THE UNIVERSITY OF HULL

BUREAUCRATIC ELITE IN EGYPT:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

being a Thesis submitted for the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in the University of Hull

by

ZOHAIR ABDEL SALAM MOSTAFA

B.(Com.), Cairo University
M.A. (Public Admin.) American University
M.A. (Econ.) Manchester University

April, 1979

CONTENTS

PREFACE

It has been my long-standing interest since I joined the
Central Agency for Organisation and Administration of Egypt in
1966 and later the Institute of Public Administration (now the
National Institute of Management Development), to study and write
about the Egyptian bureaucratic elite. Perhaps I developed this
interest out of my continuous contact, as a faculty member of the
above-mentioned Institute, with the Egyptian bureaucratic elite.
I always contended that the bureaucratic elite in Egypt, as else-
where, plays a crucial role in socio-economic and political
development.

My interest was further strengthened by Professor Berger's
study of the Egyptian higher civil servants made in 1954. Professor
Berger's study, the starting point of the present research, was
considered as a pioneering empirical work. Professor Berger's
ground-breaking survey of the higher civil servants in a non-Western
society added to my interest and stimulus for doing a study along
broadly similar lines. As will be seen later, however, the present
study is a modest attempt to go beyond Professor Berger's theoretical
framework.

The present study provides me with the right opportunity to
satisfy my old interest, drawing upon my years of experience with
the Egyptian bureaucracy and its elite. The data in this study, how-
ever, are based, in the main, on interviews I have conducted in Egypt
in 1975 with Egyptian higher civil servants.

The broad aim of the present study is to provide a detailed
characterisation of the Egyptian bureaucratic elite of contemporary
Egypt and to examine the role of this elite in socio-economic and

political development.

* * * * * * *

In an endeavour such as this, the researcher owes a great
deal to a variety of people for rendered help either directly or
indirectly. It would have been difficult to contemplate under-
taking this study, much less contemplating it, without the co-
operation of many Egyptian higher civil servants who willingly
gave their time for interviews and offered so much enlightment
on administration in Egypt. Because they were assured of total
anonymity, I can do no more than express my gratitude to them
collectively.

My intellectual debts are numerous, foremost among these is
my indebtedness to Professor C.H. Dodd, Head, Department of Political
Studies, the University of Hull. To him, I owe deep gratitude and
admiration, not only for his valuable advice and assistance in the
preparation of this study, but for his continuing confidence and
support which he has given to me over the course of the years.

Another intellectual debt is owed to Professor Morroe Berger
for the contribution that he has made to the field of public
administration in the Middle East through his book, Bureaucracy and
Society in Modern Egypt. To my former Professor at the University
of Manchester, I owe still another special intellectual debt. I am
particularly indebted to Professors Dennis Austin and S.E. Finer, who
first introduced me to the field of comparative politics and
administration. The impact of their lectures and advice grows rather
than diminish with each passing year.

I am also grateful to the Central Agency for Organisation and
Administration, the Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and
Statistics, The National Institute for Management Development of
Egypt, the British Council and the Egyptian Government whose help,

financial and otherwise, made it possible for me to do the things necessary to complete this work.

My thanks are extended to Miss Julie Morris and Mrs Nesta Morris who typed the manuscript with admirable skill and dedication. Finally, I must acknowledge the gracious patience, encouragement, and faith of my wife and daughter.

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE   PAGE

LIST OF FIGURES AND DIAGRAMS

PART ONE

INTRODUCTION AND

OVERVIEW OF EGYPTIAN

BUREAUCRACY AND SOCIETY

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Comtemporary public administration in the developing countries of the world is a subject of vital importance. The public bureaucracies of these countries have been called upon to bear much of the burden for two fundamental and inter-related goals: nation-building and socio-economic progress.[1] Direct participation in these two areas of governmental activity has placed the public bureaucracy in a position of being one of the most valued assets possessed by a developing nation. In this context of highly valuable and influential bureaucracies, public servants, particularly in the higher echelons, gain additional importance, playing key roles in all phases of the developmental process. As a strategic elite, higher bureaucrats actively mould social and economic institutions and set major political courses. Their values and attitudes, reflected in the making of public policy, affecting almost every individual in the nation.

The significance of bureaucracy and the bureaucratic elite in a country like Egypt can hardly be over-emphasised. Observers have often pointed, if only briefly, to the prominence of the Egyptian bureaucracy in the national political and developmental process. Ilyia Harik noted that Egyptian commitment to radical change has been primarily the responsibility of state officials, acting through old and new administrative structures.[2] Relating the same point to the entire historical trend, Amos Permutter observed that Nasser and

---

[1] Milton J. Esman, "The Politics of Development Administration," in John D. Montgomery and William J. Siffin (eds.) Approaches to Development (New York: McGraw Hill Co., 1963), p.59.

[2] Ilyia Harik, "Political Mobilisation and Social Change," in Ilyia Harik and Richard Antoun (eds.) Rural Politics and Social Change in the Middle East (Bloomington, Ind: Indiana University Press, 1972), p.300.

his followers have created bureaucracies for the modernisation of
the country and this is in line with Egypt's entire history.[1]
Discussing the integrative revolution, Leonard Binder described the
Egyptian political system as a Modernising Autocracy dominated by
a bureaucratically-oriented elite.[2]

There has been, however, a major dispute among many scholars
in the field of comparative administration regarding the bureaucracy's
role in society and in the political process. Two views concerning
the role of bureaucracy and bureaucratic elites in a political system
have gained especially wide currency. The first, which is held by some
observers in third world states, claims that the political leaders
frequently make important policy decisions without the advice of
their civil servants, and that they (i.e., the political leaders) tend
to interfere to an excessive degree in even the detailed execution
of the policies which they have set down.[3] In other words, the bureau-
cracy is regarded as totally subordinate to the political leaders.
This view contrasts rather markedly with that held by most Western
observers, who like Fred Riggs, generally believe that the political
function tends to be appropriated, in considerable measure, by the
bureaucrats in the new states.[4] Phrased differently, the bureaucracy
according to the latter view, is seen as being an all-powerful, and
hence an autonomous institution in the new states.

---

[1] Amos Perlmutter, "Egypt and The Myth of the New Middle Class:
A Comparative Analysis," Comparative Study in Society and History,
Vol.1. No. 1,(October, 1967), p.350.

[2] Leonard Binder, "Egypt: The Integrative Revolution,"in Lucien
Pye and Sidney Verba (eds.) Political Culture and Political Development
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1969), p.448.

[3] See, for example, A.L. Adu, The Civil Service in the New
African States (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1965), p.231.

[4] See, for example, Fred Riggs, "Bureaucrats and Political
Development: A Paradoxical View," in Joseph La Palombara (ed.)
Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1963), p.120.

There can be little doubt that these two extreme views - subordination and autonomy - of the role of the bureaucracy in a political system have led to a deplorable result: they have impeded the study of the bureaucracy as an integral and dynamic part of the political system and the society at large. That it is to say that the bureaucracy has seldom been regarded as an institution that functions within the wider politico-administrative environment. If, however, the bureaucracy is regarded as an institution which interacts with other institutions in a society, it becomes easier to understand why a governmental bureaucracy cannot be described as either totally subservient or totally autonomous. As usual, the reality is far more intricate.

The broad objective of this study is to provide a detailed characterisation of the Egyptian bureaucratic elite and to examine the role of this elite in the political and developmental process. This study represents an attempt to focus on the Egyptian higher civil servants as an integral part of the politico-administrative system.

To achieve this objective, one must consider several important questions - First: what role do the Egyptian bureaucracy and bureaucratic elite play in policy-making in the field of economic and social development? Second: do the Egyptian bureaucracy and bureaucratic elite really want economic and social, including administrative development - in what form and to what extent? What are their attitudes to the values of modern economic, social and administrative life? Third: to achieve this economic and social development, do the Egyptian bureaucracy and bureaucratic elite really act developmentally? Or, more precisely, are its present activities building a base for future economic and social development? Such are some of the fundamental questions underlying this study.

The characterisation and the role of the Egyptian bureaucratic elite in the national developmental and political process are

principally examined through a five-pronged approach: (a) by analysing in some detail the historical, political, economic and social development of Egyptian society; (b) by examining the social and educational background of this elite; (c) by identifying career and value orientations and the extent of professionalisation and bureaucratisation among the elite; (d) by analysing the characteristics of its bureaucratic organisation particularly in the higher echelons; (e) by exploring the attitudes of this strategic elite towards development.

In undertaking a study of this sort, the student of the Egyptian public administration might be fortunate in that a study of higher civil servants in Egypt along broadly similar lines was made in 1954 by Professor Morroe Berger.[1] There is therefore an opportunity to make a general comparison of the results of this ivestigation with that made by Professor Berger. Such a longitudinal comparison would help to establish the more permanent features of the Egyptian public administration and to assess the changing role, if any, of the higher civil servants in Egyptian society. Comparison will also be made so far as possible with the results of studies of other nations' bureaucratic elites. Whilst these studies are unfortunately not plentiful, nor always strictly comparable, they are utilised whenever possible to suggest conclusions of wider significance.

There are, in addition, several factors that point to the need for a study of this type, and they fall into two categories: theoretical and practical.

Starting with the theoretical, the present study falls within the realm of comparative administration. More specifically, it falls within the realm of middle-range theory of bureaucracy, in spite of the

---

[1] See Morroe Berger, Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt, A study of the Higher Civil Service (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957). See also his "Bureaucracy East and West," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. I, No. 9 (March, 1957).

fact that it is primarily a study of Egyptian higher civil servants.

It has been suggested that to "bite off smaller chunks of reality

and research these extensively" will be a more feasible, useful and

practical undertaking.[1] Such an approach can be far more fruitful

since it tries to combine both theory and research, a synthesis

necessary for the development of comparative administrative theory.[2]

Actually middle-range theorising involves the explicit statement of

premises, theories, working hypotheses, definitions, and findings

so that the research can be judged and also built upon by others

in the field.[3]

As a matter of fact, it was primarily along the middle-range

theory movement that the previously-cited Berger's study of 1954

was conducted. Since the research design of the present study starts

with Berger's original work and falls within the realm of middle-

range theory, an attempt will be made to analyse his theoretical

formulations. One of the primary theoretical interests of the present

study, however, is the effort to go beyond Professor Berger's

theoretical formulations. After briefly discussing and evaluating

his theoretical framework, an attempt will be made to revise it in

the light of recent developments in bureaucratic theory and research

with a view to utilising it, in its revised form, in the study of

---

[1] Robert V. Presthus "Behaviour and Bureaucracy in Many Cultures," Public Administration Review, Vol.XIX (Winter, 1959), p.26.

[2] It is perhaps worth noting that three basic and very distinct trends could be distinguished within the area of comparative administration during recent years: i) a movement for the establishment of a number of typologies of bureaucracies, ii) a trend for theoretical formulations and model-building, and finally iii) an attempt to use and develop middle-range theories for the improvement of both comparative administration theory and research.

[3] Presthus, op.cit., p.26.

the higher civil service.[1]

Another theoretical consideration that needs to be mentioned here is that pertaining to the political role of bureaucracy and the bureaucratic elite in developing countries. Several theories and models have been advanced in the literature on this important subject. Typical of these are Fred Riggs' "imbalance proposition" regarding bureaucracy and other political institutions in "prismatic" society and Alfred Diamant's "movement regime model."[2] Drawing upon the survey data collected in Egypt, an attempt will be made to compare these two theories or models, among others, with Egyptian political reality.

On the practical side of the picture, there seem to be several reasons for undertaking this study. Being an emergent society, in which events and consequences occur at a faster pace than in a more stable setting, Egypt should offer an illuminating case study of the bureaucratic elite as it affects economic and social development, and of the institutions and social processes through which higher civil servants are generated. This type of research may contribute to the study of the relationship between the higher civil service (as an elite) and social change.

---

[1] It should be emphasised at this point that although the theoretical formulation of the present study is different from that of Professor Berger, an attempt will be made to present comparisons between the findings of this research and those of Professor Berger in view of the fact that both descriptive and analytical methods are employed throughout this study.

[2] See inter alia, Fred Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries, The Theory of Prismatic Society (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1964) his "Bureaucratic Politics in Comparative Perspective," in Fred Riggs (ed.) Frontiers of Development Administration (Durham: Duke University Press, 1970) and his "Administrative Reform and Political Responsiveness. A Theory of Dynamic Balancing" Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics, 1 ser. 01-010 (1970). See also Alfred Diamant, "Bureaucracy in Development Movement Regimes in" Fred Riggs (ed.) Frontiers of Development Administration, op.cit.

Moreover, this study may contribute to the understanding of the problems of selection, recruitment and training of higher civil servants. Closely related to this point, this study will suggest to policy-makers some of the shortcomings of the present educational system in relation to development needs. Finally, the Egyptian experience may contain some lessons for policy-makers interested in creating a supply of bureaucratic and administrative leadership elsewhere.

In order to provide answers to the questions posed earlier, a dual research strategy is employed. In its simplest form, this strategy is a combination of both historical and cultural data as well as a questionnaire survey. With regard to the former, the origins of the Egyptian bureaucracy will be traced from ancient times, through the Ottoman Turkish domination of the major civil service posts until the British intervention in 1882 which, as will be seen, introduced reforms in the area of administration but not in the political or social sectors. Moreover, the social, economic and political conditions of contemporary Egypt will be analysed in an attempt to identify the environmental setting in which the Egyptian bureaucratic elite functions and interacts.

The major part of this study is derived from replies to a questionnaire completed under interview conditions by four hundred Egyptian higher civil servants in 1975. In order to maintain comparability and to help develop a scientific understanding of bureaucracy, the questions were asked after careful perusal of

questions used in similar studies.[1] It is perhaps worth noting
that the two research techniques are not, in the main, mutually
exclusive, in that both are used as complementary to one another.
This is partly due to the fact that a survey cannot always provide
answers to all questions. Sometimes it can do little more than
to point to certain possible answers, and this only when account
has been taken of all available historical and cultural material.

It should be emphasised, moreover, that many of the conclusions
reached here, as well as certain reformulations of standard
interpretations of Egyptian politics, were suggested by the survey
that the present writer carried out and were drawn from the interview
material as well as from the explicit comments that the respondents
voluntarily made about the phenomena and issues being dealt with.
They generally had to be followed up in further interviews with the
more knowledgeable informants of our respondents. Moreover, an
attempt was made throughout to make judicious use of the survey
data and to place these data, within a theoretical, and where possible,
a comparative context.

---

[1] Selected questions included in the questionnaire used in
this study have previously been used in or adapted from the
following empirical studies: 1. Morroe Berger, Bureaucracy and
Society in Modern Egypt, op.cit.; 2. Leslie L. Roos and Noralou
P. Roos, Managers of Modernisation, Organisation and Elites in
Turkey (1950-1969). (Mass.,Cambridge: Harvard University Press
1971); 3. Frederick Bent, "The Turkish Bureaucracy as an Agent
of Change," Journal of Comparative Administration, Vol.I No.1
(May, 1969); 4. Muneer Ahmed The Civil Service of Pakistan
(Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1969); 5. Deil Wright and
R. McAnaw, American State Administrators (Department of Political
Science, The University of Iowe, Iowe City, Iowe 1965),
6. Lloyd Warner et al, The American Federal Executive, (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1963).

CHAPTER II

BUREAUCRATIC EVOLUTION IN EGYPT

This chapter sketches some of the more significant factors which underlie the development of Egypt's administrative pattern. This task is approached with the recognition that a background in the dimension of the time is basic to the understanding of the present.

Bureaucracy in Ancient Egypt

Egypt, called the historical model for all later bureaucracies by Max Weber[1] can trace its recorded history for nearly six thousand years. The records of the Old Empire (Ca. 2900 to 2475 B.C.) reflect a strong unitary state. Beyer, noting that the state was "at once bold in action and sophisticated in administration", speaks of the systematic training of government officials, of the development of an attractive career service with clear lines of promotion, and of a record of accomplishment (pyramids, river control) bespeaking efficiency.[2]

The early Empire was essentially a unitary state. True, it had local governments; but these were little more than administrative districts of the central government, at the head of which was a King, or Pharaoh, with absolute power. He was a god as well as a political ruler, and all power -- legislative, executive and judicial -- was vested in him. Moreover, the hierarchical structure of the state was highly centralised. Authority was from the top down in a line without interruption.

There is little doubt that all high officials were directly

---

[1] H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.) From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), p.204.

[2] William C. Beyer, "The Civil Service of the Ancient World," Public Administration Review, Vol. XIX, (Autumn, 1959), p.245.

appointed by the Pharaoh, responsible to him alone and holding office

subject to his divine pleasure. These officials consisted in part of

members of the Pharaoh's family, of whom there were always a great

many. Another source of recruitment to the bureaucratic elite was

the feudal land owning group.

Although the traditional behaviour of the Ancient Egyptian

Empire might seem to have discouraged any division of work, there was

no limit to the number of specialised jobs. "The beginning of history

marked a basic social change, in which the undifferentiated society

came to cluster around villages which were agriculture, political and

economic centres".[1]

Recognising the importance of division of labour in the system,

ancient Egyptians restricted a tradesman from pursuing a trade other than

that of his father and barred him from political life. In addition,

ancient writings indicate that Egyptian bureaucrats recognised the

importance of planning and value of staff.[2]

The ruling class was for the most part the only class eligible

to retain positions within the public bureaucracy. Below them spread

the vast world of the commoners. Its members shared a negative quality:

none of them was allowed to participate in the affairs of the state

apparatus. Division of labour among the commoners was related to the

preparatory (directed toward irregation) and protective operations

(directed toward flood control) for the maintenance of the waterways.[3]

The status and class systems during the Pharaonic rule were

[1] Mary F. Gyles, Pharaonic Policies and Administration, 633 to 323 B.C. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1959), p.87.

[2] For details see C.S. George, Jr., The History of Management Thought (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.; Prentice Hall, Inc. 1968), pp.6-9.

[3] For details see Karl Wittfogel, Oriential Despotism (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1957), p.27.

probably similar to those found in modern Egypt,

> "... where a man, (born) into one class, finds it difficult
> to gain entry into another class, even though his education
> and accomplishments may have alienated him entirely from the
> ways of his parents. There is no law against his change
> from one class to another. The restriction is social not
> legal."[1]

To be sure, government positions were very attractive as a career in ancient Egypt. Some scholars' observations have a contemporary ring. "In ancient Egypt," says A. Hocart, "to administer and to make a record are synonymous: the official is a scribe. Then, as now, government employment enjoyed the greatest prestige and appeared to offer the most desirable career, because it seemed an easy life compared with other occupations and ensured a steady livelihood from the government, or, as the ancients expressed it, 'from the King's house'."[2] "The civil servant," notes M. Kamal, "was valued better than the _fallah_ (peasant), the soldier, or even the priest."[3] "It is not surprising," writes Jean and Simonne Lacouture" that the masterpiece of Egyptian sculpture is not at all some goddess rising from the sea, nor an athlete throwing the discus. No, it is a sturdy masterful civil servant, with his round head and piercing eye and the firm tread of a man who knows how to make his word felt."[4]

As the prestige and power increased, the civil servants were perhaps more feared than respected. They seemed to be the people's masters rather than their servants.

---

[1] Gyles, _op.cit._, p.84.

[2] A. Hocart, "The Legacy of Modern Egypt," in S.R.Glanville (ed.) The Legacy of Egypt (London: Oxford University Press, 1942), p.375.

[3] M. Kamal, The Effects of the Pharaonic Civilisation on our Present Life (Cairo: Dar El Maaref, 1957), p.105 (In Arabic).

[4] Jean and Simonne Lacouture, Egypt in Transition (London: Methuen and Company, 1966), p.27.

In considering the bureaucratic evolution in Egypt, it is perhaps worth noting some facts. In the first place, there is the continuity of Egyptian history and civilisation. We shall see from our review of bureaucratic evolution that over a period of centuries Egypt has developed an absorptive capacity in her culture which even its conquerors - Persians, Greeks, Romans, Byzantines, Arabs, Ottoman Turks, French and British - were unable to resist.

With the end of the last Pharaonic dynasty, Egypt and the rest of the Middle East were dominated for nearly a thousand years by a Graeco - Roman culture. Then from Arabia, Islam broke upon this civilisation, accompanied by new religious and social values. But these and other foreign influences were not the occasion of radical transformations in the Egyptian society. Secondly, the social fabric of Egypt has, by and large, remained stable for centuries. Until the 1952 Revolution, no great upheavals nor violent revolutions threatened her social life.

Moreover, the Egyptian civilisation has generally been able to retain a substantial working balance between the old and the new - freely assimilating external and novel influences into the social fabric without suffering the basic structure to alter appreciably.

For example, the earlier authority structure that evolved in the Egyptian Empire of the Pharaonic dynasties was based upon the divine power of the King, has not significantly changed even in the modern era of Egyptian history. The absolute authority of Mohammed Ali in the nineteenth century A.D. cannot be appreciably differentiated from that of the Pharaohs. The Pharaoh was Egypt, but Mohammed Ali also had all authority in his hands. He set himself up as the only proprietor, manufacturer, businessman and administrator in all Egypt. The caliphate's authority during the Arab Administration era, on the other hand, differs only from the Pharaoh's absolute authority in its religious

interpretations. In its present form, the authority structure bears some resemblance to that of the Pharaoh or the Caliph.

Arab-Islamic Administration in Egypt

One of the most significant and pervasive sources of modern Egyptian political culture is the Arab-Islam period. The Muslim community that came into existence with the advance of Islam was based on certain principles, chief among which are the following :

1. When the sovereignty of the people and of the state belongs to God and the Islamic temporal state on earth is in reality a vice-regency, its right and the right of its deliberate bodies, whether the Caliph's or the consultative assembly's, are subordinate to the law revealed by God through his prophet.[1]

2. The Shariah (the Islamic Law) is the supreme law under which everyone must submit to the Koran and to the authentic practice and sayings of the Prophet Mohammed.

3. God, the Prophet and those in authority must be obeyed. There is little doubt that the Arab-Islamic period in Egypt was marked by an authority structure based on religious factors carrying with it absolute obedience to the Caliph whose authority was delegated to him by God. In other words, the people do not create the function of the caliphate, neither does the Caliph derive his authority from the people or its representatives. Thus the Caliph was looked upon as the leader of the community and his power was absolute. This concept of authority seemed to have discouraged popular initiative in political life.[2]

Another outstanding feature of Arab Administration is the ease with which the Arabs permeated foreign institutions with their own

---

[1] The Koran, Chapter Four, Verses 59, 105, Chapter Five, Verses 44-45.

[2] See H.A.R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, Islamic Society and The West, Vol. I, Part 1, (London: Oxford University Press, 1950), pp.26-30.

notions of government. Most of the institutions of the lands they
conquered were kept intact, but a new and vigorous spirit was
infused in them. In Syria and Egypt, they adopted the Roman system
and reinforced the old centralised administrative system - - one of
the main features of the Egyptian bureaucracy for centuries.

A review of the administrative system of the Arab-Islamic as
represented in the Fatimid State (established in Cairo in 972 A.D.)
would indicate that at least two major elites existed and controlled
the actual power interchangeably. First, there was the bureaucracy
itself working closely with the head of the state. In the first period
of this state, the group was represented and led by elites who were
well-trained, efficient and bright, mainly young civil servants. The
second elite included mainly theologians; the Ulama class who were the
leaders of Islamic sects. They were supported by the Arab aristocracy
and perhaps by the majority of the ordinary citizens. This second
group wanted the Caliph to be guided by the principles of the Shari'ah
Laws.[1] The Caliphs were leaning towards the bureaucratic elite. Because
the Caliphs were themselves the beneficiaries and wielders of the power,
they delegated to the civil servants the authority to exercise what they
had gained. Because the bureaucrats were themselves the beneficiaries
of any gain for the Caliph's power, they resented the attempts of the
Ulama and their supporters.

In a later period of this continuous struggle, however, the
bureaucratic elite started to usurp some of the ultimate legitimation
of the Caliph's powers and to propagate a similar one of its own.
Not surprisingly, the provincial governors subsequently proclaimed their
independence from the central government, underscoring Ibn Khaldun's

---

[1] For details see Montgomery W. Watt, Islamic Political Thought
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press) pp.64-67.

thesis of growth and decadency which occurred in other empires in the area such as the Babylonian and Pharaonic empires when they went astray.[1]

However, such a bureaucracy, when its upper elite developed tendencies towards displacement of their own goals of service to other strata goals or the goals of the rulers, did so in connection with the transformation of its components into a strong ascriptive stratum which later developed into an independent semi-aristocracy composed mainly of foreign elements (i.e.,The Mamluks, Maghribi etc.,). As a gentry group, some of it became part of an already existing aristocratic stratum. This transformation in the time of the decay of the state already alienated at least to some extent from the ruler, alienated them even more from the community which still stressed the religious virtues of the Shari'ah.

This kind of phenomenal development had occurred not only within the Fatimid State in Egypt in its declining period but also within the Byzantine Empire and within France in the 18th century.[2]

Bureaucracy in Ottoman Egypt

There seems to be essential agreement that the initial Ottoman institutionalisation pattern was influenced by both Islamic and non-Islamic percepts. Both Balkan and Muslim models - the latter through the medium of the Seljukido - Mongol regime - influenced the Ottoman Empire.[3] In confirmation of this evidence of non-Islamic influence Wittek has argued that the Ottomans were primarily a warrior class and

---

[1] See Abdel Rahman Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah. An Introduction to History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958).

[2] See S.N. Eisenstadt, The Political Systems of Empires (New York: The Free Press, 1963), p.286.

[3] See Claude Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey (London: Allen and Unwin, 1968), p.216.

secondarily champions of the Muslim religion.[1]

More specifically, the Ottoman Empire and its social structure developed out of a nucleus of ghazi (warrior) tradition, and in the process adopted Islam. Islamic law was, therefore, superimposed on this essentially non-Islamic tradition, and the ensuing mixture of norms was embodied in the initial institutionalisation pattern of the Ottoman evolution. Gradually the overall influence of Islamic law increased,[2] and with the gate of interpretation (ijtihad) closed, a largely static and quasi-medieval conception of the state and of the social structure was reached. But due to the interaction of non-Islamic tradition with the comprehensive prescriptive Islamic precepts, a dual political philosophy with accompanying dual policy emerged: the Ruling Institutions versus the Muslim Institution. The Ruling Institution was served almost exclusively by non-Muslims having the status of slaves of the Sultan. The Muslim Institution was staffed by free-born Muslim - the religious, educational, and legal - judicial officials of the Empire.[3]

The Islamic precept of the dual philosophy of the state was, as already noted, a medieval version of the origin formulation of that religion. Islam no longer was viewed as regulating the life of a community of equals but was a means of providing unity and order in a stratified society, through the application of power. As such it was necessary to have an imperial system with a sovereign, in place of a

---

[1] See Paul Wittek, The Rise of the Ottoman Empire (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965), pp.13-14.

[2] Lewis notes that until the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent, Kazaskers (the judges of the army) were superior to Seyhulisham's (chief muftis - juris consults) but after his reign the order of priority reversed. See, Geoffrey Lewis, Turkey (London: Benn, 1965), p.22

[3] See Richard Chambers, "Turkey: The Civil Bureaucracy," in Robert E Ward and Dankwert A. Rustow (eds.) Political Modernisation in Japan and Turkey (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp.202-203.

17

simple community of believers and their leaders. This structure was outlined in the classical Islamic theory of Imamah. According to the Ottoman view, the Sultan was appointed by God to hold together the estates of the society. However, the Sultans gave heavy emphasis to executive functions above and beyond the purely judicial functions prescribed by the Islamic law. Thus there were definite efforts to enlarge the area of the will of the Sultan. Weber defines this type of government as "Sultanism":

> "The members are now treated as subjects. An authority of the chief which was previously treated principally as exercised on behalf of the members, now becomes his personal authority which he is entitled to exploit, in principle like any economic advantage - to sell it, to pledge it as security, or to divide it by inheritance. The primary external support of patrimonial authority is a staff of slaves, coloni, or conscripted subjects... Where authority is primarily orientated to tradition but in its exercise makes the claim of full personal powers it will be called "patrimonial" authority. Where patrimonial authority lays primary stress in the sphere or arbitrary will free of traditional limitations, it will be called "Sultanism."[1]

In 1517, Egypt was absorbed in the Ottoman Empire when the Sultan Selim conquered Cairo. The paramount aim of Ottoman administration in Egypt was "the exploitation of its wealth and the diversion of a maximum portion of the resulting revenues to the Porte or to its objectives and obligations in Egypt and in the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina."[2]

The official hierarchy of government was a hierarchy of functions imposed by the Ottoman and led by the Vali (governor) and was referred to as the Ottoman hierarchy of government in Egypt. It was paralleled by a hierarchy of power, formed by the Mamelukes and led by the Beys and

---

[1] Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation, translated by A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (London: Oxford University Press, 1947), p.347.

[2] Stanford J. Shaw, The Financial and Administrative Organisation and Development of Ottoman Egypt, 1517-1798 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1962), p.1.

military officers and was referred to as Mameluke hierarchy.[1] This

a conflict between

dual bureaucratic hierarchy was characterised by/the Ottoman and

the Mamelukes and among the Mamelukes themselves.

The absolute power was eventually acquired by the Mameluke

hierarchy and this meant absolute authority in the administration

of government. But this authority was used mainly by the Mameluke

Beys for personal gains for the members of their own Mameluke houses.

This led to political and administrative degeneration, and to conflict

over the abuses of power.

As far as the subjects themselves were concerned, the conception

of government which developed during the Ottoman administration in

Egypt implied "..... as assertion of power accompanied by a certain

measure of harshness and violence."[2] The predominance of such a

conception of government may, according to Gibb and Bowen, be attributed

to a long history of governmental abuse and suppression, with the

tradition of peaceful behaviour and political quietism already induced

in the minds of the subjects by religious views playing a major role.

Gibb and Bowen point to the importance of the notion that authority

confers privilege, to which those factors are seen to be important.

Contributing to the general toleration of abuses of authority were other

factors related to the unstable and temporary nature of most types of

authority and to the background of the voilence of factional spirit common

to Egyptian society during this period.[3]

---

[1] Most of the members of the Mameluke hierarchy came to Egypt
as slaves purchased from Georgia, the Caucasus and elsewhere to perform
in the service of its leaders. As they grew in stature and knowledge,
many of these slaves were freed and able to rise through the various
positions and ranks in the hierarchy according to their accomplishments
and good fortune and the favour of their masters.

[2] Gibb and Bowen, op.cit., p.205.

[3] Ibid., pp.205-206.

Although the Ottoman rulers retained foreign administration
of a servile character,[1] many educated Egyptians all through these
centuries had succeeded to enter the bureaucracy and to maintain
their positions by transmitting their expertness through education,
from one generation to another.

Despite the enormous gap that existed between the Ottoman
rulers and the subjects, the bureaucracy was interposed between the two
classes in view of the fact that it was more stable and altered more
slowly than did the rulers it served.

Egyptian Bureaucracy During Mohammed Ali's Reign

The Napoleonic invasion of Egypt (1798-1801) has two features
relevant to our interest. First, the French directly transported to
Egypt the products of Western Science and technology and some aspects
of Western ideologies, and shocked the native elite into recognition
of Western achievements. This shock was considerable in its effects.
In essence the French objective consisted in calling to power the
national elements and in making them serve the interests of the French
in opposition to those of the Mamelukes and Ottomans. Napoleon was,
therefore, the first governor in modern times to think of Egypt as a
national unity, exclusive of both Mameluke and Ottomans. An important
indirect contribution of the Napoleonic expedition was to pave the way
for Mohammed Ali who declared himself the ruler of a sovereign Egypt
independent of the Ottoman Empire.

Mohammed Ali's modernisation attempts were financed by a kind of
Pharoanic statism in which the Pharoah owned everything and was the sole
distributor of all the means of life. As noted earlier, moreover, the
absolute authority of Mohammed Ali was almost equal to that of the early
Pharoahs.

---

[1] _Ibid._, pp. 42-43

With the help of a group of foreign advisers (mostly French),
Mohammed Ali was able to institutionalise the administrative system
of his government along radically new lines and he may have tried, in
addition, to follow the practice of consultation and discussion in
managing the business of government, but in the final analysis his power
was for the most part, absolute.

Mohammed Ali decided to develop an indigenous elite of professionals
which could manage the huge state-owned productive apparatus. Therefore,
in addition to primary, secondary and high schools offering every branch
of study (all run along French lines), military, industrial and
educational missions of young Egyptians were sent to various European
countries to specialise in all branches of knowledge and industry.

Although Mohammed Ali's policy of drawing upon the Egyptians for
his technical and administrative staffs was unpopular among the Turks
and the foreign officials, it held great significance for Egypt in the
long run. It had resulted, for the first time in modern history, in the
formation of a more professional Egyptian bureaucratic elite. Moreover,
a special bureaucratic interest had developed as a result of the attempts
to develop a modern bureaucracy and the increase in the number of civil
servants. "Civil servants tended to show common ideas about the role of
the state. In 1870's, they were more or less united in their desire to
prevent any increase in the number and the privileges of Europeans within
the government service."[1]

It is fair to say that Mohammed Ali succeeded, in a short period,
in developing an industrial base, building social overhead capital and in
forming a cadre of educated civil servants and technicians to man his
bureaucracy and industry. However, Mohammed Ali's defeat in 1841 by the

---

[1] Roger Owen, "Egypt and Europe," in Roger Owen and B Sutcliffe
(eds.) Studies in the Theory of Imperialism (London: Longman Group Ltd.,
1972), p.204

European Powers brought to an abrupt end all modernisation and
industrialisation.

There is little doubt that the Egyptian experience, 1820-1840,
shows that a country given a strong leadership, government willing to
mobilise all resources to achieve its objectives, and perhaps
an exogenous stimulus can develop and grow in a relatively short time
without having to develop highly skilled manpower first, in fact with-
out any base of high level manpower, and in face of traditional, stag-
nant culture par excellence.

It must be noted, however, that in no way is it suggested here
that the cultural pre-conditioning arguments should be rejected. It is
quite conceivable that growth may be thought desirable mainly through
private initiative. A national government dedicated to growth without
extensive public bureaucracy, may indeed find that the main way is that
of creating a milieu where private entrepreneurs can function effectively.
The policy prescription for such circumstances may very well be one that
focuses on human capital formation, and a slow process of socio-economic
development. Such a course though was not available to Egypt nor to the
scores of other developing Afro-Asian countries dominated by colonial or
traditional feudalistic governments uninterested in their development
or the welfare of their people.

Moreover, the ruthlessness with which Mohammed Ali's government
achieved its objectives may be repulsive to many modern societies. Economic
development under such conditions may be considered to be highly un-
desirable. However, the same could have been said about economic develop-
ment during the Industrial Revolution in England, or certainly the Soviet
or Chinese development. The fact of the matter is that the process of
rapid development in a country which does not enjoy a rich supply of
national resources, nor receives from abroad a major source of capital

must be a very painful one requiring sacrifices and deprivations.
Furthermore, such deprivations or pains are not absent in such countries
even without development. Mameluke-or Ottoman-dominated Egypt was not
any happier, indeed much less happier than the growing Mohammed-Ali-
Egypt.

The Egyptian Bureaucracy Under The British Rule - 1882-1922

The political life in Egypt during this period was characterised,
in general, by instability, conflicting interests, and corruption of
the ruling forces. The country and the government were under three
struggling political powers: the British, the Khedives (the Kings of
Egypt), and the political parties.

The British occupied the country in 1822, with the intention, as
they declared, of seizing control of the government to secure the payment
of the large loans which the Khedives of Egypt contracted from British
and French financial sources for the building of the Suez Canal. This
occupation, however, lasted for seventy-four years, and its main concern
was to crush the national leaders and their opposition, deprive the
country of its independence and resources, and turn it into a wide
personal colony.

The reigns of the Khedives witnessed the growth of a national
conscience for constitutional reform and the democratic way of government.
In all encounters, they stood against the demands and aspirations of the
people, and, in most cases, with the British to rule the country absolutely
in accordance with their mutual interests.

The political parties started their activities with an honest
national movement against the absolute rule of the Khedives and against
the British for restoration of the country's independence. Their genuine
efforts, at first, succeeded in effecting some democratic changes in
government institutions. However, through the alliance of the Khedives
with the British, the political parties had been driven into the trap of

lust for power and material ends. They soon forgot their national objectives of restoring the country's independence, of effecting a constitutional and democratic government, and of working for economic and social growth.

Government, during the same period, was a personal rather than a public, instrument, judging by all indicators of political development. As a matter of fact, government in Egypt changed hands more times than it ever did in the history of any country of comparable stance. Therefore, there was no continuity, or consistency in the administration of public policies that, in most cases, were not formulated in accordance with the real needs of the people. The political leaders would serve in office at the discretion of the British, or of the Palace, or of both. In order to stay in power longer, they often tried to gain the consent and blessing of these forces, even by sacrificing the rights and welfare of the people.

The origin of the British bureaucratic invasion of Egyptian Public Administration was financial and preceded the military. In 1876 Lord Goschen undertook a mission to Egypt with a view to obtaining some modifications which the shareholders considered necessary to financial arrangements embodied in a decree issued by the Khedive on May 7, 1876.

Britain again sent Lord Dufferin to Egypt to report upon measures which were necessary in order that "the administration of affairs should be reconstructed on a basis which would afford satisfactory guarantees for the maintenance of peace, order and prosperity in Egypt."[1] There was, in Lord Dufferin's opinion, only one practicable method by which the Egyptian Public Administration could be reformed. That was to place the government more or less under British control and guidance.

The theory and practice of British administration seemed to require that the direction of the actual operations of the subordinate government

---

[1] Abdel Rahman Al Rafie, Egypt and Sudan in the Beginning of the Occupation Era; 1882-1892 (Cairo: Al Nahda Al Masriah Book Company, Second Ed., 1952), p.41 (In Arabic)

should be entrusted to a permanent corps of experts and professional

administrators, and to place British personnel in strategic posts of

administration. The basic administrative function of these British

personnel was to exercise complete governmental control.

What had the British occupation done to the Egyptian bureaucracy

after forty years of total control of the government? To answer this

question, a brief discussion of the administrative reform adopted under

British control is necessary.

The British administrative policy led to the systemisation of the

Egyptian bureaucracy, but it also introduced most sources of present _

day administrative problems. The British had in mind two official

purposes for what they called "reform of the administration", those were:

1. To secure an efficient control of the country through a
   strong central administration, and,

2. To control the finance of government to secure that Egypt's debts
   to European interests were paid.

The most outstanding features of the reforms of the Egyptian

bureaucracy which were introduced by the British were:

1. Recruitment on educational qualifications (e.g.,school
   certificate) basis.

2. The division of the Civil Service into two grades, the higher
   and the lower, each recruited from a different educational
   level.

3. The introduction of a system of complete centralisation based
   upon a great volume of rules and regulations.

4. The reservation of senior posts for the British or foreigners.[1]

There is little doubt that a new bureaucratic structure began to

emerge during the British rule in Egypt. At the beginning the British

had to advise, supervise and control. Gradually, however, they interfered

more and more in the direct business of government with the increasing

number of British officials at the higher echelons of the bureaucracy.

Thus, the Egyptian bureaucracy had quickly developed into a haughty and

---

[1] Ibid., p.45

exclusive aristocracy.

In spite of the fact that the British had tried to make the Egyptian bureaucracy incorruptible and professionally-oriented, the whole system was directed towards the fulfilment of the British objectives of maintaining order and guaranteeing enough public revenue to pay the Khedive's debts. Looking at the work of the British rule in Egypt, Ahmed L. El-Sayeed, an Egyptian politician and writer, notes that although:

> ". . . It had brought personal freedom, equal rights, before the law, and financial stability, it had not touched the core of the Egyptian problem. The official class, for example, had become more upright and honest, but it was a passive kind of honesty, and honesty ... . born of rigid control and vigilance, and supervision, which are more likely than not to curb freedom, and independence of thought, which can really teach a man."[1]

Therefore, the Egyptian bureaucrats became more unimaginative and aloof and were interested mainly in governing. There seemed to be a lack of sympathy on the part of the British members of the Egyptian bureaucracy with the Egyptian aspiration for growth and self-government.

On the part of the Egyptian government, its first attempt to regulate the civil service by statute was on April 10, 1883, when a "Higher Order" was issued by the Khedive of Egypt (Tawfik), incorporating rules and regulations for governing the conditions of "Royal employees." This Higher Order introduced a "pass examination" as a condition for appointment in government. It was, in fact, the nucleus of the public service in Egypt. It laid down some ground rules for creating a systematic personnel administration in government. However, its coverage was rather limited, and many high positions and agencies were exempted from

---

[1] Jamal M. Ahmed, The Intellectual Origin of Egyptian Nationalism, (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, Oxford University Press, 1961), p.94

its application.[1]

There is no indication in the Higher Order, however, that it was influenced by the British rule in Egypt. In fact, the Commission that prepared the Higher Order was formed by the Khedive on October 20, 1881, before the British occupation took place. Like all Egyptian public laws of that time, there is a great probability that the Higher Order was inspired by the French public administration. Moreover, it came about as a result of the national pressure from the political leaders over the Khedive, to effect some improvements in government administration.

The British influence on the Egyptian bureaucracy was much more felt in 1921, when a new set of civil service regulations was issued by an Order-in-Council in June of the same year. This influence, however, was less political than conceptual, because of the British personnel concepts born in the new set of regulations, a matter which will be discussed later in this chapter. The British political influence, nevertheless, centred around keeping the Egyptians out of the top level positions, and this was done according to an unwritten public personnel policy.

Between 1883 and 1921, the Egyptian bureaucracy experienced a few piecemeal legislative acts designed to meet specific situations. The first was the Decree of 1901, which imposed some comprehensive rules and regulations concerning disciplinary action and the right of appeal for public employees; the second was the Order-in-Council of 1906, which was issued for the purpose of improving the conditions of employees in the lower levels of administrative category, and the third was the Order-in-Council of 1907, which adopted a new plan for the re-classification of

---

[1] The Khedive of Egypt, _The Higher Order in 1883 concerning the Royal Employees_ (Cairo: Civil Service Department, 1962), pp.3-4

technical, industrial and judicial positions in government.[1]

These personnel policies, in effect, show less British political influence and more partisan political influence and pressures of employees from inside. By treating the public personnel policies piecemeal, they merely added to the endless confusion caused by the many civil service Higher Orders, Orders-in-Council, Financial Committee's decisions, and Ministry of Finance circulars scattered throughout the various government departments that dealt with personnel policies during this period. As a matter of fact, this chaotic situation better served the intentions of the British (in getting increasingly more involved in running the Egyptian government) until the year 1922.

After World War I, and as a direct result of it, the cost of living in Egypt rose to such a point that the civil servants were unable to meet the necessities of life, due to their limited salaries and incomes. In fact, this problem continued until the year 1921, when the government moved to place its bureaucratic system on a more stable basis. It appointed a committee, including foreign and Egyptian experts for that purpose. This committee submitted to the Cabinet a draft of regulations which was finally approved on June 30, 1921. This cadre encompassed the following personnel policy goals:

1. Recruitment to public positions on the basis of open competitive examinations.

2. Classification of positions on the basis of a ranking system composed of eight levels for the "Technical and Administrative Group," and three levels for the "Clerical Group."

3. Pay in accordance with the personal qualifications of the employees.

4. Promotion with a minimum time in grade.

5. Mobility of employees without restrictions.

---

[1] See Order-in-Council of 1907 Concerning the Civil Service, (Cairo: Civil Service Department 1962).

6. Political activities of employees without restrictions.

7. A Board in every department to decide on personnel actions.[1]

This cadre, in effect, created a uniform personnel system in government. It also resulted in more grades, higher salaries, and more spread between the minimum and maximum rates of grades, to allow progress by means of regular and automatic increments, which became subject to no more discretion and determination of heads of departments.

It will be recalled that the British civil service concepts had deeply influenced the organisation and regulation of the Egyptian bureaucracy during this period, and afterwards. Three influences of the British on the Egyptian bureaucracy deserve specific mention:

First: One of the important characteristics of the British civil service was that it survived through the ages without being formalised by parliamentary statutes. Civil servants were not defined by law.[2] In the same manner, the Egyptian civil service was not regulated by law up to 1951, and the civil servants were not defined before the Civil Service Act of 1951.

Second: The concept of emphasis on educational certificates to be entitled to a government job tied the Egyptian bureaucracy to the formal system of education, with its fluctuations up to the present time. It created the policies of pricing qualifications at the entrance levels of the service which greatly troubled the government as well as the employees during this period. This policy, however, did not in any way induce the poor to pay the high cost of education. As a result, only the affluent had been able to get a government job after completing his education.

---

[1] Ministry of Finance, Order-in-Council of 1921 Concerning the Public Service (Cairo: Civil Service Department 1962), p.1-7

[2] See, Royal Commission on The Civil Service; Report Presented to Parliament by Command of Her Majesty (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1955)

In other words, the bureaucracy was only representing the rich. Even the rich, under British rule, could not aspire to hold top-level positions that were confined to the British and foreigners. When the British hold on government was terminated in 1922, and the Egyptians began to get rid of foreigners in high level positions, only the Egyptian rich had acquired the seniority and experience to replace them. So the government service started to be an object of domination of the rich over the poor, and continued to be so for a long period. There was no attempt to revise the qualification - based system of recruitment. With the changes that took place in the educational system over the years, it was very difficult for the government to evaluate the resulting certificates and diplomas in relation to each other, in terms of treasury civil service grades. Moreover, it created serious rivalry between employee groups, each of which was trying to get more price for its certificates. The bureaucracy was, thus, converted to an arena for pricing qualifications. And the political parties misused this issue tremendously to gain popular support.

As far as the qualification for entry and promotion into the civil service is concerned, this developed an excessive emphasis on formal attainment in public examinations. The bureaucracy suffered also from over-staffing due to the social prestige which was attached to government service and the few opportunities which industry offered to educated Egyptians.[1]

Third: As suggested earlier, the British civil service and concepts had left deep imprints on the regulation of the Egyptian bureaucracy during this period, and afterwards. The British civil service, similar in that to all European civil service of that time, centred around the

---

[1] See, A P Sinker: Report on the Personnel Questions of the Egyptian Civil Service, (Cairo: Government Press, 1950), p.7.

"Rank-in-Man" concept. Theoretically this concept is based on classification of employees rather than jobs, recruitment is related to the general educational qualifications of the applicants, regardless of their prior specific training or fine specialisation and pay follows the personal ranks of the employees, rather than the difficulty of their work or positions. Moreover, promotion is based, in the main, on the seniority of all employees in one rank. In the British civil service in particular, these features were predominant even before the Trevelyan-Northcote report of 1854, which formulated the basic ideas upon which the civil service rested for a long period.[1] Through the British occupation of Egypt in 1882, the ideas of the Rank-in-Man concept has been transplanted into the Egyptian civil service. Examples of that are found in all the Egyptian civil service regulations since 1883. A clear example, however, rests with the cadre of 1921, which shows that the Egyptian civil service followed exactly the footsteps of the British in a great number of personnel administration.

The Egyptian Bureaucracy after Independence - 1922 - 1952

By the declaration of Egypt's independence in 1922, the Egyptian bureaucracy and its rules and regulations became completely an instrument and an object of local politics, and continued to be so for the next thirty years. It is in this sense that the bureaucracy had been a weapon of partisanship among the Egyptian political parties and an articulate ally of these parties in their struggle against British rule. Yet, in the matters of public-policy, as distinct from partisan politics, the Egyptian bureaucracy had been a relatively pliant tool in the hands of any executive rather than a rival seeking to control over broad policy issues of government not directly affecting the exercise of political power itself. One reason for this pliability had been the fact that the

---

[1] See, Wyn Griffith, The British Civil Service 1854-1954, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1954)

group in power could bend the bureaucracy to its will because of the absence of a strong system of job tenure.

In 1931, a new set of regulations was issued based on the principles of 1921 regulations but excluding open competitive examination.[1] The new regulations imposed restrictions for the determination of grades and number of civil servants to be employed. Other committees were established, with equal lack of success, until 1939 when the government issued new regulations designed to supress those of 1931.

In 1949, however, a culmination of reform efforts produced a draft law with a view of reforming the public service. The following year, the Egyptian Government invited A.P. Sinker, a British expert, to examine the problems of the Egyptian bureaucracy and to suggest some means to improve it. He states the following:

> "The problems of civil service reform which confront Egypt are not
> new. They are common to all civilised countries in varying degrees.
> In the not very distant past the British government had been faced
> with all these problems and some of them still trouble us. Indeed,
> I have been impressed by the fundamental similarity between
> Egyptian problems and our past or present problems. Useful lessons
> could be drawn from the experience of other countries also, but an
> attempt to cover several countries would result in too much
> distinct generalisations. For this reason, and because I am most
> familiar with the British scene, I shall draw attention from time
> to time in this report to British practices, which have resulted
> from British experience."[2]

In 1951, as a result of some studies made - including Sinker's report - in order to correct the problems of the Egyptian public bureaucracy, the government issued a new Civil Service Act No. 210 of 1951. This act incorporated major rules concerning recruitment; classification; performance rating; promotion; salaries and increments; mobility; assignment, loan; discipline; termination of service and lay-off.[3]

[1] See, Ministry of Finance, Order-in-Council of 1931 concerning the Public Service, (Cairo: Civil Service Department, 1962)

[2] A P Sinker, Report on the Personnel Questions of the Egyptian Civil Service, (Cairo: Ministry of Finance of Egypt, Government Press 1951) p. 2

[3] Civil Service Department, State Civil Service Acts (Cairo: Government Press, 1962), pp. 1-214

Compared with the Cadre of 1939, the new Civil Service Act of 1951 introduced the following policies.

1. Recruitment on the basis of open competitive examinations. The authority for administering such examination was vested in the newly created Central Personnel Agency.

2. Ranking system that grouped positions into four cadres, senior technical and administrative cadres, and intermediate technical and clerical cadres. The idea of such groupings, however, was not new. It was enforced by the Cadre of 1921, and later suggested by the co-ordination rules of 1947, and Sinker's report.

3. Pay in accordance with employee qualifications. A small increase in salary ranges of grades and increments was provided.

4. Promotion on the basis of seniority with a less time-in-grade. However, a percentage ranging from 20 to 30 per cent of the vacancies was left for promotion by merit, depending on the grade to which the promotion was affected.

5. Mobility is restricted in terms of eligibility for promotion in the new job to which the employee is transferred.

6. Political activities of employees clearly restricted for the first time.

7. Clearly-defined channels and procedures for grievances and appeals of public employees.[1]

It is important to note that, unlike all previous public service regulations that were enforced by executive orders (Orders-in-Council), the new one was enacted by law, to give it more seriousness and power in implementation.

This Act, however, had not had the opportunity for enforcement before July, 1952, when the revolutionary government took over.

---

[1] Ibid.

CHAPTER III

EGYPTIAN BUREAUCRACY AND SOCIETY

A bureaucratic elite functions at a particular stage of history and within a particular kind of society. Cross-time differences between elites can be explained in terms of the changing spirit of the time. Moreover, cross-cultural differences between elites can be traced to the broader differences in the social system they serve. Thus, to gain a full understanding of the Egyptian bureaucratic elite, one must base one's analysis on the two well-known dimensions of scientific inquiry; time and place. Having introduced the first dimension in the preceding chapter, attention now turns to the second dimension of our study, namely that of place or more specifically the important ecological factors in Egyptian society. Taken together, both dimensions provide the setting within which the Egyptian bureaucratic elite must operate and interact..

Perhaps the question of ecology or background looms larger in the case of Egypt than other countries because things are changing rapidly in Egypt. Considering the nature and source of change, the evidence suggests that in Egypt, as perhaps elsewhere, bureaucracy, particularly in the higher echelons as an elite has a practical centrality and significance. This does not mean, however, that bureaucracy can escape the effects of such conditions as time, place, geography and population; or that it is independent of and isolated from the cultural and social setting in which it functions. On the contrary, one can more accurately analyse bureaucracy and bureaucratic elite in Egypt when, besides their changing characteristics, their relationship with other social, economic and political phenomena are observed.

Geography

The impact of geography in shaping the institutions of a country
is perhaps more pronounced in Egypt than in other countries. Egypt is
primarily a desert with rather limited resources. The cultivated
productive area represents no more than 4 per cent of the total land
area which is 386,198 square miles.[1] The cultivable land constitutes
an inner territory through which runs the Nile River. It is fertile,
productive and densely populated.

The River Nile brings life to the people and crops of the land.
The often quoted saying of Herodotus that "Egypt is the gift of the
Nile" has lost none of its truth today.[2] The strong central government
which has characterised Egyptian history has its tap root in the need
for unified management of the problems of irrigation, the canal and basic
system, and of control of the seasonal flood which brings down the
melting snows of inland Africa.

The geographic location of Egypt has shaped its development in
at least four ways. Proximity to the centres of Judaism, Christianity
and Islam has left a deep stamp upon the cultural growth. Egypt's
position astride the water transportation route to inner Africa has
loomed large in her history. Location at the juncture of East and West
has influenced both foreign and domestic affairs·in a series of
occurrences of which the 1956 Suez crisis is a clear example. And
Egypt's position at the geographic centre of the Arab world, coupled
with her status as the most populous and perhaps most influential of the
Arab nations, seems destined to give her a continuing central position
in leadership of the Arab countries as Middle Eastern oil and other
factors influence international conflict considerations.

---

[1] Egypt, The Year Book, 1970 (Cairo: Information Department, 1970)
p.25.

[2] T.S. Brown "Herodotus Speculates About Egypt," American Journal
of Philology, Vol. LXXXVI,(January, 1965) pp. 60-76.

The effect of the climate upon agriculture is to force dependence on the Nile for water, to permit the maturing of two or three crops per season, and to restrict the variety of agricultural produce. The effect of climate upon the people and the administrative system can only be surmised, but with Toynbee it may be safely assumed that the absence of climatic challenge affects national cultural response. The implications of the climate upon public health and construction programmes are evident, and the excessive mid-afternoon heat sets limits to not only the work habits of government employees but also the possibilities, for example, of double-session educational programmes.

Population

The present population of Egypt is a product of the mingling of ancient Egyptians with the invaders of many millennia. The ethnic composition of the nation, as it is now, is relatively homogeneous. Aside from a number of small minorities living in urban centres, mostly Greeks, Italians and Armenians, the population is Egyptian-Arab in origin. Having risen from less than ten million in 1897 to twenty-six million in 1960, to thirty-five million in 1972, the annual rate of increase now is about 2.54 per cent,[1] which is among the highest in the world. Especially in the case of Egypt, which is not particularly gifted with many natural resources, and 96 per cent of the land of which is either uninhabitable or is unreclaimed desert.

As a result, the government got caught in the process of balancing the difficult equation of population explosion against economic and social development. Many plans, e.g., birth control plan and socio-economic development, have been adopted. However, the close-to-three per cent-and-rising rate of population growth still constitutes a major threat to the already low social and economic condition of the country.

---

[1] Arab Republic of Egypt, Statistical Handbook, 1973 (Cairo: Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics, 1973) p.7.

One of the important goals of central planning for socio-economic development was to provide enough employment opportunities for all the people who needed to work. The rate of unemployment in the country in 1961 was 3.2 per cent, then decreased to 1.8 in 1962, 1.9 in 1964, and again increased to 3.1 per cent in 1968.[1] This rate dropped in 1962, and, in 1964, because of the five-year plan of socio-economic development, which created some opportunities for employment. However, this rate increased again to its 1961 level in 1968, with the decline in socio-economic development as a direct result of the war in the Middle East.

In this context, what were the effects of population growth on public bureaucracy? Evidently, this had to do with the continuous pressures on the government to create more and more employment opportunities, at a rate that would keep pace with the rate of increase in population. If, for any reason, this rate were not achieved, the government would face two alternatives: one would create serious problems of unemployment, and the second would be to break down its personnel rules and regulations by lowering the standards of the civil service.

The second alternative is what typically happened in Egypt in the 1960's. In the past, civil service rules and regulations were sometimes violated for political and personal reasons. The public service was intentionally kept at a low level, because the government's revenues were spent on extravagances that had little to do with the people. Moreover, population growth did not constitute a serious problem at that time, and there were other opportunities for employment outside the government.

In the 1960's, however, the government had to lower the standards

---

[1] United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 1970 (New York: United Nations, 1971), p. 107.

of its civil service, in order to provide employment for the unemployed with a minimum cost, considering also that the government had to raise tremendous amounts of funds for development investment.

Examples of such actions of the government were evident. In 1961, the government decided to employ thousands of university graduates wholesale in the public service, without examinations, because of the unemployment situation that emerged among them.[1] In the Civil Service Act of 1964, the government had to re-structure the classification and pay systems on the basis of different concepts (i.e., "Rank-in-Job" concepts), which it then deserted for what seemed to be the high cost involved and the restrictions that would have limited its authority in employment, assignment and mobility of public employees. Pay, increments and promotions in this Act were also restricted to conditions designed to keep the cost of public employees at a reasonable minimum, in terms of the government's budget.

Moreover, figures on the number of public employees as compared with the total population are interesting from a comparative perspective and in their relationship to the attitudinal data presented in the following chapters of this study. While the proportion of public employees to total Egyptian population was 26 per thousand in 1950, it rose to 53 per thousand in 1975. This proportion in Turkey was 7 per thousand in 1931, it rose to 19 per thousand in 1970's.[2] Thus, cross-culturally, it might be noted that the proportion of Egyptian population employed by the government is almost triple that employed by the Turkish government. As we shall see later, the educated Egyptian is much more

---

[1] Luther Gulick and James Pollock: Government Reorganisation in the UAR. A report submitted to the Central Committee for the Reorganisation of the Machinery of Government (Cairo: The Central Committee for the Reorganisation of the Machinery of Government, 1962) p.131.

[2] For the Turkish figures see Cahit Tutum, "The Turkish Personnel System on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Republic," Turkish Public Administration Annual, No.1 (1974), p.150.

dependent upon the government employment than is his Turkish counter-part.

High Level Human Resources

However, Egypt's main resource is its high-level manpower. The country is considered today a vital centre of culture and learning in the Middle East and Africa. Egypt is a net exporter of high level talents. In 1964, it was reported that more than 4,000 Egyptian teachers are helping neighbouring countries, particular Arab countries, educating their youth, in addition to a number of medical doctors and engineers on loan to several Arab countries.[1] Since then it is widely believed that the number of high-level Egyptians working abroad has risen sharply.

Moreover, Egyptian high-level manpower operated the nationalised Suez Canal after the unannounced, sudden withdrawal of all foreign personnel in 1956, and other trained personnel are managing the country's modern, budding industries.

Such high calibre manpower is a very important factor in the development of Egypt. However, the formation of such "human capital", the motivation and allocation of its participants, and the structure of skills and professionals within it pose some problems to the planners of contemporary Egypt. The historical and cultural determinants of the present human-resource mix shed many lights on the understanding of the interaction of human resource and economic development, and the role played by education in initiating and sustaining growth. Furthermore, many insights into the problem of entrepreneurial manpower scarcity - one that plays a pivotal role in development - can be acquired from a long-term study of a developing country like Egypt, emerging from centuries of stagnation into the era of modernisation, industrialisation

---

[1] UAR Yearbook 1963 (Cairo: Department of Information, 1964), p.108.

and rapid growth. There are elements of Egypt's history which are unique, but many others display a familiar pattern of old orders and new elites interwoven with the formidable imperialist system of the 19th and early 20th centuries.

Some cultural, historical and economic factors militated against the creation of an entrepreneurial class that could contribute positively to Egypt's development. The absence of an entrepreneurial class can be attributed to two sets of factors:

1. Factors retarding the emergence of entrepreneurs.

2. Factors frustrating entreprenurial efforts leading to economic development.

As far as the first set of factors are concerned, it might be noted that some elements of the culture were inimical to innovation and risk-taking. In fact, as is the case with many developing countries, change itself at one time was regarded as undesirable. Later, it will be seen, the educational system itself tended to reinforce such attitude against originality, self-reliance, initiative and risk-taking. Religious leaders and ideas also regarded risk-taking and business transactions involving interest, speculation, hedging, etc, with great suspicion.

Very low social status was assigned to business and trade until very recently. The poor Egyptians were basically farmers; the rich, landowners. Most trades were practiced by foreigners. Whatever native craftsmen had existed at the turn of the 19th century, later vanished after the collapse of Mohammed Ali's industrial complex.

The defeat of Mohammed Ali leading to the imposition of the capitulation was followed by an influx of thousands of foreigners who enjoyed protection from taxes, government interference and local loans. They monopolized the trade and financial sectors. Their advent frustrated further the emergence of native entrepreneurs. Moreover,

their make-up made business more repugnant to the Egyptians.[1]

Consequently, not only was it difficult for any Egyptian businessman to compete with the foreigners, but it became quite undesirable culturally to do so. It meant association with people society condemned. Government employment offered by contrast a much higher status and prestige and thus attracted a great number of potential entrepreneurs to its ranks where they became veritable bureaucrats.

As for the second set of factors, i.e.,factors distorting entrepreneurial efforts, it might be noted that the British policy in Egypt consistently opposed the industrialisation of the country; by discouraging foreign industrialists from establishing any manufacturing enterprises, by denying Egypt the right to establish any protection of the infant industries and by frustrating every effort to induce entrepreneurs to establish such industries.

Even without such vigorous blocking efforts, it is very hard to introduce new productive processes to a developing economy: the lack of many external economies that are abundant in the developed countries, the scarcity of capital and the shortage of social overhead capital make it very difficult indeed for the potential entrepreneurs to see how they can gain from their efforts. Accordingly, if any potential entrepreneurs appear on the scene, they usually engage in "zero-sum" games (those which do not raise national income) rather than "positive-sum" games. Such activities as "cornering the market", investing in real estate, bidding up the price of choice agricultural land, etc., which characterised the Egyptian entrepreneur business for a long time, were not signs of lack of entrepreneurial talent, but of simple and realistic calculations on his part. By trial and error he found out that there was very little relationship between his efforts and national growth.

---

[1] For the best description of them see David Landes; Bankers and Pashas: International Finance and Economic Imperialism in Egypt (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958).

He then turned to zero-sum activities which produced a high personal profit but provided little gain to the economy.

The dilemma of the private entrepreneur was heightened after Egypt's independence in 1922 was gained and the attention of the new government was turned to social welfare legislation and redistribution of income. His "liquidity preference" shifted up rapidly. He foresaw that sooner or later he would be harmed by such measures. The revolutionary government made his fear come true by introducing labour legislation and other controls that restricted his freedom to act and raised his doubts and suspicions. His very action though brought more government counteractions to speed up the process of development, and the encroachment became cumulative. The sheer impossibility of an individual entrepreneur's effort to make any dent in the country's staggering problem brought up the quick condemnation of the new nationalistic revolutionary government, and he was soon accused of jeopardising national efforts.

More recently, however, the entrepreneur-manager-organisation-builder has been rising to the top. He is a government employee and as such he enjoys the prestige and status of a higher ranking government official and the power of an innovator. He is equipped with the knowledge and experience that make him a professional manager, but he is still a member of a scarce elite. The development and motivation of a class of profess-ional manager-innovator is becoming a strategic requirement for Egypt's development.[1]

[1] Harbison accepts the Marshallian concept of entrepreneur, but he indicates the entrepreneur according to it cannot possibly be one individual, rather he is an organisation which comprises all of the people required to perform entrepreneurial functions. More recently, Sayigh revives the Shumpeterian emphasis on innovation, but he relates it to the developing countries. Harbison's and Sayigh's entrepreneur could be a government employee or a political leader and accordingly Egypt could develop a supply of entrepreneurs by a systematic investment in the development of a managerial class and the careful manipulation of incentive systems to motivate it to innovate and become important agents of growth. See F. Harbison "Entreprenurial Organisation as a Factor in Economic Development," Quarterly Journal of Economics, (1956) and Y. M.Sayigh, Entrepreneurs of Lebanon,(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962).

Family

As in most agrarian countries, the family is considered one of the fundamental units in the Egyptian society, where it plays a dominant role in the culture of the people. The father, being the head of the family, is responsible for the family's welfare, and ultimately authority rests with him. The rather autocratic role of Egyptian fathers has influenced the attitudes and behaviour of the people towards the older and superior people in the society. This relationship seems to have somewhat stifled the initiative of individuals who might otherwise have fully participated in challenging discussions. It has also somewhat discouraged them from assuming complete responsibilities and has made them rather dependent on their superiors in matters of making decisions.

One of the overwhelming features of socialisation in Egypt is the requirement that the individual subordinate himself to his family, or any other group with which he is identified. This is linked to traditional Islam which deals mainly with the community of the faithful and is less concerned with the individual believer.[1] In this connection, it is significant to note that the intervention of government in economic and social life in Egypt could be more understood in terms of social values emanating from the family, chief among which is the Egyptian view of the individual. The individual in Egypt is still regarded, even after the 1952 Revolution, as subservient to the group or the family. Although this thesis may not always be evident in conscious verbal arguments, it could be clearly deduced from many youth movements and from social and even political programmes.

What is even more apparent is that the individual in Egypt's social philosophy is not regarded as the best judge of what is good or bad for him. Society is represented by the government (which sometimes means

---

[1] E.A. Sarhan, _Interests and Culture_, Contributions to Education, No. 959, Teacher's College (New York: Columbia University, 1950), p.119.

effectively a small group of people, i.e., the family). In this sense, the government is regarded as an Arab father, the guardian of the individual and the family.[1] In this respect, it is interesting to note that in his public speeches, President Sadat frequently refers to himself as the father of the larger Egyptian family.

This phenomenon may explain the fact that the first characteristic of the Egyptian pattern of development is that it is governmental. Thus the people look to their government for help. Their increased use of government has carried with it an increased vesting of power in it.

Social Strata

The class structure of Egyptian society traditionally has been rigid. While social mobility has increased somewhat during the last generation, class lines still remain sharp despite official claims to the contrary.

A. The Upper Class: With the coming of Mohammed Ali, a quasi-royal status was assumed by his family. Throughout the latter part of the nineteenth century, the ruling family formed the centre of a court which was surrounded by wealthy landlords who sought to exchange their support for Royal favours. Titles such as "Pasha" and "Bey" were given by the monarchy, but these titles were not heriditary since they expired with the death of the holder. Although the titles were impermanent, they were desired because they carried political power, influence and privileges which usually led to more wealth and more influence. Among the important positions were cabinet ministers, members of parliament and high-ranking army officers and officials. This gradually led to the appointment of relatives and was strengthened by family intermarriage.

With the 1952 Revolution, the removal of this old upper class was

[1] The Middle East Institute, Middle East Development, Goals, Plans and Prospects, Transcript of a Washington Conference (Washington D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1958), p.2.

a primary target. The royal family and those closest to it were deprived of their lands, and the holdings of lesser landlords were abolished. Although wealth is still one of the main criteria for social status, we find that social acceptability is now established on a broader basis than the mere possession of land.[1]

B. The Middle Class: Westernisation and modernisation brought with it the first signs of a shift in the political and economic centre of gravity. One of the main forces that is inextricably connected with the process of social change since the beginning of the twentieth century is the emergence of the middle class.

There is little doubt that the 1952 Revolution has brought forward more forces which were culminating in the rapid process of modernisation and secularisation. This process has brought with it an increasing social, economic and political awareness on the part of the Egyptian middle class. New criteria of confirming status in the middle class have been developing. Among these criteria we find education, government service and success in industry or international commerce.[2]

C. The Lower Class: This class consists mainly of the <u>fallaheen</u> and the blue-collar workers. This class is largely illiterate and poor.

<u>Religion</u>

Islam is the religion of the majority in Egypt. About 92.2 per cent of the Egyptians are Muslims. The rest are mainly Coptic Christians.[3]

Moreover, Islam is the official religion of the State. A distinctive governmental institution representing the Islamic heritage in Egypt

---

[1] Donald Wilber, <u>United Arab Republic</u>, <u>Egypt</u> (New Haven, Connecticut: Human Relations Area Files Press, 1969), p.91.

[2] See Anouar Abdel Malek, <u>Egypt</u>: <u>Military Society</u> (New York: Random House, 1968), pp.174-181.

[3] H.T. Croley, "United Arab Republic," <u>Country Profiles</u>, (Columbia: Columbia University Press, 1969), p.2.

is the Ministry of <u>Wakfs</u> and Al-Azhar Affairs in the executive branch which is in charge of endowment, welfare and Islamic learning.

Islam has played a very important role in shaping Egypt's cultural background. Politically, Islam differs from Christianity in that from the very beginning, it took the form of a state as well as a religious movement. Theologically, Islam is characterised by its transcendentalism, its ready and natural belief in predestination and its outlook on the problems of sin and pain. All these characteristics have combined to free Muslims to a remarkable extent from morbidity, but coupled with the doctrine of submission to God's will (Islam), it also has inclined them to accept unquestioningly and rather apethetically the lot appointed them in this world.[1]

Of all the oriental religions, the Islamic is, paradoxically, one of the best equipped to cope with both economic development and cultural modernisation. Islam is basically a rational, positive, egalitarian and non-ritualistic religion.

Economic Development

<u>The Egyptian Economy Before the 1952 Revolution</u>: Egypt before the time of the 1952 Revolution had a free economy, though it was not properly and efficiently developed for many reasons. Progress in agriculture reached a state of limbo because all the land that could readily be cultivated was already used. Similarly, progress in industry was handicapped by lack of capital and investment. Industry was only slightly developed, of a monopolistic nature, and of little impact on the national income. Thus, the country continued to stagger economically because of the rate of population growth which was greater than the rate of growth in national economy.

---

[1] For an analysis dealing with the same problem see H Geodicke, "Early References to Fatalistic Concepts in Egypt", <u>Journal of Near Eastern Studies</u> Vol. XXII, (July, 1963).

By 1952, the national income of Egypt was estimated at £E813.5 million, and per capita income at £E37.9.[1] The population in the same year reached 21,437,000, with a rate of increase estimated at 2.4 per cent.[2]

The role of the government in society was confined to law and order, defence, agriculture, public works and utilities, means of communication, supplies and finance. For lack of economic development and natural resources, the government was always managing a rather limited budget. In 1951/52, the budget year before the revolution that is always taken as a base for comparison, government was composed of sixteen ministries, in addition to a few agencies for inspection and control. The total general expenditure of government on various sectors in the same year amounted to £E234.7 million.[3] The number of employees in government service, according to the 1950/51 Budget, was 440.985 thousand employees with a total cost of £E71,482,000.[4] This is in contrast to 52,974 employees in 1882, drawing a total annual salary of £E1,648,503.[5] While figures concerning the total operating budget of the government in 1882 are not available, it was a recognised fact during this period that the cost of public employees always constituted a heavy burden on the public budget. This had been indicated by our respondents, and an unqualified estimate would be that more than one-third of the operating budget was spent on public employees.

[1] National Bank of Egypt, Economic Bulletin, Vol.XVII (Cairo: 1964), p.50.

[2] The Year Book of the U.A.R. General Statistics 1952-1962 (Cairo: Memphis Printing House, 1967), p.9.

[3] United Arab Republic, The Year Book (Cairo: Information Department, 1966), p.76.

[4] A.P. Sinker, Report on Personnel Questions of the Egyptian Civil Service (Cairo: Government Press, 1951), p.45.

[5] Morroe Berger Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p.31.

The high cost of public employees does not necessarily indicate that the level of pay was very high. On the contrary, the Egyptian public employees were among the lowest paid in the world, compared with the standard of living. To cite only one example, the entrance level for holders of university degrees was determined in the Cadre of 1921 at the sixth grade, with a salary range of £E180 - 468, while in the Civil Service Act of 1951, it was determined at the sixth grade with a salary range of £E180 - 300. This does not include the high cost-of-living allowance which was computed on the basis of the size of the employee's family. Still, the basic range of this level was less in 1951, than it was in 1921, while the cost of living during this period of thirty years nearly doubled.[1] The reason for the inflated cost of public employees was, then, not the high level of their pay, but their excessive number beyond the exigencies of work requirements.

Because of the economics of the national budget, regardless of the reason behind the inflated personnel budget, the government was compelled many times in the history of this period to reduce the salary ranges of grades, to suspend the granting of increments or delay of them, and to increase the required time-in-grade for promotion to a higher grade. Examples of such action lie in the Cadre of 1931, the Order-in-Council of 1934, suspending the granting of increments to all employees.

The economic influence of the budget on public personnel policies is also indicated by linking pay determination with the qualifications of employees, rather than with the nature and difficulty of work. The pricing of qualifications enabled the government to pay less for jobs which, if treated otherwise, it would pay more. In the absence of reliable job descriptions and equal pay for equal work principle, it

---

[1] Unqualified estimate in the absence of accurate figures concerning the cost of living in the country.

became more economically beneficial for the government to treat the
public officials as treasury grades, despite the difficulty of their
work assignments, in terms of pay.

Economic Development from 1952 to 1960: When the revolution came
about in 1952, the country was economically staggering. Thus, in
September, 1952, an agrarian reform Decree-Law was enacted to correct
the problem of land-holding economy. Moreover, the revolutionary
government adopted a policy of horizontal land expansion for economic
development. The agrarian reform measures were followed by two other
important measures towards the rapid industrialisation of the country;
first, the use of central planning for socio-economic development, and
secondly, the nationalisation of some foreign-owned enterprises and
companies.

By the end of this period, in 1959/1960, the national income
reached £E1,285.2 million[1] and per capita income reached £E48.2.[2] The
population in the same year reached 25,800,000 with a rate of increase
estimated at 2.8 per cent.[3]

The size of the government was slightly enlarged, due to the
creation of new ministries, functions and activities. The government,
in 1960, consisted of twenty-four ministries in addition to a few
regulatory agencies. The total budget of the government in the fiscal
year 1961/62 amounted to £E700.1 million. The number of employees in
the public service reached 369,059 in 1953/1954, 381,615 in 1954/1955,
and 700,549 in 1961/1962. They drew a total salary of £E50,127,950,

[1] United Arab Republic, The Revolution in Thirteen Years
1952-1965 (Cairo: Information Department, 1965), p.35.

[2] United Nations, Statistical Year Book, 1970, op.cit., p.598.

[3] United Nations, Demographic Year Book, 1968 (New York:
United Nations, 1969), p.113.

£E52,318,720 and £E152,351,694, respectively.[1]

While the above figures are not highly reliable, especially when they deal with the number of public employees and their total cost over the years, they nonetheless reflect that the economy during this period enjoyed some degree of progress and stabilisation. The national income and per capita/income increased in the face of a population growth of 2.8 per cent. The total traditional budget of services more than doubled. This, of course, was attributed to the gradual expansion of the role of government in the society, and the creation of new ministries and public agencies.

Through the policy of price control, the government had been able to keep the salaries of public employees at the same level provided by the inherited Civil Service Act of 1951. Moreover, the high cost-of-living allowance was kept in effect over and above the basic salaries, with some modifications.

The government in this period, nevertheless, did not attempt to reduce the basic salaries of public employees, nor did it stop the granting of regular increments at any time, as was the case in the past, in order to achieve economy in the budget. In fact, the government, despite its financial difficulties in the early years of the revolution, moved willingly to relax some of the unrest which had been inflicted upon the public employees by personnel actions of the past, regardless of the additional financial burdens it might encounter. An example of that was the issuance of Act No. 371 of 1953, concerning the evaluation of

---

[1] Figures for 1953/1954 and 1954/1955 are quoted from: Civil Service Department, Annual Report, 1955-1965 (Cairo: Government Press, 1955), pp.49-50. These figures do not include the Army, Ministry of Wakfs (Endowments) and Al-Azhar University. They do not include also the high cost-of-living allowance which was estimated at £E27 million in 1953/1954 and £E26,500,000 in 1954/1955. Figures for 1961/1962 are quoted from: Civil Service Department, Civil Service Annual Report, (Cairo: Civil Service Department, 1962).

academic certificates and diplomas in terms of civil service grades.[1]
All of these indicate that there was a slight improvement in the
management of public money, and a more realistic approach to the
problems of the civil service.

This does not mean, however, that the government had been
successful in solving all personnel problems bearing on the inflated
budget. The excessive number of employees was still the most serious
problem that faced the government during this period. This number
was accumulated due to a variety of reasons. One was the political
and personal influence which, in the past, worked to provide posts for
the many protéges of ministers and others. A second reason was the
past absence of an adequate central personnel agency, which would
control the number of employees in the public service. A third reason,
or cause, was the shortage of employment opportunities outside the
government.

Yet another cause was the absence of a sound classification plan
that would relate the number of employees to work requirements. Lastly,
the government offered many services, such as education, public health,
and social welfare, which in other countries were rendered by private
organisations.

The government in this period, therefore, tried to treat the problem
of the excessive number of public employees by suspending appointments
for a certain period, but with practically no success at all. In Egypt,
where government employment absorbed a relatively high proportion of
the output of schools and universities, the suspension of appointments
resulted in a considerable degree of unemployment among the educated class

---

[1] Civil Service Department, State Civil Service Acts, (Cairo:
Government Press, 1962), pp.231-249.

in the absence of other employment opportunities outside the government,
that is, in private industry. Yet private industry in Egypt during
this period was underdeveloped to a point where it could not compete
with the government in the field of employment. At the same time, the
government could not adopt the policy of reducing its civil force in
one fell swoop, because, if it did, it would have created a serious
problem of unemployment, especially among the educated persons.

So, the problem of excessive numbers of public employees remained
unsolved during this period. However, it was eased to some extent when
the government started its industrialisation and economic development
plans later on, but it did not diminish entirely.

Economic Development: From 1961 to the Present: The Egyptian
economy during this period had relatively scored a considerable progress,
compared with the past. This may be attributed to the measures taken
by the government to nationalise means of production and the adoption
of a five-year comprehensive plan for socio-economic development.

In July 1960, the first five-year comprehensive national plan for
socio-economic development was designed to raise the national income to
£E1795.0 million in 1964/1965, or by 40 per cent. The value of the
national income, in the base year of 1959/1960 reached £E1285.2 million.[1]
This plan was considered a first step in a long range plan (ten years),
aimed at doubling the national income by the end of the ten years.

By 1965, the achievements of the first five-year plan were
published. The national income increased from £E1285.2 million in
1959/1960, to £E1363.5 million in 1960/1961, £E1411.1 million in 1961/1962,
£E1562.8 million in 1962/1963, £E1739.6 million in 1963/1964 and £E1884.0
million in 1964/1965.[2] This means precisely that the five-year plan
had totally increased the national income by £E598.8 million, or slightly

---

[1] United Arab Republic, The Revolution in Thirteen Years, op.cit.,
p.35.

[2] Ibid., p.231.

more than 40 per cent.

According to the national accounts statistics of the United Nations, the per capita national income (in U.S. dollars) reached 111 in 1958, 140 in 1963, 164 in 1966, 157 in 1967 and 162 in 1968.[1]

As a result of the wars in the Middle East in 1967 and 1973, however, the second five-year plan of socio-economic development extending to 1970, was greatly interrupted and handicapped. Much of the country's revenues and attention were devoted to war activities that impeded socio-economic growth to a great extent. While the first five-year plan achieved an annual growth of 6.6 per cent in Gross Domestic Product, and 3.7 per cent in per capita gross domestic product,[2] which is fairly good, considering the socio-economic high degree of backwardness inherited from the past, the present close-to-three per cent of population growth, together with the economic and social effects of the war in the Middle East, have created major obstacles in the course of further developing the standard of living in the country. This cannot be successfully achieved unless the national income is increased beyond the average increase in population, and unless the effects of the war are offset by opening the door widely for foreign investment.

A few years after President Sadat's corrective Revolution in May, 1971, a policy of opening-up the economy (called Infitah in Arabic) was envisaged and subsequently adopted in 1976. This policy was mainly designed to attract foreign investment, side by side with the Egyptian public sector, to participate in the development of the Egyptian economy. It is too early to evaluate the policy of Infitah, let alone its achievements.

[1] United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 1970, op.cit., p.598.

[2] United Nations, A Survey of Economic Conditions in Africa, 1967 (New York: United Nations, 1969), p.10.

From this brief review of economic development, it is apparent
that in contrast with the previous periods, the role of Egyptian
Government in the society has been enlarged to a great extent. The
government has not only acted as a public servant with increased
multifarious activities, but has also acted as a producer. Owing to
the socialist trend of the country, the government owns and runs a
large number of industrial, commercial and financial enterprises. The
number of ministries increased under the central government to thirty-one
in the 1972/1973 budget, in addition to twenty-five other public agencies
for administrative adjudication, inspection, control, statistics,
accounting, training etc. The number of newly added public business
enterprises (i.e.,state economic enterprises) reached a total of sixty-
six in the same fiscal year. The total expenditure of government on
various sectors amounted to £E3232 million in 1972/1973. The number of
public employees working in the government (but excluding state economic
enterprises) reached 1,498,010 in 1972/1973, with a total cost of
£E489 million.[1]

The cost of living in the country, however, continued to rise. This
is indicated by the increase in the amounts of funds allocated during this
period for price support. In 1961/1962, the government spent £E16,645,000
then 36,511,500 in 1962/1963 and 45,000,000 in 1965/1966 in order to
provide the basic necessities of life for the people at reasonable prices.[2]

In this period public personnel policies, as far as salaries and
increments of public employees were concerned, were influenced either by

[1] See National Bank of Egypt, Economic Bulletin (Cairo: National
Bank of Egypt, 1972, 1973), p.20.

[2] See U.A.R., The Revolution in Thirteen Years, op.cit., p.47. It
is significant to note, however, that if the cost of living index is set
at 100 in 1939, by 1952 it had reached 317 and 417 by 1972. See Arab
Republic of Egypt, Statistical Handbook, 1973, op.cit., p.25.

the increased revenues of government or by the increased cost of living, or both. This is indicated by the schedule of pay attached to the Civil Service Act of 1964, which affected a slight increase in the minimum rates of lower and middle grades, a wider range of grades to allow better opportunities for advancement, and a yearly regular incremental system.[1]

The rapid rate with which the Egyptian bureaucracy has expanded is indicated by the increase in number of public employees, and the growth of the financial appropriations set for the public service in relation to the total government expenditures. The nature of this increase is particularly interesting, in view of the fact that the government's payroll, i.e., the cost of public employees in relation to the total government spending, has risen at a lower rate than the rate of increase in the number of these employees. The following table details the development of total government expenditures, the increase in total number of public employees (excluding state economic enterprises), and total government payroll over the period 1962-1973.

---

[1] According to the Civil Service Act No. 46 of 1964, the grading and pay schedule was structured as follows:

Grade	Salary £E per year	Increment £E per year
Under Secretary	1,400 - 1,800	75 every year
Grade One	1,200 - 1,500	72 " "
Grade Two	876 - 1,440	60 " "
Grade Three	684 - 1,200	48 " "
Grade Four	540 - 960	36 " "
Grade Five	420 - 780	24 " "
Grade Six	330 - 600	18 " "
Grade Seven	240 - 480	18 " "
Grade Eight	180 - 360	12 " "
Grade Nine	144 - 300	9 " "
Grade Ten	108 - 228	9 " "
Grade Eleven	84 - 180	6 " "
Grade Twelve	60 - 84	6 " "

It is significant to note that the Civil Service Act No. 58 of 1971 has not affected that grading and pay schedule.

Table III.1

Total Government Expenditures, Total Number of

Public Employees and Total Government Payroll Over

the period 1962-1973

Fiscal Year	Total Gov't Expenditures (in millions)	Total Number of Public Employees	Total Gov't Payroll in Millions	Total Gov't Payroll as a percentage of Total Government Expenditures
1962/1963	1,012	770,312	199	19.6
1963/1964	1,079	849,530	224	20.7
1964/1965	1,184	891,068	271	22.8
1965/1966	1,206	922,897	311	25.8
1966/1967	1,318	1,035,347	336	25.4
1967/1968	1,941	1,102,935	347	17.8
1968/1969	2,146	1,134,862	373	17.3
1969/1970	2,414	1,187,736	404	16.7
1970/1971	2,610	1,250,380	427	16.3
1971/1972	2,784	1,312,510	446	16.0
1972/1973	3,232	1,498,010	489	15.1

Source: National Bank of Egypt, Economic Bulletin, op.cit.,
          p.20

The above table indicates that, despite the tremendous increase

in the number of public employees, total government payroll as a percent-

age of total government expenditures has been almost steady. In other

words, Egyptian public bureaucrats cannot be regarded as a "pressure

group" with regard to the increase of salary levels. That this conclusion

is held by many higher civil servants is especially significant and indeed

reassuring in a country like Egypt where the bureaucratic apparatus is

massive and there is a great need to avoid the pressures to increase the

government payroll at a much higher rate than the rate of increase in

total government expenditures.[1] However, it is not hard to observe that

the Egyptian pay levels in the public service are rather low compared with

the cost of living and the inflationary pressures associated with economic

---

[1] These conclusions are based on the interview material compiled
by the author in 1975.

development. That this conclusion too is held by some higher-civil

servants is particulary important.[1]

In short, it is important to bear in mind two points. First, it

is crucial to avoid the pressures of public employees to raise their pay

levels in order to maintain economic stability and to ensure that the

economic resources entrusted to the bureaucracy are not used to increase

their salaries irrespective of the general economic interest. Secondly,

full recognition must be given to the fact that pay is the heart of any

personnel system upon which all other personnel functions depend and

encircle. This means that it is inevitable to effect a balanced and

continuous increase in the real salary, i.e.,the purchasing power to the

money wage paid to the public employees. Phrased differently, there must

be an accurate and consistent linking of the money wage to the general

price level in the country.

One of the most important developments in this period under study

was the decision of the Egyptian government to adopt the American comp-

etitive method of personnel administration with the hope that such a

decision would effect a general uplifting in the conditions of the public

service, in addition to modernising it. Thus Acts No. 46 of 1964 and

No. 58 of 1971 adopted the concept of duties classification (Rank-in-job)

as opposed to the concept of employees classification (Rank-in-Man) in

government for the first time. Both Acts provided that positions in the

civil service should be classified on the basis of their duties and

responsibilties, level of difficulty and qualification requirements; that

all positions should be objectively described, and that class specifications

should be established and published. The responsibility for carrying out

such classification system was entrusted to the Central Agency for

---

[1] This conclusion is based on the interview material compiled
by the author in 1975.

Organisation and Administration, established in 1964.

On June 6, 1965 the Central Agency for Organisation and Administration announced by "Ministerial Order No. 2 of 1965," the preliminary results of classifying positions according to their kinds and levels.[1] Without going into the details of that Ministerial Order, suffice it to say here that the duties classification pattern presented by that Ministerial order, although not complete or without pitfalls, constituted an unprecedented effort in the history of the Egyptian Civil Service. One only hoped, after the tremendous efforts of the personnel planners and administrators who thought and toiled in collecting the necessary occupational information, writing positions descriptions, analysing and evaluating positions, writing class standards, and adjusting the classes together with the predetermined set of grades, that the resulting classification system would be directly implemented, developed and improved upon as time went by. Thus has not materialised in any way. Except for the preparation of the successive personnel budgets in accordance with the new classification system and titles, no further action has been taken as to the enforcement of the Ministerial Order of 1965.

It is significant to note that the failure to implement in the Egyptian Civil Service the American concepts of duties classification and equal pay for equal work, can be attributed to the economic element.

.As previously indicated, the Egyptian government under socialistic trends has assumed the awesome responsibility of being the major producer and business dealer over and above its traditional role as a public servant, and, in so doing, it has become the largest employer and payroll payer in the country.

As a result of its being the largest employer, the government encountered no competition from the private sector in the labour market.

---

[1] See United Arab Republic Official Gazette, _Ministerial Order No. 2 of 1965 Concerning the Insurance of Classification Standards (No. 5, 8th Year)_ (Cairo: Government Press, 1965) pp.10-14

The latter consisted of small individual enterprises with very limited capital, and constituted about 25 per cent of the total economy. The private sector, being what it has been, has been practically incapable of competing with the government for specialised and skilled labour or in salary and wage administration. At the same time, the government has provided expanding free education at all levels, and recognised its social, economic and moral obligation to provide employment for all people, educated or otherwise. In other words, the people have had no alternative except to work for the government and depend on it for their survival.

Based on the interview material, it might be argued that the adoption of American competitive concepts of personnel administration, in a socialist society or environment which excludes competition in the labour market, has been a mistake for the following reasons:-

1. The government has been obliged to provide employment for all who needed work, whether educated or not, To administer open competitive examinations to admit them, would have been a waste of effort and time, since they would all get in anyway.

2. The government has had to provide work or job for all, whether described in terms of standards or not, and with so many people in the public service, it has become very difficult 'to find enough work for them that could be described. Moreover, the descriptions of jobs would have limited the government's action to squeeze in more people, whenever the conditions of unemployment in the country warranted that.

3. The implementation of a duties classification plan would have cost the government more financial sacrifices, at a time when the budget has been inflated, because of the excessive number of public employees. The adoption of the principle of equal pay for equal work would have deprived the government of its authority to mobilise and utilise its employees wherever they have been needed best, at a salary rate not necessarily comparable to the nature and difficulty of their assignments, but bearable in terms of its economics and budget. If soundly implemented under socialism a duties classification plan would have resulted in a serious un-employment in the country, especially among the educated people.

Thus, one might argue that the duties classification can operate with success under a capitalistic or competitive society. It is ironic to mention, however, that when Egypt needed a competitive system of

personnel administration before the socialist measures took place in 1961, it was never introduced to the Civil Service. And when the country reverted to a socialist path, the competitive system of personnel administration emerged, most probably, at the wrong time.

Before concluding this section, it is significant to note that Egypt's quest for economic development as a more or less a panacea for its long economic ills has increased the power and status of the Egyptian bureaucratic elite.

It is fair to state that the Egyptian bureaucratic elite, despite all the obstacles it met, was able to effect a higher rate of economic growth compared with that of the pre-revolutionary era. The achievements of the first five-year plan can be singled out to prove that Egyptian higher civil servants are a modernising elite.

Political Developments

The presentation and analysis of all the political developments since the 1952 Revolution is a task extending beyond the scope of this study. However, a brief analysis of some of the major political developments since the 1952 Revolution and their effects on the Egyptian bureaucracy will be attempted in the following sections.

The 1952 Revolution: The army take-over in 1952 was quite peaceful, and seemingly facile, even though it was the culmination of a great social and political upheaval. Of course, the Egyptian Revolution of 1952, like other revolutions, was not just an accident. On the one hand, it can be fairly placed in a context of contemporary events; but on the other, its roots run deep in the past of Egyptian society. A short backward glance brings out some very significant facts: prior to the July 1952 Revolution the Egyptians has reached the top of their dismay, due to the existing British occupation, Royal extravagance, governmental corruption, and long awaited political, economic and social reforms. Egyptian society was virtually locked in vicious circle of secular stagnation. Per capita

real income decreased sharply, and the standard of living fell significantly during the interwar and the war years. This state of secular stagnation was increasingly associated with a very marked degree of income equality, increasing misery of the working classes and a growing reserve army of up and under-employed workers. The Egyptians felt that something somehow by someone had to be done to save the country.

This state of affairs could not be maintained indefinately, for in one respect pre-revolutionary Egypt did not operate as a totally self-contained social system. Inevitably, it generated its antithesis, namely, a growing middle class of "salariat" made up of army officers, educated civil servants and employed professionals. Because the army officers had intimate and enduring tutelage under the British, both at home and abroad, and because they formed a disciplined, cohesive unity by virtue of their education and professional calling, they became the strongest and most solid native elite familiar with Western patterns of the rationalised application of violence. Seizing power in 1952, a group of them was able to depose the government, dismiss the King and the British, thus ending the thirty-year, three-way struggle that had been going on between them, i.e.,the King, the politicians and the British. This group of army officers moreover, embarked upon a somewhat calculated course of change embracing virtually most aspects of Egyptian social life. It is in this sense that the army acts as a conscious, independent agent of social change.[1]

Government by The Military. The R.C.C.: At the outset the Revolutionary Command Council (The R.C.C.) appeared not to have been motivated by political ambition. Instead most of its members were at first singularly naive about the realities of the political process, and

---

[1] The role of the military in the politico-economic and cultural change of Egypt has accasioned some interest among social scientists in the last two decades. For a sample of the literature on this subject see Morroe Berger, Military Elites and Social Change (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), P.J.Vatikiotis, The Egyptian Army in Politics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1961) and Abdel Malek, op.cit.

the dynamics of political struggle, believing that merely by ousting

the King and removing the discredited party politicians, they could,

at once, purify and transform Egyptian political life. Consequently

Egypt's troubles would be ended.

Yet, soon after the members of the R.C.C. came face to face with

the irresponsibility of the old regime, the conclusion became inevitable.

The implementation of reforms could not be trusted to the old regime

politicians with their vested interests and their cynical disdain for

public good. Thus, it might be argued that the political climate then

demanded that the new elites, i.e., military officers, should retain

their hold rather than sharing it with the old political elite.

Between 1952 and 1956 the military elites underwent two main phases

of development: the internal struggle for power and the consolidation of

power. The chronological decisions and happenings show the increasing

control by the new elites accompanied by elimination of old politicians,

factions and parties.

In this early period of the 1952 Revolution, political authority

ran both laterally and vertically from the R.C.C. to the Cabinet and then

downward through the upper levels of the administrative bureaucracy. These

changes were significant, for they drastically reduced what civilian

participation there had been in government. Nearly all the key posts

were now held by ex-army officers. Top policy decisions in the inter-

locking military-political-administrative structure were left to the R.C.C.

This experiment of militarising the executive branch of the

government was justified during the early years of the 1952 Revolution.

Reacting to different pressures, the main purpose and the most important

problem of the Revolutionary Government during this period was to maintain

itself in power. At the same time, the centralisation of power secured

the swift execution of undisputed commands from above, minimised the spread

of clashes of opinion, and disputes through the hierarchy, and allowed for quick changes of policies. It was only the central authority of the R.C.C. that could bring the aims of the Revolution into being, and as there was no limit to its right, there was none to its might.

Besides the control of key ministries by the R.C.C., the leader of the 1952 Revolution, wanted to ensure the loyalty of the civilian administrators. Therefore, in December 1954, the Revolutionary leaders appointed trusted army officers in key bureaucratic offices to supervise the work of the civilian departments and, generally, to effect a drastic change in public administration as well as to roll the wheels of government with more organisation, effi*ciency and productivity.

It is significant to note that although merit has doubtless played a good part in the selection of bureaucratic elite, it is, nevertheless, important to give credit to the fact that sympathetic collaboration with the goals of the 1952 Revolution became the dominant qualification for the higher position and for advancement within the government service. This step, at least at that time, seemed proper and essential. Harold Lasswell states that:

> "It is self-evident that during crises an elite is wise to recruit administrators and other agents primarily for bias and secondarily for objectivity. Bias in favour of the elite breeds self-confidence among the elite."[1]

As a result of such steps, however, differences began to arise and tension began to mount between some members of bureaucratic elite and their counter-elite; army officers. The former scored at the new inexperienced recruits to the public service, pointing out the shortcomings of army officers, and, sometimes, resenting many aspects of their administration while remaining loyal and patriotic to the political leaders of the 1952 Revolution and its objectives. The latter, on the

---

[1] Harold Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How (New York: Meridian Books, Inc. 1960), pp.90-91

other hand, looked at some members of bureaucratic elite with distrust, pointing out their lack of commitment and patriotic spirit.

Under such unusual circumstances which every revolution undoubtedly faces in its early period, the civil service planners and administrators had a hard time fighting against the administrative excesses of the military elites in order to protect the inner structure of the civil service. At times they succeeded in preserving the rule of the law, and at more frequent times, they failed.

Besides the military control of public bureaucracy and the appointment of military bureaucrats in key administrative posts, the revolutionary leaders continued to believe that extensive changes in the top level personnel of the ministries were still necessary if the Revolution was to carry out its objectives of social and economic reform. In so far as it was important to maintain an efficient, co-operative, loyal and honest public service, the R.C.C. created temporary "purge" committees in the different ministries.

The purge movement marked the early years of the 1952 Revolution. One guideline for the work of the "purge" committees was to ensure political loyalty, integrity, productivity and efficiency in government. It also reflected a reaction against the rigidities and delays of the ordinary disciplinary methods, as the "purge" committees were authorised to investigate changes and recommend action against the civil servants without following the normal procedures. No system of appeal, moreover, was provided.

The extreme power of the "purge" committees and the secrecy of their investigations created some fear and anxiety among the civil servants, particularly among those who were known for their corruption. "Fear and anxiety forced some of them into a rigid adherence to established routine as a defence mechanism against feelings of insecurity and consequently

paralysed their activities."[1]

Perhaps one of the main values which resulted from enforcing this method of "selecting out" through purge committees was that they actually stimulated each civil servant, especially in the higher grades, to watch his conduct and review the work of his department before the purge committees could start to bother him. The purge movement also revealed the changing conditions of standards for official conduct.

It is significant to note that the 1952 Revolution's concern was by and large, geared to the higher levels of the public service, while the only sure solution was to give people at all levels a sense of mission, an understanding of interrelations, and a compelling sense of overall objectives and values. This, of course, was an extremely difficult task. Yet, it was not any easier to try to rebuild from the bottom.

In short, by the nature of its character, the 1952 Revolution disposed of the ancient regime top level bureaucrats and politicians. New ministers, mostly from the armed forces and professional groups, took their positions. Many existing ministries expanded their role and staffs. Some changes were introduced in some areas of bureaucratic influence and in some aspects of government. This led to political and administrative control on a new basis. The control at the early period of the 1952 Revolution was military in nature. The institutionalisation of control was rather thorough, and the measures for obtaining it were rather drastic. It involved the injection of selected military element into the civil service, ousting undesirable elements from the government through the purge movement, and the displacement of all vestiges of civilian authority and influence by shifting governmental control to the hands of military personnel in the R.C.C., the Cabinet and other posts.

---

[1] Abdel Karim A. Darwich, Bureaucracy and Socialism (Cairo: The Anglo-Egyptian Bookshop Co., 1964), p.210. (In Arabic).

The effects of these changes upon bureaucracy has been at first to
accelerate the decline of its prestige.

The Constitutional Government: There can be little question,
it seems, about the wisdom of the revolutionary government's refusal
to call a parliamentary election immediately after it came to power.
Such an election would have not merely served to revive the old
political parties, but also to enable the counter-revolutionary forces,
and there were many, to integrate and organise themselves under the
guise of a political party operating within the framework of the new
regime.

In fact it could well be argued that what Egypt required mostly,
was order and good government, considering the near chaos and maladminist-
ration in pre-revolutionary period. However, as the Revolution gained
some stability and experience, it took some positive actions towards the
establishment of a new political system based on a new constitution.
In March 1954, therefore, under the leadership of Nasser, a new cabinet
was formed replacing the R.C.C. which functioned in the first years of
the 1952 Revolution and a new constitution was laid down in January 1956.
In June of the same year, a plebiscite was held on the proposed constitut-
ion and the presidential candidacy of Nasser which was unanimously
accepted.

Since the adoption of the Egyptian Constitution of 1956, which
proclaimed for the first time that the Egyptians are an Arab people,
and a part of a larger Arab Nation, President Nasser, and for that matter,
President Sadat, albeit to a lesser extent, assumed leadership in the
development of the movement and ideology of Arab nationalism which can
be considered an important factor contributing to the growth of the Egyptian
bureaucratic elite. Egypt, as a vital centre and a leader of the Arab
countries, is called upon to supply administrative and technical manpower,
not only for its own development, but also for its neighbouring Arab

countries as well. Egypt has supplied government experts, school and

university teachers, and other advisers to other Arab states. It is

through this process, it is believed, that the ideology of Arab

nationalism can be exported and indeed practiced.

On the social and economic plan, the constitution was rather

socialistic on a number of points, but it left a wide scope for private

capital. The constitution emphasised, for the first time, the duties

and responsibilities of public service. Public servants, according to

the constitution, should aim to serve the public in the performance of

their duties. Egyptians were given the right to complain to the State

authorities in the cases where public servants disobeyed the law or

neglected their responsibilities.

The system of government could be described as Presidential. It

provided for an independent Chief Executive in the form of a President,

popularly elected for a fixed term of six years. The 1956 Constitution,

and for that matter, all subsequent constitutions and constitutional

proclamations, adopted in 1958, 1962, 1964 and 1971, granted the

President of Egypt a wide range of powers. Besides being the Head of

the State, the President of Egypt is also the Chief Executive, i.e.,he

presides over the executive branch of the government. In this capacity,

he draws the general policy of the State and supervises its implementation.

He presides over the Council of Ministers whenever he deems it necessary,

though he is not responsible, in view of the fact that he is popularly

elected. He has the right to appoint his vice-presidents and ministers

without the approval of the National Assembly (i.e.,the Legislature),

to propose, issue and veto laws and decrees.

There can be little doubt as to the wide range of powers conferred

upon the President of Egypt. In fact, the 1956 Constitution, and for

that matter, all the subsequent constitutions and constitutional proclam-

ations consecrated the Presential regime in a form more or less resembling

that of the United States of America.

Finally, it is noteworthy that all subsequent constitutions and constitutional proclamations adopted in 1958, 1962, 1964, 1969 and 1971 were very similar, if not identical, to that of the 1956, except in one respect, that is the legislative power which has formally been vested in the National Assembly (renamed The People's Assembly in 1971). The effects of a powerful presidency upon the Egyptian bureaucracy will be discussed in a later stage of this study.

Growth of the Power of Government: As the revolutionary government nearly smashed the principal pillars of the old regime and as it gained some stability and experience, it took some positive measures to accelerate economic and industrial development through governmental action. It is significant to note, however, that the revolutionary government followed conservative lines at the beginning, encouraging private and foreign enterprise through tax incentives and subsidies, fighting and fairly managing to suppress corruption and graft; calling for austerity measures and price stability, succeeding in balancing the budget through cutting government expenditure and other similar measures. A return to party system democracy was promised very soon, a moderate increasing contribution of government to economic development, and mild social reforms were advanced.

None of those measures seemed to impress the business men and landowners to take the initiative of investing in new industrial ventures and to give the economy the required push. In spite of a fairly favourable economic investment conditions, the businessmen and landowners seemed to have been suspicious about the government's long term intentions. For one thing, there was the land reform law, setting a limit of 200 faddans on land ownership and providing for redistribution of the land among landless peasants by the government. There were also the efforts of the new revolutionary government to consolidate its power through curtailing the power of those representing the old order. There was also the

increasing role, albeit moderate, of the government in economic life.
Finally, there was the rising nationalistic tide calling for Egyptian-
isation and, in effect, limiting, if not eliminating the foreign
entrepreneurs who at the time controlled most of the financial sector
of the economy.

The result was dismaying. Every effort to increase national
capital formation by public investment was offset by the withdrawal
of private investment as Table III.2 shows. Industrialisation was
moving at a very slow pace. Moreover, the bulk of the remaining private
investment was going into real estate and land speculation. As a
result, growth was minimal for the first three years of the 1952
Revolution.

Table III.2

Private, Public, Total Investment and

Per Capita Income 1950 - 1956

Year	Private Investment	Public Investment	Total Investment	Current per Capita Income	Current per Capita Income at 1939 prices
1950	112	22	134	36.20	10.46
1951	103	29	132	39.10	10.20
1952	83	25	108	37.50	10.77
1953	64	34	98	38.50	10.84
1954	57	53	110	40.80	11.72
1955	54	62	116	41.80	11.92
1956	39	66	105	45.10	11.11

Sources: United Nations, Economic Development in the Middle East
1958-59 (New York: United Nations, 1959), p.102.

This points out the great dilemma facing a rather moderate regime
trying to enforce certain reforms in a basically traditional society,
while desirous in the meantime of the co-operation of the richer
privileged classes, who could come forth with funds for development in

a private enterprise climate.

The greater the reluctance of the private entrepreneurs to invest in the economy, the greater the demands for more government action and the greater the role of the government in economic life, which in turn increased their reluctance and forced more government action and interference in the society. We can see one set of important reasons, why, by and large, the government was left with no alternative but to rely on the public sector for economic development. At this point, it might be suggested that "developmentalist interventialism" is a non-radical ideology which is closely linked to nationalist feelings, but which does not have to be expressed in either socialist or communist forms. The growing power of government in the early period of the 1952 Revolution seems to substantiate the suggestion that interventionism is a necessary result of economic development and not necessarily connected to political leanings, considering also the fact that in this period the revolutionary leaders lacked a comprehensive and coherent political ideology. A case in point is the agrarian reform in Egypt, which formally aimed at (1) improving the peasant conditions; (2) destroying the economic and political power of the landlords; (3) changing the direction of capital to industry by limiting land ownership,[1] and (4) increasing agricultural productivity.

Thus in September 1952, the revolutionary government established the Higher Committee for Agrarian Reform in order to supervise the execution of the Agrarian Reform Law. This Committee changed its name many times and finally, in 1957, was called the General Organisation for Agrarian Reform (G.O.A.R.). Along with these changes in names, the Committee increased its responsibilities and scope of action.

---

[1] It is significant to note that the Agrarian Reform Law No. 178 of 1952 restricted the ownership of lands to 200 faddans per individual. This Law was amended in 1961 and in 1969 to limit further the ownership of lands to 100 faddans and to 50 faddans per individual, respectively.

The programme of land tenure which the Higher Committee for

Agrarian Reform advocated was in theory that of small holdings

distributed|peasants who were grouped into co-operatives. There is
            to

little question, however, that agrarian reform in practice was

nationalisation of the large estates which had previously been controlled

by the Royal family and feudal families. Official titles to this land

were sold to peasants, but they had only limited ownership rights. The

agrarian reform co-operatives were the arms of the bureaucracy, and

under the direction of their supervisors appointed by the Higher Committee,

they controlled every aspect of the operation. The managers of the

co-operatives were agronomists sent out from Cairo, employees of the

former landlords, or those who supervised land in the Ministry of Waqfs

(Ministry in charge of endowment).[1] They performed the functions which

had formerly been carried out by the bailiffs of the ex-landlords,

extracting taxes and instalments due from the peasants for the land they

had purchased under the auspices of the Higher Committee for Agrarian

Reform.[2]   The entire structure was highly centralised, with boards of the

local co-operatives being under the control of regional co-operatives,

which in turn were administered by the central authority in Cairo.

Agrarian reform in practice was nationalisation of the large estates,

with bureaucrats taking the place of agents of landowners, and the state

itself taking over the role of landlord. The rhetoric of private enter-

prise and individual ownership was retained but it had little correspond-

ence in the reality of land tenure. The reform did not have the immediate

effect of creating a class of Egyptian kulaks, for the recipients of the

confiscated land were more akin to wage labourers or sharecroppers than

---

[1] For a discussion of the recruitment and role of managers of
the co-operatives, see Gabriel Saab, The Egyptian Agrarian Reform
(London: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp.53-56.

[2] Ibid., pp.54-55.

individual entrepreneurs, although they were better off than those
without any land at all.

There is little doubt that the agrarian reform has increased
the power of the government. Given the tradition of centralisation
of government authority, it was expected that when the opportunity
arose to take over direct control of land, the government would seize
it. As military modernisers, the revolutionary leaders desired to
increase government power. By assuming control over the formerly
private estates, the government was aware it could determine independent-
ly certain key aspects of agricultural policy, such as choice of crops
to be planted, crop rotation, amounts of fertiliser and water to be
applied, etc. As a de facto owner, the government did not have to
raise commodity prices to induce private owners to grow what the state
agricultural experts recommended.

Moreover, both the revolutionary leaders and the bureaucrats
in charge of agrarian reform were primarily interested in stimulating
production. They feared that if land was distributed to peasants it
would be fragmented through inheritance into units of insufficient size
to support cash cropping. Subsistence agriculture would deprive the
government of the cash crops necessary to finance an industrialisation
programme, so some method had to be found both of satisfying the peasants'
thirst for land and preventing them from using the land as tradition
dictated. The agrarian reform co-operatives appeared to be a solution
to this dilemma, and once established, the main criterion by which
agrarian reform co-operatives were evaluated was that of productivity.[1]

---

[1] It might be noted that by far the greatest amount of space in
the official publications of the Higher Committee for Agrarian Reform,
and its successor, the Ministry of Agrarian Reform, is given over to
comparing levels of production in the agrarian reform co-operatives
to production figures for other areas. See for example, Saad Hagrass,
the Implementation and Appraisal of Results of the Land Reform
Programme in the Arab Republic of Egypt after 20 years (Cairo:
Government Press, 1972), (In Arabic).

It is significant to note, however, that when agrarian reform

was embarked upon in 1952, many had been afraid that it would be

an expensive venture for the government, obliged to provide

administrative and technical assistance and supplies at levels

sufficient at least to maintain, if not increase, production. By 1955-

56 these fears had vanished, and the Higher Committee had built up a

surplus of almost £E14 million. By July 1956, when Mr Sayid Marei

was made Minister of State for Agrarian Reform, his operation had

become one of the government's best money makers.

The proliferation of functions for which the Higher Committee

for Agrarian Reform had responsibilities was due to its efficiency and

competence. One of the government organisations to achieve profit,

it was highly visible as a successful public institution, much as the

Suez Canal Authority, and the High Dam Authority were to become. It

was, therefore, quite understandable for revolutionary leaders to give

more responsibilities to the Committee, it being one of the branches

of the Egyptian public bureaucracy to have proved itself competent.

By successfully running its operation by directing its efforts towards

realising profit necessary to finance an industrialisation programme,

the Committee had won the favour of the regime, whose leaders, like the

bureaucrats in charge of agrarian reform, were much more interested in

stimulating production than in transforming relationships in the

countryside. That the bureaucrats are as interested as the revolutionary

leaders in economic development rather than political development is

consistent with the Egyptian bureaucratic elite's perceptions of

modernisation, a subject which will be discussed in a forthcoming

chapter of this study.

The Suez Episode and Its Aftermath: The nationalisation of the

Suez Canal Company marked, however, a series of revolutionary acts which

are economic in overtones but political in substance. While this action

by the Egyptian government was, officially speaking, to find means to

finance the projected Aswan High Dam, after Britain, the United States

and the World Bank dramatically withdrew their offer of help, the

nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company deeply touched Egyptian,

and indeed Arab, feelings as it transformed the image of the Canal

from a symbol of foreign domination to a symbol of administrative and

technical efficiency. The performance and the efficiency of the Suez

Canal Authority, established on 26 July, 1956, to operate the canal,

seems to have bolstered the self-confidence of the Egyptian bureaucratic

and military elites, and to have built a modicum of achievement

motivation in the growing public sector in Egypt.

The Anglo-French-Israeli attack on Egypt, following the Suez Canal

nationalisation led to the nationalisation of British and French companies

and other economic interests, and the subsequent expulsion of British and

French personnel. The government thus found itself with large assets,

including some of the most important banks and insurance companies, and

this both formed a nucleus for further expansion of state ownership and,

it seems, whetted the appetite for more. A new round of nationalisations

of some of Egypt's leading enterprises was put through at the beginning

of 1960. Quite expectedly, Egyptian bureaucratic and military elites

were called upon to replace the foreign managers and to man the top

managerial positions after the dissolving of the boards of the nationalised

companies and enterprises.

The union with Syria in 1958 opened new vistas of possible

development through integration which meant, in practice, more governmental

control of the economy and co-ordination of policies by careful central

planning. We shall not go into detail of the accompanying changes. We

may just point out that differences in history and attitudes have affected

such a union. Thus, for example, "the increased political regimentation

from Cairo, and the gradual institution of a controlled economy throughout

the Republic were quite alien to the Syrians but seemed to be standard

procedure for the Egyptians."[1]

Syrian secession from the union in 1961 was interpreted by the regime in Egypt to be the work of capitalist and landowing classes. As a result, a series of nationalisation and sequestation measures were initiated against the property of wealthy Egyptians as a counter offensive. Thus, by the mid-1960's, the Egyptian economy was overwhelmingly in the hands of the government.

There is little doubt that the war in the Middle East in 1967 has interrupted the second five year plan for socio-economic development in Egypt. The 1967 crisis, however, has given more impetus to planning in view of the need to mobilise all resources to fight a liberation war (which has taken place in 1973), to offset its economic and social effects, and to rebuild in its aftermath. As a matter of fact, the Egyptian planners were, in 1975, busy drawing a new five year plan for socio-economic development.

Following the death of President Nasser, Mr Sadat took over as President of Egypt. President Sadat has demonstrated that he is committed more to a technological, scientific approach to development than to an ideologically inspired, mass mobilisation one, as favoured by his predecessor and some of the Arab Socialist union activists. There is little doubt that more emphasis on technological, scientific approach to Egypt's development has enhanced the role of the bureaucratic elite.

Local Government: The system of local government was established by Law No. 124 of 1960, dividing Egypt into regional (governorate), city and village units, each with its own council. According to this Law, governorate councils are headed by governors, while village and city

---

[1] P.J. Vatikiotis, The Egyptian Army in Politics (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1961), p.186.

councils are chaired by career civil servants theoretically appointed by the Minister of Local Government. The law specified three types of members of each council, elected, appointed and ex-officio members. The latter were designated as bureaucrats working in villages or cities in the areas of education, housing, health, etc., while elected members were actually to be chosen from among those elected to basic units of the National Union, and, after 1962, the Arab Socialist Union. Appointed members were those chosen to serve on the councils by high ranking officials in the governorate branch of the National Union, and later, the Arab Socialist Union. In practice, there has never been any difference in the selection procedure of elected and appointed members.

While the 1960 local government law was presented as a step towards democratising local politics, its most immediate consequence was to create a system of local administration which was in fact no more than an administrative subdivision of the national government. The true position of local government in Egypt was well described by Mr Ibrahim Osman, during his tenure as Minister of Local Government. "National controls over local councils are varied, numerous, and inclusive. Almost every significant activity undergoes some scrutiny, inspection or examination and requires some degree of approval."[1]

There is little doubt that the revolutionary regime did not throw open the doors to democracy with the local government law, but it skillfully succeeded in blunting the criticism of those who objected to the lack of formal structures or electoral politics on the local level. The governorate councils were placed under the control of governors, whom the President of the Republic personally chose, while village and city councils were placed under chairmen selected by higher civil servants

[1] Ibrahim M. Osman, "Local Administration System in the United Arab Republic," Journal of Administration Overseas, Vol.VI, No. 2 (April, 1967), p.96.

in central ministries. Control of the these structures of local government
was further buttressed by including the ex-officio members (bureaucrats)
who were responsible, not to local government councils in which they
served, but to the ministries by which they were employed. Finally,
the revolutionary leaders relied on the highly centralised National
Union and its successor, the Arab Socialist Union, to ensure that the
elected and appointed members of the councils were at least not openly
hostile to the regime.

The second phase of local government began after the May, 1971,
"correction of the Revolution". Its beginning was marked by measures
taken ostensibly to decentralise administrative power and to facilitate
popular participations, or in other words, to revive the spirit and in
some cases the letter of the much flaunted 1960 local government law.
That some measures of decentralisation were achieved was the result not
of the demand made by the masses, even those active in the Arab Socialist
Union. It was instead a reflection of the growing power and size of
local government bureaucrats, a group which had been greatly expanded by
the 1960 Law. In reality, local councils can be considered as executive
committees in which bureaucrats attempt to synchronise the policies of
their various ministries with respect to local areas.

The Representative Institutions:

The National Assembly (The Legislature): There is little doubt
that the only exercise of policy making authority outside the executive
branch of the government has been that of the National Assembly after
1964, and that has been too limited in scope and duration to be of any
great significance. One may consider it significant as a patent of future
political development, as Dekmejian does,[1] but since the 1960's it has
done very little to decentralise the policy making machinery.

[1] R.Hrair Dekmejian, Egypt Under Nasser (Albany, N.Y.: State
University of New York Press, 1971), pp.154-155

Up to mid-1970's Egypt has had five legislatures. The first was elected in 1957 and was established in March 1958 when Syria joined Egypt in the United Arab Republic (U.A.R.) A joint U.A.R. National Assembly existed from July 1960 until its dissolution following Syria's secession from the Union in September 1961. Neither body had been more than a rubber stamp,[1] the first simply approving without debate the executive's policy decisions,[2] the second being more a constitutional convention than a legislature (most of its work involved the drafting of a new charter for the U.A.R. and even this function was dominated by President Nasser and the Syrian Ba'thist Party leaders). Significantly, the socialisation decrees of 1961, probably the most important economic legislation of Nasser's presidency, were not even sent to the ligislature, but were enacted by presidential decrees.[3]

From September 1961, when the joint U.A.R. National Assembly was dissolved, until March 1964, Egypt had no legislative body at all. The National Charter of 1962 called for the creation of a new legislature to represent the workers' and farmers' interests more democratically than had the earlier Assemblies, which had allegedly been infilitrated by reactionary elements.[4] A presidential decree of November 17, 1963, defined the structure of the new Assembly and provided for elections the following year. In March 1964, elections were held to fill 350 legislative seats, and President Nasser filled ten more by appointment; all chosen were to serve five year terms. Before the Assembly convened, President

[1] Ibid., p.155

[2] Vatikiotis, op.cit., p.106

[3] Harvey H.Smith et al., Area Handbook for the United Arab Republic (Egypt)(Washington D.C.; U.S. Government Printing House, 1970),p. 195

[4] Barhan Dajani, "The National Charter and the Socio-economic Organisation in the United Arab Republic,"Arab Journal, 77, No. III (Summer, 1955), pp. 26-27

Nasser proclaimed a new provisional constitution, which included
provisions for the National Assembly that were identical with those
contained in his earlier decree. When the Assembly convened on March 26,
1964, its first item of business was to ratify this constitution.[1] No
permanent constitution was ever drafted during Nasser's presidency.[2]
As a result, the structure of the National Assembly remained as defined
by President Nasser's decree.

On November 14, 1968, and in accordance with the Provisional
Constitution, President Nasser dissolved the 1964 Assembly and ordered
new elections for January 8 1969. The 1964 Assembly's full term ran to
February 1969.[3]

On January 8, 1969, a new Assembly was elected. However, this
Assembly was dissolved in October 1971 in order to form a new Assembly
in accordance with the Permanent Constitution of 1971. Accordingly, in
October 1971, elections were held to fill 350 legislative seats, and
President Sadat filled ten more by appointment; all those chosen were to
serve five year terms. For the first time in Egypt's parliamentary history,
this Assembly has run its course.

The Permanent Constitution included provisions for the People's
Assembly that are identical with those contained in the Provisional
Constitution of 1954. Both constitutions grant the People's Assembly
relatively extensive powers, particularly in the field of domestic
policy. Of crucial importance in this respect is the provision that all
laws, including the budget, require legislative approval before taking
effect, thereby prohibiting rule by presidential decree. If this power

[1] United Arab Republic, The Year Book, 1965 (Cairo: Information
Department, 1965), pp.32-33

[2] Smith, op.cit., p.

[3] Maxime Rodinson,"The Political System,"in P.J. Vakitiotis (ed.),
Egypt Since The Revolution (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1968),
pp. 87-89

had been vigorously used in practice, the People's Assembly could have had a decisive voice in economic policy, because after 1962 the budget has been used as a principal instrument for achieving annual development goals. In addition, the Assembly is granted the rights to question the Government, withhold confidence from a minister or the Government, which forces the minister's resignation or the Government's fall, initiate legislation, and nominate a presidential candidate.[1]

Few modern legislatures make full use of their constitutional powers, but the Egyptian People's Assembly bears a rather faint resemblance to the body described in the Constitution. In the crucial area of budget preparation, the Assembly's Plan and Budget Committee is responsible for discussing the executive's proposed budget. The committee is divided into sub-committees according to the budget's sectors, and a special sub-committee studies the Government's general statement on financial and economic policy and makes a report on it. The chairman of all the permanent committees then join the Plan and Budget Committee for debate on the budget. The constitution prohibits any modification of the Government's draft budget by the Assembly without the Government's approval, but requires ratification of the draft as a condition of putting the budget into effect. The Assembly is limited to forcing budget changes by obstruction and recommendation, but a persistent refusal to accept the executive's proposals, if carried out skillfully, can be effective in modifying executive policies.

Compared to the records of previous Assemblies, some activities of the 1964 and 1971 legislatures were rather remarkable.[2] However, this should not obscure the fact that the People's Assembly has had only a

---

[1] See The Arab Republic of Egypt, The Permanent Constitution of 1971 (Cairo: Government Press, 1971)

[2] For a brief review of the activities of the 1964 National Assembly, see Dekmejian, op.cit., pp.154-166

very limited voice in policy making. Both Presidents, Nasser and
Sadat, address the Assembly from time to time and they occasionally
submitted to questioning by the members. But there is no evidence
to indicate that the Presidents of the Republic take the Assembly
seriously as a partner in policy making, much less a rival. They seem
to regard the People's Assembly as an experiement in the gradual
democratisation and decentralisation of Egyptian political life. But
there is no reason to doubt that they could not bring themselves to
permit a genuine opposition that might block their most cherished
programmes or undo the progress their regimes has made so far.

Secondly, the policy changes that the Assembly's efforts seemed
to make have been marginal. The budgetary modifications affected only
a small part of the total budget. Criticisms of Government policies
have been usually mild and indirect.

Thirdly, the Assembly's important constitutional right to approve
all legislation has not been respected fully.

But the most important weakness of the Assembly is to be found
in the one party system that the government created in Egypt. The A.S.U.
is described in more detail below. Here it is sufficient to point out
that after the formation of the A.S.U. in 1962, the government screened
prospective candidates for Assembly seats and A.S.U. membership was a
legal requirement for admission to candidacy. In other words, the
candidates should be acceptable to the regime.

The Arab Socialist Union (A.S.U.): In 1961, after a period of
trials and errors, the regime found that socialism was the most suitable
approach to solving the problems of development. This change resulted in
the emergence of new concepts for political organisation such as the need
for a socialist organisation based on the alliance of the working forces

of the nation.[1] The power base of the new political organisation would come from the deprived and under-privileged classes; the peasants and workers. The A.S.U. was viewed, therefore, as the guardian of the socialist revolution and the institution through which the lower classes could exercise power and participate in building the socialist political system.

The concept of alliance was based on another important concept, that of the peaceful solution of class contradictions, especially between the workers, peasants and intellectuals. Each of these classes has its own demands and outlooks and thus must co-operate within the A.S.U. for their achievement. The aim of the A.S.U. in this context, was to balance differences among classes and to develop an awareness of common ties and responsibilities among them.

The concepts of alliance and eventual elimination of class contradictions were unrealistic. The idea that A.S.U. would function as the framework within which different classes can play a political role was valid, but the assumption that this would lead to lessening class differences and eventually harmony between classes was not valid. Within the A.S.U., peasants, workers and intellectuals continued to struggle and compete for the preservation of their own interests. The A.S.U., moreover, institutionalised these differences by creating secretariat for each of these groups. These functioned to protect their clients within the A.S.U.[2]

The A.S.U. in contrast to its predecessor i.e. the National Union, was formed on yet another basic concept, which was guaranteed representation

---

[1] It might be noted in passing that the concept of alliance of the working forces was later affirmed in the Provisional Constitution of 1964 as well as the Permanent Constitution in 1971.

[2] Some of our respondents recognised this problem and pointed out that class differences created rivalry within the A.S.U. They stressed that these class differences will be resolved in the long run, if ever. Interview material compiled by the present writer in 1975.

for the peasants and workers. By law, these two classes were guaranteed
at least fifty per cent representation in all the committees and
institutions of the A.S.U., and, as noted earlier, in the People's
Assembly.[1]

The concept of people's control over all political institutions
in society and the concept of the A.S.U.'s authority above both executive
and legislative branches of government was dependent on two conditions:
first, the emergence of qualified and politically trained leadership from
the A.S.U. that would enable it to effectively play a political role in
society; and second, the complete independence of the A.S.U. from other
institutions, especially the executive branch of government.[2]

The emergence of leadership from the working classes was difficult.
Effective leadership depended on a long process of political education,
and involvement in political decision-making, since the masses were for
generations denied real participation in the political process. The
A.S.U., moreover, was the child of the executive branch of government,
created by it and kept under its control. It was difficult, therefore,
for the A.S.U. to oversee the executive branch of government in reality.

Such were the concepts upon which the ideology of the A.S.U. was
based. How did the A.S.U. function, especially in relation to the
Egyptian bureaucracy?

There is little doubt that Nasser's model for the A.S.U., which he
outlined in 1964-1965, was that of indirect rule through cadres who

---

[1] The concept of minimum representation for the peasants and
workers was first introduced by The National Charter in 1962, and was
later embodied in the A.S.U. Statute of December 7, 1962, and in the
Provisional Constitution of 1964 as well as the Permanent Constitution
of 1971.

[2] A debate over the meaning of "people's authority" ensued.
Some argued that the A.S.U. represented the highest authority in the
State, others argued that it should have legislative powers, and
others argued that it was not part of the State's authority, but
rather a political institution that should not interfere in the
legislative process. See Gamal Al Uteifi, The Socialist Union (Cairo:
Dar el Ma'arif, 1968), p.65-72 (in Arabic).

somehow were to be flushed out of the Egyptian woodwork. President

Nasser, and for that matter, his predecessor, did not believe that all

5½ million members of the A.S.U. would be dedicated Arab socialists.[1]

Cognizant of that fact, President Nasser's organisational model was

based on the key role of cadres, who were not to be created by the

A.S.U. activity but rather were to be pre-existing informal and formal

leaders in local communities, universities, labour unions, public service,

etc., who could be induced to become active in the A.S.U. In this way,

according to President Nasser's thinking, the masses could be linked to

the elite through their own popular leaders and formal bosses, now defined

as A.S.U. cadres.[2]

Creation of a cadre-based party by a regime in power may be an

impossible task. The regime's strategy of calling influentials cadre

was probably the best method available given the circumstances of

incumbency, but in practice even this relatively unambitious project

had a rather limited success. Influentials, formal and informal leaders,

are roughly of two types. First, as a part of the regime's campaign to

improve the quality of government services, it sought to give civil

servants and administrators still more power by making them simultaneously

A.S.U. officials. The rationale was that since one of the purposes of the

A.S.U. was to upgrade administrative efficiency, the goal could best be

attained by giving the civil servants and administrators another parallel

to the government structure. Therefore in 1965, governors, the most

powerful figures in local administration, were made de facto chiefs of

the governorate A.S.U. stucture by giving them powers over the selection

of A.S.U. governorate secretaries. Iliya Harik, in his account of local

---

[1] Total membership of the A.S.U. was invariably claimed to be
5½ - 6 million, or virtually every male head of household in Egypt.

[2] See Al-Talia (March, 1965), p.16. (An Arabic Political Periodical).

politics in Egypt, misinterprets this step as a means by which the
independent power of the A.S.U. was bolstered.[1] It was, instead, a
means by which the ruling elites guaranteed that local A.S.U.
organisations would not get out of hand, and secondly, it was intended
by them to ensure that the right people would be recruited into the
A.S.U., right meaning both politically loyal and energetically devoted
to improving governmental performance at the local level. Governors
augmented their official privileges of participating in the selection
of A.S.U. secretaries by the unofficial manipulation of A.S.U. elections.

The dual role of administrator, A.S.U. official, embodied at the
governorate level by governors, was duplicated at the levels of districts,
cities and villages, by other government officials who used their posts,
and hence their influence for widening their control over the A.S.U.
units. It is, for example, quite common for managers of agricultural
co-operatives, who are usually agronomists and invariably civil servants
sent out from Cairo, to be chairmen of the co-operative societies' A.S.U.
units. This overlap of roles was not discouraged by the ruling elites,
and indeed, was encouraged by them as a part of their desire for political
control and their paternalistic scheme for improving the quality of
administration. Far from being autonomous from government, and therefore
a representative of "popular authority" to exercise control over the
executive branch of government, the A.S.U. became another administrative
arm through which government officials could communicate information to
the population, recruit individuals to discharge various administrative
functions.

The second type of A.S.U. influentials includes those who were
leaders by virtue of their popularity, i.e., informal worker leaders or

---

[1] Iliya Harik, "Mobilisation Policy and Political Change in Rural
Egypt," in R. Antoun and Iliya Harik (eds.) <u>Rural Politics and Social
Change in the Middle East</u>, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972)
pp.306-308.

those whose positions were based on control of material resources, i.e.,
landowners.

Rather than a mobilisational party, the A.S.U., it may be argued,
manifested some characteristics of a collaboration movement in which
the ruling elite entered into one form or another of "alliance" with some
influential formal and informal persons, and whereby the party organisation
served as a kind of "formal contact" between them.[1]

In summary, it might be said that if the purpose of the A.S.U. had
been co-optation of some influential persons to act as house spokesmen,
then it was rather successful. If, as the regime originally implied,
it was to mobilise mass support for the regime, then it might well be
argued that it had very limited success, if any.

There is no question that the fabric of society inherited from the
pre-revolutionary era was not a classless and homogeneous one. The
revolutionary leaders, i.e.,Nasser and his close associates, however,
thought otherwise. They presumed that "occupational groups", i.e.,
peasants, workers, intellectuals, including professionals, bureaucrats,
etc., and national businessmen, rather than social classes with conflict-
ing interests existed in the society and it was in the interests of the
occupational groups, or rather their spokesmen, to co-operate within a
regime-created party, i.e., the A.S.U., which was theoretically based
on the concept of the "alliance of the working forces." It was further
assumed that the particular version of modernisation, designed to restrict
political participation and slow mass mobilisation, while promoting
economic development, which was launched would better the lot of all
groups in the society at the same rate. Besides, the principles of 1952

---

[1] For a corroborating argument see Iliya Harik, "The Single Party
as a Subordinate Movement: The Case of Egypt," World Politics, Vol. XXVI,
(1973). p.98.

Revolution had never developed into a doctrinaire system.

Thus, without recognising social conflict, without having a coherent ideology, and without having as its goal the radical transformation of the social fabric, the regime could not possibly develop vigorous political leadership and institutional vitality within the A.S.U. Given this, the best alternative available was to fall back on the public bureaucracy, the growth and functions of which became almost the operational definition of Egyptian state-building.

Administrative Reform

Given the role of public bureaucracy in the Egyptian society, several administrative reforms were attempted by the new revolutionary regime to increase the capability of the administrative system in the process of development. As the desire for administrative reform, and for economic and social development prevailed, it ultimately led to the well known dilemma that "development requires good administration, yet good administration is itself a result of economic development."[1] In this respect, experience in the United States and Britain indicates that the changes in the character of economic and social life in these countries preceded the different reforms in their public administration.[2] To the contrary, the leaders of the Russian Revolution introduced sweeping reforms in the Russian Civil Service, immediately after the Revolution, to pave the way for new social and economic policies.[3] Egypt, however, had to follow a middle way. The urge to develop and to mature if not properly

[1] H.W. Singer "Obstacles to Economic Development," Social Research, Vol.XX, No.1, (Spring, 1963), p.21. Certainly, this statement must only be partly true, otherwise, economic and social development in the developing countries would be completely impossible.

[2] See, for examples, Leonard D. White, Introduction to the Study of Public Administration, (New York: Macmillan Company, 1947), p.20 and Herman Finer, The Theory and Practice of Modern Government, (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1957), pp.261-262.

[3] For the Soviet Case, see V.M. Chikhikvadze (ed.) The Soviet State Law, (Moscow:1969) and V.G. Afansyal, The Scientific Management of Society, (Moscow:1971).

administered may lead to opposite results. Thus, both economic and

social development and administrative reform had to go side by side.

However, when the revolutionary government became involved in

the serious problem of reorganising the Egyptian bureaucracy, it

brought no pre-conceived ideas as to its structure and functions.

Rather, it seems, it had an open mind through which all alternatives

of re-organisation plans were examined. Much progress and improvements,

as a result, had been achieved in the area of administrative reform.

However, this does not mean that the Egyptian bureaucracy had been

completely transformed or had solved all its problems. As a matter of

fact, the Egyptian bureaucracy, until the year 1975, twenty three years

after the Revolution, was still facing some problems that its

administrative capability for development was crippled in some ways.

This was attributed to such reasons as a sudden expansion of the role

of government in society, lack of co-ordination, lack of well-trained

public employees, lack of an appropriate system of information-gathering

that would provide the necessary data for effective planning, and above

all, high degree of bureaucratic pollution inherited from the past.

There is little doubt that, administrative reform is a political

move that slow and lengthy studies prepare but will never replace.[1]

But the opposite is also true: namely, the political move does not

disavow the need for deep and extensive studies. The Egyptian *Civil Service*

Commission (renamed The Central Agency for Organisation and Administration

in 1964) is a case in point.

The idea of creating a Civil Service Commission in Egypt goes back

to many years. In 1915, 1921, 1924 and 1946 many measures were proposed

---

[1] For a corroborating view see Albert Lanza, Le projects de reforme administrative en France de 1919 a nos jours (Paris: Presses Universitaries de france, 1968), p.100.

to create such a Commission.   These measures, however were not
successful.[1]

In 1947, other measures were proposed through the financial
committee of the Parliament, with equal lack of success, to persuade the
government to create a Civil Service Commission. By 1948, the idea of
creating such a Commission became ripe enough that the Government issued
a decree for setting up a department for civil service and pensions in
the Ministry of Finance, to be composed of three divisions: civil
service regulations, position classification and pensions and allowances.[2]

The Parliament was not satisfied with the way the government wanted
the Civil Service Commission to be. The Financial Committee of the House,
while it approved in principle the creation of the Commission, felt that
it lacked the independence plus the authority to carry out its responsibil-
ities. Therefore, the Financial Committee stood in the way of implementing
the decree, pending a thorough investigation of the entire civil service
by a special committee to be formed from   parliament members and
government officials.[3] The crux of the matter was that the parliament
wanted a powerful and independent body not subject to the Ministry of
Finance, reporting annually to the Parliament and the Prime Minister,
headed by a non-removable President (except by approval of the Parliament)
in the grade of a Minister, to be appointed upon the recommendation of
the Prime Minister and subsequent approval of the Parliament. The
government, on the other hand, wanted a body with limited authority and
independence and subject to its own pressures and influence.

---

[1] For a brief history of the Civil Service Commission in Egypt
up to 1955 see Civil Service Commission, A Research Paper Concerning
The History of The Civil Service Commission (Cairo : Civil Service Commission, 1955).

[2] Ibid.,p.4.

[3] Ibid., p.8.

Sinker, the British expert, was of the opinion that the Civil Service Commission should have some independence from the Ministry of Finance, and should report to the Cabinet through and under the general authority of the Prime Minister. That would, in his opinion, give the civil service a new powerful impulse towards increased efficiency.[1]

In 1951, the government finally was persuaded to create the Civil Service Commission under the provisions of Act No. 190, which was issued to the liking of the Parliament.[2] Later, in May 1952, however, when the government changed hands, a Decree, No. 78, was issued, which put the Civil Service Commission back as originally planned under the Ministry of Finance. Moreover, the authority of its President was considerably and unjustifiably trimmed, regarding the organisation of the Commission and the handling of its personnel. It was stipulated that he should report annually to the Minister of Finance instead of the Parliament and the Prime Minister. On the whole, the Civil Service Commission was deprived of its authority, independence and effectiveness in directing and controlling a sound system of personnel administration in government.[3]

The Civil Service Commission actually had not had the opportunity to start its activity before July, 1952, as advanced earlier. In the same month, the Revolution took over, and no later than August, it brought with it a new Decree (No. 158 of 1952), concerning the construction of the Civil Service Commission. Accordingly, the Commission was considered as an independent body attached to the Ministry of Finance. Moreover,

---

[1] Sinker, op.cit., pp.9-10.

[2] Civil Service Commission, State Civil Service Acts (Cairo: Government Press, 1962), pp.304-305.

[3] Ibid., pp.305-306.

the President of the Commission was given complete authority to
organise it and to deal with its personnel. It was provided that he
report to the Minister of Finance every year, and his report should
be submitted to the Parliament with the annual budget draft. While
the new Decree created, in effect, a more powerful and independent body,
it left the impression that the Civil Service Commission was under,
or a part, of the Ministry of Finance and subject to its authority,
which caused endless conflicts for a considerable time.[1]

In accordance with Article 2 of Decree No. 158 of 1952, the Civil
Service Commission was assigned the responsibilities of supervising
the implementation of personnel regulations in government, controlling
the number of public employees in relation to work requirement and
administering competitive examination.[2]

Since August, 1952, the Civil Service Commission continued to
operate under the above Decree for a long period. There were fluctuations
as far as the relationship with the Ministry of Finance was concerned. In
most cases, however, the latter was dominating because of the influence of
its Minister in the Cabinet, and the non-existence of a parliament in the
early days of the 1952 Revolution. A well-publicised incident between the
Minister of Finance and the President of the Civil Service Commission
resulted in the latter's removal in 1955. This incident was related to
matters of authority and jurisdiction.[3] Later, in 1956, the Civil Service
Commission's Act was amended to make its president removable by a
Republican Decree or by disciplinary action.[4]

---

[1] Civil Service Commission, Annual Report 1952 (Cairo:
Government Press, 1953), pp.35-37.

[2] Ibid., p.40.

[3] Civil Service Commission, Annual Report 1955-1956 (Cairo:
Government Press, 1955), pp.1-2.

[4] State Civil Service Acts, op.cit., p.308.

It is fair to state, however, that the Civil Service Commission, despite all the obstacles it met, was able to effect many improvements in the public service, especially in the fields of personnel budget, position analysis and evaluation, recruitment and examination, training, application of personnel rules and regulations, and research.

As the Civil Service Commission matured in its function and influence over the years, the government realised that a more powerful and organised body would render greater services to public personnel administration. On October 19, 1959, a Decree was issued to attach the Commission to the office of the President of the Republic. Then, on October 4, 1960, a new Decree No. 1663 was issued for the reorganisation of the Commission with consideration to its new role in the administrative machinery of government.[1] The new organisation emphasised the importance of planning in all phases of personnel administration, the establishing of standards for personnel recruitment and selection, the setting of performance standards for work and for personnel evaluation, the following up of implementation of the various programmes administered by the Commission and the importance of developing the role of personnel divisions in various ministries.

The above functions of the Civil Service Commission were actually a breakthrough. Moreover, the two decrees of 1959 and 1960 were significant in the sense that they matched the authority of the Commission by the responsibilities entrusted to it and raised its prestige.

In practice, however, the Civil Service Commission was unable to carry all the load as planned, and many of its functions remained on paper without execution. There were many factors which contributed to that end. The most important was the opposition of some ministries to the Commission's decisions and interpretations in areas of recruitment,

[1] U.A.R. Official Gazette, Decree No. 1163 of 1960 Concerning The Functions and Organisation of the Civil Service Commission (Cairo: Government Press, 1960).

personnel budget and civil service regulatory applications; the

formulation of personnel policies on higher levels without the

Commission's participation; the lack of expertise and skill in

dealing with some of the new functions assigned to the Commission,

and failure of the Commission to establish good lines of communication

with the ministries.

Moreover, the Commission had to deviate from the competitive

system of recruitment in 1961 in view of the government's commitment

to appoint university graduates wholesale in government which was

influenced by political, education and social factors. Under these

circumstances it was not surprising that the normal procedures newly

established were abandoned in recruitment areas. The transition from

recruitment policy without competitive examination to open competition

has been interrupted since 1961 to enable the government to meet its

commitment to appoint university graduates wholesale in government.

Selection for the service has been mostly based on seniority of

degree and the grades scored by the applicant in his final university

examination.[1]

As things become more complicated between the Civil Service

Commission and the ministries, the government finally conceded to the

pressures of the ministries for reviewing the Commission's organisation,

its authorities and functions in the interest of modernising and,

to some extent, strengthening it, and more important, providing the

ministries with greater degree of flexibility in administering their

personnel functions. This led to the issuance of a new Decree of

March 21, 1964, creating the "Central Agency for Organisation and

Administration" to replace the Civil Service Commission. The new

---

[1] See U.A.R. Presidential Decree No. 8 of 1961, Concerning
the Selection for the Civil Service (Cairo: Government Press, 1961).

organisation incorporated all the functions of the old commission

in a rather more consolidated and rational approach, except that of

recruitment, which was delegated to the ministries and various

operating agencies, subject to the standards laid down by the Central

Agency.[1]

An examination of the functions of the Central Agency for Organis-

ation and Administration would indicate that the old Civil Service

Commission had been converted to an agency of planning, research, con-

sultation and follow up. As previously indicated, this change came

about as a result of the pressures of the ministries to have a greater

degree of authority to deal with the personnel functions in their

own jurisdiction. There is little doubt that the establishment of the

Central Agency for Organisation and Administration came as a surprise

to the old Civil Service Commission, and was initiated without the

latter's consultation.[2] The newly created agency was first attached

to the office of the President in 1964, to give it more power in

administering its functions, then in 1966, with the changes in government

organisation, it was attached to the office of the Prime Minister and

finally, in 1970, it rested with the Ministry of Treasury as a part of

it and under the direct control of its Minister.

There is little doubt that the move to create the Central Agency

for Organisation and Administration was more political than organisational.

It depicted the struggle for power between the centralisation forces, i.e.

the parliament, the central personnel planners and the decentralisation

forces, i.e. ministers and higher civil servants who were accustomed to

[1] See U.A.R. Official Gazette, Decree No. 1085 of 1964 Concerning the Organisation and Functions of the Central Agency for Organisation and Administration, (Cairo: Government Press, March 21, 1964).

[2] From an interview with a high-ranking official in the Central Agency for Organisation and Administration.

regulating their ministries personnel systems and who wanted to enhance their power. While this move satisfied the ministers and higher civil servants it did not eliminate conflicts entirely, nor did it improve the quality of recruits to any significant extent.

In short, it might well be argued that the reform which led to the decentralisation of the important functions of the Civil Service Commission was hastily prepared and ill-conceived. Its motives were political and it was not preceded by detailed and profound studies.

Reports and Studies of Foreign Experts: One important factor in explaining the emergence of interest in administrative reform in developing countries and the significant role played by foreign experts might be the availability of technical assistance for reform purposes.[1]

In 1953, Mr Terras Sallfors, Director General of the Office of Organisation and Management of the Swedish Government, was commissioned by the United Nations and the Egyptian government to make a comprehensive survey of the need for an Institute of Public Administration. Mr Sallfors report, presented to United Nations in November, 1954, served as the basis for the establishment of the Institute in Egypt. Moreover, the Sallfors report provided the base, heavily Westernised, upon which the Egyptian programmes of training in public administration have been built.[2]

Improvement in the quality of higher civil servants and in the efficiency of bureaucracy has been an avowed objective of the revolutionary leaders since 1952. Several factors have contributed to the Revolution's concern with the higher civil servants, among which are the vigour of this Revolution, the scope of the tasks facing the government in the

---

[1] For a corroborating view see Guthrie S. Birkhead, Institutional-isation At a Modest Level: Public Administration Institute for Turkey and the Middle East, (Pittsburg; University of Pittsburg, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, 1967). p.14.

[2] Terras Sallfors, The Establishment of An Institute of Public Administration and Other Provisions for the Training of Civil Servants in Egypt, (New York: United Nations Report No. TAA/EGY/2, 7 November 1954).

process of Egypt's development, the Revolution's efforts to create

a social category, _tabqat al mudirin_ (the managerial class) to

represent, and the emerging respectability of comparative public

administration. It was primarily along these factors that a pioneering,

empirical research was conducted in 1954, namely, M$_o$rroe Berger's study

of the Egyptian higher civil service. Since the research design of

the present study starts with Berger's original work which will be

discussed in part four of this study, no attempt will be made to

analyse his study in detail. For the purpose of this chapter, however,

a few points are in order.

Although Berger's study was not concerned with administrative

reform, it attempted to unravel the complexities of Egypt's public

bureaucracy and pointed to some possible avenues for reform. This

study, moreover, brought to the open, for the first time, the realities

of the new, emerging social system in Egypt, with its far reaching

implication for the public service. In concluding his study, Berger

notes:

> "As one of the most important sections of the middle class in
> Egypt, civil servants have been transmitters of cultural
> innovations and borrowings. In this respect, too, they may
> be declining in significance as other middle class groups
> become more numerous and as education spreads among the
> working class. A responsible, articulate, and organised
> middle and working class does not yet exist in Egypt, but
> may now be coming into being. It is often said that the
> present military regime seeks to "represent" the middle
> class. It if does, it is not the present middle class it
> seeks to represent - a middle class of the older kind of
> clerical government bureaucracy, the liberal profesions and
> small trade. Rather, it seems to look toward a middle class
> with technological, managerial, and entrepreneurial functions,
> a class that is now only taking shape. The military regime,
> it might be more accurate to say, has really been seeking
> to create a class to represent."[1]

In the emergence and growth of this new bureaucratic-technocratic

class, education and training, especially of the Western type, became

an important factor. The public bureaucracy, particularly at its higher

---

[1] Berger, _op.cit._, p.185.

echelons, was also made a closed system by the institutions of the educational caste system and seniority. Initial entry was governed by educational qualifications; thereafter seniority played a rather significant role. Lateral entry was rather insignificant. Moreover, in order to make sure that the public bureaucracy was staffed with personnel with appropriate skills, special emphasis was placed on modifying the position classification system (when that system was being adopted in the mid-1950's) so that education per se could be given more significance. As will be shown later, moreover, the unequal opportunities inherent in the recruitment of the Egyptian bureaucratic elite arise from the educational system especially at the university level, which favours those already more socially advantaged.

Luther Gulick and James K. Pollock, two prominent American international experts on government and public administration, were invited in 1961, by the Egyptian Government to cast their views and comments on the reorganisation of the Egyptian bureaucracy. In their report, they stressed the fact that re-organisation of administrative machinery cannot take place apart from the general and great currents of life and basic beliefs of the people. Moreover, this report brought to the foreground the realities of the emerging socialist system in Egypt, with its far reaching consequences for the Egyptian bureaucracy.[1]

In sum, it might be said that the reports and studies of foreign experts provided more impetus for administrative reform in Egypt and upgrading the managerial quality of the Egyptian bureaucratic elite through training.

Administrative Training: As noted earlier, the availability of technical assistance for reform purposes has been one of the important

---

[1] Gulick and Pollock, op.cit.

factors which contributed to the establishment of the Institute of

Public Administration in Cairo, which was modelled after Public Administration Institute *as well as that in Brasil.* for Turkey and the Middle East / As one scholar notes in his review of the

administrative revolution, "these three countries adopted a strategy

of "developmental nationalism" through bureaucratic mobilisation."[1]

Two more institutes concerned with the training of the bureaucratic

elite in Egypt were established through the technical assistance of

the United Nations and the Ford Foundation. These were the National

Institute of Management Development established in 1961 and the

Executive Conference Programmes, an offshoot of the Central Agency

for Organisation and Administration, established in 1965. In 1970, it

was reported that these three institutes have offered administrative

training programmes for some eight thousand higher civil servants and

top-level administrators in state economic enterprises.[2]

As a matter of fact, administrative training for reform purposes

has been called into play by several reasons, chief among which are

in order.

As far as the strategy of the Technical Assistance of the

United Nations in the 1950's was concerned, training in a technically

assisted institute (i.e., the Institute of Public Administration in

Cairo) seemed the appropriate medium for the transmission of technology

so as to secure reform and improvement. This strategy was in part a

matter of doctrine. It was commitment to using marginally modified

replicas of Western and predominantly United States academic models.

As noted ealier, this was the case in so far as the Institute of Public

Administration in Cairo was concerned. In this sense, administrative

---

[1] See N.N. Al-Ayoubi, The Administrative Revolution (Cairo: Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, 1977), p.48.

[2] Helmi El Said, "The Development of Administrative Leadership in the Governmental Sector in the U.A.R.," Al A'Dara, Vol.III, No.2, (July, 1970) (in Arabic).

training was mainly concerned with mimesis as the way to modernisation. One is inclined to argue, however, that the required changes in the motivations, skills, values, objectives and knowledge of the personnel making up the Egyptian bureaucracy have not been sufficiently sought.[1]

Moreover, administrative training has been called into play by the premise of training needs. In general, these training needs were felt in view of the inadequacy of education output in terms of the quality and quantity of university graduates. In some cases, it has been noted that Egypt's educational system was not adequately geared to the requirements of the public service.[2] For example, 26 per cent of university students in 1954-1955 were enrolled in the Faculties of Laws, whose curriculum tend to emphasise law as an end in itself to the exclusion of alternative subjects which might positively affect the potential administrator's role in economic development. On another dimension, it has been noted that the Faculties of Commerce and Business Administration in the Egyptian universities have no specific and well defined programmes in public administration. These are but a few examples that illustrate the case for administrative training as a more or less provisional alternative to educational inadequacy. One might argue, however, that such training needs must have been either short-term or not wholly for administrative training itself rather than education.

From time to time there have been more or less specific needs which could be met by administrative training. These included a need to

---

[1] For a similar argument see Metin Heper, "Training for Potential Bureaucratic Elites of The Transitional Societie," in Irving Swerdlow and Marcus Ingle (eds.) Public Administration Training for the Less Developed Countries (Syracuse: Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, 1974), p.5.

[2] As we have seen earlier, most of these university graduates are employed in the Egyptian bureaucracy because of the State commitment to find a job for every citizen and the shortage of employment opportunities outside the government.

replace some administrators very quickly indeed from those who were not otherwise being prepared, as in the case after the nationalisation of many foreign and national private enterprises in the 1950's and 1960's and the subsequent process of turning over more and more posts in these nationalised enterprises to some unqualified administrators. Moreover, the sudden expansion of the role of the Egyptian bureaucracy in society has very much contributed to the demand for managerial personnel to lead the process of development.

It is significant to note that the discontinuity in Egyptian society, and for that matter, developing societies, between those who have scaled the sharp pyramid of educational opportunity into security and employment, Westernised career and salary, and those who have not, has been reinforced by the outcome of administrative training. There is little doubt that administrative training was also a device which reinforced the elite characteristics of higher civil servants as a group.

Public Personnel Policies and Regulations: As indicated earlier, the increased role of government in the Egyptian society since the late 1950's, resulted in the public bureaucracy being shouldered with tremendous new responsibilities and functions, encountering some problems, in addition to the unprecedented problems of personnel administration. There is little question that the government was rather uncertain how to approach personnel administration when socialism was adopted in 1961. Several committees were formed, including local and foreign experts, to look into the situation. Few reports were made, including some suggestions to correct the shortcomings of the old system, provided by the Civil Service Act of 1951. This led eventually to the issuance of a new Civil Service Act (No. 146 of 1964) to replace that of 1951.[1]

---

[1] In September 1971, a new Civil Service Act (No. 58 of 1971), modified very few articles of the Civil Service Act No. 46 of 1964. Our analysis and discussion here emphasise the main principles and regulations which are not different in these two Acts.

The most important reasons for such change can be summarised
as follows :

1. The old system did not provide for systematic or authorative
descriptions of positions, and this in turn led to inequalities in pay.

2. Promotion was based mainly on seniority, thus leaving very
little room for merit. Ability and skill were not seriously recognised
for advancement. The opportunity for progress was not wide or equitable.
A time-in-grade was required for promotion either by seniority or merit.
Whole holders of university degrees had more opportunity for promotion,
others with lower degrees often found themselves in a dead end. The
system was inclined to follow the view that possession of an educational
certificate confers on its holder the right to move ahead in the civil
service hierarchy at precisely the same rate as all others possessing
the same educational qualifications, irrespective of the nature of work
performed or the ability and skills which the employees possess and prove.
Contrary to the fact that certificates of education are merely an
evidence of being qualified to undertake a certain type of work, they
were construed to mean that the employee is entitled to more favourable
treatment in so far as raises and promotion are concerned, especially
when those with equal work and efficiency have lower educational
qualifications. While promotion, in theory, should effect a higher pay,
equal to a higher level of duties and responsibilities, under the old
system it meant a higher pay but not necessarily a higher level of work.
This resulted in many employees of different grades doing the same work.

3. The old system led also to inflation in the size of the
bureaucracy. In the absence of position classification, it was very
difficult for the Civil Service Commission and the Ministry of Treasury
to control the number of positions.

The Civil Service Act of 1964 and that of 1971, which is still in
effect, was designed to correct all the shortcomings mentioned above.

It incorporated major rules regarding recruitment, job classification, pay, promotion, training, performance ratings, incentive rewards, increments and allowances, transfer, discipline, lay-off and termination of service. The most important features of these two Acts, compared, at least theoretically, with that of 1951, may be summarised as follows:[1]

1. Recruitment on the basis of open competitive examinations. The ministries were assigned the responsibility for issuing examination announcements, designing and administering tests. They also had the authority to decide what vacancies to fill, when to fill them and to make the actual final hiring. The old Civil Service Commission used to handle recruitment on a centralised basis.

2. Classification of position on the basis of their duties and responsibilities, level of difficulty and qualification requirements. This task was assigned to the newly created Central Agency for Organisation and Administration. According to the old Act of 1951, positions were classified in accordance with employee qualifications and seniority.

3. Pay was fixed according to the principle of equal pay for equal work. A pre-determined statutory schedule of 12 defined grades was provided. In the old system, pay was determined on the basis of employee qualifications and seniority.

4. Promotion was made on seniority up to the third grade, and on merit to higher grades. A specific time-in-grade was required before being eligible for promotion to a higher grade. In the old system, a percentage ranging from 20 to 50 per cent of the vacancies was left for promotion by merit, depending on the grade to which the promotion was affected.

---

[1] See Civil Service Act No. 46 of 1964 (Cairo: Government Press, 1964) and Civil Service Act No. 58 of 1971 (Cairo: Government Press, 1971).

It is significant to note, moreover, that these Civil Service
Acts did not restrict the political activity of the public employees.
In other words, public employees are allowed to join the Arab Socialist
Union, the sole political party in Egypt, which is based on the concept
of "the alliance of the working forces of the nation.

. As noted earlier, this alliance includes peasants, workers,
intellectuals, i.e.,civil servants, other public employees, soldiers,
etc., and national businessmen.

Organisation of Government

While a good deal of factual information concerning laws,edicts,
and regulations are readily available, the same cannot be said for
information concerning the makeup and organisational structure of the
Egyptian Government. Moreover, few researches have been made to pin-
point the problems of government organisation. However, on the basis
of the interviews with Egyptian higher civil servants it is possible
to highlight the organisation framework of the Egyptian Government as
well as some of the major problems in Egyptian public administration.

As noted earlier, under the Egyptian Constitution the executive
function is said to be performed by the President of the Republic who
sets together with the Council of Ministers, the general policy for
the state. In addition, the President supervises the implementation
of the aforesaid policy as stipulated by the Constitution. There are
Vice-President and Consultants who work most intimately with the
President.

The Council of Ministers is composed of all the ministers with
departmental duties together with Deputy Prime Ministers and Ministers
of State. Moreover, there are the Cabinet Committees, which deal with
Legislation, Planning, Production, Economy and Services.

Though the above-mentioned consultative groups are important both
as individuals and in their collective capacity, the President is

himself not only the formal centre of all legitimate authority and power, it appears that he is also in person, and by nature, the dynamic centre of the state.[1]

Under this organic structure there are 28 ministries, 42 public authorities, 40 public corporations with 373 public companies and 25 governorates (provinces).

Egyptian ministries usually have a uniform internal structure with a systematical graduation of horizontal divisions and official titles. Thus we find Egyptian ministries organised into general directorates and subordinate directorates; below these we find "branches", offices" and "sections". The overall organisational and hierarchical contours of the administrative system tend to conform to the French pattern.

Below the minister and his Private Office is the Under-Secretary who is a career civil servant and to whom the general directors in the ministry are formally responsible.

Apart from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, all the ministries and a number of other central government organisations, i.e.,public authorities, possess provincial organisations, though not all are represented in every governorate. As noted above, there are 25 governorates, each governorate (Mohafza) being divided into subordinate units, namely the city (Madina) and village (Kariah), each of these have a local council whose membership is made up of elected members chosen from amongst the members of the responding executive committee of the A.S.U., selected members chosen from amongst the active members of the A.S.U., and ex-officio members representing the ministries. Elected councils are related in various ways to the centrally appointed

[1] For a similar conclusion see Gulick and Pollock, op.cit., p.13.

officials of whom the governor of the governorate is the most important.
The minister of local government acts as a co-ordinator between the
organisations of local government and the ministries.[1]

As indicated earlier, the role which the Egyptian government
plays in economic life has increased by the nationalisation of many
foreign and private enterprises, and by the creation of government
owned and run enterprises. These state enterprises are now organised
in the main under Public Corporations placed under the several related
ministries. Each corporation in turn is made responsible for a
number of public companies affiliated with it.

On the basis of such information it is possible to show the
formal hierarchical divisions of an Egyptian ministry in Diagram III.1,
which depicts no particular ministry but is, rather, a summary of the
general lines of authority in Egyptian ministries. This diagram,
moreover, indicates the pivotal positions of the higher civil servants
in an Egyptian ministry. Nor are there many uncertainties in their
responsibilities.

It is still difficult, however, to envisage the Egyptian
administrative machine as a whole despite the attempts made to co-
ordinate it and give it unity by such bodies as the Civil Service
Commission or the Central Agency for Organisation and Administration.

The emphasis is still on the individual ministries or general
directorates. This is partly due to the French model to which the
organisation and hierarchical contours of the administrative system
tend to conform, partly to the fact that administrative modernisation
has preceded the achievement of political control.

---

[1] See UAR, Law No. 124 of 1960 Concerning Local Government
(Cairo: Government Press, 1960). In addition to the 25 Governorates,
there are 200 Town Councils and about 1000 Village Councils. See
also Arab Republic of Egypt, Law No. 57 of 1971 Concerning Local
Government (Cairo: Government Press 1971).

DIAGRAM III.1

HIERARCHICAL SCHEMA IN AN EGYPTIAN MINISTRY

The control and legal direction of the ministries is worthy of comment. The following bodies point out the proliferation of control agencies; the Central Agency for Accounting, the Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics, the Central Agency for Organisation and Administration, the Council of State, the Administrative Control Agency, the Prime Ministry and the Presidency. Moreover, in Egypt, as perhaps elsewhere, much of the work of the administration is laid down in laws and subsidiary legislation; and this constitutes another element in the control of the administration. There is little doubt, however, that the proliferation of the central control agencies and the excessive legalism which characterises the structure of the Egyptian bureaucracy tend to discourage discretion and initiative on the part of the civil servants.

As far as planning is concerned, the 1971 Constitution, not unlike the preceding Constitutions, stipulated that economic, social and cultural development would be planned. The blossoming of state planning can be attributed to a number of factors. Externally, the growing reliance of Egypt on foreign imports and foreign financing dictated a need for a well-planned state sector.

Internally, the revolutionary regime's heavy emphasis on planning indicated a desire to avoid the haphazard functioning of governmental departments and ministries which characterised the pre-Revolution era. Moreover, the country was urbanising, growing, the political system was heading towards socialism. Mixing new and old, the state was seen as the logical mechanism to provide economic growth and social justice.

The rise of planning has fed itself, plans requiring more sophisticated planning and evaluation, and has led, finally into the development of a super-ministry of planning in 1961. The Ministry of Planning has been made responsible for economic and social planning.

The Minister of Planning is to work in co-operation with the Cabinet Committee for National Planning, which includes a number of ministers mostly concerned with economic and social development. Each ministry has provision for a planning division, with trained professional planners. To assist in the process of gathering information and statistics, the Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics, and the Institute of National Planning were established in 1964 and 1965, respectively.

There is little doubt that the growth of the planning function and the greater sophistication of the modern state has led, in a very natural process, to a greater reliance on the Egyptian bureaucratic elite that is the critical key to the functioning of the new political system brought about by the 1952 Revolution. Because this new political system is at least partially justified through emphasis on economic development and governmental efficiency, the revolutionary leaders then become dependent upon bureaucratic elite to make the model work.

Conclusion

In Egypt, historical, geographical, cultural, economic and political conditions have characterised the relations of public bureaucracy and society. Moreover, our analysis has pointed to the conclusion that Egypt's bureaucracy has served four major functions:

(1) that of political centralisation - utilised as a tool for unifying control over the country; (2) the job-providing function - that of providing employment for the large mass of the educated and semi-educated classes in return for implicit support for the current political system; (3) the efficiency and economy function - that of performing stated tasks effectively, and at minimal costs; and (4) the modernisation function - that of planning and guiding socio-economic development. It might be argued that different combinations of functions have been

unique for different periods of Egypt's history. However, the modernising function, as the pre-eminent task of the Egyptian government, is unique to the present revolutionary period, and is a fundamental factor in applying the new political system, brought about by the 1952 Revolution. One important consequence of the modernising function is the growing role and power of the Egyptian bureaucratic elite in Egyptian society. It is this bureaucratic elite that is the focus of the following chapters.

PART TWO

THE EGYPTIAN BUREAUCRATIC ELITE:

BACKGROUND AND RECRUITMENT

CHAPTER IV

THE BACKBROUND OF THE EGYPTIAN BUREAUCRATIC

ELITE : A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Social and educational background analysis has become the most important means in modern elite studies to relate specific elites to the whole social system, since background factors such as place of birth, social class, urban or rural upbringing and education help furnish significant information about patterns of elite recruitment and composition.

Broadly speaking, this chapter represents an attempt to answer the question of who, socially, occupies the leading positions in the key institutions, i.e., political and bureaucratic organisations of post-revolutionary Egyptian society. More specifically, we will attempt to answer four questions: (1) What are the social and educational backgrounds of the Egyptian bureaucratic elite? (2) How compatible are its social origins and educational background with those of other elites, i.e., cabinet ministers and top-level administrators in state enterprises, in Egyptian society? (3) What are the changes, if any, in the composition of the Egyptian bureaucratic elite and other elites over time periods within Egyptian society? and (4) How can the Egyptian bureaucratic elite be compared with bureaucratic elites in· other countries, either developing or developed, in terms of social origins and educational backgrounds?

Such an approach would bring into clear focus the elites' order of priorities, the tendency of socio-economic and political development as well as the Egyptian political system itself. Because the developing countries are engaged in achieving rapid development, the type of an elite's education assumes greater importance than is the case with modernised societies. An analysis of elite socialisation patterns and changes in educational specialisation may indicate a sweeping

transformation in elite culture. A study of the Egyptian case shows

that a primarily "lawyer - oriented" elite culture[1] has been transformed

into one which might be called "revolutionary technological". The

new post-revolutionary Egyptian power elite is presumed to be

"modernising", and therefore, apparently committed to the ethos of

industrialisation and technological advancement.

Another dimension of the study of the "circulation of elites"

is to try to elucidate the social background of the elites. In the

Egyptian-Arab context in which social strata and family ties have

traditionally played a decisive role in determining one's power and

status, it becomes essential to know the social origins of this new

Egyptian power elite in order to ascertain whether there is much

circulation. If the existing elite structure is composed largely of

people who come from upper-and middle-class families with predominantly

bureaucratic-professional career orientations, skills and status, then,

there would not be much elite circulation. For the top leadership

might be perpetuating itself by restricting wider circulation from

other quarters at large as well.

The Post-Revolutionary Elites

When the military officers decided to take action in 1952 it was

faced with an elite who were members of the Royal House: the landed

aristocracy exercised control over almost all the political and .

administrative activities; the occasional influence of Al-Azhar which

represents the stronghold of the Islamic leaders; and the representatives

of the British in Egypt. Moreover, the military officers were not

prepared to "rule" or "govern" . Its members' first aim was to purge

---

[1] For a comprehensive historical analysis of this epoch, see
Farhat J. Ziadeh, Lawyers, The Rule of Law and Liberalism in Modern
Egypt (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1968).

Egypt of the King and his acquaintances. However, circumstances and
miscalculations of the corrupt pre-revolutionary elites favoured
the shift of power to the military and bureaucratic class. A new
power elite was in the making. In the following discussion we will
consider the development of the new power elite under three phases:
1) the persistence of elements of the Traditional Elite from
1952-1953; 2) the takeover of the Military Elite, 1953-1961; and
3) the emergence of the Bureaucratic - Technocratic Elite, 1961-1975.[1]

The Persistence of Elements of The Traditional Elite 1952-1953

With King Farouk banished from Egypt in July, 1952 and his closest
advisers arrested, the revolutionary leaders sought to operate the new
regime with the old traditional political elite and the old political
structure. Thus they favoured recalling the suspended parliament.
They allowed the political parties to continue, although with a new
law for purging the corrupt elements. Thus, during the early stage of
the 1952 Revolution, some strong elements of the traditional politicians
persisted up to June 1953 when a new civilian cabinet was formed.[2]

By September 1952, the failure of the civilian government to
introduce reforms led the revolutionary leaders to elect Mohammed Naguib
as Prime Minister with new civilian cabinet. In both the September 1952
and the December 1952 cabinets Mohammed Naguib was the only officer who

---

[1] Besides our own data on the Egyptian bureaucratic elite compiled
in 1975, additional data concerning cabinet ministers, presidents and
top-level administrators are derived from many sources, chief among which
are the following: R. Hrair Dekmejian, Egypt under Nasser (London:
University of London Press, 1971); R. Hrair Dekmejian, Patterns of Political
Leadership (Albany, N.Y.: State of New York University Press 1975);
Egyptian newspapers e.g. Al-Ahram, Morroe Berger, Bureaucracy and Society
in Modern Egypt (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1957); M.S. Kassem,
"Business Executives in India, USA and Egypt,"International Journal of
Comparative Sociology, 12 (July, 1971).

[2] It must be noted that no exact comparisons could be made between
the pre-revolutionary and the post-revolutionary elites due to the absence
of empirical data on the former elites. Tentative comparisons, however,
will be attempted on the basis of secondary data presented here and in
other sources. See Labib Younan, History of the Egyptian Cabinets 1878-
1952 (Cairo: Centre for Political and Stratetig Studies).

was the member of both of these cabinets. Moreover, the high premium

placed on the old liberal professions and the concomitment lawyer-

oriented culture which had dominated the old regime ruling elite

continued to play a great part in the early years of the 1952

Revolution as evidenced in the September and the December cabinets

formed in 1952.

No information is available on the composition of the civil

service in the period under consideration. As we have seen in

Chapter III, the R.C.C. on August 4, 1952, enacted a bill creating

temporary "purge" committees in the various ministries. The enactment

of this law was followed by a series of purges in the civil service,

the armed forces, the police force, and the teaching professions.

There is little doubt that the purge movement marked the early years

of the 1952 Revolution.

The complete results of the purge committees were not disclosed.

There are no available data to indicate accurately the total number

of purged civil servants. It has been estimated, however, that after

the purge movement nearly half of the higher civil servants lost

their place in public life mostly because of their involvement with

the discredited parties and Palace. Of the remainder some were ruled

out because of extremist activities or record of personal and official

corruption.[1]

The Takeover of the Military Elite - 1953-1961

The revolutionary leaders' three experiments with all-civilian

cabinets, under Ali Maher in July 1952, and General M. Naguib in

September and December 1952 proved to be short-lived and transitional.

According to the revolutionary leaders, these civilian elements did not

[1] See John S. Badeau, "The Problem of Stability Among Middle
Eastern Governments," in H.P. Paul (ed.) The Evolution of Public
Responsibility in the Middle East (Washington D.C.: The Middle East
Institute, 1955), p.27.

prove to be sincere in dealing with Egypt's socio-economic problems. Therefore these revolutionary leaders decided to do the job on their own.[1] This was initially reflected in the changes brought about by the June 1953 cabinet. They drastically reduced what civilian participation there had been in government.

An inquiry into the composition of Egyptian cabinets formed between June 1953 and October 1961, demonstrates a proportionately high representation of military or former military officers. In nine cabinets formed during this period, there were 100 officers out of a total of 224. The ratio of military to civilian ministers in these nine cabinets was 44.6 per cent.

It should be noted, however, that this percentage figure conceals the generally upward trend of military representation in the cabinet over time. Thus, the military representation in the cabinets rose from 26.3 per cent (in June 1953) to 48.5 per cent (in October 1958), to 51.6 per cent (in October 1961).

Moreover, the overall numerical superiority of civilians over officers in some cabinets formed between June 1953 and October 1961 should not contradict the title of this section. While it indicates the degree of the military elite's growing reliance on civilian professionally trained bureaucrats and technocrats it does not perhaps represent a valid measurement of their relative power. There is little doubt that no single civilian member of the different cabinets from 1953 until 1961, however able or anxious to increase his share in power, has emerged as a political leader in his own right or have been able to find easy access to civilian support to build an

---

[1] See Gamel Abdel Nasser, The Philosophy of the Revolution, (Washington D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1955) and Anwar El Sadet, Revolt on the Nile (New York: J.Day and Co., 1957).

independant power base. Perhaps post-revolutionary political life
in Egypt has basically been characterised by a lack of political
strength among the civilian leadership.

The process of transformation in elite culture and the
accompanying changes in the elite power structure can best be studied
by examining briefly changes in educational specialisation of the
cabinet-rank ministers during this period (1953-1961). The major
trends that emerge from this examination indicate a progressive increase
in technological specialisation, e.g.,engineering and agriculture
reaching a peak in August 1961 when it registered 25.8 per cent. This
is indicative of the regime's heavy emphasis on rapid industrial and
technological advancement. The law specialisation category registered
a decline after having been in a leading position in pre-revolutionary
cabinets or for that matter, in the September and December 1952
cabinets. The law specialisation category, however, still claims a
high representation among the elite. But the fact remains that the
number of lawyers falls short of the engineering category and thus
indicates the secondary position of the former in marked contrast to
their role in the pre - 1952 years or for that matter in the early
years of the 1952 Revolution. Moreover, there has been a decline in
leadership drawn from those trained in humanities, i.e.,literature,
Islamic studies, fine arts, philosophy, linguistics and journalism.

Politically, the military-revolutionary orientation has proved
to be incompatible to the old liberal profession of the lawyers and
intellectuals. The new revolutionary milieu, with its heavy emphasis
on revolutionary ideology and economic development represents almost
a total negation of the period of legalistic, competitive, and less-
populist-oriented politics and economics which characterised the pre-
revolutionary liberal political leadership culture. Thus, the lawyer
has become the odd man out whose future status is not likely to change

for the better in the short term.

It is significant to note that all cabinet-rank ministers appointed in the cabinets during the period under review had received university education. Moreover, more than one third (i.e., 35 per cent) had Masters' degrees and about 43 per cent of them had doctorates.

Another significant feature of cabinet social background characteristics is related to occupational sources of recruitment. Where is the system finding its leaders? As noted earlier, the largest occupational source of elite recruitment is the military, reaching an average of 44.6 per cent. The second largest source of cabinet-rank individuals was academic reaching an average of 20 per cent. The academics' numerical position, second only to the military is one indication of the regime's reliance on competent civilian experts. The third, fourth and fifth largest sources of recruitment into the cabinet were engineering, law and bureaucracy.

Compared with the sources of recruitment into the cabinet formed in September and December 1952, the three categories that showed gains during this period (1953-1961) were military, academic and engineering.

As far as the elites who were appointed in the cabinets formed between 1953 and 1961 are concerned, an average age of 44 was registered. The relative youth of these ministers is in contrast to the average age of over 49 for the ministers appointed in the September and December 1952 cabinets or for that matter, the pre-revolutionary elites. There is little doubt that the relative youth of the ministers during this period (1953-1961) was due mainly to the appointment of young military officers whose first political office was a cabinet post.

The restrictive scope of the circulation of elites in Egypt could be further shown by studying the social origin of the cabinet-rank ministers. How representative is this elite? While there are gaps in the data to answer this question, we possess general evidence to show

that this elite, i.e. cabinet-rank ministers, originates from what may
roughly be termed the middle and upper classes whose income derive
mainly from salaries.[1]

Are Egyptian higher civil servants similar to the cabinet-rank
individuals in terms of social and educational backgrounds during this
period (1953-1961)?

To begin with, Egyptian higher civil servants are an extremely
well-educated group of individuals for, as Professor Berger reports,
88 per cent of them had completed university education, while among
those about 11 per cent received some sort of graduate education after
finishing university education.

Table IV.1

Educational Level of Egyptian Higher Civil Servants

Educational Level	Percentages: No of Cases in Parentheses
Less than secondary	0.4
Secondary only	11.6
B.A. (or equivalent) and Higher than B.A.	88.0
Total	100.0
	(249)

Source: Morroe Berger, _Bureaucracy and Society in Modern
Egypt_ (Princeton: Princeton University Press),
p.43.

As far as Professor Berger's respondents' educational and
functional specialisation are concerned, comparisons are not feasible
between higher civil servants and cabinet-rank ministers during this
period (1953-1961). On the basis of Professor Berger's general data,

---

[1] See, _Inter alia_, Eliezer Be'eri,"Social Origin and Family
Background of the Egyptian Army Officer Class," _Asian and African
Studies_ (1966), pp.1-40; his _Army Officers in Arab Society and
Politics_ (N.Y: Frederick Praeger 1970) and Dekmejian, _op.cit._, p.212.

however, some general results tend to be discernible. Professor

Berger reports that about 15 per cent of his respondents fell into

the administrative category while about 85 per cent fell into the

technical group.[1] This may suggest that an overwhelming majority of

Egyptian higher civil servants have specialised in engineering,

economics and commerce as well as the military. This last educational

specialisation is of some interest in so far as comparisons between

higher civil servants and cabinet-rank ministers are concerned.

Although the proportion of military persons in the Egyptian higher

civil service was not reported by Professor Berger, some of our

knowledgeable informants and indeed some who took part in Professor

Berger's study believed that Egypt never had as many military persons

in the higher civil service as at the time of Professor Berger's study.

Estimates of the number of military men at the top level ran as high

as 25 per cent. This might be an accurate figure in view of the large

number of the higher civil servants who were purged after the 1952

Revolution took place. This meant, if anything, that the revolutionary

government during this period had a very limited number of higher civil

servants who could be trusted with the task of making the new objective

indigenous and permanent. Because of this lack, military officers had

to play an increasing role in the Egyptian higher civil service. However,

the military penetration into the higher civil service had further been

increased in another way. According to our respondents, the military

presence in the civilian-led ministries was sustained by assigning

military officers in the number two positions. Depending on the formal

hierarchical divisions of the particular ministry, the military

appointment could come at the deputy minister, or under-secretary levels.

In terms of social origins, the Egyptian higher civil servants

[1] Berger, op.cit., p.44

originated mainly from what may roughly be termed the middle and
upper middle class. According to Professor Berger, the middle and
upper middle class (i.e.,civil servants, military officers, professionals
and landlords) provided an overwhelming majority of the higher civil
servants. The working class is totally excluded, while the peasants
(fallahin) were largely excluded in terms of representativeness.[1]
Moreover, the Egyptian higher civil service was mainly compósed of
officials born and raised in urban areas (about 97 per cent), which
in terms of representativeness did contrast greatly with Egypt's
32 per cent urban population.

Finally, Egyptian higher civil servants were similar to cabinet-
rank ministers in terms of their relative youth, the mean age of the
former group being about 46 to a similar mean age of about 44.1
for the latter group.

Thus, it might be safely said that Egyptian higher civil servants
were quite similar to the cabinet-rank ministers in terms of social
and educational backgrounds in so far as the period under consideration
is concerned.

The Emergence of The Technocratic Elite As an Integral Part of The Bureaucratic Elite, 1962 - 1975

The cessation of the union with Syria in September 1961 meant a
new step for the development of the elite. As noted earlier, the
cessation of the union was accompanied by the "Socialist measures"
between 1961-1963. These socialist measures meant a greater role for
the government in almost every aspect of the Egyptian society.
Moreover, these measures were directed at the Egyptian and foreign-owned
industry and private enterprises. This meant a dismantling of the
industrialist bourgeoisie class and its replacement by a new group.

---

[1] Ibid., pp.44-46.

There is little doubt that the socialist laws made it impossible for the new elite to remain confined to the military personnel. The military, therefore, found it ncessary to widen the bases of the new elite by recruiting an even-wider loyal (if not subservient) civilian element in an expanded bureaucracy.

A new elite technocracy which is an integral part of the public bureaucracy has thus come into existence. In effect, the essentially administrative-bureaucratic nature of the Egyptian state has become all the more dominant. This situation was attuned to the Egyptian notion of the state as primarily an administrative entity. "The Egyptian political system is a modernising autocracy dominated by a bureaucratically-oriented elite. Its processes are in essence administrative . . . ."[1]

Focusing attention on cabinet-rank ministers during this period (1961 to 1975), perhaps the most striking fact is the steady decline of the military component beginning in September 1962. An examination of the significant feature of cabinet minister's background characteristics during this period reveals that the ratio of military to civilian ministers in 17 cabinets was 30 per cent. Moreover, the recent trend towards civilianization under President Sadat is a good example of the sharp decline of the military component of Egypt's cabinets formed between November 1970 and March 1975. The ratio of military to civilian ministers in 7 cabinets formed between November 1970 and March 1975 was about 22 per cent.

The field of engineering continued to be the second largest educational specialisation reaching an average of 19 per cent. Moreover, the fields of law and economics continued to claim the third and fourth highest proportion with the educational specialisation of

---

[1] Leonard Binder, "Egypt, The Integrative Revolution," in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (eds.) Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton : Princeton University Press 1969), p.448.

ministers reaching averages of 17 per cent and 8 per cent respectively.

As far as educational level is concerned, almost all cabinet ministers during this period had obtained a Bachelor's degree, while an average of 34 per cent obtained a Master's degree and an average of 42 per cent obtained doctorates.

Another important aspect of cabinet ministers' background characteristics is relative to occupational source of recruitment. Although the military has registered a sharp decrease as a source of elite reaching an average of 22 per cent, it was still the first largest occupational source of elite recruitment. The second largest source was academic, reaching an average of 19.5 per cent. Moreover, the academic source of elite recruitment has shown gains since November 1970 or for that matter during President Sadat's regime. From an average of 19.5 per cent, the academic contribution to elite recruitment increased to a high average of 25 per cent during President Sadat's regime.[1] Thus it may be said that an increasing number of men reaching top-level ministerial positions have taught in the national universities or higher institutes as a profession. Moreover, it can be assumed that owing to the said fact many of the cabinet-rank ministers have participated in a significant fashion to the socialisation of future civil servants through their position on the teaching staff of the Egyptian universities.

The ministerial (civil service) and economic (state enterprise) bureaucracies have shown large gains as sources of elite recruitment. From an average of 7.6 per cent between September 1962 and October 1968, the ministerial and economic bureaucracies component increased to a high average of 18 per cent. It is to be noted that this category includes the professional bureaucrats who made their way up the ladder

---

[1] Between 1970 and 1975.

to the under-secretary positions or other top-level positions in
state economic enterprises and went from there into the cabinet.
However, since some of the military officers and engineers entered
the bureaucracy prior to the cabinet and remained there for quite long
periods of time, one might also count them as bureaucrats, which would
swell the bureaucratic component by 19 per cent. Moreover, there was
about 24 per cent of those ministers who passed through one or more
of the bureaucracies prior to cabinet office. Thus, it may be said
that for over 60 per cent of the cabinet ministers, bureaucracy was
one of the main occupational gateways to the top.

While there are gaps in the data required to ascertain the
social origin of the cabinet ministers during this period, it may be
safely said that 80 per cent of them originate from what may roughly
be termed middle and upper classes.[1] Moreover, it seems plausible
to assume that the working classes (workers and peasants or fallahin)
are largely excluded.

As far as religious identification is concerned, it can be noted
that the Revolutionary elite has maintained the practice of appointing
one Coptic (Christian) minister per cabinet. However, since 1972 the
Sadat regime has originated and maintained the practice of appointing
two Coptic ministers per cabinet (or an average of 6 per cent).

As far as the geographical origin of Egyptian ministers during
this period is concerned, once again there are gaps in the data.
However, it is safe to assume that most of those ministers were born
and brought up in urban centres, the most important of which are Cairo
and Alexandria.

Finally, the average age of the ministers appointed in the
cabinets formed between 1962 and 1975 is relatively higher (i.e.
about 51) than the average age registered for those ministers who were

---

[1] See Dekmejian op.cit., p.215.

selected for cabinet formed between 1953 and 1961.

In sum, it might be said that the period between 1961 and 1975 witnessed a gradual shift from a primarily military orientation as the basis of power to one which is technically and administratively oriented. In both cases, occupants of the primary decision-making positions in the government, i.e. in politics and administration, were accorded relevant power.

Moreover, as we have seen and as will be further shown, the 1952 Revolution evidenced two main trends in terms of recruitment. The first trend depended on the military personnel for filling virtually all the vacant positions whether they were political, administrative or bureaucratic. It has been argued that these vacancies were created by and large with the realisation of the revolutionary leaders that if social and economic reforms were to take place, the old politicians and old-regime bureaucrats were to be replaced.

The second trend in recruitment represented another realisation by the Revolutionary leaders, namely the lack of technical and administrative training of the military elite to meet the expanding control and administration of the various economic, administrative and political institutional structures within society. This led to a new emphasis in recruitment and that was by and large from the newly emerging technocratic elite and from the bureaucratic elite who were not primarily anchored in the landed dimensions of society.

Shifting attention from the cabinet to the bureaucracy since 1961, perhaps the most striking fact is the sharp decline of the military component in the Egyptian bureaucracy beginning in 1961 and accelerating during the Sadat years.

While no figures are available on the composition of the bureaucracy, a 1962 government publication gives some statistics on the

Egyptian civil service as of November 1961.[1] This government

publication shows that the ratio of individual with military education

to the total civil servants was as little as 1.3 per cent. Moreover,

the above publication indicates that the ratio of military officers

to civil servants with university and higher education degrees in

the civil service was about 6.5 per cent. However, there was a

massive military appearance in the Ministry of the Interior where

out of a total of 9,868 civil servants, 3,446 were military officers,

or about 35 per cent representation ratio. This high proportion of

military officers in the Ministry of the Interior may indicate the

regime's traditional interest and desire to keep check on local

development and security.

As far as the proportion of military persons in the higher civil

service was concerned, Professor Dekmejian reported that out of 137

undersecretaries in 1964, there were 13 military officers.[2] Thus,

it might be said that the ratio of military men to undersecretaries

with a non-military background in the Egyptian higher civil service

in 1964 was about 9.5 per cent.

With regard to our respondents, only 5 per cent were ex-military

officers. Comparatively speaking, this percentage figure indicates

that there has been a sharp decline in the proportion of military

officers in the higher civil service over time.

---

[1] See U.A.R. Bureau of Census and Statistics, Report on
Statistics of Employees of The Government and Agencies (Cairo: 1962)
pp.52-53., and Luther Gulick and James Pollock, Government
Reorganisation in the U.A.R: A Report Submitted to the Central
Committee for the Reorganisation of the Machinery of Government
(Cairo: The Government Press, 1962), pp.

[2] Dekmejian, op.cit., p.220

Educational Attainment and Specialisation

Our respondents, like the cabinet-rank individuals, i.e. ministers, are well educated. In fact, Egyptian higher civil servants and ministers are among the most educated of all Egypt's adult population. All the sampled higher civil servants had some schooling, a fact which immediately distinguishes them from a very substantial majority, (i.e.,75 per cent) of Egypt's polulation. Moreover, 94 per cent of the sampled higher civil servants were university graduates (c.f. Table IV.3), whereas only 3 per cent of Egypt's total adult male population in 1966 had done the same.[1] But when the total adult population in 1947 is taken as a more proper base for comparison, we find that only 2.5 per cent of the latter had a university degree.[2] Such high selectivity indicates the importance of education as an avenue to access to an elite position.

In addition to its importance as a determinant of occupational opportunities and leadership possibilities, education performs a double function relative to the still differential social structure of Egypt. On the one hand, the provision of superior educational opportunities is one of the classic techniques by which parents pass on their socio-economic status to their offspring, education serves as a means, therefore, of socio-economic inheritance, and an individual's level of education can frequently be taken as prima facie evidence of his socio-economic origin. That there is a close positive relationship between the education level of the higher civil servant and the socio-economic position of his father will be seen in the next chapter. On the other hand, "working one's way through university" seems to be an accepted avenue, albeit to a very limited extent, of socio-economic

---

[1] The U.A.R. Yearbook of 1966 (Cairo: Information Department, 1966), pp.530-534.

[2] The 1947 Census of Population (Cairo: Government Press, 1947), pp.35-36.

mobility for the more ambitious but less privileged sons of farmers.

Since an overwhelming number of our respondents graduated from universities (94 per cent), it might be said that a bachelor's degree or its equivalent has become almost a minimum requirement for the achievement of an elite position in the Egyptian bureaucracy, or for that matter, in the Egyptian government, i.e.,in the top or cabinet rank positions. One must therefore shift attention from university graduation to the level of university education and areas of special- isation; how many higher civil servants received post-graduate degrees and in what academic discipline? Table IV.2 and Table IV.3 provide answers to these questions and furnish comparative data on Great Britain, the United States, Canada, Peru, Turkey, Japan, Ecuador and Israel.

A look at Table IV.2 suggests that 40 per cent of our respondents obtained advanced academic degrees. There is at present one post- graduate diploma among every five Egyptian higher civil servants, about one master's degree for every seven, and only one doctoral degree for every twenty. Considering that only 10.9 per cent of Professor Berger's respondents in 1954 had post-graduate degrees, one might argue that a bachelor's degree or its equivalent which was thought of two decades ago as almost the terminal degree for the majority of university graduates, is becoming increasingly only a step towards the achievement of full educational qualification for entrance into the bureaucratic elite.

According to current assumptions, a high educational level can be generally expected in social background analysis of any elite, including the bureaucratic elite. A perusal of Table IV.2 shows this hypothesis to be correct. In cross-cultural terms, a high level of education is a common pattern in the higher bureaucracies; over 70 per cent of all higher bureaucrats have university degrees, with the exception of Ecuador where the percentage is a little lower (61 per cent)

Table IV.2

Educational Level of Higher Public Officials By Country

(In Percentages)

Education Level	Country								
	Ecuador[1] 1967	Britain[2] 1949-51	Peru[3] 1956	Turkey[4] 1964	Egypt 1975	U.S.[5] 1959	Canada[6] 1959	Japan[7] 1949-59	Israel[8] 1969
Secondary or less	39.0	26.8	25.0	1.5	6.0	19.0	21.3	-	49.4
University or other Higher Education	61.0	73.2	74.5	98.5	94.0[a]	81.0	78.7	99.2	50.6
No Information	-	-	0.5	-	-	-	-	0.8	-
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Sources: (1) Freeman J.Wright, The Upper Level Public Administrator in Ecuador (Quito: Editorial Fray Ricke 1968), p. 8
(2) R.K.Kelsell, Higher Civil Servants in Britain, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1955), p.135-136
(3) Jack W.Hopkins, The Government Executive of Modern Peru, (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1957), p.47
(4) C.H.Dodd, "The Social and Educational Background of Turkish Officials," Middle Eastern Studies Vol. I, No. 3 (April 1963), p.293
(5) Lloyd W.Warner et al., The American Federal Executive (NewHaven: Yale University Press 1963) p.354
(6) J.Porter,"Higher Public Servants and The Bureaucratic Elite in Canada," Canadian Journal of Economic and Political Studies, Vol. 24 (November,1958), p.484
(7) Akira Kubota, Higher Civil Servants in Postwar Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969) Table 12, p.58
(8) Nimord Raphael, "The Senior Civil Service in Israel. Notes on some characteristics;" Public Administration Vol. 48 (Summer, 1970) pp. 169-178 Table 5, p.174

(a) Forty percent of our respondents obtained advanced academic degrees, i.e., 20% higher diplomas; 15% master's degree; 5% doctorale degree.

and of Israel, where the number of higher civil servants with secondary education or less (49.4 per cent) is extremely high. Israel, however, may be seen as a clear exception, being a relatively new state with a recently established bureaucracy, as compared with long-established administrative systems.

As far as educational specialisation is concerned, the overwhelming majority of our respondents, like cabinet-rank individuals, i.e.,ministers, have majored in the applied fields of commerce/economics, engineering and law. More than one-third of respondents (35 per cent) received their degree in commerce and economics. A similar ratio (34.5 per cent) received their bachelor's degree in engineering (including agricultural engineering). 12 per cent of the bachelor's degrees received by our respondents were in law. 7.5 per cent majored in science and medicine and 5 per cent in military disciplines. The remaining 6 per cent of the respondents hold degrees in the humanities and social sciences, (not including commerce/economics).

It is significant to note, as Table IV.3 shows, that the proportion of lawyers in the Egyptian higher civil service is, in comparison with other professions, lower than might be expected in a prismatic bureaucracy, where lawyers should have comparatively more primacy.[1] In the cross-national view, however, lawyers maintain their influential proportion in every higher civil service, especially in Japan where two of each three top public officials are lawyers.

As far as the Egyptian higher civil servants are concerned, one may ask: why is economics/commerce leading all other areas of academic specialisation? Economists and commerce-specialised graduates meet what seem to be the requirements of top-level positions in the Egyptian

---

[1] Fred Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1964), pp.181-184.

Table IV.3

Academic Specialisation of Higher Civil Servants

By Country

(In Percentages)

Academic Specialisation	Country			
	Egypt(a) (1975)	Japan(1) (1949-59)	Ecuador(2) (1967)	Peru(3) (1956)
Law	12.0	68.5	29.2	27.5
Engineering	34.5	12.2	25.0	17.5
Economics, Commerce & Administration	35.0	5.4	27.8	-
Humanities and Social Sciences	6.0	2.7	4.2	16.0
Others	12.5(b)	11.2	13.8	39.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Sources: (1) Kubota, op.cit., Table 23, p.79
(2) Wright, op.cit., Table 4, p.9.
(3) Hopkins, op.cit., Table 8, p.48.

(a) Percentages given to nearest 0.5 per cent.
(b) Five per cent of our respondents hold military degree and another 7.5 per cent in medicine and science.

bureaucracy; they are in a highly prestigious occupation. But so are engineers, lawyers, scientists and military officers. Why are economists and commerce-oriented graduates (e.g.,accountants etc.,) dominant in the Egyptian higher civil service rather than members of these other high-prestige groups? The answer to this question can be answered, in the view of our respondents, against Egypt's economic background. Needless to say, Egypt is facing severe economic problems at the macro and micro levels. These economic problems require, it has been argued, economists, accountants and management-oriented higher civil servants to solve them. Moreover, it is possible that President Sadat's apparent commitment to a more rational, economic and technocratic approach to problem-solving may have influenced the selection of higher

civil servants. Equally important is the fact that the most influential cabinet ministers in Egypt since 1970 have been economists par excellence.

Other Characteristics of Higher Civil Servant's Social Background

Age: The average age of the Egyptian higher civil servant is 46.6 years. However, age, as shown in Table IV.5, ranged from thirty to over sixty. Seventy-six per cent of the respondents were under fifty. They will be referred as the "younger" group, in contrast to the "older" one, which consists of those of fifty years of age or over.

Table IV.4

Mean Age of Higher Civil Servants

By Country

Country	Mean Age
Egypt (1975)	46.6
Japan (1949-59)(1)	46.8
Peru (1956) (2)	47.4
United States (1963) (3)	48.0
Israel (1969) (4)	48.2
Philippines (1964) (5)	52.9
Great Britain (1945-51) (6)	53.3

Sources: (1) Kubota, op.cit., from figure 4, p.42.
(2) Hopkins, op.cit., from Table 21, p.65.
(3) Franklin Kilpatrick et al., The Image of the Federal Service, (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1964), and Kubota, op.cit., p.42.
(4) Raphaeli, op.cit., estimated from Table 2, p.171.
(5) Jose N. Abveva, Social Background and Recruitment of Legislators and Administrators in the Philippines, Philippine Journal of Public Administration, Vol.9. No. 1 (January 1965), p.15.
(6) From Kelsall, op.cit., estimated from Table 31, p.200.

As Table IV.4 reveals, the mean age of higher bureaucrats tends to be from the middle to upper 40's, in almost every country examined. Three main factors can explain this pattern of similarity as well as the variations in the mean age, entry requirements, length of career pattern, and value of seniority. Generally, a university education

and an age requirement favouring individuals in their twenties are
factors determining entry to careers leading to top positions in the
public service. Therefore, current higher public officials probably
entered the service about the same time, i.e. as young recent
university graduates, a factor which may account for their arriving
at the top positions nearly simultaneously. Differences in the mean
age, however, may be a product of the other two factors. Length of
career service may explain some of the variations, since time to
reach the top level may vary from system to system. Finally, the
value of seniority in a specific society or public service may affect
the selection of certain individuals to fill the higher positions.
Great Britain, probably on account of the high value of seniority
in British society, has the highest average age.

An examination of the distribution of age group (c.f. Table IV.5)
reveals other dimensions in the analysis. A tendency towards an older
higher civil service is characteristic of more developed nations.
Developing nations (at least with regard to Egypt) have more top
civil servants in the lower age groups. Explanations of these variations
may be found in the socio-economic structure of these nations. Developed
societies have higher numbers of people in the later ages as well as
greater competition among educated people because of their abundance.
These conditions may coincide to produce more emphasis on seniority
in differentiating between two equally able candidates for higher
position.

Explanations of variations in age may further be found in the
prevailing social values in these nations. There appear to be three
reasons why, comparatively, larger proportions of Egyptian higher civil
servants are young. There is, first of all, the average age of the
ruling elite, the leaders of the 1952 Revolution and those selected to
be ministers, which serves a ceiling which any candidate for top

position in the bureaucracy may not exceed. Age, in this sense, may
be a reflection of the national style of leadership. Secondly, there
is the question of attitude towards change. In a revolutionary society,
like Egypt, young people are believed to be more willing to accept
and implement change. They are the legs and arms of the revolution.
The final reason accounting for the relative youth of our respondents
may be found in the fact that the tradition that old age brings wisdom
and experience seems to be rejected in modern Egypt. According to this
traditional belief, the longer one worked, the more experience one
gained and the greater one's chance to achieve an elitist position.
Now young men no longer wait their patrimony. As we have seen before
and shall see later, they go off to metropolitan centres, both home and
abroad, in search of learning and training opportunities.

Table IV.5

Age Distribution of Higher Civil Servants

By Country

(In Percentages)

Age Group	Country		
	Egypt (1975)	U.S. (1) (1963)	Great Britain (2) (1945-51)
Under 30	-	1.5	-
30 - 39	0.5	12.5	4.5
40 - 49	76.0	41.3	28.0
50 - 59	21.5	35.9	49.4
60 and over	2.0	8.8	18.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Sources: (1) Kilpatrick et al., op.cit.,and Kubota, op.cit.,
         p.42.
         (2) Kellsal, op.cit., Table 31, p.200.

It can, however, be equally argued that a mature higher civil
servant will be more able to handle problems by virtue of his previous
experience. Age should be no barrier against achieving a high-ranking

position in the bureaucracy as long as the higher civil servant can do his work effectively.

Those who advocate youth often argue that younger higher civil servants are more innovative and willing to take risks than older civil servants. Indeed, as will be seen later, age seems to play a role as far as the attitudes of the Egyptian bureaucratic elite towards initiative and discretion are concerned. In other words, younger higher civil servants are found to be more favourably disposed towards initiative and discretion than older officials.

Georgraphic Origin: As far as our respondents are concerned, slightly more than three-quarters (77 per cent) were born in urban centres, the most important of which are Cairo and Alexandria (80 per cent). Since the mean year of birth of the respondents was 1929, a comparison of their places of birth with the geographical distribution of the entire Egyptian population at the time of the 1927 census is appropriate. The urban centres which produced over three-quarters of our respondents had only 28 per cent of the population in 1927.[1] This is almost exactly the converse of the ratio for the entire country. Moreover, the weight of urban influences becomes even greater when we know that 98 per cent of Egyptian higher civil servants lived until age 20 at urban centres, which in terms of representativeness contrasts sharply with Egypt's situation of 33 per cent urban population.[2] Nevertheless, the heavy weight of urban influence seems to reflect a common pattern of all bureaucracies as shown in Table IV.6 which also shows comparative data on the degree of urbanisation in each country mentioned. A general explanation may lie in the greater availability of education and opportunities for advancement in urban

---

[1] See The Central Agency of Public Mobilisation and Statistics, Population Increase and Urbanisation (Cairo: 1966), pp.51-60.

[2] The 1947 Census (Cairo: 1947), p.30. The 1947 Census was the closest census year to the age of respondents when they were in the early twenties.

areas. In the case of more developed countries, such as the United States, the extension of higher education opportunities to the rural population seems to reduce the weight of urban representation, thereby increasing the proportion of rural influence. However, in countries such as Egypt, where education is still an urban commodity, the over-representation of the urban sector seems to be normal.

Table IV.6

Rural-Urban Origin of Higher Public Officials

By Country

(In Percentages)

| Origin | Country[a] | | |
	Japan[1] (1949-59)	United States[2] (1959)	Egypt (1975)
Rural	27.4 (36)	34.0 (30)	2.0 (60)
Urban	72.6 (64)	66.0 (70)	98.0 (40)
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Sources: (1) Kubota, op.cit., Table 10, p.39.
(2) Warner, op.cit., Table 13B, p.333.

(a) Numbers in parentheses show the degree of urbanisation in each country using census data or estimates from Kingsley Davis, World Urbanisation, 1950 - 1970, Vol. Population Monograph Series, No. 4 (Berkeley: University of California, 1969). The census data or estimates employed are drawn from the year closest to the time of the studies mentioned above, i.e. Japan (1960), United States (1960), and Egypt (1966).

A closer look at Table IV.6 leads one to hypothesise that the lesser the degree of urbanisation of a given country the greater the contribution of its urban centres to the bureaucratic elite.

Religious Identification: In terms of their formal religious identification, our respondents as a group are somewhat typical of Egypt's population. As compared with the proportion their adult members comprise of the adult Egyptian population, Coptic Christians are

clearly over-represented and Moslems are under-represented. Coptic
Christians were 7.5 per cent of the population in 1960, but 15 per
cent of the higher civil servants were born and raised as Copts. On
the other hand, Moslems comprised 92.2 per cent of the Egyptian
population, but only 85 per cent of the higher civil servants raised as
Muslims.

It should be noted, however, that the urban Copts were the
traditional white collar employees in government and business in Egypt.
Copts had a higher literacy rate as well as educational achievement
than the general Muslim population. This condition dated back to the
days of Mohammed Ali, who, bent on modernising the economy of Egypt,
was the first ruler in the country's modern history to staff his
expanding bureaucracy on a universalistic basis. He recognised and
rewarded talent; he also established a climate of religious tolerance
allowing Coptic functionaries to rise to high positions of power, wealth
and prestige. Over the years, the vicissitudes and dynamics of a
minority status led the average urban Copt to seek security in education-
al accomplishment. Copts became the engineers, lawyers and physicians
of a modernising Egypt. They also became the country's clerks, surveyors
and, almost exclusively, its tax collectors. At the turn of the century
45 per cent of Egypt's civil servants were Copts.[1]

During the first half of this century, however, the position of
Copts as an economically privileged minority declined in comparison as
the educational level and aspirations of the general population experienced
unprecedented growth. By the late thirties, their share of civil service
positions dropped to 9.1 per cent.[2] By implication , it would be

---

[1] Gaberial Ba'er, Population and Society in the Arab East (New
York: Frederick A Praeger, 1964), p.97.

[2] Ibid.

argued that the slight under-representation of Muslims among Egyptian higher civil servants can be attributed less to specifically religious factors than to historical and cultural traditions which limited their exposure to Western culture.

Further, one can argue, on the basis of the empirical data that the change in religious discrimination in Egypt is grossly exaggerated. In fact, the percentage of government positions at the higher echelons of the Egyptian civil service which were occupied by Copts in our sample is somewhat higher than that reported in Professor Berger's (12 per cent) study of the Egyptian civil service made in 1954.[1]

Reference should be also made to the fact that the influence of religious differences is very weak among the higher civil servants in our sample.

Social Class Origin: No factor has perhaps been so constantly stressed in studies of social composition of elites as their social class origin. These studies offer the primary basis for the development of a similar analysis among higher civil servants. Based on the assumptions discussed as to the educational level of higher civil servants and professional requirements for recruitment, expectations are that higher civil servants would originate from middle and upper class families, because in these social strata higher education is more accessible. In order to find the proportion of Egyptian higher civil servants drawn from different social classes, an index of social class origin was compiled. This index was based on three factors: father's occupation , father's educational level, and identification or perception of father's social class when the respondents lived in his parent's home.[2] The distribution of Egyptian higher civil servants among three

[1] Berger, op.cit., p.63.

[2] See Appendix I for method of index construction.

social strata defined by this index reveals that the Egyptian

bureaucratic elite comes overwhelmingly from the middle class. About

one-fifth orginates from upper class and only one-tenth can be said

to come from a lower social class origin.

Table IV.7

Social Class Origin of Egyptian

Higher Civil Servants

Class	Percentages: No, of cases in Parentheses
Upper Class	19.0
Middle Class	71.0
Lower Class	10.0
Total	100.0
	(400)

It is significant to note that the upper class, which probably

has never comprised more than one per cent of the population in Egypt,

including the fathers of 19 per cent of the Egyptian higher civil

servants, produced almost as twenty times over its normal share than

one would expect in the polar cases of a purely "open" society where the

father's position had no influence on the son's opportunities. This

suggests that men whose fathers were of the upper stratum are over-

represented among Egyptian higher civil servants at a ratio of 19 to one

in relation to their percentage of the total population. Similar but

less marked over-representation characterises higher civil servants whose

fathers were of the middle class. On the other hand, the lowest stratum

assuming that it comprised 70 per cent of the population a decade ago,

is under-represented among the higher civil servant's fathers at a ratio

of about one to 7 in relation to their percentage of the total population

in Egypt.[1]

Although an index of social class was considered to be a more accurate measurement of social class origin, since it takes into account a larger number of factors, the use of father's and grandfather's occupation as the sole indicator of social origin is the most common pattern in the comparative studies of national bureaucracies. The social origin of our respondents, by reference to their father's and paternal grandfather's occupations, are shown in Table IV.8

Table IV.8

Occupations of Egyptian Higher Civil Servants'

Fathers and Paternal Grandfathers

Occupations	Percentages: No. of cases in Parentheses	
	Father's Occupation	Paternal Grandfather's Occupation
Civil Servants	40.0	36.5
Military Officers	15.0	12.5
Professionals (i.e., teachers lawyers, doctors . . .)	16.0	17.5
Business Employees	7.0	9.0
Businessmen	5.0	8.5
Landlords	9.0	11.0
Peasants	8.0	5.0
Blue-collar workers	0	0
Total	100.0	100.0
	(400)	(400)

One point of interest arises from these figures in the comparison of the Egyptian higher civil servants' fathers and paternal grandfathers.

[1] According to Dr Annis, about 70 per cent of the population in Egypt belongs to the lowest class, 29 per cent of the middle class and one per cent of the upper class. See M Annis, "Economic Structure of the Postwar Egypt," Egypt Contemporaine (Cairo : 1962) pp.112-132.

If one assumes a 30 year age difference between generations, these data indicate that those attracted to the Egyptian civil service have come from virtually the same segment of the population during the past half century. At that time it is suggested that at least one-third of the higher civil servants have been drawn from those with a civil service background. To look at it in a rather different way we find that an average of 38 per cent of the present higher civil servants have a purely civil service background for two generations.

Another way of viewing the data is to consider the extent to which contemporary higher civil servants have a public service background, i.e. civil service, military officer and other professional occupations which are closely connected with the public service.[1] On the basis of the above figures, it could, therefore, be said that about 60 per cent of the present Egyptian higher civil servants have a public service background so far as their fathers' occupations are concerned.

In terms of recruitment pattern, the social background of Egyptian higher civil servants suggests very little differences in the social classes furnishing recruits to the Egyptian higher civil service. As a matter of fact, the Egyptian civil service has a greater tendency towards in-group recruitment.

Has the civil service operated as a channel for upward social mobility? Has this function changed with time?

Considering that there is a general acceptence that the occupations of civil servants and other broadly professional positions place their holders in the Egyptian middle or upper-class, it may be clear that most of the Egyptian higher civil servants had enjoyed their present

---

[1] About half of those in professional occupations, i.e., judges, teachers, are closely connected with the public service and indeed their holders can be defined as public servants.

socio-economic status long before entering the civil service or indeed
the public service. They have no occasion to feel that they have
improved their socio-economic status by virtue of their civil service
career. It could, therefore, be said that the average individual
joining the Egyptian civil service comes from a middle or upper-class
background and is likely to find his socio-economic status somewhat
frozen, if not reduced from that held by his father, or for that matter,
his paternal grandfather.

Finally, reference should also be made to the fact that there is
little difference between the Egyptian bureaucratic elite and other
Egyptian elites, i.e.,cabinet ministers, as far as social origins are
concerned. This is to say that the Egyptian bureaucratic elite, like
other elites, i.e. cabinet ministers, are not representative of Egyptian
society. Given this, one may wonder whether this reveals some important
traits of Egyptian society or whether it indicates characteristics which
inhere in the recruitment of elites in general. The answer is both;
the socially restricted nature of the Egyptian elite is grounded, as
we shall see in the next chapter, in a severly restrictive selective
educational system in which socio-economic status is closely related to
academic success. But while other societies may possess less restrictive
educational systems, they too, as we shall see later, exhibit a
correlation between socio-economic status and academic success.

That other nations' bureaucratic elites, like the Egyptian
bureaucratic elite,are not representative of their respective societies
is a nearly universal phenomenon can be seen from Table IV.9, which
provides comparative data on the social origin of higher civil servants
in seven countries, by reference to their fathers' occupations.

Table IV.9

Comparison of the Occupations of the Fathers of Higher

Civil Servants in Seven Countries

(In percentages)

Name of Country	Middle Class						Others	
	Shopkeepers Businessmen	Governmental (incl. Army Employees	Business Employees	Profess-ionals	Skilled Workers	Total for Middle Class	Unskilled Workers	Agricultural Workers and farmers
Denmark (1945)	19.5	25.1	4.3	38.3	-	87.2	4.3	8.5
Gt.Britain (1949-52)	17.8	27.0	13.3	30.4	8.7	97.2	1.5	1.3
France (1945-51)	11.4	50.2	8.3	23.1	3.3	96.4	-	3.6
U.S.A (1959)	20.0	-	24.0	20.0	17.0	81.0	4.5	15.0
Turkey (1960)	16.0	45.5	-	29.0	-	90.5	1.0	8.5
India (1947-56)	12.0	50.6	4.5	29.2	-	96.3	-	4.7
Peru (1956)	14.5	48.0	10.7	12.6	1.2	87.0	-	12.6

Source: V Subramaniam, "Representative Bureaucracy. A Re-assessment," The American Political Science Review , Vol. LXI (December,1967), p.1016, data on Peru are from Hopkins, op.cit., pp.72-73

One point of interest to arise from Table IV.9 is the extent to which the public bureaucracy can be considered as an instrument of social mobility. Some studies on development have seen the public bureaucracy as an institution of social mobility.[1] These studies, however, define the public bureaucracy as a middle-class institution by considering the actual status of the civil servants, their profession and salaries.

[1] This view is expressed in the writings of S.N.Eisenstadt, "Bureaucracy and Bureaucratisation," Current Sociology, Vol. VII (1958), pp.99-129; S.C.Dubie, "Bureaucracy and Nation-Building on Transitional Societies," International Social Sciences Journal, Vol. XVI, 1964), pp.229-336; and David Apter, The Politics of Modernisation (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965), Chapter 7.

The description of the public bureaucracy as an instrument of social
mobility implies that the public bureaucrats, by entering the civil
service, acquire a class status higher than that of their parents. We
have suggested earlier that the average individual joining the
Egyptian civil service comes, by and large, from the middle class
and is likely to find his socio-economic status somewhat frozen. On
the basis of the data presented in Table IV.9, one could argue, more-
over, that by entering the civil service in those countries included.
on the table, bureaucrats are not likely to acquire a class status
higher than that of their parents. In cross-national terms, it could,
therefore, be argued that the public bureaucracy is not likely to
operate as a channel for upward social mobility. Indeed, a 1964 study
of socio-economic background of the Turkish Civil Servants in the middle
and the highest ranks concluded that:

> ". . . many of the officials studied - and particularly those
> in the highest ranks - have enjoyed their present social
> standing long before entering the public service. They have
> no occasion to feel that they have improved on their positions
> in society by virtue of their public service careers, nor indeed
> that they have ever had any need to do so."[1]

Background Characteristics of Top-Level Administrators in State Enterprises

In the preceding sections, we have examined and analysed the
significant features of the social and educational backgrounds of the
cabinet-rank ministers and Egyptian higher civil servants in order to
see what sort of men they are as a group. We now turn to a brief
discussion of the broad and significant characteristics of the social
and educational backgrounds of another elite: high-ranking administrators
in Egyptian state economic enterprises.

---

[1] C.H.Dodd, Politics and Government in Turkey (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1969), p.291.

In contrast to many countries which had to undergo the family enterprise stage in their development, Egypt seems to have by-passed this stage.[1] Several factors have contributed to this, chief among which are the reluctance of the wealthy class to invest in industry, the Egyptianisation of foreign interests and the accelerated industrial programmes, coupled with the nationalisation movement. Consequently the present managerial elite in Egypt is professional, which presumably will be more receptive to new administrative concepts and techniques. Although a great effort was needed to supply a large number of competent managers to replace the foreigners and other Egyptian directors, Harbeson and Abdel-Kadir believed that Egypt had the capacity to generate the high-level managers for development of the country. The significance of Egyptian management, in their view, lies in its potential rather than its present stage of development.[2]

While blue-collar workers sometimes produce top-level managers in the United States, or Britain, this is not so in Egypt. Despite the official position of favouring the participation of workers in management, with the exception of the elected directors, top-level management in state enterprises, including the appointed directors, tends to come from the bureaucratic and professional classes.[3] According to S.Kassem, top-level administrators in Egyptian state enterprises were largely recruited from the sons of civil servants (i.e.,31 per cent). Sons of professionals

---

[1] F.Harbison and C H Myers, Management in the Industrial World (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co, Inc,, 1959),p.160.

[2] F.Harbison and I Abdel-Kadir, Human Resources for Egyptian Enterprises (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co, Inc., 1958), p.162.

[3] According to Law No 58 of 1971, these enterprises we regard to have no more than nine directors, four of them elected and representing the workers and employees, and the rest appointed by the respective members of the cabinet. The examination and the analysis of the social composition of top-level administrators focus on the appointed members since no data was available on the elected members. At any rate, the latter group does not seem to play any significant role in so far as the management of state enterprises is concerned.

and army officers accounted for 13 per cent and 7 per cent respectively. It is interesting to note that these were also the three main sources which the Egyptian higher civil service drew largely upon. It is significant to observe, moreover, that the sons of peasants were tremendously under-represented (i.e. 10 per cent), while the sons of blue-collar workers were totally excluded from the posts of top-level administrators in Egyptian state enterprises.[1] The total exclusion of the sons of workers and the almost total exclusion of the sons of peasants from high positions was also noticed in so far as the Egyptian higher civil service was concerned. This is a fact which reflects the restrictive scope of Egypt's power elite and the limited nature of elite circulation.

When socio-economic status of the top-level administrator's family is used as a more appropriate indicator of his social origin, the cohesive character of Egypt's power elite struture becomes sharper. According to the above-mentioned study, about two-thirds of top-level administrators in Egyptian state enterprises were of middle class origin. It also indicated that more intended to be recruited from the upper and fewer from the lower socio-economic strata.[2] It will be recalled that the majority of Egyptian higher civil servants and cabinet-rank ministers were also of middle class origin.

Cross-culturally, the Egyptian managers were recruited from sons of civil servants to a much greater degree than their Indian or American counterparts, a fact which reflects the control role of the state in Egyptian society.

As far as the geographic origin is concerned, 76 per cent of the Egyptian managers were born in urban centres.[3] That the Egyptian elites

---

[1] Kassem, op.cit., p. 107.

[2] Ibid., p. 108.

[3] Ibid., p. 107.

are predominately urban in character is now more evident. Cross-
culturally, the percentages of urban-born managers were slightly
higher in Egypt than in the United States, and lower in Egypt than in
India.[1] This pattern of rural-urban differential reflects the degree
of urbanisation of the three respective societies. As noted earlier,
the degree of urbanisation seems to be inversely related to the
contribution of urban centres to elite formation.

In terms of age, Egyptian managers, not unlike higher civil
servants, seem to be relatively young. According to Westfall, the
Egyptian manager in state enterprises had an average age of forty-
one as compared with an average age of fifty-two for the typical
American manager. Moreover, about 50 per cent of the Egyptian managers
are under forty, and 7 per cent are over fifty, as compared with 11
per cent who were under forty and 54 per cent who were past fifty years
of age, in the United States.[2]

Three explanations might be given for the relative youth of the
managers in Egypt. First, there is a considerable difference in
educational background of the Egyptian manager and his American counter-
part. As will soon be evident, a far greater proportion of Egyptian
managers received a university degree, and consequently reached their
present positions in a shorter time than their American counterparts.
The use of "formal education" as a substitute for experience - -
more as a matter of necessity than of choice - - may, in part, explain
the age differential. Second is the explusion of most of the former
older Egyptian managers because of the doubt surrounding their political
affiliations. Third is the high rate of expansion of the public enter-
prise system in Egypt, as compared with the rate of accumulation of

---

[1] Ibid., p. 107.

[2] Ralf Westfall, "Business Management Under Nasser," Business
Horizons, Vol. VII, No. 2 (Summer, 1965), p. 77.

managerial resources.

As noted earlier, Egyptian cabinet-rank ministers and higher civil servants are well-educated. So are top-level administrators in Egyptian state enterprises. Moreover, the educational level of the Egyptian administrator in state enterprises, like that of the higher civil servant in the civil service is much higher than that of his counterpart, in a number of developed countries. Table IV.10 shows the eucational level of the Egyptian top administrators in state enterprises and furnishes comparative data for the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and India.

Table IV.10

Educational Level of Managers by Country

(In Percentages)

Educational Level	U.S.	U.K.	U.S.S.R.	INDIA	EGYPT
Less than University Education	43	74	20	8	6
University Education	57	26	80	92	94

Source: Ralf Westfall, "Business Management Under Nasser," Business Horizons, Vol. VII, No. 2 (Summer, 1966), p.77

In a cross-national view, Table IV.10 suggests the similarity between socialistic countries which rely more on educated people than do free enterprise economies.

As far as the educational specialisation of top-level administrators in Egyptian state enterprises is concerned, engineering and economics/commerce accounted for the major part (40 per cent and 37 per cent respectively). Only 9 per cent of the Egyptian managers had a liberal arts degree, as contrasted with 40 per cent in the United States who had liberal arts degree, and 25 per cent in engineering, while in the Soviet

Union virtually all managers held an engineering degree.[1]

The belief that economic development is associated with manufacturing and that the latter can be best handled by engineers might explain this heavy reliance on engineers in managing the Egyptian enterprises. Quite possibly, the emphasis on an engineering approach to administration has been inspired by the Soviet model, the main feature of which is a narrow engineering training reinforced by simplistic adherence to production credos like Taylorism and by the rigidities of the command economy mechanism.

As far as recruitment into top-level positions in state enterprise is concerned, the Egyptian government had five sources from which to recruit: the civil service, the army, universities, self-employed professionals and managers in the business sector. A survey conducted by the National Institute of Management Development of a sample of appointed directors attending a top-management programme after nationalisation, revealed that 38 per cent of the directors were from the civil service, 15 per cent from the amry, and 5 per cent were university professors and self-employed professionals.[2] With a total of 62 per cent of the directors recruited from non-business organisations, one might expect that some acquired non-business patterns of administrative behaviour would be transferred to the state economic enterprise, the latter being engaged in business-like activities which require a reasonable degree of flexibility, autonomy and discretion in decision-making. Sherif argues, however, that the transferability of non-business experience does not necessarily have to be a handicap to

[1] Ibid., p.78

[2] Alumni of National Institute of Management Development, Lessons Learned from the First Plan, Book No. 4 (Cairo: The Association, 1967), p.122, (In Arabic).

effective performance. There might be some positive advantage to cross-fertilisation of business and non-business experiences.[1]

The heavy reliance of the government on the non-business sector in recruiting top-level administrators in state enterprises might be explained by the following factors :

1. There was a need to select new managers for a large number of state enterprises at one time.

2. Many professional top managers were not eligible for political reasons.

3. The rate of management formation lagged behind the needs of the replacement market and the demand for new management created by new state economic enterprises.

4. Board membership was restricted to only one state enterprise for any individual.

It is not uncommon to use political criteria in selecting top-level administrators particularly in periods of transormation from one economic system to another. Many socialistic experiences have pursued this path. However, the dangers of adopting such a policy have far-reaching effects. It might dilute the professionalisation of management, affect the morale of potential qualified managers, and reduce management competence. While there is little doubt that political conformity was used by the government in its selection of directors, it seems that quality was not overlooked. As the above survey shows, 38 per cent of the directors were recruited from the business sector. In addition, the high percentage of university graduate directors indicated that education was used as a major guide in the selection process.

Thus for a high percentage of the top-level administrators in state enterprises, not unlike the cabinet-rank ministers, the Egyptian civil service, not to mention the army bureaucracy, was one of the main occupation gateways to the top.

---

[1] A.F. Sherif, Top-Level Management and Personnel Problems of Public Enterprises, N.I.M.D. Studies No. 17 (Cairo: May, 1967), p.10.

It is perhaps significant to note that the establishment and expansion of the state enterprise system in Egypt since 1961 have helped cause a shift into new jobs in state enterprise on the part of the higher civil servants or the military officers from officials' background, and this in turn seems to have assisted in reducing the conflict between higher civil servants or army officers on the one hand, and high-ranking administrators in state enterprises on the other. Contacts and linkages among some rather different sectors of the society seem to be on the increase. An administrator working in a state enterprise whose father has been employed in one of the central ministries or the armed forces is not likely to be over hostile towards the central ministries or the military. In accordance with the well-known hypothesis of "cross-pressures", individuals being pulled in different directions by various tendencies might be expected to adopt relatively moderate opinions.

Background Characteristics of Members of Formal Organisations on the Local Level

Although this study bears largely on those who occupy the highest posts within the administration proper - the higher civil servants of the central administration - it is nevertheless important to examine briefly the available data on the background of those incumbents in formal organisations on the local level in order to ascertain the character of Egypt's power elite. There is little doubt that they are particularly important because they are directly in contact with provincial life and probably influential in their areas.

In comparison to the rural population as a whole, in which almost 90 per cent of adults are illiterate, members of village councils are an educated elite. Chairmen of councils are of even higher educational status, and for the most part are former employees of the ministries of

Education, Social Affairs, Agriculture, Agrarian Reform and Health.

A sample of the membership of 20 village councils in Menoufia Governorate from a survey conducted by the Institute of local Administration in 1967, pointed out the relative elite status of chairmen. Of the 20 chairmen, 16 were bureaucrats formerly employed by one of the ministries mentioned above; one was a doctor practicing privately; and three were either peasants or landowners, it being impossible to determine their status from the category provided. Two of these three were chairmen only temporarily and by virtue of their seniority (age), as the government had not yet appointed the permanent chairmen for these councils. Thus almost all chairmen had held positions of relatively high status in rurual Egypt, jobs requiring at least a secondary school certificate and usually a university degree.[1] A sample of 97 village council chairmen who participated in a training programme in local administrations in 1966 reveals similar occupational and educational backgrounds. Ninty five of the 97 held either secondary school or university degrees, and only one had no formal education. Eighty five of the 97 were former bureaucrats employed in the ministries mentioned above, 5 were peasants or landowners, 3 were lawyers, 2 were Umdahs (the traditional village headmen), and one an engineer.[2] Members of governorate councils are also of the bureaucratic elite in the countryside. Of a sample of 43 governorate council members who underwent a training programme at the Institute of Local Administration in 1969, all were literate, 18 held a secondary school certificate, 18 were university graduates and 5 had done post-graduate work. Thirty of the 43 were employees of the ministries, 9 were peasants, 5 were small

---

[1] See Ali Abdel el Alim Mahgoub, An Evaluation of Village Councils in Menoufia Governorate (Cairo: Institute of Local Administration, 1968) (In Arabic).

[2] See James Mayfield, Rural Politics in Nasser's Egypt (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1971), pp. 189-190.

businessmen, and one was a skilled labourer.[1]

The overwhelming predominance of bureaucrats in formal leader-
ship positions and the relatively prestigious educational status of
the members of local councils points to the role which these councils
play in rural administration. They are the administrative arms of the
government in which bureaucrats can meet and co-ordinate efforts and
try to gather support for their projects from local elites. While
there are no data on ASU chairmen and secretaries in basic units,
the distribution of social background characteristics would vary only
slightly if at all from those of village council members, for it is by
virtue of their election to the ASU posts that villagers are selected
to serve in village councils. In other words, local ASU leaders and
village councillors are usually the same people.

There is little doubt that the relationship between socio-economic
status and access to elite positions is high, and the status of occupants
increase as one moves from the geographical and political periphery
towards the centre. Furthermore, the predominance of highly-educated
individuals in local government appears to be a phenomenon peculiar to
Egypt. In Morocco, for example, 66 per cent of municipal councillors
have no education and only 4 per cent have university degrees,[2] while in
Egypt less than half of village councillors have no formal education while

---

[1] See Institute of Local Administration, An Evaluation of Governorate
Councils, (Cairo: The Institute, 1970), p.15. It is interesting to note in
passing that the governorate councils were placed under the control of
governors, who were upgraded in status to the rank of deputy ministers,
and whom the revolutionary leaders themselves chose. Governor's partial
control over appointments within their provinces, over governorate
budget, and their links to the revolutionary leaders have insured their
pre-eminent position in the countryside. No data on the backgrounds of
governors is available. However, the greater incidence of army and police
officers as well as higher civil servants among governors and the fact that
the revolutionary leaders appointed them personally, was pointed to me by
some Egyptian higher civil servants.

[2] William Quandt, The Comparative Study of Political Elite (Beverley
Hills: Sage Professional Papers, 1970), p.187.

18.5 per cent have university degrees and 26 per cent have secondary certificates.[1] These figures reflect the strategy of rural development adopted by the revolutionary leaders. This strategy consists of an attempt to expand the bureaucracy into the countryside and to mobilise the rural elite behind plans and projects designed by the central government and its local representatives. Peasants and other low status rural elements are approached only indirectly by the government through the linkages between traditional leaders and those elements.

There can be little question, however, that the Egyptian peasant, despised in pre-revolutionary Egypt, was idealised by the 1952 Revolution as the true Egyptian, but the revolutionary leaders, a bureaucratic and military class, found it difficult to get to grips with peasant problems. For the revolutionary leaders and higher civil servants , these problems were made all the more difficult by the enormous gap between rural and urban life. Revolutionary leaders and higher civil servants had only very distant ties with the countryside - - they were urban by residence and outlook. They scorned peasant tradition-alism - - that was the enemy to be rooted out. Peasants are perhaps not socialist, they are for the most part dedicated Muslims.

The socialist, or those who claimed to be, were none other than the rural upper and middle classes; the rural elite. It was these classes who spoke the language of the revolutionary leaders and the urban elite, and who had the skills necessary to make the technocratic socialism work. A similar commitment to rapid economic development, and especially industrialisation, would have made it difficult for even more dedicated socialists to alter the rural power structure. The main problem confronting Egyptian revolutionary leaders or for that matter, any other revolutionary regime in developing countries attempting the

[1] Mayfield, op.cit., p.187.

modernisation of traditional peasant society is how to emancipate peasants from traditional relationships and from poverty without relying on the skills of their oppressors. That is to say, it is the rural middle and upper classes who are the first to obtain skills on which the revolutionary regime depends for modernisation. If the regime then chooses to mobilise those skills behind a modernisation effort, it is compelled to accept the side effects of the persistence of a political stratification system. The basis for the new roles may be different, but their occupants will be the same.

This investigation of the backgrounds of the Egyptian power elite has shown that in terms of social origins, post-revolutionary elite recruitment remains restrictive in scope. In the next chapter, an attempt will be made to explain why the Egyptian bureaucratic elite, like other elites, in Egyptian society is always recruited from the same social classes.

In short, the data and analysis have shown that the Egyptian bureaucratic elite is relatively young, well-educated, urbanised and predominantly of upper and middle class origin. It has been seen, moreover, that the Egyptian bureaucratic elite is quite similar to other elites, e.g., cabinet-rank ministers, and top-level administrators in state enterprises in Egyptian society in terms of social and educational backgrounds. In fact, it might be argued, that towards the late 1950's it became increasingly difficult to distinguish the members of the higher echelons of the Egyptian bureaucracy from the cabinet-rank ministers, and, for that matter, from top-level administrators in state enterprises in Egypt. Our respondents argued, moreover, that there is no significant distinction between the bureaucratic elite and cabinet-rank ministers in view of the similarity in social and educational background, the interchangeability of personnel and overlapping of

functions. It must also be noted that the distinction between the Egyptian bureaucratic elite and the cabinet-rank ministers could only be made on structural or institutional and not on a functional basis; no administration-politics dichotomy is assumed. This last point will further be discussed in the forthcoming chapter. Cross-culturally it might be significant to note that towards the late 1930's it became increasingly difficult to distinguish the members of the bureaucratic elite from the political elites insofar as Turkey is concerned. In fact, in Turkish political science terminology, the bureaucratic and political elites of the 1930's and 1940's are all referred to as simply "the bureaucratic elite."[1] The fact that Ottoman polity was primarily a bureaucratic polity plays a role here.[2] But more significantly, towards the late 1930's, the Turkish civil bureaucracy, not unlike its Egyptian counterpart, played an increasingly influential role in politics.

In a cross-national perspective, Egyptian higher civil servants are quite similar to higher civil servants in other developing countries, e.g., Turkey, India and Peru, insofar as the broad social and educational characteristics are concerned.

---

[1] For utilisation of the term "bureaucratic elite" in Turkey, see Kemal H. Karpet, Turkey's Politics, the Transition to a Multiparty System, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), see also his "Economics and Politics in Contemporary Turkey," World Politics, Vol. XVII, (October, 1964), pp.50-74.

[2] See Metin Heper, et al., The Role of Bureaucracy and Regime Types: A Comparative Study of Turkish and Korean Higher Civil Servants (Iowa: The University of Iowa, 1977), p.32.

CHAPTER V

EDUCATION, RECRUITMENT OF THE BUREAUCRATIC

ELITE AND SOCIETY

Studies of elites in both Western and non-Western societies have

emphasised the crucial role of education in the recruitment of these

elites. Suzanne Keller, for example, in discussing political stratifi-

cation in developing countries, concludes "formal education is the single

most important entrance requirement into the higher circle."[1] The

centralised nature of the Egyptian educational system and the selection

procedure that characterises it constitute, among other things, the most

important factors in the recruitment of the Egyptian bureaucratic elite

as well as other elites in Egyptian society. The recruitment into the

higher positions in the key institutions, the state bureaucracy, the

state economic enterprises, the political posts proper, is restricted to

those few who are able to overcome the selection mechanism which conforms,

in most of its outward manifestations, to democratic norms.[2]

Education and Bureaucracy: Some Problems

More than 25 years have passed since John Gaus aptly stated that:

"Administration is education. Administration is education in that the
entire civil service is in part a product of a country's educational
system and the prevailing attitudes toward education. Administration
is education in that the effectiveness of administration is in the
long run determined by a process of educational interaction between the
bureaucracy and the public, conditioned by the morality, morale, values,
and work philosophy of both."[3]

Indeed, no better illustration of this concept set forth by Gaus,

can be found than by looking, rather deeply, at the relationship between

1 Suzanne Keller, Beyond the Ruling Class, Strategic Elites in Modern Society (New York: Random House, 1953), p.121.

2 The ensuing points of interest and analysis derive chiefly from discussions with the Egyptian higher civil servants.

3 John Gaus, Reflections on Public Administration (Alabama: University Press, 1948) p.50.

the education system and Egyptian bureaucracy over time.

Egypt's Education is an old system. From the beginning of the
nineteenth century and specifically with the French invasion of Egypt
in 1793, Egypt started to modernise its educational system. By that
time, the Al-Azhar University, the most honoured centre of Islamic
learning in the world, had already existed since the tenth century.
With Egypt's exposure to Western culture at the turn of the nineteenth
century, it discovered the need for a modern secular system of education
to run in accordance with the Western culture, along with the traditional
Islamic culture initiated by the Al-Azhar. Thus, the old culture was
subjected to a severe test, and in response, Egypt took a series of
changes to modify its traditional culture. It would seem, however, that
the most important social development of modern secular education was
introduced during Mohamed Ali's rule (1805-1849). So Egypt had a set of
modern schools, including a number of higher institutes as early as the
first half of the nineteenth century, a school of engineering (1820) and
a school of medicine (1827).

Despite all reform efforts made by Mohamed Ali and his successors,
the educational policy suffered from some problems which, surprisingly,
have persisted in one way or another till the present. One of these
problems has to do with the educational planning during this period which
was greatly influenced by the needs of the army and later by civil
bureaucracy, which the existing regimes were trying to build. When the
army needed medical doctors and engineers, higher technical institutes
were emphasised and established for them. Then, the establishment of
secondary and primary schools became necessary to provide students for the
higher schools. In other words, the Egyptian educational system was first
built from the top down, and, when the military power of Egypt was weakened
in the later part of the century, the entire structure of education was
greatly affected in quantity and quality. Likewise, with the failure of
Mohamed Ali's successors to institutionalise an independent bureaucracy in

the later part of the century, the entire structure of education was greatly affected in quantity and quality, thanks to Ali's successors' use of the bureaucracy as an instrument of political and economic patronage for the few and the powerful. As we shall see later, this problem i.e. building the educational system from the top down, has persisted till the present.

Closely related to the above-mentioned problem, is the fact that all the schools established by Mohamed Ali were connected with the supply and demand of the armed forces and, to a lesser extent, with the civil bureaucracy either directly or indirectly. "Not a single institution was set up philanthropically or for the sole purpose of improving the intellectual outlook of the people."[1] To meet the different requirements of the educational system, Mohamed Ali established for the first time in the history of modern Egypt a governmental department of education. This was the first form of any kind of centralised bureaucratic control over the school system, and this, in turn, led to the centralisation of the Egyptian educational system. This strong and centralised relationship between the state and the educational system enables us to understand why the educational institutions of learning, particularly those of higher learning, in Egypt have, ever since their creation, had as their primary task the training of those destined to serve the state, whether as teachers, scientists ..., or civil servants. An indissoluble link has existed in Egypt between state education and state service. The result of this link, insofar as civil service is concerned, is that the state is guaranteed a rather adequate and trained cadre of civil servants. Along with this positive effect, this link has resulted in associating seeking a degree with a government position, which has been plaguing Egypt's educational system till the present and has put tremendous pressure on successive

---

[1] J Heyworth-Dunne, An Introduction to the History of Education in Egypt, (London: Luzac & Co, 1938), p.152.

governments to find jobs for the graduates of the school. This, in turn, has added focus to the centrality of the state, which from Pharaonic times has been the only sizable organised institution and the principal distributor of values and services.

It is significant to note that Mohamed Ali's modern educational system did not supplant the traditional institutions of learning. Each system served a different clientele and performed a different function: the religious schools continued to provide a rudimentary religious education for the masses, while the modern, i.e., secular schools provided a technical, European-style education for existing and aspiring elites. The dual system unquestionably tended to perpetuate differences among social classes by creating an intellectual elite - - "the cultured aristocracy", who monopolised government positions and high-income professions.[1] Thus, the split in the education of the nation, i.e., Egypt, created a dichotomised and chaotic culture that has more or less persisted to the present.

British educational policy in Egypt did not help bridge the gap between the masses of illiterate Egyptians from the Western-educated intelligensia. Indeed, as one of our interviewees has put it, "No aspect of British policy in Egypt was as severly criticised as its attitude to education". One of the major indictments made by critics of British educational policy in Egypt is its alleged neglect of education. This, however, was in reference to government-run schools. Until 1922 the British had complete control not only of general state finance, but also of the finances of the Ministry of Education, which were held under close supervision by a Scottish adviser named Douglas Dunlop. So whatever the structure of the government shcool system, the resources devoted to its development at various levels were a matter of British rather than Egyptian policy. Quantitatively, the charge is rather convincingly documented by statistical

---

[1] Ismail Qabani, A Memorandum on the General Policy of the Spread of Education in Egypt, (Cairo: Ministry of Education, 1945), pp. 2-3.

comparisons of figures showing governmental budgetary support for

education and total school enrolment in the British and independent

periods.[1] Qualitatively, the British education policy is criticised

for having been inappropriate in preparing students to be productive

and participant citizens in an independent modern state.

Since one British aim was to establish an effective administration,

they geared the educational system towards preparing a limited number of

Egyptians for the middle and lower echelons of the Egyptian bureaucracy.

By not providing university education, they hoped to prevent the emergence

of an indigenous elite which might provide leadership for a nationalist

movement and by limiting the output, to prevent an over-supply of

frustrated and alienated graduates unable to find satisfactory employment

to swell the ranks of such a movement. By providing some sort of

rudimentary education for the masses in the traditional Kuttab schools,

they hoped to socialise them towards accepting the status quo. Calling

attention to the absence of a basic foundation of widespread elementary

education, the Elementary Education Commission in 1919 rightly complained

that:

---

[1] In 1905-1906, after twenty-four years of British control, the
proportion of the state budget allotted to education was still less
than one per cent. The amount rose from £E 1,600,000 in 1920, representing
4 per cent of the national budget, to £E 29 million in 1951 representing
13 per cent. An even more striking index of growth is provided by
enrolment in government secondary schools. In 1893 there were only
3 governmental secondary schools. Only 42 students passed the Baccalaureate
Certificate Examination that year. Enrolment increased from 2,500 in 1913,
to 15,000 in 1933 and 122,000 in 1951. Moreover, University graduates
increased from a negligible number in 1913 to 41,000 in 1951, when there
were also about 1,400 Egyptians studying abroad. In fact, when Lord Cromer
left Egypt in 1907, after twenty three years of effective control, an
estimated 92.7 per cent of the total persons aged ten years and over were
still illiterate; ten years later the figure had decreased to 91.2 per cent.
See U.A.R. Ministry of Education, Documentation and Research Centre for
Education Education in U.A.R: An Outline, (Cairo :1964), p.6., and
Donald C.Mead, Growth and Structural Change in The Egyptian Economy
(Homewood, Ill:Richard D. Irwin Inc. 1967), p.301.

". . . education in Egypt resembles an inverted pyramid. The
financial situation . . . has until recent years precluded any
broad treatment of the educational needs of the country;
available funds have been utilised preferentially in developing
the Europeanised system of schools for the wealthier classes,
and but little has in consequence been done towards the provision
of vernacular education for the masses of the population."[1]

As noted earlier, the early education policy, which was initiated
during Mohamed Ali's rule, had as its goal the preparation of civil servants
as well as military officers and soldiers who carry out the responsibilities
of government. This connection between education and government service
was made more intimate in view of the fact that Lord Cromer - - since
1892 - - made the school certificate not only a requirement for a civil
service job but also a guarantee for one.

By the time Egypt gained its partial independence in 1922, there
existed a three-track system of education made up of (1) an ancient system
of theological education, at the apex of which was the medievel university,
i.e.,Al-Azhar; (2) elementary schools to reduce the illiteracy of the
peasant masses; and (3) a modern, Europeanised system for the privileged
classes consisting of primary, secondary, technical and higher schools,
crowned by the Egyptian University. In addition, there was a flourishing
and exclusive ladder of foreign schools with their imported curricula.

Following the attainment of independence, the indigenous nationalist
elite sought to make fundamental changes in the educational system. These
were: (1) a marked expansion in educational facilities, in budget allocation,
and in the number of students; and (2) secularisation of the content and the
structure of education.

Owing to strong political pressure for an expansion in educational
opportunity at all levels, particularly in elementary and primary schools,
the total number of school students rose from 324,000 in 1913 to 942,000
in 1933 and 1,900,000 in 1951.[2]

---

[1] Ministry of Education, Report of The Elementary Education
Commission (Cairo: 1919), p.1.

[2] Peter Mansfield, Nasser's Egypt (London: Penguin Books, 1965),
p.120.

The main impetus for this expansion was the promulgation in 1944 of a law providing for free and compulsory education from the age of seven to twelve. For various social and economic reasons, however, practical implementation of this programme was slow. The 1950 enrolment represented only about 30 per cent of the elementary-age children, and as late as 1960-1961, after a considerable expansion, this percentage had risen only to perhaps 65 per cent.[1]

With their eyes set on eventual admission to university and therefore a job in the already overstaffed bureaucracy a flood of primary graduates (in 1946 there were 21,000 primary graduates, the number increased to 97,000 in 1953),[2] jammed the secondary schools in the early fifties. At the same time, the secondary technical and commercial schools, which had achieved some expansion over the previous decade, incurred an actual drop in enrolment. Vocational and technical schools for industry, commerce, and agriculture continued to be despised by students anxious to pursue the 'status symbol' and imagined 'open sesame' of a literary or scientific university degree. From 1943 to 1953 technical school enrolment increased only from 16,000[3] to 18,838[4], whereas between 1943 and 1952 general secondary school education increased from 70,000 to 232,579[5] and primary education from 1,100,000 to 1,553,352[6]. With this unnatural increase in high career expectations of students, there was mounting pressure on the budget to expand secondary education

[1] Malcolm H. Kerr, "Egypt," in James S. Coleman (ed.) Education and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968) pp. 173-174.

[2] Ismail Qabani, "Development of Education During the Last Decade," in Habib Kourani (ed.) Lectures on Educational systems in Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Iraq and Jordan (Beirut: Dar El-Ketab, 1956) pp.126-130.

[3] Ibid., p.147.

[4] U.A.R. Ministry of Education, Education in the U.A.R. op.cit., p.43.

[5] E El-Said, "Report on the Expansion of University Education," Arab Review, (1960), p.22.

[6] Qabani, op.cit., p.147 and El-Said, op.cit., p.42.

at the inevitable expense of improved primary facilities - - in 1950-1951

the secondary school budget gained an 85 per cent increase from the 1949

standard. In this same period the primary school budget had gained only

46 per cent increase, at the time when Egypt was still 75 per cent

illiterate.[1] The result of this new policy, if continued, could only

have been what Dr. Qabani referred to as a 'social catastrophe'. [2]

Up to 1952, when the Egyptian revolution took place, Egyptian

universities had graduated, beginning with the inception of formal

university education in 1925, a total of 50,134 students with all types

of degrees in the normal fields of modern education. The highest number

of graduates was in the field of education with 12,000 teachers, while the

lowest number was in dentistry with 322 dentists.[3] As is the case with the

other developing countries, a comparatively large number of lawyers was

graduated but unlike the latter almost as many degrees in commerce as in

law were awarded. More striking yet is the dominance of literary and

theoretically-oriented studies which had facilitated the production of

rather idle manpower which was an economic liability rather than an asset

in enhancing future politico-economic development. Most, if not all, of

these educated young men sought government employment. This eventually

produces unemployment, which leads to social and political troubles.

Since the 1952 Revolution significant progress has been made in

expanding educational opportunities. The government's most notable

---

[1] Qabani, op.cit., p.149.

[2] Ibid.,pp.130-131. It must be noted, in passing, that a law
passed in 1949 had provided free tuition for the first two years of
general secondary school to students scoring above a certain grade
(60 per cent average) in their primary examinations, then in 1950 the
Government decreed free secondary tuition to all, regardless of grades.

[3] Fahaim I. Qubian, Education and Science in the Arab World
(Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1966), p.203.

It must be noted in passing, that up to 1952 there were three
universities, i.e.,Cairo University, Alexandria University established
in 1942, Ain Shams established in 1950. As indicated earlier the Al-Azher
University, a university devoted to Islamic education and learning was
established in the ninth century.

attention has been devoted to continuing the spread of primary education

and to expanding the facilities for university instruction in science,

medicine and engineering. There has also been a moderate increase in

enrolment in technical secondary schools. General secondary education

has shown only a rather modest increase, but the proportion of those

going on to a university has risen from 59 per cent to 63 per cent of

all secondary school graduates between 1965 and 1972.

Table V.1

Students' Enrolment at Different Education Levels

in   1953-1954,   1965-1966 and 1971-1972

Level of Education	Enrolment (thousands)		
	1953-1954	1965-1966	1971-1972
Primary	1,693	3,418	3,873
General preparatory	349	574	925
Vocational preparatory (technical)	3	27	22
General secondary	22	209	312
Vocational secondary (technical)	19	101	299
Universities	54	124	199

Source: Arab Republic of Egypt, Statistical Handbook (Cairo: Central
          Agency for Mobilisation and Statistics, 1960, 1967, 1973).

As a matter of fact, the increase, however moderate, in enrolment

in technical secondary schools has been in line with the revolutionary

government's general programme of economic development and industrial-

isation of Egypt. Another factor responsible for the increase in

enrolment in technical secondary schools is Egypt's defeat in the June

1967 war with Israel in view of the fact that it is now generally recognised

that the latter is more technologically advanced than Egypt. But the fact

remains, however, that enrolment figures for the last two decades have

continued to show a general disfavour against technical schools. The

result of this general disfavour against technical education has brought

about a severe shortage insofar as technicians and skilled workers are

concerned. As one of our respondents put it "The real shortage of talent in Egyptian public administrations is at the lower technical grades (e.g.,computer programmers, draughtsmen, sanitarians, and so forth)."

There is little question that the value system prevailing in most developing countries, including that of Egypt, assigns very low status and prestige to such occupations (i.e. manual work) vis-à-vis occupations of authority, religion and those of a professional or white-collar nature in general. Moreover, technical secondary education (as opposed to general secondary education which leads to university education) is not attractive to the children of the middle class elite who can for the same investment of time and effort attain the occupations which culturally enjoy greater prestige and status. The same problem appears in the development of agricultural sub-professionals. A recent study of the graduates of vocational (technical) agriculture schools in Egypt, found that only 2 per cent had become established in farming; the rest stayed in the cities and sought off-farm employment. The study revealed that social-cultural and psychological factors had a profound effect on the graduates' decision to farm.[1] As the rural student goes to town and spends years pursuing his studies in the vocational agricultural school, he acquires a new set of values, those of the urban bourgeois. Such values assign a very low position on the scale of social prestige to farming and farmers. The school itself indirectly contributes to such personality changes which defeat its very purpose, namely preparing a person most useful on the farm.

Another indication of the profound effect on the students' decision to choose technical secondary education comes from the fact that the commercial vocational school graduates were the only vocational school

---

[1] A. Abdel Aziz, "Socio-Cultural Problems and The Role of Agriculture Education in the U.A.R.," Arab Journal, Vol.1 No.4, (1966), p.16.

students who became successful after graduation.[1] This was so because
their training prepares them to do clerical and white-collar jobs which
are acceptable by middle-class urban norms.

Lack of experience or skill could be considered as an important
reason for some students who reject technical secondary education, but
as a recent study revealed, there was a considerable proportion of the
interviewed students who rejected technical education and, therefore,
rejected manual work, on the basis of "dignity" and not suiting social
position. Surprisingly enough, of those interviewed students who said
that technical secondary education, and, therefore, manual work did not
suit the family's status were not particularly from families with high
social status.[2] To be sure, this problem is not one of economic
motivation, i.e., wages and security of jobs. In fact, in Egypt wages of
skilled workers and technicians have risen rapidly surpassing those of
white-collar employees in many places. The need for security of such
workers has been solved also.[3] Nevertheless the problem still exists.
Society still assigns a low prestige value to such occupations.

Accompanying the growing and indeed obsessive desire of young people
for the acedemic type of secondary education -- the customary stepping
stone to a prestigious university degree, the great stress is laid on
university education by the government. As a matter of fact the government
policy, in response to public pressure has put, by fault, undue stress on
this kind of education at the expense of primary education. Some
comparative statistics concerning education in Egypt show clearly that
over almost a decade (1953 to 1961) the budget of the universities has
almost quadrupled, whereas the budget of the Ministry of Education which is

[1] Frederich Harbison and I. Abdel Kader, Human Resources for Egyptian
Enterprises (New York: McCraw Hill Book Company, 1958) pp.120-124.

[2] Institute of National Planning, Research Project on Employment and
Unemployment Among the Educated, Final Report (Cairo:1963), p.83.

[3] Ibid., p.35.

concerned with general education and particularly with primary education -
has little more than doubled.[1] In a country in which, in absolute terms,
the number of illiterate has continued to increase, university education
has enjoyed an unusually favourable position.

It might appear fortunate for a developing country to possess such a
large supply of educated man power. But such an observation would overlook
two basic considerations. One is the fact that about 70 per cent of the
university enrolment is in the faculties of Arts and Law, and Commerce, and
for the vast majority of these graduates there is no demand. The over-
production in the number of graduates of the different faculties and higher
institutes which represents a large number of unproductive and destabilising
unemployables could clearly be seen from the following table.

Table V.2

Faculties and Higher Institutes

Whose Graduates Exceeded the Known

Manpower Needs of the County in 1964-1965

Faculty or Institute	State of Supply and Demand	
	Number of graduates	Positions Available
Law	1584	600
Economic and Political Science	169	30
Commerce	3563	2054
Commercial Institutes	535	16
Agriculture	1541	247
Cotton Institute	478	14
Arts and Humanities	2049	197
Languages	139	14
Science	1263	128
Art	241	6
Social Workers	440	36

Source: Institute of National Planning, Educational Policy
          (Cairo: 1966), Table I.

---

[1] Kerr, op.cit., p.187.

The crisis of the massive increase in the number of university graduates becomes more acute among those in theoretical disciplines. Indeed, the case of Law graduates is a characteristic example of the problem. It is estimated that by 1978 Egypt will have 17,000 law degree holders, of whom only 600 will be needed in the country.[1]

At the same time, there is a pressing need for scientists with advanced post-graduate degrees to fill the present and future vacancies in the universities, and research organisations, doctors, and most of all middle-range technical manpower.

Coupled with this lack of balance in the supply of graduates at the different levels and the consequent "over-supply" of large number of unproductive and destabilising unemployables is the rather low level of competence of most graduates.[2] This was emphasised by the President of the Civil Service Commission in his annual report for 1957-1958. Indeed, the same theme was echoed in our interviews with Egyptian higher civil servants.

Education and Government Employment

It is a well known fact that education could further the individual's awareness of politics. In the Arabs' case this often means increasing expectations that the government should help to realise their demands. This, however, is in line with the dominant historical tradition of almost total reliance on a strong executive. The government is expected to do something about everything, and it is to blame for anything going wrong. In modern times, by a kind of "demonstration effect" the increase in the functions of government and in the number of people affected by government decisions have rendered the situation more complex, by adding

---

[1] Al-Ahram, September 3, 1970.

[2] This was the general agreement of the panel of university teachers whose discussions were published in Al-Ahram, June 2, 1962, and June 24, 1968. See also Anwar Abdel Malek, Studies on Natural Culture (Beirut: Dar Al-Tali'ah, 1967) pp.218-221 (In Arabic).

some demands from more people.[1]

In Egypt, the overriding demand of the new graduates of the secondary and the university has continued to be the same since the turn of the century: to find a job. Also, the state has been the largest employer, for all kinds of graduates, from the days of Mohamed Ali, down to Nasser or Sadat. As one of our respondents put it, "The advent of socialism in Egypt was no great shock, and really altered very little in the domain of employment and occupational choice."

Indeed, from the turning point of the twentieth century onwards the rapid growth of population and the growing tide of graduates from various educational levels made the Egyptian bureaucracy virtually the only satisfactory outlet for employment. In 1961 the government employed 228,800, 26.5% of whom were university and higher education graduates. Table V.3 shows the percentage of university and higher education graduates of different academic specialties employed by the government in 1956. The figures were derived from a census of university graduates from 1910-1956. It covers a period when government was of the Western, conservative type, i.e.,engaged in very little commercial or industrial activities. It shows clearly that the majority of graduates of all university colleges and institutes sought and found employment with the government.

---

[1] See Rogmen Nurke, <u>Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries</u> (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), Also Daniel Lenner, <u>The Passing of Traditional Society</u> (4th Ed, New York: Free Press 1968), pp.12-24 and Howard A. Reed "A New Force at Work to Democratic Turkey," <u>Middle East Journal</u>, Vol.VII (1953), pp.33-44.

Table V.3

Percentage of University Graduates

Employed by the Government

University College or Institute	% Employed by Government
Teachers - male	98.0
Teachers - female	99.2
Music - Academy	98.0
Police - Academy	98.9
Arabic Literature (Dar El Ulum)	97.2
Al-Azhar	95.2
Fine Arts - Academy	93.9
Applied Arts	92.7
Social Work	94.6
Veterinary	92.3
Faculty of Letters (Social Sciences, Humanities)	89.8
Agriculture	83.5
Medicine	73.0
Sciences	75.3
Engineering	67.0
Commerce	58.0
Law	52.0

Source: Compiled from Department of Mobilisation, Manpower Surveys, 1953-1962 (Cairo)

Even though the percentages are very high for all graduates, it is lowest for graduates of law, commerce, engineering and medicine, who have the most employable skills outside the realm of government service and administration.

As will be seen later, thirty-five per cent of Egyptian higher civil servants recently interviewed, indicated that they had sought government jobs because there was limited opportunity elsewhere, i.e. outside the realm of government service. The very high percentage of university graduates employed by the government could serve as a further support to the argument that the rapidly expanding supply of university graduates of every speciality was absorbed by government employment as the only alternative to unemployment. Those who were not lucky to get government jobs found no gainful work elsewhere. A striking example, in

this basically agriculture economy, is the inability of even the relatively few agronomists to find non-government employment. A postwar survey concluded: "At present the supply of technically trained advanced students of agriculture exceeds the demands for their services on big agricultural projects or in agricultural companies."[1]

With the growing tide of university and higher education graduates, (31,834 in 1971-72)[2] and with the number of opportunities outside, government employment has not grown, the higher reaches of Egyptian bureaucracy have become more staffed with degree holders than its real needs might justify. Evidently, this has also to do with the adoption of "Socialism" by the government. Under "Socialism" the government has been obliged to employ thousands of university and higher education graduates in view of the fact that the government owns and runs about 75 per cent of the business enterprises in addition to its traditional activities. In fact, the government managed to keep pace with the growth in numbers of university and higher education graduates because of the nationalisation of all large private enterprises and because of the First Five-Year Plan of socio-economic development, which created more opportunities for employment. But since 1965 the growth in number of university graduates, which has doubled in less than a decade, and the decline in socio-economic development as a result of the war in the Middle East, have largely out-stripped any rise in opportunities for employment, whether in civil service or in state enterprises. The government has, then, faced two alternatives: one would be to create a serious problem of unemployment among university and higher education graduates; and the second would be to break down its own personnel and recruitment rules by lowering the standards of the public service. For some reasons, to be discussed shortly, the government adopted

---

[1] Roderick D. Matthews and Matta Akrawi, Education in the Arab Countries of the Near East (Washington, D.C.: American Council of Education, 1944), p.84.

[2] Arab Republic of Egypt, Statistical Handbook (Cairo: 1973), p.197.

the second alternative, i.e., lowering the standards of the public service in order to provide employment for the university and higher education graduates who might otherwise have become unemployed. That is to say that the government employment has been used as a means of alleviating unemployment rather than perhaps getting the employees best fitted for the job. Sixteen per cent of Egyptian higher civil servants recently interviewed complained of unqualified personnel or the wrong use of personnel. As interviews revealed, this complaint has to do with the Government's Decree of 1961, to employ tens of thousands of university and higher education graduates wholesale in public service, mostly without examination or interview. Moreover, these graduates have been employed mostly without regard to the personnel needs of the various administrative results and a great number of them occupied positions unrelated to their specification or qualifications.

During interviews with Egyptian higher civil servants it was revealed that the Government's Decree of 1961, to employ thousands of university and higher education graduates wholesale in the public service was motivated by political, social and economic elements, all of which have acted individually with no attempted co-ordination between their goals and the impact of their action on the public service as a social subsystem within a larger social system.

Some of our respondents argued that the educators worked only for the expansion of free education at all levels, without giving adequate consideration to the state of the nation's economy or to the civil service policies. On the other hand, sociologists were concentrating on finding employment for all who needed employment, at any price. In fact, the government's decision to employ thousands of university and higher education graduates wholesale in the public service has been influenced by the social element that leaving them in the streets would be much more dangerous to the existing social system than employing them in the public service with not enough work to do, considering also that university graduates are, by

definition, an elite group in Egyptian society.

Those who claim that the government Decree of 1961, to employ thousands of university graduates wholesale in the public service has been influenced by an economic element argue: (1) that it is a waste of the nation's most valuable economic resource, i.e., trained manpower, not to employ university graduates in the only satisfactory outlet for employment, i.e., the public service and state economic enterprises; (2) that the economic influence of the budget on public personnel policies is also indicated by the economists' efforts to link pay determination with the qualifications of job applicants or employees, rather than with the nature and difficulty of their work. In fact, the pricing of qualifications enabled the government to pay less for jobs which, if treated otherwise, it would pay more in view of the fact that in the absence of reliable job descriptions and the equal pay for equal work principle, it has become more economically beneficial for the government to treat the employees or job applicants as treasury grades, despite the nature and difficulty of their work assignments, in terms of pay. Thus, with the increasing number of university graduates, who are considered as the nation's most valuable economic resource, and with the existence of little work for all of them, the economists have been primarily concerned with reducing the public budget by lowering the cost of public employees, i.e., by the pricing of qualifications. Thus, the economists helped the successive governments to squeeze in more university graduates as they pleased, and to run their functions the least expensive way, without due consideration to the impact of low pay on the morale and productivity of public employees.

Finally, those who claim that the Government's decision to employ thousands of university graduates wholesale in the public service has been influenced by the political considerations argue: (1) that over centuries economic has been subordinate to political power, i.e., the

superstructure is politics, while the substructure is economics;

(2) that the political groups have acted to keep the public service

loosely regulated to serve their purposes. Appointments in the

public service have been, therefore, unrestricted by examinations to

provide the political groups with the opportunity to provide public

employment for increasing numbers of otherwise unemployable

university graduates in return for implicit support for the current

political system.

Elite - Mass Gap: The Consequences of Educational Policy

Modernisation universally requires the dissolving of traditional

orientations and the mobilisation of mass energies. Whether occurring

from the bottom up or from the top down, effective mobilisation is

always interactive. In many countries of the Third World, modernisation

is thwarted by the fact that the elite, although relatively immune from

mass influence, is itself unable to mobilise its subjects in a process

of controlled change, because of what is commonly termed the "elite-mass

gap". The gap often results in distinctive elite and non-elite political

cultures. "Ordinary citizens, illiterate or a product of religious

education as they may be, tend to be traditional and parochial in out-

look, while the elite is secular-minded, modernist, and cosmopolitan."[1]

Such an elite is, perhaps, ill-equipped to respond to real problems at

the grass roots, and politics tend to be court politics. The elite

extract taxes and services from the non-elite but do not attempt to

mobilise them for collective goals.

The elite-mass gap in socialisation exists in all societies, but

it is perhaps particularly marked in less developed countries. Move-

ments towardsindependence and modernisation in these traditional, rural

societies have usually been led by secular-minded, Western-educated,

---

[1] Robert D. Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites,
(Englewood Cliffs; New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc. 1976) p.163.

urban, upper-class or middle-class men and women. As we shall see
later, formal, modern and higher education particularly is most common
among elites precisely in those countries in which this kind of
education is least common among the non-elite.

Generally speaking, national builders in the developing countries
base much of their faith in education on the generally held belief that
it will facilitate national cultural and political unification.[1]
Increased enrolment in schools is seen, therefore, as a means of
bridging the elite-mass gap created, in most cases, by restrictive-
elitist colonial educational policies, and, henceforth, enhancing an
indigenous common outlook toward the nation and the elite. This,
however, does not preclude the fact that educational expansion might
perform disintegrative functions which may be counter-integrative to
the modernisation process [2]

Having reviewed the educational expansion in Egypt, we could say
that the resulting increase in school enrolment has been rather
meaningless. This is due to the rather low standards resulting from
inadequate physical and human resources, a rapid population growth,
a non-burdened economy, and most important, undue support for higher
education at the expense of primary education, which have combined to
frustrate all efforts to eliminate illiteracy. In 1950, a UNESCO Report
estimated the Egyptian population over seven years old to be 90 per cent
illiterate. In 1956 the proportion was still about 82 per cent illiter-
ate. Indeed, in spite of all efforts to reduce the illiteracy rate, in

---

[1] L.Gray Cowen James O'Connells and David G.Scanlon (eds.)
Education and Nation Building in Africa (N.Y.:Praeger, 1965).

[2] Philip J.Foster, Secondary Schooling and Social Mobility in
a West African Nation, Sociology of Education, Vol.37,(1963), p.152.
Also, Edward Shills, Political Development in the New States, (The
Hague: Morton & Co. 1962).

absolute terms the number of people who cannot read or write has continued to increase.[1] In a recent series of articles on education, Lewis Awad showed that 75 per cent of the people of Egypt are still illiterate almost the same percentage as during the last year of the Monarchy.[2]

Accompanying this high illiteracy rate, the great stress laid on higher and university education has served to perpetuate the imbalance in the different levels of the educational system, and, in effect, to exacerbate the wide cleavage separating the illiterate masses from a highly-educated group, i.e., the elite, at the other extreme.[3] Moreover, in view of the fact that Egypt's high illiteracy accounts for the predominance of traditional Islamic cultural beliefs and practices, it could safely be said that the secularisation of the masses remains the great unfinished business in Egypt, and this, in turn, leads to a widening of the elite-mass gap.

Earlier in this chapter we referred to the fact that the division of education into two distinctive systems, i.e., the traditional religious and modern secular - - was inevitable with Egypt's exposure to Western culture at the turn of the nineteenth century and as a new way of life was being introduced. The new way of life demanded a special system of education to serve it and perpetuate it, the old way of life continued to maintain its own, mainly through the religious educational system. The split in the education of the nation has created a rather

---

[1] See D. Mead, op.cit., Statistical Appendix p.301, Table 11-A-6. The number of illiterate has risen from 7,277,303 in 1907 to 12,587,686 in 1960.

[2] Lewis Awad, "The Counteracting Revolution and the Egyptian Education," Al-Ahram, February 26, 1971, March 12, 19 and 26, 1971.

[3] It will be recalled that over almost a decade the budget of the Universities (all of them are state-owned), has almost quadrupled, whereas the budget of the Ministry of Education (one of its most important functions is to offer primary education to combat illiteracy) has little more than doubled.

dichotomised culture, which has persisted to the present.[1] This dual

system unquestionably tended to perpetuate differences among social

classes by creating an intellectual, secular-minded educated elite who

monopolised the government positions and high-income professions.

This dual system has, in effect, widened the gap between the elite

and masses in terms of values, culture and even ways of thinking in

view of the fact that the modern secular education is intended for the

elite and the traditional religious one for the masses.[2]

In an effort to reform Al-Azhar University, a law was passed in

1961, which provided for the conversion of this university into a

modern-style university offering degrees in the full range of scientific

and humanistic secular disciplines alongside those of Islamic Law and

Theology. However, some observers have argued that there are limits to

the adaptability of a traditional institution such as Al-Azhar, which

has acquired high visibility and great respect, to a modern national

educational system. The cultural gap between the educational patterns

in the different spheres of the dual system inevitably means that the

graduates of this traditional institution have a competitive disadvantage

in the modern sector of society.[3] Moreover, recent studies on the impact

of secularisation on the religious institutions in general and Al-Azhar

in particular have shown the failure of reforms to have the desired effect

upon the _ulama_.[4] In spite of all efforts to reform the religious

education institutes, notably Al-Azhar University, the fact remains that

---

[1] Kerr, _op.cit._, pp.160-164.

[2] The education division of Al-Azhar, in co-operation with voluntary groups, maintains about three hundred Quaranic schools in the provinces in 1968-1969, see U.A.R. _Statistical Indicators, 1952-1968_ (Cairo: Central Agency for Mobilisation and Statistics 1969) p.193.

[3] Kerr, _op.cit._, p.183.

[4] Daniel Crecelius, "Al-Azhar: A Millennium of Faithfulness to Tradition," _Mid East_, (April, 1970), pp.34-41.

in many ways those studying in these institutes and those who call

themselves ulama are still predominantly traditional in their manner

and dress, in values and beliefs, and in social behaviour. Indeed,

Al-Azhar University and its affiliates continue to produce men who

are largely out of touch with the problems of modern Egypt life and

useless for the modern sector.[1] In fact, the course of secularisation

in modern Egypt is still far from complete. The problem is exacerbated

by the increasing number of illiterates among the Egyptian masses.

Consequently, it could be said that the gap separating the modern-

educated Egyptian elite, working mainly in the bureaucracy, from the

masses of the people, who are almost by definition, illiterate and

traditional-bound, tends to grow wider. This means, among other things,

that the elite-mass gap is not likely to lead to effective national

mobilisation nor perhaps to further the cause of modernisation.

Education as a Socialisation Agent of the Bureaucratic Elite

It is a well-known fact that every individual is essentially a

product of his social and cultural environment. Given this fact, the

term "socialisation" can be interpreted - - in its broadest sense - -

as the process of continuing cultural contact which all individuals

undergo throughout their lifetime. Thus, the congruence between the

personalities of the individual role actors in a society and the existing

structure of role expectations depend to a considerable degree upon the

content of their socialisation.[2] However, our discussion will be con-

fined to education and to a lesser extent, the family as the most

important agents of socialisation in so far as Egyptian bureaucrats are

---

[1] In 1968-1969 the total number of enrolments in the primary and
secondary levels of Al-Azhar affiliates (i.e., Koranic schools
particularly in the provinces) was 69,676. See U.A.R. Statistical
Indicators (Cairo: The Central Agency for Mobilisation and Statistics,
1969), p.193.

[2] See Daniel F. Aberle, Culture and Socialisation in Francis
Higa (ed.) Psychological Anthropology, Approaches to Culture and
Personality (Homewood: The Dorsey Press, 1961), pp.381-397.

concerned.[1]

Lucian Pye has suggested that individuals pass through essentially three stages of socialisation which are relevant to their performance of a political role. The first of these stages is what Pye calls "the basic socialisation process." This process involves both manifest and latent socialisation, and is the stage during which the individual learns the basic values and norms of his' society. During this stage the fundamental structure of each individual's personality is formed and he realises his identity as a member of society. Following this first stage of socialisation, Pye contends that the individual next passes through a process of more or less explicit political socialisation, during which he becomes aware of the political world around him and learns something of the prevailing political culture. It is at this stage that the individual realises his political identity. The final stage in the political socialisation process takes place as a result of recruitment into a political role. Once the individual assumes a recognised political role, he gains a deeper understanding of the political process and acquires the values and behaviour patterns associated with this role. In a relatively stable and culturally homogeneous society there is a considerable degree of congruence between the three stages, and the content of socialisation at each stage tends to reinforce that of the others. Generally speaking, the early socialisation process inculcates in the individual the motivations and predispositions compatible with his prescribed performance of political roles later in life.[2]

However, in transitional societies such as Egypt, it could be

---

[1] See the general impact of the family as an agent of socialisation in the Egyptian society in Chapter III of this study.

[2] See Lucian Pye, *Politics, Personality and Nation Building* (New Haven, and London: Yale University Press, 1962) pp.44-46.

argued that the situation is, generally, the opposite. In Egypt, there is more or less a lack of continuity between the various stages of socialisation due to the differential impact of cultural change. Thus, the changing content of the later stages of the socialisation process is not generally consistent with that of the earlier process of socialisation. The family and other agents of primary socialisation continue to inculcate traditional values and norms, while the new agents of secondary socialisation, such as the government, schools, and universities, have been attempting to introduce new attitudes and patterns of behaviour. Consequently, the early socialisation experience of Egyptians generally does not prepare them for performing the new roles which have been introduced into the political, administrative and economic sectors of society.

In view of the traditional character of the early socialisation of Egypt's bureaucratic elite, it is useful to regard their subsequent exposure to modern education, Western-style education, so to speak, as essentially a process of counter-socialisation. To begin with, it is fair to say, that the more or less modern or Western education which they received in schools and universities was rather contradictory to some of what they were taught in their early childhood. Moreover, some of the values, motives, and behaviour patterns which they acquired in their early childhood were somewhat altered by their schooling. However, most members of the bureaucratic elite tend to agree that the essential socialisation role played by the pre and post-revolutionary educational system in Egypt, still supports the pattern of traditional values and behaviour inculcated mainly through the family and other agents of primary socialisation. Indeed, as one of our respondents put it, "Few schools in Egypt are at best islands of modern culture which have been established in the midst of tradition-oriented Egyptian society."

In particular, educational practices still emphasise the following traditional values and norms inculcated by the tradition-bound family. These are :-

1) The absolute authority of the teacher which resembles the absolute authority of the father over his children.

2) The uniformity and rigidity of the educational curriculum as well as the route method, are very much similar to one of the over-whelming features of primary socialisation in Egypt, which emphasises the subordination of the individual to his family or his government. Needless to say, this is linked to traditional Islam which deals mainly with the community of the faithful and is less concerned with the individual believer. This attitude pressures the individual into extreme societal conformity where there is only one authority, one policy, or one curriculum and one typical pattern of answering the questions posed by school examinations, and almost everyone is expected to obey and accommodate himself to that authority, policy, curriculum or certain kind of knowledge.

3) The strict uniformity and discipline in schools and universities are in line with what the family as a socialisation agent inculcate into the children to agree more and differ less with/their fathers think or do, regardless of what they themselves think or want to do.

It is not surprising then that the bureaucratic organisation in Egypt is, somehow, similar to a great extended family or clan.[1] As we shall see later, moreover, some behavioural orientation manifested by

[1] Abdel Karim Darwish, <u>Bureaucracy and Socialism</u> (Cairo: Anglo-Egyptian Bookshop, 1964) p.42. (In Arabic)

Egyptian higher civil servants has its roots in the prevalent extended family system which seems to be reinforced by the prevailing educational practices and existing educational system. Important features of administrative behaviour and bureaucratic interaction become more understandable if one remembers that some members of the bureaucratic organisation behave towards each other in ways analogous to the father-son relationship or the teacher-student relationship.

At the university education level, however, the more specific socialisation begins. This is where the student is further introduced to the inner workings of a bureaucratic atmosphere, the way in which the university is organised under state control, the career prospects, the importance of academic degree as such, and the relationship of "organised" and "controlled" extracurricula activities for his career advancement.

Leonard Binder states succinctly:

"Imperfect a system though it may be, the university performs a very important socialising function for the administrative elite of the country. As they learned about the overt character of the political system and its ideal goals in grammar schools, they learn about its internal workings, the flow of authority, prestige, and permitted variations during their higher education."[1]

Earlier in this chapter we referred to the fact that higher education has an unusually favourable position. There is, perhaps, too much stress on academic degrees as such. Parodoxically, at the university education stage, the students learn not to study too hard in view of the fact that university examinations under the Egyptian university education system, only require mechanical memorisation and an ability to recite the facts stored in their minds without the ability to relate them to each

[1] Leonard Binder, "Egypt: The Integrative Revolution," in Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba (eds.) Political Culture and Political Development Princeton University Press, 1969) p.415.

other and without truly understanding them. In fact, the satisfaction of the requirements for a university degree does not need hard work nor much intelligence. Instead, they might learn that the bureaucracy is a personal and political arena and that success in this arena depends on the ability to wield influence, to win the support of the powerful, and to counteract the opposition of one's rivals. In a word, it requires political and perhaps personal skill. Thus, if they learn that technical competence may in fact be somewhat irrelevant to successful performance, then they wonder what good the highest achievement in university examinations would have been.

Yet, they learn that the excessive stress on an academic degree as such is functional for the operation of a bureaucratic polity in another way. They will come to know that if admission to the bureaucracy is in effect admission to the ruling class, hence they understand that the pressures for admission might be great. That is to say, that if everyone were eligible for admission, then the decision facing those in power as to whom to admit and whom to reject would be difficult indeed. Thus, they learn that by making academic degrees a prerequisite for admission, and by relating the degree level to a graded hierarchy of administrative classes, it becomes possible to simplify the problem of screening applicants for admission to the bureaucracy. Indeed, they will have to know that those without appropriate degrees could not even apply and thereby remove themselves from the competition.

In short, the university students are likely to learn that the degree system is viewed primarily as a device for screening the initial entrants to the bureaucracy. Since a university degree is more likely to be acquired by those with a fairly substantial family background and since the university education confers on all graduates some common denomination of acquired tastes and social graces, it may be thought to assure a degree of homogeneity and compatibility among members of the

bureaucracy. In fact, the university performs a very important socialising function for the bureaucratic elite in that it provides potential recruits who can be expected to understand and abide by the rules of the bureaucratic and/or political games which they have to learn more about after entry into the bureaucracy. For the polity, this socialisation function performed by the universities is perhaps more important than what technical competence is also brought from studies in a university.

It is not insignificant that all the Egyptian higher civil servants recently interviewed had finished one or another stage of formal education prior to the 1952 Revolution. It is not surprising, therefore, that we consider Egyptian higher civil servants as well as the ministers at cabinet level as elites. Indeed, as we shall see later, Egyptian higher civil servants do consider themselves as an elite and seem to develop an elitist outlook. As far as their education is concerned, it is important to observe that fees were not abolished in primary schools until 1944, in secondary schools until 1951 and in universities until 1962. Thus, the small minority of secondary school graduates who succeeded in gaining entrance to universities regarded themselves as a privileged elite.[1] In addition, the schools and universities implicitly encouraged a sense of elitism. Yet, this sense of elitism, to be sure, fostered by the educational system was one based on social and economic status rather than on rigid intellectual standards. Moreover, once having achieved extra privileges associated with a secondary or university education, the educated Egyptian has been able to rest largely on his laurels, since promotion in the public service

---

[1] It has been estimated that the opportunity to compete for appointment even to the clerical classes is restricted to about 5% of the youth of Egyptian society between 15 and 20 years of age, while the administrative class draws from a reservoir of little more than 1% of the youth between 20 and 30 years. See Darwish, op.cit., p.58.

and perhaps elsewhere tends to be based mainly on seniority and academic qualifications rather than performance. Consequently, there has been a tendency among the bureaucratic elite and indeed other elites, in Egyptian society, to regard their educational achievement somewhat as an ascribed status.

Bureaucratic Elite, Education and Social Structure

In Chapter IV we referred to the fact that the Egyptian bureaucratic elite, not unlike the political elite, i.e., elites at cabinet-level, is not representative of the society as a whole. Given this fact, we may ask whether this reveals some important traits of Egyptian society or whether it indicates characteristics that inhere in the recruitment of elites in general. The answer is both; the socially restricted nature of the Egyptian elite is grounded, as we shall see presently, in a rather severely selective educational system, a system in which social status is closely related to academic success. But while other societies may possess less restrictive educational systems, they, too, may exhibit a correlation between social status and academic success. In other words, if access to education, especially higher education, depends on social status, then selecting a well-educated elite may be tantamount to selecting an elite from near the top of society's system of social stratification. Mosca argued precisely this:

> "Even when academic degrees, scientific training, special aptitides as tested by examination and competitions, open the way to public office, there is no eliminating that special advantage in favour of certain individuals which the French call the advantage of positions deja prises (positions already captured). In actual fact, though examinations and competitions may theoretically be open to all, the majority never have the resources for meeting the expense of long preparation, and many others are without the connections and kinships that set an individual promptly on the right road."[1]

As far as the British higher civil servants are concerned, Kelsall

---

[1] Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class (New York: McGraw Hill Book Co., 1936) p.50.

notes that the social status of the members of the Administrative

class was related to the type of schools they attended and to their

academic success.[1] Parris notes, moreover, that this is also the

case with regard to other leadership groups, i.e.,members of the House

of Commons, industrial managers.[2] As a matter of fact, the unequal

opportunities inherent in the recruitment of British elites particularly

the bureaucratic elite, arise from the educational system, which favours

those already more advantaged.

In France, too, Suleiman shows that the recruitment of French

elites, and particularly the administrative elite, has not been

democratised, principally because the means of democratisation have

always been linked to severe academic barriers, which exclude a major

segment of the population from elite positions and, in effect,

perpetuate the class basis of recruitment.[3] Educational requirements,

Suleiman notes, in both France and Germany serve to exclude the sons

of workers (and farmers) from holding positions in the higher civil

service. In percentage terms, it has been estimated that the son of

a high-level executive has 85 times more chance of entering a university

than the son of a peasant and 40 times more than the son of a worker.[4]

In many developing countries, where some efforts have been made

to break the direct link between social and political status, the link

between education and political status is still extremely strong.

Moreover, the link between social class and education is also found to

---

[1] R.K. Kelsall, Higher Civil Servants in Britain (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd, 1955) p.154.

[2] Henry Parris, Constitutional Bureaucracy (London: George Allen Unwin Ltd 1969) p.315.

[3] Ezra Suleiman, Politics, Power and Bureaucracy in France, the Administrative Elite (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974) p.86-89.

[4] Ibid., pp.86-87.

be very strong. It has been estimated, for example, that the chances

of a middle-class Indian getting a university education are one hundred

times greater than the chances of his lower-class compatriots. Hence,

the indirect impact of social standing on political stratification will

probably continue to be very strong.[1]

Earlier in this chapter we have suggested that up until the 1952

Revolution there was a ubiquitous link between social status and access

to education in the sense that only a small minority of the population,

i.e.,those with a fairly substantial family background, was able to

continue their education and this, in effect, perpetuated the class

basis of recruitment into elite positions. Thus, in comparison with

the conditions in the United States, only about one in each fifteen of

the Egyptian children in primary schools in Egypt continued to secondary

schools. In the United States the corresponding figure was better than

one in two. Even more striking are the comparative figures for

university education. In Egypt, no more than one child in thirty-five

continued his education to the university level. In the United States,

the proportion was approximately one in ten.[2] Such a severely restrict-

ive educational system is not primarily the result of the application of

rigid intellectual standards. To a considerable extent, on the contrary,

access to education, particularly at secondary and university stages,

has been closely linked to socio-economic status. This fact is fundamen-

tal because only those members of society with a fairly substantial

---

[1] V. Subramanian,"Representative Bureaucracy: A Reassessment,"
American Political Science Review, Vol.61. (December,1967), p.1018.

[2] Figures for Egypt are compiled from two sources: Ministry of
Education The Development of Education in U.A.R. (Cairo: Ministry of
Education 1958), p.48 and United Arab Republic, Year Book of 1960,
Cairo: Information Department, 1960) pp.500-504. Figures for the
United States are from J. Donald Kingsley, Representative Bureaucracy
An Interpretation of the British Civil Service (Yellow Springs, Ohio:
The Antioch Press, 1944) pp.142-143.

family background have had far greater chances to continue to university education than have their lower-class compatriots. Therefore, Egyptian education has continued as a clearly stratified social institution which in turn, has been reflected in the Egyptian bureaucracy.

In the case of the Egyptian civil service, the data show an undeniable correlation between socio-economic status and academic (or career) success. As we have seen in the previous chapter, those most likely to gain entry in the higher echelons of the Egyptian bureaucracy come from near the top of society's stratification. The sons of blue-collar workers are totally excluded from the bureaucratic elite in Egypt, while the sons of peasants are very much under-represented in the higher echelons of bureaucracy at a ratio of one to five in relation to their percentage of total population. In fact, one may say that it is as unusual for the son of a peasant (not to mention the son of a worker) to find his way into the high administrative ranks as it is for a son of a well-to-do family to become a clerk at the bottom.

Indeed, the data show a very close association between the socio-economic level of the higher civil servant's father and the educational attainment of the higher civil servant himself. As can be seen in Table V.4, higher civil servants whose fathers are of the upper socio-economic stratum tend to have more education than those whose fathers are of the lower stratum, and whose from the middle stratum fall in between. As has been suggested above, this relationship is not unexpected in view of the unequal opportunities in the recruitment of Egyptian higher civil servants as a result of the educational system, especially at the university education level, which favours those already more socially advantaged.

Table V.4

Father's Socio-Economic Status

and Higher Civil Servant's Educational Attainment

(In Percentages)

Higher Civil Servant's Educational Attainment	Father's Socio-Economic Status		
	Lower	Middle	Upper
Less than University	87.5	9.9	0
University Degree	7.5	40.1	42.1
Graduate Degree	5.0	50.0	57.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Furthermore, a comparison of Egyptian higher civil servants' fathers' and gradfathers' occupations indicates that the civil service, professional and largely upper and middle-class occupations of the higher civil servants' fathers is matched by their grandfathers, whose occupations are much the same in terms of prestige and status. Thus, it might be said that there are more men of higher occupational backgrounds precisely because more men from these prestigeous groups are able to attend universities. In this manner higher education functions to maintain occupational success. Sons of men with high occupational status have a more than equal opportunity to secure the educational qualifications necessary to maintain or enhance high status in their own lifetimes.

So far we have discussed the unequal opportunities inherent in the recruitment of Egyptian higher civil servants, who are mainly the products of the pre-1952 educational system. This educational system, we have suggested, tended to favour those already more socially advantaged, and, in effect, perpetuated the class bias in elite recruitment. But what about today's secondary and university students, who are almost by definition tomorrow's higher civil servants in Egypt?

Could it be said that access to education and academic success no longer depend on the socio-economic status of the students in view of the fact that fees for primary, secondary and university education were abolished in 1944, 1951, 1962 respectively? As a matter of fact, these and similar questions are crucial in view of the fact that in all the hard struggle to transform Egyptian society over the past 25 years, the education system has been considered by some as one of the greatest achievements. Revolutionary leaders came to power with a vow that they would give the ordinary peasant the opportunities denied to so many before the 1952 Revolution. In other words, there has been a belief that the Egyptian society would become more egalitarian and democratic as a result of the expansion of education system and the institution of educational criteria as the chief means of selection. Yet, as we shall argue later, this faith in the democratic potential of education is hardly justified, if only because it is oblivious to the central problem of access to educational opportunities. Indeed, it can be shown that the contrary is somewhat closer to the truth; that is, whenever the avowed aim is to democratise a particular elite or institution and whenever academic criteria are instituted as the sole means of ensuring this democratisation, it is practically certain that little democratisation will occur. The reason still lies in the undeniable correlation that exists between high socio-economic status and access to education as well as academic success.

As indicated earlier, secondary school students are, almost by definition, an elite group in Egypt in view of the fact that, according to the Census of Population, no more than twenty per cent of Egyptian male youth in the age group from 15 to 18 were in school in 1966.[1]

---

[1] The Census of Population, Vol.II (Cairo: The Central Agency for Mobilisation and Statistics, 1966) p.15.

Moreover, secondary school students are, almost by definition too,
Egypt's future civil servants in view of the fact that these students
together with university graduates are virtaully the sole and the
largest reservoir from which the public service draws its potential
recruits.

That secondary school students are an educated elite in itself
is matched by the fact that their fathers are also of the educated elite
as can be clearly seen in the following table.

Table V.5

Educational Attainment of Secondary School Students'

Fathers as Compared with the Educational Attainment

of Total Egyptian Adult   (In Percentages)

Educational Level	Students' Fathers	Adult Male Population
None, or primary	43	87
Secondary	17	10
University (including post secondary institutes and all graduate degrees)	34	3
Do not know	6	-
Total	100	100

Sources: (1) The Census of Population, Vol.15 (Cairo: The Central
Agency for Mobilisation and Statistics, 1960), p.20.

(2) Peter C. Dodd, A Survey of Egyptian Secondary School Students
(Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1966), p.12.

A look at Table V.5 indicates that slightly more than one third
of the secondary school students' fathers have received post secondary
degrees from institutes, i.e. post intermediate certificates, higher
education and in some cases, post-graduate degrees as opposed to only
3 per cent of Egyptian adult males who are so privileged. Moreover, if
the 17 per cent of those students whose fathers have received secondary

school certificates is added to the 34 per cent of those students whose fathers have obtained higher education, it is possible to state then that slightly more than one half of the students (i.e.,51 per cent) are from families of the educated elite in Egypt.

But the above figures tell us little about equality of opportunity as far as access to education is concerned. For it does not take into account the relative size of the socio-economic strata in the total population. While there are serious gaps in the data needed to discuss this point, we do possess sufficient evidence to show that the majority of students came from financially privileged families, and almost none are truly poor.

Table V.6

Students' Fathers' Income Per Year

(In Egyptian Pounds)

Income Strata (a)	% of Students' Fathers
Less than £E.150	2.3
£E.150 - £E.380	25.4
£E.380 - £E.650	20.1
£E.650 or more	27.4
Don't know or no answer	24.8
Total	100.0

Sources: The Census of Population, op.cit., p.XVII and Dodd, A Survey of Egyptian Secondary School Students, op.cit., p.13.

(a) Per Capita annual income in Egypt in 1966 was about £E.75.

A close look at Table V.6 indicates the very low percentage, 2.3 per cent of the secondary students' fathers whose annual incomes fall within the lower stratum, a stratum which constitute more than 55 per cent of the total Egyptian population. This figure suggests that equal opportunity for access to secondary education, the only

gateway to university education for the lower stratum in Egyptian society has been, by and large, more assumed than practiced.

Moreover, as Table V.6 suggests, slightly less than one half (47.5 per cent) of the secondary students came from what may roughly be termed the middle and upper-classes in Egyptian society. It is fair to say that the majority of students came from financially privileged families, and almost none are truly poor. Thus it may be suggested that the faith in the democratic potential of education is hardly justified, if only because it is oblivious to the central problem of access to educational opportunities. Indeed, it might be further suggested that whenever the avowed aim is to democratise a particular elite or institution and whenever academic criteria are instituted as the sole means of ensuring this democratisation, it is practically certain that little democratisation will occur. The reason, we suggested earlier, lies in the undeniable correlation that exists between high social status and academic success.

In an effort to democratise admission to university education, it has been decreed by the post-1952 Revolutionary government that the sole criterion for selection and elimination is that of the grades obtained at the conclusion of general secondary school education. All candidates are equal before an objective public examination where no personal factors enter into the decision. That is to say that particular emphasis is put on formal equality where entry into a particular elite, i.e., the bureaucratic elite, is restricted. This system of admission to university education is perhaps fairer and more just than that which prevailed before the 1952 Revolution. It must not be forgotten, however, that the formal equality insured by the formal system whereby university entrance is determined by the grades does little more than to transform privileges into merit, since it allows social origin to continue exercising its effects, but by more covert means.

The figures from the survey of secondary school students permit us to see the relationship between grades (i.e., academic success) and socio-economic of the students. Table V.7 suggests a very strong monotonic relationship between class composition of the student bodies and academic success.. That those students who are from the higher social strata of Egyptian society have achieved the highest grades can be seen in the case of Urman Secondary School, which is most predominantly upper and middle in student composition. Moreover, those who obtained the lowest grades are students who came from the lower stratum of the society is illustrated in the case of the student sample from Mohamed Farid School, which is predominantly lower class in student composition. As for the other two schools, they fall between these polar extremes, the school of Zagezig, the larger of the two cities - having a somewhat more favourable distribution.

Table V.7

Students' Grades by School

(In Percentage of Students)

School	Below 200	Grade Average[a] above 200	Total
Urman	9	91	100
Zagazig	71	29	100
Tanta	56	44	100
Mohamed Farid	95	5	100

Source: Dodd, A Survey of Egyptian Secondary School Students, op.cit., p.15.
(a) Grades range from 150 (failing) to 260 (excellent). A 200 is an average grade.

Similar results may be obtained by analysing the data on the level of the individual student. As can be seen in Table V.8, less than one in five of the low socio-economic status group have had grade average above 200, whereas one in two of the high socio-economic status group

have gained such grades. Thus, it is fair to say that the students who came from the highest social strata of Egyptian society, i.e., upper and middle class, are academically most successful in secondary school examinations and therefore could enter the universities, whereas the other secondary school students who came from the lower strata of society could not aspire to go on to universities in view of the fact that university entrance is determined strictly by grades.

Table V.8

Students' Grades in Terms of the Individual

Student's Socio-Economic Status

| Level of Student's socio-economic status | Grade Averages | | Total |
	% of students with grade average below 200	% of students with grade average above 200	
High Socio-Economic status students	49.9	50.1	100
Low Socio-Economic status students	80.2	19.8	100

Source: Dodd, A Survey of Egyptian Secondary School Students, op.cit., p.16

As far as university students are concerned, a recent sample survey of university students at Cairo University and Al-Azhar University reinforce the fact that there is class bias in the educational system.[1] On the basis of the data contained in this survey, it is suggested that those who are most likely to benefit from modern secular education are the

---

[1] It will be recalled that Cairo University offers modern secular education, while Al-Azhar University offers mainly religious traditional education, notwithstanding the recent reform in 1961 concerning the latter university which provides for the conversion of Al-Azhar into modern style university offering some ranges of scientific and humanistic secular disciplines alongside those of Islamic law and theology.

sons and daughters of professionals, who are over-represented in the
sample of Cairo University students at the ratio of ten to one in
relationship to their percentage of total population. Similar over-
representation, albeit less marked, characterises students who are the
children of landowners. Moreover, the data suggest that those who are
most likely to be educated in the traditional subjects of Islamic
Theology and Arabic Language education which prepares students for
traditional roles and careers such as that of "Imam" in the village
mosque - - are mainly children of peasants.

Table V.9

University Students According to Fathers' Occupations

(in percentages)

Fathers' Occupation	% Cairo University	% Al-Azhar[a] University	% total population
Professionals (e.g. lawyers, doctors, civil servants etc)	33.2	17.9	3.7
Clerks, sheiks etc.,	23.0	1.8	3.8
Landowners, Private enterprises, Rentiers etc.,	29.3	19.6	8.1
Labourers	5.6	7.2	28.3
Peasants	5.3	45.5	54.3
Not specified	3.1	8.0	1.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: National Institute of Planning, A Survey of University
Students, (Cairo; 1966) p.12.

(a) Since the survey did not identify the faculty, i.e., modern secular
versus religious tradtional, in which students were entrolled, it can
be assumed that those students whose fathers are of the lower socio-
economic strata, who are enrolled in the Al-Azhar University are
distributed across faculties in proportion similar to those which
prevail for the university of Al-Azhar students. If there were
significant deviations from these proportions it would be that students
from workers and peasant families are over-represented in the faculties
of Religious and Arabic Language.

What is more striking perhaps, is the fact that those least likely
to benefit from university education, whether modern secular or
religious traditional, are the children of labourers, who are under-
represented in both samples of Cairo and Al-Azhar Universities. If it
is recalled that no single higher civil servant in the Egyptian samples
(i.e.,that of Professor Berger and our) was the son of blue-collar
worker, then one can safely say that to no group are the social and
educational paths to higher positions, particularly in the public service,
so closed as to the industrial workers who represent the second largest
group of the total population in Egypt, in both relative and absolute
terms. Access to education particularly at secondary and university
stages has been closely linked to socio-economic status. This fact is
fundamental in view of the fact that those with a fairly substantial
family background have had far greater chance to continue to university
education than have their lower-class compatriots. Thus, it can be said
that access to university education and indeed academic success have
been restricted and, in effect, excluded a major segment of the population
from elite positions, and this in turn perpetuated the class basis of
recruitment. This is the case with regard to the Egyptian civil service
particularly at its higher echelons. That the class basis is evident
with regard to the Egyptian bureaucratic elite could further be shown
from the data concerning higher civil servants' fathers in terms of
educational attainment. If one assumes a 30 year age difference in gener-
ations, these data indicate that the Egyptian higher civil servant's
fathers were also of the educated elite. Across the total Egyptian
population in 1937 and 1947, 99.93% and 99.88% respectively were
illiterate or had attended only primary school, (little over two fold
and slightly less than ten fold of the percentages for Professor Berger's
respondents' fathers and our respondents' fathers respectively), while
slightly more than 50 per cent and 90 per cent of Professor Berger's

Table V.10

Educational Attainment of Egyptian Higher

Civil Servants' Fathers

(Longitudinal Comparison)

Respondent's Father Educational Attainment	Percentages: No of cases in Parentheses			
	Of Total Egyptian Population (1)		Of Berger's Respondents (2)	Of our Respondents
	In 1937	1947	In 1954	In 1975
None, or primary	99.93	99.88	47	10
Seconadry	.04	.08	23	12
University	.03	.04	30	78
	100.00	100.00	100 (249)	100 (400)

Sources: (1) The 1937 and 1947 Census of Population (Cairo: Statistics and Census Department, 1947),pp.10-11

(2) Morroe Berger, Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957) p.47

respondents' fathers and our respondents' fathers respectively, had obtained secondary school degrees or university degrees. Only 0.07% and 0.12% of the Egyptian total population in 1937 and 1947 respectively were so privileged.

Higher Education and Elite Administrative Preparation

As we noted earlier, a great majority of higher civil servants and indeed most members of the political elite - at cabinet-level - have received higher education. This is not unexpected in view of the formal requirement of a higher education for the higher posts. Thus, it may be said that if the secondary school certifies eligibility for general elite roles, the university has been the gateway to the bureaucratic and political elites in particular. This means, if anything,

that the higher institution provides separate education or training for particular elite roles. In some measure, of course, this is rather true. One of the most significant characteristics of the formal entrance requirements for the bureaucratic elite, however, is that they do not really prescribe (as Max Weber assumed in his model of bureaucracy) specialised education as necessary, in an instrumental sense, for the occupation.

This proposition can be demonstrated without much difficulty in the case of the Egyptian universities and higher education institutes. As noted earlier, university entrance is determined strictly by the total grades which the secondary school students obtained in the public secondary education examination. In other words, all subjects have equal weight as entrance requirements. Thus, what is at work is a form of Gresham's Law; if all subjects have equal weight as entrance requirements for universities, then those subjects with least relevance for certain kinds of academic specialisation and indeed careers will tend to predominate in the competition for entry to universities.

Moreover, at the university level, the educational system is far more concerned with conferring lifelong titles than with providing technical expertise. This is partly due to the fact that the educational elite believes that intense preparation in few subjects is inferior to a broad course distribution. As one of the higher civil servant puts it: "University graduates seem to know more than all about it, but do not know what it is all about."

Indeed, as interviews reveal, the basic argument for concentration, i.e., intense preparation in few subjects - at the university level is that a young man - in contrast to a boy - would become intellectually proficient only by deep mastery of a few challenging subjects. This mastery of detail can be aptly assumed to be directly transferable to a

professional activity like administration. Nevertheless, universities continue to provide separate education (albeit not very specialised) for the bureaucratic elite. Some effects of the types of elite administrative training and education dominant in Egypt on administrative role definition can only be suggested here.

As noted in the previous chapter, slightly more than one third, (i.e., 34.5 per cent) of the Egyptian bureaucratic elite have a university degree in engineering. A similar proportion of high-ranking administrators in the Egyptian state economic enterprises have such a degree. As the interviews revealed, however, the engineers were much more dominant in the higher civil service as well as state economic enterprises during the last two decades. Why were engineers dominant in the higher civil service as well as state economic enterprises rather than members of other high-prestige groups, like economists, lawyers, scientists etc? The answer to this question can only be gathered from interviews. Some higher civil servants believe that the reason for the predominance of engineers in administration is due to the fact that Egypt is supposed to be a production-oriented economy. Like the rest of production-oriented economies, they would argue, the notion that production is strictly a technical problem, a matter of materials and machines, dominates the mentality of its policy-makers. Hence, the predominance of engineers! Production rather than administration is of great importance at the present stage of industrialisation.

As a matter of fact, the impact of engineering preparation on an administrator's role definition can hardly fail to instil an element of eagerness to participate in the industrialisation of Egypt. Not only is the engineering profession closely related to industrialisation, but professional status depends on the importance attached to this process. However, the very strength of this identification has posed role problems when the engineer ceases to be a staff aid and assumes the direction of

major resource allocation activities. As one of our interviewees

aptly put it: "Whatever the talent of our engineers, talent which many

are ready to recognise, we must say that as adminstrators or managers

they are far from being dominated by the spirit of prudence and economic

calculation. They are generally indifferent to money matters. They

need to be guided, reined in by a calculating administration motivated

by public interest. The tendency of the engineers to take pleasure

in the construction of fine works without concerning themselves with

the importance of the costs is indeed the principal source of the

economic difficulties which Egypt is facing now."

Quite possibly, the emphasis on an engineering approach to

administration has been inspired by the Soviet model, the main feature

of which is a narrow engineering training reinforced by simplistic

adherence to production credos like Taylorism and by the rigidities of

the command economy mechanism.

Moreover, the impact of engineering preparation on the

administrator's role definition can instil a tendency - noted repeatedly

by our interviewees - to neglect the social cost of his projects. In

any event, the tendency to adopt abstract rationalisation to the neglect

of human values is harmful to broad social planning.

Our interviewees indicate that not long ago, legal education was

considered sufficient for the political elite as well as the bureau-

cratic elite, notwithstanding the small proportion of the contemporary

bureaucratic elite who held a degree in Law.

The impact of legal preparation on an administrator's role

definition can hardly fail to instil an element of eagerness to accept

rigid legal restrictions complacently instead of seeking ways for

governmental initiative or planning. A more precise, though indirect,

effect of legal dominance of formal preparation is the exclusion of

alternative subjects which might positively affect role definition in

economic development. We do not need to discuss these alternative subjects

here, but their minimization by legal pre-emption of the curriculum needs to be emphasised here. As some of our interviewees put it: "Law tends to become an end in itself; all the substance of administrative activity is regarded as auxiliary."

From all that our interviewees have said, we can note some hints that economics and related subjects, i.e., accounting, business and public administration offer an alternative to engineering as well as legal preparation for higher administrative careers. On the whole, economics and related subjects represent a compromise between that of the law faculty and an excessive technical or engineering orientation. It is encouraging to note that 35 per cent of higher civil servants and a growing percentage of the political elite have a degree in economics or related subjects. In a wider perspective, the present regime's slogan of "science and faith" with its emphasis on economic rationality and human values may be a response to the public's delayed reaction to the engineering approach to administration which was dominant in the previous regime.

Rejection of the notion of relying upon top administrators trained in law and engineering to guide and supervise economic development does not mean that one needs to reject the participation of such elements in a balanced administrative elite. As a matter of fact, some interviewees noticed how the minor but significant position of conseil d'Etat (The Council of State) and other legal structures provide a sense of the value of legal norms and human considerations for contemporary Egyptian administration.

Similarly, a technically-trained component well-integrated into the administrative elite may be very useful. We believe, nevertheless, that the dominant element in a dynamic but prudent Egyptian administration will be men with broad economic training, embracing deep appreciation of technology and the social sciences as well as law and humanities.

CHAPTER VI

THE CIVIL SERVICE AS A CAREER

The Choice of a Career in the Civil Service

Why does one become a civil servant? This is a complex question
that cannot be answered simply by an examination of the social back-
ground of the Egyptian bureaucratic elite - indeed the data presented
in Chapter IV contribute little. Many explanations have been offered
for the choice of the civil service as a career: the power and prestige
of the civil service, a dogmatic pursuance of the general interest,
security, etc.

The motivation that initially determine the choice of the civil
service as a career can be gauged to some extent by the period in the
subject's life when the civil service was thought of as a career. To
this end, the respondents were asked "How old were you when you began
thinking about a career in the civil service?". Table VI.1 shows 18
per cent of the higher civil servants interviewed had thought of a career
in the civil service either before entering a university or during (or
before) adolescence. An overwhelming majority, 78.5 per cent, indicated
that they thought of a career in the civil service while at the
University or upon graduation, which would seem to indicate that other
alternatives were not as attractive or available, though they had perhaps
been considered. From this point of view, their motivation in seeking a
career in the civil service, higher civil servants fall into three
categories: the first includes those who saw the relative attractiveness
of the civil service in security terms; the second includes those who had
no alternative but to seek a civil service career; and the third comprises
those who were bent on a civil service career from the start out of some
desire to perform a public service or to do an interesting job.

Table VI.1

When Respondents Thought of a Career

in the Civil Service

	Percentage: No of cases in Parenthesis
Before Secondary school education	7
At Secondary school	11
At, or upon graduation from University	78.5
Others	3.5
Total	100.0
	(400)

In a study conducted in 1966 by Dr. Richard Chapman for the

Fulton Commission, it was revealed that of 32 entrants in 1956, only

one had decided to enter the British Civil Service before entering the

University, and seventeen had decided while they were at the University

i.e.,while undergraduates.[1] In other words, a close look at the data for

Egypt and Britain would suggest that the University had a determining

effect on the majority of civil servants in both countries in choosing

or thinking about a career in the civil service. It is important to

note, however, that the years at the University produce no single motive

for thinking about a civil service career in either case, as the following

comments by higher civil servants in the respective countries suggest:

In Egypt:
   "While at the University, I was thinking about a career, and
one university professor whom I admired very much advised me to choose
a career in the civil service i.e. Ministry of Economy and Finance."

   "I had studied law at the university and I did not have the
means for creating my own law practice. So what else was there to do
with my qualifications?"

---

[1] Richard Chapman, "Profile of a Profession: The Administrative
Class of the Civil Service," The Fulton Commission, The Civil Service
Vol. III,(2) (London: H.M.S.O., 1968), p.11.

"I had studied economics and commerce and it seemed very clear that I could not go very far with my education in view of the limited employment opportunities outside the government."

"I had studied law at the university, and through my studies then I began to realise that the conditions in private enterprises do not appear to guarantee security of tenure, let alone the prospect of receiving a pension on retirement, to any significant degree as does the government."

"As a university student I wanted to render a public service; e.g., to serve the community. As far as I am concerned, the civil service could give me this opportunity to serve the community."

In Britain:
"While at university I decided that I wanted to join . . . (Ministry), but no other government department."

"As a student . . . I wanted to "serve the community". I wanted to avoid any scrambling for position, etc. The Civil Service seemed the answer . . . (I also wanted to prove to myself that I could pass those administrative examinations which are spoken of with bated breath)."

"At university, my tutor suggested that I ought to explore the civil service as a career." 1

The determining effect that the Egyptian universities have on their students in choosing or thinking about a civil service career is of great importance.

As we have seen earlier, the university does little more than provide students who are fortunate enough to be there with a certain type of education which reinforces middle-class or "bourgeois" culture. The very fact of being at the university in a society where the circulation of elites remains restrictive in scope, means that one has a choice of profession, restricted as that choice may be by one's social origin and cultural milieu. Even below the university education level, the academic secondry system seems to reinforce middle-class bourgeois cultural constraints against blue-collar work and thus by the time the student achieves a seconday school certificate he is unable to accept anything but a white-collar job even if it means his or her staying at home, trying hard to acquire more education by any means and delaying

---

1 Ibid., pp.11-12.

entry into the labour force as much as possible.

The importance of having a university degree becomes all the more obvious in view of the legal requirement of a higher education for the higher posts in the civil service.[1] This is clearly the case in Egypt and no doubt has its parallels elsewhere. In Turkey, for example, there is a close relationship between educational achivement on the one hand and level of entry to the civil service on the other hand. A university degree assures a quite high level of entry into the civil service. Furthermore, the legal requirements for high level posts makes it virtually impossible to be promoted to these posts without a university education.[2]

Knowing the age at which one first thinks or decides on a civil service career does not tell us why the civil service is chosen as a career in preference to non-government professions. To this end, our respondents were asked "Why did you choose the civil service as a career in preference to a non-government position?" As similar question in content but rather different in structure was posed by Professor Berger to his respondents in his study made in 1954.[3] Table VI.2 shows our respondent's reasons for choosing a civil service career as compared with the reasons stated by Professor Berger's respondents.

---

[1] The popular magazine Sabahel Kheir reports the story of an employee of the Ministry of Education who after 20 years of service obtained a bachelor's degree from the faculty of Letters. As soon as he informed his superiors of the new achievement he was required to re-apply to the Ministry to receive a new status, where upon he was required to get a medical test usually given to new applicants. He failed the test and was immediately fired from his job. The man collapsed and died of chagrin. Many stories of the same nature fill Egyptian newspaper columns and demonstrate the desperate drive of these older employees to improve their promotional chances. See Sabahel Kreir, (August, 1974).

[2] C.H.Dodd, Politics and Government in Turkey, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1969), p.295.

[3] Morroe Berger, Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p.68.

Table VI.2

Respondents' Reasons for Choosing Civil Service Career

(Longitudinal Comparison)

Reasons	Percentages: No. of cases in Parentheses	
	Egypt - 1954[1]	Egypt - 1975
Security	22.6	28.0
Limited opportunity elsewhere	30.2	35.0
To serve the community or to perform a public service	6.9	15.5
Inadequate funds for own business	14.9	6.0
Interesting work	-	6.0
Family's order or family tradition	6.9	2.0
Only a place for an educated person	8.9	2.0
Qualifications are not good elsewhere	6.4	-
Government paid for my education	3.2	-
Just by chance, decided to stay	-	2.0
Good opportunity with a future	-	3.5
Total	100.0	100.0
	(249)	(400)

Source: (1) Morroe Berger, Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p.71

Thirty-five per cent of our respondents stated that they entered the civil service because of limited opportunities elsewhere, while thirty per cent of Professor Berger's respondents indicate the same reason. Professor Berger finds such a reason explained by the close connection between education and government service. The universities are geared towards producing candidates for the civil service employment. As we have seen before and as Table VI.2 suggests, there are now more Egyptians who entered the civil service in view of the limited opportunities outside the government. Thus, it may be said that the connection between education and government employment has become much closer. As one of our respondents put it: "A bright young man always

ended up in the civil service because, having traditionally lacked

respect for industrial development, the State has not encouraged, may

have even discouraged, the creation of schools to train men for service

in the private sector."

Apart from this negative reason, namely that there is no

alternative for an educated person but to join the civil service, there

are some positive reasons which are responsible for the sustained in-

flow of the educated class into the civil service. The most important

of these positive reasons given by our respondents was job security,

i.e.,guaranteed security of tenure. Moreover, a closer look at Table

VI.2 suggests that job security is somewhat more salient in so far as

the comparison over time is concerned. That is to say that job security

as a reason for choosing a civil service career is slightly more

pronounced among our respondents than among Professor Berger's respondents.

This point will be further discussed later on in this chapter.

Another positive reason for entering the Egyptian civil service was

the opportunity to serve the community or to perform a public service.

This orientation is more pronounced by our respondents than by

Professor Berger's respondents. It is possible that the present Egyptian

civil servants are now more aware of the "accepted" or "acceptable"

reasons for entering the civil service at least in so far as a calling

for state service is concerned.

Here are two comments about this kind of motive, i.e.,a chance

to perform a public service, which impelled some of our respondents to

become civil servants.

(1) "Because I think that struggling for our nation's economic
    and social development is a worthy cause or reason for
    entering the civil service, through which, I think, people
    can take part in Egypt's development."

(2) "It is not only a question of administration or the civil
    service as a career for me, it is ultimately a question of
    the place of our civil service in national life. Indeed,
    the two issues are closely connected. The connection is
    between public service and economic development. Economic

development is a vast and complex process, which has to be
supported by scientists who produce or adapt new ideas and
techniques. But an equally important task is that of social
engineering, that of organisation, administration and
mobilisation of resources, both human and material, and this
is the task of civil servants. The gap between ideas and
results has to be filled by action and for the society as a
whole this requires a collective action which is what public
administration is. I joined the civil service to
participate in such action."

Furthermore, a closer look at Table VI.2 suggests that an attach-
ment to a public service vocation may be in fact more discernible in
our data. If we consider that the sum of the following factors:
serving the community or performing a public service, interesting work,
family tradition and good opportunity with a future, evidences a
predilection for or an orientation towards government service as opposed
to private employment, we may conclude that an attachment to public
service reveals itself in 27 per cent of our respondents.

Advantages of Government Employment

Once a person has joined the civil service, what are the things
he likes or dislikes about it? Or, more generally, what is his orient-
ation towards government employment?

First of all, one of the basic attitudinal questions included in
the questionnaire was the one pertaining to the advantages of government
employment. The item was designed to obtain information on the
attitudes of civil servants towards public service, as it asked: "People
have many reasons for working for state government. In your case,
which of the following are the advantages or best things about working
for the civil service?" A similar question in content but different
in structure was included in Professor Berger's study about the Egyptian
civil service made in 1954.[1] The replies of our respondents are
presented in the following table, which also furnishes data pertaining

---

[1] Ibid., p.74. The question posed by Professor Berger to his
respondents read as follows: "What do you like about government
work?"

to the responses of Professor Berger's respondents to a similar

question.

Table VI.3

Most Important Advantages of Civil

Service for Egyptian Higher Civil Servants

(Longitudinal Comparison)

Advantages	Percentages: No. of cases in Parentheses	
	Egypt - 1954[1]	Egypt - 1975
Chance to perform public service	33.9	32.0
Job Security	33.1	28.0
Good salary	13.1	4.5
Nothing at all	11.4	0
Opportunity to reach high position	6.5	5.5
Prestige of the job	0	12.0
Feeling of independence	2.0	0
Stimulating and challenging work	0	6.0
Importance of work being done	0	9.5
People I work with, everything	0	2.5
Total	100.0	100.0
	(249)	(400)

Source: (1) Berger, Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt, op.cit., p.74

Apparently, one function of government bureaucracy, e.g., service

to the public, has been adopted as a value orientation by several of our

respondents as well as Professor Berger's respondents who had originally

indicated that they entered the civil service for economic or security

reasons. Only 6.9 per cent of Professor Berger's respondents and 15.5

per cent of our respondents directly stated that they had chosen the

civil service as a career in order to perform a public service.

The second most important reason which was frequently stated by

our respondents and Professor Berger's respondents was the security of

tenure guaranteed in government service. This advantage as will be

seen later, reflects upon the conditions of service in private enter-
prises which do not appear to guarantee security of tenure to the
same degree as does the government.

A rather surprising result, from the standpoint of old stere-
otypes about bureaucratic red tape and obstructionism, is the 15.5
per cent of the Egyptian higher civil servants in our sample who felt
the importance, stimulating and challenging nature of their work were
the most important advantages of the civil service. This sense of
importance and the challenging nature of the work is totally absent in
so far as Professor Berger's respondents are concerned. A few of the
higher civil servants in our sample remarked, during their interviews,
that they had worked both in and outside the state government and the
civil service seemed to allow a man greater scope to use his own
initiative to create new solutions to challenging problems than was
possible in private organisations.

Comparatively, about 11.5 per cent of Professor Berger's respondents
could find nothing at all about the civil service which was pleasing.
None of our respondents could find anything wrong or unpleasant about
the civil service. This is perhaps,one of some examples illustrating
the higher job satisfaction enjoyed by our respondents as compared to
their Egyptian counterparts who took part in Professor Berger's study
in 1954. Moreover, twelve per cent of our respondents indicated that the
prestige of the job was the most important and pleasing job satisfaction.
None of Professor Berger's respondents regarded their job in the civil
service as prestigeous. It should be noted, however, that our sample
has a lower percentage of respondents, (4.5 per cent) who indicated that
a government position is economically rewarding. That the low salaries
is one of the major complaints expressed by our respondents could be
seen when we consider the most important disadvantage of the Egyptian
civil service.

In a study of two British ministries comparable to the present study in some ways, a similar question was asked of the respondents to rank the attraction of the civil service from a given list of ten attractions. The British civil servants ranked job security first, salaries fifth, and status in the community ninth as attractions or reasons for satisfaction of the government service. Skill and service to the state or public were not included in the ten given attractions, but attractions dealing with economic and working conditions ranked consistently higher than non-material conditions.[1]

Finally, it should be noted that our respondents, regardless of their social and educational background, value the same aspects of government employment, since social and educational variables did not yield statistically significant relationships when cross-tabulated with the various attitudinal items.

Disadvantages of Government Employment

In order to get a clear picture of the attitudes and perceptions of higher civil servants towards government work, the subject was also approached from exactly the opposite end of the continuum. Respondents were asked: "What disadvantage do you see in working for the government service?" "What things do you dislike about it?" Table VI.4 shows the percentages of the responses and compares them with those reported by Professor Berger with regard to a similar question in content but rather different in structure.[2]

Professor Berger's respondents were mainly concerned with the routine and monotony of governmental work, a complaint which has rather

---

[1] Nigel Walker, *Morale in the Civil Service* (London: Edinburgh University Press, 1961) p.199.

[2] The question posed by Professor Berger to his respondents was as follows: What do you dislike about the government service? See Berger, *op.cit.*, p.85.

Table VI.4

Most Important Disadvantages of Government Employment

For Egyptian Higher Civil Servants

(Longitudinal Comparison)

Disadvantages	Percentages: No of cases in Parentheses	
	Egypt - 1954[1]	Egypt - 1975
Routine, monotony	36.5	12.5
Favouritism	24.1	25.5
Wrong use of Personnel, unqualified personnel	14.5	16.0
Low salary	11.2	21.0
Absence of initiative	8.0	5.0
Nothing	9.0	10.0
Instability	2.0	3.0
Public pressures and..a poor public image of civil servants	0	7.0
Total	100.0	100.0
	(249)	(400)

Source: (1) Berger, Bureaucracy and Society, op.cit., p.85.

surprisingly, scored low, 12 per cent in so far as our respondents are

concerned.

A major complaint, in both groups of respondents, is favouritism.

25.5 per cent of our respondents, as opposed to 24.1 per cent of

Professor Berger's respondents were concerned about favouritism. More-

over, 16 per cent and 14 per cent of our respondents and Professor

Berger's respondents, respectively, complained of unqualified personnel

and the wrong use of personnel. Such results are perhaps reflections

of the cultural and societal environment in Egypt. A culture like that

of Egypt, emphasising such things as familial ties and friendship

connections will naturally breed a rather high degree of favouritism on

the part of its civil servants.

It is significant to note that the second major complaint given

by our respondents was related to low pay. Slightly more than one-fifth

of them indicated that one of the major disadvantages of government

employment was low salaries, something which scored rather low with

regard to Professor Berger's respondents. Moreover, our respondents

have one other plague which Professor Berger's respondents seem unaware

of: the poor public image of the job. This finding indicates that our

respondents are concerned about the public's opinion of them. Cross-

culturally, however, the British bureaucrat, on the average, seems to

judge himself even less appreciated by those he serves than his Egyptian

counterpart in view of the fact that 38 per cent of the British civil

servants (as opposed to 7 per cent of the Egyptian ones) complained

about the poor attitude which the public has towards the civil servants'

work.[1]

The diversity of the most important disadvantages of government

employment notwithstanding, ten per cent of our respondents and a

similar percentage of Professor Berger's respondents had no criticism to

offer at all. The present writer pressed those who gave a "nothing"

answer for more elaboration but none of these respondents changed their

original answer. The same respondents were not afraid to criticise

sharply other aspects of the Egyptian government, so the present writer

can only come to the conclusion that these respondents are apparently

quite satisfied with their jobs.

It might be said, generally speaking, that our respondents are

constantly revealing more intrinsic job satisfaction, i.e., satisfaction

derived from the importance of the job, stimulating work and from per-

forming a public service, when compared with Professor Berger's

respondents. As previously indicated about 48 per cent of our respondents

(as opposed to 33.9 per cent of Professor Berger's respondents) considered

[1] Walker, op.cit., pp.202,231,290.

the chance to perform a public service, the stimulating nature and the importance of their jobs as the most important advantages of government employment.

It should be noted, however, that the Egyptian civil service does not attract its members on the basis of either performing a public service or a stimulating and challenging career to any great extent (c.f. Table VI.1), but rather on such exogenous reasons as social factors and economic reasons, chief among which is job security. Coupled with this is the large proportion of Egyptian higher civil servants who emphasised job security as one of the major advantages of government employment.

Security Orientation and Bureaucratic Environment

The security orientation manifested by large proportions of Egyptian higher civil servants, is not, however, unusual for public officials in developing countries and indeed, as we have seen, in a developed country, e.g. Britain. Scholars concerned with the civil service organisation in a number of different developing countries have all commented on the magnitude and prevalence of the phenomenon. Richard Taub, in his study of the Indian Administrative Service, and James Scott in his study of the Malaysian Civil Service reported that the majority of the civil servants in these countries entered the public service for reason relating to security.[1] It has already been noted, moreover, that the British civil servants value job security first in so far as the attractions of the British government service are concerned.[2] It may well be argued, however, that the dominant security orientation of civil servants in developing countries is of importance for the process

[1] See Richard Taub, Bureaucrats Under Stress, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969) pp. 75-76. See also James Scott, Political Ideology in Malaysia (new Haven: Yale University Press, 1968) pp. 138-148.

[2] Walker, op.cit., p.199.

of development and modernisation, and thus is of considerably greater significance than a similar orientation of civil servants in developed countries like Britain. It is a well known fact that the developing countries differ from the developed countries in the role of government in the effort towards economic and social development. Much of the effort and activity that contributes to economic and social development in the developed countries took place in autonomous spheres, outside of government administrative organisations. However, in Egypt and elsewhere in Africa and Asia, government is the main, perhaps the only indigenous agent with the potential to mobilise and control the level of human and material resources necessary to effect economic and social development. Consequently, an organisational character dominated by security consciousness could well undercut the capability to meet this potential.

Why are the civil servants oriented towards job security rather than towards public service? This is a complex question which cannot be answered simply by examination of the social backgrounds of higher civil servants - indeed, these data, as we have seen before, are not helpful in explaining some of the attitudes of the Egyptian bureaucratic elite. Given this, however, three types of explanations have been offered for the dominant security orientation manifested by civil servants in developing countries: psychological, social structure, and ecological. The first mode of explanation emphasises either personality variables or variables involving psychic disorientation. In the first instance socialisation under the colonial aegis is said to produce personality types oriented towards security and bureaucratic ritualism.[1] The second type of psychological explanation views an orientation towards security, risk avoidance, and short-term goals as the consequence

---

[1] See Lucian Pye, "Bureaucratic Development and the Psychology of Institutionalisation", in Ralf Briabanti (ed.) Political and Administrative Development (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1969) pp.400-426.

of a type of anomie induced by social change.[1] With the old values
destroyed by contact with the West, and the new values introduced by
the West not yet internalised, the civil servant, this line of argu-
ment would contend, is set adrift without firmly-rooted long-term
values and goals, and so, to orient his behaviour, he turns to the
protection of short-term private and personal interests.

In sharp contrast to the psychologically oriented school are
those scholars who seek an explanation for the security "mindedness"
of "transitional" bureaucrats in social structural factors.[2] Here
class-related variables are stressed. In this view the civil servants
are an incipient ruling class in the new states, privileged, powerful,
and set apart socially and economically from the mass of the population.
From this perspective civil servants are not oriented towards develop-
ment or service goals, simply because they have little identification
with the new national unit or the "people" that inhabit it, except
perhaps in terms of exploitation, their interests are class, not
national. A security orientation is said to be the most effective
way to serve this class interest because the ruling class in the new
states has no independent economic base, and therefore it must depend
for its well-being on the perquisites accompanying neo-colonial
domination by foreign business interests. The fact that many post
colonial civil servants received their training under the aegis of the
colonial power is a second and reinforcing thread to this argument.
Civil servants are viewed as having accepted the values of order and
stability that are widely believed to have formed the character of the

---

[1] See Hahn-Been Lee "Developmentalist Time and Leadership in
Developing Countries," CAG Occasional Papers, Comparative
Administration Group, Indiana University, 1966.

[2] See Franz Fanon, Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press,
1955) pp.119-164; also Giovanni Arrighi and John S. Saul, "Socialism
and Economic Development in Tropical Africa," Journal of Modern
African Studies, Vol.V.1 (1968), pp.141-159.

colonial administrative service, and as a result they manifest hostility

towards policies and methods directed towards change and involving

innovation and risk.

The third mode of explanation for the dominant security orientation

of civil servants in developing countries - the ecological approach -

is associated with the work of James Scott on Malaysia. Scott argues

that a security orientation is a rational response to existential

reality in transitional politics. "Uncertainty about the future and

instability are facts of life in transitional society and attempts to

realise largely short-term personal goals represent a rational strategy

against this background."[1] To Scott, transitional bureaucrats are

committed to short-term gains and to narrow and personal goals because the

uncertainties of the economic and political environment make commitment

to long-term goals, such as development, too costly and hazardous..

This ecological approach seems to be most relevant to the subject

of this chapter in that we shall try to show that Egyptian civil

servants' behaviour is not the result of irrationality, ambivalence,

and confusion, but rather a "rational" response of individuals to their

environment. This ecological approach is, moreover, interesting from a

comparative perspective. The available comparative data suggest that the

greater security orientation manifested by the Egyptian and for that

matter, Pakistani civil servants could be related to the lower level of

per capita income and limited opportunities for employment outside the

governments in these countries. The threat of the loss of jobs means

more to Egyptian and Pakistani civil servants than, say, to their Turkish

counterparts (the latter's country has a higher per capita income and

more opportunities for employment outside the government)

---

[1] Scott, op.cit., p.144

since the economic consequence are likely to be more severe.[1] In fact, the Turkish data from 1965 suggest a sharp decline in the saliency of job security in so far as the reasons for job satisfaction among Turkish civil servants are concerned.[2] This is mainly due to the opening up of employment opportunities outside the old-line ministries as well as to the increase in per capita income in Turkey over the 1962-1967 period.[3]

Coupled with this, is the fact that most Egyptian higher civil servants, as the interviews revealed, are suspicious of the stability and security of tenure of private employment, i.e.,the private sector, in view of the hesitation and conflict over the role of the private sector in the Egyptian economy. As one of our respondents put it , "The political argument over the proper role of the private sector in the Egyptian economy has been commonplace in Egypt especially after the 1952 Revolution and this in turn has contributed to the decline of this sector and made the instability and insecurity of tenure in private employment all the more obvious."

Moreover, many elements of the culture have been inimical to risk-taking, experimentation and innovation. In fact, as is the case with many developing countries, change itself at one time was regarded as undesirable. Later, it was seen, the educational system itself re-inforced such attitudes against initiative, self-reliance and risk-taking. Religious ideas also regarded risk-taking and many business

---

[1] For the security orientation of the Pakistani higher civil servants see Muneer Ahmed, The Civil Servants in Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1964) pp.78-81. See also Leslie L. Roos Jr. and Noralou P. Roos, "Bureaucracy in the Middle East: Some Cross-Cultural Relationships," Journal of Comparative Administration, Vol.I, No.3, (1969) pp.281-299.

[2] Leslie L. Roos, Jr. and Noralou P. Roos, Managers of Modernisation: Organisations and Elites in Turkey (1950-1969), (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), p.213.

[3] Ibid.,pp.213-219.

transactions involving interest, speculation, hedging, insurance etc., with great suspicion. Added to this is the very low status assigned to business and trade. As one of our respondents noted: "In Egypt, the notion of business is often misunderstood. Generally speaking, the businessman is often considered as speculator, if not a thief. Moreover, business has long been down-graded and looked upon, in general, as an occupation which no respectable Egyptian would enter." In contrast, government employment has been associated with high status and greater security of tenure. Under such conditions the security orientation of the Egyptian civil servants, as it is the case with many civil servants in other developing countries, might be viewed as a "rational" response to the values honoured and demands generated within the social fabric in which they are enmeshed.

Recruitment Policy and Bureaucratic Character

It has been argued that the Egyptian civil service does not attract its members on the basis of either performing a public service or pursuing a stimulating and challenging career, but rather on such exogonous reasons as social factors or economic incentives, chief among which is job security. The security orientation manifested by Professor Berger's respondents as well as our respondents is suggestive of the type of role behaviour they are likely to engage in, and the sort of bureaucratic character that will emerge from the combination of these behaviours. It may be argued, however, that personal orientations are only one in a number of factors that shape human behaviour and bureaucratic character. This is particularly true in the Egyptian public bureaucracy in which the security value of the civil service positions is by and large the most important element in its recruitment policy.[1]

---

[1] The security value of civil service positions is used here to mean, the security of tenure, the prospect of receiving pension on retirement, the regularity with which salaries are paid, etc. . .

As one of our respondents put it: "There is an infrastructure of employment security in the recruitment policy of the Egyptian civil service and, indeed, the whole Egyptian public bureaucracy, both in theory and practice." Some of our respondents argued, moreover, that the security value of the public service positions, is so important in the recruitment policy that it is beneficial for the state and indeed for the nation as a whole. These respondents further argued that such a recruitment policy is designed to extend the security value of the public service position to public officials so that the state may attract its share of talents and may then hold these talents, thus benefiting from the knowledge and ability of its recruits and securing their services which they can devote consistently and impartially to the general welfare of the nation. In short, such a recruitment policy is of great value to the state because it establishes a large and stable body of highly skilled and devoted public servants in view of the security value of its public service positions.

Given this, it could be equally argued, however, that under such a recruitment policy, recruits enter the public service after vigorous screening, this being the only way to justify the security value of the public service positions guaranteed by the government to the public servant, once recruited. In other words, such security value of the public service positions could attract the best possible recruits and establish a large and stable body of highly skilled and devoted public servants, only if the recruitment policy itself is objectively and properly designed and implemented to do so. This raises the question of recruitment policy.

In the effort to learn their assessment of the usual mode of entry into the civil service, the respondents were asked some questions relating to some important issues of the recruitment policy and procedures. Before we consider their assessment, however, it would be useful to

recall that favouritism was mentioned by 25.5. per cent and 24 per cent of our respondents and Professor Berger's respondents respectively, as a serious complaint about the government service, and to this we may add the group (16 per cent and 14.5 per cent of our respondents and Professor. Berger's respondents respectively) disliking the wrong use of personnel and the absence of qualified personnel. These complaints shed some light on the personal criteria used in the recruitment policy.

Moreover, answers to a related question throw some light on the personal criteria used in the recruitment of new civil servants. Of the respondents who advised their own children or someone else to choose the civil service as a career, a majority (85 per cent) indicated that the best way to get in, i.e., to get a government job, is through the regular procedure of application providing the applicant is qualified, i.e., has the necessary education and training. Three-quarters of this group of respondents, however, qualified their suggestion by saying that if their own children or someone else, however qualified, wanted to get the best available or at least good jobs in the civil service, they must get the support of an important person, preferably a higher civil servant or a minister. Needless to say, a majority, if not all, of the educated persons would naturally like to get the best available or to say the least, good jobs in the civil service. To this group, we must add the other group of respondents (15 per cent) who suggested that an aspirant to a government job should seek someone to intercede for him or to get the support of an influential person. Other evidence would have to be considered before any firm inference could be drawn from these figures, but they do suggest that regular procedure of application and the acquisition of education by the applicant are necessary and sufficient conditions for government employment in general. They are, moreover, necessary conditions for getting the best available or good jobs in government, but are not sufficient in themselves.

Knowing some influential person in government is a prerequisite in so far as the best available or good jobs in government are concerned. It is significant to note, moreover, that none of the usual background traits, such as education, yields any significant differences among the respondents with respect to this question.

Another question relating to the recruitment policy and procedures asks: "How did you obtain your first civil service post?" Table VI.5 shows the percentage of the responses to this question and furnishes data pertaining to an identical question posed by Professor Berger to his respondents in 1954.

The following table suggests that 60 per cent of our respondents obtained their first civil service posts by non-personal means, i.e., competitive examinations or personal interviews and competitive examinations, or regular application only in response to advertisements in newspapers. Yet, from these data it is impossible to judge how competitive these examinations were or what sort of standards applied.

A large minority of our respondents (i.e.,34 per cent), however, indicated that they obtained their first post in the civil service by personal means, i.e.,mediation or the recommendation of relatives or friends. Moreover, and as far as the unspecified or not known answers are concerned, it seems more likely that this group of respondents (i.e. 6 per cent) obtained their first civil service posts through personal means as well.

Another look at table VI.5 would suggest that a higher percentage, (i.e.,89 per cent) of Professor Berger's respondents in 1954 entered the civil service through the regular procedure of application than did our respondents. It may well be argued, however, that Professor Berger's respondents are either more secretive than our respondents or indeed many more of his respondents obtained their first civil service posts through some form of mediation than did our respondents. In view of the

Table VI.5

How Respondents Obtained their first

Civil Service Posts

(Longitudinal Comparison)

Recruitment Procedures:	Percentages: No of cases in Parentheses	
	Egypt - 1954[1]	Egypt - 1975
Regular Procedures: Regular application only in response to advertisement in the newspapers	89	40
through a competitive examination	..	10
through a competitive examination and personal interview	..	10
Other Procedures: Mediation	11	19
Recommendation of relative or friend	..	15
Not specified, Not known	..	6
	100	100
	(249)	(400)

Source: Berger, Bureaucracy and Society, op.cit., pp. 131-132.

documentary evidence presented by Professor Berger in his study

of the Egyptian higher civil service and of the fact that examination

for government posts was a recent innovation in Egypt at the time of

his study, the second explanation seems to be the more accurate. Thus,

it could be suggested, on the basis of such data, that the mode of entry

into the Egyptian bureaucracy has not been based on the competitive

examination system nor on objective criteria to any great extent.

As far as the Egyptian bureaucracy is concerned, at least two

factors may account for the absence of objective and sound criteria on

the basis of which the recruitment policy could be more impersonalistic.

The first factor has to do with the virtual non-existence of a suitable and objective plan for position classification upon which efficient and more impersonalistic recruitment policy and procedures could be designed and implemented. The second factor could be related to the absence of an efficient and effective Civil Service Commission which could impartially organise and administer open competitive examinations or to plan and control recruitment into the civil service. As one of our respondents put it, "In the absence of a central personnel agency, ministers and some influential persons in the civil service had all the powers for personnel actions with hardly any controls or limitations, other than very broad personnel policies. This situation helped the ministers and some influential persons in the service, each in his department, to take different personnel actions against the existing rules and regulations, such as appointing people without competitive examinations or without the proper qualifications."

In a cross-cultural view, however, this situation does not seem to be unique for Egypt. As far as the Turkish civil service is concerned, Professor Dodd notes that "those who entered the civil service without examinations amounted to 31 per cent; those who were obliged to join the civil service because they had received state assistance with their education accounted for another, surprisingly large, proportion at 30 per cent." He further notes that "entrants by qualifying examination, non-competitive, formed the remaining 7 per cent."[1] Moreover, he indicates that while there are some of the typical formal ways of entry into the Turkish civil service; it is frequently suggested that at the informal level favouritism is a not uncommon factor in appointment - whether it be in recruitment or in promotions.[2]

---

[1] C.H.Dodd, Politics and Government in Turkey (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1969) p. 284.

[2] Ibid., p.273.

Another question which relates to the recruitment procedure asks: "How did you first learn about the first civil service post that you obtained?" Table VI.6 shows the replies to this question and furnishes data pertaining to an identical question to Professor Berger's respondents in his study made in 1954.

Table VI.6

How Respondents Learned About First

Civil Service Posts

(Longitudinal Comparison)

First heard through:	Percentages: No of cases in Parentheses	
	Egypt - 1954[1]	Egypt - 1975
Friends or relatives	36	44.5
Non - personal sources e.g. Newspapers announcement, the university, or the government itself	64	55.5
Total	100.0	100.0
	(249)	(400)

Source: (1) Berger, Bureaucracy and Society, op.cit., p.133.

The answers indicate that personal or political influence were generally involved in contacting civil service appointees for Egypt. With regard to comparison over time, it may well be argued again that Professor Berger's respondents are either more secretive than our respondents or indeed many more of them first heard about their jobs through personal means than did our respondents. In view of the reasons mentioned in relation to obtaining their jobs, the second conclusion appears to be more warranted. None of the usual background traits, such as age, yields any significant differences among the respondents with respect to these questions or the following question which will be dealt with in the next paragraph.

Another question deals with the respondents' view about recruitment in government employment. It asks: "As you know, the government, in employing people, consider their degree of education and experience. Do you think the government should consider other factors in employing the higher civil servants, for example . . ." The following "factors" were listed: political belief or affiliation, social position, family connections, wealth, and religion. The majority of our respondents, i.e.,79 per cent rejected all of these considerations or factors since they accepted education and experience as the only qualifications for higher civil service. Of those who considered other factors than education and experience, about 80, 11, and 7 per cent respectively indicated political affiliation or belief, social position and religion. In response to a similar question, 41 per cent of Berger's respondents selected at least one of these factors and 59 per cent rejected all of them, advocating only the criteria of education and experience. Of the respondents questioned about these five considerations a majority in Professor Berger's study selected "social position [1] as the data of the following table 'suggest.

Another look at the longitudinal data furnished by Table VI.7 suggests that political belief or affiliation are clearly more salient in so far as other factors than education and experience are concerned. This raises the question of bureaucracy and politics. Discussions of bureaucracy and politics have often suggested that, because universalism implies "neutrality" in role behaviour, the politicisation of bureaucracy is ipso facto damaging to bureaucratic performance. As my discussions

---

[1] Berger op.cit., pp. 135-136. The question posed by Professor Berger to his respondents had as follows: As you know, the government in employing people · considers their degree of education and experience. Do you think the government should consider other factors in making these appointments? For example, social position, wealth, family connections, religion, and political belief.

Table VI.7

Other Factors Than Education and Experience

which should be Considered in the Recruitment Process

in Egyptian Civil Service

(Longitudinal Comparison)

Factors	Percentages: No of cases in Parentheses	
	Egypt - 1954[1]	Egypt - 1975
Social Position	59	11
Wealth	27	00
Family Connections	7	2
Religion	5	7
Political belief of affiliation	2	80
Total	100	100
	(101)	(84)

Source: (1) Berger, Bureaucracy and Society, op.cit., p.136

with the Egyptian elite concerning ideological and bureaucratic

commitment suggests, some of them do not share this view. Indeed,

they would maintain that in certain circumstances the reverse is the

case. The source of confusion is, as the interviews revealed, the

inference that universalism and ideological commitment are mutually

exclusive. But, it might be argued, if universalism is viewed as a

'practical' ideology - a technical means - to achieve goals sanctioned

in a 'pure' ideology, then commitment to the latter does not preclude

universalistic role behaviour.Rather, higher civil servants committed

to both types of ideology are likely to be more affective organisational

performers - to be more highly motivated in their role behaviour, and

to apply universalistic standards in a manner that is more rational in

relation to organisational or bureaucratic purposes - than are higher

civil servants whose commitment is merely to the practical ideology.

Moreover, in the context of rapid change, political ideology may be an

important means available to leadership for introducing universalism into a situation that would otherwise sanction particularism.[1] In such a situation, some of our respondents argued that the recruitment or promotion of higher civil servants based on political criteria, i.e., political belief or affiliation, might well enhance bureaucratic performance. Such a recruitment factor should not necessarily be viewed as a violation of achievement norms, but rather might well be an instance of their application, achievement being technically defined as criteria which "give priority to the actor's actual or expected performance and to attributes only as directly relevant to their performance."[2]   Thus it might be suggested that if higher civil servants with a particular political affiliation or set of beliefs are perhaps more likely than others to share the goals of a given bureaucratic organisation, then this would be an attribute relevant to performance, and therefore, in such a situation the utilisation of political criteria in the recruitment process or promotion would be consistent with the criteria of achievement.

In summary, Professor Berger's as well as our data, albeit to a lesser extent, suggest that Egyptian higher civil servants are not particularly oriented towards public service or intrinsic values relating to their career in the service. Rather, they are concerned with the security value of the civil service position. Such an orientation, it was argued, could be conducive to a higher level of administrative performance, but only if the recruitment policy, among other things, is objectively and properly designed and implemented to select the best possible recruits who could be expected to achieve this high level of

---

[1] For utilisation of the terms 'pure' ideology as well as 'practical' ideolgoy, see Frauz Schurmann. Idealogy and Organisation in Communist China (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of Calafornia Press,1968) pp. 23-53.

[2] Talcot H.Parsons and Edward Shills (eds.) Toward a General Theory of Action (New York: Harper and Row, 1951) p. 83.

performance. From the data presented in the chapter, it seems that
the mode of entry into the Egyptian bureaucracy has not been based on
the competitive examinations system nor on objective criteria to any
great extent.

CHAPTER VII

CHANGES IN STATUS AND PRESTIGE IN THE HIGHER CIVIL SERVICE

Public Attitudes Towards The Government

The members of a public bureaucracy in any country encounter

some hostility from the general public because the functions it must

perform include some which are regulatory or repressive. The civil

service has a monopolistic position in many of its fields of endeavour

and this fact may be frustrating to individual citizens who feel

dissatisfied with the bureaucratic procedures but have no other

alternative courses of action. "Hostility towards the public bureau-

cracy does not, of course, imply disrespect or a low status for it."[1]

The value of high prestige for the higher civil servants should

not be underestimated. Fritz Morstein Marx finds status to be a vital

element in a modern bureaucracy; "As a source of strength, status

serves as the cement by which bureaucracy is held together."[2] The

practical utility of status, for official conduct by higher civil

servants, lies in the administrator's assurance that he can exercise

a certain amount of independence in his decision-making. If the public

expresses confidence in the civil servant's judgement, his activities

are encouraged instead of being hampered or self-suppressed. "Status

is an essential foundation for the creation of a productive administra-

tive system. At the same time, status holds the bureaucracy to its

basic assignment, to doing that which it is told to do by those

[1] Morroe-Berger, Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p.90.

[2] Fritz Morstein Marx, "The Higher Civil Service as an
Action Group in Western Political Development," in Joseph La
Palombara(ed.) Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1963) p.69.

legitimately in political control."[1] While public confidence in the
bureaucracy allows the administrators to assess their roles in policy
formulation and its execution, public status also requires certain
standards of bureaucratic behaviour which can serve as a check on the
excessive use of administrative prerogatives.

As a matter of fact, the image of public service is affected
not only by the type of the political system of a country but also
by the economic and social systems, by the type of employment
opportunities available, as well as by the traditional attitudes
towards government which have emerged through the years of the
country's history.

The appeal and prestige of the Egyptian civil service is well-
nigh legendary. It has been portrayed, and sometimes caricatured, by
some of the greatest literary figures of the twentieth century. Yet,
this appeal and prestige have been subject to ups and downs. There
have been some factors which continued to make state service an
appealing career; for example, the ever-growing role of the state
appealed more and more to the emerging middle class. That is to say
that one important reason for the Egyptian higher bureaucrat's
relatively higher status has been that he used to have more influence
owing to the fact that the government has played an increasingly
important role and has been the major source of power. Similarly,
the attractiveness of private employment affected as this was by the
economy, wars, and state policies, did at times influence those who
were about to choose a career. Until World War II, public service has
probably carried higher prestige and enjoyed higher social rating in
relation to other occupations in Egyptian society. Until that War, a
father might say to his son "if you are not studious you will be good

---

[1] _Ibid._, p.70.

only for farming or business." The Egyptian parents' dream has been
to see their sons giving orders in government offices, becoming part
of the unseen power that has ruled from a distance; fixing the prices
of cotton, collecting taxes, issuing permits and licences. Stability
of tenure and certain, if rather modest, pension for old age satisfied
the Egyptian family. Egyptian literature is rich in novels, stories,
proverbs, that all reflect the glamour, dignity, and higher prestige
of public service in those days.[1]

The bureaucracy of the immediate post-world war II period has
been characterised by somewhat low prestige, incompetence, meagre
resources, and a large measure of cynical corruption. However, the
rather low prestige has been caused, by and large, by such standard
salaries and corrupt bureaucratic behaviour. The pay rates have been
inadequate because they have been adjusted for cost of living indexes
that have been computed for a minimum of subsistence standard of
living. Moreover, the cynical corruption has been caused by a more
complex range of contributive factors. The more obvious has been
the carryover of attitudes and habits of the war-time years, when
even upright bureaucrats were demoralised by the almost daily practice
of administrative corruption justified by patriotic and economic
necessity. Equally important has been the spread of favouritism,
nepotism and patronage in the recruitment of civil servants. One
important reason, however, why the civil service has been able to hold
its own as a career is the fact that almost all of the prestigious
educational institutions of higher learning are state institutions
which prepare their students for government service.

---

[1] One of the most common Egyptian proverbs is "If you miss
the government wagon it is worth while to catch the dust that
trails it." See, for example, Mahmoud Taumour, Egyptian Popular
Proverbs (Cairo: Anglo-Egyptian Book Co. 1962).

There is little doubt, moreover, that the effect of the 1952
Revolution upon the public bureaucracy has been at first to accelerate
its decline in status and prestige. As we noted earlier, the public
bureaucracy, particularly in the higher echelons, was one of the
first targets for reform and suffered by its association with the
"old regime" which was considered by the military regime as corrupt
and feudalistic.[1] As one of our respondents put it, "Perhaps, the
higher bureaucracy has never suffered from a rather sharp decline in
status and prestige as was the case in the early period of the 1952
Revolution."

While it is true, as many of higher civil servants admit, that
the general economic status of them may be declining, the fact still
remains that their prospects, status and prestige have been enhanced
by institutional changes subsequently initiated by the 1952
Revolution. There is no doubt as to the overall superior standing
of the Egyptian bureaucratic elite. Perhaps in few nations have so
many members of the bureaucratic elite moved into so many important
and influential positions in many areas. This is perhaps another
way of saying that the long-range effects of the 1952 Revolution upon
the higher civil service has been to enhance its power, prestige and
status. There have been some factors that enhanced the position of the
Egyptian bureaucratic elite, for example, the 1952 Revolutionary
elites' attempts to reduce the influence and status of other social
classes or groups, i.e., the old political class and its leaders and
the big landowners.

To illustrate the place that sheer power has in the relation-
ship between governors, i.e., bureaucrats, and the governed, i.e., the
general public in Egypt, Professor Berger asked the Egyptian higher

---

[1] For a similar view see Berger, op.cit., p.113.

civil servants about their impression of the average Egyptian's attitude towards government officials. Of Professor Berger's respondents asked about the citizen's fears of public servants, a majority of the Egyptian civil servants,(i.e., 59 per cent), answering "yes" gave as their reason for this fear the power of the civil servant as an agent of the government. Similarly, when the same respondents were asked whether the man in the street respects the civil servants, more than 82 per cent said "yes", namely, that the general public respects the civil servant, primarily because he can exert power over the ordinary citizen. Evidently, then, a large number of Professor Berger's respondents, i.e., higher civil servants, were thinking of government more as a regulating and restricting force than as a service to the community.[1]

Although our data do not permit a systematic comparison as far as Berger's findings are concerned, some interesting and rather similar trends tend to emerge. In an effort to discover something about the public image of the civil servant, four different images of Egyptian civil servants were described to our respondents, who were asked to indicate which of them, in their opinion, best conveyed the attitudes of the general public towards civil servants. The four images were:

a. The general public look upon a civil servant as an
    individual who is above them and who is there to rule them.

b. As an individual who is an agent of the state, i.e.,
    a servant of the state and whose main job is to protect
    the interest of the state.

c. As an individual who is a servant of the public and
    whose main job is to safeguard the interest of the public.

d. As an individual who is a leader of the people and
    whose main job is to guide and educate the people.

Fifty-two per cent indicated that people look upon a civil servant as a ruler. However, about 88 per cent of this group of

---

[1] Ibid., p.93.

respondents qualified their opinion by stating that mainly the
illiterate, the relatively poor and the people in the countryside
or villages regard a civil servant as a ruler. This second type of
response indicates some of the reasons for the negative attitude of
the general public towards a civil servant as being awesome.
Generally speaking, the second type of response is in line with
Professor Berger's finding in 1954, in the sense that the Egyptian
higher civil servant believes the general public stands in awe of
him.[1]

The image of a civil servant as an individual who is a servant
of the state was selected by 23 per cent of our respondents. This
image indicates that the general public does not look upon the civil
servant as a servant of the public, nor does it regard him a ruler
or a leader. This response is also generally in line with Professor
Berger's findings as to the reasons given why the public respects or
fears the civil servant, in view of the large percentage of respondents
who saw the civil servant as an agent of government.[2]

The response that a civil servant is looked upon as a servant
of the people was given by 15 per cent of our respondents. It is
interesting to note that slightly less than half of these respondents
were working in the ministries which have as their main objectives
the welfare of the people, such as the Ministry of Health, Ministry of
Social Affairs and Ministry of Education.

As for the image of a civil servant as an individual who is a
leader of the people, only 10 per cent of our respondents selected such
an image.

No significant variation was noticed in the responses of

[1] Ibid., p.111.

[2] Ibid., p.93.

Egyptian higher civil servants of different grades or different ministries in so far as the public image of the civil servant is concerned. It should be noted, however, that the civil servants whose duties have a welfare bias, such as those working in the Ministries of Health, Social Affairs and Education, are more likely to be regarded as servants of the people rather than as rulers. Moreover, none of the usual background traits, such as age, yielded any significant difference among our respondents with respect to this question.

Looking at the findings of the two studies concerning the attitude of the general public towards the government and those connected with it, e.g., the civil servants, it might be said that the Egyptian government is still regarded by the people as all the more powerful and as a consequence its agents, the civil servants, share this position in Egyptian society. This is not surprising. Egypt's historical heritage going back to the time of the Pharaohs laid great emphasis on a powerful central government. This is typical of agricultural lands dependent on irrigation. A greater need for synchronised co-ordination and control is evident.[1] Religion, moreover, reinforced the role of government throughout Egyptian history. In old Egypt, the Pharaoh was God and King. Later, Islam became the dominant religion of the Egyptians. Islam lays greater emphasis on the community and on social welfare. No dichotomy exists in Islam between Church and State. The Islamic ruler combines the role of a religious as well as a political leader. The religion does not require a separate institution (a church); that is why words such as secular, ecclesiastic, ecumenical, etc., have no counterpart in Islam. Since the Muslim ruler is not the representative of God on earth, nor is he

---

[1] See Charles Issawi, Egypt in Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), p.4.

divine in any way, modern scholars call Islam a nomocracy and not
a theocracy, i.e. a state governed by law, in this case God's law
in which the ruler applies.[1] The effect of such fusion of state
and church was to strengthen the state.[2] Belief in the sinfulness
of the state, traceable to St Augustine and sharpened by centuries
of struggle between the papacy and the empire, had no counterpart
in Muslim Egypt. The fact that the state in Egypt was not
challenged by either an organised church or independent cities, or
a federal nobility or forceful corporations has led to much less
awareness of its dangers and much more pliant submission to its
encroachment.[3]

The added fact that Egypt has experienced thousands of years
of centralised autocracy has accustomed the people to look to the
government to initiate any business whatsoever.[4] This explains why
the government is the most powerful institution and indeed is the main,
perhaps the only, indigenous agent with the potential to mobilise and
control the level of human and material resources necessary to effect
economic and social change. As one of our respondents put it, "The
advent of Socialism to Egypt was no great shock in terms of the
public attitude towards government."

---

[1] Alfred C. Smith, Islam in Modern History, (Princeton: New Jersey,
Princeton University Press, 1957), p.50.

[2] C. Stevens, (ed.) The United States and the Middle East, (New
Jersey: Princeton Hall, 1957), p.15.

[3] Ibid., p.16.

[4] It may be interesting to note in passing that the first
subscriptions of Egyptians to the British business corporation estab-
lished in Egypt at the turn of the century were made under the
impression that they were supported by the Egyptian Government. The
false impression was created by the phrase "Authorised by Kedivial
Decree", appearing after the name of these companies which was
supposed to mean that they were registered as corporations in Egypt
under a particular corporate law. See, Great Britain, Egypt, No 3,
1899, Report by Her Majesty's Agent and Consul General on the Finances,
Administration and Conditions of Egypt and the Sudan (London: HMSO,
1900), p.15.

Although the question of press criticism of the civil servant was not included in the questionnaire, it was, nevertheless, brought up by some of our respondents during the interviews. It will be recalled that 7 per cent of our respondents had listed a poor public image of civil servants as one of the disadvantages of government employment. It will be recalled, moreover, that none of Professor Berger's respondents emphasised such a disadvantage or complaint. It was thus suggested, comparatively speaking, that our respondents were concerned about the public's opinion of them. When the subject of press criticism was raised, the interviewer gained the impression that not a few of his interviewees thought that the press criticisms were usually unfair. During the interviews, moreover, critical comments from the Egyptian newspapers and magazines were seen by the interviewer, being circulated and passed from official to official, sometimes with comments being written on them by some higher civil servants concerned with the subject matter. To what precise extent the role of the press, in creating the measures of public opinion from which the civil servant erects his evaluation of social status, could be considered as a major determinant is not easy to say from the available information. As no more than an impression it may be said, however, that it is the public press, not the opinion of the individual citizen which the Egyptian higher civil servant encounters in his work, which relatively lowers the civil servant's estimation of his public image.

Decline or Increase in Status and Prestige of the Egyptian Higher Civil Service

Professor Berger suspects that a subtle decrease in the status of the civil servant is occurring in Egypt.[1] Professor Berger's respondents were asked to suppose that they were advising an

---

[1] Berger, op.cit., p.94.

intelligent young man - - a cousin - - on his career, and to indicate what sort of career they would advise him to follow. Of the 248 who replied, only 4, or 3 per cent, said they would recommend the civil service. When those respondents who had not mentioned the civil service were asked what they thought about it as a career, an additional 9 per cent had something favourable to say about such a career. The vast majority unequivocally rejected the idea with varying degree of intensity.[1]

In response to a similar question in context,[2] 54 per cent of our respondents chose the civil service as a career for their own children or other young persons, while 46 per cent preferred private employment, i.e., the private sector. Although such a percentage may not be considered as overwhelmingly high, generally speaking, public employment enjoys first preference among our respondents. This seems to indicate that the Egyptian higher civil servants in 1975 were much more likely to recommend the civil service as a career for some-one else than were the Egyptian higher civil servants in 1954. This, in turn, may suggest that the civil service has now a higher status. In other words, the status of the Egyptian civil service seems to be, comparatively speaking, increasing as more higher civil servants are recommending it as a career for their own children or someone else. Cross-culturally, an increasing estimation by the general public of the civil service profession was found in one study of a segment of the United States' population.[3]

---

[1] Ibid., p. 95.
[2] The question posed to our respondents was as follows: If you were advising your own child or another young person on the choice of a career? Which would you advise him to choose (   ) Civil Service   (   ) Private Sector.

[3] Morris Janowitz and Deil Wright, "The Prestige of Public Employment, 1928 and 1954", Public Administration Review, Vol. XVI, (Winter, 1956), p. 16.

As far as our respondents who recommended the civil service as a career are concerned, the following reasons are typical :

(1) The civil service has security you do not find on the outside, i.e.,the private sector.

(2) The civil service provides an opportunity to its recruits to contribute to the national development of the country.

(3) The civil service confers upon its incumbents a special status in society. Moreover, the civil service offers greater prospects to positions of higher responsibility and prestige which are not available in private sector to the same degree.

For those who favoured private employment as a career for their children or someone else, the following reasons are typical :

(1) The private sector offers better salaries, recognises the achievement of its employees to a larger degree than is the case with public employment.

(2) In view of the fact that the country is carrying out some great development projects, chief among which are engineering projects, I think the private sector must share in this task with the government. The role of the private sector in national development is officially recognised in the National Charter of 1962 and in some other official documents, as well as in the Third Five_ Year Plan (1976-1981).

(3) The opening up of employment opportunities outside the government is beneficial not only to the individual (i.e. greater prospects for better salaries) but also for the nation as a whole (i.e.,participation of the private sector in Egypt's development and relieving the government of the huge surplus of manpower).

A matter related to occupational choice and status was explained in a question (briefly referred to in the previous chapter) requiring our respondents to suggest the best way to obtain a government post in so far as their own children or someone else are concerned. It will be recalled that an overwhelming majority of 85 per cent suggested a regular application and the acquisition of the proper education and training. As previously noted, three-quarters of this group of respondents qualified their suggestion by stating that if their own children or someone else, however qualified, wanted to obtain the best available or at least good jobs in the civil service, they must seek

the support of an important person. It has been argued, therefore, that most, if not all, of the educated persons would naturally like to obtain such good jobs in the civil service. But which jobs are the best or at least good ones in the civil service? In view of the near uniformity of salaries in the civil service, these respondents argued that the best or good jobs are those which enable their incumbents to acquire power and authority. As some of our respondents put it, "In the absence of effective financial incentives, e.g., salaries, higher civil servants, and indeed most of the Egyptian civil servants compensate by the status symbols, chief among which, they emphasised, are power and authority." Power is definitely, in the eyes of public officials, one of the worthwhile symbols. The Egyptians usually admire power and powerful authoritarian positions, (or good positions according to our respondents). Several studies found this to be common among Arabs in the Middle East. Indeed, a comparison of the statements of the respondents from different ministries, (i.e., different in terms of power and authority they enjoy)[1] as to the recommendation of the civil service as a career, corroborates the above argument put forth in the interviews. Of the respondents who recommended the civil service as a career for their own children or for someone else, a majority, i.e., 68 per cent, of them was found in the Ministries widely believed to be the most influential and powerful in Egyptian society. These ministries include the Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Local Government, Offices of The President and Prime Minister, Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. On the other hand, as little as 12 per cent of our respondents in the Ministries known to be the least powerful and influential, (i.e. ,

---

[1] The ranking of ministries in terms of power and influence was checked with some knowledgeable informants within the Egyptian public bureaucracy.

Ministries of Social Affairs, Ministry of Health, Ministry of

Manpower) recommended the civil service as a career for their children

or someone else. The remaining percentage, i.e., 20 per cent of those

respondents who recommended the civil service as a career were found

in ministries usually known to fall between the two extremes of power

and influence, such as the Ministries of Electricity and Power,

Industry, Agriculture and Irrigation.

A look at the same item within the cross-cultural context,

suggests some interesting findings. Table VII.1 suggests that more

than one-half of the respondents in respective countries, i.e.,

Turkey, Pakistan and Egypt in 1975, are likely to recommend the civil

service as a career for someone else.

Table VII.1

Responses of Bureaucrats in Turkey and Pakistan

Of Whether to Recommend The Civil Service as a Career

Compared with Egyptian Responses to the same Item

Country	Percentages: Yes I would recommend Civil Service as a Career
Turkey (1967)[1]	58
Pakistan (1964)[2]	53
Egypt (1954)[3]	3
Egypt (1975)	54

Sources: (1) Leslie Roos and Noralou Roos, "Bureaucracy in the
Middle East," Journal of Comparative Administration,
Vol. I, No. 3, (1969), p.285.

(2) Muneer Ahmed, The Civil Service of Pakistan (Karachi:
Oxford University Press, 1969), p.89.

(3) Morroe Berger, Bureaucracy and Society in Modern
Egypt, (Princeton: Princeton University Press), p.95.

It is possible to argue, on the basis of the above comparative

data, that the status and prestige of the civil service in developing

countries are not as low as it is generally assumed. Moreover, as reported earlier, an increasing estimation by the general public of the civil service profession was found in one study of a segment of the United States' population.[1]

Prestige and Status: Evaluation of Occupations

Based on his extensive study of social stratification, Bernard Barber concludes that in all societies high status is given to those social roles which are thought to be of the greatest functional importance to the society.[2] He also notes that: "The greater the degree of responsibility included in a political role, the higher the stratification position of its incumbent."[3] If these two propositions made by Barber are valid, then the relative prestige accorded to Egypt's higher civil servants ought, among other things, to be a good indicator of the functional importance and degree of responsibility associated with their roles.

In the effort to learn how specific occupations are ranked against each other in terms of status and prestige, these respondents were asked to indicate which of the ten listed occupations the general public regarded most highly, by placing a "1" before the occupation of the highest prestige, a "2" before the occupation of the second highest prestige, a "3" before the occupation of the third highest prestige and so on. A further question asked our respondents to indicate which of the ten listed occupations they regarded most highly, by placing a "1" alongside the occupation they, i.e., the higher civil servants think most highly of, a "2" for the next, and so forth. It is important to note

---

[1] Janowitz and Wright, op.cit., p. 16.

[2] Bernard Barber, Social Stratification, (New York: Harcourt Bruce and Co, 1957), pp. 19-20.

[3] Ibid., p. 31.

that the second question asked the respondents to give their own
ranking as opposed to the first one which asked the respondents to
give not their own but the general public's ranking. The following
ten occupations were listed: factory worker, small merchant, independent
professionals (i.e., doctor, engineer, businessman), army officer,
university professor, higher civil servant, i.e., under-secretary,
director-general, and high-level civil servants up to the third grade,
landowner of 50 feddans,[1] member of the Egyptian People's Assembly
(i.e., politician in the parliament), civil servant (i.e., government
employee between grade 7 and grade 4) and peasant (fallah).

Since questions of this sort inevitably bring out biases, the
respondents tended to rank their own occupations among the top two.
Nevertheless, the results clearly indicate that most of the respondents
thought the higher civil servant's occupation ranked second highest in
terms of prestige and status. Moreover, the other civil service
occupation - civil servant or government employee between grade 7 and
grade 4 ranked seventh, just above small merchant.

It is significant to note that the higher civil servants' own
ranking does not differ from the general public's ranking in so far as
the ten listed occupations are concerned. In other words, there are no
significant differences between our respondents' own views concerning
the ranking of different occupations and what they think the general
public's ranking is.

A similar question in general content but rather different in the
ten listed occupations was posed by Professor Berger to his respondents

---

[1] A Feddan is equal to 1.8 acres.

in his study made in 1954.[1] Professor Berger assigned a weighted
score to his respondents' ranking of ten given occupations and then
constructed a relative ranking chart. A similar weighting technique
was applied to our data.[2] The results of both studies are shown in
Table VII.2.

Table VII.2

Prestige Ranking of Selected Ten

Occupational Positions By Egyptian Higher

Civil Servants

(Longitudinal Comparison)

Ranking	Egypt - 1954[(1)]	Egypt - 1975
1	Doctor	University Professor
2	Bank Director	Higher Civil Servant
3	Lawyer	Army Officer
4	Factory Owner	Independent Professionals (doctor, lawyer, engineer businessman)
5	Landowner	Member of People's Assembly
6	Government bureau chief	Landowner of 50 feddans
7	Government clerk	Civil Servant
8	Small Merchant	Small Merchant
9	Factory Worker	Factory Worker
10	Peasant	Peasant (fallah)

Source: Morroe Berger, Bureaucracy and Society, op.cit., p.99

The results clearly indicate that most of our respondents thought
the university professor ranked highest in prestige. In second place
was the higher civil servant, after him came the army officer, independent

---

[1] Professor Berger's question had as follows: "People rate various
posts and occupations differently. Here is a card listing several
occupations. Just place number 1 alongside the occupations. The general
public thinks most highly of, number 2 for the next, and so on. The
listed ten occupations are shown in Table III.

[2] The weighted score was obtained by counting and ranking of first
place as 10, second place as 9, and so on, and then totalling the points
accumulated for each occupation. See Berger, op.cit., pp.99,

professionals, the member of the People's Assembly, the landowner of

50 feddans and the civil servant. After a large gap came the small

merchant followed by the factory worker. The peasant was ranked

lowest of all. At this point, reference should be made that there

were no significant differences between the ratings given to these ten

given occupations by younger and older respondents, or by those more

and less educated, or by those working in different ministries. In

other words, none of the usual background traits yielded any significant

difference among our respondents with respect to the prestige ranking of

such occupations. This would suggest that the prestige ranking of the

ten occupations pervades the civil service and is not concentrated among

one or another group within it. Nevertheless, our interview material

as well as a comparison over time provide some perspective.

As noted earlier, the university professor is clearly rated

highest in terms of prestige and status in Egyptian society,[1] As a

matter of fact, such rating is consistent with the growing importance of

universities as an occupational source of elite recruitment in general.

As we have seen in Chapter IV, academia is one of the three largest

occupational sources of recruitment into the power elite, chief among

which are the ministers. Moreover, the highest prestige accorded to the

university professor is in line with the findings of a study made by

the Egyptian National Planning Institute in 1963, where it was found that

the top choice for the majority of the higher education graduates was

university teaching.[2]

The most interesting result, from a comparative perspective, is

the relative higher rating given to the higher civil service occupation

---

[1] The position of university professor is technically a part of
the public service but not the regular civil service.

[2] Research on The Employment and Unemployment among the Educated
Persons, (Cairo: The National Institute of Planning, 1963) p.28.

by our respondents. As far as the comparison over time is concerned, the higher civil servant was rated second highest, while a "government bureau chief" was rated fifth by Professor Berger's respondents. We must accept this comparison with some caution because the term "higher civil servant" as defined in our study, is not equivalent to the term "government bureau chief" used by Professor Berger, and because of the time that has elapsed between the two study dates. However, it is possible to say that with the increased awareness of the strategic positions of Egyptian higher civil servants in the process of making and implementing policies related to economic and social development, and with the expansion in number of professional and well-educated persons in the higher civil service, the attitudes of the general public and indeed of the higher civil servants themselves, have changed to a more favourable regard for such a profession. At this point, we must recall that about 55 per cent of our respondents (as opposed to only 3 per cent of Professor Berger's respondents) recommended the civil service as a career for their own children or someone else. Moreover, it has already been noted that for about 61 per cent of the Egyptian cabinet ministers, the public bureaucracy was one of the main occupational gateways to the top, i.e., the power elite.

Rather as expected, the Egyptian higher civil servants ranked the position of army officer the third highest in terms of prestige and status in Egyptian society. This rating should be seen in terms of the crucial role of the military in contemporary Egyptian society. As one of our respondents put it: "Not only are the military officers the creators of the new socio-economic order, but they are also the "custodians" of that order." It should be noted, however, that the position of army officer was ranked below that of the higher civil servant. This relative lower prestige accorded to the Egyptian army officers must be seen in conjunction with the recent trend towards

civilianisation of the political system under President Sadat.

Rather unexpectedly, the independent professionals, (i.e.,
engineers, lawyers, doctors and businessmen) were ranked fourth
highest, but below the higher civil servant occupations. This is
somewhat surprising in view of Professor Berger's findings as well
as other studies' results in developing countries. Professor Berger
reported that two independent professions, that of doctor and lawyer,
were ranked first and third respectively. That is to say that these
two independent professions were ranked higher than that of "government
bureau chief." Such ranking suffers from the fact that most of the
free professions are of generally high standing, while the category
of "government bureau chief" covers a wide range of jobs, some of
which are widely-believed to be of low standing.

In a cross-cultural context, it appears that the independent
professions are ranked higher than that of higher civil servant at
least as far as Turkey is concerned. Table VII.3 shows the prestige
ranking of selected occupational positions by Turkish civil servants.
The lower prestige accorded to the higher civil service profession
might be related to the fact that high-level government officials
suffered from some pressures (political and financial) which clipped
away at the prestige of the public bureaucracy in general and the central
ministries in particular. In fact, the opening up of the power structure
and the employment apportunities outside the old-line ministries produced
a major systematic change; the Turkish bureaucratic elite was displaced
from its once pre-eminent position.

Professor Berger was surprised to find two professional occupations
and two highly urban occupations ranking higher than the landowner class.
The landowner in Egypt had traditionally enjoyed the highest status.
Professor Berger felt this was probably symptomatic of the growing

Table VII.3

Prestige Ranking of Selected Occupational Positions

By Turkish Civil Servants

Ranking	A.Matthews (1954)[1]	O.Us (1972)[2]
1	Provincial governer	Big Businessman
2	National legislator	Private Practitioner (e.g., doctor, lawyer engineer etc.)
3	Engineer	Scientists (professor research person etc.)
4	General in Army	Senior manager in private sector
5	Doctor	Public Servant
6	Judge	- - -
7	Diplomat	- - -
8	Professor	- - -
9	Big Businessman	- - -
10	Chief department administrator	- - -
11	Lawyer	

Sources: (1) A.J.Matthews, Emergent Turkish Administrator (Ankera: Faculty of political sciences and University of Ankera 1955) p.21

(2) Oznur Us, "Perception of Civil Service Prestige by Civil Servants, "Ankara: The Institute of Public Administration for Turkey and the Middle East, 1973) p. 12 (Mimeographed)

industrialisation and professionalisation of Egyptian society.[1] In view of the high status accorded to the higher civil servants and the professionals, it is probably more accurate to say that this rating is symptomatic of the relative change in the power structure as well as the growing industrialisation and professionalisation of Egyptian society.

One general factor which can account for the higher status of the Egyptian higher civil servant in relation to the landowner is the efforts made by the revolutionary elite to reduce the power and

---

[1] Berger, op.cit., p.100.

influence traditionally associated with large landownership in Egyptian society. Towards this end, the revolutionary elites took some measures, which culminated in the 1969 Agrarian Reform Law limiting land ownership to 50 _feddans_ per person and 100 _feddans_ per family. Coupled with this was the revolutionary elites' reliance upon the Egyptian higher civil servants in effecting economic and social change.

Furthermore, the strategy of rural development adopted by the revolutionary elites has been termed bureaucratic mobilisation in that it consisted of an attempt to expand the bureaucracy into the countryside and to mobilise the rural people behind plans and projects initiated by the central government and its local represent-atives. Thus, by relying on the higher civil servants to design and administer local government programmes, paternalistically supervise bodies of local government and even to provide the backbone of the Arab Socialist Union (ASU), the government has made sure that the higher civil servants are the most powerful figures and perhaps the most prestigious group at the local level, i.e.,rural areas. Certainly, this has been done at the expense of the landowner, traditionally of higher status. As one of our respondents put it, "The effect of Agrarian Reform on such social stratification has not yet gone beyond replacing the landlords with the higher civil servants and to a lesser extent shifting and re-shuffling peasants within the social scale. The political effects, i.e., the change in power structure, of the Reform have been the most obvious. The change resembled a political revolution in which the members of the middle class, chief among which are those whose incomes derive mainly from salaries and those working for government, played the major role in trying to replace the former ruling oligarchy and abolish feudalism."

Yet, in view of the loss in their status and power in Egyptian

society, the landowners and indeed their children were among the first groups in society to realise the importance of education and modern skills, by virtue of their accessibility to. quality primary and secondary education in the countryside and secular university education in the urban areas, on which the revolutionary regime depends in its drive towards modernisation and development. In other words, landowners and their children were quick to realise that status ascribed to vocational roles in society was changing; that their status as landowners was decreasing while the civil service and professional occupations were gaining more prestige and status; hence their drive towards modern education. It will be recalled that those most likely to benefit from modern education were the sons of professionals and, to a relatively lesser extent, the sons of landowners. Moreover, Professor Berger reported in 1954 .that almost a quarter of his respondents were the sons of landowners. Our study indicated that 9 per cent of Egyptian higher civil servants is made up of sons of landowners. As the decreasing status and prestige accorded to the landowners continue, more and more landowners are becoming bureaucrats or professionals.

Elite Groups: Contribution and Prestige

Our respondents' attitudes towards the potential contribution of elite groups to the development of the Egyptian state are in line with the prestige accorded to these groups in Egyptian society. When our respondents were asked : "In which of the following ways can a citizen best benefit his country?" their answers favoured university teaching and the higher civil service; 35 per cent said being a university professor, 32 per cent said by being a higher civil servant, 16 per cent mentioned working in the army, 13 per cent said by practising one of the free professions or being a businessman, and 4 per cent said by being a deputy or member in the People's Assembly, i.e. a politician.

None of the usual background traits, such as education or age, yielded any significant differences among the respondents with respect to this question. Moreover, no significant variation was observed in the responses of our respondents working for different ministries as to the evaluation of the contribution of the elite. This would suggest that this evaluation pervades the higher civil service and is not concentrated among one or another group of respondents within it. It may be said, therefore, that in order of importance the university professor, the higher civil servant, the army officer, and the independents are the four groups seen as making the biggest potential contribution to Egypt's national development, in proportion to the prestige and status accorded to these elite groups in Egyptian society. That the higher civil servant see themselves as a modernising elite will be further shown later in this study.

Cross-culturally, the Turkish civil servants are not of the opinion that the official class, i.e. the bureaucratic elite, plays an indispensable role in Turkish national development. Of the Turkish civil servants questioned about the potential contribution of various occupations, 46 per cent favoured business, 20 per cent mentioned politics, 11 per cent indicated government administration, 6 per cent mentioned free professions, and only one person indicated the military.[1]

Job Satisfaction

We have just reviewed the increase in the Egyptian higher civil status and prestige, as revealed in the respondents' attitudes towards the potential contribution and prestige of various occupations in Egyptian society. One type of evidence regarding job satisfaction remains to be explored. Job satisfaction affects not only the prestige of higher civil servants but also production and turnover. Some students

---

[1] Roos and Roos, Managers of Modernisation, op.cit., p.161.

of bureaucratic behaviour have been interested in the factors that affect job satisfaction. They have found out that it is higher when there is a high level of skill, such as high complexity, and/or low formalisation and centralisation.[1] Others have incorporated it as an important variable in the development of a theory of organisation.[2] All these attempts do indicate that job satisfaction is an important dimension in the study of the bureaucratic elite and organisations.

There are several ways that can be used in measuring job satisfaction e.g., "by standard attitude batteries and the amount of turnover."[3] In the present study, the former measure has been employed. Such conceptions as the degree of responsibility, job satisfaction, centralisation, close supervision, and challenging work, are important elements affecting a person's job satisfaction. Four items were designed to obtain information on the attitudes of Egyptian higher civil servants towards job satisfaction, as they asked:

a) How do you feel about the amount of responsibility you have in your job now? Would you like to be given more responsibility, less responsibility, no change in responsibility?

b) Considering all aspects of your job, how well do you like it? How satisfied are you?

c) Do you think that supervision in your ministry is too close, satisfactory, about right, or not close enough?

d) How challenging do you find your present work - in the sense of demanding concentration, intelligence or energy?

The favourable responses to these items and the index results are presented in the following table.

---

[1] See, for example, James March and Herbert Simon, _Organisations_, (New York: John Wilay, 1959), Chapter IV.

[2] See Jerlad Hage, "An Axiomatic Theory of Organisation," _Administrative Science Quarterly_, Vol. X (December, 1965), p.289

[3] Ibid., p.294. See also, Roos and Roos, Managers of Modernisation, op.cit., particularly Chapters V, VI, VII, and VIII as a serious attempt to study job satisfaction and dissatisfaction in terms of the amount of turnover and career mobility.

Table VII.4

Items Incorporated in the Job Satisfaction Index

And the Distribution of Respondents in the Index

Job Satisfaction Index	Percentages: No. of cases in Parentheses
Items Incorporated in the Index:	
1. No change in responsibilities	75
2. Very or fairly satisfied with job	84
3. Present supervision is satisfactory	77
4. Job is extremely and strongly challenging	65
Position on the Index	
Low (0	2
(1	5
(2	25
High (3	40
(4	28
Total	100
	(400)

As the data reveal, 68 per cent of the respondents were in

positions 3 and 4 of the index indicating a high degree of

job satisfaction. Since slightly more than two-thirds of the

respondents fall in this category, this is an indication of the high

degree of job satisfaction prevailing among Egyptian higher civil

servants. When such factors of education, age, and governmental levels

were cross-tabulated with the job satisfaction scale, none of the

relationships came out as statistically significant.

Although our data do not permit systematic comparisons, they

nevertheless, provide some perspective with regard to the comparisons

over time. As noted earlier, about 55 per cent of our respondents (as

opposed to only 3 per cent of Professor Berger's respondents) recommended

the civil service as a career for their children or someone else. This is one of the many examples which may illustrate the higher job satisfaction enjoyed by our respondents as compared with Professor Berger's respondents. Moreover, it has been suggested that our respondents are constantly revealing more intrinsic job satisfaction, i.e., satisfaction derived from the importance and challenging nature of their work and from performing a public service, when compared with Professor Berger's respondents. Statistically speaking, about 48 per cent (as opposed to 34 per cent of Professor Berger's respondents) considered the chance to perform a public service, the importance and challenging nature of their job as the most important advantages of government employment.

Although a rather high proportion of our respondents (21 per cent as opposed to 11.2 per cent of Professor Berger's respondents) complained about low salaries, their occupational demands are satisfied by other aspects of government service, e.g. being involved in a challenging job etc. In other words, our respondents seem to be satisfied with government employment more than Professor Berger's respondents. Perhaps such a favourable attitude is further improved by their own prestigious image of the higher civil service, which they feel is among the top two occupations in terms of prestige ranking and potential contributions of various occupations in Egyptian society. This does not mean that Professor Berger's respondents as well as our respondents do not have traditional status to support or inflate their own prestige, nor does it mean they do not have a feeling of power over mere citizens. Comparatively speaking, it may be suggested, however, that our respondents base their claim for public respect, and therefore, their higher degree of job satisfaction on what they do _for_ the ordinary citizen and the state, not what they do _to_ the ordinary citizen and the state.

Despite their loss of economic status, i.e., real low salaries, the Egyptian bureaucratic elite continue to consider their profession as highly prestigious in terms of power, status and occupational demands. This seems to be the case in so far as the Turkish bureaucratic elite is concerned:

"For a fuller description of Turkish society today, the socio-economic classification must not be overlooked. As a social class, the civil service or the ruling elite should be mentioned first, since they still persist in regarding them-selves as a separate body above the people, and since they do play a most important role in setting the socio-political direction of the country . . . Although they are limited in income, they are compensated by power and prestige - The greater part is subject to a lower class existence but considers itself above the smaller businessman, the individual shopkeeper, whose income in the last fifteen years has been far above that of a civil servant. The civil service is rigidly Atatürkist and secularist, tending towards emphasis on an authoritarian regime with strict controls of the economy. Though conscious of its social responsibility, it is imbued with a patern-alistic philosphy which keeps it aloof from the masses inhibiting a sympathetic understanding of their problem and lending to military expedience decisions."[1]

[1] Nuri Eren, Turkey Today and Tomorrow: An Experiement in Westernisation (New York: Frederick A.Praeger, 1963), p.170.

CHAPTER VIII

CAREER PATTERNS OF THE EGYPTIAN

BUREAUCRATIC ELITE

Earlier in this study we have referred to the fact that the typical career pattern has characteristically been bureaucratic in Egyptian polity for the last two decades or so. This holds true, as we have seen, so far as the Egyptian cabinet ministers, Prime Ministers and Presidents are concerned. This is also the case, as will be seen soon, with regard to the top-level administrators in state enterprises in view of the fact that the image of the career for these administrators includes three alternative courses, two of which are associated with Egyptian public bureaucracy, be it civilian or military. As might be expected, the typical career pattern of the Egyptian higher civil servants is, by and large, a bureaucratic one, which entails beginning in the civil service as a civil servant, working up the ladder from junior staff through minor administrative posts, and ultimately moving into a major administrative position in the civil service.

The objective of this chapter is to analyse the career patterns of Egyptian bureaucratic elite. Unfortunately, the concept of career is not very explicitly defined in the literature. In common usage, it is synonymous with occupation and profession, with the addition of the notion of job stability. For the purpose of this chapter, the present writer has in mind a more limited use, in which "career" and "career pattern" are combined "as a series of adjustments made to the institutions, formal organisations, and informal social relation-ship involved the occupation, or sequence of occupations, which make up the history of a person or a group of persons."[1]

----

[1] Julius Gould and William L. Kalb, A Dictionary of The Social Sciences (London: UNESCO, Tavistoc Publications, 1964), p.73.

Moreover, for the purpose of contrast and illustration, major aspects of the career patterns of Egyptian higher civil servants will be compared with those of top-level administrators in Egyptian state enterprises and with those of other nations' higher civil servants, wherever data is available.

Experiential Background: Bureaucratic Elite's First Job

When the respondents were coded by the type of occupation or job they first held, i.e., prior job experience at the time they entered the civil service, it becomes evident that 80 per cent began their career as civil servants. Moreover, 5 per cent started their careers in the military bureaucracy. Thus, for 85 per cent of our respondents, the Egyptian public bureaucracy was the most important occupational gateway to the top, i.e., the bureaucratic elite. Such finding is understandable in view of the traditional status and role of the Egyptian bureaucracy as the primary source of employment for the educational class. One might argue, however, that Egyptian higher civil servants lacking experience in the "work-a-day" world of business, commerce and professions, would be handicapped in carrying out their duties as planners or advisors on government policy relating to business and commerce. Considering the role of the Egyptian public bureaucracy in matters related to regulation of business and especially its role after the adoption of the "Open-Door Policy" or ·Infitah, whereby the private business enterprises are to·play a greater part in Egypt's development, this lack of prior occupational experience in the world of private business and commerce might be more serious.

In contrast, the top-level administrators in Egyptian state enterprises appear to have more diversified occupational experience, as the following table shows.

Table VIII.1

Experiential Background: The Egyptian Higher Civil Servants'

First Jobs As Compared With Those of High-Ranking

Administrators in Egyptian State Enterprises

(In Percentages)

First Jobs	Higher Civil Servants, 1975	Top-Level Administrators in State Enterprises, 1967.(1)
Civil Servant	80	17
Army Officer	5	27
Professionals (e.g., doctor, lawyers, engineers)	10	16
Independents (e.g., businessmen, landlords)	2	8
Others (e.g.,white collar business	3	32
Total	100.0	100.0

Source: (1) M.S. Kassem, "Business Executives in Egypt, India
and the U.S.A.," International Journal of
Comparative Sociology, Vol.XII (July, 1971),
p.110, Table 3.

Although the occupational experience of high-ranking administrators

in Egyptian state enterprises is more diversified than that of Egyptian

higher civil servants, it may be noticed that a large proportion of

them (44 per cent) have been drawn from the Egyptian public bureaucracy,

be it civilian or military. While no empirical data is available,

discussions with the Egyptian bureaucratic elite suggested that the

new employment opportunities created by the establishment of state

enterprises, helped to siphon off some able, dissatisfied individuals

from the army, and to a lesser extent, the civil service. Considering

that the personnel status in the public business sector, i.e., state

enterprises are more favourable than those prevailing in the civil

service or in the army both with respect of salary scales and promotional

opportunities, it might be suggested that by providing more satisfying

or rewarding work (at least in terms of salary and promotional opportunities) for some members of the military and bureaucratic elites, the state enterprises aided the cause of political stability. This employment function of state enterprises has been emphasised by some of our respondents in the interviews. As one of our respondents put it "The inefficiency of the state enterprises system in Egypt has been the subject of discussion by economists, but one political function - that of providing a safety valve for the dissatisfied members of the Egyptian bureaucratic elite in general and military elite in particular - has hitherto been neglected. The employment opportunities opened up outside the traditional old line ministries seemed to have helped prevent over mobilisation of dissatisfied members of the Egyptian military elite and, to a lesser degree, those of the bureaucratic elite, against the regime."

Career Routes: Time in Service, Ministry and Position

One of the primary means of establishing the career routes of higher public officials is to determine the time-span between the first governmental position and their attainment of the top-level position. "Time" is referred to here in three distinct categories: time in service, i.e., the time since higher civil servant held his first job, time in ministry, i.e., the duration of his employment by the ministry for which he worked when interviewed; and time in position meaning the length of time he had occupied the position he was holding when the interview took place. Table VIII.2 shows the distribution of Egyptian higher civil servants according to these time categories. Before defining the compound meaning of this tri-dimensional table, specific explanations for each category should be considered.

Table VIII.2

Distribution of Egyptian Higher Civil Servants According to

Their Time in Service, Ministry and Position

(In Percentages)

Time Span	Time in Service	Time in Ministry	Time in Position
Less than 1 year	1.0	10.3	24.0
Between 1-2 years	4.3	26.5	51.8
Between 3-4 years	4.3	12.5	13.8
Between 5-6 years	5.5	6.8	4.5
Between 7-10 years	7.8	8.0	2.8
Between 11-15 years	9.5	8.5	1.3
Between 16-25 years	30.3	15.0	1.3
Over 25 years	37.3	12.3	0.5
Totals	100.0	99.9*	100.0

* Percentage may add to less than 100 because of rounding.

As can be noted, Egyptian top bureaucrats tend to be senior

officials who have long been associated with the public service,

67.6 per cent of them can be classified as being in the service for

more than 16 years, although the modal categories/25 years.
is

In practical terms, these figures mean that on the average it took

about 18 years (mean length of service minus mean time in position)

for an official to reach his current high-ranking position. This

time length is generally in line with the career span of other

nations' higher public officials. For example, 26 years is the average

in the Philippines,[1] while the typical time is about 20 years for both

the United States and Peru.[2]

---

[1] Jose A. Abueva, "Social Background and Recruitment of
Legislators and Administrators in the Philippines," Philippines
Journal of Public Administration Vol.II, No. 1 (Journal, 1965), p. 26.

[2] For the United States, See David Stanley, The Higher Civil
Service (Washington D.C.:The Broakings Institution, 1964), p.22.
For Peru, see Jack Hopkins, The Government Executive of Modern Peru
(Aines ville: University of Florida Press 1967), p.67.

That the Egyptian higher civil servants tend to be senior officials who have been long associated with the public service is confirmed by another study made by the National Institute of Management Development on a number of under-secretaries in the civil service as well as chairmen of the boards of state economic enterprises. The distribution of Egyptian under-secretaries in the civil service and chairmen of the boards of state economic enterprises according to their time in service is shown in the following table:

Table VIII.3

Distribution of Egyptian Undersecretaries in the

Civil Service and Chairmen of the Boards in the State

Economic Enterprises according to their Time in Service

Position / Time Span	Undersecretaries in the Civil Service %	Chairmen of the Boards in State Economic Enterprises %
From 10 and 15 years	4.0	-
More than 15 and less 20	4.0	-
More than 20	88.0	91.0
Unspecified	4.0	9.0
	100%	100%

Source: The National Institute of Management Development, Developing New Managers for the Socialist Enterprise Sector in U.A.R. (Cairo: The Institute, 1965), p.19.

Moreover, the same study shows that at the time of investigation, 80 per cent of undersecretaries and all chairmen of the boards of public enterprise have been in their positions for five years or less. Table VIII.4 shows the distribution of undersecretaries and chairmen of the boards according to their time in position.

The very high proportion of Egyptian top-level public officials who have long been associated with the public service and the average 18 years (as reported by our study) it took them to reach their current

positions, would appear as paradoxical for analysts who used to see

public bureaucracy as a political arena at least in so far as the

higher echelons of it are concerned. In these circumstances, lateral

entry into the higher positions could be expected to be the common

pattern, because of commonly mentioned practices of appointing

politically-trusted officials to the public bureaucracy in developing

countries.[1]

Table VIII.4

Distribution of Undersecretaries in the Civil Service and

Chairmen of the Boards in State Economic Enterprises

According to their Time in Position

Position Time Span	Undersecretaries in the Civil Service %	Chairmen of the Boards in State Enterprises %
Less than 2 years 2 years and 5 years More than 5 years Unspecified	52.0 28.0 4.0 16.0	44.5 55.5 - -
Total	100%	100%

Source: The Institute of Management Development, Developing
New Managers.... op.cit., p.19.

Nevertheless, as the data suggest, the proportion of public

officials holding top-level positions increases very rapidly with

increasing length of service. Although the suggestion based on these

---

[1] This view is explicitly expressed in the analysis of S.C. Dube.
His analysis of the major characteristics of bureaucracy in the
transitional societies and its problems in the context of "the culture
of politics", the emerging ethos, the expanding sphere of state
activity and the new institutional arrangement has a sufficiently
generalised quality to be of special value in thinking about the
politicisation of management in many developing societies. See
S.C. Dube "Bureaucracy and Nation-Building in Transitional Societies,"
International Social Science Journal, Vol. XVI (1963), pp.229-236.

data is of a stronger professionalism in the civil bureaucracy than could have been hypothesized, some other dimension of career pattern will be examined for complementary evidence of this suggestion.

As far as time in the Ministry or organisation is concerned, although about half of our respondents are relatively new to the Ministry having less than four years of tenure, there are a significant number (27.3 per cent) who have been in their respective ministries for more than 16 years.[1] The probable reason for this bi-modal distribution is that seniority and lateral entry into the organisation are both equally valued. It is important to note here that this reference is not to the lateral entry into the public service as discussed in the previous paragraphs, but to the lateral entry into the organisation. In other words, the lateral entry discussed here refers to the appointment of senior officials chosen among civil servants elsewhere in the government who are assigned to their current ministries for the first time as top-level officials.

As indicated in Table VIII.2, by the time of the interviews, 89.6 per cent of the bureaucratic elite had been in their positions for less than four years. Moreover, it can be seen from Table VIII.3 that 80 per cent of undersecretaries of state in the civil service and 100 per cent of the chairmen of the boards in state enterprises had been in their positions for five years or less. In fact, a longer term in office was not expected due to the following reasons.

(1) The impact of political factors in appointment particularly in the highest levels of the civil bureaucracy, which

---

[1] It is important to notice here that these data do not take into consideration governmental administrative reforms or re-organisation where ministries or agencies are sub-divided or collapsed into new agencies. However, the interview questions were posed in broad terms at the most inclusive and general level (i.e. Ministry level) where possible distortions in the data are minimised by the few changes in the higher organisational level.

results in many changes of their occupants with

changes in the head of the executive machinery and

respective ministers, and

(2) the absence of a formal procedure for the recruitment

of higher civil servants as well as executives in state

enterprises which cause uncertainties as to the job

tenure.

Inferred from this three dimensional analysis is the proposition

that Egyptian higher civil servants are primarily senior officials in

the public service but not necessarily with seniority in their

respective ministries or agencies. Lateral entry into the higher

public service seems to be the exception rather than the rule; however,

lateral entry into a Ministry can be regarded as a common practice

owing to the large turnover of higher public officials occurring when

the head of the executive machinery, i.e., Prime Minister or the

respective ministers are changed. This proposition is in line with

the findings of the study conducted by the National Institute of

Management Development. As Table VIII.5 indicates, 32 per cent of

undersecretaries of state had been associated with their respective

ministries (i.e., the same ministry in which an undersecretary holds

his current position), while 56 per cent had previously been associated

with other civil service organisations than the ministries in which

they hold their present position, and 21 per cent had been working

in the military bureaucracy as staff or commanding officers. This

means that 68 per cent are relatively new to the ministry in which they

hold their current positions. Insofar as the chairmen of the state

enterprises are concerned, it may be said that laterial entry into

these enterprises is much more a common practice than is the case in

the civil service, owing to the fact that none of chairmen of the

boards had previously been associated with such enterprises.[1] In

other words, lateral entry into a state enterprise is the rule in

view of the fact that all chairmen of the boards of Egyptian state

enterprises had started their careers and been working in either

the civil service or military bureaucracy.

Table VIII.5

Distribution of Undersecretaries of State and Chairmen of the

Boards in State Enterprises According to Their Previous

Experience in Different Ministries or Other Organisations.

Position / Ministry of Organisation	Undersecretaries of State %	Chairmen of the Boards in State Enterprises %
The same Ministry (i.e., the ministry in which the respondents hold their current position)	32	73
Outside the Ministry but in Civil Service	56	18
Military	12	9
Private Sector	-	-
	100%	100%

Source: The Institute of Management Development, Developing New Managers.... op.cit., p.20.

The proposition advanced in the previous paragraph is simply

a consequence of the analysis of the temporal factor in the careers

of senior public officials, which, however, needs to be checked through

the analysis of organisational or agency mobility in the public service.

Inter-Organisational Mobility

A further aspect of career pattern is closely related to inter-

organisational mobility. Inter-organisational mobility is understood

[1] It must be noted in passing that state enterprises are
affiliated with their respective ministries, i.e., ministries most
related to the activities and nature of business of state enterprises.
However, state enterprises have different organisations hierarchies
and positions at the higher echelons of their organisational set up.

to mean the change between different organisations during the career of a specific bureaucrat. An examination has accordingly been made of the career of higher civil servants by reference to the types of organisation i.e., ministry or public enterprises in which they have worked.

Patterns of inter-organisational mobility among Egyptian higher civil servants are shown in Table VIII.6, which also furnishes comparative data on Japan, the United States and Peru.

Inter-organisational mobility has been considered not only as a normal practice but also as an advantageous practice for the American higher federal official.[1] In contrast, the concept of a career civil service based on a low inter-organisational mobility has been defined as a major characteristic of Japanese industry and government.[2] In comparative terms, Table VIII.6 shows that Egypt has the strongest career civil service in terms of expectation of working for the same organisation i.e., ministry during the whole career path. The high proportion of officials who work for only one agency (43.3 per cent) is in sharp contrast with the United States case and even well above the Japanese (31.4 per cent), which was expected to be comparatively high. This observation, however, may sound paradoxical if the previous analysis of time in the ministry or agency is remembered, since lateral entry into the organisation from another agency or ministry elsewhere in the government was found to be high. In a single country perspective, however, Egypt, like the other nations examined, has in fact had the majority of its higher public officials working for more

---

[1] Lloyd Warner, Paul Van Riper, Norman Martin and Orvis Collins, The American Federal Executive (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), pp. 173-174.

[2] Akira Kubota, Higher Civil Servant in Postwar Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), p.92.

than one organisation during their careers. In terms of the lateral

organisational entry, this analysis of inter-organisation mobility

does not refute the hypothesis of high lateral entry into the

organisation among senior public officials, but merely decreases

its quantitative importance in cross-national terms because this

proportion is higher in other nations.

Table VIII.6

Inter-Organisational Mobility of Higher Public Officials

By Country

Number of Organisations	Country			
	Egypt	USA(a)	Peru(b)	Japan(c)
	%	%	%	%
1	43.3	13.0	27.3	31.4
2	28.3	14.0	22.2	32.9
3	13.8	17.0	20.5	24.3
4	5.5	15.0	9.1	8.8
5 or 6	6.3	22.0	11.9	2.6**
7 or more	1.8	19.0	5.1	-
N.A.	1.0	-	4.0	-
Total	100.0	100.0	100.1*	100.0

* Percentages may add to more than 100 because of rounding
** 5 or more

.   Source: (a) Warner, op.cit., Table 27, p.170
              (b) Hopkins, op.cit., Table 18, p.60
              (c) Kubota, op.cit., Table 29, p.100

In addition, these findings about a strong "one agency career

service" reinforces the argument about "professionalism" (rather strong

in cross-national perspective) of Egyptian higher civil servants,

earlier based solely on the low lateral entry into the civil service.

Thus, it might be said, generally speaking, that the Egyptian higher

civil servants are not much for "organisation hopping." Organisational

attachment is rather strong: 43.3 per cent of the sampled higher

civil servants have been associated with one organisation, 28.3 per cent

with two, and 13.8 per cent with three. This, in turn, may suggest

that the Egyptian higher civil servants are overall rather little

experienced in other than central administrative organisations.

Moreover, as we have seen, they have not moved much among the central

administrative organisations (as opposed to state economic enterprises,

administrative organisations of local government, and private enter-

prises).

In sum, the analysis of inter-ministerial mobility suggests that

the Egyptian higher civil service is, in cross-national perspective

the most professionalised one in terms of career service in only one

ministry or organisation. This has considerable advantages in

encouraging an expertise in the work of the ministry, but, as the

interviews revealed, probably does not help fostering the overall

and efficient co-ordination nor does it encourage a sense of the unity

of the administration and greater ability to comprehend it in its

entirety. No doubt, this result has its parallels elsewhere. For

example, Professor Dodd, having examined career patterns of Turkish

higher public officials, noted that:

> "They (the higher Turkish officials) do not move about
> between ministries very much, nor do they seem much called
> upon to perform tasks for which their education has not
> broadly fitted them. There is a great merit in this
> practice. Civil servants who have a real expertise in the
> functions of their ministries are surely the best sort of
> higher civil servants for developing countries.... The
> defect, if there is one, may lie in a lack of overall civil
> service experience, which is bad for co-ordination and a
> sense of overall purpose."[1]

It is perhaps to be expected that one concomitant of a strong

"one ministry career service" is a wide experience in the ministry,

including those parts of it situated in the provinces or the country-

side. Moreover, given the fact that the life of town and country

is very different in terms of amenities and culture, it is important

that the higher civil servants should have experience of administration

---

[1] C.H. Dodd, Politics and Government in Turkey, (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1969), p.302.

in the provinces. As already pointed out, the Egyptian higher civil

servants are overall somewhat little experienced in other than central

administrative organisations. Moreover, it was found that the

average proportion of career spent by Egyptian higher civil servants

in different provinces (outside Cairo, Alexandria, and big urban

centres) is 18.8 per cent, a rather low average in view of the fact

that Egypt is mainly an agrarian society, with about 60 per cent of its

population living in the provinces or the countryside. However, this

low average may be accounted for in the wide gap between the big urban

centres, i.e., Cairo, Alexandria, and the provinces or the countryside.

As one of our respondents put it: "To a civil servant, transference

to a province is regarded as a punishment or even a catastrophe, his

fears are justified by the absence of such basic needs as schools

and social life." It is common practice that officials resort to

different pressures on their administration in order to stay in big

cities. Since there are few who would willingly accept to work in

provinces, personal favours become perhaps a matter of course.

PART THREE

THE STRUCTURE AND BEHAVIOUR

OF THE

EGYPTIAN HIGHER CIVIL SERVICE

INTRODUCTION TO PART THREE

So far as the general study of the Egyptian bureaucratic elite is concerned, the present research has attempted to fill the gap which exists with regard to data on the social economic backgrounds, education and training, status and prestige and career patterns of Egyptian higher civil servants, all of which have been discussed in Part Two.

As previously indicated, this research also has a theoretical orientation. One of the primary interests of the present study is the effort to focus on bureaucratic and organisation theory which will help to improve our understanding of the organisational and professional environment in which the Egyptian bureaucratic elite functions.

The ordering and structure of this part of the present study reflect this concern with bureaucratic and organisation theory. In Chapter IX, an effort will be made to evaluate the theoretical framework of a notable but imperfect study of "non-Western" bureaucracy, that of Egypt, in which Professor Berger tried to use the Weberian bureaucratic model as a basis for the study of the Egyptian higher civil service.[1] Chapter IX will try to illustrate how existing bureaucratic theory has been misused in Professor Berger's study of the Egyptian higher civil service. Having done so, an attempt will be made to utilize Weberian bureaucratic thought as well as the contributions of comtemporary researchers to bureaucratic and organisation theory with a view to reformulating Professor Berger's theoretical scheme. Using the structural-behavioural dichotomy, the

---

[1] Professor Berger's theoretical bureaucratic framework used as a basis for the study of Egyptian higher civil service is propounded in two of his works, i.e., Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957) and "Bureaucracy East and West," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. I (March, 1957) pp. 509-525.

subsequent chapters will focus on the internal aspects of Egyptian

bureaucratic organisation, the behavioural characteristics of the

Egyptian bureaucratic elite, and the relationship between the

structural features of Egyptian bureaucracy and the behavioural

characteristics of the Egyptian bureaucratic elite.

CHAPTER IX

THE STRUCTURE AND BEHAVIOUR OF THE HIGHER CIVIL SERVICE:

A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

In spite of the difference between the theoretical framework of

Professor Berger's pioneering study of the Egyptian higher civil service

and that of the present study, the former's empirical findings and results

have been referred to in the previous part and will be referred to through-

out the present part of the study to provide some perspective for comparison

over time. In view of this difference, an attempt will be made in this

chapter to analyse Professor Berger's theoretical framework of his study

and to highlight some of its shortcomings in order to reformulate this

framework and utilise it, in its redefined form, in the subsequent chapters.

<u>Professor Berger's Theoretical Framework of his Study of the</u>

<u>Egyptian Higher Civil Service</u>

The departure of Professor Berger's investigation is fundamentally

an examination of the degree to which the Egyptian civil service approaches

Western norms of bureaucratic behaviour and professionalisation.[1] In

achieving this purpose, Professor Berger is faced with the task of

constructing a "model" of Western bureaucratic behaviour. Upon reviewing

Western literature regarding public bureaucracy, he finds two types of

studies. One group of studies concerns bureaucratic structures and analyses:

(a) centralisation of power and authority; (b) establishment of a hierarchy

of offices with special requirements and prerogatives; and (c) rules

governing the exercise of functions and authority. A second group of

studies deals with bureaucratic behaviour and examines the behavioural

concomitants of bureaucratic structures. These behavioural tendencies are:

---

[1] Morroe Berger, <u>Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt</u> (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1957), p.8.

(a) caution in interpreting the rules; (b) self-interest among groups of officials; and (c) conduct towards the public and informal relationships not envisaged in the prescribed system.[1]

From the structural features of bureaucracy, Berger "distills three related components of bureaucratic behaviour." [2]   Thus, he constructs a Bureaucratic Scale, consisting of the following elements :

(a)   Rationality and universalism:
    (1)   Emphasis upon efficiency in job performance.
    (2)   Recruitment upon merit and competence.

(b)   Hierarchy:
    (1)   Emphasis upon prerogatives of position.
    (2)   Authority of the supervisor and obedience of the subordinate.

(c)   Discretion:
    (1)   Emphasis on the official's use of judgement and personal initiative.
    (2)   Willingness to accept responsibility and to exercise the full measure of discretionary power permitted by regulations. [3]

The Bureaucratic Scale is erected by Professor Berger, from three items in the questionnaire which he feels can compare the attitudes and behaviour of Egyptian and Western higher civil servants.[4]

The increasing growth and service functions of public bureaucracies in the West have created an increasing demand for civil servants with technical skills. Professor Berger finds three related components in professional patterns of behaviour as he surveys the writings on Modern Western bureaucracies. Thus, he constructed a Professionalism index comprising such elements as :

(a)   Skill:
    (1)   Emphasis upon technical competence.
    (2)   Emphasis upon self-control and regulation to maintain group standards.

---

[1] Ibid., p.48

[2] Ibid., p.49

[3] Ibid., p.49

[4] Ibid., pp.217-219

(b) Self-Protection:
   (1) Emphasis upon self-interest of professional group
       using monopoly of function, secrecy and exclusion.

(c) Service:
   (1) Emphasis on service to the public.
   (2) Emphasis on protection of public's interest.[1]

The Professionalism Index is constructed by Professor Berger from four
items in the questionnaire which he feels can compare the professional
attitudes of Egyptian and Western higher civil servants.[2]

In constructing the questionnaire, Professor Berger deems it necessary
to make certain assumptions about "Western norms" of bureaucratic behaviour.
There has to be, first of all, a firm idea of what actually constitutes
Western behavioural patterns of bureaucracy. Thus, the 'Bergerian' bureaucrat
is presumed to place great emphasis on efficiency in performance and
competence as a basis for recruitment, to emphasise the importance of
hierarchical arrangements and to favour the exercise of initiative and
discretionary power. As a professional he is expected to emphasise skill
or technical competence coupled with self-regulation as the mark of
professionalism, to insist upon protection by the professional group of
its own interests, and to place great importance on service to the public.

Evaluation of the Theoretical Framework of Professor Berger's Study

In evaluating the theoretical framework of Professor Berger's study,
some shortcomings relating to the Bureaucratic Scale and Professionalism
Index must be pointed out.

First of all, it must be noted that there is no specific item in the
Bureaucratic Scale constructed by Professor Berger that would accurately
measure the degree of hierarchy. Professor Berger has posited hierarchy
as a behavioural component related to rationality, universalism and
discretion.

The findings pertaining to the Bureaucratic Scale do not confirm

---

[1] Ibid., pp.49-50.

[2] Ibid., pp.219-220.

Professor Berger's expectation that the Egyptian higher civil servants
most exposed to Western influences would score high   on items touching
the component of hierarchy.

Professor Heady suggests two possible explanations of such a finding :

"It may be significant that it is on items touching the
component of hierarchy that the Egyptian respondents highly
exposed to Western patterns scored low, indicating either
that these supposedly Westernised Egyptian bureaucrats did
not actively conform in this respect to the Western norms
or that the norm itself was inaccurate as an indicator of
the actual patterns of behaviour of Western bureaucrats
regarding hierarchy." [1]

The latter explanation seems more likely in view of the recent
bureaucratic theories and empirical researches. Professor Walker, among
others, points out that strict hierarchical and authoritarian relationships
do not seem to characterise the superior-subordinate relations in the
British civil service.[2]

Furthermore, the last two components of Professor Berger's
Bureaucratic Scale hierarchy and discretion (initiative), appear in essence
to be near contradictions to each other. Professor Heady feels it is
unlikely that the two norms would be found together.[3] Professor Blau is
especially concerned with the hierarchical problems of authority and an
organisation's ability to adjust to change. He finds a prerequisite for
the willing compliance by subordinates to a superior's orders to be liberal
supervision, if bureaucratic authority, which rests on the power of sanction,
is too frequently resorted to in operation, its power is in fact weakened.[4]

---

[1] Ferrel Heady, "Bureaucratic Theory and Comparative Administration,"
Administration Science Quarterly, Vol.III, (March, 1959), p.521.

[2] Nigel Walker, Morale in the Civil Service (London, Edinburgh
University Press, 1961), pp.214-218.. See also William Delany, "The
Development and Decline of Patrimonial and Bureaucratic Administration,"
Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol.VII (March, 1965), pp.470-482.

[3] Heady, op.cit., p.522.

[4] Peter Blau, Bureaucracy in Modern Society (New York: Random House,
1958), pp.76-77.

As one of the top-level bureaucrats who took part in Professor Berger's study as an interviewer put it to the present writer: "One of the most difficult problems encountered by me as an interviewer in Professor Berger's study was in persuading the respondents to choose between "yes" and "no" answers to the authority conflict situation presented in Professor Berger's questionnaire." Most of the situations asked the respondents to choose between complete submission to or complete rejection of a superior's orders. Professor Berger's respondents found it difficult to conceive of such a direct clash between a superior and a subordinate. Many of the respondents implied that such conflicts frequently happen in the Egyptian bureaucracy but a compromising process is usually initiated which seeks out some reasonable solutions to the differences. Egyptian higher civil servants felt that the ordering of a subordinate to carry out a policy, which the subordinate had stated was normally wrong or incorrect, was a poor personnel policy. A superior needs the willing compliance and support of his subordinates if a programme is to be carried out successfully.

In our analysis of the Bureaucratic Scale we have seen that all items comprising the Scale deal with the component of discretion (personal initiative).

Yet Professor Berger implies that personal initiative

"is usually characterised as unbureaucratic behaviour in scholarly studies as well as in popular discussion. Similarly, its opposite, extreme caution, 'playing it safe', 'covering' one's self by getting a decision from the official on the next level of the hierarchy, is thought of as the typical behaviour concomitmant of bureaucratic structure."[1]

The above quotations do indicate very clearly how existing bureaucratic theory has been misused by Professor Berger in his study of the Egyptian higher civil servants. Particularly in the case of the personal initiative norm, Professor Berger states that the norm is considered unbureaucratic in scholarly studies, but he uses it in his Bureaucratic Scale.

[1] Morroe Berger, Bureaucracy East and West," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. I (March, 1957), p.520.

Such a theoretical problem is rooted, perhaps, in the usage of the concepts of rationality and discretion in Professor Berger's Bureaucratic Scale. Recent bureaucratic theorists and empirical researchers have suggested that in many cases, rationality is almost incompatible with modern bureaucratism. Francis and Stone, in their empirical research in bureaucracy, question Merton's assumptions that people within bureaucracies "internalise" the rule: Be A Rule Follower. They find that Western bureaucracy is not characterised by impersonality and rule following.[1] Bureaucracy has competing and conflicting patterns of behaviour rather than one dominant system or pattern.[2] Apparently the component rationality, as an institutionalised behavioural norm, has not produced the dangers outlined in Merton's dysfunctions of bureaucracy. Professor Berger, however, uses these characteristic dysfunctions as guides in constructing his bureaucratic scale.[3] Evidence that organisational rationality, universalism and efficiency are not necessarily the prime factors in administrative decision-making is indicated by responses to questions included in a survey of British Bureaucrats similar to the survey conducted by Professor Berger in Egypt in 1954.[4]

Evidence such as this clearly indicates the major theoretical problems involved in the construction and use of Berger's Bureaucratic Scale. One may well ask: How "Western" are the Western bureaucratic norms used by Professor Berger? The real problem, exposed by comparative examination of empirical research findings, lies not in the questionnaire but in the

---

[1] Roy Francis and Robert Stone, Service and Procedure in Bureaucracy (Mineapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956) pp. 10-13.

[2] Ibid., p. 125.

[3] It is significant to note, in passing, that Professor Berger gives, as a direct source from which Western bureaucratic norms were in part obtained, a major work by Robert Merton. The behavioural characteristics, it can be further noted, that Berger points out are those Merton discusses under the heading of "Dysfunctions of Bureaucracy". See Berger,"Bureaucracy East and West,"op.cit., p.521-522 and Robert K Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure. (Glencoe, Ill: The Free Press, 1956).

[4] Walker, op.cit., especially pp. 52-60 and pp. 200-206.

theories upon which Professor Berger constructed his scales and indexes. What theorists have called Western bureaucratic behaviour is being constantly modified and changed as more empirical studies are conducted within the Western bureaucracies.

All the foregoing, based on existing bureaucratic theory and empirical research, indicates that some characteristic Western behaviour patterns do exist in the Western bureaucracies, but that the Bureaucratic Scale used by Professor Berger fails to measure these patterns accurately due to theoretical misconceptions and difficulties. Specifically, data available from Professor Berger's study require that we re-evaluate the component of hierarchy used by him in his Bureaucratic Scale. A possible solution would be to view hierarchy as a "structural" element and discretion as a "behavioural" feature of bureaucracy. By discriminating between structural and behavioural characteristics, a better understanding of bureaucratic structures as well as behavioural patterns of the bureaucratic elite can be achieved. Moreover, empirical research can be led by more meaningful theoretical guidelines.

In evaluating the Professionalism Index constructed by Professor Berger some theoretical misconceptions seem to be fairly clear. First of all, it appears that the norm of self-protection is, at best, only vaguely measured in the Professionalism Index. In his own re-evaluation of the Professionalism Index, Berger finds that Egyptian higher civil servants most exposed to Western influence tend to rank high on the skill component, but rather low on the self-protection component. Just as in the Bureaucratic Scale, those most exposed to the West clustered in the middle of the Professionalism Index.[1] Blau and Scott, in discussing the professional, find him to be more concerned with the welfare of his dependent and vulnerable clients than with the self-interest of the professional himself.[2]

---

[1] Berger, "Bureaucracy East and West," op.cit., p.527.

[2] Peter M.Blau and W.R.Scott, Formal Organisations (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co, 1962), p.61.

It is significant to note, moreover, that Professor Berger makes explicit the distinction between "structure" and "behaviour". There is little doubt that he is aware of the structural-behavioural dichotomy. Yet, in his theoretical formulations he confuses the two. He combines both structural and behavioural elements and he labels them "bureaucratic behaviour". Under such theoretical misconceptions, naturally, empirical results and analyses will be confusing and perplexing.

The findings of empirical researches, along with the findings of Professor Berger's study in Egypt, lend support to the supposition advanced by Professor Berger's critics, who have pointed out that the Bureaucratic Scale and the Professionalism Index do not accurately measure Western bureaucratic behaviour, nor can they accurately measure Egyptian bureaucratic behaviour. Although we should be cautious in making final judgements and in drawing generalisations based on the outcome of different studies (i.e., different in terms of methodology, cultural environments, etc.) the point is that the outcome of such researches gives some clues to the student of bureaucracy and bureaucratic elite as to the direction of future research and theorising. This is why now a modest effort will be made to reconstruct Professor Berger's bureaucratic model in the formulation of the theoretical framework of the present part of our study.

It is apparent from the above discussion that the question which still confronts the student of bureaucracy and the bureaucratic elite is how to meet the difficulties raised by Professor Berger's study of the Egyptian higher civil service. A useful and illuminating suggestion has been offered by one of Professor Berger's critics. Professor Ferrel Heady finds Professor Berger's indications of the possible existence of two models of bureaucracies, one for the Western countries, and one for non-Western countries, is interesting. He points out, however, that formulating more ideal types and models seems to create more difficulties than it solves

and it is not necessary. He provides theorists and researchers with an alternative when he states that:

> "An escape from some of these semantic snares, which might at the same time open the way toward progress, would be to define bureaucracy in terms of certain essential structural characteristics that are already generally accepted and understood, without attaching the label "bureaucratic" to any particular pattern or combination of behavioural traits. It would then be possible to classify bureaucracies by behavioural patterns into whatever numbers of types seem to be required by the data available without having to decide which behaviour is more bureaucratic and which is less bureaucratic ... By making the structural aspect central to the concept of bureaucracy, we can provide a conceptual framework on which there is already a substantial measure of agreement and which offers a basis in both Western and non-Western states."[1]

It is along the above central thesis to define bureaucracy in terms of commonly accepted structural characteristics and try to identify the behavioural patterns associated with them in the various social contexts, that the theoretical framework of the subsequent chapters of this study will be grounded. The fundamental notion underlying this theoretical scheme is that bureaucracy will not be viewed as a variable, as in Professor Berger's study of the Egyptian higher civil service. Rather, it will be considered as a type, entity, or factor, and only the patterns of behaviour will be treated as dependent variables characterising and distinguishing one type of bureaucracy from another.

Some Theoretical Assumptions

The theoretical framework of the present study is rooted in three basic theoretical assumptions. First of all, it will be assumed that the manifestations of bureaucracy are organisational in character. In other words, concepts of bureaucracy and organisations, and administrative theory will be used interchangeably. True bureaucratic and organisational, as well as administrative, theories are founded on different assumptions. Yet, all three focus more or less upon the same unit of analysis in spite

---

[1] Heady, op.cit., p.523.

of the fact that each one of them considers it from a different angle.

Bureaucratic theory, at least classical bureaucratic theory, for example, concentrates on the organisational structure as a whole. Organisational theory, on the other hand, emphasises human relationships within the organisation, and concentrates more or less on the human element. Finally, the administrative theory lies betwen the two. It focuses upon the operation of the administrative structure itself, and tries to identify better ways of doing things. The general principles of administration enter the picture here. They emphasise the concept of "efficiency", namely, trying to achieve the organisation's goal in the most effective way.[1] It is evident that much overlapping occurs among these three types of theories and their corresponding concepts. That is why one can be very helpful to the other in both theory building and research. It is within this general framework that the present theoretical design has been based. Bureaucratic theory can profit from the advancements of both organisational and administrative areas and vice versa.

The second assumption is based on the idea that structural features of bureaucracy will be considered as "givens". There is considerable agreement among scholars in the field as to the structural (and to some extent the behavioural) characteristics of bureaucracy as Table IX.1 shows

Such structural elements are of a more or less universal nature. Although there are differences in detail, the authors' formulations show a close similarity. Bureaucracy can be viewed as an organisational structure. Such an assumption is closely related to Weberian theory because it employs some of Weber's fundamental conceptions of bureaucracy. It also extends his theory a step further by assuming that bureaucratic functioning is influenced by behavioural factors which Weber did not consider.[2] There are

---

[1] Dwight Waldo, "Organisation Theory: An Elephantine Problem," _Public Administration Review_, Vol. XXI (Winter, 1961), p.210.

[2] D S Pugh, et al.,"A Conceptual Scheme for Organisational Analysis," "_Administrative Science Quarterly_, Vol. VIII, No 3., (1963), pp. 294-305.

Table IX.1

Characteristics of Bureaucracy As Listed By Major Authors

Dimensions of Bureaucracy	(1) Weber	(2) Merton	(3) Friedrich	(4) Blau	(5) Berger	(6) Heady	(7) Udy	(8) Presthus
Structural Elements								
Hierarchy	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Specialisation	*	*	*	*		*	*	*
Professionalism	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Size	*	*		*		*		
Organisational Goals	*							
Behavioural Elements								
Precision – Continuity	*	*	*	*	*	*		*
a) Privacy – Secrecy			*			*		
b) Discretion – Initiative		*	*	*	*	*		*
Objectivity								

Sources: (1) Max Weber, "The Essentials of Bureaucratic Organisation," in Robert Merton, et al (eds.) Reader in Bureaucracy (Glencoe, Illinois: The Press Press, 1952); (3) Carl J Freidrich, "Some Observation on Weber's Analysis of Bureaucracy," loc.cit., p.28; (2) Robert Merton: "Bureaucratic Structure and Personality," loc cit., p.361; (6) Ferrel Heady, "Bureaucratic Theory and Comparative Administration," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. IV (1959), p.509; (7) Stanley H Udy, Jr. "Bureaucracy" and "Rationality" in Weber's Organisation Theory: An Empirical Study," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. XXIX (1958) p.791; (5) Morroe Berger, Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p.49 and also his "Bureaucracy East and West," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. I (1957), p.518; (8) Robert Presthus, "Toward a Theory of Organisational Behaviour," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. III (1958) p.48; (4) Peter Blau, Bureaucracy in Modern Society (New York: Random House, 1958), and Richard Hall, "Inter-Organisational Structural Variations: Application of the Bureaucratic Model," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. VII (December 1962), p.295, where a similar table is presented.

two underlying premises derived from recent empirical and theoretical studies: (1) Bureaucratic form is a _type_ rather than a variable: an organisation is or is not a bureaucracy,,a sub-unit is or is not a bureaucracy, rather than either being more or less bureaucratic;[1] and (2) Weber's bureaucratic insights can be very useful in testable hypotheses.[2] Recent theoretical and empirical clarifications of bureaucratic structures can be very useful in directing future research. The development of a multi-dimensional analysis of structural variables of bureaucracy can lead to a very illuminating study of organisations. As suggested, it seems to be more feasible to "regard bureaucracy as being characteristic of structure of an organisation and relate given organisat_ ional forms to group and individual behaviours."[3] This is actually one of the major assumptions of the present theoretical framework developed and employed in this study.

Finally, the third assumption is that the environment or "ecology" of administration has an impact on the conduct of government affairs. It has been accepted by many political scientists and students of bureaucracy that administrative structures do not operate in a vacuum.

One of the major analytical hypotheses of the present theoretical framework is that related to the relationship of the structural and behavioural dimensions of bureaucracy. It will be hypothesised that the structural elements, or perhaps at least some, and the behavioural elements of bureaucracy, are related to each other, while some others are not. This major hypothesis stems from the previous analysis of Professor Berger's

---

[1] Ibid.,p.296

[2] Delany, op.cit., pp. 458-501

[3] Some related discussion can be found in the following studies. (1) Friedrich op.cit., where the author distinguishes structural from behavioural characteristics of bureaucracy; (2) S.N. Eisenstadt,"Bureaucracy, Bureaucratisation and Debureaucratisation,"Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol 4, (1959), pp.302-320, where the author uses the concept of bureaucracy as a structural type rather than a variable, while Heady, op.cit., and Blau op.cit., discuss the same thesis.

theoretical framework and the findings of his study of the Egyptian higher civil service, as well as from other related empirical research. Both bureaucratic theory and research reveal that "hierarchy" with its emphasis on rationality, universalism, impersonality, and strict rule following, is not an element of Western bureaucratic practice in general and Western bureaucratic behaviour in particular. Moreover, as Professor Heady has suggested, the norm of hierarchy and discretion or initiative could not be expected to be closely associated.

Turning now to the explanatory hypotheses, actual direct comparisons become more difficult because of the different theoretical frameworks between Berger's and the present studies. However, the comparisons over time will provide some perspective. An attempt will be made, moreover, to draw some major conclusions from the contributions of both Berger's and the present studies, as well as other related empirical studies.

CHAPTER X

THE STRUCTURE OF THE HIGHER CIVIL SERVICE

As previously indicated, bureaucracy will be defined in structural terms. The definition of structure has been subject to a number of conflicting ideas. The presentation and analysis of such trends as behaviouralism, functionalism, and the structural functional approach to the study of socio-political phenomena, is evidently a task extending well beyond the scope of our present study. However, a brief definition of the concept of structure is in order.

The concept of structure has usually been defined in terms of inter-relationships of roles. Roles, in turn, are viewed as based on mutual expectations of the participants.[1] Bureaucratic structure is defined as a pattern of observed uniformity of action or activity taking place within an organisation. On the other hand, "organisation is defined as a system of structured interpersonal relations, that is, individuals are different-iated in terms of authority, status and roles with the result that personal interaction is prescribed or 'structured'."[2] The element of hierarchy, for example, can be considered as a structural feature of bureaucracy. It is based on a specific pattern of action taking place in an organisational set up, under which subordinates are supposed to obey superiors. One of the functions of bureaucracy, however, is to achieve efficiency in administering a specific programme. Such a condition is nothing more than the operation

[1] For a related discussion see Talcot Parsons and Edward Shills (eds.) Toward a General Theory of Action (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1951) pp. 91-92. For a detailed discussion on the duality of the concept see H.Eckstein and David Apter (eds.) Comparative Politics: A Reader (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1963).

[2] Robert Presthus, "Toward a Theory of Organisational Behaviour," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. III (1958) p.50.

of the bureaucratic structure through time.[1]

The Element of Hierarchy:

The structural element of "hierarchy" is a fundamental feature of

any organisation. Its classical definition can be found in Weber's

writings.

> The organisation of offices follows the principle of hierarchy;
> that is, each lower office is under the control and supervision
> of a higher one. There is a right of appeal and statement of
> grievances from the lower to the higher. Hierarchies differ in
> respect to whether and in what cases complaints can lead to
> a ruling from an authority at various points higher in the scale,
> and also to whether changes are imposed from higher up or the
> responsibility for such changes is left to the lower office, the
> conduct of which was the subject of complaint.[2]

A number of writers have used different terms to refer to the same

phenomenon. Such concepts as centralisation, formal organisation, formal

organisational goals, etc., are peripheral concepts, which are closely

related to hierarchy and the pyramidal structure of the organisation of

offices. Carl Friedrich, for instance, points out that hierarchy is "a

concomitant of the rational distribution of functions."[3] Another group of

scholars state that centralisation concerns "the locus of authority to make

decisions affecting the organisation.[4] The term is used here loosely to

convey both the traditional chain of command idea as well as the notion of

mobility rates, communication patterns, and elitist qualities.[5] It is such

a pyramidal organisation of offices and the resulting inter-relationships of

---

[1] For a distinction between "structure" and "function" see Robert
Holt. "A Proposed Structural-Functional Framework for Political Science,"
in Don Martindale (ed.) Functionalism in Social Sciences (Philadelphia :
The American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1965), p.88.

[2] Max Weber, The Essentials of Bureaucratic Organisation, in Robert
Merton et al., (eds.) Reader of Bureaucracy (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free
Press, 1952), p.19.

[3] Friedrich, op.cit., p.47.

[4] D.S.Pugh, et al., A Conceptual Scheme for Organisational Analysis,
Administrative Science Quarterly, VIII, No 3 1963, p.300.

[5] For a similar usage of the term, see Blanch D Blank, "A Proposal for
a Statistical Approach to Comparative Administration: The Measurement of
National Bureaucracies:"C.A.G. Occasional Paper, Comparative Administration
Group: Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana, 1965), p.14.

roles that become the component parts of the definition of the concept of hierarchy used in this chapter.

Having this pyramidal structure in mind, a number of items has been constructed and included in the questionnaire intended to measure the dimensions of hierarchy. The questions and their positive responses are presented in Table X.1

Table X.1

Measures of Hierarchy (Positive Responses)

Questionnaire Items	Percentages: No.of case in parentheses
1. Issuing Orders regularly or occasionally	77
2. Receiving Orders regularly or occasionally	74
3. Existence of many channels and procedures	66
4. Existence of a Procedure Manual	58
5. Existence of a Policy Manual	33
	(400)

A look at Table X.1 indicates that the largest percentage of positive responses is related to the two items pertaining to issuing and receiving orders either regularly or occasionally, while the item pertaining to the existence of the Ministry's policy manual yielded the lowest percentage of positive responses. Two-thirds of our respondents indicated that there are many channels and procedures that have to be followed in so far as their respective ministries are concerned.

Using all five items, an attempt was made to construct an index of hierarchy. It should be mentioned, however, that the nature of the items is not the same. For example, items, 4 and 5 of the above table, referring to the existence of policy and procedures manuals in the ministry, are essentially "objective" items in the sense that either such things exist or they do not exist. This is primarily factual information about the Egyptian bureaucracy and not an attitude of its bureaucratic elite, i.e., our

respondents. On the other hand, item 3, on the existence of many channels and procedures, i.e., red tape, is basically "subjective". With regard to the other items, there is no such clear-cut picture. Some degree of the respondent's "subjective" judgement enters the picture. For example, he has to evaluate the situation as to whether he gives or receives orders regularly or occasionally, etc.

The distribution of respondents along the hierarchy index is presented in Table X.2. Positions 0 to 3 have been designated as "low" on the scale, while those of 4 and 5 have been considered as a high position on the hierarchy index. What this means is that when a respondent scores high, this is an indication that he issues and receives orders regularly or occasionally, that he thinks that there are many channels and procedures in his ministry's operations, and that he is familiar with the existence of the ministry's policy and procedure manuals. Since these were the main ideas involved in the index, a respondent in a high position suggests that his perceptions pertaining to the dimension of hierarchy score high on a measure of such a dimension.

Table X.2

Distribution of Respondents on Hierarchy Index

Index Position	Percentages: No. of cases in parentheses
Low (0	10
(1	4
(2	18
(3	12
High (4	35
(5	21
Total	100
	(400)

The data reveals that a higher percentage of the respondents i.e. 56 per cent falls on the higher position of the hierarchy index. The percentage of those high cannot be considered as representing an overwhelming majority of the respondents. One would expect, for example, a much higher percentage of the Egyptian higher civil servants to rank high on the hierarchy index because of the long established civil service system in Egypt which consequently enhances perhaps rigid hierarchial patterns.

As far as the respondents' age is concerned, it was found that older people have a tendency to score high on the hierarchy index. Of a sizeable proportion of the older civil servants, 50 years old or more, 70 per cent of them are found in the high position of the hierarchy index. When it comes to the younger age group, under 50 years of age, a different pattern prevails. The greater percentage of the respondents belonging to that group, namely 60 per cent, scored low on the hierarchy index. It is evident then that the Egyptian higher civil servants scoring high on hierarchy are usually older individuals.

None of the other usual background traits, such as education, yields any significant differences among the respondents with respect to the dimension of hierarchy.

It will be recalled that Professor Berger has also considered hierarchy as an element of bureaucratic behaviour. He defines hierarchy in terms of "emphasis upon the prerogatives of the position, upon the authority of the superior official and the obedience of the subordinate."[1] However, Professor Berger's study of the Egyptian higher civil servants does not include any item intending to measure specifically that dimension alone. Rather, hierarchy, with primary emphasis on authority, is incorporated in his Bureaucratic Scale with the elements of rationality and universalism, and

---

[1] Morroe Berger, Bureaucracy and Society, in Modern Egypt (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p.49.

also the element of initiative-discretion. Moreover, most of Professor

Berger's discussion along this line is related to "loyalty", and to a

considerable extent to the degree of initiative tolerated by the

bureaucrats, something which will be analysed from the behavioural point

of view in the next chapter.

Upon re-examining the questionnaire items constructed by Professor

Berger, it is found that there are two items touching the component of

hierarchy. One such item has an imaginery situation in which a government

economist is called by his superiors to prepare a memorandum defending a

policy with arguments which economists inside and outside of the government

service would find objectionable. Respondents after reading the situation

were asked "Can the department head expect the civil servant to prepare such

a memorandum?"[1] Professor Berger considers those who answered No as having

less loyalty to the component of hierarchy.[2] To this question, a large

majority of Professor Berger's respondents (79 per cent) answered that the

department head could expect the civil servant to prepare such a memorandum.

Thus, it may be suggested that a large majority of Professor Berger's

respondents could be considered loyal to the component of hierarchy.

In another item involving an imaginary situation, Professor Berger's

respondents were asked if the superior can expect the rural civil servant to

carry out a specific policy, despite the fact he felt it would not help the

villagers, a large majority of these respondents (74 per cent) affirmed the

superior's expectations. Professor Berger interprets this finding in terms

of discretion and initiative, i.e., Egyptian higher civil servants do not

appear to be prepared to allow the subordinates to use their initiative in

this case.[2] However, from the reasons given by Professor Berger's respondents

to justify their answers as well as the nature of the question itself, it

---

[1] Morroe Berger, "Bureaucracy East and West," Administrative Science
Quarterly, Vol. I (1957), p.524

[2] Ibid., p.524

seems to the present writer that this situation is more a test of the acceptance of necessary hierarchial authority rather than subordinate initiative. It might, therefore, be argued that a larger proportion of Professor Berger's respondents would have scored high on the item touching the component of hierarchy had he posited hierarchy as a structural component rather than a behavioural one. In other words, Berger's conceptualisation, theory formulations and, above all, his operation-alisation of the concepts involved are so confused, vague and improperly organised that he perhaps misinterprets the data and their findings.

The Element of Professionalism

Some of the basic features of professionalism, which is another element of the bureaucratic structure, revolve the ideas of universalism, qualification for recruitment, career, and neutrality, elements which have been incorporated in the present definition of the concept. Weber, in his discussion of administrative staff, points out that "candidates are selected on the basis of technical qualifications", or that "the office is treated as the sole, or at least the primary, occupation of the incumbent", that "it constitutes a career", and finally, that the official is "subject to strict and systematic discipline and control in the conduct of the office".[1] All these elements show that Weber has in mind the idea of professionalism and that he considers it as an important feature. In a bureaucratic organisation recruitment, for example, is based on the individual's technical qualifications. In the most rational cases, this is treated by examination or guaranteed by diplomas.certifying technical training of the candidate, or both.

Yet, it has been ably indicated, that professionalism is something more than mere departmentalisation. It is founded on a number of the following principles:

---

[1] Max Weber, "The Essentials of Bureaucratic Organisation," in Robert Merton, et al, op.cit., p.22.

1. Professional decisions and actions are governed by universalistic standards; that is, they are based on certain objective criteria which are independent of the particular case under consideration.

2. A second characteristic of professionalism is the specificity of professional expertise.

3. The professional's relations with clients are characterised by effective neutrality. Professional codes of ethics condemn emotional involvement with the clients.

4. Professional status is achieved by an individual's performance, not ascribed to him because of some qualities he cannot change, such as sex, or birth order. The professional's success rests on outstanding performance in accordance with the principles laid down by his colleague group.

5. An element in professionalism essential to protect the welfare of dependent and vulnerable clients, is that professional decisions must not be based on the practictioner's self-interest whereas in business life self-interest is expected to govern decisions.

6. A final characteristic of the professions is their distinctive control structure, which is fundamentally different from the hierarchical control exercised in bureaucratic organisation. Professionals typically organise themselves into voluntary associations for the purpose of self control.[1]

How far has professionalisation of administration gone in Egypt? The questionnaire data provide some basis to answer this important question. Before we consider the data pertaining to professionalisation of administration, it would be useful to examine a related matter; the debate over the characterisation of the present Egyptian bureaucratic elite and to recall the evidence presented in the previous part of this study touching the element of professionalism.

During the last decade, it was debated whether Egypt's present bureaucratic elite is professionally or politically oriented.

Those who claim that the Egyptian bureaucratic elite is more politically than professionally-oriented make the following points:

---

[1] Peter Blau and W.R.Scott, Formal Organisations (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1962), pp.60-62

(1) political management is a must in time of revolution. Thus when the military elite seized power in 1952, and introduced the new socio-economic order in 1961, it felt uncertain as to the loyalty of the old managerial and bureaucratic elite. Political management in the sense of loyalty to the new regime was then a matter of practical necessity in the eyes of the ruling military elite. Naturally, the younger and more loyal army officers and bureaucrats were the ones who could be trusted to carry out the mandates of the new regime. (2) Political involvement of administration in Egypt is an inevitable consequence of the increasing role of bureaucracy in the economic and social domains as well as the nationalisation of Egypt's economic system. In a state enterprise economic system, the authority to run the public corporation is delegated by the political apparatus, not by the stockholders. Top-level administration in public enterprises are, therefore, appointed by, and accountable to, the political apparatus. Moreover, and as will be shown in a later part of this study, Egyptian administration institutions seem to be politicised, a consequence which is derived from their close working relationship with the president and the presidency. (3) Professionalisation of administration is incompatible in a society which is still in a state of transition. Since an industrialising society is a professional society, and since Egypt is not yet an industrialising society, one should not expect the professionalisation of its administration, at least for the time being.[1]

Those who claim that the Egyptian elite is more professionally than patrimonially or politically oriented argue that:(1) appointment in the public service in general, and in its higher reaches in particular, is almost exclusively based on educational qualifications. That our

---

[1] On the politicalist position, see R Westfall,"Business Management under Nasser,"Business Horizon, Vol.vⅡ(1964) pp. 73-84, James Heaphy, "The Organisation of Egypt: Inadequacies of a Non-Political Model for Nation-Building," World Politics, Vol.XVⅡ (1966) pp.177-193 and David Apter, The Politics of Modernisation (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965) pp.162-163 See also A.M.Carr-Saunders,"Professionalisation in Historical Perspective"in Howard M.Vollmer and Donald L.Mills (eds.) Professionalisation,(N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1966),p.46.

respondents were appointed on the basis of their educational qualifications can be seen from the fact that the vast majority of them have received a higher education and indeed the legal requirement of a higher education for the highest posts make this fact even clearer. (2) That members of the Egyptian bureaucratic elite seem to be committed to the civil service as a career. That the members of the Egyptian bureaucratic elite are committed to government service is best seen perhaps in the fact that the majority of them have been in the government service for over 16 years. Moreover, for most this appears to have been a way of life going back to the very beginning of their careers in the civil service. This pattern extends back to parental generations, for a majority of their fathers, and indeed their grandfathers, it will be recalled, were civil servants. (3) That a socialist organisation of the economy does not necessarily lead to the politicisation of its bureaucratic and managerial elite.[1]

These, then, in brief are the two chief positions on the character of the Egyptian bureaucratic elite. Plausible as their underlying logic may appear, what evidence is there to warrant their support? This part of our study will be concerned with the professionalisation of the Egyptian bureaucratic elite. The political orientation of the Egyptian bureaucratic elite will be dealt with in the next part of this study.

Some items were included in the questionnaire intending to measure the degree of professionalism among our respondents.

Membership in professional associations has usually been a useful measure of professionalism. As the data revealed, 81 per cent of our respondents belong to one professional association or another. As far as the comparison over time is concerned, professionalisation, as measured by membership of professional organisations has been increasing in Egyptian

---

[1] For a recent statement of the professionalist position, see A.Fouad Scherif, Developing New Managers for the Socialist Sector in the U.A.R. (Cairo: National Institute of Management Development, September,1965). See also Frederick Haribson and Charles Myers, Management in the Industrial World, (New York: McGraw Hill, 1959), pp.160-168 and Vollmer and Mills, op.cit., p.46

bureaucracy, since smaller percentages (70 per cent) of Berger's respondents indicated that they were members of such organisations.[1]
Yet, when our respondents were asked: Do you think civil servants should have their own professional society, such as doctors, lawyers and engineers have? A larger percentage (65 per cent) indicated that they were in favour of such a society, as opposed to 35 per cent who were not in favour of such a society. This finding is somewhat surprising in view of the fact that a larger percentage of Professor Berger's respondents, namely 82 per cent indicated that they were in favour of such a professional society.[2] This finding must, however, be interpreted carefully in view of the kind of reasons the respective respondents gave. As a matter of fact, Professor Berger points out that in the case of a professional society for civil servants, his respondents see such a society primarily as a means of self-protection rather than as an expression of professional position, for 91 per cent of those advocating one, say they do so because civil servants need an organisation of their own to protect their economic interests. About 5 per cent stress that an association's function might be related to raising the professional standards of government workers.[3] In contrast, our respondents gave greater stress to the raising of professional standards as a goal achieved by organising civil servants. The emphasis on self-protection of the civil servant himself is not as strong as that found in Professor Berger's respondents.

Here are some of the replies from our respondents who favoured a professional society.

(1) Because some positions in the civil service are so vulnerable to personal and political pressures.

(2) To help communication, improve professional standards as well as social activities.

---

[1] Berger, op.cit., p.12.

[2] Ibid.,p.127.

[3] Ibid.,p.128.

Table X.3

Respondent's Reasons for Favouring a Professional Society

(Longitudinal Comparison)

Reasons to favour a Professional Society	Percentages: No of Cases in Parentheses	
	Egypt 1954[1]	Egypt 1975
To protect our interests	90.7	60
Right or freedom of Association	00.0	4
All workers should be in union	4.9	6
To raise professional standards	4.4	30
Total	100.0 (204)	100.0 (260)

Source: (1) Berger, Bureaucracy and Society, op.cit., p.128.

As noted earlier, slightly more than one third of our respondents were against such a professional society because the diversity of job types found in the civil service would make a mass association more of a union than a professional society. As one of our respondents phrased it: "Problems and responsibilities of civil servants differ widely. They have nothing to gain from a mass association."

Thus, there is a clear indication that our respondents are more professionally oriented than Berger's respondents. This can be expalined perhaps, in terms of educational attainment of the respective respondents in the two studies. So far as university education is concerned, our respondents have a slightly higher percentage, 94 per cent, holding a bachelor degree than that of Berger's respondents, which was about 87 per cent. Yet 40 per cent of our respondents had graduate degrees. This is, perhaps, indicative of the increasing professionalisation and specialisation of the Egyptian higher civil service as its functions become more complex. Moreover, the higher level of educational attainment has been helpful in developing favourable attitudes towards professionalism in so far

as our respondents are concerned. This is exactly what the data revealed
when membership of professional associations was used as a measure of
professionalism. Indeed, an overwhelming majority, more than 90 per
cent of those with university or advanced degrees, were also members of
professional associations, meaning that they scored high on professionalism,
as measured by membership in professional associations.

Further evidence of the degree to which our respondents express
conformity to the aforementioned norms of professional behaviour appears
in their responses to other items in the questionnaire designed to measure
the degree of professionalism.

The following are the statements which were posed to our respondents,
asking them to express whether they agree or disagree with each of them.

(1) It is unfortunate but true that there are very few people
     around me with whom I can share my professional interests.

(2) I could not let my friendships in the community stand in
     the way of moving to a higher position.

(3) My goal has always been to become the head of a small
     organisation that I could guide over the long run.

Table X.4 shows the percentages of the responses to these items.

Table X.4

Measures of the Degree of Professionalism
of Egyptian Higher Civil Servants

Items on Professionalism	Percentages: No. of cases in Parentheses
1. I disagree that there are very few people around with whom I can share my professional interests .	67
2. I agree that I could not let my friendship ties in a community stand in the way of moving on to a higher position.	72
3. I disagree that my goal has always been to become the head of a small organisation that I could guide over the long run .	64 (400)

As far as our respondents are concerned, Table X.4 is indicative of their professional orientation. One would argue, on the basis of these data, that our respondents espouse more professional values than Professor Berger's respondents. This seems to be the case when one uses the professionalism index as a more accurate guide. The professionalism index was made up of the items included in Table X.4 as well as the items dealing with membership of professional associations. Table X.5 shows the distribution of our respondents on the professionalism index.

As the data revealed, 53 per cent of our respondents scored high on the professionalism index. As far as Professor Berger's respondents are concerned, about one third of them scored high on the professionalism index. Although the professionalism index as used in the present study and that of Professor Berger are of a somewhat different nature, it might, nevertheless, be argued that our respondents emphasise professional values to a greater extent than those of Berger. Moreover, it will be recalled

Table X.5

Distribution of Respondents on Professionalism Index

Index position	Percentages: No. of cases in Parentheses
Low (0	2
(1	13
(2	32
(3	28
High (4	25
Total	100
	(400)

that in the case of membership of professional associations and indeed in the kind of reasons given by the respective respondents for favouring professional associations, the results suggest a more professional attitude.

That the membership of professional associations is conducive to the development of professional attitudes could be widely seen by the results obtained when the professionalism index was cross-tabulated with membership of such associations. Thus, 97 per cent of those belonging to professional associations were high on the professionalism index, as opposed to 33 per cent of the non-members who also fell under the high professional category.

Another index of the professionalism of an occupation is the extent to which universities give courses and degrees to prepare students for it. In the United States, for example, the universities have established many courses in public administration, give advanced degrees in it, and set up graduate courses in this field. In Europe, the universities themselves grew in response to the needs of government for trained public officials. In Egypt, as noted in Chapter V, the universities have served as providers of public officials; yet even though they are state institutions, they have hardly touched the field of public administration per se. The field of accounting, economics and administrative law are relatively well developed in Egypt, but the field of public administration is not. However, after the 1952 Revolution, four training institutions were established with a view to raising the professional standards of public officials. These institutions are: the Institute of Public Administration; the National Institute of Management Development; the Institute of Local Administration; and the Executive Conference Programmes, an off-shoot of the Central Agency for Organisation and Administration. In 1970, it was reported that three Institutions (excluding the Institute of Local Administration) offered general and specialised administrative training programmes for about eight thousand public officials and higher civil servants. It will be recalled, moreover, that about half of our respondents have received one or more of such programmes.

The Element of Specialisation

Specialisation is another structural bureaucratic characteristic. It is primarily the end product of the division of labour and different- iation of functions, a fundamental feature of modern complex organisation and the societies within which they operate. The idea involved here is that "organisation tasks are distributed among the various positions as official duties".[1] Weber considered the element of specialisation as an important principle. According to his theory, specialisation through its emphasis on expertise, which is actually the concept definition employed in this chapter, contributes a great deal to the efficiency of the organisation.

Yet, the concept of specialisation can be viewed as having two connotations. It can refer to "specialisation of jobs and duties and to specialisation of men".[2] The former meaning, as already pointed out, implies differentiation of functions, which leads to departmentalisation and hence to a functional relationship of roles. The latter, that of specialisation of people, is closer to the meaning of specialised education, competence and qualifications for office.

Writers on bureaucracy have suggested that "the structure of organisation must provide for a functional relationship of organisational roles".[3] An administrative system is "specialised" if it is differentiated, has a number of ministries or departments dealing with specific functions and have various governmental agencies or units established to carry out such functions.[4] So far as the present chapter is concerned, the above

---

[1] Blau and Scott, op.cit., p.196.

[2] Victor P. Thompson, Modern Organisation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf., Inc. 1961), p.33.

[3] Ferrel Heady, Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., Foundations of Public Administration Series, 1966) p.20.

[4] Blank, op.cit., p.32

definition of specialisation will be considered as a "given". It is assumed that the administrative system of Egypt is specialised and differentiated in the sense that specific ministries, departments and agencies carry out certain governmental functions. In this section an attempt will be made to operationalise the second element of the concept, the one referring to the specialisation of men.

There are two types of items in the questionnaire that can be used in measuring the respondent's degree of specialisation: (1) specialised education or educational attainment and (2) functional specialisation of the respondent.

The respondent's level of education has been discussed in an earlier section, and a rather great difference was found between those with university degrees and those with less than university degrees with regard to professionalism, as measured by membership of professional associations.

Another measure of specialisation is whether the respondent has received administrative training. It will be recalled that 47.5 per cent of our respondents had received such training since they obtained their first government positions. Among this group, the proportion of high professionals is much greater than among the group who had not such training, the two proportions being 75 per cent and 35 per cent, respectively.

In so far as functional specialisation of our respondents is concerned, 60 per cent of our sample indicated that they were generalistic, i.e., administrators, as opposed to 40 per cent who indicated that they were specialists, i.e., technicians. It was hypothesised that the specialists espouse more professional values than the generalists. This is exactly what the data suggest. Among the specialist group, the proportion of high professionals is greater than among the generalist group, the two proportions being 55 per cent and 30 per cent, respectively.

The Element of Organisational Size

Size is the fourth structural feature of bureaucracy. As a

characteristic of bureaucracy, size has its roots in Weberian theory. Weber conceived bureaucracy as a structure that is capable of tremendous expansion. Yet, it was a group of contemporary theorists that gave a new impetus to it. Blau's recent theory implies it, while Robert Presthus considers large size to be a part of the characterisation of modern bureaucracy.[1] Such theorists conceive size in terms of secondary group relationships. Impersonalisation is not only a consequence of size but also of a number of other factors such as professionalism etc., all of which contribute to the complexity of modern bureaucratic structure. In other words, any "size sufficient at least to assure a network of secondary group relationships"[2] is considered as adequate for the purposes of this study. Moreover, what actually constitutes "large" is not truly known.

There are several ways to operationalise the concept of size. For example, number of employees in each ministry, department or agency is probably the most common. Others include the total number of persons in national bureaucracies as compared to the total work force of the country, as well as the rate of total bureaucratic salary expenditure.[3] So far as this study is considered, the former measure will be used, namely, the total number of employees in each ministry where each respondent happens to work.

There were three items in the questionnaire dealing with the dimension of size. The first question deals with the number of employees under the respondent's direction. The second question refers to the number of subordinates reporting directly to the respondent, while the third question pertains to the actual size of the organisation in terms of the total number

---

[1] Blau and Scott, op.cit., pp.60-62. Also Robert Presthus, The Organisational Society (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1962), p.28 and Robert Merton, op.cit., p.370.

[2] Heady, Public Administration. A Comparative Perspective, op.cit., p.21.

[3] For the operationalisation of the concept of size, see Blank, op.cit., p.21

of ministry employees in which the respondent happens to work. It is this
last item that has been primarily used in this analysis and especially in
cross-tabulations. The main reason for selecting this question was its
reliability. A number of respondents in answering the previous two items
had put down some enormous numbers. The results of all three items are
presented in the following table. So far as the number of employees
reporting directly to the respondent is concerned, the table shows that
slightly more than half of the respondents have less than 15 subordinates
reporting directly to them. With regard to the number of employees under
the respondent's direction, a larger percentage (54 per cent) have less
than 150 people under their direction. The rest of them have more than
150 and quite a few of them over 200 employees. When it comes to the third
item, which was a closed question, (the respondent was asked to mark the
groups of employees his ministry had), the results show that a larger

Table X.6

Organisational Size and its Measures

Measures of Size	Percentages: No. of cases in Parentheses
A. Number of Subordinates reporting directly to respondent	
Under 15 people	51
Over 15 people	49
Total	100
B. Number of Employees under respondents' direction	
Under 150 people	54
Over 150 people	46
Total	100
C. Number of Ministy Employees	
Under 5,000	36
Over 5,000	63
Not known	1
Total	100
	(400)

proportion, (63 per cent), of the respondents were working in ministries which had more than five thousand employees. Thus, it may be suggested that the majority of our respondents work in ministries of a large size. This can be explained in terms of the phenomenal growth of the Egyptian bureaucracy, particularly after the promulgation of the Socialist Laws of 1961. As far as Professor Berger's study on the Egyptian higher civil service is concerned, there are no comparable data pertaining to the size of Egyptian ministries in which his respondents happened to work.

Organisational Goals

The final structural characteristic of bureaucracy is the one pertaining to organisational goals. Blau conceives bureaucracy in terms of achievements of its purpose.

> Bureaucracy, then, can be defined as organisation that maximises efficiency in administration, whatever its formal characteristics, or as an institutionalised method of organising social conduct in the ·interest of administrative efficiency.1

Besides the goal of efficiency, which is primarily a technical or administrative goal, organisational goals have taken numerous other forms. They have been identified with the goals of the organisation's owners, with those of the top management or with those who possess legitimate authority to direct the organisation. But Professor Simon points out that such a definition of organisational goals raises a number of problems, especially when it comes to its operationalisation. Many times organisation-al decisions do not coincide with those of the owners, or top management, whatever the case might be. On the contrary, they are modified at the various levels of administrative hierarchy in order to fit specific needs. To face this difficulty, Professor Simon offers the following suggestion:

---

[1] Blau and Scott, op.cit., p.17. See also Rolf M.Stogdill, "Dimensions of Organisation Theory," in James D.Thompson, Approaches to Organisational Design (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1966), p.8.

"The first step toward clarification is to maintain a distinction between goals, on the one hand, and motives on the other. By goals we shall mean value premises that can serve as inputs to decisions. By motives we mean the causes, whatever they are, that lead individuals to select some goals rather than others as premises for their decisions."[1]

The important thing of such an observation is that goals are not viewed as abstractions but rather as parts of the organisational role. As previously indicated, organisation roles are structural elements. Under the principle of the division of labour, roles are specified within the organisation and are assigned to individuals. Such role assignments simply imply certain sets of constraints upon the individual which actually help him in identifying his role. According to Professor Simon, whose definition has been employed in this study, organisation goals refer particularly to such constraints. In this sense, an organisational goal is not something monolithic, dominating the whole structure. Rather, it is a value or premise evident in a particular organisational role. That is why the organisational goal has been considered as a structural feature of bureaucracy. However, to try to identify these values and premises that influence organisational decisions could be a separate study in iteself. Such goals and their identification will be considered as "given" and only their clarity and goal accomplishment as understood as major organisational goals by the respondent will be emphasised and investigated in the present analysis.

Two items in the questionnaire, those pertaining to clarity and accomplishment of goals, were used to operationalise this dimension. The responses to these questions are presented in the following table. As the data show with regard to the clarity of organisation goals, where the first category has been considered as high, 71 per cent of the respondents fell in that grouping, suggesting that the majority of Egyptian higher civil servants have a clear conception of their ministries' goals. The remaining

[1] Herbert Simon, "On the Concept of Organisational Goals," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol.IX (1964), p.3.

Table X.7

Measures of Organisational Goals

Responses to Questions	Percentages: No. of cases in Parentheses
Clarity of Organisational Goals:	
Very clear	71
Reasonably clear	23
Fairly clear	5
Very unclear	1
Not known	0
Total:	100.0 (400)
Goal Accomplishment:	
Very high accomplishment	17
High accomplishment	46
Moderate accomplishment	35
Low accomplishment	1
Very low accomplishment	0
Not known	1
Total:	100.0 (400)

categories have been classified as less clear. In the case of goal

accomplishment, those in very high and high accomplishment categories

have been considered as one group, scoring high on the goal accomplishment

measure. Sixty-three per cent of our respondents fell in the high goal

accomplishment grouping. It is evident, then, that the majority of the

respondents tend to score high on both clarity and accomplishment of

ministry goals although the percentage of goal clarity is little higher

than that of goal accomplishment. Perhaps this can be explained in terms

of an individual's organisational position. A higher-ranking civil servant

will tend to be more familiar with the accomplishments of his ministry's

goals than another person at a lower organisational level merely because

he is responsible for the realisation of such goals. This became evident

when the respondent's organisational position was cross-tabulated with goal

accomplishment, with the highest percentage, 72 per cent of our respondents occupying higher posts fell in the high goal accomplishment category.

Since both questions were intended to measure the same dimension, one would expect a positive relationship. This is what the data revealed. About 70 per cent of the respondents scoring high on clarity were also high on goal accomplishment, while the largest percentage of those low on clarity were also low on accomplishment of organisational goals.

Relationships Among The Structural Bureaucratic Elements

In this section of the chapter an attempt will be made to identify possible relationships among the various structural elements of bureaucracy and also test some hypotheses. There is an extensive body of literature dealing either directly or indirectly with structural bureaucratic features. Although a unified empirical model is virtually non-existent, there has been a considerable amount of empirical work done in this area. It has primarily been centred in the Weberian bureaucratic model, and it has drawn heavily from the structural characteristics of bureaucracy as they are presented and discussed by Weber. Professor Udy's work, for example, is of particular importance here because of his constant effort to focus upon the structural elements of bureaucracy and also to use empirical data in operationalising them.[1] Based on existing literature, one can expect that the elements of hierarchy and professionalism are positively related to each other. In other words, a highly developed hierarchical structure will require some degree of professionalism because of the existence of specialisation and departmentalisation. As will become apparent very shortly, the existence of one structural characteristic is conducive in some cases to the development of another and vice versa. Hence structural elements tend to be interrelated to one another.

---

[1] Consult primarily the following items. (1) Stanley H. Udy, Jr., op.cit., p.791, (2) his "The Structural of Authority in Non-Industrial Production Organisations," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol.LIV (May, 1959), pp.582-584, (3) his "Administrative Rationality, Social Setting and Organisational Development," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol.68 (1962-1963), pp.299-308.

Hierarchy and Professionalism

As already mentioned, one would expect a person scoring high on hierarchy also to score high on the element of professionalism. When the hierarchy index was cross-tabulated with that of professionalism, this is exactly what the data revealed. There is a tendency for a statistically significant relationship between those structural elements. It was found that the majority of our respondents, 74 per cent of those scoring high on the hierarchy index, were also high on the professionalism measurements, as opposed to the 36 per cent of those low on hierarchy who fell in the high category of professionalism. Moreover, 64 per cent of those low on hierarchy fell in the low positions of the professionalism index.

A similar relationship tends to emerge when the index of hierarchy was cross-tabulated with another measure of professionalism, that of membership of professional associations. It was found that 88 per cent of our respondents falling in the high position of the hierarchy index were also members of professional associations and thus scoring high on this measurement of professionalism, as opposed to the 76 per cent of the respondents scoring low on hierarchy who were also members of professional associations. On the other hand, 24 per cent of the respondents low on the hierarchy index also fell in the non-member category, which means that they scored low on this dimension of professionalism. Again, these results suggest a tendency toward a positive relationship between the two dimensions.

Hierarchy and Functional Specialisation

It could be hypothesised that hierarchy and functional specialisation are related to each other. As already indicated, the respondent's functional specialisation (i.e., specialist or generalist) has been used as a measurement of specialisation. The data show a statistically significant relationship between hierarchy and the respondent's functional specialisation. The highest percentage of those low on the hierarchy index (56 per cent) fall

in the specialist group, meaning that they score high on the dimension of specialisation (functionally defined), as opposed to 24 per cent of those high on the hierarchy index who fall in the same group. On the other hand, the highest percentage (76 per cent) of those scoring high on the hierarchy index belong to the generalist group. Thus the data suggest that specialisation (functionally defined) tends to be negatively related to hierarchy. Such an association may be explained in terms of specialists' occupations. Specialists' occupations often involve a great deal of educational specialisation. Because of the high degree of specialisation, professional people are usually specialists and therefore staff members of one form or another. Since they possess technical power they will tend to disfavour the existence of administrative or hierarchical authority. This is exactly what Professor Blau and his associates have suggested in view of their findings in bureaucracies. As stated:

> "The inverse relationship between professionalisation and central-
> isation means, after all, nothing else than that a professional
> staff is usually accompanied by a large and dispersed managerial
> component;... The effectiveness of a professional staff, in sum,
> depends on its being complemented by an adequate managerial
> component and in larger organisations also by an adequate adminis-
> trative component."[1]

It is evident that specialisation of men or "professionalism" to use Professor Blau's term, tends to be negatively related to hierarchy. Again this is something that has·been accepted by a number of scholars and has also been confirmed by our data.

However, as we have seen earlier in this chapter, the elements of hierarchy and professionalism showed a tendency toward a positive relationship between each other. The main question that can be raised at this point is: What actually do these findings mean? Again one must turn back to the definitions of the concepts involved and the way they

---

[1] Peter Blau, Wolf V Heydbrand, and Robert E Stauffer, "The Structure of some Bureaucracies," <u>Administrative Science Quarterly</u>, Vol. XXXI (April 1966), p.19

have been operationalised. Stanley Udy, for example, has pointed out that hierarchical authority structure (hierarchy) and administrative staff (professionalism) tend to be positively related to each other.[1] Other students of bureaucracy have indicated a tendency towards an inverse relationship between professionalism (defined in terms of university education) and centralisation (existence of a hierarchical structure).[2] This problem of conflicting results can be explained in terms of both theoretical frameworks used and methodological measurements employed. More specifically, Udy's theoretical formulations as well as his empirical studies tend to come closer to the structural elements of bureaucracy and thus to a purely structural definition of the concept. His ideas of "hierarchical authority structure" and administrative staff, very Weberian in both content and form, are in broad terms equivalent to those of hierarchy and professionalism incorporated and employed in this chapter. The hierarchy index developed in the present study leans rather heavily on the existence of a hierarchical structure rather than attitudes towards it, while the professionalism index (at least about three-quarters of it) is rooted in professional attitudes rather than mere educational and occupational specialisation, as is the case with Blau's work mentioned earlier (which is much closer to the relationship between hierarchy and specialisation). Thus, it can be safely stated that hierarchy and professionalism, defined in structural terms and operationalised accordingly, tend to be positively related to each other.

Hierarchy and Size

Another relationship one might expect among the structural elements of bureaucracy is the one between hierarchy and organisational size. Again,

---

[1] Stanley H. Udy, Jr., "'Bureaucracy and Rationality' in Weber Organisation Theory: An Empirical Study," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. XXIV, No. 6 (1959), p.743

[2] Blau, Heydebrand and Stauffer, op.cit., p.179-191

from existing bureaucratic theory and research one could hypothesise that these two variables are positively associated to each other. A highly developed organisational structure with clear patterns of hierarchical authority would require a large organisation set up. In the same vein, large organisations would tend to promote a more rigid hierarchical pattern with detailed rules and regulations, impersonalisation and some degree of red tape. As hypothesised, "the larger the size of the organisation, the greater the number of sub-groups in it, the greater the overall emphasis on formal and impersonal rules and specificity of rules."[1]

Based on the previous indications, the element of hierarchy was cross-tabulated with that of size. The results suggested that there is a tendency for a positive relationship between those elements. The highest percentage (78 per cent) falling under the higher position of the hierarchy index, work in large ministries with more than 5,000 people, as opposed to 48 per cent for those respondents scoring low on the hierarchy index who work in the same size ministries. On the other hand, the highest percentage of those low on the hierarchy index, namely 52 per cent work in smaller ministries with less than 5,000 employees. Thus, it may be suggested that administrative complexity and extended role relationships seem to be related to the structural elements of hierarchy and the pyramidal organisations.

Hierarchy and Organisational Goals

When the hierarchy index was cross-tabulated with goal clarity and goal accomplishment, none of the relationships were significant. Not even when the respondent's organisational position was used as a control variable. It was hoped since individuals occupying higher level positions

---

[1] Stanley Udy, Jr., "The Comparative Analysis of Organisations," in James G. March (ed.), <u>Handbook of Organisations</u> (Skokic, Illinois: Rand McNally and Company, 1965) p.693

tended to be clear on organisational goals and the degree of accomplishment of such goals, that when organisational level was held constant, people scoring high on hierarchy would also tend to score high on goal clarity and accomplishment. But how can this lack of relationship between the hierarchy and organisational goals items be explained? As a matter of fact, Professor Balu defines bureaucracy in terms of its 'purpose' alone, which means that some sort of an organisational "goal" is involved in the establishment of any organisation. Moreover, Professor Heady views "goal" as a peripheral element of that hierarchy rather than as a separate structural entity in itself.[1] Based on these discussions, one would expect the elements of hierarchy and organisational goals to tend to be related to each other, since goal has usually been viewed as a part of the pyramidal structure. However, as we have seen earlier, the data tend to suggest that this is not the case. A possible explanation that can be offered for the lack of relationship between those two structural elements is that of Professor Simon's thesis. Professor Simon is one of the few advocates of organisational goal as a separate entity and variable in itself. He tries to isolate such a dimension and also measure it.[2] Perhaps, then, organisational goals are separate elements in themselves which can be singled out and studied separately.

Specialisation and Size

One would expect large organisations, i.e.,ministries, to have more specialised people than smaller organisations. The results suggest a positive relationship between the variables. The respondents with university degrees or more as well as the majority of specialists tend to

---

[1] Ferrel Heady, <u>Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective</u> (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc. 1966) p.21 where the structural elements of bureaucracy are discussed but no reference is made to organisational goals.

[2] Herbert Simon, "On the Concept of Organisational Goal," <u>Administrative Science Quarterly</u>, Vol. IX, No 1 (June, 1964), p.1

be found in larger ministries. More specifically 98 per cent of the respondents of the ministries with over 5,000 employees were university graduates or held graduate degrees, as opposed to the 90 per cent of those in smaller ministries who belonged to that category. With regard to the respondent's functional specialisation (generalist vs. specialist) such a relationship is less clear.

Specialisation and Organisational Goals

When the dimension of specialisation, as measured by the respondent's level of education and his functional specialisation, was cross-tabulated with that of the organisational goal, namely goal clarity and accomplishment, none of the relationships emerged as significant. The explanation is two-fold. The two items used to measure specialisation pertain to the individual's personal achievements, in the sense that he is either an educated person or not, or he is either a specialist or not. On the other hand, the dimension of goal is purely organisational and has very little to do with the respondent's personal characteristics and achievements. Considering these two dimensions in personal versus organisational terms, there is very little, if any, theoretical basis for anticipating a relation-ship between the two dimensions. Secondly, a theoretical explanation, which is very closely related to the previous one, can also be taken into consideration. The concept of goal is purely organisational; it is some-thing that exists separate and apart from the individual. Goal is related to the purpose and policy of the organisation, i.e. ministry, as a whole and is not necessarily a part of the individual's interest and objectives. As it has become apparent, "organisational goal" is a very complex concept, and something that can be influenced by such factors as personal organisat-ional, and environmental elements.[1] Moreover, it involves not only organisation theory but also role behaviour, motivation and decision making

---

[1] Richard L Simpson and William H Gulley "Goals, Environmental Pressures and Organisational Characteristics," _Administrative Science Quarterly_, Vol.XXVII, (1962), p.344.

theory as well, to name but a few.[1]

Professionalism and Size

One would expect a positive relationship between the two elements. For example, a larger ministry would tend to have more professionally-oriented people than a smaller one. The hypothesis holds true in so far as our respondents are concerned. The largest percentage of our respondents, i.e.,78 per cent, falling in the member category (indicating a high score on professionalism, as measured by membership of professional associations) worked in larger ministries of more than 5,000 employees, while 48 per cent of the non-member category (indicating a low score on professionalism) fell in that group. Such a positive relationship is understandable. Larger ministries are more specialised than smaller ones. These are the organisations which are more likely to employ highly specialised and, thus, more professional people. Moreover, this result is also consistent with the earlier one pertaining to the relationship between size and specialisation (as measured by respondent's level of education).

Professionalism and Organisational Goals

· When the dimension of professionalism and organisational goals were cross-tabulated, none of the relationships emerged as statistically significant. Considering the previous result in connection with specialisation and organisational goals, such an outcome is not surprising.

Organisational Size and Organisational Goals

It could be hypothesised that organisational goals and size are negatively related to each other. For example, it seems that members of a smaller ministry will be familiar with the ministry's goals and their accomplishment than the members of a larger ministry. The fact is that size tends to alienate employees from the goals of a large ministry, while, on the other hand, in smaller ministries, officials will tend to be familiar with such goals, since there are less people involved and personal

---

[1] Simon, op.cit., p.1

relationships are more likely to develop. This hypothesis is confirmed by the results of our data. The highest percentage (79 per cent) of those respondents working in smaller ministries (5,000 employees or less), scored high on the clarity of goals as well as goal accomplishment categories, as opposed to the 63 per cent of those working in larger ministries who fell into the same categories. This is evidently an indication of a negative relationship between the two dimensions.

CHAPTER XI

THE BEHAVIOUR OF THE HIGHER CIVIL SERVICE

One of the primary aims of this chapter is the identification of the behavioural patterns of the Egyptian bureaucratic elite. Moreover, an attempt will be made to identify the relationships between the structural and behavioural dimensions as they appear in the present study. In defining bureaucracy, its structural elements were considered as "givens", and also as universal features of bureaucratic organisation. The behavioural dimensions of bureaucracy are the dependent variables. They are important features useful in distinguishing one bureaucracy from another within a cross-cultural context and comparing the same national bureaucracy over time.

Before we identify and analyse the behavioural patterns of the Egyptian higher civil servants, however, it will be useful to examine a related matter; the definition of "attitudes" and "activity". Both concepts are related to human behaviour. It has been correctly pointed out that:

> The term "attitudes" is being used here very broadly to cover all kinds of states of mind of organisation members; their definitions of the organisation's goals, their personal values and preferences, their norms concerning specific organisational roles, their perceptions of the organisation's characteristics, their satisfaction with their jobs and with the organisation.[1]

The discriminatory aspect here is that attitudes are primarily "states of mind", not actual behaviour. As such they can influence behaviour tremendously in view of the fact that human values and attitudes play an important role in human behaviour. Two basic assumptions related to this are: (1) the views expressed by actors reflect underlying values and attitudes; (2) values and attitudes are formed in the process of

---

[1] Allen H. Barton, _Organisational Measurement and its bearing on the Study of College Environments_ (New York: College Entrance Examination Board, 1961) p.42.

the actor's participation in the learning experiences, which in turn
take place in the socialisation process during which the individual
is influenced by outside factors such as familial, communal,
educational and societal ones. Yet, it is through occupational
channels that the individual enters, perhaps, a new social organisation
dominated by a different set of values and attitudes which in turn exert
an influence on the newcomer. This is why a person's occupation can
also be viewed as a learning process. It is also another part of the
whole socialisation process.

In the light of the above discussion, it is evident that attitudes
can be studied more easily than actual behaviour; they can, therefore,
be extremely helpful in behavioural bureaucratic theorising and in
comparative administrative research.

Activity has been defined as "individual behaviour in organisation-
al roles."[1] In other words, activity refers to the actual behaviour of
a person as related to the specific role he plays in a social system.
The point which needs to be emphasised under the present dichotomy is
that the definition of the role (attitude) as conceived by the
organisation members, and his actual behaviour (activity) in carrying
out such a role are two factors of vital importance in empirical
research. Human behaviour is very complex. Individuals do not always
behave the way they believe they should. Their definitions of roles
and their actual behaviour are often two different matters altogether.
In such a case, the attitude-activity dichotomy is important. It
should be clear that this study focuses primarily upon bureaucratic
attitudes rather than actual behaviour. However, through a study of the
attitudes of Egyptian higher civil servants, some light will be shed on
their behavioural patterns.

Within this theoretical framework of attitudes, an attempt will

---

[1] Ibid., p.53.

be made to identify some behavioural patterns of the Egyptian bureaucratic elite.

The Dimension of Continuity and Precision

The behavioural feature of continuity and precision is primarily related to the idea of rules and regulations governing the conduct of the individual bureaucrat. In analysing their characteristics of precision and continuity more closely, two elements could be identified: (1) privacy, referring to the idea that certain issues which are vital to the organisation's survival are not usually disclosed to the public. With regard to the public bureaucracy, where the problem of security can be crucial, not only privacy but the element of secrecy becomes of vital importance so far as bureaucratic behaviour is concerned,[1] and (2) discretion (or initiative) pertaining to both organisational and individual flexibility in the process of carrying out organisational policies. Actually, it is within this general context that Professor Blau's purposive behaviour becomes of great significance to the study of bureaucracy and bureaucratic elite. Professor Blau, considering the element of rationality in a bureaucratic organisation, points out that such assumption is irrational because it ignores the non-rational aspect of human conduct. He ably states that:

> "Rather than considering it an administrative system with
> particular characteristics it may be preferable to follow
> another lead of Weber's and to conceive bureaucracy in terms
> of its purpose. Bureaucracy, then, can be defined as
> organisation that maximizes efficiency in administration,
> whatever its formal characteristics, or as an institutional-
> ised method of organising social conduct in the interest of
> administrative efficiency."[2]

I. The Dimension of Privacy

As far as the dimension of privacy is concerned, only one question

---

[1] Carl Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1950), p.55.

[2] Peter Blau, Bureaucracy in Modern Society (New York: Random House, Inc. 1955), p.60.

was incorporated in the questionnaire, asking "Do you agree or disagree with the idea that it is sometimes necessary for public officials to keep information from being disclosed to the public?" About 65 per cent of our respondents answered in the affirmative. It should be noted at this point that the principle of secrecy and various attitudes related to it vary from country to country, and indeed, within the same country from time to time. This is true in so far as Egypt is concerned. Considering the severe secretive nature of Nasser's era in Egypt, the present research could not have been carried out earlier. Generally speaking, however, the principle followed by Western countries is that all administrative activities and documents shall be secret unless and until the government chooses to reveal them. "The public has no right to know the manner in which the Government is carrying out its trust. To the average citizen, the civil service is anonymous, faceless, and impervious."[1] Yet, governmental secrecy and administrative privacy usually seem to be a matter of degree rather than quality, for example, the Swedish principle of public access is rooted in the country's constitutional document and seems to be much more liberal than the Western European or even the American equivalent. In the case of Egypt, our respondents have indicated that administrative secrecy is not only a well understood issue but it is something which is generally well accepted by the state officials.

The impression gained by the present writer during interviews is that although the majority agree with the idea that sometimes public officials must keep information from being disclosed to the public, yet, they generally feel that more information, not considered as being secretive in nature, must be disseminated. Here are some of the typical reasons given for this general feeling on the part of the bureaucratic

---

[1] For a related discussion see Donald C. Rowat, "The Problem of Administrative Secrecy," International Review of Administrative Sciences, Vol. XXXII, No. 2, (1966), p.99.

elite in Egypt.

(1) The public must know and see the results of government programmes. This can be achieved by disseminating more information to the public.

(2) People who are aware of the civil servant's accomplishment respect him. The ill-informed do not. The whole issue of disseminating more information on civil service activities is closely related to the morale as well as the behaviour of civil servants.

When an attempt was made to identify the various characteristics of the respondents scoring high or low on the dimension of privacy, it was found that none of the respondents' background (age, socio-economic status, education etc,) seemed to be a factor. No comparable data are available, since the element of privacy is not included in the theoretical framework of Professor Berger's study of the Egyptian higher civil service.

II. The Dimension of Initiative - Discretion

In any organisation there is a specific authority allotted to each position in the hierarchy control. Those lower in the hierarchical structure are formally subordinate to those above them. Authority, as defined by Chester Bernard, is exercised when a subordinate permits his behaviour to be guided by a superior's orders, without a detailed examination by the subordinate of the relative merits of the decision.[1]

In reality, authority is usually a mixture of control, suggestion and persuasion.[2] The subordinate will accept the superior's authority up to a certain limit, then he will rebel. "Restraint of the superior is as important as obedience of the subordinate in maintaining the relationship."[3]

Besides the dualistic nature of the authority relationship, one

[1] Chester Bernard, The Function of the Executive, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938), p.163.

[2] Herbert A Simon, Administrative Behaviour (New York: Macmillan & Co 1958), p.12.

[3] Ibid., p.134.

must also take into account secondary or informal structurings which develop within the formal control structure of a bureaucracy.

"The organisation is not only a formal hierarchy; it is also an informal hierarchy on a line with the numerous social hierarchies which characterise social life. A break of hierarchical laws brings about disapproval, and, in certain cases, social sanctions."[1]

The formal structural element, hierarchy, as defined and employed accordingly in the last chapter, seems to make little allowance for the dualistic nature of authority. But a behavioural dimension of bureaucracy, discretion (or subordinate initiative), describes the subordinate side of the authority relationship.

To what extent do we find indications that high public officials dislike delegating authority and responsibility or that their subordinates fear to exercise initiative and responsibility in the Egyptian bureaucracy, or for that matter other, nations' bureaucracies?

It will be recalled that of the respondents questioned about the nature or kind of supervision in their organisations (i.e., too close, satisfactory, about right, or not close enough), a majority of our respondents, 77 per cent indicating that present supervision is satisfactory.

In all bureaucracies, the broad problem of initiative and discretion must be faced and resolved to some extent. Both our respondents as well as Professor Berger's respondents seem to stress initiative as a highly desirable quality. In both studies, Egyptian higher civil servants were asked which of the following characteristics described the best higher civil servant, (1) one who follows rules and regulations literally; (2) one who uses initiative in interpreting them; and (3) one who uses strong initiative and broad discretion without seriously

---

[1] Paul Mayer, _Administrative Organisation_ (Copenhagen: Stevens and Sons Ltd, 1957), p.165

violating the regulations. The responses to this question for the

two Egyptian studies are present in the following table.

Table XL1

Descriptions of a Higher Civil Servant

Which Respondents Thought Best

Description	Percentages: No. of Cases in Parentheses	
	Egypt - 1954[1]	Egypt - 1975
(1) One who follows regulations literally	1	11
(2) One who uses initiative in interpreting regulations	32	38
(3) One who uses strong initiative without seriously violating regulations	67	51
Total	100	100

Source: (1) Morroe Berger, Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p.156

Cross-culturally, the Turkish higher civil servants appear some-

what more reluctant to use strong initiative, for two-thirds of them

preferred the middle position of initiative without undue risk.[1]

The evidence, then, indicates that in replying to a direct

question, the majority of Professor Berger's respondents tended to re-

veal a unanimous preference for the type of higher civil servant who uses

his own initiative in conducting public affairs. However, their

responses to other less direct questions do not reveal such a wide

preference in the application of personal initiative. Moreover,

Professor Berger found some inconsistency in so far as initiative as a

behavioural trait of Egyptian higher civil servants is concerned. In

---

[1] Frederick T Bent, "The Turkish Bureaucracy as an Agent of Change,"
Journal of Comparative Administration (May, 1969), p.51.

some instances, he indicates that "among the Egyptian higher civil

servants there is a greater desire to exercise personal initiative

than is acceptable or customary in the Egyptian public bureaucracy."[1]

Still, in some other instances, Professor Berger concludes that

"the Egyptian higher civil servant are apt to "play it safe" by avoid-

ing responsibility whenever possible, rather than to act independently

within their authority."[2] Professor Bent found the same inconsistency

so far as the Turkish higher civil servants are concerned.[3] In contrast,

our respondents do not demonstrate this consistency, or to say the

least, the same degree of inconsistency. In an attempt to identify

the degree of discretion and initiative, our respondents were asked: In

carrying out the functions and responsibilities of your position about

how often do you find it reasonable and necessary to deviate from some

policy or procedure in order to do a more effective job? Around 55 per

cent of our respondents indicated that "occasionally" they find it

necessary to do so. About 40 per cent tended to deviate frequently

or fairly often, while only 5 per cent hardly ever found it reasonable

, to deviate from some policy or procedure in order to do a more effective

job. Thus, it might be suggested that our respondents tend to favour

the exercise of initiative and discretion little more than they are

willing to practice it. In other words, when it comes to real situations

where they have an opportunity to use their initiative, quite a size-

able proportion of our respondents are willing to do so. The majority

of them do not try to "play it safe."

Broadly speaking, the students of bureaucracies are more likely

[1] Morroe Berger, Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p.163.

[2] Ibid., p.161.

[3] Bent, op.cit., pp.51-52.

to find a division in opinion involving situations such as those posed by Professor Berger and Bent to their respective respondents where strong, conflicting loyalties clash. Personal initiative is approved by public officials in some areas of bureaucratic operations, but a degree of hierarchical, formal authority is also expected by the higher officials in order to make the civil service responsible for the programmes which the public or legitimate political authorities entrusted to it. Someone has to answer for the proper operation of these public programmes. Those with the responsibility to act must have the authority to enforce the implementation of their acts. Hierarchy and discretion cannot be viewed as structural elements, as they were in Professor Berger's study and for that matter, Professor Bent's study of the Turkish higher civil servants.[1] Hierarchy and discretion appear to be contradictory. Above all discretion can hardly be considered as a structure element of the bureaucracy. As previously indicated, this is primarily the major weakness of Professor Berger's theoretical framework. However, by separating the two, i.e., the structural and behavioural elements of bureaucracy, a more significant study and thus a better understanding of bureaucracy and bureaucratic elite can be achieved. More specifically, any hierarchical structure does not automatically preclude the behavioural traits of discretion. A big, heavily built young man is not necessarily a heavy-weight champion. He may or may not be one, depending whether he uses his potentialities or not. The same reasoning can be applied to types of hierarchical structures. A very rigid bureaucratic hierarchy, e.g. the army leaves no room for initiative, yet a less rigid one can end up being a "company of equals", a structure primarily found in the universities of the

---

[1] It is significant to note that Professor Bent used Professor Berger's theoretical framework as a base for the study of Turkish higher civil servants, see Bent, op.cit., pp.47-63

modern Western world.[1]

Having this theoretical premise in mind, a number of items, the
most important of which has already been discussed, have been cons-
tructed and included in the questionnaire intended to measure the
degree of initiative and discretion as far as our respondents are
concerned. Thus, an effort was made to construct an index of initiative
and discretion of the items which are presented in the following table,
along with the most favourable responses.

Table XI.2

Measures of Initiative - Discretion

of Egyptian Higher Civil Servants

Items	Percentages: No, of cases in Parenthes**s
1. Existence of either frequent or fairly often deviation from procedure of policies. .	40
2. Strong personalities influence ministry decision making.	13
3. There is enough authority to decide things,	70
4. Percentages of respondents preferring the type of higher civil servant who uses some or strong initiative.	89
	(400)

Since the items included in the above table tend to measure the
same dimension, i.e.,initiative-discretion, an index of initiative-
discretion was developed incorporating all these items. Table XI.3
shows the distribution of our respondents on the index of initiative-
discretion.

---

[1] Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation,
trs. by A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1947) pp.59-60.

Table XI.3

Distribution of Respondents on Initiative-Discretion Index

Index position	Percentages: No. of cases in Parentheses
Low { (0 (1 (2	2 23 44
High { (3 (4	25 6
Total	100 (400)

As table XI.3 shows, slightly over two-thirds of the respondents scored low on the initiative-discretion index, while 31 per cent of them scored high on the same index.

With regard to the characteristics of those scoring low or high on the index, age seemed to play some role. About 75 per cent of the older individuals, above 50 years old, fell in the low category of the discretion index, as opposed to the 49 per cent of the younger age group, those under 50 years old. The data with regard to education were less clear, although a tendency seemed to exist for people with less than university education to score low on the initiative-discretion index. The tendency of older respondents to score low on discretion can perhaps be explained in terms of their governmental positions. Older individuals have been longer in the governmental service, and, thus, because of their seniority, tend to occupy higher governmental positions and perhaps because they themselves are important parts of the organisational structure. As a result, they tend to resist the use of initiative, something which affects them directly in connection with their relationships to subordinates.

The Dimension of Objectivity

One of the basic behavioural characteristics of the bureaucratic elite refers to the concept of objectivity, which is presumably a consequence of professionalism and expertise, and which emphasizes competence and neutrality in treating people both within the organisation itself and outside of it. Thus, the concept of internal objectivity refers to the former case, and external objectivity refers to the latter. Some items of the questionnaire were designed to measure the degree of objectivity among our respondents. Since some of these items are also included in Professor Berger's study, there is excellent opportunity to compare the degree of objectivity among Egyptian higher civil servants over time. It should be noted, however, that although comparable data pertaining to single items are available, the same or similar items were not used to measure the same theoretical concepts. A good example is the element of objectivity. According to Professor Berger's theoretical construct, objectivity is actually a part of his idea of "rationality and universalism" (emphasising competence in recruitment) which in turn is a part of his Bureaucratic Scale.[1] It is apparent that objectivity is considered by Professor Berger as a behavioural feature of bureaucracy, but it is combined with another structural element, i.e. the element of hierarchy, in his Bureaucratic Scale. As already noted, this and similar theoretical formulations have attracted a considerable amount of criticism of Professor Berger's theoretical construction.

Before we consider our respondents' responses as well as those of Professor Berger's responses to items intending to measure the element of objectivity, however, it would be useful to examine briefly a related matter, the concept of objectivity and rationality from a comparative viewpoint.

---

[1] Berger, op.cit., p.49.

Professor Berger elaborates at some length upon the relationship between a culture's primary ethical and societal norms and the patterns of bureaucratic behaviour manifest within the public bureaucracy of that culture. He reminds us that certain Western bureaucratic characteristics, e.g.,fairness, honesty, efficiency, and individual responsibility, seen as moral issues, have evolved historically within the Western culture. When these Western organisational standards are super-imposed on a non-Western culture, conflicting loyalties, from primary social groups within that culture and from the expected patterns of behaviour demanded in a modern bureaucracy, are bound to clash. Western bureaucratic norms represent different value systems for those administrators coming from a traditional society in the Middle East. The degree to which the officials of the government have separated themselves from traditional relationships for the newer, impersonal social roles which are supported by institutional and popular expectations marks the degree of "Westernisation" occurring in the society. A Western bureaucracy demands (not always successfully as we shall see shortly) "a certain impersonal attitude on the part of the official toward all who come before him . . . In the Near East, people are not yet accustomed to looking upon others impersonally in any situation."[1] The impersonality and lack of traditional relationships, which Professor Berger hypothesizes in Western bureaucracy are not as evident in this bureaucracy as one might expect from reading Professor Berger's analysis of the contrast between Middle Eastern and Western bureaucracies.[2]

Competing loyalties exist in the most professionalised Western bureaucratic institutions. Even if primary loyalties (i.e. traditional familial, political friendship . . . etc) are overcome in favour of

---

[1] Ibid., pp.117-118.

[2] Ibid., pp.114-118.

secondary (i.e. organisational goals) competing, conflicting patterns
of behaviour still emerge within the bureaucracy.[1]

Major social theorists have drawn particular attention to the
necessity of exploring the individual's subjective conceptions of the
social action. Max Weber, used the term "ethos" to describe the
dualistic nature of social action. Each man's participation in his
society involves a personal commitment both to the behaviour patterns
and to the material and ideological interests of his particular social
group. While the Western bureaucrat works within an institutional
context which requires certain expectations of standardised behaviour
patterns, he also belongs to a social organisation of fellow bureaucrats
and to a kinship organisation with blood ties and obligation. The
values he places on these various norms in his individual, subjective
evaluations will determine to some extent the action he will take in
particular situations. To understand his behaviour, one needs to know
the meaning (Weber calls it _Sinn_) that a man associates with his actions
in a society.[2]

Looking at the Western and Egyptian bureaucracies from a
comparative viewpoint, it would seem that in both cases, the civil
servant is torn between primary loyalties and secondary loyalties, e.g.,
organisational and bureaucratic loyalties. What is the difference
between the American concept of "pull" and the Egyptian concept of
wasta , i.e., deference to relatives or friends? Perhaps the more valid
distinction is in the matter of degree; how frequently do particular-
istic relationships have preference over universalistic ones and how
important are the situations in which particularistic relationships
are favoured?

---

[1] Roy Francis and Robert Stone, _Service and Procedure in
Bureaucracy_ (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1956), p.125.

[2] Reinhard Bendix, _Max Weber:An Intellectual Portrait_ (Garden City,
New York: Doubleday and Co, Inc. 1962), p.489.

Having reviewed the concept of objectivity from a theoretical

and comparative perspective, we now turn to a discussion of the items

devised to measure the degree of objectivity among our respondents and

to compare the findings with those reported by Professor Berger in so

far as his study of the Egyptian higher civil service in 1954 is

concerned.

It will be recalled that of our respondents questioned about a

number of factors, other than education and experience, that should be

considered in recruiting people in the civil service, more than three-

quarters (i.e., 79 per cent) indicating that such factors as religion,

wealth, political belief, etc., should not be considered at all. As far

as Professor Berger's respondents are concerned, 59 per cent indicated

likewise.[1] It has been argued, however, that the recruitment process

of the Egyptian civil service is not based on the examination system to

any great extent.

The manner in which personal and familial loyalties conflict with

organisational or bureaucratic loyalties is well illustrated in answers

given by Professor Berger's respondents, and to a lesser extent, by our

respondents to an imaginary situation: "A civil servant is officially

informed that he is to be transferred from the capital (Cairo) where

he works to a new post in a rural area. He has no objections to serving

in rural areas, but he feels that he must be near his aged parents, who

cannot be moved away from the capital (Cairo), where they receive

medical treatment. He therefore approaches his superior, e.g., the

director general in the ministry, who is a close friend of his, and asks

the director general to keep him in the capital."

In this situation, where friendship conflicts with organisational

loyalties the respondents were asked: (a) whether the civil servant

---

[1] Berger, op.cit., p. 135-138.

could properly expect the director to keep him in the capital and
(b) if a similar situation arose, what do you think the director
would actually do in view of his obligation to both the government
and to the civil servant? In such a situation, the evidence indicates
that Professor Berger's respondents had a higher expectance of
personal favour than did our respondents, since 73 per cent of the
former as opposed to only 48 per cent of the latter supported such
particularistic considerations over universalistic values. An
interesting contrast emerges between the respective groups of respondents
when they were asked what the director would actually do in such cases.
Fewer of Professor Berger's respondents, 60 per cent, concede that the
civil servant would actually receive the personal favour than those,
73 per cent, who said he could properly expect the favour.[1] Conversely
slightly more of our respondents, 52 per cent admit the civil servant
would actually receive the favour than are willing to admit, 48 per cent,
that the civil servant can properly expect such favours. Perhaps it
might be suggested that the Egyptian data from 1954 indicate that
secondary loyalties, e.g. organisational values, appear to be hampering
primary loyalties, e.g. friendship ties, while the Egyptian data from
1975 indicate that the secondary loyalties in operation are being modified
by persistent primary loyalties.

When the situation above is then altered by making the civil
servant involved a cousin of the director, only 11 per cent of our
respondents indicate that such a civil servant has a greater right to
expect the director to keep him in the capital. In other words, an
overwhelming majority of our respondents feel that if a relative, e.g.,
a cousin, is involved, the "right" still remains the same. In contrast,
75 per cent of Professor Berger's respondents indicated that a relative,

---

[1] Ibid., p.142.

e.g., a cousin should be given special consideration and thus a favour to remain in the capital.[1] As a matter of fact, some of our respondents who thought a friend would receive favouritism were not as sure about a relative receiving the same benefits. The public is quicker to attach favouritism to relatives on the public payroll than personal favours to friends which is more difficult to detect. A number of our respondents said it was their policy not to have any relatives in their departments or even their ministries in order to avoid bad publicity.

A similar question involves favouritism in relationships with the public:[2] "Suppose a civil servant arrives at his office one morning and finds several persons waiting to see him, among whom is a close acquaintance of his. Is it proper to keep his friend waiting because others came before him?" A majority, 85 per cent of Professor Berger's respondents and 86 per cent of our respondents, agreed it was proper to keep the friend waiting. The reason universally given by our respondents was: the need for equality of treatment. However, in expressing their views on what the average civil servant would actually do, 49 per cent of our respondents thought the civil servant would receive his friends before others. As far as Professor Berger's respondents are concerned, the percentage is much larger, 85 per cent, indicating a higher degree of favouritism that tended to prevail in the civil services in the 1950's. In both studies, much more so in Professor Berger's than in our study, the ideal or correct bureaucratic behaviour diverges from the actual behaviour when friendship loyalties are involved. It is significant to note, however, that the prevalence of these strong, personalistic relationships has been discovered in other empirical studies of Western bureaucracies.[3]

---

[1] Ibid., p.143.

[2] Ibid., p.139.

[3] See, as an example, Francis and Stone, op.cit., p.130.

Generally speaking, the Egyptian data from 1954 suggest that the friendship and kinship loyalties are affecting bureaucratic behaviour to a greater extent than is evidenced by the data from 1975. It is a matter of degree. Our respondents expect to find more universalistic behaviour in this type of situation. This is exactly what our data revealed, when the objectivity index was constructed of 4 items intending to measure the degree to which our respondents express conformity to the aforementioned norms of objectivity; emphasis upon competence and rationality in treating people both within the organisation itself and outside of it. These items have already been discussed. Table XI.4 shows the distribution of our respondents along the index of objectivity.

Table XI.4

Distribution of Respondents on Objectivity Index

Index position	Percentages: No. of cases in Parentheses
Low (0 (1 (2	2 15 27
High (3 (4	32 23
Total	100 (400)

As Table XI.4 suggests, 55 per cent of our respondents fell in the high position of the objectivity index. Although this could not be considered as an overwhelming majority, nevertheless, it does suggest that the respondents express adherence to certain qualities intending to describe an individual's traits called objectivity.

Some Relationships Between the Structural and Behavioural
Dimensions of Higher Civil Service

Having identified the structural elements of Egyptian bureaucracy

and the behavioural characteristics of Egyptian bureaucratic elite,

we now turn to a discussion of some relationation between these

variables.

The structural dimension of bureaucracy seem to be of a more or

less universal nature; but the behavioural characteristics are not.

It is at this point where comparative bureaucratic theory enters the

picture. Although bureaucratic behaviour can be influenced by the type

of the organisational structure, a host of ecological elements, such as

the social and economic; system do play a vital role in the way in

which such individuals behave. Bureaucratic behaviour will tend to

vary from culture|depending upon the environment within which it
_{tó culture}

operates. This is why the structural-behavioural dichotomy has been

considered as a useful theoretical tool in the study of bureaucracy and

bureaucratic elite. Moreover, it can be useful in the development of

comparative bureaucratic theory and administration, and in future

empirical research.

Hierarchy and the Behavioural Characteristics of Egyptian
Bureaucratic Elite

The element of hierarchy - a structural element - does not seem

to be related to that of objectivity - a behavioural one, since almost

equal proportions of those high or low on hierarchy score high or low

on objectivity, too. No association between the two features was

discovered even when the data were controlled for such variables as

the respondent's level of education and his organisational positions.

Originally it had been expected that hierarchy would be negatively

related to the element of objectivity. An individual emphasising

hierarchy and favouring a rigid hierarchical structure would tend to

disfavour objectivity. Such a person would emphasise authority in

organisational procedures, and, thus, be less concerned perhaps with objectivity. Yet, the data suggest no relationship between the two features.

It should be noted from the theoretical and comparative point of view, that Professor Berger had incorporated both dimenisons, e.g., hierarchy and objectivity, into his Bureaucratic Scale, which was intended to measure bureaucratic behaviour.[1] Although he used the term "nationality-universalism", he evidently had in mind objectivity, because he defined his concept in terms of objective recruitment and emphasis on competence. However, he viewed both elements as behavioural ones. If such reasoning were correct, one would expect the two items to be highly correlated to each other because they would measure the same dimension, bureaucratic behaviour or bureaucratism. Our data do not seem to point in the direction. Phrased differently, hierarchy and objectivity do not seem to be components of the same dimension. This strengthens previous criticisms related to Professor Berger's theoretical formulations. Perhaps in operationalising his concepts he used dimensions contradictory to each other and has grouped hierarchy (a structural element) and objectivity (a behavioural feature) together under the label of bureaucratic behaviour.

The elements of hierarchy and discretion-initiative do not seem to be related to each other, since almost equal proportions of those high or low on hierarchy score high or low on discretion-initiative, too.

In trying to interpret the above result, it should be remembered that Professor Berger combined these two dimensions (e.g. hierarchy and initiative) in his Bureaucratic Scale, and he was severely criticised for doing so. He labelled as "bureaucratic" a pattern of behaviour which emphasised the prerogative of position, the authority of the

---

[1] Berger, op.cit., p.49.

superior officials, and the obedience of the subordinate.[1] Further-
more he combined this attitude towards hierarchy with one emphasising
the use of initiative-discretion which Robert Merton considers as
dysfunctional. As already pointed out, "it is unlikely that the two
norms, e.g., hierarchy and initiative-discretion would be found to-
gether."[2] Based on this and similar discussions, it has been
hypothesized that the elements of hierarchy and initiative would not
be related together. This is exactly what the data revealed.

Professionalism and the Behaviour Characteristics of Egyptian Bureaucratic Elite

When the professionalism index was cross-tabulated with that of
objectivity, a strong positive relationship was found between the two.
The highest percentage, 82 per cent of those scoring high on the
objectivity index also fell into the high category of the profession-
alism index. On the other hand, about 35 per cent of those falling
high in the high category of professsionalism were low on objectivity,
and 65 per cent, the highest percentage of those scoring low on
objectivity, also scored low on the professionalism index.

Such a positive relationship between the two items can be easily
explained. It is understandable that an individual who has developed
certain favourable attitudes towards professionalism will also have a
tendency to put them into practice. It is fairly well known that an
emphasis upon professional attitudes will tend to lead to the develop-
ment of objectivity on the part of the person in dealing with other
people. As a professional, he will tend to emphasise professional
standards and competence, and, thus, treat people in/objective way.
This is actually what the data suggest and reveal.

---

[1] Morroe Berger, "Bureaucracy East and West," Administrative
Science Quarterly, Vol. I (March, 1957), p.523

[2] Ferrel Heady, "Bureaucratic Theory and Comparative Administration,"
Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol.III(March,1959), p.522

Turning now to the relationship between professionalism and discretion, the data suggest a positive relationship between these two elements. The highest percentage, 75 per cent of those scoring high on the discretion-initiative index also fell in the high category of the professionalism index. On the other hand, 39 per cent of those falling in the high category of professionalism were low on the discretion-initiative index, and 61 per cent, the highest percentage of those scoring low on discretion-initiative, also scored low on the professionalism index.

In concluding the discussion of the relationships between the structural elements of the Egyptian bureaucracy·and the behavioural characteristics of Egyptian bureaucratic elite reference should be made to the original issue stemming from Professor Berger's study of the Egyptian higher civil servants, namely, the relationship between "his" professionalism index and "his" bureaucratic scale. Professor Berger pointed out that:

> "Although professionalism and bureaucracy are usually said
> to be closely related in the West, this relationship does
> not necessarily hold in other culture . . . When we try
> to compare bureaucratic and professional predispositions
> in the East and the West, we find that there may be
> differences of attitudes and behaviour in spite of the
> similarity in structure. As in other realms, similarity
> of structure and form, often the results of cultural
> diffusion, does not mean similarity of institutional
> or behavioural patterns. [1]

The above quotation is very suggestive. First of all, it should be noted that "professionalism" and "bureaucracy" are the key concepts in the whole theoretical construct of Professor Berger's study of the Egyptian higher civil servants. The relationship between his Professionalism Index and his Bureaucratic Scale becomes the essence of the whole of Professor Berger's study. The findings pertaining to his Bureaucratic Scale and his Professionalism Index did not confirm

---

[1] Berger, "Bureaucracy East and West," op.cit., p.529.

Professor Berger's expectations, i.e. that these two elements would be positively related to each other. He found that among those high on professionalism, about 38 per cent were high on the Bureaucratic Scale, while among those low on professionalism, again about 38 per cent were high on bureaucratic orientation.[1] From this, he concludes, as the above quotation indicates, that although professionalism and bureaucracy are usually said to be closely related in the West, this relationship does not necessarily hold in other cultures (e.g., Middle Eastern Culture). As far as the latter part of Professor Berger's conclusion is concerned, our data and results tend to suggest that he was wrong. However, some clarifications should be made before any firm conclusion can be reached.

First of all, there is a need for conceptual clarifications, for example, there is no problem involved with the concept of professionalism. Professor Berger defines it in terms of skill, service, and self-protection. All three have been accepted in our study. However, when it comes to the concept of bureaucratic behaviour, a bureaucratism, a conceptual difference emerges. More specifically, Professor Berger defines it in terms of rationality-universalism, hierarchy and discretion. All these items, except hierarchy, have been viewed as behavioural elements in the present study. Hierarchy, however, has been defined in structural terms. This conceptual difference naturally leads to a methodological difference.

As far as the methodological difference is concerned, the professionalism indexes, as used in the respective studies, are not indentical. Yet, both have been devised to measure the same dimension. When it comes to the bureaucratic scale, the methodological differences tend to appear clearly. Professor Berger has used one scale, i.e.,

---

[1] Ibid., p.528.

the bureaucratic scale, to measure a multi-dimensional concept. His Bureaucratic Scale focuses upon all three concepts, namely, hierarchy, rationality-universalism (or objectivity), and discretion. All three have been operationalised separately in our study. Therefore, the only way the relationship between professionalism and bureaucratic behaviour can be identified is to look at the association of professionalism to each of the three bureaucratic elements incorporated in the respective studies.

As previously indicated, Professor Berger suggested that professionalism and bureaucracy are not closely related in other cultures, e.g., Middle Eastern Culture, in view of his findings pertaining to the lack of relationship between his Bureaucratic Scale and his Professionalism Index.

As far as the present study is concerned, the results present in this part, suggest that professionalism is positively related to the elements of hierarchy, objectivity and discretion, all of which, it will be recalled, were incorporated in Professor Berger's Bureaucratic Scale.

Thus, it is fair to say that Professor Berger's theory formulations and his operationalisation of the concepts involved were so inadequate and improperly organised that the resulting misinterpretations of the data were inevitable. As aptly stated, "Berger's inconsistent findings were a product of his instruments rather than a reflection of some intrinsic weakness of the Western bureaucratic model."[1]

---

[1] Robert V. Prestbus, "Behaviour and Bureaucracy in Many Cultures," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. IV, (Winter, 1959), p.35

.PART FOUR

THE POLITICAL AND MODERNISING

ROLE OF THE EGYPTIAN BUREAUCRATIC ELITE

INTRODUCTION TO PART FOUR

In part three, an attempt has been made to focus upon the internal aspects of Egyptian bureaucratic organisation and especially those related to bureaucratic behaviour. Yet, bureaucratic behaviour can hardly be understood separately from the environment which influences it. It is at this point that the concept of ecology of administration or perhaps an even broader one, that of "culture" enters the picture. Administrative culture is the product of the political, economic and social culture of the society within which it operates. In other words, ecology becomes fundamental in the study of administrative systems, in general and comparative bureaucratic theory, in particular.

With regard to the study of the external aspects pertaining to the ecology of Egyptian bureaucracy, the present part of the study will concentrate on some important aspects of the relationship between the Egyptian bureaucratic elite and the immediate environment of the Egyptian bureaucratic structure, namely, that of the political system. The interview material and the discussion with the Egyptian bureaucratic elite will help us to analyse and assess the political and modernising roles of the Egyptian bureaucratic elite in the light of the theories and models concerning the role of bureaucracy in political development. Thus, in Chapter XII, and attempt will be made to present and evaluate the theories of Riggs and Diamant relating to the role of bureaucracy in developing countries with a view to presenting a theoretical perspective for the analysis and evaluation of the political role of the Egyptian bureaucratic elite. Chapter XIII will be concerned with some fundamental questions, viz:

1) What type of relationship exists in Egypt between the bureaucratic elite and other political institutions, and why?

2) What is the position of the Egyptian bureaucratic elite in

relation to the revolutionary regime and its leadership?

3) What role does the Egyptian bureaucratic elite play in

policy-making, if any, and why?

4) Is the Egyptian bureaucratic elite playing an important

role in political development, and if so, why?

Since there has been little work done on the Egyptian higher

bureaucracy, we cannot answer these questions / From the interview data

definitively .

we may, however, offer some tentative answers.

In Chapter XIV, an attempt will be made to explore the perceptions

of the Egyptian bureaucratic elite on the process of development and

modernisation with a view to assessing its modernising role. In

evaluating the views of the Egyptian bureaucratic elite, the present

researcher was most interested in its perceptual and/or interpretive

frameworks of the develppmental and modernisation process and whether

or not their frameworks include common rules and values for the

building of consensus on important issues.

CHAPTER XII

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BUREAUCRATIC

AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT: A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

The role of bureaucratic elites in political development and modernisation has been a major concern for the scholars in the field of comparative public administration. Yet, comparative public administration is torn by a continuing debate over the nature of the role of bureaucratic elite in the political system and, more generally, the nature of the realtionship between bureaucratic and political development. This debate, as Martin Albrow reminds us, is hardly novel, having been a prominent topic of nineteenth century social thought.[1] But in the contemporary era, especially in a period of heightened interest in the politics of "third world" nations, the debates over the role of the bureaucratic elite and the relationship between political and bureaucratic development are particularly heated.

At the heart of this debate is the observation that development is a process of "leads" and "lags" - - that various parts of society change at different rates, with attendant delays in the required adaptations.[2] "It is . . . characteristic of the new states", Donald Kingsley writes, ". . . that they come into the world equipped with a baffling and contradictory assemblage of modern and traditional institutional limbs."[3] Both sides in this debate agree that an imbalance between bureaucratic and political development confronts today's less

---

[1] Martin Albrow, Bureaucracy (New York: Praeger, 1970).

[2] David R.Segal "Differential Institutional Development in Transitional Society," Journal of Developing Areas, Vol. IV (January 1970), pp.157-172

[3] J. Donald Kingsley, "Bureaucracy and Political Development, with Particular Reference to Nigeria," in Joseph La Palombara (ed.) Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p.302

developed nations. Michael Lofchie, among others, characterises the

lag between bureaucratic and political development in these terms:

> "First, in a large number of new states, representative
> institutional structures . . . are characterised by extreme
> weakness and fragility. Second, the bureaucratic sector,
> possessing high functional capability and high relevance
> to economic development, has gained an overwhelming degree
> of influence over government policy."[1]

What are the implications of political, bureaucratic imbalance,

particularly for the prospects of political development? Ajami and

Sours see the issue as whether the relationship between political and

administration (or bureaucratic) development is "symmetrical" or

"asymmetrical".[2] But such an understanding can only confuse the issue,

for, as it might be noted, developmental asymmetry is the "given" at

the core of the debate. The debate centres on how to interpret this

asymmetry, with the battle lines drawn between those who see bureaucratic

modernity as a facilitator of political development, and those who see

it as an inhibitor. These arguments are summarised in Figure XII.1

The "Facilitator" Position

As Figure XII.1 indicates, those who take the "facilitator"

position argue that the present imbalance between bureaucratic and

political development merely reflects historical realities, especially

the influence of Western systems on currently developing nations. Many

nations were exposed to the Western influence by their colonial

experience. The legacy of the colonial powers' heavy reliance on

bureaucracy as an instrument of political control, juxtaposed with the

tenuous institutionalisation of self-governance mechanisms, have

produced the current political-bureaucratic imbalance. Even in those

---

[1] Michael F. Lofchie, "Representative Government, Bureaucracy and Political Development: The African Case," Journal of Developing Areas, Vol. II (October 1967), pp.39-40.

[2] F. Ajami and M. Sours "Political and Administrative Development: Symmetrical or Asymmetrical Growth?" Journal of Comparative Administration Vol. III (May, 1971), pp.119-128.

Figure XII.1

The "Facilitator" and "Inhibitor" Positions

	"Facilitator" Position	"Inhibitor" Position
Present Situation	Historical Legacy → High Bureaucratic Development ↓ → Low Political Development	Historical Legacy → High Bureaucratic Development ↓ → Low Political Development
Pre-dict-ion	High Bureaucratic Development → High Political Development	High Bureaucratic Development → Low Political Development

nations which did not experience colonial rule, or in those where the colonial experience is historically distant, the infleuence of Western patterns has been carried by technical assistance programmes.

According to this viewpoint, then, the present developmental imbalance is simply a product of peculiar historical circumstances, and will be corrected as political development takes hold. Moreover, the relatively high level of bureaucratic development in these nations will facilitate political development. As far as the "facilitator" position is concerned, two major approaches can be singled out, namely the capabilities approach and the socio-economic modernisation approach.

The "Capabilities" Approach: Analysts who take a "capabilities" approach to political development generally view bureaucratic development as a factor cementing enhanced political capacity. Ralph Braibanti, for example, holds that political modernity includes heightened capacities for representation, participation, integration, and administration. But what of the relationships among these components? Braibanti makes his priorities explicit:

"It is my assumption that administrative modernisation, while it depends ultimately on the larger process of politicisation cannot wait for the maturation of that process, but must proceed irrespective of it."[1]

Nor should concentration on developing administrative capacities aggravate the imbalance between administrative and political institutions:

"The stark realities of developing societies suggest the urgency of rapid administrative development which, if conditions of permeability are created, may result in diffusion of norms and technology into the larger political order, thereby enhancing the possibility of achieving more balanced political growth."[2]

In a similar vein, Gabriel Almond and G Bingham Powell have distinguished five dimensions of political capability; extractive, regulative, distributive, symbolic and responsive. Although administrative capability is not explicitly included in a dimension, the authors nevertheless consider modern administration to be vital to the developmental process:

"In a more specifically structural sense, it is predicted that higher capabilities depend upon the emergence of "rational" bureaucratic organisations. Thus, we predict that a system cannot develop a high level of internal regulation, distribution, or extraction without a modern governmental bureaucracy in one form or another."[3]

The Socio-Economic Modernisation Approach: A massive amount of empirical evidence suggests that the development of societal subsystems is highly inter-dependent. Working from these basic correlational findings, a number of analysts have proceeded to infer that political development is casually dependent on development in the other societal

---

[1] Ralph Braibanti, "Administrative Modernisation," in Myron Weiner (ed.) Modernisation: The Dynamics of Growth (New York: Basic Books, 1966), p.167.

[2] Ralph Braibanti, "Administrative Reform in the Context of Political Growth," in Fred Riggs (ed.) Frontiers of Development Administration, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1971), p.241.

[3] Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), p.323.

sectors.[1]

Whatever their shortcomings, these studies have emphasised, and correctly so, that political development is not an exclusively political process, but is shaped and constrained by other influences. Unfortunately, such shaping and constraining forces are often interpreted far too deterministically - - a situation which occasions charges of "economic determinism" and "loss of focus upon politics." But, it can be argued, many of these charges could be avoided if it were more generally recognised that socio-economic modernisation is itself dependent upon governmental stimulation. Thus, if it is accepted that governmental promotion and bureaucratic modernity are preconditions of modern socio-economic development, then bureaucratic development, mediated by its impact on socio-economic modernisation, would exert a powerful, though indirect influence on political development.

Both the capabilities and the socio-economic modernisation approaches, then, see bureaucratic development as a process facilitating the transition to political development. This influence, it is argued, is both proximal (focused directly on political development) and distal (mediated by economic, educational, and communicatory development). For these reasons, analysts who take the "facilitator" position are optimistic about the relationship of a bureaucratic and political development.

The "Inhibitor" Position

Analysts taking the "inhibitor" position agree that political bureaucratic imbalance reflects historical circumstances which are

---

[1] For a sample of the literature on this subject see, _The Passing of Traditional Society_, _Modernisation in the Middle East_ (New York: Free Press, 1958), Gilbert R. Winham "Political Development and Lerner's Theory: Further Test of a Casual Model, "_American Political Science Review_," Vol. LXIV (September, 1970), pp.810-818; Donald J. McCrone and C. F. Cndde, "Toward a Communications Theory of Democratic Political Development: A Casual Model," _American Political Science Review_, Vol. LXI, (March, 1967) pp.70-76, and Arthur K. Smith, "Socio-economic Development and Political Democracy" A Casual Analysis, _Mid West Journal of Political Science_, Vol. XXX (February, 1969), pp.92-125.

peculiar to "third world" nations. But, they continue, the imbalance
is hardly restricted to less-developed nations, in view of the fact
that the fragility of political institutions in the face of modern
bureaucracy characterises political systems at all levels of develop-
ment. In an era of increased governmental involvement in complex
economic and social issues, the unique resources commanded by
administrative systems (e.g., expertise, status, strategic position)
lead to ever greater dependence upon the administrative sector and
bureaucratic elites and to atrophy of political structures.

But it is not simply the indispensability of the bureaucracy and
bureaucratic elites which facilitates acquisition of increased
bureaucratic power. "If 'indispensibility' were decisive," Weber
wrote decades ago, "then where slave labour prevailed and where free
men usually abhor work as a dishonour, the 'indispensable' slaves
ought to haveheld the position of power . . . ."[1] It is rather their
unmatched high functional capacity and expertise which allow bureaucratic
elites and bureaucracies to dominate political systems. In Weber's
words:

> "Under normal conditions, the power position of a fully
> developed bureaucracy is always overtowering. The "political
> master" finds himself in the position of the 'dilettante' who
> stands opposite the "expert," facing the trained official who
> stands within the management of administration."[2]

Having described the power position of a fully developed bureaucracy
as "always overtowering", Weber called for greater emphasis on political
leadership, and advised politicians to resist any effort on the part of
bureaucrats to gain control.

Those who argue the "inhibitor" position would point that
bureaucratic development was unaccompanied by political development.

---

[1] H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (ed.), From Max Weber, Essays in
Sociology, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), p.232

[2] Ibid.

The prevalence of this pattern, they would assert, is a compelling evidence that modern bureaucratic systems, because of their tendancy towards political dominance, actually inhibit the prospects of political development.

To provide a theoretical perspective for the subsequent discussion and analysis, the models which Riggs and Diamant have offered for the study of comparative public administration will be utilised to help understand the political role of the Egyptian bureaucratic elite.

Riggs' Imbalance Model

Riggs is one of those scholars who take the "inhibitor" position. His imbalance thesis rests on the belief that while bureaucratic elites and bureaucracy have some political influence in every society, this role of bureaucratic elites and bureaucracy in politics is exceptionally strong in the transitional societies. The outcome is usually ominous for political development, a term meaning in the Riggsian thesis, specialisation and functional specificity, with the policy making centred in representative institutions. To Riggs, "development involves a gradual separation of institutionally distinct spheres, the differentiation of separate structures for the wide variety of functions that must be performed in every society.[1] From a larger perspective, Riggs considers that "the process of modernisation in the developing countries is marked by the progressive creation of formally distinct social structures, adapted from Western models, to which differentiated political and administrative tasks are assigned."[2] Such a definition, it may be argued, is concerned with the structure and function of the polity, but not very much with the output

---

[1] Fred W. Riggs "Bureaucrats and Political Development: A Paradoxical View," in La Palombara (ed.) Bureaucracy and Political Development, op.cit., p.122.

[2] Ibid., p.123.

side of the system. It requires certain types of institutions which would perform certain types of functions.

Although Riggs identifies different types of imbalanced politics, we are only concerned here with the type which is said by many analysts to be common among the developing countries, where bureaucracy is in a dominant position and the constitutive institutions are weak.

In order to support his thesis concerning the imbalance between administrative and political institutions, which he considers a basic feature of the developing countries, Riggs offers his historical analysis.

In their quest for change, the traditional societies acquired Western technology at various degrees of speed and in selected sectors such as military, agriculture, education and some others. These efforts affected the administrative institutions without any impact on the constitutive institutions which were left to the "natives".

In other cases, the colonial power created its own administrative institutions which are not subject to political control by the native political institutions. While these processes were taking place, the type of political leadership in these polities did not change and remained, to a great extent, traditional. This imbalanced situation was more obvious in the countries which were under colonial control. While the colonial administrations were able to create and develop bureaucracy, the political institutions lagged behind and were not able to control the bureaucracy. The reason for this, which still exists today, is that administrative matters are considered technical and foreign advice is accepted while advice in political matters is considered intervention. The need for modernisation in these societies increases the bureaucratic role in the society as compared to other political institutions, because bureaucracy is the only institution which is allowed to have foreign advice and assistance in order to implement

economic development and modernisation.[1]

The historical analysis by Riggs seems to be one-sided. The political institutions such as the parliament, political parties and others, were unable to develop, not just because the natives refused to accept advice from foreign advisors as Riggs advocates, but also because the colonial power denied the natives and their political institutions any political role. The British policy in Egypt caused many political crises which in part prevented parliamentary systems from being effective and establishing their roots in Egyptian political life. This policy of the British in Egypt is just an example of the colonial policy in all their colonies.[2] Therefore, it might be argued that Riggs ignores completely the interest of the colonial power in these nations, which could be undermined if the natives developed their political institutions. It is reasonable to say that the colonial powers not only refused to help their colonies to develop politically, but, sometimes, they deliberately weakened the development of representative institutions.

Having presented his historical analysis, Riggs goes on to discuss the relationship between this burgeoning of bureaucratic institutions and the course of political development. In discussing the relationship, Riggs limits his examination to the consequence of bureaucratic expansion in the political system.

For Riggs, to achieve effectiveness in policy execution it is essential to control the public bureaucracy and to make it an instrument

---

[1] Ibid., p.124-126.

[2] British colonial history in Egypt is a testimony to this, especially when the British Ambassador, on February 3, 1942, presented an ultimatum to King Farouk that Mr. Nahhas, the leader of the Wafd party, should form a new government. The British troops surrounded the Royal Palace which gave no choice to the King but to invite Mr. Nahhas to form a new government without any consideration to constitutional requirement. See P. J. Vatikiotis, The Modern History of Egypt (London: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1969), pp.348-349.

of government policy. The chief executive needs a power base outside
the bureaucracy in order to control and manage the public bureaucracy,
otherwise the bureaucratic power and its development would undermine
the position of the chief executive.[1] As will be argued later and
contrary to Riggs' analysis, the Egyptian bureaucratic elite is
closely identified with and influenced by the chief executive, i.e.,
the President, who has many bases of power. This close relationship
between the Egyptian bureaucracy and the chief executive enhances
the political role of the Egyptian bureaucratic elite. However, as
will be seen later, the Egyptian President's position vis-à-vis the
bureaucracy does not compare with Riggs' analysis and assumptions of
the bureaucratic ability to undermine the position of the chief
executive in the developing countries.

In order for political development (as he defines it) to take
place, Riggs believes, "there must be a balance of power between the
constitutive institutions and bureaucratic institutions."[2] We agree
with Riggs that bureaucracy needs control in order to ensure a high
level of administrative performance and to implement the policies and
laws effectively and efficienctly, but this control, it might be argued,
can come from other institutions such as the chief executive or a
strong one-party system. The source of this control is not important
as long as there is effective control by one or more political
institutions.

The legislative body is the political organisation which is
theoretically responsible for national governmental decision-making

---

[1] See Riggs, "Bureaucrats and Political Development. . .," in
La Palombara (ed.) Bureaucracy and Political Development, op.cit., p.158

[2] Fred W. Riggs, "Administrative Reform and Political Responsive-
ness: A Theory of Dynamic Balancing," Sage Professional Papers in
Comparative Politics, 1, ser. 01-010 (1970), p.578

and formulating the laws of the nation. To fulfil this role, according to Riggs, the legislative body must be representative of its constituencies and have the power and means to force the implementation of these laws by the governmental apparatus. For the legislative body to be strong and effective, it needs the support of the electoral system, political parties and interest groups. Riggs contends that, in the developing countries, bureaucratic control of local government is one of the reasons for the ineffectiveness of the electoral system. This weakness produces unrepresentative and unresponsive candidates to reflect the people's political "felt needs" and demands. Therefore, the legislative bodies in the developing countries become unrepresentative organisations which undermine their basic purpose.[1]

A vigorous political party is very important for the effectiveness and activities of the legislative body. Riggs concedes that a strong one-party system can control bureaucracy, but the decisions are usually made by the top leadership of this party and hence the legislative body becomes a rubber stamp of the party's policy. It is important for the legislative body to have a vigorous and loyal opposition in order to achieve an effective, parliamentary system.[2] In the case of the new nations, where bureaucratic development limits the spoils system, the opposition parties become less loyal and vigorous, due to the lack of incentives and rewards for their followers.

The last means of support for the effective and powerful legislative body is a proliferation of interest groups. These organised interest groups can aid and help the legislative body by their political support, articulating and communicating the demands of their groups to

---

[1] Riggs, "Bureaucrats and Political Development . . ," in La Palombara (ed.) Bureaucracy and Political Development, op.cit., p.146

[2] Ibid., p.146.

the decision-making organisation. Also they can offer very important information to the legislative body. Again Riggs places responsibility for the interest groups' weaknesses (and hence the legislative's weaknesses) on the bureaucratic elites in the new nations. According to him, they weaken the groups through the government's mobilisation process.[1] In the attempt to promote development, the government tries to mobilise all the society and co-ordinate the activities of the population.

With regard to policy-making power the legislative bodies in the new nations depend to a considerable extent, according to Riggs, on the bureaucratic elites for information and guidance due to the lack of a vigorous political party system and strong interest groups. Therefore, the initiative for new laws and policies comes mostly from the bureaucratic elite, thus enhancing its own role and increasing its power.[2]

In the final analysis, Riggs believes that the bureaucracies with their heavy weight of power in the new nations are responsible for the weakness of the legislative bodies, political parties and interest groups. It may be partly true that bureaucratic power has been a factor in the weakness of these political institutions. However, a more important factor, which Riggs does not consider, lies in the history and membership of these political institutions themselves.

During the colonial period, most members of these political institutions were not concerned with changes and modern processes in their society. They struggled among themselves for government position, but not over national political issues. Moreover, many interest groups in these nations draw their membership from people who had foreign origins (such as foreign investors in the business community) or belonged to minority groups.

---

[1] Ibid., p.147.

[2] Ibid., p.151.

The activities of these political institutions during the pre-independence period discredited them in the minds of post-independence leaders. Therefore, many new leaders in the developing societies are disenchanted with or opposed to these old political institutions and their members. It might be argued that the weakness of these political institutions and the attitudes of the bureaucratic elite towards them is at least in part due to the negative attitude of the new leaders towards these old political institutions, whose interests and policies have been so different from those of the leaders. Thus, it might be suggested that it is not simply the power of the bureaucratic elite which keeps these institutions weak, but the opposition of the new leaders in the developing countries who incorporate the bureaucracy into the mass movement regimes. In other words, it is in the nature of the revolutionary system of many developing countries which usually centres around a very strong and powerful chief executive and, sometimes, strong mass movement organisation, not the extent of bureaucratic power, that an explanation can be found for the weakness of the legislative bodies and the absence of "developed" political parties and interest groups in these countries.

In evaluating Riggs' theory one may wonder what "balance" of power really means and where one can draw the line between "balanced" and "imbalanced" systems. Riggs admits that it is hard to do so because it "requires an assessment of the relative power in the constitutive system and the bureaucracy."[1] Furthermore, he suggests that "the concept need not imply explicit equality of power but only an approximate equality."[2] In spite of that, one can see that it is hard to establish

[1] Fred W. Riggs, "Bureaucratic Politics in Comparative Perspective," in Riggs (ed.) Frontiers of Development Administration, op.cit., p.391.

[2] Ibid., p.391.

with precision an operationalised definition for the concept of "balance" and "power".

Richard Sisson questions Riggs' proposition which asserts a relationship between "balanced" politics and achievement of governmental programmes. To Sisson, this is just an assumption by Riggs which is not empirically demonstrated and there is historical evidence for both sides of the argument. Turkey, under Kemal Ataturk, with his dominant party, achieved a great deal of reform, such as educational reforms and many other achievements in spite of his "unbalanced" system.[1]

Moreover, Riggs lumps most of the new nations with their political and bureaucratic institutions together in one model. He does not recognise the great differences that exist between their bureaucratic institutions. Egypt is considered by many scholars to have a developed and centralised type of bureaucracy, which does not exist in many new nations. Also, not all bureaucratic elites take the same attitude and behaviour towards development. To this it may be added that the role of the political parties is not the same in all developing countries. The ASU in Egypt, for example, is not similar to the Baathist Party in Syria or Iraq. The latter party is more ideologically oriented than the ASU of Egypt.

Lee Sigelman, while recognising the lack of cross-cultural data on bureaucracies in developing countries, tests the imbalance thesis empirically. His test centres around the main argument of the imbalance theory - - that bureaucratic development effects bureaucratic over-participation or an increase of bureaucratic political role. Sigelman arranges the bureaucracy of the developing countries according to their degrees of bureaucratic development and their bureaucratic

---

[1] Richard Sisson, "Bureaucratic Politics in Comparative Perspective: A Commentary and Critique," _Journal of Comparative Administration_, Vol. I, (May, 1969), pp.37-44.

participation or lack of it, in political functions.

Sigelman finds that most of the relatively developed bureaucracies do not over participate in political functions - - only six (including Egypt and Turkey) out of thirty do overparticipate. Moreover, he finds that the great majority of the non-developed bureaucracies overparticipate in political functions.[1] Sigelman's findings are opposed to those of Riggs who takes the inhibitor position and who considers the relatively developed bureaucracy in the developing countries to be politically disfunctional and a hindrance to political development. Riggs' model, in spite of its difficulties and pitfalls, is a useful tool for studying bureaucracy and a step toward a more precise model.

Having examined and analysed Riggs' imbalance theory, we now turn to a somewhat contrasting approach to the political role of bureaucracy. This different approach is offered by Diamant's developmental movement regimes model.

Diamant's Developmental Movement Regime Model

Diamant is concerned with a special cluster of nations which he calls "developmental movement regimes". The main features of such a regime are its goals for development and its revolutionary mass movement which controls the polity and mobilises the society.[2]

In determining which countries are included in his model, Diamant uses two characteristics. The first is "political system goals" - - the major purposes that the system is trying to achieve. Diamant examines these goals without attempting to measure the success of various systems in accomplishing them. In terms of goals, a developmental system

[1] See Lee Sigelman, "Do Modern Bureaucracies Dominate Underdeveloped Politics: A Test of Imbalance Thesis," American Political Science Review, Vol. LXVI (June, 1972), pp.522-523.

[2] See Alfred Diamant, "Bureaucracy in Developmental Movement Regime" in Riggs (ed.) Frontiers of Development Administration, op.cit., pp.486-537. It is interesting to note that this model includes Egypt as one of its examples.

appropriate to his model is one in which the process of modernisation
is already started and modernising objectives are well established.
"Political system style" is the second characteristic Diamant uses
to identify the policies covered by his model. By "style" he means
the manner in which power is exercised and how decisions on public
policy are made. In the countries included in his model, the style is
that of a movement regime.[1]

Since political development, as Diamant perceives the process
and contrary to Riggs' definition, does not necessitate the establishment
of particular kinds of institutions and it can move forward, stop,
or be reversed, the matter of goals in particular political system
is of crucial importance. Diamant postulates that the two basic
political goals of developing countries are nation-building and socio-
economic progress.[2]

Leaders of these regimes attempt to make the developmental
ideology prevail over the whole society and to change the existing
traditional order. To do so, they mobilise resources, break old habits
and round up people for the new tasks, while using the still strong
traditional channels for their developmental purposes. In trying to
achieve their goals, the leaders become less tolerant of political
permissiveness and potential or actual coercion becomes evident. More-
over, the bureaucracy becomes subordinate to the policy-makers and the
leaders of the regime and high positions in government are given only to
the loyal individuals.

These methods and processes of mobilisation and coercion are
viewed in the "Movement Regime Model" as a result of the drive towards
developmental ideology. This may be an oversimplified construct. It

---

[1] _Ibid._, p.490.

[2] _Ibid._, p.512.

may be argued that the reasons why the leaders put a premium on coercion and sometimes make coercion appear necessary involve more than simply the drive for development. Diamant does not fully take into account two important factors: the desire for _fast_ change in these countries and the disenchantment of the political leaders with the parliamentary system which they experienced during colonial rule.

In the developmental movement regimes, political authority has mixed, co-existing elements of traditional, legal-rational and charismatic legitimacy. The nature of the mix-varies from one state to another.

Most of the time, the developmental ideology raises the expectations and demands of the people in the society. This factor makes leaders advocate centralisation in order to satisfy the demands of the people through the public-sector. Centralisation requires an increase of non-traditional authority which is essentially charismatic authority. Such authority bases its legitimacy on the public support for this charismatic leader, without much consideration for the existing institutions. This charismatic authority in developmental regimes not only co-exists with traditional elements of authority but also might require, in its initial period, some form of traditional sanctions.

In the "Movement Regime Model" a mass movement is considered to be an essential part of the developmental regime. The leaders of these polities try to make the developmental ideology prevail throughout society by mobilising the society towards these goals. The movement is open to all segments of the society and will have cellular structures at the level of the small community or village. It is here that the differences are very clear between a highly-organised movement such as in the Soviet Union, and the less-comprehensive types in the new states.

In the new states, the traditional leadership and residual values still retain great influence which presents serious obstacles to the

success of the mass movement's structure and could defeat the movement's attempts at total mobilisation. This was one of the reasons given by President Nasser when, in 1961, he changed the National Union to the Arab Socialist Union in order to eliminate certain members who were considered to represent traditional values. These traditionalists, according to President Nasser, were able to subvert the activities of the National Union from the inside.

Finally, in "Movement Regimes", the role of the charismatic leader is not crucial because the mass movement, according to Diamant, will be able to replace the charismatic leaders and demand the work and sacrifice from the people.

This contention by Diamant could undermine the basic assumption and purposes of his model. The "Developmental Movement Regimes" in Diamant's definition are those countries which do not include the Communist states and which have a less organised mass movement.[1] If we then follow Diamant's line of thought we are almost compelled to accept the conclusion that charismatic leaders are important in these regimes. How else can a "movement" get started? Most, if not all, of these countries did not institutionalise their political process and their movement is not well structured and developed. Moreover, in the "Movement Regime Model" the existence of differing degrees of mobilisation among the subsystems, plus the mixed types of authority, would lead us to believe that in these societies the efforts of modernisation are not accepted by all segments of the society. These phenomena make us wonder whether the movement can get the necessary support and sacrifices from the people without charismatic leaders.

The situation in Ghana after Nkrumah lost power supports our argument. His programme went into reverse after his fall because the

[1] Ibid., p.517.

people had been following his charisma rather than his philosophy.
What really makes Diamant's model different from the Communist model
is the weakness of the political institutions and the lack of a strong
doctrine in the new states. This leads us to conclude that charisma
is still important in many of these developing countries until they
firmly establish their political institutions.

Having introduced the main features of the development movement
regimes, Diamant attempts to spell out the characteristics of bureau-
cracy in these regimes.

To help fulfil particular crucial needs of the system of which
it is a part, the bureaucracy plays a very important role. The role
of bureaucracy is enhanced by the fact that government in these
polities has a very wide scope of activities. In view of its important
role, bureaucracy is expected to be loyal to the developmental ideology.[1]

In these polities the operation of bureaucracy is affected by the
movement regimes in many ways, the most important of which are the
efforts to mobilise the entire society. These efforts require a great
degree of involvement by the bureaucratic elite, which must be competent,
in the political process.

Moreover, bureaucracy must activate communication for political
participation and undertake other activities such as community
development and integration. Bureaucrats assist in developing the
state communication system which is necessary for modernising symbols.
In short, these bureaucratic functions are considered to be entrepren-
eurial, innovative and concerned with planning.[2]

In evaluating Diamant's model, one can argue that the basic
problem with such a model is its closeness to the Communist model, in
which ideology is all embracing and the political party is well

[1] Ibid., pp.523-525.

[2] Ibid., p.530.

established. However, in most of the developing countries mentioned by Diamant, ideology is less systematic and the mass movement is not very strong, i.e., it does not fully mobilise all segments of the society. Certain traditional elements of the society remain; as a result, these nations have a mixed type of authority and do not follow sweeping changes easily. Diamant seems to be ambivalent regarding this point. He shows that the mass movement is weaker and ideology is less important in developing countries than in Communist ones, but at the same time does not consider a charismatic leader to be crucial for his model of the developmental movement regimes polities.

In the final analysis Diamant's model seems to be more specific and more related to the reality of the developing countries than does Riggs' model.

To recapitulate, Diamant considers political development as a continuing process in which new goals and demands are met in a flexible manner by a variety of patterns. Since political development, as he perceives the process, does not require the creation of particular kinds of institutions, Diamant focuses his attention on the goals of politics - an element which, he believes, is neglected in Riggs' model because of his lack of concern with alternative patterns of strategies of development.

Diamant and Riggs agree that the bureaucratic elite is highly active in policy making in developing countries or in the developmental movement regime, as Diamant defines it. Yet, there is an essential difference between Riggs' and Diamant's models concerning the impact of the bureaucratic elite's political role; Riggs sees it as a threat to development unless evenly balanced by constitutive institutions; Diamant considers this role as an aid to development as long as the bureaucracy is incorporated into the mass movement and the bureaucratic elite uses its participation, as a part of the modernising elite, to achieve developmental goals. More specifically, the bureaucratic

elite's influence over and interference and relationships with the constitutive bodies take place, in Diamant's model, as a part of its role as a representative of the movement regime and in response to the direction and guidance of the revolutionary leaders. However, "imbalance" between bureaucracy and constitutive institutions is not of concern to Diamant, in contrast to Riggs' concern regarding relations between the two.

Throughout the following chapter these two models, among others, for the study of public administration will be referred to as reference points for the understanding of the political role of the Egyptian bureaucratic elite.

CHAPTER XIII

THE POLITICAL ROLE OF THE EGYPTIAN BUREAUCRATIC ELITE

Having reviewed and analysed some theories concerning the
relationship between the bureaucratic elite and the political system,
we now turn to a discussion of the political role of the Egyptian
bureaucratic elite. For the purpose of this chapter, the two
variables that can explain to a significant degree the variations
observed in the extent of the political role of the bureaucratic elite
in political systems are the differences in the historical input and
variations in the relative "power base" of the bureaucratic elite. The
historical input essentially refers to the extent of bureaucratic
development in relation to the degree of political development. This
variable is important and highly relevant to the study of the political
role of the bureaucratic elite in developing countries in view of the
contention among many scholars concerned with developing countries that
bureaucratic development precedes political development. The second
variable; power base, refers to those sources (both tangible and
intangible) that bureaucratic elites could draw upon the respect to
their political roles.

The Historical Input

From a historical perspective, political and bureaucratic develop-
ment in Egypt have been discussed elsewhere in this study. However,
it is in order to elaborate this discussion by referring to the existing
theories concerning the political role of the bureaucratic elite.

To take political development first, we find that scholars in the
field discuss the term in somewhat different ways. For Fred Riggs, for
example, the term political development means a power increase

on the part of the representative institutions.[1] Representative

institutions include parliament, political parties and other

organisations which enhance the concept of equality of citizens and

representation. Alternatively, Samuel Huntington defines the term

as the "institutionalisation of political organisations and

procedures."[2] "Institutionalisation" and "political development"

will be achieved when adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence

of the political institutions are well established. Institutionalisation

of the political organisation in any society could be measured according

to the level reached in the direction of political process.

It is significant to note, and in so far as Riggsian theory is

concerned, that political development means the existence of politically

powerful, specific types of representative institutions. Huntington,

however, emphasises institutionalisation of political organisations and

procedures without calling for specific types of political organisations.

It is also important to note that Riggs' definition of "political

development" is perhaps impossible to operationalise while that of

Huntington offers greater opportunity for applicability. For this

reason, in our re-appraisal of political development in Egypt, the

level and degree reached in Huntingdon's four variables will be noted.

Political Development Prior to the 1952 Revolution: Adaptability

is Huntington's first criterion of institutionalisation. From our

previous analysis, one could safely say that Egyptian representative

organisation, i.e., the Parliament, had a short span of life due to the

---

[1] Fred Riggs, "Bureaucratic and Political Development: A
Paradoxical View," in Joseph La Palombera (ed.), Bureaucracy and
Political Development (Princeton.N J: Princeton University Press,
1963). See also his, Administration in Developing Countries (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1964)

[2] Samuel P.Huntington "Political Development and Political Decay,"
World Politics, Vol. XVII (April, 1965), p.393

constant interruptions by the British and the King.

As a matter of fact, no parliament ever completed its regular sessions under the 1923 Constitution.[1] There is little doubt, moreover, that the Egyptian parliament and the political parties were not able to adapt to the desires of the mass of the Egyptian people due to their membership which was dominated and controlled by the rich minority.

To assess the Egyptian political organisation along the second criterion of institutionalisation, i.e., complexity, one has to say that the Egyptian parliament had a limited role. The executive branch of government, more often than not, assumed most of the political responsibilities and the parliament was used for either political agitation or legitimisation purposes. Therefore, the parliament and the political parties in Egypt had a marginal function.

The third variable to consider is the autonomy of the institutions. The Egyptian Constitition of 1923 "formally" provided that parialment and the political parties were distinct in their roles and functions from each other and from other political organisations. But in practice the ruling class i.e., the King, the influential politicians and the British, constantly interfered in their functions. Policy-making and budget approval were supposed to be the parliament's responsibilties. However, a review of the Egyptian political history would indicate the contrary. Suffice it to say here that the dual control over Egypt by the French and the British imposed upon the Egyptian parliament many restrictions in this area without its consent.

Also, the political parties are supposed to aggregate and

---

[1] New Trends in the People's Assembly (the parliament)(Cairo: Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, 1976), p.15. It is to be noted in passing that the 1923 Constitution had been in force until 1953. See also Democracy in Egypt (Cairo: Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, 1977), p.16.

articulate the public interest. In reality this was hardly done.
Before 1952, the political parties represented the rich minority and
they were mainly concerned with their interests while ignoring
majority interests.

The final dimension is the degree of coherence in political
organisations. Most Egyptian political organisations had some degree
of coherence. The British colonial rule was a unifying factor in the
nation as a whole. Within the political parties, some degree of unity
was necessary in view of the common interests which bound their leader-
ship to obtain government favour and prestige. Besides, the Egyptian
political parties were not organised to any great extent according to
ideology; therefore personality or benefits became the unifying factors.

From this brief re-examination of the Egyptian political develop-
ment, one can fairly say that the Egyptian representative political
organisations achieved a low degree or level of institutionalisation
or development. None of the Egyptian representative political
organisations stayed long enough to mature or develop and to become
a vehicle of established political process. This, of course, was due
to both external and internal factors.

The British and other foreign occupations were the main external
factor which constantly interrupted the life of the Egyptian political
organisations. One crisis after another prevented these political
institutions from maturing, developing or taking root in Egypt's
political life.

The internal factors were many: the King, the national leaders
and their political parties, and the social environment in the country
contributed to the weakness of these institutions. The King and the
ruling class always refused to accept any challenge or limitations to
their power. They put themselves in opposition to the parliament and
the political parties whenever they tried to limit the ruler's power

or to represent the public interest. Moreover, the national leaders and the political parties were obsessed with the issue of full independence while Britain stubbornly refused to give up to them. The social reforms which were badly needed for the country were almost completely ignored by the political parties and their leaders due to this factor and many others. This state of affairs contributed to the failure of the parliamentary and party systems and discredited them as viable institutions in Egypt.

Finally, parliamentary traditions were foreign to the Egyptian people or discredited before their eyes. The parliamentary system and political parties were modelled along European lines without consideration for the particular needs of Egyptian society. The Egyptian people never experienced a high degree of political participation or the use of the representative institutions such as the parliamentary government. These systems and institutions were alien to the Egyptian people and society.

Administrative Development Prior to the 1952 Revolution:

Administrative development or reform may be defined as a process by which bureaucracies adopt efficiency and effectiveness as their operating principles.

To Fred Riggs, specialisation and co-ordination are very important elements where government administration is divided into different departments according to their specific functions, or, as he puts it, 'functional specificity'. In his theory of "prismatic society", he considers the "diffracted" system as a modern or developed one, where administration is differentiated into many specialised agencies.[1]

Again Riggs, in his theory of "dynamic balancing", ties

---

[1] Riggs, op.cit.

administrative development to political development. He advocates a

contextual approach to administrative development or reform, that is

to say, "as a part of a comprehensive view of government as a system

of interdependent elements."[1] He believes that "balance of power is

essential to enhance the administrative capabilities of government,

just as it is needed to safeguard its political responsiveness."[2]

In his theory, Riggs believes that administrative efficiency and

effectiveness cannot be achieved until a power balance between

administrative and representative political organisation is achieved.

Therefore, administrative reform or development also implies or carries

with it political reform or development where the two principles -

"capacity" and "equality" of citizens - can be achieved simultaneously.

This Riggsian approach to administrative development or reform comes

from his conviction that "government effectiveness or capabilities

depend on its ability to command the continuing support and loyalty

of its population."[3]

Alfred Diamant views political development as "the successful

sustaining of new goals, demands and organisations, more specifically

nation-building and socio-economic progress as the successful fulfill-

ment of major system capabilities."[4] From this view we could infer

that Diamant would advocate administrative development or reform which

would increase and enhance the system capabilities and performance

to achieve its new goals and demands. This need to increase the

[1] Fred Riggs, "Administrative Reform and Political Responsiveness. A Theory of Dynamic Balancing," Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics, 1, ser. ol-olo (1970), p.579.

[2] Ibid., p.572.

[3] Ibid., p.573.

[4] Alfred Diamant, "Bureaucracy in Development Movement Regimes," in Fred Riggs (ed.) Frontiers of Development Administration (Durham: Duke University Press, 1970), p.512.

abilities of the political system would certainly require specialisation

and co-ordination which would make Diamant's administrative development

or reform similar to Riggs'. But it seems that Diamant's reforms are not

tied or conditioned to Riggs' version of political development.

If we take Weber's ideal model of bureaucracy as a basis for

judgement, administrative reform or development would basically mean a

division of labour, professionalism, hierarchy, and impersonality of

rules. But we know that bureaucratic development is affected by the

political reality of each society. Hence, bureaucratic development or

reform varies from one state to another, depending on the type of

political system which carries out these reforms. What is considered

a desirable development or reform to one system may not be considered

so in other systems. This line of thought makes John Montgomery's

typology of sources of bureaucratic reform relevant to our discussion

here.[1]

Montgomery contends that most bureaucratic reforms can take place

through the following agents: "By the rulers, policy makers, and other

power sources of government; or by other elements in the social order,

external to the government, or by the bureaucracy itself, in its

search for an adequate degree of internal cohesion and discipline.[2]

In re-appraising administrative development we are going to

discuss only the bureaucratic reforms which are undertaken by the rulers,

because, in our view, most if not all bureaucratic reforms in Egypt

were undertaken by its rulers. Moreover, in re-appraising Egyptian

administrative reform or development, we will be looking for many

[1] John D. Montgomery, "Sources of Bureaucratic Reform. A Typology of Purpose and Policies," in Ralf Braibonti (ed.) Political and Administrative Development (Durham: Duke University Press, 1969), pp.427-471.

[2] Ibid., p.428.

administrative concepts which would enhance or increase the capability of administration in implementing government policies and programmes. This approach will make use of Riggs', Diamant's and Weber's elements of administrative development in addition to Huntington's four variables of institutionalisation.

First of all, it is significant to note that although Egyptian political development moved very slowly, Egypt has a long history of a highly centralised state, and somewhat well-developed bureaucratic structure and well-educated bureaucratic elite. The civil service of the ancient Egyptian Kingdoms goes back 1500 years before the Christian era and became according to Max Weber, "The historical model of all later bureaucracies."[1]

The existence of a somewhat well-developed bureaucracy in Egypt may be attributed to a variety of factors. Ancient Egyptians was a river civilisation. Its unified population depended wholly on the waters of the Nile which made it imperative that a highly centralised state with well-developed professional bureaucracy exists in order to make the fullest use of the water of the Nile. The Arab-Islamic conquest of Egypt introduced a new religious doctrine which discouraged, to a certain degree, popular initiative in political life. In administration, the Arab-Islamic rulers retained much of the Byzantine system and reinforced the old centralised administrative system. Although the Ottoman rulers perpetuated foreign administration of a servile character, many educated Egyptians all through these centuries succeeded to enter the bureaucracy and to maintain their positions by transmitting their expertness, through education, from one generation to another. Despite the enormous gap that existed between the Ottoman

---

[1] See H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), p.204.

rulers and the subject Egyptians, the bureaucracy was interposed between these two classes (the rulers and the ruled) in view of the fact that it was more stable and altered more slowly than did the rulers it served.

The French occupation of Egypt in 1798 improved the Egyptian admininistration and gave it some Western colour.[1]

Mohammed Ali's era (1805-1848) was characterised by attempts, which were rather successful, to develop and reform the Egyptian public bureaucracy. However, this was done without much regard to the representative political institutions. But in spite of that, Mohammed Ali was responsible for creating a new educated class which carried the cause of national interest for years after his era.

With regard to the British era, the same thing could be said but with some differences. The British reforms were in the area of administration but not in the political or social sectors. The British were very interested in stability and maintaining the status quo. Loyalty, control, and law and order were their main objectives in Egypt.

Thus, it may be said that during the period which extended from the Arab conquest of Egypt to the end of the British occupation of Egypt, political development was very much concerned with self-determination, political participation and institution-building which all opposed the interests of the rulers and thus had little success. Moreover, during the period, the Egyptian rulers and the foreign colonial powers were very much interested and concerned with controlling the country and increasing governmental revenue. This interest or concern enhanced the government bureaucracy and allowed it to develop and improve

---

[1] For details see, P.J. Vatikiotis, The Modern History of Egypt (London: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1969), pp.50-56.

itself in order to execute the rulers' policies.

Moreover, the government bureaucracy was very much related or identified with the rulers and was considered the rulers' personal administration. This close relationship between the rulers and the bureaucracy allowed the latter to develop and increase its power and prestige in Egyptian society. The bureaucracy was able to acquire modern administrative methods from European personnel and universities.

There is little doubt that this state of affairs contributed to the existence in Egypt of a powerful bureaucracy and weak political institutions which created what Riggs calls an "imbalance" political system.

Moreover, if we examine the Egyptian administrative development or reform during this period in terms of Huntington's four criteria of institution-building, we may conclude that the Egyptian bureaucracy is well institutionalised and achieved a relatively high degree of development. As already noted, the Egyptian bureaucracy has a long history behind it. It was able to adapt to the needs of many different rulers and systems of government. It served the Pharaohs, the Romans, the French, the British and the Egyptians and adapted to their different needs. Besides, the Egyptian bureaucracy achieved a high degree of complexity by expanding its role and through many administrative developments. It became a somewhat autonomous institution by having its own requirements for its members and its own areas of activities. The Egyptian bureaucracy developed its own rules and regulations, its own organisation and hierarchical system which enabled it to have a high degree of unity and coherence.

Our findings about Egyptian bureaucracy are supported by other scholars. Irma Adelman and Cynthia Morris classified seventy-four developing countries according to their degree of administrative efficiency. Their classification scheme is divided into three ratings

which range from A to C.[1] The A rating was assigned to those countires which have a reasonably efficient administration and a well-trained civil service. Those countries have a stable policy at the top administrative levels and a limited degree of corruption. Also, their bureaucratic inefficiency was not as noticeable as in other developing countires. Adelman and Morris included Egypt, Turkey, Chile, Israel, Mexico, Costa Rica, South Africa, Tunisia, Uruguay and others in this A group rating.

Ferrel Heady agrees with this positive conclusion. Noting the age and experience of the Egyptian administration, he states: "The Egyptian bureaucratic tradition is thus ancient, cumulative and mixed." He adds that since 1952 the Egyptian bureaucracy "has become competent and effective, and that it has been made responsive to the political leadership."[2]

The Power Base of the Egyptian Bureaucratic Elite

Having re-examined bureaucratic and political developments prior to the 1952 Revolution, we now turn to an examination of the power base of the Egyptian bureaucratic elite to ascertain its political role. This examination will be made within the framework of the relationship between the Egyptian bureaucratic elite and the political system.

The Paramount Position of the Presidency in the Egyptian Political System: In the last chapter, we examined Professor Riggs' theory which contends that the chief executive needs a power base outside the

---

[1] Irma Adelman and Cynthia T. Morris Society, Politics and Economic Development, A Quantitative Approach (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1967), pp.76-78. These authors used quantitative studies as their indicators for administrative efficiency by means of interviews with experts, on these countries. In addition they made use of recent studies about these countries and they cross-checked their classification with Banks and Textor's A Cross-Polity Survey.

[2] Ferrel Heady, Public Administration, A Comparative Perspective (Englewood Cliffs N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1966), p.93.

bureaucracy in order to control and manage the state bureaucracy. Otherwise, the chief executive "becomes a prisoner of his own bureaucracy."[1]   To Riggs, the chief executive should have a balance in the office which "requires both accountability and seriousness."[2] This balance in the office of the chief executive is necessary to both the political responsiveness and the administrative effectiveness of government."[3]

In Western democratic states, the party and the electoral system serve as a non-bureaucratic base of power. This type of power base relates the chief executive to his constituency, and provides him with support for his policy. Therefore, the bureaucrats are under pressure to accept the chief executive's directions knowing that they presumably serve their country.

With regard to the developing societies, where the traditional bases of power such as religion, kinship and old political institutions are weak or partly destroyed, a charismatic leader or dictator emerges. In this case charisma is used as a power base and gives legitimacy to these leaders. To Riggs, this legitimacy is very weak because it is temporary. Some of these leaders established mass party systems to control their societies without much concern for the electoral and parliamentary systems which they used as puppets to serve their purpose. But because of the temporary nature of the charisma, these societies will face instability and a decline of the executive power, and a concomitant rise of bureaucratic power, Riggs argues, negatively

---

[1] Riggs, Bureaucrats and Political Development....", in La Palombara (ed.) Bureaucracy and Political Development, op.cit.,p.158.

[2] Riggs, Administrative Reform and Political Responsiveness, Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics, op.cit., p.576.

[3] Ibid., p.576.

affects government performance.

Unlike Riggs, Diamant believes that in the polities of
"developmental movement regimes" bureaucracy is controlled by the
leaders of the movement, and it serves as an instrument of development.
The leaders of the movement regimes create a mass party which serves
as a power base and as an instrument to mobilise the society for their
developmental goals. The revolutionary leaders try to make their
development ideology prevail over the entire society. One consequence
of politicising the society is a complete control of the bureaucracy,
and only loyal bureaucrats will be given the positions in government.
Because of their developmental goals, the movement regimes engage
in economic planning, industrialisation and many other developmental
activities.

Besides the above measure and means of power and control, one
can find, as Diamant explained, a mixed type of political authority
in these societies. Accordingto Diamant, Weber's elements of
traditional, legal -rational and charismatic legitimacy co-exist in
these polities. These mixed types of political authority are used by
the movement regimes as a legitimacy base and also are used for control
over the bureaucracy and the entire society.

We now turn to an examination of these relationships and their
consequences in Egypt after the 1952 Revolution.

Upon examining the Constitutions and Constitutional Proclamations
issued since 1953, some remarks are in order to show the broad power
base and the paramount position of the Egyptian president.

It may be significant to note that of the seven Constitutions
and Constitutional Proclamations issued since 1953, five have been
adopted by means of Presidental Decrees. Only two Constitutions, that

of 1956 and 1971 have been adopted by plebiscites.[1] Moreover, these subsequent Constitutions and Constitutional Proclamations have all provided for presidency with a very wide range of power.[2] Besides being the President of the Republic, i.e., the Head of the State, he is also the chief executive, i.e., he presides over the executive branch of the government. In this capacity, he draws the general policy of the State and supervises its implementation. He presides over the Council of Ministers whenever he deems it necessary, though he is not responsible.[3] He has the right to appoint his vice presidents, the Prime Minister and the Ministers without the approval of the People's Assembly, (the Parliament). The President has the right to propose, issue and veto laws and he can declare the state of emergency which gives him an even wider range of power. Besides these and other legal bases of power, the President of the Republic is also the President of the Arab Socialist Union (A.S.U.) which until very recently has been the only political organisation or to use the term very loosely the only political party allowed in Egypt.

That the Egyptian political system centres around a very strong and powerful Presidency, i.e., the President of the Egyptian Republic, which plays a paramount role in policy-making, vis-à-vis the People's Assembly (the Parliament), can clearly be seen from a comment made by one of the most influential members of the People's Assembly. Mr Mohammond Abu Wafia, one of the key henchmen in the People's Assembly concluded before the Committee of the future of Political

---

[1] These seven Constitutions and Constitutional Proclamations were subsequently adapted in 1953, 1956, 1958, 1962, 1964, 1969 and 1971.

[2] See Democracy in Egypt, op.cit., pp.18-20.

[3] The President is not responsible before the People's Assembly because he is popularly elected.

Action by commenting:

> "As a matter of fact, the Presidency is the sole and only
> political institution which exercises its political
> authority in Egypt!" 1

To illustrate his comment, Mr Abu Wafia referred to the case of the

Egyptian People's Assembly:

> "After a rather lengthy discussion, the People's Assembly
> unanimously refused to adopt a particular legislative proposal
> intended to provide salary grades for public employees
> working in the public sector. However, when President Sadat
> declared in the press that the above-mentioned proposal
> should be adopted and, in effect, implemented, the People's
> Assembly re-examined the proposal and accepted it......
> unanimously, too." 2

Besides illustrating the fact that the Presidency enjoys in

reality a paramount position vis-a-vis the People's Assembly, the

above example also shows that the Egyptian bureaucracy is protected by

and identified with a strong and powerful Presidency. One more specific

example might further illustrate this point.

As part of the major governmental re-organisation following the

May 1971 "correction of the revolution", led by President Sadat, changes

initiated to decentralise services to the local level and to increase

the participation of popularly-elected members in local decision-making

were embodied in clauses in the 1971 Constitution and in decrees issued

in the autumn of 1971.

An important part of the 1971 decentralisation and participation

re-organisation was the creation of people's councils in the governor-

ates. This was accomplished by dividing governorate councils into two

unequal parts. Ex-officio members (i.e., bureaucrats) were placed in an

executive council and elected and appointed members formed the new

people's councils. Since the creation of village, city and governorate

1 Rose-El-Yousef, Weekly Magazine, Cairo ,1976, p.3.

2 Ibid., p.3.

councils in 1960, elected and appointed members had been disenchanted with their positions and had frequently complained that they were tyrannised by executive power, represented in councils by ex-officio members. Their complaint was justified. Ex-officio members chair all subcommittees of villages, city and governorate councils and as the local representatives of ministers, they have tended to dictate ministerial policy to other council members.

Clause 162 of the 1971 Constitution provided for local councils to be created through direct election, and that 50 per cent of members should be workers or peasants.[1] In September 1971, the Presidency announced the new local government law No. 57, which called for the creation of people's councils on the level of governorate. These councils were to be chaired by the A.S.U. secretary general of the governorate, and the members were to be the members of the A.S.U. governorate committee, the secretaries of the A.S.U. district committees, two representative of women drawn from A.S.U. units, and five other members elected from district, bandar or quism[2] A.S.U. units.[3] By and large, the membership of these people's councils which was decreed by Law No. 57 of 1971 meant that the bureaucratic elite would be predominant in these councils in view of the fact that most if not all the members of the A.S.U. governorate committees, the secretaries of the A.S.U. district committees and other members of district, bander, quism A.S.U. units are bureaucrats par excellence. Nevertheless, the Presidency did not wait for the People's Assembly to pass the Law No. 57 of 1971. Instead, the Presidency had announced Law No. 57 of 1971 which established

---

[1] See Arab Republic of Egypt, The 1971 Constitution (Cairo: The Government Press).

[2] Administrative sub-divisions of districts.

[3] Al-Ahram (Egyptian newspaper), 21 September 1971.

people's councils, and had then gone ahead and formed them in accordance with the provisions of the law.

At the People's Assembly session of 21 February, 1972, at which the Committee for Local Government and Popular Organisations presented its favourable report on the "President's legislative proposal No. 57 for 1971," Dr Mohamoud Al Qadi, one of the most outspoken members in the Egyptian People's Assembly put his finger on the crux of the matter:

> "This legislative proposal is in direct contradiction to the
> 162nd clause of the 1971 Constitution which states that
> local popular councils will be set up in the administrative
> units on the basis of direct elections. The method of setting
> up local popular councils described in the proposal also
> contradicts the 162nd clause of the 1971 Constitution which
> states that at least half the membership should be made up
> of peasants and workers. The proposed local people's councils
> would not be directly elected nor would they be 50 per cent
> peasants and workers. Moreover, the second paragraph of the
> 162nd clause of the 1971 Constitution states that the choice
> of speakers and deputy speakers should be made through
> elections among the members. The legislative proposal,
> however, states that the speakers are to be the chairmen of
> the A.S.U. in the governorates. This legislative proposal
> therefore contradicts the constitutional laws found in the
> 162nd clause of the 1971 Constitution."[1]

In the light of these two examples, it might be safely said that the Presidency dominates the legislative institution by its constitutional and other political powers.

This paramount position of the Presidency, in the Egyptian political system, provides the state bureaucracy as well as its bureaucratic elite with great power and prestige in their relationship with the People's Assembly (the legislature). And yet this apparent presidential hegemony over the legislative process makes the fact that much of what ultimately comes to be regarded as the Presidential Decrees or the President's legislative programmes seem to stem in the first place from the advice

---

[1] Committee Report on Legislative Proposals No. 57, 1971 by the Committee for Local Government and Popular Organisations, 21 February 1972, People's Assembly Debates and Speech by Mahmoud al Qadi to the People's Assembly, 21 Febfuary 1971, Ibid.

of bureaucrats in the executive establishment. Located as they are in intimate contact with the everyday process of government, the bureaucratic elite have an unexcelled vantage point from which to see the need for new legislation.

Moreover, in private discussion with some members of the Egyptian People's Assembly, the present writer was told time and again that the Assembly is not able to exert influence or to exercise control over the Egyptian bureaucracy because of the close relationship between the Presidency and higher civil servants. Also, this lack of control or influence by the People's Assembly could be a result of the general reluctance and even fear of the deputies to criticise the government administration. Such criticism, the members of the People's Assembly maintained, could be viewed by the executive branch of the government as an attack on its leadership and policies.

The Egyptian People's Assembly lacks the experience and the expertise as well as the essential information. These requirements are needed to help it to achieve effectiveness in policy-making and control over bureaucracy. It is not insignificant that slightly more than one half of the members of the Egyptian People's Assembly are peasant and workers, compared to only 48 per cent of the deputies who are professionals, civil servants, army officers and any other occupations than peasants or workers.[1] Most of the deputies who are peasants or workers have little or no education, knowledge or experience in dealing with complicated subjects such as government budgets or other policies.[2]

---

[1] New Trends in the People's Assembly, op.cit., p.9.

[2] Ibid., p.34. It must be noted that the Egyptian Constitutions of 1964, 1969 and 1971 provide that at least fifty per cent of the Parliamentary seats in the Legislature (the People's Assembly) are reserved for peasants and workers. The same provision is made insofar as the A.S.U. is concerned.

Except for the fifth session (1971-1976), no term of the Egyptian People's Assembly had run its course, thus limiting the amount of experience which the deputies can gain.

Finally, it is important to note that Egypt, as many other developing countries, receives a great sum of foreign financial aid, which, as Professor Riggs observed, limits the role of the legislative bodies in the area of budget and finance. This financial aid is negotiated by higher civil servants and diplomats and the legislature has very little influence. Needless to say, the role played by higher civil servants with regard to foreign financial aid enhances their power.

All this notwithstanding, the limitations of the Egyptian People's Assembly and its weakness could mainly be attributed to the heavy concentration of power in the hands of the President of the Republic. By and large, Egypt has a strong President with a weak and controlled legislature.[1]

In the light of the above discussion, how is it possible to argue that this study lends support to the proposition that the Egyptian higher civil service is politicised, a consequence which is derived from its close working relationship with the most powerful political institution, i.e., the presidency? As far as the Egyptian higher civil servants' views of the importance of outside influences are concerned, Table XIII.1 is illustrative. It shows the results of the various responses given to an item in the questionnaire asking the higher civil servants to rank the influences which seem to carry the greatest weight on the outcome of the decisions related to major ministerial

---

[1] For a similar view, see J. Harris Proctor, "The Legislative Activity of the Egyptian National Assembly of 1957-8," Parliamentary Affairs, Vol.XIII No.2, (1960), pp.213-226. It must be noted in passing that the Egyptian National Assembly has been renamed the People's Assembly in 1971.

Table XIII.1

Perceived Importance of Outside Influences

Influentials	Rank of Influentials Percentages: No of cases in Parentheses		
	1st Influential	2nd Influential	3rd Influential
The President of the Republic	63	20	12
Prime Minister	20	42	15
Governors	5	12	13
People's Assembly (Parliament)	2	5	6
Arab Socialist Union	0	4	3
Public Interest	10	17	46
Clientele	0	0	5
Others and Not Known	0	0	0
Totals	100	100	100
	(400)	(400)	(400)

or organisational policies. Our respondents indicated that the first and most influential factor on the outcome of the decisions related to major ministerial or organisational policies is the "President of the Republic." Such outside elements as the Arab Socialist Union (A.S.U.), The People's Assembly (the Parliament), clientele, governors, etc., do not seem to play a vital role in the decision-making process related to major ministerial policies. As far as the second most influential element is concerned, the Prime Minister received the highest percentage of responses. With regard to the third most influential, public interest seems to play a vital role in the ministries' decision-making process. Finally, other political elements, e.g., the governors, the People's Assembly and the A.S.U. seem to have some importance only as fourth, fifth and sixth most influential factors. The percentages are usually low, around 15 per cent, an indication of the remote role these external forces play in the ministries' activities while the

"unknown" category is large here (over 46 per cent in many cases),
suggesting perhaps the respondent's confusion in identifying the
fifth, sixth and seventh most influential elements.

In retrospect ⌐, it is obvious that the Presidency was the
most powerful political institution. Writing in 1971, Professor
Dekmijian notes that "the Presidential bureaucracy was always a primary
centre of power in the Egyptian political system by virtue of its
closeness to President Nasser himself."[1] The Late President Nasser
was also the President of the Arab Socialist Union, the only legal
political party in Egypt, and in this capacity he controlled it as
well as the legislative body and the professional groups. The
concentration of power in the hand of the President made his position
paramount and provides the state bureaucracy with great power and
prestige in view of its closeness to the Presidency.

As far as the Egyptian bureaucratic elite is concerned, the
President can, and indeed, does exercise a very strong influence and
control in various ways.

Personalised control over the bureaucracy has been one of the
methods which the President has used with the Egyptian bureaucracy.
As indicated by our respondents, the most important way to exercise
such control and influence is through the President's personal selection
of the Prime Minister, Ministers and sometimes even at the relatively
low level of undersecretaries and chairmen of the boards of public
corporations. As a result, the Presidency can make sure that those
nominees are politically trusted, loyal and competent. Moreover,
there is some evidence that agreement with the Presidency is a pre-
requisite for appointment to and then retention of a post. For example,

---

[1] R. HrairDekmijian, Egypt Under Nasser: A Study in Political
Dynamics (London: University of London Press, 1971), p.191. See also
his Patterns of Political Leadership, (Albany, N.Y.: State of New
York University Press, 1975).

Mr S. Marei, who is publicly known to be an efficient administrator and was thought by President Nasser to be an extremely competent Minister of Agriculture and Land Reclamation, was nevertheless dismissed because he disagreed with the President over land reclamation.

Even at the height of his power, the late President Nasser continued to keep his hold over the bureaucracy through his appointment of many army officers and some politically trusted civilians in key positions with a view to maintaining his personal control over the state bureaucracy. Despite the enormous concentration of power, constitutional or otherwise, at the Presidency, it is widely acknowledged that the Presidency spares no effort to use extensively this personal method of selection of political and bureaucratic elites. Moreover, the Presidency reinforces this control or influence by periodically reshuffling the Cabinet and sometimes key administration positions in order not to allow any member of the elite, particularly those members of the political elite, i.e., cabinet ministers, to develop any basis of power. The present President in office, like his predecessors, has many bases of power.

Given this, it is safe to say that the Presidency's position vis-à-vis the bureaucracy does not compare with Professor Riggs' analysis and assumptions of the bureaucratic power to undermine the position of the Presidency, i.e., the chief executive in the developing countries. Instead, the Presidency with its many bases of power controls the bureaucracy. Yet this domination by the Presidency over the bureaucracy could be misleading if we do not refer to some of the problems which were created by the Egyptian bureaucracy for the regime and its political leadership.

Certainly there are some bureaucratic problems, such as lack of initiative, over-staffing, excessive degree of red tape, but they are not due to opposition to the regime or its policies. In other words, the Egyptian bureaucracy causes some problems for the revolutionary

regime, but they are not the political type of problems, with which

Professor Riggs is concerned. Egyptian bureaucrats seem to accept

and work with a strong and powerful President, but certainly do not

undermine his position. The President's authority and powers are

many and attract the bureaucratic elite itself. Moreover, these bureau-

cratic problems are the type of problems which exist not only in the

developing countries, but in developed countries, too. Also, one must

remember the expanding role of the Egyptian bureaucracy which has made

it the main, if not the only, employer in Egyptian society, which,

in turn, has affected the attitude and behaviour of technocrats towards

the regime.

The situation is well explained by Professor P. Vatikiotis:

"Even though the economic and social interests of this new
technocracy seem to converge with those of the ruling
military elite, it cannot, so far, act as a check upon the
power of the modernising leader, because it has no alternative
to state employment." 1

The Predominant Role of Egyptian Bureaucratic Elite vis-à-vis

The People's Assembly and The Arab Socialist Union: It has already

been noted that the other political organisation, namely: the Arab

Socialist Union and the Egyptian People's Assembly do not play any

vital role vis-à-vis the Egyptian bureaucratic elite. Rather, it was

argued that the Egyptian bureaucratic elite enhances its role

vis-à-vis the Egyptian People's Assembly and the A.S.U. in view of

its close working relationship with a strong and powerful presidency.

This section will deal with the relationship between the

bureaucratic elite and the members of the People's Assembly (the

Parliament). Moreover, an attempt will be made to discuss the manners

in which each perceives the other role, placing by far the greatest

emphasis on the views of the higher civil servants. Before doing this,

---

1 P.J. Vatikiotis, "Some Political Consequences of the 1952
Revolution in Egypt," in P.M. Holt (ed.) Political and Social Change
in Modern Egypt (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p.373.

however, a discussion of politics and administration is in order.

One of the main interests of this study is to reject the stasis and rigidity of the politics-administration dichotomy in order to establish a more realistic appraisal of the functions of bureaucracy and indeed the whole political system.

There is little doubt that the relationship between politicians and the bureaucratic elite is far more intricate than has hitherto been acknowledged. Our respondents seem to be of the opinion that the rigid and static distinction between politicians and bureaucratic elite seems to ignore the reality, in which there are interchangeability of personnel and overlapping of functions. Thus to suggest, as some scholars do, that the administration is 'technical' and the domain of ministers, i.e., the cabinet is 'political' is to make a theoretical distinction that there exist two separate spheres having distinct personnel and distinct recognisable functions. This according to our respondents is a normative or prescriptive assumption rather than a descriptive one. It is not insignificant that over sixty per cent of the total membership of Egyptian ministerial cabinets since 1952 has been made up of men with bureaucratic and civil service background and men with some experience in bureaucracy prior to their assuming a cabinet office. As some of our respondents put it, since the 1952 Revolution it has become increasingly difficult to distinguish the members of the bureaucratic elite and ministers owing to their similarity of social, educational and experiential background. Such practice of appointing ministers with a bureaucratic and civil service background as well as ministers with some experience in bureaucracy, is seen by some of our respondents, and perhaps also by the Presidency which is responsible for appointing ministers, as an important factor which reduces conflicts between the Egyptian bureaucratic elite and ministers.

Kingsley and others noted this argument with regard to Britain, where ministers and civil servants share the same backgrounds. Because of this common background, they have suggested, there has been a close relationship between ministers and their senior civil servants.[1]

Although this study suggests that a rigid and static distinction as drawn by Weber between bureaucratic and political types needs in general to be abandoned since it seems to be of little help in the analysis of the relationship between politics and bureaucracy, this nevertheless should not be taken as a rejection of the Weberian framework on which the present study has depended heavily. Indeed, as we shall shortly see, Weber's framework is helpful in an analysis of the relationship between the members of the People's Assembly (the Legislature) and the Egyptian bureaucratic elite, since this relationship involves two groups and is, it seems, intermittent.

It is perhaps rather alluring, but entirely wrong, to suggest that the Weberian classification of bureaucrats and politicians is simplistic and can have little or no applicability. Like many of Weber's classifications, chiefly that concerning the bureaucracy, this one was presented as a mere framework for analysis. Weber wrote that "to an outstanding degree, politics today is in fact conducted in public by means of the spoken or written word. To weigh the effect of the word properly falls within the range of the lawyer's task but not at all into that of the civil servants."[2] There is little doubt, however, that Weber was cognizant of the fact that in the Germany of his day (as is the case in present-day Germany), the majority of

---

[1] J. Donald Kingsley, Representative Bureaucracy (Yellow Springs, Ohio: Antioch Press, 1944), pp.273-282. See also Henry Parris, Constitutional Bureaucracy, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1969), pp.146-148.

[2] Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.) From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), p.95.

higher civil servants had a substantial legal education.[1]

The Representative and the Bureaucracy: For many scholars, many of the developing societies are experiencing the heavy weight of bureaucratic power with the bureaucrats deeply enmeshed in the function of rule-making. Such a situation, they argued, may inhibit, perhaps preclude, the development of democratic political institutions.[2] Other scholars maintained that the higher civil servant's attitude towards the elected official has been characterised by a traditional, overt anti-parliamentarianism.[3] These arguments suggest that the bureaucratic elite, whether out of principle or out of technical competence, share an ideology that is basically at variance or incompatible with democratic norms and institutions. This is a widely accepted thesis, though it has not hitherto been analysed or explained in a convincing manner. It is a rather simplistic explanation, because it does not take into consideration the political factors that have entered into and shaped this relationship over time.

As far as pre-revolution Egypt is concerned, it has already been noted that the parliament did not enhance the concept of representation. On the contrary, it only represented the small, rich minorities in the society. Therefore, the Egyptian revolutionary leaders viewed the representation concept differently, and established a one-party system within a centralised and presidential system by/which in their view, the interests of people will be better served.

Today, as we have seen before, the members of the Egyptian People's Assembly ranked low in the almost unanimous opinion of the Egyptian bureaucratic elite in terms of the prestige and possibly, the importance

[1] See Rolf Duhrendorf, Society and Democracy in Germany (New York: Doubleday, 1967), pp.250-252.

[2] See the articles by Riggs, La Polambora in Joseph La Polambora (ed.) Bureaucracy and Political Development, op.cit.

[3] For example, see Jean Maynaud, Technocracy (London: Faber and Faber, 1965).

of work, despite the fact that the influence of the members of the

People's Assembly has been sharply curtailed since the 1952 Revolution --

or perhaps because of it. These two factors, i.e., prestige and

importance of work, can be regarded as being linked to the nature of

the political system of Revolutionary Egypt. As many members of the

Egyptian bureaucratic elite observed, by reducing the power of the

People's Assembly the Revolutionary leaders have also eroded the

prestige and the role of the deputies.

There is little question that the relationship of deputies

and the bureaucratic elite has often been depending on the representat-

iveness or unrepresentativeness of the bureaucracy. With regard to

Egypt, it has already been shown that the Egyptian bureaucratic elite,

and cabinet-rank ministers are unrepresentative of the society as a

whole. But how representative are its members of the Egyptian People's

Assembly? While there are serious gaps in the data needed to answer

this question, we do possess some evidence to show that they are not,

in fact, more representative than the Egyptian bureaucratic elite to

any great extent. It has already been shown that 52 per cent of the

total membership of the Egyptian People's Assembly is made up of

peasants and workers. However, according to the same source, the

"other" category, i.e., professionals, landowners, former army officers

and bureaucrats, constitute 48 per cent of the total membership, a

percentage which would give them greater weight in the People's Assembly.

Moreover, it was revealed by the same study that the distribution of

members does indicate the over-representation of the "other" category

in areas or provinces which are predominantly agricultural or

industrial.[1] Finally, it is widely acknowledged that most of those

elected to the Assembly as peasants are in fact owners of middle sized

---

[1] See New Trends in the People's Assembly, op.cit., p.32.

or large-size farms.[1]

On the basis of these data and information, it can be argued that the majority of the members of the Egyptian bureaucratic elite, cabinet-rank ministers as well as members of the Egyptian People's Assembly, originate from what may roughly be termed the middle and upper-middle classes. Such a similarity in social background could have been an important factor in enhancing the role of the People's Assembly vis-à-vis the Egyptian bureaucratic elite, were it not for the strong and powerful presidency which dominates and severely restricts the Assembly's role. Cross-culturally, Pulzer noted this argument with regard to Britain, where the social origins of Members of Parliament and of the Administrative Class of the Civil Service have been more or less homogeneous. Because of this homogeneity, it has been concluded that the British higher civil service has been responsive to politicians.[2]

Indeed, from the data presented in the following chapter, it will be argued that an overwhelming majority of the members of the Egyptian bureaucratic elite has an intellectual commitment to a democratic, representative form of government.

Local vs. National Interests: The Egyptian higher civil servant views his role, as has been suggested, as being influenced by the presidency, ministers and public interest. Nowhere is this better illustrated than in the higher civil servant's perception of outside influences (see Table XIII.1). In contrast, the deputies interests,

---

[1] While no data is available, an educated guess would be that up to one half of the deputies elected as peasants or "others" in the elections of 1964, 1969 and 1971 owned more than 20 feddans of land, which by Egyptian standards is a rather substantial proportion of land.

[2] See inter alia, Peter G.J. Pulzer, Political Representation and Elections: Parties and Voting in Great Britain (New York: Frederick A Praeger, 1967), pp. 68-71 and Kingsley, op.cit., pp. 273-282

in the view of the Egyptian higher civil servant, are segmental, whether they concern the particularistic interests of the people who elected them or their local constituencies. They are not, nor can they be, some of our respondents maintain, the general or public interest. That the members of the Egyptian People's Assembly did not concern themselves with general questions, but only with particular cases was one of the most persistent themes of the bureaucratic elite. It is interesting to note that the deputy himself ascribes a greater importance to his local activities and particularistic demands.[1]

The above situation is not unique for Egypt and no doubt has its parallels elsewhere. In the United States, for example, the legislator is often seen in much the same light as the Egyptian deputy. Samuel Huntington notes that the American "Congressmen tend to be oriented towards local needs and small-town ways of thought. The leaders of the administration and of the private national institutions are more likely to think in national terms."[2] In Egypt, however, the Legislator's preoccupation with satisfying his constituents, coupled with centralised administrative system, contributed to the decline of the deputy's role vis-à-vis the bureaucracy.

Technical Competence vs.Incompetence: One of the most crucial criticisms made of members of the People's Assembly and those of the A.S.U. in general is their technical incompetence, which higher civil servants contrast to their own expertise.

By and large, the Egyptian bureaucratic elite is more highly qualified and more competent than the members of the People's Assembly in terms of educational background. As far as our respondents are

---

[1] See New Trends in the People's Assembly, op.cit., pp.28-30

[2] Samuel Huntington, "Congressional Responses in the Twentieth Century," in David B.Truman (ed.) The Congress and American's Future (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall 1965), p.15

concerned, an overwhelming majority (94 per cent) have a university
education or more, as compared to the 35 per cent of the members of
the Egyptian People's Assembly who have such education.[1] According
to our respondents, moreover, most members of the People's Assembly
do not have the necessary knowledge and experience.

The higher civil servants tend to think of their work, as
has been suggested, as being both administrative and political.
As far as administration and politics are concerned, the present
writer was repeatedly told by higher civil servants that they have
much to do with each other. That is to say, our respondents acknow-
ledge that their role is political and administrative. Nowhere is
this better illustrated than in the Egyptian higher civil servants'
view of their role vis-à-vis the politicians, i.e. members of the
People's Assembly and the A.S.U. That our respondents see themselves
as responsible for establishing norms and general guidelines as well
as for working on long-term projects and policies can be seen from
Table XIII.2 which also shows that they think the task of formulating
broad policies should be shared with politicians. Moreover, our
respondents claimed responsibility insofar as the other basic
governmental activities are concerned. Overall, these results
indicate that the Egyptian bureaucratic elite recognises that it
plays an important political role.

It is not unimportant, moreover, that the term siyasa in
Arabic covers both "politics" and "policy" and to the extent that the
Egyptian bureaucratic elite formulates or participates in formulating
policies, it is engaged in politics. As their role perception suggests,
the Egyptian higher civil servants can and are capable of assuming a

---

[1] For the data on the educational background of the members of
the Egyptian People's Assembly, see Demoncracy in Egypt, op.cit.,
pp.36-37.

Table XIII.2

Perceived Responsibilities of Egyptian Bureaucratic

Elite vs. Politicians

Responsibilities:	Percentages: No. of cases in Parentheses		
	Primary Responsibility		Shared Responsib-ility
	Politic-ians	Higher Civil Servants	
Formulation of broad politics	13	14	73
Establishing norms and general guidelines	3	89	8
Working on long-term projects and policies	0	98	2
Fixing of priorities in programme implementation	4	90	6
Policy decisions relating day-to-day working of government	0	94	6
Implementation of programmes	0	100	0
Distribution of loans, foreign aids and subsidies	0	98	2
Allocation of licences, quotas and permits	0	97	3
Selection of sites for programmes	2	88	10
Disposal of public grievances	9	80	11
Dealing with emergency situ-ations, (e.g., floods, droughts etc.)	12	73	15
	(400)		

wide range of roles, certain of which place them very close to

politicians. Against this backdrop, Professor Chapman notes that

public policy is the politics of administration.

"Politics means much more than the manoeuvering of parties and their relations with particular clientele. It is not possible forever to evade questions about 'theright kind of society', the purposes of the state, the basis and judification of government business. The determination of ends, the choice of means, the balance of social forces, are the stuff of politics. In these terms it is clear that some civil servants are engaged

in politics. The word 'policy' is recognition of this, it is a way of describing that what civil servants do when they play a part in determining ends, choosing means and fixing priorities."Policy" is then nothing more than the political activity of civil servants."[1]

Professor Chapman has well illustrated the inevitable political role that higher civil servants assume in their daily tasks as administrators. From the data presented so far, it might be suggested that the Egyptian bureaucratic elite plays an even more political role than indicated by Professor Chapman. Yet, the Egyptian bureaucratic elite is not, as implied by Riggs' model, solely responsible for the weakness of the legislative branch of government. On the contrary, all available evidence suggests that the Egyptian higher civil servants help members of the People's Assembly to become acquainted with the problems and work of the Egyptian bureaucracy which is supposed to be controlled by the Assembly. Moreover, the Egyptian bureaucratic elite helps members of the People's Assembly in yet another important way; through initiating legislative proposals or bills.[2] This is, in part, due to the fact that the bureaucratic elite in Egypt is the only group which can supply trained, well-informed personnel in society and the near absence of private organisation which could provide technical expertise.[3]

With regard to Professor Riggs' model, the present writer feels that although Riggs understands the social and political situation in

---

[1] Brian Chapman, The Profession of Government (London: Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1969), pp.274-275.

[2] It has been revealed that out of 308 legislative proposals submitted to the Egyptian People's Assembly during the fifth session, 129 have been approved and adopted. Of those approved, there were 107 legislative proposals initiated by the government i.e. higher civil servants as opposed to only 22 proposals initiated by the members of the Assembly. See New Trends in the People's Assembly op.cit., p.81 and p.26.

[3] There are other factors responsible for the weakness of the People's Assembly such as the weakness relating to the internal organisation of the Assembly itself, lack of political participation, etc., - - - - See, Ibid pp. 80-85.

the transitional societies, he is very much influenced in his recommendation by his political values, which are, of course, derived from the Western culture.

Riggs, for example, considers lack of spoils and the lack of party control over the state bureaucracy as reasons for the weakness of the legislative bodies in developing countries. In Egypt, however, the government is obliged to find a job for everyone, and also the Presidency dominates and controls the public bureaucracy through different means. Despite that, Egypt still lacks a strong effective legislative body.

It is perhaps in the nature of the revolutionary system, not the extent of bureaucratic power, that we can explain the absence of "developed" political parties and interest groups in Egypt. This line of argument is in agreement with Alfred Diamant's model of bureaucracy in "developmental movement regimes." Professor Diamant argues that in the developmental movement regime, the revolutionary leaders have the decision-making power and all the political organisations in the society including the legislative body - - are mobilised and incorporated into the mass movement. The bureaucrats' influence over and their interference and relations with the legislative body take place, in Diamant's model, as a part of their role as a representative of the movement regime, and in response to the direction and guidance of the revolutionary leaders. Therefore, the bureaucratic elite interacts with the legislative body as an agency of the movement regime and its leadership.[1]

According to Professor Diamant, however, the character of the mass movement impinges directly on the public bureaucracy. The strength

---

[1] Alfred Diamant, "Bureaucracy in Developmental Movement Regime," in Riggs (ed.) Frontiers of Development Administration, op.cit.

or weakness of the mass movement is the key variable.[1] That is to say that the political power of the bureaucratic elite depends on the degree of mobilisation achieved by the mass movement. If the movement regime is able to achieve a high degree of mobilisation the bureaucracy becomes a part of the movement and has no power of its own. Therefore, the degree of political power in the hands of the bureaucrats is inversely proportinate to that of the movement itself. However "imbalance" between the two is not of concern to Professor Diamant, in contrast to Professor Riggs' concern regarding relations between bureaucracy and political institutions.

It is significant to note that Egypt, according to Professor Ferrel Heady, has a dominant-party mobilisation system which is dominated by revolutionary leaders, committed to social, economic and political change.[2] To achieve those objectives, the revolutionary leaders adopted a socialist ideology, although without being too rigid, and they selected the mobilisation system as their political process. They established the Arab Socialist Union as a mass movement to serve as a mobilising force in the society. This process of mobilisation required complete control over all the political organisations in Egypt in order to channel all political efforts and supports on behalf of revolutionary developmental goals. Thus, the Egyptian political system coincides with Professor Diamant's model of the"Developmental Movement Regime." It is developmental with a mass movement, i.e. ASU, and it is engaged in mobilising process in order to achieve its developmental goals.

---

[1] Ibid., p.526

[2] Ferrel Heady, Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall Inc., 1966), p.91

It is in order now to evaluate briefly the inter-relationship between the ASU as a mass movement serving as a mobilising force and the Egyptian bureaucratic elite.

All available evidence suggests that the ASU has played a very limited role, if any, as a mobilising force in Egyptian society. As our respondents suggest, the ASU has not been able to exercise influence or control with regard to the Egyptian bureaucracy simply because the President has chosen to channel his influence directly to the Egyptian bureaucratic elite. The Egyptian political system , as we have explained before, is very centralised and a great deal of power is concentrated in the hands of the President of the Republic.

As noted earlier in the case of the People's Assembly, the Egyptian bureaucratic elite is not responsible for the weakness of the ASU. In fact, some of our respondents emphasised that the Egyptian presidency which controls both the government and the ASU would not allow bureaucracy, in spite of its bureaucratic power, to weaken the ASU or the People's Assembly because of the usefulness of these political organisations to the Presidency, i.e., providing the image, if not the reality, of mass popular support. Moreover, the Egyptian bureaucratic elite, which is controlled by the Presidency and has no political power of its own, participates in the political activity of the ASU and the People's Assembly as agents of the revolutionary leaders. This bureaucratic-political role could easily be depicted from the paramount position which the Presidency and the executive branch of government enjoy in relation to other political organisations i.e. the People's Assembly and the ASU. The prestige and the power of the Presidency enhance and protect Egyptian bureaucracy from the control or influence of other political organisations. In addition, since Egypt has very few private organisations to provide technical expertise, the

Egyptian bureaucratic elite is the only group which can supply
trained personnel to the society. The bureaucratic advantages
and the weakness of other political organisations, i.e. the People's
Assembly and the ASU, enhance the position of the bureaucratic
elite in Egyptian society and would make its participation in politics
not only desirable, but necessary for the success of the regime in
achieving its goals.

Some scholars have interpreted such criticisms of the politicians
and political institutions as an anti-democratic attitude on the part
of the bureaucratic elite and as an evidence of its technocratic
predisposition.[1] However, it might well be suggested that the attempts
to analyse the intricate issue of the bureaucratic elite's role and its
relationship with the political system in terms of anti-democratic bias
is a simplistic approach. On the one hand, it tends to attribute to
one factor an overriding importance that may not be entirely warranted
despite the element of truth it may contain. On the other hand, this
one explanation is basically ahistorical for, as we have seen earlier,
in this chapter, it does not take into account the historical roots
of the complex role of the Egyptian bureaucratic elite in society.

That the members of the Egyptian People's Assembly and those of
the ASU are not technically competent and hence are not able to exercise
an active political role vis-à-vis the bureaucratic elite can be
attributed to three factors: (1) the nature of the Egyptian political
system particularly after the 1952 Revolution and the paramount position
of a strong and powerful presidency, (2) lack of time to acquire
expertise; and (3) lack of information.

Clearly, all these factors are in some way related to one
another. But these factors are certainly not peculiar to Egypt, although

---

[1] See, for example, Jean Maynaud, Technocracy (London: Faber
and Faber,1965), p.219

they may be somewhat acute there, given the tremendous increase of
executive power after the 1952 Revolution. In Britain, for example,
Bernard Crick deplores the declining effectiveness of the British
Parliament and the accompanying increase of executive power, which
he nevertheless acknowledges to be an indispensable element of modern
government:

> "The declining effectiveness of the House has been paralleled
> by a rising efficiency of the Executive. But there is no
> necessary contradition between wanting a strong Executive
> and wanting a more effective and efficient House of Commons.
> The more power we entrust to a government to do things for us,
> the greater the need for it to operate amid a blaze of
> publicity and criticism. But there is such a contradiction
> at the moment because Parliament has not improved her own
> instruments of control, scrutiny, criticism and suggestion
> to keep pace with the greater of improvements of efficiency
> and the increase in size of executive government. Small wonder
> that public comprehension of Parliament is low and that
> confidence is declining."[1]

The present writer shares Crick's belief that a strong parliament
or the ASU, for that matter, does not lead to a weak executive. In
other words, without reducing his power, the President's power could
also be used to enchance the position of both the People's Assembly
and the ASU. That is to say that the President who is also the
President of the ASU, could do this by playing a more active role as
the president of the ASU and by making the cabinet accountable to him
not primarily as a "president of the republic" but, more so, as the
President of the ASU. Furthermore, this would contribute to a more
active political role in so far as the People's Assembly is concerned.

The Higher Degree of Ministers' Dependence on the Advice of the
Egyptian Bureaucratic Elite: Having argued that the Egyptian
bureaucratic elite is closely associated with a strong and powerful
Presidency, as a result of which the bureaucratic elite enhances its

---

[1] Bernard C. Crick, The Reform of Parliament (New York: Doubleday,
1965), p. 15.

political role vis-à-vis other political institutions i.e., the People's Assembly and the ASU, we now turn to the question of the Egyptian bureaucratic elite's role within the executive branch (i.e. cabinet-rank ministers).

In order to determine whether the Egyptian bureaucratic elite perform the role of policy adviser to their ministers, the questionnaire contained the following statement: As far as development policy is concerned, ministers depend to a great extent on the advice and recommendations of the higher civil servants. An overwhelming majority of our respondents (89.5 per cent) agreed with this statement, indicating that ministers are in fact relying on the higher civil servants for advice and recommendations in the formulation of development policies. In responding to this statment, no significant differences were noted among our respondents as regards socio-economic background, perspective ministeries . . . etc., . This would suggest that their agreement with this statement prevades the higher civil service and is not concentrated among one or another group within it.

The reasons for the ministers' reliance on the higher civil servants for advice in the formulation of development policy are specified in the answers to the further question: "Why do you think so?" The 358 who agreed that ministers rely a great deal on the advice and recommendations of the higher civil servants gave three main reasons: 49 per cent said because ministerial instability enhances the influence and policy-making role of higher civil servants, 23 per cent said because higher civil servants usually possess the necessary information with respect to development policy, and 20 per cent believed that ministers more often than not lack the necessary expertise, hence their heavy reliance on the advice and recommendations of higher civil servants.

Given these reasons, one can argue that one of the most important

factors determining the degree of ministers' reliance on the advice

and recommendations of higher civil servants is the instability of

ministers' tenure, and this factor is intimately linked to, and

affected by the civil servants' possession of necessary information

as well as the lack of the necessary expertise on the part of ministers.

Information is generally a monopoly of the higher civil servants in

the ministry, which can be eroded only if the minister remains in office

for a sufficiently long time. The necessary competence and expertise

cannot be acquired by a minister in view of his short tenure.

This dependence of the minister on his higher civil servants

gave rise to a situation where some higher civil servants saw them-

selves as "guiding" the minister. As one of our respondents put it,

"The ministers were forced to be very dependent on our advice and

recommendations."

In the light of our respondents' reasons for ministers' heavy

dependence on the advice of higher civil servants, it is important to

discuss what is meant by governmental instability. To be sure, the

recurring cabinet crises prior to the 1952 Revolution entailed constant

changes of governments, the average life of a government being

approximately nine and a half months.[1]   This holds true with respect

to the governments i.e., cabinets formed since the 1952 Revolution.

Between September 7, 1952 and March 21, 1976, twenty-eight cabinets

were formed. This last figure indicates a ratio of one cabinet every

10 months. After the 1952 Revolution, these cabinet changes, however,

did not entail ministerial changes to the same degree.

Since the frequent changes in government induced constant

reshuffles, even when the same ministers were appointed to the same

ministries , it is perhaps more practical to define ministerial

instability in terms of the climate or atmosphere of instability which

---

[1] Between March 15, 1923, and July 23, 1952 a total of 38
cabinets rotated in office.

certainly affected our respondent's reasons as to the heavy reliance

of ministers on their advice and recommendations as well as the

ministers themselves. It appears that ministers realised that the

government they belonged to would sooner or later be reshuffled and,

though some of them may have been promised a position in the next

government, they could not be sure of the same post. We must take

into consideration this expectation of discontinuity or instability,

since it has affected our respondents' reasons for ministers'

dependence on their advice. As one of our respondents put it:

"Ministers, aware of the instability of tenure, turned their attention

to seeking out political support and away from the immediate administ-

rative and ministerial tasks at hand." Perhaps, finding political

(i.e., patrons') support for policies and for oneself is seen as one

of the most crucial aspects of the minister's job and may consume

almost all of his job-related efforts. In effect, ministers have to

rely a great deal on their higher civil servants as policy-advisers.

The phenonenon of ministerial instability which appears to give

greater leeway to the Egyptian bureaucratic elite and increase their

influence over ministers is not peculiar to Egypt. Even for a developed

country such as France, Philip Williams observes that "Long-range

policies had been the work of officials rather than politicians in the

Third Republic as well as the Fourth."[1] This situation, according to

Williams, was a by-product of ministerial instability.[2]

---

[1] Philip Williams, Crises and Compromises. Politics in the Fourth Republic (New York: Doubleday Anchor,1966), pp.365. Williams notes that the average life of a French government was approximately eight months, an average which is very close to that of an Egyptian government. See also Alfred Diamant,"The French Administrative System: The Republic Passes but the Administration Remains," in William J.Siffin (ed.) Toward the Comparative Study of Public Administration (Bloomington: Indianna University Press, 1959).

[2] Williams, op.cit., p.305.

The present writer believes however, that it is not simply the phenomenon of ministerial instability which renders the minsters heavily dependent on higher civil servants' advice and recommendations. Rather, it is the combination of ministerial instability with the lack of competence and expertise on the part of ministers and the higher civil servants' near monopoly of information.

Even for another developed, but traditionally-stable political system such as Britain, Richard Neustadt notes that the civil servants must be and are consulted by the ministers, who in turn do not inter-fere in recruitment and promotion matters and who protect the anony-mity of their officials. "More important," writes Neustadt, "the politicians i.e., the ministers lean on thier officials. They expect to be advised. Most important, they very often follow the advice that they receive."[1] Sisson argues, moreover, that "When a (British) Minister announces in the House that he will do something he is rarely talking about the sort of the thing that he himself does . . . It is more usual to speak of what a Minister is responsible for than what he does."[2] That the Labour government, which appointed the Fulton Commission in 1966, to conduct a fundamental and wide-ranging inquiry into the British Civil Service, could not envisage any modification in the relationship between ministers and higher civil servants testifies to the fact that both civil servants and politicians recognise that it is the former who bear the burden of the formulation and execution of policy.[3]

Given our respondents' opinions as to the ministers' heavy reliance on their advice, it was assumed that a large percentage of our respondents

[1] Richard Neustadt, "White House and Whitehall," The Public Interest, Vol. XI, (1966), p.233.

[2] C.H.Sisson, The Spirit of British Administration (London: Faber and Faber, 1959), p.13.

[3] For a corroborating view see, Geoffrey K.Fry,"Some Weaknesses in the Fulton Report on the British Home Civil Service," Political Studies, Vol. XVIII, No. 4 (1969), p.484.

had frequent contact with their ministers. To verify this assumption,
our respondents were asked: "How often do you have contact with the
following individuals in carrying out your official duties?"
Individuals listed were citizens, clientele, personnel of other
ministries, members of the ASU, members of the People's Assembly,
governors, ministers and others. The responses are presented in the
following table.

<div align="center">Table XIII.3</div>

<div align="center">Frequency of Contacts of Egyptian Higher</div>

<div align="center">Civil Servants with Various Individuals</div>

Individuals contacted	Percentage: No of Cases in Parentheses			
	Frequent	Occasional	Infrequent	Never
Citizens - the public at large	1	12	77	10
Clientele - persons served or regulated by your ministry	13	17	66	4
Personnel of other Ministries	29	44	21	6
Members of the ASU	7	6	77	10
Members of the People's Assembly	5	31	49	15
Governors	30	21	45	4
Ministers	66	20	12	2
Others	0	0	0	0
	(400)			

As can be noted from Table XIII.3, the majority of our respondents,
66 per cent have indicated that they frequently have contacts with
ministers. Moreover, one-fifth of our respondents indicated that they
occasionally have contacts with ministers.

It might be suggested from the above analysis and findings that
the Egyptian higher civil servants play a political role in addition to
their administrative function. But this political role does not impair
their performance nor is it solely responsible for the weakness of the

representative institutions. The bureaucratic elite in Egypt, as in many other developing countries, is the most organised technical group in the country. Therefore, the success of governmental policies in countries such as Egypt depends, to a large degree, on the abilities of these governments to manage and use their bureaucrats for the achievement of their policies. The Egyptian regime is able to achieve bureaucratic co-operation and control through the concentration of power in the hands of the President, mobilisation efforts, charismatic leadership and actual or potential coercion.

In short, the Egyptian bureaucratic elite which serves under a powerful and charismatic leader - - plays a major role in policy making but as a part of the modernising group. The Egyptian higher civil servants' near monopoly of technical expertise,and, above all, their close relations with the revolutionary leaders enchance their positions in dealing with other political organisations.

Vis-à-vis ministers, the higher civil servant's policy advice seems to have a high level of legitimacy in view of ministerial instability as well as the lack of expertise on the part of the ministers. The higher civil servant seems to be very influential as a manipulator of information and advice, but this, in the present writer's view, is not contrary to the professional ethics implicit in the administrator's function. His personal policy opinions are backed by knowledge which is highly important and is not shared by ministers, owing to the short tenure of the latter. The higher civil servants' role as policy advisers seems to have further increased their share in the policy making process.

It might well be suggested that a close link between policy formulation and execution is essential for effective governments in developing countries.

CHAPTER XIV

THE MODERNISING ROLE OF

EGYPTIAN BUREAUCRATIC ELITE

Having argued that the Egyptian bureaucratic elite makes a
significant contribution in the making and execution of public policy,
we must now ask whether the Egyptian bureaucratic elite tends to
oppose change in the interest of stability, or whether it constitutes
elements of change and development - - in what form and to what extent?
What are its attitudes towards the values of modern social, economic
and political life? Since there has been little work done on the
Egyptian higher civil servants, we cannot answer this question
definitively. From the interview data we may, however, offer a tentative
answer.

Respondents' Self-Concept As A Modernising Elite

Becuase in the early stages of the research it became evident that
very few higher civil servants would refrain from assuming the role of a
modernising elite, it was decided to assess their role concept somewhat
more unobtrusively, i.e., not to ask direct questions. When interviewed,
Egyptian higher civil servants were asked about their opinion as to who
should take the initiative as regards modernising Egyptian society.
Their opinions indicate clearly that, alone or in combination with other
groups, the higher civil servants are regarded as a group to take the
initiative in Egypt's modernisation by more than 90 per cent of the
research population. More than 50 per cent of these seem to think that
their initiative ought to come from the higher civil servants alone,
as Table XIV.1 suggests.

Table XIV.1

Egyptian Higher Civil Servants'. Opinion of

Initiative in Egypt's Modernisation

Initiative Taken	Percentages: No. of Cases in Parentheses
1. Higher Civil Servants	54.5
2. Military	.5
3. Religious Leaders	.5
4. Businessmen	1.5
5. Politicians	7.5
1 and 4 and 5	20.0
1 and 5	15.5
Total	100.0
	(400)

Here are some of the typical reasons given by our respondents who think that this initiative ought to come from higher civil servants alone:

Human Skills and Resources: According to some of our respondents "only the civil service has the reservoir of human talents needed to act on behalf of modernisation and development." These respondents asserted that "the creative types in our society, those who have leadership qualities and capabilities, and those who have expertise usually find jobs in the civil service." The civil service, according to these respondents, "has the only elite which could reasonably assume the role of a modernising elite and influence modernising values by its expertise and authority. The rest of society lacks such men."

Responsibility for the Public Interest: Some of our respondents explained that it is the higher civil servants who consider the public interest here; the non-governmental sector is preoccupied with profit or with personal gain, no matter what the cost to others.

Organisational Resources: Some of our respondents pointed out
that only the government and its civil service have the organisation,
effective channels of communication, the data, expertise, coordination
mechanism, and plans to act effectively on behalf of modernisation and
development.

The Public Bureaucracy as the Modernising Force: Still others
identified the bureaucratic elite as the only elite in Egyptian
society, no one else is able or willing "to accomplish this task".
Generally speaking, these respondents pointed out that the situation
in Egypt is different from that in other countries such as England.
Private initiative does not exist in Egypt and the people do not
understand the basic elements of economic and social development. They
are almost entirely ignorant of the necessary skills and, without the
initiative of the Egyptian bureaucratic elite, the Egyptians cannot take
even a step in this direction. These respondents further added that
the Egyptians are temperamentally etatists; they expect the government
and higher civil servants to take the initiative in almost everything
new and progressive.

There is little doubt that developing countries are compelled to
use the public bureaucracy and its bureaucratic elite as agents of change
in their quest for modernising and developing their respective societies.
Along similiar lines, La Palombara notes that:

> "As far as the new states are concerned, it is apparent that top-
> level bureaucrats provide one of the few sources - perhaps the
> sole source - from which one expects a rational confrontation
> and management of the problem of public policy."[1]

A growing reliance upon the skills of top-bureaucrats in developing
societies in planning and carrying out public policy towards development

---

[1] Joseph La Palombara, "Bureaucracy and Political Development:
Notes, Queries and Dilemmas," in Joseph La Palombara (ed.) Bureaucracy
and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1963), p.52.

and modernisation has been observed both among students of development and modernisation and the practitioners in developed and developing societies. Paradoxically, this growing reliance upon the skills of the bureaucratic elite and bureaucracy has often co-existed with another description with which it is in sharp contradiction - - the description noted in the previous chapters that the Egyptian bureaucracy is in a transitional stage of development by comparison with Western standards i.e., being neither modern nor traditional, Egyptian bureaucracy reflects the characteristics of both modern and traditional organisations.

Based on the interview material we may postulate, however, that transitional societies (developing societies i.e., neither modern nor traditional) produce transitional organisations, and by the same token only a transitional organisation (reflecting characteristics of both modern and traditional organisations to varying degrees) could survive and function effectively in a transitional environment. As one of our respondents put it, "Present developing nations, being transitional societies, are equipped to accommodate effectively only transitional organisations. Highly modern and highly traditional organisations cannot perhaps function effectively in developing societies, although they may survive for some time." In fact, it is not a pure coincidence that all of the organisations in developing societies, including public bureaucracies, were established either by a colonial government or by native modernising leaders. After a few years of existence they tend to become transitional organisations in structure as well as in attitude. This is a very natural process when the inter-related nature of the societal system is taken into consideration. For that matter a structural-functional analysis is very helpful in understanding the above-mentioned phenomenon. Such changes or adaptions to a foreign enviroment are inherent in every system, be it a biological, mechanical,

cultural or social system.

A second postulate may also be drawn from the interview material as follows: transitional organisations are relatively superior as a modernising organisation to both highly modern, Western organisations and to highly traditional organisations in the modernisation process of developing societies. By the same token, we may also state that the present somewhat corrupt and semi-professional public bureaucracies in developing societies are comparatively superior to both the highly modernised public bureaucracy and the highly traditional public bureaucracy as an agent of change for modernisation and development. The above-mentioned postulate may seem strange to the students of public administration and administrative reform. If present inefficient public bureaucracies in developing societies are relatively superior to other types of organisations, why does practically every developing nation-state struggle to initiate an administrative reform? There is little doubt that the strangeness of the statement stems from the conventional concept of administrative reform which concentrates on perfecting administrative performance. If analysed from a structural-functional perspective, the present developing societies' public bureaucracies are comparatively superior as an agent of change in their respective societies, but this does not mean that public bureaucracies in developing societies cannot be improved further to make them a more effective agent of change. The activities of administrative reforms, however, should not be strictly and solely concentrated on perfecting administrative performance. Rather, true administrative reform involves activities which enhance the capabilities of a public bureaucracy as an agent of change for modernisation and development, in whatever forms such activities may take; it might be towards the Western model, or it might be away from it, in both cases such reforms are always administrative reform as long as they contribute to the modernisation and development

of the society.

It is significant to note that during the rapid modernisation and industrialisation of Western Europe and the United States, public bureaucracies were not very professional, neutral, or free of corruption and red tape.[1] The Weberian type of neutral, professional service bureaucracies started to emerge during the final stage of the Industrial Revolution. There is not always a positive correlation between a highly professional, incorrupt and neutral bureaucracy and its ability to contribute to the modernisation and development of a society. In certain cases it is conceivable and very probable that a semi-professional and somewhat corrupt bureaucracy might be able to contribute to the development of a given society at a given time. Public bureaucracy in Turkey under the Democrat Party administration is a case in point. It is aptly noted that the Turkish public bureaucracy under the administration of the Democrat Party (1950-60) became less neutral, less qualified, less specialised, perhaps more corrupt and to some extent less efficient.[2] But ironically the period between 1950-57, until the Democrat Party itself began to abuse its power and relied upon force rather than persuasion (which ended with a military coup d'etat in 1960) has been one of unprecedented social, political and especially economic development in Turkey. Perhaps the case of the Turkish bureaucracy is another example contradicting the positive correlation between the highly modernised public bureaucracy and its capability as an agent of change for modernisation and development in developing societies.

The Bureaucratic Elite's perception of Modernisation and Development

To explore the perceptions of the respondents on the process of

---

[1] For a corroborating view see, Martin Lispet, The First New Nation, (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1963), pp. 52-58.

[2] For a corroborating view see, C.H.Dodd, Politics and Government in Turkey, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1969), p.319.

modernisation and development, each respondent was asked to reflect
aloud on the process in open-ended questions. In evaluating the views
of the respondents, the researcher was most interested in their
perceptual and/or interpretive frameworks of the modernisation and
development process and whether or not their frameworks include
common rules and values for the building of consensus on important
issues.

When interviewed, the respondents were asked about what they
understand by the term development. The respondents on this question
emphasised four somewhat different themes as discussed below.

Table XIV.2

General Definition of Development

By Egyptian Higher Civil Servants

Definition	Percentages: No. of Cases in Parentheses
A. New, rational type of <u>thinking</u> accompanied by the adoption of technology and/or technical values and economic progress.	70
B. Cultural or <u>value change</u> accompanied by the adoption of technology and/or economic progress. No specific mention of change in "thinking".	20
C. <u>Economic Progress</u> accompanied by the introduction of modern science and technology. No mention of change in thinking or cultural value.	8
D. Complete emancipation, cultural, <u>political</u> and economic.	2
Total	100
	(400)

A. <u>Development as New Thinking</u>: Defining development as primarily a transformation of mental processes, 70 per cent of the respondents mentioned some items which characterise the developmental mentality of man as becoming more "rational", "scientific", "technical", "new", "realistic" - - - based on reality rather than on traditional ways or emotions; "efficient", "logical", "problem solving", "modern", "planning-oriented", "productive", and "up-to-date."

Generally, development and rationality were closely associated by most higher civil servants as illustrated by the following comments on development.

> "It is the introduction of the ways of thinking and doing characteristic of industrial society to replace our traditional way of thinking when making decisions."

> "It is the total change of society, mental and physical with man thinking according to reason rather than emotion. In this process, people adopt a new value of time."

> "It is the willingness of people to change so that they think efficiently, see things on a scientific basis and open themselves to new technologies."

B. <u>Development as Value Changes</u>: Rather than perceiving development as a mixture of new rational ways of thinking and the use of new technologies and economic progress, 20 per cent of our respondents perceived it as a <u>cultural experience</u> in which the experience of new technologies would be accompanied by economic and cultural value change. These comments illustrate their view of development:

> "It is simply the readiness to adapt new techniques that will transform our traditional style of life. Rather than exclusively oriented to self or to our little group, we will develop a concern for others."

> "It is a type of detraditionalisation. Old habits and customary ways of doing things one replaced by better ones."

> "It is the new ways of solving problems to achieve a better living in this country. It will be accompanied by more openness to the views of others and increasing self-reliance on the part of the individual."

C. <u>Development as Economic Progress</u>: Rather than representing

development as including mental or cultural transformation processes,

8 per cent of our respondents chose to represent it merely as one of

technical <u>economic change</u>, that is, the introduction of the modern

means of economic production. These respondents either explicitly

denied that development would involve the transformation of the minds

and values of men or failed to express such a view. They defined

development as follows:

> "It is the introduction of modern equipment to increase
> productivity with consequent improvement of our material
> welfare."

> "It is merely the replacement of existing production techniques
> by cheaper and more effective ones."

D. <u>Development as Political Emancipation</u>: Only two per cent of

our respondents clearly defined development as a <u>politically liberating</u>

experience. These respondents explained:

> "Development means emancipation in the fullest sense of the word.
> In it, man becomes free: free to choose his leaders, free to
> participate in politics, free of the dictates of tradition and
> superstition, and free from material want."

In summary, ninety-eight per cent of our respondents defined

development as an experience in economic change that would change the

traditional mental attitudes and/or cultural or religious attitudes

that now seem to characterise Egyptians. Only two per cent of our

respondents perceived development in expressly "political" terms.

<u>Some Indicators of Development as Mentioned By Egyptian
Bureaucratic Elite</u>

When interviewed, Egyptian higher civil servants were asked about

their indicators of development. In accordance with their definitions

of development as intellectual-cultural reformation and economic

technical change, our respondents maintained a variety of indicators

reflecting their visions. These indications may be classified as

(a) socio-cultural, (b) cultural-associated, (c) economic, (d) political, and (e) administrative.

Socio-Cultural Indicators

Introduction of New Types of Practical Vocational Education: (46.5% of responses).   The new education mentioned by respondents was described as "practical" in that it involved new types of instructions designed to instil more practical, modern outlooks among both women and men.

Replacement of Traditional Values: (40 % of responses). The replacement of primitive rural attitudes and old habits and ways of doing things by new ways of thinking and acting was identified as a central feature of development by some respondents.

Less Dependence on Irrational Traditional Religious Feelings and Mystical Beliefs: (38 % of responses). Some respondents suggested that development should be accompanied by an easing of attitudes they called dogmatic, intolerant, exclusivist, or inflexible prevalent among many Egyptians, particularly in rural areas. Some other respondents explained that development will occur when rural leaders and indeed many people in the countryside who dread development because they are ignorant of its real meaning and see it only as gambling, dancing - - etc., reduce their unreasonable opposition, to it.

Less Passive Attitude to Nature: (12% of responses). Development will be accompanied by a less passive and more independent attitude toward nature. The modern man, because of his new freedom from immediate survival pressures, will develop hope for tomorrow and a planning mentality.

Less Dependence on Family: (10% of responses). Some respondents explained that the dependence of family or family surrogates was counter-productive. In their views, the financial drain imposed on potential modernisers or developmentalists by the obligation to support swarms of family relations prohibited potential investors from

accumulating and investing capital. In a similar view, some respondents cited the drain of personal initiative occasioned by the psychological dependence by civilian and military bureaucrats on paternal-surrogates in the offices and units. Such dependence was described as draining the willingness of some bureaucrats to make decisions at their own levels and of causing them to refer some decisions upward to their patrons.

New Work Habits: (8.5% of responses). Some respondents called for harder work, longer hours, and acceptance of discipline in work as needed for development. Some others pointed out that development would be accompanied by the introduction of new technology and organisation which would make current work requirements less burdensome and more productive.

Cultural-Associated Indicators

Adaptability: (40% of responses). More than one third of our respondents identified the capacity to adopt new ways of acting and perceiving in lieu of the parochial outlook as an indicator of development. Some respondents termed this cosmopolitan trait the "ability to adopt appropriate technology;" some other described it as "responsiveness to new techniques," some termed it "flexibility" -- that is, the absence of traditional rigidity in confronting new problems. Still others used the terms "synchronisation" and "harmonisation" in describing the mental attitudes and values needed for the adoption of the new techniques accompanying development.

Some respondents flatly defined the import of development as "Westernisation" in all of its many ways and called for the total Westernisation of all sectors of Egyptian life. As noted earlier, some other respondents denied, however, that development needed to affect Egyptian cultural life at all and insisted in portraying it as a specifically economic - technological phenomenom. For all other respondents, although development was represented as the importance of

novel foreign ways, it was portrayed less as a process resulting in
the total transformation of local life and more as the selective
adoption of the means to renew or to revitalise counter-productive
aspects of socio-economic traditions. In view of the repeated fear
of traditional religious and other leaders of a development associated
with secularisation, weakening of family ties, dancing, gambling, etc.,
some respondents suggested that the term "westernisation" be abandoned
and replaced by less alarming synonyms such a "development" "renewal"
or "growing more educated."

Instrumental Rather than Emotional Communications: (22% of response).
Calling for a new type of communication, some respondents described it
as "calm and unfanatical" and "cool, scientific, and rational".
Some others described is as "open to the world".

Less Dependence on Personal Bonds of Organisation: (8.5% of
responses). The replacement of personal ties by more impersonal
organisational arrangements was cited as another indicator of develop-
ment by some respondents.

Introduction of More Clearly-Structured Organisations: (27% of
responses). Some respondents identified development with the introduct-
ion of many more modern principles of organisation. Some other
respondents described the traditional chaos characterising private
commercial competition in Egypt and called for development in the
form of government intervention to bring more ordered and structured
commercial arrangements.

Economic-Material Indicators

Higher Productivity Through New Technology: (85% of responses).
The employment of new techniques in economic production and government
for greater productivity was identified by the great majority of our
respondents as a key indicator of development.

<u>Improvements in Material Welfare Through Material Production</u>: (20%
of responses). These respondents explained that development was
signalled by higher standards of living, higher incomes and the gradual
elimination of extreme poverty.

<u>Population Planning</u>: (8% of responses). Surprisingly, few
respondents mentioned a lower birth rate and/or modern family planning
practices as indicators of development. Some respondents explained that
given the prevailing religious beliefs, they did not believe that the
government could make significant changes via population planning progress
in the near future.

<u>Political Indicators</u>

<u>Political Leadership of a More Rational Character</u>: (17% of
responses). Some respondents identified development with the rule of
enlightened political leaders thinking according to the rules of reason
than tradition. These respondents were critical of some political
leaders for failing to honour the rules and values of scientific reason.

<u>Political Participation</u>: (4% of responses). Political freedom
or open political debate and discussion were identified with development
by few respondents. Some of these respondents identified instrumental
participation of the people under governmental direction in government
projects as an indicator of development.

<u>Administrative Indicators</u>

<u>Depoliticisation of the Public Administration</u>: (7% of responses).
Some respondents called for the replacement of current political norms
by achievement norms in promoting and recruiting some official and
awarding government contracts.

<u>Reduction of Corruption</u>: (6% of responses). Describing prevailing
corruption as extravagant, some respondents called for its reduction.

In summary, the indicators of development cited by Egyptian higher
civil servants were overwhelmingly socio-cultural and/or economic rather

than political. For this highly educated and strategically placed elite political indicators seem to lie outside its immediate perception of the process of development.

Primary Basis for Allocating Government Resources

When interviewed, Egyptian higher civil servants were asked about the basis on which government should make its decisions regarding the allocation of present resources. This question was placed to them in order to elicit their personal biases, if any, regarding the goals that the government should have in mind when spending its scarce resources.

The comments of our respondents reflected their preoccupation with both economic ends and means as the primary basis for guiding government allocations.

Table XIV.3

Respondents Opinions as to the Primary Basis

For Allocating Government Resources

Primary Basis for Allocating Government Resources	Percentage. No. of Cases in Parentheses
Economic Development	50.0
Economic Welfare (food, income, living standards, prosperity....)	25.0
Economic Development with Political Stability	7.5
Economic Rehabilitation or Stability	6.5
Economic Growth and Production	4.5
Political Power, Prestige, Political Stability	3.5
Administrative Reform	3.0
Total	100.0
	(400)

Only 3.5 per cent of our respondents discussed the central government's allocations as oriented to the achievement of political ends. Moreover, seven and half per cent described economic development accompanied by political stability as the guiding goal in allocating

government resources. These respondents argued that the current
regime's needs in this regard differed from earlier regimes not in
political ends but rather in means, i.e., that while the previous
regime (President Nasser's Regime) employed ideological-political
methods to achieve power and prestige, the present regime employs
economic methods.

Fifty per cent of the respondents expressed explicitly an economic
rather than political preoccupation, indicating that the government
should allocate its resources in order to develop the economy of the
nation now and in future years. Describing the drastic change from
earlier governing elites who were preoccupied with political means to
ends, one respondent labelled this change in elite thinking as a
"swing of the pendulum" necessitated by the awful plight of the economy
after years of neglect, i.e., before the 1952 Revolution.

In summary, an overwhelming majority of the respondents seemed
primarily and immediately concerned, in both the long and short-term,
with improving the economic and material welfare of the people and
state by implementing continuing economic development programmes more
effectively. Although a few respondents expressed their concern with
the realisation of such political ends as stability, power, prestige,
their primary and immediate visions of change and reasons for allocating
government resources were predominantly economic.

The Modernising Experiences of Other Countries as Models

Another indication of the respondents' perceptions of modernisation
and development as well as their self-concept as a modernising elite
emerges from their answers to the question which asks: "Which country
or groups of countries are models which Egypt should follow in its
efforts to develop?"

Table XIV.4

Modernising Experiences of Other Countries

As Models As Indicated by Respondents

Country	Percentages No. of Cases in Parentheses
Japan	45.0
No other country	20.0
Yugoslavia	15.0
Britain	2.0
France	4.0
Soviet Union	2.0
Germany (West)	2.0
United States	1.5
Turkey	1.5
Scandanavia	3.0
Other countries	4.0
Total	100.0
	(400)

In selecting Japan as a model for imitation, our respondents mentioned somewhat different reasons. Some of them indicated economic indicators as the reason for their selection. These respondents mentioned Japan's industrial productivity and its overall rate of economic growth as worthy of emulation. Others expressed admiration for Japan's capacity, particularly during the Meji period, to modernise and develop the country while preserving important traditional values.

Twenty per cent of the respondents described Egypt as "unique" and incapable of modelling itself after the example of any other nation. These respondents explained that countries in the process of development are "too different" to serve as models for one another but it was possible to imitate "some aspects from all."

Fifteen per cent of the respondents named Yugoslavia as worthy of emulation by reason of its strong development-minded leadership and its success in agriculture, tourism and industry.

It is interesting to note that in the majority of models cited

by the respondents, it is an authoritarian, development-oriented,
central government which acts as the driving force for economic
modernisation and development.

The Bureaucratic Elite's Attitude Towards Representative Government

As already noted, ninety-eight per cent of our respondents defined
development as an experience in economic change that would change the
traditional mental and/or cultural or religious attitudes that now
seem to characterise Egyptians. Only 2 per cent of these respondents
perceived development in expressly "political" terms. Moreover, about
55 per cent of them denoted that they did regard themselves as a
modernising elite. For modernising models, the respondents who accept
the experience of other states as relevant to their own, look primarily
to the authoritarian economic modernisers of Japan and some other
nations. Finally, from the data and analysis presented in the last
chapter, it was suggested that the Egyptian bureaucratic elite plays
an important political role vis-à-vis the legislative body, i.e., the
Egyptian People's Assembly, due to the former very close working
relationship with a powerful and strong President and/or presidency.
Yet, the Egyptian bureaucratic elite is not, it has been argued, or
as implied by Professor Riggs' model, responsible for the weakness
of the legislative branch of government. Rather, it is the nature
of the Egyptian political system (i.e., the paramount position of the
President and or the Presidency, in addition to the mobilisation efforts
among other reasons....) not the extent of bureaucratic power, which
can explain the weakness of the legislative body or the absence of
"developed" political parties and interest groups in Egypt.

Given these findings, however, we must ask whether the
Egyptian bureaucratic elite is an unwilling beneficiary of the above-
described situation, or whether it is motivated by a conscious desire
to maintain such a situation in which it may possess more power.

In seeking an answer to this question, the Egyptian higher civil servants were asked to indicate with which of the following three alternatives they agreed:

a) The Egyptian people are qualified to run a democratic form of government. Therefore the task of policy-making must be undertaken by the elected representatives of the people and the public servants should confine themselves to the implementation of the policies.

b) The Egyptian people are not yet ready for a democratic form of government. Therefore, until they are ready for it, they should leave both the task of policy-making and of administration in the hands of the public servants.

c) The Egyptian people are not qualified, and never will be to run a democratic form of government. Therefore, they should leave the task of policy-making and administration in the hands of the public servants.

The responses to this question are presented in the following table:

Table XIV.5

Respondent's Attitudes Towards Representative Government

Attitudes	Percentages No. of Cases in Parentheses
a) The People are qualified to run a democratic form of government	14.5
b) The People are not yet ready for a democratic form of government	73.5
c) The People are not qualified and never will be to run a democratic form of government	7.0
Not known or no answer	5.0
Total	100.0
	(400)

Slightly less than three-quarters of our respondents indicated that the Egyptian people were not yet ready and, therefore, the public servant should meanwhile look after the government, i.e., he should

assume the task of policy-making and administration. A number of
these respondents noted that the people needed more sustained
experience and maturity before they (i.e., the people) would be
ready to operate democratic self-government. More generally, some of
these respondents implied that a democratic society is a participant
society. As one of our respondents aptly put it: "Democratic
governance comes late, historically, and typically as a crowning
institution of the participant society." Political democracy or
modernisation, in the view of some of these respondents, proceeds
through several phases. The first phase is economic progress that would
change the traditional mental attitudes and/or cultural or religious
attitudes that now seem to characterise Egyptians, as a result of which
people would be more economically productive. The second phase is
literacy - that would increase the people's ability to change their
society and raise participation in all sectors of the social system.
The final phase is democracy which is the crowning institution of the
participant society.

As can be noted from Table XIV.5 only 7 per cent of our
respondents deemed that some sort of authoritarian system of govern-
ment would be necessary. Moreover, about 3 per cent of our respondents
were reluctant to make any comment on so "sensitive" a subject and
about 2 per cent were unable to say anything. A closer look at the
data, however, suggests that something resembling an intellectual
commitment to a democratic, representative form of government may in fact
exist. If we add the percentage of those respondents who think that
the people are ready for self-government to that of those who think
that they will be ready in due course, we may conclude that an
intellectual commitment to a democratic, representative form of govern-
ment reveals itself in slightly under 90 per cent of our respondents.

Attitudes of Egyptian Bureaucratic Elite towards Government
Planning

Four questions were asked to understand the attitudes of the

respondents towards Government economic planning. Table XIV.6 presents

responses to these questions:

Table XIV.6

Respondents' Attitudes Towards

Government Planning

Items	Percentages
a) Planning or no planning, we will succeed if we are lucky ...	96 (disagree)
b) Development is possible without government planning	94 (disagree)
c) The legitimate and proper functions of government are law and order and not running business and trade	89 (disagree)
d) Open-door Policy Infitah will facilitate economic planning since the resources will be more available for planning	78 (agree)

As can be noted from this Table, an overwhelming majority of our

respondents strongly support government planning. Moreover, the

respondents showed a strong endorsement of the government planning

mechanism. In presenting the respondents' reasons for their strong

endorsement of the governmental planning mechanism, an attempt is made

to present their opinions in a logical thematic format.

According to the respondents, it is the extreme scarcity of

economic resources and the extremely disorganised and predatory

character of private interests that make public planning so essential

in Egypt. The respondents indicated   that the scarcity of capital

resources is so extreme that it is essential that they be employed to

maximum effect by a single central, co-ordinating agency in accordance with a single design. The only agency, according to the majority of our respondents, capable of undertaking such a task is the central government, for only it "acts for the good of society and not just for the capitalists."

The relative weakness and disorganisation of the private sector disqualifies it as a primary agency for developing the economy.

In contrast with the private sector, the respondents depict the central government as having more of the resources needed to plan development. According to the respondents, it has superior capital resources, human resources, informational resources, motivational resources and organisational resources.

Functions of the Plan: Perhaps the most vital functions performed by a Plan were described as follows by the respondents. First, a plan brings scientific knowledge to the exploitation of the nation's scarce resources. Secondly, it publicly "takes scarce resources out of the system where they are subject to plundering by the most powerful" and it clearly allocates them to certain sectors. Third, a plan co-ordinates public and private economic activities and brings them to bear at the most critical sectors for maximum economic and social effects. Fourth, the plan educates the public in the ideas of development by introducing an atmosphere of development and publicly explaining why certain sectors and regions are allocated resources.

Moreover, the respondents demonstrate consensus in expressing their general acceptence of the role of government in the society, that is, the legitimate functions of government are law and order as well as running business and trade. They indicate, moreover, their agreement that the "Open-door Policy" Infitah will facilitate the government's policies to develop and plan the economy because more resources will be available. Some of these respondents called for an increase in foreign capital

investment and technical aid with a view to accelerating the process

of planning and development. However, twenty-two per cent of the

respondents expressed their disagreement regarding the "Open-door

Policy." To paraphrase the words of some of these respondents:

> "Foreign investment and aid are detrimental at this time for
> they lull us into believing that we can rely on our strategic
> position and national resources to attract foreign capital
> while we postpone taking the hard actions needed to plan
> and develop our society."

The Impact of the Military in The Egyptian Civil Service

The data presented above suggest that our respondents are in

general agreement on their perceptions of the nature of development

and modernisation and on the key policies and programmes required to

achieve them. What is important for our analysis in this section, is

the fact that the Egyptian higher civil servants with a military

background were virtually identical in their perceptions of modernis-

ation and development and indeed in their responses to other questions

to the entire sample. However, the higher civil servants with a

military background differed from those with a non-military background

with respect to one item pertaining generally to the impact of the

military in the Egyptian civil service and particularly to the reasons

for hiring military officers in it. This item sought a response (open-

ended) to the following question.[1] "It has often been said that the

military officers have been employed in the Egyptian civil service

because they were considered more innovative and modernising in carry-

ing out economic development programmes and in order to establish a

control device over the civil service. If you disagree, why do you

think military officers have been employed in the Egyptian civil service?"

Only 30.5 per cent of the higher civil servants with a non-military

background agreed as did 75 per cent of those with a military background.

---

[1] This item was agree/disagree question.

This suggests that military officers may be innovative and modernising, but it might also be interpreted and explained in terms of the dual role (revolutionary or modernising-stabilising) of the military in the rapidly changing Egyptian society. Not only can the army officers be considered as the creators of the new politico-socio-economic order, but they also/act as the "custodians" of that order. It is interesting to note that the 25 per cent of the higher civil servants with a military background who disagreed with the above-mentioned question, indicated that the military officers have been regarded by the Revolutionary regime as an appropriate source of technical talents for specific programmes and projects such as the Suez Canal Authority and the High Dam Project. Only 9 per cent of those civil servants with a non-military background agreed with the latter reason, indicating that without employing highly qualified and more technically-oriented military officers in the civil bureaucracy, some of the most important projects of the Revolution, (i.e. the building of the High Dam or the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company, as well as other foreign companies), would probably not have been feasible.

As regards the other reasons for employing military officers in the civil service, 30.5 per cent of the higher civil servants with a non-military background indicated that at some time, military officers were considered more politically trustworthy and loyal to the regime or the administration in office than other occupational sources. Another 30 per cent indicated that many military officers were appointed in civilian positions because they had failed in their previous military capacities. These respondents argued that the manner in which the Revolutionary regime handled the dilemma of the bureaucracy can be understood in simple terms. By appointing army officers to the bureaucracy, the regime thought it was killing many birds with one stone,

it would please the incompetent army officers (and perhaps these were many) as well as the efficient ones who were striving to improve the conditions in the army by purging the incompetents. A significant factor, however, was pointed out by some respondents: the civilian employees did not resent the regime attempts to employ in the civil bureaucracy some military officers because the latter were in fact, added to the bureaucracy rather than substituted for the civilians.

The diversity of the reasons for employing army officers in the higher civil service in Egypt notwithstanding, what can be said by way of generalising from these three sets of responses as well as the interview materials and discussion? In presenting the respondents' reasons for the employment of the military officers as well as their general impact in the civil service, an attempt is made to present the discussion in a logical thematic format.[1]

Military Control over Bureaucracy: Max Weber noted that control over the bureaucratic apparatus by an insurgent group cannot be attained through its destruction, since under modern conditions that group would need a bureaucracy of its own to put the new policies into effect. Consequently, only shifts in control over modern bureaucracy can, according to Weber, be obtained either through the democratic machinery of representation or through a coup d'etat.[2] This view of Weber is significant for the purpose of the following discussion about the impact of the military in the Egyptian civil service.

The revolutionary leadership in Egypt was convinced that some radical changes should take place in the bureaucratic apparatus. The

---

[1] The ensuing points of interest derive chiefly from discussion with higher civil servants with military background.

[2] Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organisations, translated by A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), pp.338-339.

new ministers – some of them were from the free officers – were also facing a great and unanticipated challenge. They were faced with the immediate problems of assuming responsibility for ministries that they knew almost nothing about. They had to implement the legislative and administrative reforms promised by the 1952 Revolution to satisfy the impatient public eager for rapid results. Moreover, they had to continue being active politicians, making public speeches and caring for the needs of the people.

In any government, such pressures more often than not force cabinet members to lean heavily on their permanent bureaucrats. In the early period of revolutionary change in Egypt, however, the situation was not yet encouraging such delegation of authority. The fear of red tape and sabotage of the plans invited another technique. The new ministers entered their office with their secretaries. In the case of the military ministers, these secretaries were a staff of army officers who were associates of the ministers before the 1952 Revolution, officers whom they trusted and personified.[1] They were also ready to remove any top civil servant as soon as he showed signs of opposition to government plans, designed by the revolutionary leaders.

The key civil servants, on the other hand, were appointed before the 1952 Revolution and were mostly political appointees, expected to be changed soon after the revolutionary ministers took office. They knew that the revolutionary regime was aware of the partisan nature of their appointments. Some of them actually had begun to look for other jobs. The majority, however, in the hope of maintaining their positions, tried to show their loyalty and sympathy in different ways.

The new "military aides" were quite numerous in each ministry. Yet, they functioned as a bridge between the new ministers and the heads

---

[1] The use of such staff is one of the distinctive features of modern military organisations.

of departments, bureaus, and sections. Despite some friction and clashes, they worked somewhat closely with both sides and were, to some extent, able to inform each of the views of the others. Their frequent contact with the ministers made them in a position to know what kind of information they needed and enabled them to explain the ministers' views on different subjects. Because they had ready access to the ideas of their ministers, and were fully acquainted with their opinions, wishes and policies, their recommendations and presentations were often accepted.

A new attitude seemed to have swept the civil bureaucracy. Being military in character, it emphasised discipline, speed and decisiveness in governmental operations. Although centralisation became virtually complete, there seems to have been little regard for routine, old regulations, and complicated financial checks and procedures. Meanwhile the amount of office work imposed on the ministers became quite enormous. Almost everything passed through their hands. They alone could tell what was to be done, and when their time was not as wide as their authority, they had to leave things to their military aides. The result was that the latter became a more or less integral part of the ruling elite. Gradually this group of young officers gained more experience and, to a certain extent, the co-operation and acceptance of the civil service, and consequently the centre of gravity of bureaucratic power seemed to have shifted to their hands.

Another important dynamic element, had been operating. The old high-ranking bureaucrats represented experience and knowledge of governmental work. Therefore, the revolutionary elite was rather willing to win them over to their side. The high-ranking bureaucrats, on the other hand, were feeling somewhat insecure and anxious to show their loyalty to the 1952 Revolution. This desire on both sides seems to have eased the process of transition and the task of the military

aides.

During this period of revolutionary change, some of the guides to sound administration were disregarded. The new aides more often than not assumed great power, and insisted on reviewing most matters. In this sense the military penetration into the civil bureaucracy has been employed, in the view of some of our respondents, as a control device over the civil service. Moreover, these military officers, it has been argued, tried to exercise strong initiative and sometimes violate regulations if they believed this would advance programme objectives. In this sense, according to some of our respondents, military officers were more innovative and modernising than civilian administrators with regard to carrying out economic development programmes. Edward Sheehan argued that "the officers - unlike the ordinary Egyptian officials - have disciplined minds and are willing to make decisions. Intellectually and culturally, they often compare with the best of the civilian intelligentsia. And as the principal repository of power, the army is attracting more and more of Egypt's bright young men."[1]

While no data are available on the proportion of military in the higher civil service, knowledgeable informants within the Egyptian civil service believed that Egypt had never had as many military persons in its public bureaucracy as at this time of early revolutionary change (which roughtly lasted to 1961). Estimates of the number of military men at the top level ran as high as 25 per cent. By the end of 1961, however, the military component of the Egyptian bureaucracy had declined sharply. As far as the higher civil service is concerned, about 9.5 per cent was made up of ex-military officers compared to about 7 per cent for the ranks below the higher civil

[1] Edward R. F. Sheehan, "The Birth Pangs of Arab Socialism," Harper Magazine (February, 1962), p.90.

service.[1] It is not clear why there had been a sharp decline in the proportion of ex-military officers in the Egyptian bureaucracy. However, some of our respondents believed that at least two reasons could explain this sharp decline in the presence of ex-military officers in the Egyptian bureaucracy.

It has been argued by our respondents that when this operation of induction (i.e., redirecting the behavioural patterns and performance of the civil service) was completed somewhat successfully, and the revolutionary struggle began to ease, the governmental machinery returned to function on the more usual patterns. The ministers had more time to see their undersecretaries as well as the heads of departments in their ministries. Their contact with their military aides and ex-military officers in the civil service on matters of policy and modernisation of the administration became less frequent and rather more remote. Consequently, the role and effectiveness of ex-military officers diminished considerably. The civil service and the ministers had by then developed a direct working relationship. The fact that army officers do not follow an aristocratic military tradition had probably facilitated the integration of the remaining ex-military officers into the civilian bureaucracy since 1952. In fact, the day-to-day management of Egypt seems to be passing more and more to such a partnership.

It was felt, moreover, that if many ex-military officers were to remain permanently in the civil service, they could in fact become an obstacle and not an asset in the situation. They themselves realised, it has been argued by some . ' respondents, that their job was but a transitional and temporary one, and when accomplished they sought to build a "more" stable career elsewhere. Therefore, they were gradually

---

[1] U.A.R., Bureau of Census and Statistics, Report on Employees of Government and Agencies, (Cairo: 1962), pp.52-53.

transferred to other top positions. These new positions were mainly

in the foreign service and the Presidency. In fact, no less than

40 per cent of the top diplomatic posts as well as 20 per cent of the

top posts in the Presidency were made up of ex-military officers who

had been recently transferred from the regular civil service.[1]

In sum, there is some evidence supporting military officers'

efforts to control, purge and modernise the civil service. Less

recognised but perhaps more significant is the military officers'

intention to channel bureaucratic effort in one direction, namely to

serve public interest, and to put the governmental machinery in a

state of more or less full mobilisation devoted to achieving the

economic and social development. The devotion to public interest and

the attempts to achieve bureaucratic mobilisation seem to have been

facilitated and accelerated by the absence of other forces such as

Mohammed Ali's military aims, the British and foreign interests, and

rivalries among political parties, all of which engaged bureaucracy

during previous eras.

However, an examination of the changes and modernisation of the

Egyptian bureaucratic apparatus does not indicate that the military

officers have effectively controlled and modernised it. It is not

insignificant to repeat some of our respondents' arguments in this

respect. Repeatedly, the present writer was reminded of a specific

example related to the fact that the Egyptian bureaucracy, some twelve

years after the 1952 Revolution, was still operating under laws and

[1] See the Report of a Ministerial Committee to Supplement the Declaration of March 30, 1968, cited in Al Ahram Al Ikitisadi, (July, 1968), p.18. Moreover, it has been estimated that in the last decade the proportion of ex-military officers filling provincial governship in Egypt has been 50 per cent. However, it is not clear whether these ex-military officers had been transferred from the regular civil service to these top positions in Local Government or had been transferred directly from military service to fill provincial governship. It should be noted, strictly speaking, that posts of provincial governors in Egypt are not regulated by Civil Service regulations, hence they are not mainly administrative.

regulations enacted during the British occupation of Egypt.

Military Officers as an Appropriate Source for Technical Talents:
As noted earlier, 25 per cent of those respondents with a military back-
ground as well as 9 per cent of those with a civilian background
advocated that the military officers were regarded by the revolutionary
regime, as an appropriate source of technical talent for specific programmes
such as the nationalisation and management of the Suez Canal Company.
These respondents pointed out that technical talent include managerial
or administrative talents as well. These respondents, moreover, indicated
that the leadership of Mr M. Younes and his successor Mr M.A. Mushoor,
both are ex-military officers, as well as the technical talents of some
other military officers have been essential to the operation and manage-
ment of the Suez Canal Authority after its nationalisation.[1]

Another example cited by some of our respondents was the case of
the High Dam Project, which was headed by Mr M.S. Soliman, an ex-army
officer. Our respondents added that the Egyptian military officers,
mainly engineers, must take some credit for the construction of the
High Dam, which is bigger than the size of thirty Great Pyramids.[2]

As indicated earlier, 30.5 per cent of those respondents with
civilian background argued that military officers have been employed
in the civil service simply because the latter were, at some time,
considered more politically trustworthy than others. Some of these
respondents believed that this was the case with regard to the Suez
Canal Authority and the High Dam projects, due to their very political

---

[1] For a Western view of the performance and efficiency of the
Suez Canal Authority headed by ex-military officers since it has been
nationalised see: John Ridney, Suez, De Lesseps' Canal (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1968) and The Economist (June, 1959), p. 1006.
Some of those and other Western references were usually mentioned by
our respondents during interviews.

[2] For more details on the Aswan-High Dam Construction, see Middle
Eastern Affairs, No. 12 (December, 1965), pp. 383-387

nature and importance of these two cases to the regime. Rather than placing particular importance on the technical and administrative capabilities of those who headed and took part in the operation of the Suez Canal Authority and the High Dam project, these respondents indicated that political and ideological elements have been the main criteria for recruiting military officers in these and other politically-important projects. All this notwithstanding, it is plausible to say that the military officers have succeeded in running and operating some important projects or at least as regards the most frequently-mentioned and the most crucial projects, i.e., the Suez Canal Authority and the High Dam Project.

Finally, about 30 per cent of our respondents with civilian background have claimed that military officers were appointed in the civil service positions because they had failed in their previous military capacities. Some of these respondents further argued that potential trouble-makers in the army were switched to various and often lucrative positions in the civilian bureaucracy. In either case, these respondents believed that this practice has served some purposes which were earlier referred to in this section.

All this notwithstanding, it is important to remember that our respondents whether of civilian or military backgrounds, are in general agreement on their perceptions of the nature of development and modernisation as well as on the key policies and programmes required to achieve them at least in relation to the empirical evidence presented throughout this study. It can, therefore, be said that there is no evidence that there is internal strife between the Egyptian higher civil servants with different educational backgrounds.

In summary, the Egyptian civil servants demonstrate consensus in defining development or modernisation as an experience in economic change that would change the traditional mental attitudes and/or

cultural or religious attitudes that now seem to characterise most Egyptians. The indicators of development cited by the Egyptian higher civil servants were overwhelmingly socio-cultural and/or economic rather than political. An overwhelming majority of Egyptian higher civil servants showed strong support for government planning. Moreover, they demonstrated consensus in expressing their general acceptance of the role of government in Egyptian society.

For modernising models, the Egyptian higher civil servants who accept the experience of other states as relevant to their own, look primarily to the authoritarian economic modernisers of Japan or Yugoslavia. The Egyptian higher civil servants, however, demonstrated an intellectual commitment to a democratic, representative form of government. Although our respondents showed some differences as to the impact of the military in Egyptian civil service, there was nevertheless an impressive degree of consensus on other important issues.

In demonstrating an impressive degree of consensus on the general issues relating to development and modernisation, these highly-educated and strategically placed higher civil servants represent a promising force for intra-elite agreement and cohesion on such vitally important issues.

As previously indicated, our respondents seem to be more professionally oriented than Professor Berger's respondents in the 1950's. Furthermore, our respondents seem to play an important political role in addition to their administrative function. Finally, there seems to be a high degree of consensus on the general and important issues relating to development and modernisation insofar as our respondents are concerned. In the light of the above analysis and findings, it might be suggested that the Egyptian bureaucratic elite appears to be the most important and promising agent of change in Egyptian society.

Discussing the politics of modernisation, David Apter arrives at

the same conclusion. He asserts, "Perhaps the most important elite

modernisation roles are the technical and civil service of a country."[1]

---

[1] David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernisation (Chicago:
The University Press, 1965), p.166.

CHAPTER XV

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This study of the Egyptian bureaucratic elite has attempted to concentrate on its role in the national political and developmental process. This has entailed description of the development of Egyptian bureaucracy and detailed examination of the bureaucratic elite of contemporary Egypt.

There is some ideological argument against concentration on the elite. The consideration that makes the position of the ideological elitist so controversial is the moral argument for rule by the few. It is important to note, however, that this does not apply to the use of the concept as an analytical tool for empirical research since the latter has nothing to do with the moral question of "what should be."

Basically, the present study has dealt with four related themes. In Part One, an attempt has been made to present an overall view of the development of Egyptian bureaucracy, and to analyse the social, economic and political setting in which it now operates and interacts. Part Two has dealt with the background and recruitment of the Egyptian bureaucratic elite, revealing the socio-economic and educational characteristics common to this elite. In Part Three, attention has been given to the adherence of the Egyptian bureaucratic elite to the values and norms of modern bureaucracy. In Part Four, the Egyptian bureaucratic elite has been viewed against its role as a participant in the policy process of government, and lastly, by the degree to which this elite regards its role in an ideologically flexible and instrumental framework for development and modernisation similar to that attributed by scholars to the successfully-modernising elites of other countries.

Throughout the present study, there have been some attempts at explanation and generalisation emerging from the findings and their analysis. It may now be possible to combine these into a more systematic interpretations so as to suggest conclusions of wider significance. Before doing so, however, a brief summary of the main and most important findings from the present study is in order to provide a wider context for the later general discussion and conclusions.

From the examination of the general characteristics of the Egyptian bureaucratic elite, it is possible to portray a brief factual profile of this elite. It is found that the elite status is closely related with educational achievement, since an overwhelming majority of the Egyptian higher civil servants (94 percent) are highly educated having a first or higher degree. Their main areas of educational specialisation are in economics, commerce, administration (35 percent) and engineering (34.5 percent). Their mean age is 46.6, and they are of almost completely urban origin. They are also predominantly middle class in social provenance, and very largely from civil service (40 percent) professional (16 percent) and military backgrounds (15 percent). This background extends over two generations. Entry to the higher civil service by those of lowly social origin is greatly limited by their comparative lack of access to higher education.[1]

. Most higher civil servants (78.5 percent), decide upon the civil service as a career, while at the university or upon graduation. Several reasons account for the choice of the civil service as a career: the security of public employment (35 percent); the scarcity of employment opportunities for secularly educated youth in an agricultural but

---

[1] In terms of the broad social and educational background, the Egyptian bureaucratic elite is similar to other elites in Egyptian society i.e., Cabinet-rank ministers : and high-ranking administrators in state enterprises.

transitional society (28 percent); the desire to serve the community (15.5 percent); the interesting nature of work in the civil service (6 percent), good opportunity with a future (3.5 percent), and family tradition (2 percent). If, however, we consider that the sum of the following factors: serving the community, interesting work, good opportunity with a future and family tradition, evidences a predilection for or an orientation towards government service as opposed to private employment, we may conclude that an attachment to public service reveals itself in 27 percent of the sampled Egyptian higher civil servants. It is argued that the quest for job security is not necessarily a dilution of professionalism, if and when the recruitment policy is objectively and properly designed and implemented to attract the best possible recruits and to establish a large and stable body of highly skilled and devoted public servants. However, the mode of entry into the Egyptian bureaucracy is not based on the competitive examination system or on objective criteria to any great extent since 34 percent of the sampled higher civil servants obtain their first job in the civil service by personal means i.e., mediation or the recommendations of relatives or friends. Yet, an overwhelming majority of the sampled higher civil servants (79 percent) believe that education and experience should be the only qualifications for a post in the higher civil service.

Although 21 percent of the sampled higher civil servants complain about low salaries, their occupational demands are satisfied by other aspects of government service, e.g., being involved in an important and challenging job, etc., Such a favourable attitude is further improved by their own prestigious image of the higher civil service, which they think is among the top two occupations in terms of prestige-ranking and potential contributions of various occupations in Egyptian society.

The Egyptian public bureaucracy is one of the most important

channels to elite positions since 80 percent of the sampled higher civil

servants begin their career as civil servants. On the average, it takes

about 18 years for the officials interviewed to reach their current high-

ranking positions.

In orientation, the Egyptian higher civil servants included in

the present study show a greater degree of attachment to professional

values (53 percent) than do Professor Berger's Egyptian respondents

(32 percent). The Egyptian higher civil servants are also politically-

oriented since almost all of them see themselves primarily responsible

for working on long-term policies and establishing norms and general

guidelines. About three-quarters of them also think that they should

share in the formulation of broad policies with politicians.

An overwhelming majority of our respondents (90 percent) clearly

indicate that alone or in combination with other groups in Egyptian

Society, the higher civil servants are regarded as the group to take the

initiative in Egypt's modernisation. Moreover, the sampled higher civil

servants demonstrate a high degree of consensus in defining development

or modernisation as a process emphasising economic development, challenging

counter-productive traditional values, enhancing the role of government

in society, and including governmental planning to guide economic and

cultural change.

Social Origin of Bureaucratic Elites and their Attitudes

As far as the social class basis of the Egyptian bureaucratic elite

is concerned, an attempt has been made to show that the persistent

predominance of the middle and upper classes is a characteristic shared

by other Egyptian elites, chief among which are cabinet-level ministers

and top-level administrators in state economic enterprises, as well as by

the bureaucratic elites of other societies. This finding is in line with

the assumptions of some elitist theories which suggest that the homogeneity

of background is a characteristic of some professional elites.[1] This

leads to the question as to whether the social background of the

Egyptian bureaucratic elite would determine, in and of itself, the

attitudes and hence sheds some light on the behaviour of this elite.

As far as Professor Berger's study of the Egyptian higher civil

service is concerned, social origin does not appear to determine the

attitudes of his respondents. As a matter of fact, Professor Berger

turns a number of times to cultural differences in trying to understand

the attitudinal characteristics of his respondents such as those

related to professionalism, favouritism, and so on.[2] There is little

evidence to suggest that social background data are relevant in deter-

mining and explaining the attitudes of the Egyptian bureaucratic elite

included in this study. Cross-national studies of higher bureaucracy

suggest, moreover, that social background data are not helpful in

defining and explaining the attitudes of the Turkish and French

administrative elites.[3]

It might well be suggested that by retaining or acquiring middle-

class standing, the attitudes and views of the bureaucratic elites may

be more directly determined by the values and standards of that class

rather than by any class from which they have been recruited. This, in

turn, raises two points. Regardless of the degree of apparent

representativeness of the bureaucratic elite, there may well still be a

---

[1] See, for example, C.Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York :
Oxford University Press, 1961)

[2] Morroe Berger, Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt. (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1957), particularly pp. 109-135

[3] See, Frederick Bent,"The Turkish Bureaucracy as an Agent of
Change," Journal of Comparative Administration, Vol. I (May, 1969);
Metin Heper et al., The Role of Bureaucracy and Regime Types: A
Comparative Study of Turkish and Korean Higher Civil Servants. (Iowa:
The University of Iowa, 1977); Ezra N.Suleiman, Politics, Power and
Bureaucracy in France (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1974); and Lewis Edinger and D.Searing, "Social Background and Elite
Analysis," American Political Science Review, Vol. LXVI (June, 1967).

great degree of similarity of attitudes and views among those elites. The second point relates to the relationship between the social basis of an elite and the responsiveness of that elite to the societal demands; a point which will be discussed shortly.

It might be suggested, moreover, that the question of the social origin of an elite must be kept separate from questions regarding the attitudes and behaviour of this elite. Except within the framework of a Marxist analysis there can be no a priori link between the two. There is no doubt that social background data are extremely helpful in elite studies, in so far as they permit an assessment of the relative composition of a society's groups and classes in its elites. Based on the social background data included in this study, it can be said that the Egyptian higher civil servants are/unrepresentative of the society. They are neither a cross-section of the society, nor an average sample of ordinary man, to use Harold Laski's terminology.[1] Beyond the question of who (socially) occupies the leading positions in the key institutions of society, there is little evidence to suggest that social origin determines, in and of itself, the attitudes and views of the Egyptian bureaucratic elite. As Dankwart Rustow aptly observed in his review of a number if elite studies, "a study of social background can furnish clues for a study of political performance, but the first cannot substitute for the second."[2]

Recruitment of the Egyptian Bureaucratic Elite

The data and findings on the recruitment, and education of Egyptian civil servants, in general, and higher civil servants, in particular, suggest some points of interest.

---

[1] Harold H. Laski, Democracy in Crisis, (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1933), p.30.

[2] Dankwart A Rustow, "The Study of Elites: Who's Who, When and How," World Politics, Vol. XVIII (July, 1966), p.699.

The success of the Egyptian bureaucracy in planning and implementing national development policy depends a great deal on the development of competent administrative leadership. The competence with which Egyptian higher civil servants perform these tasks has been and will always be in dispute. Very probably they perform, their roles a good deal more adequately than most informed observers appreciate. The impressive records of achievement of the Suez Canal and the High Dam managements, as well as the achievements of the first five year plan, speak for the calibre and competence of the Egyptian bureaucratic elite. Yet, few would deny that there is room for improvement.

Our previous analysis of the Egyptian data suggests that two strategies of action which would probably improve the calibre of the Egyptian bureaucratic elite are open to Egypt. First, every effort might be made to make the recruitment process much more competitive, and to reduce, if not to eliminate, the existing imperfections in the supply of administrative skills. A greater equalisation of educational and training opportunities, the institutionalisation of a well-defined, achievement-oriented selection system, and efforts to make the civil service a more attractive career are often suggested as a means to that end, and, if put into effect, they would no doubt help. There are many reasons why these measures seem socially desirable. One that is perhaps overlooked is that these policies would create greater equality of opportunity to compete for higher administrative positions. Under such circumstances as these, fewer talents would be wasted and recruitment would be more efficient than it is now.

Admittedly, these suggested policies are based on the value premise that the desirable course of action is to make the recruitment process more truly egalitarian. This premise, to be sure, is congruent with the stated "socialist-democratic" ideology of the revolutionary regime in Egypt. Yet despite such an ideological claim, some feel that Egyptian

society is still stratified and less competitive today and perhaps is
becoming more so than it was before the 1952 Revolution.[1] They argue
that the current practice of selecting higher civil servants and indeed
other elites on the basis of political loyalty rather than professional
competence might impede the professionalisation of bureaucracy and
administration in Egypt, politicise the administrative process, downgrade
management competence and demoralise merit candidates. While there is no
conclusive evidence on this point, it may be true. Egyptians may well
have to reconcile themselves to an even less competitive system of
administrative selection in future years. If this should happen, a wise
public policy would take advantage of the defects of the situation. Under
such conditions, leadership opportunities in the bureaucracy would be more
unequal than they are today. This situation has one advantage; it is
possible to design special management development programmes for training
those who are likely to be the next generation's bureaucratic elite. Under
these circumstances such opportunity should be exploited.

Thus it seems that Egypt might improve the quality and calibre of
its bureaucratic elite in two different ways. Under the first approach
Egypt would attempt to evaluate administrative competence by actual
performance under conditions of open competition. Under the second
alternative, Egypt would ensure that its present and future bureaucratic
elite were competent through the provision of special intensive management
development programmes under conditions of limited competition. There is
little doubt that many Egyptians would instinctively favour the superiority

---

[1] See James Heaphy, "The Organisation of Egypt: Inadequacies of
Non-political Model for Nation-Building," World Politics, Vol. XVIII,
(January, 1966), pp.177-193; Ralph Westfall, "Business Management Under
Nasser," Business Horizons, Vol. VII (1964) pp.73-84; and Robert Spring-
borg, "Patterns of Association in the Egyptian Political Elite," in George
Lenezowski (ed.) Political Elites in the Middle East (Washington D.C.: The
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977), pp.83-108.

of theory over the inferiority of reality, that is, they would subscribe to the first of these two alternatives. Yet in an age which seems to be increasingly characterised by the hardening rather than softening of class lines and perhaps also political attitudes, the advantages of the second alternative should be recognised. The present system of recruitment into the Egyptian higher bureaucracy which combines many inequalities in leadership opportunities with more formal education and special training for the narrower base from which the current bureaucratic elite is recruited, tends to lean heavily towards the second of these two alternatives.

The Study of Bureaucracy

Our findings have some wider theoretical implications for the study of bureaucracy. As noted earlier, the present study falls within the realm of bureaucratic theory and comparative administration, in spite of the fact that it is primarily a study of the bureaucratic elite in Egypt. It started out by focusing on the theoretical framework of a pioneering and notable but imperfect study of "non-Western" bureaucracy, that of Egypt, in which the Weberian bureaucratic model has been used as a base for the study of the Egyptian higher civil service by Professor Morroe Berger in 1954. An attempt has been made to reformulate his theoretical scheme to use it within a comparative cross-time and cross-cultural context.

In drawing some final conclusions for his empirical study of higher civil servants in Egypt, Professor Berger points out that:

> "Although professionalism and bureaucracy are usually said to be closely related in the West, this relationship does not necessarily hold true in other cultures .... When we try to compare bureaucratic and professional predispositions in the East and West, we find that there may be differences of attitudes and behaviour in spite of the similarity in strucutre. As in other realms, similarity of structure and form, often the results of cultural diffusion, does not mean similarity of institutional and behavioural patterns."[1]

---

[1] Morroe Berger, "Bureaucracy East and West," _Administrative Science Quarterly_, Vol. I, No. 4, (March, 1957), pp.528-529

The above quotation is suggestive both of the problems involved in the theoretical formulations of Professor Berger's study and also the focus of future empirical research. As far as the former point is concerned, "professionalism"and "bureaucracy" are the key concepts in the whole theoretical construct of Professor Berger's study of the Egyptian higher civil service. The relationship between the professionalism index and the bureaucratic scale becomes the essence of his whole research. However, the multi-dimensionality of the two concepts, as defined and operationalised by Professor Berger, complicates his final conclusion even more, and misleads other researchers who use his definitions. As Professor Fred Riggs noted, "One student who used Morroe Berger's definitions to compare the attitudes and practices of officials in Tennessee to those of Egyptian higher civil servants found that bureaucratic behaviour in Tennessee was less Western (!) than in Egypt."[1]

Professor Berger makes explicit the distinction between "structure" and "behaviour". There is little doubt that he is aware of the structural-behavioural dichotomy. Yet, in his theoretical formulations, he confuses the two. He combines both structural and behavioural elements labelling them both "bureaucratic behaviour." Under such theoretical misconceptions, naturally, empirical results and analyses will be confusing and perplexing. Following the severe criticisms of Professor Berger's theoretical formulations, the present study has tried to focus upon the structural-behavioural dichotomy in reformulating the theoretical framework and in redefining the concepts involved according to existing bureaucratic theory and empirical research.

As mentioned earlier, the concept of bureaucracy has received primary attention, and has been considered as an organising concept, that can be extremely useful in initiating empirical research in the

[1] Fred Riggs, "The Myth of Alternatives: Underlying Assumptions About Administrative Development," in Kenneth J Rothwell (ed.) Administrative Issues in Developing Economics, (Mass: D.C.Heath and Co., 1972) p.136.

fields of bureaucratic theory and comparative administration. Bureaucracy is a structural entity and an institution that is very likely to be found in almost every society. To marshall pro and con arguments in relation to the structural-functional analysis is a task extending well beyond the purpose of this chapter. It will suffice to mention that:

> "For the student of public administration, the structure of bureaucracy has some advantage over the function of rule application, or any functional alternative that has been suggested . . . Apparently bureaucracy a a apecialised structure is common to all modern nation..-states .... to focus in the public bureaucracy is not automatically to ignore the probability that it performs functions other than rule application. Indeed, if all structures are multifunctional. .. it may be just as valuable for comparative studies to focus on a universally existing structure and to investigate the differing functions it performs as it is to focus on one function and identify the structures that perform it. Tracing a given function through a multitude of structures would appear to present problems of conceptualisation and research."[1]

It is along this line of reasoning that a decision has been made to use the structural-behavioural dichotomy in the present empirical research of bureaucracy. In recasting Professor Berger's theoretical construct, bureaucracy has been defined in structural terms. Such a theoretical emphasis not only enjoys a general consensus of opinion among a number of scholars in the field, but it also allows for the utilisation of a number of theoretical advancements made in empirical research in related social science fields, for example, in the study of large-scale organisations and organisation theory. Therefore, it can be argued that such an approach is not only extremely useful, but also pragmatic in the present stage of development of public administration.

Another argument that can be advanced in favour of such an approach is that it promotes the development of a middle-range theory which attempts

---

[1] Ferrel Heady, Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall Inc., 1966) p.15.

to abstract from the whole social context a more limited but, hopefully, significant segment of analysis. "Middle-range theory attempts to explain a restricted set of relationships, as opposed to theory such as Parsons , which attempts to comprehend and to explain an entire social system."[1] In other words, the primary effort here is to synthesise existing knowledge of bureaucratic organisation, and try to develop a significant theoretical framework that can be useful in comparative empirical research. The aim is to define bureaucracy in terms of its structural characteristics. It is generally accepted that bureaucracy is a form of organisation, although not all organisations are bureaucracies. An organisation is a bureaucracy if it has certain structural characteristics. As aptly stated:

> "A principal advantage of selecting a structural focus in defining bureaucracy, rather than incorporating a behavioural component as well, is that it allows us to consider all patterns of behaviour that are actually found in bureaucracies as equally deserving to be called bureaucratic behaviour. One pattern of behaviour is not singled out as somehow entitled to be labelled bureaucratic, leaving other behavioural patterns, also found in existing bureaucracies, to be described as non-bureaucratic or less bureaucratic. This practice has been the source of much confusion that can be eliminated."[2]

Another wider implication along this line of reasoning is that behavioural traits can be very useful in distinguishing one bureaucratic type from another, and also in identifying behavioural patterns that can be helpful in classifying administrative systems within a cross-national context and in comparing national administrative systems from a cross-time perspective. It is at this point that the ecology of administration and the various environmental influences enter the picture of the study of bureaucracy.

Employing this theoretical framework, our findings suggest that the Egyptian bureaucratic elite included in this study espouse professional values to a rather significant extent. On items touching the component

---

[1] Robert V. Presthus, "Behaviour and Bureaucracy in Many Cultures," Public Administration Review, Vol.XIX (March, 1959), p.26.

[2] Heady, op.cit., p.19.

of hierarchy, our respondents score rather high. In relation to objectivity, the respondents express a somewhat high degree of adherence to this norm. However, on items relating to initiative our respondents score low, indicating perhaps the excessive legalism which characterises the Egyptian bureaucracy and the proliferation of the administrative control agencies.

Although the conceptual framework and the methodological procedures of the present study are different from those employed by Professor Berger, our overall findings, nevertheless, tend to suggest that our respondents manifest a greater degree of professional norms and more patterns of behaviour regarding objectivity than do the Egyptian higher civil servants included in Professor Berger's study.

Another consideration that needs to be mentioned here is that pertaining to the original issue stemming from Professor Berger's study of Egyptian higher civil servants in 1954, namely, the relationship between his professionalism index and his bureaucratic scale. As noted earlier, Professor Berger does not expect the two elements to be positively related to each other in a non-Western culture (e.g., Middle Eastern culture). In spite of the differences in the conceptual framework and the methodological procedures between our study and Professor Berger's, our overall findings tend to suggest that his assumption is not upheld since professionalisation tends to be positively associated with hierarchy, objectivity and discretion (the latter items, it will be recalled, are incorporated in his bureaucratic scale).

Given that the role of higher civil servants is principally conditioned by the character of their bureaucratic organisation, the previous considerations have focussed upon the internal aspects of bureaucracy. Yet, their role can hardly be understood separately from the environment in which they function. With regard to their relation to society as a whole this study has tried to concentrate on some important

aspects of the immediate environment of the bureaucracy, namely that of political system, in order to establish more realistic appraisal of the role of the Egyptian bureaucratic elite.

This study suggests that there are two main variables which can explain to an important degree the variations in the extent of the political role of the bureaucratic elite in different political systems. These variables are the differences in the historical input and variations in the relative power base of the bureaucratic elite. The historical input necessarily refers to the extent of bureaucratic development in relation to the degree of political development. This variable is important and highly relevant to the study of the political role of higher bureaucracy in developing countries in view of the contention among many scholars concerned with these countries that bureaucratic development precedes political development. The second variable, power base, refers to those sources (both tangible and intangible) that the bureaucratic elite could draw upon with respect to its political role.

One important theoretical consideration that needs to be emphasised here is that concerning the politician-bureaucrat distinction advanced by Max Weber. It has been suggested in the present study that this rigid and static distinction does little to help students of public administration understand the relationship between politics and bureaucracy, because, as we have seen, higher civil servants can, and are, able to assume a number of roles, certain of which are political in nature.

It is perhaps rather alluring, but completely misleading, to maintain that Weberian classification of bureaucrats and politicians is simplistic and of limited or no applicability. In line with many of Weber's classifications, most chiefly that pertaining to the bureaucracy,

this one is presented as a mere conceptual framework for analysis.[1]

Although this study suggests that a rigid and static distinction between bureaucratic and political types needs in general to be abandoned, this nevertheless should be taken as a rejection of the Weberian framework on which the present research has depended so heavily. Indeed, as has been shown, Weber's framework is extremely helpful in the analysis of the relationship between the member of the People's Assembly (the legislature) and the Egyptian bureaucratic elite.

Bureaucratic Elite, Revolution and Society

The rise of the military to power in 1952 has caused transformations in Egypt's political and administrative systems. These changes are not fully understood, as neither the military nor the civilian bureaucracy have been extensively researched. However, there seems to be a broad consensus that more than two decades of revolutionary rule has seen a sharp decline in the influence of the political class, made up of professional politicians. And rising in their stead, have been highly-trained senior officials; the Egyptian bureaucratic elite.

Our findings suggested that there are some factors that give prominence to the Egyptian bureaucratic elite. First, the distinction

---

[1] Weber writes that "to an outstanding degree, politics today is in fact conducted in public by means of the spoken or written word. To weigh the effect of the word properly falls within the range of the lawyer's task but not at all into that of the civil servant. Yet Weber is certainly not unconscious of the fact that in the Germany of his day (as is the case in the present-day Germany), the majority of bureaucrats at the higher echelons of the administration has a substantial legal education." See Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.) From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958), p.95. It is significant to note, moreover, that a number of countries accept the fact that there is no conflict between a civil service position and political activity. In West Germany, for example, about one-fifth of the Bundestag (the Parliament) is composed of civil servants on leave.

between politics and bureaucracy, or between politicians and bureaucrats, appears to have been effaced under the revolutionary rule by the practice of selecting men with public service backgrounds for appointment as ministers, and by the stable nature of the regime that seems to dispense with politics and professional politicians.

Another factor has been the decline of the parliament and political parties.[1] The importance of the People's Assembly (the parliament) and the Arab Socialist Union (until very recently the sole political party in Egypt) is in sharp contrast to the power that the pre-revolutionary political parties and parliament had come to enjoy.

Still another factor concerns the ideology of development and the growing involvement of the government in economic and social matters which have brought, perhaps in a natural process, the Egyptian bureaucracy and the bureaucratic elite to prominence as never before.

Paralleling the major shift in the political system have been modifications in the administrative apparatus of the state. Although it is more difficult to examine changes in this arena, as there is little empirical information available for analysis, nevertheless our study leads us to conclude that Egypt's bureaucracy serves five major functions: (1) that of political centralisation- utilised as a tool for unifying control over the country; (2) that of providing an entrance point into the political system - employed as one of the main occupational gateways to the top; (3) the job-providing function - that of providing employ- ment for the large mass of the educated and semi-educated classes in return for their implicit support for the current political system; (4) the efficiency and economy function - that of performing stated tasks effectively, and at minimal cost; (5) the modernisation function -

---

[1] While there is little question that the Egyptian legislature is definitely marginal to the decision-making process in Egypt, there is also a world-wide decline of legislatures, and similar problems are being faced in other countries.

that of planning and guiding socio-economic development. It was argued
that different combinations of functions have been unique for different
periods of Egypt's history. However, the modernising function as the
pre-eminent task of the Egyptian government is unique to the present
revolutionary period, and is a fundamental factor in the functioning
of the new political model brought about by the 1952 Revolution.

With the advent of the modernising function, the role of the
bureaucracy, activities of public agencies and organisational goals also
changed. The move to military rule, re-emphasised a concern with
centralisation and efficiency, but more importantly, placed the
administrative apparatus at the forefront of the government's move
towards rapid economic development. This functional emphasis has made
the Egyptian bureaucratic elite a very important decision-making group
in the regime.

Given its background characteristics and the regime's ideology of
development, it is not surprising that the Egyptian bureaucratic elite,
as the key functionary in an authoritarian system ruled by other middle
and upper sector bureaucrats of the same political generation, appears
to work with their elite colleagues in apparent harmony.

As in many other societies, the elites of revolutionary Egypt
appear to have replaced the politics of primitive unification with the
politics of economic development. In such disparate regimes as post-
Ben Bella Algeria, post-Jadid Syria, post-Mussadiq Iran, post-Franco
Spain, post-Allende Chile as well as Lee Kwan Yew's Singapore, and
Marcos' Philippines, among many others, modernising elites similar to
those of the revolutionary Egypt appear to have employed a strategy of
economic modernisation similar to that of the revolutionary Egypt to
strengthen the authority of central organisations and to unify states.
The strategy of modernisation of the bureaucratic-technocratic elites
as a time-tested and stabilising method of rule, so long as it is able
to satisfy the economic requirements of its participants and so long

as "it occurs along with considerable coercion in connection with

the achievement of modernisation goals", seems, according to David Apter

"an optimal form of politics for modernisation."[1]

The foregoing findings and interpretations give rise to some

questions which must be answered in the final chapter of this study

of the Egyptian bureaucratic elite. Is the unrepresentative bureaucratic

elite undemocratic? Is it a technocratic-bureaucratic elite which is

unresponsive to the society? Some of the writing on the bureaucracy

argues that bureaucracy is responsible for the prevailing state of

under-development in these countries. If these countries are under-

developed and stagnant societies, it is often argued, this is due largely

to a centralised bureaucracy, dominated by a homogeneous elite having

similar values and few criteria other than standardisation and perhaps

also efficiency. Much of this writing suggests, moreover, that

bureaucracy tends to resist change because of the "character" of the

[1] David Apter, Politics of Modernisation (Chicago: The University
of Chicago Press, 1965), p.411. See also inter alia A.F. Organski, The
Stages of Political Development (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), pp.
84-85. Douglas A. Chalmers (ed.) Changing Latin America, New Inter-
pretations of its Politics and Society, the Academy of Political Science,
vol.30, No. 4.(New York: Columbia University, 1972), p.92; Jean Meynaud,
Technocracy (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp.183-225, Barrington
Moore Jr. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1967); Edward Shills "Alternative Courses in Political Development,"
Jason L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable (eds.) Political Development and
Social Change (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1966); Samuel P. Huntington
Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven and London: Yale
University Press, 1968); Juan J. Linz "An Authoritarian Regime: Spain,"
in Erik Allardt and Yirjo Littunen (eds.) Cleavages, Ideologies and
Party Systems (Helsinki: Distributors - The Academic Bookstore, 1964).
Charles W. Anderson, The Political Economy of Modern Spain, Policy
Making in an Authoritarian System (Maidson: The University of Wisconsin
Press, 1970). The strategy of modernisation perceived and introduced by
the Egyptian bureaucratic elite in revolutionary Egypt seems quite similar
to the models of modernisation described by the above authors. See
Apter's "Neomercantilism", Shills' "modernising oligarchy", Organski's
"bourgeois totalitarianism", Huntington's "modernising monarchy",
Linz's "authoritarian regime", Meynaud's "technocracies", C. Anderson's
"evolutionary model of development", Chalmer's "developmentalism",
Moore's "Asian Fascism."

underdeveloped societies. There is little doubt that such arguments
are over-exaggerations, at best, of the reality in the developing and
perhaps also the developed countries where some scholars argue along
similar lines.

Perhaps the simple point which is overlooked is that elites are
unrepresentative by their very function of their being elites. As we
have seen success and achievement in society in general and academic
success in particular tend to be positively related to social status.
There is little doubt that the elite which a society (even a democratic
society) selects to govern may well be very similar at least in terms
of social and educational backgrounds to an elite appointed to rule.
This is the case in Egypt for, as we have seen, the revolutionary
leaders in their drive for modernisation, attempt to mobilise the modern
skills of the educated class and, in effect, maintain the stratified
political system. The bases of the new roles are different, but their
occupants, i.e., the elites, will be homogeneous so far as social
and educational backgrounds are concerned. This means that elitism and
unrepresentativeness are common among a society's elites and not
restricted to the public bureaucracy, although they might be more obvious
in the latter because of the emphasis on the merit system. As noted
earlier, moreover, many scholars have shown that social background does
not seem to determine the attitudes and views of the elites.

Nevertheless, the predominance of the higher civil servants not
only in the state apparatus, where they are naturally to be found, but
in other key institutions and their mounting influence over all phases
of economic, political and social sectors have caused apprehension that
the Egyptian society is being governed by a group of bureaucratic-
technocratic elite sharing common social and educational backgrounds,
and perhaps also common values. That the omni-presence and influence
of the Egyptian bureaucratic-technocratic elite have occurred under the

revolutionary regime has led, perhaps quite naturally, to the view that this regime is responsible for creating more conditions conducive to the rule of that elite.

There is little doubt that the revolutionary regime has considerably facilitated, as well as encouraged, the transfer from a bureaucratic to a political career. Ever since the beginning of the revolutionary regime, more higher civil servants have occupied cabinet posts, higher-ranking posts in state economic enterprises and many top-level positions in the Arab Socialist Union (the sole political organisation in Egypt).

Could the presence of more higher civil servants in these high positions be described as an abnormality and is it due to Egypt's anti-democratic situation?

It is interesting to note that in pre-revolutionary Egypt higher civil servants occupied ministerial posts. While there are presently more higher civil servants in ministerial positions than in the so-called democratic era (i.e., prior to the 1952 Revolution) the proportion of higher civil servants in ministerial cabinets and in other top-level positions has likely shown a more steady growth.[1] This constant increase confirms two arguments discussed earlier. First the public bureaucracy now has planning and modernisation duties. As these responsibilities grow, the personnel situation has to change to reflect these new obligations. While it is true that the bureaucracy, under the monarchy, probably represented the brightest minds of the period, and a large proportion of the educated class, nevertheless, this was a pre-developmental period, and governmental activity was more tutelary and paternalistic than stridently modernising. In other words, while the capabilities and

---

[1] It must be recognised that no exact comparison could be made between the pre-revolutionary elites and those of the post-revolutionary, due to the absence of empirical data of the pre-revolutionary elites. Tentative comparison, however, could be attempted on the basis of secondary data. See Younan L. Rizk, A History of Egyptian Ministries, 1879-1952 (Cairo: Centre of Political and Strategic Studies, 1975).

intelligence were there, the ideology of development was not. The
period was not entirely free of its dreams and visionaries, however.
Yet the modest accomplishment of the monarchy could not be compared
with the more grandiose plans, ambitions and achievements of the
revolutionary era. Secondly, this modernisation and industrialisation
direction in Egypt's growth is in many ways an irreversible and perhaps
apolitical process. That is, the commitment to development and
modernisation is accepted universally in Egypt. Furthermore, the movement
towards development and modernisation is worldwide. For a developing economy
like that of Egypt, such expansion and diversification is generally
applauded by many. Given the ideology of development, it might well
be argued that the growth in numbers and influence of the Egyptian
bureaucratic elite, the only group in Egyptian society which has a near
monopoly of technical expertise and information, would have occurred
under any type of political system.

There is little question, moreover, that the fear of a bureaucratic
technocratic elite dominating the society is based on the static and
rigid theoretical distinction drawn by Weber between the role of the
politician and the role of the bureaucrat. As noted earlier, recent
writings in the areas of public administration and political science have
found it necessary to abandon the idealised conception of a strictly
neutral and instrumental bureaucracy, in order to establish a more
realistic appraisal of the functions of bureaucracy and political system.
In its place, scholars have adopted the notion of mixture of politics and
bureaucracy.

It is perhaps worth noting that the conviction that the higher
civil servants are strictly neutral, i.e., devoid of any ideological
predispositions may paradoxically allow politicians to accept, more often
than not, the higher civil servants' advice and recommendations even
after long periods in Opposition. Although there is little empirical

evidence of the neutrality of the higher civil servants, it may well be argued that some countries (e.g., Britain) are perhaps less well served with regard to policy decisions because of that conviction.

It may be argued, moreover, that the minister with a public service background, i.e,, politician-technician, may be more capable of imposing his will on the ministry he presides over than a "pure" politician, i.e., who lacks technical competence. But if this is the case, is it because the ideas and views of the politician-technician are generally compatible with those of the higher civil servants in his ministry, or because he is more likely to exert more influence on his ministry than the "pure" politician who lacks technical competence? Perhaps both answers are right depending on circumstances.

Finally, reference should be made to the responsiveness of the bureaucratic elite. Given the homogeneity in social and educational background of the bureaucratic elite, it might be argued that this elite cannot be responsive to the societal demands and needs because of its unrepresentativeness. There is little doubt that there is some truth in the belief that because of its common social and educational background, the Egyptian bureaucratic elite may be expected to preserve the status quo. However, the Egyptian bureaucratic elite has probably been more responsive to the society than some observers might suppose from its narrow social base.

It may be that for the middle sector there are identification and agreement with drives to improve government effectiveness and speed economic development. It is to this class that government programmes seem most attuned; and it comes as no surprise that most of the civilian decision-makers and military leadership seem to come from this class. For the well-to-do, there is satisfaction that Egypt has not experimented with extensive land and wealth redistributive schemes. For the working class, there is satisfaction that government-led industrialisation

programmes have created more job opportunities. And for the peasants,
there is content that the relationship between peasants and government
officials differ completely from the previous relationship between
landlords and peasants which was based on social, economic and political
exploitation of the peasants by the landlord and was characterised by
extreme instability, insecurity and unrest.

Perhaps because more Egyptians seem to be committed to economic
development, regardless of the class, there is a recognition and even an
acceptance that the present-day bureaucratic elite is much more
responsive to the society than were the pre-revolutionary elites.

As noted earlier, the behaviour of the bureaucratic elite must
be viewed in the context of the larger socio-political environment in
which it operates and of which it is a part. Bureaucracy is not an
activity or an institution that is separate from society. Given this,
it is very unconvincing to argue, as some scholars do, that the reasons
for developing societies' resistance to change can be found in the
contemporary social and cultural conditions in these societies, and to
argue at the same time that their bureaucracies form the main obstacle
to change in these societies.[1] This is not to deny that the bureaucracy,
as an integral part of the society, shares and reflects some values and
defects of the society. The extent to which the revolutionary leaders
in Egypt have been capable of manipulating the bureaucracy might well
suggest that the latter is more malleable than most observers appreciate.
It may be that the Egyptian bureaucracy does little more than reflect
the values and outlooks of the revolutionary leaders and that it responds

[1] See, for example, Bent, op.cit., pp.47-64. Bent, among others,
seems to conclude that the Turkish bureaucracy resists change because of
contemporary social and cultural conditions in Turkey.

and is accountable to them only.[1] Thus, although the policies which

ensue may be divorced from direct control by popular opinion, they

may paradoxically be more responsive to some political forces than are

policies made in more democratic systems. Even so, this would suggest

that the bureaucracy is not remote from the society, but that it is

sensitive to the society's demands and influences. Some reasons for

this include the following: the bureaucratic elite's perception of

modernisation and development as an experience in economic change which

would change the traditional attitudes and/or cultural attitudes which

characterise many Egyptians, and more importantly, the involvement of

this elite in politics, or in the policy-making process, which has

probably rendered it more responsive to the society than has hitherto

been appreciated.

---

[1] For a corroborating view see Ferrel Heady, Public Administration, A Comparative Perspective (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1966), p.93.

APPENDIX I

METHODOLOGY AND DATA GATHERING TECHNIQUES

This appendix consists of four sections, each of which broadly comes under the heading of methodology, yet contains a rather different problem. The first section will be concerned with the definition of the Egyptian bureaucratic elite; the second with the sampling design; the third with the data gathering techniques; and the last with the construction of indexes. These four sections will be considered in turn.

The Definition of Egyptian Bureaucratic Elite

For the purpose of this study, Keller's definition of elites seems acceptable. She defines elites as "those whose judgements, decisions, and actions have important and determinable consequences for many members of society."[1] Bureaucratic elite is here employed indiscriminately as a synonym of higher civil servant. Thus bureaucratic elite for the purpose of this study is defined as the relatively permanent top groups of civil servants, who are placed between the political decision-makers and the rank and file bureaucrats, and who share in the task of policy making and in directing the various administrative agencies of the governmental bureaucracy. In the Egyptian context, the bureaucratic elite are the high-ranking civil servants who occupy positions in the first three hierarchical levels immediately below the Minister level, that is the under-secretary of state, general director and his deputy, department head and other officials in similar controlling and advisory positions.[2]

---

[1] Suzanne Keller, Beyond the Ruling Class: Strategic Elites in Modern Society (New York: Random House, 1963), p.20.

[2] See diagram III.1 in Chapter Three of this study which shows the formal hierarchical divisions of an Egyptian Ministry as well as the pivotal positions of the higher civil servants in the three highest grades.

In view of their authority and professional expertise, as well as their socio-economic background, these relatively permanent civil servants in the highest ranks are considered an elite group in the Egyptian society. They are clearly an elite group when compared either with the Egyptian population as a whole or with the rest of the bureaucracy.

The Sampling Technique

In deciding on an appropriate sampling method for this study, three considerations were taken into account. First, a delimitation of the coverage of the study was necessary to make the project manageable. Thus it was decided to limit the study to higher civil servants who work chiefly in Cairo and Alexandria, where the overwhelming majority of the central civil service is stationed. Moreover, it was decided to omit the Ministry of War for security reasons. A third consideration in making decisions about sampling method was the desire to draw a relatively large, randomly selected, sample of the actual actors being analysed (higher civil servants) to allow legitimate use of cross-tabulation in the analysis stage and similarly to be able to compare our respondents with their counterparts in other countries.

The ideal sampling method would have been to draw a simple random probability sample of the entire Egyptian higher civil service. But since such a sampling technique would have stretched the resources allocated to this research beyond their limit, a method was sought which would fulfil the objectives of this research and the three considerations just described and would, at the same time, be feasible.[1] It was decided to utilise a stratified random sample, with the higher civil servant

_____

[1] Utilisation of a simple probability sample would have meant that individual higher civil servants would have had to be located and reached in all parts of Egypt, no small task for the lone researcher. Furthermore, since composition of the Egyptian higher civil service is numerically dominated by the second grades, the sample, unless it was exceedingly large, would have been made up of too few respondents above these grades to make analysis worthwhile.

population divided into strata according to geographic location (i.e., Cairo and Alexandria), and rank, i.e., the three previously-defined hierarchical levels.

Determining the exact size of the sample population among Egyptian higher civil servants was another operational difficulty. This is due to the fact that the 4100 who were estimated to be in the highest grades mentioned above cannot be said to constitute the whole of the Egyptian higher civil service. Such entity has never been well-defined. If it were, it would probably include some civil servants not in these top grades, but those who made up the sample population would certainly form a major part of it.

Staff lists of higher civil servants in the previously-defined hierarchical levels were obtained from the personnel departments of the central ministries located in Cairo and Alexandria. These lists were checked for accuracy against the records of the Central Agency for Organisation and Administration (i.e. the Civil Service Commission) and those of the Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics. Given the goal for the sample size, it was decided to interview about 11 per cent of the civil servants at the previously defined hierarchical levels (i.e., the three highest grades) in the central ministries in Cairo and Alexandria. Respondents were then drawn randomly from each list. In this way 451 higher civil servants were selected for interviewing. The distribution of sample for each hierarchical level is shown in Table I.A. which also compares the sample with an estimate for the total universe.

TABLE I.A

Distribution of Sample by Hierarchical Level

Level	Sample		Universe (estimate)[1]	
Undersecretary of State	(35)	7.8	(320)	7.9%
General Director	(75)	16.6	(680)	16.5%
Department Head (i.e., second grade)	(341)	75.6	(3100)	75.6%
TOTAL:	(451)	100.0%	(4100)	100.0%

[1] This estimate includes higher civil servants at the above-mentioned hierarchical levels in all central ministries in Cairo and Alexandria. It does not include, however, temporary advisory units, temporary inter-ministerial units, universities and schools. For the calculation of the number of higher civil servants in each ministry, the second half of 1975 (time when interviews started) was taken as a basis. This procedure was necessary to ensure a certain uniformity in the estimate since a number of ministries were, by that time and since then, undergoing administrative reform with some alterations in the hierarchical structure.

For reasons of georgraphic accessibility, higher civil servants respondents were chosen from two main locations, i.e., Cairo and Alexandria. Table I.B shows the distribution of sample for each georgraphic location.

TABLE I.B

Distribution of Sample by Geo.·graphic Location

Location	Sample		Universe (estimate)[1]	
Cairo	(369)	81.9%	(3358)	81.9%
Alexandria	(82)	18.1%	(742)	18.1%
TOTAL:	(451)	100.0%	(4100)	100.0%

[1] See note to Table I.A of this appendix.

Thirty of the sampled higher civil servants who could not be reached were either on leave or on overseas assignments. Only 21 of the higher civil servants approached refused to be interviewed. In sum, a sample of 400 higher civil servants was interviewed, representing as accurately as proved to be possible about 10 per cent of the Egyptian bureaucratic elite.

Data Gathering Techniques: The Questionnaire and the Interviews

As mentioned earlier, the research methods used in this study were broadly similar to those that have been followed by Professor Berger and his school - namely, a questionnaire completed under interview conditions, supplemented by historical and cultural data. In spite of the relative newness of the questionnaire technique in Egypt, and the difficulties encountered by its early users, such as Daniel Lerner, Hamed Ammar and Morröe Berger, the questionnaire device was decided on as the best research instrument available for some types of investigation, certain of which is the present study. As noted in the general introduction to this study, surveys cannot always provide answers to all questions. Sometimes they can do little more than to point to certain possible answers, and this only when account has been taken to all available historical, cultural material. It can be argued, however, that the use of survey analysis involves a judgement about relative merits. In the final analysis, no matter what precautions are taken or supplementary material compiled, confidence in the validity of the data collected through survey techniques cannot always be absolute, but rather is relative to what can be obtained through other methods. It is the present writer's belief that when it comes to assessing role orientations and perception, survey methods are an improvement over impressionistic statements of observers. At least, in the former case, the basis for making one's judgement - the survey items - is objective rather than subjective.

In designing the survey items attention was given to the problem of formalistic answers. The respondent, when faced with various behavioural alternatives, one of which may be required explicitly or implicitly by organisational rules, could be expected to give the formalistically appropriate answer even if this differed from his actual beliefs or behaviour. While the problem of formal, as opposed to "truthful", response is inherent in all survey research, an attempt was made to avoid as much as possible the types of questions that were likely to be perceived by the respondents as demanding a potentially "self-incriminating" answer. Thus we utilised a projective type of format, which presented a scenario in which some hypothetical civil servants were depicted, and asked the respondent about the behaviour of the civil servant in the imaginary situation, and about the actions of other actors in relation to the civil servant - for example, his friends, relatives and the like.[1] More importantly, the interviews helped a great deal to reduce the dangers of formalistic responses through probing and arguing with the respondents.

In order to minimise such limitations and to dispel any suspicion some of our respondents might harbour, some strategies were followed. First, an early draft of the questionnaire was pre-tested on a small group of higher civil servants who worked chiefly in the Capital. After the revision, a second pre-test was informally run by the National Institute of Management Development at Cairo (where the present writer works). The response from the pre-testees was very favourable.

The second strategy was psychological in nature. The selected respondents were first sent a letter, which described the research

---

[1] The assumption in this type of projective approach is that respondents will generalise from their personal experience when they comment on the imaginary situations, without having to feel threatened by their responses. There is evidence in the literature to support such an assumption. See, for example, C. Selltiz et al, Research Methods in Social Relations (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959), p.290.

project in general terms, provided information on the researcher's

academic affiliation, stated the government's permission to carry

out the research, and solicited the potential respondent's participat-

ion. Within a few days of their receiving the letter, each respondent

was reached at his place of work, at which time the interview was

conducted or an appointment was made for an interview at a later date.

All the interviews were conducted by the present writer. There is

no doubt that the Egyptian government's approval of the research and

the support it extended to the present writer contributes much to this

work and helped a great deal in soliciting the respondent's co-operation.

The present writer's status as a faculty member of the National

Institute of Management Development at Cairo was of great help in

overcoming some problems and in dispelling suspicion among respondents.

As a result, only about 5 per cent approached refused to be interviewed,

a refusal rate which is considered quite respectable by the standards

of survey research in the United States.[1] This favourable response

would suggest, moreover, that elites are by no means averse, as is

generally thought, to submitting themselves to structured interviews.

So long as the questions are addressed in the language to which persons

being interviewed are accustomed, and so long as they remain pertinent

and rather specific, they will be willingly responded by an elite

regardless of how structured or "closed" they are.

Construction of Indexes

The present study utilises six indexes in which more than one

questionnaire item is used. While one of these indexes measures the

respondent's social class origin, the other measure the degree of

hierarchy, his degree of professionalism, objectivity, initiative and

---

[1] See, for example, Johan C. Galtung, Theory and Methods of Social Research (New York Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), p.147.

job satisfaction. In all indexes, including the attitudinal ones, the technique of summated ratings is used. The preference for this method is based not only on its simple procedure of calculation, but also on its advantage over other scaling techniques.[1]

With the exception of the index of social class origin, the other indexes were discussed in the context of this study. However, a brief description of how they were constructed is in order.

1. Index of Social Class Origin: Three variables based on three questionnaire items are used to construct an index of social class origin of higher civil servants: respondent's social class origin evaluation, occupational prestige of respondent's father and father's educational level. The purpose of the index is to classify all higher civil servants under three social class origin catergories of upper, middle and lower classes. Therefore, for each of the variables above, a score point of 2, 1 or 0 is given as their variations reflected respectively as defined characteristic of upper, middle or lower class. Adding the score of each higher civil servant per variable results in a 7 point scale, with scores varying from 0 to 6. The higher civil servant scoring in the extreme low points, 0 to 1, are defined as having lower class origin, higher civil servants scoring very high on points 5 or 6 are judged to have upper class origin, finally, those scoring the middle points, 2, 3, 4 are described as having originated from middle class families.

The first variable used in the index is the respondent's evaluation of family social class position obtained from the following

---

[1] Tittle and Hill show that the magnitude of association between attitudinal and behavioural factors vary little with the scale construction technique employed. They also suggest that the summated rating provides the best result in prediction, (attitudes and behaviour) analysis. See Charles R. Tittle and Richard J. Hill "Attitude Measurement and Prediction of Behaviour: An Evaluation of Conditions and Measurement Techniques," Sociometery, Vol.XXX, No. 2 (June,1967), pp.199-213.

question (questionnaire item number 6): "Taking all things into consideration, how would you classify the social position of your parents when you lived in their home? Upper class, middle class, below the middle class? These three options are assigned scores 2, 1 or 0 for the higher civil servants whose answers fall respectively in the above-mentioned options.

The second variable used in the index is based on questionnaire item number 7, which asks the respondent to indicate his father's occupation. A score of 2 is given to all responses that reflect an occupation judged to be of high occupational prestige, i.e., university teachers and professors, higher civil servants, military officers, liberal professions (doctors, lawyers, engineers) business owners or high-rank executives, landlords of some standing. Occupations judged to be of medium occupational prestige were given score 1. The positions include white collar professions such as clerks, salesmen, middle level accountants and technicians, public servants of middle ranking, small businessmen, shopkeepers, and military non-commissioned officers and enlisted men. Finally, a score of 0 is given to occupations such as unskilled and semi-skilled manual labourers, agricultural workers and farmers and bottom-level public servants (i.e., porters) which are classified as being of low occupational prestige.

The third and last variable used in the index is based on questionnaire item number 8, which described the respondent's father's educational level. Here the three scores are given as follows: score 2 or higher educational levels for higher civil servant's fathers with some university education, completed university education or other high education or above, score 1 for medium educational level consisting of complete, or incomplete, secondary education, and score 0, for lower educational level embodying only primary education or less.

2. <u>Index of Job Satisfaction</u>: Four questionnaire items are used in this index: items number 25, 26, 27 and 28. A value 1 is given to a response considered to be indicative of job satisfaction and a value 0 in a case judged otherwise.

Question 25 asks: "Considering all aspects of your job, how well do you like it? How satisfied are you?" The value 1 is attributed to answers indicating that the respondent is very or fairly satisfied with his job, and the value 0 to responses showing otherwise.

Question 26 asks: "Do you think that supervision in your ministry is too close, satisfactory, not close enough?" Responses to this question indicating satisfaction with supervision is given a value of 1 and otherwise is attributed to the 0 value.

Question 27 asks: "How do you feel about the amount of responsibility you have in your job now? Would you like to be given more responsibility, lesser responsibility, or no change in responsibility?" The value 1 is given to answers indicating "no change in responsibility", and the value 0 to responses showing otherwise.

Question 28 asks: "How challenging do you find your present work — in the sense of demanding concentration, intelligence or energy?" Responses to this question describing the respondent's work as being extremely or strongly challenging is given a value of 1 and otherwise is attributed to the value 0.

Adding the score of the respondents on each question, a five point index could be constructed. On one side, higher civil servants scoring low with 0, 1 and 2 points are classified as having low job-satisfaction, on the other, higher civil servants scoring 3 and 4 points are classified as having high job-satisfaction.

3. <u>Hierarchy Index</u>: This index is made up of questionnaire items 29, 30, 31, 32 and 33.

Question 29 asks: "Does your ministry have a written "policy manual" that spells out policy directives or organisational goals?" A positive answer to this question is given a value of 1 and negative response is attributed the 0 value.

Question 30 asks: "Does your ministry have a written "procedure manual" that describes how routine operations and other matters are to be handled?"

A positive answer to this question is given a value of 1 and negative response is attributed the 0 value.

Question 31 asks: "How often do you issue or give orders and directives in written form?" Answers indicating "regularly" or "occasionally" are given a value of 1 and otherwise is attributed the 0 value.

Question 32 asks: "How often do you receive orders and directives in written form?" like the previous question, responses indicating "regularly" or "occasionally" are given the value of 1 and otherwise is attributed the 0 value.

Question 33 asks: "Do you think that there are many procedures and channels that have to be followed in your ministry?" A positive answer to this question is given a value of 1 and negative answer is attributed the 0 value.

As in the previous index, the scores of the respondents in each question are added, and the possible summed values resulted in an index of 6 points, with minimum of 0 and maximum of 5. On one side, higher civil servants scoring 0, 1, 2 and 3 points are classified as "low" on the hierarchy index, while those scoring 4 and 5 points are considered as "high", on this index. What this means is that when a respondent scores high, this is an indication that he is familiar with the existence of the ministry's policy and policy manual, that he issues and receives orders regularly or occasionally, and that he

thinks that these are many procedures and channels involved in his ministry's operation. Since these are the main ideas involved in the index, a respondent in a high position suggests that his perceptions pertaining to the dimension of hierarchy score high on a measure intending to describe this structural feature of the higher civil service.

4. <u>Professionalism Index</u>: The construction of this index is based on four items in the questionnaire: 46 and 48 (three parts: a, b and c.).

Question 46 asks: "Do you belong to any professional association?" Membership in a professional association is, of course, taken to be indicative of a more highly developed sense of professionalism than non-membership. Thus, responses indicating membership in a professional association is given a value of 1 and otherwise is attributed the 0 value.

Question number 48 is made up of 3 statements referring to professional colleagues, the influence of friendship ties in deciding to move for a better position, and the respondent's goal to become the head of an organisation. The respondents are asked whether they agree or not with such ideas, all of which are related to some degree with professionalism. A value 1 is given to a response considered to be indicative of professional orientation and a value of 0 in a case judged otherwise. The statements and respective values are :

Statement	Agree	Disagree
a) It is unfortunate but true that there are very few people around me with whom I can share my professional interests.	0	1
b) I would not let any friendship ties in a Community stand in the way of moving on to a higher position.	1	0
c) My goal has always been to become the head of a small organisation that I could guide over the long run.	0	1

Adding the score of the respondents in each question, a five

point index is constructed. On one side, higher civil servants scoring

low with 0, 1 and 2 points are classified as having a low orientation

towardsprofessionalism, on the other, those scoring 3 and 4 points

are classified as having highly developed sense of professionalism.

5. Initiative - Discretion Index: Four questionnaire items are used

to construct this index. These are items number 39, 40, 41 and 42.

Question 39 asks: "Do you feel that you have enough authority

to decide the things you should decide?" A positive answer to this

question is given a value of 1 and otherwise is attributed the 0 value.

Question 40 asks: "In carrying out the functions and responsibil-

ities of your position, how often do you find it ncessary and reasonable

to deviate from procedures or policy in order to do more effective

job?" A value 1 is given to a response indicating either frequent or

fairly often deviation from policy and the value 0 to response showing

otherwise.

Question 41 asks: "Do persons in your ministry with strong

personalities play an important role in decision-making regardless of

the position they hold?" A value 1 is given to a positive response

considered to favour initiative and the value 0 to response showing

otherwise.

Question 42 is made up of 3 statements. The respondents are

asked to indicate which of these statements best express his view

of how a civil servant should conduct himself: 1) He follows rules

and regulations literally, 2) He uses initiative and discretion in

interpreting rules and regulations, and 3) He uses strong initiative

and broad discretion without seriously violating rules and regulations.

A value 1 is given to a response preferring the type of administrator

who uses some or strong initiative and a value 0 in a case showing

otherwise.

Adding the score of the respondents on each question, a five point index is constructed. On one side, higher civil servants scoring low with 0, 1 and 2 points are classified as having low orientations towards initiative; on the other, those scoring 3 and 4 points are classified as having more orientation towards initiative.

6. <u>Objectivity Index</u>: Four questionnaire items 19, 44 a) and b) and 45 a) used in the construction of this index which intends to measure the degree to which the respondents express adherence to certain qualities, all of which are related to external and internal objectivity.

Question 19 asks: "As you know, the government in employing people consider their degree of education and experience. Do you think the government should consider other factors (e.g., social position and wealth, religion, family connection, political belief) in employing the higher civil servants?" A negative answer to this question is taken to be indicative of a preference for a more objective type of behaviour. Therefore, a score of 1 is given to a negative response and a score of 0 to a positive answer.

Question 44 is less simple. The respondents are asked to consider the following imaginary situation: "A civil servant is officially informed that he is to be transferred from the capital (Cairo) where he works to a new post in a rural area. He has no objection to serving in the rural area but he feels that he must be near his aged parents who cannot be moved away from the capital (Cairo), where they receive medical treatment. He therefore approaches his superior (e.g., the director general in the ministry), who is a close friend of his, and asks the director general to keep him in the capital."

With this situation before him, the respondent is asked whether the civil servant can properly expect the general director in the ministry to keep him in the capital. A negative response to this question is taken to be indicative of a preference for a more objective

APPENDIX II

STUDY OF EGYPTIAN HIGHER CIVIL SERVANT

1975 QUESTIONNAIRE

Ministry .... Department ....

Title of Post .... Grade ....

1. When were you born?   (Year) .....

2. Where were you born?   (Village) ....

                            (City)   ....

                            (Province) ....

3. What is your religion? (   ) Muslim (   ) Christian

                           (   ) Other

4. What was the population size of the community in which you

   were born? ....

5. What was the population size of the community in which you

   grew up before the age of 20? ....

6. Taking all things into consideration, how would you classify

   the social position of your parents when you lived in their home?

   (   ) Upper class

   (   ) Middle class

   (   ) Below Middle class

   (   ) Other (please specify)

7. What were your father's and your paternal grandfather's major

   occupation (i.e., specific work role during most of life time).

	Father	Grandfather
Civil Servant	( )	( )
Military Officer	( )	( )
Professionals (lawyers, doctor, accountant ....)	( )	( )
Businessman	( )	( )
Business employee.	( )	( )

type of behaviour. Therefore, a score of 1 is given to such an answer and a score of 0 to a positive answer.

Part "b" of question 44 asks the respondents to express their view on what, if a similar situation arose, the director general in the ministry would actually do in view of his obligation to both the government and the civil servant. Those who say the director general would not keep the civil servant in the capital are taken to have the more highly developed adherence to such a quality intending to describe an individual trait called objectivity. Therefore, a score of 1 is given to such answers and a score of 0 to other answers indicating otherwise.

Question 45 is rather similar. The respondents are asked to consider the following imaginary situation: "A civil servant arrives at his office one morning and finds several persons waiting to see him. Among them is a close acquaintance of his."

With this situation before him, the respondent is asked whether it is proper to keep his friend waiting because others come before him. A positive answer to this question is taken to be indicative of a preference for a more objective type of behaviour. Therefore, a score of 1 is given to such an answer and a score of 0 to a negative answer.

As in the previous indexes, the scores of the respondents in each question are added, and the possible summed values resulted in an index of 5 points, with minimum 0 and maximum of 4. On one side, respondents scoring low with 0, 1 and 2 are classified as having less orientation towards objectivity, on the other, respondents scoring 3 and 4 points are classified as having more orientation towards objectivity.

	Father	Grandfather
Landlord	( )	( )
Peasant	( )	( )
Blue collar worker	( )	( )
Other	( )	( )

8. How much education have you had and where, and how much education did your father and grandfather have?

Level of Education	Your-self	Father	Paternal Grand-father	Place of Education Egypt	Elsewhere (Specify)
Less than Secondary Level	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )
General Secondary School	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )
University Education (B.A. and B.sc.)	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )
Post-Graduate Study	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )
Other (please specify)	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )

9. If you have had university education (University Degree), would you please indicate ....

Names of Institution Attended	Degree	Specialisation	Year of Degree

10. If you have had post-graduate study (above your first university degree), would you please indicate ....

Name of Institution Attended	Degree	Specialisation	Year of Degree

11. Have you had formal training in administration? ( ) Yes ( ) No

12. If yes, would you please indicate, where and when

Name of Training Institution Attended	Degree (if any)	Specialisation	Year of Course or degree

13. How old were you when you began thinking about a career in the civil service?

   Before secondary school   (   ) Yes   (   ) No

   At secondary school   (   ) Yes   (   ) No

   At, or upon graduation from
     University   (   ) Yes   (   ) No

   Other (Please specify)   (   )

14. Why did you choose the civil service as a career in preference to a non-government position?

15. People have many reasons for working for state government. In your case which of the following are the advantages or best things about working for the civil service. (Please check one or more as appropriate).

   (   )   Chance to perform public service

   (   )   Good salary

   (   )   Job security

   (   )   Opportunity to reach higher position

   (   )   Prestige of the job

   (   )   Stimulating, challenging work

   (   )   Importance of work being done

   (   )   Other (please specify) ....

   (   )   Nothing at all

16. What disadvantages do you see in working for government? What things do you dislike about it? (Check one or more as appropriate).

   (   )   Low salary

   (   )   Favouritism

   (   )   Routine, monotony

   (   )   Absence of initiative

   (   )   Other (please specify) ....

   (   )   Nothing at all (No disadvantage)

17. How did you obtain your first civil service post? (Check one or more as appropriate).

( )   Regular application in response to advertisement in the newspaper

( )   Through a competitive examination

( )   Through a competitive examination and interview

( )   Recommendation of a relative or friend

( )   Mediation

( )   Other means (please specify) ....

18. How did you first learn about the first civil service post that you obtained? (Check one or more as appropriate).

( )   Through a friend or relative

( )   Through non-personal agency: the government itself, newspaper announcement, the university ....

( )   Other (Please specify)   ....

19. As you know, the government in employing people consider their degree of education and experience. Do you think the government should consider other factors in employing the higher civil servants? For example:-

	Yes	No
Social position	( )	( )
Wealth	( )	( )
Religion	( )	( )
Family connections	( )	( )
Political belief or affiliation	( )	( )

20. (a) If you were advising your own child or another young person on the choice of a career, which would you advise him to choose?

( ) Civil Service   ( ) Private Sector

(b) If civil service, why would you advise him as you do?

(c) If civil service, what would you advise him about the best way to obtain a government post?

21. Could you indicate what positions in the civil service or any other public or private organisations you have held.

> Please fill in the following table indicating the dates of entry, dates of departure.
>
> please begin with your present job and go back in turn to the first.
>
> please indicate promotions (positions you have obtained as a result of promotions) by putting letter (p) against the positions to which you have been promoted.

Serial Number	Name of Ministry or any other organisations (i.e. public or private)	Title of Post held	Grades	Year Date Entered	Year Date Left	Any Remarks you like to make

22. In your opinion, which of the following statements best convey the attitudes of the people towards a civil servant (check one as appropriate).

(a) The people look upon a civil servant as an individual who is above them and who is there to rule them. (   )

(b) As an individual who is an agent of the State (i.e., servant of the States) and whose main job is to protect the interests of the State. (   )

(c) As an individual who is a servant of the public and whose job is to safeguard the interests of the public. (   )

(d) As an individual who is a leader of the people and whose main job is to guide and educate the people.   (   )

23. The following is a list of ten occupations.

(a) As far as the opinion of the general public is concerned, could you just place number (1) alongside the occupation, the general public think most highly of, number (2) for the next and so forth.

.... Army Officer

.... Landowner (of 50 feddans)

.... A member of The People's Assembly (the Parliament)

.... Independent Professional (doctor, lawyer, businessman)

.... Higher Civil Servant (i.e., Under Secretary, Director
                         General, Officials in grades 2 & 3)

.... University Professor

.... Small Merchant

.... Factory Worker

.... Peasant (fallah)

.... Civil Servant (i.e., officials in grades 4, 5, 6, 7)

(b) As far as your own opinion to the above mentioned occupations is concerned, could you just place number (1) alongside the occupation you think most highly of, number (2) for the next and so forth.

.... Army Officer

.... Landowner (of 50 feddans)

.... A Member of The People's Assembly (the Parliament)

.... Independent Professional (doctor, lawyer, businessman)

.... Higher Civil Servant

.... University Professor

.... Small Merchant

.... Factory Worker

.... Peasant (fallah)

.... Civil Servant

24. In which of the following ways can a citizen best benefit his country? (please check one as appropriate).

.... Businessman or independent professional

.... University Professor

.... Higher Civil Servant

.... Army Officer

.... Politician(i.e., a member of the People's Assembly)

.... Other (please specify)

25. Considering all aspects of your job, how well do you like it? How satisfied are you? (Check one as appropriate).

(   ) like ti very well

(   ) like it fairly well

(   ) do not like it too well

(   ) do not like it at all

26. Do you think that supervision in your ministry is:(check as appropriate).

(   ) too close

(   ) satisfactory, about right

(   ) not close enough

27. How do you feel about the amount of responsibility you have in your job now? Would you like to be given: (Check one as appropriate).

(   ) more responsibility

(   ) lesser responsibility

(   ) no change in responsibility

28. How challenging do you find your present work - in the sense of demanding concentration, intelligence or energy?

(   ) extremely challenging

(   ) strongly challenging

(   ) hardly challenging

29. Does your ministry have a written 'policy manual' that spells out policy directives or organisation goals? (   ) Yes (   ) No.

30. Does your ministry have a written 'procedures manual' which describes how routine operations and other matters are to be handled? ( ) Yes ( ) No.

31. How often do you issue or <u>give</u> orders and directives in written form?

( ) regularly ( ) occasionally ( ) seldom ( ) never

32. How often do you <u>receive</u> orders and directives in written form?

( ) regularly ( ) occasionally ( ) seldom ( ) never

33. Do you think that there are many procedures and channels that have to be followed in your ministry? ( ) Yes ( ) No.

34. How large is the ministry in which you work? (in terms of number of employees). (please specify)..............

35. How many subordinates report directly to you? (Please specify)
....

36. What is the total number of employees under your general direction? (Please specify) ....

37. How clear is the mission or goal of your ministry to you?

( ) very clear

( ) reasonably clear

( ) fairly clear

( ) very unclear

38. How well do you think your ministry accomplishes its mission or goals?

( ) very high accomplishment

( ) high accomplishment

( ) moderate accomplishment

( ) low accomplishment

( ) very low accomplishment

39. Do you feel that you have enough authority to decide the things you should decide? ( ) Yes ( ) No.

40. In carrying out the functions and responsibilities of your position how often do you find it necessary and reasonable to deviate from procedures or policy in order to do a more effective job?

( ) frequently   ( ) fairly often   ( ) occasionally

(.) hardly ever   ( ) never

41. Do persons in your ministry with strong personalities play an important role in decision-making regardless of the position they hold?

( ) Yes   ( ) No.

42. Here are three descriptions of administrators. Who among them do you think is the best higher civil servant? (Please check one as appropriate).

( ) One who follows rules and regulations literally

( ) One who uses initiative and discretion in interpreting rules and regulations.

( ) One who uses strong initiative and broad discretion without seriously violating rules and regulations.

43. Do you agree or disagree with the idea that it is sometimes necessary for public officials to keep information from being disclosed to the public?

( ) strongly agree ( ) agree ( ) disagree ( ) strongly disagree

44. Transfer of Employee (please imagine the following situation).

A civil servant is officially informed that he is to be transferred from the capital (Cairo) where he works to a new post in a rural area. He has no objection to serving in the rural area but he feels that he must be near his aged parents who cannot be moved away from the capital (Cairo), where they receive medical treatment. He therefore approaches his superior (e.g., the director general in

the ministry), who is a close friend of his and asks the director

general to keep him in the capital.

    (a) Can the civil servant properly expect the director general

        in the ministry to keep him in the capital? ( ) Yes ( ) No.

    (b) If a similar situation arose, what do you think the director

        general in the ministry would actually do in view of his

        obligation to both the government and the civil servant?

    (c) Suppose the civil servant is a cousin of the director general

        in the ministry. Does the civil servant now have a greater

        right to expect the director general to keep him in the

        capital?

45. Suppose a civil servant arrives at his office one morning and finds

several persons waiting to see him. Among them is a close acquaint-

ance of his.

    (a) Is it proper to keep his friend waiting because others come

        before him? ( ) Yes ( ) No

    (b) What do you believe the average civil servant would do in

        such a case? Would he receive his friend before the others?

        ( ) Yes ( ) No.

46. Do you belong to any professional associations? ( ) Yes ( ) No

47. Do you think civil servants should have their own professional

society, such as doctors, lawyers, and engineers have?

( ) Yes ( ) No.

If yes, why do you think so: ....

....

48. The following statements have occasionally been made by some higher

civil servants when looking at their own job situations. Would you

please read them and indicate whether you agree or disagree with

each one of them.

(a) It is unfortunate but true that there are very few people

around me with whom I can share my professional interests.

( ) Agree   ( ) Disagree

(b) I could not let my friendship ties in a community stand in

the way of moving on to a higher position.

( ) Agree   ( ) Disagree

(c) My goal has always been to become the head of a small

organisation that I could guide over the long run

( ) Agree   ( ) Disagree

49. In the process of making decisions on major ministerial policies.

(i) What influences seem to carry the greatest weight in

effecting the outcome of the decisions? (please indicate

by ranking with numbers 1, 2, 3,...etc., the first most

influential, second most influential, and so on).

a. President of the Republic

b. The People's Assembly (the Parliament)

c. The Arab Socialist Union (the Party)

d. Prime Minister

e. Ministers

f. Governors

g. What is in the public interest

h. Other (please specify)

(ii) Why have you ranked the above influences as you do? ....

....

50. How often do you have contact with the following individuals in

carrying out your official duties. (Please check whenever

appropriate for each category of individuals contacted).

Individuals Contacted	Frequency of Contact			
	Frequent	Occasional	Infrequent	Never
Members of the People's Assembly	( )	( )	( )	( )
Members of the Arab Social Union	( )	( )	( )	( )
Governors	( )	( )	( )	( )
Ministers	( )	( )	( )	( )
Clientele (persons served or regulated by your ministry)	( )	( )	( )	( )
Citizens - the public at large	( )	( )	( )	( )
Personnel of other ministries	( )	( )	( )	( )
Others (please specify)	( )	( )	( )	( )

51. As far as development policy is concerned, ministers depend to a great extent on the advices and recommendations of the higher civil servants.

    (i) Do you agree or disagree with statement No. 51

       ( ) Agree   ( ) Disagree

    (ii) Why do you think so? ....

52. Whom do you think primarily responsible, politicians (e.g., members of the People's Assembly and the Arab Socialist Union), or higher civil servants, or whether responsibility is shared for each of the following basic government and/or policy activities.

Responsibilities/ Activities	Primarily Responsible		Shared Responsibility
	Politician	Higher Civil Servant	
a. formulation of broad policies	( )	( )	( )
b. Establishing norms and general guide-lines	( )	( )	( )
c. Working on long-term projects and policies	( )	( )	( )
d. Fixing priorities in programme implementation	( )	( )	( )
e. Policy decisions relating to day-to-day working of government	( )	( )	( )
f. Distribution of loans foreign aids and subsidies	( )	( )	( )
g. Allocation of licence quotes and permits	( )	( )	( )
h. Selection of sites for programmes	( )	( )	( )
i. Disposal of public grievances	( )	( )	( )
j. Dealing with emergency situations (e.g. floods drought etc.)	( )	( )	( )

53. In your judgement, who should take the initiative in Egypt's development

(i) please check wherever appropriate for each of the following category of individuals::

.... military

.... religious leaders

.... peasants

.... businessmen

.... higher civil servants

.... blue collar workers

.... politicians

.... other (please specify)

(ii) Why do you think so?.....................................

54. As you know, the term development means different things to different people.

    (i)   Could you indicate what you understand by the term development.......................................

    (ii) Could you indicate some indicators of development?

         ....

55. On what basis should the government make its decisions regarding the allocation of present resources?

....

....

56. Which country or groups of countries are models which Egypt should follow in its effort to develop?

....

....

57. Could you please indicate with which of the following statements you agree (please check one statement only, if you agree).

    (a) The Egyptian people are qualified to run a democratic form of government. Therefore the task of policy-making must be undertaken by the elected representatives of the people and the public servants should confine themselves to the implementation of the policies.   (   ) Agree

    (b) The Egyptian people are not yet ready for a democratic form of government. Therefore, until they are ready for it, they should leave both the task of policy-making and administration in the hands of the public servants.   (   ) Agree

(c) The Egyptian people are not qualified, and never will be to run a democratic form of government. Therefore, they should leave the task of policy-making and administration in the hands of public servants.   (   ) Agree

58. Would you please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following statements.

(a) Planning or no planning, we will succeed only if we are lucky.

(   ) Agree   (   ) Disagree

(b) Development is possible without government planning.

(   ) Agree   (   ) Disagree

(c) The Open Door Policy <u>Infitah</u> will facilitate economic planning since the resources will be more available for planning.

(   ) Agree   (   ) Disagree

(d) The legitimate and proper functions of government are law and order and not running business and trade.

(   ) Agree   (   ) Disagree

59. (i) Could you please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following statement.

"It has often been said that the military officers have been employed in the Egyptian civil service because they were considered more innovative and modernising in carrying out economic development programmes and in order to establish a control device over the civil service."

(   ) Agree   (   ) Disagree

(ii) If you disagree with the above statement (No.59), why do you think military officers have been employed in the Egyptian civil service?

59. (ii) ....

....

60. Now that we have completed the interview, would you like to

comment on any aspect of it - the things we have covered as

well as some things we may not have covered?

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Books and Monographs

Abdel-Malek, Anwar. Egypt: Military Society.
    New York: Random House, 1968.

Adelman, Irma and Morris, C.T. Society, Politics and
    Economic Development. A Quantitive Approach.
    Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1967.

Adu, A.L. The Civil Service in the New African States.
    London: George Allen and Urwin Ltd., 1965.

Ahmed, J. The Intellectual Origin of Egyptian Nationalism.
    London: Oxford University Press, 1960.

Ahmed, Muneer. The Civil Service of Pakistan. Karachi:
    Oxford University Press, 1969.

AL-Ayoubi, N.N. The Administrative Revolution. Cairo:
    Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, 1977.

Almond, Gabriel A. and Verba, Sidney. The Civic Culture.
    Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963.

Andreson, Charles W. The Political Economy of Modern
    Spain, Policy Making in Authoritarian System.
    Madism: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1970.

Apter, David The Politics of Modernisation. Chicago:
    University of Chicago Press, 1965.

Banks, A.S. and Textor, R.B. A Cross-Polity Survey.
    Mass: M.I.T. Press, 1963.

Baer, Gabriel. Population and Society in the Arab East.
    New York: Praeger, 1964.

Be'eri, Eliezer, Army Officers in Arab Society and Politics.
    New York: Praeger, 1970.

Bendix, Rreinhard. Higher Civil Servants in American Society.
    Colorado: University of Colorado Press, 1949.

_____ Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait. New York:
    Doubleday and Co., 1962.

Berger, Morroe. Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt:
    A Study of Higher Civil Servants. Princeton, N.J.:
    Princeton University Press, 1957.

_____ Military Elites and Social Change. Princeton, N.J.:
    Princeton University Press, 1960.

_____ The Arab World Today. New York: Doubleday and Co., 1962.

Binder, Leonard.. "Egypt: The Integration Revolution," in
    Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba (eds.). Political Culture
    and Political Development. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
    University Press, 1969.

Blau, Peter. The Dynamics of Bureaucracy. Chicago:
    University of Chicago Press, 1955.

_____. Bureaucracy in Modern Society. New York; Random
    House, 1956.

_____. and Scott, W Richard. Formal Organisations: A
    Comparative Approach. San Francisco: Chandler
    Publishing Co., 1962.

Bottomore, T.B. Elites and Society. Baltimore: Penguin
    Books, 1966.

Braibanti, Ralph (ed.) Political and Administrative
    Development. Durham: Duke University Press, 1969.

Caiden, Gerald. Administrative Reform. Chicago: Aldine
    Publishing Co., 1969.

Cambell, George. The Civil Service in Britain. London:
    Duckworth, 1965.

Cecil, Lord Edward. The Leisure of An Egyptian Official.
    2nd. ed. London: Hodder and Stoughton Ltd., 1921.

Chapman, Brian. The Profession of Government. London:
    George Allen and Urwin Ltd., 1959.

Chapman, Richard, "Profile of a Profession: The Administrative
    Class of the Civil Service: The Fulton Commission,"
    in The Civil Service.Vol. III (2). London; Her Majesty's
    Stationary Office, 1968.

_____. The Higher Civil Service in Britain. London: Constable and
    Co., 1970.

Coleman, James (ed.) Education and Political Development.
    Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963.

Crick, Bernard. The Reform of Parliament. New York
    Doubleday and Co., 1965.

Cromer, Lord Evelyn. Modern Egypt. London: Macmillan, 1908.

Darwish, Abdel Karim J. Bureaucracy and Socialism. Cairo:
    The Anglo-Egyptian Book Co., N.D. (In Arabic).

Diamant, Alfred. "The French Administrative System: The
    Republic Passes But The Administration Remains," in
    William Siffin (ed.) Toward The Comparative Study
    of Comparative Administration. Indiana: Indiana
    University Press, 1959.

_____. "Bureaucracy in Developmental Regime," in Fred Riggs
    (ed.) Frontier of Development Administration. Durham:
    Duke University Press, 1970.

Davis, Kingsly, <u>World Urbanisation, 1950-1970</u>. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969.

Dekmejian, Richard H. <u>Egypt Under Nasser: A study in Political Dynamics</u>. London: University of London Press, 1971.

____. <u>Patterns of Political Leadership: Lebanon, Egypt, Israel</u>. New York: State of New York University Press, 1975.

Dodd, C.H. <u>Politics and Government in Turkey</u>. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1969.

El. Stadt, Anwar. <u>Revolt on the Nile</u> London: Wingate, 1957.

____. <u>In Search of Identity: An Autobiography</u>. London: Collins and Co., 1978.

Etzioni, Amitai. <u>Complex Organisation</u>. New York: Reinhart and Winston, Inc., 1961.

____. <u>Modern Organisations</u>. New Jersey: Prenctice Hall, Inc., 1964.

Feit, Edward. <u>The Armed Bureaucrats</u>. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1973.

Finkle, J and Gable. R. (eds.) <u>Political Development and Social Change</u>. New York: John Willey and Sons, Inc., 1966.

Francis, R and Stone, R. <u>Service and Procedure in Bureaucracy</u>. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956.

Friedrich, Carl. J. <u>Constitutional Government and Democracy</u>. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956.

____. <u>Man and His Government: An Empirical Theory of Politics</u>. New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, Inc., 1963.

Gaus, John. <u>Reflections on Public Administration</u>. Alabama University of Alabama Press, 1947.

Gerth, H.H. and Mills, C. Wright (eds.) <u>From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology</u>. New York: Oxford University Press, 1958.

Gibb, H.A.R. and Brown, Harold. <u>Islamic Society and the West</u>, Vol.I London: Oxford University Press, 1959.

Granick, David. <u>The Red Executive</u>. New York: Doubleday and Co., 1960.

Griffith, Wyn. <u>The British Civil Service</u>. London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1954.

Halpern, Manfred. <u>The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa</u>. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963.

Hammond, P. and Alexandar, S. (eds.) <u>Political Dynamics</u>
<u>in the Middle East</u>. New York: American Elsevier
Publishing Co., Inc., 1972.

Hansen, B. and Grigis, M. <u>Development and Economic Policy</u>
<u>in the U A R (Egypt)</u>. Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing
Co., 1965.

Harbison, F. and Ibrahim, I.A.K. <u>Human Resources for Egyptian</u>
<u>Enterprise</u> New York: McGraw Hill, 1958.

_____ "Management in Modern Egypt," in F Harbison and
Charles Meyers, (eds.) <u>Management in the Industrial</u>
<u>World</u>. New York: McGraw Hill, 1959.

Harik, Illiya. "Political Mobilisation and Social Change,"
in Richard Antown and Illiya Harik (eds.) <u>Social Change</u>
<u>in the Middle East</u>. Indiana: Indiana University Press,
1972.

Heady, Ferrel, and Stokes, Sybil (eds.) <u>Papers in Comparative</u>
<u>Public Administration</u>. Michigan: The University of
Michigen, 1962.

_____ <u>Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective</u>
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966.

Heper, Metin. "Training for Potential Bureaucratic Elites
of the Transitional Societies," in Irwing Swendlow (ed.)
<u>Public Administration Training for the Less Developed</u>
<u>Countries</u>. Syracuse: Maxwell School of Citizenship and
Public Affairs, 1974.

_____ et al., <u>The Role of Bureaucracy and Regime Types:</u>
<u>A Comparative Study of Turkish and Korean Higher Civil</u>
<u>Servants</u>: Iowa: The University of Iowa, 1977.

Heyworth, Dunne, J. <u>An Introduction to the History of Education</u>
<u>in Egypt</u>. London: Luzac and Co., 1938.

Hocart, A.M. "The Legacy of Modern Egypt," in S.R.K.
Glanville (ed.) <u>Legacy of Egypt</u>. London: Oxford
University Press, 1942.

Holt, P.M. <u>Political and Social Change in Modern Egypt</u>.
Oxford University Press, 1969.

Holt, Robert and Turner, John (eds.) <u>The Methodology of</u>
<u>Comparative Research</u>. New York: The Face Press,
1970.

Hopkins, Harry. <u>Egypt The Crucible</u>. London: Secker and
Warburg, 1969.

Huntington, S.P. <u>Political Order in Changing Societies</u>.
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.

_____ and Moore, C.H. (eds.) <u>Authoritarian Politics in</u>
<u>Modern Society</u>. New York: Basic Books, 1970.

Ilchman,Warner, and Uphoff, N.T. The Political Economy of
     Change, Berkeley: University of California Press,
     1976.

Issawi, Charles. Egypt at Mid-Century. London: Oxford
     University Press, 1954.

_____. Egypt in Revolution. London: Oxford University Press,
     1963.

Kamal, M. The Effect of the Pharaonic Civilisation on Our
     Present Life. Cairo: Dan El Marref. 1957.

Karpat, Kemal. H. Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a
     Multi-Party System. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
     University Press, 1959.

Keller, Suzanne. Beyond The Ruling Class. Strategic Elites
     in Modern Society. New York: Random House, 1963.

Kelsall, R.K. Higher Civil Servants in Britain. London:
     Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1955.

Kilpatrick, F. et al. The Image of the Federal Service.
     Washington, D.C.: The Broakings Institutions, 1964.

Kingsley, Donald. Representative Bureaucracy, Ohio: The
     Antioch Press, 1944.

Kubota, Akira. Higher Civil Servants in Postwar Japan.
     Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969.

Lacouture, Jean and Lacouture, Simone. Egypt in Transition.
     London: Methwen and Co., 1958.

Lacouture, Jean. Nasser London: Secker and Warburg, 1973.

La Palombara, Joseph. (ed.) Bureaucracy and Political
     Development. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
     Press, 1963.

Landes, David. S. Banker and Pashas: International Finance
     and Economic Imperialism in Egypt Cambridge, Mass:
     Howard University Press, 1958.

Lasswell, Harold, et al The Comparative Study of Elites
     Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951.

Lasswell, Harold. Politics: Who gets What, When, How .
     New York: Mandian Books, Inc., 1960

Lenezowski, George (ed.) Political Elites in the Middle
     East . Washington, D.C: American Enterprise Institute,
     1974.

Lerner, Daniel. The Passing of Traditional Society, The
     Modernisation of the Middle East ,Glencoe, Ill: The
     Free Press, 1958.

Little, Tom. Modern Egypt . London: Ernest Benn Ltd.,
     1967.

Mabro, Robert. The Egyptian Economy 1952-1972. Oxford:
     Oxford University Press, 1972.

Mansfield, Peter. Nasser. London: Methwen and Co, 1969.

_____. Nasser's Egypt. London: Penguin Books, 1960.

Mannheim, Karl. Ideology and Utopia. New York: Harcourt,
     Brace and World, 1940.

Matthwes, D. The Social Background of Decision - Makers .
     New York: Random House, 1954.

Matthwes, R and Metta, A. Education in Arab Countries of
     the Near East. Lebanon: Contemporary Press, 1949.

Mayfield, James. Rural Politics in Nasser's Egypt. Austin:
     University of Texas Press, 1971.

Mead, Donald C. Growth and Structural Change in the
     Egyptian Economy. Homewood, Ill: Richard D Irwin,
     Inc., 1967.

Merton, Robert et al., (eds.) Render in Bureaucracy. ·
     New York: Unigate Books, 1952.

Meynaud, Jean. Technocracy. London: Faber and Faber, 1965.

Moore, Barrington. Social Origin of Dictatorship and
     Democracy. Boston: Beacon Press, 1966.

Montgomery, D.and Siffin, W.(eds.) Approaches to Development
     Politics, Administration and Change. New York: McGraw
     Hill Book Co., 1966.

Mosca, Gaetano. The Ruling Class. New York: McGraw Hill
     Book Co., 1939.

Mosher, Frederick, Co. Democracy and the Public Service ,
     New York: Oxford University Press, 1968.

Nasser, Gamal. The Philosphy of the Revolution. Washington
     D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1955.

Nettle, J.P. Political Mobilisation. London: Faber and
     Faber, 1969.

Neustadt, R. Presidential Power. New York: John Willey and
     Sons, 1960.

Nigel, Walker. Morale in the Civil Service. London:
     Edinburgh University Press, 1961.

Nutting, A. Nasser. London: Constable, 1972.

O'Brien, P. The Revolution in Egypt's Economic System.
    London: Oxford University Press, 1969.

Organski, A.F. Stages of Political Development. New York:
    Alfred A Knoph, 1965.

Parsons, Talcott, and Shills, Edward (eds.). Toward a
    General Theory of Action. New York: Harper and Row,
    1951.

_____. Structure and Process in Modern Societies. Glencoe
    Ill; The Free Press, 1960.

Parris, Henry. Constitutional Bureaucracy. London: George
    Allen and Unwin, 1969.

Partent, M. Surveys, Polls and Samples: Practical Procedures.
    New York: Harper and Row, 1960.

Peters, Guy. The Politics of Bureaucracy. London:
    Longman, 1978.

Price, Robert M. Society and Bureaucracy in Contemporary
    Ghana. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975.

Pulzer, Peter G. Political Representation and Elections.
    New York: Praeger, 1967.

Pye, Lucian. Aspects of Political Development. Boston:
    Little Brown and Co., 1966.

_____. Politics, Personality and Nation Building. New Haven:
    Yale University Press, 1966.

Quandt, William. The Comparative Study of Political Elites
    Beverly Hills: Sage Professional Papers, 1970.

Qubian, Fahim. Education and Science in the Arab World.
    Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1969.

Rivlin, Helen Anne B. The Agricultural Policy of Mohammed
    Ali in Egypt. Mass: Cambridge University Press, 1961.

Riggs, Fred. Administration in Developing Countries. Boston:
    Houghton Mifflin Co., 1964.

_____. (ed.) Frontiers of Development Administration. Durham:
    Duke University Press, 1970.

_____. Administrative Reform and Political Responsiveness:
    A Theory of Dynamic Balancing. Sage Professional
    Papers in Comparative Politics, I, Ser. 01-010, 1970.

Roos, Leslie, and Roas, Noralou.P. Managers of Modernisation
    Organisation and Elites in Turkey. 1956-1969 (Cambridge
    Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971.

Saab, S.Gabriel. The Egyptian Agrarian Reform 1952-1962.
    London: Oxford University Press, 1967.

Sayegh, Fayez. "The Theoretical Structure of Nasser's Socialism," in Sami Hanna and G Gardner (eds.) Arab Socialism.(Leider: J Brill, 1969).

Safran, Nadev. Egypt in Search of Political Community. Mass: Harvard University Press, 1961.

Schaffer, Bernard (ed.) Administrative Training and Development. New York: Praeger, 1974.

Sharp, Walter. "Bureaucracy and Politics: Egyptian Model," in William Siffin (ed.) Toward the Comparative Study of Public Administration. Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1959.

Shaw, Stanford. The Financial and Administrative Organisation and Development of Ottoman Egypt, 1517-1978. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962.

Shills, Edward. Political Development in the New States. The Hague: Hout on and Co., 1962.

Simon, Herbert. Administrative Behaviour. New York: Macmillan, 1957.

Smith, Harvey et al., Area Handbook for United Arab Republic (Egypt) Washington D.C.: U S Government Printing House, 1970.

Stanley, David T. Higher Civil Servants. Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1964.

Stephens, Robert. Nasser: A Political Biography. London: Allen and Unwin, 1971.

Suleiman, Ezra N. Politics, Power and Bureaucracy in France. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974.

Thompson, James (ed.) Approaches to Organisational Design. Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 1961.

Thompson, Victor. Modern Organisation. New York: Alfred Knopf 1967.

Tingor, Robert L. Modernisation and British Colonial Rule in Egypt. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966.

Vatikiotis, P.J. The Egyptian Army in Politics. Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1961.

_____ (ed.) Egypt since the Revolution. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967.

_____ The Modern History of Egypt. London: Weinfield and Nicolson, 1969.

Waldo, Dwight. _Comparative Public Administration: Prologue Problems, and Promise_. Chicago: Papers in Comparative Public Administrations, No. 2, 1964.

_____ and Landau, Martin. _The Study of Organisational Behaviour: Status, Problems and Trends_. Chicago: Papers in Comparative Public Administration, No. 8 1966.

Ward, R.and Rustow, D.(eds.) _Political Modernisation in Japan and Turkey_. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press 1964.

Weber, Max. _The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation_ trs. by A M Hendreson and Talcott Parsons (eds.). New York. Oxford University Press, 1947.

Wheellock, Keith. _Nasser's Egypt_. New York: Praeger, 1960.

Wittfogel, Carl. _Oriental Desposition_. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957.

II. Periodicals

Abdel, Aziz, A. "Socio-Cultural and The Role of Agriculture Education in the U.A.R.," _Arab Journal_, Vol. I, (1964)

Abueva, Jose. N. "Social Background and Recruitment of Legislation and Administrators in the Philippines," _Philippine Journal of Public Administration_, Vol. IX, (January 1965).

Almond, Gabriel. "Political Systems and Political Change," _American Behavioural Scientist_, Vol. VI,(1963).

Anis, M.A. "Economic Structure of the Postwar Egypt," _Egypt Contemporaine_, (1962).

Be'eri, Elizier. "A Note on Coups d'etat in the Middle East," _Journal of Contemporary History_, Vol. V, (1970).

_____ "Social Origin and Family Background of the Egyptian Army Officer Class," _Asian and African Studies_, Vo. II, (1966).

Bent, Frederick T. "The Turkish Bureaucracy as an Agent of Change," _Journal of Comparative Administration_, Vol. I, (May, 1969).

Berger, Morroe. "Bureaucracy East and West," _Administrative Science Quarterly_, Vol. I, (1957).

Beyer, William. "The Civil Service of the Ancient World," _Public Administration Review_, Vol. XIX, (Autumn 1959).

Bill, James A. "The Military and Modernisation in the Middle East," _Comparative Politics_, Vol. II,(1969).

Blau, Peter. "Critical Remarks on Weber's Theory of Authority," American Political Science Review, Vol. LVII, (June, 1963).

_____ and, Heydebrand, Wolf. "The Structure of Small Bureaucracies," American Sociological Review, Vol. XXXI, (April, 1966).

Brady, J.R. "Japenese Administrative Behaviour and the 'Sala's" Philippine Journal of Public Administration, Vol. III, (1964).

Brown, T.S. "Herodotus Speculates About Egypt," American Journal of Philology, Vol. XIX (January, 1965).

Caplow, Theodore. "Organisational Size", American Sociological Review, Vol. I,(March, 1957).

Constas, Helen. Max Weber's Two Conceptions of Bureaucracy," American Journal of Sociological, Vol. XXXII,(1958).

Deflueur, Melvin, and Westie, F. "Attitudes as a Scientific Concept," Social Forces, (October, 1963).

_____ "Verbal Attitudes and Overt Acts," American Sociological Review, Vol. XXII,(December, 1958).

Delany, William. "The Development and Decline of Patrimonial and Bureaucratic Administration," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. XII, (1963).

Dodd, C.H. "The Social and Educational Background of Turkish Officials," Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. I,(April, 1965).

Dube, S.C. "Bureaucracy and Nation Building in Transitional Societies," International Social Science Journal, Vol. XVI, (1964).

Edinger, Lewis, and Searing, Donald. "Social Background in Elite Analysis: A Methodological Inquiry," American Political Science Review, Vol. LXI,(June, 1967).

Eisenstadt, S.N. "Bureaucracy, Bureaucratisation, and Debureaucratisation," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. IV,(1959).

El-Said, M.H. "The Development of Administrative Leadership in the Governmental Sector in the U.A.R.," Al-A'dara, Vol. II,(July, 1970). (In Arabic).

England, G.W., et al. "Overcoming Contradictions in Attitude Survey Result: The Trend for Relevant Attitude Form," Personnel Administration, Vol. XXII,(1961).

Esman, Milton. "The Ecological Style in Comparative Administration," Public Administration Review, Vol. XXVII, (1967).

Flemming, W.C. "Authority, Efficiency, and Rule Stress: Problems in the Development of East African Bureaucracies," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. II, (December, 1966).

Gordon, Michael, R. "Civil Servants, Politicians and Parties; Shortcomings in the British Policy Process," Comparative Politics, Vol. IV, (1971).

Hage, Jerald. "An Aximotic Theory of Organisation," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. X, (1965).

Hall, R.H. "Bureaucracy and Small Organisation," Sociology and Social Research, Vol. XXLI, (1963).

_____ Interorganisational Structure Variation: Application of The Bureaucratic Model, "Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. VII, (1962).

Heady, Gerrel. Bureaucratic Theory and Comparative Administration," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. III, (1959).

_____ Recent Literature on Comparative Public Administration," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. V, (1960).

Heaphy, James. "Organisation of Egypt: Inadequacies of a Non-Political Model for Nation-Building," World Politics, Vol. XVI, (1966).

_____ "Comparative Public Administration: Comments on Current Characteristics," Public Administration Review. Vol. XVX, (1963).

Hopkins, Jack W. "Comparative Observations on Peruvian Bureaucracy," Journal of Comparative Administration Vol. I, (November, 1969).

Huntington, S. "Political Development and Political Decay," World Politics, Vol. XVIII, (April, 1965).

Illchman, Warner, F. "Rising Expectations and the Revolution in Development Administration," Public Administration Review, Vol. XXV, (1965).

Issawi, Charles. "Social Structure and Ideology in Iraq, Lebanom, Syria, and the U.A.R.," Journal of International Affairs, Vol. XIX, (1965).

Kassem, M.S. "Business Executives in India, USA, and Egypt," International Journal of Comparative Sociology, Vol. XII, (July, 1971).

Langendenfer, Harold. Q. "The Egyptian Executive: A Case Study in Conflict," Human Organisation. Vol. XXIII , (1964).

Perlmutter, Amos, "Egypt and the Myth of the New Middle Class. A Comparative Analysis," Comparative Study in Society and History, Vol. I,(1967).

Polk, William, "The Nature of Modernisation: The Middle East and North Africa," Foreign Affairs Quarterly Review, (1965).

Porter, J. "Higher Public Servants and the Bureaucratic Elite in Canada," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, Vol. XXIV,(1958).

Presthus, Robert V. "Behaviour and Bureaucracy in Many Cultures," Public Administration Review, Vol. XIX , 1959.

_____. "Toward a Theory of Organisational Behaviour," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. III,(1959).

Pugh, D.S. et al., "A Conceptual Scheme for Organisational Analysis," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. VIII,(1963).

Rustow, Dankwart A., "The Study of Elites: Who's who, when and How," World Politics, Vol. XVIII, (July, 1966).

Searing, Donald. "The Comparative Study of Elite Sociolisation," Comparative Political Science, Vol. I,(1958).

Scott, William. "Organisational Theory: An Overview and an Appraisal," Journal of The Academy of Management, (April, 1961).

Siffin, William. "Bureaucracy; The Problem of Methodology and the Structural Approach," Journal of Comparative Administration, Vol. II,(February, 1971).

Sigelman, Lee. "Do Modern Bureaucracies Dominate Under-developed Politics? A Test of The Imbalance Thesis," American Political Science Review, Vol. LXIV, (1972).

Simpson, Richard and Gulley, William. "Goals and Environmental Pressures and Organisational Characteristics," American Sociological Review, Vol. XXVII, (1962).

Subramanian, V. "Representative Bureaucracy: A Reassessment," American Political Science Review, Vol. LXI,(December,1967).

Title, Charles and Hill, Richard. "Attitude Measurement and Prediction of Behaviour: An Evaluation of Conditions and Measurement Techniques," Sociometery, Vol. XXX, (June, 1967).

Tutum, Cahit. "The Turkish Personnel System on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Rpublic," Turkish Public Administration Annual, No. 1,(1974).

Udy, Stanley H. "'Bureaucracy' and 'Rationality' in Weber's Organisation Theory: An Empirical Study," American Sociological Review, Vol. XVII, (1959).

Udy, Stanley, H. "The Structure of Authority in Non-Industrial Production Organisation," _American Journal of Sociology_ Vol. XLI,(1959).

_____ . "Bureaucratic Elements in Organisation: Some Research Findings," _American Sociological Review_, Vol. XVIII , (1960).

Westfall, Ralf. "Business Management Under Nasser," _Business Horizons_, Vol. VII,(Summer,1964).

Wright, Deil. "Executive Leadership in State Administration," _Midwest Journal of Political Science_, Vol. XI,(February, 1967).

III. _Public Documents_

Arab Republic of Egypt. _The Constitution_. Cairo: Information Department,(1971).

_____ . _Statistical Handbook_, 1973. Cairo: Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics,(1973).

Arab Republic of Egypt Official Gazette. _Act No. 57 of 1971 Concerning Local Government_. Cairo: Government Press, (1971).

_____ . _Act No. 58 of 1971 Concerning State Civil Service Regulations_. Cairo: Government Press,(1971).

_____ . _Act No. 59 of 1971 Concerning Public Sector Regulations_ Cairo: Government Press,(1971).

Central Agency for Organisation and Administration _Personnel Statistics, 1964-1975_ Cairo: Central Agency for Organisational and Administration,(1975).

_____ . _Annual Reports 1964-1975_. Cairo: Central Agency for Organisation and Administrations,(1975).

Civil Service Department _Annual Reports 1952-1960_. Cairo: Government Press,(1960).

_____ . _A Research Paper Concerning the History of The Civil Service Department_. Cairo: Civil Service Department (1955).

Gulick, Luther, and Pollock, James. _Government Reorganisation in the United Arab Republic. A Report submitted to the Central Committee for the Reorganisation of the Machinery of Government_. Cairo: The Central Committee for the Reorganisation of The Machinery of Government, (1962).

Information Department. _The Revolution in Thirteen Years 1952-1965_. Cairo: Information Department, (1965).

Khedive of Egypt. _The Higher Order of 1883 Concerning the Royal Employees_. Cairo: Civil Service Department, (1962).

Ministry of Finance. Order-in-Council of 1907 Concerning the Public Service. Cairo: Civil Service Department, (1962).

Ministry of Finance. Order-in-Council of 1921 Concerning the Service. Cairo: Civil Service Department, (1962).

National Bank of Egypt. Economic Bulletin Cairo: National Bank of Egypt, (1964), (1965),(1966),(1967),(1968),(1969),(1970),(1971), (1972), and (1973).

National Institute of Planning. Research Report on Employment and Unemployment among the Educated Final Report. Cairo: National Institute of Planning, (1967).

_____. Survey of University Students. Cairo: National Institute of Planning, (1963).

Sallfors, Terras. The Establishment of An Institute of Public Administration and Other Provisions for the Training of Civil Servants in Egypt. New York. United States, (1954).

_____. Developing New Managers for the Socialist Enterprise Sector in the U.A.R. Cairo: National Institute of Management Development, (1967).

_____. Top-Level Management and Personnel Problems of Public Enterprises. Cairo: Institute of Management Development (1967).

Sinker, A.P. Report on the Personnel Questions of the Egyptian Civil Service. Cairo: Government Press, (1951).

Stephens, Roy W. Suggestions and Comments Concerning the Proposed Revision of the Civil Service Law of the United Arab Republic. Cairo: The Central Board for Government Reorganisations, (1962).

United Arab Republic. The Charter. Cairo: Information Department, (1962).

_____. Census of the Population, 1960 and 1966.

_____. The Constitutions: Cairo: Information Department, (1964).

_____. The Year Book: Cairo: Information Department, (1962) (1963,(1964,(1965) and (1966)

United Arab Republic Official Gazette. Act No. 46 of 1964 Concerning the State Civil Service Regulations. Cairo: Government Press, (1964).

_____. Act No. 113 of 1964 Concerning the Creation of the Central Agency for Organisation and Administration. Cairo: Government Press, (1964).

_____. Act No. 158 of 1964 Concerning Temporary Regulations of State Civil Servants. Cairo: Government Press, (1964).

_____. Decree No 1085 of 1969 Concerning the Organisation and Functions of the Central Agency for Organisation and Administration. Cairo: Government Press, (1964).

United Arab Republic Official Gazette. Decree No 2067 of 1964 Concerning the Implementation of Position Classification System. Cairo: Government Press, (1964).

_____. Ministerial Order No. 2 of 1965 Concerning the Insurance of Classification Standards. Cairo: Government Press, (1965).

United Nations. Appraising Administrative Capability for Development. New York: United Nations, (1969).

_____. A Survey of Economic Conditions in Africa, 1967 York: United Nations, (1969).

_____. Report of the Interregional Seminar on the Development of Senior Administrators in the Public Service of Developing Countries. Vol. II New York: United Nations (1970).

_____. Statistical Year Book, 1970. New York: United Nations (1971).

_____. World Economic Survey, 1962-1970. New York: United Nations, (1971).