the Loango Coast from absorbing European models of economic and political organization. A Mafouk or Mambouk sat at the pinnacle of this institution as he was responsible for striking a balance between facilitating trade and maintaining these barriers at each Loango port.

# Chapter 3: Maximizing Profit and Minimizing Risk: Transatlantic Shipping and the Loango Coast Slave Trade

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Whereas the discussion up until this point has dealt with the popularity of African ports and the mechanisms involved in providing ships from Europe and the Americas with human cargo, this chapter explores how Europeans calculated the risks and profits of these voyages. It sketches patterns of European trade on the Loango Coast, setting patterns of seasonality and slave procurement against a detailed analysis of the economic transactions of the MCC. In doing so, this chapter will expand upon the themes of merchant communities introduced in the previous chapter, while presenting the theme of knowledge accumulation, particularly focusing on the eighteenth-century experiences of the Dutch on the Loango Coast.

Unlike the bilateral trade between Brazil and Angola, the English, French, and Dutch traders engaged in a triangular shipping route between Europe, West Central Africa, and the Americas to exchange textiles, weapons, and alcohol for African slaves and plantation commodities. As part of the minimizing risk, merchants would have continually calculated and compared seasonal trading patterns, the procurement rates of slaves on the African coast, and slave prices in both Africa and the Americas. This information would have circulated informally in the major European ports which outfitted the slave trading voyages. Shipping companies and investors monitored these fluctuations, as the more efficient the procurement process the faster the ship would return to port, reequip, and embark on another voyage. Efficiency increased the potential profit by reducing the risks of illness and death for both the crew and the cargo.

This chapter explores the broader conclusions of Stephen Behrendt's British Atlantic and Johannes Postma's Dutch studies of seasonality as they pertain to the Loango Coast and contrasts these findings with more specific data collected from the MCC records for the period between 1732 and 1797. Both Behrendt and Postma's studies analyse records that focus on a triangular shipping cycle, and both British and Dutch traders focused their West Central African trading expeditions on the Loango Coast. To achieve these ends, this chapter will be divided into four sections: The first



section will describe the sources and highlight the importance of the Loango Coast to the Middelburg slave supplying venture; the second section will explore the decision-making processes of European traders as they prepared for their voyages in Europe and calculated an optimal time to sail to Africa; the third section will explore questions of profitability and procurement, the durations of the middle passage, and the volumes of slaves available on the Loango Coast, and how these factors influenced how long to stay in Africa and when to sail for the Americas; and finally, the fourth section will provide a detailed analysis of the role of slave prices in decision making.

### **The Sources: The MCC on the Loango Coast**

The Middelburg Commercial Company was a privately owned slaving company which stepped in to fill the gap when the state-assisted West India Company (WIC) failed in the early eighteenth century. Postma asserts: “[The MCC] was undoubtedly the largest of the free-trade slaving companies in the Dutch Republic.”<sup>1</sup> The location of the company in Middelburg was the result of a longstanding commitment to long-distance trade. Located on the south-western coast of the Netherlands, Middelburg was the capital of the province of Zeeland. While Middelburg is better known for its connections with the Dutch East Indian Trading Company (the VOC), Middelburg’s local politics made it a staunch supporter of the Dutch West India Company (WIC) in the seventeenth century. In his major work *Salvador de Sá and the Struggle for Brazil and Angola 1602-1686*, C. R. Boxer describes Zeeland’s tenacious support of the WIC during the Spanish/Dutch war in Brazil:

Holland on her side was anxious for peace, but the province of Zeeland, which was deeply interested in the fate of the West India Company, refused to assent to the ratification of peace with Spain unless the other provinces consented to help the struggling West India Company in Brazil with large supplies of ships, men and money. Accordingly, in August 1647, the States-General resolved to assist the West India Company on a large scale, in return for Zeeland’s assent to

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<sup>1</sup> Postma, *The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade*, p. 123.

peace with Spain, and the dispatch of fifty-three ships and 6,000 men was resolved on.<sup>2</sup>

In addition to their outspoken support of the WIC, the district of Middelburg also supported the Privateering Board of Zeeland which authorized and outfitted various expeditions for the Angolan coast where they attempted, and for some time succeeded in, thwarting Spanish-Portuguese trading efforts.<sup>3</sup> Despite the eventual failure of the WIC, Middelburg merchants reinvented themselves in the eighteenth century in the form of the Middelburg Commerce Company, reflecting the heavy financial support of Middelburg merchants in this venture.<sup>4</sup>

The MCC records, which are currently housed in the Zeeuwse Archief (Zeeland Archives) in Middelburg, have been explored by scholars including W. S. Unger, Johannes Menne Postma, and L. R. Priester.<sup>5</sup> However, these works have primarily focused on transatlantic trade and Dutch trading communities. The MCC records also have significant potential to reveal a greater understanding of African slaving ports. The Voyages Database currently contains a record of 114 voyages of ships owned by the MCC. Of these 114 voyages, the database records 32 voyages which record Loango Coast ports as their primary port for the embarkation of slaves, 26 voyages to the Windward Coast, 24 voyages to either multiple ports or unspecified ports, 23 voyages to the Gold Coast, three to the Bight of Biafra, three to the Bight of Benin, two to Guinea broadly defined, and one to Sierra Leone (see Table 1 below). The Loango Coast thus appears as the single most frequent destination of MCC slaving voyages. For the purposes of this thesis, I will focus on these Loango Coast voyages. Despite the progress in cataloguing these data and the richness of these sources, the MCC records have been underutilized in the study of African history. This thesis will

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<sup>2</sup> C. R. Boxer. *Salvador de Sá and the Struggle for Brazil and Angola 1602-1686*. (London: Athlone Press, University of London, 1952) p. 250.

<sup>3</sup> Boxer, *Salvador de Sá and the Struggle for Brazil and Angola*, p. 284.

<sup>4</sup> James A. Rawley and Stephen D. Behrendt, *The Transatlantic Slave Trade*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005) p. 84.

<sup>5</sup> W. S. Unger, *Het Archief der Middelburgsche Commercie Compagnie*; idem, "Bijdragen tot de genschiedenis van Nederlandse slavenhandel II"; Postma, *The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade*; L. R. Priester, *De Nederlandse houding ten aanzien van de slavenhandel en slavernij, 1596-1863: Het gedrag van de slavenhandelaren van de Commercie Compagnie van Middelburg in de 18e eeuw* (Middelburg : Commissie Regionale Geschiedbeoefening Zeeland, 1987).

address this gap and hereby expand our knowledge of both the Middelburg and Loango Coast merchant communities.

In this chapter, I will engage in a more in-depth analysis of trade on the Loango Coast focusing on the MCC's trade negotiation documents between 1732 and 1796. This time period is defined by the documents themselves, as the first MCC ship arrived on the Loango Coast in 1732 and the last MCC ship departed from the coast in 1796. Of the 32 voyages outfitted by the MCC, significant data have been preserved for 29 voyages. For each of these voyages, between two and eight documents have been preserved. These documents contain hundreds of pages of purchases and sales of materials on the European, African, and South American coasts; journals of anecdotes, sailing coordinates and weather patterns; crew lists and wage tallies; and even occasional packets of letters. Although every document has a story to tell, this chapter focuses on the transaction records between Loango merchants and MCC captains. These data have been sorted and organized into a database which records ships' names, captains' names, the names of African merchants, ports of transaction, days of transaction, numbers of slaves exchanged (men, women, boys, and girls), and values of European goods exchanged. These data represent approximately 30 per cent of MCC ships which engaged in slave trading on the Western African Coast and contain records of approximately 10,000 slaves sold in 5,000 transactions.

*Table 1: Primary Embarkation Regions of MCC Slaving Voyages*

<b>Embarkation Region</b>	<b>Number of Voyages</b>
Loango Coast	32
Windward Coast	26
Other Africa	24
Gold Coast	23
Bight of Biafra and Gulf of Guinea islands	3
Bight of Benin	3
Guinea	2
Sierra Leone	1
<b>Total:</b>	<b>114</b>

Sources: <http://www.slavevoyages.org/tast/database/search.faces> Query: Vessel owners - Middelburgsche, accessed 19 July 2011 and Unger, *Het Archief der MCC*, pp. 30, 45, 81 & 104.

## Decision Making: From Europe to Africa


This section will expand upon the theme of merchant communities, which was introduced in the previous chapter, while developing the theme of knowledge accumulation, particularly focusing on the eighteenth century experiences of the Dutch on the Loango Coast. In contrast to the bilateral alcohol-slave trading cycle which came to dominate the Angola-Brazil slave trade, the English, French, and Dutch traders engaged in a triangular shipping route loading trade goods in Europe, slaves on the Loango Coast, and plantation commodities in the Americas. This section tests Behrendt and Postma's findings about shipping patterns in the transatlantic slave trade against the MCC evidence on the Loango Coast between 1732 and 1797. In doing so, it begins to trace the decision making process in leaving Europe and approaching the African coast.

Using the data from the Voyages Database, it is possible to track the arrival of the majority of slaving voyages on the Loango Coast. Focusing on the period of MCC trade on the Loango Coast, 1730 to 1795, Graph 1 (below) tracks the arrival of 816 known voyages to the Loango Coast for the purpose of procuring slaves, which means an average of 12 ships per year.<sup>6</sup> While this graph shows constant engagement of Europeans on the coast at a rate of 5 to 20 ships arriving on the coast, four periods of particularly sparse trade and six periods of particularly dense trade emerge. These four periods of sparse trade include 1734 to 1736, 1746 to 1747, 1757, and 1779 to 1782. During these periods, fewer than five slave trading ships were present on the coast in any one year. The six periods of particularly dense trade occurred in 1749, 1764 to 1768, 1770, 1772 to 1774, 1777, and 1784. During each of these 12 years more than 20 ships arrived on the Loango Coast in search of enslaved Africans. While internal supply and competition among other African ports played parts in these fluctuations, European events also played their role.

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<sup>6</sup> In his description of the methods used to establish the period in which a slave voyage traded in Africa, David Eltis explains that when hard evidence was insufficient, the Voyages Database includes an estimate: "There are also imputed variables for both voyage dates and on numbers of captives. Because most slaving voyages lasted for many months or even years, and no voyages have complete information for all ten date variables, we have created three definitions of "year" in the full downloadable database from which users can choose for purposes of analysis: the year in which the voyage originated, the year of embarkation of slaves, or the year of arrival at point of disembarkation. In the Voyages Database only "YEARAM" or "year of arrival" is provided. We created imputed year values when the sources did not record the years when voyages departed their homeport, or departed the African coast, or the year when vessels arrived in the Americas." David Eltis, "Construction of the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database: Sources and Methods" in (Emory University, 2010), available at <http://www.slavevoyages.org/tast/database/methodology-10.faces> Accessed 24 July 2011.

Graph 1: Number of Slaving Ships Arriving on the Loango Coast, 1730 to 1795



Source: <http://www.slavevoyages.org/tast/database/search.faces> Query - Principal place of slave purchase: Cabinda, Congo North, Congo River, Rio Zaire, Kilongo, Loango, Malembo, Mayumba, and Mpinda Accessed: 12 March 2010.

In Behrendt's analysis of sailing hazards during wartime he calculates that British ships were at the greatest risk of capture during the following periods: 1689 to 1697, 1744 to 1745, 1777 to 1782, and 1793 to 1794.<sup>1</sup> These periods of unrest on the sea increased the risk of an unsuccessful trading voyage while simultaneously triggering lenders to tighten the restrictions on credit, particularly between 1778 and 1779, and again in 1793. Presumably, this also resulted in higher premiums among insurers or an unwillingness to extend insurance altogether. These periods of pronounced shipping risks correspond to two periods of sparse trade on the Loango Coast: between 1746 and 1747, and between 1779 and 1782 (which overlaps with the Anglo Dutch War 1780-1782). Significantly, 1777 stands out as a year of particularly dense trade despite Behrendt's suggestion of pronounced hazards. This delayed response to shipping hazards in 1777 could be explained in part by the possibility that numerous ships had set sail before word of increased hazards reached British ports.

However, Behrendt's analysis of European wartime threats does not address the diminished trade on the Loango Coast between 1734 and 1736 and in 1757. Equally, Phyllis Martin's work on the Loango Coast fails to shed light on the 1734 to 1736 reduction. However, 1734 to 1736 is the very period in which the MCC began trade on the Loango Coast – presumably due to the lack of competition. For 1757 we have a more comprehensive picture. Interestingly, while the Seven Years War (1756-1763) may account for the spike in slaving voyages between 1764 and 1777 to make up for the preceding gap, the only year significantly affected by the war was 1757, when no ships arrived on the Loango Coast. For the remainder of the war, between 5 and 12 ships arrived on the Loango Coast per year. In addition to the conflicts in Europe during this period, 1757 was a significant year on the Loango Coast itself. Phyllis Martin reported that in the 1750s two French warships were dispatched for Cabinda: "From there they sailed northwards to Malemba, Loango Bay, and Mayumba, attacking rival ships en route. When they arrived off the Loango Coast in March 1757, the French succeeded in clearing the area of Dutch and English traders."<sup>2</sup> Thus the French seemed to have extended the Seven Years War in Europe to the Loango Coast by attempting to forcefully secure a monopoly by dispatching two warships.

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<sup>1</sup> Stephen D. Behrendt, "Markets, Transition Cycles, and Profits: Merchant Decision Making in the British Slave Trade," *The William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd Ser., Vol. 58, No. 1, New Perspectives on the Transatlantic Slave Trade. (Jan., 2001) p. 173.

<sup>2</sup> Martin, *The External Trade of the Loango Coast*, pp. 84-85.


At the other end of the spectrum, 1764 to 1777 marks the period of heaviest concentration of ships trading on the Loango Coast in the eighteenth century, with additional but unsustainable peaks in 1749 and 1784. While the latter might be explained in part by the ending of the high risk shipping periods of 1746-1747 and 1779-1782, the former may be linked to events on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean. Behrendt suggested the demand for slaves in the Americas increased with the emergence of a more liberal credit system. Demand for slaves in the Americas was highest for the following periods, in which planters had the greatest access to credit: post 1763 in Grenada, Dominica, and St. Vincent; Jamaica and other possessions post 1792.<sup>3</sup> This surge in the availability of credit significantly increased demand for slaves in the Americas. This increased demand for slaves, post 1763, corresponds directly with the 1764 to 1777 boom in trading on the Loango Coast. Thus, it might be concluded that a significant rise in the extension of credit to plantation owners in the Americas had a significant impact on the volume of trade on the Loango Coast, which was tempered only by the Anglo Dutch War of the early 1780s. Nevertheless, this boom in trade could not have occurred without the mechanisms of coordination and supply which had developed on the Loango Coast. (These mechanisms will be further discussed in Chapters 4 & 5.) It is important to note that the 1764 boom was not limited to the Loango Coast but appeared throughout Western Africa. However, the Loango Coast was particularly successful in responding to this boom, as will be argued below.

European merchants were required to balance these issues of risk and demand in order to make a profit. While the discussion above has focused on the fluctuations over the years, it will now turn to the fluctuations of trade in a 12 month cycle. The MCC records include much of the details necessary to fill in this picture. While the data discussed above included estimates on when ships arrived on the Loango Coast calculated from their departure dates, the data in the MCC records are more precise, giving the month of arrival for 28 voyages and details of the time spent on the Loango Coast for 26 of these voyages. Graph 2, below, traces the data for these 28 voyages to the Loango Coast. Although this dataset is small, it clearly shows a bimodal pattern in trade on the Loango Coast: The first peak, from December to April, was in March and represents 13 voyages; the second peak, between July and October, centers in September and represents 14 voyages. During the months of May, June, and November, no MCC ships landed on the coast.

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<sup>3</sup> Behrendt, "Markets, Transaction Cycles, and Profits" p. 174.

Graph 2: Arrival of MCC Ships on the Loango Coast by Month



Source: MCC 216, 219, 335, 400, 410, 456, 488, 517, 524, 528, 533, 575, 677, 795, 825, 932, 938, 980, 985, 990, 1009, 1013, 1019, 1106, 1224, 1229, 1286, 1289, & 1308. See Appendix A.

These patterns suggest that the MCC merchant calculated the risks of when to leave Europe in hope of arriving in Africa at optimal trading periods. These calculations involved knowing when to hire a crew and when to hire and provision a ship. Behrendt calculates that late European summer to early autumn was the optimal period to hire sailors and skilled workers for a voyage, as it was a down period for other British shipping interests. Thus ships were in greatest supply between July and September. Slightly more complicated was the procedure of obtaining a ship and outfitting it with provisions and trade goods: lumber was in greatest supply June through November; rice was imported between November and May; textiles were in short supply in the winter months; and pulses were harvested twice a year: April/May and August/September.<sup>4</sup> Behrendt comes to the conclusion that June through September was the optimal time for outfitting a slaving voyage in England.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Behrendt, "Markets, Transaction Cycles, and Profits", pp. 176-80.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 181.



Once a ship was outfitted and the weather allowed, the ship would set sail for Africa. Using data for 90 MCC voyages to the Western African Coast, Johannes Postma calculated that MCC voyages took as little as one month and as long as 11 months to reach their African destinations, while the average voyage took 76 days.<sup>6</sup> Using the 27 MCC voyages with sufficient data, I have calculated a voyage from Middelburg to the Loango Coast took between two and nine months, with the average ship taking 4.7 months. The modal, or most frequent, timing for a voyage was even less, at four months.<sup>7</sup> As one might expect for the slave trading region farthest from Europe, MCC voyages to the Loango Coast took slightly longer than the average 2.5 months calculated by Postma. The variations in shipping times show that although European merchants might have a preference for when they might aim to arrive on the Loango Coast, weather, currents, conflicts, and accidents could intervene to slow down the voyage.

Interestingly, Behrendt suggests that the prime time for outfitting a ship with enough food for a slaving voyage in England corresponds with the English pulse harvest in April/May. Given the proximity to the Netherlands, we can assume a similar crop cycle. Equally, he suggests that Loango Coast did not produce foodstuffs for export. It is also possible that local conditions, for example the use of foodstuffs to manipulate the departure of ships, may have discouraged Europeans from purchasing food on this coast. Whatever the case, ships bound for Loango tended to provision in Europe. If a ship were outfitted with foodstuffs in the North Sea in April/May, it could reasonably expect to reach the Loango Coast in August/September. This correlation may partially explain the disproportionate number of ships arriving on the Loango Coast in September and the resulting high numbers engaging in trade in October.

Calculating seasonality in Western Africa was not as clearly defined. Behrendt highlights two African regions with coordinated “seasonal slaving and provisions networks” in Sierra Leone and the Bight of Biafra. In both regions, Behrendt provides evidence of local efforts to coordinate supplies of slaves reaching the coast with local harvest seasons. The key seasons of supply for Sierra Leone fell between October and March, and again in July, whereas the slave supply in the

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<sup>6</sup> Postma, *The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade*, p. 152.

<sup>7</sup> The data for this calculation were derived from the following documents: MCC 215-223, 333-337, 398-403, 410-413, 455-460, 516-536, 574-578, 793-799, 823-829, 929-942, 978-983, 984-993, 1009-1022, 1103-1110, 1222-1233, 1286-1292, 1307-1311.

Bight of Biafra and the availability of slaves peaked between August and October at the same time as yams were in ample supply. In contrast, Behrendt argues that the Loango Coast, which he refers to as “the coastal areas north of Luanda where the Britons traded”, produced foodstuffs for domestic consumption only or made it difficult for Europeans to purchase foodstuffs, and therefore the supply of slaves need not be coordinated to harvest times. He goes on to suggest that the trade on the Loango Coast had no distinct pattern, allowing the British greater flexibility in timing their arrivals. It is also possible that the lack of British strategy in determining when they should arrive on the coast meant that local traders had to be perpetually prepared for trade. The success of Loango Coast merchants in procuring slaves is evident in Behendt’s conclusions. He lists Anomabu, Whydah, Bonny, Old Calabar, Loango, and Malemba (the latter two both ports of the Loango Coast) as “the more efficient [slave] markets” of the transatlantic slave trade based on provisioning cycles and shipping times. Still, Behrendt highlights the success of the British on the Loango Coast, particularly between 1791 and 1794, as owing to the retirement of the Dutch from the trade and the French preoccupation with revolutions in France and St. Domingue.<sup>8</sup> Thus, he concludes it was the lack of competition more than the convenient supply of slaves which drew the British to the Loango Coast at that moment.


Graph 3 below shows the numbers of MCC ships present on the Loango Coast in a given month. The data peak twice, first in April, recording 16 voyages trading through April and second, and more significantly, in October recording 19 voyages lasting through the month of October. Thus, October was the most popular month for MCC trade on the Loango Coast, representing almost 10 per cent of stays on the coast. This pattern of increased trade in July through November was not confined to the Loango Coast. It is also reflected in Herbert Klein’s study of Portuguese trade on the Angola Coast, which includes data from 549 ships in an overlapping time period: 1723 to 1771.<sup>9</sup> Despite the distinct nature of the Loango and Angola Coast as trading regions, their proximity meant that they shared similar environmental factors in provisioning the slave trade. The similarity between Klein’s findings for trade in Angola with the MCC records for the Loango Coast suggests that these environmental factors were important in provisioning slaves.

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<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 184, 186-188, 191.


<sup>9</sup> Klein, “The Portuguese Slave Trade from Angola in the Eighteenth Century,” pp. 894-918.

Graph 3: Number of MCC Ships Present on the Loango Coast, by Months



Source: MCC 216, 219, 335, 400, 410, 456, 488, 517, 524, 528, 533, 575, 677, 795, 825, 932, 938, 980, 985, 990, 1009, 1013, 1019, 1106, 1224, 1229, 1286, 1289 & 1308.

Graph 4: Numbers of MCC Slaves Purchased, by Months



Source: MCC 216, 286, 335, 400, 410, 456, 488, 517, 524, 528, 533, 575, 677, 795, 825, 932, 938, 980, 985, 990, 1009, 1013, 1019, 1106, 1224, 1229, 1289, 1308.

September/October was the beginning of the rainy season on the Loango Coast that lasted well into April.<sup>10</sup> Richard Steckel and Richard Jensen's analysis of slave mortality in the transatlantic slave trade indicated that the rainy season was at its height in the Congo area between December and February. During this period crews and slaves were at the highest risk of deaths from gastrointestinal diseases and malaria.<sup>11</sup> The link between the rainy season and illness may partially explain the slight reduction of ships trading on the coast in these months, as exhibited in Graphs 2 and 3.

Regardless of season, Postma found WIC reports which noted that fresh water was easily obtained on the Loango Coast, "in contrast to the Gold Coast and the Slave Coast, where it was often difficult to obtain water."<sup>12</sup> Thus the procurement of fresh water would not have impacted the decision-making process involved in European shipping on the Loango Coast. Despite these potential explanations for the ebbs and flows of trade in this region, it is important to note that Middleburg merchants arrived on the coast in most months and traded in all months of the year, reflecting the relatively steady supply of slaves to Loango Coast markets. In addition to these local factors, pull factors in the Americas, such as avoiding the hurricane season and arriving during high demand for labour, would have influenced the departure time of the ships.

Graph 4, above, sorts the numbers of slaves purchased by the MCC by month. While highlighting the sales of slaves throughout the year, it identifies October and November as months of greatest supply. While this pattern can be partially explained by the greater concentration of ships on the coast during this period, as detailed in Graph 5 above, the October ratio of 19 ships to 1,326 slaves purchased shows a significantly higher rate of procurement than April, when 16 ships purchased 557 slaves. Although these data are collected from a fairly small sample (28) of all (816) of the ships trading on the Loango Coast between 1730 and 1795, they suggest that MCC merchants procured slaves at a faster rate in October and November. Table 2, below, calculates the speed with which ships procured cargoes of slaves depending on when they arrived. It calculates that while an average ship procured a cargo in 5.3 months, ships arriving in October might procure a

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<sup>10</sup> Miller, *Way of Death*, p. 14.

<sup>11</sup> Richard H. Steckel and Richard A. Jensen, "New Evidence on the Causes of Slave and Crew Mortality in the Atlantic Slave Trade," *Journal of Economic History*, vol. 46, no. 1, (Mar. 1986) pp. 55-77.

<sup>12</sup> Postma, *The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade*, p. 158.

cargo within 2.5 months. (The difference between these calculations and Postma's calculations will be discussed below.) Given the large percentage of MCC ships arriving on the coast between August and September, it is possible that MCC merchants calculated the advantage of greater supplies and aimed to arrive on the coast during this period and achieve this objective with relative success. However, the MCC shipping data presents a very small number of the total ships present on the Loango Coast in the eighteenth century. Further research into shipping data from other Dutch, French and/or English ships is required to verify whether this pattern was confined to MCC ships or whether it had broader application.

*Table 2: Procurement Times of MCC Ships on the Loango Coast*

Month	Number of Arrivals	Total Months Present	Average <sup>13</sup> Months Present
Jan	1	10	10.0
Feb	3	17	5.7
Mar	5	32	6.4
Apr	1	7	7.0
May	0		
Jun	0		
Jul	3	20	6.7
Aug	5	30	6.0
Sep	4	25	6.3
Oct	2	7	3.5
Nov	0		
Dec	2	11	5.5
	26	159	6.1

Source: MCC 216, 286, 335, 400, 410, 456, 488, 517, 524, 528, 533, 575, 677, 795, 825, 932, 938, 980, 985, 990, 1009, 1013, 1019, 1106, 1224, 1229, 1289, 1308.

## **Decision Making: From Africa to the Americas**

Just as an expectation of high availability of slaves might have attracted ships to a port in a certain period, the expectation of diminishing slave availability could have motivated a captain to set sail

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<sup>13</sup> This is a measure of how many months a ship was present rather than how many 30-day periods therefore the first and last month are both counted.

for the Americas. Slave mortality was another factor in evaluating when to leave the African Coast. This section will examine the Loango Coast's broader trends of mortality and procurement and how those factors influenced the decision making process of European slave merchants.

Postma notes that turn-around times for WIC slave ships ranged from 11 days (on the Slave Coast) to 8 months (on the Loango Coast). Using a dataset of 125 ships, he estimates the average Dutch ship spent 128 days or 4.3 months on the Western African coast procuring slaves (see Table 3 below).<sup>14</sup> In a similar study of British slaving voyages, Galenson concludes: "An African stay of four months was usually calculated to obtain a cargo of slaves; among 36 voyages made on behalf of the Royal African Company during 1719-25, the shortest stay in Africa was 33 days, the longest was 9.5 months, and the median stay was just under 3.5 months."<sup>15</sup> Returning to Table 3, Postma calculates that the MCC ships travelling to the Loango Coast (all of the ships being directed to Central Africa north of the Congo River) had a substantially faster average loading rate than their counterparts on the West African Coast. My calculations above (see Table 2) differ slightly from Postma's figures. Whereas Postma suggests an MCC ship could load a cargo of slaves in an average of 4.8 months, my figures show that loading a cargo of slaves took closer to 5.3 months. This small discrepancy can be explained by noting that Postma used a sample of 13 MCC voyages to calculate his figure, whereas my calculations included data for 26 voyages, making use of data from the log books when the data in the financial records were insufficient. Nevertheless, this figure still remains well below the 7.2 months which it took to load a cargo of slaves on the West African coast.

The merchants of the Loango Coast were able to maintain this speed of embarkation while procuring cargoes of at least 100 more enslaved Africans per voyage than their counterparts to the north. The data from the WIC and the Royal Africa Company (hereafter the RAC) both reflect faster loading times of almost 1.5 months on the Loango Coast, particularly in the earlier period of trade; however these faster loading times are more of a reflection on the small numbers of ships arriving on the Western African Coast in the earlier period rather than a diminished capacity of African traders to procure enslaved Africans. Indeed, by returning to Graph 1, we can see that the numbers of ships on the Loango Coast increased dramatically in the second half of the eighteenth

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<sup>14</sup> Postma, *The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade*, p. 142.

<sup>15</sup> David W. Galenson, *Traders, planters, and slaves: market behavior in early English America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) p. 26.

century, as was the case throughout Western Africa. This pattern of increased presence on the Loango Coast is equally reflected in the increase of MCC voyages (see Appendix A). The increasing number of European ships arriving resulted in the procurement rates increasing dramatically, though not quite as quickly as the demand. During this period of increased demand, we see a decrease in loading speeds throughout the Western Coast of Africa. Nevertheless, Dutch ships still procured slaves faster on the Loango Coast than in West Africa.

*Table 3: Procurement Efficiency in the Dutch Trade*

<b>Period</b>	<b>Carrier</b>	<b>Sample</b>	<b>Average per Ship</b>	<b>Days in Africa</b>	<b>Loaded per Day</b>
<b>1687-1735</b>	<b>WIC</b>	19	436	90.4	4.8
<b>1700-1734</b>	<b>WIC</b>	49	397	93.4	4.3
<b>1732-1802</b>	<b>MCC (Central Africa)</b>	13	361	143	2.5
	<b>MCC (West Africa)</b>	42	256	217	1.2
	<b>MCC (All)</b>	57	284	200	1.4
<b>Total</b>		125	372	128	2.9

Source: Figures from Postma, *The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade*, p. 142.

The length of time spent in procuring slaves was of importance to European merchants as time passing increased mortality and decreased profits. Furthermore, the length of the middle passage and related slave deaths would have been key considerations to profit margins. To this end, Postma argues:

The significance of the duration of the middle passage is further illustrated by the discrepancy in mortality rates between consignments obtained on the Guinea coast compared to those from the Loango region. The latter showed consistently lower death rates, both in the WIC and in the free trade, although Loango is farther from the Caribbean than Guinea... the western winds and currents along the Guinea Coast made it necessary for ships to sail east and south to Cape Lopez (above Loango) before they could pick up the eastern winds suitable for the Atlantic crossing. These ships had to cross the equator

twice with their cargo of slaves, thus lengthening their crossing by an average of several weeks at least.<sup>16</sup>

As a result, the average “Dutch slavers carrying a slave cargo from the Loango-Angola region registered considerably shorter middle passage durations than their counterparts from the Guinea coast. WIC slavers averaged fifty and free traders forty-seven days for the crossing from Loango, compared with eighty-one and seventy-one days, respectively, for overall averages for the middle passage.”<sup>17</sup> Postma demonstrates, as we can see in Table 3, “that slave ships sailing from Loango, compared to the Guinea coast, had lower mortality rates but also significantly larger slave consignments.”<sup>18</sup> This analysis concurs with Postma’s findings that fast procurement, short middle passages, and large cargoes contributed to the success of the Loango region as a major source in of slaves for the transatlantic market.<sup>19</sup>

Having obtained their supply of enslaved Africans, captains had two major concerns when approaching markets in the Americas: first and foremost, captains sought to avoid hurricane season which peaked in late August early September, and second, captains aimed to land when slaves were in the greatest demand. The latter was defined by crop seasons: Caribbean sugar plantations required large amounts of unskilled labour between November and May; North American tobacco reached its most labour intensive between April and May and again in August and September; North American rice required intensive labour from April to October. Caribbean sugar would be most relevant to predicting trading cycles from the Loango Coast, as Behrendt notes that the majority of enslaved Africans embarked by the British in West Central Africa disembarked in Jamaica.<sup>20</sup> The importance of the sugar season is confirmed by the MCC records

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<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 253.

<sup>17</sup> Postma, *The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade*, p. 163.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 255.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 276.

<sup>20</sup> Behrendt, “Markets, Transaction Cycles, and Profits”, pp. 192, 195.



which list St. Martin, St. Eustatius, Suriname, Paramaribo, Curacao, Demerara, and Essequibo as the destinations of slaves from the Loango Coast.<sup>21</sup>

Using these criteria, Behrendt calculates that the optimal British slave shipping cycle involved an early summer departure to purchase slaves in Africa during the October harvest, which coincided with the best availability of enslaved Africans. If the ship stayed on its course and African transactions went smoothly, it would arrive in the Caribbean or North America during the sugar season between November and May, avoiding the hurricane season between August and September, and return to England in the following Spring to restart the cycle. However, many elements of risk were involved in this calculation, including travel time and adequate supplies. Additionally, loading, negotiating, and selling periods were dependent on cycles of supply and demand in three locations. Should one of these elements throw off the schedule, the next cycle had to be recalculated. If British captains left England at a less optimal time, they were likely to avoid ports which had a seasonal pattern of supply and sail for regions such as West Central Africa which had a consistent supply of slaves throughout the year, or at least a consistently unpredictable supply.<sup>22</sup> This study shows that Middelburg merchants chose an early summer departure for West Central Africa slightly more than any other time of year. This preference of the Loango Coast over West Africa will be discussed further below.

These seasonal patterns, in addition to qualifying factors of political instability in Europe, piracy on the high seas, fluctuating slave prices, and commodity demand in Western Africa, were keys to the development of merchant strategies in Europe and Brazil. Even seasonal patterns shifted over long time horizons and merchants' strategies evolved as they gained more information in newspapers, customs documents, and by word of mouth.<sup>23</sup> Behrendt suggests that it was the British merchants' ability to coordinate their shipping routines to optimal schedules, their ability to predict ebbs and flows in African trade in multiple markets, and their flexibility to adapt to the demands of the trade which allowed the British to dominate the transatlantic slave trade at the peak of its expansion. The growing success of the British may have been one of the factors in the decline of

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<sup>21</sup> MCC 410, 524, 680, 795, 980, 985, 990, 1224, 1230, 1289 & 1311.

<sup>22</sup> Behrendt, "Markets, Transaction Cycles, and Profits", pp. 197-98.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 198.

the Dutch on the Loango Coast in the 1780s and its eventual death in 1796 during the Napoleonic Wars.

### **Slave Sex and Age in the Price Data on the Loango Coast**

Beyond calculating the optimal time to buy captives and to sail for the Americas, captains also had to grapple with the question of which American market to choose. In addition to providing faster loading rates and a shorter middle passage, Postma suggests: “Slaves from the Loango-Angola coast and the Bight of Biafra were generally purchased at lower prices than the slaves from the Guinea coast ... the consignments from Loango produced prices on average 20 per cent less per slave.”<sup>24</sup> Graph 7, below, traces the patterns of slave prices on the Loango Coast. The dark grey line represents data from the *Voyages Database* on fluctuations in prices for slaves originating on the Loango Coast. These values are defined in the database as the “average price of slaves standardized on sterling cash price of prime slaves sold in Jamaica”.<sup>25</sup> These figures show the prices of slaves remaining fairly steady from 1681 to 1750, fluctuating between 17.5 and 26.9 pounds sterling. In the 1751 to 1755 period, the price of Loango Coast slaves rose to 35.1 pounds sterling, followed by a minor correction in slave prices between 1756 and 1765 and a significant jump in the 1766-1770 to an average of 45.4 pounds sterling per slave. From this point, slave prices rose steadily until 1786-1790, when the value of a Loango Coast slave peaked at 77.9 pounds sterling. For the last three periods, 1791-1805, prices remained steady at 71 to 72 pounds sterling per slave. Whereas the *Voyages* price data have been collected in the Americas, the MCC price data have been collected from the African transactions.

Without comparative data, it is difficult to tell how representative the MCC price data is of the broader slave trade on the Loango Coast between 1746 and 1776. The MCC data were derived from 29 voyages during which over 10,000 slaves were purchased. However, the sample size for prices is limited to the 3,263 transactions in which slaves of a single category, man, woman, boy, or girl, are represented. In the remaining transactions include a combination of two or more categories of slaves (man, woman, boy, and girl) within a single transaction, which does not allow

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<sup>24</sup> Postma, *The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade*, p. 267.

<sup>25</sup> *The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database SPSS Codebook: Expanded Dataset*, 2010 edition. Available at: <http://slavevoyages.org/downloads/Codebook2010.pdf> P. 32. Accessed 27 June 2011.


a separate costing based on gender or age categories. In these transactions, the value is expressed in the Loango Coast currency of account, the “piece”.<sup>26</sup> Thus in Graph 5 below, two slave prices are expressed, in two currencies: the piece and the sterling pound. Slave prices have been calculated here, not on the nominal price of a prime male, but on the average of all slaves: men, women, boys, and girls. However, for the purposes of this study it is the trend in slave prices rather than the values of slaves which is of importance. The fluctuating difference in prices is represented in how many points exist between the two measures. This highlights the divergence and convergence in prices. Although the MCC data are fragmented, they follow the general trend of the numbers from the *Voyages Database*. In the earliest period, 1731 to 1735, the prices are only 4.4 points apart. Between 1746 and 1765, the difference between these sets of numbers remains almost constant, ranging between 7 and 11 points. However, in the 1766 to 1770 period the rise in prices recorded by the MCC is far sharper than the increase reflected in the *Voyages Database*, as the gap doubles to 20 points. Between 1771 and 1775 both sets of prices continue to increase, but with a diminished gap of 16 points. By the 1776-1780 period they have recovered to differences more consistent with the 1731 to 1735 period, being only five points apart. The overall pattern which emerges is that slave values on the Loango Coast remained fairly stable until the 1751 to 1760 period when there was an initial peak. This peak is followed by a slight reduction in prices in the late 1750s and a steady increase in slave prices until 1790. The MCC data parallel the price data for the Americas. This strong relationship between African and American prices suggests European traders may have been more willing to pay higher prices in Africa when they anticipated higher profits in the Americas. Alternatively phrased, Europeans were likely to have outfitted more ships when they judged demand to be highest in the Americas.

Given the length of the period covered by this data, inflation must be taken into consideration in calculating the extent of value increase in a slave. According to an online calculator, available at <http://www.measureingworth.com>, which has been set up by Economics Professors Lawrence H. Officer and Samuel H. Williams of the University of Illinois at Chicago, the best way to index the fluctuating value of an unskilled labourer is by using a “historical standard of living” index. This index measures “the purchasing power of an income or wealth in its relative ability to purchase a

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<sup>26</sup> For a more detailed discussion of currency on the Loango Coast see Chapter 5.

Graph 5: Prices of Slaves Originating on the Loango Coast



Sources: The data combine two sources: <http://www.slavevoyages.org/tast/database/search.faces> Query – Principal place of slave purchase: Boary, Cabinda, Congo North, Congo River (Rio Zaire), Loango, Malembo, Mayumba; Table Function – Rows: 5-year period; Columns: Embarkation Ports; Cells: Sterling cash prices in Jamaica. And a database compiled from MCC records 216, 219, 335, 400, 410, 456, 488, 517, 524, 528, 533, 575, 677, 795, 825, 932, 938, 980, 985, 990, 1009, 1013, 1019, 1106, 1224, 1229, 1286, 1289 & 1308. See Appendix B for a more details on these slave prices.

(fixed over time) bundle of goods and services.”<sup>27</sup> Using this index, a slave costing £18 in 1681 (at the low point of slave prices) would have been worth a bundle of goods to the values of £18 in 1681 and £21 16s in 1786. However, according to the Voyages data, an average male slave from the Loango Coast was worth an average of £78 by 1786, at the peak of slave prices. According to the same measure, the 1786 value of £78 was worth £64 in 1681. This is a difference of £46 in 1681 values. Thus when indexed according to a historical standard of living, the cost of one slave in 1786, at the peak of slave prices, was equivalent to the cost of approximately three slaves in

<sup>27</sup> Measuring Wealth Online Calculator available at <http://www.measuringworth.com>. Accessed on 1 May 2012.

1681 at the lowest slave price. Unfortunately, the lack of information to index the Loango Piece to a historical standard of living prevents a similar calculation for the second set of data. However, fluctuations in inflation may account for the slight deviations between these data sets. Thus, this comparison is most useful to show a broader trend in the common trajectory of slaves purchased in at the Loango Coast, and the Loango Coast slave sale prices in the Americas.

In the past 30 years, discussions over the relative significance of gender and age have dominated historical inquiries into fluctuations of slave prices in the Atlantic World. While Johannes Postma has provided the most comprehensive analysis of the Dutch data on slave prices available for the Loango Coast, no one has done a more in-depth analysis into gender and age categories.<sup>28</sup> This chapter begins to address this deficiency in the literature. Broader studies on the gender patterns of slave cargos include David Eltis and Stanley Engerman's 1992 article "Was the Slave Trade Dominated by Men" and G. Ugo Nwokeji's article on "African Conceptions of Gender and the Slave Traffic." Both studies have sought to explain the preponderance of male slaves in the transatlantic market. Eltis and Engerman have suggested: "The desires of planters in the Americas and those of the power elites in Africa ... dovetail in a preference for male slaves."<sup>29</sup> Nwokeji concurred with this position, arguing: "Planters forced black men and women alike into labor in the fields, and the price differential between males and females was generally much lower in the Americas than in Africa."<sup>30</sup> Nwokeji goes on to suggest that within African cultures there was a premium on the value of female slaves, and therefore women were retained in the internal market and men were funnelled into the external market.<sup>31</sup> If Atlantic markets showed a clear preference for male slaves, as Eltis and Engerman have suggested, one might expect to find consistently higher prices paid for male slaves in African ports. However, the discussion below indicates that the differences

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<sup>28</sup> Postma, *The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade*, pp. 264-269, also see Appendix B.

<sup>29</sup> David Eltis and Stanley L. Engerman, "Was the Slave Trade Dominated by Men?" *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Autumn, 1992), p. 238.

<sup>30</sup> G. Ugo Nwokeji, "African Conceptions of Gender and the Slave Traffic," *The William and Mary Quarterly*, Third Series, Vol. 58, No. 1, New Perspectives on the Transatlantic Slave Trade (Jan., 2001) p. 47.

<sup>31</sup> See: Nwokeji, "African Conceptions of Gender and the Slave Traffic"; and, Paul E. Lovejoy and David Richardson, "Competing Markets for Male and Female Slaves: Prices in the Interior of West Africa, 1780-1850," *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 28, 2 (1995), pp. 261-293.

in male and female slave prices on the Loango Coast were more representative of the patterns which Nwokeji has described for the Americas.

Furthermore, Paul Lovejoy has argued that non-economic considerations also may have impacted gender ratios of slaves entering the transatlantic slave trade through Muslim trading networks. While Muslim ethics would not have had an impact on West Central African trading patterns during the transatlantic slave trade, it is possible that other non-economic factors still impacted who was and was not be sold.<sup>32</sup> Calculations from the Voyages Database on gender ratios for the Loango Coast indicate that a slightly smaller percentage of females embarked on slave trading ships than in the broader transatlantic trade. Whereas transatlantic voyages average 35.4 per cent female slaves, the Loango Coast averaged 31.2 per cent female slaves. Additionally, the Loango Coast exported a high percentage of children, 28.7 per cent, compared to the overall average of 20.9 per cent.<sup>33</sup> However, MCC sales of 10,069 slaves suggest a different pattern between 1732 and 1797, when women made up 37.3 per cent of slaves boarded and children accounted for 28.5 per cent.<sup>34</sup> Although the percentages of children in the MCC data match those calculated from the Voyages Database, the percentage of female slaves is seven per cent higher, indicating that MCC ships loaded larger percentages of women than both the averages for the Loango Coast and the transatlantic slave trade as a whole. This seems to indicate that the MCC had a weak bargaining position on the Loango Coast, as female slaves were generally less profitable in the Americas. However, a more in-depth study of MCC profit margins on female slaves in the transatlantic slave trade could suggest other factors in this make up of slaving cargoes.

Graph 6, below, shows the differences between the costs of men, women, boys, and girls on the Loango Coast. In analysing these data, it is important to note that the years on the horizontal axis do not proceed with a consistent scale as the data are intermittent. Two basic patterns emerge:

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<sup>32</sup> Paul E. Lovejoy, "Internal Markets or an Atlantic-Sahara Divide?" in Gwyn Campbell, Suzanne Miers, and Joseph C. Miller (eds.) *Women and Slavery: Africa, the Indian Ocean World, and the Medieval North Atlantic* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2007), p. 272.

<sup>33</sup> <http://www.slavevoyages.org/tast/database/search.faces> Query 1– Principal place of slave purchase: Boary, Cabinda, Congo North, Congo River (Rio Zaire), Kilongo, Loango, Malembo, and Mayumba; Query 2– Principal place of slave purchase: All. Accessed on 12 September 2011.

<sup>34</sup> MCC 216, 286, 335, 400, 410, 456, 488, 517, 524, 528, 533, 575, 677, 795, 825, 932, 938, 980, 985, 990, 1009, 1013, 1019, 1106, 1224, 1229, 1289, 1308.

first, the price difference between adult male and female slaves is marginal; and second, the average price of child slaves differs even less than adults along sex divisions, with only a slight deviation in the early 1770s, when in a single year boys were more expensive, and then next year girls were more expensive. The overall average price for adult male slaves between 1732 and 1776 was 27 pieces per slave; the average for adult female slaves was 25 pieces; the average price for a male child was 18 and a female child cost 16 pieces (see Appendix B). (See Chapter 5 for additional information on how Europeans circulated information of slave prices for the Loango Coast.)

Postma's analysis of the whole Dutch Atlantic slave trade led him to conclude: "Prices fluctuated in response to supply and demand, and the price differential between the sexes tended to decrease during the eighteenth century as females and youthful slaves came to be in greater demand."<sup>35</sup> However, this change in gender and age ratios may have been a result of internal as much as external factors. The growing volume and potential profits of the slave trade may have encourage Loango Coast merchants, or indeed merchants in the interior, to part with female slaves who had previously been retained to supplement local productive and reproductive cycles. The data in Graph 8 suggest that, at least in their dealings with MCC merchants, the traders of the Loango Coast demanded consistently high prices for female slaves, and occasionally, as in 1755, 1758, and 1770, the most expensive slave purchased was an adult female rather than an adult male (see Appendix B). As MCC captains and crew members were expressly forbidden to purchase slaves on their own accounts, it seems unlikely that these women purchased based on attractiveness for long term sexual exploitation.<sup>36</sup> However, captains may have had shorter term goals. A difference of two pieces between the values of a male and female slave is quite consistent throughout the period, with the exception of 1776 when the average male slave was worth 11 pieces more than the average of female slave. This exception aside, the difference in male and female prices did not rise and fall as a constant percentage of the total prices but rather remained almost fixed, suggesting it was a social convention rather than a result of supply and demand. As the Loango Coast began to supply increasing numbers of slaves as the eighteenth century proceeded, this region came to represent a larger proportion of overall slave sales thereby influencing the overall statistics to a greater degree. This increased demand for slaves may


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<sup>35</sup> Postma, *The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade*, p. 265.

<sup>36</sup> MCC 816. Also see Postma's comment on the broad availability of such regulations among MCC officers: Postma, *The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade*, p. 366.

account in part for the diminishing differences between male and female slave prices observed by Postma.

*Graph 6: MCC Data on Slave Prices on the Loango Coast Measured in Pieces*



Sources: MCC 216, 219, 335, 400, 410, 456, 488, 517, 524, 528, 533, 575, 677, 795, 825, 932, 938, 980, 985, 990, 1009, 1013, 1019, 1106, 1224, 1229, 1286, 1289 & 1308. Also see Appendix B.

Comparing the price data by sex in Graph 6 to the fluctuating number of ships on the Loango Coast, as represented in Graph 1, can help to understand some of these fluctuations in slave prices. For example, the decrease in slave prices in 1748 may have been influenced by the particularly dangerous shipping conditions in the 1746 to 1747 period. Equally the peak of prices in 1755 corresponds with the first unusually high concentration of European ships on the coast, suggesting that competition drove the price upward. The dip in prices between 1757 and 1762 corresponds to the Seven Years War which again destabilized shipping. The period from 1762 to 1774 marked a steep rise in prices which corresponds with the period of highest concentration of European competition on the Loango Coast. These results validate Phyllis Martin's hypothesis that



the Loango Coast slave trade peaked around 1763 to 1793.<sup>37</sup> Given the early stage of the research of the scale of the transatlantic slave trade when Martin wrote this and the sporadic nature of Martin's data on slave prices, Martin's conclusions are remarkably true to this more detailed analysis. The increased European competition among slave traders on the Loango Coast increased slave prices during the late eighteenth century. The pace of these transformations offered new challenges in the decision making process of the transatlantic slave trade.<sup>38</sup>

## Conclusion

This chapter has provided an analysis of outfitting strategies in Europe, provisioning and trade in the West African and West Central African Coasts, the duration and mortality of the middle passage, the destinations and commerce in the Americas, and the return and re-provisioning in Europe. In doing so, it highlights the importance of developing a "culture of knowledge" and how this knowledge allowed both the European and African traders to optimize profits and minimize risks. Middelburg and Loango Coast merchants built upon a foundation of trade laid by free merchants and WIC traders in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The consistent flow of information between Loango and Middelburg markets allowed Middelburg merchants to engage in a risk assessment based upon provisioning, labour, and shipping cycles in Europe, with procurement rates and slave prices in on the African coast.

Trade on the Loango Coast was characterized by the challenges of disease in the rainy season, greater distance from Europe, and scarcity of foodstuffs, counterbalanced with provision of reliable supplies of water, the efficient procurement of enslaved Africans, and a short middle passage. MCC records indicate patterns of trade on the Loango Coast were influenced by external events: they were disrupted by periodic warfare throughout the eighteenth century, particularly during the Seven Years War and the Anglo Dutch War. Equally, trade boomed during periods of

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<sup>37</sup> Martin, *The External Trade of the Loango Coast*, p. 86.

<sup>38</sup> See: Warren C. Whatley "Guns for Slaves: The 18<sup>th</sup> Century British Slave Trade in Africa" (working paper, 15 August 2008) available at <http://www-siepr.stanford.edu/Whatley.pdf> Accessed on 10 September 2011. David Richardson, "Prices of Slaves in West and West Central Africa: Towards an Annual Series, 1698-1807," *Bulletin of Economic Research* 43, no. 1 (1991) pp. 21- 56; H. A. Gemery and Jan Hogendorn, "Evidence on English/African Terms of Trade and 18th Century," *Explorations in Economic History* 27 (1990) pp. 157- 177; Curtin, *Economic Change in Precolonial Africa*; and, Marion Johnson, J. Thomas Lindblad, and Robert Ross. *Anglo-African Trade in the Eighteenth Century: English Statistics on African Trade, 1699-1808*, (Leiden: Centre for the History of European Expansion, 1990).

greatest access to credit in the Americas. As these events affected the volume of trade, they also influenced slave prices, which diminished when demand was low and increased when competition was at its peak in the late eighteenth century.

Whereas these external factors of trade influenced events everywhere along the African Coast, a number of factors specific to the Loango Coast also influenced the volume of trade there. Although Behrendt's suggestion that there was a seasonally unpredictable supply of slaves on the Loango Coast, MCC records indicate that Middelburg merchants experienced the most success in procuring slaves in October. During this month, the rate of procurement, which was generally the fastest on the Western African Coast, was cut in half. However, the small sample of these data requires corroboration through additional studies on other Dutch, French and English shipping records to further elaborate on the diversity of shipping patterns in this period. Postma's research also indicates that ships were able to obtain larger cargoes on the Loango Coast than in other Western African slaving regions, suggesting that the Loango Coast was able to adapt to increased European demand as readily as the Bight of Biafra, noting these two regions as exceptional in their ability to expand the supply of slaves to the transatlantic trade. In addition to the fast loading times and large cargoes, favouring winds allowed ships leaving the Loango Coast to reach their destinations in the Americas faster than ships sailing from more northerly trading regions, reducing overall mortality among slaves in transit. These factors facilitated a mutually beneficial trade between Loango Coast and Middelburg slaving merchants leading Middelburg merchants to send the largest number of the voyages they sent to Africa to the Loango Coast. However this arrangement did not benefit everyone on the Loango Coast. Chapter 4 will discuss the consequences of the trade for the political organization of the Loango Coast.

# Chapter 4: Cross-Cultural Exchange and the Transformation of the Loango Coast Merchant Communities, 1732-1797

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Whereas previous chapters have focused on broad patterns of change across time, this chapter examines the detailed day-to-day trading activities of the MCC merchants on the Loango Coast. In doing so, it begins to explore the political world in which European and African merchants met. While much has been written on the European trading partners, the identities of the African trading partners for the most part have remained obscure.<sup>39</sup> Using the MCC sources, this chapter lists 593 Loango Coast merchants who traded with the MCC between 1732 and 1797. Each of these merchants is identified by a personal name or a title, or both. Therefore, this list makes both a major contribution to the identification of economic actors on the Loango Coast as well as increasing our knowledge of key figures within Loango, Ngoyo, and Kakongo political structures. Beyond the efforts of Phyllis Martin in 1972, few authors have attempted to make sense of the political structures discussed in the writings of the travellers and compilers of the time, authors such as Andrew Battell, Pieter van den Broecke, Olfert Dapper, Abbé Proyart, Samuel Brun, Louis de Grandpré, Bishop J. Cuvelier, and Eduard Pechuël-Loesche. This chapter begins to address this deficiency in the literature.

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<sup>39</sup> Some recent contributions to this field include: Peter A. Coclanis (ed.), *The Atlantic Economy during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century: Organization, Operation, Practice and Personnel* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1999); Leonor Freire Costa, 'Merchant groups in the 17th century Brazilian sugar trade: Reappraising old topics with new research insights', *e-JPH*, 2/1 (Summer 2004); Diogo Ramada Curto and Anthony Molho (eds.), *Commercial Networks in the Early Modern World* (Firenze: European University Institute, 2002) (EUI Working Paper HEC No. 2002/2); Albane Forestier "Risk, kinship and personal relationships in late eighteenth-century West Indian trade: The commercial network of Tobin & Pinney" *Business History*, 52, no. 6 (2010) pp. 912-931; Sheryllyne Haggerty "Risk and risk management in the Liverpool slave trade" *Business History*, 51, no. 6 (2009) pp. 817-834; John J. McCusker and Kenneth Morgan (eds.), *The early modern Atlantic economy: Essays on Transatlantic Enterprise* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Robin Pearson and David Richardson "Social capital, institutional innovation and Atlantic trade before 1800" *Business History*, 50, no. 6 (2008) pp. 765-780; and Filipa Ribeiro da Silva, *The Dutch and the Portuguese in West Africa*.

This chapter goes some way towards filling this formidable gap in our understanding of precolonial African polities and their transformations during the slave trading era. To achieve these ends, it compiles and organizes the current data on the polities of the Loango Coast to identify a significant list of Loango merchants who engaged in cross cultural exchange and to understand how wealth and power shifted on the Loango Coast in the eighteenth century. Furthermore, it weaves together a more comprehensive picture of the interconnections between Loango Coast merchants, emphasising the importance of key political offices in obtaining personal wealth. In doing so, it argues that two key transformations took place on the Loango Coast in the eighteenth century: first the separation of the polities of Kakongo and Ngoyo from the sphere of influence of Loango, and second, the redistribution of wealth and therefore power within each polity. Both of these transformations can be linked to the impact of the transatlantic slave trade on the Loango Coast. While Phyllis M. Martin has advanced the second thesis for the nineteenth century, this chapter traces the beginnings of this transition back to the eighteenth century.<sup>40</sup>

To achieve these ends, this chapter is organized into five sections: the first section outlines the basic structures of the key trading ports, the polities, and the peoples of the Loango Coast and how they interacted between 1535 and 1800. The second section compiles fragmented information on the political leaders of these polities, offering an updated list of rulers for two of the communities, and measuring the engagement of these rulers in the transatlantic slave trade. The third section examines the role of the Mafouk as both a regulator and supplier in the transatlantic slave trade. The fourth section examines the substantial list of Loango Coast merchants and speculates about the nature of slave supply to the Loango Coast. Finally, the fifth section discusses the transformative nature that the slave trade played on the Loango Coast, first in the redistribution of wealth and second in the redistribution of power.

### **The Ports, Polities, and Peoples of the Loango Coast 1535 to 1800**

Due to the absence of common knowledge about the political organization of the Loango Coast, a brief description of the political landscape of this region will provide a backdrop for this chapter's discussion of political transformations. Building upon the description of the Loango Coast in Chapter 1, Table 1 below sets out the links between ports, polities, and peoples on the Loango

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<sup>40</sup> Phyllis M. Martin, "Family Strategies in Nineteenth-Century Cabinda" *Journal of African History*, Vol. 28, No. 1, (1987) pp. 65-86.

Coast which are discussed in this chapter. It begins with a description of the polity of Loango and goes on to provide an outline of the polities of Kakongo and Ngoyo. When the Portuguese arrived at Loango Bay in 1535 they encountered the polity of Loango. The members of this community referred to themselves as Vili whereas their neighbours to the south referred to them as Muburi. Their ruler was called the Maloango. These people spoke a Kikongo dialect, which belonged to the larger category of West Bantu languages.<sup>41</sup>

To the south of Loango Bay was the port of Malemba. Malemba was the dominant Atlantic port for the polity of Kakongo. Their leader was called the Manikakongo and their people the Kotchi. Prior to 1650 Kakongo paid tribute to the dominant polity of Loango. By the mid-eighteenth century, their financial success in slave trading diminished their ties to Loango giving them greater autonomy. Between Malemba and the Congo River was the Bay of Cabinda, which was the key port of the polity of Ngoyo and was ruled by the Mangoyo. The people of Ngoyo were known as the Woyo. Like the Kakongo, the Ngoyo paid tribute to Loango in the seventeenth century but emerged as an independent polity in the eighteenth century, primarily due to their success in slave trading. Like the Vili to the north, both of these communities spoke variations of Kikongo.

These three polities shared a Kikongo language group and religious ethos, which facilitated trade and political cooperation even after tributary relations were severed. As rulers of tributary polities of Loango in the period of early contact, the Manikakongo and the Mangoyo followed the lead of the Maloango in organizing trade relations with European traders. While at first these leaders dealt directly with European merchants, in the mid-seventeenth century the Maloango began employing a Mafouk to be the main point of contact between European and Vili traders. The Manikakongo and the Mangoyo seem to have followed this principle but added one layer of administration: They appointed a Mambouk to oversee the Mafouk. These Mafouks acted in the same capacity as the Mafouk of Loango Bay. In this configuration, the Mafouk remained the primary contact for European merchants but reported to the Mambouk who in return reported to the Manikakongo or Mangoyo. Furthermore, Mafouks of the primary ports could appoint Mafouks in the lesser ports of their polity. These Mafouks of the lesser ports answered to the Mafouks of

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<sup>41</sup> A. Doutreloux, "Les Kongo" in Jan Vansina (ed) *Introduction à l'ethnographie du Congo* (Bruxelles: CRISP, 1966) pp. 115-116; Loëmbe, *Parlons Vili*, pp. 26-29.

Loango Bay, Malemba, or Cabinda Bay. The following two sections discuss these political roles in more detail.

*Table 1: Guide to Political Terminology on the Loango Coast*

Port:	Loango Bay	Malemba	Cabinda Bay
Polity:	Loango	Kakongo	Ngoyo
Status of Polity:	Dominant Polity of the Loango Coast (1535-1650) Independent Polity (1700s)	Tributary Polity of Loango (before 1650) Independent Polity (1700s)	Tributary Polity of Loango (before 1650) Independent Polity (1700s)
People: <sup>42</sup>	Vili/Muburi/Fiotti	Kotchi/Muburi	Woyo/Muburi
Ruler:	Maloango	Manikakongo	Mangoyo/Maningoyo
Seat of Government:	Buali (3 miles from the Coast)	Kinguele (35-40 miles inland from Malemba)	Mbanza Ngoyo (two days from Cabinda)
Primary European Contact:	Mafouk	(1)Mambouk (2)Mafouk	(1)Mambouk (2)Mafouk
Language Group:	Kikongo, a West Bantu Language	Kikongo, a West Bantu Language	Kikongo, a West Bantu Language

Sources: Compiled from Birmingham, *Central Africa to 1870*, pp. 72-74 ; Doutreloux, "Les Kongo," pp. 115-116; Loëmbe, *Parlons Vili*, pp. 26-29; Frank Hagenbucher-Sacripanti, *Les Fondements Spirituel du Pouvoir au Royaume de Loango* (Paris: Office de la Recherche Scientifique et Technique Outre-Mer, 1973) pp. 17-28, 73; and Martin. *The External Trade of the Loango Coast*, p. 3, 5,10, 29-30, 98-99.

## Rulers of the Loango Coast: Political Power and Economic Engagement

In exploring the history of the Loango Coast, no single coherent narrative emerges of how the polities of the Loango Coast evolved prior to the nineteenth century. Existing accounts are based on a combination of artifacts, oral history, and myth and were recorded by misguided and ignorant European travellers whose tales often grew and distorted with retelling. From these sparse and challenging sources, few historians, most notably Phyllis Martin on the Vili people and more recently Zdenka Volavka on the Ngoyo, have attempted to sift through the evidence to construct a

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<sup>42</sup> Just as Muburi is used to describe all of the peoples of the Loango Coast, Vili can also be used to describe all of the inhabitants of the Loango Coast from Gabon to the Congo River as discussed in Chapter 1. However, this thesis only describes Vili in the more specific context of members of the polity of Loango.

skeleton of political and economic actors on the Loango Coast.<sup>43</sup> Using the transaction records of the MCC, this section tests and contributes to a greater understanding of the political structures on the Loango Coast in the eighteenth century. Although understanding the roles of these leaders still requires reliance on imperfect anecdotal sources, the names of rulers that can be identified in the financial transactions and the dates associated with those names can offer more reliable evidence.

During the early period of European trade, the influence of the Maloango extended beyond the boundaries of the polity of Loango to the smaller polities of Kakongo and Ngoyo to the south. Andrew Battell explains this relationship in a roundabout way: "Anciently the King of Kakongo [the Manikakongo], before he assumed his kingship was bound to marry a princess of the blood royal of Kongo, whilst he of Luangu [Loango] married a princess of Kakongo; yet the ruler of Luangu was highest in rank, for he enjoyed the title of nunu ("aged person"), whilst his brother of Kakongo had to be contented with the inferior title of nkaji ("spouse")."<sup>44</sup> In contrast to the title of the Maloango as the "aged person" or husband and the title of the Manikakongo as the "spouse" or wife, the Mangoyo was called the "Itemma" or priest. In addition to these symbolic titles, the Kakongo and Ngoyo presented tribute to the Maloango in this period.<sup>45</sup> Thus, particularly in the formative period of European/African trade on the Loango Coast, before the political separation of Loango, Kakongo, and Ngoyo circa the eighteenth century, the policies which the Maloango developed in relation to Atlantic trade had resonance throughout the entire coast.

In addition to this role, the Maloango was the political, social, and spiritual leader of the polity of Vili at Loango: "The Maloango was the key figure in the structure of this powerful Loango kingdom. He was the Supreme Lawgiver and Protector of the people, the ultimate sanction of all administrative activities on a local and national level. The Vili believed that he had a semi-divine status, because of a unique relationship with Nzambi, the creator. The Loango ruler's position was exemplified in such titles as Ntotela, the Supreme Ruler, Nganga Mvumbi, the Guardian of Spirits,

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<sup>43</sup> See: Phyllis Martin, *The External Trade of the Loango Coast 1576-1870*; idem. "Power, Cloth and Currency on the Loango Coast" *African Economic History*, (1986), no. 15, pp. 1-12; idem. "Family Strategies in Nineteenth-Century Cabinda," pp. 65-86; idem. "The Cabinda Connection," pp. 47-59; and Zdenka Volavka's *Crown and Ritual: The Royal Insignia of Ngoyo* (University of Toronto Press: Toronto, 1998).

<sup>44</sup> Battell, *Strange Adventures*, p. 104.

<sup>45</sup> Martin, *The External Trade of the Loango Coast*, p. 31.

and Ntinu, the Supreme Judge."<sup>46</sup> Phyllis Martin identifies two main themes in the origin myths of the Maloango: the unification of Loango, and the appointment and succession of individuals to rule this polity. "One group of traditions link the appointment of the first ruler directly to the volition of the Manikongo at Mbanza Kongo...Dapper gives a different tradition ...that the Maloango came originally from Zarry, a territory on the north bank of the Congo River...If the Maloango was indeed closely related to the Kongo royal family, it is reasonable to suppose that he originated from the same region of the southern Mayombe."<sup>47</sup>

Although our primary interest here is in the economic and political role of the Maloango, Phyllis Martin asserts: "The spiritual and ritual significance of the Maloango's office and person can hardly be overemphasized. Indeed, it was a basic reason for the enormous respect that he commanded over a wide area. Some of his spiritual powers even seemed to have been passed on to his people, for among other Kongo groups itinerant Vili traders and porters were feared for their magical powers."<sup>48</sup> Linda Heywood and John Thornton suggest: "The king [or Maloango] had an important religious role, being described as a "great magician" and a rainmaker. In this way he dominated ultimately the entire chain of shrines and religious offices."<sup>49</sup> These skills also impressed European visitors. Broecke records with some surprise the Maloango's ability to predict the details of his trading expedition: "The king himself is a great magician and often speaks with the devil. He knew of my coming long before my arrival, and precisely on which day my ship would anchor in the bay; also that I would bring certain goods to him, which turned out to be exactly right."<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 19.

<sup>47</sup> Martin, *The External Trade of the Loango Coast*, p. 6-7. Also see, Dapper, *Beschrijvinge*, p. 143; Merolla, *A Voyage to Congo*, p. 651; Cavazzi, *Istorica descrizione de' tre regni Congo, Matamba et Angola*, p. 564; Dennett, *Notes on Folklore of the Fjort*, p. 1-2; idem. *Seven Years among the Fjort*. pp. 50-7; Pechuel-Loesche, *Volkskunde*, pp. 167-9, 184; Cuvelier, *Traditions congolaises*, pp. 480-4, 487; Balandier, *Sociologie actuelle de l'Afrique noire*, p. 285; Jan Vansina, "Notes sur l'origine du royaume de Kongo," *The Journal of African History*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1963) pp. 33-8; Birmingham, *Trade and Conflict in Angola*, pp. 5-8; William Graham Lister Randles, *L'ancien royaume du Congo des origines à la fin du XIXe siècle* (Paris : Mouton and Co., 1968) pp. 17-18.

<sup>48</sup> Martin, *The External Trade of the Loango Coast*, pp. 20-21.

<sup>49</sup> Thornton and Heywood, *Central Africans, Atlantic Creoles, and America*, p. 106.

<sup>50</sup> Broecke, p. 65.



Perhaps as part of this spiritual role, "The Maloango lived a secluded life in his palace at Buali." When the people of Loango sought his judgment in civil disputes or crimes, they waited in the square in front of his palace. "He arrived accompanied by nobles and announced by the royal trumpeters who played instruments carved from elephant tusks. He sat in great splendor upon a throne on a raised dais. Here, he [also] received homage and tribute from Vili leaders who came from all parts of the kingdom." Much of the Maloango's business was conducted in this public way including legal judgments, diplomatic affairs, and trade negotiations.<sup>51</sup> While the centralized authority of the Maloango at Loango mirrors the political authority of the rulers of Ashanti (Gold Coast), Dahomey (Slave Coast), and Benin (Bight of Benin), the Maloango was more successful in maintaining its control over the port of Loango Bay and sustaining the peaceful conditions necessary for a high volume slave trade.<sup>52</sup>

The Maloango delegated many of the more tedious tasks of governance to lesser officials. Early records indicate the appointment of four or five key officials. In the early 1600s Andrew Battell records the presence of "four princes" governing the "four Lordships" of Loango: "The first is Mani Cabango, the second Mani Salga, the third Mani Bock, and the fourth Mani Cay. This Mani Cay is next to be king, and hath his train and court as a Prince. And when the King dieth, he cometh presently into the seat of the King." The editor's footnote explains: "the mani (mwana, or princes) mentioned by Battell are those of Chibanga, Selanganga (of the family of the Petra Paria of Kenga), Mbuku, and Kaya, in Chikamba."<sup>53</sup> This seems to identify "mani" or "mwana" as the office or political designation and the second part as a family name suggesting the mani were selected from among the elite families of Loango. If so, this may explain why only a couple years later in 1610 Pieter van den Broecke lists Manni Vasja, Manni Macase, Manni Queboute, and Mannij Quingie as the four "principle nobles" of the Maloango's court. Fifty years later in the 1660s Dapper records the names of three primary officials: Manibas (Manibanze?), Makinga (Maquimbe?) and

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<sup>51</sup> Martin, *The External Trade of the Loango Coast*, p. 21. Also see: Dapper, *Beschrijvinge*, pp. 164-7; Proyard, *Histoire*, p. 139; and, Battell, *Adventures*, p. 44.

<sup>52</sup> On Ashanti see: Margaret Priestley, *West African Trade and Coast Society: A Family Study* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969) pp.73-74; and, Larry W. Yarak, *Asante and the Dutch 1744-1873* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990). On Benin see Mann, *Slavery and the Birth of an African City*, p. 27. On Dahomey see: Law, *Ouidah*, pp. 119-122.

<sup>53</sup> Battell, *Adventures*, p. 50.

Maboma.<sup>54</sup> While Martin suggest that these names represent offices, it is more likely that in this early period the prefix “Ma” “Mani” or “Manni” represented the offices while the second part represented the identity of a family or individual. Where names reoccur, this is more likely that consecutive members of the same family were appointed “Mani” or princes, rather than the consistency of a title of office. This would also account for differing descriptions of functions given to officials with similar names. Over time, these positions acquired official titles. In 1776 Proyart identified five “principle ministers” the Ma-ngovo [or Mangove], the Ma-npoutou, the Ma-kaka, the m-Fouka [or Mafouk] and the Ma-Kinba.<sup>55</sup> These titles had been standardized not only in Loango but also in Cabinda and Malemba.

Successors to the Maloango were appointed by the Maloango from within this select group of officials/princes. Martin explains: “the succession to the throne had both elective and hereditary feature. The heirs were chosen from a certain clan, usually that of Kondi, and from among the nephews [the sister’s sons] of the ruling Maloango.”<sup>56</sup> Given the matrilineal pattern of succession, it is unlikely that the Kondi is the only family group from which a Maloango could have been chosen as that would require the marriage of the Maloango’s sisters only within the Kondi group.

It is important to note that the Maloango, like the Manikakongo and the Mangoyo [leader of Ngoyo], is an office not an individual. Unfortunately, European sources often do not mention the name of the individual who is filled the office; therefore, multiple individuals can be represented by a single title. However, Phyllis Martin has attempted to reconstruct a list of individuals who filled this office (see Table 2 below). Though she lists rulers between the seventeenth and twentieth century, this chapter is most interested in the period between 1600 and 1800. During this period Maloangos did not have a particularly long reign. Martin lists between seven and nine rulers in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries: Gembe (Gymbe, Njimbe); Tati of Konde; Bicullu; Makussu; Nombe; Puati of Chibanga; Yambi; Mutati (possibly the same as Tati of Konde);

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<sup>54</sup> Dapper, *Beschrijvinge*, pp. 164-7.

<sup>55</sup> Proyart, *Histoire de Loango*, p. 124.

<sup>56</sup> Martin, *The External Trade of the Loango Coast*, pp. 175-6.

Bicullu Unkangebange (possibly the same as Bicullu). Unfortunately, she is unable to give time periods for these rulers or even to place them in chronological order. For the second half of the eighteenth century, the chronology is clearer: Ntangu preceded Makosse who is known to have died in 1766; between 1766 and 1773 there was no ruling Maloango; Buatu (Puati) ruled for 14 years between 1773 and 1787; and for the period from 1787 into the 1800s, two names are documented: Maloango Tait and Maloango Makawso Masonga – the presence of two names could be explained by two complementing titles for the same individual or by one or another source being inaccurate.

This suggests that the Maloango may have been referred to in the MCC trading documents between 1732 and 1797 as Ntangu, Makosse, Buatu or Tait/Makawso Masonga. An analysis of the MCC documents shows no reference to a trader in Loango named Ntangu. However, Koning Stolck (Koning being the Dutch word for King, which is used interchangeably with Maloango in the MCC sources) appears in multiple entries of the *Snaawschip de Drie Gezusters*' slave trading records at Loango Bay between 1757 and 1758. During this period Stolck sold 22 slaves in six transactions.<sup>57</sup> Though it goes without saying that the Dutch captain struggled to spell unfamiliar African names, Stolck does not bear any resemblance to Ntangu, who Martin proposed came before, or Makosse, who Martin proposed came after. This leaves us with the options of Stolck being either an alternative name of either Ntangu or Makosse, a ship captain mistaking Stolck's status, or Stolck being a third Maloango between the two. In the absence of evidence for the first two options, Stolck will be assumed to be Makosse's predecessor. Makosse Koning appears 13 years after Stolck in the *Snaawschip De Welmeenende*'s slave trading records on 4 May 1771 as providing Captain Cornelis van Haijen with one man and one boy slave at Loango Bay.<sup>58</sup> Though numerous other Makosses appear throughout the data trading at Malemba and Cabinda, none of them appear to be the Maloango himself as convention restricted the movement of the Maloango.<sup>59</sup> While it is possible that these traders could have been family members or clients of Maloango Makosse, it is also possible that these traders were free agents.

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<sup>57</sup> MCC 488.

<sup>58</sup> MCC 1013.

<sup>59</sup> Martin, find page number.

Table 2: Phyllis Martin's Provisional List of Loango Rulers

Date	Maloango (Ruler of Loango)		
c.1600	Gembe (Gymbe, Njimbe); Tati of Konde; Bicullu; Makussu; Nombe; Puati of Chibanga; Yambi; Mutati (possibly the same as Tati of Konde); Bicullu Unkangebange (possibly the same as Bicullu) <sup>60</sup>		
?	Ntangu		
?-1766	Makosse		
1766-73	No ruling Maloango		
1773-87	Buatu (or Puati)		
1787-18?? <sup>61</sup>	Tait	Tait	Makawso Masonga
	Luemba	Mancossu	Makawso Manawnbo
	Macossu I	Umpuati	Makawso Matukila of Kondi
	Puata I	Nyambi	Man'anawumbo
	Puati II	Mancossu	
	Macossu II	Nombe (Lemba Kambeninsiko)	
	Macossu III	Luemba Mawalla	
		Gamwo Macossu Manombe	
		Gamwo Umpuati Umbunje	
		Yamba Muinsa	
	Puati Umtomba		
	Macossu Matukula		
	Makossu		
?-1874	Nombe (Numbi)		
1874-82/83	Ntatu		
1882/83- ?	Macosso Chicusso		
?-?	Prati		
1898-?	Luemba		

Sources: Martin, *The External Trade of the Loango Coast*, pp. 175-6. Also see: Battell, *Adventures*, pp. 44-45; Proyart, *Histoire de Loango*, p. 130; Cuvelier, *Traditions congolaises*, pp. 21, 100; Grandpre, *Voyage a la cote occidentale d'Afrique*, i. 116; Bastian, *Die deutsche Expedition an der Loango-Küste*, i. 64, 266-7; Pechuël-Loesche, *Volkskunde von Loango*, pp.155, 185, 188; Dennet, *Notes on Folklore of the Fjort*, pp. 5-7, 15; and, Appendix C.

At the same time on the very same ship, "King Pombe Jobbe" appears as a slave trader. He engages in three transactions between March and June involving seven enslaved persons. The captain noted such purchases as taking place at Loango.<sup>62</sup> Martin provides corroborative evidence for Makosse as Maloango during this period. If the European captain was accurate in identifying Pombe Jobbe as a political ruler, the identity of Pombe Jobbe proves to be a problem. The most obvious answer would be that Pombe Jobbe was either a visiting political ruler from one of the surrounding polities of Kakongo or Ngoyo, or that the *Snauwschip de Welmeenende* sent smaller

<sup>60</sup> Chronological order for these names is uncertain.

<sup>61</sup> For this period Bastian provides two possible lists of secession and Dennet provides a third.

<sup>62</sup> MCC 1308.

boats down the coast to supplement purchases on the Loango Coast and expedite shipment. Unfortunately, this author was unable to obtain even a rough list of rulers for Kakongo. However, Zdenka Volavka has compiled a rough list of rulers in Ngoyo (see Table 3 below). Although no direct match is found, Pombe Jobbe bears some similarities to the names Jimbe and Gimbi, which reoccur throughout the lists. It is possible that a MCC captain may have interpreted this Kikongo name differently than one of their European colleagues. However, this meagre evidence is by no means conclusive and further research into the ruling dynasties of the Loango Coast is necessary before the identity of Pombe Jobbe can be confirmed.

Returning to the question at hand, the fourth known Maloango during the MCC trade at Loango Bay was Buatu (or Puati) who ruled for 14 years between 1773 and 1787. The MCC records do not show anyone by that name trading within that period, though they do contain multiple entries for a Batje Claas trading at Loango Bay between 1769 and 1771.<sup>63</sup> If this is the same man, it is possible that the new demands of office altered his trading prospects. Whatever the case, we do not have a record of Bautu trading while holding the office of Maloango.

For the final Maloango to hold office while the Vili traded with MCC two names are documented: Maloango Tait and Maloango Makawso Masonga. The only merchant(s) trading with the MCC bearing any resemblance to either name is Kok Tate/Tate who supplied one man and two boys to the Fregatschip Philadelphia at Loango Bay in 1762.<sup>64</sup> However, this is unlikely to be the same individual who later became the Maloango as an official trading at Malemba during the same period is also recorded as Mafoeke Tate and Kok Tate.<sup>65</sup> The minimal interaction of Maloangos in the transatlantic slave trading documents of the MCC raises some questions about the nature of the office of Maloango. Although the Maloango appears to be a minor figure in the eighteenth century MCC trading records, he appointed the Mafouks and ruled the court of last appeal in trade disputes at Loango Bay. Thus, it is in his legal capacity rather than his economic capacity which is most important in the eighteenth century slave trade.

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<sup>63</sup> See MCC 335, 488 & 1013.

<sup>64</sup> The names "Kok Tate" and "Tate" may represent the same individual trader or two different traders. For more information see MCC 488.

<sup>65</sup> See MCC 400, 524, 795, 825, 938, 980, 1286 & 1289

Unfortunately, despite the detailed lists of Mangoyos which Volavka provides (see Table 3 below), identifying the Mangoyos in the Cabinda data seems all but impossible: this is partially due to the lack of dates in Volavka's chronology and partially due to the spelling variations making a positive match difficult. However, some similarities do present themselves. Volavka's list contains the name Pukuta/Pucuta; similar names appear in the MCC list: Paketapo, Pieketa Loende, Pieketa Pee, and Pieketapo. Further research may show a link between these names. Additionally, there is the possible connection between Cabinda and Pombe Jobbe at Loango Bay, which appears above. Due to the sparseness of the MCC data on Cabinda, it is difficult to make valuable conclusions about the power structure at Ngoyo beyond the fact that it seemed to mirror the structure of Loango Bay with the Mafouk acting as the Mangoyo's chief representative in foreign trade.

The absence of data on Malemba is even more pronounced than the lack of data on Cabinda despite Malemba's prominent role as the dominant procurer of slaves for the MCC on the Loango Coast. Thus, it is difficult to procure a list of Kakongo's Manikongos, or leaders, to check against the MCC records. However, the documents still lend some clues as to the type of involvement of the Manikakongo. Between 1772 and 1774, six slaves were sold in six separate transactions in which a Markedoor, or middle man, represents the Manikakongo (whom the Dutch refer to as the "Koning"). During the same period, the Manikakongo's son or his proxy engaged in an additional three transactions. Obviously this merchant's position as the Manikakongo's son had some importance for the MCC merchants as they make a special note of this relationship. However, it is uncertain whether this merchant is acting in his own interests or in that of a family member. A third merchant present in the records with the word "Koning" which the Dutch use in reference to local leaders is Pieter Koning (1757) and likely the same trader Pieter King (1759). This merchant engaged in six transactions selling six slaves. Although it is most likely that King was an European merchant trading on the coast or an African merchant with an Anglicised name, it has been included as a possible connection to the Manikakongo because it does match the name of any slave trading captain known to be trading in this period.<sup>66</sup> These data indicate that the Manikakongo had a small direct investment in the transatlantic slave trade which he negotiated using markedoors and possibly his son as proxies. Whereas the Manikakongo may

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<sup>66</sup> MCC 216, 219, 533, 795, 985.

Table 3: Zdenka Volavka's Provisional and Incomplete List of Ngoyo Rulers

Order	MaNgoyo (Ruler of Ngoyo)					Additional Political Figures
1	Lilu	Ma-Impinda	Moe Panzo	Mue-Panzo I	Mibimbi Pukuta	Mbenzi Luemba (MaNgoyo's assassine)
2	Bursi/Bunsi	Sinda Umkalla	Moe Pucuta	Mue-Púcuta I	Panzu (real MaNgoyo)	Mbenzi Luemba (pretender)
3	Kanga a/ Musolo-ngo	Maluemba	Moe Benci Luemba	Mue-Bénci-Luemba I	Pukuta	Ieze/Jeze (MaNgoyo's Wife) N'Zingo/Nzingo (MaNgoyo's Son)
4	Saltind-inga/ Muni Ilemba	Mani Jimbe	Cito Tafi	Mue-Ncito-Táfi	Cito Tafi Ngeta Kalombo	Mocata Calombo/Mocata-Colombo (kin of MaNgoyo); Sengo N'Dula (MaNgoyo's Wife, kin: T'chingo, from Mayombe); Maitica (MaNgoyo's and N'Sélo's son, pretender, appointed Mangovo)
5	Muni Jimbe	Mani Baschi	Moe Gimbi N'Pandi Sili		Ngimbi Pandi Sili	N'Pandi Sili (Father of MaNgoyo, kin of Prince of Sambo)
6	Muni Leamba (Poabo)	Umkongo	Pucuta Poabo	Púcuta Puabo I	Poaboa	Muni-Fumo N'Poabo/Muni-Fuma-Mpuabo (Father of MaNgoyo) Mangovo Maitica (proposed Pucuta Poabo for MaNgoyo)
7	Mani Bashi Umkongo	Mani Baschi Inyongo/ Mangoy Manimbatchi Concató	Bat'Chi N'Congo	Mue-Bátchi-Ncongo	Mbatshi Nyongo	Mancata and Jack (kin of MaNgoyo)
8		Mangoy Mani-Jimba/ Manni-Jimbe	Bat'Chi-Nhongo	Mue-Bátchi-Nhongo	Mpongo Nganga	
9			Moe N'Pongonga	Mue-Mpongonga	Forgotten	Puna (Kin of MaNgoyo)
10			Moe Gimbi	Mue-Gimbi II	Moe Gimbi	Puna (Kin of MaNgoyo)

Sources: This data is a synthesis of a table which appears in the appendix of Zdenka Volavka's *Crown and Ritual: The Royal Insignia of Ngoyo* (University of Toronto Press: Toronto, 1998) pp. 305-7. Cited by Volavka: Adolf Bastian. *Die deutsche Expedition an der Loango-Küst* Vol. I (Jena:Hermaan Costenoble, 1874) p. 215, 217-20; Domingos José Franque. *Nós, os Cabindas* (Lisbon: Editora Argo, 1940) p. 15-35, 43-8; Pierre Mandemvo, "Notes sur le royaume de Ngoyo" in *Ngoyo Kongo I* (June 1960); and, Evaristo Martins Campos, "Monarquia do Ngoyo" in *Portugal em Africa* (July-Aug. 1956) p. 197-210.

have benefited in an indirect way from the slave trade through taxation or investing in caravans, he is not listed as a prominent slave merchant in the MCC records.

The minor role which Loango Coast rulers play in procuring slaves for the transatlantic slave trade is in stark contrast to the role of the ruler of Ouidah. In Robin Law's extensive studies of slave trade at Ouidah, he concluded: "The kings of Dahomey retained a privileged position in the trade, selling their own slaves first, before private merchants could trade, and receiving higher prices for them."<sup>1</sup> While the rulers of Dahomey occasionally used proxies to sell their slaves, they received the profit. In contrast, the MCC records indicate that the rulers of the Loango Coast neither traded in large numbers nor retained the profits acquired by their appointed officials but rather periodically requested a portion of the Mafouk's earnings as will be discussed in the next section. The key to this difference in distribution in profits may lay in procurement of slaves. Whereas the slaves sold at Ouidah were primarily acquired through wars and thus the property of rulers of Dahomey to be distributed as he wished, the majority of slaves sold at Loango Bay, Cabinda Bay, and Malemba were brought to the coast in caravans, which meant the profits lay primarily with the merchant who provisioned the journey.<sup>2</sup>

### **Mafouks and the Regulation of Cross Cultural Exchange**

Though the Maloango was the most senior political actor in Loango, he was not the primary contact of Europeans at Loango Bay. He appointed the Mafouk to engage in economic affairs on his behalf. F. Denis Carli, an Italian, Catholic missionary, was among the first Europeans to record the presence of a Mafouk on the Loango Coast. In his 1666-1667 "Account of Congo" he wrote:

As I passed though the Kingdom of Angola, one of the aforesaid forts of the Oath called Bolungo was administered [by] a Mafucca (so they call the Receiver among the Whites) a

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<sup>1</sup> Robin Law, "The origins and evolution of the merchant community in Ouidah" in Robin Law and Silke Strickrodt (eds) *Ports of the Slave Trade, Bights of Benin and Biafra* (Stirling: Centre of Commonwealth Studies, University of Stirling, Occasional Paper Number 6, October, 1999) p.56.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 57-59. For a further discussion on provisioning see section four of this chapter. For a more detailed discussion on caravans see Chapter 5.



relation to the King of Congo, and to him of Loango, one of the powerfulest among that Coast, and whose sone, as they told me, was to succeed.<sup>3</sup>

Even at this early stage, the power of the Mafouk and the importance of his role in cross cultural exchange was quite clear. According to Martin, "The sale of offices was one of the principal sources of revenue for the Maloango by the late eighteenth century." The man whom the Maloango appointed to the office of Mafouk was expected to reciprocate with a sizable gift to the Maloango, a gift equal to the potential gains of such a politically and economically advantageous position. Though the recipient of the post may not "belong to the class of princes", as Martin describes it, he could obtain great wealth. As the collector of trading taxes and duties, the Mafouk was expected to provide a portion of this income to the Maloango. As this was not a fixed sum but a negotiable payment, a strong Mafouk may pay a small fee whereas a weak Mafouk may be coerced into forfeiting a greater share of the profits."<sup>4</sup> Miller describes the Mafouks and Mambouks as appointed as "ministers of trade to administer the foreigners' affairs in the markets." He goes on to highlight "the principal danger for the trading kings was that the officers they appointed as market administrators would enrich themselves so much that they became powerful in their own right."<sup>5</sup>

To aid in his tax collecting and market regulating duties, the Mafouk appointed the Markeddoors or African brokers who were middle men in the coastal trade. However, "he alone settled the payment of taxes with Europeans, discussed and fixed the initial price of slaves and goods, held tribunals to adjudicated disputes that arose between Europeans and African traders."<sup>6</sup> European merchants were careful to maintain the favour of the Mafouks of Loango Bay, Malemba, and Cabinda as they were truly the door keepers of the trade. To engage in trade, European captains and brokers had to engage in very specific protocol. The Mafouk was at the centre of this protocol: "On arrival off the Loango Coast, it was customary to give a salute of several cannon shots in honour of the dignitaries of the country; this also warned the Mafouk of the arrival of a new ship.

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<sup>3</sup> Angelo and Denis, "Account of the Congo", p. 679.

<sup>4</sup> Martin, *The External Trade of the Loango Coast*, p. 101.

<sup>5</sup> Miller, *Way of Death*, p. 184.

<sup>6</sup> Martin, *The External Trade of the Loango Coast*, p. 101.

Often the Mafouk and his retinue might go on board to welcome the captain and to open discussions on trading arrangements. Once these were agreed on, the captain went ashore to make more specific contacts with the brokers to negotiate the sale of slaves."<sup>7</sup>

In addition to these powerful Mafouks at Loango Bay, Malemba and Cabinda, Mafouks also represented smaller communities within each trading region:

Lesser Mafouks were appointed by this principal Mafouk in villages that were trading centres, often by rivers, lakes or on the coast. In Loango, for example, there was one at the Chilogo River in the northern part of the kingdom, where Europeans sometimes sent small boats to collect a handful of slaves, from their ships anchored at Loango Bay. These were minor positions, however, compared to the Mafouk at Loango Bay who dealt with Europeans and organized the trade.<sup>8</sup>

Thus, the Mafouks of the primary ports held the most sway both over their own port and over the lesser ports where they appointed officials. Whereas the Mafouk of Loango was a closest advisor to the Maloango, in Kakongo and Ngoyo the Mafouk was in charge of external trade with the Mambouk functioning as their overseer, chief advisor to the throne, and primary heir to the throne.<sup>9</sup>

Identifying the Mafouk of the key trading ports of Loango Bay, Malemba, and Cabinda using the MCC records does not come without its difficulties. Table 4 below lists all of the traders at Loango Bay who held the title of Mafouk and who engaged in slave trading activities with the MCC. This list includes 15 Mafouks. The variation in spelling ranges from Mafoeke, Mafoenge, maVoenge, Mafоек, Maffoeque and Mafoeque to Maphuka (see below). For the sake of consistency and clarity, this author will follow the lead of Phyllis Martin in retaining the spelling "Mafouk" from this point forward when the sources do not specify alternative spelling.

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<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 97-8. Also see: Proyart, *Histoire*, pp. 124-5, 131-2; Grandpre, *Voyage*, pp. 121-2, 189-91, 199-205; Cuvelier, *Documents*, p. 20, 22; and, Merlet, Annie, *Autour du Loango, XVe-XIXe siècle: histoire des peuples du sud-ouest du Gabon au temps du Royaume de Loango et du "Congo français"* (Libreville: Centre culturel français Saint-Exupéry-Sépia, 1991) p. 55.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*

Table 4: Mafouks Trading at Loango Bay 1757 to 1774

<b>Mafoukes Trading in Loango</b>	<b>First Year</b>	<b>Last Year</b>	<b>Number of Transactions</b>	<b>Number of Years with Data</b>
Mafoeke Claas/Mafoeke Klaas	1757	1758	24	2
Mafoeke melemme	1757	1757	2	1
Willem Mafoenge/Willem maVoenge	1757	1758	5	2
Mafoeke deijk/Mafoeke Dik	1758	1762	5	2
Mafoeke Bleinboo/Mafoeke Bliembo/Mafoeke Blienbo/Mafoeke Blienboo	1762	1762	22	1
Mafoeke Fabba	1762	1762	16	1
Mafoeke Kobbole/Mafoeke Kobele/Mafoeke Kobole/Mafoeke Koebel/Mafoeke Koebele/Mafoeke Koebeloe/Mafoeke Koebole	1762	1762	39	1
Mafoeke Kombij	1762	1762	5	1
Mafoeke Robben/Mafoeke Robijn/Mafoek Robijn/Maffoeque Robbin/Mafoeque Robbin/Maphuka Robben	1762	1774	37	5
Mafoek Calli	1769	1769	2	1
Mafoeke Batje	1770	1770	4	1
Maffoeque Emanuel/Mafoeque Emamice/Mafoeque Emanuel/Maphuka Manuel	1771	1774	13	2
Mafoeque Fammer	1771	1771	1	1
Mafoeque Malemba	1771	1771	4	1
Maphuka Pessa	1774	1774	1	1

Sources: MCC 219-223, 333-337, 929-935, 1013-1017, & 1307-1311.

Establishing which Mafouks were visiting trade representatives and which Mafouks were the dominant negotiators of trade in a situation where at least 6 of 15 Mafouks are engaged in a significant number of transactions proves challenging. The approach is simple; it takes three considerations: first and foremost, Mafouks were appointed by the political ruler of the polity on the Loango Coast, and therefore if the ruler changed, it was most likely that the Mafouk changed; second, the Mafouk of a key port was more likely to be present in that port over more than one trading period; and finally, the key Mafouk was likely to engage in multiple transactions due to their key role in trade negotiations and the highest potential for profit. By applying these criteria to the MCC records, a rough but by no means conclusive list of Mafouks emerges for the mid eighteenth century.

Between 1757 and 1774, the MCC records provide five lists of transactions conducted at Loango Bay collected by Captain Hendrik Vandleven between 1757 and 1758, Captain Phillippus Verdonk in 1762, Captain Cornelis Pieterszen between 1769 and 1770, Cornelis van Haijen in 1771, and Skipper Johannas Bakker in 1774.<sup>1</sup> Vandleven reported to have traded with Mafouks Klaas, Melemme, and Willem. Four years later Verdonk reported trading with Mafouks Blienbo, Fabba, Koebole, Kombij, Robijn, and Calli. After a seven year gap in the records, Pieterszen also recorded transactions with Mafouk Robijn as well as with Mafouks Calli and Batje. The next year Haijen continued trading with Mafouk Robijn, adding Mafouks Emanuel, Fammer, and Malemba to the list. Three years later Bakker reported trading with Mafouks Robijn, Emanuel, and Pesso.

Based on the criteria established above, Mafouks Claas, Blienbo, Fabba, Koebole, Robijn, and Emanuel emerge as traders engaged in large numbers of transactions. As Mafouk Claas is the only Mafouk trading at Loango Bay in significant numbers in the 1757-58 period, he emerges as the most likely Mafouk of Loango Bay in the period. However, after this period he disappears from the records. In 1762, Mafouks Blienbo, Fabba, Koebole, and Robijn all appear to be trading at Loango Bay simultaneously. Though Blienbo, Fabba, and Koebole engaged in a substantial number of transactions, 22, 16 and 39 respectively, their presence at Loango Bay for only one trading cycle, as opposed to Mafouk Robijn who was present for five periods of trade with 37 transactions, leads me to believe Mafouk Robijn was the more permanent fixture at Loango Bay and most likely

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<sup>1</sup> MCC 219-223, 333-337, 929-935, 1013-1017, & 1307-1311.

the highest ranking Mafouk. Mafouk Robin continues to trade in the 1771 and 1774 periods when Mafouk Emanuel is also trading at Loango Bay.

Thus Mafouk Claas emerges as the Mafouk of Loango Bay 1757-58 during the reign of Koning Stolck who appears in the MCC records for the same period. He was followed by Mafouk Robijn who traded between 1762 and 1774. During this period the MCC records report Makosse Koning as Maloango in 1771. This evidence challenges Martin's list of Maloangos which suggest Maloango Makosse finished his reign in 1766 and that there was no ruling Maloango between 1766 and 1773. This new evidence suggests that Maloango Makosse was still around until at least 1771 with Mafouk Robijn acting as the Makosse's chief representative in foreign trade. Thus the MCC records are a valuable source in refining Martin's rough time line of Maloangos and in adding valuable information on the Mafouks of Loango Bay as well as the leaving a record of the Mafouks within an feasible commute of the trading port. Still, much work remains to be done on the reconstruction of eighteenth century political stage of the Loango Coast. Additionally, these MCC records indicate that the Maloango had minimal personal engagement with the transatlantic slave trade during the peak of slave trade on the Loango coast. Both Koning Stolck and Makosse left the majority of slave trading to the Mafouks of Loango Bay (Claas and Robijn) and their regional counterparts (including Mafouks Bienbo, Fabba, Koebole, and Emanuel).

Unfortunately, the MCC data for Cabinda is less helpful in reconstructing the political and economic structure of trade of the Ngoyo. In 1770 the *Fregatschip de Geertruijda en Christina* traded at both Malemba and Cabinda. The 196 transactions recorded by this ship are the only data available on Cabinda traders in the MCC data. Although this makes it difficult to make any observations for Cabinda alone, it is not impossible. As data for the port of Malemba contains 3,156 transactions, these data can be used to exclude the Malemba merchants from the first list. As the *Geertruijda en Christina's* list of transactions only contains three possible Mafouks, this further simplifies the process. As Mafouk Blima exist in the records exclusive to the Malemba trade and Mafouk Mabaka only appears once, Maphaka Waba (or Mafouk Waba) seems to be the most likely candidate for the position of Mafouk for Cabinda in 1770. Mafouk Waba appears five times in the trade data and provides seven slaves (three men, three women and one girl) to an overall cargo of 320 slaves.

Despite its shortcomings where Cabinda is concerned, the MCC data on Malemba have the richest African merchant data of the entire coast and is consequently an excellent case study for the

development of Mafouks on the Loango Coast. Table 5, below, organizes these data based on period of trade, number of transactions, and total slaves sold. With the exceptions of Mafouks Malimbe and Louwango (Malemba and Loango) who engaged in five transactions in 1749, Mafouks do not begin to dominate the Malemba trade until 1755. A strong case can be made for Mafoeke Blienbo as Mafouk of Malemba between 1755 and 1776. Blienbo both the most consistent Mafouk on the coast during this period being present for nine trading periods, and Blienbo was far and away the most prolific trader engaging in 68 transactions for the sale of 171 slaves. If Blienbo was indeed the Mafouk of Malemba, it is highly likely that the 1755-1771 entries simply listed as “Mafoeke” are short form for Mafouk of Malemba and since these two categories completely overlap it would follow that the categories of “Mafoeke” and “Mafoeke Blienbo” could be combined to equal an impressive 173 transactions for the sale of 316 slaves. This represents at least three per cent of all 10,077 slaves recorded to have embarked on 30 MCC ships. This easily would make Mafouk Blienbo the most important Loango trader for the MCC who held a political post. In addition to these totals for Malemba, Blienbo is also recorded to have traded at Loango Bay in 1762 and at Cabinda Bay in 1770 where he is listed as Blima. Blienbo was not the only Mafouk who left his post to trade to the best advantage: “Mafoeke Robin” who the Loango records suggest was Mafouk of Loango Bay from 1762 to 1774 appears to be trading on at Malemba in 1759. As this does not contradict the Loango Bay records above and as no records exist for that year, it is likely that Mafouk Robin’s tenure can be extended to 1759 through 1774. Mafouks Fabba and Kombij also appear on both the Loango and Malemba coasts suggesting that they were appointed as Mafouks of small settlements somewhere between the two ports. Also, according to Malemba records “Mapuka Wabben”, who was likely to have held the post of Mafouk of Cabinda in 1770, was still trading small numbers of slaves in 1772 and 1773. This suggests he was still active in Cabinda during this period. Mafouks Cousin, Boosman, Tate, Tom Pollo, Pollen, and Pieter, represented here by small numbers of transactions, were likely lesser Mafouks of nearby communities governed by the Maloango, Manikakongo, or the Mangoyo.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> MCC 216, 219, 456, 524, 528, 533, 795, 825, 938, 980, 985, 990 & 1289.

Table 5: Mafouks Trading at Malemba 1749-1774

<b>Mafouks Trading at Malemba</b>	<b>First Year</b>	<b>Last Year</b>	<b>Number of Transactions</b>	<b>Number of Years with Data</b>
Mafoeke Malimbe	1749	1749	4	1
Mafoeke Louwango	1749	1749	1	1
Mafoeke	1755	1771	105	5
Mafoeke Bliem/Mafoeke Bliembo/Mafoeke Blienbo/Mafoeke Blienboo/ MafoekeBlim/Mafoeke Blimbo/Mafoeke Blinbo/Mapjuka Blimba/Mafoeke Cliem	1755	1776	68	9
Mafoeke Cousin	1757	1757	1	1
Mafoeke Robin	1759	1759	1	1
Mafoeke Boosman	1759	1759	1	1
Mafoeke Fabba/Mafoeke Fabbaa	1764	1764	13	1
Mafoeke Koembie/Mafoeke Kombij	1764	1776	16	3
Mafoeke Tate	1769	1770	6	2
Maphuka Tom Pollo	1772	1772	3	1
Mapuka Wabben, Waba	1772	1773	2	2
Mafoeken Pollen	1773	1773	4	1
Maphuka Pieter	1774	1774	1	1

Sources: MCC 216, 219, 456, 524, 528, 533, 795, 825, 938, 980, 985, 990 & 1289.

## Merchants of the Loango Coast

However important the big men of history, the economic records of the MCC give us a clearer glimpse of how these big men fit into the broader merchant community of the Loango Coast. The MCC records have detailed information on 593 Loango Coast merchants who engaged in 4,192 transactions for the purchase of 7,912 slaves between the years 1749 and 1776. This sample represents almost 80 per cent of the individual slaves recorded in the MCC data. So we know the identity of at least 80 per cent of slave merchants who were trading with the MCC during this period. This does not necessarily preclude these merchants from engaging in a greater proportion of the trade, it simply means we cannot connect the remaining 2,095 slaves to slave merchants known or unknown.

Appendix C includes a list of the before mentioned 593 Loango Coast merchants, including data on the multiple spellings of their names, the date range in which they appear in the MCC records, the numbers of individual transactions and slave sold, as well as the transactions and slaves which were sold in a joint venture with one or more other merchants. Using these numbers the author has calculated two different rankings: a ranking based on an average total of slaves sold per year, a ranking based on an average total of transactions per year. These rankings help to construct a picture of the overall importance of each merchant to the MCC slave trade throughout the 27-year period. (See Table 6 below. Also see Appendix C for a full list of Loango Coast merchants.)

According to the first index of based on the total number of slaves purchased, 43 Loango Coast Merchants stand out as the most important trade partners of the MCC in this period: Mat Intjee, Prins Thom, Mafoe [Mafouk] Bliem, Manuel, Coffij, Prins Majelle, Prins Macolle, Prins Maponda, Timpolle, Jan Claase, Mafoeke [Mafouk] Claas, Tim Candie, Prins Mangoeve, Maffoeque [Mafouk] Robbin, Mafoeke [Mafouk] Fabba, Maboba, Boense Basa, Pieketa Pee, Logie Jongen, Conde Samboe, Batij Claas, Andries, Tom Pollo, Gomma Konings Zoen [Gomma, King's Son], Prins Tom Crib, Tincosse, Tam Pollo, Bon Claijs Monebee, Masanse, Moenemoese Eerste Jonge [First Son of Moenemoese], Magoffe Dick, Prinses Mamtevi, Prins Wille Bort Mattijentie, Prins Jmbico, Tam Beelei, Mafoeken Pollen, Lange Piet, Maffoeque Emanuel, Prins Mavoegge, Pieter Claas, Puket, Coebeloe Loeboe, Gouverneur Mapello.<sup>1</sup> As you might expect, this list includes merchants who supplied large numbers of slaves: Mat Intjee supplied 391 slaves, Prins Thom supplied 374 slaves, Mafoe [Mafouk] Bliem

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<sup>1</sup> There are often multiple spellings of each name present in the MCC data, for simplification the spelling listed here is the first in an alphabetical list. For a more complete list of spellings see Appendix C.



supplied 195 slaves, Manuel supplied 170 slaves, Coffij supplied 165 slaves, Prins Majelle supplied 141 slaves, Prins Macolle supplied 140 slaves, Prins Maponda supplied 134 slaves, Timpolle supplied 120 slaves, and Jan Claase supplied 110 slaves. Each of these traders supplied slaves over more than one year, with Timpolle spending a minimum of two years trading with the MCC and Mat Intje spending a maximum of at least 10 years trading with the MCC. (See Table 6 below. Also see Appendix C for a full list of Loango Coast merchants.)

*Table 6: Overall Procurement Rates versus Procurement per Year for Loango Coast Merchants Trading with the MCC, 1749-1776*

<b>Top 10 Merchants: Total Slaves</b>		<b>Total Slaves</b>	<b>Top 10 Merchants: Slaves/Year</b>		<b>Slaves/Year</b>
1	Mat Intje	391	1	Timpolle	60.0
2	Prins Thom	374	2	Prins Thom	53.4
3	Mafoe Bliem	195	3	Prins Tom Crib	41.0
4	Manuel	170	4	Mat Intje	39.1
5	Coffij	165	5	Mafoeke Claas	36.0
6	Prins Majelle	141	6	Prins Macolle	35.0
7	Prins Macolle	140	7	Logie Jongen	34.5
8	Prins Maponda	134	8	Tincosse	33.0
9	Timpolle	120	9	Masanse	30.0
10	Jan Claase	110	10	Moenemoese Eerste Jonge	29.0

Source: Appendix C.

However, a second analysis of traders based on the rate of slave supply produces a different rank ordering of merchants, involving both some of those noted above as well as some others: Timpolle, who had been ranked second last jumps to first place with 60 slaves per year; Prins Thom remains a solid second trading 53.4 slaves per year; Prins Tom Crib, who did not rank in terms of total slaves, is third highest in the new ranking with 41 slaves per year; Mat Intje drops from first place to fourth place in the rankings with 39.1 slaves per year; Mafoeke Claas, who also did not rank in the top 10 total slaves, appears fifth highest with 36 per year; Prins Macolle rises from seventh in total slaves to sixth in slaves per year, supplying 35 per year; and Logie Jogen, Tincosses, Masanse, and Moenemoese Eerste Jonge all appear for the first time in seventh through tenth place respectively supplying 34.5, 33, 30 and 29 slaves per year. While a few traders engaged in a large percentage of the trade, many traders engaged in a very small percentage of the trade. This is consistent with the inequality analysis below, which shows that the majority of Loango Coast merchants who traded


with the MCC in the mid-eighteenth century engaged in small numbers of slave sales while a small minority of traders controlled a disproportionate of the supply.

Using an inequality analysis (see Graph 1 below) we can examine the pattern of individual investment of Loango Coast merchants in the slave trade with the MCC. While the Line of Equality traces the pattern which would have occurred if each trader engaged in the same number of transactions or provided the same number of slaves, the lines of cumulative transactions and slaves purchased, represent the divergence from the equality line. Over the 27 year period covered by this data, the first set of 500 merchants engaged in sales of groups of 19 slaves or less and contributed some 30 per cent of the total. Put another way, 85 per cent of merchants sold less than one slave per year on average. Merchants 501 through 568 each sold between 19 and 62 slaves contributing a further 30 per cent of total sales. This means that some 10 per cent of merchants sold an average of fewer than three slaves per year. Merchants 569 through 593 contributed the remaining 40 per cent of slaves, each provisioning between 65 and 319 slaves. These 25 merchants, equivalent to 15 per cent of Loango Coast merchants dealing with the MCC, sold on average 2-12 slaves per year to MCC ships. However, this is only an average rate. This did not mean a merchant could not sell in excess of 12 slaves per year, this calculation is simply meant to trace broad patterns. The analysis of transactions, closely follows this trend, identifying a few merchants engaging in the majority of transactions, while the bulk of merchants engage in small numbers of transactions. While it is possible that the merchants who traded small quantities of slaves for the MCC were busy trading larger quantities with the French and English ships which frequented this coast during this period, it is impossible to know without locating and examining other detailed records. For now, we will concentrate on the data relating to the MCC trade. A more nuanced interpretation of the data is available by calculating the rank of each merchant.

To begin understanding the large concentration of slave transactions in the hands of a few traders, it is possible to calculate the importance of merchants who are known to serve both a political and economic function in the slave trade. Where it has been established above that the most prominent political figures on the Loango Coast, the Maloango, the Manikakongo, and the Mangoyo had little direct influence on either the political or economic functioning of the slave trade, the Mafouks have been identified as playing a crucial political role. Table 8 below measures the economic importance of the Mafouks against two other groups: merchants with recognizable titles (including prince, or the prefixes "Ma" "Mani" or "Manni") and merchants without recognizable titles. In understanding this table it is important to recognize that identifying the second category of titles is an imprecise science

based on limited sources, as has been discussed above; Europeans struggled both to understand the political context of the Loango Coast and to

*Graph 1: Cumulative Percentages of Transactions and Slave Purchased by the MCC on the Loango Coast, 1749-1776*



Source: Appendix C.

convey their understandings in European languages. This table identifies 30 Mafouks who engaged in 447 transactions which involved 837 slaves. These 30 Mafouks account for the highest number of slaves traded per year, the highest number of transactions per merchant, and the highest overall average of slaves per merchant. In all three categories, merchants with other titles rank second, and merchants with no political status rank last. This suggests that merchants who held the title of Mafouk were the most prominent merchants in the trade with the MCC.

Table 8: African Merchants and Political Status in Slave Transactions with the MCC, 1749-1776

Merchant Status	Merchants	Transactions	Slaves	Avg. Slaves per Year	Trans. per Merchant	Slaves per Merchant
Mafouk	30	447	837	8.9	14.9	27.9
Other Title	265	2327	4617	6.8	8.8	17.4
No Title	297	1418	2458	5.0	4.8	8.3
	592	4192	7912	6.0	7.1	13.4

Sources: MCC 216, 219, 456, 524, 528, 533, 795, 825, 938, 980, 985, 990 & 1289.

These data have implications on both how we envision slave procurement and mechanisms of credit on the Loango Coast. While the supply of the big merchants can be easily explained by Phyllis Martin, Joseph Miller, and Jan Vansina's evidence of caravans running between the Loango Coast to Stanley Pool and beyond (which will be describe in detail in the next chapter), it does not necessarily account for the 95 per cent of merchants who supplied 60 per cent of slaves traded. While it is possible that some of these slaves were obtained from caravan traders once they arrived on the Loango Coast, it is also possible that men employed to carry goods and or provide security were paid in slaves upon completing their journey.

In the procurement process, Phyllis Martin provided proof that "An important limitation on the sale of Vili to Europeans was contained in a law which prohibited the sale of anyone born in Loango." With the exception of slaves who were disloyal or who had become a slave as punishment for a crime, this law was "strictly enforced by the Mafouk and his brokers."<sup>2</sup> Thus, local people would have access to slaves who had been found guilty of murder, theft, adultery, or who had unpaid debts. Another form of enslavement more common on other parts of the coast was enslavement through kidnapping and war. Due to the limited number of conflicts on the Loango Coast during the eighteenth century, it is unlikely that wartime conflicts were a major source of slaves. In John Thornton's book on *Warfare in Atlantic Africa*, the only significant conflict which he records on the Loango Coast prior to the nineteenth century is the failed attempt of the Portuguese to dominate the Cabinda market by force.<sup>3</sup> Phyllis Martin corroborated this finding:

<sup>2</sup> Martin, *The External Trade of the Loango Coast*, pp. 167-168.

<sup>3</sup> Thornton, *Warfare in Atlantic Africa*, p. 104.

Large-scale wars were unusual. An army of 200 was a considerable size. There was seldom a pitched battle. Vili armies preferred to use surprise and ambush. Once prisoners were taken, they could be used as a bargaining counter for the fortunate side. Campaigns seldom lasted more than a few days, for the soldiers did not like to go far from their home. They usually carried sufficient food with them. Or if they were close to home they were supplied by women.<sup>4</sup>

Despite the infrequency of conflicts, this does not completely discount the possibility of occasional occurrence of enslavement through war on the coast. Furthermore, it is possible that some slaves were obtained by kidnapping. However, the only documented occurrence of kidnapping I have been able to locate involved one African merchant seizing the slaves of another African merchant.<sup>5</sup> Still, the very fact that a law existed banning the selling of local residents and that it was part of the Mafouk's responsibility to prevent this occurrence suggests that the possibility existed. As this was considered a matter of internal governance in a society which did not maintain written judicial records, the absence of proof is not surprising.<sup>6</sup>

In addition to questions in connection with procurement, these data also raise questions, and perhaps some answers, about financing. Building upon the evidence from Chapters 2 and 4 which indicates that the bulk of trade was conducted in barter relations, it seems reasonable to conclude that it would be too risky or not cost effective for European slave traders to offer advances of goods to Loango Coast traders who offered a small number of slaves. As 568 of 593 traders provided 70 per cent of slaves at a rate of less than 13 slaves per year, it is unlikely that credit was extended for 70 per cent of 5,000 slave transactions. This would suggest, that if pawnship (which is defined by Toyin Falola and Paul E. Lovejoy as "a system in which individuals are held in debt bondage as collateral for loans")<sup>7</sup> was used as a method of extending credit on the Loango Coast, it is unlikely to have been widely used for 70 per cent of MCC trading transactions. The question of the remaining 30 per cent

<sup>4</sup> Martin, *The External Trade of the Loango Coast*, p.24.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 114.

<sup>6</sup> The ideas about the large numbers of small scale traders being linked to the possibility of enslavement as punishment and particularly debt enslavement were developed in conversation with Judith Spicksley on, 01 July 2011. This possibility requires further analysis.

<sup>7</sup> Toyin Falola and Paul E. Lovejoy, "Pawnship in Historical Perspective" in Toyin Falola and Paul E. Lovejoy (eds) *Pawnship, Slavery, and Colonialism in Africa* (Trenton: Africa World Press, 2003) p. 1.

of traders who supplied large numbers of slaves by provisioning caravans to the interior will be addressed in the next chapter in a specific analysis of slave procurement.

At this point we can conclude that while a small number of African merchants provided an extraordinary number of slaves to MCC ships, a large number of smaller traders also engaged in the trade. This suggests a large financial commitment to the transatlantic slave trade through multiple levels of society on the Loango Coast in the eighteenth century. While previous studies of merchant communities have focused primarily on the big merchant in the African slave trade, perhaps there is an underlying story of minor merchants yet to be discovered in Western African history, a history of small merchants who worked alongside the Aro in the Bight of Biafra or the major trading families in Ouidah. Mariana Candido has also indicated in a study of Benguela, that although a small number of big men, and even some prominent women, dominated the trade, “there were also many smaller merchants who handled only a few slaves at a time.”<sup>8</sup> Unfortunately, it is the big men of history whom the records allow us to remember best.

### **Power and Wealth: Transformations on the Loango Coast**

In 1966 Jan Vansina suggested that the Loango Coast followed an unusual path in response to encounters with Europeans. Unlike their neighbours to the south, the polities of the Loango Coast experienced a relatively peaceful period during the transatlantic slave trade. That is not to imply that the transatlantic slave trade did experience a great deal of external pressure due to the growing demands for slaves.<sup>9</sup> However, in 1990 Vansina goes on to argue that the disruption of political systems caused, at least in part, by external events on the Loango Coast in the seventeenth and eighteenth century were repaired by falling back on traditional power structures based authority in matriclan, “house”, or association structures.<sup>10</sup> This chapter has aimed to reimagine how the transformations which took place in the political and economic spheres contributed to this peaceful transition on the Loango Coast.

By comparing the activities of the local rulers to their appointed Mafouks, it quickly becomes apparent that the rulers themselves were reluctant to make a large direct investment in the

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<sup>8</sup> Candido, *Enslaving Frontiers*, p. 100.

<sup>9</sup> Vansina, *Kingdoms of the Savanna*, pp. 196-197.

<sup>10</sup> Vansina, *Paths in the Rainforest*, p. 236.

transatlantic slave trade. Whereas the Mafouks invested in large numbers of slaves, the Maloangos, Mangoyos and Manikakongos are listed only infrequently in the MCC records. While it is possible that they engaged more frequently with English or French traders, their absence in the 5,000 trade transactions with the MCC is conspicuous. Creating a system where exchanges were controlled by one man, who had no access to leadership promotion, where exchanges happened on the outskirts of town, and where profits were largely concentrated with one individual rather than the community as a whole, it is possible that the Maloango, the Manikongo, and the Mangoyo shielded, or insulated, their communities from external economic, religious and social influences. Miller described this relationship:

Mafouks or mambouks appointed at first to manage trade on the beaches on behalf of the monarchy gradually applied their growing wealth to take over the levers of political power in the realms for themselves. The royalty, which had begun by insulating itself from the commercial sphere, found itself compelled to remain distanced from the new sources of power.<sup>11</sup>

However, the evidence available does not speak to the intentions of these leaders in creating this system. It is possible that the trade simply became too complex and time consuming to manage alongside the other economic, political and religious obligations of the Loango Coast rulers.

Whatever the intent and however strategic or accidental this process was, the Loango Coast resisted the integration of new religious practices, at least in the short term. In her study of religion in Ngoyo entitled *Crown and Ritual*, Zdenka Volavka argues that the people of the Loango Coast maintained “certain deeply rooted social and cultural values during times of fundamental change.”<sup>12</sup> Heywood and Thornton confirm this finding in their exploration of West Central Africa. Noting the lack of permanent European settlement during the period of the transatlantic slave trade, they argue that the Loango Coast was not “creolized” in the same way as other Atlantic trading regions.<sup>13</sup> Thus the Loango Coast insulated itself from direct contact and perhaps even more profound change in their philosophies on authority. This could partly be explained through the appointment of Mafouks

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<sup>11</sup> Miller, *Way of Death*, p. 185.

<sup>12</sup> Volavka, *Crown and Ritual*, pp. 6-7.

<sup>13</sup> Thornton and Heywood, *Central Africans, Atlantic Creoles*, p. 207.

which was consistent with the policy of keeping Africans in charge of the trade on the Loango Coast and not allowing Europeans to maintain a permanent status on the Coast.

However, this concentration of the bulk of the profits came at a cost to the leaders in the region. As wealth began to be distributed among a new class of people, most notable the Mafouks, the leaders became less credible as centers for the redistribution of wealth. The eighteenth century slave trade provided a context of destabilization of Ngoyo. While the ruler of Ngoyo was not permitted to travel to the coast, the great men of Cabinda increased their wealth trading slaves with Europeans, and as their wealth grew, they gained authority. This led to a crisis of leadership when profits from the slave trade diminished and disappeared towards the end of the nineteenth century<sup>14</sup>

Martin further described the crisis of Ngoyo leadership: “Unable to participate fully in the trade, too weak to control the powerful families at Cabinda and overburdened with the expenses of the office, the Ngoyo rulers found themselves in an economic and political crisis.”<sup>15</sup> Beyond the power of the ruler, the Mafouks began to expand their influence in Cabinda through “a judicious mixing of economic activities of a capitalist kind, namely commerce with foreign slave-traders and investments in a more traditional mode.”<sup>16</sup> Although the slave trade was one element in the disintegration of central power, internal factors also may have played a role. Although it is difficult to establish to what extent the slave trade stimulated change in the political situation or the political situation shaped the slave trade, it is evident that these two patterns are inextricably linked.

## Conclusion

Through an examination of the MCC slave trading transactions, it quickly becomes evident that the Mafouk of Malemba, and to a lesser degree the Mafouks of Loango and Cabinda, held pivotal roles in intercultural exchange, benefiting hugely in both economic and political terms. This transition transformed the political structure of the Loango Coast. However, as argued above, this transformation occurred within a traditional framework of problem solving. In the eighteenth century, the role of Mafouk insulated the Maloango, the Mangoyo, and the Manikongo from the

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<sup>14</sup> Martin, “Family Strategies in Nineteenth-Century Cabinda,” p. 69.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 69-70.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 70.



religious and cultural transformations which took place in Angola. Equally, it allowed these leaders to indirectly benefit from the financial profits of the economic exchange while diminishing the effects intercultural exchange. However, the increasing profits and prestige gained by the Mafouk, an appointee without natural paths of access to leadership himself, and the growing dependence of the Loango Coast leaders on these brokers eventually created unforeseen consequences in the next century. When the profits of the transatlantic slave trade dried up, the authority of the Mafouks that was built on those profits diminished. This transformation undermined the political stability of the region and leaving it more vulnerable to European interference in the late nineteenth century.

In this region, a pattern of slave trade evolved which concentrated on procurement through indirect enslavement via long distance caravans to internal markets in contrast to regions such as Angola and Dahomey where slaves were supplied through direct wartime enslavement. Perhaps this caravan dominated slave supply, which drew from multiple interior sources and was supplemented by smaller but steady streams of slaves from minor traders, provided a more diverse and therefore possibly more consistent slave supply providing a viable and attractive alternative to the major slaving ports of Ouidah and Luanda. This theme of slave procurement will be further explored in the next chapter.

# Chapter 5: Negotiating Cross-Cultural Trade: From Coastal Markets to the Interior

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Whereas previous chapters have attempted to make sense of the actors in the transatlantic slave trade at both a collective and individual level, this chapter concentrates on the spaces in which these encounters happen and what happens when those actors meet. In doing so, it will provide a more focused analysis of the mechanisms of the slave trade, the frequency of exchanges, and the functions of those African actors holding key political roles. By tracing the journey of slaves backward from the Loango Coast through the caravans to the slave markets, this chapter will examine the role which European commodities play in African markets and communities. To achieve this end, this chapter will be divided into four parts: the first section explores the role of geographical factors in the slave trade on the Loango Coast; the second section examines the transactions between Middleburg and Loango traders from the arrival to the sailing of the ships focusing on qualitative rather than quantitative data; the third section discusses commodities and demand cycles on the Loango Coast in contrast to other African slave trading regions; and, the fourth section explores the journey of the caravans to the markets of the interior. This chapter explores the relevance of knowledge accumulation in negotiating the barriers and the obligations of trade partners. It is only through the creation of a cross-cultural understanding of limits and expectations that the Loango Coast was able to sustain and expand its supply of slaves into the transatlantic system throughout the eighteenth century.

Furthermore, this chapter argues that it was the Mafouks, rather than the local rulers, who facilitated and controlled the Loango Coast slave trade. This provided a barrier between European merchants and the local trade communities, slowing the impact of cross-cultural exchange on the local religious and cultural norms. However, this also allowed the Mafouks to amass enough personal wealth and political influence to undermine the power bases of local rulers.

## **The Geographical Context of the Loango Slave Trade**

By the mid-eighteenth century, Europeans and Africans had developed a complicated protocol for beginning trade on the Loango Coast. Due to strong winds and ocean currents ships arrived on the Loango Coast by one of two routes. The first route was favoured by the Portuguese ships that sailed in a “C” shaped pattern west out of Portugal and then south on the Atlantic Ocean passing close to the Brazilian coast before turning east from there to Benguela and north to the Loango Coast.<sup>17</sup> Dutch, English, and French captains did not often favour this route as it took them through Portuguese dominated waters. Instead they preferred the second route that held much more tightly to the western African coast stopping first at Mayumba, a small slave trading port to the north of Loango Bay, or even Gabon before proceeding southward to the Loango Bay, Malemba, or Cabinda Bay. This was the most common route in the eighteenth century. This section explores the physical geography which Europeans encountered at these ports.

As already established in previous chapters, after a series of failures to maintain permanent settlements on the Loango Coast Europeans had settled into a pattern of ship based trade in the eighteenth century. This meant that European merchants generally set up a temporary trading base on the periphery of Loango Coast towns or ports. The location of these temporary factories, as illustrated below in J. Kip’s 1732 drawing of Cabinda Bay, was often on the fringes of local settlements. Although little information is available about Kip himself, Kip’s diagram of Cabinda Bay is an exceptional document for the western coast of Africa. Although other historians have attempted to reconstruct descriptions and maps of the geography of ports, few have such excellent source material. For example, Robin Law’s meticulous study of the port of Ouidah includes a reconstruction of historical locations onto a modern map of the city and a physical description of where the European factories and forts were likely to have been located. Likewise, Paul Lovejoy and David Richardson use Kannan Nair’s 1972 map of the historical port of Old Calabar in combination with various British sources to reimagine the port of Old Calabar.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Candido, *Enslaving Frontiers*, p. 23.

<sup>18</sup> Law, *Ouidah*, pp. 11, 31-41; and, Lovejoy and Richardson, “Trust, Pawnship, and Atlantic History,” pp. 332, 347-348.

Thus, although historical images of Africa produced in this time period are notoriously unreliable, Kip's diagram is an excellent starting place.<sup>19</sup> The relative location of the temporary factories at Cabinda is corroborated by Martin's description of the bay:

Cabinda had the most room and safe anchorage on the Loango Coast. The sea was deep close to the shore, the bay was sheltered, wood and water were plentiful. This was the most convenient place for a base for the repair and refitting of ships. There was a village called Cabinda, but around the bay towards the Point of the Palmar were other smaller settlements which were also part of the Cabinda complex. The only disadvantage was that the climate of Cabinda was not as good as that of Malemba and most captains preferred to sleep on board ship.<sup>20</sup>

On Kip's drawings we can see marshy grounds, "wood pyles" [a wall of large pointed sticks], a fishermen's village, and a fresh water river separating the "Town of Cabinda" from the Factories. This seems to indicate that not only were the Europeans on the edge of town, but also that they were separated from town by both natural and manmade barriers. Presumably, these barriers would be for the protection of the indigenous inhabitants rather than Europeans, as they are positioned next to the "Town of Cabinda" rather than around the factories. Robin Law confirms this separation between indigenous towns and foreign merchant spaces both in Ouidah and in the coastal regions of Western Africa as a whole though he does not make mention of a physical barrier between the indigenous towns and the Europeans' lodgings.<sup>21</sup> Furthermore, Joseph C. Miller supports this interpretation in his analysis of trade in West Central Africa: "Quarantine of the often aggressive foreign traders and their crew of unruly slave guards and bearers within the


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<sup>19</sup> For a discussion on the difficulties of representing "others" in art see: Dipti Desai, "Imaging Difference: The Politics of Representation in Multicultural Art Education," *Studies in Art Education*, Vol. 41, No. 2 (Winter, 2000), pp. 114-129.

<sup>20</sup> Point of the Palmar is also known as Pont do Palmar. The editor's note in Andrew Battle's *Strange Adventures* reads: "This is Red Point or Ponta Vermelha, where there is a grove of palms" p. 42. Martin, *The External Trade of the Loango Coast*, p. 95.

<sup>21</sup> Law, *Ouidah*, pp. 32.

Illustration 1: Cabinda Bay



Source: Kip, J. Mouth of the River Congo and Cabinda Bay (G241:4/23), Macpherson Collection, National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, UK. Also available at <http://www.nmm.ac.uk/collections/explore/object.cfm?ID=G241%3A4%2F23>. Accessed on 31 March 2011. Reproduced with permission from the National Maritime Museum.

market settlements helped to insulate the surrounding neighbourhoods from the unsettling influence of foreign trade.”<sup>22</sup>

Even farther along the point we find “Negro’s Town”. Reference to a “Negro’s Town” can be found in a drawing of Fort James, the English fort at Accra. The drawing includes a location for both “Negro’s Town” and “The landing place”.<sup>23</sup> Perhaps this is where the slaves were housed before embarking.

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<sup>22</sup> Miller, *Way of Death*, p. 183.

Another possibility is that this is where the local inhabitants lived when they had a labour contract with European traders. These are by no means exclusive options, nor are they the only possible explanation for these “towns”. Whatever the case, these “Negro’s Towns” seem to be directly related to the presence of European forts or factories. Another factor involved in the location of the factories is implicit in the map: the vulnerability of European health. Two features, the proximity of fresh water and the relative distance from the mosquito infested marsh lands, inevitably were negotiated with recognition of poor European adaptation to the climate and the need for fresh water at the end of a long voyage from Europe. While the town of Cabinda is located on high ground, the elevation of the factories is not clear from this diagram; higher ground usually was associated with healthier living conditions. If the factories were located at low elevation, this may account for the unhealthy conditions reported by European travellers.

Like Cabinda, Loango Bay had a reputation for being “unhealthy”, though Martin suggests that “such tales were often a ruse to discourage Europeans from trying to establish more permanent factories ashore.”<sup>24</sup> As was the case for Cabinda, Loango Bay and Malemba also had small areas for European trade on the periphery of town. At Loango Bay European factories sat upon the top of a small hill referred to as the ‘Point’; at Malemba European factories sat at the top of Malemba Hill, with the northern side being referred to as ‘Dutch Hill’ and the southern side ‘French Hill’. In contrast to Cabinda and Loango, Malemba’s climate was relatively healthy. At least, European traders were willing to risk sleeping on shore and the factories were of a more permanent nature. Perhaps these small comforts had an impact on the growing popularity of Malemba in the late eighteenth century.

Yet even before the boom in the slave trade in the late eighteenth century, European travellers were attracted to the port of Malemba. F. Denis Carli, an Italian missionary to Kongo and Kakongo between 1666 and 1667, offered the following description of Malemba and the Kakongo people:

The first and most famous of these [ports] is that of Loango, the second of Capinda [sic], and the third and last that of Cacongo [Malemba] itself, but which is not very secure. This kingdom for the most part is flat, with air indifferently

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<sup>23</sup> “The Fort James, English at Accra A. Negro's town B. The landing place C. A large canoe” (London, Printed by assignment from Messrs. Churchill for H. Lintot and J. Osborn, 1744-46. vol. 5, Available at: Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University, Bibliographic Record Number: 2031576.)

<sup>24</sup> Martin, *The External Trade of the Loango Coast*, p 95.

wholesome, and soil not unfruitful, by reason of frequent showers, and the moulds being generally black, whereas in other parts of Ethiopia [meaning Africa] it is either sandy or chalky. The Inhabitants of this country, considering they have been born pagans, are more courteous and humane than ordinary, and though they are Infidels, they cherish and respect our priests.<sup>25</sup>

While admitting the less secure anchorage for ships off the coast of Malemba, Carli's descriptions of the healthy climate and his warm reception from the Kakongo people are more useful than his moral pronouncements. Though, it seems clear that Carli's religious motivations did not unsettle the people of Cabinda. This contact occurred seventy years before the arrival of the MCC at Malemba. Just as Carli before them, the MCC found a positive reception at Malemba conducting their most successful slave trading endeavours at this port.

### **Day to Day Negotiations on the Loango Coast**

Using a compilation of travel documents and shipping logs, Phyllis Martin constructs a picture of what Europeans encountered upon their arrival: first the captain fired a volley of cannon shots to signal their arrival; second, the Mafouk either sent a messenger to the ship or went to the ship himself to set the terms of trade, at this point a fixed price might be set; third, the captain went ashore to establish the availability of slaves, the level of competition, and to seek news of the other local ports; if the conditions were favourable, his crew would hire local porters and canoes to set up shop on the coast.<sup>26</sup> While Chapter 2 has outlined the resistance to permanent factories on the Loango Coast in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, in this context a factory refers to a temporary store house which the Europeans used while anchored off shore and abandoned once the ship was fully provisioned and set sail for the Americas. Johannes Postma refers to the factories of the Loango Coast as "mere trading lodges that could operate only with the approval of the indigenous African authorities."<sup>27</sup> This description seems consistent with the MCC's trade patterns on the Loango Coast.

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<sup>25</sup> Angelo and Carli, "Account of the Congo," p. 736.

<sup>26</sup> Martin, *The External Trade of the Loango Coast*, pp. 101-102.

<sup>27</sup> Postma, *The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade*, p. 65.

While Martin has given us a solid starting point for imagining how trade proceeded on the Loango Coast, there is a significant problem in her description of these events. While it is evident in her footnotes, Martin does not acknowledge the time differences between her documents which range from sixteenth century to late eighteenth century. Thus Martin does not sufficiently explore the possibility of change over time. Although Dutch trader Pieter van den Broecke, English trader Andrew Battell, British Captain Charles Wilson, and the MCC representatives experienced similar elements in their reception on the Loango Coast, an almost two century time difference undoubtedly resulted in differing expectations between the two men. In his published journals Broecke records asking the Maloango for permission to trade upon arrival but does not mention saluting with a cannon upon his arrival.<sup>28</sup> Neither does Andrew Battell mention a salute as part of the customs of trade at the Loango Coast.<sup>29</sup>

Almost 200 years after Broecke and Battell visited the Loango Coast, Europeans continued to follow a similar, though presumably more institutionalized, protocol. This protocol is described in a 1783 letter from Leyland, Penny and Co. of Liverpool to Captain Charles Wilson of the Brig *Madampookata*: “On your arrival off Cabinda, or should you first fall in with Malimba [Malemba], and find ships there, take care not to approach too near, until you are informed if they are Friends or Enemies – We apprehend you will meet with no ships at Cabinda; on your coming near the Bay anchor without in five Fathom, the canoes will come along beside and by them send for Prince Mambooka Madampookata [Mambouk], and the Mamfooka [Mafouk].” (For a full transcription of the letter see Appendix D). Although this document also notes the requirement to seek permission to trade before going ashore, it contains a notable difference. By the eighteenth century it was the Mafouk to whom European traders appealed upon their arrival on the Loango Coast rather than the Maloango, or in this case the Mangoyo who was the ruler of Cabinda. Once the office of Mafouks had been established, Europeans only had access to the rulers of the Loango Coast in exceptional circumstances.

Likewise, between Broecke’s voyage in the early 1600s and Wilson’s voyage in the 1780s, the volume of European trade to the Loango Coast had increased significantly in response to the

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<sup>28</sup> Broecke, *Journal*, pp. 56 & 74.

<sup>29</sup> For more details on Battell’s experience and observations on the Loango Coast see: Battell, *Strange Adventures*, pp. 9, 42-50, 86, 104, 166.



external demand for captives. Outside of his own trading expedition, Broecke does mention at least one other ship on the coast. This is in contrast to the year the Madampookata arrived on the Loango Coast when the Slave Voyages Database records five other slave trading ship on the Loango Coast. However, during the entire 1604 and 1614 time period of Broecke's travels, the database records no slaving ships on the coast.<sup>30</sup> While the concentration of ships on the Loango Coast was undeniably lower in the early 1600s than it was in the 1780s, it is important to remember that not all ships arriving on the Loango Coast in either period were slaving ships. Prior to 1670, most Europeans trading on the Loango Coast sought redwood, ivory, and cloth. Nevertheless we can conclude that between these two periods, the volume of institutional knowledge about trade on the Loango Coast increased exponentially in Europe, as exhibited in Captain Wilson's letter, while at the same time the people of the Loango Coast were adjusting their trade mechanisms to accommodate an ever growing European demand for trade goods, primarily slaves.

In L. R. Priester's analysis of the MCC records, he found a journal entry from Johannes Bakker, Skipper of the Fregatschip Aurora, in April of 1772. This entry records that upon arrival Bakker ordered the cannons fired: five times to salute the ruler of Malemba and seven shots twice to salute the Mafouk of Malemba. Priester also mentions MCC captains using this signal at Nazareth and Popo.<sup>31</sup> Nazareth was the name for the Ogooué River which is located at Cape Lopez the northern most point of the Loango Coast. Popo was located to the west of Ouidah on the Slave Coast. The diversity of places where this signal was employed raises the possibility that it was a signal arranged by the Europeans rather than the people of Loango. This signal would have expedited gaining the permission required to commence trade.

Priester found the following description in Hendrik Vandleven's logbook for the *Snaawschip de Drie Gezusters* in October of 1758. This is a translation of Priester's argument which is originally written in Dutch:

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<sup>30</sup> <http://www.slavevoyages.org> Query: Time Frame - from 1783 to 1783; Principal Place of Slave Purchase - Mayumba, Kiloango, Loango Bay [Boary], Malemba, Cabinda, Congo North [Loango Coast Undefined], Rio Zaire [Congo River],'

<sup>31</sup> L. R. Priester, *De Nederlandse houding ten aanzien van de slavenhandel en slavernij, 1596-1863: Het gedrag van de slavenhandelaren van de Commercie Compagnie van Middelburg in de 18e eeuw* (Middelburg : Commissie Regionale Geschiedbeoefening Zeeland, 1987) p. 129.

[African and Europeans] both favour commercial techniques which involve the kidnapping of people and the seizure of goods, to prevent [their trade partners from not] fulfilling their trade promises. When Hendrik Santleven wanted to go from Loango to Cabinda or Malemba to find slaves, the [Loango] traders seized his [Santleven's] trade goods plus a number of crew. Only one month later, when there were over 170 slaves added [to the cargo], both were released.<sup>32</sup>

This is an example of Dutch crew members and cargo being taken to ensure Dutch traders would return to continue buying slaves. To describe this relationship Priester uses the Dutch word “bemanningsleden” which translates roughly as pawnship. Although this arrangement could not strictly be called pawnship by Toyin Falola and Paul E. Lovejoy’s definition as it does not involve an explicit debt nor does it require the seized person to perform labour, this might be better understood as “hostages” being voluntarily offered or “pledged” to guarantee a business arrangement.<sup>33</sup> It is difficult to tell from the source if this was indeed a “voluntary” action or a seizure of goods and persons because the merchants of Loango feared Vandleven [or Santleven] might be tempted to violate an agreement. If the seizure was involuntary, it comes closer to Robin Law’s definition of panyarring: “by which a creditor could hold a community collectively responsible for a debt contracted by one of its members, by seizing another member as security for repayment.”<sup>34</sup> In fact, Law provided an example of Europeans being seized in a similar manner as the example given by Priester:

On occasion, indeed, African creditors could even invoke the sanction of panyarring against European debtors. In 1722, the King of Allada, pursuing his claim for the debt of 100 slaves’ value which he claimed was owed to him by the Royal African Company, thus detained Bulfinch Lambe, an employee of the Company’s factory at Jakin, then the port of Allada, and told the Company’s chief

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<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 129.

<sup>33</sup> For a more in-depth discussion of the boundaries of defining a slave see Toyin Falola and Paul E. Lovejoy, “Pawnship in Historical Perspective” in Toyin Falola and Paul E. Lovejoy (eds) *Pawnship, Slavery and Colonialism in Africa* (Trenton: Africa World Press, 2003) p. 16.

<sup>34</sup> Robin Law, “On Pawning and Enslavement for Debt in the Precolonial Slave Coast” in Toyin Falola and Paul E. Lovejoy (eds) *Pawnship, Slavery and Colonialism in Africa* (Trenton: Africa World Press, 2003) p. 62.

factor there that “if he did not forthwith pay him this debt, he would make Mr Lambe a slave.”<sup>35</sup>

While Law’s corroborating example indicates that the use of Europeans as hostages in the negotiation of the slave trade was not an isolated example, we cannot extrapolate from these two examples that this style of negotiation was common place either in these specific ports or in Western Africa as a whole. It does, however, indicate the vulnerability of Europeans while trading on the Loango and Slave Coasts.

The most complete record of trade on the Loango Coast appeared in series of letters from an American slave trader reprinted in the Brownsville *Valley Sunday Star-Monitor-Herald* in 1938. This unidentified author wrote the following directions for trade on the Loango Coast circa 1812: “In running in for the land in the night, there is no danger to run into nine or ten fathoms of water or any part of the coast. The anchorages are all good. In being seen from the land, in the night, the Natives will immediately come off and show you the anchoring place.”<sup>36</sup> Although there is no mention of a cannon signal, the letter continues to describe a scene very similar to the one outlined by Martin above. This account reinforces and confirms six key themes of trade discussed this far. Firstly, it confirms the role of the Mafouk in greeting foreign merchants, negotiating the conditions of trade, maintaining order, and establishing merchants on the coast. Secondly, this reinforces the suggestion that Mafouks and European merchants engaged in price fixing before transactions began, at least by the early nineteenth century. Thirdly, this account corroborates reports that merchants trading at Loango Bay slept aboard ship at night thus engaging in shipboard trade. This leads us to the fourth theme, the use of local factories only as warehouses rather than as accommodation. Furthermore, this letter confirms the practice of foreign merchants being required to hire local labours as “factory boys” and guards for their factories. Finally, this letter reinforces an emphasis on barter trade in the context of an organized market involving the immediate exchange of goods.<sup>37</sup> Although trading protocol inevitably changed with time, Martin’s conclusions, in combination with the evidence from Broecke, Wilson, Bakker, and this unknown American slave trader, help to

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<sup>35</sup> Ibid., p. 63.

<sup>36</sup> Minne Gilbert, “Rare Glimpse of Slavery is Given in Letters Found in Valley Attic,” in *Valley Sunday Star-Monitor-Herald* (Brownsville, Texas: 9, 16, 23 January 1938). Many thanks to Bruce L. Mouser for bringing these documents to my attention.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid.

reconstruct a picture of how trade was established in the early seventeenth century and how this trade evolved to the state of trade which existed the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

Using this evidence, we can begin to imagine how slave trading occurred between MCC and Loango Coast merchants. In February of 1759 MCC Skipper David Mulders of the *Fregatschip Middelburgse Welvaren II* landed on the Loango Coast to begin slave trading at the port of Malemba. In just over two short months, Skipper Mulders embarked 424 slaves and set sail for Curacao. In September of the same year Captain Adriaan Jacobse of the *Fregatschip Prins Willem de Vijfde* began trade at the same port. By the end of November he had departed the coast for Suriname with 472 slaves on board.<sup>38</sup> Drawing upon these records we can begin to get a clearer picture how trade negotiations proceeded. After anchoring off the coast from Malemba, signaling with their cannons, and negotiating for trading privileges, Skipper David Mulders and Captain Jacobse would have spared no time in establishing themselves on the above mentioned Dutch Hill. This might take days or in best case scenario, a number of hours. Once established, trade negotiations began immediately. Illustrations 2 and 3 below are transcriptions and translations of the first two trade transactions of each of these ships. While the majority of MCC transactions are recorded in a standard format containing very similar information, two examples are given to show the types of slight variations in style between captains. These records have been chosen by four criteria: first and foremost, they were chosen for legibility; second, they were chosen roughly in the middle of the MCC's trading period on the coast; third, they have been chosen from the records of transactions at Malemba Bay; and four, they have been chosen on the first day of trade to control for fluctuations in both slave availability and European trade goods. An analysis of these documents will help us to understand the nature of a business transaction between a European and an African in eighteenth century Malemba.

Several things can be observed by a cross comparison of these documents. First and foremost, although the formats are quite similar, they do include subtle differences which complicate the standardization of data collection. For example, the first document contains details including the date, the Malemba merchant's name, the number of slaves involved, and the rate of remuneration

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<sup>38</sup> For more information on these voyages see *Fregatschip Middelburgs Welvaren II's* trading records, MCC 793-799 *Fregatschip Prins Willem de Vijfdes'* trading records, MCC 989-993. Also see: <http://www.slavevoyages.org> Query: Voyage 10872, *Middelburgs Welvaren* (1759) and Voyage 10960, *Prins Willem de Vijfde* (1760).

per slave, whereas the second document simply lists the name of the Malemba merchant. The cross comparison of these documents also give us a sense of variation between slave prices and the bundles which these prices represent.

Furthermore, the listing of the number of pieces per slave in Illustrations 2 and 3 suggests a pre-negotiated fixed price. A further analysis of the data for Skipper David Mulders' records shows that with the exception of two male slaves purchased for 14 each and two male slaves being purchased at 7 ½ each, the remainder of 192 male slaves were purchased for 15 pieces; with the exception of one female purchased for 15 pieces, the remainder of 113 female slaves were purchased for 14 pieces. For children the statistics are more complicated, presumably due to varying ages: whereas one boy was purchased for 15 and another for 14, the majority of children, including 112 slaves both male and female, were purchased for between 9 and 13 pieces each. These data seem to support the suggestion that Skipper Mulders prearranged a fixed-price for male and female slaves and perhaps even a price range for children, before trading commenced. Other sources indicate the price range for slaves had some flexibility in the negotiation of a fixed price.

British Captain Charles Wilson's 1783 letter of instructions from his employer Leyland, Penny and Co. reads: "make them this offer that if they will agree to give you prime slaves for 14 pieces with 2 or 3 pieces wages you will continue and make your whole purchase, nay rather give them 15 or 16 pieces, with 2 or 3 Pieces wages than go farther for we conceive what you'll gain in dispatch will be adequate to the difference in price."<sup>39</sup> Whereas this suggests that fixing slave prices was a common practice, the fixing of prices did not necessarily result in Malemba merchants receiving merchandise worth a fixed amount in guilders, as exhibited in Illustration 2 where Banse receives approximately 164 guilders worth of guns, ammunition, textiles and miscellaneous goods equaling almost 55 guilders per slave, whereas Jan Flink receives less than 54 guilders in trade goods per slave. This letter also suggested that in the 24 years between the sailing of Mulders' 1759 voyage and Wilson's 1783 voyage, prices at Malemba remained fairly stable in terms of the piece currency. However, this does not stand up against a more sustained analysis of price data over time.

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<sup>39</sup> See Appendix D below.

Illustration 2: Translation and Transcription of the first two Trade Negotiations of Skipper David Mulders at Malemba, 1759

Transaction No.	Male	Female	Boy	Girl	Quantity	Malemba Merchants / Trade Goods	Pieces	Guilders <sup>1</sup>		
1	1					<b>Mafoeke</b>				
					3	Barrels of Gunpowder	3	12		
					2	Guns	2	6	18	
					1	Blue Guinea [textile]	3	11	6	
					1	Sitz [?]	3	9	5	
					1	Tapseils [textile]	2	9	10	
					1	Company Nicanes [textile]	2	6	5	
					1	Half Ankers <sup>2</sup> [alcohol]	1	4	10	
					1	Half Seylone [Silesias, textile]	1 ½	5	5	
					1	Ysene[?] Slave	½	1	10	
					5	Cannen	½	8	8	
					1	E. Baay [textile?]	1	7		
					1	Kelder[Beer]	1	3		
							Subtotal	20 ½	76	17 8
2			1			<b>Jan Klaasen</b>				
					2	Barrels of Gunpowder	2	8		
					2	Guns	2	6	18	
					1	Blue Guinea [textile]	3	11	6	
					1	Fooklas [Folhinhos, cotton from Balghat, India]	2	7	15	
					1	Company Nicanes	2	6	5	
					2	Kelder[Beer]	2	6		
					½	Seylone [Silesias]	1 ½	5	5	
					1	Ysene[?] Slave	½	1	10	
					5	Cannen	½	8	8	
							Subtotal	15 ½	53	7 8

Source: MCC 79

<sup>1</sup> The guilder is a historical Dutch currency. It was divided into 20 stuivers, each of 16 penningen. Thus the first subtotal would read: seventy-six guilders, seventeen stuivers, eight penningen.

<sup>2</sup> An anker is 10 gallon measure of wine, spirits or beer.

Illustration 3: Translation and Transcription of the first two Trade Negotiations of Captain Adriaan Jacobse at Malemba, 1759

Number of Slaves	Male	Female	Boy	Girl	Quantity	Transaction Details / Trade Goods with individual prices	Pieces	Guilders
3	3					<b>1 February 1759 at Malemba from the merchant Banse 3 male slaves @ 15 pieces per slave</b>		
					6	8lbs Barrels of Gunpowder @ 4	6	24,
					3	Soldier's guns @ 3,13	3	10, 19
					3	Blue Guinea Textile @ 11 ¼	9	33, 15
					1	Large Cavalry Chelloes @ 8 ¾	2 ½	8, 15
					2	Long English Nicanes @ 9 ½	4	19,
					1	Compt [possibly VOC or MCC] Nicanes @ 6 3/8	2	6, 7 ½
					3	East India Tapseils @ 9	6	27,
					2	Blue Bajutapauts (textile) @ 9 ½	5	18, 10
					3/17	Ells Bright Blue (textile)@ 48 ½	1	2, 8 ½
					5/16	Ells Blue Piece (textile) @ 48	½	15
					2	Kelders [?] @ 6 jugs malt [beer] @ 2 ¾	2	5, 10
					6 doz	Packages iron knives@ 14	1 ½	4, 4
					6	Glass Tankards @ 6	1	1, 16
					1	Earthenware Pots @ 8 ½	1 ½	1, 5 ½
						Subtotal	45	164, 5, 8
1	1					<b>On the same date from Jan Flink one man slave at 15 pieces</b>		
					2	8lbs Barrels of Gunpowder @ 4	2	8,
					1	Soldier's guns @ 3,13	1	3, 13
					1	Blue Guinea Textile @ 11 ¼	3	11, 5
					1	Long English Nicanes @ 9 ½	2	9, 10
					1	Compt [MCC] Nicanes @ 6 ¾	2	6, 7 ½
					1	Course Blue (textile) @ 5 ½	1 ½	5, 10
					1	Alf Anker malt [beer] @ 4 ½	1	4, 5
					2 doz	Packages iron knives@ 14	½	1, 8
					3	Glass Tankards @ 6	½	18
					3	Earthenware Basins @ 6	½	18
					1	Zere* Slave @ 33	½	1, 13
					1	Earthenware Pots @ 8 ½	½	8 ½
						Subtotal	15	53, 16
						Total Cost	60	218, 1, 8
Total Slaves	4							

Source: MCC 990.

While Mulders and Wilson's records are very useful in establishing the nature of transactions, the composition of bundles, and the MCC methods of recording purchases, their information on price data is limited and, it is useful to fit these into a broader context. Appendix D in Chapter 3 includes a more systematic analysis of slave prices from the MCC records between 1732 and 1776. Two major patterns emerge from this appendix: the first occurs from 1732 to 1766, and the second occurs from 1767 to 1776. In the first period prices begin at an average of 17.5 pieces per slave in 1732; they drop to 13.1 in 1748, peak at 26.8 in 1755, drop to 13.7 in 1759, and stabilize between 18.1 and 19.8 for the remainder of the period. During this first period, 1755 stands out as an anomalous year. During the second period, slave prices start at an average of 24.3 in 1767, climbing steadily to 32.6 in 1770, briefly correct in 1771 to an average of 27 pieces per slave, then climb to a high of 48.6 in 1776. Comparing these data to Mulders data we find that Mulders purchased his cargo of slaves at the cheapest rate obtained by the MCC in the eighteenth century. In contrast Wilson's letter comes 10 years after this data, we can draw one of three conclusions: first, it is possible that the British were obtaining slaves at lower prices than the Dutch; second, it is possible that events of the late eighteenth century caused prices to drop (although this conclusion would contradict the patterns of slave prices from the Voyages Database which is illustrated in Graph 6, Chapter 3); third, it is possible that Leyland and Penny were working with old information, dating from before the explosion in slave prices circa 1766. Phyllis Martin's 1972 analysis of slave prices on the Loango Coast, compiled from French, English and Dutch sources, corresponds with the price trends exhibited in the MCC records and extend into the 1780s at which time prices range from 40 to 54 pieces per slave. This suggests that Captain Wilson likely encountered prices between 25 and 30 pieces per slave rather than the 15 or 16 pieces Leyland, Penny and Company led him to expect.<sup>1</sup>

Moving beyond slave prices to method of payment, a careful reading of the samples from the Mulders and Jacobse records suggest that the date of the negotiation was also the date of the exchange of slaves for goods. Here it is important to note that the format of the original documents has been preserved in the transcription and translation of these documents. Each transaction included a date. Multiple entries are given for each week. If merchants were accepting credit, it would seem most likely that multiple slaves would be contracted at a time and the

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<sup>1</sup> Martin, *The External Trade of the Loango Coast*, pp. 113-114.



merchant would not return for multiple days. However, in these transactions it is not unusual to see the same merchants recorded making multiple within the same month. For example Skipper Mulders engages in 29 transactions with Malemba merchant Tate and 76 transactions with Prins Tom. Furthermore, while the price slaves could have been fixed before the Middelburg merchants arrive on the shore, the composition of a bundle was not. There is no reason to suppose that these bundles were negotiated in advance of the transfer of slaves. Equally, if these goods are not being exchanged at the time of negotiation, why is there no mention of goods being owed at a later date nor any further documents remarking that these payments have been made? Negotiating for such specific bundles without immediate distribution would require meticulous running inventories of Dutch merchandise. Promising goods that were not available would have created difficulties in maintaining trust. Additionally, no records of delayed payments are available in the extensive records of the 31 MCC ships on this coast.

This runs contrary to Martin's description of trade on the Loango Coast:

When the slave trade was completed by a ship, the gong was rung to advise all the brokers to come for the payment of their fees. This was often a time of much hard bargaining on both side and the Mafouk and other captains might be needed as mediators. The adjustment of payments in relation to advances and to hostages was a particularly thorny problem. A broker frequently asked for advances in order to commence the purchase of slaves from inland merchants, and captains usually had to comply since they would be outplayed by their competitors if they did not. Sometimes a captain was able to insist on hostages as surety and the broker, if he was in debt, might have trouble in recovering a member of his family or a friend detained by a European.<sup>2</sup>

Although Martin presents a compelling and colourful description here, unfortunately she does not offer corroborating evidence in the form of footnotes. Martin may have evidence from other sources; however, the MCC financial records remain silent on the issue of pawnship, with the notable exception of the 1772 voyage of the *Aurora*, discussed above, which records the seizure of

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<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 103.

European goods and crew by local merchants who feared the *Aurora* would not honour their agreements.

Thus, in the absence of evidence of Loango Coast merchants seeking credit from European traders and in light of multiple transactions between the same parties in a concentrated time frame, we can conclude that MCC slave traders in the eighteenth century exchanged goods for slaves on the transaction date. Furthermore, evidence from the letters of an unidentified American slave merchant above and from English Commander James Fraser discussed in Chapter 2 provide more evidence for a barter based trade than a trade based on the extension of European financing of African slaving expeditions. Martin's conclusion that slaves were transferred immediately after an agreement was struck, also support this hypothesis of barter trade: "Once in the hands of the European buyer, the slave was usually kept over-night in the prison below the factory, and then transferred by canoe to the ship the next morning."<sup>3</sup> As soon as slaves were loaded onto the ships the slaves began their Middle Passage even if the ship did not leave the coast for several months. From this point MCC merchants were responsible for the nutrition and health of the slaves; any slaves who died would result in a loss of profit. Thus, fast procurement was the highest priority.

In the Western African slave trade, profits also depended on a series of costs beyond the individual payments for slaves. Portuguese sources suggest that the taxes demanded from African authorities who controlled the trade from Ambriz north to Mayumba, including the key ports of Loango Bay, Cabinda and Malemba, were substantially lower than their Portuguese counterparts in Luanda and Benguela.<sup>4</sup> Also unlike their Portuguese counterparts to the south, there was some flexibility in the negotiation of taxes on the Loango Coast. Captain Wilson is instructed by his employer Leyland, Penny & Co.: "you may with much propriety plead (being a small vessel you cannot afford to pay the same customs and presents and let the aforementioned gentlemen ratify such agreement ~ All this must be done before you send your Boat onshore."<sup>5</sup> This is not to suggest that such payments were avoidable, simply negotiable.

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<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. 104.

<sup>4</sup> Martin, "Family Strategies in Nineteenth-Century Cabinda," 73.

As not to overstate the importance of the evidence arrived from the analysis of two MCC records, we should further contextualize our knowledge of these two voyages in our earlier discussion of the Dutch transatlantic slave trade. Upon their departure from the Loango Coast both ships had been loaded in approximately two months, well under the 4.3 month average. While Mulders embarked an above average number of 424 slaves, Jacobse embarked a substantially higher 464 slaves. Both ships also maintained a relatively low death rate, with Jacobse's crew only losing zero point two per cent of slaves on the middle passage, and Mulders' crew losing zero point nine per cent.<sup>6</sup> Yet, even if these voyages are exceptional in the broader context, they still describe the processes taking place in 1759 and can thus be compared with other sets of data to create a more complete view of the Loango trade.

This brings us back to the theory proposed in Chapter 2, which suggested the purchase of slaves involves three levels of knowledge and three corresponding power relations: the establishment of a price in a local currency, pieces, where the local merchant has the advantage; the exchange of pieces for European goods, where Middelburg merchants know the value of the goods in Europe and Loango Coast merchants know the value of goods in the internal market; and, the calculation of the bundle in guilders, where Middelburg merchants have the advantage. These records indicate that the Mafouk successfully negotiated a fixed price for slaves, which balanced his exclusive access to knowledge of internal slave markets and his desire to keep European merchants from moving on to more profitable slave markets. Equally, if the Europeans did not agree to these terms, they risked prolonging their voyage and a loss of reputation with the local Mafouk. In the case of both the Loango and the Middelburg merchants, experienced traders had the edge in these negotiations. Yet by the eighteenth century, inexperienced traders on both sides had access to larger bodies of institutional knowledge, which helped to protect them from rash decisions.

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<sup>5</sup> See Appendix D below.

<sup>6</sup> See Fregatschip Middelburgs Welvaren II's trading records, MCC 793-799 Fregatschip Prins Willem de Vijfde's Vijfdes' trading records, MCC 989-993. Also see: <http://www.slavevoyages.org> Query: Voyage 10872, Middelburgs Welvaren (1759) and Voyage 10960, Prins Willem de Vijfde (1760). For further details on the average cargo sizes and mortality rates of ships see Chapter 3.

## Commodities

These bodies of institutional knowledge included an understanding of European demand for slaves among Loango Coast merchants and an understanding for the demand for textiles, guns, and alcohol on the Loango Coast commonly held among merchants of the MCC. To trade on the Loango Coast, a Middelburg merchant must have been aware of both the traditional cloth market and the demand for new and innovative trade goods. Despite the abilities of both trade parties to manipulate their institutional knowledge to their best advantage, the illustrations of trade negotiations above indicate a regular pattern in the distribution of goods involved in each “package” or “bundle” of trade goods exchanged. Joseph Miller suggests that the “assortment” of these bundles was dictated by the African consumers and that offering the appropriate assortment was integral to successful trading transactions.<sup>7</sup>

In Illustrations 2 & 3, above, I have included two samples of trade transactions to establish the variables involved in each exchange of a bundle for one or more slaves. In both sets of transactions the sample is taken from the first day of trade and thus the quality of slaves and variety of European merchandise should both be relatively good. Presumably, having chosen one year from which to examine these transactions will control for the influence of both African and European political events as well as the relative fluctuations in market demands. Thus, from these transactions we can make the following assumptions about an average bundle circa 1750.

First, each transaction contained at least one barrel of gunpowder (each barrel containing eight pounds of gunpowder) and one firearm (referred to by Jacobse as a soldier’s gun). In each case, the barrels of gunpowder were valued at one barrel to one piece, and each gun was obtained in the Netherlands for four guilders. This suggests that there was little flexibility for European profit on these goods, as the cost and the exchange rate remained fairly stable. In contrast, while guns were equally valued at one gun to one piece, Jacobse reported the cost of each gun at 3,13 guilders whereas Mulders reported a cost of 3,9 guilders suggesting that Mulders made a marginally higher profit on guns. An average male slave could be purchased for 15 guns or 15 barrels of gunpowder.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Miller, *Way of Death*, pp. 66-70.

<sup>8</sup> See Illustrations 4 & 5 below.

These items are consistently listed at the top of each list and therefore presumably the first items offered or requested. However, they only made up an average of 21 per cent of the value of each of the four trade bundles above. This finding is slightly lower than the combined figure of 23 percent which combines Unger's figures for guns, at 9 per cent, and gunpowder, at 14 per cent.

The sale of guns on the Loango Coast did not seem to stem from a desire among Dutch merchants to arm their enemies, as Postma suggested was the case on the Gold and Slave Coasts.<sup>9</sup> On the Loango Coast there is little evidence of armed forces above 200 men, yet each slaving ship delivered an approximate ration of one gun and one to two barrels of gunpowder per slave purchased.<sup>10</sup> This raises the question, why did Loango Coast merchants want guns? Miller argues that one of the driving forces behind the composition of a bundle on the West Central African Coast was the demand for assorted goods at Malebo Pool (also known as Stanley Pool).<sup>11</sup> Miller, Newson, and Minchin emphasize the continued reluctance of the Portuguese to trade guns and gunpowder to African merchants.<sup>12</sup> With limited supply of munitions available at the trade port of Luanda and the perpetual conflict in the interior of Angola, this may have stimulated some of the demand for guns on the Loango Coast which found their way into Angola markets.<sup>13</sup> In addition to war, Alpern suggested several non-war-related motivations for purchasing firearms including

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<sup>9</sup> Postma, *The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade*, p. 92.

<sup>10</sup> See Chapter 4 regarding army size.

<sup>11</sup> Miller, *Way of Death*, p.180.

<sup>12</sup> In the 1770s, the sale of gunpowder was banned in Luanda to protect the local Luso-African merchants from attacks from the interior, *ibid.*, p. 607. This is consistent with reports that the Portuguese were reluctant to sell firearms to their African trading partners in the earlier centuries of trade. See: Linda A. Newson and Susie Minchin, *From Capture to Sale: The Portuguese Slave Trade to Spanish South America in the Early Seventeenth Century* (Leiden: Brill, 2007) p. 45.

<sup>13</sup> Miller, *Way of Death*, p. 77. For a description of conflicts in Angola in the eighteenth century see: Thornton, *Warfare in Africa*, pp. 122-124.

hunting, protection from wild animals, noise making, as well as projecting an image of prestige and power.<sup>14</sup>

The second set of items to appear is textiles. While at least nine different varieties of cloth appear in these lists, Blue Guinea, Tapsiels, and Company Nicanes are the only varieties traded in both sets of documents. As with the guns, Blue Guinea cloth is valued differently between Jacobse at 11,6 guilders per cloth and Mulders at 11,5 guilders per cloth, while both are valued consistently at one cloth for three pieces. For Tapsiels, Jacobse reports a cost of 9,10 guilders per cloth and Mulders reports a cost of 9 guilders per cloth, while Tapsiels consistently traded on at Malemba for one cloth for two pieces. Company Nicanes cost Jacobse 6,5 while Mulders paid 6,7½. Again, value was more consistent at the Malemba market where Company Nicanes was exchanged in both cases at one cloth for two pieces. In this sample of transactions, textiles represent 64 per cent of the average bundle. This is approximately eight per cent higher than Unger's findings. This concurs with Jan Gewalt's findings that the proportion of textiles was higher in bundles negotiated on the Loango Coast.

This dominance of textiles in trade bundles is consistent with broader patterns throughout Western Africa. Drawing upon English, Dutch, and French sources, Marion Johnson described the importance of textiles: "The item imported into Africa most regularly and in the largest quantities was cloth in various forms."<sup>15</sup>In Linda Newson and Susie Michin's study of seventeenth century trade on the Upper Guinea Coast, they also suggested that cloth was the primary trade commodity. They calculated that cloth made up 40 per cent of the cargo for slave ships between 1617 and 1618. However, it is difficult to know how this compares to the percentages of bundles discussed above. Stanley Alpern provides an extensive, but by no means exhaustive, list of European, Indian, and African textiles and clothing items that were included in slaving ships'

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<sup>14</sup> Stanley E. Alpern, "What Africans Got for Their Slaves: A Master List of European Trade Goods" *History in Africa*, Vol. 22 (1995) pp. 20-21.

<sup>15</sup> Marion Johnson, "The Atlantic Slave Trade and the Economy of West Africa" in Roger Anstey and Paul E. H. Hair (eds) *Liverpool, the African Slave Trade, and Abolition* (Bristol: Historical Society of Lancashire and Cheshire, Occasional Series Vol. 2, 1976) p.16.

cargos in his articles “What Africans Got for Their Slaves: A Master List of European Trade Goods.”<sup>16</sup>

The dominance of cloth as an import good into the Loango Coast might be surprising given the availability of high quality locally produced cloth. In the early sixteenth century, Andrew Battell observed the production of palm cloth, or raphia cloth, on the Loango Coast. He observed: “The men in this kingdom make good store of palm-cloth of sundry sorts, very fine and curious.”<sup>17</sup> This cloth industry supported not only the local market but also markets as far away as Luanda where pieces of Loango textiles were used as currency (see the discussion on cloth as currency above).<sup>18</sup> However, European and Indian textiles found a ready market on the Loango Coast. Colleen Kriger, in *Cloth in West African History*, has argued that in areas such as the Guinea Coast where cloth production was a staple of the economy prior to European contact that: “far from being new trendsetters that offered long-overdue variety to a dreary local market, imported textiles were for the most part preselected to conform to established tastes and cultural values.”<sup>19</sup> This pattern of European adaption to African demands also characterized the import industry on the Loango Coast.

The analysis of slave prices provided by these data requires an understanding of Loango Coast currency. The cloth currency on the Loango Coast was a sophisticated currency which transformed to meet the demands of increasing cross cultural exchange from the earliest period of contact to the late eighteenth century. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Vili made cloth currencies called the libongos panos or panso sambes were in common circulation as far away as Luanda. However, the value of this currency diminished in Luanda when the Portuguese began using copper as currency in 1694. In Phyllis Martin’s article “*Power, Cloth and Currency on the Loango Coast*” she describes a ‘piece’: “The basic piece of cloth was used for currency, a libongo [the plural of libongo is mbongo], was about fourteen inches square and describes as about the size of

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<sup>16</sup> Alpern, “What Africans Got for Their Slaves,” pp. 6-12.

<sup>17</sup> Battell, *Strange Adventures*, p. 50.

<sup>18</sup> Miller, *Way of Death*, p. 181-2, 274; Broecke, *Journal*, p.102.

<sup>19</sup> Kriger, *Cloth in West African History*, p. 39.

a large handkerchief.”<sup>20</sup> Martin argued that in this early period the production of cloth was limited to the households of the elite in Loango, thus being a “carefully standardized” currency.

Furthermore she suggested: “The Maloango, himself, may have been the chief guarantor of the currency.”<sup>21</sup> In the seventieth and eightieth centuries, another type of cloth was in circulation on the Loango Coast called a macoute. This was different from the macoute used in Luanda by the Portuguese. Circa 1700, 350 macoute could purchase one slave. By this time a third measure of cloth currency came into use: the piece. This is the currency which appears alongside guilders in the MCC account books. A piece was a locally spun cloth measuring “six yards of material, and could be subdivided into four fathoms or twelve sticks.”<sup>22</sup> In addition to being an actual cloth, a piece could also be a standard unit of measure to value trade goods as we see in the MCC records. In 1700 one piece had the same value as a gun, a barrel of gun powder, or two cutlasses.<sup>23</sup>

A large and highly specific demand for certain European textiles developed out of a more historical demand for cloth on the Loango Coast not only as currency but also as a key commodity. Cloth was one of the oldest and most valued commodities of the Loango Coast. Understanding the peculiarities of the demand for cloth on the Loango Coast is fundamental to understanding the intersections between the Loango markets, their links to the interior, and the willingness to supply slaves for European consumption. Thus a more in-depth discussion on the production and social

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<sup>20</sup> Martin, “Power, Cloth and Currency on the Loango Coast,” p.2.

<sup>21</sup> Martin, *The External Trade of the Loango Coast*, p. 38.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 107.

<sup>23</sup> In his work on WIC sources Henk den Heijer found that the Dutch also purchased cloth on the Ivory Coast and in Benin for resale on the Gold Coast although it is unclear whether this cloth was used as currency. See Henk den Heijer, “West African Trade” in Johannes Postma and Victor Enthoven (eds) *Riches from Atlantic Commerce: Dutch Transatlantic Shipping, 1585-1817* (Leiden: Brill, 2003) p. 154 . For a description of the historiography of Cloth-Currency on the Guinea Coast of Africa see Carlos F. Liberato’s “Money, Cloth-Currency, Monopoly, and the Slave Trade in the Rivers of Guiné and the Cape Verde Islands, 1755-1777,” in Catherine Eagleton, Harcourt Fuller, and John Perkins (eds.) *Money in Africa* (British Museum Press, 2009) pp. 9-29. Joseph C. Miller describes the use of cloth as currency in the Angola slave trade in *Way of Death: Merchant Capitalism and the Angolan Slave Trade*, pp. 81-82. Cloth was not only used as currency in Africa during this period. Walter Hawthorn reports that cloth currency was also used in the Portuguese colonies of Pará and Maranhão in Amazonia in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. See: Hawthorne, *From Africa to Brazil*, p. 147. For more information on the use of cloth currencies on the Loango Coast see: Martin, *The External Trade of the Loango Coast*, pp. 36-39, 60, 61, 106, 107, 165; Curto, *Enslaving Spirits*, p. 58.



significance of cloth in Loango society and how the influx of European cloth affected these traditions is needed.

In her earlier works on Loango Coast in the seventeenth century, Martin suggests that weaving offered an occupation for a free man who did not have access to the wealth of the aristocracy in addition to the possible professions of copper smith and salt-making.<sup>24</sup> Drawing on Portuguese sources, David Birmingham emphasizes the central role of cloth in the expansion of trading networks throughout West Central Africa: "In the early seventeenth century much of the slave trade was conducted in two stages. In the first stage salt and shells as well as European trinkets and beads were used to buy palm-cloth from the people of the forest regions to the north and east of Kongo. In the second stage this cloth, which was used for clothing as well as being the most widely accepted currency in Angola, was exchanged for slaves. Pombeiros were sent to 'Congo de Batta' (or 'Gogon and Batta' in Battell's terminology) to buy the cloth. According to Pedro Sardinha this trade had expanded enormously in the first decade of the seventeenth century."<sup>25</sup>

Birmingham goes on to describe in more detail the cloth bought on the Loango Coast: "a number of cloths called 'exfula' were imported from the Loango coast. Each year two or three small vessels went there to fetch cargoes of six or seven thousand a piece. A rarer and more valuable Loango cloth was the 'ensaca' of which only about 300 were obtained each year, costing 1,200 *reis* apiece." According to Birmingham 'ensaca' is twice as expensive as the highest grade cloth 'painted cloth' which was available in Angola.<sup>26</sup>

Martin describes the role of cloth on the Loango Coast which went far beyond a currency or basic clothing: "Clothing and accessories were little associated with utilitarian needs, since neither climate nor work conditions made them necessary. Rather, dress conveyed identity, status, values and a sense of occasion. The association of power and wealth, ostentatiously displayed, was

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<sup>24</sup> Martin, *The External Trade of the Loango Coast*, pp. 27-28.

<sup>25</sup> Birmingham, *Trade and Conflict in Angola*, p. 79.

<sup>26</sup> Birmingham, *Trade and Conflict in Angola*, p. 79. Also see Battell, *Strange Adventures*, pp. 43-44.

deeply entrenched in equatorial African societies from the earliest times.”<sup>27</sup> She goes on to suggest that certain types of cloths could be worn only with permission of the ruler.<sup>28</sup> These laws are reminiscent of similar European sumptuary laws which forbade peasants to wear brightly coloured clothing or that governed the size of a ruff in correspondence to wealth and political position. Interestingly, while the people of the Loango Coast only allowed certain powerful members of society to wear specific types of high quality, locally produced cloth, they also developed somewhat contrary laws in regards to the consumption and display of European textiles. Thus, European textiles, and later Asian textiles imported by Europeans, added complexity and texture to a thriving textile trade on the Loango Coast. These imported textiles would have had to be competitive with the internal textile market by offering superior prices, quality, or variety.

Just as the production of superior quality of cloth offered significant economic potential within Loango Coast markets and in external trade, so did the importation of European cloths. The scarcity of European and East Indian cloth on the Loango Coast in the seventeenth century meant that it had more prestige value. The prestige associated with cloth resulted in constant demand for new varieties to distinguish the wealthiest members of society. As the profits of merchants rose, the wealth of the traditional rulers remained fairly constant. Thus, shifting cloth preferences came to symbolize the shifting power base on the Loango Coast which is described in the previous chapter.<sup>29</sup>

The third set of items to appear is alcohol. Alcohol is measured in two ways: by “kelder” and by “anker”. As malt is the only type of alcohol explicitly mentioned, calculations are made assuming both measures kelders and ankers refer to malt in these documents. Jacobse paid higher prices for both kelders and half ankers, spending 3 and 4,10 guilders respectively while Mulders paid 2,15

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<sup>27</sup> Phyllis M. Martin, “Contesting Clothes in Colonial Brazzaville” *The Journal of African History*, Vol. 35, No. 3. (1994) p. 401.

<sup>28</sup> Martin, “Contesting Clothes in Colonial Brazzaville,” pp. 402-3. Also see Battell, *Strange Adventures*; Brun, *Schiffarten*; Dapper, *Naukerige Beschrijvinge der Afrikaensche Gewesten*.

<sup>29</sup> See Martin, “Contesting Clothes in Colonial Brazzaville,” pp. 403-404; and Martin, “Family Strategies in Nineteenth-Century Cabinda.”

and 4,4 respectively. Alcohol represented seven per cent of the merchandise in these bundles. This is three per cent less alcohol than Unger finds for the MCC in Western Africa. This could suggest either that the demand for alcohol was slightly lower than the West African Coast, or that these bundles under-represent the total demand for alcohol on the Loango Coast. In contrast to these figures, José Curto has calculated that of the 1.2 million slaves shipped from Angola between 1710 and 1830, almost 300,000 were purchased using Brazilian alcohol.<sup>30</sup> This works out as 25 per cent of each bundle. This is substantially higher than either Unger's calculations for MCC trade in Western Africa and the sample given in this chapter. Furthermore, Miller concluded: "British muskets and French brandies off-loaded at Loango only partially satisfied hunters and chiefs in the interior near that part of the coast; buyers there also demanded secondary contacts with traders who could deliver Portuguese gunpowder and Brazilian rum from Luanda or Benguela."<sup>31</sup> José Curto has argued that within a West Central African context, alcohol played both a practical role, being consumed with meals, and a social role, being present at "occasions, social gatherings, commercial transactions, feasts, marriages, rituals, ancestor worship, and possibly even the display of the rulers' power."<sup>32</sup> Thus, it is unlikely that there was less demand for alcohol on the Loango Coast. If indeed alcohol was a less important part of a bundle on the Loango Coast than elsewhere, the extraordinary amount of cheap alcohol available through Luanda trade networks may have been part of the cause.

The final products to be listed in the MCC transactions include pots and basins. These appear only in Jacobse's transactions, suggesting that Jacobse provided a more diverse set of trade goods than Mulders. Perhaps this can be attributed in part to Jacobse's greater experience trading on the Loango Coast.<sup>33</sup> As not only the captain, but also as the chief factor, an MCC captain was responsible for overseeing the complete provisioning of the voyage.<sup>34</sup> Numerous bills of sale for

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<sup>30</sup> Curto, *Enslaving Spirits*, p. 129.

<sup>31</sup> Miller, *Way of Death*, p. 78.

<sup>32</sup> Curto, *Enslaving Spirits*, p. 40.

<sup>33</sup> Jacobse had already made a voyage to the Loango Coast in 1756, see <http://www.slavevoyages.org> Voyage ID 10958.

<sup>34</sup> Postma, *The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade*, p. 150.

provisions purchased in the Netherlands are kept in each MCC ship's records. Each bill is endorsed by the captain or his representative. Two items conspicuously absent from the MCC records for the ships trading in Loango are cowry shells and beads which were in high demand in the Niger Delta, Gambia and the Gold Coast and cowry shells which were in high demand in Angola.<sup>35</sup>

By comparing the common elements of these four transactions we can draw the following conclusions. First and foremost, Mulder was more successful than Jacobse at obtaining the best prices on trade stuffs in the Netherlands, paying a rate equal to or below Jacobse price on seven of eight items listed (see Illustration 4 below.) Second, prices of good fluctuated more in the Netherlands during the provisioning of these two ships than on the Loango Coast, where exchange between these two voyages remained steady. This would suggest more state control in the markets of the Loango Coast, and more flexibility to individual traders in the Netherlands during the same period. Third, by comparing the exchange values of guilders to pieces on eight key trade commodities, we can calculate a rough exchange rate of 3,15 Dutch guilders to one Loango piece in 1759. Four, textiles were clearly the most valued commodity on the Loango Coast contributing to 64 per cent of the four bundles listed below, weapons following at a distant 21 per cent, and alcohol and sundries contributing seven and eight per cent respectively (see Illustration 5 below).

Illustration 4: A Comparison of Trade Goods

	Gilders/ Jacobse	Gilders/ Mulders	AVG Gilders	Quantity	Piece	Exchange Value for a 15 piece Male Slave	Gilders/ Piece
Gunpowder	4.00	4.00	4.00	1	1	15.0	4.00
Gun	3.65	3.45	3.55	1	1	15.0	3.55
Blue Guinea	11.30	11.25	11.28	1	3	5.0	3.76
Tapsiels	9.50	9.00	9.25	1	2	7.5	4.63
Company Nicanes	6.25	6.38	6.31	1	2	7.5	3.16
Kelder	3.00	2.75	2.88	1	1	15.0	2.88
Half Anker	4.50	4.20	4.35	1	1	15.0	4.35
						AVG Exchange:	3.76

Source: These figures are calculated using Illustrations 2 & 3.

<sup>35</sup> For more information on the demand for beads and cowry shells, see: Johnson, "The Atlantic Slave Trade and the Economy of West Africa" pp. 17,18, & 20; Curtin, *Economic Change in Precolonial Africa*, pp. 238,240, 242, 246, 252, 258, 263, 312-319 & 326; Miller, *Way of Death*, 77, 78, 86, 183;

Illustration 5: Distribution of Goods in Bundles Sorted by Piece Values

Transaction No.	1	2	3	4	Totals	Percentage
Weapons	5	4	9	3	21.0	21.4%
Textiles	15.5	8.5	30	8.5	62.5	63.8%
Alcohol	2	2	2	1	7.0	7.1%
Sundries	1	1	3	2.5	7.5	7.7%

Source: These figures are calculated using Illustrations 2 & 3.

To measure changes in bundles over time, Mary Henrietta Kingsley offers a point of comparison. She identified three types of trade goods that were in demand on the Loango Coast in her 1883 book *West African Studies*. Here she describes broad patterns for the demand for trade goods at “Congo and Cabenda” in 1700. First and foremost, she lists textiles: Blue bafts, Guinea stuffs, Tapseils, Nicanees, Black bays, Annabasses, Painted callicoes, Blue paper Slesia, Scarlet, Pentadoes, Blue perpetuanas; second, she lists weapons: Muskets, Powder (in seven pound barrels), and Dutch cutlasses; and third, she list miscellaneous goods: Brass basins, Pewter basins of four, three, two and one pounds, and Coral.<sup>36</sup> Almost 60 years later Mulders and Jacobse list similar items in their trade receipts with Merchant Banse, Jan Flink, Mafoeke, and Jan Klaasen.

Several consistencies appear between Kingsley’s list from 1700 and the 1759 MCC trading receipts. In both cases gunpowder, guns, textiles, and basins rank among items of value on the Loango Coast. However, we find a slight change in the price of gunpowder. Whereas Europeans could trade seven pounds at the value of one piece in 1700, by 1759 the ratio was eight pounds of powder to one piece. It is more difficult to judge the change in textile prices as Kingsley specifies the measure of cloth that is exchangeable for a piece whereas Mulders and Jacobse do not include a measure. The exchange of one gun for one piece seems to remain consistent. Thus by comparing the MCC transaction records of 1759 to Kinsley’s reports we can conclude, over a 60 year period demand for cloths such as Guinea stuffs, Tapseils, and Nicanees remained in high demand on the Loango Coast, as did demand for guns and gunpowder, though the value of gunpowder diminished slightly over this time period.

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<sup>36</sup> Kingsley, “Trade Goods Used in the Early Trade with Africa,” pp. 631-632.

In Phillip Unger's analysis of the MCC slave trading records for the Western African Coast, he provided a breakdown of key commodities present in an average bundle. Based on his data, textiles were most important making up an average of 57 per cent of each bundle, gunpowder represented the next largest demand making up approximately 14 per cent of each bundle, alcohol accounted of 10 per cent, and guns and luxury goods accounted for nine per cent each.<sup>37</sup> While Unger's analysis included data from the West and West Central African Coasts, Postma suggested that the proportion of textiles were higher in bundles traded on the Loango Coast. Postma qualifies this statement, acknowledging a small sample which Jan Gewald used to calculate these figures.<sup>38</sup>

## Caravans

In examining supply chains in the transatlantic slave trade from the Loango Coast, it is import to remember two things: first and foremost, this is a trade developed, controlled, and at least to some extent financed by African traders. There is no evidence of European middle men operating in these supply chains; indeed, there are no African middlemen in the sense of Africans working at the behest of Europeans but only African agents and traders. Second, these trade networks were not formed by the demand for slaves but rather through the demand for copper and ivory. In describing the procurement for slaves who were sold at the Loango Coast, Martin asserts:

Unlike some other African kingdoms such as Dahomey, Loango had had a previous and long-established prosperity based not on the slave trade, but on a long-distance trade in copper and ivory. Thus, for the Vili, it was perhaps easier to obtain slaves through traditional trading methods rather than by other means [such as waging war or as a sentence for committing a crime].<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> W. S. Unger, "Bijdragen tot de geschiedenis van de Nederlandse slavenhandel II," p. 68.

<sup>38</sup> Postma, *The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade*, p. 105.

<sup>39</sup> Martin, *The External Trade of the Loango Coast*, p. 118.

Although Martin acknowledges the limitations of the sources on the supply routes running from the Loango Coast to slave markets in the interior,<sup>40</sup> she is confident that many of the caravan leaders originated in the Loango Coast.<sup>41</sup> It is very possible that this absence of information on slave caravans to the Loango Coast can be directly linked to European detachment from the process. This detachment could have sprung from an active policy among the Vili to protect their dominance of the trade, or it could have simply been a byproduct of the impermanent presence of Europeans on the coast.

Due to this relative lack of European involvement in slave procurement on the Loango Coast, very little work has been done on the topic. Jan Vansina's work remains one of the most substantial contributions to our understanding of these networks. In his 1962 article "Long-Distance Trade-Routes in Central Africa," he begins by dividing "the structure of indigenous trade in Central Africa" into three different categories:

- 1) **Local trade:** "trade from village to village within a given population" which is based on local resources and skills
- 2) **Trade between 'chiefdoms':** "conducted over greater distances either between culturally different peoples within a state, or between neighbouring peoples" which involves the trade of locally produced items in exchange for long-distance trade items such as European imports, salt, copper, and luxury goods which have passed through many hands.
- 3) **Direct trade over long distances:** "consisted mainly of the exchange of European goods-such as cloth, cowries, beads, fire-arms, powder, wine and, in some instances, iron or copper objects for slaves, ivory and copper, and , in the later seventeenth century, wax, and in the late nineteenth century, rubber."<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 122.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, p.119.

<sup>42</sup> Vansina, "Long-Distance Trade-Routes in Central Africa," pp. 376-77.

In terms of local trade networks on the Loango Coast, Vansina traces the Loango Bay trade of ivory, redwood, and oyster with Mayumba, and an ivory and redwood trade with Sete Cama. More likely in the trade between 'chiefdoms' was the trading networks established via the Portuguese with communities further afield:

Moreover the Portuguese had established a regional network between San Tome, Benin, Calabar, and the Rio del Rey, Loango and Pinda and Luanda. From Loango they exported to Luanda, elephants' hair, redwood, and raphia cloth. This raphia cloth was also used as currency in Angola. Copper from Loango and Pinda was exported to Luanda and turned into manilas which were exported to Benin, Calabar, and the Rio del Rey, where blue cloth would be bought to be sold again in Loango and Pinda.<sup>43</sup>

However, for the purposes of this chapter it is the last category, direct trade over long distances, in which we are most interested. In Joseph Miller's 1989 article "The Numbers, Origins, and Destinations of Slaves in the Eighteenth-Century Angolan Slave Trade," he suggest there were three long distance commercial networks in West Central Africa: "The same African suppliers who sent slaves toward Luanda also sold captives to both of the competing trading networks, one to the north that reached the Atlantic bays along the Loango Coast and beyond the mouth of the Zaire River and a southern one at the Portuguese town of Benguela."<sup>44</sup> Miller insists that these were "distinct commercial networks."<sup>45</sup> These networks drew slaves from regions of dense population around the Kwanza River, the Kwango Valley, the Kunene River, and even as far away as the Kasai River; whereas the Zambezi River, the Kubango River, and the Kunene River specifically served only the southern network. Likewise, slaves originating in regions north of the Congo River were sold exclusively through what Miller describes as the northern network. In

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<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 380.

<sup>44</sup> Miller, *Eighteenth-Century Angolan Slave Trade*, p. 383.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 385.



addition to these trading networks, Eugenia W. Herbert identifies trading routes between Loango and Mindouli (east of Loango, across the Niari River).<sup>46</sup>

Vansina explains the logistics involved in organizing this sort of long distance trading route: “The trade was conducted by caravans, and currencies, standards of value, and means of payment for services were extensively used.” Vansina refers to the provisioning centres as ‘stables’ where caravans were outfitted and the bulk of goods and slaves were stored. For the Loango Coast trade, the ports of Loango, Malemba, and Cabinda served as both the markets of cross-cultural exchange and stables which sent caravans into the interior.<sup>47</sup> The exceptional nature in terms of proximity of African rulers to “stables” and the outfitting of long distance caravans by African merchants delayed the permanent settlement of European factories on this part of the western African coast as African not European traders directed the trade and controlled the physical area up until the time of colonialization.

After 1700 escalating conflicts in the hinterland of the Loango Coast radically increased the supply of slaves to Cabinda, Malemba, and possibly even Loango. This influx of slaves was timed perfectly to meet a sharp increase in demand driven by the appearance of French traders on the coast. Vansina suggests that it was in this context that the Vili began to expand their trading routes further into central Kongo:

There they would meet the Hum, who organized the trade from the Pool to this area. The other major trade route from the old kingdom of Okango or Kwango – which had been destroyed, also around 1700, and replaced by the kingdom of Yaka – had been taken over by the Zombo, who exported either to the harbors of the north [the Loango Coast] or via the Loje valley to Ambriz.<sup>48</sup>

As early as 1550 Vansina suggests that the Hum were trading slaves, who he identifies as “the Teke and prisoners-of-war originating from countries beyond the Teke kingdom, far to the north or the

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<sup>46</sup> Herbert, “Portuguese Trade Patterns,” p. 417.

<sup>47</sup> Vansina, “Long-Distance Trade-Routes in Central Africa,” pp. 377.

<sup>48</sup> Vansina, *Kingdoms of the Savanna*, p. 194-195.

north-west of the Pool.”<sup>49</sup> However, it is unlikely that many of the slaves from this period left for the Americas through the Loango Coast ports as the slave trade on the Loango Coast did not really begin to take off until the end of the seventeenth century:

By 1580 the caravans were also bringing ivory and raphia cloth from the Teke at the Pool in exchange for salt, which came from salt-pans in Ambriz and Pinda, *nzimbu* shells, and probably cowries. *Nzimbu* shells were used as currency in the kingdom of Kongo and in most of the areas lying to the east of it, whilst raphia cloth was the unit of currency in Angola.<sup>50</sup>

It is odd that Angola and Loango should rely upon raphia cloth as their currency during this period, while Kongo, which was situated between the two, should rely upon *nzimbu* shells. Perhaps raphia cloth was the form of currency on this whole stretch of coast prior to extensive trade to the east, as these *nzimbu* shells most definitely came from the east. Then it is possible that European trade interrupted this transition and reinforced the cloth currency in some ports where cloth imports supported an internal production network whereas in other ports, such as Ambriz where there was not a local cloth industry, European trade strengthened an inclination towards *nzimbu* shells.

Vansina writes of the trade on the Loango coast: “The trade was almost entirely in the hands of the Vili, the people of Loango, who manned the caravans and directed them. The few Portuguese traders used to send their *pombeiros* inland. The main trade-route went from Loango to Stanley Pool, to the Teke town of Monsol. The Teke exported slaves and ivory. Copper came from the Mindouli mines, which first belonged to the Teke and were taken later by Kongo from Nsundi, and north-east of Mayumba, where pygmies hunted it.”<sup>51</sup> In his 1974 analysis of the Niger River Basin, Thurstan Shaw suggested the possibility that Vili copper may have made it all the way to the Niger

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<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, The Pool refers to Pool Malebo, which was formerly Stanley Pool; it is also known as Malebo Pool, or Lake Nkunda.

<sup>50</sup> Vansina, “Long-Distance Trade-Routes,” p. 378.

<sup>51</sup> Vansina describes *pombeiro* as follows: “Pombeiro come from Mpumbu, the name applied by the Kongo to Stanley Pool. The name is derived in the Kongo from the Kikongo name for the Hum or Wumbu, living on the south bank of the Pool. The use of the term in 1584 as a generic name for trader in the interior indicates then that the trade had been in existence for some time and that the caravans were frequent.” *Ibid.*

River Basin before the European arrival on the coast.<sup>52</sup> Vansina continues: “The Vili brought European goods and salt inland as well as big iron knives which they bought in Mayumbe to sell them to the Jaga just east of that area. The slaves were used as carriers and thus the entrepreneurs did not have to pay for the carriage of copper and ivory.”<sup>53</sup> Although the evidence of a Portuguese presence on the Loango Coast prior to 1810 is scarce or non-existent, it is possible that Vansina is drawing his evidence from a later time period.

Vansina traces the main caravan route from the Loango Coast along the north side of the river through Kwilu Nyari to Kimbede and finally to Stanley Pool. Here, he suggests, the Vili caravans could purchase Teke, Hum, and Bobangi slaves in circa 1787, thus drawing slaves from as far as the “lower reaches of the Ubanghi River.”<sup>54</sup> Goods traded by the Vili at the Pool could easily be purchased by traders from Luanda. In describing demand for European goods in Luanda, Vansina argues that other European goods were “cheaper and better quality” than Portuguese goods.<sup>55</sup> José Curto reinforced this argument in his study on the importance of alcohol to the Luanda slave market: “Without [cheap Brazilian alcohol], the Luso-Brazilian slave traders based at Luanda were unable to have their caravan leaders attract the business of African slave suppliers who would otherwise illegally seek better quality and lower priced goods provided by their English and French competitors.”<sup>56</sup> This reinforces the idea that by the 1800s the Portuguese dominated the Kongo/Angola trade by military force not through superior economic bargaining. However, in Loango the political center was much closer to the coast and Europeans were not allowed to build permanent trading post or military post, nor were they able to procure caravans or actively participated in trade with the interior. Here the Vili peoples were more discriminating of European goods and drove a harder bargain.

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<sup>52</sup> Thurstan Shaw. “Those Igbo-Ukwu Radiocarbon Dates: Facts, Fictions and Probabilities,” *The Journal of African History*, Vol. 16, No. 4. 1975, p 513.

<sup>53</sup> Vansina, “Long-Distance Trade-Routes,” p. 380.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 380-1.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 381.

<sup>56</sup> Curto, *Enslaving Spirits*, p. 158.

Despite his extensive coverage of what he describes as two parallel and intersecting phenomenon of European demand for slaves and a changing value system in the Kongo River basin which promoted the enslavement of large groups of people, Vansina stop short of suggesting a causal link. Nor does he argue that the European trade had a significant demographic impact on Central Africa. His analysis is more interested in the growing connectedness of West Central Africa, describing it at the end of the nineteenth century as “covered by a web of regional trade systems.”<sup>57</sup> In addition to the Loango Region’s links to the vast slave trade markets south of the Congo River, the Atlantic slave trading markets of Loango, Cabinda, and Malemba also engaged in slave procurement in markets to the east of the Loango Coast.<sup>58</sup>

One major piece of the puzzle of the Loango caravan which is missing is the time it would take for the caravan to complete a round trip. However, Andrew Battell’s *Strange Adventures* estimate a shorter trade route between Loango Bay and Congo which Battell suggests takes a 14 day journey. Ravenstein, Battell’s editor, provides a map at the end of the volume. Ravenstein’s map suggests that Congo was a community to the north east of Loango Bay. Phyllis Martin corroborates this location.<sup>59</sup> If Ravenstein’s estimations about the location of Congo are correct, the direct distance between the two places is approximately 90 direct miles (as opposed to the actual distance travelled).<sup>60</sup> The actual route was presumably longer as it would follow local paths, roads, and river crossings as well as detour around obstacles of a geographical or political nature. If this route indeed took 14 days to travel, a caravan could expect to cover approximately 6.5 direct miles a day. Now, by the same map, Loango Bay is approximately 240 direct miles from Malebo Pool [Stanley Pool]. In William J. Samarin’s 1985 book chapter “The State’s Bakongo’s Burden Bearers,” he provides a map tracing nineteenth century caravan routes from Loango, directly east over land

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<sup>57</sup> Vansina, “Long-Distance Trade-Routes,” pp. 387 & 388.

<sup>58</sup> Miller, “The Numbers, Origins, and Destinations of Slaves,” p. 383.

<sup>59</sup> See “Map 2. Loango and its neighbours in the seventeenth century” in Martin, *The External Trade of the Loango Coast*, p. 12.

<sup>60</sup> Battell, *Strange Adventures*, p. 52. Ravenstein identified the geographical location of Congo [also known as Nkanga or Chinkanga] as 3°9’S, 12°3’E and the location of Stanley Pool as beginning at 4°16’S, 15°17’E when heading East along the Congo River.

through Ludima and Boanza to Brazzaville on the western side of Malebo Pool.<sup>61</sup> This journey is likely similar to the journey plotted by caravans in the eighteenth century. If the obstacles are comparable to the trip to Congo, a one way trip to Malebo Pool would have taken approximately 37 days. Return travel to the Pool and back would have taken almost two and a half months. If this is the main caravan route to collect slaves, as Vansina suggests, it would be difficult to procure slaves in less than three months assuming that the actual transactions and provisioning of the caravan would also take some time.

In the Congo River basin where the food staple was cassava, Robert Harms estimated that preparing enough food to provision a long distance trade expedition in the late nineteenth century could take several days.<sup>62</sup> Just as voyages from Europe had to consider harvest times and the availability of food stuffs in provisioning their long distance trade ventures, caravans from the Loango Coast likely travelled most often when foodstuffs were in good supply. Cassava was harvested in the Congo River basin at the end of the wet season and prepared for consumption in the early dry season.<sup>63</sup> Thus, caravans leaving the Loango Coast in April/May would have found it easiest to procure adequate foodstuffs to provision a caravan quickly. In Chapter 3 we found that ships arriving on the Loango Coast between September and October were able to find a cargo most quickly. If caravans were influenced by the supply of foodstuffs on the Loango Coast and set out for the slave markets of interior in April/May this may account for the low number of ships on the coast during these months. If caravans returned approximately four months, allowing for travel, trade, and a return journey, caravans would have begun to return in August/September. However, this cycle of supply and demand does not allow for European investment. This suggests that caravans set out on speculation, hoping for the arrival of European slaving ships.

This brings us back to the issue of credit: if indeed Europeans were financing these slaving expeditions, the negotiation of credit would presumably also take some time. The two voyages mentioned above are able to procure between 424 and 474 slaves in two months' time, even

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<sup>61</sup> See Map 12.1 in William J. Samarin, "The State's Bakongo Burden Bearers," in Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch and Paul E. Lovejoy (eds.) *The Workers of African Trade* (London: Sage, 1985) p. 270.

<sup>62</sup> Robert Harms "Sustaining the System," p. 99.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 100.

given the rough and speculative nature of the time taken to travel this distance, it seems highly unlikely that European credit could have resulted in such speedy provision of slaves, at least not from the Malebo Pool. It is also unlikely that one caravan could procure as many as 474 slaves, thus multiple caravans would have to be outfitted. Furthermore, Chapter 4 previously suggested that 75 percent of merchants trading with the MCC over a 27 year period traded less than 10 slaves, with the average procurement rate of 2.8 slaves per year. It is improbable that European traders would have financed such minor transactions. Furthermore, the absence of permanent MCC agents on the Loango Coast, as outlined in Chapter 3, eliminates the possibility of longer term credit arrangements outside of the shipboard documentation. These factors, combined with the absence of evidence of credit the MCC data and James Fraser's testimony that he engaged barter to procure slaves (as discussed in Chapter 2), suggest that previous authors have overestimated the use of European credit to procure slaves on the Loango Coast.

## **Conclusion**

This chapter expands upon the themes of barriers, trust, and knowledge accumulation which appear throughout this thesis. By the eighteenth century, English, French and Dutch merchant ships had established a pattern of trade with the people of the Loango Coast which both facilitated trade while balancing the conflicting objectives of each party. Solutions to these conflicts ranged from the exclusion of permanent factories, to the construction of barriers between local communities and cross-cultural trading spaces, to the fixing of slave prices. Over time, trading practices were streamlined to accommodate growing trade. While the Maloango was able to regulate the trade himself in the early seventeenth century, making negotiations and granting trade permissions, by the eighteenth century the increased volume of trade required more complicated systems. Thus a set of conventions evolved which included the firing of cannons to open negotiations and the appointment of Mambouks and Mafouks to represent local rulers. Most important to the negotiations was the establishment and maintenance of trust. While some authors have suggested that the supply of European credit for the facilitation of trade was at the heart of this issue of trust, this chapter suggests a different perspective. This chapter has argued that while some Europeans may have offered credit to facilitate slave trading transactions, this does not appear to have been central to the slave supply chains of the eighteenth century slave trade on the Loango Coast. Instead, the slave trade at the Loango Coast was dominated by barter transactions within an organized market system. However, further research is required to

establish how the provisioning of the caravans to the interior occurred. It is clear that Loango Coast merchants were able to procure substantial numbers of slaves and to provide these slaves in increasing quantities and at reasonable prices. In return, their European trading partners were expected to continue to provide Loango Coast merchants with high quality trade goods. When Europeans did not appear, large number of slaves continued to accumulate on the Loango Coast further reinforcing the evidence in this chapter that African merchants provided the majority of capital for the slave caravans.<sup>64</sup>

The successful trade between European and Loango Coast merchants was driven by the ability of both partners to supply the other's demands. From the European perspective, this required a slightly different approach in each different trading region. In an examination of the bundles exchanged for slaves in the day to day transactions of the Loango Coast slave trade, three key categories of trade goods emerge: guns, textiles, and alcohol. The demand for guns on the Loango Coast, though slightly lower than other regions, was still substantial at a ratio of one gun per slave. This demand for weapons in a relatively peaceful region suggests that guns were valued beyond their utility in war for their resale value in the interior, their utility in hunting and protection from wild animals, their utility as noisemakers, and their significance as prestige signifiers. While the broad patterns of bundles traded on the Western African Coast included a large percentage of textiles, the popularity of textiles was most pronounced on the Loango Coast. For alcohol, the demand on the Loango Coast was relatively low compared to the other ports of the transatlantic slave trade. This may be explained in part by the incredibly high imports of cheap Brazilian alcohol in Luanda. This would have diminished the demand in the Congo River basin for more expensive Dutch, English, and French alcohol supplied through the Loango Coast. These goods were traded in exchange for slaves, driven by an ever increasing demand by Europeans. Expanding upon trade routes which were developed in the sixteenth century or before, European guns, textiles and alcohol gradually begin to supplement and perhaps at times even to surpass demand for local production of salt, raphia cloth, and copper which were traditional monopolies of the Loango Coast that were dispersed by caravan traders.

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<sup>64</sup> Martin, *The External Trade of the Loango Coast*, pp. 90, 139-140.

Although the Loango Coast developed different patterns of consumption and trade regulation, it shared substantial sources of slaves with the Angola Coast markets, while also importing small numbers of slaves from the northern and eastern regions. Yet Loango traders are able to supply trade goods of greater quality and variety than those offered by traders from the closer port of Luanda. The strategy of traders on the Loango Coast in trading with all Europeans is therefore consistent with their desire to obtain the best quality goods. One key to this superior supply is firearms. In maintaining their relationships with Europeans as trade partners rather than military competitors, as happens in Kongo, Angola, and Benguela, the sale of firearms posed no significant risk to European traders. Equally, by keeping competition open, Europeans were encouraged to compete with each other driving up the price of slaves while also keeping the quality of goods higher. Thus the Dutch, English, and French goods supplied to Loango Coast traders offer something unique at the internal markets, which in turn justify longer and more costly caravans.



## Chapter 6: Conclusions

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Stretching from 1514 to 1865, cross-cultural trade on the Loango Coast represents the longest recorded period of slave supply into the transatlantic slave trade.<sup>1</sup> During this era, slave trading underwent a series of economic and technological transformations which evolved through continual contact between the four continents of the Atlantic world. Using slave trading negotiations to measure the tempo of change, this thesis has used the case study of the Loango Coast in the eighteenth century to explore the culture of exchange which evolved in the Atlantic and more specifically the Western African world. Within this context, the Loango Coast was a key contributor to the Atlantic and African commercial spheres in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This thesis has argued that the Loango Coast emerges as a distinct geographic and political region; and therefore the category of West Central Africa is better understood as two economic spheres by analysing patterns of trade.

The Loango Coast emerged as a major supplier of slaves to the Atlantic market in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. During this period raw data from the Voyages Database indicate at least one million enslaved Africans left the Loango Coast ports of Loango Bay, Malemba, and Cabinda, making the Loango Coast the fourth largest supplier in the transatlantic slave trade.<sup>2</sup> In return these merchant communities received substantial quantities of textiles, weapons, alcohol, and various other European and East Indian trade goods linking the Loango Coast not only into the Atlantic trading networks but also into the textile trading networks, which linked the Indian and Atlantic Oceans. Although the traders of the Loango Coast engaged in substantial internal trading networks which spanned from Angola to Gabon and perhaps even as far as the Niger River, this new explosion of “external trade” in the eighteenth century led to increased intercultural contact and the consolidation of a socioeconomic system which allowed the smooth transactions of goods for persons on the Loango Coast.

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<sup>1</sup> <http://www.slavevoyages.org/tast/database/search.faces> Query: Principal place of slave purchase – West Central Africa. Accessed on 23 May 2010.

<sup>2</sup> See Chapter 1, Table 3 for a breakdown of the raw data from the Voyages Database.

In an attempt to better understand these transformations, this thesis has begun to address the question of what cross-cultural exchange looked like on the Loango Coast in the eighteenth century. In doing so, it has developed three major themes around the topic of cross-cultural exchange: neutrality, institutionalization, and insulation. First, the theme of neutrality reflects the status of the Loango coast as a region defined by an open trade policy. This policy was maintained despite the transformation of political authority in the eighteenth century, thereby differentiating Loango from the turbulent Angola coast to the south. Second, the theme of institutionalization encapsulates the evolution of mechanisms, European, African, and cross-cultural, which facilitated and defined trade on the Loango Coast. Finally, the theme of insulation exemplifies the effects of these mechanisms on the Loango Coast, contrasting the Loango Coast with other key regions of transatlantic slave trade supply. Using these themes, this chapter organizes the conclusions of this thesis, thereby resituating the Loango Coast in the West Central African Coast and the Atlantic World.

### **Political Stability and Economic Neutrality on the Loango Coast**

This thesis has established that the Loango Coast was a politically stable and economically open trade region from the point of first contact until the end of the eighteenth century. It had recognisable market institutions and legal systems in addition to viable resources which were available to any nation who respected local conventions. This argument was laid out primarily in the first chapter, which explored European engagement on the Loango Coast using the Voyages Database and is supplemented by the argument about the nature of cross-cultural exchange in Chapter 2, the explanation of the political organization of the Loango Coast in Chapter 4 and the discussion about slaving hinterlands in Chapter 5. Although European levels of engagement sit at the heart of this argument, they do not define the pattern of trade. Rather it is the local political conditions as defined by the Vili, and later by the Kotchi and the Woyo, which established and reinforced a firm policy of open trade while simultaneously maintaining peaceful relations throughout the region and facilitating the steady trade of slaves on the Loango Coast.

Patterns of trade on the Loango Coast have been explained by contrasting the centralized polities and relatively peaceful relations between these polities on the Loango Coast with the fragmented and warring polities of the Angola Coast. This thesis has argued that establishing neutrality on the Loango Coast was essential to its success as a trading region. The Loango Coast provided both the stability required for long-distance caravan supply routes and the steady

demands of multiple European trading partners. While the Loango Coast is commonly lumped with the Angola Coast into the more general region of West Central Africa, this categorization can be misleading. Upon the arrival of the first Europeans to the Congo River, the peoples of the Loango Coast were politically distinct from the Kongo and Ngola peoples to the south of the Congo River. Nevertheless these groups were linked by a common cosmological framework with regional variations. Equally, commonalities in language and culture facilitated extensive trading networks bridging the Congo River. However, the relatively peaceful and centralized governments of the Loango Coast enforced an open trade zone, where all Europeans were welcome to trade. They resisted settlement in the eighteenth century in contrast to the Angola Coast, where the Portuguese were both military allies and trade partners forming an exclusive trading relationship and allowing for permanent settlement.

Although scholars, including Johannes Postma, David Birmingham, and Phyllis Martin, have long argued that the Loango Coast was a distinct trading region in precolonial Africa, the creators of the Slave Voyages Database have chosen to conflate the Loango and Angola Coasts into a broader categorization of West Central Africa. Providing the first analysis of the Voyages Database to separate these two coasts, this thesis has shown two distinct trading patterns emerged for trade in West Central Africa.<sup>3</sup> Ports listed between the mouth of the Congo River and northward to Cape Lopez exported slaves to multiple ships with multiple flags including Dutch, French, English, Portuguese, Brazilian, Spanish, and American, whereas ports from Ambriz southward to Cabo Negro traded over 90 per cent of their slave exports to ships flying the Portuguese and later the Brazilian flags. Furthermore, an analysis of time series data has clarified that the Portuguese engaged in the majority of their slave trading on the Loango Coast during the nineteenth century. In light of the Portuguese dominance of the southern coast, this exclusion of the Portuguese raises important questions about the nature of trading systems on the Loango Coast. These conclusions support Phyllis Martin's theory that the traders of the Loango Coast strictly enforced a free trade policy.<sup>4</sup> Even with this redefinition of slave trading regions, the Loango Coast remains in the top four slave supplying regions of the transatlantic

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<sup>3</sup> Postma, *The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade*, pp. 56-7 & 60-61; Birmingham, *Central Africa to 1870*, pp. 68-74; and Martin, *The External Trade of the Loango Coast*, pp. 29-32.

<sup>4</sup> Phyllis M. Martin, "The Slave Trade Era, c. 1670-1793: European Rivalry and African Policy," in Phyllis M. Martin *The External Trade of the Loango Coast 1576-1870: The Effects of Changing Commercial Relations on the Vili Kingdom of Loango* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972) pp. 73-92.

slave trade behind Angola, the Bight of Benin, and the Bight of Biafra (listed from largest to smallest).

At the beginning of the slave trade, the West Central African Coast was made up of four major polities: the Loango to the north which maintained hegemonic influence over the lesser polities of Ngoyo and Kakongo; the Kongo on the south bank of the Kongo River; the Angola, or Ngola, to the south of the Kongo, who over the period of the slave trade challenged and eventually dominated the Kongo; and the Dombe to the furthest south. Each polity established or expanded a coastal city to accommodate the growing European trade: Loango settled a city on Loango Bay; Ngoyo at Cabinda; Kakongo at Malemba; Kongo at Ambriz; Angola at Luanda; and Dombe at Benguela. The northern ports of Loango, Cabinda, and Malemba evolved into an open trade zone. Kongo served as a buffer between the northern polities and Angola to the south which was allied with and eventually politically and economically dominated by the Portuguese, as they became dependent on the Portuguese to maintain control over Kongo and the polities to the east. The conflicts between Angola, Kongo, and the polities to the east continued throughout the early period of contact and into the eighteenth century. While Kongo was never completely dominated during this period, it was vulnerable to the Angola/Portuguese alliance. The stronghold of Luanda blocked other European trade to the south and helped the Portuguese to gain a foothold in the Benguela hinterlands.

Problems of definition in this area stem from imprecise and conflicting usage of terms between Europeans in historical documents. This has resulted in English, Dutch, French, and Portuguese scholars using the same terms but with different meanings which causes many difficulties when cross comparing studies. Therefore a common usage of geographical terms is essential. If Western Africa is understood as reaching from Senegambia to Angola, and West Africa is a category within Western Africa stretching from Senegambia to the Bight of Biafra encompassing Senegambia, Upper Guinea, Gold Coast, Bight of Biafra and Bight of Benin, then West Central Africa can be best understood as a category within Western Africa stretching from Loango to Angola. Thus it would acknowledge the distinctness of the development of both the Loango Coast and the Angola Coast. These definitions focus on the African reality and avoid the pitfalls of geographically defining Africa primarily through its interaction with European slave traders.

Building upon the arguments of the first chapter, Chapter 2 has demonstrated that the slave trade on the Loango Coast was supported by a strong centralized government, similar to the

organization of trade the port of Bonny at the Bight of Biafra. On the Loango Coast appointed government officials facilitated trade and resolved disputes. Chapter 4 has given a more nuanced analysis of these political roles outlining the dominance of the polity of Loango in the early period of trade and the peaceful transition of Ngoyo and Kakongo from tributary to independent polities. Despite this political fragmentation, slave exports continued to rise. Within these polities, this thesis has demonstrated that the political leaders did not have a large investment in the slave trade and thus did not obtain substantial profits directly through trading slaves. Finally Chapter 5 has argued that while the Loango and Angola Coasts had overlapping slave supply routes, with supporting evidence from Phyllis Martin, Jan Vansina and Joseph Miller, that MCC records show that Loango Coast markets did not have the same patterns of demand for European trade goods: Loango Coast merchants did not accept beads or shells as payments for slaves as was common on the Angola Coast, but rather Loango Coast merchants required textiles, guns, alcohol, and basins or pots. Thus the Loango Coast can be contrasted to the Angola Coast in the role of its leadership in trade, its lack of major conflicts, and its demand for European trade goods. The differing trade patterns between the Loango and Angola Coasts reflected differing local political and economic realities and the adaptation of European merchants to these conditions of trade.

### **The Institutionalization of the Slave Trade**

Understanding the political and economic system, which had evolved on the Loango Coast by the end of the eighteenth century, requires the exploration of European sources that privilege Eurocentric interpretations of events. In doing so we must avoid the old stereotypes of modern Europeans and traditional Africans, and the equally dissatisfying categories of civilized and innocent, in order to understand African agency during the transatlantic slave trade and the existence of complicated mechanisms of governance and trade prior to European contact. Through exploring the institutionalization of trade on the Loango Coast, this thesis has documented the relationship between traders of Europe and the Loango Coast as they move from negotiations of first contact to major slave trading partners. On the one hand, the experiences of indigenous peoples engaging in first contact with sea faring Europeans is a common story of the early modern age. On the other hand the set of internal solutions and institutions which developed on the Loango Coast were adapted to a specific context. This argument is outlined in chapters two through five. Chapter 2 began with a brief examination of European conceptions of cross-cultural trade then traced these elements as they appeared in

the period of first contact on the Loango Coast and later how they appeared in the more systematized institutions of eighteenth century slave trading. Chapter 3 examined the decision making processes involved in predicting optimal trade on the Loango Coast; Chapter 4 examined the role of local traders on the Loango Coast and their impact on political systems; and Chapter 5 examined the negotiation and supply of trade goods between the Loango Coast and the Interior.

As we have seen in Chapter 2, when Europeans “reached out” to extend their trading networks they encountered other complex trading networks with which they cultivated conditions of exchange. These exchanges, at least initially, were framed by their previous experiences of cross cultural exchange. While Europeans sought to re-establish privileges which were common for foreign traders in European port cities, such as the foundation of a nation or a permanent settlement, they also would have expected various obstacles in their role as outsiders. Just as a Dutch trader would not have expected equality when trading with a local trader in Portugal, Europeans could not have expected the same privileges as local traders on the Loango Coast. Thus once European traders had established a basis for on-going trade, their first goal on the Loango Coast was to establish a merchant community to facilitate safety, communication, transport, and information.

During the early period of trade on the Loango Coast, multiple commercial strategies were attempted. Filipa Ribeiro da Silva has suggested that the Dutch experimented with three types of trade: a multi-ship strategy which involved a small ship arriving in advance to negotiate trade conditions; a temporary settlement strategy which involved leaving a Dutch agent on the coast; and sending a regular wave of ships to the coast to establish a steady presence.<sup>5</sup> However, Pieter van den Broecke’s experiences on the Loango Coast have suggested that when Europeans overstepped their perceived rights on the Loango Coast local justice was swift and decisive, reinforcing the right of the local people to trade with whom they pleased.<sup>6</sup> Furthermore, Chapter 2 detailed the continued and unsuccessful attempts of Europeans to establish permanent settlements. This blocked any single European group from gaining control over their

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<sup>5</sup> Broecke, *Journal of Voyages*, Pg. 94.

<sup>6</sup> Broecke, *Journal of Voyages*, pp. 54-55.

European competition on the Loango coast. This multilayered approach to shipping strategies suggested the employment of trial and error in establishing trade norms in the early period of trade. During this period, Phyllis Martin has suggested that the proximity of the Loango ruler to the coast and his “considerable royal authority” over locals and visitors alike played a significant role in establishing mutually beneficial trade protocols on the Loango Coast.<sup>7</sup>

Chapter 3 further expands upon this idea of negotiating trade mechanisms through a process of trial and error. Driven by demands for gold and luxury goods, European encounters with African merchants on the Western Coast of Africa were characterized by an initial period of openness and flexibility on the part of the European merchants adapting to new markets. During this period, European merchants adapted their mechanisms of trade developed in the European contexts to meet the new challenges and demands of sub-Saharan port cities. Examples of this negotiation on the Loango Coast have shown that although European vulnerability diminished over time, African merchants continued to set the terms for trade. The ability of European merchants to adapt to the ebbs and flows of African markets was a key factor in the successful exploitation of first luxury goods in European markets, and later slaves in transatlantic markets. These adaptations have been evaluated over three temporal registers: years, months, and days.

In the analysis of year to year patterns of the transatlantic slave trade on the Loango Coast, this thesis has identified four periods of disruption and six periods of particularly dense trade. This analysis has confirmed Stephen Behrendt’s observations that cycles of war and credit had an important impact on transatlantic slave trading patterns. Although Behrendt’s analysis of English trading records documented a slightly different timeline on the ebbs and flows of trade than the MCC records, these have been explained in terms of differing national interests. In both cases, when their country went to war their shipping was reduced. This pattern was especially acute when European conflicts overflowed onto the Loango Coast. However, external events could also increase demand for slaves on the Loango Coast. In the post war periods and in the late eighteenth century as the availability of credit radically increased, the demand for slaves in the Americas the number of ships arriving at the Loango Coast increased distinctly. This increased demand required mechanisms of trade which facilitated the smooth running of supply and trade negotiations. One of the strategies settled upon to facilitate the incredible boom in slave

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<sup>7</sup> Martin, *The External Trade of the Loango Coast*, pg. 24.

demand in the second half of the eighteenth century was the incentive of skyrocketing slave prices. During this period, slave prices recorded by the MCC ranged from an average of 13.7 pieces per slave in 1759 to 48.6 pieces per slave in 1776, at least a 250 per cent increase.

Narrowing our focus from the broader patterns of year to year trade, this thesis has also examined the ebbs and flows of trade on a month to month basis. Despite Behrendt's analysis of the transatlantic shipping cycle which suggested that the Loango Coast had no optimal slave trading period, an examination of MCC shipping cycles has yielded some distinct monthly trading patterns. The examination of 28 MCC ships' trading logs has established that there were two peaks in arrivals of MCC ships on the Loango Coast in March and September; a further analysis has shown that the optimal time for trade to be March through April and again August through November.

Using the 27 MCC voyages with sufficient data, I have calculated a voyage took between two and nine months to reach the Loango Coast, with the average ship taking 4.7 months and the most frequent timing for a voyage being even less at four months. If a ship were outfitted with foodstuffs in the North Sea in April and May, it could reasonably be expected to reach the Loango Coast in August and September. This correlation may partially explain the disproportionate number of ships arriving on the Loango Coast in September and the resulting high numbers engaging in trade in October. Furthermore, the popularity of the September/October trading period could be partially explained by the desire of ships to leave the coast before the peak of the rainy season and the onset of gastrointestinal diseases in January/February. Although Behrendt has suggested that there was no seasonality to the slave trade on the Loango Coast, MCC records have indicated that ships arriving on the Loango Coast in October procured slaves at least twice as fast as those that arrived in any other month. However, 28 ships is a small dataset and further evidence is required to make a conclusive argument. Nevertheless, this pattern of increased trade in July through November is not confined to the Loango Coast. It is also reflected in Herbert Klein's study of Portuguese trade on the Angola Coast which includes data from 549 ships in an overlapping time period: 1723 to



1771.<sup>8</sup> This suggests a common season of trade in the two West Central African regions of Loango and Angola.

Furthermore, an analysis of MCC slave prices on the Loango Coast has indicated that despite an established demand for male slaves in the transatlantic slave trade, female slaves on the Loango Coast were only marginally less expensive than male slaves. Despite the relatively high cost of female slaves, they made up 37 per cent of an average slave cargo, which is seven per cent above the average on the Loango Coast and two per cent above the transatlantic average. Over time, slave prices on the Loango Coast diminish during periods of European conflict and increase during periods with high concentrations of European demand.

Chapter 3 examined the outfitting strategies in Europe, provisioning and trade in Western Africa, the duration and mortality rates of the middle passage, the destinations and commerce in the Americas, and the return and re-provisioning in Europe. In doing so, it has shown the importance of developing a “culture of knowledge” and how this knowledge allowed both the European and African traders to optimize profits and minimize risks. Within the Atlantic world, the Loango Coast provides the challenges of disease in the rainy season, distance from Europe, and scarcity of foodstuffs counterbalanced with the provision of a reliable source of water, an efficient procurement of enslaved Africans, and a short middle passage.

Moving from the monthly to the daily patterns of trade, Chapters 4 and 5 focused on the African actors in cross-cultural exchange and the space where those actors interact with Europeans. Chapter 4 introduced the Mafouks, appointees of local rulers on the Loango Coast, who oversaw the regulation of cross-cultural exchange. Through an analysis of MCC records, this chapter has shown how the Mafouks invested large amounts of capital in the slave trade and accumulated large profits, while the local rulers only received a variable percentage of the profits from the Mafouks and did not invest large sums in slaves for transport. While acknowledging the large contributions of a few merchants to the slave trade, this chapter has suggested that the majority of slave trading transactions were small exchanges with the average merchant selling less than one slave per year to MCC ships. From this information the thesis has inferred that due to the complications of offering credit to a large number of traders for small returns, it is unlikely that

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<sup>8</sup> Klein, “The Portuguese Slave Trade from Angola in the Eighteenth Century,” pp. 894-918.

the majority of MCC transactions required financing from external European sources. Furthermore, it suggests that while a few big men acquired slaves through provisioning caravans, the majority of traders must have exchanged their goods or labour for smaller numbers of slaves hoping to make an investment. If large traders provisioned caravans which arrived on the Loango Coast ahead of the arrival of a European ship, selling part of the slaves to smaller local traders may have reduced the burden of slave care on the larger merchants. It is also possible that some slaves were obtained through small local raids or kidnapping; however, I have not been able to locate any evidence of this method of procurement.

Chapter 5 moved on to argue that due in part to the centralized nature of the Loango Coast governments and their desire to control shipping activities on the coast, the Mafouks and European ship captains established a trading protocol. Upon arrival at a port, the ship would anchor and signal with its cannons. In response a party would approach the ship in canoes to negotiate the conditions of trade, including gifts, and later taxes, for the privilege of trading, the hire of men and canoes to transport the Europeans and their goods between shore, and at times fixed prices for male and female slaves was agreed upon. This established, Europeans could land and commence trade.

By the eighteenth century, this thesis has suggested that the increased knowledge and experience of both the European and Loango Coast merchants had allowed the trading ports of the Loango Coast to establish the set of protocol recorded by the Middelburg merchants. In contrast to Lovejoy and Richardson's theory that Euro-African relations were characterized by systems of trust, authority, and pawnship, this thesis has suggested a fourth system of trade developed on the Loango Coast within the context of the transatlantic slave trade: a barter-based, ship trade supported by a centralized local government and internal financing. This theory of trade was hypothesised in Chapter 2, the idea of ship trade was explored in Chapter 3, and Chapter 5 developed the idea of barter within the context of an organized market.

The barter of trade goods for one or more slaves involved three levels of knowledge and three corresponding power relations. An examination of four individual negotiations has shown firstly how the Mafouk successfully negotiated a fixed price which balanced his exclusive access to knowledge of internal slave markets and his desire to keep European merchants from moving on to more profitable slave markets. Equally, if the Europeans did not agree to these terms, they

risked prolonging their voyage and a loss of reputation with the local Mafouk. Secondly, Middleburg and Malemba traders negotiated an exchange of goods for slaves agreeing upon the exchange value of European goods in the local currency of a piece. Thirdly, Europeans retained exclusive knowledge of the value of European merchandise, or rather merchandise obtained in Europe, and thus had the ability to promote more vigorously goods which have equal value in the Loango Coast markets but which have lesser value in Europe. In the case of both the Loango and the Middelburg merchants, experienced traders had the edge in these negotiations. Yet by the eighteenth century, inexperienced traders on both sides had access to larger bodies of institutional knowledge which helped to protect them from rash decisions. Evidence of this institutional knowledge is available in the letters of instruction provided to the Captain Charles Wilson, the notes of the unknown American slave merchant, and James Fraser's testimony in the British House of Commons.<sup>9</sup>

The negotiation of European trade goods for African slaves centred on the composition of a bundle. Bundles on the Loango Coast held three primary commodities guns, textiles, and alcohol. A sample of trading records shows that guns made up 21 per cent of each bundle, textiles 64 per cent, and alcohol 7 per cent (measured by their value in pieces). The extraordinary demand for cloth lay not in the absence of a cloth industry on the Loango Coast, where substantial quantities of raphia cloth were produced for both internal consumption and export, but in the use of cloth as a prestige marker and a currency.

These goods, along with locally produced commodities, were then loaded onto caravans to be traded in the interior for slaves, copper, and ivory. It is important to note that this was a trade developed, controlled, and at least to some extent financed by African traders. There is no evidence of European middle men operating in these supply chains; indeed, African middlemen on the Loango Coast were organized by and loyal to the local Mafouk rather than to European interests. Furthermore, these trade networks had not been formed by the demand for slaves but rather through the demand for copper and ivory in an earlier period. It is very possible that this absence of information on slave caravans to the Loango Coast can be directly linked to

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<sup>9</sup> Leyland, Penny and Co. "Letter to Captain Charles Wilson of the Brig Madampookata" Harold Cohen Library, Liverpool, United Kingdom, Dumbell papers, MS 10.47 (transcribed in Appendix D); Minne Gilbert, "Rare Glimpse of Slavery is Given in Letters Found in Valley Attic"; Lambert, Sheila (ed.) "Minutes of Evidence on the Slave Trade 1790, Part I" pp. 3-58.

European detachment from the process. This detachment could have sprung from an active policy among the Vili, and later among the Kotchi and Woyo, to protect their dominance of the trade, or it could have simply been a byproduct of the impermanent presence of Europeans on the coast. While these caravans primarily focused on the vast slave trade market at Malebo or Stanley Pool on the Congo River and markets to the south of the Congo River, the Atlantic slave trading markets of Loango, Cabinda, and Malemba also engaged in slave procurement in markets to the east of the Loango Coast.<sup>10</sup> A round trip on foot between the primary ports of the Loango Coast and Malebo Pool could have taken a minimum of three months. Though we do not have adequate data to speculate on how many slaves such a caravan would include, it is highly unlikely that a single caravan could transport the average 361 slaves it took to supply a MCC ship. Furthermore, an analysis of merchants trading at Malemba suggests that 75 percent of Loango merchants trading with the MCC over a 27 year period traded less than 10 slaves, with the average procurement rate of 2.8 slaves per year. It is improbable that European traders would have financed a large number of such minor transactions.<sup>11</sup> Moreover, the absence of permanent MCC agents on the Loango Coast diminishes the possibility of longer term credit arrangements outside of the shipboard documentation. Even if a MCC ship spent an average 4.8 months on the Loango Coast, it is unlikely that Loango caravans would have enough time to obtain European credit, outfit a caravan, make the voyage to the interior, trade their commodities for slaves, return to the Loango Coast, and deliver the slaves in this window. It remains to be discovered how these caravans were financed. Additionally, the absence of evidence of credit being extended or repaid in the transaction records of 30 MCC shipping voyages and the evidence from the British parliamentary papers discussed in Chapter 2 suggest that previous authors, such as Lovejoy and Richardson, have overestimated the use of European credit on the Loango Coast. Furthermore, the only identified source which explicitly speaks to the method of exchange between Europeans and Africans on the Loango Coast has indicated that these slave purchase transactions were barter based.

This evidence presents the Loango Coast as a market with a unique pattern of consumption and trade regulation. Although it shared substantial sources of slaves with the Angola Coast markets, it also imported small numbers of slaves from the northern and eastern regions. Nevertheless,

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<sup>10</sup> Miller, *Eighteenth-Century Angolan Slave Trade*, 383.

<sup>11</sup> Figures taken from Table 1 in Chapter 3.

Loango traders were able to supply trade goods of greater quality and variety than those offered by traders from the closer port of Luanda. The strategy of traders on the Loango Coast in trading with all Europeans is therefore consistent with their desire to obtain the best quality goods. One key to this superior supply is firearms. In maintaining their relationships with Europeans as trade partners rather than military competitors, as happened in Kongo, Angola, and Benguela, the sale of firearms posed no significant risk to European traders. Equally, by keeping competition open, Europeans were encouraged to compete with each other driving up the price of slaves while also keeping the quality of goods higher. Thus the Dutch, English, and French goods supplied to Loango Coast traders offered something unique at the internal markets which justified longer and more costly caravans.

This thesis has argued that slave trade on the Loango Coast was a barter based system which evolved where it is possible that internal financing allowed the greater independence of local traders from their European counterparts and negated the need for systems of credit to be developed. Ship based trade may have had an impact on the loading time of slaves, but it also prevented European encroachment on the sovereignty of local governments while simultaneously minimizing maintenance costs for European traders. Finally, a centralized government created the stability and regulation which allowed the trade to flourish reduced threat of default or trickery, both parties knowing the terms of negotiation are guaranteed by the Mafouk on the one side and the ship captain on the other. Thus, Western African trade communities' transatlantic trade relations should not only be evaluated in terms of their relation to European credit but evaluated in terms of three dimensions: credit versus barter, settlement versus ship trade, and centralized versus autonomous trade. This highlights the need to understand each Western African port within its own specific context, while at the same time acknowledging the common features which bind them together in the transatlantic slave trade.

### **The Insulation of the Loango Coast in the Eighteenth Century**

In examining the consequences of the development of the trade mechanisms outlined in the previous section, this thesis has argued that the nature of trade relations that were negotiated on the Loango Coast had an insulating effect in the eighteenth century. This argument builds upon ideas of cultural and geographical buffers that were introduced in Chapter 2 and teased out in Chapter 5, the evolution of the political system which was discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, the preference for ship board trade outlined in Chapter 3, and the questions of financial

investment which were explored in Chapters 2 and 5. This system began to evolve around first contact between the Vili at Loango Bay and Europeans and later transferred to the major ports of Cabinda and Malemba where the traders of the Loango Coast developed a system of trade which was characterized by a combination of significant internal credit, ship trade, and centralized indigenous control. The Mafouks of the Loango Coast served not only as important brokers of trade on the Loango Coast; they also supplied large numbers of slaves to the transatlantic trade.<sup>12</sup> Although it is difficult to judge the internal processes involved in the development of these systems, the positioning of the Mafouks between Loango Coast communities and European merchants resulted in the relative insulation of the Loango Coast in the eighteenth century, which slowed the permeation of European values, particularly the spread of Christianity, during this period. This highlights the varying levels of cultural adaptation in the process of contact between two cultures.

As the dominant polity of the Loango Coast, the Vili set the tone for European relations with the traders of the Loango Coast. The policies of trade that were established at Loango Bay were emulated at Cabinda and Malemba. In Chapter 2, this thesis has tested the political theories of Paul Sharp which have suggested that when two cultures collide there is both an impulse to learn about each other and become closer as well as an impulse to maintain connection while maintaining separateness.<sup>13</sup> Through a process of encounter and reencounter, norms were established between European and Loango merchants. After prolonged attempts of Europeans to establish permanent factories failed at these ports, Europeans had settled into a pattern of ship board trade. As elaborated upon in Chapter 3, shipboard trade in the eighteenth century allowed most ships to spend only four to five months on the Loango Coast rather than the average seven months required to provision a slave ship on other parts of the Western African Coast. Chapter 5 has described how ship board trade in some circumstances required Europeans to sleep aboard their ships. Thus the model of ship board trade supported a model of minimal or minimizing contact.

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<sup>12</sup> See Chapter 4, Table 8.

<sup>13</sup> Sharp, *Diplomatic Theory of International Relations*, pp. 10-11.

Additionally, though it was the norm for Europeans to provide the broker at other ports of the Western African Coast, local brokers were most common on the Loango Coast. Wary of Europeans and interested in maintaining high levels of control over long-distance trade, Loango elites were providing their own brokers by the time the slave trade started to peak. Another element of this internally regulated system is the role of credit, as there is little evidence of African traders seeking European credit. If Europeans were not providing significant sources of credit, this would have reduced the time and energy required in exchange as caravans could depart for the interior markets before the arrival of Europeans. This would offer further support to this idea of minimal contact.

Though Europeans had a set of pre-established long distance trade norms, they did not necessarily work best on the Loango Coast. Europeans did not set the tone for trade. In fact, the Loango Coast was one of the few regions of Africa which simultaneously established a set of slave trading institutions agreed upon by Loango merchants and Europeans while at the same time insulating its people from cultural and religious transformation in the eighteenth century. On the Loango Coast, the impulse to maintain separateness was particularly successful. This conclusion is supported by David Birmingham, Linda Heywood and John Thornton's studies of cultural assimilation on the West Central African Coast in the pre-colonial period.<sup>14</sup>

In one of the most striking examples of insulation, Chapter 4 has examined how the rulers of the Loango Coast polities removed themselves from the day to day functioning of the slave trade. This analysis of rulers on the Loango Coast has shown the relative insignificance of the rulers in slave procurement. Instead we find a heavy investment by the Mafouks and Mambouks, the key officials appointed by the Maloango, Mangoyo, and Manikakongo to supervise the trade, negotiate with Europeans, and collect revenues, first in the form of gifts and later in more organized taxation systems.

By comparing the activities of the local rulers to their appointed Mafouks, this thesis concludes that the rulers themselves were reluctant to make a large direct investment in the transatlantic slave trade. Perhaps this can begin to be explained by coming back to the multidimensional role

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<sup>14</sup> David Birmingham, *Central Africa to 1870*, p. 53; and, Heywood and Thornton, *Central Africans, Atlantic Creoles, and the Foundation of the Americas*, p. 207.

of rulers discussed above. In addition to their political, judicial, and economic roles as rulers of their respective communities, the Maloango, Manikakongo, and Mangoyo also had significant religious and social roles. In appointing a Mafouk to oversee intercultural exchange it is possible that the leaders of the Loango Coast were attempting to insulate their polities; however, it is more likely that the institutions of cross-cultural trade became too complex to manage while simultaneously offering political and religious leadership. The Maloango created a system where exchanges were monitored by one man, who had no access to leadership promotion, where exchanges happened on the outskirts of town, and where profits were largely concentrated with a few individuals rather than the community as a whole. This system was implemented by the Maloangos, the Manikakongos, and the Mangoyos of the Loango Coast thereby shielding their communities, at least partially, from the effects of external economic, religious and social influences.

Whatever the intent and however strategic or accidental this process was, the ultimate outcome was successful, at least in the short term. During the eighteenth century, the people of the Loango Coast maintained “certain deeply rooted social and cultural values during times of fundamental change.”<sup>15</sup> At the same time they resisted the influence of European religion to a much greater extent than other financially successful Western African ports.<sup>16</sup> Thus the Loango Coast insulated itself from direct contact and profound change through the appointment of Mafouks. Although Zdenka Volavka and Heywood and Thornton have supported the idea of the Loango Coast as less absorbent of foreign social and religious beliefs than the Angola Coast during this period, they do not speculate how this barrier was constructed. This thesis has suggested that the appointment of royal representatives to oversee cross-cultural exchange played a fundamental role in this process.

Through an examination of the MCC slave trading transactions, this thesis has argued that the Mafouk of Malemba, and to a lesser degree the Mafouks of Loango and Cabinda, held pivotal roles in intercultural exchange, benefiting hugely in both economic and political terms. This transition had profound effects on political structure of the Loango Coast. In the eighteenth

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<sup>15</sup> Volavka, *Crown and Ritual*, p. 6-7.

<sup>16</sup> Heywood and Thornton, *Central Africans, Atlantic Creoles*, p. 207.



century, the role of Mafouk insulated the Maloango, the Mangoyo, and the Manikongo from direct contact with European traders while alleviating their administrative burden. Equally it allowed these leaders to indirectly benefit from the financial profits of the economic exchange while diminishing the effects intercultural exchange. However, the increasing profits and prestige gained by the Mafouk, an appointee without natural paths of access to leadership himself, and the growing dependence of the Loango Coast leaders on these brokers eventually create unforeseen consequences in the next century undermining the political stability of the region and leaving it more vulnerable than ever to European interference in the late nineteenth century. While Martin recognized the role of the political role of slave trade in the deterioration of traditional power structures, and Thornton and Heywood have acknowledged the slow rate of cultural absorption on the Loango Coast during the eighteenth century, this thesis brings together these two ideas to argue that the role of the Mafouks and Mambouks played a central role in the slave trade allowing them first, to create or support an insulating barrier between the Europeans and the people of the Loango Coast, and second to amass immense personal wealth that would eventually lead to the breakdown of the traditional political system.

## **Conclusion**

By the time the English, Dutch, and French slave traders had abandoned the Loango Coast, the insulating factors of the major trading families of the Loango Coast began to seriously undermine the political structures of the Vili, the Kotchi and the Woyo. By the early nineteenth century, the men selected to rule these polities refused the obligation to attempt to control the ever more self-sufficient merchant class. Describing the fate of the Loango Coast in the nineteenth century, David Birmingham has concluded: "The traditional structure of a great political and religious king supported by a large royal family was subverted. The power of the king was reduced, the pattern of succession was disrupted, and the power shifted in fact, if not in theory, to the commercial officials and the slave-owning agricultural aristocrats. This pattern, with a weak nominal king and a range of powerful notables, apparently survived until the colonial period."<sup>17</sup> As long as the slave trade persisted and these merchants continued to accumulate wealth, these merchants had been able to maintain order. However, with the end of the income from the slave trade and the death of the last slave trading merchants, the

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<sup>17</sup> Birmingham, *Central Africa to 1870*, pp. 146-147.

communities fractured. Thus when Europeans returned to the Loango Coast in the late nineteenth century to occupy and colonize the peoples of the Loango Coast they were met by a power vacuum.<sup>18</sup> Thus, it was the end of the slave trade itself which removed the last layer of protection between the people of the Loango Coast and European colonizers laying the way for the economic exploitation and political domination of the Loango Coast which would stagnate its political, economic, and cultural development over the next century.

Beyond the implications of this study on our understanding of governance on the Loango Coast, this thesis highlights the distinct nature of trade on the Loango Coast; the absence of European credit data in the MCC shipping records; and, the difficulties in procuring slaves via caravan in the average four months a European ship spent on the coast. This thesis attempts to take a step beyond the European focused studies of shipping patterns to discover the identity of the African traders of the Loango Coast. In doing so it provides the first comprehensive list of members of an African merchant community in the eighteenth century. This list has helped to reinforce fragmented lists of rulers for the polities of Loango, Kakongo, and Ngoyo. It has also given us a more concrete picture of the role of Mafouks in the eighteenth century. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, it has emphasised the investment of large numbers of relatively small investors giving names and faces to the minor merchants of the slave trade. Thus African merchants stop being amorphous interchangeable figures in the history of the transatlantic slave trade and begin to gain an identity more comparable to that of their European counterparts.

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<sup>18</sup> See Martin, "Family Strategies in Nineteenth-Century Cabinda," pp. 65-86.; and idem. "Trade and Change Among the Vili" in Phyllis Martin, *The External Trade of the Loango Coast*, pp. 158-174.

## Appendix A: MCC Voyages to the Loango Coast, 1733-1794

Year**	Beginning Month of Trade	Concluding Month of Trade	Ship	Captain	Loango Bay	Malemba	Cabinda and Malemba	Loango Coast Undefined	Total Slaves Purchased	MCC Record Numbers
1733	DEC	MAR	Fregatschip Het Hof van Zeeland	Jan de Moor	321				321	574-578
1748	?	?	Fregatschip Groot Prooyen	Hendrik Van Rijn	323				323	486-492
1749	JAN	OCT	Fregatschip de Grenadier	Albert Steenhof		323			323	455-460
1755	AUG	DEC	Fregatschip Prins Willem de Vijfde	Adriaan Jacobze		346			346	978-983
1757	OCT	NOV	Fregatschip Prins Willem de Vijfde	Adriaen Jacobse		462			462	984-988
1758	OCT	FEB	Snauwschip de Drie Gezusters	Hendrik Vandleven	405				405	333-337
1758	AUG	NOV	Fregatschip De Vrouw Johanna Cores	Jan Fuynevan		372			372	1222-1227
1759	FEB	APR	Fregatschip Middelburgs Welvaren II	Schipper David Mulders		424			424	793-799
1759	AUG	OCT	Fregatschip Prins Willem de Vijfde	Adriaan Jacobse		472			472	989-993
1760	AUG	MAR	Fregatschip De Vrouw Johanna Cores	Jan Tuijneman		361			361	1228-1233
1761	?	?	Fregatschip Middelburgs Welvaren II	David Mulders		338			338	800-807*
1762	SEP	?	Fregatschip Philadelphia	Philippus Verdonk	357				357	929-935
1762	?	?	Fregatschip Middelburgs Welvaren II***	Jacobus Husson		338			338	808-812*
1764	AUG	FEB	Fregatschip Philadelphia	Philippus Verdonk		326			326	936-942
1765	OCT	FEB	Snauwschip de Nieuwe Hoop	Schipper David Mulders		197			197	823-829
1766	SEP	MAR	Snauwschip De Eenigheid	Schipper Willem de Molder		307			307	398-403
1767	SEP	MAR	Fregatschip Prins Willem de Vijfde	Cornelis Pieterszen			334		334	1009-1012
1767	MAR	NOV	Fregatschip Haast U Langzaam	Jan Menkenveld		302			302	516-522
1769	SEP	FEB	Fregatschip Prins Willem de Vijfde	Cornelis Pieterszen	379				379	1013-1017
1769	JUL	JAN	Fregatschip Haast U Langzaam	Adriaan Chatelain		326			326	523-527
1771	MAR	JUL	Snauwschip De Welmeenende	Cornelis van Haijen	257				257	1307-1311
1771	MAR	JUN	Fregatschip Haast U Langzaam	Adriaan Chatelain		367			367	528-531
1770	MAR	OCT	Fregatschip de Geertruyda en Christina	Johannas Bakker			320		320	410-413
1772	APR	OCT	Fregatschip Aurora	Schipper Johannas Bakker		317			317	215-218
1772	JAN	JUN	Fregatschip Prins Willem de Vijfde	Cornelis Loett (Loeff - Loess)		318			318	1018-1022
1773	FEB	AUG	Fregatschip Haast U Langzaam	Jan van Sprang		326			326	532-536
1774	APR	DEC	Fregatschip Aurora	Schipper Johannas Bakker		313			313	219-223
1774	MAR	AUG	Fregatschip de Watergeus	Adriaan Chatelain		368			368	1286-1288
1775	AUG	?	Snauwschip de Jonge Willem****	Cornelis Loett (Loeff - Loess)		75			75	677-680
1776	JUL	NOV	Fregatschip de Watergeus	Adriaan Chatelain		325			325	1289-1292
1780	?	?	Fregatschip de Watergeus***	Cornelis Loett (Loeff - Loess)			338		338	1297-1298*
1794	SEP	JAN	Fregatschip het Vergenoegen	Johannas Gerrits Claver	393				393	1103-1110
Totals					2435	7303	320	672	10730	

\* Number of slaves purchased is an estimate using the average number of slaves purchased by the other 29 ships

\*\* Second last year of Voyage

\*\*\* Ship Sunk returning to the Netherlands

\*\*\*\* This ship embarked 90 slaves on the Guinea Coast before heading South to embark a further 75 slaves at Malemba

## Appendix B: MCC Slave Price Data, 1732 to 1776

Year	Men					Women					Boys					Girls					Total					
	Min	Max	No.	Value	Avg	Min	Max	No.	Value	Avg	Min	Max	No.	Value	Avg	Min	Max	No.	Value	Avg	Min	Max	No.	Value	Avg	
1732	15.0	22.0	27	521.0	19.3	16.0	19.5	5	93.5	18.7	5.0	22.0	11	143.5	13.0	13.0	13.0	1	13.0	13.0	5.0	22.0	44	771.0	17.5	
1733	17.0	24.0	156	3267.8	20.9	17.0	22.0	35	687.5	19.6	9.0	27.0	52	752.0	14.5	9.0	18.0	25	349.0	14.0	9.0	27.0	268	5056.3	18.9	
1748	10.0	17.0	154	2182.0	14.2	11.0	15.0	110	1441.0	13.1	6.0	13.0	39	396.0	10.2	7.0	12.0	17	178.0	10.5	6.0	17.0	320	4197.0	13.1	
1749	16.0	23.0	164	3339.5	20.4	13.0	22.0	105	1982.8	18.9	11.0	22.0	31	494.0	15.9	13.0	20.0	15	241.5	16.1	11.0	23.0	315	6057.8	19.2	
1755	24.0	29.5	111	3254.5	29.3	22.0	35.0	89	2498.5	28.1	14.0	28.0	68	1584.0	23.3	16.0	27.0	34	764.0	22.5	14.0	35.0	302	8101.0	26.8	
1757	16.0	21.3	31	563.0	18.2	14.5	14.5	1	14.5	14.5	11.5	23.5	7	79.0	11.3	10.5	13.0	3	35.5	11.8	10.5	23.5	42	692.0	16.5	
1758	15.0	22.3	26	518.0	19.9	14.0	22.9	12	228.8	19.1	13.0	13.0	4	52.0	13.0	n/a	n/a	0			13.0	22.9	42	798.8	19.0	
1759	14.0	15.0	196	2923.0	14.9	12.0	15.0	114	1595.0	14.0	9.0	15.0	67	772.0	11.5	9.0	13.0	47	534.0	11.4	9.0	15.0	424	5824.0	13.7	
1762	16.0	24.5	143	3144.0	22.0	15.0	23.0	86	1738.0	20.2	9.5	20.5	84	1261.5	15.0	8.0	20.0	37	542.5	14.7	8.0	24.5	350	6686.0	19.1	
1764	16.5	27.5	132	2888.0	21.9	14.5	25.0	63	1159.3	18.4	10.5	18.5	56	816.0	14.6	11.0	18.0	31	439.0	14.2	10.5	27.5	282	5302.3	18.8	
1765	20.0	24.0	43	998.0	23.2	18.0	23.0	27	565.0	20.9	11.0	21.0	36	591.5	16.4	12.0	20.5	16	262.5	16.4	11.0	24.0	122	2417.0	19.8	
1766	17.0	25.0	18	413.0	22.9	15.0	24.0	37	702.0	19.0	9.0	22.0	17	246.5	14.5	10.0	18.0	13	175.0	13.5	9.0	25.0	85	1536.5	18.1	
1767	22.0	43.0	66	1851.0	28.0	10.5	30.0	17	375.5	22.1	11.0	24.5	19	326.0	17.2	14.0	24.0	11	194.0	17.6	10.5	43.0	113	2746.5	24.3	
1769	20.0	34.0	52	1563.0	30.1	17.0	34.0	28	738.0	26.4	14.5	28.0	44	887.5	20.2	16.0	27.0	14	273.0	19.5	14.5	34.0	138	3461.5	25.1	
1770	27.0	45.0	147	5328.0	36.2	23.0	86.5	75	2642.5	35.2	13.0	38.0	68	1806.5	26.6	13.3	30.5	38	915.0	24.1	13.0	86.5	328	10692.0	32.6	
1771	26.0	32.0	67	1996.3	29.8	23.0	32.0	33	963.0	29.2	12.0	27.0	38	794.5	20.9	17.5	29.5	7	166.5	23.8	12.0	32.0	145	3920.3	27.0	
1772	32.0	45.5	31	1151.0	37.1	33.0	44.5	10	389.0	38.9	20.5	35.0	15	403.0	26.9	22.5	32.0	9	240.0	26.7	20.5	45.5	65	2183.0	33.6	
1774	40.5	52.0	16	778.5	48.7	36.0	51.8	14	641.0	45.8	19.5	35.5	32	992.5	31.0	27.0	34.5	9	287.5	31.9	19.5	52.0	71	2699.5	38.0	
1776	58.5	59.3	6	353.5	58.9	39.2	55.2	10	477.0	47.7	30.7	30.7	3	92.0	30.7	n/a	n/a	0			30.7	59.3	19	922.5	48.6	

## Appendix C: A List of Loango Coast Slave Trading Merchants from the MCC Records, 1732 to 1797

First date of Appearance	Last date of Appearance	Number of Years with Information	Merchant Name	Transactions	Number of Slaves	Joint Transactions	Number of Joint Slaves	Total Transactions	Total Slaves	Slaves/Year	Rank	Transactions/Year	Rank
1774	1774	1	? Pieter	1	7			1	7	7.0	154.5	1.0	470.5
1757	1757	1	_ins Colleij	1	6			1	6	6.0	177	1.0	470.5
1759	1759	1	Amsterdam	1	2			1	2	2.0	396.5	1.0	470.5
1770	1770	1	Andrees Mangova/Andries Mangova	3	11			3	11	11.0	94.0	3.0	188.0
1767	1774	3	Andries/Prins Anderies/Prins Andrees/Prins Andries	11	47			11	47	15.7	57.0	3.7	153.0
1771	1771	1	Andries Dien	1	2			1	2	2.0	396.5	1.0	470.5
1768	1768	1	Andries Mafoeke	1	2			1	2	2.0	396.5	1.0	470.5
1766	1766	1	Anthonij Anboujou	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1759	1759	1	Anthonij van Malemba/Antonij van Malemba	5	5			5	5	5.0	208.0	5.0	108.0
1759	1759	1	Antonie	2	2			2	2	2.0	396.5	2.0	280.0
1757	1759	2	Apollo	15	24			15	24	12.0	83.5	7.5	56.0
1759	1759	1	Arie aan boe/Arij aan boe	2	2			2	2	2.0	396.5	2.0	280.0
1772	1774	2	Arij Maba/Arij Mabbu	3	7			3	7	3.5	280.0	1.5	342.0
1770	1771	2	Arij Mantie/Arij Matien/Arij Martien	2	12			2	12	6.0	177.0	1.0	470.5
1749	1749	1	Arij Simson	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1770	1770	1	Arij Teijiensa/Arij Tiensa	3	4			3	4	4.0	253.5	3.0	188.0
1774	1774	1	Atoemba Atoemba	1	8			1	8	8.0	137.5	1.0	470.5
1749	1749	1	Prins Arij	14	14			14	14	14.0	67.5	14.0	13.0
1764	1772	2	Ban Matijelle/Basa Mathella/Basa Mathijella	3	6			3	6	3.0	310.5	1.5	342.0
1759	1759	1	Batiekanse/Batte Cansie/Batie Carasie/Balsekanse	3	4	5	6	8	10	10.0	107.0	8.0	48.0
1769	1771	3	Batij Claas/Batje Claad/Batje Claas/Battie Claas/Prins Batje Claas/Prins Battje Claas/Prins I	23	29	7	22	30	51	17.0	46.5	10.0	30.5
1770	1770	1	Batje/Battie			6	9	6	9	9.0	120.5	6.0	83.0
1762	1762	1	Bek Jan	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1759	1759	1	Belkesnsa	3	3			3	3	3.0	310.5	3.0	188.0
1766	1767	2	Ben Coffij	3	3			3	3	1.5	452.5	1.5	342.0
1770	1770	1	Bikeo			9	11	9	11	11.0	94.0	9.0	37.5
1770	1770	1	Prins Boersie	2	4			2	4	4.0	253.5	2.0	280.0
1770	1770	1	Prins Bon Vernando	2	2			2	2	2.0	396.5	2.0	280.0
1770	1774	4	Boense Basa/Boense Bassa/Boensie Basa/Boersie Basa/Boese Basa/Boesse Basa/Boesse Baz	18	70			18	70	17.5	43.5	4.5	123.5
1774	1774	1	Boma Niema	1	2			1	2	2.0	396.5	1.0	470.5
1759	1759	1	Bomba	3	3			3	3	3.0	310.5	3.0	188.0
1762	1772	2	Bomgo/Prins Boangoo	3	3	2	7	5	10	5.0	208.0	2.5	223.0

First date of Appearance	Last date of Appearance	Number of Years with Information	Merchant Name	Transactions	Number of Slaves	Joint Transactions	Number of Joint Slaves	Total Transactions	Total Slaves	Slaves/Year	Rank	Transactions/Year	Rank
1767	1768	2	Bon Claiijs Monebee	16	32			16	32	16.0	53.0	8.0	48.0
1759	1759	1	Bonse	13	13			13	13	13.0	77.5	13.0	16.5
1759	1759	1	Bonse Mantesse	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1774	1774	1	Bonza Sioes/Bonza Soeer	1	2	1	3	2	5	5.0	208.0	2.0	280.0
1749	1759	2	Boo Coffij/Bou Coffij	9	12			9	12	6.0	177.0	4.5	123.5
1771	1771	1	Bosesoer Tjecaja/Cosesoer Tjecaja	1	1	4	10	5	11	11.0	94.0	5.0	108.0
1767	1767	1	Caap Bende	2	3			2	3	3.0	310.5	2.0	280.0
1757	1757	1	Caap de loop	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1767	1767	1	Cabende Claiijs	2	2			2	2	2.0	396.5	2.0	280.0
1755	1776	3	Cabende/Cabienda/Cabiendn	5	9			5	9	3.0	310.5	1.7	332.0
1770	1770	1	Cabinda de Jong/Kabinda de Jonge	2	2			2	2	2.0	396.5	2.0	280.0
1762	1762	1	Caijo de Comma	6	6			6	6	6.0	177.0	6.0	83.0
1772	1772	1	Cambo Konings Zoen/Kambo Konings Zoen	2	2			2	2	2.0	396.5	2.0	280.0
1774	1776	2	Cap Barbe/Capiteijn Baab	5	28			5	28	14.0	67.5	2.5	223.0
1769	1769	1	Cap Moor Voor Matientje/Cap Moor Voor Matting	2	2			2	2	2.0	396.5	2.0	280.0
1759	1772	2	Capiteijn Moor/Capitijjn Mon/Capiteijn Moor	3	3			3	3	1.5	452.5	1.5	342.0
1773	1773	1	Cappita van Magoven	1	4			1	4	4.0	253.5	1.0	470.5
1758	1758	1	Prins Calleij	1	3			1	3	3.0	310.5	1.0	470.5
1769	1769	1	Prins Cambo/Prins Chambo	5	5			5	5	5.0	208.0	5.0	108.0
1749	1767	3	Prins Claas/Prins Claes/Prins Klaas/Prins Klaes	19	26			19	26	8.7	126.0	6.3	74.0
1770	1770	1	Prins Coffij Maponde	2	3			2	3	3.0	310.5	2.0	280.0
1770	1770	1	Catte Quande	1	2			1	2	2.0	396.5	1.0	470.5
1757	1757	1	Cilklonden	1	4			1	4	4.0	253.5	1.0	470.5
1771	1771	1	Coebeloe Loeboe	1	2	4	14	5	16	16.0	53.0	5.0	108.0
1769	1774	4	Coema/Comma/Comme	1	2	3	4	4	6	1.5	452.5	1.0	470.5
1759	1759	1	Coffij Anboe	9	15			9	15	15.0	59.5	9.0	37.5
1772	1772	1	Coffij Caleijnse	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1766	1772	3	Coffij Cosie Jongen/Coffij de Losie Jong/Coffij Losie Jong	8	9			8	9	3.0	310.5	2.7	213.5
1776	1776	1	Coffij Dongoe	1	4			1	4	4.0	253.5	1.0	470.5
1774	1774	1	Coffij Makossa	1	2			1	2	2.0	396.5	1.0	470.5
1764	1774	4	Coffij Martien/Coffij Martijn/Coffij Matijelij	5	9			5	9	2.3	344.0	1.3	352.0
1764	1764	1	Coffij Mavinga	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5

First date of Appearance	Last date of Appearance	Number of Years with Information	Merchant Name	Transactions	Number of Slaves	Joint Transactions	Number of Joint Slaves	Total Transactions	Total Slaves	Slaves/Year	Rank	Transactions/Year	Rank
1770	1770	1	Coffij Teijmbamba/Coffij Tempambo	2	2			2	2	2.0	396.5	2.0	280.0
1755	1770	8	Coffij/Coffije/Koffij/Prins Coffij/Prins Koffie	109	159	3	6	112	165	20.6	27.0	14.0	13.0
1757	1757	1	Collenbin Konings zoon	1	6			1	6	6.0	177.0	1.0	470.5
1768	1768	1	Combange Combates	2	2			2	2	2.0	396.5	2.0	280.0
1767	1767	1	Commandeur	4	5			4	5	5.0	208.0	4.0	141.0
1772	1776	3	Conde Samboe/Condo Sambo/Kondo Sambo	13	60			13	60	20.0	30.0	4.3	129.5
1749	1749	1	Conings Loon	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1769	1770	2	Coraië/Corail	2	2			2	2	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1769	1770	2	Couburin Macost/Coubroin Matosi/Coubrou Macos	14	14			14	14	7.0	154.5	7.0	67.0
1769	1770	2	Coubrou	9	9	3	12	12	21	10.5	102.5	6.0	83.0
1767	1767	1	Crenisse Mouijmalblle	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1759	1759	1	De bimba	3	3			3	3	3.0	310.5	3.0	188.0
1757	1757	1	denfeloen	2	2			2	2	2.0	396.5	2.0	280.0
1755	1759	2	Dicke Barend/Dickke Barent	43	50			43	50	25.0	19.0	21.5	6.0
1774	1774	1	Dieke de Vries	4	8			4	8	8.0	137.5	4.0	141.0
1767	1771	5	Docke/Dokke/Prins Dock/Prins Dokke	4	4	8	24	12	28	5.6	190.0	2.4	230.0
1749	1749	1	Prins Duck Wil	8	8			8	8	8.0	137.5	8.0	48.0
1770	1770	1	Doende			1	1	1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1767	1767	1	Doffij Markedoor	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1764	1764	1	Dolphin	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1762	1762	1	Dokkoe	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1773	1773	1	Prins Faaten Gomma	2	19			2	19	19.0	35.5	2.0	280.0
1769	1770	2	Prins Famel/Prins Famele/Prins Famell/Prins Famile	7	8			7	8	4.0	253.5	3.5	157.0
1757	1757	1	Prins Feck	1	2			1	2	2.0	396.5	1.0	470.5
1767	1768	2	Prins Ferdinand/Prins Fernand	10	19			10	19	9.5	111.0	5.0	108.0
1770	1770	1	Prins Ferenk Makolla/Prins Frenk Makolla	10	16			10	16	16.0	53.0	10.0	30.5
1767	1768	2	Fam Koning	7	11			7	11	5.5	193.0	3.5	157.0
1762	1762	1	Femmen	2	2			2	2	2.0	396.5	2.0	280.0
1764	1765	2	Ferdenart	9	9			9	9	4.5	225.5	4.5	123.5
1757	1758	2	Fernande	3	6			3	6	3.0	310.5	1.5	342.0
1767	1767	1	Fernande Poo	3	3			3	3	3.0	310.5	3.0	188.0
1759	1759	1	Flink/Frink			5	6	5	6	6.0	177.0	5.0	108.0

First date of Appearance	Last date of Appearance	Number of Years with Information	Merchant Name	Transactions	Number of Slaves	Joint Transactions	Number of Joint Slaves	Total Transactions	Total Slaves	Slaves/Year	Rank	Transactions/Year	Rank
1774	1774	1	Foema Candie	1	3			1	3	3.0	310.5	1.0	470.5
1767	1768	2	Foete Tatie	10	11			10	11	5.5	193.0	5.0	108.0
1757	1757	1	Foearij	2	2			2	2	2.0	396.5	2.0	280.0
1766	1766	1	Fouke Combij Pollo Matamba/Mafouke Combij Pollo Matamba	4	4			4	4	4.0	253.5	4.0	141.0
1767	1767	1	Frange Bange/Franke Banges	2	3			2	3	3.0	310.5	2.0	280.0
1762	1764	2	Frank Cabenda/Franke Kabende	3	3			3	3	1.5	452.5	1.5	342.0
1764	1767	2	Franke	4	4			4	4	2.0	396.5	2.0	280.0
1766	1767	2	Geele Prins	4	4			4	4	2.0	396.5	2.0	280.0
1762	1762	1	Gerst	2	2			2	2	2.0	396.5	2.0	280.0
1769	1770	2	Goblet	2	2	4	18	6	20	10.0	107.0	3.0	188.0
1764	1767	3	Goevermier Antonie/Goeverneur Antonie/Gouverneur Antonin/Gouverneur Anthonij	13	13			13	13	4.3	231.0	4.3	129.5
1772	1774	3	Gomma Konings Zoen/Gomma Koning Zoon	12	44			12	44	14.7	61.5	4.0	141.0
1759	1759	1	Gouverneur Mapello/Gouverneur Mappello	8	16			8	16	16.0	53.0	8.0	48.0
1757	1759	2	Gouverneur Matendo/Gouverneur Matinde/Gouverneur Mattendo	3	4			3	4	2.0	396.5	1.5	342.0
1757	1757	1	Gouverneur Matimo/Gouverneur Matimongoo/Gouverneur Mattimomongo/Gouverneur Mattir	6	11			6	11	11.0	94.0	6.0	83.0
1749	1749	1	Gouverneur Minne Baanse	2	2			2	2	2.0	396.5	2.0	280.0
1755	1755	1	Goveneur Cabende	6	6			6	6	6.0	177.0	6.0	83.0
1762	1762	1	Groot Markez Dick	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1771	1771	1	Guine Mattiemba	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1759	1759	1	Im Arij/Imarij	3	3			3	3	3.0	310.5	3.0	188.0
1757	1757	1	Immi Webbens	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1771	1771	1	Prins Gillo	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1762	1762	1	Prins Jakob	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1749	1757	4	Jan/Prins Jan	15	15			15	15	3.8	275.0	3.8	151.5
1759	1759	1	Invensie Congo	3	3			3	3	3.0	310.5	3.0	188.0
1757	1757	1	Jaas Koningzoon	2	4			2	4	4.0	253.5	2.0	280.0
1759	1767	3	Jan Alfet/Jan Alfret/Jan Alphet/Jan Alttet	10	10			10	10	3.3	284.0	3.3	163.0
1764	1769	3	Jan Amsterdam	4	8			4	8	2.7	337.0	1.3	351.0
1749	1765	5	Jan Arij/Janarij	37	41			37	41	8.2	131.0	7.4	58.0
1762	1770	3	Jan Baarents/Jan Baarns/Jan Barentz	46	59			46	59	19.7	33.0	15.3	9.0
1759	1759	1	Jan Bien Opsteeker/Jan Bier Opsteeker	2	2			2	2	2.0	396.5	2.0	280.0
1749	1774	5	Jan Binda/Jan Cabende/Jan Cabinda	27	36			27	36	7.2	145.5	5.4	95.5



First date of Appearance	Last date of Appearance	Number of Years with Information	Merchant Name	Transactions	Number of Slaves	Joint Transactions	Number of Joint Slaves	Total Transactions	Total Slaves	Slaves/Year	Rank	Transactions/Year	Rank
1770	1770	1	Jan Blanco	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1749	1749	1	Jan Bordt	6	6			6	6	6.0	177.0	6.0	83.0
1769	1770	2	Jan Broer	11	11	4	11	15	22	11.0	94.0	7.5	56.0
1764	1772	5	Jan Cato/Jan Cattoo/Jan Catto	29	36			29	36	7.2	145.5	5.8	92.0
1770	1770	1	Jan Claas Timbongo	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1757	1771	5	Jan Claase/Jan Clase/Jan Clasen/Jan Klaafe/Jan Klaase/Jan Klaasen/Jan Klaasfe/Jan Klase/Ja	63	107	1	3	64	110	22.0	24.0	12.8	18.0
1770	1770	1	Prins Jan Claas Malembo	1	2			1	2	2.0	396.5	1.0	470.5
1759	1759	1	Jan Coffij/Jan Koffij	2	2			2	2	2.0	396.5	2.0	280.0
1749	1770	5	Jan Coni/Jan Conij/Jan Connij/Jan Conni/Jan Cooni/Jan coonij/Prins Jan Coni	30	32	10	23	40	55	11.0	94.0	8.0	48.0
1759	1759	1	Jan Flink	2	2			2	2	2.0	396.5	2.0	280.0
1769	1769	1	Jan Groer	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1762	1762	1	Jan Holvoet	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1768	1768	1	Jan Hout	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1759	1759	1	Jan Janse Mavongoo/Jong Janse Mavongo/Jonge Janse Mavongo	3	3			3	3	3.0	310.5	3.0	188.0
1769	1769	1	Jan Jelimbe			4	5	4	5	5.0	208.0	4.0	141.0
1767	1767	1	Jan Kiel	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1770	1770	1	Jan Koening/Jan Koning	2	2			2	2	2.0	396.5	2.0	280.0
1764	1776	4	Jan Lazare/Jan Lesaar/Jan Lezaar/Jan Loesaav	15	20	2	17	17	37	9.3	115.0	4.3	131.0
1770	1770	1	Jan Letto	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1749	1771	2	Jan Luemba/Jan Malemba/Jan Salemba	7	9	3	7	10	16	8.0	137.5	5.0	108.0
1772	1772	1	Jan Mamkakka	1	4			1	4	4.0	253.5	1.0	470.5
1770	1770	1	Jan Mateello/Jan Mateijlla	2	2			2	2	2.0	396.5	2.0	280.0
1749	1749	1	Jan Minnebal	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1770	1770	1	Prins Jan Matitenbie	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1770	1770	1	Jan Otte	1	2			1	2	2.0	396.5	1.0	470.5
1755	1764	3	Jan Prins	18	20	8	8	26	28	9.3	113.0	8.7	41.5
1769	1774	3	Jan Zwart	18	32	3	10	21	42	14.0	67.5	7.0	67.0
1774	1774	1	Jan Zwarte Toto	1	2			1	2	2.0	396.5	1.0	470.5
1755	1758	3	Prins Jansen	5	15			5	15	5.0	208.0	1.7	332.0
1759	1765	2	Jeck Bord/Jeck Bordt	4	9			4	9	4.5	225.5	2.0	280.0
1769	1769	1	Jeck Jimike	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1770	1776	2	Jeck Koining/Jeck Koning	2	6			2	6	3.0	310.5	1.0	470.5

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1774	1774	1	Jeck Koning Malemba	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1759	1759	1	Jeck Mafoeke	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1765	1772	5	Jeck Magova/Jeck Mangove/Prins Jeck Magova/Prins Jeck Mangove	38	62			38	62	12.4	82.0	7.6	53.5
1772	1772	1	Prins Jes Mamtunie	1	2			1	2	2.0	396.5	1.0	470.5
1774	1776	2	Jeck Masolla/Jeck Mazola	2	6			2	6	3.0	310.5	1.0	470.5
1755	1766	5	Jek/Prins Jeck/Jek Prins	35	52	1	2	36	54	10.8	100.0	7.2	60.0
1762	1762	1	Jek Konning Linste	2	2			2	2	2.0	396.5	2.0	280.0
1762	1762	1	Jek Zien Gaa	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1766	1766	1	Jelle Magove	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1749	1759	3	Jem Arij/Jemmie Arij/Jemmij Arij/Jim Arij	12	12			12	12	4.0	253.5	4.0	141.0
1759	1759	1	Jemmie Koffij/Jemmij Koffij	2	2			2	2	2.0	396.5	2.0	280.0
1768	1770	2	Jhms Claas/Jimi Claijs/Jims Claas	5	9			5	9	4.5	225.5	2.5	223.0
1767	1767	1	Jim Baatie/Jim Battie	2	2			2	2	2.0	396.5	2.0	280.0
1767	1770	3	Jimbi/Jmbie			3	3	3	3	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1757	1757	1	Jimbo Labelle	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1755	1755	1	Jimie Jars	2	2			2	2	2.0	396.5	2.0	280.0
1757	1758	2	Jimmi Ammetton	5	16			5	16	8.0	137.5	2.5	223.0
1755	1755	1	Jimmidood	2	2			2	2	2.0	396.5	2.0	280.0
1767	1767	1	Jo Monebee	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1755	1764	4	Joarij/Joo Arij/Jou Arij	49	54			49	54	13.5	71.5	12.3	20.0
1774	1774	1	Joel Maze	1	3			1	3	3.0	310.5	1.0	470.5
1766	1767	2	Jon Croos/Jong Croos	5	6			5	6	3.0	310.5	2.5	223.0
1749	1759	2	Jong Jan Arij/Jonge Jan Arij	5	8			5	8	4.0	253.5	2.5	223.0
1759	1759	1	Jong Marck David/Jongmarck David	2	4			2	4	4.0	253.5	2.0	280.0
1774	1774	1	Jong Matitentie	1	2			1	2	2.0	396.5	1.0	470.5
1766	1766	1	Jong Tom Ellefutte	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1766	1766	1	Jong Tom Sito	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1767	1767	1	Jonge Bondes	2	2			2	2	2.0	396.5	2.0	280.0
1749	1749	1	Jonge Captijn Moor	2	2			2	2	2.0	396.5	2.0	280.0
1755	1767	4	Jonge Claijs/Jonge Claas/Jonge Klaas	11	19			11	19	4.8	220.0	2.8	211.0
1749	1765	3	Jonge Coffij/Jonge Koffij	26	28			26	28	9.3	113.0	8.7	41.5
1762	1762	1	Jonge Dik	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5

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1767	1767	1	Jonge Fernandes	5	6			5	6	6.0	177.0	5.0	108.0
1758	1758	1	Jonge Franke	1	2			1	2	2.0	396.5	1.0	470.5
1770	1770	1	Jonge Gouari Maronge	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1762	1762	1	Jonge Jan	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1762	1762	1	Jonge Jan Coffij	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1770	1770	1	Jonge Jeck	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1758	1767	2	Jonge Madeke/Jonge Mafoeke	6	7			6	7	3.5	280.0	3.0	188.0
1749	1749	1	Jonge Marki	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1771	1771	1	Jonge Mattjentje	1	2			1	2	2.0	396.5	1.0	470.5
1749	1749	1	Jonge Minnebel	2	2			2	2	2.0	396.5	2.0	280.0
1769	1770	1	Jonge Monnebanse	9	12			9	12	12.0	83.5	9.0	37.5
1749	1749	1	Jonge Pieter	13	13			13	13	13.0	77.5	13.0	16.5
1764	1764	1	Jonge Was	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1749	1749	1	Jonge Windt/Jonge Wint	3	3			3	3	3.0	310.5	3.0	188.0
1749	1749	1	Jonge Wint Hondt	2	2			2	2	2.0	396.5	2.0	280.0
1762	1762	1	Jos Sien Gaa	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1769	1770	2	Joubert/Prins Joubent/Prins Joubert	5	5	1	2	6	7	3.5	280.0	3.0	188.0
1771	1771	1	Prins Jmbico	7	12	5	14	12	26	26.0	16.0	12.0	22.5
1774	1774	1	Kamboekn	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1770	1770	1	Kandie	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1776	1776	1	Kapieta Juba	1	5			1	5	5.0	208.0	1.0	470.5
1770	1772	2	Katte Quande/Kotte Quande	2	2			2	2	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1757	1757	1	King markedoor	1	2			1	2	2.0	396.5	1.0	470.5
1771	1771	1	King Pombe Jobbe	2	2	1	5	3	7	7.0	154.5	3.0	188.0
1762	1762	1	Klaas de Lozie/Klaas Lozij	5	5			5	5	5.0	208.0	5.0	108.0
1755	1755	1	Kleijn Klaasje	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1759	1759	1	Kleijn Mapotika	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1755	1755	1	Kocks Maat	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1755	1755	1	Koffij Calientje	1	9			1	9	9.0	120.5	1.0	470.5
1774	1774	1	Koffij Tati	3	3			3	3	3.0	310.5	3.0	188.0
1762	1764	2	Kok Tate	4	4			4	4	2.0	396.5	2.0	280.0
1759	1759	1	Kokke Labonse	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5

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1759	1759	1	koks maedt	2	2			2	2	2.0	396.5	2.0	280.0
1757	1757	1	Kollenbin Koning Zoon	1	4			1	4	4.0	253.5	1.0	470.5
1762	1768	3	Koning	21	32			21	32	10.7	101.0	7.0	67.0
1762	1764	2	Koning Elingstel			8	8	8	8	4.0	253.5	4.0	141.0
1757	1757	1	Koning Jon	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1757	1758	2	Koning Stolck	6	22			6	22	11.0	94.0	3.0	188.0
1772	1774	2	Konings markedoor/Konings Maridoor	4	34			4	34	17.0	46.5	2.0	280.0
1766	1766	1	Kotte Kwande voor de Koning	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1767	1768	2	Krins Cabinda	1	1			1	1	0.5	591.5	0.5	590.5
1770	1770	1	Krins Koning	4	5			4	5	5.0	208.0	4.0	141.0
1769	1769	1	Labeer	1	2	1	1	2	3	3.0	310.5	2.0	280.0
1774	1774	1	Label dongo	1	4			1	4	4.0	253.5	1.0	470.5
1774	1774	1	Lakela	1	2			1	2	2.0	396.5	1.0	470.5
1749	1762	5	Lange Jan	24	30	1	3	25	33	6.6	163.0	5.0	108.0
1762	1762	1	Lange Jan Kok	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1764	1764	1	Lange Jan Poffe	3	4			3	4	4.0	253.5	3.0	188.0
1771	1771	1	Lange Piet	11	12	3	8	14	20	20.0	30.0	14.0	13.0
1757	1757	1	Lange Pieter	2	8			2	8	8.0	137.5	2.0	280.0
1762	1762	1	Lange Vees	2	2			2	2	2.0	396.5	2.0	280.0
1770	1772	2	Lavena de Losai Jong/Loemba de Losie Jong	2	2			2	2	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1772	1772	1	Le Veine de Jonge	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1762	1762	1	Lende	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1771	1771	1	Libelle Doengo/Libelle Doengo	3	4	2	5	5	9	9.0	120.5	5.0	108.0
1767	1767	1	Lobbe Claijs	3	3			3	3	3.0	310.5	3.0	188.0
1772	1774	2	Logie Jongen/Logie Jongens/Loosie Jongen/Lossie Jogen	3	14	6	55	9	69	34.5	9.0	4.5	123.5
1776	1776	1	Loheemba Lokaijje	1	6			1	6	6.0	177.0	1.0	470.5
1758	1762	2	London/Prins Londen	5	8			5	8	4.0	253.5	2.5	223.0
1749	1749	1	Longe Jan Arij	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1774	1774	1	Longom Bakkes	1	2			1	2	2.0	396.5	1.0	470.5
1755	1755	1	Lowij	7	7			7	7	7.0	154.5	7.0	67.0
1769	1769	1	Prins L Dock	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1762	1762	1	Prins Laas	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5

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1774	1774	1	Prins Laden	1	2			1	2	2.0	396.5	1.0	470.5
1770	1770	1	Prins Langro	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1769	1769	1	Prins Linga/Prins Lingo	5	6	1	2	6	8	8.0	137.5	6.0	83.0
1770	1770	1	Prins Lonne Mojombe	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1771	1771	1	M____M_____	1	16			1	16	16.0	53.0	1.0	470.5
1766	1766	1	Maaster Braams	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1755	1755	1	Mabanse	36	36			36	36	36.0	6.5	36.0	3.0
1757	1759	2	Mabialla/Mabijalla	2	2	3	6	5	8	4.0	253.5	2.5	223.0
1757	1774	4	Maboba/Maboeba/Maboeba/Maboek/Maboeka/Maboeki/Prins Maboeke/Prins Maboeke/Prins Maboeke/Prins Maboeke/	43	72			43	72	18.0	39.5	10.8	28.0
1774	1774	1	Maboeki Rowaan	1	6			1	6	6.0	177.0	1.0	470.5
1774	1774	1	Maboeki Wabba	1	5			1	5	5.0	208.0	1.0	470.5
1770	1770	1	Mabonda de Peer	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1772	1772	1	Mabuma Viensa/Mabuma Viensa Konings Zoon	2	18			2	18	18.0	39.5	2.0	280.0
1770	1770	1	Macos Melonge	2	2			2	2	2.0	396.5	2.0	280.0
1759	1770	2	Prins Mabaka/Prins Mabake	2	2			2	2	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1771	1774	2	Prins Mabeijlla/Prins Mabeilla/Prins Mabeiele	3	8			3	8	4.0	253.5	1.5	342.0
1767	1768	2	Prins Mbjere/Prins Majere	7	11			7	11	5.5	193.0	3.5	157.0
1759	1759	1	Prins Mabokeras	6	6			6	6	6.0	177.0	6.0	83.0
1757	1759	3	Prins Mabotte	7	13			7	13	4.3	231.0	2.3	231.0
1767	1776	4	Prins Macolle/Prins Makolla/Prins Makossa/Prins Makosse	20	140			20	140	35.0	8.0	5.0	108.0
1765	1773	6	Prins Macosse Mamobij/Prins Makossa Mambua/Prins Makossa Mamubo/Prins Makosse M	44	87			44	87	14.5	63.0	7.3	59.0
1759	1772	2	Prins Maeoangelo/Malowango/Mowango/Prins Mawangelo/Prins Monwango	10	23			10	23	11.5	86.5	5.0	108.0
1759	1759	1	Prins Mag wangese	20	20			20	20	20.0	30.0	20.0	7.0
1771	1771	1	Maffoeque Emanuel/Maffoeque Emamice/Maffoeque Emanuel/Maffoeke Emanuel	9	11	3	8	12	19	19.0	35.5	12.0	22.5
1759	1771	5	Maffoeque Robbin/Maffoeke Robijn/Maffoeke Robben/Maffoeke Robijn/Maffoeke Robin/Maffoeq	29	48	9	28	38	76	15.2	58.0	7.6	53.5
1755	1776	9	Mafoe Bliem/Maffoeke Blienboo/Maffoeke Bliem/Maffoeke Bliembo/Maffoeke Blienbo/Maffoeke	83	195			83	195	21.7	26.0	9.2	34.0
1769	1769	1	Maffoeke Calli	2	2			2	2	2.0	396.5	2.0	280.0
1759	1759	1	Maffoeke Boosman	2	2			2	2	2.0	396.5	2.0	280.0
1767	1767	1	Maffoeke Canties	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1757	1774	3	Maffoeke Claas/Maffoeke Klaas/Mafongo Claas	25	108			25	108	36.0	6.5	8.3	43.0
1757	1757	1	Maffoeke Cousin	1	3	3	6	4	9	9.0	120.5	4.0	141.0
1758	1762	2	Maffoeke Deijk/ Maffoeke Dik	5	9			5	9	4.5	225.5	2.5	223.0

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1762	1767	4	Mafoeke Fabba/Mafoeke Fabbaa/Mafouke Saba/Mafouke Vaba/Maphaka Vaba	48	75			48	75	18.8	37.0	12.0	22.5
1762	1762	1	Mafoeke Kobbole/Mafoeke Kobele/Mafoeke Koebel/Mafoeke Koebela/Mafoeke Koebele/Mafoc	39	39			39	39	39.0	5.0	39.0	1.0
1762	1776	3	Mafoeke Koemie/Mafoeke Kombij/Maphuka Koemie	21	30			21	30	10.0	107.0	7.0	67.0
1749	1749	1	Mafoeke Louwango	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1757	1771	8	Prins Majelle/Prins Mapello/Prins Matiella/Prins Matijella/Prins Matijello/Prins Matjeele/	75	141			75	141	17.6	42.0	9.4	33.0
1749	1771	4	Prins Majobo/Prins Majombe/Prins Majompe/Prins Man Jobba/Prins Mapompe/Prins Majo	8	8	1	2	9	10	2.5	340.0	2.3	232.0
1749	1776	4	Prins Makaaije/Prins Makaij/PrinsMakaijje/Prins Makaik/Prins Makaje	7	18			7	18	4.5	225.5	1.8	328.5
1773	1773	1	Prins Malingen	1	7			1	7	7.0	154.5	1.0	470.5
1770	1770	1	Prins Mamamiensa	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1770	1770	1	Prins Mame Makossa	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1759	1759	1	Prins Mandezete	3	3			3	3	3.0	310.5	3.0	188.0
1768	1768	1	Prins Mane Loeketas	1	3			1	3	3.0	310.5	1.0	470.5
1774	1774	1	Prins Manemuza	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1749	1771	3	Mafoeke Malimbe/Mafoeke Melemme/Mafoeque Malemba	10	17			10	17	5.7	189.0	3.3	163.0
1769	1774	3	Mafoeke Tate	8	30			8	30	10.0	107.0	2.7	213.5
1767	1767	1	Mafoeke Wis	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1755	1771	8	Mafoeke/Maffongo/Mafongoo/Makoeke/Maphaka	111	153	5	7	116	160	20.0	30.0	14.5	10.0
1773	1773	1	Mafoeken Pollen	4	20			4	20	20.0	30.0	4.0	141.0
1770	1773	3	Mafoeken Wabben/Maphaka Waba/Mapheika Waba	6	14			6	14	4.7	221.0	2.0	280.0
1771	1771	1	Mafoeque Fammer	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1770	1770	1	Maphaka Mabaka	1	3			1	3	3.0	310.5	1.0	470.5
1774	1774	1	Maphuka Manuel	1	2			1	2	2.0	396.5	1.0	470.5
1774	1774	1	Maphuka Pessa	1	3			1	3	3.0	310.5	1.0	470.5
1774	1774	1	Maphuka Pieter	1	2			1	2	2.0	396.5	1.0	470.5
1772	1772	1	Maphuka Tom Pollo/Mphuka Tom Pollo	3	3			3	3	3.0	310.5	3.0	188.0
1762	1762	1	Magoff Mafoeke	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1769	1771	2	Magoffe Dick/Magove Diek	7	17	3	10	10	27	13.5	71.5	5.0	108.0
1764	1774	3	Magova	68	70	1	3	69	73	24.3	20.0	23.0	4.5
1771	1774	2	Magova Claas/Magove Klaas	7	18	2	5	9	23	11.5	86.5	4.5	123.5
1774	1774	1	Magova Jns Konings Vaerp	1	3			1	3	3.0	253.5	1.0	342.0
1772	1774	2	Magova Makaaija/Magova Prins Makaijia/Magove van Makaaije	3	8			3	8	4.0	253.5	1.5	342.0
1771	1771	1	Magove Koning			1	4	1	4	4.0	253.5	1.0	470.5

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1766	1766	1	Majem Poketa	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1770	1770	1	Majimba Claas	2	2			2	2	2.0	396.5	2.0	280.0
1774	1774	1	Makaaija	1	4			1	4	4.0	253.5	1.0	470.5
1773	1773	1	Makaijen van Magoven	1	5			1	5	5.0	208.0	1.0	470.5
1772	1772	1	Makakka Basa	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1776	1776	1	Makalleman	1	8			1	8	8.0	137.5	1.0	470.5
1759	1759	1	Makelaer Bokse	3	3			3	3	3.0	310.5	3.0	188.0
1774	1774	1	Makembe Biko/Makembe em Beike	2	3			2	3	3.0	310.5	2.0	280.0
1759	1759	1	Makka Mamoeba	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1774	1774	1	Makoffa Gubec/Makossa Gublu	2	4			2	4	4.0	253.5	2.0	280.0
1772	1772	1	Makossa Mamima	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1764	1776	6	Makossa/Makosso/Prins Mkosse	3	12			3	12	2.0	396.5	0.5	590.5
1771	1771	1	Makosse Koning	1	2			1	2	2.0	396.5	1.0	470.5
1757	1759	2	Malemba/Malembo	2	2			2	2	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1770	1770	1	Malieenlu	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1769	1769	1	Malkadoor Malondu	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1767	1768	2	Maloende Masenje/Maloende Masentie	3	4			3	4	2.0	396.5	1.5	342.0
1769	1774	3	Prins Mangoeve/Prins Mavoenge/Prins Magoeoe	9	77			9	77	25.7	18.0	3.0	188.0
1770	1770	1	Mamabele P Was/Mamebele Prins Was	3	4			3	4	4.0	253.5	3.0	188.0
1770	1770	1	Mamebaanse Tom Pollo/Mamebaca se Tom Pollo/Mamebaense Tom Pollo/Memibaense Tom	5	7			5	7	7.0	154.5	5.0	108.0
1764	1774	5	Mamebaanse/Mannebaanse/Mannebanse	7	12			7	12	2.4	343.0	1.4	350.0
1772	1772	1	Mamebanse Prins Was	5	8			5	8	8.0	137.5	5.0	108.0
1774	1774	1	Mamebelei	1	2			1	2	2.0	396.5	1.0	470.5
1774	1774	1	Mamebele op Malemba	1	2			1	2	2.0	396.5	1.0	470.5
1757	1757	1	Mamoeba	2	4			2	4	4.0	253.5	2.0	280.0
1772	1772	1	Mamtette Lolmba	2	10			2	10	10.0	107.0	2.0	280.0
1749	1764	2	Manboeke	3	4			3	4	2.0	396.5	1.5	342.0
1767	1767	1	Manepoeketa Majobo	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1749	1764	3	Mangoffe/Mangoffet	38	44			38	44	14.7	61.5	12.7	19.0
1762	1762	1	Mangoffee Mafoeke	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1773	1773	1	Mangooven van de Kooning	1	7			1	7	7.0	154.5	1.0	470.5
1776	1776	1	Manka Masasie	1	3			1	3	3.0	310.5	1.0	470.5

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1770	1770	1	Mankaka Mangonge Keela	1	2			1	2	2.0	396.5	1.0	470.5
1770	1770	1	Mankakka Mangonse	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1766	1766	1	Manko	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1771	1771	1	Manne Beele/Mannebeele	2	2	1	2	3	4	4.0	253.5	3.0	188.0
1749	1774	3	Mannetattie/Mantijntje	2	6			2	6	2.0	396.5	0.7	589.0
1774	1774	1	Manteve	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1769	1776	5	Prins Maponda/Prins Maponde	20	134			20	134	26.8	14.0	4.0	141.0
1759	1759	1	Prins Mapoteko/Prins Mapotika	3	3			3	3	3.0	310.5	3.0	188.0
1759	1759	1	Prins Matempe	3	3			3	3	3.0	310.5	3.0	188.0
1771	1771	1	Prins Mavoenge/Prins Mavoenge			7	18	7	18	18.0	39.5	7.0	67.0
1757	1774	7	Manuel/Manuwel/Manuwel/Prins Manuel	40	159	2	11	42	170	24.3	21.0	6.0	83.0
1776	1776	1	Mapoete Masumboe	1	3			1	3	3.0	310.5	1.0	470.5
1759	1759	1	Mapotika Doffijn	11	11			11	11	11.0	94.0	11.0	26.5
1776	1776	1	Maquebo	1	3			1	3	3.0	310.5	1.0	470.5
1770	1770	1	Maqueebba Mambba	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1757	1757	1	Marbeule	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1774	1774	1	Marke Davut	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1773	1773	1	Markedoor Koning Zoon	2	13			2	13	13.0	77.5	2.0	280.0
1757	1776	5	Marcadoor/Markesoor/Markidoor/Markodoor	13	43			13	43	8.6	127.0	2.6	216.0
1772	1772	1	Markidon van de Koning/Markidoor van de Koning	3	13			3	13	13.0	77.5	3.0	188.0
1770	1770	1	Markie	2	2			2	2	2.0	396.5	2.0	280.0
1764	1765	2	Marollo Apollo/Mazollo Apollo	5	11			5	11	5.5	193.0	2.5	223.0
1771	1771	1	Masanse	2	30			2	30	30.0	11.5	2.0	280.0
1776	1776	1	Masoengoe Matoenove	1	5			1	5	5.0	208.0	1.0	470.5
1772	1772	1	Masola Koning Zoen	1	3			1	3	3.0	310.5	1.0	470.5
1765	1765	1	Masoola/Mazola	5	5			5	5	5.0	208.0	5.0	108.0
1749	1771	10	Mat Intje/Mateelentee/Matieentie/Matiente/Matijnie/Matijeniye/Matijnje/Matijntje/Matin	169	364	8	27	177	391	39.1	4.0	17.7	8.0
1762	1762	1	Matientie Lato/Matjenje Lato/Matjinje Lato/Mattjenje Lato	6	6			6	6	6.0	177.0	6.0	83.0
1769	1769	1	Matientje Andries	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1757	1757	1	Matintje Konings zoon	1	3			1	3	3.0	310.5	1.0	470.5
1774	1774	1	Matitentje Bieko	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1774	1774	1	Matitentje Retoer	1	2			1	2	2.0	396.5	1.0	470.5



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1774	1774	1	Matongo Claas	1	4			1	4	4.0	253.5	1.0	470.5
1770	1770	1	Matotte	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1774	1774	1	Mattintje van Mangoeve	2	9			2	9	9.0	120.5	2.0	280.0
1771	1771	1	Mattjentje Dokke	1	1	1	2	2	3	3.0	310.5	2.0	280.0
1776	1776	1	MeGaart	1	6			1	6	6.0	177.0	1.0	470.5
1770	1770	1	Melonde Malos/Melonde Melos/Melonge Macos	9	9			9	9	9.0	120.5	9.0	37.5
1770	1770	1	Melonde Maros Latoes/Milonde Markos Latoes	3	3			3	3	3.0	310.5	3.0	188.0
1771	1771	1	Mil Waal			1	2	1	2	2.0	396.5	1.0	470.5
1757	1773	5	Minne belle/Minnen Belle/Moenbellen/Moenebele/Moenebellen/Moenebule/Moinibuli/Mon	17	65			17	65	13.0	77.5	3.4	161.0
1755	1774	10	Minnen banse/Monebanse/Monnebaanse/Monnebanse/Monnebense/Monnen Banse/Monne	66	130	5	11	71	141	14.1	64.0	7.1	61.0
1769	1771	3	Moebank/Moenebank	6	58			6	58	19.3	34.0	2.0	280.0
1776	1776	1	Moenebatje	2	7			2	7	7.0	154.5	2.0	280.0
1773	1773	1	Moemematta Konings Caffe Cier	1	5			1	5	5.0	208.0	1.0	470.5
1771	1776	3	Moememoensoe/Prins Moememoensoe	8	48			8	48	16.0	53.0	2.7	213.5
1773	1773	1	Moememoese Eerste Jonge/Moememoensen eerste Logie Jonge	4	29			4	29	29.0	13.0	4.0	141.0
1773	1773	1	Monebanse Coning Zoon	1	8			1	8	8.0	137.5	1.0	470.5
1767	1768	2	Monebee Maboek	6	10			6	10	5.0	208.0	3.0	188.0
1769	1770	2	Monnebanse Laton/Monnebase Laton	15	17			15	17	8.5	129.0	7.5	56.0
1769	1770	2	Monnebelle Joba	5	5			5	5	2.5	340.0	2.5	223.0
1770	1770	1	Monso	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1755	1755	1	Montette	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1749	1749	1	Net Arij/Nett Arij	8	8			8	8	8.0	137.5	8.0	48.0
1768	1768	1	Nite Claijs	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1764	1764	1	Onse Coffij/Onse Koffij/Onso Coffij	3	4			3	4	4.0	253.5	3.0	188.0
1749	1749	1	Oud Coffij/Oude Coffij/Oudt Coffij	8	8			8	8	8.0	137.5	8.0	48.0
1749	1749	1	Oud Lang Jan/Oude Lange Jan/Oudt Lange Jan	6	6			6	6	6.0	177.0	6.0	83.0
1770	1770	1	Oud London	1	2			1	2	2.0	396.5	1.0	470.5
1749	1749	1	Oude Franck/Oude Frank/Oudt Franck	3	3			3	3	3.0	310.5	3.0	188.0
1749	1749	1	Oude Nett Arij	2	2			2	2	2.0	396.5	2.0	280.0
1770	1770	1	P Magova	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1770	1770	1	P Majimma Ingous	1	2			1	2	2.0	396.5	1.0	470.5
1770	1770	1	Prins Pacsent	2	2			2	2	2.0	396.5	2.0	280.0

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1767	1768	2	Prins Parrij	10	12			10	12	6.0	177.0	5.0	108.0
1762	1762	1	Paarendoeke	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1770	1770	1	Pains Lingo	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1770	1770	1	Paketapo	1	2			1	2	2.0	396.5	1.0	470.5
1774	1774	1	Pakkeza	2	3			2	3	3.0	310.5	2.0	280.0
1759	1759	1	Pam Copte	1	1			1	1	1.0	396.5	1.0	470.5
1772	1772	1	Pam Pollo	1	2			1	2	2.0	396.5	1.0	470.5
1757	1758	2	Pampje	4	13			4	13	6.5	164.5	2.0	280.0
1776	1776	1	Pansoe Laamboe	1	10			1	10	10.0	107.0	1.0	470.5
1770	1770	1	Passantte Pollo			1	1	1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1772	1774	2	Pattei/Pattie			2	7	2	7	3.5	280.0	1.0	470.5
1772	1772	1	Pattie Magovas Zoen	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1773	1773	1	Pattimbongo van magoven	1	5			1	5	5.0	208.0	1.0	470.5
1749	1765	5	Peero Malemba/Piero Malemba/Pierro Malembo/PierroMalemba	27	27			27	27	5.4	196.0	5.4	95.5
1757	1758	2	Peero Matintje/Peerro Matintje/Pero Matingje/PerooMatintje	4	9			4	9	4.5	225.5	2.0	280.0
1755	1759	2	Peter Griffij/Pieter Griffijn	2	2			2	2	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1774	1774	1	Peter Makossa/Pieter Makosse	3	3			3	3	3.0	310.5	3.0	188.0
1770	1770	1	Pieketa Loende	2	5			2	5	5.0	208.0	2.0	280.0
1770	1776	4	Pieketa Pee/Pieketapo/Pieketee/Pieketie	14	70			14	70	17.5	43.5	3.5	157.0
1769	1769	1	Pierro	1	1	1	2	2	3	3.0	310.5	2.0	280.0
1769	1770	2	Pierro Magoffe	7	7			7	7	3.5	280.0	3.5	157.0
1762	1774	6	Pieter/ Prins Pieter	19	55	1	1	20	56	9.3	113.0	3.3	163.0
1749	1749	1	Pieter Ampole	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1759	1759	1	Pieter Andoensie	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1764	1764	1	Pieter Apollo/Pieter Apolloo	2	2			2	2	2.0	396.5	2.0	280.0
1749	1749	1	Pieter Cabende	9	9			9	9	9.0	120.5	9.0	37.5
1759	1759	1	Pieter Cinci	2	2			2	2	2.0	396.5	2.0	280.0
1755	1770	1	Pieter Claas/Pieter Classen/Pieter Claaven/Prins Pieter Claas	11	18			11	18	18.0	39.5	11.0	26.5
1749	1749	1	Pieter Coffij	3	3			3	3	3.0	310.5	3.0	188.0
1764	1767	2	Pieter Donk	5	5			5	5	2.5	340.0	2.5	223.0
1758	1758	1	Pieter Eaasse	1	4			1	4	4.0	253.5	1.0	470.5
1774	1774	1	Pieter Goebu	1	7			1	7	7.0	154.5	1.0	470.5

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1759	1759	1	Pieter Insonie	2	2			2	2	2.0	396.5	2.0	280.0
1759	1759	1	Pieter Jamboeka	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1749	1749	1	Pieter Jansen	6	6			6	6	6.0	177.0	6.0	83.0
1766	1772	3	Prins Pieter Joens/Prins Pieter Johns	3	4			3	4	1.3	456.0	1.0	470.5
1770	1774	3	Prins Polle/Prins Pollo	4	6	2	6	6	12	4.0	253.5	2.0	280.0
1769	1769	1	Prins Present	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1766	1767	2	Pieter Jonboke	7	8			7	8	4.0	253.5	3.5	157.0
1757	1759	2	Pieter King/Pieter Koning	6	6			6	6	3.0	310.5	3.0	188.0
1762	1762	1	Pieter Klaas Dominee	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1755	1755	1	Pieter Lowange	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1769	1770	2	Pieter Macaaij/Pieter Maraaij	5	5	1	4	6	9	4.5	225.5	3.0	188.0
1767	1767	1	Pieter Malembe	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1749	1759	2	Pieter Marka door/Pieter Markadoor/Pieter Markedoor	28	30			28	30	15.0	59.5	14.0	13.0
1767	1767	1	Pieter Markedoor oud Mannebaanse	3	4			3	4	4.0	253.5	3.0	188.0
1759	1773	4	Pieter Mavonge/Pieter Mavongo/Prins Pieter Mavongo	16	28			16	28	7.0	154.5	4.0	141.0
1762	1762	1	Pieter Pasep/Pieter Pasop	2	2			2	2	2.0	396.5	2.0	280.0
1774	1774	1	Pieter Porttie	1	2			1	2	2.0	396.5	1.0	470.5
1749	1749	1	Pieter Sinboeke	7	7			7	7	7.0	154.5	7.0	67.0
1749	1749	1	Pieter Zwart	4	4			4	4	4.0	253.5	4.0	141.0
1772	1772	1	Pikett de Losi Jong	6	13			6	13	13.0	77.5	6.0	83.0
1759	1759	1	Po	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1759	1759	1	Po Alie	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1759	1759	1	Po Jinbo Lowange	14	14			14	14	14.0	67.5	14.0	13.0
1759	1759	1	Poaw	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1776	1776	1	Polle Boeka	1	5			1	5	5.0	208.0	1.0	470.5
1776	1776	1	Polle Markedoor	1	3			1	3	3.0	310.5	1.0	470.5
1759	1759	1	Ponge Madeke	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1759	1759	1	Pouw	2	2			2	2	2.0	396.5	2.0	280.0
1771	1771	1	Prina Matioa	1	16			1	16	16.0	53.0	1.0	470.5
1767	1767	1	Princes Meningo	1	2			1	2	2.0	396.5	1.0	470.5
1767	1767	1	Prinisse Moijmalille	2	2			2	2	2.0	396.5	2.0	280.0
1770	1770	1	Prins Memmienso	1	4			1	4	4.0	253.5	1.0	470.5

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1764	1764	1	Prins Monteffe	1	2			1	2	2.0	396.5	1.0	470.5
1770	1770	1	Prins Mooije	1	2			1	2	2.0	396.5	1.0	470.5
1772	1772	1	Prinses Mamtevi/Prinses Mamtevie/Princes Mamtivis/Prinses Mamtuva/Prinses Mantevie	7	26			7	26	26.0	16.0	7.0	67.0
1774	1774	1	Puket/Puketa/Puketapo/Puketie	5	17			5	17	17.0	46.5	5.0	108.0
1767	1767	1	Quibon	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1769	1771	3	Quini Matienije/Quinie Mattjente	11	11	1	4	12	15	5.0	208.0	4.0	141.0
1762	1762	1	Qwienda Mangoff	2	2			2	2	2.0	396.5	2.0	280.0
1757	1757	1	Robben/Prins Robben	2	7			2	7	7.0	154.5	2.0	280.0
1757	1758	2	Robben de Winter	4	22			4	22	11.0	94.0	2.0	280.0
1755	1755	1	Robbert Jan	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1749	1749	1	Roben Gangomsinga	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1774	1774	1	Rode Logi Jong	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1759	1765	2	Rotterdam	7	7			7	7	3.5	280.0	3.5	157.0
1774	1774	1	Prins Sam	1	9			1	9	9.0	120.5	1.0	470.5
1769	1769	1	Prins Sambo	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1769	1770	2	Prins Sangron	2	2			2	2	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1774	1774	1	Sakela Logi Jong	1	3			1	3	3.0	310.5	1.0	470.5
1774	1774	1	Sakkela	1	2			1	2	2.0	396.5	1.0	470.5
1759	1774	4	Sam Claas/Sambo Klaas/SamboKlaase/Sambo Klase/Prins Sambo Klaas	7	8			7	8	2.0	396.5	1.8	328.5
1770	1770	1	Sambij			1	1	1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1771	1771	1	Sangela Loeet			1	2	1	2	2.0	396.5	1.0	470.5
1774	1774	1	Sangeloe	1	6			1	6	6.0	177.0	1.0	470.5
1759	1759	1	Sarsant/Sersant	3	4			3	4	4.0	253.5	3.0	188.0
1770	1770	1	Se nomba de Lasie Jong	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1771	1771	1	Sierke Laarde/Sierke Larde	3	3			3	3	3.0	310.5	3.0	188.0
1749	1749	1	Sim Pokote	6	6			6	6	6.0	177.0	6.0	83.0
1769	1769	1	Siclander	6	6			6	6	6.0	177.0	6.0	83.0
1770	1770	1	So Nemba Em Bakke	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1757	1762	2	Soe Belle/Soebelle/Zoebellaa	3	3			3	3	1.5	452.5	1.5	342.0
1774	1774	1	Sonaka Jompo	1	2			1	2	2.0	396.5	1.0	470.5
1769	1769	1	Sorme Maijomba/Prins Sonne Majomb	2	2			2	2	2.0	396.5	2.0	280.0
1767	1767	1	Prins Taffij	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5

First date of Appearance	Last date of Appearance	Number of Years with Information	Merchant Name	Transactions	Number of Slaves	Joint Transactions	Number of Joint Slaves	Total Transactions	Total Slaves	Slaves/Year	Rank	Transactions/Year	Rank
1772	1772	1	Prins Tam Maponda	2	17			2	17	17.0	46.5	2.0	280.0
1774	1774	1	Prins Tate Gomma	1	7			1	7	7.0	154.5	1.0	470.5
1774	1774	1	Tam Beelei/Tam Beelie/Tam Belie	3	24			3	24	24.0	22.0	3.0	188.0
1772	1774	2	Tam Pollo/Tam Polloo	9	33			9	33	16.5	49.0	4.5	123.5
1755	1776	7	Tate/Prins Tate	34	43	4	6	38	49	7.0	154.5	5.4	94.0
1765	1765	1	Tate Lemboeba	4	4			4	4	4.0	253.5	4.0	141.0
1764	1765	2	Tate Mafoek/Tate Mafoeke	18	23			18	23	11.5	86.5	9.0	37.5
1766	1767	2	Tate Mafouke Sijn Broer/Tate Mafouke Zijn Broer	4	5			4	5	2.5	340.0	2.0	280.0
1766	1766	1	Tate Mafouke Zoon	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1766	1766	1	Tate Mandgove Zijn Jonge	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1770	1776	1	Tate Wabbe/Tatie Waba	3	13			3	13	13.0	77.5	3.0	188.0
1770	1770	1	Tatte Commandor	1	2			1	2	2.0	396.5	1.0	470.5
1770	1770	1	Tattie			1	1	1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1762	1762	1	Tek Koning Lingste	2	2			2	2	2.0	396.5	2.0	280.0
1749	1767	7	Prins Thom/Prins Tom/Prinstom	264	368	2	6	266	374	53.4	2.0	38.0	2.0
1771	1771	1	Prins Titte	5	7	1	2	6	9	9.0	120.5	6.0	83.0
1766	1767	2	Prins Tom Brib Mannebaanse/Prins Tom Crib Mannebaanse	8	11	1	1	9	12	6.0	177.0	4.5	123.5
1757	1764	3	Prins Tom Coffij/Tom Koffie	8	9			8	9	3.0	310.5	2.7	213.5
1764	1764	1	Prins Tom Crib/Prins Tom Krib	23	41			23	41	41.0	3.0	23.0	4.5
1762	1762	1	Tek Koning Tolk	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1772	1772	1	Them Pattie	2	4			2	4	4.0	253.5	2.0	280.0
1749	1749	1	Thom Vrijman	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1771	1771	1	Tiecaja/Tjecaja	7	7			7	7	7.0	154.5	7.0	67.0
1770	1770	1	Tieeentie Loemba/Tienttie Lomba	2	4			2	4	4.0	253.5	2.0	280.0
1770	1770	1	Tijimpattie Magovaa-doen	1	2			1	2	2.0	396.5	1.0	470.5
1769	1774	4	Tim Candie/Timcandie	13	87			13	87	21.8	25.0	3.3	165.0
1776	1776	1	Timpansoe	2	10			2	10	10.0	107.0	2.0	280.0
1771	1771	1	Timpattie	1	11			1	11	11.0	94.0	1.0	470.5
1774	1776	2	Timpolle	20	120			20	120	60.0	1.0	10.0	30.5
1776	1776	1	Tincosse/Tinkosse	5	33			5	33	33.0	10.0	5.0	108.0
1755	1762	4	Tom Aarij/Tom Arij/Tomaij/Tomarij	48	53			48	53	13.3	73.0	12.0	22.5
1762	1767	4	Tom Apollo/Tom Apollloo	12	16			12	16	4.0	253.5	3.0	188.0

First date of Appearance	Last date of Appearance	Number of Years with Information	Merchant Name	Transactions	Number of Slaves	Joint Transactions	Number of Joint Slaves	Total Transactions	Total Slaves	Slaves/Year	Rank	Transactions/Year	Rank
1771	1771	1	Tom Beele	6	10	1	3	7	13	13.0	77.5	7.0	67.0
1764	1764	1	Tom BeJonge	8	11			8	11	11.0	94.0	8.0	48.0
1764	1776	3	Tom Bonge/Tom Bongoe/Tom Bouges	9	11			9	11	3.7	276.0	3.0	188.0
1767	1767	1	Tom Fernandes	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1759	1759	1	Tom Fombij	2	2			2	2	2.0	396.5	2.0	280.0
1762	1762	1	Tom Gem	2	2			2	2	2.0	396.5	2.0	280.0
1755	1755	1	Tom Gouverneur Cabende	2	2			2	2	2.0	396.5	2.0	280.0
1759	1759	1	Tom Gouvernuer	5	5			5	5	5.0	208.0	5.0	108.0
1757	1759	2	Tom Grieffij/Tom Griffie/Tom Griffij/Tom Griffin	9	18			9	18	9.0	120.5	4.5	123.5
1759	1771	2	Tom Imica/Tom Jemica/Tom Jimica	20	21			20	21	10.5	102.5	10.0	30.5
1759	1766	2	Tom Jemanbe/Tom Jombie	3	3			3	3	1.5	452.5	1.5	342.0
1766	1773	3	Tom Loambe/Prins Tom Leomba/Prins Tom Liomba	5	18			5	18	6.0	177.0	1.7	332.0
1766	1773	3	Prins Tom Maponde/Prins Tom Maponden/Prins Tom Mapondo/Prins Tom Meponda	5	13			5	13	4.3	231.0	1.7	332.0
1759	1764	2	Tom Makasfo/Tom Makosse/Tom Makosso/Tom Makozoo	6	7			6	7	3.5	280.0	3.0	188.0
1764	1764	1	Tom Manboe	4	4			4	4	4.0	253.5	4.0	141.0
1764	1765	2	Tom Poffij	13	13			13	13	6.5	164.5	6.5	73.0
1762	1773	2	Tom Pollo/Tom Polloo/Tom Pollen	7	7	4	38	11	45	22.5	23.0	5.5	93.0
1759	1765	2	Tom Povre	23	23			23	23	11.5	86.5	11.5	25.0
1764	1764	1	Tom Prins	2	2			2	2	2.0	396.5	2.0	280.0
1757	1759	2	Tom Vrijman	3	4	3	6	6	10	5.0	208.0	3.0	188.0
1759	1759	1	Tombie	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1757	1758	2	trankkiellake	3	15			3	15	7.5	144.0	1.5	342.0
1772	1772	1	Van die Losijongens	1	4			1	4	4.0	253.5	1.0	470.5
1755	1755	1	Van diverse makelaars gekogt op het verbuck	1	30			1	30	30.0	11.5	1.0	470.5
1770	1770	1	Ver Nando Pieketa	1	2			1	2	2.0	396.5	1.0	470.5
1769	1770	2	Voerdeijn/Vordeijn	11	14	1	3	12	17	8.5	129.0	6.0	83.0
1770	1770	1	Prins Verdenando/Prins Verdinando/Prins Vernando	8	14			8	14	14.0	67.5	8.0	48.0
1755	1770	5	Prins Waba/Prins Wabbe/Prins Was	22	30			22	30	6.0	177.0	4.4	128.0
1757	1770	4	Prins Was Mamebee	1	2			1	2	0.5	591.5	0.3	592.0
1773	1773	1	Prins Was Ondenebansen	1	14			1	14	14.0	67.5	1.0	470.5
1770	1770	1	Prins Wie Tombij	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1768	1771	4	Prins Wiel/Prins Will/Prins Wile	3	3	12	19	15	22	5.5	193.0	3.8	151.5

First date of Appearance	Last date of Appearance	Number of Years with Information	Merchant Name	Transactions	Number of Slaves	Joint Transactions	Number of Joint Slaves	Total Transactions	Total Slaves	Slaves/Year	Rank	Transactions/Year	Rank
1767	1770	2	Prins Wil Matombe/ Wil Tombie/Prins Wis Fombe/Prins Wit Tombe	4	4			4	4	2.0	396.5	2.0	280.0
1773	1773	1	Prins Wille Bort Mattijentie/Prins Willeport Matientie/Prins Willebort Matijentie/Prins Will	5	26			5	26	26.0	16.0	5.0	108.0
1762	1762	1	Waar Binje	2	2			2	2	2.0	396.5	2.0	280.0
1770	1770	1	Wall			1	1	1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1759	1759	1	Water Boer	1	1			1	1	1.0	523.5	1.0	470.5
1767	1768	2	Wie Gouverneur/Wis Gouverneur	8	9			8	9	4.5	225.5	4.0	141.0
1770	1770	1	Wie Vernando Mima	2	2			2	2	2.0	396.5	2.0	280.0
1749	1749	1	Wil Claes/Will Claes	6	6	1	1	7	7	7.0	154.5	7.0	67.0
1764	1776	6	Wilborot/Prins Willebordt/Prins Willebort/Prins Wel boerd	10	11			10	11	1.8	449.0	1.7	332.0
1762	1762	1	Wille Walije/Willij Walije	2	2			2	2	2.0	396.5	2.0	280.0
1766	1767	2	Wille Loamba	4	5			4	5	2.5	340.0	2.0	280.0
1767	1767	1	Wille Teundi	4	5			4	5	5.0	208.0	4.0	141.0
1757	1758	2	Willem Mafoenge/Willem maVoenge/Willem mavoenke	5	17			5	17	8.5	129.0	2.5	223.0
1759	1759	1	Willem Toete/Willem Tote	3	3			3	3	3.0	310.5	3.0	188.0
1757	1758	2	Willem Waar	3	8			3	8	4.0	253.5	1.5	342.0
1770	1770	1	Zoen van Prins Maponde	1	2			1	2	2.0	396.5	1.0	470.5

Appendix D: Transcription of a Letter from Leyland, Penny and Co. to Captain Charles Wilson of the Brig Madampookata<sup>1</sup>

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The Brig Madampookata sailed on the 8<sup>th</sup> of Febr[uar]y 1783

Captn Chas Wilson

Liverpool 4 January 1783

Sir

You being appointed to the command of our Brigantine Madampookata are directed to embrace the first opportunity and proceed thro[ugh] the South Channel for Cabinda on the coast of Angola – make a large allowance for the in draft set[t]ing on the Coast of Spain of Barbary (especially at this season of the year) and in passing the Island Madeira keep at least by your reckoning 4<sup>o</sup> Degrees to the Westward of it, and in all probability you will see it – from thence steer for the Cape de Verd[e] Islands, and take your departure from those Islands ~ We recommend to your perusal the annex [sic] directions for making the quickest passage to Angola.

If you should be so fortunate to capture any vessel from our Enemies, on this side or near the Latitude of Cape Finisterre, direct the Prize Master to keep well to the Westward until he gets to the Northward of Cape Clear, then proceed into the first safe port in Ireland, from thence immediately write to us, and wait our orders; but should you capture a vessel near the Latitude of Lisbon, with a Cargo suited for that market, give your orders to proceed there, and that we may be informed of the event as soon as possible – too much cannot be said as to all vessels that are, or appear to be Neutral, and we pray you will not meddle with them on any consideration ~ From the confidence we entertain of your knowledge and experience we need not be very particular in our other Instructions; yet we cannot avoid recommending to you to be strictly careful to guard against accidents by Fire, to be equally attentive to your Gun powder and Spirits, particularly where trading in Africa ~ be also uniformly watchful to guard against Insurrections, as they always proceed from Neglect, and will inevitably ruin the Voyage.

You cannot too forcibly impress on the minds of your crew officers (who are unacquainted with the African Trade) how necessary it is to establish among the crew a steady uniform discipline to be duly careful to keep all Edge Tool and Iron from the Slaves, but above all guard against Drunkenness which is the source of every tumult and disorder on board, therefore when you dispose of Liquor to the Sailors, let it be only in small quantities at a time ~

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<sup>1</sup> MS 10.47 Harold Cohen Library, Liverpool, Dumbell papers.



On your arrival off Cabinda, or should you first fall in with Malimba [Malemba], and find ships there, take care not to approach too near, until you are informed if they are Friends or Enemies – We apprehend you will meet with no ships at Cabinda; on your coming near the Bay anchor without in five Fathom, the canoes will come along beside and by them send for Prince Mambooka Madampookata [Mambouk], and the Mamfooka [Mafouk], acquaint them you are bound to the River Ammoris, and desire them to let you have a young man the son of Prince Peter Sweat for a Linguist, from whose assistance and Captn Lawsons's directions you will benefit - (We imagine at Ammoris you will buy slaves at 10 pieces or 12 at the most) – inform them you intend to finish your Trade on your return at Cabinda, at the same time make them this offer that if they will agree to give you prime slaves for 14 pieces with 2 or 3 pieces wages you will continue and make your whole purchase, nay rather give them 15 or 16 pieces, with 2 or 3 Pieces wages than go farther for we conceive what you'll gain in dispatch will be adequate to the difference in price ~ you may with much propriety plead (being a small vessel you cannot afford to pay the same customs and presents and let the aforementioned gentlemen ratify such agreement ~ All this must be done before you send your Boat onshore ~ You will be remarkably choice in the quality of your Negroes, buy none but those that are in the full Bloom of youth and health, full chested, well limbed, without defect; in short you must be far more particular than its usual on the Windward Coast of Africa, where you have been generally employed a superior attention is also necessary to be paid to Angola Slaves, they being more tender and delicate ought to be treated accordingly ~ On their first coming on board feed them sparingly, the sudden change from green vegetable diet, to dry good is apt to make them costive, which the Surgeon must guard against ~ You'll not fail to point out to your officers how necessary it is to be kind to the Slaves, to endeavour to cheer their spirits, and give them all comfort consistent with safety~

When you have completed your purchase proceed with a press sail for the Island St. Lucia where you will find Letters lodged for your Government with Messrs Gudgeon and Wildmen, follow those of the latest date, but if contrary to our expectations you should not meet with any letters from us, apply to Ducan Campbell Esq.

If he will engage to take you up at the average of £38 Sterling certain with the benefit of Sales, Bills on the Sales being closed at 3,6 & 9 months, or not exceeding 6, 9 & 12 months fix with him ~ if not, then proceed without loss of time for Tortola, there apply to Messrs Capstick and Nelson and Messrs Hagart Allison and Co. at St. Thomas for Letters, put your cargo into the hands of the latter house, who we have a guarnte [sic] for and will give you Bills at 6, 9 & 12 months ~ If the War continues w hop you will average upwards of £42 Stirling, it will require all your address and management to procure a fair sale, for its now become too much the custom among the Factors to be both buyers & sellers of Slaves ~ You will receive from the House who sells the Cargo your Coast Commissions £4 at £104 on gross Sales (first deducting your and the Mates Privilege Slaves) with two average slaves on each and every hundred sold in the West Indies with £5 per month, subject to ships articles, your chief Mate Mr Molineaux is to have one privilege Slave, on an average with the Cargo and £4.10 per month, your Surgeon Mr Murray is to have £4.10 per month and head money, one Shilling currency on each Slave sold ~ We must likewise remark neither you, or any person on board, will be permitted

to buy or otherwise receive any Slave or Slaves on your or their accounts, on forfeiture of all your Coast Commissions and Privilege.~

The Madampookata in point of sailing and construction is particularly suited for the West Indies, such Vessels have sold for Eighteen hundred Guineas, if the War continues she will fetch a good price, you'll get all you can for her and consult with the house who sells the Cargo, if they should want her give them the preference, if their offers are equally good to others, but do not sell her if you can't get £1260 Sterling, or upwards, ~ If it should be peace and you find you cannot dispose of her, then sell your Water cash[e]s, plat form, boards etc. and fill her with Cotton only it being the safest remittance ~ here we be to inform you should you sell the Vessel it must be to a person residing in the British West Indies and a subject of Great Britain, otherwise both you and we are liable to pay treble the value of the Vessel for which Bond is given, therefore you will take strict care to have a Certificate from the Collector of the Customs to cancel this Engagement ~ You will pray use the utmost economy in the Ships Disbursements in the West Indies ~ no part of the business of the Voyage marks the good character of an African Captain so much as this ~

We are etc.

Leyland, Penny and Co.

## Appendix E: A Glossary of African Terms

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Bantu – A group of Sub-Saharan African languages with common characteristics, also can refer to the people who speak these languages.

Kikongo - A set of dialects spoken in West Central Africa, which belonged to the larger category of West Bantu languages.

Maloango – Appointed political, economic, and religious ruler or leader of the polity of Loango.

Mangoyo/Maningoyo – Appointed political, economic, and religious ruler or leader of the polity of Ngoyo.

Manikakongo - Appointed political, economic, and religious ruler or leader of the polity of Kakongo.

Mafouk – Appointee of the Maloango, Mangoyo or Manikakongo to engage in economic affairs on his behalf. The primary Mafouks lived in the major ports

Loango - Dominant Polity of the Loango Coast (1535-1650); an independent Polity in the 1700s.

Kakongo – Polity between Loango to the north and Ngoyo to the south with a tributary relationship to the polity of Loango (before 1650); emerges as an Independent Polity (c. 1700).

Ngoyo - Polity on the north bank of the Congo River a tributary relationship to the polity of Loango (before 1650); emerges as an Independent Polity (c. 1700).

Vili - People lived primarily in the polity of Loango, also known as the “Foiti” or the “Muburi”.

Muburi – The Kongo name for the Vili or for traders from the north of the Congo River including the Vili, Kotchi, and Woyo.

Kotchi – People who lived primarily in the polity of Kakongo, also known as “Muburi”.

Woyo – People who lived primarily in the polity of Ngoyo, also known as the “Muburi”.

Mambouk – Appointee of the Mangoyo or the Manikakongo to oversee the Mafouks in Ngoyo and Kakongo.

Zarry – An attempted Dutch settlement on the north bank of the Congo, or Zaire, River.

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