THE UNIVERSITY OF HULL

# HEIDEGGER AND LACAN: A Revisionist Account of Heidegger's Fundamental Intentionality According to Lacan's Psychoanalytic Study of the Imaginary Order.

This being a Dissertation submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

in the University of Hull

by

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September, 1993.

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# Introduction

## THE SUBJECTIVITY OF THE SUBJECT

In the title of a recent book, a collection of articles, the 'Subject' is put into question, 'Who Comes After the Subject?'[1] This is a book that takes its starting point from the assumption that the 'subject' is dead. Nietzsche[2] shocked the wise men of his day when he dared to announce the death of God. He was not announcing that he had a new idea for the future. He was merely giving an account of the way things were. The death of God had already taken place, even while the name of God was on everyone's lips.

There were two forms of assumption. There was the assumption that God was alive and well and ruling over the affairs of man. But there was a quite different assumption and that was the assumption of a way of life. The way of life indicated the real assumption. The theoretical assumption was out of joint with it. The theoretical assumption is different from the life assumption in that the latter is not explicit. The nature of the latter's kind of assumption is not explicit either. Do they work in the same way? Does theory relate to its assumptions in the way everyday activity relates to its? Do they have the same sort of preeminence for existence? We are now questioning some of our fundamental assumptions about our most fundamental assumptions.

## Introduction

The assumption that is fundamental to theory is the explicit understanding of it as theory. It is understood to be a way of looking at things as a condition of them appearing under the projected aspects. The theoretical assumptions then dictate the conditions of determination. It is legislative for that which it applies to. In this sense it is pre-eminent to what it applies to. It classifies the field in advance. The field is either relevant to it or not. Thus that which does not apply to it has only negative status. Theory is the way of looking. And this looking, determines the view in advance.

On one hand as a matter of pure Heidegger scholarship, this point defines where Heidegger scholars have failed to understand the original motivation behind Heidegger's questioning of the fundamentals of existence, what he called 'fundamental ontology'. On another hand, as a matter of pure philosophy, it pinpoints a fundamental attitude of philosophers concerning the nature of the symbolic and that which is symbolized. It is, that philosophy gives preeminence in the order of things to the system and its logos.

This attitude runs through opposing camps in philosophy. It is true of those philosophies which are essentially hermeneutical and emphasize the integration of reality within our cultural settings. But even for the realist, who holds the ontological independence of a reality outside of our cultural schema, preeminence is given, contrary to what they

think, to the cultural schema. They understand the work of cognition as one of bringing reality under the most up to date schema we have. It is preeminence through the order of subsumption.

It is these philosophies of the word that Heidegger wants to question, and to subvert. The short way to put it is that they place the word, the logos as the order of the logical/rational, before anything else in the order of determination.

## The Preeminence of the Everyday

Heidegger questions the fundamental assumptions we make in order to obtain our fundamental sense of things. What is it to make sense of things? Is it to subsume things under a prior rationality? Is it that we bring the unintelligible under and fit them within our cognitive systems? Is it that our modes of cognition determine things, and in thus making things intelligible according to our systems of belief that we make sense of things?

These are all ways in which cognition and the features of cognitive systems are given preeminence over the being of things. In order to preempt this move Heidegger began his analysis with the everyday to question the nature and function

of our assumptions about Being, and the everyday sense we have of them. What does making sense mean in terms of the everyday?

Heidegger noticed how the everyday was just ignored by the theoretical disciplines. It is often assumed that the everyday is just a simpler case of the more scientific approach. They assume that it is just levels of sophistication in bringing more and more data into the intelligibility of our belief systems. The everyday is now the place of 'folk theory'.

It is often assumed that theory runs ahead of the 'everyday'. It occurs in the experimental sciences, of psychology and psychoanalysis. Both of these come in for criticism for the way they relate their theory to the observable facts. Psychoanalysis does seem to be way ahead of the facts that can be researched through modern methods of experimentalism.

The case of Freudianism seems very much like this. It is still shocking how much modern psychiatry follows a Freudian line after the years Freudianism had been consigned to the scientific and medical wilderness. Basic premisses like the repetition of childhood trauma in adult neuroses, which were so much the defining feature of psychoanalysis, are now meat and drink to large areas of psychiatry. Yet what sort of research

establishes this? Is it theory ahead of empirical confirmation?

Lacanian theory takes over the ideas of Saussure in general linguistics and applies them straight into psychoanalytic theory.3 What kind of experimentalism actually demonstrates Lacanian principles of reading the psyche? What establishes his structural and hermeneutical principles behind his theory of the psyche? That they are in principle open to empirical research is not my point here, merely that theory looks to run ahead of the facts through prior determination of their possibility. Theory sets the agenda for factual studies and even for facts themselves. Lacan for example refers his 'Mirror Stage'4 theory to studies in mimicry as it applies to animals. But this then need only apply by analogy without demonstration. It is an a priori use of theory that simply borrows from other fields in order to extend an idea.

The everyday affairs of man and his practices are often thought to come trudging along after the prophets have had their say. And this seems to be the way of the relation between theologian and church attender. It is important not to preach from the pulpit what is the everyday fare for the theological student. This same spirit met Galileo when he wanted to make public his theories concerning cosmology.

This of course concerns scientific theory. But is it true of philosophy? Is philosophy ahead of the everyday or is it in continual debt to it? Is philosophy led by the everyday practices of common activities or does it lead them with its expertise? Does it guide us into new ways of being or do the old ways of being dictate its message? Is philosophy ahead of things or behind them?

The title of the book mentioned above puts the question in terms of temporality. The matter of time, questions us in terms of the times we live in. It is the question of where we go from here regarding the issue of subjectivity. We have hitherto thought of ourselves as subjects. There has been a whole history of the use of the term,5 through terms cognate with it from ancient times to its modern use and usage.

It is more than a term, but a way of being.6 Not only has the term come to be used more and more to connote idiosyncrasy, but it covers the modern tendency to a greater individualism as a way of life. This is one of the great features of the work of Heidegger. He took the analysis of the subject out of the school system, and made it a matter of individual issue for the being of each thinker. For Heidegger in his early days the matter of the subjectivity of the subject, was an issue of absolute and resolute interest, concern for us. It was a sort of crisis for how we are and for how we are going to be.

This made him phrase the question in terms of the being of each subject.. For each subject 'being', or rather, 'to be' is always the 'issue'. The question behind every question that a subject faces is that of being. What a subject is going to think, ask, believe, do, hate, love, ignore, all concerns that individual in respect of their being something or other. Being is always the purposive matter, the substance of the issue.7

Yet the primacy of the question of Being for Heidegger was a way setting us free from the dictations of logos over Being. Heidegger lived under this vision. His philosophy was dictated by this vision. The last sentence contains an amalgam of sensory metaphors, advisedly so. It comprises the visual metaphor of philosophy as one of seeing things, as well as philosophy of listening to the voice of reason. The philosopher is caught up in both of these simultaneously. Heidegger was not to realize until very late that his basic motivation was continually being derailed by these very metaphors. Was it possible to discover Being by listening to the dictates of the word?

In an attempt to free himself from Logos as the final mode of determination, he sought ways in which to discover Being without doing so. Yet the way of philosophically following up clues turned out to be only ways of listening to the dictations of the word. He tried to follow the sense of the term. And

to do so was to follow its dictates. It was the voice of Being, but as Being spoke. Thus the prior determination was linguistic. Was there no other way of doing it?

The Heideggerean analysis of Being, as the subjectivity of the subject, was both an analysis of the temporality of the subject as well as the spatiality of the subject. The temporal analysis came first. It took the form of Being and Time. The spatiality took the form of the topology of the subject, which concerned Heidegger more particularly in his later philosophy.

Poggeler for example identifies the 'topology of Being' with Heidegger's later attention to poetic texts rather than philosophical texts. [8] This is exactly right and this thesis in looking at Heidegger's early view of Being from the point of view of a topology rather than a temporality is drawing upon what is latent in the early work rather than an announced theme by Heidegger. He was finally finding a way to discover what drove him in the first place. But it coheres exactly with the thesis that Being is located in the encounter with a logico-linguistic topos. But what sort of encounter?

The poet through divine inspiration realizes he is on holy ground. He is situated in the unity of the fourfold: the heavens above and the earth underneath, taking up his mortal place with a sense of the divine. It is in the later work that

Heidegger was to realize the necessity of analysing human existence in its placing, according to how it is placed, rather than to the logic of its place. This had been the intention in the earlier work. The need that Heidegger sensed, but did not know how to go about it is the issue now.

Is this analysis of the subject a foundational study?9 What does this question mean? [10] It depends upon our metaphors.[11] Is the subjectivity of the subject something we are rooted in as subjects, or is it something we aspire to? If this question is put in the temporal terms used above, then we ask, is the subjectivity of the subject that which we come from, as the origin of our being, or that which we look forward to as the aim of our being, i.e. that which is not yet?

There is an essential ambiguity in Heidegger's analysis that leaves either of these alternatives open. This is due to the way the term can be both origin and end. Heidegger's original thought is couched in transcendental metaphysics. Thus it is necessary to return again to his analysis of Being according to its transcendental account; in particular the way he shows us how to approach it through Kant. It is a return to the question of Being, but with a view to subverting the preeminence of the word.

There is a way of doing this and it is through Lacan. It is due to Lacan's study of the phase prior to what he calls the

Symbolic Order, which is the cultural order of things. Lacan realized through the study of the understanding of the infant, that there was a pre-symbolic stage, which was determinative for the symbolic phase. The relation was not evolutional, nor straightforwardly determinative. There was a play between the two. This play was however analysable.

As such Lacan develops a theoretical format for the development of the psyche which defines, delimits, the Heideggerean account of the subjectivity of the subject. The subject is such that it is always a psychical problem of substantial concern for each psyche. It shows how they are composed as subjects in the cultural order of things and the relation of cultural composition to a pre-cultural setting. Lacan shows the format of an internal cut through the psyche, a fault line between the pre-cultural and the cultural. This fault line is mediated by what he calls the 'Imaginary Order'.[12]

There is a strong parallel here between the approach of Heidegger to the subjectivity of the subject in his early work on Kant. The subjectivity of the subject as Heidegger discovered in Kant, was composed of a categorial framework, underlaid by the Transcendental Imagination. Is there a Kantian framework behind both the work of Heidegger and Lacan? Does this reveal the theoretical framework behind Lacanian psychoanalysis, rather than the usual Hegelian framework supposed?

Such a use of Kant rather than Hegel, returns us more seriously to the problem of Being in Heidegger, as a problem of an internal fault line that runs through Being. Being is not the ground of a monistic unifying and logical ground of all things as it seems to be in Hegel. Heidegger's vision of Being is not the ultimate grounding of all things that it is often taken to mean, whether this be nothing or something. Through this comparison I mean to return to the problem of Being to deny the course Heidegger's work is supposed to have taken for the modern subjectivity of the subject.

## Ontology and the Language of the Subject

But why return to the subjectivity of the subject at all? The assumption after all these days is that the subject is dead, long live postmodernism. This is an unwarranted assumption about the times we live in. It is typical of our metaphysics that it no longer feels the weight of Being as a substantial issue. It is not sensed at all other than in the logic of its term. It is not felt by those who think that philosophy is just a matter of grafting texts on to other texts. The matter of philosophy just is a former text. There is nothing that grounds it. There is nothing to go by but the system itself.

There seems to me a striking parallel with Kant. Kant realized the need for ballast in metaphysical questions, the

deep questions, the questions that fundamentally matter. Without this sense of the weightiness of the issues, the metaphysician can easily take wings into a theoretical imagination where there is no friction to give their work the necessary rub.

'Misled by such a proof of the power of reason, the demand for the extension of knowledge recognises no limits. The light dove, cleaving the air in her free flight, and feeling its resistance, might imagine that its flight would be still easier in empty space. It was thus that Plato left the world of the senses, as setting too narrow limits to the understanding, and ventured out beyond it on the wings of the ideas, in the empty space of the pure understanding. He did not observe that with all his efforts he made no advance - meeting no resistance that might, as it were, serve as a support upon which he could take a stand, to which he could apply his powers, and so set his understanding in motion.'[13]

Does this mean that Kant wrote a work based upon empirical study? On the contrary, he produced an a priori work, based upon a priori investigations into a priori principles. Is it legitimate to claim such a feeling for the relation of ideas, i.e. the theoretical investigation, to the earth beneath us, while to continue in the realm of ideas? What sort of sensitivity is this? Ought it not to be full of

experimentation in order to keep its feet firmly planted on the ground?

This is exactly the point Wittgenstein felt acutely, when he criticised the philosophy of language that he had been heir to. He realized that the analysis of the logic of our language was only carried out when language was idling, and not when it was doing work.[14] Linguistic analysis only took place upon a language that was on holiday. And yet he continued his analysis of language in a purely a priori fashion. Where is the consistency here? Can one be sensitive to the actual workings of language, with an a priori investigation, without getting lost in the idle linguistics of word play?

When we take up the work of Heidegger on fundamental ontology, are we just responding to the terms he coined, the text he grafted on to other texts? Or are we trying to think something through? Does a critique of Heidegger consist in thinking through the logical implications of his texts? Does a refutation consist in deriving illogicalities within it? Surely there is no Being to which the account is supposed to correspond?

This is such an important question for Heidegger studies today, especially when one considers the spread of Deconstructionism in the name of Heidegger. Is this word play of the idling variety, or does it do work? In what sense does what goes on

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only with other sets of discourse. It certainly does not establish itself by any state of reality that it represents.

The philosopher, it would seem that Rorty is saying, is an agent of his mode of discourse, and within it he is to be adjudged according to its internal principles and whether or not what he has to say is of interest. But this leaves the question of whether philosophy is entirely composed by the internal relations of its own logic, or whether the philosopher feels that in his thinking he is bound by more than the drive of logic.[17]

The Continental tradition has more of a sensitivity to the composition of the subjectivity of the subject. The analytic tradition seems to have a blind spot to this problem.[18] Although there is a great deal of analytic philosophy that takes itself seriously concerning the substantive nature of its philosophizing, the subjectivity of the subject is dealt with on a par with the objectivity of the object.

There is a necessary sense of balance in the sensitivity to that which philosophy actually talks about. It reflects how philosophy not only tries to talk, but in doing so there is something that it is trying to say.19 This often however takes the form of thinking the subject as just another object of reference requiring full description in the form of subsumption under objective categories.

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Rorty is closer to the mark in his recognition that our involvement in discourse is not one of using them representational purposes. Modern versions of Realism are just as naive. It is completely naive of Sterelny and Devitt to say for example against Kantianism,

'Talk of imposing on the world should be just a metaphor. Yet the metaphysics of the radicals requires that we take this metaphor literally.... Once these metaphors are recognized for what they are, we are left with only the organizing mind and its experience together with the unknowable, and gratuitously assume, thing-in-itself. There are not really any stones, tress and cats at all.'[20]

Yet how can they not realize that it is stones, trees and cats that they are referring to? Reference in each case is conducted according to the terms. The sort of reference they are using, assumes we know them according to their names. We know them by their terminological references. And this is my point about Realists. They assume the priority of language without realizing it. They refer according to the way the system refers, all the time, while proclaiming that it is the thing independently of the system that refers us.

It is easier on this matter to agree with Rorty that there is no such thing as a reality that is discourse-independent, and that our forms of discourse are all moving towards a more

accurate representation of. Philosophical discourse does not do its work by attempting more and more accurate representations of reality either.21 To the contrary all this is argued for by Searle. Language is the categorial22 grid we use for reading off reality. It is all part of science and the scientific quest to bring reality under our modes of discourse. Let us go to work and form a language that is adequate.

The account of language in this thesis will show the misguided nature of both approaches. This means it intends to show why language does work with that which is outside the logic of the system, without accepting a realist view of the world. Rorty's position seems to be that language produces more and more interesting things to say23 without really telling us what 'say' means here, and how it is that language can function non-representationally and yet have a real function.

Is it possible to say that language does real work to that which is outside the system, while accepting that language does not represent the world? The thesis here is that this is not only possible but decidedly the case. It is the case because it is not language that projects itself upon reality, but that the pre-cultural projects itself into language. The pre-cultural is not the world, nor reality. In order to understand this 'projection' must first be understood. The

nature of this projection is the focus of the analysis. More specifically the understanding that belongs to it.

The work of Searle is on target in this regard. He has been singled out by Deconstructions of the Subject to exemplify the naive approach to the subject.24 Even so, Searle's work has recently taken a turn which is important for this work. He has realized the significance of the subject's background.[25] Thus Searle's observations provide a marker for the discussion that arises here on 'Background', a marker helpful to keep our 'Continental' thinkers mapped on to more familiar surroundings.

The intentionality of the subject is based upon a background, the nature of which has become a controversial issue. What is also controversial about it is the possibility of decoding it. Can we make it the objective ground of research? While Searle is going to work to bring it into the field of theoretical research, Dreyfus is arguing that this has been tried before, viz. by Husserl and was a failure that the work of Heidegger exists as a landmark in showing why.

Is the background to human understanding intrinsically inaccessible, or just an infinite task for finite processing measures? Dreyfus uses Heidegger to warn other philosophers off from following the Husserlian misconception of the nature of this background to understanding.26

## Introduction

The background to understanding is the philosophical issue that Heidegger was sensitive to. I want to argue that it required a peculiar kind of sensitivity to the background of thought, that gave for him the pull on his thinking that meant his thought was not idling. The nature of this sensitivity is not exposed by Dreyfus's account of the background. Heidegger's account of the relation of thought to background begins with Kant, and its boundaries are particularly well marked out by Lacan.

Lacan draws the distinction between three orders. They are the Real, the Imaginary and the Symbolic. I want to compare these divisions with the way Heidegger treats the Kantian distinctions between Being, the Transcendental Imagination and the Understanding. Such distinctions in Kant are found through his transcendental method of-investigation. It is the procedure of discovering the assumptions that show the a priori conditions upon which rests the possibility of things being as they are to us. But within this transcendental method, there is a backward, regressive movement of thought back to its own, most original capacity of thought. It works back to that out of which thought emerges. This is what thought thinks. I.e. there is a content that works itself out in thought.[27]

This is such a basic orientation in Heidegger and yet one that is missed over and over again in Heidegger studies. In the attempt to attribute to Heidegger such anti-dualist tendencies

the nature of the resistance of thought to that which is thought is overlooked, and substituted with Being and its manifold forms. Thus Heidegger becomes a kind of inverted Hegel. Instead of thought thinking itself out, we have Being working itself out.

If language is intrinsically non-representational, is thought non-representational also? In that case what does thought think? And if it thinks it non-representationally, then how does it think, if it is non-representational? It is not an anwer just to say that thought is non-representational. This leaves the matter high and dry. Is there an alternative?

**Neo-Kantianism:**

Underlying Heidegger's early critique of the subjectivity of the subject was his opponents in philosophy. They were the school of Neo-Kantians. The view that Heidegger's critique of Kant was a refutation of, was the Neo-Kantian view that the relation of the subject to the world was a logically determinative one.

The critique of the subjectivity of the subject has not yet been understood by Heidegger readers as yet. The latest misreading of his view is the assimilation of Heidegger under Holism as a philosophical doctrine.

This view is repeated again in Haugeland's paper, 'Dasein's Disclosedness', [16] Haugeland suits my purposes here because he is the most modern exponent of this, although Dreyfus has a similar view. Dreyfus however is different in a most important respect. For the moment I will just state the view, and then set it into the framework of Heidegger and modern philosophy of language.

Heidegger's rejection of Neo-Kantianism in his Kant book, comes in the form of an exposition of Kant. Kant, he says, produced a work on fundamental ontology. The Neo-Kantians said it was a work on epistemology, i.e. the possibility of knowledge. Heidegger said that the being of the subject, i.e. its subjectivity, was a receptive mode of orientation. The Neo-Kantians said it was an active, spontaneous mode of cognizing reality. According to Heidegger's Kant, our understanding of reality was the basis for our logical determination of reality.28 But according to the Neo-Kantian, reality only came in the forms that our cognitive determinations gave it, and these all belonged fundamentally to the transcendental categories of imposition or projection.

It is the last point that helps define Heidegger's original views on Being and where he stands in regard to modern positions in philosophy. It is this point that shows that Heidegger is at odds with these positions, and does not share their philosophy of language and culture.

In sum the position is this. The Neo-Kantian position is that the determination of anything at all is finally and ultimately based upon the logical form of our categories. This gives priority of determination to the logos over being. It gives it a preeminence that Heidegger wanted to deny.[29]

Haugeland is one such case in that he represents the philosophical position of hermeneutical holism. This is the position that if we are to make sense of anything at all, it must be put into context. The context is a wider setting which has that which is to be understood, made sense of, placed within its boundaries. Its place within the set up is what enables us to make sense of the object the respective inquiry is about.

Haugeland puts his point like this.

'There are three main points. First, whatever is interpreted must be taken in its full concretion; in particular, each item must be taken in its complete concrete context - not just physical circumstances, but also conversational, biographical, political, and what have you.... Second, whatever is to be interpreted must always already belong to and be construed in terms of a common institutional framework.... To say that the language is common is to say that all the utterances are "in " the same language - the same vocabulary and the same grammar, roughly. (If each utterance were in a different language,

holistic constraints could not get a grip, and interpretation would be impossible.... Third, interpreted behavior must always be apportioned among accountable agents.'30

The last point is particularly interesting for this thesis but it does not arise until later in the discussion. For now I want to put to Haugeland's holistic thesis of Heidegger the question, 'Where does it place Heidegger's position in respect of the Neo-Kantians? What I believe is false about Haugeland's reading of Heidegger is that it puts Heidegger in amongst them.

The thesis that I want to present for Heidegger is that to make sense of a concrete situation, object or state, requires more than context of this kind. What it requires is not first and foremost a context, because it is not a text of any kind. Nor is it just a wider logical or institutionalised framework within which to set the narrower frame.

What Haugeland is in fact doing is exactly what the Neo-Kantians did. All interpretation was a case of bringing something or other into a wider, already cultured and institutionalised setting, such that it was readable by the fit it had within the prior intelligibility of that framework. Later it will be seen that we take 'culture' in a wide sense. It is what Lacan calls the symbolic order.

## Introduction

Within culture everything has its logos, its logic. Everything is made to fit intelligibly with every other thing. It is this fit that Haugeland is talking about when he says,

'... voting for president only makes sense in the context of being a registered voter with a valid ballot during a presidential election; ... if behavior is to be interpreted as making sense of things, it must itself be understod as situated and busy <u>in the midst of</u> those things.'[31]

It is from the standpoint of our cultural contexts that any interpretation is made. The artefacts we have are culturally based. And even the things of nature are understood for their relevance to cultural requirements. It is this assumption of the holist that I want to question. Firstly it is not the way to follow the thinking on these matters made possible for Heidegger. Secondly, it is not the case anyway.

'Neo-Kantian' then can serve as the label for any view in which the categories of the cultural contexts serve to subsume the being of anything, and thereby serve as the original and final determination of things, upon which relies their sense. It is a Neo-Kantian philosophy if the categories are what ultimately determines a thing in its mode of being.

Contrary to this I will show a quite different possibility. While I will continue to follow the texts of Heidegger, I will

interpret them with the aid of work done by Lacan on the Mirror Theory. And just as Heidegger developed his position through the work Kant had done on the Transcendental Imagination, I will in turn do Heidegger the courtesy of reading him through the work Lacan has done on what the latter calls the Imaginary Order.

It will however be an attempt to stay close to the spirit of Heidegger and to think the problem through even if it means violence to the text. Heidegger has given license to this in the Kant book.[32] Violence does not mean riding roughshod over the text. On the contrary it means strict fidelity to the intentions of the text but insofar as those intentions have failed to come out. In other words to think them through.

The view I will express here is that firstly, the logic of the context is not what finally settles the meaning or sense of things. It is from beyond the context, outside of the logical scope of the context, that sense is brought to the context itself.

Secondly, the orientation towards the determination of things, which constitutes the subjectivity of the subject, is not first and foremost a mental attitude, or a disposition to categorially determine things. On the contrary understanding consists first and foremost with the concern to find means to rendering them as they are already given.

Thirdly, the relation of our cultural and symbolic order is not to represent reality, but as a cultural matrix whereby we resolve ourselves through a restructuring of ourselves.

# CHAPTER ONE: **Fundamental Ontology**

## DISJUNCTION OF BEING AND BEINGS

Heidegger's original quest for a fundamental ontology looks, on the face of it, to be a straight case of producing an analysis of Being, which is then seen to stand in a primordial relation to beings. Each individual being is a determination of Being in general. But the matter is not as simple as that, even if this was the way Heidegger originally saw the problem.

To take Being in general as the fundamental ground for the determination of individual beings does not work. The reason is that it gives priority of the word, in its wide sense of 'logos'(rationale) over everything. For Being is understood from the position of our worldliness, and our worldliness is the subject's constitution insofar as it stands within a cultured context. Such a cultured context is what Heidegger calls a clearing. This is the place where matters have been cleared up. We see things with an understanding such that things have an intelligibility. This intelligibility is a cultural one.

## Fundamental Ontology

If Heidegger makes Being primordial for an understanding of beings, then is this understanding of Being based upon the clarity given by our culturalized state? If it is then Being is eqivalent to the enlightenment that our worldly ways casts upon things. Being is then based upon the intelligibility that derives from the system whereby things are determined.

Is it the case that Heidegger thought like this? He proceeded according to an analysis of the meaning of Being. The clue the analysis followed upon, would then be the logic of its intelligibility. We need therefore to take another look at Heidegger's whole approach to fundamental ontology. In doing so we need to ask again about the radical disjunction between Being and being, in what Heidegger calls the ontological distinction?

Searle once asked Cornelius Castoriadis whether he thought there was a radical break between the biological realm and the cultural realm.[1] While Castoriadis claimed there was, Searle claimed the opposite. It is in putting this question to Heidegger's disjunctive distinction between Being and being, that the relation between the two can be further developed, and in a way that develops the notion.

In fact these two philosophers are talking at cross purposes without realizing. Searle is talking about the relation of body to mind in terms of how we can from our position as

theorists, give a systematic and embracing account of their natures. Below we will see what this comprises of. Castoriadis however sees the situation from a quite different point of view, and that is from the standpoint of human understanding. How does understanding transform itself from a pre-cultural form into its cultural form? The latter's question is about the fundamental nature of the subjectivity of the subject.

Tracing the origins of what is fundamentally the case about human existence consists of taking understanding as the clue. It is our own understanding that provides the clue to what is fundamental. We trace the fundamental through what is already given to our understanding. Searle on the other hand is comparing two objective states of affairs, and from an objectivising position he looks for emergent properties in the subject which are on a par with any object.

This is not to deny that for Searle the problem of subjectivity does not arise. It arises for him in a radical way. He realizes the limitations of objectivity as a way of accounting for human understanding from a position of subjectivity. But this has not prevented the misunderstanding and the continuing debate which is based upon it.

So we must be clear that the relation between nature and culture that is being discussed here is the one that traces the

roots of our understanding. Freud had begun his own programme from the position I have ascribed to Searle. He tried to show how neurophysiology and the logic of the understanding belonged together. It was only later through a different approach, that of interpreting what people said, and then seeking to find a method of decoding this. The interpretation locates the deep understanding which formed its significance. In this way Freud put the whole programme on a hermeneutical basis.

Here again we have the foundation for our comparison of Lacan and Heidegger in the subjectivity of the subject. Lacan produces a radical reading of Freud's texts. Freud has bequeathed to us the psychic distinctions of id, ego and superego. These distinctions are of particular interest here due to the way they draw up the categorial relations between Being and being.

Freud uses the category of the 'id', or really the 'it' (das Es) to refer to the those aspects of the psyche which come into contact with cultural norms and standards.[2] These cultural standards are imposed on the psyche from without. The psyche integrates them to a certain extent and they form the superego. A relation between cultural and pre-cultural then is set up. Both of them are now working as different functions within the same mind.

The potential disjunction between these two makes another feature of the mind to form and that is called the ego. The ego mediates between the two. Freud tends to concentrate on the disjunctive relation between id and superego and the mediating relation of the ego as one of overcoming it. But the fundamental philosophical question behind his empirical questioning, is how the relation between culture and nature is understood insofar as they are co-present in the unified psyche. Is it an arbitrary one, a radical disjunction such that the natural does not develop naturally into the cultural, or is it an entirely natural development?

In Lacan this question is posed within a similar framework. There is what Lacan refers to as a pre-symbolic state, what I take to be a pre-cultural state, of the biological organism of the infant. In Lacan, the subject is caught between the two. The subjectivity of the subject can only be understood within their radical disjunction. This is not a simple disjunction between nature and culture because talk of 'nature' is a culturalized entity. It is that which is present in the subject, that the subject needs to adapt to, without being able to know what it is. For to know what it is, is to enculture it.

Just as in Freud there is a radical conflict between the two, so there is in Lacan. The biology of the infant is one of incompleteness, dependence, biological immaturity. These then

become constituents of the psyche. The psyche has to be such as to find the answers to these in the image.

We are, in referring to the 'id', talking about more than just the biological. We are talking about how it transposes an orientating disposition of itself into the psychical. For Freud this realization took the course of a process of wresting himself free from talk about basic instincts, from a purely quantitative libido theory, to that of realizing the possibility of the psychical through these elements. It does not just 'emerge'.

Freud talks of the displacement of the libido, which is a dislodging, a transposing, a transference, a translation etc. This is not a transmutation of a biological process into a mental process. It is a holding together of two processes that do not merge into one. They are still features of the psyche. The psyche is more than rationality. Freud like Plato, in his dialogue (Phaedrus), sees the ego at war with the id. The relation is like that of the a man on horseback. The horse is the one with the superior power and drive, the rider is merely director of it.[3]

Lacan symbolizes this relationship by using a model from Linguistics, more specifically that of Saussure. Each word functions as a sign which is the unity of a signifier (the material element of the sign) and a signified (usually taken to

be the concept). Only in the unity of these two can there be a word. Lacan uses the model as a model for the componential nature of the psyche.

It is composed of the fixed unity of signifier and signified. The model is intended to account for the way pre-symbolic and symbolic composition of the psyche are fixed together. Lacan calls these fixes 'points de capiton' (as in upholstery buttons). Lacan realizes that to systematically relate the signifiers to other signifiers and respectively so for signifieds, would result in an unacceptable linearity. It would not show the nature of com-positon of the internal elements of the psyche. Thus,

'All our experience runs counter to this linearity, which made me speak once, in one of my seminars on psychosis, of something more like 'anchoring points' (points de capiton) as a schema for taking into account the dominance of the letter in the dramatic transformation that dialogue can effect in the subject.'[4]

How much is this internal disjunction which forms the subject akin to the distinction Heidegger draws between Being and being? This distinction is the basis of Heidegger's understanding of 'transcendence', which furnishes him with an account of what Kant was striving to solve with his (Kant's) transcendental account of metaphysics.

An illustration of the problem we are coming across here, comes from what we base our understanding of language upon. Now let us imagine this problem as itself, in return, defined by the linguistic model. How do we know we are using a word correctly? Is it when we are able to relate it correctly to all other words?

This answer corresponds to being able to link up all the signs in a linear line. All the signs in the system are related correctly as the system dictates it. One looks up the word in the dictionary and sees which words one is to relate them to. Would this be enough? Not, illustratively so, according to Norman Malcolm.

Malcolm asks whether we would say that a tree understood a word if it were possible for that tree to speak and to use the word correctly every time by linking it up correctly with other words. Malcolm says that this would not be a sufficient condition for saying that the tree understood the word. For Malcolm, understanding language involves more than correct use of words. It involves behaviour. Thus he says,

'To see this point think of the normal teaching of words (e.g. "spoon," "dog," "red,") to a child and how one decides whether he understands them. At a primitive stage of teaching one does not require or expect definitions, but rather that the child should <u>pick</u> <u>out</u> reds from blues, dogs from cats, spoons

from forks. This involves his looking, pointing, reaching for and going to the right things and not the wrong ones... Try to suppose that he says the right words but looks at and reaches for the wrong things. Should we be tempted to say that he has mastered the use of those words? No, indeed. The disparity between words and behavior would make us say that he does not understand the words.'[5]

Malcolm has made a very relevant point here. When we come to understand what is involved in the use of words there must be more in our account than the correct application of those words. It is somehow united with more basic forms of behaviour. It is rooted in actions which involves us in the practicalities of daily living.

What however is missing from this account is how the behavioural activities become infused with logic, such that they become socio-logical. What does it mean for our behaviour to become social? Is it that it has a socio-logicality to it? How then does this behaviour transmute into the logicality of linguistic use? Does it have a logicality prior to a linguisticality? The basic problem is how these two forms of behaviour hold together.

It was Wittgenstein who had said that when we learn to use words like 'pain' we learn a new pain behaviour. Here is a case of transmutation. Wittgenstein claimed, 'Our language-

game is an extension of primitive behaviour'.[6] The metaphor 'extention' does not do enough work. Is the primitive not still present in the secondary form of behaviour? In what way is the primitive related to the secondary? How is it still present? Dilman uses the metaphor 'embedded'.[7] He says,

'It is in learning to speak this language and assimilating the culture that the individual is transformed; and this includes what he becomes capable of cognizing and experiencing - cognizing in himself and elsewhere. Insofar as we regard some of the things he becomes capable of feeling in adulthood as continous with the feelings that find expression in these primitive, instinctive reactions, we could speak of the original feelings (belonging to the id, as Freud would say) as <u>transformed</u> when they become the object of the person's awareness.'[8]

It is one thing to claim that a new form of pain behaviour is learnt and actually showing the nature of how they work together. Is there a dichotomy formation between new pain behaviour and old? How does new pain behaviour translate the old? Is it a sublimated version of the old, and thus pain behaviour in disguise? In what way is the former present in the new? Is it a transcendental form? How does the secondary form show the prior form? Do we take it for the prior form or in place of it? Calling it a new form of

behaviour says nothing about these questions. And yet these are the sorts of problems it was designed to absolve.

This is the sort of thing that the behaviourism of meaning as use does not even attempt to account for. It is as if the form of linguistic behaviour is self-evident in its function just as behaviour. As soon as they point out that it is a form of behaviour we are all supposed to think that this is the end of the story. But it fails to show us how language works. It fails to show us how language works when it is used.

What this account lacks is depth. I mean that the nature of the linguistic form of behaviour is abstracted from that other form of behaviour which it transforms. In the Freudian and then Lacanian theory of meaning, there is a kind of metaphorical union of the two. It is in their union that we have meaning. But in the behaviourist account the original form of behaviour is left behind and no longer plays a part in the 'higher' form of behaviour.

In Heidegger, the relation between Being and beings is a problem. But when neobehaviourists like Rorty read Heidegger, the problem is regarded as a non-problem. To even regard it as a problem they say, is to fall into a dualist trap. Or it is to fall into the trap of taking such behaviourist activities

like thinking, as somehow modes of representation which try and reflect an extra-linguistic reality.

The hidden thesis behind Rorty's thesis, is that when we use language, the actual use does no real work, other than bringing together the use of terms. If I may use a metaphor, it is a horizontal form of behaviour with our vocabulary with no vertical plumbline into reality. This I take it is to return to the idle use of language. It no longer feels the pull of language as it works something. It is as if the bicycle chain has become free from the function of turning the wheels. It performs perfectly in its cyclical motion, but it is not actually doing any work.

This is the kind of uselessness of saying that language is just a form of behaviour. To say that we use these words just to behave like this says nothing at all. It is as if behaviour was just an end in itself. If we came to a civilization and saw that they pedalled bicycles in which chain and sprockets did not turn bicycle wheels, we would be amused and bemused. If we asked what the point of this was and they replied that it was just a custom, one would be excused for thinking that they had once upon a time been hoodwinked by some clever salesman selling a bicycle that did not work. And if we had any decency about us we would show them how to make the bicycle work.

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Another way to illustrate what I take to be the Rorty account of Heidegger, and of his philosophy of mind in general, is to accuse it of being a form of epiphenomenalism. Linguistic use emerges out of other behavioural forms. But with the emergence of this form, it is no longer responsible to that which it emerges from. It carries on, in and under its own steam, creating more and more vocabulary, and a world that belongs to linguistic variations in purified form.

This is not a case of making a straw man out of Rorty's position. On the contrary much of this position about language and reality is accepted here. Rorty has realized how the emergent realm of cultural behaviour, that emerges with an existence in a new linguistic habitat, is no longer in a simple referential relation to that which it has come from. We are now within a new culture and anything we can talk about or refer to is now going to be within the terms of our prioritizing mode of discourse.

Language is not separable from reality such that there is reality on one side and its linguistic reflection on the other. Reality does not exist without language. Reality cannot be pointed at without assuming what we understand linguistically what it is we are pointing at. The pointing itself is one language game presupposing others.

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Presupposing this though does not imply that language does no work beyond relating itself to other words within the linguistic system. This is where the departure with Rorty is made. But where then is this work to be found?

Searle takes this problem as a mind-body problem.[9] He thinks that he explains the emergence of the psyche as akin to the emergence of higher properties from the bonding simpler units into a more complex composite. For Searle how the brain becomes a psyche is the same problem of how the molecules of water become water when the bind into complex water molecules.

On the contrary, mind emerges, not as a straightforward case of particles bonding, but as the capacity of an individual to assume and thus constitute itself according to the higher logic of a cultural realm.

This is where emergence takes place. And because it takes place here, on a cultural stage, all its references will take place on that stage as well. There is no status quo still left outside the stage that we can simply point at with our linguistic pointers.

The emergence of psyche, mind is not the emergence of brain. Searle does not do enough to keep these two apart. Psyche is formed by a socio-logic. It is always in a subjectivity structure. It emerges when it can constitute its activities

according to these sociological forms. It is not the forging of biological units. That is merely the emergence of the biological unit we call brains.

The properties of the subject are not emergent properties. They do not belong to the subject the way water properties belong to water molecules. The latter's properties belong to it purely in virtue of its own individual and material composition. But the human subject can only have a psyche when it assumes social roles that are there independent of its individual composition. There are two radically different relations to their respective properties. The psyche and the subject relate to their properties through transcendence. Their properties are transcendental.

The transcendental is that which is over and above the individual. The individual takes on certain properties and wears them. It is like putting on clothes and taking them off again. Without them he is nothing in terms of subjectivity. He is only something subjective according to them. Paradoxically though they show that these modes of being lack substance. This is the basis of the Heideggerean position as he develops it from Kant.

The Heideggerean distinction between Being and beings, the ontological difference, was never intended by Heidegger to hyphen itself off into rarefied cultural products. The

concentrated focus upon Being was meant to prevent this. He intended to keep heaven and earth together.

But the problem now is, how aware was Heidegger in his pursuit of the problem of Being and its relation to beings, of the formation of the subject from a natural state, projecting itself into a cultural mould? Did Heidegger try and solve the meaning of 'Being' entirely within the cultural system? Is it to be analysed purely within a logicality of Being? Had he no sense of the boundaries of culture as places where logical form became flesh and flesh becomes logical in form?

It is the place where logic and flesh come together without us having out the nature of the togetherness. In this case is the relation between Being and being something that can be analysed strictly within the logic of our discourse? Or does it comprise a sense of disjunction right at the heart of Being, between the logic of our culture and that which enters it in order to be present in it?

## A QUESTION OF BEING

Heidegger's magnum opus, Being and Time is famous for the way it restores 'Being' to the centre of all philosophical focus. 'Being' is the question. 'Being' is put forward as the thesis for all philosophers, no matter what their special interest.

But was 'Being' what Heidegger was most fundamentally interested in? Or was it that Heidegger was interested in the most fundamental, only later to find out that Being was not the most fundamental? Was it that he was drawn to Being at first because he was caught up in the logic of being a philosopher? Was it not also the case that when he came to realize that the logic of the philosopher was not fundamental enough, he had to resort to another way to get beyond Being to that which lay behind it?

This retracing of the Heidegger mind may be summarized as this. Heidegger realized that the determination of beings in the history of mankind was made from the position of Being. Even so a philosophy of Being could not be regarded as fundamental. The philosophy of Being, as that which constitutes the subjectivity of the subject, is caught up in the logicality of its own framework. Being must always be determined philosophically in the form of a logicality. The reason for this is, that philosophical analysis of Being is guided by the term. And thus it is the term which decides.

And this is why Being, as discovered by philosophy, turns out to be disposed according to the logicality of the transcendental nature of subjectivity. As such it is the determinative ground for the beings which it determines according to modalities that belong to our rational order of

things. Culturally constituted subjectivity means a culturally constituted Being.

And yet Being is not identical with logicality, even its own logicality. But can they be prized apart? Is ontology as the philosophical discipline that analyses the nature of Being, delimited by how it presupposes the unity of Being and logic? Ontology must live up to its name. Can we work back to Being as that which is understood as the primitive grounds out of which the subjectivity of the subject forms? This is the Heideggerean problem.

As such this account differs from that given by Olafson and many others like Richardson.[10] The Heidegger of Being and Time according to them, is supposed to be interested in Dasein (the term Heidegger uses to stand for the kind of existence he gives priority to), that being for whom Being is the issue, and then in his later writings reversed the order of priority. On the contrary 'Being' was the issue at the beginning only to be subverted later.

It is not necessary to take Dasein as human existence as they do. Even though Heidegger says that Dasein is that for which Being is the issue does not imply that it stands for human existence either. I will later show a totally different way to understand Dasein. The literal meaning is just 'existence'. The etymology, which Heidegger is making word

play upon is 'being-there'. But the meaning of 'being-there' is what is analysed, so as to show that to be there is the intentional content of the understanding. It is therefore an issue for human existence but not identical to it.

What they have not noticed was that although Being was the issue in Being and Time he phrased the question as the problem about the meaning of 'Being'. It was this move that prejudged the outcome and limits of the enquiry. For it is 'Being' as the content of the intentionality of the understanding. If it is a meaning content, then this makes analysis possible. But it also means that if we identify Being with the meaning of 'Being' insofar as this is present in an intentional content, then there already is a fusion between Being and the logicality of the term. This already makes ontology the means of determination. The logic of being is what ontology intends to settle. Ontology does not impose its categories upon Being, but by analysis discovers them.

Realizing this the later work needs to go beyond the logic of 'Being' to Being as happening, in order to get more primitive access to an understanding motivated by and towards being there, here and now. Thus we find Heidegger gravitating towards different fundamental terms like 'Ereignis'. This explains why the later Heidegger no longer works with philosophical texts, and why his work does not fit the category

of 'philosophy'. Thus we find him working with poetic texts in which his own work becomes more and more poetical.[11]

As Heidegger pointed out about Kant, it is possible to understand a thinker's problems better than he understood them himself.12 Maybe Heidegger did not understand that there was an understanding of this situation in the early work. This is what I intend to look for.

A differentiation had emerged, not merely a logical distinction but an event in human history, between Being and beings,[13] which is not to say that Being is an event or process.14 But beings receive their determination from Being in general. Heidegger then, in the role of 'philosopher', searches out the basic understanding of this Being from the history of thought.[15] All the time he is presupposing, or taking his cue, from that history of thought, that Being is the more primary of the two. But what Heidegger does not do, is suppose that Being can be understood from the logic of the term, or the language game in which it figures. He ends up going beyond the boundaries set by the term. We shall see where he thought this was.

Here is a crucial point where Heidegger has been misunderstood by Rorty. For Rorty, just as for Heidegger, the way to subvert the modern metaphysical mentality, is by showing how it fits into the pattern of thought bestowed upon it by the

history of metaphysics. But for Rorty, it shows that philosophy is just one more language game that we are caught up in today. We have traced the history of our vocabulary, and now we become intrigued by it, by continuing within it.

Rorty states his own position typically thus,

'Following Wittgenstein, we shall treat the fact that there is no such thing as "a misleading appearance of pain" not as a strange fact about a special ontological genus called the mental, but just as a remark about a language-game - the remark that we have the convention of taking people's word for what they are feeling. From this "language-game" point of view, the fact that a man is feeling whatever he thinks he's feeling has no more ontological significance than the fact that the Constitution is what the Supreme Court thinks it is, or that the ball is foul if the umpire thinks it is.'[16]

The point of view of the language-game is precisely the point of view that Heidegger is questioning. This can be seen from his use of Aristotle on nature as 'phusis'(emerging). Being as phusis is an emergence from a dark state. I.e. there is a movement from the benighted state of understanding, lacking any clarity, into the unconcealed light of day, the cultural stage. Thus carried into the light of the language-game is the movement of emergence. It is the movement of bringing oneself out of darkness into light.

The history of thought though has moved further and further away from the origins of this scene and taken up camp within the language game. Thus when Being is analysed it is done from the point of view of the logic of our language game. But not when Being is doing its work.

Today the ontological problems centre around what exists.[17] For Heidegger these are problems already set out for us in the history of the development of different historical determinations of the problem of Being. The modern one is characterized by taking 'Being' to mean 'actuality'. It is also the identification of Being with Reality. The question about what we can grant ontological status to is the problem of what we are prepared to grant reality to, or actuality.

For Heidegger, these problems of philosophy are carried out naively if we do not at least begin by tracing the origins of our inheritance. The vocabulary determines our thinking and the kind of resolutions we look for. It sets the parameters for our ontology.

One fundamental distinction metaphysics works with is that of what a thing is and that it is. This is at the root of our problem. It shows how we divide things into logical determination and the reality of the thing. But this is not just a mental distinction we carry around in metaphysical circles. 'The division into whatness and thatness does not

<u>just contain a doctrine of metaphysical thinking. It points to an event in the history of Being.</u>'[18]

When we couple this distinction with the subjectivity of the subject, the belief then emerges that our modality of subjectivity has no being. It has no reality because it falls into the ontological divide on the side of whatness. In Rylean language it would be adjectival rather than substantial. For Heidegger this misses the whole nature of the ontological distinction. It misses out the intentionality of the subjectivity of the subject, as the transcendental condition for individual beings to be determined.[19] The subjectivity of the subject thus removed returns the subject to the existence of a substance.

This affects how one lives one's life, it becomes an issue, because individuals search for a mode of subjectivity which will be substantial. They want a kind of existence which perpetuates the way substances do, continuing in sameness of identity through time. In this way they look for that which gives substance to their lives. For Heidegger this is to turn one's back on the subjectivity of the subject which is not substantial at all. But the mistake is to conclude that it has no Being.

It is in the subjectivity of the subject that Being holds true. Being belongs to the subject as its intentional modality. It

is not a property of the individual. It is not a property of the object, using 'property' in a very non-Heideggerean sense. This would be due to the object not being intentional. The object does have transcendental properties, but these stem from the way the subject takes an individual.

Plato mistook it for the Idea, the universal Form. Aristotle was closer to the Greek view, according to Heidegger, in that he saw that it was the emergence of nature (physis) into the light of unconcealment. Although we cannot discuss Aristotle here, it should be apparent in what follows, how close to Aristotle Heidegger is. And I find nothing closer to the Heidegger position that I wish to draw out here than the metaphor he puts in the mouth of Cicero, '<u>Ex-sistere</u> <u>speculo</u> means for Cicero to step out of the cave. Ome might suspect here a deeper relation of <u>existentia</u> as stepping out and forward to coming forward to presence and unconcealment.'[20]

Being as the subjectivity of the subject is the stepping of the individual into the lights of culture. It is emergence indeed, but not in the Searlian sense. It is the emergence into Being, into the subjectivity of the subject. It is the emergence into the transcendental mode of existing. It is the stepping up into the stage of human culture. And here then it is we live and move and have our Being.

The Heideggerean account of Being however does not entirely rely upon these accounts. These are passed down to us through the culture of our philosophy. Our philosophy would have us believe this about Being, and it is effective in that this way of speaking about Being is given to us by our culture. In that case, how can we check it?

Now suppose Heidegger is right about this, what then? We see that our culture does not agree with the Greek culture, but so what? We can live with that. Cultural relativity is something we have come to terms with, and are glad to see the back of cultural imperialism. This is not however the end of the story.

There are two features about this we must notice. Heidegger is interested to follow lines of derivation. Lines of derivation point to original visions from which later visions do not improve, but become restricted versions of. The line of our accounts of Being, are in Heidegger, derivative. We have taken them over from more original views and naively moved into line with them. We trade on their assumptions. We act upon these assumptions, taking them for our own. Thus it becomes the business of philosophy, as part of its task to discover our assumptions, to reduce our naivety.

In this case our naivety is not improved by merely carrying out the mission of our assumptions about Being, without enquiring

into the origins of them. To base a metaphysics upon unthought out assumptions is what philosophers do all the time. But in metaphysics this is untenable. Metaphysics should leave no assumption unquestioned. It is not enough to discover them, but to discover their origins.

Supposing we are working with derivative notions, why should we worry about that? To do so is to base our accounts of action, mind, rationality, etc., upon what makes sense to us, without further enquiring into what it is that makes it make sense to us. Thus it is assumed that what it is that makes us come to 'this' view of action rather than 'that', is because of the rationality of action that is present already in the logic of our view. But if the logic of that view, which we have been so successful in delineating in a philosophical account, is a derivative one, then one has formulated a standard account, the privileged view of the day, but one that has a history that has gone unchecked.

It leaves open the fundamental questions. Firstly, is the derivation equivalent to a kind of decadence, or is it an improvement, or is it just an offshoot? What is the nature of what we are assuming in relation to what was previously assumed? Secondly, can we ask, how did the assumption form in the first place? Is this determinative for the assumptions that the logic of our account is based on? How important is

knowledge of how the original emerged, from which there is a sliding scale of logical derivation?

Heidegger's thinking begins only by asking in what manner the logic of our present account compares with the logic of historically prior accounts. He is also asking if the more original account historically, is more original in another sense?

For, as a phenomenologist, he bases his account on what is given to us in everyday experience. Things appear to us, in experience, as the beings they are, and this is what the phenomenologist must be faithful to. It is not within his brief to add or subtract to the mode of appearance.[21]

But how is it that he can develop an account of the Being of things which harmonizes more with an account of Being that belongs to the ancient Greeks, notably the Presocratics, than to modern metaphysical accounts of experience of the Being of things? Does the cultural view of things, for example our substantialist way of viewing beings, not dictate the mode of appearance of things?

For Heidegger they do come into conflict. We could say of course that modern metaphysics could be producing a faulty account of things. There is no reason why we should not accept that modern metaphysics is no more perfect in this

matter than its historical predecessors. But this would not be the point.

Heidegger allows that our metaphysical accounts have shown adequate reflections of our account of Being. But phenomenology produces a more radical account of experience because it is not based first and foremost on previous philosophical accounts. It is the opposite to what Moore claimed for the basis of his own philosophical reasoning. Moore had said that it was what other philosophers had said that gave him something to think about.22

But akin to Moore, Heidegger used what other philosophers had to say, to show how this was out of line with ordinary, everday experience. How can ordinary everyday experience undercut the history of our accounts of experience? Do they not determine our experience by determining the way we view things and thus the forms in which we can experience them? Can the whole history of philosophy be unravelled from the history of experience such that there is a more original logic of experience, that the history of accounts of this experience, does not affect?

Is there a certain level of experience that culture is impervious to? That is, is there a certain mode of experience that our accounts of experience have failed to change because they cannot percolate down that far? Is it impossible that

our sense of the Being of things cannot be changed by centuries of education and brainwashing? All that education into the substantialist view of things and we end up holding two separate views.

On the one hand there are such things as the religious/ metaphysical views, that constitute a belief system of propositions. These form our outlook and can be the way we express our desires. We believe we consist of substantial souls and behave according to a system of ethics that is based on it.

But then there is another way of existing, that is so close to our ways of being, that it is extremely hard to disclose. It is a form of being upon which the metaphysical views are derived, and from which they can be accepted or rejected. Does Heidegger need to say this in order to be able to reject modern metaphysical accounts of the Being in our experience, in favour of the thoughts about Being that were produced once upon a time? Or does he just need to show the nature of the derivation in order to show their lack of originality?

We are then hitting upon the bedrock of our problem. Did Heidegger work upon an area of disclosure that he thought was both determinative for our accounts of Being, but that could not be altered by the cultural reflections of it?

Could it just be that there is an area of experience that is encultured in the use of our language? This would account for there being a discrepancy between an account and experience. The account is the reflective product of what we ordinarily know. But what we ordinarily know is based upon how we use language. Until our epistemologies (theories of knowledge) and ontologies (theories of Being) are worked into the use of terms like 'know' and 'to be', everyday experience will not have been altered by philosophical accounts. Nevertheless it will still be the logic of our language that is determining the philosophical acccounts of everyday experience and not vice versa.

Heidegger's search for derivation, on first thought, seems to follow this. He after all is looking for trails in the development of terms. He looks into etymologies to see how the experience of things took shape. The history of the use of terms shows us a trail of experience. And Heidegger also allows for the difference of the modern situation from the ancient situation as though they were just culturally different forms.

But this does not seem to account for Heidegger's view of derivation. There is another type of derivation that he works from. It is closer to a synchronic account than the diachronic account above. When he looks for a point from which to develop a phenomenological account of experience, he begins

with the everyday. He does not however begin with the everyday vocabulary, use of terms.

Heidegger's phenomenology is not a linguistic phenomenology as in for example that of Austin, or Wittgenstein for that matter. He makes an issue of not relying on philosophical accounts because, on the contrary, we are to approach directly the modes of experience and the experienced. But this does not mean for him either producing analysis of how we use certain metaphysically appropriate terms. He follows Husserl's line of going directly to the things themselves.

Heidegger goes to the things themselves by turning his attention past what is normally taken amongst philosophers to be basic. These are the normal objects of experience with their properties. Heidegger thinks that this is to be philosophically naive. It begins with objects that have already been philosophically prepared. They are substances with properties, or properties without substances, or virtually the same thing, appearances with or without substances.

This is philosophically naive, for it misses out a whole realm of Being, from which this realm is derived. This is his famous distinction between things that are just there and things that are there in terms of their availability for use.[14] The former are neutralized versions of the latter. He goes back to the world to which we belong, in a practically

orientated mode of being, and shows that this is more primordial than the neutralized world of objects. It is more primordial because the neutralized version is a secondary and derivable version of the former. It does not go beyond the former, but merely negates, by way of forgetting, the essential features of the former.

He is working towards a standpoint from which he can adjudicate on the philosophical account. This is not a point in history. It is somewhere in the here and now. And he, in arriving there, wants to be where the ancient Greeks stood, when they wrested out of the nature of things, out of their own experience, a view of things that their language was responsible for bringing to view.

But where is this place that Heidegger thinks he, as the philosopher, has arrived at? Where is this place from which he can adjudicate on metaphysical accounts? This place is the place that is already there for human activity. It is a place where use is understood. The use of a word is understood in a way that is not answered by asking about the use of 'use'. To understand the use of 'use' presupposes an understanding of the use of things.

A phenomenological description of the use of a door and the understanding involved, will not come through a linguistic analysis. The use of the term will not 'gather in' the

phenomenon. It will not tell me how this sort of understanding works. In order to see this I have to apply myself to the circumstances and to observe how they function, and what sort of assumptions are at work in order for them to appear in this light. I apply myself to the situation on hand to see how it all comes together. This will not come to me by thinking out the sense of a term.

There is an understanding of use and 'use'.24 How are they related? When I use a term I follow an understanding of how to use, which comes from my practical dealings, skills with things. Such practical understanding develops into the use of language. I know that when I use things, these things are brought to bear on other things such that something is worked. It is not idling.

This knowledge continues when I use words. The words are brought to bear on things and events, including other words. The former understanding continues to hold when it transfers from the non-linguistic use of things, into a linguistic use. The big question is, what is the relation?

Do I learn a new use-behaviour as I do with pain? Or is it a case of the prior understanding finding a new medium within which to reside? Or is it that the linguistic sense of use dictates the non-linguistic sense of use? Am I trying to analyse use by following what I mean by 'use'?

The last position would argue that once we have a linguistic sense of things that this is the sense that subsumes the intelligibility of our behaviour. Once we know X to be a 'dinner' then we relate to it as a dinner, as this is dictated to by our vocabulary. Knowing what dinners are means being able to distinguish them from 'teas' and 'breakfasts'. Thus what they are fits into a logical schema of things.

Does the linguistic sense of 'use' now dictate to any non-linguistic understanding of use? Or is it that a non-linguistic sense makes sense for the linguistic?

## QUESTIONING BEING

We need to push our questioning to the edges of experience in order to define Heidegger's own philosophical questioning. It was always marked by its radicality. My comparison of Heidegger with Lacan is going to put this in question. Philosophy at its most fundamental questioning is supposed to be metaphysics.

It was Heidegger who returned metaphysics to the question of Being. Although Hamlyn draws attention to this in his own book on metaphysics, it is mere lip service. After having shown the distinction between General and Specific Metaphysics, he moves straight into specific metaphysics.[25] So although

returning metaphysics, to fundamental ontology, was for Heidegger a propaedeutic for metaphysics, and right in the centre of the transcendental tradition according to Kant, it is still not really the case for analytic philosophy. For even though metaphysics has regained a form of validity as a philosophical subject in analytic philosophy, after its banishment from the realms of genuine philosophy by Logical Positivism, it has not regained its original questioning of Being.

There is no textbook on metaphysics in the analytic tradition to my knowledge that begins with an analysis of the general meaning of Being, such that it can then determine the different kinds of being we have in Existence, Reality, Actuality, Essence, the difference between object, thing, entity, etc., possibility as an ontological modality rather than logical, and so on.

On the contrary its starting point is what would originally have been classified as special ontology. It deals with the nature of universals, the nature of mind, the object, reality and existence, space and time, etc., without a foundational critique of the difference senses of Being that they presuppose. This is what Heidegger would have called naivety concerning Being.

It is naive on two scores. Firstly, its use of general ontology is vague. There is no real analysis of Being in general. Secondly, what there is, is based on naive assumptions about Being. Being is treated on a par with Reality or Existence. This for Heidegger means that it bases its assumptions of Being on that which is present to hand and not on that which is ready to hand. In more colloquial English, for these are translations of Heidegger's German, the analysis of the Being of things is based on things, in a modification of their primordial form of being.

Heidegger has gone to great lengths to expose this naivety. Reality belongs to a specific area of being which he designates as just mentioned, 'present at hand'. 'Reality' categorizes the realm of objects that have been neutralized from the practical realm of being available in terms of their use.[26] Their practical being is omitted and their mode of being held to be just there, an entity as the unity of properties, is taken as basic.

This is not where the most fundamental philosophy must begin. It begins with Being because being is more primordial than Reality. Such philosophy concerns itself first and foremost not with the existence of mind, time, space, the object, etc., nor their reality, but with their being as derivative from existential modes of Being. What does it mean to say that they are, were or will be? We use the terms of Being ('to

be'), so freely, and even though they are primordial determinations of our experience, metaphysics passes them by.

We are able to distinguish Being from Reality and Existence linguistically. The words 'real' and 'exist' are not interchangeable with components of the verb 'to be' and so we are familiar with the different ways in which they work. We are aware of the different senses that they have. Such familiarity is seen in the ability to use them, and their differentiation through knowledge of how to apply them differently. But how is it that we do have such a sense? Is it based upon an abstraction from things just being?

Heidegger at the beginning of Being and Time points out how Being was distinguished by the ancients. Aristotle had realized that Being was not an abstract predicate. It does not apply across the board in an abstract way but in an analogous way. Numbers do not have being in the way objects do. They do not participate in a general property. At most it can be an analogous relation.

And so Being is not a universal which can be participated in or of, in the way all dogs are dogs. I.e. each dog is a dog in the same way, but each being is not a being in the same way. A substance can be in a certain way that a property cannot be. Thus they do not share the same determination of Being.

The tendency has been to put Being on one side of a divide. On one side is Being and on the other are the individual beings. It has been orthodox metaphysics to put mind and body on either side of the same divide. They do not share the same basic properties. Bodies exist in space. They occupy space. They take up space. They can be measured in terms of length, weight, volume.

Minds on the other hand do not. They do not occupy space. They have no weight, length or volume. Thoughts are neither six inches long, two feet nor any length. If thoughts are weighty it is not that they can be put on a scale, or that the head can hardly hold itself up.

This dichotomy has been applied not only to mind and body but to anything at all. It is of course very applicable to words. If one writes a word on a page, or on a blackboard, it is not a word if it is just a scribble. It is not a word if it is just a recognizable form. This could be a drawing, or a sign, or a symbol. But for it to be a word it must relate to other words in a certain capacity.

This capacity is not the relation of one physical thing to another. It must have meaning. Without meaning it would not be a word. How does meaning relate to the physical such that it becomes a word? The meaning is distinct from the physical. Like mind it does not have weight or measure. If one rubs

some of the physical out, the meaning is not thereby affected. None of the meaning has been erased.

Why is it that everything divides up like this? For some metaphysicians it was because of the presence of universals in the particulars. The universals do not have the same properties as bodies. But there can be no bodies without universals. Each dog is only 'a' dog, an exemplification of 'Dog'. My point however is not to show the whole history of the metaphysics of this problem but to indicate where Heidegger makes his entrance.

It is acknowledged that Heidegger distinguishes between Being and beings. But would he put Being on the side of mind, or universals, or predicates, or properties? He agrees with Aristotle that such a move is illegitimate. But where then does it fit?

Does Heidegger have any use for the dualist dichotomy between mind and body? Heidegger is always assumed to overcome this dualism with sudden attention to Being. But how is this possible? It is as though he were treating it as a non-problem. But it is far from this. He almost wants to play up the dualist position.

Why is it then we do not see the dualism of the above tackled by Heidegger? The answer to this is that Heidegger did not

have an answer but was continually working on it. The more he worked on it the trickier it became.

At first we see the problem formulated in terms of a myth. It is the myth of the origin of the dualist categories. He writes it out in full in Being and Time. It is the myth of Care.27 He is still working on this myth in his late writings, writings that are hardly recognizable as philosophy. Even so the basic categories of the dichotomy is there.

The myth tells us of the creation of the human being. Care is shaping it with the earth. It is given a soul and the gift of this soul comes from Jupiter. Then a dispute arises as to after whom this being should be named. The case is taken up by Saturn. Saturn decides that when the human being comes to an end, its material shall return to Earth from whence it came. Its soul shall return to Jupiter in the heavens. But while these elements are together it should be named after Care, for it was she who brought them together.

This myth formulates the rationale with which Heidegger is pursuing his analysis of Being, thing-being and human-being. He analyses human being in terms of what is called Dasein. Through this analysis he demonstrates that Care is what holds together body and mind. It is what human existence comes to. It is constituted in terms of its concern to be.

But how does Care unite, gather together (in Heidegger's terms) mind and body?

It might seem to some plainly ridiculous to reduce Heidegger to such conventional problems in philosophy. But Heidegger is very much caught up in this relation of mind and body as seen through the myth of Care. It is obviously the mind-body problem. But he has couched it in the terms of earth and heaven.

In his later work, for example in 'The Origin of the Work of Art' we see him wrestling with exactly this problem all over again.28 How does earth become a jug? How does the earth and heaven (universal) come together? Heidegger takes these categories very seriously.

Heaven is obviously not the literal sky, the heavens. And Earth is not the literal earth either. But he struggles with terms with which to rethink the usual categories of 'universal' and 'matter'. These categories are not to be forgotten. Nor are they to be taken as final. They are not to be eradicated from the history of human thought. They are to be seen in terms of that which they are attempts to think. They are to be thought through to their origin.

It is a matter of thinking them through to their "common" root in the subjectivity of the subject.[29] Heidegger sees this in a very special sense. The meaning of the word 'originarius' has its root in its original meaning 'to spring forth'.[30] For Heidegger this takes us right down to the roots of our psyche where thinking can stem from. It takes us down to an original situation which is our constant emerging (physis-nature), our struggle with fundamental elements.31 This in turn is the nature of the Heideggerean mode of thinking. It turns back to this root to discover the primordial sense of it. To it we owe our metaphysical terms. They are not to be abandoned but thought through.

He is not trying to destroy these concepts, but trying to rethink them, so that they can never be left where they are, just in their sheer logicality. He will use new ones. He will talk of 'shining'.32 This only so that our thinking may become more original and primordial.

And he is taking their mythical origin seriously as well. These pagan categories precede the Christian categories of body, mind and spirit, although they unify into the same problem. The problem is not to deny the disjunction, but to rediscover it. It is not to overcome the division of body and mind by one sweep of Being. It is to rediscover the place the human being takes up as a mortal being, in respect to the

presence of the earthly, with all its properties, and the non-earthly with its.

However this does not mean that Heidegger's approach to these problems is orthodox. It is far from it. But it is not so far from it that we cannot see how he is tackling in a very serious way the problematic situation that philosophers have found themselves in for centuries.

Another word here to give Heidegger's work even more perspective. This division of Earth and Heaven Heidegger tries to rethink in order to discover our situation as mortals that Christianity has successfully clouded over due to its substantializing of Being. It has been very successful through its theology and its metaphysics. Modern secular metaphysics, inherits the whole problem from Christianity and is still in service to it.

Heidegger tries to rethink the relation of spirituality to body in a way that Christianity has lost to us. These are not categories that are to be swept aside. They are to be savoured. Christian thinkers, like the apostle Paul, showed a kind of hidden memory that worked itself through, into their terms, symbols and categories. It was as if there was an unconscious present to these categories, giving them a significance that they were not sure of. Yet that which gave them their significance gave them a way of working with them,

such that they knew that they were working, without knowing why.

## QUESTIONING THE NATURE OF BEING

The call to philosophy shows the nature of Heidegger's problem. That he thought it was a call of Being to 'Being' was where he was mistaken. [3] He follows this trail through Being and Time, but even there he finds that the very nature of Being contains a deep division within it that he had not anticipated. The orthodox division of mind and body, mentality and being, would not be answered in a straightforward way.

If Care works in a mediating position between spirit and earth, and in doing so it is familiar with Being, albeit in a pre-ontological way, does this familiarity with Being coincide with our ability to use the linguistic terms of Being? Is our sense of Being distinct from, or identical to, our linguistic sense of Being?

If we take Heidegger's references to the relation of human beings in their dealings with things, then the primordial relation to things is with their manipulability, a relation that is transparent. Only secondarily is the use of language involved.

Leaving for the moment the relation of language to the primordial relation of Dasein to beings, concentration must be first made upon how this distinction between Being and beings first holds.

'...the less we just stare at the hammer-Thing, and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become, and the more unveiledly is it encountered as that which it is - as equipment.'[33]

Heidegger is saying here that our relation to the Being of equipment becomes more primordial. This is not a clarity of the idea of the equipmentality of equipment. Our familiarity with Being does not arise out of some kind of reflective, representational view of our practical dealings with things. It is there present to us in our very dealings with them. It is present to us when we are not thinking about it, and especially when we are not thinking about it.

This makes it difficult to see that the pre-ontological familiarity is familiarity with 'Being'. What enables us to say that it is with Being, if we do not have the linguistic distinction between the terms 'Being' and 'beings'? And what would show us here that such a distinction was present? We can see that such a distinction is present to the linguistic being who can make the linguistic distinctions.

It is clear that the individual who has a linguistic command of the declensions of the verb 'to be' as well as its nominal forms, that they can use it in all the correct places, i.e. semantically correct places, must be able to make sense of these distinctions.

But Heidegger is referring to showing that a person has the primordial sense of Being and beings, when they are just using things. It is in their involvement with those things that such a distinction is involved. But how can this be?

He says that it is a more primordial sense of the Being of things, and means first of all by that, that the primordial shows the nature of the secondary but not vice versa. This is the criterion of the transcendental. In this case it enables Heidegger to pick out the more primordial and then follow up the task of showing that which trades within the parameters set up by it.

Thus if he thinks of the sense of 'Being' and 'beings' as it belongs to the linguistic user of the linguistic terms, he will want to show that it belongs to it in a derivatory sense. The sense of Being/beings present to the language user, is the sense that belonged to the tool user. How they actually transfer is not specifically explained. We do know that he says that the latter or secondary works within the intelligibility of the former.

The tool user is working within a system of things. That this is a system of things, of tools, is, as Dreyfus points out, what distinguishes Heidegger's sense of 'tool' here, from say the use of a stick by a chimpanzee.[34] The stick is not a piece of equipment because it does not belong within a system of tools, and thus within a world that that system is part of.

We can make some headway with this text when we admit that Heidegger is basically distinguishing between Being as a comportment[33] of Dasein and those beings that the comportment was directed to, but did not share this comportment. Thus in the basic relation there was a primordial distinction, just in the mode of behaviour. The mode of behaviour required an understanding which distinguished the kind of comportment that Dasein had to take up and the kind of being it had to address this comportment to.

This distinction that is present to the understanding Dasein can be opened up further to Dasein if it has a mind to. And by that I mean if it becomes an issue for it. But everyday use of equipment does not make it necessary as long as nothing goes wrong. It is in such a case that Heidegger brings in lingistic use, and brings it in, so as to show that the linguistic use of 'Being' is not identical with the primordial use. The primordial use is the practical involvement.

He however puts them together in just that case when things break down.[34] In the case of someone finding that the hammer they are about to use, is too heavy, their immediate world undergoes clarification by coming into the focus. In the primordial involvement, they were totally involved. The hammer in the hand was hardly noticeable in its manipulation. But during the wielding of it, the manipulability of it might prove troublesome. At such times as these it becomes noticeable.

This does not lead into a theory of the hammer. Such a theoretical attitude towards the hammer would mean standing back, detaching oneself from the activity and examining the hammer in terms of itself. Then this Thing, the hammer, could be appraised as a Thing with the property of heaviness. But long before this happens there are other stages to phase through.

This particular hammer's transparency[35] is broken. It begins to stick out. But it does not stick out as a thing with properties. It is noticed in terms of the way it frustrates the activity. It prevents the flow of things. The absorption in the task is disturbed. It is during the breakup of the flow that the being of the hammer makes its appearance. At first, through the way this hammer does not work, and its negativity towards the flow of things.

The next phase is to look for something that will do the work. Heidegger here points out what would happen prior to any type of theoretical judgement making an appearance. He is slotting in what he would take to be a more primordial phase than the theoretical one.

'Interpretation is carried out primordially not in a theoretical statement, but in an action of circumspective concern - laying aside the unsuitable tool, or exchanging it "without wasting words." From the fact that words are absent, it may not be concluded that interpretation is absent.'[36]

The interpretative activity of the manipulative absorption in the practical activity is not linguistic. It does not mean in this case that the user of the equipment in Heidegger's example is not a language user. But he is showing, not only that these two forms of use of a sense of Being, can exist side by side. Even so he does say that one is more primordial than the other. Does this mean that one evolves out of the other? This does not follow automatically, as will be apparent when we examine the Lacanian view of the nature of the Unconscious.

Even if we take it as more primordial how does this affect our problem of the relation of the universality in Being and beings? If we take the comportment in Being towards a thing as Dasein's understanding of Being as distinct to being, is it not still the case that Dasein can return to this modality as

the same modality? Is it that in a primordial absorption such understanding is not necessary? Does Dasein not know that he is in the same comportment?

At this stage we may say that he does not recognize the comportment as comportment. He is just absorbed in it. But what is his relation to this comportment? Does he not realize that he has to take up this comportment, even if not as comportment, in order to realize certain conditions? Is this too modified for him to be primarily true to him in this phase? That is, there is already the distinction between Being as comportment, as soon as the Dasein in question, understands that it must take up a way of being, in order for some other being to be realized as possibility.

There is a distinction present within the modus operandi, such that Dasein is able to understand that it has to slip into one rather than the other. To say that such a distinction is just present to the practical understanding leaves this whole ability to distinguish still in the dark. Obviously there are whole areas of existence in which it may be unable to make such distinctions. But the question here is what constitutes the type of understanding which is able to make them? Is it that the agent who understands the distinction between the mode of being which the agent has to slip under, subsume itself under, is such that it falls under the problem of including the unity

of universal and particular? Thus the comportment takes the form of being a form of comportment.

Does Dasein just go in and out of such comportments like an animal?[37] Are such comportments open to it such that there is an attempt to realize them? If so, then do comportments carry with them a sense of perfection as opposed to failures to obtain them? Are they recognizable in terms of standards and failures?

These sorts of questions are prompted from the side of experience which contains language. We do now, with all the advantages of hindsight, see distinctions such as universal and particular. When we see a door and use it as such, both of these determined uses go into operation. Once the distinctions have been made it is hard to think back into conditions without them.

Yet Heidegger need not be thinking of a time without them. That is, he need not be thinking of a primitive man with primitive needs, and at a stage of development prior to language. He is describing moments that are present to us now. Thus his descriptions of primordial Being are not descriptions of access to Being prior to language. The relation is more subtle than that.

He is saying that these experiences go on now with the presence of other modes of experience. To say that one is derivable from another, does not say anything about stages of evolution. But knowing this it becomes even more imperative to know how he holds them together.

## THE HINDSIGHT OF BEING

How does hindsight affect the philosopher in this? The philosopher, Heidegger advocates, has a way of doing philosophy such that Being is an issue for him and the philosophy he is performing, and thus more than an account of it is involved. This means that in striving to give the account of Being, he recognizes the clarication of Being as the issue. But more than this. Being is not just the issue to be clear about, but being-clear and being in the clear are issues to bring about. In bringing Being to light, objectively, Being is being brought to light. Being is taking place. Being takes place in the being-there of itself. And this is to culturalize Being.

Even so, how is the philosopher to obtain access to it? Does the fact that the philosopher goes in quest for it mean that he is looking for what he anticipates according to the view he now has of it? And is that view not the one given to him through the history of the term? Can he do anything other than try and bring Being under the category of 'Being' in a way akin to

any other theory that seeks to give an account of something? Does he not anticipate his inquiry from the point of view of the way he sees Being logically? Can he avoid the dictates of this now that they are already present to his mind?

It is the problem that Heidegger must have hit upon most fully when the high aims mentioned in such optimistic works as Being and Time and Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics were making a name for him. We know that later he dropped the quest for Being. Yet he also tells us that he was faithful to one calling. He answered the promptings of one question.

An attempt at consistency might by made by saying that Heidegger followed up the same quest but changed the name of what he was questioning. What is there in a name?

But there is more to it than that. Being contains within it, by virtue of what it is, a difficulty that makes it impossible for the philosopher to obtain access to it. Heidegger must have discovered this difficulty by realizing how his call to do philosophy was called into question. The methods he had been so successful with at the beginning of his career, were beginning now to show their limitations.

This shows up in the nature of the questioning, rather than in anything Heidegger specifically says. It is there as the intrinsic impossibility of the quest for Being. And it shows

up in the way Heidegger was compelled to use methods of thinking that the philosopher would find unrecognizable. He is suddenly engaged in philosophy through the analysis of poetic texts. When he engages these texts, his work is a sort of poetry itself.

I.e. he engages in a kind of thinking that is meant to let the poetic mode of thinking become clear. Again he is working with the same sort of movement, but applied to a different medium, the strangeness of it helps us see what he had run up against in the first place. It is not a meta-representation of how the poetic work takes place. This is done in poetics. And poetics these days is very much a scientific, technical form or meta-representation of the poetic technique.

Heidegger's poetic philosophy is anything but this. He tries to work the text so that we can practically see the thought in action, in the text, (not the psychological process, but thought in the Fregean sense) happening, taking place. We see thought working the material.

This is why the work that Heidegger engages in is not a way of dismantling the work. He works with the work. He does work on the work so that the original work is seen in its working capacity. This is not showing how the work works, i.e. the technicality of the working elements, but seeing the work doing its work. This should not therefore be called deconstruction.

So how was his mission as a philosopher put in question? Remembering that to question Being is not to ask it questions, but to put it in question. To question Being as a philosopher ends up putting philosophy in question. Philosophy comes into question because it is the hindsight that marks out the divisions. It is looked upon from the point of view of what it means to us as it has settled into the term. It is the hindsight that prohibits access to the primordial. It is like the flaming swords surrounding the Garden of Eden. After the original sin there is no return to innocence.

If a philosopher, as a philosophical phenomenologist claims to do, viz. Husserl, discovers the a priori assumptions that make certain phenomena appear as they do, what guides him in his analysis? Heidegger has presented to us, two, side by side senses of the being of certain things. There is the sense we have of the being of the hammer which is apparent to us in the use of it in its capacity as equipment. When we use the word 'hammer', and say thereby that we know what a hammer is, we are claiming to know the sense of the word 'hammer'.

Is our sense of what a hammer is, different in both cases? For Heidegger at first the answer was presumably yes. It is only later he sees how he is presupposing too much. At first he would have said that the linguistic sense is a more restricted sense of the latter.[38] Without enquiring just yet

into what that means, the question I am drawing attention to, is what sense is it that the philosopher is guided by?

When the phenomenologist draws out the sense of Being as Heidegger would have himself do, as he records his aims in Being and Time, what sense is it that he is drawing out? This is not the question of which sense he intends to draw out. The answer to this is that he intended all along to draw out the sense of Being as it was contained in our absorptive experiences.

But phenomenology is a philosophical method into the a priori of experience. But as its etymology suggests, it is an investigation directed by the logic of experience. Heidegger goes to great lengths to show this in Section 7 of Being and Time.

Now, if this is the case, then the determination of Being that the philosopher is guided by, is that of the logic of the term. The analysis follows up the logic, and it is the logic that guides the sense of Being. But if this is so, and this is what section 7 says, then surely Heidegger as a philosopher is cut off from entering the realms of the sense of Being which is more primordial than the logical sense of Being?

This would then suggest that in determining the sense of Being, as Heidegger does in his early works, that he is really

following up the sense of Being, as it shows itself, in terms of the logos of its sense, and thus on one side of the dualist's dichotomy.

Heidegger's early quest for Being is disrupted by the phenomenological form of investigation, because the determination of Being is taken from a sense of Being, already removed from the primordial and absorptive sense of Being. It takes its sense from the sense of Being, and this is the logic of the term. Yet when he began with phenomenological investigation, he was obviously not following up the logic of our terms. Heidegger thus swings from one side to the other here.

We have seen this already. It is not a case of linguistic phenomenology as we have in Austin, Moore, Ryle and Wittgenstein. He was paying attention to the appearances as they showed themselves and not in terms of the sense that was given through the logic of the term.

Heidegger was aware that he was bringing two dimensions of 'sense of Being' into alignment. But he assumed that the sense of Being that belonged to the absorption in activities, was followed straight into the logic of the term. And this followed the line of repetition of the original in terms of secondary, narrowings of the original.[39]

So even though a wider sense followed into the narrower sense, Heidegger could grasp the wider sense according to the narrower sense.

But when he pays attention to the original absorptive sense of Being, how does he know that he has access to it and not just using the logic of our term, the sense of Being that belongs to language, to determine and thus subsume theoretically the absorptive sense? Is he not just assuming that the one follows into the other? Is it not bound to if he is using the secondary to make this determination? The sense of Being from a primordial situation must fit the logic of the term sense, because it is the latter that is determining for the philosopher what the original is.

The philosopher deludes himself in thinking that he has somehow got access to the primordial sense of Being, when all that is really happening is that he is reading it back into it through hindsight. Even though this is the case, it is also the case that because Heidegger believed he was working through the original sense into the linguistic sense, he was aware of the relation. He was aware of the need to take both together.

## CHAPTER TWO: THE EDGES OF PHENOMENOLOGY

We continue the probe to the questioning that is supposed to take us to Being. Does it really take us to Being, or does it merely take us to the logical structures of our culture? The method Heidegger used in his early work was specifically phenomenological. We need to put phenomenology into question.

Phenomenology shows the logos behind the phenomenal. The phenomenal has significance through the way it gathers together. Heidegger's account of phenomenology in section 7 of Being and Time shows his own very special sense of what phenomenology meant to him. He uses the terms that form the word, to think through the nature of what a phenomenologist does. This would be enough to establish the case here if Heidegger was completely governed, guided by the terms. But Heidegger is not merely following the logic of the terms but working through them.

His use of etymology on the face of it looks dubious. That is until one realizes what he is doing. He is not looking for prior, previous usage. He is looking for the places, points, ontological spaces, in which certain senses emerged. Lacan talks of 'points de capitons', upholstery buttons. They are

those places where a meaning comes through such that it is pinned into a reality. In such case it does work other than relate to other words in the system of vocabulary.

Heidegger is not just following the term phenomenology to see how it is used. He is looking for how the word originally broke into the system. One only has to think of Hegel's use of the term and to see how radically different this is from Husserl's work as a self-acclaimed phenomenologist. Heidegger would of course be extremely aware of the difference. But even Heidegger's own way of doing phenomenology is so different from that of the master phenomenologist, Husserl, that the latter disowned it as phenomenology, once he saw the results of it. Heidegger had slipped into anthropologism. It was an ontic work and not a pure science.

Heidegger however as always was not concerned to overthrow any of this work. He was concerned to think it through to the origins of it, origins that still lay forgotten, covered over by the logical debris. He tried to take it through to the nature of the work itself, through to the term as a work of art. Husserl was at the centre of a project while being ignorant (in Heidegger's view) of where he was coming from in taking up the work.

In what way did Heidegger think that Husserl was ignorant of the sources of his own thought? This of course is a damaging

claim to make against Husserl's work. The essence of it was to obtain a naive-free thinking.[1] To do so meant discovering its most fundamental assumptions and the manner of holding them. Thus it includes the a priori discovery of the consitution of the world as such, as well as that mode of ego structure which was necessary to do this.

Heidegger held the view that Husserl had omitted a genuine approach in his pure thought of Being. In a letter to Husserl, in respect to the article on Phenomenology that they were preparing for the fourteenth edition of the Enclopaedia Britannica, Heidegger wrote, 'There is agreement that the entity in the sense of what you call "world" cannot be explained in its transcendental constitution by a return to an entity with the very same kind of being. However, this does not mean that what makes up the place of the transcendental is not an entity at all. Rather, just this problem arises: what is the kind of being of the entity in which the "world" is constituted? That is the central problem of Being and Time - i.e. a fundamental ontology of Dasein. It is a matter of showing that the kind of being of human Dasein is totally different from that of all other entities, and that the kind of being, which it is, shelters right within the possibility of transcendental constitution.'[2]

To miss the metaphors Heidegger uses here is to miss his whole way of thinking. Notice that the entity he is giving a

fundamental ontology for is Dasein, not as a particular individual, but in its uniqueness as the being which shelters within transcendental constitution. The difference from all other beings is in the special kind of habitat, world. This world is such as to provide transcendental constitution. And that is to say that it provides a symbolic habitat according to which this being can instantiate itself according to transcendental modes of subjectivity. And this is to exist through symbolic modes of behaviour.

Husserl's reaction to this is to point out that his own thought is not supposed to be applied to being. It is not applied to beings, nor actual egos, nor to facts, but to the pure form of these. Husserl means that he (Husserl) was thinking through to the pure transcendental form of these things.

Let me try and give an account of what he meant by this. Husserl was not inquiring into the nature of actual beings, to actual egos, to actual thoughts, beliefs or to actual facts. It was a science, yes. But it was not an empirical science. Psychology as an empirical science would apply itself to the structures of actual minds, based on the observations of them and their reactions to actual conditions.

In contrast to this phenomenology is a pure psychology. It is normative and not empirical. It does not discover the form any particular thought (he is really thinking here of thought

processes) took, or takes, or will take under specified conditions. It is purely concerned to discover the forms that thought ought to, must take, if it is to be a thought. I.e. if it is to be regarded as a thought. This then is the discovery of the transcendental logic of the thought. It is the logical form the thought must have if it is to be counted as a thought.[3] That this form constitutes it as a thought shows that it is transcendental.

How then does this work? Let us continue with the example just mentioned, viz. the thought. Husserl draws, as just mentioned, a distinction between the actual thought and the form of the thought that makes it count as a thought. The actual, concrete thought is what psychology studies, as something that exists or existed in someone's head. The thought that Husserl is interested in does not exist in anyone's head. It is a universal, logical form. It is logic of the form of the thought that any individual who would produce such, must adhere to, in order to produce a constituted thought that Husserl is fundamentally interested in.

Such a form would be the criterion (criteria) involved in specifying that this is a thought. This entails that if someone claims to have a thought on a certain matter, such cannot be claimed for it unless it meets certain objective standards. Thus thoughts belong to the public realm and the

public criteria must be satisfied, for the claim requires public satisfaction.

So if someone claimed that an image in their mind was a thought, then the claim would be rejected. To have a thought means more than to have an image. An image in the mind's eye does not constitute a thought. Someone could have an image of Donald Duck suddenly pass into the forefront of their mind, but this would not mean that they were thinking about Donald Duck. Nor would it mean that the image of Donald was itself a thought.

What would constitute something then being a thought? For Husserl this is the question. But it would not be an answer to look at cases of what we take for thoughts and abstract their common features. Again his would be empirical psychology. But for him the thought must be approached from the point of view of our knowledge of what counts as something being a thought. Such knowledge must be a priori, but it must also provide the conditions whereby thoughts are obtained as such.

Thus it must be related to rational activity, it must contain unity with other thoughts, it must be propositional, etc. Thoughts being the product of ego activities belong to the rational activities that constitute that ego as such. The ego, again, is understood from a normative point of view. The

ego must relate to its activities such that it performs them according to the standards that adjudicate them as 'ego' activities.

The ego can only claim to be rational if it knows what to do in order to follow the rational, prescriptive order. It can fail to be rational if it does not subsume itself sufficiently under the order for being rational. E.g. it must be coherent and consistent. If it is not, then it cannot claim to have attained them, and thus failed to obtain them in its activity.

Husserl at this stage is committed to an intentionality thesis. In each of the cognitive acts for example, whether belief, knowledge, reasoning, etc., there must be an intention to obtain the requisite conditions for the constitution of that act. According to Husserl one cannot believe something without an intentionality towards the conditions of belief. Such a person knows the systematic distinctions between belief, imagination and knowledge.

The intentionality is rooted in the ego. To believe something, is for me to believe something. I bring the belief under the conditions of my own rational unity. There are conditions that each of us must fulfil in order to assume for ourselves the form of using 'I'. When I appropriate 'I', I intentionally assume those conditions and act out of them.

The intentionality of the ego then is such that it must know what conditions it must satisfy in order to intend that act.[4] It must intend that act in order to bring that act about and in satisfying the specific conditions, it constitutes itself under those conditions. Thus if it meets the conditions of rationality which include consistency, then it has in part constituted itself as a rational act.

## Heidegger's Critique of Husserl

This is where Heidegger thought Husserl was missing something fundamental. He thought that Husserl had omitted Being. In the letter to Husserl, Heidegger wrote,

'What constitutes is not nothing; thus it is something and exists - though not in the sense of the positive.

The question about the kind of being of what does the constituting itself cannot be circumvented.

Thus the problem of being is universally tied to what constitutes and what is constituted.'[5]

Husserl thought that he had missed nothing of the sort. What he was interested in had nothing to do with being, because phenomenology was specifically interested in those normative

conditions whereby the act fulfilled itself. If the conditions are normative they do not refer to factual conditions.

But this was exactly Heidegger's point. These were not ontic conditions of the ego. They were transcendental. He would accept that Husserl could call the normative ego a transcendental ego. But for Heidegger this transcendental ego, once it had fulfilled the conditions, normative as they are, for being a transcendental ego, has fulfilled the conditions for being that ego. This applies to rationality, or any cognitive situation that one could care to mention.

If the ego fulfilled the conditions required to satisfy a belief becoming a belief, then that ego obtained being through the fulfilment of those conditions, but furthermore according to those conditions. Its mode of being was identical with them. And likewise if there are conditions to be fulfilled for being a transcendental ego, then in the fulfilment of those, the individual takes on the being of a transcendental ego. To realize those conditions is to realize a mode of Being which was a condition of an agent being the condition for an objective state of affairs. This is partly what made it transcendental.

This explains why Follesdaal presents an inadequate distinction between Husserl and Heidegger in respect of the intentionality

problem.[6] According to him Heidegger made a more primordial basis for phenomenology by referring the situation to practical states of affairs before theoretical and cognitive states of affairs. This does not show how it was Being that was the issue between them. Heidegger did not need to bring in practical forms of being in order to attack Husserl's omission of Being from phenomenology.

It was just as easy to point out, as Heidegger in fact did, that no matter how cognitive one is treating the transcendental ego, the ego is striving to realize transcendental conditions which were in themselves constitutional. When it realizes those conditions it becomes something according to them. It does not become an empirical ego only. It actually becomes a transcendental ego. The transcendental is itself realized. In assuming the conditions of the transcendental, it realizes them. It becomes transcendental. It then is transcendental.

So Husserl, in pointing out that this was just a normative science and therefore not applicable to being, was in Heidegger's view both correct and incorrect. It was due to Husserl not being able to distinguish between Being and beings. Once the transcendental is realized as conditions necessary for rationality, the ego becomes transcendentally rational. It is a mode of Being.

Just to say that certain acts have normative features about them which make it necessary to fulfil these conditions, says nothing against becoming, and then being something according to those forms. The person who fulfils the norms set out by society for being rational, thereby becomes rational by obtaining them for himself.

This form of Being though has certain strange features about it. The properties of being rational does not belong to them in the way the properties of being a stone reside in the individual stone. The human subject must subject themselves to these as possible modes, that do not reside intrinsically inside them, but are assumed as social ways of being. But they are ways of being nevertheless. And it is this difference that Heidegger draws attention to in his ontological difference between Being and being.

There is another problem with Husserl's thinking though which takes us even deeper into the problem Heidegger saw with the level of Husserl's phenomenology. It is not obviously the case that belief, thought, knowledge and so on, are intentional in the way that Husserl thought. Do we intend the conditions of satisfaction for belief, or can beliefs just occur within one, without us intending them?

Ryle, for example in '<u>The Concept of Mind</u>' holds that belief is a disposition. Now why would he take such a view? Surely

it was because he must have thought that it is our tendency, a dispositional property, to act in certain ways, that show to ourselves and others, whether we have certain beliefs, and not that we have intended them. If belief was an intentional state, it would be based upon a dispositional orientation, presumably developed through habit formation. I.e., it would then be perfectly feasible to claim, that we have all sorts of beliefs that we know not of.

According to White, it is the case that we have all sorts of knowledge that we know not of.[7] He illustrates with a case from the classroom. A teacher asks a boy if he knows the answer to a certain fact. The boy does not know if he does or not. She prompts him and he responds with the right answer. To which she is prepared to say, and does in the case White presents, that he knew after all.

Did this boy know? Was it that the teacher was saying, when she said that he knew the fact, merely that the fact was present to him? That would only mean that he was capable of releasing the fact because he held the fact. But he was not sure if this was what she wanted. Thus he was unable to make the connections that she was expecting.

Of course White is saying that, not only was the teacher prepared to say that the boy knew (and we would agree), but that

shows that we are prepared to use the word 'know' in cases where there is not knowledge of knowledge.

Husserl would disagree with this because these acts are intentional. The conditions lie outside of us. They are not internal, they are transcendental. They belong to the social sphere, and not to some internal psychological sphere. Thus it is not the case that beliefs go on formulating in our beings without the intention to do so.

**Intentionality and the Rule**

Dreyfus has related this view of Husserl's to modern cognitive psychology.[8] This in turn relates to views of mind and mind functions as assimilable to a computer's use of a computer program. The computer is able to perform the 'cognitive' acts because it fulfils a rule governed programme.

It is when we compare however, what I have just said about Husserl, that it can be seen that this comparison does not work the way Dreyfus says it does. The intentionality thesis of Husserl's is a transcendental one. This means that the rules which formulate the conditions that the subject must assume for itself, if it is to realize the cognitive state, lie outside the individual. That is why they are transcendental.

They are not transcendental because they are universal properties by abstraction. They are only universals in a normative way. The individual must attain to them, and subject themselves to these external conditions of satisfaction.

But in the AI case, and in the cognitive psychological views of the mind, the transcendental structure does not play a part. Consequently they look for intrinsic capacities within the mind as an organism, with inbuilt rule programmes. This leaves it open to a form of criticism where Husserl is not. For it just seems absurd to think of rule-governed systems running through our biology. It just seems obvious that these rule-based systems belong to our culture.

When we try and understand our biology we use rules as part of our descriptive way of understanding. We bring it under rules as our method of understanding. The rules are part of our way of understanding. But the biology itself follows no rules.

For example, it is a mistake to move from saying that we can bring the ripple motion on water under a system of rules, to saying that water follows rules. Water does not follow rules, we do. This kind of conflation is common and leads to applying rules to all sorts of organic activities. In the example often used by Searle, when a dog jumps up and catches a ball that we have just thrown against a wall, the dog does this

through its own skills and not through following a system of rules. The dog is not calculating angles of incidence and reflection, sines and cosines.

The usual reaction to this is to say that the dog's brain does. But this takes us back to the wave-ripple example. The dog's brain does not, anymore than ripple motion, follow rules. It is the human subject who describes what happens in dog-brain behaviour according to systems of rules. Because, when we are understanding something theoretically, this is how we do it.

Yet it suits the cognitive theorists to think of the beliefs as somehow intrinsic to that individual. This seems to be because they have no tradition in transcendental philosophy. They do not see the difference between properties that are instantiated in a being due to their intrinsic inherence, and those properties that are instantiated through appropriation of an external standard.

Now, where does Heidegger stand with this? Does he agree with Husserl that intentionality towards externally objective standards is what constitutes Being? What is his view on beliefs forming without specifiable rules which they bring themselves under?

Heidegger's views on phenomenology show that he was caught between two views of phenomenology. He believed in the intentional relation towards the transcendental. But at thesame time sensed that the transcendental emerged out of the unknown, which it nevertheless had a sense of.

If the Lacanian account of the unconscious working as a doubling up of two levels of significance, it presents a clue to the Heideggerean problem for phenomenology.

As was mentioned above, the phenomenologist works with the phenomena as they present themselves in given situations. This differs from the linguistic phenomenology which concentrates on terms and the logic of their use, rather than descriptive situations as they give themselves. Incidentally presenting the distinction in these terms puts Wittgenstein outside the camp of linguistic phenomenology.

He has less in common with Austin and Ryle, or the kind of linguistic analysis epitomized by White, than he has with Heidegger. Wittgenstein applied himself to the logic of the game which is something very different to examination of the logical use of terms.

**THE ROOTS OF THE LOGICAL**

Reference to the use of terms can mean something quite different from the logical use of terms. The linguistic

analyst kept pointing to how we use terms. But he was talking of a logical use and not a working use. His descriptions of use were about the logical possibility of the term. Thus 'We would say this, but we would not say that.' 'I am merely saying how the word is used,' were often heard rejoinders in philosophical argument and analysis. The point behind it being that we are led to the phenomenon by the implications of the term.

But there is a deeper sense of 'use' in situations that shows how the terms can be incorporated into different levels of use. To use Ryle's term, if we limit the field to a logical geography, we forget the archaeological dimension to the use of a term. Lacan has succeeded in jolting the situation by pointing to the depth of each situation, and the depth to the logic of the situation, (See next chapter).

If we apply ourselves to the logic of the game and the sense that we derive from it, we have to ask ourselves if the sense of the game is in the logic of it. This is what emerges from the Lacanian account of the Unconscious as present within the game. It is the unconscious which gives the game the significance it has. Which is not to say that the elements of the game have a significance totally derived from the Unconscious. It is that the sense is present in an interplay of two separate but interdependent dimensions, and originally one that lies outside of logical determination.

Does that which lies outside of determination continue within the logic of the language games we play demanding to be understood? Does it continue to operate through the logic? Is it prior to the logic of the language game such that the logic of the game becomes a channel for its expression?

**The roots of Phenomenology**

Heidegger's account of phenomenology in Section 7 is an analysis of phenomenology and 'phenomenology'. He shows us the derivation of the nature of the work of phenomenology. Part of this derivation is based on the logic of the terms. The logic of the terms however is related to our cultural history. We are encultured diachronically. There is a transmission in our culture from older established ways. We derive our ways from these old ways.

Heidegger looks for these old ways that are still present in the new ways through analysis of the terms that are still present. They are present in a sort of coded form. It takes someone to crack them open in order to find what is still in there working and wording itself through. Heidegger sees this as a form of violence. By violence he means that we need to break through the logic of the terms that can sometimes work as a mere gloss. The logic of our terms fails to show us where the originating sources of our understanding emerges from, where we as subjects are coming from.

So in discovering the ways that are now present to us, and to base a method of discovery of those ways, viz. phenomenology, he retraces the steps of the logic of our ways, but in searching for more than the logic, i.e. for the being of those ways. Logic is not self-sufficient. It is driven by being. The logic of our language makes no sense at all if it makes no sense.

He traces the terms the phenomenologist uses to describe the ways of the phenomenologist, ways that are not arbitrary. But why are they not arbitrary? Is it because they continue a tradition? Is it because they follow the rules set up in the logic of the terms we use?

These are questions disrupting, breaking into the Heideggerean analysis of the terms that we use as derivations of former terms. The former terms he traces them to are Greek. And he discovers that the central term, 'phenomenon' is a Greek term. It comes from the verb 'phainesthai' meaning 'to show forth'. This term itself can be traced back to the root term for 'light'. And thus the term 'to show' has a derivative sense from 'shining'.

This sort of derivation follows the traces in our language to rediscover the way in which we have travelled, to be in the way which we are now. It is part and parcel of the removal of

the naivety that belongs to the subjectivity of our present position.

This only shows us one section of the word 'phenomenology'. There is another piece of it that needs unravelled. For the word, being composite, brings together two separate ways. Two ways of being are brought together to form two ways in a single mode of being which in turns converts into a method.

The second word is 'logos'. The derivations of this word are obviously related to the general discussion in this thesis. For I have been talking about the logic of games, the logic of our language and the logic of our behaviour. These phrases have not been merely mentioned, but put into question. The logic of our language was put into question by Wittgenstein. A description of our world based singly on the logic of our language fails, because it describes that language only when it has gone on holiday. It fails to see the language at work.

But how does one see it at work? By replacing it within the real situation? By looking at it in terms of how language works in poetry?

In the former point, relating language to its work in the real situation, it must be realized that this is inadequate. Once again returning to the Lacanian model, the logic of the language game, cannot show the full significance of the game.

Or rather, if one remains purely within the surface level of the game, then one could produce a full analysis of the language and logic of all the elements, their full significance of them within terms of the game itself, and yet leave out the real significance; i.e. what is really happening in the game is missed entirely.

This has the serious consequence of putting up a show of having shown the significance of the event by spelling out the phenomenon of the game, by showing how all the elements in the game fit together in terms of their interdependent significance. But this would only be a show, a mere appearance of the significance. The real significance remains hidden. So the phenomena remain hidden and still in the dark, i.e. as far as the account goes.

The phenomenon in this sense is that which hides itself behind the appearances.

'That which does the announcing and is brought forth does, of course, show itself, and in such a way that, as an emanation of what it announces, it keeps this very thing constantly veiled in itself... what thus shows itself (the "phenomenon" in the genuine primordial sense) is at the same time an "appearance" as an emanation of something which <u>hides</u> itself in that appearance - an emanation which announces.'[9]

This misses out the way in which the elements in the game do signify. It takes the logic of the game and skims it off the top. The univocal logic that this account comes up with is not the logic at all. It is not the logic of the game and so the logic of the game is not shown for what it is. This will be made clear in the next section through the Lacanian account of the game.

So not only are the phenomenal elements of the game not shown, but neither is the logic of their relations shown either.

Now Heidegger must have been aware of this phenomenon. For what he discovers about the term 'logos' is that it takes us back to the same roots as the phenomenon. The logos, when we take up its root meaning, is according to Heidegger's scholarship, taken from the root which means 'to gather'. This is normally just accepted by Heidegger scholars on the face of it. Heidegger has given the meaning of 'word', viz. 'logos' in terms of another word.

But this would be extraordinary. How can we understand the meaning of 'word' by reference to another word? This is not the same as looking up the meaning of a word in a dictionary and finding the meaning of it in terms of other words. There is nothing wrong with this. This is only telling us the meaning of a word we do not know in terms of words we do know.

The new word is clarified by us bringing it under meanings that we already have.

This cannot be the case with 'logos'. For here we are not looking for the meaning of a word in terms of other words. We want to know the nature and function of 'word' per se. And this such that any word can come under this understanding. But we would be caught in a vicious circle if we could only understand the meaning of word as such in terms of another word. For to pass the understanding off to another word, presupposed that we understand the other word as 'word'. But this is where we started from, complaining of ignorance.

If we look again we can see that Heidegger is not in fact doing this. He is not showing us the meaning of 'word' in terms of other words. At a surface level it gives this impression. If one stays at the level of the logic of the terms then one will be caught in the trap. But Heidegger by referring us to other words, in fact shows us a way out of the words. For he is not merely directing us to the logic of other terms, but to a metaphor.

So when he points us to the meaning of 'logos' he does not only refer us to the use of other logical terms, he points to a metaphorical figure. The metaphor is that of gathering. Thus if we are to think of what a word does, then we are to think of a situation in the world metaphorically. That

situation shows us an activity, one which we understand. So are we being asked to understand the nature and function of language from an understanding we have of the work done, intended in gathering?

It is not a picture we have of gathering. This would involve us in another vicious circle. For how would this picture have the meaning it has for us if we were not to bring it under the logic of our terms?

What Heidegger is referring us back to, is an understanding. The understanding belonging to gathering has now found its way into language. There is a repetition of the first understanding in the second.

Thus in the sense we have of the logos as such, is another sense. It is the sense of gathering. I.e. the logos with its sense of gathering is not original in this sense. It is a derived sense. And thus it is a derived understanding.

It is clear that Heidegger points to the sense that is in language, i.e. the sense of language, to a sense beyond language. The sense that belongs to our use of words, is a sense that carries over from an understanding that belongs to practical affairs. Heidegger shows that this is what he means by the way in which the phenomenality of things and the logicality of words belong together.

The logicality of words is a repetition of the phenomenality of phenomena. To see this we just have to look again at the definition of phenomenology that Heidegger produces.

'Thus "phenomenology" means apophainesthai ta phainomena - to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself.'[10]

So what we have in the term phenomenology is that two ways of showing are brought together. The first form of showing is the thing showing itself. That is what things as phenomena do. For Heidegger this happens in a way that is not dependent on language. For those who think that Heidegger makes language preeminent for things showing themselves, this is a mistake. It can be seen here in the way this text is working.

This view seems to come from the oft quoted phrase of Heidegger's, that language is the house of Being. This is quite the opposite meaning. And the analysis of the text on phenomenology shows it. The house of Being is the place where Being dwells. This is not the place where it is constructed, invented, brought into being. It is the habitation of Being. This means that Being has found another medium in which to reside. The transference is from one form into another. And we have seen already that this is how he sees 'transcendence'. I.e. where he talks of transcendental constitution in the form of shelter.

To transfer from one medium such that that which is present in the original medium now comes to reside in the new medium is both what Heidegger is talking about here in his early account and unchanged in the later account. The act of gathering, which is the act of showing something off, takes place in all sorts of non-linguistic ways. It takes place in the use of colours, shapes, in the clothes we wear, where we set up house, and a multitude of different ways.

Where the settler settles, where he builds his settlement, and prepares to settle down, means that he has a way of gathering things together. He knows where to put down the dwelling in relation to the wind and shelter, near the water source, not too near the mountain in case of slippage, but near enough for shelter, where the sheep can graze, etc. That is, the settler is already gathering things into a unity so that each comes to identity through how they are to each other.

The mountain just is shelter for the dwelling, the source of food for the sheep, the separation from the next valley, avenue for the river, etc.

So for a prospective settler, he looks down the mountain valley, and in looking he does not just take a snapshot. His look follows a prior mode of activity as a prior mode of determination. The look recaptures. The look seeks to

take in the way the valley shows itself. It shows itself in the way that features originally all belong together.

But how do they belong together? They belong together to the prospective settler under the intention of the possibility of settlement. It is the settling that brings these things together. It is settling that gathers them together. And it is settling that makes it possible for the things in the mountain valley to show themselves as they do.

**Perception and the Original**

If we pay attention to perception here, I said that it was not a snapshot of the valley. Perception takes place according to the educated eye. The eye is educated to pick out how things show themselves. So the eye is not just representing things pictorially. It is putting things together, replacing them, so that they show themselves off for what they are. And what they are is the way they work for us and we with them.

So the eye runs over the terrain in the form of repeating an original work, action, viz. the putting of things together so that they can and do work. Heidegger calls this the things showing themselves off. Perception has to run things through in the manner of how things would be originally run through. So it runs through by going over again in the mind, the way things would have been previously undergone in experience, in

our dealings with them. It is originally the way we pass through them. Our passing through is our original experience (erfahren) of them in the way we get them to work. In a manner of speaking the eye already knows the form.

The eye is intelligent and knows what to look for. But it is intelligent in a very special way. It knows how to go over things so as to regather them in the way it already knows how the hand goes over them. It follows the course our feet would go. The track is not seen geometrically but as the hard slog it is. It follows the activities of drawing water, not mathematically yet abstractly. It is abstract only in that one runs through in mind only, not in body. It recapitulates the way we would go without actually going.

It does this, not by putting them together physically, but putting them together so that they show themselves off in the way it already knows them to work. The eye puts them together so that they can now be seen together. But seeing them together is a rehearsal, a repetition of the original way they go together.

Thus one looks at the mountain and sees something very steep. By going over the mountain with the eye, the mind works by repeating to itself the actual, physical going over the mountain. With the eye it runs through the more literal

running through. The eye picks out what it would be like to live at the bottom of that mountain.

We tend to forget this in our viewing of things. We look on a landscape and say that it is lovely. But we forget what we mean by lovely. We are talking about the experience we get by things working for us. A landscape can inspire awe in us, but why? Because for what it means to the way we exist on the land. Because we forget this, we think of perceptions as somehow totally cut off from the working conditions they have for the rest of our body and the other activities it is invested in.

Or we look at a piece of wood and say that it is beautiful. The tendency is to think of the description as something to do with perceptual content or the mere meaning of the term. But it is only this on a superficial score. It is because we can cash what we are perceiving, into our more solid dealings with the world that the perceptual content is as it is. Only when we do cash it out do we see the real sense of it.

Thus the piece of wood is beautiful to the eye, and then we run our hands over it. Why do the two go together? Why do they make up the same perceptual content? Because they make sense according to the original. It is beautiful because of the work I want it for. My eye scouts this out, and so does my hand.

Looking at the wood which looks beautiful, and feels beautiful, the meaning is envisaged in the door it will make. I see its solidity. But when I see its solidity, my eye is where my hand will be. My eye is where the door serves as a defence against the world. My eye is with my need for security. My eye is upon the impression of my visitors.

The intelligibility that the eye relates to is in the order of things. It simply rediscovers that intelligibility as it researches and discovers. And for the settler, it is already found in his ventures with his surroundings. Heidegger is saying that this original intelligibility, order, is the way we understand things. And this is the way they gather together in our dealings with them.

So what perception does, is regather them together according to their original gathering. The original gathering that perception relies on is merely repeated in the new medium of perception. But perception would not work without the kind of understanding that works by gathering things together. It does not learn a new way of ordering reality. It learns how to go back over that ordering in a new medium.

**Perception and Language**

Now enter language. Language is 'logos'. This means 'to gather'. So language, like perception does not occur in a

vacuum of understanding and intelligibility. When it performs its functioning it does so by operating within the parameters already set by understanding, but by using a new medium. It repeats the old in terms of the new medium.

Logos is not the dramatic entry into human intelligibility that one would normally associate with Heidegger. Logos is very much situated. It is situated within an order that it finds itself being faithful to. When logos appears on the scene, gathering is the form of intelligibility that understanding relates to. Understanding is gathering. It makes one wonder if our metaphorical expression of understanding 'I gathered what he meant was ...' goes anyway towards contributing to Heidegger's thesis.

So phenomenology puts together two words that show the same mode of operating. To be a phenomenon is to be that which shows itself. To show is to gather together again. The phenomenon is that which shows itself according to the way we deal with it. And the way we deal with it was understood by the Greeks was our cultural way of bringing things together so that they form themselves into how they are for us. But this is what the word does. The word also gathers together so that things can be regathered. To show something is to go over it for someone so that they can see it working. To demonstrate something is to show that it works. If you know what it is to

gather things in the world, then you are now in a position to try it with words, i.e. in a secondary medium.

Phenomenology thus is a double activity. It belongs within two dimensions of showing. The first activity is to let the entity become a phenomenon within a worldly activity. The second is to present an account, a logos, such that the original showing is repeated in the account. It is a second showing of the original showing. The difference is the medium.

# CHAPTER THREE: THE INTENTIONAL BACKGROUND

## TRANSCENDENCE AND THE BACKGROUND

Heidegger's account of phenomenology, ~~which~~ if it is to be consistent, must itself be a case of showing, in the form of gathering, some prior, intelligible unity together. At the same time saying that language comes from the unsaid does not say that language comes from the unintelligible. Language emerges out of some situation where gathering is taking place and where this is the form of understanding.

One way in which Heidegger's view of intentionality differs from Husserl's, is that Heidegger shows that Being and the transcendental are not separate in the way Husserl thought. When someone fulfils the norms of rationality we say that they are being rational. But why not just say that they are instantiating rationality?

Heidegger's view of intentionality is different from Husserl's because of the difference in their views of transcendence. The nature of this now needs to be made clear. At some points the two are very close, and it would seem that Heidegger only

had a vague sense at first of their difference. The point about Being does not take Heidegger far enough along the road that his sense of Being was laying out for him. He realized that he had to go further back to trace where Being emerged out of, in order to find the roots of the distinction between Being and being.

The clue he follows is transcendence. Being is a transcendence. But Husserl was already basing phenomenology on transcendence. So if transcendence was to lead to Being rather than to a transcendental ego that was purely normative, then how was it to be done?

There is a tendency among some scholars to interpret Heidegger's sense of transcendence along the lines of Husserl. And there is every reason for doing this. Much of what Husserl says about transcendence of the ego fits the Heideggerean picture, right down to Heidegger's views of the Nothingness at the heart of Dasein's existence.

Consider then how this would go. Heidegger provides transcendence as a way of thinking through the subjectivity of the subject.[1] This is seen very clearly in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. Heidegger follows Kant's own search for the transcendental roots of the soul.[2] Kant follows clues that lead him back into the dark recesses of the human soul. He finds his way by following the transcendental thread.

There has always been a problem in the history of metaphysics on the matter of the ontological status of the transcendental. Sometimes it is given the most fullness of being and at other times it is thought to have no reality at all. Heidegger as usual is not concerned to take one side or the other, but to see how this scission forms. There is a thinking behind the scission which breaks down into a scission.

The mediaeval debate concerning the reality of universals is really an attempt to understand the nature of the transcendental. And thus it meets some kind of formulation in Kant. Kant's means of discovering the nature of universals and their reality, is for Heidegger, the Kantian search for the subjectivity of the subject. And Heidegger regards this as an early attempt at pure phenomenology.[3]

Heidegger in his own paper 'What is Metaphysics?' sees that the subjectivity of the subject is to be found in an enquiry into Nothingness.[4] And further, the subjectivity of the subject is to be found in Nothingness. This is the sort of talk that got Heidegger a reputation for indulging in meaningless propositions, and made it easy to spread the criticism to metaphysics itself.[5]

But Heidegger was right. The metaphysics of the subjectivity of the subject does show that the subject is rooted in nothing. But that is due to our way of giving preeminence for reality to

beings and not to Being. The subject, just as Husserl says, forms itself by taking on transcendentals. These are the norms and standards that form the ways of doing things.

Society is made up of them. There are norms and standard ways, rule-governed forms of behaviour, which social individuals must assume in order to practise certain forms of behaviour. Thus for someone who would be a bus-conductor he must let his life be ruled by specific norms and standard forms of conduct.

Where does transcendence come in here? Well if we take it on a purely Husserlian analysis, the individual, the actual/ontical individual, embraces the rules and by intentionally fulfilling them, he fulfils the conditions prescribed. They are prescribed norms, standards which measure out his behaviour. As such he takes them into his being in the form of oughts and obligations. He brings his ontic being under them.

But for Heidegger they are not just norms but ways of being. As a way of subjective being they are modes of Being. Granted that these forms of Being are not on all fours with being, but this means continuing the research for analysis. Such analysis must take into account a consideration of the difference.

The difference Heidegger describes as the difference between Nothingness and being. By this he means to accept that the subjectivity of the subject has its being composed out of modes of Being which are not inherent to the individual's make up, its own individual being. The subject must realize forms of subjectivity by assuming modes of Being for itself that do not reside in its own individual being, but must be appropriated for the duration of the activity.

Thus the mode of being a bus-conductor does not reside in an individual. When he loses his job, he is no longer a bus-conductor despite the individual skills he has integrated into his individual system. This goes for any social role. And yet it is that role which made something out of him. He actually became something through it. In appropriating the role of bus-conductor he became a bus-conductor, such that he could affirm that he himself was a bus-conductor. He had the being of a bus-conductor.

But the being of a bus-conductor does not reside in him in the way being solid, or being heavy, or being strong does. These latter properties are all inherent properties that belong to his bodily individuality. But being a bus-conductor does not belong to his individual person in the same way. It does not have the same kind of being. And because it does not have the same kind of being that belongs to individual beings with their

inherent properties, this form of being must be regarded as a form of non-being.

Because Husserl saw that it did not have ontic being, he ascribed it to non-being and thus without any form of being at all. It belongs to the realm of meaning.

Social roles then do not inhere in individuals. They are held within the social order so that subjects can appropriate them for themselves. They become forms of subjectivity, i.e. ways of being subjects.

The way of being the subject is to do what the etymology of the term suggests. The subject becomes a subject by making himself, the individual, subject to the social way of being. Once he is able to do this, he is able to enter into ways of being that are now appropriate to him. To be able to do this requires the ability to transcend.

The individual transcends by taking upon himself a role as a possible form of subjectivity, and assuming the role as the condition of being something. He needs to be able to transcend his own individuality in order to take upon himself a form of being that does not reside naturally in him. Thus he takes on a cultural form of being and brings his natural being under it. In the case of the bus-conductor he has to take his

natural capacities and transmute them into activities that will count as bus-conductor activities.

Thus his ability to climb stairs are now transformed into climbing the stairs in the bus in pursuit of his duty, counting (although not a natural ability but a cultured one) is transformed into taking fares, and the capacity to utter into speaking lines appropriate to bus-conductor-speak.

Heidegger's Kant analysis is a way of finding the search for the subjectivity of the subject in transcendence in the work of Kant. The act of transcendence for Kant was the transcendental act of the imagination. This is the act of projecting the individual into a transcendental mode of being. That it is an act of the imagination shows the nature of subjectivity. The mind must project itself, not by projecting natural possibilities but by holding itself into possibilities that are not natural, but belong to cultural construction.

This is where the difficulty that Heidegger was wrestling with begins to beome a little more apparent. On the face of it, it looks as if Being and Time is saying something about the natural possibilities of human existence. Human existence, what Heidegger calls Dasein, functions through its abilities of looking ahead into possibilities for itself. It is only able to open itself up to future possibilities for itself on the basis of its present conditions.

Its present conditions are made up out of its past crystallizing into a set of possibilities. Thus its biological capacities are the result of what happened in the past, but still present now as a set of possibilities. The brain's ability to function is the result of many other events, events now frozen in the brain's capacity.

Not only are there biological capacities but psychological capacity. There is memory, and the content of experience in the memory, and the ability to use language, etc. These now form a future for the human subject. The future is set by the range of possibilities that the present conditions are capable of opening for itself. Language is possible for a being with brain capacity as well as other natural capacities. Thus a future with language opens up for the animal with such a range of capacities.

But is this what Heidegger considered the nature of human existence as openness towards the future? Is this what he meant by Dasein being its futural possibilities? Not at all. This omits what Heidegger saw in his Kant thesis.

Dasein is the possibility of projecting itself into transcendental conditions, not merely into ontic conditions. This is the capacity of projecting itself into cultural possibilities that do not belong to the ontic and natural sphere. This is the ability of projecting itself into a

world, culturally constructed, and being constituted in its being by those cultural constructions.

Now the problem emerges. What is the relation of the natural abilities and properties and the transcendent properties? The answer to this question is the nature of transcendence. It is also the nature of appropriation. To find the properties which are appropriate, means properties that do not belong naturally but which yet are appropriate. What does this mean?

## The Possibility of Phenomenology as the Ontological Synthesis

What is the relation between the set of possibilities that are natural and those properties that are cultural? This is the problem that I maintain runs right through the whole of Heidegger's philosophy. It is what he calls the question of Being. And it is what he later changed to the questions he asked around 'Ereignis'. The question that concerns the philosopher is the same issue for human existence. At all times it is concerned with Being. It is always concerned with itself being this or that. With events coming into being. With bringing things into the here and now. With making things be there.

Philosophers have missed this obvious concern by becoming concerned themselves with logical categories. They become

concerned with the logic of the language game, with how we use words as though this were encased in the logic of its use. Philosophy has been concerned with ideas, the ideal, universals, the nature of particulars, the nature of mind. When it becomes interested in the nature of something it is just a matter of providing a description of its structures.

Or when it is language and philosophy it is the question of the nature of meaning, the relation between syntax and semantics. Such studies involve taking an object and describing its general features. Even when it becomes a matter of showing how language and world become intereffective this again becomes descriptions of the general structures of reference. And works now in the philosophy of reference are buried in symbolic logic. Again a move away from how language is, how it 'ises', the presence of its action.

And the problem occurs around the question of the human subject. The philosophy is usually about the general features of the subject. Even when it is about the nature of the existence of the subject. What is the nature of existence turns into a question about the essence of existence. Are there universal features of existence?

This is when philosophy turns into science. And it is when it turns into phenomenological science. Husserl is this approach to its extreme. The human subject is approached from the

point of view of cutting it off from all being through the method Husserl calls 'bracketing'.[6] Bracketing fixes the human subject in a realm of pure structure, what Husserl calls pure meaning. But such pure structure is not real structure. For it is what he is also calling normative and not real.

Thus the individual, ontical subject realizes itself through following systems of rules. In its obedience to these rules it intentionally satisfies the conditions of meaningful behaviour. I.e. it appropriates itself through these rules. But this is where Heidegger sees the nature of his own work making its entrance.

As was pointed out above, the appropriation of the norms may well be a way of realizing the individual and ontical subject. But how? How does the individual become something through the use of these norms? Husserl does not approach this question. His philosophy works upwards away from the 'being' problem. His concern is chiefly with naming the norms. Philosophy for him is concerned only with meaning.

This process of seeing the norms, through which, according to which the individual can become something, is turned on the individual itself. The individual must intentionally realize those norms that enable it to embrace the social norms. Thus there are norms for the individual to appropriate. These are the norms of the transcendental ego.

The transcendental ego is not an individual. It is the form, norm of the subjectivity of the subject. These are the presuppositions of those forms which the individual subject has embraced in its activities of being a human subject. It is the order of rule that the individual must have adhered to, such that it could have a unified and rational order of existence.

But notice that while Husserl presupposes that these are all norms that the individual must embrace, must realize, must be, the problem of being is never his problem. He has already bracketed it out of existence. He is not concerned how the individual takes on those norms, how they are present within him, if they are ontological, because he is working in the opposite direction to this problem.

For Heidegger it is virtually the opposite problem. It is not phenomenological to move away towards the forms of the appearances of things. It is phenomenological to discover how they do appear, as the way things go together, happen. To go back to the appearance of the thing, to original appearance, is to trace the order of appearance. It is not just to look for higher and higher universal forms of present appearances.

His treatment of Kant in his Kant book, is an attempt to overcome the approach of the Husserlian project. For Heidegger's Kant is in quest for the original ontological

synthesis. Kant begins with synthetic a priori judgements. Heidegger follows the Kantian transcendental programme, not to a transcendental subject who is above experience, but to a transcendental understanding of Being, which shows how experience is fundamental to the human subject.

So Kant begins with a priori judgements. It is not any kind of a priori judgement. For this could just lead one away from experience into the highest universal and logical forms of them. He is interested only in those judgements which are a priori and synthetic, i.e. are in principle concerned with experience and the possibility of experience.

These judgements are propositions. This is how Heidegger takes them out of a purely cognitive framework and sets them into an experiential one. A judgement in the cognitive sense, is originally based upon a proposition in the existential sense.[7] The proposition shows the existential structure of the subject. The subject exists by pro-positioning. It projects its possibilities upon reality which respond in kind. Thus the response of reality is in accord with the frame set up by the pro of the proposition.

What a thing, is has to do with the position with which I come at it. A tree can be something for climbing, burning, building, sheltering under, etc. These are existential positions of the subject, and ones that the cognitive

proposition finds itself repeating. Thus the synthetic nature of the cognitive proposition finds itself rooted in the existential form of syntheses. It repeats the order of proposition, because the existential form is it in its essence.

The mind when it functions cognitively is going over the ground for the sake of some existential pro-positioning. Its researches are re-searches, hypothetical pro-positionings. A hypothesis is a projection. It is a projection for what we can bring about in experience. In fact according to the etymology it is more than a projection. It is an under-positioning. This shall be fully explained later. But it derives from understanding.

What is the nature of the transformation of understanding when it passes from a pre-linguistic understanding to a subjective form of understanding? We are not primarily concerned with ~~how~~ the subjectivity of the subject. We are concerned with the understanding which informs it. Does the pre-subjective understanding carry an understanding of Being into subjectivity, that then consists in an effort towards being or Being? Does this constitute the drive behind subjectivity?

Heidegger's solution to this problem is not to oppose language to reality. Language does not mirror reality. Nor does Heidegger accept a correspondence theory of truth. Nor is he content to deny it. Again, he looks for the thinking behind

the correspondence theory. What sort of response is truth in the co-response of statement and reality? What is the setting for this response? Do we require an archaeology to discover it?[8]

The central problem for Heidegger is to see how language and Being are not related arbitrarily. This is left in the realms of mystery by the correspondence theory of truth. For example we are told that reality corresponds to a proposition. But this leaves the nature of the correspondence a mystery. How do they correspond? How does something in the order of the real 'co-respond' to a proposition? We are in the realms of metaphor. Although when it is argued that the relation is one of satisfaction, the Freudian element is then open.

This entailed for Heidegger the work of showing how the nature of the proposition is derived from a sense of Being in the way it was analysed above. I.e. he traces levels of syntheses from our sense of Being down through the proposition. In Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics this method occurs as that of tracing the nature of the ontological synthesis. How does he do this and what does it mean for the problem of transcendence?

The solution to this problem is based on the solution to other problems. But again the problem set against the problem of that which distinguishes Husserl's form of phenomenology and

intentionality from Heidegger's. It is leading us closer to Heidegger's view of transcendence.

How is phenomenology possible? This is answered differently by Husserl and Heidegger. Heidegger was trying to answer the question of how fundamental ontology was possible. How is it that we can make determinations of Being? How can we give an account that is a priori and transcendental of Being? It is one thing to do this with a priori notions, but Being is a different matter.

If one followed Kant then the transcendental was discoverable as a priori because the transcendental a priori was the presupposition necessary for conditioning experience. It was a knowledge we already had, but a special form of knowledge. It was what Kant called 'synthetic a priori'. Heidegger called the knowledge which made possible the propositions that Kant called synthetic a priori the ontological synthesis.

Heidegger's view of transcendence is wrapped up in this and not in Husserl's view of the possibility of transcendental knowledge. So let us consider Husserl's first.

In Husserl's view Intentionality is the clue. Husserl's view does not have the metaphysical trappings that Kant's did. It allows for a much more natural interpretation, at least to modern philosophical ears than Kant's does. Phenomenology is

possible as an a priori form of knowledge. It is contained within a circular form of understanding.

The knowledge that the phenomenologist is looking for is already present to him. But Husserl differs from Kant on this and sees it as the relation between implicit knowledge and explicit knowledge, rather than the Kantian notion of the transcendental as an a priori relation to empirical knowledge that was a posteriori.

The implicit-explicit notion is very neat.[9] It just means that the phenomenologist's work is converting implicit knowledge into explicit knowledge. But it serves as part of the answer to the problem of the possibility of phenomenological knowledge. How then is the knowledge the phenomenologist strives for, possible?

The first clue is to be found in how one already has it in the form of implicit knowledge. How can one produce the definition of the word 'chair'? Only because one knows the meaning of 'chair' already. But knowing it already is knowing it only implicitly. This can be seen by the many attempts of the naive to define 'chair'.

For those who are unaware of the difficulty of doing such a thing, feel quite free in producing several definitions. Upon having the first few of them dismissed with counterexamples,

there is a sense of surprise and unease. One reason for this is because the naive usually associate, knowing the meaning of a word, with having a definition of it. So it comes as a surprise to find out that they do not know the meaning of the word.

But of course they know the meaning of the word. There is however an uneasiness about withdrawing the claim that they do know the meaning of the word. Yet without the ability to provide a definition they feel uncomfortable with the claim. It is the example of 'chair' that does this. It does not happen with a word like 'love'. It is common to hear people say that we all have different meanings of the word 'love' because we all have different definitions of it. And that is the result of quite separate and different developments of experience.

Philosophers on the contrary feel no such compunction to deny them knowledge, due to these unfortunate circumstances. Not because philosophers sympathise and identify with similar difficulties, but because they believe that the meaning is known if the individual can use the word correctly. The philosopher cannot accept the everyday account here. Does this mean denying the ordinary appearance of things?

Not so. The philosopher is quite right to deny it. That is because it is an account of meaning and not an experience of

it. Those same individuals will go on following the meaning of love, encounter love, differentiate love from lust, all on a common understanding of an objectivity of love that they deny in their account.

Using this as a criterion of knowing the meaning of a word however only applies to implicit knowledge. It does not apply to explicit knowledge. It was important as part of Wittgenstein's critique of meaning to free meaning from a pictorial theory of meaning. Was the picture-representation explicit or implicit?

The second clue given in implicit knowledge is the way it is assumed. This knowledge is transcendental. That means that it is assumed as a subjective condition for the obtaining of some objective state of affairs. Assuming it as a condition shows that the knowledge assumed is assumed for an aim. Thus the assumer, the subject, does so with an aim in mind. I.e. the assumption is taken on intentionally.

As the assumption forms the conditions of the subjective state, and the subjective state provides the conditions for the productions of the objective state, then the assumptions made are understood. They are understood in terms of what they will deliver. Thus they are understood prior to the conditions they are to bring about. Not prior in time, but prior in the sense of condition only.

Let us have an example of this from the realm of knowledge. Supposing I want to know if it is raining. Then on the simplest of accounts I look to see if it is raining. But notice I said that my intention was to know if it is raining. So I have to provide the conditions whereupon I can say that I know that it is raining.

So I intentionally put myself under the condition whereupon this becomes possible. I stick my head out the window, or hold my hand out, or look up to the sky. I can check that somebody is not pouring water out of an upstairs window. What is happening here is that I understand already the conditions I have to satisfy if I am to know that it is raining.

I am not satisfying objective conditions but subjective conditions. These are conditions that I must satisfy if I am to be able to claim knowledge. These are conditions that I must obey, bring myself under. And this is a case of a subject assuming these conditions for itself. And it subjects itself to those conditions so that it can then obtain a subjective state. In this case it is one of knowledge.

This then is what is meant by assumption. It is primordially more than just having mental goings on in one's head. It is the satisfaction of public criteria. It is satisfaction of criteria that exist in our social world. It is not the

satisfaction of psychological criteria. For Husserl it is the intentional satisfaction.

But this raises a problem for Husserl's account of the possibility of phenomenological knowledge. How do we relate the implicit-explicit circle to the intentionality thesis? If we go back to the example of the chair, and ask again what knowledge it is that enables us to provide an explicit definition (explicit account and therefore explicit knowledge) of a chair, then Husserl would say that it is our implicit knowledge.

But what then does our implicit knowledge of what a chair is consist of? To be consistent with the intentionality thesis, he would say that it is a public set of criteria. I relate to the chair as a chair in knowing already what it is. I can assert a proposition, 'That is a chair' meaningfully, if I can know what a chair is. But I can do this meaningfully without being able to provide a definition of a chair. But in what way is the meaning present to me such that it is implicit and not explicit?

In Husserl's way of thinking it should not only be implicit, but in the form of socially established criteria. It must be something we can intend. But if it is, then why is it that the public find it so difficult to say what they are? What

kind of criteria are they? Is it a rule we can go by? If it is a rule then it ought to be explicit.

In the case of the social role then these would seem to lend themselves to rule formation. How do we know what a bus-conductor is? We know what he has to do. We know the sorts of obligations he is under. When the bus-conductor is being trained as such, he will be shown the rules he must obey. He will not of course be shown the rules for counting, nor the rules for how to climb stairs. It will be presupposed that he knows these.

Even if we suppose this to be the case it is not the case that all our knowledge is like this. And is it that Husserl wants to attribute this sort of rule-based knowledge to explicit knowledge and keep implicit knowledge for a kind of knowledge which does not utilize explicit rules? In the case of the chair example, there is no explicit rule. The knowledge is implicit.

The implicit knowledge is the ground of the explicit knowledge. It is the ground in that it decides every time whether the explicit account is adequate. But is this because we have an implicit rule, or is it that implicit knowledge is not rule-formed at all?

Heidegger as already pointed out, says that this knowledge that forms the ground for explicit knowledge, knowledge he calls thematic, is of a more primordial kind. And it was said that it was practical. This would not of itself tell us whether the practical knowledge was rule based or not. Rules are just as applicable to practical knowledge as they are to thematic knowledge. And it may also be the case that there are all sorts of areas in thematic knowledge that are not obviously rule-based either.

But how would Heidegger account for the intentionality towards the knowledge of the chair? Would the subjectivity of the subject then be required to fulfil certain subjective conditions that were explicitly obvious to that subject in order to relate to the chair as a chair? The chair becomes a chair when the subject can occupy it as a chair. I.e. he can use it as a chair.

For Heidegger the knowledge of the chair as a chair belongs primordially to the actual use of the chair as a chair. This does not mean a historically actual use. It need only be an imagined use. I.e. if someone were to be shown what a chair is, without being able to experience a chair, they would base their knowledge as much as possible on imaginative experience. But the imagination works in the way analysed above for perception. It runs through possibilities that work. Without such a background of possibilities then the notion of

'chair' would be impossible to convert into a knowledge of a chair as chair.

Some of this is present in Kant's use of schemata. To have a concept is not enough to form knowledge without a schemata, which fits the concept into the imaginative possibility of experience.

Other accounts of language and meaning begin with utterances as though they can have meaning enough for us without presupposing a whole area of background knowledge and experience to interpret it. This is a point made recently by Searle in his latest work on the nature of the Background. It is not enough to suppose that a sentence like 'Bring me a pizza' uttered in a restaurant has obvious meaning due to the meaning of the sentence itself. All sorts of interpretations are possible.

When uttering it I do not expect that the waiter will bring it in encased in cement or on the back of a donkey. Nor do I expect him to smear it all over my head. Nor to post it to my house. But how is it that all of these misinterpretations are avoided?

This is where Searle feels the necessity of bringing in a Background to our intentions.[10] But what he says is that there must be a background of capacities which are non-

intentional if our intentional capacities are to be possible and realizable.

Where Searle's account fails is in not explaining how this background can be brought in at all. For Heidegger it is because it emerges out of a working situation. The intentionality of the use of words is always situated within working conditions.

In order to tackle this problem of background I will now bring in the psychoanalytical approach of Lacan.

# CHAPTER FOUR: THE UNCONSCIOUS AS BACKGROUND

## THE OEDIPALIZATION OF THE SIGNIFIED

The development of the psyche for Lacan occurs in the relation between the social order and the organic order. The former is called the symbolic order. It is the cultural order. It is the order of language. It is however a technical term for Lacan and hitherto I shall capitalize it when used to refer to the specific Lacanian sense. Otherwise I try and tame it by integrating it into more natural parlance. In this way the study is kept as phenomenological as possible.

This Symbolic Order is based on the structural principles through which structuralists have discovered the nature of language. Lacan does not talk of an organic or biological order, because he is concerned to emphasize that we as human subjects always see reality according to our symbolic orderings. As such even the biological order is first and foremost a bio-logical order.

To obtain the background to Lacan's view of how the symbolic order gets imposed on the organic order, we need to see how Freud developed the theoretical framework that Lacan works into a structuralist framework.

It is probably no accident that Freud developed his Oedipal theory shortly after the death of his father.[1] The death of his real father does not mean the death of the Father figure that hovers over Freud's existence. As most of Freud's theories emerge out of his own self-analysis, the Oedipal theory is no exception. It is a realization that not only can one's real father preside over the direction of one's life, but so can a Father Figure.

For Freud the Father Figure was strongly tied to his real father. Freud was obsessed by personal advancement. He pursued it relentlessly. He pursued it through fame. It is present in the way he used his partner Breuer for the theory of hysteria.[2] It is there in his need to be the first to discover cocaine.[3] In his dream analyses we see how others are seen as hindrances to his future.[4] His struggle for professorship was no ordinary drive for a position. The position Freud wanted was to be something in history. A messiah for science.

Through his self-analyses Freud could see how he was in fact driven to this ambition. It was a strange kind of analysis that showed him how he was driven. It demanded such self-

honesty. But he was cornered into it. The drive to understand himself had become intertwined with his obsession for fame. He was achieving fame through the ability to discover the contents of the unconscious. And he was in the main doing this, not through his patients, but through his analysis of himself.

Freud realized that access to the contents of his patients' unconscious was made accessible by first understanding the access and contents of his own. It was the penetration into his own psyche which would put him into the position which he desired. But this position could only be obtained by exposing his own position.

And so he came to realize that what was driving him lay buried in his past. This past was not only in his past. It constituted his future. Only when his future could realize the voice of his past could he be satisfied. His desire was always running ahead of him.

What he desired to be was written up ahead of him. But what was written on the wall ahead of him was his past. It was his childhood past, and one that continued to haunt him. It drove him. But it also constituted him by giving significance in advance of everything he did that was in conformity to his desire.

This past, that was always ahead of him, was an event. But mostly it was the encapsulation in words of the event. And these words were the words of his father. The words represented not the voice of his father, not the thought of his father, but the will of his father.

The incident was this in Freud's own words.

'When I was seven or eight years of age another domestic incident occurred which I remember very well. One evening, before going to bed, I had disregarded the dictates of discretion and had satisified my needs in my parents' bedroom, and in their presence. Reprimanding me for this delinquency, my father remarked: "That boy will never come to anything." This must have been a terrible affront to my ambitions, for allusions to this scene recur again and again in my dreams, and are constantly coupled with enumerations, of my accomplishments and success, as though I wanted to say: "You see, I have amounted to something after all.'[5]

In what way is this not just a memory of his father? There is an abstraction at work to convert the father into a father figure. To begin with a metaphor, we can see how the father of his own childhood now begins to figure in his life. What does this metaphor mean?

The father begins to figure in everything he does. But he figures in things as the significance of his life. When Freud is able to look back upon his life events, he can make sense of them in terms of his father. To say that it is in terms of his father shows that it takes on a kind of transcendental significance for him. It is not just that he can associate these events with his father. It is rather that they are now cases of trying to please his father.

If we are to make sense of them we have to see the significance the father has for him. The father takes on a certain meaning for Freud. It is a regard he needs from his father. The regard then becomes specified. The need for regard was there previously to the specification. It is not arbitrarily present. It is not just suddenly there. We see how it is there through Freud's Oedipal theory. But for now we see that whatever kind of regard is needed it now becomes specified for Freud. It is transformed into ambition.

At first he looks for the regard of his father. Now he looks for the will of his father. But then the father figure becomes separated from the ontic father. That this has happened can be seen from the way others can figure as his father. More accurately, others can be figured as his father. I.e. they can take on the figure of his father. The figure of his father can now be projected on to them.

This is only possible if some kind of abstraction can take place from the ontic father to the father figure. Otherwise it would be a case of taking a new father figure for his real father. Obviously this is not what has happened. For example Breuer becomes a father figure, but not because Freud could not tell him from his own historical father.

It means that Freud now desires to step into a certain position with regard to a figure in his life, such that in that position he obtains a specific kind of favour. Or rather he obtains a certain regard. He is looked at in a specific way. But what is there in a look? This is all important. What there is in the look is in the position it grants. The look puts the object of the look into a specific position in respect of the nature of the look.

Thus if the look is favourable the position of the object is one of being favoured. If the object is an individual with the capacity to be self-reflective, then it can recognize itself as being favoured.

My claim is that Freud had his life moulded by a father figure, because this figure came to specify a certain look, more accurately a regard. This regard defined a position, the objective position of the regard. Freud sought to find himself within the terms set by this look. This was the position cast by the regard.

His life then consists in a constant need to manoeuver himself into the position dictated by the regard. I mix the metaphor on purpose. I said that the regard functions as a regard. This is deliberately to state that the word, the logos, has its roots in the pre-linguistic. It then acts according to this pre-linguistic positioning. So when the word functions, as it does in this case for Freud, it is a case of words acting in the form of a regard.

The regard of Freud's father now runs ahead as a cast position, for Freud to perpetually try and occupy. And it now receives further definition, but still in the form of regard, in the form of a logos. The words of the father run ahead and tell Freud the kind of position he must now occupy if he is to meet the father's regard.

I will develop this case through another example, viz. that of the Heavenly Father of Jesus. A legend recorded in the New Testament has Jesus at the age of twelve, giving his mother and father the slip, and disappearing into the temple. There he enters into dispute with the theologians of his day, the educated of the temple. When his mother and father finally find him, they chastise him. Then Jesus rebukes them, letting them know that he was about his Heavenly Father's business.

This is a distinction that every Christian makes. But what is the difference between a Heavenly Father and the real one?

The Heavenly Father is more a father than the real one. He is the real generator of the believer's being. With him one can come into being in a different sense than with the real one. While the real father is the author of one's biological being, the Heavenly Father is the author of one's spiritual being. He is the one who gives meaning to one's being.

The real father is the earthly father. He can provide only the material capacity that the Heavenly Father can mould into something. The real father is only a father in this sense, in fact hardly even in this sense. But in the role of being a father to his children, he does this by bringing them up in the ways of the Lord. This means in the ways of his fathers, and in the ways of their fathers.

Thus to be a father is to educate the child into the traditions that have been passed down. Such an education is an education of the child into being something. Thus there is origin of being. Such origin of being is recognized when the Spirit can be responsible for regeneration. An individual is born again, but by adoption into a new cultural form.

The earthly father is a father in a derivative sense only. He carries out the duties of a (an exemplification of) Father. But the traditions he passes on are not his own. He thus does not originate the being of the son/daughter. To bring them up in the ways of the tradition is to educate them into

possibilities which are social possibilities. Again the father is not the origin of such possibilities of being. He is merely the mediator.

The earthly father thus plays the role of father. How to be a father is a social role and thus his own being as father is engendered. It is society that is the real father. It is society in which the origin of the possibilities of being are found. The father is merely the administrator of these. He is one particular guardian of fatherhood. He is merely the instrument through which the children can form themselves into the roles society has for them. Only in socio-symbolic ways can they become sons and daughters.

The distinction between father and Father figure emerges within the religious/social cult that brings a child up in the traditions of their fathers. It is a recognition of how society is the Father because it is the generating factor. Because it is culture that presents the possibilities of being something, culture is the originating power of the Father.

So this cult distinguishes between two kinds of generation. The first is biological and the second is cultural. The first provides the individual material with its capacities and the second has the power to give it being of a specific kind. The second is given the greater power. For even the nature of being an earthly father only has sense within the scope society

has formed and now gives it. Thus each father is only a father in virtue of following the law. It is the law that makes one a father and not the biological factor.

This relation between culture and biology is something that Freud came across in his psychoanalytical work as something that he needed to obtain a theory about. The relation of biology and culture was something that he needed to explain the great deal of malfunctions that he came across in his clients.

E.g. in his cases of hysteria Freud realized how the relation between body and mind could alter normal relations. The body would take on physical illnesses that were not appropriate to it. The body that had the malfunction was not the biological body as known by medical science, but the body as mapped out in the mind of a psychically ill person. Thus a person could develop a limp due to the belief that in the past they had taken a false step.[6] Or a cough could develop, not because there was an irritation in the larynx, but because of the need to identify with the father.[7]

Freud, in order to understand the kind of relationship which holds between culture and organism, thought that it must take place in the psyche. The psyche forms as the bringing together of these two orders. He saw it occurring through a process of Oedipalization. But let us see how it takes the form of the psyche first.

The psyche is formed out of the interrelations of three components. The first is the drive system. It emerges out of the organic state of the infant. At first these centre around the mother as the object of pleasure satisfaction. Subsequent to this the infant becomes a child, towards becoming a little girl or boy, and so it emerges into a socialization programme.

Through this socialization programme the child is weaned off the mother as the object of its world, and on to the social order of things. The interruption between the desire for the mother and thus the mother-orientation of all desire, towards a re-orientation to the socially prescribed way of becoming satisfied, is father.

The way of society is at first imposed from without. The infant as an organic entity does not have social codes and manners. These must be learnt. So they are imposed upon an order that they do not belong to. The question we are in search of an answer for is, is this an arbitrary imposition?

The child though begins to form a psyche by introjecting this strange order.[8] At first it works by Daddy and Mummy introducing their will, and then reinforcing it. Introjection begins when the child is able to repeat what Daddy and Mummy want without the presence of those parents. Thus it starts to tell itself what they want.

Now the grounds for conflict arise within the child. The organic desires are at odds with the culturally imposed desires. Culture begins by denying the child's desires in the name of its own. But those desires do not go away. They go underground. The child has to learn the art of repressing them. This requires a mediating function between the demands of the organic pulsions and the cultural law. This Freud designates as the work of the ego.

It is the ego that represses the desires that culture will not stand for. Repression is not simply the denial of the old ways from being actualized. It is not just the desire to eat out of the larder when nobody is there. It is more subtle. The original desire was for the mother. The desire for the mother and to satisfy oneself upon her is forbidden. It is more than just the desire. It is even the thought. The ego has to deny itself the very thought of desire for the mother.

The whole way in which one has to orientate oneself in the world, is such that one must see that this is what one desires. One has to bring one's desires into alignment with what society desires. As these desires for the mother do not go away overnight, they form the unconscious. The original desire for the mother does not go away at all. It is simply re-directed. This also requires that it be reinterpreted.

Thus when the child directs its interests on to the world the world becomes the source of its (possible) satisfaction. But its interests are formed from its desires for physical contact, for nourishment, for security, for that which smells nice, sounds nice, feels nice. It desires to be taken in an all embracing fashion. It desires to be pampered in a passive role. It also desires to be the focus of attention. It still desires to manipulate that attention. And so on.

These desires all centred around the mother-object are forbidden. But they will not go away. The child cannot be expected to stop functioning according to these desire structures. And society does not expect it to do so. Society just forbids them and redirects them. But it does so in such a way that the child learns that it is wrong to have these desires in regard to the mother.

So the desires are maintained. It can do none else. It finds new objects for them. But in finding a new object for those desires does not make them new desires. They are the old forms of desire but with new ways of satisfaction. Repression comes in by not being able to admit the desires and what they are desires of. Thus they become repressed memories and converted into acceptable forms of desire. Their real nature is kept hidden from one's own mind.

## SYMBOLIC TRANSPOSITION: THE POWER OF THE SYMBOLIC ORDER

The relation between the organism which is the infant and the father order of society is taken up by Lacan. Lacan's account is nowhere straightforward. And this is a tribute to him. The problem is not as simple as the behaviourist would suggest. It is not straightforward case of the pain behaviour of the organism just becoming cultural pain behaviour.

It is essential to realize though that for Lacan the order of the psyche is the order of society, the social order. That is why it has been possible to deal with the order of the subject as a transcendental order. Lacan's major influence here was Levi-Strauss, who applied the structure of structuralist linguistics to the social order. For Lacan then psychoanalysis and its philosophy of the logic of the psyche is not concerned with mental entities.

The problem is always how the psyche is composed by the individual being able to assume a socially ordered mentality. This does not imply mental events that have internal structure. The central feature of his psychoanalytical theory comprises of the stages of development towards this. They are two, the imaginary stage and the full symbolic stage. The latter is the equivalent of the Oedipal stage in Freud.

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behaviour to another. The problem with this account is that the nature of the transformation does not show. Just to say that it learns this, is not enough. We have seen already from Lacan's treatment of the unconsious how the nature of such learning abilities can be completely missed. And when it comes to being behaviourally constituted through the logic of the game, the transformation remains unaccounted for.

Take the following quotation from Hamlet to see what I mean. In response to his mother's query, 'Why seems it so particular with thee?' Hamlet pounces upon the use of 'seems'.

'Seems, madam! Nay, it <u>is</u>; I know not "seems".
'Tis not alone my inky cloak, good mother,
Nor customary suits of solemn black,
Nor windy suspiration of forced breath,
No, nor the fruitful river in the eye,
Nor the dejected 'haviour of the visage,
Together with all forms, moods, shows of grief,
That can denote me truly. These, indeed, <u>seem</u>,
For they are actions that a man might play.
But I have that within which passeth show;
These but the trappings and the suits of woe.'[8]

In recent days the psychotherapeutic understanding of psychical conflicts, the reading of this part of <u>Hamlet</u> would reinforce their view that Hamlet was able to correctly distinguish his

feelings from the world of his intellect. Thus he was pointing to feelings that could not seem, because they just were. Not only were they indubitable, but they could not take the form of show. They were inner, present to him in a way that he could neither deny nor avoid.

If one takes Heidegger's transcendentalism to be founded on the gap created between one's concrete and individually based capacities on the one hand and the cultural possibilities true of the subject, then one would see perhaps the possibility of Hamlet's distinction to be based on this gap. The transcendental as the cultural clothing of the subject can be worn at will. It is taken upon oneself in the form of play, and precisely in the form of drama.

The distinction then that Hamlet draws our attention to, between 'seems' and 'is', in this case, refers to the distinction between feelings as experienced and the forms of those feelings which can be put on and off like a suit of clothes.

As we can see, Hamlet remarks that even moods and feelings can be mimicked. They can take on the appearance so that even they can seem. One can take on the look of melancholy, despair, joy, etc. To take on the look without the being, how is this possible? Are we separating two separate elements? Does emotion have two distinct compositional elements?

It is a natural tendency to think of the emotional state as the real thing without the cultural form. The cultural form does not give it reality. The cultural form is not the reality. Thus the emotion retains its reality outside of the cultural form.

Thus if there are two separate elements, then they are the real nucleus and the outward appearance. In the behaviourist frame the outward appearance is the new form of emotion behaviour. But the behaviourist would not want to say that the new form of behaviour is not the real thing but its outward manifestation.

It is a common sense view, a folk psychological view, to think of the emotion as some sort of internal bodily disturbance. But this is never enough. The bodily disturbance would not be the emotion that we know, if it did not have a rationality to it. E.g. it is not a bodily disturbance that distinguishes annoyance from indignation. If one were asked to distinguish these two it would be impossible to do so in virtue of distinguishing different sensations of distinct bodily movements alone.[9] The sensations are not what distinguish here.

So if someone were asked if they knew the distinction between annoyance and indignation they would not reply by trying to explain certain goings on in the viscera. They would respond by explaining what each of them meant. They would naturally

try to define the distinction according to the logic of the terms. Indignation occurs when one's dignity is called in question. This need not be the case with annoyance. So the difference in the emotions is present through the different logic of the respective terms.

This distinguishes folk psychology from our everyday experience.[10] If folk psychology is determined by questioning the account that comes most naturally, then this is quite different from the way we ordinarily do make the distinctions prior to account giving. This should be where the analysis begins not by asking for naive accounts, theories. For these primitive modes of distinguishing are anything but naive. Therefore we ought to distinguish between naivety of account and naivety of experience.

So it is a false view of our primitive view of the emotions. In the primitive way of determining what emotions one is experiencing or observing, it is the logic of the situation, the position someone is in, that permits the determination of the emotion.

But what is the relation between the bodily emotive aspect and the logic of the emotion? As the etymology of the word suggests the e-motion of the individual plays a part. Of course this need not always be the case. In fear brought on by the sight of a wild animal in one's immediate vicinity,

there is bodily movement. But there need not be when one expresses fear that the weather might not turn out the way one hoped, or that there is going to be a rise in interest rates.

Is it just that the logic of the situation becomes further and further removed from the most primitive bodily movements of fear? The logic of the fear is continued and developed but without the bodily disturbance. How is it that we occupy the logic of fear without the bodily sensations and drives?

**THE SYMBOLIC ORDER:**

Lacan's account of this may be taken from what he calls the Symbolic Order.[11] We will have to return to it later to show that this Symbolic Order does not function in relation to the organic order without a mediating factor. This, as it turns out is the Imaginary Order. Thus a direct parallel occurs between Lacan on the one hand and Kant and Heidegger on the other.

Lacan takes the work of Freud on the relation of the order of the Superego and the libidinal drives of the lower orders of the Id, and gives it a linguistic twist. By using the work of Saussure, he is able to show that Freud's account of the psyche can be read according to Structuralist principles.

Saussure presented a structural representation of the composition of the word. It had three components. It has a physical, material component that he calls the signifier. This is what I have already mentioned above. The second factor is what he calls the signified, and this is what we might call a concept, except that a concept is too psychological. It is possibly a meaning.[12] Diagrammatically the word consists of the unity of the signifier to the signified. This unity is represented by the bar which at the same time divides them. Thus we have the following -:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| material image | | tree |
| ——— — — | = | |
| | = | |
| concept | | concept of 'tree' |

The material image does not have to be a written, alphabetic image, but could be an acoustic image, or a gestural image as in sign language. But what we have is the unity of the material with that which belongs to the symbolic order.

This is the image that Lacan carries over to his account of the formation of the psyche. He represents the individual subject as the compositon of these two components. One is a culturally originated component and the other is a materially originated component. This already misrepresents Lacan who

wants to stress that the organic dispositions do not have a non-interpreted status with which we can approach them.[13] The subject is represented by the 'S' of the signifier. This in turn represents its socio-logic as bestowed by society. Society is Father which comes about as the loss of the mother. The infant (infans-without speech) has its mother as a real thing. It must now turn to the cultural order for culturally imposed forms of satisfaction. They are symbolically registered. They are symbolic ways of being, ways of being satisfactorily significant . Society bestows these forms of signification fron above. They come to us from above, thus out of the heavens as far as our earthly component is concerned. This relationship is represented by the bar. The bar shows us that there is a gap formed between the transcendental logic of the subject, which is the logical form that a subject can take. This is what I have been calling assumption. What then is the bar over?

The logic of the Signifier is over the signified. If there are no uninterpreted signifieds then what can the bar be over? Should it be over an empty space? In that case there would be no need for a bar at all. But for Lacan the logic of the Signifier is over the unconsious form of desire. Thus the role which is the social role is placed over, superimposed over the underlying role of the unconscious.

I say 'role' because Lacan keeps faith with his view that it is not uninterpreted. In fact the unconscious role of desire is an interpreted mode of being, desire of the subject's own interpretation. This is not a private interpretation. The subject can only interpret its own desires according to the Symbolic Order that orders it, tells it how to place those desires.

It is here that Lacan is able to draw out what is unique about Freud's view of the unconscious. The Signifier is always over another signifier. The bar represents repression. That which is beneath the bar is kept out of the Signifier above it. The signifier above it relates itself to another signifier and not to another signified. The signified is eternally missing.

This is easily understood but bears a great deal of structuralist deductions about the human subject. Keeping in mind the model, the upper signifier represents the logic of the social role. Thus suppose a subject to be a policeman. The signifier as the role he assumes relates to other signifiers as they form themselves above the bar. The policeman bears within his symbolic position the significance it has to other signifiers. Thus it has a relationship to criminals, to the general public, the police station, police cars, police equipment, traffic control, etc. It is caught up in a network of other signifiers. The situation it has within the network gives it the position it has. In true structural terms, it

has its positive identity through the negativity of a system of differentiation.

The human subject is not only a signifier. It is the unity of the components above and below the bar. What is below the bar is the signified for what is above the bar. Because that which can appear to any subject is always going to be in the form of a signifier within the symbolic order, then what is below the bar will always have the form of signifier. It is however the way it relates to that which is above the bar that makes it a signified.

If for example I put myself into this model, then above the bar would be a signifier for me, viz. student. It could also be male, white, Irish, speaker of English, etc. Below the bar could be my name, in an attempt to bring me into the model. Although I try and bring something concrete into the model to designate myself, this only functions to provide another signifier.

Even so, this still shows what is at work. It is the 'literal' me that is being transposed into the signifier above. This is what Lacan calls the metaphorical relation in the model. But I call it here 'transposition'. The term means that what is on the bottom, below the bar, is transposed above the bar in that it is given a position through the signifier above the bar.

What I am calling a 'position' in this case would be either that of the policeman above or in my own case that of a student. The individual, whoever he may be, is transposed when he becomes a policeman as soon as he is able to legitimately take on the role of policeman. Within the system of things above the bar, he now has a position. The position he has is determined by the network of signifiers.

The network is the system of signifiers that the individual must understand if he is to identify himself as any instance of signifier. He must know the logic of their relations prior to being able to carry out his duties. Knowing who he is according to his signifier is knowing how each of the relevant other signifiers places him. I.e. places him logically.

In order to become a policeman, Mr. X, let us call him Bobby, must know how to transpose. He must know how to convert his own private being into that of a policeman. How does he do this? He must learn to behave like a policeman. He must learn a new behaviour. The limitations of such an account can now be delineated.

The policeman must know the nature of transposing himself into a logic. He must know how to fit his being into a network of logical relations. He must know what it means to fit. To understand how his actions have to be befitting to the logic of a network. All of this sort of thing, Lacan would relate to

that which is above the bar. What he is not explaining is how the transposition takes place. We need to add pieces here from Heidegger to fill it out.

Thus the individual must know how to submit himself to the network. He must therefore know what it is to assume a role. To assume a role is not first and foremost a cognitive enterprise. It is an ontological enterprise first. Thus the individual assumes a role by taking that role upon himself such that he (ontologically) constitutes himself through and according to it.

Submitting to it means that he lets it dictate to him the order of his behaviour. It dictates to him how he must behave, the significance and course of his actions. It shows him his place. He must obey according to his place. He must listen to the dictates of this Reason so that he knows when he is out of place, when his action, thought, or intention, emotion, is out of order. Thus even his inner life is dictated to. And these dictations reach down into his inner life and convert them into the order that announces itself from above.

This is a case of transposition because he now has his position as a private citizen placed into a higher position according to its new public duty. When he is on duty he is forbidden to think of himself according to his private life,[14] unless that aids him in the course of his duty. The private becomes

subject to the social. The lower position is transposed on to a higher level. The higher level dictates its logic to that of the lower level.

Is there no input from the lower level? A form of input has been mentioned before. The capacities of the private individual are now transposed into capacities at the level above. The capacities of strength, height, bearing, speed, intelligence, ability to make quick judgement, courage, tidiness, discernment of situation, etc. These natural abilities have to be taken up into the higher level, and trained to a higher level in order to make them more refined, more systematic and coherent, and educated to be present to the mind instructed in the logic of its new environment.

In one way these might be taken as earthly capacities. Thus height, braininess, strength, etc. Other features may be more obviously socialized capacities. Thus discernment is a form of judgement which suggests the trained eye.

And the trained eye is the educated eye. The eye of the art historian is more discerning than someone momentarily enjoying a glance at a work of art. The eye is more discerning when it knows what to look for and how to go about looking for it. These are the direct results of education, which the other momentarily lacks.

The eye of the art historian is not necessary limited by his ability to cash what he sees in terms of experience. This is relative. If he were a spirit then what would soft curves mean to him, or sharp corners? It is essential to note here though that there is no art work to do if one cannot cash out the work in terms of primitive working conditions.

The question though is not whether the work of art does not deal in abstractions, but how they have bearing and vice versa upon more primitive working conditions. It was surely not any of Heidegger's intention to say that one could not understand the work by Vincent Van Gogh depicting a pair of well worked peasant boots, to stress the way the work cashes out in terms of farm labour. It was not the detail of the boots but the world behind them that spoke through them, that Heidegger saw there.

But does this not show how world and the items of that world work through each other at different levels. We can feel the pain the boots speak of without the need to envisage the world of labour. Yet we can take our pain, and the drudgery of our own lives and through the imagination have them transposed, taken up by the farming world of the nineteenth century.

This was the problem for Heidegger. How does such a world, or any world take things up, and how do the things of the world

bring the world down to it? How does the world world, and how does the earth earth?

But are the capacities that we mentioned as earthly not also taken on some kind of signfying function. A policeman has to be of a certain height because of what it signifies. For those who targeted those with height, the reason they were directed towards it as a necessary property, was that they accepted a specific social significance with it. It had connotations of - more inclined to induce respect, fear, more inclined to have physical strength, etc.

Thus something purely physical is not without significance. Paradoxically, it is not purely physical if that means without the logic of some signifying position within the order of things. Thus it already takes place within some signifying network. This means that there is no possibility of obtaining in the model, a signifier over a signified, where the latter is without a signifying function. What does this mean then for the Unconscious?

## LACAN AND THE UNCONSCIOUS

Lacan's view of the unconscious is a rich source of enlightenent for this theme. But Lacan himself is notorious for his own obscurity. So the study of Lacan is another case

of bringing the obscure into the light. So I propose to bring it into as clear a language as I possibly can with a view to throwing light into the more obscure regions of Heidegger's own dark sayings.

The clearest account I can give of Lacan's view of the unconscious is through the illustration of Freud's own experience of the fort/da game played by his grandson. When Freud went to visit his daughter he noticed his grandson Ernst playing a game.

The game is portrayed in Freud's work Beyond the Pleasure Principle[15] where it features as part of Freud's portrayal of traumatic neurosis, in which someone suffers from a prior traumatic scene which they constantly repeat. The game as Freud first witnessed it, consisted of the child sitting in the middle of the room, playing. His play took the form of throwing toys from the centre of the room into the corner. He accompanied this action with the phonemic sound of 'ooo'. Freud, in collusion with the child's mother understood this to be the child's version of the word 'fort', the German for 'away'. So in effect the child was throwing the toys away.

It was not just that the child learnt to associate toys leaving its arm, and being projected into the corner of the room, with the phoneme 'ooo'. The child knew, or understood what it was doing. To understand what it was doing indicates more than

repeating associations. The association does not have meaning merely in virtue of being associated. But we have to work out the meaning of the action/event as performed by the child to see that it did have meaning and not mere association. And to see that it was an act of understanding. And also to show what we mean by the act being an act with understanding. It is also elucidatory about how the child has a sense of what it is doing. What it means for a child to understand the sense of what it is doing.

The picture begins to emerge in the second visit of Freud some months later. He notices that the child is playing the same game but now in a more modified and developed form. This enables Freud to be able to tell what is going on. The child still has the rudiments of the game in operation. But in the more elaborate form, it has made for itself a toy which substitutes the toys that were flung across the room.

The constructed toy is a cotton reel with a string attached to it. It is constructed according to the requirements of the game, but also for deeper significance than even this. Apart from this construction, the child is now using a cot, with a curtain that draws in front of it, thereby blanking out the external field of vision. With these props in place the game can continue as normal. But instead of flinging a succession of toys across the room, the child throws the cotton reel out of the cot.

With the string attached to the reel the toy can be retrieved at will. It is retrieved from behind the closed curtain. Each time the toy is flung out, the child calls out 'ooo', meaning 'fort' (away). When it hauls it back in, it responds with 'aaa', which Freud again supposed to be representative for 'da', the German for 'there'.

When Freud witnessed this, he understood the child to be playing a game, now known as the fort/da game. The game is of significance to the theory of the unconscious, because of the way it shows the doubling of two scenes in order to create significance, meaning.

Freudian theory is radically different from any cognitive approach to the development of the child. The game the child is playing shows how the unconscious works through the conscious. It shows that the child is not simply playing a game. If this scenario were presented to cognitive psychology, this child's skills would be researched to see what level of sophistication it had reached. These would be observed through the game to see how the child was able to exercise such skills according to the demands of the game. Freud's theory is much more sophisticated than this.

The child is playing two scenes off against each other at one and the same time, and by conflating the two scenes into one. It has to be realized that the child is playing the game, not

just to exercise its skills on the environment. Nor is it merely developing itself into a fully skilled creature. Such an account only takes in its relations between present and future. There is another temporal moment that cognitive and behavioural approaches neglect. This is the relation back into the historical past and how the child's actions are out of such a history.

The past the child is coming from, and the past it is still trying to come to terms with, is that of dealing with the presence and absence of the mother-object. The presence of the mother is pleasure to the child as the source of satisfaction. The presence of the mother comes as the return of the mother. So even this contains past, present and future orientation.

The presence of the mother, her return and the satisfaction this brings with it, are all experienced passively. But as the child develops into its environment, it has to take active control of it. It seeks to gain mastery over its own experiences of pleasure. It is already doing this by substitution of oral activity pleasure without nutrition, for oral activity with the object of pleasure. Thus the act can bring the pleasure without the object. The aim of the act can be obtained without the object, showing at this stage their differentiation.

The central fact that has to be mastered however is the presence and absence of mother, who can represent environment, or the object of pleasure. But any child that is going to seek such mastery by taking active control, is also learning to work with representatives, i.e. with substitutions. It engages in playing out the active role without the object being present. Thus it plays out the presence of the object during the absence of the real object.

The child that Freud observed was at the stage when it could use phonemic representations as words. This use of symbols shows the child working with elements that stood for that which was absent. Even if the full nature of the symbolic is not yet there for the child, it is now working with presence and absence in their pregnant significance for the child. It is doing so through the significance of what it intends, means to say. What it means to say is seen in the nature of the act.

Thus it accompanies the significant term 'ooo' (fort) with the act of propelling something that belongs to it into a state of 'gone'. The significance of the toy in the corner is 'gone'. Thus the act is used to create a significant event. The toy in the corner is representative of a state of being absent. The child is in part basing this on its own state of being separated from the object.

It is not just that the object in the corner is signified by the symbol 'ooo'. It is the relation between object and the resulting state of the agent. The child is representing the kind of absent being, paradoxical though this is, and the nature of its own being in regard to it. It signifies that the entity has gone from it, the projecting being.

So the child is playing a game, which is a way of it being able to obtain mastery over its environment. This mastery over environment is mastery of its own states. It is able to bring pleasure and dissatisfaction to itself in the form of a game. By reducing it to a game it can master it more easily, i.e. it is less serious. And it is easier in that it is done repetitively. It is also done with the realization that the strings are now under its control, and it is not at the complete dependence on the object of pleasure.

The game however is a representation of a more original scene. Thus it repeats the original scene. The scene is repeated in symbolic form so as to rehearse the original. So if Freud is right here, then the game the child plays is much more than just a game. It is much more than an exercise of motor skills. And although the child is obtaining great pleasure from the game the nature of the pleasure is deep and not surface.

It is by realizing how this game is one of representation, symbolic of a prior scene, that we can work out, through comparing the interplay at work, the nature of the unconscious. We can also see how the signficance of the things we do, is not surface, but deep. It shows us that games can be understood as language games because of their deep significance. The analysis that Wittgenstein began of the things we ordinarily do, requires a totally different analysis due to realizing more than the logic of the game.

It is not merely a language game. Analysis of the game in terms of its logico-linguistic format, misses out how the logic of it works. It would seem that Wittgenstein had a sense of this, when he did think that there were two superimposed games at work. The use of the word 'pain' was indeed a new form of behaviour. But it was a form of behaviour that can only be fully understood in terms of the depth significance that it superimposes.

This does not mean that there was a depth significance there previously. The depth significance is formed out of interaction from the surface logic and that is representational.

So when we return to what the act signifies it is clear that the act represents more than the items that are present to the

child. The system of representation is complicated. But more to the point is its depth.

On the first level the terms 'ooo' and 'aaa' represent the situation created by the game. So they are representational in the way language is. But this is not the only system of representation. The game itself is representational. It signifies another scene, viz. the scene between mother and child. This is not a carbon copy of the original but an extention of it in symbolic form.

It is a created drama in which a theme is taken and reworked. Thus there is legitimately a development of the original. It is legitimate due to the purposes of the reworking. The aim is not just one of copying, or trying to mirror image something, show a replica of that which is originally there. The purpose is to rework it. In the new medium the aim is to re-work it, with the stress on 're'

The specific aim of this reworking is to practise mastery over environment, over one's own personal states, and over those states which are the resultant states due to interaction with the environment. Due to this aim, the game used to present the original, has to represent it with these aims in mind. Thus the main actor, the engaged agent, has a different role. He has the role of master, of active agent, rather than dependent and passive recipient.

Thus the environment is revolved around the will of the agent. While in the first scene the environment is the agent and the child is merely its toy. This gives an added delight to the secondary dramatic form, when the child, now master, has mastery over a toy. The toy is used for its delight, and it takes delight at projecting it into absence. That which is projected into absence, is in the original, the mother.

So there is a preservation of the central characters with a reversal and development of their roles. The mother is no longer agent, but now the manipulated thing of the child. The child who was once toy is now the user and ab-user of the toy. The arbitratory will of the mother is now transferred to the new master-child. Now it dispenses its power in the reverse role.

The state of pleasure however is transformed. The child is now author of its own pleasure states. It has been able to transfer them through this new game from an arbitrary dispenser, to itself. Thus it takes the arbitrary relation to the pleasure and takes it into its own arbitrary control. Now it can decide the comings and goings of its own pleasure states. It is self-gratifying. It takes its own states out of the hands of another and places them where it can have complete control over them. This is a way of taking control over its own environment. A kind of sovereignty is installed.

It also plays with a new will power. Again it experiences this through transfer. It has experienced what it is like to be the victim, the toy of another unpredictable will. Originally through the will that existed without it, its states of pleasure came into being. But now it can will its own states. It can will effectively and efficiently. It can practise this and enjoy it at the same time.

Where is the unconscious in all this? So far I have been talking as if the whole act was deliberately planned and executed by the child. But this is not the case. The child is just playing with toys which it is taking pleasure in propelling out of reach into the corner of the room. What I have been trying to show, in Lacanian interpretation of this game, is that the game is not arbitrary. It did not just emerge for no reason. It has its very specific purposes and the child is working at something very specific.

This is what gives the game its logic. Once we read the game in terms of its significance we could spell a logic out at two levels. At least. But the child in playing the game is enjoying itself in the game. The child is only conscious, if we can take this word at face value (for I think that if we work through the full significance of this analysis we can see the limitations of saying what the subject is conscious of), of the game itself. It is not conscious, at this time, of the

mother, her role in the game, or the pleasure and displeasure concomitant at her appearance and disappearance.

The original scene is working as the deep significance of the game. It is what Lacan is calling the unconscious.

When I say that we must take the word 'conscious' and 'unconscious' for that matter, at face value, it is because there is a sense in which the child is conscious of what it is doing. It is in this sense conscious of its own unconscious striving. This is so because the child knows what game to invent, what elements to put in it, how to put itself in it, and how to reap the rewards of the game.

At a deep level the child knows what it is about. It knows when the game works and when it does not. It is searching for satisfaction through the game and it manipulates the elements into an organized form such that the elements do work. It knows how to work those elements in a very crafted way.

The significance to the game is not taken from the game itself but that which it is reworking. That is, if we just took the logic of the game itself, the relation of its elements, we would not know what was really going on. That is not to say that the game could not be made sense of on its own. It has a perfectly good sense in relation to itself.

This is an account of the unconscious and so it differs from what is called the symbolic behaviour of the child in cognitive psychology. This occurs when the child is playing with toys that it uses to imitate the adults of its world. For example the child may be playing with toy telephones or cups and saucers. This may be symbolic. But it may also just be imitative.

If it is symbolic then the child sees what it wants to represent. It sees the adult world and tries to enter into it through play-acting. This superimposing of two worlds shows the symbolic nature of play. The above analysis could equally apply in the mode of superimposing one field of activity upon another. But then the above analysis applies equally well to drama. This is because drama is a re-enactment. It is also the re-working of a theme.

But what distinguishes the account given above from these other accounts is that it is unconscious, and it shows the rudiments of drama taking place as soon as the infant is taking on a symbolic world. Its original symbolic world is composed of the unconscious. We are shaped 'dramatically' as soon as we enter into the world.

The point I want to draw from this however is the way in which the child is taking a pre-symbolic material and working it into its symbolic material such that what is ordinarily not supposed

to be symbolic is in actual fact precisely that. But notice that our ordinary everyday activities, our cultural activities, have depth to their symbolism. They are 'lower' strata of experience, a prior level of experience, transformed into higher symbolic and cultural forms.

The logicality of the higher, encultured and symbolic form, has its significance not in the relation of the elements that the logic runs together, but in that which the game transforms. In other words, if we are to give an account of what is going on, we cannot do so by reference to the logic of the game no matter how accurate that is.

If we put this into phenomenological terms, we can see that no amount of phenomenology is going to work here. Phenomenology can at most give the way things appear in the surface game. It focuses upon how the appearances appear. How the phenomena appear in the game is determined by the level of 'appear' we are using. And in phenomenology this applies to the ordinary everyday way they appear. We are not to put construals upon the mode of appearance, but just to let them appear.

And thus we derive the phenomenality of the phenomena according to the logic of the game. And phenomenology depends upon this. Or rather this is what phenomenology supposes. But the question is whether it does.

Perhaps linguistic phenomenology is closer to the logic of the behaviour and the logical significance of the elements in the game. To investigate the sense of a term, early forms of linguistic analysis took reference, to begin with, from the dictionary. Such a reference sets up a bias. It is biased towards the logic of the term in isolation from the situation in which the significance of the items in an actual game are at work. Thus priority is given to the logic of the terms when they are idling, on holiday.

It was very noticeable how Wittgenstein sensed there was something wrong with this. And so he used a tactic of imaginatively resetting the terms to see them at work. He contrives unnatural settings for them to stretch the working capacity of the term. This is not to show that such terms do not work here, but the oddity of the work. Thus he sets in opposition a place in which the term is not supposed to work with a setting in which it is.

What I suggest has happened here, and one which calls in question the strategy of philosophies in this area, is that there is a lost connection between that which gives the logic its significance. The logic is treated as self-sufficent. The self-sufficiency occurs at the surface level and it is supposed that this is where the whole of its work stems from.

But if we take the Lacanian theory seriously, then this whole approach is called into question. The logic of the game is not self-sufficient. The nature of what gives it its signifance is hidden. This is an area that philosophy does not ignore. They have transposed it into another realm.

The relation they see to be one of how the intelligible refers to the sensible. But this whole relation must be called in question because it supposes that significance comes from the one dimension of the intelligible game. The logic of the game has its significance in the way it gathers the sensible elements.

Thus it can be realized that the logical is not internally significant. Once logical connectives are isolated from reality then they are no longer significant. They have no longer anything to do with truth, only with validity. But even this is based on some sort of reference.

As already shown the unconscious does not function without signification. The example of the fort/da game shows the unconsious breaking into the signifying order of signification. It does so by imposing itself into the signifying order. It requires a means of working itself out. But working itself into, is a case of working itself out.

This is a very important realization, for it shows that the relation between signified and signifier in the social realm is not based on an arbitrary relation.

For the moment though, how does the unconscious work itself into the signifying chain? In the case of Freud's grandson, the unconscious is the desire to master the discomfort caused by the arbitrary pleasure and despair concomitant upon the comings and goings of the mother object. The desire to overcome this formulates itself in the game that the child enacts.

Thus the child does not formulate this problem in a presentation of its situation. The child does not know of this sense of being out of control in any kind of explicit sense. It does not think about it in a direct way. It does not represent it to itself in a direct way. What it does do is work itself out by working it into another medium.

On the face of it the chosen game looks arbitrary.16 This is no doubt due to the lack of resemblance between mother and toys. The game of throwing toys into the corner looks nothing like a mother visiting a cot. And usually when this story is told to students they scoff at the connection made. This is grist to the Lacanian mill.

But once one assumes the connection then all sorts of underlying identities can be spotted. These have already been put into the form of the analysis given above, on the involvement of the unconscious in the game. But one can see the use of the situation of mastery versus dependency. There is the pleasure of an object being seen after its disappearance. The underlying framework repeats itself in the new medium. As such it is transformed and the signifying elements are transposed.

It is helpful to know that Freud did later see another version of the same game after this game.17 The same child used a mirror. He showed his game to his mother. The game consisted in making himself disappear. He learnt to look at himself in the mirror and then crouch low so that he could see himself no longer. Then when his mother returned he would perform the same stunt, and announce to her, 'Baby ooo!'

With this information then it becomes obvious how the two games signify the desire to control its own disturbing situation.

But we are picking out the features of the original in the terms set by the secondary revision of it. The secondary revision of the situation is now the game. The original situation is present to the child but now in the form of the secondary logic and signifying elements. Its satisfaction shown to itself and the mother is again to the child, a

satisfaction which it takes to be due to the game. There is satisfaction derived from the game. But this is not the underlying satisfaction. This however is not explicitly open to the child.

If we put this into the form of the model, above the bar is the game the child is playing, viz. the fort/da game. Below the bar is the signified. The signified is what is taken up into the signifier above the bar and represented there. The signified however has its form of signification dictated from above.

To see this further let us take the other case of the child prior to the socialization of its desires for the mother.[18] The child wants its mother, it wants her breast, her naked body, to be in bed with her, to be comforted on her breast, the scent of her nipple, the feel of being in the cleavage of her breast, the smell of her body, to have her hands all over the child's body. As soon as these desires can be seen to be forbidden, then they are cast socially as undesirable. But what is the son or daughter to do with them?

They have to transmit them into other acceptable desires. But the new desire is the old desire, except the object has changed. What looks like an acceptable desire is the old desire in a new guise. So in effect there was nothing wrong with the old desire. It was just that society wanted to

change the object. But the new object is merely a substitute for the old.

So in fact, because the new object is merely a substitute the old desire is still present. It is merely using a substitute for it. But the socialized individual would never accept this. It is an abomination to any well adjusted male to think that it wants to sleep with its mother. Incest is taboo.

CHAPTER FIVE

# IMAGINATION AND THE IMAGINARY ORDER

## NARCISSISM AS MEDIATION

Freud understood the psyche to function as a mediating factor between the social form and the uncultured desires of the pre-socialized child. Lacan also recognized the need to show how the adoption of the symbolic order comes about. He interposed between the symbolic order and the natural state another order which he calls the Imagimary Order.

It has its theoretical basis in Freud's view of the narcissistic form of love. So we will take this way as an introduction to what Lacan develops into a mirror theory of development of the ego.

The myth of Narcissus and Echo sets the theme for Freud. This Greek myth tells us that when Narcissus was an infant his

mother asked Tiresias, a prophet, whether he would have a long life. Enigmatically Tiresias replied, 'He will if he never knows himself.'

Narcissus was beautiful and attracted both men and women who would court him. However, Narcissus repelled the love of all suitors including Echo. Echo was a nymph who had suffered punishment at the hands of Hera, Zeus's queen. Her punishment was that she had no original voice, and could only repeat the last syllable of the one who was speaking to her. Some match for Narcissus. For this he was condemned by Nemesis to the contemplation of his own beauty in a pool. He became more and more absorbed in his own beauty. But this had a wasting effect, and he wasted away and died.

This myth has important reverberations for psychoanalytical theory. It not only displays the nature of love, but the nature of the human psyche. Freud realized that the myth portrayed a drama that held within it important structures present within the modern psyche as well as the ancient. In other words the myth tells us something about our own nature. Is this nature to do with our social forms or with our natural structures?

Narcissism was not the only form of love. There was another that Freud called Anaclitic. But if we compare them we can see that the Narcissistic form is the more basic. This means

that if we look deeply at an Anaclitic form of love and follow it through we will end up with a Narcissistic form.

Anaclitic Love means the kind of love that shows a fundamental dependency of the lover upon the beloved. There is a type here. The anaclitic lover is basically clinging. He lives for the other. The other sets the goals and aims while the anaclitic helps only to attain them. Thus the will of the other is not only dominant, but in actual fact it forms the only will of the 'partnership'.

So at first this seems quite the contrary to the Narcissistic form of love. Let us consider this first before comparing them. The Narcissist is in love with themselves. This means that they are fundamentally concerned with their own image. They enjoy the attention given to them by others. And they feel attracted to others. But they are only attracted to others because of the way the other bolsters up the image they have of themselves, or the image they desire for themselves, or to bask in the sheer attention of that other.

Thus all the time it works on the basis of a self-orientation. The anaclitic lover is drawn away from their own image to the being of the other. This would seem to draw together opposites who are made for each other. But before I do this I want to continue the thread we are working on. Does this myth or structure show a natural structure or a social structure?

And to complicate the picture I want to draw in another myth to show how social structures are depicted through myth. Furthermore I want to use one myth which depicts exactly this structure we are concerned with.

This is the Hebrew myth of the creation of man.[1] This is particularly pertinent to this study because it shows a mythical framework for the theme we are working. The theme is exactly that which Heidegger illustrates in Being and Time when he uses the myth of origin of humanity as the myth of Care forming the human form of existence out of earth and heaven.

It also illustrates how myth has its own truth value and its own way of understanding the nature of things. It is demonstrable according to what it purports to make demonstrable. It purports to show us the structures of our subjectivity that we intend. It is a claim that this is how we understand things, because this is how we appropriate the structures that constitute us.

These structures are open to us because this is how we realize ourselves intentionally.[2] It is how we situate ourselves and then how we see ourselves situated. We relate to others through the position they have to us and our respective positions to them. The situated images reflect each other. The whole situation is reflected in the myth which reflects back to us our understanding of how we are situated. It

reflects back to us the way we position each other in response to our own positions within a social structure.

In the Hebrew myth therefore I want to show how we encounter our general theme but with connotations applicable to our theme on Narcissism. Yahweh Elohim creates man by forming him out of the earth. This provides his material base. Yet he is not a human being, he does not have the principle of life. So into him is breathed the spirit of life, which is his living soul.

If we compare the properties of the living soul with that which society does to the infant biological material, we see that what is breathed into the earthly capacity corresponds to the transcendental. It is the transcendental nature that gives this earthly vessel its immortal nature. It has properties now which are not earthly, but transcend each earthly vessel. These properties do not die when the earth dissipates, but perpetuates its own existence. When a rational individual dies, rationality lives on, and so on. Enough has been said to show the parallels here between myth and Heidegger's use of it for the philosophy of mind.

What concerns us here is how myth shows the structure that Freud is describing out of the Narcissus myth and psychoanalytical theory. Man is formed out of the earth. Into Him is breathed that which gives Him transcendence. Thus

He has earthly properties as well as divine properties, properties which do not reside in the earthly structure. This Man (denoted by capital) however is not the masculine that we know. For this masculine is formed by the removal of some of the being which belongs to Man. When the removal takes place we have the formation of woman as well as man.

The formation of woman is the formation of woman as she is known to the myth makers. They are presenting their view of woman, as they find her, within their own social setting. They express it in mythical terms. So we pay attention to their description of her. Their description is how they see her in terms of her social position with respect to the man, her other.

She has the existential relation to the man as one of dependency. She is described as a helpmate.[3] This means much more than that he is lonely and needs a companion. It is not good that he should be alone represents a condition of dependency. And the woman is not there just as someone helping out. These are prototypes for the nation. They are ideals for the purposes of the people's vision. To describe the woman as a helper is to say how she is in prototype. It indicates that her role is subservient to the man's. This means that her will is the will of the man. That is, he already has his goals set, his intention towards the fulfilment of these goals is towards self-fulfilment. His goals are

heaven fixed and thus belong to the eternal plan of things. She is there to help the man bring them about.

Thus her will, her intentionality towards fulfilment, is set by the man's will. It is submissive to his. This in fact must be the meaning of the submission of the woman. The submission of will just means that there is only one will and that is the will of the man. To submit to the will of the man is to submit to it as the only will. An important rider to this is that this will of man is identical to the will of God.

Now if this myth allows for this kind of interpretation, then it is being used in the same way that Freud, and Lacan and other analysts relate to ancient myths. The purpose of doing so is to show that the myths describe the functions of the psyche. But in this case the functions of the psyche, as they are structures of the will and its intentionality, are social structures.

There is thus a truth function in these myths. They are phenomenological myths. They are describing things as they show themselves. They describe the man as he shows himself and the woman as she shows herself. But what do we mean here by her showing herself? It means much more than an object being looked at. It involves our whole picture of what a woman and man ought to be if they are to be man or woman.

Thus the ought is towards an ontological position. And the ontological position is that which is dictated by the culture.

To go back to the 'property' issue for a moment, the structures of society are transcendental properties. They are structures that do not belong to an individual inherently, but to that individual, in the form of what it has to assume upon itself if, it is to be something or other. The biological entity which then becomes woman, does so by incorporating into herself the properties of being a woman. They are all there in social form, and she has to be groomed in order to be able to bear them. She has to be moulded in order to be able to subsume herself under them. I am deliberately taking categories that belong to logic and cognition to show that they have first and foremost an ontological place.

A repercussion of this is that these structures of subjectivity treated as ontological structures and not only as cognitive structures, are describable because they are intentionally open to us. They need to be understood in advance for the purposes of intentional realization. This is what makes them accessible. So they are as accessible to the mythical mind as they are to the sociological and phenomenological mind.

If we put these two myths together they show us the psychological structure that Freud came across in psychoanalysis while showing its limitations. The

naricissistic structure Freud thought was a feature of love. But it was much more than this. It was the structure of the psyche as it was intentionally orientated in all sorts of activity. Lacan however thought it foundational and made it one of the hallmarks of a patriarchal society.

The narcissist is self-orientated. Now we cannot really say this if the self does not emerge until the individual can incorporate the symbolic order. So I prefer to say that any use of self and subject must be kept resolutely for terms which only apply to that which is psychically constituted, and that means an individual that is able to assume social forms, manners of doing something. Lacan is inconsistent here. He seems to allow the word 'I' to apply to the subject in pre-cultured states. To be consistent though, it ought to be maintained that 'I' requires a logical assumption for the individual.

How then can narcissistic structures emerge? Do we only find them in the psycho-logical structure? There are rudiments for them in the pre-logical structure. This enables the infant to be moulded so that it can then be prepared to take on logical structures 'naturally'.

The infant in the mother's arms, in its cot and recipient of the mother's attention, responds to the overtures of whoever is manipulating the infant's attention. These rudiments have

narcissistic undertones that it would not enter into the head of research into cognitive development in child psychology, to look for.[4] The infant does not have a view of itself, it cannot do so. It is orientated towards the external environment. Such an orientation is adaptive.

Observation has to be careful here. Theory dictates what one sees. How does the infant orientate itself into the world? Is it that the infant is only able to orientate itself in this field by manipulating the environment and adapting accordingly? One does not need studies done on children to show the child manipulating an adult with smiles of its own. It is also manipulating the environmental adult with its cries. Successful manipulation leads to adaptive manipulation.

So the infant is able to decipher its own behaviour from the reactions it gets in the field. Thus its pre-understanding of where it is coming from, is one of primitive orientation. It is primitive orientation of itself in accordance to feed back. Thus it reads the nature of its own vocal emissions according to the resultant state of the field. But what is going on?

The nature of this is completely missed by Dreyfus. He thinks that it comes down to an induced passivity or an induced spontaneity according to the culture. He interprets what Heidegger means by a preontological understanding of Being as the background induced by the culture. Thus it could be a

passivity if one is a Japanese infant or spontaneous if American. He is citing Bourdieu for the scientific study.[5]

Dreyfus misses the whole point. The pre-ontological understanding of the child has nothing to do with the differences in culture. It is due to the inducement into culture per se. It will be shown later the full signifiance for this in the nature of the ontology of the subject. But we must for now continue to see as the background to the specific cultural inductions, the fundamental nature of the projection of the uncultured pre-understanding into understanding what is there on the cultural stage.

This is the preliminary groundwork for narcissism. The infant is able to see itself not by direct inspection of its states. It is able only to understand its states by reading them off an objective screen. That this is a primitive screen can be seen from the modulation of behaviour. There is pre-self adjustment according to enviromental response.

I can illustrate what I mean by showing that this form of behaviour does not drop with the educated adult. It is still basic behaviour for the sophisticated adult. The mistake of cognitive psychology is to miss this.[6]

Consider the view put forward by cognitive psychology that our explicit behaviour, understood theoretically according to

information processing theory, is conducted by following rules.[7] I have already shown what I take to be a logical mistake behind this. Now I want to show the central importance of what it misses out. It just is not the case that behaviour, if we allow for the term to be ridiculously stretched by psychology, to be rule based. Picking up coffee cups, walking, swimming, shaking hands, swinging a hammer, we do not have rules for. We just know how to do them.

But let us take a case of ordinary everyday behaviour to show that our behaviour is based on a deep background that does not only work on the principle of rule following, but the primitive stages of naricissistic behaviour. Supposing I go along to hear a lecture. I plant myself in a seat with a view towards seeing and hearing. I do not have to think about this, I do it automatically. I can do it automatically not because I have learnt a rule off by heart, but because of the way orientation is now built into my behaviour. I have no rule for orientation. No-one has ever taught me it. They may teach me how to do it better. But that teaching has to trade off me being an intentionally orientational-working individual.

So I go into the lecture hall and without thinking, sit in an appropriate seat. There is no thinking necessary because the architecture of our whole environment is built according to our need for orientation, and thus our orientation requirements. But supposing in this situation I find that my view is blocked

by a pillar, or a woman's hat, or my ability to hear is being checked by chatter behind me. There are no rules to consult about specifically these items. There are no rules for generalizing from them to objects as obstacles. But nevertheless I then find myself moving about to find the appropriate place where audio-visuality takes place to my satisfaction.

I am moulding myself to my environment by reading my situation, position, according to the focal object. The focal object directs my position. According to the focal object I read my own situation. Thus I find that I am unable to see or hear. I turn my ears this way and that. I squint, or tilt my head. My situation is defined not by the focal object, but by the work that needs to be done. The focal object is now my cue for telling me something about the subjective conditions I am bringing to the work, and informing me about their adequacy or inadequacy. Thus I, in terms of my position, am being measured up. The measuring concerns my occupation of a satisfactory position.

My self-understanding is read off my orientation by external environment. It is read first of all according to the work to be done. Then it works off my reading of the focal object, and then my subjectivity is defined by how I am to bring it about. Thus subjectivity is read from the object and not from the subject.

There is no rule for this. There is a guide though. And that is when the work takes place. I am the place where it does take place, and so I measure the success. Secondly, my own form of subjectivity is seen, not from an act of direct inspection, but by reading it off an objective screen dictating to me where and how I ought to be, and then how I am. I am now in the right place. I can now hear. I am now in a good position. I am now effective regarding that person.

Narcissism works, not on the naive view of it as a form of self-worship. It works off the way we read ourselves from the positions of others to ourselves. The other is the screen to ourselves.

Returning then to the infant, this can be illustrated. The infant feeds its own self-image, anachronistically speaking, off the look of its mother. If the mother pays it attention the infant can sense itself. It enjoys this. Thus a building block for self-enjoyment. It only has a sense of itself according to the mother acting upon it.

If the mother is angry with it, the infant senses itself in a negative fashion. It becomes nervy, fearful, losing a sense of security, feeling helpless, etc. This prepares grounds later for self-interpretation and self-image. A child that bases its self-image on such a screen, can take itself for unwanted, as bad, as the cause of trouble, etc.

If on the other hand the infant is constantly ignored, then the screen is not there. This child can lose any sense of identity. The fact that such children later have a peculiar fear of loss of self due to the absence of others shows regression to this phase of development, or non-development. It also shows that this period is a stepping stone of some kind to the symbolic order. Loss of self-worth can take the form of needing others to verify one's existence. It is an existential problem and not a moral one.

The narcissist on the face of it, looks like one with purely the desire to see their own image. But its structure derives from the picture painted above. The image of oneself is always derived from the image others give to us. Narcissus was beautiful. This is only a judgement that can have meaning in relation to others. That he was beautiful meant that others held him as such. His self-image is thus derived.

## THE MIRROR IMAGE: MEDIATING THE SYMBOLIC

Freud's work on narcissism shows the relation to the other that Lacan made a great deal out of. But we need to go very much further than the relation between a subject and an other to show what Lacan was to make out of narcissism. How is the subject formed? How does an individual with the capacity form

itself or have itself formed into a subject? How does it become an 'I'?

Lacan's work develops the view of Freud on Narcissism that in a way that is missed by most commentators.[8] Concentration is set on the importance for the subject the preeminent position of the other and the Other. This is the case in Lacan. But it is not a straightforward case of seeing oneself in the other. Or seeing oneself according to the other. Again this is true. But it misses out the fundamental. Lacan saw the emergence of the other as the situation of what he calls 'jouissance', a term usually left untranslated.

The other emerges only against the background of jouissance. It is the emergence of the individual into subjectivity as a kind of orgasmic experience of coming into its own. This forms the background to Lacan's theory of the Unconscious as expounded above. It is thus the deep background to any subject relationship within the symbolic order.

So I want to outline the theory of the Mirror Stage as it is presented in Lacan's paper, 'The mirror stage as formative of the function of the I as revealed in psychoanalytic experience'.[2] The question at issue is much more than image formation as studied in psychology. And this is easily missed due to talk of the formation of the I, or even formation of images.

As the title of the paper shows, it is about the formation of the I. It is also about how the I is based on the formation of experience through the image. The I is not primordial. This means that it is an image. It functions as an image. Thus Lacan sets out to show how this can be the case. If we remind ourselves that the I taken transcendentally is the ground of the unity of experience, then it is clear that Lacan has to show how the image is the ground of the unity of the transcendental ego.

Secondly, we can learn from this paper, a critique of the view that the I is a substantial unity. This is the metaphysical view that in order for the I to function as a unity it must presuppose its own substantial identity. This pertains to Heidegger who is arguing on the one hand for the ontology of the I while denying substantial identity.

Thirdly, the formation of the I through the image stage, is a critique of the temporality of the I. This we leave until the next section.

Fourthly, and most importantly, the image stage is a stage, a theatre for performance, and not a specular form of representation. This parallels Heidegger's comparative analysis of Being as the physis of the Greeks. It also provides the ground for seeing why Heidegger in his later work was able to use a different term for Being, viz.'Ereignis'.

Taking the last point first, because Lacan's account of the development is so easy to take as a case of child development and its capacity to work off images, it must be stressed how Lacan's most fundamental issue, how the emergence into the symbolic form of experience, whereby we are constituted as subjects, comes through an irruptive entry into the symbolic. It is the nature of this irruption that is the issue.

Again in order to take perspective on the theme, it parallels what Searle calls emergence. But it is such a different account of it, that it forms a critique of the simplistic way in which Searle imagines the unity of the biological with the cultural. It is also the emergence of the unity of the being with the logos that makes ontology possible.

The Mirror Stage theory of Lacan shows how the image theory of Narissism can be the basis of a whole critique of metaphysics. It is explicitly a criticism of Sartre's work in Being and Nothingness.10 For our purposes it is the direct light it throws on the nature of Heidegger's critique of Husserl and Kant. Fundamentally it is the problem of Being. How, in the access to the cultural order, does the child, as subject, come to be?

What is the access to the cultural realm, is the same problem of the formation of the psyche. This is more than a psychological problem, i.e. psychology considered according to

its modern orthodoxy. But Kant had for years rooted around in the psychology of Tetens for the clue to the unity of understanding and sensibility.[11] He found it in the work done on the imagination. History repeats itself here. For Lacan's work in the imagination now provides the clue to Heidegger's own use of the imagination as the mediating factor between being and logos.

Let us then take again the thread of the problem, the seeming arbitrary relation between logos and being. How is ontology possible? How are the faculties of Understanding and Sensibility unified in Kant's critique of metaphysics? It was the Transcendental Imagination. And now we have the dispute between Heidegger and Husserl about the ontological status of the transcendental that phenomenology describes. Is the transcendental ontological or is it purely normative?

To put the problem back into Lacanian framework how are we to understand the mediating factors of the imagination between the moulding of the pre-cultural movements of the child toward psychical development, and the symbolically ordered experience itself? Of course this is not identical with the mediating function Heidegger and Kant are talking about. Their topic involves the understanding within the symbolic framework. But we come to this later.

It should thus be taken very seriously that Lacan is highly interested in how to subvert a philosophical dogma. Thus whatever he has to say about the nature of the imagination he expects to be translatable into philosophical consequence. This is possible because as he says,

'... it sheds light on the formation of the I as we experience it in psychoanalysis. It is an experience that leads us to oppose any philosophy directly issuing from the Cogito.[12]

Lacan begins with a mention of empirical work done by Kohler on chimpanzees. But this should not detract our attention away from the fact that Lacan's interest is specifically upon what he calls 'jouissance'. This is the nature of the entry of experience into the human dimension. It is the same experience that is behind the function of the unconscious. The unconscious as described above showed that underneath the logic of the game played at the conscious level, there was another level that gave it its significance. It was not the elements in the game that gave the logic its 'real' significance. It was the way the logic gave way to the experience of the child at play.

I.e. the child found a logical space within which to realize itself. This is what gave the game meaning for the boy. It was the child coming into its own through the game. This ties the logic of the game to reality. It also gives the elements

within the game their significance. It is what makes the objects within the game present themselves to the player with significance.

Thus it is the entrance into the game that we find the real experience of the child. In the nature of the entrance into the game things become things for the child. And it is also here that the child experiences itself being.

Lacan had noticed in the work of Wallon how mimicry takes place within nature. Mimicry takes place throughout the whole order of nature. It is a strategy developed by some species in the food chain to avoid being eaten by their predators. This is obviously not a consciously devised strategy for survival. It involves genetic mutation.

An illustration of this is the White Ermine moth. It is eaten by its predators. But it puts them off by being distasteful. The repulsive taste comes from the acetyl and histamine that it contains. There is another moth called the Buff Ermine. It has developed a mimicking strategy. It is able to mimic the White Ermine moth in order to protect itself against its predators.

The Buff Ermine has through natural processes taken on the image of the White Ermin. It does not develop the internal chemical composition but the external look of the White Ermine.

Thus nature plays about with images, perceptions, i.e. what things look like.

At this stage of his thinking, much like Freud's, Lacan is interested to show a gulf between culture and biology. The human infant is different in its use of images from the higher apes. The higher apes can respond to images in mirrors but their use of the image is quite different. The human infant is able to relate the image to itself.

The fundamental experience Lacan is looking for is not just the use of an image. It is the experience of the image such that it takes the human child into the human dimension in a moment of jouissance. Lacan sees this present in the term used by Kohler, 'Aha-Erlebnis'.[13] It is a moment of joyfulness. As said, without explanation above, the child comes into its own. Again this parallels the later work of Heidegger on Being when he changes the name to Ereignis.[14] It is the moment of coming into one's own.

The joy is not an emotion. It is the joy of fulfilment. It is the projection of a pleasure-principled disposition on to a stage where it is worked out. For Lacan it is a fragmentation,[15] for Heidegger it is 'gathering', coming together.

While nature prepares the vessel, the formation of the psyche projects beyond it. Like Lacan, we will concentrate on the specifics of going beyond. However in keeping with what has just been said about infant image formation, Lacan understood the image of the child to form through something from without. It sees its own image in the mirror and recognizes that image as its own. But in what way does it relate this external image to itself?

Because the infant is only able to chart the definition of its own being from external screens and not from self-inspecting seeing, it takes what it sees in the mirror to be itself. I.e. it takes its view of itself from what the mirror tells it about itself. But as Lacan points out, this is not a one to one correspondence. It is not matching two objective pictures.

Even so, Lacan has not prepared the anti-Cartesian ground enough. There are two problems here. The first is what is meant by the image. This has led some to take the view that Lacan is distinguishing the image as representation, from the object. The second problem is how the image is supposed to be related by the child to itself, if it as yet has no sense of itself as the sort of thing that can be represented.

The first problem we come across in Smith. He thinks Lacan is showing developmental stages towards the ability to use language as the full symbolic system. Thus he follows

Freud's stages of preverbal organization as separate phases rather than as two elements within the one subjectivity.[16] Secondly he takes image to mean that which represents the original object. The image is then a representation. It is a mental representation of a real object. 'Desire comes to be know by reason of representation (image or word) that substitutes for and in that sense spells the death of the thing. The image and the imager, the word and the speaker, are thus diverted, alienated from the real.'[17]

This gives us a chance to explain the nature of the image. One must pay closer attention to the text of Lacan before making such assumptions. Smith translates Lacan straight into more orthodox psychological accounts of development. This is why I have taken such pains at the beginning of this account to warn the reader not to make these very assumptions.

The image is normally taken to be that which is a mental representation of the real situation or object. As Smith puts it, 'The lack marking the subject is a consequence of having been diverted from the real into imagery and language.'[18] Thus it is based on a perceptual model of development. And although Smith has recognized that Lacan is avoiding the perception to cognition model of intellectual development, Smith goes ahead and falls right into the trap.

The image is not a mental representation in this sense at all. The image is the object. The object has image status. It is not in the mind, not a mental entity at all, but a real, live object. In the case portrayed above, of Freud's grandson, we had a boy playing a game. Every element in the game was an image. The cotton reel he constructed was an image. In fact, the whole game was an image.

The image is that which he projects himself into. It is an image because it is what represents him. It represents an original situation. The original is more in his mind than the image. The original is what we are calling the unconscious. This is the place from which the projection is made. It is the projection from an original topos, on to a stage. The stage is the image of the original topos.

On the stage the theme of the original is replayed. I.e. it is played out. And it is played out in representative form. What is essential for psychoanalysis to recognize, is that there is more than playing at work. There is resolution and working out. Or perhaps we should say that play involves resolution as apart of its function. The stage is the place where things that need to be represented can be worked out.

There is a pun at the centre of Lacan's paper. The stage of the mirror stage, is not just a development stage. It is a theatre. It is an arena, a stadium upon which some

disposition can be played out, worked out, resolved, in a way that we might well take as a further stage of development.

The image is representative then only in the way that the significance that one finds within the state of affairs, reflects some hidden significance. The hidden is shown through them. In that they show themselves as representatives of the original, they are images of the original.

As we are all players on stages, we project more original dispositions on to stages. We respond and act upon these stages as ways of working things out for ourselves. In doing so we operate with things at two different levels. The surface level is with the image itself. This is what we meet first and foremost. We meet the thing as it shows itself. This is its phenomenality.

But at a deeper level we are at work. Just like the child playing with the cotton reel, we are enjoying the game at the level of how it works for us. The thing has to work at the two levels. This leaves us with the problem of saying what we mean by work.

Are there two levels of work? Is there the level of work in which we get the things themselves to work? For example the cotton reel functions as a cotton reel. The string works as string, such that when we tug on it the cotton reel is jolted

back. And the other level, in which what is indicated is that things work out for us. By this sort of work, we mean that our own origninal situation, position, is worked out, resolved. Or is there a third possibility? Could they both amount to the same thing?

This problem takes us to our second point about the nature of the image. The second problem was how the image is supposed to be taken by the child as its own image. How could it be if the child is not supposed to have a sense of self at this stage? To ascribe the image under its own image suggests that the child already has a sense of 'mine'. And this is what it is supposed to derive from the image.

It has already been shown how an adaptive manoeuverability forms the grounds for image formation. The child moves itself into position as a means of self-adjustment according to what it is trying to realize. The child playing with an image in the mirror then manoeuvers itself in relation to the image only to discover that it has control over the movements of the image. Now it is able to identify its own movements with that of the image. It is its own motor abilities that are forming the background to the image identification.

So we must not take Lacan's idea of the mirror stage as a development into a higher form of mental faculty. The child has developed another stage by entering itself on to a stage.

It is now able to present its own abilities on to a theatre where it can play them out.

Psychoanalytically the thing works only by resolution.

## EGO FORMATION

Now we come to how the ego forms out of the image. On the screen the image provides the information that the child is a single unit. But according to Lacan the child does not have as yet the motor capacity for such unity of behaviour. So there is a discrepancy. There is an actual discrepancy, i.e. a discrepancy between actual experience and visual expectation derived from the image. It is not clear to me whether Lacan is saying that the child is able to match up the discrepancy. This seems false.

The child sees an image of itself objectively, and in viewing itself as an oppositional unity, introjects this image into itself. It tries to behave according to an image of an overall unity, while at the same time not being able to. Thus the discrepancy builds into the experience. It is not there as an image comparison with actual experience.

The image coming to it from without, has the same dyadic structure as described above. It comes from reading its own

self-image from the focal object. It is an external image that is focusing its definition. Thus the child receives self-determination from an other and not first and foremost from itself. Seeing itself according to a reflection in a mirror is a continuance of this way of working with the environment. Lacan would argue that this never changes. The only views we have of ourselves come from others.

Lacan's stress on the word 'image' and the whole model of the Mirror Stage theory, is useful for showing the psychical nature of the occurrence. It has the weakness of letting us forget that images originate in manoeuvering ability. Manoeuvering oneself into position is an image-based activity. One works oneself into position according to the dictates of the screen environment. It dictates to us the definition of our being, and what we have to become in order to enter into a situation that works.

This in fact opens us up to the kind of background that Heidegger sees in operation behind the formation of the imagination. But we will continue for the moment with Lacan's enquiry into the nature of the image.

The development of the Mirror Stage theory is part of the development of the larger theory on the nature of the Imaginary order that takes place in the psyche even when it is ordered according to the system of the symbolic construction.

The child that looks at its image and experiences a discrepancy between its own motor capacity and the unity of itself (its self-image), is now in possession of an image to live according to. In (proto-) believing that it has this unity, it now tries to live according to it. But to live according to it, is to put this image before it. So to live according to it, is to live up to it. This suits our metaphor perfectly. The organic is a move up towards the subjectivity of the subject.

The image now forms an ideal of itself. Thus the ideal of itself is an image. The image is before it in the form of what shows oneself to oneself. Thus the 'oneself' comes to <u>one</u>, to 1, in the form of an image. One lives one's life according to an image. Which is to say that one lives one's life according to a screen in which one can see one-self. One lives one's life, and understands the nature of one's life according to something other than oneself.

Although the image is of oneself, it is not oneself. It is something different to oneself. It is a means of seeing oneself. But it does not reflect oneself in a direct pictorial representation of oneself. It shows oneself in the way one is not.

The ideal image of oneself as a unified being is Lacan's way of showing how the ego emerges. The ego is that form of thinking, rationality, which assumes the position of unity.

I.e. it acts out of a unity that it supposes for itself. This is close to the ego that has its place from Cartesian metaphysics to Husserl's Cartesian phenomenology. These all suppose the ego as the 'I' to be a thinking substance. To say that it is a thinking substance is to say that it has a unity as the basis of its thought.

Thought presupposes unity. Thought works out of a unity. But thought also works towards a unity. This shows the inherent dichotomy at the heart of Cartesian metaphysics that Heidegger was trying to expose.

The image is the source of the unity of the being of the agent child. But it forms a desire for the unity which it supposes itself to have. It supposes the image for itself. This means that it subsumes itself under the form of the image. The image it takes for itself. 'To take for' is to assume oneself to be something. It takes the image for the form which it assumes itself to have. Thus the form of the image now serves as the proto-idea it has of itself. But such an idea is originally the eidos of itself, its own reflection.

That which the child assumes is not only an image, then it is a form. It is the form of unity. Thus a form of unity is that which it tries to live according to, live up to.

This form that it tries to live according to, is the form it tries to live as. It is not just the form it tries to live up to, it is the form it takes as the form of its own being. Thus its agency does not discriminate between the form that is an ideal and the form which constitutes its own being.

But then these two come together in its agency. That which it takes to be the form of its constitutional being is the form which it tries to obtain for itself. In trying to obtain it for itself, it is doing so for the purposes of constitution. Thus it assumes, that when it does assume this form, then it will be constituted as that form.

The agent, in not discerning a difference between that which it takes to be its form already, takes that form as what constitutes its being. But at the same time that which constitutes its being takes a futural form. Lacan, referring to his self in relation to his past wrote, 'What is realized in my history (i.e. in that of the individual subject) is not the past definite of what was, since it is no more, or even the present perfect of what has been in what I am, but the future anterior of what I shall have been for what I am in the process of becoming.'[19] It is that which will constitute its being. Thus it exists in the form of an orientation towards that form of being.

Lacan notices this as a split within the subject. The subject is split between that which it assumes as the ground of its being and its ideal ground of its being. At one time the child takes the image for what is the case now. But its own being is discordant with this state. And so it strives for this unity. It strives for the unity as its way of being non-discordant, not uncoordinated. But in this striving for an uncoordinated state the motivation is that which it assumes itself falsely to be.

The image now serves as that image of a unified being which calls the agent to a higher unity. This higher unity is only an image, and an image of that which does not exist. Nevertheless it is an image of unity that is powerful. For it has the power to call to unity. It serves the function of being a mover towards unification. It is a unifying power.

## TRANSCENDENTAL IMAGINATION: MEDIATION OF UNDERSTANDING AND SENSIBLE

Saussure pointed out that the relation between the signifier and the signified was arbitrary. The signifier 'tree' is arbitrarily related to the signified -tree-. It could be a hieroglyphic, a drawing. It could be the French 'arbre' or the German 'baum'. There is no correlation between these sounds or graphic configurations and the concept -tree-.

Lacan draws conclusions from this for the Symbolic Order.[20] In doing so he is also following Levi-Strauss who applied it before Lacan to the cultural order. The cultural order is a structure which is imposed upon the biological order. E.g. the biological sexuality has nothing inherent in it against incestual relations. But the cultural order has. And so it imposes a psycho-sexuality upon the biological order of individual subjects.[21]

Is then our sexuality ordered by culture or biology? This is a big question today within medical ethics. It has fundamental philosophical roots. Following the Continental tradition on this question means that one follows the formation of the understanding. The fundamental question thus is different. It is how does our understanding take shape according to symbolic formation? How does the organic come to rest, or occupy the logicality of our cultural order? Is it pure emergence? Or is it that two quite distinct elements never fully integrate?[22]

Kant faced this problem. For him it was how does our faculty of Understanding with its composition of (Transcendental) logical categories unite with our faculty of Pure Sensibility with which our immediate contact with reality is made?[23]

Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's problematic in metaphysics is this. He thought that the transcendental imagination was

the assumed unity of the understanding and the sensible.[24] If we are to understand how they each work we have to understand how they work as a non-arbitrary unity.[25]

Although Heidegger expressed himself in these terms, it is never fully clear what his problem was. On the face of it, it looks like a strictly Kantian problem. The faculty of Understanding applies categories to experience that have no basis in experience. How can they be applied without being arbitrary?

Kant's solution, to this according to Heidegger, is that the pure categories of experience are unified prior to experience with a pure form of sensibility. Which Heidegger explains as, 'The essent is accessible to a finite being only on the basis of a precursory act of ob-jectification which at the same time is orientation toward that something. This [activity] admits in advance all entities capable of being encountered into the horizon of unity which forms the condition of all possible modes of togetherness. The unity which unifies is itself, however, already included in advance in the horizon of time pro-posed by pure intuition. The anticipatory, unifying unity of the pure understanding must itself, therefore, also have been united beforehand with pure intuition.'[26] In the Deduction of the Pure Categories he has to show that this is presupposed.[27] In the next chapter, The Schematism of the Categories he has to show how pure concepts are united prior to

experience with images of temporality. All this within the Kantian framework is very obscure.

Now we have a clue to understand this within another framework. The argument consists in showing that the image is the basis for the ego function. The ego works out of a unity and towards a unity. This is the basis of its rationality. To think is to strive for logical unity. In this sense it is normative. But to do so is also to think from the position of unity. This is not a substantial unity but one of assumption.

That Heidegger saw an ontological problem behind Kant's unity of the faculties comes out as the ontological ground of the self which has a primordial sense of Being. If we remember the analysis above of Husserl, then this problem comes to how the ego as a function has an intentionality towards Being. To put this straight into Husserlian terms and then convert it straight into ontology, then the problem is how does the ego achieve Being as it anticipates Being for itself?

Because the fundamental, normative nature of the ego is unity, then the being the ego strives for is to be unified. That is, the ego strives to be a unity. Unity is its principle. Its ontology is principled. It is ordered, rational, logical. The logicality of it is rooted in unity. The ego projects itself towards a state of unity according to which it strives for resolution.

Lacan sets up the image as the basis of the unity of pre-cultural disposition and the unifying order of the Symbolic Order which all human experience is organized into. We can use the above account coupled with this account of Lacan's to unearth the obscurity of Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's metaphysical problematic. Consider it as expressed in the following obscure passage in Heidegger's Kant book. Taking it out of its obscurity takes us to the heart of Heidegger's own thinking at this time of his philosophical career.

Heidegger is interpreting the following statement of Kant.

'Thus the principle of the unity of pure (productive) synthesis of imagination, prior to [before] apperception, is the ground of the possibility of all knowledge, especially of experience.'

Heidegger's textual analysis concentrates on one word out of the above.

'What is the significance here of the phrase "before all apperception"? Does Kant mean to assert that the pure synthesis precedes the transcendental apperception in the order of the establishment of the possibility of a pure knowledge? This interpretation would coincide with the assertion above, namely, that the apperception "pre-supposes" the pure synthesis.

But does this "before" have yet another significance? In fact, Kant employs the expression in a way which first gives the whole statement an essential sense and one so decisive that the interpretation mentioned above is at the same time included in it. At one point, Kant speaks "of an object for [before] a quite different intuition." In this passage, to replace the "before" [vor] by "for" would not only be useless but would also serve to weaken the text, especially when one remembers the Latin expression **coram intuitu intellectuali** which Kant likewise employs. Only if one takes the "before" in the phrase cited to mean **coram** does the nature of the structural unity of transcendental apperception and pure imagination come to light. Consequently, the representation of unity has essentially in view a unifying unity, i.e., this act is in itself unifying.'[28]

The account given above accounts for this interpretation of Heidegger out of the Kantian terminology. The image is before one. It is before one in different senses, but not in incompatible senses. The different senses are all acountable for within this mirror stage.

The image is 'before' in the first sense of being external to the agent proto-subject. It is outside it as beyond it. Thus originally it is there for perception. Kant is of course talking of apperception and not perception. But the image is introjected. That is, it is taken into one's mind

such that this is now the way the mind sees things. It is an image which determines things.

The introjected image is one which is still before one. Even though introjected it still functions oppositionally. It must still be there, as a recall of the original form. The original form was one in which the image was there before the agent. This placing of the image, even after introjection is still maintained because the agent works itself off an oppositional screen. It still sees itself according to a screen version of itself. Thus the image maintains its oppositional form in the Lacanian scheme of things.

It is before one in a second sense. It is that which has to be striven for. The image is an image of unity, while being an image for unity.

And according to Lacan it is a false unity. There is the appearance of unity without any reality. But this is due to the way the image is united in the two senses of 'before'. It is real while it is oppositionally there. It is unreal in two senses. Firstly it is unreal because the image is taken for that which it is not. Thus it is fictional. Secondly it is unreal in that it is before one not as something present but as a future possibility. And it is a future possibility in that it is an ideal unity to be striven for.

The image in its capacities of being before one, Heidegger says has a unifying power. This is a deep point for Heidegger. But we can make inroads into it through the mirror image. The image is unifying because of the way the different senses of 'before' work together. The futural before, which is the basis of the normative before, unifies one's actions. The agent sees those actions as ones which have to be unified. The unity of the image calls the actions towards unity.

This occurs partly through the sense of discomfort in the discrepancy between what the image tells one of one's state and the uncoordinated experience of the state. The sense of uncoordination can only come throught a prior sense of unity that can be a measure of a non-unified state.

I say partly because the image works as a unifying power in another complimentary way. The unity is not only up front, it is behind as well. The agent assumes, falsely, that it is a unity. Taking the image as its own unity, then the actions towards unity are at the same time an act that assumes unity. The image thus unifies the actions through forming an assumption.

The assumption itself is a unifying act. In taking oneself to be a unified being, the act takes a unity upon itself. But paradoxically it is doing so according to the 'before'. In assuming that it is a unity, this assumption is the basis, the

ground of the unity of the act. But the assumption contains within it an element of striving. In assuming the unity, taking a unity as one's own, it engages in an act which searches for unity as its goal. It does this, not only because the image is before it as a goal, but because this is now the nature of the act. I.e. assuming a unity is enough to make the act one of unity.

So while the agent is assuming its act to be a unity, it acts in a unifying way. It acts in a unified way in order to unify its own act. There is an internal division within the act itself. It acts out of a unity, towards a unity, for the sake of a unity.

But the meaning of 'for the sake of a unity' is twofold. For the sake of a unity can mean for the sake of obtaining a unity. But it can also mean for the sake of the unity that it must maintain.

The ego then is the rational function in transcendental philosophy. It is that which strives for a normative unity. But it can now be seen that it assumes this normative unity for the sake of a unity in both senses. This ego works for this unity, assuming itself to be the ground of this unity. When I say that it assumes itself to be this unity, the sense in which it is the unity is through the unifying nature of the act.

The act serves to unify, and serves to bring experience to a unity. In order to do so it does so by making unity the condition of itself. This is an assumption. But in making the assumption it actually assumes the form of unity, and thus becomes unified itself. It is thus the ground of its own unity through its form of activity.

And yet it is based within the image of unity.

## THE INTELLECTUAL INTUITION OF THE MIRROR IMAGE

The unity of the symbolic order is the unity of the subject. For Lacan this unity has its origin in the imagination. It does so for Kant and for Heidegger. But does this mean that it is the Transcendental Imagination which projects this unity out of itself as the condition for the unity of things that take place within the order? In order to answer this question we need to question how projection works.

Heidegger's understanding of projection is of course that projection is a mode of Being and also of course, a mode of being. There is a naive way of taking Heidegger's point on projection as we have it in Being and Time.[29] And that is to consider it as the projection of our possibilities upon possibilities that the things of our environment have and are.[30] This is what I call the existentialist interpretation of

Heidegger. It was picked up by Sartre as the way to interpret Heidegger and then serves as the basis of his own philosophy.

This view holds that our projections are what provide the grounds for things being as they are and even for things being at all. The view contains '"Things being as they are" is naive', until we realize that it should mean that things are only what they are for us. 'For us', in turn represents the human subject. Simple examples would be, a tree is what it is for us, because what it is depends upon the use we put it to. For a boy it could be a swing, a (tree)house, a hiding place, a shelter, wood for the campfire, etc.

The boy projects his own horizons upon the tree and the tree yields up possibilities in the terms of the projected horizon.[31] Everything the tree is, is so only as a result of the boy's own possibilities.

While the above describes the ontological situation of the tree, the same analysis has been applied to it with reference to our knowledge of the tree. The cognitive determinations of the tree must conform to the cognitive framework which we project towards it. The tree can only appear to us in terms of the categories we project upon it.

In both of these scenarios the subject's own possibilities are made the ground for the being of the tree. In the first case

every possibility the tree is depends upon the possibility we have for it. In the second case every possible conceptual appearance (cognitive determination) the tree has for us depends upon the categorial grid that we can determine it by.

We need to look again at this familiar way of reading Heidegger. Can projection be analysed completely within the framework of the cultural setting, or must it likewise be treated as a double feature? If the subject is split between the logic of its symbolic significance on the one hand and its own need to live up to such a role, is this reflected in the existentialist account? Can projection be understood within the cultural context purely or is it also comprised of the need of the organism to press itself into a cultural mould? Is it also a case of expression?

Now obviously we cannot say 'describe' the organism without using the logical forms it is expressed by. To describe it is to de-scribe it. We put it into the form of our script. The organism we are talking about, is after all talked about in the terms of the cultural order. We cannot say what it is, we cannot refer to it, observe it, notice it, etc., without it being something we observe, refer to, etc. And this means granting it space within the order of our social framework. It is something or other, within our system of things.

We cannot however conclude from this, that we understand it from the point of view of the cultural order. Do we know that the view of the cultural order is not fixed as an expression of an unconscious, that uses it merely as a stage in order to resolve itself? It is only an assumption that understanding is a matter of bringing experience under categories. Is it that, or is it a case of description in another sense?

The sense I am suggesting is that description is not a represention of things in language, by being a linguistic picture reflection of how they are. Rather, description is what the word itself shows, a de-scription. It is putting our experience into a script by developing it into a script. Thus there is a linguistic, symbolic mould into which one can project one's form of existence. Far from this script being a copy of reality it is a transcendent form in which one form of existence is translated into another. Who, at the moment, is to say what that removal need be?

Because the relation is not arbitrary we need to show what the relation is. But that it is not a reflection of facts as we have it in the correspondence theory of truth, should be apparent by now. The infant that projects itself into a symbolic game is not using symbols to correspond to any facts. It is expressing itself in a form by projecting itself into a symbolic form. It then occupies that form, knows how to work

that form, is interested in being in the logic of that form. None of this amounts to 'propositions corresponding to facts'. It is the relation of logic to being, it is present in projection, but what is the unity? Is it in our understanding?

Is there an understanding present in our projective acts, which like the presence of the unconscious in the conscious act, comprises an ontological understanding, i.e. onto-logical? Is there an understanding which is like that which is present in use, when we can use a hammer and then use words such that the sense of the first carries on in the secondary? An understanding of use which carries over from the non-linguistic into the linguistic?

We need to go beyond the existentialist reading of Heidegger and put Heidegger's questioning even more into question. Heidegger appealed to a deeper understanding in the Kant book. He sees it in the distinctiveness of Kant's critique of rationality. What kind of understanding guides a critique of rationality? What kind of understanding can show us the ground of our own logical principles?

Kant crossed this problem in his tangles with the Rationalist tradition in philosophy, especially Descartes and Leibniz. Heidegger shows this dispute focusing on how Kant was able to

show how the Rationalists confused the finite form of understanding with the divine form of understanding.[32]

He called the divine form of understanding 'intellectual intuition'.[33] It is an original form of thinking. It grasps things as they are in themselves. The human form of understanding is finite, and its objects are not things in themselves but things as they appear to us. Put like this it sounds very like the latter falls into the existentialist reading.

What we have to notice about Heidegger's commentary is the sharp focus upon the question of Being, general metaphysics, and the question of the kind of understanding proper to the human subject such that it has an understanding of Being. The second of these two points, the kind of understanding argues that our mode of understanding is mediate while that of the Deity is immediate. The latter is originative, while the former is receptive.

But let us take the first problem first. What kind of knowledge of Being do they respectively have access to? Kant put it in the way just mentioned. The divine knows things as they are, while the finite subject, things as they appear. The divine is said to know things as they are because it creates them as it thinks them. Its very thinking process is one of creativity.

The existentialist interpretation of Heidegger puts Heidegger into the position of saying that knowledge of the order and unity of things, is a priori determinative for the objects of the cultural order. Knowledge of the Being of things is prior to those objects in that it is constitutive of their being. The mode of Being towards things is not essentially receptive but spontaneous. As Heidegger spends the whole of Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics arguing that our form of knowledge is receptive, our mode of Being is essentially receptive, I want to get a clearer view of the meaning of this by applying what we have already found out about the unity of the subject and its origin in a kind of being which takes its orientation from the other.

So let us follow this problem through how it emerged for Kant and the rejection of cognition based upon intellectual and spontaneous intuition. It will require a brief excursus into Descartes and Leibniz. For Kant their fundamental misconception took place when they assimilated the human understanding to divine understanding, and in doing so misconceived our understanding of Being. Remember 'Being' is our human mode of subjectivity.

Kant was saying that the rationalists assumed that they could cognize the nature of being directly. That is because they took this to be identical to knowing the order of being, i.e.

the universe. To know the order of being was to know its principles and to deduce everything from them.

Thus the order of the universe and everything in it was founded upon logical principles. These logical principles were the ontological structures of things. They could know the nature of things by what they took to be cognition, when it was not cognition but pure thought. Their science was based upon logical determination and not upon empirical arrangement.

Why is it that they thought they could know the universe simply by thinking it out? At the foundation of their thinking they were making a fundamental assumption about how things come to be. They understood things coming into being through the efficient and direct operation of the divine mind. The divine mind creates things, not by producing them mechanically, but by creatively intending them according to a divine plan of organization.

The universe is created by the deity as a divine 'mind'. And the divine mind created things out of the logic of its own mind. The universe flows in its being out of divine principles which are at the same time creative ontologically. The universe pours out of the divine mind. But if it does so, then what are the principles that it follows? Well, as the universe is created on divine principles, and these are the

eternal principles of the logical, then the universe is created along the principles of logic.

How then does the rationalist know the nature of the universe? First of all it is only possible for the finite mind to know the nature of the universe by being able to follow the logic of its ontological determination. Secondly, this possibility becomes actual by tracing out the order of creation along the logical principles of the divine creative act. To do so is to follow the logic of the principles without being ontologically creative.

So the rationalist discovers the nature of things by adapting himself to those principles, according to which the universe was created and then he simply follows them. He is then led into the nature of things, which is purely logical. He is led into the nature of things according to their logic. The best of all possible worlds is the most logical of all possible worlds.

The principle to follow is the principle of reason. How does reason work? By deduction. The rationalist deduces the nature of things. To do so is to follow the divine mind, but in logic only, not in onto-logic. The divine mind then creates the universe by creative deduction.

No wonder then that Kant was accusing them of knowing things as they are in themselves according to intellectual intuition. They do not know the nature of things, their mode of being, in any kind of mediate sense. They are able to directly see the nature of things, even without looking. They do not require sensibility. It is all present within the logical capacity of the mind.

Simply following the principles logically, one cannot help uncovering the nature of things, for this nature just is the logic of things. The nature of things is grasped directly, because it does not have to come to the mind through the mode of sensibility, but directly by thinking it, conceiving it. By conceiving it they know it, thus conflating knowing with thinking. To know the nature of a thing and being able to deduce its nature are one and the same thing.

Whereas for Kant there could be no knowledge without experience and experience required sensibility. But secondly, knowledge was mediate in another sense. The intellectual component which is the understanding functions mediately, not immediately. The intellectual rule does not function intuitively. It is a way of ordering information, not seeing their nature. This is what Kant is denying in rationalism.

The logical unity of the universe is our finite way of ordering it, organizing it. By giving an order to things, and for

things, is not to intuit them. It is not to see any order they originally have. It is just a means of gathering them together, a way of putting things.

Heidegger follows Kant in this. Likewise for him cognition is not intellectual intuition. It is based upon projection. His way of putting this into a Kantian framework is to say that we have only access cognitively to ob-jects.[34] We do not know a thing by deducing its logical form. The logical form must be based on being. Why?

This gives us an opportunity to go behind Heidegger's view of the existence of Dasein as projection. The normal view of Heidegger is that he saw that Being required a more primordial understanding than one based on a theoretical view of things. We exist in relation to beings at a more primordial level than our theoretical relation. We exist at a practical level with things. But is this what gives us our fundamental sense of Being?

This could not be it. For whether one takes a practical orientation towards things or a theoretical one, they both presuppose a sense of Being. And for Heidegger the theoretical relation is a practical one anyway. Even though there is a derivative line from the practical to the more abstract just-looking-at-things, which is definitive of a

theoretical base, the practical orientation towards things requires a sense of Being that needs accounted for.

So when Heidegger uses projection, it is as an existentially founded mode of being that is understood. To say that it is understood means that Dasein, in a practical way, or in a circumspect way, knows what it is about. What it is fundamentally about for Heidegger, is that it brings something to be. But it projects itself so that something can be. So it understands the need to project. It understands the need to project itself such that something can be. So projection itself is understood. It knows what it is about through its need to project itself, but more specifically the nature of projection. Absolute cognition is based on a different kind of projection, viz., one that brings something into being. Finite projection plays itself out by letting something be, not by producing it. It is an essentially passive mode of Being.

The projections for the human subject serve as the grounds of the thing being something. The thing then is fundamentally an object. The object belongs to a project. In this relation it takes up an opposing position. This opposing position is what it can be for the projection. And this grants it the position of an object.

We might call this for Heidegger the object stage. For the practical orientation for which being is the issue, takes place

on a certain stage. Or we might say that it takes place within a certain theatre. Things fit together within this frame. The elements are set within the positions that are available for being taken up.

That these are ontological possibilities for Heidegger can be seen from the way he calls them possibilities. They are possibilities for being. The projection is towards realizing its own possibilities. This goes for the thing which becomes an object. An object is not the result of a private experience. It is what it is in our culture. It is as it is according to our culture. Thus there is the logic of experience which goes with the projection. Its possibilities are set towards the possibilities of the project. The project is set within the logic of the culture.

Thus it looks as if what Heidegger means to show is that there is a fundamental ontological framework here because the realization of possibilities along projective and objective lines is the pursuit towards things being. Thus the human agent must have a sense of being in order to be concerned above anything else in turning possibilities into actualities.

At first this looks like quite the opposite view to Lacan's. Lacan argues that the subject takes his own position from an external. Thus it is only able to determine its own mode of being from an external used as a screen. For Heidegger, if we

are to follow the orthodox and above mentioned existentialist way of understanding projection, the being of the object receives its determination from the projector.

Is this not the reason why objects have the being of instrumentality? They are instrumental for us. It is not the instrument that determines our being but our being, our possibility that determines the thing as an instrument. It exists as such for the sake of our use. Thus the screen for the instrument is us.

Another difference that seems to be present here is that Heidegger argues for a direct and intuitive awareness of our sense of being. This would also apply to our sense of projection. We have a prior sense of projection that serves as the basis for determining the entity before us as a possibility for us. Only when we spread a horizon of possibility before us, can there be objects to take up position within that field as such possibilities.

Projection however cannot work off this order. This existentialist interpretation of early Heidegger does not see the way his mind is working. It is easier to see this by seeing how the intentionality towards subjectivity works. In the account just given intentionality is directed first and foremost for the sake of the subject. But notice how this does not work.

The subject in the capacity as projector, projects itself as the possibility for something taking place. For something to take place is for it to be. It takes place in time and space in the form of an individuality. What is the order of projection for this? The agent's mind is set on that which is to come to be. In order for this to happen it must take up the form of subjectivity. That is, it must present itself as the condition to bring about a state of affairs.

The first thing to notice about this projection is that it is not simple and direct in the existentialist sense. It is not the direct projection of its possibilities upon an object. It is first and foremost the projection of itself as condition. This is exactly what Heidegger is drawing out of Kant when he supports Kant's claim for intellectual intuition.

He says, that our cognition is essentially finite in its form of receptivity, in its form of sensibility. And we know that Heidegger is setting this within an ontological scenario. Not only is the form of cognition finite because it is receptive, but the being of the human subject is finite because it is receptive. Thus the finite form of projection is receptive, and not directly creative. What does this mean?

It means that the projection upon an object is such that it does not create the being of that object. I.e. what and how that object is, does not originate ontologically from the

subject. The subject merely provides conditions for the drawing out of possibilities of that object. It is only the condition for drawing out possibility, not for creating those possibilities.

What this means for us, is that the subject sees itself as the condition for something becoming something, and as such it sees itself as the condition for bringing about something. But if we left this here this would fit the existentialist scenario. For the existentialist would say that the mode of Being of the subject/agent is not to actually create the being, but only to be conditions for its mode of being. Thus it presents itself as the possibility which can draw upon the possibility of some other and draw out what is potentially there. But what is potentially there is only relative to that which presented itself as the initiating condition for it presenting itself thus. The mode of being of the object is thus dependent upon the projected Being of the agent subject. Thus this piece of wood is only potentially a snooker cue, when such initiating conditions as the game of snooker are brought to bear upon it. The game of snooker does not create the piece of wood, it only creates its possibility as a snooker cue.

This kind of orientation if taken as the fundamental sense of Being, which we are trying to analyse, would consist of understanding one's own essential subjectivity as one of relating to oneself first and foremost as the condition for

something being what it is. It means that the condition is reflected off that which the thing is. So the agent sees itself first and foremost as the possibility for things being as they are.

This would be certainly a creative mode of Being. It originates the being of the object. It brings it forth, to put it in Heideggerese. The being of the object is ontologically dependent upon the agency of the subject to provide initiating conditions for it. But if this is Heidegger's thesis on the receptivity of Being, then it is at odds with the sense of Being that the child must be initiated into when it is initiated into the object stage, the cultural stage. So we must question it to see what kind of receptivity this demands.

The entrance on to the objective stage then is such that the individual is introduced into the scene as agent, not for himself but for the being of present objects. The individual is introduced into the world of things, and into the various worlds of things. I.e. it is not introduced into a world that it creates. It is not projected into a mode of creativity but into one of receptivity. But in what sense?

Now when it is introduced into this world, it is shown how to exist in this world. This can only be by subjecting itself to the conditions of the world. But this amounts to knowing how

to put itself into various ways of Being which will bring those things which it is introduced to, about.

Thus an individual is introduced into a world in the capacity of agent-subject. This much is true to the existential account. But what it is missing is that the agent takes up a subsidiary role to the objects that are already present. Now it learns to adhere to the conditions of their presence. Their presence in an individual time and place, with their type of being, becomes then the issue for the agent subject. That which is there, before the agent subject, is the thing in its being. And it is this that becomes the issue.

The issue is the being-there of that entity, as it is shown. The agent is called upon, not to be creative in any way. It is called upon to be totally subjective to bringing that about, in that form, in the way that society will demonstrate, in accordance with the way the thing is. The being-there, as it is before one, then is the issue itself.

Let us take the illustration Heidegger uses, the hammer. The agent-subject is not introduced to the hammer as an idea, or as that which it is to project its own possibilities upon. Quite the reverse. The hammer is presented as there, in its being. The agent-subject is presented with a fait-accompli. The hammer is there already in its being. It is this that defines the subject, not vice versa. The subject is now forced back

into the definition of its own being in regard to the hammer. The presence of the hammer defines its mode of being. It has to be available for this thing. It has to be available for this thing in its already accomplished being. The agent requires certain flexibility, muscle power, hand-eye coordination, etc. If he has not got these he has to grow towards them.

The presence of the thing is there pressurizing the subject into its subjectivity. It is now pressed into servitude.. It is forced to find its way into living up to the presence of that which is before it. It does this by bringing itself under the conditions that are necessary to rise to the challenge that is now present to it.

Its form of being is now pressed upon it. Its only option is that of respecting what the hammer is, and how one can best honour that. The way of doing that, as the subject is shown, is to adopt a certain method of handling it. The method is prescribed. The subject is subject to the handling procedure. The handling procedure though is the condition that the subject must present itself under in order for the presence of the hammer to maintain the kind of presence it has.

The manoeuvering is of the hammer, but it is first and foremost the manoeuvering of the agent. It is the agent flexing its muscles, its wrist, its hand-eye coordination, adapting itself

to the play of contrary forces etc., in order for the hammer to present itself there and then.

Another example of this is someone learning to play the piano. On the face of it this looks like someone having to learn how to bring this thing under control. In fact it is the exact reverse. The apprentice has to do everything to bring themselves under control. The kind of control is all dictated by the piano.

They have to bring their body under posture control. The posture is dictated. Not any posture will do. When it comes to learning the skill, one again assumes that there is mastery over the instrument. But the skill is learning to submit to every whim of the instrument. One has to learn to press keys with exactly the right pressure, thus submitting the fingertip pressures to be led by the opposing pressures from the keys. It is not vice versa. The distance between the keys means that the agent is spaced out according to the spacing of the keys. If one's fingers are not long enough then too bad. The placing of one's hands, arms, eyes, legs, back, shoulders, etc., is such that one's body is mapped out by the instrument.

Then there is the timing. One has to learn the whole art of when to bring oneself into play. When to bring in this finger, then this one, when and what coordination, what synchronization of fingers and pressures. The speed that

one's fingers gallop along the keyboard is all time dictations from without.

This then is the world stage. It is already there upon entry. It is what one is projected into. Heidegger says thrown into. How does he see the sort of entry on to this stage.?

This gives us the kind of background against which Heidegger sees the development of the image. But what is the sense of being here? And is the access to the transcendental the same as transcendence? Or is the sense of being the transcendence we maintain in the unity we use to irrupt into things? First of all they realized that the 'I' required unity. Thought acting out of a rationality could only do so if there was an overall unity to it. Rationality without unity was not possible.

# CHAPTER SIX: UNDERSTANDING THE SYMBOLIC ORDER

## THE IMAGINARY NATURE OF THE EGO IN HEIDEGGER

The final stage of inquiry for this thesis is the symbolic order itself. It is the stage where the ontological difference is manifest. It is the place where the unity of the subject and the unity of the order of things takes place. It is also the place where we understand things, and where understanding takes place as a possibility.

The order of ego is based upon the unity projected and held there by the imagination. Thus the order of that ego is the unity that derives from the imaginary order. The rationality of the ego is to follow the unity set before it. It is set before it as the directedness of its intentionality. It is before it as an ideal.[1]

The ego as the factor of rationality is one aspect of the total subject. In Freud it is the unity of id, ego and superego. The last is the introjection of the social order. It is this last feature that requires the transcendental mode of the subject. The subject is constituted by the superimposition of the imaginary order and the symbolic order. Is this then the place where Being takes place? Is this the junction where the subjectivity of the subject is initiated? Is this the origin of the subjectivity of the subject?

The problem initially concerned whether the subjectivity of the subject could give us the kind of fundamental analysis of Being that Heidegger thought possible. Ontology consists of the relation of the logos to Being. Is there an original understanding of this relation in pre-ontological experience? Does ontology, in taking the pre-ontological state up as its theme, rely upon the union of Being with the logical order of things, or does it impose its own theoretical order upon the pre-ontological?

Both Heidegger and Kant thought that this sort of inquiry was possible due to a prior understanding which was always the guiding clue. Like the daimon of Socrates, the determination of the subjectivity of the subject as a thematic determination, followed the prior determination of beings in the way we understood them, i.e. prior to any kind of theoretical approach to the way things are.

So the very possibility of ontology was based upon there being the prior light of Being we already lived by. But for this clue, and as this clue we can no longer rely upon being guided by the logic of the term. This as shown belongs to the stepping out of darkness into light, the light of our symbolic experience. Is this prior light we have of Being, our fundamental understanding of the subjectivity of the subject, based upon a direct insight into the order of that subjectivity?

The metaphor is that of stepping out of darkness into light. There is the emergence from an uncultured way of orientation into orientation by culture. The cultured understanding however is mediate. It has been shown how this works by taking up a self-reading that has its reference from the external. Is this the same for the understanding of Being?

In Being and Time Heidegger talks of the natural light. There he gives the impression that our self-understanding is immediate. This would mean that we understand the subjectivity of the subject, Being, directly. 'When we talk in an ontically figurative way of the lumen naturale in man, we have in mind nothing other than the existential-ontological structure of this entity, that it is in such a way as to be its "there". To say that it is "illuminated" means that as Being-in-the-world it is cleared in itself, not through any other entity, but in such a way that it is itself the clearing. Only for an entity which is existentially cleared in this way does that which is present-at-hand become accessible in the light or hidden in the dark. By its very nature, Dasein brings its "there" along with it. If it lacks its "there", it is not factically the entity which is essentially Dasein; indeed, it is not this entity at all. Dasein is its disclosedness.'[2]

So which is it? Does this entity have its own most fundamental Being directly disclosed or indirectly disclosed?

Heidegger acknowledges that logic is a secondary mode of disclosure.[3] So if we only understand ourselves in the symbolic order does this mean that our self-understanding as Being-there in the symbolic order is indirect?

Lacan as shown, draws a line through the subject. This symbol indicates the rift that every subject lives through. Now our problem to begin with is exactly that split. For our Heidegger study it is the split between logos and being. This is in fact the problem of the possibility of ontology. For ontology is the placing together of logos and beings. It is based upon pure description. But how can pure description be possible? It cannot be arbitrary. The relation between the word we put our understanding of Being into, our phenomenological terminology cannot be arbitrary? It must fit.

Heidegger talks about this in terms of articulation. Such talk, discourse is articulative of the way things are, when it is able to dismember it. 'The question of the essential unity of pure intuition and pure thought is a consequence of the previous isolation of these elements. Thus, the nature of their unity may be designated in advance by showing how the structure of each of these elements is such as to require the other. They reveal articulations which indicate in advance the possibility of their fitting together. Hence, the veritative synthesis not only dovetails these articulations by

fitting the elements together, it is also that which first makes these articulations "fit" to be joined.'[4]

In other words there is a prior fit. Heidegger understood Kant's transcendental critique to be a regression towards primordial unities guided by how the pieces we now have in abstraction, originally fit. Fundamental ontology is guided by this original fit. But in our case, the original subject, according to the Lacanian analysis is split. The unity of the subject is split from that which seeks to occupy it. It is this split that current analysis of Heidegger fails to notice.

Because they do not see a problem in the relation of the pre-culturalized behaviour with the cultured behaviour, understanding is understood purely from the linear aspect of the logic of the culture. Haugeland thus gives this account of 'Articulation'.

'Telling (Rede) is the articulation of significance or intelligibility, both in the sense of separating or carving up, and in the sense of expressing in words. The carving up is not a matterof focusing attention or arbitrary subdividing, but an essentially public or shared way of distinguishing determinate entities, in determinate regards. Thus, in playing chess, I deal with your pawn and my rook (two pieces), with regard to one's threatening the other, and as pieces that you likewise deal with. Because the intelligibility for the position is

articulated in this shared way, I can say to you, "Your pawn is threatening my rook",; and you could reply, "I'm sorry" (or remain tellingly silent);'[5]

Is this what 'articulation' comes to? Haugeland in consistency with his thesis that our understanding is based upon the holism of the institutional system, shows articulation as a case of isolating elements within the system. The question is however whether the articulation comes straight out of the logic of a system in the way that Haugeland thinks.

Once we have already questioned the account that belongs to supposing that understanding upon which the articulation is based, is linear, but is fundamentally metaphorical, then the answer Searle gives to this is seen to be indadequate. Thus Searle would rise to this challenge, with the example of intelligibility being based upon the background. If I ask for a pizza in a restaurant, I do not expect it dumped over my head, or delivered to my address. Searle's reason is that the background provides the intelligibility. But what is the relation of the background?

The two choices on offer are firstly that the background functions as part of a holistic system. This is what I have been calling the linear approach. Secondly the background functions metaphorically. It works as an underlying

significance which gives the surface intelligibility a deep intelligibility.

A case in the newspaper recently illustrates this. A ticket collector on a British Rail service requested that a passenger show her ticket to him. From her handbag she pulled a gun. With the gun she terrorised the passengers and the police who were called to the scene. Later it was found out that the lady in question had the correct ticket in her bag. And we know from the report that she was detained under the Mental Health Act.

The guard on the train was operating with conventional conditions of intelligibility. The lady interpreted the situation, momentarily, differently. How is it possible? She is able to utilize a different background from the guard and by doing so transform her reading of the situation. The transformation occurs by reading the surface situation according to a projected background.

For Haugeland this would be explained by saying that the lady was able to put the immediate situation into a different context. She projects a context which then fits the immediate situation within it. The wider logic determines the narrower. The collector was using a different context.

Thus there are two quite different approaches. One which uses background as a wider logical context, and one which uses background as that which is superimposed upon a different situation. Searle's account rides in ignorant bliss between the two. Haugeland explicitly goes for the former. While Dreyfus, rejecting Haugeland's logical account, does not show how the background functions as ground.

But it is clear from Dreyfus that background cannot function in the way Haugeland uses it. For background consists of that which does not have the same kind of normativity. It does not operate with rule-governed or orientational intelligibility. The institutional form of intelligibility comes after the background intelligibility. Normative behaviour presupposes it and thus cannot be used to account for it.

It is the examples of how we play the games we play on two levels that show how the background functions. It is the background that comes to light. The background steps out of its darkness into the light of an explicit scenario. The game of chess that Haugeland uses does not show that chess is understood within a holistic scenario. It shows that it is anoher scenario that forms the significance for the game of chess.

It is war that gives chess its significance. The strategies of war are replayed through the logic of the game. Only by

already knowing the significance of these is chess fully significant. One could play it without the deeper underlying significance of threats, attacks and counterattacks, strategies, defence of troops, kings and queens, etc. This would be like playing out syntax without semantics.

This is not just holism. It is another scene working through another. The other scene underlies it and finds a mode within which to express itself.

Heidegger said above that Dasein expresses itself in the clearing. In the clearing it finds a way to express itself. It is not just a way of telling itself something about itself. It is a way of showing itself off. To show itself off, is not just a mirror reflection of itself. It is a way of showing itself according to an objective form, which turns out to have a structure of its own.

Dasein discloses itself, not by a mirror reflection of itself, but by taking up an objective form, which then becomes the mode of disclosure. But there is a radical split between the two scenes that make up the subject's disclosure, and the projection from one to the other. Where in this does the Being of the subject lie?

Heidegger said that the disclosedness of Dasein always takes its 'there' with it. Which is to say that disclosedness

always shows itself through the alterity of the place, the scene into which Dasein has disclosed itself. There is an original understanding required here, which is the understanding of the unity at the back of the 'there', where the disclosure takes place.

Can fundamental ontology be guided back to the original unity of the subject as being guided back to the original fault line that runs through the subject?

The original understanding, which is the original stepping into the light, if it is to count as 'understanding', is the understanding of the need to fit. The orientation towards the 'there' must take place with understanding. The understanding is guided by the fit.

This sort of orientation can be present in the way an artist can know when the work is right. They need not know what makes it right. They just know that it all fits together. The elements fit due to a sense of satisfaction. The lack of fit produces discomfort. The artist keeps on going until he feels, senses the fit. Things are now judged to be in place, not due to the logic of their arrangement. The guiding principle, is the satisfaction of the need in the one doing the work.

One can look at a painting for example and feel something wrong. What do we mean by such a feel? One can experiment by placing a hand over certain features of the painting. In this way the offending item can often be disclosed. It is disclosed in the way it is causing an offence. It is literally an eyesore. This is a completely different view from the representational version of art. It is rather that projection on to the canvas takes place to express something. When that need is not expressed the structure of the work is not right.

According to Haugeland the understanding works through that these are the social possibilities. These are modalities, wherewith the subject can, and is to, be. These socially provided possibilities, are the imposed, and as impositions they become self-constitutional forms.

But this leaves the whole nature of the understanding in limbo. Heidegger pinpoints that which makes the understanding make sense. It works when the institutional forms fit. The individual projects his individual capacity into the social matrix, such that those forms are befitting. The forms themselves have to do something for one. Considered in abstraction from their befitting nature for individuals they are meaningless. In the way that chess is meaningless without it being the 'there' for something else, so our social

aspirations are meaningless without them working for us as a set of needs projected into them.

Haugeland concentrates upon the logic of the insitutional form without its being. He does not see the need in the logic of the form the need to be. It is the more than the understanding of the need to orientate oneself according to the logic of the positions that one is offered. Thus understanding must first work by recognition of the social forms as modes to be. It must recognize these modes of being, these social positions, as the means of actively disclosing itself.

Once this is understood it gives a new depth to position taking according to social forms. The Freudian for example uses it when he sees motivation in the rock star for his position in society. It is a case of fulfilment, not just through being what he always wanted to be. It is the means perhaps of the more basic craving for attention to be focused in his direction. The aspiration for fame is this writ large. The projection into the social structure of the rock star is simply the projection into a stage where the lower needs are being fulfilled. On the stage, his he is having his needs satisfied.

The direction of understanding is projection guided by an orientation. This is towards that which reveals one's

position only by taking up the position which it is not. I.e. the projection is orientational. But one locates one's orientation the moment one sees it according to an adopted position, the objective there. One then can read back to oneself the original orientation. The position adopted reflects that original position that one is not. But the orientation continues to orientate itself until it finds the one that befits it. It finds that a certain position is to its suiting.

The child then, with all of its needs, motor orientations, steps into understanding as a requirement, the moment it is able to project such need for orientation, according to the external position. The external position is what provides for it a 'reading' of itself. Its orientations in the world can only be according to the world. It is only possible when the child sees itself as a good boy, doing what it is supposed to do, following the given.

In many cases one finds that the social options open to one are unsuitable. The father who seeks to fulfil his own dream through his son forces the boy into moulds that do not work for the boy. Or the categories of sexuality do not work for many initiates. These are cases which demonstrate how meaning and making sense works, not by applying categories to subsume a situation, but belongs to the more original scenario, when the projection works the other way round.

Nevertheless understanding does take place according to these orientations that are already established by society. The child is only able to make judgements upon itself by following the judgements of others. It is only able to make judgements of itself and others by assessing like everybody else. Every

case of understanding what something is, takes place according to an imposed place. The initiate must learn first of all to act according to the position that comes from without, but assuming it now as the position from which to make a judgement, an understanding, or a self-constitution.

## THE POSSIBILITY OF ONTOLOGY

Yet is our understanding of Being direct or indirect? It was always supposed by Heidegger that it was direct and served as the basis of our understanding of the beings that are there. This conclusion follows from the claim that holds for intentionality in general. We must know what it is we are aiming at in order to know how we fail in achieving it. Thus in the human world to know something is intentional only when we can know when we do not know.[6]

The function of the ego is to bring unity and consistency to the order of things. The ego is intentional in that it subjects itself to conditions which will constitute it. In performing its activities it strives to become an ego. It strives for unity and consistency not only in the order of things but in itself. It strives for consistency and order by being consistent and orderly.

How is it possible to analyse the nature of the ego activity? Because it contains the direction of our own intentionality. We know already what we are about as egos. The clue that Kant found, the clue that is transcendental, the guide to correct use of words, is based on our intentionality. It is because we intend to constitute ourselves in specific ways that we can come along afterwards, reflect upon what it is we do, and can think back into what we are about, by examining our intentionality.

The difficulty put in the way of this claim comes from Freud. Can we rely upon our intentionality to know what we are doing? Is it the case that because there is an unconscious dimension to our actions that we cannot know what it is that we are doing?

Dilman follows up this problem.[7] He thinks that Freud had a point here, and that it shows how there can be an unintentional source to our actions. His account of Freud's view of the unconscious is illustrated by post hypnotic suggestion. This follows the line Freud was led into, in realizing how the unconscious worked. But it also shows how the intention in action can be unconscious.

Although there is a difference in the intention in action and the intentionality of meaning, they come together when we realize that the conditions for satisfaction must be

anticipated as the directedness of the action. The directedness of the action is in its anticipational orientation.

The problem that Dilman uses Freud's theory to tackle is the sort of thing said by Hampshire, that that unconscious intentions are contradictions in terms. In the case of post-hypnotic suggestion, the subject carries out an action, for a reason they know not of. I.e. they do not know the reason consciously. It is present unconsciously. A subject can be the victim of a suggestion made to them while under hypnosis and that suggestion then becomes the reason they act as they do, at a moment when they are no longer under hypnosis. They act by obeying a command. They subject themselves to a rule and follow the course set by it in acting as they do.

Dilman develops this notion of unintentional action into more normal circumstances. There are times in which we can be said to be doing things intentionally while doing them unconsciously. Thus someone asks me to find something for them in another room. I pass into the other room intending to locate this thing. While I am subsequently in the next room, other things come into my mind. These other things do not prevent me from going through drawers in pursuit of the object. It is just that I am performing the act absent mindedly.

According to Dilman I am still performing the act intentionally. For if someone were to interrupt my action, I would be perfectly capable of telling them what it was I was about.

If Dilman is correct then it should be perfectly possible to perform acts completely intentionally while still being unintentional on a conscious level. Thus it is a demonstration how the unconscious functions in everyday life, in ways which are not extraordinary. On the contrary, they are commonplace.

Although Dilman's version of Freud's view of the Unconscious looks very different from Lacan's, there is a parallel in the way that an intentionality can span two different scenes. In the fort/da case the two different scenes overlap. The scenario of absent and present mother and the induced discomfort through lack of mastery (and sense of lack), is projected into the different scene of the fort/da game. And it has been shown how they overlap.

## Subjectivity and the Nature of Intentionality

And there it was pointed out how the child (in a certain sense) can be said to know what it is about. This is true because the child is using the game to obtain mastery and receives

enjoyment through the game. It is however the way that the child uses the game. It uses the game not as something in itself, but as something that works for reasons that lie outside the game.

Thus there are standards that the game must meet, standards that come from outside the game, from another scenario, that are used to determine whether the game works or not. The touchstone here is the enjoyment the child is obtaining. Its enjoyment comes from the other scene, the original scene. Or rather perhaps we ought to say that this is where the enjoyment lies.

This is different from the case that Dilman uses in that the case of looking for scissors and forgetting what one is about, does not constitute the action that one consciously engages in. It is the unity and depth of the act that is the interesting feature to Freud's view of the Unconscious that Dilman has completely missed.

Even so this complicates the Heideggerean reasons for the possibility of ontology. For Heidegger the possbility for an understanding of Being derives from an understanding of the sense of Being that belongs to the intentionality of our understanding. We understand what we are about due to our intentional orientation towards what we are about. But what if this intentional orientation lies outside the present scene?

Is phenomenology able to rely upon the way things show themselves if this really depends upon an intentionality forged in a different scene?

Heidegger's answer to this it seems to me must be twofold. Firstly, the intentionality we are concerned about, is that which is set within transcendence. And this is what occurs in the irruption of individual into world. This is present in the event of passing into a scene as such. Thus the fact that there might be two different intentions on the go, does not affect the understanding of how to play out a scene through subjectivity, toward the logic of a position, for the sake of getting something to work. This has to apply in any case.

Secondly, Heidegger thinks that intentionality is towards Being in general. What this means is central. But the individual that enters upon 'world', is called upon to keep 'world' open as the condition of things working. And the way Heidegger saw that originally, was for things to come to presence. Things have to come to be. We could say, it means that world has to body forth. The world as condition has to become present in a body. In this way it would be akin to what Kant was doing in the Schematism. Sensibility and the logic of the Understanding belong together in an original unity. Being in general seems to be something to do with maintaining these two together while holding their distinction apart.

This in effect is what is meant by working. Thus the mind that projects itself on the stage lives in the intentionality of anticipation towards things working.

This applies to the infant that projects itself into the logic of the fort/da game. It projects itself into its work. The outcome of the game is the working of things out. Things work out when the child finds satisfaction within the game. Satisfaction is only gained when the prior scenario is projected on to another stage so that in the re-presentation the child finds what it was looking for originally.

The child is driven into the next scene. This is because it has not been able to resolve its problem in the original scene. It pursues resolution in the second scene. But it does not directly know that it is resolving a problem set in the original scene. It sees the immediate object of its pleasure to be the toys it is manipulating with a satisfaction, that on the surface of things belongs precisely there, viz. at the surface of things.

So why the child finds satisfaction, is because it finds what it was looking for in another scene, the second scene. It resolves the need for mastery over presence and absence of mother, by adapting to it in symbolic terms, in the symbolic order. Freud noticed that when problems are unresolved at one

stage the subject is forced back into regression. They regress to the stage that still remains unresolved.

Just as Dilman saw that the intentionality carries over from a search that had its origin in one room, such that it continues in another room, when the intentions that surface are quite different, so there is a carrying over of intention from one scene into another.

Intentionality is then seen to be based upon an original imagination. The 'carrying over' is its metaphorical nature. It is projection in the quite special sense of superimposition. It carries over from one scene into another such that the second scene is given significance in virtue of the first scene. 'Projection' is not sufficiently analysed by subjective possibilities being the grounds for objective possibilities. We must be closer to what Heidegger originally envisaged by the imaginative nature of projection.

It is far from being simple. It contains a double layer of experience.

Here we have made room for the way intentionality fits into a transcendence in which projection constitutes the significance of a whole objective scenario. The whole nature of 'horizon' is transformed though.

We can see this intentionality in 'action', but what about in the use of a word? In using a word correctly, intentionality has to open itself up to the meaning of the word, as it is given, and not to how one arbitrarily decides to use it. This seems to suggest that the difficulty for intentionality is that the individual has to subject itself to the meaning of a word which it cannot intentionally cover.

The word's meaning carries so many connotations beyond the subject's intended use that in the occasion of actual use it must be overdetermined. Thus the words I use in a written letter to a friend, are open necessarily to a variety of interpretations for readers of the letter, due to the manifold ways in which it can be construed beyond the use intended. The word is thus not under the control of the intentionality of the user.

There are many occasions in which users realize after they have used words that they need to qualify them, and this due to the way in which it is open for construal. How then can we rely on intentionality to tell us about the meaning of words? And by analogy how can we rely upon intentionality to determine the being of things phenomenologically? Is not the being of things, just like the meaning of words outside the scope of intentionality?

The mistake here is to miss how our intentional relation to words is fundamentally a working relation and not to just an abstract ruling. And thus the whole approach to following the meaning of words, by appeal to their use, was based upon a muddled view about our intentional orientation towards use. The assumption was that the use of a word was something settled, a rule which we must follow, and that rule dictated to us the meaning of the word.

This is not at all correct. There is latitude built into use. The individual in the use of words is not hamstrung by rules and correct usage. Only those who do not see linguistic use as an essentially engendering process try to place the rule over the work to be done. Heidegger would regard this as inauthentic use of language. It just relies upon someone else's use of language to open a scene, and remains content to chatter on this basis.

It gives way to cliché, to over indulged words, to lack of sensitivity to using words to do work, rather than resting on the work already done. Lawrence Durrell said that he in talking about a scene he refused himself the luxury of using the same adjective twice. The point was to pressure himself in applying words to working situations.

Intentionality is directed to the work to be done and the means to do it. Thus the current use of a word may require a

correct use, or an incorrect use. It may require a slightly askew use, or one completely off beam. But intentionality towards the use of a word is directed towards the work to be done.

So there must be an anticipation of the work to be done. The mind is already ahead in the projected work.

The use of the word comes in as knowledge of a condition that works or will work. The intentionality thus surrenders itself to the condition for the sake of the conditioning act.

It is this factor that enables us to approach a word. It is the selecting power behind our approach. We access a word with intentions already in mind. And we are prepared to discard the word when the selection is inadequate. But it also means that in our approach there is an inbuilt determination of sense.

In the rush of linguistic analysts to define according to the use of a word, the established use of the word was regarded as the thing in itself. It was from the established use, and appeal it, that we could define the phenomena we were interested in. Thus the phenomenon of 'Truth' could be defined by the use of the word. In the rush towards a new scholasticism, the Wittgensteinian discovery that words were tools was conveniently forgotten.

The selection of a tool is governed by the work we have in mind. First of all we realize here what it is that defines the scope of the object at hand. The edges of the object are defined by that which is relevant in its manipulation towards the work to be done. Thus if I need a stick to poke something out of a hole, I tear at the tree for something to do this with. But it is the work to be done that tells me where to make the cut. I cut the branch at the point where I think the the prospective tool will prove, demonstrably show itself, adequate and convenient as a 'poker'.

The same must go for words. I select the word not purely according to use or usage, but first and foremost with the work to be done in mind and then according to the properties it has as a tool. One has a certain sense of the word, a feel for its use. But such a feel stems from the work to be done. I anticipate in advance where to make the cut. Thus I select which use is effective and not because it is conventional.

In the same way holding the hammer, one has a sense of it, not purely in abstraction, but in relation to the power required to crack something open, or drive something it. That is where the feel of it belongs. The swordsman picking up a sword for the first time, feels the beauty, or lack of it, in terms of what he intends it for. In brandishing it in practice the mind does not decontextualize this, but uses it as background significance in practising how to use it.

In the selection of a word, I am not directed to this word for no reason. I am not suddenly up front with it without knowing why it is now available to me. The conditions of use are there prior to me approaching it. The intentional use of words emerges out of words becoming present to one. They make themselves available. When we are speaking, all the time we must run ahead with the work to be done. It is not just a case of forming well formed formulae. It is a case of finding the appropriate word.

The conditions of words being present to one then are the working conditions, the work to be done, as it is present to the mind, held open to the mind, is the ground for the choice of words.

Just as with tools, I can bring the two uses together. This allows me to have an unconventional use based on a conventional use. I need a bookend but I only have a doorstop. I refer myself to the doorstop on the basis of work needing done. This enables me to approach it on the basis of current usage and override it. Conventional use is overridden.

Conventional use shows the mind where to go for the work to be done. Where there is work to be done we are educated into knowing how to do it and how to go about it. We are directed to use as current use, based upon the cultural reservoir of ways of getting things done. But agents are constantly faced

with situations that do not fit stereotype situations. Thus improvisation is just as much the order of the day as normality of situation.

Everyone knows the difference between the one who does everything by the book and the one who has a genuine sense of what is appropriate. Due to this we know how to continually adapt ourselves to situations by the work that needs to be done, this being the measuring device for the use of the tools. It is not the use of the tools that is the measuring device for the work to be done. Tool is defined by work, not vice versa.

This puts a quite different complexion Heidegger's analysis of signification. In Sections 17 of Being and Time the sign is analysed from the standpoint of the context it is in. But the point is not just to show that signs must be read within the setting of a system (Frege, Derrida) or a holistic framework (Haugeland, Dreyfus). It is rather that the sign enters the scene againt a background of practical work that provide a setting for its working conditions. Secondly, it functions by having these background conditions working through it. Thus again it is a doubling function.

The example Heidegger takes is that of the indicator in a motor vehicle. Now the significance of the indicator must be understood in terms of the system into which it fits. This is

not doubted. The system here is the road traffic system. But the analysis could not possibly remain here. The analysis of the significance of the function could begin with the system within which it functions. The indicator relates to other rules of the road traffic system, plus the signs that make it up.

But the whole system itself is contained within the whole movement and flow of traffic that was taking place before the installation of a road traffic system. Thus as a system it has significance. When an indicator is put into action, the significance of this act cannot be fully understood by relating it to other traffic signs. It can only be understood when the significance of the traffic signs as a whole are given their signifance from without the system. Their significance is projected into the signs and system. We know what they are about on two scores. First by their internal relations. But more primordially for the reason they were installed in the first place.

Thus we can say that the reason behind the system is what gives the individual sign its most fundamental significance and not its place within the system. For unless one understands the purpose of the system itself then just being able to operate the signs correctly does not give the sense of the signs. It is important to know that I put out the indicator, not just because it is the correct thing to do, but because it will

prevent accidents. And the nature of such accidents is what the driver ought to know about prior to knowing how and when to operate signals.

Thus underlying the rules for the use of the signal, is the understanding of the primitive scene that is the reason for the rules. When this is understood the latitude for the use of the rules becomes apparent. The rule is merely a guide to one's way around the original scene

This a refutation of Haugeland's case for Holism. The example he uses to make his case, and one Wittgenstein uses to illustrate the nature of the language game, is chess. 'The game of chess is a condition of the possibility of chess discoveries not only negatively, as a <u>sine qua non</u>, but also positively, as enabling or rendering possible; it is precisely in terms of the game that there <u>can be</u> such discoveries at all. Chess evidence (e.g., from looking ahead), chess discoverers (canny players), chess proof (winning and losing), chess consciousness (whatever it is) - '[8] (p.28)

Haugeland is demonstrating what would count for the sense and understanding that belongs to playing a game. And of course this is only an example to demonstrate what disclosure, making sense, understanding amount to in the big world. The chess is only a case in point. Understanding the moves, the pieces all

belong to the game. And belonging to the game means belonging to the system of rules which is the game.

This of course is all very understandable and almost beomes the most kind of conventional account of making sense. And philosophers recognizing it as a case of Holism know where it is coming from and where it is going to. It will confine the sense that each move has to the game/system itself. Sense belongs to the system. And chess itself is part of a wider system.

The Holistic view of meaning belongs with a coherence theory of truth. For those who reject both of these the countering of the case attempts to show that there is more to meaning than the logic of a system. This usually means that the sense can belong to the system but there can only be meaning if we can apply the logic of the system to a state of affairs in the world. Such a view would be Fregean.

These two options are the only ones that appear to philosophers. But in this examination of Heidegger another one has appeared. The application of the system in order to create meaning is not the application of the logic of the system to an extra linguistic state of affairs which we can call reality. There is no such thing as an extra-linguistic reality that we can refer to. We can only refer according to the terms we have. And following Wittgenstein, this applies

to ostensive definition as well. Pointing is just another language game. So how does reality come into it?

The non-NeoKantian position is that we do not make sense purely by the internals of the system, nor by applying the logic of the term outside into a linguistic free universe. It is by projecting a real state into the logical structure.

So let us look again at chess. The chess game is not entirely understood from within the system of chess. Nor are the moves. The game of chess is devised as a war game. Thus the background out of which it emerges is a prior situation. This background does not fit chess into it as a piece of its own system. It uses chess metaphorically. It uses it symbolically. To do so, as shown previously is not to just represent. It is to re-present, with the emphasis on the 're'.

But the more primitive scene is projected into a separate structure, a purely logical structure, and re-enacted therein. The game of chess is a stage for war. War develops on to this symbolic stage to play itself out. As it is a different stage, with different rules and structures, different codes of conduct are called for.

But, the understanding of war underpins it and gives it a meaning which lies outside the structure of its own scenario.

It consists of two opposing sides. They are at war. It is based upon attack and defence. There is to be a victory by killing opponents, and destroying their position. And victory is obtained by taking their symbolic leader.

There are many other examples of this in sport. Not all sports are sports. If one follows up the folk inclination that sports are games and not the real thing, then we can count some out straight away. Boxing for example is not a sport, it is the real thing. It is a real fight. It is just that we impose rules to make it as equal and fair as possible. But then we see a progression towards symbolism.

Boxing begins to move away from a knockout being the only form of winning to a point system. In Karate and Judo there is points are substituted for the real thing. In polo and football the points and the form of the game become so symbolic that it is harder to recognize the original. In football it is the hunt and in polo, the ball was once the head of the enemy.

This is where Heidegger sees how intentionality and finitude go together. The intentionality is already set within an understanding of how things in general work. Not just how they work specifically. But that the world divides into two. On the one hand there are entities and on the other the conditions that must be assumed for the sake of bringing those things

about. This is the distinction between the world and the things that are in it.

This division is already present within skills. The skill is to surrender the body to being the means of delivering some state of affairs. Intentionality fits into this distinction. It must be through the accentuation of skills that this distinction is capitalized upon and the world opens up as a reservoir of known skills as conditions for desired ends. Dreyfus misses the way that skills the world as the reservoir of how to get things done. Skills presuppose world.

And so for Heidegger, the system, the symbolic order, cannot be the ultimate the structuralists take it for. The relation to it is not arbitrary. Its rule is not arbitrary. It is there to make things work. The system is a system of conditions for working things. Thus it comes under a higher control. No system ought to be preserved if it does not work.

Lacan shows us how the initiate comes into the world through the development of an unconscious. This was illustrated by means of the fort/da game. The child not only enters into a socially significant universe, it enters into it with projectsof its own, and an understanding that we understand it to have, through recognizing how the unconscious works.

If we apply the unconscious scenario to the scene of intentionality as presented in Heidegger, we see in more detail the sort of intentionality that the child is carrying. The child is projecting its own project into a logically orientated scenario.

## INTENTIONALITY AND TRANSCENDENCE

Is there a way of bringing this work to a point which gathers all these endeavours into a unity? If we maintain the focus on subjectivity and a subjectivity which carries over on to a stage something that it is working out through the stage, then we can see that the subject's main concern is with obtaining a position on this stage.

The individual projects itself on to the stage, and it is fundamental that it take up a position on this stage. Taking up a position shows us the spatiality of the act. To adopt a position, take a position, is to relate to all the other positions. It means relating to them as positions. These positions take place within a space.

The position and the stage are not purely spatial. It is temporal also. It is after all a stage in the developmental sense. In structuralist terms though it is diachronic. The stage is a development out of a former situation and temporally

subsequent to it. It is not subsequent in a juxtapositional sense. The former relates to the secondary stage as an origin for it. The secondary is the working through of the originary, but in terms of a new set, a new medium.

## The Internal Split in Dasein

The relation between the originating scene and the secondary stage on to which it is projected, now becomes the place in which to interrogate Dasein. Heidegger's analysis of Dasein was his starting point for coming to the understanding we have of Being. It is now time to return to Dasein and look again into this analysis.

The cultural order as the secondary stage on to which the individual projects itself reveals a split in Dasein that is akin to that spoken of by Lacan. It is this split that I want to concentrate upon in order to make it explicit.

Dasein, as Haugeland points out is what Heidegger calls disclosedness. Haugeland concentrates upon this aspect of Dasein to show that this is what shows us its nature. I want to show another picture of Dasein, Dasein as intrinsically split. This picture is a deeper philosophical analysis of Dasein that has not been noticed before.

The projection upon the secondary stage is a case of expression. The sense of expression here is that suggested by the components of the term itself. It is a case of forcing something out. That which is forced out is that which requires expression. Following the analysis of the fort/da case, expression is projection, and consists of the act of projecting oneself on to an external structure which in turn becomes the medium for reflecting that which one has just expressed.

That which is expressed is thus impressed upon an objective medium. The expressed then takes a different form. It takes the form of that into which it is impressed. Freud's grandson, Ernest, expressing himself in the game, expresses himself in terms of the game. He expresses his desire for mastery over the affects of the environment's independent alternation of withdrawal and return takes place in a different setting, with different participating entities and background etc. It is however an impression of the original scenario with elements of reworking.

The general claim is that this is the nature and function of language. Language is how we express ourselves, not by using it as a tool to paint word pictures of a reality that is there, but to reconstitute our selves with the intention, a view towards, working something out. The claim is intended to cover any cultural form and indeed the whole of the culture.

~~cultural form and indeed the whole of the culture~~. Culture is what takes our expressions and plays them back as impressions.

How then does Dasein as being-there feature in this? Dasein is the place where Heidegger begins his analysis. Just like Kant he begins the analysis with how and where things show themselves. In this case it is where the human existence takes place. But it takes place as being-there. The stage where it is there, is the cultural order. Again Heidegger begins with where things are.

But if this is where the analysis begins, it begins where the projection has already taken place. There, where the being is, is the result of the initiating projection. It is the place of the initial expression. Thus what shows up, in being-there, is what the expression is going to reflect. What is contained in the being-there is a re-structured and resulting effect of an initiating expression.

Being-there thus takes place, not as original, but as a mirror reflection of that which is expressed. Being-there exists in a reflective separation from the expressed. Thus being-there is another case of the mirror stage. It functions essentially relectively.

Behind this claim is that Being-there, Dasein, is the same as 'to take place'. The understanding of Being in the subjective

modality, is the intentionality towards taking place. It sees the object taking its place. And the subject sees itself as the need to take a place for the sake of the object.

The spatiality of the topos shows us also that there is an overlapping of the imaginary order and the symbolic order. The imaginary order is present in position due to the way positions play off each other. The position of slave to master, the position of child to parent, lovers male and female. They work by the way each sees themselves in terms of the other.

Thus we know that erotic phantasies work a great deal on the social position of the other. In the language of love we use the expression 'falling in love'. The lover is put on a pedestal. Love can degrade by bringing one's position down to a lower grade. And in psychoanalytic terms, the ups and downs, revolve within the parameters set by parents and siblings, authoritarians and subjects.

As said above the infant learns to mobilize itself in regard to the position of the other. It is the mother that determines the child's position. The child needs the mother even to let it know that it exists. The mother that ignores its child removes the ground for the child's own self awareness that becomes identical to lack of self affirmation. The child has nothing originally to tell it that it exists. Lacking all

response to its movements, cries, needs, the infant has no way of knowing that it exists.

To have a view of oneself as lovely is to have an original view of oneself as loved. Self-love cannot originate from a state of complete self-sufficiency. It is merely an affirmation of what it has received from others.

The confidence to make judgements about oneself, is always a case of making judgements on behalf of others. To know that I am clever is to know how something I say will go down with others. It is to know how something I have said will be taken up within a specific world. To produce a work of poetry can only work within the world of poetry. It takes its place within the canon of poetic works. Only against such measures, which lie beyond and external to the individual, can the poet obtain a place for his work and thus himself.

This brings us to the other feature of space, viz. logical space. The child that projects itself on to a second stage has to adopt a position. It is prepared for this through the mirror form of mobilization. But these positions have an additional element. They are positions that the child must assume. They are positions that become its new identity. But they are more than mirror reflections of itself. They have a logic to them.

The position that one must assume has an order with it. The child is told that it is a son/daughter. It is told that this is mummy, and this is its relation to mummy. So in addition to mobilizing one's being to adapt itself for the sake of something working, now there is a way of doing this imposed from without. It has to mobilize itself in subjection to imposition.

The positions it takes up now, unlike former positions, are not ones that come naturally. They are told in advance. To say they are imposed is to say that they are im-positions. As impositions they are dictated. Now the child has to put these two together. The impositions are positions which show one's position already, and in advance of finding one's own reflection. One is told what one will be.

So the origin of one's identity comes from the positions not only that one can adopt, but those positions that have been handed out. In each case though they work the same way. As positions they are mirror images. Only through them can one see oneself. But in seeing oneself, one does not see a reflection, but a transposition on to another stage.

Thus one anticipates in advance how one will look, i.e. will be, once one is able to come into a certain position. One knows how this position reflects society's regard. So all one

has to do is occupy that position and the regard comes automatically.

Morality is thus instituted. The positions that are to be occupied are those that society sanctions. They are the authorized ones and the ones that the countenance of society shines upon. This metaphor holds behind every position that is occupiable. They are all ways of taking up a regard.

Society then is just the set of possible positions that can be taken up. It functions by imposing these positions upon its intitiates. And the members of society can only function with the logic of the positions that society has set up. Each individual member of society is constantly in search for a position within society. They are constantly in need to take up a place.

**Understanding and the Internal Split**

Intentionality shows how Dasein is split as a form of human exisentence. It is split in that the mode of subjectivity is to constitute itself according to a subjective modality for the sake of an objective reality. Being as a subjective modality is for the sake of beings. Being is the condition for bringing about beings. It is not the condition for the determination of beings. In fact it is the other way round.

Intentionality is the directedness of the subject towards the subjective conditions that will be sufficient for the bringing about of the object. The orientation is towards the subjective state as condition, for the sake of the objective condition being realized.

Understanding is the relation of the subject to the the mode of subjectivity, which is conditional for the objective state of affairs being realized. The term itself again shows this. It is a case of standing-under. The metaphor shows itself in the etymology. The metaphor points to the same metaphor behind subjectivity. Sub-jectivity and under-standing are cases of sub-mission to ways for the agent to be. Subjection is intentional. Thus it is also a desired result. Understanding is this at one remove. It goes through the motions only.

Thus I understand a situation when I can anticipate how the subject can subject itself to the conditions that will bring about the state of affairs. This point is missed if one thinks that it is experience which brings understanding. Experience shows that someone has 'undergone' something. It is not the undergoing that creates the understanding. It is being able to apply the subjectivity to the objectivity.

Again it is not enough to say that someone understands something if they know how it works. Only if it applies to

subjectivity are we talking about understanding. Thus if I say I know how something works, I am saying that I know what to put myself through in order that something or other can take place. To understand how something works is to understand the conditions that will bring it about.

It is often said that men cannot understand women. This depends upon what conditions men are capable of bringing themselves under. There are those which are neutral to both. But there are those which they are incapable of bringing themselves under both in reality and imagination. They are unique to the other. Thus the best one could do to understand that would be to imaginatively project undergoing something as close to it as possible.

So the origin of one's identity comes from the positions not only that one can adopt, but those positions that have been handed out. In each case though they work the same way. As positions they are mirror images. Only through them can one see oneself. But in seeing oneself, one does not see a reflection, but a transposition on to another stage.

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## SOCIETY AS THE ORDER OF BEING

The culture of our society is the place where we take place. Lacan stresses that it is a symbolic order. For Heidegger it is understood ontologically. It is a world. As such it is a transcendental world. It is the place where we live and move and have our being.

How do we bring these two together? We need to bring together symbolic order and the ontology of position. And then we need to show that this order is the ground of our being.

The world of culture shows the way we do things. 'To do things' is to bring things about. And to 'bring about' is a term I use to incorporate the temporal, spatial and semiotic aspects of it.

Yet is not just the pool of skills. It is where we do things. It is a topos in the sense of where all these things come together. 'Coming together' is not just their assembly. Heidegger was able to show us in Being and Time that a world is more than just this single universe. To think so makes us forget that we mean something more by 'world' which we are in danger of losing by thinking of the worl as this world.

We have the world of mathematics, poetry, art, dance, teaching, etc. The term 'world' is not a metaphorical use of the literal world. Because even here we need to know what we mean by the term 'world' to see why it has application here. It is a specific way certain things go together. How they go together as a world, is a sense we have when we can apply it to all these different situations.

The sense in which I am using it is an attempt to bring Lacan and Heidegger together. Let us say then that it is an order. Lacan capitalizes Order. Calling it an Order puts together two senses that Heidegger seemed to be looking for himself. It is an Order in both an ontological sense and in a morally imperative sense. The ontological sense is that which

Heidegger worked without developing an ethics. The moral sense is the sense that Freud worked when he read our social world in terms of the morality of the superego.

It is an order in the ontological sense in that it is the place where things take place. It is the order of their respective positions. In an order they find their being. One position relates to another position through respective modes of being. The slave occupies a position in respect of the master such that they each find a reciprocal mode of being in respect to each other. Their positions are mutually and ontologically determining.

The nature of that ontological determining is one of reflection. They find a mode of being in respect of the other. I could also say here that they find a mode of being in regard to the other. In both of these I am drawing on the way it is a matter of being according to the 'look' of the other. Thus in 'regard' to the other, it is how the other sees one that determines the being one is. One acts according to how the position of the other regards this position. The occupier of the position must look according to his position.

Thus it is the position that looks, regards, more than the individual who looks according to it. The occupier of the position has his look dictated by the position. The priest must look upon certain actions as sinful, the policeman the

same acts as unlawful, the pimp as income, the moralist as disgusting, etc.

The position is one of being because it is one of identity. The occupier of the position regards the other in respect of his own position. The master holds the slave in certain regard. It is more than a way of looking. It is looking from the viewpoint of an identity. In regarding according to one's position one acts according to an identity. The priest cannot look at this act other than an act of sin because of who he is and the demands of his office (position).

The certain regard is that which is in respect of his position. The respect is specular. It is a sort of 'beholden' relationship. He is beholden to this regard by his own position. So in regard to his own position he is beholden.

The term 'beholden' shows us the way the specular element joins with the ontological nature of the position. It also contains the moral element. Take the expression 'Behold, the son of god!' The specular element is obvious. To behold is to look upon. So in the command we are commanded to direct our gazes at an object of perception.

But there is much more in this command than to just direct our gazes at something. It is the command to recognize something. Again there is more than mere coming to remember what this

means. It is to recognize the position of someone. And in the announcement, annunciation in this case, the nature of the recognition is announced. It means not only to look at the son of god and recognize the son of god, but acknowledge the son of god. Or even stronger than this, to acknowledge him as such.

To recognize him as the son of god is to acknowledge his position and thus be, and to act accordingly. It is his position as the son of god that we recognize. How do we recognize it? By occupying immediately the position for ourselves that his position demands. His position is such that we are put into position by it. To behold something is to be held by it.

Now we see the way the language forms. To perceive in this instance, as one of beholding, is to learn to adopt a posture. Looking again at the building blocks of the word, we see the two elements of the verb 'hold' and the intensifier 'be'. Thus to perceive here is to look at something with a view towards holding. What are we invited to hold? The respective posture. The command is almost the command to take up posture.

To hold oneself in the posture is to take up the respective identity, the demanded identity. Here lies one's being, as an identity through position.

Another example I would give just to emphasize this view of perception as one of being essentially based on a respective position is one of coming across a wild animal in an open space. Analyses of perception tend to assume the one-way nature of viewer to the scene viewed. They overlook how the objective position determines the viewer.

The wild animal is suddenly there in front of one. That which I perceive in this instance is one of beholding. Suppose it is a tiger. The first thing is danger. But the tiger defines me. One minute I am a sight-seer, the next I am dinner. Thus the object in front of me classifies me. My perception is not merely a representation of what is there before me. It is a direct orientation and determination of my position.

Immediately my vulnerability is opened up to me. I recognize that the terrain is defined by the object. The speed and agility of the tiger reflects that the open terrain again defines me, my weakness. The distance to a tree defines my speed and agility. Failure to recognize in perception its essential reflectivity misses the fundamental background against which perception must be analysed.

I said that there was also a moral element. Heidegger did not define any system of morality. It would have been built into

his ontology. We can see the rudiments here in this relation to Order.

Within that order, one is ordered. It is both ontological and morally driven. The ontological order is that one has a mode of being constituted through it. Thus it is through the order of their spiritual order that the monk takes up a position within his Order, and when he is positioned he becomes something or other only according to the hierarchy of the system.

A monk within an Order recognizes both the ontological and imperative aspects running simultaneously through the order. The rule is one of maintaining the order. The rule in a sense of the order. Obedience to the rule is obedience to the Order.

I left it ambiguous on purpose. Which is ontological and which is imperative? The rule is how one obeys the Order. The Order itself is composed only of the order to which they all submit. That to which they all submit is the order rather than the Order. The actual Order which is the actual company of monks, say the Jesuits, is composed by the way they subject themselves to an order. They subject themselves to this order, not by just following a rule.

It is important to see how the order is there in an ontological sense which then forms as the ontological standard which they must now meet. This standard is desirable. The rule is the means for obtaining the order they desire. The order is the peculiar way the monks are together. The rule is the way they must follow in order to keep it like this. It is the means for holding it like this. It is a safeguarding measure.

Those who desire this order are then beholden to the rule. To keep oneself in the order is to hold one's own position within the order. It is a necessity for holding together the order. The order of things then is that the order of things must be held to if the order of things is to be maintained. This statement shows the way ontology weaves itself through morality.

Let us take an even simpler case. The order of a straight line. It is a spatial order. All of its points run through it from its beginning to its end. They are all positions along it. Each point is ordered along the line according to its position respective of every other point along it. This is straightforwardly ontological. But what about its imperative?

Let us introduce the order to form a straight line. An everyday army matter. We know that the army is a life of order and it is all about being able to give and take orders.

But what happens in the case of the order to a body of men to form a line? Does this incorporate the imperative with the ontology?

To give an order is to do both of these things. It is to announce in advance the order (ontological) that has to be obeyed (moral). The giving of the order in an utterance comes between these two. So if a sergeant major barks out an order, say to line up, what is the order that he gives? Is the order what he barks out, viz. the utterance? He barks out 'Line up ...!' What is it that is being obeyed? Is it his utterance?

It is only superficially his utterance. His utterance is really saying that it is the order of the line (the ontological order) that is addressing them and to which they must now address themselves. I.e. the sergeant is a link in a chain. He mediates to them the order of the line. In the final analysis it is the line that orders them. Not him. He brings to bear the moral imperative of the line in its ontological sense upon their individual minds.

The ontological order addresses them as a transcendental order. The order is there for them to be ordered into. And they then order themselves according to the order which they hold in front of their minds. They know how to fall under this order. To obey it. To obey it means that they fall into position. They fall into respective positions, respective to each other

under the order of the line. Once their positional orders are respectively correct, the line should be ordered.

In being ordered into a line they become a line. The order of the line is the line. Even when they are in the line, the order of the line continues to order them in both senses. For someone out of line, the response then is evoked from the sergeant major. That individual is marked out of line not by the sergeant major but by the line itself. Again his word represents by bringing to mind the broken order.

## CONCLUSION

This study of Heidegger has been an attempt first of all to clear some philosophical space. The debates around the philosophy of intentionality, or representation argue on the basis of a standpoint that Heidegger's work was designed to call into question. Today however even those who find themselves in support of Heidegger, like Dreyfus and Haugeland, take standpoints that they think are Heideggerean, but in fact are Neo-Kantian. As such, they take the exact stand that Heidegger was concerned to subvert.

The standpoints are the following. Firstly, those who follow Heidegger in showing that our representations of the world presuppose a background. My objections to this are that the background they emphasize is not the one that interprets Heidegger most closely. It regards representation in a Neo-Kantian way, as that which brings reality under its categories. So even if we accept that a background is essential in Heidegger for understanding representation, the misunderstanding of representation indicates the misunderstanding of the relation between background and understanding. It is not the projection of background into representation. The very understanding of Background needs to be changed. For it is understood as the background to

representation and thus in terms of representation. This view of the relation can no longer be assumed.

Secondly, the view (Rorty) which sets out to undermine the relation between our categories of experience and an independently existing state represented by those categories, does not suit either to interpret Heidegger. Heidegger would accept that language does not refer to a 'reality' outside of its categories, which it is supposed to represent. The whole idea that our symbolic systems and theoretical constructs, our systems of representations, 'hook on to the world' is misconceived. This much is agreed with Rorty. But this is only because the world is a re-presentational place. It is symbolically ordered. It is the symbolic order. The mistake is to think the world is that which is out there to be symbolically ordered. Now just because language is not a system of representation but a system of re-presentation, then there is work for language to do. It has to hold us in its symbolic structures, such that we feel resolved in them. Rorty's views need resolved out of their Neo-Kantian framework.

Thirdly, against those scholars who persist in rewriting Heidegger in his own terms, they are not performing what Heidegger considered work. It is tautology, the empty clashing of symbols, at its worst. This consists of using Heideggerean jargon with heavy attention to word splitting and etymology. Yet Heidegger opened up the possibility of style

of philosophy which is still potent. The danger is to avoid adopting his way of doing philosophy just because of past and present misuse of it. It has still a powerful way of examining our language, categories and is still employable as long as one has a sense of doing work and not empty sounding phrases which imitate the master. This is a fine line to be walked, but one that takes us somewhere.

Fourthly, perception is understood to be secondary in our experience and not primary. The primary positioning of perception still figures largely in theories of intentionality like that of Searle's. This approach reverses that and makes our practical dealings the basis of the work perception does. Its form of work is defined by it and as a function it is thus derivative.

Fifthly, the nature of the understanding needs to be changed if it is no longer thought of as obtaining representational models of reality. The understanding was shown above as the way in which we construct ourselves. Society holds out positions for us to hold, and that is what understanding is. It is the ability to hold positions responsibly. It is the placing of one's individuality under a mode of being which is the required condition for bringing a state of affairs about.

Lastly, this thesis makes theoretical space for a new use of Heidegger in the general area of psychotherapy. As mental

activity is the projection into symbolic structures, rather than adequate mental adjustment of a mental model to reality, then mind disturbances can be treated not as failure to come to terms with reality, but as one of bad symbolic housing.

# NOTES

## Introduction

1. Cadava, E. & P. Connor & J. L. Nancy (1991). Who Comes After the Subject?, Routledge.

Nancy defines the purpose of his question thus: 'I asked the question: "Who comes after the subject?" to settle on one of the principle rupture lines [between Continental philosophy and Anglo-Saxon philosophy]. The critique of the deconstruction of subjectivity is to be considered one of the great motifs of contemporary philosophical work in France, taking off from, here again and perhaps especially, the teachings of Marx, Nietzsche, Freud, Husserl, Heidegger, Bataille, Wittgenstein, from the teachings of linguistics, the social sciences, and so forth. p. 4.

2. Nietzsche, F. The Gay Science, Section 125. Nancy also sees the question to have emerged in the form of an event. 'My question aimed in the first place to treat this motif as an event that had indeed emerged form our history--hence the "after"-- and not as some capricious variation of fashionable thinking ...' op.cit., p. 4.

3. For the account that sees Lacan completely from the point of view of Saussure's linguistics see Anika Lemaire, (1982)

Jacques Lacan , Routledge. My own account will show how to relate the work of Lacan to the more philosophical analysis coming from Heidegger. The place for Saussure's work is given perspective. This is done by showing how to relate Lacan with Heidegger by actually doing the philosophical work, not by making comparisons.

4. Lacan, J. 'The mirror stage as formative of the function of the I as revealed in psychoanalytic exerience' in Ecrits: A Selection, trans. A Sheridan, Tavistock. pp. 1-7 (hitherto Ecrits).

5. As in for example, hypokeimenon, substantia, subjectum. These go hand in hand with other terms with varying degrees of metaphysical use, as soul, self, spirit, mind, with their Greek and Latin equivalents.

6. This thesis is closer to Gadamer than Nancy. The question of subjectivity is only a question for history because of the way it is original as an ontological event, and not a concrete event. Gadamer says, 'The "understanding" that Heidegger described as the basic dynamic of Dasein is not an "act" of - subjectivity, but a mode of being... I have myself shown that understanding is always an event.' in his paper, 'Philosophical Foundations' in his Philosophical Hermeneutics ed. David E. Linge (1977) University of California Press.

7. This thesis has not made use of Aristotle but the recourse Stewart has to Aristotle, viz. one of showing that Heidegger on 'intentionality' must be understood as Heidegger's acceptance of the Aristotelian critique of Plato on Forms, and as one of claiming that a deeper foundation is found in the practicality of our bodily mode of existence ('Intentionality and the Semantics of "Dasein"' Philosophy and Phenomenological Review: Vol. XLVIII, No. 1, Sept. 1987) is not only a misuse of Heidegger on Aristotle, but a deep misunderstanding of Heidegger. It completely misses the point of the Heideggerean contemplation of 'Physis' as that in which Heidegger feels the necessity of showing the non-arbitrary union of being with logos. This problem is not resolved by appeal to practical dealings with the world.

8. Poggeler, O. (1989) Martin Heidegger's Path of Thinking, Humanities Press International, Inc. Atlantic Highlands, NJ. ch. 10. pp. 227-242.

9. It is not doubted that Heidegger's early work is an attempt to ground thinking. His Kant book is such an attempt to follow Kant in this. Rorty's view that Heidegger subverted all foundational approaches is a reference to Heidegger's later work.

10. Consider for example the definition given by Heidegger in his Kant book, 'To set forth the ontological analytic of

Dasein as a prerequisite and to make clear to what purpose and in what manner, on what basis and under what presupposition it puts the concrete question: "What is man?"' Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, p. 4 (hitherto KPM).

11. The metaphor used by Kant was architectural. Heidegger repeats it in his analysis of the radical discovery of the subjectivity of the subject. 'To this end, it is necessary first to clarify the meaning of the expression "to lay the foundation of ..." Its meaning is best illustrated within the field of architecture.... laying the foundation of metaphysics is not the mere fabrication of a system and its subdivisions but the trading of the architectonic limits and design of the intrinsic possibility of metaphysics, i.e. the concrete determination of its essence.' Ibid., pp. 4-5. We follow the blue print set up by Heidegger here, in looking for something concrete from which to devise the essence and limitation of the subjectivity of the subject, not from the texts of metaphysics, which are essentially abstract, but from using psychoanalysis of the subject, from the point of view of the entrance of the infant into subjectivity.

12. One of three orders that Lacan uses to show the structure of the subject. The other two are The Real and The Symbolic Order. This study does not make use of the Real, but it does use the Symbolic Order.

13. Kant, I. (1973) Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith, MacMillan. P. 47: A5/B8-9 (hitherto The Critique of Pure Reason.

14. Philosophical Investigations, Sect. 38. Wittgenstein is pointing out how problems of reference, the problem of how the logic of our language belongs to reality, can be forgotten by philosophers when they come to understand reference. We forget to pay attention to the way we are referred by language, forgetting what it is like to experience reference, and just to treat it as an unanalysable phenomenon.

15. While for Kant it was by the unity of that which was both prior to experience and transcendental, with that which was substantial and thus synthetic. But for Rorty philosophy through the linguistic turn came to realize that it was impossible. 'When, with the later Wittgenstein, this kind of philosophy turned its attention to the question of how such a "pure" study of language was possible, it realized that it was not possible.' 'Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and the reification of language' in Richard Rorty, (1991) Essays on Heidegger and Others: Philosophical Papers Volume 2, Cambridge.

16. See for example his Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, ch. 8, 'Philosophy Without Mirrors.' (hitherto PMN). For an early work of his on Heidegger see, 'Overcoming the Tradition:

Heidegger and Dewey' in Michael Murray, ed., (1978) Heidegger and Modern Philosophy, Yale University Press.

17. This problem is actually modelled by Lacan. The S/s model of the sign, as given by Saussure models the way in which some philosophers think themselves doing substantial work, when all it sounds like is the re-arrangements of the logical sense of our terms. This is the case with the work of Derrida. Simply put, the idea that language is an interplay of the symbols within their system, confines one's play to the S above the bar.

18. For an action illustration of this see the debate between Spivak and Searle on Channel 4's series 'Voices', programme 'The Trouble With Truth'. At the end of this debate Spivak invites the audience to decide how well Searle was able to understand her points. This was tantamount to saying that, judging by the rephrasing of her points by Searle, she felt his understanding was poor.

19. Rorty distinguishes 'reference' as a term of philosophical science from the everyday term 'talking about'. He is quite right to do this. Philosophers of language use reference naively. Rorty puts up our sense of 'talking about' as preeminent. The terms are not synonomous. For philosophers of language argue that reference implies the existence of that which is referred to, while no such implication is necessary

for 'talking about.' It is legitimate to talk about Sherlock Holmes and know full well he never existed. See Rorty, PMN, p. 289.

20. Devitt and Sterelny (1987) Language and Reality, p. 205.

21. For Rorty philosophy, as the title of his book indicates, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature has been captivated by a metaphor, viz. mind is the mirror reflection of reality. Everything he seems to write is his way of shaking us loose from it. In fact this thesis is an examination of the mirror reflectedness of the psyche. It develops Rorty's idea that language is not representational and nor is mind. It argues however that reflection is a basic constitutive feature of psyche, mind.

22. I shall take issue later with the following kind of assumption prevalent in Searle, viz., 'By explaining Intentionality in terms of language I do not mean to imply that Intentionality is essentially and necessarily linguistic. On the contrary it seems to me obvious that infants and many animals that do not in any ordinary sense have a language or perform speech acts nonetheless have Intentional states.' (1983) Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge. p. 5 (hitherto Intentionality). To explain intentionality in terms of language shows a unique kind of intentionality that forms in language. To show intentionality

in language requires one to show how a prior form of understanding follows into language and functions in it.

23. For Rorty there are two traditions in philosophy. There are those who think that philosophy like the sciences are ways of obtaining a greater and more accurate description of what reality is really like. On the other hand,there is the tradition that Rorty himself identifies with, and that is the hermeneutical tradition. They hold that philosophy is one mode of discourse like many otners, in which the main function is to edify ourselves. They deny that there is an intrinsic nature of reality to be described. The definitory account of tnis is in Part Three of his Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.

24. Spivak tells Searle (in the programme mentioned above, n. 6.) that Deconstructionists have chosen him (Searle) as a perfect example of those who just cannot see. She is referring to the debate between Searle and Derrida. Derrida's papers are collected in the book Limited Inc. Searle however declined to have his published together with Derrida's in the same volume.

25. Searle on 'Background' can be found in chapter five of his Intentionality. It is discussed from the Heideggerean viewpoint by Dreyfus and Wakefield in 'Intentionality and the Phenomenology of Action', contained in John Searle and His

Critics, ed. Ernest Lepore and Robert Van Gulick (1993), pp. 259-270.

26. 'On the opposed view worked out by Heidegger, theoretical holism with its account of interpretation as translation must be distinguished from what one might call practical holism, which thinks of interpretation as explication.

Practical understanding is holistic in an entirely different way from theoretical understanding. Although practical understanding - everyday coping with things and people - involves explicit beliefs and hypotheses, these can only be meaningful in specific contexts and against a background of shared practices. And just as we can learn to swim without consciously or unconsciously acquiring a theory of swimming, we acquire these social background practices by being brought up in them, not by forming beliefs and learning rules.' Dreyfus, 'Holism and Hermeneutics' Review of Metaphysics, 1980-81, p.7.

Dreyfus is the most up to date examination of Heidegger on 'Background'. For Dreyfus it is the background skills that form the basis for understanding, and not rule governed thought or action. He traces the problem through readings of Husserl by Gurwitsch, and then recently by Follesdaal. He shows how Heidegger diverged from Husserl on this issue. See especially his ''The Perceptual Noema' in his edited (1982) Husserl:

Intentionality and Cognitive Science. Bradford Book, MIT. The issue is taken up further in this thesis.

27. For Rorty though this is still to follow Kant, where Kant himself ought not to have gone. 'Kant gave us a way of seeing scientific truth as something which could never supply an answer to our demand for a point, a justification, a way of claiming tnat our moral decision about what to do is based on knowledge of tne nature of the world. Unfortunately, Kant put his diagnosis of science in terms of the discovery of "inevitable subjective conditions". to be revealed by reflection upon scientific inquiry.' PMN, p.383.

28. In Neo-Kantianism the scientific and mathematical forms of cognition were the prototypes of cognition that they understood all other types by. This gae them a very specific view of the nature of the object and its cognition, upon which they hung everything else. Werkmeister shows the radical nature of this. There is no original object that can appear. Everything must be determined in advance by positing.

'In order to get the process going at all, that is to say, in order to have some anchorage, some vantage-point from which to begin the determinationof the indeterminate, it is necesary to "posit" or "fixate" something in experience as our point of departure and then to advance from it as far as possible on logically justifiable grounds. We must remember at all times,

however, that our starting-point was "posited" or assumed and that it is subject to revision as soom as such revision seems possible or necessary in the light of subsequent experiences. The individual"factum," therefor, originally posited as our starting-point or "discovered" in the process of advancing cognition, is never an issolated datum, but must needs be an elemnt iwthin a context - within the context of cognition itself.' 'Cassirer's Advance Beyond Neo-Kantianism'. In The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer, ed., Paul Arthur Schilpp, p.762

29. 'Although one cannot defend the attempt of the so-called "Marburg school" to interpret space and time as "categories" in the logical sense and to reduce the transcendental aesthetic to logic, one must admit that the attempt is inspired by a legitimate motive. This motive arises from the conviction, certainly never clearly justified, that the transcendental aesthetic taken by itself can never constitute the whole of that which lies in it as a possibility. However, from the specific "syn" character of pure intuition it does not follow that this intuition is dependent on the synthesis of the understanding. On the contrary, the correct interpretation of this "syn" character leads to the conclusion that pure intuition originates in the pure imagination.' KPM, p.152

30. In Dreyfus/Hall, eds., HEIDEGGER: A Critical Reader, pp. 32-33.

31. ibid., pp. 32-33.

32. 'It is true that in order to wrest from the actual words that which these words "intend to say," every interpretation must necesarily resort to violence. This violence, however, should not be confused with an action that is wholly arbitrary. The interpretation must be animated and guided by the power of an iluminative idea.' KPM, p.207.

**Fundamental Ontology**

1. 'Voices', ibid., 'The Rationality of the Emotions'.

2. '... the ego is that part of the id which has been modified by the direct influence of the external world', S. Freud, (1949b) The Ego and the Id trans. J. Strachey, Hogarth Press, p.39.

3. Freud uses this metaphor in the Ego and the Id, p.25.

4. Lacan Ecrits. p.154

5. Norman Malcolm, 'Knowledge of Other Minds', The Journal of Philosophy LV, 23 (November 6, 1958): repr. David M Rosenthal ed. (1991) The Nature of Mind, Oxford University Press. p.94.

6. L. Wittgenstein, Zettel, Sect. 545.

7. I. Dilman (1984) Freud and the Mind, Blackwell. p.100.

8. Dilman, ibid., p.100.

9. J.R. Searle (1992) The Rediscovery of the Mind, pp.100-105.

10. Frederick A. Olafson, (1993) 'The unity of Heidegger's thought' in Guignon ed. (1993) The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, Cambridge. William J. Richardson, (1974) Heidegger Through Phenomenology to Thought, The Hague: Nijhoff.

11. The later works to which I am referring, are mainly Identity and Difference, On Time and Being, and Poetry Language and Thought.

12. 'The fundamental purpose of the present interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason is to reveal the basic import of this work by bringing out what Kant "intended to say." Our interpretation is inspired by a maxim which Kant himself wished to see applied to the interpretation of philosophical works and which he formulated in the following terms at the end of his reply to the critique of the Leibnizian, Eberhard.

'"Thus, the Critique of Pure Reason may well be the real apology for Leibniz, even in opposition to his partisans whose

words of praise hardly do him honor... They do not understand the intentions of these philosophers when they neglect the key to all explication of the works of pure reason through concepts alone, namely, the critique of reason itself (as thecommon source of all concepts), and are incapable of looking beyond the language which these philosophers employ to what they intended to say"' M. Heidegger, KPM. pp.206-207.

The clue now is towards an understanding which forms the basis of the logicality of experience.

13. The distinction is now common parlance but not in the way Heidegger had set it up. For Rorty it is the metaphysical distinction between mind and body as realized by Descartes, 'pains "in" amputated limbs are nonspatial - the argument being that if they had <u>any</u> spatial location they would be in an arm, but since there is no arm, they must be of a quite different ontological sort.' PMN, p.62. Cf. how he uses Ryle on adjectives and substantials as another trace of the ontological gap, p.66.

14. 'One might get the mistaken idea that being for Heidegger is not an entity but some sort of event or process. Many commentators make this mistake. For example, Joseph Kockelmans gets his book on Heidegger off to a very bad start by noting, "Heidegger is never concerned with beings or things, but with meaning and Being; never with stable entities, but

with events." Hubert Dreyfus, (1991) Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England. p.11 (hitherto CBT).

15. Rorty thinks he is copying Heidegger's own approach towards analysing the history of language games and their respective vocabularies. Both agree that basic assumptions that give rise to the views of the ontological difference should be put in question by tracing their intellectual history. 'Understanding why they are made requires an understanding of intellectual history rather than an uderstanding of the meanings of the relevant terms or an analysis of the concepts they signify.' PMN, p.37.

16. PMN, p.32.

17. This tone was set by Russell in his paper, 'On Denoting' Mind (1905) who was able to defuse what seemed the absurdity of Meinong's different realms of being as in 1/ the existence of objects and 2/ the subsistence of objectives.

18. M. Heidegger, 'Metaphysics as History of Being' in his (1975) 'The End of Philosophy, trans. Joan Stambaugh, Souvenir Press Limited. p.4 (hitherto EP).

19. M. Heidegger, 'The establishment of the intrinsic possibility of ontology is accomplished as the dislosure of transcendence, i.e., the subjectivity of the subject.' KPM, pp.212-3.

20. EP, p.12.

21. M. Heidegger (1973) Being and Time, Sect. 7. (hitherto B&T).

22. Klemke gives the context for Moore on this as well as quoting Moore's statement. 'Aristotle said: "It is through wonder that men begin to philosophize" - wonder which is caused by reflection upon the world, its nature and origin. And Plato held that the philosopher is a spectator of all time and existence. The suggestion here is that the philosopher's problems are provided to him (for the most part) directly by the world.... With Moore, the situation is reversed. He himself has said:

"I do not think that the world or the sciences would ever have suggested to me any philosophical problems. What has suggested philosophical problems to me is things which other philosophers have said about the world or the sciences."' E.D. Klemke (1969) The Epistemology of G.E. Moore, Northwestern Universtity Press: Evanston. p.4.

23. B&T, Sects: 22-24.

24. The Hintikkas, Merrill and Jaako, reinterpret Wittgenstein in order to take him out of philosophy as a purely logical analysis of discourse. '... the received view is fallacious. It involves the mistake of understanding Wittgenstein's language-games as predominantly intralingual (verbal) games, games whose moves consist typically of speech-acts. By contrast, on the interpretation advocated here the "moves" consist of transitions in which utterances can play a role but normally not the only role; on the contrary many moves need not involve any verbal utterances.' (1989) [1986] Investigating Wittgenstein, Blackwell. p.218.

25. D.W. Hamlyn (1984) Metaphysics, Cambridge University Press. See 'Introduction'.

26. Ultimately Heidegger's critique of Kant's critique is that although it works towards an analysis of the subjectivity of the subject, that subjectivity is an orientation towards things as present-at-hand. Thus it is not subjectivity at its most primordial.

27. B&T, p.242:H 198.

28. 'The Origin of the Work of Art' in (1971) Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. A. Hofstadter, Harper. pp. 15-87.

29. KPM, 'It is possible that this originally unifying [bildende] center is that "unknown, common root" of both stems? Is it accidental that with the first introduction of the imagination Kant says that "we are scarcely ever conscious" of its existence.?' p. 144. Note should be taken here of how we are scarcely conscious of that which gives us our guiding sense.

30. KPM, p.148.

31. 'Man is deinon, first because he remains exposed within this overpowering power, because by his essence he belongs to being. But at the same time man is deinon because he is the violent one in the sense designated above. (He gathers the power and brings it to manifestedness.) Man is the violent one, not aside from and along with other attributes but solely in the sense that in his fundamental violence [Gewalt-tatigkeit] he uses power [Gewalt] against the overpowering [uberwaltigende].' M. Heidegger, (1974) Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 150.

32. Heidegger goes so far as to see the light metaphor in the root meaning of the word 'life' or rather the Greek word for Life. 'Za - signifies the pure letting-rise within the appearing, gazing upon, breaking in upon, and advancing, and all their ways. The verb zen means rising into the light. Homer says, zen kai oran phaos eelioio, "to live, and this

means to see the light of the sun." 'Aletheia (Heraclitus, Fragment B16)' in M. Heidegger, (1975) [1950] Early Greek Thinking, Harper and Row. p.116 (hitherto EGT). This coincides with the view to be advocated here. It is the emergence into the light, as the emergence of existence on to a cultural stage, through which it can reflect itself, that Heidegger finds the springing forth from the root.

33. B&T, p.98:H 69.

34. Dreyfus, CBT, p.62.

35. 'The more urgently we need what is missing, and the more authentically it is encountered in its unreadiness-to-hand, all the more obtrusive does that which is ready-to-hand become - so much so, indeed, that it seems to lose its character of ready-to-hand. It reveals itself as something just present-at-hand and no more.' B&T, p.103:H 73.

36. The understanding of what the entity is begins long before one can predicate things of it. And it is only because of this that the predicates can be made. 'Thus any assertion requires a fore-sight; in this the predicate which we are to assign and make stand out, gets loosened, so to speak, from its unexpressed inclusion in the entity itself' B&T, p.199:H 157.

37. Heidegger's distinction between animality and human existence has been tackled a number of ways. The time has come to see it in terms of how Dasein is constituted by the step into the light of culture; the reflection of one's being according to a symbolic way of being. 'Because the animal does not speak, self-revealing and self-concealing, together with their unity, possess a wholly different life-essence with animals.' EGT, pp. 116-7.

38. Husserl shows this for logic 'The phenomenological elucidation of the origin of the logical reveals that its domain is far more extensive than traditional logic has dealt with hitherto. At the same time, this elucidation uncovers the concealed essential grounds of this contraction - and it does so precisely in returning above all to the origin of the "logical" in the traditional sense of the term. Thereby it discovers not only that logical activity is already present at levels in which it was not recognized by the tradition and that, accordingly, the traditional logical problematic begins at a relatively higher level, but that, above all, positions are to be found, on the basis of which the meaning and legitimacy of the higher-level self-evidcences of the logician are first and ultimately intelligible.' E. Husserl, (1973) Experience and Judgment: Investigations in a Genealogy of Logic, trans. James S. Churchill and Karl Ameriks, Northwestern University Press: Evanston. pp.12-13. But Heidegger was

already doing this explicitly in B&T, sects. 32-34 and KPM, pp.33-4.

39. Heidegger shows this in the strata of levels of synthesis. They are the ontological synthesis, veritative synthesis, the predicative synthesis, and the apophantic synthesis. KPM, p.33f.

**Chapter Two: The Edges of Phenomenology.**

1. Husserl calls the ordinary every day attitude to the world, the 'natural attitude'. 'For the attitude of the humanistic sciences the point of departure is the "natural attitude," in which everyone, and thus also the beginning humanist, is situated in waking life prior to all scientific intent and activity and thought which he can find himself to be such.' E. Husserl, 'The Attitude of Natural Science and the Attitude of Humanistic Science. Naturalism, Dualism, and Psychophysical Psychophysical Psychology' in his (1970) [1954] The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, Northwestern University Press: Evanston. p.321. It is this understanding of the pre-given nature of the world that he says he analyses phenomenologically. Heidegger is often taken on a par with this. He is said to begin with the everyday. This needs to be reexamined. It is Dasein that Heidegger questions and the sense of the violent nature of Being in culture.

Dreyfus merely dissolves Heidegger's phenomenology in the cultural background.

2. qu. from W.Biemel, 'Husserl's Encyclopaedia Britannica Article' in Frederick Elliston and Peter McCormick, eds.,(1977) Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals, University of Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame and London. pp. 299-300.

3. J.N. Mohanty shows this in his book (1982) Husserl and Frege, Indiana University Press: Bloomington. According to Mohanty Husserl before 1891 was making distinctions between the sense or meaning of a term and the presentation of such a meaning. Failure to distinguish these ends up in the dreaded psychologism. This is where philosophers take their region of study to be psychological modes in which thoughts occur rather than the thought itself.

4. As in Searle, the conditions of satisfaction are directions of fit. Intentionality, pp. 10-11.

5. Biemel, ibid, p.300.

6. Dagfinn Follesdaal, 'Husserl and Heidegger on the Role of Actions in the Constitution of the World,' in E. Saarinen et al., eds., (1979) Essays in Honour of Jaakko Hintikka, Dordrecht: Reidel.

7. 'On Claiming to Know' in A. Phillips Griffiths ed. (1968) Knowledge and Belief, Oxford Readings in Philosophy, Oxford University Press.

8. See his 'Introduction' to his edited (1982) Husserl: Intentionality & Cognitive Science, MIT.

9. B&T, pp.53-4:H 30.

10. B&T, p.58:H 34.

**Chapter Three: The Intentional Background**

1. KPM, p.213.

2. Heidegger draws out Kant's metaphors on this as the 'root' to two stems (the faculties of Intuition and Understanding) and the 'spring' for them in KPM, p.40.

3. KPM, p.92.

4. 'What is Metaphysics' in the collection of papers under Heidegger's name by Werner Brock, Existence and Being.

5. Rudolph Carnap, 'The Overcoming of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis' in Murray (1978).

6. What Husserl 'brackets' in his phenomenological reduction is the actual world, the world that is. Phenomenology does not describe actual appearances. It turns away from being to the meaning of being. So the phenomenologist not the actual object but the meant object, the object intended, the intentional object. From the object as meant, he phenomenologically proceeds to the original subjective grounds out of which the intentional object originates. '...the multiplicities of modes of consciousness that belong together synthetically and pertain to any meant object, of no matter what category, can be explored as to their phenomenological types. Among such multiplicities are included those syntheses that, with regard to the initial intending, have the typical style of verifying and, in particular, evidently verifying syntheses - ..' , Cartesian Meditations, p.56. Husserl can be read to be saying that cultural experiences, of which the phenomenological is the most radical, is the development into the realm of the purely symbolic, into further and further mediacies of experience.

7. KPM, p.33,4

8. Heidegger finds that the correspondence of assertion and reality has a more original setting from which it is derived. 'Whence does the representative statement receive its command to "right itself" by the object and thus to be in accord with rightness? Why does ths accord (Stimmen) at the same time

determine (bestimmen) the nature of truth?... Only because this postulate (Vorgeben) has already freed itself... and become open to a manifestation operating in this openness.', 'On the Essence of Truth', p.330

9. Husserl finds the roots of the implicit understanding in the horizons according to which we anticipate the objects that appear to us. '... it is still necessary to consider that the horizon-intentions, which are always awakened in advance on the basis of the typical familiarity of each object even with its first becoming-given, and which belong to the essence of every explication...', Experience and Judgement p. 129.

10. See pp.145-148 of Intentionality for examples of requiring background in order to understand the meaning of utterances.

**Chapter Four: The Unconscious as Background**

1. This is the thesis argued for by Robert Steele,(1982) Freud and Jung: Conflicts of Interpretation, Routledge and Kegan Paul. 'We can find in both Freud's and Jung's childhoods the origins of their theories...' p.21.

2. Steele: 'Josef Breuer: Freud's last father', ch.3. ibid.

3. Jones's extremely partisan account of Freud does not even attempt to cover over Freud's wrecklessness here. He notes an unconscious drive. 'In the references to his previous writings Freud gave in his apologia in 1887, in which he implicated the hypodermic needle as the source of the danger in the employment of cocaine, he omitted any reference to the 1885 paper in which he had strongly advocated the evil injections. Nor is the latter paper included in the 1897 list of his writings he had to prepare when applying for the title of Professor. No copy of it is to be found in the collection he kept of his reprints. It seems to have been completely suppressed.' (1974) The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, ed. and abridged by Lionel Trilling & Steven Marcus, Penguin. p.105-6.

4. This is found in his dream 'The Botanical Monograph, a dream which Freud presents with interpretation in his Interpretation of Dreams.

5. qu. from I. Dilman (1984) Freud and the Mind, Blackwell. p.28.

6. For the limp in Dora's case see Felix Deutsch, 'A Footnote to Freud's "Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria"', in Charles Bernheimer and Claire Kahane ed., (1985) In Dora's Case: Freud; Hysteria: Femininism, Virago. p.41.

7. For the coughing see Maria Ramas 'Freud's Dora, Dora's Hysteria' in Bernheimer ibid., esp. p.162.

8. This is usually understood in psychoanalysis as purely moral. But there is no need for this. It must also incorporate the introjection of the order as an ontological. Cf. Phyllis Tyson & Robert L. Tyson, (1990) Psychoanalytic Theories of Development, Yale University Press: New Haven and London. p.201.

9. Example taken from Errol Bedford, 'Emotions', in Donald F. Gustafson (1967) ed., Essays in Philosophical Psychology, MacMillan: London and Melbourne. p.79.

10. It is not my point here to argue for against the use of folk psychology as the debate is for example represented by Paul Churchland, 'Folk psychology, insist some, is just like folk mechanics, folk thermo-dynamics, folk meteorology, folk chemistry, and folk biology. It is a framework of concepts, roughly adequate to the demands of every day life, with which the humble adept comprehends, explains, predicts, and manipulates a certain domain of phenomena. It is, in short, a folk theory. ... Folk psychology, insist others, is radically unlike the examples cited. It does not consist of laws... It central purpose is normative rather than descriptive.' 'Folk psychology and the explanation of human behaviour' in John C. Greenwood ed. (1991) The future of folk

psychology, Cambridge University Press. p. 51. Nevertheless it can be seen that the individual addresses themselves to that which constitutes their emotion, the logical discrimination of it. As the distinction refers to that which is constitutive for the subjectivity of the state of the individual it must be both normatively and descriptively based. I take this point up later.

11. Lacan's classic account of this is his Rome Discourse, viz. 'The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis' in Ecrits.

12. A. Lemaire (1982) Jacques Lacan, Routledge, runs these two together, p.12, as if they were one and the same thing. It is essential to distinguish them for purposes of intentionality. The project is towards the meaning, what Heidegger calls the intelligibility. 'That which can be Articulated in interpretation, and thus even more primordially in discourse, is what we have called "meaning".... This can be dissolved or broken up into significations. Significations, as what has been Articulated from that which can be Articulated, always carry meaning.... discourse, as the Articulation of the intelligibility of the "there", is a primordial existentiale of disclosedness... B&T p.204: H 161.

13. For Lacan it is the symbol now that creates space for the thing. 'Through the word - already a presence made of absence

- absence itself gives itself a name in that moment of origin whose perpetual recreation Freud's genius detected in the play of the child. And from sounds modulated on presence and absence ... there is born the world of meaning of a particular language in which the world of things will come to be arranged.' 'Function and field of speech... ' ibid., p. 65.

14. It is possible because life as a subject is constituted by the forbidden and sacrifice. 'What is forbidden is coincidence between kinship relationships (blood relationships) and relationships of alliance (marriage relationships) on pain of abolishing the Family. The Family appears as a symbolic structure which is irreducible to any natural structure: animal promiscuity. It is also irreducible to awareness of the psychological relations actualized by reproduction of the one hand and by love on the other hand.... This means that the family structure manifests a transcendence of all natural order by the establishment of Culture... The Forbidden is, therefore, the first of the forces which establish culture or the symbolic order...' Lemaire, ibid. pp. 61-2.

15. Freud, S. (1920) Beyond the Pleasure Principle, SE, 18.

16. Lacan was to make a great deal of the arbitrary relation that Saussure argued was the feature of the relation of signifier and signified. Heidegger follows Kant in trying to show that this is not arbitrary at all. The relation between

the transcendental and that which subsumed under it is not arbitrary. David Holdcroft wisely relates this problem to Port Royal Logic. 'This can be seen by noting that Port Royal grammarians could readily agree about the marginality of onomatopoeia and interjections, and continue to maintain that lingistic categories correspond to conceptual categories - noun phrases to substances, adjectives to modes, etc. - and that the structure of sentences corresponds to that of thoughts.' (1991) Saussure: Signs, System, and Arbitrariness, Cambridge University Press. p.55. Heidegger is of course basing logic on the ontological. The 'if-then' of logic is derived from the if-then of ontological projection.

17. Sigmund Freud, Standard Edition, XVIII: 15n. This point was noted by Michael Payne, (1993) Reading Theory: An Introduction to Lacan, Derrida, and Kristeva, Blackwell. p.53.

18. Freud argued that they were in prototypical form. 'It was the child's first and most vital activity, his sucking at his mother's breast, or at substitutes for it, that must have familiarised him with this pleasure... To begin with sexual activity attaches itself to functions serving the purpose of self-preservation and does not become independent of them until later. No-one who has seen a baby sinking back satiated from the breast and falling asleep with flushed cheeks and a blissful smile can escape the reflection that this picture persists as a prototype of the expression of sexual

satisfaction in later life. (1905) SE 7: Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality pp. 181-2.

**Chapter Five: Imagination and the Imaginary Order**

1. Genesis, 2:4-25. It is well known that there are two creation myths in Genesis. This is the second, and is the product of the Yahweh cult.

2. It is not only psychoanalysts that use myth to interpret the interpretations of human being, but philosophers have always used myth as the source of philosophical analysis. Klemm points out that Ricoeur sees it as grounded in the symbolic order and that it pertains to the commmunity's understanding of its own being. 'Myths also refer to the concrete mode of being of a historical community insofar as they characterize the destiny of a community through narration of the struggles of a figure or group of figures who present and make perceptible the community's view on human being.' p.65, (1983) The Hermeneutical Theory of Paul Ricoeur, Lewisburg, Bucknell University Press, london and Toronto: Associated University Presses.

3. Genesis, 2:18. 'It is not good that he should be alone; I will make a helper fit for him.'

4. Not a word about this for example in Alison Gopnik's, 'Developing the Idea of Intentionality: Children's Theories of Mind', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 20, No.1, March 1990, pp. 89-114).

5. Dreyfus, CBT, (1991) pp.16-17.

6. Dreyfus's example of this in his Heidegger commentary is Papert. 'The work of Seymour Papert of the M.I.T. Artificial Intelligence Laboratory is an example of the cognitivist culmination of this tradition. Papert claims that even physical skills such as bike-riding and juggling are performed by following theories. One would be better able to learn bike-riding if one followed the steps of a bike-riding program. According to Papert, when one sees one's skills as programs "the reward is the ability to describe analytically something that until then was known in a global, perceptual-kinesthetic way."' p.86. Other examples are Marvin Minsky, 'A Framework for Representing Knowledge,' in J. Haugeland ed. (1981) Mind Design, Montgomery, Vermont: Bradford, 1981.

7. The classic case of this is Chomsky. Language use is rule-governed. The speaker in each speech act is following the rules in his own head. These rules are innate. They are the elements of what he calls a 'universal grammar'. Chomsky is an obvious target for anyone who wants to deny that language use is rule-governed. But note how it is taken for granted in

philosophical high places. Peter Hacker while debunking scientific attempts to show the brain has a language, says, 'Someone who has a language has mastered a technique, acquired or possesses a skill of using symbols in accord with rules for their correct use....' (1987) 'Languages, Minds and Brains' in Colin Blakemore and Susam Greenfield eds., (1987) Mindwaves: Thoughts on Intelligence, Identity and Consciousness, Basil Blackwell. pp.161-2.

8.. This is not true though for Elizabeth Grosz,(1990) Jacques Lacan: A femininst introduction, Routledge. chs.2 & 3. Her connections are not those made here. Nor does she see how important the connection between the pre-cultural and the cultural is from the point of view of understanding. She puts it into the problem of the relation between biological and cultural.

9. Ecrits, ch.1.

10. Lacan says it is directly against any philosophy that takes its view directly from the Cogito, ibid. p.1. This applies to Sartre in that for him consciousness is transparent. For Lacan it masks a deep significance, as shown above in his theory of the Unconscious.

11. See H.J. de Vleeschauwer (1961) The Development of Kantian Thought, trans. A.R.C. Duncan, Thomas Nelson and Sons, London and New York.

12. Ecrits, p.1.

13. Ecrits, p.1.

14. This is taken up by Hofstadter, who uses the word 'Enownment' to account for Being as 'Ereignis'. He is showing that the identity of thought and Being for Heidegger in the later work is developed into the experience of 'enownment'. Hofstadter's work fails as an exegesis of Heidegger's problem. It is illustratively so. He insists, like many other Heidegger scholars, on translating Heidegger's own terms and language into other terms of Heidegger as well as Heidegger's own peculiar form of expression. For example, 'In a word, das Ereignis is the letting-belong-together, das Zusammengehorenlassen, in and through and by which man and Being belong together.' 'Enownment' in William V. Spanos ed. (1979) Martin Heidegger and the Question of Literature: Toward a Postmodern Literary Hermeneutics, Indiana University Press: Bloomington. p.27.

15. In Lacan the subject is the result of a 'suture' and other times a 'Spaltung'. It is the split between desire and the symbol of the word sown together. As if for example, when he

says, 'But desire is simply the impossibility of such speech, which, in replying to the first can merely reduplicate its mark of prohibition by completing the split (Spaltung) which the subject undergoes by virtue of being a subject only in so far as he speaks.

'(Which is symbolized by the oblique bar of noble bastardy that I attach to the S of the subject in order to indicate that it is that subject, thus $S^{/}$.') 'The direction of the treatment and the principles of its power' in Ecrits, p.270.

16. Joseph Smith (1991) Arguing with Lacan, Yale University Press. ch.1.

17. Smith, ibid., p.22.

18. ibid., p.72.

19. qu. from S. Weber, (1991) Return to Freud: Jacques Lacan's Dislocation of Psychoanalysis, Cambridge University Press, p. 7.

20. Lacan, 'The Agency of the Letter in The Unconscious' Ecrits, pp.150-152.

21. Levi-Strauss, borrowing terminology from Freud, suggests that we speak of the "polymorphous" state of the child's mental

structures. When the psychoanalyst describes the child as a "polymorphous pervert" he means that the child presents in a rudimentary and coexisting form all the types of eroticism that the adult will specialize (through a selective process) into normal or pathological eroticism. In his own way, Levi-Strauss is rethinking the Freudian notion of repression and applying it to the mental state fo the child. Just as the child manifests all erotic forms, the adult, through a process of displacement and substitution, narrows the scope of his eroticism through repression into an unconscious of all forms other than genital. In an analogous way, the forms (systems/codes) of the unconscious are formed through displacement and selection of some systems and exclusion of others, so that, for Levi-Strauss, culture becomes the area of permitted relations (law), whereas nature is that of unacceptable relations - permitted or not permitted in the conscious life of the group (Freud's reality principle.) Thus, the child should be called a "polymorphous socialite." p.26. Thomas Shalvey, (No date) Claude Levi-Strauss: Social Psychotherapy & the Collective Unconscious, Harvester Press.

22. This latter position is not only held by Lacan, but developed by Kristeva. It becomes pivotal to her work. See especially in relation to this thesis her application of this idea to the subversion of Husserl's and Searle's views on the unity of a transcendental subject in the speech act. Julia

Kristeva, (1984) Revolution in Poetic Language, trans. Margaret Waller, Columbia University Press: New York.

23. 'Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding' Critique of Pure Reason, pp.120-150: A84-A130.

24. 'The synthesis of the manifold through pure imagination, the unity of all representations in relation to original apperception, precede all empirical knowledge.' NKS, p.150:A 130.

25. 'If each representation were completely foreign to every other, standing apart in isolation, no such thing as knowledge would ever arise.' NKS, p.130:A 97.

26. KPM, p.81.

27. 'For this unity of consciousness would be impossible if the mind in knowledge of the manifold could not become conscious of the identity of function whereby it synthetically combines it in one knowledge. The original and necessary consciousness of the identity of the self is thus at the same time a consciousness of an equally necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances according to concepts, that is, according to rules, which not only make them necessarily reproducible but also in so doing determine an object for their intuition, that is, the concept of something wherein they are

necessarily interconnected. For the mind could never think its identity in the manifoldness of its representations, and indeed think this identity a priori, if it did not have before its eyes the identity of its act, ...' CPR, pp.136-7: A 108.

28. KPM, p.85.

29. This interpretation is present in Charles Guignon's interpretation of the existential projection of Dasein as we find it in Heidegger. He says, 'What is crucial about the description of the ready-to-hand in terms of the ways things have turned out to be is that the as-structure that determines how equipment is to count for us is always determined in advance by a hierarchy of goals and purposes.... The pyramid of proximate and long-term goals implicit in my activity reaches its pinnacle in a conception of myself in terms of some role that makes up my own self-evaluations and self-understanding.' (1983) Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge, Hackett Publishing Co. p.96.

30. 'The ends towards which a ballplayer aims, and that allow him to see and use a bat with its defining function, will include not merely such extrinsic possibilities as earning his salary or winning the game, but also the role of ballplayer itself, which is constituted precisely by a competence over the relevant equipment.' John Richardson, (1986) Existential

Epistemology: A Heideggerean Critique of the Cartesian Project, Clarendon Press: Oxford. p.27.'

31. The meaning of the concept 'horizon' then comes to mean that projected human grid which determines reality. 'At the start , the secret of the horizon was brought to light by considering the horizon as man's expression of himself in the world. Now a more profound level is reached. The horizon relates the totality of the surroundings to man. It is no longer a matter solely of a reflection of man in the world, rather, this world, from its periphery to its center, is expressed in an impulse that goes toward man.' Cornelius A Van Peursen, (1976) 'The Horizon' in F. Elliston et al. ed., Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals, p.195.

32. 'Divine knowledge as knowledge, not as divine, is also intuition. The difference between infinite and finite intuition consists only in this, that the former in its immediate representation of the individual, that is, the singular and unique essent taken as a whole, first brings it into being, that is, effects its coming forth (origo). KPM, pp.29-30.

33. CPR, p.90: B 72.

34. 'Absolute cognition itself reveals the essent in letting it come forth and possesses it "only" as that which arises from this very act, i.e., as e-ject.' KPM, p. 36.

**Chapter Six: The Imaginary Nature of the Ego.**

1. Freud distinguishes between the ideal ego and the ego ideal. He shows that the ego-ideal is the origin of the psychic formation in that the man-child takes the father as his ideal such that he becomes himself according to the way of the father. This means in effect conflating two forms of identification. And these two forms function as the way of culture based upon an unconscious providing significance for it. The need for identity with the mother is forgotten culturally only to form the desire to follow in the way of the father. 'The broad general outcome of the sexual phase governed by the Oedipus complex may, therefore, be taken to be the forming of a precipitate in the ego, consisting of these two identifications [mother and father] in some way combined together. This modification of the ego retains its special position: it stands in contrast to the other constituents of the ego in the form of an ego-ideal or superego.' Freud, The Ego and the Id, p.44.

2. B&T, p.171:H 133.

3. 'The understanding, in turn, is not only involved in the finitude of intuition, it is itself even more finite inasmuch as it lacks the immediacy of finite intuition. Its mode of representation is indirect; it requires a reference to something general by means of which, and according to which, the several particulars become capable of being represented conceptually. This detour (discursiveness), which is essential to the understanding, is the clearest index of its finitude.' KPM, 34.

4. KPM, pp.64-65.

5. Haugeland, op.cit., 37.

6. Searle does bring together the psychological condition with the speech act conditions. 'What is crucially important to see is that for every speech act that has a direction of fit <u>the speech act will be satisfied if and only if the expreseed psychological state is satisfied,</u> and <u>the conditions of satisfaction of speech act and expressed psychological state are identical</u>' <u>Intentionality</u>, pp.10-11.

7. I. Dilman, (1984) <u>Freud and the Mind</u>, ch.5

8. op.cit., p.28

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