

THE UNIVERSITY OF HULL

**How Terrorism Ends: A Comparative Conflict Analysis of
Northern Ireland, the Basque Country and Corsica**

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by

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Abstract

This study is concerned with how ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorism is countered within liberal democracies and what impact government responses have on how a conflict involving the use of terrorism is transformed from one of violence to constitutional political activity. Specifically, we are concerned with the balance between coercive and conciliatory responses. A moderate terrorism studies approach is used, which focuses on root causes of terrorism and places them in a historical context ranging from the historical precedents of a terrorist campaign to when a group reaches a permanent and verifiable ceasefire. The study combines theories from within terrorism studies and conflict studies to develop a theoretical framework, in which the relational conflict triangle model of situation-attitudes-behaviour is informed by academic knowledge on terrorism. In order to put the study into context preliminary matters are addressed as to what ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorism is and the relationship between terrorism and liberal democracy. The following chapters introduce conflict studies, terrorism studies, and develop the theoretical framework, noting the convergence of interests between the two disciplines.

The framework is then tested by comparing three protracted cases of ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorism in the Basque Country, Corsica and Northern Ireland. The analysis centres on the terrorist groups involved and how they come to emerge and, in many cases, reach the decision to abandon violence. The analysis is historical and takes into account the situation, attitudes and behaviour of the protagonists involved, noting the proneness of terrorist organisations towards volatile division. The conclusion drawn is that a combination of coercion, conciliation and reform led to the eventual ending of terrorist campaigns in the three cases but conciliation and reform were dependent on the use of coercive measures targeted directly at the groups involved. The reasons for splinter groups continuing violence are also discussed.

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Chapter One: Introduction

This study contributes to the study of terrorism by carrying out a comparative case study of ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorism affecting France, Spain and the United Kingdom within three regions: Corsica, the Basque Country and Northern Ireland. The three cases are of interest because of their longevity and what they reveal about how a liberal democracy approaches the problem of domestic terrorism. There are significant implications for government policy to be found in the history of these conflicts. Government responses fall on a scale of coercion and conciliation and whilst there is existing literature on the topic this has not been applied to Corsica, the Basque Country and Northern Ireland in the form of a comparative study. This has been done previously in only two articles¹ and never with a direct focus as to how terrorism ends or through the use of a relational model of terrorism applied in a historical context.

Where this study differs from previous studies, including those comparing the Basque Country and Northern Ireland, is in the use of conflict theory to develop a method of analysis specific to terrorism, in effect, creating a model of terrorism as opposed to applying an existing conflict model. The lessons for how terrorism ends do not lie solely in its end stages but also at the beginning and a historical analysis using a stage model allows for the factors, which enable a conflict to move to the next stage, to be identified and compared. A second contribution is in the choice of the three cases, being of a similar type, and building on more general works of how terrorism ends² by focusing on a small number of cases in depth. A third is the central research question of the impact of coercion and conciliation by the state on

¹ John Loughlin & Francisco Letamendia 'Lessons for Northern Ireland: Peace in the Basque country and Corsica?' *Irish Studies in International Affairs* Vol 11, (2000) pp147-162; Anastasia Filippidou "Negotiating tactics in low intensity conflicts: The cases of Northern Ireland, the Basque Country and Corsica" *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* Vol 7, No 3 (2007) pp 94-108.

² Martha Crenshaw (2005) "Pathways out of terrorism: A conceptual framework" in: D.R. Kaarathikeyan (ed) *Pathways out of Terrorism and Insurgency: The Dynamics of Terrorist Violence and Peace Processes* (New Dawn Press Inc:Elgin:2005); Audrey Kurth Cronin *How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns* (Princeton University Press: Princeton:2009); Tore Bjorgo & John Horgan (eds) *Leaving Terrorism Behind* (Routledge:London:2009).

terrorist groups in three cases and how this contributes to the ending of terrorist campaigns. The present study therefore contributes to the understanding of how terrorism ends by building on previous research through the application of an integration of conflict and terrorism theory to demonstrate that both coercion and conciliation by the state is crucial in ending terrorist campaigns of the ethno-nationalist/separatist type.

This study began with what could be considered a simple aim: to compare the three cases using a stage model of conflict and derive conclusions as to how terrorist campaigns come to an end. The outcome addresses this as its central goal, but with the unplanned result of investigating in greater depth how conflict studies can be utilised by terrorism studies³. This came about through the writing of the theory chapters, including a revisiting of theories of conflict and terrorism and as a consequence of attending conferences on terrorism; including the good fortune of attending a conference on how terrorism ends at the University of Aberystwyth at the same time that research was begun⁴. I was struck by the prevalence of critical theory at these conferences and this prompted me to question at a deeper level how terrorism is conceptualised and researched. Whilst I did not adopt a critical studies approach it was clear that there was a strong argument for going back to basics and questioning existing approaches and my own understanding.

As a result, the theoretical chapters form a narrative leading to a framework of analysis in the fifth chapter. In terms of the field of study, the approach taken is a fusion of conflict studies and terrorism studies, which are introduced in chapters two and three, taking methodological practices from conflict studies and using them to develop a framework of analysis specific to the study of terrorism. The two major influences on this were Franks, who synthesises conflict and terrorism studies into a comprehensive and holistic framework⁵, and Weinberg & Richardson, who applied the process model of Louis Kriesberg to the conflicts in Northern

³ 'Conflict Studies' is used for brevity to refer to Conflict Analysis, Conflict and Analysis and Resolution, and Peace Studies.

⁴ 'How Terrorism Ends', Aberystwyth University (2009).

⁵ Jason Franks *Rethinking the Roots of Terrorism* (Basingstoke:Palgrave MacMillan:2006).

Ireland and the Basque Country⁶. The second of these marked the theoretical starting point, as it demonstrated the practicality of analysing Western European terrorist campaigns using a stage model. My contribution is of a narrower focus than Frank's as I focus specifically on one type of terrorism, and more general than that of Weinberg and Richardson as I have included the Corsica case, and developed a stage model directly applicable to terrorism.

A second application came about through the writing of chapters three and four. Chapter three introduces conflict studies, including the Galtung conflict triangle of contradiction-attitudes-behaviour, which became more important when the fourth chapter on terrorism studies was written. Despite the protestations of Schmid in 1988 that terrorism theory was distinctly lacking, drawing on other fields of study for its methods⁷, condensing the far greater volume in 2008-2009 into a single chapter was not feasible and a more specific approach was required. The most promising opportunity at this point was to go back to the conflict triangle, in its modified form as outlined by Mitchell as situation-attitudes-behaviour⁸, and using terrorism studies to inform how these three interlocking aspects of conflict can be understood. In the broadest terms, situation is the sociological aspects, examples of which are socio-economic conditions, history and culture; attitudes is the socio-psychological conditions, examples of which are personality, group dynamics and frustration; and behaviour the choice of action, or tactics and strategy employed as a result of the situation and attitudes, examples of which are costly signalling, intimidation and provocation. The end result of the integration of conflict studies and terrorism studies is an approach that is definitively one geared towards the study of terrorism, but grounded in the practices of conflict theory. By applying the relational model to each stage of a conflict we are able to gain an historical understanding of a given conflict from beginning to end (or its current

⁶ Leonard Weinberg and Louise Richardson (2004) Conflict Theory and the Trajectory of Terrorist Campaigns in Western Europe in Andrew Silke (ed) *Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures* (Frank Cass: London) pp 138-160.

⁷ Alex P Schmid & Albert J Jongman *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and Literature* (Transaction Publishers: London:1988).

⁸ C R Mitchell *The Structure of International Conflict* (The Macmillan Press Ltd: Basingstoke: 1981).

stage) and in depth, utilising the best aspects of relational and stage models of conflict.

Ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorism

We are concerned with a distinct type of terrorism in a specific context: Ethno-Nationalist/Separatist terrorism within liberal democracies. In order to continue any further it is necessary to clarify exactly what 'terrorism' is and how the type of terrorism under study is understood. A discussion of the definitional problems associated with 'terrorism' takes place in chapter four, although it should be understood that there is no agreed definition, and here I summarise it as it is used in this thesis.⁹

To begin with there is 'terrorism' itself, and this can be understood as the use of violence to create fear and publicity, which reaches beyond those attacked to a wider audience and is a means to gain power and influence where little or none exists.¹⁰ This is from a largely orthodox perspective but gives a general idea of what terrorism is, albeit one leaning towards sub-state terrorism.¹¹ A more proactive understanding would be to treat terrorism as 'something one 'does' as opposed to something one 'is''¹², thereby tackling the pejorative undertones in defining terrorism. Distinct characteristics of terrorism are: the intention to create a feeling of terror, the aim of influencing a wider audience than the actual targets, and the use of extremely violent methods against targets, which are random and symbolic¹³.

The use of 'ethno-nationalist/separatist' terrorism to define the type of terrorism under study comes from Hoffman¹⁴ and is used as it conveys three

⁹ Easson & Schmid cite over 250 definitions. See: Joseph J Easson & Alex P Schmid "Appendix 2.1 250-plus academic, governmental and intergovernmental definitions of terrorism" in Alex P Schmid (ed), *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research* (Routledge: Abingdon:2011) pp 99-157.

¹⁰ Bruce Hoffman *Inside Terrorism* (Columbia University Press: New York: 2006), pp 40-41.

¹¹ In this study we are explicitly concerned with a type of sub-state terrorism, yet the impact of state and state-sponsored terrorism cannot be underestimated.

¹² David J Whittaker (ed) *The Terrorism Reader 3rd Edn* (Routledge:London:2007) p11.

¹³ Paul Wilkinson "Some observations on the relationships between terrorism and freedom" in Martin Warner & Roger Crisp (eds) *Terrorism, Protest and Power* (Edward Elgar:Aldershot:1990) pp 44-53. Wilkinson cites Schmid.

¹⁴ Hoffman, op cit.

distinct motivations specific to the groups under study: an ethnic identity, an understanding of oneself and people as a nation, and the wish to be separate or independent from a larger state entity. The description 'national-separatist', as used by Miller¹⁵ and used to cover the LTTE, PKK and ETA (for example), also conveys the same idea of terrorism, as nationalism is linked to ethnic identity. The usage of Hoffman's 'ethno-nationalist/separatist' terrorism is for two purposes: firstly it is indicative of type of terrorism under investigation; secondly, its use avoids adding another definition of terrorism to a field of study overloaded with definitions and typologies.

Cases

Having defined the type of terrorism under study we turn to the three cases under study: Northern Ireland, the Basque Country and Corsica. The Basque Country and Northern Ireland are the most well known, having received both extensive media coverage and academic attention, Corsica less so, predominantly due to it having been far less lethal, yet, as will be seen in the analysis to follow, it has had a major impact on French politics from the 1960s onwards. The groups under study are all sub-state actors opposing far superior (in terms of size and resources) state forces, they claim to represent a minority ethnic group, seeking separation, not overthrow of the state, they have links to nationalist political parties, (which frequently exist before the group forms), and have political aims, which they communicate and support through violence. Their strategy and tactics lead them to carry out attacks on both civilians and the security forces in deliberate actions aimed at inducing fear.

In Northern Ireland the main ethno-nationalist/separatist group is the IRA, in the Basque Country it is ETA, and in Corsica the FLNC. It is from these groups that offshoots have emerged, and perhaps the most well know is the PIRA, which was the dominant Republican group in Northern Ireland between 1972 and 1997. The

¹⁵ Gregory D Miller 'Confronting terrorism: Group motivation and successful state policy' *Terrorism and Political Violence* Vol 19 Issue 3 (2007) pp331-38.

cases were selected according to the following criteria in order to allow the comparison of similar cases:

1. That they be of the ethno-nationalist/separatist type, in which armed groups are seeking separation from a larger state entity on the basis of ethnicity.
2. The state protagonist was required to be a liberal democracy. It should be noted that when ETA first emerged Spain was governed by the Franco dictatorship but their campaign escalated under the new democracy. The importance of the liberal-democratic form of governance is that there are other ways, in which dissent can be expressed, meaning that there are alternatives to armed struggle.
3. Evidence of ceasefires, successful or unsuccessful, as this indicates that a group is willing to consider other options.
4. The governments involved, and which change over time, needed to have demonstrably attempted conciliation or reform alongside coercive counter-terrorist measures in order for the efficacy of coercion, conciliation and reform to be compared.
5. A limit of scope to Western Europe for two reasons: the comparability of the three cases and also the practicality of carrying out the research.
6. Finally, there was the question of the longevity of the cases, which emerged from the selection process, as these allow a long term historical analysis commensurate with a moderate terrorism studies approach.

Such criteria meant that there were few cases other than Northern Ireland, the Basque Country and Corsica that were appropriate as other cases of terrorism in Western Europe did not have an ethnic, nationalist or separatist element. There was trans-national terrorism and terrorism inspired by the far-left and far-right, to be sure, by groups, which had passed. In fact, the IRA, ETA and FLNC, who were influenced by left wing politics, which gave way to nationalism, have proved to be the only groups to have survived over time. The only other case, which warranted consideration for inclusion, despite being outside of Western Europe, was the FLQ: whilst Canada could be considered a Western Liberal Democracy, the FLQ never

matured as an ethno-nationalist/separatist group and within ten years had lost any pretence of support from its potential minority support group.¹⁶

It should also be noted that in all three cases there have been opposing sub-state organisations, which have also used terrorist violence, the most prominent being the Loyalist paramilitaries in Northern Ireland, a consequence of a conflict, which centred round a divided society. Whilst this study aims to use similar cases, each has their own unique characteristics and the socio-political make-up of Northern Ireland means that it is not simply a matter of the state versus the challenger.

The broadest description of the division in Northern Ireland is three dualisms: Catholic/Protestant; Nationalist/Unionist; Republican/Loyalist, oft used interchangeably when the reality is much more nuanced (being Protestant by religion does not automatically lead to one being Loyalist for example). The consequence of this division is that the IRA has battled both Loyalist groups and the British. The Loyalist groups are not excluded from the analysis in the empirical chapters but it should be emphasised that they are not its focus either: the purpose of this study is to understand ethno-nationalist/separatist groups, how they reach the point of a permanent ceasefire, and the impact of the state actor on this. The Loyalist groups, in contrast to Republican groups, are actors who are fearful of becoming a minority in a Catholic dominated Irish state. They are inherently ethno-nationalist, if divided on the nature of the relationship with the United Kingdom, but their strategies and use of violence centre round the issues of Republican violence and the prevention of British withdrawal¹⁷.

An analysis of the conflict in Northern Ireland is incomplete without the Loyalist groups and so their impact on the conflict is discussed, as is their political

¹⁶ For an introduction to the FLQ see: Ted Robert Gurr "Terrorism in democracies: its social and political bases" in Walter Reich (ed.), *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind* (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press: 1990) pp. 86-102; Miller, op cit.

¹⁷ For the differences between Loyalist groups see: Lyndsey Harris 'Implications of a Strategic Analysis: The Operational Strategy of Loyalist Paramilitaries' *Behavioural Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression*, Vol 4, No 1 (2012) pp 4-25.

impact and that of the Unionist politicians. This study does not aim to explain the entirety of the Northern Ireland conflict, as it is focused on comparing the IRA, ETA and FLNC as case studies in their respective environments: whilst the historical approach taken means that a history of the respective conflicts is important to the analysis, the study is at its core, challenger group centred.

How terrorism ends (I): The three cases

The aim of this study is to understand how terrorist campaigns of an ethno-nationalist/separatist type within liberal democratic states reach the point, at which they abandon armed struggle and what an incumbent government can do to facilitate such an outcome. Alternatively, we also need to understand what governments have done that has made their situation worse. Whilst we are concerned with the impact of the state actor the analysis is challenger group centric as in order to understand a terrorist campaign we need to understand the motivations of the group concerned. Such an approach falls within the moderate terrorism studies school of thought as it is historical in focus and aimed at understanding the underlying social conditions, from which a terrorist campaign emerges, changes and reaches an end¹⁸.

The literature on how terrorism ends is limited with regard to the three cases, perhaps because that at the time this study was begun only Northern Ireland had reached the stage where a major terrorist protagonist had declared a permanent ceasefire that held. This was offset by the fact that in all three cases terrorist groups had ended their campaigns but others had continued: a persisting theme in the historical analysis to come is the divided nature of terrorist groups and their affiliated political parties. As the theoretical chapters were reaching completion and the analysis chapters were in their earliest stages the Basque Country saw the major development of ETA declaring a ceasefire. This was then followed by an FLNC ceasefire.¹⁹ Given that ceasefires have failed before, any

¹⁸ The 'moderate school' of terrorism studies utilises a roots based historical approach. This is outlined further in chapter three.

¹⁹ A glossary is included in the appendices due to the number and diversity of terrorist groups and political organisations discussed in this study.

conclusions to be drawn from this are cautious but there are strong indications that this time the ceasefires are truly permanent and the analysis here treats this as the case.

What the literature did say was limited in nature and the least destructive case, which is Corsica, barely features at all. One way, in which terrorism was seen to come to an end, was through negotiation and the move to party politics in the cases of ETA-pm and the PIRA.²⁰ Another was diminishing public support or backlash as a result of terrorist violence, which had seen the demise of the first incarnation of the RIRA, a small splinter group of the PIRA opposed to the Northern Ireland Peace Process, which collapsed after the Omagh bomb and was further crippled by the arrest of its leader²¹. ETA had also provoked a public backlash through its actions²² and the potential was there for this to be a factor should its campaign end.

Studies of how terrorism ends are general works and for the three cases to be fully understood requires a more specific approach to generate conclusions as to how the type of terrorism under study comes to an end. Nor does the literature on the most discussed case, Northern Ireland, which emphasises the transition to party politics, fully convey how this came to be: for example, the British and Irish were unremitting in their efforts to 'understand the IRA, to frustrate its campaign and to guide it to cessation'.²³ There was also over time a decoupling of the concepts of the nation and state, which, according to Loughlin and Letamendia, made the quest of the PIRA, ETA & FLNC to gain or recover states appropriate to their nations meaningless.²⁴ The conditions that brought about the emergence of these groups changed over time, continuing to inform their actions but, as the historical analysis will demonstrate, a democratic deficit in each region was addressed. A comparative case study addressing the full history of each case has

²⁰ Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahur & Arie Perliger *Political Parties and Terrorist Groups* (Routledge: London: 2009); Audrey Kurth Cronin "How terrorist campaigns end" in Tore Bjorgo & John Horgan (eds) op cit, pp 49-65 (p 55); Audrey Kurth Cronin, 2009, op cit.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

²³ Rogelio Alonso 'Pathways out of terrorism in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country' *Terrorism and Political Violence* Vol 16 Issue 4 (2004) pp 695-713 (p705).

²⁴ Loughlin & Letamendia, op cit.

the potential to be more explanatory of how terrorism ends and contribute to the knowledge on the topic.

How terrorism ends (II): Coercion and conciliation

The liberal-democratic response to terrorism within state borders is discussed in chapter two. The subject is introduced here as the question of the balance between coercion and conciliation is a primary concern of this study.

The liberal-democratic state is compelled to take action when faced with an onset of terrorism. An elected government acts as power holder of the liberal democratic state and is expected to provide security for its citizens whilst not becoming a threat to them itself. Wilkinson argues that a liberal democracy is required to actively combat terrorism with all the means at its disposal provided that it does not violate the freedoms, on which it is based, in doing so. There can be no giving in to the demands of terrorists who carry out political violence as there are other outlets for expression and political change. Liberal democracies have historically responded to demands for political reform²⁵ but not solely in response to terrorist actions. Chalk gives three principles that should apply to a liberal democratic response to terrorism and allow it to 'maintain constitutional principles of law and order'.²⁶ Firstly, the response should be well defined and only directed at the terrorist themselves. Secondly, a credible response is required. Thirdly all the activities of the security forces, especially the intelligence services need to be 'subject to parliamentary supervision and oversight'.²⁷ Miller investigates how states should respond to terrorism. He argues that this should not be seen simply in terms of coercion or conciliation but on a scale between the two, ranging from 'Do Nothing', through 'Conciliation', 'Legal Reform', 'Repression' and 'Violence'. He assesses four types of terrorist group: Nationalist-Separatist, Revolutionary, Reactionary and Religious and finds that different types have different responses.

²⁵ Wilkinson (2001) op cit.

²⁶ Peter Chalk 'The response to terrorism as a threat to liberal democracy' *Australian Journal of Politics and History* Vol 44 issue 3 (2002) pp 373-388 (p386).

²⁷ Ibid, p 387.

In the case of nationalist- separatist groups a combination of concessions, legal reform and restriction is most effective.²⁸

Sederberg²⁹ analyses two models of coercive responses to terrorism, the 'War model' and the 'Rational actor model' and concludes that both incorporate conciliation. The War model, with its overheated rhetoric of total war acknowledges that challenger groups rarely want to destroy an incumbent government and do not use the full amount of violence available to them, nor does a government seek the destruction of the group and does not utilise the full weight of force available to it. This recognition of limited aims allows a political process to develop. The Rational actor model assumes that a challenger group will apply a cost-benefits calculation to their activities; thus, repression discourages the challenger group, whilst conciliation encourages them. Whilst this is simplistic, the rational actor model being more complex than can be outlined here, these assumptions are false, particularly within relatively open Western societies. Groups seeking change may experience the 'free-rider' problem, in which potential recruits sit out any challenge in the hope that the problem will resolve itself without their taking any risks. For the government, conciliatory strategies can facilitate the exit of individuals from challenger groups. Sederberg concludes that approaches to counterterrorism cannot be wholly repressive or conciliatory and the two are not mutually exclusive. Over time, the 'initial negative effects of immediate concessions may be offset by increased defensive or repressive measures'.³⁰ Likewise, a long term strategy of concessions can offset immediate repressive measures.

The question of 'spoilers' is an important one, which reflects the internally divided nature of terrorist groups: moderates may accept concessions, hardliners will not, hence the peculiarity that in the short term terrorist activity increases in the period immediately following government concessions.³¹ An alternative explanation, which relates to negotiations and peace processes, is that extremists

²⁸ Miller, op cit.

²⁹ Peter Sederbergh "Conciliation as counter-terrorist strategy" *Journal of Peace Research* Vol 32, No 3 (1995) pp 295-312.

³⁰ Ibid, p 309.

³¹ Ethan Bueno de Mesquita 2005 "Conciliation, counterterrorism and patterns of terrorist violence" *International Organisation* Vol 59, No 1 (2005) pp 145-176.

within a group seek to sabotage negotiations for their own benefit or revenge. Spoilers can and do ruin peace processes, notably that of the Israelis and Palestinians, but this does not have to be the case.³²

The literature on coercion and conciliation indicates that coercive measures alone rarely reduce terrorism and that the liberal-democratic state has limitations in the extent to which it can legitimately use force. Whilst noting that the immediate response to conciliatory measures can result in a temporary increase in terrorist violence in the long term they can also prove effective, but only as a part of a combined package of coercive and conciliatory measures. This is particularly the case for groups of the ethno-nationalist/separatist variety, whose goals relating to independence or autonomy, ending ethnic discrimination, and language rights give room for accommodation and discussion but whose violence requires immediate countermeasures of a coercive nature. A final observation, acknowledged by all the authors included here, is that each terrorist group is unique and so require countermeasures that are unique to the conflict situation.

Further research into the impact of coercion and conciliation is required for a better understanding of their utility in bringing terrorism to an end. A comparative case study, focusing on three similar cases, allows the existing understanding of the contribution of coercive and conciliatory measures to be tested empirically on cases that have only come to an end in recent years.

Methodology

The campaigns of ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorist groups within Northern Ireland, the Basque Country and Corsica warrant attention because of their longevity, the level of organisation of the groups involved and the impact they have had on the idea of the nation state.³³ It is proposed that by conducting a comparative analysis of the three cases at a qualitative level that commonalities

³² Andrew Kydd & Barbara F Walter "Sabotaging the peace: The politics of extremist violence" *International Organisation* Vol 56, No 2 (2002) pp 263-296.

³³ Loughlin & Letamendia, op cit.

can be found within three disparate cases with regard to the ending of ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorist campaigns. More specifically, there is the question of the merits of coercion and conciliation in achieving this aim. Miller has concluded that in the case of nationalist-separatists, that a combination of coercion and conciliation is effective in countering terrorist campaigns, specifically concessions, legal reform and restriction.³⁴ However, as Miller notes, this is a preliminary analysis and as Sederberg argues, repressive and conciliatory approaches towards counterterrorism are not mutually exclusive; even within the predominantly coercive 'War' and 'Rational Actor' models. From this the following hypothesis is posited:

"A combined strategy of coercive and conciliatory measures is more effective in countering ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorism than solely coercive measures."

The thesis aims to demonstrate this hypothesis by utilising conflict and terrorism theory to analyse empirical data concerning the histories of the three cases. In order for the hypothesis to be proven there needs to be empirical evidence of coercive and conciliatory measures having been applied by the state actor, with corresponding impacts on the challenger groups over time. The hypothesis would be disproven in the event that either coercive or conciliatory measures alone proved to be effective in bringing a terrorist campaign to an end.

The existence of three similar cases of terrorism of the ethno-nationalist/separatist type invites a comparative case study and the existing literature, however limited, encourages continuing study that builds on existing knowledge. The case study can be understood as a research tradition³⁵ and the type of case study selected is the influenced by the number of cases and stage of enquiry within the research field³⁶ (terrorism studies). The number of cases involved in the study means that the approach used here is be a focused case comparison: The analysis is qualitative, case penetration will be relatively thick, the

³⁴ Miller, op cit.

³⁵ John W Cresswell *Qualitative Enquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Traditions* (London:Sage Publications:1998).

³⁶ Daniel Druckman *Doing Research: Methods of Inquiry for Conflict Analysis* (London:Sage Publications:2005).

unit of analysis is whole cases and the stage of enquiry (in terms of the research field) is later.³⁷ Therefore, this study falls in-between the thin penetration of the large group study and the thick penetration of the single case study and is 'geared towards developing broader insights by combining similar cases'³⁸ as it draws on existing understanding of the three cases but seeks to find common factors. The use of the case study method allows a phenomenon such as terrorism to be understood in depth and in terms of contextual conditions.³⁹

The primary source of empirical information for this study is written material, the analysis of which has the potential to present 'a processual view of events often unmatched by any other method of data collection'⁴⁰. Material available includes books, articles, memoirs, reports, statements, newspapers, pamphlets, websites, databases and archives, meaning that there is a wealth of information available. Of these, archives and databases stand out as they usually include all the rest, but the main benefit of all is that they provide access to documents and allow facts to be gathered. Archives that have been visited are the Linen Hall Library in Belfast and the Center for Basque Studies at the University of Reno. Online archives that have been used are the Conflict Archive on the Internet (CAIN) and the Unita-Naziunale website, which has documents related to the Corsica case, including primary material from clandestine groups. These archives include such information as histories, events, views and opinions, manifestos, guidelines, arguments, and statements from the perspectives of challenger groups, governments, academics, the minority group, and the general public. Use has also been made of media reports for more recent events, as the situation in each case was constantly evolving whilst the research was being carried out. The most dramatic example was the declaration of the end of armed struggle by ETA but it was also the case that there was little published material relating to Corsica. With regard to Corsica, much of the information collected was in French, including that from the Unita-Naziunale website and was translated into English for the purposes

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid, p 215.

³⁹ Robert K Yin *Case Study Research: Design and Methods* (Sage Publications:London:2009).

⁴⁰ Nan Lin *Foundations of Social Research* (New York:McGraw Hill:1976).

of this study. Interviews and conversations with people specialising in areas related to the study and either involved or affected by the conflict situation have also been utilised. It should be noted that these are secondary to the analysis of written material. Due to the impracticability of developing the relationships required to access members of terrorist organisations for the number of cases under the study a decision was made from the beginning not to conduct interviews with former or active operatives. To do this would have required that the number of cases be reduced and diminish the purpose of the study, which is to compare and contrast three similar cases with regard to how terrorism ends.

The theoretical method applied to the three conflicts draws strongly on conflict theory and is an application of these to the literature of terrorism studies, being adaptations, which effectively constitute a new model, by which ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorism can be analysed. The use of conflict theory has two benefits: the first is that it allows the theoretical approaches from conflict studies to be applied to terrorism; the second is that the use of such theories allows the three cases to be treated as conflicts, tackling the problem of defining terrorism and the associated problems with labelling and legitimacy, which remain controversial within terrorism studies. The model developed combines relational and process theories of conflict in order to allow a campaign of terrorism to be analysed from its beginning to its conclusion (or not, depending on the conflict).

The first of these, the relational model, was first proposed by Johan Galtung, distinguishing between the conflict itself (contradiction), and the behaviour and attitudes of those involved.⁴¹ What at first is a simple proposition that a conflict can start at one of three points (but must involve all three) becomes more complex when we consider what the contradiction, behaviour or attitudes are and how they actually interrelate. The model was adapted by Mitchell, who took Galtung's model and examined the component parts in more detail whilst retaining their intimate connections. For Mitchell, a conflict can be understood as

⁴¹ Herman Schmid 'Peace research and politics' *Journal of Peace Research* Vol 5, No 3 (1968) pp 217-232. (pp 224-225).

based on incompatible goals, in which situation, attitude and behaviour inter-relate.⁴²

The second is process or cyclical models of conflict. A conflict is not simply an event static in time; it has a socio-historical context that results in a situation of conflict, which evolves over time, going through phases of escalation and de-escalation. The reasons why a conflict began may be different to the reasons why it is prolonged. Weinberg and Richardson⁴³ have previously applied Kriesberg's process model⁴⁴ of conflict to Northern Ireland and Spain, however they did not apply the full model ranging from bases through to consequences, covering only emergence, escalation and de-escalation.⁴⁵ Kriesberg's and other process and cyclical models are outlined in detail in chapter three. The process model used for this study is an adaptation of the Kriesberg model, influenced by that of Bloomfield and Leiss⁴⁶ to produce a model specific to the study of ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorism. Using the terrorism studies literature, stages applicable specifically to the type of conflict are set out. These are: Historical Precedents, Origins, Pre-escalation, Escalation, Normalisation, De-escalation and Permanent Ceasefire, reflecting an emphasis on a historical approach applicable to moderate terrorism theory. It is by treating the conflict as a process that the changes in the structure of terrorist conflict can be understood and a historical, roots based, understanding of the evolution of a terrorist campaign and how it can be brought to an end is mapped. The early stages are important as they not only hold the key to how the conflict can be resolved, but also include examples of how terrorism ends, including the Official IRA and ETA-pm.

Two themes, which inform the methodology of this thesis, are the convergence of interests between the two distinct fields of conflict studies and terrorism studies and the interdisciplinary nature of the two and the social sciences

⁴² C R Mitchell, op cit p 32.

⁴³ Leonard Weinberg and Louise Richardson op cit.

⁴⁴ See: Louis Kriesberg (2003) *Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc: Lanham).

⁴⁵ Weinberg & Richardson, op cit.

⁴⁶ Lincoln P Bloomfield & Allen Moulton *Managing International Conflict* (St Martins Press Inc: New York:1997).

in general. These are developed throughout chapters three (Conflict Studies), four (Terrorism Studies) and five (Framework of Analysis) but I will give a short outline here.

By convergence I mean that the separation between conflict and terrorism studies has broken down, due to changing nature of conflict. The debates concerning the 'new wars' and 'new terrorism' have effectively eroded the distinction between state and non-state actors so security is no longer seen in purely state-centric terms⁴⁷. States remain important, but the major actors in what are predominantly intra-state conflicts are warlords and terrorist groups⁴⁸. Terrorism, insurgency and guerrilla warfare have long been a concern of governments, whether during the withdrawal of the colonial empires or due to the proxy wars of the Cold War era. The last decade of the twentieth century saw the United States humiliated in Somalia, ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia and the genocide in Rwanda. The new century began with the 9/11 attacks, which made countering terrorism a strategic priority: a new kind of terrorism (Al Qaeda) for a new kind of war (GWOT), which I will discuss in chapter three.

By interdisciplinarity I am referring to a trend seen within conflict studies to cross disciplines in the search for explanatory theoretical frameworks, examples are the University of Michigan's Centre for Research on Conflict Resolution and John Burton's human needs approach.⁴⁹ Terrorism studies, whether as a sub-discipline or discipline in its own right, has been multidisciplinary from the outset although the various contributors have brought their in their own theories from their own disciplines⁵⁰ and the majority of articles about terrorism have been authored by

⁴⁷ Oliver P Richmond 'Realising hegemony? Symbolic terrorism and the roots of conflict' *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* No 26 (2003) pp289-309.

⁴⁸ Herfried Munkler *The New Wars* (Polity Press:Cambridge:2005).

⁴⁹ Martha Harty and John Modell 'The first conflict resolution movement, 1956-1971: An attempt to institutionalize applied interdisciplinary social science' *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 35, No. 4 1991), pp. 720-758.

⁵⁰ Paul Wilkinson "Research into terrorism studies: achievements and failures" in: Ranstorp (ed) *Mapping Terrorism Research: State of the Art, Gaps and Future Direction* (Routledge:London:2007) pp 116-328 (p 316).

people from outside the field⁵¹. We should add that there is a core of researchers and academics who are driving terrorism studies forward and established journals meaning that terrorism studies can emerge as a distinct discipline⁵². This thesis is influenced by Galtung's argument that the social sciences in general are badly in need of integration: specialism is a necessary aspect, but applied social sciences (including conflict and terrorism studies) need to account for the gaps between disciplines⁵³. Conflict studies has matured considerably since its inception and has a lot to offer terrorism studies, a project that has already begun, but with former informing the latter and not by direct transfer of a model or theory.

Thesis Outline

Chapter two considers the relationship between terrorism and liberal democracy. The number of democratic countries of the world has increased since 1974 with a surge in the period after the end of the Cold War. In this respect the vulnerability of liberal democracies to terrorism becomes an important international concern. Whilst liberal democracy as a form of governance cannot be described as a direct cause of terrorism, liberal-democratic states are vulnerable as they have open societies and encourage the rights of the individual. The history of the threat to liberal democracies by terrorist groups is outlined and the merits of coercive and conciliatory responses discussed.

Chapter three introduces conflict theory, which together with terrorism theory in chapter four, provides the theoretical base of the thesis and is crucial to the development of the methodology in chapter five. Chapters three and four are intended to complement each other and act as introductions to conflict and

⁵¹ Magnus Ranstorp "Mapping terrorism studies after 9/11: an academic field of old problems and new prospects" in: Jackson, Breen Smith & Gunning (eds) *Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda* (Routledge:London:2009) pp 13-33 (p 19).

⁵² Avishag Gordon "Terrorism and knowledge growth: A databases and internet analysis" in A Silke (ed) *Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures* (Frank Cass: London: 2004) op cit, pp 104-118.

⁵³ Johan Galtung "Toward a conflictology: the quest for transdisciplinarity" in: DJD Sandole, S Byrne, I Sandole-Staroste & J Senehi (eds), *Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution* (Routledge:London:2009) op cit, pp 511- 524 (516).

terrorism theories. There is also a trend in conflict studies towards interdisciplinarity that is of particular importance to terrorism studies as it has been from the outset a multi-disciplinary field of study. The bulk of chapter three is given to a synopsis of theoretical approaches to the study of social conflict and closes with process and stage models of conflict.

Chapter four addresses terrorism studies and how terrorism ends. There is a vast volume of literature on the subject of terrorism, and many of the contributions of quality are applied studies as the academic study of terrorism is typically done by, amongst others, political scientists, social psychologists, international relations theorists, and historians who apply their own theories to the subject of terrorism. The chapter begins by introducing the problems academics have identified in defining terrorism and the schools of thought in terrorism studies. Attention then turns to what can be understood from theories of terrorism regarding situation, attitudes and behaviour, before closing with theories of how terrorism ends.

Chapter five outlines the framework of analysis that is drawn from the theories introduced in chapters two and three. Terrorism studies needs its own theories in order to be considered as a distinct discipline or sub-discipline within the social sciences. Whilst it is not the intention of the thesis to develop a theory of terrorism there is an intention to build towards one that draws on work that has already been carried out. As such, this is by treating terrorism studies and its near cousin conflict theory as applied social sciences. The framework put forward is the 'structure of terrorist conflict' and is based on Mitchell's structure of international conflict, in which situation-attitude-behaviour relate and interact with each other.

In chapters six, seven and eight, the model developed in the previous chapters is applied to each case in turn, identifying the developments, which lead to the progression of the conflicts between stages and discussing the outcomes of the analysis in terms of situation, attitudes and behaviour and the impact of coercion, conciliation, and reform by governments.

Chapter Nine is a comparative analysis of the three cases based on the findings of the previous chapters and discusses what can be understood as to how

terrorist groups form, develop and then reach the point where terrorism ends, closing with ten conclusions as to how terrorism has ended.

Finally, in the conclusion, I summarise the findings of each chapter, and the findings reached as to the impact of coercion, conciliation, and reform towards the ending of ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorist campaigns. I demonstrate that all three are important: coercion, when targeted directly at the challenger group, diminishes their capability to organise and carry out attacks, causing them to reconsider political alternatives; conciliation, in the form of talks, concessions, and negotiation, provides a way out of terrorism, provided that no concessions are made to violence; political reform, a distinct form of conciliation, is the prerequisite for an end to violence as it strengthens political parties, resolves the root cause of unequal political representation, and undermines minority group support. I close with six propositions regarding how terrorism ends.

Three appendices have been included. The first is matrices for all three cases, which are the outcome of the historical analysis in chapters six and seven and eight. The second is genealogical trees for ethno-nationalist/separatist clandestine groups, dated by the years which they were active, as ETA, the FLNC and the IRA have all undergone major division in their histories. The third is a glossary, included due to the number of terrorist groups, political parties, and organisations referred to throughout this study.

Chapter Two: The Relationship between Terrorism and Liberal Democracy

Introduction

Chapter two explores the relationship between liberal democracy and terrorism and asks two questions. The first is as to how common terrorism is within liberal democracies when compared to authoritarian governments: are the former more vulnerable due to their open societies? The second is to how liberal democracies should respond to campaigns of terrorism: is coercion, conciliation, or a combination of both the most effective means how terrorism can be countered? This chapter considers the answers to these questions by comparing studies of the prevalence of terrorism under the two types of government, exploring the history of terrorism and its impact on democracies, and discussing how democracies should respond to terrorism. To begin, the question of what is meant by the word 'democracy' is discussed and then the historical spread of democracy is examined: a key assumption of this study is that the number of democratic states has been, and is increasing, presenting new opportunities for the emergence of ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorism.

Democracy

In this chapter the focus is on the relationship between terrorism and liberal democracy, raising the questions as to what democracy is and whether or not a particular state can be considered as democratic.

As is the case in defining 'terrorism', 'democracy' is a contested concept, with no consensus on a definition, being a concept before it is a fact, with no single precise meaning as this has changed over time¹. Part of the problem is that when we talk about democracy we are referring to both an ideal and an actuality, with

¹ Anthony Arblaster *Democracy 3rd Edn* (Open University Press: Buckingham: 2002).

the latter rarely reflecting the former². It is, however, possible to discern a thread of meaning as all definitions of democracy have the root idea that power should rest with the people and there should be representation and elections³.

Here, our focus is on liberal democracy, a combination of two different things: liberalism, a concept of the state, in which the state has limited power and functions, and democracy, a mode of government, in which power rests with the many⁴. This distinction is important as for democracy to be successful, and by this is meant that there should be universal suffrage for adults and free and fair elections, liberalism, which recognises the rights of the individual, is essential⁵. There is also the question of power, democracy grants power to the individual through the vote and representation, liberalism ensures constitutional mechanisms, in which the executive is subordinate to parliament, which is in turn accountable to a jurisdictional court. Also, local government should be relatively autonomous and the courts independent of the government⁶.

From this brief introduction to the debate over the transition paradigm we are able to understand that when we say 'democracy', we are implicitly referring to 'liberal democracy' along the lines of a Western model, which carries with it the expectation that there will be universal suffrage and pluralism, underpinned by constitution and the idea that the government will represent the people and give up power when asked to do so. In order to ascertain if a state is democratic it is necessary to take into account both how elections are carried out and civil liberties; signs of which, are an independent judiciary, a free press, and the separation of the state and the military. In the analysis chapters the question as to how democratic the Basque Country, Corsica, and Northern Ireland were will be addressed; by way of example, Spain has fought the ETA as a dictatorship and liberal democracy, the regional Stormont government of Northern Ireland was fundamentally

² Robert A Dahl *On Democracy* (Yale University Press: New Haven: 2000).

³ Arblaster, op cit.

⁴ Norberto Bobbio *Liberalism and Democracy* (Verso:London:2005).

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

undemocratic, favouring the majority Protestants over the minority Catholics, and on Corsica, governance was left by France to local elites.

The spread of democratic governance

This study has begun on two premises: that terrorism is a political act that directly affects liberal democracy, and that the number of countries in the world that are subject to democratic governance has increased, creating more likelihood that terrorist acts will occur. To begin, the evidence for the increase in the number of democracies is discussed.

In his 1991 article Samuel Huntington states that between 1974 and 1990 a transition was made to democracy by at least thirty countries; this effectively meant a doubling of the number of world democracies. Transitions to democracies had come historically in waves and counter waves:

‘The current era of democratic transitions constitutes the third wave of democratization in the history of the modern world. The first "long" wave of democratization began in the 1820s, with the widening of the suffrage to a large proportion of the male population in the United States, and continued for almost a century until 1926, bringing into being some 29 democracies. In 1922, however, the coming to power of Mussolini in Italy marked the beginning of a first "reverse wave" that by 1942 had reduced the number of democratic states in the world to 12. The triumph of the Allies in World War II initiated a second wave of democratization that reached its zenith in 1962 with 36 countries governed democratically, only to be followed by a second reverse wave (1960-1975) that brought the number of democracies back down to 30.⁷

The question for Huntington, was not that transition had occurred but if there was to be a major reversal as had happened after the first two waves. He noted that there were already two countries (Sudan and Nigeria) that had reverted to

⁷ Samuel Huntington 'Democracy's Third Wave' *Journal of Democracy* Vol 2, No 2 (1991) pp 3-25, p3.

authoritarian rule, although this in itself did not indicate a major reversal to the third wave.⁸

The initial post-cold war era was an optimistic one, as evidenced by Francis Fukuyama's 1989 *The End of History?* He argued that the 'end of history', in which Western liberal democracy becomes 'universalised as the final form of human government'⁹, had been reached. The only viable alternative, represented by communism, had become defunct with the demise of the Soviet Union. Fukuyama's end of history thesis came with a qualification:

'at the end of history it is not necessary that all societies become successful liberal societies. Merely that they end all ideological pretensions of representing different and higher forms of human society.'¹⁰

The thesis was further expanded in *The End of History and the Last Man?*¹¹ It was important that a country should be liberal as well as democratic, a particularly important point given that it is possible for a country to hold elections but not be liberal (Iran being a case in point). In it a strong case is made that totalitarian and authoritarian regimes have given way to liberal democracies and that:

'democratic government has broken out of its original beachhead in Western Europe and North America, and has made significant inroads in other parts of the world that do not share political, religious, and cultural traditions of those areas'.¹²

In this Fukuyama was essentially correct. However, the thesis of a 'universal history' was questioned. There were still countries, which aspired to other 'ideological pretensions', such as Iran, North Korea and China, even at the time Fukuyama was writing. This remains so today, though this does not affect the argument that liberal democracy has made substantial inroads as a form of governance.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Francis Fukuyama, 'The End of History?' *The National Interest* No 16 (1989), p4.

¹⁰ Ibid, p13.

¹¹ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (Penguin Books:London:1992)

¹² Ibid, p50.

In one respect Fukuyama's optimism was rewarded, and Huntington's concern of a reversal of the third wave did not come to pass. In the period 1990 to 1996 the number of countries that were democratic increased from 76 to 118 so that 61.8% of countries in the world were democratic. This decreased to 117 in 1998 but rose again to 121 in 2002, or 62.7% of all countries, although this meant that of 193 countries 72 remained non-democratic.¹³ Moreover, the spread was a general one:

'As democracy spread to Eastern Europe, a few states in the former Soviet Union, and a number in Africa, while extending deeper into Asia and Latin America, it came during the 1990s to be a *global* phenomenon, the predominant form of government, and the only broadly legitimate form of government in the world. Today, about three-fifths of all the world's states are democracies, and the global predominance of democracy has stabilized at this level over the past half-decade...Today, there are no global rivals to democracy as a broad model of government. Communism is dead. Military rule everywhere lacks appeal and normative justification. One-party states have largely disappeared...Only the vague model of an Islamic state has any moral and ideological appeal as an alternative form of government—and then only for a small portion of the world's societies.'¹⁴

It should be noted that this general success story did have its exceptions. The Middle East and North Africa stands out as region that has resisted democratisation: of nineteen countries only Israel and Turkey had some form of democracy in 2002. There are also various other countries from the former Soviet Union, such as Belarus and the Central Asian Republics, that hold out against democracy; large numbers of Sub-Saharan and some Asian Countries also continue to resist democracy. Diamond argued that there was no lack of a wish for democracy in these countries, it is the leadership that held out: a chronic example

¹³ Larry Diamond *Can the Whole World Become Democratic? Democracy, Development, and International Policies*. Center for the Study of Democracy (University of California, Irvine) (2003) <http://repositories.cdlib.org/csd/03-05>.

¹⁴ *Ibid*, p4.

is North Korea, a country so closed that its populace have little idea of any alternative form of governance.¹⁵

The main concern with regard to the spread of democracy was that it had slowed down with little change in sight regarding the remaining authoritarian states. Carothers argued that this was due to four factors: 1) The reversion of some newly formed democracies to authoritarian or semi-authoritarian rule as a result of authoritarian mindsets and actors (Many Former Soviet Union (FSU) and Sub-Saharan countries); 2) Problems with democratic (socio-economic) performance in third wave countries (Venezuela, Paraguay); 3) Economic success in authoritarian and semi-authoritarian countries (China, Kazakhstan, Russia); 4) the international context of the US war on terrorism, resulting in its loss of credibility by cooperating with autocratic regimes (Pakistan, Uzbekistan), and the use of the antiterrorism banner by authoritarian governments to crack down on dissent (The Middle East and parts of Asia).¹⁶

It is at this point that human history, unpredictable and dynamic as it is, impedes on our narrative: an unexpected revolution is occurring across the Middle East and North Africa, which may add to the count of liberal democracies or, alternatively, produce illiberal or fractured states. It has been called the 'Arab Spring' and may prove to be a regional political revolution of the most profound order. Time will tell, but it may be a long time in coming. A shortened list of events includes: the Egyptian Revolution (2011), the Libyan Civil War, the Bahrain Uprising (2011) and the Syrian Civil War (2011-ongoing). It can be seen that the outcome of the protests in these countries has been very different: in Egypt there has been temporary success, in Bahrain suppression, in Libya success enabled by Western military intervention leaving a fragile government in charge, and in Syria, a brutal civil war, which is impacting directly on neighbouring countries. These events do not impact on our discussion for now, but they do point towards the possibility of further additions to the waves of democracy.¹⁷

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Thomas Carothers 'Democracy's Sobering State' *Current History* (2004) pp412-416.

¹⁷ This paragraph is based on the author's observation and interpretation of events.

Some facts are clear. Firstly democracy, whether liberal or simply electoral, has spread consistently since 1990 and the expected reversal has not occurred. But it is true that this process has stalled, as Carothers observes above. How much this is down to the will of the strong to rule is difficult to say on the basis of a general analysis as democracy did not develop in its bastion area of North America and Western Europe overnight: in 1790 only France and Switzerland were democratic, in 1975 neither Portugal or Spain were democratic, but by 1990 all of Western Europe was democratic.¹⁸ The growth in democratic states also benefited from a huge boost when Soviet dominance over Eastern Europe ended and from the splitting down of states such as Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia¹⁹. Many countries of the former Soviet Union have remained authoritarian or semi-authoritarian; the difficulty is that for democracy to emerge there is advantage in a having a liberal tradition to drive the population and willingness of the leadership to let go. How shaky the foundations of the remaining 'strong states', as Fukuyama would call them, really are, only time will tell. We could be on the cusp of a fourth wave of democratisation, the Arab Spring underlining this potential and the hazards it contains for the peoples of the strong states, or things could stay as they are. However, for our purposes one question is answered: the number of liberal democracies has increased, and with it the potential for minorities to want to break away or gain autonomy. But the question must be asked, are democracies actually more vulnerable to terrorism?

Terrorism in democratic and non-democratic Countries: A comparison.

The question of whether terrorism is more prevalent in democratic countries than non-democratic ones has been addressed using quantitative analysis, with contested results.

¹⁸ Based on data from Fukuyama (1992) op cit pp 49-50.

¹⁹ Two very different examples of how countries can split.

Weinberg & Eubank²⁰ contend that terrorist groups are less likely to be found in non-democratic countries than in democratic ones. To demonstrate this they characterised 172 independent nations on the criteria of whether or not they had terrorist groups operating within them. They took into account the argument that the activities of terrorist groups will be reported more in open societies and found that terrorist groups were more likely to be found in democratic countries than non-democratic ones but observed that this did not indicate that democracy causes terrorism but that it provides a setting where terrorism can occur. The analysis did not take into the account the number of terrorist groups within a country, their size, or their impact and hence could not determine the severity of the threat posed by them.²¹

Critics raised several points in response. Firstly, the problem of non-disclosure on the part of authoritarian countries was not adequately addressed, particularly Schmid's observation that compliant media in controlled societies will not report terrorist acts.²² A second observation was that by measuring terrorist groups instead of events (on the basis that events were not reliably reported) their conclusions were based on an invalid measure of terrorism. A third was that, 'there is the conceptual problem of distinguishing urban terrorist groups from rural guerrilla movements'.²³ In response to the criticisms Weinberg & Eubank²⁴ commented that group data was 'more suggestive of the links between government type and terrorism than is the link between events and type'²⁵ as events may occur at the hands of groups external to a country. The connection between terrorism and democracy remained and they argued that their conclusions were general, not specific, observations.²⁶

²⁰ Leonard Weinberg & William Eubank 'Does democracy encourage terrorism?' *Terrorism and Political Violence* Vol 6 Issue 4 (1994) pp 417-435.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² Abraham H Miller 'Comment on "Terrorism and Democracy"' *Terrorism and Political Violence* Vol 6 Issue 4 (1994) pp 435-439.

²³ Christopher Hewitt 'Comment on "Terrorism and Democracy"' *Terrorism and Political Violence* Vol 6 Issue 4 (1994) pp 439-441.

²⁴ Leonard Weinberg & William Eubank 'A Response to Miller and Hewitt' *Terrorism and Political Violence* Vol 6 Issue 4 (1994) pp 442-443.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p 443.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

Despite Weinberg and Eubank's responses to earlier criticisms Sandler²⁷ also made a case for the use of events data as opposed to the presence of terrorist groups as events are harder for authoritarian countries to hide: a major bomb explosion cannot be hidden, the group that did it can. There is also the problem that terrorist events can be caused by individuals not directly linked to groups, examples being the Oklahoma and World Trade Centre bombs. Events data also allows the intensity of terrorism to be measured and accounts for 'spill-over' terrorism such as that of Middle Eastern terrorism in Europe and ignores state sponsorship of terrorism, which can only be accounted for by events and perpetrator data.²⁸

A 1998 study by Eyeran²⁹ addressed the concern of the underreporting of terrorism by authoritarian states, investigating the relationship between democracy and the decision calculus of terrorist organizations. Two schools of thought were compared; the *strategic school*, in which democracies are soft targets due to their emphasis on civil liberties and so diminish the risk of engaging in violent activity, and the *political access school*, which argues that by providing nonviolent alternatives for policy change terrorist activity is discouraged. The analysis was based on rational choice theory in that terrorist groups will evaluate the direct costs of engaging in violence in a specific state. Eyeran's study was based on cross-national events data (wherein national and international media sources are used to code terrorism events) to counter the problems associated with under-reporting in states where the media is controlled by the regime. Spill-over events were removed from the analysis as the political access school does not account for them hence the events count was limited to terrorist events directed at the terrorist organisation's homeland. The conclusion was that whilst established democracies are less likely to suffer terrorism than non-democracies newly formed democracies are more vulnerable than all. From this, as regards the strategic and political access schools, elements of both were shown to be correct. Notably, whilst

²⁷ Todd Sandler 'On the relationship between democracy and Terrorism' *Terrorism and Political Violence* Vol 7 Issue 4 (1995) pp 1-9.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Joe Eyeran 'Terrorism and democratic states: Soft targets or accessible systems' *International Interactions* Vol 24, Issue 2, (1998) pp 151-170.

democratic institutions lower levels of violence the importance of expected retaliation to violence is a factor. Also, a larger state would provide a better return to the rational terrorist than a smaller one.³⁰

In return, Weinberg & Eubank³¹ argued that stable democracy and terrorism go together. In response to the earlier criticisms they noted:

‘We responded...in two ways. First, we used the frequency of terrorist events occurring on a worldwide basis (events occurring within countries governed by different types of political regimes) and over a two year period (1994-95) to see if the link between terrorism and democracy was supported by this evidence. And, second we investigated the role within one country, Italy. For the purposes of analysis the latter was divided into more and less democratic regions to see if there was a link between terrorist activity and the strength of democratic institutions as they existed in the country’s various regions. The results of both studies confirmed our initial findings.’³²

For the new study two datasets were used, the first classified countries according to how they were ruled in the mid 1980s, the second the frequency, in which the nationals of the countries carried out, or were victims of, terrorist attacks. As the nationality of the terrorists were taken into account the effects of spill-over violence from groups based in absolutist regimes carrying out their activities in democracies was included. It was argued that attacks occurred most often in stable democracies and that the perpetrators and victims were nationals of the same democracies. However, Weinberg & Eubank, noted Laqueur’s argument that terrorism does not prevent a democracy retaining its democratic institutions, much in the way it is not actually threatened by crime. They added that terrorist groups operating within stable democracies represent a wider sentiment, reflecting the views of an excluded minority who feel they have lost out in terms of public policy. Instead of providing peaceful alternatives for conflict resolution, democracy may

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Leonard Weinberg & William Eubank ‘Terrorism & democracy: Perpetrators and victims’ *Terrorism and Political Violence* Vol 13 Issue 1 (2001) pp 155-164.

³² Ibid, p 156-157.

actually make it possible for dissident groups, of all sizes, to wage terrorist campaigns on the behalf of their goals.³³

A category not discussed above is that of the 'failed state', in which there is no effective governance, liberal or illiberal. In a 2008 analysis Piazza argued against the prevailing understanding of the United States anti-terrorism policy that terrorism was 'the product of illiberal political and economic systems'.³⁴ The alternative explanation was that 'population, political stability and possibly religious-demographic factors'³⁵ are more important. A failed state faces enormous challenges as it can no longer deliver political goods or security to its population, leaving areas of its territory unpoliced and unable to control conflict in society, police borders or provide economic ability or support an effective civil society. As Piazza explains, the concept of the failed state is not new and the consequences in relation to terrorism is that there is space for terrorist (and insurgent) groups to base themselves, reserves of potential new recruits and political elites willing to tolerate terrorist organisations in return for political support.³⁶ The existence of failed states is a major concern in international politics and adds a new perspective to the discussion, as whilst authoritarian and democratic states maintain control of their territories the failed state is unable to do so. The consequences, which include terrorism, insurgency and rule by warlords, impact beyond the failed states borders and also bring them into conflict with strong states.

The results of quantitative research are not encouraging. Whilst there were clear criticisms above of the earlier work by Weinberg & Eubank it is also clear that they answered their critics, particularly in terms of using events as opposed to group data and accounting for spill-over violence from authoritarian countries. A fundamental problem that remains, with Eyerman also, is that problems with data from closed societies still apply, particularly in terms of the reporting of events, compounded by a further problem: the media, particularly in an open society, will

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ James A Piazza 'Do Democracy and Free Markets Protect Us From Terrorism?' *International Politics* No 45 (2008), pp72–91 (p45).

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

show more interest in events that affect their own citizens or are spectacular in nature.³⁷

How do we account for the differences in results between Weinberg & Eubank and Eyerman? Put simply, they are studying different aspects: for Weinberg & Eubank the focus is on a general quantitative analysis, even when they study an individual country (Italy) they do this by breaking it down into regions and applying quantitative methods. Eyerman is more focused: he wants to evaluate schools of thought relating to democracy and apply an economic theory of terrorism. A concern is that both studies conclude that democracy is vulnerable to terrorist activity: their main difference of opinion is on the type, whether newly formed or stable. What is undeniable is that terrorist violence can be quantitatively proven to be prevalent within liberal democracies; this is not contended, it is the comparative degree of the occurrences between authoritarian and democratic countries that is under dispute. All other arguments pertain to the methodology used. Nor does the fact that newly formed democracies are particularly vulnerable give any consolation as this places them under threat from their inception. Finally, there are the most vulnerable states of all, the failed states, which are not addressed in the literature above, with the exception of Piazza. These are a more recent development and were not the subject of the debate, but bring a new dimension to the question of state vulnerability to terrorism.

The challenge of terrorism to liberal democracy.

The short review provided here is predominantly limited to the impact of terrorism on the West, as we are specifically concerned with the impact of terrorism on liberal democracies. A note of caution should be raised beforehand: we cannot assume that the countries affected are wholly in the right, the battles for liberation against the West European colonial powers demonstrate that being a liberal democracy at home does not translate into general legitimacy at home and abroad.

³⁷ See Hoffman, op cit, regarding the media and terrorism (Chapters six and seven).

Rapoport identifies four waves of modern terror, by which the history of modern terrorism can be understood. Revolution was an aspect in all the waves but in each one it had a different context³⁸. The four waves are a useful tool by which the history of modern terrorism can be understood:

‘In the 1880s, an initial “Anarchist Wave” appeared which continued for some 40 years. Its successor, the “Anti-Colonial Wave” began in the 1920s, and by the 1960s had largely disappeared. The late 1960s witnessed the birth of the “New Left Wave”, which dissipated largely in the 90s leaving a few groups still active in Sri Lanka, Spain, France, Peru, and Columbia. The fourth or “Religious Wave” began in 1979, and, if it follows the pattern of its predecessors, it still has twenty to twenty five years to run.’³⁹

The first wave, the anarchists, described themselves as terrorists and terrorism was both their strategy and their means of communication. Originating in Russia during the 1880s, anarchism ‘spread rapidly to other parts of Europe, the Americas, and Asia before reaching its peak and receding.’⁴⁰ Their principle tactic was the assassination of public figures, claiming the lives of President William McKinley and Czar Alexander II, and often through the use of bombs that killed the anarchist involved.⁴¹ The response by the authorities was the creation of plain-clothes police forces in every country it affected, including the Okrana, Scotland Yard and the FBI.⁴² The situation at the time represents the first of four times when terrorism can be understood to have an international impact.

The period preceding the First World War was one of growing unrest on the part of the Macedonian’s, Armenians and Serbs as the Ottoman and Habsburg

³⁸ David C Rapoport ‘The four waves of rebel terror and September 11’ *Anthropoetics*, Vol 8, No 1 (2002) <http://www.anthropoetics.ucla.edu/>.

³⁹ *Ibid*, p2. For sources on anarchism and Russian anarchism see: Roland Gaucher *The Terrorists: From Tsarist Russia to the O.A.S.* (Secker Warburg:London:1965); Walter Laqueur *A History of Terrorism (Transaction Edition)* (Transaction Publishers: London: 2001); Yves Ternon “Russian Terrorism, 1878-1908” in Chaliand & Blin (eds) *The History of Terrorism from Antiquity to Al Qaeda* (University of California Press:London:2007) *op cit*, pp 132-174.

⁴⁰ Rapoport, *op cit*, p3.

⁴¹ Walter Laqueur ‘Postmodern terrorism’ *Foreign Affairs* Vol 75, No 5 (1995) pp 24-37 (p1); see also Oliver Hubac-Occhipinti “Anarchist terrorists of the nineteenth century” in Chaliand & Blin (eds), *op cit*, pp 113-131

⁴² Rapoport, *op cit*.

empires slid into decay.⁴³ It was a Serbian nationalist group, the Black Hand Society, which organised what has been credited as the 'assassination of the century'.⁴⁴ The death of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife would perhaps have been forgotten amongst the other assassinations of heads of state that had taken place earlier had it not been for the aftermath. It would be a gross error to place the blame for the First World War on the head of one young assassin as there were men and women of greater authority who held much more responsibility for the descent into the cataclysm that followed, particularly as the Balkans was a hotbed of nationalism and rivalry at the time.⁴⁵ However, this event represents the second time terrorism can be seen to have had an international impact.

The second wave, the anti-colonialists, included the resurfacing of the ill-fated Irish Republican Brotherhood in 1916 along with the Ulster Volunteers⁴⁶ and the Macedonian IMRO who sought independence from the Turks, and whose ultimately futile actions brought repression on their people.⁴⁷ Anti-colonialism reached its zenith in the period after the Second World War: The Irish finally achieved independence and in the British Palestine Mandate, the Haganah, a Jewish army for defence against the Arabs split, creating the Irgun, from which emerged the Stern Gang.⁴⁸ It is in the post-war period that definitional problems with terrorism became evident: most groups chose instead to call themselves 'freedom fighters', governments continued to call them terrorists and the media failed to use either term consistently.⁴⁹ Some nationalist struggles (using terrorist

⁴³ Hoffman, op cit.

⁴⁴ Gerard Chaliand & Arnaud Blin "The golden age of terrorism" in Chaliand & Blin (eds), op cit, pp 175-196

⁴⁵ For the origins of the First World War see: Samuel R Williamso Jr "The origins of the war" in Arthur Marwick, Clive Emsley and Wendy Simpson (eds) *Total War and Historical Change Europe: 1914-1955* (Open University Press:Maidenhead:2001) pp 72-85; and for an account of the origins and conflict in Eastern Europe see: Winston S Churchill *The World Crisis Vol V: The Eastern Front* (Folio London:2007) Note- originally published in 1931.

⁴⁶ Edward Hyams *Terrorists and Terrorism* (JM Dent & Sons:London:1975). The IRB was founded in 1858 and was also known as the Fenians.

⁴⁷ Gaucher, op cit.

⁴⁸ Gaucher, op cit; Hyams, op cit.

⁴⁹ Rapoport, op cit

tactics) were successful: the Jewish groups in Palestine, EOKA in Cyprus and the FLN in Algeria.⁵⁰

The, third wave of the 'New Left', beginning in the late 1960s, is one that represents a benchmark for terrorism directed against the Western democracies and is the third example of terrorism having an international impact. Rapoport refers to this as the 'New Left Wave', in which radicalism is often combined with nationalism in the case of the Corsicans, Basque's and Northern Irish, and the international terrorism of Palestinian groups. Also, urban terrorism in South America and groups such as the West German RAF, French Action Directe and the Italian Red Brigades were driven by a revolutionary ethos.⁵¹ Bowyer Bell dates terrorism as an emerging threat to democracies in the period 1968-71⁵² and observes a shift from guerrilla revolution to transnational terror.⁵³ Hoffman dates the advent of modern terrorism to the hijacking of an El Al flight by the PFLP on the 22nd July 1968. He notes that whilst there had been hijackings before this was the first time that a national group (the Israelis) had been targeted for a political purpose (the release of Palestinians held in Israel).⁵⁴

The democracies were shaken by a revolutionary wave, which used tactics that were clearly terroristic in nature: shooting, the kidnapping of prominent figures, bombing, armed robbery, attacks on embassies, and the hijacking of aircraft.⁵⁵ Shocking as it was, the wave of revolutionary terror that caused such alarm was not a coherent or planned challenge to liberal democracy. Laqueur observes that it consisted of three different subspecies that emerged at the same time: separatist-nationalist (Canada, the Middle East, Spain, Ulster); Latin American urban terrorism, distinct from civil wars and coups; and, urban terrorism in the Western democracies and Japan.⁵⁶ For European nations there were significant

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² J Bowyer Bell *A Time of Terror: How Democratic Societies Respond to Revolutionary Violence* (Basic books Inc: New York: 1978).

⁵³ J Bowyer Bell *Transnational Terror* (American Enterprise Institute:Washington DC:1975).

⁵⁴ Hoffman, op cit.

⁵⁵ Christopher Dobson & Ronald Payne *The Weapons of Terror: International Terrorism at Work* (Macmillan Press: London: 1979).

⁵⁶ Laqueur (2001), op cit.

problems, most of which originated from within their own territories. In 1971 these included: the Bretons in France, groups of the Far Left and Far Right in Italy, the IRA in Northern Ireland, ETA in Spain and the Baader Meinhoff Group in West Germany.⁵⁷

Terrorism, whatever its origins, had again become an international problem. Whilst many countries had to knuckle down and deal with what were primarily domestic problems the targeting of aviation was a different matter. This was predominantly in the form of hijacking but also saw aircraft being shot at and passengers shot in airport terminals and deliberately blown up.⁵⁸ As a result of the events beginning in the 1968-71 period airline security underwent drastic improvement and airports that lagged behind, such as Rome's Leonardo da Vinci, became magnets for terrorists until security was improved.⁵⁹ For all its impact, the revolutionary wave of terror began to decline almost as soon as it had begun with many groups simply ceasing to exist or reduced to impotence.⁶⁰ The clear exceptions are the ethno-nationalist groups, which, as Rapoport has observed, have persisted across all the waves of modern terror.⁶¹

The 'religious wave' is the fourth of Rapoport's four waves of terror; religious identity had been important in earlier waves as religion and ethnicity overlap, but in the fourth wave religion became the predominant justification for terror and the predominant religion influencing the religious wave of terror is Islam.⁶² However, there are examples of terrorism inspired by other religions. Jewish inspired terrorism has seen the 1994 Cave of the Patriarchs massacre by an ultranationalist orthodox Jew and the 1995 assassination of Yitshak Rabin. Christian White Supremacists are prevalent in the United States and are typically anti-government in orientation. A particular concern of the FBI is the threat by 'lone wolves' such as Timothy McVeigh who whilst not a member of a white supremacist group was heavily influenced by their ideology when he carried out the Oklahoma bombing. A

⁵⁷ Bowyer Bell (1978) op cit, p70.

⁵⁸ Hoffman, op cit; Bowyer Bell (1978) op cit.

⁵⁹ Bowyer Bell (1978) op cit.

⁶⁰ Laqueur (2001), op cit.

⁶¹ Rapoport, op cit.

⁶² *ibid.*

third example is that of cults, the most well known example being the Aum Shinrikyo sect that carried out Sarin attacks in Japan.⁶³

Fundamentalism, historically evident in the three great Abrahamic religions, saw a revival and its roots lay in the discontent within Middle Eastern countries with the state of society and politics and a fearful resistance to the material and ideological influences of the West.⁶⁴ Driven by the need to establish Sharia law and re-establish the unity of religious and political rule (Khilafah) the theoretical origins of the religious wave go back to the establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood established in Egypt during 1928 and the writings of the imprisoned Sayed Qutb.⁶⁵ The Brotherhood and its offshoots have battled unsuccessfully over the years with the forces of the Egyptian Government but the Afghan Jihad against the Soviets, recruiting from Islamic transnational networks, was a success.⁶⁶ However, it is not the ideological underpinnings of the fourth wave that have come to define it, but more the use of suicide attacks and the aim to cause mass casualties. It was not simply the question of sending a message, but to kill as many people as possible.⁶⁷

This short history of terrorism closes with Al-Qaeda, the organisers of the 9/11 attacks on the United States and the fourth example of how terrorism has had an impact at the international level. Al-Qaeda was known as a terrorist organisation prior to the 9/11 attacks but the impact of 9/11 was such that it provoked the onset of the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Its origins lie in Abdullah Azzam's Maktab Al-Khidamat (MAK) offices set up to recruit Arabs to fight in Afghanistan war, a group of mujahedeen (Islamic Warriors) that would become known as the Arab Afghans.⁶⁸ Near the close of the war Azzam had begun to conceive the goal of the re-conquest of the Arab World, a project ended by his assassination in 1989 and succession by Osama Bin Laden. The United States became the focus of Bin

⁶³ Hoffman, op cit.

⁶⁴ Laqueur (2004) op cit, p 31. See also: David C Rapoport 'Fear and trembling: Terrorism in three religious traditions' *American Political Science Review* Vol 78, No 3 (1984) pp 658-677.

⁶⁵ Ibid; Paul Berman *Terror and Liberalism* (W.W,Norton & Company:New York:2004). See also: Phillipe Migaux "The roots of Islamic radicalism" in Chaliand & Blin (eds), op cit, pp 255-313.

⁶⁶ Berman, op cit, 2004.

⁶⁷ Hoffman, op cit.

⁶⁸ Elena Pavlova "Terrorism after September 11: Regional and global implications" in Rohan Gunaratna (ed) *The Changing Face of Terrorism* (Marshall Cavendish Academic: Singapore:2004).

Laden's attention when Coalition forces were stationed in Saudi Arabia after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. For Bin Laden this was a humiliation for all Muslims and justification for a Jihad against the United States.⁶⁹ What had been an international 'holy war' to be carried out in 'lands of Jihad' including 'Kashmir, Bosnia, Chechnya, Tajikistan, Dagestan, the Philippines, Algeria and Somalia'⁷⁰ became Jihad directed at the United States and her interests abroad, her allies and later, the United States homeland. What can be described as a litany of spectacular and bloody attacks on the United States and her allies culminated in the spectacular and bloody terrorist 9/11 attacks. The result was the invasion of Taliban ruled Afghanistan after Al-Qaeda's erstwhile supporter and ally refused to hand over Bin Laden and his followers, an action that crippled the Taliban and dismantled Al-Qaeda as an organisation. The Taliban's malaise was temporary and Al-Qaeda has maintained itself in the form of franchises such as the Jamaa Islamiya (JI) and maintains a global presence and influence.⁷¹

The above has demonstrated that terrorism can have a major impact on both individual nations and international affairs. Yet, there is always the question of how to respond, and the responses to the four waves of terror were varied: the creation of police forces, withdrawal from empire, improvements in security at vulnerable locations and the launching of a decade defining 'war on terror' are varied responses. Notably, waves of terror do cease to dominate and terrorist groups do decline and end, with others taking their place: how and why will be discussed in chapter four. The terrorist challenge to liberal democracy is a varied one and one that has a long and disparate history. Here, the focus is on the ethno-nationalists, who have managed to maintain themselves over a long period of time, in particular the IRA, ETA, the FLNC, and their respective successors.

The three cases are of interest because each, in a different way, involves the issue of the independence or autonomy of a region from a democratic state. In a world, in which the number of democracies is increasing and populations becoming

⁶⁹ Migaux, op cit.

⁷⁰ Pavlova, op cit.

⁷¹ Migaux, op cit. For an account of the Taliban and Al Qaeda prior to the 9/11 attacks see: Ahmed Rashid *Taliban: The Story of the Afghan Warlords* (Pan Books:Basingstoke:2001).

more aware of their rights to representation, the issue of separatism in the form of ethno-nationalism is of paramount importance. Religion and ideology can wax and wane, ethnic identity does not; this is not to say there will not be religious or ideological elements inherent in future separatist conflicts, whether they be war, insurgency, or terrorism, but that separatism and ethno-nationalism may be the core driving causes behind them. It is this that puts the study of how conflicts such as those in the Basque Country and Corsica and Northern Ireland came about and more importantly, where liberal democratic countries such as the France, Spain and the United Kingdom were successful or unsuccessful in their approach to them.

As regards these conflicts, we can note that:

‘Of all the regions in Western Europe where violent conflict has arisen over the past four decades, three stand out because of the longevity of the conflict, the degree of political organisation within the armed groups involved and the challenge posed by these groups to the traditional nation-state: Northern Ireland, the Basque Country and Corsica.’⁷²

And despite their differences:

‘the three cases illustrate the problems associated with the notion of a nation-state that is supposed to integrate minority groups into the national system and exercise absolute sovereignty over every piece of its territory.’⁷³

The nature of this challenge is different to that posed by other types of terrorism. Although, particularly in the cases of Northern Ireland and the Basque Country, Marxist ideology is a factor, as is religion in Northern Ireland, they are not the driving force. The ethno-nationalist does not seek to overthrow the state, or its legitimacy to rule, the single, overriding goal has always been separation, on the part of a minority group, from an established nation state.

⁷² John Loughlin & Francisco Letamendia ‘Lessons for Northern Ireland: Peace in the Basque country and Corsica?’ *Irish Studies in International Affairs* Vol 11, (2000) pp147-162 (p 147).

⁷³ *Ibid*, p 147-148.

The democratic dilemma: Combating terrorism and maintaining democratic principles.

Terrorism places the democratic government in an unwanted position. The nature of liberal society limits the action that it can legitimately take, but it also has a duty of care and is expected to provide an appropriate response:

‘Given the fundamental threat that terrorism poses to any liberal democratic society living under the rule of law, it is generally accepted that such polities must, as a basic principle, respond to acts of terrorism in a firm manner. Given that the basic task is to defend the community’s liberal democratic way of life, however, it is essential that the manner of the states response to terrorism does not undermine those values and traditions which make such an existence possible in the first place. Indeed, should the government start to use counter-measures of an illegal or unconstitutional manner (fighting “fire with fire”), the state in question runs a grave risk of undermining its own legitimacy and creating a situation far worse than the one it is attempting to counter.’⁷⁴

And herein lays the dilemma: fail to counter the terror and the government loses authority and fails to fulfil its part of the social contract, over-react and legitimacy is lost; either way there will be little hope for re-election.

Terrorism challenges, whether by accident or design, the legitimacy of a ruling government. Legitimacy can be understood as follows:

‘a government is legitimate when it protects and enhances the values and norms of its citizens, when it preserves and expands their culture, and when it behaves itself in foreign affairs’⁷⁵

Some observations should be noted here: The first is that legitimacy is desirable from both the viewpoints of the regime and the people as the value patterns of society are respected and governing costs are minimised. Secondly, revolutions can also be legitimate. However, this depends on legitimacy of the regime and if the new regime improves on the previous one in terms of the definition given above.

⁷⁴ Peter Chalk (2002) ‘The response to terrorism as a threat to liberal democracy’ *Australian journal of Politics and History* Vol 44 issue 3 (2002) pp 374.

⁷⁵ Peter G Stillman ‘The concept of legitimacy’ *Polity* Vol 7, No 1 (1974) p 32- 56 (p48).

Thirdly, legitimacy is not static and can be considered over a period of time according to two criteria: firstly concerning the past regime, secondly a prediction over its future legitimacy. Finally, and crucially, legitimacy is not a dichotomous attribute (present or not present) but based on a sliding scale. Some regimes will be more legitimate than others but no regime can be understood to be fully illegitimate or legitimate.⁷⁶

Based on the brief description above, terrorism can be seen to challenge democracy on two counts. Firstly, the government that does not protect its citizens from terrorist violence loses some of its legitimacy as it fails to fulfil the function of maintaining a monopoly of violence within its borders. Here the challenge is to formulate an appropriate response. The second is that liberal democracies are by definition open societies based on freedom of movement and non-interference in personal affairs. Here the challenge is to formulate a response that does not undermine personal freedoms.

Openness is crucial to the function of liberal democracy but also the source of its vulnerability to terrorism:

‘modern democracies have certain characteristics that make them vulnerable to terrorist operations. Schmid rounds up the usual suspects. In democracies there is freedom of movement; people are free to come and go without the kind of surveillance that often exists in closed societies. Similarly, there is freedom of association; the state does not prevent like-minded individuals from forming private groups and organizations. Third, open societies furnish would-be terrorists with an abundance of targets to strike. The legal systems require the presentation of evidence, proof of guilt and various due process protections before someone can be imprisoned for participating in terrorist activities.’⁷⁷

These characteristics are described as the usual suspects for good reason: they are generally agreed upon and are not contested in the way that definitions, typologies and origins of terrorism are. Democracies are also limited in how they respond to terrorism. Gurr understands democracies as societies, in which there is both

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Leonard Weinberg & William Eubank, 1994, op cit, pp 418-419.

organised expression of contending political views and office holding on the basis of elections. Unlike authoritarian states democratic leaders have to maintain a balance between the suppression of violence and deterring or accommodating those who support their aims.⁷⁸ Wilkinson takes a strong moral stance against terrorism on the grounds that even in authoritarian societies there is always another way to express dissent than the resort to violence. As regards the liberal democratic state, there are other ways of campaigning for a cause and terrorism is wrong as it inevitably involves indiscriminate and arbitrary violence against the innocent. Democracy is laid open to terrorism because of the openness of society and ease of movement.⁷⁹

A central goal behind the strategy of terrorism is to inflict fear on a target population.⁸⁰ For liberal democracies, this is particularly the case with Rapoport's third and fourth waves of terror. The intention is to create a climate of fear, to make the individual unaware of when or where the next shooting or bombing will occur, or question the safety of using mass transit systems, aircraft or even the likelihood of simply being in a building at the wrong time and place. Inherent in this imposition of fear is the hope that the fearful will lash out, that the target country or people will counter terror with terror, fear with fear, and so be exposed as the oppressors that the terrorist claims them to be. But this has to be put into perspective:

'In common discussion, fear and terror are treated as if they are of a kind. This is not so; while fear is produced in response to objective threats, it is in response to the uncertain elements of those uncertain threats. Terror, on the other hand, is produced by the realisation of the certainty of life's destruction. For example, someone becomes afraid when they know they have cancer. They are not sure what will happen, or how to act, but once they know the cancer is definitely killing them, and they start to experience it, so there is no doubt; then they are terrorised. A

⁷⁸ Ted Robert Gurr "Terrorism in democracies: its social and political bases" in Walter Reich (ed.), *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind* (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press: 1990) pp. 86-102.

⁷⁹ Paul Wilkinson *Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response* (Frank Cass: Abingdon: 2001).

⁸⁰ Peter R Neumann and M.L.R Smith *The Strategy of Terrorism* (Routledge:London:2008).

politics that involves the creation of terror requires acts that are deliberately destructive to the people that are being terrorised.’⁸¹

But:

‘When terrorising situations are produced by acts of violence, they barely last longer than the terrorising act of violence itself. For this reason, terror produced by acts of violence cannot last for very long and, in terms of power has little effect after it has finished.’⁸²

Fear, then, is based on uncertainty, terror on the actual; as Spark’s argues: the state of terror is temporary and the state of fear can be managed within a liberal context, as the idea of liberalism was born out of religious conflict and social upheaval. The real danger lies not simply in the fear of terror itself, but the eradication of civil liberties as a result of it.⁸³ This does not mean that myopia should develop with regard to the danger of terrorism as this would be neglectful on the part of a government and actually create more fear should the terrorist get through. It is more important to effectively counter terrorist attacks and so manage the source of fear. A good example is suicide terrorism, of which Hoffman notes its appeal to terrorist groups as being comparatively cheap, relatively easy to organise and requiring no escape strategy. As a tactic it was very successful in the Lebanon, Israel and Sri Lanka. It serves as a good example as the flexibility of the tactic allows it to be carried out using aircraft (9/11), boats (the attack on the USS *Cole* in 2000), vehicles and pedestrians and against a diverse range of targets from the symbolic (World Trade Center) to public areas and targeted individuals.⁸⁴ For Hoffman:

‘The challenge in responding to suicide terrorism is not to fall victim to the psychological paralysis and sense of defencelessness or powerlessness that the terrorist hopes to achieve. A myth is only as strong as you believe it is. As Ehud Sprinzak had long argued “Contrary to popular belief, suicide bombers can be stopped- but only if security authorities pay more attention to their methods and

⁸¹ Chris Sparks ‘Liberalism, terrorism and the politics of fear’ *Politics* Vol 23, issue 3 (2003) pp200-206 (p204).

⁸² Ibid, p204.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Hoffman, op cit.

motivations.” The experience of a country like Israel, for example, shows that despite the significant death toll inflicted by suicide attacks initially, with the proper attention, focus, preparations, and training this threat can effectively be countered.⁸⁵

It can be seen that an appropriate response to the threat of terrorism, and the fear it causes, is in the effective countering of terrorism through increased security. This has not been limited to recent developments such as suicide bombing. After the events beginning in the 1968-71 period, airline security underwent significant improvement. The Israelis, already accustomed to terror, used armed sky marshals on El Al flights. It is notable that Palestinian groups chose to use airports outside of Israel due to the already tight security in Israel. Comparatively lax security at North American and West European airports was greatly improved: armed guards were present to deter terrorist attacks within the terminals, check in desks were moved away from the aircraft, metal detectors introduced and baggage was separated from its owner and screened.⁸⁶ It is worth noting, however, that the terrorist actor will adapt. The most obvious example of this is the 9/11 attacks, in which the aircraft themselves were weapons: the guns and bombs were not needed and the planes were hijacked by people holding box cutters.

But this really only dealt with trans-national terrorism and the deranged, many European states had internal terrorist concerns: the British, French and Spanish faced nationalists, the Germans and Italians groups emanating from the Far Left (and for the Italians, the Far Right also). It is in the countering of domestic terrorism that the democratic dilemma comes to the fore. Increased security effectiveness is one thing, even if it is inherently expensive and time consuming, as it at least gives the citizen the reassurance that something is actually being done and makes the citizen feel safer. Freedom of movement is affected, but not prevented or curtailed, and the increased difficulty of carrying out an attack at an airport or the hijacking of an airliner makes it less attractive as an option for the terrorist. But when dealing with the domestic terrorism of such groups as the IRA,

⁸⁵ Hoffman, op cit, p167.

⁸⁶ Bowyer Bell, op cit.

ETA and FLNC governments cannot simply increase security against a foreign foe, instead they are faced with the prospect of carrying out counter-terrorist measures within their own population. The challenge for the state is not only to protect its citizens from harm but also to actively combat those who engage in violence and within its own communities. How to deal with fear, and the violence that produces it, yet maintain the openness that is part of the values and norms of liberal democracy? To begin, responses can be reduced to two basic categories: coercion and conciliation.

Liberal Democratic responses to terrorism: Coercion.

Coercion can be understood as military, police and legal countermeasures that directly combat the ability of terrorist groups to operate. This is the most visible way a terrorist campaign can be countered, but can also lead to repressive means. In contrast, conciliation is taken over the longer term and attempts to deal with the root causes of a terrorist campaign and undermines minority support for a terrorist group by dealing with socio-economic factors that contributed to the outbreak of the campaign and also provides ways out of terrorism. Coercive means to deal with terrorism can be considered as three types: 1) Legislative through changes in the law; 2) The use of security forces such as the Police and Army; 3) Intelligence gathering. These are not separate functions as they overlap as the police and army can become heavily involved in intelligence gathering.

Here, we are treating legislation as a coercive function that can have a deterrent effect on terrorist activity. Generally domestic anti-terrorist legislation within European Union countries should have three safeguards:

- '1. All aspects of the anti-terrorist policy and its implementation should be under the overall control of the civil authorities and hence democratically accountable.
2. The government and security forces must conduct all anti-terrorist operations within the law. They do all in their power to ensure that the normal legal processes are maintained, and that those charged with terrorist offences are brought to trial before the courts of law.'

3. Special powers, which may become necessary to deal with a terrorist emergency, should be approved by the legislature only for a fixed and limited period, at the very minimum on an annual basis'.⁸⁷

These are general guidelines, based on the experience of countries such as the United Kingdom and Spain in countering terrorism. Historically, legislative steps have been mixed in their results. The use of internment and juryless 'Diplock courts' in Northern Ireland had the opposite effect to that intended as far from deterring membership of the PIRA it actually encouraged it.⁸⁸ The newly democratic Spanish government passed a large number of anti-terrorist laws between 1978 and 1979 that speeded up trials, allowed longer detention in custody and greater access and allowed to carry out postal intercepts and wiretap terrorist suspects. These and other measures were met with a violent response by ETA.⁸⁹ It can be seen that legislation is a tool that should be used carefully and only when necessary, as it can have an impact detrimental to the ending of a terrorist campaign.

Unlike the French and Spanish, the British utilised the army over the course of the 'troubles' in Northern Ireland, although their initial deployment was necessary to protect a then threatened Catholic population.⁹⁰ Generally, military units are not deployed on public order duties with the European democracies. As Wardlaw notes, the British did not have a 'third force' that was present in other European countries and could deal with public order problems. This was due to the 'British model' of policing that separated routine police work from public order.⁹¹ Once in the province, the army rapidly became a source of discontent but could not be withdrawn lest civil order collapse.⁹² As Wilkinson observes, even an army as steeped in democratic ethos and as highly trained as the British Army, made

⁸⁷ Wilkinson, op cit, p 117.

⁸⁸ Patrick Bishop & Eamonn Mallie *The Provisional IRA* (London:Corgi Books:1988).

⁸⁹ Fernando Jimenez 'Spain: The terrorist challenge and the government's response' *Terrorism and Political Violence* Vol 4 Issue 4 (1992) pp 110-130.

⁹⁰ Michael Dewar *The British Army in Northern Ireland* (London:Arms and Armour Press:1985).

⁹¹ Grant Wardlaw *Political Terrorism: Theory Tactics and Counter-measures* 2nd edn (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge: 1989).

⁹² Dewar, op cit.

mistakes when deployed to Northern Ireland.⁹³ For the British, the goal was to maintain order and return 'police primacy' to the province.⁹⁴ It is also the case that the use of specialist groups such as the CRS on Corsica was counter-productive, turning a farm occupation into a lethal battle between the CRS and nationalists.⁹⁵ With regard to the deployment of the military:

'It must be a cardinal principle never to commit the army to take over responsibility for the task of restoring and maintaining public order unless it is absolutely beyond doubt that the civil police can no longer cope.'⁹⁶

This then puts the onus on the police as effectively the main means by which terrorism can be countered in liberal democratic states, and in turn means that the police need to have anti-terrorism units in order to fulfil their role. The distinction is that these are highly specialised and so fall out of the rubric of everyday policing but at the same time can be seen as a civil as opposed to military force. In Northern Ireland, the RUC developed a highly effective capability as the emphasis on policing the province switched from Army patrols to local policing but was a controversial organisation in the eyes of Catholics.⁹⁷ It is critical that the police are seen to be fair, impartial, subject to the law they are upholding and accountable to the general public.

The gathering of intelligence is crucial to the prevention of terrorism⁹⁸ and can involve not only security services such as MI5 but military and police units, as was the case in Northern Ireland.⁹⁹ Taking the intelligence services separately, the role can be understood as 'to prevent any insurgency or terrorism developing beyond the incipient stage'¹⁰⁰. But intelligence gathering is controversial at best. Governments see the gathering of information on terrorist groups as being of high importance:

⁹³ Wilkinson, op cit.

⁹⁴ Mark Urban *Big Boys Rules: The SAS and the Secret Struggle against the IRA* (Faber & Faber, London: 1992).

⁹⁵ Robert Ramsay *The Corsican Time Bomb* (Manchester University Press:Manchester:1983).

⁹⁶ Wilkinson, op cit, p129.

⁹⁷ Urban, op cit.

⁹⁸ Richard English *Terrorism: How to Respond* (Oxford:Oxford University Press:2009).

⁹⁹ Urban, op cit.

¹⁰⁰ Wilkinson, op cit, p 106.

'it is clearly the duty of a properly elected government to collect and analyse as much information as possible about extremist political groups. Since many such groups openly espouse the overthrow of democratically elected governments such targets have a right to defend themselves. The precautionary measure of intelligence gathering is therefore justified as long as it is carried out within the limits of the law.'¹⁰¹

The caveat about the limits of the law is a pertinent one: if the use of troops can be considered as an overt threat to democratic freedoms, the activities of unseen and unheard intelligence activities can be just as damaging. Wardlow later observes:

'[critics] argue that the conservative nature of the intelligence services makes them inherently undemocratic. And they argue that many such agencies grow without justification, expand their activities and their influence until they become a law unto themselves'¹⁰²

The answer to this concern lies in the legislative function discussed above: everything should be done within the law and be democratically accountable. Having introduced coercive measures, attention now turns to conciliation.

Liberal Democratic responses to terrorism: Conciliation.

Conciliatory measures to deal with terrorism are presented here as two types: 1) political reform to address underlying grievances; 2) The provision of incentives to allow an exit for those engaged in terrorist violence. Treating these as separate aspects of conciliation allows for the affects of each to be seen more clearly.

When faced with an outbreak of ethno-nationalist or separatist violence a liberal democracy should be expected to be reflective as towards its origins. As conventional wisdom holds, if the source of discontent is removed support for ethno-nationalist terrorism wanes. This is a long process and is inhibited by the terrorist themselves as any self respecting government can hardly be seen to give in to terrorist threats, although, it is possible to deal with the roots of a terrorist

¹⁰¹ Wardlow, op cit p 136.

¹⁰² Wardlow, op cit p 137.

campaign, if not with the terrorists themselves. Political reform addresses the grievances of a minority population, such as socio-economic disadvantage and autonomy. The target of political reform is not the terrorists themselves but the minority population that they claim to represent. Filippidou, in a study of Northern Ireland, the Basque Country and Corsica argues:

‘In general, the three long-standing case studies confirm that policies designed to accommodate fuller recognition and rights to a minority population have been more effective in preventing or diminishing polarisation and violent conflict than rigid policies of assimilation’.¹⁰³

The reasons for the political reform may be extant to the situations themselves. A factor in the three cases under discussion here is that since the outbreak of violence the context of political activity has changed in the countries of the European Union:

‘Political activity is no longer confined to the nation-state but occurs in a system of European Governance marked by a complex variety of public actors. Regions and local authorities, despite their diversity within European states, have found a new role as political actors within the new European system.’¹⁰⁴

However, as Wilkinson observes, it should be emphasised that there can be no giving in to the demands of terrorists who carry out political violence as there are other outlets for expression and political change. Liberal democracies have historically responded to demands for political reform but not solely in response to terrorist actions.¹⁰⁵

It is a fallacy that terrorist groups consist entirely of committed and hard-line members. In their history of the Provisional IRA Bishop and O’Mallie write that the Northern and Southern commands of the IRA had very different views of the trouble in the North, and the Official’s and the Provisional’s disagreed on strategy to the point that violence broke out between them. This was not limited to groups:

¹⁰³ Anastasia Filippidou (2007) ‘Negotiating tactics in low intensity conflicts: The cases of Northern Ireland, the Basque Country and Corsica’ *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* Vol 7, No 3, (2007) pp 94-108 (p95).

¹⁰⁴ Loughlin & Letamendia, op cit, p161.

¹⁰⁵ Wilkinson, op cit.

often volunteers would go out on their first mission and be so distraught at having taken a life that they became effectively useless, although others, did not have the same qualms.¹⁰⁶ Sullivan's history of ETA and Basque Nationalism details how historically ETA splits occurred often, including the division that resulted in two organisations, a solely military one and a politico-military one.¹⁰⁷ On Corsica, the FLNC split dramatically in 1990 as a result of institutional reform proposed by the French government.¹⁰⁸

At the individual level there are a number of factors why individuals disengage from an organisation. These include disillusionment relating to the realities of being involved in a clandestine organisation and disagreements relating to both tactical issues and ideological differences, the changing personal priorities of members and becoming burned out.¹⁰⁹ Given that there are individuals who wish to disengage from terrorist groups it is prudent to consider assisting them to do so. This has a practical benefit in that it effectively eliminates the threat that the individual presents to society. It has proven successful in the case of the Basque Country when the offer of the social reintegration was taken up by members of ETA-pm in the early 1980s, leading to the end of the organisation's involvement in armed struggle.¹¹⁰

A second means of exit is a move to electoral politics. In their study of political parties and terrorist groups Weinberg, Pedahur & Perliger conclude that ties between terrorist groups and political parties are relatively common and often go hand in hand. The most common circumstance is where political parties give rise to terrorist groups. However the relationship should be understood as dynamic and reciprocal as parties may turn to terror but terrorist groups often turn to electoral politics. Political conditions that encourage the move to terrorism are crises of

¹⁰⁶ Bishop & Mallie, op cit.

¹⁰⁷ John Sullivan *ETA and Basque Nationalism: The Fight for Euskadi 1890-1986* (London; New York: Routledge: 1988).

¹⁰⁸ Bernard Foster "Corsica-Nation, region or something else?" in: M Kelly & Rosemary Boch (eds) (1993) *France: Nations and Regions* (Southampton: University of Southampton) pp 248-259.

¹⁰⁹ John Horgan 'Individual disengagement: A psychological analysis' in Tore Bjorgo & John Horgan (eds) *Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement* (Routledge: London: 2009) pp 17-29 (p23).

¹¹⁰ John Bew, Martyn Frampton & Inigo Gurruchaga *Talking to Terrorists* (London:Hurst & Co:2009).

national integration, disintegration and legitimacy. Political conditions that encourage an exit from terrorism are transformation of the political order, state repression, the difficulty of secret (clandestine) operations and government amnesty or forgiveness.¹¹¹ There is also an effect from competition of non-violent nationalist parties. In her study of militant nationalism Irvin observes that by 1976 there was a significant challenge to the PIRA and ETA from more moderate, non-violent constitutional parties such as the SDLP and PNV, radical political groups and competition from other military organisations, resulting in Sinn Fein's return to politics and the emergence of political parties allied to ETA.¹¹²

Given that there is potential for both individual and group disengagement from terrorism there is a case for the encouragement of both. A difficulty is that it also means that any acts of violence that they have committed may go unpunished by the state. A practical answer is that if they have not actually been caught and prosecuted then the argument that they do not face justice becomes weakened. This is offset by the fact that for the victims of violence, for justice to be seen to be done, the perpetrators of violence must be seen to have been brought to justice. The balance between concessions to former terrorists and calling them to account for their actions is a difficult one, which can have significant repercussions in the search for the resolution of a terrorist conflict. In closing, a distinction has to be made between conciliatory moves towards terrorist groups and reform, which tackles underlying issues, and directly benefits the population the group claims to represent.

The democratic dilemma: Coercion, conciliation, or both?

Given the above observations on coercion and conciliation we now return to the democratic dilemma of how a liberal democracy approaches the problem of terrorism, in particular that within its own borders. It has been demonstrated that

¹¹¹ Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahur & Arie Perliger *Political parties and terrorist groups* (Routledge: London: 2009).

¹¹² Cynthia Irvin *Militant Nationalism: Between Movement and Party in Ireland and the Basque Country* (University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis: 1999).

conciliatory measures can enable an exit from terrorism for both individuals and groups. Yet, hardliners frequently remain to carry on the struggle, as is the case with all three of the conflicts under study here. Also, armed people, who seek to maim and kill in the furtherance of their goals do have to be confronted directly, making coercive means a necessity. This suggests that a multifaceted approach is required when responding to a terrorist campaign.

Firstly, we return to Millar's observation that the response depends on the type of terrorist group involved: in the case of Nationalist-Separatist groups he found that a combined approach utilising concessions, legal reform and restriction was the most effective approach. Importantly, coercion and conciliation should not be viewed separately but in terms of a scale between the two.¹¹³ We return also to Chalk's three principles of how a liberal democracy should respond: it should be well defined and targeted only at the terrorist group, credible, and subject to parliamentary supervision.¹¹⁴ The second is of particular concern here as it links back to the issue of legitimacy raised above:

'The general populace has to be convinced that the state's action is necessary and effective in producing results, both with respect to performance in combating terrorism and protecting civil liberties.'¹¹⁵

The question, then, is not if coercive measures should be used, but when they are used that they are demonstrated to be necessary and above all, applied so as not to become repressive as this can escalate the violence, and in fact may encourage it. Furthermore, it results in more support for violence within minority communities.¹¹⁶ Both Chalk and Millar are primarily concerned with how the direct response to the terrorist group should be carried out but general rules of counter-terrorism, which exclude the wider socio-economic picture are only part of the solution. English argues that a practical response should '*where possible, address*

¹¹³ Gregory D Millar (2007) 'Confronting terrorisms: Group motivation and successful state policy' *Terrorism and Political Violence* Vol 19 Issue 3 (2007) pp 331-380.

¹¹⁴ Chalk, op cit.

¹¹⁵ Ibid, p 387.

¹¹⁶ Louise Richardson *What Terrorists Want* (John Murray: London:2007).

*underlying root problems and causes*¹¹⁷ and avoid over-militarisation when force is necessary.¹¹⁸

How a liberal democracy approaches the problem of terrorism can be influenced by what is known of how terrorist campaigns end. Wilkinson outlines six pathways out of terrorism: 1) Terrorists achieve their goals and abandon violence; 2) Terrorists perceive the failure of their campaign and abandon violent struggle; 3) The terrorist campaign is eradicated by military action; 4) A political solution on the state's terms in which sufficient concessions are made to the political grouping in which the terrorists operate; 5) Through law enforcement and judicial control, treating terrorist acts as criminal; 6) An educational effort by democratic political parties, civil society and major social institutions to persuade terrorists and their supporters that political violence is counterproductive to their goals. These are not mutually exclusive.¹¹⁹ It is notable these are based on outcomes from a mix of coercive and conciliatory measures and perceptions of change by the terrorist group themselves.

It is important to note that without legitimate coercive pressure on terrorist organisations the benefits of conciliatory measures will not be realised. Terrorist campaigns do not end solely due to conciliatory measures, nor are future ones likely to buck this trend. In closing it is worth emphasising Wilkinson's assertion that a liberal democracy is required to actively combat terrorism with all the means at its disposal provided that it does not violate the freedoms on which it is based in doing so.¹²⁰ According to English:

'...the best response here to the terrorist problem is probably this: *respect orthodox legal frameworks and adhere to the democratically established rule of law*. Staying within the law maintains that important Weberian distinction between legitimate states and their illegitimate terrorist opponents. If states are to successfully maintain a monopoly over the legitimate use of force within their territory, then it is important that they credibly uphold the division between what they do and what their

¹¹⁷ English, op cit, p 123.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Wilkinson, op cit.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

(illegitimate) opponents resort to. To transgress the line which legitimizes you as the state is to risk undermining that on which your own power ultimately rests.¹²¹

From the above, it can be argued that theory indicates a combination of coercive and conciliatory measures is critical to the ending of terrorist campaigns within liberal democracies, but with the oft-repeated caveat that in doing so democratic freedoms are not trodden upon.

Conclusion

Four conclusions can be made from the discussion above with regard to terrorism and liberal democracies. Firstly, there has been a large increase in the number of democracies since 1974, including a large increase between the period 1990 and 1996 and slowing down by 2002. The increase in the number of democracies is good news as it means better political participation and representation but also means more open societies, in which challenger groups with grievances can emerge and engage in violence against the state, particularly when there is a mix of nationalisms and/or ethnic groups. The second conclusion follows on from the first: Terrorism has been quantitatively demonstrated to be prevalent in liberal democratic societies when compared to authoritarian societies. Newly formed democracies are particularly vulnerable but the most vulnerable of all are 'failed states'. The third conclusion demonstrates the disproportionate impact of terrorism as a means of protest or action: There are four occasions can be identified where there was a major multinational impact due to terrorism: The anarchists beginning in the 1880s, the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand, the 'wave of terror' beginning in the late 1960s and the 9/11 attacks. This raises the questions of how measured a response to terrorism should be and the means by which the state can respond. The fourth conclusion relates directly to the three cases under analysis and the hypothesis presented in chapter one: Theory indicates that the most productive way for a liberal democracy to approach the problem of ethno-nationalist violence is through a combination of coercion and conciliation. It

¹²¹ English, op cit, p 134

is important to distinguish between conciliation as directed at challenger groups and reform as directed at the underlying causes of terrorism.

Chapter Three: Conflict Studies

Introduction

This study has its theoretical grounding in two areas of study, conflict studies and terrorism studies, and this chapter introduces the first of these. The purpose is to demonstrate the applicability of methods from conflict studies to the study of terrorism and this is the first of three chapters in which the framework of analysis is developed. To begin, how 'conflict' is understood in this thesis is outlined and the divisions within the discipline are addressed for purposes of clarity, followed by a short history of the evolution of conflict resolution and terrorism studies and the characteristics of conflict in the post Cold War period. I then look at social science and the study of conflict, influential theoretical approaches to conflict analysis and resolution, and close with a closer look at conflict as a structure and as a process, as these are key components of the methodology developed in chapter five. It should be noted that the focus is predominantly on how conflict is analysed as opposed to resolved, although it is not wholly possible to separate the two. An understanding of the contributions made by conflict studies is crucial to the methodology developed in chapter five.

Conflict

When we refer to 'conflict' there is an implicit assumption that it involves violence. Taking the media as an example, when a newsreader refers to a conflict, it generally relates to a situation occurring in a region where armed combatants are fighting. Current examples are the Syrian civil war, Eastern Ukraine and the rise of the self titled Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. However, conflict does not need to include violence and can be generically understood as an incompatibility between two or more parties. In this context an effective definition is given by Stagner:

'...Conflict is a situation in which two or more human beings desire goals which they perceive as being obtainable by one or the other but not both. This compact definition

can be opened out and clarified by saying that there must be at least two parties; each party is mobilising energy to obtain a goal, a desired object or situation; and each party perceives the other as a barrier or threat to that goal...¹

From this conflict is not simply about violence but is reflected in what people do and can in fact be transformative and constructive if it brings about beneficial change and involves cooperation between the conflicting parties. A state of conflict in which there is violence is rightly seen as counterproductive and undesirable and in the discussion of theories below it will be seen that there has been a development in conflict studies from conflict resolution to conflict transformation: implicit in this is the removal of violence from the conflict.

The type of conflict under investigation here does include violence. It is the use of lethal violence by terrorist groups which enables terrorism to be studied through the lens of conflict studies. Historically, typologies of conflict centred around interstate war, as this was seen as the predominant form of conflict in the modern period since the treaty of Westphalia.² More recent typologies reflect the end (though not absence) of the dominance of interstate warfare in the period that began in 1945.³ Put succinctly, the era of total war has given way to one in which the state is no longer the primary driving force behind armed conflict.⁴ Wallensteen reduces types of conflict to a trichotomy: interstate, and two categories of intrastate (over government and over territory).⁵ In a similar vein, Miall et al divide conflict into four types: interstate and three categories of intrastate (revolutionary/ideological, identity/secession, and factional).⁶ These are two examples, which do not include categorisation due to the number of deaths (severity) or reasons for the conflict beginning (root cause). The reason for typologies is to allow researchers to identify trends and categorise and define the

¹ Ross Stagner, cited in: C R Mitchell *The Structure of International Conflict* (The Macmillan Press Ltd: Basingstoke: 1981) p 32.

² Jason Franks *Rethinking the Roots of Terrorism* (Palgrave Macmillan:Basingstoke:2006).

³ Ibid.

⁴ Mary Kaldor *New and Old Wars* (Natraj Publishers:New Delhi:2005). First published in 1999; Martin Van Creveld *The Transformation of War* (The Free Press:New York:1991).

⁵ Peter Wallensteen *Understanding Conflict Resolution: War, Peace and the Global System* (SAGE Publications: London: 2002: p5).

⁶ Cited in Franks, op cit.

subject under study, hence we can conclude that whilst armed conflict is varied and its practice changes over time, influencing how academics perceive it, the method of study and how a conflict is defined rests on two factors. The first is the nature of the incompatibility between the actors involved and their subjective understanding of their relationship. The second is the contextual lens through which the researcher is analysing the conflict between the actors, influenced by their training and field of study. It is to the second that we now turn.

Conflict Studies

Before any review of the conflict analysis and resolution field can begin a clarification needs to be made of how it is described due to variations in academic literature. Groom identifies three paradigms in conflict: the 'strategist, the 'conflict researcher' and the 'peace researcher'. These relate to conceptions of conflict as realist (state centric), world society (non state centric) and structuralist (world system or class orientated).⁷ Here the focus is on the second and third of these world views. In this study conflict analysis and resolution is used to describe a field that is understood by its contributors in specific terms:

'The emerging field of study that is directly concerned with peace and conflict phenomena furnishes numerous theoretical and practical approaches, including Conflict Analysis and Resolution (CAR), in which, as a prerequisite for resolution, inquiry focuses on understanding the structural dynamics of conflict; Conflict Resolution (CR), in which the emphasis is on perspectives, processes, and structures that empower and facilitate the resolution of conflict; and Peace Studies (PS), in which the focus is on understanding the structural dynamics of peace, in the form of peacebuilding, peace sustenance, and institutionalising peace in light of elaborations of elaborations of what constitutes a society of culture and peace.'⁸

⁷ AJR Groom "Paradigms in Conflict: the strategist, the conflict researcher and the peace researcher" in John Burton and Frank Dukes (eds) *Conflict: Readings in Management and Resolution* (The Macmillan Press Ltd: London: 1990) pp 71-98.

⁸ Harry Anastasiou "Encountering nationalism: the contribution of peace studies and conflict resolution" in: Dennis JD Sandole, Sean Byrne, Ingrid Sandole-Staroste & Jessica Senehi (eds) *Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution* (Routledge: London: 2009) pp 32-44 (p33).

Alternatively, Wallensteen differentiates clearly between peace research, conflict resolution and conflict management. Whereas peace research deals with societal affairs with the goal of understanding the causes of violence and ways to reduce or remove it, conflict resolution is based on the insight of peace research 'drawing conclusion from the study of causes of war, issues of disarmament and arms control or conflict dynamics'.⁹ Also, whilst conflict management aims at reducing the danger of crisis and lessening suffering, conflict resolution attempts to address the basic issues and incompatibilities that affect parties and can be defined as:

'a social situation where the armed conflicting parties in a (voluntary) agreement resolve to peacefully live with – and/or dissolve – their basic incompatibilities and henceforth cease to use arms against each other.'¹⁰

As a definition, the above is clearly associated with the resolution of armed conflict. The introduction of 'conflict management' to the terminology necessitates that differences between the management, settlement and transformation be acknowledged. For the purposes of this study conflict studies is used as generic term to encompass all of them.

The history of conflict studies as an academic field and the emergence of terrorism studies

The evolution of conflict resolution as a distinct discipline can be understood as having taken place in stages from the early twentieth century and continued through to today.¹¹ Clearly, these are arbitrary and intended to allow comprehension through structure as opposed to a dynamic path. It can be argued that the agenda of peace and conflict research has been formed by traumas such as

⁹ Wallensteen, op cit, p5.

¹⁰ Ibid, p50.

¹¹ Louis Kriesberg "The evolution of conflict resolution" in: Jacob Berkovitch, Victor Kremenyuk & I William Zartman *The Sage Handbook of Conflict Resolution* (Sage Publications: London: 2009) pp 15-32; Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse & Hugh Miall *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts 2nd Edn* (Polity Press: Cambridge: 2005).

Hiroshima and hopes such as the League of Nations and this is reflected below.¹² The history of terrorism studies has also been included as from 2001 onwards terrorism has become inextricably linked to conflict analysis and resolution and the interests of the two fields have become similar.

1914-1945: Precursors and preliminary developments.

The development of the study of war as a branch of the social sciences began in earnest after the First World War, an event that had been traumatic for Western societies that had assumed scientific progress would lead to a better world.¹³ The illusion of peace through interdependence had been shattered and the revulsion at the carnage of the War encouraged peace and religious organisations, and saw the foundation of the League of Nations. Scholarly research by, amongst others, Lewis Richardson, Quincy Wright and Pitirim Sorokin analysed violent conflict whilst Dollard and others addressed psychological and socio-psychological processes.¹⁴ The period saw the establishment of International Relations as a distinct academic discipline with the endowment of the first chair in international relations at the University College of Wales in Aberystwyth, a memorial to former students killed during the First World War. This was followed by the creation of the First chair of Peace Research at the University of Lyons, the International Federation for the League of Nations was formed at Prague and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace created in 1924. 1930 saw the founding of a German Peace Academy and during this period Mary Parker Follet's work on organizational behaviour and labour relations laid the foundations for later researchers.¹⁵ These developments took place against a background of the 1930s worldwide depression and rise of Fascism. People and governments still dealt with conflicts through military force: the period saw wars in China and Spain, culminating in the Second World War.¹⁶

¹² Wallenstein, op cit.

¹³ Michael Nicholson *Conflict Analysis* (Barnes & Noble Inc: New York: 1970).

¹⁴ Kriesberg, op cit.

¹⁵ Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, op cit.

¹⁶ Kriesberg, op cit.

1945-1969: Consolidation and the laying of groundwork, and the first stage of terrorism studies.

The Second World War increased interest in the study of the causes of war. The First World War was not the war to end all wars as had been assumed, and with advent of nuclear weapons the prospect of a Third World War loomed into view.¹⁷ The threat of nuclear confrontation and reach of the Cold War made it important to understand the dynamics of conflict.¹⁸ The Peace Research Laboratory was founded at St Louis, Missouri by Theodore F Lentz after the use of nuclear weapons against Japanese cities¹⁹ and the period also saw the establishment of institutions such as the United Nations, the European Coal and Steel Community and World Bank.²⁰ The integration of Germany and France made it possible that dynamics could be reversed so conflict studies now looked at integration. Internal conflict such as the 1960s civil rights struggles in the United States meant a focus on grievances and problem solving.²¹ Although a primary concern was nuclear war, in the United States and Europe two differing approaches emerged. In the United States the Center for the Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences (CASBS) at Stanford University invited academics, including Kelman, Boulding, Rapoport and Laswell, who reinforced each others work in the emerging field of Conflict Resolution and *The Journal of Conflict resolution* was established at the University of Michigan in 1957. A plethora of subjects were addressed, including psychology and social-psychology, interstate war, and foreign policy decision making. There was a strong emphasis on the collection and analysis of quantitative data, an example being the *Correlates of War Project*. In Europe the emphasis was on peace and conflict research with the founding of the International Peace Research Institute (PRIO) at the University of Oslo, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and Centre for the Analysis of Conflict at the University of London. The *Journal of Peace Research* was founded in 1964 by Johan Galtung. Non-university conflict networks were also formed: The Peace Science Society (1963) and International

¹⁷ Nicholson, op cit.

¹⁸ Wallensteen, op cit.

¹⁹ Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, op cit.

²⁰ Kriesberg, op cit.

²¹ Wallensteen, op cit.

Peace Research Organisation (1964). The period was not without crisis in the form of independence struggles and Satyagraha campaigns of Ghandi.²²

Towards the end of the period the first, limited contributions to the study of terrorism began to emerge, the first stage in the evolution of terrorism studies, although macrostudies of political violence predominated.²³ The neglect of the subject during the cold war can be attributed to the emphasis on strategic issues such as arms control, containment and the nuclear arms race. Terrorism was for most states (excepting Israel) a matter of internal security and meant that funding was limited for major research projects into terrorism.²⁴ From the outset the contributions to the study of terrorism were made by a wide variety of academic disciplines, including: political science, international relations, history, sociology, criminology and anthropology.²⁵

1970-1989: Consolidation and institutionalisation, and the second stage of terrorism studies.

By this period conflict resolution and peace research had a strong institutional base and its aims were defined by three great projects. These were: the avoidance of nuclear war, the removal of global inequalities and injustice, and ecological balance and control. Work took place at three levels of analysis: interstate, domestic politics and deep rooted or intractable conflicts, and the areas of study included problem solving workshops, principled negotiation and mediation.²⁶ Non-governmental actors also came to prominence and institutionalisation took place in the form of sections of universities dedicated to peace studies. There were also educational concentrations in conflict resolution, associated MA courses and PhD programs in both Europe and US and chairs in peace and conflict studies were

²² Kriesberg, op cit.

²³ Edna F Reid 'Evolution of a body of knowledge: An analysis of terrorism research' *Information and Processing Management* Vol 33, No 1 (1997) pp 91-106.

²⁴ Paul Wilkinson "Research into terrorism studies: achievements and failures" in: Ranstorp (ed) *Mapping Terrorism Research: State of the Art, Gaps and Future Direction* (Routledge:London:2007) pp 116-328 (p 316).

²⁵ Ibid, p 316.

²⁶ Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, op cit.

established in Europe.²⁷ The period also saw centres for conflict resolution established in South Africa, Northern Ireland and the Basque Country, notable because these were areas of protracted social conflict.²⁸ The period was dominated by the Cold War with increasing tensions during the 1980s after the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union but this ended with the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from the Cold War.

Terrorism studies emerged as a specialisation in the mid-to late 1970s but was 'atomized and peripheral to the major disciplinary debates within the social and behavioural sciences'.²⁹ This represented what Edna Reid calls the 'take-off stage' and occurred between 1970-1978.³⁰ The core academic specialists within the field were few: Ted Gurr (*Why Men Rebel*), Martha Crenshaw (*The Concept of Revolutionary Terrorism*), David Rapoport (*Assassination and Terrorism*), and Paul Wilkinson (*Political Terrorism*). The RAND terrorism research program was established by Brian Jenkins in 1972, and the journal *Terrorism: An International Journal* was established by Yonah Alexander in 1977. Early work was done by Paul Wilkinson on liberal democracy and terrorism and Walter Laqueur on the history of terrorism and guerrilla warfare. But it was the concept of the urban guerrilla appearing in democracies in 1970s that generated academic interest in understanding nature, causes, and effects.³¹ A third stage also occurred within the 1970-1989 period. Dated by Reid as 1970-1985, the field of terrorism studies stabilised and was characterised by a 'linear growth in publications and increased controversy and specialization among researchers.'³² Between 1986 and 1990 the field underwent a crisis and appeared to be on the verge of demise³³, although we can treat Reid's fourth period of the development of terrorism studies as lasting until 2001. We should note that two major terrorism journals emerged in this period, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, founded by David Rapoport and Paul

²⁷ Kriesberg, op cit.

²⁸ Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, op cit.

²⁹ Magnus Ranstorp "Mapping terrorism studies after 9/11: an academic field of old problems and new prospects" in: Jackson, Breen Smith & Gunning (eds) *Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda* (Routledge:London:2009) pp 13-33 (p 19)

³⁰ Reid, op cit.

³¹ ibid

³² Reid, op cit, p96.

³³ Ibid.

Wilkinson during 1989, and *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, founded by Bruce Hoffman shortly afterwards.³⁴

1990-2008: Reconstruction and diffusion, and the re-emergence of terrorism studies.

The conclusion of the Cold War opened up new possibilities for proactive international involvement in protracted conflicts such as South Africa, Namibia and Northern Ireland. The non-violent sweeping away of East European regimes prompted an interest in conflict transformation. As the 1990s progressed events in Bosnia and Rwanda and the former Soviet Union demonstrated that the decade would also have a darker side.³⁵ Nevertheless, the ending of proxy wars, freeing up of the United Nations from the Cold War, spread of democracy and increase in number and level of engagements by transnational movements and organisations were positive steps. There was also growth in the 1990s of de-escalation, transformation, grass roots initiatives, post agreement problems and solutions and use of the internet. A more pronounced diffusion of conflict resolution in the non Western world and global establishment of conflict resolution programmes occurred. The new century saw the 9/11 attacks and subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.³⁶

The 9/11 attacks made terrorism a strategic threat³⁷ and led to a massive upsurge in terrorism related literature: In the period 2000-2001 seven out of 102 articles in the journals *Terrorism and Political Violence* and *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* were on Muslim extremism or a Middle Eastern topic, but by 2007 39 of 80 articles were on al-Qaeda or 9/11 related topics.³⁸ The effect on total output was that it almost doubled. From 1995- 2001 there had been 1310 non-fiction books published with the word 'terrorism' in the title, but from September 2001 to June 2008 there 2281, in 2000 there were 133 recorded articles on terrorism, by

³⁴ Wilkinson, op cit.

³⁵ Stephan Ryan "Conflict transformation: reasons to be modest" in: Sandole, Byrne, Sandole-Staroste & Senehi (eds), op cit, pp 303-314.

³⁶ Kriesberg, op cit.

³⁷ Wilkinson, op cit

³⁸ Ranstorp, op cit

2007 there were 502. The post 9/11 period also saw the emergence of new journals on terrorism, *Critical Studies on Terrorism & Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict*.³⁹ An important aspect of the period since the 9/11 attacks is the emergence of Critical Terrorism Studies, which has led to the academic field now encompassing orthodox, moderate and critical theories.⁴⁰

Conflict studies and terrorism studies have both increasingly crossed disciplines in their attempts to develop frameworks and theory⁴¹ and in the new wars/old wars and new terrorism/old terrorism context their methods and subjects of analysis have become complementary and have laid ground for the incorporation of theories from conflict studies into terrorism studies. The historical account of these academic fields above leads to the conclusion that there is a convergence of interests due to the change in the nature of conflict and how it is understood. The following section addresses international conflict in the period after the end of the Cold War. Intrastate conflict has been present throughout the twentieth century but has been overshadowed by mass destruction of the two total wars and the nuclear menace of the Cold War. The period that followed was very different.

Post Cold War developments: Twenty-five years of conflict.

The end of the Cold War brought about a new era of optimism. The tearing down of the Berlin Wall, collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and breakup of the Soviet Union saw the end of the bi-polar world order and with it support for proxy wars. Conflict was wound down in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Angola, Mozambique and the United Nations brokered an accord that saw Vietnam withdraw from Cambodia. The subsequent ejection of Iraqi forces from Kuwait by a United States led coalition that included Western and Arab states underlined

³⁹ Andrew Silke "Contemporary terrorism studies: issues in research" in: Jackson, Breen Smith & Gunning (eds), op cit, pp 34-48

⁴⁰ These are discussed in chapter four.

⁴¹ Oliver Ramsbotham *Transforming Violent Conflict: Radical Disagreement, Dialogue and Survival* (Routledge: Abingdon:2010).

hopes of brave new world in which the United States would act as global policeman under the auspices of the UN.⁴²

The next decade saw these hopes dashed. In Algeria the democratic project was cut short when the Army realised that the Islamist FIS would win and a bloody decade long civil war erupted, resulting in the massacre of entire towns and a death toll that would approach 100,000 people.⁴³ In Central Africa the decades long animosity between Hutu and Tutsi escalated from massacres to genocide as up to a million Tutsis and moderate Hutus were slaughtered⁴⁴, an event that had been prepared in advance and took place using machetes.⁴⁵ In Europe, Yugoslavia splintered, Slovenia broke away without violence, Croatia did not, and from the horror in Bosnia Herzegovina a new term entered the lexicon of international relations: 'ethnic cleansing'.⁴⁶ In the Caucasus during 1991 the Chechen secessionists broke free of the Russian Federation and Russia prevaricated for three years before launching an ill fated invasion that led to a bloody 21 month war.⁴⁷ In Iraq, a Kurdish uprising after the 1991 war was crushed by Iraqi forces, a continuation of an oppression that had included the gassing of the Kurdish population towards the end of the Iran-Iraq war.⁴⁸ Nor did the United States escape untouched: a humanitarian mission to Somalia under the auspices of the United Nations underwent mission creep, resulting in a bloody fire-fight in the capital and their subsequent withdrawal.⁴⁹

Such events would indicate that the post Cold War period would be one of increased violence, that without the dominant paradigm of the Cold War conflicts

⁴² Lincoln P Bloomfield & Allen Moulton *Managing International Conflict* (St Martins Press Inc: New York:1997); Peter W Galbraith *The End of Iraq: How American Incompetence Created a War Without End* (Simon & Shuster UK Ltd:2007).

⁴³ Remy Leveau *Algeria: Adversaries in Search of Uncertain Compromises* (Chaillot Paper 4:Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union: Alencon, France: 1992); H Saleh 'Algeria tries to escape the nightmare' *The World Today* April 1997, pp92-94.

⁴⁴ Dixon Kamukama, *Rwanda Conflict-Its Roots and Regional Implications* (Kampala: Fountain Publishers Ltd: 1997).

⁴⁵ Fergal Keane *Season of Blood: A Rwandan Journey* (Penguin Books: London: 1996).

⁴⁶ Laura Silber and Allan Little, *The Death of Yugoslavia* (Penguin Books: London: 1996).

⁴⁷ John B Dunlop *Russia Confronts Chechnya: Roots of a Separatist Conflict* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge: 1998).

⁴⁸ Galbraith, op cit.

⁴⁹ Bloomfield & Moulton, op cit. See also: Mark Bowden *Blackhawk Down* (Corgi:London:2000).

would escalate, and the New World Order would be characterised by entrenched hatred and ethnic violence. Such a view has to be placed in the context of major conflicts that have taken place during the Cold War:

‘In a longer perspective, none of the armed conflicts initiated in the 1990s has been as devastating as some of the older conflicts. The protracted war in Afghanistan, which began in 1978, has more than 1 million deaths. The 1980s also witnessed the Iran-Iraq War with 1.2 million deaths. The Vietnam War...ended in 1975, with possibly 2 million deaths. The Nigerian Civil War in the 1960s was a disaster with 1 million deaths. The Korean War in the 1950s reportedly led to 2 million deaths.’⁵⁰

It can be argued that the above is over a longer timescale, but the list is far from complete, and the 1980s wars in Afghanistan and between Iran and Iraq alone demonstrate that armed conflicts such as those in Algeria and the Former Yugoslavia are not unprecedented. Arguably, the genocide in Rwanda stands out, as an outbreak of mass murder that claims approaching one million lives in a period over only 99 days⁵¹ is horrific. However, even this is not without precedent. Taking ‘total genocide’ in the twentieth century only, there are three other instances in which an attempt was made to destroy or exterminate a people: the Turkish genocide against the Armenians (1914-1923); the Holocaust (1933-1945); and the Khmer Rouge in Kampuchea against minorities, the Cham nation and urban classes (1975-1979).⁵² However, we are concerned here with conflict during the post Cold war period. The above has established that the shocks of the 1990 were not unprecedented, or new, but represent a continuation of violence. The causes and geo-politics may be different, but the outcomes are similar in that the violence is endemic, brutal, and for the most part, outside of the Clausewitzian style of warfare.

A general picture of the nature of armed conflict since 1989 indicates that despite the tragedies outlined above armed conflict in the world has decreased since 1989. Based on data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Project that takes into

⁵⁰ Wallensteen, op cit, p27.

⁵¹ Christian P Scherrer *Ethnicity, Nationalism and Violence: Conflict Management, Human Rights and Multilateral Regimes* (Ashgate Publishing Ltd: Aldershot: 2003).

⁵² Ibid.

account the number of conflicts as well as the location of conflicts, an overview can be inferred of the incidence of armed conflicts by year by type. Taking total conflicts, initially there was a rise from 48 armed conflicts in 1989 to a peak of 54 in 1992, which then dropped to 47 in 1993, and 35 in 1995. The total number of conflicts in 2002 was the lowest at 31. When broken down to a typology of intrastate, internationalised intrastate and interstate conflicts the picture is dominated by intrastate armed conflict. This rose from 43 in 1989 to a peak of 52 in 1991, dropping to 33 in 1995 and 26 in 2002. The internationalised intrastate category in which either or both sides receives outside support underwent an increase from 3 in 1997 to 6 in 1999 and dropped again to 4 in 2002, in 1989 there were two of these. Taken together, there was still a decrease in armed conflict of the intrastate type between 1989 and 2002. Overall, the figures indicate that armed conflict had decreased and it was predominately of the intrastate type.⁵³ The initial upsurge after 1989 can be largely attributed to the breakup of the Soviet Union and Former Yugoslavia, which gave nationalist and ethnic sentiments room to breathe, and a Central African regional conflict complex that initially centred around the Hutu-Tutsi conflict. It should be noted that despite a decrease in the number of armed conflicts globally there was still a large amount of conflicts ongoing and as some were settled others began.⁵⁴

The new century was barely two years old when the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York occurred. This event, for it truly was an event of the highest magnitude, defined the course of the first decade of the 21st century. As it drew to a close the United States led ISAF forces remained entrenched in Afghanistan with fading political support at home. Moreover, the British and Americans had only just withdrawn from their ill-fated excursion into Iraq. A consequence of the Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts is that attention has been drawn from the numerous other conflicts that are ongoing across the world. These conflicts are often protracted and driven by ethnicity, identity or religion and

⁵³ Mikael Eriksson & Peter Wallensteen 'Armed Conflict, 1989-2003' *Journal of Peace Research* Vol 41 (2004), No 5, pp625-636.

⁵⁴ Wallensteen, op cit.

include the Israeli-Palestinian, Kashmir, the Caucasus and the Great Lakes region of Central Africa.

The most notable change in how armed conflict is perceived has been the transition from a Cold War dynamic, dominated by the dangerous rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, their alliances in the form of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and various proxy associations across the globe. Whilst this was at heart an ideological confrontation between capitalism and Marxist-Leninism it was also driven by fear and the perception that the other side was a major threat. The emergence of nuclear weapons and their integration into the arsenals of the East and West gave credible reasons for this fear, yet the major Cold War confrontations never took place directly between them. The wars, when they did occur were in the other 'third' world: the Middle East, Korea, Vietnam and Afghanistan are examples. Then it ended, unexpectedly.⁵⁵ The false dawn of the New World Order and the 'cases from hell' in the 1990s; Algeria, Chechnya, Rwanda and Yugoslavia, coupled with the launching of the Global War on Terror by the United States in the 2000s have led to the question of what the nature of contemporary warfare actually is.

For now, regular warfare between states is rare, and has relatively low potential to increase in the immediate future. The obvious concern is that there is still 'potential' for a major conflict to occur as there are numerous national rivalries where there is a risk of escalation to interstate war. Examples are: The United States and Russia/China, Greece and Turkey, India and Pakistan, the United States/South Korea and North Korea, and the 'strategic surprise' of unknown versus unknown. The last recognises that war can come as a total surprise, as the United States realised in 1941.⁵⁶ For the populations of the Cold War warriors the threat of annihilation has receded, yet it would be a major omission to forget that they have their nuclear deterrents permanently deployed. Yet, as we have seen above, intrastate conflict has increased and irregular warfare, which includes insurgency, guerrilla warfare, and terrorism, is endemic. This has led to the argument that war

⁵⁵ For an introduction, see: John Lewis Gaddis *The Cold War* (Penguin:London:2007).

⁵⁶ Colin S Gray *Another Bloody Century* (London:Phoenix:2006).

has been transformed and a new form of warfare has become the dominant grand narrative, replacing interstate war.

'New War' arguments were put forward prior to the 9/11 attacks, in short, the focus was now on identity instead of territory and there is more use of guerrilla or terrorist tactics, as put forward in Mary Kaldor's examination of the Bosnian tragedy. The economics of warfare has also changed as actors are no longer dependent on states to obtain funding or armaments.⁵⁷ The shift in the nature of warfare is characterised by the shift to asymmetrical conflicts with major actors being warlords, mercenaries and terrorist groups. Violence, when it occurs, is increasingly directed against civilians with little actual fighting between organised forces. The change from organised 'classical' warfare between states to non-state actors, and bearing more similarity to the Thirty Years War has been a gradual, rather than sudden one. Whereas the modern warfare of the American Civil War and World Wars was characterised by state-building, the new wars are state-disintegrating.⁵⁸ Martin Van Creveld also observes that there has been a gradual transformation in the nature of warfare, arguing that there has been a change from the Clausewitz's state centred model of warfare to one that is more complex. The wars fought by the dominant military powers after the Second World War, including the British and the French, the United States and the Soviet Union, invariably led to the opposing insurgent forces winning, in the face of overwhelming, often brutal force and despite significant numbers of casualties. War has become predominantly low-tech, utilising small resources and based around ethnicity, religion and the tribe.⁵⁹ In essence, warfare across the globe has become dominated by goals and tactics that are utterly alien to the high tech and heroic ideal of that practised by the professional militaries of the nation-state. This is not to say that they are not superior when committed directly against a foe, the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate how effective Western armed forces can be against both conventional and non-conventional forces. The problems arise

⁵⁷ Kaldor, op cit.

⁵⁸ Herfried Munkler *The New Wars* (Polity Press:Cambridge:2005).

⁵⁹ Van Creveld, op cit.

when they attempt to occupy and control territory and are then vulnerable to the low tech and insurgent/guerrilla tactics of local forces.⁶⁰

The transition in the nature of war in the decade before the 9/11 attacks and the decade or more that followed has brought terrorism to the forefront for the major powers, who for now are the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States). In the contemporary security environment divisions, which were once conceptually clear, are no longer so:

‘Thus, the divisions between war, peace, low intensity and high-intensity conflict, and terrorism, between friend and enemy, soldier, criminal, and civilian have become relatively indistinct...’⁶¹

With these divisions broken down, the new wars and new terrorism become merged, for the GWOT, or ‘terror wars’, between the United States and allies and Al Qaeda and affiliated groups are the dominant conflict, yet this overlaps with localised conflicts involving governments, good and bad, against challenger groups. Some of the old conflicts remain, with the Israelis and the Palestinians an example, major power rivalries continue, such as the United States and Russia, and local rivalries such as that between Taiwan and China have the potential to draw in the United States into a major conflagration. Old wars, new wars, and strategic surprises abound, offering fertile ground for the conflict analyst and conflict resolver alike.

Social science and the study of human conflict.

The study of conflict has a long history. Writers such as Clausewitz and Machiavelli discussed war in terms of policy, St Thomas Aquinas and other Moralists discussed

⁶⁰ For an account of the Iraq War demonstrating how effectively the British and American’s invaded Iraq see: John Keegan *The Iraq War* (Huchinson:London:2004). For Afghanistan, see: Stephen Tanner *Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the War Against the Taliban* (Da Capo Press: Philadelphia:2009).

⁶¹ Oliver P Richmond ‘Realising hegemony? Symbolic terrorism and the roots of conflict’ *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* No 26 (2003) pp289-309.

moral justifications for war.⁶² In Sociology Marx discussed social conflict, focusing solely on class conflict, Simmel laid the foundations for the study of conflict as constructive and was analysed and restated by Coser, as was Marx by Dahrendorf.⁶³ Also, the twentieth century discipline of international relations has early forebears in Hobbes “state of nature” and Thucydides history of the Peloponnesian Wars.⁶⁴ In short, for the student of conflict there are volumes of material available from across the ages that describe the conduct of war and later, the nature of human conflict.

The sources of human conflict can be understood as both inherent and socialised, or nature versus nurture. Put another way, there are behavioural arguments and sociological arguments. The short review below considers two aspects: the nature of aggression and conflict, including violence, as a functional aspect of societal interaction.

The study of innate aggression has a long and controversial history. A principal problem is that it is grounded in the study of animals and then generalisation to humans, one that is often flawed by studying captive animals who have been demonstrated to behave differently in their natural habitats, and the fact that that humans can design their society and so have more opportunities to adapt.⁶⁵ However, a generally accepted conclusion is that much of human aggression is innate and linked to frustration related to gratification, although this relates primarily to how the individual perceives it.⁶⁶ Also, whilst it can be argued that instinctual drives that served primitive society are still present, and so we should not be surprised when they are manifested in conflict, there is need for modification when considering aggression in more modern human society.⁶⁷ Studies from psychology demonstrate that aggression and hostility can be displaced and projected from the real object of frustration to a scapegoat when it is not

⁶² Nicholson, op cit, p 14.

⁶³ Robert C Angell “The sociology of human conflict.” In: Elton McNeil (ed) *The Nature of Human Conflict* (Prentice Hall International Inc: 1965) pp 91-115.

⁶⁴ Bloomfield & Moulton, op cit, p 5.

⁶⁵ Nicholson, op cit.

⁶⁶ Elton B McNeil “The nature of aggression” in: Elton B McNeil (ed) op cit, pp 14-41

⁶⁷ Nicholson, op cit.

feasible to confront the original source directly, and that we are subject to selective recall, preferring arguments that reflect our point of view, and a perceptual constancy to facts that resists contradiction.⁶⁸ This would imply that aggression, and therefore violence, is inherent and will always happen, a conclusion that can be qualified by the prevalence of conflict across history. As a generalisation this is undermined by observing one's own actions: how much of the day is taken up by conflict and how much by making tea and watching television? Extended across a period of days or weeks this Weberian mental experiment may reveal some periods of conflict but mostly periods of non-conflict.⁶⁹ From the above, it can be argued that there are instinctual drives towards conflict, however it does not have to be taken as read that there will be conflict as a result.

On the understanding that aggression is inherent although not deterministic, the idea of conflict as functional or constructive is addressed. The idea that conflict is constructive was explored by Simmel:

'the central idea in Simmel's essay is that conflict is constructive. It is his belief not only that it gives rise to social change, as Marx would have it, but also that in many ways it is immediately integrative. This of course is obvious in the case of external conflict producing internal integration...but it is not at all obvious that (and perhaps it is questionable) that internal conflict gives rise to internal integration or that external conflict unifies the antagonists.'⁷⁰

Coser reduced Simmel's famous essay to sixteen propositions that demonstrated conflict as functional. It should be noted that he did not claim that all groups would be strengthened by conflict or that every type of conflict will benefit group structure:

'Our discussion of the distinction between types of conflict, and between types of social structures, leads us to conclude that conflict tends to be dysfunctional for a social structure in which there is no or insufficient toleration and institutionalization of conflict. The intensity of a conflict which threatens to "tear apart," which attacks

⁶⁸ Ross Stagner "The psychology of human conflict" in: Elton B McNeil (ed) op cit, pp 45-63.

⁶⁹ Keith Webb 'Science, biology and conflict' *Paradigms* Vol 6, No 1 (1992) pp65-96. Accessed online at <http://snipe.ukc.ac.uk/international/papers.dir/webb2.html>.25/08/98.

⁷⁰ Robert C Angell, op cit, p 98.

the consensual basis of a social system is related to the rigidity of the structure. What threatens the equilibrium of such a structure is not conflict as such, but the rigidity itself which permits hostilities to accumulate and to be channelled along one major line of cleavage once they break out in conflict.⁷¹

There are two aspects of Coser's argument that should be mentioned here. Firstly, he noted the importance of institutional 'safety-valves' to provide displacement for hostility, allowing for the release of tension and thereby channelling social conflict 'away from the original unsatisfactory relationship into one in which the actor's goal is no longer the attainment of specific results'.⁷² Secondly, he distinguishes between realistic conflicts that are the result of the frustration of specific demands, thereby allowing for an adjustment in how parties interact, and non-realistic conflicts, which are occasioned by non-specific tensions on the part of one or both parties. The latter does not allow for functional alternatives to be explored that stop short of conflict. Coser later discussed the merits of violence in the social structure. In a discussion of the Luddite movement and Watts riots he makes two distinctions: that whilst observers may attribute the violent behaviour of the actors involved as irrational it may not be so from the point of the actors themselves, and that even where irrational behaviour is found it 'nevertheless serves latent positive functions for the group engaged in conflict.'⁷³

The argument that conflict is inherent and can also be functional does not carry with it an acceptance that it is a necessarily good condition. The emphasis in the literature had a strong emphasis on the source of conflicts on the understanding that it was a costly social problem; through identifying sources it would be possible to reduce or eliminate conflict. There was also an acceptance by social scientists that there was no single cause of conflict but instead multiple causalities. Any framework would require conflict to be understood as a concept and typology, and take into account the conditions and context, parties involved

⁷¹ Lewis A Coser *The Functions of Social Conflict* (Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd: London: 1956), p 157.

⁷² *ibid*, p 156.

⁷³ Lewis A Coser *Continuities in the Study of Social Conflict* (Collier-Macmillan Ltd: London: 1967) p 93.

and the interaction between them; in effect, a system.⁷⁴ The idea that conflict is either functional or dysfunctional carries with it the suggestion that there can be some kind of cost calculation as to whether or not a conflict is functional. It can be argued that to evaluate the functionality of a given conflict three levels should be taken into account: the parties who are involved, factions, and individuals within the parties and the social system in which the conflict is taking place. Such considerations affect the parties in a dispute and have implications for conflict resolution in that if a conflict is demonstrated to be functional in a particular respect, for example giving status to otherwise low status groups, then alternatives can be sought that will give the status without the need for conflict.⁷⁵

According to North et al, when applied to the relations within and between groups, conflict can result in two clearly distinguishable outcomes:

‘[It] may result in the destruction or disruption of all or certain of the bonds of unity which may previously have existed between the disputants.’⁷⁶

Alternatively:

‘[It] may strengthen the pre-existing ties or contribute to the establishment of unifying bonds where previously none existed.’⁷⁷

North et al identify four ways that conflicting parties can deal with a conflict: 1) withdrawal from contact, 2) domination by one party, 3) compromise and 4) free integration on the basis of equality. Of these, only the first does not allow integration, although the second can be a strong motivator for further conflict. The third allows for the exploration of unsatisfied needs at the roots of the conflict and identify common interests. The fourth involves the parties engaging in a cooperative effort that is based on free consent.⁷⁸ Competition and cooperation processes within and between groups have been extensively researched by Morton

⁷⁴ Raymond W Mack & Richard C Snyder ‘The analysis of social conflict- toward an overview and synthesis’ *Conflict Resolution* Vol 1, No 2 (1957) pp 212-248.

⁷⁵ C R Mitchell ‘Evaluating Conflict’ *Journal of Peace Research* Vol 17, No 1 (1980) pp 61-75.

⁷⁶ Robert C North, Howard E Koch Jr & Dina A Zinnes ‘The integrative functions of conflict’ *Journal of Conflict Research* Vol 4, No 3 (1960) pp 355-374 (p 355).

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

Deutsch and others. Generally cooperative behaviour involves positive characteristics including effective communication, coordination of effort, and the recognition and respect of the other through recognising the others needs. Competitive behaviour is the opposite and has negative characteristics including impaired communication, uncoordinated division of work, and repeated disagreement.⁷⁹

The above has focused on conflict from a social science perspective as a social phenomena resulting from the interaction between people and peoples, a survey which was general but not exhaustive of the theoretical contributions available. To briefly recap: we began with a discussion of the idea that aggression is inherent and then explored the idea that conflict can be functional or constructive. The discussion demonstrated that it is unsound to see aggression, and so violence, as inherent in human nature as despite humanity's long tradition of conflict there are also long periods of non-violent activity. For violence to occur requires a cause and the discussion then turned to a one of whether or not conflict can be functional or constructive; generally conflict is seen as a bad thing, however, it can be argued that where a conflict has addressed, for example, inequality and resulted in a more equitable relationship between two or more parties then it has been functional.

The question then arises of how to deal with a conflict in such a way as it remains or becomes non-violent. Conflict becomes a state of affairs, which is natural and balances the relationships between groups, and it is violence in a conflict situation which is destructive and counter-productive, not the conflict itself. The Weberian thought experiment introduced above can be modified to our asking the question: 'How much conflict do I experience in my everyday life which is non-violent?'

⁷⁹ Morton Deutsch "Cooperation and Competition" in: Morton Deutsch, Peter T Coleman & Eric C Marcus (eds) *The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice 2nd edn* (Jossey Bass: San Francisco: 2006) pp 23-42.

Theoretical Approaches

Theoretical approaches within conflict studies, and here this includes peace studies, have developed significantly since its period of consolidation, which began after the Second World War, and saw the founding of university centres dedicated to peace studies and conflict analysis and resolution and dedicated journals. The following discussion introduces theoretical contributions, which are paradigmatic in terms of their impact, and critical theory based approaches, which challenge and complement them. The intention is to compare and contrast the approaches in the terms of their applicability to the subject of study and what they can do to help us to understand it better. There are four overall: Galtung's relational model, Burton's human needs approach, conflict transformation and constructive conflict, and critical theory.

The Conflict Triangle.

The ABC triangle is a relational model developed by Johan Galtung. This has three components: the attitudes of the actors involved, their behaviour, and the contradiction (conflict), forming a structure of attitudes, behaviour and contradiction.⁸⁰ A concise description of Galtung's triangle conflict model is given by Schmid:

*'Galtung distinguishes between three aspects of conflict: the conflict itself (C) which is defined in terms of incompatible values or goals between two or more actors, the conflict behaviour (B) and the conflict attitudes (A) of the actors...the three components are mutually interrelated. Any of the three factors may be the starting point for a conflict to develop. Hostile attitudes may create hostile behaviour and also goal incompatibility. Hostile behaviour may lead to hostile attitudes and to goal incompatibility. Goal incompatibility, in turn may lead to hostile behaviour and hostile attitudes.'*⁸¹

⁸⁰ Herman Schmid 'Peace research and politics' *Journal of Peace Research* Vol 5, No 3 (1968) pp 217-232 (pp 224-225).

⁸¹ *Ibid*

What at first is a simple proposition that a conflict can start at one of three points (but must involve all three) becomes more complex when we consider what the attitudes, behaviour and contradiction are and how they actually interrelate. A founder of the Peace Research tradition, Galtung also distinguished between 'negative peace' in the form of 'the absence of organised collective forms of violence'⁸² and 'positive peace', which he originally defined as 'integration' but found unsatisfactory⁸³ and later reformulated to mean the ending of structural violence (due to poverty) and cultural violence (blindness to poverty or its justification).⁸⁴ Galtung still retains the conflict triangle in his recent work, linking the conflict triangle of attitudes-behaviour-contradiction to a conflict triangle of deep attitudes-deep behaviour-deep contradiction.⁸⁵

The benefits of using the conflict triangle as a means of analysis lie in its applicability to the themes of convergence and interdisciplinarity outlined in the introduction. It is in itself a theory, which encourages an interdisciplinary approach, as by contradiction we can infer environment and so sociological aspects, by attitudes we can infer psychological aspects, and by behaviour we can infer action intended to influence the contradiction and the attitudes of the other actor(s). Mitchell developed Galtung's triangle further into one for international conflict, demonstrating its potential for adaptation and change in a given context.⁸⁶ The conflict triangle will be discussed further below.

Human needs.

Burton's human needs approach and Azar's protracted social conflict are now considered. Burton based his approach on Abraham Maslow's hierarchy of human needs. For Burton, human needs are universal and if they are not met within society frustration, and consequently, conflict will result. For a state to be legitimate it needs to fulfil human *needs* (for example, growth and development),

⁸² Johan Galtung, cited in Schmid, *ibid* p 223.

⁸³ Schmid, *op cit*.

⁸⁴ Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, *op cit*.

⁸⁵ Johan Galtung "Introduction: peace by peaceful conflict transformation- The TRANSEND approach" in: Charles Webel & Johan Galtung *Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies* (Routledge: Abingdon: 2007) pp 14-32.

⁸⁶ Mitchell (1981, *op cit*).

which are universal and primordial in nature, *values* (customs and beliefs) and *interests* (relating to material goods such as occupation), which relate to the aspirations of both the individual and identity groups.⁸⁷ According to Burton needs and values are non-negotiable whereas interests are negotiable. This is because needs are 'inherent drives for survival and development, including identity and recognition'.⁸⁸ Also, Burton and Dukes observe that strongly held values can imply needs such as identity and thus for practical purposes can be treated as needs, moreover needs have implications for conflict in that situations which already involve needs 'do not respond to coercive measures or bargaining and negotiation.'⁸⁹ For these reasons, where a conflict is at the level of human needs it is likely to be intractable. According to Burton, regimes, which believe they lack a legitimised foundation because they have been unable to satisfy human needs and aspirations, become more defensive or oppressive.⁹⁰ Edward Azar, with Burton and others, developed the basic human needs approach to explain protracted social conflicts. These:

'result from the denial of basic needs that are fundamentally connected to the issues of identity, including the ability to develop a collective identity, to have that identity recognised by others, and to have fair access to the systems and structures that support and define the conditions that allow for the achievement and building of identity.'⁹¹

Azar observed that identity related conflicts, of a social, prolonged and violent nature, were on the increase after the Second World War. Whilst typically in the 'third' world, Northern Ireland and Cyprus are examples of this. An important aspect is that instead of the state it 'is the identity group – racial, religious, ethnic, cultural and others'⁹² that is the 'most useful unit of analysis in protracted social

⁸⁷ John Burton *Conflict: Resolution and Provention* (Macmillan Press Ltd: Basingstoke: 1990).

⁸⁸ *Ibid*, p 39.

⁸⁹ John Burton and Frank Dukes *Conflict: Readings in Management and Resolution* (Macmillan Press Ltd: Basingstoke: 1990), p 8.

⁹⁰ Burton, *op cit*.

⁹¹ Celia Cook Huffman "Identity and conflict" in: Sandole, Byrne, Sandole-Staroste & Senehi (eds) pp 19-31 (pp 22).

⁹² Edward Azar "Protracted international conflicts: Ten propositions" in: Burton, *op cit*, pp 145-155 (pp 147-148).

conflict situations.⁹³ The state served only to 'satisfy or frustrate basic communal needs, thus preventing or promoting conflict.'⁹⁴

The human needs approach has been very influential and Azar's concept of protracted social conflict not only provided insight into the conflicts of its time but also is arguably explanatory of the conflicts of the twenty-first century. It has also proved durable. The recent textbook *Contemporary Conflict Resolution* draws on and develops Azar's work.⁹⁵ Given that the Basque Country and Northern Ireland are two of the conflicts which informed Azar's theory, it is a promising method for the study undertaken here. The focus on the needs of an identity group in relation to the state, and Azar's argument is that the identity group is the most useful unit of analysis in such conflicts, leads us to consider the importance of republicanism and Basque and Corsican nationalism. In analysis chapters the depth of commitment of sub-state actors to their respective causes will be seen and it is worthwhile to consider that if the human needs related to national identity are met then there is a possibility of conflict resolution. A state that demonstrates its recognition of the need for identity will satisfy rather than frustrate nationalist actors and, potentially at least, resolve the conflict.

However, the human needs approach has its limitations. Firstly, it is conflict resolution orientated and relies on workshops to achieve its aims, requiring the actors involved to accept the idea of the conflict being resolved to their mutual consent and engage in a discourse.⁹⁶ In order for the ethno-nationalist/separatist actor to perceive the conflict as resolved requires the very thing that the more powerful state actor is unlikely to allow: independence (a zero-sum outcome contrary to human needs theory, which assumes non-zero sum outcomes). Secondly, membership of an armed group offers, for example, prestige and empowerment, which encourages the continued pursuit of unachievable aims: where the identification is with armed struggle peace brings loss of status and the

⁹³ Ibid, p 147.

⁹⁴ Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, op cit.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ For a description of how the conflict resolution workshop can be used see: Christopher Mitchell and Michael Banks *Handbook of Conflict Resolution: The Problem Solving Approach* (Pinter:London:1996).

prospect of being usurped by more militant elements if they engage in a dialogue with the state (one unlikely to achieve their aims). A third problem is that coercion as a form of response is rejected, due to needs being non-negotiable, and consequently one aspect of the analysis here, which is the utility of coercion within the counter-terrorist response, is seen as part of the problem instead of the solution. Finally, there is the possibility that a conflict is transformed from violence to non-violence instead of resolution.

Conflict transformation and constructive conflict

The intractability and protracted nature of some conflict situations has led to thinking beyond conflict resolution towards either transforming conflicts or so that they are pursued constructively. Such approaches are not simply a move forward from the roots debate but represent attempts to treat conflict as a situation that is multilevel and multidimensional. Put succinctly:

‘Given the complexity of much contemporary conflict, attempts at conflict resolution have to be equally comprehensive.’⁹⁷

Pragmatic approaches to conflict resolution work well in organised society, allowing rational approaches to be used and conflict to be managed. In disorganised society, bereft of rules, whether written or unwritten, rational approaches are not easily applied: much of the violence in today’s world ‘is more fragmented, complex, and unmanageable.’⁹⁸ This is not to say that problem solving approaches cannot be used, but instead that they be part of a more holistic approach. The transformation approach is distinguished by some key features: Firstly it aims at conflict transformation that is deep and profound, looking at the ‘broader environment within which violent conflict takes place.’⁹⁹ Secondly, there is an emphasis on

⁹⁷ Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, op cit, p 104.

⁹⁸ Raimo Vayrynen “From conflict resolution to conflict transformation: a critical review” in: Ho-Won Jeong (ed) *The New Agenda for Peace Research* (Ashgate Publishing Ltd: Aldershot: 1999) pp 135-160 (p 159).

⁹⁹ Ryan, op cit, p 304.

working at the grassroots level. Thirdly, as the emphasis is on profound change there is an understanding that it will take time.¹⁰⁰

The emphasis on a grassroots approach does not mean that other levels are excluded, as evidenced by the approach taken by John Paul Lederach. Here a population affected by a conflict is presented as a pyramid, with three levels: the grassroots leadership, numerous and living day to day; the middle range leadership who have some influence; and the top level leadership who have power but are highly visible and as a consequence locked into their positions. Whilst it is the grassroots that drives transformation, it is the middle level that serves as a link with the top level. Peace building, via methods appropriate to the level, can be pursued at all levels, however:

‘an integrative, comprehensive approach points toward the functional need for *recognition, inclusion, and coordination* across all levels and activities.’¹⁰¹

Finally, Lederach emphasises a focus on the ‘epicenter’ of a conflict, the web of relational patterns from which ‘episodes’ of conflict emerge.¹⁰²

Linked to the ideas of conflict transformation is the concept of ‘ripeness’ and the associated notion of ‘hurting stalemates’, both of which were formulated by I William Zartman prior to the end of the Cold War. Zartman took the idea that parties to a conflict are rational actors, making decisions and pursuing strategies prior to engaging in conflict on the basis of rational considerations, and turned it on its head, proposing that they will also make rational calculations towards ending a conflict.¹⁰³ The notion of ripeness was developed with regard to potential moments for mediators to intervene when there are favourable conditions for settlement.¹⁰⁴ A conflict can be seen as ‘ripe’ for resolution when a set of circumstances arrives in

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ John Paul Lederach *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (United States Institute of Peace: Washington D.C: 1997) p 60.

¹⁰² John Paul Lederach *The Little Book of Conflict Transformation* (Good Books: Intercourse, PA: 2003).

¹⁰³ Wallensteen, op cit.

¹⁰⁴ Karin Aggestam ‘Reframing international conflicts: “Ripeness” in international mediation’ *Paradigms* Vol 9, No 2 (1995) Accessed online at <http://snipe.ukc.ac.uk/international/paradigms.dir/aggastam.html> 18/03/98.

the form of a 'mutually hurting stalemate' or 'mutually enticing opportunity'.¹⁰⁵ A hurting stalemate can come about when both sides are exhausted and there is no prospect of victory, where neither side is significantly hurt but cannot defeat the other, or when both sides are frustrated as they realise they cannot achieve a clear cut victory. The more optimistic enticing opportunity comes about through the parties to a conflict perceiving that they have other opportunities to slogging on with an ongoing and costly struggle.¹⁰⁶ It should be noted that a difficulty is that this is in retrospect:

'One can never know that the conditions are ripe for a particular de-escalation. One discovers whether or not that is the case by trying.'¹⁰⁷

There may also be opportunities for third parties to enhance ripeness and so create a situation where a conflict can be moved to de-escalation.¹⁰⁸

Also linked to the idea of transformation is waging conflict constructively. It would be simplistic to state that conflicts are either constructive or destructive, the two represent a dimension. However, it can be argued that a constructive conflict can be understood as one, in which violence and coercion are avoided and adversaries recognise each other's legitimacy and right to exist, moving toward mutually acceptable outcomes.¹⁰⁹ Inherent in this is that conflict can be either functional or dysfunctional in that it can result in a change in oppressive relations and so positive social change through non-violent conflict, or violence, based on hostile interactions and subject to escalatory spirals.¹¹⁰ It is also possible to escalate a conflict constructively via non-violent action to resolve an underlying social conflict or offer non-coercive inducements, although escalation is generally of the

¹⁰⁵ Karin Aggestam "Enhancing ripeness: Transition from conflict to negotiation" in: I William Zartman & Guy Oliver Faure (eds) *Escalation and Negotiation in International Conflicts* (Cambridge University Press: 2005) pp 271-292.

¹⁰⁶ Christopher Mitchell 'The right moment: Notes on four models of ripeness' *Paradigms* Vol 9, No 2 (1995) Accessed online at <http://snipe.ukc.ac.uk/international/paradigms.dir/mitchell.html> 18/03/98.

¹⁰⁷ Louis Kriesberg, cited in Aggestam (1995), op cit.

¹⁰⁸ Aggestam, 2005, op cit.

¹⁰⁹ Louis Kriesberg "Waging conflict constructively" in: Sandole, Byrne, Sandole-Staroste & Senehi (eds), op cit, pp 157-169.

¹¹⁰ Ho Won Jeong *Understanding Conflict and Conflict Analysis* (Sage Publications Ltd: London: 2008).

destructive nature. Even after a destructive conflict has ended, including those of a protracted nature involving gross violations of human rights, there are still means by which a constructive peace can be sought. These include reconciliation, compensation, justice in the form of punishment of the perpetrators of human rights violations, and the provision of security.¹¹¹

The idea that a conflict can be transformed from violence to a non-violent constructive conflict is a major conceptual development beyond that of human needs. Lederach does not reject pragmatic conflict resolution outright, instead including it in a more holistic framework. The aim is to transform the conflict to one where there is recognition and inclusion at grassroots, middle, and top levels of leadership with the grassroots driving transformation. Kriesberg, returning the discussion back to the earlier concerns of conflict as functional and/or constructive, observes that a constructive conflict is one in which the actors avoid violence and coercion. When the two are combined the idea that a conflict can be transformed from one that is destructive and violent to one that is constructive and nonviolent, instead of resolution, comes into perspective.

A transformative-constructive approach is one that is more conducive to ending violence than the more limited aims of conflict resolution and represents an end goal for conflict analysts and peace researchers to consider. Moreover, 'transformation', as was introduced by Lederach, is as much an idea or philosophy as it is an approach. The three cases under study here are not the disorganised societies which Lederach's holistic approach addresses (it should be noted that Lederach did do work in Northern Ireland), yet they have also proved to be resistant to resolution and the more realistic idea of transformation is more applicable: violence is removed, but the conflict remains. As such, the underlying idea of the transformative-constructive approach is one that is complementary to the framework of analysis used in this thesis, in which the focus is conflict analysis over conflict resolution.

¹¹¹ Kriesberg (2009), op cit.

A difficulty in applying the transformative-constructive approach alone is that it relies on conflict resolution and mediation to achieve its goal of conflict transformation¹¹² and this effectively means that the parties involved need to engage in a discourse to move the conflict to a state where violence is reduced, or ideally actually absent, and becomes a constructive one, in which there is reconciliation. Lederach has disorganised societies in mind and the commitment involved in what is a long term process, Lederach allows for over twenty years, is immense and ambitious. For the parties involved to reach the point of discourse requires years of patient mediation and intervention and the establishment of a level of security in which the parties feel able to talk. The three cases which are analysed here are asymmetrical ones between powerful state actors and challenger groups in which the societies are highly organised. Nor, as with human needs, is there allowance for the state to use the coercive measures that the monopoly of violence within its borders and responsibility for the security of its citizens requires. In order to understand the comparative benefits of coercion and conciliation in countering domestic terrorist organisations the use of coercive measures has to be considered. Such organisations rationalise their position, as per Zartmann, but for them to reach the point of negotiation they need to accept that the military option is not a viable means of achieving their goals. The question is to what the level of coercion should be to allow the benefits of conflict transformation to be seen: a conflict will not be transformed by coercive means alone, peaceful means are essential, but there also needs to be an environment in which the benefits of transforming a violent conflict to a constructive one can be seen.

Constructivism and critical theory

The fourth theoretical contribution to conflict analysis and resolution theory is the application of constructivism and critical theory. Treating the two as the same belies the divisions within this area of theory although in the literature they are inextricably interlinked.

¹¹² See: Lederach (1997), op cit, chapter four.

Constructivism is 'a theoretical lens and set of conceptual tools and not a substantive theory in itself'¹¹³ and many of the concerns of constructivism can be found in the early conflict and peace studies, as such it is not a rival approach but a complementary one. Constructivism can be understood to have five main themes: 1) at the core is the social construction of reality and how it explains social change; 2) 'agents and structures are inter-dependent and co-constitutive.'¹¹⁴ 3) a commitment to 'ideas, language, symbols and other discursive processes as constitutive – of identities, interests, beliefs and conceptions'¹¹⁵; 4) the understanding of normative structures; 5) a rejection of cause and effect explanations in favour of social causality.¹¹⁶

Critical theory does not take the world as it is and each problem as one to be solved according to the existing world order but instead calls into question the origins of institutions and social and power relations in the context of continuing historical change.¹¹⁷ It has been argued that Post-Cold War international relations theory should incorporate critical theory as a recovery of the idealist programme, modernised to take into account developments over the years:

'The normative purpose of critical theory is to facilitate the extension of moral and political community in international affairs.'¹¹⁸

Another aspect of critical theory is the focus on discourse, and linguistic intractability in intractable conflicts.¹¹⁹

A contribution by Vivienne Jabri uses an approach based on structuration theory and critical theory. Using this, conflict can be understood in terms of structure and agency. Human conduct is reproduced through interaction and is historically situated. War is a phenomenon that is specifically human:

¹¹³ Richard Jackson "Constructivism and conflict resolution" in: Berkovitch, Kremenyuk & Zartman, op cit pp 172-189 (p 173).

¹¹⁴ Ibid, p 175.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Robert Cox 'Social forces, states and world order: Beyond international relations theory' *Millennium* Vol 10, No 2 (1981) pp 126-155.

¹¹⁸ Andrew Linklater 'The question of the next stage in IR theory: A critical theoretical point of view.' *Millennium* Vol 21, No 1 (1992) pp 77-98.

¹¹⁹ Ramsbotham, op cit.

'Violent conflict is seen as an aspect of social systems reproduced through the dialectical interplay between agency and the structural continuities of social life. The continuity of war, is therefore, a product of the recursive character of social relations, constituted through the deeply embedded discursive and institutional practices and constitutive of these patterns in patterned social systems.¹²⁰

Whilst critical theory is relatively new to conflict analysis and international relations it is strongly influenced by the works of Habermas and Gadamer. The former is emancipator as he argues for agreement through communication that is based on a discourse of equality; within this disagreement should be approached through discourse and be present even after agreement has been reached. Gadamerian hermeneutics can be understood as the interpretation of texts using a productive dialogue in order to produce a new, shared reality.¹²¹ These are clearly reductions of complex arguments that aim to illustrate the approaches, not describe them extensively.

It can be argued that the critical theory based approaches outlined above would allow for an inter-disciplinary approach, notably the constructivist and critical theory approaches. Taking constructivism first, the themes of interdependence between agent and structure and the importance of discursive processes offer an explanation of the relationship of the individual with the structural aspects of society and the nature of the discourse between them. Critical theory, starting from the bases of questioning the basis of existing social and power relations, and placing them in the context of historical change and also focusing on discourse and linguistic intractability offers an alternative approach to state-centrism. However, whilst this study is not state-centric, as the challenger groups are the focus of the analysis, the legitimacy of the liberal democratic state to maintain security within its borders is assumed. The counter-terrorist approach of the state is not treated as infallible, but it is treated as necessary, and what the research question is trying to answer is the comparative utility of coercive and conciliatory approaches towards influencing terrorist groups towards a permanent

¹²⁰ Vivienne Jabri *Discourses on Violence: Conflict Analysis Reconsidered* (Manchester University Press: Manchester: 1996) p 173.

¹²¹ Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, op cit.

ceasefire. Critical approaches to conflict will explain the discursive relationship between actors, not forgetting that terrorism has a communicative influence beyond physical action, and will provide a critique of unequal relationships. However, as with the other approaches discussed above, the situation requires non-violent communication for progress to be made. For this to happen, the parties have to reach the point at which they will modify their goals and compromise as part of a joint project of discourse towards a new, shared, reality. This study addresses how this point is reached.

Conflict as Structure and Process

Galtung's conflict triangle was introduced above and is but one of many theoretical approaches discussed which can be used to analyse a given conflict. The reason for choosing the conflict triangle as the means of analysis in this study is in its applicability to the goals of the study. We are studying a conflict situation, in this case that between a challenger group and the successive governments of the country involved (in democracies governments have a limited time span and lengthy terrorist campaigns will outlast them). Specifically, we are looking at what impact an incumbent government can have on ending a terrorist campaign and in order to understand this we need to have an understanding of the impact of attitudes and behaviour of actors on their opponents.

An example is in how attitudes and behaviour change over time, in particular the key questions of how and why a challenger group reaches the point of permanent ceasefire. The conflict triangle also allows us to begin with the basic model of attitudes-behaviour-contradiction and then bring in the findings of terrorism studies to analyse what exactly these attitudes and behaviours are and how they impact on the contradiction and change it, generating new attitudes and behaviours. In chapter four theories of terrorism will be examined with the purpose of developing a conflict triangle specific to terrorism.

The conflict triangle forms one part of the framework of analysis outlined in chapter five, the second draws on process models, which allow a long term historical understanding of a conflict, and allow us to identify at what stage the conflict is at. This chapter closes with a further exploration of the conflict triangle and an introduction to process models of conflict.

Conflict as Structure

Having introduced Galtung's ABC triangle a consideration can be undertaken of how it has been applied. It has been used by Mitchell who took the structure and examined the component parts in more detail whilst retaining their intimate connections. A conflict can be understood as a 'situation of incompatible goals'¹²², the 'range of psychological conditions experienced by the parties involved'¹²³ and a 'set of related behaviours used to achieve the disputed goals'.¹²⁴

The three components are now introduced in turn, beginning with the conflict 'situation', which Mitchell defines as:

*'Any situation in which two or more social entities or 'parties' (however defined or structured) perceive that they possess mutually incompatible goals.'*¹²⁵

The conflict situation (or contradiction in Galtung's original formulation) is due to an incompatibility of goals between the actors involved and may involve more than two actors. In this study the primary actors under consideration are the challenger group (the FLNC, ETA and PIRA) and the government and its security forces (France, Spain and the United Kingdom), although, the actors impacting on the conflict may be more numerous. Taking Northern Ireland as an example, the conflict is at heart a clash between the Nationalists who wish to become a part of Ireland and the Unionists who wish to remain within the United Kingdom. Hence, there is a very distinct incompatibility between two actors, with the British government as a third actor. To add to this complexity, Nationalism and Unionism are represented by constitutional political parties as well as the terrorist groups on either side. It can

¹²² Mitchell (1981) op cit, p 32.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Ibid, p17.

be seen that whilst we are concerned specifically with the impact of the government's actions in ending the PIRA's terror campaign, other actors have a significant influence and cannot be discounted. The situation, or incompatibility, is more complex than it at first appears, even from the most basic assessment. For our purposes, there are differences when analysing symmetric and asymmetric conflict:

'In a symmetric conflict, the contradiction is defined by the parties, their interests, and the clash of interests between them. In an asymmetric conflict it is defined by the parties, their relationship, and the conflict of interests inherent in the relationship.'¹²⁶

This is a critical distinction: symmetric and asymmetric conflicts are very different. In the case of ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorism the challenger group cannot challenge the incumbent government directly but resorts to the strategies and tactics available to it in order to counter its weaker position. The conflict of interests between them is embedded within the relationship, whereas in a symmetric conflict they are not.

Mitchell understands conflict 'attitudes' as:

'those psychological states (both common attitudes, emotions and evaluations, as well as patterns of perception or misperception) that frequently accompany and arise from involvement in a situation of conflict.'¹²⁷

Whilst in a situation of conflict the information received is simplified in order to reduce stress and anxiety. This is referred to as cognitive consistency, or a simplified view of our environment. This affects how we information is interpreted¹²⁸, an example is the positive in-group image and negative out-group image, and selective recall, which was introduced earlier. Such processes are inherent in everyday life, but in a situation of conflict their intensity is increased and they become more frequent. It follows that a negative out-group image

¹²⁶ Ramsbotham, op cit.

¹²⁷ Mitchell (1981), p27.

¹²⁸ Mitchell (1981), op cit.

encourages perceptions such as stereotyping, polarisation, and self-fulfilling prophecy, which encourage overt conflict behaviour.

Mitchell defines conflict 'behaviour' as:

*'Actions undertaken by one party in any situation of conflict aimed as the opposing party with the intention of making that opponent abandon or modify its goals'*¹²⁹

Conflict behaviour can be understood as the strategy and tactics applied by the challenger group and government in and the aims and goals to which these pertain. Whereas conflict attitudes reflect what motivates the two parties, enabling their actions, conflict behaviour is the enabler towards achieving their goals.

Conflict as a process

The understanding of conflict as a process is inherent in much of the literature discussed above. By treating a conflict as a process it can be better understood in terms of its origins, escalation, de-escalation, and eventual resolution or transformation.

At the most basic level, a conflict can be understood to progress over time and vary in intensity throughout its existence. Beginning with its initiation a conflict will be of low intensity, becoming more intense as it escalates and plateaus into a high intensity entrapment. As the conflict de-escalates and eventually terminates the intensity is reduced. Clearly actual conflicts do not follow such a simple and linear process as conflict spirals will occur within the stages and it is difficult to be clear when a new stage has begun, however, conflicts will generally undergo such a process¹³⁰. Nor does termination mean that the conflict will not be initiated again:

'Kriesberg...adds the notion of circularity in the process of conflict,

- There is an awareness of conflict,
- strategies and tactics are used to address the conflict in some way,
- the conflict escalates and then de-escalates,
- some termination to the conflict is seen,

¹²⁹ Mitchell (1981), p29.

¹³⁰ Jeong, op cit.

- and then the outcome of the present conflict affects the way future conflicts are enacted.¹³¹

The focus of this study is predominantly with social conflicts and as such it is not enough to see conflict simply as form of violence. A conflict situation does not require violence to take place, nor is a conflict situation necessarily evident in the relations between parties, as they may have underlying tensions that affect their relationship. It is important to distinguish between latent and manifest conflict:

‘A simple solution is to define *latent* conflict as the existence of a situation of conflict (parties possessing mutually incompatible goals); and *manifest* conflict as conditions in which parties possess incompatible goals and are pursuing some overt strategy *vis-a-vis* their opponent in order to achieve their goals. Thus *latent* conflict may be regarded as a conflict situation, while *manifest* conflict is a conflict situation accompanied by overt behaviour.’¹³²

To this can be added *incipient* conflict, in which the parties have incompatible goals but one or more parties do not recognise them, and *suppressed* conflict, in which incompatible goals are recognised, but where one party is unable to challenge a stronger opponent and is effectively coerced into accepting status quo. Mitchell presents the stages of conflict as a progression through incipient, latent, and manifest conflict to termination, although these are analytical and not all conflicts have to pass through all stages. Also, conflict between parties can go through repetitive cycles that produce spirals where one conflict outcome produces the substantive issues that drive the next.¹³³

A conflict can also be treated in terms of a matrix that compares:

‘the level of power between the parties in a conflict and the level of awareness of conflicting interests and needs’¹³⁴

¹³¹ Louis Kriesberg, cited in: Roxanne S Lulofs & Dudley D Cahn *Conflict: From Theory to Action 2nd Edn* (Allyn & Bacon: London:2000), p75.

¹³² Mitchell (1981), op cit, p 49.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Lederach (1997), op cit, p 64.

This is along a continuum that moves from un-peaceful to peaceful means through four stages; latent conflict (hidden conflict due to unawareness of equality), confrontation (where inequality is recognised and addressed), negotiation (mutual recognition and cooperation) and more peaceful relations (restructuring of the conflict relationship). This model was formulated by Adam Curle.¹³⁵

An alternative model is provided by Bloomfield and Leiss. Here a conflict takes place across six dynamic phases. To begin with there is a quarrel between two or more parties over something that they value; this is not treated as a conflict, but as a *dispute* that if unresolved leads to the generation of a *conflict* as the dispute become militarised but fighting has not broken out. The third phase, *hostilities*, involves combat between organised military units that generates a significant number of casualties, and may lead to the involvement of other actors. The fourth and fifth phases are concerned with the state of affairs after the conflict is terminated; a post-hostilities, or *cessation of hostilities*, in which the original dispute remains and one actor still sees it in military terms, and a post-hostilities, in which the actors are *beyond conflict* and no longer preparing military options, but have still not resolved the dispute. The sixth phase is *settlement* in which the dispute is actually settled. There are three aspects of the model which require mention here. Firstly, the model incorporates a feedback mechanism as conflicts do not always proceed in a linear fashion between phases and may loop back and forth, for example between the cessation of hostilities and hostilities, never actually reaching a phase of beyond conflict. Secondly, it is not necessary for a conflict to pass through all stages, it is not inconceivable that actors may become militarised but seek settlement without actually fighting, or never reach settlement. Thirdly, the thresholds between stages should be seen more as convenient separations: the events that indicate a transition between phases are dynamic and interact during phases.¹³⁶

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Bloomfield & Moulton, op cit.

A final example of an approach to conflict as a process is provided by Louis Kriesberg.¹³⁷ It should be stated at the outset that Kriesberg, like those above, does not argue that a conflict will occur across clear stages, but that they will overlap. Following Kriesberg, a conflict can develop across seven stages. These are: 1) underlying conditions (bases), 2) manifestation, 3) escalation, 4) de-escalation, 5) settlement, and 6) consequences. The first of these, *bases* are the underlying conditions that have the potential to result in overt conflict and produce within parties 'a sense of grievance and the formulation of antagonistic goals'¹³⁸, although most such situations have the potential to result in manifest conflict it does not follow that they will. *Manifestation* occurs when one or more parties realises that they are adversaries have incompatible goals and start to mobilise supporters and/or try to directly influence the other party. *Escalation* is characterised by the pursuit of incompatible goals, usually, although not exclusively, through violence. Generally escalation 'refers to increases in the *severity* of coercive inducements used and increases in the *scope* of participation in a conflict.'¹³⁹ *De-escalation* occurs in all conflicts, if only temporary, and will come about due to changes between parties, within parties and/or external parties. Generally de-escalation involves a long term commitment by the parties involved and is characterised by reduced antagonism. The move to *settlement* of a conflict may come about through one party abandoning the fight, a unilateral imposition of a resolution by the stronger party or compromise, possibly with outside assistance from third parties. However, this does not mean that the conflict is resolved to the extent that it will not escalate again in the future. The *consequences* of a conflict's outcome are important, what is a resolution or transformation to one conflict may hold the bases for another. For this reason Kriesberg emphasises that seeing conflict as a cycle is misleading, it would be more accurate to perceive it in terms of a spiral, with consequences from a conflict forming the bases of the next.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁷ Louis Kriesberg *Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution 2nd Edn* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc: Oxford: 2003).

¹³⁸ *Ibid*, p 370.

¹³⁹ *Ibid*, p 159.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid*.

The introduction above has introduced four different approaches, those of Mitchell, Curle, Bloomfield and Leiss, and Kriesberg, all of which make a contribution to the understanding of conflict as a process. In chapter five this understanding will be used to develop a stage model specifically applicable to terrorism. The models of Curle and Kriesberg are general models, ones which can be applied across all conflicts in order to understand their origins, escalation and (should a given conflict reach an end) eventual transformation. In contrast, those of Mitchell and Bloomfield and Leiss are focused on international conflicts. All four have applicability to different types of violent conflict, including intra-state conflicts as they have methodologies which allow the analyst to categorise the stage or phase a given conflict is at (taking into account that transition between stages or phases may be gradual and indistinct). The advantage in identifying the stage of a given conflict is that this then allows the analyst to determine if positive change can occur or identify the potential for escalation. A model specific to terrorism would be more appropriate, as was the case with the conflict triangle, for the analysis of the three cases and this is addressed in chapter five.

Conclusion

Theories from conflict studies are the theoretical base on which a framework of analysis is to be developed with which the three cases are analysed. Conflict studies, which can be understood as incorporating the related fields of conflict analysis, conflict analysis and resolution, and peace studies, has a longer history than terrorism studies and has developed its own unique theories. Areas of academic interest reflect the nature of armed conflict at their inception: International Relations became a distinct discipline after the First World War, the nuclear bombs that ended the Second World War led to an interest in understanding the dynamics of conflict and the avoidance of nuclear war, and after the 9/11 attacks terrorism became to be seen as a strategic threat. The changing nature of conflict, and which will no doubt change again, has led to a convergence

of interests between the two related fields of conflict studies and terrorism studies, both of which have crossed disciplines to develop their frameworks and theories.

This chapter has provided the reader with a brief introduction to conflict studies and the contribution that it can make to the development a model of analysis for studying terrorism. The conflict triangle and process/stage models of conflict have been covered in more detail as they are integral to the model outlined in the methodology chapter. Within conflict studies there is a wealth of knowledge and theory that can be applied to the study of terrorism in general, including that of ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorism. The next chapter continues the application of conflict studies by investigating how terrorism theory can be applied to the conflict triangle.

Chapter Four: Terrorism Studies

Introduction

Chapter four introduces terrorism studies. As this study is concerned with ethno/nationalist terrorism the literature is predominantly weighted towards sub-state terrorism, or terrorism from 'below'. To begin, definitions and typologies are discussed, developing further the understanding of terrorism presented in the chapter one, followed by what terrorism theory has to say in the context of situation, attitudes and behaviour. As such, the chapter follows a roots based perspective towards conceptualising terrorism and recognising the importance of the history of a conflict situation. The final part of the chapter is dedicated to the understanding of how terrorism ends and compares and contrasts what leading theorists have to say on the subject. This chapter builds on the previous chapter by beginning the integration of conflict studies and terrorism studies, which is explored further in chapter five.

Terrorism and Ethno-Nationalist/Separatist Terrorism.

In this study we are concerned with a distinct type of terrorism in a specific context: Ethno-Nationalist/Separatist terrorism within liberal democracies. In order to progress any further it necessary to clarify exactly what 'terrorism' is and how the type of terrorism under study is understood. This was outlined in brief in chapter one but is addressed in more detail here. As the first is highly controversial within the terrorism studies field what follows is an introduction to the definition and typologies of terrorism, culminating in the characteristics of ethno-nationalist/Separatist terrorism as it is understood and used in this thesis.

Terrorism is very much a 'now' topic, one that has been the 'now' topic for over a decade and it is not only a controversial topic but also in how 'terrorism' is understood and defined. To take oft quoted examples, Jenkins closes his definition

criticising the 'pejorative' application of the term with the quip 'terrorism is what the bad guys do'¹: to be labelled a terrorist carries with it pejorative undertones as the terrorist is inevitably in the wrong and the forces of the state are in the right. A second, and common observation, is that one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter, one that owes its origins in the post-colonial campaigns that followed the collapse of European empires after the Second World War². We should also consider that 'theory is always for someone and some purpose'³, there is usually something to be demonstrated, an argument to be made, and terrorism is a topic that many discuss in many places. The polarisation between the 'evil' of the 'terrorist' and the 'good' of 'counter-terrorism'⁴ is aptly demonstrated than by the 'global war on terror'. Perhaps more accurately described as the 'terror war'⁵ it has also taken in the 'axis of evil', or 'rogue states', which are deemed to sponsor terrorism or are 'terrorist states' themselves.⁶ In one respect, the criticisms from within terrorism studies that terrorism is not the sole province of the sub-state actor and that states can be terrorist too have been answered with the understanding that, yes, there are states that are terrorist, but the pejorative undertones remain: there are states that are terrorist, but they are the bad, undemocratic, non-Western ones.⁷ Such a polarised black/white state of affairs has enabled the emergence of Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS).

The impact of the 9/11 attacks has led to a distinction being made between 'old' and 'new' terrorisms, one of terrorism studies newer controversies. 'Old', or 'traditional' terrorism, such as that of the IRA and ETA and FLNC, involves hierarchical groups with stated nationalist or other secular concerns and open to compromise or negotiation. They limit their actions and are wary of losing support. In contrast, the 'new' terrorism, represented by groups such as Al-Qaeda, operate

¹ Brian M Jenkins *The Study of Terrorism: Definitional Problems* Rand Paper Series P-6563 (The Rand Corporation: California: 1980).

² Bruce Hoffman *Inside Terrorism* (Columbia University Press: New York: 2006)

³ Robert Cox 'Social forces, states and world order: Beyond international relations theory' *Millennium* Vol 10, No 2 (1981) pp 126-155.

⁴ Beau Grosscup *Strategic Terror: The Politics and Ethics of Aerial Bombardment* (Zed Books: New York: 2006).

⁵ Paul Berman *Terror and Liberalism* (W.W. Norton & Company: New York: 2004).

⁶ Paul Rodgers *Global Security after the War on Terror* (Oxford Research Group: London: 2009).

⁷ David J Whittaker *Terrorists and Terrorism in the Contemporary World* (Routledge: London: 2004).

under a religious mandate or 'sacred duty', are less amenable to small scale political change and negotiation, and are more indiscriminate in their actions.⁸ Such a division is contentious, and not simply because it makes the practitioners of the old terrorism seem reasonable and those of the new fanatical. The division between the old and new terrorisms may be a controversial one, but it is an inescapable fact that the 9/11 attacks represent a benchmark for international relations and the students of conflict. Prior to 9/11 counterterrorism was typified by a law enforcement approach concerned with human rights and the rule of law; afterwards it is dominated by the military approach of the War on Terror. September 10th thinking treats terrorism as a crime, September 12th thinking treats terrorism as warfare: the military approach has always been present as one part of the counterterrorism toolbox, but post 9/11 it has come to be the main approach.⁹

The question of how terrorism is understood and defined has never been resolved: An attempt by Alex Schmid to define terrorism by asking academics to define 'terrorism' resulted in 109 definitions.¹⁰ Walter Laqueur had previously argued that to attempt to define terrorism was neither possible nor worthwhile to attempt¹¹ and in response to Schmid's request argued that after 'Ten years of debates on typologies and definitions have not enhanced our knowledge of the subject to a significant degree.'¹² According to critical terrorism studies theorists the problems associated with the term 'terrorism' 'poses significant challenges for research practice and political praxis'¹³ for terrorism studies.

⁸ Antony Field 'The 'new terrorism': Revolution or evolution?' *Political Studies Review* Vol 7, No 2 (2009) pp 195-20.

⁹ Ronald Crelinsten *Counterterrorism* (Polity:Cambridge:2009).

¹⁰ Alex P Schmid & Albert J Jongman *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and Literature* (Transaction Publishers: London:1988). Schmid's later handbook gives '250 plus' definitions of terrorism, see: Joseph J Easson & Alex P Schmid "Appendix 2.1 250-plus academic, governmental and intergovernmental definitions of terrorism" in Alex P Schmid (ed), *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research* (Routledge: Abingdon:2011) pp 99-157.

¹¹ Hoffman, op cit.

¹² Schmid & Jongman, op cit.

¹³ Richard Jackson, Marie Breen Smith & Jeroen Gunning "Critical terrorism studies: framing a new research agenda" in: Richard Jackson, Marie Breen Smith & Jeroen Gunning (eds) *Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda* (Routledge:London:2009) pp 216-236.

Here it is necessary to set out an understanding of what exactly ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorism actually is. To begin with there is 'terrorism' itself, and this can be understood as the use of violence to create fear and publicity, reaches beyond those attacked to a wider audience, and is a means to gain power and influence where little or none exists.¹⁴ This is from a largely orthodox perspective but gives a general idea of what terrorism is, albeit one leaning towards sub-state terrorism.¹⁵ The pejorative undertones attached to the word 'terrorism' can be countered in part by attributing it as something that is done, over something that one is (*a terrorist*).¹⁶ Alternatively, Schmid suggests that terrorism be defined more narrowly by the methods used and as the peacetime equivalent of a war crime.¹⁷ Definitional problems aside, it can be argued that many people have 'a general understanding of what terrorism is'¹⁸ and is an 'unmistakable phenomenon, even if the search for a scientific, all-comprehensive definition is a futile enterprise.'¹⁹

If it is not possible, nor worthwhile for some, to find a definition of terrorism, to which all will agree, it is possible to identify its characteristics. Wilkinson, citing Schmid, argues that there is a consensus on the distinguishing characteristics of terrorism:

'These five elements are:

1. The intention to create extreme fear or terror;
2. The targeting of random and symbolic targets, including civilians and civilian property;
3. The attempt to influence a wider audience than the immediate victims of the violence;
4. The use of particularly brutal or extreme methods of violence, viewed as

¹⁴ Hoffman, op cit, pp 40-41.

¹⁵ In this study we are explicitly concerned with a type of sub-state terrorism, yet the impact of state and state-sponsored terrorism cannot be underestimated.

¹⁶ David J Whittaker (ed) *The Terrorism Reader 3rd Edn* (Routledge:London:2007) p11.

¹⁷ John Horgan, cited in Whittaker (ed), op cit, p 12.

¹⁸ Andrew Silke "An introduction to terrorism research" in: Andrew Silke (ed) *Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures* (Frank Cass:London:2004) pp 1-29 (p3).

¹⁹ Walter Laqueur *No End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century* (Continuum:New York:2004) p238.

extranormal' according to the norms of the community under attack;

5. The exploitation of terrorism for a variety of purposes, including influencing the mass media, public opinion, sectors of the population and governments.²⁰

Both Wilkinson and Schmid fall into the orthodox category of terrorism theorists. Yet, these five characteristics are a consensus resulting from a concerted attempt to accommodate the terrorism studies field in general.²¹ A problem arises when these characteristics are used to distinguish terrorism from other forms of political violence, particularly warfare by states. The common examples given are the bombing of British and German cities and the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki during the Second World War.²² These involved far greater destruction than the sub-state actor can inflict and terrorising a population was clearly a factor. The main difference is that for the terrorist actor, also distinct from the guerrilla and insurgent, terrifying people is the central part of their strategy, both in concept and method.

Terrorism comes in many forms, hence the need for many authors on the topic to discuss them. Martin outlines five general types of terrorism: *state terrorism*, predominantly against internal foes; *dissident terrorism* by non-state groups; *religious terrorism*, based on religious convictions; *criminal terrorism*; and *international terrorism* carried out across state boundaries.²³ Clearly, these are not mutually exclusive: Al Qaeda represents a religious based terrorism which is international and non-state. The three cases under analysis are clearly of the second type, but this basic typology can be further broken down with dissident terrorism being potentially revolutionary, nihilist or nationalist its motivation.²⁴ Whittaker cites Schultz's three general categories of political action from 1978, all

²⁰ Paul Wilkinson "Some observations on the relationships between terrorism and freedom" in Martin Warner & Roger Crisp (eds) *Terrorism, Protest and Power* (Edward Elgar:Aldershot:1990) pp 44-53.

²¹ Schmid & Jongman, op cit.

²² See: Caleb Carr *The Lessons of Terror: A history of warfare against civilians- why it has failed and why it will fail again* (Random House:New York:2002) with regard to warfare against civilians; Igor Primoratz (ed) *Terrorism: The Philosophical Issues* (Palgrave Macmillan:Basingstoke:2004) is an edited work which covers many aspects of the moral and ethical questions surrounding terrorism, including strategic bombing by nation-states.

²³ Gus Martin *Understanding Terrorism 2nd Edn* (Sage Publications: London: 2006).

²⁴ Ibid.

use the threat or use of political violence to effect change. They are: *Revolutionary terrorism* (for total change); *Sub-revolutionary terrorism* (for the changing of a political system), and *Establishment terrorism* (against internal and external opposition).²⁵ As with Martin's typology, each of Schultz's types of terrorism is defined by seven variables: causes, environment, goals, strategy, means, organisation and participation. It is by environment (or where) that most typologies are defined, a third, general typology is that offered by Stepanova, based on the non state actor and the function that terrorist tactics play: *Classic Peacetime terrorism* (independent of broader armed conflict); *Conflict related terrorism* (a tactic within a wider asymmetrical conflict), and; *Superterrorism* (global, with existential non-negotiable goals).²⁶ Stepanova notes that these are not exclusive categories and there will be some overlap, and this is the case for all typologies, principally because terrorist groups are multifaceted and whilst some may have characteristics that are in common with other groups, all are unique to their temporal and geographical contexts.²⁷ These are but three examples of typologies and their sub-types, which are numerous: Schmidt and Jongman's typology of terrorism research has some forty four categories and sub-categories of research that will undoubtedly have increased substantially since its time of writing in 1988.²⁸ A more recent research desiderata has some 25 categories and 490 subcategories²⁹, demonstrating that an up to date typology matrix would be sizeable.

From the above introduction to definitions and typologies of terrorism, ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorism can be understood as having the following characteristics:

1. Be driven by the belief that a minority population ascribed to a distinct ethnic identity should break away from a larger political entity. As a type of

²⁵ David J Whittaker (ed) (2007), op cit.

²⁶ Ekaterina Stepanova *Terrorism In Asymmetrical Conflict: Ideological and Structural Aspects* SIPRI Research Report No.23 (Oxford University Press:Oxford:2008).

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Schmid & Jongman, op cit

²⁹ Berto Jongman "Research desiderata in the field of terrorism" in Magnus Ranstorp (ed) *Mapping Terrorism Research: State of the Art, Gaps and Future Direction* (Routledge:London:2007) pp 255-291.

terrorism it is distinct from revolutionary terrorism aimed at the overthrow of the state and religiously inspired terrorism. The ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorist group claims to represent a minority group and carry out actions on its behalf.

2. Have links to nationalist political parties.
3. Involve the use of violence or threat of violence to achieve stated political aims.
4. Utilise violence as a means of communicating grievances ascribed to a minority group.
5. Use tactics and/or strategy aimed at inducing fear amongst the targeted population.
6. Deliberately target civilians, including people ascribed to belong to a rival ethnic group, politicians of such groups and the police.
7. Distinct as an 'old' terrorism in that whilst utilising terrorist tactics does not aim to achieve mass casualty attacks of a spectacular nature: the 'new' terrorism of Al Qaeda.

The above is the understanding of ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorism, which is used in this thesis, and as such, it is not a new typology but a more explicit statement of an existing one.³⁰

The Study of Terrorism: Schools of Thought.

Theory is critical to academic practice and there have been a variety of contributions from many disciplines to terrorism studies. Franks outlines three theoretical approaches to terrorism: *Orthodox*, which is state centric and explains terrorism as illegitimate and is the foundation on which the counter-terrorism of governments is based; *Radical*, which is from the terrorist point of view and a justification of violence based on structural root causes; and *Moderate*, which addresses root causes of terrorism in relation to political causes, structural and

³⁰ See 'Ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorism' in chapter one regarding this. The characteristics were developed for this thesis but are derivative of Hoffman and Miller.

socio-economic factors.³¹ For our purposes these can be understood as theoretical blocks or paradigms. A fourth approach, critical terrorism studies is a more recent development that applies critical theory to the study of terrorism, drawing in the normative, emancipatory and interdisciplinary elements of critical theory.³² Radical theories, which include Marx, Camus, Fanon, Sartre and Qutb³³, will not be outlined here on the premise that we are not seeking justifications of terrorism but theoretical analysis of terrorism as a type of phenomena. The three remaining theoretical approaches are now outlined in turn.

Orthodox terrorism theory is the predominant theoretical approach evident in the literature on terrorism. We can take this approach as typified by the work of 'Wilkinson, Hoffman, Alexander, Schmid and Jongman'³⁴, Wardlow and Clutterbuck. The orthodox approach can be understood in terms of its critics and can be characterised as an approach defined by the illegitimacy of the terrorist actor versus the legitimacy of the state actor:

'Due to the dominance of state power, the 'relative legitimacy' explanation has become the widely accepted understanding of terrorism. As a result, terrorism has become a pejorative term adopted by actors to make a moral justification of their claim to legitimacy and moral condemnation of their opponents, State's call groups terrorist, not necessarily because they use lethal violence to attempt to maintain their political goals but because they view their challenge as illegitimate.'³⁵

From the orthodox viewpoint terrorism is something to be countered, a persistently changing threat to democratic societies. One of the predominant British theorists on terrorism, Paul Wilkinson, has consistently framed his work in

³¹ Jason Franks "The root causes of terrorism: How to address them" in Cornelia Beyer & Michael Bauer (eds) *Effectively Countering Terrorism: The Challenges of Prevention, Preparedness and Response* (Susses Academic Press:Brighton:2009) pp 55-78. A similar outline is given by Butko but relates more to Post 9/11 events. See: Thomas J Butko 'Four perspectives on terrorism: Where they stand depends on where you sit' *Political Studies Review* Vol 7, No,2 (2009) pp 185-194.

³² Harmonie Toros & Jeroen Gunning "Exploring a critical theory approach to terrorism studies" in Richard Jackson, Marie Breen Smith & Jeroen Gunning (eds), *op cit*, pp 87-108.

³³ Jason Franks *Rethinking the Roots of Terrorism* (Palgrave Macmillan:Basingstoke:2006). For examples of writings see: Walter Laqueur (ed) *Voices of Terror: Manifestos, Writings and Manuals of Al Qaeda, Hamas, and Other Terrorists from Around the World and Throughout the Ages* (Sourcebooks Inc: Illinois:2004).

³⁴ Franks (2006), *op cit*.

³⁵ *Ibid*, p 13.

terms of the nature of the terrorist threat and how liberal democracies should respond to it.³⁶

Moderate terrorism theory is focused on a roots debate and structural explanations that are distinct from the state-centric approach of orthodox terrorism theory and typified by the work of 'Gurr, Bowyer Bell, Crenshaw, Della Porta and Berman'.³⁷ If, as Frank's asserts, orthodox theory is comprehensive in explaining how terrorism occurs and what it intends to achieve, but does not explain why it occurs, moderate theory can be seen as addressing the latter. Orthodox theory does not explain the factors that have led to the individual or group to reach the decision to engage in terrorism. To understand this, structural factors, including culture, ideology, and socialisation³⁸ need to be taken into account and placed into a historical context that includes social, economic and political factors.³⁹ The structural factors that contribute to the onset of terrorism can be understood as preconditions and precipitants⁴⁰ that together contribute to the onset of terrorism. Preconditions are the underlying causes which lay the foundations for terrorism to be triggered by a precipitating event or events.⁴¹ Through examination of root causes the factors which contribute to terrorisms decline can be identified.

Critical terrorism theory is a newer approach that is highly critical of the state-centric approach of orthodox terrorism theory and is becoming increasingly established in Great Britain. This approach is typified by the approach of Jackson, Breen Smyth, Gunning and Sluka. CTS is a research agenda, which 'speaks to all the important dimensions of research practice'⁴², covering, 'ontology, epistemology, methodology, ethics, and Praxis'⁴³ and is both a critique of the existing orthodox

³⁶ See: Paul Wilkinson *Terrorism and the Liberal State* (Macmillan Press:London:1977); Paul Wilkinson *Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response* (Frank Cass: Abingdon: 2001).

³⁷ Franks (2006) op cit, p46.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Martha Crenshaw "Thoughts on relating terrorism to historical contexts" in Martha Crenshaw (ed) *Terrorism in Context* (The Pennsylvania University Press:Pennsylvania:1995) pp 3-24.

⁴⁰ Tore Bjorgo "Conclusions" in Tore Bjorgo (ed) *Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward* (Routledge:London:2005) pp 256-264 (p258).

⁴¹ Martha Crenshaw 'The causes of terrorism' *Comparative Politics* Vol 13, No 4 (1981) pp 379-399.

⁴² Jackson, Breen Smith & Gunning, op cit, p216

⁴³ Ibid.

field of terrorism studies and a proposal as to how address these problems. The problems lie in how terrorism is defined, and this is inconsistent, with the term 'terrorism' 'a tool of de-legitimation by political actors'⁴⁴, and with research politically biased towards the Western state interests and counterterrorism policies, uncritical of official sources of information concerned with terrorism, and driven by a problem solving approach making terrorism studies an intellectual adjunct to the state. In response to these problems CTS adopts a critical, sceptical approach and treats terrorism as a 'social fact rather than a brute fact'⁴⁵, moving from the state-centrism as a central concern to 'a focus on the security, freedom, and well being of human individuals'⁴⁶ and commits to a set of normative values derived from a broadly defined notion of emancipation.

General theoretical perspectives on terrorism, whilst having the advantage to the student of placing the various contributors to terrorism studies into clearly defined contexts, do overlap. Even if one is to accept the CTS approach as the most beneficial means of studying terrorism it does not follow that there should be a Nietzschean throwing out of all that has gone before. An additional difficulty is that many contributions to the study of terrorism come from a variety of disciplines, for example philosophy and strategic studies, in which the vagaries of orthodox, moderate, radical and critical approaches to terrorism studies do not apply, it being counterproductive to pigeonhole them. Aside from this, the only perspective that truly defines itself is the CTS approach, and this is because it not only stands separate from the orthodox approach, but defines itself by its opposition to it. An important problem for this study in terms of overall theoretical approach is that a distinction must be made as to whether the thesis is at the very least orthodox, moderate or critical in its approach because CTS scholars have highlighted the differences in approach to the extent that it is not possible to proceed without doing so. Moreover, once one has made this distinction Frank's separation of orthodox and moderate terrorism theory also becomes pertinent. Many of the criticisms of the orthodox approach are valid and have to be taken into account:

⁴⁴ Ibid, p 217.

⁴⁵ Ibid, p 222.

⁴⁶ Ibid, p 223.

there has to be more to evaluating a terrorist campaign than simply what the terrorist group does and what is to be done about it. The benefits of a roots based approach is that it can treat a conflict involving terrorist groups in terms of structure, by evaluating the 'why' of the emergence of terrorism the 'how' of its decline can be mapped. That the literature on terrorism is predominantly orthodox in nature is a concern but does not render it invalid, it merely needs to be re-read through critical eyes, its conceptual and historical analysis extracted from its pejorative overtones. Given that this study is concerned with how a state responds to terrorist violence, and that terrorism is treated as a type of violent conflict that should be brought to an end, the challenge to engage terrorism critically becomes more paramount.

Situation.

Situation is the environmental factors that inform the development of attitudes and conducive to engagement in terrorism as subsequent behaviour. In order to understand 'situation' sociological factors, which include culture, ideology, and socialisation⁴⁷ need to be taken into account and placed into a historical context that includes social, economic and political factors.⁴⁸

Situation is understood as social structure, or 'habitus', which includes the norms and values passed down over generations, which can become deeply engrained in the individual's consciousness⁴⁹, influencing the mind-set of the individual and the group. It should emphasised that the understanding here is that this constitutes the environment, or situation that contributes towards a structure in which attitudes, situation and behaviour interact. Habitus is closely linked with history:

'there is an obvious overlap between history and habitus. If we are to understand the latter today we must possess knowledge about the social activity and ideas that have

⁴⁷ Jason Franks (2006), op cit.

⁴⁸ Crenshaw (1995), op cit.

⁴⁹ Stephen Vertigans *The Sociology of Terrorism: People, Places and Processes* (Routledge: London:2011).

re-formulated over generations and which are largely accepted uncritically. Social memory is narrated by legitimised agents of memory and reflective, symbolic practices.⁵⁰

How the individual and group relates to their habitus and the wider environment of the nation is critical to understanding how terrorist groups emerge, and this can relate as much to how violence is practiced by the state as it can to predispositions towards violence within the habitus.

The situational factors that contribute to the onset of terrorism are described by Crenshaw as preconditions and precipitants, these can be understood as 'two ends of a continuum'⁵¹ that together contribute to the onset of terrorism:

'First, a significant difference exists between preconditions, factors that set the stage for terrorism over the long run, and precipitants, specific events that immediately precede the occurrence of terrorism. Second, a further classification divides preconditions into enabling or permissive factors, which provide opportunities for terrorism to happen, and situations that directly inspire and motivate terrorist campaigns. Precipitants are similar to the direct causes of terrorism.'⁵²

But what exactly are these preconditions and precipitants? The answers can tell much about how terrorism campaigns are maintained over long periods of time because historical and cultural memory can be recycled, reconstituted and reinforced throughout a terrorist campaign.

A common explanation given for terrorism is poverty, but this is a myth, often used by 'social-revolutionary terrorists, who may claim to represent the poor and marginalized'⁵³ yet are not actually poor themselves. With regard to international terrorism a myth exists of the poor, male and uneducated terrorist:

⁵⁰ Ibid, p 45.

⁵¹ Tore Bjorgo "Conclusions" in Bjorgo (ed), op cit, pp 256-264 (p258).

⁵² Crenshaw (1981) op cit, p 381.

⁵³ Bjorgo "Conclusions", op cit, p 256-257.

'If there is one view concerning terrorism on which public opinion, media and politicians from opposing government camps seem to agree it is that poverty is a root cause of terrorism'⁵⁴

In fact, neither research into the both the individual and cross-country analysis demonstrate that terrorists carrying out international attacks are predominantly poor, they are instead comparatively well off and educated, although at the local level militant groups will recruit from the poor.⁵⁵ The families of Palestinian suicide bombers have the same economic status as the rest of Palestinian society and the level of education of the bomber is close to the rest of Palestinian society.⁵⁶ Schmid has compared the UN Human Development Index with a Terrorism Index and concludes:

'that while the direct correlation between the presence of poverty and the incidence of terrorism at the country is quite low, the correlation between observance of human rights and absence of terrorism is significantly higher.'⁵⁷

This is further supported by an analysis of terrorist incidents and casualties from 1986 to 2002 by Piazza, which covered ninety-six countries, and in which he concluded that there was no significant relationship between terrorism and measures of economic development. Having debunked the 'rooted in poverty' thesis he proposed the alternative explanation of 'social cleavage theory' of party systems, using India, Israel and Columbia as examples:

'More diverse societies, in terms of ethnic and religious demography, and political systems with large, complex, multi-party systems were more likely to experience terrorism than were more homogenous states with few or no parties at the national level.'⁵⁸

⁵⁴ Jitka Maleckova "Impoverished terrorists: stereotype of personality" in: Bjorgo (ed), op cit, p 33.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ariel Merari "Social organizational and psychological factors in suicide terrorism" in Bjorgo (ed), op cit, pp 70-86 (p 79).

⁵⁷ Alex, P. Schmid 'Frameworks for conceptualising terrorism' *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol 16, No 2 (2004) pp 197 — 221 (p 227).

⁵⁸ James A Piazza 'Rooted In Poverty?: Terrorism, Poor Economic Development and Social Cleavages' *Terrorism and Political Violence* Vol 18, No 1 (2006) pp.159-177.

However, this does not mean that there is not an indirect link between poverty and terrorism. The well off may identify with the poor, appointing themselves 'champions', recruiting from the impoverished and indoctrinating them.⁵⁹ Throughout terror campaigns, armed groups of the left continue to champion 'idealised notions' of the proletariat or peasantry and those to the right continuously refer to the notion of the nation.⁶⁰

A similar pattern can be found in separatist terrorist groups that have operated in the Western Industrialised societies, including the ETA, the IRA and the FLQ:

'educated activists from the middle classes often prevail amongst those who initiate separatist terrorism. However, the expansion and continuity of such violence were actually determined by the extent to which young males extracted from lower strata of society became hegemonic within an armed clandestine organisation and working-class people were a majority among its supporters.'⁶¹

Poverty itself may not be a direct cause of terrorism, but inequality stands out as an important factor. In the case of Sri Lanka there was no disparity in the per capita incomes of Tamils and Sinhalese but a differing standard for University admission and employment practices meant that Tamils were placed at a disadvantage, laying the foundations for the growth of militancy.⁶²

Yet inequality, like poverty is not a sole direct root cause of terrorism. There are much wider, interlinked contributing factors. With regard to the Middle East, socio-economic factors in interrelated ways as a whole may be:

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Michel Wieviorka *The Making of Terrorism* (University of Chicago Press:London:1993).

⁶¹ Fernando Reinares "Nationalist separatism and terrorism in comparative perspective" in: Bjorgo (ed), op cit, pp 119-130 (p 128).

⁶² Shri D.R. Kaarthikeyan "Root causes of terrorism?: A case study of the Tamil insurgency and the LTTE" in: Bjorgo (ed), op cit, pp 131-140.

‘Economic conditions, a political vacuum, a high rate of illiteracy, the collapse of the family system, and religious fanaticism are all related to the phenomenon of extremism: the vehicle of terrorists on the road to their destiny.’⁶³

To this can be added political factors that affect the post Cold War Middle East: the occupation of Arab lands by Israel, dictatorial regimes with savage security and intelligence forces, a dearth of democracy preventing the opposition from expressing themselves and the ‘inequality, oppression, and injustice perpetrated in this region’⁶⁴, which leads to terrorism as a last resort, being major factors in its causation.

Cultural factors are also important. Nationalist-separatist groups are notoriously intractable, and the reason for this is that the bitterness of each generation against the incumbent ethnic group is passed down to the next, hatred is ‘bred in the bone’ as the previous injustices experienced by parents are passed down:

‘They have heard the bitterness of their parents and grandparents in the coffee houses in Jordan and the occupied territories about the economic injustices they have suffered. Youths drawn to the path of the IRA heard similar bitter stories in the pubs of Northern Ireland.’⁶⁵

The role of history and culture are significant in laying the foundations of, and maintaining violence:

‘Violence can be enshrined in the history and culture of society and is apparent from the level of occurrence or propensity for violence in a society, community or region in both historical and contemporary events. A culture of violence can be propagated and prolonged by the continuity provided by historical and cultural memory.’⁶⁶

Inherent in the culture of a society is religion. In recent years religion, particularly Islamic Fundamentalism has been seen undeservedly as not only a cause, but *the*

⁶³ Abdullah Yousef Sahar Mohammed “Roots of terrorism in the Middle East: internal pressures and international constraints” in: Bjorgo (ed), op cit, pp 103-118 (p 105).

⁶⁴ Ibid, p 105.

⁶⁵ Jerrold M Post ‘The socio-cultural underpinnings of terrorist psychology: when hatred is bred in the bone’ in Bjorgo (ed), op cit, p56.

⁶⁶ Franks (2006), op cit, p 34; See also: Vertigans, op cit (Chapter Two).

cause of terrorism. Historically, instances of terrorism related to religion have been on the increase and religion not only transcends borders but shows less restraint.⁶⁷ However, despite its dubious record historically in relation to conflict and science there is another side to religion:

‘First of all, it must be kept in mind that much, probably most, religious practices are peaceful. Historically, religion has often been a mechanism to control certain potentially harmful human impulses, notably those referring to sexuality and violence. Unfortunately, this has often been confined to the ‘in-group’—not to intergroup violence.’⁶⁸

Moreover, the adherents of religion have historically been able utilise non-violent methods to spread their influence, as with all causes of terrorism, it takes additional factors to bring about the fusion of religion with political violence, although when this occurs the ‘us and them’ dichotomy of religion offers a justification for extreme violence⁶⁹:

‘Religion is never the sole cause of terrorism; rather religious motivations are interwoven with economic and political factors. Yet religion cannot be reduced to social and economic factors. It is a powerful force in itself. Religion serves to incite, to mobilise and legitimize terrorist actions. Moreover, religions pre-occupations with fundamental notions of good and evil tends to ensure that groups with religious motives are much less prone to compromise. Islamic fundamentalists tend to see the world in terms of an enduring struggle between good and evil. Religiously motivated groups, therefore, tend to be more fanatical, more willing to inflict mass casualties and better able to endure unassailable commitment from their adherents.’⁷⁰

Cultural factors, then, and here religion has been included as a major cultural factor, whilst not the sole cause of terrorism can have a significant impact in laying down the preconditions for terrorist violence, but only in combination with other situational factors.

⁶⁷ Louise Richardson *What Terrorists Want* (John Murray: London).

⁶⁸ Schmid (2004), op cit, p227.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Richardson, op cit, p 92.

The final aspect of preconditions is ideology, distinct from religion as ideology does not refer to a higher being or reward in heaven. Compared to the weighty issues of religion or socio-economic realities of poverty ideology appears a poor cousin, but this is not the case. It can be argued that the connection between ideological politics and terrorism is what distinguishes 'modern terrorism from earlier forms of political violence'.⁷¹ The most influential ideology for terrorism is Marxism as it 'justifies the use of violence for political goals'⁷² and has influenced groups in Western Europe (the IRA and ETA), the Middle East (PFLP) and Columbia (FARC)⁷³ despite revolutionary terrorism having been 'officially rejected by Marxist-Leninist and Maoist parties'⁷⁴. Yet, this has not prevented the Soviet Union from offering indirect support and assistance to groups as varied as the PIRA, PLO (Palestine Liberation Organisation) and Baader-Meinhoff group. Wilkinson identifies three strands of ideology:

'There are three major contemporary strands in revolutionary terrorist ideology; (i) 'classical' anarchism and nihilism; (ii) Third World revolutionism; and (iii) New Left ideologies of violence. These elements are frequently combined and are often fused with Marxist, Marxist-Leninist and Nationalist doctrines.'⁷⁵

The terrorist groups of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, did not have to rely solely on the ideologies of the anarchists, nihilists and Marxist-Leninists, they had their own adherents in Fanon, Marighela, Debray and Guevara⁷⁶ and a historical plethora of writers advocating violence, whether as tyrannicide, terrorism, guerrilla warfare, or in the greyest of areas between guerrilla warfare and terrorism: urban guerrilla warfare. Whatever their motivation, be it revolutionary, nationalist, Islamist or otherwise, the proponents of terrorist violence see fit to justify their actions

⁷¹ Noel O'Sullivan *Terrorism, Ideology and Revolution: The Origins of Political Violence* (Wheatsheaf Books Ltd:Brighton) p 5; see also: Wieviorka, op cit, regarding the intellectual roots of terrorism (Chapter Two).

⁷² Franks (2006), op cit, p 33.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Paul Wilkinson *Terrorism and the Liberal State* (Macmillan Press:London:1977) p 97.

⁷⁵ Ibid, p 97.

⁷⁶ O'Sullivan, op cit.

through manifesto, statement or website.⁷⁷ For those who colour terrorism as contrary to democratic principles there are disconcerting origins for terrorism with the Western liberal traditions. O' Sullivan argues that the relatively recent development of an ideological style of politics, of practical significance since the French Revolution of 1789 has 'three crucial assumptions about the nature of man and society'⁷⁸: 1) men could remake society and refashion human nature; 2) man is naturally good and evil lies in the structure of society; and 3) the principle of popular sovereignty. It is the latter that has been the most influential. According to Philips the intellectual origins of terrorism are 'popular sovereignty, the principle of self-determination, and ethical consequentialism'⁷⁹, although it does not follow that this makes terrorism justifiable.⁸⁰

If the combination of socio-economic, cultural, and ideological preconditions are the root causes of situational factors leading to terrorism then what would constitute a precipitating event? The breaking points are varied and unique to each group. Triggering events:

'are the direct precipitators of terrorist acts. Such a trigger can be an outrageous act committed by the enemy, lost wars, massacres, contested elections, police brutality, or other provocative events that call for revenge or action.'⁸¹

Examples from the history of terrorism demonstrate this. In Sri Lanka the killing of a 13 man army patrol by the LTTE and subsequent media outrage sparked rioting in major cities that led to the death of 3,000 Tamils and the destruction of 18,000 homes. These events and a sustained recruitment drive by the LTTE led to thousands of Tamils joining the LTTE.⁸² A trigger may also be due to the failure of alternative means of achieving goals. The Palestinians recognised their weakness

⁷⁷ For examples, see: Walter Laqueur (ed) *Voices of Terror: Manifestos, Writings and Manuals of Al Qaeda, Hamas, and Other Terrorists from Around the World and Throughout the Ages* (Sourcebooks Inc: Illinois:2004).

⁷⁸ O'Sullivan, op cit, p 7.

⁷⁹ Robert Phillips "Terrorism: Historical roots and moral justifications" in: Warner & Crisp (eds) *Terrorism, Protest and Power* (Edward Elgar:Aldershot:1990) pp 68-77 (p 68).

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Bjorgo (2005) *Conclusions*, op cit, p 260.

⁸² Kaarthikeyan, op cit. See also: Andrew Silke "Fire of Iolous: the role of state countermeasures in causing terrorism and what needs to be done" in Bjorgo (ed), op cit, pp 241-255.

after the 1967 Arab defeat by Israel, coupled with a historical Middle Eastern tradition of violence and the difficulty of attacking Israel, saw the emergence of transnational terror aimed at gaining international recognition.⁸³ It does not follow that preconditions and precipitating events will lead on to terrorism as social movements may increase their efforts, becoming more militant, but without recourse to organised violence. The armed group that emerges from the failure of protest groups can be seen as a form of 'antimovement':

'A *social movement* is characterised by three fundamental dimensions- the principles of identity, opposition, and totality- which it is capable of articulating at a highly theoretical level. A *social anti-movement* begins by inverting these three dimensions. Then, rather than combining them, it fuses them together into a single whole.'⁸⁴

In this schema, for the social movement, *identity* is defined by reference to social entity, *opposition* 'defines the social adversary'⁸⁵, and *totality* 'the field of historicity that the social movement and a given leader are vying to control.'⁸⁶ In contrast, for the anti-movement *identity* is defined by the championing of a 'mythic or abstract entity, essence, or symbol'⁸⁷, *opposition* becomes an enemy, one which is larger, more menacing and total, and *totality* is defined by the need to overthrow the social order. Within the armed group, these three dimensions deteriorate further: the group members define themselves 'solely by commitment to the cause'⁸⁸, objectify the enemy as something to be attacked and destroyed, and the 'principle of totality becomes wholly dissolved' as the destruction of the existing order becomes the primary goal.⁸⁹

The above has introduced a number of explanations of sociological factors which contribute to the onset of terrorism. Crucial to this is the concept of the habitus, or social structure, within which people grow and live. From historical experience come what Crenshaw calls the preconditions for the onset of terrorism;

⁸³ Crenshaw (1981), op cit.

⁸⁴ Wieviorka, op cit, p 5.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Ibid, p 6.

⁸⁷ Ibid, p5.

⁸⁸ Ibid, p6.

⁸⁹ Wieviorka, op cit.

the root causes which inform later action. It is notable that poverty as a direct cause of terrorism is demonstrated to be a myth, yet inequality stands out as a major factor, although there is also no direct link and neither of these alone is sufficient as a precondition for later action. The subsequent discussions of culture, religion and ideology also fail to provide a single explanation for terrorism, which leads to the conclusion that single explanations for a general causality in a specific case, whether the nationalism of the IRA, or the fundamentalism of Al-Qaeda are not only flawed but also misleading. A better approach is to treat culture, religion and ideology as factors within an overall framework as their impact is not reducible to a good/bad dichotomy.

Following Crenshaw, the move to terrorist activity is informed by preconditions but linked to a specific event or events in the immediate present which acts as a trigger. At this point, an emphasis needs to be made on the fact that it is individuals who join terrorist organisations: an event such as the British use of internment in Northern Ireland can both be witnessed by a person living on the Falls Road and via media by a Republican supporter in the United States resulting in involvement in the 'cause'. It can also be experienced directly by actually being interned, seeing the Army or Police taking someone away or being in a house which the security forces enter to take away a parent or child. It is not necessary for one to be directly affected for the event to have an impact, or for the outcome to be radicalisation leading to actually joining a terrorist group.

A final observation is that the factors identified above are not guaranteed to result in terrorism, it may also result in an increased determination to use constitutional politics, protest, or other forms of dissent other than terrorism (including by way of example: rioting). Nor does it rule out a tacit acceptance of the situation, a withdrawal that involves no practical involvement in attempting to change the status quo. The root causes which bring about and sustain a terrorist campaign are numerous, complex and have cultural depth. Moreover, they interact and change over time. In order for them to be analysed and understood the method of analysis used needs to reflect such complexities and interactions.

Attitudes.

Environmental explanations of terrorism provide contrasting explanations of the situational factors which enable terrorism to emerge, the preconditions and percipients, but they do not explain why the individual or group actively choose to utilise it as a means of action, or why a minority of people will choose terrorism over other actions available to them. In order for this to be understood the contribution of attitudes needs to be addressed at the individual and group level.

Before any useful discussion of the psychology and social-psychology of terrorists and terrorist groups can begin it is necessary to dispel the myth that terrorists are mentally unbalanced or psychopathic. It is comfortable for the observer of inhumane terrorist acts to assume that they are the result of individual imbalance as opposed to a political struggle.⁹⁰ With regard to this it can be noted that terrorists do not show any distinct psychopathology:

‘What limited data we have on individual terrorists (and knowledge must be gleaned from disparate sources that usually neither focus on psychology nor use a comparative approach) suggest that the outstanding common characteristic of terrorists is their normality. Terrorism often seems to be the connecting link among widely varying personalities.’⁹¹

Also, there are two similar problems of inquiry into the psychological aspects of terrorism that should be avoided. The first is overgeneralization. The history of terrorism reveals it to be a complex phenomenon and it is futile to attribute to all terrorists a simple global generalisation. The psychological characteristics for the various terrorist groups across history vary and a terrorist group can shift in character. The second is reductionism, or the attribution of terrorism to a single cause. Examples of this are attributing terrorism to vitamin deficiencies, inner-ear vestibular function, mental illness and narcissism, some of these are clearly flawed,

⁹⁰ Michael Stohl “Introduction: myths and realities of political terrorism” in: Michael Stohl (ed) *The Politics of Terrorism* (Marcel Dekker Inc:New York:1979) pp 1-28.

⁹¹ Crenshaw, 1981, op cit, p390.

but even if they were not focusing on a single cause would be misleading.⁹² To this can be added gender distinctions, with women terrorists being presented as irrational when men within the group are not.⁹³ It should also be acknowledged that characteristics identified in one group do not necessarily explain other groups and even within groups motivations can change over time.⁹⁴ In summary, studies into the psychology of terrorism have demonstrated that there is no uniform terrorist mind, no striking psychopathology and terrorists are 'normal'.⁹⁵

This is not to say that personality traits and tendencies are not evident. Post points to a number of these:

'Although there is no single personality type, it appears that people who are aggressive and action-orientated, and who place greater than normal reliance on the psychological mechanisms of externalization and splitting, are disproportionately represented amongst terrorists. Data indicate that many terrorists have not been successful in their personal, education and vocational lives. The combination of feelings of inadequacy with the psychological mechanisms of externalisation and splitting leads them to find especially attractive a group of like minded individuals whose credo is, "It's not us-it's them; they are the cause of our problems."' ⁹⁶

It should be understood that the Post's synopsis is based on studies conducted predominantly on activists from European terrorist groups: Irish, German, Italian and Spanish, with an exception being Crenshaw's study of the FLN in Algeria, and even within the European groups there are identifiable differences. When placed in terms of parent's attitude to the incumbent regime and youths attitude towards parents Post finds that members of 'anarchic-ideologues' groups, typified by the German RAF and 'nationalist-separatist' groups such as ETA, there are clear differences. Members of anarchic-ideologue groups identify their parents with the

⁹² Walter Reich "Understanding terrorist behaviour: The limits and opportunities of psychological enquiry" in: Walter Reich (ed) *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, theologies, states of mind* (Woodrow Wilson Center Press: Washington DC:1998) pp 261-279.

⁹³ Martha Crenshaw 'The psychology of terrorism: An agenda for the 21st Century' *Political Psychology*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (2000) pp. 405-420.

⁹⁴ Reich, op cit.

⁹⁵ Jerrold M Post "Terrorist psycho-logic: terrorist behaviour as a product of psychological forces" in: Reich (ed), op cit, pp 25-40.

⁹⁶ Ibid, p 31.

establishment and are disloyal to them, striking out at their parent's generation and 'seeking to heal their inner wounds by attacking the outside enemy'.⁹⁷ The members of nationalist-separatist groups are loyal to their parents and see themselves as carrying out the 'mission of their parents who were wounded by the establishment'.⁹⁸ However, despite these differences:

'in both cases the act of joining the terrorist group represents an attempt to consolidate a fragmented psychological identity, to resolve a split and be at one with oneself and with society, and most important, to belong.'⁹⁹

Even if the above is accepted, that there are distinct personality traits amongst terrorists, we have to consider that there are sociological, or structural factors, that bring about such traits and that once within the group there are group dynamics that affect behaviour. Before these are addressed we need to consider how the individual can carry out terrorist activity.

Bandura considers the mechanisms of moral disengagement. These allow the individual to override self-sanction:

'Self-sanction plays a central role in the regulation of inhumane conduct. In the course of socialization, people adopt moral standards that serve as guides and deterrents for conduct. Once internalized control has developed, people regulate their actions by the sanctions they apply to themselves. They do things that give them satisfaction and build their sense of self-worth. They refrain from behaving in ways that violate their moral standards, because such behaviour would bring self-condemnation. Self-sanctions thus keep conduct in line with internal standards.'¹⁰⁰

There are psychological mechanisms which allow self-sanction to be disengaged:

'Self-sanctions can be disengaged by reconstructing conduct as serving moral purposes, by obscuring personal agency in detrimental activities, by disregarding or

⁹⁷ Ibid, p 30.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Ibid, p 31.

¹⁰⁰ Albert Bandura "Mechanisms of moral disengagement" in: Reich (ed), op cit, pp 161-191 (p 161).

misrepresenting the injurious consequences of one's actions, or by blaming and dehumanising the victims.'¹⁰¹

Such mechanisms are general, and are as applicable to security forces as they are to the member of a sub-state terrorist group. With regard to the latter, acts of violence are often perpetrated not at a desired target, but at a third party, in order to influence the desired target. As a consequence it is more horrific psychologically for the individual carrying out an attack on innocent women and children in public places than on a detested public official or member of a repressive regime.¹⁰² Here a distinction needs to be made between the 'lone wolf' and the member of a terrorist group. Lone wolves are capable of causing immense damage and harm, examples of which are the Oklahoma bombing by Timothy McVeigh and the bombings in London by David Copeland, but they were isolated individuals. Each had links to extremist political movements of the far right, but acted alone, and led troubled or isolated lives. An increase in access to online websites and communication from the 1990s onwards has led to an increasing influence of external sources on lone wolves, including Anders Brievik, and religious groups such as Al Qaeda increasingly use the internet as a to recruit and train lone actors.¹⁰³ The members of ethno-nationalist/separatist groups are very different; their grievances are typically left wing and their capacity to use violence is managed, sometimes mediated, by membership of organisations which utilise instrumental violence towards a common aim. The discussion now turns to the influence of groups on behaviour.

Post argues that 'political violence is driven by psychological forces'¹⁰⁴ and sees political violence not as instrumental but the end in itself, it is the group that provides the rationale and ideology for terrorist acts but the individual joins the terrorist group in order to commit acts of terrorism. Once within the group, the

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ See: Gabriel Weimann 'Lone Wolves in Cyberspace' *Journal of Terrorism Research* Vol 1, Issue 2, Autumn 2012, pp 75-90. There is very little academic literature on David Copeland. For an in depth account see: Graeme McLagan and Nick Lowes *Killer On The Streets* (John Blake Publishing: London: 2003).

¹⁰⁴ Post (1998) op cit, p 35.

individual is strongly influenced by group psychology. There is then the pressure to conform as the individual's identity (which for Post is fragmented) is submerged and a 'group mind' results. External danger reduces internal divisions and group ideology comes into play:

'What the group, through its interpretation of its ideology, defines as moral becomes moral – and becomes the authority for the compliant members. And if the ideology indicates that "they are responsible for our problems," to destroy "them" is not only viewed as justified but can be seen as a moral imperative.'¹⁰⁵

Along with the pressure to conform is the pressure to commit violence as a terrorist group '*needs to commit acts of terrorism in order to justify its existence*'.¹⁰⁶ The leader who proposes moderation is likely to lose control to someone more committed to the cause and an underground group of action orientated people is not suited to inactivity, generating the need to carry out more and more attacks against the enemy to prevent it turning in on itself. Also, groups in general tend towards riskier choices than would an individual: within the group the previously unsuccessful individual is a hero and will not easily relinquish the role and position that he or she holds.¹⁰⁷ The benefits for the individual in being part of a terrorist group are many:

'[...] there are frequently overlooked and misinterpreted positive features of increased engagement for the individual terrorist, and these include the rapid acquisition of some sort of skill or skills, an increased sense of empowerment, purpose and self importance, an increased sense of control, which appears to reflect the common effects of ideological control and auto-propaganda [...] and a tangible sense of acceptance within the group, and in combination with this, the acquisition of real status within the broader community'¹⁰⁸

Given the above benefits it is understandable that the need to belong in the group prevents resignations. The internal dynamics of the group itself is characterised by

¹⁰⁵ Ibid, p 34.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, p 36.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ John Horgan, cited in: Whittaker (ed) *The Terrorism Reader*, 3rd Edn (Routledge:London:2007), p 16).

intolerance of dissent, rejection of compromise, and the identification of the enemy as evil. Having carried out terrorist acts and placed themselves outside of ordinary society the group becomes fearful of success, when goals are reached they are redefined, or seen as inadequate or false. The threat of success threatens the survival of the terrorist group itself: the group has to be successful enough to attract new members, yet not so successful as to put itself out of business and this may account for the unachievable goals that some terrorist groups set themselves.¹⁰⁹

The group does not immediately take over the individual's identity. Della Porta, an analyst of terrorism in Germany and Italy is one adherent of the view that the conversion to terrorism is the result of a gradual process and not a sudden conversion.¹¹⁰ Another proponent of the view that individual identification with the terrorist group is gradual is Sprinzak who studied the Weathermen, a North American ideological terrorist group. According to Sprinzak there is a process by which an ideological group de-legitimises the established authority or regime. The group is formed through a political process of challenging authority; it does not start as a terrorist group but becomes one:

'the process does *not* involve isolated individuals who become terrorists on their own because their psyche is split or they suffer from low esteem and need extravagant compensation...Rather it involves a group of true believers who challenge authority long before they become terrorists, recruit followers, clash with the public agencies of law enforcement from a position of weakness, obtain a distinctive world view, and, in time, radicalize within the organisation to the point of becoming terroristic.'¹¹¹

The radicalisation encompasses three stages. The first is the Crisis of Confidence, in which the group is in a profound conflict with the establishment, although not the political system itself. The stage is characterised by disobedience and direct action such as protests and demonstration. The second is the Conflict of legitimacy, in

¹⁰⁹ Post (1998) op cit.

¹¹⁰ Crenshaw (2000), op cit.

¹¹¹ Ehud Sprinzak "The psycho-political formation of extreme left terrorism in a democracy: The case of the Weathermen" in: Reich (ed) op cit, pp 65-85.

which the 'system itself is manipulative and oppressive'¹¹² and the challenge group is disappointed with their own lack of success and the hostile response of the government. The stage is marked by 'ideological, symbolic, and psychological changes...[and]...intense political action'¹¹³ involving small scale violence. The language of the challenge group is revolutionary and 'lives now in a state of radicalisation. It solidifies itself and closes ranks.'¹¹⁴ The third stage is the Crisis of legitimacy, 'the behavioural and symbolic culmination of the preceding psychological stages'¹¹⁵ and one that 'presupposes an acute stage of psychological transformation'¹¹⁶, in which conventional morality is abandoned and the crisis is manifested politically in terrorism. The system is now de-legitimised to the point that anyone involved with it is perceived as sub-human and is a legitimate target for indiscriminate murder. Those members of the challenge group that have lasted into the third stage perceive themselves as an elite, a cut above the rearguard that provides the support an underground group needs.¹¹⁷

Sprinzak's analysis is limited to one group, and one defined by an ideological outlook. In contrast Gurr, in a more general analysis, argues that to move to extreme measures requires 'a climate of acceptance of unconventional means of political action' from a support group.¹¹⁸ There are two ways in which this happens: *radicalisation* from frustration at failing to achieve political change leading to the rationalisation of the use and justification of violence, and *reaction*, brought about by 'threatening social change or the intervention of the authorities'.¹¹⁹ An example of radicalisation is the Weather Underground who resorted to violence after the failure of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) to change US policy over Vietnam. The Front de liberation du Quebec (FLQ) moved to violence after the failure of separatists aiming to achieve the independence of Quebec from Canada. Examples of reaction are the Ku Klux Klan against the reconstruction of the

¹¹² Ibid. p 81.

¹¹³ Ibid, p 81-82.

¹¹⁴ Ibid, p 82.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Ibid, p 83.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Ted Robert Gurr "Terrorism in democracy: Its social and political bases" in: Reich (ed), op cit, pp 86-102 (p 87).

¹¹⁹ Ibid, p 89.

American South and marginalised Neo-Nazis and Neo-Fascists in Germany and Italy. A final example combines both radicalisation and reaction: the PIRA emerged due to frustration over Catholic civil rights and reaction to loyalist violence and British military intervention.¹²⁰

Frustration is also a factor in the resort to suicide bombing by Palestinians:

‘The fact is unmistakable and the message comes over loud and clear: a deep sense of injustice beyond the stage of profound frustration and despair stands at the heart of the issue. The Palestinian drive for freedom has been hampered by Israeli occupation atrocities. Resorting to ‘body bombing’ signifies failure of other attempted tactics to the same extent that it reflects the immensity of pain and feeling of demoralisation that engulfs Palestinian society.’¹²¹

Of the many terroristic activities, the act of suicide bombing stands out as one that would imply a particular personality trait or psychopathology. In fact Ariel Merari, having studied suicide bombing by Palestinians concludes that there is no clear psychopathology, nor personality traits to be found in relation to suicide bombing, leading to the consideration of group process as an explanation. In order to prepare a suicide bomber there are three stages. The first is indoctrination, in which the candidate, already convinced at the start of the group’s cause, is ‘subjected to indoctrination by authoritative persons in the group’.¹²² The second is group commitment, Palestinian groups train suicide bombers in ‘martyrdom cells’, the Sri Lankan LTTE trains suicide bombers in special ‘Black Tiger’ and ‘Bird of Freedom’ units (for men and women respectively) that are distinct from other cells or units within their organisations. This develops group commitment in the form of a social contract. The third is the personal pledge, in which the candidate makes a recording of themselves committing to carrying out a suicide attack, representing a point of no return.¹²³

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Hisham H Ahmed “Palestinian resistance and ‘suicide bombing’: causes and consequences” in: Tore Bjorgo (ed) op cit, pp 87-102 (p 95).

¹²² Merari, op cit.

¹²³ Ibid.

The above review demonstrates the contribution of psychology and social-psychology to the analysis of terrorism. Whilst some aspects, notably considering personality are controversial and contested, the insights into group dynamics offer a strong explanation of how people in groups come to consider involvement in terrorism and how group dynamics can maintain the momentum of an underground movement.

Psychological and psycho-sociological theories have the potential to explain traits that may enable terroristic behaviour and how group processes enable individuals to disengage morally from indiscriminate violence and justify the acts of violence that they carry out. However, even if the possibility of an individual joining a group with the intent of carrying out terrorist acts (as Post contends) is accepted, this does not account for why a group of people will join together and make a rational choice that a campaign of terrorism be formulated and carried out. Nor does it fully explain the factors that have led to the individual or group to reach the decision to engage in terrorism.

Explanations of terrorist behaviour provide specific contributions to our understanding of the internal motivations of individuals and group members who engage in terrorism. An example is moral disengagement, which allows violence to take place, as it explains how psychological processes, perception and groupthink lead to violence and its justification and repetition. What is not explained is why one individual is influenced to violence by a given set of circumstances whilst another is not. Conversely, if a person is the child of a militant, this does not lead automatically to participation in terrorist activity, with other options available other than violence. We should note again the earlier observation that pathologies, specifically the psychopathic personality, are not a general explanation for everyone who engages in terrorism. Attitudes, or internal processes, is only one part of the explanation for terrorist activity, to better understand the why of terrorism the environmental explanations discussed above also need to be considered.

Behaviour.

Once a situation has reached the point in which group processes lead a group to move from nonviolence to terrorism they will discuss and develop a change in strategy in order to accommodate political violence. The analysis of terrorism as a strategy has the benefit of moving away from the pejorative connotations in its definition. By treating terrorism as a strategy or tactic we move away from moral and legitimacy questions and are able to treat the phenomena in terms of goals. Addressing terrorism in terms of strategy:

‘avoid[s] the trap of getting bogged down in definitions or dismissing terrorism as an irrational activity indulged in by wild-eyed zealots or individuals with deeply flawed personalities.’¹²⁴

Also, addressing terrorism in terms of strategy allows it to be analysed as a rational and wilful choice in which the resort to violence is for political reasons rather than ‘the unintended outcome of psychological or social factors’¹²⁵ although the rationale may be subject to miscalculations.¹²⁶

To understand terrorism as a strategy a short introduction to strategic theory is required. Strategy is ‘the use of available resources to gain an objective’¹²⁷ and the means by which the objective is sought can be of any nature, although ‘political actors may employ more than one means to achieve desired ends.’¹²⁸ Strategic analysis involves looking at the opponent’s point of view and ‘identifying his opportunities and his interests.’¹²⁹ There are a number of key postulates: firstly, there is a natural connection with realism in that strategic theory is morally neutral and assumes power as being the capability to influence outcomes; secondly, it is

¹²⁴ Lawrence Freedman “Foreward” to Peter R Neumann and M.L.R Smith *The Strategy of Terrorism* (Routledge:London:2008) p viii.

¹²⁵ Martha Crenshaw “The logic of terrorism: Terrorist behaviour as a product of strategic choice” in Reich (ed), op cit, pp 7-24 (p 8).

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Michael Howard, cited in: Peter R Neumann *Britain’s Long War: British Strategy in the Northern Ireland Conflict* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan: 2003).

¹²⁸ Lyndsey Harris (2006) ‘Introducing the Strategic Approach: An Examination of Loyalist Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland’ *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, Vol 8, No 4, pp 539-549.

¹²⁹ Neumann, op cit.

instrumental, the means are subordinate to the ends, and war is both a series of engagements, which allows participants to change their strategy and a bargaining process; and thirdly, a subjective rationality is assumed and actors will attempt to maximise utility.¹³⁰

From a strategic viewpoint 'terrorism is not the political goal itself, but a specific tactic to achieve that goal'¹³¹, nor is it an ideology; 'rather it is a specific, hyper-extreme tactic of using or threatening violence.'¹³², a political tactic, which is distinctive in that it attempts 'to frighten people for political advantage.'¹³³ Terrorism is not an end in itself, but instead the means by which goals can be met¹³⁴.

But what is a strategy of terrorism? Despite the limited means in which a terrorist campaign can be carried out (coercion), the rationale has multiple components. Following a logic of 'costly signalling', these include attrition (imposing costs to the enemy), intimidation of the population (demonstrating the ability to punish disobedience), provocation (inducing a government to overreact and so radicalise the population), spoiling (of peace initiatives by undermining moderates) and outbidding (in relation to rival groups).¹³⁵ Alternatively, terrorism as a strategy can be conceived as having three stages:

'The first – disorientation- seeks to alienate the authorities from their citizens by reducing the government to impotence in the eyes of the population and creating the impression that 'those in power' are unable to cope with a situation of evolving chaos. The second – target response- aims to induce the government to respond in a manner that is favourable to the insurgent cause. The third – gaining legitimacy – serves to exploit the emotional impact of the violence to insert an alternative political

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Stepanova, op cit, p 12.

¹³² Ibid, p 29.

¹³³ R.E. Goodwin *What's Wrong with Terrorism?* (Polity Press:Cambridge:2006) p 31; see also: Vertigans, op cit (Chapter Six).

¹³⁴ Vertigans, op cit.

¹³⁵ Kydd & Walter, op cit.

*message as well as broaden the terrorists' support base, often through the media or political front organizations.*¹³⁶

Terrorist groups are limited in the type of strategy they can use. The three basic types of strategy are controlling, in which the aim is to remove the targets capacity to choose and in game-theoretic terms is zero-sum, consensual, in which the game is non zero-sum as each party is able to choose and so reach a mutually beneficial outcome, and coercive, in which choice remains but 'the preferences are hard to reconcile'¹³⁷. The aim is to influence the target through threat. According to Freedman, terrorism can only be coercive in strategy as terrorist groups cannot exercise control and, for the target at least, it is not consensual its prospective outcome. A coercive strategy depends on threat and the perception of the threat, hence, a terrorist strategy relies on the perception of threat by the intended recipients.¹³⁸

As a strategy, terrorism it is not generally perceived to be successful. Frey, citing Crenshaw and Wilkinson observes:

'Interestingly enough there is a broad consensus amongst leading scholars in the field that terrorism – despite media attention – has been quite unsuccessful.'¹³⁹

Studies from strategic studies bear this out. Here terrorism must be separated from guerrilla warfare. Whilst both share the same methods, guerrilla warfare involves the masses and aims towards a military confrontation; terrorism relies primarily on acts of violence that are symbolic and avoids the mobilisation of the masses and a conventional military confrontation.¹⁴⁰ Nor should the communicative aspect be underestimated, terrorism is both a means of communicating a message and an aspect of counter-terrorism strategies.¹⁴¹

¹³⁶ Neumann & Smith, op cit, p 32.

¹³⁷ Lawrence Freedman 'Terrorism as a Strategy' *Government and Opposition* Vol 42, No 3 (2007) pp 314-339 (p 319).

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Bruno Frey *Dealing with Terrorism: Stick or Carrot?* (Edward Elgar:Cheltenham:2004) p 21.

¹⁴⁰ Neumann and Smith, op cit.

¹⁴¹ See: Jan Oskar Engene *Terrorism in Western Europe: Explaining the Trends since 1950* (Edward Elgar:Aldershot:2004; Neumann & Smith, op cit; Ronald Crelinsten 'Analysing terrorism and counter-terrorism: A communication model' *Terrorism and Political Violence* Vol 14, No 2 (2002) pp 77-122.

There are arguments that terrorism does in fact work when government policies are changed and demands met. The suicide attack against the United States Marines in Beirut in 1983 led to their withdrawal, the 9/11 attacks was followed two years later by the withdrawal of US forces from Saudi Arabia and the kidnapping of a Filipino truck driver resulted in the recall of Filipino troops from Iraq.¹⁴² To this can be added the withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq after the Madrid train bombings, Spain had been identified as a 'weak link' in the US led Coalition as her public was almost totally against the war and the government was isolated.¹⁴³ Overall:

In fact, terrorism has been so successful that between 1980 and 2003, half of all suicide terrorist campaigns were closely followed by substantial concessions by the target governments.¹⁴⁴

Examples where terrorism has worked can be countered by examples where a strategy of terrorism has been deeply flawed. Taking into account the communicative aspects of terrorism, terrorism can reverse previous gains. Prior to the 1999 apartment bombings in Russia, most Russians perceived the Chechen conflict as a territorial issue. The first Chechen War had been deeply unpopular and Russian forces had been withdrawn. After the bombings the Chechens were perceived as wanting to destroy Russia, the Chechen separatists were no longer seen as separatists but as terrorists; what had been a public willing to compromise became one willing to incur military casualties to counter a terrorist threat. The 9/11 attacks failed to communicate the aims of Al-Qaeda to the American public who took the attacks as assault on American values and freedom instead of as a response to American foreign policy and involvement. As a result, US foreign policy saw increased political and military involvement in the Muslim world, counter-terrorism operations that have resulted in thousands of Muslim deaths and a less partial approach to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The First Intifada, a comparative lull in violence in the intractable Palestinian-Israeli conflict, had similar effects on

¹⁴² Andrew H Kydd and Barbara F Walter 'The strategies of terrorism' *International Security*, Vol. 31, No. 1 2006) pp. 49–80.

¹⁴³ Neumann & Smith, op cit.

¹⁴⁴ Kydd & Walter, op cit, p 49.

public opinion in Israel. The aim was to communicate the need for Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories, the result was to increase public perception that the Palestinians wanted to conquer and destroy Israel, decreasing support for a 'two state' solution. In all three examples the message that the groups were attempting to communicate was lost in the immediate wake of terrorist violence as a terrorist act has a high correspondence.¹⁴⁵

It is in the creation of a sense of threat in the target and deliberate provocation to over-react that the flaws of terrorism a strategy are manifest. It is undeniable that terrorism has propelled the causes of terrorist groups into the limelight and made them known to the world through intensive media coverage:

'Clearly, terrorism and the media are bound together in an inherently symbiotic relationship, each feeding off and exploiting the other for its own purposes.'¹⁴⁶

But this is not as simple as it initially appears, the media increases the public's awareness of terrorism as a threat but the coverage is rarely positive.¹⁴⁷ Moreover, it is relatively short term. Laqueur, writing in 1978 observed:

'Terror is noisy, it catches the headlines. Its melodrama inspires horror and fascination. But seen in historical perspective it hardly ever has a lasting effect.'¹⁴⁸

And in relation to actually inspiring fear:

'Society will tolerate terrorism as long as it is no more than a nuisance. Once insecurity spreads and terror becomes a real danger, the authorities are no longer blamed for disregarding human rights in their struggle against it.'¹⁴⁹

More recent studies have demonstrated that populations actually adapt to terrorism. It would be expected that levels of stress and disorientation would be high during and after terrorist campaigns, yet this was not the cases after the London and Madrid bombings or amongst Israeli's during and after the second

¹⁴⁵ Max Abrahms 'Why terrorism does not work' *International Security* Vol 31, No 2 (2006) pp. 42–78

¹⁴⁶ Hoffman, op cit, p183.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ Walter Laqueur *The Terrorism Reader: A Historical Anthology* (Meridian:New York:1978) p 255.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid, p257.

Intifada.¹⁵⁰ We have also seen above, with the examples of the apartment bombings in Russia, 9/11, and the first Intifada, that the communication aspect of terrorism does not always communicate the intended message. We close with what Neumann & Smith call the 'escalation trap'. In order to maintain a climate of fear a group must escalate its actions, invariably alienating the target population and eventually pushing the government past its breaking point, provoking a ruthless response. A group that does not escalate its actions peters out in a low level campaign; terrorism can be successful in the short term, gaining attention and concessions, but in the long term it is an inherently self-defeating strategy that rarely achieves its aims.¹⁵¹

Studies of terrorist strategy and its utility in terms of achieving the group's goals enable an understanding of the rationale behind a group's actions, treating them as rational actors who have aims and objectives. In contrast to the socio-psychological contributions above, which explain the psychological factors that enable violence, they provide an explanation of how campaigns of violence are undertaken. There is invariably an end goal, often unachievable, and the strategies and tactics applied are a means to an end and not an end in themselves. Given that there is serious dispute over the ability of a terrorist strategy in achieving these goals a wider explanation is needed of why rational actors would fall into the 'escalation trap' and continue with strategies that are inherently counterproductive. To do this the psycho-sociological and situational factors introduced in the attitude and situation sections above need to be taken into account. In the longer term the group leadership will look at other options by which they can achieve their goals. In the analysis chapters the questions of how and why this occurs will be addressed.

Terroristic behaviour invariably provokes a response from the incumbent states security forces and changes the attitudes and situation of the protagonists involved as well as that of the regional and national populations. What a terrorist group actually does, and it does not follow that the strategy employed will be that

¹⁵⁰ Neumann & Smith, op cit

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

which the group initially envisaged, has a direct impact on the society within which they live. A series of shootings directed at the security forces or a bombing campaign aimed at destabilisation inevitably produces casualties, both civilian and military, and hardens the resolve of the target group. Studying the behaviour of terrorist organisations is but one part of an overall picture due to the disproportionate impact they have in relation to their size. To fully understand a terrorist campaign requires an in-depth understanding of the root causes behind the campaign and the individuals who participate in it. How the three complementary aspects of situation, attitudes and behaviour can be integrated together is discussed in the next chapter. The discussion now turns to how terrorism ends.

How Terrorism Ends

Understanding how terrorism ends is the purpose of this study. Although historically understudied within the terrorism studies field it has been given more attention in recent years. Three general conceptions of how terrorist groups decline are outlined below but before this is done individual disengagement from terrorist groups is introduced.

A significant contribution towards understanding how terrorism ends has taken place into the disengagement of the individual from terrorism. At the individual level there are a number of factors why individuals disengage from an organisation:

- '1. Disillusionment arising from incongruence between initial ideals and the fantasies that shaped a person's initial involvement and their subsequent experiences with the reality of what is entailed by involvement – in other words, the mismatch between the fantasy and the reality;
2. Disillusionment arising from disagreement over tactical issues;
3. Disillusionment arising from strategic, political or ideological differences;
4. Becoming burned out;

5. Changing personal priorities.¹⁵²

As can be seen, the reasons for individual disengagement are diverse, ranging from disagreement within the group to more prosaic issues such as starting a family and becoming burned out by the pressures of clandestine activity. Participation in a terrorist group is a choice that does not go well with conventional life and requires a commitment to a lifestyle that is arduous and a group that is polarised in its mindset.¹⁵³ The road to decline can be one for the terrorist group as a whole and the individual: terrorist groups are not static organisations, they are similar to other organisations, be they commercial or military. There is a need to continuously recruit, train and indoctrinate new members into the philosophy of the group, a commitment that draws on resources and is ongoing. Where they differ from the commercial organisation is in their clandestine and militarised nature, one which brings complications as some ways by which the individual exits terrorism are not voluntary, or based on a personal decision: these, in short, are injury, incarceration and death, factors which put additional strain on maintaining personnel. The five factors noted above give room for exploitation by the state actor as counterterrorism can make an already dangerous life more so, and the government willing to compromise and negotiate can influence the end of a terrorist campaign by enabling the departure of the membership of armed groups.

The first conception presented here is that of Gurr, who writing in 1990, observed that terrorism in Western Societies has been demonstrated to decline. Of thirty-one groups that had been active in Western Societies in the 1950s, twenty had ceased to exist after an average of six and a half years. Many others that had emerged in the 1960s and 1970s had reached a state of decline or had ended, the exceptions including the durable terrorist campaigns in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country. Underlying the decline of terrorist groups are conditions which

¹⁵² John Horgan "Individual disengagement: a psychological analysis" in: Bjorgo & Horgan (eds) *Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement* (Routledge:London:2009) pp 17-29 (p23).

¹⁵³ Ibid; See also: Tore Bjorgo "Processes of disengagement from violent groups of the extreme right" in: Bjorgo & Horgan (eds), op cit, pp 30-48.

undermine the political support offered by the larger group and these processes are backlash, reform and deterrence.¹⁵⁴

Backlash occurs both in the minority group support of terrorist organisation and amongst the general public, but it is the former that is the most devastating and this can come about through 'propaganda campaigns by public officials and the media'¹⁵⁵ and 'counterterror strategies that raise the costs for ordinary citizens in tolerating the terrorists' presence.'¹⁵⁶ North American groups such as FLQ, the Weather Underground and Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) were all undermined by the backlash against violence. In the case of the FLQ the backlash in minority group support was against political violence, not separatism. For the United States groups, a general social change away from radical social change towards private interests was an additional factor. German groups also suffered a backlash, but to a lesser extent.

Whilst governments are loath to negotiate with terrorist groups they can pursue reforms, which will undermine the minority group's support of a terrorist group. Reforms may not always dissuade the committed members of a terrorist group from violence, but they can reduce the number of potential new recruits. In the case of the FLQ, reforms leading to autonomy for Quebec led to members leaving the organisation to join a political party, although in the end there was not public support for independence. In the United States, the ending of the draft and of the Vietnam War undermined revolutionary organisations as these were the two main reasons for militancy against the government.

Deterrence, in the form of counterterrorist policies, is harder to demonstrate as its success can only be inferred. The FLQ and Weather Underground and SLA were directly affected by counterterrorist activities, particularly arrest. However:

'To summarize, counterterrorist policies in democracies, whether they emphasise traditional law-enforcement techniques or, as in Italy, incentives to defect, are most effective when they coincide with larger shifts in the climate of political opinion away

¹⁵⁴ Gurr, op cit.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid, p 95.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

from support for, or in sympathy with, terrorist causes and tactics. Law enforcement strategies may reinforce the erosion in support for radical action; they cannot create it.¹⁵⁷

Also, a counterterrorist campaign may appear successful but the benefits may only be temporary as minority support may increase due to resentment at antiterrorist policies and a terrorist group may wait until the counterterrorist campaign has subsided before re-emerging.¹⁵⁸

Crenshaw, in a general conceptual framework, makes six propositions as to why a terrorist group in opposition to the state moves away from the use of violence:

1. Leadership: The members of small underground groups have a tight cohesion and there is a strong need to maintain the group, even at the expense of achieving the group's goals. A strong leader, able to take the risk of making a transition that affects the existence of a group is critical in justifying changing the group's doctrine. A government may opt to boost the credibility and legitimacy of a leader that is willing to compromise.
2. Popular Support: The erosion of popular support for the use of terrorism must not only happen but must also be communicated to the group, who will have an exaggerated view of their own popularity.
3. Recruitment: The prevention of the recruitment of new members is important but difficult as terrorist groups require few members.
4. Tolerance Limits: A backlash will occur if violence is escalated beyond what the group's target audience will accept, resulting in a loss of minority group support. Also, repression may occur from an outraged government and/or its supporters.
5. Offering options: Terrorist groups need not abandon their goals in order to abandon violence. The context of a situation changes over time, terrorist campaigns can continue for reasons other than those that begin them, and peaceful options can be presented again and again.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid, p 101.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

6. Ingrained terrorism or adaptability: Some groups are more adaptable than others; groups that make exclusive use of terrorism are more intractable than groups that have wider roles (Hamas, Hezbollah).

The transition to non-violence occurs over a long time span and for violence to truly end a patient commitment to peace processes is required for a conflict to be genuinely resolved. It is notable that the entrenched nature of underground groups affects their perception of reality, this being particularly relevant to propositions 1, 4 & 6.¹⁵⁹

The third general framework is that of Audrey Cronin:

‘There are at least seven broad explanations or critical elements in the decline and ending of terrorist groups in the modern era: (1) the capture or killing of the leader, (2) failure to transition to the next generation, (3) achievement of the group’s aims, (4) transition to a legitimate political process, (5) undermining of popular support, (6) repression, and (7) transitioning from terrorism to other forms of violence.’¹⁶⁰

These are summarised in turn below:

1. The impact of the capture or killing of a leader varies according to how important or replaceable the leader is. Even if it does not result in the demise of the group it can be a major turning point. The Real IRA, Shining Path and Aum Shinrikyo are examples of groups who suffered a major setback when the leader was captured.
2. The failure of a group to pass the cause to the next generation is a common reason for a groups decline. This may be down to a poor formulation or vision of goals, as was the case for left-wing/anarchist groups, which arose in the 1970s, or the tendency of right wing groups to engage in criminal behaviour, which allows them to be traced by law enforcement agencies. However, in

¹⁵⁹ Martha Crenshaw (2005) “Pathways out of terrorism: A conceptual framework” in: D.R. Kaarthekeyan (ed) *Pathways out of Terrorism and Insurgency: The Dynamics of Terrorist Violence and Peace Processes* (New Dawn Press Inc:Elgin:2005) pp 3-11.

¹⁶⁰ Audrey Kurth Cronin “How terrorist campaigns end” in: Tore Bjorgo & John Horgan (eds) *Leaving Terrorism Behind* (Routledge:London:2009) pp 49-65 (p 55); Audrey Kurth Cronin *How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns* (Princeton University Press: Princeton:2009).

the case of the persistence of racist or fascist inspiration for right wing groups means that whilst the groups may disappear their beliefs cross generations and their decentralised nature makes them harder to track.

3. Some groups actually achieve their aims, examples being the Irgun, who having hastened the withdrawal of the British from Palestine, disbanded with the establishment of Israel, and the ANC who ceased operations with the ending of apartheid.
4. The transition to a legitimate political process has a diverse range of effects. Both the PIRA and the PLO engaged in successful negotiations and peace processes, although the PLO's remains to be finished. However, a common outcome, and one that applies to both the PIRA and PLO is the emergence of splinter groups that oppose the peace process. Negotiations need not be formal or directed solely at a group's leadership. The offering of amnesty by the Italian government to the Red Brigades and the Peruvian government to members of the Shining Path targeted the members of both organisations. Groups are more amenable to negotiation if they are hierarchical, have a strong leader, ambivalent constituencies and have negotiable aims.
5. Popular support can be undermined for four reasons: Government counteraction can make normal life uncomfortable for an apathetic population and even the radicalised can become exhausted under repression, reform may offer better alternatives, a population can lose interest in a group's ideology and objectives (i.e: Marxism), and, finally, terrorist attacks can cause revulsion amongst the minority support group.
6. Repression is a means open to the state as terrorism is asymmetrical in nature and the use of force shifts the balance in the state's favour. The Narodnaya Volya, Shining Path and Kurdistan Workers Party are examples of terrorist groups that have declined due to the use of military force. However, the effects of repressive force can also be not only temporary, but counterproductive. The use of repressive means contributed to Chechen groups moving from insurgency to terrorism and spread the conflict to neighbouring areas. For democracies, the use of repressive force is not only

counterproductive to liberal values; it can also threaten the existence state itself.

7. Finally, groups can transition from terrorism to criminality (e.g. Columbian narco-terrorist groups) and insurgency or conventional war (e.g. the Algerian Armed Islamic Group), the latter more common to ethno-nationalist separatist groups.

The critical elements outlined do not apply to every group or situation and the key to ending a terrorist campaign lies in recognising which apply.¹⁶¹

There are common themes of interest within the three frameworks outlined above. These are: the impact of reform, the role of the leader in the decision to abandon violence, the impact of counter-terrorist measures by the government, and success in achieving the group's aims as a result of the move to a different modus operandi. In closing, these are briefly discussed.

Reform by an incumbent government, addressing the underlying issues that have brought about a terrorist campaign and the offering of alternative options to terrorism can lead to the abandonment of violence and the move to party politics. This is the conclusion of Weinberg, Pedahur & Perliger: whilst in some circumstances political parties can give rise to terrorist groups the reverse is also true. Government actions which enable this vary from repressive means to conciliatory measures such as amnesty.¹⁶² The impact of competition from non-violent nationalist parties is also important: constitutional parties in the Basque Country and Northern Ireland resulted in the emergence of political parties linked to ETA and the return of Sinn Fein to the political scene¹⁶³. Linked to this is the role of peace processes, which require a commitment by both parties to the peace process, influential individual leaders, and a consensus to the peace process from

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahur & Arie Perliger *Political Parties and Terrorist Groups* (Routledge: London: 2009).

¹⁶³ Cynthia Irvin *Militant Nationalism: Between Movement and Party in Ireland and the Basque Country* (University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis: 1999).

the mainstream.¹⁶⁴ Political reform is an enabler for the move from violence to non-violence, but it may not bring about immediate results of a positive nature as it is a long term solution and we should remember that it is not a silver bullet which will resolve a terrorist conflict alone.

The role of the leader in the decline of a terrorist group is also important but in two opposing ways. Firstly, they can act as an engine of change, challenging the members of the group entrenched in a commitment to violence, and are particularly effective if they have strong credentials within the organisation. Secondly, and this is particularly the case with groups centred round a strong or charismatic leader, the capture or killing of the leader can remove the rock on which the group is based. Whichever it may be, the way in which the incumbent government deals with the leader is critical: a captured or killed leader can become a focus of attempts at gaining their release, or a martyr to the cause, and it is important not to undermine a leader who is moving a group in direction of abandoning violence.

The impact of government countermeasures is difficult to measure. An effective counter-terror campaign can undermine support for a terrorist group, reduce recruitment, inhibit its operations, affect the support of the minority support group and capture or kill the terrorist groups' core membership. History abounds with examples of terrorist groups defeated by Government action, some thirty groups having been defeated in the United States alone.¹⁶⁵ Alternatively, repression may initially appear to be effective but a terrorist group can sit out repression until conditions are more favourable and its ranks can be swelled, and minority group support increased. Outright repression, which can crush a group, is only available to non-democratic regimes and for democratic regimes the associated impact on civil rights and credibility is unpalatable.

Finally, terrorist groups may be successful in achieving their aims and cease operations, revert to criminality, or make the move from terrorism to other levels

¹⁶⁴ Paul Wilkinson *Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response* (Frank Cass: Abingdon: 2001).

¹⁶⁵ Weinberg, Pedahur & Perliger, op cit.

of conflict such as insurgency and civil war. The latter is thankfully rare, and Cronin's example of Algeria is an example of how bad this could be.¹⁶⁶ The Algerian Civil War of the 1990's was one that incorporated terrorism into a wider conflict involving atrocities so bad as to undermine the Islamist cause and eventually bring about a ceasefire after over 100,000 deaths. In terms of success, these are also rare, and most examples cited (the Irgun, EOKA) involved the withdrawal of the British during a period in which that country had lost its grip on empire and the will to maintain it. Historically, no democracy has been overthrown by terrorism.¹⁶⁷

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to investigate terrorism studies in the context of situation-attitudes-behaviour and introduce the literature on how terrorism ends. The most appropriate to *situation* are environmental theories, which provide insight into sociological factors that are the preconditions, or root causes, which result in terrorism taking place. In order to understand *attitudes*, psychological and socio-psychological theories offer insight into individual personality traits and group psychology. An effective approach to understanding *behaviour* is the theories of terrorism deriving from strategic studies, which explain terrorism in terms of a choice made towards achieving a desired aim or set of goals. One aspect of the strategic approach beneficial to the understanding of terrorism is its moral neutrality as terrorism does not represent the end goals, but the means to achieve them, so is instrumental in nature. The literature on how terrorism ends demonstrated the importance of distinguishing between individual and group departures from terrorism. It also confirmed the importance of reform and the transition to party politics, although there was ambiguity over the impact of coercion.

¹⁶⁶ Cronin, *How Terrorism Ends*, op cit.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

Chapter Five: Framework of Analysis

Introduction

The methodology chapter draws together the three theoretical strands of this study. The second chapter was concerned with the impact of terrorism and liberal democracies and what has been done historically to counter terrorism. This combines with the section on how terrorism ends in the fourth chapter to form the subject of study: ethno-nationalist-separatist terrorist campaigns in liberal democracies and what theory tells us about how they come to an end. The third chapter on conflict studies and fourth chapter on terrorism studies introduced and discussed theoretical approaches and identified those that can be used to analyse terrorist campaigns within a historical context, which takes into account the relation between the situation of a conflict, the attitudes of the persons involved and their behaviour. The integration of conflict studies methodologies into terrorism studies enables a historical approach, which takes into account root causes, placing this study within the theoretical block of moderate terrorism studies. The bulk of chapter five is given over to outlining the framework of analysis to be used, but prior to this the preliminary issues of interdisciplinarity, the convergence of interests between conflict and terrorism studies, and the influence of previous studies are addressed.

The inter-disciplinary nature of conflict and peace studies, and the convergence with terrorism studies.

This section introduces the important idea of interdisciplinarity. It begins by explaining the separation of disciplines then moves on to how the field of conflict and peace studies have approached the problem of crossing disciplines, followed by terrorism studies. The convergence of interests between conflict studies and terrorism studies is introduced, followed by studies that have combined conflict and terrorism studies.

The separation of disciplines and inter-disciplinary approaches within conflict and terrorism studies

Whilst once there was a clear division between the 'educated', in the sense of classical learning, and the 'uneducated', improvements in education led not only to this line been blurred but new 'distinctions based on the specific nature of the education one received'¹ and a subsequent sorting out of disciplines distanced by a gap similar to that of the educated and uneducated. A professional, specialised and formal system of education came into being and, increasingly 'moral and theological truth ceased to be recognized as objects of substantive enquiry and instead were relegated to the realm of privatised belief.'² A distinction also developed between 'vocational' and 'university' education: the first being a specialised education in one skill and body of knowledge that enables the skill; the second an intellectual capital, which can also be specialised, that is exploratory as opposed to prescriptive.³ Mayer, writing in 1934, observed that there were a number of schools of thought, which could be divided into two categories: natural science and cultural schools.⁴ He argued that social science needed to be dependent on a 'rigorous scientific methodology' based on 'observation and verification; theory and rigorous analysis.'⁵

There are clear advantages of the division of disciplines: the scope of knowledge is too broad, even within disciplines, to allow for general knowledge in depth, and without specific theories and methods, knowledge becomes unstructured and disorganised. However, this has implications for the study of the human condition as the parts become understood but the whole is lost. Such concerns led to a call to unify the sciences without losing the gains of disciplinary

¹ Elton B McNeil "The nature of social science and human conflict" in: EB McNeil (ed) *The Nature of Human Conflict* (Prentice Hall International Inc: 1965) pp 3-13 (p 4).

² Alastair McIntyre *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy and Tradition* (Duckworth: London: 1990), p 217.

³ Michael Oakshott *Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays (New and Expanded Edition)* (Liberty Fund: Indianapolis: 1991).

⁴ Joseph Mayer 'Scientific method and social science' *Philosophy of Science*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (1934), pp. 338-350 (p339).

⁵ *Ibid*, p 350.

separation and recognising that synthesis would need to be fruitful in order to counter the tendency to specialisation.⁶ A distinct trend has been that social science has moved towards post-positivism and away from mechanistic explanations of human behaviour. In terms of intellectual discourse there is a need to consider that in following a theoretical line of enquiry we may naturally exclude what is potentially disruptive.⁷

The separation of social science disciplines has implications for peace and conflict studies as they are clearly dependent on contributions from the social science disciplines, but it can be argued that they also reciprocate the knowledge gained:

‘Whilst reviewing the literature for this essay we also reached the conclusion that peace research does have the qualities of a discipline. It is certainly important that peace research is one dimension of virtually all disciplines. On the other hand, it is vitally necessary that the various dimensions be assembled, as is the need in efforts to develop long-range peace-building strategies. As with other disciplines, the peace research discipline will always have a need to be continually linked to, and apply, the insights of other disciplines. But at the same time, other disciplines need the insight that the peace research discipline can offer them with respect to how the dimension of peace research that is an aspect of their discipline fits into the more holistic view of peace.’⁸

How the discipline of conflict analysis and resolution has approached the problem of the separation of disciplines will now be addressed.

A pioneering attempt at establishing an inter-disciplinary research centre took place at the University of Michigan between 1956 and 1971. This involved the founding of the *Journal of Conflict Resolution* and shortly after the establishment of the Centre for Research on Conflict Resolution (CRCR). Despite a productive output

⁶ Carl Landauer ‘Toward a unified social science’ *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 86, No. 4 (1971), pp. 563-585 (p585).

⁷ George A. De Vos ‘Toward an integrated social science’ *Ethos*, Vol. 27, No. 1 (1999), pp. 33-48.

⁸ Chadwick E Alger “Peace studies as a transdisciplinary project” in: C Weibel & J Galtung (eds) *Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies* (Routledge:Abingdon:2007), pp 299-318 (p300).

the goal of unifying social science disciplines into a theoretical framework for conflict analysis and resolution was not met.⁹

Attempts to clarify the study of conflict as a distinct body of thought have a recent history:

‘There are at least four paradigms relevant to conflict and conflict resolution at *all* levels, from interpersonal to international: (1) Political Realism (*Realpolitik*), (2) Political Idealism (*Idealpolitik*), (3) Marxism, and (4) what I call “Non-Marxist Radical Thought” (NMRT)’¹⁰

Without going into the intricacies of international relations theories the above needs some clarification here. By NMRT, Sandole is referring to an approach that ‘recognizes the potency of our biological nature’¹¹ yet,

‘...stresses structural change to bring social, political and economic, and other institutions more in line with *basic human needs*.’¹²

The combining of the four paradigms and two approaches into an overall framework and its application to levels of conflict into a generic theory that incorporated elements of biology, psychology, sociology and international relations, was a framework that transcended competing paradigms. The *Conflict Series* helmed by John Burton represented another attempt at creating a viable framework, arising in the late 1980s and coming to prominence in the 1990s. Burton sought a ‘political philosophy’ that moved away from power politics and focused on human needs. For Burton ‘conflict is a symptom of the need for system

⁹ Martha Harty and John Modell ‘The first conflict resolution movement, 1956-1971: An attempt to institutionalize applied interdisciplinary social science’ *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 35, No. 4 1991), pp. 720-758.

¹⁰ Dennis J D Sandole “Paradigms, theories, and metaphors in conflict and conflict resolution: coherence or confusion?” in: Dennis J D Sandole & Hugo Van der Merwe (eds) *Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application* (Manchester University Press: Manchester: 1991) pp 3-24 (p4).

¹¹ Ibid, p5.

¹² Ibid, p4.

change. Conflict resolution processes and conflict prevention policies could be the means for peaceful change.¹³

Despite such demonstrable attempts at crossing disciplines within conflict studies, according to Galtung:

‘However, polarised by the niches assigned to them in the intellectual landscapes the social sciences are badly in need of bi-, multi, inter- and transdisciplinary integration’¹⁴

And:

‘Obviously, we are now also saying that interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary sciences have a major role to play in bridging the gaps between legitimate but one sided approaches.’¹⁵

The argument is therefore that whilst specialisations are necessary and valuable to knowledge, for the applied social sciences such as peace and conflict studies that draw on them, there is a need to account for the gaps between the ‘black boxes’ of disciplines. The solutions put forward by Galtung are both simple and complex: for the simple, talk to a ‘dialogue partner’ from another discipline, start the day at a focus of interest and follow the leads across disciplines; for the complex (conflictology), Galtung specifies that it should be intra- and inter- (conflict within and between), individual and collective, ‘draw on the distance between space and time’ in that it uses history and takes into account non-western societies¹⁶, and a ‘diachronic-nomothetic combination, because it is causally orientated and generalizing.’¹⁷

The short description above is a indication of what can be, pointing ‘in the direction of a conflictology or general theory of conflict that is transdisciplinary and

¹³ John Burton “Conflict resolution as a political philosophy” in: Sandole & Van der Merwe (eds) op cit, pp 55-64 (p63).

¹⁴ Johan Galtung “Toward a conflictology: the quest for transdisciplinarity” in: DJD Sandole, S Byrne, I Sandole-Staroste & J Senehi (eds), *Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution* (Routledge:London:2009) op cit, pp 511- 524 (516).

¹⁵ Ibid, p518.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

captures reflexive practice as well as theory building¹⁸. The present is a visible and burgeoning conflict analysis and resolution field that is holistic and organic and has matured over the last twenty years.¹⁹ In contrast, terrorism studies, does not demonstrate a truly interdisciplinary approach to the same extent as conflict analysis. Excluding the more recent developments of Critical Terrorism Studies²⁰, Frank's multi-level approach²¹ and Crenshaw's theoretical work²², terrorism studies has been typified by the application of theories from other social science disciplines and sub-disciplines to the study of terrorism. A significant (and by no means exclusive) contribution to the study of terrorism has been made from the fields of political studies, international relations, history, psychology, sociology and criminology.²³ The various contributors brought with them their own theories, which were then applied to terrorism, hence whilst Wilkinson argues correctly that terrorism studies has been multi-disciplinary in nature from the outset²⁴ it can also be argued that gaps (as per Galtung) will remain from the contributions of the disciplines. Such a state of affairs is compounded when we consider that the majority of articles about terrorism have been authored by visitors to the field, preventing debate and theory driven contributions with terrorism studies.²⁵

The current state of terrorism studies is that it has evolved to the extent that there is a core of terrorism researchers whose main interest is terrorism and seek to push terrorism studies forward as a discipline with some 42 terrorism journals, which provide a solid knowledge database. When combined with the increase in terrorism literature after 9/11, this provides the foundations for terrorism studies

¹⁸ Sean Byrne & Jessica Senehi "Revisiting the CAR field" in: DJD Sandole, S Byrne, I Sandole-Staroste & J Senehi (eds), op cit, pp 525-536 (p 525).

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ See Richard Jackson, Marie Breen Smith & Jeroen Gunning (eds) *Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda* (Routledge:London:2009). Critical Studies defines itself by inter-disciplinarity.

²¹ Jason Franks *Rethinking the Roots of Terrorism* (Basingstoke:Palgrave MacMillan:2006).

²² An example is: Martha Crenshaw 'The causes of terrorism' *Comparative Politics* Vol 13, No 4 (1981) pp 379-399.

²³ Paul Wilkinson "Research into terrorism studies: Achievements and failures" in M Ranstorp (ed) *Mapping Terrorism Research: State of the Art, Gaps and Future Direction* (Routledge:London:2007), pp316-328.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Magnus Ranstorp "Mapping terrorism studies after 9/11: an academic field of old problems and new prospects" in Jackson, Breen Smith & Gunning (eds) *Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda* (Routledge:London:2009), pp 13-33.

to emerge as a separate discipline.²⁶ In effect, much as Galtung proposes that peace and conflict studies can develop into 'conflictology' there is potential for terrorism studies to develop into 'terrorology'. These are grand projects, it is not the purpose of this study to develop such projects, the aims being smaller and the method specific in its approach, but the themes of inter-disciplinarity and trans-disciplinarity within conflict studies are transferable to terrorism studies. This is possible for two reasons: the aforementioned by Wilkinson that terrorism studies has been multi-disciplinary from the outset²⁷ and the convergence of interests between the two areas of study.

Convergence

In the third chapter it was argued that there had been a shift in the nature of conflict across the world from one of the classical warfare of organised state actors to one in which the major actors are mercenaries, warlords and terrorist groups.²⁸ The nation-state still underpins the new frameworks but distinctions such as friend/enemy and soldier/civilian have been lost²⁹: warfare has become more complex, moving from that involving the organised forces of the state to the low technology conflicts centred round ethnicity, religion and the tribe.³⁰ The principal reason for this is that conflict between states has declined and intrastate conflict has increased³¹: the prospect of interstate war has not vanished, but it has faded into the background for now. The 9/11 attacks by Al Qaeda on the United States placed terrorism firmly into the context of international conflict and made terrorism a strategic concern for the world's predominant superpower. This has brought about a convergence of interests between conflict and terrorism studies, two areas of study previously divided:

²⁶ Avishag Gordon "Terrorism and knowledge growth: A databases and internet analysis" in A Silke (ed) *Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures* (Frank Cass: London: 2004) op cit, pp 104-118.

²⁷ Paul Wilkinson (2007), op cit.

²⁸ Herfried Munkler *The New Wars* (Polity Press:Cambridge:2005).

²⁹ Oliver P Richmond 'Realizing hegemony? Symbolic terrorism and the roots of conflict' *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* Vol 26 , No 4 (2003) pp 289-309 (p 290).

³⁰ Martin Van Creveld *The Transformation of War* (The Free Press:New York:1991).

³¹ For a survey of the prevalence of different types of conflict see: Mikael Eriksson & Peter Wallensteen 'Armed Conflict, 1989-2003' *Journal of Peace Research* Vol 41 (2004), No 5, pp625-636.

'Partly, this division has arisen because of conflicting methodologies and ontologies-conflict analysis focuses on roots and institutional responses from states or state-controlled organisations and agencies as well as from nongovernmental organisations (NGO's), whereas terrorism studies focuses on individual and group dynamics, legal and military regimes, and prevention within a legalist and state-centric framework.'³²

The breaking down of the separation between conflict and terrorism studies reflects the changing nature of conflict. According to Richmond, the 'new wars' and 'new terrorism' debates have deconstructed 'the traditional distinction between state and non-state actors and issue areas' and 'broadened the concept of security away from its traditional state-centric framework'.³³ This has implications for theory within terrorism studies as it encourages the incorporation of theories and methodologies from conflict studies. Conflict and terrorism studies have both had to cross disciplines in order to present 'coherent frameworks and bodies of theory'.³⁴ Although works combining the two are rare, they are of interest here.

Studies utilising conflict and terrorism studies

A synthesis of terrorism studies and conflict studies has been previously undertaken by Franks to develop a comprehensive and holistic framework that can be applied to the study of the roots of terrorism. He compared approaches of terrorism studies and conflict studies and used conflict theory to break out of a mono-causal and positivist understanding of terrorism.³⁵ Weinberg and Richardson applied the process model of Kriesberg to understanding how terrorist campaigns begin and end. Based on a process of emergence, escalation and de-escalation it they first applied to terrorist campaigns in Western Europe in general before applying it directly to Northern Ireland and Spain. They concluded that conflict theory can be useful in understanding the trajectory of terrorist campaigns.³⁶ Tellidis, focusing solely on ethno terrorism in the Basque Country, combined critical

³² Richmond, op cit, pp 289-290.

³³ Ibid, p 290.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Franks, op cit.

³⁶ Leonard Weinberg and Louise Richardson (2004) Conflict Theory and the Trajectory of Terrorist Campaigns in Western Europe in A Silke (ed) op cit, pp 138-160.

theory approaches to terrorism and the root causes and human needs aspects of conflict theory, concluding that civil society can have a greater contribution to the resolution of conflicts than liberal democratic states recognise.³⁷ Buttner compared the conflicts in Corsica and the Basque Country using conflict analysis, utilising Byman's theory of ethnic terrorism. He found that there were similarities in that there was an incompatibility between regionalism and centralism and the long term survival of clandestine groups despite an environment in which states were democratically responsive, although there was a stronger concept of identity and greater degree of ideology in the Basque case.³⁸ A final example is Schmid's application of Crenshaw's preconditions and precipitants to produce a conceptual model for the emergence of terrorist campaigns which draws on root causes.³⁹

These studies demonstrate that the combining of conflict and terrorism studies is theoretically sound and provides a small body of knowledge on which the present study can draw. Moreover, the use of a process model by Weinberg and Richardson is of interest as process and stage models represent part of the method applied here. The applicability of the structure of terrorist conflict and process models will now be discussed.

A notable addition, although not strictly a combination of conflict analysis and terrorism studies, is Neumann and Smith⁴⁰, who apply strategic theory to terrorism. This is of interest for two reasons relevant to the study at hand. Firstly it is an example of Galtung's call for interdisciplinary integration, in this instance strategic theory and terrorism studies; it is not simply an application of strategic studies to terrorism studies, but an example of scholars within terrorism studies utilising strategic theory. The second is that the strategy of terrorism is presented

³⁷ Ioannis Tellidis *Preventing Terrorism? Conflict Resolution and Nationalist Violence in the Basque Country* University of St Andrews PhD thesis (2008) <https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/>

³⁸ Wolfgang Buttner *Corsica and the Basque Country: A Comparative Conflict Analysis* (Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag:2000).

³⁹ Alex P Schmid 'Root causes of terrorism: some conceptual note, a set of indicators, and a model' *Democracy and Security* Vol 1, No 2 (2005) pp 127-136.

⁴⁰ Peter R Neumann and M.L.R Smith 'Strategic Terrorism: Its Framework and Its Fallacies' *The Journal of Strategic Studies* Vol 28, No 4 (2005) pp.571 -595; Peter R Neumann and M.L.R Smith *The Strategy of Terrorism* (Routledge:London:2008).

in stages: disorientation, target response and gaining legitimacy.⁴¹ The three stages have clear military and political goals with the purposes of first alienating the authorities from their citizens by making them seem impotent, secondly provoking the government into overreaction, which favours the insurgent cause, and thirdly, the exploitation 'of the emotional impact of the violence to insert an alternative political message'.⁴²

Of the above there are two which have been utilised as a theoretical base for the approach taken in this thesis. The first is Frank's, whose comparison and integration of conflict studies and terrorism studies is comprehensive in its approach and demonstrates that the two separate disciplines can be successfully integrated and used as a means of analysis, in this instance the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Frank's division of terrorism studies into orthodox, radical and moderate schools of thought, and his focus on root causes led to an early decision to adopt a moderate terrorism studies approach as this was more commensurate with the historical analysis undertaken here.

The second is Weinberg and Richardson as they applied a specific aspect of conflict theory, process models, to terrorism and demonstrated that the application of process models to ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorist groups, in this case the ETA and IRA, was beneficial as it helped to understand the dynamics of terrorist campaigns.

These were taken as influential starting points for the means by which the analysis of the three cases presented here would be undertaken in that a conflict theory (Kriesberg) would be applied to the understanding of terrorist campaigns and how terrorism ends. It has been noted in the introduction that this was a starting point, in the process of preparing chapters three and four the theoretical approach became one in which conflict studies was used to inform the study of terrorism: one narrower in focus than that of Franks, and of deeper application than that of Weinberg and Richardson. A key aspect of the theoretical model was the use of Mitchell's adaptation of Galtung's conflict triangle, specifically developed

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Neumann and Smith (2005), op cit, p571.

to incorporate terrorism theory, which is original to this thesis in its conception and application. This led, in turn, to a reconsideration of the process model to be applied, again resulting in the application of terrorism studies to conflict theory to produce a model original to this thesis.

Two other contributions were utilised in the development of the framework of analysis below. Schmid's application of Crenshaw to produce a conceptual model for the emergence of terrorist campaigns, another example of the interdisciplinary approach, aided the conception of a stage of terrorist conflict as having theoretical contributions specific to it. In the analysis chapters, and below, it will be seen that root causes and precipitating events form an important part of the early stages of a terrorist conflict. We have already seen Neumann and Smith applied in the previous chapter to explain terrorist behaviour: an important part of the 'structure of terrorist conflict' presented below is the reasons why a particular strategy or tactic is used (behaviour). Neumann and Smith have produced an invaluable explanation of why terrorist groups do what they do and the pitfalls involved, the 'escalation trap' being a pertinent example.

However, the above two contributions were specific in their application here, not a founding part of the theoretical model developed. The process model outlined below is one which is concerned with the full range of the trajectory of a terrorist conflict – beginning with the historical precedents, which lead to escalation and leading to a permanent ceasefire, on the part of the terrorist group involved. Schmid's concept is limited to the emergence of a terrorist campaign and Neumann and Smith are concerned with the stages of a terrorist strategy and its flaws from a wide perspective. The study here is concerned with the full trajectory of the conflict and the stages it goes through in the context of process models adapted from conflict studies. In the course of the analysis below, terrorist groups will be seen to apply the strategies of disorientation, target response and gaining legitimacy, but the process model used treats the strategy of terrorism as one aspect amongst others: the situation and the attitudes and behaviour of other actors, notably the security forces, are also prevalent.

Framework of Analysis

The application of conflict studies to terrorism studies in this thesis has two distinct parts. The first is in the development of a 'structure of terrorist conflict'. The structure of terrorist conflict is an application of Mitchell's structure of




Figure 5.1 Structure of Terrorist Conflict

international conflict in which situation, attitudes and behaviour relate and interact with one another.⁴³ The second is to treat terrorist conflict as a process by which it moves from emergence, to escalation and de-escalation.⁴⁴

The Structure of Terrorist Conflict (I)

The 'structure of terrorist conflict' takes the conflict triangle as a starting point and uses terrorism studies to develop a model for analysis and is illustrated in fig 5.1. Given the variety of academic disciplines that have been applied to the study of terrorism it is necessary to structure the conflict triangle to reflect the social science approach that the study follows; hence, discussions on theory are organised into three groupings: Situation, drawing on sociological and environmental aspects, Attitudes, to include psychological and social-psychological aspects and Behaviour, to include strategy and communication aspects. These are

⁴³ Christopher R Mitchell *The Structure of International Conflict* (The Macmillan Press Ltd: Basingstoke: 1981) p 32.

⁴⁴ Weinberg & Richardson, op cit.

not simply arbitrary attempts to reduce a vast literature into a small space, but to place the conceptualisation of terrorism into the context of a relational structure in which the three components of situation, attitudes and behaviour influence one another. Having said this, there is an overlap between the three components, which is unavoidable. When investigating terrorism mono-causal explanations are not adequate, hence a combined approach is required in order to accommodate approaches that are not mutually exclusive.

The three parts of the structure of terrorist conflict are mutually supporting and reinforcing. A terrorist conflict can be understood to originate in the situational preconditions and precipitants that lead to the development of attitudes conducive to terrorist behaviour, resulting in a campaign of terrorism (behaviour). Terrorist campaigns do not simply break out on whim, this would be the province of the individual who strikes out at society and is of a criminal or psychopathic nature, close to the stereotype of the 'terrorist'. Instead, the terrorist campaign is a combination of socio-economic conditions in a historical context fused with a group ideology that justifies the use of terrorist violence.

Once a terrorist campaign begins and the government responds the situation then changes as the conflict is now manifest. The conflict becomes dynamic, the situation changing and the attitudes of the underground group polarising, an 'us' versus 'them' attitude reinforced by the difficulties of living in the underground group and actions of the security forces; what had once been perceived oppression on the part of the group becomes real as the incumbent Government inevitably responds so as to maintain law and order. The root cause approach demonstrates how a terrorist conflict can emerge and be sustained.

All terrorist conflicts have this structure although they will differ in nature as each is unique to their own context and all three factors are required to form a terrorist conflict. Each factor can be broken down according to factors that are present in a situation of terrorist conflict.

Situation




Figure 5.2 Situational factors

Firstly, there are situational factors, as shown in fig 5.2. These represent the environment within which a terrorist campaign has its root causes (preconditions) and the environmental reasons for its continuation and possible resolution through, for example, addressing the grievances of minority groups (although not actually acceding to the demands of the terrorist group).

In chapter four environmental factors, which can impact on individuals and groups joining and forming terrorist organisations, were discussed. These represent what Vertigans describes as the habitus (social structure), the norms and values present in a social group, and are closely linked to history and social memory.⁴⁵ Within this context there preconditions and precipitant events: respectively, factors which lay the foundations for the emergence of terrorism and immediate triggering events which result in a campaign of terrorism, as conceived by Crenshaw.⁴⁶ We should note that the interpretation of habitus is a worldview which is that of the individual, as are the preconditions for later violence.

Inequality is a significant contributory factor, including access to employment, education and housing; where one group in society has an advantageous position over another such access can outweigh even equality in per

⁴⁵ Stephen Vertigans *The Sociology of Terrorism: People, Places and Processes* (Routledge: London: 2011).

⁴⁶ Crenshaw, op cit.

capita income.⁴⁷ In contrast, poverty is a poor explanation and the impoverished terrorist is largely a stereotype⁴⁸ often used by social-revolutionaries who claim to champion the poor.⁴⁹ Linked to inequality is the wider socio-economic and political environment, an example is the Middle East in which the actions of non-democratic regimes and their security forces coupled with poor economic conditions, illiteracy and religious fanaticism provide a wider context.⁵⁰

Religion acts as a powerful motivator for terrorist violence, but within a given context and it should be clarified that it is religious fundamentalism which enables terrorist action, not religion in itself. Religiously motivated terrorism shows less restraint and transcends borders.⁵¹ In one respect religion acts as a powerful enabler once fused with political violence but there has to be a grievance in the first instance for this to become manifest.

Ideology, distinct from religion as it does not appeal to a transcendental belief, is a powerful motivator for political action, violent and non-violent. The most recognised of these is Marxism, which has been an influence across continents: the IRA and ETA in Western Europe, the PFLP in the Middle East and the FARC in Columbia are examples.⁵² Ideological influences are revolutionary in nature but are frequently fused with nationalism as well as Marxism and Marxism-Leninism.⁵³ Marxist/Leninist influences have been influential in the formation of terrorist groups but they are generally not the sole motivation and are dependent on the political and social situations of the groups involved. Finally, there are intellectual origins from within the Western Liberal tradition: notably the principle of popular

⁴⁷ Shri D.R. Kaarthikeyan "Root causes of terrorism?: A case study of the Tamil insurgency and the LTTE" in: Tore Bjorgo (ed) *Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward* (Routledge:London:2005), pp 131-140.

⁴⁸ Jitka Maleckova "Impoverished terrorists: stereotype of personality" in: Bjorgo (ed), op cit, p 33-43.

⁴⁹ Michel Wieviorka *The Making of Terrorism* (University of Chicago Press:London:1993).

⁵⁰ Abdullah Yousef Sahar Mohammed "Roots of terrorism in the Middle East: internal pressures and international constraints" in: Bjorgo (ed), op cit, pp 103-118 (p 105).

⁵¹ Louise Richardson *What Terrorists Want* (John Murray: London:2007).

⁵² Franks, op cit.

⁵³ Paul Wilkinson "Some observations on the relationships between terrorism and freedom" in Martin Warner & Roger Crisp (eds) *Terrorism, Protest and Power* (Edward Elgar:Aldershot:1990) pp 44-53.

sovereignty and self-determination.⁵⁴ As with religion, ideology is linked to a grievance, and one of the most powerful is inequality.

The above provides a survey of potential situational aspects related to the onset of terrorism, none of which explain why terrorism happens, but do provide contributing factors within a larger framework. Nor is it necessary for all to be present in a given case. The most significant underlying factor is inequality, particularly when linked with lack of representation, and it is notable that many of the ideologies linked to terrorist groups are concerned with creating a fair and equal society.

Situational factors can be countered by changing the aspects of a conflict situation which enable and perpetuate group violence. This requires an astute government to recognise that inequality and/or a legitimate grievance is present, which encourages revolutionary ideology and exacerbates differences along cultural and religious lines, and the most effective way to do this is through social and political reform. It should be noted that the fact that a nominally liberal democracy has allowed a state of affairs to continue that has resulted in the emergence of an ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorist group then there has been a fundamental failure of the political process, as if all groups within society are adequately represented then conflict will be managed by politics. In the case of the FLQ reform undermined the group and strengthened political parties and the ending of the draft in the United States undermined militant groups.⁵⁵ The principal benefit of reform as a measure is that it strengthens political participation over terrorist violence and encourages terrorist groups to consider the move from the use of violence to political participation, although this may take a long time.⁵⁶ For

⁵⁴ Robert Phillips "Terrorism: Historical roots and moral justifications" in: Warner & Crisp (eds) *Terrorism, Protest and Power* (Edward Elgar:Aldershot:1990) pp 68-77 (p 68).

⁵⁵ Ted Robert Gurr "Terrorism in democracy: Its social and political bases" in: Walter Reich (ed) *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, theologies, states of mind* (Woodrow Wilson Center Press: Washington DC:1998), pp 86-102 (p 87).

⁵⁶ Martha Crenshaw (2005) "Pathways out of terrorism: A conceptual framework" in: D.R. Kaarathikeyan (ed) *Pathways out of Terrorism and Insurgency: The Dynamics of Terrorist Violence and Peace Processes* (New Dawn Press Inc:Elgin:2005) pp 3-11; Audrey Kurth Cronin *How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns* (Princeton University Press: Princeton:2009); Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahur & Arie Perliger *Political Parties and Terrorist Groups* (Routledge: London: 2009).

the benefits of reform to be realised requires a secure environment in which constitutional party politics can flourish: whilst reform targets the minority support group, deterrence through coercive measures targets the terrorist group. It is absolutely critical, as observed in chapter two, that coercive measures do not target the minority support group or wider population and are subject to parliamentary oversight in all areas, including intelligence gathering.⁵⁷ The principal means by which a violent group is countered is through the use of the security forces as these undermine the ability of terrorist groups to organise and carry out attacks, acting as a deterrent⁵⁸ but the security forces have to be careful not to cross the line into repression and exacerbate the underlying conditions of the conflict further. The government has to be careful not to alienate the population and convince them that action is necessary, and combats terrorism without undermining civil liberties.⁵⁹ When challenged by a terrorist group the government is required to protect its citizens, hence the coercive approach is the first applied as a countermeasure, unfortunately it is a blunt measure and does not deal with underlying problems.

Attitude

Situational factors alone are not enough to result in a terrorist campaign. Fig 5.3 below shows the attitudinal factors necessary for an individual or group to move towards terrorism.

Whilst there is no 'terrorist personality' and the idea of terrorists as insane has been effectively debunked, personality factors such as aggression and action-orientation are prevalent and there is an above average externalisation of blame

⁵⁷ Peter Chalk 'The response to terrorism as a threat to liberal democracy' *Australian journal of Politics and History* Vol 44 issue 3 (2002) pp 373-388; Richard English *Terrorism: How to Respond* (Oxford:Oxford University Press:2009); Chris Sparks 'Liberalism, terrorism and the politics of fear' *Politics* Vol 23, issue 3 (2003) pp200-206; Grant Wardlaw *Political Terrorism: Theory Tactics and Counter-measures* 2nd edn (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge: 1989); Paul Wilkinson *Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response* (Frank Cass: Abingdon: 2001).

⁵⁸ Gurr, op cit.

⁵⁹ Chalk, op cit.

for perceived failure to the 'other'.⁶⁰ Joining a terrorist group has the potential to resolve a split identity and allows the individual to belong.⁶¹ These are personality traits, not disorders. For the individual to commit violence the self sanctions that guide moral behaviour are overridden by mechanisms of moral disengagement, principally by obscuring personal agency when committing acts of violence,




Figure 5.3 Attitudinal factors

whether by misrepresenting the consequences or by dehumanising the target.⁶² It is clear from analyses of widely differing groups such as the Weathermen, PIRA and Palestinian suicide bombers that frustration and a sense of injustice are a major factor in the move from political protest to political violence.⁶³ Whilst there is a trend towards a slow-burning move to the use of violence for political ends (radicalisation) there is also 'reaction' to a particular event or social change⁶⁴ although this can happen in a wider context of dissent.

⁶⁰ Jerrold M Post "Terrorist psycho-logic: terrorist behaviour as a product of psychological forces" in: Reich (ed), op cit, pp 25-40.

⁶¹ Jerrold M Post 'The socio-cultural underpinnings of terrorist psychology: when hatred is bred in the bone' in Bjorgo (ed), op cit, p56.

⁶² Albert Bandura "Mechanisms of moral disengagement" in: Reich (ed), op cit, pp 161-191.

⁶³ Hisham H Ahmed "Palestinian resistance and 'suicide bombing': causes and consequences" in: Tore Bjorgo (ed) op cit, pp 87-102 (p 95); Gurr, op cit; Ehud Sprinzak "The psycho-political formation of extreme left terrorism in a democracy: The case of the Weathermen" in: Reich (ed) op cit, pp 65-85.

⁶⁴ Gurr, op cit.

Whilst individual processes are important, it is group dynamics and the associated socio-psychological processes that allow a move to violence for the majority of people who become involved in terrorism. Group dynamics allow riskier choices and polarised attitudes of an 'us versus them' nature and the group itself may undergo a process of radicalisation leading a once peaceful protest group to splinter and take part in violence.⁶⁵ Radicalisation is therefore not simply a matter for the individual but also for the group: conflict with the establishment typically comes about through a first stage of involvement with a group who is protesting against the government, goes through a conflict of legitimacy in its second stage in the political system is questioned to a third, driven by the consequences of failure to elicit the desired change, in which the system has become inhuman and conventional morality is abandoned.⁶⁶

There are positive features to membership of a group, these are: empowerment, acceptance, increased engagement and a sense of control. A group's internal dynamics, which discourage dissent within the group and identification of the enemy as evil, mean that the individual and the group have separated themselves from ordinary society. Groups also lean towards riskier choices than would an individual and in order to perpetuate its existence the group needs to carry out attacks.⁶⁷

It should be observed that none of the above factors results in a pre-determined trajectory to terrorism as the individual who joins a terrorist group represents a tiny minority within a given population. Other people in the same circumstances may choose to accept their position or continue political action. We are not seeking to explain why people in general resort to terrorism but why a small number do so. What we can do is try to understand the factors that contribute to this in a given context and situation and seek explanations of how the reverse situation can be reached: the exit from terrorism.

⁶⁵ Bandura, *op cit.*

⁶⁶ Sprinzak, *op cit.*

⁶⁷ Post (2005), *op cit.*

For the individual to leave the group and abandon terrorism they need to reach the conclusion that their chosen course of action is flawed. This may happen through disillusionment, whether due to a mismatch between the fantasy of being in a terrorist group and the reality, practical disagreement over tactics or due to differences in ideology, politics or strategy.⁶⁸ Terrorist groups are homogenous entities as they have internal differences over a wide range of issues, akin to other political organisations, resulting in difference and discontent. Other reasons for exit are exhaustion and changes in personal priorities⁶⁹, membership of a terrorist group is exhausting and dangerous and it is not amicable with the requirements of an ordinary life. Moreover, pay is frequently poor or non-existent, meaning that to support a family is not practical. Such factors mean that conciliatory measures such as amnesty and reduced sentencing can have a positive impact on the exit of the individual from a terrorist group. There is also the possibility of talking to the challenger group, whether directly or through intermediaries, an option fraught with difficulties for the government involved. Despite the prevalence of coercive means and the myth that governments do not negotiate with terrorists it is undeniable that they in fact do so.⁷⁰

Coercive measures by the judiciary and security forces also have an impact, however these are likely to be of a negative nature and any success may be temporary and make the situation worse.⁷¹ The main contribution that a coercive approach can have is in convincing the leadership that they will not achieve their goals through the utilisation of violence but this is only viable if alternative options exist, principally constitutional party politics. A strong leadership can lead a group into a peace process but this requires cooperation from the government⁷² and in the case of a small group, the capture or killing of a charismatic or influential leader

⁶⁸ John Horgan 'Individual disengagement: A psychological analysis' in Tore Bjorgo & John Horgan (eds) *Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement* (Routledge: London: 2009) pp 17-29 (p23).

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Anastasia Filippidou 'Negotiating tactics in low intensity conflicts: The cases of Northern Ireland, the Basque Country and Corsica' *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* Vol 7, No 3 (2007) pp 94-108.

⁷¹ Cronin, op cit.

⁷² Crenshaw (2005), op cit.

can cause a major setback.⁷³ Generally, coercive measures will reduce a group's capabilities but not their will, for the leadership to consider other options the situation needs to have changed, and this requires political reform.

Finally, a terrorist organisation may be the authors of their own demise as they are dependent on minority group support to exist, whether they are a justification for the terrorist group's existence, or provide the sea in which the group swims. A terrorist group has an exaggerated view of its own popularity and if they escalate violence beyond what the audience will accept they run the risk of a backlash.⁷⁴ It is in the loss of minority group support where this is the most keenly felt and this can be exploited by an effective government media campaign.⁷⁵ Loss of support is linked to a change in situation, attacks may cause revulsion (backlash) and if there has been reform there may be better alternatives and a population can lose interest in a group's ideology.⁷⁶ Ethno-nationalist/separatist groups are particularly vulnerable to the backlash as they claim to directly support a particular




Figure 5.4 Behavioural Factors

group and their actions, and the government's, impact directly on the minority support group.

⁷³ Cronin, op cit.

⁷⁴ Crenshaw (2005), op cit.

⁷⁵ Gurr, op cit.

⁷⁶ Cronin, op cit.

Behaviour

Once situational and attitudinal factors have combined terrorist behaviour takes place. Fig 5.4 above shows these.

The use of terrorism is a strategic choice made by rational actors in relation to a political goal.⁷⁷ It is not the goal in itself but a specific tactic involving violence and the threat of violence for a political advantage.⁷⁸ From a strategic perspective it is only one means by which the desired end can be met as political actors can pursue their goals through more than one means.⁷⁹ This is important in understanding how terrorism ends as the assumption that terrorism is a rational, if subjective, choice of action then actors will conceivably actively reconsider the utility of a terrorist strategy. Following postulates of strategic theory, in which the means are subordinate to the ends, and war is a bargaining process and series of engagements, participants can change their strategy.⁸⁰ Whilst in practice this may mean a change in how violence is applied it may also mean that violence is abandoned in favour of other means of achieving the desired end. In the three cases presented in this thesis the predominant alternative means is through political parties.

The strategy of terrorism demonstrates the importance of studying terrorism through a situation-attitudes-behaviour triad. Despite arguments that terrorism has caused governments to change their policies terrorism and at the very least achieves the goal of communicating grievances⁸¹, as a strategy it is inherently flawed as to maintain the attention received the terrorist group needs to continuously escalate its strategy of violence⁸², eventually taking it past the limits

⁷⁷ Crenshaw (1981), op cit.

⁷⁸ Ekaterina Stepanova *Terrorism In Asymmetrical Conflict: Ideological and Structural Aspects* SIPRI Research Report No.23 (Oxford University Press:Oxford:2008).

⁷⁹ Lyndsey Harris (2006) 'Introducing the Strategic Approach: An Examination of Loyalist Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland' *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, Vol 8, No 4, pp 539-549.

⁸⁰ Peter R Neumann *Britain's Long War: British Strategy in the Northern Ireland Conflict* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan: 2003).

⁸¹ Andrew H Kydd and Barbara F Walter 'The strategies of terrorism' *International Security*, Vol. 31, No. 1 (2006) pp. 49-80.

⁸² Peter R Neumann and M.L.R Smith (2008), op cit.

of what the minority support group and incumbent government will bear⁸³: even where it is successful, and here we exclude post-colonial campaigns, the successes lead to eventual failure.

It is behaviour that counter-terrorist approaches attempt to change but it is through changing attitudes and situation that this occurs. The underlying tactic of a strategy of terrorism is communication through costly signalling: attrition through imposing costs to the enemy, intimidation of the population through the punishment of disobedience, the provocation of the government and security forces into over-reaction, spoiling of peace process and outbidding rival groups in terms of violence.⁸⁴ The intent is to alienate the population from the government by demonstrating their inability to maintain order (disorientation), provoke a response favourable to the group's cause, and use violence to present an alternative political message. The government, though, is the powerful actor in an asymmetrical relationship and has more options available to it than does the terrorist group.

The primary response from governments towards ending terrorism is to use coercive measures, indeed, police forces and the judiciary will act appropriately once the law is broken and in liberal democracies the police, in particular, are apolitical: charges are brought if the law is broken and guilt is decided in the courts. In the event that the police cannot cope then other security forces may be used, including the intelligence services and the Army as a last resort. Yet terrorism is inherently political in nature and governments have historically introduced extra legislation and special measures to counter it.

Coercive measures rely on direct action in order to be successful, but it is by no means guaranteed that short term success will translate to the long term, or that in the short term a situation will not be worsened. Coercive responses will tackle the terrorist actor head on and inhibit their operations but deal with only the symptoms, not the causes of terrorism. In response to terrorist activity the

⁸³ Daniel Byman (1998) 'The logic of ethnic terrorism', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* Vol 21, No. 2, pp. 149-169.

⁸⁴ Kydd & Walter, op cit.

government needs to demonstrate their ability to maintain order, undermine the group's support and maintain the primacy of its own political message (the mirror of the terrorist strategy as described by Neumann and Smith). To deal with the causes requires a concerted effort at reform directed at the minority support group and this is a long term commitment. Changing behaviour is dependent on changing attitudes and as such, the observations made above with regard to attitudes apply: offer conciliation to exploit disillusionment and changed personal circumstances, coercion to reduce capability, and reform to address underlying grievances but do so proportionately and with accountability. How the security forces act has a significant impact on how the situation is perceived by the general population and the actors directly involved.

The Structure of Terrorist Conflict (II)

In having three inter-relating components, the structure of terrorist conflict, as with all conflicts, is not a static one but instead dynamic and undergoing constant,




Figure 5.5 Dynamic Terrorist Conflict Situation

sometimes subtle change: a situation and attitudes leading to terrorist behaviour begets a transformed conflict situation, as illustrated by Fig 5.5. In effect, the relationship is not a linear one but more a constant fusing of situation, attitudes and behaviour, constantly interacting and changing. The structure remains the same, it is the importance of the various factors and factors within factors that

changes: attitudes may have become so entrenched that changes in situation are not recognised, with group dynamics driving the conflict rather than the original situation, or behaviour may have changed the situation to the extent that the situation has become worse. However, the structure has within it the possibilities of the resolution of the conflict; if attitudes are demonstrated to be the driving force then in order to transform the conflict it is the attitudes that should be targeted with the aim of ending the terrorist aspect of the conflict. The same follows for situational and behavioural factors, and the factors within them: each terrorist conflict is unique and some factors will contribute more to prolonging violent conflict than others. In the case of terrorism the conflict is transformed to non-violence when the terrorist actor voluntarily declares the end of violence as a means of achieving their political goals and adopts a purely political approach.

Conflict as Process

Here our focus is on conflict as a process, in particular we are concerned with returning a conflict to the point where there is no longer a terrorist conflict. Using Weinberg and Richardson, we are interested in the process as three stages: *emergence*, *escalation* and *de-escalation*. *Emergence* occurs when there is an awareness of a social or group difference between parties and becomes manifest, although it does not follow that this leads directly to violence. *Escalation* occurs when the number of issues and people drawn into the conflict expands and specialised 'struggle' groups emerge. Coercive means become endemic and attitudes between groups become polarised; political goals are displaced by the need to inflict violence on the other group. Escalation can be seen to have occurred when coercive means are intensified, violent encounters become more frequent, the geographical boundaries of the conflict expand, and the number of participants increases. There is then a spiral of conflict, in which the parties are trapped in a cycle of conflict. How they end is varied; there may be an outright victory by one party (such as the American Civil War) but these can in turn lead to further conflicts or de-escalation without resolution (such as 1973 Arab-Israeli war). *De-escalation* is the final stage and can occur for a number of reasons: Outside intervention to

impose a settlement, one party may win outright, one party expels the other from its territory, one party is converted to the others point of view, implicit bargaining




Figure 5.6 Basic Conflict Cycle

by both sides reduces the intensity of the conflict and finally, one party may abandon the fight and allow the conflict to go dormant.⁸⁵ The three stages outlined by Weinberg and Richardson are indicated in Fig 5.6. Once a situation of manifest conflict becomes evident there is an opportunity for the liberal democratic state to resolve the conflict before it escalates into violence.

Should the situation escalate into terrorist conflict the state will naturally




Figure 5.7 State Intervention to Conflict Cycle

⁸⁵ Weinberg & Richardson, op cit.

Intervene. As previously discussed in chapter two the 'democratic dilemma' means a state is morally obliged to act so as to maintain order and protect its citizens and this can be at any point along the cycle, indicated in Fig 5.7. However, this is misleading as it indicates only a positive impact from state intervention. As the three cases under analysis will demonstrate, state intervention can and has exacerbated conflicts that involve ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorist groups. In Northern Ireland it was the use of internment, in Spain the Burgos trial, and in Corsica the Aleria incident. On a more positive note, state intervention can stop the conflict from escalating, and so contain it at the level of emergence.




Figure 5.8 The Developmental Stages of Conflict⁸⁶

The process outlined above does not take into account the roots of a conflict situation to the extent required by this thesis, and in order to adopt a roots based approach to understanding how terrorist conflict ends a deeper approach is needed towards how a terrorist conflict emerges. Mitchell considers conflict not simply as the outbreak of hostilities but as a condition that is present in all human activity. Conflict then, may be incipient: the conditions for conflict, in terms of goal incompatibility, exist but are not recognised. The conflict becomes latent when these goal incompatibilities are recognised and manifest when there is conflict behaviour to achieve goals (Fig 5.8).⁸⁷ It can be understood that a situation of conflict need not lead to hostilities. Our interest lies in how a manifest conflict involving a terrorist campaign can be settled and understanding the root causes of

⁸⁶ Mitchell, op cit, p 51.

⁸⁷ Mitchell, op cit.

a conflict is important to its resolution. The state of conflict will always be present; the aim is for it not to be manifested in violence, which for the purposes of this study is terrorism. The purpose of introducing Mitchell's developmental stages is to demonstrate that a conflict situation exists long before there is a resort to violence, which Mitchell treats as *manifest* conflict, and that the conflict may be suppressed




Figure 5.9 Kriesberg's Conflict Cycle with State Intervention⁸⁸

and as a consequence unresolved. For Weinberg and Richardson, a conflict is manifest when the parties become aware of the conflict situation, which for Mitchell is the *latent* stage. In order to incorporate root causes of terrorism into the framework Kriesberg's conflict cycle is addressed in full; Weinberg & Richardson reduced Kriesberg's model to only three stages: Emergence, Escalation and De-escalation. By applying the model in full more detailed analysis of how a terrorist conflict progresses can be undertaken, particularly in the important developmental stages in which a conflict originates. This is illustrated in fig 5.9. The Kriesberg conflict cycle has six stages: Underlying conditions or 'bases' (that have the potential to result in overt conflict), 2) *manifestation* (realisation of incompatible goals and mobilisation of supporters and/or attempts to directly influence the other party), 3) *escalation* (increase in the scope of participation and severity of

⁸⁸ Louis Kriesberg (2003) *Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc: Lanham) p 23. The diagram is a slight modification and state intervention has been added.

coercive inducements), 4) *de-escalation* (due to changes between parties, within parties and/or external parties) characterised by reduced antagonism, 5) *settlement* (the ending of the conflict), and 6) *consequences* (the resolution or transformation of one conflict may hold the bases for another). For Kriesberg, the conflict moves from *bases* to *settlement* with subsequent *consequences*, but does not have to pass through every stage.⁸⁹ Each stage in the cycle impacts heavily on the next and throughout, 'factors internal to each adversary as well as social environmental factors also affect each stage'.⁹⁰ Of particular interest is the consequences stage where a new conflict emerges from the outcomes of the old, starting the cycle again, with the consequences as new bases. The points of potential state intervention have been added in fig 5.9 to indicate that state intervention can occur at any stage.

A practical difficulty in applying the model is in identifying when a conflict has truly ended with a cessation of violence instead of experiencing a pause, where violence appears to have ended but then continues, drawing on the original roots of the conflict: effectively a re-escalation of the current conflict. An example of this is the situation in Northern Ireland involving the Continuity IRA and Real IRA, splinter groups from within the Provisional IRA. Whilst the Provisional's have clearly abandoned their armed struggle, the successor groups have continued with their more limited campaigns based on arguments put forward by the Provisional's at the time of their formation in the early 1970s. As such, whilst the situation in Northern Ireland is a far cry from that of the 'troubles', the activities of the successor groups represents a re-escalation of the conflict and not the beginning of a new one, returning the conflict to the escalation stage. Not all such conflicts will re-escalate, but the potential is there, particularly among armed groups such as the IRA, ETA and FLNC who are historically prone to splintering and division. A method of analysis for ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorism, whether concerned here with state intervention or otherwise, needs to take into account the potential for

⁸⁹ Kriesberg, op cit.

⁹⁰ Ibid, p 24.

successor groups preventing the conflict being resolved when the leadership has committed to a permanent cessation of hostilities.

The construction of a model dedicated to ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorism requires the reconsideration of all the stages of Kriesberg's theory, for our aim here is to produce a model specific to the subject at hand, therefore narrower in scope: The purpose is to analyse a particular type of conflict as opposed to conflict in general. We are not seeking a general theory of conflict, one which allows all conflicts to be analysed, but a less ambitious one dedicated to the task at hand. As we have seen, terrorism is difficult to define, crossing the boundaries between war and crime and politics and violence. But what are the potential new stages? Thus far Mitchell and Kriesberg, two differing approaches, have been applied, demonstrating the importance of historical depth in the development and existence of a conflict prior to actual violence. An alternative model is that provided by Bloomfield and Leiss and introduced in the previous chapter, which they describe as a 'phase dynamic model'. Here a conflict takes place across six dynamic phases. To begin with there is a quarrel between two or more parties over something that they value; this is not treated as a conflict, but as a *dispute* that if unresolved leads to the generation of a *conflict* as the dispute become militarised, but fighting has not broken out. The third phase, *hostilities*, involves combat between organised military units that generates a significant number of casualties, and may lead to the involvement of other actors. The fourth and fifth phases are concerned with the state of affairs after the conflict is terminated; a post-hostilities, or *cessation of hostilities*, in which the original dispute remains and one actor still sees it in military terms, and a post-hostilities in which the actors are *beyond conflict* and no longer preparing military options but have still not resolved the dispute. The sixth phase is *settlement* in which the dispute is actually settled. There are three aspects of the model that require mention here. Firstly, the model incorporates a feedback mechanism as conflicts do not always proceed in a linear fashion between stages and may loop back and forth, for example between the cessation of hostilities and hostilities, never actually reaching

D I S P U T E					
C O N F L I C T					
HOSTILITIES					
Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3	Phase 4	Phase 5	Settlement
Dispute Quarrel about an Issue <i>Factors</i> →	Conflict Military Option Develops <i>Factors</i> ← →	Hostilities Fighting between organised units <i>Factors</i> ← →	Post- Hostilities Conflict Remains <i>Factors</i> ← →	Post-Hostilities Dispute Remains Unsettled <i>Factors</i> ← →	Dispute Settled

Figure 5.10. Dynamic Phase Conflict Model (Bloomfield and Leiss:1997)

a phase of beyond conflict. Secondly, it is not necessary for a conflict to pass through all stages, it is not inconceivable that actors may become militarised but seek settlement without actually fighting, or never reach settlement. Thirdly, the thresholds between stages should be seen more as convenient separations: the events that indicate a transition between phases are dynamic and interact during phases (Fig 5.10)⁹¹

A significant difference between the above model and those of Mitchell and Kriesberg is that it allows for conflicts to return to previous phases, a useful analytical tool given that conflicts can fluctuate between escalation and de-escalation. Notably, as with Kriesberg, it is not necessary for a conflict to pass through every phase and phase transitions are dynamic, there being no clear dividing line between each phase. These represent a compromise between theoretical structure and the uniqueness and messiness of actual conflicts: a conflict model that does not take this into account will inevitably fail as a method of analysis and as a consequence fail to contribute to key tenets of conflict analysis

⁹¹ Lincoln P Bloomfield & Allen Moulton *Managing International Conflict* (St Martins Press Inc: New York:1997).

and resolution studies: the prevention and resolution or transformation of violent conflict, a purpose of this study being to contribute to the early resolution of future cases of ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorist conflict.

Yet, a model with feedback loops through all stages clashes with our treating of terrorism cases having a historical trajectory, in which a terrorist group emerges from incipient and latent conflict characterised by differences within a society, to a manifested one, in which armed struggle is undertaken against the state. Should feedback loops be applied throughout a long conflict such as those under study here there is a risk of losing the understanding of how a terrorist group progresses from its formation through to permanent ceasefire. A more rigid approach is required for a historical analysis, and any use of feedback loops needs to be limited: dynamism between phases or stages is necessary as it accounts for the overlap between the stages of a conflict, but one which is in a cycle of escalation/de-escalation/escalation is one which a long term historically based analysis shows to have been 'normalised' in on-off violence. In this context, a ceasefire (and the cases under study here include many) does not represent the end of violence, it is simply a pause. Likewise, negotiations alone do not represent a move to de-escalation when violence is either ongoing or is a likely consequence of failure. Conflicts between states and terrorist groups are different to those between states or alliances as they are between challengers of low empowerment and resource, and governments who are power holders with comparatively large resources. The small group, driven by political aims and limited capacity to inflict violence is forced by its situation to be clandestine in nature as it cannot confront state forces directly and its behaviour is informed by methods crossing the boundary between war and criminality. The lack of conventional military capability also separates terrorism from insurgency and civil war, although the potential for criminality, in terms of the breaking of the law of the land and usurping of the states monopoly of the use of violence within its own borders remains present. Less the reader think that we are subscribing to an orthodox view of terrorism, the state is not treated as a blameless victim, but as a participant in the conflict who, whilst holding the legitimate reins of power, is called to account for their

involvement in the origins of the conflict and how it conducts itself during the conflict. The importance of taking a historical approach is in enabling the analysis of a terrorist campaign and state counterterrorism, which includes social, cultural and political aspects, an approach more akin to the moderate theory of Crenshaw.

Given that the model used should be about terrorism and take into account history prior to the armed group's emergence the following stages are proposed. As a conflict is treated as a linear progression from beginning to end (should it reach an end), yet account for the potential of a conflict re-escalating after a serious attempt by the armed group at a cessation of hostilities It is not necessary for it to be cyclical as a terrorist conflict, which reaches a permanent ceasefire that lasts represents the end of the conflict. A future one, involving the same participants, would need to be treated as a new conflict whose origins would include the one that had just ended. Seven distinct phases are proposed:

1. Historical Precedents
2. Origins
3. Pre-escalation
4. Escalation
5. Normalisation
6. De-escalation
7. Permanent Ceasefire (If a re-escalation occurs returns the conflict returns to stage four)

The stages draw on the account of terrorism studies in chapter three and proceed in sequence, the fact that a conflict may miss stages out not forgotten, until the conflict reaches a stage, in which the armed group has called a 'Permanent Ceasefire', representing an end to armed struggle and the use of violence to achieve political aims. Not all conflicts reach this stage, although it is an aim of this study to understand how the terrorist campaigns actually come to an end. The stages are illustrated in fig 5.11. A concession is made to the possibility of re-escalation leading to the conflict feeding back to the Pre-escalation stage and this is the only feedback loop built into the model. The stages are outlined in detail below:

The Stages of Ethno/Nationalist-Separatist Terrorist Conflict

Stage 1	Stage 2	Stage 3	Stage 4	Stage 5	Stage 6	Stage 7	
<i>Historical Precedents</i>	<i>Origins</i>	<i>Pre-Escalation</i>	<i>Escalation</i>	<i>Normalisation</i>	<i>De-escalation</i>	<i>Permanent Ceasefire</i>	<i>Re-escalation</i>
Ethnic or national groups history prior to the new conflict	Emergence of armed group during new conflict and codification of rules of organisation and operation	Limited armed activities against the security forces and emergence of minority group support	Extensive use of violence : Greater capability to organise operations and increase in minority group support	Strategic move to the 'long war' as goals are not met and violence becomes the normal state of affairs	Increased emphasis on political activity over violence and loss of minority group support for violence	Clear and definite cessation of armed struggle	Renewal of the use of violence by dissident members who refuse to accept the permanent ceasefire
S-A-B (Factors)	S-A-B (Factors)	S-A-B (Factors)	S-A-B (Factors)	S-A-B (Factors)	S-A-B (Factors)	S-A-B (Factors)	S-A-B (Factors)
↑	↑	↑	↑	↑	↑	↑	Return to Escalation Stage

Notes:

1. There are eight stages. The importance of historical and cultural factors in the origins of a contemporary conflict is indicated by the use of three stages before the Escalation stage.
2. S-A-B Factors indicates the use of Situation-Attitude-Behaviour as a means of analysing the factors in each stage.
3. Conflicts progress through the stages, although it is feasible that stages may be passed over in a given conflict. Should a conflict reach Re-Escalation (and not all will do so), the conflict reverts back to the Escalation stage and passes through the stages again.
4. The model is terrorist group centric but the analysis at each stage takes into account other parties, for example: the security forces.

Fig 5.11: The Stages of Ethno/Nationalist-Separatist Terrorist Conflict

Historical precedents – The pre-history of the ethnic group represented by the organisation and activities of the organisation prior to the outbreak of violence are the preconditions of the contemporary armed struggle. The historical and cultural memory of communities runs deep and informs the attitudes and behaviour of the contemporary group, particularly where there is a history of resistance or a perceived history of violence from another party. The armed group may have a history of armed struggle prior to the contemporary conflict under analysis or may be only informed by the historical precedents.

Origins- The contemporary events affecting an ethnic group, which form the preconditions for the emergence of a challenger group to the state. Factors affecting this are repression and relative inequality, social discontent over the status of the ethnic group in society, and a democratic deficit in which the ethnic group feels that they are underrepresented politically. There is increased public support for opposition to the government. If challenger organisations currently exist, they are either codifying their political strategy or are dormant and focused on non-violent means of protest. Contemporary events can reinforce existing attitudes informed by historical and cultural memory: if one is taught from birth that the forces of the state are a repressive enemy and that 'enemy' obliges by arresting a loved one or friend then ones perceptions are confirmed. Should a number of arrests take place then a group mentality is reinforced. Whether these perceptions are right or wrong is a moot point: it is down to the individual or group if they are right or wrong.

Pre-escalation – The use of violence on a limited scale against the security forces and defined civilian enemies. The reasons for armed groups reaching a stage of pre-escalation lie in situational events outside of their own control. Having reached the previous stage of origins does not mean that there is a predetermined trajectory to pre-escalation: an astute and effective government can implement conciliatory social and political reforms, which the group believes makes violence unnecessary. Alternatively, the state may resort to the use of the security forces to eliminate the threat the armed group represents, bringing about a temporary cessation of the armed groups activities. At this stage there is the risk of a precipitating event that

tilts the conflict over the edge into full blown escalation. At the stage of pre-escalation armed groups have the ability to launch small attacks, a small cadre of volunteers operating in secret even from the wider ethnic group and a limited minority group support. Pre-escalation is the stage at which a long conflict can be avoided, representing a last chance for resolution before violence results in casualties, which entrench pre-existing attitudes further.

Escalation- Once the conflict reaches the stage of Escalation an armed group has emerged that makes extensive use of instrumental and communicative violence in achieving their aims. This stage can include precipitating events or be a direct result of them. There is a clear defining of friend and enemy and violence between the two, with the enemy substantially dehumanised in the eyes of the group. The impact on the group of clandestine operations and pressure from the state further entrenches the perception of being at war with an oppressive foe, there being a significant likelihood of death or arrest both during operations and whilst relaxing. A key difference between Pre-escalation and Escalation is the number of volunteers available to the armed group and an increase in minority group support, meaning a larger sea in which the armed group can swim. There is also a belief that victory can be achieved, particularly if operations are successful in targeting the state security forces. In the escalation stage the conflict has developed to the point where violence has become the predominant means of protest.

Normalisation – The entrenchment of the conflict into one of continuing conflict when it is realised by the organisation that demands will not be met or goal's achieved in the short term. The conflict becomes understood as a permanent fixture of life, or 'normality' for the protagonists and the general population. The situation becomes one in which there is a hurting stalemate between the armed group and the security forces: the state cannot bring about an end to the operations of the armed group without the resort to non-democratic means, nor can the armed group achieve their goals. For the armed group there is a move in strategy, from one of a short campaign to a long war of attrition, with the purpose of wearing down the state, its government, population and security forces.

De-escalation – Where the group leadership realises that their goals cannot be achieved by force alone and increases political activity. Armed struggle may still be present but there is an increased emphasis on negotiation. The stage can also be identified by a declining capability on the part of the terrorist group and decreased support from the minority support group. The bulk of the membership of the armed group, having followed the leadership into armed struggle, may remain committed to the cause, but the leadership will be increasingly aware that their goals will not be met through violence even in the long term. For political activity to be feasible requires there to have been a change in the political and social situation through conciliatory reform by the incumbent government. Armed struggle does not stop, but there is a move into political activity as a parallel or alternative method to armed struggle in reaching the groups goals and more openness to talks and negotiation, whether open or in secret.

Permanent ceasefire – The official ending of hostilities by the organisation and move to political agitation on a permanent basis. The emphasis is on a permanent ceasefire as armed groups may declare more than one ceasefire during their conflict, which are unsuccessful in the short term, and may occur at any stage of a conflict. The path to Permanent ceasefire lays in the preceding stages, and this may take years or decades. Armed groups that are drawn from an ethnic community have an ability to sustain campaigns over a long period of time because their volunteers are committed ethically and morally to their cause and can draw on minority group support. The decision to abandon violence can depend on a strong leadership capable of persuading hardliners into abandoning armed struggle, a difficult task given the blood that will have been split in the course of the group's campaign. The move to constitutional politics on a permanent basis is a major step and the question of how a situation arises in which attitudes and behaviour change to allow the pursuing of the groups goals through solely political means is the purpose of the this study.

Re-escalation – Re-escalation is distinct from the beginning of a new campaign in that it is the renewal of armed struggle by hardliners who refuse to accept the decision of the leadership to end violence. The continuation of armed struggle will

Matrix for Historical Analysis of Ethno/Nationalist-Separatist Terrorism

	Historical Precedents	Origins	Pre-Escalation	Escalation	Normalisation	De-escalation	Permanent Ceasefire	Re-escalation (Returns conflict to stage four)
Situation	X							
Attitude	X							
Behaviour	X							

Notes

1. With the exception of historical precedents each stage is analysed according to the situation-attitude-behaviour of protagonists in the conflict.
2. The Matrix is evolutionary in that it traces a conflict from the Historical Precedents, which have an impact on the evolution of an armed group, through its contemporary Origins to Permanent Ceasefire.
3. Historical Precedents relates to the ethnic group the armed group claims to represent. The incumbent state may have a history of involvement with the ethnic group and it is not until the escalation stage that violence by challenger groups becomes the dominant form of conflict.
4. Progression between stages does not have a specific point where one stage begins and another ends: Conflicts make a transition from one stage to another with some aspects overlapping.
5. A conflict is not pre-ordained to go through each stage: Some may not reach the stage of Permanent Ceasefire and may remain ongoing and others may be resolved early, reaching a state of Permanent Ceasefire without undergoing Normalisation or De-escalation.
6. A primary focus of the thesis is to understand how terrorist conflicts reach the point of Permanent Ceasefire.

Fig 5.12 Matrix for Historical Analysis of Ethno/Nationalist-Separatist Terrorism

not be at the level achieved by the original armed group and returns the conflict to the stage of escalation.

The stage model, when combined with the structure of terrorist conflict forms a matrix for the historical analysis of terrorist conflict, as shown in Fig 5.12 above. As the conflict is analysed a picture emerges of each stage according to the situation, attitudes and behaviour of the protagonists involved. Stage or cyclical models of conflict are particularly useful as a means of analysis as they allow a conflict to be considered in its entirety, and the use of a relational model at each stage gives breadth. Models such as those of Mitchell, Kreisberg and Bloomfield & Leiss take into account that an underlying state of conflict may not be resolved, but violence as a symptom can be de-escalated or even stopped. In one respect it can be argued that the processes and procedures of democracy itself are a form of conflict management, in which parties with conflicting goals compete and terrorism represents a failure of such conflict management, in that the goals of one party are so insufficiently met that they result in political violence.

Conclusion

Chapter five has presented a working framework that is based on conflict as a process, which recognises that the settlement of a conflict has consequences that may entail future conflict. Democracy is a form of conflict management where competing groups vie for goals and resources but becomes dangerous and counterproductive when a group (or groups) resort to violent means to achieve their goals and, in Kriesberg's terms, is the move from manifest conflict to escalation. Our interest lies in how a conflict such as that in Northern Ireland, the Basque Country, or Corsica can be returned from the use of violence for political ends to a situation where there is debate using electoral politics. By including the structure of terrorist conflict we are also recognising that there is structure that underlies it. The following chapters introduce the three conflicts under analysis, Northern Ireland, the Basque Country and Corsica, and apply the framework in

order to understand how ethno-nationalist/separatist campaigns in liberal democracies come to an end.

Chapter Six: Northern Ireland

Introduction

Northern Ireland was the first case to reach a permanent ceasefire and is also the only one to have subsequently re-escalated. Participants in the other cases have been influenced by events in Northern Ireland during the de-escalation and permanent ceasefire stages so it is the first to be discussed. It is distinct as a case due to its origins from within a divided society and this has to be taken into account during the analysis. The emphasis is on the Republican terrorist groups and the British as the purpose of this study is to understand how groups such as the PIRA come to end their campaigns, transforming violent conflict into party politics. However, the political reform that was very important in bringing the violence to an end required the active involvement of the elected politicians from both sides of the divide, as I will demonstrate. I refer to Catholics and Protestants, Nationalists and Unionists, and Republicans and Loyalists, specifically during the historical analysis. In this chapter I apply the stage model and present the history of the conflict, followed by a summary of the situation-attitudes-behaviour of the challenger groups and the impact of government response, broken down as coercion, conciliation, and reform.

Historical precedents (to 1963)

There is no distinct 'Irish' or 'Gaelic' race distinct to the island of Ireland and the Irish gene-pool is one which is mixed from its earliest origins. As the furthest western extent of Europe the island was the one of the last to be settled by nomadic hunters and even into the Iron Age the island's story is one of wave upon wave of newcomers resulting in a hybrid population.¹ The geographical boundary of the Irish Sea protected the western island from 'pacification' and 'civilisation' by

¹ Norman Davies *The Isles: A History* (London:Papermac:2000); Frank Welsh *The Four Nations: A History of the United Kingdom* (London:Harper Collins:2002).

the Romans² although from the 850s Ireland was subjected to the Viking invasions but their customs were never transmitted to the Irish.³ During the medieval period, the Irish fought each other as much as they did the 'Ostmen' and often allied with them, but this did not result in a unified Ireland. The only major cultural impact was through trade and cultural links with Britain and Europe: Christianity began to make an impact in the fourth century and by the sixth century had replaced Pagan and other beliefs.⁴

The English invaded Ireland between 1169 and 1172 but their influence was limited and their power concentrated in the 'Pale' around Dublin. Irish lords dominated the majority of the island but after a rebellion by the Fitzgerald's of Kildare in league with Yorkist challengers to Henry VIII in England Ireland was pacified and its lords given their privileges back when they surrendered. Attempts to anglicise Ireland were incompatible with Gaelic custom and led to brutal conflicts which were dealt by Henry VIII's successors through the banning of private armies and establishment of plantations. The Irish Wars did not end until 1603 when Elizabeth defeated a rebellion in Ulster by Hugh O'Neil, the 2nd Earl of Tyrone.⁵ Plantation was the forced taking of Irish lands for English and Scots settlers, particularly in the north-east, and was consolidated by Oliver Cromwell during the English Civil War when he crushed the Irish. He left his deputies to confiscate Catholic lands, bring about conversion to Protestantism and deport rebels abroad to the colonies. The Reformation under the Tudor Monarchs had led to Protestantism taking hold in England and Scotland but it had failed utterly to take hold in Ireland.⁶

Wars in Europe involving the English led to Williamites and Jacobites battling in Ireland: the Protestants stood firm during the siege of Derry in 1689 and William of Orange was victorious at the battle of the Boyne in 1690. The Irish were subject to hundreds of years of domination by the British but did not accede

² Welsh, op cit.

³ Davies, op cit; Welsh, op cit.

⁴ Richard English *Irish Freedom; The History of Nationalism in Ireland* (London:Macmillan:2007).

⁵ R.F.Foster *Modern Ireland 1600-1972* (London:Penguin:1988).

⁶ Davies, op cit.

quietly, in 1803 the Catholic Association, a party which would argue successfully for Catholic emancipation and the more nationalist and militant Young Ireland were formed. The emergence of Irish nationalism begins in the eighteenth century with the Society of United Irishmen, a reformist and middle class organisation which crossed religious divisions but became more revolutionary when associated with another political group, the Defenders. An insurrection was attempted in 1798 and one of its great thinkers, Theobald Wolfe Tone was executed and would provide inspiration for future republicans.⁷

In 1845 Ireland's great disaster, the Great Potato Famine, began and is estimated to have resulted in the deaths of up to a million people. The British responded by setting up food depots and soup kitchens and imported grain, fixing prices, but have been criticised for being ineffective and the population was decimated through death and an increase in emigration to the United States and Britain.⁸ By 1914 the Irish population had declined from eight million to just under four and a half million.⁹ Initially, the Famine immobilised Irish nationalism, but it would determine 'the direction of Irish politics for the next fifty years'¹⁰: anti-English hostility had already been present but the Famine transformed it and nationalism became forged with the question of land and later Irish nationalists would look back on the Famine as the nadir of brutal, colonialist and heartless British rule.¹¹ The story of Irish nationalism is one of two nationalisms, Catholic and Protestant, and their interests sometimes overlapped: Charles Stewart Parnell was a Protestant country gentleman who campaigned for Irish Home Rule and sought to reconcile the differences between northern Protestants and southern Catholics (Protestants were a minority in the rump of Ireland, Catholics a minority in the north, or 'Ulster').¹² The focus here is on Catholic nationalism.

For twenty years after the Famine a group called the Ribbon Society was active in retaliation against landlords who they flogged and lynched. In 1858 the

⁷ English, op cit.

⁸ Foster, op cit.

⁹ Davies, op cit.

¹⁰ Alvin Jackson *Ireland 1798-1998* (Oxford:Blackwell:1999), p86.

¹¹ Jackson, op cit.

¹² English, op cit.

Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) was formed and they launched a failed insurrection in 1867 which resulted in the execution of its leadership and suppression of the Fenian Press. The smaller 'Invincibles' later assassinated the Permanent Under-secretary in Ireland in Dublin's Phoenix Park and the Fenians continued to kill landlords.¹³ The British responded by introducing special powers in Ireland, including internment, through the Coercion Act but these measures failed.¹⁴ In Easter week of 1917 the IRB and the Irish Citizen Army (ICA) of James Connolly began a failed and bloody rebellion which led their leaders being shot when captured.¹⁵ Between 1905 and 1908 Irish politics underwent a reconstruction and a broad front of nationalist politics developed which was called Sinn Fein and the policy of abstention from Westminster and formation of an Irish parliament was developed. The IRB became the Irish Republican Army (IRA).¹⁶ In 1919 Michael Collins and Eamon de Valera began a successful and brutal rebellion against the British and in 1921 the Irish Free State was born.¹⁷ Ireland was partitioned into the fiercely loyal and Protestant dominated North-East and the larger Catholic South.¹⁸

The IRA was divided over the obligation of the members of the new Irish state to swear allegiance to the British crown, leading to the Irish Civil war of 1921-1923, won by the 'stepping stoners', who felt that Ireland had secured the ability to achieve freedom bit by bit. The IRA was ordered to dump its arms and became branches of the newly formed Fianna Fail political party but this alliance was terminated when de Valera gained enough seats to form a coalition government in 1932 and in 1936 he declared that the IRA was an illegal organisation.¹⁹ For the IRA the only legitimate government of Ireland were the members of the Irish Parliament who had voted against the 1921 treaty partitioning Ireland and these members transferred their responsibilities to the IRA Army Council in 1938.²⁰ In

¹³ Peter Hyams *Terrorists and Terrorism* (London: JM Dent & Sons: 1975).

¹⁴ Jackson, op cit.

¹⁵ Hyams, op cit.

¹⁶ Foster, op cit.

¹⁷ Hyams, op cit.

¹⁸ Foster, op cit.

¹⁹ Ed Moloney *A Secret History of the IRA* (Penguin:London:2007).

²⁰ CJM Drake 'The Provisional IRA: A case study' *Terrorism and Political Violence* Vol 16 Issue 3 (1991) pp 401-419.

1937 the IRA officially ended its war against the Irish State and focused on the goal of ejecting the British from Northern Ireland. In the North, the IRA had defended Catholics during sectarian violence after partition and in 1935 and launched a failed campaign from 1942 to 1945. It was not until 1948 that the organisation was again large enough to hold a convention and prepare for its next failed campaign, Operation Harvest, between 1956 and 1962, which was defeated when internment was used on both sides of the border and the RUC and Irish police worked together against the IRA, marking the end of the IRA as an apparent threat.²¹

Historical precedents provide the foundations for later conflict and the historical experience of Ireland was domination by the British over centuries eventually culminating in the successful rebellion, which led to partition into the Irish Free State and Northern Ireland in 1921. From this emerged a strong Republican tradition with cultural, historic and literary depth, which was antipathetic to the British and the Irish Free State from its inception. Prior to the partition constitutional Irish politics was integrated unequally into the British parliamentary political system and there were two competing Irish nationalisms with distinct and competing interests. The refusal of the Protestant dominated north to be part of an Irish nation covering the entirety of the island resulted in the creation of a state which was inherently sectarian with a Protestant majority fearful of dominance by the larger Catholic south and a northern Catholic minority fearful of the dominance of the Ulster Protestants. They were, in effect, competing groups in a divided society, with different historical-cultural memories, a highly visible example of this are the highly contentious orange parades whose origins reach back to the siege of Derry and battle of the Boyne in 1689 and 1690 and which pass through Catholic areas.

Catholic nationalism became a political force at the beginning of the seventeenth century and increased in influence from thereon in, exacerbated by the question of land and the Great Potato Famine, and after a period of unsuccessful and brutally put down failures culminated in the emergence of the republican politics of Sinn Fein and the founding of the IRA, which achieved their

²¹ Richard English *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA* (Pan:Basingstoke:2003).

greatest, and only, success in 1921. Consequently, the Republican habitus is one of looking back at heroic success and heroic failure, and brutal suppression by the forces of the state, but an overwhelming commitment to the removal of the British from Ireland. The period after 1921 for the IRA was one of unremitting failure culminating in the failure of the 1956-62 border campaign, in which they failed to garner minority group support in the North, and were subjected to internment on both sides of the border. In the years that followed the leadership of the IRA would actively question the importance of nationalism as the centre of their political ideology.

Origins (1963-1969)

History

As Northern Ireland's quagmire loomed on the horizon the IRA had wound down its capability to conduct military operations and was committed to fomenting social change. Many in the IRA Army Council, and the IRA Chief of Staff Cathal Goulding had come to see the use of force as futile. Instead, the future lay in the forming of left-wing workers movements that were non-sectarian and in which Catholics and Protestants would work together to overthrow capitalism in Ireland as a whole and create a socialist and united Irish State. Many IRA volunteers left the organisation as a result.²²

The history of Northern Ireland is one of the political dominance of Protestants over Catholics.²³ For over fifty years the Unionist Party exercised the interests of a Protestant majority, which via the majoritarian democracy style of the British parliament at Westminster, excluded Catholics from power and dominated the government at Stormont. In areas such as Londonderry where a Catholic majority might challenge Protestant dominance unionist councils deliberately manipulated constituency boundaries (gerrymandering) in order to maintain

²² Drake, op cit.

²³ Jackson, op cit, p 335.

control.²⁴ By the 1960's Unionists were not blind to the need for reform and the O'Neil government which took power in 1963 sought to bring through moderate reforms, which divided Unionism and stimulated emerging forces on the other side of the political divide.²⁵ O'Neil sought to build bridges, not only with Catholics in Northern Ireland, but also with the Republic and his party was being challenged by a new political party, the Northern Ireland Labour Party (NILP), which whilst orientated towards the Union, had Catholics in its ranks. However, even moderate change outraged intransigent Unionists, of which the Reverend Ian Paisley is but one, who vehemently opposed anything which threatened the citadel of Protestant domination. Unionists were wholly committed to Great Britain but differed over the need for social and economic change.²⁶

In 1966 the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) killed three people in separate incidents. The perpetrators were arrested and the killings were generally condemned as most Unionists were against violence but many were opposed politically to O'Neil and his reforms.²⁷ On the other side of the divide, Catholic politics underwent major change, the vast majority of the Catholic population became politically mobilised and unified between 1968 and 1969 and in the more deprived urban areas Republicanism began to reappear.²⁸ A major actor in nationalist politics at the time was the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA). It had had no defined leadership or formal membership yet was open to all, crossing class, occupation and politics and with the clear aim of improving the rights of Catholics far beyond that offered by O'Neil's reforms. NICRA's demands included one man one vote, the reform of housing allocations, the redrawing of electoral boundaries and the disbandment of the paramilitary B-Specials police force. From April 1967 to mid 1968 NICRA was fairly ineffectual, but influenced by the approach of Martin Luther King moved to popular protest marches. The first at Dungannon in August of 1968 resulted in minor skirmishes between the police and

²⁴ John Bew, Martyn Frampton & Inigo Gurruchaga *Talking to Terrorists* (London:Hurst & Co:2009).

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ David McKittrick & David McVea *Making Sense of the Troubles* (London:Penguin:2001).

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Paul Bew, Peter Gibbon & Henry Patterson *Northern Ireland 1921-1996, Political Forces and Social Classes* (London:Serif:1996) pp 146.

some protestors but a major turning point in the crisis was a later march on the 5th of October in Londonderry²⁹ and resulted in televised mayhem as the police intervened to stop both the NICRA parade and a loyalist counter-demonstration. The march was put down by baton wielding police. NICRA became more militant and a joint 'long march' with the more radical student led People's Democracy (PD) from Derry to Belfast, passing through loyalist areas, resulted in a pitched battle between marchers and protestant extremists near Londonderry at Burntollet bridge.³⁰

The Loyalist strand of Unionism saw the perceived threat of the end of unionist dominance and Catholicism as increasingly real and the violence escalated when bombings occurred at water and electricity plants. It later emerged that the bombings, initially attributed to the IRA, had been carried out by the UVF. Unionist politicians became divided and the embattled O'Neil was forced to call an election. Left with a bare majority, he resigned from office to be replaced by James Chichester-Clark.³¹ In response to the increased Nationalist agitation, Loyalists had attempted to keep the movement within the confines of Catholic areas, firstly using the RUC and by counter-demonstrations led by Ian Paisley. The conflict became more pronounced and ghettoised. Rioting broke out in Londonderry between police and Catholics after an Apprentice Boys march, lasting three days and spreading to Belfast.³² Pitched battles had taken place in the Bogside of Londonderry, a Catholic enclave and a call by civil rights leaders for diversionary activities to help the Bogside had unintended consequences in Belfast, a city in which sectarian tensions amongst Catholics and Protestants living in close proximity were high and between which there was a history of recurring violence. Ancient guns were brought out of their hiding places and missiles thrown, houses were set on fire and barricades were erected.³³ Large areas of the two cities of Northern

²⁹ The name of Northern Ireland's second city is controversial. Republicans object to the prefix 'London' and have referred to it as 'Free Derry' or 'Derry'. It is referred to here as 'Londonderry' for narrative consistency.

³⁰ Jackson, op cit.

³¹ McKittrick & McVea, op cit.

³² Marc Mulholland 'Irish Republican politics and violence before the peace process, 1968-1994' *European Review of History* Vol 14, Issue 3 (2007) pp 347-421.

³³ McKittrick & McVea, op cit, pp 55.

Ireland had become sectarian battlegrounds and the security forces were struggling to cope with the violence. The government of the North had lost control and the northern cities appeared to be on the precipice of a civil war. As this went on, the IRA had not taken organised military action to intervene on the behalf of Catholics. Goulding's IRA had stayed true to its course of non-sectarian Marxism and his men had been heavily involved in supporting NICRA but there was division between the Dublin leadership and those who faced harsher realities in the North. The involvement with NICRA had aggravated the internal divisions within the IRA further. At the beginning of the critical year of 1969 all the IRA's military activities had stopped but by August the IRA Army Council had belatedly authorised the release of weapons to the Belfast IRA for self defence.³⁴

Situation-Attitudes-Behaviour

The situation in the origins stage was one in which Catholics had unequal political representation and as a consequence, less access to employment and housing and the Nationalist cause was mobilised by the lack of change and the reaction of Unionism to potential change. There was also a strong ideological undercurrent to the activities of the IRA and NICRA, the first newly committed to a non-sectarian socialism, the second to the promotion of Catholic civil rights through protest marches which were influenced by the success of the civil rights movement in the United States. It is too simplistic to say that these divisions between Catholics and Protestants were due to religion, but instead between two opposing habitus's with distinct cultural and religious identity passed down throughout their history.

Nationalists had become unified in their attitudes towards better rights for Catholics and as the two sides became entrenched the perceptions of 'us and them' became more pronounced. The attitude of the IRA leadership was that a unified Ireland would be brought about by socialist action against capitalism, which crossed the sectarian divide, a position not held by the rank and file. At what was a critical juncture in the history of Northern Ireland the leadership had reached the

³⁴ Patrick Bishop & Eamonn Mallie *The Provisional IRA* (London:Corgi Books:1988).

conclusion that political violence was ineffective and political activism would achieve the desired change.

It is notable that the first military action taken was by the loyalist UVF, firstly in the roundly condemned murder of Catholics, later through bombings at utilities. The behaviour of the IRA during the origins stage was one of maintaining its non-sectarian stance, whilst along the sectarian fault-lines in Londonderry and Belfast there was inter-communal violence and rioting the self proclaimed defenders of Catholics had failed to act, exacerbating the increasing or divisions between the southern leadership and northern rank and file.

Response

The British were largely absent in the Origins stage of the Northern Ireland conflict, leaving the running of the province to the Unionist dominated Stormont government. Their primary response to the recent political mobilisation of Catholics was coercion, initially through the use of the RUC in crowd control. As the cities descended into inter-communal violence the Police struggled to maintain control. At this stage the involvement of the Police was to attempt to maintain order within Londonderry and Belfast, re-establish control, and prevent the situation escalating further. Conciliation was not applied at this stage, although political reform was planned prior to the troubled years of 1968 and 1969. The origins of the conflict lay in the response to the proposed reform as it drove home to Catholics the inequality of their situation and the resistance from Unionists and Loyalists to more than moderate reform.

Pre-escalation (1969-1970)

History

Towards the end of the 1960s the situation in Northern Ireland was one of open confrontation and violence between Catholics and Protestants but the IRA had yet to become engaged militarily. Goulding's innovative leadership based in Dublin had

encouraged the rise of the civil rights movement but had not been prepared for a military confrontation. In 1969 the divisions within the IRA between the southern Dublin based leadership and the embattled volunteers of the North came to a head. The IRA had fired its first shots in anger on the 14th August in Belfast and those in the North were preoccupied with defending Catholics and fighting back.³⁵ Traditionalists within the IRA had met in August of 1969 and agreed that the IRA had not provided the needed defence of Catholics in Londonderry and Belfast. In October the IRA Army Council voted against continuing the policy of abstentionism, a long standing prohibition against taking parliamentary seats in Dublin, Belfast and London.

The abandonment of a core republican value and failure to defend to Catholics brought about the emergence of the Provisional IRA (PIRA) in December of 1969, a splinter group of more traditional orientation that would see itself as the legitimate Army of the Irish people. Goulding's organisation was to become known as the Official IRA (OIRA).³⁶ Both organisations recruited new members, the OIRA remained as stringent as they had been from the beginning, whilst in contrast the numerically inferior PIRA went for quantity, recruiting young men who had little knowledge of Republicanism and were essentially joining in order to fight 'Prod's'.³⁷ As a consequence the new organisation had a leadership, which had an understanding of both Republicanism and IRA history coupled with military experience, but an ever increasing membership whose motivations for joining were linked directly to the ongoing violence.

The schisms in the IRA occurred during a period of intense sectarian violence, during which the overwhelmed RUC and B-Specials had killed Catholics. Chicester-Clark was forced to request the assistance of the Army and the reluctant British acquiesced, but stated that this meant a fundamental change in the political relationship between London and Belfast.³⁸ The arrival of the Army in Londonderry

³⁵ Bishop & Mallie, op cit.

³⁶ English, 2003, op cit. The tags 'Provisional' and 'Official' came about through the media but were accepted by the organisations and stuck.

³⁷ Bishop & Mallie, op cit.

³⁸ McKittrick & McVea, op cit.

and Belfast marked a major change in the situation of the conflict as it introduced its most powerful actor. The initial deployment of British troops was a success, with soldiers being famously offered tea by Catholic housewives. Rioting in the Bogside of Londonderry and Belfast's Catholic areas ended with the deployment of troops and within a month the Army had erected a 'Peace Line' of reinforced fences in Belfast.³⁹ The success can be attributed to a constructive relationship which developed between Catholics and the Army and both communities taking stock of the situation after the summer and autumn violence of 1969. Catholic barricades were talked down through negotiation by Downing Street and the Army and even-handedness was also demonstrated. The disbandment of the notorious and sectarian B-Specials resulted in rioting on the Protestant Shankill Road, which was put down by the Army, resulting in the death of two Protestant gunmen.⁴⁰

Yet the 'honeymoon period' in Londonderry was not as cohesive as it first appeared. Whilst the Catholic community were grateful for the security the troops offered the British had not in fact been universally welcomed and the well meant attempts to win over 'hearts and minds' were counterproductive. Catholics had seen the deployment of troops as a temporary measure but they were quickly becoming a permanent feature. More importantly, the Army was responsible for policing the city, a role which it was fundamentally unsuited and brought it into conflict with the population as it attempted to control riots. By the time a new regiment replaced the one originally deployed, any goodwill to the Army had been lost.⁴¹ In Belfast, Protestant Orangemen were given permission by the Army to parade through a Catholic area. The result was rioting, which was put down by the Army using tear gas and the use of snatch squads, a tactic not applied to the Protestant side and in Catholic eyes putting the Army on the side of the Protestants.⁴² In the course of a single year, the situation in Northern Ireland had moved more swiftly than any of the actors involved could reasonably expect and

³⁹ Mullholland, op cit.

⁴⁰ Michael Dewar *The British Army in Northern Ireland* (London:Arms and Armour Press:1985).

⁴¹ Niall O Dochartaigh *From Civil Rights To Armalites: Derry and the Birth of the Irish Troubles* (Cork:Cork University Press:1997) Accessed via CAIN.

⁴² Moloney, op cit.

the IRA, the self proclaimed 'defenders of the North', were still divided and coming to terms with it.

Situation-Attitudes-Behaviour

The introduction of the British Army marked a major change in the situation in Northern Ireland and was accompanied by an increase in the involvement of the British in Northern Ireland politics. A second major change, one of great importance to our analysis, was the division of the IRA into the OIRA and the PIRA, the second of which was dominated by 'northerners' who had recruited new members and were committed to striking back. At the pre-escalation stage the British and the IRA were yet to engage with each other and the situation remained one of civil unrest.

The violence and arrival of the Army had a powerful impact on the young men and women who joined the OIRA and PIRA, a result of rapid radicalisation: the historical-cultural memory of the Catholic community legitimised by the actions of the Protestants and the British, and the two competing strands of Republicanism offered a way of responding for the action-orientated amongst them. The attitudes within the two communities had become entrenched and the IRA had suffered the humiliation of seeing Catholics rescued by the Army. The attitudes of volunteers within the IRA had also become entrenched and they had a wealth of ideology, tactics and history on which to draw when confronted with current events.

The now divided IRA continued to recruit new members. Each organisation was becoming stronger but they had yet to make any significant impact, concentrating on recruitment and obtaining weapons. The violence that had taken place had been between the two communities and between Catholics and the security forces; whilst members of the IRA may have been involved, they would not have been acting in an official capacity sanctioned by the IRA leadership. The schism in the IRA had been over abandonment of the longstanding republican principle of abstentionism and military failure, but the existence of two competing Republican groups bode ill for the future whilst the Catholic enclaves in Londonderry and Belfast were under threat.

Response

The response of Stormont, then the British, was overwhelmingly coercive and reform was not utilised in what was a short period of time in which the authorities were trying to establish order. The exceptions were the initial period of the British Army's deployment as they negotiated down barricades and provided security in an air of conciliation, and the reform of disbanding the B-Specials. The local security forces, the RUC and B-Specials (until their disbandment), had been actively involved from the start, but in a coercive capacity, as a consequence the local government had opted for coercion over any form of conciliation. The arrival of the Army signalled that the imposition of order would be fundamentally coercive.

Escalation (1970-1973)

History

Through the deployment of the army, what was an inter-communal conflict in Northern Ireland became a militarised one and by the early part of 1970 the Army had ceased to be seen by Catholics as an impartial peacemaking force. The OIRA and PIRA had been active in countering Loyalist gunmen and Protestant incursions into Catholic areas and had begun to attack the Army.⁴³ The Catholic population had also become increasingly hostile and the Army was not simply faced with rioters and gunmen: local women had come out to block the Army, a different challenge for the soldiers to deal with when they had to be moved.⁴⁴ Both the OIRA and PIRA had been active in the Falls Road area of Ballymurphy, engaging British soldiers and by the end of the year the PIRA had consolidated their position in Belfast. Chichester-Clark declared that his government was at war with the PIRA and the Army was authorised to use live rounds.⁴⁵

Catholic attitudes towards the Army had significantly hardened. After the Falls Road curfew the Peoples Democracy movement argued that the area had

⁴³ English, 2003, op cit; Moloney, op cit.

⁴⁴ Conversation with former British Army Serviceman (IL).

⁴⁵ Moloney, op cit.

been left disarmed and unable to defend itself, leaving it at the mercy of the Army and the Unionist government.⁴⁶ Nor had the Army been unscathed, in February 1971 the first soldier was killed and then three young off-duty Scots soldiers were shot dead by the IRA whilst drunk, polarising the attitudes of soldiers⁴⁷. English cites a soldier's reaction:

"The IRA didn't know what they'd let themselves in for. Many historians who write about Ulster talk of turning points. For me and everybody at the table, that was the major turning point."⁴⁸

With the Army and security forces now in open conflict with the beleaguered Catholic enclaves and the IRA Faulkner introduced internment so as to halt the violence and make peaceful political progress easier.⁴⁹ Stormont held the IRA responsible for much of the violence and saw internment as the means by which they could be countered:

'There was no prospect of dealing effectively with this organisation by the ordinary processes of law. In the existing atmosphere of fear and intimidation people were not willing to offer information let alone give sworn evidence, juries were subjected to intimidatory pressures and police given the minimum of public cooperation. None of those who have since been critical of the internment policy had suggested any practical means to control the situation.'⁵⁰

The vehicle for the implementation of internment, which is arrest and incarceration without trial, was the Army and as it was initially introduced to counter the IRA it was thus a measure directed primarily at one side of the sectarian divide. The impact on Catholics was severe. A NICRA survey of the families of internees their demonstrated that women had suffered from nerves or depression and children demonstrated fear of the Army and going out, distress and

⁴⁶ The Peoples Democracy, Special Bulletin, 7th July 1970 'Troops Batter Falls'
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/ephemera/leaflet/PD_Free_Citizen_070770_78r.jpg accessed 24/01/12 15:59.

⁴⁷ Dewar, op cit, p 51.

⁴⁸ English, 2003, op cit, p 138.

⁴⁹ McKittrik & McVea, op cit.

⁵⁰ Statement by the Government of Northern Ireland, Tuesday 21st September 1971. Linen Hall archive no P4308.

had their sleep patterns affected.⁵¹ The SDLP announced that it would not deal with the British government whilst internment was in place and called a rents and rates strike by Catholics in the North. Catholics also withdrew from other aspects of public life.⁵² Despite calls for its end the Unionist Research Department (URD) argued that as its purpose was to prevent 'ruthless violence and murder'⁵³ and it would be 'evil' not to, internment had been a successful weapon and should not end until 'the I.R.A. hold on some sections of the community is broken.'⁵⁴ This view was not held by the Army who 'regularly briefed journalists about the difficulties and counter-productive effects of internment'⁵⁵ and admitted, if unofficially, that internment was 'something that they would rather not help to implement'.⁵⁶ Privately, the Commander Land Forces (CLF) outlined significant public order problems in Belfast and Londonderry and argued that they 'were a direct result of the internment decision and the events which followed'.⁵⁷

Neither of the Army or the British Government had felt that internment was a good idea, yet had allowed it to be pushed through. It was used between 1971 and 1975 and was a disaster: it inflamed the province and proved to be ineffective in both military and political terms.⁵⁸ Innocent people were arrested based on out of date intelligence about republicans, no loyalists were arrested and there were numerous complaints about Army conduct. In the aftermath property was destroyed, civilians were killed and both the Army and IRA suffered casualties.⁵⁹ The real beneficiary of internment was its target: the IRA, and it was the PIRA in Belfast who benefited the most, IRA folklore holds that their strength increased

⁵¹ Survey of Internees Families (NICRA), Linen Hall archive no P2192.

⁵² Hibernia Fortnightly Review, Supplement to Hibernia, August 9th 1974, 71 Internment 74, 'Internment: The record of three years', Michael Mckeown, p 7. Linen Hall archive no P6560

⁵³ Unionist Research Department 'The Case for Internment', p4, Linen Hall archive no P1221.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Hibernia Fortnightly Review, Supplement to Hibernia, August 9th 1974, 71 Internment 74, 'Internment: The record of three years', Michael Mckeown, p 7. Linen Hall archive no P6560.

⁵⁶ Hibernia Fortnightly Review, Supplement to Hibernia, August 9th 1974, 71 Internment 74, 'The British Army's point of view', Robert Fisk, p 8. Linen Hall archive no P6560.

⁵⁷ British Military Assessment of Internment in 1971 – Memo from the CLF (Commander Land Forces) to the CGS (Chief of the General Staff), Linen Hall archive no P15955.

⁵⁸ Dewar, op cit, p 51.

⁵⁹ McKittrick & McVea, op cit.

from fifty in 1969 to over 1200 by the end of 1971.⁶⁰ Army operations in the border areas had also antagonized Catholics and IRA units in the counties of Tyrone, Armagh and Fermanagh increased in strength and opted to join the PIRA. They were now a more formidable force which could challenge the Army.⁶¹ Many in the Catholic enclaves would feel that they were needed: at the end of 1971 the UVF bombed the McGurks Bar in Belfast, killing fifteen Catholics.⁶² Catholics could argue that they were assailed on two fronts but the Army was also under pressure: in 1971 43 soldiers were killed and they were under the constant threat of attack by the IRA and stoning and petrol bombing by rioters.⁶³ The following year would be the most lethal of the 'troubles' with 496 deaths but it would be remembered by Catholics for one event: Bloody Sunday.

On January 30th 1972 NICRA had organised a march in Londonderry at a time when Faulkner had declared marching of any kind illegal until the end of the year but had striven to ensure that the RUC and the Army were aware that it was a peaceful demonstration. During the march the Army deployed the Parachute Regiment to arrest some rioters who had broken away from the march but within the space of thirty minutes thirteen Catholics were dead, another mortally injured and fourteen had been injured. Such are the agreed upon facts, how and why they were shot has been a source of dispute, but according to eyewitness accounts no bombs or bullets were used by or found on the killed and wounded.⁶⁴ NICRA's response was damning: 'Derry has taken its place with My Lai and Sharpeville as a milestone in the struggle of humanity against oppression.'⁶⁵ The blame for the tragedy fell on both the Army and their political masters: the deaths had come about as a result of British and Unionist policy in Northern Ireland, compared to the RUC and B specials 'the only difference was that the Army was better at it'⁶⁶ and the majority of the Catholic working class was now 'implacably hostile to the British

⁶⁰ Moloney, op cit, p 103.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Peter Taylor *Loyalists* (Bloomsbury:London:2000).

⁶³ Dewar, op cit.

⁶⁴ CAIN Chronology.

⁶⁵ NICRA 'Massacre at Derry' (undated), Linen Hall archive no P1061.

⁶⁶ Eamonn McCann 'What happened in Derry', 1972 (undated), p14. Accessed via CAIN.

Army'.⁶⁷ Edward Daly, a priest who was an eyewitness to the shootings observed that Bloody Sunday had the direct result of young people joining the PIRA, noting 'I am not at all sure about how I would have reacted, had I been a teenager and witnessed those same events.'⁶⁸ The reaction by the Unionist government of the time fell solidly behind the Army and bore scant regard for those who had been shot and the 1972 Widgery Enquiry into the shootings exonerated the soldiers. It cleared the victims of being actively involved in using a firearm or firebomb against the soldiers but did not clear all of them of having handled a bomb or firearm, or having used one.⁶⁹ The Catholic community saw this as a whitewash and the British, condemned abroad, were aghast: they had deployed the Army as a temporary measure and it had been Faulkner who had made a fateful decision for the soldiers in the Bloody Sunday operation to be armed with live rather than plastic bullets. The Tory led Heath government suspended Stormont for a year and implemented Direct Rule and William Whitelaw became the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.⁷⁰ The PIRA were going from strength to strength, their ranks swelled from Bloody Sunday and the backlash to internment and they had imported the Armalite rifle from supporters in the United States and developed the car bomb.⁷¹

But in the short period between Bloody Sunday and the fall of Stormont the IRA began to make mistakes. The OIRA took the war to the Officers Mess of the Parachute Regiment but their bomb killed seven civilians, including five cleaning women⁷², and the PIRA exploded a bomb in Belfast, killing two women and injuring seventy people at the Abercorn restaurant.⁷³ After Direct Rule was imposed the mistakes continued, the OIRA kidnapped and shot dead a local Royal Irish Regiment soldier home on leave, horrifying local opinion at the killing of a local man and bringing local women into direct criticism of the OIRA, and the PIRA killed seven

⁶⁷ Ibid, p 13.

⁶⁸ Edward Daly *Mister, Are you a Priest?* (Dublin:Four Courts Press:2000) p 200. Accessed via CAIN.

⁶⁹ Bloody Sunday Inquiry (2010). *The Report of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry*, [Saville Report], (HC 29-1 - HC 29-X, Volumes 1-10), (released 15 June 2010). London: The Stationery Office. Accessed via CAIN.

⁷⁰ Bew, Gibbon & Patterson, op cit.

⁷¹ Moloney, op cit.

⁷² Dewar, op cit.

⁷³ Moloney, op cit.

people in a flawed operation on Donegall Street in the city centre of Belfast.⁷⁴ These were events amongst many as Catholics were being killed in the enclaves as the IRA battled with the security forces and bombs were killing innocents.⁷⁵ The middle of 1972 was to be the PIRA's high point, they appeared to be in the ascendancy but the reality was different. Catholics were tired of the violence, including that of the IRA, and the end of unionist rule meant that the moderate Nationalists and the war weary felt that a major objective had been achieved and the PIRA could stop their campaign.⁷⁶

The backlash from Ranger Best's murder ended the campaign of the OIRA who declared a suspension of violence in April of 1972.⁷⁷ The leadership had only committed itself to defensive actions and still saw military action against the British as futile and damaging to the working class.⁷⁸ The demise of the OIRA is an education in the loss of minority group support as even in the heady times of 1972 the majority of Catholic support went to the peaceful constitutionalist parties represented by the SDLP. A second development, linked also to the overall Catholic reaction to violence, was the declaration of a ceasefire by the PIRA, which had come about through contact with the SDLP and British Government and opposition, during which the British had made the key concession that republican prisoners would be granted political status. A suspension of hostilities for one week was agreed and the ceasefire called on the 8th July, it ended two days later after the Army quelled an outbreak of violence on the Lenadoon housing estate over the rehousing of Catholics, an action the PIRA perceived as heavy handed and signalling the end of the truce.⁷⁹

The PIRA felt that they were in a strong position. Britain's ruling elite had collectively acceded to negotiation and the enclaves in Belfast and Londonderry were no-go areas policed by the PIRA. They also sought to demonstrate the

⁷⁴ English, 2003, op cit.

⁷⁵ Bishop & Mallie, op cit.

⁷⁶ Moloney, op cit.

⁷⁷ English, 2003, op cit.

⁷⁸ Bishop & Mallie, op cit.

⁷⁹ Andrew Mumford 'Covert peacemaking: Clandestine negotiations and backchannels with the Provisional IRA during the early 'Troubles', 1972-76' *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* Vol 39, No 34 (2011) pp 635-648.

inability of the British to provide security by car bombing Belfast, a flawed operation, which killed nine people and injured 130, both Catholic and Protestant, an 'own goal' of spectacular proportions known as 'Bloody Friday'.⁸⁰ Condemnation of the event was universal in the mainstream media of the United Kingdom and Ireland and the impact on the legitimacy of the PIRA was compounded by the killing of eight people in the village of Claudy, County Londonderry, including five Catholics.⁸¹ Their military strength also proved to be an illusion, after Bloody Friday the British responded with a massive operation involving a force of 21,000 troops⁸². The PIRA offered no resistance as 'Free Derry came to an end'⁸³ and a number of 'no-go' areas in Belfast were also cleared by the Army.⁸⁴ Aware that the balance was swinging against them the PIRA escalated their war by taking it to the British mainland. On 8th March 1973 bombs outside the Old Bailey and in Whitehall, killing one person and injuring another 180. The violence was less than that in Belfast on the same day but the dramatic nature of the attacks in the capital generated substantial media interest and led to the crucial lesson for the PIRA that 'one bomb in London was worth a dozen in Belfast.'⁸⁵

The bombings escalated in 1974, targeting a bus carrying soldiers and their families on the M62 motorway in the north of England, killing 12 and injuring many more.⁸⁶ This was followed by pub bombings in Woolwich and Birmingham, killing 23 people and injuring hundreds, intended to influence British popular opinion in the direction of acceding to their demands but the bombings caused such outrage the PIRA did not immediately claim them as theirs. The British response was flawed: the people convicted for the M62, Guildford and Birmingham bombings were innocent, their confessions forced and prison terms lengthy. The events are

⁸⁰ Moloney, op cit; Northern Ireland Office News Sheet 'Bloody Friday July 21st 1972'. Accessed at the Linen Hall Library, Belfast.

⁸¹ CAIN Chronology.

⁸² Dewar, op cit.

⁸³ The Museum of Free Derry website 'History-Operation Motorman'
<http://www.museumoffreederry.org/history-motorman.html>

⁸⁴ Dewar, op cit.

⁸⁵ Moloney, op cit, p 127.

⁸⁶ CAIN Chronology.

remembered as much for the treatment of innocent Irish people as they are for the bombings.⁸⁷

The British solution to the 'troubles' was not simply about providing security and combating republican paramilitaries, it was also about reforming the governance of Northern Ireland, by bringing the constitutional Nationalists of the SDLP into governance in a power sharing relationship with Unionists. This project also involved the Irish government and resulted in the Sunningdale Agreement of December 1973, in which the Irish government acknowledged the necessity for self-determination in the North. The British acceded to the formation of a Council of Ireland, and both the British and Irish defined security as a common issue.⁸⁸ It was a remarkable move, which brought Ireland into the search for a solution in the North and recognised that the dispute over the province was a problem did not stop at the Irish border. It was also virulently rejected by the Loyalist strand of Unionism and the Power Sharing Executive was short lived, brought down by a strike by the Ulster Workers Council strike, which lasted fourteen days and severely affected the province, cutting power and closing roads.⁸⁹ The strike was a mass action, but was orchestrated by Loyalist paramilitary groups who used intimidation; acting as the Ulster Army Council, the Loyalist paramilitaries, including the Ulster Defence Association (UDA and UVF effectively ordered the beginning of the strike.⁹⁰ Whilst the strike was underway the Irish cities of Dublin and Monaghan were bombed, resulting in the deaths of thirty-three people and injuring of approximately another 258.⁹¹ The perpetrators were not known at the time, although the LVF later claimed responsibility in 1994 after accusations of collusion by the British.⁹² The reaction of the Irish government at the time was one of collective horror and was equated with violence in the North and in Britain and

⁸⁷ English, 2003, op cit.

⁸⁸ The Sunningdale Agreement (December 1973) - Tripartite agreement on the Council of Ireland - the communique issued following the Sunningdale Conference. Accessed via CAIN. <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/sunningdale/agreement.htm>

⁸⁹ McKittrick and McVea, op cit.

⁹⁰ Don Anderson *Fourteen Days in May: The Inside Story of the Loyalist Strike of 1974* (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan Ltd:1994). Accessed via CAIN.

⁹¹ CAIN Chronology; McKittrick and McVea, op cit.

⁹² J Bowyer Bell *In Dubious Battle: The Dublin and Monaghan Bombings 1972-1974* (Dublin:Poolbeg Press Ltd:1996) Accessed via CAIN.

support for the Garda and Defence Forces in countering violence.⁹³ The events of 1974 illustrate the impact of Loyalist paramilitaries on the situation in Northern Ireland: they were a significant force and responsible for a large number of shootings and bombings in the North and to a lesser extent, the South. The PIRA were also a major force but had chosen escalation at a time when the people they claimed to represent wanted peace, and worse still, were killing them.

Situation-Attitudes-Behaviour

The situation in the escalation stage of the conflict changed rapidly between 1970 and 1973 and was dominated by two major precipitating events: the deliberate policy of internment and the tragedy of Bloody Sunday. The British then implemented direct rule, effectively taking full responsibility for Northern Ireland and removing the Unionists from power. The PIRA had become stronger and far more capable of inflicting harm, and with the demise of the OIRA and crippling of NICRA, they were the dominant republican group for the radicalised youth to join. The context of the conflict had changed to one between the PIRA and the British, alongside the existing sectarian conflict, and the PIRA had taken the war to England.

The major change in attitudes was in that of Catholics who had been the main victims of the violence and now found themselves in direct conflict with the Army. For Catholics, the Army was an occupying force, and internment and Bloody Sunday gave them little reason to believe otherwise. This should not be taken as an overall consensus of support for the OIRA and PIRA, which had increased but was far from total. Bloody Sunday effectively ended any constructive relationship between Catholics and the Army and young Catholics, who had not previously become involved with the IRA were now willing to join the ranks of the PIRA in large numbers.

The behaviour of the Republican groups and the Army severely escalated the conflict between them, the Army through its misapplication as a police force and tool of the Stormont government, the IRA by taking their war to the centre of

⁹³ Dáil Éireann: Volume 272: 21 May, 1974.

Belfast and England. The PIRA was fully committed to the use of violence, both as a means of communication, and as coercion designed to force the British from Northern Ireland. They sought to both sap the morale of the British people and demonstrate the inability of the British to provide security in the North, but this led them quickly into the 'escalation trap': they were committed to increasing escalation, yet at the same time provoking an overwhelming response from the British. The demise of the OIRA, whose leadership still clung to their idea of a class based resolution to the 'troubles' in the North, provides an example of terrorism ending during even the most volatile of times as it was due to the reaction of the local population to their actions (backlash).

Response

The British response to the actions of the IRA was to use the Army for general policing duties and was fundamentally coercive in nature. Negotiation with the PIRA was attempted and was the only conciliatory measure of significance. The British also attempted to reform Northern Ireland politics, but met with failure.

The use of internment falls at the far end of the coercive scale and is more accurately interpreted as repression. The use of armed soldiers to patrol the cities has to be placed in context as there was a real risk of ambush by either of the OIRA or PIRA, but this brought them into contact with Catholics and resulted in the deaths of Catholics as a consequence. The apex of this was Bloody Sunday, an unnecessary event contributed to by the use of armed soldiers in a policing role. The consequences have been outlined in the situation section above, but the fact needs to be emphasised: during the escalation stage the Army lost the goodwill of the Catholic population and became to be seen as an occupying force.

Negotiations with the PIRA took place when they were at the zenith of their influence and resulted only in the declaration of a week-long ceasefire. In the event it only lasted for two days as the PIRA had no reason to maintain it and the events at Lenadoon, gave them a reason to back out.

The British saw Northern Ireland's 'troubles' as a political problem and set about reforming how Northern Ireland was governed. The implementation of Direct Rule was not reform, but a stepping stone to reform, a measure finally taken in the wake of Bloody Sunday. The failure of the Power Sharing Executive underlined the difficulties the British faced: they were attempting to bring together two fundamentally opposed groups and Loyalism was a major force unwilling to compromise with Republicanism or the wider Catholic community. The British were also victims of their own success in bringing Ireland into the search for a political solution to Northern Ireland's 'troubles'.

Normalisation (1973-1988)

History

The PIRA quickly realised that they would not be able to eject the British forcibly from the North: their success in the early 1970s represented the ascendancy of their campaign but the overwhelming force of Operation Motorman had ended the illusion that they could succeed in a military confrontation with the British, who in turn realised that there would be no swift defeat of the PIRA and that they were firmly embedded in a conflict which required a political, not military, solution.

After the failure of the 1972 ceasefire the British had declared an end to negotiations with the PIRA but the covert backchannels continued to work across British governments and an intervention by Protestant clergymen led to the PIRA declaring a ceasefire on the 22nd December 1974 to give the British time to consider three terms for a total ceasefire: a constitutional assembly based on the electorate of the North and South, British withdrawal, and 'an amnesty for political prisoners'.⁹⁴ The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Merlyn Rees, who had been present as the opposition spokesman for Northern Ireland in the meetings which presaged the 1972 ceasefire had little interest in talking to the PIRA but was interested in returning Northern Ireland to a state of normality through the

⁹⁴ Bishop & Mallie, op cit, p 273.

development of a 'political machine' by which constitutional parties in Northern Ireland could run the province.⁹⁵ This was part of a developing strategy towards 'Normalisation' or 'Police Primacy' in which the Army would be withdrawn from policing duties in the cities, a decision made by the British government after the failure of the Sunningdale Agreement.⁹⁶ As part of normalisation, internment would be ended and the legislation put in place to tackle the PIRA would be replaced by normal criminal procedures, effectively ending political status for paramilitary prisoners. Rees scaled down the Army's operations and in the House of Commons spelt out that the potential outcome of an ending of PIRA activity would be the withdrawal of the Army to barracks and allowed the creation of 'incident centres' to monitor a suspension of hostilities declared by the PIRA on the 10th February 1975.⁹⁷ The ceasefire ended in October as a consequence of internal rivalry and feuding within the PIRA over the ending of offensive action.⁹⁸ This was part of a wider convulsion with the military wing of republicanism to which we now turn, as whilst the PIRA had wound down operations against the Army and was regrouping their year was far from quiet.

The cessation of the OIRA's campaign in 1972 had resulted in the emergence of a faction opposed to the end of military force and in 1974 this was accentuated when the OIRA leadership backed Workers Party councillors taking the seats that they had vacated in protest at internment. From this division the Irish Republican Socialist Party (IRSP) emerged and a third of the OIRA membership defected and from this would emerge a military wing, the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA). A bloody feud between the OIRA and the INLA took place and the INLA and IRSP survived at the expense of the OIRA. Whilst committed to the secession of Northern Ireland from the United Kingdom, the INLA and its political counterpart the Irish Republican Socialist Party (IRSP) were socialist in orientation and strongly

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Caroline Kennedy-Pipe *The Origins of the Present Troubles in Northern Ireland* (Longman:London:1997). Also known as 'securitization'. Normalisation as policy is distinct from 'normalisation' as a stage of conflict as presented here.

⁹⁷ Bishop & Mallie, op cit.

⁹⁸ Mumford, op cit.

influenced by Marxism.⁹⁹ Within the spectrum of republican armed struggle the INLA are best described as been politically close to Goulding's OIRA, in that they wanted a socialist Ireland, but with an approach to the use of violence more sectarian and indiscriminate than the PIRA. What also stands out in their history is their proneness towards internal division and fighting; in 1987 former members of the organisation who had been expelled or resigned formed the Irish People's Liberation Army (IPLO) in an attempt to take over the INLA. After several killings, including the leadership of both groups, a truce was declared.¹⁰⁰

The 1974 battle between the OIRA and INLA was mirrored by a resumption of the rivalry between the OIRA and the PIRA and division within the PIRA over the ceasefire. Some of the PIRA membership were sympathetic to the INLA rebels and frustrated at inaction against the British and in a short but bloody feud eleven people were killed after an order was given to assassinate the OIRA on the 29th October.¹⁰¹

A third aspect of the 1975 ceasefire period was the PIRA degeneration into sectarian warfare with the Loyalist UDA and UVF.¹⁰² The reaction of the Loyalist groups to the ceasefire was one of fear of being sold out by the British, who were actually only talking about withdrawing troops, and they reacted with renewed savagery which was reciprocated by the PIRA. The casualties were predominantly civilians and in 1975 alone the Loyalist groups killed 121 and the Republicans 120. Amidst the bloodletting the 'Shankill Butchers' emerged, a brutal UVF gang, which would kill nineteen people in the 1970s.¹⁰³

The ceasefire period was seen as a catastrophic failure in the eyes of the rank and file of the PIRA and led to the replacement of the leadership, which underwent a major shift in leadership from the southern based O'Bradaigh and O'Connell to the Northern Command of Adams and McGuinness. The second change, the move to a cell based structure, was typified by active service units (ASU's) and was also a

⁹⁹ Henry McDonald and Jack Holland *INLA: Deadly Divisions* (Poolbeg:Dublin:2010).

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰¹ Bishop & Mallie, *op cit.*

¹⁰² Drake, *op cit.*

¹⁰³ Taylor, *op cit.*

response to the ceasefire and a reaction to the success of the British policy of normalisation.¹⁰⁴ The policy that Rees had begun was implemented by his successor Roy Mason, internment had become history in 1975 and had been replaced by a highly effective and controversial technique of extracting confessions from suspected paramilitaries in RUC run interrogation centres. Juries had been abolished after the 1972 Diplock report and witnesses were rare due to paramilitary intimidation, hence suspects were tried by a single judge on the basis of the evidence the RUC collected.¹⁰⁵ The final destination for paramilitaries was the newly constructed 'Maze' prison, the end of a highly effective 'conveyer belt' where they held no 'special category' status and one that ensnared Republican and Loyalist paramilitaries alike.¹⁰⁶ From 1976 the RUC and UDR were given responsibility for policing and the Army was focused on the border areas, to where the PIRA had increasingly moved their operations. In reality, the move to 'normal policing' did not occur as the RUC in the cities became militarised as it took control of the cities and the Army began to rely on Special Forces to counter the PIRA.¹⁰⁷

During this period, as McGuinness and Adams took charge there was a major shift in thinking from one of forcing the British out through a short war to one of a combined political and military strategy defined by the 'long war' doctrine of grinding down the British through a war of attrition. An important part of this was a move back towards socialism and emphasis on politics, to be spearheaded by Sinn Fein, as a long war required the widening of support for the cause. To counter British infiltration of the ASUs and RUC interrogation techniques an 'internal security' department conceived in 1972 was implemented and the famous 'Green Book' for volunteers produced in 1978.¹⁰⁸ In August of the following year the PIRA killed eighteen soldiers, mostly from the Parachute Regiment, in an ambush near the border town of Warrenpoint and assassinated Lord Mountbatton, a member of

¹⁰⁴ Bishop & Mallie, op cit; MLR Smith *Fighting for Ireland? The Military Strategy of the Irish Republican Movement* (Routledge:London:1995).

¹⁰⁵ McKittrick & McVea, op cit.

¹⁰⁶ Taylor, op cit; Moloney, op cit.

¹⁰⁷ Kennedy-Pipe op cit.

¹⁰⁸ Moloney, op cit. The 'Green Book' was more than advice for volunteers to resist interrogation, it was the official handbook of the PIRA and set out its aims, objectives and constitution as well as disciplinary procedures. It is reproduced as an appendix by Martin Dillon in his *25 Years of Terror*.

the Royal Family, in Mullaghmore in the Irish Republic. The attacks were expertly planned and coordinated and shocked the British political and military establishment, leading to the resolution of a rivalry between the RUC and Army and the appointment of a Security Coordinator.¹⁰⁹ Barely three months before the two PIRA spectaculars Margaret Thatcher had been elected as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and she would prove to be resolute and uncompromising in her approach to the PIRA and INLA. But the next major success on the part of Republicanism was not a military one, but one of incredible will and personal sacrifice.

The 1981 hunger strikes were a significant event in the history of Northern Ireland. For the PIRA and Sinn Fein the strikes were a mobilising force and Sinn Fein improved its electoral stake in the province.¹¹⁰ In 1976, the Maze prison had opened, enabling the criminalisation of offences committed by paramilitaries. The first prisoner convicted under the regime refused to do prison work or wear prison clothes, starting the 'blanket protest' and in 1978 'dirty protests' began.¹¹¹ A hunger strike in 1980 divided Catholic opinion on the granting of special status for paramilitaries and was called off when it was believed that significant concessions had been made by the British Government.¹¹² Republicans soon realised that this was not the case and momentum built for another hunger strike. The position of the Unionists was strong about the granting of special status to prisoners:

¹⁰⁹ Mark Urban *Big Boys Rules: The SAS and the Secret Struggle Against the IRA* (Faber&Faber: London: 1992).

¹¹⁰ I have used three sources to produce a continuity in the history of the Northern Ireland Conflict. These are: Ed Moloney, op cit, pp 669-687; McKittrick and McVea, op cit, pp 243-322; Conflict Archive on the Internet (CAIN) <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/chron.htm>. These are referred to as 'NI Chronology'.

¹¹¹ Michael von Tanden Page *Prisons, Peace and Terrorism* (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press: 1998). For an authoritative account of the hunger strikes see: David Beresford (1987) *Ten Men Dead: The Story of the 1981 Irish Hunger Strike* (London: Grafton: 1987). Accessed via CAIN.

¹¹² F Stuart Ross *Smashing H-Block: The Rise and Fall of the Popular Campaign against Criminalization, 1976-1982* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press: 2011). Accessed via CAIN.

'Think of the memory of the 2000 dead and tell me the self inflicted action of these murderers be allowed to blackmail Government and Society alike, to give them privileged treatment? The answer comes back from near and afar – NO NEVER.'¹¹³

The position of the British was set out before the hunger strikes began:

'Such changes would go far to give, and are intended to give, the protesting prisoners control over their lives in prison, and could not be agreed to by the Government, since to do so would be to legitimise and encourage terrorist activity. What the Government is committed to is to ensure that, for all prisoners, the regime is enlightened and humane as possible. This statement clarifies, in relation to the prisoners demands, how far this has already been achieved.'¹¹⁴

The Thatcher led government's position remained solid throughout the hunger strikes: special status would not be granted. The resolve of the prisoners was strong and ten men died before the families of the remaining strikers called a halt, including Bobby Sands who had been elected as a Westminster MP during the strike, and Kieron Docherty, as an Irish Parliament TD.¹¹⁵ Through Sands the republican movement had taken the protest to the heart of British and Irish politics and electoral support for Sinn Féin increased: 'By June 1983 Sinn Féin had obtained some 13.4% of the vote in the North which compared well with the SDLP's 17.9%.'¹¹⁶ The prisoners never achieved the goal of special category status but reforms were made, including the right to wear their own clothing (although this was vetted) and more free association.¹¹⁷

After the end of the hunger strikes the PIRA and INLA continued with their campaign of violence. Previously, the INLA had killed the conservative MP Airey Neave in the House of Commons car park in 1979 and in 1982 carried out a bombing of a pub frequented by British Army soldiers in Ballykenny, killing eleven

¹¹³ Peter Robinson *Self-Inflicted: An Exposure of the H-Blocks Issue* by Peter Robinson M.P. (Belfast: Democratic Unionist Party: 1980). Linen Hall archive no P686.

¹¹⁴ Prisoners rights and privileges in Northern Ireland: Statement by the Secretary of State (Northern Ireland Information Service: 4th December 1980). Linen Hall archive no P7998.

¹¹⁵ CAIN Chronology.

¹¹⁶ Paul Bew & Gordon Gillespie *The Northern Ireland Peace Process 1993-1996: A Chronology* (London: Serif: 1996).

¹¹⁷ Tanden Page, op cit.

soldiers and six civilians, including four women who the INLA referred to as 'consorts'. In 1983, the INLA killed three churchgoers after opening fire on the congregation of the Pentecostal Church in Darkley. As an organisation, the INLA was fragmented by personal grudges and driven by the need for revenge over political thinking.¹¹⁸ The PIRA took the war back to England. On the 20th of July they carried out two lethal nail bombings in Hyde and Regents Parks. On the 17th December 1983 a car bomb left outside Harrods in London killed six people and on the 12th October 1984 they attempted to assassinate Margaret Thatcher by bombing the Grand Hotel in Brighton during the Conservative Party conference, killing five people.¹¹⁹ These were major events garnering strong media coverage but in reality, as was the case throughout the conflict, the majority of victims of violence were killed or injured in the more numerous shootings and bombings, which occurred unremittingly for over thirty years.

The PIRA and INLA had faced an increasing direct opposition from 1976 onwards with the deployment of the Army's Special Air Service (SAS) and the RUC's Special Patrol Group within Northern Ireland and the general increase of covert operations units within the Army and RUC from 1973 onwards.¹²⁰ The Army had become increasingly unhappy with its role during the 1970s and within the British government there was a realisation that political options had become increasingly unviable. The most promising was power-sharing under a devolved government and this led to the policy of 'Ulsterisation', which included the idea of Police Primacy in which the RUC would take increasing responsibility for the policing of Northern Ireland, including anti-terrorism. Political responsibility would be returned to Northern Ireland's politicians. The Army was concerned with PIRA activity in the border areas, in particular, Crossmaglen.¹²¹ The combating of the republican groups would be taken on by specialised units within the Army and RUC: a covert war of direct action based on intelligence gathering. The history of these

¹¹⁸ McDonald and Holland, op cit. The Darkley attack was claimed by the Catholic Reaction Force (CRF), a cover for the INLA at the time.

¹¹⁹ NI Chronology.

¹²⁰ Urban, op cit.

¹²¹ Desmond Hamill *Pig in the Middle: The British Army in Northern Ireland 1969-1984* (London: Methuen: 1985).

operations is one of poor cooperation between the Army and the RUC and an effective but controversial tackling of the PIRA and INLA leading to 'shoot to kill' allegations. In the 1980s a pattern of aggressive operations by specialised forces emerged. The SAS are the most well known, but they represented the spear of a formidable array of specialists from within the Army and RUC with intelligence, surveillance and firearms expertise.¹²² This included running agents within paramilitary groups, aiding the conviction of paramilitaries through 'super-grass' trials although out of 120 people convicted all but one were later released on appeal. Despite the impact of informers on the PIRA, INLA and loyalist groups, the super-grass system was seen as a controversial failure.¹²³

The British also moved politically, signing the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985 setting out the working relationship of the British and Irish governments.¹²⁴ A relatively short document, the first article can be seen as a boon for the British in terms of the Irish acknowledging the current status of Northern Ireland and the principle of consent governing any change in the political status of the Province.¹²⁵ The agreement also set out the parameters for a permanent Anglo-Irish conference, devolution and other matters such as security. For their part, the Irish government now had a say in the affairs of Northern Ireland. The agreement pleased the two governments but did not go down well in the North: the SDLP were positive, but the Unionists, particularly Ian Paisley's DUP saw it as a further step towards a united Ireland which amounted to British treachery.¹²⁶ A 1986 report is indicative of Unionist views, concluding:

'We are convinced and agreed that the Anglo-Irish Agreement represents a fundamental and unacceptable change in the constitutional relationship between Great Britain and Northern Ireland. We have no doubt that the Anglo-Irish Conference is tantamount to joint authority and that its early demise is vital if we are

¹²² Urban, op cit, p 247.

¹²³ Ibid; Martin Dillon *25 Years of Terror: The IRA's War Against the British* (London: Bantam Books: 1996) p 260.

¹²⁴ Also known as The Hillsborough Agreement.

¹²⁵ Great Britain Parliament *Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Ireland* (London: HMSO: 1985). Accessed via CAIN.

¹²⁶ Jackson, op cit.

to arrest a quickening process leading to our inevitable absorption in an Irish unitary State. *Having sworn never to accept the Agreement as a basis for continued membership of the United Kingdom, we must ascertain what alternative terms for the Union can be found.*¹²⁷

The attitude of the PIRA and Sinn Fein is ably demonstrated by Gerry Adams:

‘it represents...a coming together of the various British strategies on an all Ireland basis, with the Dublin Government acting as a new guarantor of partition.

In the final analysis the agreement is about stabilising British interests. It is about what the British and Dublin governments quaintly call ‘security’. It addresses itself to a problem for the British outlined in Brigadier Glover’s 1978 report [a British military intelligence assessment of future trends in violent republicanism leaked to the IRA and later published in *Republican News*]: British Army intelligence could do nothing about the structures and organisation of the IRA in the 26 counties; only ‘security’ harmonisation with Dublin could remedy this lack.¹²⁸

Northern Irish politics remained bitterly divided at its extremes. Adams would continue with the strategy of ‘the bullet and the ballot box’, Paisley was apocalyptic in his response and unionists rioted, loyalist groups targeted the homes of police officers and fifteen unionist MPs resigned their seats, which they lost in re-elections. It was all to no avail, the agreement survived.¹²⁹

In 1986 another split occurred within militant Republicanism when Adam’s proposed at the 1986 Sinn Fein Ard Fheis that abstentionism be dropped in the Dail Eireaan; a relatively low key gesture as Sinn Fein would still abstain from seats in Belfast and Westminster. Adam’s was successful but some veterans, led by Ruairi O Bradaigh, walked out, later forming Republican Sinn Fein (RSF) and in time its armed wing, the Continuity IRA (CIRA).¹³⁰ The PIRA were also having problems: they were losing volunteers through violent deaths, had been penetrated by informers,

¹²⁷ Harold McCusker, Peter Robinson & Frank Millar ‘An End to Drift’ The Task Force Report (Abridged version) presented to Mr.Molyneaux and Dr. Paisley (Belfast: UUP and DUP: 16th June 1987). <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/aia/sources.htm>

¹²⁸ Cited in: Bishop & Mallie, op cit, p 440.

¹²⁹ McKittrick & McVea, op cit.

¹³⁰ Moloney, op cit.

were losing arms and supplies and were unintentionally killing civilians. The last was a serious problem as it undermined support for the cause and the organisation had been actively trying to avoid the indiscriminate killing of civilians.¹³¹ On the 8th of November at a Remembrance Day parade in Enniskillen a bomb caused a wall to collapse, killing 11 Protestants and injuring another 83.¹³² In an interview the leading Republican Danny Morrison noted:

‘Enniskillen came close to pushing the people of the 26 counties into the arms of those urging internment, proscription of Sinn Fein, the banning of *An Phoblact (Republican News)* and the ending of the right to silence. We have weathered the storm in the long term but we are unable to quantify the damage in the long term.’¹³³

The Enniskillen tragedy had been such an error that the PIRA had been loath to acknowledge responsibility. It came in the week of a damaging defeat inflicted by the security forces at Loughgall in South Armagh. An ASU had planned to blow up the police station but instead found the SAS waiting, resulting in the deaths of eight volunteers in what was effectively an ambush.¹³⁴ This was one event in a border war, which was costing the PIRA dearly, but the organisation was far from defeated, it was flush with arms supplied by Libya and envisioned a major ‘Tet offensive’ launched across the border from the Irish Republic. As a plan it was one, which had the inherent flaw, that whilst it would cause severe damage to the British military it would also fail in the face of far superior British firepower and resources. In the event, the secret gathering of arms had been betrayed and the Irish police and the British were forewarned and a consignment of the weaponry was lost. One aspect of the plan that survived was the expansion of the PIRA campaign to attack British targets in Europe.¹³⁵ In contrast, Sinn Fein published *The Scenario for Peace* in 1987, which was a restatement of Republican claims for the right to self-determination and required the British to set a date for political and military withdrawal from Northern Ireland as a solution to the conflict. It did not take into account that this would require Great Britain, the Republic of Ireland and

¹³¹ English, 2003, op cit.

¹³² NI Chronology.

¹³³ Cited in: Bishop & Mallie, op cit, p 462.

¹³⁴ Urban, op cit.

¹³⁵ Moloney, op cit.

Northern Ireland's Protestants to accede to the plan and was consequently politically unrealistic.¹³⁶ The document was important not for its content but its intent in that it set out Republican aims and accepted the idea of national self-determination and also set a foundation for later documents produced by Sinn Fein during the Northern Ireland Peace Process. It also signified an increasing interest in political rather than military solutions to the conflict.

Enniskillen and Loughgall represent two major factors affecting the thinking of the PIRA leadership. The first was that the killing of civilians, particularly the high profile events such as Enniskillen was costing Sinn Fein in the political arena: A vote for Sinn Fein was seen by many voters as a vote for the PIRA due to the clear links between them. The second was that the security forces were not only killing and arresting volunteers but had also penetrated the PIRA at the highest level. In short, the PIRA could not win the long war and force the British out of Northern Ireland, and the leadership who had so firmly directed PIRA strategy and managed even the most hard-line of volunteers, knew this. In contrast, Sinn Fein, in the wake of the Hunger Strikes, was making progress through garnering an increased proportion of Catholic votes.

Situation-Attitudes-Behaviour

The normalisation stage was one of a persisting hurting stalemate between the Republican groups on one side and the security forces on the other. The PIRA, having lost control of the cities, realised that the British were not going to be driven out of Northern Ireland by force whilst the British had found that they not only could they defeat the PIRA in the short term, they could not achieve a political solution either. This was, to a large extent, due to the intransigence of the Unionists and Loyalists towards any political concession which would benefit the cause of the republicans. The result was a prolonged period in which the PIRA and INLA tried to sap the will of the British on the long run and the British resorting to preparing the security forces of Northern Ireland to work without the Army. This did not change until the impact of the hunger strikes, Enniskillen and Loughgall

¹³⁶ Leslie Macfarlane 'The right to self-determination in Ireland and the justification of IRA violence' *Terrorism and Political Violence* Vol 2, No 1 (1990) pp 35-53.

brought about a reconsideration of the political instrument in achieving Republican goals.

The end of the brief period of conciliation and negotiation between the PIRA and the British, marked by the failure of the 1974-75 ceasefire, was followed by a revitalisation of the commitment of the PIRA to the military instrument. There was little question of the validity of the military instrument, or the end goal of the ejection of the British from Northern Ireland. The early period of the normalisation stage was also marked by the acceptance of the primacy of the group in guiding action as the nominally socialist INLA split violently from the OIRA and the Loyalist groups increased their activities. The major change in thinking occurred in the wake of the Republican hunger strikes and the success of Sinn Fein as a result. Whilst the core of volunteers remained committed to military action, it was clear to the leadership that the long war was also failing, was counterproductive, and was holding back the political potential of Sinn Fein.

The success of the security apparatus in countering and inhibiting the operations of the PIRA resulted in a major tactical change to the operational use of active service units (ASUs) and the long war doctrine. Both the PIRA and the INLA applied the coercive measures of attrition, intimidation and provocation and maintained a constant threat, achieving major successes in targeting the Army and the British political establishment.

Response

The British response during the normalisation stage was predominantly coercive. The key strategy was to return the province to some form of normality under the idea of 'Police Primacy', with the intent of reducing the role of the Army in Northern Ireland. What actually occurred was that the coercive element became more effective. The British had also removed political status for prisoners convicted of terrorist related offences, a move that led to the hunger strikes and a rare political victory for Republicanism. The PIRA's struggle against a reformed and highly effective security response and the political success as a consequence of the hunger strikes (and tragedy at Enniskillen) was to increase the use of the ballot box.

The British, still committed to the political reform that they believed to be the solution to the 'troubles', signed the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement, but this failed to satisfy either Republicans or Unionists, emphasising the continuing divisive nature of Northern Irish politics.

De-escalation (1988-1993)

History

The period from 1988 to 1993 is one of separate strands of talking with sometimes actual negotiation contrasted with an increase in sectarian attacks by armed groups and a persisting campaign of violence by the PIRA against the British on the mainland and in Europe. The year did not begin well when in March the complexities and volatility of the conflict were brought into international view in the space of a mere two weeks when a series of interlocking events occurred.

It began on the 6th March when the SAS shot dead three members of a PIRA ASU on Gibraltar, cars belonging to the ASU members with bomb making equipment and plastic explosives inside were later found in Marbella by the Spanish Police but the deaths were controversial as the three had been unarmed. On the 16th March a Loyalist, Michael Stone attacked mourners at the funeral of the ASU members with grenades and an automatic pistol, injuring over fifty people and killing three others. He was caught and beaten by the crowd before the RUC arrived and intervened, saving his life. The sequence of events came to a bloody conclusion on the 19th March at the funeral of one of Stone's victims, a PIRA volunteer named Kevin Brady. A car driven by two British Army Corporals, Derek Woods and David Howes, drove at high speed towards the cortege before attempting to reverse away. Their way was blocked by a black taxi and the two men were dragged from the vehicle by the crowd, stripped, beaten and then taken away and executed by the PIRA.¹³⁷ The events at the funerals had been televised and the Gibraltar shootings sufficiently controversial so as to ensure that media coverage

¹³⁷ CAIN Chronology.

showed the conflict for what it was: the brutal and sectarian meshed with the battle between military Republicanism and the British. Worse violence had occurred before, worse would occur in the following years, but 1988 marks the beginning of a period in which republicanism sought to end a war which was increasingly seen as futile. Whilst PIRA violence continued to result in deliberate and accidental deaths Sinn Fein was seeking a way for the PIRA's war to end without the loss of face which would come from admitting defeat.

From January to September in 1988 secret but formal talks between the SDLP's John Hume and Sinn Fein's Gerry Adams began to bridge the gap between constitutional and Republican nationalism, the SDLP was willing to embrace the idea of Irish self-determination but balked, as it had done before, at the issue of PIRA violence. The meetings had been a result of the efforts of Father Reid who had also laid the groundwork for secret meetings in the same year between representatives of the Irish government, Martin Mansbergh and Dermot Ahern and the senior republicans Adams, Pat Doherty and Mitchell McLaughlin. The talks were ended by Taoiseach Haughey when it became clear that the PIRA was not going to end its violence. Sinn Fein had also met the head of the Catholic Church in Ireland, Cardinal O Faich, who had stressed that the use of violence was morally wrong and counter-productive. Sinn Fein had hoped to achieve a broad nationalist front but the Irish government, the Catholic Church and the SDLP had no interest in the republican agenda and had reaffirmed their rejection of violence outright.¹³⁸

In 1990, as PIRA continued to use violence and appeared intransigent whilst being countered by the SAS, the 'backchannel' between Republicans and the British government was secretly reopened by the Northern Ireland Secretary Peter Brooke¹³⁹, completing the number of parties with which the republicans were in dialogue. There were other, more unassuming actors at work: for example, a small group of women worked throughout the 'troubles' to help individuals from armed groups to leave armed struggle, maintaining independence from the British who

¹³⁸ Eamonn Mallie and David McKittrik *The Fight for Peace: The Secret Story Behind the Irish Peace Process* (Heinemann:London:1996); Moloney, 2007, op cit.

¹³⁹ Mallie & McKittrik, op cit.

sought information and the armed groups who did not wish to lose members.¹⁴⁰ The British, Irish, and SDLP were not aware of each other's secret connections, had they been so they may have understood better what was happening within the closed world of Republicanism.

Key to the ending of the PIRA long war was the realisation that Republican goals would not be met through armed struggle and that violence was holding back political progress. This represents a major shift on the part of key Republicans such as Gerry Adams, Martin McGuinness and Danny Morrison as the PIRA were born out of the need for the IRA to continue armed struggle during the Official-Provisional split of 1972. What Adams and McGuinness were effectively asking the PIRA to do was accept the very thing which the OIRA had argued for during the early 1970s: abandon military struggle and continue the fight for Irish unification through constitutional politics, including taking seats in the future Northern Ireland Assembly, a major volte face.¹⁴¹ An IRA volunteer puts the situation into perspective:

'If, for thirty years or so you're conducting an armed struggle and it hasn't achieved your goals, well then you're either going to have to escalate it to a level whereby the achievement of your goals becomes closer or you reassess it, and I think that is what happened. The armed struggle was in progress from say from 1970 to 1994 and throughout that period, there were always attempts being made to escalate it, to get more people involved, to instigate more attacks, that was always happening. By 1990, maybe before that, I think it was clear that Irish republicanism was incapable of raising it even more. My own opinion is that the IRA could have continued the armed struggle at the same level for another hundred years, but you have to ask yourself, will that achieve anything just by sustaining an armed struggle? It's not enough. If you're involved in armed struggle, it's not enough just to sustain it just to keep the war going. The war has to, there has to be some progress, there has to be the

¹⁴⁰ Conversation with Peace Worker (IK).

¹⁴¹ Rogelio Alonso 'The modernization in Irish republican thinking towards the utility of violence' *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* Vol 24, no 2 (2001) pp 131-144.

prospect of victory and I think by 1980 that didn't exist and the IRA had attempted to escalate it, to raise it even more and weren't able to do so.¹⁴²

From studies of the PIRA used in this study, and to the point of consensus, it can be argued that they were manoeuvred into the ceasefire by their leadership in the form of Martin McGuinness and Gerry Adams.¹⁴³ The latter had officially left the PIRA to pursue the development of Sinn Fein in the move towards the ballot box, but it is generally accepted that he had an immense influence on the move away from armed struggle. It is characteristic of the perceived links between the PIRA and Sinn Fein that a significant amount of communication directed at the PIRA went to Sinn Fein.

As the Republican and Loyalist paramilitaries continued with violence, the talking went on between the British and Irish, the British and Sinn Fein, the SDLP and Sinn Fein, the Irish and the Unionists, the British and the Unionists in a complex interaction of secret and public talks all geared towards one goal: producing a scenario which would satisfy Republican goals of self-determination and give the PIRA a way out of violence and at the same time reassuring Unionists that they were not being sold out and the Union with Great Britain would not end without their consent. This was against a background, in which Loyalist attacks against Catholics had escalated, and included the targeting of SDLP politicians alongside those of Sinn Fein. A consistent and overriding problem was that crucial output from the talks between Adams and Hume, which was discussed by the Irish and British governments, was visibly tainted by Adams' association with the PIRA and their ongoing violence.¹⁴⁴ Whilst Adams was talking peace, he was embroiled in controversy over PIRA violence, a striking example being the Shankill road bomb on 23rd October of 1993 when Adams was seen to carry the coffin of one of the bombers. The bombing had been another of the PIRA's tragic outcomes from what had been a carefully planned attack on the UDA whose leadership regularly met above a fish shop in the hard-line loyalist district of the Shankill. The bomb exploded prematurely killing the PIRA volunteer carrying it and nine Protestant

¹⁴² Rogelio Alonso *The IRA and Armed Struggle* (Abingdon: Routledge: 2003) p 138.

¹⁴³ Ibid; English, op cit; Moloney, op cit. Adams has never admitted to having been in the IRA.

¹⁴⁴ Mallie & McKittrik, op cit, p 89.

civilians, injuring another fifty seven.¹⁴⁵ The Loyalist response was bloody, the UVF and UDA killed twelve Catholic civilians within a week; on the 30th October the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) killed seven people and injured another thirteen at the Rising Sun bar in Greysteel, claiming it as a response to the Shankhill bomb.¹⁴⁶ As has consistently been the case, the Loyalist and Republican paramilitaries failed utterly to kill each other and killed innocents instead during a month of tit for tat violence. Adams had little choice but to carry the coffin of Thomas Begley, Loyalists saw him as 'scum', Republicans as a 'volunteer' in the PIRA and for Adam's to retain his credibility within Republicanism required him to carry the coffin and retain the image of Republican unity. The violence came close to killing off the move to peace, Hume was delegitimized and came under criticism he had not faced before due to his public talks with Adams and the John Major government, who had been in the process of preparing a joint declaration with Taoiseach Reynolds, put negotiations on hold.¹⁴⁷

A critical juncture in the peace process took place before Shankhill and was the joint statement by Gerry Adams of Sinn Fein and John Hume of the SDLP on the 24th April 1993, who recognised as leaders of their respective parties, that:

'...reaching agreement on a peaceful and democratic accord for all on this Island is our primary challenge.'¹⁴⁸

The British Government and Sinn Fein's communications had previously developed to the point that the British had sent a nine paragraph note to Sinn Fein stating their position on the 19th of March, a document which, in summary, restated the British position over the rejection of violence, non-negotiation over partition but acceptance that the eventual outcome of a talks process could be an end to partition and a commitment to the reduction of the security forces if violence in the province ceased.¹⁴⁹ The British were also aware that if the process was successful

¹⁴⁵ CAIN Chronology; Mallie & McKittrik, op cit, p 89; Bew, Frampton & Gurruchaga, op cit.

¹⁴⁶ CAIN Chronology. The UFF was a cover name for the UDA.

¹⁴⁷ Mallie & McKittrik, op cit, p 89.

¹⁴⁸ First joint statement from Gerry Adams and John Hume (Sinn Fein Press Release: April 24th 1993). Linen Hall archive no P5622.

¹⁴⁹ British nine paragraph note to Sinn Fein, sent on 19 March 1993. Linen Hall archive no P5622.

they would have to acknowledge and defend their entry into dialogue.¹⁵⁰ The difficulty for the British was that whilst they were talking the PIRA were still visibly active in Ulster and on the mainland and despite Sinn Fein assurances that they were committed to a lasting settlement the PIRA appeared to be off message.¹⁵¹ The communication then ceased when the British concluded that an impasse had been reached. On the political front, the British and Irish Governments solidified the principle of self determination with the Downing Street Declaration of December 1993.¹⁵² The declaration was based on earlier drafts, which had circulated between London and Dublin and despite denials by the Major government, was influenced by drafts produced from the Hume's-Adam's talks. In reality, the agreement was the end of a long line of documents with:

'...input not only from Dublin but also from Hume, the Army Council of the IRA, loyalist paramilitary groups and Protestant clergymen'.¹⁵³

Despite the violence of October and ending of secret talks between the PIRA and the British the declaration presented Sinn Fein and the PIRA with a moment of truth:

'The fact that London and Dublin could agree on something so substantial, within weeks of the horrors and despair of October, was in itself an achievement for politics and negotiation and a reaffirmation of the strength of the Anglo-Irish relationship. The Declaration was widely welcomed in Britain, the Republic and internationally; the Unionist community, after a period of uncertainty, decided not to take exception to it.'¹⁵⁴

As 1993 drew to a close the momentum towards peace in Northern Ireland had drawn in the PIRA and the Loyalist groups, the Nationalists and Unionists, and the British and Irish in the search for a political solution to the 'troubles' during a period in which the PIRA unremittingly used violence as a means to secure

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Sinn Fein to British Government. Linen Hall archive no P5622.

¹⁵² Bew, Frampton & Gurruchaga, op cit; McKittrick and McVea, op cit.

¹⁵³ Mallie & McKittrik, op cit, p 271.

¹⁵⁴ Mallie & McKittrik, op cit, p 268..

Republican goals. What remained was the question of how Republicanism would respond to the challenge presented by the Downing Street Declaration.

Situation-Attitudes-Behaviour

The situation for the PIRA in 1988 was that they were suffering under British led security measures and had called the legitimacy of their war into question with the Enniskillen bomb. The situation was being changed from within and without of Northern Ireland politics as secret talks about talks were taking place with Sinn Fein involving, separately, the SDLP, Irish and British. The willingness of the SDLP leader John Hume to talk to, and then stand by, Sinn Fein's Gerry Adams was a political risk that paid off with their joint declaration. This was against a background of continuing violence, which was undermining Sinn Fein's talks. The British and Irish governments changed the context of the situation with the 1993 Downing Street Declaration.

The attitudes of leading republicans, including Adams and McGuinness, had changed considerably by 1988. The conclusion had been reached that the PIRA would not force the British out of Northern Ireland and were in fact holding back Sinn Fein. The PIRA leadership were not so convinced: the PIRA and Sinn Fein were closely linked, but Sinn Fein did not control the PIRA.

The behaviour of the PIRA was in apparent contradiction to that of Sinn Fein, for as the latter talked, the former continued shooting and bombing. The reason for this was that the PIRA's war was far from over, and it was yet to be seen what would be achieved through talking. It also sent a clear message to the British that the PIRA was hurt, but not defeated, and could remain a viable threat if a political solution was not found. The primary mover for republicans was Sinn Fein, who was talking to the SDLP, Irish, and British, as they sought a way out of violence for the PIRA.

Response

The coercive security response of the British continued into the de-escalation stage, but the major change in the British approach was the use of conciliatory measures.

These were limited to talking about what the outcome of any talks would be and consistently rejected the PIRA's use of violence, but presented the prospect that the security forces would be reduced in talks were successful and the violence ceased. The talking was done mainly through Sinn Fein, and broke off due to continuing PIRA violence. By this time success had been achieved with the Downing Street Declaration, which confirmed the principle of self determination for Northern Ireland.

Permanent ceasefire (1994-1998)

History

The PIRA did not reject the Downing Street Declaration outright but they did not show any indications that they were willing to accept either, in truth, they were on a hook as the declaration was far from their proclaimed aims but they did not want to be seen as the ones who had rejected peace.¹⁵⁵ Sinn Fein asked for clarification of the declaration from the British but received none although Adams's profile was raised still further when he visited the United States. John Major had been opposed to Adams being allowed into the US but the Clinton administration had listened to advice from the Irish government and Hume.¹⁵⁶ The pressure remained on the PIRA to produce a response to the declaration but in March of 1994 they fired mortars at Heathrow Airport in what appeared to be a reckless escalation, particularly given the consequences if an airliner exploded. In reality, it was an elaborate hoax: the mortars had been rigged not to explode.¹⁵⁷ The situation appeared dire but in the background the Adams led 'think tank', which acted as an advisory body to the PIRA on political matters, had almost completely taken control of PIRA strategy.¹⁵⁸

In March 1994 the PIRA called a three day ceasefire, it had done this previously in December 1993, but this had been only a formal announcement of an

¹⁵⁵ Moloney, op cit.

¹⁵⁶ McKittrick & McVea, op cit.

¹⁵⁷ Bew, Frampton & Gurruchaga, op cit; McKittrick and McVea, op cit.

¹⁵⁸ Moloney, op cit.

annual event and a new document began to circulate entitled 'TUAS'.¹⁵⁹ This was presented to PIRA volunteers as 'Tactical Use of Armed Struggle' and to Nationalist allies as 'Totally Unarmed Strategy' but it was never actually defined and left ambiguous in its meaning.¹⁶⁰ The basic argument of TUAS was that the Downing Street Declaration did not hold a 'solution', but there was a 'substantial political momentum which will considerably advance the struggle at this time' through political consensus based on the construction of an 'Irish nationalist consensus', which included Sinn Fein, the SDLP and the Irish government. The goal of a 32 County Republic remained the same but the means had clearly changed:

'The leadership has now decided that there is enough agreement to proceed with the Tuas option. It has been stated from the outset that this is a risky strategy. Its success will depend greatly on workload. All activists must be pro-active. Those who continue in their present work need to double effect. If you find yourself idle, help in another field.'¹⁶¹

The 'risky strategy' was what hardliners in the PIRA feared, the end of hostilities without guarantees from the British as to what would happen next, but with Sinn Fein in a stronger bargaining position without PIRA violence. English describes the PIRA of the period between 1988 and 1994 as 'talking and killing' and this is an apt description for the organisation was in convulsion as the Adams and McGuinness camp dragged it towards an announcement of a complete cessation of its campaign on the 31st March 1994.¹⁶² After the Downing Street Declaration the CLMC had announced that if the PIRA laid down their arms they would do the same and after a period of reflection they announced a cessation of operational hostilities on the 13th October 1994¹⁶³.

The question then arose of the matter of the decommissioning of paramilitary weapons and an international body was formed at the behest of the British and Irish governments led by Senator George Mitchell. It produced a report

¹⁵⁹ McKittrick & McVea, op cit.

¹⁶⁰ Moloney, op cit.

¹⁶¹ TUAS document circulated by the republican leadership in summer 1994, in: McKittrick & McVea, op cit, pp 381-384.

¹⁶² English, op cit; Moloney, op cit.

¹⁶³ Taylor, op cit.

on 22nd January 1996, which said the decommissioning of arms prior to talks would not happen, and would need to proceed in parallel to negotiations. This was rejected by Major yet was acceptable to Sinn Fein, but the body also produced six principles, or anti-violence statements, which all parties involved in negotiations would be required to accept.¹⁶⁴ In the long term decommissioning was addressed in parallel to talks, which continued despite progress in this respect, and the Mitchell Principles provided the bedrock on which all-party talks and the peace process would progress.

The ceasefire was broken after only seventeen months and nine days when the PIRA exploded a bomb in London's Docklands killing two people and causing serious damage to buildings in the centre of the city. Prior to the bombing the British Prime Minister and the new Taoiseach, John Bruton, had been optimistic about the ceasefire, believing that Adams and McGuinness could hold sway over the PIRA, and the British had pushed for PIRA to decommission its weapons whilst refusing to accede to Sinn Fein demands for talks. Such pressure did not fall on the Loyalist paramilitaries and the Unionists were critical to the Major government as they had a slim majority in the commons. The PIRA leadership had concluded that TUAS was not working and that the British were acting in bad faith.¹⁶⁵ During three critical years sectarian violence had continued: in 1995 nine people had died, in 1996 twenty-two, and in 1997 there were twenty one deaths related to the conflict, but the PIRA and CLMC had remained steadfast in their ceasefires.¹⁶⁶ Much of the violence in the period came from fringe groups opposed to the ceasefire, the INLA on the Republican side and elements within the UVF on the Loyalist side, but the resumption of violence by the PIRA was a major shock¹⁶⁷. It galvanised Bruton and Major into action towards the start of all-party talks and Hume, Adams and PIRA representatives also held talks. Voting took place for a Northern Ireland forum

¹⁶⁴ McKittrick & McVea, op cit.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ Bew, Frampton & Gurruchaga, op cit; Taylor, op cit.

¹⁶⁷ McKittrick & McVea, op cit.

but Sinn Fein was excluded from the first meeting due to the breaking of the PIRA ceasefire and the SDLP later withdrew.¹⁶⁸

The political situation in Great Britain and Ireland changed dramatically in 1997 when a majority Labour government came into power and Fianna Fail returned to power in a coalition government. The new British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, stated publicly on the 25th June that a restored ceasefire would allow Sinn Fein to return to all party talks.¹⁶⁹ The Peace Process continued on, its momentum driven forward despite resurgent Republican and Loyalist violence and the only declared obstacle to Sinn Fein's involvement was PIRA activity. Talks had progressed since 1990 on a three strand formula of interlocking institutions which were mutually independent: a locally elected Northern Ireland government, a north-south body for cross border cooperation and a British-Irish connection.¹⁷⁰ In the background, the Irish government intensified its dialogue with the PIRA and reassured them that they would oppose Sinn Fein's exclusion on the basis of decommissioning and the only justification for exclusion would be a breach of the Mitchell Principles. The PIRA was severely divided on the issue of abandoning armed struggle and much of this centred round the Mitchell Principles.¹⁷¹ Yet, in the same elections that had brought Ahern and Blair to power there was also success for Sinn Fein: McGuinness and Adams had been elected as MPs and in the South Sinn Fein had won a seat in the Irish parliament. The PIRA leadership, seeing the potential for talking over killing, announced a second cessation of its military operations on 19th July 1997 and in September Sinn Fein formally accepted the Mitchell Principles and entered into the all-party talks.¹⁷²

The North was on the way to some form of peace: the PIRA were taking part in decommissioning talks led by the US Senator George Mitchell, an issue key to the establishment of the Northern Ireland Assembly and Sinn Fein would eventually usurp the SDLP as the leading Nationalist political party. There were some

¹⁶⁸ CAIN Chronology.

¹⁶⁹ Bew, Frampton & Gurruchaga, op cit.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ Moloney, op cit.

¹⁷² English, op cit.

difficulties, the Unionists would not talk to Sinn Fein formally but would talk to the Irish Government and the SDLP. In the event Tony Blair and Bertie Ahern, Senator Mitchell and others, produced what was unveiled on the 10th April 1998 as the Good Friday Agreement which was later accepted overwhelmingly by the electorate in the North and the South.¹⁷³ It was a political achievement of the highest order: Irish cooperation throughout the 'troubles' had been consistent, and to pull together the Unionists and Nationalists, the Orange and the Green, of Northern Ireland politics was a boon, but it had been dependent on the PIRA ending their campaign and acknowledging the primacy of Sinn Fein in achieving Republican goals. Bowyer Bell, an eminent analyst of the IRA, was cutting in his analysis of the 'endgame': the IRA had in fact ended up right where they started, with the British still in Northern Ireland.¹⁷⁴ For its part, the Army still needed to patrol throughout the Peace Process as before and they were as welcome as they had been previously. A young soldier, who had not been allowed to go out on patrol until his 18th birthday, spent part of it having stones thrown at him by youths.¹⁷⁵

The ongoing success of the peace process did not mean that the North would be free of violence at the hands of the violent wing of republicanism. Internal division within the PIRA resulted in the emergence of the Continuity IRA (CIRA) in 1986 and the Real IRA (RIRA) in 1997¹⁷⁶ related to changes in the approach of the PIRA and Sinn Fein leaderships. The CIRA was born from the decision to take part in party politics by accepting seats in the parliament of the South and the RIRA as a result of the Peace Process and the realisation by hardliners that McGuinness and Adams were abandoning armed struggle. Both organisations have complementary political parties which represent their interests. For the CIRA it is Republican Sinn Fein (RSF), established in 1986 after the Sinn Fein Ard-Fheis which voted to end abstention in the Irish Parliament. For the RIRA it is the 32-County

¹⁷³ McKittrick and McVea, op cit; Bew, Frampton & Gurruchaga, op cit.

¹⁷⁴ J Bowyer Bell *The IRA 1968-2000 Analysis of a Secret Army* (London:Frank Cass:2000).

¹⁷⁵ Conversation with former British Army Serviceman (MK).

¹⁷⁶ For a history of the Real IRA see: John Mooney & Michael O'Toole *Black Operations: The Secret War Against the Real IRA* (Maverick House:Ashbourne:2003). For the Continuity IRA and Real IRA see: Jonathan Tonge "They haven't gone away you know". *Irish dissidents and armed struggle' Terrorism and Political Violence* Vol 16, No 3 (2004) pp 671-693.

Sovereignty Movement (32-CSM) which initially acted as a pressure group within Sinn Fein against the acceptance of the Mitchell Principles. The split was deepened when they were prevented from attending the 1998 Sinn Fein ard-fheis. In both cases the political organisations existed before the military.¹⁷⁷

Whilst the violence had not gone away, what had happened since the 1994 ceasefire by both the PIRA and the CLMC, was that the capability of the armed wing had been significantly reduced:

‘Neither new army troubled the IRA central command unduly for long because the Continuity Army Council lacked assets and the Real IRA collapsed after the Omagh bomb in 1998. The two splinters, however, indicated to all the need to make haste slowly – increasingly difficult in 1998-99 when no progress was visible at all but the release of prisoners.’¹⁷⁸

Progress, history shows, was made. The CIRA and RIRA, the potentially most effective group, effectively isolated themselves from their tiny minority support groups and galvanised the majority of the people of the North in the direction of the Peace Process in a single action, the bloodiest of the ‘troubles’, by setting of a bomb in the town of Omagh, County Tyrone. The result when the bomb exploded was one of carnage which killed twenty-nine people.¹⁷⁹ The outcome for the two dissident groups was immediate and universal condemnation from all quarters: The Irish, the British, the United States and, the people of Northern Ireland, and their brethren in Sinn Fein and the PIRA. The RIRA announced that it had ‘suspended’ its operations on the 18th August and accepted responsibility for the Omagh bomb, but denied that it had intended to kill people, and on the 7th September they announced a ‘complete cessation’ of their campaign leaving the CIRA as the only remaining Republican paramilitary group. The INLA had declared a ceasefire on the 22nd August and had called for the CIRA to do the same.¹⁸⁰ At the close of the permanent ceasefire stage of analysis, the CIRA remained as the only active

¹⁷⁷ Tonge, op cit.

¹⁷⁸ Bowyer Bell, op cit, p 156. See also: The Economist Online, 19th Aug 2010, *The bombs of August: The violence that was supposed to be a thing of the past is on the rise again* <http://www.economist.com/node/16847842> accessed 27/06/12 15:31.

¹⁷⁹ Mooney & O’Toole, op cit, p 158.

¹⁸⁰ CAIN Chronology.

Republican paramilitary group and military Republicanism appeared to have killed itself off through the carnage it caused at Omagh.

Situation-Attitudes-Behaviour

The situation had changed irrevocably for the PIRA in the wake of the Downing Street Declaration as the onus was now on them to respond positively or be seen to be responsible for the end of the then nascent peace process. Sinn Fein had made progress and would be allowed into multi-party talks, but this was dependent on the PIRA maintaining its ceasefire. The momentum for peace was immense, the CLMC had proved responsive, stating that it would declare its own end to violence in response to PIRA ending their war, and Sinn Fein had laid out republicanism future in the TUAS document.

Whilst the PIRA leadership had grudgingly accepted Sinn Fein's TUAS strategy and the majority of volunteers had followed suit, some remained committed to the military instrument. They were acutely aware that the British had offered no guarantees regarding Republican aims, for some the armed struggle had achieved nothing, an interpretation not far from the truth. In the event, their commitment to violence in achieving republican aims was short lived when the PIRA and RIRA bombed Omagh. The willingness of the PIRA to call an end to armed struggle in order to strengthen Sinn Fein's position, demonstrated their commitment to the Republican cause over violence.

The behaviour of the PIRA during the de-escalation stage was one of trying to maximise their influence as Republicanism went down the route of negotiation. Their sole means of influencing events lay in the use of coercion through violence in order to push talks through the deadlock around decommissioning. Having committed to an end to armed struggle in 1994 they broke it in 1997 over decommissioning, before announcing a second end to armed struggle in 1997. The biggest impact on the peace process came from the Omagh bomb, which brought about a backlash of condemnation from all quarters, and propelled Northern Ireland along the road to peace.

Response

The British moved solidly in the direction of negotiation, alongside their long standing commitment to political reform, but remained resolutely committed to requiring an end to PIRA violence in order for Sinn Fein to take part in talks. They were also willing to place the key issue of decommissioning in the hands of an outside party, Senator Mitchell, and pushed Northern Ireland's politicians towards locally elected government. The path to political reform was set in the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, the culmination of a commitment towards involving Ireland in the search for peace. Despite the provocation of the Canary Wharf bomb and the tragedy of Omagh, the British did not resort to escalating coercive measures in response. Nor did they need to do so, Sinn Fein was succeeding in supplanting the PIRA, and Omagh had utterly delegitimized the military wing of Republicanism.

Re-escalation (1999-2015)

History

Re-escalation represents a return to the escalation stage of the conflict and occurs when a permanent ceasefire has taken place and new groups emerge. It does not represent the beginning of a new conflict as it is a continuation of the current one. The only case to undergo re-escalation is Northern Ireland, although it must be emphasised that the successor groups in Northern Ireland have far less capability or support than the PIRA. The ceasefires of the PIRA, INLA and CLMC and the demise of the RIRA in the wake of the Omagh bomb marked an end to the 'troubles': the conflict remained but was transformed into one of social and political activity. For our purposes, the end of the PIRA campaign removed the most dominant and lethal ethno/nationalist-separatist group from the conflict and returned Republicanism to non-violent political campaigning. The Peace Process, despite its flaws, has been a success and Republicans have been able to take seats in the Northern Ireland Assembly. The subsequent campaigns of the dissident groups, including a reformed RIRA, have meant that the conflict has re-escalated although

on a much smaller scale and with much less political impact. The aims of the dissidents correspond to the core Republican values, which the PIRA and Sinn Fein had adapted over time. It is for this reason that the violence in the new century marks a return to the violence which began in the late 1960s and is not the beginning of a new conflict.

The CIRA and RIRA are much smaller organisations than either the PIRA or INLA but are led by committed individuals whose predominant strategy is the use of armed struggle but they have been subject to much flux and division. In 2002 a split occurred within the RIRA when prisoners affiliated to the group called for a ceasefire and the leadership to stand down, resulting in two factions: one operating under the Real IRA mantle, another distinguishing itself as 'Oglaigh na hEireann' (Soldiers of Ireland). In 2006 a splinter group broke away from the CIRA, also calling itself Oglaigh na hEireann (ONH) but went into decline, leaving the RIRA faction as the sole claimant to the ONH banner. Another CIRA split, with young members in the North claiming to have held a convention and taken charge was denied by the incumbent leadership.¹⁸¹ A further addition is the emergence of a group of former PIRA volunteers which claimed to have recruited heavily after giving Peace Process time to work towards the achievement of republican goals.¹⁸²

This is not to say that the activities of the dissidents are without impact. Between 1998 and 2003 the RIRA carried out ten bombings, resulting in 32 deaths and 368 injured.¹⁸³ When the Omagh bomb is excluded there was nine bombings with two killed and 58 injured; far from the damage caused before the ceasefire but a significant amount nonetheless. The dissidents (RIRA, CIRA and their splinter groups) have actively targeted the Army and officers of the PSNI, regardless of

¹⁸¹ Martyn Frampton *The Return of the Militants: Violent Dissident Republicanism* (ICSR:London2010).

¹⁸² The Belfast Telegraph (Online), 22 Apr 2011 *Former Provos claim Kerr murder and vow more attacks*
<http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/local-national/northern-ireland/former-provos-claim-kerr-murder-and-vow-more-attacks-15146426.html> accessed 28/06/12 12:21.

¹⁸³ Frampton, op cit. The 'dissidents' moniker came from the media and has entered common usage to refer to republicans who did not accept the new approach of the PIRA and Sinn Fein, much in the way that the 'Provisional' moniker stuck in the early 1970s. The 'dissidents' argue that they have remained true to republican aims and that the PIRA and Sinn Fein were in fact the dissenters.

religious affiliation, and have sought to lure them into ambushes. Such attacks have proved lethal: On the 7th March 2009 an operation led by the RIRA led to the killing of two British soldiers outside the Massereene Barracks in Antrim. These were closely followed on the 9th March 2009 by the killing of a PSNI Officer in Craigavon¹⁸⁴. The killings brought immediate condemnation from as thousands of people took part in silent protests across Northern Ireland and when the Chief Constable of the PSNI condemned the killings he was flanked by the DUP's Peter Robinson and Sinn Fein's Martin McGuinness who referred to the killers as 'traitors to Ireland'.¹⁸⁵ None of the dissident groups took this as a reason to stop their violence, the CIRA announced shortly after the shooting of Officer Stephen Carroll that they would continue to target PSNI Officers:

'In the year since last Easter the war has been carried to the English enemy. Nobody should be surprised at this development by the Continuity IRA. As long as British occupation forces remain in Ireland, that will be the inevitable result of their presence here. The lessons of history are working out again in our time.'¹⁸⁶

The killings of security forces members were of a high profile and deliberately provocative but they were only one aspect of the overall violence. Between 2004 and 2011 there were over 800 casualties, including 21 murders, resulting from paramilitary violence. Many casualties were from sectarian motivated violence, the policing of communities by paramilitaries who punish drug dealing and anti-social behaviour. Notably, up to 2010, more casualties resulted from Loyalist violence than Republican.¹⁸⁷ Dissidents have also killed Republicans, the RIRA claimed responsibility for the death of Kieran Docherty, an RIRA member in February of

¹⁸⁴ BBC News Online, 10 Mar 2009, *Continuity IRA shot dead Officer*

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/7934426.stm accessed 28/06/12: 15:19.

¹⁸⁵ The Economist Online, 12th May 2009, *Shadow of the past: A reminder of the Troubles brings unionists, policemen and republicans together* <http://www.economist.com/node/1327191> accessed 27/06/12 15:45.

¹⁸⁶ The Guardian (Online), 12th Apr 2009 *Continuity IRA issues warning of more attacks against police*

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/apr/12/northern-ireland-continuity-ira-attacks> accessed 16/11/12 18:59.

¹⁸⁷ Twenty-Sixth and Final Report of the Independent Monitoring Commission 2004-2011 – Changes, Impacts and Lessons (London: The Stationary Office: 2011).

2010¹⁸⁸ and the killing of the informer Denis Donaldson.¹⁸⁹ In Ireland, there have been shootings between the Dublin CIRA and a breakaway faction in Limerick, with the violence spreading into Maghaberry jail in the North. For a time, the RIRA also switched to targeting banks in both the North and South in an attempt to link in with anti-capitalist sentiment.¹⁹⁰

The response of the British and Irish to the continued activities of the dissidents has been consistent with previous years, through intergovernmental cooperation, security normalisation, infiltration by the intelligence services, and judicial process but with one crucial exception: the absence of the Army and a militarised RUC. The RIRA has come under severe pressure from the Police and Intelligence services of the British and Irish, with operations monitored and prevented and RIRA volunteers arrested in Ireland and the United Kingdom. The one glaring failure was that the RIRA managed to place the Omagh bomb.¹⁹¹ In Northern Ireland security normalisation was accelerated between 2004 and 2007: The troop levels of the British Army were reduced from 14,100 to 4,275 (below the agreed threshold of 5,000), the military was withdrawn from police stations and watch towers removed from the border areas, bringing to an end British military involvement in law enforcement.¹⁹² Security and policing in Northern Ireland lies largely with the PSNI, formed in 2001 and replacing the RUC as Northern Ireland's sole police force. The PSNI is a more community focused force than the RUC and has proved less capable of handling counter-terrorism, working with fewer officers and on a reduced budget and the PSNI has been reluctant to move away from what

¹⁸⁸ BBC News Online, 20th Jan 2012 *Timeline of dissident republican activity* <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-10866072> accessed 27/06/12 15:26.

¹⁸⁹ The Belfast Telegraph (Online), 16 Apr 2011, *Anatomy of murder* <http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/opinion/news-analysis/anatomy-of-murder-15142787.html> accessed 28/06/12 12:23.

¹⁹⁰ The Belfast Telegraph (Online), 3rd Jan 2012, *Dissidents pose less of a threat as splits widen* <http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/opinion/news-analysis/dissidents-pose-less-of-a-threat-as-splits-widen-16098050.html> accessed 28/06/12 12:27.

¹⁹¹ Mooney & O'Toole, op cit; see also: The Economist Online, 8th Aug 2003, *Keeping the dissidents at bay* <http://www.economist.com/node/1973765> accessed 27/06/12 15:36.

¹⁹² 26th IMC Report, op cit; Operation Banner: An Analysis of the Military Operations in Northern Ireland (Army Code 71842: July 2006).

could be called 'normal' policing.¹⁹³ However, the PSNI has proved to be proficient at finding dissidents and acquiring the evidence to send them to court¹⁹⁴ and in the long term the focus on 'normal policing' by a force, which recruits from both sides of the sectarian divide and the absence of the Army leaves little room for the dissidents aims and methods to be viable in the eyes of the people of Northern Ireland.

In 2012, dissidents announced the formation of a new organisation under the IRA banner, an amalgamation of the RIRA, Republican Action Against Drugs (RAAD) and various independent factions acting under the banner of 'Soldiers of Ireland', but not including the CIRA who remain independent.¹⁹⁵ The new 'IRA' has declared its intention to target the security forces in Northern Ireland and Great Britain in line with the principles of the Proclamation of 1916.¹⁹⁶ The membership of the amalgamated organisation was estimated at several hundred, including the experienced volunteers of the RIRA and the former Provisional's of RAAD, who have targeted drug dealers in Derry.¹⁹⁷ What it does not have is the support of mainstream Republicanism, or a situation of oppression to generate support, as was the case with the PIRA in the early 1970s. Overall, the dissidents, whose number include the inexperienced, impressionable and personally disaffected alongside the more experienced¹⁹⁸ have been divided by internal divisions over the utility of armed struggle, the loss of volunteers to anti-ceasefire movements and the involvement of experienced volunteers in gangland wars in Dublin and Limerick.¹⁹⁹ Despite the amalgamation, the dissidents remain what they were prior to their announcement: an unwanted consequence from darker times without the

¹⁹³ Frampton, op cit; The Economist Online, 8th Aug 2003, *The curse of the conflict junkies* <http://www.economist.com/node/1973765> accessed 27/06/12 15:36.

¹⁹⁴ The Economist Online, 10th Dec 2009 *Resurgent: A political impasse means violence can flourish* <http://www.economist.com/node/15065945> accessed 27/06/12 15:43.

¹⁹⁵ The Guardian (Online), 26th Jul 2009 (1), *How the republican dissidents delivered their statement of unity* <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2012/jul/26/republican-dissidents-statement-real-ira?intcmp=239> accessed 04/08/12 21:59.

¹⁹⁶ The Guardian (Online), 26th Jul 2009 (2), *New IRA: full statement by the dissident 'Army Council'* <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2012/jul/26/ira-northern-ireland-dissident-republican-groups1?INTCMP=SRCH> accessed 04/08/12 21:56.

¹⁹⁷ The Guardian (Online), 26th Jul 2009 (1), op cit.

¹⁹⁸ The Economist (Online), 10th Dec 2009, op cit.

¹⁹⁹ The Belfast Telegraph (Online), 3rd Jan 2012, op cit.

minority group support generated by the PIRA and Sinn Fein. They are a minority at odds with their own minority group.

Situation-Attitudes-Behaviour

The situation in Northern Ireland is far different for the dissident groups than that when the PIRA emerged. They are unable to garner the minority group support of the PIRA, and have been condemned by Sinn Fein. Nor can they claim that Republicans are not represented as Sinn Fein has benefited from the Peace Process, and they are targeting a police force made up of Catholics as well as Protestants. Northern Ireland is not without its political divisions, in fact voting for the extremes is stronger without the violence, but these are openly discussed by elected politicians.

The dissident groups are committed to the Republican cause, but unlike mainstream Republicanism have remained committed to abstention from taking seats in the North and South (the CIRA), and have rejected the end of armed struggle (the RIRA). Divisions amongst the groups indicate that the commitment to armed struggle is not universal, but a core remains.

The behaviour of the dissident groups relies on the coercive application of terrorist tactics, predominantly shooting and bombing, in an attempt to provoke the PSNI into an overreaction. A long term trend in Republicanism has been existence of political parties alongside military wings, and the CIRA and RIRA are no exception. They are also prone to division, over strategy and leadership, although the emergence of a new 'IRA' may signal a change to this. The actions of the dissident groups have brought condemnation from Sinn Fein, who due to their success in Northern Ireland politics are committed to constitutional party politics.

Response

The British approach to the re-escalation of violence in Northern Ireland was one in which they avoided the mistakes of the past. The coercive element remains, but this is in the hands of the PSNI, judiciary, and intelligence services, and they are more visibly accountable than in years past. The Army is no longer deployed on

active duty in Northern Ireland and the PSNI is very different to the counter-terrorism oriented RUC. Drawn from both sides of the community the PSNI has the unenviable task of maintaining order during the parades season and its officers have been the target of dissident attacks. The British have not sought to negotiate with any of the varied republican groups, nor are they committed to reforming the political situation. They do not need to: the governance of Northern Ireland is in the hands of the locally elected politicians of the Northern Ireland Assembly, the end result of decades of seeking a political solution through reform.

Conclusion

The most influential Republican challenger group in the Northern Ireland conflict was the PIRA and they emerged because of the unequal political status of Catholics in relation to Protestants. The use of coercion was present from the *escalation* stage through to *permanent ceasefire* and counter-terrorism was the most visible aspect of the British approach. In the *escalation* stage and early part of the *normalisation* stage the British were unsuccessful in their attempts to negotiate with the PIRA, although the reason for this was that the PIRA were not ready to compromise. In the *de-escalation* and *permanent ceasefire* stages conciliatory measures played a major part in the decision of the PIRA to end their armed struggle and allow Sinn Fein to pursue the Republican cause alone, but this involved other actors than the government in a prominent role. Throughout the conflict the British pursued a political solution as they believed that the source of the 'troubles' was political. The pragmatic British brought Ireland into the search for a political solution in 1973, 1985, 1993 with a final success in 1998. The key to transforming the conflict was the end of PIRA violence, as it also meant a CLMC ceasefire, and allowed Sinn Fein to participate in the political process.

Chapter Seven: The Basque Country

Introduction

The Basque Country is distinct in that the primary ethno-nationalist/separatist actor, ETA, emerged during dictatorial rule and then continued under the newly constituted liberal-democratic state of Spain. In a comparative study of the response of liberal-democratic states to ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorism the fact that the Basque conflict originates from the time of the Franco regime does not preclude an analysis of the earlier stages as a roots based analysis requires a complete understanding of the history of a given conflict. ETA was a complex organisation with many divisions in the period prior to 1983 and I have used the standard categorisation by assembly (ETA-V/ETA-VI) and politico-military division (ETA-pm/ETA-m) up to this point. This chapter follows the same structure as the previous one, following the stage model, and presenting the history of the conflict followed by the application of situation-attitudes-behaviour to the challenger groups, and the impact of government response, broken down as coercion, conciliation, and response.

Historical precedents (to 1945)

The Basques are truly unique as a people with their most distinctive feature being their group of languages known as *Euskera* which has no known connection with any other tongue and is not Indo-European.¹ This uniqueness extends to culture: neither the Basque population nor its language can be traced to any other ethnic group.² Whilst the claims by Basque nationalists of racial purity are unproven the origins of the Basques are a mystery, and no archaeological, linguistic or anthropological evidence exists of where they came from.³ The first power known

¹ John Sullivan *ETA and Basque Nationalism: The Fight for Euskadi 1890-1986* (London; New York:Routledge:1988).

² Stanley G Payne *Basque Nationalism* (Reno:University of Nevada Press:1975).

³ Roger Collins *The Basques* (Oxford:Basil Blackwell:1986).

to have exercised power over the Basques is the Romans who brought them Christianity and Basques served as auxiliary troops in the Roman army. Later invaders, the Visigoths and Franks experienced serious problems and the Basques demonstrated an ability to hold the mountainous areas, which remained consistent into the middle ages. The Franks and the Arabs suffered serious defeats at the hands of the Basques who avoided head on encounters and the Viking raids of the 8th and 10th centuries did not have much impact. Basques and Arabs lived side by side in Pamplona for three centuries but Arabs could not penetrate into the mountains. It is believed that the Basques became Christians during the Reconquista, although at the time they were fighting for the Basque land rather than Christianity.⁴

Although unconquered, the Basques were in constant warfare and developed a military chain of command which led to Generals, and in turn, rulers: the Basques came to have their own Kingdom, Navarre and it would last from 818 to 1512 and be pivotal in the Reconquista.⁵ The Basques were not all in Navarre, the provinces of Guipuzcoa, Alava and Bizkia were all in Castile, in which the Basques had their own set of charters, the *fueros*, covering administration, legal and financial structure and they retained their distinctive culture and language. Despite the appearance of equality, the rise of the commercial classes led to an inequality between Spanish speaking merchants and Basque Speaking peasants, paralleled by a political dichotomy between Liberals who envisioned change and embraced market economy and the Traditionalists who distrusted change, preferring faith and stability.⁶

France invaded Spain in 1808 and Basque lands were occupied and towns and churches burned down but in Navarra the French held Pamplona throughout the war but had to contend with guerrilla attacks from the mountains. The war ended in 1813 when Napoleon was forced from the Iberian Peninsula by an alliance of the Spanish, British and Portuguese. Spain then descended into a period of civil

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Mark Kurlansky *The Basque History of the World* (London:Vintage:2000).

⁶ Cameron J Watson *Basque Nationalism and Political Violence: The Ideological and Intellectual Origins of ETA* (Reno: Centre for Basque Studies:2007).

war beginning with the Royalist War of 1820-23 in which there was armed resistance in Navarra and Catalonia. The Basques played a prominent role, predominantly on the side of Carlos, in the first Carlist War of 1833, which was a brutal guerrilla war of attrition⁷. For the Basques, Carlism was close to their traditional rural and religious outlook and 'encapsulated the defense of Basque culture itself'.⁸ Carlos's defeat in the second Carlist War (1873-1876) resulted in a trauma for the Basques who lost their *fueros* and leadership and saw their language and culture under attack from the anticlerical First Spanish Republic⁹. From the Spanish Restoration era of 1876-98 and into the early twentieth century the two leading provinces of the Basque region, Vizcaya and Gipuzkoa, became heavily industrialised and with this came immigration from other parts of Spain.¹⁰

The founder of Basque nationalism was Sabino de Arana y Goiri who came to the quick conclusion that an exclusivist Basque Nationalism was crucial if the Basques were to achieve moral and religious salvation, material development and a cultural identity. Arana established the political party 'Centro Vasco' in 1893 and it later became the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV)¹¹ and called for all seven Basque Provinces in Spain and France to be federated.¹² Arana's writings focused strongly on Bizkayan nationalism and were anti-Spanish and exclusivist Basque in their rhetoric. He died in 1903 having set out a 'discourse envisaged in terms of violence, struggle and warfare'¹³ which 'owed much to an interpretation of traditional Basque culture'.¹⁴ Before his 'tactical turn' towards armed struggle, Arana added a racist element to Basque nationalism's existing fears over race and language, and yearning towards *foral* past.¹⁵ The PNV, with a predominantly urban power base, became a serious force over the next two decades and the Basque Country

⁷ Kurlansky, op cit; Payne, op cit.

⁸ Watson, op cit, p35.

⁹ Ibid; Joseba Zulaika *Basque Violence Metaphor and Sacrament* (Reno:University of Nevada Press:1988).

¹⁰ Payne, op cit.

¹¹ Payne, op cit.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Watson, op cit, p 89.

¹⁴ Ibid, p 88.

¹⁵ Antonio Elorza "Sabino Arana and the dynamics of ETA terrorism" in: L Sergio Germani & DR Kaarthikeyan (eds) *Pathways out of Terrorism and Insurgency: The Dynamics of Terrorist Violence and Peace Processes* (New Dawn Press Inc:Slough:2005) pp 237-258.

experienced a cultural revival until the cleft in Spain between landless labourers and the industrialists and landowners led to socialist unrest and a coup d'état and military dictatorship under General Miquel Primo de Rivera. The PNV went underground until the establishment of the Second Republic in 1931, taking control of Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa and gaining approval for a statute of autonomy.¹⁶ Republican Spain granted Basque autonomy as it floundered under the pressures of Spain's internal divisions and in 1936 the Spanish Civil War began and the Basque's were on the losing side as Franco's Fascist Nationalists secured victory in 1939.¹⁷ In the aftermath General Franco immediately set about brutally consolidating his dictatorship. The Basque Country endured severe repression from 1937 onwards and Franco stigmatised Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa by branding them as traitorous provinces.¹⁸

Basque history is one of resistance to occupation by major powers, predominantly by the holding of mountainous areas and inflicting attrition on occupying forces through guerrilla warfare. Politically there was the ability to organise government, the best example being the Kingdom of Navarre, and they were also able to retain their culture and language despite occupation by whichever power was dominant at the time. Territory waxed and waned over time, the essential character of Basque culture and language did not. In the modern era, the Basque's suffered traumas of the Carlist wars and the Spanish Civil War, which would leave an indelible imprint on the Basque psyche.

As a consequence of their history, the Basque historical and cultural memory was one of resistance to overwhelming external political and military force, given a nationalist coda by the writings of Arana and expression in the political activities of the PNV. Such histories, of local nationalist revolt against powerful enemies, provide a wealth of heroes and antipathy towards a superior foe that can be passed down from generation to generation. This does not mean that violence will be advocated, yet the antipathy is there: the Spanish can be portrayed as brutal

¹⁶ Basque Textbook Series *Basque Culture: Anthropological Perspectives* (Reno:Center for Basque Studies:2007); Paul Preston *A Concise History of the Spanish Civil War* (London:Fontana Press:1996).

¹⁷ Preston, op cit..

¹⁸ Cameron, op cit.

occupiers responsible for all ills, with much anecdotal and historical evidence to support the position.

Origins (1945-1961)

History

The PNV organised acts of sabotage between 1945 and 1947, which brought down severe repression from the Francoist state, and a wave of strikes brought another wave of repression. Its leadership divided into a clandestine PNV in the Basque Country and an exiled one in 1951 and became largely ineffectual. Basques had been imprisoned or killed and over a hundred thousand had left the Basque Country and their language had been banned.¹⁹ Nor did they have any outside support, at the close of the Second World War the Franco regime was isolated, having been condemned by Britain, France and the United States, but in 1947 US foreign policy changed and by the 1950s openly supported Franco.²⁰ The PNV was failing, some members were benefiting from the Franco regime and the majority of its political and cultural activities were taking place abroad, whilst the Franco regime was coming out of the cold.²¹ The stage had been set for a new generation of nationalists.

In the 1940s young nationalists had set up a Society of Basque Students (EIA) in exile but when they held political meetings in the French Basque Country they also began to distribute leaflets and journals on the Spanish side. It was quickly uncovered by the Spanish police and its leadership arrested or exiled in 1951.²² In 1952 a group of Bilbao University students formed the clandestine group *Ekin* ('to begin') and whilst not rejecting the principles of the PNV's traditions were critical of the PNV's approach to the struggle against Spanish oppression. *Ekin* became fused with the PNV's youth wing (EGI) and began to advocate the use of

¹⁹ Cameron, op cit.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Daniele Conversi *The Basque, the Catalans and Spain: Alternative Routes to Nationalist Mobilisation* (London: Hurst & Company:1997).

²² Ibid.

violence but the PNV saw Basque cultural events as political activities and the two generally distrusted each other. After a personal dispute, during which a founder member of *Ekin* was expelled from the EGI by the PNV dissident, *Ekin*/EGI members broke from the PNV and formed ETA on the 31st July 1959.²³ The period 1952-1959 is described by Clark as the 'Ekin-EGI Generation' and *Ekin* was tiny until its merger with the EGI, beginning with six members in 1952 and having an estimated fifty by 1956. In the early days of the 'Old Guard Generation' of 1959-1967, ETA had between 50-70 members in 1959, rising to 300 in 1960.²⁴ Its members came from a social network, including mountaineering clubs, which was close knit and closed to the police and state authority and was essentially a cultural movement, meaning that activists were not isolated individuals. The choice between joining the PNV or ETA came largely down to friendship as opposed to political affiliation.²⁵ However, from the outset, ETA subscribed to Aranist mythology and for the first generation there are two aspects without which ETA cannot be understood:

'the nationalism of Arana, whose idea is to consider Euskadi an occupied country, and Francoism, which makes that occupation real.'²⁶

ETA was the direct consequence of political failure and division within the Basque politics of the 1940s and 1950s and in its earliest years it had yet to come to the attention of the Franco regime. This was to change dramatically in 1961.

Situation-Attitudes-Behaviour

The situation for the Basque Country in the Origins stage was a continuation of the situation which had existed since Franco's victory in 1939: political and territorial dominance by the Spanish nation-state. Of the three cases, the Basque Country is unique as the state was not liberal-democratic and Franco could act with relative impunity against what he termed the traitorous Basque Provinces. In terms of preconditions, there was an existing Basque nationalist ideology, a distinct and

²³ Sullivan, op cit.

²⁴ Robert P Clark *The Basque Insurgents: ETA 1952-1980* (Wisconsin:The University of Wisconsin Press:1984).

²⁵ Sullivan, op cit.

²⁶ Gurutz Jauregui (1981:460) cited in: Diego Muro *Ethnicity and Violence: The Case of Radical Basque Nationalism* (New York:Routledge:2008), p7.

historical Basque habitus, which was under direct repression, and aware that there was no political representation for the Basque people.

The attitude amongst young Basques was that Basque nationalism had failed, and in some instances was linked to the regime. Feelings of injustice did not need to be perceived, for the injustice of their situation was very real, hence, in terms of both individual and group radicalisation, there was ample opportunity to come into conflict with the establishment as it was actively repressing them. Despite their differences, the EIA, Ekin and ETA were clubs which allowed the expression of Basque culture and gave young Basques a group in which to belong, away from the gaze of the state, which represented the 'other' and was responsible for the ills of Basques.

The emergence of EKIN was a result of the failures of the PNV and EIA and it is at this point that the behaviour of the small groups becomes wholly clandestine and they begin to advocate violence. Some of the personal differences that would later plague ETA were evident in the split leading to the formation of ETA. The competing groups had yet to codify any tactics or strategy; they had knowledge of Basque nationalism but little experience of how this could be fused with military action against the state. They were also far too small to offer any form of realistic resistance to the Franco regime.

Response

The actions of the Francoist government and security forces falls at the repressive far end of the coercion-conciliation scale and were a continuation of their methods from the previous stage. The repression was an attack on Basque culture and when this resulted in a low level of violence by the PNV the answer was more repression. The Franco regime had yet to face a terrorist response to its actions but through crushing Basque political and cultural independence it had laid the preconditions through which a terrorist response would emerge as they had forced Basque culture itself to become clandestine. Even prior to the pre-escalation stage the new Basque challengers to the state had been radicalised.

Pre-escalation (1961-1967)

History

In ETA's first two years of existence its activists had moved within nationalist circles that were restricted and carefully distributed propaganda. In 1961 the *Journal Zutik* was first published and Txillardegi gave a speech in Paris calling for a unified National Front, bringing the organisation to a wider audience. ETA then came to public attention for the first time after attempting to derail a train carrying Francoist Civil War veterans, bringing about a repressive response which resulted in arrests and the flight of activists to France.²⁷ The mountainous border with France and a semi-tolerant French government allowed ETA to set up bases for operations and recuperation, without which ETA would not have later become the organisation it was.²⁸ ETA held its first assembly in the French Basque Country, leading to a statement of principles and reorganisation into a tighter structure with the leadership based in France. The idea of the full time clandestine activist (*liberado*) emerged from the first assembly and with it the need for financial support.²⁹ In 1962 ETA's Executive Committee was created with four 'Fronts' responsible for political, economic, cultural and military affairs, although this was later changed to five 'Branches': 'internal publications and communications, cells and study groups, mass propaganda, legal actions (mass organizing), and military actions'.³⁰

ETA's internal debates over its political grounding and approach were fervent, varied and produced a voluminous amount of literature.³¹ The debate is summarised by Clark:

'Much of the ETA debate had been heard before in Basque Nationalist circles, but there was a new element that involved the clash between ethnicity and class. Broken

²⁷ Sullivan, op cit.

²⁸ Jules Stewart *ETA*. This book is stored in the Center for Basque Studies library in Reno. It is undated but has interviews carried out prior to the 1980's, suggesting that it is an early primary study of ETA written before 1980.

²⁹ Sullivan, op cit.

³⁰ Clark, op cit, pp 205.

³¹ These have been collated in *Documentos*, of which there are several volumes. These were consulted at the Center for Basque Studies, Reno.

down into its constituent parts, this new issue involved three key sub issues: (a) ethnicity versus class as an organising principle for the revolution; (b) nationalism versus socialism as a guiding ideology; (c) the conduct of struggle based solely on ethnic Basque versus integrating non-Basque immigrants into the conflict; and (d) the use of “direct action” or “activism” (euphemisms for insurgent violence) versus nonviolent organising among the masses of industrial workers. Factions within ETA mixed these issues together in myriad formulas and in ways that at times defied logic. At the risk of oversimplification we can identify three separate strands in the debates.³²

The first strand, represented by an *Ekin* and ETA founder Txillardegui emphasised ethnicity and culture and stressed the importance of the Basque language. The second strand, represented by the 1960s head of ETA’s Political Office Paco Iturrion, saw social class as more important than ethnicity. The third strand, represented by Federico Krutwig Sagredo, was influenced by events in the third world and saw the struggle as an exclusively Basque one against Spanish colonialism.³³

ETA’s second assembly in 1963 did not produce any ideological change but their publications began to accept the idea of immigrants as, at the very least, potential Basques although in return immigrants should show that they respected Basque language and customs or adopt them. ETA also developed the crucial theory of the cycle of action/repression/action, which at the time had little to with ETA’s actual activities, but became policy after the third assembly in 1964.³⁴ The spiral theory envisaged that selective and careful attacks combined with intervention in popular causes would provoke the regime into repressing Basques, spiralling upward until a spontaneous revolt by the masses occurred leading to civil war and Basque secession.³⁵ The adoption of the theory meant a more socialist orientation geared towards mass action instead of the original and elitist minority action by an armed group and this was adopted after the Fourth Assembly in 1965. Friction between the supporters of socialism and class action and advocates of

³² Clark, op cit, p 32.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Sullivan, op cit.

³⁵ Clark, op cit, p 9.

armed struggle led to the Fifth Assembly in 1965 and a major split occurred in which the minority socialists formed a new group, ETA-Berri, later renamed as Komunistak (The Communists). The group was to merge with other small communist groups in 1972. The majority held the second part of the Fifth Assembly in 1967, in which there was further division, when the alliance between the Txillardegi and Escubi-Etxebarrieta factions broke down.³⁶ The ideological divisions within ETA after the Fifth Assembly remained complex. Escubi and the Etxebarrieta brothers, having despatched of ETA-Berri members actually considered themselves' to be communists and advocated socialist revolution yet criticised the previous leadership for abandoning nationalism.

Despite the differences and contradictions, work continued apace politically, socially and militarily.³⁷ ETA militants were expected to study ETA publications, including *Zutik*, and to be familiar with *Kemen*, ETA's tactical manual which outlined expected conduct and instructions for *etarras*.³⁸ In the period leading up the beginning of effective armed struggle in 1967, ETA had reorganised itself and recruited new members but ideological divisions were complex. The reasons for the complex mix of ideologies lay in the personal beliefs of the leaders and the competing influences of nationalism, Marxism and Maoism, but ETA's situation has to be taken into account. Even the most militarist would have to concede that they could not defeat the powerful Francoist state, which could crush opposition through the paramilitary Guardia Civil and National Police. To take on the state required mass action and much of the theorising was about how to bring this about as any action *guaranteed* brutal repression. ETA had been crushed by the response to the train derailment, but it was committed to taking on the Franco regime and had reorganised and codified a method of struggle in the full knowledge that it would bring down the very thing that the PNV had hoped to avoid: further repression for the Basques.

³⁶ Sullivan. op cit.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Stewart, op cit.

Situation-Attitudes-Behaviour

The situation for the Basque Country remained the same as in the origins stage but the situation of ETA changed dramatically when they carried out their first major action and provoked a characteristically repressive response that resulted in ETA basing itself in the safety of the French Basque Country. A second major change was the importation of socialism, and consequently Marxism, into ETA's ideology.

The attitudes of ETA members varied during what was a period of intense debate over ETA's ideology, what form resistance to the state would take, and the comparative merits of violent and nonviolent activity. In terms of radicalisation, the move towards the use of violence was sanctioned after the first assembly with the creation of the 'liberado' and there was an element within ETA for which the process of moral disengagement was complete and the representatives of the state were legitimate targets.

In terms of behaviour, ETA acted on all possible fronts and after their withdrawal to France the ETA leadership set about a substantial reorganisation of ETA, which meant that it would traverse politics, culture and militarism in the fight against the state. The inaction of military effort was in stark contrast to the intense ideological debates taking place alongside assemblies producing doctrine. ETA had yet to engage in sustained terrorist activity but was in the process of codifying its rules of engagement and goals.

Response

The reaction of the Spanish state remained consistent with that of earlier stages and. In the short term, ETA had been crushed, but in the medium term the result was that the ETA leadership came to depend on their safe haven in France and were able to reorganise, engage in debate, and hold assemblies. The repressive nature of the state continued to prevent any cultural and political activity by Basques and meant that the option of an ETA encompassing cultural and political activities was increasingly viable. ETA may have been militarily defunct but it was a cultural and political powerhouse with a rapidly increasing membership.

Escalation (1967-1983)

History

ETA began its armed struggle with bank robberies and the damaging of official monuments and buildings in the spring and summer of 1967; *liberados'* began to carry weapons on missions but the impact was small compared to that of the 1967 and 1968 workers struggles. In 1968 ETA's first death occurred after a confrontation between two *liberados* and the Civil Guard. In the same year ETA assassinated a notoriously brutal police chief, Meilton Manzananas, and a subsequent wave of bombings, shootings and robberies led to a State of Emergency in 1969 resulting in brutal and arbitrary arrests of hundreds of innocent people and ETA activists. The core of the leadership was captured and the rest fled to France, the State of Emergency ended in the same year but ETA was no longer able to continue armed struggle.³⁹ In 1970 the ideological debates remained complex and a Sixth Assembly led to three mutually hostile organisations: ETA-V (the '*milis*' committed to the outcome of the Fifth Assembly who declared the Sixth Assembly illegal); ETA-VI (the interior leadership who sought a middle path incorporating socialism and nationalism); and the Red Cells, who subsequently split entirely from ETA.⁴⁰ The split was a critical one in ETA's history as it signified that ETA's contradictory internal goals could not be reconciled. ETA had undergone many divisions and had emerged from each one more radicalised and with more commitment to armed struggle.⁴¹

In 1970 ETA militants were put on trial in Burgos. The outcome was a social and political disaster for the Franco regime, an increase in support for the goals of ETA and a greater knowledge of the Basque situation outside of Spain. The trial represented the end of the Franco regime's heavy handed response to the assassination of Manzananas, in which Basques had been tortured, jailed and exiled in

³⁹ Sullivan, op cit.

⁴⁰ Goldie Shabad & Francisco Jose Llera Ramo "Political violence in a democratic state: Basque terrorism in Spain" in: M Crenshaw (ed) (1995) *Terrorism in Context* (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press) pp 410-469; Sullivan, op cit.

⁴¹ Clarke, op cit, p 35.

their thousands.⁴² Support for the prisoners crossed the political spectrum, protests took place outside of the Basque Country in Spain and there were demonstrations throughout the world. The regime had attempted to present a more liberalised image to the outside world that was not helped by the trial of Nationalists in a military trial, in which the ETA members, including two priests, recounted the repression of themselves and Basques in general to foreign journalists until they were silenced.⁴³ It was a major event in the history of ETA and 'resulted in the commutation of six death penalties and a total of five hundred years of imprisonment for those convicted'.⁴⁴ The trial had considerably strengthened ETA-VI politically but its leadership had been forced into exile by the repression surrounding the Burgos trial. They opted for continuing with mass mobilisation, which came at the price of losing its Basque base of support and exclusion from the national front.⁴⁵ ETA-V, more in tune with ETA's traditional social base increased its membership, recruiting members of EGI, the PNV's youth group, in 1972.⁴⁶

In 1971 and 1972 ETA-V began kidnapping and bombing and their range of targets expanded to include any member of the security forces and in 1973 they assassinated the Spanish Prime Minister, Admiral Carrero Blanco.⁴⁷ The action brought ETA unprecedented respect and an influx of new recruits but a flawed attack directed at headquarters of the state security forces resulted in the deaths of twelve civilians in a cafeteria and was to prompt yet another major split.⁴⁸ The assassination of Franco's chosen successor had been by the Military Front but the ensuing repression fell upon the whole organisation, not just the members of the Military Front, who were able to slip across the French border. The Workers Front broke away and formed the Langile Abertzale Iraultzaileen Alderia (LAIA), or Revolutionary Patriotic Workers Party, effectively removing the problem of combining mass activity with armed action. In October 1974, ETA-V was divided

⁴² Robert Clark *Negotiating With ETA: Obstacles to Peace in the Basque Country 1975-1988* (Reno:University of Nevada Press:1990).

⁴³ Sullivan, op cit.

⁴⁴ Shabad & Ramo, op cit, p 429 (Footnote).

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Shabad & Ramo, op cit.

⁴⁷ Sullivan, op cit.

⁴⁸ Bew, Frampton & Gurruchaga, op cit.

between a majority who argued that political decisions should determine military decisions and the Military Front who refused to be bound by such decisions. The majority became ETA-Politico-Militar (ETA-pm) and the minority ETA-Militar (ETA-m), although the most active was the far more numerous ETA-pm.⁴⁹ This split led to a tactical reorganisation, neither abandoned violence, but ETA-pm saw the need for the workers to be made militants, whilst at the same time rejecting Marxism.⁵⁰

The Franco regime came to an end in 1975 but he had gone to great lengths to ensure that he had the power to appoint his successor. His choice was Don Juan Carlos, the son of the heir to the Spanish throne, Alfonso XIII, acting as Head of State with a seventeen man body of advisors (the Council of the Realm), who would nominate three candidates for the Premiership. Juan Carlos had moved behind the scenes prior to Franco's death and had manipulated the Council of the Realm into nominating his chosen candidate, Adolfo Suarez, as Prime Minister. Aided by the Speaker of the Cortes they pushed through a bill that would reform parliament and introduce universal suffrage and was endorsed on the 15th December 1976 in a referendum with 'yes' votes of 94.2%. The Old Guard and the opposition had been caught completely by surprise.⁵¹ ETA remained intransigent, despite the promise of democracy, stating that its objectives remained socialism and independence: the use of armed struggle depended on political conditions.⁵² The impact of the transition on ETA was reflected in the differing approaches of ETA-pm and ETA-m. ETA-pm adopted a dual strategy of escalating violence in order to assume a position of strength whilst seeking negotiation with the state and attempting to participate in the political process whereas ETA-m thought that reform would fail, producing a climate of revolution and so rejected the process of political reform. ETA-pm held a seventh assembly in 1976 and decided to create a 'leftist mass party' Euskadi Iraultzaraka Alderdia (EIA) to engage in the political process but continued to engage in violence.⁵³ The beginning of the transition period was marked by a substantial increase in Radical Nationalist parties making the

⁴⁹ Sullivan, op cit.

⁵⁰ Stewart, op cit.

⁵¹ John Hooper *The New Spaniards* (London:Penguin:1995).

⁵² Enbata, no 380, 4 Dec 1975, Basques: une table pour discuter. Accessed at the CBS, Reno.

⁵³ Shabad & Ramo, op cit.

Nationalist camp fragmented but some form of unity was achieved In 1975 when both ETA-pm and ETA-m took part in the formation of the *Koordinadora Abertzale Sozialista* (KAS, or Socialist Patriotic Coordinator) with non-violent pro-ETA political groups in an attempt to unify the Nationalist camp. The KAS was based on an ETA-pm manifesto and was essentially a list of Nationalist demands.⁵⁴

The situation in the transition period was one of incredible complexity: ETA was divided but committed to armed action, new Nationalist parties were emerging, the PNV had re-emerged to take part in the political process and there was no guarantee that it would work. The repressive state security agencies of the Franco era remained in place and so indiscriminate repression continued and would prove counterproductive as the new democracy implemented security reforms.⁵⁵ There was major political change: between 1976 and 1977 there were three amnesties, which allowed exiled Basques to return to Spain without facing charges, and the release of all prisoners except those involved in bloodshed.⁵⁶ In 1978 Spain's new constitution abolished the death penalty and envisaged regional power sharing by autonomous communities, including the 'historical nationalities' of Galicia, Catalonia and the Basque Country.⁵⁷ The state was decentralised into seventeen autonomous communities with substantial powers and the Basque Autonomous Community, which did not include Navarra, was granted fiscal autonomy, a capital with flag and anthem, an official language and a local police force.⁵⁸

The transition to democracy led to a general increase in terrorism within Spain and the Basque Country and this included a significant increase in the activity of both ETA-pm and ETA-m and the new Spanish government increased its efforts against ETA.⁵⁹ The major difference was that the security forces became more organised. The National Police and Guardia Civil retained their roles but after

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Rogelio Alonso & Fernando Reinares 'Terrorism, human rights and law enforcement in Spain' *Terrorism and Political Violence* Vol 17(2005) pp 265-278.

⁵⁶ Sullivan, op cit.

⁵⁷ Hooper, op cit.

⁵⁸ Bew, Frampton & Gurruchaga, op cit.

⁵⁹ Clark, 1990, op cit.

consulting Great Britain and West Germany the Grupo Especial de Operaciones (GEO) and Grupos Antiterroristas Rurales (GAR) were created in 1978 and thousands of National Policemen and Civil Guards were deployed in the Basque Country. As anti-terrorist legislation toughened in response to terrorism, the police were given greater powers of arrest and the police forces continued to act much as they had before and between 1978 and 1979 both ETAs experienced a growth in recruitment.⁶⁰ Illegal organisations were also operating, the first of the 'Dirty Wars' took place during the transition to democracy and took place in two stages. The first was carried out by the ATE and Guerillas de Cristo Rev from 1975 to 1976 who claimed responsibility for actions against ETA activists, their supporters and family and friends, families and friends of ETA prisoners and refugees. The second stage was the BVE, operating from 1975 to 1980 and, according to the document, responsible for 38 deaths. In both stages, the groups are alleged to have included Civil Guards, and worked for the Spanish secret services.⁶¹ Thus, ETA was facing an onslaught from both legal and illegal organisations and it is in this contradictory period of democratic reform and oppression that the Basque's and ETA were coming to terms with the potential of the political process.

In 1978 the political party Herri Batasuna (HB) was created by the political organisation HASI and ETA in order to participate in the forthcoming general election and gained a vote of 15%.⁶² This was in part motivated by the decision of the EIA, former ETA-pm members, to become part of the socialist coalition Euzkadiko Ezkerra (EE) in 1977.⁶³ The two ETA's were divided over the forthcoming elections and the Spanish government was reluctant to grant amnesties whilst violence continued, but would grant an amnesty if there was a halt in ETA's

⁶⁰ Fernando Reinares & Oscar Jaime-Jimenez "Countering terrorism in a new democracy: the case of Spain" in: F Reinares (ed) *European Democracies Against Terrorism: Governmental Polices and Intergovernmental Cooperation* (Dartmouth:Ashgate:2000. See also: Fernando Jimenez 'Spain: the terrorist challenge and the government's response' *Terrorism and Political Violence* Vol 4, No 4 (1992) pp 110-130.

⁶¹ Euskal Herria, Feb 22nd 1995, 'Spanish state and paramilitary activity', by Inaki Egana, Inigo Elkaro & Luis Nunez. Accessed at the CBS, Reno.

⁶² Marianne Heiberg "ETA: redeeming an Arcadia lost" in: M Heiberg, B O'Leary & J Tirman *Terror, Insurgency and the State: Ending Protracted Conflicts* (Philadelphia:University of Pennsylvania Press:2007)

⁶³ Clark, 1990, op cit; Shabad and Ramo, op cit.

violence. ETA-pm saw this as an opportunity to rebuild and agreed to a truce whilst their prisoners were freed, ETA-m argued that this circumvented KAS and undermined Nationalist unity, continuing with armed struggle.⁶⁴ By this time ETA-pm had broken away from KAS and published its own alternative four demands in 1980 which were immediately rejected by Madrid.⁶⁵

In February 1981 ETA-pm declared a ceasefire that was to last a year and was ostensibly called to allow for political developments in the Basque Left under the new autonomy statute and resolve any issues, including amnesty and the integration of Navarra. ETA-pm was divided between pro-truce and anti-truce factions, the first saw the ceasefire as part of a process that would lead to ETA-pm's dissolution through negotiation; the second saw the ceasefire as a pause that would allow for the resumption of armed struggle once conditions made it possible to do so. The division led to an eighth assembly and an amicable split into a pro-truce ETA-pm-VII and anti-truce ETA-pm-VIII, which accounted for the majority of the assembly. ETA-pm-VIII resumed armed struggle and in late 1983 most of their membership joined ETA-m or were deported by the French to Cuba. A series of negotiations led by the Spanish interior minister Juan Jose Roson and the EE leader Juan Maria Bandres resulted in the amnesty and re-integration into civil society of ETA-pm-VII members and the announcement of dissolution of ETA-pm-VII by its leadership on 30th September 1982. ETA-pm-VIII actively threatened any ETA-pm-VII members who sought amnesty and ETA-m argued that the use of armed struggle had been correct in the face of unjust repression and that the Spanish should leave.⁶⁶ Throughout its short existence ETA-pm had been responsible for the deaths of over 130 people and had a negative impact on the democratic transition. Approximately 100 members followed the leadership and up to 200 continued to operate under the ETA-pm-VIII banner until most of them joined ETA-m.⁶⁷

The militarists sought to expose democratic Spain as a continuation of the Franco regime and through armed action tried to provoke the state into repressing

⁶⁴ Sullivan, op cit.

⁶⁵ Sullivan, op cit.

⁶⁶ Clark, 1990, op cit.

⁶⁷ Bew, Frampton & Gurruchaga, op cit.

the Basque population.⁶⁸ In 1982 ETA-m began a sustained campaign of violence attacking Police and Civil Guard facilities, kidnapping and killing industrialists, and blew up Madrid's central telephone exchange. The Government was uninterested in making concessions with a new general election pending and during its campaign the PSOE stated clearly that they would not countenance negotiating with ETA. The UCD also took a strong anti-ETA stance. From 1982 onwards ETA and HB became more interdependent; whereas once HB had been a coalition of Basque groups formed independently of ETA in 1978, the inescapable truth was that HB had existed because ETA existed. HB's suggestion in 1982 that the Spanish Government should engage in face to face negotiations with ETA led to key members being arrested and imprisoned. The new Government stated its willingness to engage in dialogue but only with groups that rejected violence and within Basque politics the PNV and EE preferred to work towards a solution through the elected Basque government. As HB had boycotted the elected institutions they were excluded.⁶⁹ Despite this, the popular Basque President, Carlos Garaikoetxea, suggested a meeting between the PNV, HB and PSOE, which had the success of getting the leaders of the PSOE and HB to meet and some progress was made by all parties in talks, despite HB's insistence on the KAS alternative as a basis for talks. The fledgling peace process was effectively brought to an end by ETA's intervention. Having stated on 1st February 1983 that there could be no ceasefire without the acceptance of the KAS Alternative they killed a Civil Guard, wounding two others, leading to the end of the PSOE's participation in peace talks, a position which solidified in the face of more attacks.⁷⁰ By the end of the escalation stage, Spain had had two democratic governments and negotiations had taken place with ETA but also implemented tough anti-terrorist measures. Developments in Basque politics had meant that there was Nationalist political competition for the PNV, including the ETA affiliated HB, and ETA had been stripped of its political elements

⁶⁸ Robert P Clark "The legitimacy of ethnonationalist insurgency, evidence of popular support for the Basque separatist organisation Euzkadi ta Askatasuna (ETA)" in E Brewer (ed) (1987) *The Legitimacy of Political Violence?: The Case of Western Europe* (Program in West European Studies: Occasional Papers Series No.5). Robert P Clark collection (Reno), Box 3-C67.

⁶⁹ Clark, 1990, op cit.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

and had become a purely military organisation with separatist goals and armed struggle as its method.

Situation-Attitudes-Behaviour

During the escalation phase the situation in the Basque Country underwent dramatic change. Initially, the emergent conflict between ETA and the state had resulted in the feared repression of Basques and a second crippling of ETA which ended ETA's military challenge to the state as quickly as it had begun. This was followed by the politically inspired show trial at Burgos, which embarrassed the regime, and in the wake of the repressive states of emergency had resulted in support for the prisoners. The trial, and repression taking place alongside it, constituted a precipitating event, which strengthened ETA's cause, with ETA-V benefiting from an increase in membership. The most dramatic change, however, was the transition to democracy, which allowed the creation of the Basque Autonomous Community and the representation of Basques by constitutional political parties.

ETA cannot be treated as a single organisation during the escalation stage as its divisions were too pronounced. The attitudes towards the use of violence of the competing factions varied according to their ideological commitment and their understanding of their and the Basques situation at a given time. The principal difference after the transition was that the politically motivated saw the potential for purely political action with the formation of the autonomous community and constitutional political parties. What had happened in the long run was that elements of ETA were gradually stripped away leaving militarism and Basque nationalism as the defining characteristics of the reconstituted ETA. At first, this was due to ETA's internal contradictions, later due to the success of the democratic transition. The militarists had no confidence in the transition, nor did they wish to do so, as to accept the transition meant a fundamental change in their status as militants and modifying their aims.

ETA continued to undergo internal division throughout the escalation stage and the contradictions of differing ideologies were only finally resolved by the

departure of socialists and 'políticos', leaving the nationalists and militarists in control of a smaller but unified ETA. It is in the escalation stage that the full panoply of terrorist strategies becomes evident in terms of coercive behaviour with an initial overall escalation in violence by all the ETA divisions but it was ETA-pm-VIII and ETA-m, who sought to actively spoil attempts at peace, intimidate the peacemakers, and provoke the state into further repression after the ETA-pm ceasefire.

Response

The Franco led government continued to utilise a repressive strategy into its final days and this led directly to support for ETA as the organisation came out into the open. The successor democratic governments practiced a mix of coercion, conciliation and reform.

The coercive element remained due to two factors. Firstly there was a security apparatus which had a lot to lose from the transition and was yet to fully engage in what was not guaranteed to be a successful democratic transition. The second was the increase in terrorism in general and escalation by ETA-m and ETA-pm which resulted in a reorganisation of the security forces and stronger anti-terrorist legislation. Overall, in the Basque Country there was a more organised and numerous security presence, which carried on much as it had before and was complemented by the first dirty war period, which lasted from 1975 to 1980. In this period, the promise of a more democratically accountable security apparatus had yet to be realised, giving militarists in ETA-m the basis to argue that the New Spain was merely a continuation of the old.

In contrast, conciliatory moves produced positive results in bringing terrorism to an end for a significant number of ETA militants during a period when the overall situation was in escalation. This began with the amnesties of 1976 and 1977, release of prisoners and abolition of the death penalty, general actions which affected the Basque community in a positive manner. It was followed by negotiations with ETA-pm-VII, resulting in amnesties and reintegration for the members of ETA-pm-VII who wished to take part. For them, terrorism was at an

end and the negotiation, amnesties and reintegration had facilitated the exit from terrorism. This did not solve the overall problem as ETA-pm-VIII and ETA-m remained active, but it is an example of individual and group disengagement from terrorism as a result of conciliatory measures applied directly to a challenger group.

However, the situation in which conciliation was able to be applied was dependent on the changing political environment. ETA had been formed in the wake of the PNV's failure and lack of political representation for Basques and consequent threat to Basque culture. The new democratic environment, even in its new and uncertain beginning, had meant that there was substantial political representation for Basques from competing Basque political parties and autonomy enshrined in the new constitution. This facilitated the exit of politicians who saw the potential of political participation and exacerbated the divisions between ETA-pm and ETA-m. The consequence of political reform was that there was now a realistic chance for Basque interests to be represented by elected politicians and so viable alternatives to ETA in achieving disparate Basque goals. ETA was now in competition with constitutional political parties and had formed its own party, HB, as a distinct political entity, leaving ETA as a predominantly military organisation.

Normalisation (1983-1998)

ETA's situation changed markedly in the years after the consolidation of the new democracy: they were faced with increased competition from Basque political parties, a more effective counter-terrorism approach by Spain and, critically, they lost their French safe haven. The transition period had seen ETA's capability to carry out operations at its height but this went into decline after ETA-pm gave up armed struggle. In terms of deaths, there was a peak of 93 in 1980 and this dropped to 30 in 1981. There are peaks in 1985 of 31 deaths and in 1987 of 49 deaths but these were down to more indiscriminate violence in incidents which killed civilians.⁷¹

⁷¹ Shabad & Ramo, op cit.

The swift political transition to democracy in Spain had not been reflected in the activities of the security forces who continued to use repressive means in their war against ETA: both the testaments of ETA and their supporters and the record of Amnesty International demonstrate this.⁷² Yet the worst extremes of the fight against ETA was not to be carried out directly by the security forces but proxies, whether mercenaries or members of the Spanish security forces, operating well beyond their remit. Links to Spanish government, military and police are a matter of record and took GAL operations took place in Spain and on French territory. From 1983 through to 1987 a second 'dirty war' took place when the GAL took the war to ETA in their French sanctuary, killing *etaras* and innocents alike. At the time, the GAL murders did not do the PSOE any harm politically, a split in the PNV left the PSOE as the largest party in the Basque government in 1986 and they were successfully re-elected in the 1986 national election called after Spain had gained EEC membership.⁷³

The GAL attacks had made the French haven unsafe, they prevented ETA members from living openly in France and ETA also began to face pressure from the French police. Spain had been requesting that France tackle ETA since the transition began, with little actual result. Between 1983 and 1984, there were meetings between the highest levels of the French and Spanish governments, in which the Spanish sought to reassure the French that Spanish democracy was genuine and that extradited ETA suspects would not be mistreated. This came to fruition in January 1984 when France began to deport ETA suspects and in September the first three ETA suspects were extradited to Spain. The election of the conservative Jacques Chirac in March 1986 was followed in April by terrorist attacks in France by Middle Eastern groups and led to a toughening of the French approach to terrorism in general. French policy towards expelling Basques to Spain changed and in the

⁷² Report of an Amnesty International Mission to Spain, 1975 (London: Amnesty International Publications: 1975); Report of an Amnesty International Mission to Spain, 3-28 October 1975 (London: Amnesty International Publications: 1979); Euskal Herria, Feb 2nd 1995, 'Never ending repressions against the Basque Country', by Inaki Egana, Inigo Elkaro & Luis Nunez. Robert P Clark collection (Reno) Box 1 C-36; Box 1 C-37; CBS Reno BSQP0264.

⁷³ John Bew, Martyn Frampton & Inigo Gurruchaga *Talking to Terrorists* (London:Hurst & Co:2009).

next year seventy Basques were expelled. During 1985 and 1986 the ETA leadership had been effectively dismembered due to arrests in the French Basque Country.⁷⁴

In the 1980s there were three distinct orientations within the Basque political system and these are defined by their stance on the political status of the Basque Country: centralism, autonomy and independence. The largest was the autonomists, including the PNV, the next the independentists, represented solely by HB, and the centrists, the conservative PP, were the smallest. Basque politics were dominated by the two major issues of Basque nationalism and the distribution of parties on a continuum ranging from the conservative to the radical ideological.⁷⁵ Our interest is in the support amongst Basques for the four Basque Nationalist parties known as *abertzale* (patriotic). Three of these parties shared the principle that the way to Basque home rule was through democratic institutions. The largest, and oldest, was the PNV, who had been dependent on coalitions with the Basque wing of the PSOE. The second largest was the EE, formed in 1977 and originated from members of ETA-pm but which evolved to accept the Spanish constitution as legitimate. The third *abertzale* party was Eusko Alkartasuna (EA) and was a result of a split in the PNV in 1986, falling politically between the centre-right PNV and the socialist EE. The fourth party was HB, the party which represented ETA, and were the only party not to accept the legitimacy of the constitution and whose candidates did not take seats in the Basque and Spanish parliaments.⁷⁶

The four parties competed for the Basque Nationalist vote within a complex political system ranging from the right to left and HB had become increasingly divorced from the majority of Basque voters. The assassination of the head of the Ertzantza in 1985 led to an explicit and public condemnation of ETA by the Basque Government for the first time in their history and by 1986 they had become isolated from the elected parties.⁷⁷ In elections HB had consistently gained a significant percentage of votes: in general elections 15% in 1979 and 14.8% in 1982;

⁷⁴ Clark, 1990, op cit.

⁷⁵ C Joanne Crawford 'Basque attitude towards political violence: Its correlation with personality variables, other sociopolitical attitudes, and political party vote' *Aggressive Behaviour* Vol 19, No 5 (1993) pp 325-346.

⁷⁶ Clark, 1990, op cit.

⁷⁷ Shabad & Ramo, op cit.

in regional elections 16.5% in 1980 and 14.6% in 1984.⁷⁸ As the sole party directly linked to ETA and advocating independence these are representative of the percentage of Basque voters who supported ETA's goals, however they do not equate to acceptance of ETA's methods so the percentage of voters who supported ETA can be taken as a maximum of between 14.8% and 16.5% in this period. ETA's support was a significant number but they were a minority within a population whose choice of political party ranged across the political spectrum and was dominated by a trend towards consolidating Basque autonomy within the Spanish state and an attitude increasingly against the use of violence for political ends.

From 1984 to 1986 there was a second attempt at the social integration of ETA prisoners, led by a PNV senator, Joseba Azkarraga, but this required the prisoners to sign a public document rejecting armed struggle. A total of eighty five prisoners signed between 1984 and 1986 but no prisoners accepted the amnesty offer after 1986 and the murders of former *etarras* Mikel Solaun in 1984 and Maria Dolores Gonzalez Catarain ('Yoyes') in 1986 by ETA effectively brought the second attempt at social reinsertion to an end.⁷⁹ Between 1986 and 1989 the Spanish government and ETA took part in negotiations in Algeria, which were serious and open attempts to end the ETA insurgency, and occurred due to a combination of factors: Firstly, a strong and re-elected PSOE government was seeking for Spain to join Western democracies in NATO and the EEC but was embarrassed by failed military coups and ETA violence; Secondly, ETA's weakness due to France's actions, in coordination with the Spanish, against ETA in the French 'sanctuary' of the French Basque Country leading to more amenability towards negotiation; Third, the fact that Algeria was an acceptable mediator to both parties.⁸⁰

Ludger Mees gives a concise overview of the talks:

'After its beginning in September 1986 until the definitive breakdown in April 1989, the negotiation process passed through several phases. Its main protagonists were, on the one hand, several ETA prisoners transferred to Algeria, including the leaders

⁷⁸ Thomas Clegg & Luis Moreno 'Nationalist upsurge in Spain: The Basque and Catalan elections of 1984' *Politics* Vol 4, No 2 (1984) pp 8-15.

⁷⁹ Clark, 1990, *op cit*.

⁸⁰ Ludger Mees *Nationalism, Violence and Democracy* (Basingstoke: Palgrave: 2003).

Iturbe and Eugenio Etxebeste ('Antxon'), and, on the other hand. A delegation of the Spanish socialist government made up by Rafael Vera, the director of state security, and two middle-ranking politicians. Other participants were several Basque lawyers close to radical nationalism, and representatives of the Algerian government. The talks were carried out in an atmosphere of tension. Despite the announcement of various short term ceasefires, violence continued with acts of kidnapping and car bombing.⁸¹

Mees gives four arguments as to why the talks eventually failed: Firstly, the process was a transparent one, preventing discrete or secret conversations; Secondly, neither the ETA representatives nor those of the government had any real influence in ETA or the PSOE respectively; Thirdly, Mees's questions if the two sides were truly willing to seek a negotiated settlement as both still believed a military victory was still achievable; and fourthly, the PNV and Spanish opposition party were sidelined, leaving only ETA and the government negotiating over issues affecting the political framework of the Basque Country. As a consequence, the early flourishing of a 'two-track' formula began to emerge, allowing a secondary negotiating strand led by the political parties who could advise the first strand negotiators but this was embryonic, not mature.⁸² Ultimately, the government found the negotiations unpalatable in the wake of the Hipercor and barracks bombings of 1987, with which ETA had sought to strengthen their hand.⁸³ ETA blamed the Spanish government for failing to honour eight points agreed between them, were critical of the PNV for condemning ETA's armed struggle but benefiting from it politically and roundly condemned the French state for wanting to destroy the Basque movement.⁸⁴ The reality of ETA's situation was that by the late 1980s they were struggling under the weight of counter-terrorist response from the Basque, French and Spanish security forces, had come into conflict with the main abertzale party, the PNV, and were seeking to achieve their aims through

⁸¹ Mees, op cit, p 68.

⁸² Ludger Mees 'Between votes and bullets: Conflicting ethnic identities in the Basque Country' *Ethnic and Racial Studies* Vol 4, No 5 (2001) pp 798-827.

⁸³ Bew, Frampton & Gurruchaga, op cit.

⁸⁴ *Egin*: Interview with Euskadi ta Askatasuna, the Basque side has shown that it is prepared to negotiate (1990). CBS, Reno, BSQAP0260.

negotiation, in which their primary means of influencing the Spanish government was the bomb.

In June 1987 ETA bombed the Hipercor supermarket in Barcelona, killing twenty-one people and injuring others and in December bombed a Civil Guard barracks in Saragossa, killing eleven people, including five young girls.⁸⁵ These actions represented a major change in ETA tactics, compared to the precision of the Blanco assassination these actions were far more indiscriminate. Yet ETA's core support remained committed and willing to defend their actions as Woodworth's interview with the daughter of a GAL victim demonstrates:

'Yes, but they got thing wrong, thinking that the police were going to give a warning. Of course, if they had known what was going to happen, I can tell you now that they would have preferred to die themselves, with the bomb in their hands, than cause the barbarity that happened afterwards. They will never forgive themselves, she continues, not for having left a bomb in a supermarket, but for having trusted the Spanish police to act promptly on their warning.'⁸⁶

When faced with the consequences of ETA violence its core support, which was under pressure from the GAL, remained strong. The expectation that the security forces would be capable of clearing an area after a bomb threat was not limited to the Basque Country: on Bloody Friday in 1972 the PIRA had believed that the security forces would be able to cope with the bombs they planted.⁸⁷

The end of the negotiations was followed by the implementation by the Spanish of the 'dispersion policy', the scattering of ETA prisoners across Spain. ETA convicts had a high level of influence and had a strong internal unity and this often compromised the attempts at re-insertion into civil society. Outside of the prison ETA members led clandestine lives, once prisoners they received recognition as

⁸⁵ Bew, Frampton & Gurruchaga, op cit; Shabad & Ramo, op cit

⁸⁶ Paddy Woodworth *Dirty War Clean Hands: ETA, the GAL and Spanish Democracy* (London:Yale University Press:2002) p 147.

⁸⁷ Ed Moloney *Voices from the Grave* (London:Faber & Faber:2011).

members of ETA, and with the dead, were seen as heroic. The dispersion policy was aimed at breaking down this unity.⁸⁸

The Spanish also moved politically. Between 1987 and 1988 three pacts were signed 'to unify the democratically elected forces and ostracise ETA and its most influential political organisation, Herri Batasuna. The first was the Madrid Agreement Against Terrorism (01.11.1987) and was signed by all parties except HB and EA. Its key point was that it 'rejected ETA's pretension to negotiate the political problems of the Basque People'. The second was the lengthy Pact for the Normalisation and Pacification of Euskadi, or Pact of Ajuria Enea (12.02.1988) and represented a clear division between a violent intransigent minority (ETA) and the vast majority who were in favour of democracy. The text favoured the 'rule of law' and police action against ETA but did not rule out negotiation or re-insertion into society. The third pact was the Agreement for Peace and Tolerance (October 1988), emphasising that only the existing political institutions in the Basque Country and Navarre had the means of making legitimate political change.⁸⁹ Collectively, the three pacts strengthened democratic forces and isolated ETA and HB politically and sent a signal to ETA and their minority group support that ETA's continued armed struggle was not one which represented the will of the Basque people. Euskal Herria would later be very critical of the Ajuria Enea pact in particular, claiming that it criminalised the Basque Leftist movement in its search for independence and sabotaged dialogue. The other Basque Nationalist's were also condemned for abandoning their principles and denying Basque national aspirations by signing to a pact dictated by Madrid.⁹⁰

The 1987 bombings had demonstrated that ETA would resort to the use of the large car bomb to achieve its aims. From 1990 through to 2000 ETA carried out a total of 687 attacks resulting in 183 victims and carried out six kidnappings.⁹¹ A complementary tactic, emerging from a new MLNV strategy of creating social

⁸⁸ Mees, 2003, op cit.

⁸⁹ Muro, op cit, p 145.

⁹⁰ Euskal Herria, No 6, March 1998, 'Ajuria Enea Pact: Ten years against peace.' Accessed at the CBS, Reno.

⁹¹ Yonah Alexander, Michael Swetnam & Herbert M Levine *ETA: Profile of a Terrorist Group* (New York: Transaction Publishers Inc: 2001).

tensions to demonstrate the limits of the existing political framework, was the use of street violence, including riots, beatings, attacking the property of the members of rival political parties and confronting the Basque Police. Influenced by the Palestinian *Intifada*, the violence was known as the *kale borroka* and carried out between 1994 and 2001 by young Radical Nationalists, it resulted in the 'minors law', a new legislation to combat the violence.⁹² ETA killed less people in the 1990s but the range of their targets expanded to include members of the main political parties, prison officers, and the Ertzantza⁹³ and had become completely indiscriminate as to whether the victim was ethnically Basque or Spanish. In a 1999 letter to journalists ETA requested that journalists be objective in their reporting and stop being servants of the Spanish state. The letter contained no implication of violence yet was explicit in its criticisms and was sent to 'a number' of journalists who were failing in their 'objectivity'.⁹⁴ By 1997 ETA had departed from being the defenders of the Basques and allowed 'the crushing supremacy of military activism over any kind of political reasoning'⁹⁵ to undermine support for the organisation, even within the political wing HB, as demonstrated by two incidents. The first was the kidnapping of the prison worker Ortega Lara who was rescued after 532 days during which his kidnappers would allow him to starve to death if their demands for the transfer of prisoners were not met.⁹⁶ A revolt of public opinion did not prevent the murder of a little known politician Miquel Blanco:

'Despite the mobilization of millions of Basques and Spaniards, ETA turned a deaf ear to them and to the petitions of international mediators, some HB politicians and even various ETA prisoners. A few minutes after the expiration of the ultimatum, Blanco was executed with a shot to the back of the head'.⁹⁷

The result was the spontaneous mobilisations of millions of Basques and Spanish in what became known as the 'spirit of Ermua', intensified by media coverage and

⁹² Muro, op cit.

⁹³ Mees, 2003, op cit.

⁹⁴ Euskal Herria, No 11, February 1999, 'ETA sends a letter to a number of journalists'. Accessed at the CBS, Reno.

⁹⁵ Mees, 2003, op cit, p 75.

⁹⁶ Mees, 2003, op cit.

⁹⁷ Mees, 2003, op cit, p 74.

would lead to increasing doubts within the MLNV's political wing about ETA's strategy. ETA had jeopardised not only its own survival but also that of HB.⁹⁸ This was complemented by the dismantling of Radical Nationalist organisations by the police and the prosecution of their members in the courts.⁹⁹ In December 1997 the leadership of HB were imprisoned for including ETA videos in an electoral campaign and the prisoners organisation pro Amnistia and youth wing Jarrai were both criminalised. The newspaper EIGIN was also later closed.¹⁰⁰

At the close of the normalisation stage, attempts by Spanish governments to negotiate directly with ETA had proved to be a failure, as had attempts at reconciliation between the two from Basque political forces, as ETA had remained committed to their unrealistic goals of achieving Basque sovereignty and a unified Basque Country that included Navarre. The organisation had come into increasing conflict with Nationalist political parties and was resorting to threatening anyone who did not accept their worldview, Basque and Spanish alike, and had drawn the ire of Basques and Spanish who were marching in protest against them. The counter-terrorism of France and Spain had been relentless and in Spain the Radical Nationalist camp was under increasing pressure as political parties, Jarrai and EIGIN were criminalised and closed. ETA had followed a course of increasingly indiscriminate violence and negotiation and had become a very different organisation to that which had challenged Franco.

Situation-Attitudes-Behaviour

ETA's situation changed dramatically during the normalisation stage. The Basque political system was varied but the trend was towards autonomy over independence and against the use of violence for political ends. Their sole affiliated political party was able to garner only a small, if significant percentage, of the Basque vote and protests in the street against ETA were a severe loss of face for an organisation which claimed to represent the interests of the Basque people. On

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Muro, op cit, p 168.

¹⁰⁰ Mees, 2003, op cit; Alberto Spektorowski "Evaluating the achievements and flaws of peace initiatives: A comparison of the Basque and Israeli-Palestinian Oslo processes " in: Germani & Kaarhikeyan (eds), op cit, pp 259-280.

the military front, the safe haven in France had been compromised and ETA had been able to carry out far less operations than they had previously and were now in conflict with the security forces of the Basques and French.

The ETA of the normalisation stage was a smaller and more unified one than that of previous years and was dominated by the nationalist militarists as political campaigning was now the responsibility of HB. The moral disengagement of the remaining core was increasingly pronounced as self sanction was overridden to the extent that one could become an ETA target merely by speaking against them. What was left from the rump of ETA militants was a dedicated group of hardcore activists driven by the unachievable goal Basque independence. Part of the explanation for this lies in the fact that they had suffered terrorism in France at the hands of the GAL and were facing a highly organised response by the Spanish security services and were under attack in France.

ETA's behaviour had become overwhelmingly coercive in nature and proved to be the last resort on all occasions. The principal tactic was costly signalling, first to the state, to militants who accepted conciliation from the government, then to anyone who spoke against them, whether Spanish or Basque. When confronted with the need to compromise during the Algeria negotiations the response was to carry out indiscriminate bombings to influence the state and when confronted with criticism in the press the response was to intimidate the media. This extended to the new tactic of provoking social violence by younger Nationalists and the murder of a captive when demands were not met. ETA had failed to adapt to the realities of a liberal-democratic Spain and were increasingly in a losing situation of their own making as their actions caused Basques to come out against them and their tactics.

Response

The state response to ETA remained overwhelmingly coercive in nature but they also attempted further conciliatory efforts with limited success. This was matched by intense political activity in cooperation with the Basque political parties and the French government. The benefits of previous reform from the escalation stage

were realised in the normalisation stage as the Basque political parties became stronger, more diverse, and so more representative.

The most coercive action against ETA came from the GAL and whilst this was not government sanctioned it was tolerated and was later proved to involve a small number of people from the Spanish government and security services. This was an example of terrorism used to counter terrorism and falls far outside the legitimate remit given to liberal-democratic governments when countering terrorism. Whilst it undoubtedly strengthened the resolve of the remaining ETA militants it also had a significant impact in countering ETA as it contributed to the ending of the safe haven. The other factor in the ending of the safe haven was France's increasing intolerance to terrorist organisations in general and her willingness to treat ETA as such as a result of political engagement by Spanish government representatives. ETA now had to deal with counter-terrorism operations by the Basque, French and Spanish security forces, and this was taking a great toll: ETA's ability to wage their war had been severely inhibited and led to their willingness to take part in the Algeria negotiations.

The Spanish PSOE government made two major conciliatory efforts. The first was the successful reintegration into society of ETA prisoners and this is an example of individual disengagement. Whilst the prisoners were militarily inactive, ETA clearly saw this as a major threat as they resorted to killing in order to bring it to an end. The second was the three year long Algeria negotiations, and this also involved the ETA prisoners, including two leaders. Whilst these were ultimately unsuccessful it did demonstrate that ETA could be brought to the bargaining table, if only as a result of the coercive measures which had been taken against them, and gave the Spanish government experience in handling negotiations and recognising the importance of the Basque political parties as part of this. In reality, both sides were unwilling to compromise and ETA's resort to the Hipercor bombing brought negotiations to an end and marked a change in their tactics.

De-escalation (1998-2007)

History

In the late 1990s the Northern Ireland Peace Process began to impact on the situation in the Basque Country as Nationalist parties came to see the transformation of the conflict in Northern Ireland as a model for the Basque Country. In 1998 the PNV and other Nationalist forces signed the Estella (Lizara) Agreement, proposing a negotiated settlement of the Basque conflict involving the Basque's, Spanish and French. ETA was aware that in Northern Ireland the PIRA were moving towards a ceasefire and Sinn Fein's successes were increasing the electoral viability of Republicanism.¹⁰¹ The declaration was subtitled 'Aspects that favoured the peace process in Ireland' and referred explicitly to the Northern Ireland Peace Process for half of its length.¹⁰² It would begin with a dialogue leading to full negotiations with a final framework, which was left 'open' and on the 16th September 1998 ETA declared a ceasefire that was 'general and indefinite'.¹⁰³ The agreement had been preceded by a significant shift by the PNV who had agreed to take on ETA's final goal of an independent Basque State.

The contacts between the PNV and ETA, the Lizarra Agreement and ETA ceasefire were the beginning of the 1998-1999 Basque peace process. They ended when ETA broke all contacts with the PP government on 25th August 1999 and the 'security stalemate' between the two deepened over the next decade.¹⁰⁴ ETA reorganised itself, integrating new members unknown to the police and became more violent than political, expanding its targets to include journalists and university teachers and making the allies of the 1998 agreement into enemies. People began to leave the Basque Country and the Basque political system was thrown into crisis.¹⁰⁵ According to Spektorowski, Basque Nationalists were not really ready for a major change in strategy and the ceasefire had been an attempt

¹⁰¹ Bew, Frampton & Gurruchaga, op cit.

¹⁰² Euskal Herria, No 9, September 1999, 'Declaration of Lizarra, aspects that favoured the peace process in Ireland'. Accessed at the CBS, Reno.

¹⁰³ Bew, Frampton & Gurruchaga, op cit.

¹⁰⁴ Diego Muro 'The politics of war memory in radical Basque nationalism' *Ethnic and Racial Studies* Vol 32, No 4 (2009) pp 659-678.

¹⁰⁵ Mees, 2003, op cit.

to endorse the Nationalist goals of ETA in exchange for their offer of a ceasefire and was ultimately flawed as ETA had unrealistic demands for sovereignty.¹⁰⁶ Yet, with the Basque political system entrenched, a resolute and uncompromising PP government, and an ever indiscriminate ETA there was still hope: public rallies and protests condemned ETA violence and politicians were pushed to honour 'peaceful dialogue and public unity' over 'short-run, blind and egoistic party politics'.¹⁰⁷ ETA's support base had continued to decline: by 2001 minority group support for ETA, reflected by votes for Radical Nationalists, remained high only in small towns and villages, ranging from 40% in Orendain to 88.5% in Orexa but support in the main cities had been lost by the end of the 1990s. The support in the villages is explained by the number of people in them who know or are related to someone in prison for ETA related activities.¹⁰⁸

The 2000s saw a continuing decline in the fortune of ETA, whose targets included airports and department stores. Regional elections came and went in May 2001 resulting in a coalition between the PNV and EA, one which excluded Euskal Herritarok. ETA's response was to kill a town councilman and a Basque policeman on the same day that the PNV leader Ibarretxe was inaugurated. In November 2001 ETA car-bombed Madrid's commercial centre during rush hour and injured nearly a hundred people.¹⁰⁹ ETA had put the Basque Country into a virtual state of siege:

'A university professor with a bodyguard? Sadly yes. In today's bitterly divided northern Basque region, it's not just the teachers. Several thousand town councillors, lawyers, journalists, even a priest, who have been outspoken about the outlawed Basque separatist group ETA, dare not step outside without one or two gun-toting hefty shadows. These are frequently plainclothes police officers, or private security guards.'¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁶ Spektorowski, op cit.

¹⁰⁷ Mees, 2003, op cit, pp 160-161.

¹⁰⁸ Carlos Pestana Barros & Luis A Gli-Alana 'ETA: A persistent phenomenon' *Defence and Peace Economics* Vol 17, No 2 (2006) pp 95-116.

¹⁰⁹ William S Shepard 'The ETA: Spain fights Europe's last active terrorist group' *Mediterranean Quarterly* Winter (2002) pp 54-68.

¹¹⁰ Al Goodman 'Voice: Spain: The ETA enigma' *Journal of Aggression, Maltreatment and Trauma* Vol 9, No 1/2 (2004) pp 171-173.

The ETA of the 2000s have been described as fascists, labelling the people they kill, and creating a general feeling of fear with Basques becoming unwilling to become involved in politics. Accounts abound: the woman assaulted on a bus for not being Basque, planting a bomb in a tomb near the funeral of a victim¹¹¹ and the prevalence of bodyguards for non-nationalist politicians elected by half of the Basque voters, yet under threat from an ethno-nationalist movement was almost certainly unique within Europe.¹¹² ETA has been described as quasi-totalitarian as they were not the single dominant party in the region, yet they behaved with a totalitarian mentality, grounded in the racist ideology of Sabino Arana.¹¹³ In 2002 four out of ten voters for constitutional parties were willing to leave the Basque Country if they could maintain their living standards and nearly two thirds were fearful of participation in politics.¹¹⁴ In the five years after the 1999 ceasefire ETA was responsible for the deaths of many civilians, bringing about a repressive offensive by the Spanish government. With highly successful victims campaigns by the victims groups *Elkarri* and *Gesto por la paz* (and others) already gaining momentum in the late 1990s and generating widespread public support for their condemnation of ETA violence, ETA was increasingly in a crisis of legitimacy. The 9/11 attacks and subsequent Madrid train bombings on the 11th March 2003 further undermined the legitimacy of terrorist violence.¹¹⁵

With the socialist PSOE of Rodrigo Zapatero elected to government and engaging in multi-party talks and ETA significantly weakened, the organisation declared a permanent unilateral ceasefire on the 22nd March 2006.¹¹⁶ The new peace process was heavily influenced by the Northern Ireland Peace Process and its participants and the Nationalist intelligentsia drew parallels in the history of both

¹¹¹DVD source: Inaki Artela 'Voces – Sins libetad' (Leize Productions: 2004); Interview with anonymous source (Details withheld at individuals request. They were not an active or former *etarra*).

¹¹² Alonso & Reinares, op cit.

¹¹³ Elorza, op cit.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Ross B Macdonald & Monica C Bernardo 'The politics of victimhood: Historical memory and peace in Spain and the Basque region' *Journal of International Affairs* Vol 60, No 1 (2006) pp 173-196.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

conflicts¹¹⁷, yet they were different in that historically the Irish had submitted to colonialism and the Basque Nationalists missed the length of time that was involved in the Northern Ireland Peace Process.¹¹⁸ Thus, the Spanish were to experience another failed peace process, one which was to last until June 6th 2007.¹¹⁹ Whilst the ceasefire began in 2006, it was brought about by increasing doubts amongst ETA prisoners (communicated to the group in 2004) and Batasuna's interest in participating in a 'Spanish roadmap' towards resolving the Basque conflict later in the same year. Also, delegations from the Zapatero government held meetings with ETA in secret in Geneva and Oslo, the third in the month before the ceasefire and at this point ETA had not killed anyone for over a thousand days. Without support from the PP opposition, the PSOE officially announced that they would be talking with ETA on two levels: the first would be direct negotiations between the PSOE and ETA concerning prisoners; the second an all-party roundtable discussing political questions, which would include Batasuna under condition that they distanced themselves from ETA and violence. The PSOE and ETA met in Geneva and Ankara and the all-party roundtable had borne no fruit when ETA carried out a bombing of a multi-storey car park at Barajas international airport. Despite three warnings, which allowed police to clear the airport terminal, the attack was lethal as it killed two Ecuadoran's who had been sleeping in their cars: the two men were the first victims of ETA in three and a half years. ETA eventually called off the ceasefire and the Barajas bomb meant that the PSOE had to end their strategy of negotiation. Muro notes that some scholars have compared the Barajas bombing to the Canary Wharf bombing in London by the PIRA in 1996; ETA were sending a signal to the government to make concessions and speed up the process. Ultimately the process failed due to ETA's dissatisfaction with the progress of the talks.¹²⁰

¹¹⁷ Jacques Massey *ETA-Historie Secrete d'une Guerre de Cent Ans* (Flammarion: 2010); Pablo Mendez "Between the Basque Country and Northern Ireland: Imagination or fantasy?" in: Germani & Kaarthikeyan (eds) op cit. pp 281-289.

¹¹⁸ Mendez, op cit.

¹¹⁹ BBC News Online, 20th Oct 1999 (1) 'Timeline: ETA campaign'

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11181982> accessed 15/11/11 20:37.

¹²⁰ Massey, op cit; Muro, 2009, op cit.

Situation-Attitudes-Behaviour

The de-escalation stage of the conflict in the Basque Country was dominated by the impact of the Northern Ireland Peace Process and its flawed application to the Basque Country. The situation for ETA was that they were politically isolated, militarily ineffective, and seeking a way to achieve a political victory and avoiding military defeat, but not at the cost of abandoning their goal of an independent Basque state. By the end of the de-escalation stage radical Basque nationalists had lost further minority group support and were limited to core support in a small number of villages and towns. ETA's military capability was a shadow of what it had been after the Burgos trial, HB had been shut down and its successor, Batasuna, largely discredited by ETA's violence.

The attitudes of ETA and their affiliated political parties were in stark contrast to that of the majority of Basques, who were tired of both ETA's violence and the activities of the security forces. Radical Nationalism had failed to adapt to the wishes of the wider Basque community and remained committed to the cause of Basque independence at any cost and ETA continued to see the use of violence as an acceptable means of achieving it. Their actions betray their implicit understanding that their war could not be won in their existing situation and that the situation needed to change. Ceasefires were both a way to explore a negotiated exit from violence and at the same time reorganising and rearming in preparation for a new campaign. ETA's attitude towards anyone who questioned them was revealed in their actions as a weakened ETA lashed out and became a fear to Basques similar to the Franco regime they had originally opposed.

In terms of behaviour, ETA's strategy was dominated by the coercive application of potential and actual use of terror. Targeting was indiscriminate and was a sign of weakness as ETA's actions were increasingly demonstrating that they were attempting to force Basques to support their cause. They embarked on two separate peace processes and conclusively ended both by returning to violence and it was their ability to spoil peace processes, which formed the leading part of their negotiating strategy. This was inherently flawed as when violence is used as a

negotiating tactic it effectively ends serious negotiation and when used to push for concessions backfires as a government cannot be seen to be willing to concede to threat. In terms of costly signalling, the message that ETA wanted to speed up the 2006-07 peace process was lost when they killed two foreign nationals.

Response

The response of the Spanish government included coercive and conciliatory elements and they worked in conjunction with the mainstream Basque Nationalist parties and ETA towards resolving the conflict with ETA. They did not initiate further reform during the de-escalation period although the benefits of earlier reform continued to be seen.

The coercive approach, which was utilised throughout the escalation stage with the exception of the ceasefire years, followed the earlier trend of unremitting pressure on ETA, alongside that of the Basque and French police, but without the presence of illegal organisations. This meant that the counter-terrorist response to ETA was by democratically accountable security forces. The effect was that ETA militants continued to be arrested and incarcerated. The benefits of the earlier political engagement with France continued to be seen. With ETA in severely weakened state, coercion continued to put pressure on them, and was a factor in their willingness to negotiate, but with the consequence that ETA's targeting became increasingly desperate.

The primary conciliatory methods used were dialogue and negotiation, initially made possible in 1997 by constitutional Basque Nationalism's understanding of the Northern Ireland Peace Process and willingness to involve ETA in negotiations to end the Basque conflict. This was short lived as ETA was actually unwilling to compromise and the Spanish PP government had little incentive to compromise with a group that it reasonably believed could be defeated. By the time of the 2007-09 peace process a new PSOE government made a serious attempt at negotiation and set out conditions by which Batasuna would be able to join the negotiations and covered the important issue of prisoners. This was again

influenced by the Northern Ireland Peace Process but any progress was ended by ETA's attempt to influence the talks through the use of violence.

Permanent ceasefire (2008-2015)

After the failure of the peace process the main Spanish political parties, the PSOE and PP, entered into an anti-terrorist pact and the French struck heavily at ETA in France. By 2010 ETA would be weakened to its lowest ebb since 1992 and to the point that the leadership could not meet.¹²¹ ETA remained a depleted force and its attacks between 2007 and 2011 were limited in comparison to those of the 1990's, which in turn, were far less lethal than those of its peak in the 1980s. In the three years following the end of the 2006-07 ceasefire they killed ten times.¹²² In a major attack they attacked a Civil Guards barracks in Burgos but did not cause any casualties and were subject to increasing pressure from arrests; between the 17th November 2008 and 11th March 2011 five key members were arrested and an *etarra* suspected of six murders, Juan Manuel Inciarte, was deported from Mexico. Amongst these were four leaders.¹²³ An announcement was made by ETA on the 5th September 2010 stating that it would not carry out any more attacks, followed by a 'permanent and internationally verifiable' ceasefire in January 2011.¹²⁴ This was followed the 20th January by the urging of international negotiators for ETA to declare a definitive end to their campaign; the group included Sinn Fein's Gerry Adams, former Irish Prime Minister Bertie Ahern and Kofi Annan, the former UN chief.¹²⁵ An announcement was made by ETA on the same day of a 'definitive cessation' of its armed struggle. Factors in this decision were almost certainly the

¹²¹ Massey, op cit.

¹²² The Economist Online, 29th Oct 2011, *The war is over: After 40 years of bloodshed, ETA throws in the towel* <http://www.economist.com/node/21534821> accessed 15/11/11: 20:05.

¹²³ BBC News Online, 21 October 2011, *Spanish PM Zapatero hails end to Basque Eta violence* <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-15398799> accessed 26/12/11 18:10.

¹²⁴ BBC News Online, 20th Oct 2011 (2) *Full text: Basque ceasefire declaration* <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-15395157> accessed 15/11/11 20:38.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*

impact of joint Spanish and French police operations and pressure from the 700 ETA members in prison.¹²⁶

Crucially, the ETA message was different from previous ceasefire announcements as ETA said it was actually giving up armed struggle and hoped to engage in talks with the Spanish and French governments¹²⁷. Claiming a change had occurred in the Basque Country, representing a 'new political era' allowing a possible 'just and democratic solution' for the Basque Country, ETA remained intransigent:

'The struggle of many years has created this opportunity. It has not been an easy road. The rawness of the struggle has claimed many companions forever. Others are suffering jail or exile. To these our recognition and heartfelt homage. From here on, the road will not be easy either. Facing the imposition which still remains, every step, every achievement, will be fruit of the effort and struggle of Basque citizens. Throughout the years Euskal Herria has accumulated the experience and strength necessary to tackle this road and it also has the determination to do it.'¹²⁸

So, the doubts of many notwithstanding, ETA's armed struggle may have finally come to an end after forty years. There are, of course, concerns: ETA has called permanent ceasefires before, the possibility of a split within the group would be in line with the historical development of ETA, and there has been a change in government since the ceasefire from Zapatero's socialist PSOE to the conservative PP of Mariano Rajoy, a man who as opposition leader refused to support the 2006 peace process. Yet hope remains, the critical point at which it can be claimed that the armed struggle is really over will be when ETA relinquishes its arms.

The self declared end of ETA's campaign for Basque independence took place after this study began and the future trajectory for the group is uncertain as they have not dissolved themselves in the manner of ETA-pm in the early 1980s. Without doubt the 'permanent and internationally verifiable' ceasefire is a major

¹²⁶ The Economist Online, 26th Oct 2011, *The end of ETA: A new Basque beginning* <http://www.economist.com/blogs/dailychart/2011/10/end-eta> accessed 15/11/11 20:18.

¹²⁷ The Economist Online, 21st Oct 2011, *Terrorism in Spain: The end of ETA?* <http://www.economist.com/blogs/newsbook/2011/10/terrorism-spain> accessed 15/11/11 20:09.

¹²⁸ BBC News Online, 20th Oct 2011 (2), op cit.

event in the group's history but questions remain, namely, will they stay true to the course of the abandonment of violence and is there a possibility of a split resulting in the emergence of yet another militarist group? The change in government is a factor is this but should not be overstated as both the PSOE and PP are centrist parties: the PP leader Rajoy is unlikely to place obstacles in the way of peace and the PSOE leader Zapatero, under whose government the cessation of hostilities was declared, has been tough in his approach to ETA.¹²⁹ The PP government is understandably cautious but the door is open for talks and the Basque public are overwhelmingly in support of change.¹³⁰ As regards the emergence of a splinter group, not only does ETA have little strength due to security countermeasures¹³¹, throughout the last two decades a significant majority within ETA were unhappy with the organisations course, yet continued armed struggle for the sake of unity. A return to violence would be against everything ETA has to gain and there will be discipline to maintain the permanent ceasefire.¹³²

ETA's announcement was met with fanfare internationally but Basque and Spanish political figures have been more downbeat as painstaking negotiations had failed before after the 2006 ceasefire and the Spanish have continued to wage their war against ETA in what Gerry Adams sees as a missed opportunity.¹³³ The situation for ETA when the new ceasefire was called is not dissimilar to that of the short lived 1998-1999 and 2006-2007 peace processes in that they were crippled by counter-terrorist measures, had diminishing support, faced public opposition to their methods and were acting on behalf of a people who were sick of the violence of both ETA and the security forces. The only real difference in the situation has been that the impact of these factors has increased as ETA became more indiscriminate over time in its choice of target and method. In one respect, the new ceasefire is the beginning of a new peace process as it has originated from the involvement of mediators from within Basque politics and abroad but is characterised by ETA

¹²⁹ Interview with Joseba Zulaika.

¹³⁰ Interview with Imanol Murua.

¹³¹ Interview with Sandra Ott.

¹³² Interview with Joseba Zulaika.

¹³³ Javier Argomaniz 'Opinion piece – Electoral politics and ETA's ceasefire' *Journal of Terrorism Research* Vol 2, Issue 1 (2011) ojs.st-andrews.ac.uk/index.php/jtr/article/view/175.

having ended armed struggle to allow political negotiation to take place and means that Radical Nationalist political parties can pursue their agendas free of the debilitating impact of ETA violence. The political problem in the Basque Country remains to be addressed, it did not begin with ETA, nor will it have finished with ETA but it will be easier to do so without ETA's violence.¹³⁴

ETA's talk of a 'new political era' indicates an acceptance that their violence is preventing a political path to Basque independence and that they are acutely aware that they cannot succeed through violence. Their political voice, Batasuna, remains banned and isolated because of Spain's harsh actions against any actor who supports ETA and for any progress to be made Batasuna needs to be rehabilitated so that it can challenge EA who have consistently rejected ETAs violence. Batasunas plight had a major impact on ETA's decision to end armed struggle, but in order for the militarists to be kept in check Batasuna or a proxy will need to be allowed to return to electoral politics and this is dependent on Spain.¹³⁵ Whilst it has taken an array of mediators and interested parties to enable ETA's dramatic step, it is the actions of the Spanish government which may have the most influence on Batasuna and ETA: their actions in crushing the extremes of Radical Basque nationalism were a major factor in the ceasefire, but a continuation has the potential to be counterproductive. The fact that ETA made their decision official means that the internal debate within ETA was over and that dissenters had accepted the decision to end armed struggle¹³⁶ but for the moderates to hold sway and unity to be maintained requires that there be political opportunities. ETA's actions and statements indicate that they were seeking a way out of armed struggle but for this to continue there needs to be a political voice. Actors in the Basque conflict have consistently referred to the Northern Ireland Peace Process as a model but the British never attempted to eliminate Sinn Fein as a political party.

¹³⁴ Interview with Imanol Murua.

¹³⁵ Argomaniz, op cit.

¹³⁶ Interview with Imanol Murua.

Situation-Attitudes-Behaviour

ETA's situation remained similar to that of before in that they had lost minority support, alienated the people they claimed to represent, and were unable to mount a campaign to bring about their end goals. The difference was in the degree of their inability to mount armed struggle: they had been crippled again but had nowhere to go to reorganise. Moreover, their actions, and connections, with Batasuna had led to the corresponding crippling of the political wing of radical Basque nationalism as Batasuna were inextricably linked to ETA.

The major change in the attitudes of ETA was in the willingness to abandon the military instrument without any concession, far different from the intransigence which accompanied the 1998-99 and 2006-07 peace processes during which ETA had the option to take part in negotiations. From the evidence available, ETA was trying to find a way out of violence whilst not abandoning their goals, if the move to ceasefire is taken as beginning in 1998. What is not currently known is if any secret negotiations took place that would have impacted on ETA's actions, nor is the extent of the impact of international negotiators known. There had also been a significant input from ETA prisoners, who were able to be more reflective in their consideration of ETA's future than the depleted militants who were still active.

ETA's behaviour during the final stage of its conflict with the Spanish state was dominated by the abandonment of violence and acceptance of what they termed 'a new political era'. In their public statements they were intransigent in maintaining the importance of their struggle in reaching this new era, and for a public statement to have been made required a consensus. In the few years since the permanent ceasefire there has been no return to violence and this is a sign that there had been agreement amongst what was left of the organisation as to what the future was for ETA.

Response

The actions of the Spanish government in the short period between the failure of the 2006-07 peace process and the ETA 2011 permanent ceasefire were predominantly coercive in nature and were matched by the crippling of the ETA in France by the French security forces. The result was that ETA was at the weakest it had ever been and its leadership had been arrested and were unable to meet. The permanent ceasefire has held but ETA's political wing, Batasuna, has remained banned. The inescapable truth was that ETA had been crushed, its political wing silenced, and ETA had realised that it would not achieve its aims through military action.

The final supremacy of the coercive approach would appear to validate coercion over conciliatory measures and reform as ETA had finally recognised the failure of the military instrument. This is not the case. Whilst it is true that ETA was gradually ground down in the long run until it abandoned violence its viability as the representatives of the Basque people came to an end when the transition to democracy became a success and the Basque Autonomous Community became an established political entity, and Basques were able to vote for their representatives. Successive conciliatory attempts, including re-insertion and negotiation, often proved successful when applied and were ended only by ETA's actions. The move to permanent ceasefire does not occur simply because of events during the final stage of an ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorist campaign, but also of because of events far earlier. When terrorism ends it does so because of a cumulative series of events over time and even failures of reform and conciliation can provide a base for future attempts.

Conclusion

ETA emerged as a challenger organisation to the state as a consequence of the repression of the Franco regime. The transitional governments inherited this problem. Under liberal-democracy, the governments applied coercion, conciliation

and reform in their attempts to resolve the challenge presented by ETA, which as an organisation deteriorated over time from being a resistance group against state oppression to being a terror to Basques, whom they claimed to represent. Coercion is consistently present, from the *escalation* stage through to *permanent ceasefire*, and ETA was ground down over time to the point that it could not organise itself effectively, and was resorting to increasingly desperate actions in order to perpetuate its existence and force Basques to support it. Through political change, ETA's opponents had expanded to include the Basques and the French. Attempts at conciliation produced mixed results. At the individual level, amnesties and the reintegration of prisoners ended terrorism and/or the support of terrorism for those involved. A second method was negotiation, which proved unsuccessful in general as neither of ETA or the state was willing to compromise. Reform, which had a major influence on the ending of terrorism in the Basque Country, enabled the benefits of coercion and conciliation. Without the transition to democracy the creation of the Basque Autonomous Community would not have been possible, nor would the ending of the safe haven in the French Basque Country and the participation of France in countering ETA have occurred. The history of ETA since the transition was one of military decline, political isolation and failure to adapt to a changed political environment.

Chapter Eight: Corsica

Introduction

Corsica is distinct in that the challenger groups, predominantly the FLNC and its successor groups, have pursued a general strategy of a non-lethal and persisting low level of violence when pursuing their goals. Fatalities have occurred, as will be seen below, but these are far lower in number than that in the Northern Ireland and the Basque Country. It is for this reason that the conflict is less well known, despite its impact on France. The Corsica case is also the only one not to have passed through a de-escalation stage. This chapter follows the same structure as those which have preceded it, following the stage model, and presenting the history of the conflict followed by the application of situation-attitudes-behaviour to the challenger groups, and the impact of government response, broken down as coercion, conciliation, and response. The Corsica case was the last to reach a permanent ceasefire, taking place in 2014, and because of this any conclusions are made with caution, although it should be noted that the FLNC have definitively declared an end to armed struggle.

Historical precedents (*to 1950*)

History

Much of Corsica's history in prehistoric times is a mystery although there is evidence of a pastoralist megalithic culture dating back to the 10000 BC and a Ligurian incursion around 2000 BC that resulted in an increase in art and organisation into clans. A bronze age Iberian-Celtic people invaded in the latter half of the second millennium BC and their culture replaced that of the Ligurians. Corsica's geographical location meant that it was of interest to the major Mediterranean powers who sought mastery of strategic sea routes: the Phoenicians

traded and Greeks sought to establish colonies.¹ Rome continued coastal urbanisation and introduced Christianity and Latin speech but left the pre-existing Corsican administrative divisions and social division of the interior culture almost untouched.² The fall of Rome resulted in a period of 'oppression, misery and depopulation'³ that lasted around six hundred years with invasions by the Vandals, Ostrogoths, Byzantines and Lombards.⁴ During Arab occupation, in which the indigenous population remained within the interior, the people were allowed to maintain their own government in the form of elective chiefs called 'Caporali' who sided successfully with expeditions sent to expel the Arabs. The island was then typically ruled by feudal lords, or 'signori', who were originally foreigners and had some influence on the interior, prompting the formation of an association of villages called the Terra Del Commune based on the ecclesiastical division of the pieve (parish). The elected leaders of the pieves were the Caporali, although this became over time a hereditary position.⁵

Feudal warring between nobles in Corsica and extreme violence led to the Corsican people making a plea to the papacy who appointed the archbishop of Pisa to administer the island and throughout the twelfth and thirteenth centuries there was relative calm, allowing the building of churches, bridges and public works and an extension of the island's agricultural area.⁶ Pisa was defeated by Genoa who ruled Corsica for four centuries, building a chain of citadel towns between 1195 and 1539 and despite a democratic legal code and near absence of open warfare the period was miserable and the seventeenth century became known to Corsicans as the 'century of iron'. An interlude in the fourteenth century after a revolt led by the Corsican Vincentello d'Istria in 1407 was followed by a war against the feudal lords which decimated the noble families and resulted in economic ruin and emigration.⁷ Genoese governors exploited the island although Corsicans served abroad in the Genoese army and amongst Corsicans the vendetta re-emerged, a custom that

¹ Ian Thompson *Corsica* (Newton Abbot:David & Charles:1971).

² Thompson, op cit.

³ Thompson, op cit, p71

⁴ Thompson, op cit.

⁵ LH Caird *The History of Corsica* (London: T Fisher Unwin:1899).

⁶ Caird, op cit; Thompson, op cit.

⁷ Thompson, op cit.

would be passed down through generations as families' exercised vengeance on each other.⁸

In 1729 the Corsican War of Independence began after the introduction of a new tax and establishment of a Greek colony by Genoa and a Corsican government was proclaimed in 1747. France intervened and pacified the island in 1747 but was forced to withdraw due to continental concerns and Genoa returned.⁹ The war of independence was revived by Pascal Paoli who was proclaimed 'General of the Nation' on his arrival on the island in 1755. He implemented political, economic and agricultural reform¹⁰ and mitigated the effects of the vendetta, the suppression of which is credited with an increase in Corsica's population.¹¹ His defeat in 1769 led to exile in England and he would later lead the Corsicans to defeat at the hands of Napoleon in 1792 and 1793.¹² Napoleon drew heavily on Corsican manpower, raising Corsican regiments in an Army which had around forty generals of Corsican origin. He also made tax concessions, yet the most important factor was the man himself, development of Corsica was limited, but the legend that was Napoleon drew the Corsicans to France.¹³ Corsicans fought for the French during the First World War, served disproportionately in government service and resisted the overtures of Mussolini's fascists. The only interlude was after the fall of France in 1940 when the island was occupied by Axis forces and Corsica was to become the first department of metropolitan France to be liberated during the Second World War. An underground movement, the *maquisards*, took part in the liberation.¹⁴ Corsican history has been one of prolonged occupation and mostly unsuccessful resistance but the benefits of French rule from Napoleonic times onwards meant an increasing connection and loyalty to France.

The modern Corsican political identity can be summarised as developing in four stages. The first, from 1769 to 1896, was one of slow integration into France

⁸ Dorothy Carrington *Granite Island: A Portrait of Corsica* (London:Penguin:1984).

⁹ Caird, op cit; Thompson, op cit.

¹⁰ Thompson, op cit.

¹¹ Caird, op cit.

¹² Caird, op cit; Robert Ramsay *The Corsican Time-Bomb* (Manchester University Press:Manchester:1983)., op cit; Thompson, op cit.

¹³ Robert Ramsey *The Corsican Time-Bomb* (Manchester University Press: Manchester:1983).

¹⁴ Ramsey, op cit; Thompson, op cit.

and characterised by an opposition between the Italian and the French cultures. The second, from 1896 to 1940, saw an increased focus on identity, particularly culture and language and an anti-establishment stance on the part of social and cultural actors' such as poets and writers. The third, from 1940 to 1965 was driven by the dual problem of the results of decolonisation and the implementation of French regional plans in opposition to local realities, bringing about an economic, demographic, cultural and political crisis. The fourth, post 1965, is a consequence of the third, and passes through social and economic regionalism and autonomy to the nationalist organisations.¹⁵ Corsica was undeniably connected to France, but their language and society are more closely related to that of Sicily, Sardinia and Southern Italy, resulting in a fusion of French and Italian identities and the political dominance of Corsican clans within a French political system.¹⁶

Corsica was subject to constant invasion and occupation for much of its history due to its strategic location in the Mediterranean and proximity to competing powers. Most, if not all, of the great powers with a Mediterranean coastline had, at some point, sought to dominate the island, resulting in a tortured history of occupation, repression, resistance and exclusion of Corsicans from the exterior of the island.

Corsica is unique amongst the three cases in the modern era as, with the exception of the World War Two occupation by Italy, they were part of a French Empire which offered new opportunities for Corsicans abroad. They were in fact colonisers under the auspices of the French empire, serving in disproportionate numbers overseas. Nor did they have the antipathy towards France that the Basques and Irish had to Spain and Great Britain and they have been described as more French than the French. Corsicans did not see the French as occupiers and but for later events, and had there not been a development crisis, there would

¹⁵ Thierry Dominici *Le Systeme Partisan Nationalitaire Corse Contemporain: Etude d'un Phenomene Politique* (Barcelona:Institut de Ciencies Politiques i Socials:2005). Dominici describes the stages developed by Fernand Etorri.

¹⁶ John Loughlin & Francisco Letamendia 'Lessons for Northern Ireland: Peace in the Basque country and Corsica?' *Irish Studies in International Affairs* Vol 11, (2000) pp147-162.

have been no Corsican case to compare to that of the Basque Country and Northern Ireland.

What the Corsicans did have was a tradition of banditry and vendetta, which until the Napoleonic era had been responsible for thousands of deaths and was etched into the historical and cultural memory of the islanders, particularly those of the more traditional interior. When Corsican nationalism began to reassert itself as a major political force, there was a historical and cultural memory of rebellion, tragic heroes, banditry and vendetta, very similar to that of Sicily, present in Corsican history on which to draw.

Origins (1950-1968)

History

In Corsica political forces began to move as social and economic factors combined to produce political discontent. The clan system had pursued its own interests contributed to the weakening of the Corsican economy and caused the French system of governance to be seen as distant and with no moral authority. Clan and kinship prevailed and to contest it was seen as non-conformist and contrary to the interests of Corsican society¹⁷. The clan system had acted as a mediator between Corsica and distant France for generations:

‘There was, then, a symbiotic relationship between the clan and the central government. The central government needed the clan in order to effectively govern the island, and was prepared to turn a blind eye to its abuses. This was in part a reflection of the difficulties posed by Corsican social organization and social violence....It was also, in part, a symptom of a policy of disengagement: Corsica did not have enough votes or resources to make it worth the bother.’¹⁸

Corsicans, who are naturally suspicious of others, had to accept the corruption, fraud and violence as a customary and normal mode of operation in the social and

¹⁷ Alexandra Jaffe *Ideologies in Action: Language Politics on Corsica* (New York: Mouton de Gruyter:1999).

¹⁸ *Ibid*, p 51.

political system.¹⁹ Corsica's underdevelopment became a major issue, in 1957 the Plan d'Action Regionale (CAR) for Corsica was initiated as part of a wider French project for regional plans and this led to the establishment of two agencies which would put the plan into effect with a dual focus on agriculture and tourism. The first was the responsibility of the Societe de la mise en valeur agricole de la Corse (SOMIVAC), the second the responsibility of the Societe d'Equipement touristique de la Corse (SETCO)²⁰. By the end of the 1960s it seemed that these two elements of the island's planned development were coming to some form of fruition as the tourism industry had expanded and there was more land for farms.²¹ Yet this did not benefit the island as a whole and few Corsicans benefited from the investment.

The main beneficiaries of SETCO were the owners of hotel and campsite developments and the entrepreneurial capital required to invest in the development of hotels came from France. Few of the jobs created went to Corsicans. Likewise, the main beneficiaries of SOMIVAC were outsiders. The redevelopment of Corsica coincided with the independence of Algeria, a nearby event, which not only shook the French nation and brought about the end of the French Fourth Republic. France resettled pied noirs in Corsica who had been compensated by the French government and had the financial capital and motivation to take advantage of the opportunities offered by SOMIVAC. They promptly took a substantial share of the redeveloped farming land. The first of these pied-noirs had links to Corsica but between 1958 and 1964 17,000 resettled in Corsica²², a significant number as the population of the island in 1954 was 150,000.²³ The pied noirs became a focal point for autonomist discontent who argued that they had an advantage over local farmers who could not afford the costs of investment and were emphasising production over quality, thus

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ John Loughlin "Regionalism and ethnic nationalism in France" in: Y Mery & V Wright (eds) (1985) *Centre-Periphery Relations in Western Europe* (London: George Allen & Unwin) pp 207-235.

²¹ Thompson, op cit.

²² Ramsey, op cit.

²³ Carrington, op cit..

undermining the quality of wine, as their industrial methods involved the adding of sugar to wine.²⁴

Dissatisfaction also arose due to internal concerns over the clans. Despite their competition with each other, clans would co-operate to protect a system that was essentially apolitical and maintained political hegemony via clientilism, electoral fraud and the threat of violence. The combination of corruption and economic decline led to the emergence of Corsican nationalism and regionalism in the early 1960s.²⁵ Initially, these took the form of 'local businessmen and politicians who totally rejected any suggestion that Corsica was not 'French'.²⁶ In 1960 the Mouvement du 29 Novembre and Defense des Interets économiques de la Corse (DIECO) were formed but these failed to create mass movements. The more radical Union Corse was founded in the same year by Corsican's studying in Paris and became the Front Regionaliste Corse (FRC) in 1963. The FRC defined Corsica's problems as being due to capitalism and colonialism and were left-wing in their political orientation.²⁷ The Comite d'Etudes et de Defense des Interets de la Corse (CEDIC) was also formed and would found the weekly Corsican newspaper *Arrittu!* (Arise!). An attempt at unity was attempted in 1966 but was unsuccessful. Whilst the FRC refused to engage in elections, which they saw as a sham, CEDIC put forward Max Simeoni as a candidate in the legislative elections as a regionalist. He was unsuccessful and the group subsequently formed themselves into 'l'Action Regionaliste Corse (ARC) and moved from a focus on economic problems to minority issues. The ARC was a stronger organisation in terms of public support than the FRC and would continue to grow in strength over the next ten years.²⁸ At this stage of analysis the voices of discontent came from businessmen and autonomists who were concerned with political, not clandestine, activity.

²⁴ Ramsey, op cit.

²⁵ John Loughlin, 1985, op cit.

²⁶ Ibid, pp 218-219.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ramsey, op cit. For the early development of autonomist and nationalist organisations on Corsica see: Pierre Poggioli *FLNC annes 70* (DCL editions:2006); Xavier Crettiez *La Question Corse* (Editions Complex:1999).

Situation-Attitudes-Behaviour

The situation for Corsicans in the origins stage was one of political, social and economic inequality, which had existed earlier, but had become a greater problem due to the social stresses of underdevelopment and the repatriation of pied-noirs from Algeria. Corsica was politically and socially ill-equipped to absorb immigration equivalent to over eleven percent of the existing population. There were no clandestine organisations operating during this stage, which was dominated by autonomist political action.

The attitudes of the autonomists became more prevalent when they began to see that the beneficiaries of the economic reform programs were outside investors and the capital advantaged pied noirs. This tied in with discontent over the perceived lack of political representation, corruption and electoral fraud. There was no significant consideration of the application of political violence, but there was a commitment to addressing political issues. This did not mobilise minority group support within the population, nor was there any significant questioning of the Corsica being part of France.

The reaction to the problems besetting Corsica was an increase in the political activity of nationalists and autonomists, of which the latter were more influential. This was driven by local businessmen, politicians and students who were in the vanguard of political action, but failed to achieve popular support. The leading autonomist forces by the end of the origins stage were the ARC who moved to tackling minority issues in an attempt to garner greater public support. Young Corsican's continued to seek better opportunities outside of Corsica.

Response

The French response to Corsica's underdevelopment when compared to the mainland was to implement major reform, although it should be noted that there had been reform previously and the regional plan for Corsica was part of a more general project of regional reform within France. The reform targeted two areas of the Corsican economy with the potential for benefits for the island, which would in

turn revitalise the economy, these were agriculture and tourism. Whilst the benefits of SETCO for agriculture and SOMIVAC for tourism were realised in a short timescale, these went largely to outsiders, who had the money to invest. Also, the reform was economic, not political, and this meant that the problems of clientilism and corruption were not addressed. The consequences were that social and political forces were invigorated, nationalist and autonomist, these had been present before, but became more focused.

Pre-escalation (1968-1975)

History

In Corsica the ARC began to engage in direct action from 1968. Prior to this there had been a protest movement but this took the form of meetings, seminars, work with youth organisations and protests that whilst clear indications of widespread discontent were still legal activities. Direct action was illegal enough to provoke a response from the authorities but not damaging or irresponsibly violent and was linked to a popular issue or complaint. As a tactic it was confrontational and led to more publicity for the ARC and the issue involved.²⁹ This was against a background of increasing low level violence. The tipping point for the Corsican Nationalists was the granting of farm land that had been set aside for Corsican farmers to 500 *piéd noir* families in the wake of Algeria's independence in 1962 and violent clandestine groups emerged in the 1960s who bombed *piéd noir* properties and crops.³⁰ In the early 1970s a 'Liberation Committee' claimed responsibility for over a dozen fires and explosions, targeting an administrative building, a French owned hotel and a farm belonging to a *piéd noir*, and so were symbolic, rather than indiscriminate in nature.³¹ In 1973 and 1974 two clandestine groups emerged which would later

²⁹ Ramsey, op cit.

³⁰ Loughlin & Letamendia, op cit.

³¹ Thompson, op cit.

coalesce into the FLNC when the conflict escalated: the Fronte Paisanu Corsu di Liberazione (FPCL) and Ghjustia Paolina (GP).³²

The violence against pied-noir property was but one part of a more general condition of underlying conflict. Development had occurred on the coast whilst the more traditional interior continued to depopulate and stagnate and culturally the interior was indigenous and traditional whereas the coast was diverse and cosmopolitan and the young were emigrating leaving a high proportion of elderly people in a native born population that was two thirds of the total. The most divisive underlying conflict was that economic control rested with outsiders and brought little direct benefit to native born Corsicans.³³ All of these underlying conflicts informed the mindset of the ARC as they began direct action and the nationalist clandestine groups as they began their attacks, but it is the last which was the catalyst for escalation.

The French reaction to the increasing tensions was one of increasing engagement and recognition of the discontent on the island. When protests took place over the dumping of waste by an Italian company on the Tuscan coast, which caused pollution on Corsica's north-eastern coast, the French government responded in a limited manner by announcing it would deal with the problem through diplomatic channels. The result was protests, which were put down by riot police and arrests, including that of the ARC leader Edmond Simeoni, resulting in turn in general protests. A minor concession was made to the teaching of the Corsican language, but seen as a short measure as it would be optional on the part of the pupil and the teacher. In response to clandestine violence there was a firm response as the government attempted to show that it would deal strongly with those willing to use violence, undermined by a code of silence, even despite disapproval of actual incidents, and a consequential failure to secure a conviction for any of the more than one hundred explosions that had taken place in 1974. As tensions rose the government despatched a representative, Libert Bou, to Corsica

³² John Loughlin & Farimah Daftary *Insular Regions and European Integration: Corsica and the Aland Islands Compared* (ECMI Report 5: November 1999).

³³ *Ibid*, p 267.

in an attempt to resolve the island's political problems from within. Bou met with consulted with local individuals and groups, and set up working parties, in order to develop a Charter of development. However, his work was undermined by the fact that the constitution was strictly off-limits and would not be changed.³⁴

Situation-Attitudes-Behaviour

The ARC and the clandestine groups were the primary transformative actors of the situation in the pre-escalation stage as they adopted new tactics towards their social, economic and political grievances. The divisions between the developed exterior and the depopulating traditional interior, with the benefits of the earlier CAR reform continuing to benefit outsiders meant that the young continued to leave the island. This threatened Corsican culture and language, alongside existing concerns over economic status and underdevelopment.

The actions of the ARC and clandestine groups indicate action-orientation was present as a psychological trait but they were certainly not radicalised or morally disengaged towards those affected by their actions. The fact that there was organised, if small, clandestine groups meant that riskier actions such as bombing could be undertaken.

More direct behaviour was applied by the autonomist and nationalist protagonists during the escalation stage. This was of two distinct types. The first was the 'direct action' of the ARC, which was illegal and political in nature, and so provocative, and due to being non-violent was the communication of discontent to both political forces and the Corsican people. The second was the emergence and escalation of actions by violent clandestine groups against French and pied noir properties but this has to be placed in the Corsican context. The small clandestine groups were intimidating but not lethal and more reflective of the Corsican traditions of rebellion and banditry than terrorism and it is of note that the targets were symbolic of the grievances that they had.

³⁴ Ramsey, op cit.

Response

The French response was a mixture of coercion, conciliation and limited reform. The activities of the clandestine groups and protests of the ARC were subject to a police response, the ARC were engaged by Libert Bou who was careful to rule out political change, and minor attempts at economic reform continued. None of these dealt with the increasing political problems on Corsica and political reform, which would have tackled the problem of the discontent with the political dominance of the clans, was absent.

Escalation (1975-1982)

Within the Action Regionaliste Corse (ARC) there had been calls for direct action and in 1975 twenty men with hunting guns undertook to occupy a *piéd noir* property in Aleria for a period of three days. They believed that the authorities would sit out what was a largely symbolic protest intended to be concluded by a large political meeting questioning the fraudulent practice of repatriation. It was not unusual for men to carry arms openly in a land which had been so intimately linked with the concept and practice of the vendetta. On the second day of the protest a contingent of twelve hundred riot police arrived with back up from armoured personnel carriers and helicopters. In the ensuing shoot out two of the riot police were killed and an ARC member injured before they surrendered. Despite the fact that two policemen were killed, it was the over handedness of the reaction by the authorities which was remembered and protests by Corsicans and violence by nationalist groups escalated.³⁵ The French government swung between statements insensitive to the Corsican senses and a conciliatory air. Their action against the ARC was severe: the organisation was first banned, ten members were arrested to be put before the State Security Court and, finally, the organisation was dissolved. Its replacement organisation, the Associu di i Patrioti Corsi (APC) moved back from the ARC's stance on direct action. The trial of the ARC leader, Edmund Simeoni, and eight others, resulted in Simeoni's conviction of having indirectly caused the deaths

³⁵ Ramsey, op cit; Crettiez, op cit.

of the gendarmes and subsequent imprisonment. On his release from prison in 1976 he denounced the use of violence. In 1976 the APC became the Union di u Populu Corse (UPC). As the autonomists moved more towards non-violence many younger members left to join nationalist organisations.³⁶

During 1974, amid the increasing tensions, the first drafts of Libert Bou's Charter were ready, having three main sections covering a fairer, more balanced economy, development (specifically: training, the environment and preserving Corsican culture), and a schedule of eleven essential capital projects. The Charter was put before a government committee, who changed its title from a 'Charter' to a 'Programme', before reversing the decision. As a consequence the impact of the document was reduced, largely because Corsica had experienced 'programmes' before, which had failed to deliver.³⁷

In the wake of the Aleria incident the incumbent President, Giscard d'Estaing, instructed the Prime Minister, Jacques Chirac, to deal with four problems relating to Corsica. These were: territorial continuity, an enquiry into wine production, passing an 'Expansion Fund' to local representatives, and ensuring the fairness of the electoral system. This was followed by a letter from d'Estaing to the Corsican people, in which he identified with Corsican's and their concerns, whilst avoiding discussing political solutions. These conciliatory actions, which at least showed Presidential concern, stopped short, as had been the case previously, of any move towards regionalisation.³⁸

The FLNC, a merger of FPCL and GP, became the predominant terrorist group on Corsica in 1976 and initially targeted property relating to the French occupation of Corsica. Amongst many early incidents were the blowing up of a French airliner on the ground at Ajaccio airport, the partial destruction of a holiday village at Cargesse in 1977, and the 1978 attack at the Solenzara airbase. In 1981 the sentencing of FLNC members led to forty-six bombings in a single night.³⁹ The early

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ramsey, op cit.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Edward Moxon-Browne "Terrorism in France" in: J Lodge (ed) *The Threat of Terrorism* (Brighton:Wheatsheaf Books:1988).

FLNC had a third-world view which would later give way to a more strictly nationalist outlook. The Solenzara base was:

'an instrument of under-development imposed on Corsica...Solenzara allows western imperialism to threaten the free and progressive countries of the Mediterranean...a base for intervention and aggression against the Palestinian people in 1967, hand in glove with fascist and bloody regimes in Iran and South Africa who sent their pilots to train at Solenzara... .The Front will continue the political and military struggle which is the only way the Corsican people can throw of colonialism.'⁴⁰

There had also been anti-autonomist violence prior to the foundation of the FLNC but this increased in 1977 when a new group called the Front d'Action Nouvelle Contre l'indépendance et l'Autonomisme (FRANCIA) emerged. The FLNC, having escalated the violence, was caught between a drive by the security forces and the clandestine FRANCIA, but this did not stop the FLNC from carrying out its armed struggle.⁴¹ The organisation had four 'commissions' for military, economic, political and propaganda/international affairs and divided itself into six areas of operations.⁴² The FLNC's first campaign had wavered due to the security response and FRANCIA, but a new campaign began in 1979 and widened targets to include mainland France in an effort to emulate the IRA.⁴³ A hunger strike begun in December 1980 was ended by the forced feeding of prisoners in January 1981. A combination of an autonomist stance against clandestine action and political initiatives by the French government of Giscard d'Estaing was reflected by an increasing gap between the autonomists and nationalists prior to the reforms of 1981.⁴⁴ The campaign by the FLNC continued to escalate into the 1980's with actions by the FLNC occurring at a high and sustained rate and the French security forces, predominantly the Police and CRS, engaged in countering the FLNC. Throughout the 1980's there was significant activity, with between 600-700

⁴⁰ FLNC statement, cited in Moxon-Brown, op cit, p 223.

⁴¹ Ramsey, op cit; Crettiez, op cit.

⁴² Crettiez, op cit.

⁴³ Ramsey, 1983, op cit; Peter Savigear *Corsica: Regional Autonomy or Violence?* (London:Institute for the Study of Conflict:1983) Conflict Studies 149.

⁴⁴ Ramsey, op cit.

explosions yearly in the 1980s.⁴⁵ Two aspects of note are that on Corsica incidents decrease during the summer months as separatists do not wish to drive away tourists, tourism being the chief industry of Corsica, and the prevalence of the 'blue nights' in the modus operandi of the Corsican groups, a non-lethal series of coordinated explosions aimed at causing damage rather than death.⁴⁶

Situation-Attitudes-Behaviour

The early part of the escalation phase was dominated by the precipitating event at Aleria and the heavy handed security response. The ARC action was commensurate with its commitment to illegal, direct action combined with political issues. The security force response demonstrated no understanding of the nuances of what was a protest grounded in the Corsican habitus of allowing openly carrying firearms and tolerating robust action. The action was inherently political in nature and aimed to draw attention to a political issue, after which the incident would likely have come to a peaceful end.

The leadership of the ARC were committed to drawing attention to Corsican causes and were willing to use intimidation and symbolic action to draw a response from the authorities. However, they also demonstrated with the later renunciation of violence that their motivations were political, not military, and what they were seeking was social, economic and political solutions to Corsican issues. When faced with escalating from protest, and in legal terms, criminal actions, to political violence the autonomists favoured political action. The attitude of the existing members of clandestine groups and dissident autonomists was that violence was acceptable, but stopped short of indiscriminate violence against the person.

Once the situation had escalated and the FLNC emerged they engaged in actions which were very symbolic and spectacular, but were careful to ensure that the damage was to property instead of people. They also set a trend whereby the majority of actions were coordinated explosions, which damaged property but

⁴⁵ W Alejandro Sanchez 'Corsica: France's *petite* security problem' *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* Vol 31 Issue 7 (2008) pp 655-664.

⁴⁶ Gary La Free 'Descriptive Analysis of French Terrorism from 1972-1997' Undated internet source. www.tournyolduclos.fr/Publications/Terrorism_France.PDF

were, again, not lethal. Yet, the danger was always there that people might be harmed. The FLNC were highly organised, benefiting from the experiences of GP and the FLCP, and limited their operations during the summer months.

Response

The French response to the Aleria incident was overwhelmingly coercive, first in the role of the security forces, which turned an occupation into a violent siege, secondly in the legal actions taken against the ARC and thirdly in a counter-terrorist drive against the newly formed FLNC. The first, and second, exacerbating the tensions within the autonomists, with the autonomist condemnation of violence rejected by younger members who became involved in the more militant nationalist movements. The division between the autonomists and nationalists became greater: on the one hand, the successor political groups to the ARC, the APC and UPC denounce the use of violence, on the other, the nationalist FLNC is formed. It is at this point that the conflict escalates into major actions by the FLNC and a substantial security response. The escalation originated in the events at Aleria and subsequent crippling of the ARC.

There was also conciliation directed at the Corsican population, which stopped short of political reform as it did not reconcile autonomist demands with the unitary French state. This was both an attempt at demonstrating that Corsican concerns were being heard at the highest level and towards presenting a conciliatory face. Corsica had become a national problem, indicated by the Presidential initiative, and, whilst it did not placate the autonomists, or prevent the emergence of the FLNC, it did appeal to the established politicians and demonstrated to the general population that the highest levels of the French government were listening to their concerns. It should be noted that whilst support for the ARC had increased, this support was far from a majority. Ultimately, conciliation was overshadowed by the noise of the coercive response.

Normalisation (1981-2013)

History

After the events of the escalation of the conflict through FLNC attacks on mainland France the conflict reached the stage of normalisation in the mid 1980s. Nationalists have continued to use violence whilst autonomists have not. The distinction between autonomists and separatists⁴⁷ is an important one as these two groups account for the strongest political movements aside from the main French parties. The autonomists quickly came to reject the use of violence as a means of achieving their aims, whereas the separatists were represented by the FLNC and political parties with varying attitudes towards the use of violence. The most basic distinction is that the autonomists advocated more powers for Corsica along the lines of a regional assembly and the ability to make their own decisions concerning the island and the separatists advocated a complete secession from France and the establishment of the Corsican nation. The two approaches are both nationalist as they focus on the rights of Corsicans as a people and despite the trigger for escalation being related to economic concerns the discontent also took into account matters of history and the inter-related aspects of identity, language and culture.⁴⁸

At the beginning of the 1981 election campaign in France the FLNC declared a short lasting ceasefire to 'see how things developed'. The election of the socialist Francois Mitterand was greeted with delight by Corsica's autonomists who celebrated by firing 'thousands of rounds of ammunition into the air' in the city centres of Bastia and Ajaccio. The new socialist government had a wider concern with separatism related to the French Basque Country, Brittany, Corsica and Guadeloupe, prompting a move towards regionalism and decentralisation with the aim of promoting diversity whilst retaining the concept of the unitary French

⁴⁷ Thierry Dominici *Le Systeme Partisan Nationalitaire Corse Contemporain: Etude d'un Phenomene Politique* (Barcelona:Institut de Ciencies Politiques i Socials:2005).

⁴⁸ Farimah Daftary 'Experimenting with territorial administrative autonomy in Corsica: Exception of pilot region?' *International Journal on Minority and Group Rights* Vol 15, No's 2-3 (2008) pp 273-312; Patrick Hossay 'Recognizing Corsica: The drama of recognition in nationalist mobilisation' *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol 27, No 3 (2004) pp 403-430

state.⁴⁹ The 1982 Special Statute for Corsica recognised the distinct geographical and historical character of Corsica and whilst other regions were allowed a regional council Corsica was granted a regional assembly. However, the special status applied to all on the island, not just Corsicans and the assembly was not to have legislative powers. The administrative competences of the Corsican Assembly gave it a greater remit over regional planning, energy and transport, and education and culture and Corsica was to have two consultative councils on these issues, twice that of the mainland regions.⁵⁰

Mitterrand was re-elected in 1988 and the FLNC declared a truce which lasted until 1990 when the nationalist movement fragmented. The splits occurred as a result of government initiatives and proposed institutional reform on Corsica put forward by the minister of the interior, Pierre Joxe. The FLNC declared that it was willing to cooperate with 'progressive' forces in Corsica, a major departure from its previous stance of armed struggle. A new group calling itself Resistenza emerged in September 1990, committed to armed struggle it began to make its presence felt with acts of sabotage and occupation. In 1990 the FLNC split into two factions, the hardline FLNC-Canal Historique and FLNC-Canal Habituel who suspended military actions in 1991 and this was mirrored by a split in the legal organisation A Cuncolta in 1989.⁵¹ The fracture of political and military nationalism was linked to political developments on Corsica and in France itself. The Corsican Assembly had adopted a resolution in October 1988 'affirming the existence of a living historical community, the Corsican people'.⁵² A new statute for Corsica, passed by the French National Assembly in April 1991 made Corsica a new territorial entity. It still had to work within the confines of the French Constitution but the Joxe statute made further decentralisation possible.⁵³ However, 'the Corsican Assembly still lacked sufficient responsibility and influence', electoral

⁴⁹ Ramsay, *op cit.*

⁵⁰ Daftary, *op cit.*

⁵¹ Bernard Foster "Corsica-Nation, region or something else?" in: M Kelly & Rosemary Boch (eds) (1993) *France: Nations and Regions* (Southampton: University of Southampton) pp 248-259.

⁵² Farimah Daftary "Insular autonomy: A new approach to conflict resolution in Corsica?" in: K Gal (ed) (2002) *Minority Governance in Europe* (Budapest: Open Society Institute) pp 201-244 (p208).

⁵³ *Ibid*,

fraud continued, resulting in the assembly's dissolution in 1998, and there was no improvement in the economy.⁵⁴

There was continuing violence, political and otherwise, with nationalist infighting predominant and peaking in the period 1993-96.⁵⁵ The 1990s would see a propensity for division which led to a large number of competing clandestine groups. The causes of these splits lay in political rivalries and personal disputes which had the consequences of being both lethal and preventing a strong unified front being maintained. Whilst the violence put pressure on the French to acknowledge Corsican demands it also affected the willingness of people to identify with or support Corsican nationalism.⁵⁶

The period 1991 to 2000 was characterised by further splits within the armed groups and internal feuding⁵⁷, although the killing of ex-activists was also related to private activities. Chronologically the larger have been (with the date of formation): the Fronte Ribellu (1995); FLNC of 5 May 1996 (1996); Sampieru (1997); and Armata Corsa (1999), critical of the mafia links of the FLNC.⁵⁸ Many even smaller groups have also emerged, carrying out few attacks and then disappearing. It is likely that these related to personal grievances, feuds and criminal activity, all under the cover of a nationalist agenda. The question of how much of the violence on Corsica is due to the activity of criminal gangs working under the cover of nationalism is a difficult one to answer. Extortion and theft have been a characteristic of the armed struggle as they allow armed groups to finance their struggle.⁵⁹ The links between criminal gangs and political violence become more pronounced in the period after 2000. In December 1999 four groups merged into the Union des Combatants. These were: the FLNC-historique, Fronte Ribellu, the FLNC-1996 and their successor group Clandestinu. Sampieru announced its own

⁵⁴ Daftary, 2008, op cit, p 290.

⁵⁵ Daftary, 2002, op cit.

⁵⁶ Hossay, op cit, p 426.

⁵⁷ Loughlin & Letamendia, op cit; Loughlin & Daftary, op cit.

⁵⁸ Sourced from:

<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?search=Corsica&sa.x=27&sa.y=6> (Global Terrorism Database) and genealogical trees in: Dominci, op cit, pp 42-45; Foster, op cit, p 251; Loughlin & Daftary, op cit, pp 57-59.

⁵⁹ Sanchez, op cit.

dissolution in 1998 due to the 'megalomania' of its leaders and condemned any attack that might take place against 'certain representatives' of the French state'.⁶⁰

In February 1998 the French prefect, Claude Erignac, was assassinated and suspicion fell on the FLNC-historique who had recently ended a seven month truce⁶¹, although their political wing condemned the killing⁶², but the dissolved Sampieru claimed responsibility and provided the manufacturers reference numbers for the handgun used in the assassination.⁶³ The French reaction was an immediate crackdown by the police and gendarmerie: arrests were swift and frequent and some raids targeted known criminals and nationalist dissidents.⁶⁴ There was also a public backlash against violence in the form of protest marches by tens of thousands of people in Ajaccio and Bastia, which were organised by women's groups opposed to political and criminal violence on Corsica.⁶⁵ It was a significant event: having mobilised a large number of the island's population into protest and a scathing indictment of violence for a population given to a code of silence. The anti-violence movement *Manifeste pour la vie* had been founded in 1996:

'Its founders argued that everyone, including ordinary people and politicians, had a role in perpetuating the culture of violence, silence, and lawlessness that pervaded the island because they failed firmly to reject nationalist and other forms of violence and accepted at face value exclusionary, individualistic understandings of Corsican identity. The state also contributed by failing to enforce the law equally and

⁶⁰ The Economist Online, Feb 12th 1998 *Corsica: It goes on*
http://www.economist.com/node/113649?story_id=E1_TTPGQJ accessed 17/07/11 19:30.

⁶¹ Ibid; BBC News Online, Feb 7th 1998 *Corsica's top official killed*
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/54319.stm> accessed 28/08/11 20:18.

⁶² BBC News Online, Feb 9th 1998 (1) *Mystery surrounds Corsica slaying*
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/54808.stm> accessed 28/08/11 20:10.

⁶³ BBC News Online, Feb 9th 1998 (2) *Mystery nationalist group claims Corsica killing*
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/54923.stm> accessed 28/08/11 20:08.

⁶⁴ Ibid; The Economist, Feb 12th 1998, op cit.

⁶⁵ BBC News Online, Feb 11th 1998 *Thousands protest about Corsica violence*
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/55759.stm> accessed 28/08/11 20:05; The Economist, Feb 12th 1998, op cit. The correct number is difficult to establish as it was reported as 60,000 and the organisers claimed 40,000.

dispassionately, by negotiating with violent nationalists, and by supporting a non-transparent culture of public policymaking on the island.’⁶⁶

Whilst the French had reacted with a strong security response in the longer term the political nature of the Corsican conflict was pushed into the forefront of national politics. Prime Minister Lionel Jospin announced that there would be public and inclusive negotiations with nationalist groups, a major change in the attitude of France to Corsica. Previously, secret negotiations had taken place with separatists and government reports had deemed these a failure: the new negotiations would be public and include Corsican political parties.⁶⁷ In December 1999 four of the armed groups announced a ceasefire and said that if their demands were met they would hand in their weapons.⁶⁸ The fact that the rump of armed Corsican nationalism declared a ceasefire on the basis of the progress of the negotiations reflected the close links with their political wings.

In response to the murder of Erignac the French had appointed a new prefect, Claude Bonnet, who was tasked with cracking down on the violence on Corsica. The report by the French enquiry on Corsica commissioned after the murder of Erignac was damning: the island was deemed to be rife with corruption, tax fraud and the mismanagement of European Union funds. Despite having only 0.5% of the French population the island accounted for over half of the total of violent attacks within France and the island was described as being in a ‘pre-mafia’ state of lawlessness amid which criminal gangs and nationalists operated with impunity.⁶⁹ Bonnet’s appointment produced swift results, reducing bomb attacks

⁶⁶ Susan J Henders *Territoriality, Asymmetry, and Autonomy: Catalonia, Corsica, Hong Kong and Tibet* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan: 2010).

⁶⁷ Anastasia Filippidou ‘Negotiating tactics in low intensity conflicts: The cases of Northern Ireland, the Basque Country and Corsica’ *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* Vol 7, No 3 (2007) pp 94-108.

⁶⁸ BBC News Online, 23rd Dec 1999 *Corsican separatists declare ceasefire* <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/576330.stm> accessed 28/08/11 18:47; The Guardian Online, 24th Dec 1999 *Terror groups call ceasefire* <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/1999/dec/24/2?INTCMP=SRCH> accessed 03/05/11 19:05. The groups did not include Armata Corsa who were fiercely opposed to the ceasefire.

⁶⁹ BBC News Online, 3rd Mar 1998 *French parliament sets up Corsica enquiry* <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/61853.stm> accessed 28/08/11 20:04; BBC News Online, Sep 10th 1998 (1) *Unpunished reign of crime* <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/168486.stm> accessed 28/08/11 19:56; BBC News Online, Sep 10th 1998 (2) *Corsica damned as haven of lawlessness* <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/168861.stm> accessed 28/08/11 19:5. See

from hundreds to a relatively low ninety-six. Moreover, illegally built holiday homes and restaurants had been torn down and corruption and fraud tackled.⁷⁰ The success was undermined in March and May of 1999 when Bonnet was discredited in a scandal after an elite squad of the gendarmerie had burnt down an illegally built restaurant and one of the men confessed and implicated their commander and Bonnet.⁷¹ It was a major setback but Jospin continued to push through the negotiations with Corsican politicians.

The Matignon Process began on 13th December 1999 and lasted through to the 20th July 2000 and culminated in the 'Matignon Proposals which were 'approved by the overwhelming majority of the Corsican Assembly'.⁷² In terms of its acceptance by the legally recognised political sphere of Corsican politics it was an unarguable success:

'The 'Jospin Method' of open and transparent talks facilitated the reaching of an agreement. It also signified that there would be no more secret dealings with clandestine groups. Jospin also stressed the need for the Corsican side to reach a consensus before the approaching the government. The high-level meetings in Paris and the intense debates of the Assembly testified to a political will on both sides to find a solution to the 'Corsican Question'. Nationalists, *e.g.*, placed on hold demands for the recognition of the 'Corsican People' and an amnesty for 'political prisoners'. The broader nationalist movement backed the talks while also using violence (or the threat of it). This led to criticisms that the government was being blackmailed, even though some of the attacks were claimed by groups seeking to derail the Matignon Process.⁷³

also: Jean-Louis Briquet "Drift into mafiadom?: Political violence and criminality in the Corsican nationalist movement" in: J-L Briquet & G Favarel-Garrigues (eds) (2010) *Organized Crime and States: The Hidden Face of Politics* (Basingstoke: Macmillan) pp 197-219.

⁷⁰ The Economist Online, 6th May 1999 *Pluprefect*
http://www.economist.com/node/606751?story_id=E1_GDGSVT accessed 17/07/11 19:40.

⁷¹ BBC News Online 3rd May 1999 *Arson arrest rocks Corsica*
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/334507.stm> accessed 28/08/11 19:30; The Economist Online, 6th May 1999, *op cit*; The Guardian Online, May 9th 1999 *Corsican flames engulf ministers in corruption crisis* <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/1999/may/09/theobserver5?INTCMP=SRCH> accessed 03/05/11 19:10.

⁷² Daftary, 2008, *op cit*, p 292.

⁷³ *Ibid*, p 293.

The Matignon Process was enabled by the formation of Unita in 1999, an umbrella of nationalist organisations, which the autonomist UPC refused to join on the basis of Unita's ambiguous stance on the use of violence.⁷⁴ External actors' also had an influence on events: The autonomists within the UPC had particularly admired the role played by the SDLP's John Hume in Northern Ireland's Peace Process⁷⁵ and the European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) held a conference which enabled dialogue between Corsicans that was not possible in Corsica. There were rapid and concrete changes in attitudes to negotiation and compromise.⁷⁶ The success of nationalist political parties in elections to the Corsican Assembly in March 1999⁷⁷ and the Aland Island conference was followed by the Fiumorbu Declaration, also in 1999, active involvement in the Matignon Process and aided by the ceasefire declared by armed nationalist groups. The French position can be characterised by Jospin's willingness to engage in public negotiations in Paris and a compromise by the Jospin government as regards a requirement for participants to condemn the use of violence.⁷⁸ The continuation of violence by groups opposed to the process links in with the use of 'spoilers' by groups opposed to a peace process. The majority of bombings that took place around the time of the Matignon Process were carried out by a new group, Armata Corsa, which in 1999 claimed to have 200 members.⁷⁹

The Matignon Proposals were ambiguous in content and were in fact a compromise document resulting from the negotiations that had taken place between Corsican politicians and the French government and limited by the concept of the French unitary state. There is no mention of the Corsican 'people', the 'general aims of the reforms are to take into account the specificity of Corsica within the French Republic based on its insularity and history'.⁸⁰ Much of the proposals are concerned with implementation, however, Corsica was to become

⁷⁴ Ibid, Dominici, op cit.

⁷⁵ Loughlin & Letamendia, op cit. The UPC is a rough equivalent to the SDLP.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid; Luis de Calle & Andre Fazi "Making nationalists out of Frenchmen?: Substate nationalism in Corsica" *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* Vol 16 (2010) pp 397-419.

⁷⁸ Loughlin & Letamendia, op cit; Daftary, 2008, op cit.

⁷⁹ Loughlin & Letamendia, op cit.

⁸⁰ Daftary, 2002, op cit, p 216.

one region instead of two departments, with extended regulatory powers for the Corsican Assembly and the power to adapt national laws. Teaching of the Corsican language would be extended and a fifteen year public investment plan implemented to improve socio-economic conditions.⁸¹

The implementation of the Matignon Process was not carried through to its fullest extent and there were significant developments which impacted on this. The Socialist party was defeated in the 2002 elections and the FLNC-UC withdrew their support for the process, breaking a two year ceasefire. The new French government consulted Corsican representatives on the outlines of a third statute for Corsica and new talks were boycotted by nationalists over arrests. The Matignon Proposals were watered down and revised and the new Statute did not include the power of the Corsican assembly to adapt national laws. A referendum in July 2003 saw a 'no' vote to the new statute returned by Corsicans. After the referendum the Interior Minister, Nicolas Sarkozy, announced that there would be no more talks and further implementation of the Matignon Proposals was abandoned. As a consequence Corsica's political arrangement was merely an amendment of the 1991 Special Statute.⁸²

The early 2000s saw further divisions within the armed nationalist movement. The principal groups were the FLNC-UC, FLNC-1976 and FLNC-October 22nd.⁸³ Armata Corsa had been disbanded after the assassination of two of its leaders, including Jean Michel-Rossi. The attacks have been attributed to the FLNC-historique/FLNC-UC, who at the time were supporters of the Matignon Process⁸⁴ but the killings may also have been by a mafia gang and related to non-nationalist activities. It is not always possible to attribute claims made by the three factions to armed actions as many are simply claimed by the 'FLNC'. The FLNC-1976 refers to the year in which the original FLNC was formed, indicating a commitment to the early goals of the original FLNC. The FLNC-October 22nd has an evolutionary history

⁸¹ Ibid, Daftary, 2008, op cit.

⁸² Daftary, 2008, op cit.

⁸³ Corse Matin (Online), 10th Aug 2009 *Corse Deux membres d'un FLNC unifié revendiquent l'attentat* <http://www.corsematin.com/article/corse/corse-deux-membres-dun-flnc-unifie-revendiquent-lattentat.22732.html> accessed 03.10.12 15:07.

⁸⁴ Daftary, 2008, op cit.

from Resistenza (1990-1997), through the FLNC-May 1996 (1996-1999), Clandestinu (1999) to the October 22nd organisation. Some of these groups were absorbed into the FLNC-UC in 1999 indicating that some members would not have agreed with the FLNC-UC's acceptance of the Matignon Process as the FLNC-October 22nd emerges in 2003 when the FLNC-UC splits.⁸⁵ By the 2000s, the FLNC-habituel and FLNC historique factions are defunct, their successor organisations from the 2003 split having become the dominant groups. In terms of claims to armed actions and media reports the FLNC-1996 is rarely referred to, leaving the FLNC-UC and their FLNC-2nd October as the dominant, competing organisations until 2012.⁸⁶ In 2012, in a six page announcement, a new group came into public existence. It called itself, simply, the FLNC and demanded that a new 'process' be begun and the release of 'prisoners'.⁸⁷ Of the two main groups, it is the FLNC-UC which has proved more willing to engage in ceasefires: a 2003 ceasefire lasted until 2005⁸⁸ but both groups are committed to the use of violence in order to achieve their goals. The only clear difference is that The FLNC-UC is willing to stop operations if it benefits the nationalist movement overall but are not beyond the use of violence to influence political developments.⁸⁹

In recent years the propensity of factionalism within mafia style gangs, criminal organisations and the armed nationalist groups have combined to make Corsica the region of France with the most murders.⁹⁰ The murder of the lawyer

⁸⁵ Corse Matin (Online), 10th Aug 2009, op cit; genealogical trees in: Dominci, op cit, pp 42-45; Foster, op cit, p 251; Loughlin & Daftary, op cit, pp 57-59.

⁸⁶ Corse Matin (Online), 12th Jun 2012 *Le FLNC résumé par le commandant Le Seigle* <http://www.corsematin.com/article/ajaccio/le-flnc-resume-par-le-commandant-le-seigle.679130.html> accessed 03.09.12 12:21.

⁸⁷ Corse Matin (Online), 11th Jul 2012 *Un nouveau FLNC voit le jour dans le maquis de la clandestinité* <http://www.corsematin.com/article/corse/un-nouveau-flnc-voit-le-jour-dans-le-maquis-de-la-clandestinite.706884.html> accessed 03.09.12 11:20.

⁸⁸ The Guardian Online, 28 Aug 2006 *Welcome to your new holiday home. Please beware of the danger of bombs* <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/aug/28/france.travelnews?INTCMP=SRCH> accessed 03/05/11 18:48.

⁸⁹ The website for Unita-Naziunale has online archives concerning clandestine nationalist groups. These sources have been translated and analysed. The FLNC-UC and FLNC 22nd October feature heavily in the post-Matignon period. See: <http://www.unita-naziunale.org/portail/index.htm> First accessed 03/10/11 20:30.

⁹⁰ The Guardian Online, 20th Oct 2012 *On Corsica, the intrigue of crime and politics claims another life* <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/oct/20/corsica-intrigue-crime-politics?INTCMP=SRCH> accessed 22.10.12 10:04.

Antoine Sollacaro who had represented nationalists in the courtroom, including the convicted killer of Claude Erignac, was the fifteenth such 'hit-style' murder on Corsica in 2012.⁹¹ Likewise, the murders of former fighters who had turned to politics can be linked to the conflict.⁹² The police have continued to have successes in arresting and charging nationalists and they have undergone due process in the courts.⁹³ The effect can be seen in the reduction of activities related to nationalism, but not its elimination, the armed groups remained stoically active but were limited in the number of actions which they could carry out. An analysis of the situation in which the murders have escalated is complicated by the undoubted links between criminal violence and political violence. Moreover, the use of extortion and robbery to fund political violence falls within the blurred boundary which denotes crime and political violence and Corsica is rife with it.⁹⁴ A further complication is the confusion between purely criminal and political activity: murders ascribed to nationalists may include disputes over control, personal loyalties, the use of nationalism as a cover for criminal activity and the settling of scores as the clandestine groups are not the only violent actors on the island.

Situation-Attitudes-Behaviour

The end of the escalation phase marked an end of the FLNC's major actions and the beginning of a prolonged stage of a hurting stalemate, in which the FLNC and successor groups could not be defeated but had no realistic hope of forcing the French to accede to their demands. The FLNC had never entertained the goal of actually defeating the French state, but they did count on the impact of attrition on the targeted groups. As the years of the normalisation stage went on, they, and the

⁹¹ The Guardian Online, 17th Oct 2012 Corsica lawyer Antoine Sollacaro assassinated in Ajaccio <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/oct/17/corsica-lawyer-antoine-sollacaro-assassinated?INTCMP=SRCH> accessed 22.10.12 10:01 ; The Guardian Online, 20th Oct 2012, op cit; France 24, 18th Oct 2012 *Top lawyer shot in ongoing Corsican gang war* <http://www.france24.com/en/20121018-top-lawyer-shot-in-ongoing-corsican-gang-war-organised-crime-nationalism-france> 04.11.12 11:02.

⁹² The Guardian Online, 20th Oct 2012, op cit.

⁹³ The website for Corse Matin has numerous articles covering the court cases of FLNC-UC and FLNC-22nd October members. See <http://www.corsematin.com> for 2012.

⁹⁴ Briquet, 2010, op cit; France 24, 21st Oct 2012 *Mafia image of Corsica 'totally divorced from reality'* <http://www.france24.com/en/20121021-corsica-19th-century-mafia-image-totally-divorced-reality-crime-gangs-france> accessed 04.11.12 11:02 ; Sanchez, 2008, op cit.

successor groups, had increasingly less impact and they saw the political parties grow stronger, whilst at the same time, anti-violence campaigns were gaining strength. Between 1991 and 2013, the divisions between the successor groups reflected the political changes affecting Corsica and the links of some to criminal gangs undermined their cause. They constantly faced the fact that there was far greater support for greater autonomy than there was for independence: voting patterns consistently demonstrated that the majority wanted to improve the lives of Corsicans, but not at the expense of losing the benefits of being a part of France.

The attitudes of the FLNC and the successor groups varied between maintaining a low level of persisting violence and a minority view of the use of lethal violence. The latter proved to be damaging, particularly in the case of the Erignac assassination. Complementing this was a division between calling ceasefires in order to allow political developments, and countering ceasefires through continuing violence. Alongside these, were very different attitudes to involvement in criminal activity, a natural route for members of a clandestine organisation, possibly along the lines of a division between criminal activity for personal gain, and criminal activity for the purpose of funding political violence. The division due to attitudes over these three key issues of the level of violence, politics versus militarism, and criminal gain versus funding, contributed to the divided nature of the clandestine groups.

The behaviour of the FLNC and the successor groups has been one of utilising predominantly low levels of violence with limited lethal violence. When violence has been used outside of intergroup it has been highly communicative in nature and has reflected the attitudes of the respective group to attempts at reform. The FLNC of 1981 was a unified group, able to anticipate the potential of reform and call a ceasefire to see how the situation developed. This was not the case in 1989 when the organisation was divided to the extent that it split into two major groups with smaller factions also breaking away. Analysis of the successor groups becomes more difficult after 1991 as they become more numerous and a period of infighting takes place over personal grievances, feuds, and links to criminal activity. This then gives way to a broader coalition during the period of the Matignon Process, who in

a similar vein to the FLNC of 1981, are willing to call a ceasefire whilst the Process took place, and smaller groups, including Armata Corsa, who used spoiler violence as a tactic. The failure of reforms and ceasefires to meet nationalist demands consistently led to the renewal of violent activity, meaning that there was demonstrable willingness to allow a political solution to be found, but a willingness to revert back to military action once demands were not met.

Response

During the extensive period of 1981 to 2013, the French applied all types of responses, but the greatest impact came from reform.

French security policy has been consistent across governments in continuously pursuing the memberships of clandestine groups and their successes have undoubtedly inhibited the ability of the clandestine groups to maintain cohesion and carry out operations. The coercive element was most visible in the period immediately following the assassination of Prefect Erignac, a crackdown, which brought immediate results, but was undermined by the arrest of his replacement, Prefect Bonnet.

The 1998 escalation of the coercive response was also followed by the negotiations that were part of the Matignon process. These were the first public attempts at negotiation, but it should be emphasised that these negotiations were with elected representatives from the Corsican Assembly, not the clandestine groups. An indirect link came from the nationalist political party, Corsica Nazione, and the choice of talking to the Corsican Assembly meant that all the divisions within Corsican politics were represented and the Centrist's in the Assembly were reassured that the government was not talking to militants. A change in government and the end of the Matignon Process meant that the negotiations eventually came to an end, but they were important to the process beginning and continuing.

The clandestine groups were responsive to all three of the major attempts at reforming the political relationship between the Corsican people and the centralist

French government. Ceasefires were called in all three instances, the first in 1981 anticipated the impact from the election of the Mitterrand government, the second, beginning in 1989 split the FLNC in two, and the third, the Matignon Process, begun in 1999, split the successor groups and also drew the nationalist political parties into discussion and negotiation with other Corsican parties. Overall, the attempts at reform, gave Corsicans more responsibility and recognition, but not autonomy, and so were limited in scope. The principal reason for this is the concept of the indivisible French state, which is intended to guarantee rights to all French citizens and for this to change would require a change in the constitution. The impact on the clandestine groups was that it undermined their already limited minority group support and exacerbated the internal divisions within them. Prior to 1989 there had only been one FLNC, by the end of the normalisation stage the internal divisions between and within factions had contributed to a significant decline in numbers. Most of the attacks in the years between 1998 and 2002, including the Erignac assassination and during the Matignon Process, were carried out by smaller splinter groups who later disbanded. When the Matignon Process came to an end, the attacks increased and the newest FLNC factions coalesced and continued with their low level violence.

Permanent ceasefire (2014-2015)

Corsica does not pass through the de-escalation stage in this analysis and it is not predetermined in the framework of analysis that a conflict will do so. In fact, the preferable trajectory is that the conflict is resolved in the origins stage, prior to the emergence of challenger organisations (conflict prevention), or in the pre-escalation stage, whereby a challenger group has emerged but government intervention has rendered the cause irrelevant (conflict transformation, or resolution). Due to the persistently low level of violence, which is the modus operandi of Corsican groups, and their divisive nature in relation to government initiatives, the willingness by one to call ceasefires is offset by other groups continuing.

On the 25th of June 2014 the FLNC announced that they had put down their weapons and were giving up armed struggle and rejected any further use of violence:

'[O]ur organisation has decided unilaterally to initiate a process of demilitarization and gradually come out of hiding. In this instance, since the publication of our press release, we reject in advance any paternity of military action on Corsican and French territory.'⁹⁵

The FLNC also stated their future direction:

'It is not the end of history. On the contrary, by this action today we want to offer new perspectives to our march towards sovereignty...It is time to move to a new phase, that of building a political force to govern Corsica and lead to independence.'⁹⁶

The press release also cites the reasons for the decision to abandon armed struggle, coming from the adoption of three major separatist demands by the Corsican Assembly in 2013. These were: the consideration of Corsican as a co-official language with French; a move to increasing administrative autonomy via a reference in the French constitution; and, the most influential according to the FLNC statement, a vote that in order to buy property the buyer must have had a permanent five year residency on the island.⁹⁷ The FLNC also stated that there was no preconditions in relation to 'political prisoners'⁹⁸, which can be taken to mean any militants convicted of clandestine activity and political activists convicted of non-violent crimes in relation to the Corsican cause. The status of political prisoners had been a key issue for the newly announced FLNC in 2012, which had argued for a new political process to be begun.

⁹⁵ Cited in: France 3tv (online) 25th Jun 2014 *Corse: le FLNC dépose les armes* <http://france3-regions.francetvinfo.fr/corse/2014/06/25/corse-le-flnc-depose-les-armes-506193.html> accessed 13.04.15 20:04.

⁹⁶ Cited in: Le Monde (online) 26th Jun 2014 *Corse : le FLNC annonce qu'il dépose les armes* http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2014/06/25/corse-le-flnc-annonce-qu-il-depose-les-armes_4445252_3224.html accessed 13.04.15 19:54.

⁹⁷ New York Times (online) 04th Aug 2014 *Corsica's Separatist Retreat* http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/05/opinion/corsicas-separatist-retreat.html?_r=0 accessed 13.04.15 19:49.

⁹⁸ The Independent (online) 27th Jun 2014 *Corsican terror group lays down arms in battle for independence from France* <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/corsican-terror-group-lays-down-arms-in-battle-for-independence-from-france-9569569.html#> accessed 13.04.15 19:46.

The declaration by the FLNC of an end to armed struggle and commitment to purely political action, one without preconditions, and made on the basis of developments in Corsican politics indicates that armed struggle is at an end. However, such an interpretation must be treated with necessary caution, for three reasons. The first is that ceasefires have been called before, and then later broken, and the current permanent ceasefire is a very recent development and only the passage of time will confirm if it will remain so. The second is the divisive nature of the clandestine groups on Corsica, as a declaration of a ceasefire by a major group does not guarantee that smaller groups will not emerge. The third is the blurred line between criminal violence and political violence. As noted above in the normalisation stage, the clandestine groups are not the only violent actors on the island and the links between criminal activity and clandestine activity are as pervasive as those between the clandestine groups and political activists.

The declaration of an end to armed struggle by the FLNC was met by little fanfare when compared to that of the PIRA in 1998 and ETA in 2011, despite it marking the end of the last ethno/nationalist-separatist terrorist group in Europe. This is no doubt due to the far greater lethality of the Northern Irish and Basque Country cases, in which, respectively, the PIRA and ETA, were the dominant and most lethal challengers to the state. The vast majority of actions by the Corsican clandestine groups have been non-lethal, involving damage to property, and care has been taken to avoid damaging the tourist industry. The factors indicating that the ceasefire will hold are firstly, that this is the first time the FLNC, or a successor group, has declared an end to armed struggle, and secondly, that there has been progress by the nationalist parties within Corsican politics. These are concrete facts, made clear in the FLNC statement.

The estimated membership of the FLNC is small, numbering approximately fifty people in 2012⁹⁹, but the commitment of Corsicans to nationalist and autonomist political parties and organisations is strong, giving them the all

⁹⁹ Institute for the Study of Violent Groups: National Liberation Front of Corsica
http://vkb.isvg.org/Wiki/Groups/National_Liberation_Front_of_Corsica accessed 28.04.12 13:48

important alternative to violence.¹⁰⁰ The Corsican tolerance of violence does not mean the acceptance of violence, and this has an impact on the clandestine groups, with their claim to represent the Corsican people. The everyday Corsican has had enough of the violence¹⁰¹ and when this happens a backlash occurs as the tolerance limits of the population towards terrorist violence, including the predominantly low-level of that of the Corsican groups, is exceeded.¹⁰² The most dramatic was the protests after the killing of Prefect Erignac.¹⁰³ The clandestine groups, as political actors, are responsive to their political environment have strong links to nationalist parties who are able to compete in elections. The FLNC statement drew on the experiences of Northern Ireland and the Basque Country (without directly naming the 'brotherly movements' of the PIRA and ETA), and the Scottish and Catalan referendums, indicating an acceptance that nationalist agendas can be pursued by non-violent political means.¹⁰⁴

A second problem is the divisions since 1991 within the clandestine groups as despite the positive responses to political change and reforms a splinter group or groups have always been present, carrying out spoiler violence, an example being Armata Corsa during the Matignon Process.¹⁰⁵ On the 14th September 2014 a Club Med resort at Cargesse was damaged by a bomb attack, which took place in the early hours of the morning but did not cause any casualties as it was unoccupied at the time. There was no claim made for the attack.¹⁰⁶ Such an attack is characteristic

¹⁰⁰ Calle & Fazi, op cit.

¹⁰¹ Henders, op cit.

¹⁰² For backlash see: Martha Crenshaw (2005) "Pathways out of terrorism: A conceptual framework" in D.R. Kaarthykeyan (ed) *Pathways out of Terrorism and Insurgency: The Dynamics of Terrorist Violence and Peace Processes* (New Dawn Press Inc:Elgin:2005) pp 3-11; Ted Robert Gurr "Terrorism in democracy: Its social and political bases" in Walter Reich (ed) *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, theologies, states of mind* (Woodrow Wilson Center Press: Washington DC:1998) pp 86-102.

¹⁰³ BBC News Online, Feb 11th 1998, op cit. BBC News Online, Feb 11th 1998 *Thousands protest about Corsica violence* <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/55759.stm> accessed 28.08.11 20:05

¹⁰⁴ Nationalia (online) 26th June 2014 *Corsica's FLNC gives up armed struggle amid "stage of political conquest" by "brotherly movements"* <http://www.nationalia.info/en/news/1915> accessed 13.04.15. The Catalan referendum did not actually take place and the Scottish referendum returned a 'no' vote.

¹⁰⁵ Loughlin & Letamendia, op cit.

¹⁰⁶ Corse Matin (online) 14th Sep 2014 *Corse: attentat contre la discothèque du Club Méditerranée Cargèse* <http://www.corsematin.com/article/france/corse-attentat-contre-la-discotheque-du-club-mediterranee-cargese.1520346.html> accessed 16.04.15 18:22.

of the FLNC and observers on the island have noted that other factions coexist and the bombing was in a political context.¹⁰⁷ The potential for a continuation of violence remains, but it should be noted that this is the only such attack to have come to light, and the FLNC had explicitly denounced the use of violence. As no claim has been made the reasons for the bombing are not conclusively for nationalist reasons. *Corse Matin* cites a total of 10,500 bombings on Corsica since 1976, of which, 4,700 were not claimed¹⁰⁸, and it should be noted that some actions may have taken place for reasons other than a nationalist political agenda.

A major problem is the blurred boundary between political violence and criminal activity, posing a unique and complex problem for the analyst in that the distinction between criminal activity by mafia style gangs, internecine violence by clandestine groups, personal grievances and attacks by clandestine groups overlap.¹⁰⁹ Historically, the clandestine groups have funded themselves through the usual channels of extortion, armed robbery, arms and drug trafficking, and the misappropriation of government funds¹¹⁰, activities which undoubtedly lead to both competition and collusion with criminal organisations. In 2012 the overall violence on Corsica combined to make the island the region of France with the most murders.¹¹¹ This points to other problems than the ethno-nationalist/separatists, which need to be resolved, but these are distinctly criminal issues, as opposed to the separatist violence of the FLNC. For the analyst of terrorism, one means of identifying if terrorism has in fact come to an end is to distinguish clearly between political violence and criminal action for financial gain. The only true indicator that political violence has ended is an end to actions against French owned properties, politicians, the police, lawyers and public figures.

¹⁰⁷ *Corse Matin* (online) 14th Sep 2014 Un village du Club Med visé par un attentat à Cargèse en Corse-du-Sud <http://www.corsematin.com/article/ajaccio/un-village-du-club-med-vise-par-un-attentat-a-cargese-en-corse-du-sud.1520112.html> accessed 16.04.15 18:25.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁹ Briquet, *op cit*; Sanchez, 2008, *op cit*; *The Guardian Online*, 20th Oct 2012, *op cit*.

¹¹⁰ Crime and Justice International (2006) 'In Focus Corsica: A French Playground and One of Europe's Oldest Terrorist Problems' *Crime and Justice International* Vol 22, No 90, p 43.

¹¹¹ *The Guardian Online*, 20th Oct 2012 *On Corsica, the intrigue of crime and politics claims another life* <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/oct/20/corsica-intrigue-crime-politics?INTCMP=SRCH> accessed 22.10.12 10:04.

Situation-Attitudes-Behaviour

The FLNC's situation in the permanent ceasefire stage is close to that at the end of the normalisation stage. They had a dwindled membership who was subject to continuing pressure from the police and were being brought before the courts in major trials. They were also witnessing a stronger approach from within the Corsican Assembly towards arguing for key demands regarding issues that had mobilised dissent in their founding years.

The major change in the attitudes of the FLNC, and this bears a close resemblance to that of ETA in 2011, was in the willingness to abandon armed struggle without any concession. The FLNC has stated that they want to pursue a non-violent struggle, building on what has gone before, and has also stated that they see critical demands being pursued within the Corsican Assembly. A key factor in enabling the decision was the emergence of a single, dominant, FLNC faction during the normalisation stage, which allowed for a clear commitment to ending armed struggle.

The FLNC's behaviour during the short years of the permanent ceasefire was dominated by the decision to end armed struggle, explicitly stating the reasons for the decision, their future political direction, and the influence of events in the Basque Country, Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Catalonia. Their commitment to the end goal of Corsican independence remains but there has been a move to political activism over the use of violence.

Response

The French approach, after the end of the FLNC's armed struggle, was to continue with the establishment of law and order, typified by the three waves of arrest resulting from clandestine activity. This has included members of Corsica Libera, the FLNC's closest political ally.

The FLNC are unlikely to acknowledge the importance of coercive measures in bringing their conflict to an end, and their stated reasons for ending armed struggle must be subjected to critical evaluation. Yet, it should be observed that the

actions taken by the Corsican Assembly in 2013, so important to the FLNC's exit from violence, came about as a result of reforms which began in 1981 and have progressively, if slowly, enabled greater Corsican representation and expression through political parties of nationalist and autonomist aims. The FLNC successor groups reacted differently to political reforms and proposals by the French, yet there was a trend towards responding positively to attempts at reform, and responding negatively to failure.

Conclusion

The FLNC emerged as a consequence of the French response to the Aleria incident, a result of discontent over concerns about the Corsican economy and culture. The French response to the FLNC and the successor groups included all three of the approaches under analysis. Coercion was evident prior to the emergence of the FLNC, conciliation was the least applied, and reform was utilised prior to the conflicts' escalation and would form a major part of the governments' approach to 'the Corsican Problem'. Overall, the groups were subjected to an unrelenting coercive response, which caused their already small numbers to dwindle. Conciliatory measures proved to be generally unsuccessful. There was limited and unsuccessful direct discussion with the groups, although later talks, which took place with nationalist politicians and representatives, were more successful during the terminated peace process. The French made three separate attempts at political reform, which were initially limited in their success, but overall the reforms have moved the larger clandestine movements in a general direction towards declaring an end to their campaigns. The reforms gave greater responsibilities to the Corsican Assembly and the adoption of nationalist goals by the Assembly was cited by the FLNC as the reason for their ending armed struggle.

Chapter Nine: Comparative Analysis

Introduction

The three case studies have presented the historical accounts of the three conflicts and have applied the framework of analysis to each individually, identifying the role of coercion, conciliation and reform by governments in bringing terrorism to an end. In this chapter the findings are compared. Ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorist groups act as rational actors in response to the situation around them, and in turn influence and transform the situation through the use of violence towards a goal, but will consider the utility of violence towards that goal. The purpose of this analysis is to extract the impact of governmental responses on the armed group and develop conclusions as to how terrorism ends.

Comparative Analysis

The prehistory of a people does not cause conflict, as contemporary events do, but it does *inform* it as it evolves. Each of the cases is unique but there are parallels which can be drawn which impact on historical-cultural memory. All have experienced prolonged and damaging periods of occupation and domination across centuries but have retained their ethnic identity and culture and have persisted in actively resisting the domination of external powers.¹ These three elements of occupation-identity-resistance are potent when combined and can be passed down the generations in oral and written form. When ethnic identity and culture is threatened, or a boot is put through a door, cultural traditions, including those of occupation-identity-resistance, can be called upon. Zulaika's anthropological study of the Basque town of Itziar in terms of myth and metaphor and the impact of

¹ For Northern Ireland see: R.F.Foster *Modern Ireland 1600-1972* (London:Penguin:1988); for the Basque Country see: Cameron J Watson *Basque Nationalism and Political Violence: The Ideological and Intellectual Origins of ETA* (Reno: Centre for Basque Studies:2007); for Corsica see: Dorothy Carrington *Granite Island: A Portrait of Corsica* (London:Penguin:1984).

tragic history and socio-economic change are indicative of the importance of history and culture in informing the actions of individuals in armed groups.²

The territory of a people is an important aspect in the origins of a conflict. As, Voutat argues, although the 'nationalist question' has been tackled by a various social science disciplines, this diversity should not be allowed to hide the fact that 'human societies necessarily occupy space'³ and 'use their territorial location as a foundation for their social identity'.⁴ The historical record demonstrates that in all three cases ethnicity, culture and territory have come under threat, and in the modern era of nations nationalism developed with very different results. Irish nationalism was heavily influenced by the question of equality and reform for Catholics before the Famine brought the question of land to the fore.⁵ The land question and the Famine represent two traumas, which have affected Ireland, and the successful revolt against the British, which resulted in the partition of the Island, brought new problems. The historian Alvin Jackson describes Northern Ireland as a 'compressed version of the story of Ireland in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries'⁶, one 'founded on the defeat of the IRA in the North, and not the firm clay of political consensus.'⁷ The Basques suffered three 'traumas', which significantly affected their culture and politics: the second Carlist war, the Spanish Civil War and Francoist repression, the first of which was followed by the emergence of Basque nationalism.⁸ Corsican nationalism, in contrast to that of the Basques and Irish, developed during a period of intense identification and connection with France. Initially it was due to an opposition between Italian and

² Joseba Zulaika *Basque Violence Metaphor and Sacrament* (Reno:University of Nevada Press:1988).

³ Bernard Voutat (2000) 'Territorial identity in Europe: the political processes of the construction of Identities in Corsica, the Basque Country, Italy, Macedonia and the Swiss Jura' *Contemporary European History* Vol 9, pt 2 (2000) pp 285-294.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Richard English *Irish Freedom; The History of Nationalism in Ireland* (London:Macmillan:2007).

⁶ Alvin Jackson *Ireland 1798-1998* (Oxford:Blackwell:1999), p 335.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Zulaika, op cit.

French cultures and was social and cultural in nature but later socio-economic problems became a concern.⁹

The status of the armed organisations is a reflection of the *habitus* (social structure) in which they live. The IRA was an organisation whose leaders not only had a thorough understanding of Irish nationalism and Republicanism but actual experience of armed struggle, in this case the failed border campaign of 1956-1962, which had failed to generate support from the people it was purported to represent: the Catholics of the North. They had developed a Marxist analysis and had reached the conclusion that their future lay in a socialist approach, which would unite the Catholic and Protestant working classes and became involved in and encouraged the civil rights movement.¹⁰ The *Ekin-EGI* generation which led to ETA were not isolated individuals, they were embedded the *habitus* of a Basque culture, which persisted in the towns and villages of the Basque Country but were influenced by the nationalism of Arana. The limited and sporadic activities of the small Corsican clandestine groups were a reflection of the Southern Italian cultural influence of the interior where personal revenge and vendetta had been historical constants and violence was a normal response to personal grievance.¹¹ Yet, in both Northern Ireland and Corsica there was a belief that social and political action could produce change and it was through social protest and politics that primary actors' such as NICRA and the ARC sought to address their complaints.

The behaviour of Great Britain, Spain and France in the early part of the *pre-escalation* stage was markedly different: France continued with benign neglect as its regional reforms of the 1950s and 1960s continued to have a negative effect¹². In Spain Franco introduced 'States of Exception' and used the National Police and

⁹ Fernand Etorri, described in: Thierry Dominici *Le Systeme Partisan Nationalitaire Corse Contemporain: Etude d'un Phenomene Politique* (Barcelona:Institut de Ciencies Politiques i Socials:2005).

¹⁰ CJM Drake 'The Provisional IRA: A case study' *Terrorism and Political Violence* Vol 16 Issue 3 (1991) pp 401-419; Richard English *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA* (Pan:Basingstoke:2003); Ed Moloney *A Secret History of the IRA* (Penguin:London:2007).

¹¹ Carington, op cit; Ian Thompson *Corsica* (Newton Abbot:David & Charles:1971).

¹² Robert Ramsey *The Corsican Time-Bomb* (Manchester University Press: Manchester:1983).

Civil Guard to counter ETA's train derailment and the workers protests.¹³ The British, faced with a rapidly deteriorating situation in Northern Ireland, took decisive action and deployed the Army, something Franco did not do, and this needs to be placed in context. The British knew that they had to restore order but unlike other countries did not have a 'third force' which was 'trained to deal with such situations as riots, terrorist incidents or insurrections.'¹⁴

For the IRA, and ETA, the developments in the early stages of their conflicts are examples of Gurr's concepts of *radicalisation* due to a failure to achieve social change and *reaction* to the intervention of authorities.¹⁵ ETA's radicalisation had occurred earlier, in the origins stage, but the IRA was an organisation, which had moved, as politically orientated armed groups do¹⁶, into non-violent political action. However, the situation of Catholics, particularly in Londonderry and Belfast, sent newly radicalised volunteers into the IRA ranks at a time when the leadership was still committed to a non-sectarian approach wholly inconsistent with the rank and file who were desperate to fight back. The radicalisation of the FLNC did not occur until the events of Aleria.

In all three cases, precipitating events occurred, which stemmed from the pre-conditions of the previous stages and led to democratic governments facing the 'democratic dilemma' as organised and capable terrorist organisations directly challenged the state. Precipitating events are 'specific events that immediately precede the occurrence of terrorism'.¹⁷ In Northern Ireland the Army was at the centre of two precipitating events, internment and Bloody Sunday, deliberate policy and lethal error, and both were sufficient on their own to escalate the conflict. In the Basque Country the regime was exposed as being fundamentally

¹³ John Sullivan *ETA and Basque Nationalism: The Fight for Euskadi 1890-1986* (London; New York:Routledge:1988).

¹⁴ Grant Wardlaw *Political Terrorism: Theory Tactics and Counter-measures* 2nd edn (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge: 1989) p 98.

¹⁵ Ted Robert Gurr "Terrorism in democracy: Its social and political bases" in: Walter Reich (ed) *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, theologies, states of mind* (Woodrow Wilson Center Press: Washington DC:1998), pp 86-102 (p 87).

¹⁶ Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahur & Arie Perliger *Political Parties and Terrorist Groups* (Routledge: London: 2009).

¹⁷ Martha Crenshaw 'The causes of terrorism' *Comparative Politics* Vol 13, No 4 (1981) pp 379-399 (p 390).

weak: the Burgos trial had the contradictory effect of increasing support for ETA and undermining the regime. Despite continuing repression the two wings of ETA recruited and ETA-V were able to increase their attacks. In Corsica the French became more directly involved when they over-reacted to the ARC's Aleria occupation, first by using overwhelming force, second by banning an organisation that was careful in its application of 'direct action', which was sometimes illegal but not deliberately dangerous.¹⁸ There had been problems before, but internment and Bloody Sunday, Burgos, and Aleria radicalised people who had not been involved with the armed groups before. The numbers who went into the ranks of the IRA, ETA, and FLNC represented a minority within their populations, but they were a minority of significant size.

The path to ethno-nationalist /separatist terrorism involved a complex fusion of competing and incompatible ideologies (theory) competing with changing realities (situation). The IRA, informed by Catholic Irish nationalism, which embraced parliamentary politics and liberalism but was divided over abstentionism, had adopted a strict Marxist analysis before the traditionalists broke away when faced with the situation of sectarian violence, cementing the division between the moderate but nationalistic side of Irish nationalism (NICRA and the SDLP) and the proponents of armed struggle (the IRA, then PIRA).¹⁹ ETA's is the most complex of the three cases with mass action and political activism competing with elitist clandestine action and armed struggle throughout a long evolution leading up to the ETA-m and ETA-pm split as communist and socialist tendencies leave the organisation or are forced out. In Corsica, autonomists and nationalists were influenced by anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism as they addressed the economic problems facing Corsica, and when the FLNC was formed it espoused a third world view, before giving way to nationalism as a dominant doctrine.²⁰ At the end of the *escalation* stage the separation was complete and nationalist forces represented by the SDLP, EE and UPC represented social movements and the PIRA,

¹⁸ Ramsey, op cit; Xavier Crettiez *La Question Corse* (Editions Complexe:1999).

¹⁹ English, 2007, op cit.

²⁰ Edward Moxon-Browne "Terrorism in France" in: J Lodge (ed) *The Threat of Terrorism* (Brighton:Wheatsheaf Books:1988).

ETA, and FLNC had become social anti-movements, the first highly theoretical, in the second the dimensions of identity, opposition and totality become fused: commitment to the cause, attack the enemy and destroy the existing order.²¹

A critical change is that in their respective periods of *escalation* each group becomes dominated by the dual tendencies of nationalist-separatism and armed struggle with secession the aim and terrorism the method. By 1974 the PIRA had superseded the OIRA, by 1983 ETA-m was the sole bearer of the ETA name, and by 1982 the FLNC was attacking predominantly French targets. They had all become ethno-nationalist/separatist organisations where the military elements took precedent over the political and left political representation to linked political parties: Sinn Fein, HB and CCN/MCA. Yet, as they evolved they always faced competition from non-violent political parties: in Northern Ireland NICRA and the SDLP consistently gained the support of Catholics, during the last years of the Franco regime non-violent actors remained in the majority, and in Corsica autonomist and nationalist parties were predominant. Even at the most provocative of times during the escalation stage non-violent actors were at the forefront. Terrorism is not a predetermined outcome of social discontent and coercive state response but it is from this that the PIRA, ETA and FLNC emerged as the groups they were and the historical account from *Historical Precedents to Escalation* is the story of how they got there.

At the heart of all three cases is a fundamental lack of political representation, an inequality of status, of which parties in all three cases become aware, and this is important as genuine democratic governance is a form of conflict management. The Basque case is clearest, a dictatorship, which crushed any form of opposition through repression and violence, the coercive extreme of the coercion-conciliation scale. Liberal democratic Spain inherited the problems that the Franco regime had created, but in the early stages of the transition, the activities of the unreformed security forces and toleration of the illegal activities of the GAL undermined the immediate benefits of the transition. For Northern Ireland and Corsica, the benefits of being part of two of the worlds founding democracies

²¹ Michel Wieviorka *The Making of Terrorism* (University of Chicago Press:London:1993).

were mitigated by the Unionist dominance of the regional Stormont government and the dominance of the clans in Corsica. Nominally, there was political representation, but in reality fundamentally flawed democracy and neither were suited to dealing with social discontent.

The situation had changed significantly for the PIRA, ETA, and the FLNC as their respective conflicts entered the *normalisation* stage. They had reached the peak of their capabilities, had failed to defeat the state and were in competition with nonviolent political groupings for the hearts and minds of the people they claimed to represent. The political situation in two of the three cases had also changed for the better. Spain was now a stable democracy and France was no longer willing to allow ETA to treat the French Basque Country as a safe haven by the mid 1980s. Also, France had granted special status to Corsica as part of a wider decentralisation in the early 1980s. In the remaining case, the British had also attempted to return political power to Northern Ireland politicians and had brought Ireland into the search for a political solution in the early 1970s. None of this ended the violence but it did demonstrate that there could be change in the political status of the three regions.

The British approach was the most nakedly political, Northern Ireland was seen as a political problem, which required a political solution and defeating the terrorist groups was only one aspect of the British aim to return political responsibility to elected politicians. The difficulty was that it proved impossible to bring politicians from the Nationalist and Unionist sides into government with each other and the sole political success was the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement which acknowledged that Ireland had a 'political role to play in the internal affairs of Northern Ireland'.²² The 'Ulsterisation' approach sought to return Northern Ireland to 'normality' but the reality was far from normal as a militarised RUC patrolled the cities and the Army the countryside and paramilitary organisations from both sides of the divide continued to 'police' their predominantly working class areas of support.

²² Sean Byrne 'Consociational and civic society approaches to peacebuilding in Northern Ireland' *Journal of Peace Research* Vol 38, No 3 (2001) pp 327-352 (p 336).

In the Basque Country, a major reform had already taken place when the Basque Autonomous Community was created and Basques were able to vote for elected representatives. The history of the Basque conflict since the transition is the consolidation of autonomy within the Spanish state and the political isolation of Radical Basque Nationalism. ETA's situation was changed to one of confrontation with the Basque government and security forces.

The French approach was one of political reform, very different from the economic reforms which had contributed to the escalation of the conflict. Violence on Corsica has never reached the proportions of that in Northern Ireland but political crises and nationalist violence has prevented the democratic and economic development of the island.²³ Three attempts at reform have failed to resolve either autonomist or nationalist demands, although the Matignon Proposals were never actually implemented as they ultimately fell afoul of a change in government and the concept of the indivisible French state. However, even the prospect of political reform brought positive responses from the FLNC and the successor groups and led to the demise of those willing to compromise.

In the 1980s Spain attempted conciliatory measures in its approach to ending ETA's campaign of violence, through a second attempt at social reinsertion (1984-1986) and public negotiations between ETA and the PSOE government in Algeria between 1986 and 1989.²⁴ The former produced some success but the failure of the latter resulted in the entrenchment of the conflict between ETA and the state. The reasons for the failure of the talks has been described above but the principal reason was that the two sides were negotiating whilst holding no intention of meeting the others goals. ETA had not modified the goal of Basque independence and had entered the talks as a consequence of counterterrorism from the Basque, French and Spanish security forces (including the illegal GAL dirty war). As talks failed to progress they resorted to bombing as a means of enhancing their position, which the government found unpalatable: the transparent nature of the talks

²³ John Loughlin & Francisco Letamendia 'Lessons for Northern Ireland: Peace in the Basque country and Corsica?' *Irish Studies in International Affairs* Vol 11, (2000) pp147-162.

²⁴ Robert Clark *Negotiating With ETA: Obstacles to Peace in the Basque Country 1975-1988* (Reno:University of Nevada Press:1990).

meant that they were visibly negotiating with an organisation that was employing indiscriminate violence.²⁵ Whilst the talks were failing, more success was achieved in the signing of anti-terrorism pacts between 1987 and 1988, which effectively clarified the division within Basque politics between the supporters of ETA violence and the majority who advocated peaceful democratic change.²⁶ The British also made an abortive second attempt at negotiating with the PIRA, but through secretive back channels and reduced Army activity in response to PIRA ceasefires in 1974 and 1975, but as was the case with ETA in the late 1980's, the PIRA had not given up on their belief that independence could be achieved by force.²⁷ Both ETA and the PIRA were asking for concessions that neither the British and Spanish governments could make as to concede would be to respond to force and be against the wishes of the majority in each region.

The propensity of terrorist groups for internal division as the advocates of armed struggle vie with the advocates of political activity, which had been present in the earlier stages, continued on into the *normalisation* stage. The FLNC had been the dominant group on Corsica until 1990 when internal divisions over how to respond to French attempts at political reform caused a split between the hard-line FLNC-Canal Historique and FLNC-Canal Habitual.²⁸ This was an important point in the history of the Corsica case as it marks a point in which unity is irrevocably lost, infighting ensues, followed by more division to the point that the FLNC is consigned to history. The successor groups were much smaller and more divisive allowing little room for either political thinking or a strategic or tactical change. The trend is interrupted by the formation of the FLNC-UC and announcement of a ceasefire in 1999 in response to the Matignon Process and resumption of violence and more division after it failed. When one group calls a ceasefire another continues and some are very temporary and as likely to be driven by personal grudges under the

²⁵ Ludger Mees *Nationalism, Violence and Democracy* (Basingstoke: Palgrave: 2003); Diego Muro *Ethnicity and Violence: The Case of Radical Basque Nationalism* (New York: Routledge: 2008).

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Andrew Mumford 'Covert peacemaking: Clandestine negotiations and backchannels with the Provisional IRA during the early 'Troubles', 1972-76' *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* Vol 39, No 34 (2011) pp 635-648.

²⁸ Foster, op cit.

cover of nationalist violence as they are to be actually committed to a cause.²⁹ Division was also present in Northern Ireland and in 1974 centred again round the OIRA and the question of using armed struggle, leading to the emergence of the INLA.³⁰ The PIRA remained united until the 1986 debate in Sinn Fein over taking up of seats in the Irish parliament. The breakaway group from this was small and did not result in violence at the level of that in 1969 and 1974 but, it did lead to the creation of the CIRA.³¹

Terrorist organisations are far from unified internally and in the case of the ethno-nationalist/separatist groups they are inherently political in their motivations as a group. The difficulty is that clandestine activity in the face of a coercive state response favours the development of the 'in group' self image and encourages activity which reinforces the self image of the in group and consequently their behaviour.³² Behavioural change requires either a reassessment of the end goal or the means by which it is to be achieved. Where armed struggle is the means the change will relate to the method of armed struggle (abandoning larger units and adopting small cells or active service units for example) or the utility of politics over violence. For the latter to happen, a change in perception is needed where the group or individual perceives that violence will not achieve the end goal and that there are non-violent alternatives.

Change in behaviour requires a change in perception and this relies on a re-evaluation of the use of violence at the individual and group level in the face of the dominating ideology of the cause. In the case of the ethno/nationalist separatist group there is a link to the wider ethnic community, whose political rights the self appointed terrorist organisation purports to represent. A change in their political status impacts on the more moderate within the organisation, particularly if there are more opportunities for representation of minority views. Hardliners, those unwilling or unable to modify their political aims or how they are addressed,

²⁹ Based on the analysis of translated declarations by Corsican groups and French and Corsican media reports cited in the Normalisation section for Corsica above.

³⁰ Henry McDonald and Jack Holland *INLA: Deadly Divisions* (Poolbeg:Dublin:2010).

³¹ Jonathan Tonge "They haven't gone away you know'. Irish dissidents and armed struggle' *Terrorism and Political Violence* Vol 16, No 3 (2004) pp 671-693.

³² Albert Bandura "Mechanisms of moral disengagement" in: Reich (ed), op cit, pp 161-191 (p 161).

supported by a corresponding number amongst the minority support group, do not accept compromise: they will negotiate and talk but will always fall back on their unrealistic goals, which a government cannot meet. The moderates negotiate and talk on the basis of the change in political opportunity and ultimately abandon violence and enter party politics, even retaining unrealistic goals as they do so. The fracturing of the FLNC in 1991 is one example of this, as are the subsequent divisions, but they are all linked to the impact of political reform and announcements by the clandestine organisations support this. The limited success for Spain of the second social reinsertion attempt has its roots in the earlier political reforms, which brought about the demise of ETA-pm and was ended by ETA assassinations, although they may also have reached the limit in terms of prisoners who were willing to renounce the use of violence. For the British there was little visible success, the change in the strategic direction of Republicanism was out of sight and secret, even from the PIRA.

A characteristic of the situation for the terrorist groups during the *normalisation* stage is that in all three cases is that they were locked in a hurting stalemate with the security forces of the state. Despite the inherent weakness of the terrorist groups, who faced the far superior resources of the state, they remained active and able to carry out operations, if of ever declining effectiveness. There was no real prospect that the state could be ground down through wars of attrition, a facile strategic assumption which guided the groups in the normalisation stage and it was in fact the reverse that was true: it was the challenger terrorist organisations which were ground down. The concept of the war of attrition is not evident in the Corsica case in the manner that it was for the PIRA and ETA as the approach of the less lethal Corsican groups was persisting low level violence.³³ The prospects for the FLNC successor groups had always been low as they had limited resources and had varying degrees of commitment, causing splits in response to political reforms. ETA's ability to mount operations had also declined and they had

³³ W Alejandro Sanchez 'Corsica: France's *petite* security problem' *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* Vol 31 Issue 7 (2008) pp 655-664; For ETA and PIRA and wars of attrition see: Ignacio Sanchez-Cuenca 'The Dynamics of nationalist terrorism: ETA and the IRA' *Terrorism and Political Violence* Vol 19 Issue 3 (2007) pp 289-306.

provoked the ire of the public through increasing indiscriminate actions.³⁴ The only organisation capable of inflicting serious harm on the state was the PIRA, whose senior strategists had realised that they could not defeat the state and had observed the potential for political activity through Sinn Fein.³⁵

The *de-escalation* of a terrorist conflict does not mean the violence disappears: a reduction of terrorist events is evident as counter-terrorism impacts on their operational capabilities but the violence becomes more indiscriminate in nature. The flawed logic of terrorism, discussed in the fourth chapter, requires the inadvertent complicity of the state in over-reacting to terrorism and targeting the wider ethnic group the terrorist group represents and ever escalating violence as the group continually fails to achieve its aims.³⁶ The state avoids this by targeting only the terrorist group and inhibiting their ability to organise and carry out attacks. In all three cases presented here the state initially reacted repressively, but reformed their approach and directed counter-terrorism at the groups themselves. In order to achieve its goals the terrorist group, through the logic inherent in the strategy of terrorism has to escalate its activities in response to failure. The alternative is more difficult to accept: end the campaign and move to party politics.

At the highest levels of the PIRA and Sinn Fein the long war was being evaluated and the conclusion was damning: victory was not simply improbable, it was impossible, a romantic ideal at the core of republican thinking completely opposed to reality. The way out was pragmatism, so evident in the history of both Republicanism and Irish nationalism, and the means would be Sinn Fein. The difficulty was that Sinn Fein was isolated from their co-nationalists the SDLP and Irish political parties because of PIRA violence, the SDLP having condemned violence from the onset of the 'troubles' and beaten Sinn Fein for the Catholic vote in every election held since.³⁷ As Gerry Adams sought to convince the SDLP leader John Hume that he was serious about ending the war he also had to convince the

³⁴ Muro, op cit.

³⁵ MLR Smith *Fighting for Ireland? The Military Strategy of the Irish Republican Movement* (Routledge:London:1995).

³⁶ Peter R Neumann and M.L.R Smith *The Strategy of Terrorism* (Routledge:London:2008).

³⁷ English, 2007, op cit.

PIRA leadership, and in turn, the rank and file. The PIRA was losing the war but they were undefeated and they were still recruiting new volunteers and retained experienced leaders who were fully committed to armed struggle.

The fortunes of ETA during the de-escalation stage were markedly different. ETA was a depleted force, its operations curtailed by counter-terrorism from the Basque, French and Spanish security forces and it had provoked the ire of the majority of Basques and Spaniards through its increasingly indiscriminate actions.³⁸ The ETA of the period between 1998 and 2011 was markedly different from the ETA that had assassinated Carrero Blanco and confronted the Franco regime.

A key difference is the continuity in influential leaders, ETA's were subject to continuous change due to arrest and exile, but the future direction of Republicanism was not in the hands of the IRA Army Council, but in those of Martin McGuinness and Gerry Adams and the 'think tank' and crossed the blurred and indistinct line between military and political Republicanism. They were seeking a way by which the PIRA could end its armed struggle without admitting defeat and had to convince both the hardliners in the PIRA, over which they had influence but not control, and the constitutionalist SDLP and the British and Irish governments that this was possible. Secret and public talks, which had also drawn in Unionists and Loyalist paramilitaries came to an impasse resolved when the British and Irish governments made the Downing Street Declaration in 1993.³⁹

The Northern Ireland Peace Process had proved to be a success and was a major influence on ETA and the nationalist parties in 1998 when they signed the Lizarra Agreement in 1998 in the hope of emulating the success in Northern Ireland. The major flaw was that elements of the Northern Ireland Peace Process were transplanted into the conflict in the Basque Country when in fact the conditions were very different.⁴⁰ The two main protagonists, ETA and the PP

³⁸ Muro, op cit.

³⁹ Eamonn Mallie and David McKittrik *The Fight for Peace: The Secret Story Behind the Irish Peace Process* (Heinemann:London:1996).

⁴⁰ This conclusion is on the basis of the historical analysis carried out however it is a theme evident in the comparative literature of the two conflicts. See: Rogelio Alonso 'The modernization in Irish republican thinking towards the utility of violence' *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* Vol 24, no 2

government, had little to talk about: ETA did not want to give up on any of its unrealistic goals and the government still believed that ETA could be defeated. There was no strategic reformulation going on within the ETA leadership akin to that of the PIRA as their leadership was constantly changing and their political wing HB had been dismantled. The PNV was a poor surrogate for HB as it was more analogue to the SDLP, had a historically poor relationship with ETA, and had reached a compromise with ETA in order to end ETA violence, not pursue ETA's goals.

It was not until 2006 when a second peace process began and a new PSOE government took part in multiparty talks and ETA declared a 'permanent unilateral ceasefire'.⁴¹ The influence of the Northern Ireland Peace Process was again evident and the all party talks would include Batasuna (the HB replacement) provided they distanced themselves from ETA violence, which they failed to do. ETA's degeneration had continued, their targets expanded to include anyone who was not 'for' them and they were facing increased condemnation from groups representing the victims of violence. In another nod towards the Peace Process in Northern Ireland they attempted to influence the poor progress of talks by emulating the PIRA and bombing the Barajas Airport car park, after which the PSOE withdrew from negotiations and ETA abandoned their ceasefire. Ultimately, the two short peace processes in the Basque Country case failed because of the intransigence of an ETA in its death throes, unwilling to compromise on unrealistic goals of Basque independence, which were at odds with the majority of voters in the Basque Country, and an absence of an effective political party to represent ETA's aims. HB and Batasuna were poor analogues to Sinn Fein and the coercive dismantling of the radical nationalist movement by respective Spanish governments meant that there was no genuine political path for radical Basque nationalism.

(2001) pp 131-144; Rogelio Alonso *The IRA and Armed Struggle* (Abingdon: Routledge: 2003); Alberto Spektorowski "Evaluating the achievements and flaws of peace initiatives: A comparison of the Basque and Israeli-Palestinian Oslo processes" in: L Sergio Germani & DR Kaarthikeyan (eds) *Pathways out of Terrorism and Insurgency: The Dynamics of Terrorist Violence and Peace Processes* (New Dawn Press Inc:Slough:2005), pp 259-280; and, Cynthia Irvin *Militant Nationalism: Between Movement and Party in Ireland and the Basque Country* (University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis: 1999).

⁴¹ Mees, op cit, 2003; Muro, op cit.

The Northern Ireland Peace Process was not without its own shortcomings: Alonso argues that the victims were overlooked and former paramilitaries have taken up political roles and the self serving rhetoric of a violent group was justified.⁴² According to Dingley, peace could have been achieved at any time simply by the PIRA ending their campaign of terror as they were the main instigators of violence, the 'peace process' being Republican rhetoric and beginning with the weaning of Republicans off violence and entry into talks provided that violence stopped, but without any substantial evidence that they would in the long term; potential for violence remained as the peace process moved forwards. The Belfast Agreement, which resulted from the Good Friday Agreement, was an exercise in 'constructive ambiguity', which was phrased so that it could be read in different ways according to the political view held. Unionists had made the most compromise for peace and Northern Ireland remained segregated and the issues which were present before the Peace Process remain the same.⁴³ An unmistakable brute fact is that Sinn Fein was rehabilitated despite republican violence and, as Dingley notes, Northern Ireland politics is unmistakably polarised.⁴⁴ As it stands, the Northern Ireland Peace Process was an unmistakable success despite its flaws, the cruellest of these being that the victims of the paramilitaries were overlooked in favour of the very people who had been responsible for the perpetuation of the violence.

The Spanish government was in an unenviable position as they attempted to negotiate with ETA, they were being asked to make concessions, which would affect all not only the Basque Autonomous Community but Navarre also, and against the wishes of voters. The government had little that they could offer to placate the demands of an organisation, which had become a terror to Basques, and had been denounced by observers as fascist in nature, a dramatic reversal for an organisation that had emerged under a dictatorship and they had missed the

⁴² Alonso (2009), op cit.

⁴³ James Dingley "Constructive Ambiguity' and the Peace Process in Northern Ireland" in: Germani Kaarthikeyan (eds), op cit, pp 173-200.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

impact of the consolidation of democracy: by the end of the 1980's the reason for the existence of ETA had vanished.

The declaration of a *permanent ceasefire*, which holds and becomes the end of an ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorist campaign, represents the culmination of the stages of the conflict that have preceded it. All three cases have reached this stage. In the cases of Northern Ireland and the Basque Country the final endgame between the challenger group and the state involved terrorist violence, in which the PIRA and ETA attempted to influence the progress of talks by used the only instrument available to them: coercion. Neither government made concessions to violence and penalised its use. In the case of Corsica, the newly reformed FLNC had dwindled as an effective force, its members subject to the constant attention of the French Police. The FLNC and its successor groups had demonstrated a historical flexibility to political events, calling ceasefires to allow political solutions to be explored, and a critical event was the adoption by the Corsican Assembly of three major separatist demands.

The Downing Street Declaration of 1993 had placed the onus on the PIRA as Sinn Fein could not participate in all-party talks whilst PIRA violence continued. Irish involvement, so important in seeking an end to violence throughout the 'troubles', was critical to the peace process. It was cooperation between the UK and Ireland, which finally pushed through the deadlock and the declaration had been endorsed by Nationalists and Unionists, a feat in itself, due to the inclusion of the principles of self-determination and consent.⁴⁵ For Sinn Fein to take seats in a future assembly required a major volte face on the behalf of Republicanism and the British were offering no guarantees except the inclusion of Sinn Fein in said assembly. The historical relationship of independent Ireland with the IRA was one of confrontation and the horror of the 'troubles' meant that the Irish looked to the prospect of unification with trepidation. Despite this, the PIRA was persuaded, even coerced, into declaring an end to its armed struggle by Adams, McGuinness and their

⁴⁵John Bew, Martyn Frampton & Inigo Gurruchaga *Talking to Terrorists* (London:Hurst & Co:2009); Mallie & McKittrik, op cit.

allies, who had reached a conclusion about the utility of armed struggle back in the late 1980s.⁴⁶

The PIRA of 1994 were a very different organisation to the ETA of 1998 who attempted to emulate them and two factors that stand out are a stable and strong leadership and a viable political party, by which the cause could be represented if armed struggle was abandoned. Subsequent lack of progress led them to break the ceasefire, however, it did galvanise the British and Irish governments into resuming all-party talks. The Peace Process continued despite resumed PIRA violence and Sinn Fein's acceptance of the Mitchell principles and flexibility over the decommissioning of arms paved the way for the PIRA's second ceasefire on the 19th July 1997. Continuity was provided by new British and Irish governments after the elections of 1997, which included success for Sinn Fein.⁴⁷ The Mitchell principles provided a frame of reference for all the parties involved and by sticking to these principles and excluding Sinn Fein after the PIRA broke their ceasefire the British again placed the onus on the PIRA as the impeters of peace and demonstrated that the use of violence would not be allowed to dictate the progress of talks. The 1994 ceasefire had caused dissent within Republicanism and a breakaway in 1997 led to the formation of the RIRA. The dissidents, as they became known, sought to derail the Peace Process, but killed themselves off after the Omagh bomb, an atrocity, which they did not intend, but certainly caused.⁴⁸ The PIRA leadership had realised the how harmful such mistakes were to the cause after the 1987 Enniskillen bomb and Omagh was the death knell of a military Republicanism at odds with the will of the electorate in the North and South.

The decline of Radical Basque Nationalism was very different to the strength of Republicanism in Northern Ireland during the Peace Process. The end of ETA's ceasefire in the Basque Country in 2007 was followed by a reinvigorated counter-terrorist approach by France and Spain, which further curtailed ETA's operations; they were still capable of mounting attacks, but their capabilities were severely

⁴⁶ Moloney, 2003, op cit.

⁴⁷ Mallie & McKittrik, op cit.

⁴⁸ John Mooney & Michael O'Toole *Black Operations: The Secret War Against the Real IRA* (Maverick House:Ashbourne:2003).

depleted.⁴⁹ The cooperation between France and Spain was a matter of countering ETA and not political, the question was not of how to address Basque demands for unity and independence (which were little) but how to defeat it.

In time, the secret story behind ETA's abandonment of armed struggle may become clear in the manner that the earlier secret story behind the PIRA abandonment of armed struggle has. Every Spanish government, to the left and right of the political spectrum, has engaged in public and secret negotiations with ETA⁵⁰ and there is no reason to believe that the PSOE government, historically more amenable to negotiation, would not have done so. The public presence of international mediators, including Gerry Adams, Bertie Ahern and Kofi Annan⁵¹ demonstrates that there was at the very least indirect communication. Other international mediators are less well known: Brian Currie, Alex Reid and Julian Hottinger.⁵² Basque political parties have consistently condemned ETA violence since the democratic transition, codified in the pacts of 1987 and 1988 and endorsed negotiated settlement in the 1998 Lizarra Agreement. Hardliners and ETA have in turn consistently condemned and rejected anything that opposes the fantastical goals of an independent Basque nation, despite the lack of interest in this of Navarre.

In one respect ETA has responded to the public demand of Basques and Spaniards to end its violence, which became evident in public protests in the 1990s. An organisation, which is roundly condemned by the very people it claims to represent, is one that has entered a crisis of legitimacy and ETA's response was to lash out as it went into terminal decline. It became an anachronism and the reality is that when it finally chose to declare an end to its armed campaign the cause, for

⁴⁹ Jacques Massey *ETA-Historie Secrete d'une Guerre de Cent Ans* (Flammarion: 2010; The Economist Online, 29th Oct 2011, *The war is over: After 40 years of bloodshed, ETA throws in the towel* <http://www.economist.com/node/21534821> accessed 15/11/11: 20:05.

⁵⁰ Siamak Khatami *Peacemaking in the Basque Country* (AuthorHouse:Bloomington:2013); see also: Anastasia Filippidou 'Negotiating tactics in low intensity conflicts: The cases of Northern Ireland, the Basque Country and Corsica' *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* Vol 7, No 3 (2007) pp 94-108.

⁵¹ BBC News Online, 20th Oct 2011 (2) *Full text: Basque ceasefire declaration* <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-15395157> accessed 15/11/11 20:38.

⁵² Khatami, op cit.

which it fought had died far earlier, when the Basque Autonomous Community came into being and Basque voters were able to elect their representatives. As was the case in the de-escalation stage, Radical Basque Nationalism had difficulty formulating new strategies other than violence as it had been comprehensively dismantled by the Spanish state; Republicanism, historically adaptive but divisive, was able to adapt because of the existence of Sinn Fein as an alternative to the PIRA. Republican aims are as fantastical as that of Basque nationalists in some respects, the likelihood of a united Ireland is low whilst over half of Northern Ireland's population opposes it and Ireland has a starkly revised perspective of the idea of a united Ireland than that prior to 1969.

The situation in the Basque Country at the time of the ETA ceasefire is similar to that of Northern Ireland in 1994 in that an armed group had declared a permanent ceasefire after years of hostility (the differences between the PIRA and ETA notwithstanding) and the onus was now on the Spanish government in particular to heed the lessons of the British in the period between 1994 and 1997. Having made considerable effort to achieve a positive situation and one based on the efforts of others who took substantial political and personal risks, the British were slow to respond to the ceasefire of a paramilitary organisation who had opposed them in bloody and intransigent fashion for over twenty-five years and were willing to end armed struggle for the *prospect* of change and make a major political compromise. ETA is a thoroughly depleted force, but for this to remain so requires movement in the direction of addressing the prisoner question and room for Radical Nationalist political parties to campaign. If this means an increase in voter support for Radical nationalism (by which is meant Basque independence) then it is a price worth risking, if it is an outcome which comes about without violence or intimidation. The political winners in Northern Ireland have proved to be Sinn Fein and the DUP (who were strictly constitutionalist) at the expense of the more moderate SDLP and UUP, the difference is that voters can express their political views without having them attached to violent organisations. This is not guaranteed to happen in the Basque Country, ETA has terrorised the Basque electorate to a degree that has alienated the majority of Basque voters but Spain

has to recognise and accept the possibility. The conflict in Northern Ireland has not been resolved, but it has been transformed, a sectarian divide remains and the conflict is now addressed in a Northern Ireland Assembly and policed by a PSNI manned by the Catholics and Protestants.

Corsica is a more difficult case to analyse as the FLNC's declaration of the end of armed struggle is more recent and at the time of writing less than a year had passed since it took place. Up until the 25th June 2014 the conflict had remained locked at the normalisation stage with the last major ceasefire taking place during the Matignon Process of 1999 to 2002 (The FLNC-UC observed a two year ceasefire from 2003 to 2005 but other groups continued). The armed groups had continued to be active, their leaderships had been brought before the courts, and between 2002 and the 2014 permanent ceasefire the only sign that there had been a change of perspective concerning the conflict was when the newly reformed FLNC demanded the beginning of a new 'process' and the release of political prisoners.

Given that the declaration of armed struggle is so recent, and the propensity of the FLNC to fracture, any conclusions as to the future must be made with caution. As was the case with ETA, there is no public acknowledgement that any negotiations have taken place, although in the past negotiations have involved the elected representatives of nationalist parties. What can be ascertained is that the declaration of the end of armed struggle was definitive and final, unlike any of the ceasefires that had been called before. Moreover, the FLNC's declaration referred both to a specific event, the Corsican Assembly's adoption of some of their aims, and to the cases of Northern Ireland and the Basque Country. This indicates that the same conclusions were drawn as those by the PIRA and ETA: constitutional nationalist politics had a greater contribution to make towards the attainment of nationalist goals than the military instrument, and the latter would hold the former back. The Corsican groups have always been small in comparison to the PIRA and ETA, immediately reactive to the potential of political reform, and demonstrably aware of the impact of armed struggle on the Corsican economy. Whilst there have been questions over the links between militants and crime, the FLNC is an inherently political organisation, one which makes decisions for political reasons.

We now turn to the question of what exactly had been achieved by the PIRA, ETA, and the FLNC as they approached permanent ceasefires in 1997, 2011 and 2014. On the one hand they had brought attention to their causes and inflicted material and financial damage on the state, on the other, their violence had brought them no nearer to achieving their goals as positive change had occurred despite violence and not because of it. In fact, violence had made change harder to come by as their actions made the situation worse, not better. This is particularly the case for the PIRA and ETA. They polarised division, brought down aggressive state responses on their ethnic groups, resorted to ever widening targets and killed and maimed in the pursuit of goals, which they imposed on their ethnic groups and justified in the name of the cause. In their actions there was a major gap between the romantic ideal and the reality. Criticisms of the ETA as eventually fascist and an uncompromising terror to Basques overlook the brutality of the PIRA and the intimidation involved in maintaining its areas of support. Such brutality and willingness to carry out indiscriminate bombings are far more evident in the actions of PIRA than they were in the case of ETA, and the bombings in England in 1974 are just one example. The FLNC were comparatively less brutal, with far less deaths as a consequence of their actions, but their actions impacted on the economic well being of Corsica as investors stayed away. They were certainly discriminate, avoiding the mass civilian casualties associated with Northern Ireland and the Basque Country, but they were dangerous to the French Police and intimidating to property owners. Critics of pragmatic approaches to countering terrorism that include mediation on the basis that it rewards terrorists and legitimises their actions should consider that coercion by the democratic state has its limitations and the primary goal is to end violence: terrorist organisations delegitimize themselves through their actions, becoming anti-movements. Our focus is on conflict transformation, as the ending of a terrorist conflict does not mean the resolution of the underlying conflict, and it is at this point that our subject of analysis ends, resolution is another matter and more elusive.

How Terrorism Ends

There are ten conclusions to be made regarding how ethno-nationalist/ separatist terrorist campaigns have come to an end. The first four conclusions relate directly to the use of coercion, conciliation and reform by governments and their cumulative affect over time. Conclusions five, six, and seven, are a consequence of the first four conclusions: It is the group that ultimately decides to end armed struggle; internal divisions within terrorist groups are an important factor; and, terrorism has ended during escalation in two of the cases. Conclusions eight and nine are concerned with the impact of strong leaders and neighbouring countries. Finally, the tenth conclusion addresses the flawed strategy of terrorism and counterproductive results of repressive means to counter it.

Coercion is crucial to the ending of terrorist campaigns.

All three of the cases involved an unremitting coercive response by the governments involved conducive to the severity of the respective conflict. The British were committed to making Northern Ireland governable but were frustrated by continuing Republican and Loyalist paramilitary violence, prompting a mixed intelligence-police-military security response. Spain (in the period after the transition) clamped down further on ETA in the wake of every failed ceasefire but crossed a boundary, which even the British did not countenance by eliminating all means of Radical Nationalist political expression when ETA, the core of Basque resistance to Spain, was weakened and needed a pathway out of violence. The FLNC successor groups have also been subjected to a relentless pursuit by the police and judiciary on Corsica and trials of militants became a fixed aspect of the battle against the clandestine groups in the 2000s. The FLNC had not seen itself as a challenger to the state as ETA and the PIRA did when they conceived the idea of 'long wars' that would drive out their opponents but the security responses, or counterterrorist responses, of the British, Spanish and French were critical in exposing the possibility of the challenger groups achieving their aims through force as fundamentally unrealistic. Without an effective and legal counter-terrorist

approach it is unlikely that any of the clandestine organisations would have reached the conclusion that armed struggle was futile as a long term strategy.

Conciliation

Conciliatory measures have their place in a counter-terrorist strategy in the form of talks, negotiation and concession. The unwritten rule that governments do not negotiate with terrorists is a fallacy, but there are limits as to what a government can and should do in terms of why they negotiate and make concessions. The primary means of communication and means of influence for a terrorist group is the bullet and bomb and any government that makes concessions whilst under threat sets a precedence by which violence is rewarded and legitimated. Yet, negotiation and concession can also have their benefits when it is made clear to the terrorist actor that they will not receive concessions as a result of their violence but when they stop using it. The Spanish policies of reinsertion and amnesty provided an individual way out of terrorism provided the individual rejected violence.

Reform is critical to resolving root causes

Political reform, which targets the underlying conditions of the conflict, was evident in all three cases but to varying degrees. The British had been frustrated in their attempts at reforming the political status of Northern Ireland in the years between the imposition of Direct Rule and the Northern Ireland Assembly but they kept trying and involved the Republic of Ireland in the search for a political solution. Ironically, as the British tried to disengage, paramilitary violence and the intransigence of Northern Ireland's politicians on both sides of the divide made this impossible. The eventual success came about through the involvement of all parties to the conflict and required a major change in the attitudes of the Republican and Loyalist extremes. The most dramatic was the transition to democracy in Spain and the creation of autonomous governments during the escalation stage but the impact carried through into all stages of the Basque conflict as parties opposed to ETA violence became stronger and ETA became involved in a conflict with the Basque Autonomous Government. For France, reform was a much a means of resolving the 'Corsican Problem' as was its security response. There were three

major attempts at reform, and all had an impact on the clandestine groups, some of whom actually gave up on violence as their members moved into nationalist political parties. The importance of regional political parties and organisations should not be underestimated and governments should allow these to develop unaffected by their security response and exploit the benefits of reform.

Cumulative affect

The impact of coercion, conciliation and reform is cumulative over time. Coercive measures, when applied in a transparent, accountable and legal context, and directly at the challenger organisation, have the long term effect of reducing the challenger group's ability to survive as a viable military organisation. Conciliatory measures can have an impact beyond the immediate, such as Spain's use of reinsertion into society, as they allow those no longer committed to military action to exit. Conciliation directed at elected nationalist politicians, allowing nationalist issues to be discussed without benefiting the challenger group, takes time to have a positive effect, but demonstrates a commitment to resolving underlying issues, strengthening the position of the political parties. There is a corresponding effect from the implementation of political reform, which gives nationalist politicians the ability to represent the nationalist community, allows votes to be cast for nationalist parties that condemn the use of violence, and allows the voter to express nationalist sentiment without directly or indirectly supporting the use of violence.

The group realises militarism is counterproductive to their cause

A key factor in the ending of terrorist campaigns is the realisation by the terrorist group that they cannot achieve their aims through military means and there are viable nationalist political parties to represent their cause. The only people who can decide to conclusively end an ethno/nationalist-separatist terrorist campaign are the leaders and members of the armed group themselves when they realise the futility of armed struggle and potential of purely political activity. The government and security forces are critical to bringing this realisation about and how they go about doing it either enables the move to peace or cripples it. The key

contributions a government can make are in countering armed struggle directly and enabling political change, which will bring about the willing acquiescence of armed groups in ending their violence. Challenger groups such as the ETA, IRA and FLNC and their splinter organisations are political actors who use violence as a means to an end and they undergo an evolutionary development as they resort to violence, discuss its application, amend goals and make rational discussion as to whether or not their strategy will ultimately bring about their end goals. As rational actors they can (and do) reach the conclusion that political violence is inhibiting their end goals. The aim is political, terrorism is the means, and when the means prove inadequate to the ends the group goes through the long and painful transition towards politics as the sole means.

Terrorist groups have a propensity towards internal division, which can contribute towards individual and group disengagement from terrorism.

The proneness of terrorist organisations to undergo often bloody division is a characteristic that had been present in ETA and the IRA in the stages prior to *normalisation*, continued to be a problem for Republican paramilitaries, and became one for the FLNC and their successor groups. As politically minded actors they have divisions that can be exploited by an intuitive government, allowing some to depart from the organisation (the individual level) and for organisations to reach a conclusion that political means outweigh the military (the group level). Terrorist organisations, including the highly organised and strongly led such as the PIRA, are not the cohesive and monolithic organisations that they appear. This makes them vulnerable to infiltration by intelligence operatives, causing fear and distrust and the disruption of operational effectiveness (*coercion*), division due to political change, which affects why they are utilising armed struggle (*reform*) and means that some will be willing to give up violence if certain conditions are met whilst others will reject talking as a betrayal (*conciliation*).

Terrorism can, and does, end during escalation.

In two cases terrorism ended during escalation: as some remained radicalised, others abandoned armed struggle, and for them terrorism ends. ETA-pm's ceasefire

came about after the tensions within ETA had culminated in the division between the political-military ETA-pm and military ETA-m and was a direct outcome of the transition to democracy: ETA-pm's leaders saw that despite the flaws of the new democracy, it was indeed working and there was much to be gained from political process. There had also been contrasting conciliatory measures by Spanish government's, beginning with Juan Carlo's approach to ETA and amnesties, and continuing with negotiations mediated by the Basque political party EE, accompanied by the prospect of reinsertion into society. The demise of the OIRA has become but a footnote in the history of the 'troubles' but it is of interest as it represents an armed group ending its campaign during the most difficult of times. Studies of the IRA indicate how detached the Dublin leadership was from the realities of the North, but they did come to a conclusion that their successors would later emulate: armed struggle was futile and damaging to the cause.

Strong leaders

The importance of strong leaders in pushing through a move to permanent ceasefire was critical in the Northern Ireland case. Adams, McGuinness, and Morrison were long serving republicans with good reputations within the PIRA and were only the tip of the iceberg in terms of talent available to Adams, who formed a 'think tank' to facilitate the move to constitutional politics. ETA did not have such a consistency in leadership as the Spanish and French were successfully in capturing them, preventing an internal dialogue taking place of the type present in ETAs early years. They also had few opportunities to meet and reconsider political and military strategy, a problem also for the PIRA that was offset by the existence of Sinn Fein who could meet and the fact that PIRA prisoners were not dispersed in the manner that had befallen those of ETA. Corsican clandestine groups had linked political organisations, which were able to influence them in the direction of ceasefires when politically expedient, although the fractured nature of Corsican nationalist parties and clandestine groups prevented this from becoming a general development, which crossed all of the clandestine groups at a given time. Nor did the Corsican groups retain consistent leadership and in the 2000s in particular leaders were subject to arrest or assassination. The emergence of a unified FLNC in

2012 represented a change in the trend of division, and their ability to meet and to make announcements indicates a coherent leadership able to make effective decisions. The only group in which there was a strong leadership which amended its goals over a long period of time was the PIRA, and this was an important factor in the eventual decision to end armed struggle.

Neighbouring Countries

The cooperation of neighbouring countries proved important in the Northern Ireland and Basque Country cases. Ireland was critical to the search for a political solution in Northern Ireland and it would have been impossible for the Peace Process to take place without them. As well as talking to the PIRA and rejecting violence outright Irish governments made significant constitutional concessions and became directly involved in cross-border political initiatives aimed at providing the much sought after political solution to the 'troubles'. They also undermined the Republican case for British withdrawal by underwriting the principle of consent regarding the will of Unionism to leave the United Kingdom. The loss of the ETA safe haven in France and a significant shift in attitude towards arresting and deporting ETA suspects meant that ETA was facing effective counter-terrorism in both Spain and France. This was a major blow to an organisation whose leaders met and members recuperated in France and had a major impact on ETA's ability to survive. The impact on the terrorist group is *coercive*, as it affects their ability to organise, particularly when the freedom of movement on safer territory is removed, and undermines their claim to legitimacy.

Terrorism as a strategy is inherently flawed as are repressive means to combat it.

In terms of the end goal, and in all three cases presented here the aim was independence, all three campaigns have led to failure on the part of the groups involved and a diminishing level of support and tolerance for the use of violence. Actual support for a terrorist group's goals does not equate to support for the terrorist group's means: voters can choose to vote for nationalist parties who either oppose the use of violence or simply do not support it. In the only case to have seen the long term benefits of a permanent ceasefire (Northern Ireland) the

cessation of violence by the Provisional IRA led to an increase in support for Sinn Fein and the political winners of the Peace Process proved to be the two extremes as when violence was no longer present people who opposed violence could vote honestly. As to whether this will be the case in the Basque Country and Corsica remains to be seen as the end of ETA's and the FLNC's armed struggles are recent developments.

In all three cases the activities of terrorist organisations brought about a *backlash*. Ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorist groups draw their legitimacy from claiming to represent the interests of an ethnic constituency. Whilst they will retain a small core support their actions affect how the ethnic constituency perceives them and when they begin to provoke the ire of the people the armed group is in serious trouble. The PIRA, ETA and FLNC all undermined their own positions through the use of violence, although, the most cutting example, is the first incarnation of the RIRA, who provoked protests at home and abroad with their Omagh operation, a quick and bloody lesson of the flawed nature of terrorism as a strategy: the bombing cemented the peace process and exposed the futility of violence.

Nor do repressive means aid a government that is countering terrorism. How a government acts when a terrorist campaign begins can have a major impact on whether it is brought to a quick end or actually gains greater minority group support and the sympathy of the wider public. The repressive reaction of Franco's Spain to ETA came to a head in the Burgos trial, which proved to be an embarrassment to the government, and legitimised the fight of ETA in the eyes of Basques. The use of the GAL under the democracy was an aberration which undermined the comparatively conciliatory approach of the democracy who had survived an initial escalation of terrorism in general. In Corsica, the French reaction during the Aleria crisis turned an armed protest into a shootout and trial which generated sympathy for the hostage takers and removed the strongest autonomist party from the scene and resulting in the emergence of the FLNC. As for Northern Ireland, the deployment of the Army had provided some form of stability but its use as a police force and involvement in internment undermined its already weak

legitimacy as an impartial actor and actually raised recruitment for the IRA. Repressive means are successful in countering terrorism in the short term as they crush armed groups and their supporters but in the long term they increase minority group support and allow stronger armed groups to re-emerge.

Conclusion

At the close of the historical analysis the situation for terrorist groups in all three cases is very different to that of the origins of their campaigns, the most significant are the changes in how Northern Ireland, the Basque Country and Corsica are governed, each is more democratic and representative in nature and there is scope for the expression views from across the political spectrum. The power for implementing political change has moved firmly in the direction of the people of each region, although they retain strong links to the state.

Coercion has its place in the state response to terrorism but it is only part of a wider package, conciliatory measures also have their place and coercion is not successful alone, at some point the state has to do what states claim they will never do: talk and negotiate with terrorist organisations. Then there is the matter of reform, which took so long in Northern Ireland despite its place at the forefront of Great Britain's solution, but there were major obstacles due to the divided nature of the two communities, yet they and the politicians came together, and transformed Northern Irish politics. Reform was critical to undermining support for ETA amongst Basques and the reason why the coercive approach has not backfired: in this respect ETA-m failed to recognise that the reason for its existence, Franco's Spain, had been consigned to history after the successful democratic transition and in the long run the war between ETA and the Spanish state became a war between ETA and the Basques. Reform has impacted historically on the Corsican groups, causing some to dissolve, for them terrorism was at an end, and the FLNC of 2012 has stated explicitly that its move away from armed struggle is linked to developments from within the Corsican Assembly.

In closing, what of any substance has any of the terrorist organisations achieved? The answer is little, their aims were never met and they contributed little of benefit to the people they claimed to represent and political change has taken place despite them rather than because of them. As to governments, which changed several times in each case, as a democratic government can be voted out of power whereas a terrorist organisation cannot, the predominance of coercion at the beginning of the conflicts made each situation far worse but remained important as coercion came to be directed at the challenger groups and reform undermined their minority group support.

Chapter Ten: Conclusion

The purpose of this study was to compare three cases of ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorist campaigns in order to understand how they come to an end and how the government actor can influence this. According to Millar, responses fall on a continuum of coercion and conciliation and a combination of both is necessary in response to ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorism.¹ This study sought to investigate this conclusion through a comparative case study of three similar cases. As the analysis progressed it was seen that reform should be treated as a separate category of conciliation targeted at the minority population the terrorist groups claimed to represent. The approach taken was from the moderate school of thought of terrorism studies, a historical analysis focused on root causes. The framework of analysis developed was a fusion of conflict studies and terrorism studies, which drew on Weinberg and Richardson² and was influenced by Franks.³

At the beginning of the analysis only Northern Ireland had reached the stage of a permanent ceasefire, meaning that the analysis for the Basque Country and Corsica would need to close with discussions of the future trajectory of the conflicts and the conditions under which they could reach the permanent ceasefire stage. It was clear that whilst neither conflict had ended, the activities of the challenger groups were had undergone a considerable reduction when compared to the earlier stages. By the end of the analysis, the major challenger groups in the Basque Country and Corsica had declared an end to armed struggle, meaning that if the declarations were able to be demonstrated to be permanent, which they were, then the analysis would turn to how this had happened in all three cases. None of the three conflicts have been resolved, but they have been transformed, and it is at this point that my analysis ends. As a researcher I have to acknowledge that I was incredibly fortunate to have ended my research examining three cases in which

¹ Gregory D Millar (2007) 'Confronting terrorisms: Group motivation and successful state policy' *Terrorism and Political Violence* Vol 19 Issue 3 (2007) pp 331-380.

² Leonard Weinberg and Louise Richardson (2004) *Conflict Theory and the Trajectory of Terrorist Campaigns in Western Europe* in Andrew Silke (ed) *Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures* (Frank Cass: London).

³ Jason Franks *Rethinking the Roots of Terrorism* (Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke:2006).

terrorism had ended. For the people of the Basque Country and Corsica the impact is undeniably more important as political violence has given way to political parties; radical nationalism remains, as it also does in Northern Ireland, but this is now pursued by elected representatives.

The second chapter addressed the relationship between terrorism and liberal democracy, setting the context for the chapters which would follow. It began by discussing what 'democracy' is and the spread of democratic governance. This was followed by a comparison of terrorism in democratic and non-democratic countries, and the challenge posed to democratic countries by terrorism. The discussion then turned to how liberal-democracies deal with the challenge that terrorism presents; firstly by considering the combating of terrorism whilst maintaining democratic principles, then discussing the merits of coercion and conciliation in responding to terrorism. Two findings, which emphasise the importance of studying the emergence and ending of ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorist campaigns, are that the number of democracies in the world has increased significantly in the second half of the twentieth⁴ century and that democracies have a demonstrated vulnerability to terrorism⁵. Terrorism was demonstrated to be a persisting challenge to liberal-democracies, its impact often beyond the actual threat posed. How terrorism should be countered was well demonstrated by Chalk, who outlines three principles of counter-terrorism: firstly, the response should target only the terrorists; secondly, it should be credible; and thirdly, all the security services should be subject to parliamentary oversight and supervision⁶. The approach taken here was broader as it takes into account root causes and the wider population, but Chalk does give us an idea of what the coercive side of

⁴ Samuel Huntington 'Democracy's Third Wave' *Journal of Democracy* (1991) p3; Larry Diamond *Can the Whole World Become Democratic? Democracy, Development, and International Policies*. Center for the Study of Democracy (University of California, Irvine) (2003) <http://repositories.cdlib.org/csd/03-05>.

⁵ Leonard Weinberg & William Eubank 'Does democracy encourage terrorism?' *Terrorism and Political Violence* Vol 6 Issue 4 (1994) pp 417-435; Todd Sandler 'On the relationship between democracy and Terrorism' *Terrorism and Political Violence* Vol 7 Issue 4 (1995) pp 1-9; Joe Eyerman 'Terrorism and democratic states: Soft targets or accessible systems' *International Interactions* Vol 24, Issue 2, (1998) pp 151-170; Leonard Weinberg & William Eubank 'Terrorism & democracy: Perpetrators and victims' *Terrorism and Political Violence* Vol 13 Issue 1 (2001) pp 155-164.

⁶ Peter Chalk 'The response to terrorism as a threat to liberal democracy' *Australian journal of Politics and History* Vol 44 issue 3 (2002) pp 373-388.

ending terrorism should look like: specific, realistic and accountable. Conciliatory measures were divided into the separate categories of conciliation and reform in order to allow greater clarity as to their impacts. Reform targets the minority support group, undermining the terrorist group's support. Talks, negotiation, and concession, can be applied directly to the terrorist group or indirectly via elected politicians.

The third chapter introduced conflict studies, firstly by discussing what 'conflict' and 'conflict studies' are, then the history of conflict and terrorism studies. I then investigated the nature of conflict since the end of the Cold War, and social science and the study of conflict. Four blocks of theoretical approaches to analysing conflict were then compared: Galtung's conflict triangle; Burton's human needs and Azar's protracted social conflict; transformative and constructive approaches; and, the contribution of constructivism and critical theory. The chapter closed with how conflict is understood in terms of structure and process. The fact that conflict studies has made significant progress in merging social science disciplines is crucial to the application of conflict studies to the study of terrorism: conflict studies and terrorism studies are inherently applied social sciences which rely on combining the findings of social science disciplines. The strength of conflict studies lies in its history of having attempted to do so whilst also absorbing theoretical paradigms such as realism and critical theory. Chapter three also introduced the relational model of Johan Galtung⁷ and its further development by Christopher Mitchell into a relational model of situation-attitudes-behaviour.⁸ The model lies at the heart of the method developed later in chapter five and has the advantage of being able to incorporate psychology, social-psychology, sociology and rational choice theories⁹ within its structure: it allows us to analyse a conflict in terms of the *situation* of the combatants, their *attitudes* as a consequence of their perceived situation, and their *behaviour* as a result; actions which produce a changed situation and revised attitudes. Treating conflict as a process ensures a

⁷ Herman Schmid 'Peace research and politics' *Journal of Peace Research* Vol 5, No 3 (1968) pp 217-232.

⁸ C R Mitchell *The Structure of International Conflict* (The Macmillan Press Ltd: Basingstoke: 1981)

⁹ An illustrative, rather than complete list.

complete historical understanding of a conflict in line with the aim of utilising a roots-based approach to understanding ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorist campaigns¹⁰.

The fourth chapter moved the theoretical focus to terrorism studies. I began by addressing how terrorism is defined and categorized, then introduced competing schools of thought. The following sections explored what theories of terrorism had to say in the context of situation, attitudes, and behaviour. This was the direct application of terrorism studies to Galtung's conflict triangle. The chapter closed with a discussion of general explanations as to how terrorism ends. The definition of terrorism, and the typologies, and theoretical approaches and perspectives, are essential preliminaries, which describe the field of terrorism studies and the history of terrorism as presented by the literature on the topic, forming an introduction to the field. We should note that defining terrorism is an academic black hole which provides no accepted definition and results in authors writing on the topic having to state their definition of what terrorism actually is, with a myriad of typologies as a consequence. The comparison of the schools of thought acknowledged the contribution that each could make in understanding terrorism, but concluded that for a historical study a roots-based moderate approach was the most appropriate. The chapter closed with a more detailed outline of general contributions to the study of how terrorism ends, from which four findings were drawn: the impact of reform in enabling the exit from violence to politics, the importance of strong leaders, the ambiguity of the impact of government countermeasures (coercion), and the potential for terrorism to actually succeed (if limited to the withdrawal of the colonial empires) or transition to criminality or other forms of warfare. Whilst the positive impact of reform was of particular interest, as it indicated that reform should be considered separately from conciliatory measures, the ambiguity regarding coercive counter-terrorism was of concern as it indicated that the long term impact of coercion had to be considered.

¹⁰ For an understanding of a roots based approach see: Martha Crenshaw "Thoughts on relating terrorism to historical contexts" in Martha Crenshaw (ed) *Terrorism in Context* (The Pennsylvania University Press:Pennsylvania:1995); Jason Franks *Rethinking the Roots of Terrorism* (Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke:2006).

Also of note, was that there is a need to understand that both groups, and the individuals within them may decide to end their violence, as such we should realise the importance of individual disengagement within the more general study of how groups reach the point of ceasefire.¹¹

In the fifth chapter I began by discussing the interdisciplinary nature of conflict studies and the convergence of interests with terrorism studies, and studies that utilised both, which were influential in the development of the method used. I then expounded on the framework of analysis, which treated conflict between the sub-state and state actor as a structure and a process. Interdisciplinarity is fundamental to the epistemology of the study, as the methodology requires the crossing of the disciplines of the social sciences. I have treated conflict studies and terrorism studies as applied social sciences and followed Galtung's argument that whilst specialism is a fundamentally necessary aspect the social sciences also need to account for the gaps between them.¹² I argued that the two separate disciplines of conflict studies and terrorism studies had undergone a convergence of interests, due to the changing nature of conflict since the end of the Cold War. This is marked by the end of the distinctions between friend and enemy, soldier and civilian, debates concerning 'new wars' and 'new terrorism, and the increasing prevalence of intra-state warfare.¹³ Convergence, as I refer to it, has led to studies which utilise both conflict and terrorism studies. Two such studies were the foundation on which my framework of analysis was developed. Firstly, Weinberg and Richardson applied Kriesberg's process model to Northern Ireland and the Basque Country, demonstrating the viability of the approach. Secondly, Franks, in a more comprehensive work, compared and integrated conflict and terrorism studies into an overall framework for analysis. Where my work is unique is in the depth of analysis of the three cases undertaken and the combination of a relational model and process models. These were outlined in more detail and a process model more

¹¹ See: John Horgan "Individual disengagement: a psychological analysis" in Bjorgo & Horgan (eds)) *Leaving Terrorism Behind* (Routledge:London:2009) , pp 17-29.

¹² Johan Galtung "Toward a conflictology: the quest for transdisciplinarity" in: DJD Sandole, S Byrne, I Sandole-Staroste & J Senehi (eds), *Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution* (Routledge:London:2009) op cit, pp 511- 524 (516).

¹³ Oliver P Richmond 'Realizing hegemony? Symbolic terrorism and the roots of conflict' *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* Vol 26 , No 4 (2003) pp 289-309 (p 290).

specific to terrorism was developed from a discussion and critique of existing process or stage models of conflict. The rationale was that terrorism studies needs to develop its own models of analysis and not simply rely on a straightforward application of conflict theory.

In the sixth chapter the framework of analysis was applied to Northern Ireland, beginning with historical precedents and ending with re-escalation, the only case in which this has happened. I presented the history of the conflict for each stage and analysed situation, attitudes and behaviour of the challenger organisations, and government responses in each stage. The conflict originated due to the reaction of Catholics and Protestants to proposed reforms, intended to address the unequal political status of Catholics, and escalated into sectarian violence and the emergence of the PIRA as the major challenger group. The Stormont government responded with coercive policing until the point that the RUC could not cope and requested that the British Army be deployed. The British employed coercion, conciliation and reform when attempting to resolve the conflict, with mixed results. Coercive measures initially calmed the situation, before making it worse with the precipitating events of internment and Bloody Sunday. After the introduction of 'normalisation', the challenger groups, including the PIRA, were subjected to an unremitting and often controversial security response, which severely impeded the PIRA's ability to conduct operations, whilst Sinn Fein was emerging as the primary force for Republicanism. Conciliatory measures were applied to a lesser degree, playing an important part during the de-escalation and permanent ceasefire stages, but only as a part of a wider and complex picture of separate talks involving Sinn Fein, the PIRA, Unionists, Loyalists, and the British and Irish governments. The British were committed to reforming the political situation in Northern Ireland and drew the Irish into the political affairs of the North, and making it clear that Northern Ireland's future would be based on the principles of self-determination and unionist consent. The British met with resistance to their attempts at reform in the earlier stages of the conflict, but their cumulative effect was felt in the later success of 1993 and 1998.

The seventh chapter focused on the Basque Country. ETA emerged as a challenger to the state as a consequence of the Franco regime's political and cultural repression of the Basque's and coercive response to dissent. Under liberal-democratic government coercion, conciliation and reform were utilised in countering ETA. Coercion was applied up to and after ETA's permanent ceasefire, including the GAL's dirty war, and ETA's war became one against Basque's alongside that with the Spanish state. The coercive response was also applied to ETA's political wings, HB and Batasuna, undermining the ability of radical Basque nationalism to provide a political alternative for ETA. In the long run, ETA was ground down by the coercive response, and the reason this did not backfire was political reform. Conciliation produced mixed results, the reinsertion policy worked at the individual level, allowing a way out of terrorism for members of ETA-pm, until it was countered by ETA-m when they realised the threat it posed. Negotiation was applied during ceasefires, but this was unsuccessful as ETA had no intention of compromising on their aims, and Spanish governments did not give them any incentive to do otherwise. Reform had a major impact on the transformation of the conflict, and the most influential reform was the creation of the Basque Autonomous Community, in turn, a consequence of the successful transition to democracy. Basques now had political representation, their culture was no longer under threat, and Basque nationalist parties flourished and voting was able to reflect the wishes of the Basques. This did not mean that ETA's goals had been met, but they were revealed as ultimately fantastical and contrary to what Basques actually wanted. Radical nationalism was able to garner a significant minority of votes, yet they were, crucially, a minority. The transition to democracy also resulted in France countering ETA in the French Basque Country, removing a crucial safe haven.

Corsica was analysed in chapter eight. The main challenger group in the Corsica case was the FLNC and its successor organisations. The FLNC was formed from smaller groups as a result of the French response to the Aleria incident, but the origins of dissent on Corsica was the exclusion of native Corsican's from the benefits of economic reforms amid general concern about underdevelopment and

political representation. France utilised coercion, conciliation, and reform in its attempts to resolve the 'Corsican problem'. The coercive response played a significant part in escalating the conflict, although it did reduce the capability of the FLNC to carry out major attacks. The police response to the FLNC and the successor groups was applied throughout the conflict and has seen militants brought before the courts and their numbers reduced. Conciliatory measures outside of reform were more limited and inconclusive, although talks with nationalist politicians and representatives were productive during the terminated Matignon process. Reform was used before the conflict escalated, and afterwards. Whilst the early economic reforms backfired because the main beneficiaries were not Corsicans, political reforms, beginning in 1982, gradually gave more responsibilities to the Corsican Assembly and more recognition of Corsican culture and language. They also caused splits in the clandestine groups, empowered both nationalist and autonomist political parties, and ultimately, the proposals made by the Corsican Assembly that the FLNC cited in its declaration of the end of armed struggle.

In chapter nine the findings of the three case study chapters were compared in order to produce conclusions about how terrorism ends and the role that coercion, conciliation, and reform plays in this. As this was the purpose of the study I discuss it below, but first acknowledge where the conclusions, a result of the comparative analysis, relate directly to other works.

The importance of *reform* is a common theme in the literature of how terrorism ends, and is the conclusion of Weinberg, Pedahur & Perliger¹⁴ as it allows for the transition from violence to party politics, and this has happened in all three cases. This is recognised by Gurr (in the case of the FLQ)¹⁵, Crenshaw (as offering other options)¹⁶, and Cronin (as transition to legitimate political process)¹⁷,

¹⁴ Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahur & Arie Perliger *Political Parties and Terrorist Groups* (Routledge: London: 2009).

¹⁵ Ted Robert Gurr "Terrorism in democracy: Its social and political bases" in Walter Reich (ed) *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, theologies, states of mind* (Woodrow Wilson Center Press: Washington DC:1998) pp 86-102.

¹⁶ Martha Crenshaw (2005) "Pathways out of terrorism: A conceptual framework" in D.R. Kaarthekeyan (ed) *Pathways out of Terrorism and Insurgency: The Dynamics of Terrorist Violence and Peace Processes* (New Dawn Press Inc:Elgin:2005) pp 3-11.

although these include conciliatory measures within reform, whereas I have separated the two.

A theme that was consistently evident in the analysis chapters was the propensity of the challenger groups to *division* over the primacy of military or political action, strategy and tactics, and personal differences. The divisions within militant organisations has been described by Irvin as between *Ideologues*, who favour independence and armed struggle, *Politicos*, who favour self-determination and non-violence, and *Radicals*, who have the middle ground.¹⁸ The tension between these groupings is clearest during the formative years of ETA, but is also evident in the other cases also. This has not come out in the analysis in such terms, but this is due to my narrower focus on the impact of government responses on challenger organisations, and my emphasis on the terrorist organisations and the ending of violence. Irvin's is a broader analysis of militant nationalism in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country, although not Corsica.

The *impact of strong leaders* is discussed by both Crenshaw and Cronin, with regard to the PIRA, where strong leaders led the move to party politics¹⁹, and the RIRA, where the leadership was arrested.²⁰ This was a clear theme in the case of Northern Ireland, although, in the Basque Country and Corsica the absence of a strong and consistent leadership meant that groups of declining influence and capability were not steered to ceasefire when it was already clear that the military option would not succeed. Yet, the continuing arrests of the leaderships of ETA and the FLNC successor groups also meant that their ability to organise and carry out operations was severely inhibited.

My final conclusion was concerned with the *flawed strategy of terrorism and repressive means to counter it*. Terrorism as a flawed strategy is presented as a strong argument by Neumann and Smith, as populations have more resilience to

¹⁷ Audrey Kurth Cronin *How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns* (Princeton University Press:Princeton:2009).

¹⁸ Cynthia Irvin *Militant Nationalism: Between Movement and Party in Ireland and the Basque Country* (University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis: 1999).

¹⁹ Crenshaw, op cit.

²⁰ Cronin, op cit.

	Basque Country	Corsica	Northern Ireland
Coercion	ETA emerged in response to Francoist repression and survived major assaults by the regime on ETA and the wider Basque population. The Burgos trial led to greater support for ETA and wider international attention. After the transition to democracy the security forces continued the coercive approach but became more organised and specialised counter-terrorist units were formed and extensive legislation put in place. Use of illegal proxies before and after the transition. Spanish counter-terrorism has ground down ETA in the long term and has continued after the ETA permanent ceasefire.	The crippling of the ARC after the Aleria occupation and the overwhelming security response to Aleria led to the formation of the FLNC. The subsequent countering of the FLNC and successor groups was predominantly by the Police and judiciary. The police response in the 1980s reduced the ability of the FLNC to carry out major operations. The capabilities of successor groups has been seriously affected by the arrests of their members in the 1990s and 2000s. Nationalist violence has come to be seen as part of a wider problem of lawlessness affecting the lives of Corsicans.	A repressive response at the escalation stage contributed to the emergence of the PIRA. A sustained and unremitting use of the RUC, Army, judiciary and the intelligence services aimed at the frustration and defeat of the IRA and successor groups from the outset of the conflict until the PIRA permanent ceasefire in 1997. Extensive use of special forces from the Army and specialised counter-terrorist police units. Extensive use of counter-terrorist legislation including trial without jury and criminalisation of paramilitaries.
Conciliation	Social re-integration of prisoners after the democratic transition a factor in the end of ETA-pm's end to armed struggle. Open talks in Algeria between 1986 and 1989 ended with a continuation of the ETA campaign. Later peace processes in 1997-1998 and 2006-2007 failed but contributed to the later ETA permanent ceasefire. No concessions made after the end of armed struggle by ETA.	The French attempted secret talks with clandestine groups but these met with little success and were abandoned. Open talks took place later during the Matignon Process and a ceasefire was called.	Limited use of talks in the early stages of the conflict but very little more until secret talks in the 1990s. Talks and negotiation of greater depth take place between the British and Irish. More intensive talks took place between SF and the SDLP and Irish governments and SF/PIRA. Early release of paramilitary prisoners after the 1997 ceasefire.
Reform	The most significant reform in all three of the cases was the Spanish transition to democracy and granting of autonomy to the Basque Country. The ability of Basque nationalists to fight for autonomy and independence within the Basque political system undermined the case for ETA violence and brought ETA into conflict with the Basque government and police force and the Basque population.	French economic reforms contributed to the emergence of discontent despite significant investment. Political reform in 1982 resulted in a ceasefire but real benefits were not felt until the 1991 Special Statute and abandonment of armed struggle by the FLNC-habitual. The Matignon Process resulted in a ceasefire by the majority of armed nationalist groups which was broken after the Matignon Proposals were watered down by a new government.	The British consistently sought to return political power to Northern Ireland politicians throughout the conflict but did not make significant progress until after the 1997 PIRA ceasefire. The peace process built upon more limited earlier success brought about through Irish cooperation. The most significant change prior to this had been near the beginning of the conflict when the Stormont government was removed from power.

Fig 8.1. Comparative Table for Government Response

terrorism and are more adaptive to terrorism than terrorist organisations assume, and their actions do not push governments past a breaking point whereby they give up.²¹ Also, as terrorism is limited to coercive means, escalation proves necessary when success (already unlikely) does not happen, and this can result in the group's actions becoming more indiscriminate and provoke a counter-escalation from the government (the escalation trap).²² This occurred in all three of the cases, although I have focused specifically on the impact on the minority support group and political wings. Instead of generating more minority group support, escalation can produce a *backlash*, as observed by Neumann and Smith, Gurr, Crenshaw, and Cronin, as it is the minority support group who suffer the consequences of terrorist actions and coercive government responses. As regards repression as a response to terrorism, I treat this as the far end of the coercion scale, which should be avoided as it is not only a contributing factor in escalation and counterproductive over the long term, but is also beyond the remit of a liberal-democratic government.

This study began with a literature review that resulted in a hypothesis concerning the contribution of coercion and conciliation by governments to the ending of ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorist campaigns. According to Miller's article, a combination of the two is the best approach for countering a terrorist campaign of this type.²³ The research hypothesis was:

"A combined strategy of coercive and conciliatory measures is more effective in countering ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorism than solely coercive measures."

Further investigation in chapter two, resulted in a differentiation of conciliation into the complementary categories of *conciliation*, which includes talks, negotiation and amnesty, and *political reform*, which aims to resolve the root causes of the conflict. These are shown in Fig 10.1 above for each case.

²¹ Peter R Neumann and M.L.R Smith *The Strategy of Terrorism* (Routledge:London:2008). The misconception that governments will give in is linked to the withdrawal of the colonial empires, overlooking that the will to maintain the empires had been lost.

²² Ibid.

²³ Miller, op cit.

The conclusion of this study is that *a combination of coercive and conciliatory approaches works better than either alone*, although the understanding of the impact of conciliatory measures is better understood when defined according to conciliation and reform, as described above.

Coercion, or 'counterterrorism', is essential to the ending of ethno/nationalist-separatist terrorist campaigns and the democratic dilemma means that a government must act when organised violence breaks out within its borders. How this is done returns us to Chalk's principles as the weight of the response should fall on the armed groups and their support networks.²⁴ It should never apply to community at large, whether they favour the cause or not, and the means used needs to be credible and accountable, as per Chalk's second and third principles. The responses of the security services in all three cases have often fallen outside of these principles, particularly in the early stages of the conflicts, but improved over time to be more specific and successful in their application. The PIRA, ETA, and FLNC came to realise that they would never break down the resolve of the security forces or their governments, and so not achieve their goals of independence. The impact of counter-terrorism in all three cases diminished the ability of armed nationalist groups to carry out operations, but the benefits of this were dependent on their being viable political alternatives to militarism.

In terms of *conciliation*, the willingness, if inconsistent, of the British, Spanish, and French governments to talk and negotiate led to unsuccessful ceasefires but laid the foundations for later, more successful talks via intermediaries, including political parties that rejected the use of violence. A notable success, during the escalation and normalisation stages, was the use of amnesty and reinsertion by the Spanish, which ended terrorism at the individual level. Talking and negotiation with elected political representatives were also productive in all three cases, if not with immediate effect, but with the caveat that any violence by challenger groups would lead to the termination of talks unless the participants rejected the use of violence. This strengthened legitimate political

²⁴ Chalk, op cit.

parties at the expense of terrorist groups and political parties that failed to reject the use of violence.

Political reform, a distinct aspect of conciliation, is the key to ending ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorist campaigns, although the benefits may not be immediately realised, and the final decision to end armed struggle lies with the challenger group. In all three cases the political conditions required for a permanent ceasefire to occur were a transformation of the political conditions during the emergence of the challenger groups. Northern Ireland, the Basque Country and Corsica had distinct political problems, but these had the important similarity of a lack of genuine political representation for Catholics, Basques and Corsicans. Their inability to address their grievances by political means was the preconditions for later escalation. Yet, throughout the conflicts, the majority chose non-violent political activity, with the violence of the terrorist organisations the loud expression of a minority claiming to represent them. Political reform, a major part of the British, Spanish and French approaches, has meant that there is better political representation for Catholics in a Northern Ireland Assembly, Basques in a Basque Autonomous Community, and Corsicans in a Corsican Assembly. The ethno-nationalist/separatist group relies on the legitimacy garnered from its minority group support to justify its reason for existing. It follows that if the grievances which led to the emergence of a terrorist group are addressed then this claim to legitimacy is undermined in the eyes of the small percentage of the minority support group who accept (not favour) the use of violence and in the eyes of the group leaders and membership themselves.

In closing, what of the future government facing a new campaign of ethno/nationalist-separatist terrorism? The most painless response would be to identify discontent prior to the outbreak of violence and take steps regarding it. However, once political violence is underway how the government approaches the problem can make a difference between the conflict being resolved quickly and it developing into the longer term conflict such as the ones analysed here. It must be emphasised that there is a balance to be maintained between coercion and

conciliation, and this balance will be unique to the conflict at hand. The six propositions are:

1. A government has to act when a terrorist campaign begins, but this must be within the limits allowed by liberal-democratic means.
2. Counter-terrorism should only ever apply to people who are carrying out violence or part of their support network and not the wider population.
3. Identify the root causes of the emergence of terrorism and address them directly through reform.
4. Ensure that nationalist parties which reject violence are unhindered by the security response and allowed to exploit the benefits of reform swiftly.
5. Ensure the security response is proportional to the situation and subject to parliamentary oversight.
6. The military are only to be used in instances where all other options have been tried and this use should be limited in scope and time with control returned to the civil authorities.

The above is no guarantee that the situation will be immediately resolved. Whatever their outside similarities all conflicts are unique, as are the actors involved and these propositions apply specifically to a particular type of terrorism. This is a consequence of the cases chosen for analysis but the theoretical model outlined was developed from a more general understanding of terrorism studies and an application to other cases has the potential to identify at which stage a case is at and give indications as to how it will develop. A protracted conflict such as that of Israel/Palestine is one example as this has ethno-nationalist origins and bears similarities to Northern Ireland as it involves divided communities. Less suitable for study using the method is Al Qaeda and its affiliates due to the fluid and decentralised nature of the organisation and ideological as opposed to nationalist grounding. A more realistic approach would be to treat affiliates as local organisations with local aims combating government forces (democratic or otherwise). Examples of this would be Al Qaeda in the Maghreb, Iraq and the Yemen and al-Shabab in Somalia, allowing for a root's based analysis and such cases would be of interest in both comparative and individual analysis. However,

this is a separate study and as regards the type of terrorism under analysis here, it can be taken as given that if the propositions outlined above are not taken into account there is an increased likelihood of a situation worsening.

Appendix One: Matrices for the Results of Historical Analysis

Northern Ireland: Historical Precedents to Escalation

	Historical Precedents To 1963	Origins 1963-1969	Pre-Escalation 1969-1970	Escalation 1970-1973
Situation	Domination of Ireland by the British begins in 1169 and plantation begins. The reformation leads to Protestantism in England and Scotland, Ireland remains Catholic. Irish nationalism develops in Protestant and Catholic forms in the eighteenth century. The 1845 potato famine decimates the population. Catholic nationalism becomes more pronounced and leads to a rebellion and formation of the Irish Free State. The six protestant dominated counties become Northern Ireland.	After limited reforms by the O'Neil led government Catholics are politically mobilised. NICRA is formed and tensions between Catholics and Protestants leads to major sectarian unrest in the cities of Londonderry and Belfast.	Catholics and Protestants are in open confrontation and the RUC and B-Specials have lost control. The British Army is deployed to maintain order and protect Catholics. The IRA splits into the OIRA and PIRA over the abandonment of abstentionism and IRA's failure to defend Catholics. Disbandment of the controversial B-Specials leads to Protestant riots and a confrontation with the Army.	OIRA and PIRA counter loyalist gunmen and begin attacks on the Army. The first soldiers are killed in 1971. Internment is introduced to counter the IRA. Catholics are killed by the Army on Bloody Sunday. The fall of Stormont leads to Direct Rule and places the OIRA and PIRA in direct confrontation with the British. The OIRA and PIRA begin major attacks on the British mainland. The OIRA suspends operations in 1972 and the PIRA declares a ceasefire
Attitude	Catholic attitudes are dominated by the land question as plantations are managed by settlers from Scotland and England. Plantations and landlords are seen as exploitative and the British are blamed for the Great Potato Famine. Protestants see Ireland as a part of the Union but seek greater rights within the British parliament but are committed to the Union. Catholic nationalists strive for independence.	Catholics are politicised and seek to redress their rights. Loyalists perceive this as a threat to the Union and their way of life. UVF murders are roundly condemned. Violence polarises the divide between Catholics and Protestants. The Protestant dominated RUC and B-Specials are perceived by Catholics as being on the Protestant side.	Catholics initially welcome the Army but become disenchanted due to the Army's heavy handed approach. Unionist dominated Stormont government and Loyalists perceive the IRA's as the principal threat to peace and security and the Union. British see the situation as one requiring the restoration of order to enable political dialogue. Protestants and Catholics are bitterly divided.	Catholics no longer consider the Army to be impartial and the OIRA and PIRA are in open conflict with Loyalists and the local and British security forces. The PIRA and the British believe they can achieve their goals in the short term. The PIRA sees talks as exploratory but secondary to physical force. OIRA eventually sees armed struggle as counterproductive.
Behaviour	The British dominate Ireland for much of the island's history and introduce settlers. The Irish resist unsuccessfully but rebellions become stronger after the Famine and are eventually successful. Ireland partitioned into the Catholic Irish Free State and Protestant Northern Ireland. Irish differences over partition are settled by the Irish Civil War. The IRA ends its campaign in Ireland but launches campaigns in Great Britain in the 1940s and Operation Harvest between 1956 and 1962.	The IRA is dormant as military organisation and becomes involved in the Civil Rights movement. The UVF kills three Catholics in sectarian attacks. The Stormont government attempts to control the violence. Protestants and Catholics are in open conflict in the cities and inter-communal violence forces people from their homes	The Stormont government admits that it cannot maintain order and request the deployment of the Army. The British become involved in the conflict. Catholics welcome the Army until it becomes clear that their deployment is not a temporary measure. The Army puts down rioting by both Catholics and Protestants.	The armed wings of the Republicans and Loyalists increase their military activities to the detriment of non-violent actors and dominate the political situation. The British increase their military presence and crackdown on no-go areas. UVF carries out bombings in Ireland and the UDA leads Loyalist opposition to political reforms. British bring Ireland into the search for a political solution.

Northern Ireland: Normalisation to Re-escalation

	Normalisation	De-escalation	Permanent Ceasefire	Re-escalation (Returns conflict to stage four)
	1973-1988	1988-1993	1994-1998	1999-2015
Situation	<p>A brief ceasefire by the PIRA is accompanied by a split in the OIRA and emergence of the INLA, Republican feuds and violence between the PIRA and Loyalist groups. The British attempt to 'normalise' the situation and return governance to Northern Irish politicians. The PIRA escalate their attacks on the British Mainland. Paramilitaries lose their special status leading to the Hunger Strikes. In the 1980s Sinn Fein gains greater prominence in the Republican movement. The abandonment of abstentionism leads to the emergence of the CIRA.</p>	<p>During a period of intense paramilitary violence secret then public talks take place between the leaders of Sinn Fein and the SDLP as senior Republicans seek to end the PIRA campaign. Secret talks also take place between republicans and the Irish government and also the British. Discussions between the British and Irish lead to the 1993 Downing Street Agreement. Secret talks also take place between the Irish government and Unionists.</p>	<p>There is a significant reduction in PIRA activity although fringe groups from both sides continue with violence. PIRA calls two ceasefires, the second of which holds after the announcement of the Good Friday Agreement by the British and Irish. The RIRA and CIRA carry out the Omagh bombing which is roundly condemned as an atrocity, weakening both the RIRA and CIRA. Ceasefires are called by the INLA and CLMC, leaving only fringe groups from both sides active.</p>	<p>The Peace Process continues and the Northern Ireland Assembly is formed. Dissident Republican groups begin new campaigns but at a much lower level than that of the PIRA.</p>
Attitude	<p>The PIRA are overwhelmingly committed to the ejection of the British from Northern Ireland. British see the conflict as political and requiring reform and the countering of paramilitaries. Hunger strikes lead to the acceptance of a political approach alongside the military. Loyalists remain committed to the Union.</p>	<p>Rank and file PIRA volunteers remain committed to armed struggle whilst the republican leadership sees the war as futile. Unionists remain wary of losing the link to the United Kingdom. All parties see the end of the PIRA campaign as the key to transforming the conflict.</p>	<p>All the major parties are committed to ending the violence. The PIRA remains committed to the removal of the British from Northern Ireland but accepts the potential of Sinn Fein as the primary Republican actor. Slow progress and British insistence on decommissioning frustrates the PIRA leadership. British attitudes to decommissioning change and it is no longer a precondition. Fringe Republican groups remain committed to the principles of armed struggle and abstentionism.</p>	<p>Mainstream Republicans are committed to the Peace Process but the dissidents remain committed to the core Republican principles. British see the security situation as stable and withdraw the Army.</p>

<p>Behaviour</p>	<p>The PIRA adopts the long war strategy and moves to the use of a cell based structure (ASU). The success of Sinn Fein in the 1980s, the Enniskillen bomb and coercive security force response leads to a dual military-political approach. The British seek political reform and draw Ireland further into the search for a political solution. Use of specialised forces from the Army and RUC to counter the PIRA. There are agreements between the British and Irish in 1973 and 1985 as they search for a political solution.</p>	<p>The paramilitaries continue with their violence and the British continue their coercive use of the security forces. Key Republicans, the British and Irish governments and Unionists all engage in secret talks with the aim of ending the PIRA campaign.</p>	<p>Republican leadership unveil the TUAS strategy. PIRA calls a ceasefire which is then broken. New British and Irish governments push through the Good Friday Agreement. Sinn Fein accepts the Mitchell principles and PIRA calls a second ceasefire. Dissident Republicans form the RIRA and the CIRA becomes more active. Unionists accept the Good Friday Agreement.</p>	<p>CLMC, PIRA and INLA ceasefires hold and Sinn Fein competes successfully in elections, becoming the dominant Nationalist party. The British withdraw the Army and the PSNI replaces the RUC. Fringe Republican groups carry out lethal actions but undergo division.</p>
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The Basque Country: Historical Precedents to Escalation

	Historical Precedents To 1945	Origins 1945-1961	Pre-Escalation 1961-1967	Escalation 1967-1983
Situation	Basque lands subject to invasion and occupation since Roman times but retain control in the mountainous areas. In the modern era the Basques are incorporated into Spain. They are on the losing side in the Carlist wars and the Civil War. Nationalism emerges in the late nineteenth century and the PNV is formed. Severe repression occurs under the Franco regime.	Spain, including the Basque Country, is ruled by the autocratic Franco regime and the Basques are isolated internationally. The PNV is forced into exile and ETA emerges.	The Franco regime continues to dominate Spain and suppress nationalism and dissent. ETA rebases in the French Basque Country.	An increase in ETA attacks is followed by a second period of repression. The Burgos trial brings the Basque's to international attention. In a major change Spain undergoes a successful democratic transition but ETA attacks increase. The Basque Country is granted autonomy. The first of the 'Dirty Wars' takes place.
Attitude	Despite a historical lack of independence the Basques retain their identity and culture, leaning strongly towards traditionalism and faith over change. When Basque nationalism emerges it draws on the traditional past. The leading nationalist, Arana, introduces a discourse of warfare, struggle and violence.	Franco regime is seen as an occupying power and Basque nationalists draw strongly on the nationalism of Arana.	ETA committed to opposing the Franco regime and recognises the importance of the French Basque Country as a safe haven. There is intense internal ideological debate and division. The Franco regime is committed to the security of Spain.	Franco remains committed to repressing dissent until his death. His nominated successor, Juan Carlos is committed to democratising Spain. ETA undergoes divisions which lead first to ETA-V and ETA-VI then a major split into ETA-pm and ETA-m. ETA-pm is receptive in the long term to political change.
Behaviour	Prolonged resistance to foreign occupation. The Basque's participate in the Reconquista and Peninsular War. The Basque's retain their own culture, language, and form of governance. The emergence of nationalism occurs at a time of industrialisation and immigration. The Basques join the Republican side in the Civil War. Franco crushes Basque opposition after the war's end.	The PNV organises acts of sabotage before it is exiled. Students form <i>Ekin</i> which then merges with the PNV youth wing to create <i>Ekin-EGI</i> . ETA is formed in 1952. Franco regime represses the Basque Country.	ETA attempts to derail a train carrying Civil War veterans provoking severe repression from the Franco regime. ETA activities in the pre-escalation stage are centred around discussion over the political direction they should take and the utility and method of armed struggle.	Franco again crushes ETA and attempts a show trial in Burgos. Juan Carlos and Adolfo Suarez lead the democratic transition. ETA-pm and ETA-m offered incentives to abandon armed struggle but their continued resistance leads to the deployment of more specialised security forces. The state offers amnesty to repentant <i>ettaras</i> leading to the end of ETA-pm.

The Basque Country: Historical Precedents to Re-escalation

	Normalisation 1983-1998	De-escalation 1998-2011	Permanent Ceasefire 2011-2015	Re-escalation (Returns conflict to stage four)
Situation	Spain's democracy becomes stronger and continues the fight against ETA. The second of the 'Dirty Wars' occurs, bringing violence to the French Basque Country. ETA becomes increasingly isolated as nationalist Basque political parties gain more support. Social re-insertion is attempted a second time and negotiations take place in Algeria between ETA and the Spanish government but are ended by the Hipercor bombing.	A period heavily influenced by the Northern Ireland Peace Process. ETA attacks decline but their widening of targets alienates all but their core support. Key events are the two peace processes which fail but demonstrate how weakened ETA has become. ETA's intransigence is matched by the security response of the Spanish and French security forces.	International negotiators and Basque politicians, including actors from Northern Ireland are heavily involved in the search for a resolution to the violence. ETA announces in 2011 that it has called an end to its armed struggle. The situation for ETA is one of being crippled by coercive measures and a loss of support for their goals. The permanent ceasefire has lasted four years and there has been little change in the counter-terrorism of both the Spanish and French.	n/a
Attitude	ETA has become more hard-line as ideological divisions have been resolved by the ETA-pm ceasefire and moderates have left to join or form political parties. Governments show a willingness to offer concessions but abandon these when ETA violence continues and in the late 1990s shut down organisations which support ETA. France is responsive to the political change in Spain.	ETA remains intransigent throughout two peace processes and is inflexible to change. Basque political parties are receptive to ETA goals but with the exception of ETA linked parties condemn violence. Spanish governments are willing to engage in talks but see coercive measures as the most effective. The vast majority of Basques are opposed to ETA violence and anti-violence movements grow in strength.	ETA has not changed its goals, nor has it expressed any remorse for its previous actions. The Spanish government is vigorously opposed to making any concessions regarding prisoners or allowing the development of political parties which represent ETA goals. Basques are cautious as to how the situation will develop but hopeful that the change is permanent.	n/a
Behaviour	ETA attacks decrease due to ETA-pm's abandonment of armed struggle but targets are widened. ETA and the Spanish government take part in failed negotiations in Algeria. Spain moves to isolate ETA by signing anti-terrorist pacts and continues arresting and incarcerating ETA members. Anti-violence groups are formed. France joins the fight against ETA.	ETA attacks continue to decrease and the organisation takes part in two peace processes. Major Basque nationalist parties sign the Estella Agreement aimed at a negotiated settlement of the conflict and PNV attempts to represent ETA. Spanish PP and PSOE governments enter into negotiations with ETA. The failure of the Peace Processes leads in both cases to ETA widening their targets and a repressive response by the government. Support for ETA limited and Basques begin to leave the Basque Country.	ETA continues with limited attacks until it announces an end to armed struggle in 2011. Spanish and French security forces continue their assault on ETA before and after the end of armed struggle. ETA prisoners a critical influence on the ETA permanent ceasefire but Spain makes no concessions in the period 2011-2013.	n/a

Corsica: Historical Precedents to Escalation


	Historical Precedents To 1950	Origins 1950-1968	Pre-Escalation 1968-1975	Escalation 1975-1981
Situation	Dominance of the coastline by Mediterranean powers leads to a division between a foreign dominated exterior and Corsican culture in the interior of the island. French control begins in the Napoleonic era and the island becomes closely connected to France.	Corsica undeveloped when compared to the rest of France. The clans dominate politics and effectively run the island on France's behalf. Economic reforms targeting agriculture and tourism are begun. Pied noirs are resettled on Corsica between 1958 and 1964.	Farm land set aside for Corsican farmers is given to pied noir families. Development benefits the coast and younger Corsicans are emigrating. The traditionally orientated interior does not benefit and is depopulated.	Overwhelming security response to the Aleria occupation leads to the formation of the FLNC and the armed struggle begins. Counter violence by FRANCIA. The conflict escalates into a confrontation between the FLNC and the police and CRS.
Attitude	Corsica's modern history of Italian then French domination produced an opposition between Italian and French cultures. Increasing identification with France solidified by the Second World War. Domination of politics and economy by the clans. Nationalism develops during a period of intense connection to France.	Discontent over the dominance of the clans and arrival of the pied noirs. Economic reforms seen as benefiting outsiders and not ordinary Corsicans. Strong connection to France remains.	Economic control seen as resting with outsiders. Pronounced division between the cosmopolitan coast and traditional interior. Attacks take place but there is no lethal intent.	Increasing gap between autonomists who oppose clandestine action and nationalists. France treats the violence as a security problem but also considers political initiatives.
Behaviour	Withdrawal to the interior of the island. Many Corsicans serve abroad in foreign armies and the vendetta is prevalent amongst Corsicans. 1729 war of independence is the first successful revolt in Corsican history. France takes control in 1793 and Corsicans serve disproportionately in the French military and civil service.	Emergence of nationalism and regionalism. Formation of DIECO and CEDIC by businessmen and autonomists. Union Corse formed and becomes the FRC, CEDIC becomes the ARC. FRC and ARC are more political than their predecessors and political concerns begin to overtake the economic.	ARC begins to engage in 'direct action'. First clandestine groups emerge and carry out symbolic attacks against pied noir and French owned property. FPCL and GP are formed.	FLNC carries out major attacks on high profile targets before moving to a modus operandi of 'blue nights', or multiple bombings of empty properties. French approach is primarily coercive in nature.

Corsica: Normalisation to Re-escalation


	Normalisation 1981-2014	De-escalation	Permanent Ceasefire 2014-2015	Re-escalation (Returns conflict to stage four)
Situation	Corsica gains more autonomy due to reforms and the FLNC is irrevocably split in 1990 over the utility of violence. Over time separatist violence becomes meshed with non-political criminal activity. The failure of the Matignon process in 2002 terminates a nascent peace process and the security stalemate continues.	n/a	The recently reformed FLNC declares and end to armed struggle in 2014 as the Corsican Assembly has taken on three major separatist demands. FLNC has been weakened by persisting arrests and trials. The Police continue to arrest people suspected of involvement in militant violence.	n/a
Attitude	Clandestine groups prove responsive to political reforms and increased autonomy but are divided over their response. Division remains between autonomists and separatists and the nationalist movement becomes fragmented over the use of violence. Corsican population is mobilised into anti-violence protests.	n/a	FLNC has not changed its goals, nor has it expressed any concern for its previous actions. They have acknowledged the influence of the political situation of similar organisations and political parties in making their decision.	n/a
Behaviour	Non-lethal attacks remain in the majority but divisions within the FLNC leads to lethal infighting in the 1990s and the fragmentation of the separatist groups. French approach remains coercive but three attempts at political reform are made. Open talks take place between the government and clandestine groups during the Matignon Process. The majority of the clandestine groups declare a ceasefire which breaks down after the Process ends.	n/a	FLNC announces that it has ended armed struggle and will pursue independence via politics. They have made no demands regarding prisoners. French Police arrest members of the affiliated political party Corsica Liberia for militant activity.	n/a

**Appendix Two: Genealogical Trees of Ethno-Nationalist/Separatist Terrorist
Groups**


ETA Genealogy



FLNC Genealogy



IRA Genealogy



Appendix Three: Glossary

APC Associu d ii Patrioti Corsi

ARC 'l'Action Regionaliste Corse

ASU Active Service Units

ATE Anti-Terrorismo ETA

CA Conflict Analysis

CAR Conflict Analysis and Resolution

CAR Plan d'Action Regionale

CASBS Center for the Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences

CEDIC Comite d'Etudes et de Defense des Interets de la Corse

CIRA Continuity Irish Republican Army

CLF Commander Land Forces

CLMC Combined Loyalist Military Command

CRCR Centre for Research on Conflict Resolution

CRS Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité

CTS Critical Terrorism Studies

DUP Democratic Unionist Party

EA Eusko Alkartasuna

ECMI European Centre for Minority Issues

EE Euzkadiko Ezkerra

EEC European Economic Community

EIA Euskadi Iraultzaraka Alderdia (Party of the Basque Revolution)

EGI Euzko Gaztedi Indarra (Basque Youth Force)

EOKA National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters

ETA Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Homeland and Freedom)

ETA-m ETA-Militar

ETA-pm ETA-Politico-Militar

FARC Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FIS Islamic Salvation Front

FLN National Liberation Front

FLNC Fronte di Liberazione Naziunale Corsu (National Liberation Front of Corsica)

FLNC-hab FLNC-Canal Habitual

FLNC-his FLNC-Canal Historique

FLNC-UC FLNC-Union des Combatants

FLQ Front de liberation du Quebec

FPCL Fronte Paisanu Corsu di Liberazione

FRANCIA Front d'Action Nouvelle Contre l'indépendance et 'Autonomisme

FRC Front Regionaliste Corse

FSU Former Soviet Union

GAL Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberacion

GAR Grupos Antiterroristas Rurales

GEO Grupo Especial de Operaciones

GP Ghustizia Paolina

GWOT Global War on Terror

HB Herri Batasuna

ICA Irish Citizen Army

IMRO Bulgarian National Movement

IRB Irish Republican Brotherhood

INLA Irish National Liberation Army

IPLO Irish People's Liberation Army

IRA Irish Republican Army

IRSP Irish Republican Socialist Party

ISAF International Security Assistance Force

KAS Koordinadora Aberzale Sozialista

LAIA Langile Abertzale Iraultzaileen Alderia

LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

MAK Maktab Al-Khidamat

MLNV Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional Vasco

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NICRA Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association

NILP Northern Ireland Labour Party

NMRT Non-Marxist Radical Thought

OIRA Official Irish Republican Army

ONH Oglagh na hEireann (Soldiers of Ireland).

PD People's Democracy

PIRA Provisional Irish Republican Army

PLO Palestine Liberation Organisation

PFLP Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

PP Partido Popular

PRIO International Peace Research Institute

PNV Partido Nacionalista Vasco

PS Peace Studies

PSNI Police Service of Northern Ireland

PSOE Partido Socialista Obrero Español

RAAD Republican Action Against Drugs

RAF Red Army Faction

RAF Royal Air Force

RAND Research And Development Corporation

RIR Royal Irish Regiment

RIRA Real Irish Republican Army

RSF Republican Sinn Fein

RUC Royal Ulster Constabulary

AS Special Air Service

SDLP Social Democratic and Labour Party

SF Sinn Fein (We Ourselves)

SDS Students for a Democratic Society

SETCO Societe d'Equipement Touristique de la Corse

SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

SLA Symbionese Liberation Army

SOMIVAC Societe de la Mise en Valeur Agricole

TUAS Tactical Use of Armed Struggle

UN United Nations

UNSC United Nations Security Council

UCD Unión de Centro Democrático

UDA Ulster Defence Association

UDR Ulster Defence Regiment

UFF Ulster Freedom Fighters

UPC Union di u Populu Corse

URD Unionist Research Department

UUP Ulster Unionist Party

UVF Ulster Volunteer Force

32-CSM 32 County Sovereignty Movement

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