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SOCIAL EQUITY AND COLLECTIVE ACTION:

The Social History of the Korean *Paekjong* under
Japanese Colonial Rule

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ABSTRACT

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on

Social Equity and Collective Action :

**The Social History of the Korean *Paekjong* under
Japanese Colonial Rule**

The main aim of this thesis is to reconstruct and analyse the *Hyongpyongsa* [Equity Society] and its activities in Korea under Japanese colonial rule. The work presents a historical and sociological account of the social life of the *paekjong*, the beneficiaries of the Society's activities, and of an assessment of the social dynamics of the period with particular reference to the *Hyongpyong* movement. Part One stresses the historical and social backgrounds of the *paekjong* who were discriminated against and stigmatised throughout the Choson period and even before. Their distinct occupations, mainly relating to slaughtering, butchering and wickerwork, left them segregated from the rest of the society. While their social conditions had improved in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, their stigmatised status continued well into the twentieth century and up to the 1920s. Part One reviews the "constraining" and "enabling" factors in the eventual foundation of the *Hyongpyongsa* in 1923.

Part Two discusses the birth, development, dynamics, and decline of the *Hyongpyong* movement, which was initiated by "professional social movement activities" and wealthy *paekjong*, and then developed with the enthusiastic support of the ordinary *paekjong*. The initial aims of the movement bore on "human rights" and "community solidarity". Local branches of the *Hyongpyongsa* rapidly developed. Despite severe factionalism in the national leadership and hostile opposition in the early years of the movement, the *Hyongpyongsa* soon established itself at the heart of the "social movement sector" of the times and received considerable support from other social movement groups. This development, particularly in association with the support of various radical groups, brought the Society under the close surveillance of the Japanese authorities, whose interventions before and during World War II became a major factor in the decline of radical activists and the consequent re-emergence of a moderate leadership in the movement. In the end, the *Hyongpyongsa* changed its name to *Taedongsa* [Great Equality Society] and tended to represent the interests of its wealthy members who collaborated with the Japanese rather than the interests of its poorer rank and file members.

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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It was from reading Hwang Sunwon's novel, *Ilwol*,¹ when I was still a university student in the early 1970s that I first became aware of the sufferings of the "paekjong"² as a stigmatised group in Korea's history. In the 1970s their story had been largely forgotten. As a sociology student, I was interested in the history of contemporary Korean society, and especially in the study of social movements. The past struggles of the *paekjong* thus made a deep impression on me and my interest was further stimulated when, on moving to Gyeongsang National University in Chinju in 1981, I was told the story of the *Hyongpyongsa* which had been launched there nearly 60 years before, by local residents ~~people~~ who were proud of the role played by the town in the history of the *paekjong*. As a result, I soon found myself delving into the history of the *Hyongpyong* movement.

Since then, I have at various times hesitated to proceed with my inquiries, not because of any lack of sources or of difficulties encountered, but because of the ignominious story itself. Most of the old people I met who had been involved in the *paekjong* community wanted me to conceal their names, and I wondered about the possible influence of my work on them. Most seemed to

¹ Hwang Sunwon, *Ilwol* [Sun and Moon], (Seoul, 1964)

² I apologise for using the stigmatising term which the *Hyongpyong* movement fought to abolish, but there is no alternative.

think that the story of their struggle and that of their ancestors was best left untold. In contrast to the *Burakumin*, a similar Japanese group, the Korean *paekjong* have successfully shed their past and I inevitably asked myself whether it was proper to revive it. But on balance I thought it worth doing as a matter of intellectual interest and in the belief that the *paekjong's* history remains of interest and relevance in the search for an egalitarian society in present day Korea and, indeed, in other societies in the world at large. In any case, the past cannot be hidden forever and telling the story may contribute to preventing injustice in the future. History, whether honourable or shameful, is always relevant to the realisation of justice and fairness.

My attempted reconstruction and analysis of the *Hyongpyongsa* and its activities falls into two parts which are preceded by an introductory chapter outlining my conceptual and theoretical framework and the nature of the materials used.

Part One discusses the historical and social backgrounds of the *Hyongpyong* movement, with Chapter 2 focusing on the status of the *paekjong* in Choson society and on the social and economic transformations of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; and Chapter 3 dealing with the internal and external environments of the *paekjong* community which conduced to the formation of the *Hyongpyongsa*. These two chapters

thus aim to establish the pre-conditions of the *Hyongpyong* movement.

Part Two dwells on the history of the movement as reconstructed from all materials available to me. Chapter 4 deals with the movement's early formative stage from 1923 to the early months of 1924. Chapter 5 dwells on the serious factional dispute which developed within the movement in 1924 and was partially resolved in 1925. Chapter 6 describes the opposition encountered by the movement from ordinary members of society from 1923 to 1925. Chapter 7 then dwells on the development of the movement from 1924 to 1928 and on its relative stagnation from 1928 to 1930. Chapter 8 dwells on the ideological tensions which developed within the movement in the 1930s and on its subsequent decline. The analysis of the movement, which stems from the conceptual and theoretical discussion outlined in Chapter 1, lies in the description itself, but a brief summary is finally presented in Chapter 9.

Throughout my research, I have been supported---intellectually and practically---by many people. Without them, I could not have produced this thesis. Although I cannot acknowledge all of them by name, I would like to express my particular gratitude to a few. For my initial introduction to historical sociology and social movements, I am deeply indebted to Professor Yong-Shin Park of Yonsei University, Seoul, who has continued to give me moral support and intellectual stimulation

throughout the period of my work. Since joining the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology at Hull University in 1984, my research has been supervised by Professor Valdo Pons who is one of the first British sociologists to have established contact with Korean students of sociology. As my supervisor, he has generously guided me throughout the period of my research and of writing this thesis. Without his encouragement and tolerance, this work could not have been realised.


In regard to specific issues bearing on the *Hyongpyongsa*, I received a great deal of help from Dr. Ian Neary of Newcastle University who has himself been a pioneering worker on the *Hyongpyongsa*, as well as on the Japanese *Suiheisha*, in the English-speaking world. In particular, he has supplied me with numerous Japanese materials---even direct from Japan---up to the last moments of my writing, and his translation of Japanese terms for me has been of great assistance. I would also like also to express thanks to the authorities of Gyeongsang National University who gave me leave of absence to enable me to complete this work, and to all the people, especially descendants of *Hyongpyongsa* members, who generously made their knowledge available to me and gave me permission to use it.

Finally, I would like to acknowledge the moral and practical support of my wife, Chong-Ok, who shared the difficulties and strains I encountered throughout the period of my research, and who helped me to transfer

messy handwritten draft chapters into neat products on a word-processor. My son, Wu-Kang, was exceptionally quiet and never disturbed his father's work, and my parents always had me in mind. I express my thanks to them for their moral support.

Despite all the help and support I have received, I am solely responsible for the shortcomings and errors in this work.

Figure 1. Map of Provinces and Major Towns of Special Relevance to the *Hyangpyang* Movement



INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER ONE

AIMS, THEORY, METHODS, AND SOURCES

I. STARTING POINTS

In April 1923, the *Hyongpyongsa* [Equity Society] was launched in Chinju, in central southern Korea. The general aim of the association was to liberate the *paekjong* from their traditional status as a despised stratum of society. The *Hyongpyongsa* was the organisation of the *Hyongpyong* movement until 1935 when it was transformed into the *Taedongsa* [Great Equality Society], a successor organisation with more specific and more limited aims. The *Taedongsa* functioned from 1935 till its virtual collapse under the conditions of Japan's participation in World War II.

This thesis sets out to reconstruct and analyse the birth, growth and activities of both associations from a sociological perspective. In this sense the work may be construed as a study in historical sociology. However, as an exercise in this field, it was inevitably constrained by the poor state of hitherto existing knowledge on the *Hyongpyong* movement and its two associations. As far as I am aware, there is no authoritative academic history of the events which the thesis sets out to analyse. The first goal of the study is therefore to provide such a history based partly on some 2000 newspaper reports stretching over the

whole period, partly on such documentary evidence as has survived from the Japanese colonial period, and partly on other supplementary information gained from a few slight accounts on the *paekjong* and from field interviews conducted for this study with a small number of elderly *paekjong* or descendants of *paekjong* who were involved in the movement. What this in effect means is that the first aim of the study is to provide a social history of the movement and its associations written to enable an initial historical/sociological interpretation to be attempted. In this sense, the study is in my own view far more basic and exploratory than are many studies in historical sociology based on social histories that have previously been constructed by others.

A second point to be made at the outset is that in the 1920s there was in Korea a veritable burgeoning of associations and social movement groups with diverse aims and purposes. The birth, the development and the activities of the *Hyongpyongsa* were thus much affected by their wider social and political contexts in what I have throughout this thesis referred to as the "social movement sector" and the "social movement era". The *Hyongpyongsa* was, however, scarcely "typical" of other social movement groups, especially in its early days. It was, in two principal respects, "unique". Firstly, in contrast to other groups, the beneficiaries of its activities were specifically defined as a community or stratum which was not comparable to any other in Korean society. The *paekjong* have sometimes been referred to as "Korea's untouchables", a despised and

stigmatised group who were treated as inferior for thousands of years during the Choson Dynasty (1392-1910) and earlier. Secondly, the *Hyongpyongsa* lasted longer under Japanese colonial rule (1910-1945) than any other association, even if the period of the *Taedongsa*, its successor group, is excluded from this count. Both these distinctions are of considerable importance in attempting to evaluate the significance of the *Hyongpyong* movement in the period of history during which the Confucian-based Choson Dynasty was relinquishing some of its past. It can therefore be claimed that the study of the *Hyongpyongsa* and its activities could and should make a significant contribution to the analysis of the wider social and political dynamics of the times.

Since there is no comprehensive authoritative account of the *Hyongpyong* movement, this study had perforce to address itself to several basic questions. To begin with, how and why did the *paekjong* and their leaders perceive or feel a need to establish an association with the goal of liberating and emancipating themselves? The answer to this question is clearly related to the exceedingly long history of their unequal treatment, of the prejudice and discrimination against them, and of the institutionalised stigmatisation from which they suffered. A brief historical sketch of the *paekjong* community is therefore necessary before attempting to record and analyse the activities of the *Hyongpyongsa*.

The *paekjong* background was inextricably intertwined with the rigid hierarchical structure of Choson society as

a whole, which consisted of a series of distinctive social status groups. This hierarchical structure had begun to "break down" long before the birth of the *Hyongpyong* movement. Thus over the previous two centuries, slaves had been emancipated; peasants, who constituted the vast majority of the population, had conducted large-scale nationwide rebellions against the ruling class; and various liberal reformers had from time to time organised action groups to mobilise people and to demand the reform of their society and its government.¹

These developments over the preceding century or two have been generally perceived and interpreted as "new" trends of social reform in a prolonged struggle for, or towards, equality in society. The *Hyongpyong* movement clearly has to be seen in the context of this broad and protracted trend. As the *Hyongpyongsa's* title implies, the primary goal of the association was to realise the equality of people, specifically the *paekjong*. Though it had many distinctive aspects, it can in a wider sense be regarded as a representative example of collective attempts in Korea's recent historical past to realise an egalitarian society. The point to stress is that the emancipatory struggle of the *paekjong* took place in the context, and as a part, of complex processes of transition towards equality. It is therefore essential to explore the history of the *paekjong* and the ultimate birth of the *Hyongpyongsa* with a

¹ Further details of the history of the period can be found in Lee Ki-baik, *A New History of Korea*, translated by Edward W. Wagner and Edward J. Shultz, (Seoul, Ilchokak, 1984) and Kang Man'gil, *Han'guk Kundaesa* [The Modern History of Korea], (Seoul, Ch'angjak-gwa Pip'yŏngsa, 1984).

background appreciation of a society in the throes of far-reaching transition.

But, historically, the *Hyongpyongsa* was only established in the early 1920s, whereas the social constraints on other despised and stigmatised status groups---slaves in particular---had largely disappeared in the nineteenth century without comparably organised collective actions. Thus the second initial question to be asked is: why did the *Hyongpyongsa* movement and its organisational manifestations not develop earlier in the course of the *paekjong*'s history of treatment as inferiors, nor even in the late nineteenth century as in the case of some other groups? Any attempt to answer this naturally calls for a close review of the historical and social conditions surrounding the ultimate launch of the *Hyongpyongsa* in the 1920s. In particular, compared with earlier periods, what was the social and economic situation of the *paekjong* in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries?

While it is not possible to answer such questions briefly, we can at this point simply say that, during this late period of the Choson Dynasty, there were continuing collective demands for reform at the same time as Japan's ambition to occupy Korea was becoming more intense. And the changing internal and external situations made a deep impact on the *paekjong* community, including their traditional industries. It was a combination of changing social, political and economic factors which eventually enabled the *paekjong* to establish their own association and

for this to maintain a certain fluctuating momentum as a social movement until World War II. Any study of the emergence of the *Hyongpyongsa* thus requires a proper understanding of the overall historical and social backgrounds of the *paekjong*.

Basic questions which naturally arise following the initial establishment of the *Hyongpyongsa* include the following: what were the social conditions conducive to the movement? In what form were the movement's aims and purposes first stated? How were these defined and re-defined over time? Who organised and led the movement? How did the association maintain its action as a social movement? Which other social movement groups supported it? What kind of action programmes did it develop? What reception did the *Hyongpyongsa* and other groups receive from the public and from the colonial authorities? In particular, how did "ordinary people" (non-*paekjong*) respond to the *Hyongpyongsa*'s activities? What factors affected its growth, its subsequent decline and its change in nature and in title to the *Taedongsa*? And so on.

These and numerous other closely related questions obviously demand that the history of the association and the movement be traced in the overall social context of the period. In other words, we need a comprehensive record of the association as the longest lasting social movement group in this period of marked transition in Korean society, as well as of the place of the group in the entire social movement sector and of the diverse relations which it had with other groups and movements. Providing such an

account is the first aim of this study. In the course of pursuing it we can then begin to follow the second aim, which is to analyse the *Hyongpyong* movement from a historical/sociological perspective.

The *Hyongpyongsa* and its activities were closely associated with and affected by the social and political processes of Korean society under Japanese colonial rule. Numerous diverse associations sprang to life, especially after the massive "March 1 movement" of 1919,² when there was a quite unprecedented efflorescence of peasant and labour groups, youth groups, children's and women's associations, all establishing and developing programmes of social action. In addition, radical ideologies were introduced to the society from neighboring countries through diverse channels.³ Thus a mixture of radical ideology and collective action came to bear on a wide range of demands for social reform.

The general tendencies of social ferment were partly an emancipatory reaction to the rigidities of centuries of life in the hierarchical Confucian-based Choson society, but partly also a response to subordination of the harshest kind under Japanese colonialism. There were in the collective actions of the period differing ideologies affected in varying degrees by both nationalism and

² For further discussion about the March 1 movement, see Chapter 3.

³ cf. Kim Chunyŏp and Kim Ch'angsun, *Han'guk Kongsan Chu'i Undongsa* [The History of the Korean Communist Movement], Vol.1 (Seoul, Korea University Press, 1973); R.A. Scalapino and Chong-sik Lee, *Communism in Korea* (Los Angeles and London, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1972)

socialism. In certain respects, however, the struggle for emancipation may be seen as having had pragmatic rather than ideological motivations, as was to a considerable extent the case with the *Hyongpyong* movement in some of its stages and manifestations. Whatever the mix in relation to particular developments, the 1920s and the 1930s in Korea may ^{be} characterised as "the era of social movements" under Japanese rule. The social and political processes of this era were extremely complex,⁴ and the *Hyongpyongsa* was inevitably involved in, and constantly affected by, the activities of other associations, groups and movements.

As a result, any descriptive analysis of the *Hyongpyongsa* and its activities requires not only an appreciation of change and breakdown in the traditional status structures of Choson society, but also of the social and political dynamics of change under the Japanese. The subject of the analysis attempted in this thesis consists of "historical facts". We know, of course, that "facts"--- historical and social--- are in themselves seldom neutral or unproblematic. But in the case of the historical facts on the *Hyongpyongsa* and the social movement sector in Korea in the 1920s and 1930s, there are additional problems stemming from the turbulent history of the country during and since that period. It is only in the past couple of decades that serious academic research on the period has been instituted. And this is why the facts of interest to

⁴ cf. An Pyŏngjik and Pak Sŏngsu (eds.), *Han'guk Kundae Minjok Undongsa* [The History of Contemporary Nationalist Movements in Korea], (Seoul, Tolbyegae, 1980); and Yun Pyŏngsŏk, Sin Yongha, and An Pyŏngjik (eds.), *Han'guk Kundaesaron* [Collected Essays on Korean History], Vol.3, (Seoul, Chisik Sanopsa, 1977).

us in the present study have scarcely been systematically gathered and collected, let alone presented in a coherent way. The few brief and rather superficial writings on the *Hyongpyongsa* to date give us little more than selective and unsystematic references.⁵ In brief, there has as yet been no serious academic attempt to write the history of the *Hyongpyongsa* and its activities, either in Korea or abroad. The present study is to the best of my knowledge the first attempt to do so.

The collective actions of the *Hyongpyongsa* and its members can be seen as constituting a social movement aiming at the emancipation of the *paekjong* and thus at far-reaching social reform. The *Hyongpyongsa* members did not confine themselves to protecting their economic interests and such privileges over their traditional occupations and industries as they had enjoyed even as a stigmatised and inferior stratum in Choson society. They also aimed to bring about fundamental change in the social conventions governing their lowly place in society.

In my attempt to go beyond the systematic collecting of available materials on the *Hyongpyongsa*, I have therefore adopted analytical concepts and tools from the sociological literature on social movements. So, despite the modest exploratory aims of this thesis, it is closely related to two major disciplines, sociology and history. Dealing with historical materials is commonly seen as the task of historians, while the analysis of social movements

⁵ For an evaluation of previous writings, see Section III of this chapter.

has largely been conducted by social scientists, and especially by sociologists. However, this conventional division of labour in the researches conducted and in their final products cannot be split and compartmentalised without damaging their purpose and intent. Whatever its sources, and whatever its methods and concepts, this thesis is principally an attempt to reconstruct the reality of the *Hyongpyong* movement and this inevitably involves both history and sociology. More emphatically, it has to be seen as historical sociology and as an attempt to break down the barriers between the two disciplines from which it draws its inspirations and insights.

Before moving on to discuss substantive materials on the *Hyongpyongsa*, it is therefore relevant and helpful to refer to general views expressed by both historians and sociologists on the relations between their two disciplines and to the broad conceptual and theoretical framework within which the study is cast.

II. SOCIOLOGY, HISTORY, AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

1. HISTORICAL FACTS AND SOCIOLOGICAL CONCERNS

Despite its different scholastic background from historical studies, sociology as a discipline has a strong tradition of close interest in the processes of history. As is well known, the great founding fathers of sociology such as Karl Marx, Max Weber, and Emile Durkheim, all

contributed to the analysis of historical phenomena in their respective works. In a broad sense, sociology was born out of the industrial revolution and as such was directly concerned with the processes of capitalism and industrialisation in the western world.⁶ The objects of early sociological analysis were historical phenomena, but the theoretical frameworks developed to deal with them distinctively sociological rather than historical. Thus a dual interest in sociology and history was a common feature of all such work. And, although some sociological specialists later abandoned historical perspectives, history has remained central to the main stream of sociology.⁷ It is true, as C. Wright Mills pointed out, that both "grand theory" and "abstracted empiricism" in American sociology of the twentieth century were regrettable departures from the mainstream tradition; they were in fact "anti-historical".⁸ But even during the period of their dominance there were in the United States some important branches of sociology which continued to see a close relationship between the two disciplines; the works by Neil Smelser⁹ and Robert Bellah¹⁰ are prominent examples

⁶ Philip Abrams, *Historical Sociology* (Shepton Mallet, Somerset, Open Books, 1982); Anthony Giddens, *Capitalism and Modern Social Theory* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1971).

⁷ For a brief account of the relation between the two disciplines, see Peter Burke, *Sociology and History* (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1980); for the general history of sociology, see, *inter alia*, S. N. Eisenstadt and M. Curelaru, *The Form of Sociology: Paradigms and Biases* (New York, Wiley, 1976).

⁸ C. Wright Mills, *Sociological Imagination*, (New York, Oxford University Press, 1959).

⁹ Neil J. Smelser, *Social Change and the Industrial Revolution* (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1959).

¹⁰ Robert N. Bellah, *Tokugawa Religion: The Values of Pre-Industrial Japan* (New York, Free Press, 1957).

from the 1950s. In Europe, the historical tradition remained dominant throughout, and in the United States there has in the 1970s and the 1980s been a significant return to historical perspectives.¹¹ In Korea, sociology began to develop in the early decades of the twentieth century but remained relatively undeveloped until the early 1970s and was little concerned with historical matters until the 1980s.

In regard to history itself, there have been a variety of conceptions as to what its proper task and methods should be. But the view that it consists simply of collecting and recording past facts has long been outmoded. In modern scholarship it is generally recognised that historical facts call for interpretation by research workers according to their respective insights and intellectual traditions. In other words, facts do not necessarily "speak for themselves". On the contrary, their interpretation depends very closely on the interests and over-arching conceptual frameworks of the research worker.¹² As E. H. Carr argues, the researcher therefore needs to have well-formulated views of the present to look at the past.¹³ Accordingly, the work of explaining the past can only be carried out by those whose academic backgrounds are not confined to training in historical studies, but are also rooted in other disciplines, including sociology. In

¹¹ cf. Theda Skocpol(ed.), *Vision and Method in Historical Sociology* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984).

¹² Michael Oakeshott, "Present, Future, and Past," *On History and Other Essays* (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1983), pp.1-44.

¹³ E. H. Carr, *What is History?* (London, Macmillan, 1961).

this sense, it is improper to regard history as a discipline dealing with facts from the past and sociology as supplying abstract frameworks for analysing these facts. Even though the main concerns of each may be seen in terms of "the past" and "the present" respectively, their contributions to the understanding of society cannot be identified and appreciated in such a simple and categorical dualism. The relations between the two disciplines are far more subtle and complex, and it is essential to see the two as sharing a common ultimate goal.¹⁴ Neither their boundaries nor their methods are independent of each other's. Our research capacities are therefore likely to be much enhanced if we abandon simplistic definitions of their respective concerns. And this is particularly true in relation to the development of "social history".

As Peter Burke explains, such views have been increasingly accepted and elaborated by both historians and sociologists.¹⁵ The best sociological research into the past has contributed very significantly to interpretations of "history", while the best historians are now continually referred to and used by sociologists who are ever more fully aware of the significance of historical understanding.¹⁶ Philip Abrams even urges that "sociological explanation is necessarily historical", and that "historical sociology is the essence of the discipline".¹⁷

¹⁴ *ibid*, pp.59-60.

¹⁵ Peter Burke, *op. cit.*, especially Ch.1.

¹⁶ *ibid*.

¹⁷ P. Abrams, *op. cit.*, p.2.

The crux of the matter is that all social action is experienced by actors in "space" and within "time", and that the central concerns of sociology are to analyse the structure of action within these two broad concepts. Only then can the interplay of action and structure be properly understood as a process or a set of interrelated processes over time. Such a processual perspective involves both individual actors and society as a whole. Thus, the ongoing processes of society have not only drawn the attention of sociologists; they have become a major and central focus for them.

In his social theory deriving from classical sociology, for example, Anthony Giddens stresses structure and action as the two major aspects of the social life which have to be analysed in relation to each other, and he defines social theory as the theory of structuration.¹⁸ In similar vein, Philip Abrams argues that sociology is essentially concerned with process rather than with either structure or action; sociology is the study of social process.¹⁹ It is this emphasis on social process which has led to the rise of interest in historical sociology.²⁰ We may also note that such arguments are not only relevant in studying the past; they apply equally to sociological work dealing with contemporary phenomena, which invariably have

¹⁸ Anthony Giddens, *Central Problems in Social Theory* (London, MacMillan, 1979); *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration* (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1984).

¹⁹ P. Abrams, op. cit.

²⁰ Theda Skocpol, "Sociology's Historical Imagination," in T. Skocpol (ed.), op. cit., p.1.

historical backgrounds that need to be appreciated before we can understand them.

The development of the above historical/sociological perspectives is of quite particular relevance to the study of social movements. And, the analysis of social movements is in its turn of particular importance for the understanding of the historical dynamics of any society. The wider concerns of all sociology involve the analysis of social change, and social movements are but one prominent manifestation of change.²¹ Yet, despite their undoubted significance, social movements have thus far attracted relatively little research and certainly do not constitute a major field or specialism in sociology.

The present study of the *Hyongpyong* movement in Korea in the 1920s and 1930s is an attempt to explore and analyse one particular set of "historical facts" as a contribution to the development of historical sociology in general. More particularly, however, it is intended as a contribution to the understanding of dynamic aspects of Korean society---a society which has up to the present received comparatively little attention and is poorly understood. The broad assumption underlying this study is that any attempt to understand the *Hyongpyong* movement should contribute not only to our understanding of the period of history in which the movement occurred, but also to the nature of Korean society before and after the particular events on which the analysis focuses.

²¹ Alain Touraine, *The Self-Production of Society*, translated by Derek Coltman, (Chicago and London, The University of Chicago Press, 1977).

2. THE SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

As already indicated, the establishment of the *Hyongpyongsa* and the development of the activities in which the organisation and its members engaged can be seen as a social movement. The definitions and conceptions of "social movements" are, however, quite varied. Different scholars have defined social movements with differing emphases depending on, or stemming from, different theoretical perspectives. Toch, for example, emphasises psychological aspects in his definition: "A social movement represents an effort by a large number of people to solve collectively a problem that *they feel* they have in common."²² But, to take a contrasting example, Herberle considers that the aim of a social movement is principally "to bring about *fundamental change in social order*, especially in the basic institutions of property and labour relationships".²³ On the other hand, the main emphases in the work of Turner and Killian are on the commitment of members and the form of the organisation; they thus define a social movement as "a collective action with some continuity to promote or resist a change in the society or organisation of which it is a part."²⁴ This definition has something in common with Jenkins' which stresses organisational variations, ranging

²² Hans Toch, *The Social Psychology of Social Movements* (Indianapolis, Babbs-Merrill, 1965), p.5.

²³ Rudolf Heberle, *Social Movements: An Introduction to Political Sociology* (New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1951), p.6.

²⁴ Ralph H. Turner and Lewis M. Killian, *Collective Behavior* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1957, 1972), p.246.

from the largely informal and highly fluid to the formally structured.²⁵

Taking into account a wide variety of views on social movements, Wilkinson develops the following useful working conception;

A social movement is a deliberate *collective endeavour* to promote change in any direction and by any means, not excluding violence, illegality, revolution or withdrawal into "utopian" community.....A social movement must evince a minimal degree of *organisation*, though this may range from a loose, informal or partial level of organisation to the highly institutionalised and bureaucratised movement and the corporate group.....A social movement's commitment to change and the *raison d'être* of its organisation are founded upon the conscious volition, normative commitment to the movement's *aims or beliefs*, and active participation on the part of the followers or members. (italics added).²⁶

In elaborating a social psychological conception of social movements, Zurcher and Snow largely reiterate Wilkinson's definition, but in a briefer form: "social movements are *organised collective manifestations* of issues for which people have considerable concern."²⁷

These several definitions have three major points in common: they all direct our attention to (a) collective

²⁵ J.C. Jenkins, "Sociopolitical Movements," *Handbook of Political Behavior*, Vol.4, (New York and London, Plenum Press, 1981), p.83.

²⁶ Paul Wilkinson, *Social Movement* (London, Pall Mall Press, 1971), p.27.

²⁷ Louis A. Zurcher, Jr. and David A. Snow, "Collective Behavior: Social Movements," in Morris Rosenberg and Ralph H. Turner (eds.), *Social Psychology: Sociological Perspective* (New York, Basic, 1981), p.447.

actions (including the actors), (b) organisation and (c) continuity of aims.

The *Hyongpyongsa* and its members and activities clearly constituted a social movement in this general sense. The movement had the primary general aim of abolishing all discriminatory social conventions against the paekjong; it had a national organisation and numerous local branches run by its members; and it engaged in a variety of programmes of collective action.

The social conditions of the times in which social movements emerge and develop are obviously associated with the historical experience of any movement and can be interpreted as "constraining and enabling" its formation. The concept of social constraint, as initially developed by Emile Durkheim,²⁸ can be used to define certain aspects of the social conditions conducing social movements. When some members of a society perceive certain aspects of their social reality as being unfair and unjust, they are socially constrained, and in experiencing such constraints find it necessary to seek to change the existing social order and therefore to mobilise collective action to bring about change.²⁹ The social constraints which they experience do not consist only of the external pressures of social conventions, but also of internalised norms and thus of the emotional feelings of the members themselves. Theorists of collective behaviour have referred to

²⁸ Emile Durkheim, *The Rules of Sociological Method* (1895: Glencoe, Free Press, 1964).

²⁹ Barrington Moore, Jr., *Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt* (New York, M.E. Sharpe, 1978).

constraints in various terms such as structural conduciveness or strains,³⁰ grievances,³¹ social deprivation³² and status inconsistency.³³ Thus these social constraints appear or manifest themselves in both social and psychological forms.

While the concept of "social constraint" may be used to cover the factors that operate to suppress the members of society who are the potential participants and actors in collective action, "social enabling" refers to the social conditions which allow them to mobilise for such action. In order to launch and maintain social movements, the activists need to find and develop the social capacity to allow their intentions to be translated into concrete activities. In referring to this issue, recent writings on collective action stress the significance of resources available for action.³⁴ These resources are closely associated with the people who find themselves able to join movements and with the economic facilities which are available to the movements. In addition to resources, there

³⁰ Neil J. Smelser, *Theory of Collective Behaviour* (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962).

³¹ For a classical work on the psychological aspects of collective action, see Gustave Le Bon, *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind* (1896: London, Ernest Benn, 1960).

³² Ted R. Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1970).

³³ J. A. Geschwender, "Continuities in Theories of Status Consistency and Cognitive Dissonance," *Social Forces*, Vol.47 (1968-9), pp.127-135.

³⁴ A general review of resource mobilisation theory can be found in J. Craig Jenkins, "Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements," *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol.9 (1983), pp.527-553; and John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol.82 (1977), pp.1212-1241.

are various conditions which may enable or prevent mobilisation. For example, pre-existing communication networks linking potential participants constitute one factor enhancing or retarding the advent and progress of social movements, while the presence in at least part of the society of a social basis on which the movement can be established at the normative level is likely to be another major factor.³⁵

Such pre-existing social conditions are naturally interwoven with the historical and social backgrounds of the movement. In the case of the *Hyongpyong* movement in Korea, the questions raised above as starting points are closely related to these conditions. While the social constraints of prejudice and discrimination were integral aspects of the historical and social experience of the *paekjong*, incipient changes in their status situation prior to the launch of the *Hyongpyongsa* were undoubtedly important in enabling them to mobilise a social movement. But this raises yet another important question: how do factors of this kind combine with the conducing element of a "new idea"? For it is difficult to see how concrete action plans can come into being without a new idea developing to provoke those concerned into realising the nature of the situation in which they find themselves. In a broad sense, a new idea commonly appears to crystallise in or through the constraints and this then provides the opportunity for members---both leaders and followers---to

³⁵ cf. Jo Freeman, "The Origins of the Women's Liberation Movement," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol.78 (1973), pp.792-811; and Louis A. Zurcher and David A. Snow, op. cit., pp.404-456.

share interests and to perceive new opportunities and visions. In previous writings, the "new idea" has been referred to in terms of concepts such as "generalised belief"³⁶ and ideology.³⁷

"Constraints", "enabling conditions" and a "new idea" are, then, three aspects of the overall process or processes through which a social movement comes into being. But while they are to a greater or lesser extent conducive to a movement, the events which are seen as the "crisis" precipitating or triggering any movement usually take place in a particular place at a particular moment.³⁸ Sometimes, however, there may be no such observable events in a movement's formation and the crisis involved in the incipient stages may well be exaggerated by observers and writers of the period for effect or in an attempt to explain what may otherwise seem inexplicable.

Another notion which may be useful is that which I have come to think of as the "detonating group"---a group consisting of people with pre-existing contacts with one another and with an earlier realisation of the possibility, or what they may have seen as the need for change in the situation. When such a group perceives a suitable juncture for the launching of a new organisation with a programme of concrete activities, it may well play a determining role in

³⁶ cf. N. Smelser, op. cit., Ch.5.

³⁷ cf. A. Zurcher and D. A. Snow, op. cit., pp.456-457.

³⁸ N. Smelser, "Theoretical Issues of Scope and Problems of Collective Behavior and Conflict," *Sociological Quarterly*, Vol.5 (April 1964), pp.116-122; J. Freeman, op. cit.

bringing about events which then develop their own dynamics and momentum.

As the movement becomes established, so does the complex and dynamic interplay of various factors. These will, of course, involve the participants, the organisation and its aims and purposes, and the external environment. Writing the "history" of a movement clearly demands an analysis of wider trends in the society within which the movement has arisen. And a successful analysis of the movement's history may well in turn clarify our understanding of the wider society.

Now, constructing the history of a movement naturally demands the systematic collection of several sets of "facts". First of all, close attention has to be paid to the participants who constitute a basic element in the maintenance of the organisation of the movement and its programmes. An analysis of the participants in terms of their origins and characteristics will in itself tell us a great deal about the movement, partly because they are the agents of the historical process and partly because they are at the heart of the activities. The participants can usefully be divided into two broad categories, the leaders and the followers. The boundaries between the two may often be blurred and fluid, and there may well be constant fluctuations between the two categories when viewed as groups of actors, as well as in different sub-groupings that may develop within each. Nonetheless, the distinction between leaders and followers emerges in the study of all social movements, and similarities and differences between

them merit close attention. The leadership group obviously plays a general role in determining the nature of the movement as a whole, the articulation of the direction it takes, and its representation to the outside world.³⁹ It also plays a key part in more specific matters such as defining shorter-term goals and strategies and in setting up concrete programmes of action. Hence the characteristics of the movement as a whole are always closely related to its leaders.⁴⁰ Accordingly, fluctuations in the leadership may naturally be expected to correlate with periodical re-adjustments in general directions and in on-going processes of redefining goals, and with any changes in the whole nature of the movement. Thus an initial analysis of who the leaders are, where they come from, and the like, is obviously important whatever conceptual framework is being used for the study.

The same is true of the second broad category of participants, the followers. Again, we need to know their origins and characteristics, their patterns of recruitment and their stability of membership. Their support is usually affected by the rise and fall of the movement activities. When there is a voluntary membership, the rank and file can often exercise much control over the movement by their enthusiasm or, alternatively, by withdrawing their support. Not surprisingly, then, the general direction of the movement may be closely related to the way in which members

³⁹ J. R. Gusfield, "Functional Areas of Leadership in Social Movements," *Sociological Quarterly*, Vol.7 (1966), pp.137-156; Mayer N. Zald and Roberts Ash, "Social Movement Organisations: Growth, Decay and Change," *Social Forces*, Vol.44 (1966), pp.327-341.

⁴⁰ J. R. Gusfield, op. cit., 1966.

are recruited and persuaded to participate. Depending on the internal and external environments of the movement, on its goals and strategies, and on responses from the outside, there may be different patterns of recruitment. Zald and Ash distinguish in the first place between "inclusive" recruitment, when all members of the society are liable or eligible for membership, and "exclusive" recruitment, when the membership is rigorously screened.⁴¹ This difference arises from the very nature of the movement and its social and political contexts.

The second set of facts required concerns the organisational structures established to allow the movement to pursue its activities over time. A movement's organisation operates to mobilise individual members into collective actions linked to specific goals and to various strategies of action, and also to develop structural incentives for the participation of members.⁴² The form of the organisation will depend on a number of factors, the overall setting and circumstances of the movement, such as the structures of power in the society, and the type of communication networks through which its members or potential members can be reached. Thus the organisational forms likely to prove effective and suitable will be affected by, and will reflect, the dynamics of the movement and social processes in the wider society.

The third essential set of facts concerns the stated aims and purposes of the movement which provide the basis

⁴¹ M. N. Zald and R. Ash, op. cit., pp.330-331.

⁴² *ibid.*



for the involvement of members in collective action and which affect, and are also affected by, the formal organisational elements of the movement. Aims and purposes are in the initial stages of a movement's formation usually influenced by the new idea underlying the movement. At the same time, they provide the movement with a "platform" or basis on which to formulate practical programmes which give expression to the idea and general direction being sought and pursued. As a result, the nature of the practical programmes is commonly seen as a barometer of how acceptable the movement is to the public in the context of the dominant social and political conditions of the society. If unacceptable in relation to the norms and convention of the society, the activities of the movement will inevitably face strong opposition from those who are not sympathetic to the new idea. Thus the activities have to be formulated and defined in relation to their intended and anticipated responses from the outside.

In general, the outside environment, and the responses likely to be evoked from it, can usually be seen in terms of two broad stances, favourable and hostile. There will be the favourable stances of supporters and sympathisers from cognate groups who will give practical or moral encouragement to the movement, while hostile responses will naturally come from those who are categorically opposed to or who feel threatened by the movement. But in between the extremes of favourable and hostile, there are likely to be responses of relative indifference and apathy or the responses may be muted and scarcely discernible. And here

there may well be a significant difference between democratic and non-democratic societies. In democratic societies, official government policy to a new movement may well be one of inaction based on a philosophy of toleration even if the general direction of the movement is not in keeping with official thinking. In non-democratic societies, on the other hand, a movement which embraces ideas that are at odds with the official thinking is more likely to encounter immediate opposition.⁴³ Whatever the case, and even when there is severe suppression, the responses from the wider society--from the general public and/or the government---are likely to have a considerable impact on the process of a movement.

The paradigms outlined above naturally allow for the fact that various aspects of social movements may be expected to take diverse forms. Furthermore, different aspects will be intermingled with one another in the process of any movement as we see it at the time or retrospectively. The point to stress is simply that the research into the *Hyongpyong* movement reported in the present thesis has been conducted in the full expectation that an appreciation of its social dynamics could only be reached by ignoring the conventional boundaries between history and sociology.

⁴³ Up to the present most social movement theories have emerged in democratic societies. The extension of research to non-democratic societies could be important to the development of the theories. cf. J. Craig Jenkins, op. cit., (1983), p.549.

III. AN ASSESSMENT OF PREVIOUS WRITINGS

As in all cases of research conducted in "virgin territory", the present study had to begin by gathering substantive materials. Although there is a good deal of work on other social movements of the period, especially the communist and nationalist movements, the *Hyongpyong* movement has hitherto received little attention from Korean scholars. In 1958, Kim Yonggi produced a brief account of its foundation,⁴⁴ and Kim Ŭihwan referred to the movement's history in several writings which tend to repeat each other and are largely based on records of Japanese colonial administration.⁴⁵ In the 1970s, there were a few attempts to discuss it in relation to other movements; Kim Chunyŏp and Kim Ch'angsun referred to it in their history of communist movements in Korea,⁴⁶ and Chin Tokgyu touched on it in his assessment of the liberal tradition.⁴⁷ More recently, there has been a spate of brief articles on

⁴⁴ Kim Yonggi, "Hyongpyongsa-ŭi Paljŏn" [The Development of the Hyongpyong Movement], *Kyŏngsang Namdo Chi* [Reports on South Kyongsang Province], Vol.1 (Pusan, 1958), pp.810-824.

⁴⁵ Kim Ŭihwan, "Ilje Ch'iha-ŭi Hyongpyong Undong Ko" [A Study on the Hyongpyong Movement under Japanese Rule], *Hyangt'o Seoul* [Journal of Seoul City], No.31 (1967), pp.51-90; "Iljeha-ŭi Hyongpyong Undong" [The Hyongpyong Movement under Japanese Rule], *Han'guk Sasang* [Korean Thought], Vol.9 (1968), pp.77-108.

⁴⁶ Kim Chunyŏp and Kim Ch'angsun, op. cit., Vol.2 Ch.7 Sec.5, "Hyongpyong Undong" pp.160-173 and Vol.3 Ch.11, Sec.7, "Hyongpyong Undong-ŭi Soet'oe" [The Decline of the Hyongpyong Movement], pp.160-168.

⁴⁷ Chin Tokgyu, "Hyongpyong Undong-ŭi Chayujuŭi-jŏk Kaehyŏk Sasang-e Tahan Insik" [Research on the Liberal Reformation of the Hyongpyong Movement], *Han'guk Chongch'i Hakhoebo* [Journal of Korean Political Science], Vol.10 (December 1976), pp.169-181.

specific limited aspects of the movement; Ko Sukhwa⁴⁸ and Kang Chŏngt'ae⁴⁹ focused on its early stage and on the factional dispute of 1924/1925 respectively, while Yi Myonggil discussed its activities in Chinju.⁵⁰ In addition, there is one rather biased and inaccurate account by Kim Yongdae, a descendant of an ex-member of the *Hyongpyongsa*.⁵¹ But all these writings are fragmentary and they do not between them add up to anything like a comprehensive history of the movement.

Compared with these Korean writings, a few Japanese scholars have, since the early 1970s, done a good deal more. Ikegawa Eisho, whose writings on the movement began to appear in the 1970s, made a substantial contribution for Japanese scholars by translating newspaper articles from their original Korean,⁵² and he then produced two brief

⁴⁸ Ko Sukhwa, "Hyongpyongsa-e Taehan Il Yŏn'gu" [A Study on the Hyongpyongsa], *Sahak Yon'gu* [Studies in History], No.38 (December 1984), pp.645-690, based on her MA dissertation of Ehwa Womans University in 1983.

⁴⁹ Kang Chŏngt'ae, "Iljeha-ŭi Hyongpyongsa Undong: 1923-1935: Kupjinp'a-wa On'gŏnp'a-ŭi Taerip-ŭl Chungsim-ŭro" [The Hyongpyongsa Movement under Japanese Rule: 1923-1935: on the Confrontation Between the Radical and Moderate Factions" (MA Diss. of Korea University, 1981).

⁵⁰ Yi Myonggil, "Sinbunje Haech'e-wa Hyongpyongsa Undong" [The Breakdown of Status Structure and the Hyongpyong Movement], Nos.1-3, *Chinju Sangui* [Journal of Chinju Commercial Board], (April 1986), pp.6-18; (July 1986), pp.6-26; (October 1986), pp.20-33.

⁵¹ Kim Yŏngdae, *Sillok Hyongpyong* [The Authentic Record on the Hyongpyong Movement], (Seoul, Songsan Publisher, 1978).

⁵² For instance, he translated all reports about the *Hyongpyongsa* from *Tonga Ilbo* from 1923 to 1928 into Japanese and wrote "the Chronicle of the *Hyongpyong* movement" in Japanese. Ikegawa Eisho, "Tonga Ilbo: 1923-1928 ni Miraveru Chosen Kohei Undo [Articles on the Equity Movement which Appeared in Tonga Ilbo, 1923-1928], Pts I-III, *Chosen Gakuho* [The Journal of Korean Studies], Nos. 60 (July 1971), 62 (January 1972), and 64 (July 1972): "Chosen Hyongpyong Undoshi Nenpyo" [Chronicle of Korean Hyongpyong Movement],

articles, focusing on the first and second halves of the period respectively.⁵³ In the 1980s, Kim Chŏngmi wrote on the social and economic situations of the *paekjong* in the late 19th and early 20th centuries,⁵⁴ Akisada Yoshikazu wrote on the relation between the *Hyongpyongsa* and the Japanese *Suiheisha*,⁵⁵ and Iguchi Kazuki's on the early stage of the *Hyongpyong* movement.⁵⁶

The above studies are of some interest mainly in the way in which they reflect continuing Japanese interest in the problems of stigmatised status groups. While the *paekjong* in Korea no longer experience public discrimination, the *Burakumin* of Japan, a similar group to

Buraku Kaiho Kenkyu [Studies of Buraku Liberation], No.3 (September 1974).

53 Ikegawa Eisho, "Chosen Hyongpyongsa Undo ni Tsuite" [About the Korean Hyongpyong Movement], *Chosen Gakuho*, Vol.83 (April 1977), pp.141-162; "Chosen Kohei Undo no Shiteki Tenkai: Koki Undo o Tsujute" [The Historical Development of the Korean Hyongpyong Movement: on the Latter Period], *Chosen Gakuho*, No.88 (July 1978), pp.73-101.

54 Kim Chŏngmi, "19 Segi Mal-esŏ 20 Segi Ch'ogi-e itsŏsŏŏi Paekjong," [Paekjong in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries], Kang Chaeŏn et al. (eds.), *Han'guk Kŏndae Sahoe-wa Sasang*, [Korean Modern Society and Ideas], translated by Kim Chonghui, (Seoul, Chungwon Munhwa, 1984), pp.191-226; "Chosen no Hisabetsumin 'Paekjong': Niteika ni okeru Seikatsu to Kaiho Undo," [Paekjong: The Discriminated People of Korea; Their Life and Liberation Movement under Japanese Rule], *Kansei* [Great Outcry], No.5 (15 August 1983), pp.44-62; "Kohei Undo no Kaka to Mirai", [The Past and Future of the Hyongpyong Movement], *Sabetsu to Tatakau Bunka* [Culture Which Fights Discrimination], Vol.13 (1984), pp.19-31.

55 Akisada Yoshikazu, "Chosen Koheisha Undo: Nihon no Suiheisha Undo to Kanren Shite" [Korean Hyongpyongsa Movement: Related to the Japanese Suiheisha Movement], *Buraku Kaiho* [Buraku Liberation], No.52 (March 1974), pp.45-57.

56 Iguchi Kazuki, "Chosen no Hyongpyong Undo: Hyongpyongsa no Soritsu to Shoki no Undo" [Korean Hyongpyong Movement: The Formation of the Hyongpyongsa and its Activities in the Early Period], *Suiheisha Undoshi no Kenkyu*, [Study on the History of the Suiheisha Movement], Vol.6 (1973), pp.277-298.

the *paekjong*, still suffer from open social prejudice and discrimination. Unlike the *Hyongpyongsa* which ceased to be active in the 1940s, the *Suiheisha*, the Japanese association for the liberation of the *Burakumin*, is still active.⁵⁷ As contributions to our historical/sociological understanding of the Korean *Hyongpyongsa*, however, these studies are of limited value.

Beyond the Korean and Japanese speaking worlds, there has been very little research on the *Hyongpyongsa*. There are two brief studies of the *paekjong* as a status group,⁵⁸ but only one contribution of which I am aware on the *Hyongpyong* movement.⁵⁹ And these English studies are largely based on Japanese sources.

On the basis of the above review, it is clear that the *Hyongpyong* movement remains relatively unstudied. Few of the works referred to exceed a dozen pages and they either focus on specific limited aspects of the movement or are such general and overlapping accounts that we have from them little more than an outline profile. To the best of my knowledge, there is no comprehensive history or analysis of the movement as a whole.

⁵⁷ For the history of the *Suiheisha*, see Ian Neary, *Political Protest and Social Control in Pre-War Japan: The Origins of Buraku Liberation* (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1989).

⁵⁸ Herbert Passin, "The Paekchong of Korea: A Brief Social History," *Monumenta Nipponica*, Vol.12 (1956), pp.27-72; and Soon Man Rhim, "The Paekjong: Untouchables of Korea," *Journal of Oriental Studies*, Vol.12 (1974), pp.30-40.

⁵⁹ Ian Neary, "The Paekjong and the Hyongpyongsa: The Untouchables of Korea and Their Struggle for Liberation," *Immigrants and Minorities*, Vol.6 No.2 (July 1987), pp.117-150.

IV. THE SOURCES OF MATERIALS

The main source of materials for this study were documents of the period, consisting of newspaper reports, articles in periodicals, and official documents of the Japanese colonial authorities. In addition to these, some limited materials were drawn from interviews conducted by myself in 1984-1986 with elderly people who had participated in the *Hyongpyong* movement and other events of the times and with descendants of a few other participants who are no longer alive .

Newspaper reports, which were in a quantitative sense the main source for this study, have to be treated with caution for three main reasons. Firstly, they tend in their very nature to be scattered and piecemeal and it is therefore difficult to know how complete their coverage was. Newspaper reporters can, after all, only report evidence which they either witnessed themselves or which they happened to hear about from their "sources"---other reporters, contacts among activists, government officials, and so on. Secondly, newspaper reports tend, again by their very nature, to focus on events which are "newsworthy." And what may be considered newsworthy at one period of time may be less so at another. Some categories of events, such as meetings which were accompanied by violence, are likely to be sensational enough to be newsworthy at all times, but the newsworthiness of less sensational events may well vary

according to their immediate particular social and political settings. Thirdly, newspaper reports in a country under authoritarian rule like that of the Japanese colonial regime in Korea are of course likely to be much affected by whatever methods are used to control the press. In the particular case of Korea in the 1920s and 1930s, we know that all newspaper reports were subject to examination by the police before publication.

During the first decade of the Japanese occupation no news media were allowed except for two government-run newspapers (*Keijo Nippo* [Seoul Daily] in Japanese and *Maeil Sinbo* [Daily News] in Korean).⁶⁰ Following on the "March First Movement" of 1919, however, greater press freedom was allowed, and two openly nationalist daily newspapers, *Tonga Ilbo* and *Choson Ilbo*, began to print in 1920. By 1923 when the *Hyongpyong* movement was launched, these newspapers were regularly devoting large sections of their issues to social affairs. As nationalist papers, these two were particularly interested in reporting on the *Hyongpyongsa* and, between them, *Tonga Ilbo* and *Choson Ilbo* contained over 800 reports on various events connected with the *Hyongpyong* movement from 1923 to 1935. When reports in *Sidae Ilbo*, which began to publish in 1924, and in other subsequent newspapers are included, this figure rises to over 2,000. These reports covered a wide range of events from national and local meetings of the *Hyongpyongsa*---occasionally even with full agenda, lists of names of executive members of the national

⁶⁰ Chŏng Chinsŏk, *Iljeha Han'guk Ŏllon T'ujaengsa* [The History of the Struggle of the Korean Press under Japanese Rule], (Seoul, Chŏngŭmsa, 1982).

and regional headquarters and of local branches---to all manner of social tensions between members and ordinary people. And on special occasions, the newspapers devoted much space and detailed coverage of the events concerned, such as the launching of new organisations (May to July 1923), the factional disarray in the *Hyongpyongsa* (April to August 1924), violent disturbances of law and order in particular places (e.g. in Kimhae in August 1923, in Ipjang from July to August 1924, in Yech'ŏn from August to September 1925), the "Koryŏ Revolutionary Party" (January and November 1927) and the "*Hyongpyong* Youth Vanguard League" (January to August 1933 and subsequent reports on this affair until 1936).

Such wide and detailed coverage of events connected with the *Hyongpyong* movement was also given to other social movements of the period, with the main nationalist newspapers devoting approximately one in four of their pages to social movement news. There were two immediate and interrelated reasons for this. Most developments in the social movement sector were highly newsworthy during this period under Japanese rule as they constituted the major political concerns of the day. Secondly, by the same token, many of the newspapers editors and reporters were themselves committed social activists. Many intellectuals who joined social movements after the unsuccessful "March First Movement" in 1919 had sought jobs in the press. The two main Korean-run newspapers (three after 1924 and more later) and several periodicals provided them with their major channel of communication with the people at national

and regional levels and even in local areas. Thus it was common to find social activists working as directors and/or reporters in the local branches of the national press. It is thus not surprising that a substantial number of the activists prosecuted under charges of violating social order over this period had at one time or another been journalists.⁶¹

Most significantly in relation to the *Hyongpyong* movement, several leaders and core members of the *Hyongpyongsa* had direct newspaper connections. For example, several of the leading non-*paekjong* founders of the *Hyongpyongsa* in Chinju in 1923 were involved in the press; Sin Hyonsu was the then director of the Chinju branch of the *Choson Ilbo*, and Kang Sangho had been the first Chinju branch director of the *Tonga Ilbo* in 1920. And later regular members of the *Hyongpyongsa* included Ch'oe Chungjin (the Ch'onggŭp branch director of *Choson Ilbo*), Yo Hae (*Choson Ilbo*, in Masan), Im Yunjae (*Choson Ilbo*, in Nonsan), Pak P'yŏngsan (*Choson Ilbo*, in P'yŏngt'aek) and Yi Hanyong (*Choson Chungang Ilbo*, in Onyang). Thus some reports and articles on the *Hyongpyongsa* were certainly written by a few of its own members. Such reports are a particularly valuable source for perceiving the movement "from the inside" as few unpublished documents by leading activists have yet been found. Unfortunately, under the conditions of the time, articles were not published under

⁶¹ Ch'oe Minji and Kim Minju, *Iljeha Minjok Ŏllonsaron* [Study on the History of Nationalist Journalism under Japanese Rule], (Seoul, Ilwŏlsŏgak, 1978).

the names of their authors, but it is sometimes possible to detect particular authors from the contents.

The strength of newspaper reports as sources of material can overcome their assumed weakness, particularly with the support of a computerised data bank system. After the systematic sorting of all reports, including names of members and details of events, even scattered and fragmentary information can become significant. Such computer treatment was found to be particularly useful in reconstructing trends and processes of leadership and participation. (For details of the computer analysis, see Appendix 1.)

In addition to contemporary newspaper reports, we have a much smaller number of articles published in a few periodicals. These were often signed, as were articles in the official journal of the *Hyongpyongsa*. These are also useful because of their more discursive nature.

Official reports and statistics compiled by the Japanese colonial authorities constitute a quite different category of documentary evidence. These were largely compiled by the police who were responsible for the direct supervision of the activities of Korean people, particularly those involving, or thought likely to lead to, social unrest. It is assumed that most police reports, especially those of local stations, were destroyed at the end of World War II, but some have survived and they are of particular interest in conveying aspects of the colonial authorities' stance towards the social activities of the

period; they are in a sense reports "from outside" and "from the other side".

These documents naturally have to be evaluated critically as do all sources. The purposes for which they were written and compiled were primarily to keep a check on anti-Japanese activities and certainly not to identify with or to "understand" the social movements of the period. The reports may therefore well be biased and misleading; and there are some which are inconsistent with each other and patently inaccurate in the information they purport to impart on local situations and events. And if that is the case, what credence, we may well ask, can we place on summaries and more general reports written in the central police offices? The only possible answer to this broad question is that the research worker has to use his judgment on the basis of all the evidence available to him.

On occasions, the whole diverse range of documents---from newspapers to official records---seem to be inconsistent and even contradictory. But this does not necessarily mean that we should disregard whatever materials there are; it does mean that we have to assess various materials in relation to each other. After critical evaluation, they may well be found to be complementary.

To counter the biases and inadequacies of documentary materials and to redress their limitations as far as possible, I have also used "live stories" or oral history gathered in the course of interviews with a few people who either participated in events of the 1920s or claimed to

have been told about them. In the course of my researches, I met several dozen elderly people with some memory of personal involvement in the movements of the period, but only about ten gave me any interview information which appeared sufficiently convincing and coherent for use. It is difficult to have full confidence in such oral evidence, partly because of the advanced age of some of the interviewees and partly because of seeming biases of emotion. Some of the data are nonetheless used in this study as a contribution to interpreting documentary evidence. Even though oral testimony cannot now be a major source for the study of events in the 1920s and 1930s, it is of some help in association with documentary materials.

The use of interview materials did, however, raise an ethical problem. In responding to questions on the basis of such personal rapport I was able to establish with them, the interviewees from *paekjong* families were usually apprehensive over the possible implications of their individual identities being revealed. I therefore assured them that I would not refer to them by their real names and all interviewee names contained in the text are pseudonyms.

PART ONE

THE HISTORICAL AND SOCIAL BACKGROUNDS

CHAPTER TWO

THE *PAEKJONG*: BACKGROUND AND HISTORICAL PROFILE

"I am a man born in a village of Kangwon Province. The village where I was born was called a *p'ich'on* [blood village] or a *paekjong-ch'on* [*paekjong* village]. The residents of the village were called *k'aljabi* [knife handlers] or *paekjong-nom* [wretches]. For several hundred years, all people outside the village had remembered these appellations. They passed them on from fathers to sons, from mothers to daughters and from seniors to juniors. Instead of being called by their names, members of my family and their neighbours and friends were *paekjong-nom*, *paekjong-nyŏn* [bitches] and a *paekjong-saekki* [brats]. Thus, the ordinary people regarded *paekjong* as beings dirtier than and inferior to dogs and pigs. They perceived *paekjong* as a-moral or a-human objects, and oppressed all of us. This was their principal morality and attitude to us.

Nevertheless, the people of my village never protested, remaining non-resistant in their segregated community. Rather we sacrificed our whole lives in slaughtering cattle and pigs which were supplied to satisfy the ordinary people's greedy tastes, even though they oppressed and despised us without reason. That is to say, we have been loyal servants in slaughtering cattle and pigs for the ordinary people. From generation to generation, our ancestors have devoted themselves to this job. We have also spent our whole lives doing that. Moreover, our descendants will not be able to avoid doing the same."

by a member of the *Hyongpyongsa* in 1929¹

The emergence of the *Hyongpyong* movement has to be seen against the background of the historical and social conditions which the *paekjong*, who were to make up the vast

¹ Anonymous, "Naŭi Ch'uŏk" [My Memory], translated by myself. *Chŏngjin* [Right Progress], (The Official Journal of the *Hyongpyongsa*), Vol.1 (1929), pp.30-31.

majority of *Hyongpyongsa* members and to be the beneficiaries of the movement, had faced for centuries. Questions therefore have to be asked as to why the association was only founded in the 1920s, and as to what social circumstances enabled the movement to be established and to be active in the 1920s. Put in another way, what were the constraining and the enabling factors at work? In an attempt to answer such questions, this chapter presents, in its first section, a discussion of the social status of the *paekjong* in traditional Choson society and, in the second section, an account of the transformation of their community. The first section focuses on the historical experience of the *paekjong*, their social status under the Choson dynasty, their origins, their distinctive and inherited occupations, and the prejudices and social discriminations against them. The second section stresses their social and economic situations in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the period immediately preceding the birth of the *Hyongpyongsa*.

I. SOCIAL STATUS

1. THE STATUS HIERARCHY OF CHOSON SOCIETY

The reasons prompting the *paekjong* to organise their own association within a social reform movement in Korean society can be traced back to the long history of their low and stigmatised status throughout the Choson dynasty (1392-

1910) and even before that time. The Choson dynasty, dominated by Confucian ideas, incorporated a rigid status hierarchy which was hereditary and unchanging. In a broad but decisive way, all aspects of social life were ordered in a hierarchical system. A man's position in society, his social relations and public duties, and even his occupation depended on his status ascribed by birth.

There were four main hierarchical ranks: the *yangban* [aristocrats or literati], the *chungin* [middle people], the *sangmin* [common people] and the *ch'ŏnmin* [despised people] in downward order.² The first three ranks or status groups were together characterised as the *yangmin* [good people] as distinct from *ch'onmin*, the lowest people. The *ch'onmin* were in turn divided into two groups, the first, *ch'ilban kongch'on*, consisting of seven categories of publicly despised people and the second, *p'alban sach'ŏn*, of eight categories. The *ch'ilban kongch'ŏn* included (1) the *kisaeng* [female entertainers], (2) the *naein* [male servants inside a palace], (3) the *ijŏk* [servants in government offices like messengers and cleaners], (4) the *yŏkjol* [servants in the government travel stations and rest houses], (5) the *noryŏng* [prison keepers] (6) government slaves, and (7) fugitives. The *p'alban sach'ŏn* included (1) Buddhist monks, (2) the *yŏngin* [messengers], (3) the *chaein* [itinerant actors], (4) the *mudang* [sorceresses or witches], (5) the *sadang* [mourners and keepers of the memorial tablets], (6)

² cf. Kim Yŏngmo, *Han'guk Sahoe Kyech'ŏng Yŏn'gu* [Study of Social Stratification in Korea], (Seoul, Iljogak, 1980).

the *kōsa* [executioners], (7) the *hejang* [leather shoemakers], and (8) the *paekjong*.³

These distinctions were well defined in principle, but in practice exceptional cases were often encountered. Specific relations with commoners, especially with *yangban*, were commonly effective in determining general social positions. For instance, government slaves were generally accorded more freedom than other despised people, while the *kisaeng*, exercising their musical and dancing skills for the entertainment of the *yangban*, had closer social relations with the higher strata of society than others. In contrast, the *paekjong* were kept socially distant even from the other despised people. Thus, the *paekjong* group was perceived as the lowest, even by and among the despised.⁴

³ cf. Chōng Yakyong, *Mokmin Simso* [Book on Governing People], (1830: Seoul, Hyonamsa, 1972); Ch'ŏnt'ae Sanin, "Paekjong-ŭi Sājōk Koch'al" [Historical Research on Paekjong], *Pando Sahwa-wa Nakt'o Munje* [The History of Korean Peninsula and Issues on Paradise], (Sinking, 1943), pp.229-231; Kim Chōngsil, "Kunse Chosŏn-ŭi Sahoe Kyegŭp" [Social Classes in Modern Korea], *Sindonga* [New East Asia], Vol.5 No.4 (April 1935), pp.24-25; Imanishi Ryu "Chosen Paekjong Kou" [Research on Korean Paekjong], *Geibun* [Art and Literature], Vol.9 No.4 (April 1918), p.337; Iwasaki Keisho, "Chosen no Paekjong Kaikyu" [The Paekjong Class of Korea], *Chosen*, Vol.211 (December 1932), p.73. For English language materials, see Herbert Passin, "The Paekchong of Korea: A Brief Social History," *Monumenta Nipponica*, Vol.12 (1956), pp.37-40.

⁴ There is no doubt about the low ranking of *paekjong* in Chosen society. cf. Imanishi Ryu, op. cit.; Imamura Tomo, "Chosen no Tokushu Buraku [Special Community of Korea], *Chosen Fuzokushu* [Compilation of Korean Customs], (Seoul, 1914); Yi Kakjong, "Chosen no Tokushu Buraku" [Special Community in Korea], *Chosen*, Vol.104 (1923), pp.116-130.; Ayugai Fusanoshin, "Paekjong fu Suchok, Hwachok, Kolisuchok" [The Paekjong and the related Suchok, Hwachok and Kolisuchok], *Zakko* [Collected Essays], Vol.5 (1932); Iwasaki Keisho, op. cit., pp.73-91. For English-language materials, see S.F. Moore, "The Butchers of Korea," *The Korean Repository*, Vol.5 (April 1898),

In this sense, the *paekjong* in Choson society may be broadly compared with the untouchables of India and the *Burakumin* of Japan.

Even though the *paekjong* were the most despised people, the term "*paekjong*" (literally "white people") did not carry shameful connotations in East Asian culture, even during the Koryo dynasty (936-1392), prior to the Choson dynasty.⁵ During the Koryo dynasty, the term indicated a special group of "commoners" who had no obligations in regard to taxation and military service.⁶ Later, probably during transition from the Koryo to the Choson dynasties, the term was associated with the title of the then outcast groups of *chaein* and *hwach'ok*.⁷ As shown in Figure 2-1, these groups were originally called *yangsuch'ok*.


pp.127-132; H. Passin, op. cit., pp.27-72; Soon Man Rhim, "The Paekchong: Untouchables of Korea," *Journal of Oriental Studies*, Vol.12 Pts.1-2 (1974), pp.30-40; Ian Neary, "The Paekjong and the Hyongpyongsa: The Untouchables of Korea and Their Struggle for Liberation," *Immigrants and Minorities*, Vol.6 No.2 (July 1987), pp.121-126.

⁵ Yi Usong, "Hanin. Paekjong-ŭi Sin Haesok" [New Interpretation on Hanin and Paekjong Groups], *Yŏksa Hakbo* [The Journal of Historical Studies], Vol.19 (1962), pp.75-89; Imanishi Ryu, op. cit., pp.338-343; Imamura Tomo, op. cit., pp.41-42.

⁶ Yi Usong, op. cit., pp.75-79.

⁷ Yi Sukt'ae (ed.), *Sahoe Kwahak Taesajŏn* [Encyclopedia of Social Sciences], (Seoul, 1948: 1987 reprinted), pp.248-249; Imanishi Rye, op. cit., pp.349-362; Iwasaki Keisho, op. cit., pp.74-76.

Figure 2-1. Changes in the Appellations of the Outcast Groups



source: Yi Sukt'ae (ed.), *Sahoe Kwahak Taesajon* [Encyclopedia of Social Sciences], (Seoul, 1948: reprinted in 1987), p.249.

During the Koryo period, the outcast group consisted mainly of slaughterers and butchers, producers of wickerwork, itinerant entertainers and, on occasion, even prostitutes.⁹ In the early fifteenth century, they were called *sin-paekjong* [new *paekjong*] in an attempt to assimilate them into the ranks of commoners.⁹ Later, the term "sin" was dropped, and the group was seen as consisting of *such'ok* (hunters, leather workers, and prostitutes) and *paekjong* (slaughterers of animals and producers of wickerwork). *Paekjong* were regarded as inferior to *such'ok*. Ever since then the term *paekjong* has carried a strongly derogatory connotation of outcast, though in Choson society the outcast group was referred to interchangeably as *yangsuch'ok*, *such'ok*, *chaein*, *chaein-paekjong* and *sin-paekjong*.¹⁰

⁹ Kang Man'gil, "Sŏnch'ŏ Paekjong Ko" [Research on Paekjong in the Early Choson Period], *Sahak Yon'gu* [Studies in History], Vol.18 (1964), pp.491-526. He found in *Sejong Sillok* (Annals of King Sejong) that the name of *chaein* or *hwach'ok* of Koryo period, a then non-despised group even though they had menial jobs, was changed to *paekjong* in October 1423 (the 5th year of King Sejong's reign).

⁹ *ibid.*, p.492.

¹⁰ Ayugai Fusanoshin, *op. cit.*; Kang Man'gil, *op. cit.*, p.492.

In the late Choson period, the appellations of the outcastes became more complicated and were differentiated according to occupation. *Paekjong* mainly engaged in wickerwork were called *yugijang*, or *kori-paekjong* [willow *paekjong*]; others, producing leather goods, were called *p'ijang* [leather craftsmen], *katbach'i*, *p'igong* [leather workers], or *tubŏl-paekjong* [double *paekjong*]; those who were mainly slaughterers and butchers were called *k'aljabi* [knife handlers], *chaesalkkun*, *tohan* [slaughterers], or *p'anin* [slaughterers for a government office]¹¹

In short, the *paekjong* constituted the lowest stratum of Choson society. Regardless of their various and changing appellations and of divisions within their ranks, their collective social status was consistently regarded as lower than that of all other members of society, including members of other *ch'onmin* groups.

2. ORIGINS

The origins of the most despised and stigmatised people in Choson society can only be partially traced in the history of Korea on the basis of scattered, disparate and incomplete records. There are, however, various legends which are worth mentioning as an indication of past conceptions about the place of the *paekjong* in Korean history.

¹¹ Ayugai Fusanoshin, op. cit., pp.134-187.

The claim made by the *Hyongpyongsa* about the ancestry of the *paekjong* is based on the legend of 72 loyal subjects of the Koryo period who refused to submit to the newly founded Choson dynasty and retreated to Tumundong in the Songak mountains near Songak or Kaesong, the capital of the Koryo dynasty.¹² From there, they strongly resisted incorporation into the new Choson dynasty. For survival in their mountain retreat, they began to make willow baskets and trunks for daily use and they hunted animals for food. After the new ruler attacked them by setting fire to the mountain forests, ^{they} fled from their mountain settlements and were scattered throughout the rural areas of the country. To allow them to live and survive, they continued to rely on jobs based on the skills they had developed in the mountains. Members of the *Hyongpyongsa* -- descendants of the *paekjong* -- argued that the people descended from these scattered groups were the most oppressed *paekjong* in the Choson dynasty.

Another legend claims that the *paekjong* are descendants of a high status and noble group and, specifically, that it was Prince Han of Tan'gun, the legendary founder of Korea's first kingdom in 2333 BC, who required some of his attendants to slaughter cattle; The descendants of these attendants became *paekjong*.¹³ Another

¹² Chosen Hyongpyongsa Sohombu [General Headquarters of Korean Hyongpyongsa], "Chosen Kohei Undo no Kogai" [General Account of the Korean Hyongpyong Movement], *Chosen oyobi Chosen Minzoku* [Korea and Korean People], (Seoul, 1927), p.166; Imamura Tomo, op. cit., p.42; For a record by a descendant of *paekjong*, see Kim Yongdae, *Sillok Hyongpyong* [The Authentic Record of the Hyongpyong Movement], (Seoul, Songsan Publisher, 1978).

¹³ Imamura Tomo, op. cit., p.42.

claim, similar to the first legend above, is that during the course of transition from one dynasty to another the politically defeated groups suffered systematic downgrading in social status. After the fall of the Silla (57 BC-935) and the Koryŏ dynasties, ruined nobles became slaves and some of these were segregated from the rest of the people and forced either to slaughter animals or to engage in wickerwork. Their descendants then became *paekjong*.¹⁴ Such legends are not supported by any real evidence.

In contrast to the legends which are not supported by documentary evidence, Kang Man'gil, a Korean historian has attempted to explain the origin of the *paekjong* on the basis of archival sources from the period of the Choson dynasty.¹⁵ He argues that the *paekjong*'s ancestors were foreigners from Manchuria whose nomadic and gypsy-like life style was not assimilated into the agrarian society of the Korean peninsula. As a way of life, they hunted wild animals with bows and arrows, walked from village to village providing unusual entertainments and sometimes allowing their women to earn money as prostitutes. As their life style was quite unacceptable to Korean people, it is not surprising that they were not absorbed into the agrarian society.¹⁶ In the early period of the Choson dynasty, particularly under King Sejong's reign, the government sought to promote their integration into agrarian settlements by encouraging intermarriage with ordinary people and by training them as farmers. At the

¹⁴ *ibid.*, p.42.

¹⁵ Kang Man'gil, *op. cit.*

¹⁶ *ibid.*, pp.498-504.

same time, the government tried to suppress their derogatory appellations and introduced the new term of "*sin-paekjong*."¹⁷ But these official efforts ended in failure, partly because members of the homogeneous host society were reluctant to admit such aliens as fellows, and partly because the *paekjong* themselves appear to have been reluctant to abandon their life style and to settle down to sedentary farming.¹⁸ As a result, their distinctiveness remained; they continued to be segregated from others and it would appear that there was increasing social discrimination against them in Choson society.

Whatever the true origins of the *paekjong* may be, there can be no doubt that they have had a long history of oppression and discrimination and that they were treated with contempt on account of their occupations and in accordance with institutionalised prejudice against them. As shown in Figure 2-1, the original outcast group was divided into two in the early period of the Choson dynasty. Members of the first group, referred to as *paekjong*, were the most despised. Their main occupations were slaughterers, butchers and wickerworkers. Members of the second group, called *such'ok*, were regarded as a little superior to the *paekjong*, even though traditionally engaged in leather production. And the group engaged in itinerant entertainments was designated as *kwangdae* [clowns or acrobats]; even among the despised people, they were generally considered as superior to the *paekjong*.

¹⁷ See Figure 2-1.

¹⁸ Kang Man'gil, op. cit., pp. 512-520.

On the other hand, there was one distinctive group, the *kogoljang* [bone workers], whose job was to slaughter and butcher animals in the early Choson period.¹⁹ At this time, the *kogoljang* were not considered as members of the despised people, but as *yangmin* [good people], and slaughtering and butchering were presumably not associated with the *paekjong*, but with the *kogoljang*. The *kogoljang* are, however, believed to have been assimilated into the *paekjong* at a later period. The *kogoljang*'s exclusive occupation was eventually taken over by the *paekjong*.²⁰

This depreciation of the *kogoljang*'s status may have been a factor contributing to the *paekjong* eventually occupying the lowest rank among all outcast groups. Both groups were connected with work involving the slaughter of animals and the handling of meat. Regardless of their true origins, it seems that this eventually led to the lowering of their status in the long history of the Buddhist- and Confucian-based Koryŏ and Choson Dynasties. Even though there was no prohibition on eating meat in Choson society, there was persistent prejudice against the slaughtering of animals and this led to increasing discrimination against those engaged in doing so. As a minority group, the *paekjong* thus experienced ever greater suffering and deprivation.

¹⁹ *ibid.*, pp.510-512.

²⁰ *ibid.*, p.512.

3. OCCUPATIONS

As seen above, the hereditary and exclusive nature of the occupations of the *paekjong* was a major factor in maintaining their isolation from ordinary people. In Choson society, their occupations fell into two categories; the first involved all work connected with the slaughtering and butchering of the animals, and the second involved wickerwork.²¹ Most *paekjong* were engaged, partly or fully, in producing either animal or wicker products as their main sources of income.

But slaughtering was their main distinctive and exclusive work. Whenever they were required to slaughter animals, they visited the villages of ordinary people to do this. They slaughtered mainly domestic animals, including cattle, pigs, horses and even dogs. After completing their work, they normally took the leather and, in the case of cattle, the bones and blood in reward. Occasionally, in the harvest seasons, they might also receive crops. To some extent, the slaughtering of animals was considered to be a public obligation on their part rather than simply a source of income.²² The slaughtering was, however, not a sufficient source of income for their survival. Cattle breeding was insufficiently developed for slaughtering to provide anything but an impoverished basis for their lives, and slaughtering opportunities and facilities remained poorly developed up to the late period of the Choson

²¹ Ayugai Fusanoshin, op. cit., pp.188-190; Yi Kakjong, op. cit., pp.118-119.

²² Ayugai Fusanoshin, ibid., pp.188-189; Yi Kakjong, ibid., p.118.

dynasty.²³ The exclusive nature of the job nonetheless brought some benefits to the *paekjong*. Because the ordinary people refrained from all work associated with slaughtering, the *paekjong* benefited from a monopoly over these activities up to the late Choson period. If a commoner occasionally slaughtered an animal, he would do so clandestinely and would not allow it to be known. When such a case became known to the *paekjong*, they would visit the offender, threaten to publicise his conduct and claim money from him in compensation for keeping the matter secret. Such money was referred to as *paekjŏng-ip-magae-ton* [money for blocking *paekjong*'s mouth].²⁴ Thus, the slaughtering of animals was regarded as menial work and it remained a *paekjong* monopoly in Choson society.

An associated *paekjong* occupation was leather work.²⁵ The group of *paekjong* specifically engaged in tanning leather were called *katbach'i* or *tubol-paekjong* [double *paekjong*]. Another *paekjong* group, consisting of leather shoe makers, were called *hejang* [leather craftsman]. They normally carried out the tanning of ox hides and made leather shoes in their household workshops.²⁶ Their products were supplied to authorised merchants and sold to ordinary people at the market place.

²³ Ch'oe Yŏngjin, "Chosŏn Cho'gi Ch'uksan-e kwanhan Yŏn'gu" [Study on Breeding of Cattle in the Early Choson Period], *Inch'ŏn Kyoyuk Taehak Nonmunjip* [Collected Papers of Inch'on College of Education], Vol.6 (1971), pp.269-279. Most cattle were not owned by private farmers, but by the government.

²⁴ cf. Yi Kyut'ae, "Paekjong," *Kaehwa Paekgyŏng* [One Hundred Scenes in the Opening of Korea], (Seoul, Sint'aeyangsa, 1971), p.203.

²⁵ Ayugai Fusanoshin, op. cit.; Yi Kakjong, op. cit., p.118.

²⁶ Tongnip Sinmun, 28 August 1897; 9 March 1899.

The other main work of the *paekjong* was to produce wicker products.²⁷ Those who were called *kori-paekjong* [willow *paekjong*] made basketry and winnowing fans. The sale of these goods constituted their major source of income. Regardless of the distinctive titles, most *paekjong* performed one or more of the jobs referred to, and wickerwork was often a subsidiary source of income.²⁸ Thus, in general the *paekjong* had poor living conditions in Choson society, and in some exceptional cases they even became the chattels of wealthy people.²⁹

On occasion, *paekjong* were engaged to carry the coffins of national figures.³⁰ When a king or a queen died, *paekjong* were temporarily recruited to the *yŏsagun* [pallbearer corps].³¹ On the command of the manager of the pallbearer-corps, selected *paekjong* accompanied the coffin to a burial place. For this, they normally received some reward from the palace. The job was regarded by the *paekjong* themselves as an honorary duty. Even in local village communities, *paekjong* sometimes carried the coffins of ordinary people. On some occasions, *paekjong* were recruited as *hoejasu* [executioners]. This was also seen as

²⁷ Ayugai Fusanoshin, op. cit., pp.311-318; Yi Kakjong, op. cit., 118-119.

²⁸ This may be one reason why the *kori-paekjong* were not dissociated from other *paekjong*, even though their work had no connection with butchery.

²⁹ Kang Man'gil, op. cit., pp.523-525.

³⁰ Ch'a Ch'onja, "Paekjong Sahoe-ŭi Amdamhan Sanghwalsang-ŭl Kŏrŏn-haya Hyongpyong Chonsŏn-ŭi T'ongil-ul Ch'okham" [Note on the Miserable Living Conditions of the Paekjong Community in an Attempt to Provoke the Unity of the Hyongpyong Movement], *Kaebiyok*, Vol.5 No.7 (July 1924), pp.39-45; Yi Kakjong, op. cit., pp.123-124.

³¹ The *kŏsa* were another group despised for carrying coffins. cf. Ch'a Ch'onja, op. cit., p.43.

an honour by the *paekjong*, because they were then directly associated with ordinary people.³² In addition, there were other special tasks carried out by *paekjong*; for example, they were engaged to open specialised dog-meat restaurants in some corners of Seoul.³³

Thus, there were distinctive occupations followed by the *paekjong*. These were mainly slaughtering and its associated activities like the meat trade, the tanning of hides and, occasionally, the running of restaurants. These were added to wicker work and became their major occupations. In addition, the *paekjong* were sometimes involved in other low-status work such as the carrying of coffins and the execution of prisoners. Whatever variations there were from one region to another or over time, all their jobs were generally perceived as menial in Confucian society.

4. SOCIAL DISCRIMINATION

Generally speaking, a wide range of behaviour in Choson society was strictly prescribed on the basis of Confucian ideas. In all relations between superiors and inferiors---for example, between a king and his subjects, between men and women, and between adults and children---the people of lower status were expected to behave with extreme modesty and deference towards their superiors in

³² Ch'a Ch'ŏnja, *ibid.*, p.44. However, he guessed that *paekjong* was ordered to take over the job, due to cruelty of the work rather than warm treatment of them.

³³ *ibid.*, p.45.

accordance with prevailing morals and conventions.³⁴ All such practices of deference and respect were, even more severely and strictly, expected of the *paekjong* towards all other members of the society, and particularly towards the *yangmin*.³⁵

As the most inferior and despised people, the *paekjong* were required to be extremely modest and to show the utmost humility towards all others in institutional relations as well as in personal contacts. They were not allowed to join public meetings with the commoners. They were prohibited from drinking alcohol with ordinary people and from smoking in their presence. When they walked with commoners, they had to keep an appropriate distance behind them.³⁶ In addition, the *paekjong* were normally expected to stay outside commoners' houses when visiting them; and, if and when allowed to enter a non-*paekjong* house, they would kneel down on the ground below the floor. Social and status differentials were also expressed in conversational norms and practices; whereas all *paekjong* used a "higher" form of language when addressing ordinary people---even children---

³⁴ The representative phrase of this regulation was "*sangang oryun*" [the three bonds and the five morals of behaviour].

³⁵ For social discriminations against the *paekjong*, see Ch'a Ch'onja, op. cit., pp.41-44; Imamura Tomo, op. cit., pp.44-47; Yi Kakjong, op. cit., pp.120-124; Ayugai Fusanoshin, op. cit., pp.190-192; Iwasaki Keisho, op. cit., pp.78-79.

³⁶ These conventions also applied, in more or less the same way, between men and women and between adults and children respectively. The inequalities between them also gave rise to active social movements for children and women in the early twentieth century, and these movements were similar in their underlying reactions to the *paekjong* movement.

all ordinary people responded to any *paekjong* in a "lower" form.³⁷

Social differentiation and discrimination were similarly expressed through, and enforced by, differences in certain items of clothing, in personal names and even in aspects of home construction. *Paekjong* men were forbidden to wear the ordinary headgear of black varnished lacquer.³⁸ Instead, they had to wear a *p'yŏngyangja* or *p'aelaengi* [crude bamboo hat] which was normally used by ordinary people only during the mourning period for a parent's death. With a *p'yŏngyangja*, they had to use a thin cord instead of the usual black silk used by ordinary people.³⁹ They were also forbidden to wear silk clothing or leather shoes, even though leather shoes were exclusively produced by them. Instead, they had to wear work clothes and straw sandals. As a symbol of marriage, *paekjong* women arranged their hair *tulemori* [twisted, with a parting down the middle of the forehead], whereas ordinary women wore their hair with in a bundle at the back of the head. Married *paekjong* women were not allowed to put ornamental hairpins in their hair. As in the case of personal adornments, there were distinctive conventions in regard to housing. *Paekjong* were nor supposed to use tiles on the roofs of their

³⁷ The "higher" and "lower" language forms are, broadly speaking, the *chondaemal* [respectful language] and the *panmal* [half language] respectively.

³⁸ This was a *yangban* symbol. cf. Yi Kyut'ae, op. cit., p.199.

³⁹ *ibid.* It was found after the relaxation of the discrimination that one *paekjong* family put their father's hat and cord on his mourning table because they believed that he would be able to enjoy the forbidden hat and cord in the other world after his death. Imamura Tomo, op.cit.; Yi Kyut'ae, op.cit., p.204.

houses. Discriminatory distinctions even extended to individual names. *Paekjong* could not use certain honourable characters such as *in* [benevolence], *ŭi* [righteousness], *ye* [courtesy], *hyo* [filial piety], and *ch'ung* [loyalty]. They had instead to use words with unpleasant connotations like *sŏk* [stone], *p'i* [skin] and *tol* (no meaning).⁴⁰

Social discrimination against the *paekjong* was also expressed through differences in wedding and funeral services which were rituals of deep significance in Choson society. *Paekjong* brides and bridegrooms were forbidden to mount saddled horses or to use covered palanquins which were customary at the wedding of other people. There was an extremely rigid convention forbidding intermarriage between the *paekjong* and all other members of society.⁴¹ *Paekjong* burials had to be conducted without the use of the funeral cart available to others. When mourning the death of a parent, *paekjong* were not allowed to wear the mourning hats and clothes, nor to use the mourning staves which were the traditional expressions and symbols of grief. In addition, *paekjong* burial places were segregated from those of ordinary people. The extremely high respect of Koreans for their ancestors was associated with strong concern that their forebears should not be polluted by the most despised people even after death.⁴²

⁴⁰ Ch'a Ch'ŏnja, op. cit., p.42; Imamura Tomo, op. cit., p.46.

⁴¹ In traditional Korean society, couples did not know each other personally before marriage. All marriages were arranged by their families having due regard to social status, family background and the like.

⁴² Imamura Tomo, op. cit., p.46.

Some of the above discriminations carried disadvantageous administrative implications for the government.⁴³ Following the failure of attempts to assimilate the *paekjong* into the agrarian society, segregated residential areas were usual.⁴⁴ As outcastes, the *paekjong* did not have the same rights as other members of the society, and were not registered in official government records. They were not employed in public domains and they were denied benefits from normal social institutions such as schools. Nor did they pay national tax or perform military duties.⁴⁵ There are, however, a few records of *paekjong* occasionally being used in military service against enemies on the northern frontier; they had a reputation for bravery and military skills.⁴⁶

Breaches of the whole range of discriminatory behavioural norms were met by severe sanctions. The ordinary people collectively punished *paekjong* through autonomous community organisations for public security such as the *Nongch'ŏng* [Farmers' Office].⁴⁷ Even official

⁴³ For a discussion of the implications, see Ch'a Ch'ŏnja, op. cit., p.43; Yi Kakjong, op. cit., pp.120-121; Iwasaki Keisho, op. cit., pp.78-79.

⁴⁴ *Kyŏngguk Taejŏn* [National Code], Vol.5 (1469: reprinted in 1978), Section "Hyŏngjŏn" [Criminal Law].

⁴⁵ During the Choson period, registration of people was intended mainly for the purposes of taxation and military service. The social groups exempt from these duties consisted not only of the despised people, *ch'onmin*, but also of the ruling class, *yangban*.

⁴⁶ Kang Man'gil, op. cit., pp.521-523.

⁴⁷ *Nongch'ŏng*, controlled by senior local people, was intended to keep public order in the community on the basis of social conventions. For example, in the case of a woman's disobedience to her parents-in-law, or of a youngster's disrespect to old people, the *nongch'ŏng* decided on an appropriate punishment. Appropriate punishments (e.g. lynching or expulsion from the community) were decided according to the merits of each case. Even up to the early twentieth century,

punishments incorporated discrimination. For example, whereas ordinary prisoners were normally beaten on a wooden platform, *paekjong* were beaten on the ground.⁴⁸

Thus, the entire existence of the *paekjong* was subject to extreme deprivation and stigmatisation. They were discriminated against in all social life, ranging from personal contacts and individual behaviour to the public domain and government treatment. Through institutional discrimination and prejudice, they were totally segregated and set apart from other members of the society.

II. THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE *PAEKJONG* COMMUNITY: 1890-1930

By the end of the Choson period, the society's overall status hierarchy was being eroded. The slaves, who originally made up the majority of all despised people, had largely been freed from bondage after the Japanese invasion of the late sixteenth century,⁴⁹ and the breakdown of the old order was accelerating in response to developments in trade and agriculture. The trading markets which had formerly been exclusively controlled by government-licenced merchants were expanding in size and in the turn-over of

hostile actions against the *paekjong*, and even against the *Hyongpyong* Movement, were carried out by the *nongch'ong*. cf. Hwangsŏng Sinmun, 20 October 1900; Tonga Ilbo, 30 May 1923; Yi Kyut'ae, op. cit., "Class".

⁴⁸ Ch'a Ch'onja, op. cit., p.43; Imamura Tomo, op. cit., p.45.

⁴⁹ cf. Hirano Hiroshi, *Chosŏn Hugi Nobije Yŏn'gu* [Study on Slavery in the Latter Period of Choson Dynasty], (Seoul, Chisik Sanŏpsa, 1982).

commodities. In consequence, the intrusion of the private and non-licensed merchants into the markets could not be resisted.⁵⁰ The growth of markets coincided with the development of urban areas and was accompanied by the development of skilled manufacture to meet the increasing demands of the merchants. At the same time, the agricultural sector on which Choson society was largely based was also being transformed through agricultural innovations and gradual but steadily increasing differentiation in the rural community between owners of large farms and small peasants.⁵¹ Furthermore, this differentiation was in the nineteenth century to lead to widespread peasant rebellions throughout the country. Thus, the *yangban* domination of Choson society was no longer stable and social institutions underpinning the hereditary status structure were losing their strength.⁵²

1. SOCIAL SITUATION

The influence of the above developments on the *paekjong*'s situation was relatively weak until the closing decades of the nineteenth century. The earliest study of any tendency towards the improvement of the *paekjong*'s situation appeared during the *Tonghak* [East Learning]

50 cf. Kang Man'gil, *Chosŏn Hugi Sangŏp Chabon-ŭi Paldal* [The Development of Trading Capital during the Latter Period of Choson Dynasty], (Seoul, Korea University Press, 1973).

51 cf. Kim Yongsop, *Chosŏn Hugi Nongŏpsa Yŏn'gu* [Study of the History of Agriculture in the Latter Period of Choson Dynasty], (Seoul, Iljogak, 1970).

52 cf. Chŏng Sŏkjong, *Chosŏn Hugi Sahoe Pyŏndong Yŏn'gu* [Study of Social Change in the Latter Period of the Choson Dynasty], (Seoul, Iljogak, 1983).

peasant war in 1894.⁵³ In an attempt to weaken unfair and unequal social conventions and to challenge existing practices, *Tonghak* leaders submitted a reform agenda to the government following on a temporary ceasefire between the *Tonghak* peasant army and government forces.⁵⁴ Among seven demands by the *Tonghak* leaders was the removal of the *p'aelaengi* [crude bamboo hats which were a derogatory symbol of *paekjong* status]. They also asked that slave register records be abolished and that social treatment of despised people be improved. Even though their demands were undermined by their military defeat, the government apparently recognised the significance of some of the demands and responded to them ^{with} its own reform plan, the so-called *Kapo* Reforms, in 1894.⁵⁵ This reform plan included provisions for the abolition of social status divisions and for equal opportunities to be offered to all people to enter government posts. Nominally at least, the legislation

53 cf. Kim Ch'ongmi, "19 Segi Mal-esŏ 20 Segi Ch'ogi-e itsŏsŏyi Paekjong" [Paekjong in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries], in Kang Chaeŏn, et. al. (eds.), *Han'guk Kundae Sahŏe-wa Sasang* [Korean Modern Society and Ideas], trans. by Kim Chonghui (Seoul, 1984), pp.191-226; Ko Sukhwa, "Hyongpyongsa-e Taehan Il Yŏn'gu," [A Study of the Hyongpyongsa], *Sahak Yon'gu* [Studies in History], Vol.38 (1984), pp.645-690.

54 O Chiyŏng, *Tonghaksa* [A History of the Tonghak], (Seoul, 1940: reprinted in 1973).

55 *Kojong Sillok* [Annals of King Kojong], 28 June; 2 July 1894. cf. Song Pyŏnggi et al. (eds.), *Hanmal Kundae Pŏp'ryŏng Charyojip* [The Compilation of Contemporary Laws in the Latter Period of the Choson Dynasty], (Seoul, National Assembly Library, 1970), pp.16 and 20. According to the decree, the *p'ijang* (leather workers) were to be exempt from *ch'onmin* status. This raised the question as to whether the *paekjong* were to enjoy the benefits of the decree or not, because the *p'ijang*, though part of *paekjong*, were regarded as slightly superior to the ordinary *paekjong*. Nonetheless, this decree is believed to have covered all *ch'onmin*, even the most despised *paekjong* group. cf. Kim Ch'ongmi, op. cit., pp. 196-198.

provided for equality between all Korean people, even the despised strata which included the *paekjong*.

There followed a long process of change in *paekjong* status but with some ambivalence. For example, in the Chinju incident of Kyŏng-Nam Province,⁵⁶ and in the Yech'on incident of Kyŏng-Puk Province,⁵⁷ *paekjong* were still forced to wear the humiliating hats. As in Haeju, Hwanghae Province,⁵⁸ bribes were demanded by government officials in reward for liberation from the despised status. Internal government instructions to the security police reveal that the despised people were to be punished if they disobeyed noble people.⁵⁹ However, even though the legal reforms were not followed in practice, conventions discriminating against the *paekjong* were relaxed in diverse areas. To remove their *p'aelaengi* from their heads and, instead, to wear ordinary hats and *mangen*, the *paekjong* had to submit petitions to the king or a government office.⁶⁰ But when the *paekjong* began to defy the social conventions in regard to dress and headgear, they were still likely to encounter difficulties from ordinary people.⁶¹ Nevertheless, by the first quarter of the twentieth century some *paekjong* could no longer be identified by their appearance.

⁵⁶ Hwangŏng Sinmun, 28 February 1900.

⁵⁷ Hwangŏng Sinmun, 8 February 1901.

⁵⁸ Hwangŏng Sinmun, 16 May 1901.

⁵⁹ Tongnip Sinmun, 3 November 1896; 13 and 19 March 1897; 8 July 1899.

⁶⁰ S.F. Moore, op. cit., pp.127-128; Hwangŏng Sinmun, 28 February 1900.

⁶¹ As an example, the *paekjong* who successfully appealed to wear ordinary clothing in Chinju were attacked by non-*paekjong* in 1900. Hwangŏng Sinmun, 20 October 1900.

The strict segregation of residential areas was also abolished. Even though some *paekjong* villages still remained in the 1930s,⁶² and even later, there was some movement of *paekjong* families to commoners' areas. Accordingly, contacts with ordinary people were facilitated and became more frequent.⁶³ It was, however, also an indication that their community relations had begun to lose their strength and that such contacts were causing social tensions. Even Christians, who were regarded as liberals by Korean standards, did not accept *paekjong* coming to church services. The first recorded case of a dispute over *paekjong* attending church services was in the late nineteenth century in Seoul.⁶⁴ The believers complained to their minister over allowing *paekjong* to share a service and the discontented group eventually left the church. In 1909, over one decade later, similar trouble occurred in a church in Chinju, with the same outcome.⁶⁵ Such cases show how difficult it was for *paekjong* to mix socially with ordinary people. This situation continued, even into the early 1920s. One incident, involving *kisaeng*, occurred in 1922; some *kisaeng* who had joined in a *paekjong* picnic were

⁶² The Japanese colonial authorities reported that several *paekjong* villages still existed. See Chosen Sotokufu [Korean Government-General], *Chosen no Shuraku* [Korean Communities], Section on "Tokushu Buraku" [Special Communities], Vol.2 (1933), pp.307-308.

⁶³ For example, we know that some activists of the *Hyongpyong* movement had already moved to ordinary residential areas and were in contact with commoners. See, Chapter 4.

⁶⁴ S.F. Moore, op. cit., pp.131-132.

⁶⁵ Chinju Kyohoesa Yonhyŏk Wiwŏnhoe [Committee for the Compilation of the History of Chinju Church], *Chinjumyŏn Okbongni Yesukyo Changnohoe Yŏnhyŏksa* [The History of the Presbyterian Church in Okbong, Chinju], (Chinju, 1930), pp.15-19.

severely criticised by the ordinary people and the *kisaeng* concerned were punished by the regional *kisaeng* guild.⁶⁶ From the fact that such contact with *paekjong* provoked social sanctions we can infer that the strict and firm prohibition of the intermarriage and grave-sharing were still in force.⁶⁷

The process of *paekjong* involvement in social affairs and in government offices was ambivalent. In the late nineteenth century, *paekjong* had eventually been registered in the government's records of the inhabitants, and this had brought some satisfaction to those who had previously not had any official records of births and deaths.⁶⁸ Yet those concerned still had descriptions like *tohan* [slaughterer] or a red dot entered next to their names.⁶⁹ Thus when copies of their registrations were submitted with job applications, their backgrounds were known and their chances of success were affected.⁷⁰ Moreover, *paekjong* were considerably disadvantaged in pursuing public education. In

⁶⁶ Maeil Sinbo, 11 May 1922.

⁶⁷ See Ch'a Ch'onja, op. cit., p.45. And for ^{the} Kunsan incident, caused by the attack of ordinary people ^{on} ^{the} *paekjong* funeral, see Chungwoe Ilbo, 3 May 1929.

⁶⁸ cf. Yi Kyut'ae, op. cit., p.203. The story is told of a policeman visiting a *paekjong* village for registration and being cordially welcomed because the residents were so pleased.

⁶⁹ Choson Ilbo, 14 May 1923; Ch'a Ch'onja, op. cit., p.45. This was admitted by the mayor of a town in 1925. Tonga Ilbo, 13 October 1925. I also found that there was an entry concerning the social status of pupils on school register records in the 1920s.

⁷⁰ There is a well known story concerning Chang Chip'il, one of the founders of the *Hyongpyongsa*. He saw his status mark on the government register when he applied for a job with the Government-General of Korea after his return from university studies in Japan. As a result, he gave up the attempt to be appointed and devoted himself to the *paekjong* movement instead. Tonga Ilbo, 20 May 1923.

Choson society few *paekjong* were able to educate their children. Instead of sending them to public schools, the wealthy *paekjong* used to engage educated people as private tutors at their own expense. And even after the education facilities were formally opened to all in the 1920s, many were unable to enrol their children in schools, and *paekjong* children who did gain entry were discriminated against at school.⁷¹

Thus, there were two broad aspects to the social situation of the *paekjong*. One was the recognition of their deprived and inferior status, though moves to improve it were often nominal and ineffective. The other was that they were still oppressed and discriminated against. Both aspects --- and the contradiction between them --- were, implicitly or explicitly, involved in the development of their social movement. Such relaxation as there was of traditional social oppression contributed to the *paekjong*'s capacity to develop a consistent and systematic social movement, while the continuing social constraints on them exacerbated their feelings of resentment and provoked them to participate in collective actions of resistance. In that sense, both aspects contributed to the development of the *paekjong* social movement.

Now, it is necessary to consider the size of the population of *paekjong* in the early twentieth century, even if ~~so~~ ^{it is} unlikely that existing statistics are accurate. In its official report of 1929, the *Hyongpyongsa* claimed that

⁷¹ Ch'a Ch'ŏnja, op. cit., pp.42 and 45.

it represented 400,000 members.⁷² This figure is generally accepted as the best estimate of their numbers at the time, even though it was never confirmed by any national census. In contrast, the last national census of the Choson dynasty had recorded 2,189 *paekjong*,⁷³ and a Japanese police survey in 1926 released a figure of 36,779 as shown in Table 2-1.

⁷² Chosen Hyongpyongsa Sohombu, op. cit., p.166. And Yi Tonghwan, a core leader of the *Hyongpyongsa*, reported that the association had 389,750 members in 1931. Yi Tonghwan, "Hyongpyongsa Che 9 hoe Chŏn'guk Taehoe P'yŏng" [Comments on the Ninth National Conference of the Hyongpyongsa], *Pip'an* [Critic], Vol.1 No.2 (June 1931), p.37. These figures would mean that around 2 % of the total population (approximately 20 million) were *paekjong*.

⁷³ Tongnip Sinmun, 26 February 1898. There can be no doubt that this figure was highly unreliable. Even the total population which was reported as 5,340,901 (see Tongnip Sinmun, 16 May 1899) was regarded as quite misleading by the newspaper. Tongnip Sinmun, 9 September 1898.

Table 2-1. The Population of *Paekjong* and Their Occupations in 1926 by Province

	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h
Kyōnggi	477	25	1114	176	334	98	168	142
Ch'ung-Puk	129	2	870	239	286	32	74	2
Ch'ung-Nam	237	54	1592	498	444	109	236	8
Chōn-Puk	289	43	1557	134	864	156	349	5
Chōn-Nam	556	84	1309	21	403	99	539	33
Kyōng-Puk	381	156	1037	681	2480	136	286	229
Kyōng-Nam	239	146	1005	302	496	134	74	58
Kangwōn	281	3	210	326	787	110	209	4
Hwanghae	232	553	78	674	3406	189	40	278
P'yōng-Puk	505	106	76	229	295	29	80	40
P'yōng-Nam	136	0	16	157	283	45	1	0
Ham-Puk	24	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Ham-Nam	211	3	3	1	47	16	18	12
Total	3697	1175	8868	3539	10125	1153	2074	811
%	10.1	3.2	24.1	9.6	27.5	3.1	5.7	2.2

	i	j	k	l	m	Total	%
Kyōnggi	2	0	72	193	439	3,240	8.8
Ch'ung-Puk	8	0	33	41	338	2,054	5.6
Ch'ung-Nam	52	0	36	144	389	3,800	10.3
Chōn-Puk	29	1	19	153	194	3,893	10.6
Chōn-Nam	11	0	45	82	50	3,232	8.8
Kyōng-Puk	77	0	34	529	1384	7,410	20.1
Kyōng-Nam	61	0	71	44	32	2,662	7.2
Kangwōn	16	0	11	29	59	2,045	5.6
Hwanghae	26	0	1	211	0	5,688	15.5
P'yōng-Puk	71	0	11	39	1	1,482	4.0
P'yōng-Nam	46	0	3	43	189	919	2.5
Ham-Puk	0	0	0	0	0	25	0.1
Ham-Nam	0	0	2	9	7	329	0.9
Total	399	1	338	1517	3082	36,779	100%
%	1.1		0.9	4.1	8.4	100%	

(Key) a=slaughterer, b=leather worker, c=butcher, d=wicker worker, e=farmer, f=labourer, g=restaurant~~er~~, h=leather shoemaker, i= basketry worker, j=public servant, k=merchant, l=miscellaneous, m=jobless

(source: Chosen Sotokufu Keimu-Kyoku [Police Affairs Bureau, Korean Government-General], *Chosen no Chian Jokyo* [Public Security in Korea], (1927).

The total figure of this survey was also much below the *Hyongpyongsa* claim but could well have been a gross underestimate due to difficulties in finding *paekjong* and to their probable reluctance to expose their backgrounds. Nonetheless, the survey deserves attention for its indication of the geographical distribution of the *paekjong*. It reveals that the population of *paekjong* in the southern area was much higher than in the northern area,⁷⁴ and this was confirmed by another record of the Japanese colonial authorities shown in Table 2-2.

Table 2-2. Population of *Paekjong* by Province in the Early 1920s

	population	%
Kyŏnggi	2,431	7.2
Ch'ung-Puk	2,418	7.2
Ch'ung-Nam	3,296	9.8
Chŏn-Puk	3,724	11.0
Chŏn-Nam	3,034	9.0
Kyŏng-Puk	6,121	18.2
Kyŏng-Nam	3,384	10.0
Kangwŏn	2,184	6.5
Hwanghae	4,221	12.5
P'yŏng-Puk	1,456	4.3
P'yŏng-Nam	1,015	3.0
Ham-Puk	34	0.1
Ham-Nam	394	1.2
Total	33,712	100%

source: Chosen Sotokufu [Korean Government of General], *Chosen no Gunshu* [Mass of Korea], (1926), p.172.

⁷⁴ Generally speaking, the southern area is taken as the Kyŏnggi, Ch'ungch'ŏng, Chŏlla and Kyŏngsang Provinces, whereas the northern area covers P'yŏngan and Hamgyŏng Provinces. These provinces except Kyonggi were again divided into *Nam* [south] and *Puk* [north]. The remaining provinces of Hwanghae and Kangwon can be regarded as "marginal area" for the *Hyongpyong* movement. Further discussion about regional variations will be met in Chapter 9.

These two tables clearly indicate that there were considerable differences between regions. It may well be that those who lived in the southern region were relatively easily identified through living in collective settlements and being clearly segregated from the ordinary people. In contrast, those living in the northern region, and especially in the Hamgyŏng and P'yŏngan Provinces, may have been more difficult to identify and locate due to more scattered settlements there and lesser social discrimination against them. One researcher into *paekjong* villages observed a similar distribution,⁷⁵ with all thirteen villages which he visited being located in the southern area, mainly Cholla and Kyongsang Provinces.

Table 2-1 also gives some general indication on the *paekjong*'s occupations in the early twentieth century. According to this survey, the majority of *paekjong* were at the time still engaged in their traditional pursuits. Over one third had connections with the slaughtering (a: 10.1%) and butchering (c: 24.1%) of animals. One notable feature revealed by Table 2-1 is that in the southern areas the number of slaughterers was smaller than the number of butchers, whereas in the northern areas the reverse obtained. In Kyŏnggi, Ch'ungch'ŏng, Chŏlla and Kyŏngsang Provinces, there were 2,308 slaughterers (a), compared with 8,484 butchers (c) (a:c=1:3.7). In contrast, in P'yongan and Hamgyŏng Provinces there were 876 slaughterers compared with 95 butchers (a:c=1:0.1). This probably implies that many *paekjong* in the southern area had switched from the

⁷⁵ Chosen Sotokufu, *Chosen no Shuraku* [Korean Communities], Vol.2 (1933), pp.306-308.

lower paid work of slaughtering to larger scale butchering involving some capital investment. A similar trend may have taken place in regard to restaurant work (in the south 1,726 out of 26,291: 6.6%) as compared to the north (99 out of 2,755: 3.6%).

Meanwhile, other traditional jobs such as wicker work (d, i: 9.6, 1.1%) and leather work (b, h; 3.2, 2.2%) had also declined proportionally in both the south and north, but here again there were some regional differences. The proportion engaged in less-profitable wickerwork in the northern areas was much higher than in the southern areas. In the north, there were 479 out of 2,755 wickerworkers (17.3%), compared with 2,291 out of 26,291 in the south (8.7%). However, in the case of leather workers there was not much difference.⁷⁶

The most important change in the occupations of *paekjong* was their increased participation in farming. Over a quarter had farming as their main job (e:27.5%).⁷⁷ This figure was probably exaggerated, partly because they may have sought to conceal their more menial stigmatised occupations, and partly because they regarded farming as the most prestigious of their several income sources. Nonetheless, the records provide convincing evidence that many *paekjong* had settled down in farming areas and were abandoning the itinerant jobs on which they had formerly

⁷⁶ These figures regarding leather workers are very dubious because the industry suffered severely from Japanese intrusion. Nonetheless, the fact that relatively more *paekjong* in Kyongsang Provinces than in other regions were involved in leather work merits attention.

⁷⁷ See, *Chosen no Shuraku*, Vol.2, pp.306-308.

relied. Some of the *paekjong* farmers had probably been compelled to settle because of changes in demand.

Another indication of change in their occupational structure is that, as shown in Table 2-1, over 10 % of jobless and low-wage manual labouring *paekjong* were no longer working in their inherited occupations.

Despite the trends referred to, however, most *paekjong* were still engaged in their inherited occupations in the early twentieth century. And their occupation of slaughtering landed them in an awkward and rather vicious role in the early years of the 1920s. In order to combat hydrophobia, some *paekjong* were occasionally recruited by the Japanese colonial authorities to slaughter roving dogs. Not surprisingly, their role in this respect provoked hostile reactions from the ordinary people. Their occasional cruelty to the dogs, and the mistakes they sometimes made in slaughtering the wrong dogs, aggravated their relations with ordinary people, especially when their conduct was reported in national newspapers.⁷⁸ Their involvement in the killing of dogs continued to provoke hostility from the ordinary people up the eve, and even during the period, of the *Hyongpyong* Movement.

In summary, the inherited occupations of *paekjong* largely persisted into the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, though the occupational structure of their communities had been changing, especially in its

⁷⁸ Maeil Sinbo, 14 May 1921 and 14 April, 30 May, 20 June and 17 July 1922; Tonga Ilbo, 21 June 1922 and 3 February 1923.

regional variations. These changes in their occupational situation no doubt reflect trends of wider change in the whole social environment of the *paekjong* community. They were no longer compelled to remain members of a despised group, at least legally and nominally, but social conventions of unequal and unfair treatment and prejudice continued in practice to be widespread.

2. ECONOMIC SITUATION

The general economic situation of the *paekjong* was clearly transformed in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. The sources of the transformation were rather diverse. To begin with, the government attempted to intervene in the business of slaughtering and butchering through legislation.⁷⁹ The initial legislation on slaughterhouses was proclaimed in 1896 for most ~~part~~ of the country,⁸⁰ and in 1898 for the Seoul area;⁸¹ it aimed to control the trade through the licencing of slaughterers. Those who wanted to run a slaughterhouse (and/or a butcher shop) were required to get a licence from their provincial office and to pay taxes based on shop size. Similarly, those who were engaged only in slaughtering were also taxed

⁷⁹ For the progressive development of this legislation, see Kim Chŏngmi, op. cit., pp.201-212; Ko Sukhwa, op. cit., pp.650-657.

⁸⁰ "P'osa Kyuch'ik" [Regulations on Slaughterhouses], *Kojong Sillok* [Annals of King Kojong], 18 January 1896. At the time, there was no clear distinction between slaughterhouses and butcher shops. *P'osa* [slaughterhouse] apparently implied a working place for slaughtering as well as butchering. cf. Ko Sukhwa, op. cit., p.651; Kim Chŏngmi, op. cit., p.202.

⁸¹ *Tongnip Sinmun*, 29 October 1896.

and were directly supervised by provincial offices.⁸² They were thus legally and personally superintended by the government.

These rather complex provisions reflect the fact that the meat trade was expanding and becoming very profitable. Some non-*paekjong* were now also involved in the trade which was no longer the private and exclusive business of *paekjong*. Furthermore, working conditions in the trade were sometimes insecure.⁸³ Corrupt officials often demanded bribes with threats to withdraw slaughterhouse registrations, and they also commonly took it for granted that they should receive meat and accessories of slaughtered cattle without payment.⁸⁴ It should also be noted that the *paekjong* were now commonly differentiated according to their jobs in the slaughterhouses (e.g. owners and simple slaughterers).

The business undoubtedly became a significant source of revenue for the government which assigned quotas for the number of cattle to be slaughtered according to the amounts of revenue required by each province.⁸⁵ The government

⁸² "Seoul P'osa Kyuch'ik" [Regulations on Slaughterhouses in Seoul District].

⁸³ In response to some *paekjong* petition, the government urged the provincial offices to engage in *paekjong* work. *Tongnip Sinmun*, 5 June 1897.

⁸⁴ *Tongnip Sinmun*, 13 February 1897.

⁸⁵ The regional differences in revenues and in numbers of animals to be slaughtered are shown in Table 2-3. As in the case of regional differences in occupational structure in Table 2-1, the revenues and numbers of slaughtered animals in the south were higher than in the north.

Table 2-3. Assigned Numbers of Slaughtered Cattle and Revenues

Province	County	Cattle	Revenue
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dispatched officials to local slaughterhouses for supervision and taxation.⁸⁶ However, some private slaughtering outside the licenced slaughterhouses continued and the government urged officials to thwart it.⁸⁷ Corrupt officials who embezzled revenues constituted a real social problem.⁸⁸

The above regulations were reinforced in the early twentieth century by the Japanese, who were then the real power holders.⁸⁹ The revised legislation introduced different criteria for slaughterhouses and butcher shops with complex implications for the *paekjong*. Also the new regulations made additional demands for the identification and supervision of butchers, while the former restriction on Japanese investment in the business of slaughtering and butchering was withdrawn,⁹⁰ and Japanese investment in the

Kyŏnggi	38	3,648	14,592
Ch'ungch'ŏng	54	5,346	21,384
Chŏlla	56	5,544	22,176
Kyŏngsang	71	5,751	23,004
Kangwon	26	1,326	5,304
Hwanghae	23	1,449	5,796
P'yŏngan	44	2,904	11,616
Hamgyŏng	24	1,152	4,608
Total	336	27,120	108,480

(unit: *nyang*)

source: Tongnip Sinmun, 22 May 1897.

⁸⁶ There were several articles on this in one newspaper. cf. Tongnip Sinmun, 23 January, 22 May 1897 and 30 June 1899.

⁸⁷ Tongnip Sinmun, 21 January 1897 and 16 January 1899.

⁸⁸ There were numerous articles on this in one newspaper. cf. Tongnip Sinmun, 6 February, 11 September, 9 October 1897, and 19 January, 5 August 27 July 1899.

⁸⁹ Based on the Korean-Japanese treaty of 1904, the Japanese were intervening in internal affairs of Korea. They revised the legislation on slaughtering and butchering in 1905, 1909 and 1919. cf. Kim Chongmi, op. cit., pp.207-208; Ko Sukhwa, op. cit., pp.653-654.

⁹⁰ "Regulations on Slaughtering," cf. Kim Chŏngmi, op. cit., p.208. Even before the end of the nineteenth

trade accelerated throughout the country.⁸¹ Thus, the Japanese colonial administration set out to superintend the slaughterhouses and butchers closely on the one hand, and allowed Japanese traders to enter the profitable business on the other. What was of most concern to the *paekjong* was the Japanese move to control the ownership of slaughterhouses. The slaughterhouses had traditionally been under the control of private individuals, wholly or mainly *paekjong*, but they would now require a government licence. This enabled the Japanese to deprive private owners and to transfer slaughterhouses either to provincial government offices or to local "social clubs" which consisted of Japanese residents in Korea.⁸² The strong grip of the Japanese over the slaughterhouses was accompanied by the introduction of a regulation prohibiting slaughterers from refusing to slaughter. As a result, the *paekjong* slaughterers and their places of work were largely controlled by the Japanese administration. And the butchers, who necessarily got their meat from slaughterhouses, became more than ever dependent on Japanese manipulation of prices and quantities.

century, there was evidence that a Japanese opened a butcher shop in Seoul without permission from the Seoul government. Tongnip Sinmun, 28 January 1897.

⁸¹ As one example, a Japanese applied to open a slaughterhouse in Samnangjin, Milyang, Kyong-Nam Province. Kyongnam Ilbo, 24 November 1909.

⁸² Tonga Ilbo, 28 March and 9 November 1921. cf. Kim Chongmi, op. cit., pp.213-214; Ko Sukhwa, op. cit., pp.656-657. While the concrete evidence is inconclusive, both authors suspect that the Japanese exploited the benefits from the slaughterhouses for provincial office administration funds and pro-colonial Japanese social clubs.

On the other hand, the expansion of urban areas⁹³ caused an increase in demand for meat and butcher shops. Meat became a major everyday commodity sought by urban inhabitants and the meat trade became highly profitable. As with slaughtering, the Japanese entered into the selling of meat in urban areas along with non-*paekjong* butchers. Those who entered the inherited business of the *paekjong* competed with them on the market, and the appearance of rivals from outside their community was perceived by the *paekjong* as a threat to their exclusive benefits from the trade.

Despite the emergence of rivals on "their" market, the meat trade still remained a substantial source of income for the *paekjong* in the early twentieth century. Female *paekjong* commonly peddled meat on their heads, walking from house to house in urban areas,⁹⁴ and some wealthy *paekjong* opened butcher shops in newly established market places.⁹⁵ Thus, as the demands for meat increased, the *paekjong* continued to profit from the meat trade, but tensions grew between them and non-*paekjong*, including Japanese, who entered the business.

⁹³ There were 14 cities with over 10,000 population in 1910 but 31 such in 1925. cf. Yi Yosong and Kim Seyong (eds.), *Suja Chosŏn Yŏn'gu* [The Statistical Study of Korea], Vol.5 (Seoul, Semunsa, 1935), p.75.

⁹⁴ Information from interviews with ex-members of the *Hyongpyongsa*, Kim Manju (born 1909; 19 May 1986); and Chang Sunok (21 May 1986). Not surprisingly, there were in the 1920s several confrontations between ordinary people and members of the *Hyongpyongsa* due to the ordinary people's contempt of female butchers. cf. *Tonga Ilbo*, 11 July 1926; 23 June and 14 September 1929.

⁹⁵ Information from interviews with Yi Ch'unyŏp (born in 1902, widow of Kang Sangho; 9 May 1984 and 17 May 1986); and Kim Manju (19 May 1986).

The change in the economic situation of the *paekjong* was not confined to slaughtering and butchering. Accessories from slaughtered cattle such as lard, cow blood and ox hides, were also important trade commodities. In particular, ox hides became important because leather was a major export item, especially to Japan, 70% of the country's leather imports coming from Korea.⁹⁶ The demand for leather products brought a boom to the leather industry with the result that more and more Japanese entered the business.⁹⁷ The leather factories, of which the largest were in Yongdungp'o outside Seoul, in Taejon and in Chinnamp'o,⁹⁸ increasingly captured the former markets for *paekjong* household leather production. In 1924, out of 24 major leather factories, none was under the management of Koreans, and the products of Korean companies constituted only 9.8% of the total figure.⁹⁹ In particular, the markets for crudely tanned ox hides, which had formerly been carried out mainly in residential areas,¹⁰⁰ were lost to those selling hides processed by new advanced methods with large amounts of capital.¹⁰¹ Accordingly, the *paekjong* leather workers were losing their household jobs and becoming low wage employees of leather factories. In addition, their working conditions and situations were, in

⁹⁶ cf. Kim Chŏngmi, op. cit., p.209.

⁹⁷ For the process of Japanese intervention in the leather industry, see Kim Chŏngmi, op. cit., pp.209-211.

⁹⁸ These factories were mainly established in the 1910s: Yŏngdungp'o in 1911, Taejŏn in 1917, and Chinnamp'o in 1918. Tonga Ilbo, 6 March 1924.

⁹⁹ Chosen Sotokufu, *Chosen no Butsusan* [Products in Korea], (Seoul, 1927), pp.535-537.

¹⁰⁰ The practice was often the subject of complaints by residents as being unhygienic. Tongnip Sinmun, 28 August 1897; 9 March 1899.

¹⁰¹ Kim Chŏngmi, op. cit., pp.55-56.

general, poor. Their wages were, for instance, much below those of their Japanese counterparts.¹⁰² Meanwhile, even though they made up an extremely small proportion of the total figure, a number of *paekjong* successfully changed their occupation to leather traders, and these are believed to have accumulated more wealth than all other *paekjong*.¹⁰³

Like leather, other accessories of slaughtered cattle such as cow blood and lard no longer remained in the hands of the slaughterers. These, which had traditionally belonged to the workers, became a subject of contention. For instance, there was in the late 1910s and early 1920s a long dispute over cow's blood between the Seoul local government and slaughterhouse workers.¹⁰⁴ Thus, the benefits which the *paekjong* had earlier exclusively enjoyed were changing on the basis of competition for profit. It was more or less same for those engaged in wickerwork. Even though this was still a major source of income for the *paekjong*, the demand for wicker products waned due to the development of substitutes. Wickerwork for sale was displayed in the corners of market places on regular fair days, or pedlars would visit ordinary people's houses with articles for sale. Not surprisingly, the wickerworkers and pedlars had low incomes and poor living standards.

¹⁰² Japanese male adult workers earned 3.30 yen on average, compared with 1.30 yen (40% of Japanese earnings) by their Korean counterparts; the female and children workers were paid much less. On average, female adult workers earned 0.74 yen, and boys and girls were paid only 0.50 yen and 0.30 yen, respectively. cf. Yi Yösong and Kim Seyong (eds.), op. cit., Vol.2 (1932), p.95.

¹⁰³ Some of key members of the *Hyongpyongsa* were engaged in the business. See Chapter 4.

¹⁰⁴ Maeil Sinbo, 19 October 1919; for a similar case in Kaesong, see Tonga Ilbo, 19 April 1920.

All these changes in the economic situation of the *paekjong* inevitably had major impacts on their lives and their communities. They no longer enjoyed a hereditary monopoly over slaughtering and butchering, and the popular assumption that the *paekjong* were wealthy¹⁰⁵ has to be questioned. As shown in Table 2-4, there was in the 1920s a wide range of variation, with a small number of well-to-do and a large mass of poor members in the community.¹⁰⁶

Table 2-4. The Value of *Paekjong* Properties per Household in 1926

	unit= 1000 yen							
	under 0.1	up to 0.5	up to 1	up to 5	up to 10	up to 50	over 50	total
Kyŏnggi	431	160	68	51	10	4	2	726
Ch'ung-Puk	254	91	31	32	13	3	2	426
Ch'ung-Nam	425	186	77	53	24	14	4	783
Chŏn-Puk	518	298	70	35	11	1	0	933
Chŏn-Nam	358	194	64	41	6	3	1	667
Kyŏng-Puk	826	439	169	86	30 ¹⁰⁷	5	0	1555
Kyŏng-Nam	474	164	83	64	32	5	4	826
Kangwŏn	229	118	43	27	7	5	0	429
Hwanghae	707	322	62	31	4	1	0	1127
P'yŏng-Puk	143	97	18	8	1	0	0	267
P'yŏng-Nam	256	62	17	5	1	0	0	341
Ham-Puk	69	30	3	0	0	0	0	102
Ham-Nam	6	4	0	1	0	0	0	11
Total	4696	2165	705	434	139	41	13	8193
%	57.3	26.4	8.6	5.3	1.7	0.5	0.2	100%

source: Chosen Sotokufu Keimu-Kyoku [Bureau of Police, Korean Government-General], *Chosen no Chian Jokyo* [Public Security in Korea], (1927).

¹⁰⁵ It was known that some poor *yangban* secretly borrowed money from *paekjong*. cf. Ch'a Ch'onja, op. cit., p.45; Imamura Tomo, op. cit., p.48.

¹⁰⁶ Even though the figures may be unreliable, they are probably a valid indication of the *paekjong*'s general economic situation.

¹⁰⁷ Another document showed this figure as 20 households. cf. Kyongsang Pukdo Keisatsubu [Bureau of Police Affairs, North Kyongsang Province], *Koto Keisatsu Yoshi* [The Brief History of Supreme Police], (Taegu, 1934), p.352.

Over half the *paekjong* households had property worth less than 100 Japanese yen (57.3%). *Paekjong* households worth less than 500 yen made up 83.7%.¹⁰⁸ In contrast, *paekjong* with property worth over 10,000 yen accounted for only 0.7% of the total. From the circumstances, it would seem that the few who may be considered to have been wealthy were those who had successfully established profitable businesses as butchers and leather traders.¹⁰⁹

The most relevant point for us is that even though most members of the community were poor by the standards of the time, a small number had the capacity to meet the financial needs of their own association when it was launched. The differences in the relative affluence of *paekjong* in the southern and northern parts of the country is also worth noting. On the basis of the figures in Table 2-4, it can be shown that 4,818 out of 5,916 (81.4%) were poor *paekjong* with property of less than 500 yen in the south, whereas in the north, they numbered 667 out of 721 (92.5%). And of the total of 48 *paekjong* with property worth over 10,000 yen all were in the south.

¹⁰⁸ Even though the criteria adopted by the Japanese to assess wealth may well not have been altogether valid, there can be no doubt that the large majority of *paekjong* were living in considerable poverty. Equally, it seems almost certain that the living conditions of the poor majority had markedly worsened under Japanese rule. cf. Kang Man'gil, *Ilje Sidae Pinmin Saenghwalsa Yŏn'gu* [Study of the Social History of the Poor People under Japanese Rule], (Seoul, Ch'angjaksu, 1987).

¹⁰⁹ This view is based on my interviews with Kim Manju, a member of the *Hyongpyongsa*, (19 May 1986) and Chang Sunok, the wife of a former member, (21 May 1986).

Together with the information given in Table 2-1 on regional variations in the occupational structure, the figures on *paekjong* wealth would imply that those in the south had generally been more successful than their fellows in the north in developing larger businesses. However, as has been explained, the economic situation of the community as a whole was under threat from Japanese intrusion into Korean industries, and it is abundantly clear that the living standards of the vast majority of all *paekjong* were declining in the 1910s and 1920s.

CONCLUSION

We can on the basis of the evidence draw several conclusions about the historical and social circumstances of the *paekjong*. First of all, the *paekjong* were clearly perceived as a much despised and stigmatised group in Choson society. Despite various claims about their origins, we know that the prejudice and social discrimination under which they lived had for long been associated with their distinctive occupations which were mainly related to slaughtering, butchering and wickerwork. They were discriminated against and segregated in all spheres of social life, ranging from personal contacts to public relations and even in their treatment by government administrators. In the past, however, their lowly social status had allowed them the benefit of a monopoly over stigmatised occupations and they had lived in a segregated

but united communities with a strong sense of fellowship, and with a great^{deal,} of mutual support for each other.

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, however, their social and economic situations were changing significantly. Their stigmatised status was legally abolished and they were gradually being emancipated from it. But they were still subject to discrimination and prejudice by the large majority of the ordinary members of Korean society. The duality of this process---their incipient and partial liberation from traditional constraints and the general persistence of prejudice and discrimination---can also be detected in their changing economic situation. As the rigid status hierarchy was relaxed in the society as a whole, occupational distinctions began to break down with the result that some non-*paekjong* entered the business activities formerly monopolised by the *paekjong* who therefore lost some of their economic privileges, particularly their exclusive control of the stigmatised occupations of slaughtering and butchering. For the first time in their long history, they had in these spheres to compete with rivals from outside their own community. Furthermore, they suffered from the intervention of the Japanese colonial power whose support for her own nationals culminated in Japanese investors taking control of the industries concerned. Despite this "unfair" competition, the general increase in the demand for products of these industries, especially meat and hides, allowed a small number of *paekjong* to develop their

positions within the industries and thus to accumulate some wealth.

The duality of these social and economic processes appears to have had two main consequences. On the one hand, there was a deterioration in the circumstances of the *paekjong* which can be taken a major factor in leading them to establish their own association; on the other hand, there was a certain increase in their capacity to launch it.

CHAPTER THREE

THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT PRIOR TO THE FORMATION OF THE *HYONGPYONGSA*

Although the *paekjong* were the lowest-ranking stigmatised stratum of Choson society, they were inevitably influenced by the social changes of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Indeed, as compared to their long history of consistent misery, they were to experience quite dramatic changes in their social and economic situations during these decades. While the earlier institutional^{ised} prejudice and discrimination against them remained largely intact, they were in the first instance much affected by the impact of changes in the economy on their occupations and by the society-wide consequences of the incipient disintegration of the Choson status hierarchy. These effects were first felt in the nineteenth century and were to escalate in the early decades of the twentieth century when there was increasingly perceptible change in the entire social environment of the *paekjong* community.

Well before the *Hyongpyongsa* was finally launched in 1923, the boundaries of the public activities of the *paekjong* had expanded quite appreciably. The very foundation of the *Hyongpyongsa* constitutes evidence of the fact that there had been sufficient change in the social atmosphere to lead them to mobilise their meagre and

scattered resources for positive action. In addition, it is clear that there had been definite growth in the notion of egalitarianism in the society as a whole. This chapter therefore sets out to delineate the main aspects of the changes which had taken place in the internal and external environments of the *paekjong* community making it possible for the *Hyongpyong* movement to come into being.

I. THE *PAEKJONG*'S PUBLIC RELATIONS AND ACTIVITIES

Over several decades before the foundation of the *Hyongpyongsa*, there were a few instances of *paekjong* involvement in public activities. While there is no evidence to connect these instances with each other, we can assume that they sprang from the same circumstances. And there seems to be little doubt that they contributed to an improvement in the status of the *paekjong* and can be seen as antecedents to the development of the *Hyongpyong* movement.

Political unrest and turmoil were widespread throughout the country towards the end of the Choson dynasty. In particular, there were collective demands, led by the members of the *Tongnip Hyŏphoe* [Independent Club] for reform of the government. At one gathering where the reform agenda was discussed, a *paekjong*, Pak Sŏngch'un,¹

¹ He was presumably the person introduced to the Presbyterian Church by an American missionary. cf. S.F. Moore, "The Butchers of Korea," *The Korean Repository*, Vol.5 (April 1898), pp.131-132.

addressed government ministers and representatives of the Independent Club, saying that although he was a despised member of society he fully recognised that the loyalty to the king and the state should be the basis for progress in the country. He then went on to advocate that the best way to achieve progress was for the government and the people to trust each other. His speech drew applause from the audience.² At the same period, another *paekjong*, Kil Yongsu, was the mayor of Sangju County, Kyŏng-Puk Province, under the patronage of King Kojong.³ We have no knowledge of any contribution he may have made to improving the *paekjong*'s status, but the fact that he had personally achieved the position of mayor is of significance in itself.

In the early years of the twentieth century several collective actions by *paekjong* were reported in the newspapers. In 1900, *paekjong* from 16 counties around Chinju submitted a petition to the provincial office seeking permission to wear ordinary hats and clothes.⁴ Their request drew two responses; an initial favourable one from the government allowing them, albeit reluctantly, to wear ordinary clothes,⁵ and a later hostile reaction from ordinary people who attacked them and destroyed their

² Chŏng Kyo, *Taehan Kyenyŏn* [The History of Korea in the Late Nineteenth Century], Vol.3 (Seoul, 1899; 1957 reprinted).

³ Some reports noted that Kil Yongsu may have been the same person who had led the *popusang* [pedlars] group who attacked gatherings of the Independent Club in the 1890s. cf. *Taehan Maeil Sinbo*, 29 December 1905; Chong Kyo, *op. cit.*; and Yi Kakjong, "Chosen no Tokushu Buraku" [Special Community in Korea], *Chosen*, Vol.104 (1923), p.125.

⁴ *Hwangsong Sinmun*, 5 and 17 February 1900.

⁵ *Hwangsong Sinmun*, 28 February 1900.

houses.⁶ In 1901 three *paekjong* defied an order by the mayor of Yech'ŏn County, Kyŏng-Puk Province, to wear their low-status hats and were, as a result, tortured and taken into custody for several months.⁷ When this incident was related to a certain Pak Songch'un,⁸ he sent a petition to the Interior Minister who then released the three. About the same time, some *paekjong* in Haeju, Hwanghae Province, turned down demands by local officials for money in return for being set free from their traditional bondage. The officials then detained them and the detainees later submitted a petition of complaint to the government in Seoul.⁹

In contrast to such cases, there is some evidence of *paekjong* being positively involved in public activities of the times. For example, it is recorded that some *paekjong* in the Chŏlla area joined the *Ŭibyŏng* [Righteous Army] resisting a Japanese invasion in 1906.¹⁰ Another recorded incident, which occurred during the demonstration of the March 1 Movement in 1919, concerns a *paekjong* who, when arrested, shouted that he would prefer to be a *paekjong* in an independent Korea than a first class citizen under Japanese rule.¹¹

⁶ Hwangsŏng Sinmun, 20 October 1900.

⁷ Hwangsŏng Sinmun, 8 February 1901.

⁸ He was probably the person who had addressed the meeting of the Independent Club.

⁹ Hwangsŏng Sinmun, 16 May 1901.

¹⁰ Taehan Maeil Sinbo, 26 May 1906.

¹¹ Referred to by Ko Sukhwa, "Hyongpyongsa-e Taehan Il Yŏn'gu" [A Study on the Hyongpyongsa], *Sahak Yŏn'gu* [Studies in History], Vol.38 (December 1984), p.663, citing Ono Kenichi, *Chosen Kyoiku Mondai Kankui* [An Opinion on Korean Education], (Seoul, 1936), p.78.

In addition to these cases of individual *paekjong* asserting themselves in public, there is some evidence of a *paekjong* organisation during the Choson dynasty and well before the later foundation of the *Hyongpyongsa*.¹² With national headquarters in Seoul, it was run by members of the local *paekjong* community. It was divided into several sections---general affairs, public duties (e.g. the carriage of coffins and the execution of criminals), a jury on internal disputes, and business. The head of the national headquarters (*Yŏngwi*) in charge of the association ran the organisation with the assistance of the local leaders of branches (The P'yŏngyang branch, P'yong-Nam Province, had its own name, *Ogach'ŏng*, and other branches were called *Tojung*). Their strong community fellowship, which we can assume to have been due partly to intermarriage and partly to their following of the same occupations, seems to have been the basis of their solidarity. However, the association was dissolved following on the *Kapo* Reforms of 1894 which legally abolished all status groups.¹³ Since then, there had been several attempts to re-establish a *paekjong* organisation, particularly by butchers. In 1910, for example, a certain Ch'oe Yonggyu of Seoul went to Chinju with the aim of organising a *paekjong* guild.¹⁴ And Chang Chip'il, one of the later founders of the *Hyongpyongsa* in 1923, is recorded

12 Ch'a Ch'ŏnja, "Paekjŏng Sahoe-ŏi Amdam-han Saenghwalsang-ul Koron-haya Hyongpyong Chonson-ŏi T'ongil-ul Ch'okham" [Note on the Miserable Living Condition of Paekjong Community in an Attempt to Provoke the Unity of the Hyongpyong Movement], *Kaebŏk*, Vol.5 No.7 (July 1924), p.44.

13 *ibid.* p.44.

14 *Kyŏngnam Ilbo*, 5 January 1910.

as having tried to maintain the association in 1910.¹⁵ But it apparently failed when confronted by hostile reactions from the ordinary people.¹⁶

There are also several records of butchers' unions in some cities, though these do not appear to have had any relation to each other. One Seoul organisation in particular, the *Chipsŏng Chohap* [Success Union], founded in 1921 had made efforts to establish programmes for the education of members' children and the development of their industry.¹⁷ While, it is doubtful whether all its members were *paekjong*, several were butchers. At a meeting in 1922 the Seoul association elected Kim Taejip and Nikawa Matsji (a Japanese member) to the posts of head and adviser respectively. The association did not consist only of "pure" *paekjong*, and it seems to have met with cooperation from the Japanese authorities. When a request was made for an increase in meat prices, for example, the local authorities in Seoul immediately responded favourably.¹⁸ In addition to the Seoul organisation, there were some other butchers' associations. For example, in 1922 the butchers union in P'yongyang had promoted a collective protest against a government-backed stock farming guild which had for years charged a local cattle trade tax.¹⁹

¹⁵ Kyŏngnam Ilbo, 7 January 1910.

¹⁶ cf. Kim Ŭihwan, "Ilje Ch'ihwa-ŭi Hyongpyong Undong Ko," [A Study on the Hyongpyong Movement under Japanese Rule], *Hyangt'o Seoul* [Journal of Seoul City], Vol.31 (1967), p.66; Yi Myonggil, "Sinbunje Haech'e-wa Hyongpyongsa Undong," [The Breakdown of Status Structure and the Hyongpyong Movement], *Chinju Sangui* [Journal of Chinju Commercial Board], Vol.19 (April 1986).

¹⁷ Maeil Sinbo, 3 December 1921.

¹⁸ Tonga Ilbo, 21 April 1922.

¹⁹ Tonga Ilbo, 8 July 1922.

There are thus several scattered indications that the *paekjong*, especially butchers, had attempted to organise themselves collectively prior to the formation of the *Hyongpyongsa* and the accumulation of such experiences in the rapidly changing social situation of the period no doubt contributed to the development of their capacity to launch a more comprehensive social movement. However, it would seem that the public activities referred to were not geared exclusively to help *paekjong*, nor to benefit the *paekjong* community as a whole. For example, members of the Seoul butchers' union were obviously concerned about their own economic interests rather than with the social status of *paekjong*, and we shall see that they were later to oppose members of the *Hyongpyongsa*.²⁰

Thus the appearance of the butchers' unions initiated, partly at least, by non-*paekjong* reflects the complex situation in which, as seen in the previous chapter, the *paekjong* were being deprived of privileges over their traditional industry. There were clearly contradictory tendencies operating on the *paekjong*. On the one hand, they continued to suffer from the constraints of discriminating conventions and new tensions were caused by non-*paekjong* economic competition in their traditional occupations; on the other hand, there was the gradual recognition of their human rights and they had begun to assert themselves through public activities developed on the basis of their existing social and economic resources. Both sets of

²⁰ These conflicts are discussed in Chapter 7.

tendencies stemmed from on-going changes and the incipient development of other social movements.

II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS UNDER JAPANESE RULE

Various collective actions in the 1920s and the 1930s, including those of the *Hyongpyongsa*, were rooted in the expansion of Japanese colonialism which figures so prominently in the history of the Korean people in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.²¹ For a couple of decades preceding Japan's formal "annexation" of Korea in 1910, Japanese aggression had led to slow but steady and far-reaching transformations in various sectors of Korean society. Soon after Japan had in the late 1870s compelled the Korean government to abandon its age-old policy of isolation, it began to undermine the autonomy of the Korean economy. In particular, Korea's native industries came into direct competition with their powerful capital-oriented counterparts in Japan. As Japanese companies penetrated Korean markets, the political and military aggression of the Japanese government accelerated. Japanese victories over China and Russia in 1894 and 1904 respectively had the net effect of consolidating their dominant position over Korea. Korean resistance was vigorous and sometimes well-organised but it nonetheless failed to stem Japan's

²¹ The modern history of Korea is presented in several studies, including one of the latest, Ki-baik Lee, *A New History of Korea*, translated by Edward W. Wagner and Edward J. Shultz, (Seoul, Ilchokak, 1984).

superior military power, and the Korean government was eventually compelled to accede to Japanese demands to sign the "Protectorate Treaty" of 1905, which allowed the Japanese to take charge of Korea's foreign affairs. In 1907 the Japanese Resident-General then took effective control of the internal administration of the country and in 1910 the last monarch of the Choson dynasty was finally removed from his throne.

1. DISRUPTED SOCIAL PROCESS AND PROTEST

The escalation of Japanese intervention and control largely disrupted the processes of change that had been gathering momentum in Korean society. The ultimate Korean responses were the massive March 1 Movement in 1919 and the burgeoning of diverse social movements in the 1920s, including the *Hyongpyong* movement.

In order to appreciate the sequence of these responses, a brief summary of Japanese policies and actions is necessary. Firstly, as the Japanese colonial authorities took complete totalitarian control over social and political activities, Koreans had virtually no opportunity to express their opinions. All public gatherings were banned, depriving Koreans from the freedom of assembly. These measures were so strictly enforced that social and political discussions and activities could only be conducted in secret or abroad.²²

²² Ch'oe Yonghŭi, "3.1 Undong-e irŭnŭn Minjok Tongnip Undong-ŭi Wŏllyu" [The Origins of the Nation's Independence Movement Related to the March 1

Secondly, economic life, and especially trade and commerce, came under severe pressure from the colonial authorities. The autonomous capitalist commercial transactions which had just begun to emerge in the latter part of the Choson period²³ withered in the face of powerful Japanese capital investments, while direct control was exercised to limit the very existence of Korean companies.²⁴ Legislation was introduced which gave the colonial authorities the rights to permit private companies to be established and existing ones to be dissolved.

In addition to taking a firm grip over trade and commerce, the colonial authorities attempted to transform the structure of agriculture. After conducting a major cadastral survey in the 1910s,²⁵ they took over a great deal of agricultural land which had been the major economic basis of traditional Choson society. The vast majority of Koreans lost their inherited lands and were grossly impoverished as government-subsidised Japanese firms became large land owners with Korean tenants. Those who lost their lands largely migrated from their farming villages to urban areas where they attempted to earn their livings as day

Movement], Tonga Ilbo (ed.), *3.1 Undong 50 Chunyŏn Kinyom Nonmunjip*, (Seoul, Tonga Ilbosa, 1969).

²³ Kang Man'gil, *Chosŏn Hugi Sangŏp Chabon-ui Paldal* [The Development of Trading Capital during the Latter Period of the Choson Dynasty], (Seoul, Korea University Press, 1973).

²⁴ Cho Kijun, *Han'guk Chapon Chuŏi Sŏngnipsaron* [A Study of the History of Korean Capitalism], (Seoul, Korea University Press, 1973).

²⁵ Sin Yongha, *Chosŏn T'oji Chosa Saŏp Yŏn'gu* [Study of Korean Land Survey Project], (Seoul, Chisik Sanŏpsa, 1982).

labourers or, at the very best, as low-paid factory workers.²⁸

These far-reaching impositions on political and economic life were accompanied by attempts to restrict social activities and to control communications with the outside world. Educational services were severely restricted and the free expression of opinions suppressed. Korean enthusiasm for education, which had exploded after the society's initial contacts with western culture in the late nineteenth century, was checked with the closure of numerous schools in the early decades of the twentieth century, following on restrictive legislation passed in 1908 and 1911²⁷: whereas there were 2,722 schools in the country in 1908, by 1919 there were only 753 and by 1931 only 558.²⁸ As a result of these measures, less than one fifth of Korean children were receiving any kind of formal education.²⁹ It is thus not surprising that, as we shall see in chapters to follow, activists in the social movements of the 1920s were highly committed to the opening of unofficial schools.

Measures in regard to news and public information were equally severe. With the exception of *Maeil Sinbo* in Korean and *Keijo Nippo* in Japanese, both published by the

²⁸ Kang Man'gil, *Ilje Sidae Pinmin Saenghwalsa Yŏn'gu* [Study of the Social History of the Poor People during Japanese Rule], (Seoul, Ch'angjaksu, 1987).

²⁷ cf. Son Insu, *Han'guk Kundae Kyoyuksa* [History of Modern Korean Education], (Seoul, Yonsei University Press, 1971).

²⁸ No Yongt'aek, *Iljeha Minjung Kyoyuk Undongsa* [The History of Educational Movement of People under Japanese Rule], (Seoul, Tamgudang, 1979), pp.38-44.

²⁹ *ibid*, p.43.

government, no newspapers were allowed under legislation of 1907 and 1910.³⁰

Such ruthless oppression by the military-backed colonial government was at first very largely effective in bringing political and social activities to a stand-still in Korea, though several nationalist groups were active abroad, particularly in Manchuria. However, the overall situation produced by these harsh policies resulted in wide-spread generalised discontent which culminated in massive protests towards the end of the 1910s. These were nationwide and lasted for months on end. They were to prove a watershed in the early history of modern Korea, particularly when viewed in the light of the social movements which followed them.³¹ The event which came to be known as the "March 1 Movement" marks the starting point of the protests.

On 1 March 1919, there were massive protests in Seoul with leaders from various groups declaring the independence of the country. In the first stage of the demonstrations, the leaders urged that their goal should be pursued peacefully. The movement rapidly spread out throughout the country with support from the whole network of religious

³⁰ Ch'oe Chun, *Han'guk Sinmunsa* [The History of Korean Journalism], (Seoul, Iljogak, 1970).

³¹ There are numerous accounts of the March 1 Movement. See, for example, Tonga Ilbo (ed.), *3.1 Undong 50 Chunyŏn Kinyŏm Nonjip* [Collected Papers in Commemoration of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the March 1 Movement], (Seoul, Tonga Ilbosa, 1969); Yun Pyŏngsok, Sin Yongha, and An Pyŏngjik (eds.), *Han'guk Kundaesaron* [Collected Essays on Korean History], Vol.2 (Seoul, Chisik Sanopsa, 1977); An Pyŏngjik, *Samil Undong* [The March 1 Movement], (Seoul, Han'guk Ilbosa, 1975).

institutions, and particularly from the Protestant churches and mission schools.³² In addition, intellectuals were active in initiating local protests in their respective areas with the support of labourers and peasants.³³

It was reported at the time that over two million of Korea's 20 million people participated in over 1,500 separate demonstrations and gatherings in all but seven of the country's 218 counties.³⁴ The demonstrations took place continuously and intensively for two months and then sporadically for several more. At first, the demonstrations were peaceful, but they later turned into violent confrontations with the Japanese forces, due mainly, according to reports of the time, to attempts at brutal suppression by the military. From March to May in 1919, 46,948 demonstrators were arrested, 7,509 killed, and 15,961 injured. In addition, 715 houses, 47 churches and two schools were destroyed and burnt by the Japanese forces.³⁵ The demonstrations were eventually fully suppressed towards the end of 1919.

³² Sin Yongha, "3.1 Tongnip Undong Ch'ikpal-ui Kyŏngwi" [The Launching of the March 1 Independence Movement], in Yun Pyongsok, Sin Yongha, and An Pyongjik (eds.), op. cit., Vol.2 (1977), pp.39-112.

³³ An Pyŏngjik, op. cit., pp.92-144; Chŏng Sehyŏn, *Hangil Haksaeng Minjok Undongsa Yŏn'gu* [Study in the History of the Korean Students' anti-Japanese Movement], (Seoul, Iljisa, 1975); Sŏng Taegyŏng, "3.1 Undong Sigi-ŭi Han'guk Nodongja-ŭi Hwaldong" [The Activities of the Korean Labourers during the March 1 Movement], in Yun Pyŏngsok, Sin Yongha, and An Pyŏngjik (eds.), op. cit., Vol.2 (1977), pp.186-212.

³⁴ Pak Ŭnsik, *Han'guk Tongnip Undong Chi Hyŏlsa* [The Bloody History of the Korean Independence Movement], (1922: reprinted in Seoul, Somundang, 1972).

³⁵ *ibid.* pp.534-555.

2. THE ERA OF POST-MARCH 1 MOVEMENT

The March 1 Movement had an enormous impact on the social and political atmosphere in the country, as well as on Japanese colonial policies, and there is no doubt that it contributed a great deal to the later development of the social movement era in Korean life. To begin with, the nationwide upheaval caused the Japanese colonial authorities to change their policies, at least nominally. They were determined not to give up their occupation of the country, but a new Governor-General, Saito Makoto, appointed in August, 1919, announced that they would abandon their military control in favour of a new policy of "enlightened administration".³⁶ Some legislation in regard to social and political activities was accordingly revised. The strict prohibition of social and political gatherings was to be relaxed but, retrospectively, it seems clear that the real aims and purposes of the new form of administration envisaged were to intensify policies of "divide and rule".³⁷ A first result was that numerous formal organisations began to appear at both national and local levels. The violent nationwide protests had "succeeded" in the sense that they were now replaced by a diversity of social organisations and activities.

In addition to the relaxation of their close control over public gatherings, the colonial authorities now

³⁶ Kang Tongjin, *Ilje-ŭi Han'guk Ch'imnyak Chŏngch'aeksa*, [The History of Japanese Policy in Korea], (Seoul, Han'gilsa, 1980).

³⁷ Kang Tongjin, *op. cit.*; Pak Kyŏngsik, *Ilbon Cheguk Chuŭi-ŭi Chosŏn Chibae* [The History of Japanese Imperialism in Korea], (Seoul, Chŏngga Ch'ulp'ansa, 1986), pp.193-221

allowed the publication of newspapers and periodicals in Korean and the first issues of *Choson Ilbo* and *Tonga Ilbo* began to circulate in 1920, and were followed by *Sidae Ilbo* in 1924.³⁸ The new press was, however, subject to strict censorship; but, despite this, some news and views from home and abroad did appear and the evidence is that the press certainly encouraged social activists of the period, and also gave them considerable, even if limited, scope to publicise their actions. (See Chapter 1.)

In contrast, the Korean economy became ever more dependent on Japan. Although the notorious legislation strictly regulating Korean economic activities was abandoned in 1920, the depletion of the previous decade had continuing effects as Japanese investments rose and Korean companies were largely unable to compete. As a result, Korea rapidly became an increasingly profitable market for Japanese companies, and the major industries came under Japanese ownership.³⁹ Korean workers who had migrated to the towns after losing their lands over the preceding decade remained low-paid employees of Japanese employers. In fact, the living conditions of Korean labourers and peasants were now lower than before.⁴⁰

³⁸ See Chŏng Chinsŏk, *Iljeha Han'guk Ŏllon T'ujaengsa*, [The History of the Struggle of the Korean Press under Japanese Rule], (Seoul Chŏngŭmsa, 1982); and Ch'oe Minji and Kim Minju, *Iljeha Minjok Ŏllonsaron*, [Study on the History of Nationalist Journalism under Japanese Rule], (Seoul, Ilwŏlsŏgak, 1978).

³⁹ Cho Kijun, op. cit.

⁴⁰ Kang Tongjin, "Iljeha-ŭi Han'guk Nodongja-ŭi Saenghwalsang" [Social Life of Korean Labourers under Japanese Rule], *Yŏksa Hakbo* [Journal of Historical Studies], Vol.43 (1977); and Kang Man'gil, op. cit., (1987).

The above trends all contributed to turning Korean society of the 1920s into fertile ground for the launching of new associations. According to Japanese sources, new groups with some formal organisation mushroomed in the first few years of the 1920s as shown in Table 3-1.

Table 3-1. The Growth in Number of Formal Associations, 1920-1925.

YEAR	A	B	C	D	E	F	TOTAL
1920		11	33		251	1	296
1921		18	90	3	446	14	571
1922		19	81	23	488	25	596
1923		55	111	107	584	43	900
1924	1	86	91	112	742	81	1113
1925	1	83	128	126	847	127	1312

Key: A: nationalist B: socialist C: labour
D: peasant E: youth F: children

source: Chosen Sotokufu Keimu-Kyoku, *Saikin ni okeru Chosen Chian Jokyo* [The Present Security Situation in Korea], (Seoul, 1933), pp.168-169.

It is impossible to know how accurate the Japanese police records, on which the table is based, were. But, even allowing for considerable inaccuracy, the evidence points to an extremely rapid growth of groups with diverse aims and purposes. Whatever the intentions of the Japanese authorities may have been in lifting their former strict ban on social activities, the net effect was to allow activists to organise on a quite new and unprecedented scale. The enthusiastic participants in the earlier demonstrations for independence now joined associational groups in very large numbers. These groups adopted and represented various political stances. In keeping with

their general "divide and rule" policy, the colonial government made considerable efforts to support pro-Japanese groups of Korean collaborators.⁴¹ Nevertheless, the majority of new groups and associations were in varying measures both anti-imperialist and emancipatory; while they arose in the context of the struggle against the Japanese, many of their aims were to liberate people from the constraints of Choson society. These trends culminated in the proliferation of diverse social groups, many of which played a key role in the development of wider social movements.

As reflected in the classification of formal organisations presented in Table 3-1, the groups and the movements with which they were associated covered a wider range, from nationalist to socialist in their underlying ideologies. And in their strategies they ranged from moderate to radical. The overall composition, structure and dynamics of the entire social movement sector was thus exceedingly complex.

We may start by discussing the nationalist strand in the total situation. Even though the number of overtly nationalist groups was small, as shown in Table 3-1, the independence of the country was undoubtedly a major and pervasive goal of much social activity whatever the different strategies advocated and ideologies professed by social activist leaders. In fact, there were numerous nationalist-inclined groups in the early 1920s, and these were in varying degrees either associated with or

⁴¹ See, Kang Tongjin, *op. cit.*, (1980), especially Ch. 2.

influenced by the organised nationalist movement abroad and, in particular, by "the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea" which had been established in Shanghai, China, soon after the March 1 Movement in 1919.⁴² But this provisional government was not only nationalist and anti-Japanese; it was also republican in advocating the formal rejection of Korea's earlier monarchical system.⁴³ The future Korean government was in the nationalist republican view to reflect a social consensus on the elimination of the hierarchical status group distinctions of Choson society. [For the *paekjong* this clearly implied their own emancipation.] At the same time, different groups of "independence fighters" in Manchuria---some of which were under the control of the provisional government---received support and recruited members from Korea and were able to intensify their military resistance, with occasional success, against the Japanese forces.⁴⁴ The development of nationalist activities in Manchuria ^{was} ~~was~~ also later linked with the *Hyongpyongsa*, specifically in the case of the Koryo Revolutionary Party affair.⁴⁵

In contrast to the nationalists abroad who were engaged in an armed military struggle, the activists at home were involved in deliberately "moderate" programmes

⁴² Chong-sik Lee, *The Politics of Korean Nationalism* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1965), especially Ch.8.

⁴³ Kang Man'gil, "Tongnip Undong Kwajǒng-ŭi Minjok Kukga Konsolnon" [Study on the Formation of Nation-State during the Independence Movement], in *Han'guk Minjok Undongsaron*, (Seoul, Han'gilsa, 1985), pp.112-154.

⁴⁴ Pak Yǒngsǒk, *Iljeha Tongnip Undongsa Yǒn'gu* [A Study of the Independence Movement Under Japanese Rule], (Seoul, Iljogak, 1984).

⁴⁵ For details of this affair, see Chapter 7.

for the development of the national capacity to achieve independence for Koreans. One of their central ideas was to enlighten the uneducated on the principle of national liberation. Accordingly, consciousness education was perceived as a major issue in their activities. This, of course, was also a reaction to the closure of hundreds of educational institutions by the Japanese authorities with the net effect of depriving innumerable Koreans of opportunities for schooling. Efforts to establish unofficial voluntary schools were made by social activists throughout the country.⁴⁶ These contributed significantly to meeting the aspirations of many parents for their children, but also to new trends of thought which involved, *inter alia*, egalitarian ideas. In some instances, the educational drive was extended to attempts to establish formally recognised institutions, especially in the cities and towns. For example, activists in Chinju sought to establish a high school for boys with official approval.⁴⁷ There were similar cases in different parts of the country, and the activists even launched a campaign for a "people's university".⁴⁸ These efforts seldom met with Japanese approval, let alone encouragement, so that concrete

⁴⁶ Kang Tongjin, "Iljeha-ŭi Nodong Yahak" [Labourers' Night Schools under Japanese Rule], *Yŏksa Hakbo* [Journal of Historical Studies], Vol.46 (1970); and No Yongt'aek, op. cit.

⁴⁷ Kim Chungsoŭp (Joong-Seop) and Yu Nakgun, "1920 nyŏndae Ch'ŏ Sahoe Undong-ŭi Tonghyŏng: Chinju Chiyŏk-ul Chungsim-ŭro" [Trends of Social Movements in the Early 1920s in Chinju], *Hyŏnsang-gwa Insik* [Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences], Vol.10 No.4 (Winter 1986), pp.9-43.

⁴⁸ Son Insu, "Minjok Kyoyuk-gwa Minjok Kyoyuk Undong" [Education for the Nation and its Movement], in Ch'a Kibyŏk (ed.), *Ilje-ŭi Han'guk Singmin T'ongch'i* [Japanese Colonial Rule in Korea], (Seoul, Chongumsa, 1985), pp.401-406.

achievements were limited. Yet the emphasis laid on education and enlightenment by the activists of the period clearly made a major impact on the people in lifting the level of their general aspirations. And the *Hyongpyong* movement's conception of its own aims was undoubtedly affected by national trends in this respect.

Unofficial schools were not initiated only by moderate nationalists, but also by other activists. In particular, the leaders of peasant and labour movements which also developed in the early 1920s, commonly launched schools in both rural and urban communities as part of their programmes of action.⁴⁹ Two major labourers' associations, the *Nodong Kongjehoe* [Labourers' Mutual Benefit Society] and the *Nodong Taehoe* [The Labourers' Great Society], were separately launched in Seoul in 1920.⁵⁰ Even though they were largely initiated by intellectuals, they set out to represent the demands of impoverished labourers and peasants. The launching of labour groups soon followed in several major cities. Labourers on extremely low wages and with very bad working conditions were obviously major "resources" for the movements.⁵¹

The capacity of labourers for well-organised and disciplined industrial action had been well demonstrated in

⁴⁹ Kim Nakjung and Kim Yunhwan, *Han'guk Nodong Undongsa* [The History of Korean Labour Movements], (Seoul, Iljogak, 1970).

⁵⁰ Sin Yongha, "Choson Nodong Kongjehoe-ŭi Ch'angnip-gwa Nodong Undong" [The Foundation of the Korean Labour Mutual Benefit Society and Its Labour Movement], in *Han'guk-ui Sahoe Sinbun-gwa Sahoe Kyech'ŏng* [Social Status and Social Stratification in Korea], (Seoul, Munhak-gwa Chisongsa, 1986), pp.71-201.

⁵¹ Kim Nakjung and Kim Yunhwan, op. cit.

major cities in the early 1920s.⁵² It is thus not surprising that labour movements spread rapidly. And their growth in urban areas was soon followed by peasant movements in rural areas. In fact, in many areas the two movements were closely associated and in some they were even unified as labour groups joined peasant activities, especially those of tenants in the smaller towns.⁵³ The rural community had for long been sharply divided between landowners and tenants, and the establishment of many large farms by the Japanese after the land survey had quickly contributed to the impoverishment of the tenant peasants and to social tensions in the countryside. The peasants thus readily participated in protests against their treatment by landowners and in the establishment of associations to deal with their problems.⁵⁴ Their main grievances were associated with their tenancy conditions. Tenants normally had to hand over about two thirds of their produce to the landlords under contracts which they saw as grossly unfair. Their enthusiastic participation in collective protest actions was thus to be expected. And, as shown in Table 3-1, the number of peasant association rose from only three in 1921 to 126 in 1925. In 1922 peasant

⁵² *ibid.*

⁵³ An example of this occurred in Chinju. See, Sin Yongha, *op. cit.*, pp.111-114.; and Kim Chungsoŏp (Joong-Seop) and Yu Nakgun, *op. cit.*

⁵⁴ Kwŏn Tuyong, "Iljeha Han'guk Nongmin Undongsa Yŏn'gu," [A Study of the History of the Korean Peasant Movement under Japanese Rule], *Sahoe Kwahak Nonjip* [Collected Papers of Social Sciences] Vol.3 (Korea University, 1974), pp.43-72; and Cho Tonggŏl, *Iljeha Han'guk Nongmin Undongsa* [The History of Korean Peasant Movements under Japanese Rule], (Seoul, Han'gilsa, 1979).

leaders convened a national gathering in Chinju for the first time in Korean history.

The rapid growth of labour and peasant movements in the early 1920s was one of the most striking reflections of the development of collective actions for the redress of social injustice in the society at large. But the quest for change and reform was also expressed in other spheres, and notably in matters relating to the position of women and children who were traditionally treated as inferior to men and adults respectively. These became major concerns of social activists. The improvement of women's status through education and social activities was largely based in Christian missionary churches,⁵⁵ but the boundaries of their action often extended to the local community as a whole, and the few educated women sometimes led independent social activities. Social activists, including religious leaders, were also concerned about the improper treatment of children, and numerous groups campaigning for the welfare of the next generation were launched in local areas. As shown in Table 3-1, there were also a large and increasing number of youth associations with young people becoming a major source of recruitment of social activists.

Thus there was clearly an extremely wide set of movements in the early 1920s with a nationwide burgeoning of social consciousness and ideological activity. Radical and socialist groups had begun to develop among Koreans who had escaped from Japanese colonial rule and settled down in

⁵⁵ Yung-Chung Kim (ed.) *Women of Korea: A History from Ancient Times to 1945* (Seoul, Ewha Womans University Press, 1979).

Manchuria and Siberia well before the March 1 Movement.⁵⁶ The success of the Russian revolution stimulated their radicalism, especially in relation to the gross inequalities of Korean society.

In addition, there were various groups of radical Korean students in Japan itself.⁵⁷ Even though these were not all specifically socialist in the beginning, there is little doubt over their broad ideological leanings and their later involvement in the development of socialist movements after returning to Korea. There were numerous factional conflicts between many of the groups that developed outside the country and these were often closely related to the diversity of, and divisions between, the peasant, labour, women's and even children's movements controlled or influenced by them at home.

The large number, wide scope and diverse nature of associational groups of the period all contributed to the complex socio-political situation within which the *Hyongpyong* movement was launched and developed. There were large numbers of social activists working at both national and local levels. Some of these were full-time or "professional" workers but the majority of enthusiasts worked with little or no economic rewards. Their devoted commitment was one of the major resources which allowed and promoted the rapid development of various social movements. They had heterogeneous social backgrounds, but a good

⁵⁶ Kim Chunyŏp and Kim Ch'angsun, *Han'guk Kongsan Chu'ŭi Undongsa* [The History of the Korean Communist Movement], Vol.1 (Seoul, Korea University Press, 1973).

⁵⁷ *ibid*, Vol.2.

number were "intellectuals" from relatively wealthy families. For example, most members of the promotion committee of the first labourers' associations have been referred to as "leading intellectuals".⁵⁸ Many such activists were able and willing to devote themselves to social activities without being paid for their services. They were often young people who had first come into contact with liberal ideas when being educated in the larger cities. Whatever the particular social and economic backgrounds of their families---and these varied a good deal---they were brought together by common ideals in regard to the miserable situations which they observed around them and they felt committed to a "mission" of social reform on behalf of the masses of "ordinary people" with whom they identified but were not themselves members. They shared strong feelings of fellowship with the rank and file members of social movement groups, whom they considered as "comrades" or "colleagues" on the basis of the "in-group" feelings they adopted from them or with them. They may be referred to as "professional social movement activists" and were the people who actually sustained the social movements of the times.

Even though the "fellowship" between these professional activists was later often marred by factional disputes and ideological differences, they constituted special and crucially important elements in local communities and in the national society. It was they who brought into being and who largely operated what has been

⁵⁸ Sin Yongha, *op. cit.*, pp.89-93.

commonly referred to as "social movement sector" of the society. This "sector" consisted of all social movement groups and their activists, excluding those involved in collaboration with the Japanese.

The underlying principles and motives of the social movement sector were, broadly, to promote, reform and improve society. The aims and purposes of the multitude of groups that developed ranged all the way from action on the basic political and economic issues already noted to concern with welfare and social problems under the banners of, for example, the "No Smoking and No Drinking Movement", the "Famine Relief Society" and the "Mutual Benefit Society". The significance of the rapid increase in the number of social movement groups nationally can be appreciated if we also think of this in terms of what was happening in local communities. For example, in the case of Chinju, where the *Hyongpyongsa* was eventually launched, some fifty associations were founded between 1920 to 1924.⁵⁹ These included labour and peasant societies, religious youth clubs and unofficial school support associations.

There was variety in their identities, and the differences and similarities between them often lent richness to their interconnections. On occasions of their respective social events, for example, members of one or more other groups usually received warm hospitality as special guests. The general sympathies of the "professional

⁵⁹ Kim Chungsoŏp (Joong-Seop) and Yu Nakgun, op. cit., pp.9-43.

activists" in a wide range of programmes and activities greatly enhanced the overall atmosphere of liveliness and common enterprise in the social movement sector. Different groups supported each other in improving their respective standings and in encouraging each other's activities. For example, the exchange of congratulatory telegrams, occasional joint activities, and attendance at each other's meetings became standard practices. As a result, the mobilisation of members and resources at local, regional and national levels was much facilitated and federal organisations with varieties of sub-groups were common.

This "era of social movements" was, in the early 1920s, accompanied by and closely associated with the growth of a Korean press, including the two main nationalist newspapers of *Choson Ilbo* and *Tonga Ilbo*. When newspapers and periodicals began to print, they naturally needed reporters both in Seoul and in the many towns and cities where they established local branches. Even though the economic rewards were poor, many social movement activists were attracted to journalism. As reporters and, in a few cases, as directors of local branches, they had good opportunities to become involved in social activities while simultaneously reporting on them for their head offices in Seoul. As a result of their commitments to different movements, the newspapers allocated a considerable amount of space to local activities which were frequently reported in detail and from a sympathetic and favourable stance. This clearly contributed to the wide dissemination of viewpoints in a way that facilitated and

enhanced the activities of the social movement sector. It also explains how and why, as we saw Chapter 1, the press of the period proves such a good source of materials for the study of the *Hyongpyongsa* and other social movements.

The expansion of social movements in the society as a whole undoubtedly affected the *paekjong* community and was an important factor in the growth of the *paekjong*'s realisation of their own situation. It also contributed to the welcome and support received by *Hyongpyongsa* branches from local professional activists. Although, as we shall later see, the *Hyongpyong* movement met with much opposition from ordinary people, there was a section of its external environment only too ready to accept and propagate the idea that the *paekjong* were fully entitled to seek their own emancipation.

III. THE SPREAD OF THE EGALITARIAN IDEA

Although it is certainly difficult to establish precisely how ideas and visions affect the birth and development of a social movement, there can be no doubt that they do play a crucial role. In the case of the *Hyongpyongsa*, the idea of egalitarianism and the vision of the *paekjong*'s emancipation into respected members of society operated at two levels: one was directly related to themselves as *paekjong* and the other was more indirect in that it bore on the idea of a generally egalitarian

society. Whatever the origins of the idea and the vision may have been, they had to be newly re-defined and adapted to the context of the *Hyongpyong* movement.

There were two religious traditions with a direct relation to the vision of liberating the *paekjong* from their stigmatised status. The first was *Tonghak* [Eastern Religion] which was founded in the mid-nineteenth century. Even though it had its origins in diverse pre-existing thoughts and traditions, it certainly contributed to the spread of the egalitarian idea in the late Choson period.⁶⁰ The best known phrase in regard to its main theme was "*In-nae-Ch'ŏn*" [Human is equal to Heaven]. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the leaders of *Tonghak* peasant war in 1894 demanded that distinctions of social status, including those bearing on *paekjong*, should be abolished. During the war, the *Tonghak*'s area of influence extended to most parts of southern Korea and was strongest in the Cholla and Kyongsang Provinces,⁶¹ and it was here that *Tonghak* beliefs and attitudes were most widely accepted. This may be a simple reflection of the fact that it was in the south that the idea of resisting, and rebelling against, the rigid hierarchies of Choson society had gained considerable ground by the late nineteenth century.

⁶⁰ Kim Inhwan, "19 Segi Tonghak Sasang-ŭi Songgyŏk" [The Characteristics of Tonghak Thought in the Nineteenth Century], in Chin Tokgyu et al., *19 Segi Han'guk Chŏnt'ong Sahoe-ŭi Pyŏnmo-wa Minjung Ŭisik* [The Transformation of Korean Traditional Society and People's Consciousness in the Nineteenth Century], (Seoul, Korea University Press, 1982), pp.91-150.

⁶¹ *Kyŏngsang Namdo Chi* [Reports on South Kyongsang Province], Vol.2 (1963).

The second significant religious tradition was Christianity which, as briefly mentioned in the previous chapter, was introduced to the *paekjong* by missionaries in the Seoul and Chinju areas. In the late nineteenth century, S. F. Moore, of the American Presbyterian Mission, initiated evangelistic work among the *paekjong* in Seoul.⁶² Though there are few precise details of his success, it is reported that he converted a large number of *paekjong* and that he continued his mission among them until the early years of the twentieth century.⁶³

The Seoul experience was largely repeated in Chinju by Hugh Curell, an Australian Presbyterian missionary, who began his work there in 1905. A number of *paekjong* were converted to Christianity and special services were conducted for them separately from those for ordinary non-*paekjong* converts.⁶⁴ His successor, D. M. Lyall, intensified mission work in the segregated *paekjong* community, but at the same time urged that *paekjong* members should attend the services held for ordinary people. It is recorded that in 1909 there was trouble over the issue of common attendance but efforts to maintain the practice continued.⁶⁵ The Christian mission in the *paekjong* community gave a high priority ^{to} ~~on~~ the status of women and children in association with welfare activities including

⁶² S. F. Moore, op. cit.; and L.G. Paik, *The History of Protestant Missions in Korea: 1832-1910* (1927: reprinted in Seoul, Yonsei University Press, 1971).

⁶³ L. G. Paik, op. cit., p.280.

⁶⁴ Chinju Kyohoesa Yonhyŏk Wiwŏnhoe [Committee for the Compilation of the History of Chinju Church], *Chinjumyon Okbongni Yesugyo Changnohoe Yonhyŏksa* [The History of the Presbyterian Church in Okbong, Chinju], (Chinju, 1930).

⁶⁵ S. F. Moore, op. cit.

the opening of a hospital and schools.⁶⁶ There is, however, little recorded evidence on the later history of the Christian mission in Chinju.

Apart from the effects of Christian missionary work among the *paekjong* community itself, however, it is clear that the *paekjong* were increasingly affected by the growth of emancipatory and egalitarian ideas in the society as a whole. The breakdown of the general hierarchies of Choson society was inevitably associated with a challenge to inherited inequality in the western-style education mainly introduced by Christian missionaries.⁶⁷ People who had been exposed to "new" ideas at school were prominent in the March 1 Movement of 1919 and continued to play key roles in the subsequent development of the social movement sector.⁶⁸ At the same time, these ideas became increasingly mixed and differentiated under the additional ideological influences of nationalism and socialism,⁶⁹ and socialist ideas became the principal radical force in relation to inequality with the formation of a variety of socialist groups.⁷⁰

⁶⁶ On the general strategy of missionaries, see Pak Yŏngsin, "Ch'ogi Kaesin'gyo Sŏn'gyosa-ui Sŏn'gyo Undong Chŏllyak" [Strategies of the Early Protestant Missionaries Movement], *Tongbanghakji* [Journal of Korean Studies], Vols.46-48 (June 1985), pp.529-553.

⁶⁷ cf. Son Insu, op. cit.

⁶⁸ No Yongt'aek, op. cit.

⁶⁹ Pae Sŏngyong, "Choson Sahoe Undong-ŭi Sajŏk Koch'al" [A Study of the History of the Korean Social Movements], *Kaebŏk*, Vol.67 (March 1926), p.32; and Kang Tongjin, "Iljeha-ui Han'guk Sahoe Undongsa Yon'gu" [Study on the History of Korean Social Movements under Japanese Rule], in An Pyŏngjik and Pak Sŏngsu (eds.), *Han'guk Kundae Minjok Undongsa* [The History of Contemporary Nationalist Movements in Korea], (Seoul, Tolbyegae, 1980), pp.482-516.

⁷⁰ For details of the communist movement in general, see Kim Chunyŏp and Kim Ch'angsun, op. cit., 5 vols.

While radical ideas were systematically propagated by educated social activists, a less focused awareness of the unfairness of traditional conventions was also developing within a wide spectrum of the members of the society. Thus, when social activists sought to ^{disseminate} ~~disseminate~~ their ideas through various channels including unofficial schools and circuit lectures, they often encountered ready responses. Such formal education as there had been in the late nineteenth century was largely replaced by unofficial schools which represented new "modern" ideas, and circuit lectures were often given by students and social movement activists. Students from the larger towns and even from abroad commonly visited rural areas in special groups during their vacations. Their activities contributed to the formation of local associations and to the building up of connections between separate existing groups, while local activists learnt how to organise their own smaller circuit units which then visited the immediate surrounding areas.⁷¹

The central point is that, whatever the initial origins of the new ideas, they were in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries spread by a vigorous group of social activists through a variety of channels to a public with many willing respondents, including members of the *paekjong* community.

⁷¹ For such developments in Chinju, see Kim Chungsoŏp (Joong-Seop) and Yu Nakgun, *op. cit.*

CONCLUSION

The successful launch of a social movement can only take place in a situation conducive to it. This chapter has attempted to explain that the general situation of the *paekjong* in the early twentieth century contained a variety of factors on the basis of which the *Hyongpyong* movement was able to come into being in the 1920s. The penetration of new ideas into the community from the outside had clearly brought about changes which allowed the *paekjong* to react against the prejudice and discrimination which they had previously endured.

Under Japanese colonial rule, there were numerous social movement groups, especially after the March 1 Movement. Those who initiated these activities had close relations with each others and constituted a fairly distinct element in the wider society. Although the various groups often had different specific aims, their leaders and activists commonly supported each other and co-operated in joint activities. The common element running through these activities and groups lay in the new ideas of egalitarianism and emancipation. The rise of these new ideas had close connections with the *Tonghak* and Christian traditions, as well as with the ideologies of liberalism and socialism.

Taken together with Chapter 2, which dwelt on the situation of the *paekjong* in Choson society, this chapter points to the social conditions which were conducive to the

foundation of the *Hyongpyongsa* in the 1920s. In terms of the concepts outlined in Chapter 1, these social conditions contained both "constraining" and "enabling" elements. The way in which these conditions operated in the establishment and development of the *Hyongpyongsa* are discussed in the following chapters.

PART TWO

THE *HYONGPYONG* MOVEMENT: 1923-1940

CHAPTER FOUR

THE BIRTH OF THE *HYONGPYONG* MOVEMENT

When the *Hyongpyongsa* was launched in the early 1920s, the circumstances both inside and outside the *paekjong* community were quite markedly different from those that had prevailed during the Choson Dynasty. As explained in the previous two chapters, there was now a certain contradiction in the social status of the *paekjong* in that they had gained nominal and official recognition of their human rights but were still stigmatised by most ordinary people who continued to discriminate against them. And, in a similarly contradictory way, there had been considerable growth in their collective economic capacity, but with a few members only becoming wealthy as the loss of communal privileges over the traditional industries had occurred with competition from non-*paekjong*, including Japanese. These changes were closely related to the launch of the *Hyongpyongsa*.

This chapter dwells on the emergence of the *Hyongpyong* movement and its development and consequences during the first two years. The first section is devoted to a reconstruction of the details of *Hyongpyongsa*'s formation in Chinju; the second to its organisation at different levels; the third to a discussion of its participants and supporters; the fourth to its initial aims and purposes; and the fifth and last to its strategies for action.

I. THE LAUNCH OF THE *HYONGPYONGSA* IN CHINJU IN 1923

The *Hyongpyongsa* was officially launched in Chinju, Kyong-Nam Province, on 24 April 1923. As seen in the previous chapter, there had already been several significant events bearing on the *paekjong* in Chinju. Among them were the *paekjong*'s appeal to be allowed to wear ordinary hats and clothes in 1900, their attendance at a Christian church in 1909, and their attempt to organise an association in 1910. But even in the early 1920s, the *paekjong* community in Chinju was still residentially segregated. There were about 350 *paekjong* there.¹ Some had apparently moved out of their segregated area,² but most were still living there, outside the city centre. However, it is difficult to know whether Chinju was an exceptional city in retaining severe social discrimination against the

1 Kim Uihwan, "Ilje Ch'ihwa-ŭi Hyongpyong Undong Ko" [A Study on the Hyongpyong Movement under Japanese Rule], *Hyangt'o Seoul* [Journal of Seoul City], No.31 (1967), p.59. Another estimate was as high as 400 households of *paekjong*. cf. Kim Yonggi, "Hyongpyong Undong-ŭi Paljŏn," [The Development of the Hyongpyong Movement], *Kyŏngsang Namdo Chi* [Reports on South Kyongsang Province], Vol.1 (Pusan, 1959), p.818. On the basis of the total population (14,136 in 1920), the figure of 350 *paekjong* is believed to be the best estimate. cf. Katsuda Isuke, *Chinju Taikan* [Overview on Chinju], (Chinju, 1940), p.70.

2 For example, Chŏng Ch'anjo, a *paekjong* and treasurer at the foundation of the *Hyongpyongsa*, was living next door to Kang Sangho's house, one of the non-*paekjong* founders. Interviews with Yi Ch'unyŏp (Kang's widow, born in 1902; 9 May 1984 and 17 May 1986) and Chŏng Taegon (Chŏng's son, born in 1929; 18 May 1986). And Yi Hakch'an, one of the *paekjong* founders, was also living in the city centre at its foundation. (Interview with Yi Ch'unyop).

paekjong, in demanding more animal slaughtering for its prosperous trade, or in having a substantial population of *paekjong*. There were certainly several cities with larger numbers of slaughterhouses³ and *paekjong*⁴.

Whatever the case, it is worth dwelling on the historical experiences of Chinju in regard to the *paekjong* issue. It was the political, economic and cultural centre of its region with a long history as a provincial capital and only lost this status to Pusan in 1925. It also had a well-known history of collective resistance to the establishment.⁵ Peasant rebellions, started in Chinju, had spread throughout the country in the nineteenth century. Again, during the *Tonghak* peasant war, the *Tonghak* army had occupied the area around Chinju with the support of its inhabitants,⁶ and in the March 1 Movement, it was the centre from which the demonstrations developed. After the massive protest of 1919, social activists in Chinju maintained a momentum for social reform in the 1920s.⁷ They

³ Even in Kyŏng-Nam Province, there were several cities with a large number of slaughters (e.g. Tongnae, Ch'angwon, Wulsan, Milyang, Kŏch'ang and Ŭiryong). Kyongnam Ilbo, 26 February 1910.

⁴ According to a survey in Kyŏng-Puk Province on June 1929, several cities such as Kimch'ŏn, Yech'ŏn, Uisong, Sangju and Andong had more *paekjong* than Chinju. cf. Kyongsang Pukdo Keisatsubu [Bureau of Police Affairs, North Kyongsang Province], *Koto Keisatsu Yoshi*, [Brief History of Supreme Police], (Taegu, 1934), pp.350-351.

⁵ There is one claim, but without concrete evidence, that those historical events contributed to the foundation of the *Hyongpyongsa*. Yi Myonggil, "Sinbunje Haech'e-wa Hyongpyongsa Undong" [The Breakdown of Status Structure and the Hyongpyong Movement], (1), *Chinju Sangŭi* [Journal of Chinju Commercial Board], Vol.19 (April 1986), pp.14-18.

⁶ *Kyŏngsang Namdo Chi* [Reports on South Kyongsang Province], Vol.2, (1961) pp.823-831.

⁷ My research shows substantial continuity between the March 1 Movement and social movements in the 1920s in

had in fact been involved in the growth of numerous social movements. While establishing contacts with activists in other cities and towns, they developed new ideas for social action and expanded these through the period of the emergence of substantial programmes. They had simultaneously participated in several groups, as was typical of some "professional social movement activists" discussed in the previous chapter. They had established numerous social movement groups in Chinju---up to close on 50 between 1919 and 1923.⁸ Their activities were varied, ranging from labour and peasant affairs to church youth programmes. Despite often diverse immediate goals, all had the broad underlying principle of wanting to transform an unequal and unjust society.⁹ There was in these movements a general sympathy towards the deprived members of society. In the circumstances of the time, some of the activities thus dwelt on the *paekjong's* situation. However, the *Hyongpyongsa* was not organised only by the professional social activists. The more influential *paekjong* also participated actively in launching the association and this gave the movement a particular slant which can only be appreciated in the light of the *paekjong's* historical background outlined in Chapter 2.

It is not clear precisely when the founding members began to discuss the organisation of the new association,

Chinju. cf. Kim Chungsoep (Joong-Seop) and Yu Nakgun, "1920 nyŏndae Ch'o Sahoe Undong-ŭi Tonghyang: Chinju Chiyŏk-ŭl Chungsim-ŭro," [Trends of Social Movements in the Early 1920s in Chinju], *Hyonsang-gwa Insik* [Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences], Vol.10 No.4 (Winter 1986), pp.9-43.

⁸ *ibid.*, pp.12-31.

⁹ *ibid.*, pp.35-38.

but it would appear to have been in the winter of 1922 or the spring of 1923. Whatever the case, there is evidence that the *Hyongpyong* movement was formally established in the spring of 1923, specifically in April,¹⁰ with the founding members actively canvassing and persuading *paekjong* to join the new association. The first well-documented result was a meeting of about 70 *paekjong* on 24 April 1923 in the city centre of Chinju. This was the formal promotion meeting of the *Hyongpyongsa*.¹¹ On the following day, there was an inaugural meeting of the association, also in Chinju, of over 80 *paekjong*. Kang Sangho presided over the meeting as its new provisional chairman. The rules of the new association were formally established and plans were adopted for future action concerning the education of the members and for publicly announcing their goals. Committee members were elected to take charge of various assignments at the headquarters.¹² Those present at the meeting agreed to proclaim a

¹⁰ Sin Hyŏnsu, one of the founders, testified that he had discussed the foundation of the *Hyongpyongsa* with Kang Sangho in March 1923 on the way from Chongŭp, Chŏn-Nam Province, where they had been for another matter, attending the *Poch'ŏngyo* [Universal Heaven Religion] worship and frankly, seeking for financial aid from the religious group. cf. Kim Yonggi, op. cit., pp.816-818. The other source confirms that Sin and Kang had left for Chongup along with other companions on 15 March 1923. *Kaebŏk*, Vol.4 No.5, (May 1923) p.59. However, there is no direct connection between their trip and the foundation of the association.

¹¹ Choson Ilbo, 30 April 1923.

¹² Choson Ilbo, 30 April 1923. Members of ^{the} executive committee were Kang Sangho, Sin Hyŏnsu, Ch'ŏn Sŏkgu, Chang Chip'il and Yi Hakch'an. Ha Sŏkgŭm and Pak Hoduk were chosen as coordinators. Chŏng Ch'anjo and Chang Chimun were selected as treasurer and ^{the} secretary respectively. And there were 7 members of ^{the} directorial board. All members of the executive committee except Kang, Sin and Ch'ŏn were known as *paekjong*.

prospectus for action.¹³ The central contents of the prospectus concerned the liberation of the *paekjong* and the aim of equity for them as human beings. Copies of the prospectus were then delivered both to ordinary people and *paekjong* from village to village.

The leaders of the newly launched social movement sought ways to announce their initial goals in public. One step taken was to dispatch some members to explain their goals in the southern area of Kyŏng-Nam Province. Thousands of leaflets proclaiming the initial goals were also circulated in towns, and national newspapers were used to disseminate the message to every corner of the country. A large gathering was planned for 13 May 1923 to celebrate the foundation of the movement and sums of money were donated for future action. Thus, the *Hyongpyong* movement was launched, both nominally and practically.

After this inaugural meeting, the tour committee for publicity, which originally consisted of two groups, received sufficient response in many places to enable it to expand to four groups which then extended their visits from Kyŏng-Nam Province to various parts of southern Korea.¹⁴

As planned, the celebration gathering was held in Chinju on Sunday 13 May 1923.¹⁵ About 10 o'clock in the morning, the staff circulated approximately 7,000 leaflets around the town by car. They then joined the meeting at Chinju theatre, which was at the time the biggest building

¹³ Choson Ilbo, 30 April 1923.

¹⁴ Choson Ilbo, 14 May 1923.

¹⁵ See Choson Ilbo, 19 May 1923; Tonga Ilbo, 17 May 1923.

in the town. At 1 o'clock, Kang Sangho announced the opening of the meeting in the presence of over 400 *paekjong* and other sympathisers. As a result of previous publicity, there were numerous *paekjong* from various areas, with *paekjong* from at least 22 counties or communities in Kyong-Nam Province.¹⁶ In addition, there were a few influential members from *paekjong* communities in the other provinces. Among the latter were O Songhwan and Ch'ŏn Myŏngsun of Ch'ung-Nam Province, and Kim Kyŏngsam of Kyŏng-Puk Province.

Kang's opening announcement was followed by Sin Hyonsu's explanation of the main purpose of the movement, and Chŏng Hŭich'an read several dozen telegrams received from social movement groups in Korea as well as in Japan. This was followed with speeches by guests, most of whom were non-*paekjong* professional social movement activists from Chinju. They expressed strong confidence in the foundation of the association and in the historic significance of the steps being taken. The meeting ended around 6:30 p.m. with loud cheering and popular acclaim. A total sum of about 2,200 won was donated, individually and collectively, at the meeting.¹⁷

On the following day, the delegates who had attended the celebration gathering held a meeting chaired by Sin Hyŏnsu.¹⁸ They decided on a set of policies for the management of the new association. According to decisions

¹⁶ The list of donor's names and places was published in a newspaper. Choson Ilbo, 24 May 1923.

¹⁷ Choson Ilbo, 21 May 1923.

¹⁸ Choson Ilbo, 21 May 1923.

taken, the work at their headquarters was to be divided into the five major sections of general affairs, treasury, external liaison, education, and supervision of membership, and the headquarters were to be run by one full time secretary.¹⁹ The delegates agreed to establish the movement as a national organisation, with the result that they set about opening provincial headquarters in each province with local branches in many counties. To fund the headquarters, they agreed to collect money through both voluntary donations and a compulsory membership fee. Significant organisational changes planned included the expansion and the reshuffling of the headquarters staff. The previous staff had consisted mainly of Chinju people, but these were now to be replaced with members from various areas.²⁰ And some heads of the provincial headquarters were appointed.²¹ Most of those attending the meeting were later to contribute to the development of the movement at both the local and national levels.

¹⁹ Chang Chip'il was chosen as the full-time secretary. This became a decisive moment for Chang himself as he was thus presented with the opportunity to play a key role in the development of the movement.

²⁰ Choson Ilbo, 21 May 1923. Executive committee members included the incumbent members from Chinju. These were Kang Sangho, Sin Hyŏnsu, Ch'ŏn Sŏkku, Chŏng Hŭich'an, Chang Chip'il, and Yi Hakch'an. In addition, there were Yi Sŏngsun and Cho Iksŏn from Pusan, Pak Yusŏn and Yi Sangyun from Masan, and Kim Kyŏngsam from Taegu. All executive committee members except Kim Kyŏngsam were well known in Kyŏng-Nam Province. However, members of the directors' board were not publicised except Ha Kyŏngsuk from Chinju.

²¹ The heads whose names appeared in the newspapers were Kim Kyŏngsam from Taegu of Kyong-Puk Province, Ch'ŏn Myŏngsun from Nonsan of Ch'ung-Nam Province, and Kang T'aewŏn from Okch'ŏn of Ch'ung-Puk Province. cf. Choson Ilbo, 24 May 1923.

After the meeting in Chinju, the headquarters staff were sent to different areas in southern Korea to encourage members to open local branches.²² One of two groups was led by Sin Hyonsu and Chang Chip'il, the other by Kang Sangho and Yi Hakch'an. Their trips were mainly to the Ch'ungch'ong and Cholla areas. After returning to headquarters, meetings were held to evaluate their activities and discuss future action.²³ The agenda of the meeting seems to reflect the main concern in these early days of the movement: (1) there was general agreement to keep in touch with the local branches which would, sooner or later, open their offices; (2) as funds grew, other activities were to be launched, including the establishment of a business to provide work for unemployed members and the opening of an unofficial school for uneducated members; (3) members were actively encouraged to read newspapers and books for their general enlightenment; and (4) plans were set up for the protection of members when facing attacks by ordinary people.

Meanwhile, there were various responses from the rest of the Chinju people. From the time of the inaugural meeting on 24 April till the celebration gathering on 13 May, there had been little or no antagonistic reaction to the movement. The first negative response came, rather ironically, from the *kisaeng*, the female entertainers whose guild in Chinju turned down the *paekjong's* request to provide entertainments at the celebration gathering.²⁴ Then

²² Choson Ilbo, 21 June 1923.

²³ Choson Ilbo, 21 June 1923.

²⁴ Tonga Ilbo, 20 May 1923.

about ten days after the celebration meeting, the representatives of *nongch'ŏng* [farmers' office] from 24 nearby villages gathered in Chinju city centre in protest against the *paekjong* organisation and to start a meat boycott campaign.²⁵ After the meeting, a mob of several hundred people demonstrated in the city centre with banners "Destroy the *Hyongpyongsa*," and "Now Kang Sangho, Sin Hyonsu, Ch'ŏn Sŏkgu are *paekjong*". In the evening, members of the mob attacked the houses and shops of non-*paekjong* founding members of the *Hyongpyongsa*.²⁶ For several days, protesters and *paekjong* confronted each other repeatedly, while the meat boycott stopped people from buying meat and thus from interacting with *paekjong* and leaders of several social movements were accused of supporting the foundation of the *Hyongpyongsa*.²⁷

The net effect of their hostile responses to the development of the *Hyongpyong* movement seems to have been merely to provoke the members of the *Hyongpyongsa* to greater unity and to systematic organisation in their own defence. In the meantime, the leaders of social movements concluded that the ordinary people of Chinju had been

²⁵ Tonga Ilbo, 20 and 30 May 1923.

²⁶ Tonga Ilbo, 30 May 1923, and interviews with Yi Ch'unyp.

²⁷ Tonga Ilbo, 30 May 1923. The specifically accused groups were *Chinju Nodong Kongjehoe* [Labour Mutual Benefit Society] and *Chinju Ch'ŏngnyŏnhoe* [Youth Society]. Particularly, the Labour Society supplied the major non-*paekjong* key founders. For the nature of the *Nodong Kongjehoe*, see Sin Yongha, "Choson Nodong Kongjehoe-ui Ch'angnip-gwa Nodong Undong," [The Foundation of the Korean Labour Mutual Benefit Society and Its Labour Movement], *Han'guk-ŭi Sahoe Sinbun-gwa Sahoe Kyech'ŏng* [Social Status and Social Stratification in Korea], (Seoul, Munhak-gwa Chisŏngsa, 1986) pp.71-201.

provoked by landowners into attacking the *Hyongpyongsa* and its sympathisers.²⁸ Some landowners were strongly opposed to the leaders of the social movements whom they saw as being in sympathy with the peasants and thus in alliance with their tenants. The confrontation lasted for several days, during which time the leaders of the social movements were active in reducing tension and in mediating between the two sides. These problems were eventually resolved, with both sides working for better relationships. Thus, the *Hyongpyong* movement came to be accepted in Chinju, even though confrontations between its members and the hostile ordinary people still occurred from time to time.

II. THE DEVELOPMENT AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE *HYONGPYONG* MOVEMENT IN THE EARLY PERIOD: 1923-1924

1. GEOGRAPHICAL EXPANSION


After the foundation of the *Hyongpyongsa* in Chinju, the movement rapidly spread its geographical boundaries of action and influence, first into Kyŏng-Nam Province and later northwards. The list of places from which people came to attend the celebration gathering in Chinju gives some indication of the movement's geographical distribution during its incipient stage.

²⁸ Choson Ilbo, 13 and 15 June 1923; Tonga Ilbo, 27 June 1923.

Figure 4-1. Map of Location of Hyangpyang Groups in 1923

* Local branches founded in 1923

- 3 Kimhae
- 17 Hadong
- 18 Taegu
- 20 Taejŏn
- 21 Nonsan
- 22 Tongnae
- 23 Kyŏngju
- 24 Sangju
- 25 Yech'ŏn
- 26 Koryŏng
- 27 Andong
- 28 Uisŏng
- 29 Kimje
- 30 Chŏngup
- 31 Iri
- 32 Chŏnju
- 33 Kusan
- 34 Puan
- 35 Chulp'ŏ
- 36 Koch'ang
- 37 Sunch'ang
- 38 Kumsan
- 39 Kwangju
- 40 Mokp'ŏ
- 41 Naju
- 42 Songjŏng
- 43 Tamyang
- 44 Yŏngkwang
- 45 Pŏpsŏngp'ŏ
- 46 Nŏnju
- 47 Ch'ŏngju
- 48 Chech'ŏn
- 49 Ch'ungju
- 50 Ch'ŏngan
- 51 Pugang
- 52 Kongju
- 53 Ch'ŏnan
- 54 Hongŏng
- 55 Poryŏng
- 56 Sŏch'ŏn
- 57 Kanggyŏng
- 58 Puyŏ
- 59 Yesan
- 60 Pakch'ŏn



* Counties represented at the Chinju gathering on 13 May

- 1 Chinju
- 2 Pusan
- 3 Kimhae
- 4 Masan
- 5 Ch'angwŏn
- 6 Haman
- 7 Uiryŏng
- 8 T'ongyŏng
- 9 Kosŏng
- 10 Sach'ŏn
- 11 Ch'angnyŏng
- 12 Kŏch'ang
- 13 Milyang
- 14 Hapch'ŏn
- 15 Sanch'ŏng
- 16 Namhae
- 17 Hadong
- 18 Taegu
- 19 Okch'ŏn
- 20 Taejŏn
- 21 Nonsan

As seen in Figure 4-1, communities expressing interest were located in most of the major towns in Kyōng-Nam Province, along with some from other provinces such as Taegu, Okch'ŏn, Taejŏn and Nonsan.²⁹ In Kyong-Nam Province, at least 17 out of the then 21 counties³⁰ had sent delegates to the gathering. After the celebration in Chinju, another large meeting was held in Taejon, Ch'ung-Nam Province.³¹ This was attended by over 100 *paekjong*, mainly from the Ch'ungch'ŏng and Cholla areas, and a number of key executive members of the Chinju headquarters. After this meeting, the leaders intensified their campaign for the establishment of local branches, mainly in the Ch'ungch'ŏng and Chŏlla areas. As a result, the number of newly founded branches increased rapidly. There are, however, few detailed records of the development of the movement during this period. As shown in Table 4-1, one Japanese source would indicate that in addition to the national headquarters there were twelve regional headquarters and 67 local branches in the early period.

²⁹ Choson Ilbo, 24 May 1923.

³⁰ See *Kyōngsang Namdo Chi* [Reports on South Kyongsang Province], Vol.2 (Pusan, 1963).

³¹ Tonga Ilbo, 28 May 1923.

Table 4-1. Number and Provinces of *Hyongpyongsa* Branches in 1923/1924³²

province	region hdqs	local branches (%)--	
Kyŏnggi	1	1	1.5
Ch'ung-Puk	1	7	10.4
Ch'ung-Nam	1	16	23.9
Chŏn-Puk	1	6	9.0
Chŏn-Nam	1	6	9.0
Kyŏng-Puk	1	11	16.4
Kyŏng-Nam	2	17	25.4
Kangwŏn	2	3	4.5
Hwanghae	0	0	
P'yŏng-Puk	1	0	
P'yŏng-Nam	1	0	
Ham-Puk	0	0	
Ham-Nam	0	0	
Total	12	67	100.1%

source: Chosen Sotokufu, *Chosen no Gunshu* [Mass of Korea], (1926), p.183.

Another source reported 83 branches of the *Hyongpyongsa* for 1924.³³ Whatever their accuracy, these two figures would suggest that the *Hyongpyong* movement had been successfully launched in this early period. There is additional confirmation of this in the numerous newspaper reports on the movement's activities. As shown in Table 4-2, there were numerous newspaper articles, albeit scattered and sketchy, on the *Hyongpyongsa* activities in 1923.

³² The survey was supposedly conducted between the end of 1923 and mid-1924. As in regard to other figures of the Japanese colonial authorities, it is difficult to know how reliable these figures are, because they were compiled mainly from local police reports drawn up for the purpose of intelligence on anti-Japanese activities. Nonetheless, these figures from Japanese reports give some indication of the general trend of the movement.

³³ Chosen Sotokufu Keimu-Kyoku [Police Affairs Bureau, Korean Government-General], *Saikin ni okeru Chosen Chian Jokyō* [The Present Security Situation in Korea], (1933), p.168.

Table 4-2. Local Branches of the *Hyongpyongsa* Established in 1923

Province	Place	Date	Source
Ch'ung-Puk	Ch'ongju	7 July	CS, 14. 7.23
	Chech'on	4 Sep.	CS, 9. 9.23
	Ch'ungju	6 Sep.	CS, 11. 9.23
	Ch'ongan	8 Sep.	CS, 17. 9.23
	Pugang	no date	TA, 12.11.23
Ch'ung-Nam	Taejon	21 May	CS, 28. 5.23
	Nonsan	21 May	CS, 30. 5.23
	Kongju	6 June	TA, 11. 6.23 (region/hdq)
	Ch'onan	9 June	CS, 16. 6.23
	Hongsong	13 July	TA, 20. 7.23
	Poryong	16 July	TA, 2. 8.23
	Soch'on	20 July	CS, 16. 7.23 (planned)
	Kanggyong	2 Oct.	CS, 9.10.23
	PuyO	no date	TA, 12.11.23
	Yesan	no date	TA, 12.11.23
Chon-Puk	Kimje	20 May	TA, 26. 5.23 (<i>Sogwanghoe</i>)
	Chongup	23 May	CS, 5.27.23
	Iri	30 May	CS, 2. 6.23 (<i>Tonginhoe</i>)
	Chonju	31 May	TA, 6. 6.23
	Kunsan	30 May	CS, 4. 6.23
	Puan	late June	CS, 18. 7.23
	Chulp'o	5 Aug.	CS, 25. 8.23
	Koch'ang	6 Aug.	TA, 10. 8.23
	Sunch'ang	18 Sep.	TA, 3.10.23
	Kumsan		TA, 12.11.23
Chon-Nam	Kwangju	25 May	CS, 30. 5.23 (region/hdq)
	Mokp'o	27 May	CS, 2. 6.23
	Naju	4 June	CS, 14. 6.23
	Songjyong	5 June	CS, 13. 6.23
	Tamyang	10 June	CS, 18. 6.23
	Yonggwang	27 July	CS, 15. 8.23
	Popsongp'o	29 July	CS, 15. 8.23
	Nungju	early Aug.	CS, 16. 8.23
Kyong-Puk	Taegu	20 May	CS, 29. 5.23 (region/hdq)
	Kyongju	18 July	CS, 27. 7.23
	Sangju	1 Aug.	CS, 30. 8.23 (<i>Sup'yonghoe</i>)
	Yech'on	early Aug.	CS, 15. 8.23
	Koryong	20 Sep.	CS, 9.10.23
	Andong	early Oct.	TA, 12.10.23
	Uisong	10 Nov.	CS, 19.10.23
Kyong-Nam	Kimhae	11 Aug.	TA, 18. 8.23
	Hadong	19 Aug.	CS, 25. 8.23
	Tongnae	4 Sep.	CS, 11. 9.23
	Chinju	early Oct.	CS, 6.10.23 (region/hdq)
P'yong-Puk	Pakch'on	mid July	TA, 20. 7.23
TOTAL	45 branches		

(Key) CS: Choson Ilbo, TA: Tonga Ilbo.

The local branches founded between May and September were mainly in Ch'ungch'ŏng and Ch'ŏlla Provinces. By the end of 1923, most major towns in the southern area would appear to have settled down to local programmes of action,³⁴ and there can be little doubt that there was a marked regional difference between the southern and northern areas of the country.³⁵ With the exception of one branch, all those with records of public action were in the south. The foundation of Pakch'ŏn branch in Py'ŏng-Puk Province was the only one recorded in the north in 1923. Despite slight differences in numbers, the overall view of the geographical location of branches revealed by newspaper reports is very similar to that portrayed by the Japanese evidence presented in Table 4-1. This low level of activity in the north may possibly be a consequence of the location of the national headquarters and a consequent inability to develop a greater following in the north.³⁶ It may also have been a factor of the internal factional struggle which is discussed in the next chapter.

Whatever the case, the geographical expansion in the south may be attributed to the efforts of the executive

³⁴ Even though few towns in Kyong-Nam Province were mentioned in the newspapers, there is a good deal of indirect evidence that the people who attended the celebration gathering in Chinju maintained their work for the movement in their respective localities.

³⁵ The regional differences will be further discussed in Chapter 10.

³⁶ Choson Ilbo, 4 June 1923.

members of the national headquarters in Chinju.³⁷ In the course of a well-organised programme, they visited potential *paekjong* members in all the major towns and on occasion convened and presided over promotion meetings for local branches. At these meetings, they commonly gave lectures on the historic meaning of the movement and encouraged *paekjong* to join it.

Their campaigns were usually supported by social movement activists in the regions, especially in the Cholla area. Furthermore, like Ch'oe Chungjin in Chŏngŭp and Im Chunghwan in Iri, some activists followed the example of the leaders in establishing local branches. With the support of local *paekjong*, they were often successful in launching local activities in towns such as Chŏngŭp, Naju, Yŏnggwang, and Tamyang. The leaders of regional headquarters also participated actively, especially in drawing local *paekjong* into action. Their efforts were particularly successful in Naju, Tamyang, Kunsan, Koch'ang and Kyongju.

In addition, it is important to note that in some areas the local *paekjong* acted independently to establish their own associations, and there were communities where they even created their own distinctive titles, for example, *Sŏgwanghoe* [Dawning Brightness Society] in Kimje and *Tonginhoe* [Equal Human Society] in Iri. Some of these names were readily surrendered when these local organisations merged with the *Hyongpyongsa*. In one case, at

³⁷ Among them were Chang Chip'il, Sin Hyŏnsu, Kang Sangho, Yi Hakch'an and Chŏng Hŭich'an.

least, however, that of *Sup'yŏng Tongmaenghoe* [Level Union] in Sangju, the local organisation at first sought to maintain its independence and this led to its being at odds with the *Hyongpyongsa* for a while.³⁸

As the organisational basis of the movement developed, it was decided that regional headquarters should be located in provincial capitals. Thus, the regional headquarters of Ch'ung-Nam Province was moved from Nonsan to Kongju. There were also regional headquarters in Chonju for Chon-Puk Province, Kwangju for Chŏn-Nam Province, Taegu for Kyong-Puk Province and Chinju for Kyŏng-Nam Province. The launching of each headquarters followed the same patterns as in Chinju. After an inaugural meeting, a celebration gathering was held in Taegu (on 10 June),³⁹ Chŏnju (on 24 June),⁴⁰ Kwangju (on 1 July),⁴¹ and Kongju (on 9 July).⁴² Numerous members and guests from each area attended their gatherings; thousands of leaflets were distributed by car, and speeches were made by professional social activists and others. These gatherings greatly stimulated the movement in the regions. The role of the leaders of the regional headquarters was not only to represent each area on the national scene, but also to develop and lead activities inside their respective areas.

³⁸ Tonga Ilbo, 13 February 1924. At the national meeting in Pusan in 1924, delegates persuaded the *Sup'yŏnghoe* to join the *Hyongpyongsa*.

³⁹ Choson Ilbo, 8 June 1923; Maeil Sinbo, 9 June 1923; Tonga Ilbo, 10 June 1923.

⁴⁰ Tonga Ilbo, 26 June 1923; Choson Ilbo, 30 June 1923; Maeil Sinbo, 1 July 1923.

⁴¹ Tonga Ilbo, 5 July 1923; Choson Ilbo, 6 July 1923.

⁴² Tonga Ilbo, 9 July 1923.

The rapid development of the movement seems to have been accompanied by increasing confidence and commitment to the cause. At a special national meeting in Pusan held on 10 to 11 February 1924, there were over 330 delegates from 49 counties.⁴³ At this meeting, led by Kang Sangho and Chang Chip'il, the delegates dwelt on the main current issues then facing the movement.⁴⁴ These ranged from education for the members and their children to relations with *Suiheisha* [Leveller Society] and the Japanese colonial authorities and to organisational expansion, including the move of the national headquarters from Chinju to Seoul. When informed that about 3,100 won were urgently needed for the maintenance of the movement, the delegates easily raised 3,200 won.⁴⁵ Plans were also laid to celebrate the anniversary of the foundation at a national meeting and a series of regional meetings which were all to be held on 24 April 1924.

2. THE ORGANISATION: NATIONAL AND LOCAL LEVELS

At the inaugural meeting held on 24 April 1923, proposals had been made to organise a national network for action.⁴⁶ A hierarchical organisation was envisaged with national, regional, and local programmes.⁴⁷ The national

⁴³ Tonga Ilbo, 12 February 1924.

⁴⁴ Tonga Ilbo, 13 February 1924.

⁴⁵ Tonga Ilbo, 15 February 1924.

⁴⁶ Kim Uihwan, op. cit., pp.60-63.

⁴⁷ "Constitution of the *Hyongpyongsa*", Items 2 and 14, referred from Chosen Sotokufu, *Chosen no Gunshu* [Mass of Korea], (1926), pp.179-181.

headquarters, located in Chinju,⁴⁸ was to have power to control regional headquarters and local branches in the provinces and counties. The local branches would then be required to submit reports on action to regional and national headquarters and they would have the right to send delegates to both national and regional meetings.⁴⁹ The members at each level would thus have channels to express their opinions. The intention was to prevent subordinate groups from being unilaterally manipulated from the top of the hierarchy and to allow them as much autonomy as possible, while ensuring that the influence of the national organisation continued to be exercised over their activities.

As the organisation developed, the national headquarters consisted of several sections. The executive committee took decisions on the general direction of the movement. It consisted of one treasurer and several secretaries---one for internal affairs, one for education one for the supervision of members, and one for external relations. Their work was regularly superintended by both annual and occasional national meetings.⁵⁰ Despite the division of labour thus envisaged, policy formulation and decision-making seem to have been carried out collectively


⁴⁸ The location of the national headquarters was clearly stated in the constitution. That it was located outside Seoul was quite exceptional, and soon caused a dispute over the efficiency of the location. However, Chinju became well known for its initiation of the movement, and is still perceived as having been the centre for the movement.

⁴⁹ "Constitution of the *Hyongpyongsa*," Items 14, 15, and 16.

⁵⁰ "Constitution of the *Hyongpyongsa*," Items 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12.

by key members of the executive committee and the incumbents of specified posts.

Figure 4-2. The Organisation of the *Hyongpyongsa* in the Early Period



At the local level, the organisation was also designed or perhaps emerged as hierarchical. As depicted in Figure 4-2, local branches were intended to be under the direct control of a head. Under the head of a branch, there were a vice-head, and then a general secretary, a treasurer, a recorder and an accountant. In addition to the managing section, there was a council of key members with a chairman and several councillors. Even though it is difficult to find firm information on the function of the council, it seems probable that it was an independent group which discussed general affairs and monitored the actions of the managing section. As a result, even at the local level, it

probably influenced policies and activities which were collectively decided, at least nominally. The available information on this is hazy.

Another peculiar aspect of the organisation was the role of advisers, particularly in the branches of the Cholla area. There is little information on the social backgrounds of these advisers except in the cases of Iri and Chongup.⁵¹ In Iri, their social positions were varied, including a banker, a government official, a medical doctor and the head of a youth club. However, their social positions were generally connected with social movements in the region. And among them were prominent professional social movement activists like Sŏ Chŏnghŭi of Kwangju. Some were also managers of, or reporters for, local branches of national newspapers. The role of most advisers was to fill an honorary post but there were a few cases of active leadership. As in the case of Ch'oe Chungjin,⁵² some advisers had initiated activities in their respective local areas.

For funds to run the movement, the headquarters relied on both donations and compulsory membership fees. Each member paid an initial registration fee and a monthly membership fee.⁵³ The local branches were expected to pay fees to the national headquarters in proportion to the number of their members. In keeping with the constitution

⁵¹ Choson Ilbo, 2 June 1923; Tonga Ilbo, 3 June 1923 for Iri. And Choson Ilbo, 27 May 1923 for Chongup.

⁵² He was the manager of Chongup branch of *Choson Ilbo* as well as the head of a labour movement union in Chongup. cf. Choson Ilbo, 23 and 25 May, 4 and 23 June 1923; 24 June, 13 August 1924.

⁵³ "Constitution of the *Hyongpyongsa*," Item 6.

of the organisation, the executive members of the national headquarters visited local branches to collect funds.⁵⁴ In addition, local branches were required to pay the travelling expenses of the headquarters executive members who visited them.⁵⁵ Thus the maintenance of the movement was in principle the responsibility of rank and file members of the association acting under the leadership of the executive members.⁵⁶ In the early stage of the movement, the association experienced no financial problems due to the enthusiasm of the ordinary members. At all special gatherings such as the initial celebration gatherings and national meetings, substantial donations were collected from those who attended. With the support of local branches, the national organisation had, soon after the foundation of the movement, bought a building for its headquarters office and for an unofficial school.⁵⁷

3. THE PARTICIPANTS AND SUPPORTERS.

According to the *Hyongpyongsa* constitution, all Korean people were eligible to join the association, which was therefore open to all people sympathetic to the movement and not only to *paekjong*.⁵⁸ The members had to observe the constitution and the association's regulations. In addition, they had the rights to vote for and to be elected

⁵⁴ Choson Ilbo, 18 August 1923.

⁵⁵ Choson Ilbo, 18 August 1923.

⁵⁶ Some leaders contributed substantial sums from their own resources. Interviews with Yi Ch'unyop, Sin Yŏngjin (a grandson of Sin Hyonsu, 21 May 1986) and ex-members of the *Hyongpyongsa* and their descendants.

⁵⁷ Choson Ilbo, 18 and 29 August 1923.

⁵⁸ "Constitution of the *Hyongpyongsa*," Item 4.

to the managing board.⁵⁹ The *Hyongpyongsa* was thus inclusive in principle, even though its goals were exclusively on behalf of the *paekjong*. In practice, there were very few non-*paekjong* members. The vast majority of members were *paekjong* who spontaneously identified with the association and its goals as representing their own interests. One Japanese police report claimed that there were 7,681 members of the *Hyongpyongsa* out of their reported figure of 36,779 *paekjong* in the country in 1926.⁶⁰ However, the *Hyongpyongsa* claimed to have some 400,000 members.⁶¹

Even though the names of many key members are known, the full membership list of the association has not yet been found---if indeed it exists. The names of participants and supporters are known mainly from newspaper reports, and it is of considerable interest to examine their social backgrounds. The publicly known names may be divided into two categories: one of leaders who took charge of the direction and general affairs of the movement, the other of followers engaged mainly in practical and administrative matters.

The executive members and heads of the national and regional headquarters are here taken to have been "the leaders". On the whole, they were the people who had established the national headquarters and launched local

⁵⁹ "Constitution of the *Hyongpyongsa*," Items 5 and 6.

⁶⁰ Chosen Sotokufu Keimu-Kyoku, *Chosen no Chian Jokyo* [Public Security in Korea], (1927). The total figure included *paekjong* children and women, so that the number of members, who were mainly men, reflects a very high rate of involvement.

⁶¹ See Chapter 2.

activities. They included both non-*paekjong* and *paekjong*. Non-*paekjong* leaders had been actively involved in various social movements such as the peasant and labour movements since the March 1 Movement.⁶² They were relatively well educated and had established reputations as professional social movement activists.⁶³ Some had connections with journalism. For example, Kang Sangho and Sin Hyonsu in Chinju, Yo Hae in Masan, Ch'oe Chungjin in Chŏngŭp and Cho Chonghŭi in Iri had all been in charge of local nationalist ~~()~~ newspaper branches. Others, like Cho Uje and Ch'ŏn Sŏkku in Chinju, had connections with journalism as reporters. All those with newspaper connections played key roles in the development of the *Hyongpyongsa*, especially in cooperation with the leaders of other social movements.

Among *paekjong* leaders were people like Kim Kyŏngsam in Kyŏng-Puk Province, Chang Myŏngam in Chŏn-Nam Province, Kwŏn Tuho in Chŏn-Puk Province, and some regional leaders who were particularly responsible for launching local activities. Their initiatives were important in managing the movement and especially in promoting its rapid spread through their pre-existing connections with neighbouring *paekjong* communities.

The characteristics and backgrounds of the leaders who were themselves *paekjong* were exceptional in several ways. Some, like Chang Chip'il, had high education and

⁶² We may note Kang Sangho's career, in particular, which included six months in jail for his involvement in the March 1 Movement. Interviews with his widow, Yi Ch'unyop (9 May 1984; 17 May 1986). And Maeil Sinbo, 23 and 25 April 1919.

⁶³ In regard to the Chinju situation, see Kim Chungso (Joong-Seop) and Yu Nakgun, op. cit.

considerable experience in organising an earlier *paekjong* association in 1910; some had joined and participated in local *paekjong* fellowship clubs.⁶⁴ Most of them were relatively well-to-do merchants who had accumulated their wealth through the leather trade and/or butchering. The leaders from Kyongsang areas in particular were well known as wealthy merchants.⁶⁵ With both economic resources and social influence within the *paekjong* communities, they found themselves well able to mobilise *paekjong* for the movement.

While the leadership was mixed in background, the administrative work of the *Hyongpyongsa* was generally undertaken by ordinary *paekjong*. For example, *paekjong* members took charge of practical matters in relation to its treasury, internal affairs, and education. Despite the division of labour involved in running the association, the *paekjong* leaders normally shared work with all members under the instruction of the leading group. And the working members were generally younger than the leaders. Some of them, especially in the local branches of Kyŏng-Nam Province, had been present at the celebration gathering of the foundation of the association in Chinju. They were mainly engaged in relatively profitable occupations such as

⁶⁴ They were probably responsible for recording the history of local branches prior to the foundation of the association in Chinju. cf. *Tonga Ilbo*, 1 to 16 January 1929.

⁶⁵ Kim Kyŏngsam was well known as a leather trader (cf. *Tonga Ilbo*, 12 May 1923). Pak Yusŏn and Yi Sangyun in Masan, Yi Sŏngsun in Pusan and Yi Hakch'an in Chinju were known as wealthy merchants in their communities.

butchering.⁸⁶ Even though less wealthy than the leaders, they were better off than the rest of the *paekjong* who were still engaged in slaughtering, producing wickerwork or farming.

There was also another category of people who supported the development of the movement, without necessarily being formal members or regular workers. These non-member supporters included some who attended the celebration gatherings, or sent telegrams of congratulation at the time of the launch of the movement in Chinju or where regional branches were established. Many of the names of such supporters are not known, but there are records of those who were specially invited to the events and were apparently sympathetic to the movement. Some of these were influential people in local communities, such as Christian ministers, government officials, medical doctors and journalists. Most of ^{the} guests whose names appeared in the newspapers of the day already had strong personal contacts with social movements in their respective areas. Their involvement in the *Hyongpyong* movement has to be seen in the context of their sympathy and co-operation with social movement groups in general. Some groups, like *Puksonghoe* [North Star Society],⁸⁷ were inclined to socialist ideas and their members gave a warm welcome to the foundation of

⁸⁶ Interviews with their descendants, some of whom were still retaining their father's butcher shops when I met them.

⁸⁷ *Ch'okhudaē* [Pioneer Unit], (The Official Newsletter of the *Puksonghoe*), No.3 (15 May 1923, printed in Japan). The members of the association did not know about the foundation of the *Hyongpyongsa* in advance. Nevertheless, they immediately assumed that the movement would further the socialist cause.

the *Hyongpyongsa* without seeking to disguise their desire to use the movement in the pursuance of their own goals.

Strong support also came from newspapers, especially the two nationalist [*sic*] ones, *Choson Ilbo* and *Tonga Ilbo*. Journalists on these two papers who were generally perceived as liberals at the time and were often involved in various social movements. In consequence, both newspapers reported the events of the *Hyongpyong* movement in detail and with sympathy and enthusiasm. Their leading articles also gave strong support to the *Hyongpyongsa*.⁸⁸ It would seem, too, that some of articles on the *Hyongpyong* movement were written by journalists who were themselves affiliated to the movement. Whatever the case, the two newspapers became major channels of communication on *Hyongpyong* activities and undoubtedly contributed to the spread of the movement's outlook and goals.

The general conclusion to be drawn is that the *Hyongpyong* movement was founded and developed through cooperation between *paekjong* influentials in local communities and social movement activists. The former played the key role of establishing the movement in their own local communities, while the latter were mainly responsible for linking the movement with a wide set of social movements on the national scene.

⁸⁸ On its foundation, see *Choson Ilbo*, 3 May 1923; *Tonga Ilbo*, 18 May 1923. On its development, see *Tonga Ilbo*, 29 May 1923; *Choson Ilbo*, 21 May 1923. And on confrontations with the ordinary people, see *Tonga Ilbo*, 31 May 1923; *Choson Ilbo* 26 August 1923.

4. THE INITIAL AIMS AND PURPOSES.

In principle, the primary aim and purpose of the *Hyongpyongsa* was clearly to protest against the social discrimination and stigmatisation of the *paekjong*. In practice, however, the stance taken by the association was greatly affected by its context of social ferment in the 1920s. In its constitution, the aims of the association were stated as being "the abolition of classes and of contemptuous appellations, the enlightenment of members, and the promotion of mutual friendship among members."⁶⁹ These aims can be reduced to two central issues: human rights and community fellowship. The question of human rights was clearly posited in the first phrase of the declaration of the association presented to the inaugural meeting in Chinju.

Equity is the basis of society, and love is the essential idea in the human mind. Therefore, we want to overthrow unequal social classes, to put an end to contemptuous appellations and to enlighten people. Thus, we, too, will become truly human beings. This is the main principle of the association.⁷⁰

The issue of equity was repeatedly referred to in the statements and agenda of meetings, while the declaration of the *Sŏgwanghoe* in Kimje insisted on the aims of abolishing social discrimination against *paekjong* and of establishing

⁶⁹ "Constitution of the *Hyongpyongsa*," Item 3.

⁷⁰ "The Prospectus of the *Hyongpyongsa*," in *Choson Ilbo*, 30 April 1923.

human rights.⁷¹ At the two-day national meeting in Pusan in 1924, the members reaffirmed this basic aim of destroying all conventions of social inequality. They were quite fundamentally determined to resist unacceptable contempt and to remove all infringements of their rights as human beings. This was one ^{of} their basic goals,⁷² and it justifies my characterisation of the *Hyongpyongsa* as a human rights movement.

At the same time, the movement was directly involved in attempts to combat all social discrimination. Soon after its foundation, key members of the association visited the police headquarters of Kyŏng-Nam Province in order to urge that all marks against *paekjong* names should be effaced from government registers. The head of the provincial police accepted this demand in principle and eventually ordered the subordinate administration to erase all such marks.⁷³ The rank and file members of the association also took determined action on the general issue of the outward expression of their inferior status. For instance, some branch members collectively gave up their traditional hairstyles which were an important symbol of their inherited status.⁷⁴ In this they received support and co-operation from other social movement groups. (See, for example, a public lecture in Chinju⁷⁵ and the circuit

⁷¹ "Declaration of the *Sogwanghoe*," in *Choson Ilbo*, 26 May 1923; *Tonga Ilbo*, 26 May 1923.

⁷² *Tonga Ilbo*, 13 February 1924; *Choson Ilbo*, 21 June 1923.

⁷³ *Choson Ilbo*, 14 May 1923.

⁷⁴ *Tonga Ilbo*, 3 October 1923 for the case of Sunch'ang. And *Choson Ilbo*, 6 November 1923 for the case of Yech'on.

⁷⁵ *Choson Ilbo*, 9 May 1923.

lecture by *Puksonghoe*.⁷⁶ The two cases together provided opportunities for explaining various social issues, including the *Hyongpyong* movement.)

The second main aim of the movement was to regain for the *paekjong* a sense of communal fellowship and the privileges of their traditional industries. As seen in Chapter 2, non-*paekjong* had in the course of the social transition of the period started to take over the more profitable *paekjong* occupations in butchering and the leather trade. This tendency had coincided with the relaxation of their communal fellowship bonds, and they aimed to regain their original jobs and community solidarity. One of their stated aims was to work for the restoration of closer relationships between *paekjong*. Thus the constitution of the association stipulated that members should help each other when in trouble whether through natural disasters or personal illness, and even in regard to unemployment.⁷⁷ From the earliest days of the movement, special attention was paid to the deprived members and to the need for mutual cooperation in the development of their industries,⁷⁸ particularly the leather industry.⁷⁹ In addition, they resolved to organise collective resistance to the ordinary people's aggression on the *paekjong*. These aims were probably major factors inducing the *paekjong* to join the new association with such enthusiasm. To some extent, the *Hyongpyong* movement was thus a "community

⁷⁶ Tonga Ilbo, 11 August 1923 for the lecture in Kwangju; Choson Ilbo, 6 August 1923 for in Chinju; Tonga Ilbo, 18 August 1923 for in Kimhae.

⁷⁷ "Sub-Rules of the *Hyongpyongsa*," Items 4, 5 and 6.

⁷⁸ Tonga Ilbo, 12 November 1923.

⁷⁹ Tonga Ilbo, 24 March 1924.

movement" which held the promise of providing its members with concrete benefits.

These general aims have to be appreciated to understand the nature and development of the movement. Educational opportunities for children and general enlightenment of all members were seen as being closely related to the more specific aim and hope of gaining practical benefits and of improving the social status of *paekjong*. People who had for a long time been denied the opportunity of attending formal educational institutions were naturally in favour of, and very enthusiastic about, the foundation of the *Hyongpyongsa*.⁸⁰ Their educational aspirations are clearly reflected in the constitution which provided for the establishment of a middle school for members' children and the publication of a journal for the *Hyongpyongsa*.⁸¹ The sub-rules repeated their desire to open unofficial schools for their children, to read newspapers and periodicals, and to have public lectures for social

⁸⁰ Their frustration at being deprived of educational opportunities was seen by some commentators as the chief motive for the foundation of the *Hyongpyongsa*. cf. Chosen Sotokufu Keimu-Kyoku, *Saikin ni okeru Chosen Chian Jokyo*, (1933), p.133. According to one Japanese record, a wealthy *paekjong*, Yi Hakch'an, was at an earlier period so frustrated by the inability to have his son educated in a public school that he wished to establish a *paekjong* association. Most previous writings about the *Hyongpyongsa* have used this story as an explanation of the movement's origins. However, there is considerable doubt about its authenticity. Interviews with people in Chinju, who knew Yi very well but never read the Japanese record, do not corroborate the story. Among them were Kang Sangho's widow and ex-members of the *Hyongpyongsa*. According to their testimony, Yi was a rich butcher who had a shop in the only standing market place. However, he had only one daughter and no son.

⁸¹ "Constitution of the *Hyongpyongsa*," Item 19.

knowledge.⁸² In addition, their members were taught and encouraged to refrain from committing social and moral errors.⁸³ They believed and stressed that their own actions should set high social and moral standards for the maintenance of human dignity, a goal which they had been anxious to have recognised for so long.

The initial step for the education of *paekjong* children was the establishment of unofficial schools.⁸⁴ The first of these schools was located in a part of the association's headquarters office in Chinju.⁸⁵ Soon after its opening, there were over 100 students being instructed by one full-time teacher. The curriculum consisted mainly of writing and reading in Korean, common knowledge and ethics. The national headquarters urged local branches to follow this example. Local branches, like that at Kanggyŏng,⁸⁶ gave the highest priority to the opening of a school. At the same time, however, members were quite eager to send their children to official schools. Both regional and national leaders were determined to send their children to official schools at the beginning of the new academic year.⁸⁷ But they anticipated hostile reactions from the ordinary people and therefore prepared to resist any

⁸² "Sub-Rules of the *Hyongpyongsa*," Item 1, in *Maeil Sinbo*, 15 May 1923.

⁸³ "Sub-Rules of the *Hyongpyongsa*," Items 2 and 3.

⁸⁴ *Choson Ilbo*, 21 June 1923.

⁸⁵ *Choson Ilbo*, 18 and 29 August 1923.

⁸⁶ *Choson Ilbo*, 9 October 1923.

⁸⁷ For the meeting of local branch heads in Kyong-Puk area, *Tonga Ilbo*, 10 December 1923; for a national meeting, *Tonga Ilbo* 13 February 1924; for the meeting of Ch'ung-Nam regional headquarters, *Tonga Ilbo* 24 March 1924.

aggression against themselves.⁸⁸ In fact, there was a severe confrontation in Ipjang, Ch'ung-Nam Province.⁸⁹

At the same time there was a felt need to enlighten the rank and file members about the nature and purpose of the *Hyongpyongsa* in the context of the desired emancipation of the *paekjong* and of social changes of the times. To this general end, the leaders urged members to read newspapers and periodicals, and they began to consider the possibility of publishing a journal for the movement.⁹⁰

4. STRATEGIES FOR ACTION.

The leaders' public announcement of their goals in 1923 had several distinct features. First of all, the Chinju leaders publicised their goals as quickly as possible. The day after the promotion meeting, they convened the inaugural meeting in Chinju and, immediately after this, they dispatched staff to the southern parts of Korea to announce their purposes. Without waiting for the ordinary people to respond they prepared a massive celebration gathering in the presence of well-known non-*paekjong* and delegates from neighbouring areas. This three-stage strategy served as a model and was generally adopted by local branches. There were also frequent federal or national meetings such as the south regional meeting in

⁸⁸ Tonga Ilbo, 13 February 1924.

⁸⁹ For an account of this confrontation, see Chapter 6.

⁹⁰ Tonga Ilbo, 24 March 1924. There was in fact only one issue of the journal, partly because the Japanese banned it and confiscated the first issue. cf. Choson Ilbo, 19 December 1924; Tonga Ilbo 22 December 1924.

Taejon,⁸¹ several regional meetings,⁸² and the national meeting in Pusan.⁸³ This strategy of the immediate public announcement of their actions followed by frequent meetings would appear to have been appropriate and effective in mobilising many *paekjong* stage by stage, and in giving wide publicity to their actions. And we know that the movement was then soon joined and supported by a good number of professional social movement activists.

Secondly, the leaders planned their activities in as elaborate a way as possible. This was clearly demonstrated in the inaugural meetings and celebration gatherings. They printed a prospectus of their aims and distributed copies throughout the country, while also promoting and receiving ample coverage in national newspapers through their connections with journalists. The distribution of the prospectus and publicity leaflets was done with the use of cars which were still very prestigious at the time. Although ordinary people with low literacy were not familiar with printed materials, the very fact that they were now being addressed in this way made a significant impact on them. In these ways, as well as through the celebration gatherings which were held in important public buildings in the presence of large audiences, they attempted and clearly succeeded in giving a high profile to the *Hyongpyongsa* and in importing a sense of pride to the *paekjong*. Publicity was also given to the acknowledgement of all messages of support received by telegram from well

⁸¹ Tonga Ilbo, 28 May 1923.

⁸² For Kyōng-Puk region, Tonga Ilbo, 10 December 1923, and for Ch'ung-Nam region, Tonga Ilbo, 24 March 1924.

⁸³ Tonga Ilbo, 11, 12, 13 and 15 February 1924.

known social movement activists and to the invitation of well-known public figures as speakers.

Another marked feature of the whole process was that all activities were carried out peacefully and, with the exception of a few occasions when there were attacks by ordinary people, within the confines of legality. This was equally the case in relation to the Japanese colonial authorities. There was at the time a growing mood of nationalist fervour, but the movement did not at this stage adopt any overly political stance. Even though the Japanese soon began to scrutinise the activities of the *paekjong*, to keep files on them,⁸⁴ and to be concerned about any possible connection between the movement and communists abroad⁸⁵ and with the Japanese *Suiheisha*,⁸⁶ the leaders carefully refrained from confronting the Japanese and concentrated all their efforts in other directions. And, indeed, they planned to utilise the Japanese for the development of the *Hyongpyong* movement by sending representatives to Governor-General Saito to explain their aims and to seek his support for their activities.⁸⁷ This may well have contributed to protecting the movement from direct intervention by the Japanese for a while.

⁸⁴ Choson Ilbo, 5 June 1923; Tonga Ilbo, 5 June 1923. Police headquarters ordered its subordinate stations to do it.

⁸⁵ Maeil Sinbo, 27 June 1923.

⁸⁶ Their relation with the Japanese *Suiheisha* was rather complicated. cf. Akisada Yoshikazu, "Chosen Koheisha Undo: Nihon no Suiheisha Undo to Kanren Shite" [Korean Hyongpyongsa Movement: Related to the Japanese Suiheisha Movement], *Buraku Kaiho* [Buraku Liberation], No.52 (March 1974), pp.45-57.

⁸⁷ Tonga Ilbo, 13 February 1924. However, there is no concrete evidence of the meeting taking place.

CONCLUSION

The *Hyongpyong* movement, founded in Chinju in April 1923 by professional social movement activists and wealthy *paekjong*, rapidly developed an elaborate set of strategies and plans. It was established as a national movement, but immediately received support from many local *paekjong* leaders and social activists. Even though there were hostile reactions from the conservative ordinary people, the movement drew a widespread and enthusiastic response from the *paekjong* who saw it as meeting their general aspirations and also being likely to provide them with direct benefits. The aims and purposes of the movement can be conceived as two-fold: the establishment of human rights for the *paekjong* and the regaining of their "community" as a supportive set of relations. In its early days, the movement clearly drew widespread enthusiasm but, as we shall see in the next chapter, it was soon to face severe internal strains.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE INTERNAL DYNAMICS : 1924-1925

I. THE FACTIONAL DISPUTE

As seen in the previous chapter, the foundation of the *Hyongpyongsa* was warmly welcomed by ordinary *paekjong*, particularly in the southern areas of the country. Their enthusiasm was an important factor in the movement's rapid geographical expansion to the middle areas, while their activities in the south were soon well established in the context of more general social movements. The development of the movement was, however, not without considerable internal conflicts, which had serious implications in its early period and were in various ways to affect it throughout its history.

A major internal conflict arose within the movement a year after its foundation, the first public indication of it appearing on the day after the end of the two-day meeting in Pusan in 1924. Some members, unhappy about the outcomes of the Pusan meeting, gathered in Taejon on 12 February in the course of their return journeys from Pusan.¹ Whatever their aims, their prompt action is clear

¹ Chosen Hyongpyongsa Sohombu [General Headquarters of Korean Hyongpyongsa], "Chosen Kohei Undo no Kogai" [General Account of the Korean Hyongpyong Movement], *Chosen oyobi Chosen Minzoku* [Korea and Korean People], Vol.1 (1927), p.167.

evidence of the severity of factional tensions within the movement.² The gathering, presumed to have been led by Chang Chip'il and O Sŏnghwan,³ developed into a promotion meeting of a new association independent of the Chinju leadership.⁴ They were apparently intent on forming another group within the *Hyongpyong* movement. The net outcome was that they soon formulated plans for an inaugural meeting of the *Hyongpyongsa Hyŏksin Tongmaeng* [Reform League] to be held in Ch'onan on 12 March 1924.⁵ Chang Chip'il, the only executive member from Chinju headquarters to defect to the new group, presided over the meeting attended by about 60 delegates. With new programmes (e.g. to launch a leather firm and to begin publishing a journal), they unilaterally decided to move the national headquarters to Seoul within two weeks of their meeting. Their actions immediately drew strong objections from the Chinju leaders and their supporters,⁶ and the national movement was henceforth split into two factions. According to the location of their respective national headquarters, the two groups can be referred to as the Chinju and Seoul factions.⁷ In fact, the

² The *Sup'yŏng Tongmaeng* in Sangju confined its action to the county, and was later absorbed into the *Hyongpyongsa*. In contrast, the split of the *Hyongpyongsa* was at the national level.

³ cf. Tonga Ilbo, 24 March 1924. He was present at the celebration meeting in Chinju. Probably because of the illness of the incumbent head, Ch'on Myongsun, who died in the early 1925 (Tonga Ilbo, 8 February 1925), he took over Ch'on's post. He was also known as the most prominent *paekjong* in the area. Interview with Kim Yŏngdae (10 January 1986).

⁴ Chosen *Hyongpyongsa* Sohombu, op. cit., p.167; Yi Pansong, *Chosen Shakai Shiso Undo Enkaku Ryakushi* [A Brief History of Social and Ideological Movement in Korea], (Seoul, 1934), p.87.

⁵ Tonga Ilbo, 17 and 24 March 1924.

⁶ Yi Pansong, op. cit., p.87.

⁷ They could with equal effect be referred to as the Southern and Northern factions, or as the Conservative

two established different titles: the *Hyongpyongsa Yŏnmaeng Ch'ong Ponbu* [The General Headquarters of the Hyongpyongsa League] for the Chinju group and the *Hyongpyongsa Hyoksin Ch'ongdongmaeng Ponbu* [The Headquarters of General League for the Reform of the Hyongpyongsa] for the Seoul group.⁸

After the split, the two groups carried out their separate activities and there was considerable tension between them. Following on the establishment of their headquarters in Seoul in early April,⁹ the Seoul faction arranged a public lecture for the members,¹⁰ while the Chinju faction, insisting on retaining its own autonomy and its national headquarters in Chinju, launched a subordinate association for young members---the *Hyongpyong Ch'ŏngnyŏnhoe* [Youth Society].¹¹ Separate celebrations to mark the first anniversary of the *Hyongpyongsa* were held in two places, Chinju and Seoul, hosted by each faction respectively. The Chinju members prepared for an elaborate first anniversary on the lines of the original founding celebration.¹² Over 220 delegates from 34 groups attended to express their sentiments and solidarity. There were also speeches by local professional social movement activists and congratulatory telegrams were received from over 30 groups, including the Japanese *Suiheisha*. The rival celebration in Seoul equally attracted several hundred

and Reform factions. cf. Kim Chunyŏp and Kim Ch'angsun, *Han'guk Kongsan Chu'i Undongsa* [The History of the Korean Communist Movement], Vol.2 (Seoul, 1973), pp.167-173.

⁸ Sidae Ilbo, 18 May 1924.

⁹ Sidae Ilbo, 10 April 1924; Tonga Ilbo, 13 April 1924; Choson Ilbo, 16 April 1924.

¹⁰ Sidae Ilbo, 10 April 1924.

¹¹ Sidae Ilbo, 3 April 1924; Choson Ilbo, 4 April 1924.

¹² Sidae Ilbo, 28 April 1924.

members and guests who celebrated in similar fashion.¹³ The two celebrations were conducted quite independently of each other, and two separate tour committees visited branches and localities in their respective regions. Support from the Chinju faction came mainly from Kyŏngsang and southern areas. Despite the claims of the Seoul faction to have national support, it got no support from the important Kyŏngsang area.¹⁴ The division between the two factions was clearly reflected in their dealings with opposition from ordinary people. Thus, the Seoul faction dispatched some key members to an incident in Ipjang, Ch'ung-Nam Province,¹⁵ while the Chinju faction responded to the tension that arose in Kosong, Kyŏng-Nam Province.¹⁶

Meanwhile, however, there were efforts to conciliate between the two factions and re-unite them. One member of the Chinju faction, Sin Hyonsu, claimed that there would be no opposition to moving the national headquarters to another place provided that the term, *Hyŏksin* [reform], was removed from the movement's name.¹⁷ Representatives of the Chinju faction had, when visiting the Seoul headquarters, initially proposed that the two groups should be joint hosts for a unification meeting,¹⁸ and in early May 1924, key members of Seoul faction had in fact visited Chinju for

¹³ Choson Ilbo, 26 April 1924; Sidae Ilbo, 24 April 1924; Tonga Ilbo, 25 April 1924.

¹⁴ For the Seoul faction's activities, see Choson Ilbo, 22 May 1924; Tonga Ilbo, 24 May 1924. And for the Chinju faction, see Sidae Ilbo, 28 May 1924.

¹⁵ For the details of the confrontation in Ipjang, see Chapter 6.

¹⁶ Choson Ilbo, 12 May 1924.

¹⁷ Choson Ilbo, 23 April 1924; Sidae Ilbo, 23 April 1924.

¹⁸ Sidae Ilbo, 7 and 25 May 1924.

such negotiations.¹⁹ Their different opinions on a suitable meeting place led to the compromise suggestion of Taejon. As a result, both sides tentatively agreed to co-host a meeting there on 30 May.²⁰ But a physical confrontation between the Chinju members and the representatives from Seoul prevented the meeting from taking place and the factional dispute was then resumed.²¹ Both sides accused each other of being responsible for the continuing split.

A little later members of the Pusan branch again attempted to re-unite the two factions through their own independent organisation, the *Hyongpyongsa T'ongil Huwon Kisŏnghoe* [The Society for Supporting the Unity of the Hyongpyongsa].²² They brought pressure to bear on the leaders of both factions to resign their executive memberships.²³ About the same time, some members of the Chinju headquarters resigned from their posts in order to launch yet another association, the *Hyongpyongsa T'ongil Ch'okjinhoe* [Society for the Promotion of the Unity of the Hyongpyongsa].²⁴ While claiming to be neutral in the tussle between the two factions, they urged the rival leaders to hold a national meeting to promote unity. It was probably as a result of these efforts that representatives of two factions opened talks in Taejon on 23 July 1924.²⁵ In the course of these talks, Chang Chip'il, O Sŏnghwan and Cho Kwiyoung from Seoul, and Kang Sangho, Yi Hakch'an, and Ha

¹⁹ Sidae Ilbo, 11 May 1924.

²⁰ Sidae Ilbo, 7 and 25 May 1924.

²¹ Choson Ilbo, 28 and 31 May 1924.

²² Sidae Ilbo, 21 June 1924; Maeil Sinbo, 23 June 1924.

²³ Choson Ilbo, 7 July 1924.

²⁴ Choson Ilbo, 15 July 1924.

²⁵ Tonga Ilbo, 27 and 31 July 1924; Choson Ilbo, 28 July 1924; Maeil Sinbo, 6 August 1924.

Sŏkgŭm from Chinju, discussed the problems facing the movement and finally resolved to hold a special national meeting in Taejon on 15 August 1924.

The meeting was duly held in the Taejon Theatre and was attended by over 100 members, including 51 delegates from 31 local branches.²⁶ Among the many guests was Tojima Yetsuo of the *Suiheisha* in Japan, and there were congratulatory telegrams from a number of social movement groups. The meeting opened with an address by Yi Chiyŏng of the Seoul faction, and Kim Kyŏngsam from Taegu, a member of the Chinju faction, presided over the meeting on the first day. On the second day, the meeting was presided over by Yi Yikgyŏm from Chŏn-Puk Province. At the meeting, Kang Sangho and Chang Chip'il, the controversial leaders of each faction respectively, officially announced their resignations from their executive positions and, in so doing, accepted responsibility for the factional split that had arisen. Both were then seen to relinquish their influence and power within the movement, even though Chang---being a *paekjong*---remained a member.²⁷ These dealings and understandings brought an end to the factional split, at least on the surface.

At the two-day meeting it was agreed to re-arrange the entire structure of the national headquarters organisation. First of all, it was decided to move the national headquarters to Seoul and to re-name them *Choson*

²⁶ For the process of the meeting, *Choson Ilbo*, 15, 18 and August 1924; *Tonga Ilbo*, 19 August 1924; *Maeil Sinbo*, 20 August 1924.

²⁷ *Tonga Ilbo*, 19 August 1924.

Hyongpyongsa Chungang Ch'ong Ponbu [Central General Headquarters of Korean Hyongpyongsa]. Secondly, it was agreed that the national headquarters should be run collectively by members of two committees. One was a central executive committee, consisting of 40 members; the other a standing committee of six of the 40 executive members who were to be charged with the administrative work of six sections (general affairs, treasury, education, research, external liaison and industry). Each standing committee member was to take charge of one section.

In contrast to the national headquarters, each local branch was to be directly under the control of its head.²⁸ All central executive as well as standing committee members were immediately elected and assigned to their posts at the meeting; and a budget for the maintenance of the movement was passed. The confrontations now commonly taking place between *paekjong* and ordinary people all over the country were then discussed, and the meeting repeatedly confirmed that the movement and its members would be firmly protected in collective efforts to resist and counter attacks from the outside.

Despite overwhelming agreement at this meeting, factional antagonisms were not wholly removed, especially among members of the Chinju group. Shortly after the Taejon meeting---on 25 August 1924---some local branch members from the Chinju area gathered in Masan to discuss what

²⁸ *Tonga Ilbo*, 19 August 1924; *Choson Ilbo*, 20 August 1924.

stance they should take.²⁹ They claimed that there had been a "vicious conspiracy" aimed at the Chinju group. In addition, they suspected Chang Chip'il of continuing to control the Seoul headquarters in practice, because he was still staying in Seoul and involved in the affairs of the movement. They claimed that he had breached the Taejon agreement, and insisted that he and O Sŏnghwan, an incumbent member of the standing executive committee, should be compelled to give up their work at the headquarters.³⁰ Both were seen by Chinju members as the effective leaders of the Reform League. In addition, the Chinju members resisted the demands from Seoul that they should hand over the official records they held.³¹ Even Kang Sangho's effort to bring about reconciliation were less than effective in the face of the reluctance of the Chinju members to co-operate with the Seoul faction.³²

Another deadlock was thus reached between the two factions. Again, there were various endeavours at reconciliation. One of these led to new opportunities for the two controversial leaders, Chang Chip'il and Kang Sangho, to re-join the leadership ranks,³³ but with fresh pressures on them to follow the Taejon agreement. Furthermore, some young members launched independent actions for the advancement of the movement through their

²⁹ Tonga Ilbo, 27 August 1924. There were representatives from Chinju, T'ongyong, Hapch'on, Pusan, Masan and Haman.

³⁰ Their claim led to the decisions of the central executive committee to order Chang to leave the headquarters and to replace O Sŏnghwan with Yi Kyŏngch'un. Tonga Ilbo, 16 September 1924.

³¹ Tonga Ilbo, 11 and 17 October 1924.

³² Maeil Sinbo, 1 and 4 October 1924.

³³ Choson Ilbo, 1 October 1924.

own associations such as the *Chǒngwidan* [Righteous Defence Unit] in Seoul³⁴ and the *Chǒnghaengdan* [Righteous Behaviour Unit] in Chinju.³⁵ Chang and Kang were eventually supposed to re-join the Seoul headquarters as members of the standing committee, but some members continued to resist their re-admission.³⁶

As a result, it was not until the second anniversary of the foundation of the *Hyongpyongsa* that the movement was finally united under one national leadership. On 24 April 1925, the annual national meeting was, as planned, convened in Seoul.³⁷ In the presence of over 130 delegates of local branches throughout the country, Chang Chip'il's opening speech was followed by the election of a provisional chairman and secretaries for the meeting. These posts were dominated by new leaders of the Seoul faction such as Yi So (real name: Tonggu) and O Sŏnghwan. A number of congratulatory telegrams, including one from the Japanese *Suiheisha*, were again read to the audience. The agenda of the meeting ranged from general policies, through welfare issues such as education and working conditions, to ways of dealing with hostility by the ordinary people. The election of the management board of the national headquarters went through several stages. First, a special selection committee for the central executive members was formed by the delegates. Chang Chip'il, Yi Chiyong, Kang Sangho, O

³⁴ Choson Ilbo, 11 and 16 January 1925. For details of this group, see Chapter 7.

³⁵ Choson Ilbo, 28 March 1925; Tonga Ilbo, 30 March 1925.

³⁶ Choson Ilbo, 1 October 1924 and 22 March 1925.

³⁷ For the process of the meeting, Choson Ilbo, 24, 25 and 27 April 1925; Tonga Ilbo, 24, 25 and 26 April 1925; Sidae Ilbo, 24 April 1925.

Sŏnghwan and Yi Ch'ilbong were chosen to serve on this committee. The selection committee had prepared a list of 21 central executive members all of whom were later accepted by the plenary meeting without any objections.

On the next day, named the "*Hyongpyong* day", the second anniversary of the movement was commemorated in Seoul.³⁸ As had by now become usual, members distributed 20 thousand leaflets to passers-by in the streets. These leaflets set out the aims and purposes of the movement, and cars with loud speakers played music to celebrate the historic day. At the celebration gathering, some members made speeches on the painful experiences and humiliating status of the *paekjong*. With the exception of a ban on other social movement activists' addresses by the policemen supervising the meeting, the celebrations took place with no untoward incidents. The anniversary was also celebrated by local branches throughout the country.

The factional dispute was largely over and the headquarters were finally established in Seoul and the movement entered a new phase of close involvement with other social movements. The direction of the movement was firmly in the hands of Seoul members, though there were to be further intermittent factional disputes whenever sensitive issues were raised.

³⁸ Choson Ilbo, 27 April 1925; Tonga Ilbo, 26 April 1925.

II. THE BACKGROUND AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE FACTIONAL DISPUTE

1. THE CAUSES

As related above, the factional dispute was a severe setback to the *Hyongpyong* movement in 1924 and 1925. The dispute centred on three main issues of a kind not uncommon in the emergence and rise of social movements in general. First of all, the question of the location of the national headquarters was a major issue.³⁹ It was, in fact, raised soon after the movement's foundation.⁴⁰ It is unusual in Korean history for a nationwide social movement to have originated in a regional centre and not in Seoul, and to have been developed by local activists. Chinju, in the far southern area of the peninsula, was regarded as remote and as an inconvenient and inefficient base for the development of the movement. Thus the issue was repeatedly discussed several months after the initial foundation, and especially at the special meeting held in Taejon, Ch'ung-Nam Province in August 1923.⁴¹ Most of those attending were from the Ch'ungch'ŏng and Chŏlla areas and they decided that the national headquarters should in March 1924 be moved to Taejon which lies at the junction of roads from Kyŏngsang, Cholla, and the northern areas. However, this decision was

³⁹ According to Japanese records, this was the only reason of any importance and they do not refer to any difference in ideology. cf. Yi Pansong, op. cit., pp.87-88; and Kim Chunyŏp and Kim Ch'angsun, op. cit., p.167.

⁴⁰ Maeil Sinbo, 2 June 1923; Choson Ilbo, 4 June 1923.

⁴¹ Maeil Sinbo, 11 November 1923; Tonga Ilbo, 12 November 1923.

reversed by another special national meeting in Pusan in February 1924.⁴² At this two-day meeting, the delegates from 49 local branches, mainly from the Kyōngsang areas, decided to defer the move until the second annual national meeting, due to in April 1924. This reversal of a firm decision triggered a gathering of discontented members in Taejon where it was decided to establish the Reform League in March 1924.

The location issue was the main ostensible reason for the factional split, and it was often referred to in the whole course of the dispute. That it should have caused difficulties is quite understandable as most social activities of the time were centred in Seoul, and those who sought to move the headquarters to Seoul argued that this was necessary in order to allow maximum cooperation with other social movement groups. In this respect, Chinju was not a convenient or proper centre for developing the movement. However, with the exception of Chang Chip'il, the founding members from Chinju were reluctant to accept the idea, probably because they thought that the move would hinder their own active involvement and might in the end well cost them the leadership.⁴³ Thus, the matter was

⁴² Tonga Ilbo, 13 February 1924.

⁴³ The leaders of the Chinju faction often accused Chang Chip'il of splitting the movement because of his personal leadership ambitions. cf. Kim Tōkhan, "Hyongpyongsa-ŭi Naehong-gwa Hyongpyong Undong-e Taehan Pip'an," [The Internal Disarray of the Hyongpyongsa and the Critics on the Hyongpyong Movement], *Kaebŏk*, Vol.5 No.8 (August 1924), pp.39-42. In fact, their anxieties were to some extent justified by events after the move of the headquarters. See Chapter 8.

affected by conflict over the leaders' personal interests.⁴⁴

Certainly, disagreement over the location of the headquarters was intimately related to the leadership issue. The discontented members accused the Chinju leaders of abusing their authority and of misusing the funds of the movement.⁴⁵ Underlying this accusation, however, there was apprehension that the leadership positions would be monopolised by Kyŏngsang members, and especially those from Kyŏng-Nam Province. In spite of the geographical spread of the movement, the national executive committee was still largely controlled by members from Kyŏngsang and influential *paekjong* from beyond Kyŏngsang boundaries had little opportunity to be involved in policy making. Furthermore, the Chinju leaders, most of whom were non-*paekjong*, may well have found it difficult to work closely with the *paekjong* members from beyond the Kyŏngsang areas, even though they enjoyed the confidence of the Kyŏngsang *paekjong*,⁴⁶ and there is evidence of periodical overlapping

⁴⁴ The location issue was probably directly relevant to the attempted reverse move of the headquarters to Taejon in 1935. See Chapter 8.

⁴⁵ cf. Pak P'yŏngsan, "Hyongpyong Undong-ŭi Ŭiŭi-wa Yoksajok Koch'al" [The Meaning of the Hyongpyong Movement and Its Historical Research], *Chŏngjin* [Right Progress], Vol.1 (May 1929), p.12.

⁴⁶ Some *paekjong* interviewed in Chinju said that they did not go to school with their parents, but with Kang Sangho. (Interview with Kim Manhu on 5 September 1986). Even in the 1950s, before he died, he had been offered presents of meat by ex-members of the *Hyongpyongsa* on special days. (Interview with Chŏng Taegwan on 18 May 1986). And his funeral was officially served by the Kyŏng Nam Branches of a butchers trade union in 1958. (Interview with Chŏng Sunok on 21 May 1986)

tensions between the non-*paekjong* founders and the newly emerging *paekjong* leaders outside Kyongsang.⁴⁷

Disagreements over the location and the leadership of the movement cannot, however, in themselves be held as sufficient explanations of the factional split. The fundamental factor was, rather, in differing priorities and goals. Unlike the non-*paekjong* leaders in Chinju who placed a high priority on the issue of human rights, the disaffected group was mainly concerned with the fact that their traditional industries and livelihood were being threatened. Thus there were major differences between them in regard to their underlying aims and the policies they wished to pursue. The discontented members wanted to change the general direction of the movement as was shown on several occasions in the meetings held at Taejon and Pusan.⁴⁸ After the failure of the Pusan meeting, they were determined to launch their own activities through independent programmes.

2. THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO FACTIONS

The split in the movement had developed over differences in the underlying ideas on the direction which the movement should take in its early stage. And, even after the surface reconciliation between the two factions,

⁴⁷ Non-*paekjong* leaders had been accused by the *paekjong* members of contemptuous behaviour. cf. Pak P'yŏngsan, op.cit., p.12.

⁴⁸ Kim Chunyŏp and Kim Ch'angsun, op. cit., Vol.2, p.168.

the differences remained. These differences can be summarised as in Table 5-1.

Table 5-1. The Differences between the Two Factions

Faction	Chinju Faction	Seoul Faction
Area Base	Kyongsang	Ch'ungch'ong Cholla Kyonggi Kangwon
Leaders	non- <i>paekjong</i> wealthy <i>paekjong</i>	intellectual <i>paekjong</i>
Orientation	"moderate"	"progressive"
Priority Aims	(common) to promote the human rights campaign; to enrol children at school; to open an unofficial schools; (differences) to launch a publishing firm	to publish a journal; to launch a leather firm; to fix slaughterers' wage; to promote the collective sale of goods

We may consider these differences in turn. First, the areas from which support was initially drawn were well defined. The Chinju faction drew its membership almost exclusively from the Kyongsang area. In contrast, the Seoul faction, consisted mainly of disaffected people from the Ch'ungch'ong and Cholla areas and they drew most of their support from the middle and Cholla areas. Each developed its activities within these boundaries respectively. For instance, Chinju headquarters sent its executive members only to the Kyong-Nam area,⁴⁹ whereas members of the Seoul headquarters visited the Cholla and Ch'ungch'ong areas and

⁴⁹ cf. Choson Ilbo, 28 May 1924.

eventually established a hold over the southern parts of the country, with the exception of Kyŏngsang.⁵⁰ By establishing close contacts with local branches through wide-ranging and well-organised programmes both factions succeeded in building up influence among their respective rank and file members.

The origins and social backgrounds of the leaders of the two factions were also different. The leading figures of the Chinju faction, with the exception of Chang Chip'il, were either wealthy and influential *paekjong* from major towns in the Kyŏngsang area⁵¹ or local non-*paekjong* professional social movement activists.⁵² In contrast, most of the leaders of the Seoul faction were influential *paekjong* in their respective communities.⁵³ Some were well

⁵⁰ Chang Chip'il in particular had more advantages than the rest of the founders for keeping in touch with local members on account of his post at the headquarters and of his *paekjong* background. There were numerous reports of his visits to local branches in the newspapers. For the itinerary of the executive members to local branches, see Choson Ilbo, 22 May 1924; Tonga Ilbo, 24 May 1924.

⁵¹ Among them were Yi Hakch'an of Chinju, Yi Sangyun and Pak Yusŏn of Masan, Yi Songsun of Pusan, and Kim Kyŏngsam of Taegu.

⁵² Most of the non-*paekjong* founders were, however, withdrawing to some extent, seemingly on account of individual reasons. Soon after the foundation, for example, Ch'ŏn Sŏkgu had trouble with his legs (Interview with Yi Ch'unyŏp), and Sin Hyŏnsu was successfully running for a councillorship of Chinju city, which post was conceived as pro-Japanese by social movement activists at that time (Tonga Ilbo, 24 November 1923). Therefore, Kang Sangho was largely on his own, at least during the early years of the movement.

⁵³ Among them were O Sŏnghwan from Kanggyŏng and Cho Kwiyoung from Ipjang. Chang Chip'il, one of the original founders, was, exceptionally, from Uiryong, Kyŏng-Nam Province.

educated. Chang Chip'il, who was originally from the south,⁵⁴ and O Sŏnghwan⁵⁵ had studied in Japan.

These differences in their social backgrounds affected their basic approaches to the movement and remained constant latent factors in the dynamics of the relation between the two factions. The Chinju leaders continued to lay stress on the human rights aspect of the movement: whether as moderate "liberals"⁵⁶ or wealthy *paekjong*, they continually expressed their disapproval of the unequal social status of the *paekjong*. The issue of the economic situation of the *paekjong* was, however, of secondary concern to them, although they also hoped to improve *paekjong*'s living standards by, for example, launching a business firm.⁵⁷ But their ideas for helping members in trouble were limited and mainly charitable and humanitarian. Their major concern was to struggle for the elimination of discrimination against the *paekjong*, and they saw the enlightenment of their members as a major way of improving their status. Education and the improvement of

⁵⁴ Tonga Ilbo, 30 May 1923. His experience of applying unsuccessfully for a job in the public sector was well known.

⁵⁵ Kashimoto Morito, "Paekjong no Sabetsu Teppai Undo: Chosen Hyongpyongsa ni tsuite" [The Movement for the Abolition of the Discrimination Against Paekjong: on the Korean Hyongpyongsa], *Toyo [Asia]*, Vol.29 No.3 (March 1926), pp.38-47. He described O Songhwan as a Meiji graduate in Japan, even though the source of the information was not revealed.

⁵⁶ cf. Kim Chungsoŏp (Joong-Seop) and Yu Nakgun, "1920 nyŏndae Cho Sahoe Undong-ŭi Tonghyong: Chinju Chiyŏk-ŭl Chungsim-u ro," [Trends of Social Movements in the Early 1920s in Chinju], *Hyonsang-gwa Insik [Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences]*, Vol.10 No.4 (Winter 1986), pp.9-43.

⁵⁷ Choson Ilbo, 21 June 1923. But the firm that they promoted was concerned with publishing which bore no relation to the traditional industries of the *paekjong*.

social knowledge was thus a high priority for them.⁵⁸ They attempted to provide opportunities for uneducated adults to study at unofficial schools and for their children to attend public schools.⁵⁹

In regard to human rights, the Seoul faction leaders had much common ground with the Chinju leaders. Their attitude to the hostility of ordinary people to the members and activities of the movement was firm, and they visited high government officials in charge of internal affairs to urge that the distinctive marks against the *paekjong* names be erased from all government records. They also brought pressure to bear on the officials who discriminated against the *paekjong*,⁶⁰ and they worked for the enlightenment of their members by, for example, opening student houses⁶¹ and publishing a journal.⁶² Thus their work for improving human rights was, more or less, the same as that of the Chinju faction leaders.

The significant difference between two factions was in regard to economic matters. As explained in Chapter 2, the *paekjong* were in danger of losing their traditional industries. This situation attracted much attention from

⁵⁸ For their programmes and goals, see Chapter 4.

⁵⁹ These matters were, for instance, the key agenda of the Pusan meeting in which Chinju faction had apparently the majority. cf. Tonga Ilbo, 12 and 13 February 1924.

⁶⁰ Choson Ilbo, 7 February 1925; Tonga Ilbo, 9 and 16 February 1925.

⁶¹ Sidae Ilbo, 27 April 1924; Tonga Ilbo, 24 May; 27 October 1924; Choson Ilbo, 22 May 1924.

⁶² Choson Ilbo, 22 May and 19 December 1924; Tonga Ilbo, 22 December 1924. The first issue came out under the titles of *Segwang* [Light over the World]. However, the Japanese authorities confiscated all copies of the issue, accusing those responsible for it of a violation of public security.

their members. At the Taejon meeting in November 1923, several months after the foundation gathering, one member from Kimje, Chŏn-Puk Province, suggested that the movement should lay stress on improving industrial cooperation among its members.⁶³ Whereas the Chinju leaders were relatively indifferent to this issue, the Seoul leaders paid much attention to it and formulated detailed practical plans to develop it. At the inaugural meeting of the Reform League, they proposed to launch a leather tanning factory with investments of 200,000 won presented by individual members who were to become shareholders.⁶⁴ This proposal was repeatedly included in the agenda for their meetings.⁶⁵ In addition, they attempted to introduce the collective sale of leather products by the *paekjong* through a national organisation.⁶⁶ They aimed to fix meat prices under the control of the members and thus to reduce regional variations. Furthermore, they attempted to keep slaughterhouses under the direct management of members.⁶⁷

⁶³ Tonga Ilbo, 12 November 1923.

⁶⁴ Tonga Ilbo, 24 March 1924.

⁶⁵ Choson Ilbo, 23 November 1924; 2 April 1925; Tonga Ilbo, 25 and 26 April 1925. There is, however, no evidence of the firm being launched until late in 1928. See, Choson Ilbo, 20 December 1928. And on the economic activities of the *Hyongpyongsa*, in general, see Kim Chongmi, "Chosen no Hisabetsumin Paekjong: Niteika no okeru Seikatsu to Kaiho Undo" [Paekjong: the Discriminated People of Korea; Their Life and Liberation Movement under Japanese Rule], *Kansei* [Great Outcry], Vol.5 (August 1983), pp.44-62.

⁶⁶ This idea was realised in some areas. For the case of the Kunsan branch, see Tonga Ilbo, 27 February 1925; for the Chongup branch, see Choson Ilbo, 2 April 1925.

⁶⁷ While evaluating the *Hyongpyong* movement of the previous year, Chang Chip'il disclosed his hope of the new year as direct management by the members of most slaughterhouses which were under the Japanese control. See Tonga Ilbo, 1 January 1925.

These progressive programmes on economic matters reflect the orientation of the Seoul leaders who were to some extent inclined to an ill-defined socialism and they are in keeping with allegations by the Chinju faction that the split in the movement was being manipulated by supposedly "impure" socialist groups backed by the Seoul leaders.⁶⁸ Some later writers have indeed attributed the split to "socialist" intervention.⁶⁹ In fact, there is some evidence that the Seoul leaders did cooperate with social movement activists in Seoul and that some of these were socialist in orientation.

Despite this evidence, however, it is quite misleading to regard the Seoul leaders as authentically socialist. Their initial purpose was clearly to encourage the *Hyongpyong* movement as a whole, and they argued that their primary goal was not to move the headquarters to Seoul, but simply to reform the movement.⁷⁰ They fully understood the uniqueness of their activities and goals and were well aware of the differences between them and other social movements.⁷¹ They also firmly insisted on the nature of

⁶⁸ For Sin Hyonsu's opinion on the disarray, see Choson Ilbo, 23 April 1924; Sidae Ilbo, 23 April 1924.

⁶⁹ cf. Kim Chunyŏp and Kim Ch'angsun, op. cit. and Yi Myŏnggil, "Sinbunje Haech'e-wa Hyongpyong Undong (3)" [The Breakdown of Status Structure and the Hyongpyong Movement], *Chinju Sangŭi* [Journal of Chinju Commercial Board], (October 1986) pp.21-25. These authors based themselves on the evidence of the leaders' educational experiences in Japan. However, their allegations were so vague and irrelevant that their argument cannot be accepted.

⁷⁰ Tonga Ilbo, 27 April and 23, 24 May 1924. cf. Ko Sukhwa, "Hyongpyongsa-e Taehan Il Yongu" [A Study of the Hyongpyongsa], *Sahak Yŏngu* [Studies in History], Vol.38 (1984), pp.675-677.

⁷¹ For Chang Chip'il's view on the *Hyongpyong* movement, Tonga Ilbo, 1 January 1925.

their activities, which cannot be interpreted as having been based on socialist ideas, but were primarily aimed at preserving their traditional industries, and especially at regaining their former privileged position in relation to them. Moreover, the fact that most of the Seoul leaders were firmly opposed to the dissolution of the association several years later is a clear indication of their non-socialist political stance.⁷² In short, the leaders of Seoul faction were not socialist, but progressive reformers. This was the true distinction between them and the Chinju leaders who were less concerned with economic affairs.

3. THE PRESSURES FOR RE-UNIFICATION

Despite these differences on several points, the two factions were basically agreed in wanting to encourage the movement and both recognised the need to develop it on a unitary national basis. This is clearly reflected in both the internal and external pressures which developed to terminate the factional dispute.

The pressures were three-fold. The most immediate and decisive pressure came from the rank and file members. The issue of re-unification was one of the main items to appear on the agenda of many local branch meetings. It was routinely said at these meetings that any members conspiring to disrupt the movement would be severely

⁷² For the development of socialist groups within the *Hypngpyongsa*, see Chapter 8.

punished in the name of all others.⁷³ As demonstrated in the Pusan branch, there were repeated attempts to curb the factional division in the leadership, and even to be directly involved in the resolution.⁷⁴ At the same time, members of youth groups launched their own actions to end the factional disarray by establishing self-governing groups such as the *Ch'ongwidan* and the *Ch'onghaengdan*. The emergence of these sub-groups which were initiated by the members discontented with the divided leadership occurred during the period of the factional dispute. Associations for young members, the *Hyongpyong Ch'ongnyŏnhoe* [Youth Society], first founded in Chinju⁷⁵ and later some towns in the southern areas, were also launched in the middle of the factional dispute.⁷⁶ Their stated goals were not merely to end factional feuding but, more positively, develop and encourage the movement as a whole. They feared that factionalism would set back ~~to~~ the development of the movement, and were instrumental^{al} in initiating talks between the two sides.⁷⁷

In addition to such internal pressure, the intellectuals---mostly reporters and professional social activists in sympathy with the *Hyongpyong* movement---severely criticised the leadership dispute. In their writings, they reminded readers of the *paekjong*'s miserable history, criticised confrontations between the two factions,

⁷³ For instance, see the case of Hongsŏng branch. *Choson Ilbo*, 26 March 1925.

⁷⁴ *Sidae Ilbo*, 21 June 1924; *Maeil Sinbo*, 23 June 1924.

⁷⁵ *Sidae Ilbo*, 3 April 1924.

⁷⁶ The newspapers named at least 5 towns with youth societies in action before the annual meeting of 1925.

⁷⁷ *Choson Ilbo*, 15 July 1924.

and urged the divided leadership to re-unite in an endeavour to strive single-mindedly for the development of the movement.⁷⁸ Even national newspapers expressed disillusion over the repeated confrontations between the two factions and consequent setbacks over re-unification.⁷⁹ In their leading articles, they appealed to the entire membership, and especially to the leaders, to unite in the face of external hostility and obstruction.⁸⁰

In effect, however, the main pressures for re-unification came from the opponents of the movement through the frequent incidents in which ordinary people proved hostile to the members and their activities.⁸¹ These caused the divided leaders to realise the gravity of the situation and to seek a more efficient strategy to deal with it. In the face of common enemies, the leaders of both factions inevitably concluded that a strong united leadership was essential.

⁷⁸ Kim T'okhan, op. cit.; Ch'a Ch'ŏnja, "Paekjong Sahoe-ŭi Amdam-han Saenghwalsang-ŭl Koron-haya Hyongpyong Ch'ŏnsŏn-ŭi T'ongil-ŭl Ch'okham" [Note on the Miserable Living Condition of Paekjong Community in an Attempt to Provoke the Unity of the Hyongpyong Movement], *Kaeb'yŏk*, Vol.5 No.7 (July 1924), pp.39-45.

⁷⁹ They stressed the self-defeating consequences of the split for the movement. For example, see *Tonga Ilbo*, 5 June, 28 July and 27 August 1924; *Choson Ilbo*, 17 January 1925.

⁸⁰ *Choson Ilbo*, 21 August 1924; *Tonga Ilbo*, 26 April 1925.

⁸¹ The Japanese police reported numerous confrontations between *paekjong* and ordinary people: 17 in 1923, 10 in 1924, and 14 in 1925. Chosen Sotokufu Keimu Kyoku [Police Affairs Bureau, Korean Government-General], *Saikin ni okeru Chosen Chian Jokyo* [The Present Security Situation in Korea] (1933), pp.168-169. Another Japanese source reported a total of 42 confrontations up to September 1924. cf. Chosen Sotokufu, *Chosen no Gunshu* [Mass of Korea], (1926), p.185. For the details of these confrontations, see Chapter 6.

4. THE OUTCOME OF THE CONFLICT

Any factional dispute is likely to give a movement a negative image. Conflicts do, however, also serve positive functions,⁸² and there were indeed positive consequences to the factional conflict in the *Hyongpyong* movement. These positive consequences soon became evident.

One of the most distinctive consequences was the geographical spread of the movement. This was initially seen in the membership of the new national executive committee. Two lists of central executive committee members emerged from the unification meetings---in Taejŏn on 15 August 1924 and in Seoul on 25 April 1925. At the Taejon meeting, 40 executive committee members, including members of the standing board, were elected.⁸³ Unlike the previous executive committee which consisted only of Kyŏngsang members, the 40 executive members of the new committee came from all areas of the country. While the newspapers gave no details of their home areas, it is possible to trace these through subsequent reports on their activities.⁸⁴

⁸² Lewis Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict*, (New York, 1956).

⁸³ Tonga Ilbo, 19 August 1924; Choson Ilbo, 20 August 1924; Mail Sinbo, 20 August 1924.

⁸⁴ I fed all articles regarding the *Hyongpyong* movement as well as other related social affairs into a computer to produce the kind of information given in Table 5-2. Given that such information had never been collated, the exercise proved most revealing. See Appendix 1.

Table 5-2. The National Executive Committee Members Elected in August 1924 and in April 1925

Province	1924		1925	
	Name	Town	Name	
Seoul	Paek Songgye Paek Sun'gil Pyŏn Sŏngdo Yi Kyŏngch'un Yi So		So Kwanghun ⁸⁵ Yi Kyŏngch'un Yi So	
Kyŏnggi	Kil Sŏksong Kim Kiwan Yi Chiyong	Ansŏng Ansŏng Suwŏn	Kim Pongju Yi Chiyong	Suwŏn
Ch'ung-Puk	Cho Pongsok Kil Sangsu Kim Tokho Paek Nakyong Pyŏn Sunsong	Ch'ŏngju Ch'ŏngju Kwoesan Ch'ŏngju Ch'ungju	Cho Puak Paek Nakyŏng	Ch'ŏngju Ch'ŏngju
Ch'ung-Nam	Cho Kwiyoung Kil Suno Kim Ponggap Kim Tongsŏk O Sŏnghwan Yi Paeki Yi Yigyu	Ipjang Ipjang Kongju Taejŏn Kanggyŏng Kanggyŏng Ch'ŏnan	Cho Kwiyoung Kim Tongsŏk O Sŏnghwan U Hogyŏng Yi Changsul Yi Kwangsu	Ipjang Taejŏn Kanggyŏng Kanggyŏng Choch'iwŏn Tangjin
Chŏn-Puk	Cho Hakt'ae Kwon Tuho Wŏn Yŏngch'ae Yi Yikgyom	T'aein Chŏnju Kimje Chŏngup	Chang Tuwŏn Cho Kyŏngch'an	Chŏngup Kunsan
Chŏn-Nam	Yi Haksul	Sŏngjŏng		
Kyŏng-Puk	Cho Songok Ko Kiun Kim Kyŏngsam Yi Sumyŏng	Yŏngil Taegu Taegu Kimch'ŏn	Kim Toch'ŏn	Andong
Kyŏng-Nam	Im Songo Kim Sŏkgyun Yi Hakch'an Yi Okch'ŏn Yi Sangyun	Pusan T'ongyŏng Chinju Kimhae Masan	Chang Chip'il Kang Sangho Yi Hakch'an	Ŭiryŏng Chinju Chinju
Kangwŏn	Kil Manhak Kim P'alyong Yi Ch'unbong	Hwoengsŏng Wŏnju Hwach'ŏn	Kil Manhak Yi Ch'unbong	Hwoengsŏng Hwach'ŏn
P'yŏng-Puk	Song T'aeksŏng	Pakch'ŏn		

⁸⁵ His name was not on the original list of the executive members published in the newspapers, but he was later reported as working at the Seoul headquarters. See, Choson Ilbo, 17 May 1925; Tonga Ilbo, 17 May 1925.

P'yŏng-Nam	Mun Kilwŏn	P'yŏngyang
unknown	Kim Songi	Cho Songguk Kim Ch'ŏnho Yi Hakin Yi Taehyŏn
Total	38	25

As shown in Table 5-2, there were members from as far north as P'yŏngyang and Pakch'ŏn. Only three former executive members were re-elected (e.g. Kim Kyŏngsam, Yi Hakch'an and Yi Sangyun) and the new committee was virtually "taken over" by members from the middle areas of the country. Virtually all southern areas, including Kangwon Province, were represented. It seems probable that there was a deliberate drive to elect the most influential members on the basis of regional representation. A similar result emerged in the election of members to posts at the national headquarters conducted at the 1925 annual conference. Even though two executive members from P'yŏngan areas were dropped---probably for being relatively inactive---the national headquarters were now clearly under the control of regional leaders from all provinces in the southern areas.

The list in Table 5-2 clearly reflects several aspects of the national leadership in transition. The former domination by Chinju members was replaced by a nationwide set of influentials. This implies that the moderate national leadership from Chinju was taken over by progressives led from Seoul. The net result was that the national headquarters became the centre for a "federation"

of regional leaders serving on the national executive committee, but also, very significantly, setting the activities to be followed in the regions. Thus the original regional bias of the movement in its earliest days was entirely countered with national representation. Another outcome was that the non-*paekjong* leaders from Chinju were joined in the movement by numbers of non-*paekjong* leaders from other areas. However, the role of non-*paekjong* in the movement as a whole was still limited, though a few like Yi So⁸⁶ and U Hogyŏng⁸⁷ played important individual roles. This would seem to indicate that the non-*paekjong* activists assisted the movement throughout its history, even though there was no direct connection or continuity between men like Yi So and the Chinju founders.

The geographical spread of the movement within the south coincided with the intensification of action aiming to recruit members from northern areas in which there had been little participation. Both headquarters had sent key members to local branches---in competition with each other---though there had inevitably been regional restrictions. In particular, the Seoul members had planned to cover northern Korea,⁸⁸ and there is firm evidence that members

⁸⁶ Yi So (real name: Tonggu, born in Hwoengsong, Kangwon Province, in 1886, died in Seoul in 1933) joined the *Hyongpyong* movement as a *Ch'ŏndogyo* [Heaven Way Religion] after serving one year in jail for his part in the March 1 Movement. He was one of the key members arrested in the "Koryo Revolutionary Party" incident. For the incident, see Chapter 7, and on his life, see Choson Chungang Ilbo, 11 October 1933.

⁸⁷ Little information on U Hogyong's career has been found, though we know that he joined a social movement group in Kanggyŏng, the *Hyesŏngdan* [Comet Unit]. Choson Ilbo, 19 November 1925.

⁸⁸ Choson Ilbo, 22 May 1924; Tonga Ilbo, 17 October 1924.

visited areas such as Hamgyŏng Provinces.⁸⁹ Their respective separate campaign experiences were followed by visits to most areas of the country by a national circuit committee soon after the resolution of the factional dispute.⁹⁰ There is no doubt that these visits contributed substantially to the development of the movement in localities with no previous record of participation. Partly in response to their initiative, the movement gathered vigour in numerous local areas. According to a Japanese police report, the number of *Hyongpyongsa* branches increased from 83 in 1924 to 99 in 1925.⁹¹ Again, newspaper reports complement the limited information from other sources on the regional spread of activities. The newspapers refer to several local branches in the middle and northern areas being active in 1924 and 1925. There was, for example, considerable activity in Kyonggi and Kangwŏn Provinces where there had been no branches in 1923. There were several newly launched branches in Kyonggi (Seoul, Suwŏn, Kaesŏng, Yŏngdŭngp'o in 1924, and Ansong, Koyang, Panwŏl, Yŏju, and Changhowŏn in 1925), and in Kangwon (Hwoengsŏng, and Wŏnju in 1924, and Ch'ŏlwŏn, Hwach'ŏn, Kangnŭng, and Samch'ŏk in 1925). In addition, regional headquarters were opened in P'yŏngyang for P'yŏng-Nam Province and a local branch in Chinnamp'o, both in 1924. And there were several branches operating in Ham-Nam Province; among these were Hongwŏn, Sinp'o, Wŏnsan, and Yŏnghŭng. Thus local activities were intensified in 1924

⁸⁹ Choson Ilbo, 23 January 1925.

⁹⁰ Sidae Ilbo, 15 May 1925; Choson Ilbo, 17 May 1925; Tonga Ilbo, 17 May 1925.

⁹¹ Chosen Sotokufu Keimu-Kyoku, *Saikin ni okeru Chosen Chian Jokyo*, (1933), pp.168-169.

and 1925, both in the southern and middle areas, while activities began to emerge in northern areas, albeit on a smaller scale and with lower numbers involved.

Another outcome of the factional split and its resolution was the re-definition of the goals of the movement. According to the agenda of the 1925 annual meeting these goals were restated after the dispute was over.⁹² The new statement referred to the general issues that both factions had formerly raised and reaffirmed that top priority be given to the enlightenment of members. According to a resolution passed at the meeting, every local branch was to open an unofficial school and to provide compulsory teaching for the children of members. One of the main duties of the circuit committee was also to encourage educational activities by local branches.⁹³ The two factions had earlier competed with each other in establishing new programmes for the enlightenment of members. Among these were the publication of a journal and the opening of a student house in Seoul for members' children to study away from their homes.

The programmes that the Seoul faction had developed for improving the economic situation of the members were also generally adopted for future action. These aimed to regain the *paekjong's* traditional industries, mainly butchering, the slaughtering of animals and related work, and included proposals for the direct management of a slaughterhouse, the improvement of slaughterers' working

⁹² Choson Ilbo, 25 April 1925; Tonga Ilbo, 26 April 1925.

⁹³ Choson Ilbo, 17 May 1925; Tonga Ilbo, 17 May 1925.

conditions, the control of meat prices by local branches, the collective sale of leather products through local branches, and the foundation of a self-managed leather firm and ox-hide workshop.⁸⁴ From available reports, there can be no doubt of the high priority attached to these goals. Most plans, especially those for the enlightenment of members and for the improvement of their economic conditions were widely adopted, though with some regional variations. Members of both factions also visited Japanese colonial officials for negotiation and persuasion.⁸⁵

5. CONTACTS WITH OTHER SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

At the time of the factional dispute, the *Hyongpyong* movement was in the process of establishing itself as part of the wider social movement sector then developing within Korean society. (See Chapter 3.) In fact, it was closely associated with other social movements from the very beginning, having been initiated by social activists in Chinju and having received direct support from several groups. Yet, its early relations with other social movement groups were generally confined to local and regional levels and often carried out by individual initiatives.⁸⁶ At the national level, there was in 1923 little cooperation or contact with social movement activists. One exceptional event in this situation was the public circuit lectures of

⁸⁴ Choson Ilbo, 25 and 28 April 1925; Tonga Ilbo, 26 and 28 April 1925.

⁸⁵ Choson Ilbo, 7 February and 17 May 1925; Tonga Ilbo, 7, 16 February and 17 May 1925.

⁸⁶ For social activities in which the *Hyongpyongsa* was involved, see Choson Ilbo, 9 and 22 May 1923.

the *Puksŏnghoe* [North Star Society], the Korean student association in Japan, in August 1923. This association was socialist-inclined and had previously given a warm welcome to the *Hyongpyongsa*.⁹⁷ The Society's programme included lectures on the historic meaning and mission of the *Hyongpyong* movement.⁹⁸

The situation in relation to other social movements began to change during the period of the factional dispute. Early indications of attempts to align the *Hyongpyong* movement with other national social movements were evident at the launching of two national federations of social movement groups. When the *Choson Nonong Ch'ong Tongmaeng* [General Federation of Korean Labour and Peasant Societies] held its inaugural meeting in mid April, 1924, the *Hyongpyong* movement was one item on its agenda,⁹⁹ and the delegates passed a resolution to give it support.¹⁰⁰ Around the same time, the *Choson Ch'ŏngnyŏn Ch'ong Tongmaeng* [General Federation of Korean Youth Societies], a rival to

⁹⁷ *Ch'ŏkhudae* [Pioneer Unit], (The Official Newsletter of the *Puksonghoe*), No.3 (Tokyo, 1923). Chang Chokp'a (real name: Ilhwan), a member of the *Puksonghoe*, wrote a series of articles about the historic meaning of the movement in Choson Ilbo, from 21 to 28 June 1923.

⁹⁸ See Tonga Ilbo, 11 August 1923 for Kwangju lecture and 18 August 1923 for Kimhae lecture. And the Chinju headquarters had prepared for a public lecture in Chinju. Choson Ilbo, 6 August 1923. A confrontation between the members of the *Hyongpyongsa* and the ordinary people, caused by the lecture, took place in Kimhae. See Chapter 6.

⁹⁹ Choson Ilbo, 22 April 1924.

¹⁰⁰ Tonga Ilbo, 22 April 1924; Choson Ilbo, 22 April 1924; Sindae Ilbo, 22 April 1924. The *Hyongpyong* movement was not the only special issue they raised at the meeting. At such meetings, it was usual to discuss all affairs regarding social movements. cf. Kim Chunyŏp and Kim Ch'angsun, op. cit., Vol.2, pp.86-98. However, it is significant that the *Hyongpyong* movement received formal support from such a national gathering.

the previous labour federation, also agreed to assist the *Hyongpyong* movement and to set out to draw it into socialist activities.¹⁰¹ This had to some extent been anticipated when social movement activists from the southern part of Korea discussed the *Hyongpyong* movement as one of their major concerns at a gathering in Chinju early in 1924 and reached an agreement to try to reduce tensions between ordinary people and the members of the *Hyongpyongsa*.¹⁰²

Following this, concern over the *Hyongpyong* movement was from time to time raised by local groups of both federations in 1924,¹⁰³ and there is evidence of increasing concern in the agenda of meetings held in the early months of 1925.¹⁰⁴ Moreover, at provincial-level meetings of local groups, delegates confirmed their support for the *Hyongpyong* movement and for local activities of the *Hyongpyongsa*.¹⁰⁵ Despite the small number of groups---out

¹⁰¹ Tonga Ilbo, 26 April 1924. cf. Kim Chunyop and Kim Ch'angsun, op. cit., Vol.2, pp.140-149. Their diverse interests in social activities as a whole were same as the ones of the labour movement activists.

¹⁰² Choson Ilbo, 20 January 1924.

¹⁰³ For discussions on the *Hyongpyong* movement in 1924, see, Tonga Ilbo, 1 August 1924 for Samga and Choson Ilbo, 24 December 1924 for Mokpo. And the *Pukp'unghoe* [North Wind Society], a newly established socialist group, included support for the *Hyongpyong* movement in their statement of aims. Choson Ilbo, 29 November 1924.

¹⁰⁴ There were at least 10 groups dealing with the *Hyongpyong* movement in the first half of 1925. These were located in various parts of the country. (e.g. Kwangyang and Naju of Cholla, Hapch'on, Chinyong, Sangju and Andong of Kyongsang, Poryong of Ch'ungch'ong, T'ongch'on of Kangwon, Sariwon of Hwanghae, and P'yongyang of P'yongan areas.)

¹⁰⁵ Among the regions expressing support for the *Hyongpyong* movement were Kyong-Nam (Tonga Ilbo, 2 April 1924), Kyong-Puk (Choson Ilbo, 24 March 1925; Tonga Ilbo, 22 March 1925), Chon-Nam (Tonga Ilbo, 26 February 1925), Chon-Puk (Choson Ilbo, 14 March 1925)

of all existing at the time¹⁰⁶---expressing their support, the evidence suggests that during the period of the *Hyongpyongsa* factional split some considerable progress was made in improving relations with other social movement groups.

The growth of contacts between the *Hyongpyongsa* and other social movements was to some extent a result of deliberate efforts by the *Hyongpyongsa*. These took place at individual as well as organisational levels. Despite relative disarray in the social movement sector at the time---with the two separate federations referred to above¹⁰⁷---the headquarters of both the *Hyongpyongsa* factions continued to develop relations with at least some other social movement groups. For instance, the Chinju headquarters sent a congratulatory telegram to the labour and peasant federation on the occasion of its inauguration,¹⁰⁸ and the *Hyongpyong* Youth Society of Chinju joined a gathering of the federation of other youth groups.¹⁰⁹ The Seoul leaders in turn joined a massive rally to demonstrate against Japanese oppression of the press.¹¹⁰ And, as in the case of the P'yŏngyang branch, some local branches were participating in local activities in

and Hwanghae (Choson Ilbo, 1 April 1925; Tonga Ilbo, 1 April 1925).

¹⁰⁶ Official Japanese figures show that there were 1,031 and 1,311 social groups, mainly of labour, peasant, and youth movements in 1924 and 1925 respectively. cf. Chosen Sotokufu Keimu-Kyoku, op. cit., (1933), pp.168-169.

¹⁰⁷ On factional disputes in the social movement groups, see Kim Chunyŏp and Kim Ch'angsun, op. cit., Vol.2, Chapters 6 and 7.

¹⁰⁸ Tonga Ilbo, 20 April 1924.

¹⁰⁹ Tonga Ilbo, 21 April 1924; Sidae Ilbo, 21 April 1924.

¹¹⁰ Tonga Ilbo, 9 June 1924.

association with other social movement groups.¹¹¹ Some leaders, like Chang Chip'il,¹¹² were either associates or fellows of the social movement sector. There were many opportunities to collaborate with other groups, and the move of the headquarters to Seoul greatly facilitated the establishment of wider contacts.

This also meant, however, that the *Hyongpyongsa* inevitably became involved in factional disputes between various social movement groups, and especially in the factional antagonisms which came to a head in 1925. The *Hwayohoe* [Tuesday Society], one of the leading groups, organised a massive rally of social movement groups, the *Choson Minjung Taehoe* [Korean People's Rally], originally due to be held in Seoul on 24 April 1925.¹¹³ Cho Uje, one of the founding members of the *Hyongpyong* movement, joined the preparation committee,¹¹⁴ and the *Hyongpyong* movement was included as a major item on the agenda,¹¹⁵ with the intention of passing a resolution of support for it and of promoting a campaign for the elimination of social discriminations against the *paekjong*. One of the *Hwayohoe's* deliberate designs was to induce the *Hyongpyong* movement to join in the class struggle,¹¹⁶ and the Seoul leaders of the

¹¹¹ Choson Ilbo, 30 March 1925.

¹¹² Chang Chip'il was a one-time member of the committee for the public denunciation of a notorious religious group, *Poch'on'gyo* [Universal Heaven Religion]. Tonga Ilbo, 7 August 1924.

¹¹³ Tonga Ilbo, 19, 20 and 21 April 1925; Choson Ilbo, 20 April 1925. For the details, see Kim Chunyop and Kim Ch'angsun, op. cit., Vol.2, pp.269-284.

¹¹⁴ Tonga Ilbo, 19 February 1925.

¹¹⁵ Tonga Ilbo, 21 April 1925. For the details of the agenda, see Kim Chunyop and Kim Ch'angsun, op. cit., Vol.2, pp.275-284.

¹¹⁶ cf. *ibid*, p.278.

Hyongpyongsa did in fact respond positively.¹¹⁷ Some local branches followed the lead given to them by their headquarters and the host of the gathering claimed that 18 local branches of the *Hyongpyongsa* had submitted applications to participate in the rally.¹¹⁸

However, the Korean People's Rally was opposed by a rival group, the *Seoul Ch'ŏngnyŏnghoe* [Youth Society],¹¹⁹ which planned a massive counter-gathering, and some local social movement groups followed the call of the Seoul Youth Society. Among them, the hosts claimed, were 12 local branches of the *Hyongpyongsa*.¹²⁰

In the event, neither rally took place as the Japanese police withdrew permission for both at the last minute.¹²¹ But the absence of unity among local branches of the *Hyongpyongsa* in relation to the rallies had already been exposed. The differing responses from within the *Hyongpyongsa* were probably the result of differing attitudes at local levels. This was discussed at the annual national meeting of 1925, when the delegates resolved that in the future they would avoid all involvement in outside factional disputes and that they would endeavour to develop the *Hyongpyong* movement independently of any outside interventions.¹²²

¹¹⁷ *Tonga Ilbo*, 25 April 1925.

¹¹⁸ *Tonga Ilbo*, 20 April 1925; *Choson Ilbo*, 20 April 1925. Some of these groups, according to the newspapers, were from Chinju, Kimhae and Ŭisong of Kyŏng-Nam, Andong and Yŏngil of Kyŏng-Puk, Chongup and T'aein of Chŏn-Puk, Nŏngju of Chŏn-Nam, and Panwŏl of Kyŏnggi. *Choson Ilbo*, 28 March and 1, 10, 17 and 20 April 1925.

¹¹⁹ *Choson Ilbo*, 20 April 1925; *Tonga Ilbo*, 21 April 1925.

¹²⁰ *Choson Ilbo*, 20 April 1925; *Tonga Ilbo*, 21 April 1925.

¹²¹ *Tonga Ilbo*, 20 April 1925; *Choson Ilbo*, 20 April 1925.

¹²² *Tonga Ilbo*, 25 and 26 April 1925.

CONCLUSION

Within one year the foundation of the *Hyongpyongsa*, the leadership of the movement was split into two factions with their power bases in Chinju and Seoul respectively. The dispute may be seen as having originated in different opinions about the appropriate location of the national headquarters but mainly in disagreement over the incumbent leadership. During the course of the year-long dispute, however, the two factions showed differences in several aspects, and especially in relation to economic questions. In contrast to the relative neglect of these questions by the "moderate" Chinju faction, the Seoul faction offered "progressive" programmes for bringing practical and economic benefits to the members.

In the end the two factions agreed to re-unite as a result of both internal and external pressures. During the course of the process of reconciliation, the movement as a whole underwent a significant transformation. The national leadership, initially dominated by members from the Kyongsang area, was taken over by influential members drawn from various regions but mainly from the southern and middle areas of the country. The move of the national headquarters to Seoul and the emergence of a new leadership was accompanied by rapid geographical expansion of the activities from the Chinju area to the north. In addition, the *Hyongpyong* movement's relations with other social

movement groups developed apace until it was well established as a part of the wider social movement sector. However, the successful launch and subsequent early development of the movement met considerable resistance. This resistance, coupled with periodic attacks on its members by ordinary people, will be discussed in ^{the} chapter to follow.

CHAPTER SIX

THE EXTERNAL TRIALS: 1923-1925

We have seen how in its early years the *Hyongpyong* movement underwent rapid organisational development, followed first by factional disarray in its leadership and then by re-unification at the national level. We now turn to the reception of the movement by the society in which it developed.

The birth and growth of the movement was a significant development for ordinary members of the society as well as for the *paekjong*. While there were some favourable responses to it from outside---as already seen in Chapter 4---there was also widespread hostility to it and to its members and sympathisers. In retrospect, it is easy to appreciate that, following on the long history of the stigmatisation of the *paekjong*, there should have been repeated collective attacks on the *Hyongpyong* movement accompanied by a great deal of social unrest.

Any emancipating social movement is liable to face reactionary objections from the people whose privileges are challenged and threatened by it and the responses of those not likely to benefit may be expected to check the easy development of the movement's programmes. Opposition may, however, also have consequences unanticipated by those hoping to restrain the emancipation.

There are, of course, several sets of factors that may affect the outcome. Among these are the nature of movement's leadership and of its support from the inside as well as the nature and range of the forces opposed to it. In the case of the *Hyongpyongsa*, all opposition was conceived by the leaders and members as a denial of their very right to exist and there could be no compromise on this basic issue. The resolve of both leaders and members ~~was~~ ^{was} so deeply rooted that the confrontations which ensued had far-reaching impacts on the very nature and process of the *Hyongpyongsa*. This chapter is devoted to an analysis of the opposition encountered by the *Hyongpyongsa*. The first part dwells on three local confrontations in Kimhae, Ipjang and Yech'ŏn which between them reveal different aspects of opposition to the movement; and the second part sets out a broad analysis of the opposition to the movement in its first three years.

I. THE KIMHAE INCIDENT (Case Study No.1)

The members in Kimhae, some of whom had attended the foundation celebration gathering of the *Hyongpyongsa* in Chinju, established their local branch in 1923, and celebrated its inauguration with guests from other communities on 11 August of that year.¹ As in other areas, leaflets describing the aims and purposes of the movement

¹ Tonga Ilbo, 18 August 1923.

were distributed from street to street. The celebration gathering was formally opened with an address by Kang Sangho from Chinju headquarters. The programme of events was presided over by Yi Okch'on, the head of the branch, and there were congratulatory speeches by guests who included members of the *Puksŏnghoe* [North Star Society] and local influentials such as the leaders of other social movements and a Christian minister. The meeting closed with an address by Kim Kyongsam, the head of Taegu regional headquarters, who thanked the guests for attending. In the evening, the members had another opportunity to reaffirm their stand at a meeting of the North Star Society which was sympathetic to them and was at that time on a lecture tour of the area.² Support for the *Hyongpyongsa* was expressed in the lecture given at the meeting.³

Meanwhile, there was a minor, but probably decisive, incident involving the *Hyongpyongsa* members.⁴ Local social movement activists in Kimhae had organised a standing reception committee for circuit lecture groups from other parts of the country, and the North Star Society was not an exception in receiving a warm welcome. The reception

² The members of the society had already talked about the historic meaning of the *Hyongpyong* movement on previous visits to Kwangju and Chinju. See Tonga Ilbo, 6 and 11 August 1923; Kim Chunyŏp and Kim Ch'angsun, *Han'guk Kongsan Chu'i Undongsa* [The History of the Korean Communist Movement], (Seoul, Korea University Press, 1973) Vol.2, pp.37-39.

³ Tonga Ilbo, 18 August 1923.

⁴ This account of the Kimhae incident is mainly based on articles in Tonga Ilbo, 20 and 22 August 1923; Choson Ilbo, 21 and 24 August 1923; Maeil Sinbo, 20, 21, 23 and 24 August 1923.

committee, which consisted of the leaders of local social movements, invited the *Hyongpyongsa* members,⁵ as well as other activists and even students of their local unofficial school, to the railway station to welcome the North Star Society group. However, several students of the unofficial school turned down the invitation because of their reluctance to associate themselves with the *paekjong* cause. Afterwards, these students were, in turn, prevented from attending the lecture of the North Star Society, and they later complained about the local social movement activists' support for the *Hyongpyong* movement. Eventually the *Hyongpyong* movement became the focus of their discontent which was supported by most of the residents of the town. Local hostility to the *paekjong*, which had hitherto been latent, was activated by the establishment of the local *Hyongpyongsa* branch and, a few days later, this hostility was translated into open aggression against all those involved in or supporting the *Hyongpyongsa*.

The first incident reported in the newspapers took place on 14 August.⁶ Thousands of rioters attacked the buildings and facilities of the local youth society and the *Kimhae Kyoyukhoe* [Education Society], which were both accused of having supported the foundation of the *Hyongpyongsa* branch. The building in which the unofficial school was run, and where the *Hyongpyongsa* branch

⁵ It was not unusual for the *Hyongpyongsa* to be involved in the North Star Society event. In Chinju, the leaders of the *Hyongpyongsa* even joined the reception committee. *Choson Ilbo*, 6 August 1923.

⁶ *Tonga Ilbo*, 20 August 1923; *Choson Ilbo*, 21 August 1923.

celebrated its foundation, was damaged. The riot continued on the next day, when the targets were individuals sympathetic to the *Hyongpyongsa*. Anyone with *paekjong* associations in business or through marriage was also assaulted. The violence was probably aggravated by a wild rumour that a *paekjong* had insulted an ordinary person purchasing meat. On the third day the riot was extended to a *paekjong* village outside the town. There was strong resistance from the village and the result was that several people were wounded and five houses were damaged.

As the situation worsened, the local police finally intervened for the first time. Several rioters were arrested on the spot and the police action was apparently effective in dispersing the rioters and restoring order. On the following day, the mayor of Kimhae convened a meeting of village leaders to appeal for calm. The violence and disturbance ended, but the situation remained tense. The police action was condemned as inadequate and indifferent by the leaders of the local youth society who suspected that the delay in intervening was due to police sympathy with the protesters and a desire to prevent local social movement leaders from intensifying their *paekjong* activities.⁷ The condemnation of the police was repeated in national newspapers. In a leading article *Choson Ilbo*, for example, insisted that the escalation of the violence was a direct result of the police neglecting their proper duty; the police were thus held to have been

⁷ *Tonga Ilbo*, 22 August 1923; *Choson Ilbo*, 24 and 26 August 1923.

partly responsible for the rioting.⁸ The police chief had in fact said that his men did not attempt to prevent attacks on public buildings, but only on private residential property.⁹ This statement clearly implies that the police did not consider it their duty to protect the properties of social movement groups.

After the riots, the tense situation continued. People opposed to the *Hyongpyongsa* encouraged non-*paekjong* to boycott meat. The restaurant owners also joined in the action by refusing to serve meals to *paekjong*.¹⁰ And, when a cow was slaughtered, the meat was not sold in the town. As a result of such actions, daily life became very difficult for members of the *Hyongpyongsa*, especially the poor. The *Hyongpyongsa* responded with various measures to meet the situation and in the course of doing so found opportunities to develop their local activities.¹¹ They arranged to sell meat outside the town, and they organised emergency assistance for those in the worst difficulty. At the same time, they re-affirmed their determination to educate the members below 20 years of age at their independent school.¹² Meanwhile, they received assurances of support from Chinju by Chang Chip'il, the full-time executive of the headquarters.¹³

⁸ Choson Ilbo, 26 August 1923.

⁹ Tonga Ilbo, 23 August 1923.

¹⁰ Choson Ilbo, 28 August 1923.

¹¹ Choson Ilbo, 28 August 1923.

¹² As explained in Chapter 4, education was always given a high priority.

¹³ Tonga Ilbo, 23 August 1923.

It took over a month for these confrontations to be partially resolved. The leaders of the local youth society---playing two basically different roles, as teachers of the unofficial school for villagers and supporters to the *Hyongpyongsa*---helped to reduce the tension and to mediate in the confrontation.¹⁴ At a special gathering of the residents, it was re-affirmed that steps taken to improve local education facilities and to develop the town would continue, as did attempts to persuade the *paekjong* villagers that the move towards equality would be pursued despite the kind of difficulties encountered. Further efforts to improve the situation were made by the mayor of the town, and a formal conciliatory resolution was eventually agreed by both sides at a special meeting convened by him.¹⁵ This was also reconfirmed by representatives of the two sides in the presence of police and government officials. The main provisions of the agreement were that the attackers would withdraw their condemnation of the *Hyongpyongsa* and its members, while the *Hyongpyongsa* would express regret over the plight of the rioters who had been arrested.¹⁶

Next to the Chinju case discussed in Chapter 4, the Kimhae incident was the largest popular protest against the *Hyongpyongsa* in 1923. It clearly shows that antagonism was not expressed only against the *Hyongpyongsa* as such, but extended to the entire *paekjong* population and anyone

¹⁴ Maeil Sinbo, 29 August 1923.

¹⁵ Tonga Ilbo, 28 September 1923; Choson Ilbo, 2 October 1923; Maeil Sinbo, 2 October 1923.

¹⁶ There is no information on what eventually happened to them.

who supported them. It should also be noted that the attacks and the rioting were treated with relative indifference by the police. The precipitating event was quite trivial, but it released powerful feelings and emotions on both sides. Several incidents following this outburst in Kimhae show that the tension lasted for a long time and that the Kimhae branch of the *Hyongpyongsa* continued to resist vigorously.

II. THE IPJANG INCIDENT (Case Study No.2)

From July to August, 1924, similar events occurred in Ipjang, Ch'ung-Nam Province. These arose from discrimination against the children of the *Hyongpyongsa* members attending a local school. The events were, however, entangled in a complex way with social circumstances surrounding the *Hyongpyong* movement. They began with a seemingly trivial dispute between pupils at the private school in July 1924.¹⁷ There were 14 children from *paekjong* families in the school and over 200 non-*paekjong*. On 9 July some non-*paekjong* children boycotted a class, complaining over the fact that they had *paekjong* classmates.¹⁸

¹⁷ For the process of the conflict at the school, see Tonga Ilbo, 18, 21 and 23 July 1924; Choson Ilbo, 15 and 16 August 1924.

¹⁸ There were differing accounts of the precipitating event and the boycott. Japanese records claim that the boycott originated in a quarrel between two sides in a tennis game. Chosen Sotokufu [Government-General of Korea], *Chosen no Gunshu* [Mass of Korea], (1926),

Whatever the true origins of the action, it developed into an event focused on the *paekjong*. The headmaster, who was also the mayor of the town, and the teachers of the school successfully persuaded the boycotting pupils to rejoin their class, but *Hyongpyongsa* members became suspicious of the headmaster's action when he segregated the returning pupils from their own children; they accused him of reinforcing the stigmatised status of the *paekjong* simply by acknowledging their identity. In addition, one teacher was known to the *Hyongpyongsa* members for having previously denounced the *Hyongpyongsa* for supposedly "exploiting" the *paekjong* by taking money from them.¹⁸ Not surprisingly, the members were resentful and they withdrew their children from the school in protest. They then informed the *Hyongpyongsa* headquarters in Seoul and neighbouring local branches of the situation they were facing.

There was an immediate response from the Seoul leaders, who were at the time still in conflict with their

p.191. This account was, to some extent, repeated by a newspaper. See *Tonga Ilbo*, 21 July 1924. But, according to another version, the real reason for the boycott of the class was to put pressure on an unsatisfactory teacher to leave his job. Along with this demand, the issue of co-education with *paekjong* students was also raised, and it is said that, in this complex situation, some teachers manipulated the students to express their discontent towards the *paekjong*. Yi Yigyu, "Ipjang Haksul Kangsuphoe-ŭi Purakmin Haksaeng Ch'abyŏl Sagŏn" [The Discriminating Incident against Paekjong Students at Ipjang Unofficial School], *Choson Ilbo*, 15 and 16 August 1924. Yi Yigyu, the reporter of Ch'onan branch, was said to be an executive member of the *Hyongpyongsa*, and his report was certainly favourable to the *Hyongpyongsa*.

¹⁸ *Choson Ilbo*, 15 August 1924.

counterparts in Chinju. Chang Chip'il, the leader of the Seoul group, visited Ipjang with other executives. After inquiring into the situation, they succeeded in calming down the local members, and were successful in inducing the *paekjong* to return to school. But their return provoked the non-*paekjong* children to walk out again. Such repeated actions appear to have frustrated the teachers to the extent that they all tendered their resignations, taking collective responsibility for the total disarray. This led to great concern on the part of non-*paekjong* villagers, who now demanded an apology from the *paekjong* and urged the teachers who had resigned to return to the school.

At one stage in the events, the *paekjong* parents accused the headmaster and another leading teacher of being responsible for the deteriorating situation. With the support of their fellow members in the community, they protested that the two teachers had insulted the *Hyongpyongsa* and mishandled the whole school situation. Consequently, they demanded that the two should make a public apology for defaming the *Hyongpyongsa* and its members. At first, the two teachers agreed to make a formal apology under pressure of the *Hyongpyongsa* members and of the police who were also anxious to calm the situation.²⁰ Later, however, they changed their minds and finally refused to make the apology. Furthermore, they are

²⁰ Tonga Ilbo, 11 August 1924; Choson Ilbo, 16 August 1924.

said to have set non-*paekjong* villagers against the *Hyongpyongsa*.

Not surprisingly, the villagers were also sharply divided into two groups---some favourable and some opposed to the *Hyongpyongsa*. In confrontation with each other, each group found ways of enlarging the issue. Those opposed to the *Hyongpyongsa* began to boycott the purchase of meat, aiming to isolate the *Hyongpyongsa* members into submission. But the latter retaliated by ~~stopping~~^{ceasing} to slaughter animals which caused a general meat shortage on the market.²¹ Despite attempts by the local police to resolve the deadlock, the two sides remained firmly entrenched in their respective positions.

In the end, a villager wanting meat tried to persuade a *paekjong*, Kim Hŭiyon, to slaughter for him. When Kim finally accepted to do so, the *Hyongpyongsa* members on strike were angry with him.²² They convened a special gathering to discuss the matter and unanimously passed a resolution to punish him. On 13 August, he was forcibly dragged into a gathering of the members who were all in favour of sentencing him to death. The gathering was, however, raided by the police who arrested seven members on the spot. Among those arrested was Cho Kwiyong, one of the Seoul leaders, originally from Ipjang, and this action appears ^{to} ~~of~~ have ended this incident. X

²¹ Sidae Ilbo, 2 October 1924.

²² This incident is described in detail in a Japanese document. See, Chosen Sotokufu, *Chosen no Gunshu*, pp.193-194. The account favours the "strike-breaking" *paekjong* and does not hide the official Japanese hostile view of the *Hyongpyongsa*.

However, there was still the question of what was to happen to the seven members who had been arrested. The Seoul leaders visited the local police station as well as the provincial headquarters of the police bureau in an attempt to negotiate their release. They also received legal advice from their lawyers in Seoul who visited the detainees in Ch'ŏnan.²³ The Seoul leaders argued that if the detainees were to be prosecuted, all those who had prompted the villagers to boycott meat should equally be charged for having violated the course of free commercial activity.²⁴ In effect, they were arguing that if the seven members of *Hyongpyongsa* were guilty of causing social unrest, all those involved in the events should face criminal charges. Despite the efforts of the leaders, however, the arrested members were prosecuted on the main charges of illegal detention and making a death threat.²⁵ At the trial, the defendants denied the charge that they had intended to kill Kim Huiyon. In association with local legal advisers, a leading Seoul lawyer, Yi In, defended the seven detainees, but they received sentences of six to eight months imprisonment with their sentences suspended for three years. After the trial, all were freed in December 1924 several months after their initial arrest. While in prison, they received massive of support and money donations from all parts of the country.²⁶

²³ Tonga Ilbo, 27 August 1924.

²⁴ Tonga Ilbo, 9 September 1924. However, it would appear that the law suit was not pursued.

²⁵ For the detail of the trial, Choson Ilbo, 23 September, 26 October, 27 November 1924; Tonga Ilbo, 30 September, 29 November, 6 December 1924.

²⁶ For the donation of Suwon members, Tonga Ilbo, 20 September 1924. And for the support from Wonsan and

The Ipjang events were complex and are a good illustration of various aspects of the struggle of the *Hyongpyongsa*. They show how strongly discrimination in the education of the children of *Hyongpyongsa* members was resisted by the *paekjong* and their sympathisers, how deep the resentment of ordinary villagers was, and how influential figures such as the headmaster (also the mayor), the teachers and the police tended to take the side of the majority. The final prosecution of the seven detainees shows how far "official" opposition to the *Hyongpyongsa* was carried, but the evidence would seem to suggest that this only served to strengthen the solidarity of the members of the movement.

The events also served to mobilise and increase support from outside *Hyongpyongsa* groups to an even higher level than in Kimhae case. Afterwards, the Ipjang branch for long maintained their activities in a lively way and with greater intensity than same other local level branches. In addition, the Ipjang events threw up a number of key activists such as Cho Kwiyoung, Kil Pongsŏ, Kil Suno, and Pak P'yŏngsan, who all later joined the national headquarters in Seoul. It is also worth noting that some members of the Ipjang branch proceeded to gather funds for the development of their local school.²⁷

Yonghung, Sidae Ilbo, 13 January 1925; Choson Ilbo, 13 January 1925.

²⁷ Tonga Ilbo, 12 August 1925. The villagers' efforts resulted in the expansion of the private unofficial school into an officially authorised primary school. The list of donors included at least three members of the *Hyongpyongsa* branch who had been prosecuted during this incident. They were Cho Kwiyoung (300 won), Kil Ponghak (30 won), and Cho Kwanok (20 won).

III. THE YECH'ŎN INCIDENT (Case Study No.3)

In August 1925 immediately after the re-unification of the Seoul and Chinju factions, the *Hyongpyongsa* was intensifying its activities with renewed confidence. At this very time, however, major events arose in Yech'ŏn, Kyŏng-Puk Province, following an attack by thousands of rioters at the close of the special anniversary gathering there.

To appreciate the significance of this attack and subsequent developments in Yech'ŏn, we first need to note the preceding history of the local branch. In August 1923, the *paekjong* in Yech'on followed the emerging trend of the period in organising a local branch of the *Hyongpyongsa*.²⁸ Although the branch was started with a relatively small number of members,²⁹ its activities were enthusiastically promoted. At a meeting in October 1923, the members

These donations, particularly that by Cho Kwiyong, were substantial by the standards of the period. We may note in passing that these donations are clear evidence that some *paekjong* were wealthy people.

²⁸ Choson Ilbo, 15 August 1923.

²⁹ According to one newspaper report, only about 40 *paekjong* joined the branch. (Choson Ilbo, 15 August 1923) A Japanese report, based on information gathered several years later in June 1929, recorded that there were 891 *paekjong* from 147 households in the locality. According to this report, this was the largest *paekjong* community with the single exception of Kimch'ŏn county in Kyŏng-Puk Province. cf. Kyongsang Pukdo Keisatsubu, [Bureau of Police Affairs, North Kyongsang Province], *Koto Keisatsu Yoshi*, [Brief History of Supreme Police], (Taegu, 1934), pp.351-352.

decided that they would all cut their traditional hair (a symbol of their status) and collect membership fees to enable them to develop their activities.³⁰ There was clearly strong support for the *Hyongpyong* movement with members enthusiastically embracing the eventual aim of abolishing all humiliating social conventions.³¹

No records have thus far been found on activities in the Yech'on branch from their first meeting in 1923 to one in July 1925. It may well be that the enthusiasm of the rank and file members declined in comparison with the early period. Whatever the case, in July 1925, we find that the members of a local youth club, *Sinhŭng Ch'ŏngnyŏnhoe* [New Youth Society], expressed strong support for the *Hyongpyong* movement and asked to be affiliated to the Yech'on branch of the *Hyongpyongsa*.³² The leaders of the local *Hyongpyongsa* welcomed this move and took the opportunity to reactivate their work by convening a special meeting on 11 July, at which they presented plans for the development of their activities.³³ Included in their plans was a gathering to celebrate the second anniversary of the branch on 9 August.

³⁰ Choson Ilbo, 6 November 1923.

³¹ One instance of the attempted practice of a humiliating convention had occurred at the annual festival of farmers in mid-July. Dancing farmers captured some *paekjong* women as hostages and then demanded meat or a cow head as ransom. Unless the *paekjong*'s families responded to their demand, the hostages would have been ~~lynched~~^{abused}. See, Choson Sotokufu, *Chosen no Gunshu*, pp. 73-74.

³² Choson Ilbo, 10 July 1925; Tonga Ilbo, 10 July 1925.

³³ Tonga Ilbo, 10 July 1925.

This development was kept under surveillance by the local police, who were trying to bring all social movement groups in the area under tight control.³⁴ Towards this end, the police urged all youth clubs to merge under the leadership of the *Yech'ŏn Ch'ŏngnyŏnhoe* [Youth Society].³⁵ Failing that, the police threatened to disband all social movement groups on the grounds of public security. But most local social movement leaders defied the injunctions of the police and sought to dissociate themselves from the Yech'on Youth Society and its political stance.³⁶

The meeting to celebrate the second anniversary of the branch was duly held on 9 August with guests from both inside and outside the local community.³⁷ Among the latter were Chang Chip'il and Yi So from the Seoul headquarters and several local social movement activists from neighbouring towns such as Andong and P'ungsan. All the speeches were well received and applauded until Kim Sŏkhŭi, the head of the Yech'ŏn Youth Society, began his address in which he claimed that no one should be blamed

³⁴ There were five youth societies in action in Yech'on at that time. All but one were at odds with the police. The only exception was the Yech'on Youth Society, which was regarded as pro-Japanese. Tonga Ilbo, 10 July 1925.

³⁵ Choson Ilbo, 21 August 1925.

³⁶ The nature of the Yech'ŏn Youth Society can be partly gauged by the stipulation that its leader had to be a person paying taxes over a specified amount. In addition, the advisers of the society consisted of pro-Japanese people in the community such as the mayor, the chief of police, the magistrate, and the headmaster of an elementary school. cf. Choson Ilbo, 1 September 1925. The indications are that the society was in effect a social club of wealthy pro-Japanese Koreans.

³⁷ For details of the gathering, see Choson Ilbo, 14 August 1925; Tonga Ilbo, 14 August 1925, and Chosen Sotokufu, *Chosen no Gunshu*, pp.195-206.

for oppressing the *paekjong* because this was normal behaviour in the light of their communal history of criminality. He then added that there was no need for the *Hyongpyongsa* as social discrimination against *paekjong* had already been legally abolished.³⁸ His speech immediately evoked furious protests from the floor. The *Hyongpyongsa* members accused him of distorting history and of holding all their ancestors and fellows in contempt. There was virtual chaos in the gathering.

Order was restored at the meeting itself but it was followed by rioting after members of the audience had returned home.³⁹ Several hundred people attacked the *Hyongpyongsa* branch office, destroying all the facilities and ~~lynching~~^{attacking} members found in the office. Several members were wounded, including the head of the local branch. On the following day, *Hyongpyongsa* members were repeatedly attacked, they responded vigorously, and there were even more casualties than on the previous day. One of the *Hyongpyongsa* members attacked was Kim Wŏnjun who died as a result six months later.⁴⁰ The attacks continued until all *Hyongpyongsa* members were compelled to leave the town. Furthermore, the rioters also attacked non-members who

³⁸ Choson Ilbo, 14 August 1925; Tonga Ilbo, 14 August 1925. The two reports of the speech were roughly the same as, also, a report in an official Japanese source. Chosen Sotokufu, *Chosen no Gunshu*, pp. 196-197. Later, Kim and the secretary of the Youth Society present at the meeting were forced to resign their posts, because their own members were critical of them for having attended the meeting in the first place. Choson Ilbo, 1 September 1925.

³⁹ For the details of the confrontation, see Choson Ilbo, 14, 16 and 17 August 1925; Tonga Ilbo, 14, 15 and 16 August 1925.

⁴⁰ Choson Ilbo, 21 February 1926.

were sympathetic supporters of the *Hyongpyong* movement and especially members of the New Youth Society. In the course of the rioting, there was constant shouting of slogans such as "Destroy all *Hyongpyongsa* and its members and supporters," and there were constant allegations that the foundation of the *Hyongpyongsa*, and the support of the movement by the New Youth Society, were leading the *paekjong* to be more disloyal and less respectful towards ordinary members of the community.

While the rioting was in progress, Chang Chip'il and Yi So, the executive members from Seoul, visited the police station, accompanied by Kim Namsu, a reporter of the Andong branch of Choson Ilbo. The local police chief advised them to leave Yech'on as soon as possible,⁴¹ and he urged all new *Hyongpyongsa* members, who had been recruited to it by the New Youth Society, to resign. He implied that the presence of social activists from outside Yech'on and the support of the New Youth Society had provoked the violence. In the end, the national executives accepted the police advice and requested protection for themselves against the rioters. On the way back from the police to the local branch office, Chang and Yi were nonetheless assaulted and ~~lynched~~^{beaten} by the mob, and were later that night brought to Andong, the nearest big city

⁴¹ For the incident following the meeting with the police chief, see Choson Ilbo, 16 August 1925; Tonga Ilbo, 19 August 1925.

for urgent medical attention.⁴² Both spent nearly a month in bed recovering from their injuries.⁴³

The deteriorating situation in Yech'on led the local *Hyongpyongsa* leaders to seek urgent action. They convened an emergency meeting of all members, but the police refused to give permission for the meeting to be held. Despite the ban, several key members met for discussions and reached the conclusion that the members of the *Yech'on Nononghoe* [Labourers and Farmers Society] were instigating the troubles.⁴⁴ (Some rioters had in fact identified themselves as members of the society.) The meeting issued a statement accusing members of the Farmers Society of responsibility and warning them not to be involved in further violence. At the same time, they sent a telegram to their provincial headquarters in Taegu informing them of the seriousness of the local situation. But the situation was, in any case, already well known countrywide from newspaper reports. Consequently, there were immediate and determined reactions from *Hyongpyongsa* members throughout the country, as well as from other social movement groups.

Let us start to discuss the support from the *Hyongpyongsa* side. As soon as they were informed, the Seoul headquarters responded swiftly. At an emergency meeting on 15 August, the executive leaders agreed to

⁴² Choson Ilbo, 17 August 1925.

⁴³ They returned to Seoul on 16 September after discharge from the hospital in Andong. Tonga Ilbo, 21 September 1925.

⁴⁴ Choson Ilbo, 14 August 1925.

mobilise all members of the *Hyongpyongsa* in support of the Yech'on branch.⁴⁵ They requested all subordinate groups to prepare for action in support of their Yech'on fellows, and they established a special committee to investigate the situation and to take appropriate action. This committee consisted of three members, one from the provincial headquarters of Ch'ung-Nam, one from Suwon branch and one from Seoul headquarters. The committee organised a special relief unit to care for the wounded members in Yech'on. In addition to this headquarters action, the *Chōngwidan* [Righteous Defence Unit], an independent sub-group of the *Hyongpyongsa*, sent a force to Yech'on,⁴⁶ and local branches quickly followed the lead from Seoul headquarters in taking their own actions. At least 34 branches expressed their concern and support.


⁴⁵ Choson Ilbo, 19 August 1925.

⁴⁶ Choson Ilbo, 19 August 1925. For the nature of the *Chongwidan*, see Chapter 7.

Figure 6-1. Map of Location of Social Groups Supporting the Yech'ŏn Branch during the Events of August 1925

Hyangpyangsa Groups

- 1 Sinp'o
- 2 Pukch'ŏng
- 5 Kangnŭng
- 6 Yangyang
- 7 Hwach'ŏn
- 8 Kaesŏng
- 11 Yŏju
- 12 Ansŏng
- 13 Changhŏwŏn
- 14 Ch'ŏngju
- 15 Kangok
- 16 Ch'ŏngyang
- 17 Hongsŏng
- 18 Kanggyŏng
- 19 Yesan
- 20 Poryŏng
- 21 Choch'iwŏn
- 22 Tangjin
- 23 Kongju
- 24 Kunsan
- 25 Iksan
- 27 Taegu
- 28 Andong
- 29 Kyŏngsan
- 30 Yŏngch'ŏn
- 32 Hayang
- 33 Koryŏng
- 34 Chinju
- 35 Masan
- 36 T'ongyŏng
- 37 Chinhae
- 38 Chindong
- 39 Ch'angnyŏng
- 40 Haman



⊙ Yech'ŏn

Non-Hyangpyangsa Groups

- 3 Hamhŭng
- 4 Hongwŏn
- 9 Seoul
- 10 Inch'ŏn
- ⊖ 24 Kunsan
- 26 Iri
- 27 Taegu
- 28 Andong
- 30 Yŏngch'ŏn
- 31 Yŏngyang
- 35 Masan

As we can see from Figure 6-1, the local branches which sent support were spread well beyond the Kyŏngsang area near to Yech'ŏn to the middle areas of the country and even to the Hamgyŏng area.⁴⁷ Despite the possible limitations of the present known sources on these events, we may safely conclude that most of the *Hyongpyongsa* branches throughout the country realised the seriousness of the situation in Yech'ŏn and responded with help and support. There were responses from eight and six branches in Kyŏng-Nam⁴⁸ and Kyŏng-Puk⁴⁹ respectively; from nine branches in Ch'ung-Nam,⁵⁰ two in Ch'ung-Puk,⁵¹ four in Kyŏnggi,⁵² and three in Kangwŏn,⁵³ all in the middle

⁴⁷ In Hamgyong Provinces, Sinp'o and Pukch'ong branches. Choson Ilbo, 29 August 1925.

⁴⁸ Among them were Chinju (Choson Ilbo, 23 August 1925), Masan (Tonga Ilbo, 25 August 1925), T'ongyŏng (Tonga Ilbo, 25 August 1925), Ungch'ŏn (Choson Ilbo, 26 August 1925), Chinhae (Choson Ilbo, 26 August 1925), Chindong (Choson Ilbo, 26 August 1925), Ch'angnyong (Choson Ilbo, 27 August 1925) and Haman (Tonga Ilbo, 8 September 1925).

⁴⁹ Among them were Taegu, (Choson Ilbo, 17 August 1925), Andong (Choson Ilbo, 19 August 1925), Kyŏngsan (Choson Ilbo, 19 August 1925), Yŏngch'ŏn (Choson Ilbo, 29 August 1925), Hayang (30 August 1925) and Koryŏng (Choson Ilbo, 5 September 1925).

⁵⁰ Ch'ŏngyang (Choson Ilbo, 19 August 1925), Hongsŏng (Choson Ilbo, 21 August 1925), Kanggyong (Tonga Ilbo, 23 August 1925), The provincial headquarters and Yesan (Choson Ilbo, 24 August 1925), Puyŏ (Choson Ilbo, 27 August 1925), Poryŏng (Choson Ilbo, 29 August 1925), Choch'iwŏn (Choson Ilbo, 29 August 1925) and Tangjin (Tonga Ilbo, 5 September 1925).

⁵¹ Ch'ŏngju (Choson Ilbo, 23 August 1925), and Kamgok, Ŭmsong (Choson Ilbo, 15 December 1925).

⁵² Kaesŏng (Choson Ilbo, 19 August 1925), Ansŏng (Choson Ilbo, 24 August 1925), Yŏju (Choson Ilbo, 23 August 1925) and Changhowŏn (Choson Ilbo, 27 August 1925).

⁵³ Kangnŏng (Choson Ilbo, 21 August 1925), Yangyang (Choson Ilbo, 21 August 1925) and Hwach'ŏn (Choson Ilbo, 29 August 1925).

region of the country. And there were at least two from Ch'ŏlla areas.⁵⁴

The responses of most local branches were more or less on the same lines as that from the Seoul headquarters. After holding emergency meetings, they generally issued statements in which they demanded a thorough investigation of the events and strongly requested that those responsible for the attack be punished. Some clearly expressed the view that the responsibility for the events lay with the Yech'on Labourers and Farmers Society and the Yech'on Youth Society together. The statements from most branches were followed by concrete and practical moves. A number of branches despatched key members to Yech'ŏn to participate in an independent investigation. As Kyŏngsan branch did,⁵⁵ units of local members were mobilised to join the force of their Yech'on fellows. Some provincial headquarters, such as Chinju,⁵⁶ prepared for collective cooperation with local branches in the regions. Another practical step was to collect money to send to Yech'ŏn as help for wounded *Hyongpyongsa* members and for the reconstruction of damaged houses and offices.

In short, members from many branches perceived the Yech'ŏn events as a crucial challenge to the existence of the *Hyongpyongsa*. The scope and the violent nature of the attacks were unprecedented, and the rank and file members

⁵⁴ Kusan (Choson Ilbo, 23 August 1925) and Iksan (Tonga Ilbo, 31 August 1925).

⁵⁵ Choson Ilbo, 19 August 1925.

⁵⁶ Choson Ilbo, 23 August 1925.

were clearly alarmed that their activities would have to cease unless they were able to protect themselves. As a result, there was nationwide support for the Yech'on members. Now that the factional dispute in the movement was over, the strong unified leadership was able to set an example in mobilising all members in support of their Yech'on fellows. This direct and unambiguous commitment lent great solidarity to the rank and file members.

Meanwhile, there was also enormous support from other social movements throughout the country. (see Figure 6-1). Such support eventually developed into a powerful moral force legitimating the *Hyongpyongsa's* call for resistance. Social movement groups expressed their support for the *Hyongpyongsa* in various ways. Some groups sent key members to Yech'on with the main assignments of reporting back their own findings and of expressing sympathy for the Yech'on members in their immediate situation. In some larger cities, different groups became allies in a campaign to demand the launch of a new more comprehensive organisation. Among these cities were Taegu (10 groups),⁵⁷ Seoul (33 groups),⁵⁸ Andong (12 groups),⁵⁹ Masan (9 groups),⁶⁰ Kunsan (14 groups),⁶¹ Hamhŭng (6 groups),⁶² and

⁵⁷ Tonga Ilbo, 18 August 1925; Choson Ilbo, 19 August 1925.

⁵⁸ Choson Ilbo, 19 to 21 August 1925; Tonga Ilbo, 19 to 21 August 1925.

⁵⁹ Choson Ilbo, 25 August and 2 September 1925; Tonga Ilbo, 3 September 1925.

⁶⁰ Choson Ilbo, 25 August and 7 September 1925; Tonga Ilbo, 25 August 1925.

⁶¹ Choson Ilbo, 25 August 1925; Tonga Ilbo, 24 August 1925.

⁶² Tonga Ilbo, 5 September 1925.

Inch'ŏn (3 groups).⁶³ Many social movement groups had hitherto been divided from each other on factional lines and it is significant that a great deal of factionalisation was set aside in general support of the *Hyongpyongsa*. Even though in separate actions, most groups were enthusiastic in giving support. In addition, there were groups which expressed their support for the *Hyongpyongsa* on their own. Such groups were also widely dispersed geographically---from Iri,⁶⁴ Seoul,⁶⁵ Hongwŏn,⁶⁶ Yŏngch'ŏn,⁶⁷ and Yŏngyang.⁶⁸

Finally, the events drew some attraction and support from abroad. Thus a special joint meeting of ten Korean groups based in Japan and of the Japanese *Suiheisha* also expressed sympathy with the Yech'on members and support for the *Hyongpyongsa* in general.⁶⁹

All groups supporting the *Hyongpyongsa* strongly condemned the rioters, criticising their insensitivity to the broad issue of progress towards human equality and they urged that those responsible for the social unrest should be punished by law. Some alleged that the social disturbances were due to the members of the Yech'ŏn Youth Society and the Yech'on Labourer and Farmers Society. Their accusation of the Yech'ŏn Youth Society was linked to their belief that it was strongly pro-Japanese and that

⁶³ Choson Ilbo, 23 August 1925.

⁶⁴ Tonga Ilbo, 8 September 1925.

⁶⁵ Choson Ilbo, 8 September 1925.

⁶⁶ Choson Ilbo, 25 August 1925.

⁶⁷ Choson Ilbo, 29 August 1925.

⁶⁸ Tonga Ilbo, 1 September 1925.

⁶⁹ Choson Ilbo, 27 August 1925.

it should be excluded from the sector of genuine social movements. At their special meetings, or in the course of the visits of representatives to Yech'ŏn, the groups generally re-affirmed their unreserved backing of the *Hyongpyong* movement. Furthermore, their campaigns denouncing the disturbances were often conducted with public rallies---especially in the major cities---and local *Hyongpyongsa* branches were normally represented in these.

Such unprecedented and nation-wide support came from diverse quarters, including labour, peasant, youth and even ideological societies. There can be no doubt that the nation-wide expressions of solidarity gave great encouragement to the *Hyongpyongsa* members as a whole and brought the *Hyongpyong* movement closer to other social movement groups than it had previously been.

In addition to support from the overwhelming majority of social movement groups, the *Hyongpyongsa* gained enormous, and almost entirely favourable coverage from the national press. *Choson Ilbo* in particular allowed much more space and favourable comment than any other daily.⁷⁰

⁷⁰ Among its notable contributions were "*Paekjong, Labourer*" (column, 15 August 1925), "To Mr. Kim Sŏkhŭi of Yech'ŏn" (a reader's letter, 18 August 1925), "Reactionary wrongdoing due to the lack of understanding: the Yech'ŏn attack on the *Hyongpyongsa*" (leading article, 19 August 1925), "Whistle" (comment, 25 August 1925), "The Members of the Yech'ŏn Youth Society" (a reader's letter, 30 August 1925), "Revelation of Inner Story of the Yech'ŏn Youth Society" (a reader's letter, 1 September 1925). In contrast, there was only one column, "Innovation and unity: to the young people of Yech'ŏn", found in *Tonga Ilbo*, (column, 19 October 1925).

In addition to leading articles, columns, and readers letters, the newspaper repeatedly carried news items disclosing the nature and seriousness of the general social problem underlying the Yech'ŏn events, and most of these items were in tone favourable to the *Hyongpyongsa*. Some of the items were apparently written or based on reports by Kim Namsu, the Andong reporter of Choson Ilbo, who had himself been attacked by the rioters in Yech'ŏn.⁷¹

In contrast to the attitude of social movement leaders and the press, the police were shown by their relative inaction to have been little more than onlookers at best or even as opposed to the *Hyongpyongsa*. In the beginning, they took no appropriate action either to calm the situation or to curb the violence. If anything, they tried to thwart the *Hyongpyongsa*. Their principal strategy seems to have been to isolate the social activists, including the *Hyongpyongsa* leaders, from the events as a whole. For instance, the *Hyongpyongsa* leaders were advised to leave Yech'ŏn, and the Seoul members were detained and charged with contravening the "publication law" on account of a leaflet they had intended to circulate on behalf of their Yech'ŏn fellows.⁷² Some activists of *Seoul Ch'ŏngnyŏnhoe* [Youth Society] who wanted to inform their local members of the incident were also kept in custody by

⁷¹ Kim Namsu was well known as a local social activist on account of his involvement in *Hwasŏnghoe* [Mars Society], and of his close contacts with the leaders of the *Hyongpyongsa*. see Choson Ilbo, 14 and 16 August 1925.

⁷² Choson Ilbo, 21 and 23 August 1925. They were released one week later when the crucial moment had passed. (Choson Ilbo, 27 August 1925).

the police for a couple of weeks.⁷³ In addition, the police banned some activities, such as a public lecture planned by *Hanyang Ch'ŏngnyŏn Tongmaeng* [Seoul Youth League],⁷⁴ and a national emergency meeting of the *Hyongpyongsa*.⁷⁵

Furthermore, the police appear to have been involved in a conspiracy to curb the actions of the *Hyongpyongsa* and their supporters when Kim Sŏkhŭi and his associates of the Yech'ŏn Youth Society sued several social activists for libel. The police and prosecutors made a thorough search of the offices of social movement groups in Andong and Yech'on on the grounds that they needed to do so in connection with the libel action. But in retrospect it seems highly probable that their real purpose was to establish the situation and stance of the two groups. Even after the libellants had dropped their suit, the prosecutors continued to carry out their investigation.⁷⁶ Also, while some of the *Hyongpyongsa* members who were prosecuted were found guilty and fined,⁷⁷ no member of the Yech'ŏn Youth Society was prosecuted in connection with any aspect of the events. When some of those arrested were tried in court in April 1926, only five were sentenced to six months imprisonment and eight people were fined.⁷⁸ In

⁷³ Choson Ilbo, 23 August and 1 September 1925.

⁷⁴ Choson Ilbo, 25 August 1925; Tonga Ilbo, 25 August 1925.

⁷⁵ Choson Ilbo, 7 September 1925.

⁷⁶ Choson Ilbo, 12 and 28 December 1925, 29 January 1926, 5 and 9 February and 25 and 26 March, 9 April 1926; Tonga Ilbo, 21 December 1925.

⁷⁷ Choson Ilbo, 9 April 1925; 5 and 9 February, and 9 April 1926.

⁷⁸ Choson Ilbo, 2 May 1926.

the light of the scale and gravity of the rioting this outcome was derisory.

What can we conclude from this reconstruction of the Yech'on events? Beginning with agitation by an influential public figure unfavourable to the *Hyongpyongsa*, there was severe disorder and violence against the *Hyongpyongsa* branch and its members. The majority of the attackers are believed to have been villagers who were opposed to the *Hyongpyongsa's* activities. The severity and extent of the assault brought instant responses from *Hyongpyongsa* branches and other social movements throughout the country. The widespread demands for a thorough investigation of the events and for the attackers to be punished were largely in vain, partly at least because the police made no proper response to the demands but attempted instead to thwart the actions of the *Hyongpyongsa*.

There can be little doubt that the events and the way they were handled by the authorities made a significant impact on *Hyongpyong* movement. Internally, the events only served to reinforce solidarity among members for whom the importance of their movement was once again emphasised. This renewed solidarity enabled the *Hyongpyong* movement to intensify its activities. In addition, the nationwide support from other social movements gave the *Hyongpyongsa* further political strength and ever-increasing legitimation. Thus the movement came through these events stronger than ever. The local Yech'on branch was left to

reorganise its structure and activities later, but not weakened in any ultimate sense.⁷⁹

IV. THE GENERAL NATURE OF OPPOSITION AND CONFLICT IN THE EARLY PERIOD: 1923-1925

These three case studies, together with that of events in Chinju discussed in Chapter 4, give us valuable material to begin an assessment of the social and political tensions surrounding the *Hyongpyong* movement in its early years. There were, of course, numerous confrontations---at individual and collective levels---between the *Hyongpyongsa* and its opponents. Although their number cannot possibly be established exactly, we may note that the number reported to the *Hyongpyongsa* headquarters had reached several hundreds by April 1926.⁸⁰ Among them were 110 incidents which may be regarded as "larger", rather the "smaller", and these are referred to in Table 6-3. According to one Japanese police report, there were 17 incidents of conflict in 1923, 10 in 1924 and 14 in 1925,⁸¹ while another Japanese source reported 42

⁷⁹ Choson Ilbo, 17 November 1925.

⁸⁰ Hirano Shoken, "Chosen Hyongpyong Undo no Kogai" [A General Account of Overall View on the Korean Hyongpyong Movement], *Jinruiai* [Love for Human Race], Vol.2 (May 1927), p.221.

⁸¹ Chosen Sotokufu Keimu-Kyoku, [Police Affairs Bureau, Korean Government-General], *Saikin ni okeru Chosen Chian Jokyo* [The Present Security Situation in Korea], (Seoul, 1933). p.137.

confrontations up to September 1925.⁸² The latter source also records the regions where they occurred and these are set out in Table 6-1.

Table 6-1. Violent Incidents Between the *Hyongpyongsa* and Its Opponents up to September 1925

Province	numbers	%
Kyŏnggi	1	2.4
Ch'ung-Puk	7	16.7
Ch'ung-Nam	12	28.6
Kyŏng-Puk	14	33.3
Kyŏng-Nam	7	16.7
Kangwŏn	1	2.4
Total	42	100.1 %

This table would suggest that the *Hyongpyongsa* faced its most intense opposition in the southern areas of Korea, particularly in Kyongsang and Ch'ungch'ŏng Provinces. However, it raises questions as to why there were no incidents in Cholla and the northern areas? Can the public records of the Japanese be considered reliable? etc. The newspapers certainly reported several conflicts in the Chŏlla Provinces, as shown in Table 6-2. Despite the generally assumed weakness of newspapers as sources of material, they can at least raise questions of interest for historians and sociologists.

⁸² Chosen Sotokufu, *Chosen no Gunshu*, (Seoul, 1926), p.185.

Table 6-2. Incidents Reported in the Newspapers from 1923 to 1925

ref. ¹	Date	Town	Major Cause of Trouble	Source ²
(YEAR 1923)				
1	24.5	Chinju	cf. Ch.4	
2	June	Wulsan	maltreatment by police	CS 14/6/23
3	20.6	Kunsan	rejection of donation	CS 28/6/23
4	4.7	Kunsan	dispute in restaurant	TA 8/7/23
5	12.7	Samga	drinking with commoners	TA 4/8/23
6	13.7	Mokp'o	interests in meat trade	TA 23/8/23
7	14.8	Kimhae	cf. Ch.6	
8	18.8	Ch'ilgok	lynching by commoners	MI 24/8/23
9	19.8	Hadong	branch foundation	CS 25/8/23
10	4.9	Chech'ŏn	branch foundation	CS 9/9/23
11	7.9	T'ongyŏng	trouble with police	CS 24/9/23
12	Oct.	Hapch'ŏn	abuse-tax by mayor	CS 22/10/23
13	Nov.	Samga	police request	CS 3/12/23
(YEAR 1924)				
14	7.5	Suwŏn	impolite to commoners	TA 26/5/24
15	8.5	Chinyŏng	impolite language	CS 16/5/24
16	May	Kosŏng	personal dispute	CS 12/5/24
17	12.6	Hongsŏng	impolite language	CS 21/6/24
18	July	Taegu	personal dispute	MI 7/7/24
19	4.6	Puyŏ	impolite in meat trade	CS 14/7/24
20	9.7	Ipjang	cf. Ch. 6	
21	25.12	Kanggyŏng	official maltreatment	CS 2/1/25
(YEAR 1925)				
22	March	Koyang	dismissal of slaughterer	CS 15/3/25
23	18.3	Hongsŏng	impolite to commoners	CS 14/4/25
24	6.4	Okgu	impolite to commoners	CS 19/4/25
25	10.4	Talsŏng	no admission in school	TA 21/5/25
26	11.4	Ch'ŏngju	contempt by police	CS 15/4/25
27	18.4	Yŏngyang	no admission in school	CS 24/4/25
28	7.5.	Chinch'ŏn	personal dispute	TA 18/5/25
29	25.5	Chinju	dispute on meat price	TA 28/5/25
30	4.6	Ansŏng	ban of collective sale	TA 9/6/25
31	9.6	Iksan	language form	CS 14/6/25
32	24.7	Samga	Japanese assault	TA 30/7/25
33	9.8	Yech'ŏn	cf. Ch.6	
34	13.8	Hyŏnp'ung	activists support	CS 16/8/25
35	20.8	Woegwan	branch foundation	TA 18/8/25
36	1.9	Nonsan	impolite language	CS 6/9/25
37	5.9	Kimch'ŏn	councillorship election	TA 8/9/25
38	8.10	Hwangdŏng	government records	TA 13/10/25
39	9.10	Nonsan	restaurant assault	MI 13/10/25
40	16.10	Yŏngju	impolite attitude	CS 22/10/25
41	6.11	Tanyang	impolite attitude	CS 11/11/25
42	6.11	Haemi	drinking with commoners	CS 12/11/25
43	21.11	Seoul	dismissal of slaughterer	TA 23/11/25
44	14.12	Poryŏng	official's assault	TA 20/12/25

Notes for Table 6-2

1. These figures are given in brackets in the discussion that follows.

2. The dates of first reports in newspapers are recorded.

1. THE CAUSES

The principal causes of the numerous confrontations in the southern part of the country are taken as a reflection of the social circumstances that the *paekjong* had experienced in their centuries-long history. They suffered from the despised status ascribed to them up to the foundation of the *Hyongpyongsa*. From this time onwards, however, they began to shrug off the unfair and humiliating social conventions applied to them. Not surprisingly, therefore, the new stance which they adopted provoked confrontation with those who perceived them as inferior, took discrimination against them for granted and expected to be automatically respected by them. The deep-rooted social consciousness of superiority among the rest of the population is reflected in the actual precipitating events which took many diverse forms. This can be better appreciated when we compare the "causes" of incidents as reported in the newspapers with the records of the *Hyongpyongsa* headquarters which classified major incidents into five categories only, as shown in Table 6-3.⁸³

⁸³ Hirano Shoken, *op.cit.*, p.221.

Table 6-3. The Immediate Causes of the Incidents from 1923 to April 1926 as Classified at *Hyongpyongsa* Headquarters

Causes	No.
Discrimination prompted by upper class	28
Discrimination by officials	33
Discrimination by "commoners"	24
Discriminating language against pupils	10
Economic issues	15
TOTAL	110

While the source of Table 6-3 is perhaps also less than accurate, the information contributes to the development of a general view on the "causes" of the incidents. The majority of the incidents were caused by discrimination against the *Hyongpyongsa* members. This is partially confirmed by the newspaper reports. First of all, we find that the "common people" often started trouble with the *Hyongpyongsa* members over language form, personal contacts, and failures to observe conventional segregation. As in Suwŏn (14), Chinyŏng (15), Hongsŏng (17, 23), Iksan (31) and Nonsan (36), the "common people" attacked *Hyongpyongsa* members for the stated reasons that they were indignant over language form in conversations. Similarly, the personal attitudes of members were reported as provocations to anger. For this alleged reason, members were occasionally ~~lynched~~^{attacked}, as in Ch'ilgok (8), Puyŏ (19), Okgu (24), Yŏngju (40), and Tanyang (41). Furthermore, the "common people" were still reluctant to make contacts with the *Hyongpyongsa* members in the public domain. The members were not allowed to join social affairs such as in making

donations for a local school in Kunsan (3),⁸⁴ in participating in joint activities in Kimhae (7) or in co-education in Ipjang (20), and in the election of councillors in Kimch'ŏn (37).⁸⁵ The co-education of pupils from the *paekjong* and non-*paekjong* families was a particularly sensitive matter leading to disturbances in several towns like Ipjang (20), Talsong (25),⁸⁶ and Yŏngyang (27).⁸⁷ The members involved in such affairs unprecedentedly resisted the unfairness, which resulted in confrontations with the "commoners".

Resistance against government officials who expected "gifts" from the members was also common. For example, members no longer provided them, particularly the police in charge of slaughterhouses, with meat or accessories without payment. Examples of this occurred in T'ongyŏng (8) and Samga (13). As in Hapch'ŏn (13), some officials who illegally appropriated tax paid by the *Hyongpyongsa* members were even brought to court. But tensions with the government officials did not arise only over economic matters; on some occasions ill-treatment followed the use of improper language forms and members complained of officials displaying improper attitudes towards them.⁸⁸

⁸⁴ The members' offer to donate was rejected on the grounds that polluted money was not acceptable.

⁸⁵ One member's attempt to stand for election to a council was blocked by the outrage of "commoners".

⁸⁶ The children of the *Hyongpyongsa* members were not allowed to enroll at a public school by the members of the school selection committee.

⁸⁷ Because they were prevented from sending their children to a school, the members boycotted the payment of the rate for school maintenance.

⁸⁸ The leaders of the national headquarters had visited Japanese officials in order to urge them to change their attitudes. For the national conference, see

Another common complaint by members was that register records still revealed their background through letters or marks against their names, as in Hwangdŏng (38).⁸⁸

In the light of such incidents in everyday life, it is not surprising that the formation of the *Hyongpyongsa* was perceived, at least by "narrow-minded conservatives," as a dangerous outcome and symptom of what they saw as crumbling social stability. Being intolerant of the *Hyongpyongsa* for improving the *paekjong*'s status, they turned on society itself for "spoiling the *paekjong*." Many claimed that the *paekjong* had become less polite since the foundation of the *Hyongpyongsa*, and they therefore regarded the *Hyongpyongsa* as an organisation that had to be destroyed. After failing to check the foundation of the *Hyongpyongsa*, they began to assault its members for attending the movement's activities. Incidents of this kind occurred in Chinju (1), Kimhae (7), Hadong (9), Chech'ŏn (10), Yech'ŏn (32), Hyŏnp'ung (33), and Woegwan (34).

In addition to the above "causes" of confrontations, there were other factors liable to generate frictions between individuals or groups of *paekjong* and non-*paekjong*. One of these, for example, was connected with the killing of stray dogs. In the early 1920s the Japanese introduced legal provisions allowing for the extermination

Tonga Ilbo, 23 February 1924; for Kunsan, Tonga Ilbo, 27 February 1925; for the visit to Seoul officials, Choson Ilbo, 7 February 1925 and Tonga Ilbo, 9 February 1925.

⁸⁸ See Tonga Ilbo, 13 October 1925.

of dogs,⁹⁰ and the police ordered *paekjong* to do this work which inevitably involved them in disputes with dog-owners.⁹¹ Moreover, it meant that *paekjong* were often to be seen accompanying policemen which brought further grudges against them. This problem was specifically recognised by the *Hyongpyongsa* and in 1924 the national headquarters resolved that *paekjong* should no longer do this work and that subordinate groups should also be asked to refrain from doing it.⁹² Most branches followed this lead from the headquarters,⁹³ and this was welcomed by the rest of people.⁹⁴ However, not all *paekjong* conformed as there were payments attached and some decided to continue to respond to police requests.⁹⁵ Thus the matter was repeatedly raised at both local and national meetings as, for example, at the regional meeting held in Kyong-Puk in 1924.⁹⁶

Other factors affecting relations between *paekjong* and ordinary people were associated with the *paekjong*'s occupations in the meat trade. For example, complaints over meat prices were often translated into resentment

⁹⁰ Maeil Sinbo, 14 May 1921; 30 May, 20 June and 17 July 1922.

⁹¹ The difficulties ensuing from this were often reported in the newspapers. See, for example, Tonga Ilbo, 21 June 1922, and 3 February 1923; Maeil Sinbo, 26 March, 23 May 1923. Also see Chapter 2.

⁹² Sidae Ilbo, 16 May 1924.

⁹³ For instance, the members in Kimch'on reaffirmed that they would never be involved in the job. Maeil Sinbo, 21 December 1924.

⁹⁴ Choson Ilbo, 19 July 1923.

⁹⁵ When the members of Chŏnju branch carried out slaughtering of dogs, Kaesŏng fellows sent a warning them not to violate the resolution. Choson Ilbo, 31 May and 4 June 1926.

⁹⁶ Sidae Ilbo, 16 May 1924.

against members of the *Hyongpyongsa*, especially by restaurant owners. As in Kunsan (4), Hadong (9), and Nonsan (38), attacks on the *Hyongpyongsa* seem to have been either prompted or intensified by restaurant owners. Some of those who complained about unreasonable prices even launched their own butcher shops and/or butchers' unions in order to compete against *paekjong* in the meat trade; see, for example, the instances recorded in several towns such as Kunsan (4), Mokp'o, (6) and Chinju (29).

Broadly, therefore, the immediate factors which often led to confrontation involving *Hyongpyongsa* members can be classified into two categories: those stemming from the threatened loss of conventional privileges and those involving economic interests, particularly in the meat industry. But these two sets were not altogether unconnected. As the members became increasingly conscious of their human rights, they more frequently defied unfair social conventions and protested against them. And their changing attitudes coincided with attempts to protect the privileges of their traditional occupations, which in turn led to increased tensions. Thus the two main sets of "causes" were inter-related and both were central to the goals of the *Hyongpyongsa*, characterised in Chapter 4 as "human rights" and "community solidarity."

2. THE TYPES OF CONFLICT

For immediate reasons clearly related to the breach of social conventions and occupational privileges,

numerous attacks took place against the *Hyongpyongsa* and its members. These outbreaks can be discussed in terms of three broad "types". Firstly, there were cases of collective violence, as, for example, in Chinju (1), Kimhae (7), Ipjang (20), and Yech'ŏn (33). Such cases involved both the lynching of people and the destruction of property. As in Chech'ŏn (10), members of the *Hyongpyongsa* were sometimes forced to wear *p'aelaengi*, a symbol of the stigmatised group, and were paraded around the town centre on leads.⁹⁷ On the whole, collective violence was most likely to occur over the breach of social conventions.

The second type of action was commonly associated with attempts to block the business of the *Hyongpyongsa* members, especially through boycotts of meat. The aim of the boycotts was to bring members to their knees economically and, as seen in the cases discussed, this was eventually effective in relation to the rank and file members working in the meat industry. Apart from boycotts by "commoners", non-*paekjong* butchers at times launched their own local unions as, for example, in Kunsan (4), Mokp'o (6), and Chinju (29). Pressure through economic means was also carried out by government officials in conflict with the members, as in Koyang (22) and Seoul (42) where slaughterers faced coercive dismissal from their posts due to personal disputes with officials. On occasions, too, police upset by unsuccessful demands

⁹⁷ Choson Ilbo, 9 September 1923; Maeil Sinbo, 9 September 1923; Tonga Ilbo, 11 September 1923.

threatened to deprive members of shop licences as in T'ongyŏng (11) or to arrest them, as in Hapch'on.(13). Such threats, to which members were highly sensitive, could greatly aggravate confrontations, and in some cases, as in Kimhae (7) and Ipjang (20), there was retaliation by members imposing their own boycotts on slaughtering.

The third type of action involved attacking individual members who violated social conventions. The member was insulted and sometimes ~~lynched~~^{beaten}. Such individual attacks were usually disclosed to other members and the tension would then commonly escalate into a collective confrontation between the two sides as, for example, in Samga (5), Kosong (16), Kanggyŏng (210), Hongsŏng (23), Nonsan (36), and Haemi (41).

Despite the frequency of attacks, there is no evidence of any permanent organisation, either national or local, being established to oppose the *Hyongpyongsa*. Even though there were numerous confrontations in many areas, they were in the end invariably resolved locally without giving rise to formally organised opposition. The national movement's leaders would express their sympathy and regrets over the confrontations and repeatedly confirm their support for the *Hyongpyong* movement.⁸⁸ Such interventions by national leaders may have restrained the

⁸⁸ cf. So Chŏnghŭi, "Yugam Ch'ŏnman-iwoeda" [Full Regrets], *Sinmin*, Vol.5, (September 1925), pp.58-59, and other comments on this topic, "Hyongpyong Sawonda Nongmin Ch'ungdol-e Ch'woehayŏ" [On the Confrontation between Members of the Hyongpyongsa and Farmers].

development of local organisations opposed to the *Hyongpyongsa*.

3. THE SOCIAL BACKGROUNDS OF THE ATTACKERS

Those who most commonly attacked the *Hyongpyong* movement were farmers and labourers.⁹⁹ But a careful examination of the available reports reveals that two different groups of attackers can be identified: the first resented the improvement of the *paekjong*'s status, and the second was more concerned over the economic interests at stake.

Most farmers and labourers involved in attacks belonged to the first group, yet they were not always the ones to initiate violence. The initiators often had more diverse backgrounds. In the Chinju, Kimhae and Yech'on incidents, for example, the first attacks were made by "narrow-minded conservative" influentials in the community. In Kunsan (3), Hadong (9), and Yech'ŏn (32), however, the attacks were initiated by groups of youth and farmers, and there were rather different situations in Suwŏn (14) and Chinyong (15) where *paekjong* selling goods in the market were ~~lunched~~^{attached} by shoppers and shopkeepers on

⁹⁹ There are numerous reports in newspapers with titles which give some indication that the attackers were farmers and labourers. See, also, a special section of *Sinmin*, a monthly magazine, entitled "Hyongpyong Sawon-dae Nongmin Ch'ungdol-e Ch'woehayŏ," [On the Confrontation between Members of the Hyongpyongsa and Farmers]. Vol.5, (September 1925).

the grounds that they had insulted "commoners".¹⁰⁰ In Talsŏng (26), *paekjong* pupils were refused registration in a school due to objections by the committee members in charge of enrollments. There were also several confrontations which originated through discriminatory actions by government officials.

These scattered examples show that the attackers were not only farmers and labourers, but also at times people of higher status. In particular, the incidents referred to show that influential people, such as the police, officials, and leading figures in the community, were quite commonly involved. O Sŏnghwan, one of the leaders of the national headquarters, made it clear that the *Hyongpyongsa* bore no special animosity against farmers and that there was no essential conflict of interest between the members and ordinary farmers in terms of class background and economic issues.¹⁰¹ Thus it would seem that although the mass rioters were mainly farmers and labourers, those who instigated attacks against the *Hyongpyongsa* and opposed its claims for social equality were often members of the upper and ruling groups of the community. There is some corroboration of this in Table 6-3 which shows that most of the larger and more serious incidents were led by influentials.

¹⁰⁰ For the Suwŏn incident, see *Tonga Ilbo*, 26 May 1924 and for Chinyŏng, *Choson Ilbo*, 16 May 1924 and *Tonga Ilbo*, 17 May 1924.

¹⁰¹ O Sŏnghwan, "Hyongpyong Undong-ŭi Kyohun: Nongmin-e Taehan Akgam-ŭn ŏpda," [The Lesson of the Hyongpyong Movement: We Have No Animosity against the Farmers], *Sinmin*, Vol.5 (September 1925), pp.57-58.

In addition, however, there were many cases of people being in conflict with the *Hyongpyongsa* over economic interests. Among those most affected were restaurant owners and non-*paekjong* butchers. In Chinju (29), for example, non-*paekjong* butchers, including some Japanese, were the main agitators who first confronted the *Hyongpyongsa*;¹⁰² in Kunsan (4) and Hadong (9) restaurant owners were prominent, as also in Nonsan (38) where they refused to serve meals to *Hyongpyongsa* members.

In short, the main opponents with whom the *Hyongpyongsa* had to deal were generally people who resented all moves towards human equality and/or those who had rival economic interests. In the context of the period, they may be referred to as the "narrow-minded conservatives".

4. THE RESPONDING STRATEGIES OF THE *HYONGPYONGSA*

The *Hyongpyongsa* leaders were profoundly concerned about the tensions which arose as they pursued the organisation's clear but difficult goals. They swiftly responded to all confrontations but equally tried to defuse the tensions. From the beginning in Chinju (1), however, the leaders were firm in their resolve to protect the movement and its members against all attacks from the wider community. In the course of time they developed

¹⁰² Kang Sangho suspected them of manipulating the situation behind the scenes. Tonga Ilbo, 14 June 1925.

diverse flexible strategies of response, depending on the variety of situations which developed in different areas.

Their first immediate response was simply to try to defend the members of any branch with help from other branches. In the earliest cases of collective attacks, as in Wulsan (2), Kimhae (7), and Ch'ilgok (8), local members informed superior and/or neighbouring groups of their situation. On receiving information of an outbreak of violence, key members of the relevant groups were normally dispatched to the scene of violence. As seen in the cases of Ipjang and Yech'on, in the worst situations the headquarters mobilised other branch members for the assistance of their fellows who were in trouble. The strength of traditional community solidarity was sufficient to bring about instant support for those who were under attack.

Local branches in trouble also sought their own ways of protecting themselves. The most common strategy was to try to retaliate through collective efforts such as withholding labour for slaughtering animals. In some cases, as in Chinju and Yech'ŏn, "self-defence units" were set up.

"Hard" strategies of this kind were normally accompanied by complementary "soft" strategies. In principle, the *Hyongpyongsa* advocated that resistance should as far as possible be within the bounds of the law, and they pursued legal processes through the courts where there was scope for this. This was usually possible in

conflicts with government officials, as in T'ongyong (11), Hapch'ŏn (12), Samga (13), and Kanggyŏng(21). On most occasions, the national headquarters processed legal actions on behalf of local members. Successful legal actions through the courts or police were, however, few.

Support from other social movement activists was also sought and was commonly given by social movement groups from both inside and outside the area, even though there were some exceptions to this as in Kunsan (3) and Hadong (9). In some cases, as in Chinju, Kimhae and Yech'on, the social movement groups coming to the assistance of the *Hyongpyongsa* were themselves attacked by the rioters, but their efforts were nonetheless often instrumental in reducing tension and in bringing about some understanding between the two sides. The role of the newspapers in campaigning for reconciliation was also appreciable in the long run.

CONCLUSION

As a social protest movement, the *Hyongpyong* movement had, to some extent, anticipated the opposition of those who resented their activities. But the social tensions produced by its activities, especially in the southern areas of the country, were deep and wide-ranging. The factors which triggered conflicts fall into two main categories: one was resentment of the *Hyongpyongsa* and its

members and supporters for seeking to improve the *paekjong's* status, and the other was conflict of economic interests, especially in the meat trade. The former led to collective attacks led mainly by the "narrow-minded conservatives" who mobilised local residents against the *Hyongpyongsa*. Even though the attackers were generally said to be farmers and labourers, those behind the confrontations were often members of upper class and influential conservative groups, including officials and people who were in economic conflict with *Hyongpyongsa* members.

The tensions sometimes broke out into physical attacks with widespread destruction of buildings and facilities and with assaults on members. Moreover, the targets of the attacks were not only *Hyongpyongsa* activists, but also sympathetic supporters. In responding to the attacks, the *Hyongpyongsa* members first attempted to protect themselves in whatever ways possible. Their main strategies were to mobilise members at local and national levels, on the one hand, and to appeal to the law, on the other. In their responses to confrontations, they received strong support from other social movement activists.

The widespread conflicts were clearly debilitating for the movement, but they also reinforced existing solidarity among the members and were to contribute to the development and intensification of their activities after the period of open and frequent conflicts. After the

reunification of the national leadership and the fuller realisation of their situation brought about by strong opposition, the movement made rapid progress. As we shall see in the following chapter, its membership was to expand and its programmes of action were to develop very significantly.

CHAPTER SEVEN

EXPANSION AND STAGNATION: 1925-1930

By the end of 1925 the *Hyongpyong* movement was entering a watershed. The early expansion was over, the factional split was being resolved, and the worst period of open conflict with its opponents had reached its climax in the most serious confrontation in Yech'on in August of that year. There was renewed solidarity among its members and a greater level of co-operation with other social movements. In addition, members of the movement were more confident, and they were less than ever prepared to tolerate social discrimination against them.

Against the background of these events and achievements, the movement entered a new phase of expansion. To follow this phase it is necessary to reflect over the new overall situation in which the movement now faced.

In analysing the development of any social movement several factors normally need to be considered. Firstly, the success of a movement, particularly in an expanding phase, is liable to be largely dependent upon its success in mobilising its resources.¹ One basic resource naturally consists of the movement's members. The extent to which the leaders are able to induce potential members to be active

¹ See Chapter 1 for a general discussion of Resource Mobilisation Theory.

is always a crucial question. Thus the leaders and core members naturally attempt to intensify their recruitment campaign and are likely to keep potential members in mind in launching new programmes. Organisational growth and the appearance of diverse sub-groups will inevitably depend to some extent on the relative success or failure of recruitment. The movement in transition will affect the nature of its leadership and its general direction and strategies. Many changes will take place simultaneously and will inevitably influence each other. It is thus in the complex dynamic process of change that we may expect to find whatever achievements and rewards can be claimed on behalf of the activists.² Such rewards and achievements are likely to be practical and material, as well as social and psychological. Even though it may be difficult to evaluate these, especially in a historical study, they can to some extent be assessed through the performance of the movement.

Other major features and aspects of the process of the movement can be studied in relation to its changing external environments. Indeed, the movement's organisation and progress are bound to be closely related to changes in the society in which it is developing and functioning. Some aspects of the environment may contribute positively to its development, while others may have negative effects.

To facilitate the discussion, the developments of the *Hyongpyong* movement at this stage will be discussed under

² For the discussion of the rewards of participants, ~~see~~ see Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups* (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1965).

five major headings: organisational growth, the emergence of sub-groups, the national leadership, substantive achievements and, finally, general expansion in the nature and scope of the movement.

I. THE GROWTH OF THE ORGANISATION

After its successful launch in 1923, the *Hyongpyongsa* claimed as many as 400,000 potential members. The growth in the number of established groups is shown in Table 7-1, based on Japanese records.

Table 7-1. The Number of the *Hyongpyongsa* Branches: 1923-1935³

Year	Number	Index (1923=100)
1923	80 ⁴	100
1924	83	104
1925	99	123
1926	130	162
1927	150	188
1928	153	191
1929	162	203
1930	165	208
1931	166	208
1932	161	201
1933	146	183
1934	113	141
1935	98	123

³ All figures except those for 1923 come from Chosen Sotokufu Keimu-Kyoku [Police Affairs Bureau, Korean Government-General], *Saikin ni okeru Chosen Chian Jokyo* [The Present Security Situation in Korea], (1933 and 1935).

⁴ Chosen Sotokufu, *Chosen no Gunshu* [Mass of Korea], (Seoul, 1926), p.183. The survey appears to have been conducted between late 1923 and early 1924.

Growth in 1924 was slow, perhaps partly because of the factional division in the leadership and partly due to regular confrontations with opponents, (see Chapters 5 and 6). But the trend of growth accelerated in the following years. These figures cannot be regarded as fully reliable as there are several sets of differing numbers from other sources.⁵ Nevertheless, they would seem to give reasonable indications of the overall trend of growth. The number of *Hyongpyongsa* groups increased steadily until 1931 and especially in 1926 and 1927. From 1928 to 1931 their number was stagnant. These figures point to a relatively clear distinction between an expanding and a stagnant period.⁶ A more detailed set of figures, including the number of members per province, is given in Table 7-2.

⁵ Even in the Japanese records, there are contradictory and inconsistent figures. For instance, Kyonggi provincial headquarters of the police bureau recorded 128 branches of the *Hyongpyongsa* with about 10,000 members at the end of 1928. It also reported 193 branches with about 10,000 members by the end of 1930. (See Kyonggido Keisatsubu, *Chian Jokyo* [Security Situation], (May 1929), p.116; (July 1931), p.180. Another survey reported 147 branches and 7701 members in 1926. Chosen Sotokufu Keimu-Kyoku, *Chosen no Chian Jokyo* [Security Situation in Korea], (1927) p.2-9-10. And, a key member of the *Hyongpyongsa* recorded---without giving his source---that there were 233 branches and 389,750 members in 1931. Yi Tonghwan, "Hyongpyongsa Che 9 hoe Chŏn'guk Taehoe P'yŏng" [Comments on the Ninth National Conference of the *Hyongpyongsa*], *Pip'an*, Vol.1 No.2 (June 1931), p.3.

⁶ An attempt has been made to divide the process from 1923 to 1931 into three stages: the founding period from 1923 to 1925, the action period from 1926 to 1928, and the trial period from 1929 to 1931. See Kim Yŏngdae, *Sillok Hyongpyong* [The Authentic Record of the *Hyongpyong* Movement], (Seoul, 1978). And *Tonga Ilbo* described the process in terms of four stages up to 1928: the foundation stage, the stage of division and re-unification, the confrontation stage and the stage of centralisation. *Tonga Ilbo*, 14 January 1929.

Table 7-2. The Numbers of *Hyongpyongsa* Local Branches and Members in 1925, 1926, 1928 and 1929

Province	1925 ⁷	1926 ⁸		1928 ⁹		1929 ¹⁰	
	B	B	M	B	M	B	M
Kyōnggi	6	11	252	14	2016	15	540
Ch'ung-Puk	8	9	267	8	319	11	387
Ch'ung-Nam	18	24	1758	31	2313	28	19434 (1943?)
Chōn-Puk	10	23	1356	30	1135	30	1155
Chōn-Nam	7	11	400	6	238	6	239
Kyōng-Puk	11	25	2038	22	1490	23	867
Kyōng-Nam	23	20	1080	28	1492	29	1715
Kangwōn	7	12	431	17	626	16	556
Hwanghae	3	4	75	1	6	1	6
P'yōng-Puk		1	2				
P'yōng-Nam	2	1	1				
Ham-Puk		1	2				
Ham-Nam	4	5	39	5	53	3	31
TOTAL	99	147	7681 (7701?)	162	9688	162	24930 (7439?)

(Key) B: branch, M: membership

Again, these figures have a number of inconsistencies,¹¹ yet they tend to confirm the general trend noted in Table 7-1 for 1926 to 1929, though they would suggest that by 1929 there was already some decline. They would also indicate that there were appreciable variations in expansion between regions. As in the earliest days of the movement, there was a marked difference between south and north, with little evidence that the deliberate efforts of the Seoul leaders had much effect in the north.

⁷ Chosen Sotokufu, *Chosen no Sisho to Seikaku* [The Korean Thoughts and Characters], (1927).

⁸ Chosen Sotokufu Keimu-Kyoku, *Chosen no Chian Jokyū* (1927), p.2-9-10.

⁹ Chosen Sotokufu Keimu-Kyoku, *Chosen no Chian Jokyū* (1930).

¹⁰ *ibid.*

¹¹ There are obvious errors in the figures (total number of members in 1926, and Ch'ung-Nam members and total number of members in 1929), probably due to the misreading of hand written materials. Nevertheless, they can be used in conjunction with other evidence to give a general impression of the rate of growth.

On the contrary, growth in terms of local branches and members generally occurred in the southern areas, and mainly in Ch'ung-Nam, Ch'ŏn-Puk, Kyŏnggi, and Kangwŏn provinces.¹²

There were consistent and sustained responses to the launching of local *Hyongpyongsa* activities at two levels: the first came from sub-county villages and the second from the major towns where there had hitherto been no branches. In contrast to the earliest stages when the movement was largely confined to Chinju and a few major towns and cities, target areas for the campaign were now extended even to small villages. Among the village branches established during this period were Chirye,¹³ Wich'ŏn,¹⁴ Wŏnp'yŏng,¹⁵ Kumgu,¹⁶ Osu,¹⁷ Munhŭng,¹⁸ Sojŏngni,¹⁹ and Naech'ang.²⁰ Most of these were in the Kyŏngsang, Ch'ŏn-Puk and Ch'ungch'ŏng provinces, where the movement was already well established in urban areas. In addition to the new village branches, others were established in the towns of Anak,²¹ Chaeryong,²² Sunch'ŏn,²³ Namwŏn,²⁴ Changsu,²⁵

¹² This regional expansion coincided with the transfer of the national leadership from Kyongsang members to these new areas of activity. See the section on the national leadership which follows.

¹³ In Kimch'ŏn, Kyŏng-Puk, Tonga Ilbo, 2 December 1925; Choson Ilbo, 13 December 1925.

¹⁴ In Kŏch'ang, Kyŏng-Nam, Tonga Ilbo, 1 July 1928.

¹⁵ In Suryu, Kimje, Ch'ŏn-Puk, Tonga Ilbo, 28 June 1927; Maeil Sinbo, 5 July 1927.

¹⁶ In Kimje, Ch'ŏn-Puk, Chungwoe Ilbo, 16 May 1927.

¹⁷ In Imsil, Chon-Puk, Tonga Ilbo, 26 June 1928; Chungwoe Ilbo, 26 June 1928.

¹⁸ By members from Kundung and Punon, Wŏnju, Kangwon, Tonga Ilbo, 15 January 1927.

¹⁹ In Ch'ŏnwŏn, Ch'ung-Nam, Chungwoe Ilbo, 15 February 1928; Choson Ilbo, 16 February 1928.

²⁰ In Ŏmjŏng, Ch'ungju, Ch'ung-Puk, Chungwoe Ilbo, 28 June 1929.

²¹ In Hwanghae, Tonga Ilbo, 19 January 1926.

²² In Hwanghae, Tonga Ilbo, 3 October 1926.

Kurye.²⁶ Tangjin,²⁷ Onyang,²⁸ P'yŏngch'ang,²⁹ and
Yangp'yŏng.³⁰

As in the previous stage, the action in the mid-1920s was generally initiated by local and/or national core members with ~~the~~^a following of new members. The main aims of the national headquarters had right from the beginning been to expand local activities and this continued to be so for some years. Special circuit committees were constantly organised and dispatched to local areas, and the increase in local groups was accompanied by the emergence of diverse sub-groups. All this development was partly the result of increasingly active participation by potential members at the grass roots level and partly of steady support from other social movements.

II. THE EMERGENCE OF SUB-GROUPS

From 1925 to 1928, several sub-groups with specific purposes appeared within the *Hyongpyongsa*. As already mentioned in Chapter 5, some of these sub-groups appeared during the period of factional disarray in the national

²³ In Chŏn-Nam, Choson Ilbo, 5 March 1926; Tonga Ilbo, 5 March 1926.

²⁴ In Chŏn-Puk, Choson Ilbo, 2 August 1926; Tonga Ilbo, 2 August 1926.

²⁵ In Chŏn-Puk, Tonga Ilbo, 4 November 1926.

²⁶ In Chŏn-Nam, Choson Ilbo, 14 May 1929.

²⁷ In Ch'ung-Nam, Tonga Ilbo, 14 August 1926.

²⁸ In Ch'ung-Nam, Choson Ilbo, 16 March 1929; Tonga Ilbo, 17 March 1929.

²⁹ In Kangwŏn, Chungwoe Ilbo, 22 November 1927.

³⁰ In Kyŏnggi, Choson Ilbo, 8 March 1929; Tonga Ilbo, 11 March 1929.

leadership. Whatever their immediate origins, they have to be seen as a significant aspect of the organisational expansion of the movement. They provided new and different programmes for ordinary members who joined them and who clearly found them responsive to their needs. As these sub-groups attracted the attention of their members, they contributed substantially to the dynamics of the movement as a whole. They covered a wide range from the militant and ideological *Chongwidan*, to youth and student leagues and women's societies. We shall review these in turn.

1. THE *CHŎNGWIDAN*

Of all the sub-groups that emerged at this time, the *Chŏngwidan* [Righteous Defence Unit] probably had the closest connection with the factional disarray. A number of members who were disappointed over division in the leadership held a gathering to launch the *Chŏngwidan* on 1 January 1925. After the initial promotion meeting, about 50 members attended a more formal inaugural meeting in Seoul on 10 January.³¹ Several general resolutions were passed regarding the *Hyongpyongsa* and the role of the new group within the movement. They expressed several aims and intentions: of over-riding and resisting the factional division, of protecting their members and their occupations, and of organising mutual assistance between themselves and their fellows. At a further special meeting held on 14 January, the core members repeatedly accused the

³¹ Choson Ilbo, 3 and 11 January 1925; Sidae Ilbo, 12 January 1925; Maeil Sinbo, 12 January 1925.

controversial leaders of the two factions, Kang Sangho and Chang Chip'il.³² They even proposed calling an emergency national meeting to challenge leaders who were at odds with each other. Their firm stand against the factional division received warm praise from many who were anxious to reunite the leadership.³³

Information on the later actions of the *Chŏngwidan* gives us some idea of its nature. On several occasions, they intervened in social tensions between *Hyongpyongsa* members and their opponents. When a slaughterer was dismissed by the mayor of Koyang, Kyŏnggi, after personal conflict between the two, a member of the *Chŏngwidan* society was nominated to accompany an executive of the national headquarters to intervene in the dispute.³⁴ At the time of the Yech'ŏn incident, the society tried to organise a separate support unit to help their Yech'on fellows in trouble.³⁵ The society also organised a slaughterer's union in Seoul where butchers were already dominated by non-members of the *Hyongpyongsa*.³⁶ And, when a number of slaughterers were dismissed from their posts following on a personal dispute involving one of them, members of the society were quick to recognise the threat of the incident and took action on behalf of all those who were dismissed.³⁷

³² Choson Ilbo, 16 January 1925; Tonga Ilbo, 16 January 1925; Sidae Ilbo, 16 January 1925.

³³ Choson Ilbo, 17 January 1925.

³⁴ Choson Ilbo, 15 May 1925; Tonga Ilbo, 18 April 1925.

³⁵ Choson Ilbo, 19 August 1925.

³⁶ Tonga Ilbo, 22 May 1925. And for details of the non-*paekjong* butcher's union in Seoul, see Chapter 4.

³⁷ The butcher in personal trouble with a slaughterer prompted his fellows to dismiss other slaughterers, so that 16 persons finally lost their jobs. Tonga Ilbo,

Available records give us little indication of the criteria for membership of the *Chǒngwidan* or of the characteristics of the members, though there are some grounds for believing that they were mainly young activists. The executive committee consisted of ardent young members from the southern areas of the country, as the wider movement's national leaders also were. The standing executive members in charge of the general affairs of the society lived and worked mainly in Seoul.³⁸ Among them were Yi Kyǒngch'un (director), Kim Sajǒn (vice-director), So Kwanghun (general secretary) and Yi Yǒngbae (treasury). Some held these posts as well as being on central executive committee of the *Hyongpyongsa*.

Despite the lack of more precise information, there can be little doubt that the *Chǒngwidan* saw itself as an ideological and militant group.³⁹ It had two primary goals: the first to help its members, and especially those suffering from economic difficulties, and the second to protect the occupations of its members from outside competition.⁴⁰ These goals were stated at its first anniversary gathering,⁴¹ but little evidence of its subsequent achievements has yet been found. It would appear that the group was largely unsuccessful in maintaining its

-
- 25 and 27 November 1925; Choson Ilbo, 25 November 1925; Sidae Ilbo, 28 December 1925.
- ³⁸ Choson Ilbo, 8 and 17 May 1925; Tonga Ilbo, 19 May 1925.
- ³⁹ Chang Chip'il ^{described} ~~assured~~ the unit as an ideological group, and we do know that the *Chǒngwidan* circulated "ideological" pamphlets to its members. See Choson Ilbo, 7 January 1926.
- ⁴⁰ Choson Ilbo, 17 May 1925; Tonga Ilbo, 19 May 1925.
- ⁴¹ Sidae Ilbo, 13 January 1926.

activities into the late 1920s.⁴² There is no evidence that it affected local branches, despite its plans announced at its early meetings.⁴³ It is possible that its goals were so fully accepted by the *Hyongpyongsa* that the society ceased to serve any particular purpose; it may be significant that sections dealing with youth and "righteous defence" were later set up at the national headquarters and at some local branches.

2. THE HYONGPYONG YOUTH SOCIETY

Another outcome of the period of factional disarray was the establishment of the *Hyongpyong* youth movement, which later contributed significantly to the development of the *Hyongpyongsa*. In contrast to the *Chŏngwidan* which was founded in Seoul, the *Hyongpyong Ch'ŏngnyŏnhoe* [Youth Society] first appeared in Chinju, then the national headquarters of one faction, on 13 April 1924. As mentioned in Chapter 5, both can be seen as responses to the divided leadership and the factional rivalry. Yet each had quite distinct features and each followed a different process of growth. The youth movement rapidly spread out to local

⁴² The revival of the *Chŏngwidan* was strongly recommended at a central executive committee meeting in September 1927. *Choson Ilbo*, 5 September 1927.

⁴³ There was a group with the title of *Chongwidan* in Kimch'ŏn, but there is no concrete evidence of its connection with the Seoul *Chŏngwidan*. (*Choson Ilbo*, 27 December 1925; *Sidae Ilbo*, 28 December 1925) Two *Chŏnghaengdan* groups were established. They had similar goals to those of the *Chŏngwidan*, but there is no evidence of any direct link between them in Chinju in March 1925 (*Tonga Ilbo*, 30 March 1925) and in Taejon in October 1927 (*Tonga Ilbo*, 27 October 1927).

branches, whereas the *Chongwidan* initially attracted little support from local areas.

In the incipient stage, the youth groups that sprang up did not have any close connections with each other and were not co-ordinated at the national level. In fact, some had different names. There were, for example, the *Sinjin Ch'ŏngnyŏnhoe* [New Progress Youth Society] in Hongsong,⁴⁴ the *Konghwa Ch'ŏngnyŏnhoe* [Common Magnificence Youth Society] in Chŏnju,⁴⁵ and the *Hyongpyong Sinjin Ch'ŏngnyŏnhoe* [New Progress Youth Society for Equity] in Wonju.⁴⁶ In spite of the absence of any direct cooperation between them, the youth movement, which started with only a few groups in 1924,⁴⁷ developed rapidly, especially in 1925⁴⁸ and 1926.⁴⁹ This growth was a reflection of the generally increasing awareness of the *Hyongpyong* movement.

As a result of the growth of numerous independent youth groups a national youth federation of the movement was established in Seoul on 16 December 1925,⁵⁰ and this further stimulated and sustained regional activities. One

⁴⁴ Choson Ilbo, 18 August 1924.

⁴⁵ The original name was changed to the *Hyongpyong Ch'ŏngnyŏn Tongmaeng* [Youth League] in 1925. See Tonga Ilbo, 9 June 1925; Choson Ilbo, 10 June 1925.

⁴⁶ Tonga Ilbo, 21 May 1926.

⁴⁷ Among them were Chinju, Masan, and Hongsong.

⁴⁸ Among new groups established in 1925 were those in Chŏnju, Iksan, Kimje, Kunsan and Sunch'ang in Chŏn-Puk, Sunch'ŏn in Chŏn-Nam, Kimch'ŏn and Kyŏngsan in Kyŏng-Puk, Pusan and Kosŏng in Kyŏng-Nam, Taejon in Ch'ung-Nam, and Kaesŏng in Kyŏnggi.

⁴⁹ New groups in 1926 were in Kŭmsan and Iri in Chŏn-Puk, Kwangju and Hamp'yŏng in Chŏn-Nam, Kumi in Kyŏng-Puk, Kŏch'ang and Yŏngsan in Kyong-Nam, Kanggyŏng, Kongju, Nonsan, Soch'ŏn, Sŏsan and T'aeon in Ch'ung-Nam, and Wonju in Kangwon.

⁵⁰ Choson Ilbo, 18 and 20 December 1925; Sidae Ilbo, 18 and 20 December 1925.

example of this is a joint gathering of several youth clubs in the eastern part of Kangwŏn in 1925.⁵¹ Another example is the special provincial gathering for Chŏn-Puk held in Chŏnju on 22 June 1926.⁵² As in the case of Kyŏng-Nam,⁵³ however, such youth activities were kept under close supervision by the police who are alleged to have been much more anxious about them than about the activities of other *Hyongpyongsa* groups. This was probably due partly to the greater suspicion of young people and partly because youth groups tended to have closer connections with other social movements.

First of all, members of youth groups were, by definition, young people,⁵⁴ who were readily assumed to hold liberal or radical ideas. In addition, they were more highly committed to *Hyongpyongsa* activities as a whole. Some of the young activists fully identified themselves with the national leadership of the *Hyongpyongsa* and some were in fact elected to the central committee of the movement; for example, Yi Tonghwan (Kunsan), Na Suwan (Chŏnju), Yi Kyŏnggi (Chŏnju), Yi Myŏngnok (Masan), Yi Yongsu (Chinyŏng), Cho Myŏnguk (Iri), Kim Sudong (Chŏnju), and Kang Yongsang (Kyŏngsan).

⁵¹ Choson Ilbo, 9 December 1925.

⁵² Choson Ilbo, 24 June 1926; Tonga Ilbo, 24 June 1926; Sidae Ilbo, 26 June 1926.

⁵³ A gathering in Milyang, Kyong-Nam Province, was banned by the police at the last minute. Tonga Ilbo, 1 May 1928.

⁵⁴ There was, however, considerable variation in the age qualification for membership of different groups. In Hongsong, the members were aged 17 to 40. (Choson Ilbo, 26 March 1925). The members of the Hamp'yong Youth Society were between 17 and 35 (Tonga Ilbo, 4 July 1926; Sidae Ilbo, 4 July 1926), and in the Chonju youth group the highest age admitted was 30 years. (Tonga Ilbo, 16 October 1927).

Their inclination to liberal and radical ideas brought them into close contact with other social movements with which they tended to identify themselves. In many cases there was considerable overlap in membership and aims with professional social movement activities. In Chinju, Masan and Kimch'ŏn, for example, the youth societies were either launched or strongly supported by social activists from outside the ranks of the *Hyongpyong* movement. As most local youth groups had greater or less connections with the socialist-controlled *Choson Ch'ŏngnyŏn Ch'ong Tongmaeng* [General Federation of Korean Youth Societies],⁵⁵ they were naturally suspected of radical tendencies. The authorities had therefore anticipated that the general federation of youth societies would lend support to any tendency in the *Hyongpyong* movement to associate itself with the "class struggle" at a special conference held in April 1924.⁵⁶ There can therefore be little doubt that the rapid development of the youth movement within the *Hyongpyongsa* was partly a result of the support and direct intervention of activists from other social movements.

This close connection also led the local *Hyongpyong* youth societies to be much involved in the factional disputes of outside social movements, and this in turn led the national federation of the *Hyongpyong* youth societies to advise its local subordinate groups to adopt a neutral stance to difficulties within and between other social

⁵⁵ For the history of the federation, see Kim Chunyŏp and Kim Ch'angsun, *Han'guk Kongsan Chuŏi Undongsa* [The History of the Korean Communist Movement], Vol.2, (Seoul, Korea University Press, 1973), pp.136-149.

⁵⁶ *Tonga Ilbo*, 25 and 26 April 1924.

movements.⁵⁷ Nevertheless, outside influence still affected the *Hyongpyong* youth movement, partly because some local groups were not fully under the control of the national federation.

In this complex situation, the *Hyongpyong* youth societies eventually resolved that their main loyalty was to the *Hyongpyongsa* national headquarters. Even though some young activists complained about the neutral stances of their respective local branches---as in Hamp'yong,⁵⁸ for example---their leaders repeatedly confirmed their total loyalty to the *Hyongpyong* movement and attempted to follow its directions. Whatever differences there were at local levels, the youth leaders shared the main goals of the parent *Hyongpyongsa*. Friendship among, and the enlightenment of, members were regarded as their top priorities. In some areas, the national organisation even attempted to take over the role of local branches by providing unofficial schools, occasionally arranging for public lectures to be given, and organising library facilities for ordinary members.

The rapid development of the youth movement in its early stages thus helped to reactivate the *Hyongpyongsa* in many local areas. However, its later termination was nonetheless carried out mainly by its own supporters. The idea of dissolution was originally introduced by socialist activists in 1927 who infiltrated the youth movement a little earlier than the *Hyongpyongsa* as a whole. The main

⁵⁷ Sidae Ilbo, 20 December 1925.

⁵⁸ Tonga Ilbo, 4 July 1926; Sidae Ilbo, 4 July 1926.

argument for dissolution was that all youth groups should be disbanded in order to allow members to join one federation under strong leadership.⁵⁹ Not surprisingly, there were objections to the proposal for dissolution from some groups.⁶⁰ It was argued that many members of the *Hyongpyong* youth movement had different backgrounds and that some groups were quite distinct from others, so that each should retain autonomy in its own area. In the beginning, the national federation of the *Hyongpyong* youth societies seems to have been opposed to the dissolution proposal. But some local groups dissolved themselves independently, as in the case of the Kaesŏng *Hyongpyong* Youth Society.⁶¹ The issue was still predominant at the time of the national conference of the youth federation on 24 April 1928. According to the provisional agenda prepared prior to the conference, the national leaders had planned not to dissolve the youth federation.⁶² However, after considerable debate, the national federation did decide to dissolve itself,⁶³ and the remaining local groups followed the national decision. Independent youth societies within the *Hyongpyongsa* thus ceased to exist as such, and youth affairs were henceforth absorbed into the *Hyongpyong* movement with new sections at both national and local levels. Some former *Hyongpyong* youth societies did,

⁵⁹ Kim Chunyop and Kim Ch'angsun, op. cit., Vol.3, pp.146-152.

⁶⁰ cf. Ko Ŭmbae, "Hyongpyong Ch'ŏngnyŏn Tanch'e-ŭi Haech'e-rŭl Chŏldae Paegyŏk" [Total Opposition to the Dissolution of Hyongpyong Youth Groups], *Tonga Ilbo*, 31 December 1927 and 1 January 1928.

⁶¹ *Chungwoe Ilbo*, 20 December 1927; *Tonga Ilbo*, 22 December 1927.

⁶² *Tonga Ilbo*, 16 April 1928.

⁶³ *Tonga Ilbo*, 16 and 27 April 1928.

however, break away to join local youth federations in a new guise.⁶⁴

3. THE *HYONGPYONG* STUDENT LEAGUE

Unlike the two sub-groups discussed above, the *Hyongpyong Haksaeng Tongmaeng* [Student League] was launched after the national reunification of the two factions of the *Hyongpyongsa*. Its first inaugural meeting was held in Taejon on 4 August 1925.⁶⁵ Those present included the parents of students, the Seoul leaders of the *Hyongpyongsa*, and social activists from outside. The Seoul headquarters had previously given their support to the student activity.⁶⁶ Two main guiding principles were agreed at the Taejŏn meeting: one was to strive for improvement in the quality of life through education, and the other to support the authentic goals of the *Hyongpyong* movement through close friendship.⁶⁷ The meeting also decided to elect a committee for further action and to establish a unit for the encouragement of education. The student gathering received a warm welcome from local *Hyongpyongsa* members. An amount over 100 won was collected by the parents of students for further action and additional sums were pledged by some local branches such as that in Yongsan.⁶⁸ Immediately after the meeting, the newly formed unit for

⁶⁴ See *Tonga Ilbo*, 9 May 1928, for the example of Kimhae.

⁶⁵ *Maeil Sinbo*, 8 August 1925; *Tonga Ilbo*, 9 and 11 August 1925; *Choson Ilbo*, 10 August 1925.

⁶⁶ *Sidae Ilbo*, 25 July 1925.

⁶⁷ *Choson Ilbo*, 10 August 1925; *Sidae Ilbo*, 11 August 1925; *Tonga Ilbo*, 12 August 1925.

⁶⁸ *Choson Ilbo*, 19 August 1925; *Tonga Ilbo*, 20 August 1925; *Sidae Ilbo*, 22 August 1925.

education prepared to visit local branches, mainly in the Ch'ung-Nam and Ch'ŏlla areas during August 1925.⁶⁹

Despite the support from some local branches, however, the League was not as successful as had been hoped in extending its activities to local areas. It had constant difficulty in maintaining its activities, due in part to the limited time available for them by students and in part to their scattered locations. But they did hold anniversary celebrations in 1926 and 1927. In 1926, the first anniversary meeting was held in Taejŏn on 11 August.⁷⁰ Among those attending were delegates from Seoul headquarters and around 50 student members. They rededicated themselves to the cause of educating the children of members so that these might enjoy the benefits of a higher quality of life.⁷¹ A similar gathering was held on the second anniversary, this time in Ch'ŏnan on 9 August 1927.⁷² In April 1926, a special meeting was convened at the time of the national conference of the *Hyongpyongsa*,⁷³ and there are records of a few local meetings as in Wonju-Hwoengsong in 1927⁷⁴ and Ipjang in 1928.⁷⁵ But there are few records of other activities organised by the League. At a central committee meeting held in Seoul in December 1928, it was decided to change the name from *Hyongpyong Haku Tongmaeng* [Student Friend League] to *Hyongpyong Haku Ch'ong*

⁶⁹ Choson Ilbo, 10 August 1925; Sidae Ilbo, 11 August 1925.

⁷⁰ Tonga Ilbo, 14 August 1926.

⁷¹ Tonga Ilbo, 14 August 1926.

⁷² Chungwoe Ilbo, 11 August 1927; Choson Ilbo, 14 August 1927.

⁷³ Sidae Ilbo, 26 April 1926.

⁷⁴ Tonga Ilbo, 25 January 1927.

⁷⁵ Chungwoe Ilbo, 7 May 1928.

Tongmaeng [General Student Friend League].⁷⁶ At the same meeting several matters of concern were discussed, among them the special problems of female students and local students, and the publication of a student journal. The student society thus remained in existence for a few years. It particularly encouraged ordinary members to seek some education. In addition, a few students who led the society were active in later participation in the *Hyongpyongsa*. Among these were Yi Sondong and Kil Handong who were elected to the executive of the national headquarters.

4. THE *HYONGPYONG* WOMEN'S SOCIETY

Another group which bears witness to the diversity of sub-groups within the *Hyongpyongsa* was the Women's Society. The establishment of the Women's Society is of particular interest as the status of women in Choson society was in some ways similar to that of the *paekjong*; they were treated as inferior to men and had very little opportunity to join in public activities. In the early twentieth century, however, their status had begun to change with support from a number of social movement activists. The problem of women was not of concern only to women movement activists, but also to the rest of the liberal-minded activists, and *Hyongpyongsa* activists were prominent among the latter. Between 1926 and 1929 several local branches had discussed matters of special interest to women at their meetings.⁷⁷ The list included even village branches such as

⁷⁶ Choson Ilbo, 8 December 1927.

⁷⁷ In the newspaper reports referring to the issue of women in different local branches, the following

Kumgu. At the annual national conference in 1928 there was at least one female delegate and the issue of women was formally accepted for discussion.⁷⁸ At the 1929 conference there were about 20 women delegates from Ch'ung-Nam and Ch'ŏn-Puk and there were several motions on the position of women.⁷⁹ Furthermore, some local branches were beginning to provide special programmes exclusively for women members. These included unofficial schools for women⁸⁰ and public lectures specially for them.⁸¹ In some branches, concern was expressed over the general situation of women and objections were raised to early and forced marriages and to the exploitation of the labour power of women.⁸² The position of *paekjong* women in trading activities was a matter of particular interest to the *Hyongpyongsa* because of the stronger tradition of *paekjong* women working as compared to ordinary women. *Paekjong* women had traditionally peddled meat for sale on their heads, and it was not uncommon for them to encounter trouble with ordinary people due to discrimination and prejudice against them both as women and as *paekjong*. Some local branches of

places were mentioned: Kanggyŏng (Choson Ilbo, 9 March 1926), Iksan (Tonga Ilbo, 10 September 1926), Chonju (Choson Ilbo, 19 November 1926), Kusan (Choson Ilbo, 6 June 1927; Tonga Ilbo, 7 June 1927), Samnye (Tonga Ilbo, 19 April 1927), Kŏmgu, (Chungwoe Ilbo, 23 November 1927; Tonga Ilbo, 23 November 1927), Chinch'ŏn (Tonga Ilbo, 1 June 1928; Chungwoe Ilbo, 7 June 1928) and Chongup (Choson Ilbo, 21 May 1929)

⁷⁸ Tonga Ilbo, 25 April 1928; Choson Ilbo, 25 April 1928. *Choson Ilbo* reported that there were several female members.

⁷⁹ Chungwoe Ilbo, 25 April 1929.

⁸⁰ For the case of Hwach'on, Tonga Ilbo, 6 December 1927.

⁸¹ For the Wŏnju case, Chungwoe Ilbo, 16 January 1928.

⁸² For the Hayang case, Chungwoe Ilbo, 21 June 1928. And for Wonju, Tonga Ilbo, 16 April 1929; Choson Ilbo, 16 April 1929.

the *Hyongpyongsa* therefore attempted to prohibit women members from peddling meat.⁸³

The emergence of a "women's movement" within the *Hyongpyongsa* is thus of particular interest as evidence of change both in the society at large and within the *Hyongpyongsa*. In addition to the main concerns over women within the *Hyongpyongsa* as a whole, there were some local groups such as the *Hyongpyong Yŏsŏng Tonguhoe* [Women's Friendly Society] in Kanggyŏng⁸⁴ and Kunsan⁸⁵ and the *Hyongpyong Yŏsŏnghoe* [Women's Society] in Kŭmgu, Kimje.⁸⁶ However, there are few sources enabling us to trace back the activities of these groups. But, even if the nature of the "women's movement" still remains to be studied on its own, there is no doubt that the *Hyongpyong* movement was concerned with the position of women.

Taking the several groups discussed above into account, it is clear that the expansion of the *Hyongpyongsa* over this period was accompanied by an appreciable diversification of aims and interests.

III. THE NATIONAL LEADERSHIP IN TRANSITION

The organisational growth of a social movement is often accompanied by leadership fluctuations influenced by both internal and external factors. Among these factors are

⁸³ In Iri (Tonga Ilbo, 20 July 1926) and Chonju (Tonga Ilbo, 11 July 1927).

⁸⁴ Choson Ilbo, 16 May 1926.

⁸⁵ Choson Ilbo, 7 June 1927.

⁸⁶ Tonga Ilbo, 15 January 1929.

the general direction and principal strategies of the movement. In addition, differing ideas among members may well lead to factional strains and tensions which are subject to various influences and pressures from the external environment. All such factors made an impact on the leadership of the *Hyongpyong* movement. We have seen that the movement experienced a severe leadership dispute in its early years and that this eventually led to the transfer of the national headquarters under moderates from Chinju to Seoul under progressive reformists. (see Chapter 5) From that time onwards, there were frequent changes in the membership and structure of the national leadership.

To begin with it is necessary to define the national leadership of the *Hyongpyong* movement. The national headquarters consisted of two boards: the central committee in charge of the movement's general direction and principal policies, and the standing committee which, as a subordinate organisation, dealt with more specific and detailed affairs. In principle, all members of the central executive committee were elected by the delegates at the annual national conference, while the standing committee consisted of some central committee members who were on occasion replaced by others, due in part to personal reasons and in part to external contingencies and demands. In short, those who served on committees, and especially on the standing committees were usually core members who ran the overall affairs of the movement.

In addition to these committees, there were special, usually temporary, groups set up for specific purposes.

Among these were circuit committees charged with visiting branches to encourage local activities, and investigation units which were sent to areas in which the local members were experiencing particular troubles, largely in the face of attacks by opponents. Those who served on special temporary groups were mainly members of the central executive committee, accompanied on occasion by trusted and devoted non-executive members. Whatever their precise composition, these groups represented the national headquarters of the *Hyongpyongsa* both to the outside world and to local members. Their roles were therefore very significant and all the individuals involved were undoubtedly core members of the effective national leadership.

The names of those who served on these special groups in the latter part of the 1920s are all listed in the official records of the annual conferences held in Seoul every April. It may be noted here that the regular holding of annual conferences was difficult under Japanese colonialism; the fact the *Hyongpyongsa* succeeded in doing so is in itself evidence of the momentum which it had built up. Detailed lists of the national executive members from 1926 to 1930 are shown, with their provincial origins, in Table 7-3.

Table 7-3. The Regional Origins of National Executive Committee Members: 1926-1930

Province	1926 ⁸⁷	1927 ⁸⁸	1928 ⁸⁹
Seoul	Kim Sambong Yu Kongsam	Yi Kyŏngch'un	
Kyŏnggi	Kil Togun Kim Pongju P'yon Munok So Kwanghun Yi Chiyŏng	Kim Pongju Yi Changmyong	Ch'oe Manyong Kim Pongju Yi Chongsun
Ch'ung-Puk	Kim Ch'ŏnson		Kil Sangsu
Ch'ung-Nam	Cho Kwiyong Im Yunjae Kil Suno Kim Chaesil Kim Chongt'aek Kim Sajon O Sŏnghwan Pak Kamsul Yi Chŏngwon	Kil Pongso Kil Suno Kim Chongt'aek Kim Pong Kim Sajŏn Kwak Sŏngch'on Sim Sanguk Yi Chongwŏn Yi Ilson	Kil Suno Kim Chongt'aek(H) Kim Pong Kim Tongsook Pak P'yŏngsan P'yon In'gwi
Chŏn-Puk	Cho Kyŏngch'an Cho Myŏnguk Kwon Tuho Yi Pyŏngt'aek Yi Tonghwan	Cho Kyŏngch'an Cho Myŏnguk Kil Kidong Kim Sudong Kim Tŏkgun Yi Tonghwan	Cho Myŏnguk Na Suwan Yi Sŏndong Yi Tonghwan(sub-H)
Kyŏng-Puk	Kim Kyŏngsam	Kim Kyŏngsam Yi Sahyŏn	Kang Yongsaeng
Kyŏng-Nam	Chang Chip'il Sin Hyŏnsu		Yi Yongsu
Kangwŏn	Ch'ŏn Kulp'il Chŏng Tongho Kil Manhak Kim Sŏngsun	Ch'ŏn Kulp'il Kil Manhak Yi Ch'unbok	Ch'ŏn Manbong Kil Manhak Yi Ch'unbok
unknown	Yi Soni		Ch'oe Yanggyun Kil Pongu Yi Kyonggil
TOTAL	25	23	20

⁸⁷ Tonga Ilbo, 26 April 1926; Choson Ilbo, 28 April 1926; Sidae Ilbo, 26 April 1926.

⁸⁸ Tonga Ilbo, 27 April 1927; Maeil Sinbo, 27 April 1927; Choson Ilbo, 29 April 1927.

⁸⁹ Tonga Ilbo, 27 April 1928; Choson Ilbo, 28 April 1928.

Province	1929 ⁸⁰	1930 ⁸¹
Seoul	Pak Kyŏnghwan(ins) Yi Kyŏngch'un (sub)	Kil Ch'ugwang
Kyŏnggi	Kil Ŭisong (ins) Kim Pongju (sub) So Kwanghun Yi Chongsun	Kil Ŭisong(ins) So Kwanghun Yi Chongsun
Ch'ung-Puk	Cho Pongsil	Kil Sangsu(ins)
Ch'ung-Nam	Cho Kwanok Cho Kwiyong (H) Kil Handong Kil Pongso(ins) Kil Suno Kim Chaedŏk Kim Chaesil Kim Chongt'aek(ins) Kim Pong Kim Sajŏn Pak P'yŏngsan Sim Sanguk Yi Hanyong	Cho Kwiyong (H) Kil Suno Kim Chongt'aek Kim Kwang Kim Sajŏn(ins) Kim Sujin Kim Tŏngsok O Sŏnghwan Pak P'yongsan Sim Sanguk(gen-sec) Yi Hanyong(sec)
Chŏn-Puk	Kim Kapch'ŏn Yi Chunho Yi Kyonggi Yi Sondong(ins) Yi Tonghwan	Yi Tonghwan
Kyŏng-Puk	Kang Yongsaeng Kim P'alwŏn	Kang Yongsaeng
Kyŏng-Nam	Chang Chip'il(sub-H) Ch'oe Haksu Yi Myŏngnok Yi Okch'ŏn(sub) Yi Yongsu	Chang Chip'il(chief-ins) Sin Hyŏnsu
Kangwŏn	Kil Manhak Kim P'alyong Yi Ch'unbok Yi Kich'un	Kil Manhak Yi Ch'unbok(ins)
unknown	Chŏn Hŭnggi Pyon Taejung(sub) Yi Taehyŏn(sub)	Na Sujong
TOTAL	39	23

⁸⁰ Chungwoe Ilbo, 26 April 1929; Tonga Ilbo, 26 April 1929; Choson Ilbo, 26 April 1929.

⁸¹ Chungwoe Ilbo, 27 April 1930; Choson Ilbo, 27 April 1930.

(Key) H: head, sub-H: sub-head, sub: substitute executive, chief-ins: chief inspector, ins: inspector, gen-sec: general secretary, sec: secretary

As may be seen in the table, the central executive committees consisted in general of prominent figures from local communities, as in the early years. But there were some significant regional variations. Ch'ung-Nam and Chŏn-Puk Provinces, where the most rapid development of local activities took place, supplied a substantial proportion of the leaders. In contrast, there was none from the northern areas or from Chŏn-Nam Province where the *Hyongpyong* movement was least advanced. What the table shows is, thus, that the national leadership was effectively made up of influential members from local branches.

As conditions changed, the members increasingly felt the need for new organisational arrangements. Soon after the 1925 annual conference, the central committee decided to move away from a structure controlled in principle by a head executive to a system of collective leadership.⁹² It was argued that a hierarchical structure was not compatible with the spirit of the *Hyongpyong* movement which held the elimination of unequal status as one of its main goals. As a result of this decision, the annual conference in Seoul on 24 April 1926 held an election among its 300 delegates for 25 central committee members.⁹³ Kang Sangho who served as deputy speaker at the conference was excluded from the

⁹² Choson Ilbo, 28 April 1925.

⁹³ Choson Ilbo, 25 April 1926; sa 25 April 1926.

list, while Chang Chip'il (speaker), Sin Hyonsu and Kim Chongt'aek (recorders) were elected.

On the following day, the central committee elected 9 of its 25 members for the standing committee.⁹⁴ As seen in Table 7-4, the committee seems to have observed the principle of collective leadership, but the central power of the movement was nevertheless obviously swinging towards "reformist" members from middle areas of the country such as Ch'ung-Nam, Ch'ŏn-Puk and Kyŏnggi Provinces. Among these were some who were not members of the *paekjong* community such as Im Yunjae and Yu Kongsam, along with Sin Hyŏnsu. Moreover, only a year later in 1926 the principle of collective leadership was to some extent eroded through the re-introduction of specific responsibilities as shown in Table 7-4.

Table 7-4. Members of the Standing and Circuit Committees in 1926/1927

On 25 April 1926 ⁹⁵	Reshuffled on 27 November 1926 ⁹⁶	
Chang Chip'il	Chang Chip'il	general; circuit
Cho Kwiyoung	Kim Sambong	general; circuit
Chong Tongho	Cho Kwiyoung	education; circuit
Kil Suno	Cho Kyŏngch'an	research; circuit
Kim Chongt'aek	Kil Suno	research
Im Yunjae	Ch'ŏn Kunp'il	local
Sin Hyŏnsu	Kil Pongso	local; circuit
Sŏ Kwanghun	Yi Ch'unbok	account
Yu Kongsam	Yi Tonghwan	external; circuit
	Chang Songop	circuit
	Kil Togun	circuit
	Kim Sajŏn	circuit

⁹⁴ Tonga Ilbo, 27 April 1926; sd 28 April 1926.

⁹⁵ Choson Ilbo, 27 April 1926; Tonga Ilbo, 27 April 1926.

⁹⁶ Choson Ilbo, 2 December 1926; Chungwoe Ilbo, 2 December 1926; Tonga Ilbo, 2 December 1926.

In 1927 there was appreciable change in the *Hyongpyongsa* leadership, mainly because some leaders were involved in the trial of the Koryo Revolutionary Party affair.⁹⁷ At the national conference held in Seoul on 24 April under the chairmanship of Kang Sangho (speaker) and Yi Ch'unbok (deputy-speaker), about 300 delegates decided to change the name of the association, *Choson Hyongpyongsa Ch'ong Yŏnmaeng* [General Federation of Korean Hyongpyongsa], to *Choson Hyongpyongsa Ch'ong Ponbu* [General Headquarters of Korean Hyongpyongsa], reflecting the aim of consolidating the national leadership of the headquarters in the middle of the Koryo Revolutionary Party affair.⁹⁸ The affair resulted in the reconstitution of the executive and standing committees, as may be seen by comparing Tables 7-3, 7-4 and 7-5.

Table 7-5. The Standing Committees in 1927/1928

On 26 April 1927 ⁹⁹	Reshuffled on 20 November 1927 ¹⁰⁰
Kim Chongt'aek (general)	Kim Chongt'aek (accounts)
Yi Ch'unbok (general)	Kim Kyŏngsam (publicity)
Kim Kyongsam (publicity)	Kim Pong (general)
Kim Pong (publicity)	Yi Ch'unbok (education)
Kim Sajŏn (research)	Yi Tonghwan (research)
Yi Changmyong (research)	
Yi Chongwŏn (research)	
Sim Sanguk (accounts)	
Yi Tonghwan (education)	

⁹⁷ For details of the Koryo Revolutionary Party affair, see section IV of this chapter.

⁹⁸ *Choson Ilbo*, 25, 26 and 27 April 1927; *Maeil Sinbo*, 26 and 27 April 1927; *Tonga Ilbo*, 27 and 29 April 1927.

⁹⁹ *Tonga Ilbo*, 29 April 1927.

¹⁰⁰ *Choson Ilbo*, 23 November 1927; *Tonga Ilbo*, 23 November 1927.

Certain former leaders, principally Chang Chip'il, Cho Kwiyong, O Sŏnghwan, So Kwanghun and Yu Kongsam were dropped from the executive in 1927. The leaders who had once led progressive reformist groups in rivalry to the moderates of Kyŏng-Nam were inevitably removed from the *Hyongpyong* activities and their posts were mainly filled by their fellows from Ch'ung-Nam, Chŏn-Puk and Kangwon Provinces. When the number of the standing committee members was reduced in November 1927 in the face of the leadership crisis caused by the Koryo Revolutionary Party affair, former key activists remained core members of the national leadership. Their good performance in this difficult period prevented the movement from withering and contributed to its continuous development.

The moderates from Kyŏng-Nam Province had thus been largely excluded from the national leadership, and important changes continued in 1928, especially concerning the organisational system operating at the national headquarters. In association with the change of name in 1927, it was proposed in 1928 to consolidate power in the movement under a centralised collective leadership, particularly for dealing with tensions from the outside.¹⁰¹ At the annual conference held in Seoul on 24 April 1928, 220 delegates from 58 branches finally accepted a suggestion for far-reaching change in the organisation of the national leadership.¹⁰² A form of "democratic

¹⁰¹ cf. Yi Tonghwan, "Hyongpyong Undong-ŭi Kŭmhu," [The Hyongpyong Movement: Past and Present], Tonga Ilbo, 26 January 1928.

¹⁰² Choson Ilbo, 25 and 28 April 1928; Tonga Ilbo, 26 and 27 April 1928.

centralism" was aimed at to make it possible for the national headquarters to exercise effective control over subordinate branches.¹⁰³ The hierarchical organisation of the central executive committee was also re-introduced with the head, sub-head, and plain executive members standing in rank order.¹⁰⁴ In addition, the meeting, chaired by Yi Ch'unbok (speaker) and Kil Suno (deputy-speaker), accepted a restatement of the aims and policies of the movement as follows:

1. Our basic mission is improved human rights which requires improved economic conditions;
2. We will organize ourselves and harmonize and unite the *Hyongpyong* movement;
3. We will co-operate with ordinary social groups and build a rational society;
4. We will struggle for the real benefit of our class;
5. We will educate and train our class.¹⁰⁵

These reorganisations and restatements were associated with the emergence of the new leaders to replacing^c those in prison. Those who became established as leading figures around this time included Kil Handong, Pak P'yŏngsan (alias Hogun), Yi Yongso, Yi Myŏngnok, Yi Sŏndong, Kang Yongsaeng and Sim Sanguk. But these were not entirely new faces. All had once led sub-groups such as the *Chŏngwidan*, the Youth Societies, and the Student League. They were generally younger and junior to the formerly established leaders and most of them inclined to more radical ideas. Their personal

¹⁰³ cf. *Tonga Ilbo*, 4 January 1929.

¹⁰⁴ *Tonga Ilbo*, 27 April 1928; *Choson Ilbo*, 28 April 1928.

¹⁰⁵ *Tonga Ilbo*, 4 January 1929. The translation quoted is from Ian Neary, "The Paekjong and the Hyongpyongsa: The Untouchables of Korea and Their Struggle for Liberation," *Immigrants and Minorities*, Vol.6 No.2 (July 1987), p.139.

backgrounds were mixed, ranging from *paekjong* to ordinary journalists.¹⁰⁶ The young leaders represented a newly emerging power group at the heart of the *Hyongpyongsa* but they co-operated with more senior and experienced leaders. Thus the headquarters were in effect under the joint control of two power groups.

Table 7-6. The Special and Circuit Committees in 1928-29

On 8 June 1928 ¹⁰⁷	On 26 February 1929 ¹⁰⁸
s) Ch'ŏn Kunp'il	s) Chang Chip'il head-pre
Ch'ŏn Manbong	j) Kil Handong agenda
j) Kang Yongsaeng	j) Sŏ Kwanghun agenda
Kil Ŭisong	j) Yi Sŏndong agenda circuit
Kil Kidong	s) Kim Chongt'aek account circuit
s) Kil Manhak	j) Pak P'yŏngsan general
s) Kim Kyŏngsam	j) Yi Tonghwan general circuit
s) Kim Pong	Ch'ŏn Manbong circuit
j) Kim Sajŏn	Ha Kyongch'il circuit
Kwŏn Kwangbok	j) Kang Yongsaeng circuit
j) Sim Sanguk	s) Kil Manhak circuit
s) Yi Chiyong	s) Kil Pongso circuit
j) Yi Chongsun	s) Kil Sono circuit
j) Yi Tonghwan	s) Kim Pong circuit
j) Yi Sŏndong	j) Kim Sajŏn circuit
j) Yi Yongsu	Yi Chongun circuit
	j) Yi Songsun circuit
	s) Yi Ch'unbok circuit
	j) Yi Yongsu circuit

(Key) s: senior members, j: junior members,
Names with no key indicator remain unidentified.

¹⁰⁶ For example, Pak P'yongsan was a reporter for P'yongt'aek branch of Choson Ilbo. Chungang Ilbo, 31 January 1932. Further details of their backgrounds are given in the section on the *Hyongpyong* Youth Vanguard League affair in Chapter 8.

¹⁰⁷ This is the list of a circuit committee, formed on June 1928. Chungwoe Ilbo, 8 June 1928; Tonga Ilbo, 9 June 1928.

¹⁰⁸ This is the list of names from special committees to prepare for the annual national conference in 1929 and for a circuit tour for publicity. Chungwoe Ilbo, 1 March 1929; Choson Ilbo, 3 March 1929.

As can be seen in Table 7-6, the circuit committee which was launched on 8 June 1928 contained members of both groups. The special committee for the preparation of the 1929 annual conference was also largely made up of members from the two groups, though it also included Chang Chip'il and So Kwanghun, two earlier leaders now freed from prison.

In summary, in 1927 and 1928 when some leaders were in jail, there was appreciable change in the composition of those in charge: in 1927 a number of professional "*Hyongpyong* activists" mainly from *paekjong* communities came to the fore and in 1928 they shared responsibilities at the national headquarters with younger newly emerging leaders of mixed backgrounds.

Meanwhile, the old antagonism between the Chinju and Seoul groups again came to the surface. The Kyong-Nam leaders who had been removed from the national leadership by the 1927 conference convened a gathering in Masan on 13 March 1928.¹⁰⁹ At this meeting the national leaders were accused of abusing their authority. And the same group held another meeting in Milyang around the time of the annual national conference in April 1928.¹¹⁰ In an announcement circulated in advance, the group stated that there were three main reasons for the meeting: the decline of the movement, loss of confidence in the incumbent executive members, and the failure of the executives to check the economic and psychological setbacks suffered by the rank

¹⁰⁹ Tonga Ilbo, 16 March 1928; Choson Ilbo, 17 March 1928; Chungwoe Ilbo, 19 March 1928.

¹¹⁰ Tonga Ilbo, 30 April and 1 May 1928.

and file members.¹¹¹ While the ostensible purpose of the meeting was to discuss ways of reactivating the *Hyongpyong* movement, it is clear that it was in fact a continuation of factional antagonism in the *Hyongpyongsa*. Except for their attempt to maintain good relations with the Japanese authorities,¹¹² there was no new difference of substance between the group and the Seoul leaders. It can therefore be concluded that the moderate group was unhappy with the general direction taken by Seoul leaders,¹¹³ and was probably ready to change it towards "good relations" with the Japanese as was to be developed in the period of the *Taedongsa*. (see Chapter 8)

The Seoul headquarters reacted angrily to the Kyong-Nam gathering.¹¹⁴ A special meeting of the central committee accused the Kyong-Nam delegates of reviving the factional disarray, and a number of local branches outside Kyong-Nam followed the Seoul headquarters in criticising them. There was serious concern over the possible revival of the factionalism of the past.

The changing situation of the national leadership in 1927 and 1928 continued in 1929. This is revealed in the composition of the central committee. The seventh annual

¹¹¹ Tonga Ilbo, 17 April 1928.

¹¹² One of the resolutions put before the meeting was that the movement should negotiate its current position with the Japanese authorities. Tonga Ilbo, 1 May 1928.

¹¹³ The Koryo Revolutionary Party affair was perceived by the moderate leaders as not being central to the intrinsic purposes of the movement. After the reporting of the affair in the newspapers, Kang Sangho issued a comment to the effect that the *Hyongpyong* movement would continue to pursue its original aims. See Choson Ilbo, 26 January 1927.

¹¹⁴ Chungwoe Ilbo, 27 and 30 March 1928; Choson Ilbo, 30 March 1928.

conference, opened by Chang Chip'il, and chaired by Kil Suno (speaker) and Yi Ch'unbok (deputy speaker), was held in Seoul on 24 April 1929, but it was confined to one session only by order of the police.¹¹⁵ The Wonsan general strike which lasted from mid January to early April, 1929, had alarmed the police who now paid close attention to all social gatherings,¹¹⁶ and the *Hyongpyongsa* central committee had in late February---when the strike was at its height---given its support to the Wonsan workers.¹¹⁷ It is therefore not surprising that the annual gathering was closely watched by the police who banned discussion of all the items on the agenda.¹¹⁸ The delegates were, however, able to elect the central committee and to pass the annual budget, and the net outcome of the conference was that the central committee was further stratified through the introduction of various new designations such as head, sub-head, regular executives, substitute executives and inspectors, as shown in Table 7-3.¹¹⁹

The committee now consisted largely of members of the two leading groups that had emerged in the previous two years. In order to accommodate both groups, the number of committee members was increased to 39, the highest in the

¹¹⁵ Choson Ilbo, 25 April 1929; Chungwoe Ilbo, 25 April 1929; Tonga Ilbo, 25 April 1929.

¹¹⁶ Kang Tongjin, "Wonsan Ch'ong P'aǒp-e taehan Koch'al" [A Study of the General Strike in Wonsan], (1971) reprinted in Yun Pyǒngsok and An Pyǒngjik (eds.), *Han'guk Kūndaesaron*, (Seoul, Chisik Sanǒpsa, 1977), pp.237-266.

¹¹⁷ Chungwoe Ilbo, 1 March 1929; Choson Ilbo, 3 March 1929.

¹¹⁸ Choson Ilbo, 25 April 1929; Chungwoe Ilbo, 25 April 1929.

¹¹⁹ cf. Table 7-3, and Choson Ilbo, 26 April 1929; Chungwoe Ilbo, 26 April 1929.

movement's history. The emerging younger leaders had finally established themselves in the national headquarters in association with senior members. And soon after their release from prison, Chang Chip'il, Cho Kwiyong and Sŏ Kwanghun were again on the central and standing committees. The national leadership thus had a mixed composition in 1929. In particular, the younger activists were prominent in their participation at the headquarters and in visiting local branches, as can be seen from Table 7-7.

Table 7-7. The Standing and Circuit Committees in 1929-30

On late May 1929 ¹	On 23 December 1929 ²
j) Kang Yongsaeng	s) Cho Kwiyong head
j) Kil Handong	s) Chang Chip'il general
s) Kil Manhak	Chang Hojŏng research
s) Kim Chongt'aek	j) Kim Sajŏn research circuit
j) Kim Sajŏn	j) Kil Handong account
j) Na Suwan	j) Yi Kyonggi youth circuit
j) Pak P'yŏngsan	j) Yi Tonghwan education circuit
j) Sim Sanguk	Ch'oe Yongsok circuit
j) Sŏ Kwanghun	Ch'ŏn Hŭnggi circuit
j) Yi Chunho	j) Kang Yongsaeng circuit
j) Yi Hanyong	s) Kil Pongso circuit
j) Yi Tonghwan	Kil Togun circuit
j) Yi Yongsu	Kim Chaedŏk circuit
	j) Kim Chongt'aek circuit
	Kim Kapch'ŏn circuit
	Sin Hŭian circuit
	s) Sin Hyŏnsu circuit
	s) Yi Ch'unbok circuit

(Key) s: senior member, j: junior member,
Names with no key indicator remain unidentified.

Notes for Table 7-7.

1. The circuit committee organised in May 1929. See Tonga Ilbo, 27 May 1929; Chungwoe Ilbo, 27 May 1929.
2. See Tonga Ilbo, 27 and 28 December 1929.

During the course of these changes, the tension between the Seoul headquarters and the Kyŏng-Nam leaders subsided. At meetings of local branch directors convened by the Seoul headquarters on 15 October¹²⁰ and of Kyŏng-Nam delegates on 15 November¹²¹ efforts to reduce the tensions between them were made. As a result, Sin Hyonsu, one of the leaders of the Kyŏng-Nam group, joined a circuit committee, as shown in the second column of Table 7-7. What had happened was that the former rival leaders of the moderates and the progressive reformists found themselves compelled to work with each other in the face of the newly emerging power of younger radical leaders. But this was to lead to new internal tensions which developed dramatically at the eighth annual conference which was held in Seoul on 24 April under the chairmanship of Yi Ch'unbok. The delegates were soon divided into two camps over the election of Chang Chip'il as the head of the central executive committee.¹²² Some of the newly elected executives---like Kil Handong---refused to serve under Chang Chip'il whereupon two compromise candidates, Cho Kwiyong and Kil Pongso, were accepted and Cho was finally elected. However, a similar dispute then arose over the election of the chief inspector: Chang Chip'il stood and beat Yi Chiyŏng. Chang's opponents were furious, but his election was confirmed since the majority of delegates refused to withdraw their support for him.

¹²⁰ Tonga Ilbo, 3 November 1929.

¹²¹ Tonga Ilbo, 20 November 1929; Chungwoe Ilbo, 21 November 1929.

¹²² Choson Ilbo, 25, 26 and 27 April 1930; Chungwoe Ilbo, 25 and 27 April 1930.

As shown in Table 7-3, posts at the national headquarters were now more clearly specified and also more hierarchical, and a clear distinction was drawn between the chief inspector and ordinary inspectors, as also between the general secretary and the secretary. Despite disagreements in process of the election, at the first central executive committee meeting held on the following day, the standing committee shown in Table 7-8 was elected.

Table 7-8. The Standing Committee Elected on 26 April 1930

Name	Post
j) Kil Ch'ugwang	head for organisation & treasury
j) Na Suwan	organisation & treasury
s) Kim Chongt'aek	head for education & publication
n) Kim Kwang	education & publication
s) O Sŏnghwan	head for life improvement
s) Kil Manhak	life improvement
j) Yi Tonghwan	head for justice
j) Yi Chongsun	justice
j) Pak P'yŏngsan	head for youth & women
c) Sin Hyŏnsu	youth & women

(Key) s: senior, j: junior, n: new face, c: Chinju

source: Chungwoe Ilbo, 29 April 1930.

The composition of the committee covered most groups within the *Hyongpyongsa*: the younger radicals, the senior original activists, the newly emerged local leaders and one of the Chinju founders. In addition, work at the national headquarters was now divided into five sections: organisation and treasury, education and publications, the improvement of living standards, social justice, and youth and women. Each section consisted of a chief and ordinary

executives. Even though there was obvious tension between the leaders, these changes aimed to cope with the stagnation facing the movement, which was the major issue with which the leaders now had to contend.

To sum up: during the period 1925 to 1930, there were far-reaching changes in the structure and composition of the leadership of the *Hyongpyongsa*. Both internal and external affairs affected the leadership issue. The Koryo Revolutionary Party affair clearly had an enormous impact on the situation. At the time that earlier key leaders, mainly progressive reformists, were involved in the affair, a new division developed between *paekjong* leaders aspiring to national recognition and the younger more radical activists. The crucial development was the rise of new young radical members who had been active in sub-groups such as the *Chongwidan* and the Youth and Student Societies. The radical group began to confront the former leaders over the general direction of the movement, and this led the former rivals---the moderates and the reformists---to close ranks. Despite these tensions and changes, the leadership of the late 1920s prevented the movement from disintegrating. Indeed, the movement emerged from the changes with very appreciable achievements.

IV. SUBSTANTIVE ACHIEVEMENTS AND OUTCOMES

The above account of changes in the national leadership of the movement is intended to evoke something of the dynamics of the movement in the late 1920s. In this section we turn to the achievements of those years. Despite the arrest of key leaders, there were quite sufficient young professional *Hyongpyong* activists to fill their places. And we have seen that the proliferation of a variety of groups took place at the same time as the overall activities and programmes of the movement were intensified.

The main goals of the *Hyongpyong* movement had already been established in earlier years and were to some appreciable extent clarified by and through the period of factional division. While the general direction of the movement had been established in the early years, the development and institutionalisation of concrete programmes of action at the level of local groups were largely achieved in the late 1920s. The period of factional confrontation had seen considerable geographical expansion but relatively little concentration on practical programmes had been possible. In the latter part of 1920s, however, the movement made very appreciable progress in several respects. From 1925 to 1927 in particular, numerous local branches held special meetings to re-launch their activities and to promote a wider range of activities.

Among these branches were Kimje,¹²³ Masan,¹²⁴ Sunch'ang,¹²⁵ Haman,¹²⁶ Hongsŏng,¹²⁷ Hamyang,¹²⁸ Chŏngŭp,¹²⁹ T'aein,¹³⁰ Ch'unch'ŏn,¹³¹ and Chech'ŏn.¹³² The range of issues being confronted can be seen in the agenda of national conferences where they were usually raised before being handed over to branch members for local action.

The main issues discussed at the annual national conferences from 1926 to 1930 are set out in Table 7-9.

Table 7-9. The Main Items on the Agenda of the Annual National Conferences: 1926-1930.

YEAR 1926¹³³

1. Social discrimination.
2. Economic conditions.
 - 2.1 The reduction or elimination of regional variations in rent for slaughterhouses.
 - 2.2 Autonomy on meat prices: free marketing system.
 - 2.3 Minimum wages of slaughterers : 1.5 won per cow.
 - 2.4 Direct management of hide drying workshops.
3. The promotion of knowledge.
 - 3.1 Education for children and the raising of funds for studying abroad.
 - 3.2 Recommendation to local branches to provide periodicals and public lectures.
 - 3.3 Publication of a journal.
4. General direction.
 - 4.1 Support for youth, women's, students', and children's activities.

¹²³ Choson Ilbo, 27 July 1925.

¹²⁴ Choson Ilbo, 14 January 1926; Tonga Ilbo, 15 January 1926.

¹²⁵ Tonga Ilbo, 5 February 1926.

¹²⁶ Tonga Ilbo, 27 April 1926.

¹²⁷ Choson Ilbo, 15 January 1927.

¹²⁸ Tonga Ilbo, 27 May 1927.

¹²⁸ Tonga Ilbo, 26 May 1927; Choson Ilbo, 26 May 1927.

¹³⁰ Tonga Ilbo, 29 May 1927.

¹³¹ Tonga Ilbo, 21 July 1927; Chungwoe Ilbo, 21 July 1927.

¹³² Chungwoe Ilbo, 12 January 1927; Choson Ilbo, 13 January 1927.

¹³³ Choson Ilbo, 25 and 26 April 1926; Tonga Ilbo, 26 April 1926; Sidae Ilbo, 25 and 26 April 1926.

5. Social issues.
 - 5.1 Cooperation with other social movements.
 - 5.2 Avoiding involvement in factional disputes within and between other social movements.

YEAR 1927¹³⁴

1. Change of name.
2. Action against discrimination: propagation of the spirit of the *Hyongpyong* movement.
3. For the promotion of knowledge: publication of a journal.
4. Alignment with the Japanese *Suiheisha*.
5. General direction: placing priority on the education of members.
6. Encouragement of local branches by circuit committee.

YEAR 1928¹³⁵

On internal affairs.

1. Education of members.
2. Action against discrimination.
3. Preserving industrial privileges.
4. Publication of a journal.
5. Supporting sub-groups: youth and women.

On external affairs.

1. Alignment with the *Suiheisha*.
2. Support for the *Sin'ganhoe*.
3. Close relations with the labour movement (ban by police).
4. Opposition to "feudalistic" groups.

YEAR 1929 (provisional) ¹³⁶

On internal affairs.

1. Action against discrimination.
2. Confrontations with people opposed to the movement.
3. Education of members.
4. Assistance to families of members injured in attacks by ordinary people.
5. Formation of trade unions.
6. Support for a journal, *Ch'ongjin*.
7. Launch of regional federations.
8. Sub-groups: youth, women, students.

On external affairs.

1. Fighting of superstition.
2. *Sin'ganhoe*.
3. Social movements: labour, youth, peasant, children, and women.

¹³⁴ Choson Ilbo, 29 April 1927; Tonga Ilbo, 29 April 1927.

¹³⁵ Choson Ilbo, 21 April 1928; Tonga Ilbo, 16 April 1928.

¹³⁶ Choson Ilbo, 14 April 1929; Tonga Ilbo, 17 April 1929. However, the police banned the whole agenda to be discussed.

1. Support for families of members injured in attacks on them.
2. Support for official journal.
3. Economic issues.
 - 3.1 Campaign for the reduction of tax.
 - 3.2 Wages of slaughterers.
 - 3.3 Abolition of restriction on meat prices.
 - 3.4 Formation of trade unions.
4. Education: for the ordinary members, youth, women, students, poor children.
5. General direction.
 - 5.1 Establishment of "*Hyongpyong* day".
 - 5.2 Fighting against discrimination.
 - 5.3 Formation of local federation.
 - 5.4 Restructuring of organisational arrangements.
6. Conflicts with opponents.

The annual conferences were held every April in Seoul without exception, despite the difficulties sometimes created by police pressures. They normally lasted two full days and allowed the delegates ample opportunities to discuss current issues as perceived in local areas.¹³⁸ Although there were slight variations on specific issues from year to year, the general topics remained much the same: social discrimination against the *paekjong* and related confrontations with opponents, ways of improving their common knowledge and living standards, the struggle to retain or regain economic privileges of traditional *paekjong* trade and occupations, the promotion of campaigns to win over public support, and relations with other organisations, particularly those involved in social

¹³⁷ Choson Ilbo, 17 April 1930; Chungwoe Ilbo, 17 April 30. The police banned part of agenda regarding social issues.

¹³⁸ At three conferences some or all motions were banned by the police: the discussion of labour movements in 1928, the whole agenda for discussion in 1929, and of the motions on freedom of the press, the oppression of students, and Japanese police insults to Koreans in 1930.

movements. Such recurring issues can be reduced to three main concerns: (a) fighting prejudice and the recognition of human rights, (b) the enlightenment of members, and (c) their economic interests.

1. PREJUDICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

The primary goal of the *Hyongpyongsa* was from the start to abolish social discrimination and prejudice against its members and thus to assure their human rights. As the *paekjong* had from time immemorial suffered from prejudice and institutionalised subordination, they perceived general emancipation as their most urgent general problem. Despite the progress made, there was in essence little difference between their social situation in the early years of the movement and in the later 1920s. Major progress had been made in raising social consciousness within the *Hyongpyongsa* and the level of resentment by members had increased sharply. But attitudes within the wider society had changed very little. The leadership thus saw it as their salient task to stimulate members to realise the nature of the social situation surrounding them. At the local level, some branches had therefore established rules and regulations for members to report all incidents of discrimination and maltreatment based on their traditional status. In Ipjang, for example, members who did not resist discrimination and humiliation were liable to be punished by their fellow members.¹³⁹ Whenever an incident

¹³⁹ Tonga Ilbo, 22 February 1928.

happened, members from the Seoul headquarters or from other local groups became involved and they sometimes organised collective resistance.

Table 7-10. Incidents of Discrimination against Members of the *Hyongpyongsa*: 1923-1935

1923	17	1930	67
1924	10	1931	52
1925	14	1932	31
1926	14	1933	26
1927	44	1934	27
1928	60	1935	27
1929	68		

source: Chosen Sotokufu Keimu-Kyoku [Police Affairs Bureau, Korean Government-General], *Saikin ni okeru Chosen Chian Jokyo* [The Present Security Situation in Korea], (1933, 1935).

The figures on incidents of discrimination reported to the Japanese police are given in Table 7-10. The rapid increase in the numbers reported between 1926 and 1929/1930 may have been due partly to a rise in the inclusion of personal disputes and partly to pressure from the national headquarters for *Hyongpyongsa* officials to be informed of all cases.¹⁴⁰ There is no way in which we can ascertain the accuracy of the figures or the reasons for the rising trend. However, it would seem that they reflect a tendency towards a lower toleration of humiliating conventions. The *Hyongpyongsa* members appear to have been increasingly resisting treatment as inferiors in language form and personal interactions. Also there is some evidence that personal disputes were quite often escalating into

¹⁴⁰ Chosen Sotokufu Keimu-Kyoku, *Saikin ni okeru Chosen Chian Jokyo*, (1933), pp.137-138.

collective confrontations.¹⁴¹ When one man was called "paekjong" in Sŏnjang in 1929, he killed the person who had insulted him.¹⁴² When a member was prevented from burying one of his parents next to the graves of ordinary people in Kunsan, his fellows protested collectively.¹⁴³ In Yongch'on, a member was killed by rioters in 1928.¹⁴⁴ And there were repeated protests against discriminatory treatment in public situations, especially by government officials. Of all the cases reported to the *Hyongpyongsa* in 1929/30, 13 were caused by officials and 33 by ordinary people.¹⁴⁵

As in earlier years, confrontations sometimes escalated into meat boycotts by the ordinary people and into refusals to slaughter animals by the *paekjong*. Thus, personal disputes appear to have been rapidly increasing at the same time as collective attacks on *Hyongpyongsa* activities were decreasing.¹⁴⁶ In short, the *Hyongpyongsa* members as a whole seem to have increasingly demanded that their human rights be respected and increasingly protested against all conventions which they regarded as unfair.

¹⁴¹ For examples of the numerous cases of collective confrontations, see *Tonga Ilbo*, 24 September 1928; *Choson Ilbo*, 27 September 1928.

¹⁴² *Choson Ilbo*, 5 May and 15 June 1929.

¹⁴³ *Chungwoe Ilbo*, 3 May 1929.

¹⁴⁴ *Tonga Ilbo*, 17 and 18 April 1928; *Maeil Sinbo*, 17 4 1928.

¹⁴⁵ *Chungwoe Ilbo*, 20 April 1930.

¹⁴⁶ Some collective attacks nonetheless continued to take place, as in Yesan in 1928, when a regional *Hyongpyongsa* meeting was attacked on the grounds that the situation of the "despised group" was improving! See *Tonga Ilbo*, 22 and 25 August 1928; *Chungwoe Ilbo*, 22 August 1928.

2. THE ENLIGHTENMENT CAMPAIGN

The enlightenment of their members had been a major concern of the *Hyongpyongsa* from the very beginning of the movement. This was seen as the main way of upgrading their status in society, and was to some extent in keeping with the aims and strategies of the nationalist movements of the period which saw greater social awareness as a prerequisite to developing the capacity of all Koreans to achieve their independence from Japanese colonialism.¹⁴⁷ The fact that the *Hyongpyongsa* leaders embraced this view from the beginning is reflected in the regular appearance of motions on enlightenment and education on the agenda of annual conferences, as shown in Table 7-9. Various concrete programmes were adopted in pursuance of this general goal.

First of all, the education of members and their children was seen as a top priority. The issue was discussed at every annual conference and local branches were continually advised to follow programmes of action in pursuance of this primary aim. This emphasis was again shared by most nationalist activists in the 1920s. (See Chapter 3) In the situation in which formal education was largely unavailable to Koreans, numerous unofficial schools were established throughout the country during this period.¹⁴⁸ The *Hyongpyongsa* was only one of the movements to respond. Soon after its foundation, as we saw in Chapter

¹⁴⁷ cf. Cho Chihun, "Han'guk Minjok Undongsa" [The History of Korean Nationalist Movements], *Han'guk Munhwasa Taegye* [Series on the Cultural History of Korea], Vol.1, (Seoul, Korea University Press, 1960).

¹⁴⁸ cf. No Yongt'aek, *Iljeha Minjung Kyoyuk Undongsa* [The History of Educational Movement of People under Japanese Rule], (Seoul, Tamgudang, 1979), pp.38-44.

4, its leaders advised local branches to launch unofficial schools. And by the 1920s a majority of all local branches were running some type of educational institution as one of their main activities.¹⁴⁹

These institutions were set up mainly for the benefit of those associated with the *Hyongpyongsa* and members and their children under the age of 20 years were routinely advised to enrol. In some areas, attendance was even made compulsory for children. In Sŏch'ŏn, for example, a student who was absent from school without good reason was fined.¹⁵⁰ The teachers were usually unpaid volunteers recruited from among members with some higher education. As a result, they were mostly young and enthusiastic members of the *Hyongpyongsa*. A few branches attempted to maintain a full-time paid teacher, as in Chŏnju.¹⁵¹ The subjects taught were generally of practical value in everyday life, such as Korean (writing and reading), common knowledge and arithmetic.

However, the fate of each school depended largely on the level of activity and enthusiasm in the local branch responsible for it. Where branches were relatively inactive, the educational programmes inevitably waned. In some places, the management of the school was handed over

¹⁴⁹ According to newspaper reports, between 1926 and 1930, at least 20 branches of the *Hyongpyongsa* either set up or planned to establish schools. And over 50 branches discussed ways of improving the common knowledge of members at their meetings.

¹⁵⁰ *Tonga Ilbo*, 17 May 1926.

¹⁵¹ *Tonga Ilbo*, 22 December 1927; *Choson Ilbo*, 23 December 1927.

to the local *Hyongpyong* youth society for which it usually became a central activity.

The launch of unofficial schools was also accompanied by encouragement to members to send their children to public schools wherever possible but, against the background of a long history of educational discrimination against the *paekjong*, this often raised difficulties and brought out open prejudice. The absence of sufficient educational facilities under Japanese rule also aggravated the problem. Nevertheless, *Hyongpyongsa* members generally endeavoured to have their children educated as best they could, and one of main missions of circuit committees was to encourage this. At the 1926 annual conference of the *Hyongpyongsa* it was suggested that funds should be raised to finance the education of children abroad, but there is no clear evidence of any sustained effort on this.

Whatever the difficulties, by 1926 a substantial number of *paekjong* children were receiving formal education, as is shown in Table 7-11.

Table 7-11. The number of *Paekjong* Children at School in 1926.

Province	Primary			Secondary			College			Total
	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	
Kyŏnggi	195	46	50	15	4	2	3			315
Ch'ung-Puk	105	66	32	7		2		1		213
Ch'ung-Nam	152	63	38	16	1	1				271
Chŏn-Puk	125	68	21	1	3	1				219
Chŏn-Nam	149	44	22	1						216
Kyŏng-Puk	299	48	20	1					1	369
Kyŏng-Nam	177	23	32	5	3	2		1	1	244
Kangwŏn	114	14	16	1		2				147
Hwanghae	52	76	3	1						132
P'yŏng-Puk	36	15	17							68
P'yŏng-Nam	38	14	12		2	2				69
Ham-Puk				3	1					4
Ham-Nam	24	16	4						1	45
Total	1466	496	267	47	17	11	3	2	3	2312
		2229			75			8		

(key) A: enrolling, B: dropout, C: graduate

source: Chosen Sotokufu Keimu-Kyoku, [Police Affairs Bureau, Government-General of Korea], *Chosen no Chian Jokyō*, [Public Security in Korea], (1927).

The number receiving higher education was exceedingly small, and a large majority of some 97 per cent were only at primary schools. The number of students out of a total *paekjong* community of some 400,000 was still very low, but this has to be taken in the context of the fact that the education of the entire Korean population was also limited. The national leaders were clearly eager to provide higher formal education for the children of members despite the difficulties which they encountered both from the ordinary population and from the Japanese authorities.¹⁵² They even discussed the possibility of establishing a secondary

¹⁵² The general education policy of the Japanese colonial authorities was to restrict the opportunity for education, so that the attempts to establish a school quite often ended in failure. cf. No Yongt'aek, op.cit.

school, but there is no evidence that they succeeded in doing so.¹⁵³

In addition to education at informal and formal schools, all *Hyongpyongsa* members were encouraged to read newspapers and periodicals as is evident from the frequent discussions about this at the annual conferences. (See Table 7-9.) The concern with enlightenment extended to an interest in publishing a journal for members. This did not stem only from the national headquarters, but also from local branches and sub-groups. However, the attempts to launch the journal were scarcely successful. After an abortive attempt to circulate the first issue of *Segwang* [Light over the World] in 1924,¹⁵⁴ further attempts initiated by the Seoul headquarters were discussed in 1926,¹⁵⁵ 1927 and 1928.¹⁵⁶ Regional federations also discussed the item of publishing journals.¹⁵⁷ However, all these attempts appear to have come to nought and the first successful launch was in 1929 when an issue of *Chongjin* [Right Progress] came out. This was received with great

¹⁵³ Choson Ilbo, 16 May 1926; Tonga Ilbo, 17 May 1926.

¹⁵⁴ All copies of the first issue were confiscated by the police. cf. Chapter 5, footnote 62.

¹⁵⁵ The central committee decided to publish a second issue of the *Segwang*, though there is no evidence that it ever saw the light of day in 1926. Tonga Ilbo, 19 February 1926.

¹⁵⁶ At the annual conferences of 1927 and 1928, the delegates passed resolutions to publish an official journal. See Table 7-9.

¹⁵⁷ At the Kangwon, Ch'ung-Nam and Chon-Puk regional federation meetings, motions were passed to publish their own periodicals. For Kangwon, see Tonga Ilbo, 23 November 1927; Chungwoe Ilbo, 24 November 1927. They even organised a special committee for launching their journal. See Chungwoe Ilbo, 28 November 1927. For Ch'ung-Nam, see Tonga Ilbo, 16 August 1928; Chungwoe Ilbo, 19 August 1928. For Chon-Puk, see Tonga Ilbo, 16 February 1929; Chungwoe Ilbo, 16 February 1929.

enthusiasm and some local groups responded by establishing a supplement of the journal for correspondence.¹⁵⁸ The first issue of *Chŏngjin* was edited under the direction of Chang Chip'il and a few key members of the Seoul headquarters. It was intended to provide common knowledge for members and most of the contributors were well-known *Hyongpyong* activists such as Yi Tonghwan, Pak P'yŏngsan, Kil Handong, Sŏ Kwanghun, Yi Sŏndong, and Yi Chunho. The contents were not confined to *Hyongpyong* affairs, but also included items of more general interest such as the increasing problems of smoking and drinking in the population at large. Contributions from members also included poems, short stories and essays. But the journal, which had been talked about and expected for so long, had one issue only. Around this time, the national leadership was once again entering a period of ideological wrangling and the activities of the movement as a whole appear to have suffered from this. But the successful publication of the long awaited ^{ed.} journal is evidence that the movement nonetheless continued to achieve some of its main goals.

Public lectures intended for ordinary members were another medium used in the enlightenment campaign. These were arranged for local branches on special occasions and usually given by well known *Hyongpyong* movement

¹⁵⁸ Among the local groups involved in this journal were Chech'ŏn (Choson Ilbo, 14 March 1929; Chungwoe Ilbo, 16 March 1929), P'yongt'aek (Choson Ilbo, 6 April 1929), Puyŏ (Chungwoe Ilbo, 25 May 1929), Chonju (Chungwoe Ilbo, 5 June 1929; Chungwoe Ilbo, 10 June 1929), Wŏnju (Chungwoe Ilbo, 18 June 1929), Chungju (Chungwoe Ilbo, 23 June 1929), Yongdam (Choson Ilbo, 27 June 1929), and Chinju (Tonga Ilbo, 3 November 1929).

activists.¹⁵⁹ Their topics tended to be mainly on the historic significance of the *Hyongpyongsa* and the movement towards equality and they were invariably meant to encourage non-members to join.

All the programmes for enlightenment had been initiated in the earliest years, but they were much intensified in the late 1920s. As evidence of the priorities accorded to different *Hyongpyong* activities, we may refer to the budgets of the Seoul headquarters. As shown in Table 7-12, the major part of the 1926 provisional budget was allocated to educational and enlightenment activities. (Over half the total expenditure.) Except for payments to personnel and the emergency fund, little was spent on other items.

¹⁵⁹ For a typical example, see the lecture session reported in *Tonga Ilbo*, 3 August 1928. There were three speakers, Pak P'yǒngsan on "the duty of local branches," Yi Sǒkam on "the historic meaning and development of the *Hyongpyong* movement," and Kim Kiha on "the origins of social discrimination and its abolition."

Table 7-12. The Annual Budget (Provisional) of the Seoul Headquarters in 1926

Revenue : 10,056 won
 (proportionally collected from local groups)
 Expenditure : 10,056 won

items	allocation	
		%
external relation	600	6.0
communication	360	3.6
sundry items	500	5.0
fixtures and equipment	180	1.7
emergency fund	1,300	12.9
personnel (3 executives)	1,500	14.9
(*)publication and circuit	2,500	24.9
(*)grant for students abroad	2,100	20.9
(*)periodicals purchased	166	1.7
(*)subsidy to the student society	300	3.0
relief fund	550	5.5
Total	10,056	100.1%

(*) Educational and enlightenment allocation

source: Hirano Shoken, "Choson Kohei Undo no Kogai," [A General Account of Overall View on Korean Hyongpyong Movement], *Jinruiai*, [Love for Human Race], Vol.2, (May 1927).

3. ECONOMIC INTERESTS

Matters of economic interest to the members were another central concern of the *Hyongpyongsa* activists, particularly after the reformists took over the national leadership. As shown in Table 7-9, these constituted the main items on the agenda at the national conferences in most years. Particular issues in this area may be classified into several categories according to different occupations.¹⁶⁰

¹⁶⁰ For the economic struggle of the *Hyongpyongsa*, see Kim Chongmi, "Chosen no Hisabetsumin 'Paekjong'-Niteika ni okeru Seikatsuto Kaino Undo," [Paekjong: The Discriminated People of Korea; Their Life and Liberation Movement under Japanese Rule], *Kansei* [Great outcry], No.5 (15 August 1983), pp.44-62.

Firstly, there was much concern over slaughterhouses, which were one of the main sources of work for *paekjong* and over which there was a great deal of action and discussion. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the "right" to work in slaughterhouses was a major issue in the 1920s and 1930s. As the Japanese had intensified their investments in the industry, the management and ownership of slaughterhouses had largely been acquired either by the government or by government-subsidised Japanese groups.¹⁶¹ The *Hyongpyongsa* leaders therefore campaigned for control to be brought back to their members.¹⁶² Even though the new owners were seldom dislodged, the *Hyongpyongsa* had some success in making the slaughterers more aware of the situation which threatened their interests. Despite the Japanese inroads into slaughtering, the *paekjong* still had more hold on this occupation than on the butcher and leather trades, and they frequently confronted the non-*paekjong* owners and managers with demands for higher wages and better working conditions, as in Hongwon in 1926.¹⁶³ And in Suwŏn, those who received monthly wages demanded changes in the way in which payments were calculated on the basis of the work actually done.¹⁶⁴ At the 1926 annual *Hyongpyongsa*

¹⁶¹ Kim Chongmi op.cit., p.54.

¹⁶² Interview with Chang Chip'il, in Choson Ilbo, 7 January 1926. At their first anniversary, Taegu branch members decided to submit an application of the management of a slaughterhouse. See Tonga Ilbo, 13 June 1924.

¹⁶³ In Hongwŏn, for instance, they demanded wage increases from their employer, in this case the government. See Choson Ilbo, 10 and 15 December 1926.

¹⁶⁴ Choson Ilbo, 14 April 1924. They had 30 won per month. On the grounds that the real value was only 20 won, they demanded piece rates of 2 won per cow.

conference, delegates staked a concrete claim of 1.5 won per animal to be slaughtered.

Such demands were sometimes backed by industrial action, as in Kaesŏng,¹⁶⁵ and Ch'ŏlwŏn in 1925,¹⁶⁶ where strikes by the slaughterers spread to butchers who were seen as being even worse off than the slaughterers themselves. On occasions when local industrial action led to severe hardship, some help was given to the strikers by *Hyongpyongsa* groups nation-wide. A typical example was the month-long strike of slaughterers in Kaesŏng in 1928,¹⁶⁷ when contributions for the relief of the strikers were made by members throughout the country.¹⁶⁸

Industrial action was, however, often difficult to maintain against the strong hold of the government and its agents. In Kaesŏng in 1928, for example, Sŏ Kwanghun, a Seoul headquarters executive dispatched to the area to encourage the strikers, was arrested by the police and charged with threatening the disturbance of social order.¹⁶⁹ The police then replaced the strikers with workers recruited in Pusan.¹⁷⁰

In some cases, industrial action occurred over related issues of taxation and prejudiced treatment of the slaughterers. For instance, when the *Hyongpyongsa* members in Seoul organised a slaughterers' union under the direction of *Chŏngwidan*, they took action against butchers

¹⁶⁵ Choson Ilbo, 6 May 1925; Tonga Ilbo, 7 May 1925.

¹⁶⁶ Choson Ilbo, 10 June 1925.

¹⁶⁷ Choson Ilbo, 13 December 1928.

¹⁶⁸ Choson Ilbo, 3 January 1929.

¹⁶⁹ Choson Ilbo, 8 March 1929.

¹⁷⁰ Choson Ilbo, 8 March 1929.

who discriminated against them.¹⁷¹ And in Kunsan, demands for tax reductions were backed by a slaughtering strike which caused butcher shops to close; in this case the slaughterers finally achieved their goal.¹⁷² In some cases, as in Hongwŏn, Ham-Nam Province, the slaughterers successfully negotiated wage compromises with the local government officials through collective bargaining.¹⁷³

Despite such efforts, however, wages for slaughtering actually decreased gradually---allowing for some regional variations. For example, Suwon slaughterers had demanded 2 won per cow in 1924,¹⁷⁴ but in 1925 Kaesŏng workers demanded only 1 won per cow and 0.5 won per pig,¹⁷⁵ and by 1928, they were demanding even less---0.5 won per cow and 0.3 won per pig.¹⁷⁶

In butchery, the main concern of *Hyongpyongsa* members was the meat price, then under the control of local police. Repeated demands were made for a system which would allow prices to be decided by local market forces. It is unclear to what extent *Hyongpyongsa* members achieved much in this respect, but there certainly was a great deal of collective action for it. In Yŏngdong, Ch'ung-Puk, for instance, the butchers were ordered to reduce meat prices from 0.45 to 0.40 won per *gŭn* (600 grammes) by the police following on local action. But the owners then shut down their shops in protest and, in turn, demanded an increase to 0.50 won. In

¹⁷¹ See the section on the *Chongwidan* above.

¹⁷² Choson Ilbo, 7 May 1925.

¹⁷³ Choson Ilbo, 10 and 15 December 1926.

¹⁷⁴ Choson Ilbo, 14 April 1924.

¹⁷⁵ Choson Ilbo, 6 May 1925; Tonga Ilbo, 7 and 9 May 1925.

¹⁷⁶ Choson Ilbo, 13 December 1928.

the end, however, the butchers complied with the police orders.¹⁷⁷

For the benefit of members as a whole, a system of collective production-and-sale was introduced in some areas. It was aimed primarily at the problem of non-member butchers undermining the former privileges of members in the industry. There was continual conflict between the two groups. But *Hyongpyongsa* members eventually recognised that the situation had changed and, instead of trying to recreate the past, they launched a butcher's union,¹⁷⁸ to which they even admitted some Korean non-members and some Japanese.¹⁷⁹ The launch of this independent butcher's union reflects the concern of members over the new situation in which they found themselves. The 1929 and 1930 conference agendas showed quite unprecedented interest in trade unions---not only for the butchers but also for other industries. The establishment of the butcher's union in association with some non-members was, however, a reflection of another development, namely the increasing differentiation of the *paekjong* community in regard to wealth. It was the better off *paekjong* butchers who were beginning to co-operate with non-members of the

¹⁷⁷ Choson Ilbo, 18 March 1926.

¹⁷⁸ There were a number of discussions about this at regional meetings in Kangwŏn, Ch'ung-Nam, and Chon-Puk. See Tonga Ilbo, 23 November 1927; Chungwoe Ilbo, 24 November 1927 for Kangwon. See Tonga Ilbo, 16 August 1928; Chungwoe Ilbo, 7 August 1928 for Ch'ung-Nam. And for Chŏn-Puk see Choson Ilbo, 16 February 1929; Chungwoe Ilbo, 16 February 1929 Tonga Ilbo, 16 February 1929.

¹⁷⁹ For Taegu case, Choson Ilbo, 8 February 1925; and for Chonju, Tonga Ilbo, 6 May 1929.

Hyongpyongsa and this was to become a significant factor in ideological tension within the movement.

The transitional situation of the butchers was, to some extent, shared by the leather workers. The leather industry was at this period the most profitable and expanding industry in which *Hyongpyongsa* members were involved. The main aims of the movement in regard to this trade in the early years were to try to regain the ownership of firms for drying hides¹⁸⁰ and to develop collective sales of the products through the *Hyongpyongsa*.¹⁸¹ The possibility of exporting leather products abroad directly was even considered.¹⁸² But this industry called for large investments, and it is unclear (and doubtful) whether the organisation achieved much in this direction. Nonetheless, the evidence is clear that a number of members were trying to intensify the economic activities of the *Hyongpyong* movement. And we know that at least one firm, probably in the leather trade, was launched in Onyang in February 1929 under the chairmanship of Chang Chip'il.¹⁸³ This was an early sign of the division of opinions ~~there~~ ^{which was} to develop on the basis of ideological differences in relation to economic interests.

¹⁸⁰ In Nonsan, for example, the factory which used to belong to members collectively had fallen into individual ownership. Therefore, they demanded its return. *Tonga Ilbo*, 23 November 1925.

¹⁸¹ Interview with Chang Chip'il, reported in *Choson Ilbo*, 7 January 1926. See, also, the conference agenda of 1926 in Table 7-9.

¹⁸² See discussion at Seoul headquarters meeting reported in *Sidae Ilbo*, 25 July 1925.

¹⁸³ *Tonga Ilbo*, 14 February 1929; *Choson Ilbo*, 14 February 1929; *Chungwoe Ilbo*, 15 February 1929.

Another increasing concern with both ideological and pragmatic elements was over the situation of wickerworkers. During the first few years of the movement, their economic circumstances had attracted little attention, but they became the subject of repeated discussions in the late 1920s. At the Kangwŏn and Chŏn-Puk federal meetings in 1927 and 1929 respectively, a wickerwork trade union was suggested,¹⁸⁴ and there were similar discussions in some branches in the context of wider debates on trade unions.¹⁸⁵ Further discussions took place at the annual national conferences of 1929 and 1930. The point of general interest is that, despite their earlier neglect, the wickerworkers began to be regarded as deserving similar attention as members in other industries.

The above discussion of the economic situations and interests of members of the *Hyongpyongsa* serves to indicate the kind of difficulties involved in the movement's attempts to regain earlier privileges. The movement had some success in encouraging its members to realise the need for solidarity among themselves. However, they inevitably faced the strict control of economic activities by the Japanese administration, as well as the intrusion of, and competition by, non-members. Apart from these outside factors, the movement was being increasingly affected by ideological tensions within its own leadership. These

¹⁸⁴ For Kangwŏn, *Tonga Ilbo*, 23 November 1927; *Chungwoe Ilbo*, 24 July 1927; for Chŏn-Puk, *Choson Ilbo*, 16 February 1929; *Chungwoe Ilbo*, 16 February 1929; *Tonga Ilbo*, 16 February 1929.

¹⁸⁵ For Ipjang, *Tonga Ilbo*, 22 February 1928; for Hwach'on, *Tonga Ilbo*, 18 December 1927.

tensions were, as we shall see, to lead up to the final stage of the *Hyongpyongsa's* existence.

V. GROWING CONCERNS OVER SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ISSUES

The movement's substantial achievements in education, enlightenment and economic activities in the late 1920s took place side by side with the emergence of diverse concerns over social issues. The leaders no longer confined themselves narrowly to matters affecting their members directly and specifically, but increasingly extended their attention to broader social problems such as the positions of women and children and to the nationalist and socialist issues.

We have already referred to the positions of women and children in Korean society which were marked by severe oppression for both. Concern and action over women and children were not originally matters of central concern to the *Hyongpyongsa*, but the movement was soon affected by the stand of other social activists. By 1929 the social problems surrounding women and children were discussed at the annual conference and had begun to attract attention in some local branches.¹⁸⁸ The *Hyongpyongsa* readily perceived these matters as associated with their "feudal" past and soon adopted an emancipating stance to all their members of

¹⁸⁸ cf. the 1929 conference agenda in Table 7-9. And for Kangwŏn regional meeting, *Tonga Ilbo*, 23 November 1927; *Chungwoe Ilbo*, 24 and 25 November 1927.

whatever age and sex.¹⁸⁷ Their help to flood and famine victims and to Koreans in distress in Manchuria was equally associated with their general humanitarian stance. Whenever there were natural disasters, the *Hyongpyongsa* joined nationwide relief actions.¹⁸⁸ At the time of the flood disaster in July 1925, for example, the *Hyongpyongsa* headquarters supplied meals for 1,200 victims,¹⁸⁹ and the lead of the headquarters was followed by many local branches. Their general social concern also extended to campaigns against superstition, drunkenness and even smoking.¹⁹⁰

In addition to such concerns, there was an increasing tendency for the *Hyongpyong* movement to associate itself with other social movements, and especially with those expressing political views on human problems. This was a new development which contrasted with the early situation when the founders did not adopt any clear or overt political leaning. But there had been a significant turning point when some of the movement's prominent leaders became involved in the Koryo Revolutionary Party in 1926. The aim of the Party was to intensify the independence movement. At about the same time, there were contacts between the

¹⁸⁷ Antagonism towards so-called feudalistic groups were constantly rowed at many meetings.

¹⁸⁸ The scattered articles can be useful as evidences. Choson Ilbo, 14 and 20 July, 27 August 1925; 19 December 1927; 4 October 1928; 27 June 1929; Tonga Ilbo, 16 July 1925; 4 August 1925; 12 September 1925; Chungwoe Ilbo, 18 June 1929.

¹⁸⁹ Choson Ilbo, 20 July 1925.

¹⁹⁰ See, for example, reports of discussion and action in Kaesong branch, Chungwoe Ilbo, 6 March 1928; for Yesan, Tonga Ilbo, 15 March 1929; and from the Wonju branch, see Choson Ilbo, 14 April 1929; Tonga Ilbo, 16 April 1929.

Hyongpyongsa and other social movement groups, including the *Sin'ganhoe* which stood for the development and independence of Korea.

1. THE KORYO REVOLUTIONARY PARTY AFFAIR

Before discussing "the affair", it is necessary to review the preceding history of the Koryo [Korea] Revolutionary Party which arose out of the experience of poorly organised nationalist leadership in the independence movement in Manchuria. In particular, the lesson learnt in Manchuria was that nationalist movement activities need to be unified and closely co-ordinated.¹⁸¹ During the Japanese occupation of Korea, Manchuria had provided a shelter for independence activists. (See Chapter 3) Even though the groups making up the independence movement had some military successes, they were always at risk from Japanese military attacks and numerous nationalist groups rose and fell in the late 1910s and early 1920s. In the course of the independence movement, *Ch'ongŭibu* [Righteous Government] was founded in 1923, unifying several nationalist groups.¹⁸² To establish Korean control over their residents in the region, the military activities of the group needed to be complemented by a socialist political campaign.¹⁸³ In

¹⁸¹ cf. Kim Chunyop and Kim Ch'angsun, op. cit., Vol.4, pp.113-123.

¹⁸² Yun Pyŏngsok, "Ch'amŭi, Ch'ongŭi, Sinminbu-ŭi Sŏngnip Kwajŏng" [The Formations of Ch'amui, Chongui, Sinminbu], *Paeksan Hakbo*, No.7 (1969), reprinted in Yun Pyŏngsok and An Pyŏngjik (eds.), *Han'guk Kŭndaesaron*, [Collected Papers on Korean History], Vol.2, (Seoul, Chisik Sanopsa, 1977).

¹⁸³ Kim Chunyŏp and Kim Ch'angsun, op. cit., Vol.4, pp.113-114.

this endeavour, the leaders sought to co-operate with nationalists both inside Korea and abroad, and the Koryo Revolutionary Party was launched in April 1926.

The new Party's executive committee consisted of a chairman, a general secretary and other regular members. Yang Kit'ak, a well-known nationalist, was elected as chairman, and Yi Tonggu (alias Yi So), a member of the *Hyongpyongsa* executive committee, was elected general secretary. Several famous "independence fighters," including O Tongjin, Yi Ch'ŏngch'ŏn and Kim Chwajin, joined the executive committee.¹⁹⁴ Despite the communist-inspired title of the Party, its members were primarily nationalists.¹⁹⁵

Several months after the launch, Yi Tongnak, one of its executive members, was arrested by the Japanese in Manchuria on 28 December 1926, with various confidential documents, including a list of members in his possession.¹⁹⁶ As a result, all members except some in Manchuria, were arrested by the police in January 1927.¹⁹⁷

According to Japanese allegations, the party consisted of three major groups: the *Hyongpyongsa*, the *Chonguibu*, and the nationalist religious *Ch'ondogyo* [Heaven Way

¹⁹⁴ *ibid.* pp.115-116.

¹⁹⁵ Kim Chunyŏp and Kim Ch'angsun have argued that the party was essentially nationalist, even though the Japanese police classified it as socialist. *ibid.* p.122.

¹⁹⁶ *Tonga Ilbo*, 5 and 14 January 1927.

¹⁹⁷ *Choson Ilbo*, 22 January 1927; *Tonga Ilbo*, 22 January 1927.

Religion].¹⁹⁸ Those arrested and later trial^c included the six key leaders of the *Hyongpyongsa* listed in Table 7-13. x

Table 7-13. The Defendants in the Koryo Revolutionary Party Trial

Group	Name	Primary trial ¹⁹⁸	Secondary trial ²⁰⁰
HPS	Yi Tonggu	7 yr (7)	5 yr (7)
	O Sŏnghwan	4 yr (5)	3 yr (4)
	Sŏ Kwanghun	3 yr (5)	not guilty
	Yu Kongsam	2 yr (5)	accepted the verdict
	Cho Kwiyong	not guilty (5)	
	Chang Chip'il	not guilty (5)	
CED	Chŏng Wŏnhŭm	unlimited(death)	accepted the verdict
	Yi Wŏnju	8 yr (10)	accepted the verdict
	Pang Ch'anmin	8 yr (10)	accepted the verdict
CDG	Kim Pongguk	6 yr (7)	4 yr (6)
	Yi Tongnak	6 yr (7)	accepted the verdict
	Song Hŏn	5 yr (5)	3 yr (5)
	Yi Tonguk	4 yr (7)	3 yr (5)
	Hong Pyŏnggi	4 yr (5)	2 yr (4)
	Pak Kidon	2 yr (5)	not guilty

(1) The initials of groups are HPS: the *Hyongpyongsa*,
CDG: *Ch'ondogyo*, and CED: *Chonguidan*

(2) The figures in brackets indicate the sentences demanded by of the attorney.

We know that the six *Hyongpyongsa* members were key leaders of the movement. Yi Tonggu, the general secretary of the Party, had been a national executive member of the *Hyongpyongsa* in 1924 and 1925, and had before that been actively involved in the March 1 Movement of 1919 as a

¹⁹⁸ Tonga Ilbo, 3 and 4 November 1927; Chungwoe Ilbo, 4 November 1927.

¹⁹⁹ Choson Ilbo, 22 April 1928; Tonga Ilbo, 22 April 1928; Chungwoe Ilbo, 22 April 1928; Maeil Sinbo, 22 April 1928.

²⁰⁰ Choson Ilbo, 20 October 1928; Tonga Ilbo, 20 October 1928; Chungwoe Ilbo, 20 October 1928; Maeil Sinbo, 20 October 1928.

Ch'ondogyo believer.²⁰¹ In the Yech'ŏn incident of 1925, he had, like Chang Chip'il, been severely assaulted and seriously wounded by the rioters. Yu Kongsam had been an executive committee member of *Hyongpyongsa* and a member of its standing committee in 1926. The rest were also prominent and well-known activists. As previously explained, the national leadership of the *Hyongpyongsa* received a major setback through the arrest of these leaders. Four out of nine members of the standing committee in 1926 were involved and thus prevented from continuing their *Hyongpyongsa* activities. Even O Sŏnghwan, then a non-executive member, was undoubtedly a key leader of the movement and had been so from the outset.

After the opening of the primary trial in Sinuiju on 27 January 1927, the legal process was repeatedly interrupted and delayed until the sentence was finally pronounced on 20 April 1928. In the course of the trial, Yi Tonggu openly admitted his involvement and explained why he had organised the Party as a member of the *Hyongpyongsa* and how he had introduced O Sŏnghwan to it. However, he denied any contact or collaboration with the remainder of the *Hyongpyongsa* leaders concerned.²⁰² O Sŏnghwan also admitted that he was involved in Yi's planning from the *Hyongpyongsa* headquarters to extend the activities of the movement in Manchuria.²⁰³

²⁰¹ For Yi's personal history, see Chapter 5, footnote 86, and Choson Chungang Ilbo, 11 October 1933.

²⁰² Choson Ilbo, 11 March 1928; Tong Ilbo, 11 March 1928.

²⁰³ Choson Ilbo, 12 March 1928.

The remainder of the accused denied any commitment to or involvement in the Party,²⁰⁴ and complained bitterly over the unbearable cruelty and torture to which they had been subjected by the police to force them to make false statements.²⁰⁵ At the primary trial which ended on 20 April 1928, Chang and Cho were found not guilty and were finally released on 25 April, sixteen months after their arrest.²⁰⁶ At the secondary trial, which began in a P'yongyang court on 18 October 1928,²⁰⁷ Sŏ Kwanghun was eventually also found not guilty, and was freed on 22 October.²⁰⁸ All three who were found not guilty returned to the *Hyongpyong* movement and were re-elected to the central committee in 1929 (See Table 7-3). The others were convicted and served the sentences shown in Table 7-13.

Yu Kongsam accepted the verdict of the primary trial and there were therefore no further proceedings against him, and he served two years in prison. O Songhwan was released on April 1930 after 3 years in prison.²⁰⁹ Yi Tonggu who was transferred to a hospital prison during the course of his sentence and was finally freed on 7 October 1931.²¹⁰ But he was ill in prison and the experience

²⁰⁴ Choson Ilbo, 23 December 1927 and 11 March 1928; Tonga Ilbo, 9 and 10 February 1927 and 11 March 1928; Chungwoe Ilbo, 9 February 1927.

²⁰⁵ Choson Ilbo, 12 March 1928.

²⁰⁶ Choson Ilbo, 28 April 1928. They received warm welcome from the members of the *Hyongpyongsa*. Chungwoe Ilbo, 29 April 1928.

²⁰⁷ Choson Ilbo, 8 October 1928; Tonga Ilbo, 8 October 1928; Chungwoe Ilbo, 8 October 1928; Maeil Sinbo, 9 October 1928.

²⁰⁸ Tonga Ilbo, 20 and 24 October 1928; Chungwoe Ilbo, 20 and 25 October 1928.

²⁰⁹ Chungwoe Ilbo, 8 April 1930; Tonga Ilbo, 8 April 1930.

²¹⁰ Tonga Ilbo, 12 October 1931.

eventually led to his death two years later.²¹¹ O was re-elected to the central committee in 1930, and Yu was active in the mid 1930s as an executive member of the *Taedongsa* (the new name of the *Hyongpyongsa* from 1935).²¹²

The Koryo Revolutionary Party affair has given rise to several different speculations. Firstly, the well-organised *Hyongpyongsa* was held in high esteem by many social movement activists and some people thought that there were attempts from outside the *Hyongpyongsa* to involve it in the nationalist cause on account of its wide following.

Secondly, despite the fact that some of the accused were not convicted owing to insufficient evidence against them, it was generally thought that they---and especially the reformist leaders among them---were sympathetic to the nationalist movement. Even though some of the accused were found not guilty, it was thought that key leaders of the *Hyongpyongsa* were beginning to recognise the need for direct action against the Japanese while the more moderate leaders continued with the ordinary activities of the *Hyongpyongsa*.²¹³

The third speculation stemmed from the belief that the accused who were not convicted may, indeed, have been completely innocent of any involvement, and that the Japanese police may simply ^{have} used the opportunity presented to them by the event to destroy the reformist group within the *Hyongpyongsa*. There certainly is evidence that the Japanese

²¹¹ Choson Chungang Ilbo, 11 October 1933.

²¹² Choson Chungang Ilbo, 17 January and 8 February 1936.

²¹³ For Kang Sangho's comments on the Koryo Revolutionary Party affair, see Choson Ilbo, 26 January 1927.

authorities were alarmed about the possibility that the *Hyongpyong* movement was becoming sympathetic to socialism.²¹⁴ So they may well have seen current changes in leadership as constituting a dangerous challenge to their own authority. For these reasons, they may well have deliberately set about trying to neutralise the leadership. If so, they clearly failed; the net result was quite the opposite with a more radical group of *Hyongpyongsa* leaders emerging from the affair. Whatever the validity of these speculations, the Koryo Revolutionary Party affair brought about significant fluctuations in the *Hyongpyongsa* leadership.

2. CLOSE CONTACTS WITH OTHER SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

We have seen that from its earliest days the *Hyongpyongsa* had close contacts with other social movements. In particular, a number of "professional social movement activists" had been directly involved in its foundation and development. The importance of these contacts is well illustrated by the Yech'on incident when, as we saw in Chapter 6, numerous groups across the country gave material and moral support to the *Hyongpyongsa*. Such support from the outside could well have been anticipated by preceding events. In 1924, two rival groups within the social movement sector, *Choson Ch'ongnyon Ch'ong Tongmaeng* [General Federation of Korean Youth Societies] and *Choson*

²¹⁴ Chosen Sotokufu Keimu-Kyoku [Police Affairs Bureau, Korean Government-General], *Saikin ni okeru Chosen Chian Jokyo* [The Present Security Situation In Korea], (1933). p.90.

Nonong Ch'ong Tongmaeng [General Federation of Korean Peasant and Labourer Societies], had both pledged their support for the *Hyongpyong* movement, (See Chapter 5). ^{Also} ~~And~~ the factional rivalry between the two federations seems to have driven their members to greater involvement in matters related to the *Hyongpyong* movement. And the *Hyongpyongsa* in turn increasingly involved itself in outside activities.²¹⁵ In July and August 1925, for example, it participated in flood relief in cooperation with the Choson Famine Relief Society, controlled by left wing activists.²¹⁶ Even though most of the flood relief actions were banned by the police, probably in an attempt to prevent social activists from establishing working relations with members of the population,²¹⁷ there was close cooperation which led to good relations developing between the *Hyongpyongsa* and other organisations long before the time of the Yech'on incident. Moreover, during the period of the remarkable proliferation of social movement groups with diverse aims and activities (as shown in Table 7-14), the *Hyongpyongsa* had quite naturally associated over diverse matters with numerous groups at both national and local levels.

²¹⁵ According to official government records, the Japanese saw this as the beginning of the *Hyongpyongsa's* rapprochement with ideological movements. Chosen Sotokufu Keimu-Kyoku, *Saikin ni okeru Chosen Chian Jokyō*, (1933, 1935, 1938).

²¹⁶ Choson Ilbo, 20 July 1925. For the stance of the societies associated with the famine relief action in 1924, see Kim Chunyop and Kim Ch'angsun, op. cit., Vol.2, p.232.

²¹⁷ Choson Ilbo, 14 and 20 July and 27 August 1925; Tonga Ilbo, 16 July and 4 August 1925.

Table 7-14. The Number of Social Movement Organisations in Korea: 1920-1933

YEAR	A	B	C	D	E	F	TOTAL
1920		11	33		251	1	296
1921		18	90	3	446	14	571
1922		19	81	23	488	25	596
1923		55	111	107	584	43	900
1924	1	86	91	112	742	81	1113
1925	1	83	128	126	847	127	1312
1926	2	38	182	119	1092	203	1636
1927	104	85	352	160	1127	247	2075
1928	182	75	432	307	1320	293	2609
1929	214	56	465	564	1433	366	3098
1930	246	56	561	943	1509	461	3776
1931	175	35	511	1759	1482	473	4435
1932	159	31	404	1380	863	285	3122
1933	108	42	374	1301	1004	257	3086

(key) A: nationalist, B: socialist, C: labour
D: peasant, E: youth, F: children

source: Chosen Sotokufu Keimu-Kyoku, *Saikin ni okeru Chosen Chian Jokyo*, pp.168-169.

The rapid increase of labour and peasants groups was of particular significance in relation to the *Hyongpyong* movement. And we have already seen how in the late 1920s and the early 1930s, local youth groups played an important role in the proliferation of social groups.²¹⁸ Both these developments were in turn associated with numerous collective actions by peasants and labourers. The multiplication of such activities is shown in Table 7-15.

²¹⁸ Cho Ch'ansok, "1920 nyondae Han'guk-ui Ch'ongnyon Undong" [The Youth Movement in Korea in the 1920s], *Nonmunjip* [Collected Papers by Inch'on Teacher's College], No.18 (1984), pp.233-258.

Table 7-15. Collective Actions of Peasants and Labourers:
1920-1933

Year	Labourers	Peasants	Total
1920	81	15	96
1921	36	27	63
1922	46	24	70
1923	73	176	249
1924	45	164	209
1925	35	11	46
1926	81	17	98
1927	94	22	116
1928	119	30	149
1929	102	36	138
1930	160	93	253
1931	205	57	262
1932	152	51	203
1933	176	66	242

source: Chosen Sotokufu Keimu-Kyoku, *Saikin ni okeru Chosen Chian Jokyo*, pp.143-144, 157-158.

Peasants suffering from economic exploitation by landowners demanded reductions in land rents,²¹⁹ while labourers who had lost their land became low wage workers in urban areas and began to demand improvements in their working conditions, including higher wages.²²⁰ The social dynamics of these developments were commonly related to the nationwide growth of radical ideas which were expressed and articulated within the social movement sector. In the mid 1920s, socialist ideas gradually took root in Korean society where they were deliberately advocated by many social activists despite firm opposition by the Japanese authorities and their police.

²¹⁹ Cho Tonggŏl, *Iljeha Han'guk Nongmin Undongsa* [The History of Korea Peasant Movements under Japanese Rule], (Seoul, Han'gilsa, 1979).

²²⁰ Kim Yunhwan, *Han'guk Nodong Undongsa: Iljeha* [The History of Korean Labour Movements: the Period of Japanese Rule], (Seoul, Ch'ŏngsa, 1982).

Most activists in youth, peasant and labour movements eventually adopted varying degrees of socialist thought and most groups were under some degree of socialist leadership.²²¹ After the initial clandestine launching of the Choson Communist Party in Seoul in April 1925, repeated attempts to keep the Party going met with firm repression by the Japanese police, but this did not prevent the spread of a general socialist outlook. The main core of social movement groups adopted a socialist stance and this was to have far-reaching effects on the process of social movements in the country as a whole.

The *Hyongpyongsa* was no exception to the general trend. Most supporters of the movement during the Yech'on incident came from socialist groups, and this affected thinking in the *Hyongpyongsa* youth movement in particular. At the same time, *Hyongpyongsa* members were being increasingly involved in social activities outside their own organisation. In some areas, local *Hyongpyong* activists joined in launching regional youth federations at provincial and county levels. For instance, the Kyong-Puk youth federation was launched with the sponsorship of 20 groups, including seven from the *Hyongpyongsa*, and two of its 25 committee members came from the *Hyongpyongsa*.²²²

In the meantime, as the Japanese police pointed out, the members of two rival factions---represented by the *Pukp'ung* [North Wind] and the *Seoul*---were both trying to

²²¹ Kim Chunyop and Kim Ch'angsun, op. cit., Vol.2.

²²² Choson Ilbo, 27 October 1925.

attract *Hyongpyong* members to join them.²²³ Thus the *Hyongpyongsa* was increasingly involved in factional struggles being pursued between and within outside groups. This inevitably gave rise to difficulties and tensions within the *Hyongpyongsa* itself, as its leaders were divided between those who advocated the retention of close contacts with outside groups and those who wished to press for their own development independently and without any outside support. At the national conference and at headquarters committee meetings in 1926, the independent or exclusive view gained favour and it was repeatedly affirmed that the *Hyongpyongsa* would carry out its own activities without any intervention from outside.²²⁴ But the *Hyongpyongsa* nonetheless remained, quite inevitably, at the heart of the social movement sector. It was an attractive resource to other social movements, whether socialist or nationalist,²²⁵ and it was itself in need of support from all outside groups if it was to consolidate its achievements and to pursue its programme of activities.²²⁶ As a result, despite its policy of independence, its involvement in outside affairs was intensified rather than diminished. As we have seen, some of its key leaders had

223 Yi Pansong (real name Tsuboe Senji), *Chosen Shakai Shiso Undo Enkaku Ryakushi* [A Brief History of Social and Ideological Movements in Korea], (1934), pp.84-93.

224 Chosen Sotokufu Keimu-Kyoku, *Saikin ni okeru Chosen Chian Jokyo*. And Choson Ilbo, 2 December 1926; Tonga Ilbo, 2 December 1926; Chungwoe Ilbo, 2 December 1926.

225 Chin Tokgyu, "Hyongpyong Undong-ŭi Chayujuŭi-jŏk Kaehyok Sasang-e tahan Insik" [Research on the Liberalist Reformation of the Hyongpyong Movement], *Han'guk Chongch'i Hakhoebo*, [Journal of Korean Political Science], Vol.10 (December 1976), pp.177-178.

226 Interview with Chang Chip'il, in Choson Ilbo, 1 January 1927.

joined the Koryo Revolutionary Party, and in 1927, the *Hyongpyongsa* affiliated to the *Choson Sahoe Tanch'e Chungang Hyopuihoe* [The Central Council of Korean Social Organisations], which had been launched and was largely sustained by socialist groups.²²⁷

Such connections between the *Hyongpyongsa* and the wider social movement sector culminated in the 1928 and 1929 annual national conferences passing resolutions to support the *Sin'ganhoe* [New Stem Society] which had been established in February 1927 to try to bring together all nationalist and socialist groups.²²⁸ In turn, the *Sin'ganhoe* responded with warm support for the *Hyongpyongsa*. For example, the central committee of the *Sin'ganhoe* expressed support for the *Hyongpyong* movement in one of its major motions.²²⁹ And numerous local branches of the *Sin'ganhoe* repeatedly confirmed their support^{for} the *Hyongpyong* movement.

Such contacts with other social movement groups, especially socialist ones, were certainly an important factor in the emergence of radicalism in the *Hyongpyongsa*. Members who supported or were sympathetic to socialist ideas began referring to the different positions in the movement of the "haves" and "have-nots". It was in this context that the situations of the slaughterers and wickerworkers began to attract attention and that attempts

²²⁷ Choson Ilbo, 25 April 1926. Kim Chunyop and Kim Ch'angsun, op. cit., Vol.3, pp.16-21.

²²⁸ cf. Cho Chihun et al., *Sin'ganhoe Yon'gu*, [Studies on *Sin'ganhoe*], (Seoul, Tongnyok, 1983).

²²⁹ Choson Ilbo, 23 November 1929; Tonga Ilbo, 23 and 26 November 1929; Chungwoe Ilbo, 23 November 1929.

to organise trade unions developed at both national and local levels. The radical members who were influenced by outside tendencies wanted to dissolve the *Hyongpyongsa* youth groups in favour of young people joining an "open" youth federation. Criticisms of some of the leaders then followed for alleged improper and inefficient leadership, and these attacks resulted in the *Hyongpyong* movement once again having serious internal divisions in regard to the direction of the movement.²³⁰ In the next chapter we shall see how these developments affected the dissolution controversy of the early 1930s.

CONCLUSION

After the leadership's factional disarray in 1924/1925 and the Yech'on incident in 1925, the *Hyongpyong* movement entered a new phase in which its organisation grew rapidly and developed close links with other social movement groups. During this period, the movement's organisational arrangements were restructured and many of the general aims of the early years were translated into practical programmes of action. There were rapid increases in the number of local groups and in the total membership, and there was considerable diversification of sub-groups such as the *Chongwidan*, the Youth Societies, the Student League and Women's Societies. In addition, changes in the

²³⁰ Chosen Sotokufu Keimu-Kyoku, *Saikin ni okeru Chosen Chian Jokyo* (1933).

composition of the leadership emerged due in part to the arrest of some of the established key members when they were charged with ~~the~~ involvement in the Koryo Revolutionary Party affair. Younger members with different ideas were then drawn into leadership positions and this affected the internal dynamics of the leadership.

There were during this period substantial achievements, far beyond those of the founding years, in regard to the enlightenment of the members and the education of their children, as well as in the struggle to regain the economic privileges over their traditional industries. The educational achievements were mainly in the opening of unofficial schools, the provision of frequent public lectures and campaigns to encourage members to read journals and newspapers. In regard to economic matters, there was a determined drive to protect the interests of members in slaughtering and in the meat and leather trades. Furthermore, trade union ideas were introduced to the movement by the more socialist-inclined members with the aim of restricting economic intrusions by non-members in the main trades followed by members. In addition to the practical interests of members, the movement became increasingly concerned with social issues. Some members, and certain key leaders in particular, were increasingly associated with other social movements, whether nationalist or socialist. The main manifestations of these tendencies were the involvement of a few leaders in the Koryo Revolutionary Party and the emergence and growth of radicalism within the movement. The diverse developments of

the period allow us to characterise it as an "expanding stage," even though new ideological tensions were emerging in the later part of the period. The new tensions are of particular significance in relation to the dissolution controversy to be discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER EIGHT

IDEOLOGICAL TENSIONS AND THE DECLINE OF THE MOVEMENT: 1930-1940

We have seen that the history of the *Hyongpyong* movement up to the end of the 1920s was one of varied and fluctuating experiences in leadership and strategies, as well as in organisational development. We have noted, too, how the internal dynamics of the movement were affected and influenced by its external environment, and especially by its relations with other social movements. In the closing years of the 1920s, fluctuations within the movement were closely related to ideological tensions which were prevalent in the wider circles of social activists in the country as a whole. At the beginning of the 1930s, the movement was approaching a critical juncture in its history.

The final stages in the overall process of a social movement generally tend to occur in one or more of three inter-related ways.¹ Firstly, the successful routinisation of its activities may lead to a high measure of institutionalisation and a virtual cessation of the developmental process even though the organisation

¹ For criteria of a movement's success, see W.A. Gamson, *The Strategy of Protest* (Homewood, Ill., Dorsey Press, 1975), pp.28-29, and for further discussion about the last stage of social movements, see, J. Craig Jenkins, "Sociopolitical Movements," in S. L. Long (ed.), *Handbook of Political Behavior*, Vol. 4 (N.Y. and London, Plenum Press, 1981), pp.141-144.

continues to exist. To this extent, the social movement may in effect no longer be an "active movement". Secondly, the movement may well cease to be active through apathy, even if the primary purpose of the movement has only been partially achieved. While some members may be eager to continue their activities, insufficient support and external circumstances may well prevent them from continuing with the same momentum as before. Thirdly, the movement's organisation may change its nature through the transformation of its original goal or goals.

The first of these three possible lines of change may well be evaluated as "successful", and the second as "unsuccessful". The third can be considered as "successful" or "unsuccessful", depending on the ultimate outcome of the transition experienced. However, such evaluation of the outcomes of a social movement is not always as simple as this schema may imply. The process of termination is generally dependent on both internal and external factors such as the extent and degree of suppression to which the movement may be subjected, its degree of success or failure in mobilising resources, and on its changing goals. The notion of evaluation in terms of "success" and "failure" depends, in any case, on the way in which the movement's goals were first conceived, either by its own members or by outsiders.

In this chapter, we examine and discuss the processes which culminated in the termination of the *Hyongpyongsa* in the 1930s. In the early years of the 1930s, newly emerging radical groups began to argue for the dissolution of the

movement. At the same time, however, the rise of radicalism in the society resulted in much closer supervision than before of the movement's activities by the Japanese authorities and their police. Some members were inclined to collaborate with the authorities who in their turn needed the support of the leather industry workers for the wars in which Japan was engaged. In the end, the radical group was ruthlessly suppressed by the police, and the leadership of the *Hyongpyong* movement fell into the hands of a group of collaborators. In 1935 the very name of the organisation was changed from *Hyongpyongsa* to *Taedongsa*. The sections which follow deal with the termination of the *Hyongpyong* movement through its own internal strains, as well as under external pressures, particularly by Japanese intervention.

I. THE DISSOLUTION CONTROVERSY.

As a result of its close connection with other social movements, and especially with those that were socialist-inclined, the *Hyongpyong* movement had in the late 1920s become increasingly radical. Many of its new and younger leaders were people with nation-wide interests and aspirations bearing not so much on the emancipation of the members of the *Hyongpyongsa* as on the reconstitution of Korean society as a whole. The rising influence of this new element in the *Hyongpyongsa* was closely related to the dissolution controversy which became a major issue within the entire social movement sector of the times. The

Hyongpyongsa had already experienced the force of dissolution arguments in its youth groups which, as we saw in the previous chapter, were in the late 1920s disbanded and largely absorbed into regional youth federations under the influence and control of socialist leaders. Although the situation of the *Hyongpyongsa* as a whole was very different to that of its youth groups, the logic of the dissolution arguments which were now developed in relation to the parent body was similar.

1. THE BACKGROUND.

The strongly argued debate over dissolution was initiated by a number of socialist members of the *Hyongpyongsa* in the early 1930s. To appreciate the origins and course of this debate we need to place it in the context of the establishment of the *Sin'ganhoe* association in 1927.² As both right and left wing activists recognised the compelling need for them to co-operate, they had agreed to launch an inclusive association. With the enthusiastic support of all activists, excepting the leaders of overtly pro-Japanese groups, the *Sin'ganhoe* had rapidly assumed a central position in the social movement sector in the late 1920s. Most Koreans saw the *Sin'ganhoe* as an expression of their legitimate and authentic aspiration for full

² Further details of the *Sin'ganhoe* may be found in Kim Chunyŏp and Kim Ch'angsun, *Han'guk Kongsan Chuŏi Undongsa* [The History of the Korean Communist Movement], Vol.3 (Seoul, Korea University Press, 1973), pp.34-72, and in Cho Chihun et al, *Sin'ganhoe Yŏn'gu* [Studies on Sin'ganhoe], (Seoul, Tongnyok, 1983).

independence from Japan. But the *Sin'ganhoe* was inevitably, by its very constitution, an alliance between groups of widely differing political stances and there were deep tensions within it, mainly between groups that were primarily nationalist and those that were essentially socialist. Furthermore, the Japanese, who were naturally apprehensive of a unified opposition to their colonial authority, placed severe restraints on the activities of the *Sin'ganhoe*. Its actions were closely watched by the police who banned all its proposed national gatherings except the last one in 1931.

It was under these general circumstances that a dissolution proposal was submitted by left-wing members to the annual national conference of the *Sin'ganhoe* held in Seoul in May 1931. Despite strong objection by the more right-wing nationalists, the proposal was accepted. There were various inter-related reasons why the socialist members of the *Sin'ganhoe* sought the dissolution of what had been a well-organised national association. Briefly, however, the central argument was that the association was not fulfilling its original aims, largely because in their view it was primarily under the control of intellectual bourgeois leaders. However, the proposal and its acceptance are generally believed to have been affected by external pressures from the Comintern who certainly saw it as a "bourgeois group".³ The aims and intentions of those

³ Kim Myŏnggu, "K'omint'ern-ŭi Taehan Chongch'aek-gwa Sin'ganhoe: 1927-1931" [The Policy of the Comintern on Korea and the *Sin'ganhoe*: 1927-1931], *Sin'ganhoe Yŏn'gu* [Studies on the *Sin'ganhoe*], (Seoul, Tongnyok, 1983), pp.242-286.

initiating the proposal were that, after the dissolution of the "innovative bourgeois" *Sin'ganhoe*, a truly revolutionary organisation could be established to wage the essential class struggle.⁴

While the *Sin'ganhoe* was in the throes of this debate and of the dissolution which followed, similar arguments were being waged in most social movement groups. It is thus not surprising that the *Hyongpyongsa* was immediately affected. Members who were affiliated to socialist groups naturally supported the idea, arguing that the *Hyongpyong* movement should be aware of, and should respond to, the class situation of its members. In particular, they argued that, far from contributing to the development of the class consciousness of the *paekjong*, the *Hyongpyongsa* actually had the effect of preventing them from joining the class struggle.⁵ In addition, it was argued that the *Hyongpyongsa* membership had become differentiated into "haves" and the "have-nots", and that in consequence the bourgeois members were in fact exploiting their proletarian fellows. Banners with slogans such as "Let's oppose the exploitation of members by members" were often seen at *Hyongpyongsa* meetings led by the more radical members.⁶ There were certainly increasing tensions and conflicts internally

⁴ Scalapino, R.A. and Chong-sik Lee, *Communism in Korea* (Los Angeles and London, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1972); Kim Chunyop and Kim Ch'angsun, op. cit.

⁵ Pak P'yongsan, "Hyongpyong Undong-ŭi Kŭmhu" [The Hyongpyong Movement: Present and Future], *Pip'an*, [Critic], Vol.1 No.2 (June 1931), p.54.

⁶ Yi Yangk'o (real name Tonghwan), "Hyongpyong Kyong-Nam Tojibu Yonhaphoe-rŭl Pogo" [Observation on the Federal Meeting of Kyong-Nam Province of the Hyongpyongsa], *Pip'an*, Vol.1 Nos.3-4 (July and August 1931), p.73.

between members, and especially so over competition for control over the meat trade.⁷ Such conflicts of interest were used by the radical activists as clear evidence of what they saw as the loss of the *Hyongpyong* spirit.⁸ They claimed that the *Hyongpyongsa* had lost sight of its original purpose to fight against injustice and class interests. This was their central argument in proposing that the *Hyongpyongsa* should be dissolved.

The origins of the group of young radical members who led the dissolution argument can be traced back to the mid 1920s. As we saw in Chapter 7, some leaders of sub-groups such as the *Chongwidan*, the Youth Societies and the Student League had made their way into positions at the national headquarters, since when there had in fact been two fairly distinct leadership groups, each ready to advocate rather different directions and actions. As the movement also had increasingly complex relations with other social movements, the division of opinions over relations with outside groups inevitably deepened. One group embraced every opportunity to intensify cooperation with outside movements, while the other struggled to retain what they saw as the proper boundaries of the *Hyongpyongsa*. The former group consisted of young activists such as Pak P'yongsan, Sim Sanguk and Yi Chongyul, and the latter of established leaders like Chang Chip'il, Kim Chongt'aek and Kil Suno.⁹ And, as we saw in the previous chapter, there was an unsuccessful attempt by

⁷ For the Yesan case, see Choson Ilbo, 13 October 1930.

⁸ Pak P'yongsan, op. cit., p.54.

⁹ Yi Pansong [real name Tsuboe Senji], *Chosen Shakai Shiso Undo Enkaku Ryakushi* [A Brief History of Social and Ideological Movements in Korea], (1934), pp.84-93.

the younger group to oust Chang from the national leadership. The conflict between the two groups continued and was intensified in 1931, especially over the dissolution controversy.

2. THE DISSOLUTION CAMPAIGN.

Those who supported the dissolution proposal had started their campaign in local branches, as was also the case in the *Sin'ganhoe*. The members of Suwŏn branch passed the first resolution to dissolve the *Hyongpyongsa* in the spring of 1931, and in doing so they provoked heated debates among members in other branches, some of which---like Yangyang and Ipjang---expressed firm support for the Suwon proposal.¹⁰ There were also several national leaders, mostly from the younger group, who supported it. The alternative way forward for which the dissolutionists argued was largely based on the example of other socialist groups of the 1920s. They saw the *Hyongpyongsa* as having abandoned the spirit of class struggle and they therefore advocated that this should be pursued mainly through trade unionism in the industries in which their members were involved. Thus slaughterers in the larger towns were advised to organise and join independent trade unions irrespective of their status origins as *paekjong* or ordinary people. And slaughterers in smaller towns where numbers were too small to organise independent associations were advised to join the unions of other workers and

¹⁰ *ibid.*

peasants. The result envisaged was that after the dissolution all members would have better opportunities to be able under the leadership of genuine groups to participate more fully and effectively in the class struggle against social inequality.¹¹

The issue became more and more divisive. There were clearly some members who resisted the proposal. In Yesan,¹² for example, local members criticised the Suwon branch for initiating what was in their view an arbitrary and controversial debate. Instead of supporting the Suwon branch, they refrained from taking any decision until the national conference. Other branches, like Wonju,¹³ simply turned the Suwon proposal down. In addition, there was strong opposition from some key national leaders, including Chang Chip'il.¹⁴ One argument for opposition to the dissolution was that the *Hyongpyongsa* was unique and quite different from other social movements. While having much sympathy with the general argument in relation to other social movement groups, many were most reluctant to accept the idea for the *Hyongpyongsa*.

Not surprisingly, many members expected the controversy to be a major issue at the annual national conference held in Seoul in April 1931, and the Suwon branch did indeed submit their proposal to the conference.¹⁵ But other closely related internal tensions

11 Pak P'yongsan, op. cit., p.55.

12 Tonga Ilbo, 14 April 1931.

13 Tonga Ilbo, 14 April 1931.

14 For Chang Chip'il's opinion, see Tonga Ilbo, 14 October 1931.

15 Further details of the conference may be found in Yi Tonghwan, "Hyongpyongsa Che 9 hoe Ch'ŏn'guk Taehoe

intervened. In particular, about 170 delegates from 55 branches had come to the conference determined to seek action over Chang Chip'il's role as chief inspector during the previous twelve months. They claimed that he had been so inactive that he had lost the confidence of the movement. This led to a bitter confrontation between Chang's supporters and his opponents. The argument was closely related to the wider issue of the kind of leadership being sought by the members of the movement at this juncture. The majority of the delegates supported Chang and in the end he was elected as the head of the central committee. This result infuriated his opponents who claimed that the election had not been properly conducted. They then left the hall and boycotted the rest of the proceedings. By this time the conference had been so severely disrupted that most motions brought to it were dropped, and the dissolution motion was in fact the only one discussed. But, in the absence of Chang's opponents who were for the most part supporters of dissolution, the motion was not fully debated and was unanimously vetoed.

Despite these developments at the national conference, the issue continued to appear as an item on the agenda of both local and national meetings. At the Kyŏng-Nam federation meeting held in Ŭiryong on 24 May 1931, a motion on dissolution was again selected for discussion, but the

P'yŏng" [Comments on the Ninth National Conference of the Hyongpyongsa], *Pip'an*, Vol.1 No.2 (June 1931), pp.36-43; in Pak P'ilsu, "Hyongpyongsa Chŏn'guk Taehoe Pangch'ŏnggi" [Observational Record on the National Conference of the Hyongpyongsa], *Irŏt'a*, Vol.1 (June 1931), pp.27-29; and Choson Ilbo, 25 and 27 April 1931; Tonga Ilbo, 27 April 1931.

delegates agreed to reserve their position in view of the outcome on it at the national conference.¹⁶ A couple of months later, at the Kangwŏn regional conference, held in Kangnŭng on 3-4 July, there was a heated debate on it.¹⁷ On the first day of the meeting, the proposal was accepted by a majority of the delegates, but only to be reversed on the second day when the opponents queried the legitimacy of the previous day's proceedings and asked for the matter to be reopened. In the end, the proposal failed. On 8 October, the central committee of the Seoul headquarters once again discussed the issue, and concluded that the time was not ripe for dissolution.¹⁸ Chang Chip'il, who was by then the head of the central committee, argued against it and carried the day against a number of supporters on the committee,¹⁹ mainly younger leaders like Pak P'yongsan and Kil Handong who were to continue to argue for dissolution. The final fall of the radical group---and the failure of the dissolution proposal in the *Hyongpyongsa*---resulted from the *Hyongpyong* Youth Vanguard League affair which is discussed in the next section.

3. THE AFTERMATH

The heated debates on the dissolution issue in 1931 were part and parcel of dynamic transformations in the *Hyongpyong* movement as a whole during this period and they were to have far-reaching effects. First of all, there was

¹⁶ Yi Tonghwan, op. cit. (1931), p.74.

¹⁷ Tonga Ilbo, 11 July 1931.

¹⁸ Tonga Ilbo, 9 and 10 October 1931.

¹⁹ Tonga Ilbo, 14 October 1931.

bitter conflict between the leaders who were deeply split on the issue. But their confrontations were not only over dissolution *per se*; they were related to the entire general direction of the movement. The younger and more radical members who argued for dissolution were wanting to steer the movement to the left, and they were strongly opposed to then current idea of trying to meet the economic interests of members by establishing a profitable business firm.²⁰ They argued instead for top priority to be given to the wider and more general goal of struggling for an egalitarian society in all respects, social and economic.

In contrast, the senior members led by Chang Chip'il wanted the *Hyongpyongsa* to continue pursuing its original goals even though they accepted the logic of the dissolution arguments in relation to changing conditions. They thus argued that the idea of dissolution would be acceptable when the remaining "needs" of the *Hyongpyong* movement to promote an "equal society" had been met. In fact, however, some were particularly anxious to maintain such dominance as the *Hyongpyongsa* had achieved over the traditional industries of its members. There can be little doubt that they wanted to protect the economic interests which had been a significant part of the *Hyongpyong* movement's original aims. Thus they repeatedly declared their opposition to the economic intrusion of non-members into the traditional business areas of the *paekjong*.²¹ It was over this specific issue that there was a deepening

²⁰ Tonga Ilbo, 22 April 1931.

²¹ For example, see Tonga Ilbo, 29 May 1931 on the Kyong-Nam meeting, and Tonga Ilbo, 29 April 1932 on the result of the national conference.

rift between senior and junior leaders in relation to their views on the future direction of the movement.²²

The emergence of radicalism and the consequent split in the national leadership was a great disappointment and even embarrassment to the rank and file members of the movement who were at the time suffering from a slump in their main industries. Accordingly, many local branches ceased to be active, and this inactivity became a matter of major concern to the central committee in 1931 and 1932.²³ The low level of membership payments naturally hampered the maintenance of former activities.²⁴ The financial situation of the headquarters deteriorated rapidly and in 1932 the central committee even considered selling its office building in order to pay off debts.²⁵ Compared with several years earlier when the building had been bought with donations from members,²⁶ the support from local branches had clearly waned a great deal.

The decline of the movement was clearly reflected in the scene at the national conference held in Seoul on 24 April 1932. There were only 112 delegates from 44

²² Several years later, at the trial of the *Hyongpyong* Youth Vanguard League in 1936, Chang Chip'il clearly confirmed that there were different opinions between the seniors and the juniors. See *Choson Ilbo*, 6 March 1936.

²³ *Tonga Ilbo*, 9, 10 and 11 October 1931, 5 March 1932; *Chungang Ilbo*, 25 February, 5 March, and 25 April 1932.

²⁴ *Tonga Ilbo*, 29 April 1932.

²⁵ *Chosen Sotokufu Keimu-Kyoku*, [Police Affairs Bureau, Korean Government-General], *Saikin ni okeru Chosen Chian Jokyo* [The Present Security Situation in Korea], (1933), p.136.

²⁶ In 1925 and 1926, there had been massive campaigns to collect funds for the national headquarters building. *Choson Ilbo*, 15 June, 7 and 15 December 1925, 14 and 20 November, 23 July 1926.

branches,²⁷ about half the number who attended several previous conferences. The delegates discussed ways of coping with the decline in activities and of reviving the movement. But they did not come up with anything new. Instead, they simply reproduced old ideas; they suggested re-launching the official journal, standing firm against prejudice with appropriate counter-actions, re-intensifying local activities, and expelling all inactive branches from the association.²⁸

Some branches which received warnings from headquarters made efforts to reactivate their programmes.²⁹ But their efforts were largely in vain, and the rapid decrease in the number of local branches actively cooperating with the headquarters continued.³⁰ The plans for a new journal, entitled *Hyŏnggi* [Flag of Equity],³¹ appear in retrospect to have been highly optimistic and came to nought.

In 1933, the *Hyongpyongsa* faced another great trial, in the midst of continuing rivalry and tension within its divided leadership, when most of its active young radical members were arrested by the police and charged with organising a secret association, the "*Hyongpyong* Youth Vanguard League". As will be seen in the following section, this forced many prominent young activists out of the

²⁷ Tonga Ilbo, 25 April 1932.

²⁸ Tonga Ilbo, 29 April 1932.

²⁹ For example, the Koryong branch, see Choson Chungang Ilbo, 25 March 1933.

³⁰ cf. Chosen Sotokufu Keimu-Kyoku, op. cit. It was reported that less than 10 branches sent their membership fees to Seoul in the early 1930s.

³¹ Tonga Ilbo, 28 July, 28 September 1932, and 21 August 1933; Choson Chungang Ilbo, 2 August 1933.

movement with serious consequences at both national and regional levels. Other members then proceeded to press their views, demanding in particular that a higher priority be placed on the protection of the economic interests of their "old" membership. As part of this drive a new proposal for dissolution, quite independent of the earlier one, was discussed at the central executive committee meeting in February 1933.³² But this was turned down. Instead, it was proposed that a new association, *Tongin Kongjesa* [Mutual Benefit Society of Members], should be established within the *Hyongpyongsa*. This association would aim specifically to improve the economic life of members, and to give them guidance in commercial matters. For this purpose, it was proposed to launch a financial institution with low-interest loans for members.³³ After its launch by the Seoul headquarters, however, little was done in local branches, with the exception of one in Hongsŏng.³⁴

It was in this kind of atmosphere that the tenth national conference was held in Seoul on 24 April 1933.³⁵ There were about 110 delegates from some 40 branches. Under the chairmanship of Kim Chongt'aek six branches were expelled for their inactivity.³⁶

³² Chosen Sotokufu Keimu-Kyoku, op. cit., pp.134-136.

³³ Choson Ilbo, 27 April 1933.

³⁴ Choson Chungang Ilbo, 3 June 1933.

³⁵ Choson Chungang Ilbo, 25 and 28 April 1933; Choson Ilbo, 4 and 27 April 1933; Tonga Ilbo, 25 and 28 April 1933.

³⁶ These were Yesan, Kimch'ŏn, Tangjin, Yŏngwŏl, Sapgyo, and Koryŏng branches. Choson Ilbo, 27 April 1933.

While the earlier dissolution controversy was in progress, the national leadership had changed considerably, as shown in Table 8-1.

Table 8-1. The National Executive Members: 1931-1933

	1931 ³⁷	1932 ³⁸	1933 ³⁹
head	s Chang Chip'il	s Yi Sŏngsun	s Chang Chip'il
sec	s Kim Chongt'aek	y Sŏ Kwanghun	s Kim Chongt'aek
exec	n Kim Kwang (A) s Kim Chongt'aek(O) n Paek Hanung (E) y Yi Chongsun (L) y Yi Tonghwan (J) unknown 10	y Ch'oe Sŏk s Kil Manhak n Kim Manbong y Kim Sajon y Kim Sudong s O Sŏnghwan n Pak Chuwan n Yi Chongsok n Yi Myongbok n Yi Suan n Yi Tongsu n Yi Yol	n Cho Sunyong n Ch'on Kidok s Kil Pongso s Kil Suno s Kim Chaedok Kim Kiun y Kim Sajŏn s Kim Tongsŏk y Na Suwan s Pak Yusŏn n Yi Chongnam s Yi Haksul y Yi Tonghwan
c-ins	y Sim Sanguk	s Chang Chip'il	s Kil Manhak
ins	unknown 4	n Yi Ch'abok n Yi Taegil	s Kim Pong n Sin Hŭian

(Key) sec: general-secretary, exec: plain executive,
c-ins: chief-inspector, ins: inspector,
A: Assistant-Secretary, O: organisation and treasury,
E: education and publication,
L: the improvement of living standard,
J: social justice
s: senior leaders y: younger leaders
n: new leaders who emerged in their posts after 1930.

The controversial election of 1931 had been followed by a bitter aftermath,⁴⁰ with disputes among executive members disrupting normal activities at headquarters. About

³⁷ Yi Tonghwan, op. cit., (1931).

³⁸ Tonga Ilbo, 29 April 1932.

³⁹ Choson Ilbo, 27 April 1933.

⁴⁰ Yi Tonghwan, op. cit., (1931), pp.41-43.

one month later, the full composition of the standing committee was still unclear, as shown in the first column of Table 8-1. Chang Chip'il was the national leader, and some young members participated in the general affairs of the headquarters, but the more enthusiastic extreme radicals such as Kil Handong and Pak P'yongsan would appear to have been excluded. The key leaders of the time were well known *Hyongpyong* activists from the middle area of the country: Kim Chongt'aek from Ch'onan, Kim Kwang from Yesan, Pak Hanung from Ch'ongju, Yi Chongsun from Ansong, Yi Tonghwan from Kunsan and Sim Sanguk from Iksan. The national leadership thus remained under the control of the senior members with the cooperation of some young activists. Despite the leadership's disarray an effort to unite members was made and the composition of the national executive committee was largely reconfirmed at another special national conference on 30 October 1931.⁴¹

In 1932 the composition of the national executive was not much different in its essential nature from what it had been in 1931. There were again several representatives from diverse groups. Yi Songsun, the newly elected head, was the regional leader of Kyong-Nam from Pusan. With Kang Sangho, he was a key leader in the Kyong-Nam area. These two men had worked together closely in the late 1920s and their renewed partnership had a particular significance.⁴² They had represented members from Kyong-Nam area at the line of the reunification drive in 1929.⁴³ Even though Kang Sangho

⁴¹ Tonga Ilbo, 1 November 1931.

⁴² Chungwoe Ilbo, 18 November 1929.

⁴³ Tonga Ilbo, 20 November 1929. And see Chapter 8.

had been expelled from the Seoul headquarters a few years earlier,⁴⁴ Yi Sŏngsun had been co-opted in an attempt to reverse the declining trend of the movement. In addition to Yi Songsun, there were several new executive members from various areas: Yi Suan from P'yongt'aek, Yi Yŏl from Yesan, Pak Chuwan and Yi Ch'abok from Puyŏ, Yi Chongsok from Tangjin, Yi Myongbok from Ch'ŏnan, Yi Taegil from Sŏsan, and Yi Tongsu and Kim Manbong from Wonju. Even though key posts were occupied by well-known activists, there were clearly a number of new members drawn from local areas and it seems likely from the limited information available that they were co-opted in an attempt to revive interest and activities in their respective areas. In the face of the decline in the movement the junior and senior leaders cooperated in the leadership.

But this attempt to bring life back into the movement appears to have been largely ineffective. At the executive meeting held in July 1932, Yi Songsun, the elected head, was accused of being inactive,⁴⁵ and complaints about the leadership were again made at the national conference in April 1933.⁴⁶ In the absence of the radical members on police charges relating to the "*Hyongpyong* Youth Vanguard League" affair, some of the old members had returned to the executive committee in 1932, and Chang Chip'il, Kim Chongt'aek and Kil Manhak had taken three key posts. Most of the other executive members also had long careers as

⁴⁴ For the dramatic failure for Kang to make an address in the Kyong-Nam regional federal meeting, see Yi Yangko, *op. cit.*

⁴⁵ Tonga Ilbo, 28 July 1932.

⁴⁶ Choson Ilbo, 27 April 1933.

well-known *Hyongpyong* activists, as may be seen in Table 8-1. In the middle of the *Hyongpyong* Youth Vanguard League affair, there was a strongly felt need to maintain solidarity among members. The committee even wanted to keep the names of some members under detention on the list of executive members. Thus Yi Tonghwan and Na Suwan who were actually in the custody of the police⁴⁷ were elected as executives, partly as symbols and partly in the hope that they would soon return.

The heated debate over dissolution led to little change but its consequences were far-reaching. It was a central issue dividing many ordinary members from their national leaders and the decline in local activities which followed was partly a result of the controversy. Then, just as the controversy seemed likely to end, the "*Hyongpyong* Youth Vanguard League" affair broke out in 1933.

II. THE "*HYONGPYONG* YOUTH VANGUARD LEAGUE" AFFAIR

The police began to arrest leading young members of the *Hyongpyongsa* in southern areas of the country in January 1933. The first to be arrested were Sin Sonmun and Mun Chaegwi in Kwangju on 24 January 1933.⁴⁸ After that, numerous young activists from the major towns followed them

⁴⁷ Along with other members, they were arrested by the police in Seoul and Chonju on 20 March and 17 April 1933 respectively. Tonga Ilbo, 23 March and 22 April 1933.

⁴⁸ Tonga Ilbo, 3 February 1933.

into police custody. There was little concrete information about the reasons for the arrests. The newspapers published fragmented reports on the arrests and speculated that the police were searching for evidence of a large illegal organisation operating within the *Hyongpyongsa*, supposedly with communist leanings. Nearly seven months later, in August, the official version of the so-called "*Hyongpyong* Youth Vanguard League" affair was finally released by the police to the newspapers.⁴⁹ The total number of members being interrogated was said to be over 100.⁵⁰ During the intervening period, many had been detained by the police without any legal charges being laid, and others were freed individually without any reasons being given. At first 68 were prosecuted. But, even though all were said to be guilty at the preliminary examinations, only 14 were later formally prosecuted on charges of clandestinely organising an illegal association and all the others were freed on a suspension of indictment.

⁴⁹ Choson Chungang Ilbo, 2 August 1933; Choson Ilbo, 2 August 1933; Tonga Ilbo, 2 August 1933; Maeil Sinbo, 3 August 1933.

⁵⁰ Choson Ilbo, 12 August 1933.

Table 8-2. The Members of the *Hyongpyong* Youth Vanguard League Formally Charged⁵¹

Town	Name	(alias)	Age	"Posts"
Seoul	Yi Tongan	(Tonghwan)	32	Organisation & Cholla
Seoul	Sŏ Kwanghun		33	Secretary & Kangwon
Seoul	Yi Chongyul		29	
Seoul	Kim Sudong		26	
Ch'onan	Kim Chongwŏn		25	
Ipjang	Pak Hogun	(P'yŏngsan)	25	Ch'ung-Nam
Ipjang	Kil Handong		25	Treasury & Ch'ung-Puk
Onyang	Yi Hanyong		30	Kyongsang
Iksan	Sim Sanguk		28	Kyonggi
Chongup	Ch'oe Sŏk		21	
Chonju	Na Tongbong	(Suwan)	28	
Kwangju	Sin Chŏmsŏk	(Sonmun)	25	
Masan	Pak Kyŏngsik		24	
Masan	Yi Myŏngnok		27	

(notes in Table 8-2)

- 1) The town indicates their places of residence according to police records. In fact, they often changed their addresses while working for the *Hyongpyong* movement.
- 2) The posts indicate the areas for which they were alleged to be responsible.

As shown in Table 8-2, those prosecuted were young activists in their twenties and early thirties. They belonged to the radical groups which had led the dissolution campaign in the *Hyongpyongsa* and most of them had been involved in *Hyongpyong* activities at the national level, especially in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Indeed, most had served once or more on the national executive committee.

According to police allegations,⁵² the accused were inclined to communism and had on 20 April 1929 at the Seoul

⁵¹ Tonga Ilbo, 2 August 1933; Choson Ilbo, 12 August 1933; Choson Chungang Ilbo, 13 August 1933.

⁵² Chosen Sotokufu Keimu-Kyoku, op. cit., pp.134-135. Tonga Ilbo, 2 August 1933; Choson Ilbo, 12 August 1933; Choson Chungang Ilbo, 3 August 1933.

headquarters building planned a secret association, the "*Hyongpyong* Youth Vanguard League" which was to operate inside the *Hyongpyongsa*. Under a general secretary, the organisation was to have had two sections, an administration and a treasury. And there were to be regional directors in charge of organising subordinate branches in their respective areas. The general aims and principle of the organisation were to be: (1) to abolish the system of private property and to construct a communist society, and (2) to lead the struggle against "feudalistic" ideas.⁵³ The police alleged that the group was intending to dissolve the *Hyongpyongsa* and to launch a communist organisation in its place.⁵⁴

However, the sensational police allegations were followed by an extremely long legal process and the results of their preliminary examination were only made known on 28 December 1934, nearly two years after the initial arrests.⁵⁵ On the basis of the preliminary examination, the accused were committed for trial, but this was in turn postponed on several occasions until it finally opened in Kwangju on 27 November 1935.⁵⁶ By this time, the *Hyongpyongsa* in which the accused were initially involved had already ceased to exist under that name for seven months. (See next section) At the first trial, almost three years after the arrests, all defendants were given the opportunity to speak in public and all denied the

⁵³ Chosen Sotokufu Keimu-Kyoku, op. cit., p.135.

⁵⁴ Tonga Ilbo, 30 December 1934.

⁵⁵ Tonga Ilbo, 30 December 1934.

⁵⁶ Choson Chungang Ilbo, 27 and 28 November 1935; Choson Ilbo, 28 November 1935; Tonga Ilbo, 28 and 29 November 1935.

accusations made against them by the prosecutor. They also complained over unbearably cruel torture by the police. Five lawyers, including the famous Yi In from Seoul, found the interrogation records inconsistent and unreasonable. In the first place, these records, which consisted of over 4,000 pages, had all been written on the same day by four policemen, a fact which seemed impossible in its very nature. In addition, the Seoul headquarters where the accused were alleged to have organised the league was shown to have been quite unsuitable for discussing any clandestine matter, especially at the time that the *Hyongpyongsa* was fully involved in preparing for its annual national conference.⁵⁷ As witnesses, all leaders of the *Hyongpyongsa* gave testimony favourable to the defendants, and Chang Chip'il testified that there was no communist group inside the *Hyongpyongsa*, even though the accused had, as junior members, once been at odds with their seniors over the direction of the movement.⁵⁸ All in all, therefore, the charges were most unlikely to be substantiated by credible evidence.

The primary trial ended on 30 March 1936 over three years after the arrest of the accused.⁵⁹ Even though the attorney demanded that the accused be found guilty and given jail sentences ranging from three to six years,⁶⁰ the

⁵⁷ Choson Ilbo, 31 January 1936; Tonga Ilbo, 31 January 1936; Choson Ilbo, 1 February 1936; Tonga Ilbo, 1 February 1936; Choson Chungang Ilbo, 1 February 1936; Maeil Sinbo, 1 February 1936.

⁵⁸ Choson Ilbo, 6 March 1936; Tonga Ilbo, 7 March 1936; Choson Chungang Ilbo, 5 and 7 March 1936.

⁵⁹ Choson Chungang Ilbo, 21 March 1936; Tonga Ilbo, 2 March 1936.

⁶⁰ Choson Ilbo, 7 and 19 March 1936.

judge found them all innocent, except for Yi Chongyul who was sentenced to two years in prison because of his involvement in other activities of the communist movement. The whole affair would thus seem to have been fabricated by the authorities, and the police were generally held by the public to have grossly abused their authority in the case. *Choson Ilbo* and *Tonga Ilbo*, which were at the time operating under strict censorship by the Japanese authorities, bravely joined in the public condemnation of the police in their leading articles.⁶¹

Despite this outcome of the primary trial, the defendants remained in prison until the secondary trial which began in Taegu on 1 June 1936 and ended on 21 November 1936. The attorney was still asking for the same sentences as at the primary trial but these were again rejected and the innocence of the accused was reaffirmed.⁶² As a result, they were finally freed on 25 November 1936, nearly four years after their arrests.⁶³

Despite the findings of not guilty, the *Hyongpyong* Youth Vanguard League affair had a significant impact on the *Hyongpyong* movement as a whole. The power of the radicals within the movement had been effectively curtailed over four years, while their rival group made up of an alliance between moderates and progressive reformers, had enjoyed the opportunity to dominate the national leadership. Not surprisingly, the neutralisation of the radical group by the authorities was accompanied by a

⁶¹ *Choson Ilbo*, 23 March 1936; *Tonga Ilbo*, 23 March 1936.

⁶² *Choson Ilbo*, 18 November 1936.

⁶³ *Choson Ilbo*, 22 and 27 November 1936.

waning of the radical policies which they supported. (e.g. programmes on the trade unions and closer relations with other social movements). In addition, the left-inclined radicals who had not been arrested were during this period kept under close surveillance and thus had little opportunity to be active. It seems that they either ceased their activities or, at best, conducted them underground while the "conservative" *Hyongpyong* activists were intensifying their efforts to maintain unchallenged control of the national leadership. By any interpretation, it thus seems clear that the Youth League affair was a factor of very considerable significance in the last few years of the *Hyongpyongsa* during which the organisation changed both in name and in its nature.

We may well speculate over the *Hyongpyong* Youth Vanguard League itself. To begin with, it may be asked, "Did it really exist?" In present-day South Korea, with successive governments that have strictly ruled out all involvement in, or sympathy with, communism, it is almost impossible to find anyone willing to testify to any communist activities, past or present. And this makes any serious inquiry into the matter difficult. According to the outcome of the trials, however, it seems extremely doubtful that the "Youth Vanguard League" did exist. The general presumption at the time seems to have been that it was a police plot.⁶⁴ The Japanese administration and their police

⁶⁴ This view was partially shared by the descendant of a *Hyongpyongsa* member. Despite inaccurate and even incorrect records, he perceived the affair as a Japanese invention aimed at curbing activities for independence. Kim Yongdae, *Sillok Hyongpyong* [The

had notorious reputations for tracking down evidence on radical activists. Yet in this case they were unable to produce any credible shreds apart from their own interrogation records which were undoubtedly compiled under torture. On the other hand, the case of Yi Chongyul would appear to substantiate the claim that there were at least some radical outsiders in the *Hyongpyongsa*. But this is a far cry from the supposed League.

If the association did not exist, why did the police invent the plot? Though we have no records of their intentions, it is not at all difficult to believe that their initial purpose may very well have been to thwart radical members and to make it difficult or impossible for them to be active.⁶⁵ In considering this as a likely possibility, we may recall that the police said that one clue in their investigations came from an internal dispute among members of the Kwangju branch of the *Hyongpyongsa* over the launch of a local butcher's union.⁶⁶ When some 20 wealthy members of the *Hyongpyongsa* attempted to launch the union, other members led by Sin Chŏmsŏk were opposed to it on the grounds that it would be for the benefit of the "bourgeois" members. Whether this would have been so or not, the suggestion carries the implication that the authorities would have been interested in supporting the wealthy butchers against the more radical members of the

Authentic Record on the Hyongpyong Movement], (Seoul, Songsan Publisher, 1978).

⁶⁵ We know that Japanese police did consider that ~~perceived~~ the *Hyongpyongsa* was becoming more radical. See, Chosen Sotokufu Keimu-Kyoku, op. cit., pp.133-136.

⁶⁶ Tonga Ilbo, 2 August 1933.

branch. The grounds for this speculation are that when the Japanese wanted to extend the war against China in Manchuria in 1931, they badly needed the co-operation of all those involved in industries related to military supplies, and the *Hyongpyongsa* were involved through their connection with the leather trade. If the radicals were to become more influential in the general direction of the *Hyongpyongsa*, the Japanese might well have had difficulties in achieving their aims. On these grounds, they may well have wanted to cripple the radicals in the movement. We shall see that this speculation received considerable support from later developments in the *Hyongpyongsa* which are discussed in following section.

III. TRANSFORMATION TO THE *TARDONGSA*.

After the Youth Vanguard League affair and the virtual elimination of radicalism in the *Hyongpyongsa*, the activities of the organisation steadily declined. In addition, the slump in industries in which members were mainly involved in the early 1930s led to great economic difficulties for them. As already noted, support from local branches declined and only about 10 sent their membership fees to the Seoul headquarters in the early 1930s.⁶⁷ Under these circumstances, it is natural that there was much discussion about the organisation's future, especially by those who were most concerned with the protection of

⁶⁷ Chosen Sotokufu Keimu-Kyoku, op. cit., p.136.

traditional industries.⁶⁸ The members had repeatedly confirmed their stance against the entry of non-members to the meat trade.⁶⁹ And they now attempted to intensify their activities intended to safeguard their business interests. As examples, there were discussions on establishing a leather union at Kyŏng-Nam regional meeting in May 1931,⁷⁰ and negotiations were initiated to transfer a leather drying workshop from the control of a local government office to *Hyongpyongsa* members in Kunsan in February 1933.⁷¹ The launch in 1933 of the benefit society previously referred to also stemmed from similar motives.

Despite all efforts to revive the more general *Hyongpyongsa* activities,⁷² there was a continuing decline in the level of interest and this was clearly seen at the 1934 national conference, when there were only 60 delegates from 24 branches.⁷³ The leaders from headquarters continued to attempt to revive local activities through visits to branches by special committee members.⁷⁴ But the redemption of the debt accumulated by the organisation appears to have been their main concern.⁷⁵

The sharp decline of the movement can also be seen in Japanese records, as shown in Table 8-3.

⁶⁸ *ibid.*, p.136.

⁶⁹ Tonga Ilbo, 11 and 18 January and May 1931; Tonga Ilbo, 29 April 1932.

⁷⁰ Tonga Ilbo, 29 May 1931.

⁷¹ Tonga Ilbo, 16 February 1933.

⁷² Tonga Ilbo, 9 and 10 October 1933; Choson Chungang Ilbo, 9 October 1933.

⁷³ Choson Ilbo, 25 April 1934; Tonga Ilbo, 25 April 1934; Choson Chungang Ilbo, 27 April 1934.

⁷⁴ Tonga Ilbo, 9 July 1934; Choson Chungang Ilbo, 9 July 1934.

⁷⁵ Tonga Ilbo, 11 March 1935; Choson Ilbo, 12 March 1935.

Table 8-3. The Numbers of Branches and Members in 1932, 1933 and 1935.

	Branches			Members		
	1932	1933	1935	1932	1933	1935
Kyŏnggi	14	12	9	397	470	444
Ch'ung-Puk	14	13	8	468	451	237
Ch'ung-Nam	30	28	26	2687	2609	2425
Chŏn-Puk	7	6	12	391	186	967
Chŏn-Nam	27	26	5	1582	1540	253
Kyŏng-Puk	24	20	17	856	710	938
Kyŏng-Nam	28	26	18	1564	1596	1230
Kangwŏn	15	13	2	326	283	39
Hwanghae	1	1	1	6	7	7
P'yŏng-Puk	0	0	0	0	0	0
P'yŏng-Nam	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ham-Puk	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ham-Nam	1	1	0	16	16	0
Total	161	146	98	8293	7868	6540

(source) Chosen Sotokufu Keimu-Kyoku, *Saikin ni okeru Chosen Chian Jokyo* [The Present Security Situation in Korea], (Seoul, 1933, 1935).

In three years the number of branches fell from 161 to 98 and the total membership from 8293 to 6540. And many branches which continued to exist had a low level of activity. In short, there was a marked lack of vigour in the movement.⁷⁶ The only really active areas, as can be seen in Table 8-3, were Ch'ung-Nam, Chŏn-Puk and Kyŏng-Nam Provinces, all areas with direct representation in the group of national leaders.

The time had come when the leadership accepted that the *Hyongpyong* movement should be terminated in its current

⁷⁶ The Japanese police recorded the closure of all branches, except one, as "voluntary". There is no other indication on the reasons for their closure. Chosen Sotokufu Keimu-Kyoku, op. cit., (1933).

form. At the national conference on 24 April 1935, about 140 delegates decided to change the name of the organisation to *Taedongsa* [Great Equality Society].⁷⁷ While the young radicals involved in the *Hyongpyong* Youth Vanguard League affair were in prison awaiting their trial, Chang Chip'il, as chairman, argued for the change on the grounds that the original purpose of the *Hyongpyong* movement was nearly accomplished and that it needed to set itself new goals in association with other people.⁷⁸ Whether the original aims and purposes of the *Hyongpyongsa* had really been achieved must remain a matter for debate, but the historical fact is that the *Hyongpyongsa* now reconstituted itself into a successor association.

At a special meeting of the *Taedongsa*, held in Taejon on 11 January 1936, nineteen delegates from twelve areas discussed the issues now facing them. One of the major decisions made was to sell the Seoul headquarters building to repay the *Hyongpyongsa's* debts.⁷⁹ The executive committee elected Yi Songsun and Kang Sangho as head and vice-head respectively and then convened another special national conference in Taejon on 22 February.⁸⁰ This was attended by 26 delegates from 14 branches who adopted a proposal for controlling the leather trade⁸¹ which had become more important during the war period which followed the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931. The leaders of the new *Taedongsa* deliberately attempted to exploit this

⁷⁷ Tonga Ilbo, 25 April 1935; Choson Ilbo, 26 April 1935.

⁷⁸ Choson Ilbo, 26 April 1935.

⁷⁹ Choson Chungang Ilbo, 17 January 1936.

⁸⁰ Choson Chungang Ilbo, 8 February 1936.

⁸¹ Tonga Ilbo, 26 February 1936.

opportunity for regaining their privileges over profitable traditional industries. Members of the central executive approached Japanese officials to appeal to them to cooperate with the *Taedongsa* over meat prices and to discuss the question of continuing discrimination against the *paekjong*.⁸² Then, on 24 April 1936 a national conference was held in Taejon to which the national headquarters had already been moved.⁸³ Compared with earlier *Hyongpyongsa* conferences, this was conducted in a more authoritarian way. For instance, the head and vice-head elected by the delegates were granted the right to select all 59 executive members. Thus in principle Yi Sŏngsun (head) and Kang Sangho (vice-head) had enormous power. Earlier both had been much criticised by the Seoul leaders of the *Hyongpyongsa*, and especially by the young radicals, and their new positions as virtual directors of the *Taedongsa* is a clear indication of the fundamental changes that had taken place within the movement. The agenda of the *Taedongsa* meetings also reveals these changes. The main issues discussed were related to commercial matters, especially the control of the leather trade and the launching of a butcher's guild.

The general scene at, and immediately following on, the 1936 conference gives us some indication on the nature of the "new" association. First of all, it is evident that Kang Sangho and Yi Sŏngsun played a dominant role in the association. In June 1936, the regional headquarters of

⁸² Tonga Ilbo, 9 and 10 April 1936.

⁸³ Tonga Ilbo, 26 April 1936; Choson Chungang Ilbo, 28 April 1936.

Chon-Nam Province were opened under the chairmanship of Kang Sangho,⁸⁴ and two years later on 25 April 1938, the Pusan branch led by Yi Sŏngsun celebrated the anniversary of the society.⁸⁵ Secondly, the association established good relations with the Japanese authorities; two months after the Pusan celebration, there was another gathering at which the association formally presented a war plane to the Japanese government.⁸⁶ The significance of this gift can be appreciated in the context of the fact that as the Japanese intensified their plans to attack neighbouring countries, the Korean people were more and more restricted in their social activities and were under increasing pressure to cooperate with the colonial power.⁸⁷ The *Taedongsa* were clearly collaborating quite openly. In addition to their donation of the plane, they co-operated in making leather supplies available. But the Japanese authorities nonetheless sought to exercise closer direct control over the supply of hides and leather,⁸⁸ and in the end members of the *Taedongsa* were largely deprived of their relative autonomy in the industry. The *Taedongsa* then attempted to counter these Japanese moves by planning to launch an independent leather firm which would collaborate with the demands of the authorities, but in vain.⁸⁹ The Japanese proved unwillingly to be supplied in this way, and so in

⁸⁴ Tonga Ilbo, 12 June 1936; Choson Chungang Ilbo, 18 June 1936.

⁸⁵ Tonga Ilbo, 28 April 1938.

⁸⁶ Tonga Ilbo, 7 and 11 July 1938.

⁸⁷ Further details of the Japanese exploitation of Koreans at that time may be found in Mi Sŭngu, *Ilje Nongnim Sut'alsang* [The Agricultural Exploitation by the Japanese Imperialists], (Seoul, Nokwon Ch'ulp'ansa, 1983).

⁸⁸ Tonga Ilbo, 8 November 1938.

⁸⁹ Tonga Ilbo, 23 and 28 November 1938.

one respect at least the collaborators were betrayed by their colonial masters.

Only about 50 delegates attended the national conference held in Taejon on 24 April 1939, and the proceedings began with a discussion as to whether the conference should be postponed, due to the small attendance.⁸⁰ They decided to proceed but then tentatively discussed the dissolution of the association. Under the leadership of Chang Chip'il who had returned to the fold, they decided not to dissolve the association, but it was nonetheless moving towards extinction. The last reference to the association in the newspaper was in 1940 when they appealed to the colonial government for an increase in meat prices.⁸¹ The activities of the association ceased altogether during the Second World War.

In looking at the available records on the *Taedongsa's* rather unsuccessful history, it is clear that it differed quite markedly from the *Hyongpyongsa* in two main respects. Firstly, unlike its predecessor, it was almost exclusively concerned with regaining or protecting its economic privileges in traditional industries. Secondly, it collaborated with the Japanese in ways, and to an extent, quite unknown during the period of the *Hyongpyongsa*.

In the absence of more detailed records on the activities of the *Taedongsa*, it is worth while examining the composition of its leadership in greater detail. When the new title of the association was adopted in April 1935,

⁸⁰ Tonga Ilbo, 27 April 1939.

⁸¹ Choson Ilbo, 23 March 1940.

the names of the 21 executive committee members were not publicised, except for four: Ch'ŏn Kunp'il (head), Kim Tongho (secretary), Kim Pong (chief-inspector) and Yi Haksul (plain executive).⁹² They would seem to have been assigned the task of transforming the *Hyongpyongsa* into the *Taedongsa*. Soon after that, new executive members took over the national leadership. Again, there are no complete lists of all the members, but we do have seemingly complete lists of national executive members in 1936 and 1939. These are shown in Table 8-4.

⁹² Choson Ilbo, 26 April 1935.

Table 8-3. National Executive Committee Members in 1936 and 1939.

Post	Jan. 1936 ⁹³	April 1936 ⁹⁴	April 1939 ⁹⁵
head	n Yi Sŏngsun	n Yi Sŏngsun	o Chang Chip'il
v-head	o Kang Sangho	o Kang Sangho	o Kim Tongsoĳk
stand	o Yu Kongsam(S) o Kim Tongsoĳk (A) f Sŏ Yongsŏk (E)		f Pak Chaehŭi (S) f Ch'oe Sŏngbok(A) f Kim Honggu (I)
Exec	f Cho Changok o Cho Pongsik o Ch'on Kulp'il o Kil Kidong o Kil Pongso o Kim Chaedok f Kim Honggu o O Sŏnghwan o Pak Yusŏn f Sim Chaenam o Sin Hŭian o Yi Haksul o Yi Kyonggi f Yi Munil n Yi P'ilsong Yi (?)	o Cho Kwiyong o Kil Sangsu o Kim Chaedok o Paek Nakyong f Sin Tongil f Yi Hakjo o Yi Haksul	n Chang Kapsong o Kim Chongt'aek f Sim Koni o Yi Sahyon f Yi Yŏnch'un

(key) v-head: vice-head, stand: standing committee,
 exec: executive, S: Secretary, A: Account,
 I: Industry, E: Education
 o: ones who served on the executive committee in the
 1920s.
 n: ones who served on the executive committee in
 1930-1935.
 f: new members who emerged in their posts after 1935.

⁹³ Chosen Chungang Ilbo, 17 January and 8 February 1936. They were elected on 11 January 1936 in Taejon.

⁹⁴ Tonga Ilbo, 9 April 1936. This is the list of those who visited Japanese officials on 8 April 1936. Another record gives a different list. Instead of Yi Haksul and Yi Hakjo, there were Kim Tongsoĳk and Kim Chongt'aek. Tonga Ilbo, 11 April 1936. The Japanese police reported that there were 72 executive members, including Kim Chongt'aek, So Yongsok and Kim Chaedok. Chosen Sotokufu Keimu-Kyoku, *Koto Keisatsu Po* [Report of Supreme Police], No.6 (1936), p.329.

⁹⁵ Tonga Ilbo, 27 April 1939. They were elected on 24 April 1939.

Several points may be noted about the composition of these national executive committees. Firstly, and obviously due to the outcome of the *Hyongpyong* Youth Vanguard League affair, they do not include the names of any of the younger radical leaders of the *Hyongpyongsa*, whereas there are several names of former key members of the progressive reform group of earlier years. In particular, those once involved in the Koryo Revolutionary Party affair are well represented. (e.g. Cho Kwiyong, Yu Kongsam, and O Sŏnghwan, and Chang Chip'il). Some former executive members of the *Hyongpyongsa* in the 1920s who had seemingly lost influence in the movement to their more radical fellows returned to the national executive. As a result, the committee consisted largely of older *Hyongpyong* activists, as shown particularly in the first column of Table 8-3. In addition, there were several members who had first been co-opted in the early 1930s. The most distinctive feature of the new national leadership was, however, the re-emergence of members of the moderate group from Kyong-Nam.

As previously noted, soon after the establishment of the *Taedongsa*, Yi Songsun and Kang Sangho became the real power holders with authority to select the executive members they wanted at the conference of April 1936.⁹⁸ Along with them, members from the Kyongsang area were re-established in the national leadership, including Pak Yusŏn from Masan and Yi Sahyŏn from Taegu. The trends reflected in these names continued until the closing years of the *Taedongsa* when Chang Chip'il and Kim Chongt'aek were re-

⁹⁸ Tonga Ilbo, 26 April 1936.

elected in April 1939 as the head and vice-head respectively.

In short, the transformation of the leadership reflected the general situation of the association. With the radicals forced out, the allied moderate-progressive group increasingly collaborated with the Japanese. The remaining leaders who came from the wealthier strata of *Hyongpyongsa* members were keen to retain their own organisation, whatever its name, in order to protect their economic interests.

CONCLUSION

The end of the *Hyongpyongsa* launched in April 1923 came on 24 April 1935 when its members constituted themselves into a successor organisation under the name of *Taedongsa*. From the closing years of the 1920s to the early years of the 1930s, young radical activists in the organisation made continual attempts to take over the national leadership of the movement and to transform its general direction, but deliberate interventions by the Japanese police frustrated their goals which were in any case strongly opposed by many "original" members of the movement. During the period of these struggles, the movement suffered a considerable decline in the number of its local branches and their membership. This decline was associated both with the losing struggles of the radicals

and severe economic depression in the traditional industries of the *paekjong*.

In the mid-1930s, after the failure of the radicals to take over, the national leadership was largely in the hands of an alliance between moderate and progressive groups. At this juncture, the movement's organisation changed its name and this step^{was} accompanied by far-reaching changes in its nature, its aims and its political stance. The leaders of the new *Taedongsa* openly collaborated with the Japanese authorities in the expectation that this would allow them to retain exclusive control over their leather trade, which was of particular importance to Japan's then escalating military activities in Manchuria. But this final bid to avoid relinquishing control failed when the Japanese authorities themselves took direct charge of the leather trade. Japan's involvement in World War II then followed and the association soon ceased to exist.

The movement's relative success, in its early years, in routinising its main general goal of emancipating the *paekjong* and recreating their communal fellowship was thus followed by a quite different period. In this later period, it virtually ceased to function as a social movement, becoming instead an "interest group" attempting to serve the interests of a limited number of its former members. This transformation, and failure in terms of its initial goals, can to some considerable extent be attributed to the intervention of the Japanese authorities, particularly through their restriction of the radicals and most enthusiastic members. At the same time, the economic

difficulties experienced by many rank and file members in the 1930s resulted in a much lower level of activity in the local branches, and this in turn led to national headquarters facing a major financial problem. In addition to this, the earlier radicalisation of the movement with active support from more politicised outside groups would appear to have adversely affected the participation of the association's more conservative members. In the context of the period, this is not surprising.

CHAPTER NINE

CONCLUSION AND ADDENDA

The main aim of this thesis, to reconstruct and analyse the *Hyongpyongsa* and its activities, has been carried out in the foregoing chapters. The present final chapter contains the following: (1) a brief summary of the story of the *Hyongpyongsa*; (2) a brief comment on the relevance of its analysis to the sociology of social movements; (3) a note on why the *Hyongpyong* movement was relatively inactive in the north of Korea, a fact which is of interest in relation to the analytical framework used in this thesis; and, finally, (4) an evaluation of the *Hyongpyong* movement in the light of the age-old history of the *paekjong*.

I. SUMMARY

After outlining the conceptual and theoretical guidelines for this study and evaluating the materials used (Chapter 1), the main work has been to delineate the changing social and historical situation of the *paekjong* and of the *Hyongpyongsa* and its activities in the terms demanded by the analytic framework. This was done in two parts: the first focusing on the history of the *paekjong*

before the formation of the *Hyongpyongsa*, and the second on the social and historical processes of the *Hyongpyong* movement. Part One showed how the *paekjong* suffered from social discrimination and prejudice in the hierarchical society of the Choson Dynasty. Through diverse institutions and conventions, they were stigmatised and discriminated against by other members of the society in public spheres and social relations. Even in the rapidly changing social and economic situations of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the main conventions operating against them remained largely intact, despite increasing opportunities for them to join in public activities. Their economic situation changed a good deal with increasing competition from non-*paekjong* who began to participate in traditional *paekjong* industries, while a few wealthy *paekjong* emerged. The community thus became more heterogeneous in terms of wealth. By the 1920s, the community was being affected by a changing socio-political climate which saw a rapid proliferation of social movement groups and this clearly contributed to the birth and development of the *Hyongpyong* movement.

Part Two of the study dwelt on the formation, growth, dynamics and decline of the *Hyongpyongsa*. The launch of the association was initiated by a number of wealthy *paekjong* and "professional" social movement activists in Chinju in April 1923, and was followed by the rapid growth of activities in major towns and cities in the southern part of the country. The geographical

expansion of the association followed as the movement met with great enthusiasm from lowly *paekjong* and gained support from other social movement groups. Soon after the foundation, however, the movement faced a serious factional dispute, which resulted in its national leadership passing out of the hands of "moderates" from Chinju into the hands of "progressive reformers" based in Seoul. As the movement expanded, and during the period of the factional split and subsequent reunification, it encountered strong opposition from ordinary people. Far from weakening the movement, however, such opposition resulted in greater solidarity and brought it considerable outside sympathy and support, especially from the activists in other social movements.

The combination of enthusiastic support from *paekjong* and sympathetic outsiders on the one hand, and of hostile reactions from the masses of ordinary people on the other hand, stimulated and largely shaped the movement of the mid 1920s. Diverse sub-groups of the *Hyongpyongsa* arose during this period, for example, the *Chŏngwidan* (ideological group), Youth, Student and Women's associations. These sub-groups constituted the milieu in which younger activists arose to challenge the national leadership. Fluctuations in the national leadership followed and these were affected by the arrest of key progressive reformist leaders by the Japanese police who charged them with involvement in the Koryo Revolutionary Party. Up to this point, the movement had clearly achieved a great deal, especially in the

development of *paekjong* consciousness over human rights, in the enlightenment of members, and in protecting or regaining some of their privileges in relation to traditional industries. However, the emergence of younger leaders and closer contacts with other activists, especially those from socialist-inclined groups, was associated with the introduction of radical ideas to the movement. This brought about socio-political tensions between members.

The ideological tussle which followed came to a head over the dissolution issue. There was a clear distinction between those who were for and against dissolution. The younger and more radical members insisted that the *Hyongpyong* movement had lost its original purpose and should therefore be dissolved to allow and encourage its members to join appropriate trade unions, whereas the senior progressive reformist leaders argued that the movement was uniquely different from other social movements and should therefore continue to pursue its own objectives. At the same time, the radicalisation of the national leadership led to closer surveillance of the movement by the Japanese authorities, while the economic difficulties of the rank and file members owing to depression in their industries resulted in a serious decline in their support of the movement. The radicals were forced out of their leading positions by what appears to have been a police plot, and the moderates grasped the opportunity to give priority to economic rather than socio-political issues. Despite efforts to

check the decline of the movement, many members and branches ceased to be active, and the *Hyongpyongsa* finally changed its name to the *Taedongsa*. The leaders of this successor association openly collaborated with the Japanese colonial government. In the end, the aims of the original association were largely abandoned and even the *Taedongsa* ceased all activity during World War II.

II. RELEVANCE FOR THE STUDY OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

The study of the *Hyongpyong* movement raises several issues of relevance to the analysis of social movements in general.

First of all, the development of the *Hyongpyongsa* as a movement inevitably required that we should pay close attention to the social conditions surrounding its activists and potential members, and it is of particular interest to consider how these conditions fit the dual perspective of "constraining" and "enabling" factors in the establishment and growth of a movement. The age-old discriminatory conventions against the *paekjong*, and the social and economic developments that threatened the privileges they had over their traditional industries, constitute the main "constraining" factors. The "enabling" factors lay in the *paekjong's* growing experience of public activities, in the growth of the social movement sector, and in the improved economic

capacity of the *paekjong* as a group to provide the necessary resources to establish and maintain the *Hyongpyongsa*. It would be difficult to render a coherent account of the birth of the *Hyongpyongsa* without stressing the interaction of these two sets of factors. Thus the study fully confirms the value of the two concepts.

Secondly, the realisation of a social movement requires committed activists with pre-existing communication networks---in other words, it requires what I have thought of as a "detonating group". In the case of the *Hyongpyong* movement, this group consisted partly of professional social movement activists and partly of wealthy *paekjong*. It was this "detonating group" which launched the new activities aimed at liberating the *paekjong* and mobilising them as members of the association. Even though the role of the early leading activists was soon to change and the leaders themselves were to be largely replaced by more practical activists, it seems clear that the "detonating group" played a quite crucial part in launching the *Hyongpyong* movement.

Thirdly, the process of any social movement naturally takes place in the context of its times, and the case of the *Hyongpyong* movement is a telling illustration of the importance of paying close attention to the external environment of a movement. It is abundantly clear that the *Hyongpyong* movement was enormously influenced by the favourable support of other

social movement groups and by the hostile opposition of "narrow-minded conservative" members of the society. Its relations with various different groups played a key part in determining its own course and greatly affected the internal processes and dynamics of the *Hyongpyongsa*.

Fourthly, a social movement has to be assessed in the context of the type of state in which it is developed. The government of the day constitutes a major integral part of its external environment. In the case of the *Hyongpyong* movement, the harsh autocratic rule of the Japanese colonial government had an enormous impact on the nature of ^{the} movement as a whole. Thus, for example, the issues raised by the Koryo Revolutionary Party and *Hyongpyong* Youth Vanguard League affairs cannot be appreciated without taking into account the nature of the colonial regime. This is obvious, and the general point which needs to be stressed is that social movements in general are likely to follow rather different courses in democratic and non-democratic states.

These several points are naturally interrelated, but each on its own points to the need to view social movements from both historical and sociological perspectives. And this is all the more so when we appreciate the fact that all the above points are so closely related to the others that we cannot easily consider them in isolation. Thus the analysis of a social movement demands more than interdisciplinary collaboration between history and sociology; it calls for

a historical sociological approach which disregards any possible boundary between the two disciplines.

Following on the advocacy of such a historical sociological approach, we may pose a final question: why did the *Hyongpyong* movement not develop in the north of Korea as it did in the south?

III. WHY INACTIVE IN THE NORTH?

After its foundation in Chinju, the *Hyongpyongsa's* influence developed rapidly in the southern and middle areas of the country, but scarcely so in the northern region. In 1923, there was only one branch, Pakch'on, in the north,¹ and in the following years, there were only a few more. In P'yŏng-Nam Province there was a regional headquarters in P'yŏngyang,² and a butcher's union in Anju.³ In Hamgyong, some branches were launched in the mid 1920s. In Hamhŭng,⁴ Sinp'o⁵ and Wŏnsan,⁶ the *Hyongpyongsa* members were able to maintain some activity. In Hwanghae Province, there were some *Hyongpyongsa* activities in Anak,⁷ Chaeryong⁸ and Chinnamp'o.⁹

1 Tonga Ilbo, 20 July 1923.

2 Tonga Ilbo, 10 June 1924.

3 Choson Ilbo, 26 February 1925.

4 Tonga Ilbo, 5 September 1925.

5 Tonga Ilbo, 27 August 1925.

6 Choson Ilbo, 3 January 1925.

7 The branch was launched in January 1926. Tonga Ilbo, 19 January 1926.

8 After founding the branch in October 1926, there was some conflict with opponents in 1927. Choson Ilbo, 25 October 1926; 8 January and 2 March 1927.

Yet, compared with the south, all of these taken together represent a low level of activity. This was so despite repeated attempts by the national leaders to stimulate and develop greater support and enthusiasm in the north. This regional difference was accompanied by a much lower level of conflict between *Hyongpyongsa* members and ordinary people in the north than in the south.

In an attempt to explain the disparity, we need to turn again to the social conditions posited as relevant to the development of social movements in terms of the framework outlined Chapter 1: the social constraints that provoke movements, the capacity of potential members to carry out a movement, and the resources available.

As shown in Table 2-1 in Chapter 2, the number of *paekjong* in P'yŏngan and Hamgyŏng Provinces was appreciably lower than in the rest of the country, (6.5% and 1% of the total population respectively). Their lower representation was probably one factor making it more difficult for the leaders to mobilise them for local activities. However, the case of Hwanghae where there was larger number of *paekjong* (15.5% of total) still poses a question, particularly when compared with the situation in Kangwŏn Province (5.6 % of total)---an adjacent area immediately to the south---where the movement was very active. (I return to this contrast below)

^a In Chinnamp'o some trouble with ordinary people was reported in 1924. Sidae Ilbo, 10 August 1924.

In regard to the "constraining" factors, there is little evidence on the kind of circumstances under which the *paekjong* had formerly lived in the north. But it would seem that social discrimination and prejudice against them had largely been eroded.¹⁰ It would also seem that the *paekjong* were not as residentially segregated, if at all, as in the south.¹¹ On the other hand, the seeming absence of discrimination and segregation was not---as far as we can tell---associated with better social and economic living conditions. As we saw in Chapter 2, a number of *paekjong* in the south had successfully developed businesses in the meat and leather trades, whereas virtually all in the north remained poor as slaughterers and wickerworkers. On the other hand, a fair number in Hwanghae had become integrated into the farming community, and this was rather exceptional both in the north and the south.

It would thus seem that the failure of the *Hyongpyongsa* leaders to stimulate the northern *paekjong* was related to the combination of less discrimination and poorer economic conditions. This combination perhaps also accounts for the fact that there were few *paekjong* activists in the north. Except for Song T'aeksŏng and Mun Kilwŏn from Pakch'ŏn and P'yŏngyang, both of whom were elected to the central committee on one occasion only, in

¹⁰ Interview with Kim Yŏngdae, a descendant of the *paekjong*, on 15 January 1986.

¹¹ No *paekjong* village was reported in Japanese records. cf. Chosen Sotokufu, *Chosen no Gunshu* [Mass of Korea], (Seoul, 1926), pp.306-308.

1924,¹² there were no active representatives from the north in the national movement. And even Song and Mun were excluded from the executive after 1924.

We may also note that the *paekjong* in the north were less educated than their fellows in the south. (See Table 7-11) Even though the evidence on this point is scanty and unreliable, it does seem to be in keeping with what we do know about the *paekjong* in the region. All in all, it would thus seem that there was no equivalent in the north to the "detonating group" in the south.

The general point also receives some support from the contrast between the adjacent Provinces of Kangwon and Hwanghae. There were several key members from Kangwon Province (e.g. Kil Manhak, Yi Ch'unbok and Ch'ŏn Kulp'il), but none comparable to them from Hwanghae Province.

All this evidence, inadequate and incomplete as it may be, would seem to be in keeping with the general interpretation made in this thesis on the operation of "constraining" and "enabling" factors. Despite clear evidence of support for the *Hyongpyongsa* in the north from other social movement groups,¹³ there was relatively

¹² Tonga Ilbo, 19 August 1924; Choson Ilbo, 20 August 1924.

¹³ For example, there was obviously support from other social movement groups in Wonsan (Sidae Ilbo, 28 December 1925 and Tonga Ilbo, 28 December 1925), Munch'ŏn (Tonga Ilbo, 14 February 1926), Yŏnghŭng (Choson Ilbo, 6 February 1926 and Tonga Ilbo, 8 February 1926), Kowŏn (Chungwoe Ilbo, 13 March 1928 and Tonga Ilbo, 14 March 1928) and Uiju (Tonga Ilbo, 12 April 1928 and Choson Ilbo, 13 April 1928).

little response from the *paekjong*. We are therefore left to conclude that the poor response from northern *paekjong* can be accounted for by the absence of the kind of prerequisite social conditions that prevailed in the south.

IV. HISTORICAL EVALUATION OF THE *HYONGPYONG* MOVEMENT

We may now attempt to evaluate the *Hyongpyong* movement in the context of the times and of the longer history of Korean society. The initial aims and purposes of the *Hyongpyong* were (a) to establish the "human rights" of the *paekjong* and to emancipate them from their stigmatised status, and (b) to try to re-establish their strong sense of belonging to a close-knit community based on their traditional industries.

The extent to which the movement was "successful" or "unsuccessful" is, however, difficult to evaluate in categorical terms. Any attempt to do so must take into account a whole series of outcomes in relation to both its general and its more specific goals, as well as the impact on its public image and on the way in which it was perceived by all members of the society.¹⁴ In the public sphere, the movement achieved a great deal. By the early

¹⁴ Joseph R. Gusfield, "The Modernity of Social Movements: Public Roles and Private Parts," in Amos Howle (ed.), *Societal Growth* (New York, Free Press, 1980), pp.290-307.

1930s institutional discrimination against the *paekjong* no longer existed in principle and had in practice become unacceptable to many members of the wider society. The marks depicting *paekjong* status in the government registers were officially banned. The schools were enrolling *paekjong* children as a matter of course; symbols of inferior status were no longer worn. In addition, the private lives of members as well as of non-members had been deeply affected.

Even though conflicts between supporters and opponents of the *Hyongpyongsa* still occurred, there had been considerable change in the social consciousness both of the *paekjong* and of ordinary people. The *paekjong* no longer tolerated discriminatory attitudes and forms of speech by ordinary people. They had enthusiastically and successfully co-operated in demanding an improvement in their status and discriminatory conventions had been almost fully eroded. Increasing numbers of ordinary people, including social activists from other groups, had supported them and championed their cause. The change had taken place progressively. In this respect, however, it is interesting to note that, as late as 1932, it was still considered newsworthy that the headmaster of a school in Kwangju, Kyonggi Province, had carried the coffin of a *paekjong*'s wife.¹⁵

However, the movement's attempts to regain the privileges of members over their traditional industries

¹⁵ Tonga Ilbo, 18 December 1932.

and its aim of consolidating *paekjong* community fellowship do not seem to have been realised to any appreciable extent. Up to the last days of the *Taedongsa*, economic matters remained a major concern. Even though they discussed several programmes to pursue this aim, and succeeded in establishing a few, the *Taedongsa* made little headway in the face of the tough stance adopted by the Japanese colonial power. And the turmoils of the 1920s and 1930s afforded little opportunity for the reconstruction of the *paekjong* community. In the context of the political and social upheaval of the period, it is scarcely surprising that, as members achieved progressive measures of public liberation and personal emancipation, the maintenance and reconstruction of community bonds became more and more difficult to envisage as a realistic social prospect.

After the end of the *Taedongsa*, another attempt was made to re-launch an association under the title, *P'yŏnguhoe* [Equal Friends Society].¹⁶ The association was initiated by Chang Yongje, a son of Chang Chip'il, and was obviously intended to follow the *Hyongpyongsa* and the *Taedongsa*. However, little was heard of it and it does not seem to have achieved anything.

In the light of our analytic framework, the unsuccessful maintenance of the association seems to ~~reflect~~ ^{imply that} the social conditions constituting the "constraining" and "enabling" factors in earlier days

¹⁶ Interview with Kim Yŏngdae (15 January 1986 in Ch'onan).

were no longer relevant, in the sense that "*paekjong*" identity and status had changed and probably had little meaning under the conditions of World War II and of the uncertain period that followed it up to and including the Korean War of 1950-1953. In present-day Korea the *paekjong* are no longer a recognisable social minority.

However, the extent to which the *paekjong* were liberated by their own efforts, and the extent to which their identity was dissolved by pervasive trends within Korean society as a whole since the formation of the *Hyongpyongsa*, may well remain unanswerable questions.

Appendix I.

The Content Analysis of Newspaper Materials.

As explained in Chapter 1, this work is largely based on contemporary newspaper reports on the *Hyongpyongsa* and its activities. Under the circumstances of having virtually no other documentary materials on the *Hyongpyong* movement as a whole, and with very few surviving activists whom I could interview, newspaper reports became my main source for tracing the history of the movement and gaining an overall view of the *Hyongpyongsa*. As pointed out in Chapter 1, newspaper reports inevitably have severe limitations for research processes. But I proceeded in the hope that the very full coverage which they provided over time and geographically would enable me to reconstruct a broad historical profile.

During the first stage of my research I had collected all newspapers reports on the *Hyongpyongsa* from 1920 to 1940. The total number of reports I found was over 2,000. Such a large number obviously helped to give good coverage, but it also presented me with a major problem. How was I to use such extensive and detailed materials? The reports covered numerous varied events, such as national and local meetings (often including their agenda), the names of *Hyongpyongsa* office holders at the national, regional and local levels, and so on.

They referred to highly scattered activities and the information seemed to me to be so fragmented that at first I found it difficult to see how I could use it as a whole. In an attempt to deal with the problem, I established a computerised data base.

I first established categories relating to the dates of events, their localities, and the names of all participants. I then set up sub-categories of events and topics, such as meetings, conflicts with ordinary people, factional disputes, Japanese intervention and relations with other social movements. When I had fed all these into the computer, it was easy for me to trace sequences in chronological order, to sort out events according to the localities in which they took place, and the like. Such exercises proved invaluable in tracing all manner of differences and similarities between events, the origins and characteristics of individual leaders and many other participants, the histories of branches in given areas, and so on.

Without the use of the computer, it would have been a quite monumental and almost impossible task to place people and events in chronological or any other significant orders.

I naturally do not claim that the newspaper sources I used are complete or unbiased. I do, however, consider that their comprehensive content analysis made possible by the computer and the method I used allows us to draw for more inferences of value than textual reading on its

own could ever do. I was myself exceedingly surprised to see how much interpretation became possible by combining content and computer analysis. This approach may, I suggest, prove useful and well worthwhile in all cases of historical research where other primary data are largely lacking.

As an example of the newspaper coverage found on various events, limited sections of the entire chronological sequence are given in Appendix 3. The full list ran to some 46 pages.

Appendix 2

Glossary

ch'ilban kongch'ŏn	철반공천
Ch'ondogyo	천도교
Chŏngjin	정진
Ch'ŏngnyŏnhoe	청년회
ch'ŏnmin	천민
Chŏngŭibu	정의부
Chŏngwidan	정위단
Choson [Chosŏn]	조선
Chosŏn Ch'ŏngnyŏn Ch'ong Tongmaeng	조선 청년 총동맹
Chosŏn Minjung Taehoe	조선 민중 대회
Chosŏn Nonong Ch'ong Tongmaeng	조선 노농 총동맹
Chosŏn Sahoe Tanch'e Chungang Hyopuihoe	조선 사회 단체 중앙 협의회
Hanyang Ch'ŏngnyŏn Tongmaeng	한양 청년 동맹
hejang	혜장
hoejasu	회자수
hwach'ŏk	화척
Hwayohoe	화요회
Hyŏnggi	형기
Hyongpyongsa [Hyŏngpyŏngsa]	형평사
Hyŏngpyŏng Ch'ŏngnyŏnhoe	형평 청년회
Hyŏngpyŏng Haku Ch'ong Tongmaeng	형평 학우 동맹
Hyŏngpyŏng Yŏsŏng Tonguhoe	형평 여성 동우회
Hyŏngpyŏngsa Ch'ong Ponbu	형평사 총본부
Hyŏngpyŏngsa Hyŏksin Tongmaeng	형평사 혁신 동맹

ijŏk	이적
kaljabi	칼잡이
Kapo Reform	갑오개혁
katbach'i	갓바치
kisaeng	기생
kŏgoljang	거골장
kori-paekjong	고리백정
Koryo [Koryŏ]	고려
kŏsa	거사
kwangdae	광대
mudang	무당
naein	내인
Nodong Kongjehoe	노동 공제회
Nodong Taehoe	노동 대회
nongch'ŏng	농청
noryŏng	노령
ogach'ŏng	오가청
p'aelaengi	패랭이
p'alban sach'ŏn	팔반 사천
p'ijang	피장
p'igong	피공
P'yŏnghoe	평우회
paekjong [paekjŏng]	백정
Pukp'unghoe	북풍회
Puksŏnghoe	북성회
sadang	사당
sangmin	상민
Sin'ganhoe	신간회
sin-paekjŏng	신백정
Sŏgwanghoe	서광회

Such'ŏk	수척
Sup'yŏng Tongmaenghoe	수평 동맹회
Taedongsa	대동사
tohan	도한
tojung	도중
Tonghak	동학
Tongin kongjesa	동인 공제사
Tonginhoe	동인회
Tongnip Hyŏphoe	독립 협회
tubŏl-paekjŏng	두벌 백정
tulremŏri	둘레 머리
Ŭibyŏng	의병
yangban	양반
yangmin	양민
yangsuch'ŏk	양수척
yŏkjol	역졸
yŏngwi	영위
yŏsagun	여사군
yugijang	유기장

Appendix 3

Illustration Extracts from the Chronicle of the *Hyongpyong* Movement Established on the Basis of Newspaper Reports and Articles

- 24 April 1923. The promotion meeting to launch the *Hyongpyongsa* in Chinju in the presence of about 70 *paekjong*. On the following day, they held an inaugural meeting for the society.
- 11 May 1923. The first local branch of the *Hyongpyongsa* founded in Iri, Chŏn-Puk, entitled *Tonginhoe* [Equal Human Society]. (Later the title was changed to local branch of the *Hyongpyongsa*.)
- 13 May 1923. The celebration gathering in Chinju in the presence of delegates from the *paekjong* communities in Kyŏng-Nam Province and influentials from *paekjong* communities in other provinces.
- 21 May 1923. A large regional meeting held in Taejon, Ch'ung-Nam Province. Those attending at the meeting were mostly from Ch'ungch'ŏng and Chŏlla areas. After the meeting the executive of the Chinju headquarters launched a campaign for expanding the *Hyongpyongsa* in these areas.
- 24 May 1923. The first massive hostile opposition against the *Hyongpyongsa* began in Chinju.
- 14 August 1923. A hostile attack on the *Hyongpyongsa* and its members took place in Kimhae.
- 7 November 1924. A special meeting, held in Taejŏn, Ch'ung-Nam Province, of the delegates, mostly from the middle areas of the country.
- 10-11 February 1924. A special national meeting in Pusan for discussing current issues, including the location of the headquarters.
- 12 March 1924. The leaders of the *Hyongpyong Hyŏksinhoe* [Reformist Society] held a promotion meeting of their society in Ch'onan, Ch'ung-Nam Province.
- 31 March 1924. The first Youth Society within the *Hyongpyongsa* founded in Chinju.

- 25 April 1924. The factional dispute resulted in two separate celebrations of the first anniversary, held in Seoul and Chinju respectively.
- 9 July 1924. Tension between *paekjong* and non-*paekjong* children at a school in Ipjang, Ch'ung-Nam Province, led to severe conflict between the two groups in the village.
- 23 July 1924. Talks between the leaders of the two factions took place in Taejŏn where they agreed to hold a national meeting on 15 August.
- 15 August 1924. Special national meeting in Taejon, mainly for unifying the two factions.
- 16 December 1924. All copies of the first issue of *Hyongpyong*, the official journal of the *Hyongpyongsa*, were confiscated.
- 1 January 1925. The promotion meeting of the *Chŏngwidan* [Righteous Defence Unit] convened in Seoul. The Unit formally launched on 10 January.
- 23 March 1925. The Chinju headquarters decided to participate in the Korean People's Rally which was planned by a prominent socialist group, *Hwayohoe* [[Tuesday Society]. The *Chonghaengdan* [Righteous Behaviour Unit] launched.
- 24-25 April 1925. The third annual national conference and the second anniversary celebration held in Seoul with the support of both factions.
- 12 July 1925. The Seoul headquarters joined in the relief of flood victims, providing meals.
- 4 August 1925. The launch of the *Hyongpyong* Students Union in Taejon.
- 8 August 1925. The attack against the *Hyongpyongsa* and its members started in Yech'on, Kyŏng-Puk Province, and continued for several days.
- 16 December 1925. The Promotion meeting of the Youth Federation Society of the *Hyongpyongsa* in Seoul, with the aim of uniting all youth groups within the *Hyongpyongsa*.
- 10 January 1926. The first anniversary of the *Chŏngwidan* in Seoul.
- 24-25 April 1926. The fourth annual national conference and the third anniversary in Seoul.
- 10 May 1926. The foundation of the *Hyongpyong Yosong Tonguhoe* [Women Friendship Society] in Kanggyong, Ch'ung-Nam Province.

- 11 August 1926. The second annual national meeting of the *Hyongpyong* Students Society in Taejon.
- Early January 1927. Key members of the Koryo Revolutionary Party arrested and sent to prison in Sinuiju. They were formally prosecuted on 27 January 1927.
- 24-25 April 1927. The fifth annual national conference and the fourth anniversary held in Seoul.
- 9 August 1927. The third annual meeting of the *Hyongpyong* Student Society held in Ch'onan, Ch'ung-Nam Province.
- 17 December 1927. The *Hyongpyong* Youth Society of Kaesong, Kyonggi Province, decided to dissolve itself.
- 19 December 1927. The primary trial on the Koryo Revolutionary Party affair started in Sinuiju.
- 20 April 1928. The defendants involved in the Koryo Revolutionary Party affair sentenced in Sinuiju. Chang Chip'il and Cho Kwiyong, both found not guilty, released from prison on 25 April 1927.
- 24-25 April 1928. The sixth annual national conference and fifth anniversary held in Seoul.
- 26 April 1928. The annual national meeting of the *Hyongpyong* Youth Federation held in Seoul. Delegates decided to dissolve the federation and local branches followed their decision.
- 6 October 1928. The secondary trial on the Koryo Revolutionary Party affair started in P'yongyang. Sentence passed on 18 October 1928.
- 11 February 1929. The *Hyongpyong* Industry Firm was launched at a special meeting in Onyang, Ch'ung-Nam Province.
- 24 April 1929. The seventh annual national conference and the sixth anniversary held in Seoul. (The proposed agenda were banned by the police and the meeting reduced from two days to one.)
- 1 May 1929. The publication of the first issue of the official journal, *Ch'ongjin* [Right Progress].
- 24-25 April 1930. The eighth annual national conference and the seven anniversary held in Seoul. The dispute between the "radicals" and the "progressive reformers" came to the surface.
- March 1931. The Suwon branch proposed the dissolution of the *Hyongpyong*sa in an attempt to alter the general direction of the movement.

- 24-25 April 1931. The ninth annual national conference and the eighth anniversary held in Seoul. The dissolution proposal was turned down.
- 24-25 April 1932. The tenth annual national conference and the ninth anniversary held in Seoul.
- 24 January 1933. Young leaders began to be arrested on charges relating to the *Hyongpyong* Youth Vanguard League in Kwangju.
- 24-25 April 1933. The eleventh annual national conference and the tenth anniversary held in Seoul. The *Tongin Kongjesa* [Members Mutual Benefit Society] was launched.
- 31 July 1933. Members charged with involvement in the *Hyongpyong* Youth Vanguard League formally prosecuted in Kwangju.
- 24 April 1934. The twelfth annual national conference and the eleventh anniversary held in Seoul.
- 24 April 1935. The annual national conference and anniversary held in Seoul. The title was changed to *Taedongsa* [Great Equality Society].
- 11 January 1936. A national meeting of the *Taedongsa* in Taejon. The transformation of the main goal of the society to economic concerns was confirmed.
- 20 March 1936. All defendants in the *Hyongpyong* Youth Vanguard League affair were found not guilty by the primary jury in Kwangju.
- 24 April 1936. The annual national conference and anniversary of the *Taedongsa* held in Seoul.
- 21 November 1936. All defendants of the *Hyongpyong* Youth Vanguard League affair were found not guilty by the secondary jury in Taegu, Kyong-Puk Province.
- 25 April 1938. The anniversary of the *Taedongsa* in Pusan, Kyong-Nam Province.
- 9 July 1938. The *Taedongsa* donated a war plane to the Japanese army.
- 24 April 1939. The national annual conference of the *Taedongsa* in Taejon.
- 22 March 1940. The last reports on any *Taedongsa* activity appeared in the newspapers when its representatives visited Japanese officials to negotiate issues on meat prices and leather.

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