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'Moral Discipline', State Power and Surveillance: The Rise and Operation of CCTV Surveillance in Riyadh

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In the name of God, the most Compassionate, the most Merciful

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Abstract

The employment of CCTV in contemporary control policy has produced various perspectives and debates in an attempt to understand this phenomenon. In non-western countries, however, there has to date been no academic writing on the topic of CCTV. This thesis aims to make a contribution to these debates by exploring this trend in Saudi Arabia (S.A.) by asking how the rise and use of CCTV cameras fits in with the existing theoretical literature. Moreover, this research seeks to identify and define the structure and operational practices within CCTV sites. With the introduction of CCTV in the process of social control, the research explores its mechanisms by outlining how operators and surveillance technology are organized to meet the requirements and the criteria of those parties who implement surveillance, and thereby to contribute to a better understanding of the employment of CCTV cameras in the Saudi context. It is argued that the employment of CCTV and its rise are attributable mainly to the aspiration of central political control, which has been shaped and formed by cultural values that are dominant in the Saudi society.

Triangulation of research methods was adopted by using three instruments: documentary sources, observation and semi-structured interview.

The findings show the dominance of the central structure of gaze in the current surveillance practices. Although the contemporary surveillance is carried out by various actors, the decentralized surveillance structure is reassembled by state authority for the purpose of strengthening the political control of the state. Moreover, due to the social and cultural characteristics of the Saudi society, the operation of CCTV and the process of targeting are shaped by moral principles and cultural values. Significantly, the present study emphasizes the persistence of 'moral surveillance' in both the operators' attitudes towards targeting and the operational process of CCTV cameras in public settings.

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List of Abbreviations

(ANPR) Automatic Number Plate Recognition

(CAVES) Committee for the Advancement of Virtue and Elimination of Sin

(CDD) Civic Defense Department

(CR) Control room

(DCR) Department of Civic Rights

(DOC) Department of Command

(DOGS) Department of General Security

(ETCN) Emergency Traffic Call Number

(FRS) Facial Recognition Systems

(GATC) The General Administration of Traffic Control

(HCFDOR) High Commission for the Development of Riyadh

(ISU) Internet Services Unit

(KACST) King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology

(MOI) Ministry of Interior

(MP) Moral Police

(NIC) National Information Centre

(P/T/Z) Pan/Tilt/Zoom

(RRS) Riyadh Railway Station

(RTD) Riyadh Traffic Department

(S.A.) Saudi Arabia

(SBGs) Saudi Border Guards

(SCCIC) Saudi Council of Commercial and Industrial Chambers

(SNSC) Saudi National Security Council

(SRO) Saudi Railway Organization

(TPs) Traffic Patrols

Introduction

In his novel, *Nineteen Eighty Four*, George Orwell (1948) portrayed the imaginary society of Oceania, where people's behaviour, movements, actions and even their thoughts were monitored by a telescreen and concealed microphones. There was hardly any space in their life where surveillance apparatuses were not present. They were a constant reminder of the continuous monitoring process and the power of the state security agencies (the 'Inner Party' and the 'Ministry of Truth'). With the dominant capability of the state's surveillance, Orwell's novel conveys the sense of central surveillance where people are observed through the utilization of communication technology and the employment of electronic visual equipment. Orwell's novel contains anticipation of an increasingly centralized scrutinized process of surveillance and a hierarchical control strategy. It highlights the importance of state central surveillance in the governance process and the 'production' of order. This central surveillance represents a control policy for the protection of state power by keeping individuals under the state gaze. Accordingly, one of Orwell's significant contributions here is in highlighting the central practice of utilizing surveillance technologies to serve the control agenda and its emphasis on the concept of state control power.

Similar to Orwell's imaginary scenario of the central state surveillance, Saudi state has developed various 'tactics' of control within Saudi society to help maintain its central control and state power. In Saudi Arabia (S.A.), control and sustention of power have been undertaken through the employment of bureaucracy and the general welfare of all citizens as well as the state's commitment to religious principles. These state 'tactics' enabled the state to take control over its population. However, with the growth of the population and the emergence of terrorism, the Saudi policy of control has met difficult challenges. A strong and broad control policy was needed. Accordingly, the expansion of CCTV systems was adopted as a political policy to overcome political and security crises. In the Saudi context, it is argued that the political policies and the ambition of total control have shaped the structure and the process of CCTV in S.A. which have been enveloped by dominant ideas, values, rules of conduct and beliefs in the Saudi society.

The introduction of surveillance technologies and CCTV camera systems demonstrates a new tendency of integrating technology in social control. This thesis explores and analyses CCTV systems in Riyadh, the capital city of S.A. as a case study of the rise and the operation of CCTV in S.A. The research addresses two aspects of this surveillance trend in the Saudi context. It investigates the proliferation of CCTV in S.A. by tracing social, economic and political circumstances that contribute to such development. Moreover, it looks at the operational process of utilizing CCTV in the Saudi context.

With the introduction of CCTV in the process of social control, the research asks how surveillance cameras oversee people and activities in social spaces. On the one hand, it explores the mechanisms of surveillance by outlining how operators and surveillance technology are organized to reconfigure political, economic, social and cultural relations. It seeks to demonstrate to what extent surveillance apparatus and mechanisms have been developed to meet the requirements and criteria of those parties who implement surveillance. On the other, the use of CCTV cameras to control specific categories of the public raises a question about the social and cultural consequences of the employment of CCTV in public spaces. This study offers a focused discussion on these issues from both theoretical and empirical perspectives.

First, though, it is important to define the key terms that appear throughout this thesis, to avoid any misinterpretation and to ensure that these terms will be clearly perceived.

What is CCTV?

Explaining the concept of CCTV can help identify and understand the purpose and meaning of CCTV. CCTV cameras are often referred to by their technical term, Closed Circuit Television (CCTV). The precedent to CCTV cameras is visual surveillance by the human eye conducted without the use of cameras and recording devices, such as a police officer monitoring a given space and the people in it only with his/her eyes. With CCTV cameras, the observer is not embodied or subjectivized, but is replaced by the camera's lens.

Clarke (2000: 104) defines CCTV as visual monitoring that is undertaken remotely in space with the aid of image-amplifying and with the aid of image-recording devices. Goold (2004: 11-13) defines CCTV as a system in which a number of cameras are linked in a closed circuit with images produced being transmitted to a

central television monitor or recorder. It seems that the previous definitions illustrate only the mechanism and components of CCTV rather than its function. One of the limitations of these definitions is that they fail to explain what the systems really do. In other words, these definitions portray CCTV as a seemingly benign piece of technical circuitry without social or cultural meaning.

In this research CCTV refers to a form of monitoring that uses cameras as a means of monitoring individuals and spaces with the aim of control. Within this structural and conceptual term, the process of observation and control contains a cultural meaning that shapes its operation. This broad concept is supposed to be suitable for the research purpose due to its exploratory nature, which brings together for consideration a wide range of operational aspects of CCTV systems.

Surveillance, on the other hand, is a complex term, which has been defined in many ways in different literature. Essentially, surveillance implies watching for a variety of purposes. Dandeker (1990: 38) sees surveillance as an administrative means of reproducing a social rule. Similarly, Giddens (2001: 699) defines surveillance as supervision of the activities of individuals to achieve discipline. These definitions underline the surveillance function as a source of social control. However, Dandeker and Giddens do not explain the mechanism and instruments for achieving that task. This ‘concept’, nevertheless, reflects the powerful role of surveillance devices in creating discipline and self-control.

Lyon (2001: 2) defines surveillance as "any collection and processing of personal data… for the purpose of managing those whose data have been garnered". Lyon (2007: 12-3) states that surveillance should be undertaken within a systematic structure and as part of an individual's routine life. Therefore, Lyon (2001: 111) explains that surveillance is a feature of institutional relationships, and becomes routine and generalized across populations. This means that the most important purposes of CCTV as a tool of surveillance are assumed to be for power, disciplinary control, and social classification of individuals and places through the collection of information. Lyon’s concept, however, raises a series of questions. One question that needs to be asked is whether surveillance is undertaken by public or private entities. Moreover, as surveillance has been shaped by and penetrated the standard processes of individual life, Lyon’s concept suffers from the fact that it fails to consider the operational process of surveillance. One of the limitations of Lyon’s concept is that it does not explain how surveillance and information collection are undertaken.

Importantly, what are the rules and social norms that govern and regulate the operation of surveillance. Lyon's concept ignores some important social and cultural aspects relating to the operational process of collecting information through surveillance technologies and how individuals can allow and accept this penetration and infiltration of their personal detail. Furthermore, the existing concept fails to resolve the potential resistance to such invasion of private life and personal privacy.

Accordingly, the researcher understands surveillance as an instrument for facilitating the process of control function, which is based on observing and collecting images and data that are produced from visual and informational technologies. This can be undertaken by both state and non-state organizations and is shaped and formed by cultural values that are dominant in the society under study, in order to gain the support and submission of its members. This understanding might explain the trend of current studies that have begun to investigate the growth of CCTV within the wider framework of social control, political, economic and technological changes.

Statement of the problem

Sociological literature shows that social control was undertaken through traditional rules and social forces. People were shaped to conform to society's overt norms. Members of a society were merely a reflection of institutional standards. In a simple and homogenous society, one would agree that traditional standards and informal social control policy could be easily established and utilized because each individual shares the same values and beliefs. Over time, however, this form of control became inadequate. In more complex and heterogeneous societies, one might argue that the situation is different and that informal social control would be limited.

In the last three decades, the socio-economic situation in Saudi Arabia (S.A.) has improved as a result of the dramatic increase in governmental income due to oil revenue. In particular, in the early 1970s, the country witnessed simultaneous changes in socio-economic aspects, including the infrastructure and the associated technology. In fact, the development process implies that a country goes through stages that involve changes in lifestyle and economic situation. These changes have contributed to the creation of urban centres, values and culture, compared to their traditional way of life. At the same time, these changes have their effects on culture, social values and political affairs and might have negative impacts and pose threats to social stability.

Moreover, terrorist incidents, especially those of May 2003, have increased the sense of instability.

The challenge for the Saudi state is to keep pace with these developments so that it can continue to exercise its power. Therefore, the state has launched many Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) projects that may be interpreted as being employed for sustaining political power, which can be observed in public spaces. CCTV systems are used in a variety of fields, including open streets, shopping malls, hospitals, state organizations, public transport and banks. This situation indicates that the deployment of CCTV can be considered as a phenomenon which demands investigation, given that the growth of CCTV in Saudi Arabia, its aims, regulations, mechanisms and implications have not been explored.

The research motivation and objectives

After achieving my Master degree in crime prevention strategies, I was planning to focus deeply on these strategies. However, when I returned home, I was nominated to work in the control room of CCTV systems in Mecca, one of the holy places for Muslims where hundreds of advanced sophisticated surveillance cameras are deployed. I hesitated to accept this job, as my criminological background had not provided any preparation for this 'promotion'. My hesitation was attributable to a psychological feeling and concern about the required qualifications for working in this 'secret' site. Eventually, I accepted the challenge and began to prepare myself for the expected 'promotion'. This was my preliminary reason to study the operation of CCTV in S.A. Van Maanen (1978b: 314) writes that the researcher needs not only to identify the scholarly justification for conducting academic research, but also to clarify personal reasons that 'push' one to be involved in academic study. However, personal motivation seems to me not enough to justify carrying out academic research. Research is subject to academic criteria that need to be met.

The present study is concerned with the rise of CCTV systems in Saudi Arabia. Therefore, the aim of this study is, firstly, to shed light on the penetration of CCTV in Saudi Arabia, focusing on the capital city of Riyadh. Secondly, the research seeks to investigate the rise of CCTV, to find out the main factors behind the growth of CCTV in the Saudi situation. Furthermore, this study intends to explore the associations between the growth of CCTV and socio-economic and political changes that have taken place in Saudi Arabia. In this context, this study endeavours to

highlight the current policy of social control in Saudi Arabia. Thirdly, the study aims to describe and analyse in detail the operational mechanisms and regulations of CCTV systems by conducting three detailed case studies in different settings. It is my hope that this study will contribute to an understanding of how the implementation of cameras is progressing and how western literature on surveillance is perceived in a non-western context. This research is intended to be a resource that covers a broad range of surveillance issues, and also reports the findings of the field research on a specific type of society with its unique conservative cultural characteristics and how surveillance is adapted to cope with its cultural values without missing the central aspiration of control.

The research questions

According to the research problem and the study objectives, the following questions will be addressed in this study:

What are the major social, political, cultural and economic forces driving the growth of CCTV in Saudi Arabia? What is the extent and technological sophistication of CCTV surveillance systems in Riyadh? How is CCTV used in practice? For example: To what extent does CCTV in its operation and effects mirror the principles of Panopticism? Does the operation of CCTV networks in Riyadh mirror the 'surveillant assemblage' in terms of the array of public and private actors involved or does it represent an extension of the power of central state actors? To what extent does CCTV undermine 'old' forms of social control based on 'negotiation', 'subjectivity' and 'discretion'? How is the operation of CCTV shaped by the political, organisational, occupational and individual concerns of front-line operatives (Norris and McCahill, 2006)?

Importance of the study

The researcher believes that researchers have a duty to employ their knowledge and experience to increase the epistemological accounts for the academic community who are interested in surveillance studies, as well as increasing the public awareness of surveillance's role and permeation of everyday life. Since CCTV in S.A. has not been studied, the absence of detailed knowledge of this phenomenon represents a useful area of research, by which this study acquires its importance from the aims and objectives mentioned earlier. As a result, the outcomes of this research

can give a background for other researchers and open the door for more research in the area of CCTV in Saudi Arabia.

Indeed, there is a shortage of empirical work on the operation of CCTV, even in Western studies (Norris and Armstrong, 1999, McCahill, 2002; Yar, 2003). Norris and Armstrong (1999: 94-6) highlight that many studies have been conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of CCTV systems, but the significant questions of who and what is watched have been ignored. Coleman (2007: 231) emphasizes that research needs to be undertaken at the international level to examine the application of surveillance systems in different urban locations. This indicates the need for research to explore the practical operation of surveillance cameras.

Theoretically, it is important to test sociological theories and concepts in non-western countries, making sociology a discipline that can shed light on 'global' trend rather than just a Western science. While the present research is a case study, its importance springs from the endeavour made herein to put the Saudi experience into the general theoretical perspective of surveillance development literature. The application of the CCTV approach and the Panopticon surveillance concept in a different environment might provide a new perspective. Whilst there has been previous research on CCTV systems in Western democratic countries, the study of CCTV in an autocratic society has not yet been undertaken. S.A. is considered a religious and traditional society. In this respect, Crawford (2000: 193,197) highlights that academic debates have ignored the cultural and social implications of the growth of surveillance technology. Consequently, there is a need to examine the philosophy of CCTV in Saudi society in the context of its own cultural and social values, legal regulations, religious attitudes and social control systems, which might have an impact on the operation and use of CCTV systems. More specifically, the importance of the study comes from its attempts to accentuate the significance of cultural factors with respect to the study of surveillance development. In fact, it is an admission of cultural specificity into the generality of the study of surveillance development. This is enormously important, as the outcomes of this study will be useful for scholars who are interested in studying CCTV surveillance technologies, particularly in traditional societies.

Theoretical framework

Theoretically, the operational structure of CCTV cameras reflects the Panopticon principles (see for example, Lyon, 1994, 2001, 2006; Mathieson, 1997; McCahill, 1998; 2002; Reeve, 1998; Norris and Armstrong, 1999; Haggerty and Ericson, 2000; Innes, 2003; Yar, 2003; Fussey, 2004; Simon, 2005; Walby, 2005; Norris and McCahill, 2006).

The research employed the Panopticon as a theoretical framework, which serves as an eminently generalizable application of a central mechanism. The Panopticon is an architectural design where the act of looking becomes a formal process of observation, where people become socialized by the assumption that they are under continuous gaze. The purpose of this observational process is to produce obedience and conformity to authority. Foucault (1977: 200-3) argued that the Panopticon should be understood in reference to the ultimate aim of achieving disciplinary power.

Although the spaces between the theoretical structure of a disciplined society portrayed in the Panopticon and the dynamics of life are fraught with conflict and challenges in the milieu of social control, Foucault's analysis of the Panopticon was selected as a focus for the study because it looks at the expansion of surveillance as an interest in exercising power and it emphasizes the aspiration to discipline power underlying the implementation of surveillance. Moreover, while Foucault did not address the intelligence and surveillance capacities of information technologies directly, his appropriation of the Panopticon metaphor attracted contemporary researchers' attention to the structure and mechanism of the central control paradigm. Despite the fact that the Panopticon does not physically exist, many individuals in contemporary societies live as if society is encompassed by the Panopticon. Contemporary society is increasingly becoming like life in the Panopticon, in which surveillance devices and networks are increasingly focal points from which social life is monitored, regulated and to a degree controlled.

It is hoped that this continuum of Panopticism can be utilized as a framework to understand the current employment of the surveillance policy in the Saudi control agenda and its ambition of total control, which have shaped the emergence and the process of CCTV in S.A.

Overview of the methodology

This study was designed to shed light on the growth and operation of surveillance systems, in particular CCTV cameras, which have not come to research attention. With this in mind, the data was collected, transcribed, coded and analysed in order to say something more concrete about surveillance cameras as a project in the Saudi social control policy.

It is an exploratory description based on a qualitative method. The strength of qualitative research lies in its investigative nature, its in-depth focus and the detailed complexity of the data it provides. Triangulation of research methods was adopted to capture the natural settings of this 'phenomenon' and its dimensions in S.A. Data were collected by means of three instruments; documentary sources, observation and semi-structured interview. Observation was used in control rooms, in three locations: a new shopping mall, the railway station in Riyadh, which is the largest railway station in Saudi Arabia and the main official control room in Riyadh. These samples enabled the researcher to find out to what extent the CCTV technology is constructed and applied in different ways, by different groups and to some degree with different management ideologies and interests, in diverse places.

Semi-structured interviews, on the other hand, included key players in the state sector involved in the construction of the CCTV network. Similarly, interviews involved actors from private security companies, responsible for marketing and installing CCTV. The third group was operators and managers of CCTV sites. In these sites, the interviews included five participants in each site who were involved in the daily operation and management of CCTV surveillance[1]. This included the control room manager, the operator of every shift in the control room and the head of the department. The total number of the interview sample was thirty three interviewees.

Organization of the study

This study is divided into three parts. Part One outlines theory and methods. This part includes two chapters. Chapter One consists of a preliminary review of theories and existing literature relevant to the rise and operation of CCTV systems. Attention in this chapter is particularly focused on the relevant theoretical and empirical works on CCTV cameras in Western perspectives. It aims to identify and discuss several of the

[1] In the Traffic Department, there were four operators. Therefore, six participants were interviewed.

most prominent concerns driving the current surveillance debates in an attempt to understand their application in the Saudi context.

Chapter Two explains the methodological approach employed in conducting the present study. It outlines the research design and issues related to the research instruments in terms of procedures and schedules. It looks at methodological and philosophical debates that surround these approaches. Moreover, ethical arrangements that were considered during the research are highlighted and access preparations are reported. Finally, the method of analysing the collected data is outlined.

Part Two reports three case studies of CCTV systems. It contains three chapters, which explain findings that were collected from the fieldwork in the main case studies. Chapter Three contains the findings that were collected in the shopping mall. Chapter Four displays findings that were collected from the operation of camera systems in Riyadh Railway Station (RRS). Chapter Five presents the findings that were generated from the fieldwork in Riyadh Traffic Department (RTD). This part is concluded by a discussion and an interpretation of the main findings that have been generated from the fieldwork. It is an attempt to respond to some of the research questions and the conceptual viewpoints, as well as examine these trends in relation to previous research in the same field.

Part Three is Back to Theory, which includes the final chapter. Chapter Six offers insight into the findings and their implications in the light of the theoretical framework of the present study. In addition, this chapter shows the contributions that the study has made to theory, as well as offering tentative conclusions on theoretical and empirical bases.

Part 1

Theory and Method

Chapter One: The Rise of Surveillance in a 'Non-western' Context

Introduction

In recent years, the employment and deployment of CCTV in contemporary control policy has attracted the attention of researchers who have explored and analysed this trend and its consequences. Therefore, various perspectives and debates have emerged in an attempt to understand this phenomenon. This thesis aims to make a contribution to these debates by arguing that in the Saudi context, the employment of CCTV and its rise are attributable mainly to the aspiration of central political control that has been shaped and formed by cultural values that are dominant in the Saudi society.

There is a fairly substantial body of literature surrounding CCTV, especially in reference to the British context, which has been the 'leader' in the installation of CCTV compared to the rest of Western nations. When it comes to non-western countries, however, there has to date been no academic writing on the topic of CCTV. This is probably because there is no real interest in exploring this discipline or there has been little to write about. Therefore, the research attempts to explore and analyse the rise of CCTV in Riyadh as a case study of a non-western context. However, referring to theoretical and existing literature in Western countries is likely to enable us to understand and analyse the dynamic employment of CCTV systems in non-western nations, such as S.A.

To do this, an attempt is made to understand the movement towards integrating CCTV in control policy in S.A. by asking how the rise and use of CCTV cameras fits in with the existing theoretical literature. The aim is to identify and discuss several of the most prominent concerns driving the current surveillance debates. Nevertheless, the researcher would emphasize the importance of considering differences in cultural values and social sentiment in both understanding and analysing CCTV. Accordingly, although the rise and use of CCTV in S.A. may not develop in exactly the same way as in Western countries, the main themes of the literature will be outlined in order to understand the proliferation and operation of CCTV in S.A. and highlight to what extent cultural values can affect this understanding.

The themes of this chapter are not mutually exclusive; they blend and blur into each other, they support and underlay each other and they reinforce and sometimes contradict each other. The decision has been made to separate them into distinct themes for the purpose of clarity, but in the process of analysis, they will appear obvious and cohere to each other.

These themes are divided into three main sections. The first section follows the development in the policies of social control in an attempt to explain questions of CCTV systems' role as a technology for social control. The second section sheds light on the most prominent concerns of sociological perspectives in driving the current surveillance debates. The last section pays more attention to the politics of surveillance.

Surveillance, modernity and social change

Durkheim was one of earliest sociologists to explore social change and its impact on a society. Durkheim (1984) distinguished between two types of solidarity: 'mechanical' and 'organic'. Durkheim explained mechanical solidarity in terms of the view that the relationship between the members of a traditional society is founded on the basis of agreement among its members in their thoughts, beliefs and social functions. These values are very strong and have a resistant nature, such that it is quite difficult for any member of the society to violate its values or beliefs. They cannot be changed easily over time and are therefore the main components of law, politics and social control. Consequently, members of this social solidarity are absorbed into the society, adopt its moral principles and are attached directly to their society according to its moral values. Importantly, members of a traditional society who are shaped by social values and traditional morals are easily controlled in accordance with the concept and the principles of these values.

However, Durkheim did not explore how political power can employ these social values in achieving control and governance. It can be perceived that this type of social obedience can contribute to political submission to any policy that is enveloped in and formalized in terms of these values. This demonstrates that the political agenda in a society with strong beliefs in moral and normative values would be shaped and formularized in accordance with these values.

The second type of solidarity is 'organic solidarity'. In societies with a more 'organic' social character, members tend to be related by less strong faith in moral and

belief values than in the case of 'mechanical solidarity'. Moreover, they are vulnerable to change and adapt easily according to the nature of each individual's needs and 'change' in circumstances. This change is attributed to the expansion of society and mobilizing of individuals, whereby members of 'organic' society become free from social restrictions and the influence of social and moral authority. The latter development reflects the social change that occurs in industrial societies. This transformation entails the development of certain social characteristics in a society, including the structure and patterns of social interaction as well as the cultural values and moral fibre of a society.

In her analysis of the shift from the pre-industrial to the contemporary society, Lofland (1973) maintains that it was a transformation from the world of personally-known others to a 'stranger society' as a part of the structure of modern society. Without personal knowing, in modern societies, social interaction is enveloped in anonymity, which demands a 'careful' approach of interaction, rationality, and logical thoughts.

It is important, however, to note that this assumption of a 'stranger society' should not lead us to think that each individual who comes to live in a society should be considered a stranger. In line with Durkheim's argument of social solidarity, it could be argued that the existence of a 'stranger society' appeared not only due to the lack of personal knowledge, but importantly the weakness and/or absence of shared cultural values. In fact, common values can in turn improve social interaction that contributes to build personal knowledge or at least to reduce the sense of strangerhood. Drawing upon Durkheim's concept of mechanical solidarity, it will be argued that where people have common values and social principles, the 'society of strangers' can be avoided, although they may move from one society to another. When people's cultural principles are the same as those of other societies they settle in, the sense of strangerhood is reduced.

Rule (1973) explains that the process of social control in small scale societies relies on highly informal means of control. The wisdom behind this informal process is the absence of anonymity in which people of these societies know their fellows face to face and social life is likely a public matter. Within these societies, social control is undertaken by the public to ensure conformity to social rules and traditional values through the form of gossip and face to face disapproval. It can be argued that people would not enter into a social control process without their belief in and commitment

to the validity and effect of these 'rules' that constitute and shape the social life of a society. Moreover, as these social 'rules' represent symbolic social characteristics of a society, belief in and loyalty to these rules are part of what constitute social identity.

In the large scale societies and complex social units that characterize the modern age, Rule argues that new forms of social control were needed to increase the 'efficiency' of social control and restore the level of social unity. Accordingly, formal control approaches became a key mechanism of governance and utilize what can be perceived as ‘effective’ strategies of central control pattern. Rule (1973: 25-6) highlights the fact that the powerful centralization of a state is the most important factor in its attempt to maintain control. Hence, for Rule, social control is conducted through powers of control and surveillance to carry out the collection and management of information. Importantly, Rule argues that centralization of the collected data is a vital factor in maintaining order.

"Any system of surveillance should be able to collect information on a person's behaviour from any point in a society, and use it to enact measures of control on the same person at any other point". (Rule, 1973: 38-9)

This reflects the structure and process of the central control that is established on a ‘horizontal' process of surveillance. However, Rule does not explain the nature and mechanisms of these 'nodes' of surveillance. Moreover, he does not outline whether these surveillance 'nodes' are undertaken by private or formal agencies. Nevertheless, the clear issue that Rule emphasizes is the importance of centralization even with multiple 'sources' of surveillance.

Weber (1968b) analysed the process of development of control and the shift from personal informal administration in small homogeneous societies to the creation of the rationally disciplined bureaucratic administration of modern organizational society. For Weber, the integration of bureaucracy in modern society was established as a response to the enlargement, intensity and qualitative change in the scope of the administrative tasks of modern states in controlling the complexity of modern society. Moreover, Weber believed that modern society is becoming progressively more rigidly organized according to the dictates of instrumental calculus and formal rules. People perform their daily duties according to the dictates of standard procedures and machines. Weber described this tendency as the rationalization of procedure (1961: 251). Under this rationalized policy, bureaucratic authority maintains its impersonal superiority over its subjects by means of strict discipline. Rationalization implies the

concept of equality in its application and also increases the tendency to regulate interpersonal relationships in terms of a formal set of impersonal and objective criteria. Thus, bureaucracy can be perceived in essence as a surveillance instrument and a machinery for control of social forces. However, Weber did not explain adequately the central aspiration behind the implementation of bureaucratic surveillance as an attempt to maintain order and to strengthen the power of the state.

With more emphasis on rationality and instrumental surveillance mechanisms of control in modern society, Nock (1998: 109-10) argues that the presence of anonymity and the rise of 'strangers' has resulted in the employment of surveillance in order to establish and maintain reputations among modern society members. Therefore, according to Nock, persons without a reputation are strangers, and their anonymity evokes uncertainty and even suspicion. They must, therefore, earn a good reputation, which is maintained through 'credentials or ordeals'. For Nock, surveillance methods enable anonymous strangers to trust and enter into social relationships with one another.

Although Nock does not mention CCTV cameras, the employment of CCTV cameras is an attempt to promote trust in a space that is occupied by anonymous people. The trust is achieved by either identifying or observing external behaviour and assessing whether the action and deeds of an anonymous person represent a source of risk. If there is an indication of threat, the CCTV camera's record is a means of identifying the anonymous 'stranger' in the future. The stored CCTV camera images work to encourage conformity with the predictable threat. Nock's argument helps us to understand the social conditions that promote the use of CCTV systems. However, Nock's discussion essentially views the use of CCTV as a social issue; he does not explain why the 'treatment' of the social problem has to be a technical 'solution'. Moreover, Nock does not address the social impact and cultural effect of the employment of technology in dealing with a social matter. In addition, Nock does not explain how surveillance technologies can work to identify anonymous individuals who utilize forged cards or fake names to establish and maintain their 'reputation'.

What can be perceived from these developments is the importance of personal knowledge in building social communication and the process of maintaining a trustful environment, as a way of making a space safe and establishing social interaction. The rise of 'anonymity' and the absence or weakness of collective values and conformity encourage giving up moral and social values and investing in 'subjective' and rational

surveillance technologies. This demonstrates that surveillance measures have replaced traditional forms of trust, especially in terms of values, social relations and interactions. This tendency might explain Nock's focus on surveillance technologies instead of moral principles and social values as a means of creating trust and maintaining reputation in Western thought.

Social change in Saudi Arabia

The above western literatures are useful in establishing a theoretical background to understand the development of control policy in S.A. The 'old' control policy in S.A. was based on personal knowledge and direct intercommunication and was formulized in accordance to common beliefs and social values. Therefore social control was the result of negotiation and reflects constructed norms and values which enhanced social solidarity.

Saudi society is characterized by close relationships within family structure and tribal kin. Souryal (1987: 444) emphasizes that Saudi people continue to be identified first with their family and tribal lineage. In the past, the inhabitants of S.A. knew everyone and lived in a limited area. The society was simple and interconnected. Members of the society were quite attached to one another and each feels a deep sense of responsibility for other members. In such a social structure, social control is a society's fundamental capacity to regulate social activities and produce conformity. Therefore, social order was controlled by religious norms and traditional values through social institutions (see for example, Al-Ghamidi, 1981; Al-Romaih, 1993; Abo-Hasirah, 1998; Al-Sharidah, 1999).

Al-Ghamidi (1981:32-5) points out that social control was undertaken by informal methods through the employment of traditional mechanisms. Social control was enforced through tribal norms, values and principles, and included activities of reconciliation and mediation. These control structures and mechanisms are attributed to the small area and the close relationship between inhabitants of the area, where each group knew each other well. Moreover, members of a tribe shared the same belief and common cultural values, which were regarded as an expression of group solidarity. Thus, it was the responsibility of the head (*shaikh*) of the tribe to maintain and uphold these rules all the time. Given the inadequate capability of the ‘young’ Saudi state to maintain effective control in the whole country, tribal control structure and its rules, as well as their influential implementation, were harnessed for this purpose through support for the tribes' values and their leaders.

Therefore, the Saudi state sought to enhance its social cultural identity and traditional principles to control and govern its members[2]. This emphasis was especially strong in the early days of the state's establishment, when the government was not able to cover the whole country with organized police due to its brief experience and the shortage of income. Accordingly, it can be argued that during that time, social control in S.A. was built on religious, moral and traditional standards with informal social control. These principles contributed to strengthen the 'mechanical' solidarity of the society, reflecting the deep-rooted impact of informal control as one of the traditional characteristics of Saudi society.

With the geographical expansion of urban areas and the growth of the population that characterize the current Saudi society, which involves mobile and anonymous people, informal social control was not sufficient to track individuals at all times and to manage the new structure of society. In modern Saudi society, it is not always possible for citizens to know each other personally.

The discovery of oil, revenues from the sale of oil, which go directly to the state treasury, greatly increased the state's capability to dominate the domestic economy and political life. Oil provided a new and rich source of income for the state, which led to the establishment of industrial and agricultural projects, as well as the concentration on the improvement of the quality of life for the Saudi people (Al-Farisy, 1990; Birks and Sinclair, 1982)[3]. The shortage of skills among Saudi people required various foreign workers to be invited to carry out infrastructure projects. These workers brought different religions, values, traditions and cultures into the country. Moreover, those foreign workers may or may not be familiar with the traditional values that control Saudi society, such as segregation and the appreciation of privacy, especially for females.

Moreover, massive urbanization, modern lifestyle and opportunities for jobs and education have encouraged the migration of many Saudis into the new modern cities. According to the Ministry of Economy and Planning (2006: 2-8) by 2004, the urban population had jumped to 88 percent of the total population. In Riyadh, for

[2] The Saudi policy's emphasis on enhancing and preserving traditional values is reflected in the annual National Heritage and Folk Culture Festival (NHFCF) organized by the Saudi Arabia National Guard (SANG). The festival, which commemorates the culture and civilization of Saudi tribal society is attended by the king and senior royal princes.

3 According to the Ministry of Planning (2000: 492), S.A has spent more than $900 billion on building the huge infrastructure network.

instance, the population was 30,000 at the beginning of 1930. It increased in 1997 to 3.1 million and it was accounted at 5,797971 in 2005 (High Commission for the Development of Al-Riyadh, 2006: 23).

This situation urged the state to take steps to enhance its formal control forces to control 'anonymity' and the 'mobilization' of the community. In 1951, the Ministry of Interior (MOI) was established and given the responsibility for all aspects of public order and security affairs. Therefore, the Department of General Security (DOGS) became immediately responsible to the MOI. It was responsible for maintaining public order and preventing crime. The DOGS included all security services, for example, the Detective Department, Civil Defence (Fire Department), the Nationalization and Immigration Branch, the Prison Department and the Police School (see for example, Kashary, 1987; Sadigk *et al*, 1998; Alrajhi, 1981; Radady, 2001). Between 1960 and 1970, some of the DOGS departments were separated and became a regional force connected directly to the MOI, for example, Civil Defence, the Passport Department and the Public Administration of Prisons.

Moreover, Gazaz (1991: 57-8) reports, in response to the development in the society and the need for special forces, many new departments have been established, for example, the Hajj Seasonal Force for the safety and security of pilgrims to the holy places. In addition, the Drug Department, the Department of Highway Security and the Public Security's Special Emergency were created. Furthermore, the number of policemen has been increased. In 1932, the total uniformed police force in S.A. was 929 men, of which 33 were commissioned police officers and the remaining 896 were regular men. In 1970, there were 889 police officers and 21,057 policemen. In 1980, there were 4,000 police officers and over 80,000 regular policemen all over the country. In 2005, there were approximately 135,000 policemen in the public security forces (see Sirajalddin, 1969; Alrajhi, 1981; Ministry of Economy and Planning, 2006).

These developments show that there has been a growth of the state control policy and its intensification into areas that might formerly have been free from state intervention. Although each of these agencies has its own organizational structure, mechanism and working practices, all these state establishments serve the intensification of state centralization of control. The ultimate consequence is that the formal control approach replaced the old informal control function of social institutions. Cohen (1985) argues that the expanded involvement of the state in the

process of social control increases the central structure and its patterns of control. In Cohen's explanation, these reforms accelerate the 'efficient' state's intervention and an expansion of state social control 'nodes' that capture people in the formal control system. These reforms provide the state with a more active central role in terms of planning and coordinating, towards a completely centralized state control function.

It can be understood that economic development and social change resulted in development in the administration and structure of control institutions to cope with the changes in everyday life. Hence, it is necessary for formal control institutions to shape and develop their perspectives, attitudes and capabilities to keep up with the changing conditions. The transformation in the Saudi formal control policy demonstrates that in urban areas, there is a tendency to go beyond the 'old' social control policy towards a formal central control agenda to carry out the control function. However, despite the rapid extension of urbanism across S.A., beliefs, principles and traditional values are resistant to change. Previous researches in this field have shown that the socio-cultural transformation resulting from urbanization has not totally replaced old values. Instead, the society remains solidly rooted in religious and traditional values (Al-Joware, 1983; Al-Omary, 1984; Abdraboh, 1986: Alsaggaf, 2004).

These cultural norms are probably the most salient characteristic of the Saudi society. The appreciation of and commitment to these normative values demand a high degree of conformity and therefore impart a strong authoritarian attitude to social rules. Therefore, it seems that those Saudis who settle in urban areas and the main cities bring with them the same traditional and religious values that are common among the population of the city. Therefore, they are not actually strangers, because they have the same social and moral values that control their life and regulate their social interaction, in particular religious rules. Hunt (1999: 215) shows that tense social relationships are generated by large urbanized masses who do not have shared values. In the Saudi context, one practical explanation of social conformity and personal interaction is the attendance of the five daily collective compulsory prayers in the local mosque. This daily meeting works to maintain and develop satisfying social interaction and build a background of conformity and personal ties. This practice of daily worship increases the social solidarity and decreases the sense of social anonymity.

The key issue is not how much Saudi society has changed, instead, how the society has been resilient in the face of change. It seems that there is a deep influence of cultural and normative social values in Saudi society. Accordingly, they are important factors in fostering social stability and are probably the most important force in sustaining social identity and political obedience. Therefore, control policy needs to be formed and based on these values to ensure their validity and conformity to them. When self-satisfaction is gained, this means that submission to rules can be achieved and the public join the mainstream. Cohen (1985: 148) emphasizes that the success of a control policy depends upon its potential fit with a wider accepted ideology. In the same vein, Rule (1973: 19) states that social control is impossible unless the public have a degree of inner commitment to obey the established rules. The question is how contemporary surveillance approaches contribute to enhance the sense of conformity.

Sociological perspectives on the 'new surveillance'

With the rise of CCTV systems, various perspectives and debates have emerged in an attempt to understand this phenomenon. This section aims to review the most prominent concerns driving the current surveillance debates to explore and analyse this trend and its consequences.

The Panopticon

The field of surveillance studies has been profoundly influenced by Foucault's Panopticon model. Since then, the Panopticon has been at the heart of research debates on studying surveillance (see for example Lyon, 1994, 2006; Norris *et al*, 1998; Norris and Armstrong, 1999; Haggerty and Ericson, 2000; Boyne, 2000; McCahill, 2002; Norris, 2003; Simon, 2005; Haggerty, 2006).

Drawing on the work of Foucault (1977), the relationship between the concept of the Panopticon and CCTV systems lies in the Panopticon argument of observation and the power of control. Many scholars have based their arguments on this view (see for example, Lyon, 1994, 2001; Mathieson, 1997; McCahill, 1998; Reeve, 1998; Norris and Armstrong, 1999; Haggerty and Ericson, 2000; Innes, 2003; Yar, 2003; Fussey, 2004; Walby, 2005; Simon: 2005; Norris and McCahill, 2006).

The present work draws heavily on the Panopticon in exploring both the theoretical and practical aspects of understanding the rise of CCTV in Riyadh. It aims to explore the theoretical metaphor between the concept and the structure of the

panoptical framework and CCTV cameras by asking to what extent does CCTV in its operation and effects mirror the principles of Panopticism? It is argued that the proliferation of CCTV in public spaces reflects the principles of the Panopticon and an extension of Foucault's mechanism of 'disciplinary power'.

Theoretically, Foucault built his argument about the Panopticon upon Bentham's design of a prison that was designed in a circular style, divided into laterally partitioned cells, all of which are visible to those occupying the central tower (see Lyon, 1994; Norris *et al*, 1998; Norris and Armstrong, 1999; Boyne, 2000; McCahill, 2002; Simon, 2005). According to Foucault (1977), in the Panopticon, the inspector knows all the audience, sees them and can be everywhere, so individuals cannot escape from the totalized gaze. At the same time, the inspector is backed by command power where intervention is applicable. Accordingly, in such a 'security' arrangement and under this central gaze, individuals can be controlled by organizations that apply this Panopticon structure.

Given this outline of the Panopticon, it is easy to understand how the Panopticon model has come to be used as a theoretical tool for examining CCTV cameras and their operational process. The main mechanical characteristics of the Panopticon that are embedded in the CCTV cameras are 'visibility' and 'unverifiability' (Foucault, 1977: 201-5). 'Visibility' is applied by placing cameras to watch spaces and people who are visible to the operator. 'Unverifiability', on the other hand, refers to the implication that people who are under the vision of cameras cannot be certain when or if they are being watched, but they believe that they are under surveillance at any time. Moreover, the watched does not know who the watcher is.

In the Saudi context, the Panopticon helps to provide a better understanding of the spread of CCTV as an instrument for exercising power. On the basis of the Panpticon's principles, it can be argued that visibility applies to the growth of surveillance cameras in the country, whereby the public would constantly be reminded of their presence. Individuals would be aware of the existence of cameras and the surveillance process, but the exact locations of cameras, their numbers and their domains remain unknown. Moreover, people never know exactly what surveillance sees or even what it is looking at. This indicates that in S.A., low visibility and/or invisibility aims to create a belief that people and their movements are permanently under the gaze of cameras, without determining when and where a person would be observed, as well as who the observer is and why they are watching.

This embodies the anonymity of the observer, his/her location, character and the aim of observation, which all contribute to enhance the concept of unverifiability. This structural arrangement gives the impression that cameras potentially exist everywhere and cover every location. Accordingly, the production of this surveillance structure undermines social movements and social change because individuals have internalized the belief of the diffusion of visibility and 'efficiency' of power is the result of its diffusion in all its members. This argument, however, needs to be examined empirically by exploring the structure and the mechanisms of CCTV in the Saudi context.

The Panopticon and the disciplinary function

As has already been discussed, the power of the Panopticon relies on 'visibility' and 'unverifiability' (Foucault, 1977: 201-5). In Foucault's view, feeling visible rather than being visible produces the effective social control of individuals. Yar (2003: 258) maintains that in order to understand the relation between visibility and self-discipline vis-à-vis, it is important to be linked to an entire regime of 'normalization'. Yar argues that Foucault overestimates the influential effect of 'physical' visibility and undermines the potential impact of other aspects of human cognition. Accordingly, Yar introduces the notion of consciousness in the process of understanding visibility as an instrument of discipline. He refers to what he calls the *'visibility of the visibility'* (emphasis in original). For Yar, seeing and recognizing that one is being seen is the vital part in the equation of visibility and discipline. Therefore, when individuals are consciously aware of being seen, the deterrent effect is increased. Although he hints at moral order in generating normalization, Yar does not examine adequately how cognitive consciousness can be increased. Moreover, Yar's argument reflects only the cognitive values that are grounded on Western culture and its values of normalization. However, Yar's consciousness aspect plays an important in this research as it is argued that self-discipline needs to be based on moral 'cognition'. The question is how moral values enhance continuous self-discipline.

A core idea is that awareness of this visibility invokes a sense of potential observation and, hence, serves as a deterrent. This surveillance mechanism leads to the internalization of self-control and therefore adherence to the observer's rules and continuous discipline. Foucault's requirement of the Panopticon is that individuals should be confined in a fixed place and observed at every point where their movement

is continuously located. In fact, Foucault's concept of the formation of a normalized subject and automatic conformity to inspection principles is confined to closed institutions, such as factories, hospitals and schools.

The concept of the Panopticon's disciplinary power fails to take into account the many ways in which the Panopticon power structure is unable to cover a wide area, let alone the whole society. Moreover, whereas the Panopticon model was based on a prison, there are many differences between jails and public spaces and between the thinking of free people and inmates. Therefore, some writers have argued that CCTV in a specific location can work with the same mechanism as the Panopticon model in terms of continuous observation and immediate response (see for example Norris and Armstrong, 1999; McCahill, 2002). However, Norris and Armstrong (1999) suggested that continuous observation in open space could not be achieved. McCahill (2002) argues that the application of CCTV as an instrument of power can be applied to enclosed places, where individuals are subject to permanent visibility and are known to operators, while identifying people in a public space seems to be difficult. Nevertheless, even in enclosed areas, the researcher argues that borders are determined by the range of cameras. Enclosed institutions would not necessarily be premises that have walls; instead, the vision of the cameras would be considered the main criterion in determining the concept of a closed or open site.

On the basis of the theoretical disciplinary function of the Panopticon, the researcher argues that although the Panopticon structure was suggested by Foucault to create a disciplined society, society is an open space, and individuals pass from one space, which might be enclosed and observed, to another which is not, especially with the mobility characteristic of contemporary society. The Foucauldian theme of physical surveillance instruments cannot cover all areas where individuals' activities are undertaken. Similarly, it seems that CCTV might be insufficient for the creation of continuous self-discipline. This inadequacy might be due to technical or human efficacy in the operation of surveillance, insufficient coverage capability, unavailability or the moral principle that surveillance should not penetrate certain locations, due to respect for private life and accordingly the protection of privacy. This inadequacy increases with the effort of people to avoid being in the view of cameras or to escape from the surveillance gaze.

One of the main arguments of this thesis is that the creation of self-discipline depends upon providing social principles and moral standards that contribute to or

prevent people from perpetrating 'illegal' or disorderly behaviour. This type of self-discipline can be sustained and persist irrespective of the presence or absence of surveillance, in open and/or enclosed sites. Due to the influential effect of cultural values and religious principles that characterize Saudi society, it is argued that beliefs and moral practices, especially religious rituals, can be effective in the disciplinary process and in controlling human behaviour. Belief rituals, however, may not prevent criminality, but they may play an active role in strengthening social bonds and conformity, especially among those groups and societies that are religiously homogenous. Conklin (1984: 298) believes that religion often reinforces the social norms that lead individuals to obey rules and avoid any breach of social regulations. In the Saudi context, the question is to what extent these values work to generate self-discipline in locations that are covered by CCTV. This research aims to explore the real force behind the potential discipline in the affected surveillance domains.

Power and knowledge

Foucault (1977: 198-9, 203) pointed out that exercising power over individuals demands the availability of information that is gathered from surveillance, observation and writing, in order to draw up a rigorous distinction between ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ behaviour. To undertake this role, Foucault emphasized, Panopticon mechanisms should penetrate into the details of everyday individual life (*ibid*: 205-9). Foucault (1977: 198, 216-7) maintained that the penetration of state regulations into all the smallest details of everyday life of individuals creates a 'transparent society' where all details of individuals' social life are observed and recorded. This mechanism assures the function of political discipline, as the power of the state can be diffused throughout a society.

Here, there is an overlap with Weber’s view of the function of bureaucracy. Weber (1968a: 335, 339; 1968b: 987) maintained that bureaucracy is a vital approach in the process of practising power through the utilization of administrative forms that yield to the gathering of information. Bureaucracy is considered a key instrument in achieving this function. Thus, applying bureaucratic forms can be seen as an expansion of the monitoring approach and a policy to increase the capacity of gathering information with the aim of control. Thus, as has already been discussed, the bureaucratic approach becomes a foundation for the controlling of modern societies.

This indicates that applying bureaucratic procedures involves a concept of surveillance for the purpose of discipline. This process shows that bureaucratic forms are utilized to control the population according to the state's regulations. By involving bureaucratic applications at the most basic level of life, all aspects of individuals' life would be under the gaze of the state from the certificate of birth until the certificate of death. In fact, prior to birth, people are observed and followed through information that is available in the mother's medical reports throughout the period of pregnancy. Through application of these measures, individuals would be socialized to serve, ensuring a solid foundation and widespread effect of state power and its disciplinary control policy.

The application of these principles is seen in the Saudi context, where the state has sought to enhance the capacity of the penetration of the Panopticon state at every level of society. The Saudi state is the main supplier of public services, health, education, social services, and jobs. Individuals who apply for these services are required to provide information. Moreover, the individuals who are the subject of these forms would in turn involve others in application for these services, for example children, family members and friends. In Foucault's explanation of power (1977: 26-7,215), individuals who are objects of a particular sort of power or discipline will seek opportunities to apply the same power to others. Moreover, adherence to official arrangements and rules can be ascribed to the success of the state in enforcing its power.

However, Foucault (1977: 205-9) emphasized that Panopticon principles should be injected into the details of everyday individual life. Practically, and due to the cultural norms of the Saudi society, this strategy cannot be applied totally in all places, particularly in private life. There is something essential to one's life that calls for limits on what may be observed and creates room for resistance. This process of resistance is a problematic issue in Foucault's explanation of the exercise of power. Foucault highlighted the importance of resistance in relation to power. At the same time, he emphasized that practising power aims to affect and shape individuals' behaviour to comply with the Panopticon 'rules'. It can be argued that Foucault sought to show that exercising power with the structure and mechanism of the Panopticon results in the possibility of facing resistance as the Panopticon principles were designed to penetrate individuals' private life. Therefore, Foucault never really explored how deeply power has been able to penetrate the whole of individual life.

Moreover, he did not address the nature and mechanisms of resistance and how 'inspectors' can respond to the act of resistance. There are always greater or lesser differences between implementation and theorization. This may be because the Panopticon was never built. All that exists is a theoretical text that is available for theoretical debates and criticisms.

Surveillance assemblage

Under the influence of privatization, individuals come into daily contact with various agencies and provide information about themselves and their dependants to these institutions as a condition for obtaining the desired services. Such information may include personal data, income, attributes, commercial habits, preferences, suppliers, investors, competitors and family structure (see for example, Lyon, 1994, 2001; Haggerty and Ericson, 2000; Haggerty, 2006). The huge amount of information generated provides business institutions with a rationale for decision-making, as well as producing consumer profiles. Therefore, today, surveillance activities are no longer carried out by the state alone, but increasingly by non-state institutions.

With the rise of the various 'inspectors', Haggerty and Ericson (2000) introduced the notion of 'surveillance assemblage'. Unlike the Panopticon central surveillance model, they assert that the surveillance process in contemporary society is carried out within a decentralized structure. For Haggerty and Ericson, contemporary surveillance outcomes are produced by and flow from diverse sources through a ‘rhizomatic' structure. In this way, surveillance activities have been employed to go beyond the limitation of the Panopticon's central inspection. For Haggerty and Ericson (2000), the interpretation of central surveillance in the Panopticon is inadequate to explain these horizontal surveillance nodes. From this standpoint, contemporary surveillance is witnessing an end of the watchful central function and the Panopticon is limited in theorizing contemporary surveillance activities.

In the Saudi context, the 'surveillance assemblage' is a helpful framework to understand that surveillance is undertaken by a variety of actors. The implementation of CCTV in S.A. is not monopolized by the state agencies, but other players have also entered into this domain. CCTV can be observed in private settings, such as malls, banks, ATM machines, hotels, hospitals and in private entertainment spaces. This diversity of functions means CCTV becomes part of a pluralistic surveillance approach.

Moreover, the structure of the 'surveillance assemblage' enables us to understand that CCTV cameras are able to carry out multiple surveillance functions. This understanding is important in analysing the contemporary rise and use of CCTV in S.A. The rise of CCTV in S.A. can be referred to the multiple functional nature of CCTV that can be utilized by users. On the basis of multiple functions and its technical capability that can be adapted and shaped by the user's interest, use of CCTV has risen in S.A. Moreover, this advantage of adaptability adds another feature for CCTV to be used for many purposes in one location. In other words, CCTV can be used for one function, but it is soon 'discovered' that cameras are even more useful for undertaking other tasks. The initial reason for installing cameras is often supplemented or even overshadowed by another 'important' motivation. This wide concept of describing the practice and implementation of surveillance by several social bodies provides us with a theoretical explanation of this surveillance phenomenon in the Saudi context.

The key question is to what extent the surveillance activities that are undertaken by CCTV in private organizations go beyond the state's borders. This issue, however, needs to be explored and analysed to see the aims, structure and practice of these private systems within the growth of surveillance in the private sphere and their structural connection with the state surveillance rhetoric. This structure is highly significant in the Saudi context due to the centralized nature of control policy.

In a country like S.A. that has a wide area and relies on centralized power, there is often a difficulty in maintaining power at the geographical perimeters. With the application of the 'surveillant assemblage', information and visual images can be gathered at a private site in one location and then be used by the state at another location. This surveillance process can be achieved by the fact that images generated from CCTV are sent back to a central control room by way of an underground cable, fibre optic or microwave signal (McCahill, 2002; Goold, 2004). Importantly, some writers highlight that visual 'information' that has been generated from CCTV cameras can be linked into networks of information flow from different sources across geographical locations and at incredible speeds (Dandeker, 1990; Norris *et al*, 1998; Rose, 2000; McCahill, 2002). This represents a reassembled surveillance process that is undertaken by a central state authority.

According to the above assumption, it appears that despite the support of 'surveillance assemblage' and its influence in theorizing CCTV and other surveillance apparatuses in western studies, in S.A., such wide implementation seems to be modest. Western society is characterized by the dominance of capitalist principles in which privatization has been integrated in most aspects of individuals' life, even within the criminal control sphere (see Spitzer and Scull, 1977; Cohen, 1985; Rose, 1993; Garland, 1996, 2001; Hirst, 2000; Fulcher and Scott, 2007). Therefore, decentralized surveillance becomes a remarkable surveillance structure. In contrast, in S.A., the state is a central authority and is the only dominant power in Saudi individuals' life. Accordingly, the rise of CCTV and its use might reflect re-assemblage more than the concept of assemblage.

Therefore, one could argue that the 'surveillance assemblage' can be understood by the equation that the less the state operates a centralized control policy and is involved in economic and social affairs and expenditure, the less surveillance will be centralized and the greater the use of the surveillance assemblage model. The lack or weakness of direct administrative machinery and intervention of official authorities leads to widespread applications of surveillance assemblage. Therefore, in Western societies that are built upon privatization, surveillance policy has been designed to meet the requirement of those societies as a response to capitalist principles in terms of sustaining commercial interests and ensuring the flow of profits. Western states have allowed the private sector to exercise surveillance for commercial purposes as a requirement of capitalist ideology and a competitive market. As a result, surveillance assemblage has been practised and integrated into the theorizing of surveillance in these societies. In an autocratic society, this surveillance structure needs to be investigated within the cultural values that govern the nature of society. This suggestion demands more investigation in the social and economic situations in S.A., as well as its control policy through reviewing available literature and considering central surveillance structure in the empirical part of the present study. The key question would be to ask to what extent the operation of CCTV networks in S.A. mirrors the ‘surveillance assemblage’ in terms of the array of public and private actors.

Synopticon

Contemporary surveillance activities are no longer the exclusive birthright of the few; rather, they are practised by a wide range of the public. Mathiesen (1997:

217-9) describes this process as ‘Synopticism’. Mathieson's notion of 'Synopticism' offers a reversal of the Panopticon, where the 'many' watch the 'few'. Far from simply providing a power-over type of surveillance that is embedded in the Panopticon, the 'Synopticon' offers the type of surveillance that encompasses a large number of individuals watching the few for pleasure and entertainment.

Mathieson used the new media, especially television, to illustrate his view. Through the 'Synopticon' concept, the public are able to scrutinize the activities of leaders and stars. Bauman (2000: 85) argues that the 'Synopticon' replaces the Panopticon model as a means of understanding contemporary surveillance. Bauman maintains that the 'Synopticon' involves the concept of seduction rather than oppression, suppression and objectification. Lyon (2007: 152-3) indicates that the 'Synopticon' contains the concept of entertainment and the desire of enjoyment for both the watched and the watcher, rather than an instrument of social control and an object of discipline. Haggerty and Ericson (2000: 618) illustrate Synopticism through observing the activities of the royal family in the UK. In their example, they outline that those few who are being watched are aware of being watched and they might deliberately seek to expose their images and activities to be watched. In this type of surveillance, the 'Synopticon' is used to satisfy curiosity and give pleasure by enabling powerful people to be watched by powerless individuals.

What both the Panopticon and Synopticism have in common, however, is the importance of the visual characteristic that surrounds how individuals live, but with different functions and mechanisms. While the former includes the intention of control and power implications are embedded in the surveillance mechanism of the 'few' over the 'many', the latter contains the aim of temptation and 'playfulness' through a mechanism whereby the 'many' scrutinise the 'few'.

However, the Synopticon's structure and function reflect an understanding of this type of surveillance in a democratic culture where freedom is practised widely and there are no 'real' restrictions on the media. In non- democratic cultures, such as S.A., the concept of the 'Synopticon' might be explained by a different approach and from a different perspective. The 'Synopticon' enables us to understand the structure of surveillance where the 'many' watch the 'few', but this notion fails to theorize and analyse the 'Synopticon' function in Saudi context. The visual images that are presented on the television screen and are observed by 'huge' numbers of watchers have been employed to perform a political power function. In Saudi society, television

is under the censorship of the state. Therefore, television programmes provide society members with visualizations of order and demonstrate the dominant power. Television programmes can be used as a force of power in reshaping the way in which individuals see. This restriction can refigure the audience's thought and practice with the help of the 'television screen'. According to this argument, visual programmes do not merely reflect official agencies' efforts to designate disorder, but are actively involved as control agents.

Accordingly, it can be argued that some applications of Synopticon involve the concept of the Panopticon as a way of displaying power. The example of the royal family in S.A. can be taken as an illustration of the Synopticon being used with the aim of maintaining hierarchical power. For instance, in the Saudi local media, most of the official events that are attended by the king and senior princes are broadcast on TV and radio and publicized in local papers. For example, open sessions between the king and the public are broadcast on the local TV. These events are a type of political 'ritual' to enforce the control of the government. Moreover, the utilization of CCTV images by the police to track suspects and apprehend 'terrorists' is another example of the many watching the few with the aim of control and sustaining political order.

In this respect, this approach of the 'Synopticon' mechanism is a way of displaying the power of the state, where many viewers watch images of the few to promote a sense of dominant power. Although TV programmes are radically different from the classic Foucauldian disciplinary structure, in that watching is strictly voluntary, TV is certainly not exempt from its own power concept. Television's institutional power is constantly worked out among its watchers within aural and visual messages that are generated in programmes. Watching television is an exercise of power through the screen, using the act of watching to keep an eye on the social and discursive events that are 'designed' to stimulate the sense of exercising power. Through this process, television and its programmes stimulate the exercise of power over its watchers. This exercise of power becomes clear with the existence and announcement of legal accountability in the case of failing to pass information to the authorities. Moreover, to increase the influence of exercise of power, programmes strive to create a level of emotional identification. Displaying images of children who have been killed and property that has been damaged is intended to reshape spectators' thoughts and encourage viewers to respond to the displayed images. Accordingly, the motivation for viewers' response to these programmes might come from either legal

and/or moral responsibility. In both cases, TV programmes function as an instrument for the exercise of power.

In this context, more recently, some suicide bombers have used videos to explain their assaults and their targets, which have been displayed on television. This 'phenomenon' has created a debate around the aim of their presence on television. Oliver (2005, cited in McCahill, 2008a: 223) suggests that such appearance involves the 'star factor'. It seems that the appearance of those types of watched people involves exercising power rather than merely showing up. This interpretation refers to their choice of language (victory, fighting, following enemies) and 'brave' appearance with machine guns and explosive belts. It aims to manifest their presence in the 'battlefield'. Therefore, some of these videos are arranged to be broadcasted at the approach of 'remarkable' events, such as elections and international meetings. It is a way of showing power that is based on ideological values rather than the desire of being watched and pleasure.

Accordingly, it cannot be argued that the 'Synopticon' does not have the surveillance gaze and that the 'Synopticon' does not perform the function of the Panopticon. The key question is how the 'Synopticon' concept can be used for exercising power and in which context, rather than only focusing on its functions for seduction and pleasure.

Societies of control

In contemporary surveillance practice, focus has been directed to the collection of information that is related to individuals by utilizing advanced surveillance systems. This aspect of advanced surveillance devices cannot be explained within the mechanism and structure of the Panopticon. This 'failure' has encouraged a number of writers to claim that the study of surveillance should go beyond the Panopticon interpretation, to understand surveillance in contemporary society and to build an 'appropriate' theoretical framework (see for example, Boyne, 2000; Bogard, 2006; Haggerty, 2006; Lyon, 2006).

Advanced surveillance technologies have facilitated the function of control through the process of collection, storage, analysis and matching of information at any time and in any place, with the aim of exercising power and generating discipline. For example, with Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) facilities, CCTV cameras are capable of reading car registration numbers. This 'information' can be matched to data that is available on the database in order to determine whether a

vehicle is wanted, stolen or uninsured. Norris and Armstrong (1999: 216) note that such systems that link with number plate recognition software could potentially be used to identify and track individuals through the ownership of vehicles' registration. Norris and Armstrong's argument can be underpinned by the application of speed cameras, where the owner can be identified and fined on the basis of information that is available in a database held by an authority, such as the DVLA.

The attractiveness of these developments is that they potentially allow for totally automated surveillance by transforming the person into a 'digital identity' and a set of data characteristics that might be removed from the actual social personal identity. Ogura (2006: 276) argues that with the development in informatics surveillance, human beings, or at least their bodies, have disappeared and have been embodied in the form of digital data (see also Lyon, 2001, 2003a). Moreover, people's 'digital identity' is increasingly and systematically stored, identified, and catalogued according to character profiles. With the wide operational process of surveillance procedures in routine life that affects most people, this trend might result in a massive identification and classification of the public.

Deleuze (1992) argues that in contemporary society, individuals live in extensive and extended processes of discipline through the employment of electronic surveillance technologies that have been integrated into the everyday life of individuals. In contemporary society, concern has been shifted to the numerical character of people, which are transformed into digital characters. Unlike the Panopticon where discipline was enforced by the instructions and gaze of the 'inspector', contemporary surveillance depends on the numerical language of control' codes'.

The difference is in the 'efficacy' and broad scope of the contemporary surveillance that can affect the mass population. For Deleuze, this shift is ascribed to the technical capability of the instrument used and its mechanical implementation. In this respect, Deleuze outlines that 'societies of control' equipped themselves with computer systems that track and monitor societies members continually. Therefore, Deleuze points out that 'societies of control' were created in the matrix of political aspiration of control. However, despite his diagnosis of 'hyper'-surveillance, Deleuze fails to provide a 'proper' treatment for this control 'epidemic' and the potential resistance to its implications. Moreover, he does not investigate the social consequences of utilizing advanced surveillance on society members in terms of

social interaction and displacing social values. It seems that his purpose was just to highlight the influential effect of these surveillance processes within the power of control. This emphasis, however, is an important aspect in explaining the rise of CCTV in S.A. due to the importance of examining the political concern in the rise and use of CCTV in the Saudi context.

With the development in the control process associated with the marriage of bureaucracy and computer capability, there is a potential expansion in the ability to monitor a wide range of people and to enhance a central disciplinary gaze. Marx (2002: 10) indicates that advanced surveillance processes are applied not only to particular persons, but also to geographical places and spaces (see also McCahill, 2008b: 205). During this process, surveillance control policy is increasingly preoccupied with observing not only wanted and/or potential criminals, but everyone else too. Marx (1988: 217) points out that expanding surveillance technologies contributes to an air of suspicion and promotes a society where people are perceived as guilty until proven innocent. It is a shift from identifying actual commission and occurrence of deviant behaviour towards mass suspicion and potential threat of risk.

Bogard (1996) argues that contemporary surveillance is concerned primarily with the future through 'simulating' potential future risk. For Bogard, surveillance involves understanding the activities that need to be looked for. The collected information that is produced from the widespread utilization of surveillance technologies allows profiles to be constructed, making it easier to anticipate risks before they occur and so to reduce risk and eliminate uncertainty. Individuals who match the 'simulated' risk are more likely to be observed and questioned about their activities.

The criteria of 'simulation', however, are a problematic issue. For instance, CCTV cameras that are linked with sophisticated computer software Facial Recognition Systems (FRS) to match the facial features of potential 'risky' people might involve the concept of bias, as the implementation of observation could be directed toward a specific category. Moreover, the ability of FRS to provide an accurate recognition depends upon the target's sex, age, gender and physical circumstances. FRS accuracy for males is higher than for females and the average performance of the system for those aged between 18-22 years old is 62 per cent, but it increases after the age of sixty to be around 79 per cent. Moreover, Asian people are more easily identified than white (see for example, Givens *et al*, 2003; Wood *et al*,

2003; Introna and Wood, 2004). Accordingly, it seems that the application of FRS is based on crude criteria and attitudes towards a particular race and gender (Gandy, 2006: 318). The implementation of this surveillance is increasingly concerned with the spread of utilizing surveillance means and individuals need to keep in touch with social institutions as requirements of routines of everyday life. Lyon (1994) maintains that the daily contacts of individuals put more people under institutional surveillance than ever before.

The term 'societies of control' describes the 'new' social control that is characterized by anticipatory actions and suspicious motives. Therefore, the 'development' is not only in the instrument of control, but also importantly in the implementations of control that have been associated with the capacity of advanced surveillance technologies. It is a move from a reactive approach of focusing on particular targets to a proactive strategy that seeks maximisation of effort to reach 'all' members of society. This developmental process in social control is a vital factor in understanding the rise of CCTV and its use in S.A.

Saudi Arabia and the electronic gaze

As has already been mentioned, the state used to be the main supplier of public services, emphasizing its importance to the everyday lives of ordinary people. They would be in daily contact with the state on which they were dependent for services and subsidies with free or low-priced public services, such as education, health care and housing, without the state having to tax its citizens. With the assistance of bureaucratic and administrative forms, the state, for its part, is a massive collector of information about its population. This effect is increased with the dominant role of the state and its power to 'invade' and exploit available data in the private sector. For Saudi people, the details of their lives are recorded and stored in distant places by various agencies and mostly without the consent or even the knowledge of those who are detailed. Even those who know about the surveillance function would accept this 'fate' because there is no escape from the central gaze and it is difficult to avoid the state's 'intrusion', simply, because they depend on the state's services and are subject to its unique power. For the purpose of control, the government now relies upon computerized processing networks and integrated databanks.

The MOI established a National Information Centre (NIC). The NIC provides the Ministry's agencies with services related to the flow of information, updating

computer programs, usage of computers and storing data. The stored information is reported from various security departments, for example the General Department of Passports, Traffic Department, Civic Affairs, the police and the General Detective Department[4]. Accordingly, the NIC is a centralized computer system containing records of personal information, for instance, the name, age, job, blood type, numbers of owned cars, vehicle registrations and ownership, traffic fines, criminal records, numbers of wives and children, their names, age, and history of travelling (destinations, dates and airlines used). Moreover, the database of individuals in the NIC includes personal information on individual's domestics and employees. These databases can enhance the values of a control paradigm that could ultimately result in a massive and expanding surveillance over the general population. Through this surveillance process, individuals can be identified, classified and traced, so a 'proper' intervention can be undertaken.

In S.A., Deleuze's concept of 'code' is represented by the national serial number for citizens and residential number for foreigners, which are assigned by formal authority. Such numerical identification allows state agencies to access information about all people. Therefore, 'the society of control' involves not only visual surveillance, but importantly it also a digital identification and classification. According to this digital identity and evaluation of collected and stored personal data, potential risks can be predicted, assessed and precautionary actions are undertaken before they endanger social order. Its 'simulation' and predictive character show that surveillance in these forms is an instrument intended for increasing rationality in the face of potential risk. The notion of what constitutes risk, however, is a problematic issue in shaping and identifying the nature and the 'symptoms' of risk.

It appears that cultural values and political concerns would play an important role in this issue. For example, in capitalist societies, risk is related to and guided by capital norms and values that are shaped by rational thought to sustain business and commercial flow, as documented by many writers (see for example, Deleueze, 1992; Shearing and Stenning, 1983; Lyon, 1994, 2007).

In non-western societies, risk related to the employment of surveillance has not been examined. Within CCTV mechanisms, it can be argued that CCTV might be utilized as an instrument of social stigmatism by selecting behaviour and targeting

4 http://www.moi.gov.sa/wps/portal/nic/kcxml/04. (Accessed on 28th May 2008)

people who may be in a ‘suspicious’ situation. The criteria of ‘suspicion’ are presumed to be constructed upon cultural values. Behaviour and activities that do not comply with social values will be noticed and people who behave in an 'anti-social' manner will be targeted. In this respect, in conservative societies like S.A. with a strong traditional heritage and cultural values, focus is directed to examining to what extent this aspect of social 'cognition' can affect the neutral character of CCTV. This issue is important as a key debate in relation to CCTV, since its operation and effects are strongly dependent upon those individuals who control this equipment (McCahill and Norris, 1999; McCahill, 2002; Philips, 2002; Martinais and Betin, 2004; Gill and Spriggs, 2005). Moreover, within the potential influence of cultural values as well as the multiple possible applications of CCTV, focus will be directed to exploring functions that are based upon cultural values and are the production of social rituals. In this debate, two related issues are prominent and need to be addressed. Firstly, how are technologies reconstructed to observe when norms and social values are obeyed and violated? Secondly, within these surveillance developments, in S.A., examination would be directed to ask to what extent does CCTV undermine ‘old’ forms of social control based on ‘negotiation’, social conformity and a reactive approach, in favour of the concept of suspicion, potential risk and technological inspection, that are embedded in a proactive control style? Moreover, with the potential implications of 'total' electronic surveillance where the role of human supervision is delegated to computerized systems, inquiry needs to be related to the quality and credibility of the stored data and its mechanical implications, rather than the quantity of data itself. Furthermore, to what extent can cultural values and social norms affect the structure and mechanism of automatic surveillance, especially in those societies that are regulated and shaped by cultural rules and traditional norms? These questions are addressed by studying the operation of CCTV systems in three different functional settings.

The politics of surveillance

Durkheim (1984: 113) demonstrates that conformity and control depend on individuals' belief in rules and norms that govern their society. This emphasis is built upon the view that individuals are more committed to obey and conform to rules and norms that they believe in. Coleman (2004a: 27-8) has developed this perception further by arguing that power can be applied by encouraging non-state organizations

in the process of control through ‘freedom and liberty’ as a strategy of governmental control. This indicates that this type of control strategy aims to reduce resistance to the political power and ensure submission and conformity through the integration of civil society and citizenship in the process of control as a symbol of the democratic life model. Decentralization and integration of other players in social control can supply information to maximize the ability of the state to observe and control its citizens. This political structure allows the security authority to develop a ‘rhizomatic' rhetoric of collecting information with the ambition of exercising power.

Within the decentralized control structure, attention is paid to the employment of CCTV as a source of valuable information and images that are generated from a variety of agencies in various locations. Based on their empirical study in the UK, Norris and McCahill (2006: 114) argue that CCTV in semi-public spaces that are operated by private bodies provides 'extra eyes and ears' for the state authority. Similarly, McCahill (2008b: 216) maintains that CCTV in semi-public and private settings can be easily accessed and exploited by security authorities for a policing function.

What can be perceived is that surveillance is an instrumental approach that works to increase the central capacity of the state to maintain social control. Such a tendency may contribute to a dominant central control power and a police state, which might result in a strong authoritarian concept. In a totalitarian state, power is centralized and surveillance is employed as a means of maintaining social order and state power.

The structure and integration of non-state surveillance bodies seem to be useful in studying the rise of CCTV in S.A. to examine the focus and the implications of the notion of this structure in the Saudi political context. In non-democratic political ideology, we need to find out to what extent CCTV systems and other surveillance systems that are utilized and operated by private bodies can be considered as 'extra eyes and ears' for the Saudi state. Does that mean a new control policy that the state seeks to apply? What is the main force behind this tendency?

These questions come into view since, during the long period in which the current political system has exercised its control over the country, the political policy has demonstrated its ability to control its population through the employment of a variety of control strategies.

Saudi political control strategies

This aspect of literature aims to outline the control strategies under which the Saudi political stability and power have been built and practised for many decades. The discussion considers three main strategies, each of which is studied under a separate heading, as follows:

Open–door approach

In order to strengthen the relationship between the governor and the governed, official ministers keep their doors open during certain daily hours. Anyone can come without prior appointment. This open-door policy (*Majlis*) is practised widely by the King. The king devotes a specific time to the public (see for example, Alawji, 1971; Dunipace, 1977). Article 34 in the Basic System of Governance states that the *Majlis* of the King and the crown prince are open to anyone and that person has the right to speak directly to the authorities[5]. By employing this strategy, the state has created a sense of solidarity and close ties to their people to demonstrate the close relationship that exists between the people and their leaders[6]. In fact, the principle of free access does not imply giving the mass of citizens an effective channel through which they could affect the whole range of government policy, although the King may address the gathering on some topics of national concern and answer such questions as might be raised.

With this communicational structure, one could argue that attending the *Majlis* of the King or local governors is a type of propaganda in which the prestige of such meetings can be potent displays of the power of the state. Today, the existence of official media that are under the censorship of the state can contribute to increase this sense by demonstrating state power, which can be noticed by people who watch or listen to the local media in S.A. This new utilization of the media represents an implementation of the 'Synopticon', where the 'many' watch the 'few', but for the aim of the state power. Moreover, this policy demonstrates that the Saudi state believes in keeping its control through relationship networks with its citizens, where the connection between the watched and the watcher can continue. This tactic has its roots in the control mechanism of the tribal structure.

[5] A full translation of the basic regulations is available at: http://saudinf.com/main/c541d.htm.

[6] *Economist* (1st July 2006) describes this approach as a form of 'desert democracy'.

Tribal control

As has been mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, Saudi people's identity is based mostly on tribal loyalty. The head of the tribe used to undertake the responsibility of controlling his tribe and its members by which loyalty to his leadership could be guaranteed. In the early stages of establishing S.A., the state worked to gain the loyalty of tribes' leaders, '*Sheikhs',* to the 'new' political system through financial support and keeping their administrative position over their tribe's members. Cordeman and Obaid (2005a: 291) report that the king provides payments or subsidies to tribal leaders, who are largely in charge of tribal affairs, so that social stability and control are the responsibility of these leaders. One could see these subsidies as a strategy to make these leaders dependent on the state income, in order to control them and ultimately their tribes. Indeed, Lackner (1978: 172-3) argues that King Abdulaziz established overall control of the Saudi regions through making the tribal leaders, '*Sheikhs',* dependent on him for subsidies and regular payment. At the same time, Niblock (1982: 77) noted that the Saudi state is ever mindful of the requirements of security and control of the state through maintaining a close unison with the tribal leaders.

With the effort of the state to build a 'new' political structure associated with its capability to undertake a formal control role, the state sought to transfer tribal loyalties to a national identity, without loss of traditional and cultural values, through a settlement strategy that started in the 1960s (Ministry of Agriculture, 1980: 32). This policy was implemented through the creation of a series of agricultural villages with populations made up from various different tribes. To encourage the tribal members to cooperate in this policy, the state provided them with water pumps, tractors, manual tools and seeds. In addition, each project included residential accommodation, mosques, schools, shops and police offices (*ibid*: 43-7). Furthermore, the state started to distribute land in different regions. It can be argued that the purpose of this approach was to place individuals within the appropriate social setting, as well as to integrate various tribal members into a single national identity. Accordingly, it is quite common to meet isolated tribal members several hundreds of kilometres away from their traditional pastoral territories, coexisting with members of other tribes. This compatibility indicates that those tribal members have been integrated within the state policy.

This strategy can be seen as a way to control the process by which the state gets support for its own political agenda and strengthens its power position. Febietti (1982: 187-9) stresses that detribalization seeks to control tribal territories under the areas of influence of centralized political organizations. At the political level, it is easier for the state to exercise power over settled than over nomadic people. The state also sought to employ tribal members in the National Guard where they are under political supervision (see for example, Niblock, 1982; Kay, 1982). It is an attempt to create a sense of political discipline and encourage people to conform to state policy by attracting them with job opportunities and official subsidies. These tactics mean bringing members of tribes into the social and political fabric and ultimately, national cohesion.

Religious political coalition

According to Islamic doctrine, Islam deals with every aspect of life, including the basic beliefs of Islam, morality, worship, knowledge, wisdom, God's relationship to man and relations among human beings. According to Muslim belief, Islam is a comprehensive teaching on systems of social justice, politics, economics, legislation, and international relations forms. The most important aspect of Islam and its core is *Tawheed*, which literally means to single out Allah as the sole purpose of worship. The Islamic Code for proper behaviour is characterized chiefly by total compliance with such commands.

Accordingly, Islam for Saudis is not an abstract ideology, but seems broadly a practical doctrine that extends to many social institutions. Hence, Islam is the religion, identity and source of legitimacy of both the Saudi people and the government. Therefore, religion permeates every aspect of Saudi life and there is a direct relation between religion and social standing. Practising religious obligations supports an individual’s respect, reputation and appreciation in the society.

Powell (1982: 101) outlines that Islam is very much a way of life in S.A. Long (1997: 42) underscores that Islam is more than a religion; it is a totally self-contained cosmic system. It appears that the Saudi people hold a consistent view of religion and its vital role in their everyday life and activities. Accordingly, S.A. has a unique religious status that inevitably shapes both its social and cultural attitudes and the nature of political and legal reform. In line with this argument, due to their cultural values and social effect, the Saudi state has considered religious principles as an element of its control policy because Saudi people seem to be committed to their

faith. Therefore, Islamic principles have been employed by the state as a means of securing its legitimacy and an instrument of exercising its power. This tendency has been a basic part of Saudi political policy since the establishment of the state.

Historically, there was a strong alliance between the state and Islamic scholars (*Ulama*), mainly the Whahbbist doctrine when an alliance was formed between Prince Mohammed Bin Saud and Sheik Mohammed Bin Abdulwahhab, the founder of the Wahhabi religious movement. This relation has been built since the establishment of the Saudi state in 1745 (see for example Philpy, 1955; Buchan, 1982; Cordesman, 2002; Moaddel, 2006). This political-religious alliance serves to underline the concept that the state and religion are inseparable in Islamic ideology, which increases the legitimacy of the Saudi state and facilitated the project of aggregating power among Saudi people.

In accordance with this trajectory, the Saudi state presents itself as a symbol of Islamic state and the guardian of Islamic holy places in Mecca and Medina, and has declared the Holy Quran to be the main source of the constitution[7]. Moreover, the state has worked to sustain Islamic culture and moral principles in public spaces. In response to this policy, the Saudi government has established an official organization to ensure that society adheres to the highly controlled and conservative set of cultural norms and moral values, namely, the Committee for the Advancement of Virtue and Elimination of Sin (CAVES). This is the English name of a government organization employing 'Moral Police' (MP) to enforce Islamic principles and moral values. The influence and visibility of the MP can be noticed in all public places, which demonstrate to what extent the state is obligated to the Islamic morals in its attempt to shore up its base of support and commitment to moral principles and Islamic identity.

In order to strengthen the Islamic identity of the state, public meetings of the king with ordinary people commonly start with a religious lecture that includes reading and explaining a few verses of the Quran. This demonstrates the king's commitment to Islam and his links to the realm of the sacred. The commitment to the religion of the king and other officials is further manifested by their attending public prayers and visiting the holy places in Mecca and Medina. Moreover, the king has a

7 Interestingly, S.A has no written constitution, since the state believes that the Quran serves this function. This strategy can be noticed clearly in Saudi policy. The first article in the basic regulations of Saudi policy says that Saudi Arabia is an Islamic state with Islam as its religion; God's Book and the Sunnah of His Prophet are its constitution.

regular weekly meeting with religious scholars (*Ulama*) to inform them of major events and to seek their advice regarding innovations in the state, as a way of proving commitment to religious opinion. In 1986, King Fahad adopted a new title, the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques and the same title is used by King Abdullah, who is currently in power.

Furthermore, the Saudi state has sought to maintain its international Islamic identity during the annual Islamic festival. At hajj time when millions of Muslims come to perform pilgrimage, the fifth pillar of Islam, the Saudi state has spent billions of Riyals in providing services and controlling the activities of this season observed by Islamic people and states as well as the international community. For the Saudi state, it can be argued, this occasion is seen as a way of demonstrating its Islamic faithfulness and its capability of controlling Islamic settings[8].

However, with the growth of terrorism, especially after the September 2001 incidents, like other countries, S.A. has witnessed 'terrorist' attacks that have challenged its political power and legitimacy as well as creating a sense of risk and eroding political stability.

Surveillance and terrorism

Terrorism has become a global phenomenon, as indicated by many terrorist attacks around the world. Their aim is to create a state of insecurity and instability, which has an actual or at least intended remarkable impact on the control and power of the state. Weiss (2002: 12) argues that 'terrorists' seek to create the belief that the state is not able to control the country and provide a sense of safety for its citizens.

Although CCTV was used to prevent terrorist attacks, for example against IRA terrorists (Beck and Willis, 1995; Poole and Williams, 1996; Norris and Armstrong, 1999; Helten and Ficher, 2004), the events of September 11th have prompted a notable debate on political and security policies (Gaddis, 2001; Keller, 2002; Rosenau, 2005; Haggerty and Gazso, 2005). Paul (2005: 49-50) ascribes the dramatic change to the magnitude of the attacks, the suddenness of their impact, the massive casualties and the intensity of property destruction they caused, as well as the 'valuable' nature of the target, the US. Moreover, Bigo (2006: 50) maintains that the combination of various instruments of violence (hijacking planes, destroying them

[8] Between 2007-2008, official Saudi sources put the total spent for Hajj related to improvement at $17 billion (see Ministry of Hajj, 2009: 41-3). In progress, is a project to improve the *'Jammarat'* Throwing Bridge, where many pilgrims have died annually, at a cost of SR 6 billion (*ibid*).

and suicide bombers) increased the tragic consequences. All these elements have heightened security awareness and have become a key reference-point in the efforts of Western states to secure themselves against terrorist attacks (Haggerty and Gazso, 2005; Neito *et al*, 2002).

As a response to the September 11th incidents, the field of surveillance has witnessed remarkable development in technological surveillance to counter the threat of terrorism (see, Lyon, 2003a; Monahan, 2006a; Whitaker, 2006; Winner, 2006; McCahill, 2008a). Visual surveillance technologies has been employed and extended in both the public and private realms. In the US, Norris *et al.* (2004:115) reveal that 2000 open street CCTV cameras were installed in Chicago. In France, Martinais and Betin (2004) reported that the French government permits CCTV surveillance in public places, including monitoring major roads in cities and urban public areas as well as airports. In the UK, McCahill (2008a: 218) reported the intention of the city of London to double the number of cameras to cover every bus throughout the city.

Moreover, biometric features have been utilized widely for security purposes. Biometrics is the use of a person's physical features for the purpose of identification. These personal physical 'identifications' include palm and finger prints, eye and retinal scans, facial recognition, hand geometry and DNA sequencing. Moreover, communication surveillance is increasingly being employed that includes interception technologies that 'spy' on e-mail traffic, internet use, telephone calls and fax letters. In addition, the daily activities of individuals are observed, tracked and stored. These activities include utilizing credit cards, opening accounts, financial transactions, educational attendance and medical records (Haggerty and Gazso, 2005; Rosenau, 2005).

Moreover, with the global threat of terrorism that transcends national borders, global surveillance corporations have been undertaken, creating a sense of an international 'war on terrorism'. This trend is facilitated by the technological revolution, especially the existence of advanced communication technologies, which has accelerated the ease of transmitting information through space and time across considerable distances. Bigo (2006: 56-7) and Ploeg (2006: 184-5) outline that an initiative has been undertaken by several Western countries to create a central database through establishing international intelligence links with other countries. Lyon (2007: 4, 111-4, 182) illustrates that the US's security agencies, in particular Homeland Security, work to collect information from different networked databases

at international level to follow 'terrorists' and their suspicious movements and activities. McCahill (2008a: 219) reported that the European Union allows the US formal organization to utilize personal data of 'suspects' that is available in records of European security authorities (see also, Mathiesen, 2008).

Terrorism in Saudi Arabia

The emergence of terrorism can be referred to the circumstances of the 1990s with the crisis of the Gulf War when the state decided to rely on non-Muslim troops on Saudi soil to defend the country and liberate Kuwait. Moreover, it coincided with the arrival of some fighters (*Mujahedeen*) who returned to S.A. after the end of the war in Afghanistan[9]. Those young religiously motivated people sought a return to tradition, authenticity and a stricter application of Islamic values; literally, a return to the Islamic nation (*Ummah*). There was an open and ongoing debate, regarding state policies in defence, security, health, education and international affairs. In this situation, cassette tapes and fax letters were used in order to circulate their criticisms throughout the country (see for example, Fandy, 1999a; Mordechai, 1993, 1997; International Crisis Group (ICG) 2004; Cordesman and Obaid, 2005a).

Those 'radical' people distinguish themselves from the Wahhabi establishment by their willingness to discuss issues of contemporary significance rather than concentrate on abstract theological debates, as well as their participation in political activities. Moreover, they are open to modern communication technologies, such as cassette tapes, e-mail and the internet, which rapidly became their principal means of communication (see for example, Fandy, 1999b; Zuhur, 2005).

Since May 2003, S.A. has suffered from radical attacks, resulting in more than two hundred people being killed and thousands more being injured (Ministry of Interior, 2005: 12-4). This is not to suggest that S.A. was not plagued by radical attacks in the past, but compared to the nature and the rate of current waves of attacks, those were limited incidents and 'ill'-prepared. Violent attacks began in November 1995. The first major act of post-Gulf War violence took place in Riyadh against an American agency undertaking training programmes for the National Guard. The blast killed seven people, including five Americans and two Indians, and wounded 60 others, of which 37 were American. The security authority arrested the perpetrators and executed the four men who were convicted of that attack. Three of those executed

[9] Cordesman and Obaid (2005a:260) estimated the number of Saudi volunteers in Afghanistan to be between 70,000 and 100,000 Saudi fighters.

for the attack had fought in Afghanistan (Cordesman and Obaid, 2005b; Zuhur, 2005). On 25th June 1996, in the East Region, 19 Americans were killed and over 500 people were injured by a bomb in *AlKhobar* Towers, which was the accommodation of the American military mission in S.A. (Ministry of Interior, 2005: 7). From these two incidents, it is clear that the focus of radical violent actions was non-Muslim.

On May 12th 2003, bombers simultaneously attacked three compounds in Riyadh where many Arab and Muslim people were killed and wounded. On 21st April 2004, an attack was directed to a police building in Riyadh. On 21st May 2004, gunmen opened fire against oil contractors in east S.A., killing six people and wounding dozens more. On December 29th 2004, radical people launched coordinated bombings against the MOI building and security forces recruitment centre in Riyadh. On December 31st 2004, radicalists posted a statement on a web site claiming responsibility and saying that their target was an assassination attempt against the Interior minister Prince Nayef, and his son Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, who is Assistant Ministry for Security Affairs (*Aljazeera TV Channel*, January 6th 2005).

The previous incidents represented a shift of the radicalist strategy from focusing on striking Western targets to attacking Saudi leaders, security agencies and the country's economic infrastructure in order to affect the political stability and power of the state. In a further instance, on 12th January 2004, the MOI announced that the security forces had found 23,893 kilogrammes of explosive, 301 R. P. Gs, 431 homemade grenades, 304 explosive belts, 674 detonators, 1,020 small arms and 352,398 rounds of ammunition. Most of these weapons were smuggled over the Saudi-Yemeni border (*Al-Riyadh Newspaper*13th January 2004).

These figures demonstrate to what extent these attacks can affect the safety circumstances and the political stability of the Saudi state. In such a situation, it is not surprising that the Minister of Interior announced

"The battle against the 'deviant group' cannot end; although members of this group have been weakened, they may still surprise us anywhere in the Kingdom. We will continue to fight them" (*Alriyadh Newspaper* April 8th 2005).

This official statement illustrates the real concern about radicalism and its tragic aftermath, at least for the state power. These attacks can be seen as a serious cumulative crisis in terms of Saudi internal stability. These changes in Saudi stability would be interpreted as a stimulus for the state to take action to protect its power and

political order. Indeed, the state has taken up the challenge critically and has implemented many steps to protect its internal stability and exercise its power.

Security measures

Since the emergence of violent incidents and the rise of radical ideology in 2003, there has been a huge development in the structure and mechanisms of formal control policy. This, in fact, has helped drive the effort to develop and modernize the internal security forces. For example, a framework of command and control systems has been acquired and deployed and new vehicles and radio communications equipment has enabled the policy directorates to operate mobile units, particularly in the main cities, for instance, the Public Security's Special Emergency and the Special Security Forces have detachments in every major city and province. Moreover, since the state depends heavily on oil revenues, since the beginning of radical attacks in S.A., some of which were directed to oil facilities, the state has allocated approximately $1.2 billion to increase security at all of its petroleum facilities (*Al-Riyadh Newspaper*, 17th November 2006). In addition, in mid 2006, the Department of Establishments Security, which is responsible for providing security in oil production areas, was detached from the DOGS and linked directly to the Minister of Interior in order to improve the quantity and quality of its control. It is estimated that there are between 25,000 and 30,000 security personnel protecting the Saudi oil infrastructure (*ibid*).

Furthermore, on 13th October 2005, The Saudi National Security Council (SNSC) was established, headed by Prince Bander Ibin Sultan, previously the former Saudi ambassador in Washington for twenty-two years and one of the Saudi diplomatic engineers (*Al-Sharque Al-Awsat Newspaper*, 20th October 2005). The membership of SNSC includes the King, Minister of Defence, Interior Minister, Foreign Minister, Minister of Finance and National Economy and the Chief of Staff of the Army Forces. The SNSC has several functions, including security planning activity in S.A. focusing on internal stability, foreign interests and safety. Moreover, it is responsible for compiling comprehensive information on the local and international situations. This function is to be achieved through the process of coordinating information between State agencies as well as through the analysis of the international political and economic developments. Therefore, this approach can be understood as a partnership control to build a collective collaborative framework to ensure internal stability, essential for the survival and power of the state. However, the state seems to

involve only public institutions in this mission, where it can enforce its formal policies.

On the other hand, according to the former President of the General Intelligent Agency Prince Turky Al-Faisal, the government has arrested and detained more than 600 persons and questioned over 4,000 with suspected ties to radicalism (cited in Zuhur, 2005: 13). In addition, dozens of suspects have been extradited from other countries (*ibid*). At the end of 2004, the Saudi Border Guards (SBGs) detained nearly a million people attempting to gain illegal entry into S.A. and 2,000 weapons were seized at the Saudi borders, especially those with Yemen (Ministry of Interior, 2005: 23-5). The Yemeni border is hard to secure by traditional patrols, as much of it is in mountain areas or open desert, which present a serious security concern in terms of infiltration.

Moreover, the state started to tighten its control of religious activities, places and people. Alrasheed (2002: 175) reports that the security authorities undertook a greater surveillance of mosque preachers and Friday sermons, as well as prohibiting the circulation of fax letters and tapes containing messages deemed hostile to the state or critical of the ruling family. As part of its effort to control mosque activities during the first half of 2004, the Saudi authorities fired 44 Friday preachers, 160 daily obligatory prayer leaders (*imams*) and 149 prayer callers (*muzins*), for incompetence. Another 1,357 religious officials were put on suspension and were ordered to enrol in training programmes (*Al-Riyadh Newspaper*, 2005, May 30th).

Moreover, according to the International Trade Administration 2006, in 2004, Saudi imports of security equipment were estimated at $339.6 million and in 2005 $441.5 million with a market increase of 30-40 percent expected annually over the next two years. Nonetheless, it should be considered that the actual expenditure might be more than the publicized figures, with a virtually open ended capability to spend on internal security purpose. This view is supported by the fact that in 2003 and 2004 alone, the state added more than $750 million to its security budget to strengthen security arrangements (Cordesman and Obaid, 2005a: 320). With this trend, according to US Commercial Services (2006) S.A. has become the world's fastest growing single market for security equipment and technology, accounting for 12% of global security equipment sales. Particular attention has been paid to access control, identification and CCTV systems.

In Riyadh's main streets, there are ninety-five cameras with P/T/Z facilities that are utilized by more than one official organization[10]. All CCTV cameras are connected with a main control room in the Riyadh Traffic Department. The Prison Administration has fitted more than two hundred and fifty cameras. The main prison, which is fifty miles from Riyadh and has approximately 4,500 inmates including those sentenced for crime and those held on remand, has a system established twenty years ago, consisting of 80 cameras. In the main building of the Riyadh Police Department, there are 42 fixed cameras and one PTZ camera which are monitored through eighteen colour monitored. However, these cameras are originally controlled by the main control room of the Department of Traffic in Riyadh (one of the main sites of the fieldwork). Educational institutions have started to build CCTV systems, for example, King Fhad Security College has just started to install a CCTV network with more than three hundred cameras. The main hospital which is devoted to offering a health care for the royal family and senor princes has a system, which was established in 1990, with 116 cameras and currently a development of the system is in progress to increase the number of cameras to approximately five hundred. The system is operated under the security authority. The only refinery in Riyadh which produces 122.000 barrels a day for the public consumption has CCTV systems with 93 cameras and 5 colour monitors. A few months ago, in Riyadh alone, the Railway Station installed thirty-two cameras. The main newspaper in Riyadh has a system, which was established in 2005 and consists of 70 cameras. Most of the shopping malls and banks have their own CCTV systems that are operated by private security companies and their records can be utilized by state agencies.

As can be seen, there is a reformation in the state control agenda, to the extent that it does not allow sharing power and the emergence of new independent forces that can challenge the status quo in S.A. However, radicalists have demonstrated an ability to use communication and information technologies, especially the internet to take their struggle abroad as well as the local ‘distribution’ of their ideology. This type of communication has provided radical groups with an intermediate space beyond their limited conceptual and physical space. The use of the internet has put pressure on politicians and the capability of security institutions to

[10] As there has been no previous research on CCTV in Saudi Arabia, during the process of site visits, the researcher has collected primary information through informal interviews with officials and private individuals, who operate, own and control CCTV in Riyadh City.

control radical activities. Although the Saudi internal security forces have shown themselves capable of controlling threats to domestic stability, this technology is not the traditional method by which the state has 'succeeded' in exercising control for decades. The new challenge for the Saudi state is to keep pace with this development so that it can continue to exercise its power. Deibert and Villeneuve (2004) suggest that the key challenge facing the Saudi state is the potential for modern technology to undermine traditional control. The state understands that decades of state control might be affected by freedom of information. Therefore, information should be filtered. The state first decides what information is to be restricted in the name of its 'values' and then labels what is left over as the free flow of information. This in turn slows down the public access to unclassified information.

The filtrations of the Internet

Despite the fact that the internet has been available since 1997, it was only in 1999 that it was approved for public usage (Alsaggaf, 2004). The Saudi government spent two years building a controlled infrastructure, whereby all internet traffic would pass through governmental controlled servers. To achieve this strategy, the government appointed King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology (KACST) in charge of controlling the internet through the Internet Services Unit (ISU). This unit monitors all access and filters out sites by implementing software called SmartFilter created by Secure Computing in the US (for more details, see Deibert and Villeneuve, 2004; Greenfield *et al*, 2001). According to the ISU (2006) in September 1999 the number of users was 135,000; by April 2004 the number had increased to reach two million users, and by 2009, there were more than nine and a half million users (*Alwatan Newspaper*, 8th October, 2009).

The state regulations for the use of the Internet indicate that it is forbidden to use it to support activities which are decreed illegal by Islam, for example, pornography and gambling (ISU, 2006). From the state's perspective, the internet is a potential danger and source of temptation through web sites that are seen as potentially damaging to citizens. Thus, the rationale for these restrictions is to protect Saudi people and their traditional values.

Again, the state has worked to shape its regulations and control policy by cultural values and belief principles. One could view this strategy as another attempt by the state to reconstruct and reprocess communications technologies for political purpose. In the Saudi context, it can be understood that the regulation of Internet

contact and access has been more politically motivated than morally grounded, to centralize and keep its individuals under its control, through the employment of cultural hegemony. This argument is supported by the fact that some sites that have an anti-Saudi tone, and political criticisms, are blocked. Zittrain and Edelman (2002) studied 64,557 non-sexual web pages through using proxy servers in S.A. They found 2,038 sites were blocked. These sites included religion, health and educational sites. Most of them did not breach Islamic rules, but carried content hostile to the Saudi state. The claim is that state power is the real concern, which is supported by evidence of the state's practice. On 27th May 2003, three radicalists were arrested for using the internet to incite radical thoughts, critical of the state (*Al-Riyadh Newspaper*, 29th May 2003).

Interestingly, the Saudi state has utilized the internet to protect its power. On 23th October 2006 in an interview, a former radicalist who had undergone a self-revision process (*Muraja*) claimed that more than half of young Saudis who were recruited to embrace radical ideology were recruited through the internet. He revealed that there were more than 5,800 sites for radicalists in the internet (*Al-Arabia TV Channel*). The official response was to establish a project titled 'Peace of Mind' (*Sakeenah*). The state created a religious and technical team to face the radical threat, based on conducting an electronic debate with the radicalists by using e-mail letters and Bluetooth chat rooms. So far, more than four hundred radicals have been contacted[11].

In the absence of a reliable academic assessment and as this project is still in its infancy, it is difficult to evaluate its outcomes. However, the researcher anticipates that the impact might be modest, since those who adopt radical thinking seem to have strong motivations and deep belief in their ideas and their ideology, which will not be changed easily or abandoned quickly due to an electronic 'chat'. Nonetheless, such debate might sew seeds of doubt, which might be the first stage of the state's strategy in this project.

By applying these strategies, the state has adopted technological instruments to strengthen its ability to promote its political position while monitoring and controlling access to communications and information that might empower its

[11] For more information and the mechanism of this project, see http://www.asskeenh.com/, "accessed on 27th June 2009".

opponents. However, it could be argued that S.A. is not wholly secure from the possibility of attacks in the future, as the ideological 'risk' has its deep roots in its believers and cannot be demolished smoothly and quickly by only technological and physical measures. Moreover, by depending on technological devices, the state cannot assure full protection for every public building or area where ordinary people, property or official buildings might be targets for radical attacks or be affected by their impact. This argument is supported by the Ministry of Interior's comment, quoted earlier in this chapter.

The key issue is that terrorism, especially the September nightmare, is believed to be an important factor that has triggered the growth of surveillance. This assumption has been highlighted by many authors (see for example, Lyon, 2003a, Norris *et al*. 2004; McCahill 2008a). It is agreed that the growth of surveillance is linked to 'terrorist' events. However, the researcher reads the proliferation of surveillance mostly as a political tactic and precautionary responses rather than a rooted treatment for terrorism. It could be suggested that the technological embracement of surveillance to counter 'terrorism' is likely to be ineffective in practice and it seems to be limited in its 'treatment' effect.

This argument can be supported by the characteristics of 'terrorists'. Technologically, 'terrorists' have shown awareness of technological developments and have exploited them in planning and carrying out their 'activities'. The current 'terrorist' groups use computers, telecommunication links, the internet, along with cellular and radio networks (see for example, Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001; Campbell and Flournoy, 2001). Ideologically, Zanani and Edwards (2001: 31-2) state that 'terrorists' are linked by external and internal networks through adopting a pattern of small cluster cells that may have only a temporary lifecycle and are sustained by shared norms, beliefs and trust. Furthermore, 'terrorists' are cautious people in their movements and activities, which needs to be considered by policy makers when attempting to counter terrorist attacks. Indeed, Haggerty and Gazso (2005: 182) describe 'terrorists' as careful individuals who are increasingly aware of the security mechanisms that are used by authorities.

According to these characteristics, one might argue that visible surveillance, for instance CCTV, might create the concept of deterrence and prevent predictable terrorist incidents. This argument is built upon the assumption that those people are careful individuals. Entering an area with CCTV cameras and noticing the appearance

of CCTV, cautious individuals would be encouraged to be 'rational' in their actions and movements, to evade being observed, arrested, detained, prosecuted and sentenced. However, individuals who have strong motivation and powerful belief in their ideological principles would not be deterred by the existence of CCTV or other surveillance technologies. Instead, they are prepared to sacrifice their lives to fulfil their ideological 'objective'. This view can be supported by incidents directed towards public locations, such as the Pentagon building and the London Underground, which were equipped with CCTV cameras. Moreover, as 'terrorists' are supposed to be careful people, it is presumed that the existence of surveillance tools might encourage 'terrorists' to be aware of every step they intend to undertake, and organize 'properly' their movements and activities. Bowers (2003: 204) stresses that it is unwise to assume that 'terrorists' and other professional criminals are unaware of CCTV.

A central theme is that belief in technology and its rational character have encouraged politicians and security bodies to 'invest' in surveillance technology to deal with an ideological issue that has cultural principles and is subject to the 'soul's' influence. As we saw, surveillance technologies were not capable of preventing these disasters. The reason is because 'terrorists' were formulized by ideological cognition and their interpretations of the world and this provides them with the justification for engaging in 'terrorist' activities. Within this process, ideological values have shaped their thought internally and violent behaviour externally. This is because of their strict adherence to their beliefs, norms and values defined by their ideology. Accordingly, the 'war on terrorism' needs to encompass ideological value principles in an attempt to prevent the adoption of extremist ideology and to induce those people to repent and join the mainstream. As those 'terrorists' adopted the 'extremist' ideology through discussion and intellectual lectures that led to their conversion to this 'violence' ideology, in order to rehabilitate them, their cultural and ideological values need to be treated with the same language and methods. They need to be provided with techniques that include reading, thinking and discussion sessions to diminish the tacit legitimacy of their ideology, rather than depending only upon external surveillance technologies. Through the process of acquiring knowledge, the soul and thought become more aware and more in control, to prevent 'terrorism'.

Summary

The chapter shows that a new era of social control has emerged in which the traditional loyalties and customary values by which social order was maintained have been dissolved and replaced by surveillance forms that are employed by formal agencies to carry out the control function. Modern society exists in a state of centralized surveillance, by which the intensive surveillance that is undertaken by the state authority is extended by 'exploiting' surveillance outcomes that are generated from non-formal organizations.

In the present study, the researcher argues that the employment of CCTV and its rise are attributed to the aspiration of central political control that has been shaped and formed by cultural values that are dominant in a society. This cultural belief has shaped the mechanisms and operations of CCTV systems. The construction of cultural meaning differs from one society to another. In the western context, this chapter has shown that social control has been based on rational thinking and characterized by networks of calculation through deploying CCTV technology and other surveillance instruments. This response is a reflection of the rational culture and the value of surveillance systems in sustaining and controlling public order based on economic and commercial considerations.

In the Saudi context, social control has been shaped and justified by emphasizing cultural values and beliefs. This is because of the deep and influential impact of these norms in controlling and shaping individuals' thought and behaviour. This ‘design’ demonstrates that any change or development in social control policy away from its cultural roots, or any failure of the control policy to meet its cultural principles, seems to lead to political instability. Emphasis on cultural commitment further immunizes control policy from major expected resistance. By appreciating and ‘exploiting’ these cultural values, the state is in a position to use its power to define social order to advance its interest.

Two key issues have arisen in this chapter and are worth bearing in mind for particular attention and focused discussion. Firstly, in line with the central control policy of the Saudi state, the trend of the employment of surveillance systems is another state political strategy in its effort to maximize its central control. The second crucial issue is that Saudi surveillance policy needs to be shaped and operated on the bases of a cultural form, which also has its own indigenous Saudi idiosyncrasies that

should be studied differently from western surveillance systems. Accordingly, it is necessary to take the cultural influences seriously into consideration when studying CCTV cameras and their operation within the Saudi surveillance policy. In this respect, this chapter shows that, while Western literature and theoretical debates provide a useful starting point for understanding the proliferation and operation of CCTV, there is a shortage of practical application and empirical studies of these debates within the context of non-Western cultural values. This situation creates a need to demonstrate and analyse the actual mechanism of CCTV in the Saudi context. Examination of practical implementations can increase our understanding of the structure and operation of CCTV in the context of particular cultural, political and social values and social control systems. This arrangement requires first outlining the approach of the research. Thus, the next chapter gives an overview of the methodology used in the current study.

Chapter Two: Methodology

Introduction

The last chapter was dedicated to understanding the rise of CCTV in S.A. and pointed to the importance of examining empirically some aspects of the implementation of CCTV in the Saudi context in order to situate CCTV in its cultural domain. This chapter aims to describe the methodology that is used in the present study. It outlines the research strategies and looks at methodological and philosophical debates that surround these approaches. Moreover, issues related to the research instruments in terms of procedures and schedules are discussed in detail. Ethical issues that arose during the research are also highlighted. In addition, a pilot study that was carried out to evaluate the suitability of the research instruments, as well as access preparations are reported. Finally, the method of analysing the collected data is outlined.

As mentioned previously, this thesis aims to address and analyse the rise and operation of CCTV networks in Riyadh. Accordingly, the research seeks to collect data on the expansion and the construction of CCTV cameras and their operational mechanism, for which several types of data are needed. Before going on to describe in detail the instruments used in this study, the chapter will present the overall methodological strategy applied in the current research. The aim in so doing is to set the scene for the description of the research design of the present investigation by setting out fundamental aspects of the research methodological design.

Research design

This research aims to identify and define the structure and operational practices that typically occur within CCTV sites in order to contribute to a better understanding of the employment of CCTV cameras in the Saudi context. This is an important issue associated with the exploratory nature of the present study. Exploratory research is normally undertaken when relatively little is known about the phenomenon under investigation (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). The operation of CCTV in S.A. clearly falls into this category, for very little is known about it. Exploratory inquiry therefore seemed an appropriate means of initiating research. The purpose of outlining the research design is to select appropriate methods of investigation.

Within the methodological design of research, there are two types of empirical investigation, deductive and inductive (see for example, Bottoms, 2008; Robson, 1993, 2002; Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007; Christians, 2000). Bottoms (2008: 94) elucidates that the deductive approach is the paradigmatic procedure for generating valid knowledge that is built upon scientific facts and requires rigorous standards. This approach aims to collect factual evidence through empirical research in order either to confirm or reject findings on the basis of scientific inquiry. On this scientific basis, social research has come under criticism for failing to be a scientific model of research.

Ryan (1970) has questioned the scientific status of social investigation. Ryan claims that research in the social field is not part of a natural science because it does not correspond to the deductive approach, which characterizes scientific inquiry. Ryan argues that human behaviour, morals and everyday practices of social life need to be investigated and explained on the grounds of physical causality and systematic process if they are to be integrated in the science arena. For Ryan, causal explanations of human behaviour and social actions are constructed upon rules and regulations that govern social structure and actions. Ryan suggests that social rules and therefore social explanations of causality are not valid and subject to expectations. For example, rules that regulate traffic movements and driving behaviour might be followed or broken by road users. Ryan concludes that social research can best be described by a philosophical explanation and rational analysis rather than scientific investigation.

Within the deductive approach, which is linked directly to test findings on the basis of physical causality, the ability of the researcher in terms of interpretation and inference would be limited and restricted to the narrow conceptual scope of the tested causal explanation. This limitation is ascribed to the deductive principle that the researcher's argument and analysis are based on and seek to generate valid knowledge within the scientifically oriented approach. This issue is extremely important, as social life and human behaviour differ from mechanical processes and physical materials. While the latter objects can be observed and examined via fixed procedures, due to their inanimate nature, the former elements are subject to the flexible character of human beings and the social circumstances of everyday life. Accordingly, this fixed approach seems to be inadequate to explain and analyse social phenomena, where social and human influence cannot be ignored. Bottoms (2008: 88-9) argues that social meaning is essential in social research, to understand and analyse

in detail social phenomena where human actors are key players in both acting and responding to the issue under investigation.

Moreover, with the exploratory nature of the present study, it appears that the deductive approach would be limited in generating sufficiently detailed data on CCTV systems in S.A. Exploratory inquiry aims to provide the opportunity for the researcher to inform himself as well as the academic community and interested people about the rise and operation of CCTV in S.A., which has not been previously addressed. Therefore, in the present study, data is collected and analysed through the inductive approach.

This approach aims to build up knowledge and to make sense of data by capturing relevant aspects of the collected data and the interpretation of its meaning, rather than deduced from theoretical assumption (see for example, Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Hammersley, 1990; Christians, 2000; Genzuk, 2003; Bottoms, 2008). It can be understood that in exploring the rise and operation of CCTV in Riyadh based on a set of theoretical hypotheses, one may fail to discover the scope and typical nature of the studied phenomenon, being blinded by pre-assumed theoretical premises. Accordingly, the inductive approach empowers the researcher to discover and to develop 'new' interpretations, explanations and understandings of CCTV cameras in S.A. Rich and detailed data is needed to fulfil these purposes.

Therefore, this study utilized a qualitative approach for collecting data. As Robson (1993: 303) points out, qualitative research is an important methodological framework in exploratory studies in order to generate details of human behaviour and has the ability to explore social process within the bigger picture of social interaction. The collection and analysis of qualitative data allows us to study the operation of CCTV in its natural settings in an attempt to interpret and analyse the social meaning of operating CCTV systems and how social and cultural values shape operators' attitudes and practice. Moreover, previous studies on the operation of CCTV systems used qualitative methodologies (Norris and Armstrong, 1999; McCahill, 2002; McCahil and Norris, 2003; Goold, 2004). In relation to this methodological strategy, Norris *et al* (1998: 186) emphasize the importance of conducting research in control rooms to investigate the mechanism of utilization of CCTV by applying qualitative methods that can provide rich information to understand the operation of CCTV.

Nevertheless, quantitative information was also utilized to provide factual data, including the numbers of operators and cameras used, targets, deployments and

data on outcomes of surveillance. This was done in an attempt to have a full understanding of the operational process of CCTV within its physical structure and to secure an authentic interpretation of the life world of control room mechanisms. Bottoms (2008: 81) maintains that utilizing quantitative data beside the qualitative kind completes the picture and interpretation that is built upon qualitative sources and reflects adequately the real meaning of social life in the researched site.

Within the qualitative design, the research involved the usage of a case study approach to examine and to describe routine activities in the operation of CCTV systems. Yin (1994: 13) defines the case study as a strategy for doing research which involves an empirical investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon within its real life context. Dyer (1995: 48) indicates that the main purpose of utilizing the case study is for those studies that are exploratory in nature. For Dyer (1995: 50) the great value of the case study approach is that it allows a more detailed qualitative and exploratory strategy to be taken in research. Adopting the case study contributes to a focus on the sociological dimensions of the use of CCTV systems. It enables the researcher to focus directly on events, and on the behaviour and attitudes of informants who participate in the case study. The power of the case study approach in studying control rooms is that it allows features of the actions and experiences of operators to be explored in depth and helps the researcher discover how cultural norms can influence the design, construction and operation of CCTV systems in S.A. Moreover, applying a case study enabled us to perceive how CCTV systems as surveillance technologies are a form of human activity developing within a system of social production and social life.

Nevertheless, this deep focus and investigation raises the question of the limited scale of interest and explanation of the case study approach, which might potentially affect generalization and representativeness of the findings. It can be understood that the concern of the research is to collect specific data related to the operation and structure of CCTV systems. This data can be collected from sites that enable the researcher to concentrate on grasping the structure and cultural life that surrounds the operations of CCTV systems in their own 'natural' environment. Moreover, it aims to pay attention to matters of reporting practical incidents, events and procedures of the employment of CCTV cameras in particular settings. Therefore, the researcher's concern is with a smaller number of cases that allow the researcher to produce deep and 'rich' data with complex sources in one case rather than employing a

large number of cases with highly inadequate data and limited sources. Hammersley and Atkinson (2007: 31) state that the more case studies that are examined, the less time can be spent in each, which affects the quality of the collected data. Therefore, they emphasize the importance of selecting appropriate sites that result in data of better quality. Accordingly, attention was paid to the process of identifying the case under study, to enable the researcher to investigate the research problem and address its questions.

The research framework was designed to include multiple case studies, in order to gain rich information in three different locations. In view of the exploratory nature of the study and the recent employment of CCTV, these case studies can provide information about what is going on, particularly in terms of the mechanisms and the context in which they are operated.

Thus, this methodological design offers a focused and extensively detailed picture of the present research by adopting more naturalistic and less structured data collection procedures. However, achieving this goal demands application of suitable instruments capable of exploring the views and experiences of the sample.

Research instruments

The rationale for the selection of the research method depends on the research questions and the settings of the study area. The researcher sought to gather several reliable types of data in order properly to address and answer the research questions. Hence, triangulation of research methods was adopted to capture the natural settings of this 'phenomenon' and its dimensions in S.A.

Documentary analysis

In order to provide a general overview of CCTV, the researcher reviewed existing literature, reports, and official documents. This included the control room’s hierarchy regulations, duties and bureaucratic forms. The archival and written materials provided factual information related to the research inquiry. Moreover, the researcher benefited from documents that were available in control rooms, for example the daily log book and the daily work report, which contained the main surveillance activities that were undertaken in each shift.

On the basis of the exploratory nature of the present study and its inductive methodological design, all types of documents were collected, without predefined and rigid categories for identifying materials. This procedure was an attempt to obtain

tools and data to be used in observations and analysis. Each document collected was attached to a document sheet. This document sheet included the sources of the document, date, location, and a summary of the content of the document (See appendix I). The general procedure was to inspect and assess the materials and then make general categories for these documents that link to the focus of the present study. These were examined critically in order to clarify the meanings of these documents and fit them and/or their contents into a coherent structure throughout the analysis and discussion.

Observation

Angrosion and Mays (2000: 673) state that observation is a fundamental research method in social research that involves observing both human activities and their physical settings. Robson (2002: 310) points out that a major advantage of observation as an instrument is its directness for collecting information.

In the present study, observation was used to develop an integrated view to understand and interpret the experience and practice of information that related to the real life and CCTV operational activities in the control room. Applying an observation instrument facilitated focus on issues relevant to the research and observation of the activities, procedures and mechanisms undertaken in the control room. These included communications and interactions with other stakeholders such as supervisors, administrators, traffic patrol policemen and private security guards. Moreover, throughout the process of observation, particular attention was paid to the shared assumptions and values held by front-line operatives. Accordingly, the dynamic mechanism of CCTV could be understood and analysed. In this context, the practice and mechanism of 'targeting' and 'exclusion' as aspects of the research questions can be answered through observing and concentrating on the employment of CCTV in reinforcing social exclusion.

Lofland and Lofland (1995: 18, 37) distinguish between two types of observation according to the participant role of the observer. The first is the participant observer who is involved in the observed setting and becomes a part of the group which is being studied (see for example, Gold, 1969; Dobbert, 1982; Homan, 1991; May 2001; Robson, 2002). Within this type of observation, the observer, his role, character and the purpose of the research do not reflect the truth of either the observer or the research itself.

The issue of covert observation is a source of controversy in sociology. There are two main arguments in this debate. The first argument maintains that social researchers are entitled to adopt the role of covert observer (see for example, Holdaway, 1982, Denzin, 1982, Van Maanen, 1987b; Homan, 1991). Their pragmatic justification is that covert observation can generate valuable knowledge in studying specific research areas. For those writers, for sites and organizations that have a secretive character and/or are of a socially sensitive nature, for instance, religious groups, homosexuality and prostitution, covert observation is the only method by which the researcher can gain access and collect his/her data. This secret character of both the researcher and the purpose of the inquiry aim to discover hidden data and undercover information that is kept behind secret barriers and behind public understanding. Denzin (1982: 143) argues that the sociologist has the right to conduct disguised observation on anyone in any setting to the extent that the methods do not cause harm to individuals or the places observed. In the same argument, Homan (1991: 114-5) claims that lying, deception and trickery are practised and have become part of contemporary social life. Therefore, for Homan, social research should not be expected to conform to standards not honoured in society.

The opponent group argues that the reasons for conducting covert observation and producing 'valuable' data are not enough to justify lying, spying, deception and invading the privacy of other people in social research (see for instance, Bulmer, 1982; Warwick, 1982; Erikson, 1967; Norris, 1993). Bulmer (1982: 250) argues that the rights of individuals cannot be violated in the name of research and the need for disguised observation. Warwick (1982: 58) highlights that covert observation produces a society of lairs and manipulators. Importantly, covert observation harms the reputation of sociologists and sociological research, which might discourage the public from participating in future research.

Within this debate associated with the researcher's role, Hammersley and Atkinson (2007: 86) take an intermediate position in which they maintain that the researcher can move from a covert to an overt role over the course of the field work.

It seems to the researcher that this inconsistent role can on the one hand, affect the characteristics of the researcher in front of the participants. This ambiguous situation might betray the trust relationship between the informants and the researcher, which might have a negative impact on the credibility of data. The researcher's characteristics are part of a dynamic interactive process that needs to be

constructed on truth, transparency, trust and professional ties. On the other hand, this inconsistency might affect the researcher's capability to adapt to the changeable role of the observer. The researcher is opposed to covert observation because he believes that the cornerstone of academic research is to try always to communicate as fully and honestly as possible to one's informants about the research and the researcher. Moreover, how can a researcher expect informants to be honest, accurate and truthful, while the researcher ignores these required characteristics him/herself? This moral commitment and professional obligation can create and develop a rapport between the observer and his participants, while failing to disclose the researcher's identity and research function might contribute to increase suspicions about the observer's motivations or reliability. In addition, the concealment of the observer's actual identity might have created a distrustful environment and tense relationship between the researcher and operators in the control room, especially when the observation was conducted for a long period. Moreover, it seems that the implementation of participant observation could impede the researcher in writing his/her notes. Indeed, in his study of a control room in Midtown College in the UK, Smith (2004: 383, 390) applied participant observation by undertaking the role of operator, but he experienced great difficulty and he suffered from a sense of tension and the difficulty of taking mental notes while he was engaging in the operational activities in the control room.

Therefore, the researcher carried out the role of pure observer in three CCTV control rooms by making clear his identity as an observational researcher from the beginning of his fieldwork. Furthermore, according to his overt research role, he had the opportunity to ask some questions or make inquiries as they arose during the monitoring of CCTV. This situation created informal interviews that enriched existing information. In this respect, informal interviews were used to clarify issues that appeared during the course of observation time or were raised by operators who thought some events were important enough to be brought up[12], for instance, the role of and the relationship with the Moral Police, as well as the monitoring of the King's motorcade.

Observation as a data collection method has its disadvantages, however, as it can be costly and time consuming. This is especially in the absence of a rigorous

[12] In fact, some informal interviews did not always generate valuable data. Some operators were explaining and discussing personal life affairs, for instance, low salary, the cost of living, disputes with family members. However, in these situations, the researcher tried to finish such 'conversation' politely in order to maintain good relations with operators.

structure. Therefore, in the present study, an observation schedule was adopted to guide the process, focus the observation, and reduce the time spent in the field.

Observation schedule

An observation schedule aims to define and provide important concepts and data that need to be observed and recorded. Robson (2002: 232) indicates that if there is an existing observation schedule which appears to be appropriate, the researcher can use it or adapt it to provide data relevant to the research. Consequently, in the present study, an observation schedule was developed, adapted from the one employed in the URBANEYE study (McCahill and Norris, 2003[13]). The schedule included four types of information. The first category was shift log, including the date, time shift began, day, the period of the shift, number of operators on each shift, operator details, total number of individuals targeted during each shift and total number of personnel deployed during each shift. The second category was targeted suspicion data. This classification included incident number, time incident began, reason for targeting, who initiated targeting, whether a target was identified, type of suspicion, number of target/s, and whether the case was referred to another agency or department, such as the police. The third group was the personal data of the target and arrest; this section looks at the age, race, sex and appearance of the target. The fourth category was deployment data. All deployments initiated by either CCTV operators or another party, for example security staff, were recorded (see Appendix II).

Conducting the observation

Often, in the control room, the researcher took a chair that was both height and directionally adjustable, which enabled him to observe the events, activities and operators as well as the monitors. The researcher sat slightly behind the operator, where he was able observe the operator's procedures in dealing with the system as well as to ask the operator questions, when he thought it would not be bothersome, about events, issues and procedures that occurred while observing the monitors.

At the beginning, the researcher kept quiet, watching and listening to what was happening in the control rooms. At the same time, the researcher maintained a friendly approach and willing stance, offering to assist operators, for instance, answering telephone calls and contacting the supervisor on his mobile. With development of credibility and trust with control room staff, operators became

[13] This schedule was originally developed by Norris and Armstrong (1999).

accustomed to the regular presence of the researcher and might have been able to ignore it. By following this 'strategy', the researcher tried to understand the structure, culture and the special language of operators, which enabled the researcher to be familiar with operator's terms, concepts and have a sense of shared communicational perspectives[14]. Van Maanen (1978a: 234-5) indicates that ethnographic researchers need to identify terms, labels and typologies that are used, which might be used in particular situational conditions and represent cultural aspects among the studied groups. Hammersley (1990:13) highlights that, if the researcher fails to do so, he would be an outsider and might produce invalid research due to missing participants' views in their own words.

The researcher paid particular attention to the technical utilization of the systems, as well as instruments and mechanisms of communication between operators and other parties in observational sites, such as radio link and mobile. This type of observation aimed to capture the dynamics of the decision-making process and the organizational context in which it occurs. Moreover, it provided insight into the nature and mechanism of social interaction and communication between operator and non-operators in the control room, which can affect the process of monitoring.

Furthermore, during the observation, the researcher observed and recorded personal impressions about incidents, events and operators during the process of operating the systems, social interaction and reactions to events that took place in the CR and through the images in the monitors. All efforts were made to observe and record every movement and procedure that was undertaken by operators in the control room. This, in fact, reflects what Norris and Armstrong (1999: 96) recommended, that the researcher should be a shadow for the operator. For recording purpose, the researcher carried a notebook and pen throughout the observational period. As a result, no one became alarmed when the researcher wrote something or wondered what they had said or done to cause him to write. The continuous writing made note taking seem like normal behaviour, especially as the researcher's identity as observer was established and maintained from the beginning of the fieldwork.

[14] At the beginning of the fieldwork, the researcher faced a communication problem stemming from the use of jargon, which is a specialized language of the operators in the control rooms. In control rooms, operators have their own vocabulary which serves as shorthand for complicated concepts. Fortunately, the researcher realized this issue early in site visits and learnt that vocabulary to enable him to communicate in that 'language', for instance; *Derj*, which means stupid, *Mahyat*, which means troublemaker.

In the effort to organize the recording of information from the control room, accuracy and speed are important. The researcher might have limited time to write down this information. Therefore, the use of abbreviations can save time, enabling more time and attention to be paid to the mechanism of monitoring[15]. The full field notes, including full descriptions and interpretative information relevant to an observational schedule, were written immediately at the end of each shift, in order to avoid any omission of information or clues during observational time. Baker (1988: 24) refers to these records as 'memory sparkers'. Similarly Lofland and Lofland (1995: 91) emphasize that one of the vital factors in obtaining high-quality data is reviewing field-notes at the end of every day and minimizing the time period between observation and writing. Moreover, the fieldwork notes in the field were written and stored using a computer word-processor. In this way, the actual fieldwork notes were kept efficiently and safely. Moreover, utilizing a word-processing program contributed to save the data, as all notes were always kept in duplicate to prevent loss of the field notes and other data. The researcher packed up copies of the data in the PC memory card, USB and sent copies to two different e-mail addresses as an attachment, as well as saving a copy on his personal account in the university computer. The usage of a word-processing program assisted the researcher in searching for a specific word, location, note or theme.

The interview

Interviews have long been used as a research tool for data collection in qualitative research (Dyer, 1995; Markham, 1998; Marshall and Rossman, 1999). It is a methodological instrument for accessing people's perceptions, knowledge, attitudes, and interpretations of situations and constructions of reality. In the present study, an interview was used because it was thought to allow the researcher flexibility to obtain replies and reveal the views and attitudes of the respondents. For example, in an interview, the way in which a reply is given can provide information that a written response, such as a questionnaire would not capture. Taylor and Bogdan (1984) maintain that utilizing interviews involves humanistic reproductions that portray detailed accounts of what people actually say and do, rather than strict and sterilized derivations from a numerical data set. Dobbert (1982: 210, 218) maintains that

[15] Examples of abbreviating codes are SUP for supervisor, MP for Moral Police, GR for administrator, BC for Bluetooth case and MF for 'illegal' meeting between a couple.

questionnaire instruments often provide little information and might not contribute sufficiently to investigate the area studied.

This research seeks to collect specific data that can be considered sensitive information and has a special nature that may not be possible to be collected by other instruments. For instance, the actual aim of the employment of CCTV in the state's agencies might be regarded as a national security issue that should be hidden. Moreover, the mechanisms of exclusion due to cultural values in a conservative and tribal society, such as S.A., are believed to be sensitive information that could not be collected by other tools. Al-Asaf (2000: 393) highlights the point that if the information is considered important and potentially sensitive to respondents, it will be better to use an interview to collect the data. Furthermore, it is understood that people tend to introduce information orally rather than in written form because it is an easy way to answer. On such issues as those concerned in the present study, government employees would provide information, as there was no written form which they might prefer, as they were not making official statements. Another reason for using an interview is that the researcher has more chance of obtaining the required answer, since he has the opportunity of reminding respondents and clarifying the meaning of questions; also the researcher may be able to add or alter some questions depending upon the type of interview.

There are different kinds of interview, according to the extent of depth and detail of information sought. The type selected depends mainly upon the kinds of data needed and the structural nature of the research concern. Accordingly, interviews can be divided into three broad categories: structured, semi-structured and unstructured (Borg and Gall, 1983; Fontana and Frey, 1994; Dyer, 1995; Al-Asaf, 2000; Robson, 2002).

A structured interview is one in which the interviewer determines the form and the direction of the questions in advance. It is simple in the way that the interviewer reads a prepared question and the respondent answers. Robson (2002) outlines that a structured interview is similar to a questionnaire, being based on a strict procedure. This kind of interview is regarded as rigid and gives no margin for freedom and flexibility to revise or amend the wording or even order of the questions.

In contrast, unstructured interview procedures are not as strict as the structured type. It provides a great deal of freedom for both interviewer and the respondent. It might begin with raising an issue or an initial question. Then the informant will reply

to the question or introduce his/her perspective on the issue. The next questions depend upon the respondent's answers. Thus, this sort of interview is more flexible and the respondent can respond freely with no control. In some ways, an unstructured interview appears to have similarities with an ordinary conversation, but it is more purposive and directed to a particular topic (Fontana and Frey, 1994).

The third type of interview is the semi-structured interview. This sort of interview has the advantages of both structured and unstructured interview. Semi-structured interviews employ a detailed interview guide and set of questions prepared in advance, but the researcher is free to modify the order of questions and can change the way they are worded, give explanation, add or delete questions (Sarantakos, 1998; May, 2001).

It can be understood that in-depth semi-structured interviewing means that rather than focusing on the researcher's perspective as the valid view, it is the interviewee's account which is being sought and highly valued. It allows the researcher to elucidate the informants' world by understanding their perspectives in a language that is natural to them. McKernan (1996: 129) points out that in the semi-structured interview, the interviewer has certain questions to ask of all interviewees, but also allows the respondents to raise issues as the interview progresses. This method gives respondents a broad freedom of expression and elaboration within the main topic.

Borg and Gall (1983: 442) point out that semi-structured interviews are more reliable for obtaining data, with their capacity to provide desirable information and detailed valuable data that could not be successfully obtained by any other instrument.

Consequently, this type of structure permits the researcher to explore in depth and obtain in detail more data relating to the core questions of the interview. The usage of semi-structured interview attempts to achieve a deep understanding of the CCTV systems in S.A. It is concerned with collecting specific data from individuals who are engaged with such systems and experience them in their everyday lives. It is also geared towards yielding significant and meaningful insights. Semi-structured interviews were used to examine, in detail, the organisational and inter-organisational context, as well as the practice, development and utilization of CCTV systems. Moreover, the interviews sought to explore the vision of operators and system managers at each site who are responsible for implementing, maintaining and developing the systems. The flexible feature of semi-structured interviews enabled the

researcher to alter and evolve the interview schedule to achieve the aim of the procedure.

The interview schedule

The interview schedule was divided into four parts: the history and politics behind the rise of CCTV, technological features, the practice of CCTV and organizational structure and control (see appendices III and IV). Nevertheless, during the pilot study, it was noticed that some interviewees, especially from the official sector (government employees) were reluctant to talk about the employment of CCTV in the areas of these questions, which appeared to be sensitive. For those interviewees, these questions might have been directly related to the state power and the capacity of the government to employ technology in controlling its population. Participants might have refused to answer these questions, as they may have seemed to them to be political questions, which they were not qualified to talk about. Therefore, the researcher redesigned the interview schedule by introducing the interview with an open-ended question; how can you explain the growth of CCTV in S.A.? This type of general inquiry allowed the researcher to encourage cooperation and so create a rapport between himself and the respondent.

To encourage participants to provide detailed accounts of their experience, most questions were followed by asking for examples, events and/or further explanation. These types of questions reflect the feature of semi-structured interview, which allows interviewees a broad freedom of expression and elaboration of other issues within the core topic.

For interviewing operators and managers of CCTV sites, questions were designed to investigate the daily activities and process of utilizing and operating CCTV systems in practice. The daily activities and functions are seen in constantly repeated patterns that reflect the structure, mechanisms and social entity of operators and the real life of the CCTV operational process (see appendix V, VI and VII).

With all interviewees, the interview schedule was concluded by a general question, which allowed scope for other issues to be raised, beyond those already mentioned. Therefore, this inquiry enabled the consideration of other factors referring to respondents' personal experience in the CCTV field. In general, the questions overall aimed to explore facts, attitudes and interviewees' practical experience in the CCTV field.

Sample

The type of information and the nature of the study examine specific issues. The best way to do this is to benefit from asking directly those people who are presumed to have information and experience that the research needs.

The City of Riyadh

The observational fieldwork was conducted in Riyadh city. Riyadh was selected because it is the capital city of S.A. All ministries and most large business firms are situated in Riyadh. More than half of the government workforce is assigned to Riyadh (High Commission for the Development of Riyadh, 2006: 11). The central decision-making processes for the whole state, on major issues, are carried out and announced from Riyadh. These features give it an administrative function. Accordingly, Riyadh has an important role in the social, economic and political situation in S.A. Riyadh also has the largest population concentration in the country, with 5,797971 persons, exceeding the rest of the Saudi regions by at least three hundred thousand (*ibid*: 23)

For all these reasons, Riyadh is likely to be the area most affected by the growth in CCTV systems, or at least has the highest number of CCTV systems in S.A. Therefore, Riyadh can represent the growth of CCTV in S.A.

The observational sites

Observation was carried out in three locations. The choice of these sites was based on the belief that they have the capacity to meet the research aims. In addition, these locations represent public space, private space and semi public space.

Site One

The first location is a modern shopping mall that was opened in September 2005. This mall is 143,450 square metres and it includes more than a hundred and thirty multi-retail units. Approximately eighteen thousand customers use this mall on workdays and twenty one thousand at the weekend.

The main reason for choosing this site was that this mall is owned and operated by the private sector. Furthermore, this mall is part of a group, with six other branches in the capital and other branches in other Saudi cities. Moreover, the mall represents a modern type of shopping centre in the city. These characteristics might increase the possibility that what was discovered in this setting, regarding the employment of CCTV and its outcomes, might be generalized to other similar malls in other urban regions that have not been researched. Moreover, the mall encompasses

the activities of a large number of the public, so that the mechanics of operating CCTV systems could be explored with a large number of individuals.

Site Two

The second site is Riyadh Railway Station. In S.A., there are four railway stations, mostly on the line from Riyadh to the Eastern Region. The railway station in Riyadh is the largest railway station in Saudi Arabia. As mentioned in the last chapter, a few months ago, the Railway Authority installed thirty-two cameras in Riyadh station. In addition, in S.A., the Railway Authority has a legal personal status with rights and duties through the Board of Directors, which was appointed to lead the organization on commercial principles. Within this arrangement, railway stations in Saudi Arabia are considered to be between public and private statuses.

Site Three

The third site is the main state control room in the Traffic Department in Riyadh. These cameras are used for controlling traffic in the capital city and they are operated by traffic police.

Sampling Time Period

All days of the week were covered in order to observe the mechanism of CCTV operations on workdays and at weekends. At each site, observation was undertaken for three weeks. In the first week, observations were from 08.00 to 16.00; in the second week, they were from 16.00 to 00.00, while in the third week were from 00.00 till 08.00. By applying this schedule, all hours of the day were covered, and morning, afternoon and evening shifts were observed. In each location, 168 hours of observation were conducted. The total hours of monitoring were 504 hours.

Interview Sample

Babbie (1995: 225) states that it may be appropriate to select the sample on the basis of the researcher's own knowledge of the population and the nature of the research purpose. The exploratory nature of this study, its specialized subject area and the limited resources available made this approach appropriate. The present research relies heavily on a certain type of individuals to articulate their knowledge and experience relating to CCTV in Riyadh.

With this in mind and considering the exploratory nature of the present study, the sample was selected from the population that exhibited the common characteristics of those people who operate, manage and are involved in CCTV activities in S.A. According to these criteria, the sample included a number of experts

and specialists in the CCTV field who enabled the researcher to investigate a representative sample of those involved in the construction and operation of CCTV systems.

Interviews included key players involved in the construction of the CCTV network. This category included those people who are officially responsible for considering CCTV schemes that are requested by state agencies in S.A. moreover, interviews with key actors in the governmental sector provided information on the regulations that control the installation and the deployment of CCTV systems. In addition, their views enabled us to capture the dynamics and complexity of the decision-making process and organizational context, whereby the official explanation for the rise of CCTV could be realized. In this respect, the Department of Communications in the Ministry of Interior is officially in charge of identifying, designing and installing communications and technical projects. In this department, five people were interviewed; the head of the department and the CCTV project managers. Moreover, every effort was made to interview the Ministry of Interior's Adviser on communication and surveillance issues, as well as the head of the Security Cameras in the DOGS.

Similarly, interviewing actors from private security companies, responsible for marketing and installing CCTV, enabled us to explore their perspectives, which contributed to understanding the role of the private sector in the growth of CCTV. Accordingly, the second group involved interviewing five executive managers and five CCTV project managers in different private companies that have commercial activities relating to CCTV.

In S.A., every commercial institution should register with the regional office of Saudi Council of Commercial and Industrial Chambers (SCCIC). The SCCIC is a commercial body that aims to provide information about commercial activities and business enterprises in S.A. The researcher obtained a list of private companies that work in security services in Riyadh. For the purpose of selection, the names of these companies were arranged in alphabetical order and a systematic random distribution approach adopted in which every fifth number was selected, to give a sample.

As mentioned in Chapter One, the operational mechanism of CCTV systems and its actual process mainly depends upon those people who operate CCTV systems in control rooms. Thus, the third group was operators and managers of CCTV sites. In these sites, the interviews included five participants in each site who were involved in

the daily operation and management of CCTV surveillance. This included the control room manager, the operator of every shift in the control room and the head of the department. The wisdom behind this selection was that those participants represented three levels of management (top, middle and first management levels), which provides us with three different ideological and practical perspectives on the employment of CCTV in one location. The total number of the interview sample was thirty three interviewees.

In general, these samples enabled the researcher to answer the research questions and to find out to what extent the CCTV technology is constructed and applied in different ways, by different groups and to some degree with different management ideologies and interests in diverse places. The adoption of such a structure allowed us to examine the assumption that surveillance is no longer carried out by the state alone, but by several social actors.

Conducting the interviews

The interviewer's task is not confined to setting up the interview schedule and conducting the interview in the way he likes. The performance of an interview demands key components that contribute to obtain valuable data and the achievement of the interview's objectives. Among these elements, is the way in which the interviewer keeps the participants motivated and interested to answer the interview questions frankly and trustfully, by establishing and maintaining rapport. Rapport is an important feature of human interaction and social communication. Thus, for some commentators, interviewing is both a research methodology and a social relationship that must be natured, sustained and then ended gracefully (see for example, Fontana and Frey, 1994; Robson, 2002; Siedman, 2006).

Developing such rapport depends on good interviewing skills, which in turn might require extensive training. Robson (2002: 167) points out that the quality of a flexible- design study depends to a great extent on the quality of the researcher. This indicates that undertaking such research demands preparation, a well-trained, experienced investigator and knowledge of the procedures by which the research is to be performed.

With these concerns in mind, as with observation skills, the researcher attended an intensive course in Neuron-Linguistic Programming (NLP), which focuses on techniques that are essential in building rapport, such as giving good eye contact, as well as using posture and facial expression to show interest and a

sympathetic attitude to probe interviewees. The wisdom behind enrolling in this course was to gain important skills in human communications, which would result in enhanced rapport and the quality of communication with respondents.

Moreover, Norris (1993:131) suggests that researchers need to minimize the social distance with informants. Following Norris's recommendation and to reduce any difference in personal appearance, the researcher wore Saudi traditional clothes, as wearing national dress can make participants more relaxed and encourage them to speak freely as in an ordinary social atmosphere. In relation to this practice, Dyer (1995: 76) stresses that the way in which the researcher dresses is a vital indicator of social status to which careful attention should be paid, to eliminate any social differences between informants and the researcher. Moreover, in order to build rapport, Siedman (2006: 95-7) indicates that the researcher might ask an interviewee at an early stage if he/she can call him by his first name. In fact, the researcher asked interviewees their nickname, as according to Arab cultural norms, calling people by their nicknames is a mark of respect, prestige, and good manners.

Interviews took place in different locations and at variable times, chosen by participants, wherever they felt most comfortable. Most interviews were conducted in offices. In one case, due to the interviewee's schedule, the interview took place in a public café during his lunch break. For the same reason, another participant asked for an interview to be held at his farm 150 miles from the city and during the weekend at 22.30. The researcher acceded to his request because of his deep experience of CCTV systems.

Interviews were conducted morning, afternoon and evening, depending on the interviewee's request. Selecting the convenient location and time for the participant provided a suitable atmosphere, in which interviewees were relaxed and ready for the interview. In addition, it aimed to ensure that the interviews proceeded without interruption. Each interview lasted between 1 1/2 and 2 hours.

While interviewing, the researcher observed the recommendation to listen more than to talk, which gave the respondent the opportunity to speak without being interrupted. In this respect, Seidman (2006: 78, 92) states that every attempt should be made to encourage subjects to speak openly about their views by keeping quiet and to listen actively. In order to facilitate active listening and to concentrate on the progress of the interview, the interviewer employed two methods:

Firstly, a fresh copy of the written guide for every interview was used, which contained all the questions, in order to be sure of replies to all questions. Secondly, interviews were recorded on tape, which provided a much more concrete and detailed record and to capture full and exact quotations for analysis and reporting. Using a tape machine, however, requires obtaining the respondent's permission. This point raises the question of ethical considerations in the present research.

Ethical considerations

One important factor which is worthy of consideration in conducting research is to consider seriously the ethical commitment. Dobbert (1982: 76) believes that qualitative fieldworkers have a strict moral obligation because of their personal contact with informants and the actual field. Moreover, Hammersley and Atkinson (2007: 226-7) outline that the researcher needs to adhere to the ethical codes that are issued by ethical committees in institutional bodies, which regulate ethical consideration and represents guidelines on informed consent and other relevant ethical regulations for the participation in empirical researches. In this respect, the researcher submitted his research proposal to the Ethics Committee in the Department of Social Science at the University of Hull for reviewing before conducting the fieldwork. The aim of this procedure is to ensure that research done respects the rights and welfare of human participants. Moreover, in line with the guidelines of ethical practice for the British Sociological Association (BSA) (2004)[16] and the British Society of Criminology (BSC) (2006)[17], the researcher explained fully the purpose of the research and gave a description of the procedures. The researcher started each interview by introducing himself as a researcher. The researcher presented his student identity in Arabic, which enabled the participants to recognize his actual identity.

Participation in this study was voluntary. Nonetheless, before starting the interview, the researcher explained clearly to participants that he would not reveal any personal information about the interviewee and no one would have access to the data beyond the researcher, for academic purpose and with the understanding that the results would be published in an academic thesis. Accordingly, participants were aware in advance how material would be disseminated and by whom and to whom.

[16]http://www.britsoc.co.uk,/NR/rdonlyres/801B9A62-5CD3-4BC2-93E1-FF470FF10256/0/StatementofEthicalPractice.pdf (accessed on 30th March 2007).
17 http://www.britsoccrim.org/ethical.htm (accessed on 24th March 2007).

By applying these methods, respondents were clear about their respective role and its implications. In addition, they were informed that they could leave the interview at any time and without any consequences. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, using a tape machine requires obtaining the respondent's authorization. Thus, the researcher adhered strictly to this principle by asking participants' permission to record interviews.

Moreover, careful attention was given to the issue of anonymity, to protect participants' rights as well as to maintain a confidential atmosphere. The actual identities of people were disguised to preserve the anonymity of those who took part in the research. Confidentiality was achieved by changing the names of the interviewees by using letters or numbers or both. Moreover, the researcher disguised some facts that could lead to their identification.

Site visits

Site visits to further control rooms were considered a suitable starting step, by which the researcher obtained valuable information about the structure and operational approach of CCTV. Ditton and Short (1998: 148) emphasize that a good starting point in the research field is to benefit from the knowledge of those who have suitable experience in a similar area. Similarly, Hammersley (1990: 8) emphasizes the importance of ethnographic researchers learning the culture and environment of the group studied before starting their own fieldwork. This approach represents a 'mini observational study' in the URBANEYE study' (McCahill and Norris, 2003). In the preliminary stages of the fieldwork, such a procedure gave the researcher a degree of experience, which could familiarize him with the actual atmosphere for the field. In addition, site visits were an attempt to construct an appropriate focus for the research and to identify potential problems prior to the main fieldwork. Therefore, the researcher visited many control rooms in different locations[18]. These site visits represented a practical measure that helped the researcher to understand the structure and process of operating CCTV before carrying out the main case studies.

Pilot study

Yin (1994: 74) maintains that a pilot study allows the investigator to try different approaches and structures on a trial basis. It provides the researcher with an

[18] The details of these sites and their CCTV systems were outlined in Chapter One.

opportunity both to examine the structure and to test the appropriateness of interview questions before applying the main study. Carrying out a pilot study provided the researcher with the opportunity to explore respondents' reactions and allowed him to make any additions or alterations necessary. For this purpose, therefore, five people outside the main sample were interviewed prior to conducting the main interviews. Those five people were chosen from those who worked in the control room, in sites that the researcher visited.

During the preliminary stage of collecting data in the pilot study, I asked myself the following questions: what did I learn from these interviews and observational site visits that will shape my questions for the next one? What issues and events have emerged that suggest additional questions and investigations? In doing so, I was able to adjust the observational schedule and interview questions for the next round of data collection and analysis. This understanding stems from the adoption of the inductive approach in the present study.

From the pilot study, it was noticed that several interviewees highlighted particular issues, for example, the targeting of youth, moral surveillance and the role of the Moral Police. Moreover, there was particular attention to the utilization of CCTV cameras for security concerns and to protect symbols of power. Therefore, I tried to understand how other participants would respond to these issues by raising these topics with the main sample of the study in both the interview and the fieldwork observation. Moreover, it was found to be important to conduct interviews with the head of the Security Cameras Unit in the DOGS. Therefore, an arrangement was made to interview him. He was a useful source of data, especially on the employment of CCTV systems in the official realm. Importantly, during the control rooms visits, it was noticed that gaining trust and promoting rapport are vital factors in stimulating operators' motivation to provide information and 'share' their experience. Accordingly, careful attention was given to these 'personal' skills throughout the observational process in the main study. Furthermore, the pilot study resulted in a few modifications to the quantitative observational schedule:

1) 'Dominant ethnic' and 'minority ethnic' were replaced by Saudi and non-Saudi in relation to ethnic appearance.
2) Visual identity was determined on the basis of ethnic roots according to the list of nationalities obtained from the Ministry of Economics and Planning

(East Asian, Asian 'Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka', Arabic, African and western).

3) There was a difficulty in describing the target's appearance for females. According to Islamic principles, women should wear a black robe, which covers the body from the top of the head to the heel of the foot. In this situation, a uniform category was used for all female targets.

Regarding technical matters, in the pilot study, the researcher used an audio-tape recorder. However, when using a recorder with a built- in microphone, it was noticed that the quality of the interviewee's voice was not clear, which made transcription difficult. As a result, the researcher used a tape recorder with a separate hand-held microphone, by which high performance was obtained. In relation to this aspect, during the interview, the researcher used an audio-tape recorder plugged in to the mains electricity supply. However, this approach was not convenient due to the breaking down of the cable and the irritation that caused to interviewees, as shown by their facial expressions. Therefore, batteries were utilized to provide power to the recorder. In addition, the researcher kept a supply of spare batteries to hand.

Importantly, applying the pilot study enabled the researcher to make contact with people and locations where the research was focused. This practice assisted the researcher to understand the required procedures for access in the main study.

Access arrangements

Van Maanen (1978b: 311) writes that access into the police system is a problematic procedure for the flied work researcher. Van Maanen ascribed this challenge to occupational secrecy and the cultural stereotype of social researchers in their contributions to problematic issues that are related to the police activities. However, Van Maanen maintains that access to police departments can be made through the researcher's fraternal credentials. To quote him, "If one cannot claim status as a former police officer or is otherwise experienced on police matters, doors will be difficult to open" (1978b:319). Seidman (2006: 45-6) states that it is important to establish access to participants through their peers rather than people above or below them in their hierarchy. According to the above views, it seems that establishing access is preferred to be through informal channels. However, this procedure might not be applicable in studying CCTV control rooms in S.A. CCTV systems appeared to be linked to the security function, a view which was supported by the researcher's

experience. In the Saudi context, the researcher presumes that terrorist incidents have increased the concern for safety and increased the awareness of security procedures. Therefore, establishing access to study CCTV systems in S.A. would not be possible through informal negotiations.

For the purpose of the research, the researcher obtained a letter from the University of Hull that contained information about the researcher and the purpose of the study. In addition, another letter was obtained from the Saudi Cultural Bureau in London, to serve the same purpose. In Saudi Arabia, another letter was provided by the Chairman of King Fahd Security College, indicating the purpose of the study and the importance of co-operation for the success of the study. This letter explained that the researcher had permission to attend a control room for his fieldwork research and to collect the required data.

The researcher had thought that such bureaucratic procedures would facilitate access to the selected control rooms. However, the actual practice proved very different. Indeed, in the afternoon of Monday 4th June 2007, I contacted the person responsible for CCTV cameras in the DOGS. He asked me to provide him with a letter stating my identity and telephone number as well as explaining the subject and aim of the research and the facilities requested. Moreover, he asked me to support my request with official documents such as a letter from my sponsor which should be sent by fax and said he would reply to me. All these requirements were sent that day, besides a copy of my national and student identities. I waited for a week but there was no response. In this situation, according to the cultural perspectives and traditional norm of Saudi society, personal needs should be obtained through face to face negotiations. Therefore, I decided to go to the building of the DOGS in order to discuss personally the process of access.

It was difficult to go directly into the main building of the DOGS. Visitors must park their cars at some distance from the building. High fences and concrete barriers surround the building. Moreover, security vehicles equipped with machine guns are situated around the building. Moreover, the public are required to go through three check points before going into the building. At the main gate, a person and his personal belongings are inspected by electronic x-ray scan machine. At the same location, a quick interview is undertaken in which identity and destination should be revealed. At the end of these procedures, a visitor should provide security guards with

his original identity card and his mobile phone, whereupon he is provided with a visitor card.

Experiencing these procedures, it was assumed that security concerns might be the reason behind the long wait without response to my request. On the grounds of Van Maanen's suggestion (1978b:319), I decided to employ my personal relationship before meeting the person who was responsible for CCTV systems in that building. As a lecturer in the Police College from which most police officers graduate, I had a 'good' relationship with them, I asked for one officer who was one of my previous students and fortunately he was in his office. He gave me permission to go into the building. I explained to him the purpose of this visit and the importance of obtaining permission to attend the control room of CCTV cameras in RTD. He took me to the officer who is the General Director of the Traffic Departments in the country. The officer told me that he had received my request, but due to security circumstances and the rigid procedures, it was difficult to give me quick permission to have access, as this usually takes a few weeks or the request might be rejected. Eventually, after he recognized my identity, which was supported by my being introduced by the officer who worked in the DOGS, access was approved.

In the second site, in the Train Station, the CCTV is operated by the Eastern Police Region. On the basis of my experience with the access procedures in RTD, I prepared a file that contained all the necessary documents, as well as using personal contact to arrange a meeting with the General Director of the Eastern Police Region. A formal meeting was arranged in his office (around 450km from the capital). During that meeting, the research objectives and the process of observation and its schedule were outlined. The access was approved under the condition that he would be provided with a copy of the thesis, which will be fulfilled.

In the private sector, access was easier because of the official documents that I had for requesting access, which was further facilitated by personal contact before applying for access to the private setting.

Data analysis

A separate file for each interview was organised, which included the interview guide, the transcripts of the interviews, labelled audiotapes of interviews and contact details, for instance, e-mail, mobile and office telephone numbers. All these files were kept in a safe place. Both fieldwork notices and taped information were transcribed

into written form by using a computer-based word processing program in order to prepare the data for analysis.

The issue is that qualitative data is a type of data that is characterized by its 'thick' descriptive nature, which is written in a narrative form. The purpose of this description is to let the reader know what happened in the observational field, what was the participants' point of view towards the issues discussed, and what particular events or activities were undertaken and emerged in the fieldwork. For some commentators, one of the main concerns with qualitative data is its large amount of text (see for example Van Maanen, 1978b; Altheide, 1987; Miles and Hamberman, 1994; Robson, 2002; Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). Van Maanen (1978b: 346) points out that assessing the value of findings depends on providing detailed descriptions of what the researcher did and found in the fieldwork.

In recognition of this issue, steps were taken to keep the data manageable, in order to organize and display it more effectively. Efforts were made to reduce the data mountain through the production of summaries and abstracts, coding, writing memos to capture insights and summarise the main ideas, views, key events and meanings to direct and focus the data collecting process.

Throughout the data analysis, the researcher had an open attitude, looking for what emerged as important and of interest from the data. This reflects the adoption of the inductive approach in this study. The inductive approach to analysing data is a flexible framework for categorizing what is interpreted on the basis of findings and does not involve a fixed pre-existed detailed plan (see for example, Hammersley, 1990; Bottoms, 2008).

In the present study, important issues were identified, described and then classified into different themes. The researcher worked to find connecting threads and patterns among those themes, and to relate them to each other for the purpose of building a coherent structure of the rise of CCTV systems and their operation. Altheide (1987: 65) indicates that the analyses process in ethnographic research briefly stated and involves joining similar events, behaviours, attitudes and actions together. Due to the exploratory nature of the present study and the inductive analysis approach, during categorization, the researcher let the data categories emerge from the data collection process rather than determining themes in advance and applying them to the data.

After following this process of categorization, three patterns of data emerged. These themes included physical patterns, daily functional patterns and cognitive patterns. Physical patterns involved the arrangement and appearance of the control rooms, CCTV cameras, system integration, and human setting (the participants, their identity, physical characteristics and appearance). Daily functional patterns covered the diversity of aims and utilizations, targeting and exclusion. Cognitive patterns, on the other hand, encompassed responsibilities, training, relationships with other staff, moral surveillance, human mediation and regulations. In this classification, body language, vocabulary of the dialogue, important values, principles and concepts which influence everyday behaviour were brought forward and fully examined. Moreover, special attention was paid to the manner in which operators characterized targets, as well as describing the manner in which some operators might utilize some values or principles to dictate behaviour.

However, on some occasions, it was found that some excerpts fitted reasonably into more than one pattern. In such cases, copies were made of those passages and placed in multiple categories that appeared appropriate. This process of 'systematic structure' organizing assisted in making the data more manageable, and in understanding the relationships within the data that was obtained, relevant to the research concerns.

Research validity

The main concern of validity in qualitative research is the accuracy of data. Hammersley (1990: 57) argues that validity in qualitative data is linked to truth in which the data reflects the accuracy of the collected data. Lofland and Lofland (1995: 74) highlight two levels of accuracy. On the one hand, the truth of the researcher in reporting collected data; on the other hand, the accuracy of the information provided by informants. For both parties, the question of validity is related to the credibility of data (see also, Janesick, 2000; Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). Therefore, in the present study, validity aims to measure the degree to which the research results reflect an accurate picture of the rise and operation of CCTV systems in Riyadh. Therefore, steps were taken to achieve validity in order to assure that an accurate picture of CCTV systems would emerge from the interviewees' description and observational field notes that reflected conditions from the inside.

To perform this function, as the interview questions were formulated in English, they had to be translated into Arabic, the main language of informants, by the researcher. After this, consultation was held with four Arabic/ English speakers PhD researchers, who are specialists in linguistics. Letters were given to these experts, indicating the nature and the aim of the interview and telling them that they were not asked to respond to the items, but to judge ther validity and comment on the accuracy, style and presentation of interview questions. Later, all their comments and suggestions were taken into account to produce an amended translation.

Moreover, since participation was voluntary, participants were assured of the right to withdraw at any time, the objectives of the research were made clear and the researcher was open about his identity, it is presumed that there would be no reason for participants to exaggerate or lie. It was also reasoned that they would open up and truthfully report their real experience and perspectives in the light of the fact that someone was genuinely interested in what they had to say.

Robson (2002) and Mason (1996) have argued that the main threat to interview validity is the interpretation of interviewees' information. In this respect, the researcher enhanced his interpretation and understanding by quoting from more than one participant's information, which can be noticed throughout the process of analysis and discussion. It aims to demonstrate the ground for his understanding and interpretation to avoid any misunderstanding of interviewees' perspectives. Similarly, Hammersley (1990: 79) emphasizes that the *credibility* of ethnographic research needs to be enhanced by presenting extracts from field notes. This procedure of ensuring the validity of the present data was employed, as well be seen in the presentation of the findings in the next three chapters.

Moreover, for some writers, the employment of more than one instrument can increase the validity of the research (see Dobbert, 1982; Denzin, 1988; Hammersley, 1990; Dyer, 1995; Mingers, 2001; Robson, 2002). Hammersley (1990: 84) stresses that the use of more than one method of data collection is a useful method and has substantial advantages, as researcher bias can be reduced and research validity can be achieved.

It can be understood that research data that is collected, compared, and assessed by different instruments and from different angles contribute to 'purify' the data and to avoid the likelihood of error. Dobbert (1982: 265) emphasizes that multiple methods enhance validity and reliability through increasing the number of

perspectives employed. For Dobbert, the employment of multiple methods enables cross-checking of the generated data for accuracy and completeness to counteract possible threats to validity. It is hoped that congruence in the findings from several methods would result in one production and validate the study's conclusions. As has been elaborated in this chapter, a triangulated instrumental approach was used in this study by employing three methods (documentary analysis, observation and interview). Ultimately, this diversity of methods contributes to the authenticity of the research because the data of the present study does not construct the story of a single site. This research is a compilation of stories from a variety of people and sites associated with the employment and operation of surveillance devices.

Summary

This chapter has outlined the methodological approach used in conducting the present study. It began by explaining the design of the research, in which an inductive methodological approach was adopted and the utilization of the qualitative type of data needed to explore the rise of CCTV in Riyadh by employing appropriate tools for collecting data. The most important role of this chapter within the whole research is to explain the way in which the research was carried out. One of the main issues raised in this chapter was the instruments of the research. The first instrument that was used for collecting information was documentary data obtained from sites where the three case studies were applied. Moreover, an interview was selected because of its advantage of exploring the respondents' views and experiences in depth, particularly in a semi-structured interview. In addition, observation was used for obtaining information that relates to the real life operational activities in a CCTV control room. It enabled the researcher to 'discover' the daily practical operation of CCTV that might not be noticed or 'revealed' by interviewees. The procedures for conducting observation and the interview were all described in the chapter. In this respect, every attempt was made to gain interviewees' trust in terms of clarifying the status of the researcher, as well as by use of colloquial language that created a common level of understanding between the interviewees and the researcher, which contributed to strengthen the feeling of rapport. Ethical considerations were guaranteed and explained clearly as a commitment in conducting the research. Finally, the process and strategy of analysing the data was outlined.

The explanation of the data analysis process enables us to appreciate more fully the findings, which will be explored in the next part.

Part 2

Three Case Studies of CCTV Systems

Chapter Three: CCTV in a Riyadh Shopping Mall

Introduction

The operation of CCTV systems depends upon the cultural conceptualization in which these surveillance devices are operated. The process of targeting and the criteria of 'suspicion' in the operation of CCTV are constructed upon social norms and the dominant cultural values. In a western context, the practice of targeting in commercial settings is the production of a 'new' social order that is based on economic and commercial considerations. Due to an aspiration to increase the consumption culture, targeting has been dedicated towards 'new' standards of behaviour that have been defined in the matrix of capitalist power to serve its interest and concerns.

In Saudi society, the cultural identity of Saudis is still based on moral and ethical norms because people are born into, and bound to the social values of their society and are socialized in accordance with its moral values. In the Saudi context, therefore, it is argued that the operation of CCTV and the process of targeting is likely to be shaped by moral principles, due to the social and cultural characteristics of Saudi society. This argument is supported by the findings that were collected in a shopping mall in Riyadh, the capital city of S.A.

To outline this argument, the chapter is organized into five sections. It starts by introducing some of the theoretical and empirical literature on surveillance in a commercial milieu in a 'western' context. The second section describes the organizational and technological contexts in the mall. This includes some basic description of the control room (CR) as well as the CCTV systems. This section also outlines the regulations and the responsibilities of those people who undertook the role of operating the camera systems. In this section, particular emphasis is placed on examining the characteristics of operators and their attitudes towards targets who were watched. The third section shows the influence of human mediation in utilizing surveillance devices and the limits of disciplinary surveillance. The fourth section discusses the practices of targeting by demonstrating who is 'surveilled' and reasons for targeting. Then, the chapter highlights the practice of moral surveillance by displaying its components, the operational process and patterns of observing courtship

behaviour. This section concludes by describing the consequences of 'moral surveillance' by providing data on deployment practice.

Surveillance and 'consumerism' in the 'western' literature

In western studies of surveillance in 'mass private property', it is argued that CCTV systems have been employed mainly for the purpose of 'risk management' with their use being determined by the interests of the private sector in achieving commercial functions (see Shearing and Stenning, 1983, 1987; McCahill, 2002; Wakefield, 2000, 2003, 2005). For these writers, a major objective behind the installation of cameras is an attempt to create safer and more comfortable spaces in which to pursue consumerist aims. At the same time, in commercial settings, such as shopping malls, increasingly, the exercise of surveillance has been associated with the enforcement of exclusion of members of the public whose do not meet the criteria of consumption. Targeting and exclusion of the public is based on protecting commercial images and maximizing the level of consumption. Operators are not scanning mainly for those who behave 'immorally', but for those who are without the proper means of consumption. Targeting and excluding these specific types of people express an attempt to remove a kind of 'negative' influence that might jeopardize commercial activities in these sites and to provide a 'hygienic' consumption atmosphere. As Crawford *et al* (2005: 50) have explained, exclusion is directed towards those who have no 'perceived commercial value' in the consumer culture on which 'discipline' has come to be based.

This commercially-oriented exclusion has been documented empirically. In their empirical study of the operation of CCTV systems in open streets, Norris and Armstrong (1999:111-2) found that around a third of surveillance reasons were related to crime. Theft occupied more than half (55%), followed by violence 19% and drugs 13%. Order as a reason for targeting involved 192 cases, which represented 22%. However, the highest percentage of surveillance was for no obvious reason (36%). Similarly, in McCahill's study (2002:108-9), property crime-related suspicion represented almost two-thirds (61%) of all targeted surveillance. This was followed by disorderly suspicious behaviour, which accounted for almost a third (30%) of all targeted surveillance. 'Drug related suspicion' constituted 10%.

In their study of the use of CCTV in a South London Shopping Mall, McCahill and Norris (2003: 29-30) found that around two thirds of surveillance

targets were based on 'crime and order' suspicion. Within this category, 56% of targeting was related to the suspicion of 'theft from stores'. 'No obvious reason' accounted for 13% of all surveillance targets. It is worth highlighting that this category does not mean that targets were involved in any illegal behaviour; instead, targeting was based on operators' assumptions (Norris and Armstrong, 1999:111; McCahill, 2002:109).

The form of 'commercial surveillance' has been associated with the involvement of the private sector in public life. As McCahill and Norris (2003: 46) argue, with the operation of surveillance cameras in semi-public spaces, formal regulations of social control have been replaced by 'private rules' to control the public. The key issue is that the process of 'private justice' and its principles are built upon commercial interests. In consumption sites, 'private justice' cannot prosecute individuals; instead, exclusion might be a quick and easy way to accomplish economic discipline and serve the consumption aspiration. Von Hirsch and Shearing (2000: 78,93) argue that since private security guards are not authorized to exercise the power of arrest, exclusion seems a simpler and more effective strategy that works to keep 'undesiredables' out. Moreover, Shearing and Stenning (1983:500-3) maintain that private security agencies have their own definition of social order. In Shearing and Stenning's view, they do not define it on the basis of morality; instead, it is built more upon the threat to their commercial interests. Garland (2001: 128) argues that social disorder comes to be viewed and addressed from an economic perspective and based on capitalist administrative principles. This standard of ‘legitimacy’ relies on the assumption of probability, that is, not whether these actions actually occur, but whether they are likely to take place in the future, which might affect the process of business. Risk is directed towards behaviour and people who *might* disturb the flow of profit and/or do not participate in the consumption function. The policy of 'loss prevention' aims to reduce the likelihood of conduct that might affect the traffic of business and capitalist interests (Shearing and Stenning, 1983: 510). McCahill (2002) and Norris and Armstrong (1999) highlight the implication that targeting and exclusion of people with specific social characteristics were applied on the basis of probability and potential risk, without any actual 'illegal' act.

Norris (2007: 154) makes it clear that the mechanism and operation of surveillance in western thought is solidly grounded on economic principles around consumption and the consumer society. Accordingly, surveillance and its relationship

to consumerism in the capitalist system has been well documented by various surveillance scholars (see for example, Reeve, 1998; Norris and Armstrong, 1999; Coleman and Sim, 2000; McCahill, 2002; Helten and Fischer, 2003; Myers, 2007).

Organizational and technological contexts

The Crescent Shopping Mall is situated on the East Ring Road of Riyadh, which makes it easily accessible by car. Close to the mall, there is a densely populated district. The number of residents in the area around the mall has been estimated at approximately 826,102 people (Riyadh Council, 2006: 9). This indicates that people living in this area represent around 14.2% of Riyadh's population. Of those residents, 87.72% are Saudis while the rest are non-Saudi (*ibid*: 35). The mall opened in September 2005 at a cost of around SR 400,000,000 (£58,000,000). However, because the owner of the mall had a construction company, which built the mall, the cost was reduced to SR 180,000,000 (£25,000,000) (researcher's interview with the mall manager). The total area is 143,450 square metres, and the building area is 83,773 square metres. There are more than a hundred and thirty varied-retail units, which contain a wide variety of shops, and parking for over 2,600 cars.

The building has attractively-designed marble floors. The mall consists of two floors. The first floor contains 45 shops with a diversity of international fashion. Moreover, a women's prayer room is located on the north side of this floor. In the east part of the mall, there is an entertainment area, designed to resemble a large Arabic traditional tent. This is open to the second floor. The leisure area contains a variety of children's games, including electronic entertainment, as well as an ice-skating rink. This section of the mall also has over twelve international fast food restaurants.

The second floor is designed in a semicircular structure. It contains more than 86 shops, as well as a modern hypermarket which occupies around 16,000 square metres. At the north east corner of this floor, there is a balcony, which overlooks the entertainment area. On occasions, this area is used as a theatre for children. The seating is divided into two sections; one for males and the other for females. Outside this balcony, there are stairs leading to an adjacent building, where the mosque is located. Surprisingly, the researcher was informed that the original design of the mall did not include a prayer room. Therefore, an extension building was built for this purpose. According to Saudi building regulations, malls and other public premises must contain a mosque.

The mall has wide walkways and they are adorned with plants such as palm trees, which are common trees and represent a symbol of the tradition and old heritage of S.A. The walkways are covered with transparent glass framed with metal, which provides shoppers with a natural view and at the same time protects them from the harsh weather, as air conditioning is provided. The external walls are made of concrete and steel. Overall, the building was designed to provide privacy for shoppers inside the mall.

Setting of the CCTV systems

The CR was located in the security office in the south east corner of the second floor. The security office was divided into three sections. One was designated as an office for the supervisor. The second was the control room, while the path between these sections was used as a place to relax, a smoking area and a dining room for all security staff. There was a wooden partition between the supervisor's office and the control room. Set in this partition was a window, which was covered by dark paper except for the bottom corner, which was located in front of the supervisor's desk. The idea was to prevent anyone seeing into the CR from the security office, apart from the supervisor.

The CR had a box containing the keys to the gates and escalators. On the north side of the CR, there was a console, the first shelf of which contained two recording devices. The system employed real time recording. There was capacity to store images for six months, but images were of poor quality. Thus, the mall administration stored images only for a month, for which the quality was adequate. After this period, the system recorded over for another month.

On the second shelf of the consol, there were two multiplexers. One was devoted to the cameras on the first floor and linked to two 20-inch colour monitors. One screen employed sequential switching to display images from all cameras on the first floor. The other screen was used as a 'working monitor' to observe important images or places, in order to monitor incidents in progress. Often, this screen was focused on the main escalators between the first and second floor. The second multiplexer covered the second floor. This multiplexer was also connected to two 20-inch colour screens. Like the multiplexer in the first floor, one monitor used split screens to display the images from all the cameras on the second floor. The important images were relayed to the second screen, which was used for observation of incidents in progress.

Above the monitors, there was a digital clock that displayed the time for prayer. On the desk of the console, there was a joystick control panel. Next to the joystick, there was a telephone that connected only inside the mall. Usually, this telephone was used to receive calls from security staff or administrators who did not have the mall's mobile phone links. The communication between the CR and stores in the mall was undertaken by this phone or via security guards who relayed information to the CR, but this was rarely used in practice. On the edge of the console, there were eight mobile phone chargers. In the mall, there were 50 communication devices of this type, which were used by both security staff and the administrative staff in the mall. These communication links played a central role in generating surveillance requests in the mall. Next to the console, there was an internal radio with nine amplifiers, which covered the whole mall and was connected to a microphone. The internal radio was used for general announcements, for example for prayer times or public messages.

In the shopping mall, there were 32 internal cameras. The cost of the system was SR 50,000 (£7,142) (researcher's interview with the mall manager). Cameras were divided equally over the two floors. On the first floor, all cameras were PTZ except for two fixed cameras. One of the fixed cameras (camera No. 9) was directed to the delivery area, while the other (camera No. 11) was directed to the rear entrance of the food court. Similarly, the second floor included 14 PTZ cameras and two fixed cameras, one of which (camera No. 15) was directed to the safe and the other (camera No.14) was focused on the corridor that led to the CR. The PTZ cameras were of the small dome type, which were in harmony with the mall design and might not be noticed by ordinary people.

Regulations and responsibilities

It was found that the mall manager had the only equipment for copying images from the recording system in order to control the process of providing copies of records to other parties.

"A record copy cannot be handed for any institution expect the police. We are forced to respond to police requests in terms of attending the CR and providing the police with copies of the CCTV records[19]." (CO).

[19] So far, this has been requested in only one case. The case was that a shopper lost his wallet, which contained his credit card. The pin number was his date of birth, which was on his national identity card. By referring to a statement from the bank, the date and location of withdrawals were determined. The thief had withdrawn SR 25,000 (£3,500) from the ATM located in the mall. The mall administration

In the mall, there were unwritten or unpublicized rules that regulated everyday visitors' behaviour and activities. For example, there were no explicit rules to forbid courtship, chasing women, using Bluetooth and dating. However, these behaviours were not accepted or allowed because these 'rules' are known and are built upon traditional norms and moral values that represent a main aspect of the Saudi social identity. Moreover, the influence of morality and its principles affected the 'constitution' of signs. There was no sign in the mall to inform shoppers about the existence of cameras. In fact, the mall administration did not want to fit signs. An interviewee explained this situation by saying:

"Fitting these signs might affect the reputation of the mall. For some customers, the existence of signs for cameras could create a sense of suspicion that cameras are utilized to observe females for voyeurism. This feeling is not acceptable to Saudi people, who represent 90% of our customers" (CM).

This situation indicates that moral values and traditional norms constituted an important aspect of regulating the mall. The aim was to enforce traditional norms and to maintain the moral environment in the mall. This interpretation is supported by the fact that each security guard had the right to have a break for praying for 10 minutes during the prayer times, which are five times a day.

According to the documents of the security company, the supervisor was responsible for running the protective function in a systematic arrangement by undertaking continuous observation of the security staff and locations in the mall. He also undertook the responsibility for checking the attendance of the shift and preparing a daily report of attendance, activities and incidents that took place in the mall. Therefore, the supervisor had to be informed of every incident by the operator. The operator, on the other hand, was responsible for receiving reports and calls from vendors or the mall's staff such as customer services, and reacting to their queries or information:

One evening, at 23.03, the operator received a call from the customer services, informing him that there were two missing children and describing their appearance and clothes. The operator swept the mall to find the children. After thirteen minutes, he found the children in the entertainment area. (Extract from the field notes).

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returned to the recording facility and produced the image of the thief, who was identified later by the police.

The operator was also responsible for observing the mall through the available cameras. Moreover, the operator was responsible for following up the guards' reports and responding to them, as well as directing security staff to incidents. In addition, the operator undertook the responsibility of coordinating and communicating the work among the shift members. In this respect, the relationship between operators and the member of the shift was described typically like this;

"Our relationship within the shift is a brotherhood. However, on some occasions, I know that my friend has a tragic circumstance, but I cannot help him by letting him go or be absent from the shift. The reason is that the Operation Section in the company might come and check the attendance" (CS3).

This quotation indicates that there were two types of relationship: firstly, the working relationship, which was based on and organized according to the dictates of standard procedures. Secondly, brotherhood relationships that existed among some security guards and operators. The implication of this type of relationship was noticed through what can be described as a supportive relationship, 'fazza'. In fact, this type of relationship can be attributed to the tribal rules, according to which everyone should support and appreciate those who live or work with him. Thus, this kind of relationship was built upon camaraderie and its consequences emerged in many cases during the observational period. This collaboration included financial and physical support. For instance, on some occasions, the researcher observed that an operator went to the supervisor or a patrolman, asking him to lend him some money. Physical support occurred with aggressive visitors or when one of the security staff was attacked or insulted by shoppers.

At 23.44, two singles were observed hanging around in the mall without a family. A security guard was deployed in order to eject them from the mall, but they refused to leave. The operator was informed of their response. The matter was taken very seriously. Three security guards were deployed to face the two targets as well as the camera being trained on the targets. This high level of deployment was intended to demonstrate the solidarity of security staff and the importance of respecting security guards in the mall. The targets were forced to go to the security office. Moreover, a warning form was issued and the supervisor made fun of him when the target arrived the CR. In addition, the targets were excluded from the mall. (Extract from the field notes).

Brotherhood relationships might be also built upon personal association. Such relationships might be due to having attended the same school, or living in the same area. One operator had family circumstances to attend to in his village, which was 186

miles outside Riyadh. The operator did not have enough of his leave entitlement left. Therefore, he asked one of his friends who had experience of dealing with the system to cover his places when he was away for five days. Accordingly, as the replacement operator worked on another shift, he worked sixteen hours a day for five days, without any substitution. On one shift he worked as an operator, while on his original shift he worked as a patrolman.

The watchers

The CCTV system was run by a private security company, which was owned by the owner of the mall. The security staff came from various backgrounds. All were single and had only secondary or primary education. The security staff were divided into three categories: supervisors, operators and security guards. However, there was some flexibility in this division, whereby some security guards might undertake an operator role according to the internal arrangement and changing demands. Similarly, some operators might go on patrol if there was a shortage of security guards to cover the mall.

The number of security staff on each shift was variable. There were three eight-hour shifts. During the morning shift, which started at 08.00, there were nine security staff including the supervisor and the operator. In the evening shift, which began at 16.00, there were fifteen staff. The third shift was from midnight until 08.00 and it was staffed by only four people; the supervisor, the operator and two security guards. Moreover, there were seven female security staff. In shift one, there were three women, who worked from 10.00 till 16.30. The second shift included four female security staff who worked from 16.30 until 22.30. The days off were during the normal working week. Thus, at the weekends, the standard numbers of personnel should be available, due to the high number of shoppers compared to the workdays[20]. However, in practice, the actual number could be less for many reasons, including absence, annual holiday and days off.

At the beginning of the evening shift, the final match of the Asian Football Championship was being held and S.A. were playing in this event. On that day, only four out of 15 security staff were present. In that situation, the supervisor decided to deploy the available staff to the gates. Therefore, the operator was deployed to gate three, while the CR was closed. Fortunately, at 16.55, after the match finished, two more staff arrived and the supervisor returned the operator to his position in the CR. (Extract from the field notes).

[20] As mentioned in the previous chapter, approximately eighteen thousand customers use this mall during the workdays and twenty one thousand at the weekend.

In the CR, there were three operators throughout the day. Only one operator monitored the system at any given time. Ahmad had tanned skin and was in his mid twenties. He was a short man with a stutter in his speech. Since the establishment of the mall, he had worked in the mall as a member of the security staff. After a year, he was promoted from a security guard to operator. Ahmad was educated to the secondary school level. As the oldest brother of his family, he had to leave school to start work and due to his poor qualifications, he had worked in many security companies. His only interest was to find work that paid enough to feed his parents, brothers and sisters. The wage in the current security company was the highest he had earned, which was SR 2,100 (£300) per month. Ahmad came to live in Riyadh from a tribal province in the South in order to find a job, as opportunities were expected to be more available in the capital compared to other cities. Moreover, Ahmad's father had had a heart attack, which left him with a disability and he needed health care, which might not be available in his home town.

Technically, Ahmad was a gifted person in his job. It seems that Ahmad's stutter, physical structure and his technical capability encouraged his supervisor to put him in the CR. Due to his family circumstances, Ahmad was appointed to work in the first shift which started at 08.00 and finished at 16.00. For these advantages, Ahmad appeared to take his job very seriously and was very conscientious in the control room and he was considered an obedient operator. However, his bodily appearance and stutter undermined his authority when issuing orders to security guards. It was noticed that he referred to such orders as instructions from the supervisors or administrators, to avoid any conflict with colleagues. Therefore, he had satisfactory relations with the group:

> At 11.42, on the camera, Ahmad observed a security guard who was on duty in the main gate of the mall, while he was putting on an earphone to listen to music on his MP3 player. Directly, the operator zoomed the camera on the head of the guard to check the situation. When he saw the wires of the earphone, he contacted the guard and told him to take it off because one of the mall's administrators had observed the situation and asked him to tell the security guard to take off the earphone. He continued watching him until he removed it, after which the camera was moved to another location. (Extract from the field notes).

Ahmad's tribal background influenced his observation. For example, intentionally, Ahmad concentrated on young males who chased females or were

dressed in a casual fashion, which consisted of jeans and T-shirt. Usually, Ahmad put the camera on this type of persons in order to find any reason to get them out of the mall. He hoped to get married, but it would be difficult for him to do so due to the high cost of marriage in his tribe[21]. As a result, he was seriously thinking of finding another job besides his current work, to enable him to fulfil his dream.

Al-Ameen (the name means honest) gained his experience a few months previously at the hands of a previous operator who transferred to another location. This operator was the oldest member of his family. He had two sisters aged 19 and 18. Despite the fact that he was a young man of 21, he appeared to be a conservative person. He refused to allow the installation of satellite TV in the family house, to avoid its negative impact on his sisters' behaviour. This characteristic affected his attitudes towards targets. On some occasions, when he saw a woman dressed in decent clothes, he told me, "Watch this lady, she looks like a conservative girl and really she adheres to Islamic rules in her appearance". He also targeted single men who chased women. In addition, this operator targeted shops that closed late after the call for prayer.

The third operator was a quiet man, honest, dedicated and professional in his work, and familiar with his duties in the CR. Mohammed was 25 years old with tanned skin, and came from the South Region. He was educated only to primary school level. He was shy, peaceable, quiet and very conscientious. From his work in the CR, he appeared to be introverted and to have limited relationships. He chose to work on the night shift when the mall was closed and there were no customers, in order to avoid any trouble and hostility and to be away from problems or fighting with customers, especially those who were prevented from entering the mall. Accordingly, despite the fact that he had a long experience and was qualified to be a supervisor, he had refused promotion, in order to avoid any conflict with both shoppers and colleagues.

He had tried hard to find a job in the public sector, especially in the military sector, due to the high salary, but he did not obtain a work opportunity, and was unemployed for a year. After this, he had worked in many private security companies

[21] In some tribes, for example, Ahmad's tribe, the dowry might be SR 200,000 (£28,500). On his income, he would have to save all his salary for eight years just to have the dowry, without other costs, for instance, finding a house, the party, and the gifts for the bride's parents, brothers and sisters, aunties and uncles. These could add an extra SR 150,000, making a total cost is SR 350,000 (£50,000). Therefore, on Ahmad's salary, he would have to wait for sixteen years to get married.

over a period of five years. He had worked on this site since the establishment of the mall. With this background, he was the most experienced and knowledgeable of all the operators. He was able to deal proficiently with the system. He was very quick and efficient when using the joystick control panel, knew all the locations of the mall and had a talent for selecting places that should be under the gaze of the cameras.

Human mediation and limits of surveillance

It was found that the operation of the CCTV system depended upon how these technologies were perceived, not only within the function and aims of the organization in which cameras were placed, but importantly, also, how employees of the organization who were responsible for monitoring the system read and employed this technology.

Technically speaking, as has been mentioned, there were 50 mobile phones. However, there was a 'technical' difficulty in utilizing the mall mobile phone. These phones could be used only for three hours and then had to be recharged. Accordingly, security staff might work without means of contact instruments except their own mobile phones. Some security guards refused to use their own telephones or, originally, did not have mobile phones. In such situations, the operator had to deploy the nearest member of security staff who had the mall phone. The other problem with this type of communication was the fact that only the sender and receiver could hear each other, while the rest of the staff could not. This meant that in the case of collective instructions or when a target was being followed, the operator needed to repeat the same information many times to many security guards, by personal contact. In some cases, therefore, targets might escape or have disappeared from the mall before the information was conveyed to other security guards, particularly those at the gates.

One aspect of the human mediation in the operation of CCTV can be explained by the operators' practices in deploying cameras. For example, in the mall, the camera on gate four, which was blocked by a welcome sign, could not be utilized by the operator. During the day, the operator tried to direct the nearest camera to the glazed door close to the gate, where images were reflected on the glass. By this means, the operator was able to observe events and movements at the gate. Nevertheless, at night, this strategy could not be exploited.

Another illustration was, at 12.29, when the supervisor asked the operator to focus cameras on gates one and two and the area between them, because there was a shortfall in staff and the guard who covered gate one was allowed to have a break for praying and lunch. Therefore, the operator was asked to support the guard of gate two in his duty to cover the area between gates one and two. Accordingly, in the case of any incident in that area, this guard would be deployed and supported by the cameras to sweep the scene.

With the nature and cultural values of the Saudi society and their influential impacts on individuals' attitudes, local cultural norms and practices can place limits on the disciplinary potential of Panoptic systems.

At 18.37, a security guard contacted the supervisor in the CR and told him that an urgent issue had arisen, which required him to leave the mall and go home to sort it out. Due to his family circumstances and because the supervisor believed that the guard was an honest person, the supervisor appreciated his situation and allowed him to go. The supervisor replaced the security guard in the location. The guard returned after two hours. It emerged that the guard's father had two wives who had engaged in a fight and the security guard had gone to sort out the fight between his mother and his stepmother. Sadly, the guard's father was in jail because he owed three years' arrears of rent on their house (around SR 50,000, £7,000). (Extract from the field notes).

Moreover, cultural norms and traditional values can shape practical attitudes and the disciplinary response to the surveillance gaze. To appreciate the following case, it is necessary to understand that elderly people should be respected and shown consideration. Moreover, traditionally, in S.A., ordinary people always used to sit on the floor, even when they had their meals. Sitting on chairs, however, is a new phenomenon that has spread among Saudis, especially from the 1970s, with the modernization that came as a result of oil revenue. Nevertheless, some Saudis, especially old people, still prefer to sit on the ground, as a part of their culture.

At 17.05, two old ladies were observed sitting on the floor in the food court. Despite the fact that the area was provided with tables and chairs, these elderly women preferred to sit on the ground. In addition, they had brought with them two flasks. As the operator watched them, he deployed a security patrolman to the location. The operator kept the camera on them to observe the situation. The patrolman told the operator that they were elderly individuals and he felt embarrassed to ask them to sit on the chairs or leave the mall. The patrolman asked them *politely* and *shyly* to sit on chairs and *hide* their flasks. (Extract from the field notes).

In another case:

At 08:03, the operator observed an elderly person who had come to the mall with a child. During this time, the mall was closed to shoppers. The operator put the camera on the man and contacted the guard, querying his situation. The guard told the

operator that this man and his grandchild had been dropped at the mall by a family member and the elderly person could not leave and come back again due to his age. The operator told the guard to allow the elderly man to stay in the rest area until the mall opened. In this case, the operator did not inform or ask permission from the supervisor. This response might be motivated by the influence of cultural rules that elderly people should be respected and appreciated. (Extract from the field notes).

Theoretically, it was not allowed for the operator to leave the CR. In practice, the operator left the CR on many occasions, either to undertake a task, such as replacing or helping another member of the security staff, or for a personal issue.

In one case, the operator looked very nervous. He left the CR many times. He did not pay close attention to the monitors. The reason for his distraction was that he was trying to arrange an appointment for an engagement. His mother did not agree with his choice of fiancée, and he was trying to persuade her to accept this choice. On the screen, I noticed many cases, which might have been targeted or responded to, especially courtship, entry of single men and an individual who was wearing three quarter length trousers and a sleeveless-shirt.

A crucial issue is when surveillance systems might fall into the wrong hands. The concern demands examination of how operatives might 'abuse' CCTV systems by zooming on undeclared functions:

At 21.30, four security staff brought their dinner early. The supervisor asked the operator to lock the security office in which the monitors were located and transferred the camera of the entrance of the security office to the main monitor to see if anyone was coming to the office, especially the mall manager.

Another practice was observed at 22.57, when the operator was sweeping the mall, he noticed a man who was working in a kiosk in the mall. The operator wanted to call this man on a personal issue, but he did not have his phone number. When the operator saw the man, he contacted the patrolman and directed him to the kiosk, while he followed him by the camera. When the patrolman arrived at the kiosk, the operative asked the patrol guard to give the mall's phone to the man at the kiosk. The operator exploited the camera and the phone for his personal advantage. During this call, two young singles appeared on the screen, but the operator continued his personal call and ignored them. (Extract from the field notes).

Who and what is targeted?

It was found that Saudi youth appeared to be disproportionately targeted by CCTV operators. Negative attitudes towards young Saudi persons were evident. The trend of selecting young people was not due to the potential for crimes, such as theft or vandalism, but rested on the background assumption that youths were chasing women, and so represented a threat to moral principles. Saudi youths were treated as suspicious and therefore targeted merely due to their age and appearance. Nearly two

thirds (62%) of primary targeted people were in their twenties. In general, 84% of targeted individuals were aged less than thirty years. Thus, more than eight out of ten of the people who were targeted were under the age of thirty. For women, due to their dress, it was difficult to determine their age. Therefore, the researcher used the option of "DK" to avoid presenting inaccurate information.

Table 3.1 Characteristics of the primary targets for surveillance[22]

Characteristics	*No.*	*%**
Age		
Teen	9	22
Twenties	26	62
Thirties	5	12
DK	2	5
Total	42	100
Sex		
Male	40	95
Female	2	5
Total	42	100
Ethnic		
Saudi	37	88
Non-Saudi	5	12
Total	42	100
Appearance		
Smart	16	38
Uniform	4	10
Sub cultural- ethnic	6	14
Sub cultural- fashion	14	33
Casual indistinct	2	5
Total	42	100

*percentage total may not add up to 100 due to rounding up.

As can be seen from Table 3.1, more than nine out of ten (95.2%) of surveillance targets were men, despite the fact that the mall was an attractive commercial centre for both young men and women. The reasons for this situation were the difficulty for a security guard to arrest a woman because touching a non-family female member is prohibited in Islam and reluctance to invade privacy, which is highly regarded and protected by family members. Moreover, according to the traditional norms, arresting a woman in a behavioural case could affect her reputation and that of her whole family. Furthermore, according to the nature of the Saudi society, women have more ‘credibility’ compared to men. In the case of courtship, the

[22] This table includes only the cases of the primary targets for surveillance.

woman might claim that the man in question was trying to harass her, which might be accepted by those in authority. In addition, it is easier to describe, identify and follow a man than a woman because of the black cloaks and veils, which hide women's heads and faces. If a woman joined a crowd of other women, she would easily be missed. In addition, if a woman went into a fitting room or toilet, the security guard would not be allowed to follow her, while men can be followed. The tiny percentage of females represents those women who were involved in 'illegal' meeting cases.

Mostly, targets were Saudis (88.1%). One explanation for this high percentage could be the demographic distribution of the area where the mall was located. As mentioned, Saudis made of 87.72 % of the population who lived in that area. More than half of the non-Saudis were Arab (57.1%) and 28.6% of non-Saudis were of Asian ethnicity (Pakistani, Indian, Bangladeshi and Sri Lankan). More than one third (38.1%) of targets were wearing smart clothes. Only 4.8% appeared in a casual indistinct dress.

The findings of the present study reveal that more than half (50.6%) of the targets were alone and only 15.7% of targets were in groups that involved three people or more. As can be seen, targeted surveillance was focused on individuals. The low percentage of groups targeted in the mall might be explained by the fact that the entrance of singles into the mall was not allowed during the evening time and targets were aware of this issue. Therefore, they tried to enter in a small group to avoid attracting security staff's attention.

What is targeted?

As can be seen from the table below, the main concern of operators in targeting people was directed towards observing behaviour. Courtship behaviour was the most prominent reason for targeting (69.9%). No obvious reason comes next with 13.3%, then property management 8.4%. Theft from a store represented 3.6% and person in need of help accounted for 2.4%. Fighting represented only 1.2%.

Table 3.2 Reason for targeting[23]

Reason	No.	%*
Courtship	58	70
No obvious reason	11	13
Property management	7	8
Theft from store	3	4
Person in need of help	2	2
Assault/fight	1	1
Other	1	1
Total[24]	83	100

*percentage total may not add up to 100 due to rounding up.

Importantly, despite the fact that most targeted cases (80.7%) were initiated by operators, only 9.4% of cases were targeted based on the operators' familiarity and previous knowledge. It can be understood that operators mostly did not target individuals on the basis of their personal knowledge, but behaviour and 'signs' presented on the screen would significantly affect impression formation and be influential in decision-making of the operatives. Indeed, courtship was the most important type of suspicion, accounting for more than two thirds of all targeted surveillances (69.9%). This high percentage shows that operators were mainly concerned with behaviour.

There was only one case of targeted surveillance that was directed at a woman with the aim of protection. In that case, the operator watched a Saudi woman as she seemed to be vulnerable. This case was observed at 00.39, when the light was turned off and most of the shoppers had left the mall. During the observational period, it was noticed that there was no use of the CCTV for voyeurism. There are several possible reasons for this finding. Firstly, voyeurism might be discouraged by the appearance of Saudi women, with their whole bodies covered by black robes. Secondly, this trend may be attributed to the piety and self-discipline of the operators, as looking at women is prohibited in Islam. The third explanation might be the physical setting of the CR, where the operators could be observed by the supervisor.

With more concerns with moral and cultural patterns, through 'modern' technologies, operators worked to enhance 'old' cultural and traditional norms:

At 01.15, the operator received a call from the guard on gate two. The call indicated that there was fighting between a drunken taxi driver and two women. The

[23] Drawing upon the work of Norris and Armstrong (1999).
[24] This table illustrates the reasons for targeting for all the observed cases.

operator put the camera on gate two in order to document the case and informed the supervisor. The supervisor contacted the police. The fight occurred because the two women chose to go with another driver. The taxi driver was drunk and had slapped one of the two women in the face. According to Arab traditions, it is a very shameful for a man to engage in a fight with a woman. Therefore, the security guards on the gate tried to intervene and a fight started between the security staff and the taxi driver. After 32 minutes, the police arrived, but the suspect had escaped. (Extract from the field notes).

In the 'climate' of targeting and maintaining cultural principles, 'new' surveillance systems have been adapted to undertake a theocratic function. Consistent with this function, operators took care over the announcement of the call to prayer. Usually, an alerting announcement was broadcast 10 minutes prior to the start of the prayer time, through the public address system. The purpose of this was to notify both vendors and customers that the time of prayer was approaching and all shoppers should leave the shops and vendors should close their stores, to perform collective prayers in the mosque. With the assistance of cameras, this theocratic role was undertaken by operators and security guards.

At 20.32 (evening prayer time), the operator searched the mall and found one café that had not closed. Immediately, a security guard was deployed quickly (*dizz)* to the location. A few minutes later, the security guard informed the operator that he found the sellers in the café were closing the site. The operator directed the camera to the café and found the shop was closed. He instructed the security guard to return to his original location. (Extract from the field notes).

After the call for collective prayers, adult male shoppers who did not go to the mosque and vendors who closed slightly late would be arrested by the Moral Police (MP) and taken to the MP's centre.

One Thursday evening, at 20.41, during the prayer time (*Isha*), the MP came to the mall and arrested four people who did not go to pray. In addition, some sellers had not closed directly after the call to prayer. Seven people were arrested and were taken to the MP station. These shops were closed until the vendors returned at 23.25. (Extract from the field notes).

The security staff and operators were in effect acting as "Moral Policemen". If such cases were observed by the MP many times, the mall could be considered as a place of moral corruption and sin, and a Moral Police patrol would be regularly sited there. For this reason, the mall administration was working to prevent such incidents by utilizing CCTV systems, as the following incident illustrates:

At 20.17, the operator swept the mall by camera and noticed that a shop had not closed after the call for prayer. The operator contacted the patrolman and

deployed him to the location. The sellers in the shop were brought to the office. A warning was written and attached to the daily report, which was sent to the security office at the end of the shift. In such cases, after three warnings, the case was transferred to the mall's administration, which is responsible for running the mall and accountable to the mall owner. (Extract from the field notes).

By having the security staff undertaking this role, it could be demonstrated that all necessary procedures for ensuring moral observance were undertaken and there was no reason for the MP to be regularly in the mall.

The single most striking observation to emerge from the data is that the main focus and core concern of surveillance practices in the mall was linked to the creation and sustaining of moral attitudes and ethical values. CCTV cameras were significantly utilized to enhance morality and to preserve traditional norms.

New surveillance and 'moral discipline'

This section aims to demonstrate surveillance practices and mechanisms in the process of protecting morality. It starts by outlining the notion and responsibilities of the Moral Police (MP).

The Moral Police

In Saudi Arabia, the establishment of the Committee for the Advancement of Virtue and Elimination of Sin (CAVES) occurred parallel with the unification of the country. In 1929, a royal decree was issued, which included the official organization of the Moral Police (MP) (CAVES, 1999: 7). This governmental institution is headed by a minister who is linked directly to the King. There are branches in all thirteen regions in S.A. Each main branch contains many MP centres, depending upon the size of the region. In Riyadh, there are 117 MP centres. In total, there are around five hundred centres throughout the country (CAVES, 2007: 29). In Riyadh, the MP has approximately five thousand members patrolling the streets, public places and shopping malls (*ibid*: 65). Their mission is to focus on three main points; faith, worship and public morals. Some of their tasks include; the prevention of occult practices, such as saying magic spells. Moreover, they undertake the role of enforcing prayer in mosques by Muslims during the five prayer times. In regard to public morals, they work to prevent behaviours that are believed to be forbidden by Islamic principles. These behaviours include; courtship, the illegal gathering of a couple, homosexuality, prostitution, gambling, the consumption or sale of alcohol, possession or distribution of consumer products and media that have been banned as 'un-Islamic',

such as CDs and DVDs of immoral behaviour, displaying embossed pictures, especially of females, mixing between males and females, listening to loud music in public places and imitating 'non-Muslims' in dress and styles. They have the power to arrest anyone who engages in or commits any of the mentioned acts. In shopping malls, the MP prohibited the displaying of pictures of women. They did not allow shops to display mannequins that represented the female body, especially the chest and buttocks. Moreover, the MP asked the malls to exclude handsome sellers from the mall to avoid the possible attraction of female shoppers, although this was not observed during the fieldwork. In addition, the MP members sought to arrest all sellers who had long hair or did not pray or/and did not close their shops during prayer times. Those with long hair would have it cut and those who did not pray might be detained or referred to the court.

Courtship behaviour and targeting of 'singles'

As has been argued at the beginning of this chapter, surveillance activities in S.A. are centered on moral values. This persistence is embodied in both the operators' attitudes towards targeting and the operational process of CCTV cameras in public settings. This 'phenomenon' is attributed to the concrete social and cultural structures as well as the effect of moral and normative values that are deeply rooted in the Saudi society. These moral values are the source of legitimacy to both the Saudi people and the government. One aspect of these moral and cultural rules is that Saudi social life is built around the idea that girls and boys should be segregated. In S.A., it is unusual for a couple to meet, even after their parents agree that they will marry. Accordingly, behaviours such as courtship and other unacceptable contact between the sexes were contrary to the Islamic principles of morality.

During the morning, singles were allowed to enter the mall. However, if they were in a group, they would be targeted by the operator and there was a possibility that a security guard would be deployed to check their intentions and their destinations in the mall. During the evenings and at weekends, singles were prevented from entering the mall by the security guards, unless they were companied by their families. This 'rule' is based upon a moral justification:

"The prevention of young singles is referred to the fact that the main users of the mall are families. The presence of single males during these periods [evenings and weekends] might lead to immoral behaviour, such as courtship and chasing women. However, those singles aged above thirty were allowed to enter the mall as they are mature and might not be interested in flirtation "(CS1).

Operators were working to prevent those young men from slipping in the mall and looking at women. In fact, these young men would be able to see only a woman's eyes, because the rest of her shape was hidden beneath a long black robe, which covered her body from the top of the head to the heel of the foot.

In the mall, operators consciously sought to identify people who were trying to chase women. In interviews and in conversations during the fieldwork observation, operators and interviewees named certain groups of people as rather suspicious. Operators classified certain individuals as "courtship people".

"Our experience has enabled us to develop our ability to perceive this behaviour and signs. From their behaviour and external appearance, operators are able to guess if those people had the intention of courtship or not" (CO).

Behaviour and signs that were considered during the process of observing courtship behaviour and targeting singles can be classified into four patterns:

Body language

Based on interviews with CCTV operators, it was found that various signs were perceived as indicating the intention of flirtation; sucking the lips, the movement of eyes, chasing, winking and smiling in the face of girls as well as trying to speak to them, having long hair, dying the hair, using gel, wearing necklaces or bracelets, opening the top buttons of the t-shirt to reveal the chest hair, turning around without a specific direction[25], and entering shops in which men would not normally be interested: cosmetics, ladies' beauty and women's underwear shops.

Operators, therefore, were working to target such behaviour and signs in order to identify 'courtship people' for the aim of sustaining public morality.

At 23.44, on the balcony on the second floor, the operator observed a young couple who were speaking to each other and touching hands. The young woman had a tattoo with the letter A on her left hand. As the targeted female looked very young, the operator thought that she was a sister of the targeted male. However, the operator observed the man who was shy and there was apprehension in his glance, which appeared through the movement of his eyes. These signs encouraged the operator to continue zooming on them in case evidence of an illegal relationship and unlawful meeting could be observed. The targeting lasted 12 minutes, during which the operator became convinced that they were illegal friends. The operator confirmed this

[25] As Norris and Armstrong stress (1999:144) people of good moral characteristics know where they are going and proceed in that direction, without signs of deviation. However, what is deemed as 'good moral character' is culturally specific.

belief when the targets separated at the escalator and each one went a different way. (Extracts from the field notes).

Interestingly, operators believed that they could identify women's ways of making improper advances; eye movements, searching in Bluetooth, a tight cloak or wearing the cloak on the shoulders instead of the head, frequent rearrangement of the cloak, trying to show what was under the cloak, for example legs or trousers, and frequently turning around. Another sign was sitting cross-legged. Moreover, they might try to remove the veil. Turning the hands back and in front while walking was another way of attracting men to follow them. However, due to the factors mentioned previously, there were difficulties in targeting females and their behaviour, except those females who were found in dating cases. Most concern was directed towards men who were trying to have contact with the other sex.

External appearance

Decisions to target individuals on the basis of courtship behaviour by utilizing the CCTV system depended upon the operators' and security guards' interpretation of the external appearance of persons.

At 19.36, the operator watched a young single male who was wearing a poor traditional Saudi dress. The operator told me ″Watch out for this person who looks like a villager in his appearance″. The operator did not send a signal to any security personnel, because he believed that this type of person was not noisy and usually was not interested in chasing women. (Extracts from the field notes).

Another time: at 19.20, in the family section of the food court, the operator observed a single man aged around fifty. The operator told me ″Such a person is a mature person and he is not a source of noise or courting ladies. His aim is just to fill his stomach" (CO2) (Extracts from the field notes).

In contrast, in 'moral' cases, based on the external appearance, the process of targeting was undertaken. In this respect, two patterns of appearance could be distinguished. On the first meeting, the man wore a clean and smart Saudi traditional costume (*Morassem*) in order to appear attractive. If the meeting was not the first, usually men wore clean and modern sports clothes or jeans and t-shirt:

At 09.35, the operator received a call from a security guard that a single man was passing frequently in front of the cafe. There, he met a woman and went into the family section in the cafe. The operator directed the camera to the gate of the cafe. At the same time, the operator relayed the information to the supervisor, who asked the operator to contact the female security guard in order to go into the cafe and check the situation. Meanwhile, the supervisor went to the scene. While the camera was focusing on the cafe, both the female security guard and the supervisor went into the café. A few minutes later, the couple were brought to the security office. The man was

wearing a traditional Saudi dress (*Morassem*). It was found by checking their identity cards that they were not family and were meeting illegally. (Extract from the field notes).

It is worth mentioning that in line with protecting public morality and social norms, the female security staff were responsible for observing sellers who were chasing families or shops that had fitting rooms; this was prohibited by the MP, so separate fitting rooms were placed outside shops. Therefore, these female security staff worked to prevent any entrance of males into the fitting rooms as well as preventing women from taking photographs in the fitting or prayer rooms. Moreover, due to the segregation rules, female security staff were used to check the families' section in cafes to ensure all customers were 'legal' couples and there were no courtship 'activities'.

At 11:39, one morning, the operator received a call from a female security guard, saying that she thought that there was an illegal situation in the café. The man was wearing Saudi traditional clothes, which included a white garment *Thop* and a white turban *Ghotra*. The operator conveyed the information to the supervisor and directed the camera to the gate of the café. When the supervisor arrived at the place, he did not find anybody. The female security guard informed the supervisor that they had left the café. Based on her description, the operator searched the whole mall, but he did not find anyone who matched that description. (Extracts from the field notes).

One possible reason for the difficulty in distinguishing this female might be the fact that she wore a black robe, which covered her whole body. After observing this case, the operator told me that, sometimes, women could be distinguished only by the colour of their handbags or shoes. However, such a case was not observed throughout the fieldwork.

Geographical locations and 'morality'

In their effort to watch and preserve public morality, usually, operators directed the camera to check one of the cafes that was devoted to families and had a reputation for dating. The concern was to ensure that all people in the family section were families. Sometimes, girls brought their male friends *(Dandon)* to the family section, claiming that they were legal couples. However, this situation could affect the reputation of the mall as a place of illegal dating, particularly in the eyes of the MP.

At 19.45, the operator suspected that a couple were meeting illegally in a café. Despite the fact that the family section was divided by opaque glass, external movement or action could be identified. The operator zoomed on the corner of the café where images could be recognized on the monitors. The targeting lasted approximately 20 minutes. The reason for this was the nature of the case, which was proved by the images of kissing and hugging between the couple. As it would be

regarded as immoral, a legal couple would not perform such behaviour in a public café. Once the operator was convinced that there was an illegal meeting, he contacted the supervisor who asked the female security guard to go into the café, while he continued zooming on the cafe. The supervisor appeared on the screen close to the gate of the café. Later, it was observed that the targets, both the man and the woman, were brought to the office by the supervisor. The targets admitted the case of illegal meeting. Both targets were married and had families. On the basis of discretion and the importance of family, the supervisor preferred to issue a written warning in order to avoid destroying their families. (Extract from the field notes).

Nevertheless, sometimes suspicion was unfounded:

At 09.38, the supervisor was informed by a security guard that there was suspicion of an illegal meeting in a café in the family section. The supervisor contacted the operator and asked him to zoom the camera on the identified location in order to pick up any illegal or impolite behaviour, such as kissing or hugging. Later, the operator noticed a movement from the cabinet. He informed the supervisor who was close to the café, waiting for any signal from the operator. On the screen, the supervisor and one of the female security personnel were in front of the café. The targets were a man and a pregnant lady pushing her baby on their way to leave the café. It was clear that they were a legal couple with their baby. The zoom lasted 22 minutes (Extract from the field notes).

Interestingly, there was a relationship between the length of the period of targeted surveillance and courtship activities, especially the illegal gathering cases. In S.A., such cases are considered sensitive issues that might affect the girl and the reputation of her whole family. Thus, operators were aware of this issue and spent a long time verifying the case before deploying a patrol guard. In contrast, cases that related to property management or fighting did not last for a long time. As they can be distinguished easily, operators did not need a long time to identify these activities.

Regarding the practice of selecting a specific location and particular places, one could argue that the selection of these locations might be a 'tactic' to avoid the gaze of the 'moral' inspector where 'immoral' behaviour could take place. This leads us to argue that the presence of surveillance systems seems to be unable to prevent 'immoral' acts. Instead, in the absence or weakness of moral self-discipline, individuals will 'struggle' to find 'proper' ways and methods that can be adapted to serve their purposes.

Avoiding the 'moral gaze'

Despite operators' effort, single males were struggling to enter the mall and had their own ways that enabled them to achieve their aim:

At 22.07, the supervisor asked the operator to follow a single man who was entering the mall by asking a woman to let him pose as her brother. The supervisor heard the single man saying, "Bye bye, see you later" and saw him giving her a note. Then, they separated in the mall. The operator followed the target for a while until he was sure that they were not family and his behaviour was considered as inappropriate. The target admitted that he had paid 50 SR (approximately £8) to the girl. (Extract from the field notes).

Another pattern of envisioning observation was *targgeem*. If a young man was lucky, and got so much as a look, he might write his phone number on a piece of paper and throw it out to the woman concerned, hoping she would have the courage to pick it up[26]. However, technology has made life a little easier for young Saudi singles. Mobile phones with Bluetooth have made the attempt to either obtain or send phone numbers easier and less painful or harmful for both parties. Participants explained that a common way to flirt, in public places where women can be found, is to use one's Bluetooth facility, allowing wireless messages to be sent to other Bluetooth–enabled phones within reach, even when the number is not known. For the purpose of courtship, some young single people use Bluetooth to send their phone numbers or descriptions of their appearance. Then the signal will search the area for those who are opening their Bluetooth facility to receive messages. The sender will choose the names of those who appear to be girls or have girls' nicknames, for instance, "Spoiled", "Jealous" or "Strawberry".

As the operators were young and came from the same culture, they were able to identify those types of people. An operator reported:

"We can recognize those individuals from their actions. Youth who try to get female's phone numbers can be recognized by clues. These signs include looking for a long time at his mobile, searching in the Bluetooth, making a gesture with his mobile, and asking for the nickname" (CO2).

Therefore, operators targeted those people who might annoy women or attempt to contact them or meet with them. With the assistance of the zoom facility, operators were able to determine the intention of singles to utilize Bluetooth for chasing females.

At 22.35, the operator noticed a single man on the balcony in the second floor using his mobile for Bluetooth. While the camera was zoomed on the target's mobile phone, a patrolman was deployed to the target. It was found that he had entered the

[26] Interestingly enough, some young single males stick their phone numbers on their car windshields in the hope of getting a call from a woman. If the police or the MP asked them about the significance of these notes, they might claim they intended to sell the car.

mall with his family. However, the target had left his family shopping, while he went to the balcony to find a girl and contact her. (Extract from the field notes).

Moblising a response

Despite the fact that operators were responsible for more than three quarters of targeting, only security guards carried out the responsibilities of ejecting and arresting. This might reflect the structure of the relationship between operators and security guards. Usually, operators had the role of directing guards where to go, while guards directed the operator where to zoom.

On this site, 83 targeted cases were documented. During168 hours of observation, more than half of the incidents (55.4%) resulted in deployments, while the rest (44.6%) did not. This shows that during the targeting process, there was more than a 50% possibility of deployment.

Findings of the observation demonstrate that most deployments (65.2%) resulted in the target being excluded from the mall. Only around one third (30.4%) of targeted people were allowed to go and continue their 'shopping'. There was one case in which the targeted person escaped after the deployment.

Table 3.3 Characteristics of excluded people

Characteristics	*No.*	*%**
Age		
Teen	6	20
Twenties	20	67
Thirties	3	10
Thirties +	1	3
Total	30	*100*
Sex		
Male	30	100
Female		*0*
Total	30	100
Ethnic		
Saudi	30	100
Non-Saudi	0	0
Total	30	100
Appearance		
Smart	13	43
Uniform	1	3
Sub cultural- ethnic	5	17
Sub cultural- fashion	10	33
Casual indistinct	1	3
Total	30	100

*percentage total may not add up to 100 due to rounding up.

It was found that operators were more concerned about young people. As Table 3.3 reveals that two thirds of those excluded (66.6%) were in their twenties and 20% of them were teenagers. In general, more than eight out of ten (86.6%) were aged under thirty. This picture confirms the intention of operators to concentrate on young people, either in targeting and ejecting specifically males. Indeed, all the ejected people were males. Moreover, as it was a predominantly Saudi area, all those ejected were Saudis. Just less than half of the excluded people (43.2%) were of smart appearance and 33.3% appeared in sub-cultural fashion. Only one person was in casual indistinct dress (3.3%). One explanation for this finding is that the reason for targeting was due to behaviour, especially courtship. As mentioned previously, people who intended to attract women would be of an attractive appearance. By comparing the appearance of the ejected people and reason for targeting, it was found that 50% of those people who were targeted for courtship reason were of a smart appearance. The smart appearance might be either wearing clean Saudi-style or 'modern' sports clothes or jeans and t-shirt, in an attempt to appear attractive with the aim of courtship. Accordingly, those young shoppers who appeared in formal or fashionable attire were excluded.

At 00.13, the operator noticed a young person wearing jeans and sleeveless T-shirt. The operator zoomed the camera on the location and deployed a patrolman. On the screen, a few minutes later, the person was ejected. (Extract from the field notes).

At 21: 32, a teenager went into the mall. This 'unwelcome' visitor was wearing formal Saudi clothes. As he appeared in the screen, he invited the operators' attention and camera surveillance. At the same time, a patrolman was deployed. The operator continued observing the young man until he saw the patrolman excluding him from the mall. (Extract from the field notes).

When youth were in a group, a rapid and an intensive response was demanded:

At 22.19, the operator noticed a group of three people wearing loose jeans, baseball caps, and sleeveless T-shirts. The operator zoomed the camera on the location and deployed three patrolmen as well as informing the supervisor. Immediately, on the screen, the supervisor appeared in the scene. A few minutes later, the whole group were ejected. (Extract from the field notes).

The key point was that there was a high possibility of a targeted person being excluded from the mall. This situation might direct our attention to the fact that operators might have an early intention to exclude those people who were targeted for the purpose of protecting moral values. This assumption can be supported by the reasons for exclusion. Theft from a store, fighting and no obvious reason, each

accounted for only 3.1% of cases, totaling less than 10%. The main reason for excluded cases (78.1%) was courtship. Illegal meeting represented 12.5%. As illegal meeting is considered immoral behaviour, it illustrates that immoral behavioural reasons were the main reasons for being excluded. This shows that nine out of ten targets were excluded because of their immoral behaviour.

This situation, however, does not mean the absence of religiosity among Saudi people. Modernization, which involves changes in lifestyle, external appearance and urbanization have not significantly influenced Saudis' traditional values and religious rituals, which have their impacts on anticipated enforcement and self-discipline. As mentioned in Chapter One, religious culture is deeply enrooted in Saudis:

> At 23.17 a Saudi man in his early twenties, wearing jeans and a sleeveless t-shirt was observed. In a conservative society, his hair was in an 'unfamiliar' style. His hair was divided into small pig tails by an elastic band. Moreover, the unusual appearance was increased by his wearing a necklace and bracelet. The operator zoomed the camera on him and described the case to the supervisor. In his turn, the supervisor asked the operator to contact the guard at the gate and to keep the visitor there until the supervisor came to investigate the situation, while the camera was still on the target. The supervisor asked me to accompany him to have a look at the visitor. As we arrived, the supervisor asked the man to leave the mall immediately, even though he was with his family. The supervisor told him he was wearing items prohibited in Islam and his hair style was not acceptable and in keeping with Saudi traditions. The customer said that he did not know that wearing these accessories was prohibited in Islam and his aim was only for fashion and show. He asked the supervisor to give him a chance to remove these accessories and take off the elastic band. After fifteen minutes, the person came to the security office. His appearance had changed slightly. He said, "Really, I did not realise that my appearance was not acceptable by Islamic rules". With a shy expression, he promised the supervisor to avoid such appearance. (Extract from the field notes).

Summary

In the western perspective, the practice of targeting in commercial settings has been dedicated to increase the consumption and its interest in profit. The influential intervention of the private sector in public life has enhanced its 'commercial ideology' to regulate western societies in accordance to its capital power. Thus, the 'commercial' control policy is defended as a response to behaviour and acts that are thought to pose a threat to the consumption culture and profit 'values'.

In the Saudi context, based on the findings that were collected in the shopping mall as private premises, the most striking result to emerge from the present chapter is that surveillance in commercial setting is undertaken to achieve a moral function. Statistical analysis of outcomes from the quantitative observational schedule and the

qualitative data demonstrated that young Saudi males were the main targets of operators, on the grounds of protecting morality. To achieve this function, operators were targeting those behaviours and people who might not adhere to moral values and the dominant cultural principles in the Saudi society. To enhance this trend in the Saudi society, this moral task is also undertaken by the MP, which is a state authority and has the power of observing and sustaining morality in public spaces. The argument that might arise here is the persistence of 'moral discipline', which will be discussed later.

Accordingly, another way to understand the operation of CCTV, and to make a conceptualization about this technology, is to consider it as part of the culture and social norms. From this perspective, one needs to examine and analyse how both CCTV technology and cultural values emerge and integrate to shape the process of CCTV systems. This indicates that the operation of CCTV is a technical instrument, but it acquires social meaning through how it is operated and used by social subjects in various sites.

These findings demand investigation of the operation of CCTV in a semi-private setting in order to observe and examine the structure and the mechanisms of CCTV systems, which is the task of the next chapter.

Chapter Four: The Operation of CCTV in Riyadh Railway Station

Introduction

The last chapter presented the findings that were produced from observing the operation of a CCTV system in private premises and run by a private company. This chapter displays findings that were collected from the operation of a camera system in a semi public site; the Riyadh Railway Station (RRS). Basic information is introduced in the first section including a brief history of the railway services, with particular reference to the Riyadh Station. The second section describes the physical setting of the station as well as its CCTV system. In the third section, the organizational context of the system is underlined, with particular emphasis on the operators. The last section sheds light on the utilization of CCTV cameras in the station. It is argued that in the Saudi context, 'old' cultural and religious values are dominant and reflect the social characteristics and identity of Saudi society. Therefore, these social and cultural norms have their effect on the operational process and practice of surveillance technologies, in which traditional norms are perceived and enforced.

The growth of the railway services

In 1947, a railway project was initiated in S.A. and in 1951 the first train services were launched (the Saudi Railway Organization (SRO), 2001: 3). The cost of the project was SR185,791,387 (£26,541,626) (*ibid*: 9). The project was under the administration of the American Petroleum Company, which after nationalization became the Arabian-American Oil Company (ARAMCO). The first train arrived in Riyadh on 10th October 1951 from the city of Dammam (Shatarah, 1990: 34-8).

In 1966, the SRO was set up to take responsibility for the operation of the railway services in S.A. (SRO, 2001: 12-4). The organization was controlled by an administrative board with its own administrative system and financial regulations. Thus, literally, the organization is not subject to the official rules of the governmental bureaucratic system. In legal terms, the SRO is neither public nor private but can be considered a semi-public institution.

In S.A., there are four train stations on the line from the capital to the East Region: Riyadh, Bogaig, Ahsa and Dammam. The distance between Riyadh and Dammam is 449 km. All these stations are run and owned by the SRO. In 2006, the

number of passengers was 1,123,649 people and the income was SR 169,049,218 (£24,149,888) (the SRO, 2007: 19-22).

Riyadh station is the biggest station in the country (*ibid:* 11). In this station, there were six train departures and six arrivals each day. The most crowded journeys were number two, which arrived in Riyadh at 10.08 and journey number ten, which left Riyadh at 16.43. In the former journey, the number of passengers might reach 300 travellers, while in the latter, the number of travellers might reach 700 during the weekend and 500 passengers during workdays (an informal interview with the Head of Revenue Department in the SRO in Riyadh). The highest number of passengers came from the East Region. This fact was revealed by the control room manager:

> "Eighty percent of the passengers are known due to their regular use of the station. Mostly, they are from the East Region and are looking for specific health services, spare parts and other goods that are available only in the capital as well as the reasonable price of the ticket".

The standard ticket costs approximately £8 per person for one way. During 2006, the total number of travellers from and to Riyadh was 850,403 passengers (an informal interview with the Head of the Department of Revenue in the SRO in Riyadh). This shows that around three quarters (75.6%) of customers of the railway in S.A. arrived and departed through Riyadh station.

The physical setting of the station

The building was located in the east part of Riyadh, 25 km from the city centre. The building was constructed in 1990[27]. Its external design was adapted from traditional Saudi design, using concrete and marble slabs instead of the traditional construction materials of mud and stones. In front of the main gate of the station, there was a car park with space for 300 cars. The station was surrounded by fencing. Although it had eight gates, six of these were chained and padlocked. This may have been an attempt to control access and avoid the difficulty of monitoring several entrances. Nevertheless, there was a separate entrance to the VIP hall, which was located behind the station. The VIP hall was closed and it was opened only when VIP people were departing or arriving.

The station consisted of arrival and departure halls. The former included the Ticket Office, the mosque and a luggage storage facility. In addition to these services,

[27] The date was displayed on a plaque at the main gate of the building.

there were two offices, one for the police and the other for the Intelligence Agency[28]. On the east side of the arrival hall, there was an electronically operated sliding door, which was used by arriving passengers as they walked from the train to the exit.

An opaque glazed partition separated the arrival hall from the departure lobby. At the east end of this partition, there was a ticket inspection point, controlled by the SRO staff. Just next to this site, there was a security checkpoint, controlled by the police. At this point, before going into the departure hall, personal identity cards of all passengers are checked. Moreover, all personal items were scanned by an x-ray security inspection system that was used to check baggage and small items, such as handbags. Close to this scanning arrangement, there was a personal inspection point; a walk-through metal detector and lightweight hand-held metal detector to detect metallic items such as weapons. These surveillance systems were controlled by the police. After passing these inspection points, travellers would pass to the departure hall.

In the departure hall, there was a women's prayer room as well as a coffee shop where snacks and drinks were available. There were two waiting rooms; one for first class and the other for second class, the latter was occupied mostly by family passengers. Usually, single passengers waited in the area in front of the coffee shop. There were three platforms. Each platform contained two tracks. The first platform was for emergencies, the second was used for public trips, and the third was dedicated to the VIP trains. All tracks converged into a single line after four km.

The control room

The CR was situated in the police office in the north west side of the arrival hall. The area of the office was approximately 36 square metres. The office consisted of two levels. The first level contained two desks with swivel chairs. One of these desks was located to the right of the main door, while the other was located directly in front of the arriving passengers. Usually, at this desk, sat the supervisor of the shift. On the desk, there was an Arabic calendar and the daily log book. The log book contained the names of staff on duty and their signatures as well as a record of incidents that took place during the shift. At the edge of the desk, there was an extension telephone, which was used for receiving reports or calls from the head of the police station or the

[28] It is a security agency that undertakes the responsibility of ensuring the security and stability of the state. It is controlled by the brother of the king who is at the top of the pyramid of this security agency. In 2004, 2005 and 2006, the budget of this security institution was $8,500,000,000, 10,000,000,000 and 12,000,000,000 respectively (WWW.annabba.org/nbanews//66/458.htm (accessed on 27th May 2008).

head of the security office in the station. For coordination between shift members, they used their own private mobiles. On the right hand side of the supervisor's desk, the CCTV monitors were located, while on the left corner of the desk, there was a heater for making tea and coffee. In the middle of the office, there were two bolted-dawn chairs with a tea table in the middle. The second floor contained a lavatory and a room, which was empty except for a table and a dark brown sofa, which was occasionally used by staff to have a nap.

The office was separated from the arrival hall by transparent glass through which people could see images on the monitors that were produced from cameras. In addition, the office was open to the public as an official police office. Accordingly, people could enter the office freely to report any illegal action or missing property. Some people also came to the office to ask for assistance, for example mobile phone charging, or came to make a local call by using the phone. In addition, it was found that this office was used by the public to make enquiries. On many occasions, it was observed that the public came to the office to ask the whereabouts of luggage, the location of toilets, an ATM, the ticket office, the train timetable and the availability of an internet service in the station. In general, this office could be considered as a public enquiry point where anyone had the right to enter and to ask for a variety of services. The absence of a public enquiry desk encouraged travellers, users and the public to refer to the police for any public information. This tendency can be attributed to two possible reasons: firstly, the distinctive uniform of the police[29], and secondly, the public's perception that the police are available to serve citizens.

The CCTV system

The system was installed in 2006. The head of the security office pointed out that:

"A few years ago, we sent many requests to our department for the need for camera systems in the station. Only last year, they responded to our demand".

In the station, there were 30 cameras, divided equally between the internal and external areas. The system contained two multiplexers, one multiplexer for external cameras, and one for internal cameras. Each multiplexer consisted of 15 cameras, connected to two 24-inch colour monitors. In the internal multiplexers, one monitor

[29] Their uniforms consisted of a black beret with police patch, khaki shirt and trousers with arm police patch, black web belt and black shoes.

displayed sequencing images that were produced from all fifteen internal cameras. However, in that selection, images were too small and were difficult to identify, although the system had the facility to arrange images to be in 4 or 9 sequential switching, where the detail of images could be recognized. The second screen was dedicated to observe important images or places in order to monitor incidents in progress. In the normal situation, this 'working monitor' focused on the rear yard of the station where the main arrivals gate was located.

The second multiplexer was devoted to external cameras. This multiplexer, also, was connected to two 24-inch monitors. Similarly to the first multiplexers, the first screen was designed to display all images that were produced from all external cameras, while the second monitor showed images collected from one camera. Mostly, this screen showed images from the camera that covered the area in front of the main gate of the station.

The CCTV system included two recorder systems. One recording machine was dedicated to the internal cameras, while the second was for the recording of the external cameras. Cameras were not controlled either by joystick or computer mouse. The selection of any camera was undertaken by a manual switcher (video channel selector). This application is referred to the fact that all cameras were of a fixed type. In all four railway stations, the CCTV cameras were fixed. However, the difference was in the number of cameras and monitors.

Cameras were fitted to cover the entrances, luggage store, halls and front and back yards. However, cameras did not cover the whole station, such as the maintenance area. The operator of one shift emphasized this fact:

"Currently, the cameras cover some locations, while some important sites are not totally covered, for instance, the car park, the workshop, and fences around the station" (RS2).

In the view of the operator, these locations were gaps in the system, which might be vulnerable to criminal attacks or vandalism. Moreover, some cameras were not placed at strategic points. For instance, it was found that cameras that were fitted to observe the train tracks focused on a limited space because they were placed at a low point, which did not provide an overview of the whole area.

In the station, there was no map of the locations of cameras, but policemen and the public could easily spot them and recognize them by sight. However, the images displayed were of poor quality. This problem increased at night. The vision of

cameras was weak and there was a difficulty in identifying images that appeared on the screens. Moreover, during the fieldwork, it was found that some cameras were out of order.

The cost of the system was not known by the security staff. The reason for that was that the system was installed at the expense of the SRO. Therefore, the contract was arranged directly between the SRO and the executive company. Despite this fact, the surveillance cameras were operated by a state agency.

The security team and their job

In the station, there were no rules that controlled the operation of the CCTV systems. "There are no regulations for the operation of cameras" (RS1). However, it was found that there were official regulations that provided policemen in the station with information and principles that were needed for undertaking their responsibilities. For instance, like other official security agencies, in the station, policemen were provided with official circulars that included lists of wanted people. These lists contained the descriptions of those people, their names, their cases and the agencies who issued these requests. These cases could be related to security and criminal concerns or to financial cases. In addition, some official lists might include missing persons.

For security purposes, according to the regulations of the police, every traveller should have his/her original personal identity card, which was necessary to enable them to travel. Thus, in the control room, it was noticed that a common problem that faced the policemen was travellers not carrying appropriate personal identification. Some travellers had a copy of their identity document, which officially was not enough to allow them to travel. In some cases, however, it was noticed that on-duty policemen would be lenient to passengers and accept copies. This tolerance depended upon a process of negotiation and the level of commitment to work rules of the policeman who was in charge in the office, which will be clarified later.

In the station, there were no CCTV warning signs. Most interviewees in the station preferred not to have signs.

"Signs should not be fitted. Individuals who had a criminal intention would not care about the presence of cameras, especially terrorists. So the absence of signs enables investigators to reveal the identities of criminals and arrest them. However, if signs existed, individuals who intended to commit illegal behaviour would not perpetrate their crimes, but these signs could not eliminate their criminal intention. They would move to other places, which do not have signs or cameras" (RS3).

The issue that can be perceived was that in the absence of signs, the systems would be employed for a reactive approach. Moreover, in this quotation, the interviewee highlighted the possibility of displacement, whereby incidents could take place in locations where there were no camera systems.

The relationship between the shift members was a working relationship. Each one knew his responsibility and undertook it without an order from either the supervisor or other members. According to the schedule of the trains, before a journey, everyone went to his location. Thus,

"Our relationship is totally the work. We do not have personal visits or friendship. We work in cooperation, respect and undertaking our responsibility" (RS 2).

Also, they had good relationships with other departments in the station. They had a monthly liaison meeting for coordination. However, so far, the police had never received a request from other departments either to attend the office to observe monitors or for a copy of records of an incident. In fact, such a request would require provision of a permission letter from the head of the police in the station allowing the applicant to monitor cameras. Nevertheless, to save time and effort,

"Because we share with them the same concern for maintaining order and safety issues, we could allow official agencies to observe monitors where the official letter can be provided later. Requesting a formal letter, however, could be used to protect the shift members if they might be asked the reason for allowing those official people to attend or have a copy of records. Thus, the case is documented. Such procedure is increasingly important since the terrorist attacks, especially since those criminals were our children" (RO).

It appears that documentary rules seek to facilitate management by applying systematic procedures in an organization. However, with an increased sense of risk, mistrust in other people might be increased. Thus, documentation aims to establish trust through maintaining bureaucratic rules. In relation to this view, one interviewee emphasized that:

"In our current security circumstances and after terrorist attacks, me as a policeman, I should expect any incident. I suspect every person who might carry explosive items and try to bomb the train" (RS3).

After the terrorist attacks in S.A. in May 2003, the relationship between the users of the station and the policemen has become more fragile. Before the terrorist incidents, travellers and policemen in the station helped the public in conveying

personal items, such as documents, medicine, letters and, interestingly, fruit, especially dates or grapes[30]. However, the sense of suspicion and distrust has grown:

> At 20.07, a man in his mid fifties brought a military uniform. He told the operator that this uniform belonged to one of his relatives. The owner of the uniform had forgotten this item. He (the passenger) had a train to catch, which would depart soon and he could not wait until the owner came. He asked the operator to keep the uniform at the office until its owner came to collect it. The operator refused to keep it because it was a military suit and the operator did not know personally the traveller. (Extract from the field notes).

Although one cannot generalise from one or two examples, it could be argued that with an increase in the potential risk and vulnerability, the trust among people might be weakened or lost. When people expect many possible risky incidents from people with whom they used to live and have dealings, distrust might be a principle in dealing with individuals.

The organization of the security team

In S.A., the four railway stations were controlled by the East Region Police. In Riyadh Station, the railway police station was located in the railway administrative area, approximately one kilometre from the station. According to the head of the police office in the station, in 2000, there were 102 policemen. At the time of the fieldwork, there were only 52 policemen. The reasons behind this reduction were retirement and the transfer of some employees to work in other departments. The vital issue was the fact that the assessment of the need for staff depended upon the daily incident book. The low level of incidents that took place in the station indicated that it was not necessary to have a large number of staff in the station.

As has already been mentioned, in the station, there was a police office, which was occupied by a duty shift. There were three shifts. The arrangement was that a shift worked for twenty four hours and took forty eight hours off. Each shift consisted of five policemen including a sergeant who was responsible for the shift and the security in the station. The supervisor undertook a range of responsibilities concerning the safety of the station, receiving calls or reports from the public. Additionally, while the supervisor was sitting in the office, he dealt with a variety of routine problems, such as missing property, cancellation of journeys and smoking in the train.

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[30] In S.A, the East Region produce is renowned for its dates and grapes, above any region across the country. Thus, at the beginning of 'summer' season, eastern people send these fruits to relatives and friends in the capital.

The other four policemen undertook security functions. Within the shift, everyone in the group had a specific task. One policeman had the responsibility for checking luggage. The station's x-ray security inspection system had an opening tunnel to accommodate large package sizes. The system had the capability of identifying materials having specific characteristics of explosive and narcotics. Also, as stated, there was another x-ray security inspection system that was used to check baggage and small luggage as well as a walk-through metal detector and lightweight hand-held metal detector. At this checkpoint, there were three policemen; one to monitor the x-ray inspection and the other two policemen to check identities. For security purposes, the police checked the personal identity of all passengers. At this point, passengers had to display their original identities; otherwise, they would not be allowed to travel.

The Watchers

In the station, no one was officially in charge of watching monitors and could be considered a CCTV operator. The person who sat in the office might informally undertake this role. In this situation, the researcher referred to the supervisor of the shift as an 'operator', because he used to sit in the office to receive calls or reports from the public. The 'operators' also undertook the responsibility of observing the whole duty team and checked the performance of the shift. During train arrivals and departures, when on duty policemen were deployed to their locations to undertake their responsibilities, the supervisor followed them to observe their performance. Although, during work time, the head of the police office in the station might come to the office, his role was only to deal with paperwork or receive reports from the public. This demonstrates that the system was not observed systematically. The reason for that was that the 'operators' were undertaking other tasks. Moreover, the staff had not attended any training course. Thus, there was a lack of serious interest in observing the system:

"Cameras are not observed regularly. In fact, sometimes, the office is empty, especially during journey times, when every member is undertaking his role. Moreover, we do not deal with or utilize the cameras because we have not attended or received any training courses" (RS1).

It was found that the absence of experience and lack of training in technological systems can affect the utilization of these technologies:

At 19.43, a traveller came to the policeman who was sitting in front of the monitors. While the traveller was looking at the screens, he told the operator that a few minutes ago, he had left his original high school certificate in a taxi in front of the main gate of the station. The passenger asked the operator to return the camera and provide him with the registration number of the taxi so he could find it and retrieve his certificate[31]. The operator told the passenger that the system did not have a recording facility and he (the passenger) needed to endeavour by his own ability to find the taxi. The traveller left the office disappointed. (Extract from the field notes).

The fact was that the system had a recording facility, but the staff were not trained:

"We do not have any background about the ability of recording or the storage facility because we have not attended any training course" (RS3).

Interestingly, on examining the recorder devices, it was found that camera number 4, which covered the rear gate and camera number 16, which focused on the gate of the VIP entrance, were the only images that were recorded. During the fieldwork, incidents such as the previous example happened many times, but with different implications:

At 10.05, while the supervisor was in the office, he received a call from a member of the shift who told the supervisor that there was a crowd at the inspection point and assistance was needed. Immediately, the supervisor went directly to the location without looking at the monitors. (Extract from the field notes).

Not all 'operators' were originally from Riyadh. They came from many regions around the country, and had settled in Riyadh. Their educational level was a high school certificate. In fact, all of them obtained the certificate while employed; when first recruited, they had only a primary or intermediate school certificate. After getting their jobs, they continued their education. In S.A., completing a further educational stage contributes to promotion, especially in the police and military. Therefore, in S.A., there are many evening schools for those people who work during the day. In 2006, there were 377 such schools, with a total of 25,123 students (Ministry of Economy and Planning, 2007: 29-30). With promotion, the monthly salary increased. Operators' salary ranged between SR 8,000 and 10,000 (£1,142 and 1,428) per month. All 'operators' were aged over forty and their work experience ranged between 21 and 25 years.

[31] In S.A, the high school certificate is an important document that qualifies a person to continue his/her studies at the university or to apply for a job. During the fieldwork, students had just finished their final exam and obtained their certificates.

"Operators are selected according to discipline, good behaviour, performance. The mechanism of selecting operators results in creating discipline and appreciation of the values of work such as attendance, productivity and performance" (RO).

However, despite these criteria, it was found that operators might violate the requirements of their work.

At 06.05, I went to pray at the station's mosque. When I came back, I noticed that a member of the shift was sitting in the CR, while the 'operator' who had a long beard as a religious appearance was giving him religious therapy by reading some holy verses to him. When I went into the office, they stopped and the policeman left the office. (Extract from the field notes).

They might have presumed that nobody would observe them. In particular, at that early time, there would be nobody in the station, especially their managers. Such behaviour, however, is not acceptable during work time and in the workplace. Thus, the effect of self-discipline seems to depend upon the belief of people's sense of being visible and watched, so that their performance can be observed and followed up. However, the effect of surveillance cameras is linked to the existence of the physical external factor. The absence or weakness of the external factor means the absence or weakness of the self-discipline. Therefore, the head of the police in the train endeavoured to get access to the system from his office outside the station.

"I went into negotiations with the contractor in order to have access to the cameras in the station. I could observe the situation in the station and follow up the performance of shift, but my request was rejected because this facility was not provided for in the contract" (RM).

The system in practice

The practical utilization of CCTV systems in the station can be linked to two realms, security concerns and the enforcement of cultural norms.

The security function

It was noticed that operators were more concerned with observing the main rear gate of the station. This concern was based on a sense of access control and attributed to the fact that through this gate, any person could go directly to the platform and board a train without having his or her identity checked or belongings searched. Some supervisors might observe the monitor to ensure no traveller went through the arrival gate to the train. If the supervisor observed anyone, immediately, he contacted the guard to prevent such 'infiltration'. This situation happened twice during the field work. Once, the perpetrator's aim was to meet his elderly mother. In the second case,

someone had gone through the gate by mistake. In both cases, no official procedure was taken except an oral warning. In fact, despite the installation of the cameras, usually when a train arrived, a guard was placed in the back yard to prevent disembarking travellers from returning to the train. Moreover, this guard was responsible for preventing people who were inside the station from boarding the train.

In the station, there were not many remarkable incidents. The only case that took place after the installation of cameras was the theft of an expensive men's cloak, valued at SR5, 000 (£715). One respondent narrated the case:

"We were suspecting one person. We told him that cameras had recorded images of the thief and we were able to identify him. Immediately, he confessed to committing the crime. Then the case was referred to the court" (RO).

During the fieldwork, there was another incident:

It was a quiet afternoon. At 15.19, the supervisor of luggage brought a worker who had found a handbag on the train. The supervisor handed the bag to the police office. The on duty police made an announcement in the hall about the bag. Due to the segregated nature of the Saudi society, a woman sent her son, who told the policeman that the bag belonged to his mother. In the presence of her son, the policeman asked the woman some questions to check her ownership of the bag. When he had made sure that the lady was the owner of the bag, he gave it to her son. The policeman asked the son to check the contents of the bag. On checking the bag, the woman reported that she missed an amount of three hundred Riyals (£50) that had been in the bag. The worker who found the bag revealed that he had found the bag when he was cleaning the train in the workshop in the maintenance area, which was not covered by cameras. The passenger gave up hope of her money. The on duty police searched the worker's clothes. Nothing was found. The policeman told me that he wished that there had been cameras in the workshop so he could have reviewed the recording and observed the maintenance of the train. No case was brought. (Extract from the field notes).

The potential implications of this case might be that on the one hand, the system is intended to be used in a reactive way. This means that its effect would be only to identify criminals after they had committed their crimes. On the other hand, the system might be installed to perform a deterrent function. This assumption is supported by the type of cameras that were installed in the station, as well as their distribution. Furthermore, the location of the 'CR' and the displaying of images in front of visitors could contribute to the sense of actual observation of people in the station. Moreover, this feeling seems to have increased with the presence of policemen in their distinctive uniform. However, as has been mentioned, cameras did not cover the whole station, which might reduce the deterrence effect of the cameras.

In line with the concern for security, there was a police guard who joined those travelling on the train and was responsible for safety on the train. After the train reached its destination and the passengers had left, the security guard searched the train for lost or remaining items before the cleaners went into the train. Any item that might be found by the cleaners had to be submitted to the police office. In the case of any personal property, such as mobiles, handbags, books or wallets being found, all these items were collected and kept by the police until their owners reported their loss to the police. In such circumstances, the on-duty police made sure that the claimants were the owners of these items before handing them over:

One afternoon, at 14.07, one of the workers brought a handbag that had been found close to the main gate of the train. The on duty police officer searched the bag and found only personal items. He announced the find among people present in the station, but nobody came. He kept the bag in the office until its owner might come to collect it. By 08.00, when the shift finished its daily duty and the next shift started, nobody had come to collect it. A missing report was made and the bag was sent to the storage in the station. (Extract from the field notes).

For security purposes, in some cases, observation might be for the protection of specific types of people, which relates to the state power. In the station, there were two categories who were observed for protection. The first group was European and American citizens. It was thought that terrorists had been trying to show the inability of the state to provide security for its citizens and residents, especially western citizens. After terrorist attacks and tragic incidents that involved the killing of many innocent western people, the state concentrated on protecting those specific nationalities. There was a concern to safeguard the safety of western people who might be targets of terrorists. The aim was to ensure the safety of those people by preventing the possible criminal attacks against them, as well as demonstrating the ability of the state to enforce its power in the country:

"After the terrorist attacks, there were specific groups of people, especially western citizens, who were targeted by those criminals" (RO).

The other protected targets were members of the royal family. Thus:

"We would use cameras to zoom on those categories and observe their movement in the station, only to protect them and observe any suspicious movement around them to keep them away from any harm. However, due to the poor quality of cameras, we deploy policemen to observe them from a distance or to be close to them" (RS2).

The problem that might face the policemen was that people around targets would be aware that those people were under surveillance and protection. Therefore, it seems that targeting for protection might be better achieved by observing targeted people at a distance rather than deploying policeman to be close to them, so as to avoid attracting public attention. The latter procedure might encourage people to discover the target or attack him, which in both cases, puts the targets at risk. The police realized this issue and told me:

"We are trying our best to install high quality cameras to enable us to follow at distance the movement of targets" (RO).

For the members of the royal family, there was particular care during their departure or arrival. In these cases, the security procedures were intensified. For example, the official patrol was placed at the gate of the VIP hall where its warning lights were activated. In addition, a policeman was deployed to observe and keep watching the area around the VIP hall. Furthermore, the Department of Explosion might be instructed to search the area. Later, security guards were placed in the area, until the VIPs had left the station. In this respect, some royal family members might have a separate train, or use the public train but in a separate carriage. Additionally, the arrival and departure of royal family members had to be documented in the log book. If they were senior members of the royal family, the head of the police station had to be informed and usually attended these cases to ensure that full security procedures were carried out.

It appears that there is a serious concern with potential risk that might pose a threat to the power of the state, its sovereignty and its political symbols. The sense of risk and vulnerability has increased with the current security circumstances, especially after the May 2003 terrorist attacks. Although the train station was not attacked, the sense of suspicion was evident:

At 11.32, a member of the SRO brought a passenger from the train. The traveller who was in the train decided to leave the train and cancel his trip. His reason was that he was with a friend who had arrived late and missed the train because the inspection gate was closed due to the preparation for departure. Accordingly, the passenger was brought to the police office to be questioned and to fill a form that included his intention to cancel his journey. (Extract from the field notes).

The form required full personal details as well as an attached copy of his personal identification. The reason for this procedure was as an anticipatory precaution in case someone left a bomb in the train:

"There is a possibility that the station might be a target for terrorist attacks to demonstrate the insufficient security procedures and incapability of the state to provide security. Therefore, I believe that the terrorist attacks and the sense of potential bombs have accelerated the response to install cameras" (RO).

Thus, one can perceive that the wisdom behind the installation of the system was due to the impact of terrorist attacks. Mostly, a person who has a criminal intention would not perpetrate his crime in view of a policeman. At the same time, with the reduction in the number of employees in the station, it is difficult to place one policeman every two or three metres to ensure safety. According to the participants in the railway station, terrorists have spread over a large area and are in many regions in the country. Accordingly, the security situation demands extra vigilance. Ericson and Haggerty (1997: 86) argue that the risk society is fuelled by surveillance apparatuses to manage the fear and anxiety that emerge in a society. As a response to the current security circumstance, there is a proposal to upgrade the surveillance systems in the station through developing their mechanisms and their surveillance capability:

"Our plan is to employ camera systems that have the ability to observe and pick up all visitors and users from their getting out of their cars, going to the ticket office, passing the inspection points, entering the departure hall and getting into the train. All these movements would be under the cameras' vision and accordingly the police observation. Moreover, we are working to link the computer network in the ticket office with our office. Accordingly, we will be able to search the system and identify wanted people who are going to use the train and arrest them" (RM).

This development can be read as a move by the Saudi state to heighten its observational role and security presence, but in a new form. The state seeks to integrate non-state surveillance networks by linking them to its surveillance systems to support the state's central control agenda in maintaining public order. This trend reflects the interest of the Saudi state in assembling and 'exploiting' information that is generated from the surveillance process of non-state bodies for the protection of state power.

'Old' culture and religious norms shape surveillance practice

As has been argued throughout this work, Saudi society remains a fundamentally traditional society, whose cultural norms and social patterns shape the structure and practice of surveillance systems. This cultural 'identity' has its consequences on both operators' attitudes and operational paradigms.

As has already been mentioned, operators were selected according to specific criteria. The standard for selecting operators was explained by the head of the police office:

"Young people were avoided as they might exploit their positions to chat up women. All operators we selected were married and had children" (RO).

This point of view explains that young people, although they may be more technically proficient, were not chosen due to cultural norms and moral values that are related to the social and cultural characteristics of Saudi society. This reflects the values held in Saudi society and often helps strengthen the commitment to cultural values. This commitment evokes potentially powerful emotional and self-disciplinary responses, while also offering total conformity to a set of cultural and belief principles in the face of other influential rules that might appear inconsistent with social values and/or the 'old' cultural pattern, as the following incident illustrates:

Early one morning, at 02.13, an elderly man wearing tattered clothes came and asked the operator about the next train to Dammam. The operator said the first train would be at 09.30. The man left the office and went to the seating area and lay down. The operator noticed the man on the camera and went to him. The operator said "O' uncle, it is not allowed for you to wait here during this time. You need to leave the station and come back tomorrow morning". The man said, "O' my son, I do not have any relative in Riyadh. I came from the North Region by public transport and I want to travel to my daughter in Dammam". The operator replied, "You need to go to a hotel or furnished flat and you can come back early in the morning". The elderly man replied in a sad tone, "I am a poor man and I had only the cost of the ticket". The guard thought for a while and told the man, "You can have a nap here, but at the dawn (*Fajer*) prayer, you need to leave early because my boss will punish me, if he finds you here". At *Fajer* time, the operator woke up the man and gave him five Riyals (around one pound) to have breakfast. Both went to perform the prayer. (Extract from the field notes).

What can be read from this extract is that social and cultural values are more important than enforcing government rules and commitment to the requirements of work. This is attributed to the fact that these norms have a deep influential effect on Saudi people and the society remains solidly rooted in cultural and religious values because of their tenacity to withstand change. Saudi people seem to hold a consistent view of cultural values and religious norms and their vital roles in their everyday philosophy of life. This assumption can be exemplified by the fact that most Saudis begin all acts with the phrase, "*Besmillah*", which means, "In the name of Allah". This phrase is echoed before undertaking most activities: eating, giving a speech, heading a

piece of written, opening a store, starting vehicle's engine, *etc*. The root of this belief is that any activity begun without these words is devoid of Allah's blessing.

An important aspect of cultural values in Saudi society is the segregation of the sexes among the wider society members. The separation of the sexes is strictly applied in all public spheres: hospitals, schools, universities, banks, shops, restaurants and even public parks[32]. In fact, the segregation 'mentality' is carefully considered in the planning and design of Saudi homes, resulting from the influence of social and cultural rules. Home design involves provision of separate amenities for male and female guests and visitors. Accordingly, it is normal for Saudi men to know each other very well and have a close friendship for many years without either of them having met or sat with the female members of the other's family. According to cultural principles and in line with the segregation practice in Saudi society, in the train station, families were checked by one policeman and singles by another, while in a separate room next to the security barriers, female passengers were checked by a policewoman[33].

The practice of segregation is a cultural mechanism designed to protect women and their chastity by preventing males from any attempt of contact, immoral harassment and/or flirtation with women. This practice explains why, in the station, policemen might observe specific types of individuals, based on suspicion of intended misconduct, due to specific signs. Suspicious signs included numerous movements of the target, going in and out many times without reason, as well as following females in the station in order to give them his mobile number (*targeem*). With fixed type cameras, targeting and following targets would be difficult. However, the mechanism of targeting was described by one 'operator':

"I will observe him by my eyes. Then, I will stop him and ask him the reason for his frequent movements as well as check his identity. Cameras cannot be utilized because they are fixed type and we have not attended or received any training courses. "(RS1).

Although the surveillance of moral discipline was intended, during the fieldwork, no case of courtship was reported. One possible reason might be that most

[32] Today, Saudi women have joined the labour market to work in girls' schools and colleges as teachers or administrators, and in hospitals, particularly in the women's field. They are not allowed to work except in all-female institutions (see Cordesman, 2003: 20-3).

[33] In Saudi airports, there is a similar procedure, where only female officials check female passengers, to preserve the separation of the sexes.

travellers were sitting in a limited area where the movements and actions of people could be observed. Moreover, it might be that young people were aware that the station was a controlled space, especially with the presence of the police office and the presence of policemen in the station, as well as the possibility of arrest by the policemen, which could lead to official action being taken against them.

This normative 'culture' has been enhanced by state regulations that help stabilize society's culture. For example, a circular was issued by the Ministry of Interior (MOI) which emphasized the importance of the public wearing traditional Saudi dress in public utilities. This state rule aims to emphasize the importance of adhering to and respecting traditional norms and social manners in public spaces, as a major characteristic of Saudi society. According to the instructions of the MOI, Saudis should wear national costume in public utilities and it was noted that violators should be prevented from entering these locations. In the station, individuals who did not wear such clothes should be observed and prevented from travelling on the train:

"We focus on people who are wearing unacceptable clothes in public places, such as shorts, or sports suits. We target those people who do not abide by official regulations. Therefore, any person who does not comply with state regulation is observed" (RO).

During the fieldwork, it was observed that some travellers, especially young people who were wearing sports clothes, including some blazoned with what were perceived as offensive pictures or words, as well as people wearing cropped trousers or shorts, were prevented from boarding the train because of their attire.

At 12.15, while the head of the police office was present, a young man came to the office and complained that he had been prevented from travelling because he was wearing sports shorts. The on-duty policeman confirmed this rule and emphasized the importance of changing his clothes. The man mentioned that all his clothes were in his luggage, which was consigned in the baggage office. The 'operator' insisted on his previous instruction. The person shook his head and left the office. (Extract from the field notes).

On the other hand, despite the existence of official circulations of details of individuals who were missing or who were to be detained in security, criminal or debt cases, no wanted people were apprehended in the station through the utilization of cameras. This situation can be explained by the fact that the type of the cameras in the station lacked the P/T/Z facility and therefore did not enable suspected or wanted people to be targeted. In addition, at the inspection point, it was difficult to compare

the faces of wanted people with all passengers who passed this point. One of the interviewees pointed out that:

"Our way to check these names either of wanted or those who are missing is by verifying the name in the national identity card" (RS3).

The critical issue was the similarity in names. In S.A., one might find people who have had the same three first names, including family names. This can be attributed to Arab tradition. According to Arab norms, a person would name his children after his father or grandfather, out of loyalty and pride in these names. This traditional norm is inherited for many generations. Accordingly, the policemen were aware of this concern.

"We deal with suspects carefully because our suspicion might be wrong or there was a similarity in names. In the case of mistakes, we apologize and inform him that our aim is securing the country" (RO).

This practice of inspection demonstrates that cultural norms and traditional values have affected the process of surveillance by placing limits on the classification of 'suspected' people. Therefore, a few individuals had been arrested by comparing their names with those who were wanted, although during the fieldwork, no case was observed. The head of the security office pointed out that most arrests were for debt cases. It can be understood that wanted people, particularly those who were pursued in criminal or security cases, would avoid using the station because both the station and the train are controllable locations where the possibility of escape might be low. Moreover, those wanted individuals would not use public transport, or at least under their real identities.

It appears fair to state that these cultural patterns of practices emphasize that cultural norms are an important factor and play a major role both in the operation of surveillance systems and in understanding the process of applying these systems in the context of Saudi society. This significance is attributed to the cultural identity of the Saudi people and its influential impact on both the population and the state control policy.

With the dominant influential function of cultural values, one could argue that the Saudi state would accept the machines and gadgets of modern surveillance technologies inherent in the current control agenda, but with reverence and careful adherence to traditional norms and cultural values, by adjusting these technologies to a 'new' standards and ways of constructing and operating surveillance methods.

Therefore, the introduction of surveillance technologies in control policy would not result in the displacement of traditional socio-cultural patterns; rather, such patterns persist and influence the 'flow' of integrating surveillance systems in the ongoing structure of 'modern' control process. Indeed, this view confirms what the establisher of S.A., King Abdulaziz, meant by modernizing the country without losing its cultural identity (Al-Farisy, 1990: 17). Bearing in mind the vision of King Abdulaziz, the Saudi state has sought whenever possible to streamline the structures and the operation of surveillance systems in accordance with cultural values and moral rules. To a great extent, the state is endeavouring to utilize surveillance technologies without 'sacrificing' social and 'old' cultural values. In fact, with the influential paradigm of cultural and 'old' traditional norms among Saudi society, surveillance technologies would help to promote rather than hinder cultural values. Realising the depth and length of the integration of cultural values in both political and social life demonstrates the extent and magnitude of their influence. Therefore, one would emphasise that cultural norms and moral values are the most important criteria and characteristics governing the construction and processing of surveillance systems in Saudi society.

Summary

This chapter has described the operation and application of CCTV systems in a semi-public site. Despite this fact, the systems were operated and observed by a state agency, namely the police to sustain the power of the state. This surveillance structure reflects the central characteristic of the Saudi control policy. Moreover, this surveillance process emphasizes the persistence of centralization of surveillance. It demonstrates the direct state control on the operational procedure in which surveillance activities are under state observation. To enhance this policy, the state works to integrate non-state surveillance nodes into its surveillance networks. With the effort of the state to integrate technology in the control policy, this development, however, might be obstructed by the lack of training and the shortage of qualified staff to operate these surveillance systems. This view is supported by the unsystematic observation of the systems in the station. Moreover, despite this 'ambition' to the employment of technology, in S.A., surveillance operations are affected by cultural values. Cultural norms have limited the process of classifying and targeting 'suspect' people due to the similarity in names that is linked to traditional rules of Saudi

society. Moreover, young people were not employed in the station on the basis of 'immorality', to avoid potential communication with women. As a conservative society, S.A. still sticks to its traditional values and religious principles in its employment of surveillance. In this context, this chapter has revealed that the creation of a sense of consciousness and self-discipline were intended. Nonetheless, it seems that the creation of self-discipline would be shaped and generated internally by the potential consequences of values and norms that people believe in.

These findings and assumptions demand looking into a state site where CCTV systems are placed and operated, which is the subject of the next chapter.

Chapter Five: The Operation of CCTV in Riyadh Traffic Department

Introduction

The last chapter has highlighted the findings that were produced from observing the operation of CCTV systems in a semi public site. This chapter aims to present the findings that were generated from the fieldwork in Riyadh Traffic Department (RTD), which was a wholly state controlled location. The chapter is organized in three main sections. First, it describes the technological and organizational contexts of the surveillance structure in RTD. The second section examines the pervading influence of social and cultural norms in shaping and affecting the process of surveillance in RTD. Finally, the chapter explores the everyday functional practices of the surveillance systems in the 'field' of state power and its trend towards the conceptual framework of a surveillance assemblage.

Technological and organizational contexts

In an interview with the manager of the control room in RTD, he pointed out that camera system was introduced in Riyadh in 1991. According to the interviewee, the project was introduced by a Japanese company, Mitsubishi, at a cost of SR1,000,000,000 (£142,857,142). There were 89 fixed cameras as well as twenty 14 inch black and white monitors. In 2003, a development plan was undertaken. At the time of the fieldwork, in Riyadh, there were 95 Pan/Tilt/Zoom (P/T/Z) cameras. Cameras were installed on either lamp posts or roofs of buildings. Those buildings might be official premises, such as the MOI or private buildings[34]. Cameras covered partly the entrances to the city, highways and ring roads. Moreover, some cameras could be transferred from one place to another. Since cameras had PTZ facilities, they had the ability to pick up images at a distance from the camera sites of 300 to 350m. Furthermore, some cameras had the capability to zoom as far as one km. It is noteworthy that cameras were able to show precisely the details of cars and to pick up the licence plate number.

[34] Interestingly, owners of the private properties provided locations and electricity free of charge.

The CR was located in the East Wing on the second floor of the RTD building. Before the main entrance of the CR, there was a short corridor where there were two offices. On the right hand side was the office of the head of the CR. In this office, there was a 34 inch coloured monitor and a control panel, enabling the CR manager to access the images that were produced from all cameras. On the left, there was an office for administrative paperwork. Beside the main entrance there was a biometric fingerprint reader. Anyone who wanted to go into the CR would enter a code number and put his left thumb in the machine to be scanned in order to obtain permission to enter. At the right hand side, there was a closed office, which contained the records of camera images and communications. Next to the 'recording' office, there was the office of the on-duty officer. The office was separated from the CR by a partition. The partition and the door were made from transparent glass. In the middle of the CR, there was the position of the operator. Directly in front of the operator, there was a radio link, which connected operators to the traffic staff in the field. This communication link was the master tool in the connection between the field patrolmen[35]. Close to the radio apparatus, there was a telephone, which was used to contact people who reported or were involved in traffic accidents, as well as ordering services, such as an ambulance.

In front of the operator, there was a bank of five screens. The first one was connected to a computer, which linked to the National Informational Center (NIC). The second was a computer screen, which displayed the traffic accidents that were received by emergency operators and transferred to area operators. The next two screens were 29-inch Liquid Crystal Display (LCD) monitors. One screen displayed images of incidents that were in progress in the west and north areas of the city. This screen was connected to 51 cameras. The second screen, which directly faced the operator, was devoted to locations or incidents which were considered important. Usually, in the absence of important accidents, it was noticed that it was dedicated to one of the main crossroads in the city, which linked the four directions (West, East, North and South). The last monitor was a 34-inch LCD that displayed images of events which were in progress in the south and east areas (44 cameras).

To the right of these screens, there were four 'hotlines'. These 'hotline' telephones were used to arrange needed services and/or to organize work with

[35] Those people were the traffic policemen who worked in roads and streets to control and organize the traffic in the capital.

concerned authorities (the Electricity Authority, the Security Patrols Department, Department of Command (DOC) in the MOI and the Royal Guards). To the right of the CR, there were ten 17-inch colour monitors and one 42-inch screen, which were fitted to the wall. On the left hand side of the CR, there was a 200x300 cm LCD monitor displaying a variety of different camera angles. This was positioned across the corner of the room in order to facilitate optimum viewing by operatives from anywhere in the room.

Three steps led to a lower level where there were two consoles; one on each side. One was devoted to traffic operator of the West and North areas of Riyadh, while the other was dedicated to traffic operator of the East and South areas. As for the camera operatives, each desk had a radio link, a telephone and two computer monitors, one connected to the NIC and the other to receive and follow up traffic reports in their areas. The area between the two consoles was used as a prayer location.

In the north corner of the CR, there were eight cubicles, which received calls on the Emergency Traffic Call Number (ETCN). Each operator had a telephone and a computer, which was connected to a digital map of Riyadh. The role of the operators in these cabins was to receive reports from the public about traffic accidents or breaches. When an individual contacted the operator, the number and the location of the caller appeared on the screen. If a call was made through a land line, the location appeared on the screen to an accuracy of 10 metres. If the call was made by mobile phone, the location of the caller was determined to within 150 metres. After filling in the necessary information such as the location of the accident, the name of the reporter, and a brief description of the case, the report was transferred electronically to the operator of the area, which might take a few seconds. In the centre of the ceiling, there was a camera that displayed images on a monitor in the office of the head of the CR.

The organization of the security team

In RTD, throughout the day, there were approximately 173 traffic patrols. 35 Accident Patrols and 77 TPs were distributed in streets, highways and ring roads, the Strategic Campaign Patrols consisted of 30 patrols[36], and the Secret Patrols had 31

[36]Research was carried out by the HCFDOR in order to determine the main reason of accidents. It was found that speeding was the main cause of traffic accidents that involved death and injury. The

vehicles[37] (researcher's interview with the Head of the CR). The aim of this large number was to ensure coverage of most of the city with traffic patrols.

For traffic management purposes, Riyadh was divided into five areas in the CR; East, West, North, South and highways and Ring Roads. Accordingly, operators in the CR were distributed to the five areas. In the CR, there were four six hour shifts around the clock. The times worked by one shift were as follows: days 1 and 2, from 18.00 to 00.00, days 3 and 4 from 12.00 to 18.00, days 5 and 6 from 06.00 to 12.00 and day 7 from 00.00 to 06.00. After working seven shifts, they had two days off.

CCTV cameras were the responsibility of the highways and ring roads operator. The wisdom behind this was the fact that highways and ring roads were considered the most important factor in organizing the flow of traffic as any accident or jam in these roads could affect the traffic in the capital. An accident in the internal roads might affect only those directly involved. Moreover, as pointed out, most cameras were fitted along highways and ring roads. In the CR, there were four operators throughout the day. Only one operator monitored the system at any given time.

Like other traffic operators, the camera operator organized the communications between traffic patrols that worked in the highways and ring roads. For organizational purposes, patrolmen in the streets could not talk to each other directly, but only through the mediation of the operator. The radio device facilitated the delivering and receiving of information through the CCTV operator. During the shift, the system was dominated by these messages, which enabled the operator to be alerted to all events that took place in the streets as well as arranging any services needed; for instance an ambulance, a recovery wagon or maintenance work. Besides that, the camera operative was responsible for receiving reports of traffic accidents that occurred on the highways and ring roads. As indicated, these reports were received electronically from the ETCN. On the computer screen that was in front of the controller, traffic accidents were displayed. This screen displayed information about the traffic reports, such as the name of the reporter, time, location and a brief

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locations where accidents frequently occurred were designated black spots. Then, a group of TPs was assigned to cover these points and check the speed.

[37] The Secret Traffic patrols were established in order to reduce the high percentage of traffic breaches. This type of traffic patrol had civilian cars of different types and colours. The patrol looked like normal vehicles. They were distributed in many areas of the city. Their function was to observe and detect traffic breaches, especially on main roads.

description of the accident. As the report appeared on the screen, the colour was grey with the word 'pending'. The operator had the responsibility for transferring the received report to the field commander by radio link. When the operator informed the field commander, the colour changed to green and the word 'underway' appeared. Usually, the field commander transmitted the report to the patrolman who was in charge of the square in which the traffic accident or breach took place. The report had to be completed within no more than forty-five minutes, or in the other four areas, within no more than thirty minutes. The reason was that accidents that occurred on highways or ring roads usually involved more than two cars and might cause traffic congestion. If the case was not closed during the specified time, the colour of the screen turned to red and the word 'late' appeared in the screen. In such cases, the operator contacted the field commander and asked about the reason/s for the delay.

As can be perceived, the operator needed to respond to and deal with a range of tasks, which were his responsibility. However, as was described, the CR was provided with many technological capabilities that aimed to provide access to a range of functions through an integrated technological infrastructure in one site. In addition, the provision of a computer facility that was fed with a bank of data gave further benefits to operators. With these technologies, operators were able to make an urgent circulation, pass information to the field officers, receive signals from traffic patrolmen, search the NIC and respond to their queries, and coordinate with other involved departments. These everyday practices of the operators demonstrate that despite the many functions that needed to be carried out by operators, technological apparatuses were shaped to meet the users' needs:

At 18.19 the operative received a signal from a TP asking him to search the NIC system about a car. The operator searched the system; there was no notice about the car or its owner. The operator sent a signal to the TP and provided him with the result. At the same time, a report was received from the 993. The operator contacted the reporter through the land line because the location was not clear. Meanwhile, the operator received a signal from a field patrol that there was an accident and asking for a recovery wagon. The operator directed the camera to the scene to observe the accident and to give the driver of the recovery wagon an appropriate route to the location. During this time, the operator received a mobile call from his brother in order to arrange a meal for their father who will visit them tomorrow and will stay with them for a few days because he had a medical appointment in a hospital in the capital. (Extract from the field notes).

Despite the availability of technologies in the CR and the variety of tasks that were undertaken by operators, none of them had attended a training course in the

operation of cameras. All operators attended only a basic police training course for a year. They did not have special training courses in cameras.

In S.A., people who have the HSC are eligible to enroll in the Police College to be an officer. All those operators who had the HSC had applied to the Police College, but they had not passed the required tests. Moteb (the name means 'tired') came from the North Region. He was a gifted operator and very professional in his dealings and operating the available technologies. He had a good memory and was able to remember national identity numbers[38]. In addition, he could remember car registration numbers. He had obtained the HSC with an excellent grade in Science, but failed to meet the requirements of the Police College. Thus, as he was strongly religious, he applied to study Quranic Sciences at university, but he was not accepted there either. Therefore, he was unemployed for eight months. To avoid the social stigma, when he found an opportunity to work, he applied for it. It was basic police training in Riyadh, which lasted for a year. He graduated and was appointed to the CR at RTD. Nonetheless, his religiosity was clear in his behaviour.

It was sunset on Monday. At 18.31, Moteb asked the officer to leave the desk because he had been fasting and wanted to have his breakfast. According to Islamic doctrine, fasting on Monday is a voluntary action in which deeds are presented in front of God and Muslims prefer to fast on this day. (Extract from the field notes).

The sense of religiosity was observed among some on-duty members. Usually, after 03.30, only one TP was placed in each traffic area and all radio communications were conducted through the camera operative because, as mentioned, cameras covered the highways and ring roads, which were considered the most important areas for RTD. Therefore, some shift members prayed voluntarily. According to Islamic doctrine, praying at this time is preferable[39]. At this time, if someone petitions God, God gives him what he asked for and forgives the worshipper's sins. At 04.30, it was the time of the Dawn Praying, one of the five daily times that are obligatory for Muslims. During prayer times, the shift was organized to enable staff to perform prayer in groups of two or three people. The prayer usually lasted 3-4 minutes.

These practices demonstrate the dominance of cultural norms and their influence on the characteristics of the Saudi people and their ‘theocratic’ identity.

[38] Usually, this number consists of 13 digits.

[39] All acts in Islam are categorized on a scale from forbidden to obligatory. A preferable act is one which is not required, so there is no penalty for omission, but if performed it brings special favour from God.

Watching the watchers

In the CR, personnel were punctual in attendance. Usually, operators arrived at the CR fifteen to twenty minutes before they were due to commence their duties. Officers came half an hour before the shift. Throughout the field work in the CR, the researcher never saw the screens unattended. This scenario might be attributed to the surveillance arrangement and follow up approach in observing operators. As mentioned, on the ceiling of the CR, there was a camera connected to a monitor in the office of the head of the CR. Moreover, the design of the office and the presence of the on-duty officer, as well as the recording of all communication, might have contributed to this discipline. In this respect, it was noticed that shift staff using the phone or radio network were very polite when dealing with enquiries. Sometimes, a call might last fifteen minutes with some members of the public and the on-duty member was patient and very polite in his response.

At 19.21, the telephone rang in the CR. On-duty officer replied. On the other line, there was a person who complained about a breach penalty that had been issued to him during that day. The fine was for driving at sunset without turning on the light. The fine was issued by the field commander who observed the case. The CR's officer tried to explain to the citizen the procedure for appealing and official documents that were needed in this case. The enquirer was interested only in getting the fine cancelled, which the officer did not have the power to do. The officer tried to clarify this issue and the necessity of launching an official appeal, but the enquirer was arguing only in his own interest. With a patient and polite tone from the officer, the call lasted 17 minutes. The officer told me that because the call was recorded, one needs to talk carefully and select every word that might be understood incorrectly. (Extract from the field notes).

However, this commitment might have been increased by the application of a reward approach. As mentioned, the late shift was from 00.00 to 06.00 and it was before the days off. Since it was very quiet, it was noticed that the head of the shift might reward those members who had worked hard during previous shifts by exempting them from attending this shift. It appears that this led to an atmosphere of competitiveness and encouraged the members of the shift in terms of the quality of their performance and punctuality. In this context, through the recording systems, the effort of each operator in the emergency lines was recorded and monitored from the beginning of the shift to the end. The recording systems were an automatic technological process without any individual intervention. Thus, at the end of each

shift, the officer would be able to ascertain the performance of every member in the shift. These records could be kept for two years[40].

Moreover, in the CR, operators could not conceal any case, because images were displayed in front of all members of the shift. Also, the continuous presence of the officer in the CR and his following up of the staff, as well as his ability to observe all incidents that were displayed on monitors, would make hiding facts or cases impossible. In this regard, one officer added that:

"If traffic accidents occurred in streets and there were parties in accidents, it might be difficult for an operator to hide or ignore any case that appears on the screens" (TS2).

However, this type of commitment to work that was observed in the CR might be broken in the absence of watching employees:

At 06.45, on the radio, the operator heard the voice of a friend who was on duty. The operative contacted the old friend via his mobile and asked him to go to the nearest camera so he could see his face because the operator had not seen this friend for six months. While the camera was zooming on the friend's face, the friends were talking through the private mobile phones in a normal conversation. This lasted 3 minutes. (Extract from the field notes).

In fact, during the fieldwork, this incident was the only one of its kind that was observed. It might be attributed to the fact that the traffic was very quiet because it was early on a Friday, which was a weekend day. Also, the incident lasted only a few minutes, and the call was not recorded, because private phones were used.

The previous case indicates that self-discipline and work commitment increased when people were being watched and when they expected that they would be 'punished' if they committed unauthorized behaviour. In the absence of observation and the possibility of 'penalty', rules might be broken. As a consequence, the sense of observing employees and following them up resulted in application of rigid bureaucratic procedures among the staff in RTD.

In a normal situation, some on-duty traffic patrolmen might tolerate traffic breaches that were committed by their relatives or friends. In RTD, due to the application of surveillance procedures, traffic staff would not be able to waive any fine. The reason for this is that the breaches book contains numbered sheets, in

[40]Through the emergency line, every six hours, they received between 1200 to 2800 calls. During the peak time, which was between 12.00 and 18.00, they might receive between four thousand and six thousand communications. In 2005, 2006 and 2007, they received 1,230,410, 1,299,758 and 1,468,000 calls respectively (interview with the head of the CR).

duplicate. The original sheet is handed to the violator, while the copy is kept in the breach copybook, which later is handed to the computer section to have the fine entered into the NIC system through the national identity number. Nonetheless, under pressure from relatives or friends, a patrolman might change one of the national identity numbers, in which case the fine would be transferred to an innocent person:

"Although such cases were rare, the patrolman can be judged and sentenced, which might result in his being sacked and jailed. Moreover, the innocent person has the right to appeal at the Complaint Department in RTD. However, as the breach copybook is handed to the computer section, it is difficult to waive the breach fine because the computer systems are monitored by the NIC Department" (TS4).

Therefore, in the existence of such surveillance systems, official staff had a logical and acceptable justification for their behaviour, which included the impossibility of cancelling or modifying any sanction for breach of traffic rules when the system was observed by others[41]. In this respect, cameras were utilized to observe the performance of patrolmen. Through the 95 cameras that were distributed in the city, the performance of staff on roads was monitored:

At 18.37, an accident report was conveyed to the operator. The location was not clear to the operator. Accordingly, the operator contacted the reporter in order to determine the exact location of the scene. The accident was in a service road. A TP was deployed to the scene. When the TP arrived at the stated location, he did not find the vehicle. The operator directed the camera to the scene to check the claim of the TP. The operator observed the TP, but nobody was seen at the site. The operator picked up the phone and contacted the reporter, but nobody answered. The operative tried seven times, with no response. In this situation, the operator contacted the field commander who asked the operator to close the report because nobody was found at the place and nobody had answered the phone[42]. (Extract from the field notes).

The most striking result to emerge from the preceding descriptions of the organizational context of CCTV systems in the RTD is the influential impacts of cultural values. As the society has been 'designed' on the bases of these values, one could argue that the employment of CCTV would be formulated and constructed in accordance with these cultural standards. Moreover, dominant social norms and values would place limits on the operational process of surveillance systems. Marx

[41] Interestingly, under the impact of traditional norms, the researcher was informed by some participants that instead of cancelling the fine, they were forced to pay fines for their relatives or friends to avoid social stigma.

[42] The researcher was informed by one operator that some people who were involved in accidents might reach an agreement and fail to inform the TP. In the absence of an insurance policy, some drivers might agree to repair their cars at their own expense without reporting to the Traffic Authority, especially when accidents caused only minor damage.

(2002: 10) points out that despite the revolution in technologies and their development, the way they are used reflects social and cultural circumstances.

Persistence of morality and 'old' cultural norms

With the traditional and cultural identity of the Saudi society, the authority of social norms has extended to include the process and regulations of driving conditions. Most countries require mandatory insurance for third parties. In S.A., this issue is still controversial, for religious reasons. It was only in 2003 that an insurance system was introduced. The system of compulsory insurance includes third parties and it is linked only to the driving licence of the driver who was insured, not the vehicle, as is the case in many countries. The annual cost of insurance is SR 365 (£52). Drivers who did not cause any accident during the year receive a share of the profits of the insurance company.

Social norms also influence vehicle numbers and types. In 1970, the number of cars was 144,768 and in 1980, the figure increased to 1,323,000 (GATC)[43]. Currently,

> "The number of vehicles registered in Riyadh has reached more than two million cars. The average ownership of cars is between 1.72 and 1.88 cars per family. 90% of the Riyadh population use their own private vehicles. Private buses amount for no more than 2% of total traffic, while cargo vehicles make up the remaining percentage" (TM).

One reason for this demand is the consideration of privacy. Saudi people tend to use private vehicles due to the cultural preference to protect their privacy in their movements and especially to protect their female members from staring eyes. This view is supported by the number of train journeys in Riyadh. Despite the fact that Riyadh is the capital city of S.A. and has the biggest railway station in the country, as well as reasonable ticket prices, there were only six train departures and six arrivals each day. This shows that Saudis are not 'interested' in using public transport in their movements due to the concern for privacy, based on and enhanced by cultural values. Avoiding taking advantage of public transport is an effort to 'crack down' on any attempt of by outsiders, particularly men to look at and/or contact their female family members.

[43] http://www.moi.gov.sa/wps/portal/traffic/homeAR. (Accessed on, 28-3-2008).

In RTD, due to concerns of privacy and morality, if the car's owner was female, the operator would not provide the TP with the telephone number of the owner. The operative provided only the type of the car, its year, colour and whether the car was wanted or not. If the situation demanded contact with the owner, for example if the car was blocking the traffic or involved in an accident and the driver was not in the car, or the car was parked in a prohibited area, the operative himself contacted the owner by telephone, which was situated in the CR where the call was recorded. The wisdom behind that was to prevent any attempt to contact females and as a cultural norm in Saudi society. It is worth highlighting that 20% of cars were owned and registered by women (researcher's interview with the General Director of RTD).

With the dominance of cultural identity, in RTD, the power of 'old' cultural norms has shaped and affected the process and the development of techniques for monitoring and controlling the city's traffic system. In 1945, the first traffic law was issued. The traffic law was amended by the Royal Decree No. 2/49 dated on 6/11/1971[44]. By reviewing these laws, no rules were found that regulate the utilization or the operation of the CCTV systems. The only written regulations that were observed were in the daily reports and these reports contained some instructions that were more related to the administrative regulations than to the operation of CCTV systems. For instance, they included punctual attendance and the prohibition of staff leaving the CR during the shift, as well as identifying cameras that were out of order.

In an interview with the GD of RTD, he emphasized an important condition that was considered during the installation of cameras. This 'rule' was that:

"Cameras should not be turned 360 in order to sustain public privacy in their homes or offices, especially those buildings with glass fronts. In this respect, the useful feature is that most cameras are fitted on highways, not inside residential areas".

This moral obligation can be linked to the traditional concern of Saudi people to protect the privacy of their families, in particular the female members. In the operational process of CCTV, operatives were concerned for the protection of the public, especially families. The employment of CCTV cameras for the purpose of moral discipline was observed in the utilization of cameras:

[44] http://www.moi.gov.sa/wps/portal/traffic/homeAR. (Accessed on, 21-3-2008).

At 20.14, the operator received a report referring to an accident that involved four cars with one injured case. The ambulance diver was informed, while the operator kept the camera on the scene. On the camera, the operator observed that one car involved in the accident contained a family, who left the car and waited in the pedestrian area. The operative accelerated the TP because of the presence of the family. The operator's concern was to protect the family from any abuse by single people who were watching the accident. (Extract from the field notes).

The involvement of families in accidents was a sign that demanded a rapid response:

At 15.27, there was an accident. On the camera, the operator observed that one party in the accident was a family. The radio network was busy. The operator opened his mobile and got the mobile number of the patrolman. The operative used the land line in the CR and dialed the number in order to expedite the dispatch of the TP to the location. (Extract from the field notes).

In another case, at 19.32, the operator observed a family car that was broken down in the entrance of a tunnel. A TP was sent in order to protect the family from potential public curiosity. Additionally, a taxi was stopped to take the family to their destination, while the driver was waiting for rescue from his relatives. (Extract from the field notes).

On the other hand, despite the availability of modern surveillance technologies, monitoring process was directed to observe ‘old’ cultural norms of classification. In situations where there was an accident, a photographer would be deployed to document the case. Therefore, photographs provided an accurate picture of the situation at the scene. Interestingly enough, in accidents that involved abandoned camels, photographers try to get pictures of marks placed on the camels' bodies to determine their owners. Therefore, some owners attempt to remove these marks before the TP arrive, to avoid liability. If a camel was not involved in an accident, but was left moving on the roads, which might harm the public's safety, a fine would be applicable:

At 02.37, the operator received a report, which said that a camel had been observed trying to cross the West Ring Road. The operator directed the camera to the location and observed the camel. He informed the field officer. The operator zoomed the camera on the camel to find out its owner from the marks that should be on the body of the camel. The operator could not determine the mark because the level of light was somewhat low. Moreover, while the operator was zooming on the camel, the TP sent a signal through the radio asking about the location. The operator directed the TP to the location and asked him to activate the warning light so drivers would be aware of the camel. The TP worked to block the road in front of the camel to avoid disturbing the traffic. Meanwhile, the operator picked up the land line and contacted

the Council to get them to take the camel in the detention point. Later, the camel was seized by the Council team. (Extract from the field notes).

With the employment of advanced surveillance apparatuses, Saudi traditional norms still have their effects on the process of utilizing these technologies and shaping their mechanisms, which can place limits on the potential disciplinary role of surveillance systems. To illustrate this issue, the CR was a controlled area to which entry was allowed only for those who worked there, or authorized people, for instance, the General Director of the department or the head of the CR. Nobody else was allowed to enter the CR, even those who worked in RTD. For this reason, as described earlier, a biometric reader was fitted in the entrance of the CR. No one could enter the CR unless he had a security number and his fingerprint was scanned. However, apart from surveillance access, some members of RTD entered the CR for many reasons, for example to have a word with an on-duty member, to pray or sometimes out of curiosity and to pass the time. The 'strategy' used by unauthorized members to gain entry was either to knock at the door or to wait and shout for a member of the on-duty shift to open the door for them. If the on-duty person ignored a colleague's wave or shout, it would be a serious discourtesy that could affect their relationship.

The influence of 'old' cultural norms has been extended in designing and planning future traffic policy. An example is a proposed project to install more than three thousand cameras in S.A. The cost of the new project will be around SR 4,000,000,000 (£570,000,000). The new project is to include three regions. The cost of Riyadh's project is SR 1,400,000,000 (£200,000,000), and there will be 700 PTZ cameras (researcher's interview).

In this project, advanced surveillance systems will be integrated. In sensitive locations, cameras will pick up the registration number of on-coming cars before they arrive at the entrances. Cameras will be linked to a database of cars contained in the NIC system. The computer will convert the images of the driver and the plate number to digital data that will be linked with the database in the computer (both facilities, FRS and the ANPR). In the case of a correspondence, the car will be allowed to go into the premises, otherwise, an alarm will appear on the screen.

Moreover, in the case of receiving a report for a wanted car that is to be used in a criminal incident, instead of establishing checkpoints, which criminals work to

avoid, all information about the car and the driver will be fed into the computer. When this wanted car passes a camera, an alarm will be activated in the main security CR, where a security patrol would be deployed and prevent the criminal act. On the other hand, if a speed camera picks up a traffic breach, the plate number will be recorded and transferred to the database. Later, a fine will be issued automatically and sent by post to the owner (researcher's interview). However, despite the intention of adopting advanced technologies, there was a commitment to the traditional norms of Saudi society:

> "We visited more than 12 countries, searching for the best technological qualities and increasing our experience in a way that suits our traditions. We found that some speed camera systems make images of those individuals who were sitting in front of the car. As you know, in the front seats, there might be a female. Thus, we chose only camera systems that focus only on the plate of the car" (O1).

This trend raises a question about to what extent 'old' cultural norms and social values can shape the adoption of an advanced surveillance approach. The utilization of sophisticated surveillance technologies, especially CCTV systems connected to high quality computing systems and rich data can contribute to building real automatic monitoring networks. On the one hand, due to the social characteristics of Saudi society, it seems that automatic surveillance systems could reduce the real effect of social values and kin relationships through the lack of human intervention. Moreover, the utilization of computerized networks in RTD and their integration with other official departments can enhance the trend for applying automatic surveillance systems.

On the other hand, it would be difficult to assess the implications of this trend because it has not been applied. Moreover, one cannot presume that automated surveillance technologies will completely remove the role of the human element from intervention in the surveillance process. As many writers argue, automatic surveillance systems cannot prevent the intervention of the human factor. Graham and Wood (2007: 219) argue that automated surveillance systems are far from being inhuman domains. The mechanism of advanced surveillance technologies is still shaped by social practices. McCahill (2002:192) argues that the impact of the social factor has not just disappeared, but goes back to earlier processes of surveillance technologies. McCahill’s argument indicates that surveillance technologies depend upon these systems being fed with data and instructions, which together with the

design and mechanical structure, are built upon the intervention of social action. Therefore, the social factor exists and the intervention of humans in the surveillance mechanism cannot be ignored.

With the interference of the human factor in designing automatic surveillance tools and feeding them with data, potential error is expected. In fact, such concern is likely to increase as data in the Saudi national database is composed of data derived from a number of sources, for instance, the Traffic Department, the police, and the Passport and Immigration Department. This shows that collected data is developed through actions taken by the state organizations concerned, as they not only determine what data is collected, but also develop the analytic criteria for processing the data. Accordingly, data is focused on the concerns and interest of the organization itself. Haggerty and Ericson (2006:16-7) stress that when data is collected from a variety of sources and networks, each procedure that is built upon this action involves the possibility of error.

Conversely, despite the fact that the cultural norms of the Saudi society might appear to provide a motivation to adopt automated systems, they might also be an obstacle to carrying out this policy. Saudi society has specific social and cultural characteristics. In relation to this discussion, one could question how FRS can be applied in Saudi society. Is the system designed to target and follow all people who have a religious appearance, such as beard as a suspicious sign of extremism? Most Saudis might appear to fit this criterion. A crucial problem is how automated systems can distinguish the sex of the driver, when females' faces are kept behind a black veil. This issue needs to be considered, especially as the suggested new surveillance systems have been designed to focus only on the licence plate registration number. Accordingly, in the Saudi context, it appears that although this remarkable development in intelligent technologies can facilitate their application as a supporting method, these systems still cannot be operated without the impact and 'intervention' of social and cultural influences.

The issue that might be raised is to what extent the employment of surveillance technologies can support the ambition of the Saudi state in its effort to protect its power and to maintain its central control ability.

State power

Recent years have seen a significant increase in the number of traffic accidents and violations that were observed and recorded by RTD.

Table 4.1 Number of traffic accidents, dead, injured and breaches in Riyadh

Year	No. of accidents	No. of dead	No. of injured	No. of violation
2003	46,686	451	1793	1,602,469
2004	47,341	479	1546	2,564,261
2005	47,803	475	1607	2,683,615
2006	47,953	392	1187	3,210,512
2007	48,142	344	1008	2,731,866
Total	237,925	2,141	7,141	12,792,723

Source: Riyadh Traffic Department, 2007: 9-13

As can be seen from the above table, throughout the last five years, there were around a quarter of a million traffic accidents in the capital. The average figure was 47,585 traffic accidents. This means that, with the current number of Riyadh's population, in every 100,000 people, there was a possibility of 820 of them being involved in a traffic accident. In addition, around 78% of deaths were those who were under the age of 46 years (RTD, 2007: 19). Official figures for the number of deaths include only those people who died directly at the site of the accidents. In addition, one third of hospital beds were occupied by traffic casualties. Annually, between 6% to 7% of those injured leave hospitals permanently disabled (HCFDOR, 2005: 11). Furthermore, these incidents entailed costs of around SR 21 billion, which represented approximately 5% of annual national gross of the country (*Alriyadh Newspaper*, 27th April 2007).

For traffic violations, the average number was 2,558,544 traffic breaches per year. Moreover, 292 traffic violations every hour were observed and recorded (RTD, 2007: 21-3). The key issue is the type of traffic rules that were broken. According to the statistical evidence that was collected from RTD, exceeding the speed limit accounted for the highest rate of traffic infractions with 20%, while unfastened seat belt came in second place with 17%. Various locations around the city were surveyed by a team from the HCFDOR (2003: 11). They found that rates of seat belt use varied. In places where there were Traffic Patrols (TPs), 72.2% of drivers fastened their belt and 42.9% of passengers did so. In the absence of the TPs, only 25.4% of drivers and 6.6% of passengers used the seat belts. The third main traffic offence was passing the red light. Records show that 31.4% of persons go through a red light every hour and in 2007 traffic fines were issued to 1.24 out of every 1000 cars in the capital (RTD, 2007: 43).

Theoretically, in view of the foregoing discussion, CCTV cameras were introduced to monitor and manage the traffic as well as ensure a rapid and proper response to traffic breaches. In practice, they were used initially for a security function. According to the Consultant of the Ministry of Interior, the idea of cameras emerged in 1990 when the Minister of Interior, Prince Nayef, visited some control rooms in Japan. He was interested in the role of cameras in observing and following up the movements of people. As mentioned in Chapter One, at the beginning of the 1990s, the 'seeds' of political opposition emerged, due to the existence of 'foreign' forces in S.A. and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, as well as the insufficient capabilities of Saudi armed forces to protect the country from the Iraqi threat.

Due to the importance of the initial employment of cameras to sustain the power of the state and its symbols, usually, at the beginning of each shift, the operator checked all cameras in order to make sure that they were working properly. If the camera was in a sensitive place, such as the camera that covered the area around the MOI, an engineer from the maintenance company would be called immediately and maintenance work would be undertaken rapidly. Otherwise, a report would be filed and attached with the daily report and sent to the maintenance company in the morning through the administrative office. Moreover, all contracts for cameras were arranged and signed by the Department of Command (DOG) in the MOI. "If we find it necessary to install or move cameras, this should be arranged with the DOG" (TM).

The most important security function was the protection of the king and the key figures of the royal family members, as central symbols of the state and its power: "The priority of using cameras is to cover extensively the movements of the king and senior royal princes. Furthermore, cameras are utilized to observe official occasions, in particular those attended by the king or other senior members of the royal families. In the absence of these missions, then cameras are used for observing traffic" (TO).

Cameras were used to observe the movement of the motorcade of the king, the Crown Royal Prince, Minster of Interior, and the Assistant Minister of Interior for Security Affairs, the Governor of Riyadh and his Vice Governor. The roads that were used regularly by the king, for example, in his movement from his palace to the Royal Council were covered totally by cameras. Moreover, as has already been mentioned, in the CR, there was a hot line to the Royal Guards to organize the movements of the king. The role of the operator was to search the relevant roads and to ensure that there was no car on the roads, as well as to organize the closing of all exits that led to the

used roads. Nevertheless, for security purposes, the CR was not told the exact time of the movement, but they were given enough time to undertake their role. Usually, movement was reported by the Royal Guards thirty to forty minutes before the actual movement.

In the case of observing a suspected person or a car parking in the used roads, the Royal Guards were informed, so they could either slow down or change direction, while the security team would deal with the suspect. For example,

"Before the movement of the king, it was observed that there was a car that was parking in the service road. As the procession moved, the suspected car moved and stopped many times. All these incidents were under the vision of cameras. A signal was sent to the Royal Guards as well as the Detective Department and the Explosive Department. In another case, two women were observed, who were trying to cross the road just before the passing of the cortege of the king. A signal was sent to the Detective Department who is usually in front of the motorcade" (TS4).

Due to the importance of this function, in the case of the movements of the corteges of the king and the royal princes, the General Director of RTD and the head of the CR must be informed. Unfortunately, during the fieldwork time, the king and ministers were in Jeddah (the West Region). Usually, during the summer, the government worked from the city of Jeddah to be away from the harsh weather in Riyadh. Nevertheless, the application of this role was clear in cases that were observed during the field work:

At 13.19, the operator observed a car that had overturned close to the road that leads to the king's palace. The camera was zoomed on the location and the image was relayed to the main video wall. The commanding officer was informed by radio. The operative contacted the ambulance service as well as a recovery vehicle. At 13.23, a TP arrived at the scene. At 13.26, the commanding officer attended the accident. At 13.28 an ambulance arrived at the scene. On the screen, it was noticed that a security car that belonged to the Detective Department was present at the site. The role of the latter patrol was only to observe the situation without being involved in the case. Nobody was injured in this accident. After a few minutes, when the recovery vehicle arrived and pulled the car away from the road, the detective patrol left the scene. (Extract from the field notes).

At 21.37, a white coloured car was watched parking in the road that was close to the king's palace. The windows of the car were covered with a black paper. Therefore, nothing could be seen inside the car. The operator zoomed the camera to get the registration plate licence, but the number was not clear. A few seconds later, another car parked behind the first one. The field commander was informed of the case. Meanwhile, the camera kept on the two cars. A TP appeared on the camera. The operator asked the patrolman to provide him with the registration number. The operator checked the number in the NIC system. There was no notice on the car or its owner. The patrolman sent a message to the operator, saying that the white car had

broken down and the other car had come to help the man who was sitting inside the vehicle. Nevertheless, a fine was issued due to the covering of all the windows of the car. (Extract from the field notes).

At 00.05, the operator received a report of an accident close to the Palace of the Ministry of Interior. The operator directed the camera to the scene. Meanwhile, the field commander was informed by radio. On the screen, it was observed that a security patrol was present that belonged to the Security Special Forces (SSF), which is responsible for the protection of the royal family members and their palaces. At 00.07, the same report was sent by the SSF. In the radio signal, it was heard that the field officer accelerated the deployment of the TP. At 00.11, while the camera was zooming on the location, the TP attended the place and began the official procedure in such cases. At 00.21 the car was removed from the road and the security patrol left the scene. (Extract from the field notes).

All these procedures were undertaken with a rapid response, despite the fact that the prince was in Jeddah, 1000 k from the location.

In some cases, a rapid response was required due to the type and the location of the accident.

At 15.23, the operator observed a truck that was parked at the entrance of the tunnel that was located close to the MOI. The operator informed the field officer. Meanwhile, the camera was zooming on the vehicle. The operator tried to pick out the licence plate number, but he could not because the sun's rays were reflected on the plate. A signal was passed to the field commander. A few minutes later, through the CCTV monitor, a TP was seen in the place. When the patrolman arrived, he observed the driver was behind the vehicle out of the heat of the sun. The patrolman sent a signal, which included the presence of the driver and the reason for parking. The truck had broken down. Removing this truck required bringing a mass winch, which might take long time. Due to the location and the rapid response needed, the field officer decided to utilize another private truck, which was passing on the road. The broken truck was removed from the tunnel and taken away from the sensitive location. (Extract from the field notes).

It is important to highlight that the MOI building came under a terrorist attack from a car bomb that was placed in a tunnel to the east of the building. The current case was in the tunnel that was located on the west side of the building[45]. This rapid response was applied even for those locations that might be used by state figures:

At 02.11, the operator observed a car that was parked close to the external fence of the International Conference Centre, which was located close to the building of the Cabinet Council. A TP was deployed to the scene. Meanwhile, the camera zoomed on the car. The operative picked up the registration number and searched the NIC system. He found that neither the car nor the owner was wanted. A few minutes later, the TP appeared on the monitor. It was found that the 'suspected' driver had parked there in order to wait for one of his friends who came from outside the capital

[45] The incident took place on 30th December 2004; more than 93 policemen where injured. (*Al-Riyadh Newspaper*, 31st December, 2004).

and arranged this place as a clear landmark. A fine for parking in a prohibited area was issued and the driver was forced to leave the area immediately. (Extract from the field notes).

At 10.17, a car was observed parking next to the main entrance of a hospital, which was usually devoted to the medical treatment of royal family members. It was noticed that there was no driver in the vehicle. The operator checked the registration number and no notice was registered on the car or its owner. However, there was a difference between the colour of the car as recorded in the NIC system and the actual colour. The colour of the car was brown, while the colour logged in the system was dark blue. The operator searched the area around the car, but he did not find anyone around the car. The field commander was informed by the radio. Accordingly, a TP was deployed. On the screen, the patrolman appeared, parking behind the car. After twelve minutes, the driver came and informed the patrolman that the car had broken down due to a shortage of petrol. In this case, the car document was withdrawn in order to be examined. In addition, a fine was issued because the driver did not supply the car with enough petrol. (Extract from the field notes).

The implication of this case reflects the suggestion that the stored data is not necessarily or even probably accurate required information that relates to the real person or case. Nevertheless, the employment of CCTV systems was extended to monitor public spaces, which might cause disorder for the power of the state. The crucial issue for the Saudi government is that these places were used to support the state and its power. In addition, from these sites, the state obtained its legitimacy and stability:

At 10.30, the operator started focusing on mosques due to the performance of Friday prayer. The aim was to observe these sites for security purposes. Such places, particular during Friday prayer, might be exploited by some radicalists or their supporters to attack the state or its policies. Therefore, during this time, the operative zoomed the camera on the East Mosque where crowding was clear. The images were converted to the main video-wall screen. Around the mosque there were four TPs and other security patrols. In fact, there were three other mosques, which were targeted by cameras. These mosques were the Centre, the West and the North Mosque. The focusing on mosques continued until 12.45, when prayer took over. (Extract from the field notes).

It is worth mentioning that in Riyadh there were no reminder signs that might alert drivers to the existence of surveillance cameras. One interviewee explained this trend by saying:

"Drivers realize the fact that some roads are covered by monitored cameras because every morning we have a TV programme that describes and shows the traffic flow with assistance of cameras" (TS3).

Every morning, there was a daily traffic programme on the local TV. This programme was shown twice a day at 06.55 and 07.55[46]. The programme portrayed the traffic movements in the city. However as drivers did not have a TV in their cars, the benefits of these programmes would be limited. Interestingly, in Riyadh, there was a specific type of technique that included the concept of signage:

"In some cases, we contact violators and inform them that they have committed traffic breaches and we provided them with the time and the date of breach. Usually, their responses were penitence and abandon committing traffic breaches" (TO).

The effect of this procedure, however, would be limited because it dealt only with individual cases and could not be generalized. The message that might be intended by both the TV programmes and the communication with violators is that the city is covered by cameras, but without people knowing the locations of cameras, their range of vision and whether they are observed systematically around the clock, let alone the location of the observer, his identity and the real aim of observation. The sense of potential visibility is likely to increase with the development of surveillance system integration, in which available cameras were utilized by other security departments.

Expandable mutability[47]

The basic principle of employment of camera systems for observing and controlling traffic flow might be the oldest form of utilizing these technologies (see for example, McCahill and Norris, 2002a; Müller and Boos, 2004). However, in the Saudi context, it appears that the state security agencies realized that camera systems could be used not only for one purpose, but for multiple functions through adapting this technology in different scenarios. Through redesigning the operation of CCTV apparatus, the systems would be diffused to further functions. In fact, this tendency is increased with the integrated camera surveillance systems.

Some MOI agencies had access to the system. The images that were produced from the 95 cameras were relayed to a range of other security agencies, for example, the Ministry of Interior Assistant for Security Affairs[48], the Department of Command (DOC) in the MOI, the Conjoint Operations in Riyadh Police Department and the Detective Department. The Ministry of Interior Assistant for Security Affairs had the

[46] In S.A, official work time started at 07.30 to 14.30.
[47] This phrase was adopted from Norris and Armstrong (1999).
[48] He is a member of the royal family and the eldest son of the Minister of Interior.

priority above RTD to control cameras, whereas other agencies came after. Moreover, agencies like the Conjoint Operations in Riyadh Police were able to watch and to record the images, although not to control cameras. Furthermore, the Detective Department had its own recording system located within RTD.

Such an integrated structure is attributed to the various applications of the CCTV systems by a variety of security agencies. With the integrative approach, security agencies were able to increase the size, scope and utilization of the CCTV systems for their own security functions. In an informal interview with the head of the Conjoint Operations in Riyadh Police Department, he pointed out that despite the fact that there was a spread of security patrols in the city, they would not be able to deal with every incident and prevent every illegal deed[49]. Pressure on the security agencies has increased with the growth of terrorist attacks. As a consequence, he stated that:

"Our utilization of cameras is for observing those places which have security importance for us, for instance, congregation places, and places of celebration especially those attended by the king or other senior royal family members, security operations and the place of execution[50]".

In fact, this integrated surveillance structure has been applied in other state CCTV systems. In Mecca, there are 1400 cameras with 150 monitors. On the Throwing Bridge alone[51], there are 65 PTZ cameras (*Alriyadh Newspaper*, 16th December 2007). According to the Ministry of Interior's Consultant for Communications, some images from these cameras were transmitted to the palaces of the King, the Crown Prince and the Minister of Interior.

The crucial issue with this type of integration is the considerable cost of the integrated system. As already explained, there were four control rooms that received the images and dealt with different functions. The official agencies realized this point. There is a proposal to establish a mass control room that would benefit from all existing cameras. According to the proposal, the CR would undertake the role of observing cameras as well as receiving all emergency and security reports. The CR would be provided with advance computing and communications networks that link all emergency and security agencies. Like the 999 emergency concept, the suggested

[49] In the city of Riyadh, mostly, around the clock, there were around 550 security patrols that belonged only to the Department of General Security (DOGS) (researcher's interview).
[50] It is the site of performing the killing of a person who is condemned to death as a legal punishment.
[51] This is the place from which pilgrims throw stones as part of the *Hajj* rituals.

CR would obtain and transfer received reports to concerned agencies. The project will include technical records and documentary systems that can be utilized when required. The staff would include representatives from all security and service agencies concerned. This structural arrangement would ensure collaboration between agencies and a rapid response when intervention is needed. Moreover, with the power and the ability of the Saudi state, records of the CCTV systems in private premises would be utilized, especially systems located in important places:

> "State forces can benefit from the records of camera systems in public and private locations, for example, hotels and residential complexes. In the case of an explosion or serious crime, the security forces directly seize and examine computers and records of security systems, especially cameras" (O4).

The previous practice demonstrates the dominant central power of the state in utilizing CCTV cameras. Moreover, although a number of writers have pointed towards the decentralization of control, in which many surveillance activities are increasingly undertaken by 'beyond the state' organizations, in the Saudi situation, centralized surveillance control is the dominant scenario associated with the 'exploitation' of non-state surveillance systems to protect the state and its power by utilizing surveillance apparatuses.

The surveillance assemblage

As already indicated, the CR had multiple linkages and many sources of information that facilitated the work of the operators. With the assistance of cameras, operators were able to receive, manage and provide information needed for required decisions to be made 'properly'. Cameras were command and control instruments for the planning of intervention and management[52]. The camera controller had a computer, which was connected to the NIC system and had access to the database that was available in the NIC system. The operator had a code number, which allowed him to go into the database of the NIC. When the operator went into the system, through the national identity serial number, he was able to search the database and to check the full report of cars and their owners,[53] including names, addresses, the serial number of the chassis, traffic licences and their expiry dates, traffic breaches and whether a car or its owner was wanted for a criminal, debt or traffic case. Using this facility, the

[52] The official title of the CR in RTD was the Centre of Command and Traffic Control.

[53] Although the driver might not be the registered owner, through the stored address, official security would be able to identify the person who was driving the car at the time in question.

operator was responsible for receiving and responding to the queries of patrolmen in streets about a given car driver or owner.

Moreover, in the CR, they received official circulars from the MOI security agencies. These circulars contained details of people or cars that were wanted due to their involvement in criminal or security cases. These details were passed to on-duty policemen via the radio. Some circulars would be valid for two years or more because either the wanted vehicle or the person had not been seized, while some circulars would be valid for a few days or hours because the wanted person or car was arrested or seized. In this case, the circular was stopped. If the case was important, for example searching for a terrorist, a circular was sent by fax. Otherwise, circulars were sent by post.

Some of these circulations were issued on the basis of camera footage in public spaces. One of the on-duty officers pointed out that cameras were used to target the gathering of supporters and fans after football matches. In S.A., when a team wins a match, the supporters and fans of the winning team gather to celebrate their victory. From a security point of view, the gathering of huge numbers of young people is considered a matter of concern. Sometimes, those enthusiastic supporters can stop in a main road and block the traffic. Therefore, cameras were used to observe and follow the movements of these fans from one road to another. The role of the operator was to determine the situation and the location, and to zoom cameras on the leaders of suspected 'hooligans'. In such cases, the registration plate numbers were picked up and were circulated to all TPs. Details circulated generally included type of car, colour and the registration number.

These surveillance processes contribute to the production of data that enriches the available information in the NIC system. Moreover, this information increases the capability of state agencies in terms of widening the landscape of observation and strengthening their 'tracking' and control abilities:

At 22.43, a TP arrested a driver who was speeding. The patrolman contacted the operator by radio and gave him the registration number. The operator checked the NIC system. The operative found that the driver was wanted. Usually, if the driver was wanted, a red colour appeared in the screen. A check of the system revealed that the person was wanted for the Penal Court because of drinking alcohol. The instruction was to attend the court office. In this case, a confession report was made and signed by the driver. (Extract from the field notes).

At 16.33, a driver passed the red traffic light and was stopped by a TP. The person did not have official document that confirmed his identity. The TP suspected

him in this situation. The operative received a signal from the TP that included an enquiry about the vehicle and its owner. The TP provided the operative with the registration number. The operative searched the system and found that the owner was wanted by the police in a debt case (SR225,000-£32,000). The instructions were that the person be arrested and handed to the Department of Civic Rights[54] (DCR). In such cases, the wanted person was handed with a report that was signed by the on-duty person in the DCR. Moreover, the car was detained for 24 hours and a fine with SR 900(£128) was issued. (Extract from the field notes).

Sometimes, the initial source of surveillance was from the public. This might come from their involvement in a driving accident:

At 13.40, the operator received a report that a car had been hit from the rear and the other party had driven away. The operator directed the camera to the location which was in a service lane in a main road. The car was a white pick up and the mark of accident was on the rear off-side of the car. A TP was deployed. Despite the fact that the driver causing the accident had escaped, the affected driver wrote the registration number, type of vehicle and the colour. The patrolman passed the information to the operator who searched the NIC system. The information corresponded with information that was provided by the informant. The accident was simple and the car could be driven. Therefore, an accident report was prepared in which information about the escaped person was attached to the report. (Extract from the field notes).

In such cases, the report was handed to the Accident Department (AD) in RTD. In the AD, there was an office, which undertook the responsibility of finding those people who caused accidents and escaped. Through this office, the escaped person would be contacted by phone numbers that were stored in the NIC system and be asked to come over to the office. If there was no response, an official circular would be distributed about the car and its owner in the NIC. In addition, a covered fine (No. 38) would be issued. This type of fine means that a driver could not renew his driving licence and car licence or transfer the ownership of a car without attending RTD. However, if the accident was serious or there were fatalities, an immediate circulation to all TPs and security patrols would be undertaken through the radio network. Also, the Detective Department would be informed of the case and deployed on the roads to find the runaway person.

In some cases, the public voluntarily reported traffic violators:

At 11.49, a citizen reported that a truck carrying a metal cargo was driven at speed. The operative contacted the reporter and found out the exact location of the car because both the reporter and the truck's driver were moving along the same road. The operator directed the camera to the location and observed the truck as described by the volunteer. While the camera was following the truck, the operator informed the field

54 It is a state department in charge of investigating financial cases.

officer of the case. A TP appeared on the screen, the violating driver was stopped and official procedure was taken against him. (Extract from the field notes).

However, in some cases, volunteers' reports were out the vision of cameras, so confirmation of the case would be needed:

At 03.45, a Saudi person contacted the emergency line and reported that there was a truck driver who was speeding and using the middle lane as well as overtaking cars from the right side[55]. The report included the licence number of the truck, location, time, and the traffic breach. Through the telephone number that appeared in the screen during processing the report, the operator contacted the reporter and obtained his national identity number as well as his basic information (the name, telephone, job and address). Through the NIC system, operators were able to search the database by either the car registration or the national identity numbers. The operator checked the NIC system by using the national identity number and found the data that which were consistent with the provided information. According to the NIC data, the reporter was an officer in the army. Accordingly, a report was transferred to the administrative office in the TRC in order to issue a fine for the truck's driver. (Extract from the field notes).

One reason for not deploying a TP was that, as mentioned earlier, after 03.30, there was only one TP stationed in each traffic area. This one was dealing with an accident at that time.

For foreign people, the NIC system can be searched by using the residency number of a foreign person. The information involved the name, the sex, the nationality, date of birth, date of entering the country, the serial number of the visa, the job, the number of passport or renewal, issue or renewal of residence, the name of the Saudi sponsor (his national identity number), and the number of health insurance. For foreign males, information related to traffic included the registration number of the vehicle, the colour, the type of the car, the number of the certificate of ownership and its expiry date, whether the owner had a driving licence or not, its number, place of issue and date, its expiry as well as the history of traffic breaches. This included the type of traffic violation, the date, the location, the serial number of the traffic patrolmen who issued the fine, whether the fine was paid or not, the location of the payment and the number of the receipt:

At 15.07, the operator received a signal from a patrolman. The patrol officer mentioned that he had stopped a foreign driver who claimed that he had a driving licence, but was not carrying it. The patrolman provided the operative with the residency number of a foreign person to check his official statue. The operator

[55] In S.A, the steering wheel is on the left side. Therefore, normally, overtaking is done by passing from the left side.

searched the system and found that the foreign person did not have a driving licence. The standard penalty was applied[56]. (Extract from the field notes).

The utilization of advanced surveillance technologies connected to high quality computing systems and rich data have contributed to enhance the broad scope of central capability of the state to trace and scrutinize a wide space and large numbers of people. Surveillance is not limited to targeting particular persons, but also to geographical places and spaces, building a real central monitoring network (Marx, 1988, 2002; McCahill, 2008b).

Summary

It appears that the installation of camera systems was introduced to tackle the traffic crisis in the capital. The growth of the city and the human and economic effects of traffic have contributed to the employment of the systems. However, throughout the observation of these cases, the objectives of the introduction of these monitored systems had been dedicated to undertake security functions as the top priority for utilizing surveillance systems in RTD. Accordingly, for the RTD, the main applications of the cameras were for law enforcement and to enhance general security to sustain the state power. During these processes, CCTV cameras had been shaped to respond to different needs and to undertake multiple tasks within functional power arrangements. Thus, these developments should be understood within the larger framework of central control, which has been adopted by the Saudi state. Nevertheless, the employment of CCTV and other surveillance devices has been shaped by the Saudi cultural norms and therefore, its outcomes should be explored in a specific context.

In view of that, the utilization and operation of CCTV systems in many sites with different structures and functions inevitably raises many issues that need to be discussed. Through in-depth interviews and observation as well as analysis of available documents, the previous findings have built a background that enables us to examine the rise of CCTV and its operation in the Saudi context in the light of the review of the literature and work on surveillance.

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56 According to the traffic regulations, driving a vehicle without having a driving licence is defined as a class offence in the penalty classification. This category was subject to a penalty of imprisonment for 10-30 days or a fine of SR 300-900 or both. On the other hand, failing to carry the driving licence was classified in class three. This category included penalties that included imprisonment for period up to 10 days, a fine of up to SR 300 or both (General Department of Traffic, 2007: 17- 22).

Discussion

The last three chapters have presented the findings of three case studies of CCTV camera operations in three different locations. The purpose of this section is to interpret the main findings that have been elaborated in the three previous chapters, as well as examining these trends in relation to previous research in the same field.

State power

Foucault (1977: 214) argued that the desire to exercise power encourages controllers to observe every location and make it visible through thousands of eyes that are spread out everywhere. To achieve the aims of covering and controlling the city and its residents, it was noticed, in Chapter Five, around 550 security patrols that belong to the Department of General Security (DOGS)[57] were distributed throughout the city. In addition, each Traffic Patrol (TP) involved only one policeman. This policy, however, was not enough to achieve the aim of coverage, due to the expansion of the city and the growth of population. Importantly, with the real threat of 'terrorism', the situation has become worse. As mentioned in Chapter One, 'terrorist' bombings have been directed towards the symbols of power, for example the attempt of assassinating the Minister of Interior and his son the Assistant Ministry for Security Affairs, the building of Ministry of Interior (MOI), the Police Training Headquarters and some economic resources.

In view of these considerations and in line with the introduction of CCTV systems in the control policy, it can be understood that the intention of the state in employing CCTV is to ensure coverage of the greater part of the city. Accordingly, the proliferation of CCTV in public spaces was an instrument to sustain the state and its symbols of power. Despite the fact that the employment of cameras was ostensibly for the purpose of traffic control, the priority usage of the systems was for protecting the state and its power. This argument becomes especially pertinent in cases of employment by the Saudi state, where practising control and sustaining power is the dominant ethos. When the system was established, no great need for cameras emerged. Therefore, cameras were utilized for monitoring traffic. With the growth of terrorist attacks and the real threat to the state power, a new emphasis was placed on

[57] There are other types of security patrols that belong to other security departments, for example, the Intelligence Department, the Detective Department, the National Guard and the Special Emergency Forces.

cameras and their importance. Consequently, the priority for cameras was to undertake a security function in order to prevent any attempt to invade symbols of the state and its power. As has been shown, cameras were directed to observe those places which were the focus of security concerns, for instance, places of congregation, locations of celebration, especially those attended by the king or other senior royal family members, royal corteges, royal family palaces, and some mosques that were alleged to have been the focus of activities against state policies. Therefore, interviewees pointed out that the main supporters of cameras are the security leaders in the MOI. Moreover, participants from the private sector revealed that the main demand for surveillance apparatus is from security agencies in the MOI.

It is clear that the control function is the central concern. The desire to control and the objective of protecting state power are the motivations behind CCTV projects in state organizations. Thus, CCTV surveillance systems continue to serve their control role through their redeployment as a critical support technology of disciplinary mechanisms. Therefore, the priority in directing and operating cameras was in the hands of political leaders. As has been illustrated, the Minister of Interior's Assistant for Security Affairs had the ultimate power to direct and operate camera systems. He had the facility to control 95 cameras in the capital. He was able to choose, direct and zoom any camera to observe incidents that he was interested in, whether traffic, security or public events. In this process, he was able to observe and assess situations and to take a 'proper' decision. Moreover, with the desire to control and to protect state power, as we saw, the installation or relocation of any camera had to go through the Department of Command (DOC) in the MOI. Accordingly, the installation of cameras depended upon the sensitivity and importance of locations and people. For this reason, cameras were installed on highways and ring roads, where most important locations were situated.

Consequently, it can be understood that the development of social and political circumstances has prompted a reconsideration of the current Saudi security conditions and social control policy through the desire to adopt technology to undertake a security function to strengthen the political control of the state. The state realizes the importance of employing technologies in its control effort, which can be restructured and processed to achieve the policy of the state, but within the Saudi cultural framework and its moral values.

'Moral Discipline'

One of the major social justice issues that the installation of cameras raises is that not everyone within the range of cameras has an equal chance of being monitored. The operators create what Williams and Johnstone (2000: 190) call the selective gaze. Although everyone within the scope of surveillance theoretically has an equal chance of being observed, only selected categories of people and behaviour are watched. The question is what are the 'standards' and the criteria that shape the process of selecting and targeting? This is the issue that needs to be discussed and analysed, based on the argument that operation of CCTV systems affects and is affected by the dominant cultural ideas, values and interests of the studied society.

Previous research in 'western' literature shows that targeting and exclusion of the public is based on protecting commercial images and maximizing the level of consumption. In their effort to offer a consumer space, operators only target people and pick out behaviour and external expressions that might disturb commercial activities (see for example, Norris and Armstrong, 1999; McCahill, 2002; McCahill and Norris, 2003; Goold, 2004). Those 'undesirable' people and behaviours might not threaten the structure of society or the values of its institutions. Their 'risk', however, is linked to the probable effect on the consumptive environment and its consequence for profit. Therefore, it is understood that the economic motivation for operating CCTV technology includes a selective gaze focused deliberately on certain categories of people who are low or non-consumption participants. In previous western research, it appears that commercial concerns, reflecting the capitalist thought has shaped operators' perceptions in the targeting process. The entrepreneurial attitude surrounds everyday life activities and to some extent social relations are controlled within and in accordance with a capitalist attitude. The economic ideology has become a deeply embedded characteristic of industrial society.

With regard to CCTV mechanisms, in a society deeply influenced by cultural and normative social values, it can be argued that CCTV can be utilized as an instrument of social stigmatism by selecting behaviour and targeting people who may be in a 'suspicious' situation. The criteria of 'suspicion' are argued to be constituted and constructed upon social norms and cultural values. This argument is supported by results of the present study on the process of targeting. The significant difference between previous research and the present study in terms of targeting is in relation to moral surveillance.

In the present study, social and moral surveillance attitudes are the key 'constitutional' components in the operation of cameras. Targeting in the mall was mostly aimed at preventing 'moral decay', to promote conformity to moral norms in Saudi society. More than two thirds (69.9%) of all targeted surveillance was based on courtship cases. Operators were more 'interested' in focusing on cases that were related to morality. Comparing figures on the basis of social characteristics with previous research confirms this assumption. The main differences between previous research and the present study are in relation to the sex, appearance and number of targets, whether they were alone or in a group.

In McCahill's observational research (2002: 109) of two shopping mall CCTV control rooms, 71% of targeted surveillance was directed towards males, while 29% was focused on females. Similarly, in their study of a shopping mall in South London, McCahill and Norris (2003:27) found that 75% of targets were males, whereas 25% of surveillance was concentrated on females. Goold (2004: 154) found that over 83% of all surveillance subjects were males.

In the Crescent Mall, 95.2% of targets were males, while 4.8% were females. According to the ‘nature’ of courtship, it is assumed that males follow females. The presence of a tiny percentage of women did not mean that those women were chasing men, but it involved women who were found in 'illicit' meetings, which are considered a type of courtship. This situation does not mean that women do not chase men, but as mentioned, operators would not follow single females on suspicion of courtship, for the reasons explained in Chapter Three.

In relation to previous research, in terms of appearance, Norris and Armstrong (1999:101) reported that only one out of ten targets appeared in smart dress, while the majority (72%) of targets were casually dressed or nondescript. Around one-sixth (17%) of those who were surveilled appeared in scruffy attire. In McCahill's observational study (2002:108), a small percentage of targets (5%) were dressed smartly. One-fifth (20%) of targeted surveillances were directed to those who were scruffy in appearance, while a quarter of targets appeared in casual dress. In McCahill and Norris's study (2003: 27-8) a tiny percentage of targets appeared in smart dress, whereas more than half (56%) were dressed casually, and 14% were scruffily dressed. Goold (2004:154-5) found that the majority of targets (96%) were in casual or scruffy dress, while only 2% were smartly dressed.

In the current study, analysis of the social construction of those targeted shows that 91.3% of primary targets appeared in either formal Saudi-style or smart sub-cultural fashion. The ‘formal Saudi-style’ is a consisted of a long-sleeved, ankle-length garment (*Thop*), a white knitted skull cap (*Tagiyah*), a scarf folded in a triangle (*Ghotra*), and *Egal*, a thick, double, black cord that is worn on the top of the Ghotra. The term ‘sub-cultural fashion’, on the other hand, is referred to the traditional Saudi costume, but without the top dresses (*Tagiyah*, *Ghotra* and *Egal*) and perhaps accompanied with fashionable trousers and smart shirts. None of them were casually dressed. As mentioned earlier, people who had the intention of courtship would appear in either smart or sub-cultural attire. It was explained that if it was the first time of courtship, a person would appear in formal traditional dress. If it was not the first time, a person would appear in clean, attractive and fashionable attire.

The third difference in the social construction of suspicion is the numeral structure of targets. In their study of three public-space CCTV systems, Norris and Armstrong (1999:108) found that 32% of surveillance targets were alone. Around a quarter (26%) of targets involved two people, while the rest (42%) consisted of more than two people. In similar proportions, McCahill (2002:133) identified that 31% of targets were alone, whereas as many as a quarter of targets (24%) involved two persons. Almost half (45%) of those who were targeted were in groups that included three people or more. In contrast, the findings of the present study reveal that more than half (50.6%) of the targets were alone. Around a third of surveillance targets consisted of two people. The two aforementioned categories made up a cumulative percentage of 84.3%. Only 15.7% of targets were in groups that involved three people or more. A possible explanation of this difference might be attributed to the 'requirements' of courtship. If one intends to attract a member of the opposite sex, it would be more convenient to be alone or with one other. If men were in a group, women might not respond or might feel afraid of the large number of people. Another possible explanation for this trend might be the security policy of excluding single men. As singles struggle to slip into the mall, gathering in groups could attract security guards' attention and trigger exclusion. Moreover, as security guards had a discretionary power in excluding single men, if they were alone or with one other, they might try to persuade the security guard to allow them to go into the mall and they would blend into the crowd, whereas this might be difficult for groups.

The purpose of the protection of morality becomes clear, if we look at the link between courtship and deployment. More than three quarters (78.1%) of deployment was linked to courtship. In this respect, due to the culture of the Saudi society and the sensitive impact of this behaviour, such behaviour is not accepted, religiously or socially. Accordingly, this situation needs to be considered by the two parties, operators and targets. Arresting a person for such behaviour makes him the subject of moralistic tirades and social stigma. Moreover, stigmatizing a person with this behaviour can affect the reputation of the person and his family, which is very important in Saudi society, given a moral commitment to this social institution. Therefore, operators started by zooming on the target, verifying the case, and making sure that there was a courtship case, then they could deploy security guards and bring the target to the office. In this type of case, cameras provide evidence of courtship behaviour, which may be used as a basis for judgment, as well as evidence that someone has committed illegal deeds. Images that are generated from the camera as 'the silent witness' provide a powerful testimony, if not proof, of a person's innocence or guilt of courtship. This view can be supported by the fact that in many cases, operators zoomed cameras on many people based on suspicion. Operators decided to deploy patrolmen if there was a real case of violation of morality. This assumption is supported by the percentage of target identification and deployment. One out of ten was identified, while more than 90% were not identified on camera.

Thus, another dimension of moral surveillance is that operators were working to make a balance between protecting morality and the process of excluding a person on the basis of courtship. Targeting and exclusion on the basis of courtship behaviour was built upon dominant moral values and the exclusion was undertaken to avoid threats that might affect the society's moral principles, which needs to be proved. Due to its social impacts on individuals, operators built their decisions of targeting and exclusion on a reliable foundation based on the images that were generated by the cameras. As we saw in Chapter Three, based on camera images, the target was brought to the security office. For the target, there were two possibilities. The first was to admit his behaviour. The second was to deny the courtship behaviour, because he might think that there were no eyes observing his action, especially as cameras were of the dome type and there was no sign indicating their presence. In the latter case, the supervisor would inform the target that his behaviour had been watched and recorded by the camera system. To support the supervisor's claim, the target would be

allowed to look at the monitors through the transparent corner in the office. If he insisted on his innocence, he would be threatened with referral to the Moral Police (MP). In either case, the target would confess, sign the warning form and accordingly be excluded from the mall. In the second eventuality, the target would be more concerned about the shame and social scandal, which would be incurred if he was handed to the MP. This social stigma is to be expected, because such behaviour is against the moral values that control the society. In conclusion, the present study exhibits that the targeting of operators was not about the targeting of certain socio-economic conditions, but was focused on moral-cultural circumstances.

The key issue is that CCTV cameras were used to protect morality and its principles, because they are the dominant cultural values of the society. As Saudis are brought up to appreciate these norms and values, they support them and show their commitment and obedience to them. Within the operational process of CCTV systems, the absence of official legislation and regulations, as well as the dominance of moral regulations based on religious principles, are considered an admission of its acceptance among Saudi people. In this respect, the Saudi state applied these values to gain legitimacy and sustain its central political power. Through this mechanism and showing the implementation of moral principles and integrating them in political and control policies, individuals' submission could be obtained.

Along these lines, my understanding of CCTV systems is not merely as a technological instrument, but importantly as a cultural practice. However, within this cultural design, the desire for central control appeared to be the main motivation behind the employment of CCTV cameras, at least, in the Saudi context. This disciplinary inspiration goes in line with the Panopticon purpose for inspection. Accordingly, there is yet something that needs to be explored in the light of theoretical perspectives, to make sense of these materials and discussions. This further analysis is submitted in the next chapter.

Part 3

Back to Theory

Chapter Six: Back to Theory

Introduction

Previous chapters consisted of a review of the social control and surveillance literature, as well as a discussion of the findings. The present chapter offers insight into the findings and their implications in the light of the surveillance theories, with particular emphasis on the Panopticon. This theoretical analysis, on the one hand aims to generate new insights about those data, and on the other, it seeks to question and/or add ideas to improve the theory's explanatory ability. In addition, tentative conclusions are offered on theoretical and empirical bases. The chapter is organized into two main sections. It starts by discussing the current trend in applying centralization in the process of surveillance activities for the purpose of maintaining state power. This discussion is illustrated by examining the role and the structure of the 'surveillance assemblage' in sustaining state power. This is followed by analysing the Panopticon principle as a model of a centralized approach in the Saudi control agenda. The second section is a contribution to the debate of the Panopticon's function in generating self-discipline.

The 'Assemblage' and 'state power'

In recent years, Haggerty and Ericson (2000) claim that the contemporary dynamic of surveillance and its operation needs to be perceived and discussed on the basis of a decentralized structure rather than paying attention only to hierarchical surveillance patterns. For Haggerty and Ericson, current surveillance can be best perceived and analysed through the 'surveillance assemblage'. They argue that contemporary surveillance is practised by many actors and flows from diverse sources to serve multiple purposes. The key point in the notion of the 'surveillance assemblage' relates to the transformation in the structure of the present surveillance practice and its function. It is a transformation from the inherent central concept of surveillance that is undertaken by the authority in power, to multitude nodes of surveillance that are performed and organized beyond state power by many agencies across all levels of society.

One could accept the argument that contemporary surveillance is practised by many actors. However, the argument that the structure of central surveillance, which is embodied in the Panopticon's central observational design, is limited and has a marginal role in theorizing contemporary surveillance is an argument that needs to be discussed from a practical overview and analysed from a different perspective informed by other political systems and social norms. The application of central totalitarian state surveillance cannot be disregarded in explaining and theorizing contemporary surveillance activities. In fact, the assemblage of surveillance is 'designed' to support authorities in power within the hierarchic surveillance structure. Moreover, the outcomes of this surveillance structure are brought together and used by state authorities to sustain central state power. It is a central surveillance practice that works to assert state domination over the structure of the assemblage networks.

Despite the continuous involvement of state authorities in many aspects of individuals' life (health care, educational services, local economic affairs and public order) in some non-western societies, Haggerty and Ericson fail to discuss this part of the current surveillance dynamic within the formation of the 'surveillance assemblage'. Moreover, one of the limitations of their discussion is that it does not explain how state authority as a powerful force in social life can keep its power over its population. It seems that Haggerty and Ericson's argument as a way of theorizing the function of surveillance at the present time relies heavily on surveillance practice in western society with its democratic political structure and its capitalist economic process. The challenge with the 'surveillance assemblage' approach is that it fails to take into account how the mechanisms and structure of surveillance systems are organized to function in non-'democratic' and capitalist societies. One 'excuse' for this limitation is the lack of research on surveillance in non-western contexts.

Nonetheless, from a western perspective, Rule (1973) wrote the first extensive sociological study of surveillance with *Private Lives and Public Surveillance*. Rule widely and critically examined the structure and practice of centralized surveillance systems in broad sectors of modern society. Rule maintains that central power is an important element in the ability of a state to underpin social order, by knowing when rules are being obeyed and when they are broken. For Rule, the central state power is achieved by a surveillance approach to ensure conformity to social rules and norms that constitute social identity and coherence.

However, Rule (1973: 38-40) identified four limitations to performing total central surveillance. These limitations are the limited capacity to store the collected data, the amount of data, the speed of information flow and finally the limited capability of integrating surveillance systems. By tackling these 'technical' limitations, Rule maintains, central total control is applicable and can be achieved. Bearing in mind that Rule's work was carried out four decades ago, one can argue that the 'revolution' in advanced surveillance computerized technologies is able to address these technical limitations. This assumption is strongly supported by the findings of the present study, especially in state surveillance settings.

Despite Rule's concern with structure and process in studying central surveillance settings, his discussion offers no explanation for the process of extending central state surveillance by integrating non-state surveillance outcomes to be used directly for disciplinary power. A possible explanation for this might be that lack of integration capability at that time was seen by Rule as one of the main 'barriers' to applying central surveillance. Another possible explanation for this 'gap' might be attributed to Rule's adoption of Orwell's model of state surveillance, which is an ideal type of 'pure' state surveillance activities. What is missing in Rule's work is how and how often non-state surveillance systems enhance state central surveillance. A number of questions need to be asked: What is the mechanism and the procedure for integrating non-state surveillance systems into state surveillance process? What are the main forces behind this 'contribution'? Is it a compulsory involvement based on legal status or is it a voluntary participation, or is it located between these two realms? Importantly, to what extent is such a trend evident in contemporary surveillance practice?

The key interpretation to be drawn from the preceding discussion is that the structure and the process of surveillance can be analysed in two dimensions, either hierarchally or horizontally. At this point, the challenge is how to integrate these two structures into one theme that is based on the findings of the present study.

Although contemporary surveillance is the product of decentralized surveillance and performed within a horizontal structure by non-state agencies in various locations and for multiple functions, this structure of 'surveillance assemblage' is exploited by state security agencies to centralize the outcomes of surveillance. This practice represents a valid use of state power to apply the centralized surveillance model.

In the Saudi context, the current application of surveillance is still central to the state's gaze, which could be a cornerstone for control. Although private establishments might have their own surveillance data, these private organizations could not have access to official data rather than share or utilize this source of data. In contrast, the police and other state agencies can and are 'entitled' to use, collect and share both information and visual images that are produced from CCTV systems of non-state institutions for their own 'security' benefits to ensure internal stability. Within this *coercive* 'partnership', these private organizations and the outcomes of surveillance systems are considered to be supplementary sources of information for the state security agencies. A clear illustration is the utilization of mobile and landline phones data in the RTD to determine the locations and information of callers. Information in private sector records is also exploited. For example, hotels, and furnished flats are connected to the Detective Department in Riyadh Police. All information about residents who live in these locations is held on computers, which are connected to the police authority.

To enhance the value of information, the state has launched a system of identification through fingerprints and digital photographic images, which have been integrated as a requirement of various formal procedures. Prints of both index fingers are required and a full face photograph is also taken for provision of services, such as issuing or renewing a passport, driving licence and national identity. All Saudi people aged over eighteen are subject to these requirements, as are all foreign workers and visitors (Ministry of Interior, 28th June 2009).

The details on individuals that are generated from the daily exercise of surveillance through utilizing bureaucratic forms and surveillance systems represent a bank of information that is stored and used as necessary. Moreover, all these 'surveillance' forms ensure the linkage between the applicant's identity and provided information. Accordingly, individuals can be identified, classified and dealt with appropriately. To borrow Lyon's expression (2007: 84), individuals would be knowable and governable. This surveillance process contributes to the building of internal security infrastructures and enriches the available information in the NIC system. Accordingly, the security authorities would be able to follow the movements of suspected, wanted and innocent individuals. Moreover, the ability of the panoptic state security agencies in terms of rapid response would be increased. This ability has been actively used for counter-terrorism purposes, with the result that during a

ministerial address in September 2007, the Minister of Interior revealed that more than 9,000 suspected 'terrorists' and supporters had been arrested since the beginning of terrorist attack on May 2003, and 3,100 people remained in custody (*Alsharque Alawsat* Newspaper, 22nd September 2007). This surveillance process emphasizes the sense of control and the persistence of centralization of surveillance.

This central surveillance trend, however, is not limited only to the Saudi control schema. Graham (2006: 247) points out that the current trend in the employment of new surveillance systems is in line with the dominant aspiration to strengthen the power of control. Within the horizontal form of surveillance, Coleman (2004a: 28-9) suggests that the exercise of state power is an outcome of the combined roles of different players in a society. For Coleman, this reassembling of the power of the state is built upon the coalition of state agencies with non-state organizations to benefit from the series of data flows that are generated from the surveillance process of various non-state surveillance actors. The mushroom growth of non-state surveillance networks is illustrated by Coleman's (2004b: 299-300) account of the city of Liverpool, which has established an integrated CCTV system that is under state gaze and linked to 250 cameras, covering the city centre, stores, public houses and night clubs in the city. Furthermore, in their studies of CCTV systems in commercial locations, Norris and Armstrong (1999) and McCahill (2002) show that images of CCTV cameras in private settings are utilized by security authorities.

These developments demonstrate that the desire for control and the centralization of surveillance are far from being abandoned in contemporary forms of control. This tendency is clear after the attacks of 11th September and the 'war on terror'. The influence of terrorism exerts pressure on states' surveillance policies as anti-terrorism measures. Under the justification of ensuring public safety and security doctrine, surveillance activities have been redeployed under the umbrella of security concerns that seek to serve the objectives of state control. The expansion of surveillance activities by non-state agencies, besides the huge development in surveillance technologies and communication devices, have accelerated this trend and increased the capacity for practising control over societies. The integrated ability of surveillance systems enables security authorities to combine various images and data resources into central state computer database to serve the state's surveillance gaze. Lyon (2003: 146) and Bigo (2006: 49) outline that integrated surveillance systems perform many functions of centralization. Wood *et al* (2003:138) highlight that with

recent terrorist events, there is a trend to integrate surveillance technologies into national security networks. In the UK, Norris (2007: 141-5) reported that state agencies have launched a security policy that focuses on gathering and utilizing intelligence information to produce a central policing strategy. It aims to enlarge the central capacity of state control. This surveillance policy includes both state and non-state agencies, on administrative or profit-making bases.

The collected surveillance data is recombined from flows of heterogeneous surveillance systems and databases in various work locations, educational settings, business establishments, communications and the internet across national borders. This surveillance includes observing bank accounts, credit cards, educational attendance, the internet and emails, cell phone calls and other utilities companies (Haggerty and Gazso, 2005; Haggerty, 2006), as well as images that are generated from surveillance cameras in public spaces. Recently, it was announced that the databases of academic institutions are to be integrated with governmental networks for security purpose. In the UK, since 31st March 2009, all academic and educational institutions that intend to bring international students to the UK should have a licence from the Home Office through the UK Border Agency (BA). Under Tier 4 of the Points-Based System, the staff of the BA can have access to the databases of the academic agencies that educate international students and have visiting officers who have the right to check these academic settings at any time, to ensure their commitment to their 'security' duties and to interview foreign students on campuses[58]. In a similar process of gathering information, non-police agencies are required to provide the security authority with information that they have about 'suspect' people or activities, which can be gathered in routine life activities[59].

The contemporary process of surveillance can be described as a process of assembly and reassembly of outcomes of surveillance activities. The first process is undertaken by private organizations as well as state surveillance agencies. The reassembly, however, is a process that is carried out by states agencies. Accordingly,

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[58] For more details see:
http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/employersandsponsors/pointsbasedsystem/registerofsponsorseducation. (Accessed on 1st April 2009).
http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/applicationforms/pbs/Tier4migrantguidance.pdf. (Accessed on 1st April 2009).

[59] For more information, see the Policy Guidance of the Tier 4 of the Points Based systems, at: http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/applicationforms/pbs/Tier4migrantguidance.pdf. (Accessed on 1st April 2009).

the public, their movements, their communications and their financial situation are under the central gaze of the state. Hence, the traditional conceptualization of surveillance in terms of the centralization of state surveillance is clearly a dominant practice and the hierarchical basis of control still operates.

Thus, it can be understood that the Panopticon as a surveillance theoretical framework is not 'dead', although one may find the Foucauldian mechanism inadequate to define later technical mechanisms, especially the rise of computerized databases and their surveillance capability. The topical use of the Panopticon concept becomes a paradigm to be used as part of a wider state governing policy to enhance its control and the preservation of the political system. Norris (2007: 155) shows that the recent development of centralization in the security agenda represents an implementation of Panopticon surveillance. Similarly, the rise and the employment of surveillance systems in S.A. reflect the Panopticon principle and demonstrating its appropriateness to analyse and to understand the Saudi surveillance policy.

Political discipline

Foucault (1977: 218) explained that the Panopticon's political disciplinary role can be structured through four factors; its discretion, its low exteriorization, its invisibility and the little resistance. The discussion is organized around the above mentioned key conditions, which are crucial to the implementation of the Panopticon discipline. As mentioned in Chapter One, the Saudi state has carefully selected specific strategies to protect itself and to control its population. As we have seen, that policy included the distribution of financial subsidies and welfare benefits to its citizens as well as the employment of traditional values, in particular, religious and cultural principles, which were accepted by its citizens. With the terrorist activities, however, such policies were not suitable to crackdown on fundamentalist ideology, due to two factors. Firstly, those 'terrorists' were exploiting an Islamic ideology that was a strong instrument for legitimizing and sustaining the power of the state. Moreover, the identity of the state is defined by Islam. Therefore, utilizing Islamic principles for terrorist purpose challenges the identity and legitimacy of the state. It challenges its role as custodian of the two holy places in Islam; its ability to provide protection to its Muslims; its implementation of Islamic Law and its obligation to promote Islam not only within its territory, but also globally. By challenging the identity and its Islamic obligation, 'terrorists' attempt to undercut the legitimacy of the Saudi state. Secondly, those criminals were careful in their movements and activities (Haggerty and Gazso,

2005: 182). Therefore, 'terrorists' are increasingly aware of the security mechanisms that are used by authorities.

In these critical security circumstances, the Saudi state needs an instrument that enables its control forces to observe those criminals at a distance without the intensive and visible presence of security forces. Instead of deploying many policemen to observe locations of interests, cameras were deployed to cover a wide area. Moreover, the employment of cameras can contribute to a reduction in the presence of security guards. Foucault (1977: 206) indicated that the Panopticon model is an economical disciplinary instrument that can reduce the number of observers in terms of material, personnel and time. Unlike the employment of cameras in commercial locations to serve economic interests, in this context, the reduction of security guards is due to either the inadequate capability of human resources to cover a wide area for a long time and/or the desire to avoid the remarkable spread of security forces. It appears that the main concerns that attracted the attention of policy makers in S.A. are the capability of continuous watching of a wide area and the absence of feeling observed. CCTV cameras have the ability of watching targets without the feeling of being observed by the targets ('visibility and unverifiability', Foucault, 1977: 201).

To increase the sense of visibility, signage of cameras was absent. With the concern of generating the feeling of visibility rather than being visible, the absence of signs might aim to create a belief that people and their movements are permanently under the gaze of cameras, without determining when and where a person would be observed, as well as who is the observer and why. The lack of signs gives the impression that cameras potentially exist everywhere and cover every location. This depends on belief in vulnerability to observation. To increase this belief, as has been elaborated in Chapter Five, every morning, there was a live broadcast in the local TV. As drivers did not have TV in their cars, rather than increasing traffic awareness, it appears that the aim of such broadcast was mostly to demonstrate that the city was observed, to perform the function of 'unverifiability'.

On the other hand, it seems that if there were opposition to the employment of CCTV cameras, it would be due to the privacy concern. Westin (1967: 13, 29) outlines that privacy is essential in every society. He argues that the notion and patterns of privacy however, are significantly affected by social norms and cultural values. Through the influence of social norms and traditional values, Westin indicates,

traditional society is characterized by very broad powers of surveillance for governmental and religious authorities to observe and maintain conformity. Therefore, in these societies, there is a limitation in individual privacy because personal privacy is less important than the satisfaction of the whole society. In modern industrial societies, on the other hand, Westin argues, the complexities of life and the weakness of religious authorities associated with the dynamic character of modern societies have increased the scope of privacy compared to the milieu and cultural taboos of traditional societies. Therefore, for Westin (1967: 35), there is a limit to the surveillance power of political and religious authorities in favour of the privacy of individual life, allowing individuals to *deviate from social norms*. Westin (1967: 39) argues that privacy is an instrument for achieving individual purposes and satisfying individual interests. In both types of privacy, Westin maintains, according to those norms that constitute the concept and domain of privacy, surveillance is established to enforce the implementation of these values and to ensure the individuals' commitment.

One of the limitations of Westin's view is its focus on and interest in individuals' privacy, as he links the notion of privacy and its dimensions fundamentally to individuals more than to the society. Although such individual privacy is important and might serve social functions, for instance, religious tolerance and the integrity of the electoral system, Westin's argument is strongly biased towards individual privacy at the expense of collective values and social power. One possible explanation is that Westin's argument and discussion reflect the values and cultural taboos of industrial society, where emphasis is placed on individualism and civil liberty in democratic societies. Another plausible account is the 'marginal' influence of social authorities and their norms in shaping individuals' everyday activities, whereby individual privacy is dominant in 'free society'. Hunt (1999: 58,142) reports that the Church is losing its influence, resulting in a generalized separation between religion and individuals' everyday life. Religion and its principles are increasingly a matter of personal choice and a private concern. In addition, Hunt shows that the family as a primary agency for the production and the enforcement of morality and social values has become less reliable and effective. Accordingly, social institutions have become less powerful through their limited moral authority and accordingly, by a decrease of institutional commitment.

What can be perceived is that privacy is an aspect of social identity that is framed in social norms that reflect principles and concerns of the society under study. In traditional society, the appreciation and enactment of these norms among society's members represent a moral dimension and a framework for privacy. In fact, the practice of these norms increases both their satisfactory influence and their visibility among the public. Moreover, they enhance the social power in shaping the notion of privacy and the maintenance of its cultural principles.

According to cultural norms and the appreciation of privacy, especially for women, Saudi people do not allow anyone to look into their houses or at any female members of their families. In S.A., no regulations on CCTV usage were found either in the public or private sector. It was found that anyone can install a CCTV system in his own property without need to obtain permission from any state agency. The lack of regulation of CCTV may be deliberate, to create an ambiguous status, which the state can exploit for its own benefit and policy, as well as to avoid any legal accountability. In the Saudi context, however, the researcher presumes that this explanation is unlikely, due to the deep control of the state. One explanation might be that CCTV camera systems are a new phenomenon. In a bureaucratic state, it takes a long time and lengthy process to issue official regulations on any innovation. However, in the absence of official rules to regulate the installation and the operation of camera systems, the only rules that can be applied are religious norms, as religious instructions are the rules that govern the whole society. In S.A., there is no written constitution. The reason is that the Holy Quran is the main source of legitimacy of the state. The only 'rule' that regulates the operation of cameras is the protection of the privacy of families, which is a moral regulation that is based on religious principles.

In Saudi, the implementation of privacy would not be expected in public places. This is because individuals associate privacy with secrecy and the personal realm. Accordingly, privacy exists in the home and inside the family car, where being watched or observed is an invasion of privacy and might result in serious consequences, for example murder. As we saw in the mall, operators were zooming the camera to pick up abnormal behaviour, such as kissing and hugging in the café, because a 'normal' couple would not behave in this way in a public place. Furthermore, in public places, and for the protection of women, most Saudi men accompany their women in public places, which gives an indication that these places could not be considered locations that offer personal privacy. Therefore, cameras

were designed to avoid focusing on the windows of homes. Moreover, the new speed cameras were selected to avoid displaying images of people sitting inside the car, which might result in the image of a woman appearing on the screen. By respecting the privacy of families on the basis of cultural principles, the state can reduce resistance to the employment of cameras and the Saudi government can gain the submission of its citizens to its policies of control and sustain its power without facing public resistance.

The willingness to submit to power is perceived as a significant factor in protecting power and gaining support for it. In his royal speech to the Consultation Council 2008, King Abdullah emphasized that all Saudi policies include an absolute commitment to maintaining the religious and moral values of Islam as well as applying, propagating and fostering God's Law (the Consultation Council, 2008). In the Saudi context, it appears that the Saudi state was rational because it derives its power and legitimacy from Islam and by sustaining its cultural values, which harmonize with the desire of its population.

In the application of the Panopticon in S.A., the crucial issue is the full observation of the population around the clock, in all spaces. In the absence of all or part of this vision, the Panopticon concept cannot be applied. Unverifiability was achieved but visibility was limited, due to insufficient coverage of the whole city, let alone the whole country. As cameras were installed only on highways and ring roads, which covered only a part of the city, the Panopticon instrumental inspection and the potential disciplinary effect on individuals would be applicable only within this limited area. Moreover, in the case of observing the private life of Saudi people, this would create a situation of resistance. As we mentioned, if the state were to apply this type of surveillance, resistance to its surveillance policy would be strengthened, which would be irrational, at least during the challenge of the terrorist crisis.

Accordingly, there are always greater or lesser differences between implementation and theorization. To fill this gap, it seems that the wisdom behind the structure and mechanism of the Panopticon is the creation of self-discipline, so people control their life beyond the eyes and lens of the watcher.

The Panopticon and self-discipline

Foucault (1977) argues that as a result of the surveillance of the Panopticon, individuals become aware of their own acts. To quote him, "[H]e who [is] subject to a

field of visibility and knows it…He becomes the principle of his own subjection" (*ibid*: 202-3). This indicates that the feeling of visibility, rather than being visible, is the main mechanism of generating disciplinary power. In essence, the key to the Panopticon as a mechanism created to monitor people and maintain power is self-discipline. It is a process in which one is constantly observed and his deeds are evaluated. For Foucault, the main factor in producing discipline is the belief in continuous observation. Foucault (1977: 201) stressed that surveillance is discontinuous in action, but it is permanent in its effects.

The researcher shares Foucault's view on the importance and function of surveillance in creating self-discipline. However, one major criticism of Foucault's analysis is his emphasis on physical and external surveillance measures to produce self-discipline. In fact, Foucault fails to acknowledge fully the significance of internal surveillance in establishing and maintaining self-discipline. Foucault's analysis would have been more persuasive if he had considered significantly the function of internal forces in generating self-discipline. The sense of being observed would be more effective and permanent with the belief and practice of internal surveillance.

The limitation of surveillance in creating self-discipline

The Panopticon architecture was designed to give prison inmates the continuous sense of being observed. Foucault (1977: 221) maintained that the Panopticon concept of discipline is gained at a physical level. Bogard (2006: 104) shows that the Panopticon model as a form of control functions as a material diagrammatic model of control. This demonstrates that Foucault’s argument of discipline is built only on external and physical standards. Accordingly, the discipline generated from these external forces would reflect only the same level of force imposed on 'the body'. Indeed, Reid (2001: 240-1) maintains that the Panopticon would be constructed where the body could be used to control the individual's behaviour. Moreover, the Panopticon's power can generate temporary external discipline in terms of behaviour and appearance, but cannot ensure permanent internal control. Los (2006: 88) discusses this issue by arguing that in the absence of self-discipline, individuals use their intellectual abilities to overtake organizational regulations through showing external discipline.

Accordingly, while being in the vision of cameras constitutes being controlled, it is not enough to generate conformity. In general, Cohen (1985: 146-9) argues that the target of control is directed to the body and behaviour, without reference to motives, attitudes and thought. "Only the *observable* act matters…concept[s] such as

mind, thought, intention, motivation and insight are edged right out of the discourse" (*ibid*: 148, emphases added). For Cohen, as the focus is on external signs and behaviour of disorder, treatment would be directed to the external control. Crawford (2000: 208) highlights this point by arguing that a CCTV camera is an indication of physical visibility in which emphasis is placed upon tangible objects. That to say, the presence of surveillance or potential observation reshapes rather than enroots disciplined behaviour. Lianos and Douglas (2000:110) underline that surveillance technologies do not work to control individuals' souls, but their focus is to control external appearance.

With external discipline, it appears that only the body can be controlled. The reason for this is its visibility to others through behaviour and external appearance, which can be assessed as disciplined or not. Therefore, self discipline that is built upon physical observation is variable in its effectiveness and the appreciation of institutional rules. When there is a chance to be free from observation, rules would be broken.

In RTD, in the early morning when there was no observation, the operator directed the camera to his friend's face. Late at night, the operator in the train station allowed an elderly man to sleep until dawn. Furthermore, operators manipulated the effect of cameras when the sense of self-discipline was absent, as we saw when the camera was directed to observe the main corridor of the CR, to observe the arrival of the manager of the shopping mall or other administrators. Moreover, even the public escaped from the gaze of either people or cameras. As noted previously, illegal meetings were arranged in the family section in the café, which was believed to be away from the 'observer's eyes'.

The message that can be derived is that the enforced discipline that is mediated by surveillance apparatuses will last as long as the external factor exists. The absence or weakness of the external factor means the absence or weakness of discipline. Foucault's theoretical argument was that practising surveillance and continuous monitoring can internalize the concept of discipline in individuals. However, the experience of terrorist incidents demonstrates clearly that advanced surveillance technologies can fail in preventing crime, let alone creating self-discipline. In his analysis of 11th September attacks, Lyon (2003) highlights that advanced surveillance technologies did not prevent those incidents. Wood *et al* (2003: 144) point out that the performance capabilities of technical surveillance have been

overvalued and various surveillance technologies are inadequate in preventing disorder. Thus, to ensure the continuous effect of discipline, people need to experience self-discipline internally.

Internal discipline

Continuous self-discipline is formularized and constructed through a surveillance instrument that follows individuals whatever they go and whenever they act, where their behaviour and performance are continuously monitored and controlled. This indicates that the required surveillance tool must be inseparable from the person. This suggestion is considered because individuals mostly tend to commit 'illegal' deeds invisibly, beyond the eyes and lens of an inspector, away from physical visible forces, such as the police, teachers, employers, parents or surveillance cameras.

In Islamic cultural thought, the potential treatment is the discipline of the soul. A person consists of soul and body. As the soul is the main director of the body, if the soul is disciplined, the body would be disciplined as well. This suggests that there is a mental negotiation between one's soul and his/her body. The soul has more energy and influence than the body. Therefore, the body should follow and respond to the discipline of the soul. The discipline of the soul would not be affected by the existence of surveillance apparatuses or their absence. When the soul is normalized in norms, ritual or ideological values, a person would not care about the presence of surveillance apparatuses. An individual would no longer be engaged in a process of self-discipline based on the potential effect of external surveillance; instead, an individual would be engaged in an attempt to shape his own self-discipline that corresponds to his own values.

This assumption is demonstrated clearly with 'terrorists'. They are already accustomed to being disciplined and controlled by ideological principles. As the ideology of terrorism was enrooted in the soul, 'terrorists' attacked the building of MOI, despite its being surrounded with security forces and hundreds of surveillance cameras. Another example is the London Underground terrorist attacks. The London Tube is covered by huge sophisticated surveillance system, but sadly, attacks were perpetrated. The presence of surveillance devices would not have adequate impacts on preventing criminal incidents by criminals who are seeking to sacrifice themselves for their ideological principles. Locations that were provided with CCTV systems have been attacked and these surveillance cameras did not prevent extremists from committing their crimes. Compared to the strength of their ideology, signs and

cameras would not deter 'terrorists'. Surveillance systems might work to postpone the incident, but not to prevent it. As was pointed out, 'terrorists' are careful in their criminal activities. Accordingly, it seems that the aim is not to displace or abandon the action, but to ensure the maximum dramatic effect.

This shows that the discipline of the soul is more important and stronger than the discipline of body. Discipline that is generated internally works to make the object of surveillance internalize the surveillance gaze and in turn perform surveillance on him/herself. This might reflect Yar's term *'visibility of the visibility'* (2003: 263). This assumption can be supported by theoretical perspectives and empirical observation. Foucault (1977: 29) highlighted that the soul has a valuable functional effect of power over the body. Lianos (2003: 425) stresses that creating self-discipline depends heavily upon the injection of ethics and moral rules into one's self. Practical evidence is that in the train station, the operator helped poor travellers because his soul was oriented to assist those elderly and poor people on the basis of ideological principles. This belief led him to break the work's discipline in order to follow the dictates of the soul's discipline. Total conformity can be explained in relation to performing prayer. When the time of prayer approached, most people performed prayer without instruction from others. This was due to their conformity and soul discipline, built upon a belief in this obligation and its principles. What can be perceived is that permanent self-policing regardless of place or time is linked to the soul. The discipline of the soul can be created through the belief in rules, values and principles on the basis of conformity.

Disciplining the soul in a non-western context

Foucault believes that the soul "[I]s not an illusion…it exists, it has a reality, it is produced *permanently* around, on, within the body by the functioning of a power" (1977: 29, emphasis added). However, Foucault linked the discipline of the soul with a permanent surveillance over individuals. As discussed earlier, Foucault (1977: 221) maintained that the Panopticon concept of discipline is gained by employing external surveillance measures, through a network of institutions and a network of experts. This demonstrates that surveillance would be carried out through external and material standards by either organizations or human actors.

The researcher agrees with Foucault's assumption in terms of the influential role of the discipline of the soul, as well as undeviating observation over individuals to 'discipline' the soul. However, the researcher believes that the soul needs to be

constructed and perceived through a spiritual concept. If the discipline of the soul were to be achieved through external and physical surveillance, the discipline would be directed to the material body, not to the spiritual soul. The discipline of the soul needs to be generated through internal surveillance that is linked *permanently* with the person to create a ritual discipline. The ritual discipline is an expression of internal discipline that is motivated by the essence of moral values and religious belief.

In Islam, the soul has an impact on self-surveillance. It seeks to reform the individual and purify his conscience with sublime Islamic ideas and lofty morals. It warns people against committing offences and admonishes the offender with dreadful punishment in this world and in the hereafter. This influence can be positive or negative, depending on the type of soul.

There are two types that have differing impacts on individuals' deeds and thinking. The reproving self (*nafs allwamah*) is the soul that blames and makes one feel remorse when he/she thinks or sets out to commit unacceptable behaviour. This is the highest level in Islam. According to Islamic principles, the Islamic religion includes three levels. The lowest is Islam, then faith and the highest is perfection, *'Ihssan'*. Perfection means proficiency and mastery of work and decision. It is structured upon the belief that one worships Allah as if he/she is seeing Him; if he/she cannot achieve this state of devotion, then he/she must consider that Allah verily sees him/her. It is a type of soul that focuses primarily on promoting collective goodness and deterring individuals from deviance. Accordingly, it is primarily designed as a moralizing instrument. From a surveillance perspective, a person believes that he/she is in the presence and under the continuous observation of Allah. It is a type of consistent self and 'spiritual' surveillance, even when he/she is alone. The second type is the evil soul, which is a malicious and deviant soul. This sort of soul encourages a person to perpetrate immoral behaviour.

Every person has these souls, but one can overcome the other through deterrence. The deterrent force of Islam appears in the fear of punishment and desire for reward. These are the main internal factors which enable a person to commit or not commit immoral behaviour. Taking into account God's blessing and anger in the process of decision-making, the final balance indicates whether one will end up in heaven or in hell. In this respect, one develops good morals and his/her desires are controlled by thoughts of the hereafter.

Accordingly, the sense of being observed serves not only to punish, but to reward as well. Worship in Islam is an approach of normalizing a person to prevent the desire to commit crime by making him/her aware of God's observation and linking the individual with God all the time in hoping for God's mercy and reward and fearing His punishment. For instance, Muslims believe that prayer (*salah*) prevents an individual from all sorts of abominations and vices by providing him with continuous observation and chances of direct communication with Allah five times a day.

At the beginning, to establish a permanent soul discipline, individuals need to be taught certain principles, values techniques and strategies. Islamic doctrine urges Muslims to adopt good values, such as justice, courage, truthfulness, care of the aged, help of one's kith and kin, and assistance of the weak, orphans and poor people. Similarly, Islamic rules prohibit Muslims from committing injustice, dishonesty, suspicion and from degrading and harming people. Moreover, Islam seeks to observe the environment that surrounds individuals to establish an appropriate climate, in which immorality can be prevented. As a result, Islam emphasizes an important sense that an Islamic society should create a proper moral atmosphere. The responsibility for watching and 'correcting' the public is based upon the Islamic principles of enjoining good and forbidding evil. The former relies upon calling for good deeds and stipulating that people practise good behaviour on the basis of the virtues. The latter involves abstaining from doing evil and driving people away from it by removing the causes of its appearance and growth by striving to close the inlets through which it creeps into a society, such as preventing verbal and physical harassment and courtship, and applying segregation. In general, it works to scrutinize public spaces to prevent immorality by blocking the paths leading to its commission. Al-Johany (2000: 56-8) highlights the point that Islamic principles urge society to keep pure and clean of evil acts and not only to spread what is moral; they create tranquillity and incite good and virtue in public settings. Therefore, as we saw, the MPs were carrying out this function to sustain the public morality.

Foucault himself (1977: 211-3) placed emphasis on religious practices, asserting the role of religious groups and charity organisations in instilling social discipline in people. These groups work to 'purify' society from disorder and 'immoral' behaviour. "They will strive to eradicate places of… tobacco shops, life classes, gaming house, public scandals, blasphemy, impiety and any other disorders that may come to their knowledge" (*ibid*, 212) [sic]. These moral establishments work to

strengthen morality through applying surveillance activities over their population. This process would normalize individuals into self-discipline. However, Foucault's focus was on physical surveillance. It seems that the limited influence of these groups and inadequate conformity to religious principles led Foucault to depend upon external surveillance factors. Indeed, Foucault (1977: 211) reported that individuals were slowly losing religious principles and commitment to moral values. Moreover, these religious groups were working as private institutions, so they could not have a real effect on individuals, due to their private nature.

In contrast, the MP in S.A. is a state organization and has legal power to observe and arrest. Royal decree No. M/64 dated on 1-9-1929, section three assigned the responsibility for observing the public and preventing immoral conducts to the MP (CAVES, 1999: 7). A possible justification for this arrangement is the fact that religious principles control all activities of the state and its residents. Therefore, there is a link between individuals' moral commitment, the enforcement of moral rules and the political sphere.

The most striking interpretation to emerge from the previous discussion is that examining surveillance structure and operation means inquiry into its social materiality and ideological particularity. In the western context, the process and structure of surveillance are established on the cultural norms of modern capital society. Within the western cultural ethos, Weber (1968b: 1116-7) emphasizes that cultural norms in capital society are built upon logic and rationality rather than traditional beliefs and ethical norms. The Weberian notion of rationality increases the tendency of western society to regulate social life by logic and reason, to enhance the values of the control paradigm. Bearing in mind that social control and its 'influential' power depends upon the willing commitment and consent from the public to obey its established norms (Cohen, 1985; Rule, 1973), surveillance was introduced and has dominated the agenda of control in industrial society. Surveillance technologies are often seen as a rational response to the need for conformity and, therefore, an aspect of social control characteristic of industrial society. 'Rational' instrumental technologies replace moral values and social norms with the purpose of creating 'rational' social control over aspects of individual social life. Within this shift, the scope of moral attitudes was replaced by rationality, logicality, and technological instruments. Indeed, Lyon (2007: 38) highlights the fact that surveillance systems are linked to scientific measures and calculation of probabilities rather than moral

discourse. Haggerty and Ericson (2006: 14) point out that in western culture, technological solutions have a dominant influence on both individuals and organizations (see also, Monahan, 2006b).

As can be seen, in western thought, norms and social rules are established and assessed in accordance with rational and logical standards. Satisfaction with these rules and norms requires their subjection to rational instruments, calculated measures and realistic inquiry. The meaning of these norms might not have a sense of moral values, spiritual feeling and ethical discipline. The key question that needs to be asked, however, is the effects of this instrumental trend and the rational social control approach on the nature and patterns of social life. One social consequence of this process is the harmful effect on the nature and quality of the social fabric, as this trend can create a social environment that discourages communication, and a normative negotiable context of face-to-face interaction. This is not to suggest that social interaction would be absent, but to emphasize the fact that social concerns are less significant in such a context, as there are social and psychological barriers to communication, which can influence the type and quality of social interaction. This pattern of social communication can intensely affect attitudes leading to patterns of suspicious interaction and increase the trend, feelings and social atmosphere of a 'stranger society'.

Accordingly, one criticism of much of western literature is its failure to consider the role of moral values and spiritual norms in shaping the structure and process of contemporary surveillance practice. One plausible reason for not paying attention to the moral dimension is the dominance of rationality and logic thought in western culture.

This leads us to suggest that due to cultural differences in societies, it is difficult to generate a global conceptualization of the functions and operations of CCTV systems. Moreover, these differences can provide us with the argument that in the absence or weakness of moral values and their potential effect on self-control, concern would be shifted to external factors that contribute to decrease potential disorderly behaviour through manipulating the surrounding environment and the modification of situations in such a way as to minimize the opportunities for disorder and criminality. Furthermore, this analysis enables us to understand the wisdom behind the trend towards the concentration of the current approach on studying crime and social control in Western societies. The new shift of criminological analysis of

crime and social order has been shaped by focusing upon criminal opportunity and the potential environment of disorder and illegal activities. To manage and control potential risk, the proactive conceptual approach and the potentiality of risk have been adopted, which have contributed to a new form of control that is built upon probability and a sense of suspicion through the concentration on rationality, scientific analysis and technological instruments, such as CCTV cameras, rather than focusing on morality and traditional values. Moreover, this trend seeks to manage risky people rather than subject them to 'moral' treatment or 'social' corrective programmes (see for example, Cohen 1985; Feely and Simon 1992; Gilling, 1997; Norris *et al*, 1998; Christie 2000; Crawford 2000; Garland and Sparks 2000; McCahill and Norris, 2002b; McCahill, 2002; Smith 2004; Norris and McCahill, 2006). Garland (2001: 189) points out that crime control policy has shifted to the analysis of environmental external factors that are linked to the possibility of criminal behaviour. Rose (2000: 198) shows that attention is paid to bringing potential future undesirable events into calculations in the present, making their avoidance the central object of the decision–making process. Accordingly, surveillance devices have been integrated in the social control agenda to perform a control function by assessing and eliminating potential risks before they emerge.

Conclusion

On the basis of the present findings and literature review of social control and the operation of CCTV systems, this study demonstrates that CCTV cameras are a surveillance approach that has been the 'rational' answer to the perceived political and security pressures, social 'chaos' and moral breakdown of contemporary society, accompanied by 'faith' in the ability of surveillance to provide 'neutrality' and 'efficiency' in controlling urbanized society.

The point that needs to be highlighted and considered in understanding and theorizing surveillance is that there is an exercise and practice of surveillance in another part of the world with its own social identity, cultural character and ideological particularity. At this point, it seems that the main differences between the employment of surveillance technologies in Western and non-Western settings is the cultural values and social norms that have been 'exploited' in the employment and operation of these surveillance systems. Political systems have developed the 'ethos' of installing and operating of surveillance devices to correspond to the dominant

social values, ideologies, attitudes, beliefs and opinions. The utilization of the cultural values aims to reduce if not eliminate the public resistance and to enhance submission to the dominant power of control. Surveillance has been adapted to be a conceptual framework to detect resistance through the political commitment to cultural values. Consequently, surveillance has become a tool that helps maintain stability in the exercise of domination and control.

What I am interested in, as a researcher in this debate in surveillance studies, is the necessity of integrating moral and cultural explanations in studying and analysing surveillance systems. Put simply, how cultural values and moral principles can be used as a basis for understanding contemporary surveillance, as well as how they can interpret current surveillance applications. Due to the social and cultural characteristics of Saudi society, the present study demonstrates that the operation of CCTV and the process of targeting are shaped by moral principles and cultural values. Significantly, the findings of this thesis emphasize the persistence of moral surveillance in both the operators' attitudes towards targeting and the operational process of CCTV cameras in public settings.

This surveillance trajectory, however, does not mean abandonment of the Panopticon in studying and analysing surveillance. In fact, this study has shown clearly the 'persistence' of the Panopticon model of surveillance and its dominant influence in theorizing surveillance, especially in the central structure of the 'Panoptic' gaze for the aim of control. A clear application of the Panopticon inspection in contemporary society is the utilization of surveillance apparatuses in the Saudi context. For the Saudi state, surveillance systems have served the state's desire to exercise its unique central power and the reality of governing individuals without having to rely on physical force. Accordingly, the 'master shift' in Saudi social control policy is the adoption and integration of surveillance technologies in its control policies to increase in the capacity of the central surveillance policy.

Cameras and other surveillance approaches that are decentralized in governmental and non-governmental settings have been reassembled by state authorities towards the wider use of surveillance outcomes, to expand the surveillance capacity of central state in its effort to maintain stability and to protect its power. The application of this integrated surveillance process has enabled security agencies to scan wide areas and importantly to create a central digital record of data. This surveillance process allows the state to build a personal profile of an individual, with

data generated from various surveillance sources. These developments are significant because of the difficulty for the public of escaping the effects of power and central state surveillance. These applications stimulate the idea of surveillance technologies as an Orwellian collective concept of control, where the everyday life of individuals is potentially monitored. Although the current advanced surveillance technologies and the integration of non-state surveillance networks exceed what Orwell described, the novel *Nineteen Eighty-Four* conveys the sense of central state surveillance over society.

It appears clearly that the key force behind both the growth and the trend to the central approach in the employment of surveillance devices at least in the last few years is 'terrorism' and its potential attacks. In the aftermath of the May 2003 'terrorist' attacks, the threat of 'terrorist' attacks has caused extraordinary security measures to be taken by the state. Despite the trend of adopting surveillance in the current policy of the 'war on terror', in the terrorist ‘era’ with its national and international threats, the technological surveillance solution has been shown to be both theoretically and practically inadequate to encounter this security phenomenon. This reflects the limited potential effect of surveillance equipment in preventing acts that are based on values and ideology. In addition, surveillance systems are unlikely to weaken such beliefs or cause 'terrorists' to abandon their aim. Moreover, surveillance systems are likely to be insufficient to generate continuous self-discipline. Surveillance systems are only visible and external instrumental solutions. For effective exercise of self-discipline, ethics and moral principles need to be integrated in the individual's soul, rehabilitative programmes and ultimately the policy control agenda.

Future perspectives

As the conditions under which people live continue to change, social control 'tactics' do not remain static. In the Saudi context and in the light of these surveillance developments, further expansion of surveillance is reasonably expected. This potential growth is predicted due to the existence of potential terrorist attacks. Moreover, there is an instrumental escalation in the control policy that is attributed to the presence of advanced technologies and global communication structures that have been used by radical people, which might enhance the ‘survival’ of radical thought. It is expected and even accepted that the government will use whatever means to protect and sustain its power. In this respect, due to the rise of radical thought and the influence of belief values among Saudis, which are both based on religious thought, the state would

continue its control efforts that rely on the potential control effect of cultural values, especially religious norms to justify and legalize its ‘new’ control approach. In the researcher's point of view, integrating Islamic values in the control policy would be the state's solution to fight back radical thought and its consequences. This solution appeared to be successful in encountering fundamentalist ideology. On the one hand, this cultural ‘exploitation’ enables the state to gain both legitimacy and public support in the state ‘campaign’ against radical flow. On the other, it aims to outline that there would be no basis in legal discourse and religious principle to legitimate radicalism and associated violent actions.

Moreover, as public services are provided by state agencies, bureaucratic forms are expected to be applied and expanded. Accordingly, the need for surveillance is likely to increase as well to assure the maximum control and 'efficiency' of governance, especially in the light of the capability of advanced technology, which can be restructured, integrated and processed to achieve the state's control agenda. As the sophistication of CCTV systems and other surveillance technologies increases, the ability of the Saudi state to identify individuals and to track their movements through the places and times of ordinary life is likely to increase as well. This surveillance process is associated with the availability of information that has been gathered through bureaucratic procedure and the stored personal details in the NIC, as well as by monitoring communicational tools such as the internet, can be combined to produce a personal profile and informational identity of wanted people. The researcher however, would emphasize that the main concerns are not just policing and crime issues, but the key issue is central control to serve the state political power. Surveillance is not about keeping the public safe, it is about power (Brooke, 2010: 8).

The potential impact of these developments on the ‘quality’ of the state’s control policy would be nothing less than the continued control of the state power. The Saudi state seems to be strong enough to sustain itself and its power against the rise of terrorist attacks and extremist thought, as the main threats to its power, precisely because of its interlocking control. On 1st April 2009, Prince Nayef, the Minister of Interior, revealed that the Saudi security forces had prevented about 90% of the terrorist attacks in S.A. In addition, the Internal Security Forces prevented many other attacks that were being prepared and equipped for implementation, as well

as arresting a number of those who support the terrorists (*Al-Hayat Newspaper* 4th April 2009).

Within these developments, the market of CCTV is expected to increase as well. As the main demand for surveillance apparatus is from state security agencies, private security business stands to win a plethora of governmental contracts. This issue is of concern, as thirty percent of the MOI income goes to fund security and communication equipment. With the current security concern and the availability of both surveillance technologies and the required funds, the commercial market of CCTV security cameras would potentially flourish. Moreover, the growth of 'mass private property', especially in terms of shopping malls that are owned and controlled by private motives in terms of gaining profit, can increase the proliferation of CCTV systems in S.A. The commercial managerial approach in these private settings depends upon the utilization of cameras as a technological solution to reduce the cost of operation.

Future research

Additional research might be conducted to address the gaps and discontinuities in existing thought about the proliferation and operation of CCTV and other 'new' surveillance technologies, such as Electronic Monitoring, Facial Recognition Systems and DNA in non-western societies. This research would make an important contribution towards existing surveillance debates about the relationship between power, social control, surveillance and Panopticism.

At this point, two directions in which to continue this research are recommended. Theoretically, contemporary surveillance is complicated and variable from one location to another depending on the systems that are utilized and operated in that setting. As was noticed in the present study, CCTV systems were utilized in different disciplines, governance, consumption, controlling traffic, performance and the protection of the public morals. Accordingly, the theorizing of surveillance needs to be formulated according to the employment of a specific surveillance system in a specific site. This enables researchers to look at how a surveillance technology has been employed in a specific institution and operated to achieve its function (see Lyon, 2007; Wood *et al*, 2003, Haggerty, 2006). Moreover, such a trend can contribute to link the study and analysis of surveillance to other disciplines and their theoretical frameworks, for instance, political, economic, psychological sciences and public administration, rather than focusing on criminological and sociological theories. In the

broader theoretical context, this case study of S.A. reemphasized the importance of moral and cultural factors in the study of governance and surveillance. In this theoretical line, there is a need to establish a theoretical framework to explain the contemporary employment of surveillance in protecting morality. The marked difference between the findings of the present research and previous observational studies of CCTV control rooms is that the practical process of surveillance for the aim of morality is rarely if ever referred to directly by those who are interested in providing a detailed micro-sociological account of surveillance devices. What is missing in this endeavour is examining deeply the construction and operation of CCTV cameras and their application in protecting morality in different settings. More empirical research is needed to outline the real practice of moral surveillance within both western and non-western societies. This direction would show how surveillance technology is employed to protect morality within different social and cultural values.

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Appendixes

Appendix I

Document sheet

Date / / 2007

Source……

Location…….

Type of document……..

☐Official circulations ☐Leaflets☐ Agendas☐ Meeting documents☐ Reports ☐Notebooks☐ maps ☐ others, If other specify.....……....

Summarizing the content of the document:

1. ……
2. ……..
3. ……..
4. ……
5. ……..
6. …….
7. ……..
8. ……..
9. ……..
10. ……..

Appendix II: Quantitative Observational

Targeted Suspicion Log

1)Incident Number

☐☐☐

2)Time incident began

☐☐☐☐ (24 hr clock

3)Reason for Targeting

(tick one box only)

01 ☐Theft from store
02 ☐Theft from person
03 ☐Theft from Motor Vehicle
04 ☐Theft of Motor Vehicle
05 ☐Vandalism
06 ☐Other property crime
07 ☐Violent theft from person
08 ☐Assault/fight
09 ☐Other violent crime
10 ☐Unruly/nuisance Behaviour
11 ☐Traffic Violation/problem
12 ☐Person in need of help
13 ☐Personnel management
14 ☐Property management
15 ☐Drugs
16 ☐No Obvious Reason
88 ☐0ther
99 ☐ DK

If Other Specify

4) Who Initiated targeting

1 ☐System operator
2 ☐Private security patrol
4 ☐Police
5 ☐Member of public
6 ☐Management
8 ☐Other
9 ☐DK

If other please specify

5) Was a suspect/target identified?

1 ☐Yes

Shift Code ☐☐☐

2 ☐No
9 ☐DK

If yes please fill in details on the targeted person log

6) Type of suspicion/attention

01 ☐Categorical
02 ☐Locational
03 ☐Personalised
04 ☐Transmitted
05 ☐Behavioural
06 ☐Protectional
07 ☐Voyeuristic
09 ☐DK

7) Is the target alone or in a group?

01 ☐Alone
02 ☐With one other
03 ☐Group
09 ☐DK

8) If in group how many people?

☐☐ (eg 08 or Code 99 for DK)

9) Did this incident result in a deployment? (Deploy: 16)

1 ☐Yes
2 ☐No
9 ☐DK

If yes fill in the deployment log.

9b) How long did the observation last?

(In minutes)

☐☐☐ (eg: 005 code 999 for DK)

Targeted Person Log and Arrest/Eject Log

Primary Target

10) Age
1 ☐Child
2 ☐Teenager
3 ☐Twenties
4 ☐Thirties
5 ☐Middle-aged
6 ☐Elderly/frail
9 ☐DK

11) Gender
1 ☐Male
2 ☐Female
9 ☐DK

12) Appear
1 ☐Smart/formal
2 ☐Uniform
3☐Sub-cultural
4☐Sub-cultural - fashion
5☐Casual Indistinct
6 ☐Scruffy
9 ☐DK

13) Eth Appear
1 ☐ Saudi
2 ☐(non-Saudi)
9 ☐DK
If Minority group code below

14)Visual dentity
1☐ East Asian
2☐Asian (Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka)
3 ☐ Arabic
4 ☐ African
5 ☐ western
8 ☐ Other
9 ☐DK

Group Target

15) Age
1 ☐Child
2 ☐Teenager
3 ☐Twenties
4 ☐Thirties
5 ☐Middle-aged
6 ☐Elderly/frail
9 ☐DK

16) Gender
1 ☐Male
2 ☐Female
9 ☐DK

17) Appear
1☐Smart/formal
2☐Uniform
3☐Sub-cultural - ethnic
4☐Sub-cultural - fashion
5☐Casual Indistinct
6☐Scruffy
9☐DK

18) Eth Appear
(Saudi -non-Saudi)
1☐Dominant Ethnic Grp
2☐Minority Ethnic Grp
9 ☐DK
If Minority group code below

19) Visual identity
1 ☐ East Asian
2☐Asian (Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka)
3 ☐ Arabic
4 ☐ African
5 ☐ western
8 ☐ Other
9 ☐DK

Primary Arr/Eject

20 Age
1 ☐Child
2 ☐Teenager
3 ☐Twenties
4 ☐Thirties
5 ☐Middle-aged
6 ☐Elderly/frail
9 ☐DK

21) Gender
1 ☐Male
2 ☐Female
9 ☐DK

22) Appear
1☐Smart/formal
2☐Uniform
3☐Sub-cultural
4☐Sub-cultural - fashion
5☐Casual Indistinct
6 ☐Scruffy
9 ☐DK

23) Eth Appear
1 ☐ Saudi
2 ☐ non-Saudi)
7 ☐Mixed
9 ☐DK
If Minority group code below

24 Visual identity
1☐ East Asian
2☐ Asian (Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka)
3 ☐ Arabic
4 ☐ African
5 ☐ western
8 ☐ Other
9 ☐DK

Second Arr/Eject

25) Age
1 ☐Child
2 ☐Teenager
3 ☐Twenties
4 ☐Thirties
5 ☐Middle-aged
6 ☐Elderly/frail
9 ☐DK

26) Gender
1 ☐Male
2 ☐Female
9 ☐DK

27) Appear
1☐Smart/formal
2☐Uniform
3☐Sub-cultural - ethnic
4☐Sub-cultural - fashion
5☐Casual Indistinct
6 ☐Scruffy
7.☐Mixed
9 ☐DK

28) Eth Appear
1 ☐ Saudi
2 ☐ non-Saudi)
9 ☐DK
If Minority group code below

29) Visual identity
1 ☐ East Asian
2☐Asian, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka)
3 ☐ Arabic
4 ☐ African
5 ☐ western
8 ☐ Other
9 ☐DK

Deployment Log

30) Who was deployed?

1 ☐Other CCTV operators 2☐Private/shop security
3 ☐Police 4 ☐Management
5 ☐Emergency services 6 ☐General store staff
8 ☐Other 9 ☐DK
If other specify

31) During the incident which of the following took place

1 ☐Target(s) spoken to
2 ☐Target(s) physically restrained
8 ☐ Other
9 ☐DK
If other Specify .....

32) What was the on the street resolution of the incident?

1 ☐Target(s) let go
2 ☐Target(s) made to leave (ejected)
3 ☐Target(s) arrested
9 ☐DK

33) If arrested or ejected, how many people were arrested/ejected

☐☐ (eg 02 or Code 99 for DK)

34) What was the arrest / ejection for?

01 ☐Theft from store
02 ☐Theft from person
03 ☐Theft from MV
04 ☐Theft of MV
05 ☐Vandalism/Cri Dam
06 ☐Other property crime
07 ☐Violent theft from person
08 ☐Assault/fight
09 ☐Other violent crime
10 ☐ Unruly /disorderly/ behaviour
11 ☐Traffic Violation
12 ☐Drugs
13 ☐No Obvious Reason
88 ☐0ther
99 ☐ DK
If Other Specify.....……

Please fill in personal characteristic details of up to two people arrested/ejected on previous page in Column headed primary arr/eject and secondary arr/eject.

Shift Log

35) Site Code

1 ☐ Mall 2 ☐ Traffic

3 ☐ Railway

36) Shift Code

☐☐☐

37) Date - ddmmyy

☐☐☐☐☐☐

38) Time shift began

☐☐☐☐ (24 hr clock)

39) Day

1 ☐ Monday

2 ☐Tuesday

3 ☐Wednesday

4 ☐Thursday

5 ☐Friday

6 ☐Saturday

7 ☐Sunday

40)How long did the shift last

☐☐☐

(eg 240 or Code 999 for DK)

41) Operator details

1 ☐Private security (contracted)

2 ☐In house security

3 ☐Police

4 ☐General mall Staff

8 ☐Other

9 ☐DK

If other please specify.....

42) How many operators on shift?

☐☐

(eg 03 or Code 99 for DK)

43) Total number of targeted surveillance during this shift

☐☐

(eg 03 or Code 99 for DK)

44)Total number of deployments during this shift

☐☐ (eg 03 or Code 99 for DK)

Appendix III: Interview Guide (Key actors in the official sector)

Day
Date / / 2007
Interviewee's code **O**
Time: from am/pm to am/pm

First: the history and politics behind the rise of CCTV.

1. How can you explain the growth of CCTV in S.A.?
2. When and why did CCTV come in the agenda in Riyadh?
    I. Could you give us a historical brief of utilizing CCTV cameras in Riyadh?
    II. Which sites that have intensive installations of CCTV cameras and why? Could you give me an example?
3. Who were the 'key players' pushing for CCTV?
4. Why did these people want cameras?
    I. Is there any consultation with other organizations in terms of choosing or installation of CCTV systems? Could you explain that in more detail?
5. Were any groups in Riyadh opposed to the introduction of CCTV? Who were these groups and why were they opposed?
    I. How was the conflict between these groups resolved? Could you give me an example?

Second: technological features.

6. What other additional surveillance systems that are used beside CCTV cameras?
    I. What are the most important existed or planned projects regarding the use of cameras or other means of surveillance? Could you give me an example?
    II. How much would the camera systems, operation and maintenance cost?
    III. Is there a focus on products of particular firms and why? Could you explain that in more detail?

Third: the practice of CCTV.

7. Is the system used in a ‘proactive’ way or is it mainly used retrospectively to deal with incidents after the event?
    I. Are there cautionary signs to indicate that locations are under CCTV cameras? Is there a commitment to such procedure? Could you give me an example?
8. Who is targeted by CCTV?
    I. Why are they targeted? Could you explain that in more detail?
    II. What has happened to them? Could you explain that in more detail?

Fourth: organisation and control.

9. Who controls these systems?
10. What are the rules and regulations that govern the use of cameras? Could you give me an example?
11. What are your training plans?
    I. What are the main aims of these plans?
    II. Does the training courses included in the cost of CCTV installations and why? Could you give me an example?
    III. What are the priorities in training schemes? Could you explain that in more detail?
    IV. Who organizes the training schemes, time schedules and places?
12. Would you like to add or suggest any thing that you feel is related to the questions?

Thank you for your time and your valuable information.

Is it possible to provide me with any documentation on CCTV in this site, such as annual report, training scheme, training manuals, codes of practice or other material that link to our interview. I am deeply indebted for your cooperation.

Appendix IV: Interview Guide: (Key actors in the private sector)

Day
Date / / 2007
Interviewee's code **P**
Time: from am/pm to am/pm

First: the history and politics behind the rise of CCTV.

1. How can you explain the growth of CCTV in S.A.?
2. When and why did CCTV come in the agenda in Riyadh?
    I. Could you give us a historical brief of utilizing CCTV cameras in Riyadh?
3. Who were the 'key players' pushing for CCTV?
4. Why did these people want cameras?
    II. Which sites have intensive installations of CCTV cameras and why? Could you give me an example?
    III. What are the institutions demanding of the cameras?
    IV. Is there any consultation with other organizations in terms of choosing or installation of CCTV systems? Could you explain that in more detail?
5. Were any groups in Riyadh opposed to the introduction of CCTV? Who were these groups and why were they opposed? Could you give me an example?
    I. How was the conflict between these groups resolved? Could you give me an example?

Second: technological features.

6. What are the standards that are required by the official sector? Could you give me an example?
7. What are the standards that are required by the private sector? Could you give me an example?
8. What surveillance systems are required by the official sector? Could you give me an example?

9. What surveillance systems that are required by the private sector? Could you give me an example?
10. As one of the leading companies in electronic and surveillance market, how do you estimate the growth of surveillance market in Riyadh?
    I. In light of the growing demand for surveillance equipment, what marketing activities are you adopting? Could you give me an example?
11. What are the most important existed or planned projects regarding the use of cameras or other means of surveillance?
    I. How much does the camera systems, operation and maintenance cost?
    II. Is there a focus on products of particular firms and why? Could you give me an example?

Third: the practice of CCTV.

12. Is the system used in a 'proactive' way or is it mainly used retrospectively to deal with incidents after the event?
    I. Are there cautionary sign to indicate that locations are under CCTV cameras? Is there a commitment to such procedure? Could you give me an example?
13. Who is targeted by CCTV?
    I. Why are they targeted? Could you explain that in more detail?
    II. What has happened to them? Could you explain that in more detail?

Fourth: organisation and control.

14. Who controls these systems?
15. What are the rules and regulations that govern the use of cameras?
16. What are your training plans?
    I. What are the main aims of these plans?
    II. What are the priorities in training schemes? Could you give me an example?
    III. Does the training courses included in the cost of CCTV installations and why?
    IV. Who organizes the training schemes, time schedules and places?
17. Would you like to add or suggest any thing that you feel is related to the questions?

Thank you for your time and your valuable information.

Is it possible to provide me with any documentation on CCTV in this site, such as annual report, training scheme, training manuals, codes of practice or other material that link to our interview. I am deeply indebted for your cooperation.

Appendix V: Interview Guide: Operators and managers of CCTV sites (The shopping mall)

Day
Date / / 2007
Location code C
Interviewee's code
Time: from am/pm to am/pm

1. Could you give me a historical brief of utilizing CCTV cameras in the shopping mall?
    I. Which sites have extensive installations of CCTV cameras and why? Can you give me an example?
    II. Do you have a map showing the placed camera locations?
    III. To what range are the cameras effective and why? Can you give me an example?
2. What is the objective of the employment of cameras in the mall?
    I. Is the system used in a 'proactive' way or is it mainly used retrospectively to deal with incidents after the event?
    II. What are the mechanisms that are used by operators in the control rooms to monitor events in the mall?
    III. How many of those were arrested by usage of the cameras?
3. What kinds of problems do you get on a site like this and how does CCTV help you tackle those problems?
    I. Are these problems daily or seasonally?
    II. Do you regularly use cameras in the same manner to deal with those problems?
    III. How can you manipulate the features of cameras to achieve your task?
    IV. Can you describe a typical day in the CCTV control room?
4. Do you fulfil other tasks parallel to the observation?
5. What other additional surveillance systems are used besides CCTV cameras?
    I. How can you use them?
    II. How can you integrate them to fulfil a task?

III. Is it possible for you to do this function alone?
IV. How do the CCTV operatives deal with incidents that take place in the shopping mall or around it?
V. Which methods that are used to respond to such incidents?

6. Who is targeted by CCTV?
   I. Why are they targeted?
   II. How they are targeted?
   III. What are the methods used in that process?
   IV. What has happened to them?
7. Do you have a list of the names and photos of suspects or previous convicted?
   I. What are the criteria used for the production of such lists?
   II. For how long do you maintain these lists?
   III. How do operatives put names to faces?
8. Do you prevent people from entering the mall?
   I. Why are they excluded?
   II. What are the regulations that control such action?
   III. How long does exclusion take place?
   IV. How can you use the cameras to achieve exclusion?
9. Is the system integrated with other security/surveillance systems in Riyadh?
   I. How are connectivity and the reception of the cameras?
   II. Are they are controlled and monitored through a control room?
   III. How are they operated?
10. Do the retail units in the mall have their own cameras? Do they link to the central control room in the mall?
   I. Do the shop owners get involved in the payment towards the cost of security services, or is there a monthly fee they paid?
11. Do you have any automated systems?
   I. How do these work in practice?
   II. What is the aim of such system?
12. What is the recording system used?
   I. How long do you maintain these records?
   II. Are the security, official or private agencies provided with copies of the recording materials?

III. What are the rules and conditions or administrative procedures that control providing those copies?
IV. Is there a commitment to these procedures?

13. Which security agencies or other official organizations are entitled or allowed to enter the control room?
    I. What are their objectives to attend the control room?
    II. How long does that happen?
    III. What are the rules that control attending the control room?
    IV. Is there a commitment to these procedures?
14. What is your training experience in dealing with cameras?
    I. What are the main aims of these courses?
    II. Who organizes the training schemes, time schedules and places and for how long?
    III. What is the reflection of those training courses on operating the cameras?
15. Would you like to add or suggest any thing that you feel is related to the questions?

Thank you for your time and your valuable information.

Is it possible to provide me with any documentation on CCTV in this site, such as annual report, training scheme, training manuals, codes of practice or other material that are linked to our interview. I am deeply indebted for your cooperation.

Appendix VI: Interview Guide: Operators and managers of CCTV sites (The railway Station)

Day

Date / / 2007

Location code R

Interviewee's code

Time: from am/pm to am/pm

1. Could you give me a historical brief of utilizing CCTV cameras in the railway station in Riyadh?
    I. Which sites have extensive installations of CCTV cameras and why? Can you give me an example?
    II. Do you have a map showing the placed camera locations?
    III. To what range are the cameras effective and why? Can you give me an example?
2. What is the objective of the employment of cameras in the railway station?
    IV. Is the system used in a 'proactive' way or is it mainly used retrospectively to deal with incidents after the event? Can you give me an example?
    V. What are the mechanisms that are used by operators in the control rooms to monitor events in the railway station? Can you give me an example?
    VI. How many of those were arrested by usage of the cameras?
3. What kinds of problems do you get on a site like this and how does CCTV help you tackle those problems? Can you give me an example?
    I. Are these problems daily or seasonally?
    II. Do you regularly use cameras in the same manner to deal with those problems? Can you give me an example?
    III. How can you manipulate the features of cameras to achieve your task? Can you give me an example?
    IV. Can you describe a typical day in the CCTV control room?
4. Do you fulfil other tasks parallel to the observation? Can you give me an example?
5. What other additional surveillance systems are used besides CCTV cameras?
    I. How can you use them?

II. How can you integrate them to fulfil a task? Can you give me an example?
III. Is it possible for you to do this function alone?
IV. How do the CCTV operatives deal with incidents that take place in the railway station or around it? Can you give me an example?
V. Which methods that are used to respond to such incidents? Can you give me an example?

6. Who is targeted by CCTV?
   I. Why are they targeted?
   II. How they are targeted? Can you give me an example?
   III. What are the methods used in that process?
   IV. How can you use cameras in such function?
   V. What has happened to them?
7. Do you have a list of the names and photos of suspects or previous convicted?
   I. What are the criteria used for the production of such lists?
   II. For how long do you maintain these lists?
   III. How do operatives put names to faces? Can you give me an example?
8. Do you prevent people from entering the railway station?
   I. Why are they excluded?
   II. What are the regulations that control such action?
   III. How long does exclusion take place?
   IV. How can you use the cameras to achieve exclusion? Can you give me an example?
9. Is the system integrated with other security/surveillance systems in Riyadh?
   I. How are connectivity and the reception of the cameras?
   II. Are they controlled and monitored through a control room?
   III. How are they operated?
10. Do the other agencies in the railway station have their own cameras?
   I. Do they link to the central control room in the railway station?
   II. Do these agencies get involved in the payment towards the cost of security services, or is there a monthly fee they pay?
11. Do you have any automated systems?
   I. How do these work in practice?
   II. What is the aim of such system?
12. What is the recording system used?

I. How long do you maintain these records?
II. Are the security, official or private agencies provided with copies of the recording materials?
III. What are the rules and conditions or administrative procedures that control providing those copies?
IV. Is there a commitment to these procedures?

13. Which security agencies or other official organizations are entitled or allowed to enter the control room?
    I. What are their objectives to attend the control room? Can you give me an example?
    II. How long does that happen?
    III. What are the rules that control attending the control room?
    IV. Is there a commitment to these procedures?
14. What is your training experience in dealing with cameras?
    I. What are the main aims of these courses?
    II. Who organizes the training schemes, time schedules and places and for how long?
    III. What is the reflection of those training courses on operating the cameras?
15. Would you like to add or suggest any thing that you feel is related to the questions?

Thank you for your time and your valuable information.

Is it possible to provide me with any documentation on CCTV in this site, such as annual report, training schemes, training manuals, codes of practice or other material that are linked to the interview. I am deeply indebted for your cooperation.

Appendix VII: Interview Guide: Operators and managers of CCTV sites (Traffic Department)

Day
Date / / 2007
Location code T
Interviewee's code
Time: from am/pm to am/pm

1. Could you give me a historical brief of utilizing CCTV cameras in the traffic department?
   I. Which sites have extensive installations of CCTV cameras and why? Could you give me an example?
   II. Do you have a map showing the placed camera locations?
   III. To what range are the cameras effective and why? Could you give me an example?
2. What is the objective of the employment of cameras in the traffic department?
   I. How many traffic incidents occur in Riyadh?
   II. What were the results of those incidents? How many deaths and injuries?
   III. What are the main reasons behind such incidents?
   IV. How are cameras used to reduce the number of traffic incidents?
   V. To what extent has the use of cameras contributed to reduce the rate of accidents?
   VI. Is the system used in a 'proactive' way or is it mainly used retrospectively to deal with incidents after the event?
   VII. How many traffic fines are issued annually according to the use of cameras?
   VIII. How much income gained annually from using cameras go to the state treasury?
   IX. How many of those arrested annually by usage of the cameras?
   X Are there cautionary signs to indicate that locations are under CCTV cameras? Is there a commitment to such procedure?
3. What are the mechanisms that are used by operators in the control rooms to monitor events on Riyadh roads?

4. What kinds of problems do you get on a site like this and how does CCTV help you tackle those problems?
    I. Are these problems daily or seasonally? Could you give me an example?
    II. Do you regularly use cameras in the same manner to deal with those problems?
    III. How can you manipulate the features of cameras to achieve your task? Could you give me an example?
    IV. Can you describe a typical day in the CCTV control room?
5. Do you fulfil other tasks parallel to the observation?
6. What other additional surveillance systems are used beside CCTV cameras?
    I. How can you use them?
    II. How can you integrate them to fulfil a task? Could you give me an example?
    III. Is it possible for you to do this function alone?
    IV. How do the CCTV operatives deal with incidents that take place in the roads? Could you give me an example?
    V. Which methods that are used to respond to such incidents? Could you give me an example?
7. Who is targeted by CCTV?
    I. Why are they targeted? Could you give me an example?
    II. How they are targeted? Could you give me an example?
    III. What are the methods used in that process? Could you give me an example?
    IV. What has happened to them?
8. Do you have a list of the names and photos of suspects or previous convicted?
    I. What are the criteria used for the production of such lists?
    II. For how long do you maintain these lists?
    III. How do operatives put names to faces?
9. Is the system integrated with other security/surveillance systems in Riyadh?
    I. How are connectivity and the reception of the cameras?
    II. Are they controlled and monitored through a control room?
    III. How they are operated?
10. Do you have any automated systems?
    I. How do these work in practice?

II. What is the aim of such systems?

11. What is the recording system used?
    I. How long do you maintain these recorders?
    II. Are the security, official or private agencies provided with copies of the recording materials?
    III. What are the rules and conditions or administrative procedures that control providing those copies?
    IV. Is there a commitment to these procedures?
12. Which security agencies or other official organizations are entitled or allowed to enter the control room?
    I. What are their objectives to attend the control room?
    II. How long does that happen?
    III. What are the rules that control attending the control room?
    IV. Is there a commitment to these procedures?
13. What is your training experience in dealing with cameras?
    I. What are the main aims of these courses?
    II. Who organizes the training schemes, time schedules and places and for how long?
    III. What is the reflection of those training courses on operating the cameras?
14. Would you like to add or suggest any thing that you feel is related to the questions?

Thank you for your time and your valuable information.

Is it possible to provide me with any documentation on CCTV in this site, such as annual report, training scheme, training manuals, codes of practice or other material that link to our interview. I am deeply indebted for your cooperation.